

TRACING TURKEY’S SECURITY DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES VIS-À-VIS THE
KURDISH ISSUE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

GÖKÇE BALABAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MARCH 2016

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ABSTRACT

TRACING TURKEY’S SECURITY DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES VIS-À-VIS THE KURDISH ISSUE

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March 2016, 213 pages

This study analyzes Turkish state’s security discourses and practices vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue from the perspectives of traditional and critical (emancipatory) security studies. The analysis is undertaken in two periods: the past and the present. Accordingly, the thesis argues that, in the Kurdish issue, Turkish state’s discourses and practices in the past could best be understood by traditional understanding of security. This means that, in state security discourses and practices the state was constituted as the only referent object of security and in security politics the use of force was seen as the only provider of security. However, such a restricted approach was unable to bring about security for myriad of actors, including the state itself. In the present period, on the other hand, there are signs of ruptures from this traditional conception of security towards a more emancipatory approach in the Kurdish issue. As a result, security discourses and practices better addressed insecurities of various referents. This demonstrates the potential of emancipatory approach in bringing about security in the Kurdish issue and this thesis also analyzes the role of the non-state and external agents in the present context that could transform state discourses and practices in more emancipatory ways.

Keywords: Kurdish issue, Security Studies, Critical Security Studies, emancipation, agency

ÖZ

KÜRT MESELESİNDE TÜRKİYE’NİN GÜVENLİK SÖYLEMLERİNİN VE PRATİKLERİNİN İNCELENMESİ

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
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Nuri Yurdusev

Mart 2016, 213 sayfa

Bu tez, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devletinin Kürt meselesindeki güvenlik söylem ve pratiklerini geleneksel ve eleştirel güvenlik çalışmaları perspektifinden incelemektedir. Analiz iki tarihsel dönemde yapılmaktadır: geçmiş ve günümüz. Buna göre bu çalışma geçmişte Türkiye devletinin politikalarının geleneksel yaklaşımla açıklanabileceğini söylemektedir. Bu yaklaşıma göre devlet, güvenliğin hitap ettiği tek birim olarak görülmüş ve güvenliğin sadece askeri metodlarla sağlanabileceği görüşü hakim olmuştur. Fakat Kürt sorununda bu tarz bir yaklaşım devlet dahil olmak üzere pek çok aktör için güvensizlik yaratmıştır. Günümüzde ise bu geleneksel yaklaşımda kırılmalar görülmektedir ve daha eleştirel bir yaklaşım devlet söylem ve pratiklerinde yer bulmuştur. Bunun sonucu olarak değişik aktörlerin güvenlik sorunlarına hitap edilebilmiş ve silahlı çatışmada duraklama yaşanmıştır. Bu durum eleştirel güvenlik yaklaşımının güvenlik sağlamadaki potansiyelini göstermektedir. Bu tez devlet söylem ve pratiklerinde daha eleştirel bir yaklaşımı mümkün kılacak aktörleri ve onların pratiklerini de incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kürt meselesi, Güvenlik Çalışmaları, Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları, Geleneksel Güvenlik Çalışmaları, özgürleşme



To My Mother, Father and Brother

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his deepest gratitude to his supervisor Prof. Dr. Nuri Yurdusev for his advice, criticism, and insight throughout the research. The study would have been impossible without his genuine support.

The author would also like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zana Çıtak, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin, and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nezir Akyeşilmen for their constructive feedbacks. Detailed critic provided by Assistant Professor Hakan Övünç Ongur is also deeply appreciated.

The author wishes to express his gratitude to his family who has been very supportive in this process. Without their patience, the author would not be able to finalize this thesis.

The author is also very thankful to Ayşe Ezgi Erdem, who has always been there to help and to give hope in stressful times. Her support gave the author the courage to complete the research. Lastly, many thanks to Ertuğrul Erol who spent his valuable time to discuss the subject and the content of the study with the author.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK Party	Justice and Development Party
ARMHC	Societies for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CHP	Republican People's Party
CSS	Critical Security Studies
CUP	Community of Union and Progress
ECHR	European Convention of Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
GÖÇ-DER	Migrant's Association for Social Cooperation and Culture
HDP	People's Democratic Party
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHD	Human Rights' Association
IR	International Relations
MAZLUM-DER	Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introductory Remarks

Since July 2015, violence in the Kurdish issue seems to be on stage again, after the halts of dialogue in the ‘solution process’ that was taking place between the government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan a few years ago¹. Any individual living in Turkey for some time surely knows that violence is the ‘business-as-usual’ process in the Kurdish issue. The first period of military confrontation between the PKK and the state started in 1984 and continued till Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured in 1999. This era was identified not only with many human casualties², but also with a human tragedy. People in the east and south-east of Turkey had to leave their homes and villages; people serving in the military in those regions had physiological traumas (Mater, 1999); according to many studies, Kurdish people started to be discriminated in the western cities (Saraçoğlu, 2011), and so on. The second period of the armed struggle started in 2004, after five years of silence, and has been going on periodically since then.

The armed struggle between the PKK and the state demonstrates that there is a ‘security problem’ in the Kurdish issue, affecting the condition of ‘being free from threats’³. Yet, in the Kurdish issue, to reduce the ‘security problem’ to the armed struggle between the PKK and the state is to focus on one part of reality and to dismiss the historicity of the issue. Security had been unfamiliar word for many individuals in the Kurdish issue even before the armed struggle began. Few examples could be given. After the 1980 coup, many

¹‘Solution process’ as named in 2013 and ‘peace process’ as named in 2009. Those refer to the efforts of finding a peaceful solution to Kurdish issue. Solution process started a dialogue between the government and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan. However, both processes were not finalized and armed struggle resurfaced subsequently.

² According to the report of Human Rights Watching Commission of the parliament, 35.576 people are dead in the armed struggle between PKK and the state, among which 5 557 were civilians (‘30 Yılın Terör Bilançosu’, 2013)

³This is the definition of security according to Oxford dictionary. Retrieved from <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/security>

individuals were punished and even jailed for speaking Kurdish in public, because the ‘Law on Publications that will be Made in Languages Other than Turkish’ prohibited ‘expressing, publishing and spreading the thoughts on languages other than those mother tongues of the countries recognized by the Turkish state’. The purpose of the law was specified as the ‘protection of national security and public order’. (Türkçe’den Başka Dillerle Yapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun, No.2932, Article.2). The law’s primary objective was the prohibition of Kurdish in public use and it was reflecting an old tradition of the state. Indeed, making publications on Kurdish was being punished long before than the 1980 coup. ‘The Case of 49s’ is another example where Musa Anter, a Kurdish intellectual, was jailed after publishing a poem in Kurdish language in a local newspaper in 1959. With Musa Anter, fifty intellectuals and students were also jailed because of mentioning ‘The Kurds of Turkey’ in their written protest of a statement of a deputy. In the re-trial of the case, they were sentenced to sixteen months of jail and five months of exile because of ‘destroying the political and legal order of the state’ according to Turkish Penal Code Article 142.

What is underlying point in all of these events, is that state policies in the Kurdish issue which have aimed or which have been applied under the label of ‘national security’ have not created security for myriad of actors, including the state itself as the ongoing armed struggle with the PKK shows. This thesis studies this tension between state security discourses/practices and ‘being free from threats’ in the Kurdish issue from the perspective of security studies in general, and from traditional and critical approaches to security in particular. The security politics of Kurdish issue is studied because it not only affects the security of the people in the east or south-east of Turkey, but it also affects the security of many actors in Turkey. Thus, considering the Kurdish issue in Turkey, this study makes critical analysis of state’s giving meaning to security, and of its security discourses and practices. It also analyzes the potential agents and dynamics which could create change in the security discourses and practices of the state.

1.2. Conceptual Framework: An Outlook at Security Studies

While security theories are discussed in details in the next chapter, it is necessary to summarize it shortly here to better grasp the research question and the argument of the study. Since the end of the Cold War, a plethora of works emerged in security studies about thinking security in ‘new’ terms. ‘New’ here refers to bringing a different security paradigm to the mainstream approaches of security during the Cold War. However, it should also be mentioned that, even during the Cold War there were alternative voices within international

politics and IR discipline that challenged the period's dominant security understanding. For instance, peace research studies focused on social and economic justice as means of addressing insecurities (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: p.18); 'Alternative Defence' school 'helped transform security relations across Europe during the 1980s through informing various social movements' (Bilgin, 2008: p.90); sectoral approach undertaken by Buzan (1983) focused on the role of political, societal, economic and environmental aspects of security. Yet, it is after the Cold War that alternative voices started to be studied in more systematic way within security studies discipline.

Traditional security studies refer to works that are associated with the premises of political realism in its classical and neo-realist variants (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: p.4). Thus, deriving from realism, those works take states as the main object of security analysis and they treat the state as the main agent of security. Traditional security studies focus heavily on the security of states because for them state is 'the ultimate actor in international politics' and it is 'the main defender of the security of people' (Booth, 2007: p.34). The security of other referents will be taken into consideration as long as they influence the security of the states. Another characteristic of traditional security studies is the focus on military power. This also derives from realism where power, as understood as military strength, is key to state survival. Therefore, traditional security studies consider military capabilities as the main provider of security. Indeed, for traditional approaches of security, security studies may be understood as the study of the 'conditions that make the use of force more likely, the way that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent or engage in war' (Walt, 1991: p.212). Again, stemming from neo-realism, traditional security studies rely on a scientific/objectivist epistemology and positivist – quantitative methodology. Traditional approaches are committed to study the world 'as it is', and assume that researchers analyze the 'world out there' whereby they make a claim of objectivity. In this outlook, traditional security studies posit a distinction between theory and practice; between the subject and object of the study, meaning that social analyst is disembodied from social reality that s/he tries to explain.

The inability of realist scholars to predict the end of the Cold War and to make sense of this new period made number of scholars question the relevance of traditional security studies (Bilgin, 2008; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). When combined with the changing strategic environment, this situation led to the rise of new works to conceptualize the security politics in domestic, international and global levels. It is in this context that Critical Security Studies (CSS) arouse as an alternative security paradigm to

think and practice on security. The main objective of CSS is to provide a new perspective to the restricted explanation of traditional approaches to security, which take states as the only referent and which focuses primarily on the use of force. According to CSS scholars, in the post - Cold War period traditional security studies have been incapable of addressing widespread insecurities felt by non-state referents – such as individuals, immigrants, ethnic groups, women and environment- and reasoned from non-military sectors – political, economic, societal, and environmental. For CSS, on the other hand, insecurities do not only relate to states. CSS looks at those insecurities of various referents that might be reasoned from various sectors. Furthermore, CSS does not make a claim of objectivity; rather all knowledge is historical, and produced under particular social conditions. Contrary to positivist claims, this makes the subject of the study as a part of the object s/he studies. This being said, CSS believes that theory is an integral part of the practice and not a separate part of it. Each theory reflects some preliminary ideas of the observer, which leads to the idea that each theory is ‘for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1981). Since all knowledge have political purpose, CSS, being aware of its subjectivity, seeks emancipation in security. Emancipation, in political philosophy, is related to the concept of freedom and it refers to the ideal and acts of freedom from oppression (for more, please see chapter 6). Similarly, in CSS, emancipation ‘is the freeing of people from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do’ (Booth, 1991b: p.319). CSS constructs a strong link between security and emancipation because it believes that ‘security would only extend through world society when emancipatory politics made progress’ (Booth, 2007: p.114). Thus, CSS has an emancipatory object: it tries to create an emancipated world order by informing the practices of agents. Yet, it should be mentioned that for CSS, emancipation is not an end point, but rather it is an unending process. Situations have within them possibilities of a better life and there is unfulfilled potential in all situations. What critical theories should do, for CSS scholars, is to trace those unfulfilled potentialities in each situation; a concept that is called immanent critique (Booth, 2007: p.250). Such a thought process makes emancipation a relative concept; meaning that there is not an absolute emancipated order, but there is always more or less emancipated orders; and for each society and for each historical period the practices of emancipation may change. Therefore, when studying security as emancipation, one has to consider the societal characteristics in ‘unfulfilled potentials’.

Traditional security and critical security are theoretical paradigms, but thinking security in traditional or in emancipatory terms is not limited to theories. Since theories influence systems of thinking, all agents have traditional or emancipatory conception of

security politics and take action accordingly. What theories do, then, is to inform the practices of those agents in order to legitimize or change the practices. From this outlook, this study, at its broadest sense, analyzes Turkish state's conception of security in the Kurdish issue.

1.3. Research Question and the Argument of the Study

As mentioned above, since the 1920s, Turkish state has applied many policies in the Kurdish issue that affected the security of various actors. Most of those practices were labeled as 'national security' policy within and after the Cold War. However, as of 2016, nothing seems to have changed in 'business-as-usual' politics. There are attacks against police/gendarmerie forces, curfews are declared in the south-east of Turkey, people are forced to leave their houses, etc. Thus, despite all the security measures taken by the state under the name of security, it is hard to mention about a secure environment neither for the state nor for the society or for the individuals. The research question of the thesis stems from this tension between state security practices and 'being free from threats'. Accordingly, the thesis asks 'why Turkish state's security policies in the Kurdish issue have not brought about security for different referents for so many years and what kind of changes in state security discourses and practices could better address widespread insecurities in the Kurdish issue?'. This study answers this question from the perspective of security studies in general and traces Turkish state discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue from the perspectives of traditional and critical approaches to security in particular. The thesis presents the security conception of the state in historical context. Accordingly, it argues that, in the past (between the years of 1925 and 1999), state discourses and practices were in line with the traditional conception of security, that is, they only focused on the security of the state and they relied on the use of force as the main provider of security. However, such conception was unable to address insecurities felt by many referents. On the other hand, when the state took a more critical stance in the present period (between the years of 1999 and 2015) and focused on the insecurities of different referents by emphasizing different dimensions of security, such as political, cultural and economic, it better addressed insecurities. For instance, it is in this context that a dialogue between the PKK leader Öcalan and the state started to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue. As a result, there occurred halts in the armed struggle. However, the present period has its ups and downs, and also carries characteristics of traditional conceptions of security, the most important one being reliance on the use of force at the expense of political and cultural dimensions of the

issue. What the present period reveals that a critical/emancipatory approach in state security conception has further potential to contribute to the security politics in the Kurdish issue by emphasizing the security problems of different actors and by emphasizing non-military dimensions of security. Considering this role of critical understanding in the security politics of Kurdish issue, the thesis also analyzes the possibilities lying in the present context for emancipatory change in state security practices. In a nutshell, the thesis first aims to trace continuities and changes in state security discourses and practices from traditional and critical security perspective and to show how these continuities and changes affect the in/securities of myriad actors. Second, it analyzes how further emancipatory changes in state security practices could be possible.

One could ask why such a historical contextualization is initiated. It is done because the dates reflect important turning points in state discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue. 1925 was the year where the first large-scale rebellion of Kurds occurred in the newly formed Turkish Republic. As it will be shown, the Sheikh Said Rebellion changed the state perspective against the Kurds and many policies were undertaken after the rebellion which affected the securities of individuals living in the east and south-east of Turkey. Moreover, it also played a role in constituting Kurdish identity as the 'internal other' in the newly formed state. This point will be further analyzed in Chapter 3, but here it could be told that, the 'internal other' logic made Kurdish identity a threat to the ontological security of the state, the repercussions of which have lasted till today. The most important consequence of this was the securitization of Kurdish issue, and seeing the issue from the traditional security perspective. 1999, on the other hand, was the year when the leader of last Kurdish rebellion Abdullah Öcalan was captured. After his detention, the PKK made significant changes in its strategy; it renounced separatist, nationalist ideals and attempted to find solutions to the problems of Kurds within the political/territorial unity of Turkey (Özcan; 2006). It is in this period that the PKK laid down arms till 2004 which gave the government necessary impetus to initiate democratic reforms in the Kurdish issue. Beside this domestic context, the year of 1999 was also critical in terms of international context. Accordingly, in 1999, the EU recognized Turkey as a candidate state, which motivated Turkish governments to initialize many democratic reforms to start accession negotiations. The determination of governments to imply reforms for the adoption of the EU acquis affected the course of the Kurdish issue in Turkey in a great extent. It is within this historical context that the thesis establishes its argument.

When analyzing state discourses and practices in the past period, the thesis implicitly grants agency to state. Such an approach is undertaken primarily because of the

unique characteristics of Turkish case. In Turkey, state in general, and the military bureaucracy in particular, have been very dominant actors in planning and implementing security policies. Especially after 1980 military coup, the military was constituted as the only authorized actor in security policies through the legal rights recognized to the National Security Council (NSC) and to its General Secretariat. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution specified the role of the NSC, as to submit views to Council of Ministers with regard to formulation, establishment and implementation of national security policy of the state. It also mentioned that the Council of Ministers will give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSC. The General Secretariat of the NSC, at the same time, was given right to ‘formulate, determine and implement and if necessary, fix and change the national security policy’ (MGK ve MGK Genel Sekreterliği Kanunu, No.2945, Article. 13, Section. 2). When it is considered that the majority of the members in those institutions were from the armed forces, the role of military bureaucracy in security politics could better be understood. The heavy influence of military bureaucracy in security policies not only militarized the security politics of the state, but it also undermined democratic characteristic of the regime (Ülman, 1998: p.107). In this undemocratic nature, it was not possible to talk about the influence of non-state or external agents in security policies. As a result, there was not much outside voices to be analyzed and in this context, thesis focused on state agency in the past period.

Yet, in the present context, a change could be noticed in the political structure. In 1999, Turkey was recognized as a member state by the EU. The candidate status started an unprecedented democratization reform process in Turkey. With these reforms, the NSC gained a more civilian structure and the role of military bureaucracy was downgraded (Bilgiç, 2009). Thus, there occurred a democratization in security policy formulation and implementation. What is more, again in the same period, civil society raised its influence in the political system. This was both due to Europeanization reforms, which strengthened the democratic structure and the emphasis given to participatory democracy by the ruling AK Party in the early 2000s (Keyman, 2006). Thus, in this period, the voices of non-state and external agents were more sound in Turkish political system. Taking into consideration this fact, the last chapter of the thesis also analyzes the role of non-state and external agents in transforming security discourses and practices of the state. It specifically focuses on the changes that the agency of intellectuals, social movements and the EU created in the security politics of Kurdish issue.

To better understand the role of the state and the military in Turkish security politics, the study should also give the answer of the following question in this introductory part: how did the state manage to apply traditional security practices when those practices

did not produce the security that the state and society desired? Relatedly, how did state legitimize its security policies in the society? This study finds the answer in the writings of Gramsci and especially in his concepts of hegemony and common sense. For Gramsci (1971, 2000), the orthodox Marxist concept of hegemony, which focuses only on the world of capitalist production and economic domination, is not sufficient to grasp how ruling groups become dominant in society. For this end, he makes an alternative conceptualization of hegemony, where he emphasizes the role of culture alongside controlling the means of production. According to this outlook, hegemony becomes possible by controlling both the ‘base’, by which he means economy, and the ‘superstructure’, by which he means culture and ideas. While the former refers to coercive power of the ruling group, the latter requires the consent of people; meaning that as long as society does not give its consent to ruling group, hegemony would not work. Thus, what the hegemonic group do, or should do, is to impose its ideas and its own culture to the society in order to create its hegemony. The consent of people will be possible as long as the culture of hegemonic groups takes place and echoes in the common sense of society. Common sense refers to conceptions that are ‘absorbed passively from outside, or from the past, and are accepted and lived uncritically’ (Forgacs: 2000: p.421); or in Gramsci’s terms it is the ‘philosophy of non-philosophers’ (Gramsci, 1971). As long as people internalize, and absorb the ideas of the ruling groups; or in other words, as long as those ideas become dominant in the common sense of the society that the hegemony of the ruling group will be sustained. To give it with an example, today nation-states are very dominant actors in world politics despite the fragmentary effects of economic globalization to their sovereignty because nationalism is still very alive in the common sense of the people. If we adapt this logic to the security logic of Kurdish issue in Turkey, it could be assumed that statist policies prevail because state has been prioritized over other actors in the common sense; or it could easily be said that military means are widely used in the Kurdish issue because militarism is a very strong ideology in Turkish common sense.

Before moving on to the methodology and the outline of the study, one last point should be emphasized. While this study presents traditional and critical security conceptions as the ground to conceptualize the security discourses and practices of the state, it also uses the concepts of other approaches to have deeper understanding on the Kurdish issue and to better respond the research question. Ontological security is one of those concepts. The root of the concept lies in psychology and social theory, which was later adopted to IR field. Thus, it operates in individual, group and state level (Rumelili, 2015). In individual level, ontologically secure person is one who has a ‘sense of his presence as alive, whole and, in

a temporal sense a continuous person' (Laing, 1960/1990: p.39). Similarly, when the identity and autonomy of the person are in question and when the person 'lacks the experience of his own temporal continuity', s/he will be ontologically insecure (Laing, 1960/1990: p.42). In Giddens (1990, 1991), the concept addresses to the sense of being, and how this being is constituted by routines. A strong sense of self, accordingly, could only be possible by the routines which contribute to the sense of 'continuity' and 'order'. Drawing from those psychological and sociological analysis, IR literature analyzes the concept in state level by giving personhood to the state (Steele, 2005; Mitzen, 2006). According to Mitzen (2006) ontological security, at its most general sense, refers to the security of self (not of body) and the subjective sense of who one is. Accordingly, states do not only seek physical security, but they also engage in ontological security seeking (Mitzen, 2006: p.342). Lately, the concept is also being used to understand the motives of groups that are in conflict within the states and to better grasp the conflict-resolution processes within states (Rumelili, 2015; Çelik, 2015). It is in this perspective that the thesis analyzes ontological security in the Kurdish issue. The concept will be elaborated in Chapter 3 to show how the ontological security concerns of the ruling elites were decisive in the statist security practices against Kurdish ethnic community after the Sheikh Said Rebellion.

Another concept that the study relies on in developing its arguments is securitization. Securitization is the process of presentation of an issue as existential threat to a referent to justify actions outside of normal bounds (Buzan, Weaver, De Wilde, 1998: p.24-25). Seeing 'security as speech act', securitization studies argue that 'by uttering security, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it' (Weaver, 1995: p.55). The concept will be further elaborated in Chapter 2, but here it should be mentioned that this study will rely on securitization in order to understand how state elites have legitimized their use of force acts in the Kurdish issue.

1.4. Methodology

As in all academic researches, the methods used in this study derive from the necessity to respond the research question in a coherent manner. The research question of this thesis is about tracing the continuities and changes in security discourses and policies of the state from the perspective of security studies. In order to have deeper understanding of this subject, the study relies on three different methodologies.

Textual analysis: Textual analysis establishes the core of analyzing the past and the present security practices of the state in the Kurdish issue. This thesis uses different modes of textual analysis according to the subject of each chapter. In Chapter 3, the analysis concentrates on parliamentary discourses, public speeches of elites and the legal texts to see how Turkishness was officially constructed in the first years of the Republic. Chapter 4, on the other hand, concentrates on European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cases to examine state's use of force against the individuals. It should be mentioned that, this part does not make a case study research, rather it uses cases as texts in which state security practices could be traced. Accordingly, the summaries of all the violation of Article (2) decisions that are issued in English and Turkish (136 cases in total) are read with the aim of tracing how many of them related to the Kurdish issue. The study realizes this task by using HUDOC database, which gives access to the case-law of ECtHR. Chapter 5, makes a discourse analysis of the 'Law on the Compensation of Losses Emanating from Terrorist Acts and Counter-Terrorist Measures' to see the changes in state's conceptualization of security. Accordingly, the chapter will rely on the concepts developed by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) methodology, because the latter proposes tools to make comparison with the past security practices possible, especially in terms of referent-object. Since the causes of the text lie 'in the situations, institutions and social structures of a specific social and historical context' (Fairclough 2003; Fairclough and Wodak 1997), discourse analysis of the law will help to see how security conceptualization of the state has shifted in the present period. Moreover, the analysis of the discourses is also important because they are not only reflection of social practices, but they also constitute them (Mutlu and Salter, 2013: p.113). Thus, the analysis of discourse of the law is also important in seeing the path new practices could take.

Participant Observation: Deriving from ethnographic studies and anthropology, participant observation refers to the process that enables researchers to learn about the activities of the people under study in their natural setting through observing and participating those activities (Kawulich, 2005). In other words, it is a learning process through involvement in routine activities of a group (Schensul, Schensul and Le Compte, as cited in Kawulich, 2005). The objective is to have a closer experiencing and understanding of the 'insiders' by actively taking part in interactions (Hume and Mulcock, 2004: p.xi).

As a methodology, participant observation is also used in sociological studies, and especially in social movement studies in order to examine dynamics, practices and assumptions from inside the movement (Uldam and McCurdy, 2013: p.948). In Chapter 6, this study analyses social movements as potential emancipatory agents in Turkey's Kurdish

issue, and bases its analysis on the experiences that is acquired through participant observation to one social movement, namely *Saturday Mothers*. The main question that directed the observation was: ‘does this movement have the potential to change security practices of the state in less statist, less military-focused terms?’

Saturday Mothers is a silence protest movement taken up by the mothers whose children are lost under the police custody. Each Saturday they make a silent sitting protest in a central location (Galatasaray Square) of İstanbul for half an hour. Between October 2015 and November 2015, the writer of this study participated into the protests as an outsider, meaning that he was a complete-observer from outside and he was a non-member of community. By being outsider, I traced the potential of the movement in bringing consciousness to passers-byers and how it challenges the common sense thinking.

Interviewing: An interview is a verbal interchange in which an interviewer tries to elicit information, beliefs or opinions from another person (Burns, 2000: p.423). This study used interviews to have a background idea on resettlement of Kurds after 1925 and on the Law on ‘Compensation of Losses Emanating from Terrorist Acts and Counter-Terrorist Measures’. Thus, interviews do not establish a part of the analysis, rather they give insights on the topics of the study.

To have a better insight on how resettlements of the Kurds in the first years of the Republic undermined the security of individuals, an unstructured interview was conducted with Ferda Cemiloğlu, a member of influential family in Diyarbakır whose parents were forced to migrate from their homes twice in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. The interview took the form of conversation, on which there was a minimum control by the interviewer. This was important to obtain Mrs. Cemiloğlu’s subjective experiences that she lived through and heard from her parents.

To better grasp the ‘Law on Compensation of Losses Emanating from Terrorist Acts and Counter-Terrorist Measures’, the study made very short semi-structured phone interviews with the representatives of some NGOs that are interested with the topic. Accordingly, some pre-determined questions were asked to the representatives of Migrant’s Association for Social Cooperation and Culture’s (GÖÇ-DER) İstanbul branch, Human Rights’ Association’s (IHD) Diyarbakır branch and The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed’s (Mazlum-Der) Diyarbakır branch. The questions mostly covered the process of the preparation and implementation of the law.

Lastly, few words should be said about how this study approaches research. For one thing, each research delimits itself into one part of reality by drawing boundaries, meaning that there is no an all-encompassing study which can present the complete picture of reality.

In that sense, this study also has delimitations. For one thing, among many perspectives, it approaches the Kurdish issue from the security perspective. While doing this, it is aware that reading the Kurdish issue from the security studies perspective presents just one part of reality. Thus, it does not aim to argue that traditional security conception of the state is *the only* reason behind the Kurdish issue, or emancipatory security practice is *the only* solution for the Kurdish issue. Rather, it argues that a more emancipatory perception in state security discourses and practices could better address insecurities.

1.5. Outline

As mentioned above, this study analyzes security discourses and practices of Turkish state in the Kurdish issue from historical perspective. Before digging into the analysis, Chapter 2 makes a contextualization of security studies in order to define the key concepts that will be used in this study. Accordingly, traditional security studies and critical thinking on security have different outlooks on the questions of whose security to study, which threats to study, what constitutes a security issue, how can security be achieved and how to study security. The chapter discusses both approaches on the basis of those questions, especially focusing on critical/emancipatory security studies as an alternative voice to traditional security studies within the critical security thinking.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 study the security practices of the state in the period between the years of 1925 and 1999. Here, the aim is to show that the security practices of the state in the past could be understood by traditional conceptions of security. For this end, Chapter 3 focuses on the resettlements of the Kurds after 1925 as a security practice which privileges the security of the state against the security of non-state referents. The chapter argues that the demographic engineering had been a security practice of the state since the 15th century and Kurdish resettlement can also be considered under this context. However, there was also a distinct point in the resettlement: besides physical security concerns of decision-makers, this specific population policy was also a result of ontological security considerations of ruling elites in the early years of the Republic.

Chapter 4, on the other hand, analyzes the military-focused security practices of the state during the 1990s and demonstrates that how security practices based on the use of force undermined the security of individuals in the east and south-east regions of Turkey. To show state's reliance on the use of force, the chapter makes an analysis of the cases against Turkey in ECtHR on the Article (2) of European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) – right to life. Article (2) is analyzed because it establishes the core of security

which is the survival of individuals. The chapter studies the extensiveness of the use of force in the Kurdish issue during the 1990s by looking at how many of the violation decisions of ECtHR in Article (2) against Turkey related to the Kurdish issue. It also focuses on three cases more closely to demonstrate the lethal use of force methods applied by the state agents against individuals. The close focus on cases also shows the ineffectiveness of Turkish legal system in carrying out effective investigation in state agents' use of force. This shows that there was a legitimization of the use of force in the Kurdish issue in the common sense of society. The chapter also argues that this legitimization became possible due to the prevalence of militarist ideology in Turkish society due to military institution's influence in politics and education.

Chapter 5 studies the present security conception of the state by making a discourse analysis of the 'Law on the Compensation of Losses Emanating from Terrorist Acts and Counter-Terrorist Measures'. Since discourses have causes in social structures that are specific to a socio-historical situation, the discourse analysis of the law is important to see the differences in the present socio-political context. Accordingly, the analysis shows that there is both rupture from and continuity with the traditional security conception of the past. The rupture in state discourses and practices from the traditional security conception towards a more emancipated understanding in the present period started a dialogue between the PKK/HDP and the state on finding a 'peaceful solution' to the Kurdish issue which resulted with the halts of violence. Thus, it better addressed to the insecurities of various actors, including the individuals, Kurdish ethnic community and the state.

The main argument of the last chapter (Chapter 6) derives from this last point that a more emancipated understanding in state security discourse and practices could better address insecurities of various referents in the Kurdish issue. The main question to ask here is that how more emancipated understanding could be possible in state security discourses and practices and this chapter focuses on the role non-state and external agents could play in bringing about that change. Accordingly, it will be shown that alternative discourses and practices of those agents could influence security discourses and practices of the state in the Kurdish issue. From this perspective, this chapter focuses on the agency of three actors which has influenced the state security discourses and practices in the present period: intellectuals, social movements and the EU. The role played by those agents signifies that there is 'unfulfilled potential' in the practices of non-state and external agents that could create more emancipated security conception in state's security discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue.

CHAPTER 2

A REVIEW OF SECURITY STUDIES

Without doubt, security studies is one of the main subtopic of International Relations discipline (IR). Indeed, the foundation of IR, which dates back to the end of First World War, was an effort to find proper answers to the basic security questions of how and why the war began and how similar catastrophes might be prevented in the future (Burchill, 2005). Yet, security studies' turning into an academic discipline dates back to the aftermath of the Second World War. While in the interwar period IR was only limited to war studies, grand strategy and geopolitics, it is with the emergence of the Cold War that security studies became a distinctive discipline. This was largely the result of opening up the study of security to a broader set of political issues, addressing novel problems of nuclear weapons, becoming a civilian enterprise and linking diverse set of research programmes such as nuclear technology, economics and strategy (Buzan and Hensen, 2008).

As its name implies, security studies is the study on security. But what is security and what does it refer to in IR context? As mentioned before, in dictionary, security is defined as the state of being free from dangers/threats. Although it is a neat definition, in IR context it creates more questions than it answers. As IR, in its broad context, is the study of relations between states, transnational corporations, transnational classes, international organizations, NGOs and social movements, the following questions arise when one thinks about security definition: which one of these actors will be free from threats and from which particular threats this actor should be abstained from. The answers will depend on the analyst's view of world politics in particular and political theory in general (Walker, 1997). Which units, structures, processes and relationships analyst thinks crucial to understand the international politics will thus have an utmost role in shaping his/her analysis of security (Booth, 2007).

Theories are the analytical lenses through which one sees the world. As all the observers are born into a different historical period and social practice, the lenses through which they see the world differ. In other words, the social and historical location, which shapes one's political ideas, will influence the analyst's choice of theory in his/her analysis. Therefore, since all theories and definitions reflect a political opinion of the definer, creating

a unifying theory and a unifying definition of security – and thus unified discipline of security studies – is not possible.

Although different political perspectives obstruct making security studies a unified discipline, it is still not impossible to conceptualize the field. Security studies can be organized around different responses to the questions asked below:

- *Whose security to study:* The concept of security is meaningless without something to secure (Buzan, 1991; Williams, 2008). In security studies this ontological question refers to the issue of referent object (to whom security refers). Any analysis of security should be clear about its referent of security.
- *Which threats to study:* What are the threats that particular referent feels threatened by? In security studies, this refers to the study of military, economic, political, social, environmental threats.
- *What is a security issue:* What counts as a security issue for a particular referent (Williams, 2008). Who decides on which referent objects' cherished values are threatened, by what and when? In security studies, this refers to the subject of securitization and the politics of security.
- *How can security be achieved:* By which means and by whom security can be provided? Could security be achieved by power, or is security concerned with justice, human rights and elevation of oppression. Which actors and which acts are entitled to provide security and how? In security studies this refers to the different sets of issues such as power accumulation, emancipation, and agency.
- *How to study security:* Should security be studied by scientific/objectivist approaches or by interpretive, discursive modes of analysis? In security studies this refers to the question of epistemology and methodology.

As mentioned above, those questions, as any other question on security studies, cannot be separated from the most basic questions of political theory (Walker, 1997). Thus, the answers given to them, in other words, the delineation of security studies, will reflect the way the politics is understood.

2.1. Security Studies Differentiated

Based on the questions asked above, this study, in compliance with most of the literature, organizes security studies in two categories: traditional security studies and

critical thinking on security.⁴ The latter will be analyzed in three sub-sections: sectoral approach, securitization and critical security studies, which all challenged traditional security but differ from each other in crucial senses.

If the meaning of security is always political as suggested before, then the study of security is always influenced by the political context, which it tries to analyze. Traditional and critical approaches to security could also be understood within this content. The traditional security studies arose in the Cold War politics' context and the underlying political theory of traditional studies has been realism. As a result, in this period security studies had a zero-sum logic, focused on the contexts of 'threat, use and control of military force' (Walt, 1991: p.212). However, treating Cold War as monolithic historical period misses some crucial points. There were alternative stories and political contexts within the Cold War which brought alternative voices to security studies. The international context of the 1970s, for instance, flourished new ideas on security. The détente between two superpowers, the oil crisis of 1973, increasing economic interdependence, European integration, Third World poverty and environmental issues signified that threats do not only come from military sources but also from non-military ones (Fierke, 2007: p.20). Thus, different ways of looking at security flourished in this period such as Non-Aligned Movement, New International Economic Order, World Order Models Project, Alternative Defence, Third World security, and Peace Research (Bilgin, 2008: p.89-90). It could be argued that the roots of critical thinking on security lie in the security discourses and practices of those alternative voices. On the other hand, what unified this vast body of thought under the critical thinking of security in the post-Cold War period was first, the dissatisfaction with traditional security studies' inability of making sense of the new historical, social and political environment of the post-Cold War; and second, the assumption that security studies are predetermined by the construction of the political (Krause and Williams, 1997). In other words, traditional security studies' inability of foreseeing the end of the Cold War; and making sense of the new political context of the post-Cold War period, their discrepancy of formulation of the political within this new context gave rise to the rich body of the critical thinking on security after the Cold War period.

⁴ The traditional security studies-critical security studies titles that are used in this study may be seen under different names elsewhere. Bilgin (2005) offers a historical classification under the categories of Cold War Security Studies and post-Cold War thinking on security. Bill McSweeney (1999) makes his categorization under the titles of objectivist approaches and sociological approaches in security. Traditional security studies is also called as mainstream, traditional, orthodox or realist security studies in the literature.

2.1.1. Traditional Security Studies

There are two main characteristics of traditional security studies, from which its other premises can also be derived. Those are first it is an embrace of political realism (Bilgin, 2005); and second its commitment to positivist epistemology.

2.1.1.1. Realism and Traditional Security Studies

Realism was the dominant political theory to make sense of the world during the Cold War and two major concepts of traditional security, namely statism and militarism, derive from realist presumptions.

Statism

Traditional security takes the state as the main referent object of its security analysis, because it believes that state is the ultimate actor in international politics and it is the main defender of the security of people (Booth, 2007: 34). Statism, in turn, means that, there should be no higher political loyalty than the state and no higher power of decision-making (Booth, 2007, p.34; Wyn Jones, 1999). Traditional security's reliance on statism derives from realist logic of providing an answer to the question of political order in a societal context. According to realism, state is the sole provider of political order. This derives from Hobbesian logic of state of nature. In state of nature men are equal; interact in anarchy (absence of governance); and they are driven by competition, diffidence and glory which direct them to seek gain, safety and reputation (Donnelly, 2005, p.13-15). Having specified these characteristics of state of nature Hobbes makes a logic of interaction: when equal actors interact in anarchy; driven by competition, diffidence and glory; there is a high probability that generalized violent conflicts can be predicted (Donnelly, 2005, p.13-15). Since the nature of men could not change, the only way to mitigate the violence in a state of nature is to eliminate anarchy. This is where state comes in: the central authority that is gathered on the body of sovereign state eliminates anarchy and provides political order. Since there is no higher political authority than the state in the international realm, states represent the highest political loyalty in which 'order, justice, liberty and prosperity is possible' (Wyn Jones, 1999: p.98). Thus, besides states' being the only central actor in world politics, for realists states represent the idealized political community where the security of its members can be reduced to the survival of its own (Wyn Jones, 1999: p.99).

For all of those empirical and normative reasons, traditional security studies take states as the main referent object in their analysis.

Traditional security understanding accords state prominent position also because it is seen as the central agent of security. In its broad sense an agent is a person or group capable of making things happen (Booth, 2007, p.215). For realism state's being the only actor who has the license to legitimate use of violence in international realm makes it the agent of security policy. Thus, with their capability of creating action in world security politics, states become the main subject of security in traditional security studies.

Military-Focused Security

Traditional security's emphasis on military is twofold: first, it believes that, the main threats to state emanate from other states' military capabilities; and second, military capability is the main defense tool and security provider of the state against external threats. Both ideas derive from realist perception of international politics.

According to realism international system is anarchic in the sense that there is no central authority which can control the action of the states. Thus, anarchy, the ordering principle of the system, makes each state responsible for its own security; a situation which is called self-help by realism. Since international politics is the domain of recurring competition and conflict, in self-help system power, perceived in the sense of military capability, becomes key to survival of the states. This is why realism assumes that in order to survive states need to increase their military capacities. However, in an anarchic environment, one's increasing of its military capacity could always fuel the insecurity of other states. This situation is called security dilemma and it occurs when

the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for defensive purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world' or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage) (Wheeler and Booth, 1992: p.30).

In other words, in a self-help environment, where military is the way to seek security, security dilemma 'suggests that one state's quest for security is often another state's source of insecurity' (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001: p.153). Thus, the role given to military to provide security in a self-help system presumes a never ending security problematic, where militarization only fuels the insecurity of others which results with more militarization.

The prominent role of military for security of states in realism directs traditional security analysis to focus on military affairs among states. Indeed, realist scholars define

security studies as the study of 'threat, use and control of military force' (Nye and Jones, as cited in Walt, 1991: p.212). For Walt security studies 'explains the conditions that make use of force more likely, the way that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war' (Walt, 1991: p.212). As it is clear from the definition, traditional analysis of security reduces security studies to the cases of use of force. The over-emphasis on the use of force and measurable military threats has also roots in traditional security's positivist epistemology and next section analyzes positivism's influence on traditional analysis of security.

2.1.1.2. Positivism and Traditional Security Studies

One of the contemporary debates on IR is on epistemology (how can we know what we know) and on methodology (what methods do we use to analyze data); and security studies is no immune to this discussion.

There are different ways of approaching security based on the belief that what constitute knowledge. Accordingly, traditional scholars of security embrace a scientific epistemology and uses positivist methodology. For traditional thinking, this means that, the world is out there to be objectively studied. This idea has some connotations within it. An objective study of social phenomena posits a distinction between subject and object and between observer and observed (Wyn-Jones, 1995) in order to produce scientific knowledge. The role given to theories is to explain the world scientifically.

The method used by traditional scholars of security to create objective knowledge is positivism. Positivism is defined as a method which 'believes in the unity of sciences; makes distinction between facts and values; believes that social world, as natural world, has regularities that can be discovered' (Smith, 1996). Moreover, for positivism, any research 'must be focused on observable data and systematic observation' (Kurki and Wight, 2007: p.21).

The traditional security scholars have thus focused on and have worked with repetitive patterns, testable hypotheses, quasi-laboratory techniques and quantitative methods. As McSweeney (1999) notes 'the common conviction is that the behavior of the acting units is explicable in terms of laws or causal generalizations as determinate, in principle, as the laws of nature' (p.38)

For traditional scholars of security, observable data and testable empirical and theoretical claims are crucial to study security. As Walt (1991) claims:

Security studies seeks cumulative knowledge about the role of military force. To obtain it, the field must follow the standard canons of scientific research: careful and consistent use of terms, unbiased measurement of critical concepts, and public documentation of theoretical and empirical claims (p.202).

Therefore, for traditional security understanding, any knowledge claim that could not be tested against hard evidence could not be counted as science⁵. This is why, even classical realism, the method of which is to use historical examples, is presented as a mere thought, while neo-realism, which proceeds inductively to confirm or refute empirical hypotheses, is claimed as a theory by Waltz (1990). Thus, for traditional analysis any knowledge which could not be tested against empirical data is at best presented as a thought, and at worst as a propaganda as Bilgin (2005) notes.

Two assumptions arise from traditional security studies' commitment to positivism as the only reliable knowledge. First, its obsession with observable data leads it to study more tangible and more material subjects that can be measured. Thus, positivist theories reduce ontology to those aspects that can be observed and measured (Kurki and Wight, 2007: p.13-33). As McSweeney (1999) notes:

Trained to see the sciences as superior to the humanities, the student raised in the security studies tradition and faced with a choice between two commanding images of the subject matter will naturally opt for the more tangible, operational, the one which makes more sense in scientific terms. In these terms, rigour is equated with the measurement of objective facts. The world of sentiment is a subject of reasoning and philosophy, poetry and sociology, but the 'real world' of material threats and vulnerabilities is one where knowledge can be translated into numbers, accumulated into a progressive science, and sold on the promise that it works (p. 15).

Since the reliable knowledge is one which can be measured or observed, and since the states and military capabilities provide theorist the necessary observable and quantitative data, the ontology adopted by traditional security studies are shaped by epistemological and methodological concerns (McSweeney 1999; Kurki and Wight 2007).

Second, by committing itself to positivism traditional security legitimizes the status quo. Status quo means existing state of affairs. A positivist study takes the world as it finds it with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions (Cox, 1981). Considering that theory is constitutive of practice, traditional security understanding, by studying the status quo, gives legitimacy to the security practices of the prevailing order, which works for privileged few and which does not work for the majority.

⁵ What is meant is qualitative methods which uses historical, interpretive and discursive knowledge.

In this section, key common points of the traditional security studies were traced. First of all, traditional security studies are based on statist ontology meaning that both the object and subject of security are viewed as sovereign states. Thus, traditional security studies prioritize the reference (to whom security refers) of states in security over other potential referents, such as individuals, societies, ethnic groups, environment, and gender. Furthermore, states are viewed as the sole agents to provide security since they have the necessary tools and organization capability. Second, power, in anarchic system, is perceived key to state security. Since military capabilities are bedrock of power, military dimension gained a special focus in traditional security studies. Hence, threats to state security are perceived as arising from the other states' military power and the only way of altering the insecurity arising from this situation is to increase military capabilities. Third, on how to study security, traditional approaches to security use scientific/objectivist epistemology and positivist methodologies. Accordingly, the world is out there and it can objectively be studied. Thus, traditional security studies believe in the distinction of fact/value, observer/observed and theory/practice. Scientific knowledge of social world is only possible by identifying regularities, by analyzing repetitive patterns, by testing hypotheses, and by using quantitative methods. However, studying the world 'as it is' made traditional security thinking stuck on status quo – the way things are as in dictionary meaning (retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/status/quo>), which does not work for the security of the majority. The inability of traditional security's adopting itself to new social/political/historical context after the Cold War gave rise to many new security analyses.

2.1.2. Critical Thinking on Security

As mentioned above, the popularity of traditional thinking on security started to be challenged with the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War context made analysts realize various security problems of various referents that had been silenced during the Cold War. Moreover, the emergence of new threats created the need to re-conceptualize security by which security studies have been deeply transformed.

This section analyses security thinking that emerged after the Cold War. All of the approaches that are examined here show ontological, epistemological and normative varieties among themselves. Yet, they are all studied under the critical thinking label because they all try to criticize a specific characteristic of traditional security understanding.

Sectoral approach, securitization and CSS are the three approaches that will be analyzed below.

2.1.2.1. Barry Buzan's Sectoral Approach

With the end of the Cold War, a plethora of studies emerged that aimed to re-conceptualize the concept of security. Barry Buzan's 'People, States and Fear' (1991 [1983]) was the first voice within the security studies discipline that suggested a major transformation to the way of looking at security concept.

The problem that Buzan puts forward is that the concept of security was weakly developed and this prevented to have a proper understanding of national security. During the Cold War, security was seen in terms national power by policy-makers and strategists and this power view of security was also dominant in the academy. The domination of power bound the study of security to the level of states and to military issues. However, such a limited view of security was inadequate to conceptualize the concept of security, which requires more fully developed and broadly based concept to be understood. Hence, 'People, States and Fear' centers on two questions: what is the referent object for security and what are the necessary conditions for security?

For Buzan (1991) 'security clearly requires a referent object; for without an answer to the question of "The security of what" the idea makes no sense' (p. 26). Contrary to traditional understanding of security, for Buzan security has many potential referents. In his own words: '...these (referent) objects of security multiply not only as the membership of society of states increases, but also as one moves down through the state to the level of individuals, and up beyond it to the level of international system as a whole' (p. 26). Thus, Buzan explores the referent objects in three levels: individual, states and international system.

While for traditional analysis, the military is the major sector where security should be studied, for Buzan, the security of potential referents might be affected by the factors operating in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Buzan (1991) describes these sectors as follows:

... military security concerns the two level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of state, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns

of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (p. 20).

As a result, by opening up security agenda to multiple referents and to multiple sectors, in theory Buzan puts forward a reformulation of security. However, 'People, States and Fear' consists of contradictory assumptions and in the final analysis Buzan falls back to the referency of the state and to the realist security understanding.

Buzan's focus on states reasons from his commitment to neorealism and the latter's emphasis on anarchy as explanatory power of international system. According to neorealism, the ordering principle of international structure is anarchy and in anarchy states try to balance power rather than cooperate, look at the world in zero-sum logic (Donnelly, 2005). For Buzan (1991), the security approach 'confirms the centrality of neorealist insight to any understanding of international system', and 'the centrality of neorealist insight is confirmed by the powerful logic that makes the anarchic structure of the international system the primary political content for international security' (p. 21). In light of this, he reaches to the conclusion that: 'because the structure of the international system is anarchic (without central authority) in all of its major organizational dimensions (political, economic, societal), the natural focus of security concerns is the units. Since states are the dominant units, 'national security' is the central issue' (Buzan, 1991: p.19).

Thus, because states are the highest source of authority within anarchical system, they are the principal referent objects of security. This idea of Buzan directs him to concentrate on security problems that occur between states, while making him ignore the security problems that may occur within the state. As made clear by him 'the external threats will always compromise a major element of national security problem' (Buzan, 1991: p.22).

What is more, taking anarchy as the given condition of the international system, Buzan sees competitive relations as inescapable and security could be studied sensibly 'if it can be made operational within an environment in which the competitive relations are inescapable' (Buzan, 1991: p.23). Thus, by focusing on competitive, conflictual, zero-sum logic, Buzan's approach does not create much difference than the traditional security thinking.

In sum, 'People, States and Fear' was an important source in re-conceptualizing security and in demonstrating the drawbacks of traditional conception of security. For Buzan, the security understanding which focuses only on states and military issues is narrowly founded and unable to make a sense of security concept. Instead, what he proposes is a broadened concept of security, which opens up the security agenda to multiple referents

in three levels (individual, state, international) and to multiple sectors (military, political, societal, economic and environmental). But in the final analysis, because of taking anarchy as the eternal condition of international system, Buzan falls back to the referency of state. Moreover, his view of anarchy as a natural condition, rather than social construct, directs him to view international system dominated by conflictual, competitive relations among states. The focus on competitive relations implicitly places military and use of force to the center of his analysis. Thus, as a result, while Buzan proposes a broadened understanding of security, at the final instance, he falls back upon the premises of traditional conception of security in 'People, States and Fear'.

However, the explicit emphasis on the centrality of the state and implicit emphasis on military in 'People, States and Fear' seem to have changed in the subsequent works of Buzan. In 'Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe' Buzan's (1993) focus as referent object shifts to society from state; and following this, to the relationship of collective identity from coercion and sovereignty. Drifting apart from the centrality of state and military is also clear in 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis' that is co-authored with Weaver and De Wilde (1998). The book incorporates Buzan's sectoral approach to Weaver's securitization. For the writers 'if a multi-sectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other than states had to be allowed into the picture' (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: p.8). This is because the book constructs a wider conceptual security understanding that includes referent objects in multi-sectors and this broadened view contradicts with narrow definitional move (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: p.37). Yet it should also be mentioned that while the authors are moving away from state-centric analysis, they see the state as historically privileged actor due to its ability to handle security issues. Thus, the writers see security as the state-dominated field.

The multi-sectoral security approach of Barry Buzan has been criticized from few different perspectives. One line of critic comes from the traditionalists, who believe that including non-military threats to security agenda would destroy the intellectual coherence of the security field and would make it more difficult to devise solutions any of these broadened problems (Walt, 1991: p.213). However, to limit security understanding only to military threats is to be blind to empirical reality. Today, many actors' survival and security are being threatened by non-military factors. To limit security studies to use of force situations brings intellectual bias, rather than intellectual coherence.

Another line of critic to the broadening agenda of security comes from those who see a political function in the word of security. Accordingly, the labelling of security to any issue invokes exclusionary, non-democratic logic and hence the attachment of the word

security to different issues may create counterproductive and undesirable consequences (Weaver, 1995; Aradau: 2004). This ‘inherently negative’ logic of security is emphasized by the securitization studies, which will be elaborated in the next section.

2.1.2.2. Securitization

Securitization theory, which is developed by Ole Weaver, has become one of the most prominent security approaches in the post-Cold War security studies. In ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ article, Weaver (1995) positions his thoughts against traditional progressive approach. According to his view, security is reality prior to language, it is out there and the more security is better; and security should encompass more than it is and should include the environment, welfare, immigration, refugees to the security agenda (p. 46-47).

By delineating traditional progressive approach, Weaver questions the core assumptions of both traditional security’s conceptualization of security as an objective condition and the broadening of the concept of security. Instead, he reconsiders security first as a concept and then, as a speech act.

For Weaver, to rethink the concept of security one must keep an eye on the entire field of security practice. During the history, security has become the indicator of specific problematique and specific field where ‘states threaten each other, challenge each other’s sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence and so on’ (Weaver, 1995: 50). It is only through understanding this characteristic of the field that reconstructing the concept is possible. As Weaver (1995) notes:

by working from the inside of the classical discussion, we can take the concept of national security, threat, and sovereignty, and show how, on the collective level, they take on new forms under new conditions. We can then strip the classical discussion of its preoccupation with military matters by applying the same logic to other sectors, and we can de-link the discussion from the state by applying similar moves to society. With this, we maintain a mode of thinking, a set of rules and codes from the field of security as it has evolved (p. 51).

Therefore, Weaver gives attention to the security studies’ social interaction and its intersubjective constitution as a specific field. For him, this must be the beginning of restructuring security within the security studies field. The alternative security thinkers that try to widen the security studies along referent object/sector axis miss this point and deny the established practice of security field.

Against the alternative security's understanding, Weaver proposes his own re-conceptualization of security, which sees security as a speech-act. According to speech-act theory developed by Austin (1962), the speeches have performative functions in language and communication. Drawing from speech-act theory, Weaver (1995) argues that a security problem occurs when state and its elites name a certain development a security problem whereby they claim a special right on it (p. 54). In other words, something becomes a security problem when the elites declare it to be so. Security, then, can be regarded as a speech act: the utterance of the word of security itself is the act (Weaver, 1995: p.55). 'By uttering security, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it' (Weaver, 1995: p.55). This is called securitization.

The link of security with emergency measures directs Weaver to question the positive value of security. If the utterance of the word of security brings emergency measures, what is needed is to minimize security by narrowing the field to which the security act is applied (Weaver, 1995: p.55). Security should not be seen as a positive value to be maximized as traditional and critical thinkers assume. Instead, non-security modes of thinking should be applied to particular issues to keep them out of threat/emergency area. This process is called de-securitization.

'In Security: A New Framework for Analysis', co-authored with Buzan and De Wilde, Weaver (1998) elaborates the theory of securitization more. To be counted as a security issue a threat must be 'staged as an existential threat to a referent object by a securitizing actor, who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measure beyond rules that would otherwise bind' (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: p.5). The difference of this definition from Weaver's previous article is that it brings more units to securitization analysis which takes it out from the state-centric analysis.

Accordingly, three types of units are involved in security analysis: referent objects – things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have legitimate claim to survival; securitizing actors – actors who securitize issues by declaring a referent object existentially threatened; and functional actors – actors who affect the dynamic of a sector (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: p.36). Thus, contrary to Weaver's previous works, which take states as the main referent and state elites as the only securitizing actor, in 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis', Weaver argues that security does not always go through the state and it can be seen in other sectors as well. It may be argued that Weaver incorporates securitization theory to Buzan's broadening agenda by applying existential

threats, emergency measures and speech act to military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors, whereby he and his collaborators create a new mode of thinking.

Another distinctive point of the book is the emphasis given to audience. Accordingly, securitization can only be successful when the audience accepts it as such. Without the consent of the audience, there will be a securitizing move, but not a securitization (Weaver, 1995: p.25). Thus the task of the security analysis is not to evaluate some objective threats, but 'to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat' between securitizing actor and the audience (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: p.26).

Thus, in sum, what is essential in the securitization is the presentation of an *existential threat* for a referent, which will require *emergency actions* to be dealt with, and the acceptance of this process by a *significant audience*.

Securitization theory has been criticized by various approaches among which emancipatory security thinking plays an important role. According to this thinking, the meaning of security in securitization is fixed and essentialized (Booth, 2007; Wyn-Jones, 1999), which equates it with survival, militarized, zero-sum and confrontational mind sets. Thus, securitization theory gives security a negative value. However, the fixation of security's negative meaning and the construction of speech-act via this negativity could be challenged. Wyn-Jones (1999) proposes an alternative version of Habermasian speech-act, which generates validity-claims that are open to redemption and refutation through argumentation (p.111). Securitization is open to critique on the grounds of validity claims of truth, rightness and sincerity and hence, speech-act of security cannot be narrowed by any prior definition (Wyn Jones, 1999: p.111).

For Booth, while securitization fixes the meaning of security to a statist framework, and militarized, zero-sum mind-set, an alternative vision of security which sees it as emancipation gives security an instrumental value and opens up security to progressive change (Booth, 2007: p.165). Booth also believes that the meaning of words can change in time with the change of social context in which it exists. Therefore, securitization's freezing the meaning of security to the Cold War mind-set makes it a static and conservative project (Booth, 2007: p.166).

Booth also criticizes securitization on the ground of its separation of political from security. One aim of 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis' is to explore the logic of security by finding out what differentiates security, and the process of securitization which is merely political (Buzan, Weaver, De Wilde, 1998: p.4-5). This means that security is

understood out of the political process. For Booth (2007), this cannot be possible because security is all about politics and it is the reflection of one's political theory.

Last but not least, securitization theory can be criticized because of its overemphasis on discourses' setting up the security agenda. According to Weaver, 'security is a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat' (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde, 1998: p.24). However, today, many referents that do not have discourse making power and that are outside of the established discourse have real security problems. Does their weakness and inability to set up a securitization agenda make their security problems less important than those that have power to construct the security agenda? Therefore, the overemphasis on discourse making power limits the scope of securitization analysis and makes it dependent on the analysis of the actors who already have power to set-up the security agenda.

2.1.2.3. Critical Security Studies (CSS)

Deriving from various strands of critical social theory such as the Frankfurt School, Gramscian tradition, and Critical International Relations theory, CSS offers much different understanding of security than that of traditional security understanding. CSS does not only offer a theoretical commitment which re-conceptualizes ontology and epistemology, but it also provides a political orientation which aims to enhance world security through emancipatory politics. The last point also differentiates CSS from other post – Cold War security approaches that are analyzed above, which refrain to make any political claim. All in all, CSS offers a different understanding of security by emphasizing the role of political in security, by including set of referents, by rejecting naturalist epistemology, and by focusing on emancipatory praxis. This section analyses key concepts and analytic moves of CSS in order to have a better understanding of this line of thinking.

Deepening Security

Contrary to traditional theories' claim to objective knowledge, critical theories of international politics believe that all knowledge is socio-historical; meaning that the idea that theorist puts forward derive from a particular worldview that is shaped by social and historical circumstances. Derivative nature of knowledge is common to critical theories and it is also at the center of CSS' task of re-conceptualizing security. From the critical security

perspective, deepening refers to exploring the relations between notions of security and deeper assumptions about the nature of politics (Wyn-Jones, 1999). As R.B.J. Walker (1997) asserts 'security cannot be understood or re-conceptualized without paying attention to the constitutive of the political' (p. 69).

Seeing security as a branch of political theory has important implications for security studies. First and foremost, it makes one to realize how political theories specify the units, structures and processes to be studied. For instance, the emphasis given to states, military and status quo in traditional security studies derives from the realist idea that 'international politics is an arena of conflict between sovereign states, an idea which in turn derived from essentialist understanding about selfish and fearful humans living in a state of nature' (Booth, 2007: p.158).

Second, deepening move enables students to see how interests shape knowledge in security. Following from Cox's 'theory is for someone and for some purpose' (1981), critical studies on security claims that security discourses/practices cannot be operationalized from a neutral point; rather they derive from particular social context and from the interests of particular groups (Booth, 2007: p.150). For instance, traditional security with its focus on states and military reflects the interests of states, military bureaucracy and those who hold the key corners of power. Being aware of this normative character and reflexivity of knowledge, critical security studies re-conceptualizes security by focusing on human emancipation.

Lastly, deepening also demonstrates that the status quo is not static and change is possible. Considering the constitutive role of knowledge, Bilgin (2005) puts forward that 'security discourses close off certain possibilities whilst opening others: they lay the groundwork for the practices of politicians, soldiers and ordinary people by providing the assumptions on which they operate and the norms with which they judge' (p.47).

Broadening Security

As mentioned before, broadening refers to the inclusion of non-military issues to the security agenda that might affect different referents' security. Similar to Buzan's sectoral approach, CSS believes that, beside military dimension, security could be studied in political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. Yet, there are noticeable differences between broadened agenda of Buzan and that of CSS.

From the critical perspective of security broadening refers to all 'those physical and human constraints which stop individuals to carrying out what they would freely choose to

do' (Booth, 1991b: p.319). These constraints may vary from human rights abuses to militarization of society, from water shortage to illiteracy (Bilgin, 2005: p.26). From CSS perspective, to study a broader conception 'is to become aware of threats to security faced by myriad referents in all walks of life and approach them within a comprehensive and dynamic framework cognisant of the interrelationships in between' (Bilgin, 2005: p.26).

Second, from the critical perspective of security, the broadening of the security agenda is a function of deepening which means that 'security can be broadened only in the manner and to the extent allowed by the assumptions of it underlying political theory' (Booth, 2007: p.161). Hence, the implications of broadening will differ according to underlying political theory. Buzan's 'People, States and Fear' is a good example of this. In 'People, States and Fear', where a broadened security agenda is proposed, Buzan (1991) ends up his final analysis by focusing on the security of states, because policy-making is largely a state activity and at the final instance security policies are made by the states. As a result, Buzan relies on the agency of states in meeting non-military threats. However, as Bilgin (2005) notes:

broadening security without a re-conceptualizing of agency would result in falling back on the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats to security. The problem with resorting to the agency of the state in meeting such threats is that states may not be the most suitable actors to cope with them. The state being the most equipped actor in coping with some kinds of threats does not necessarily mean that it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all (p.35).

Thus, from the critical security perspective, the aim of the broadening is not putting more issues to the governmental agenda or focusing to non-military issues from a statist perspective. Rather, from CSS perspective, broadening security is a way to re-conceptualize security by focusing on deeper political assumptions and by reformulating agency.

The Purpose of Knowledge and Theory/Practice Relation

Being central to all strands of critical theory, epistemological claims are also crucial for critical thinking on security. Influenced by epistemology of 'the Frankfurt School's critical theory on society, CSS proposes a different conception of theory and theory/practice relationship than the traditional thinking on security does.

Geuss (1980) proposes some main differences between scientific theory (traditional/positivist) and critical theory. First one is about the aim and goal of knowledge. Claiming to have instrumental value, scientific theory aims successful manipulation of the

external world. These theories 'enable agents who have mastered them to cope effectively with the environment and thus pursue their chosen ends successfully' (Geuss, 1980: p.55). The objective of critical theory, conversely, is to emancipate and enlighten by making agents aware of hidden coercion they have been living.

In the study of international relations, the difference between two types of theories is reflected on Robert Cox's distinction of 'problem-solving' theory and critical theory. According to Cox (1981) problem-solving theory

takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relations and institutions. The general aim is to make these relations and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble... The strength of problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area (p208).

Critical theory, for Cox, on the other hand

stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions, social and power relations for granted but calls them into questions by concerning itself with its origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing (Cox, 1981: p.208-209).

Therefore, critical theory deals not only with past but also with a 'continuing process of historical change', whereas problem-solving theory posits a fixed order. Limiting itself to the explanation of present order does not make problem solving theories objective as self-claimed by themselves, but rather ideological because the present order serves to the interests of particular social groups, who are comfortable with the given order. However, the very basis of this order does not work for the most of the world population. For critical theory the purpose of knowledge is to put forward and to show that alternative orders exist and it is possible to emancipate from the oppression of prevailing order. In sum, it can be assumed that 'problem-solving theory replicates, while critical theory emancipates' (Booth, 2007: p.242).

Another difference between traditional theory and critical theory is on logical and cognitive structure. Scientific theories are objectifying; meaning that they distinguish between theory and the objects that they analyze (Geuss, 1981: p.55). Hence, theory is not a part of the object it tries to describe. Yet, for critical theories, theories are self-referential and reflective: 'theory is always part of the object-domain which it describes' (Geuss, 1981: p.55). Geuss (1981) explains this as such: 'any social theory is a set of beliefs some agents – at least social theorist who propounds it- has about society, so it, too, can be described as a way in which the society reflects on itself...A full scale social theory, then, will form part

of its own object domain' (p. 56). From the critical perspective, then, the goal of objectivity is not possible, because the theorist is part of the object s/he tries to explain. Reflective nature of theories makes knowledge bound to pre-defined role of norms, values and interests. Therefore, knowledge is not without interests and as Cox claims 'theory is always for someone and for some purposes' (Cox, 1981).

Another difference between traditional theory and critical theory is in theory/practice relationship. From the traditional perspective theories are there to explain and predict behaviors of agents. Theories can explain practices in a neutral sense. However, from the critical perspective, theories have much different role than simply explaining what is out there. Rather, 'theories help organize knowledge, which, in turn, informs, enables, privileges or legitimizes certain practices whilst inhibiting or marginalizing others' (Bilgin, 2005: p.51). In other words, theories 'shape how people sees reality, and how one sees reality affects how one decides to act' (Booth, 2007: p. 247). This makes theory constitutive of the reality which it seeks to understand. Could US intervention on Iraq, for instance, be possible, had military interventions been completely delegitimized by the social theories? Or could Cold War policies take place without the premises of realist thinking such as balance of power or material power maximization? Perceiving reality in a specific way directly influences the nature of the action.

Rather than feeding 'common sense' as traditional theories do, critical theories try to construct a more emancipated world order. Common sense, a concept developed by Gramsci, refers to the 'conceptions of the world which are imposed and absorbed passively from outside, or from the past, and are accepted and lived uncritically' (Forgacs, 2000: p.421). Thus, by producing/reproducing common sense, ruling group legitimizes and naturalizes its ideas in society. As a result, society starts thinking that its ideas and interests are same with the hegemonic group's ideas and interests (Jones, 2006). This makes people act in certain ways, while they rule out other modes of behavior. As a result, 'many elements in popular common sense contribute to people being willing to be subordinated in their lives, because such a mind-set made situations of inequality and oppression appear to them to be natural and unchallengeable' (Booth 2007: p.250).

The Frankfurt School also makes similar claims with Gramscian common sense. As Geuss (1981) puts it, from the critical theory perspective, the members of society are living in a false consciousness – their world view is ideologically false and in an unfree existence – and their basic social institutions are extremely coercive. False consciousness and the unfree existence is a self-imposed action realized by the agents, which impose coercive social institutions on themselves, by 'participating in them, accepting them without protest,

etc.’ Believing that they act ‘freely’ by establishing these institutions, the agents reproduce the relations of coercion according to the dictates of their world-picture. Thus, by acting, members of society construct their social institutions, and the normal operation of these institutions, maintains the general world-picture which create unfree existence (Geuss, 1980: 60). The role of critical theory is to create awareness in agents, by making them realize that the form of consciousness they hold is ideologically false, and the coercion from which they suffer is self-imposed. Thus, by inducing self-reflection in the agents, the ‘coercion loses its power or objectivity and the agents are emancipated’ (Geuss, 1981: 61).

Critical security studies, as a part of critical theory, being aware of its self-constitutive character, then, should open up space for alternative political actions by showing people that the oppression from which they suffer is socially constructed and another social construct which is based on emancipation is possible. This perspective makes re-conceptualizing of agency an important task for CSS.

Re-conceptualizing Agency / Re-conceptualizing Practice

For the last three decades, the agency-structure debate has become one of the central discussion topic in IR. Whether implicitly or explicitly almost all of the theoretical discussions in IR tell something about agency, structure or their interrelationship. In IR, agency and structure are studied in political, and to a lesser extent in social level. Coole (1995) describes political agency as the possession of the power to bring about effective change in collective level. However, besides bringing change in collective level, agency can also represent the intentional cumulative action the consequence of which is the maintenance of status quo (Cox, 2000: p.55).

Traditionally state has been accepted as the agent in IR studies. For most of the scholars in the field ‘state as agent’ is crucial to IR because it is through this construction that the identity of IR has been created (Wight, 2006: p.177). If the state is not accepted as agent, then, international theory will be no different than political theory; and IR will be ‘little other than a macro-sociological exercise in political theory or history’ (Wight, 2006: p.177).

Derived from traditional theories of IR, traditional security studies accord central role to state’s agency in studying security. For traditional security thinking, state is the agent because only states hold the necessary power resource to bring about effective change in security politics. The power capabilities required to cause change in security are controlled by the state alone, and what is more, only the state has license to legitimate use of those

power capacities. As a result, states are accepted as providing or maintaining security better than any other agent in security field.

CSS which aims at emancipatory change first tries to criticize the idea of state as primary and only agent, and second tries to reconstruct agency in a new ground so that emancipatory practices could be possible. There are significant reasons for critical analyst of security why state's agency should be de-throned. First, states do not desire any change if the change contradicts their interests. This means when agency is left to state, the latter may remain silent on widespread insecurities of many other referents (individuals, ethnic communities, civil society), especially when it thinks that providing security to these referents contradicts with its own interests. Second, states may not be capable of dealing with different threats. 'The state being the most qualified actor in coping with some kind of threats does not necessarily mean it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all' (Bilgin, 2005: p.35). Third, states tend to approach a security problem from militarized perspectives, the result of which is to bring militarized solutions to various issues (Bilgin, 2005). However, most of the problems dealt by the state are not military in nature and bringing militarized solutions to non-military problems renders the latter insoluble. The Kurdish issue in Turkey is a good example of how non-military problem could not be solved by militarized practices. For many years, under the Turkish state's agency, the problems arising from the Kurdish issue, which are non-military in nature, were dealt with military responses. The consequence was the inability to addressing insecurities of various referents.

For the reasons mentioned above, CSS aims to reconstruct agency, without which emancipatory practices could not be possible. In other words, re-conceptualizing agency is a necessary step for critical security to have relevance in 'real life' and to re-conceptualize practices. Critical approaches view non-state actors as the potential agents of emancipatory practices. Among those actors, critical approaches put special emphasis on the agency of social movements and intellectuals.

Social movements, as defined as 'collectivities of actors who want to achieve their goal and goals by influencing decisions of a target' (Opp, 2009: p 40, for more discussion of social movement theories please see Chapter 6), give people right to have a say about their own life and in security context, their own security. For Robert Cox (1981), the role of critical theory is to identify counter-hegemonic forces that may lead to structural transformation in existing world order. He views world scale social forces such as trade unions, NGOs and new social movements as potential agents of emancipatory change. Similarly, feminist approaches have given attention to the agency of women because they

believe that only women's agency can make a difference for women in an environment where the latter's security needs are not given attention.

The agency of social movements is not only a wishful thinking by critical approaches but also an empirical reality. In many parts of the world social movements create change by forcing decision-makers to act in a specific manner or by transforming society's norms. As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, *Saturday Mothers* became effective in rising their voices on the disappearances under custody. They informed public opinion on the issue whereby the disappearances under custody decreased in the subsequent years.

However, it should be noted that, not all social movements' agency brings non-statist, non-militarized practices (Bilgin, 2005). There are many non-statist organizations which aim to bring change through violent, militarized, masculinized practices and which aim to replace the already existing state mechanism. The agency of Islamic State (IS) or the military practices of the PKK show that non-state actors' agency does not necessarily bring non-statist, non-militarized, or democratically inclusionary practices.

Besides social movements, intellectuals are also viewed as agents for emancipatory transformation by critical approaches. As mentioned before, from the critical perspective, theory and practice mutually constitute each other and what theories say about reality is also a construction of reality. Theory is informed by engagement with practical issues, and, those concrete situations are affected and improved by new theoretical insights (Peoples and Vaughan, 2010: p.26). Thus, in politics, different theories construct different discourses, which 'close off certain possibilities whilst opening others' (Bilgin, 2005: p.59).

In security field, the intellectuals within critical security 'could function as agents of security by way of reflecting upon the practical implications of their own thinking and writing' (Bilgin, 2005: p.58). In Gramscian terms, this means that, critical security scholars can become the organic intellectuals of counter-hegemony whereby undermining prevailing hegemonic security discourse could be possible⁶. By their power of informing social movements, the discourses of critical security scholars could help to create fissures in hegemonic common sense, and could create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed (Wyn-Jones, 1999).

⁶ Organic intellectuals, in Gramsci, refer to intellectuals who represent or represented by emerging social classes. According to Gramsci, every social group coming into existence with itself one or more strata of intellectuals which give it awareness of its function in the social and political fields (2000, 301). Their role is to sustain the hegemony of ruling group in the field of culture. Without controlling the culture, a group could never provide its hegemony in the society. For more discussion, please see Chapter 6.

However, for critical security thinkers, the role of critical security intellectual should not only be limited to self-reflection and thinking, or to ‘thinking about thinking’ as Booth (1997) says. CSS should develop ‘tactical and strategic action in the interest of security, community and emancipation’ to have an effect in real life (Booth, 2007). The method to do this is immanent critique. Critical security believes that each situation has an unfulfilled potential of a better life within itself. Immanent critique invokes identifying the ‘features within concrete situations (such as positive dynamics, agents, key struggles) that have emancipatory possibilities, and then working through the politics (tactics and strategies) to strengthen them’ (Booth, 2007). This is how the ideas of scholars who study security can contribute to change people’s condition of existence and could help establish emancipatory practices in real life.

2.2. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the theoretical discussion in security studies literature from the perspectives of traditional and critical security approaches. Traditional conception of security derives its premises from realism and positivism. For realism states are the main actors because there is no higher authority than the state in world politics. Moreover, realism delineates state as the ideal political community in which security and order is possible. Stemming from this belief, traditional security studies take the state as the only referent-object of security, meaning that only the security of state is worth analyzing. For realism, the security of the state, on the other hand, could only be provided by military capability which is the ultimate form of power. Therefore, traditional approaches to security see the use of force as the mainstay of security studies. According to traditional security studies security should be studied by scientific/objectivist inquiries such as theory developing and theory testing.

On the other hand, after the end of the Cold War, different voices within the security studies discipline started to challenge the restricted view of traditional security studies. Those alternative works criticized some aspects of traditional security studies and this is why they are labelled as critical thinking on security in this chapter. Among those, this study focuses on CSS as an alternative voice to traditional conception of security. For CSS, there is no neutral point of studying security and each study on security derives from different political theories. Thus, contrary to traditional security claims which aims objectivity, CSS argues that each security theorizing is from somewhere and for some purpose in Coxian terms. CSS, being aware of this subjectivity, aims emancipation in security. Emancipation,

for CSS, is securing ‘people freedom from those oppressions that stop them what they would freely choose to do’ (Booth, 2007: p.112). Those oppressions might be as various as ‘human rights abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, environmental degradation, lack of access to health care’ (Bilgin, 2005: p.26). What is more, these constraints might work at state, sub-state and supra-state levels. Thus, for CSS, not only military dimension, but also economic, social, cultural and environmental dimensions are crucial to security studies. Moreover, those security dimensions do not only refer to state, but also refer to many other referents, such as community, ethnic/social groups, and individuals.

A crucial question against ‘security as emancipation’ is that how emancipatory practices could take place when decision-making mechanism is not based on emancipatory discourses. Here, reformulation of agency becomes very important for all CSS studies. Accordingly, CSS should identify the potential counter-hegemonic forces in society and should inform the practices of those agents. It is through reconstructing agency, and saving it from statist hegemony that CSS and emancipation would speak for the securities of ‘real people in real places’ (Booth, 2007).

It is on this theoretical discussion that the argument of the study will be presented in the following chapters. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 trace Turkish state’s security discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue between the years of 1925 and 1999 and argues that they could be understood by traditional concepts of security. The Chapters 5, on the other hand, analyzes present context and argues that there has been a more emancipated understanding in state security discourses and practices in this period. Chapter 6 analyzes how more emancipated understanding in state practices could be possible within the current situation and analyzes the role that non-state and external agents could play.

CHAPTER 3

STATE AS THE REFERENT OBJECT: FORCED RESETTLEMENTS OF THE KURDS

Statist security practices refer to the policies that prioritize state security over the securities of other referent objects. The theoretical background of those policies lies in realist security understanding. As mentioned in the previous chapter, according to realism, since state mitigates anarchy, it is seen as the ideal community where political order could be possible. As a result, for realism, the security of other actors within the state are reduced to the survival of the state because state is the main defender of the security of its members.

However, this realist logic does not reflect the empirical reality of today's world politics. For one thing, realism draws a hypothetical world of inside of the state where security is guaranteed in the absence of anarchy, and outside of the state from where threats emanate - anarchic international system. This leads realism to focus solely on threats coming from outside of state borders. Yet, today, the inside of the states is not problem free as in realist abstraction: there are widespread insecurities within states, such as 'human right abuses, water shortages, illiteracy, lack of access to health care and birth control' (Bilgin, 2005: p.26) which affect the security of many referents, including the state itself. Thus, in its analysis, realism overlooks these insecurities that are permanent to inside of the state.

More importantly, by glorifying the state, realism also misses a crucial empirical reality: in today's world, many people are being threatened by the policies of their own states. In many parts of the world states are the main source of insecurity for the individuals, ethnic and social groups. As Booth notes, more people are threatened by the policies of their own governments than by neighboring armies (Booth, 2007: p.204).

In line with this argument, this chapter argues that, considering the Kurdish issue, statist security practices of Turkey caused widespread insecurities for the individuals and Kurdish ethnic group. To elaborate this argument and to show how state security policy influenced the

Kurdish issue this chapter specifically focuses on one topic: the resettlements of the Kurds during the early Republican period⁷. While in literature the resettlements are mainly

⁷ The chapter particularly focuses on the period between the years of 1925 and 1934.

explained in terms of nationalist and assimilationist ideologies of the state, this study presents both physical and ontological security concerns of Turkish state as the main reason behind the Kurdish resettlements. Accordingly, this chapter argues that, after the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, it became apparent for the Turkish decision-makers that the conflict with Kurdish ethnic community was a probability that could affect the physical security of the state at any time. However, and may be more important than that, the rebellion, which was realized by a Kurdish religious leader with political reactionary motives, threatened the continuity and order of Turkish self-identity, which was under construction in the first years of the Republic. Thus, for Turkish decision-makers, rebellion revealed the presence of population within the state whose identity was different and threatening to proposed Turkish self-identity. This created a rupture in Turkish state elites' self-image. The disruption of 'continuity and 'order' of the self is crucial to actors' feeling of ontological (in)security (Giddens, 1991). Thus, for the Republican elites, to eliminate the threat arising against the ontological security of the state, the Kurdish collective identity must have been tamed in one way or other. Turkish elites decided to realize this task by assimilating Kurds into Turkishness and the best tool available to state elites was demographic engineering which had been a security practice of the state since the Ottoman Empire. The resettlement of the Kurds could, thus, be seen as a result of this specific policy of mitigating both physical and, more importantly, ontological insecurity of the state. Needless to say, relocation of the people resulted with the insecurities of many individuals who were forced to leave their lands without adequate insurance from the state.

Thus, this chapter, by focusing on the forced resettlements of the Kurds during the early years of the Turkish Republic, analyzes how statist security practices could result with the insecurities of other referents. The outline of the chapter will be as follows. The first part of the chapter focuses on the concept of demographic engineering and the reasons of it. The second part analyzes demographic engineering during the Ottoman period. The population policies of the Ottoman Empire will be analyzed in two periods: first, from expansion till the ruling of Community of Union and Progress Party (CUP) in 1913; and second, from the start of the absolute CUP power in 1913 till the end of the first World War. Considering the fact that Turkish Republic took over the state tradition of the Ottoman Empire (Heper, 2006), analyzing population policies in the Ottoman period is important to better grasp the background of Kurdish resettlement and to see the historical relation between state security and demographic engineering in security practices. Accordingly, it will be argued that, since the 16th century, security had been the mainstay of demographic engineering policies in Ottoman Empire. It will also be shown that, as the threat perception

based on ethno-religious identity comes to be the main determinant of security during the CUP period, identity started to play an important role in the population policies of the CUP. The deportation of the Greeks in 1913 and the Armenians in 1915 from Anatolia could be seen as the preliminary examples of Kurdish resettlement, where population policies were applied to eliminate ‘threats’ emanating from other identities. However, the deportation of ‘others’ in this period was still a result of physical security concern of the state, which was basically the fear of Anatolia’s partition. Evaluating on this, the third part analyzes Kurdish resettlements during the Kemalist period and mainly focuses on ontological security concern of the state behind the resettlements. This part starts with an analysis of identity theories and focuses on how social identities, social categorizations, (national) self-identities and others were constituted. Then, it makes a brief discussion of ontological security literature. Following this, by looking at various resources, it analyzes how Turkishness was constituted in the early Republican years and how after the Sheikh Said Rebellion Kurdishness was made as the ‘internal other’ to the Turkish self. Lastly, this chapter gives a close look at Kurdish resettlements and the role ontological insecurity of the state plays in them. Thus, this chapter, contrary to most of the works in literature, does not take assimilation as the main determinant of the resettlement of the Kurds. Rather, it tries to explore the reason behind the assimilationist practices and reaches to the conclusion that security concern -both physical and ontological- of the Turkish state was the main motivation behind the resettlements of the Kurds during the early Republican period.

3.1. Demographic Engineering: The Concept

The spatial control of population has always been an important policy for states to achieve specific policy objectives within their territorial jurisdiction. States resorted to different types of population control policies during the history: forced settlement, forced migration, population exchanges, ethnic cleansing to name a few. The motivations were various: sometimes it was done for economic reasons, sometimes for security concerns and some other times only for ideological reasons. Demographic engineering, in its most general sense, is the concept that is used to explain those spatial control of the populations by the state (Bookman, 1997; McGarry, 1998).

Although in literature there is a tendency to link demographic engineering policies to nation-state era and to nationalist ideology, the population control policies were also common before the rise of nation-states. As it will be shown below, Ottoman Empire, for instance, implemented population settlement policies frequently for various reasons during

its history. Yet, it is true that with the formation of nation-states, the control of the population by the political authority gained a new momentum. The dissolution of the empires and the formation of the nation-states initiated homogenizing of the population around the dominant ethnic core in most countries. The groups that were believed to be obstacle in nationalization process, from forced migration to genocide, were exposed to different population policies by the states. The ethnic dimension of demographic engineering led some writers to analyze the concept from ethnic and political competition of the groups. For Milica Bookman (1997) demographic alterations are one form of struggle for territory and control of resources, and they are applied to increase economic and political power of an ethnic group relative to other groups. The demographic alterations may be caused by nationalist policies, population resettlements, religious and linguistic conversions, immigration policies, and may take the forms of mass rape, ethnic cleansing and genocide (Bookman, 1997: p.2). According to Bookman's book, there are several methods of demographic engineering available to dominant ethnic group to keep its numerical advantage. Those are:

- Population measurement, by which the size of ethnic groups is determined,
- Pro-nationalist policies, which aim to increase the size of one population relative to others,
- Assimilation, by which ethnic leaders of the group increase their numbers over minority groups
- Population transfers which aim to alter the relative balance of population number among ethnic groups,
- Boundary changes, by which the composition of the population is altered in favor of dominant group by secessionist movements,
- Economic pressures which aim to alter the relative size of ethnic groups by economic pressures or incentives (Bookman, 1997: p. 33-34).

Elaborating on Bookman's ideas, Nesim Şeker makes a definition of demographic engineering. Accordingly, for Şeker (2007), demographic engineering refers to

any deliberate state programme or policy originating from religious/ethnic discrimination or initiated for political, strategic or ideological reasons which aim to increase the political, economic power of one ethnic group over others by manipulating population through various methods (p.461).

Although Şeker emphasizes ethnicity in this definition, he does not see demographic engineering particular to nation-state period. On the contrary, demographic engineering could be 'observed in various ages in struggles for territory and control for its resources'

(Şeker, 2007: p.461). Thus, for Şeker, demographic engineering did not rise with the nation-state; yet the rise of ethnic nationalism and ethnic, religious homogenization policies gave demographic engineering a new form which was more 'rigorous and merciless' than before.

Significant number of works in the literature focuses on security dimension of the population policies. For Murat Yüksel (2010) security concerns of state elites during the nation-state formation years constitute an important factor in spatial control of population. Accordingly, if a group is perceived as a security threat by elites, it may be exposed to rigorous security policies such as being expelled from the state territories or being vanished by it (Yüksel, 2010: p. 288). State elites could imply softer policies when they perceive other groups not as a threat but as a discipline problem. Forced settlement and forced migration, by which spatial and cultural characteristics of the minority groups will be abolished, are the policies that might be applied in those situations (Yüksel, 2010: p.288).

John McGarry (1998) is another writer who mentions the links between security, nationalism and demographic engineering. For McGarry, demographic engineering is the state directed movement of managing ethnic diversity. Accordingly, in the modern era, a number of states have been ethnicized by regimes which are associated with the state's dominant ethnic group. These regimes started to suspect the allegiance of minority groups in time of war, and thus, minorities have come to be seen as threats to state security. As a result of this logic, Mc Garry asserts that state-directed movement of ethnic groups are undertaken in the belief that it will promote security. From this perspective, states move ethnic groups within their territories when

- The state authority is rejected by minority groups,
- Inter-state conflict occurs in which minority is or believed to be a security risk,
- The state's control over minority regions is disputed by neighboring states,
- When a state acquires new territory occupies by dissentient minorities (McGarry, 1998: p.623-630).

The movement of ethnic groups are realized either by settling pro-state agents in particular regions or by moving out suspected groups out of specific regions. Pro-state agents are purposefully settled in particular regions to secure state's control of the area. Accordingly, introduction of these pro-state agents is undertaken to

- Help states to assert their sovereignty against external competitors,
- Deter local groups who otherwise might be inclined to revolt,
- Encourage intermixing,
- Speed up assimilation (McGarry, 1998: p.616).

Similarly, the groups that are suspected to pose security threats have been moved out to

- Make way for the settlement of pro-state agents,
- Enhance the control of the state in a particular region,
- Counter the risk of a secessionist bid or revolt in the relevant area,
- Assimilate suspected groups in other parts of the country (McGarry, 1998: p. 617-618).

In short, demographic engineering is a deliberate policy that aims to move particular groups within the state borders to achieve a specific policy objective. Although this objective is mostly seen as homogenizing the nation-state, the existence of population movements in imperial period signifies that non-nationalist motivations also play an important role in demographic engineering. As it is mentioned, security concerns of state elites, whether in nation-state period or before, play primary role in the population policies. It could be assumed that, demographic engineering is applied to consolidate the influence of dominant group in society and to minimize - real or imaginary- security risks that could rise from other groups. In the modern era, those 'other' groups were mainly ethnic minority groups, which were out of the state's ethnic circle. Therefore, with nationalism, the other is spatially controlled by the dominant self with the aim of minimizing the security risks for the latter. As it will be shown below, this was also the case during the late Ottoman and early Turkish republican years, where the self - constructed on Muslim/Turkish identity - imposed population policies on the other -non-Muslim and non-Turkish - identities in the country.

3.2. Demographic Engineering Policies in the Ottoman Empire

To better grasp the Turkish Republic's demography policies and the resettlement of the Kurds, the population policies of the Ottoman Empire should be analyzed. This is important for two reasons: first, Turkish Republic took over the state tradition of the Ottoman Empire (Heper, 2006) and second, the political ideology of the CUP in the late Ottoman period shaped the policies of the Republican elites in the 1920s and in the 1930s (Zürcher, 1984). Therefore, the settlement policies of the Ottoman Empire will be analyzed under two periods: the Ottoman period from the 16th century till the CUP's absolute power of 1913 and the CUP period from 1913 till the end of the first World War.

3.2.1. First Period in Forced Migration and Settlement: From Classical Ottoman Period till 1913

The main determinant of population policies in Ottoman Empire was the change of the Empire's power vis-à-vis European states. Accordingly, demographic engineering policies of the Ottomans could be analyzed in two different periods: the expansion-stagnation period (between the 14th and the 18th centuries), and the decline period (the 19th century and the early 20th century).

Several different factors influenced the settlement policies during the expansion and stagnation period. First of all, in line with Islamic *gaza* principle⁸ the Ottoman Empire conquered all the lands in the south Eastern Europe. To establish its authority in this new area, and to integrate the different religious groups with each other, the Ottoman Empire settled large number of Anatolian Muslims to Balkans⁹ (Tekeli, 1990: 143). By settling Muslim populations to the strategic areas of the new lands, the Ottoman Empire secured its domination in Europe. Moreover, by mixing populations, it also tried to prevent the economic and social imbalances among regions within the Empire.

Second, economic factors played an important role in forced migration and settlement policies of the Ottoman Empire during this period. The agricultural production was the mainstay of the Ottoman economy: the Empire collected taxes from the peasants according to their agricultural productions. Thus, more production meant more tax for the central government and for this end the population was always resettled to maximize the agricultural production, from which the government would increase its revenues.

Third, forced migration and settlement was used to discipline the nomadic tribes. A considerable number of population in the Ottoman was nomadic and the state tried to settle them in villages for security and economic reasons (Dündar, 2001). To adapt them to settled life meant more agricultural production by which the central government would profit more. More importantly, those groups were constituting a discipline problem for the Empire because of their banditry activities. They were resettled to increase the order and the security of the regions where they lived in.

⁸Holy war against non-Muslims to protect and spread the Islam.

⁹There were many religious groups (called nation in Ottoman) in the Ottoman Empire. Hierarchically Muslims were at the top of those groups. Muslims were called 'dominant nation' and they were seen as the most trustful group by the state.

Fourth, the settlement was also implemented to increase the authority of the center vis-a-vis the local principalities and the tribes.¹⁰ With the Ottoman expansion into the east, those local principalities came under the control of the Ottoman Empire. To decrease their local and regional influences, the Empire dispersed them to different regions (Dündar, 2001: p.42). The government was applying the same policies to local chieftains too, whenever the latter became influential in their regions. Thus, forced settlement was also used as a method to increase the central authority of the Empire.

Those factors point out that, the security interests of the state such as consolidating its authority, and eliminating potential threats shaped the settlement policies of the Ottoman Empire in the expansion period. With the start of the decline period in the 19th century, and with the weakening of the Empire against European states, the demographic engineering policies took a new phase. The Empire lost its territories in the Balkans as a result of Russian expansion and independence declarations of various nations (Dündar, 2001, Yüksel, 2010). The Muslim population in the Balkans, which experienced the violent policies of their host countries, forced to flee from Balkans to Anatolia. This created a migrant situation in the Empire: the large number of Muslims had to be settled in the remaining Ottoman territories. Security concerns of the state again shaped the course of the settlement. The Balkan refugees were firstly settled in Thrace region. This was a strategic decision by which the decision-makers attempted to create a buffer zone by using this population in the border region (Tekeli, 1990: p.149). However, with further territorial losses in the Balkans, these refugees, who were considered as loyal to Empire, were settled in the regions where order was lacking (Dündar, 2001: p.45-52). There was also a huge flow of Muslims from Caucasus after Russian expansion and those Muslims were being used to change the demographic composition of certain regions in favor of Muslims (Şeker, 2007: p.462).

The settlement of the nomadic tribes in this period was again realized with strategic concerns. First of all, as the Empire weakened, it was struggling to control the nomadic tribes, which were creating disorder in some regions. Second, with the new military recruitment system, the settling of tribes would mean more manpower for the Ottoman Empire. For those reasons, the tribes' transition to settled life was a major consideration of the Ottoman demography policies in the 19th century. Furthermore, the settlement of the tribes was realized in a way that will increase state authority. The tribes which were trusted by the government were settled into areas where the state authority was weak. Similarly,

¹⁰ Till the late 15th century, there were local principalities in Anatolia.

the groups close to borders which was not found reliable by the government were dispersed in other parts of the Empire (Kasaba, 2004: p.35).¹¹

In short, the Ottoman demographic engineering policies were mainly shaped by security/strategy concerns of the state. However, those concerns were not stable and the motivation behind them changed and took new forms according to the Empire's power capacity. Therefore, for instance, while in the expansion period the security necessitated the settling of Anatolian Muslims into Balkans to consolidate state authority, in the decline period, with the loss of the Balkan territories, the security necessitated the resettling of those Muslims in Anatolia, especially to places where state authority was weak. Similarly, while the settling of nomadic tribes during the expansion period was realized to eliminate the discipline problems, in the decline period, it was mostly done to benefit from manpower of those tribes for the army.

3.2.2. Second Period in Population Policies: the CUP Period

The Ottoman political, social and intellectual life entered into a new phase with the start of the Second Constitutional Period in 1908. National secessions from the Empire, the effects of the Balkan Wars, and the CUP's coming to power and having the absolute authority between the years of 1913 and 1918 were the main characteristics of the new area. This new period, which, in some perspective, was radically different than the previous era, did also have a great impact on the demographic engineering policies of the time.

The demographic engineering policies in this period could be analyzed in two levels. First, there was a huge inflow of Muslim migrants into Anatolia from the former territories of the empire. The settlement of them was a major task for the new government. Second, within the empire territories, the groups creating discipline and security problems for the state were exposed to different forms of population policies, from resettlement to deportation. The main motivation here was again security concerns. However, there was now a new factor which affected the security logic in population policies: ethno-religious identity. The Balkan Wars revealed how non-Muslim groups could be a severe threat for the security of the Empire. Some Anatolian Greek groups' support of Greece in Balkan

¹¹As a result of those policy, the Kurdish tribes that were active in banditry in east and south east Anatolia were transferred to the western parts of the country. Similarly, many Turkish and Circassian groups were settled in the Kurdish, Armenian and Alevite regions. (Kasaba, 2004: p.39). However, this policy should not be analyzed from ethnicist perspective, which was not existent during that time. Rather it should be seen as a conclusion of centralization reforms: the main motivation was to establish the Ottoman state authority where it was weak.

Wars, and Armenians rapprochement with Russia made decision-makers think that the Empire could only be saved by relying on the dominant Turkish group. At this point, the Turkish identity, which at time was perceived as an umbrella identity for all Muslim groups in Anatolia (please see below), started to be seen as a site where security presides, while non-Turkish identities were associated with threat. Therefore, those other identities should spatially be excluded in order to secure the state. Next part analyzes how Turkish identity started to be constructed as the official identity of the state during the CUP period and how this affected the population policies against the Greeks and Armenians. This analysis, by exposing the role of identity in security politics of population policies, will provide a convenient outlook to grasp the Kurdish settlement during the first years of the Republic.

3.2.2.1. Turkishness as the Official Identity during the CUP Period

With the Ottoman Empire's weakening against the European powers, and as a result of the independence of Balkan nations and the European powers' interference into Ottoman affairs, one question dominated the intellectual debate of the Empire till its collapse: how the Ottoman state could overcome those problems and 'how the Empire could be saved?' (Tunaya; 1952). These questions were approached from the perspective of integration within the Empire, because the main problem was to keep the Ottoman's multi-ethnic, multi-religious structure integrated against local nationalist movements not to lose more territory. Within this integrative perspective, three concepts started to be discussed 'to save the Empire': Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism.

Ottomanism was an ideology that aimed to create equal citizens regardless of religion and ethnicity under the Ottoman reign. It aimed to create a civic-territorial Ottoman political community where Ottoman citizenship concept would be created in modern sense. By creating equal Ottoman citizens regardless of religion and ethnicity, Ottoman decision-makers intended to overcome the intercommunal divisions that appeared in the mid-19th century. By recognizing equal rights to Christian population, Ottoman statesmen aimed to prevent the potential secessionist movements that could arise from different nationalities. Furthermore, beside the civic citizenship, a concept of fatherland was developed during this period. It targeted to create an allegiance to Ottoman territory: regardless of their religion, sect or language, all Ottoman citizens' loyalty would be to the Ottoman fatherland. With the equal political rights and the concept of fatherland, the integrity of the Empire would be consolidated (Mardin, 2002: p.366). However, the ideology of Ottomanism was

unsuccessful to stop nationalist fervors of Christian community and this challenged its credibility as the integrative ideology.

The failure of Ottomanism to prevent fragmentation directed intellectuals to focus on Islam as the unifying ideology. Islamism was an ideology of Islamic reinterpretation of Ottomanism (Kayalı, 1997; Cohen, 2012). According to Islamism, Islam would become the ideology of Ottoman unity: all the Muslims, regardless of their ethnicity, will politically be integrated under the rule of the sultan. There were two main factors which directed Abdulhamid II to focus on Islam as the integrative ideology. First, as a result of the Russian expansion in the Caucasus in the 19th century, many Muslims living in Caucasus fled to Ottoman territories which drastically increased the Muslim population in the country. Second, feared of Arab separatism, Abdulhamid II relied on Islam as the ideology of unity, with the aim of integrating Arab population more fully into the Ottoman fold (Karpat; 2002: p.549). In those senses, Islamism seems more as a pragmatic policy adopted by Ottoman statesmen than a committed religious ideology. It was used as a 'political tool in order to cement internal political unity' (Karpat, 2002: p.549). The ideology did not jeopardize the legal status and rights of non-Muslims living in the empire.

With the end of Abdulhamid II's reign and the Young Turks' coming to power in 1908 Islamism lost its significance as the integrative policy of the state. In literature, the CUP period is usually associated with new philosophy: Turkism. In its broad sense, Turkism is the philosophy which sought reconsolidation and integrity of the Ottoman state based on the unity of dominant ethnic group of Turks and which advocated the strengthening of the Turkish element within the Empire. Thus, it referred to a proto-nationalist idea, which echoed firstly in the intellectual and bureaucratic circles.

Yet, a direct categorization of Young Turk policies as Turkism is, in one sense, an oversimplification, which misses some crucial points. The main objective of the Young Turks, was to restore the power of the Empire. Despite the separations during the late period, the Ottoman state was still a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural entity, and any restoration or reconsolidation should have been realized within this structure. Thus, in its first years the CUP relied on Ottomanism in order to ensure the integrity of the state. As Hakan Yavuz implies the major concern of the leaders in this period was to 'transform a multiethnic empire into a modern, centralized, yet not necessarily national state' (Yavuz, 2013: p.31). Therefore, the CUP leaders seemed attached to the idea of Ottoman nation, which required the integrity and the unity of the all the groups within the Empire. As a result, it is hard to mention about an exclusive political emphasis on the Turkish identity in the first period of Young Turks.

However, the Balkan Wars was a serious blow to CUP's Ottomanist ideals. As a result of this war, the Empire lost almost all of its territories remaining in Europe where there were symbolically important geographies like Macedonia and Thrace.¹² Moreover, the Albanians, who had been seen as one of the most loyal people declared independence after the war. This created a frustration in Young Turks, who felt betrayed by their most loyal 'Ottoman brothers' (Karpas, 2001: p.370).

Another result of the war which knocked around the Ottomanist ideal was the expulsion of Muslim population from the Balkan states. By deportations, not only the ideal of different nations' living together came to naught, but also huge Muslim immigrant flew into Ottoman territories. The Muslim immigration made the Empire foremost a Muslim state with Anatolia establish the core geography of Ottoman fatherland. In Anatolia, the Turks were the dominant ethnic group whose number were further increased after the migration from the Balkans.

The social, psychological, demographic and geographic consequences of the Balkan Wars naturally affected the political life of the Ottoman state after 1913. The most important consequence was the emergence of the CUP as the only political power of the state in the upcoming years. In its Fifth Congress, in 1913, the CUP transformed itself to a political party from the committee. It also became the most effective social movement, 'with its organizational structure and branches stretching all over Anatolia' (Yavuz, 2013: p.60). In short, it dominated the social and political life, without any opposition, till the end of the First World War.

The main task of the CUP leaders was to save the Empire and to restore its unity and integrity. As the credence to the existence of multi-religious state was over, the CUP saw Turkish – Muslim identity as the new glue for the society, which could provide the needed social cohesion for the Empire (Yavuz, 2013). This was the time when the policies based on Turkism began to take root in state policy. Therefore, between the years of 1913-1918 'the articulation and expression of statist ethnic nationalism' was the dominant state practice (Karpas, 2001: p.356).

However, there were some important limitations to full-fledge Turkism. For one thing, the Ottoman state was still a multi-ethnic empire and the Arabs were constituting a major part of this entity. A severe political nationalism could have estranged the Arabs, which might have resulted with their separation from the state. Losing Arab lands and population, would not naturally be welcomed by the CUP after the loss of the Balkans.

¹² The leadership cadre of the CUP were mainly from the Balkans. As Yavuz mentions, the CUP was a Balkan phenomenon in terms of identity, leadership and strategies (Yavuz, 2013: p. 59).

Therefore, the fear of estranging Arabs and other Muslim communities affected the shape Turkism took between the years of 1913 – 1916. As a result, the CUP emphasized the Muslim character of Turkism rather than its ethnic aspect. Turkism was designed as supra Muslim identity, a form of Islamic nationalism, which could provide the progress and social cohesion for the state. Thus, as Yavuz (2013) indicates ‘the CUP’s ethnic Turkism was not fully developed form of nationalism but rather an amorphous idea and an intellectual attempt to redefine Turkishness within the frameworks of Islamism and Ottomanism’ (p. 64).

Mesut Yeğen (2001) also mentions that, until the Arab separation, CUP policies were based on an interplay between Turkism, Islamism and Ottomanism. Bünyamin Kocaoğlu (2013: p.57) also expresses a similar view: for him too, three ideologies were intermixed, but this time Ottomanism was resigned on the basis of Islamism to keep the Arabs reunited with the state. In short, although CUP policies shifted to Turkism after the Balkan Wars, it was the Islamic character of the Turkishness which was emphasized more not to risk the unity between different Muslim groups of the empire.¹³

The new policy which reiterated Muslim-Turkish identity as the basis of social cohesion and unity had important consequences in the Ottoman politics of identity. The theoretical background of identity formation will be discussed below, but here suffice it to say that identities are always constituted through interaction meaning that they are created through the ongoing social interaction with others and the consecutive self-reflection about who one thinks s/he is according to those social exchanges (Mead, 1934). When adopted to national identity, this argument implies that a national identity is defined through the interaction with other national/ethnic groups, which affects the self-thinking, or the realization, of the national self. Thus, national identity is not always defined ‘from within, but also from without, through distinguishing and differentiating the nation from other nations and ethnic groups’ (Triandafyllidou, 1998: p.593).

¹³ However, it should also be noted that the ethnic character of Turkism was maintained differently in different parts of the state. While in Anatolia, the ethnic Turkish policies was much more felt, in Arab geography, the Turkism was given place to Islamism. There were several reasons for this. First, after the loss of Balkan territories, the Anatolia started to be constructed as the homeland of the Turks. Second, the state continued to carry out centralization in Anatolia, which went hand in hand with nationalism. Conversely, in Arab geography CUP leaders followed more de-centralized policies. For instance, while in Anatolia, Turkish was the official language, in Arabian peninsula Arabic was the official language of education and it could also be used in jurisdiction (Kocaoğlu, 2013: 256). Therefore, ethnic character of Turkism was felt more in places where administrative centralization took place. Third, especially in economy, nationalist policies were appealing to lower class of the society, which were mainly consisted of ethnic Turks (Karpas, 2001:p.369) Thus, while implication of nationalism in Arab land would met a reaction, its implication in Anatolia was not opposed, and even supported by the masses.

Considering the role of the other in defining the national self, it could be assumed that, the constitution of Turkish-Muslim as the main element of Ottoman self-identity after the Balkan Wars, became possible by defining non-Muslims, and especially Christian groups, as others. The united front of non-Muslim Balkan nations against the Ottoman empire in the war; their violent actions against the Muslim populations in their territories; and the deportation of Turkish-Muslim elements from their territories in order to homogenize their society ethnically played important role in perceiving non-Muslims as others. The non-Muslims could not be seen within the 'Ottoman self' anymore as it used to be under Ottomanist ideal. This created us as 'Muslim' and them as 'Christian' mentality (Yavuz, 2013), which had direct repercussions on CUP population policy towards its Christian groups of Greeks and Armenians.

3.2.2.2. Security Concerns and Population Policies under the CUP

The main logic which affected the decision-making process after the Balkan Wars was CUP leader's anxiety about the survival of the state. For several decades, the primary concern of the Ottoman reformers had been to save the empire. However, the main concern of the decision-making had never been the survival of the state, rather it had been the reconsolidation of state power against Western powers. It is only after the Balkan Wars that saving the empire referred to the survival of the empire, because with the war, the most productive and advanced region of the empire was lost. What is more, Bulgarian armies' coming at the gates of Istanbul showed that without any Great Power support, the empire was at the edge of vanishing. As a result of facing the real danger of dissolution, CUP leaders started to think every issue in terms of survival of the state. Thus, state security, which was understood in terms of survival, became the main determinant in decision-making process.

For the CUP decision makers, the unity of Turkish/Muslim core in Anatolia was central for the integrity of the state. Any other identity was a potential threat against the existence, which made non-Muslim groups a 'security problem' in the eyes of the decision-makers. This was because there was a belief in CUP cadres that the eventual aim of the Great Powers was to divide Ottoman state in line with their interests and the Greeks and Armenians would be used against the state in this partition. Within this context, the government's primary objective was to reduce the numbers of Christians who were deemed a threat to national policy (Akçam, 2012: p.68). Here, the CUP leaders resorted to common state practice: population transfers.

Greek deportation that took place in 1913 and 1914 was not an officially declared policy but from the onset it was clear that the CUP played decisive role in forcing Greeks to move out from the Anatolia. The Anatolian Greeks was forced to migrate because the Balkan Wars had raised the suspicion over loyalty and commitment of Anatolian Greeks to the state (Yavuz, 2013: p.54). Not only Greek state's attitudes towards Muslim population in Balkans was ruthless, but also some Greek citizens of Ottoman Empire supported Greek armies against Ottoman army during the Balkan Wars. Some Greek soldiers in Ottoman Empire switched sides and some others provided logical support for Greek armies (Yavuz, 2013: p.55). As a result, the CUP forced Anatolian Greeks to leave the country by various methods: it encouraged the economic boycott against the Greeks; it provoked local Muslim population to use violence against the Greeks; it forcibly conscribed Greek man into the army; it brought heavy taxation to Greeks and it seized their property (Kontogiorgi as cited in Akçam, 2012). More importantly, the CUP placed Muslim migrants, which escaped from the violence of Balkan states during the war, to Western Anatolia where Greeks was populated. This was done on purpose to confront two groups, where the Muslim migrants would use violence against Greeks to take the revenge of what they had been exposed by Balkan states during the Balkan Wars (Akçam, 2012). The confrontation of two groups gave the CUP an upper hand in provoking the Muslim population against Greeks. Thus, although the CUP never officially declared the expulsion of the Greeks, in practice it did force them to migrate from Anatolia by official policies and by taking the advantage of the hatred of Muslim migrants against Greeks. Thus, as Akçam puts forward, 'a dual-track mechanism'¹⁴ was implemented in the deportation of the Greeks (Akçam; 2012).

The deportation policy against the Armenians could, again, best be understood under the context of CUP leaders' concerns on Ottoman survival. As mentioned above, the CUP leaders were seriously worried about Great Powers' intentions on partitioning the Ottoman territories. Their method of intervention, according to the CUP, would be through the reform demands of non-Muslim groups in Anatolia, within which Armenians, with their numerous population, was to be the key community. The developments after the Balkan Wars showed that CUP concerns were not baseless. Motivated by the success of Balkan states in the Balkan wars, Armenians began to seek for international assistance for the reforms (Akçam, 2012). They approached to Russia for this end, who also had interests in the Eastern part of Anatolia. Russia, thus, aimed to create a pro-Russian region by taking

¹⁴ Akçam describes dual-track mechanism as 'one in which a locally dominant population would, in an unspoken but seemingly reciprocal understanding, expel the subordinated ethnoreligious groups through violence and terror' (Akçam, 2012, p.67).

the advantage of the Armenian Question in Ottoman state. As a result, it openly supported Armenian revolutionary groups both before and during the first World War.

The Armenian – Russian rapprochement did not only disturb the Ottomans, but it also alarmed other powers, who worried about the excessive Russian involvement in the region. To not give an upper hand to Russia in Anatolia, a conference was held by the representatives of Great Powers in 1914 to implement a reform plan in Eastern Anatolia. According to ‘Yeniköy Accord’ eastern provinces would administratively be divided into two large provinces, and a foreign inspector would be appointed for each province. Despite their opposition, the Ottoman decision-makers signed the accord. With the signing of the treaty, in the minds of the CUP leaders, it was now certain that the Great Powers would divide the Ottoman state by using non-Muslim groups. As a result of this belief, Armenians now became the major threat to empire’s national security and territorial integrity. As Akçam (2012) points:

For the Unionist leaders, this was a fateful, perhaps fatal step, for Serbia, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria had been lost from the empire through just such a process. The Armenians, as the intended beneficiaries of these reforms, were thereafter viewed as a serious and permanent threat to the empire’s continued existence (p.131).

With the beginning of the World War, as with all the previous agreements, the Yeniköy Accord was also cancelled by the Ottoman decision-makers. Yet, with the Russian advancement into Anatolia in 1915, there was a fear in CUP cadre that the formation of pro-Russian independent Armenia was a serious probability. Thus, considering the Armenian issue, something must have been done for security concerns and for the CUP deportation was the permanent solution to overcome insecurities that were arising from Armenians.

The deportations of Greeks and Armenians created a platform where the lines between the self and other was crystallized. As Üngör puts forward, the deportation served as a proof of power for Muslims, which helped to constitute the sense of self (Üngör, 2011: 104). Thus, the expulsion of the non-Muslim other by force for security concerns, also helped to the constitution and confirmation of the Turkish/Muslim self-identity. Another result of the deportation was associating insecurity to other identities within the state. After the Balkan Wars, the others were non-Muslim groups and for the security of the state they were exposed to various population policies. As it will be seen, this turned into a new pattern in state’s demographic policies: other, associated with insecurity, would be forced to migrate by the self. Since the identity formation is a dynamic process, other and self in Ottoman/Turkish context changed over time. Yet, the pattern of forcing other groups to

migrate for security reasons remained stable in the future years. Next section shows how this pattern was also present in the Kurdish resettlement policies in the first years of the Turkish Republic.

3.3. The Resettlement of the Kurds in the Kemalist Period

This part analyzes how perception of Kurds as other generated ontological insecurity for the decision-makers in the early Republican period, and how this ontological insecurity resulted with the resettlements of the Kurds. To better present this argument, this section will first present a brief theoretical background of identity formation and ontological security. This is important to understand self/other distinction and its relation to ontological security that is made in the remaining part of the section. Then, it will present the characteristics of Turkish self-identity and how Kurdish identity started to be constituted as other to Turkish self after the Sheikh Said Rebellion. Last part analyzes Kurdish resettlements, especially focusing on the Resettlement Law of 1934 as an ontological security-seeking motive of the state.

3.3.1. (National) Self, Other and Ontological Security

Like security, identity is another contested concept (Yuval-Davis, 2010). It is not possible to provide a single definition of identity because each theoretical approach develops different definition (Lawler, 2008: p.7). Nevertheless, this section briefly analyzes key concepts in social identity literature to better understand identity (in terms of self/other) - security link in ontological security concerns of Turkish decision-makers in the Kurdish issue in the early years of the Republic.

Richard Jenkins (1996) constructs his definition of identity upon the etymologic root of the word. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, identity, which derives from Latin *idem* - same, has two meanings: ‘the sameness of objects, as in A 1 is identical to A 2 but not to B1’; and ‘the consistency or continuity over times that is the basis for establishing and grasping the definiteness and distinctiveness of something’ (Jenkins, 1996: p.17). Similarly, he also analyzes the meaning of ‘to identify’ which refers ‘to classify things or persons’; and ‘to associate oneself with, or attach oneself to, something or someone else’ (Jenkins, 1996: p.17). Based on those definitions, Jenkins emphasizes the similarity and difference as the two main criteria of the identity. According to him, identity ‘is our understanding of who we are and who other people are, and, reciprocally, other people’s

understanding of themselves and of others (which includes us)' (Jenkins, 1996, p.18). Identification, from this point of view, is 'the systematic establishment and signification, between individuals, between collectivities, and between individuals and collectivities, of relationships of similarity and difference' (Jenkins, 1996: p.18).

Two important points follow those definitions. For one thing, identity is not fixed, or primordial but it is a socio-cultural process (Jenkins, 1996: p.19). It is a social construct in the sense that it is being constructed in interaction. Second, and more importantly, since identifying one is to give a meaning and meaning always involves interaction such as communication and negotiation, 'all human identities are, by definition, social identities' (Jenkins, 1996: p.17). Social identity is a concept that needs further clarification.

It is in the 1970s that social identity started to be theorized largely to understand social psychology of group processes. According to social identity theory, 'when people define and evaluate themselves in group terms (i.e., social identity) they make intergroup social comparisons that aim to differentiate in-group from out-group' (Hogg, 2000: p.225). In this intergroup behavior, individuals favor their own groups (in-groups) against other groups (out-groups), because group membership confers social identity to individuals, which in turn give them self-esteem that they seek to maintain (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In other words, positive social identity is what individuals strive to achieve and it could be acquired by comparisons that can be made between the in-group and out-groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: p.40). Thus, 'groups distinguish themselves from others in order to promote their own positive social evaluation and collective self-esteem' (Jenkins, 1996: p.113).

Self-categorization theory is extension to social-identity theory and focuses on categorization process. It looks at cognitive underpinnings of social identity. The starting point is the categorization of self within social world. The outcome of the self-categorization process is the emphasis given on the similarities between self and other in-groupers and differences between self and out-groupers (Abrams and Hogg, 1998: p.19). Thus, 'people stereotype themselves and others in terms of salient social categorizations, leading to an enhanced perceptual identity between self and in-group members and an enhanced perceptual contrast between in-group and out-group members' (Turner, as cited in Ongur, 2010: p.136). According to Hogg and Abrams (1998) self-categorization accomplishes two things: first 'it places oneself in the relevant social category, or places the group in one's head', and second, 'it generates category-congruent behavior on dimensions which are stereotypic' (p. 19).

Although they have an essentialist understanding of identity and they overlook how identities are constructed within social contexts via discourses, narratives or performative

actions, social identity and self-categorization theories are important in the sense of showing how individuals positively regard themselves and their group in relation to other groups (Kinnvall, 2006: p.48). Favoring in-group for positive social evaluation, stereotyping in terms of social categorizations also have explanatory power for the constitution and maintaining of national identities and nationalism.

As mentioned above, similarity and difference are the dynamic principles of identification. In national identity formation too, they both have important roles. In national groups, similarities such as culture, religion or language are important to reinforce the idea of self. However, those characteristics are also important in differentiating self from the other, without which the quest for authenticity of national self would not be possible (Kedourie, 1992). To put it more clearly, 'for the nation to exist, there must be some outgroup against which the unity and homogeneity of the in-group is tested' (Triandafyllidou, 1998: p.598). Thus, beside commonalities (of culture, language, religion, history, so on), national identity would require others to constitute itself. However, other may not be a single category either. Oommen (1994), for instance, describes four categories of 'others': equal others (different but not subservient to the self), internal others (marginalized groups), deviant others (unacceptable groups) and non-equal others (the outsiders) (Oommen, as cited in Kinnvall, 2006: p.46). This study, on the other hand, deriving from Turkish context, takes a simpler categorization and uses Triandafyllidou's internal/external others categorization.

Triandafyllidou (1998), in parallel with the above assertions, conceptualizes national identity both internally and externally. Internally, the identity emphasizes the commonalities that bind the members of the nation, such as specific territory, belief in common descent and/or common culture (Triandafyllidou, 1998: p.599). However, since identities are always constituted in interaction, those inward characteristics become salient only in the presence of characteristics of other groups. Indeed, 'the history of each nation is marked by the presence of significant others that have influenced the development of its identity by means of their "threatening" presence' (Triandafyllidou, 1998: p.600). Thus, what is important in constituting the significant other is the perception of threat posed by other groups to the existence of the nation by the decision-makers. This threat could be posed to national independence, political sovereignty as well as to the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the self-identity (Triandafyllidou 1998: p.600).

According to Triandafyllidou, threat perception of the self may be reasoned by internal others and external others. Internal others are the groups that belong to the same political unity with the self. In that sense, they may be ethnic minorities, immigrant

communities or dominant or small nations within the multinational political units. External others, on the other hand, belong to separate political units. They may be rival nations which claim some part of in-group's homeland, or nations which raise claims to the in-group's cultural heritage 'by means of asserting that specific myths, symbols and/or ancestors are part of their national past' (Triandafyllidou, 1998: p.602). Since Kurds best fit to ethnic minority in this classification, how and why ethnic minorities were constituted as internal others deserve a lengthier quote:

Ethnic minorities that have participated in the constitution of the state within which the in-group forms the national majority may become significant others for the latter. Such minorities usually have distinct culture, language, traditions and myths of origin from the dominant nation to pose a threat either to the territorial integrity of its quasi nation-state, if they raise secessionist claims, or to its cultural unity and authenticity, when they assert their right to difference and thus disrupts the cultural and political order of the quasi nation state (Triandafyllidou, 1998: p.601).

This quote is important in the sense of supporting the arguments of this section. Accordingly, Kurds were perceived as internal others because of physical and ontological security concerns of decision-makers in the first years of the Republic. First, the Kurdish rebellions in the first years of the Republic threatened territorial integrity of the newly formed Republic. Second, and may be more importantly, the threats that Kurds posed were not limited to physical security considerations, but also to ontological security concerns, that is to the security of self-identity of Turks. The argument of this part is that after Sheikh Said Rebellion, Kurds started to be perceived and constructed as 'internal others', not only because they threatened the territorial integrity but also because the cultural traits of Kurdish collective identity disrupted the continuity of Turkish self-identity. The resettlements of the Kurds could be considered as diminishing those security anxieties of decision-makers. In order to understand this point, a more detailed analysis of Turkish national-identity and its relation to Kurdish identity will be made. But before, the concept of ontological security should be discussed to better elaborate the argument of this section.

The roots of ontological security lie in psychology and sociology. The term was first used by psychiatrist Ronald David Laing. According to Laing (1960/1990), ontologically secure person is one who has a 'sense of his presence as alive, whole and, in a temporal sense a continuous person' (p.39). Such an ontologically secure person will encounter the dangers of the life, whether they are social, ethical, spiritual or biological (Laing, 1960/1990: p.39). In the same manner, ontologically insecure person 'lacks the experience of his own temporal continuity' and his/her identity and autonomy is under question (Laing, 1960/1990: p.42). The concept gained more popularity with the works of sociologist

Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991). For Giddens (1990) ontological security is a very important form of feelings of security and it refers to the 'confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action' (p.92). Thus, it is related to the concept of being in general, and 'being-in-the-world' in particular. There is a close relation between trust and ontological security since both depends on reliability of persons and things.

Ontological security was introduced to IR literature by Jef Huysmans (1998). Although Huysmans borrows the term from Giddens, he does not specifically use it in Giddens's theoretical framework. For Huysmans, security studies are structured by the fear of death. In modernity, death has double mediations. First, to hide the fear of death, people objectify it. 'The general category of death is displaced by concretized dangers, inimical forces ranging from devil to criminals and rival states' (Huysmans, 1998: p.237). This founding of objects is the primary mediation of death. Second, once death is objectified, 'the fear of unknown transcends into a fear of concrete enemy or danger' and this mediation of people's relation with danger is the secondary mediation of death (Huysmans, 1998: p.237). This secondary mediation, according to Huysmans (1998), is not just a relationship to danger but also a 'mediation of our relation to uncertainty, levels of determination, etc.' (p.238).

Those mediations of death express a difference between mediations of friends and enemies and a mediation of chaos and order. Huysmans calls the former 'daily security', which frames a strategy of survival. On the other hand, he calls the latter 'ontological security', which does not 'refer to threat definition – in the sense of enemy construction – or threat management but concerns the general question of the political – how to order social relations while simultaneously guaranteeing the very activity of ordering itself' (Huysmans, 1998: p.242). Thus, ontological security 'is a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity – death as the undetermined – by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order' (Huysmans, 1998: p.242).

Later works on ontological security in IR field grounded their works more on Giddens' theoretical framework. Steele (2005, 2008), for instance, defines the concept as 'security as being' as opposition to 'security as survival' that has been dominant in traditional security conception. According to Steele (2005), 'an agent is ontologically secure when they choose course of actions comfortable with their sense of self-identity' (p.526). He, thus, conceptualizes security in terms of identity threats and how those threats could affect the security politics of states in international relations. Deriving from Giddens, he focuses on the sense of continuity and order that agents must have to be ontologically secure.

This sense of continuity and order is provided by actions that take the shape of routines, which produce trust (Steele, 2005: p.526). When ‘critical situations’ appear, the routines of the state are challenged and this creates anxiety, which threatens self-identity. Therefore, someone who suffers from anxiety is ontologically insecure and to overcome this, agents must reform behavior.

Jennifer Mitzen (2006) is another scholar who conceptualizes ontological security in IR field. Her point of departure is ontological-security seeking in individual level. Ontological security, for Mitzen, ‘is security not of the body, but of the self’ (p. 344). At the heart of ontological security lies stability and certainty. Agents’ understandings of self must be stable and uncertainty creates identity threats. Ontological insecurity ‘refers to the deep, incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore’ (Mitzen, 2006: p.345). Ontological security-seeking is, thus, the attempt to minimize this uncertainty by ‘imposing cognitive order on the environment’. As in Steele’s analysis, the routines are important to reduce uncertainty and to create trust in Mitzen’s analysis. For Mitzen, as individuals, states also seek ontological security in addition to their physical security, which is achieved by routinizing relationships with significant others. Ontological security-seeking in international relations could offer a ‘structural explanation for the apparent irrationality of conflicts among security-seekers that persist for long periods of time’, and could ‘help to addressing the problem of ending such conflicts’ (Mitzen, 2006: p.343).

Thus, both Steele and Mitzen gives personhood to state in their analysis of ontological security. What is more, they analyze ontological security in the level of states. However, ontological security works in IR literature are not only limited to state levels. Kinnvall (2004), for instance, analyzes how globalization renders individuals and societies ontologically insecure. Zarakol (2010), on the other hand, focuses on the role of international society on the identity of states. Lately, ontological security is also being studied in understanding the nature of conflicts and conflict-resolution processes both within and between the states (Rumelili, 2015). Accordingly, ontological security-seeking acts of one group within the society (if dominant, in the name of nation-state) may generate ontological insecurity for other societal groups (for such cases please see Bilgin and İnce, 2015; Çelik, 2015). Thus, as Rumelili mentions ‘conflicts place not only states, but whichever political actor is party to a conflict (rebel groups, minority and majority ethnic groups) in a state of ontological security vis-à-vis one another’ (Rumelili, 2015). Deriving from this logic, this section analyzes how ontological security-seeking considerations of the

decision-makers played a role in the resettlements of the Kurds in the early years of the Republic, especially after the Sheikh Said rebellion.

3.3.2. Turkishness as the Self Identity

To better grasp the boundaries of Turkishness and how the self-identity was constituted in the new Turkish state, this section focuses on the legal texts and parliamentary debates especially on citizenship discourses, regulations, leader speeches, party programmes, and daily practices during the both pre-Republican (1919-1923) and Republican period till Atatürk's death in 1938.¹⁵ In Turkish case, looking at multiple sources is necessary to grasp the frame of the Turkish identity because as it will be seen, Turkish identity in this period was flexible and had an indecisive character. The perception of the other was in transition because of internal and international developments, which also affected the characteristics of Turkishness. Hamdullah Suphi's speech in the Assembly in 1924 (please see below), for instance, is an example of the complex character of Turkishness. While he emphasizes religion as the defining point of Turkishness, in the same discourse he tells that non-Turks – referring to non-Muslims- could become Turk if they speak Turkish and he thus makes language as the primary determinant of Turkishness in the same speech. Deriving from these indecisive character of Turkishness, this part analyzes Turkish identity in four intersecting categories: territorial, religious, linguistic/cultural and ethnic. All of those characteristics played a role in constituting Turkish self-identity, while the emphasis on them changed according to internal and international developments in the first decade of the Republic.¹⁶

After the end of the first World War, İstanbul and İzmir were occupied respectively by Britain and Greece, and rumors were spread about the partition of Anatolia. The occupations created a public reaction among Anatolian Muslim population, which turned into an unorganized resistance movement under *Kuvay-i Milliye* (National Forces). Soon after, this unorganized resistance movement was transformed into an organized public action with which the War of Independence was fought. During this process, in 1919, some

¹⁵ The years between 1919 and 1923 refers to the establishment period of Turkish Republic. As Kaygusuz (2005) mentions, analyzing the establishment period of states is key to understand physical, cultural and political closure of their citizenship and identity policies.

¹⁶ For instance, while during the establishment period religion was dominant in defining Turkishness, after the foundation of Republic language and culture started to dominate Turkishness. In the 1930s, with the rising fascism in Germany, Italy and Eastern Europe (Hobsbawm, 1994), ethnicity started to become more important in defining the Turkish self.

Congresses were held in various parts of Anatolia in which the main objectives of the resistance were outlined. When the declaration of Sivas and Erzurum Congresses are analyzed, it will be seen that the primary emphasis made on the territorial integrity and indivisibility of the fatherland. Thus, in the eyes of state elites there was a specific territory to defend, and this territory would be the basis of the new political unity. As specified later on *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact), this territory (referred to Anatolia and some parts of Thrace) became the essential priority of the new state. Finalized in the Treaty of Lausanne, the territorial boundary became the definitive element of the Turkish nation. Since everyone living in this territory would be the citizens of the new state, Turkish citizenship had a strong territorial dimension (Kaygusuz; 2005: p.204). This led some thinkers to argue that, (besides its ethnic character), Turkish nationalism has a territorial basis (Parla and Davison, 2004: p.71). For them, the civic nature of the state was reflected in Article 88 of 1924 Constitution which reads as ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race are, in terms of citizenship, to be Turkish’. It is not wrong to claim that with this Article all inhabitants of Turkey were projected as Turkish, and territory was made one of the central component of Turkishness. Yet, a closer reading of the Article, and the parliamentary debates on it reveals that territory was not a strong determinant of Turkishness as some argue. Rather, it will be seen that, religion played more dominant role than territory in defining Turkishness.

In the draft document of the Constitution, Article 88 reads as ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turkish’. There occurred some objections to the draft document and different views were expressed in the parliamentary debates on who would be considered as Turk. For instance, Yozgat deputy Ahmet Hamdi suggested that the Article should be rephrased as ‘People of Turkey, who adopted the Turkish culture, are to be Turkish’ (TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, 20.4.1340, Session 42, Vol 8/1). However, the another deputy, Celal Nuri objected the proposition since because he believed that it violated Article 37 and Article 39 of Lausanne Treaty which states that ‘Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems’. Thus, for Celal Nuri, there would be a contradiction with Article 39 of Lausanne Treaty if ‘Turkish culture’ was added to original text.

Next, İstanbul deputy Hamdullah Suphi began to speak. He expressed his objections to draft document as follows:

We might aim to give the title of Turk anyone living in our political borders. However, as you can see, we went through very difficult struggle, and we all feel in our heart that, this struggle is not over yet. (*On the draft*) it is told that all the inhabitants of Turkish Republic are Turks. On the other hand, the government is struggling and trying to fire Rums and Armenians working in the foreign companies. How would you respond if those Rum and

Armenian elements say that ‘You cannot fire us because those people are Turkish according to the law accepted by your parliament’. There is one reality: they cannot be Turks...So my friends, this article could be used against us (TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, 20.4.1340, Session 42, Vol 8/1: p.910).

The views expressed by Hamdullah Suphi was supported by the large section of the Parliament. Following this, a new proposal was made by Hamdullah Suphi, to change the Article 88 as to read ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race are, in terms of citizenship, to be Turkish’. His proposal was accepted.

Those parliamentary discussions and Hamdullah Suphi’s reasoning reveal that in the minds of state elites, there was a distinction between the territorial nationality and ethno-religious nationality. In other words, political membership to the state and ethno-religious membership of the nation did not overlap (Çağaptay; 2006: p.14-15), and this created a dualism in the perception of Turkishness. While, on the one hand, Turkishness was legally defined regardless of religion or race, on the other hand, as Hamdullah Suphi’s speech exposes, non-Muslim groups of the country were not accepted within the Turkish self-identity. Thus, debates of Article 88 shows that ‘real’ Turkishness was only open to Muslims living in the country. Non-Muslims, conversely, could not be Turks, but only Turkish citizens. This signifies the significance of religion in the definition of Turkishness.

Indeed, the first indications of the link between Turkishness and Islam could be seen during the period of the War of Independence. As a result of homogenization of Anatolia’s religious composition, the concept of Turk started to be associated with Muslim communities of Anatolia. In most instances Turkish nation was used interchangeably with Muslim communities. A parliamentary discussion in 1920 reveals the situation clearly. Accordingly, the deputy Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi to be sure of what is understood by Turk requested from the parliament to clarify the meaning of Turk. He states that:

As far as I understand, whenever Turkish history was mentioned in this platform, what is meant is various Islamic groups such as Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Laz, isn’t it? (The crowd shouts yes it is, applauds). If this is not what Turk means, I request the wording of Islamic elements instead of Turk during the speeches (TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, 9.2.1336, Session: 10, Vol:2).

This parliamentary discussion is very crucial in the sense of showing that how Turk is understood in the minds of people in the early 1920. Accordingly, it reveals that the name Turk is used as an umbrella identity for the all Muslim groups living in the country. This belief also continued in the Republican period and ‘the legacy of the Millet system led the Kemalists to view all Anatolian Muslims as Turks’ (Çağaptay, 2006: p.102).

The constituent role of Islam in political identity was also emphasized during the War of Independence. The first Article of *Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafı-I Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Societies for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia) supports this idea: ‘all the Muslim elements living in Ottoman territory are genuine brothers who are full of feelings of respect for and devotion to each other and are respectful to each other’s social and ethnic norms and local condition’ (Igdemir, cited in Yegen; 2006: p.126).

Therefore, even during the War of Independence period, it was clear that religion was to play a constituent role in the new Turkish identity because Ottoman (Turkish) territory was a Muslim land, and those Muslim elements living in the state were called Turks. As a result, it can be claimed that, just before the foundation of the new state, Turk referred to a supra-identity for the Muslim groups living in the empire. Thus, taking over the ‘millet system’ mentality of the Ottoman Empire, new Turkish state saw Muslim majority as its societal ground and it created homogeneity and unitary citizenship on the basis of Muslim identity (Kaygusuz, 2005).

The religion as constituent element of Turkish identity was always reconstructed by the state policies in the first years of the Republic. Population policies of the period is worth to examine in this sense. During the Lausanne Treaty meetings right after the War of Independence, there was a strong public opinion on the expulsion of non-Muslim groups from the country. Most of the parliamentary members were also favoring the deportation of non-Muslims, because they thought they had an impact in the demise of the Ottoman Empire (Yıldırım, 2006: p.64). The public pressure reinforced the idea of exchange of Greeks of Asia Minor with Muslims living in Greece. It was apparent that Greek government had similar intentions about the exchange and as a result, in Lausanne an agreement on the population exchange was reached between the parties. The population exchange with Greece indicates the importance of religion for the state elites in the substance of Turkish identity. The exchange was realized on the basis of religion: while Muslim groups were accepted to Turkey, the non-Muslims were expelled. The religion was so significant in defining Turkishness that even Turkish speaking Orthodox group of Karamanlis were deported to Greece. In the same manner, in 1936, the demand of immigration by Orthodox Gagauz Turks from Rumania was refused (Çağaptay, 2006). While those Turkic groups were not authorized to live in Turkey, the government did not hesitate to accept non-Turkish Muslim groups to country, such as Pomaks and Bosnians, which had no common point with Turks apart from religion. Naturalization policies also exposes the central role of religion for Turkish identity. Accordingly, during the 1920s and 1930s, conversion to Islam was one

of the most important prerequisite to become a Turkish citizen. Many non-Muslims were given Turkish citizenship after they converted to Islam (Çağaptay, 2006: p.75-78).

In short, the discourses and policies of the pre-Republican period and first years of the Republic shows the primacy of religion in the Turkishness. Turkish was designed as supra-identity of all the Muslim groups living in Turkish territory. Recognizing minority status only to non-Muslim groups in Lausanne Treaty signifies that in the mind of the founders of the Republic other Muslim groups could be assimilated into Turkish identity due to the common religious background. They probably considered Islam as a mean to provide homogenization and thus, religion established the foundation of social unity.

Although Islam was seen as the mainstay of the Turkish identity, it was not the only criteria to define Turkishness. As the discourses and practices of the period indicate, language and culture were other essential elements of Turkish self for the states elites. Language had specific significance for Turkish nationalism because the latter had been prevailed as a linguistic movement at the end of the 19th century. The literary groups such as Genç Kalemler (Young Pens) and Yeni Lisancılar (New Language) initiated a language reform which aimed to simplify Turkish to ease the communication among different groups. Those groups thought that this would help to establish the national solidarity.¹⁷

Here, the role of writer, sociologist and political thinker Ziya Gökalp in Turkish nationalism should specifically be mentioned, since his ideology shaped nationalist policies of both the CUP and the Kemalist period. Having started his career in Genç Kalemler, Ziya Gökalp advocated the simplification of Turkish and the use of spoken İstanbul intellect as the written language. The purpose of Ziya Gökalp and those upholding language simplification was to ‘help to disseminate ideas to the common people’ so that the unity of Ottoman Empire could be maintained (Aydingün and Aydingün, 2004: p.419). With the purification and simplification, publications in Turkish addressed more people, which made a contribution to the ‘imagination’ of Turkish nation, especially among political and administrative elite. Thus, ‘attempts to create a new language that would unify the Ottoman Empire ultimately led to the creation of modern Turkey’ (Aydingün and Aydingün, 2004: p.421).

In time, not only literary ideas but also sociological and political ideas of Gökalp echoed among Young Turk circle. As a sociologist, he was concerned with the concepts of nation, civilization and he tried to adopt those concepts to Turkish context. He was heavily influenced from French positivism and especially Durkheim’s teachings. As a result, his

¹⁷ For these literary movements, national solidarity referred to the Ottoman unity that had been disrupted by nationalist movements at the end of the 19th century.

view of nation reflected French model which focused on the role of culture, rather than ethnicity. For him a nation ‘is not a racial or ethnic or geographic or political or volitional entity, but is composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality and aesthetics; that is to say, of those who have received the same education’ (Gökalp, 1968: p.15). Since promotion of a single culture through education has primary importance for being a nation, language through which a standardized education to the masses could be possible became the cornerstone of Gökalp’s philosophy. Thus, for Gökalp, one could be accepted as Turk if s/he is educated as Turks, s/he could express himself in Turkish, and s/he shares the Turkish ideal (Gökalp, 1980: p.37; Gökalp, 1968: p.16). In other words, for Gökalp, nation is a socialization through language and culture.

These ideas of Gökalp became the common sense of Kemalist nationalist ideology and his views on language and culture could be traced in the discourses of the 1920s and the 1930s. Hamdullah Suphi’s speech during the parliamentary debates of Article 88 of 1924 Constitution reveals the importance of language in Turkishness. As mentioned above, Suphi was against the labeling of Rums and Armenians as Turks in the constitution, since basically they were not Turks. His speech follows up with the pre-conditions of becoming Turk:

Someone (meaning a Jew), an old friend of mine, asked me ‘Could you please tell me, how can I become Turk?’ I said ‘You can become a Turk’. As long as Jews, who were expelled from Spain and came here with Spanish language, accept the (Turkish) language of the country, and the Turkish schools as their own, they could be Turks...Adopt Turkish culture. After that we can call you Turks (TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, 20.4.1340, Session 42, Vol 8/1: p.909).

Suphi’s speech reveals the essentiality of language and culture in Turkishness. Accordingly, Turkish identity is not closed to other groups; yet, becoming Turkish could only be possible under the circumstances of speaking Turkish, and adopting Turkish culture. The closure of Turkishness to non-Turkish speakers was also expressed by Atatürk in 1931:

One of the significant characteristics of the nation is language. One, who regards himself as a member of the Turkish nation, should before everything and in any case speak Turkish. If someone who does not speak Turkish claim membership to Turkish culture and community, it would not be right to believe in this (Vakit, 19 February 1931, as cited in Çağaptay, 2006).

Again, the same year, Recep Peker, the General Secretary of Republican People’s Party (CHP), in his speech to college students told that: ‘We need to express our ideas on

Christian and Jewish citizens with equivocal clarity... Our party sees these citizens as Turks as long as they participate in the unity of language and ideals' (Parla: 1995, p.108).

The idea of language and culture as the constituting element of Turkishness was also reflected in CHP programmes. In 1927 party programme, the unity in language, and in ideal was defined as the strongest link among the citizens and the objective of the party was specified as 'to spread and improve... Turkish language and Turkish culture' (Erdoğan Aydın, 2000: p.24). Moreover, the membership to the party could only be possible if one accepted the Turkish culture, and all the principles of the party. In 1931 programme, besides adopting culture, 'speaking Turkish' was also added as another condition of being a party member. These programmes tell that language and culture were sine que non elements of Turkishness for the state elites in the mid and late 1920s and the 1930s.

Speaking Turkish as a constituent element of Turkishness was also seen in daily practices. By the late 1920s, an unofficial campaign was started by the Student Association of Law School of Istanbul University. The name of the campaign was 'Citizen, Speak Turkish' and it invited everybody to speak Turkish in public places. The campaign reflected the general atmosphere of the period and in that sense it had a societal and political basis. In 1925, the municipality of Bursa and in 1927, the municipality of Balıkesir had begun to impose fines to those who were failing to speak Turkish in public areas (İnce, 2012: p.60). In other cities, where non-Muslim population was high, organizations such as Turkish Hearts were forcing people to speak Turkish. It was apparent that they were encouraged by the Prime Minister İnönü's speech at the annual convention of the organization. İnönü had declared the importance of speaking Turkish for the government which 'was going to transform all those who lived inside Turkey into Turks, at the cost of no matter what happens' (Çağaptay, 2006: p.25). With the campaign, signs were posted in all over public places such as ferries, theaters, restaurants which asked everyone to speak Turkish. However, the campaign was more than just 'recommendation'; rather, in many places, minorities that do not speak Turkish were harassed. There were public insults and beatings of non-Muslims who did not speak Turkish. Moreover, during the 1930s, in Mersin, where there was a large non – Turkish community, people were being fined for speaking languages other than Turkish (Çağaptay, 2006: p.59). This means that, the campaign's unofficial character turned into a state policy, where the state legally imposed the speaking of Turkish in public.

In short, the discourses and practices of the period signify that, beside religion, language and culture emerged as the primary foundations of Turkishness. Following Gökalp's teachings, the Kemalist nationalism saw culture as the basis of the nation. For

Gökalp, the unity in ideal and feeling could only be possible when the people were gathered around a single culture and a single language. For this reason, for the state elites, speaking Turkish was extremely important to construct the unity of the new nation. As Şeref Aykut, a deputy in parliament, mentioned in the 1930s, those who speak Turkish could be within the 'real' Turkish circle and the 'others' could be Turkish as long as they spoke Turkish (Aykut, 2008).

Although the Turkish nation designed by Gökalp was inclusionary and assimilationist, as a result of domestic and international developments, Kemalist nationalism took more exclusionary character in the 1930s by making ethnicity and race as the important characteristics of Turkish identity. Two factors were determinant in the creation of this ethno-racialist outlook: first, the general political atmosphere of the Eastern Europe in the interwar period influenced Turkey. In the 1930s, East European states went through radicalization of nationalism and shifted to authoritarian, corporatist and fascist ideologies (Çağaptay, 2006: p.65). The authoritarian and nationalist ideology of Eastern Europe did influence Turkish politics, which the latter relied more on ethno-racialist discourses/practices while defining its identity. Second, Kurdish rebellions showed that the assimilation into Turkishness would not be as voluntary as state elites had considered. Kurds' unwillingness to accept Turkish culture and language created a reaction in Turkish nationalism which started to see self/other more in terms of ethnicity. The distinctiveness and superiority of Turkish race vis-à-vis other nations was the dominant discourse of the 1930s (Parla and Davison, 2004: p.68-80). Thus, as Parla and Davison (2004) puts forward, Kemalist discourse reveals that Turkish nation is not only defined by social norms of culture and ethos, but also by ethno-racial characteristics. The speech made by Mahmut East Bozkurt, a prominent Kemalist ideologue, in 1930 is useful to understand the role of ethnicity in Turkish nationalism: 'We live in the freest country in the world... Turk is the ultimate master and ultimate owner of this country. Those who are not genuine Turks can have only one right in Turkish fatherland, and that is to be servant, to be slave. Both friend and foe, and even the mountains should know this' (Çoşkun: 2015)

Those discourses of state elites had constituting effects in state policies during the interwar period. Turkishness was closed to non-Turks by many laws. For instance, with the law on government employees, to be Turk was made the precondition to be a government employee. Similarly, doctors, nurses and dentists had to be Turk in order to practice medicine (Çağaptay: 2006: p.69). Again, with the press law in 1931 only Turks were entitled to own magazines and journals (Çağaptay: 2006: p.70).

The constituting role of ethnicity of Turkishness could also be traced in population and immigration policies. Even though Turkey accepted Muslim groups to its territory with the thought that it could assimilate them, the non-Turkish Muslim groups were always surveilled not to establish majority in a specific region. The fact that those groups were always mixed with Turkish population shows the essentiality of Turkish ethnicity for the state elites in constructing the Turkish identity.

Another such indicator was the executive act of ‘Statute on Exemptions from Settlement’ that passed in 1934. Accordingly, Article 3 and Article 4 of the act stated that

Article 3: Turkish consulates, *without approval from the Ministry of Interior*, could give immigration visas to *people who belong to Turkish race*, on the condition that the latter shall not ask for any help for settlement from the government...

Article 4: *Those who are not from Turkish race but belongs to Turkish culture*, even if they promise not to ask for governmental help for their settlement... will not be given immigration visas by the consulates unless *they take the approval of Ministry of Interior*’ (Çağaptay, 2006: 95-97, emphasis added)

As it is clear in the act, the Turkish race became more important than culture in immigration policies during the 1930s. The state could easily rely on Turkish race, but it had doubts on non-Turks even if they were part of Turkish culture. This means that with the 1930s, Turkish nationalism moved away from Gökalp’s nation idea who perceived nation in cultural terms. Rather, it took more ethno-racist path began to define Turkishness more with Turkish race/ethnicity.

3.3.3. Kurdishness as the ‘Internal Other’

This section, in a historical context, analyzes the construction of Kurdish identity as the ‘other’ by the founding elites of the Republic. It will be argued that Sheik Said rebellion which broke out in 1925 in some Kurdish cities was a breaking point in constituting the Kurds as ‘internal others’. This is because the rebellion threatened the security of the new Republic not only in the sense of traditional survival logic, but also in the sense of ontological security. It will be put forward that the state-elites saw Kurdish identity as a threat to newly formed Turkish identity; and the former threatened the ‘constituency of the story’ that the Turkish self tells itself about who it is (Steele; 2008). In the short term, this threat conceptualization started the forced assimilation policies against the Kurds by which their ethnic characteristics would be melted within Turkishness. In the long run, constituting the Kurds as a threat to Turkish self-identity made them permanent

internal others during generations which resulted with exclusionary state practices. This part explores how and why the Kurdish identity was constituted as a threat to state's ontological security during the first decade of the Republic and how this ontological insecurity motivated the Turkish state to exercise forced relocation policies against the Kurds.

To understand the role of Sheikh Said rebellion in making the Kurds as internal others, the state's views of the Kurds before 1925 should be analyzed. There are indications that Kurds' ethnic and political rights were to be recognized by the state elites during and after the War of Independence. As mentioned above, the first article of ARMHC, the political nucleus of RPP during the War of Independence, mentions that 'all the Muslim elements living on Ottoman territory are respectful to each other's social and ethnic norms and local conditions' (Igdemir, cited in Yegen; 2006: p. 126). Soon later, in Amasya Protocol, it was made clear that by Muslim elements it was meant Turks and Kurds. The protocol defined Ottoman territory as 'the land which are inhabited by the Kurds and the Turks'. Moreover, the document recognized the ethnic and social rights of the Kurds (Unat, 1961: p.361).

Again, in a closed session of National Assembly in 1920, the local administrations are defined as necessary for domestic and foreign policy in areas where the Kurds are inhabited (TBMM, Gizli Celse Zabıtları, 22.7.1338, Session 1, Vol 21: p.551). This idea was also repeated by Atatürk on 1922, who declared that the respect to ethnic and social rights is the mainstay of domestic politics (Arsan, 1959: p.221). It is also claimed that Atatürk sent many mails to Kurdish tribal chieftains during the War of Independence to fight against Armenians and Greeks that were under the control of Great Powers together. In those mails, he emphasized the ethnic and cultural rights of the Kurds (Jwaideh, as cited in Bruinessen, 1992: 407; also mentioned in the interview made by Ferda Çilalioğlu, who claimed that a mail was sent to her grandfather during the War of Independence). Thus, it was apparent that Republican elites did not see local autonomy of Kurds as a problem to their administration before 1923. This idea was legalized with the 1921 Constitution, the Article 11 of which mentions that 'the cities have autonomy and legal personality in local affairs'.

When the War of Independence was over, the Republican elites followed a nationalist line with intense centralization and denied the ethnic rights of the Kurds. Yet, this should not be understood as the Kurds were seen as other before 1925. As mentioned above, the new state was mostly designed as an entity for all the Muslim elements of Anatolia. Turkishness was a supra-identity for the all Muslim groups. The parliamentary discourses and legal texts of the period indicate that there was not any exclusionary practice

against the Kurds. Rather, it was non-Muslim groups which were exposed to ‘otherness’ and were labeled as internal strangers. As made clear in Hamdullah Suphi’s speech in 1924 constitutional debate (please see above), it was non-Muslim groups whose Turkishness was under question.

Yet, a clear shift happened in state-elites’ perspective about Kurds after the Sheikh Said Rebellion. Between the years of 1922 and 1925, the new elites adopted many laws which annoyed the Kurds. The abolition of the sultanate in 1922 and the caliphate in 1924 disturbed conservative Sunni Muslim Kurds and broke Kurds’ sentimental ties with the Turks. Again in this period, the new republic limited the use of Kurdish in schools and in the courts. Moreover, the governors of Kurdish cities were assigned from Ankara and they were all Turks. What is more, there were efforts of dismantling tribal system by settling tribal chieftains to Western parts of the country (Bruinessen, 1992: p.414-416). Those nationalist and centralist policies caused a reaction among the Kurds, which resulted with the Sheikh Said Rebellion.

It appears that the rebellion was spread rapidly in the region as a result of Turkish state’s unpreparedness to the situation, especially in northern part of Diyarbakır¹⁸. In two weeks’ time, the Sheikh’s man captured small districts without any struggle. This position alarmed Ankara government which first declared mobilization of the army and then proclaimed martial law in the region. Since he was accused of following soft policies against the rebels, the Prime Minister Fethi Okyar was forced to resignation. İsmet İnönü, who was known with his harsh attitude, was assigned as the new PM. Law on the Maintenance of Order, which gave the government exceptional powers was declared. Independence Tribunals in rebellion region and in Ankara was formed to execute people who, directly or indirectly, involved to the rebellion.¹⁹ After these legal and political changes, the government began to suppress the rebellion very harshly and at the end of the March 1925, seven weeks after its start, the insurrection lost its haste and in April the rebellion was totally controlled by the government.

The rebellion pressured the Turkish government, which came out of a major war and which was dealing with reform movements. However, although, rebellion threatened physical security of the state, it was restricted in scope. For one thing, the rebellion was not spread to the whole Kurdish area; rather, it was restrained in a region where Zaza

¹⁸ In the first days of the rebellion, the government perceived it as a regular brigandage activity. Moreover, the army’s mobilization took time and in this period Sheikh and his man captured more districts. For more about the details of the rebellion please see ‘*Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları I*’, 1992, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları

¹⁹ Later these tribunals turned into a tool of suppressing all the political opposition (Çağlayan, 2014).

speaking Kurdish Sunni Muslims were influential. Alevites, who saw Sunni extremism as a threat, did not support the rebellion. Some Alevite tribes and several influential Sunni tribes in the region took action against the rebels and fought with them (Bruinessen, 1992: p.428). On the other hand, the rebellion posed a greater threat to ontological security of the state because the rebellion disrupted the constituting characteristics of Turkish self-identity. The decision-makers in the early Republican period were in the process of constructing Turkey as a modern, secular state for all the Muslim groups in Anatolia. They had thought that Muslim groups could be assimilated into Turkishness due to religious bond. Turkish culture and language could play important role in the assimilation (Çağaptay, 2006). However, the religious characteristic of the rebellion against the modern reforms of the new Republic and the fact that the rebellion was taken by a Muslim group created a serious rupture in the identity narratives of state elites. Moreover, the rebellion revealed the presence of groups who did not speak Turkish and more importantly, who did not want to adopt Turkish culture. As a result, state elites perceived rebellion as a threat to the sense of self and to the Turkishness that state elites were trying to constitute. Thus, there was an existential threat; not only against the physical security, but also against the ontological security of the state.

The perception of rebellion as a threat to self-identity was well reflected in the final decision speech of the chairman of the Court of Independence;.

Your political reaction and rebellion were destroyed immediately by the decisive acts of government of the Republic and by the fatal strokes of the Republican army...Everybody must know that as the young Republican government will definitely not condone any cursed action like incitement and *political reactionism*, it will prevent this sort of banditry by means of its precise precautions. The poor people of this region who have been exploited and oppressed under the domination of *sheiks* and *feudal landlords* will be freed from your incitements and evil and they will follow the efficient paths of our Republic which promises *progress* and *prosperity* (Aybars, cited in Yeğen, 2006: p.128, emphasis added).

As made clear in this text, the factor threatening ‘the Republic which promises progress and prosperity’ (self-identity) was specified as political reactionism, which referred to political demands based on religion, and tradition. Such an understanding inescapably had one major consequence: it shifted the axis of security from rebellion to Kurdish ethnicity because all those characteristics of religion and tradition, such as the role of sheikhs, and landlords, were constituting important parts of Kurdish political and social identity. Religion had a special place in Sunni Muslim identity and sheiks had important social and political roles among Sunni Muslim Kurds (Bruinessen, 1992). Tribes had been the most influential political organization in the Kurdish region since centuries (Jwaideh, 1961/1999). Thus, what threatened the security of Turkey was actually the distinctive features of Kurdish

identity. It is the ontological security concern of Turkish state that constituted Kurds as other and as long as they have been seen as other, they have been perceived as threats.

Thus, the constituent characteristics of Kurdish identity was perceived as threat against Turkish state's realization of its self-identity because it disrupted the 'temporal continuity' of the self. Thus, it generated ontological insecurity for the decision-makers of the early Republican period. If it was the characteristics of Kurdishness which made it a threat to ontological security, then, to eliminate this threat, those characteristics that emanated from being Kurd should have been eliminated. This policy of assimilation against Kurds (Heper, 2007) could be considered in this context and one of the most important part of this assimilation process was the forced resettlement of the Kurds to the western part of the country.

3.3.4. The Resettlement of the Kurds

The resettlement of the Kurds could be considered as the steadiness of the policy of population transfer as a security practice of the state policy under the Ottoman Empire. As it was mentioned, during the Ottoman rule, especially Muslim groups were transferred within the country to consolidate the state's power in newly conquered (non-Muslim) territories. Here, the strategic calculations played the most important role. The main objective of the Empire was to prevent the rise of alternative power centers; and thus, the Empire was always trying to establish a balance between different groups in various parts of the country (Dündar; 2011). As a result, the decision-makers of the Ottoman Empire were always moving population to create an equilibrium and to prevent any groups' becoming dominant in one region.

It was during the CUP period that security/identity link started to appear in population policies. After the Balkan Wars, non-Muslims began to be labelled as 'treacherous elements', while the Muslims was seen as the 'dominant element' of the society. However, the nature of insecurity the non-Muslim groups pose was to the physical existence of the state rather than to identity. From the CUP perspective, those groups foremost threatened the integrity and physical security of the state by collaborating with other states (Russia in the case of Armenia; Greece in the case of Greek-Orthodox) and made the separation of the state a possibility. This is why their deportation was necessary for decision-makers through which the risks to state's physical security would be minimalized.

It is with the Kurdish resettlements after the Sheikh Said Rebellion that ontological security concerns began to play role in state's population policies. Until the rebellion, between the years of 1922-1925, the decision-makers had thought that each Muslim nationality within the country could be assimilated into Turkishness due to common religious link. As Ottoman identity was a supra-identity for all the different religious and ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire, a modern, secular Turkish identity could have been a supra-identity for all the Muslim groups in the new Turkish state. However, the insurgent showed that such thought would not be prevalent in the new state. The rebellion demonstrated Kurds' unwillingness to be assimilated into Turkishness and their insistence on carrying their own identity. The presence of a different identity with different social, cultural and political characteristics posed a serious threat to the sense of consistency, continuity and order of Turkish self-identity. Against its 'modern', 'secular', 'civilized', 'central', 'national' identity; there was a 'backward', 'feudal', 'reactionist', 'barbarian' (as mentioned by the chairman of the Court of Independence) Kurdish identity in within the fatherland that did not speak Turkish and that did not want to be a part of Turkish culture. The characteristics of Kurdish identity threatened the order and consistency of the Turkish self. Population policy was used as the primary tool of the elimination of this threat during the Republican period.

Thus, it is no surprise that it is after the Sheikh Said Rebellion that many reports were prepared by state agents about the region to know the Kurds and Kurdish region better and to eliminate the future threats that may arise in this province. The first report was written by Abdulhalik Renda shortly after the insurgent. In his report, Renda focused on Kurdish presence in the region: its population and the intensity of the use of Kurdish language. Having noticed the extensive Kurdish influence, Renda proposes policies 'to make Turkish population and Turkish influence dominant' in the province (Yıldırım, 2011: p.7). According to Renda, the most important step of this policy would be the transfer of Turkish population to the strategic axes where the Kurds were populated. The Turks could be transferred to the remaining Armenian residences; or fertile land could be opened to residency to settle them. The establishment of Turkish villages in strategic axes was particularly important for Renda to make Turks and Turkish language dominant. While proposing the settlement of the Turks, Renda also proposed the expulsion of insurgents and their relatives from the region.

Simultaneously, the Minister of Interior Affairs Cemil Ubaydın wrote his own report which proposed harsh demographic policies for the district. He recommended the transfer of 'tribal leaders, sheiks, overlords, brigands, rebels, supporters of foreign powers

and the notables of Kurdistan' into the Western part of the country with their families (Bayrak, 2009: p.109-121). Following this, Turkish immigrants from Balkan states should be settled in the Kurdish lands, and those immigrants should be economically backed by the government so that economic and political domination of the Turks could be possible (Üngör, 2011: p.134). Moreover, according to Ubaydın, Kurdish civil servants should be deported immediately and the bureaucracy should be controlled by the Turks in the region.

Two weeks after Renda and Ubaydın reports, in September 1925, the government declared the 'Reform Report for the East' which incorporated the suggestions of Ubaydın and Renda's reports. According to the Article 5 of the Report, Turkish immigrants who came from the Balkans would be settled to remaining Armenian residences in the east and south-east regions where Kurds were populated. If the Kurds had already occupied those properties, they would be forced to evacuate. According to the Article 9, the people who were thought to provoke and support the rebellion, or who were not found suitable to reside in the region by the government, would be transferred to the specified neighborhoods in the west with their families.

The government began to imply those policies immediately. In 1925, the local elites and rich landholders were exiled from their territories and those territories were either distributed to peasants or seized by the Treasury Department (Çağlayan, 2014). The deportation of influential families went on in 1926 as well. However, it is only in 1927 that the government adopted a planned resettlement strategy for the forced settlement of the Kurds in the western parts of the country. With the law No 1097 – Law Regarding the Transportation of Certain Persons from the Eastern Regions to the Western Provinces - the government aimed to destroy the feudal/tribal structure in the East. During the discussions of the law, İsmet İnönü expressed the necessity of the Law as follows:

The tribalism that has been existent in the country since the Ottomans does not suit the administration of the Republic. This law is necessary to dissolve tribal administration whereby the implementation of necessary reforms, the increasing confidence of the people to the state, and the prevention of rebels in various parts of the country will be possible (İlyas, 2014: p.335).

Therefore, the Law clearly targeted the tribal structure. It 'decreed the deportation of 1400 persons and their families, and 80 rebel families from the eastern martial law region to the western provinces for administrative, military and societal reasons' (Üngör, 2011: p.141). The deportees were obliged to settle within the boundaries of a specific area of settlement which were assigned to them by the government. On the other hand, as in the deportations

of the previous two years, the properties of the deportees (houses, apartments) were transferred to state treasury and some of the lands of chieftains, and families were distributed to peasants.

Since it aimed to dissolve the tribal structure, the Law No 1097 mainly targeted the expulsion of tribal chieftains and influential families in the region. According to one estimation, between the years of 1920 and 1932, 2774 Kurdish people was resettled in the western part (Çağaptay, 2006: p.86). Moreover, only after six months of its declaration the Law No 1097 was dismantled and the people were given permission to return to their homelands.

The 1930s saw radical changes in state policies. The unending Kurdish rebellions since 1925, the rising authoritarian/fascist regimes in the Eastern Europe such as in Germany, Italy Austria and Hungary and the socio-economic problems arising from the Great Depression (Carruthers, 2001) directed Turkey towards a more nationalist line. Nationalism, in turn, redefined the Turkish identity and identity/security relationship. As a result of nationalism, Turkish state constituted new narratives and stories that helped to restructure the image of the Turkish self. This was necessary because as McSweeney (1999) asserts the collective identity's capacity to stand as 'fact of politics depends entirely on the capacity of the group to sustain the story of belonging and solidarity which defines it in space and time' (p.163). Thus, as Subotic expresses, those narratives were mobilizational and they 'encouraged a sense of groupness and solidarity' (Subotic, 2015: p.3). This sense of groupness and solidarity was necessary for the Turkish state after the increasing Kurdish rebellions between the years of 1925 and 1930 because it is specifically at times of great stress and trauma that autobiographical narratives are needed to provide comfort and relief (Kinnvall, 2004). The Kurds' challenge of state authority, and their refusal of Turkish identity went against the constitution of stories which 'proved' the supremacy of Turkishness. The most important autobiographical narrative in this period was no doubt the Turkish History.²⁰ With the thesis, it was claimed that Turks were 'the ancestors of all brachycephalic peoples, including Indo – Europeans, whose origins went back to Central Asia, where Turks had created a bright civilization' (Çağaptay, 2006: p.51). With their immigration into Europe, Northern Africa and Anatolia, these Turks carried this civilization into these new territories. Thus, Turkish race was the inheritor of all the civilizations from

²⁰ The Kurdish rebellions were not the only, and indeed not the major, reason of the Turkish Historical Thesis. At the late 1920s, in European public opinion, there were claims that Turks do not belong to 'white race' but to 'yellow race'. As Afet İnan's memoirs indicates Mustafa Kemal tried to refute this claim and assigned İnan to prove the inaccuracy of those ideas. Turkish History Thesis was primarily constituted to prove Turks belong the 'white race' (Copeaux, 1999).

Greek to Egyptian, Roman to Hittites. By establishing a link between Turkish migration and Anatolia the thesis was proving the Turkishness of Anatolia in a historical context to disclaim the territorial claims of the Greeks, Armenians and the Kurds in Anatolia. The thesis was supported with the ‘Sun Language Theory’ which claimed that Turkish was the mother tongue of the language of all the ancient Anatolian civilizations.

Thus, the 1930s was a period of constitution of new narratives that constructed the Turkish identity. During this period of the sanctification of the Turkish race the existence of the other groups in the country were perceived as a threat to national security because it was a threat to the sense of the self that the state was trying to constitute by narratives. The best way to eliminate the threat and to provide security was, therefore, to make those groups Turks. The Resettlement Law of No 2510 that passed on June 1934 should be read from the perspective of Turkifying the Kurds so that the threat to the image of the Turkish self would be eliminated. During the discussions of the law in the parliament, this objective was made clear by the Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya, who said that ‘this (resettlement) Law will create a country which speaks with one language, which thinks in unity and which feels in the same manner’ (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 14 January 1934, Session IV, Volume: 23: p.141).

Since in the Turkish Historical Thesis the Turks were designed as the most ancient group and the only heir of Anatolia, the acceptance of the existence of other ethnicities in this land would create a disjuncture in the narrative that establish the image of self. Thus, although the Law’s main objective was to Turkify the Kurds, it denied the ethnic existence of the Kurds. To overcome this duality, the text of the Law did not use the name ‘Kurd’. Rather, Kurds were defined through the characteristic of being non-Turk: such as ‘nomads who are *not culturally Turkish*’ (Article 9), ‘people whose mother tongue *is not Turkish*’ (Article 11), ‘people who are *not from Turkish race*’ (Article 7). This ‘not being culturally Turkish’ situation should be ‘fixed’ by the reorganization of the residency based on the loyalty to Turkish culture (Article 1). To accomplish this task, the Law designated three areas in Turkey:

- Zone No 1: places where the gathering of culturally Turkish population is wanted;
- Zone No 2: places which are assigned to the transfer and settlement of the population whose assimilation into Turkish culture is wanted;
- Zone No 3: Places that are forbidden to settlement and residence due to sanitary, economic, cultural, political, military and security reasons (İskan Kanunu, No. 2510, Article 2)

Broadly speaking, Zone 1 areas referred to places in the East where the Kurds were populated, and Zone 2 referred to places in the West where Turks were populated. By the

law, ‘anyone who do not share Turkish culture’ were banned to relocate in Zone 1 areas. Only ‘culturally Turkish people’, or ‘people who are from Turkish race but who forgot Turkish language’ were permitted to settle in Zone 1 areas (Article 12). In Zone 2 areas, ‘people who are not from Turkish race’, or ‘who are not culturally Turkish’ will be settled in a way that they will not establish the majority (Article 9, Article 14). Moreover, the people whose mother tongue is not Turkish were prohibited to establish village or neighborhood, worker or artisan associations in Zone 2 areas (Article 11).

Therefore, the Law aimed to annihilate the Kurdish collective identity in Anatolia by detaching Kurds from Kurdish spatiality. What is more interesting, according to law, the forced settlement was not the only strategy to accomplish this task. The destruction of collective identity of the Kurds was also realized by delegitimizing traditional tribal life and sheikdom that were crucial in constituting Kurdish social, political and cultural identity. The tribes had been the independent socio-political administrative structure for centuries in the Kurdistan geography (Jwaideh, 1961/1999). They were the political institutions with some measure of territorial integrity. Sheiks, on the other hand, were very crucial figures in social, cultural and political life. They succeeded to turn their religious power into political power by filling the power vacuum that the dissolution of Kurdish principalities created in the 19th century (Bruinessen, 1992). Due to the strong allegiances of the masses to the sheiks they became very important political figures in Kurdistan. From this perspective, the abolishment of tribes and sheiks by the law could be read as an effort to destroy Kurdish collective identity. Because tribal chieftains and sheiks were seen crucial parts of Kurdish collective identity, they were exposed to harsher measures with the law: their properties were seized by the state (Article 10) and they were not given permission to return to their lands even after ten years²¹ (Article 29).

As a last point, beside this internal context, international context of the period and its relation to population policy should also be mentioned when analyzing Kurdish resettlements to better grasp the background in which forced relocation became possible. With the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the borders of modern Turkey were concluded, meaning that the sovereignty of the new Republic was recognized. This was the constitution of Turkey as a territory (and nation) based political system in the form of Westphalian state system. In this system, decision-making only resided in the political will or consent of the population and nobody else had any right to intervene in the affairs of the country without the consent of the political will (Jackson, 1999: p.444). Thus, contrary to contemporary

²¹ Normally, those that were deported could return to their lands after ten years.

politics, where decision-makers are restricted by international norms and regulations in topics considering human rights, there was no outside force which could have affected the decision of the rulers in the late 1920s and 1930s. On the contrary, it could be argued that population policies had a legitimate base in international society during the inter-war years.

One of the most significant peace settlement after the first World War was Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points'. The most salient principle for world politics in 'Fourteen Points' was the principle of national self-determination, which aimed the formation of new states in ethno-cultural terms in the geography of Habsburg and Ottoman empires. However, the principle was problematic in the sense that no nation was situated on one particular territory; rather in most of the cases, there were lots of nations which were sharing the same territory. Thus, with the new boundaries came not only new nation-states but also new ethnic minorities within those states. However, according to Preece, those minorities 'could potentially threaten territorial division of the postwar settlement through irredentism and sepeparation' (Preece, 1994: p.823). It is in these terms that population transfers were seen legitimate means to overcome this minority problem. The relocation of population was believed to overcome the tensions that could arise within and between the states (Preece, 1994: p.823). A similar argument, that is population transfers for conflict prevention reasons in the interwar period, was also made by Bilgin and İnce (2015). Deriving from population exchange that took place between Greece and Turkey in 1923, the authors argue that the population transfer was a conflict prevention measure of international society. It was designed by the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and his aim with the mission was to construct an unmixed Near East (Özsu, as cited Bilgin and İnce, 2005: p.507). Although Kurdish resettlement was a unilateral act adopted by the Turkish state, it is within this international context that it should be evaluated. After the end of the first World War, population transfers and demographic engineering was constituted as a legitimate practice in international society to prevent potential conflicts. There happened several rebellions in the east and south-east of Turkey between the years of 1925 and 1930 which resulted with conflicts between the army and rebels. When thought within the international context the resettlement of the Kurds could be considered to prevent conflicts between Kurdish rebels and the state which had threatened both physical and ontological security of the state. By the relocation of the Kurdish population to the west, the organization of the rebels were rendered impossible and Kurdish identity, which threatened the continuity and consistency of Turkish self-identity, was aimed to be dissolved.

In conclusion, after the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the Kurds were seen as a threat to Turkish nation-state's self-identity realization. Between the years of 1922-1925 Turkish state had constructed its identity as a modern, secular, Muslim, nation-state controlled strictly by the center. The rebellion, which occurred as a reactionary movement against the reforms of the Republic and which also had a national character, thus threatened the legitimacy of the Turkish state's self-identity. The Kurds' unwillingness to be assimilated into this Turkish identity made them internal others 'who disturbed the predictability and continuity of state's self-identity through time' and therefore created a chaos that precluded the realization' of Turkish ontological security. When ontological security is considered as a sense of continuity and order in events as Giddens points out (Giddens, 1991), the Kurds as the internal others threatened the legitimacy of the nation-state's internal order (Steele, 2008: p.64). What had to be done was to end those characteristics of the Kurds which created a sense of insecurity for the Turks. Accordingly, Turkish state adopted severe assimilationist policies against the Kurds, among which forced resettlement played a major role. In 1926 and in 1927 influential families in the east and south-east were relocated in the western part of the country. A more far-reaching resettlement took place in 1934 with the Resettlement Law as a result of continuing Kurdish rebellions and increasing influence of nationalist ideology among decision-makers. The latter played important role in constituting new narratives about the self-identity during the 1930s. The Turkish Historical Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were important narratives in that sense and with the Turkish Historical Thesis, Anatolia was constituted as the historical land of the Turks, thereby the historical existence of any other groups in this geography was disclaimed. To turn this narrative into a routinized practice, then, these groups in Anatolia must have been Turkified. As a result, a more severe assimilationist policy began. 1934 Resettlement Law was a direct reflection of this assimilationist logic, which aimed to destroy the collective identity of the Kurds for Turkish identity's self-realization. Thus, the resettlement of the Kurds during the Republican era could be viewed from the perspective of state's ontological security concerns.

3.4. Conclusion

In order to see how Turkish state's statist security practices resulted with the insecurities of other referents, this chapter focused on the forced resettlements of the Kurds after the Sheikh Said Rebellion. There were few resettlements by the state after the rebellion, but the most organized one took place in 1934 with the 'Resettlement Law'. This chapter

argued that, the resettlement of the Kurds reflects a traditional state practice of applying demographic engineering policies for state security concerns. Accordingly, since the Ottoman period, the state was resettling the groups within its territories to maximize its security interests and the resettlement of the Kurds could also be read within this perspective. However, in the Republican period, beside physical security concerns, ontological security-seeking motives also played important role in resettlement policies. In other words, the Kurds were exposed to resettlement not because they were threatening the physical security of the state, but because their identity characteristics were perceived as threat to the self-identity of the new Republic. Such a threat perception of the Kurds generated an ontological insecurity for the Republican elites. The most appropriate method to overcome this insecurity was to resolve Kurdish collective identity characteristics by assimilating them into Turkishness. The resettlements of this period were thus the reflection of this idea: by assimilating Kurds, Kurds would lose their collective identity which was a threat to the continuity and order of the self.

However, the law which aimed to end the ontological insecurity of the state resulted with the insecurity of individuals. With the law, many families from Kurdish ethnicity were forced to move to the Western parts of the country without sufficient state backing. Their houses, lands and properties were confiscated by the state, or were distributed to the people which were settled from the west. Moreover, the law also delegatized tribal life and sheikdom which were important institutions for the Kurdish collective identity. In this light, it could be assumed that 'Resettlement Law' created economic, social and cultural insecurities for Kurdish ethnicity while it aimed state security. This shows that traditional conception of security which takes state as the referent object became a part of the problem, rather than the solution in the Kurdish issue in Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY AS THE SECURITY PROVIDER: THE USE OF FORCE AND THE KURDISH ISSUE DURING THE 1990S

Theories are constitutive of practices. This means that, theories not only affect the way how one thinks but they also influence the way how one acts. This is especially true for the powerful and hegemonic theories: by becoming common sense, the ideas put forward by those theories turn into the norm of the society. Realism, which was the hegemonic theory of the Cold War, in that sense, did not only analyze the world while trying to explain it, but it also constituted the practices of the Cold War security politics. Realism's view that security could only be provided by militarist dimension of security legitimized the use of force practices of the states.

For realism the world is anarchical in the sense that there is no higher authority which can control state actions. In this anarchical world, each state is responsible from its own security; a logic which is named as self-help. Under this circumstance, power becomes crucial in self-help since only powerful actors will eliminate security risks that could emanate from other states. Military capabilities establish the cornerstone of power. Thus, for realism military and the use of force is crucial in meeting threats that emanate from other states that are outside of state's borders. However, the reality of the world is different than this realist abstraction. In many parts of the world states feel threatened by the events that occur within their own territories and to overcome those threats they resort to militaristic solutions. Thus, contrary to Cold War realist assumptions, states rely on military not only to deter external threats but also to eliminate the perceived internal threats.²² In light of this, it could be assumed that, military has been seen as a provider of security both in international and in domestic arena.

²² Didier Bigo (2001) argues that with the changing security practices after the Cold War, internal and external securities started to interpenetrate each other in Western states as well. The changing practices redefined the role of security agencies, including the army. In Bigo's words:

‘...the army no longer considers its mission solely in terms of interstate conflict or the clash of two opposing blocs; political pressure has forced it to take on new tasks: antiguerrilla strategy, cracking down on terrorism, international policing operations renamed peacekeeping, protecting nationals, and humanitarian operations’ (Bigo, 2001: 107).

Thus, the traditional understanding of internal/external spheres of security and consecutive typology of police/army as the relevant security agents of this typology lost its relevance in many parts of the world after the Cold War. Army and military people became interested in internal security matters.

This chapter analyzes military-focused practices of the Turkish state in the Kurdish issue during the 1990s. Accordingly, it argues that those practices were not only unable to address insecurities that were non-military in nature, but they also became sources of insecurity for the individuals and the community. To see the extensiveness of the use of force in the Kurdish issue and to demonstrate how it became a source of insecurity for the individuals during the 1990s, this chapter analyzes cases against Turkey brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on Article (2) – right to life – of European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) between the years of 1987 and 1999. The thesis focuses on ECtHR cases because of two main reasons. First, ECtHR cases establish well-grounded source of information on the use of force practices of the state against individuals in the Kurdish issue. Accordingly, Article (2) of the Convention states that:

1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
 - (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
 - (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
 - (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection

When the case-law of the Court on Article (2) is analyzed it is seen that the Court reviews individual applications under the negative, positive and procedural obligations. Negative obligations refer to the cases where states should refrain from unlawful taking of life in which use of lethal force by state agents against individuals establish the main topic. Thus, Article 2 points to the essence of security, which is the survival of individuals. Positive obligations refer to state's obligation of safeguarding the life of individuals who are under its jurisdiction. Procedural obligations refer to state's obligation of ensuring the adequate effective investigation of deaths (Watts, 2010; Cengiz, 2011). The analysis of the cases against Turkey on Article (2) will thus demonstrate the extensiveness of the use of force by state agents on the Kurdish issue which resulted with the death of individuals. Such an outlook provides the analysis to engage with the (in)securities of 'real people in real places' (Booth, 2005, 2007). This is important for every study which focuses on emancipation because as Booth (2007) mentions

Theories...remain abstract and incomplete unless they engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change to help humankind in whole and in part move away from existing structural wrongs...the test of a body of scholarship in this field is whether it says anything meaningful about or contributes however remotely or indirectly towards the improvement of the security of individuals and groups in villages and cities... (p. 200)

Thus, focusing on the (in)securities of the ‘real people, in real places’ is a first step from where reconstruction of new policies is realized. Analyzing ECtHR cases against Turkey on Article 2, is, then, important to see ‘where we were’ in terms of security of real people from which new emancipatory practices could be derived.

Second, the case-analysis on Article (2) of Convention is also important to see how Turkish law system acted on the use of force matters in the Kurdish issue. Since domestic laws arise from customs, norms and practices of the society, the legal action of the state reflects (and reproduces) the common sense of the society. Thus, a systemic violation of the effective investigation of Article (2) shows how the use of force ‘more than absolutely necessary’ was naturalized and made possible in the Kurdish issue.

While this chapter analyzes state’s reliance on the use of force in the Kurdish issue by looking at ECtHR decisions, it should also be mentioned that the prevalence of those military-focused practices was also accepted and criticized by some members of the armed forces. For instance, the former vice-admiral Atilla Kıyat told in a TV programme that the armed forces and the state made mistakes in fighting against terrorism during the 1990s. The unlawful practices of the state, such as unsolved murders led to the ‘rise of a generation that hold a grudge against the state’ (1993-1997 Yılları Arasında..., 2010). Similarly, the former Commander in Chief of the Gendarmerie and Commander of the Turkish Land Forces Aytaç Yalman criticizes the ‘denial logic’ of the state against the Kurds. In an interview made with journalist Fikret Bila (2007), he says that even the social demands of the Kurds were perceived as ‘destructive’ activity by the state. This implicitly means that social demands of the Kurds were responded with military means by the state. Those views of the former members of the armed forces support the argument in this chapter made by analyzing ECtHR cases against Turkey in Article (2).

However, one important question remains intact. Why the state relied heavily on the use of force while it could have approached the Kurdish issue from different perspectives during the 1990s? How did the society naturalize the disproportionate use of force in the Kurdish issue? Those questions are important to understand how military dimension of security was prioritized in Turkey. Their answers lie in the concept of militarism which became to dominate the civil life in Turkey since the 1930s. Thus, before analyzing ECtHR cases on Article (2), the chapter focuses on the concepts of militarism and militarization to better grasp how the use of force and military dimension of security was legitimized in the common sense.

4.1. Militarism and Militarization: The Concepts

Although militarism and militarization are not new concepts, their entrance to the field of IR is relatively new. These concepts started to be discussed in IR literature, largely due to feminist studies, which exposed the links between militarism and gender. Despite the increasing popularity of militarism in the literature in the last three decades, there is no agreement on what it means, because each definition embeds in a different tradition of political theory. Also, the meaning and understanding of militarism could show differences from culture to culture. For instance, militarism in Western Europe, or militarism in Middle East could refer to different system of principles or practices. Therefore, this study views militarism as dependent on social, cultural and historical characteristics of societies.

Militarism derives from the word of military and military, etymologically refers to 'being related to soldiers or war, military service and warlike' situations (retrieved from <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=militarism>). Although militarism is classically used to describe the instances of war and war preparations, reducing militarism to war and war preparation is not enough to have a full understanding of how it operates in society, for there are times where war preparation is lacking, but there is strong militarism in society. Therefore, for a full-fledged analysis of the concept scholars also studied society's reaction to military values, and military organizations. For Mann (2007) militarism refers to institutional formations that describe war and war preparations as a normal and desirable social practice. Similarly, Shaw also focuses on militarism's influence on social structure. For him, militarism is the influence of military organization or values on social structure (Shaw, 1991, p.11). By having impact on social structure and on social practice, militarism starts setting institutional arrangements and everyday practices, whereby it exceeds war related activities. Rather it 'pervades societies before, during, and after the discrete event that the word war usually used to describe' (Sjoberg and Via, 2010: p.7). Thus, it is possible to see it as the blurring or erasure of distinctions between peace and war periods; between military and civilian spheres (Sjoberg and Via, 2010: p.7).

In light of those ideas, militarism could be described as a set of ideas that glorifies norms and practices associated with militaries (Chenoy, as cited in Altinay, 2004: p.2). It is a norm that is associated with militaries but the impact of which is on civilian life; and it is a norm which is not only operational in war time, but it is also influential in daily practices of peace time. Enloe describes some militarist affirmations as follows: 'armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions, human nature is prone to conflict, having enemies is a natural

condition, hierarchical relations produce effective action, a state without a military is naïve, scarcely modern, and barely legitimate...’ (Enloe, 2004: p.219).

Militarism is made possible by the process of *militarization*. Militarization is a ‘step-by-step process by which a person or thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its wellbeing on militaristic ideas’ (Enloe, 2000: p.3). In that sense, to become militarized is to adopt militaristic values such as belief in hierarchy or obedience in civil life and priorities; to see military solutions as particularly effective such as use of force; to perceive the world as a dangerous place best approached with militaristic attitudes (Enloe, 2007: p.4). In that sense, militarization is a process that diffuses and institutionalizes militarism in the civilian arena. Yet, since it is a process, militarization cannot be taken fixed; rather it is dynamic and it is a site of dynamic construction and reconstruction of militaristic values. Militarization ‘is both an agent of and respondent to a variety of authorizing discourses, debates and conditions’ (De Mel, 2007: p.14).

To recap, even though they are used interchangeably in the literature, militarism and militarization are two distinct concepts. While the former refers to an ideology, the latter is a material process (Chenoy, 1998: p.101). Moreover, there is no necessary causal relationship between militarization and militarism; rather there is a reciprocal relationship between the two and they mutually reinforce each other (Ross as cited in Shaw, 1991: p.13).

Militarization can be seen in any social relationship. A lengthy quote from Enloe (2007) is useful to understand how militarization can operate in civil life:

A government’s international intelligence service can be militarized if intelligence gathering is done chiefly by the country’s department of defense ... A civilian court judge can become militarized if that judge begins to believe that she or he must defer to a government lawyers’ claim that, when a government agency is sued by civilian plaintiff, the government’s need to protect ‘national security’ trumps all other claims before the court... Ordinary citizens can become militarized whenever they start to think that the world is so dangerous that the necessarily slow processes of legislative hearings, compromise, and open voting don’t match the sense of speed and urgency – and may be secrecy – they have come to think are needed those alleged dangers (p.4-5).

Since militarization operates at many levels in social structure, a closer look at social, political and ordinary life practices is necessary to fully grasp militarism’s role in society. Next part analyzes how militarism grounded in the common sense of society in Turkey.

4.2. Militarism in Turkey

Even a simple look at the Turkish history would be enough to understand the role of military in Turkish politics and society. Turkey went through two military coup d'états in 1960 and in 1980. Army directly interfered in politics by issuing statements in 1971 and in 1997. The last two constitutions were written by the military regime. What is more important, none of those acts of military faced any resistance by the public opinion; rather they were mostly welcomed and they found legitimate basis on the society. Despite this prominent role of military in Turkey, militarism is an underdeveloped concept; it has not been discussed in media or in public. Even in academia there are few works which talks about the role of militarism in Turkey.²³ The silence on militarism despite the military's heavy influence in political life shows that militarism have been naturalized in the common sense which precludes to make a discussion about it. Therefore, it can be argued that military sphere and civilian life were very much intertwined in Turkey.

The naturalization of the militarist values and military institutions was a deliberative effort of Kemalist elites in the 1930s when authoritarianism and nationalism were at their peak. Militarization in this period was realized by establishing narratives which interlocked military values to ethno-cultural characteristic of the nation. Turkish Historical Thesis played significant role in constituting those narratives. The thesis defined Turks as 'military-nation', meaning that military characteristics were in the nature of Turkish culture. This gives military an ahistorical and unquestionable character: it has always been there and it will always be as long as Turkish culture exists. Thus, as Altınay (2004) puts forwards in Turkish History Thesis 'military was constructed as a cultural institution rather than a modern state institution' (p.25).

Official history writing and official discourses also made a strong link between the Turkish nation and the military, the result of which was the fusion of nationalist ideology

²³ Ayşegül Altınay is the prominent scholar who studies militarism in Turkey. See Altınay: 'Eğitimin militarizasyonu: zorunlu milli güvenlik dersi', *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu*, İnsel, Ahmet and Bayramoğlu, Ali (eds.), İstanbul : Birikim Yayınları, September 2004, 179-200; *The myth of the military-nation: militarism, gender, and education in Turkey*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, December 2004; 'Can veririm, kan dökerim: ders kitaplarında Militarizm', *Ders kitaplarında insan hakları II: tarama sonuçları*, Tüzün, Gürel (ed.), İstanbul : Tarih Vakfı Yayınları , January 2009, 143-165; "Tabulaşan ordu, yoksayılan militarizm: Türkiye'de metodolojik militarizm üzerine notlar", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Dönemler ve Zihniyetler* , Laçiner, Ömer (ed.), İstanbul : İletişim Yayınları , April 2009, 1245-1257; 'Askerlik yapmayan adam denmez: zorunlu askerlik, erkeklik ve vatandaşlık', *Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler*, Sünbülöğlu, Nurseli Yeşim (ed.), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, March 2013, 205-260; 'Bir antimilitarist feminist manifesto olarak yıldırım bölge kadınlar koğuşu', *Ne Güzel Suçluyuz Biz Hepimiz! : Sevgi Sosyal için Yazılar*, Şahin, Seval (ed.), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, January 2013.

with military institution and military values. According to the official discourse, it was due to Turks' being a military-nation that the Turkish nation had been able to survive throughout the history and hence, the existence of the Turkish nation depends on its military and its militaristic characteristic (Demirel, 2002: p.40). As a result of linking the survival of the nation to military, the military and militaristic values took a prominent role in the discourses of Turkish nationalism.

The official discourse also interlinked military to Turkish modernism. Towards the end of the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire started to lose its military superiority against the Western powers. The ongoing territorial losses directed Ottoman rulers to make reforms on the structure of the military institution, since it was believed that the weakening of the Empire could be mitigated through modernizing the army. For this end, the new military schools in Western lines were established which introduced the new generation with Western philosophy and Western ideas of positivism, and nationalism. In time, the military personnel that was educated in modern schools became effective in the administration of the Empire. With the declaration of the constitutional monarchy in 1908, this new class strengthened its position against the Sultan and became the governing elite. The founders and the ruling elite of the Republic were an extension of this modern-educated military class of modernization period. Thus, for them there was a close relation between military and modernism: the former could and should be used to bring the latter to Turkey. Thus, military in Turkey constructed itself as the agent of the modernization process. As the link between military and civilization in official history textbook *Tarih* shows, in the first years of the Republic, military would speak for the values of modernism, mostly under the representation of civilization: '...Turkish nation is the nation with the most developed military spirit...A nation with high military spirit is a nation with a history of *civilization*, one that embodied *deep and far reaching knowledge*' (*Tarih*, as cited in Altınay, 2004). As it is clear in the quote, in the official discourses of the 1930s, military was represented as the new, modern, civilized institution of the Turkish Republic and its task was to modernize the country, or save it from the old, traditionalist, uncivilized Ottoman past.

In short, during the nation-state formation years of the 1930s, the official state discourse in Turkey constructed the military as a part of Turkish culture, Turkish nation, and Turkish modernism whereby military, culture, nation, modernism were all interlocked. The result was the naturalization of military, military institution and military values in society. As Elias (1996) puts forward, the period of nation-formation is crucial in the future of the nation because this period specifies the general characteristics of social and political life. Thus, it can be argued that, the construction of military as a cultural/national/modern

characteristic of Turkey during the formation years, deeply influenced Turkish socio-political life in the future years as well. The values and ideas represented by the military became the norm of the society. Next section explores how militarism and militarization operated in Turkey since the 1930s. Militarism during this period will be analyzed in two sections: militarism in politics, and militarism in education.

4.2.1. Militarism in Turkish Politics – National Security Council and the Role of the Armed Forces in Politics

The National Security Council (NSC), as a political/administrative body, had operated under different names till 1961. It was first established in 1924 as The General Secretary of High Defense, the task of which was to specify the duties of the ministries during war mobilization. In 1949, it was renamed as the High Council of National Defense and its responsibility was to organize total national defense. With the 1961 Constitution, it acquired its present name and for the first time it became a constitutional institution. The Council was constituted of ‘the Ministers as provided by law, the Chief of General Staff, and representatives of the armed force’ (Turkish Const. 1961, Art. 111§ 3) under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic. The duty of the Council was to ‘communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the council of Ministers, with the purpose of assisting in the making of decisions related to national security and coordination’.

The organization and the duty of the Council as specified in the Constitution was pointing to two new characteristics of Turkish policy: first, the military bureaucracy’s participation to political process was legalized and institutionalized whereby the political structure was militarized (Parla, 1991: p.136). Second, the name of the Council was changed from defense to security. While defense refers to policies against the threats emanating from outside of the country, security refers to policies against (real or constructed) threats in both inside and outside of the state. Thus, security policy could cover a variety of issues in different levels such as political, economic, social and cultural. By institutionalizing military bureaucracy in politics and by making security the task of the Council, the armed forces gained the power to be in the decision-making process in various issues. As it will be seen below, this was the start of a period where, by making anything a security issue, the armed forces would be influential in politics.

On March 1971, the Turkish Armed Forces submitted a memorandum, the result of which was the resignation of government and a series of amendment in the Constitution. The amendments were made on the subjects of the right of association, right of trade union,

proclamation of martial law and civil-military relationship. Related to last one, the power of the NSC in politics was increased and what is more, the representational power of the army in the Council was strengthened. Accordingly, in the composition of the Council, the participation of the armed force was mentioned to be at the level of Commanders of Forces. This signifies the importance of the Council in the eyes of the armed forces and it indicates the military bureaucracy's desire to be more influential in the Council matters. Related to that, the duty of the Council was also amended. While in the 1961 Constitution, the role of the NSC was to 'assist to Council of Ministers in making decisions of security and coordination', with 1971 amendment, the NSC was to 'recommend to the Council of Ministers the necessary basic views for decisions to be taken' related to national security and coordination. With these amendments the role of the armed forces in the NSC, hence in politics was increased.

The militarization of Turkish politics gained significant momentum after the 1980 military coup. In the first two years of the coup, with the abolishment of the Parliament, the NSC became both an executive and legislative body of the state. Due to legal rights they obtained under the 1982 Constitution and under 'The Law on the National Security Council and the General Secretariat of National Security Council', the NSC and its General Secretariat involved in politics directly.

The Constitution firstly changed the internal structure of the NSC. Accordingly, the Council 'shall be composed of the Prime Minister, The Chief of General Staff, the Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic' (Turkish Const. 1982, Art. 118 § 3(2)). The article points to two noticeable differences from the previous constitution: first, the participants were specified name by name, and second, with the inclusion of the general Commander of the Gendarmerie, the number of armed forces representatives surpassed the number of civilians in the Council. This was a crucial move when one considers that the decision-making was based on majority rule.

The internal structure of the General Secretariat of the Council was specified in the Law No. 2945. Accordingly, the General Secretary would be elected among fifteen highest ranked commanders of the armed forces. The Secretariat would be composed of four bodies: the General Secretary, the assistants of the General Secretary, the bureau of General Secretariat and the bodies of Law Consultancy, Main Services, Personnel and Administration Affairs. The Main Services was further subdivided to four presidencies: the presidency of National Security Politics, the presidency of the Gathering, Exploration and

Evaluation of Information, Public Relations, and Total Defense. The large majority of the personnel working in these sections (presidents, vice presidents, the head advisers and advisers) were the members of the armed forces (Bayramoğlu, 2002: p.45).

Article 118 of the Constitution and the Law No. 2945 also define the duties and authorities of the Council and the General Secretariat. Compared to 1961 Constitution, the new constitution extends the authority of the Council. The NSC's task was not anymore to advise or to assist to Council of Ministers. Rather, it would

submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the *formulation, establishment, and implementation* of national security policy of the state. The Council of Ministers shall give *priority consideration* to the decisions of the National Security Council (Turkish Const., 1982, pt. 3(2), Art. 118, emphasis added).

This clause in Constitution, thus, clearly gives the Council legal authority of being influential in the political decision-making.

A further look to the Law No. 2945 gives a clearer picture of the authority recognized to the NSC and the General Secretariat. The Article 13 of the second section in third part manifests the authority recognized to the General Secretariat as: 'The General Secretariat of the National Security Council shall, directly or by joined collaborations with ministries, formulate, determine, implement and if necessary, fix and change the national security policy of the State, besides the defense politics' (MGK ve MGK Genel Sekreterliği Kanunu, 1983, Art. 13§2). As it can be seen, the law gives the Secretariat the legal right of policy making and policy implementing, which could cover almost any subject when the extended use of national security is considered.

Although the term of national security is widely used in the articles of the constitution, an explicit definition of the concept was not made. Yet, while mentioning the role of the NSC in Article 118, the Constitution makes an implicit definition of the national security, which is 'the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace of society'. A clearer definition of the national security, on the other hand, was made on the Article 2/a of the Law No 2945. Accordingly, 'national security encompasses conservation and protection of the constitutional order, national entity, integrity, all international political, social, cultural and economic interests, and conventional law of the state against all manners of domestic and external constraints' (MGK ve MGK Genel Sekreterliği Kanunu, 1983, Art. 2/a). In other words, in the constitution, the term national security refers to more obscure, abstract terms such as 'the integrity and the indivisibility of the country', which is also legally open to

interpretation. Conversely, the Law No. 2945 presents a clearer definition of the national security, which links it to policies in all levels – political, social, cultural and economic. When the broad definition of national security and the legal authority of the Council in determination, formulation and implementation of security policies are considered together, it could be argued that the NSC and its Secretariat was given the power to directly intervene in political life. In other words, the military regime, which prepared the new constitution, gave the NSC and its General Secretariat legal authority to be involved in political life by making them responsible of national security, which is defined in a way to cover almost any political issue in the state.

With the legal power given to the NSC and its General Secretariat, Turkey entered a phase of constant securitization: military regime and its elites moved any policy into the security area, thereby claimed a special right for themselves to use whatever means are necessary (Weaver, 1995: p.55). The National Security Policy Document signifies how the securitization was widely used by the armed forces. Accordingly, the policies ranging from Turkey's EU membership to economic privatization were discussed in this document. By evaluating these issues under national security topic, the armed forces claimed special right to intervene in those politics. As a matter of fact, in the 1980s and in the 1990s, with its legal and de facto power, the armed forces became so powerful that the policies presented in National Security Document was written out by using imperative moods which shows the military's commanding role in politics.

In consequence, as a result of increasing authority of the NSC and the General Secretariat, Turkish political life was highly militarized after the 1980 coup. The military regime, by claiming special right on national security issues, securitized almost any policy of the state. This was a logical move for the military regime which wanted to be influential in politics. However, as Weaver argues, securitization cannot be successful if the audience does not accept it. This brings us to the second dimension of militarism in Turkey, which is militarism in education. By being influential in education system, the military regime tried to shape the ideas of the audience, and hence, tried to construct the common sense in a way that the securitization it realizes could be successful. Next section analyzes how militarism in education has operated in Turkey.

4.2.2. Militarism in Education

The hegemony approach of Gramsci will be elaborated on Chapter 6, but a short introduction could be useful to understand why military institution militarized the education

system in Turkey. For Gramsci, hegemony is not only a simple matter of domination and subordination, but it also requires consent of the society, and unless the latter was not provided, the hegemony of the ruling group will not be sustained. Taking the consent of population could best be achieved by producing and reproducing the common sense of the society, whereby ruling group will be able to naturalize its ideology in society. As a result of controlling the common sense, society starts thinking that its ideas and interests are same with the hegemonic group's ideas and interests (Jones, 2006). This makes people act in certain ways, while they rule out other modes of behavior.

For Gramsci civil society (identified as churches, schools and media) and intellectuals are important agents to produce and reproduce hegemonic common senses. Education system, in that sense, becomes very important site of legitimizing the ideas of the ruling group in the minds of the future generations of the society. As the dominant ruling group in the most part of Turkish political history, the armed forces gave an utmost importance to education in Turkey to naturalize its role and its values in society. This section argues that as a result of this intentional effort by the armed forces, the civil/military line has been blurred and military values started to be glorified in Turkish educational system.

From primary school to higher education, the dominance of the militarist ideology can be seen in many aspects of education in Turkey. By looking at regulations, legislations and textbooks, this section analyses the militarism in Turkish education system. The main focus of the section will be on the National Security Knowledge course, which is unique in showing the influence of the armed forces in high schools.

4.2.2.1. National Security Knowledge Courses

The course on military had been mandatory in high school curriculum between the years of 1926 and 2012. Since 1979, it was known as National Security Knowledge, yet it had been taught under the different names during the history such as Military Service, Preparation for Military Service, and National Defense (Altınay, 2004: p.124). The course militarized the education and contributed to the further militarization of social life in two senses: first, its teaching structure removed civil/military barrier and made military interference into civilian life (civil education) possible. Second, the content that was taught glorified military and military values. As a result, the hegemony of the military as an institution and the dominance of the militarist ideology was consolidated in the minds of youth in the society.

Since 1926 to its abolishment in 2012, the structure of the National Security Knowledge course was designed by the General Staff. According to the 'Regulation on Teachings of National Security Knowledge Course', the General Staff, in coordination with Ministry of Education and Ministry of Defense, decided on what gets taught, for which level and for how many hours (Regulation on Teachings of National Security Knowledge Course, 1980, Article 4/a). The textbook was written by a special committee in General Staff and was accepted after the examination of Ministry of Education.²⁴

Another fixed characteristic of the National Security course was that it was taught by military officers, which were appointed by the nearest garrison to the school. Accordingly, the officer-teachers were elected among active officers who were graduated from the Military Academy. When there was no available active officer in the garrison, retired officers were to be employed. The employment of civilian teacher was the last option in case where garrison was not able to appoint either active or retired officer.

The qualifications of officer-teachers to teach National Security Knowledge course was measured not in civilian terms but in military terms. According to latest regulation, the active officer that would be appointed:

- should be recognized by his knowledge, hardworking attitude and military authority
- should be a model character for the youth

With the amended article of the regulation, the qualifications for retired officers to be teacher were mentioned as follows:

- Lieutenant or higher ranked officers who were disabled because of terrorist activities;
- (if not included to previous category) major being the lowest retirement rank of the officer
- Officers who are not older than 65 years
- Officers who were not expelled from military or retired because of undisciplined behaviour, inadequacy or some ethical reason (Regulation on Teachings of National Security Knowledge Course, 1980, Article 10/a, 10/b)

In short, the content and planning of National Security Knowledge course was designed by the General Staff and the course was taught by officers. Although it took part in the curriculum of civil education, there was no room for civilians either in the preparation or in the application of the course. What is more, it was mandatory and each student had to

²⁴The coordination with Ministry of Education and Ministry of Defense and examining role given to the Ministry of Education is specific to 1980 regulation. Prior regulations had assigned all responsibility to General Staff only (Altınay, 2004, 125).

participate into the course. In that sense, National Security Knowledge could be seen a direct interference of military to the civilian life. It removes the barrier between military and civil sphere and naturalizes military lifestyle and values in the eyes of the students.

Apart from blurring the civil/military line, the National Security Knowledge course was also militarizing the society by glorifying military values, and by reinforcing the hegemonic role of armed forces in society and in politics. To better understand how the course contribute to the consolidation of militarist ideology, one has to look to the discourses governing the textbooks.

The content of National Security Knowledge Course's textbook changed few times because of the socio-political transformations in the society and shifts in international politics. Yet, some basic discourses remained the same. Among those, the one which had the longest continuity was the view of military as the racial, cultural characteristic of the Turks. As mentioned above, the root of the discourse goes back to Turkish Historical Thesis. To recap, Turks have always been a military nation. Military characteristics were in the blood of Turkish people. It was due to this natural military characteristic that Turkish nation has been able to survive. As Altınay suggests (2005), this understanding gives military a predetermined role in Turkish history: the permanent protector of the nation. As a result, constructing military as a racial characteristic of Turks had given military service a given characteristic. Thus, military obtained an undisputable and an absolute character (Altınay, 2003). What is more, constructing military as a racial-cultural-national characteristic of the Turks made the questioning of military a taboo, because it meant questioning one's Turkishness. Thus, a strong link between militarism and nationalism was established in the textbooks, which contributed militarism's being a prevailing ideology in society.

Another unchanging characteristic of the book was the glorification of the military service. In 1983 textbook military service was defined as

the obligation of learning and doing the art of war to protect the Turkish nation, Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic... Being the most sacred duty of the homeland and nation, military service prepares the youth for real life conditions. One who does not do his military service could not be useful to his family and his country (Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi II - III, 1983: p.139).

With the changing course syllabus in 1998, a further exalting of military service can be noticed. In 2011 textbook, a reading passage, which had been written by the armed forces in 1982, is given place. This passage describes the soldier as 'having a high soul, which he requires from barracks. In military service the souls are being cleaned, cultivated and

improved' (Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi, 2011: p.68). Moreover, the soldier is assumed to have abilities of strong judgement, physical strength and tactical/strategic intelligence (2011: p.68-69). All these characteristics of soldier are described as superior qualities.

One salient characteristic of National Security Knowledge Course was its becoming an important site of policy making after the 1980 coup. While the textbooks before 1980 were mostly about military service, soldiery and ranks, in the 1980s, the discussion of an ideology was introduced: Atatürkism. Between the years of 1980 and 1998 Atatürkism and the principles of Atatürk was one of the major part of the book. The General Staff, as the author of the book, defined the Atatürkism according to military regime's political view and proposed it as the only suitable ideology for Turkey.

The political character of the course was strengthened with the new textbook that was prepared in 1998. In this new book, besides Atatürkism, political issues such as national unity and integrity, the internal threats and the external threats were incorporated to the syllabus. With this new content the National Security Knowledge course turned into a course discussing domestic, regional and international political issues from the perspective of General Staff, which was, unsurprisingly, realist in its outlook. According to textbook, 'since there is scarcity of resources on earth, the states will always compete with each other. This is a fact of today's world politics which makes war between states a natural condition' (Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi, 2011: p.26). The only way to survive in this conflictual environment according to the textbook is to have a strong military power, which is the most important deterrent power.

Having put forward this realist view, the textbook goes on with Turkey's position in regional, international level. Respectively, since Turkey is situated in a geography that is politically and strategically important and valuable, it naturally takes the attention of other states. Those others have two desires: first to acquire Turkish homeland, second, if the first one is not possible, to render Turkey weak (Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi: p.26). For instance, Greece, Armenia, Iran all want to see weak Turkey to realize their aims on Turkish homeland. Having put the problem as such, the textbook sees the solution on having a strong army. To deter those threats 'Turkey is obliged to have a strong army' (2011: p.26). What is more, the strong army is a necessity not only for dangers coming from other states, but also for the internal threats. These threats are clearly mentioned in the textbook: destructive (referring to leftist ideologies), separatist (referring to activities related to the Kurdish issue) and reactionary (referring to activities related to religious rights) activities. Thus, the textbook defines any opposition against the official ideology of the military as a threat to state survival.

It is clear that the textbook imposes conflictual, war-prone and militarist worldview. However, more importantly, it strengthened militarism in society by legitimizing the armed forces' role in socio-political life. By describing different political opinions as internal threats, and by perceiving almost all neighbors as external threats, the armed forces, the duty of which was described as 'to protect the Turkish Republic from threats'²⁵, reinforced its own position. In other words, as long as there were threats, the armed forces would be able to promote itself as the biggest necessity of the society. Hence, by securitizing issues in domestic politics, and by securitizing the relations with neighbors, the military and the actions it takes were legitimized in the society. This construction of military as the most important institution of the country in a dangerous, conflictual region was probably the most important tool of the Turkish armed forces to be in the common sense of the society.

4.2.2.2. Other Courses

Militarism in schools has not only been limited to National Security Knowledge course. Rather, the ideology is present in the context or in the textbooks of many courses from primary to high school. For instance, the signs of militarism could clearly be traced in the textbooks of Social Studies courses. As it will be seen, the militarist elements in these textbooks show great resemblances with the discourses of the National Security course. Accordingly, there major discourses are:

- Military is a part of Turkish nation and culture. Turks are military-nation:

On the 6th grade Social Knowledge course textbook, there is a special part on 'military-nation'. The reading passage in this part consists of an imaginary speech by Hun Emperor Mete Khan on Turk's military characteristics:

I am Mete Khan, the Hun Emperor. 2200 years ago, it was during my reign that the Turkish army was founded. Central Asian steppes, where we used to live necessitated that everybody in our people would be soldier... Soldiery was not a private profession. The people as a whole was ready to fight at any time. This is the reason why, the tradition of the military nation was the general characteristic of our people (Sosyal Bilgiler 6, cited in SECBIR Report on Militarism in Textbooks, 2012).

²⁵This was mentioned on the 35th Article of the Law on the Internal Services of the Turkish Armed Force. The article was amended on 2013. With the amendment the armed forces' role was described as: 'to protect the state against threats emanating from outside of the country, to protect and to strengthen the military power as to provide deterrence, to accomplish the tasks in international arena that were assigned by the Assembly and to help constructing international peace'. Retrieved from <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.4.211.pdf>

In other part of the same book, the conclusion remark emphasizes that ‘Turkish nation is the best example to military-nation’.

- Turks have strong warrior and military characteristics:

In the textbooks Turkishness is defined by its warrior characteristics. Turks are great warriors and making war, soldiery are very natural for them. Moreover, the militaristic characteristic is defined as an exclusive quality of Turks. An example can be seen in the 7th grade textbook: ‘For Turks, who are great warriors, the war is a joy. Turkish soldier is brave in the battlefield, because he sees the heaven in his gun’s barrel’ (Sosyal Bilgiler 7, cited in İnan 2013).

- Other states are afraid of Turkey’s power and therefore see Turkey as a threat to their own security:

The 5th grade Social Knowledge course textbook, based on a presumption of other states’ perception of Turkey, impose the idea that neighboring states are threats for the country. Accordingly, since Turkey is geographically located in an important spot, and since it has a large young population and is economically strong, the neighbor states see Turkey as a threat for themselves. This is why, they are engaging in activities to make Turkish Republic weak (Sosyal Bilgiler 5, cited in İnan, 2013).

Not only this assertion causes students to perceive every neighbor country as enemy, but it also implicitly imposes militarism by legitimizing the role of the armed forces against threats emanating from neighbors. Respectively, a strong army is a necessity because otherwise ‘the country would be defenseless’ against threats coming from other states’ (SECBIR Report on Militarism in Textbooks, 2012: p.9).

Another course where the signs of militarism could directly be noticed is physical education. The ceremony at the beginning of each course is typical to ceremonies in army. The students are lined up in front of teacher like soldiers’ lining up in front of their commanders. Classes start with the teacher’s at ease - attention order and his / her saluting the class like a commander. Thus, standard teacher/class relationship is replaced by an imitation of commander/squad relation. The imposition of military values in physical education is not limited to that as well. The course plan aims to train students on military style marching and to exercise them on military style physical activities.

In short, since the foundation of the Republic, militarism has always been present in the education system, whereby militarist values have been incorporated to the common sense of the society. National Security Knowledge course, which was mandatory course for high school students between the years of 1924 and 2012 was important in showing the influence of armed forces in schools. Having been taught by a military officer, the National

Security Knowledge course tried to naturalize the military in Turkey by making it a characteristic of Turkish nation, and Turkish culture. In time, the course's textbook gained a political character and imposed armed forces' ideologies to students. It created a conflictual, war-prone, realist and militarist worldview in the minds of young generation. Moreover, it defined different political opinions as threat to country. Thus, by constructing a conflictual internal and external world in the textbooks, the armed forces, which is responsible 'to protect the Republic from internal and external threats', legitimized its own position in society. Next section analyzes how the use of force was the prominent method in security politics of the state in the Kurdish issue, and how this use of force was legitimized in domestic law as a result of the prevalence of militarism in society.

4.3. Insecurities of 'Real People in Real Places': The Use of Force Cases in ECtHR

This section focuses on two points. In the first part, to show the extensiveness of state's use of force issue which is 'more than absolutely necessary' in the Kurdish issue, it makes a statistical analysis of the cases against Turkey on Article (2) of the ECHR. In the second part, it focuses on the use of force methods of the state agents against individuals and on the failure to carry out an effective investigation by the domestic legal system on those use of force situations. This task will be done by making close analysis of three cases. Before analyzing the cases, their contextual background will be presented to better expose the security practices of the state in the 1990s. The analysis of those cases demonstrates that reliance on military dimension during the 1990s resulted with the insecurities of individuals in the Kurdish issue. Ü

4.3.1. The Prevalence of Use of Force in the Kurdish Issue

To see the prevalence of the use of force against individuals, this part makes a statistical analysis of the cases that were brought before ECtHR against Turkey considering the violation of Article 2 between the years 1987 (the year Turkey became a contracting party to ECtHR) and 1999. Since violations of Article (2) by Turkey, with very few exceptions, compromise situations of using lethal force by state agents, statistical analysis of the cases shows how dominant was the use of force and militarist dimension in security policies of the state regarding the Kurdish issue.

The statistical data is established by using HUDOC, the database of the case law of the supervising organs of the European Convention on Human Rights. Correspondingly all

the violation judgments against Turkey on the Article (2) that are issued in English and Turkish between 1987 and December 1999 are examined. When these conditions are filtered (judgment, violation, Article (2), Turkey and language), HUDOC database shows that there are one hundred and thirty-six cases regarding the violation of Article 2.²⁶ Among those, eighty-eight, which is equal to 64,7% of the total cases, relate to violations that were realized in the south-east and east regions of Turkey which, with very few exceptions, affected individuals that were from Kurdish ethnicity.

How this statistic could be read? 64% of total violation cases is very high considering that Kurdish ethnicity establishes 12% - 17% of the total population. This shows the reliance the state's use of force when the Kurdish issue was on its agenda. Of course it could be argued that there was an armed conflict between the state and the PKK during the 1990s and this made use of force more likely in the east and south-east regions. However, as it will be seen below, most of the use of force by state agents targeted civilians in this period, which had no direct relation with the PKK. This last point could not be grasped only with statistical analysis and this is why next part focuses on the substantial analysis of the cases to demonstrate how state's security practices which relied on the heavy use of force became a source of insecurity for many individuals.

4.3.2. State, Security Practices and Insecurities during the 1990s

As mentioned above, Turkey's violation of Article (2) mostly includes the cases of lethal use of force by the state agents which is 'more than absolutely necessary'. Looking at the Court's reasoning of violation decisions helps one to see how various forms of use of force were applied against individuals during the 1990s. Accordingly, use of force realized by state agents could be seen in different forms such as killing of civilians by armed forces (i.e. *Benzer and Others v. Turkey*), disappearance in custody (i.e. *Çelik and Others v. Turkey*), death under unacknowledged detention, presumed dead after disappearance (i.e. *Çakıcı v. Turkey*), disproportioned and unnecessary use of force (i.e. *Uğur v. Turkey*), inability to protect life (i.e. *Tanış and Others vs. Turkey*), death in custody (i.e. *Tanlı vs. Turkey*), killing of civilians by village guards (i.e. *Avşar v. Turkey*). Apart from those, intentional destruction of villages and unsolved murders of civilians were also common.²⁷

²⁶ The actual violation number is more than this when the judgments issued in French are also considered.

²⁷ The public opinion's presumption is that the perpetrators of those unsolved murders are state agents of Gendarmie Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Branch, known as JITEM. JITEM was a secret state

Next part focuses on the details of three cases that were prosecuted against Turkey before the ECtHR. The objective here is to show how the use of force was a deliberate security policy of Turkey. The detailed analysis of the cases also exposes that use of force against civilians by the state agents was legitimized in Turkish legal system as well. In all the cases explained below (and in many others), Turkey also violated Article (2) on the ground of failure to carry out an effective investigation. This signifies that the security understanding based on military solutions was not only legitimate for the army, but it was also seen natural by the judicial system. Thus, it also supports the idea that security understanding based on army, armed clashes, deterrence, and hard security measures were in the common sense of the society in Turkey when threats come to the political agenda.

4.3.2.1. Benzer and Others v. Turkey²⁸

Background: Village guards are militia type para-military forces that Turkish government created in Kurdish provinces of Turkey (Paker, 2004: p.9). After first PKK attacks to south-east of Turkey in 1984, the Turkish government established village guardianship system by giving it legal status in 1985.²⁹ The duties of the village guards are specified as follows:

In the provinces that are identified by the Council of Ministers, upon the proposal of governor, and approval of Minister of Internal Affairs, a necessary number of village guards could be appointed as a result of situations that will make the declaration of emergency situation necessary and as a result of emergence of severe signs of violent actions in the village or in its periphery; or on the occasions of increasing violent action against villagers' lives and properties (Village Law, No. 3175, 1985, Art. 74)

The law also specifies benefits given to village guards. Accordingly, the government will pay for the salaries of the guards, for the amount of compensation at the end of their service and for the clothing expenses of the guards.

institution, founded by General Commandership of Gendarmerie to 'fight with terrorism'. Although it was fully operational in the South East and the East of Turkey during the 1990s, it was never given a legal status, and its presence had never been officially accepted by the state till 2011. Thus, it could be assumed that it was designed as a deep state organization; it was given right to use force widely but it was exempt from any legal investigation. Many disappearances and unsolved murders are thought to be realized by JİTEM. For more about JİTEM, please see Kılıç, Ecevit. 1999. Jitem: Türkiye'nin Faili Meçhul Tarihi. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.

²⁸ Benzer v. Turkey, No. 23502/06, ECHR 2013

²⁹The system was activated by making an amendment to the 74th Article of Village Law, which had been implemented in 1924.

For Evren Balta Paker (2004), the state's use of village guards can be evaluated in two periods. First period is between the years of 1984 and 1992, where the state aimed to localize the security policy. Turkish military, which was organized around the imperatives of external war-making was unorganized and inexperienced in internal war making. In this situation village guards offered Turkish army the benefit of local knowledge which would strengthen Turkish army's capacity of dealing with the PKK (Paker, 2004: p.10). The method of recruitment in this period was negotiation with aghas (tribal chieftain) who were strong enough to introduce villages to village guard system.

The second period is between the years of 1992 and 2000. For Paker (2004), after 1992, there was a change in army's strategy due to the increasing disorder, and the loss of authority in the Kurdish provinces. In 1993 area-control concept was accepted by which villages that were suspected of supporting the PKK would be evacuated (Paker, 2004: p.12). In this strategy, village guard system was used to identify which villages were pro-state and which were pro-PKK. Accordingly, the state implied carrot-stick policy to villages. The carrots of being village guards were numerous: high salaries, benefiting from social services, permission to carry weapons, etc. The stick, on the other hand, was the evacuation and destruction of villages in case villages did not accept to be included in village guard system. From the perspective of the state, if the villages did not accept to become village guards under the conditions where carrots were very attractive and sticks were highly deterrent, then they were most probably supporting the PKK (Paker, 2010: p.419-422). With this logic of the state many villages were evacuated between the years of 1992-1995.³⁰

The facts represented by the applicants: The applicants were residents of the villages of Kuşkonar and Koçağılı that were within the administrative jurisdiction of Şırnak province. On 26 March 1994, the male residents who were working in the fields outside of the villages heard aircrafts and helicopters flying nearby the villages. They were not surprised because airplanes and helicopters were flying frequently over the area in order to make bomb missions against the PKK. However, on that day, military aircrafts started bombing the applicants' two villages and machine gun fire was opened from the helicopter. As a result, thirteen people in Koçağılı and twenty-five people in Kuşkonar lost their lives. In addition, thirteen people were injured because of the attacks. Most of the houses and livestock were

³⁰The reality was much more complex than the logic of the state. The villages that accepted being village guards were perceived as traitor by the PKK. Many villagers that became village guards were killed by the PKK. Therefore, most of the villages were also afraid of becoming village guards because of constant threat they felt from the PKK (Paker, 2010:p. 421).

destroyed. The surviving residents of Kuşkonar village put the remains of their relatives in plastic bags and buried them in a mass grave without any religious ceremony. The surviving villagers of Koçağılı took the bodies of their relatives to the nearby Kumçatı village and buried them in cemetery there.

The facts represented by the government: As response to villagers' claims, the government claimed that the villages had been under pressure from the PKK members and the attack was realized by the PKK because the villagers refused to help the organization. According to the government, applicants had been advised by their legal representative to make the allegation of aerial bombardment so that they could obtain compensation.

The legal procedure and the Court's decision: The documentary evidence submitted by the parties exposes that there was a failure to carry out an effective investigation of the event by the legal authorities. On the day of event neither legal prosecutor, nor officers from gendarmerie went to the applicants' villages for post-mortem examinations. The same day, only one of the applicants was questioned by police officers in the hospital. He said that there was an operation and an explosion in his village. Only three days after the event, Şırnak prosecutor forwarded Şırnak Gendarmerie Command a cutting from national newspaper and asked for an investigation to be started. On 1 April, the prosecutor questioned the headmen of Koçağılı village. The headman was outside the village in the moment of the incident but he told that according to the statements he gathered from villagers the village had been bombed by aircraft. A total of four bombs had hit the village. Despite this statement, the prosecutor decided that the bombing of the village had been carried out by members of the PKK and forwarded the case to the prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court which had jurisdiction to investigate terror related incidents. After that a complete deadlock started: the file was constantly being transferred between the State Security Court and Şırnak prosecutor in the following seventeen years because of contrary decisions on whose jurisdiction the case was. For the State Court, there was no PKK involvement and therefore the case was not under its jurisdiction. Şırnak prosecutor, on the other hand, argued that the PKK was responsible of the event and hence, it was under State Security Court jurisdiction. In 2005, the file was also sent to military prosecutor, which sent back the file to Şırnak after declaring non-jurisdiction. Beside this constant transfer of file between prosecutors, there was also an ineffective investigation of the event and lack of communication between the prosecutors. For instance, in 2007, Diyarbakır prosecutor having opened a new investigation file, asked Şırnak prosecutor to

send him all post-mortem examinations, and reports written by investigating officials who visited the villages. Yet, Şırnak prosecutor did not respond. Or again the same year, gendarmerie questioned villagers, but most of them were not from villages that event took place.

What changed the course of events was the presentation of new evidence to the Court by the applicants' lawyer. On June 2012, the lawyer of the applicants sent to the Court a letter accompanying the flight log drawn up by the Civil Aviation Directorate of the Ministry of Transport. In the letter addressed to Diyarbakır public prosecutor, two flying missions had been carried out to the west and north west of Şırnak on the day of the incident. According to the flight log, two F4 fighter jets armed with two MK83 bombs had taken off at 10:24 am; their time over their target had been 11:00 am and they had landed at 11:54 am on 26 March 1994. Two F16 jets with two MK82 bombs had taken off at 11:00 am the same day, had been over their target at 11:20am, and had landed at midday. According to the entry in flight log, all aircraft achieved their missions.

As a result of the evidences submitted by the parties, the Court considered that there was a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its substantive aspect on account of the killing of applicants' relatives, and also was a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect on account of the failure to carry out an effective investigation.

4.3.2.2. İpek v. Turkey³¹

Background: The intensification of armed struggle with the PKK in the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s directed Turkish decision-makers to adopt new security policies in the east and south-east regions of Turkey. In those regions, state of emergency was declared in the most of the cities. As mentioned above, the area control became the priority of the state security strategy. To prevent the civilian support to the PKK, the Turkish state adopted security measures against the people in the region due to rights entitled to it with the State of Emergency Law. During this time unacknowledged detention, disappearance under custody, unsolved murder, missing person cases were frequently seen in the Kurdish provinces. Under these circumstances, many civilians, including the villagers, local politicians, civil servants were either found dead by unknown perpetrators, or disappeared. According to İnsan Hakları Derneği's (Human Rights Association) report between the years of 1990 and 1999 520 people were noticed to be disappeared under custody in the State of

³¹ İpek v. Turkey, No. 25760/94, ECHR 2004

Emergency region (Türkiye’de Gözaltında Kayıplar, 2005). This number was only based on the application of missing persons’ relatives. When it is considered that not all missing persons’ relatives notified the authorities because of their fear to be indexed by the state, the actual number is estimated to be much higher. In a more recent report of the Association, the actual number of disappearance under custody is estimated to be around two thousand. (Türkiye’de Gözaltında Kayıplar, 2005).

The facts represented by the applicant: The applicant and his family, including his sons Servet and İkrâm İpek, was living in Çaylarbaşı hamlet, which is in Türeli village of Lice district of Diyarbakır province. On 18 May 1994 at 10 am, a group of soldiers with their rifles came to the village and told the villagers to gather by the local school. While one group of soldiers remained with villagers the others went to hamlet. A short while after villagers saw flames rising from the village. Most of the houses were destroyed by the fire caused by soldiers. After the destruction, the soldiers released the villagers except six young men, including applicant’s sons Servet and İkrâm İpek. They were taken into custody by soldiers. Three of them were released the next day, but the remaining three’s (İkrâm İpek, Servet İpek and Seyithan Yolur) whereabouts has been unknown since that day.

The facts represented by the government: Against the applicant’s claims, the government denies that a security operation was conducted in Çaylarbaşı hamlet on 18 May 1994. It also claims that, based on the investigation it made, there was no evidence that applicant’s sons were taken into custody.

The legal procedure and the Court’s decision: On March 1995, in response to the petitions written by İkrâm and Servet’s brother, a deputy to the Diyarbakır Governor told that there was no security operation in the region on 18 May 1994. One month later, Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor instructed the Diyarbakır Police headquarter to summon the applicant to his office so that a statement could be taken. However, because the address of the applicant was miswritten in prosecutor’s letter, the police could not find the applicant. On June 1995, Lice prosecutor took a decision of non-jurisdiction and sent the file to Lice District Governor, which requested the gendarmerie command of Diyarbakır to investigate the applicant’s allegations. A lieutenant- colonel was appointed for prosecution. Upon his two months investigation, which included Lice Gendarmerie Commandment reports on copies of custody lodgers, operation logbooks, commander’s statement the lieutenant- colonel reached to conclusion that no security operation had been conducted by security

forces in Türelî. As a result, Lice District Administration Council decided not to grant authorization for the prosecution of members of the security forces and Diyarbakır Regional Administrative Court upheld this decision.

Since the facts of the case were in dispute, the Court conducted an investigation and in this respect, it took the oral evidences of eye witnesses. The statement of each witness was pretty much the same. Accordingly, on 18 May there was a big military operation in the area, with the participation of troops from other brigades. On the day of the incident, while the villagers were gathered in front of the local school, their houses were burned down. Six of the villagers were requested to carry the soldiers' rucksacks to military vehicles and then, they were requested to leave with soldiers. Two detainees told that they were transferred into a military regiment, where they were made to lie face down. The two witnesses both told that this was the last time they saw İpek brothers. Afterwards, they were taken into custody room, and the morning after, they were released. All of the villagers of the hamlet stated that the people who raided the hamlet were definitely soldiers, and they also said that there were no PKK activity in the hamlet. Besides, the two detainees also noticed that while they were being taken into the regiment they saw all the villages the burning of all the villages in the region.

The other witnesses whose oral evidence were taken were three military personnels (the investigator, and two gendarmerie commanders). The commander told that there was no military operation carried out under his jurisdiction. Another troop's operation in the region was not probable as well, because the troops would have to notify the commander beforehand. Also, the security forces had never engaged in village burning or village evacuations. The lieutenant commander told that he had witnessed burning of villages by the PKK and not by the army. They also denied the allegation that the brothers were taken into custody. There was no reference in the register to the detention of İpek brothers.

The Court, based on the evidences of witnesses, noted that the applicant's two sons and four villagers were seen being taken away by the soldiers. İpek brothers were last seen in the hands of the security forces in an unidentified military establishment. The Court considers that given the general context of the situation in south east of Turkey in 1994, the İpek brothers' unacknowledged detention was life threatening.³² The Court was satisfied that Servet and İkrâm İpek must be presumed dead following their unacknowledged detention by the security forces. Also, noting that the authorities did not rely on any ground

³²This presumption was referenced to previous cases (Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, ECHR 2002 ; Timurtaş v. Turkey, No. 23531/94, ECHR 2000)

of justification in respect of use of lethal force by state agents, the liability to the death of İkrām brothers was attributable to the Turkish government. This is why, the Court decided a breach of Article 2 in substantive manner.

The Court also found a violation of Article 2 on its procedural limb. Accordingly, the Court noted that as a response to applicant's various petitions, the authorities' responses were limited to denials that the security forces had not conducted an operation and İkrām and Servet brothers had not been taken into custody. The investigation of the brothers' being under custody were limited to checking of custody records. For the Court, Lice District Administrative Council cannot be regarded as independent as it was made up of an executive officer linked to the security forces under investigation. The Court considered that the appointment of a lieutenant-colonel as investigator was inappropriate given that the allegations were directed against the security forces of which he was a member. Moreover, the Court noted that the prosecuting authorities also failed to broaden the investigation. No statements were taken from the members of security forces, even though the applicant made it clear to authorities that his sons had been taken into custody by soldiers. Also, during the investigation, no steps were taken to seek any evidence from eye witnesses. The investigator did not visit the hamlet to verify the applicant's allegations and to collect data. For all of those reasons, the Court decided that there was a lack of effective investigation and Turkey breached Article 2 on procedural aspect.

4.3.3.3. Çelikbilek v. Turkey³³

Background: In the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey made a radical change in its military strategy because of two main reasons. First, the end of the Cold War transformed the nature of threats in the whole globe. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union the possibility of global war was not an option anymore. Thus, the possibility of total war ceased to exist. Second, and more importantly, in the early 1990s the PKK became a very strong organization so that the authority of the state started to be weakened in the east and south-east regions of Turkey. This made decision-makers to reconsider the fighting strategies and the structure of the army (Paker, 2010: 412). Accordingly, an army based on total war could not contain the threat that was arising from the PKK, which was requiring a different strategy (Paker, 2010: 414). As a result, a new strategy started to be applied to fight with the PKK. In 1992, the threats facing Turkey were redefined in National Security Policy

³³ Çelikbilek v. Turkey, No. 27693/95, ECHR 2005

Document, according to which ‘fight with separatism’ became priority (Ülman, 1998: 112). Following this, the army was reorganized according to ‘low intensity conflict’ structure, which had several implications such as the formation of special forces commandment, commando forces and special operation team, the improvement of technical infrastructure of the army, the purchasing of new equipment and arms suitable to fight with the PKK, etc. (Paker, 2010: 414).

The area control strategy that is mentioned above was also a pillar of the low intensity conflict strategy. With the area control the aim was to cut the public support of the PKK. As mentioned before, one part of the strategy was to pressure the people in rural area to make alliance with the state via village guard system. The villages which refused to cooperate with the state were evacuated. The second part of the strategy was to implement counter-insurgency measures to destroy the local political and economic power of the PKK. With those new measures there occurred an increase in unsolved murders and extrajudicial executions of civilians. According to Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı - TİHV (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey) between the years of 1990 and 2011 there occurred 1.901 unsolved murders, which peaked in the years of 1992, 1993 and 1994 because of counter insurgency methods (21 senedir bin 901 Faili Meçhul Cinayet Gerçekleşti, 2012).

The facts represented by the applicant and the allegations considering the Article 2:

Having given the statement to prosecutor about the death of innocent women during a military operation on June 1994, Abdülkadir Çelikbilek, the brother of the applicant, was followed by police on number of occasions. On December 1994, while Abdülkadir Çelikbilek was at café in the centre of Diyarbakır, four plain clothes policeman who were carrying firearms came to café as well, and forced Abdulkadir to get in the ‘white-Renault’³⁴ car waiting at the outside. According to testimonies of the people at the café, the car left in the direction of Diyarbakır Police Headquarters.

The next day the applicant went to Diyarbakır Court to file a petition, but the police at the door of the Court told the applicant that his brother was not on their list. The applicant tried this several times in the next days but he could not get an information about whereabouts of his brother. One week later two police officers came to applicants’ house to tell him that the body of his brother had been found on the outside of the Mardinkapı

³⁴ White Renaults were widely known as the vehicles of plain clothes policeman, or members of JITEM (Kılıç, 2009). In many extra-judicial killings, or missings, the eye witnesses talk about white Renaults approaching to victims and man inside them forcing victims to get in the car.

Cemetery. According to applicant, the marks of torture could be seen all over the body of his brother.

According to applicant, two events happened in the autopsy day and following week which made clear that his brother was killed by the police. First, while the body was on autopsy a group of policeman came to Abdülkadir's house and told her daughter that Abdülkadir had told the police that he had a package which was likely to contain firearm. According to applicant, this question indicated that the police had interrogated his brother and took a statement under torture and then killed him. Second, an officer from anti-terrorist branch came to applicant's house and asked questions about the son of Abdulkadir, who had joined the PKK sometime before the events. This was kept as a secret by Abdulkadir. The officer's knowledge on this issue indicates that the police took testimony of Abdülkadir under torture.

The applicant also submitted that there was a violation of Article 2 on the account of failure to carry out an adequate and effective investigation into the killing of his brother. For the applicant there was a failure to preserve the scene (in relation to footprints and car-tyre marks); despite the finding that the victim was strangled, there was no evidence of any tests of fingerprints; the Prosecutor did not take statements of the people at the café, from local residents, from passer-by who found the body; and the photographs of the body and the records of the detention had never been disclosed to applicant.

As a result, considering the Article 2, the applicant alleged that there was failure to carry out an effective investigation and the Government was liable for the death of the applicant's brother.

The facts and the argument represented by the government: The government submitted that the police was informed about the body of Abdulkadir Çelikbilek by the notice of a passer-by. When police identified the body, the Prosecutor and doctor arrived at scene. According to their report, footprints that were found on the body was indistinguishable and wheel traces on the crime scene were found to have been made after the discovery of the body.

The Government submitted that there was no evidence that Abdulkadir Çelikbilek was killed by the members of the security forces. For the government, information received by the people at café was second hand and could not be taken as conclusive. The government also noticed the criminal record of Abdulkadir, against whom criminal investigations had opened in the past for narcotics and counterfeit offences. He had been arrested and detained

in relation to his involvement in the setting up of drug trafficking organisation. This is why, the government relates the death of applicant's brother to 'mafia-type' vendetta.

The government also refuses the alleged inadequacy of the investigation. According to government no evidence was found next to the body that could shed light on the potential perpetrators; the Prosecutor instigated an investigation by carrying out an autopsy and questioning; and the investigation would regularly continue till prescription time of 2014.

The Court's assessment on the failure of killing of applicant's brother: Before assessing the evidences, the Court put forward some inferences regarding the respondent government's non-compliance with its obligation under Article 38 (1) a of the Convention, which is about the failure on a Government's part to submit the Court the necessary information which is in their hands without a satisfactory explanation.

In regards to Çelikkilek case, the Court noted that the Government was asked to submit the entire investigation file on July 1999. However, in reply, the Government only sent a number of documents from the file. Thus, the documents sent to the Court did not constitute the entire investigation file. The photos of the body; the past criminal activities of Abdülkadir Çelikkilek, and the records of detention facilities for December 1994 were lacking in the files sent to the Court. And the Governments did not make any explanation about those omissions despite the Court's asking. Therefore, the Court found that the Government failed to comply with the Article 38 (1) a of the Convention 'to furnish all necessary facilities to the Court in its task of establishing the facts.'

The Court established its facts based on the inability of the Government's compliance with its obligation under Article 38 (1) a. The Court was in belief that the investigation records that was not submitted to the Court would have been crucial in the verification of the accuracy of the applicant's allegations. Therefore, it could be concluded that the applicant's brother was indeed arrested and detained by the agents of the state and there was a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the killing of Abdülkadir Çelikkilek.

Relating to the allegation of inadequacy of the investigation, the Court observed that the applicant adequately informed the judicial authorities about the disappearance of his brother. From that moment, the authorities had obliged to carry out an effective investigation; yet no documents were submitted by the Government which indicated that necessary steps were taken by the authorities after the disappearance. The Prosecutor did not question either the owner or customers of the café. He also failed to question members of the police. The Prosecutor did not also examine the relevant custody records to verify the

accuracy of the allegations. Thus, the Court concluded that the Government was inactive in the aftermath of the disappearance.

After the discovery of the body, the Government did not also take necessary investigation steps. Accordingly, no meaningful examination of the scene where body was found was undertaken; no forensic tests for finger prints or DNA in the body was carried out; and there was no search for wire which was used to strangle Abdülkadir Çelikkilek. The letters that were exchanged between the police and the Prosecutor showed that no information about the actual steps about the investigation was shared by the former. In the light of all those shortcomings, the Court concluded that the domestic authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation as required by the Article 2 of the Convention.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter argues that, during the 1990s, Turkish state's security practices in the Kurdish issue which relied on the use of force and military dimension of security became a source of insecurity for the individuals in the east and south-east regions of Turkey. To show the relation between use of force and insecurity of individuals, the study analyzed cases brought before the ECtHR against Turkey considering the violation of Article (2) - right to life. The chapter focused on ECtHR cases because besides being legal texts, the cases establish a rich source of information on subjects relating to state - individual relationship. In the Kurdish issue for instance, they provide compact information on state policy which is not publicly discussed and thus, on which it is hard to find reliable sources. Article (2) was specifically chosen because for one thing it refers to the core of security, which is the survival, and for another, in Turkey's example the cases on Article (2) mostly cover the issue of excessive use of force by state agents. Thus, the analysis of the cases provides to grasp how extensive was state's use of force in the Kurdish issue, and how this policy of relying on militarist dimension threatened the security of individuals.

What the case analysis points is that, in most of the Article (2) breaches there was also a failure to carry out an effective investigation. The inadequacy of investigation of lethal use of force by the domestic legal system demonstrates that the militarist dimension of security in the Kurdish issue was also naturalized in the societal practices. This was due to the prevalence of militarist ideology in the common sense of Turkish society. Therefore, the chapter also made an analysis of militarism and militarization and looked at how militarism became predominant in common sense, and how its primacy naturalized the use of force as the only tool of security in the eyes of the public. While the politics was

militarized by the NSC, which was de-facto political decision-making mechanism, militarism was made dominant idea in the culture by education system. Thus, militarism operated in politics and culture, whereby the use of force that could also affect the lives of civilians was legitimized in the common sense of the society.



CHAPTER 5

THE RUPTURES AND CONTINUITIES IN THE KURDISH ISSUE: A LOOK AT SECURITY CONCEPTION OF THE STATE IN THE PRESENT PERIOD

To understand how the Turkish state's security practices in the past were in line with traditional security practices, that is, how it took the state as the only referent, and how it relied on the use of force as the only security provider, the last part of the study (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) took the snapshots of two different historical periods. Chapter 3 focused on the concept of demographic engineering and showed how, in Kurdish issue context, it was used as a state security practice, privileging security of the state over the security of other referents in the late 1920s and the 1930s. Chapter 4, on the other hand, analyzed military-focused security practices of Turkish state in the Kurdish issue during the 1990s. By looking at ECtHR decisions against Turkey on 'right to life', the chapter argued that use of force dimension was prevalent in Turkey's Kurdish issue, and neither political, nor economic or cultural security was given place in state policies. Thus, so far, the thesis has made visible that Turkish security policies in the past could best be understood by traditional security practices, which were unable to address insecurities of many actors. What is more, in time, those security policies of the state have become part of the problem rather than the solution, by becoming source of insecurities for individuals, Kurdish ethnic community and the state itself.

This chapter of the study focuses on the present day security politics of Kurdish issue in Turkey. The analysis of today's politics is particularly important because for the first time in Turkish Republic's history, there has occurred a visible shift in Turkey's Kurdish policy. For one thing, peace process talks, which aimed at a ceasefire in the short term and abolition of violence in the long-term, started between Turkish state and the leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan and the representatives of pro-Kurdish political party of People's Democratic Party (HDP)³⁵. Peace process not only showed the will of the state to end the violence, and relatedly security problems of various referents, but it also meant the inclusion of Kurdish agency in the Kurdish issue. The will to end the armed struggle through

³⁵ 'Peace process' was undertaken by the AK Party government in two different times: 2009 and 2013.

dialogue and the acceptance of Kurdish agency in the Kurdish issue was unprecedented in Turkish security politics.

The peace process was not the only distinguishing feature of this period in terms of Kurdish issue. This era is also distinctive in terms of human rights and democratic reforms which directly influenced the Kurdish issue. In 2002 the state of emergency, which had been in operation since 1987 in the Kurdish region was ended. In 2003, the Center of the Investigation and the Evaluation of Human Rights Violations of Gendarmerie (JIHIDEM) was formed with the aim of ‘investigating the complaints about the human rights abuses of the gendarmerie and to start the judicial process if necessary’. Through JIHIDEM ‘a direct connection between the citizens and the General Commandership of Gendarmerie’ was aimed (retrieved from www.jandarma.gov.tr/jihidem). This was an important move when the widespread human rights violations by the gendarmerie were noted in the east and south-east regions as shown in the Chapter 4. In 2004, TRT – Turkish state TV made one-hour Kurdish broadcasting. This was the first step of TRT Şeş, state sponsored Kurdish broadcasting TV that started to operate in 2009. Again in 2004, private courses on the teaching of Kurdish were made possible. In 2009, the Institute of Living Languages was opened in Mardin Artuklu University by the decision of Council of Ministers. The institute has a department of Kurdish Language and Culture where the teaching of Kurdish is possible. Restrictions on the use of Kurdish were further removed by allowing political parties making propaganda in languages other than Turkish. Again, prison-meetings in languages other than Turkish were made possible during this period.

All those developments represented a clear shift from the past, which had repercussions in the Kurdish issue, the most important being the periodical halts of the violence and armed struggle between the state and the PKK. This chapter, in line with the research question of the study, analyzes disjuncture and continuities in the Kurdish issue after 1999 from the perspective of security studies, and more specifically from the traditional/critical security dichotomy that is represented in Chapter 2 and aims to see whether the rupture in the Kurdish issue has been a result of shifting security paradigm of the state from traditional security towards emancipatory security stance.

The ruptures/continuities in state security practice will be monitored by making the discourse analysis of one critical legal text and the parliamentary debates about it: the Law No. 5233 on ‘Compensation of Losses Emanating from Terrorist Acts and Counter-Terrorist Measures’ that was passed in 2004. This Law is important in two senses: first, it established the legal background of returning to villages for the internally displaced persons in the present period and started the discussions of ‘returning to village and rehabilitation’

projects. In other words, the Law is related to demographic engineering concept that was analyzed as a state security practice of the state in Chapter 3. Thus, by remaining within the verge of same topic, the analysis of the Law presents the reader a better outlook to see shifts from and continuities with the past security perspective. Second, it shows the official policy of the state where one can trace the differences between the past and present security politics.

Since so far the study has problematized the traditional security from the perspective of state referency and military-focused security outlook, for methodological consistency, the discourse analysis that is made here will analyze the disjuncture and continuities from the dimensions of state referency and military-focused outlook of security. In the previous two chapters, it was argued that, in the past, the security discourses and practices of Turkey could be explained by traditional security perspective, that is, it was statist and it relied on the use of force in the Kurdish issue at the expense of other dimensions of security such as economic, cultural and political. In Chapter 3, the study showed how Turkish security policy took the state as the only referent and Chapter 4 demonstrated the prominence of the use of force in security practices. The current chapter, while analyzing the break-ups and continuities of Turkish security policy in the Kurdish issue, will mainly base its analysis on these two dimensions. Thus, the discourse analysis made in this chapter will focus on two main issues. First, how the referency was constituted in the Law No. 5233 and in its parliamentary debate, and second, whether dimensions other than military was included in the text. To support this analysis, the chapter will look at two more points as well. One of them is the construction of identities, and especially Kurdish and Turkish identities in the discourse. How Turkish identity is constructed? Is it still exclusionary as in the past, or is it more inclusionary? How is the Kurdish identity mentioned in the text? The answers of these questions are important in the sense of seeing potential changes in the ontological security perception of Turkey as mentioned in Chapter 3. Another one is the self-critique of the past security policies. Since the Law was on compensation of losses that arose from terrorism and counter-terrorism measures of the state, a specific mention on the past security policies, whether explicitly or implicitly, should be expected. How does the text evaluate the security policy which was based on the use of force measures as mentioned on Chapter 4? In short, it is through evaluating referency, agency, inclusion of other dimensions, construction of identities and state's self-assessment of past security policies that the present security dynamics of Turkey's Kurdish issue will be put forward.

The Law No. 5233 is not an explicit security text and its analysis in terms of security might seem controversial. However, there are few important points which make it possible

to study it in terms of security. First of all, as it is clear in the preamble of the draft document of the Law and in the justification part, the Law contains elements that directly affect security of people. Indeed, the Law is about providing economic security for those who had been damaged by terrorism or by state's counter-terrorism measures. Since it encourages people to return back to their villages, the Law also become important in the sense of societal security. Second, the Law compensates the damages given to people by the acts of terror and state's counter-terrorism measures, which is one of the central tenet of security politics. Thus, the analysis of the text is also an outlook to the security policy of the state. Third, the text also shows that how the referency and the agency is constituted and whether there are changes from the past in those senses. Are there subjects other than the state and if yes, how are they constructed? Are they passive subjects, or active subjects? What was the role of the civil agency in the design of the text? These questions are important in the senses of seeing continuities or ruptures in state's security mentality.

The discourse analysis will be established in three steps: contextualization, development of conceptual tools and interpretation. The analysis will start by drawing the socio-historical context within which the Law No. 5233 was born. This is because texts and discursive events, while having causal effects on social life, have also causes which lie in the situations, institutions and social structures of a specific social and historical context (Fairclough, 2003; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Thus, next part analyzes the circumstances which made the construction of the Law No 5233 possible. Then, the study will put forward the concepts it is going to use in the textual analysis of the Law and the parliamentary speech. Those are the tools which allow a connection between politics and linguistic. Many analytical concepts are available to political discourse analysis but not all of them could be used in every genre. The specific character of legal text and the parliamentary speech creates a limitation to the concepts that could be used in the analysis. But more important than that, the concepts that will be used should be selected with the aim of tracing the continuities/ruptures in security understanding of the state. With this objective in mind, the study will mainly use the conceptual tools that are developed by the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), since the concepts used by this methodology could better address to the research question of the chapter. Putting forward the socio-political and socio-historical context and the conceptual tools, the study will make the discourse analysis of the Law No 5233. Here, it should be mentioned that, not a detailed linguistic analysis will take place, since this is not the objective of the study. Rather, the study takes a more problem oriented approach and focuses on the points where comparison with the past on the

questions of referency/agency, including dimensions other than military, identity construction and the self-critique of past security policies could be possible.

5.1. Contextualization

If texts have causes, then, the causes of the Compensation Law lay in the social and political developments that occurred after 1999. Those developments could be evaluated in four topics: Turkey's having candidate member status in the EU during the Helsinki Summit in 1999; the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the subsequent change in PKK strategy and lastly, the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party)'s coming to power in 2002 with an outright majority. Since the role of the EU membership process will be analyzed in the next chapter, this part focuses on the other three events.

The capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and the radical shift in the strategy of the organization subsequently were important developments in the Kurdish issue, which also affected state security practices. The PKK had already declared unilateral ceasefire in 1998, which had reduced the violence in the south-east of Turkey. Yet, it is only after the capture of Öcalan that the PKK laid down arms until 2004. The new strategy designed by Öcalan in 2000 played an important role in stopping violence. Accordingly, Öcalan gave up from the ideas of national liberation and an independent Kurdistan, and focused on finding solutions to the problems of Kurds within the political/territorial unity of Turkey by realizing a democratic transformation within Turkey (Özcan; 2006). Parallel to this, Öcalan also mentioned that the revolutionary war had completed its mission and it was time to initialize a strategy from violent-revolutionary to democratic evolutionary phase (Özcan; 1999: p.128). Öcalan supported this strategy by announcing deportation of PKK fighters from Turkey and extending the unilateral ceasefire, which both echoed among PKK circles. As a result, a period of non-violence prevailed between the years of 1999 and 2004. The ending of violence gave opportunity to Turkish governments to discuss economic, social, cultural aspects of the Kurdish issue. For the first time in the last two decades, a conflict-free environment came into existence and this created a political and social atmosphere where adoption of reforms became possible. The 'Compensation Law' and the discussions of 'returning to villages' were reflections of this specific socio-political context of non-violence.

Another important political development within which the Law No. 5233 should be analyzed is the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) coming to power in 2002. Although the AKP won the one third of the vote share on 2002 elections, it gained two thirds of

representation power in the Assembly, which gave it the opportunity to implement its policies without much opposition. As made clear in its Election Declaration of 2002, the party's focus was on liberal economy, fundamental rights and freedoms, rule of law and decentralized state power. It also declared Turkey's full membership to the EU as one of the primary objectives. In line with this party programme, the AKP initiated a reform process in the first years of its power. The reforms related to the Kurdish issue were summarized above. Besides, many laws were amended or adopted in order to start accession negotiations with the EU. It is within this context that eight harmonization packages were issued by the parliament. Thus, AKP's coming to power constituted a new political will in Turkey which started/speeded up the reform process. Beside the EU path, Öcalan's capture and changing PKK strategy, this new political will also played important role in adoption of the 'Compensation Law'. In the final instance it is the AK Party cadres who prepared the draft document and who passed it on parliament.

5.2. Conceptual Tools

To better understand the object under investigation, which is the security understanding in the Law No. 5233, the study will incorporate conceptual tools from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach. The methodology of CDA sees discourse as a social practice, which implies that 'there is a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it' (Keller, 2013: 24). This means that on the one hand 'the situations, institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses, and on the other, discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions' (Wodak, 2002: 66). Since CDA implies relationship between the text and its social conditions and ideologies, CDA analysis of the Law No 5233 will reflect the institutional and political character of the present period regarding the Turkish security understanding of the Kurdish issue. Thus, CDA analysis of the Law will help to see the ruptures and continuities in security understanding of Turkey's Kurdish issue more clearly.

In line with the objective of the Chapter, the tools that will be used in the analysis are selected according to their capability of exploring the referency/agency understanding, assessing identity construction, evaluating past security policies and examining the presence of non-military dimensions of security in the discourse. Considering the referency/agency and identity constitution the chapter will benefit from the 'social actor network' model developed by Theo Van Leeuwen (2008). In his analysis, Leeuwen investigates how the

participants of social practices can be represented (Leeuwen, 2008: p.23). The main objective of Leeuwen is to explore whether social actors are included or excluded in the linguistic representations, and how these inclusions/exclusions take place. Tracing inclusions and exclusions of the actors are important because the social actors' inclusion or exclusion can serve to different political purposes on the side of the speakers/writer (Reisigl and Wodak, 2002). In this study's case, it could show whether there are referents other than the state, and if so, which referents are represented and how they are represented?

The exclusion of the actors could take place in two senses: *suppression* and *backgrounding*. While *suppression* means that 'there are no reference to the social actor in question anywhere in the text', *backgrounding* means that 'the excluded actors may not be mentioned in relation to a given action but they are mentioned elsewhere in the text' (Leeuwen, 2008: p.29). The actors could be included in the text in various ways. Role allocation is one of those categories. According to Leeuwen (2008), 'representations can reallocate roles and rearrange the social relations between the participants' and they can 'endow the social actors with either active or passive roles' (p.32-33). *Activation* occurs when social actors are represented as active, dynamic forces in activity' and *passivation* when 'they are represented as 'underdoing' the activity or as being "at the receiving end of it"' (Leeuwen, 2008: p.33). Another category of inclusion is *genericization* and *specification*. *Genericization* refers to the representations that are made as class, and *specification* occurs when actors are represented as individuals. If specification is not realized as individualization, it is realized as assimilation: (Reisigl and Wodak: 2001: p.53) the social representation when actors are referred as groups. *Assimilation* could further be analyzed under two topics: *aggregation* and *collectivization*. In *aggregation* the groups of participants are quantified, and in *collectivization* the group is collectivized under one label. Another way of representing social actors is nomination and categorization. Nomination refers to instances where actors are represented in terms of their unique identity (Leeuwen, 2008: p.40). *Categorization*, on the other hand, occurs when social actors are represented in terms of identities and functions they share with others. Categorization includes *identification* where actors are represented in terms of what they are as classes, physical identification or relational identification – representing in terms of personal, kinship or work relations. Those conceptual tools will demonstrate how the state constitutes its referential strategies in the present period, whereby it will make it possible to make a comparison with the past, where referency of the state was dominant.

Other than those referential tools, the study will use other conceptual tools when tracing the changes and continuities in the military perspective and when analyzing the

state's evaluation of past security policies. *Legitimization* (legitimation), *argumentation* and *topoi*, and *presupposition* (assumption) are the concepts that will be used in the analysis. *Legitimization*, in its basic sense, refers to justification of behavior. For political discourse it has specific importance because it is from the speech event that political actors justify their political agenda (Reyes, 2011: p.783). Thus, each political discourse is an attempt of legitimization which is realized by different strategies. Van Leeuwen (1996, 2007, 2008) underlines four categories of legitimization: authorization (legitimation by making references to institutional authority, authorized persons or traditions); moral evaluation (legitimation by making references to value systems), rationalization (legitimation by making references to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action) and mythopoesis (legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions). Reyes (2011) includes a fifth strategy to Leeuwen's classification: legitimization through altruism (p.787). This happens when speakers legitimize their proposals 'as a common good that will improve the conditions of particular community' or society as a whole. Besides those, emotions are also frequently used to legitimize a political action in the eyes of the audience, since they could easily be manipulated by political power to achieve its goals.

There is a close relation between legitimization and argumentation since 'the process of legitimization is enacted by argumentation, that is, by providing arguments that explain our social actions' (Reyes, 2011: p.782). This necessitates the explanation of the term of *topoi*, which is, in its basic sense, method of constructing an argument. Wodak (2002) describes the term as follows:

Within argumentation theory, "topoi" or "loci" can be described as parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. They are the content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion (p. 74).

Thus, *topoi* can be regarded as the means of legitimizing an argument. In the case of this study, which *topos* is used in the Law No. 5233 is important to trace changes in security mentality of the state. Is it based on exclusionary, restricted values or more universal, common, inclusionary ones? Were there any roles of *topos* of humanitarianism, justice and responsibility in the legitimization of the Law?

Another conceptual tool that might be useful for the analysis of this chapter is *presupposition* (assumption). In its basic sense presupposition is an implied meaning in a discourse. Its goal is 'to make a piece of information that the speaker believes appear to be what the listener should believe' (Yule as cited in Mazid, 2007: p.357). The analysis of

presupposition is thus important to detect what speakers believe that recipients believe and to trace strategic moves by which speakers suggest that specific beliefs are true (Van Dijk, 1998). The analysis of presupposition is also important in the sense of understanding the common sense of the society. As Stalnaker (1978) mentioned ‘presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the common ground of the participants in the conversation, what is treated as their common knowledge or mutual knowledge’ (p.321). Thus, the analysis of presupposition could also show the meanings which are shared and were taken as given, the beliefs and value-systems of the society. In this sense, analyzing presuppositions in the Law No 5233 could help to understand the common ground knowledge on security in the present period.

Fairclough (2003) distinguishes three types of presuppositions (assumptions in his own terms): existential, propositional and value assumptions (p.55). Existential assumptions are assumptions about what exists. For instance, as Fairclough (2003) shows, the sentence of ‘globalization is a demanding process, and often a painful one’ assumes (presupposes) that there is such thing as globalization (p.56). Propositional assumptions are assumptions about what is or can be or will be the case (Fairclough, 2003: p.55). Again in the same sentence, assuming globalization as a ‘demanding process’ is a propositional assumption. Value assumptions are assumptions about what is good or desirable (Fairclough, 2003: p.55). ‘Social cohesion is threatened by a widespread sense of unease, inequality and polarization’ makes a value assumption that ‘social cohesion’ is desirable and ‘unease, inequality and polarization’ is undesirable (Fairclough, 2003: p.55-57).

5.3. The Discourse Analysis of the Law No 5233

The final version of the Law No. 5233 was a result of the interplay between several texts and discourses such as the draft text prepared by the Ministry of Justice, the advices given by the Internal Affairs Commission, the changes made in the Plan and Budgetary Commission, and the changes made during the parliamentary debates. Since each of them proposes different insights on the perception of security and the Kurdish issue, the discourse analysis in this chapter will use all of them as reliable sources. In other words, the chapter will trace referential strategies, agency roles, the role of military and the use of force, and the inclusion of non-military dimensions of security in all of those documents to have a better insight on changes and continuities in the security policy during the present period.

5.3.1. Reference and Agency in the Law No 5233

Considering the referency, the most visible continuity with the past is the emphasis given to the state and to the state institutions such as Council of Ministers, Turkish Armed Forces, village guards, ministerial commissions and administration mechanisms. In terms of role allocation, the state has been given both active and passive roles. The sentence (1) could be an example of the passive role:

- (1) The losses, which result from the acts targeting the state and the society shall not be left on the sufferer (Draft Text, 2004)

Here, the state is represented as a passive agent which is exposed to the acts of terrorism. On the other hand, the text also gives an active role to the state as in sentence (2):

- (2) Whether it is because of the activities of terrorist organizations, or because of the precautions taken by the state in the fight against the terrorism, the compensation of the losses given to persons will consolidate the confidence given to the State...(Draft Text, 2004)

In this sentence, the state is represented as an active, dynamic force in the activity of giving loss to the persons. The active role emphasized here is important to show a rupture from the past since the state accepts the responsibility of giving damage to persons as a result of its security policies in the past.

However, the Law No. 5233 has internal contradictions and it should not be seen as a total reckoning with past security policies. In some instances, the same policies were labeled with positive adjectives, which is most visible when Turkish Armed Forces was represented, as in the sentence of (3):

- (3) The necessity of supporting the extraordinary success of the Turkish Armed Forces and the security forces in the fight against terrorism by economic and social precautions is widely accepted by the all sections of the society (Draft Text, 2004)

Thus, while on the one hand, it is accepted that the security policy of the state in the fight against terrorism was one of the reasons for the losses of individuals, on the other hand, the same policy was supported by labeling it as ‘extraordinary success’.

The rupture from and continuities with the past could better be traced by analyzing the referency of actors other than the state and state institutions. Since the Law is about the compensation of the losses, there is a target audience who will benefit from the Law. In most part of the texts and parliamentary speech this group is represented as ‘persons who suffered from terrorist activities’, ‘persons who are exposed to material damage as a result

of terrorist activities or counter-terrorism measures', 'society', 'one part of society', 'damaged persons'. Whatever representation is used this group of people is always in the role of passive actor who benefits from the action - beneficialized. In Leuween's classification they are collectivized in the sense that they represent one group under one label – persons who suffered.

The most important rupture from the past is that a referent other than the state – the social group who suffered from terrorist activities or counter-terrorist measures of the state – was given place in the official discourse in a topic which is related to the Kurdish issue. What is more, by relating the compensation act to those referents, the text considers the economic security of non-state actors, which signifies that there is also a shift in the military security perspective of the state. Considering the dominance of the state in the referency, and prevailing militarist dimension in the past security practices, inclusion of non-state referents and non-military dimensions to the security policy in the present period clearly represents a shift from the past.

Despite those changes, in terms of state's ontological security considerations, the Law No. 5233 does not indicate a complete change from the past. The part which explains the justification and the objective of the Law in the draft document brings a spatial and temporal limitation to compensation. Accordingly, the objective of the law is 'to specify the basis and procedures for compensations of persons' material losses that resulted from the terrorist activities or counter-terrorist measures in the state of emergency cities between the dates of 19.7.1987 and 30.11.2002' (Draft Text, 2004)

Although in the original text the limitation of space/time was lifted upon the advice of Plan and Budgetary Commission, it is clear that the persons who would benefit from the Law are mostly from the state of emergency regions. The cities which are ruled by the governorship of the state of emergency region are the cities in which Kurdish ethnic group constitutes the large majority (Diyarbakır, Bingöl, Elazığ, Van, Bitlis, Siirt, Şırnak, Hakkari, Batman, Muş, Tunceli, Adıyaman and Mardin). Thus, it might be assumed that the law implicitly accepts it is the Kurdish population which were mostly affected by either terrorist activities or counter-terrorist measures of the state, as a result of which they had to leave their homes, lands, and properties. Yet, nowhere in the text Kurdish identity is emphasized explicitly. Only in the parliamentary debates, a deputy, Naci Aslan, from the opposition party mentions Kurdish identity, by criticizing the exclusion of Kurdish identity in the texts: '... as it is known, in the report of "Humanitarian Situation of", *I underlie*, "Kurdish population in Turkey" that is prepared by Parliamentary Assembly of European Council...' (TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, 16 April 2004, Session 117(5): p.778, emphasis added). This is the

only time where Kurdish identity is declared in the discourses of the Law. Thus, it is clear that Kurd, as an ethnic group identity, is excluded from the text. This is a continuity with the past where Kurdish identity has been suppressed in the official documents since the 1920s because of the ontological security concern of the state (for more please see Chapter 3).

As mentioned above, the Law No. 5233 has internal contradictions and the analysis of the title of the Law further reveals this contradiction. Title analysis is also important because title could be considered as the name of the text and names are ‘significant symbolic identifications that draw boundaries’ (Baydar and İvegen, 2006: p.695). From this perspective, the name of the Law shows law-makers’ attempt to identify the text. As mentioned before, the Law is titled (named) as the ‘Compensation of the Losses Emanating from Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Measures’. Hence, there is an existential assumption (presupposition) that there is terror, and counter-terrorist measures, which resulted with losses. However, all the actors related to losses and compensation were excluded in the title, even though they are mentioned within the text. In other words, whose losses will be compensated and who will compensate them was not specifically mentioned in the most important part of the text. Since those actors are expressed elsewhere in the text, it can be said that they are backgrounded rather than suppressed in the title. But why the text backgrounds actors in the title related to relevant acts in the text?

Before the preparation of the Law, there was intense pressure from the international, supra-national and civil society organizations to implement a law to improve the conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Turkey. In 2002 Human Rights Watch issued a report under the title of ‘Turkish Government Policy towards IDPs’, and similarly Parliamentary Assembly of the EU issued a report on ‘Humanitarian Condition of the Displaced Kurdish Population in Turkey’ with which it made recommendations to the government to encourage IDPs returning back to their villages. As also mentioned within the justification part of the draft document, the Law No. 5233 was, partly, a response to those calls. Yet, although IDPs is the terminology that is used in the international texts, the Law No. 5233 does not use this specific term, neither in the title nor anywhere in the text. By not calling the word of IDPs, which includes persons as social actors, and by not mentioning any actor in the title, the state does two things: first, it refrains itself from the legal responsibilities that might arise in the future in international arena. Second, by not mentioning any agent in the title, whether the state as compensator, or the (Kurdish) people as beneficiary, the state covers the responsibility it had on the losses. The title uses passive voice and exclude the state as doing the compensation action. This is because the verb of

compensation implies that an act which gave damage to others was made and this act requires a reparation. The inclusion of the state to the title of the Law thus would have showed the state as responsible for the losses which required compensation. By not mentioning the state on the title as doing the compensation action in advance, the text hides the responsibility the state had on the losses. In the same manner, if the beneficiaries were not deleted, the state would have seemed responsible for the losses of those beneficiaries. In other words, if any beneficiary, for instance persons or people, was associated to the act of loss, this would mean that counter-terrorist measures (of the state) inflicted damages on those specified actors. By deleting the agency of the state and the beneficiaries, the text keeps the focus on terrorism; it associates the damages not to an agent but to terror. The exclusion of the agents in the title thus covers the responsibility of the state for the past policies which requires compensation. There is also an implied meaning in the exclusion, that is state positioning itself as powerful and normative decision-maker. Powerful because, by not using the common terminology in literature, that of IDPs, it positions itself as not being affected by the recommendations of international/supra-national organizations; normative because, from the perspective of the state, although state is not responsible for the losses and the terrorism is, compensation is still made possible by the Law, thus by the state.

Examining agency in the Law No. 5233 is another way to trace changes and continuities in the security understanding of the state³⁶. The draft document of the Law was prepared by the Ministry of Justice and amendments were made by the Plan and Budgetary Commission of the Parliament, after the discussions made with the representatives of Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of National Security, Secretariat of State Planning Organization and Secretariat of Treasury department. Although civil society organizations such as TOHAV (Foundation for Society and Legal Studies) and GÖÇ-DER (Migrants' Association for Social Cooperation and Culture) expressed their opinions and suggestions on the draft document, their proposals were not being taken into consideration in the final document. What is more, only one resolution (out of eight) made by the opposition party was accepted by the government during the parliamentary debates. Thus, the government and the bureaucracy were the prominent agents in the constitution of the Law No. 5233. What is more, the state was also designed as a prominent actor in the implementation of the Law. The determination of losses would be made by the 'Commissions of Loss Determination'. In the draft document this

³⁶ The agency concept here refers to the actors who are entitled to provide security, and bringing change (for the discussion of agency please see Chapter 2).

commission was designed to consist of the representatives of ministries under the presidency of deputy governor. With the amendment made by the Planning and Budget Commission one representative from professional organization which has public institution status was added to the commission. Upon the resolution of the opposition party during the parliamentary debate, a lawyer who is registered to the bar would be appointed to the commission by the board of the bar. Thus, although the dominant status of the state was limited with the amendments, the state was still prominent actor in the implementation of the Law and the participation of the civil society organizations was restricted.

In conclusion, in terms of reference and agency, the Law No 5233 represents both continuities with and ruptures from the past security policies. Including referents other than the state to security dynamics, and accepting state responsibility in damaging the security of those referents are the main break-ups from the past security understanding. What is more, rather than a military perspective, the document incorporates an economic perspective in an issue whose interlocutors are mainly Kurds and thus, which concerns the Kurdish issue closely. However, in the Law, there are also continuities with past security understanding. For one thing, Kurdish identity was not mentioned in the Law, except in the parliamentary debate, which, in a way, shows the continuity in state's ontological security concerns. Although the beneficiaries of the Law are Kurds in great majority, their identity, in Leuween's terminology, is suppressed in the text. Secondly, even though the Law accepts that the losses of the people in the state of emergency regions might have been reasoned by counter-terrorism measures of the state, the same measures applied by security forces are labeled with positive specification such as 'extraordinary success'. Such a describing could be seen as the support for the past security policies, even though they might have caused losses for the individuals in the region. Thus, by labeling security forces' policies as 'extraordinary' despite knowing the fact that they might have damaged people's security in the state of emergency region, the text implicitly privileges the security of the state over the security of individuals, which also addresses to a continuity in state security understanding. Thirdly, the text avoids including any actor to the title, which would show the state as responsible from the losses. By not including actors in the title, the text keeps the attention on the act of terrorism as responsible for damages. Finally, the dominant agency of the state in the decision-making and implementation process of the Law signifies an analogy with the past politics, where civil society's participation in an issue which is related to the Kurdish issue had been largely restricted by the state.

5.3.2. Legitimization and Argumentation of the Law No. 5233

How the state justifies the Law No. 5233 is an important source in exploring state's security understanding in the present period. Legitimization strategies could help to analyze on what basis state constructs its policies in the compensation law which is directly related to the Kurdish issue. Is it based on interest-maximization as in realist thinking or is it based more on normative understanding? How are the past security policies evaluated? Are they also legitimized or are they seen as illegitimate acts? All of those questions is important to explore the changes from or continuities with the traditional security understanding.

The explicit legitimization of the Law No 5233 was made in the justification part of the draft document. The sentences (4) and (5) signify that legitimization through an impersonal authority, that is through the constitutional law played an important role in justification:

- (4) In the preamble part where the general principles of the Constitution are defined, it is mentioned that 'all Turkish citizens are united in national honor and pride, in national joy and grief, in their rights and duties regarding national existence, in blessings and in burdens, and in every manifestation of national life'
- (5) In the part where the characteristics of the Republic is defined, it is emphasized that 'The Republic of Turkey is a social state governed by the rule of law, within the notions of public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights...'

Although a direct linkage was not established between those principles of the Constitution and the Law No. 5233, it is clear that the sentences are used in order to make the justification of the Law. From the sentences, it could be argued that there is a topos of justice in terms of the principle of equal rights for all. In other words, as Wodak (2002) puts forwards, the Law aims to emphasize that 'if persons/actions/situations are equal in specific respects, they should be treated/dealt with in the same way' (p.74). This is made clearer in the following sentences of the draft document:

- (6) Allocating the losses and creating an equality between the sacrifices of sufferer and the other part of the society is a requirement of the principles of justice and social state principles.

Thus, beside legitimization through authorization, there is a legitimization through moral evaluation and value systems such as justice, social state and equality. The sentence also includes legitimization through altruism where 'well-being of other people' – the sufferers-

is taken under consideration. The sentence (7) is a clearer example of legitimization through altruism where the discourse is presented as beneficial for the group and society as a whole

- (7) The compensating of the persons' losses, whether they are resulted from the terrorist acts or from the activities undertaken by the state during the fight against the terror, shall reinforce the confidence to the State and the citizen-state coalescence, and shall contribute to social peace and to the efforts in the fight against terrorism.

Besides legitimization through altruism, there is also an argumentation based on the responsibility and on burden on the sentences of (6) and (7). In (6), there is an implicit topos of burdening: there are sufferers who are burdened, and the state should act in order to diminish these burdens. The sentence (7), similarly puts forward topos of responsibility implicitly. Since the state is one of the responsible in the losses of the persons, it should act in order to find solutions to the losses.

The reform process that was started to become EU member also played a central role in the justification of the Law No 5233. The sentence (8) is an example of how the legitimization through EU membership process is made:

- (8) Under the title of 'Establishing a Justice System by Increasing the Capacity and the Functionality of the Justice' in the National Programme for the Adoption and Implementation of the Acquis, it is mentioned that 2004 would be the date of effect for the 'Law on the Compensation of the Damages Emanating from Terror and Counter-Terrorism Measures'

The justification made to adopt the acquis could both be considered a legitimization through authority and legitimization through value systems. This is because acquis is an impersonal authority, but at the same time it represents a value system that candidate member states should adopt.

The analysis made so far in this part points to the ruptures from the state's traditional and realist security understanding. In realist security understanding, it is expected that states follow policies which will maximize their self-interests even if they are source of insecurity for other referents. However, the justification of the Law No. 5233 shows that Turkish state takes a normative stance, and adopt the Law even though the latter is contradictory with the economic interests of the state. Moreover, the equality, rule of law, justice are the norms on which the Law is legitimized. As mentioned above, there is a topos of responsibility in the Law, which means that the state accepts its responsibility on the emergence of the losses of people (although this fact is hidden in the title). Such an argumentation addresses to two important points in the text: first, not only state's security,

but also the security of other referents also matters; and second, past policies of the state resulted with the insecurities (economic and social) of other referents. More importantly, the existence of topos of justice and the topos of responsibility points that with the Law No. 5233 the state moved from social exclusion to more inclusionary political structure; from domestic national norms to more universal values. Thus, it could be assumed that the stance the state took in the Law No. 5233 is a better fit to emancipatory security outlook than the realist security outlook in some perspectives.

However, without a second reading of some parts of the Law, it would be too premature to argue that the Law is a clear break from the past. Although there are clear-cut changes from the traditional perspective of security in the Law No. 5233, there are also continuities with it in some perspectives. Reading between the lines in the text and the closer look at the terminology could be helpful in tracing the cohesion with the past. To begin with, as mentioned before, the Law is titled as the ‘Law on the Compensation of the Losses Emanating from Terror and Counter-Terrorist Measures’ and its objective was specified as ‘to lay down principles and procedures for the compensation of the material losses of persons, which resulted from terrorism or counter-terrorist measures’. As mentioned above, this implies an acceptance of responsibility of the losses of the persons on the part of the state. However, this responsibility taking does not mean a total self-criticism of the past security policies. On the contrary, by defining state acts as ‘counter-terrorist measures’ or ‘acts in the fight against terrorism’ the Law brings a legitimate basis to the past security policies, even to those which are not directly related to terrorism. In the text, the losses of the persons are always presented to occur as a result of ‘terror’ and/or ‘counter-terrorist measures’. That being said, the text presupposes that there is ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ in Turkey whose objective is ‘to extinguish the Constitutional order of Turkey’. As a result, as again mentioned in the draft text, state declared state of emergency in thirteen cities and implemented counter-terrorist measures, as mentioned in the sentence (9)

- (9) As is known, upon the intensification of terrorist acts that targeted the extinguishment of the Constitutional order, Governorship of State of Emergency was set up to effectively fight against terror acts ...

Here, the ‘extinguishment of constitutional order of the state’ is used to evoke fear in order to legitimize counter-terrorist measures. As a result, the fear that insecurity creates (fear of the demolition of the Constitutional order) is used to legitimize counter-terrorist measures, even though it is accepted in the Law that the latter became the source of insecurity (economic losses) for other referents (persons). Thus, this implies that state security was given primacy, although it was known that it meant insecurity for other

referents. More importantly, by naming all the policies in the state of emergency region as counter-terrorist measures, the state acts such as evacuation and burning of villages, extrajudicial executions, unidentified murders that were prevalent in the region during the 1990s (for details please see Chapter 4) are being legitimized under the name of ‘fight against terrorism’. By defining those policies as ‘counter-terrorist measures’, the state thus denies the illegitimacy and illegality of those acts. In other words, drawing on securitization theory (Weaver, 1995), by naming the use of force policies as counter-terrorist measures, the state legitimizes the extraordinary measures it took against the individuals in the state of emergency region. The legitimizing of the use of force acts that are not directly related to terrorism and that created insecurity for other referents, could be considered as continuity in state security perspective.

5.4. Conclusion

To trace the ruptures and continuities in the security perspective of Turkey on the Kurdish issue in the present period, that is between the years of 1999-2015, this chapter made a discourse analysis of the Law No. 5233. This law was specifically chosen because its subject is related to demographic engineering concept, which was analyzed in the Chapter 3 of the study. In that sense, the analysis of the Law gives the opportunity to see the continuities with and changes from the past security policy, thereby making comparison possible. Methodologically, the chapter used the conceptual tools of Critical Discourse Analysis, because for CDA there is a symbiotic relationship between language and social practices, meaning that language and social practices mutually construct each other. An analysis of the Law No. 5233 based on the conceptual tools of CDA, thus, gives a view of the social practices of the present period whereby the tracing of the change from the past becomes possible. As Fairclough (2001) notes, the analysis of the change is the central concern for CDA: ‘Its (CDA’S) particular concern is with the radical changes that are taking place in contemporary social life, with how semiosis figures within the process of change, and with shifts in the relationship between semiosis and other social elements within networks of practices’ (p. 123).

However, it should be mentioned that the chapter did not make a detailed linguistic analysis, since this was not the primary aim. Rather, the approach it has taken was more problem-oriented, and focused on the points where comparison with the past security policy could be possible. In Chapters 2 and 3, the traditional security understanding of the state was analyzed on the statist and militarist terms, and thus, the present Chapter focused on

the points of how the Law No. 5233 constructed referency and agency, how the text included dimensions other than military, and how the text perceived and commented on the past security policies. By the analysis of referency/agency, presence of other dimensions, self-critic of the past militarist policies, the chapter aimed to see the potential shifts from the traditional security perspective to a more emancipated security understanding.

Based on the analysis made, it could be argued that the Turkish security policy on the Kurdish issue in the present period reflects a complex policy of changes from and continuities with the traditional security perspective. In terms of referency, the text incorporates referents other than the state, such as ‘persons’ who suffered, or ‘society’. This represents a break from the privileged status of state referency in security understanding. However, in terms of identity, the suppression of Kurdish identity in official document reveals that Kurdish identity is still perceived as other to Turkish self-identity. Moreover, the analysis of the title of the Law exposes that the document excludes any referent in the title, whereby the responsibility of the losses was associated only with terrorist acts. In terms of looking at security other than military-focused perspective, the text is an important step to add economic security into the security understanding. Paying compensation to persons is an initiative that incorporates economic security of the people into the state’s security understanding. Another clear break from the past is that the state accepts responsibility in the losses of the persons in the state of emergency region between the years of 1987 and 2002. Moreover, the state legitimizes the Law on the basis of universal values of justice, equality and rule of law, which drives it apart from the traditional security outlook. However, there are still major continuities with the past security understanding, and this could be best seen in the text approach to past security policies. By constructing the acts of the state under the label of ‘fight against terrorism’, the Law No. 5233, to some extent, gives a legitimate basis to all the past security policies, since they were implemented with the aim of ending ‘terrorist’ acts. In other words, as securitization theory puts forward, since there was an existential threat, the extraordinary measures were seen legitimate. Yet, as Chapter 4 showed, in the Kurdish issue, the border between the security and non-security was very blurred, and state, sometimes used extensive force against the civilians as well in the past. Labeling those policies as ‘fight against terrorism’ could be considered an attempt to give them a legitimate basis.

In conclusion, the analysis of the Law No.5233 demonstrates that the security discourses in the present period revolve around the ruptures from and continuities with the past security policies. Although a more emancipated security order is noticeable, there are also important reflections of the traditional security perspective. The present period harbors

characteristics of both traditional security perspective, which is statist and which privileges military dimension, and more emancipated security understanding, which is less statist, less militarist, based more on dialogue, justice and equality. Thus, there is a shift in traditional security perspective; a shift that is capable of addressing insecurities and stopping the violence but not enough to end them permanently. Next chapter will propose how an emancipated security approach in state security discourses and practices could be possible and they could contribute to address insecurities of various referents.



CHAPTER 6

EMANCIPATION, SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF NON-STATE AND EXTERNAL AGENTS IN THE KURDISH ISSUE

Tracing past and present security discourses and practices of the state in the Kurdish issue from the perspective of security studies in the previous chapters demonstrated two things: first, a realist outlook in state security discourses and practices in the past did not address the insecurities of various referents. Moreover, such an understanding was also unable to break the cycle of violence and to stop the armed struggle that has been going on for the last three decades. Second, a more emancipated understanding of security in state discourses and practices such as broadening the concept by including non-military dimensions and having a less statist perspective by considering the insecurities of non-state actors in the present period created ruptures in the loop of insecurity. This shows that emancipated security understanding in state discourses and practices have potential to address security problems of different actors in the Kurdish issue. This chapter could be seen as an attempt to show how security understanding based on emancipation could contribute to a more secure environment for myriad referents and how more emancipatory state practices could take place in the Kurdish issue.

The concept of emancipation, especially when thought together with the concept of security is not unproblematic and it brings more questions than answers. There are many critics in the literature against emancipation: post-colonialists see it as a form of Western/Enlightenment project that try to impose Western values; post-structuralists think that it constructs another form of domination; positivists perceive it as not being-scientific. Even within the critical thought of security, the Copenhagen School criticizes it of denoting a positive meaning to security, where the latter has traditionally been associated with exclusion, and totalization (Aradau, 2004; 2008). The presence of various critiques poses challenges to the study of the concept of emancipation and security together. Yet, the same critiques also provide opportunities to dig the concept even further. In this sense, an analysis of how emancipatory understanding could be effective in state discourses and practices could contribute to enriching the theoretical applicability of emancipation.

The chapter starts with the analysis of the concept of emancipation by focusing on its philosophical roots. The base of emancipation, as we understand it today, lies at the

critical theory generally and in Frankfurt School particularly. The concept resonated in the IR field with the increasing number of works which associated critical theory to world politics in the early 1980s. Since then, emancipation has become the *common denominator* of critical international relations theory, or its *raison d'être* as Pasha puts forward (Pasha, 2012: p.105). At the same time, Ken Booth, who tried to apply critical theory to the study of security, led the efforts to make emancipation part of security studies (1991a; 1991b; 1994; 1999; 2005, 2007). The analysis of those philosophies will help to grasp what emancipation is and why we need emancipation as a concept in both domestic and international politics.

So far, the study has traced the security discourses and practices of the state in the past and present period. Its primary focus was on the agency of the state. This was firstly because of the limited role of the non-state agents in Turkish democracy till the 1990s. Turkish modernism was state-oriented (Keyman, 2006), which limited the participation of other actors in policy-making. It was in the late 1980s and 1990s that civil society organizations started to appear in Turkish democracy scene (Keyman, 2006), and it was only in 2000s that these civil society organizations and social movements gained more democratic characteristics (Yıldırım, 2012). What is more, as shown in Chapter 4, the military bureaucracy, through its influence in the National Security Council and in its General Secretariat, was very dominant in the design and implementation of the security policies. Thus, since the agency of the state was very dominant in the policy-making till the 2000s, the study focused on the agency of the state in tracing state discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue. Second, as Williams mentions, 'while states are not the only – nor always the most important- agents of security they...have far more resources at their disposal than most of other actors' (Williams, 2000: p.82). Thus, states could bring about changes more easily than other actors in security politics, if they desire that change.

However, this chapter also argues that alternative practices of the non-state and external agents could influence state security practices and could help to transform political practices in more emancipatory ways. Those who favor an emancipated security order could seek to mobilize state resources 'for constructive purposes by persuading policy-makers that while security is still of primary importance it must be understood in a wider and human-centred sense' (Williams, 2000: p.82). The practices of alternative agents are also important in the sense of transforming common sense by bringing it a new consciousness. Let alone the fact that rulers will not be indifferent to the changing common sense in democracies, if state is accepted as hegemonic and non-state actors as counter-hegemonic bloc in Gramscian terms, the discourses of alternative agents will start a dialogic process with the

state ‘which will reshape the identities of all participants in the conversation’ (Rupert, 2003: p.187). Thus, the practices of non-state and external agents also carry potential to transform the discourses and practices of the state.

Thus, the chapter will identify the practices of non-state and external agents in the present period, which have had effects on transforming security discourses and practices of the state in the Kurdish issue in more emancipatory ways. Accordingly, three agents will be analyzed here: intellectuals, social movements and the EU. It will be argued that their influences in state discourses and practices are important to show the ‘unfulfilled potentials’ in the present context, which might also have important contributions to the security politics of Kurdish issue in the future. But first, the concept of emancipation and its place in IR and security studies literature will be discussed.

6.1. Emancipation: What is It and Why is It Important?

The meaning of a concept is not solid and it gains new connotation in different historical periods. This is also the case with the concept of emancipation. Although emancipation has purported different things in different times, one concept remained stable in its theory and practice: freedom from an authority. The root of the concept lies in the Roman Law, where emancipation referred to two particular sorts of power relationship: the freeing of a son or wife from the legal authority of the father of the family, and the freeing of slaves from their owner (Bingham et al., 2010: p.27; Coole, 2015: p.532). Thus, the emancipated subject was freed as a result of the act of emancipation. Within this context, ‘emancipated subject is essentially passive agent who is set free by another’ (Coole, 2015: p.532)

It is with the Enlightenment period that emancipation started to be associated with the field of politics, where the subjects asking for emancipation became active participants in the process. In the 18th century, the domination of authority was not realized by physical control anymore as in the example of slaves, but it was realized through institutional control. This implies that during the enlightenment period emancipation was not something that would be given by another authority, but it was a value that would be acquired by those who are willing to free themselves from authority. As a result, in the 18th century, emancipation was utilized by the bourgeoisie in their liberation from absolutism and clericism (Singh, 2006: p.137). Immanuel Kant’s views were especially influential in this case. For Kant, Enlightenment ‘is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’ and ‘immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another’ (Kant, 1991:

p.54). In the context of Kant, this means that unfree nature of one's own reason is the result of 'dogmas and formulas' and the authority of these traditions cause to immaturity that prevents enlightenment. Here, a direct link is constituted between enlightenment and emancipation since freedom in the sense of 'liberation from immaturity' becomes the defining characteristic of enlightenment.

It was in the 19th century that emancipation gained more socio-political meaning, and started to be used by groups who were struggling for freedom such as serfs in Russia, Jews, and women groups. The role of Marx should be mentioned here, because his thoughts not only influenced the emancipatory practices of the 19th century, but also shaped the 20th century's thinking of emancipation. At the core of Marx's emancipation concept lies *human*. Yet, 'human' in Marx is not isolated, atomistic being as perceived in liberalism; rather it is recognized in its collectivity, within the society. Indeed, Marx develops 'human emancipation' concept against the political emancipation of the 19th century, the objective of which was to build democratic representative republican nation based on the universal rights of man. Defined with the concepts of liberty, equality, and security, the universal rights of man, according to Marx, 'separates man from other men and from the community' (Marx, 1844/2008). He analyzes the meaning of liberty as defined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Accordingly, in this Declaration liberty refers to 'the right to do everything that harms no one else' and for Marx such an understanding of liberty isolates man from other man. This is because in practice this man's right to liberty brings man's right to private property which is 'the right to enjoy one's property and to dispose it at one's discretion'. Yet, this right of liberty is enjoyed 'without regard to other men' and 'independent of society' (Marx, 1844/2008). Thus, the individual liberty and the rights of man designated in the political emancipation understanding of the 19th century constitutes an egoistic man, an individual 'withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice, and separated from the community' (Marx, 1844/2008). Thus, political emancipation based on the 'rights of man', frequently voiced by the political emancipators of the time, is not a true emancipation, and is not equal to 'human emancipation'. In contradiction to this political emancipation, human emancipation requires transformation of man's 'own powers' as social powers. However, state at its modern meaning, constitutes a form of alienation; a concept that should be analyzed in more details to better understand Marx's emancipation.

Drawing on Hegel, Young Hegelians, a group Marx sympathized with in his youth, saw religion and religious belief as a source of alienation from humanity. According to Young Hegelians, by putting faith in divinity, 'we project the potency of our own collective

existence as something apart, a divine “other” to which we are subjects – a subjection made palpable in subordination to religious authorities’ (Comninel, 2010: p.69). By believing in religion, individuals also deny their own responsibility for the forms of life and achievements that they realize through social production in social whole (Comninel, 2010: 69). Yet, for Marx, religion is not the only source of alienation, and there are other forms of alienation in life such as state, money and capitalist mode of production. Comninel (2010) describes Marx’s alienation as follows:

Alienation was the projection of forms of material human sociality – the social relations through which we realize our collective existence, the necessary condition for human existence – into artificial institutions and ideas treated as real; not merely alien to us as individual human beings, but having power over us (p.72).

What is implied here is that, material human sociality is a social production of individuals through which individuals and society are constituted. In other words, ‘just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him’ (Marx, 1978: p.85). However, this social production, although arise from the conscious will of single individuals, appears to man as ‘objective’ and ‘arising from nature’, when it comes in totality. The result is the constitution of an alien social power, standing above individuals, circumscribing their freedom.

It is in this sense that emancipation becomes important, since it is a ‘process of overcoming alienation of all of its form’ (Comninel, 2010: p.72), reducing human relationship to man itself. Within this social context that Marx makes his definition of emancipation:

Every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man itself.... Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a species-being; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (forces propres) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as political power (Marx, 1978: p.46).

Thus, for Marx emancipation aims to bring ‘free conscious activity’ to people so that all forms of alienation would be overcome. It is only through making people aware of their social practices that people could become free subjects and fulfill their own potential.

Despite the positive connotations given to emancipation by the 18th and 19th century philosophers, the faith into the concept was faded in the first half of the 20th century largely as a result of the works of first generation the Frankfurt School thinkers, namely Horkheimer and Adorno. Although they believed in the conception of better world, and they saw the realization of this better world as the objective of the Critical Theory, the emancipation did

not take as much role in the works of Horkheimer and Adorno as in Marx's writings. There were two reasons of this: the different social, economic and political context and the philosophical differences between Marx and the Frankfurt School.

When Marx developed his theory which aimed emancipation through a proletarian revolution, the capitalism was in its early years. There was an emerging class of proletariat with the potential of bringing change and this socio-historical situation shaped Marx's hope about the emancipation. However, the period where the works of 'the Frankfurt School' flourished was radically distinct from that of Marx. The Institute was established in 1923 in the post First World War of Germany. Thus, the development of ideas in the Institute took place in the inter-war years, where fascism rose in Germany and in several European countries. The totalitarian character of Soviet regime also curbed the hopes on proletarian revolution and proletariat as a class of bringing change. All of those developments played a significant role in the pessimistic line of the Frankfurt School, yet, different socio-historical context was not the only reason of difference between Marx and the Frankfurt School. Rather, philosophical differences played much more important role in perceiving the concepts of freedom, change and emancipation.

Although the thinkers of the Frankfurt School were influenced by variety of disciplines, such as sociology, history, psychoanalysis, and aesthetics, 'Critical Theory is generally understood as a body of social thought both emerging from and responding to Marxism' (Alway, 1995: 2). Since Marxism and the critique of it establishes the central tenet of the Frankfurt School's ideas, the concepts of emancipation, freedom and change in the Frankfurt School should be analyzed in relation to the thoughts of Marx.

The primary difference between the thoughts of Marx and the Frankfurt School regarding the concept of emancipation is the latter's downplaying the role given to proletariat as emancipatory agent in the former. Marx saw the history as the history of class struggle; conflict between the oppressor and oppressed. At the modern time two classes were facing each other: bourgeois and proletariat. The dominance of bourgeoisie by capitalist production methods and the alienation of labor characterizes the present history, which does not only affect proletariat but the whole civil society. What will liberate the humanity from the control of bourgeoisie is then the revolution of proletariat. This is why Marx connotes a specific role to proletariat as an agent of emancipation. However, focus on proletariat as revolutionary, emancipatory subject was consciously played down in the works of the Frankfurt School. There are few reasons of this. First, for early the Frankfurt School, the activity of labor is transformed from 'self-actualization' to 'repression' (Benhabib cited in Alway, 1995: p.36-37) With mechanical capitalism, labor started to

exploit and dominate the nature, by which “it lost emancipatory potential accorded to it by Marx” (Alway, 1995: p.37). Second, an over-emphasis on labor does nothing but reifies capitalist mode of production, and as Adorno says in an interview ‘turns the whole world into a giant workhouse’ (Jay, 1973: p.57). Third, for Critical Theory, Marx and Marxism relied heavily on social-economic base to explain the world. While doing this, the thinkers overlooked the importance of cultural superstructure and they denied the mutual relationship between culture and economy. Culture is not autonomous and independent of socio-economic base, but it is not epiphenomenal either (Jay, 1973).

Another important difference between Marxism and the Frankfurt School lies in the role of theory and theory/practice relationship despite their common epistemological grounds. Both theories see knowledge as a social product and both associate theory a practical intent, the aim of which is the social change. In Marx, this is reflected on the thesis on Feuerbach, where he stated ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’ (Marx, 1976: p.65). Similarly, for the Frankfurt School, the particular interest of critical theory is the emancipation of men by replacing class domination (Held, 1989: p.193). However, the difference between them is that while Marx sees theory for the sake of practice, the Frankfurt School thinkers perceive theory for the sake of theory (Horkheimer, 1947/1974: p.184). In Marx, this echoes in a way that theory should focus on the interests of proletariat to make a proletarian revolution possible. He establishes a dependency between the two by claiming that ‘the head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat’. The Frankfurt School, on the other hand, refrain from giving theory such role because for them theory should have an autonomous area in order to seek truth. As Jay mentions ‘the intellectual who slavishly echoed whatever the proletariat seemed to desire was thus abdicating his own true function, which was persistently to stress possibilities transcending the present order’ (Jay, 1973: p.84). Thus, in the Frankfurt School, even though theory is a guide to action, it should have a distance from it in order ‘to sustain aggressive critique against those in whose interests theoretical work is carried out’ (Alway, 1995: p.29). Instead of focusing on one particular class, Critical Theory ‘is willing to ally itself with all progressive forces willing to tell the truth’ (Jay, 1973: p.84).

6.2. Emancipation, International Relations and Security Studies

It is in the early 1980s that emancipation was integrated to the study of international relations due to the echoing of the Frankfurt School and Gramscian thoughts in the latter.

The approaches that studied emancipation was labeled as Critical International Relations Theory and their main point of departure was the critique against the dominance of positivism in the IR field. Indeed, the primary article of this field, that is 'Social Forces, States and World Orders' written by Robert Cox in 1981, was mainly an epistemological critique of the mainstream IR approaches, which were committed to positivist epistemology. Very much in line with Horkheimer's 'On Traditional and Critical Theory' (1972), Cox tried to problematize positivist IR, while proposing a new critical lens to look at world politics. For Cox, there is no neutral point of any theory because all theories are situated in a specific social and political context, and they are history-bounded. In other words, 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose'. Having claimed this, Cox analyzes two types of theories, which serve to two purposes: problem-solving theory and critical theory. Problem-solving theory, which refers to mainstream theory of realism, studies the world in an ahistorical manner; it 'takes the world as it finds it with prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions', without questioning how this order came about (Cox, 1981). By taking the present order as granted, and by not questioning how it came about, to whom it serves and how its alternatives could be created, what problem-solving theory does is the legitimization of existing order. Critical theory, on the other hand, 'stands apart from the prevailing order' and questions how this order came about. An important part of critical theory deals with the concept of change and it tries to understand how changes happen in world politics. Being aware of its subjectivity, critical theory aims to bring about alternative orders that are immanent in the present order. By studying alternative orders critical theory of international relations aims to inform egalitarian practices, by which the voices of silenced majority would be heard. This belief on human emancipation is the underlying theme of all critical theories of international relations.

Discussing alternative orders necessarily brings the discussion of ontology. Whereas traditional theories limit their analysis to states and state-systems, critical theories of world politics analyses a wide range of actors from sub-state to supra-state level. This is because the current understanding of political community, that is sovereign state, is a primary constraint against humanity's potential for freedom, equality and self-determination, since it creates inter-societal estrangement based on social exclusion (Linklater, 1992). Rather, critical theory of international relations makes a larger inquiry about the 'nature and possibility of new forms of political community', which 'analyses the prospects for achieving progress towards higher levels of universality and difference in the modern world' (Linklater, 1998: p.4-7). Political communities seeking higher levels of

universality and respect for difference would bring freedom, equality and justice for all humanity because

Political communities embodying higher levels of universality would not attach deep moral significance to differences of class, ethnicity, gender, race and alien status. Political associations incorporating higher levels of respect for difference would display sensitivity to the variations of culture, gender and ethnicity which has been all too infrequent in the past (Linklater, 1998: p.5).

It would be rather surprising that if these new critical thought in international relations had not echoed in security studies, one of the primary sub-topics of IR discipline. Thinking the world politics and security in new perspectives by focusing on emancipation, rather than power and order was the main theme of the articles of Ken Booth in 1991.³⁷ The main theme of Booth in those articles (and in its follow ups) was that the traditional thinking on security which is based on power and order is incapable in bringing true (stable) security. Instead, 'emancipation should logically be given precedence in our thinking about security over the mainstream themes of power and order' (Booth, 1991b: 319). Booth (1991b) defines emancipation and establishes security-emancipation link as follows:

'Security' means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security (p.319)

By linking security to emancipation, Booth tries to reconstruct security on the line of referent-object and the nature of threat. For Booth (1991a), states are 'unreliable, illogical and too varied in their nature to be thought of as the primary referents for a satisfactory theory of security on a world scale' (p.540). This is why states should not be treated as ends but should be treated as means. Rather, it is people who should be treated as ends in the studies of international politics. Furthermore, military focus of security is not enough to conceptualize security problems of the present age. Booth (1991b) explains this as such: 'the threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of nations across the world derive primarily not from a neighbour's army but from other challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, terrorism, crime and

³⁷ The ideas of Booth were also summarized in Chapter 1. However, to understand them within the historical context of emancipation they will be shortly repeated here.

disease' (p. 318). As a result of this empirical reality, security studies is faced with pressure to broaden the concept of security as to include non-military issue areas to their analysis.

Over the years Booth developed his idea of security as emancipation. In his 'Theory of World Security' (2007), he mentions that emancipation has three functions for politics. First, it is a philosophical anchorage, and serves 'as a basis for saying whether something is true; in other words, whether particular claims to knowledge should be taken seriously' (p.112). Second, it is a theory of progress, and it offers an understanding of world politics in which projects are possible (p.112). Third, it is a practice of resistance and it aims to realize nearer-term and longer term politics. In this sense, it is strategic 'in the sense that it is concerned with bringing about practical results' (p.182). Thus, emancipation is about knowledge, and action, which aim to bring progress to world order.

What Booth seems to move away in this book is the idea of equating security and emancipation. Booth (2007) describes the relationship between security and emancipation as one of means and end relationship. Accordingly, security is conceived as the means and emancipation as the end. In this perspective

to practise security (freeing people from life-determining conditions of insecurity) is to promote emancipatory space (freedom from oppression, and so some opportunity to explore being human), and to realise emancipation (becoming more fully human) is to practise security (not against others but with them) (p.115).

It is through this process that people's 'invention of humanity' would be possible. With security-emancipation relationship, people would explore human self-realization with which humanity would increasingly be free of 'life-determining insecurity' (Booth, 2007: p.114).

Since its inception to security studies literature, the idea of emancipation has been criticized by various strands. The soundest critics came from those who associate themselves with post-structuralism and Copenhagen School. For the scholars of Copenhagen School, equating security with emancipation means giving security a positive value; it becomes something that need to be acquired for the well-being of individuals. Yet, considering the political implications of security, this should be given a second thought. Accordingly, security entails a particular kind of politics, which is based on exception, exclusion, violence and non-democratic decisions. Thus, what is needed is not the reconstruction of security in emancipatory forms but removal of security logic out of any political transformation.

Criticizing security as emancipation from the perspective of exclusionary logic of security is at its best not agreeing with the perspective of security that CSS tries to construct,

and at its worst falling into the clutches of problem-solving theory. The main task of CSS is not to analyze what security is in the present context; rather its objective is to study what security should be in an alternative order, the possibilities of which lie in status-quo. Many people are living with insecurity for various political reasons, probably including the negative logic that is associated with it as Copenhagen School argues. However, the primary aim of CSS is to overcome this situation through informing emancipatory politics. When emancipatory ideal comes in, the definition of security also untethers from its traditional logic. This is why CSS scholars do not equate security with survival, but he defines it as survival-plus, 'plus being some freedom from life-determining threats, and therefore space to make choices' (Booth, 2007: p.102). In a nutshell, CSS does not focus on the meanings or 'logics' of security that are present in the status-quo; but rather, it tries to reconstruct the security discourses and practices to create 'true' security for those who are doomed to live with insecurity.

Criticizing CSS for giving positive value to security and trying to remove security from political realm because of security's 'inherent' negative logic is also problematic when one considers the theory/practice nexus. It is the result of current politics that Copenhagen School associates negative meaning to security. Accordingly, today in politics, decision-makers in all over the world activates a logic of urgency and exceptionalism by naming something as a security issue. As a result of this, security is inherently connected to exception, emergency, exclusion, and violence (Weaver, 2011; Aradau, 2004). Studying security in this given condition is thinking security under the prevailing social and political context, which does nothing more than reproducing the negative meaning associated with it. However, this negative meaning is a result of specific social and historical processes and it can change. By not exploring the ways how this negative meaning could be changed, the Copenhagen Schools remains within the confines of problem-solving approach, which is 'a guide to tactical actions' - in this case desecuritization (for more details please see Chapter 2)- 'that sustain the existing order' (Cox, 1981).

Another line of critique against emancipatory security comes from post-structuralist school. For post-structuralism emancipation is loaded with values which are mainly associated with European Enlightenment, and thus belongs to specific culture and specific interests. From this perspective, how could one argue or guarantee that an emancipated order would be better than the status-quo? For post-structuralists 'using the notion of emancipation as a ground for criticizing the theoretical and practical status-quo is itself authoritative and exclusionary' (Hutchings, 2001: p.83). In this light, the terminology

emancipatory security uses- universality, progress, enlightenment- could construct new forms of social and political domination.

Yet, from the CSS perspective, a structure which harbors any form of domination is not a truly emancipated one. For this end, Booth (2007) makes a distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ emancipations. In his own words, false emancipation is

any conception that understands emancipation as timeless or static (whether in relation to ideas, institutions, or situations); undertakes emancipatory politics at the expense of others (making the emancipatory goals of others impossible); or uses emancipation as a cloak for the power of ‘the West’ or any other identity claiming to have a monopoly of wisdom (p. 113).

Thus, emancipation that took a form of domination as asserted by post-structuralist would not be a true emancipation from the perspective of CSS. What is more, post-structuralism tend to see emancipation as an end point, but it is rather a process that never completes. According to CSS, in each situation, there is an unfulfilled potential of a better life and the role of CSS is to identify ‘those features within concrete situations (such as positive dynamics, agents, key struggles) that have emancipatory possibilities and then working through politics (tactics and strategies) to strengthen them’ (Booth, 2007: p.250). This methodology, which avoids any totalization, is called immanent critique and it is the mainstay of CSS.

However, thinking security as emancipation is not unproblematic. First, equating security with emancipation, which in historical sense refers to freedom from oppression and domination as shown in this chapter, carries risk to see many domestic or international issues from security lenses. This is debatable not because security has its own exclusionary logic as Aradau (2004) specifies, but because it holds a potential of theoretical domination and reification which contradicts with knowledge premises of all strands of critical theories. Second, and more importantly, while there is now a vast literature on emancipatory security, most of the works deal with theoretical side of it and few addresses to the ‘real-world’ issues. Rengger (2001) points to same problem for critical IR theory:

...one of the features of contemporary critical theory – and especially of critical IR theory – is the sense that not only should critical theory be able to critique modern societies, it also should answer the ‘Where’s the beef?’ question. It should also be able to offer action-guiding principles and have institutional and political recommendations... (p.101).

This critique is also applicable to CSS. The lack of ‘action-guiding principles’ risks the acceptability of emancipatory security both in theory and practice. Next part, which traces

emancipatory potentialities in the practices of non-state and external agents in the Kurdish issue, could be considered as an effort to study emancipatory security in real-world situation.

6.3. Emancipatory Security and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey: the Role of Non-State and External Agents

As mentioned above, this chapter analyzes the practices of non-state and external agents in Turkey related to the Kurdish issue and aims to demonstrate how they have influenced state security discourses and practices in the present period in more emancipatory ways. In this sense it analyzes the agency of three actors: intellectuals, social movements and the EU. Before analyzing intellectuals' and social movements' role in influencing security practices of the state in the Kurdish issue, the study will first present a brief theoretical analysis of the relationship between these agents and emancipation. And before the EU's role in transforming security discourses and practices of the state, the study will analyze 'norm diffusion' theory to comprehend how the EU becomes influential in the practices of the state.

6.3.1. Intellectuals and Emancipation

For theories which aim freedom and self- realization intellectuals play an important role to create consciousness in humans, classes or society in general. For instance, Kant mentions the importance of education in self-realization of human; for him 'man can only become man by education' (Kant, 1900: p.6). For enlightenment to take place, 'public use of man's reason must always be free' (Kant, 1784) and the propensity towards free thinking is an inherent part of human nature, which will emerge through education (Bingham et al, 2010: p.28). This education of 'better condition of the world' and the "gradual progress of human nature towards its goal' should be given by the most enlightened experts, 'who take interest in the universal good', and who have a belief in progress (Kant, 1900: p.17). Thus, Kant gives an important role to the enlightened intellect, who could provide the conditions for the use of one's own reason through education.

As mentioned above, for Marx true emancipation could be achieved by the revolution of proletarian class. Even though he emphasized the unity between theory and practice and theory's role in bringing change through informing practice, Marx did not develop a theory of intellectuals. Thus, in his writings, how the theory will influence the

proletarian class and how this class will gain a revolutionary consciousness is ambiguous. The lack of emphasis on intellectuals in the realization of proletarian revolution in Marx's own writings became one of the major tasks to be fulfilled for Marx's followers. Lenin's writings, in this sense, could be seen as an effort to link intellectuals to revolution. For Lenin, intellectuals possess the necessary scientific knowledge and technical skills to guide worker's movement. Revolution, therefore, could and should be guided by advanced theory, which is the product of intellectuals (Salamini, 1989: p.144). He particularly emphasized the role of the party, which is formed by revolutionary intellectuals, in giving consciousness to the proletariat.

Among Marxist theoreticians, the most remarkable contribution to the relationship between intellectuals and bringing consciousness and change was provided by Gramsci. To understand the transformative role intellectuals play in society in Gramsci's writings, one has to have some idea about his concept of culture and hegemony. According to Gramsci, hegemony of the ruling class does not only reside in the domination of world of production, but it also takes place through the control of 'superstructure'. The latter is the distinctive point Gramsci brings to Marxist theory: hegemony does not only lie in coercive power, but it also requires societal consensus. Thus, there is an interplay of economy and culture in Gramsci's understanding of hegemony. As Salamini (1989) puts forward

In Gramsci's conception of the dynamic development of history, all classes which aspire toward hegemony first arise from the world of production as economic-corporate entities, subsequently as they progressively assume the political, intellectual and moral direction of the whole society, they transcend their particularistic, corporative conditions and with the help of intellectuals, they become hegemonic classes (p.146).

Thus, there is an important relation between social class and intellectuals, which directs Gramsci to make distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals. Organic intellectuals represent and are represented by emerging social classes. Accordingly, 'every social group, coming into existence...creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields' (Gramsci, 2000: p.301). Thus for Gramsci, intellectuals are not a restricted but a wide group that work in different levels. Capitalism, for instance, created various types of intellectuals such as industrial technicians, specialists in political economy, organizer of culture, and lawyers (Gramsci, 2000: p.301). These intellectuals are bourgeois group's deputies 'that exercise subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government' (Gramsci, 2000: p.306). Therefore, they play a

crucial role in political and civil society; by exerting political direction and by integrating politics and culture with the economic structure (Salamini, 1989: p.147).

In Gramsci's writings there is also another category of intellectuals, that is traditional intellectuals, which is constructed in opposition to organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals detach themselves from social groups and more specifically from socio-historical context. They tend to think of themselves as independent and autonomous of social classes, and tend to define themselves vis-à-vis 'past intellectual currents, as the descendants and innovators, or as the antagonists, of one another intellectual current that preceded them' (Gramsci as cited in Olsaretti, 2013: p.366). Thus, they seem to be representatives of historical continuity that is uninterrupted 'even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms' (Gramsci, 2000: p.302). For Gramsci, every group, which emerges into history out of the preceding economic structure will find a class of traditional intellectuals in existence. If this new group seeks dominance, it should struggle to assimilate and to conquer traditional intellectuals (Gramsci, 2000: p.304), and the most effective way to accomplish this is the creation of organic intellectuals by the new social group. This is because if the new group allows existing traditional intelligentsia to provide its intellectual leadership, then it will be transformed by this intelligentsia (Jones, 2006: p.88).

The role of intellectuals becomes even more important in Gramsci when his distinction between war of manoeuvre and war of position is considered. For Gramsci, in democratic societies of the West, having control over the state in a short period of time through revolution (war of manoeuvre) would not be sufficient for revolutionary success because of the strong apparatus of civil society which performs a hegemony in superstructure. Thus, in those types of societies any change requires the transformation of collective will among people. Indeed, most revolutions have to proceed this war of position; a war that will be 'fought over a long period in the superstructure, in which meanings and values become the object of struggle' (Jones, 2006: p.31). Since war of position is a transformative 'war' on the domain of culture and ideology, organic intellectuals that work in the superstructure for the social class that seek to dominate turn into crucial component of social change.

Drawing on the premises of Kant, Marxism and Gramsci, it could be argued that primary role of intellectuals is to bring consciousness to masses in order to create a change in some particular way. Considering the role of culture in maintaining the hegemony, the works of intellectuals becomes particularly important either in holding hegemony, or in disrupting and creating counter-hegemony. The latter, which is also important for the

subject of this study, is realized through challenging and creating ruptures in the commonsensical thought of society. In the light of this argument, next part analyzes the emancipatory role intellectuals could play in changing security discourses and practices of the state in the Kurdish issue.

6.3.1.1. Intellectuals, the Kurdish Issue and Emancipatory Change in State Discourses and Practices

This part argues intellectuals could be influential in state practices by informing public consciousness by which they may persuade policy-makers to adopt non-statist and non-militarist practices. In that sense, it analyzes ‘Wise People Committee’ and intellectuals’ support of non-statist, non-militarist social movements as the alternative practices which have already influenced or may influence state discourses and practices.

Various types of intellectuals such as academics, writers, civil society leaders, artists, trade-union cadres could influence state discourses and practices in different ways in the Kurdish issue. One example of this was ‘Wise People Committee’; that was established in 2013 by the intellectuals from different political opinions. The Committee included writers, trade union leaders, singers and directors. It was rather an uncommon organization in the sense that it was a state initiative and it had two aims: first informing the public about the peace process, which aimed to bring a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish issue; and second, listening to public demands, revealing public expectations on peace process and informing the government about those expectations. For this end, several committees were set up, each responsible of a different region in Turkey. In the words of then PM Erdoğan ‘it is important to prepare the public for solution process’, and he defined the committees as a part of ‘psychological operation’ (İşte ‘Akil Adam’ Listesindeki İsimler, 2013). Thus, they would contribute to the dialogue between the state and the public. Despite its being a state initiative, the Wise People Committee was important to show how intellectuals could provide dialogue between the state and society in the Kurdish issue; how they could contribute to find non-militarist and peaceful solution to this specific topic; and how they could create a new consciousness in the common sense of the society.

Intellectuals could also influence state practices indirectly by getting in critical social movements. Although *Saturday Mothers* will be focused below, here the role of intellectuals in supporting this social movement and making it more public should be mentioned. When *Saturday Mothers* (the mothers whose children are lost under

police/gendarmarie custody) started their silent sitting activity in 1995, they succeeded to take media attention. However, what spread their protest to wider public attention was the support given by famous artists in the society. In 1995, a renowned singer Ahmet Kaya dedicated his song 'Find me Mother' to *Saturday Mothers*. Similarly, in 1996, one of the most famous female singer in Turkey, Sezen Aksu wrote a song named 'Saturday Song' for *Saturday Mothers* and she also dedicated her song to *Saturday Mothers*. Those supports by intellectuals were very important in the sense of making the movement and its cause visible in the public. Since 1995, many artists, civil society organizations, writers and unions have been supporting the movement which help to question traditional, statist and military state security practices.

6.3.2. The Role of Social Movements in Emancipation

With the rise of social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, there occurred a significant interest to study this phenomenon in various disciplines. Although today there is a vast amount of work in social movements subject, it is hard to talk about a unitary discipline. Rather, there are different views on social movements due to different focus of analysis³⁸, different political theories underlying the study³⁹, different historicity and different social context. Because of those distinct points, it is hard to make a common definition of social movements. In his 2009 book, having analyzed many definitions in the literature, Karl Dieter Opp (2009: p.36-37) defines four common characteristics of social movements. Accordingly, social movements are constituted of collectivities of individuals or actors, they have specific goals, they are antagonist and they embody a joint action. Based on those characteristics, Opp defines social movement as 'a collectivity of actors who want to achieve their goal or goals by influencing decisions of a target'⁴⁰ (Opp, 2009: p.40). Most of the works in the literature characterize this goal as social change. For instance, for Jenkins and Form (2005), social movements are organized efforts to bring about social change.

³⁸ While some studies focus on the question of 'How do social movements arise and become effective?', others focus on the 'Why do social movement happen?' (Yıldırım, 2012: p.12-13).

³⁹ The political theories that affect social movements studies are as various as rational actor theory, resource mobilization theory, Marxism, pro-Marxism and post-Marxism.

⁴⁰ It could be argued that this definition very much reflects the US tradition of approaching to social movements. From the European tradition, Alain Touraine (2002: p.90) defines social movements as 'organized conflicts or as conflicts between organized actors over the social use of common cultural values'. European tradition will be focused in detail below under the new social movement theory.

Similarly, for Flynn (2014) social movements aim to achieve necessary group influence to make changes (p.26).

In order to overcome the complexity of studying various perspectives on social movements, and to increase comprehensiveness, typological classifications are made in literature. Two common approaches to grasp contemporary social movements are resource mobilization theory and new social movement theory. While the first one is usually studied in the United States, the latter has been focused by the academy in Europe. Resource mobilization theory assumes social movements as composed of rational actors engaging in instrumental action (Buechler, 1995: p.441). The movements mobilize 'available economic, political and communication resources to address' identifiable political issues (Wienclaw and Howson, 2014: p.39). By focusing on rational actors and mobilization of resources, resource mobilization approach examines the balances of costs, rewards and incentives that provide agents with the motivation to become involved in struggle (Crossley, 2002: p.12). However, in order to grasp the emancipatory role social movements could play in the Kurdish issue in Turkey this part will focus on new social movement theories rather than resource mobilization theory, since the social movements in Turkey could better understood by the former.

New social movement theories (NSM) focus on economic and cultural structures of societies within which social movements arise and in that sense analyze the historicity of the movements. NSMs are influenced by Marxist approaches of social theories and political philosophy and what makes those approaches 'new' and distinct from the traditional approaches lie in their efforts to expand Marxism's restricted scope of economic reductionism in understanding social movements. Accordingly, Marxism implies that all social action will eventually be determined by the logic of capitalist production and relatedly the most significant social actors will be defined by class relationships (Buechler, 1995: p.442). Any other action or actor outside of the capitalist production process are considered to have secondary, if any, role in shaping social relations. However, NSMs locate non-economic actions and actors to the core of social movements. For this paradigm, there is now a post-industrial stage which is much different than industrial stage which makes politics, ideology and culture the root of the social action. Thus, for NSM theories post-material values are more important in social movement than materialistic values. Moreover, rather than focusing on the role of economic redistribution in social action, NSM theories center on autonomy and identity of individuals since NSMs call into question the economic, social and political structures which limit citizens to participate in governance or enjoy their identity rights without social or political restrictions (Offe: 1985; Pichardo: 1997). To reach

those aims, NSMs take symbolic action in cultural sphere and instrumental action in political sphere (Buechler, 1995: p.442). Therefore, it could be assumed that new social movements try to establish a new political base, which focus on lifestyle and life quality of individuals by overcoming the limits of traditional political sphere. What is more, there is a constructionist relationship between the movements and participants. While participants constitute the movement to express cultural and identity claims, the movement also constructs and reconstructs the identities of the participants. This mutual relationship avoids being stuck in some fixed claims and hence carries the capacity to transform the society.

When the objectives of self-determination, self-realization and autonomy of new social movements are considered, it could be argued that those collectivities carry an important potential of emancipation in socio-cultural sphere and in that sense, they could be assumed as emancipatory actors and acts. As Hirsch argues, NSMs could be considered as a reaction to Fordism under which there occurred an increase commodification and bureaucratization of social life. The movements aim to overcome alienation created by this system by promoting individual emancipation (Hirsch as cited in Buechler, 1995: p.441). Today, environmental movements, women movements, peace movements, and gay rights movements are considered as new social movements with their focus on the rights of different identities, their rejection of institutionalized politics, and their efforts of expanding social spaces as to bring social development. In this light, those movement, by proposing an alternative political, cultural and social life, challenges the cultural hegemony of the ruling group by bringing a new consciousness to common sense of the society. As mentioned above, from Gramscian perspective, challenging the cultural hegemony of the dominant group is a crucial step in transforming the society and in this sense new social movements become very important agents of emancipatory change in society.

6.3.2.1. New Social Movements, the Kurdish Issue and Emancipatory Change in Security Discourses and Practices

The history of social movements in Turkey dates back to early 1960s. It was under the fundamental rights and liberties that were recognized by 1961 Constitution that they started to be seen in Turkish political scene (Yıldırım, 2012). In this relatively liberal environment many unions, trade bodies, and student associations were formed, which gave an impetus to social movements. Yet, those movements were different than their European counterparts, in the sense that their main objective was not expressing individual or cultural liberties. They did not aim a social transformation by creating alternative political spaces

(Yıldırım, 2012). What is more, they were also largely silent on giving voice to different identities. In this light, it could be argued that the movements after 1960s could not be considered under the new social movements, which focus on identity, culture and self-realization of individuals by challenging the cultural hegemony of the ruling groups.

After the 1980 coup, social movements in Turkey took a new form. Parallel to the developments in global social movements, the social movements in Turkey saw the civil society as the main arena for struggle and thus, they became to institutionalize under civil society organizations (Yıldırım, 2012: p.19). The social movements after 1980 aimed to bring change through societal transformation. Since the latter requires a change in civil society, civil society organizations in this period brought a new understanding of politics by expanding the political sphere to civil society. The women and human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Association, Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Mor Çatı Women's Shelter Foundation, could be considered as the most important actors in creating alternative political spaces in this period.

It is with the 2000s that the social movements in Turkey took the characteristics of new social movements. There are several aspects which differentiate the movements of this period from the previous social movements. First, rather than making lobbying activities with traditional political actors as civil society organizations have been doing, the movements of this period tried to expand political sphere by political activism in the form of protest and resistance. Second, the movements generally used public spaces as bases for their actions. Tekel workers based their resistance in Kızılay, the central neighborhood in Ankara; Saturday Mothers have been using Galatasaray Square in Taksim as the place for their protests and etc. Third, the scope of movements raised in this period. From environmental protests⁴¹ to workers' resistance, from LGBT pride walking, to protests against the restriction of internet, many social, cultural and political issues have become the subject of movements. Finally, although some civil society organizations played important role in the movements of this period, the main catalyzing power behind them was individual initiatives.

These characteristics point out that individuals' efforts of having autonomy on their own life, and increasing their life quality has become the main tenants of social movements of this period. In that sense, it could be said that it is in the 2000s that new social movements, which have emancipatory aims and potentials, started to take place in Turkey. Following from this, this section argues that these movements hold potential to influence state security

⁴¹ Environmental protests included anti-nuclear campaigns, protests against hydro-electric power plants, protests against gold mining with cyanide.

practices by raising public consciousness on state's traditional security practices and by helping to create more emancipatory security practices which could address to the insecurities of various referents. To show the transformative potential of social movements in the security politics of Turkey considering the Kurdish issue, this part makes an analysis of one significant social movement: *Saturday Mothers*.

Saturday Mothers represents a long-lasting social movement which has taken the form of civil disobedience and passive resistance against state (security) practices. Started in 1995, a group of mothers, whose children were disappeared under police/gendarmerie custody, have been gathering every Saturday at İstiklal Street and have been making a silent sitting activity to protest the state policies and to create a public consciousness about their children's whereabouts.⁴² The main motivation behind their protest was the exhaustion of all the legal proceedings; they had taken all the legal and political actions, yet no serious interest had been given to their cause (Orhan, 2012).

Saturday Mothers was not a homogenous group in terms of ethnicity, identity or culture. Rather, the common point of the disappeared was their political identity. Yet, since most of the disappearances under custody took in state of emergency region, most of the mothers were Kurdish. As a result of state's counter-insurgency activities (for more details please see Chapter 4), most disappearances took place in the first half of the 1990s.⁴³ The increasing number of participants from Kurdish districts has shifted focus to the Kurdish issue, where *Saturday Mothers* became significant actors in creating new societal consciousness. Their significance could be better understood within the context of the 1990s where state could legitimize its politics by securitizing any topic related to the Kurdish issue (please see Chapter 4). The mainstream media were silent on the undemocratic, illegal policies of the state and there was an ignorance in public opinion on what had been going on in the state of emergency region. In this environment, the act of *Saturday Mothers* created a new political space where the questioning and discussion of state's security policies became possible. Mother, as a societal identity, has an exalted and sacred meaning and is perceived as the basis of social order (Baydar and İvegen, 2006: p.695). When this perception of 'mother' is linked to 'protest', it automatically took the interest of public opinion. Increasing media coverage on *Saturday Mothers* increased the public support for

⁴² The first part of protest lasted till 1999. With the violent police interferences in that year, the movement halted. In 2009, the mothers again started to gather in the same place every Saturday.

⁴³ According to Human Rights Association, between 1991-1998 there were 520 disappearances under custody. However, this number is based on official complaints. It is predicted that there are many others who did not make official complaints to authorities because of fear.

the movement. The public involvement into the issue arouse interest on the causes of *Saturday Mothers*, where for the first time in the 1990s the parts of society which had no idea about what had been going in the state of emergency region faced with state security policies. Thus, the causes of *Saturday Mothers* created an environment where posing some questions could be possible: ‘in whose expense state security policies were being applied?’; ‘whether state security could bring insecurities to individuals?’; ‘what were the illegal and illegitimate security practices of the state?’; ‘what policies were legitimized under the name of security?’ In other words, *Saturday Mothers* became agents that questioned the legitimacy of the state security policies in the Kurdish issue.

By expanding the political space to civil society from traditional institutions, *Saturday Mothers* created a new consciousness in the common sense. In 1999, as a result of police’s suppression, the movement had to give a break to sitting protests (Günaysu, 2014, ‘Cumartesi Nasıl Başladı Neden Ara Verildi). Yet, until the break, the movement was successful in changing practices of the state on the issue of disappearing under custody which decreased in number after 1995, the year when the sittings began. While in 1994 the number of disappearance under the custody was noted as two hundred twenty-nine, in 1995 it dropped to one hundred twenty-one, and in 1998 this number was eight (Türkiye’de Gözaltında Kayıplar, 1999). *Saturday Mothers* may not be the only factor in this decreasing numbers, but they were probably the most important one. It could be argued that by informing public support about disappearances, they forced state to become more attentive on this specific topic (Orhan, 2012: p.125).

6.3.3. The EU as Norm Entrepreneur and the Norm Diffusion

This section proposes the agency of the EU as transformative power in state security discourses and practices of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue. The power of the EU comes from its ability to influence political culture, norms and values of member or candidate states. This process is called Europeanization and may be defined as

Processes of construction, diffusion, institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of European Union decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public procedures (Radaelli, as cited in Tanıl, 2014: p.485).

Europeanization is a process of norm diffusion and thus to better grasp it the operation of norm diffusion will be presented briefly.

In its most basic sense, norms are defined as the ‘standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p.891). For Bjorkdahl (2002) norms have three important characteristics: first, they create regularity in behavior; second, they are ‘general prescriptions of behavior’ and third they are considered as a ‘set of intersubjective understandings and collective expectations regarding the proper behavior of actors’ (p. 40). Based on those characteristics Bjorkdahl (2002) defines norms as ‘intersubjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations’ (p.43).

Norms are typically categorized as regulative and constitutive (Ruggie, 1998). Regulative norms are norms which order and constrain behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p.891). They operate like ‘standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity and establish rights and obligations (Bjorkdahl, 2002: p.41). Constitutive norms, on the other hand, constitute new interests, identities, categories of action and even new actors in the long-run (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p.891). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) adds a third category as prescriptive (evaluative) norms. For these scholars, because norms involve standards of appropriate behavior, intersubjective and evaluative dimensions become crucial in discussing norms. ‘It is the prescriptive quality of “oughtness” that sets norm apart from other kinds of rules’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p.891).

Diffusion, on the other hand, refers to a process whereby there occurs a transmission or spread of one actor’s ideas, information or institutions to other actors (Checkel, 1999). When it is combined with norm it refers to transmission of standards of appropriate behavior from one actor to another. For norm diffusion to happen then, there need to be at least two actors, one is the actor who spread the norms, which may be called as norm entrepreneur or norm promoter, and the other is the actor who receives the norm, which may be called as norm taker or norm follower. Norm entrepreneurs are the agents of social change with an ability to change the existing normative context and alter the behavior of others in the direction of new norms (Bjorkdahl, 2002: p.45-46).

For norm diffusion to be successful, factors relating to norm entrepreneur, norm taker and norm that is being diffused are important. On the norm entrepreneur side strategies used by the entrepreneur is important in the diffusion process. Norm promoters may use persuasive and coercive strategies to influence norm followers. But what is more important is the identity of the norm promoter. Unless the identity of entrepreneur does not resonate

with the norm or with the strategy, norm-receivers may not regard entrepreneur as legitimate as enough to be advocating the norm (Erol, 2013: p.58). On the other side of the coin, there are also factors relating to norm followers in norm diffusion. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) talk about three motivations of norm followers in conforming to the new norm: legitimation, conformity and esteem. Legitimation is important in norm diffusion because states take care about international legitimation for its contribution to the perceptions of domestic legitimacy. Conformity provides a social proof to norm taker that it belongs to a group (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p.903). Esteem is similar to conformity and suggests that norm takers follow norms because they want others to think well of them (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p.903). Lastly, the intrinsic qualities of the norm are also important in its diffusion. The norm will be diffused more easily if it is specific and durable. Specificity refers to clarity of prescriptions, rules, restraints and obligations of norms (Erol, 2013: p.61). Durability stands for norms that ‘have been around awhile, surviving numerous challenges’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p.907). Besides those factors, relationship of new normative claims to the existing norms is also important in the diffusion of a norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). New norms take place in an environment where there are settled norms. Thus, if the new norm fits better to existing normative structure, it is likely that it will be diffused easily.

This section sees the EU as norm entrepreneur, Turkey as the norm taker and the membership process as the normative structure within which norm diffusion takes place. Accordingly, the EU tries to transmit standard behavior which it finds appropriate within its European identity whereby it aims to change the normative context in Turkey. Turkey, on the other hand, is in position of norm follower because the EU accession would provide legitimation of, conformity and esteem to the international position of Turkey. Moreover, in Turkish case, policy priorities of national policy-makers could also be considered important component in the diffusion of norms.

Yet, one question still remains intact: how do norms diffuse in EU context? Manners (2002) suggests six factors in EU norm diffusion processes. Accordingly, norms could be unintentionally diffused from the EU to other actors, which is called contagion. Informational diffusion takes place as a result of strategic communications and declaratory communications. Procedural diffusion involves the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and third party, such as international cooperation agreement or enlargement process. Diffusion might also take place when the EU exchange goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties for substantive or financial means. This is called transference by Manners (2002: p.245). Procedural and transference diffusion are

characterized by ‘conditionality’ or ‘carrot and stickism’. Conditionality is a ‘bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). The rewards may be various such as financial assistances but the ultimate reward is EU membership.

Other diffusion models are overt diffusion and cultural filter. Overt diffusion takes place as a result of EU’s physical presence in third states, such as monitoring missions in non-member states. Cultural filter, on the other hand, affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third states (Manners, 2002: p.245). Diffusion of human rights norm in Turkey or democratic norms in China is an example of cultural filter.

6.3.3.1. The EU and Transformation of Security Discourses and Practices in the Kurdish Issue

Without much doubt, EU’s granting candidate country status to Turkey in 1999 gave an important political impetus to Turkish decision-makers for democratization reforms in topics of human rights, rule of law and minority rights (Kirişçi, 2011; Kubicek, 2005). In 1990s some reforms had been undertaken by Turkey on the anti-terror law, freedom of association and prohibiting torture, but they were very restricted in scope and could not overcome democratic shortcomings, which were criticized by the EU periodically (Kubicek, 2005). However, with the candidate status, Turkey started to apply reforms in many topics to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. Under the Europeanization reforms between the years of 2001 and 2006, the government adopted two constitutional and nine legislative packages (Bilgiç, 2009: p.819), which brought about many changes in topics of democracy, civil-military relations, organizational structure, human rights, and the rule of law. These reforms had important repercussions in the Kurdish issue as well. To name a few, with the reforms, state of emergency was ended in the east and south-east regions, the possibility of broadcasting in Kurdish was opened up, the restrictions on expression of thought were removed, death penalty was abolished and so on. The reforms also transformed security discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue in a way to decrease military focus in security politics and focusing on the insecurities of non-state actors such as individuals and Kurdish ethnic community. This section focuses on the role of the Europeanization reforms in transforming security discourses and practices of the state in the Kurdish issue. The transformative role of the EU in security politics of Kurdish issue will be traced by looking at the changes in the structure of the National Security Council (NSC) after Europeanization

reforms and by analyzing the influence of the EU in the Law No. 5233 that was analyzed in the previous chapter.

The structure of the NSC was analyzed in details in Chapter 4. Accordingly, it was put forward that after the military coup of 1980, the NSC and its General Secretariat, which were dominated by the military bureaucracy, were given legal authority to plan and implement security policies of the state. What is more, by making a broad definition of security, the NSC was also able to interfere many issues in domestic and international politics of the country. This resulted with securitization of many issues including the Kurdish issue. As a result, during the 1990s security politics of Kurdish issue had a military-focused, statist basis, which prevented to focus on political, cultural and economic aspects of it.

Yet, with the Europeanization reforms, the structure of the NSC changed drastically. With the constitutional amendment made in 2001, the number of civilian members was increased at the expense of military ones. This was an important democratization move because the decisions are taken by majority votes. May be more important than this, the role of the Council was rebalanced as to make it an advisory body: NSC decisions were to be considered as 'recommendation', not as 'priority' as mentioned in 1980 constitution (Bilgiç, 2009: p.804). Further changes were made in 2003 with the Seventh Harmonization Package. Accordingly, the duties of the NSC were restricted to cover defense policies only, contrary to broad coverage of security policies; the executive powers of the Secretariat were abolished; the implementation of the Council decisions was transferred to Deputy Prime Minister; some special funds of the Council were transferred to civilian control; Secretary General of the Council was made civilian; and some units of the Secretariat such as Community Relations Presidency which had authority to plan state-wide psychological operations were abolished (Bilgiç, 2009: p.805). As a result of these reforms, the military bureaucracy lost its privilege to plan and implement security policies of the country and security politics started to be undertaken by civilians. This provided to look at the Kurdish issue in non-military perspectives and different aspects of the Kurdish issue, such as cultural and economic, started to take place in the discourses and practices of the state. Beside the reforms that are previously mentioned, the Law No. 5233 could also be considered as a result of Europeanization reforms.

While making the discourse analysis of the Law No. 5233, the previous chapter put forward the political, social and historical context in which the law became to life. Perhaps one of the most important reason behind the law was the Europeanization reforms undertaken by the government. During the reform process, the EU was issuing Accession

Partnership Documents with the aim of setting out priority areas for further reforms and helping Turkey in its preparation for membership. One of those documents, the Accession Partnership Document, was issued in 2003 by the Commission and it put special emphasis on internally displaced persons. Accordingly, the document set the efforts of supporting and speeding up the return of internally displaced persons to their original settlements as a priority with the aim of enhancing economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens (Accession Partnership Document, 19 May 2003, 2003/398/EC). Moreover, in 2002, Parliamentary Assembly of the European Union declared a report under the name of 'Humanitarian Situation of the Displaced Kurdish Population in Turkey', on which it proposed the conditions of displaced Kurdish population, and measures that should be taken to facilitate their returns. In that direction, the government added the adoption of 'Compensation Law' to the National Programme of 2003 as a target to be realized in 2004. Thus, there was a direct influence of the EU in the adoption of the law.

Beside the EU, the ECtHR was also an important agent in the Law No. 5233's entering in force. As a result of increasing number of repetitive cases, which derive from problems at the national level, the ECtHR developed a system called pilot judgement procedure. With this system, the Court identifies the dysfunction under national law in repetitive cases and imposes obligations on states to address those problems (Pilot Judgments¹, 2002). In Turkey's case, as a result of increasing number of cases in compensating the losses of internally displaced persons, the ECtHR made *Doğan and Others* pilot judgement procedure (Akpat and Kalafat, 2011). In this case, the Court emphasized that the 'authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow the applicants to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to settle voluntarily in another part of the country' and concluded that there was a breach of Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 (the right to property) (*Doğan and Others v. Turkey*, Application Nos. 8803-8811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/0). This decision directed Turkish authorities to speed up the preparation of the Law No. 5233 as a domestic remedy mechanism. The economic burden that could arise from ECtHR cases if the law was not adopted was also mentioned several times in the draft document of the law, which shows the influence of the ECtHR in changing security practices of the state.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the role of non-state and external agents in bringing about change in security discourses and practices of the state in the Kurdish issue. In the previous chapters, while analyzing security discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue, the focus was on the agency of the state because the state in general and the military bureaucracy in particular had been very dominant in the design and implementation of security policies till the early 2000s. In the same manner, the influence of civil society and social movements in society was limited till 2000s and they did not have much power to influence decision-making mechanism. However, starting from the late 1990s, the influence of the non-state and external agents in political scene could be seen more frequently. Accordingly, this chapter analyzed the alternative discourses and practices of agents which brought about a more emancipated understanding to the security politics of Kurdish issue. In that sense, it analyzed intellectuals, social movements and the EU as the agents which created changes either in state discourses or in state practices. On intellectual side Wise People Committee started a dialogue between the society and the state in the Kurdish issue. As for social movements, *Saturday Mothers* made the public question the cases of ‘lost under detention’. As a result, the number of those cases decreased significantly. The relations with the EU was also very important for Turkish decision-makers and the EU candidature made possible the adoption of many democratic reforms due to conditionality which positively influenced the security politics of Kurdish issue. Those agents’ transformative role points out that the practices of non-state and external agents have important potentials in transforming state security practices towards less military-focused, less statist, and more inclusionary direction.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

What does the tracing of state security discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue tell the reader? First of all, it reveals that, in the Kurdish issue, state security discourses and practices in the past, that is between the years of 1925 and 1999, were far from addressing insecurities of many actors. The security conception of the state privileged the security of the state over the security of other referents of security; and it saw the military as the only dimension of security and ignored the role of other issues such as political, economic, cultural and societal. What is more, the security politics were highly militarized because of the influence of military bureaucracy in decision-making and implementation mechanism through the institutions of the NSC and its General Secretariat. However, such restricted conception of insecurity was unable to bring security for various referents. The ongoing armed struggle between the PKK and the state for the last three decades also shows that those discourses and practices have not also addressed the insecurity of the state.

Second, the analysis of the study also shows that the rupture in this traditional conception of security has potential to better address insecurities. The most significant rupture from the past in the years between the years of 1999 and 2015 is the inclusion of non-military dimensions to security discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue. Many reforms were made in cultural and economic spheres which addressed insecurities of Kurdish ethnic community and individuals who were negatively affected by the past security policies in the east and south-east regions. Again, in this environment, there occurred halts in the armed struggle and there was an intention to find peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue which started a dialogue between the state and the PKK leader Öcalan. Thus, less statist, less military-focused and more critical/emancipatory understanding of security better addressed insecurities of different actors, including the state.

Third, the analysis reveals the important role non-state and external agents could play in the transformation of state security discourses and practices. One important factor behind the ruptures in the present context was the reforms undertaken by the governments to start accession talks with the EU. Thus, EU conditionality was an important factor in Europeanization reforms, which enhanced democracy, human rights and rule of law in Turkey. In security politics, the reforms decreased the role of military bureaucracy in

designing and implementation of security policies. As a result, the civilian bureaucracy brought less military focus to security politics and this understanding led to focus on economic and cultural dimensions of the Kurdish issue. Beside the role of the EU, the intellectuals and social movements could also create less statist, and less militarist discourses and practices. Wise People Committee showed that how intellectuals could establish dialogue between the society and decision-makers. Social movements, at the same time, could transform state security discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue. *Saturday Mothers* is a good example of this. Short after the movement started, it created a public consciousness about the loss under detention, which resulted with the decrease of those cases in subsequent years.

What the role of these actors shows that the unfulfilled potentiality towards more emancipatory state security practices lie in the agency of non-state and external normative actors. As Williams mentions (2000), those agents could persuade policy-makers to see security in a wider, human-centred perspective. Here, the role of the EU is particularly important, because it holds the most significant capacity to persuade decision-makers. What is more, the EU's active engagement in Turkey also strengthens civil society (Keyman, 2006), which could also influence security practices of the state in the Kurdish issue.

The structure of the thesis was as follows. Security studies were conceptualized in Chapter 2. Accordingly, it was presented that traditional security studies and CSS have different ontological and epistemological outlooks in studying security and they have different answers to the critical questions of what is security; whose security should be studied; how could security be provided; what are the security issues; and how security should be studied. Traditional security studies derive from the assumptions of realism and positivism. According to realism states are the ultimate actors in international arena because there is no higher authority than the state. Moreover, realism also perceives state as the ideal political community in which security of individuals could be possible. Deriving from state-centrism of realism, traditional security approach takes states as the main referent-objects of security studies. Security of other referents are important as long as they affect the security of states. Moreover, for realism power is key to survival in anarchical international system and the ultimate form of power is military power. Thus, for traditional security approach, the main focus of security studies is the phenomenon of war in general and the study of threat, use and control of military force in particular (Nye and Lynn Jones, as cited in Walt, 1991: p.212). Beside realism, traditional security conception is also affected by positivist epistemology. It seeks objectivity through theory testing which refer to the process of verifying, falsifying and refining competing theories 'by testing their predictions against

scientifically selected body of evidence' (Walt, 1991: p.221). Therefore, it separates subject of the study from the object of the study.

CSS has become one of the prominent critics of traditional security studies after the end of the Cold War. According to CSS, security is derivative concept; meaning that 'different attitudes and behavior associated with security are traceable to different political theories' (Booth, 2007: p.150). Seeing security as derivative concept means that there is no neutral point from which security theorizing arises. Thus, contrary to traditional security studies, CSS does not make a claim to objectivity; and does not separate subject from the object. For CSS, each theorizing derives from a particular social context, and the interests of particular referent group (Booth, 2007: p.150). Being aware of the subjectivity of analysis, CSS aims emancipation in security because it believes that only through emancipation that stable security could be provided. Security as emancipation is mainly about two things: freeing people from constraints and giving them opportunities to make choices in life (Booth: 2007). Those constraints in security is not only about the use of force but also includes topics such as human rights abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, environmental degradation, lack of access to health care and birth control, militarization of society, and economic deprivation (Bilgin, 2005: p.26). This means that for CSS, insecurities are not limited to use of force situations or military sector; rather, from politics to culture, they are seen in many sectors. What is more important, for CSS, those insecurities do not only operate in state-level but also in sub-state and supra-state levels. Therefore, for CSS, states are not the only referent-objects of security; rather, the critical security scholars study security in different levels such as individual, societal, and environmental.

It is on this theoretical background that the study established its argument. Accordingly, it argued that in the Kurdish issue, Turkish state security policies in the past were constituted by the traditional security discourses and practices, meaning that the state was the only referent-object of security and military was seen as the main provider of security. However, there was a tension between those practices and the situation of 'being free from threat' for many actors, including the state. Thus, a transformation towards less statist and less-military focused state discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue may have better potential to address insecurities.

To analyze how state security practices were in line with traditional conception of security the study took snapshots of two historical periods. First, in Chapter 3, it analyzed the forced resettlements of the Kurds between 1925 and 1934 to show the statist security practices in the Kurdish issue. To have a better picture of the resettlement policy, the chapter focused on the demographic engineering policies in the Ottoman period. This was a useful

attempt to see the continuity in the state tradition since demographic engineering was a long security practice of the state. Ottoman Empire had always used population policy for security reasons, such as increasing authority in new territories, disciplining nomads, or increasing manpower for the army. Kurdish resettlement was also an extension of this state tradition. The chapter argued that the resettlement policies were undertaken not only physical security reasons, but also for ontological security concerns of the decision-makers in the early Republican period. The early discourses reveal that the Turkishness was constituted in the axis of territory, religion, language/culture and modernity/secularism. Accordingly, they thought that Muslim groups could be assimilated into Turkishness due to common religious bond. Language could play significant role in the assimilation. However, Sheikh Said Rebellion exposed the presence of groups with different identity characteristics, which disrupts the constituting narratives of Turkish self. The rebellion, thus made these different identity characteristics a threat to ontological security of the new state because it was a threat to the certainty and continuity of the perception of the self, which is crucial to actors' feeling of ontological security (Giddens, 1991). Since those characteristics were constituent part of Kurdish identity, decision-makers tried to tame them by assimilating Kurds into Turkishness. Beside physical security consideration, this ontological insecurity also played a significant role in the resettlements of the Kurds.

Chapter 4 focused on the use of force practices of the state in the Kurdish issue and how those practices resulted with insecurities of individuals. In that sense, it looked at security policies during the 1990s in the east and south-east regions by analyzing the cases against Turkey in ECtHR on Article (2) - right to life. Article (2) is selected because it is about the core of security which is survival and it includes cases of lethal use of force by state agents against individuals. The analysis of the cases demonstrated that state relied on the use of force in the Kurdish issue during the 1990s, which not only targeted the PKK fighters but also civilians. What is more important, the prevalence of militarist dimension of security was not peculiar to army, but it was also legitimized in the society. The failure of carrying out effective investigation in domestic legal system against the state agents' acts of using lethal force in Kurdish issue against civilians is an indicator of the militarist dimension's legitimacy in society. The use of force could easily be naturalized in society because militarism is a dominant ideology in the common sense of Turkish society. Therefore, chapter also analyzed how militarist ideologies are being produced and reproduced in the common sense through political and cultural practices.

Having revealed that Turkish state had traditional conception of security in Kurdish issue in the past, the study studied the present period in the context of security studies. To

better grasp the present dynamics, the study made a critical discourse analysis of a key text which is the 'Law on Compensation of Losses Emanating from Terrorist Acts and Counter-Terrorist Measures' (Law No. 5233). The law is important because it tells something new about security perspective of the state. The analysis of the text and its draft document shows that the state accepts other referents' security was damaged in the past as a result of the counter-terrorists acts of the state. Moreover, the Law aims to cover economic losses of displaced persons, and aims to provide economic security for them. In this sense, it reflects a broadened understanding of security, while also recognizing security problems of the non-state referents. In that sense, it represents a rupture from the past security understanding. However, when the draft document of the text was closely analyzed, it is seen that there are also continuities with the past. For one thing, the text glorifies the use of force policies of the past by labeling it with positive adjectives. What is more, the text always labels the use of force situations as 'counter-terrorism' whereby it provides a legitimate basis to use of force situations. One more continuity with the past is the refusal of Kurdish identity in the text even though the Law covers the area where Kurdish ethnicity is great majority. The denial of Kurdish identity in the text indicates that ontological security concerns of the state against Kurdish identity is still present.

The continuity with and rupture from the past security understanding that was prevalent in the Law No. 5233 was also characterized in the present period's practices. As Chapter 5 underlined, many cultural reforms were realized in the Kurdish issue and they reduced the oppression of the state. What is more, for the first time since the last three decades, a dialogue started between the government and the PKK leader Öcalan to stop the armed struggle. The result was halt in violence for few years and the stability in the south-east of Turkey. Nevertheless, the continuities with the past are still noticeable in state security practices, especially in privileging military dimension of security. Falling back on the traditional conception of security carries potential to undermine securities of many referents.

If more emancipatory vision of security in state security discourses and practices brings about more security for myriad referents, what should be done is to make emancipatory security conception prevail. But how will this be possible? Here, the study, deriving from the potentialities in the present context, analyzed the role non-state and external agents could play in transforming state security conception. Chapter 6 focused on the agency of intellectuals, social movements and the EU, which all challenged state's traditional conceptions of security in the Kurdish issue, and influenced governments to apply less statist, less military-focused, more inclusionary, and dialogue based security

discourses and practices in the Kurdish issue. The positive effect of those agents seems promising for the future. In the Kurdish issue, the practices of the alternative agents could help to bring about and reinforce emancipatory conception of security in state security discourses and practices

7.1. Future Works

Although, today there is a rich literature on the Kurdish issue in Turkey (Barkey 1998; Besikci 1969, 1977, 1978, 1989; Bruinessen 1992, 2000, 2003; Casier 2011; Cemal 2003; Criss 2005; Dixon and Murat 2010; Entessar 1992; Hassanpour 1997; Heper 2007; Jwaideh 2006; Kirişçi 1997; Loizides 2010; Olson 1989; Lundgran 2008; O'Ballance 1996; Ozoglu 2004, 2009; Romano 2009; Yeğen 1999, 2006, 2007, 2011), almost none of the studies focus to the topic from the perspective of security studies.⁴⁴ In this sense, this study contributed to the literature of the Kurdish issue by bringing a new perspective. However, as in all researches, this research had to draw boundaries in order to be consistent and clear on a topic. The existence of those boundaries makes future works necessary.

As mentioned in the Introduction part, this thesis did not confine the Kurdish issue to the conflict between the PKK and the state, but rather analyzed it in its historicity. This is because the armed struggle with the PKK only establishes one dimension of the subject and reducing the Kurdish issue to the armed struggle prevents one to make a broader analysis on the topic. Therefore, this study problematized state security conception to analyze the subject independently of armed struggle. However, it is also true that, today the PKK practices influence the course of Kurdish issue in a great sense. The PKK's use of force strategies further militarizes the issue and makes it difficult for society to think the issue in non-military terms. Thus, a study which critically analyze the PKK's reliance on the use of force practices and which exposes that those military practices undermine the securities of the people will be complementary to this dissertation.

Similarly, the thesis, while analyzing security-emancipation link in Kurdish issue, did not analyze emancipation from the perspective of those needing it. This means that it did not look at the agency of Kurdish ethnic community, but rather look at the agencies of actors who could bring emancipation in Kurdish issue. Thus, a complementary work is needed on analyzing agency of Kurdish ethnic community. Surely, few more questions follow. Is there any emancipatory agent who speak for the security Kurdish population? If

⁴⁴ An exception could be Kaliber and Tocci's work (2008) which focus the Kurdish issue from the perspective of securitization and desecuritization.

so, what are the its emancipatory characteristics, and how could it bring about more emancipation? These questions are important because for some part of the Kurdish population the PKK may be seen as an emancipatory actor, yet as mentioned above, the practices of the PKK are far from being non-militarist, dialogue-based and not approved by the whole Kurdish community. Again, what is the role of Kurdish civil society in bringing about emancipatory discourses and practices? These questions need further analysis to better approach the Kurdish issue from the perspective of security studies.



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APPENDICES

A- TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma Türkiye Cumhuriyet'i (TC) devletinin Kürt meselesinde öne sürdüğü güvenlik söylemlerini ve uyguladığı güvenlik pratiklerini genel olarak güvenlik çalışmaları perspektifinden ve özel olarak da Geleneksel Güvenlik – Eleştirel (Özgürleştirici) Güvenlik ekseninde analiz etmeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu analizi ise tarihsel bir perspektife dayandırmıştır. Buna göre tez şu argümanda bulunmaktadır: Kürt meselesinde TC devletinin geçmişte (burada geçmiş 1925 ve 1999 yılları arasını kapsamaktadır) uyguladığı politikalar geleneksel güvenlik anlayışı odaklı olmuştur ve bu anlayış devlet dâhil pek çok güvenlik birimi için (bireyler, Kürt etnik topluluğu, toplum) güvenlik getirmemiştir. Fakat günümüzde (1999 ve 2015 yılları arasını kapsamaktadır) bu anlayıştan zaman zaman kopmalar meydana gelmiş ve daha özgürleştirici güvenlik anlayışı devlet güvenliği söylem ve pratiklerinde yer bulmuştur. Bunun sonucu olarak ise güvenlik birimlerinin güvenlik sorunlarına daha iyi işaret edilmiş, PKK lideri Öcalan ile devlet arasında diyalog başlamış ve bunun sonucu olarak silahlar bırakılmıştır. Kısaca, daha özgürleştirici güvenlik anlayışı daha çok güvenlikle sonuçlanmıştır. Bu, eleştirel güvenlik anlayışının güvenlik sağlamadaki rolünü de göstermektedir ve çalışma bu anlayışın devlet politikalarında nasıl daha fazla yer edineceğini de araştırmıştır. Bu amaçla, devlet dışı aktörlerin – AB, entelektüeller ve sosyal hareketler - rolü incelenmiş ve bu aktörlerin devlet güvenlik politikalarını geleneksel perspektiften nasıl uzaklaştırdığı gösterilmiştir.

Tabii, bu argüman pek çok soruyu da beraberinde getirmektedir. Geleneksel Güvenlik – Eleştirel Güvenlik anlayışı neleri öne sürmektedir? Bu anlayışların birbirlerinden farkları nedir? Kısaca özetlenecek olursa, geleneksel güvenlik anlayışı siyasal realizmin (hem klasik, hem neo-realist anlayış) Güvenlik Çalışmalarındaki tezahürüne dayanmaktadır. Buna göre, Güvenlik Çalışmasının ana birimini devlet oluşturmaktadır ve diğer güvenlik birimlerinin güvenliği analizde ya yer almamaktadır, ya da ancak devlet güvenliğini etkilediği ölçüde yer almaktadır. Bu anlayış realizmin devletleri uluslararası arenada ana aktör olarak görmesinden, devletlerin halkların ana koruyucusu olduğuna inanmasından ve devletleri sınırlar içinde düzen ve güvenlik sağladığını düşünmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Devlet-odaklı bu düşünüşün yanı sıra, geleneksel güvenlik askeri ve güç kullanımı odaklı bir anlayışı da öne sürmektedir. Buna göre, anarşik uluslararası

sistemde askeri kapasite devletlerin güvenlik sağlamasındaki ana unsurdur. Öyle ki, güç kullanımı geleneksel güvenlik çalışmalarının temel taşıdır ve geleneksel güvenlik anlayışı güvenlik çalışmalarını güç kullanma durumlarını inceleme olarak tanımlamaktadır. Epistemolojik ve metodolojik olarak ise geleneksel güvenlik anlayışı, çalışmalarını bilimsel/objektivist epistemolojilere ve pozitivist metodolojilere dayandırmaktadır. Bunun sonucu olarak dışardaki dünyayı objektif bir gerçeklik olarak görmekte ve dışardaki dünyanın olduğu gibi açıklanabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Bu anlayışın sonucu olarak teori ile pratik arasına bir ayrım koymakta ve analiz yapan araştırmacının analiz ettiği sosyal gerçeklikten bağımsız olabileceğini iddia etmektedir. Özet olarak denilebilir ki, geleneksel güvenlik çalışmaları, realizmin etkisiyle, devletlerin anarşik ortamda kendi çıkarlarını düşüneceğini ve kazan-kaybet mantığıyla hareket edeceğini; çıkarların ve güvenliğin en iyi askeri yollarla sağlanacağını; devletin ana güvenlik birimi olduğunu ve güvenlik politikalarında değişim sağlamada ana aktör olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

Geleneksel güvenlik çalışmalarının Soğuk Savaş'ın sonunu tahmin etmekteki yetersizliği ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemdeki yeni gelişmeleri anlamlandırabilecek analizler sunamaması, pek çok analistin geleneksel güvenlik anlayışını sorgulamasına ve bunun sonucu olarak bu analistlerin güvenliğe yeni bir perspektif getirmesine neden olmuştur. Soğuk Savaş sonrası ortaya çıkan bu yaklaşımlar askeri odaklı anlayışın, güvenliği anlamadaki yetersizliğini ve güvenliğin siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve çevresel boyutları da olduğunu belirtmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, devletin tek güvenlik birimi olmadığını, bireyler, toplumlar, topluluklar, kadınlar gibi pek çok başka güvenlik biriminin de olduğunu; güvenlik politikalarının devlet tekeline olmadığını ve olmaması gerektiğini vurgulamıştır. Aynı zamanda güvenlik çalışmalarının pozitivist metotlarla anlaşılamayacağını ve daha yorumcu, tarihsel, söylemsel analizlere ihtiyaç duyulduğunu; sabit bir şimdiki zaman analizi yerine, değişimin nasıl mümkün olabileceğini güvenliğin siyasaldan ve siyasi teorilerden bağımsız algılanamayacağını dile getirmiştir.

Eleştirel güvenlik anlayışı ise geleneksel güvenliğin bu sorgulanması içinde anlamlandırılabilir. Eleştirel güvenlik anlayışı bilginin tarihsel, sosyal, politik ve kültürel kontekstin bir yansıması olduğunu ve bunun sonucu olarak da objektif bir bilginin mümkün olamayacağını öne sürmektedir. Güvenlik anlayışında ise bu durum güvenlik çalışmalarının arkasında siyasi teorilerin olduğu anlamına gelir. Bunun çıkarımı şudur: güvenliğe tarafsız bir noktadan bakmak mümkün değildir ve her güvenlik çalışması, bilinçli ya da bilinçsiz olarak, bir grubun çıkarını yansıtır. Eleştirel güvenlik çalışmaları da bilginin siyasi rolünün farkında olarak bilgiyi özgürleştirici bir amaç için kullanmaktadır. Çünkü eleştirel güvenlik çalışmalarına göre güvenlik ancak ve ancak daha fazla özgürleşmeyle mümkün olacaktır.

Bu anlayışın özünde ise devlet değil, birey vardır ve bireyin her türlü kısıtlamalardan özgürleşmesi çalışmanın ana eksenidir. Eleştirel güvenlik çalışmalarında birey ana odak olduğu için güvenlik sadece askeri olarak algılanmamaktadır ve birey güvenliğini tehdit eden her durum güvenlik çalışmalarının konusu olabilmektedir (ekonomik eşitsizlikler, çevresel sorunlar, ayrımcı politikalar, siyasi temsildeki sıkıntılar, vb. gibi). Bunun da ötesinde özgürleşme mantığındaki güvenlik anlayışı insanlara seçim verme hakkıyla da ilgilidir: insanların kendi hayatı hakkında seçim yapabilme özgürlüğü ve kendi potansiyellerini gerçekleştirme hakkının verilmesini amaçlamaktadır.

Fakat eleştirel güvenlik anlayışında bir temel soru ortaya çıkmaktadır: güvenlik politikalarını planlayan ve uygulayan ana aktör devletlerse ve sadece devletlerin meşru olarak güç kullanma hakkı varsa eleştirel güvenliğin ortaya koyduğu özgürleştirici düşünceler uluslararası ve ulusal politikada nasıl ortaya çıkacaktır? Burada eleştirel güvenlik anlayışlı devlet dışı aktörlerin özgürleştirici pratiklere nasıl etki edebileceğini çalışmaktadır. Devlet dışı aktörlerin politika yapmaları farklı aktörlerin güvenlik sorunlarını ve güvenliğin farklı boyutlarını dile getirmede önemli bir rol teşkil eder. Değişim yapma kapasitesi sadece devlete bırakılırsa, devlet kendi çıkarını diğer aktörlerin önüne koyabilir ve bu durum pek çok güvensizlik sorununa sessiz kalınması anlamını taşıyabilir. Ayrıca, devletin bazı politikalarda değişim yapma kapasitesinin yüksek olduğu doğru olsa da, bu, devletin her türlü tehditle başa edebilecek donanımı olduğu anlamına gelmez. Örneğin askeri doğası olmayan pek çok güvenlik konusunda sivil toplum örgütleri veya uluslararası organizasyonlar devletten daha fazla bilgi ve donanım sahibi olabilmektedir.

Güvenlik çalışmalarındaki bu tartışmaya kısaca değindikten sonra, bir açıklama da tarihsel perspektif hakkında yapılmalıdır. Yukarda da belirtildiği gibi çalışma analizini iki tarihsel boyutta yapmaktadır: geçmiş ve günümüz. Burada geçmiş 1925 yılları ile 1999 yılları arasını, günümüz ise 1999 ile 2015 yılları arasını kapsamaktadır. Pekiyi neden böyle bir ayrıma gidilmiştir? Bunun en belirgin nedeni bu tarihlerin Kürt meselesindeki devlet söylem ve pratiklerinde kırılmalara yol açmış olmasıdır. 1925 yılı Cumhuriyet ilan edildikten sonraki ilk büyük çaplı Kürt ayaklanması olan Şeyh Said isyanının patlak verdiği yıldır. Ayaklanma devletin Kürt politikasında ve Kürt kimliği algısında yansımaları günümüze kadar gelen ciddi değişimler meydana getirmiştir. Öte yandan 1999 yılı ise iki önemli gelişmeye sahne olmuştur: son Kürt isyanı lideri Abdullah Öcalan'ın yakalanması ve Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği (AB) aday ülke statüsü kazanması. İlkinin sonucu olarak, PKK strateji değiştirmiş ve silah bırakmıştır; ikincisinin sonucu olarak ise geniş çaplı demokratik reformlar hayata geçirilmiştir. Bu gelişmeler sonucu ise geçmişteki güvenlik anlayışından farklı bir güvenlik anlayışı ortaya çıkmıştır. Daha az devlet ve askeri güç

kullanımı odaklı bu yeni anlayış, değişik birimlerin güvenlik problemlerine daha fazla hitap edebilmiş ve sonuç olarak daha güvenli bir ortam yaratabilmiştir.

Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin geçmişteki güvenlik söylem ve ziyadesiyle pratiklerinin geleneksel kalıplar içinde olduğunu göstermek için iki farklı döneme ve olaya yoğunlaşmıştır. Kürt meselesinde güvenlik pratiklerinin devleti diğer güvenlik birimlerinden önde tuttuğunu ve bunun diğer birimlere güvensizlik getirdiğini göstermek için 1925'den sonraki Kürtlerin zorunlu iskânına odaklanılmıştır. Devletin Kürt meselesini sadece askeri güçle yönetmeye çalışması, güvenliğin diğer taraflarını görmemesi ve askeri güç kullanımının bireyler için ciddi güvenlik sorunları yarattığını göstermek için de 1990'lardaki güvenlik pratiklerine göz atılmıştır.

Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarındaki Kürtlerin zorunlu iskânını anlamak için Osmanlı iskân politikalarına göz atmak gerekmektedir çünkü TC devleti Osmanlı devlet geleneğini devralmıştır ve bu sebeple Osmanlı dönemi ile TC dönemi arasında bir bağ kurulabilir. Bu çalışmada Osmanlı iskân politikaları iki ana dönemde incelenmiştir: genişlemeden 1913'e kadarki dönem ve 1913 sonrası İttihat ve Terakki dönemi. İlk dönemde Osmanlı nüfus politikalarını etkileyen temel faktör imparatorluğun Avrupalı devletlere karşı değişen gücüdür. Genişleme döneminde imparatorluk Avrupa'da ilerledikçe, buradaki otoritesini sağlamlaştırmak için Anadolu'dan Müslüman nüfus göç ettirmekteydi. Bunun yanı sıra, göçebe kabilelerin çıkardığı güvenlik sorunlarını elimine etmek için onları yerleşik hayata geçirmek de iskân politikalarının bir başka boyutunu oluşturmaktaydı. Yine bu dönemde imparatorluk Anadolu'daki beyliklerin güçlerini kırmak için de bu beylikleri değişik coğrafyalara göç ettiriyordu. Tüm bu faktörler Osmanlı'nın otoritesini güçlendirmenin ve güvenliğin iskân politikalarında önemli rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Duraklama ve gerileme döneminde de güvenlik yine iskân politikalarında önemli rol oynamaktadır. Bu dönemde Osmanlı'nın Avrupa'da toprak kaybetmesi sonucu buradaki Müslüman nüfus ayrımcı pratiklere maruz kalmış ve Osmanlı topraklarına geri göç etmiştir. İmparatorluk ise sadık gördüğü bu nüfusu Anadolu'da düzenin az olduğu yerlere yerleştirmiştir. Aynı zamanda Rus işgali sonrası Kafkasya'dan gelen Müslüman nüfus da Müslüman nüfusun az olduğu yerlere yerleştirilmiştir. Göçebe nüfusun iskânı bu dönemde de önemli bir konu olmuştur. Bu göçebelerin yerleşik hayata geçmesi toprağa dayalı yeni askerlik sisteminde daha fazla asker toplamak anlamına geliyordu ve bu amaçla göçebe kabileler iskâna tabi tutulmuştu. Özetle, hem genişleme hem de gerileme döneminde, Osmanlı devleti otoritesini güçlendirmek amacıyla sıklıkla iskân politikalarına başvurmuştur.

1913'ten sonraki dönemde iskân politikalarında güvenlik kaygıları artan oranda etkisini hissettirmiştir. 1913'e kadar olan dönemde Osmanlı karar mercilerinin ana sorunu

devlet nasıl kurtulur sorusuna cevap bulmaktı. Bu durum, devletin gücünün Avrupalı güçlere karşı nasıl yeniden konsolide edeceğini kapsamaktaydı. Fakat 1913'ten sonraki gelişmeler devletin artık çökmekte olduğunu gösteriyordu ve ana politika devletin hayatta kalmasını sağlamaktı. Balkan Savaşları imparatorluğun en gelişmiş ve üretici yerini Osmanlı'dan koparttı ve savaş sırasında Bulgar ordusunun İstanbul'a kadar gelmesi imparatorluğun ne kadar güçsüz olduğunu ve dış destek olmadan yaşayamayacağını gösterdi. Bu gelişmeler sonucu Osmanlı karar vericileri her konuyu hayatta kalma meselesi perspektifinden görmeye başladı. Bu bakış açısı bu dönemdeki iskân politikalarını da etkilemiştir. Türk/Müslüman olmayan nüfusun ayrılıkçı politikaları, İttihat ve Terakki liderlerinin Anadolu'daki Türk/Müslüman çekirdeğini ana unsur olarak görmelerine yol açtı. Bunun sonucu olarak Anadolu'daki gayri-Müslim nüfus bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak görülmeye başlandı. Balkan Savaşları'nda Anadolu'daki bazı Rumların Yunanlıları desteklemesi ve Ermenilerin senelerdir talep ettiği haklar için Rusya'ya yanaşması Hristiyan grupların tehdit olarak görülmesini iyice pekiştirdi. Bu kontekstte İttihat ve Terakki hükümeti, devletin hayatta kalması için Anadolu'da gayri-Müslim nüfusun sayısını azaltma yoluna gitti ve burada bilinen bir yöntem olan nüfus politikalarına başvurdu. Resmi olarak açıklanmasa da 1913 ve 1914 yılında Anadolu'daki Rumlar devlet baskısıyla göçe zorlandı ve 1915 yılında ise pek çok Ermeni Doğu Anadolu'dan sürüldü.

1925'ten sonra meydana gelen Kürt iskânları da bu tarihsel perspektife oturtulabilir ve bu perspektifteki güvenlik-nüfus politikası ekseninde anlamlandırılabilir. Bu açıdan tez, Şeyh Said isyanından sonra Kürtlerin devletin hem fiziksel güvenliğine hem de ontolojik güvenliğine tehdit olarak görüldüğünü öne sürmüştür. Bu güvenlik kaygılarını ortadan kaldırmak için de devlet iskân politikalarına başvurmuştur. Bu argümanı ortaya koymak içinse Türklüğün Cumhuriyetin erken yıllarında nasıl kurulduğu anlatılmış ve Kürtlüğün Şeyh Said isyanından sonra bu 'öz' kimliğe nasıl 'öteki' olarak oluşturulduğu ortaya koyulmuştur. Bu argümanı daha iyi açıklayabilmek içinse öz-öteki ayrımının nasıl olduğu ve ontolojik güvenliğin ne anlama geldiği anlatılmıştır.

Kimlik oluşumunda iki ana unsur vardır: benzerlik ve farklılık. Etnik, milli grupların kimlikleri de bu iki unsur üzerine oluşturulmaktadır. Kültür, din, dil gibi benzerlikler özü tanımlamada önemliken, aynı zamanda özü ötekinden ayırmakta da önemlidir. Ötekinden ayırım sağlanamazsa öz de kendi homojenliğini tanımlayabilecek bir durum bulamayacaktır. Bu yüzden milli kimlik kendini kurmak için benzerlikler yanında öteki (milli) gruplara da ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Öyle ki, pek çok milli kimlik kendi varlığına tehdit olarak gördüğü öteki gruplar üzerinden kendini kurmuştur. Öteki gruplar ise hem aynı siyasi birim içinde olabileceği gibi –'içerdeki öteki'- ayrı siyasi birim içinde de olabilir -

dışardaki öteki'. İçerdeki ötekiler etnik azınlıklar, göçmenler veya çok uluslu devletlerdeki azınlık uluslar olabilir. Kürtler de etnik azınlık oldukları için bu kategori içinde değerlendirilebilirler.

Ontolojik Güvenlik kavramı da öz ve özün kendini kurmasıyla ilgilidir. İlk olarak psikoloji ve sosyoloji de kullanılan kavram bireylerin kendilerini canlı ve bütün hissetmeleri ve bu bütünlüğün zamansal olarak devam etmesi şeklinde tanımlamıştır. Aynı şekilde, ontolojik güvensizlik içinde olan birey öz kimliğindeki zamansal devamlılıktan şüphe duyacaktır. Sosyolojide de terim bireylerin öz-kimliklerinin devamlılığı olması şeklinde tanımlanmıştır. Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe de kavram sosyolojik temelin üzerine oturtulmuştur. Burada devletlere birey statüsü verilmiş ve ontolojik güvenlik devlet kimliğinin güvenliği olarak tanımlanmıştır. Fiziksel güvenliğin yanında devletlerin kimliksel güvenlikleri de olduğu ileri sürülmüş ve yine kimlikte devamlılığın ve düzenin ontolojik güvenlik için önemli olduğunun altı çizilmiştir. Kavram Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe genel olarak devletlerarası ilişkileri anlamak için anlatılırken, son yıllarda devlet içi çatışma çözümlerinde de çalışılmaya başlanmıştır ve bu tezde de devlet içindeki gruplar arasındaki çatışmayı anlamlandırmak için kullanılmıştır.

Buna göre, Şeyh Said isyanından sonra Kürt kimliği Türk öz-kimliğinin devamlılığını bozan bir kimlik olarak algılanmış ve bunun sonucu olarak da 'içerdeki öteki' olarak kurulmuştur. Cumhuriyet'in kökenlerinin atıldığı 1919 yılından 1930 ortalarına kadar incelendiğinde Türklüğün dört ekseninde kurulduğu anlaşılmaktadır: toprak, din, kültür ve dil, etnisite. Bu unsurların her biri farklı zamanlarda daha önemli hale gelmiştir ve hepsi de iç içe geçmiştir. Örneğin, 1923 öncesi dönemde toprak önemli unsurken, 1922'den sonra din önemli bir unsur haline gelmiştir ve yine 1925'ten sonra kültür ve dilin önemi daha fazla artmıştır ve 1930'larda da etnisite vurgusu iyice belirgin olmaya başlamıştır. Bu durum içinde Şeyh Said isyanına kadar Kürtlüğün öteki olarak algılanmadığını belirtmek gerekir. Bu dönemde devlet elitlerinin söylem ve pratiklerine bakıldığında öteki olarak algılanan grupların gayri-Müslimler olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Yine bu söylemler devletin Türklüğü tüm Müslüman gruplar için bir üst kimlik olarak gördüğünü; Türkçe ve Türk kültürü ile millet birliği sağlanabileceğine olan inancı göstermektedir. Fakat Şeyh Said isyanı devlet elitlerinin Türk kimliğini oluşturmadaki bu devamlılığına gölge düşürmüştür ve bu açıdan sadece fiziksel güvenliği değil ontolojik güvenliği de tehdit etmiştir. İsyanın yarattığı temel tehdit devlet elitlerinin Türklerin kim olduğunu ya da Türklüğün ne olduğunu yansıtan anlatıların devamlılığını bozmasıdır. Bir başka deyişle isyan şunu ortaya koymuştur: din bağı ile tüm Müslüman gruplar Türklüğe asimile edilemeyebilir; Türkçe ve Türk kültürü diğer gruplar tarafından benimsenmeyebilir ve devletin uyguladığı Batı merkezci modern

reformlar toplumun genelinde kabul edilmeyebilir. Bu durum devletin kimlik devamlılığında kırılma yaratmıştır ve devleti ontolojik güvensizliğe itmiştir. Güvenliğin sağlanması için bu ontolojik tehdit ortadan kaldırılmalıdır ve bunun için en iyi yol Kürt kimliğinin Türk kimliği içinde asimile edilmesidir. Asimilasyonda en önemli rolü ise iskân politikası tutacaktır. İsyandan sonra bölge hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinmek için yayımlanan raporlarda da iskânın Kürt nüfuzunu kırmak için önemine dikkat çekilmiştir. Bu amaçla ilk olarak 1927 yılında çıkarılan kanunla bölgedeki nüfuzlu kişiler batıya nakledilmiştir. Daha büyük çaplı iskân politikası ise 1934 yılındaki İskân Kanunu ile uygulanmıştır. Etnisitenin öz kimliği tanımlamada öne çıktığı bu yıllarda başka etnisitelerin varlığı Türk öz kimliği için iyice kabul edilemez bir durum olmuştur ve bu amaçla geniş bir asimilasyon projesi uygulanmıştır. Bu kanun ile Kürt etnisitesine mensup bireyler zorunlu olarak Türk etnisitesinin yoğun olduğu alanlara göç ettirilmiş ve mal ve mülklerine de ya devlet tarafından el konulmuş ya da malları batıdan buraya nakledilen gruplara verilmiştir. Kürt gruplarının yeni göç ettirilen yerde yüzde beşten fazla nüfusu oluşturmamaları sağlanarak kolektif Kürt kimliğinin Türk kimliği içerisinde eritilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Aynı zamanda kanun, uzun yıllardır Kürt kimliğinin önemli bir parçası olan aşiret ve şeyhlik kurumlarını yasa dışı ilan ederek Kürt kimliğinin önemli unsurlarını ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlamıştır. Sonuç olarak, 1925 ile 1934 yılları arasındaki iskân politikaları devletçi güvenlik perspektifinden değerlendirilebilir. Bu dönemde uygulanan nüfus politikaları ile devlet fiziksel ve ontolojik güvenliğine tehdit oluşturan unsur ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlamıştır. Fakat bu devletçi güvenlik politikası Kürt etnik topluluğunun ve doğu ve güneydoğudaki bireylerin güvenliği pahasına uygulanmış ve devlet güvenlik politikası belirtilen devlet dışı birimler için güvensizlik kaynağı olmuştur.

Çalışma, TC devletinin Kürt meselesindeki güvenlik politikalarının askeri odaklı olduğunu ve bu yaklaşımın pek çok insanın güvensizliği ile sonuçlandığını göstermek içinse 1990'lardaki güç kullanımına yoğunlaşmıştır. Bu yıllarda PKK ile silahlı mücadele olduğu için güç kullanımı olması normal bir durumdur. Lakin bu çalışmada incelenen, güç kullanımının bölgede PKK ile bağı olmayan bireylerin güvenliğini de derin bir biçimde etkilediği ve güvensizlik durumunu arttırdığıdır. Türkiye'nin uyguladığı güvenlik politikalarının Kürt meselesini çıkmaza soktuğu ve sadece klasik anlamda güç kullanımı ile meselenin çözülemeyeceği Silahlı Kuvvetlerin üyeleri ve siyasetçiler tarafından da zaman zaman dile getirilmektedir. Bu çalışmada güç kullanımını ve güç kullanımının bireylerin güvenliğini olumsuz etkilediğini göstermek için ise Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nde (AİHM) Türkiye'ye karşı 2.Madde'den – yaşam hakkı –açılan davalar çalışılmıştır. 2. Madde'ye odaklanılmasının sebebi ise hem yaşam hakkının güvenliğin en temel unsuru

olmasından; hem de bu madde kapsamında açılan davaların çoğunun devlet güvenlik güçlerinin sivillere karşı uyguladığı ölümcül güç kullanımlarını kapsamamasından ileri gelmektedir. Bu açıdan 2. Madde'deki davalar Kürt sorununda devletin güç kullanımı pratiklerini göstermeleri açısından önemli birer kaynak oluşturmaktadırlar. Dahası, 2. Madde'de Türkiye'ye açılan davalara bakmak bir başka açıdan daha önemlidir. Davalar göstermektedir ki, güvenlik güçlerinin sivillere karşı ölümcül güç kullanımına başvurduğu durumlarda iç hukuk etkin bir soruşturma yürütmemiş; bunun sonucunda ise güç kullanımının arka planı ortaya çıkmamıştır. Bu durum güç kullanımını iyice meşrulaştırmıştır. Çalışma, bu açıdan şu soruyu da cevaplandırmaya çalışmıştır: güç kullanımının orantısız bir şekilde kullanılması ve iç hukukta meşrulaştırılması nasıl mümkün olmuştur? Burada çalışma Gramsci'nin 'kamusal düşünüş' fikrinden faydalanmıştır. Kamusal düşünüş toplumun geçmişten gelen kavramları özümsemesi ve bu kavramları sorgulamadan, verili bir gerçekmiş gibi yaşaması şeklinde tarif edilebilir. Buradan hareketle, tez şunu ortaya sürmüştür: Türkiye'de Kürt meselesinde güç kullanımı toplumsal bazda meşru görülmüştür çünkü militarizm ve militarist değerler Türkiye kamusal düşünüşünün içinde önemli bir rol teşkil etmektedir. Çalışma bunu göstermek için ise politikada ve eğitimde militarist değerlerin yaygınlığını ortaya koymuştur. Bu açıdan Milli Güvenlik Kurulu(MGK)'nın politikadaki rolü ve Milli Güvenlik Dersi başta olmak üzere derslerde militarizmin etkisi çalışılmıştır.

Militarizm askeri norm ve pratiklerin sivil hayatta yüceltilmesi ve bunun sonucu olarak askeri alanla sivil alan arasındaki çizginin sönükleşmesi şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Militarizm, militarizasyon süreci ile mümkün olur. Militarizasyon aktörlerin yavaş yavaş askeri fikirler tarafından kontrol edilmesi anlamına gelir. Türk siyasi tarihine kısa bir göz atılınca askerin sivil hayattaki rolü hemen göze çarpmaktadır: iki askeri darbe, iki askeri muhtıra, iki askeri anayasa, vb. gibi. İşin ilginç kısmı, bu hareketlerin çoğu toplumda destek görmüştür. Bu durum militarizmin Türkiye kamusal düşünüşünde önemli bir rolü olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Militarizmin toplumda etkin olması ise 1930'lara kadar götürülebilir. Bu tarihlerde resmi tarih yazımı askerliği Türk etnisitesinin ve kültürünün değişmez bir parçası olarak inşa etmiş; Türklüğü 'ordu-millet' olarak yansıtarak askeri ve orduyu sorgulanamaz bir mertebeye yükseltmiştir. Dahası, yine bu dönemdeki anlatılarda Türklerin hayatta kalması onların askeri özellikleriyle tanımlanmış, bu durum da ordunun, milletin-devletin güvenliği için çok önemli bir aktör olduğu fikrini topluma yaymıştır.

MGK'nın Türk siyasi tarihindeki yeri de militarizmin etkin bir ideoloji olarak inşa edilmesinin bir sonucudur. Kurul aynı zamanda militarizmi topluma iyice yaymıştır. 1924'ten beri işleyen kurulun 1961'e kadar olan görevi daha çok dış düşmanlara karşı

savunma politikaları üretmek şeklindeydi. Fakat 1961 anayasasından sonra ‘Güvenlik Kurulu’ olarak isim değiştirdi ve bu sayede ülkenin genel siyasetinde legal olarak söz sahibi olmaya başladı. Bu anayasaya ile Genelkurmay Başkanı ve Silahlı Kuvvetler yetkilileri kurulun üyeleri haline geldiler ve askere milli güvenlik politikalarında bakanlara yardımcı olma görevi verildi. 1971 askeri muhtırası ile yapılan anayasa değişikliğinde Kurul’daki asker üye sayısı artırıldı ve askeri üyeler kuvvet komutanları seviyesine çıkarıldı. Kurulun yetkisi de sivil bürokrasiye ‘yardımcı olmaktan’, ‘tavsiye eder’ statüsüne yükseltildi. Fakat MGK’nın politikada tam anlamıyla etkin olması 1980 darbesinden sonraki döneme denk gelir. Darbeden sonra yapılan anayasal ve yasal değişikliklerle Kurul’daki asker sayısı sivil sayısını geçti. Aynı zamanda Kurul’un görevi sivil bürokrasiye güvenlik politikalarında ‘karar bildirmek’ olarak yeniden belirlendi ve bu kararların sivil bürokrasi tarafından ‘öncelikli olarak’ değerlendirileceği ibrası koyuldu. Dahası, 2945 sayılı kanunla MGK Sekreterliği milli güvenlik politikalarının planlanması ve uygulanmasında direk olarak yetkin kılındı. Milli güvenlik ise anayasal düzeni etkileyen tüm sosyal, ekonomik, kültürel, siyasal çıkarlar olarak tanımlandı. Bunun sonucu olarak güvenlik adı altında her türlü konuda politika yürütme yetkisi yasal olarak MGK’ya tanınmış oldu. Bunun sonucu olarak siyasi hayat yoğun bir militarizm etkisi altına girdi ve askeri düşünce anlayışı güvenlik dışındaki konularda da etkin kılındı.

Askeri değerlerin kamusal düşünüşte sağlamlaştırılması için eğitim sisteminde de militarizmin etkisi görülmektedir. Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi dersi ile sivil/askeri alan arasındaki engel kaldırılmış ve askerin sivil hayata direk müdahalesi mümkün olmuştur. Aynı zamanda, askeri değerler yüceltilmiş ve bu anlayışın gençlerin beyninde yer edinmesi sağlanmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra ilk ve orta öğretim ders kitaplarında Türklerin askeri değerlerine vurgu yapılmış ve Türkiye’nin bir ‘ordu-devlet’ olduğu teması yeniden işlenmiştir. Beden eğitimi derslerinde ise kışla sistemi öğrencilere öğretilmiş, rahat-hazır ol komutuyla dersler başlatılmış, askeri sistemde yürüme çalışmaları yapılmıştır. Bunların hepsi askeri sistemi ve askeri değerleri gençliğin kafasında normalleştirmiş; militarizmi ve militarist değerleri kamusal düşünüş alanında etkin kılmıştır. Bu değerlerin hem politikada, hem kültürde bu kadar etkin olması sonucu ise askeri anlayışlı politikalar ve güç kullanımı etkin bir meşru taban bulmuştur.

Bu perspektiften incelendiğinde Kürt sorununda askeri yöntemlerin baskın olma nedenleri daha iyi ortaya çıkmaktadır. 1987-1999 yılları arasında AİHM’de 2. Madde’den Türkiye’ye karşı açılan davalar incelendiğinde, total davaların %64’ünün Kürt meselesi hakkında olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu oran Kürt nüfusunun %12-%17 arasında olduğu düşünüldüğünde oldukça fazla bir rakamdır ve Kürt meselesinde askeri yöntemlerin sıklıkla

başvurulduğuna işaret etmektedir. Davalar yakından incelendiğinde ise güç kullanım pratiklerinin hangi biçimlerde yer aldığı anlaşılmaktadır: sivillerin güvenlik güçleri tarafından öldürülmesi (Benzer ve Diğerleri v. Türkiye); gözaltında kayıp (Çelik ve Diğerleri v. Türkiye); gözaltında ölüm (Çakıcı v. Türkiye); yaşam hakkını koruyamama (Tanış ve Diğerleri v. Türkiye); sivillerin köy korucuları tarafından öldürülmesi (Avşar v. Türkiye). Bütün bu davalar, devletin güç kullanımının yaygınlığını, bu güç kullanımının bireylere güvensizlik getirdiğini dolayısıyla Kürt meselesinde güvenlik değil, güvensizlik yarattığını göstermektedir.

Kürt meselesinde geçmiş dönemdeki güvenlik politikalarının devleti ana güvenlik birimi olarak baz aldığı ve güç kullanımına odaklandığı gösterildikten sonra şimdiki dönemdeki güvenlik söylem ve pratiklerine, bu söylem ve pratiklerdeki kırılma ve devamlılıklara odaklanılmıştır. Şimdiki dönemin ayrı olarak incelenmesinin nedeni geçmiş dönemden farklılıklar göstermesidir. Örneğin, ilk defa bu dönemde PKK ile devlet arasında Kürt meselesini barışçıl yöntemlerle çözmek için bir diyalog başlamıştır. Bunun yanı sıra Kürt meselesini ilgilendiren pek çok alanda reformlar yapılmıştır. Bütün bunlar geçmişten bir kopuş olduğu fikrini güçlendirmektedir. Bu değişimin güvenlik politikalarında da olup olmadığını görmek içinse tez 5233 sayılı ‘Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkındaki Kanun’un eleştirel söylem analizini yapmıştır. Eleştirel söylem analizi metodolojisi söylemi bir sosyal pratik olarak görmektedir ve söylemin sosyal ve kurumsal ortam tarafından oluşturulmasının yanı sıra, söylemin aynı zamanda sosyal ve politik süreçleri ve aksiyonları etkilediğini öne sürmektedir. Doğal olarak analizi yapılan söylem o dönemin politik karakteri hakkında bilgiler de sunmaktadır. Eleştirel söylem analizi metodolojisinin bu çalışmada kullanılmasının bir nedeni de bu metodolojinin geçmiş güvenlik anlayışı ile ilgili kıyaslama sağlayabilecek analitik araçları sağlamasıdır. Özellikle güvenlik birimleri ve aktörlerinin nasıl kurulduğu, hangi değerler üzerine meşrulaştırma sağlandığı, hangi anlamların varsayıldığı konularında eleştirel söylem analizi önemli bir kaynak oluşturmaktadır.

5233 sayılı kanunun güvenlik açısından incelenmesini sağlayan durumlar ise birkaç tanedir. Öncelikle kanun, 1987-2002 arasında ‘terörle mücadele’den doğan zararları da kapsadığına göre o dönemin güvenlik politikaları hakkında yorumda bulunması öngörülebilir. Aynı zamanda kanun, zararların karşılanmasını kapsadığına göre bireylerin ekonomik güvenliğine etki yapacaktır. Bu kanun ‘Köye Dönüş’ün altyapısı olarak tasarlandığından sosyal güvenlikle de bağı vardır.

Kanunun söylem analizi yapıldığında şu görülmektedir: şimdiki dönem söylem ve pratikleri geçmişteki geleneksel anlayıştan hem kopma göstermektedir, hem de onla bir

devamlılık içindedir. Güvenlik birimi olarak bakıldığında, devlet dışı birimler politikaya adapte edilmişlerdir. Bu birimler ‘bireyler’ veya ‘toplum’ olarak adlandırılmıştır. Aynı zamanda, mağdurlara tazminat ödenmesi de, askeri güvenlikten ekonomik güvenliğe geçiş anlamına gelmektedir. Her şeyden de öte devlet geçmişteki güvenlik politikalarından ötürü bireylere zarar verdiğini kabul etmiştir. Bir başka değişiklik ise Kanunun meşrulaştırılmasında görülmektedir. Buna göre kanunun çıkarılma nedeni uluslararası adalet, eşitlik ve hukuk devleti gibi ilkelere dayandırılmıştır. Bu değişimlere rağmen, bazı noktalarda geçmiş güvenlik anlayışı ile örtüşme görmek de mümkündür. Her şeyin başında yasanın kapsadığı alan çoğunlukla Kürt vatandaşların olduğu yerleri kapsa da Kürt kimliği yasada kullanılmaktan kaçınılmıştır. Bu durum, Kürt kimliği konu bahis olduğunda devletin ontolojik güvenlik kaygılarının devam ettiğini göstermektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, tekstin başlığında ve içeriğindeki devletin geçmişteki güvenlik pratikleri her zaman ‘terörle mücadele’ şeklinde açıklanmıştır ve bu sayede tüm bu pratiklere – direk terörle alakası olmayanlar da dahil olmak üzere – meşru bir temel sağlanmıştır. Fakat daha önce de belirtildiği üzere devletin terörle mücadele adı altındaki politikaları zaman zaman sivilleri de hedef almıştır ve bu politikaların terörle mücadele kapsamında değerlendirilmesi olayın güvenlikleştirilmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Bir başka devamlılık da bu politikaların nitelendirilmesinde gözükmemektedir. Hem kanun taslağında, hem meclis çalışmalarında kanunun kapsadığı dönemdeki askeri politikalar ‘olağanüstü’ gibi pozitif sıfatlarla kullanılmış ve doğal olarak askeri yaklaşımlar yüceltilmiştir.

5233 sayılı Kanunun söylem analizi şimdiki zaman güvenlik anlayışının geçmişe göre daha özgürleştirici güvenlik anlayışında olduğunu göstermektedir. Dönemin pratikleri de bunu yansıtmaktadır: çözüm süreci ile başlayan ateşkes ve diyalog, TRT’de Kürtçe yayın yapan bir kanalın açılması, Mardin Artuklu Üniversitesi’nde Kürt Dili ve Kültürü bölümü açılması, siyasi partilerin Kürtçe propaganda yapmasına izin verilmesi, mahkûm görüşmelerinde de Kürtçe yasağının kaldırılması daha özgürlükçü bir anlayışın olduğunu göstergeleridir. Kısıtlamaların kaldırılması sonucu ise bireylerin güvenlik problemlerine daha iyi hitap edilebilmiştir. Şimdiki zamanda devlet söylem ve pratiklerindeki bu değişiklik özgürleştirmenin güvenlik sağlamadaki potansiyelini göstermektedir. Buradan yola çıkarak bu tez devlet söylem ve pratiklerinde daha fazla özgürleşmenin nasıl mümkün olacağını da araştırmaktadır ve devlet dışı aktörlerin söylem ve pratiklerinin daha özgürleştirici güvenlik politikaları sağlayabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Yapılan bu argümanı ise şimdiki zaman içinde değişim sağlayan aktörlere oturtmaktadır ve bu açıdan devlet dışı aktörlerin rolünün bir hüsnü kuruntu olduğu değil bir gerçeklik olduğunu ortaya

koymaktadır. Bu açıdan devlet söylem ve pratiklerinde daha özgürleştirici anlayışı hakim kılacak üç aktörün rolü üzerinde durulmuştur: entelektüeller, sosyal hareketler ve AB.

Entelektüellerin toplum için önemini anlamak için yine Gramsci'nin fikirlerinden yararlanılmıştır. Gramsci'ye göre bir grubun hegemonyası 'altyapı'yı ve 'üstyapı'yı' beraber kontrol etmesiyle mümkün olur. Altyapıdan kasıt ekonomik ilişkiler iken, üstyapı kültüre ve fikirlerin kontrolüne dayanmaktadır. Yönetici grup kültür ve fikirleri kontrol edebildiği üzere hegemonyasını sağlamlaştıracaktır. Entelektüeller de bu grubun kültür üzerinde hegemonyasını sağlayan yegâne aktörlerdir. Her hegemon grup kendi entelijansiyasını yaratır ve bu entelijanya sayesinde fikirlerini toplum bazında meşrulaştırır. Bu fikrin doğal sonucu olarak bir değişim sağlanması için de entelektüellerin hegemon fikirleri sorgulaması ve kamusal düşünüşte kırılma yaratması önemli faktörlerdir.

Kürt meselesinde entelektüellerin oynayabileceği rolü anlamak için çalışma 'Akil Adamlar Komitesi'ni incelemiştir. Bu komite her ne kadar devlet inisiyatifi olsa da entelektüellerin özgürleştirici bir anlayış için yapabileceği katkıyı göstermektedir. Değişik alanlardan ve politik görüşlerden oluşan komitenin birincil amacı çözüm sürecini halka anlatmak ve çözüm sürecinde halk desteği yaratmaktır. İkincil amaç ise halktan gelen talepleri ve görüşlere hükümete iletmektir. Yani entelektüeller, hükümetle halk arasında diyalog yürüten aktörler konumundalardı. 'Akil Adamlar Komitesi' çözüm sürecini ve gerekliliğini halka anlatarak kamusal düşünüşte yeni bir bilinçlenme sağlamışlardır ve halkı dinleyerek de devlet söylem ve pratiklerinin ne yöne gitmesi gerektiğini hükümete bildirmişlerdir.

Sosyal hareketler devlet güvenlik söylem ve pratiklerinde değişim yaratabilecek diğer aktörlerdendir. Sosyal hareketler değişik aktörlerin bir hedefin kararlarını etkileyerek amaçlarına ulaşmaları şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Sosyal hareketleri anlamak için literatürde iki teori ön plana çıkmaktadır: kaynak mobilizasyonu ve yeni sosyal hareketler teorileri. İlkine göre sosyal hareketler rasyonel aktörlerin çıkarları için yaptıkları eylemler iken, ikincisine göre sosyal hareketler bazı ekonomik ve sosyal yapıların içinde doğmaktadır ve bu yapıların sosyal hareketlerdeki önemine vurgu yapılmaktadır. Yeni Sosyal Hareketler ekonomik, sosyal ve ekonomik yapıları sorgularlar, vatandaşların karar alma mekanizmasında etkin olmasını talep ederler ve kimlik haklarının kısıtlamalara maruz kalmadan yaşanmasını savunurlar. Bir başka deyişle, talepleri için yeni bir politik taban oluşturmayı denerler.

Bu tez Kürt meselesinde devlet pratiklerinde değişim yaratan sosyal hareket olarak 'Cumartesi Anneleri'ni incelemiştir. 'Cumartesi Anneleri' çocukları gözetiminde kaybolan annelerin 1995'te başlattığı, sessiz bir oturma eylemidir. Amaçları, toplumun ve siyasetin

ilgisini çekerek çocuklarının bilinmezliği hakkında bilinç yaratmaktır. Homojen bir grup olmamakla beraber, 1990'larda doğu ve güneydoğuda çok fazla gözaltında kayıp yaşandığından, katılımcıların pek çoğu Kürt'tür. Kürtlerin çoğunlukta olması ise pek çok insanın ilgisini Kürt meselesine ve burada uygulanan güvenlik pratiklerine çekmiştir. 1990'larda devletin güvenlik politikalarının toplumun geniş kısmında tartışılmadığı düşünüldüğünde 'Cumartesi Anneleri'nin yeni bir siyasi alan yaratmadaki rolü daha iyi anlaşılabilir. Pek çok entelektüelin harekete destek vermesiyle hareket davasını geniş kesimlere ulaştırma imkanı da bulmuştur ve toplumda gözaltında kayıp konusunda bir bilinç yaratmıştır. Bunun sonucu olarak ise hareketin başladığı yıl olan 1995'ten sonra gözaltında kayıplarda kayda değer bir düşüş meydana gelmiştir. 1994'de iki yüz yirmi dokuz olan bu sayı, 1998'de sekize kadar inmiştir.

Çalışma son olarak AB'nin aktörlüğünün Kürt sorununda devlet güvenlik politikalarında yaptığı değişimi incelemiştir. AB'nin devlet politikaları üzerinde etkili olmasını ise norm yayılımı teorisi üzerinden anlatmıştır. Normlar en basit anlamda bir kimliğin standart uygun davranışı şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Aynı zamanda, norm, aktörlerin çıkar ve kimliklerini oluşturur ve olması gereken hakkında beklenti yaratır. Yayılım ise bir aktörün fikir, bilgi ve kurumlarının bir başka aktöre geçişi anlamına gelir. Buradan hareketle norm yayılımı, uygun davranışların bir aktörden diğer aktöre geçmesi şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Norm yayılımı için en az iki aktöre ihtiyaç vardır: norm yayıcısı ve norm alıcısı. Norm yayıcısı, kurulu normatif konteksti değiştirme kabiliyeti olan, başkalarının davranışlarını yeni norm etrafında değiştirebilen, kısaca sosyal değişim yaratan aktörlerdir. Anlatılan kontekst içinde bu çalışma AB'yi norm yayıcısı, Türkiye'yi norm alıcısı ve üyelik sürecini de norm yayılımının meydana geldiği normatif yapı olarak nitelendirmektedir. AB'nin Türkiye'ye norm yayması ise şartlılık ilkesi ile mümkün olmaktadır. Şartlılık bir pazarlık stratejisi olarak tanımlanabilir ve AB'nin yaratacağı pozitif durumdan yararlanmak için, AB üyesi olmayan devletlerin AB normlarıyla bütünleşmesi durumunu anlatır.

1999 yılında Türkiye'nin aday ülke statüsü kazanmasıyla beraber, Türkiye, üyelik müzakerelerini başlatmak amacıyla geniş çaplı bir demokratik reform sürecine girmiştir. AB ile uyum amacıyla dönemin hükümetleri iki anayasal değişiklik ve dokuz tane yasal değişiklik paketi hazırlamıştır. Bu değişiklikler demokrasi, asker-sivil ilişkileri, insan hakları, hukuk devleti gibi konuları kapsıyordu ve doğal olarak Kürt sorununu da direk olarak etkilemiştir. Örneğin, reformlarla olağanüstü hal kaldırılmıştır, Kürtçe yayın yapma tartışılmaya başlanmıştır, düşünce özgürlüğündeki kısıtlamalar azaltılmıştır, idam kararı kaldırılmıştır, vb. AB reformlarının Kürt sorununun güvenlik boyutuna en büyük etkisi ise güvenlik politikasının askeri bürokrasiden sivil bürokrasiye geçirilmesiyle mümkün

olmuştur. AB uyum çerçevesinde çıkan reformlarla MGK'nın yetkilerinde önemli değişiklikler yapılmıştır. Kuruldaki sivil sayısı, asker sayısının önüne geçmiştir ve Kurul'un yetkisi sivil hükümete tavsiye verecek niteliğe indirgenmiştir. Aynı zamanda, Kurulun yetkileri güvenlikten defansa çekilmiştir ve bu sayede güvenlik politikası askeri bürokrasinin kontrolünden çıkmıştır. Bütün bu gelişmeler sonucu güvenlik siyaseti sivilleşmiş ve bunun ilk yansıması askeri boyut dışındaki boyutların da tartışılmaya başlanması olmuştur. Kürt sorununda ekonomik ve kültürel boyutların devlet söylem ve pratiklerinde yer almaya başlaması da bu döneme denk gelmektedir. Örneğin, daha önce incelenen 5233 sayılı Kanun da bu durumun bir yansımasıdır. Bundan da öte kanunun geçmesinde AB'nin direk rolü olmuştur. 2002 yılında AB Parlamenter Meclisi 'Yerinden Edilen Kürt Popülasyonunun İnsani Koşulları' adı altında bir belge hazırlamıştır ve geri dönüşleri hızlandırmak için yapılması gerekenleri sıralamıştır. 2003 yılında Komisyon'un hazırladığı Katılım Ortaklığı Belgesi'nde ülke içinde yerinden edilmiş kişilere özel vurgu yapılmıştır ve yerinden edilmiş kişilerin orijinal yerlerine dönmesi için uygulanacak politikaların hızlanmasını talep etmiştir. Bunun üzerine hükümet 2003 yılındaki Ulusal Programı'na 'Tazminat Yasası'nı eklemiş ve çıkış tarihi olarak da 2004 yılını belirtmiştir. Buradan hareketle, AB'nin yasanın geçmesinde direk rolü olduğu söylenebilir.

Sonuç olarak bu tez, Türkiye'nin güvenlik söylem ve pratiklerini güvenlik çalışmaları perspektifinden incelemiştir ve üç önemli sonuca ulaşmıştır. Birincisi, Türkiye'nin geçmiş dönemdeki güvenlik söylem ve pratikleri geleneksel anlayışla paralellik göstermektedir. Devlet ana güvenlik aktörü olarak alınmıştır ve meseleye askeri metotlarla yaklaşmıştır. Fakat bu, devlet dahil hiçbir birime güvenlik getirmemiştir. İkincisi, şimdiki dönemde klasik anlayıştan sapmalar mevcuttur. Askeri yaklaşımda kırılmalar meydana gelmiş ve meselenin ekonomik ve kültürel boyutuna vurgu yapılmıştır. Aynı zamanda devlet zaman zaman diğer birimleri de güvenlik söylem ve politikalarının içine oturtmuştur. Geleneksel anlayışta meydana gelen kırılmalar sonucu bireylerin güvenlik problemlerine daha iyi hitap edilmiş ve PKK ile diyalog başlamıştır. Bu durum özgürleştirici anlayışın güvenlik getirmedeki rolünü göstermektedir. Özgürleştirici anlayışın bu potansiyelini göz önüne alarak çalışma, devlet söylem ve pratiklerinde daha fazla özgürleştirici güvenlik anlayışının nasıl mümkün olacağını araştırmış ve bunun devlet dışı aktörlerin etkisiyle mümkün olacağını ortaya koymuştur. Entelektüeller, sosyal hareketler iç aktörler olarak AB ise dış aktör olarak devlet güvenlik söylem ve pratiklerini değiştirmede önemli bir rol oynamaktadır.

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