TC
ATILIM UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATION
INTERNATIONAL RELATION GRADUATE PROGRAM

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOMALI ETHIOPIAN WAR OF 1977 ON THE FALL OF THE SOMALI STATE IN 1991

Master's Thesis

Ismail Ibrahim

Ankara, 2016

TC
ATILIM UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATION
INTERNATIONAL RELATION GRADUATE PROGRAM

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOMALI ETHIOPIAN WAR OF 1977 ON THE FALL OF THE SOMALI STATE IN 1991

Master's Thesis

Ismail Ibrahim

Thesis Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali KARASAR

ANKARA, 2016

APPROVAL

This is to certify that this thesis titled "[The Implications of Somali Ethiopian war of 1977 on the fall of the Somali State in 1991] and prepared by [Ismail Ibrahim] meets with the committee's approval unanimously vote as [Master's Thesis/ Dissertation] in the field of [International Relation and Global Politics] following the successful defense of the thesis conducted in [02.05.2016].

Title, Name and Surname of the Director

Prof. Dr. Dilaver Tengilimoğlu

Signature of the Director:

Title, Name and Surname of the supervisor:

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar

Signature of the Supervisor:

Title, Name and Surname of the Member:

Professor Hasan Unal

Signature of the Member:

Title, Name and Surname of the Member

Assoc.Prof. Dr. Bertan S. Bilgiç

Signature of the Member:

ETHICS DECLARATION

I hereby declare that;

- I prepared this thesis in accordance with Atılım University Graduate School of Social Sciences Thesis Writing Directive,
- I prepared this thesis within the framework of academic and ethics rules,
- I presented all information, documents, evaluations and findings in accordance with scientific ethical and moral principles,
- I cited all sources, to which I made reference in my thesis,
- The work of art in this thesis is original; I hereby acknowledge all possible loss of rights in case of a contrary circumstance. (In case of any circumstance contradicting with my declaration)

22.06.2016

Ismail Ibrahim

This Thesis is dedicated to my Parents: For their endless love, support and encouragement

Acknowledgment

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Dr. Hassan Ali Karasar for the continuous support of my Master study and research, for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. His guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my Master study.

Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my Master lecturers and special thanks to the Dean of the department Prof. Dr. Hassan Ünal and the thesis committee, for their encouragement and insightful comments.

My sincere thanks also goes to my parents for their love and support throughout my life, thank you for both giving me strength to reach for the stars and chase my dreams. My mother and bro Ibrahim deserve my wholehearted thanks as well.

ÖZET

Uluslararası olarak Somali son otuz yıldır Somali aşiretleri arasında uzun süredir devam eden çatışmalar nedeniyle dünyanın başarısızı ülkelerinden bir olarak görülmekle birlikte, Somali'deki akademisyenler ve devlet misyonları Somali'de barışın tesis edilmesinin ve idarenin neden başarısız olduğunu ve bu uzun süredir devam eden çatışmaların neden hâlâ ve hangi şartlarda devam ettiğini anlayamamaktadırlar. Bu tez Somali'de barış sürecin eve devletin tesis edilmesi çabalarına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamakta ve Ogaden savaşının Somali'de devletin yıkılmasını ve Somali merkezi hükümetinin parçalanmasını nasıl kolaylaştırdığını incelemektedir.

Somali halkı arasındaki yerel inanışlara ve tartışmalara göre Somali ve Etiyopya arasındaki savaş Somali devletinin yıkılması arasında karşılıklı bir ilişki mevcuttur, çünkü birçok Somalili politikacı Somali ve Etiyopya arasındaki savaşın Somali devletinin yıkılışının nedenidir. Ancak bazı akademik tartışmalarda Somali'deki yıkım yazarın hangi açıdan baktığına bağlı olarak başka etken faktörlere dayanmaktadır. 1969'da Somali'de alt rütbeli askeri eksperlerin liderlik yaptığı bir darbe 1969'da seçilmiş hükümetin halkı tatmin edememesi nedeniyle halk tarafından devletin tesisi için son umut olarak görülmüş, ancak askeri hükümet son yirmi yılda Somali hükümetleri arasında popular olmuş adam kayırmacılık, aşiretçilik ve yolsuzluklar nedeniyle ülkeyi yıkım yoluna sokmuştur.

Literatürde devletin tesisi, ulusalcılık ve savaş gibi çeşitli alanlara dayanan bu tezde devletin tesisi ve devletin yıkılması süreçlerini ve Somali-Etiyopya savaşının Somali devletinin tesisi ve devletin yıkılması üzerindeki içermeleri daha iyi anlamak için original bir analitik çerçeve geliştirilmektedir. Teorik araştırma diğer bulguların yanında Somali devlet sorununun Somali devletinin yıkılmasıyla Somali-Etiyopya savaşı (1977 Ogaden savaşı) arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkinin anlaşılmasında yattığı bulgusunu vermiştir, bu yüzden karşılaştırmalı vaka çalışmalarında çerçevesi belirlenen nicel araştırmaların uygulanmasıyla, bu tez yalnızca devletin yıkılmasıyla tesis konularını çevreleyen teorik tartışmaları ileri bir noktaya götürmekle kalmamakta, aynı zamanda Somali tarihiyle ilgili yeni bir anlayış önermekte ve çoğu zaman romantikleştirilen Somali ülkesi için yeni bir teorik çerçeve sunmaktadır.

ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Somali, Aşiret, devletin tesisi ve devletin yıkılması, Ulus, İdare, Adam Kayırmacılık.

ABSTRACT

Although internationally Somalia is recognized one of the failed states in the world due to the prolonged conflict between the Somali clans for the last three decades, because of this, most of the scholars and state building missions in Somalia failed to understand the reason why Somali peace building and administration failed and under what conditions of this prolonged conflict still in his continuation. This thesis tries to add contribution for the peace process and state making efforts in Somalia, the core issues examined are the how Ogaden war augmented the state breaking of Somalia and the destruction of the Somali central government.

According to the local believes and discussions among Somali people there is interrelation between the Somali Ethiopian war and Somali state destruction as many Somali politicians argue that the Somali Ethiopian war was the reason cause of the state destruction of Somalia, but some academic debates about the cause factors of the Somalia destruction lies in a different factors depending on the angle of which the author looks it. In 1969 a military coup led by the junior military experts took place in Somalia where the people seen the last hope of Somali state making system because of the people's dissatisfaction of the elected state in 1969, however the military government led the country to the destruction path, because of the nepotism, Clannism and corruptions which become popular for the two last decades of the Somali government. Divining the concept of state building, nationalism and warfare by refereeing literatures relating on the different strands to better understand processes of state-making and state-breaking and the implications of Somali Ethiopian war on the Somali state building and state breaking. The hypothetical study offered finds, amongst others, that Somali state problem lies to understand the correlation between Somali state destruction and the Somali Ethiopian war (Ogaden war in 1977) therefore, the thesis submits an application for case study, theoretical and interview studies and will advances issues surrounding of state destruction and state making, also the thesis offers insight discussions into Somalia's history and presents new speculative conclusion on the recurrently romanticized case of Somaliland. **KEY WORDS: Somalia, Clan, state building and state breaking, Nation, Administration, Nepotism.**

Table of Contents

Chapter Four: **Implications of the War over Somalia State and State building**

Introduction

The Implications of Somali Ethiopian war of 1977 on fall of Somali state in 1991 is the title of this graduate thesis paper of the fulfillment of master degree of international relation. The entire of this study paper is divided into four chapters including the conclusion and the recommendations. Each chapter will introduce to on its own and this is the first chapter, which are the introduction and the research paper design itself. It starts with detailed explanation of the introduction of the study, which gives brief information of the structure of thesis. I have outlined the hypothesis followed by the methodology, scope and justification of the study, the main objectives, research questions and the methodology I applied to conduct the research paper. This chapter ends by indicating some of the limitations I expected to face in doing the research.

Hypothesis

The Somali Ethiopia war of 1977 has caused the failure of the state building process in Somalia and ended with the 1991 breakup of the country.

Objectives of the Research

The most important purpose of this Research Paper for examining the implications of Somali Ethiopian war of 1977 on the fall of Somalia State, to examine the role of the tribe system of Somali and the barrier to the state formation, the position of the clan leaders to the continuation of the president and government administration offices, to make understand the implications of the war over the state of Somalia and the case of Somaliland.

Research Question

How the war has shaped the future of Somalia State after 1977? Does the 1977 war the main reason for the failure of state building efforts in Somalia? :

Methodology

In hypothetical measurement, during my study, I would utilize my skills of literature review and for the secondary data by using desk-based studies, , I will use in two broad perspectives to examine and analyze the cause factor of Somali Ethiopian wars and their consequences to Somali state breaking. To fulfill, I have to gone through literatures on the issues of the conflict, tribe system, state building, proxy wars and modern power sharing.

Limitations of the Research

There will be a number of problems in conducting the research. The main problem is how to find unbiased information from the local people during the interview as Somali people mostly likes to tell the positive information about their clan only, but not the negative information, also the other problem will be how to reach and cover all Somali regions since the region is still under chaotic and civil war. Finally yet importantly, there will be lack of adequate financial resources to conduct the research.

CHAPTER ONE:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOMALI STATE BUILDING

1. Somali History:

A Somali community is the only Mono ethnic nation in Africa with a common culture, language religion and traditionally strong sense of cultural and linguistic unity, expecting to be one of the successful governments in the African countries after the independence. Unfortunately Somalia become one of the failed state in the world after the collapse of the central government in 1991 since present day Somali is under chaotic situation without a central government.

1.1. The Land:

The land of Somali is 638,000 Square Kilometers and has the longest border to Ethiopia and Kenya, in the sea Somali has 3025 kilometers, situating in Horn of Africa; mostly the land of Somali is flat and grassing area"[1].

1.1.1. Population

In the population, number there is different statistics although there is no accurate data collected after 1991 and the last cense was in between 7.8 million and 8 Million. Collecting data in a chaotic regions is not an easy tasks but the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) done a yearly censes in the whole regions of Somalia although it is not easy to refer as an accurate data. The report shows that the populations' growth shows a different year by year[2].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone_of_Somalia

[2] UNDP DATA 1991

1.2. Somali early State System

Somalia before the colonial era there was a Kingship administration although there was not a common one, which all the Somalia community united but every clan, had its own kingship. In the north currently, known Somaliland was the protectorate administration of United Kingdom and there was an agreement between the Kingships in the North (Somaliland) and the British. The agreement stating that the British administration has no right to intervene in the local administration of the Kingship and this resulted, the actuality of the collaboration between the local communities with their own administration system[3].

The kingships in the south Somalia went under the colonial system of the Italy by force after the kingships were defeated, Italy introduced their own administrational system by imported the European state system to Somalia. However, the two regions were united in 1960 with their administration and cultural difference by formed the great Somalia with the objective to gain five Somali regional unity[4].

Apart from this cultural difference, Somalia moved rapidly in adopting the structural features of the state in the European style rather than internalizing the concept of state itself. Therefore, the Somali society opposed the communist system introduced by the former Somali president and administration injustice and this gives opportunity to the clan leaders and opposition leaders to come in the power[5].

1.2.1. Colonial Occupation:

As historic people argue the opening of Sues canal encourages the expansion of European powers in the horn of Africa in 1869, Somali were divided into three boarder regions under the rule of three British, Italy and French, while Ogden region were handed over to the Ethiopian rule after the First World War.

[3]Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa.4th ed.Oxford: James Currey, 2002

[4]Abdi, Yusuf, **Somali unification system,** Muqdisho university press**,** 1989**.**

[5]Oday, M. The **role of traditional structure in the security,** London, 2006

1.2.1.1. **Independence:**

In 1960 the two regions of south and north become independent and united in one entity of Somali republic with the objective to work the unification of all Somali regions under the foreign administration. Soon after the independence Somalia took the democratically elected system and multi-party system, 1960 up to 1969 two election took place and two-president handover the power in a peaceful way, but a military coup happen in late of 1969, and the military leaders come into the office by force, the motive behind the coup was clan system eradication. The military allege that the elections empowered the clan system and gave the chance for the clanship, which later resulted more than 100 political parts in a form of clan representative. A way of progress and development because of the clan system of the population worsening the situation, one year later the military announced that the government would be a centralized administration ruled by the five higher military leaders under the leadership of the military general Siyad Bare[6].

1.2.1.2. **State Building of Somalia:**

Conceptual Meaning of State: State legal meaning is the common agreement between people have a common interest with a common situation living in a single land holding together, sharing with general behavior and culture in one political organ work out, having a single administration have the capacity to control populations and thinks in that boundaries, able to direct its population in one direction and have the capacity to inter international agreement with another state, and can make peace and war[7]. Theoretically, much has been said about the state; mostly state analyzers have ultimately been declared a "messy concept"[8]. Therefore, If we put state into question which is suitable to the analytical tool, for understanding polities and their routes in non-organization for economic cooperation and development countries, a number of scholars have renowned the weakening of the state in favouir of either a more global or local vision of politics[9]. An important

---

[7](http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/state).
[8]Link later, A. Community. In A. Danchev (Ed.), Fin de Siècle, **the Meaning of the twentieth Century**London: Tauris Academic Studies1995.
[9]Held, D. **Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance**. Cambridge: Polity Press 1995.

critique commonly leveled against Weberian conceptualization of the state is that they perceive it as a largely static, self-governing and homogeneous entity. In particular, those scholars who have did empirical analyses of state trajectories in sub-Saharan Africa have criticized such approaches as being insufficient to capture the 'realities on the ground', as the notions had dilemma for handlingdifference between rule and people, official and unofficial are blurred[10].

Marxist and functional understandings alike, which read the state as the needed fulfillment of certain ends, have frequently been discharged for deteriorating "to foresee the original and varied forms of state institutionalization"[11].This discussion has come to a point at which the 'statist' school, which debates that states remain the "mainly significant institutions of political life" and need to be understood in their own right, is apparently incompatible by the 'pluralist' camp, which counters this claim by voicing the need to "liberated the question from its present state-centric bias"[12].

However, despite their ill feeling, the two intellectual strands are not inherently incompatible – at least not when understanding their divergences in methodological rather than political terms. Whereas statists take the (full-blown) state and its theoretically assigned criteria as their analytical point of departure, pluralists make the (partial) state-in-the-making and its empirically observable characteristics their point of reference. While statists thus focus on what ought to be, or rather on what is not, pluralists emphasize what is – at the cost of suggesting potential directions of development out of fear of being normative.

According to the new institutional economic debate of the state and it is importance they offered that state is bridge connecting people in a definite territory in the

[10]Schlichte, K. **State Formation and the Economy of Intra-State Wars in D. Jung (Ed.), Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars – A Political Economy of Intra-State War** (pp. 27-44). London and New York: Routledge(2003

[11]Migdal, J., & Schlichte, K.**Rethinking the State in K. Schlichte (Ed.), the Dynamics of States – The Formation of Crises of State Domination** (pp. 1-40). Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.

[12]Böge, V., Brown, A., Clements, K., & Nolan, **On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility**'. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2008.

world[13]. Although its own conceptualization of the state, which pictures it " an organization that sanctions the formation, execution and adjustment in property rights, is problematic in that it ignores the issues so as to let the state to attain these purposes, valuable insights can be derived from this approach" (Journal of International Development (Impact Factor: 0.88). 01/2009; 21). A fundamental understanding is to consider of the state neither in static, autonomous, nor homogeneous terms, but rather as a dynamic and complex combination of institutions that are interrelated with a given society's sets of 'rules of the game[14].

1.2.1.3. **State failure and State building:**

For the last decades at the bottom of the global order, 'weak', 'fragile' and 'failing' states have become a key concern for the international community[15]. Since now when this research project started, ten percent of the world countries were regarded as to be 'failing' and Somali is one of the failing states in the world for the last 25 years[16], (Foreign Policy 2007; Böge et al. 2008:3), turning state- building into a central Endeavour of the earth society, because "feeble or unsuccessful states are the starting place of lots ofthe world's most serious troubles"[17]. In a volte-face to earlier opinion which had seen the state as an obstacle to development in general and state-making more particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars and policymakers alike realized the call for 'the necessitate for re-establishing the state', not least because the state played a "wide role in intensification and conservation human ability"[18]. Ever since, largely liberal interpretations of state-building, democratization and governance encouraged writers in the world on how to evidently 'fix' brittle states (Ghani/Lockhart 2008).

---

[13]Bierschenk, T & de, Sardan, Powers **in the village rural, Benin between Democratizations and Decentralizations Africa** (2003)

[14]Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC). **War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: Phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme CSRC Working Paper Series** (Vol. 1). London: London School of Economics and Political Science, (2005).

[15]Anderson, David. **Somali Piracy: Historical Context and Political Contingency; In: European Security Forum** Working Paper No. 33: Somalia and the Pirates 2009.

[16]Böge, V. On **Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility'**. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management 2008.

[17]Fukuyama, F. **State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca,** NY: Cornell University Press, Tokyo 2004.

[18]Evans. P & Skocpol, T Bringing **the State Back In**. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985

1.2.1.4. **State-Building as Regime Standardization**

Global efforts aimed at 'fixing failed states', in the 21st century have been guided by 'pragmatic neo-liberalism'. Accordingly, the promotion of human rights, civil society and pluralist values has taken centre-stage in contexts of fragility. Whereas the foreign adversaries and political analyzers from the west in (post-) conflict societies to organize a system of inclusive government based on power sharing agreements (OECD 2011:2), international development expert's advice that an adherence to liberal pluralism must be observed, if fragility is to be replaced by stability[19]

However, democratization and decentralization have not merely been seen as ends in themselves, but as important means to safeguard political tolerance, ethnic diversity, religious freedom, and linguistic non-discrimination. Carrying these liberal notions to extremes, neo-pluralist concepts, such as 'hybrid political orders' (HPOs) (Böge et al. 2008), suggest that 'hybridity' and pluralism constitute not only a goal, but, in fact the very nature of modern states.

Hobbes (1651), Locke (1694), and Rousseau (1763) suggest that the natural state of violent competition and disorder easily prevail over, if the plurality of players agree to share their powers through delegation of power to a supreme primus inter pares, the Leviathan, who can endorse a further nonviolent coexistence by put into effectfor particular 'rules of the game'. Building on these long-standing insights and scrutinizing the fashionable quest for pluralism, Schwartz (1995) reminds us that the West's general understanding of the modern state was built on a 'diversity myth'. Similarly, Levene (2000:21) argues that state promotes coexistence and cooperation but not the diversity, "on the contrary, their role is to streamline, make homogeneous, and organize people to be uniform in some sense." According to this understanding, the consolidated state is less an object of plurality, but more uniformity, and state-making is less about diversification than 'standardization'[20].

[19]Levene, M. **The Limits of Tolerance: Nation-State Building and What It Means for Minority Groups, Patterns of Prejudice**, London 2000.
[20]Levene, M. **The Limits of Tolerance: Nation-State Building and What It Means for Minority Groups, Patterns of Prejudice**, London, 2000.

In an attempt to analytically not only combine the insights of the state- and nation-building literature, but also bridge the gap between existing approaches to state-making and state- breaking, the theoretical framework presented here furthermore proposes that developments of institutional and socio-cognitive consistency is largely a function of central administration. Building on the realization that both 'rules of the game' and 'rules of the mind' are significantly shaped by the administrative architecture of a socio-political organization, the essential premise highly developed here is that state trajectories are greatly decided via the unreliable capability of ruling leaders to make and/or take advantage of inner organizational structures.

Finally, apart from the above mention debates, state-building can be explain as a method in which a set of 'rules of the game' that claims authority over other institutions comes to be shared and adhered to by a population that resides within a given territory. This process can be accomplished by either standardizing a set of the rules, which had already been exercised by parts of the population, across the entirety of that population; or by introducing a new, authoritative set of institutions across the whole populace, as has happened in instances of conquest and colonization.

In conclusion, state-building is essentially about achieving institutional standardization. Although original, this conceptualization is compatible with and draws on former approaches to state-building. Whether classical, Weberian, or libertarian interpretations of state-building, they all emphasize the need to concentrate rule-making in the hands of the few (i.e. 'hierarchization') and to enforce the respective rules across the board (i.e. 'standardization'). In institutional terms, this translates into a process in which 'institutional multiplicity' is replaced by institutional hierarchy, domination and standardization. This conceptualization sheds new light on the debate between those who argue that 'institutional multiplicity' was generally detrimental to states' stability (CSRC 2006:4) and those who suggest that the 'hybridity' of 'political orders' was beneficial for state-making[21].

[21]Böge V & Nolan A, **On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility'**. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2008.

Although it is undeniable that processes of state-making are commonly characterized by 'hybrid political orders', the ultimate goal of any state-making project lies in the attainment of regime domination by way of standardizing an authoritative set of 'rules of the game' and 'rules of the mind'. This process of implementing a common and overriding set of institutions and mental models is what also lies at the heart of historical events such as religious crusades, ethnic cleansings and the introduction of particular ideologies. The prosecution and repression of minorities, displacement and elimination of opponents, as well as political assimilation and propaganda are, after all, geared towards achieving regime standardization.

1.2.1.5.**The Nation...**

While state is assumed a messy notion, the idea of "nation is one of the most puzzle and tendentious substance in the political meaning", (Tilly 1975:6), and is regarded "one of the most complicated areas of communal discipline"[22]. This is reflected in the multitude of definitions, which range from those that emphasize the nations' "distinct ethnic identity and history"[23] to ones that characterize them as 'imagined political communities.

The reason why the academic meadowhave not the same opinion on a general explanation for 'nation' as a component of study (Smith 1998:211) lies partly in the concept's inherent paradoxes. Moreover, the several and contradictory approaches emanate from diverse disciplines of notion. While primordial suggest a nation-to-state-sequence, modernists counter by arguing that the nation is a "build dependent upon the state for its power and connotation"[24].

The opacities inherited in the concept of the nation, and the mounting the debate about it do not, however, justify its neglect in debates on state-making. Even though the dawn of a 'post national era' has long been prophesized (Hannerz 1996;

[22]Bereketeab, R. **Eritrea: The Making of a Nation**, 1890-1991. Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2000.
[23]Bereketeab, R. **Eritrea: The Making of a Nation**, 1890-1991. Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2000.
[24]Tilly, C. **Coercion Capital, and European States**, A.D.990-1990, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

Appadurai 1999; Bernal 2004:4), nation still represents "the nearly all generally lawful worth in the political life of our time"[25].

Moreover, both pre modernists and modernists demonstrate, in their own ways, that there is a close interrelationship between the state and the nation and that they develop dialectically. Moreover, it is acknowledged that aspects of 'soft power' need to be considered when explaining processes of state-making (Mann 1988:10). Similarly, others postulate that "contemporary state configuration acutely relies on the formation not just of efficient administration, but of the ordinary identities or 'imagined communities'" (Clapham 2001:14, Anderson 1983), as "within a homogeneous population, ordinary people were more likely to identify with their rulers"[26].

Therefore, nation-building can be understood as a process in which a common, state-related socio-cognitive system comes to be shared by a territorially defined population. This process can be nurtured by spreading and standardizing an existing socio-cognitive system, or by introducing a new set of 'rules of the mind' across the whole population, amongst others. That nation-building is eventually about socio-cognitive standardization is contained in numerous previous accounts of nationalism.

Hence, Converse (2007:372) and Levene (2000:21) postulate that 'homogenization' played a central role in nation- building, and Connor (1994:92) understands a nation to be a "social group that shares, a sense of homogeneity."[27] Thus, whether brought about by linguistic amalgamation (Anderson 1983; Laitin 2007), press and schooling (Hobsbawm 1977; Anderson 1983), industrialization (Gellner 2006), urbanization (Szilagyi-Gal 2001) or warfare (Tilly 1992), the common denominator of these accounts of nationalism lays in the convergence of a society's 'rules of the mind', i.e. socio-cognitive standardization.

[25]Anderson, B. R. **Imagined Communities, Reflections on the origin and Spread of Nationalism**, London: Verso, 1983.
[26]Tilly, C. **Coercion, Capital, and European States**, A.D.990-1990, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell 1992.
[27]Hobsbawm, E. J. **Nations and Nationalism since 1780 Cambridge**: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

As many authors argue homogenizing a set of rules prevents nation building and it risks the overall stake making endeavor, thereby, it has to be acknowledged that the process of 'homogenizing' does, with regards to aspects of ethnicity, for example, neither requires the purification of tribal minorities, nor cleaning the minorities of their ethnicity[28]. In fact, such efforts can badly miscarry on state-making endeavors, as they are likely to elicit an affirmation of sub-national identities, rather than allowing for the construction of an overarching socio- cognitive system.

While, the elimination of ethnic, religious, etc. minorities has historically constituted a common means to arrive at regime standardization, the latter has also frequently resulted from adding another, overarching set of 'rules of the mind', such as a national identity, to a society's regime ecology. Such a procedure could not only counter a society's potentially perceived need for ethnic standardization – a process likely to be violent due to the rather rigid and exclusionary nature of ethnic identities, but could also provide the basis for a better social integration of ethnic minorities.

1.2.1.6. **The administration**

A part from the interdependent of state building and nation building, as well as the nation, administration plays a vital role of state building, the functioning of a specific social group and its identification as such hinges on the fact that its members adhere to a particular set of 'rules of the game' and 'rules of the mind'. These institutions and socio-cognitive systems primarily serve a certain social strata within that group, namely the elite (North 1990:260f.), compliance with the rules by all individuals is by no means assured – particularly in situations in which different elites strive to implement dissimilar regimes[29].

Consequently, and in order to assure regime continuity, the authoritative set of rules need to be managed and enforced. In order to do so, elites presiding over social organizations rely on a more or less complex network of individuals and organizations, i.e. an administration. That such administrative organizations are key

[28]Schwartz, B. **The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export**. Atlantic monthly, New York, publisher press, 1995

[29]North, D. **Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

for state-making is commonly argued, not only because they "provide a basis for statehood (Röder 2007:335), but also because they "create meaning"[30].

Having been set up to maintain standing armies, collect revenues, and assure internal order (Tilly 1992,Lynn 2006:20), central government administration is generally understood as "the administrative machine that is established to assist those who exercise supreme political authority within a given state" (Adamolekun 1999:17, cf. Evans 2005:192), or, simply, as the "management of public affairs" (OED 1989). While every social organization depends on administration to accomplish its goals (Marx 1946:4), larger social organizations, such as states, are particularly dependent on central administration, because the enforcement of rules on an inter-personal level is unfeasible according to Huntington (1968:9).

Also with regards to the formation of group identities, administration plays a key role (Giddens 1985:116). Along these lines, Barth (1969) shows that the sharing of a general background was a smaller amount the definitional features of an ethnicity, but rather an 'insinuation of result' of its organization, and Anderson (1983:53) stresses that "governmental institutes generate sense."[31] (Giddens (1985:116) attributes such significance to administration that he includes "unitary administration" in his meaning of a nation, and others have also persuasively argued that state administration has been a key basis of nationalism.

One motive for the significance of administration in identity-creation is that the spatial borders created by administration are much firmer than the more fluid ones of language, history or culture. In this train of thought, Mayall (2006:553) states that it was the bureaucratic, colonial state in Africa that "pulverized traditional society and laid the foundations for an imagined modern community."[32]

[30]Röder, P. **Where Nation-States Come from – Institutional Change in the Age of nationalism**, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007.
[31]Giddens, A. **The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism** (Vol. 2). London: Polity, 1985.
[32]Mayall, J. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal Memorial Lecture: **Nationalism and Self Determination in Africa. Nations and nationalism**, 2006.

1.2.1.7. **State-Making Routes in Somalia**

On July 1st, 1960, the sovereign Republic of Somalia was formed as a union of the British Protectorate of Somaliland and the Italian-governed Trust Territory of Somalia (I.M. Lewis, 2002:203). The Republic was apparently as constituting a particularly gifted case of state-making in sub- Saharan Africa since Somali is the only mono ethnic country in African countries (Lewis 2002:205; Ake 1996:6), apparently Somali is the only mono ethnic county in Africa,. Scholars characterized Somalia as being marked by ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity (Castagno 1959:340; Martin 1966:2), and suggested that Somalis formed one of the rare true nations on sub-Saharan African soil (Fitzgibbon 1982a:2; Laitin/Samater 1987: xiv)[33].

These beliefs of Somali remark ability gained currency in the early 1960s, as Somalia was seen to embark on "distinctive democratic processes" (Contini 1964:3) that culminated in a "genuine democracy" (Africa Watch 1990:14). The newborn country at the Horn of Africa appeared to have set foot on the highway to state-making. Yet, by the mid-1960s, this highway already seemed to have turned into a wander, as Somalia's political system disintegrated into an "artificial democracy" (Adam 1999:262), "democracy gone mad" (Mansur 1995:114; Abdullah 2007:43) and "commercialized anarchy"[34] (Lewis 2002:206).

The largely free and fair elections of the early 1960s, which had been contested by a handful of nationalist parties, gradually lapse into a "semi-anarchy" of dozens of clan-based camps (Adam 2008:1). Simultaneously, Somalia was confronted with a steadily deteriorating economic situation (Markakis 1987:90), a ramshackle infrastructure (Lewis 2002:171), and an appalling administrative apparatus (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141). Having experienced the first attempted coup in Africa only one year into its existence (Adam 2008:190), the decade's history peaked in the

[33]Fitzgibbon, L. **Somalia a Call for Justice, Contemporary Review**, 240(1394), 137- 143, London publisher center, 1982b

[34]Abdullah, A. **Perspectives on the State Collapse in Somalia, In A. Osman & I. Souaré (Eds.), Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State** (pp. 40-57). London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2007a.

assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke on October 15th, 1969. Five days later, a bloodless coup followed.

Soon after Major Major-General Mohammed SiyadBarre took the power, he immediately dissolved the parliament and promised to promised to re-establish order and eradicate the inefficiency and corruption that had become endemic (ACR 1969/70:B175; Lewis 2002:207). As the majority of the population had been dissatisfied with the increasingly clannish and nepotistic politics of the 1960s, Barre's coup and military clampdown gained immediate popular support (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141; Gassem 1994:23).

In link with revolutionary propaganda, international observers judged that the military takeover had been 'inevitable' (Lewis 2002:206), and that "the military intervened in 1969 only after the civilian institutions collapsed under the weight of their own talk" (Laitin1977b:7).Hence, the military agents were perceived as heroes who "rescued the Somali nation from imminent collapse" (Dool 1998:85) and who led the Somali state back onto the road of state-making given an "improved economic performance, expanding social services and a better culture of governance"[35].

Why had Somalia's democratic state-making project of the 1960s ultimately wavered and come clan based system, and how did Barre rescue the Somali nation from 'imminent collapse'? The Somali literature presents several arguments to address these questions. While Somalia's early achievements in state- making were attributed to its unique social homogeneity, fierce nationalism, and vibrant democracy (e.g. Farer 1965), its demise in the second half of the 1960s was seen to lay in archaic clan-politics and nepotism (e.g. Lewis 2002).

[35]Abdullah, A. **Perspectives on the State Collapse in Somalia, In A. Osman & I. Souaré (Eds.), Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State** (pp. 40-57). London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2007a.

Alternatively, it has been suggested that it was bad economic performance (Markakis 1987:90.;Laitin 1993:125), the colonial legacy (Issa-Salwe 1994), and the mismatching between 'traditional' and 'modern' forms of governance that were to be blamed for state-unmaking (Mansur 1995:115; Abdullah 2007:43; Lewis 1980)[36]. A different set of scholars locates the collapse of the Somali state in international politics, holding either the "black colonialists of Ethiopia" (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141) or "Soviet complicity" (Payton 1980) accountable. Simultaneously, the greater progress achieved under early military rule is generally attributed to the "well built administration rule based on the military power with the objective to rescue the country from the poverty, tribalism mismanagement and incompetence into which it had sunk" (Lewis 2002:206, referring to Farah 1976).

Even though all of these explanations contribute to our understanding of Somalia's tumultuous state trajectory between 1960 and the mid-1970s, I argue that the current underlying state- making and state-breaking in Somalia was one of shifting stages of institutional and socio- cognitive standardization (Balthazar, Dominik, 2012:1).. Furthermore, I argue, first, that the problem of Somali state making arises after the unification of the two regions of North and South, because of the fake union. Second, I postulate that the commonly underestimated scale of state-making was considerable due to the regime plurality the young state inherited from colonialism and the military coup in 1969. Third, the decisive decision of Siyad Bare to have recapture the missing regions in Ethiopian while all the world powers were in the side of Ethiopia, and the refugee problems mainly the Ogaden community those felled and resettled in the north as their own region, which lately resulted the misunderstanding between the native community (Isaq) and the refugees (Ismail Ahmed, 1999:116).

[36]Lewis, I. M. **A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa** (2 ed.). London: Longman 1980.

CHAPTER TWO:

TRIBE AND CLAN SYSTEM IN SOMALIA AS AN OBSTACLE TO STATE BUILDING

2. Tribe as an Obstacle to state building:

Does the tribe and tribalism system of Somali community practiced is an obstacle of Somalia state building? To understand where the problem of Somalia lies first we look the structure and how Somali people are organized in political and socially. Socially Somali people are branding the name of their father in series to their grandfather to their grandfather. Somali people are structure as a clans which formulates the political system, tradition Somalis were living under the authority of their kinship, "coexistences and social connectivity among Somalis is bounded by the kinship and it is a social contract, this social contract grantee the responsibilities of security and protection among specific clans,, (Gundel, November, 2006, P.4).obligation, privileges, liabilities will keep on to be apparent a long shared rather than personal terms. The tribe will stay cooperatively in charge for actions of its individual members, generally safeguarding of women and children's rights will endlessly be seen in the context of the wellbeing of maintaining the strength of the male based tribes[37]".

The structure of Somali society is footed on ancestry kind known as tribe: family tree describes the belonging of kinsmen to sure tribes, according to the forebear from whom they stem. The clan lineage between the societies can be defined as social contract, this social contract creates strong lineage between the society by resulting that society will have a common responds and common interest, which results misunderstanding between clans in a definite place because of power sharing and resource sharing (land, water, etc).The tribes in Somali generally we can divide into two main groups with sub clans, the two main groups are those spoke Somali (MaxaadTirri) and those spoke MaayTirri, those spoke MaxaadTiri are the dominant clan in the Somalia while other are those spoke (MaayTirri) are nomadic people residing inter riverine regions of shabele and Juba.

[37]JoakimGundel**, the predicament of the Oday**, London publisher press 2006.

2.1.Somali Traditional Structure

Although Somalia's linked to a single father according to their clan affiliation system, however, the traditional societal structure is somehow different according to their regional and geographical situation (Interview 1[38]). According as Suldan Mohamed argue, the structure of Somali community lies as a clan affiliated system led by the clan Suldan, because the strongest bond of Somali community is tribe system, and therefore, the basic system of Somali community is structured as a "kinship and family clan structure which holding together rich people and poor people and treats in a same manner when it comes clan issues, traditional structure of Somali community is structured as a leadership style" (Ahmed. Samater 1999:25), which we can define as the leaders with reference to historic roots of leadership, which legitimizes their execution of power (Gundel, 2006:p5). However, as Oday argue in his predicament of the role of the traditional leaders, quit argued that the role of the traditional leaders stronger than today's role. In contrast, contemporary socio-political structures are frequently seen to be based on democratic values marked in self-governing voted"[39].

2.2.Clan family

The tribe "clan family" is commonly the upper one in the form of tribe linkage, headed by the clan Suldan, Aqil and Oday (Gundal, 2006). However, the genealogical length of a clan family is not limited and can count up to the last grandfather people can remember[40] (Lewis 1961:4). The roots of the Somali clans are united by a common, mythical sensitivity of direct lineal origin from the forefather Samaale, (Gundal, 2006:16), the division of the clan system is represented by two upper MaxaadTiri and Maay. Mostly tribes are regularlylarge and spotted that they infrequently are very useful as political entities (Lewis 1961:5).

[38]Suldan Mohamed Suldan Abdikadir, **a suldan of Habar Garxajis (Isaq clan, Somaliland), interviewed** in Hargiesa, 2016,
[39]JoakimGundel, **the predicament of the Oday**, London publisher press 2006:
[40]Lewis.I. A **Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralist and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa**. London: Oxford University Press 1961.

2.3.Customary Law (XEER)

A part from the Mag paying system of Somali community there is a bylaw between them, determining the collective cooperation of the community and their lineage, "whilst community are connected to all by association and are social gathering to the same xeer, the Somalis verbalize of belonging to a tolxeerleh"[41] (agnates bound by treaty) (I.M.Lews 1961: 161). Tol (clanship, ancestry) known leap jointly by kinship, ancestry as in a line of ties, and xeer isa deal or agreement, typically go into bilaterally among two Mag-paying groups.The agreed contract which manages the interaction among people belonging to a tol and accepted as legacy from their fathers is known Xeer(Interview2[42]).

Clearly speaking, the Somali Xeer are unwritten agreements, inherited father to the son, "the grandfather passed down orally from one generation to the next, entered bilaterally by elders representing clans that live and migrate adjacent to one another"[43]. Inter-clan xeer originally concern the sharing of resources, especially grazing and access to water between pastoralists (Interview3[44]). The xeer is a customary code and procedure founded upon contractual agreement, and denotes a body of explicitly formulated obligations, rights and duties. It binds people of the same treaty (xeer) together and defines their collective responsibility in external relations with other groups (Lewis 1961: 161). However, as Le Sage points out, xeer is not a strictly 'rule-based' system because a clan's political and military strength relative to its rivals, which is based on size, has always been a factor in reaching an enforceable consensus (Le Sage 2005: 25).

[41] Lewis, I. M. **A Pastoral Democracy: a Study of Pastoralist and Politics among the Northern,** London publisher press, 1961.

[42]Suldan Mohamed Suldan Abdikadir, **asuldan of Habar Garxajis (Isaq clan, Somaliland), interviewed in** Hargiesa, 2016

[43]Gundel, J. The Predicament of the 'Oday' - **The Role of Traditional Structures in Security, Rights, Law and Development in Somalia**; Report for the Danish Refugee Council &Novib-Oxfam: Danish Refugee Council, 2006.

[44]Aqil Abdirisaq Aqli, **chief Aqli of Habar Awal (Isaq clan, Somaliland) interviewed** in Hargiesa, 2016

Somali Xeer has never been formally written and remains an oral law passed down through generations (PDRC: 2003). However, Xeer is both guarded and implemented by respected elders, known as the Xeer beegti, the Xeer beegti are the only interpreters has the right to interpret (Inverview4[45]), as Muse Ali, one of the Xeer beegti elders argue, that Xeer is accepted because of the believe that xeer is the main defense of the population and the political tie between the tribe in general. Xeer generally can be classified into two parts, Xeer Guud (General Xeer) and Xeer Garaa (Specific Xeer). Therefore, Xeer Guud, concerns to the resolution of complaints and arguments at dissimilar stages of the family sections, and includes features that control general, day-to-day communal exchanges, social dealings, and means of disagreement conclusion within a tribe and between diverse clans (interview6[46]). The general xeer (Xeer Guud) is partly classified into two blood xeer (Xeer dhiig), the death section, which deals with the deliberate and an-deliberate killing and other serious crimes like injury and rape, and the Xeer Dhaqan (community demeanor), the communal or social conventions dealing with stealing, banditry and ancestors related issues such as household hostility, marriage, divorce and inheritance (PDRC 2003). Special Code (Xeer gaar) deals with the commercial activities and production of livestock and fishing among tribes and sub-tribes in involving pastoralist, fishing, harvesting and other economic activities (PDRC 2003: 20).

[45]Garaad Abshir Garaad Soofe, **Garaad of Dhulbahante, (Darood Clan) Academic for peace and Development**, Lasaanod, 2007.
[46]Abdullah Ibrahim Habane, **expert of Somali clan system, served as Somaliland upper house secretor more than 20 years**, interviewed in Hargeysa, 2016.

CHAPTER THREE:

OGADEN WAR OF 1977

3. Ogaden war and the State Collapse

Does the Ogaden[47] war be the starting place of the Somali state fall down? The policy of rapprochement towards Ethiopia that Mohamed Hajji Ibrahim Egal had signaled in 1967 was continued by Siyad Barre. Even although Siyad Bare continued his primarily diplomatic strategy to re-appropriate the Ogaden even when the new Ethiopian administration come to the office after the military overthrown Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassi on September 12th, 1974 (Henze 1985:32), historically war between Ethiopian and Somalia, was the longest and live lasting war took place in the Horn of Africa and is discharging into one of the most ferocious conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa[48].

Although the war flashed national fervor, it blocked the progressive state-making project Barre had initiated when he come to the office in 1969 (Mohamed 1992:6; Bryden 1999b:3; Tripodi 1999a:1). During the 1980s Somalia's was one of the richest in subs Sahara African countries and its economic based on the animal husbandry and agriculture, militarily Somali was the third largest weapon imported country in Sub Sahara African, at that time Somali was belt nationalist and there was a positive cooperation between the government and the community towards to regain the missing Somali regions in Ethiopia first and second to regain those are in Kenya[49]. In 1977 the first step of Somali ambitious started and the president launched a war to regain the missing Somali regions in Ethiopia, unfortunately Somali troops were defeated although they reached and conquered miles of Ethiopian territory beyond the regions of Somalia community in Ethiopia by the allied troops led by Russia.

[47]Ogaden , **means Somali community residing in the East of Ethiopia and south West of Somali**,
[48]Woodward, P. **Conflicts in the Horn of Africa contemporary Review**, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1977.
[49]Laitin, D. **Ogaden war: Implications for Siyad's Role in Somali History**, the Journal of Modern African Studies, 1979b.

After the defeat of the troops Somali politics came to be marked by 'bad governance', nepotism and clan politics when president's clan dominated the government positions (Sheik-Abdi 1981:163; Tripodi 1999a:1), and the country witnessed massive weapons overflow (Luck ham/Bekele 1984a/b). Moreover, parts of the population experienced relative deprivation, which aggravated existing grievances (Africa Watch 1990:1). Thus, the war is frequently perceived as a "milestone on the road to the collapse" (Abdullah 2007a:45).

The Ogaden War was not the only conflict Somalia experienced between 1977 and 1991 which resulted the state destruction of Somali state as the Somali vice president Ismail Ali Abokor argue (Interview8, HCTV). Following the Somali defeat in 1978, oppositionsagainst Barre's rule took root. In 1979 Somali salvation democratic front (SSDF) formally declared their agenda against Siyad Bare (Interview, 7[50]). The second armed resistance Somali National Movement (SNM) was pronounced in two years after dated on April 6th, 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was one of the strongest insurgent groups to form, which latterly forced the president to move the country with the help of Somali United Nation. After moving its headquarters to the Haud shortly after its formation, the SNM and SSDF waged a guerrilla struggle against the Somali government in the country's north east and north-west (Spears 2004b:185)[51].

In coalition with other militias that formed throughout the decade, the dissident movement aimed to overthrow and replace Barre. In light of his overcome and exacting enlargements telling in 1991, the SNM determined to abrogate the amalgamation of 1960 and confirmed the Republic of Somaliland an sovereign state Although Somaliland has not been internationally recognized (Dominic Balthazar, 2012:125,http://somalilandsun.com/index.php/in-depth/history/4121-somaliland-the-making-of-a-nation.

[50]Boobe Yusuf Du, ale, **Program director of Academic for peace and development, (served as general secretor of Somali National Movement, SNM)** interviewed in 2016, Hargeysa.
[51]P. Kingston & I. Spears (Eds.), **States within States – Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era** (pp. 15-34). New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.

3.1. Somali State-Breaking and Ogaden war (Somali Ethiopian war)

The eighteen month Ogaden War between early 1977 and mid-1978 was rooted in a long conflictive history (Clapham 2001; Gamst 1986:133). 'Somali regions in Ethiopia', which includes the Ogaden, the Haud, and the Reserved Areas, had before now been home to the fights of Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi in the 16th centuries respectively (S. S. Samater 1993a:12f. Lewis 2002:63ff.).At that time wars between Somali community led by Ahmed Al Ghazi was marked wars between Christianity and Islam and he was against the spread of Christianity to the Somali regions in those regions, but after the Islamic Empire become weak, the Islamic community in that regions led by Somali leaders break away in to kinship community loyal to their clan leaders. (Spears, I. (2004c). States-Within-States: An Introduction to Their Empirical Attributes. In

Late in 19th Ethiopian empire became active player in the Horn African politics when western colonies came and conquer in most of the regions around Ethiopia. Because of this opportunity Ethiopia regained the battled regions mainly Somali community dominated (S. S. Samater, 1993. 15). Around20th century when Somalia regions of North and South gained their independence, the two regions immediately united because of the fear of Ethiopian occupation in the Somali regions, and this gave Ethiopia a signal and Ethiopia immediately read just the administration system in the Somali regions and enhanced its control over the Ogaden. The objective was that to be read as attempt to increase institutional and socio-life standers on the part of the Ethiopian leadership which sparked further conflict. Ogaden rebels turned to Mogadishu, where they harvested weapons and encouragement to form liberation movements (Henze 1985:30). After the Somali-backed insurgency activities peaked in 1963 (Henze 1985:30), Ethiopian and Somali troops clashed along their common border in early 1964 three years after the independence of Somali regions[52].

Overpowered by Ethiopian forces, Somalia engaged in peace negotiations in April 1964, halted its support for the rebel movements (Nkaisserry 1997:10), and gradually

[52]Henze, P. **Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia – Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1985.

started a policy of appeasement (Henze 2000:262f.). However, unrest among the Ogaden and Oromo population continued, accompanied by rising nationalist sentiments (HRW 2008:16). Thus, in 1966, Ethiopia declared martial law in 'Somalia regions in Ethiopia' (Henze1985:31) and it took the leadership in Addis Ababa until 1971 to mollify the region (Matthias 1977:422ff.).

Yet, when the Ethiopian Emperor was overthrown in September 1974, dipping the country into civil war, Somalis within and outside of 'regions in Ethiopia' saw a fruitful historic opportunity (Farer 1979:120) and felt an "irresistible temptation"[53] (Markakis 1998:131) to finally re-appropriate the 'lost territories' .Abdurrahman Ahmed Ali, the head of Somali embassy in Ethiopia had organized a hidden meetings with the Somali populations in Ethiopia with the objective to have a common understanding how they will face this new situation emerged, the ambassador suggested that this is the last opportunity to regain the missing Somali regions in Ethiopia and if not harvested this opportunity standing currently Somali regions in Ethiopia will never regain forever.

participants and most of the elites agreed to have an emergence plan of regained at the time Ethiopia is busy to the rebuilding of it is administration, this plan was informed to the president of Somalia and his cabinet early after the decision was taken and the government of Somali took a decision to form a civil military army empowering the army resistance fighting in Somali regions in Ethiopia (Interview, 8[54]).

This objective was promising due to political changes not only in the region, but also in the prevailing international environment. The military support Somalia had secured from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1963 expanded significantly after Barre'scoup dated in 1969, his embrace of socialism in 1970, and the signing of a two-sided agreement of closeness and Cooperation in 1974.

Although Ethiopia had received military backing from the United States of America (USA) from 1953 onwards, Somalia started closing the gap and soon claimed one of

[53]Markakis, J. **Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa**, London: Sage Publications, 1998.
[54]A. A. Ali, **BBC Somali interview**, Monday afternoon, 5:30, London, 1998.

the finest military forces in sub-Saharan Africa. By 1970, it had a military manpower of 20,000, which ranked it among Africa's top five, and by 1973 the military balance in the Horn of Africa shifted in favor of the Somalis for the first time in recorded history[55].

Yet, Somalia's military window of opportunity started closing again, when the newly empowered Ethiopian military junta of the Dergue hoisted the socialist flag, striking a USD 380 million arms supply deal with the USSR in December 1976 (IISS 1978). Discontented Somalia re-evaluated its options and three months after the USA had promised military aid to Somalia in July 1977 (Ofcansky 1993:183; Weiss 1980:11)[56] officially renounced the 1974 Soviet-Somali treaty. While this completed the phenomenal great powers switch, the USA ultimately refused to supply weaponry to Somalia, largely because the latter continued to pursue its irredentist policy, leaving Egypt and Saudi Arabia as sole funders of military aid to Somalia.

Although boosting his military, Barre refrained from seeking an outright military solution to the Ogaden dispute (Matthias 1987:239f.; Lewis 2002:227f.). In order not to have his diplomatic options ruined, he brought the United Front (UF) an umbrella organization of numerous Ethiopian-based Somali guerrilla movements that had been established in 1973 under strict government control ((A. A. Ali, BBC Somali interview, September, 1998, Monday afternoon, 5:30, London)).

By 1975 the UF came to be so strongly controlled, organized and equipped by Mogadishu, that it was considered "an arm of the Somali army" (Gilkes 1994b:722). In January 1976, the movement was split for logistical and propaganda reasons into the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Abo-Somali Liberation Front (ASLF) (Compagnon1995:378).

Aiming to keep militancy on either side of the Somali-Ethiopian border at bay, Barre not only restricted the WSLF's activities (Gilkes 1994b:722), but even avoided

[55]Legume C & Lee, **Conflict in the Horn of Africa**, London: Collings 1977.
[56]Ofcansky, T**National Security, In H. C. Metz (Ed.), Somalia: A Country Study** (pp. 181-226). Washington, DC: Library of Congress/ U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

mentioning their existence to the Somali population (Markakis 1987:227; Lockyer 2006:5)[57].

At the time, Barre sent envoys to Addis Ababa to negotiate autonomy for the Ogaden (Lewis 2002:232). However, the respective regional and international-level negotiations failed, BarreSomali president purposed himself of the Somali guerrillas (Laitin 1979b:112), the Western Somali Liberation Front equipped into "one of the biggest and mainly competent rebellious movements in Africa" (Lockyer 2006:6), starting to move west in early 1977 (Ahmed I.Samater 1988:133;Markakis 1998:31).

By spring, the ASLF controlled most of the countryside in Bale (Lewis2002:233), by June the WSLF had conquered 60 per cent of the Ogaden, and by the end of July, Ethiopia had acknowledged control of its eastern territories, except for the cities of Jigjig, Harar, and Dire Dawa (Ofcansky 1993:185). Only then, on July 13th, 1977, did Barreofficially commit his regular troops to the war (Nkaisserry 1997:15), reinforcing some 6,000-15,000 WSLF fighters with 35,000 soldiers (Lockyer 2006:9, referring to Marcus 1994:196f.; Matthies 1987:241f.).Thus, "the Somali goals of greater Somali unification and re-backing the lost territories are regarding to be reached" (Nkaisserry 1997:16).

After a swift military advance, the tables turned in 1978 (Weiss 1980:8). Due to massive military support, which had been airlifted together with some 1,500 Soviet military advisors and about 15,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia in late 1977 (Henze 1985:56; Ofcansky1993:183; Urban 1983:44), the Somali attacks on Dire Dawa and Harar failed. When the Ethiopian-Cuban-Soviet counter-offensive resulted in the fall of Jigjig on March 5th, 1978, Somali defeat was inevitable[58] (Compagnon 1995:384).

[57]Lockyer, A. **Opposing foreign intervention's impact on the Course of Civil Wars, the Ethiopian-Ogaden Civil War** and paperpresented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle, 2006.
[58]Compagnon, D. **Political Resources, Authoritarian Regulation and Personal Domination in Somalia, the Regime of Siyad Bare**, University de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, Pau, 1995.

Barre recalled the Somali National Army (SNA), which had lost large number of some the armored units and two third of the Air Forces on March 9th, 1978 (Ofcansky 1993:183)[59].

While various reasons can be put forward as having sparked the conflict over 'Western Somalia', it appears that it was the decision of French Somalia to declare independence on June 27th , 1977 that ultimately sparked the military invasion a few weeks later (BBC Somali Interview, General Galaal, October, 2007). This distributed a decisive blow to the idea of 'Somali nationalism' as well as the ideal of 'Somali nations', and needed to be pawned by a clear protest that Somalis belonged together – before the existing regime plurality among the diverse Somali territories led to further fragmentation.

As many Somali elites argue, Ogaden War was the back born of the destruction of great Somali state, the mismanagement of Bare (Somalia president) and his advisors in the Ogaden War result the breakdown of the Somali state. Therefore, if viewed through the regime prism, a somewhat more shaded picture appears. Although it is indisputable that the war had significant consequences on Somalia's state-making project throughout the 1980s, it seems that the impact of the war per se on levels of institutional and a socio-life standard was less clear cut[60].

In fact, the war exertion seems to have led, overall, to an increase in regime standardization, as mass recruitment into the army and fierce national sentiments enlarged the sharing of a common set of rules. While the war activated processes of regime de-standardization that set in subsequent to the violent conflict, some of these could probably have been circumvented had the political leadership chosen other policies in the war's aftermath. The subsequent paragraphs illustrate how the inter-state war influenced the standardization of particular rules during and after the war.

By the mid-1970s, nationalist feelings had begun to diminish, partly due to Barre's increasingly oppressive policies, his condemnation of Islam, and the population's

[59]Ofcansky T. **National Security in H. C. Metz (Ed.), Somalia**: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Library of Congress/ U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.
[60]Laitin, D. **The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyad's Role in Somali History**, the Journal of Modern African Studies, 1979b.

growing objection to 'scientific socialism' (Horn Cable TV Interview with the Somali vice presidents wife Halima, in December, 2012). Yet, the prospects of eventually 'liberating' the 'lost territories' not only led to rise steeply of nationalism (Farer 1979:126), but turned into a "national obsession" (Lewis 2002:236) that resulted in increasing popular demands to invade Ethiopia (Laitin 1979b:112).

Widespread enthusiasm about decisive military action and general discontent with Barre's inert and inconsiderate policy led to "considerable unrest in the capital city" (Laitin 1979b:112). Students in Mogadishu launched protests and limbed nationalist tensions to force the government's hand (Markakis 1998:131), leading General Wako Guto to advise Barre to immediately advance military steps, "if serious domestic upheavals were to be avoided"[61].However, as Barre did not want to move beyond increasing the government's support for various Ethiopian-based guerrilla movements (Markakis 1998:131), he had several hundred students and numerous leading rebel leaders arrested (Markakis 1987:224ff.), which resulted in the formation of an organized opposition to the military government[62].

In order to keep internal turmoil at bay and re-direct the mounting aggression of the Somali people, Barre finally decided to commit the SNA to war (Lewis 2002:232;), not least because this war constituted an important source of legitimacy for Barre. Additional impetus for Somali nationalism was provided by the termination of Somali-Russian relations in 1977, "as the population was impressed by the historical significance of the hour, and the damaging 'betrayal' by ideological comrades" (Ahmed I. Samater 1988:134f.). Moreover, the general mobilization Barre announced on February 9th, 1978 "made for unity" (Greenfield 1991:16; Lewis 2002:238; Ododa 1985:285) and hardened the "ideological cement" (Compagnon 1995:428, my translation), resulting in the war marking "the high point of Somali nationalist fervor in recent Somali history" (Lewis 1989:573)[63].

---

[61] Lewis, I. M. **a Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa** (4ed.). Oxford: James Curry, 2002.

[62]Samater, Ahmed I. **Socialist Somalia, Rhetoric and Reality**, London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1988.

[63]Lewis, I. M. **A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa** (3 Ed.). London: Westview Press, 1988.

3.2 Shifting the conflict from external to internal as a weapon of office protection

Military defeat "produced a national mood of depression" (S. S. Samater 1993:45) and was followed by vehement accusations against the military government (Ahmed I. Samater 1988:137; Gassem 1994:31). In public discourse, defeat was blamed on Barre's greediness and hubris, as it was believed that Ethiopia would have signed a peace agreement in September 1977, yielding the desired territories to Somalia[64].

In order to smooth the waves of disgruntlement and discuss outstanding military challenges and opportunities, Barre met with numerous generals and officers in Hargeysa. Although the soldiery was gave the courage to address their feeling, six of the most critical were executed, which was interpreted as "main proof that Siyad had not respect for his army" (Laitin1979b:113). Only one month after the military defeat, some soldiers responded by mounting an abortive coup on April 9th, 1978 (Tareke 2000:66; Ododa 1985:285), making it plain to Barre that he could no longer rely on the military, the organ that had constituted his primary tool for regime standardization, or state-making, prior to the war.

Finding itself angled, the government came to join the troublesome search for lawbreakers as the government declared. As the attempted overthrow of Barre had largely been executed by officers of the Majerteen clan (Laitin 1979a:96), they were immediately accused of high treason. While the blame soon shifted to the Isaq clan, who had formed one of the earliest and most persistent opposition movements that did not falter like the SSDF.

The conceptualization of scapegoats in clan terms "ended any sense of national unity" (Bradbury 1997:7). Similarly, Abdullah (2007a:56) suggests that the military defeat and the fact that Barre spurned his own army in the war's aftermath "was indeed the beginning of the downfall of the very idea the army was founded upon: Somali nationalism." Instead, it "rapidly led to extensive public dejection and to a rise of 'tribalism'" (Lewis 1989:575).

[64]Spears, I. **Civil War in African States: The Search for Security**. Boulder and London: FirstForumPress 2010.

3.3 From Nationalism to Clannish

Although it is hard to found when the re-tribalization of Somali society established in, it is undeniable that an incremental restoration of clan consciousness raised after the Ogaden war (Adam 2008:192; Gassim 2002: vii ;). Rapidly, "it became possible for clan names once again to be publicly mentioned"[65] (Greenfield 1991:16) and clannish "infiltrated the regime, bureaucracy and population at large" (Abdullah 2007a:44).

As well as the divisive search for a perpetrator for the Ogaden catastrophe, Barre's over-swift promotion of Marehan and (ex-WSLF) Ogaden officers within the SNA (Security National Agency) contributed to the clannisation of society, given that their promotion strengthened the dictator's clannish power base due to his family links to these two clans (Brons 2001:184). These developments were enhanced by the increasing urbanization Somalia had experienced after the famine of 1975 and 1977 Ogaden war, which marked one of the most rapid processes of urbanization in Africa[66].

Largely settling with their own kin, the inflowing population revived clannish into a strategy of survival (Compagnon1995:504), thus heralding a clannisation of urban areas unseen until then (Marchal 2002:222p.). Nationalism gave way to clannish also as a result of the inflow of some 700,000 Ogaden Somali refugees, who feared Ethiopian reprisals. The burden of what the United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) described as "the most serious refugee problem in the world" (Fitzgibbon 1982a:62), was mainly borne by Somalia's north-west, where about half of them arrived[67].

Attracting above-average international aid, being encouraged by Mogadishu to settle in the northern region, and receiving land titles and arms from Barre to repel a potential Ethiopian invasion, the refugees created resentment among the Isaq population (Omar 1992:232; Spears 2010:139). Apart from causing "considerable

[65]Greenfield, R. **Somalia: Siyad's Sad Legacy**, Africa Report, Addis Ababa publisher center, 1991
[66]Cassanelli, L. **Explaining the Somali Crisis, the Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia** and **the War behind the War**, London: Haan Publishing1996.
[67]Spears, I. **Civil War in African States: The Search for Security**. Boulder and London: FirstForumPress 2010.

disruption in the country's internal structures" (ION 1985:2), the refugees' arrival flashed a Somalia-wide discussion about Somali (national) identity. Although it had been suitable to declare a large population living beyond the borders of 'Somalia proper' as constituting Somali citizens as long as an irredentist policy was pursued (cf. Markakis 1998:126p), opinion soon turned once this populace penetrated Somalia and put pressure on its dwindling resources.

Once the disintegration of the national identity was set in motion, the malicious circle of socio-cognitive de-standardization could seemingly not be reversed. The more breakable Barre's position got, the more he resorted to 'divide-and-rule' tactics to keep the clans opposed to his rule in check. Thus, he instrumentalized the Ogaden and other clans in the north-west to suppress the challenge arising from the Isaq. And the more Barre drew on the clans to which he was closely related the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dhulbahante – the more the opposition reverted to its own respective clan structures, as trust was increasingly confined to kinship ties (Markakis 1998:132; Adam 1995:76)[68].

Although the opposition had been at pains not to form along clan lines after the aborted coup of 1978 in order to emphasize the national character of their opposition (Compagnon 1995:441), the political landscape quickly turned into a "purely tribal confrontation" (Sheik-Abdi 1981:171). But the opposition became clannish only later in the 1980s as many Somali leaders argue, Lewis (1961) attests that the expansion of tribalism constituted "the traditional divisive response to extreme political and economic insecurity" (as quoted in Markakis 1987:233).

3.4 Softening Power Monopoly

The division of the military went in tandem with a loss of the state's power monopoly (Bakonyi/Stuvøy 2005:365). Due to "considerable anxiety in Somalia that the Ethiopian advance would not stop at the border but would press on into the Republic" (Lewis 2002:239), Barre issued major quantities of arms to the civilian population in the north, particularly to the Ogaden refugees. The dissolution of the state's domination over the means of aggression accelerated once Barre faced

[68]Adam, H. Somalia: **A Terrible Beauty Being Born**? In W, Zartman (Ed.) **Collapsed States. The disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority**. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

military opposition to his rule, as the dictator organized paramilitary units and encouraged the creation of clan militias – particularly amongst the Darod – which were trained and financed by the state[69].

Especially in combination with a resurfacing clannisation, the dissipation of the state's power monopoly impeded the maintenance of an overarching set of 'rules of the game' and 'rules of the mind'. "Finally, Barre was in deeper trouble in the provinces than even he realized; his security machinery had lost its ability to intimidate and coerce"[70] (Rawson 1994:157). Thus, battles over land titles re-occurred between nomads; Islamic fundamentalists, who claimed SSDF affiliation, briefly took over the town ofLasaanod; and a clash between Ogaden and Marehan groups put the town of Kismayo under mob siege for a week. The state's monopoly of violence had diminished to such an extent that Barre could no longer prevent a "unexpected augment in unlawful brutality" in the Mogadishu of the late 1980s (Kivimäki 2001:3, referring to Simons 1994:819), and it was not long before the vanishing power monopoly was replaced by a power plurality (Compagnon 1995:428) that was incrementally occupied by opposition movements.

3.5 Administrative Turmoil and Decline

Declination of government power and Signs of institutional de-standardization can also be detected in the administrative sphere, which came to be affected with bureaucratic mismanagement (Abdi I. Samatar1993:28, referring to World Bank 1981). Following the parliamentary elections on December 30th, 1979, which principally was not state election due to the governmental crisis resulted from the defeated war same year in 1979, but it was generally a condition from the Western following to the structural adjustment programs, therefore the parliamentary election was resulted from Western countries pressuring the government into liberalizing the economy and political life in. due to the number of seats Barre's Political parts had

[69]Ofcansky T. **National Security in H. C. Metz (Ed.), Somalia**: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Library of Congress/ U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.
[70]Rawson, D. **Dealing with Disintegration: U.S. Assistance and the Somali State.** in A. I. Samater (Ed.), **the Somali Challenge – From Catastrophe to Renewal**? (pp. 147-187). Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.

got the parliamentary elections, Barre restructured the government and abolish the position of his three vice-presidents[71].

While the fact that the newly elected 'People's Parliament' consisted only of individuals that belonged to the government party (S.S. Samater 1993a:46) and the swift reinstallation of the SRC in October 1980 point towards regime maintenance, Barre's repeated political reshuffling throughout the 1980s led to an institutional plurality that was damaging to state-making.

Despite the fact that rulers frequently replace officeholders "to control and manage charge looking for, to avoid opponents from rising their own power stand, and to exhibit their power" (Bratton/ van de Walle 1994:463, Hagmann 2005:9), such tactics resulted in weakening of Somali state. After having declared a state of emergency on October 21st, 1980 (Compagnon1995:438), the state disposed of three similar and overlapping executive arrangements: the party's politburo with its Central Committee, the CSS, and the SRC[72].

Each of these executive organizations was given its day in the sun, "only to be quickly superseded by another political constellation" (Rawson 1994:155). During this demeanor counterbalanced political opponents and left processes of decision-making exclusively in the hands of Barre (Said S. Samater 1993:46), it also paralyzed the state's administration and undermined state organizations and institutions[73].

The state's ability to maintain its administration and, thus, central tool for regime standardization was also diminished by the macroeconomic policy agreements that Barre struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in February 1980, July 1981 and July 1982. Not only did these contracts force the Somali state to cease acting as the last resort employer of all secondary school graduates (Interview10), they also led to economic crisis which resulted to reduce and to economizing of its

[71]Samater, Abdi I. **Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy**,**Bananas, Boom, and Poverty in Somalia. Economic Geography**, Haan Publisher, London 1993.
[72]Ottawa, M. **Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa,** Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies 1982.
[73]Rawson, D. **Dealing with Disintegration: U.S. Assistance and the Somali State**. In A. I. Samater (Ed.) **the Somali Challenge – From Catastrophe to Renewal**. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1994.

administrative apparatus by 1985, the Somali government had terminated some 5,000 civil servants[74].

In order to maintain cohesion amongst the remaining administrators, Barre increased military domination by reappointing loyal military officers to administer most of the country's districts and regions (Compagnon 1995:438), furthermore, he consigned "the director-generals of all ministries to a five months' stint in the national orientation centre in Mogadishu", in order to bring "all the country's top civil servants under close military control"[75] (Lewis 2002:246).

However, apart from these efforts to create a coherent and effective administrative structure, the administrative apparatus was increasingly self-absorbed, retreating from its actual task of governing the population (A.S. Mohamed 1980:205). The "absence of all representative institutions and the transformation of state institutions into instruments of oppression meant that clan was the only safe retreat and the only means with which to organize and mobilize opposition to the regime"[76], thus continuing regime de-standardization.

Barre added fuel to the fire when he resorted to his last option in trying to run the country, reinstalling the elders as a 'traditional' network of administrators (Osman-Shuke 2004:149; Elmi 1992:14). Barre either tried to appease them, or aimed at "destroying the cohesion of the community, leaving it bereft of its respected and experienced leaders" (Africa Watch 1990:123; Greenfield 1991:26). Either way, the traditional authorities increasingly acquired power over politics and the military, which provided a smooth transition into the important role they played in numerous rebel movements.

[74]Laitin, D. **The Economy, in H. C. Metz (Ed.), Somalia: A Country Study** (pp. 119- 149). Washington, DC: Library of Congress/ U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).
[75] Lewis, I. M. **A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa** (4ed.). Oxford: James Currey 2002.

[76]Spears, I. **Civil War in African States: The Search for Security**. Boulder and London: FirstForumPress 2010.

3.6 Administrative Fragility and the Signs of the civil war

SSDF was founded in late 1979 after the failed coup led by Abdirashid Ciro who belongs Darood clan, sub clan of Majerteen, and was executed almost those participated the coup except Abdullah Yusuf who fled to Ethiopia and founded SSDF (Interview9[77]). Early month of 1982 the second Somali army opposition was declared in London known SNM (Somali National Movement) SNM was Founded by a group of Isaq émigrés living in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in April 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was announced shortly thereafter in London on 18th May (Lewis 2002: 75). Created by intellectual elite with the objective of overthrowing Barre's dictatorial government, the organization soon transferred its command center to villages extending to the border of Ethiopia but belonging to the Isaq clans in the Somali Ethiopian region and established their military training bases and started their rebel against the government of Somalia in early 1982 (Lewis 2002:27)..

Facing increasing rebel activities in Somalia and Ethiopia, Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam signed a joint communiqué on April 3rd, 1988, agreeing to cease their support for rebellious operating in each other's territories. Losing its Ethiopian sanctuary (Compagnon 1990b:266), the SNM's survival was at stake, leading the rebels to launch a daredevil attack on Somalia's north-west.

Given its success in establishing a presence in the rural areas and increasingly gaining popular support, Barre had the northern cities of Hargeysa and Burco bombed to rubble in 1988, in order to retaliate against the Isaq's support of the SNM. Yet, this and similar measures "merely served to go faster the alteration of the SNM rebel war into a conservative one"[78]. The movement's exponential growth from about 1,200 to up to 50,000 fighters (Flint 1994:37) led Prunier to conclude that there was no SNM, but "purely the Isaq natives up in weapons"[79] (ibid. 1990/91:109).

---

[77]General Galaal,**BBC Somali Interview**, October, 2007

[78]Aideed, H**The Siyad Barre Regime's Genocide of the Somaliland People In R. Ford**,**War Destroys Peace Nurtures and Somali**, **Reconciliation and Development** (pp. 195-202). Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc 2004.

[79]Aideed, H,**The SiyadBarre Regime's Genocide of the Somaliland People, In R. Ford, H. Adam & E. Ismail (Eds.), War Destroys: Peace Nurtures – Somali Reconciliation and Development** (pp. 195-202). Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc 2004.

During the armed fighting and the struggle towards to overthrown the military dictator led by the SNM and other opponents, SNM invited General Aided from Hawiye to join the struggle against Bare, following that Aided formed United Somali Congress (USC) in order to increase military pressures on the government (interview10[80]). However the bonds with the movements that mainly emerged in the late 1980s remained spurious by January 1991, the SNM controlled large parts of former British Somaliland, and expanded its military control from the rural to the urban areas.

As the latter had largely been abandoned by the civilian population and SNA soldiers alike (Interviews 11[81]), the SNM took control over Hargeysa, Burco and other settlements without decisive battles (Interviews 12[82]). This military advance was paralleled by the USC's achievement in driving Barre out of Mogadishu on January 27th, 1991. Ignoring prior agreements between the diverse rebel movements, the USC unilaterally proclaimed Ali Mahdi Mohamed President of Somalia, leading to a renewed feeling of marginalization in the north and subsequent abrogation of the 1960 consummated union between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia (Adam 2008:17).

[80]Mohamed Kahin, **SNM Veteran, interviewed in Hargeysa**, 2016
[81]Muse Bixi Abdi, **Somali National Movement, veteran, Interviewed in Hargeysa,** 2016
[82]Abiib Diriye Nuur, **served minister, SNM veteran, Interviewed in Hargeysa** 2016

CHAPTER FOUR:

IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR OVER SOMALI STATE AND STATE BUILDING

4. Implications of the war

Somalia has been in a brutal civil war since 1991, whencentral government falls down, while the opposition parts expel the General Mohamed Siyad Bare who was in the office in 21 years (Samatar.A.I, 1999:27). In 1991 Somali Republic broke away into to autonomous regions, South Somalia and North Somalia, immediately after the collapse, the Northern regions held peace process and state building dialog and declared Somaliland independences, while Somali, the south regions took the paths to the destruction and bloody civil war (Interview 13[83]). Inside this section I will emphasize, implications of the War over Somalia State and why State building processes in north succeed and why South Somali is in a brutal civil war more than two decades. Firstly, I contest the position that the legendary 'traditional authorities' with their inclination towards 'grassroots democracy' lay at the heart of Somaliland state-making and how the traditional authorities in the south failed to make a peace process[84].

As many authors argue, Somaliland's state-making process has been labeled 'unique', 'peaceful', 'democratic', and 'bottom-up' peace building. Different authors not only argue that Somaliland is 'Africa's best kept secret' (Jhazbhay 2003) and constituted a unique state-making project (Hoyle 2000:85), but also that its state trajectory has largely been characterized by processes of 'traditional' reconciliation and 'grassroots' democracy (Adam 1995). These popular readings of its state-making endeavor not only led to a characterization of Somaliland's trajectory as having been 'peaceful' (Othieno 2008), but culminated in truly amnestic assertions such as the proposition that during its route of state-making " no civil confrontation

[83]Mohamed Kahin, **SNM Veteran, interviewed in Hargeysa**, 2016

[84]Samater, Ahmed. **Introduction and Overview, In Ahmed I. Samater (Ed.), the Somali Challenge, From Catastrophe to Renewal**, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1994b.

happened"[85].While authority has been added to this interpretation of Somaliland constituting a sui generis by depicting south-central Somalia as a completely opposed case of state failure, the Somaliland's case of uniqueness has not been rooted by the literatures strong, even though the hybrid political orders have similar concept to the case of Somaliland. One of the most recent attempts to theoretically corroborate Somaliland's supposedly unprecedented state making process has seen the application of the framework of 'hybrid political orders' (HPOs) (cf. Böge et al. 2008; Kibble/Walls 2010).

It is suggested that Somaliland's formula for success lay in the prevalence of a political landscape characterized by HPOs, which "allowed for a healthy adaptation of statehood to local needs"[86] (Renders/Terlinden 2010:723). Yet, as these scholars simultaneously acknowledge that the very same HPOs have come to "threaten to undermine the polity's stability" (ibid.), this theoretical framework remains inconclusive with regard to the question of under what conditions or what kinds of HPOs are conducive rather than hostile to state-making. Analyzing Somaliland's state trajectory in the post-1991 decade, this chapter aims to shed light on these questions and contributes to a better understanding of how its state-making process unfolded in the aftermath of the SNM struggle.

[85]Sufi, M. A. **The Future Political Order for the Federal States of Somalia,** northeast African Studies, Haan Publisher press, London, 2003.
[86]Renders, M., &Terlinden, U. **Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order, the Case of Somaliland, development and Change**, Haan Publisher, London, 2010**.**

4.1.The Declaration of Somaliland Independence in 1991

The first clan based meeting in north-western Somalia organized by the SNM took place in the port town of Berbera, the region's most important economic hub. Held from February 15th –27th, 1991, named the 'brotherhood meeting of Northern Clans' (Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyiga) was significant in two ways. First, it required to bring back trust and assurance among the Isaq and non-Isaq tribes (APD 2002b:19), as not only had they taken different sides during the war (Interview14[87]), but also because the SNM's military takeover had not been entirely peaceful[88] (Compagnon 1990b:266).

Secondly, it was agreed that all sea and airports constituted national assets, rather than clan property. Although these were significant accords, the conference was overshadowed in importance by the subsequent conference in Burco. The Shirweynaha Beelaha Waqooyiga ('Grand Conference of Northern Clans'), which took place between April 27th and May 18th, 1991, is generally considered the first major 'national' conference. The meeting occurred in parallel with the SNM Central Committee authorities', and numerous intellectuals, militia commanders, religious leaders, and businessmen, amongst others. The conference's purpose was to further resolve the antagonistic factions as well as to delineate the region's political destiny. Although secession had not been on the agenda of the SNM central committee (Bradbury 2008:80; Interviews15[89]), it ultimately announced the withdrawal of the former British Protectorate of Somaliland and announced independency and withdrawal of the 1960 unification of Somalia and unilaterally declared independence on May 18th , 1991 (Drysdale 1992b:24).

[87]Hajji Abdikadir Hajji Hussein, **Peace negotiator expert and member of Somaliland upper house**, interviewed in Hargeysa, 2016

[88]Compagnon, D. "**The Somali Opposition Fronts: Some Comments and Questions".Conflict Quarterly,** Annuaire Des Pays de l'Ocean Indien, APOI XI, Paris, 1990a,

[89]AbdullahIbrahim Habane, "expert of Somali clan system, served as Somaliland upper house secretor more than 20 years", interviewed in Hargeysa, 2016.

As I mention in the above, the declaration of independence was mutual decision, which was rooted in 'popular participation' from the 'grassroots' and enjoyed the support of all constituencies (Bradbury 2008:81).Although some of the SNM leadership were, indeed, unwilling to withdraw from south-central Somalia (Interview16[90]) and even sent a delegation to Mogadishu to negotiate a political way forward with southern faction leaders (Interview17), it seems that factors other than 'the peoples' voice' crucially affected the decision to declare sovereignty. In general, the SNM's prospects of significantly shaping the political developments in Mogadishu were undone when Ali Mahdi Mohamed (USC/SSA) announced that he is elected president, Ali Mahdi took over the presidential seat in Mogadishu in early 1991[91]. Moreover, Tuur's" chance of obtaining an important political post in Mogadishu was ruined by the fact that the position of prime minister in Somalia was already taken by another prominent Somaliland politician, Omar ArtehGhalib[92].

Under the guidance of SNM vice-chairman Hassan IiseJama the conference delegates drafted a provisional National Charter (Interview18[93]), which mandated the SNM to form a transitional national government and run the newly-formed polity for an interim two year period. As clear Somali National Movement has no plans for post war administration (Compagnon 1998:77; Bradbury 2008:85), its governance structure was largely copied over: the SNM executive committee became the government, its chairman and vice-chairman president and vice-president respectively, and the enlarged SNM Central Committee of 99 members functioning as a national council or preliminary parliament (Brons 2001:247). As interim president, «Tuur», presented his 19 member cabinet, which had been carefully selected in order show mutual clan participation (Bradbury 2008:85; Interview 19), on June 4th, 1991 (WSP 2005:61).

[90]Ahmed Mohamed, **Somaliland President and served as chairman of SNM, BBC** interview, London, 2008.
[91] Bradbury, M. **Living with Statelessness: The Somali Road to Development. Conflict, Security & Development,** centre for Communication Policy Research, London, 2003.

[92]Stevenson, J. "**Hope Restored in Somalia? Foreign Policy**", Centre for Communication Policy Research. London, 1993
[93]Ahmed Mohamed, **Somaliland President and served as chairman of SNM**, BBC interview, London, 2008.

The interim government led by the chairman of SNM as the president of the newly established country was clearly dominated by the victorious SNM although other groups were given their share in the cabinet, the «Tuur» administration was considered a "continuation of the SNM" (ACR 1990- 92:371) as, with the exception of those from the non-SNM members, all members of the council of the parliament were SNM veterans (Interviews 18, 19, 20[94]).However, it was not the multitude of the SNM dominated SNM vis-à-vis other clans and their militias that turned out to be problematic. While the multiple inter-clan conferences that occurred prior to the Berbera and Burco summit had restored an appearance of trust between the SNM and their neighbors, they had done little to address the rivalry that had been shouldering between different factions within the SNM for many years[95].

4.2.Bottom up Reconciliation and Rebuilding (1991-93)

The mutual ceasefire and reconciliation meetings between the SNM and the non-SNM groups of north-western Somaliland that had accompanied the progressive military victories of the SNM intensified in early 1991 and were followed by a 'national' conference in Burco. The latter culminated in an announcement of independence that was accompanied by a wave of eagerness and optimism (Bradbury 2008:81; Omar 2004:87). Yet, the atmosphere turned sour shortly thereafter and 1992 saw dwindling support for the government and the splintering of the SNM. Between January and October 1992 heavy fighting between the interim government and an SNM faction occurred in Burco and Berbera over the allocation of political power and economic resources, which led the young polity to the brink of all- out civil war and almost resulted in the overthrow of the transitional government headed by Abdurrahman Ahmed Ali «Tuur». By 1993, Somaliland far from resembled any kind of statehood, but instead its path appeared to be mirroring that of south-central Somalia. What had happened to the state-making project that had taken its first steps during the anti- regime war, and why did «Tuur's» attempts to consolidate the polity result in an unmaking of the promising state?

[94]Ahmed Mohamed, **"Somaliland President and served as chairman of SNM**, BBC interview 2008, London

[95] Academy for Peace and Development (APD) "**A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding form the Ruins. Hargeysa"**: publisher, Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development, Somaliland, 1999.

4.3.The interim government and how it tackled its obstacles

Mach of the interim government responsibilities were demobilization and reconciliation within it is two years, but also the interim administration had to rebuild the economy resources, and restore basic services, but also to draft a constitution as a basis for the country's first envisioned democratic elections. While the overall environment, characterized by a decentralized patchwork of militias, dilapidated infrastructure, roofless cities and uprooted populations (WSP 2005:61; Bradbury 2008:77), was anything but conducive to fulfilling these tasks and establishing a new state, the true challenges came from the split within the government.

While the interim government led by SNM chairman as a president was installed, the security situation was unjustified due to the mass equipped militias in the capital cities, whether they are SNM or other militias. The country was overstocked with arms, and even though many SNM mujahedeen demobilized voluntarily, numerous militias remained effectively organized or emerged from scratch in the context of physical and political insecurity (Interview 20, 21[96]). These militias frequently turned to shakedown and violence (WSP 2005:61; Bradbury 2008:88), but also provided a certain level of safety to their communities. While the decentralized structure of the SNM had been advantageous during the guerrilla struggle, the absence of a binding, centralized command posed a huge problem for regulating security in the war's aftermath. Military control over the territory was exercised by locally dominant militias with very little control by central government. The administration's ability was, thus, restricted to Hargeysa (Gilkes 1993), and rested on those armed units below authority of individuals belonging to the new government[97].

[96]Abdurrahman Ahmed Ali, **Somali National Movement chairman**, BBC interview, 1998, London
[97]Gilkes, P. "**Revolution and Military Strategy: The Ethiopian Army in the Ogadenand in Eritrea"**, Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, II (pp. 721-726). Addis Ababa, 1994b

The central state making objective of Abdurrahman Ahmed Ali government was to establish control over the militias. The President aimed at unifying the diverse clan militias and transforming them into national security forces under central state command (Drysdale 1992b:30; Renders 2006:202. ICD 1997:12).However «Abdirahman's» effort to nationalized security forces motivated apprehensions within and outside of his government. The government-critical CalanCas (the SNM military wing), who still controlled much of the SNM's military might, did not want to readily cede their power to «interim government» partly because he belonged to the 'civilian wing', and partly because the CalanCas felt increasingly shelved. The first power struggle ensued, when «President» moved to create an integrated police force.

President and Vice-President Jama wanted the police under the direct control of the presidency but were opposed by the Minister of Defense, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, who argued that it should be under the command of his ministry[98] (Renders 2006:202). The misunderstanding between «President» and Kahin was continued when it came to the question of whom to appoint as commander of Somaliland's national army. Although they agreed that the commander should come from other clans not to the clans from both of them, but they disagreed as to whom. While Kahin suggested his CalanCas companion Muse Behi Abdi, «President» opted for Hassan Yonis Habane, who was more loyal to «the interim government» despite his CalanCas affiliation (Interview 22[99]).

The misunderstanding between the officials within the government widened, when «President Abdurrahman» wanted to seize control of the militias' heavy weapons and ordered that all clan forces were to immediately join the 'national' army (Dominik Balthazar, 2012: 218-238). Again, the President was confronted by Kahin, who advocated striking a careful consensus among the different SNM colonels as well as between them and other militia leaders (.Dominik Balthazar, 2012: 218-238). Therefore, it has to be acknowledged that Kahin's position was not only rooted in the fact that he took the antagonistic environment that prevailed in Somaliland into

[98]Renders, M. "**Traditional' Leaders and Institutions in the Building of the Muslim Republic of Somaliland**, University of Ghent, and Ghent 2006
[99]Abdurrahman Ahmed Ali, **Somali National Movement chairman,** BBC interview, London, 1998.

account (Compagnon 1993:15), but was also based on the fact that «President Abdurrahman» high demands regarding demobilization threatened to cripple the power of the CalanCas. Given Kahin's caution and refusal to toe the party line, president dismissed his minister, handed the minister of defense a new minister (Jama) (Renders 2006:203), and proceeded with his plans to create an integrated national army, "by force if necessary" (Bryden/Farah 1996:8)[100]. The political brawl over power and resources quickly translated into a clan confrontation, as the elites of both sides resorted to clan mobilization to strengthen their positions[101].

4.4.Towfik Meeting in Sheikh and Boroma Conference of Elders of Somaliland communities

Towfik conference held in Sheikh between October 28th and November 11th in 1992, Towfik means understanding, has been planned to handle the clashes between Somaliland clans in Burco and Berbera in 1992, (Volume 7, Issue 2, 2013), since the situation in Somaliland turned out to be like Muqdisho (Dominik Balthazar, 2012:228). Although the conference led to important agreements on essential aspects of internal security provision and resource allocation, and Brons (2001:250) argues that it was "a first step toward the formulation of a Somaliland state", it did little to resolve the underlying political contestation. The latter was addressed in Boroma, where the second major 'national' conference was held[102] (Renders 2006:212).

The consultation meeting of Somaliland community led by the elders took place Boram with the objective to handle the security issues and economic resource allocation is named the first step towards the state building of Somaliland (Volume 7, Issue 2, 2013), sideway to that meeting, the seventh SNM Congress, which had been scheduled to mark the ending of the transitional two-year period also took place in Boram (Brons, 2001:250). Between late January and mid-May 1993, members of the warring factions, 'traditional authorities', and hundreds of official observers,

[100]Bryden, M. **Somalia's New Order: Patterns of Political Reconstruction since State Collapse**.Halifax: Pearson International Institute of Peacekeeping, Haan publisher, London, 1999b.

[101] Balthazar, D and Grzybowski, J. "**between State and Non-State: Somaliland's Emerging Security Order"** Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2012.

[102]Renders, M. "**Traditional' Leaders and Institutions in the Building of the Muslim Republic of Somaliland**, University of Ghent, and Ghent 2006

advisors and others met in order to find a consensus regarding questions of security, resource mobilization, and the political future of Somaliland (Brons 2001:250; Bradbury 2008:98).

5. Conclusion

The central empirical puzzle this thesis has addressed is the implications of Ogaden war over Somali state in 1977. Moreover, the research project raised the questions of up to what scale of the war impacted over Somali state breaking and state rebuilding since the war weakened the Somali national army, as an answer to this conundrum was hoped to render additional insights into historical root causes of the war and how Britain fooled the circumstances of Somali and Ethiopia. In order to address these and a number of further theoretical and empirical issues, the thesis put a theoretical prism that draws on well-established imminent from the writing on state-building, nation-building and warfare.

Britain signed a secret agreement to Ethiopia In 1948, in responding pressures from the second world war allies and disappointment of Somalis, Britain returned the Haud and Ogaden to Ethiopian, base on a agreement they signed in which Britain, French and Italians agreed upon the territorial boundaries of Ethiopia with the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik in swap over for his help against incursion by aggressive tribes, United Kingdom built-in the stipulation so as to that Somali inhabitants would hold on to their self-rule, but Ethiopia right away claimed control over the area.

The treaty between Ethiopia and Britain over the land of Somali's creates a hot tension between Somali community in the horn of Africa and British administration, which lately result early independent of Somali community in 1960, following to that Somali community in the north, united to their brothers in the south to return back their land. In 1962 two years after their independence, Somali army attacked the Ethiopian army in the retaliation of unjust agreement between Ethiopia and Britain. However the situation of Somalia and Ethiopian worsened after the military took the power in Somali in 1969, the manifesto of the military coup was "breaking back the missing land and the population in the Ethiopian region to the territorial boarder of Somalia. The military accused the civilian government, unwilling of return back of the land, but the military put their priority agenda how to return back the land and were planned to take the retake war of Somali territory in Ethiopia named Ogaden war.

The eighteen month Ogaden War between early 1977 and mid-1978 was rooted in a long conflictive history (Clapham 2001; Gamst 1986:133). 'Somali regions in Ethiopia', which includes the Ogaden, the Haud, and the Reserved Areas, had before now been home to the fights of Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi in the 16th centuries respectively (S. S. Samater 1993a:12f. Lewis 2002:63ff.).At that time wars between Somali community led by Ahmed Al Ghazi was marked wars between Christianity and Islam and he was against the spread of Christianity to the Somali regions in those regions, but after the Islamic Empire become weak, the Islamic community in that regions led by Somali leaders break away in to kinship community loyal to their clan leaders.

Following the withdrawal of the Somali National Army, military defeat "produced a national mood of depression" (S. S. Samater 1993:45) and was followed by vehement accusations against the military government (Ahmed I. Samater 1988:137; Gassem 1994:31). In public discourse, defeat was blamed on Barre's greediness and hubris, as it was believed that Ethiopia would have signed a peace agreement in September 1977, yielding the desired territories to Somalia (Spears 2010:139).

Therefore, following those accusation of local population that Siyad Bare has the responsibility of Somali army defeat, Somali elites argue since Bare has its responsibility, Ogaden War was the back born of the destruction of great Somali state, the mismanagement of Bare (Somalia president) and his advisors in the Ogaden War result the breakdown of the Somali state. As the picture reads and apparently appears. Although it is indisputable that the war had significant consequences on Somalia's state-making project throughout the 1980s, it seems that the impact of the war per se on levels of institutional and a socio-life standard was less clear cut.

However the majority of these groups have a common believes that Ogaden war was the mother causation factor of the state destruction. As clear People in Somalia undergone from prolonged coercion and fighting caused by quite a few problems at the hands of their fellow Somalis, Somali community experienced harsh conditions, brutal and human right violations under the military regime government after the Ogaden war.

Cruelty, bribery, favoritism and cronyism characterized state institutions. Mass killing, unclassified killing, on firing of villages and torment as tools of power, become the strategy of the military government. This in human tactic is the central cause of the formation of opposition groups those lately expelled the regime (see also African Security Review 15.1 Institute for Security Studies).

The implications of Ogaden war:

1. Formation of opposition armed groups, soon after the Somali army was defeated, the senior military officers organized themselves to oust the military regime since Siyad Bare mismanaged, the system and Strategic of the Military, according to the General Galaal BBC interview, and the armed group formation was the result of the unfair rewards of the president and the mass killings of the survived army.

2. Ciro coup, in retaliation for the unbelievable Somali army defeat, Ciro one of the most leading military expert, tried to overtake the power through military power, unfortunately the planed unsuccessfully finished due to the luck of collaboration of the military groups, soon Siyad Bara, Somali president ordered to execute killings for those worked and planned the overthrown of his power, mainly those belonged the Majerteen clan, of which the leading coup expert Ciro belongs.
3. North tension, following to the tension of north easy regions, a deep a tension following to the un expected result, Northern people met during their unification to the south Somalia were escalated, due to the military defeat and the number of persons lost their life during the Ogaden war. Since half of those lost their life and property from the north of Somalia currently known

Somaliland, this result the formation of Somali National Movement (SNM) and lately the ten year mass killings and gorily war among the military government and SNM.

4. **Declaration of Somaliland independent in 1991**, Apart from the other implications one of the most implications of the Ogaden war was the declaration of Somaliland independence (State breaking). In 1991 SNM was organized a peace building conference in North of Somalia currently known Somaliland, the first clan based meeting in north-western Somalia organized by the SNM took place in the port town of Berbera, the region's most important economic hub. Held from February 15th –27th, 1991, named the 'brotherhood meeting of Northern Clans' (ShirkaWalaalayntaBeelahaWaqooyiga) was significant in two ways. First, it wanted to bring back confidence and trust among the Isaq and non-Isaq clans (APD 2002b:19), as not only had they taken different sides during the war (Interview14[103]), but also because the SNM's military takeover had not been entirely peaceful[104] (Compagnon 1990b:266).

In conclusion, although all Somali elites have a common belief for the root cause of the Somali state failure by linking that Ogaden war is one of the mother cause factor of the Somali state destruction and breaking away of the state, however there are other contributors as I witness during my thesis research and I reached majority of the Somali clan experts, senior military staffs and politicians, majority of those I reached demonstrated that Ogaden war was the starting place of the crisis however the situation deteriorated after because of the rivalry for resources and/or power, a oppressive government and the majestic bequest which needs to have a further study in the future to examine other contributor factors of Somali problem.

[103]Hajji Abdikadir Hajji Hussein, **Peace negotiator expert and member of Somaliland upper house**, interviewed in Hargeysa, 2016

[104]Compagnon, D. (1990a). "**The Somali Opposition Fronts: Some Comments and Questions".Conflict Quarterly,** Annuaire Des Pays de l'Ocean Indien, APOI XI, Paris,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdi, A. (1998). **Education in Somalia: History, Destruction, and Calls for Reconstruction**. Comparative Education, 34(3), 327-340.

Abdullah, A. (2001): "**Tribalism and Islam: The Basics of Somaliness";** Variations on the Theme of Somaliness. Finland: Centre of Continuing Education, Abo University.

Abdullah, A. (2007a). **Perspectives on the State Collapse in Somalia,** In A. Osman & I. Souaré (Eds.), **Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State** (pp. 40-57). London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd.

Abdullah, A. M. (2007b). **The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF): The Dilemma of Its Struggle in Ethiopia. Review of African Political Economy**, 34(113), 556-562.

Abokor, A. Bradbury, M. Hoyland, P., Kibbl. (2003). Very Much a **Somaliland-Run Election A Report of the Somaliland Local Elections of December 2002:** CIIR.

Abokor, A. Y., Kibble, S., Bradbury, M., Yusuf, H. A., & Barrett, G. (2006). **Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections September** 2005.

Academy for Peace and Development (APD), (1999), **A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding form the Ruins.** Hargeysa: Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development.

Academy for Peace and Development (APD), (2002a), **the Judicial System in Somaliland, Hargeysa**: Academy for Peace and Development.

Academy for Peace and Development (APD), (2002b), **Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions (Vol. Draft)**, Hargeysa: Academy for Peace and Development.

Academy for Peace and Development (APD) (2002d), **the Impact of the War on the Family** Academy for Peace and Development Hargeysa

Adam, H. (1994). **Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea**. Review of African Political Economy, 21(59), 21-38.

Adam, H. (1995). Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born Collapsed States the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (pp. 69-90). Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Adam, H. H. (1995). **Clan Conflicts and Democratization in Somalia, In H. Glickman** (Ed.), Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa (pp. 197-226). Atlanta: The African Studies Association Press.

Adam, H. M. (2008). **From Tyranny to Anarchy, the Somali Experience, Asmara and Trenton**: The Red Sea Press, Inc.

Adam, H., & Ford, R. (1998), **Removing Barricades in Somalia, Options for Peace and Rehabilitation**, Washington: United States Institute of Peace.

Africa Contemporary Record (ACR), (1968/69-1992/94), London and New York: Rex Collings and Africana Publishing Corporation.

Ahmed, I., & Green, R. (1999), **the Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia, Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction,** Third World Quarterly, 20(1), 113-127.

Aideed, H. (2004), **the SiyadBarre Regime's Genocide of the Somaliland People**. In R. Ford, H. Adam & E. Ismail (Eds.), War Destroys: Peace Nurtures – Somali Reconciliation and Development (pp. 195-202). Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc.

Albert, M., & Brock, L. (2000), debordering**the World of States: New Spaces in International Relations**. In M. Albert, L. Brock & K. Wolf (Eds.), Civilizing World Politic, Society and Community beyond the State. Boston: Rowman and Littlefield.

Anderson, David (2009): **Somali Piracy: Historical Context and Political Contingency**; In: European Security Forum Working Paper No. 33.

Anderson, D., Beckerleg, S., Hailu, D., & Klein, A. (2007), **the khat Controversy: Stimulating the Debate on Drugs**. Oxford and New York: Berg.

Anonymous (2005) **Interview with General Mohammed NuurGalaal Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics**, 135-142.

Arab, S. (2004). **A Somali Dictionary, In R. Ford, H. Adam & E. Ismail (Eds.), War Destroys Peace Nurture**s, Somali Reconciliation and Development. Asmara: Red sea press.

Ayoob, M. (2000), **State Making, State Failure and Revolution in Military Affairs: War at the End of the 20th Century.** In G. Prins& H. Tromp (Eds.) the Future of War (pp. 147-166). The Hague Boston London: Kluwer Law International.

Ayoob, M. (2007), **State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure, In C. Crocker, F. Hampson& P. Aall (Eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War – Conflict Management in a Divided World** (pp. 95-114). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Baker, P. (2007). **Fixing Failing States**, the New Security Agenda, the Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 85-96

Balthazar, D. (Forthcoming 2013). **Somaliland's Best Kept Secret: Shrewd Politics and War Projects as Means of State-Making.** Journal of Eastern African Studies,

Balthazar, D., &Grzybowski, J. (2012) **Between State and Non-State: Somaliland's Emerging Security Order**. Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2012, 147-173.

Barnes, C. (2007). **The Somali Youth League, Ethiopian Somalis and the Greater Somalia Idea**, c. 1946-48. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1(2), 277-291.

Barre, S. (1969), **There Was No Choice - First Speech by Maj. General SiyadBarre on 24 October 1969.** In A. O. Haji (Ed.), Somalia: A Chronology of Historical Documents 1827-2000 (pp. 248f.). Goucester, Ontario: Canadian Cataloging in Publication Data.

Barth, F. (1969), **Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference.** London: Allen and an win.

Battera, F. (2005), T**he Collapse of the State and the Resurgence of Customary Law in Northern Somalia,** In W. Dostal& W. Kraus (Eds.), Shattering Tradition – Custom, Law and the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean (pp. 278-318). London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

Bendix, R. (1964). **Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order**. New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Bereketeab, R. (2000). Eritrea: **The Making of a Nation, 1890-1991**. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Berger, M. T. (2008). **From Nation-Building to State-Building: the Geopolitics of Development**, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order. In M. T. Berger (Ed.), From Nation-Building to State-Building (pp. 1-22), London: Routledge.

Berger, M. T., & Weber, H. (2008), **Beyond State-Building: Global Governance and the Crisis of the Nation-State System in the 21st Century.** In M. T. Berger (Ed.), **From Nation-Building to State-Building** (pp. 197-204). London: Routledge.

Berg-Schlosser, D &Siegler, R. (1990), **Political Stability and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda**. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Besteman, C. (1996a). **Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence: The Dissolution of the Somali Nation-State.** American Ethnologist, 23(3), 579-596.

Böge, V., Brown, A., & Clements, P. (2009b), **Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States**, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 21(1), 13-21.

Böge, V., Brown, A., Clements, K., & Nolan, A. (2008), On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging **States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility'**. Berlin: Bergh of Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.

Bourdieu, P. (1999). **Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field**, In G. Steinmetz (Ed.), State/Culture State-Formation after the Cultural Turn (pp. 53-75), Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Bradbury, M. (1994b). **The Politics of Vulnerability, Development and Conflict**: Exploring the Issues with Reference to Somalia MSc, University of Birmingham, and Birmingham.

Bradbury, M., Abokor, A., & Yusuf, H. (2003), **Somaliland: Choosing Politics over Violence.** Review of African Political Economy, 30(97), 455-478.

Brons, M, (2001), Society, Security, **Sovereignty and the State in Somalia – From Statelessness to Statelessness** Utrecht: International Books.

Brown, L. (1956). **The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute, International and Comparative Law** Quarterly, 5(2), 245-264.

Bryden, M. (1995), **Somaliland and Peace in the Horn of Africa**: A Situation Report and Analysis. Addis Ababa: United Nations Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia.

Bryden, M. (1999a). **New Hope for Somalia, the Building Block Approach**, Review of African Political Economy, 26(79), 134-140.

Bryden, M. (2000, 21-25 July), **Decentralized Governance in Somaliland**, Paper presented at the Second Reconstruction Strategies Conference, Hargeysa.

Bryden, M. (2004b). **State-Within-a-Failed-State: Somaliland and the Challenge of International Recognition.** I P. Kingston & I. Spears (Eds.), States Within States Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 167-188). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Call, C. (2008a). **Ending Wars, Building States, In C. Call & V. Wyeth (Eds.), Building States to Build Peace** (pp. 1-22), Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner

Cassanelli, L. (1996). **Explaining the Somali Crisis**, In C. Besteman& L. Cassanelli (Eds.), the Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia, the War behind the War (pp. 313-326), London, Haan Publishing.

Castagno, A. (1960). **The Republic of Somalia: Africa's Most Homogeneous State**? Africa Report,

Castagno, A. (1970). **Somalia Goes Military, the Supreme Revolutionary Council Follows a Pragmatic Course and Seeks to End Corruption.** Africa Report, 15(2), 25-27.

Center for Research Dialogue (CRD), (2005), **Traditional Governance in Somalia – South Central Somalia**, Mogadishu: Center for Research Dialogue.

Chandler, D. (2007). The **State-Building Dilemma: Good Governance or Democratic Government.** In A. Hehir& N. Robinson (Eds.), State-Building – Theory and Practice (pp. 70-88). London: Routledge.

Chesterman, S., Ignatieff, M., & Thakur, R. (Eds.), (2005), **Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance.** Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press.

Clapham, C. (2001, 10-14 April). **War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea,** Paper presented at the Failed States Conference, Florence, Italy.

Cliffe, L., &Luckham, R. (1999), **Complex Political Emergencies and the State: Failure and the Fate of the State**. Third World Quarterly, 20(1), 27-50.

Collier, P., &Höffler, A. (2001), **Greed and Grievance in Civil War**, Washington DC: World Bank.

Compagnon, D. (1990a). **The Somali Opposition Fronts: Some Comments and Questions**. Conflict Quarterly, 13(1-2), 29-54.

Compagnon, D. (1995). **Resources Politiques, Regulation Authoritarian ET Domination**Siyad Bare (1969-1991) (Political Resources, Authoritarian, Regulation and Personal Domination in Somalia – The Regime of Siyad Bare (1969- 1991).de pau ET,

Compagnon, D. (1998). **Somali Armed Units – The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship and Clan-Based Factionalism**. (pp. 73-90). Oxford: James Currey.

Conversi, D. (2007). **Homogenization, Nationalism and War: Should We Still Read Ernest Gellner? Nations and Nationalism**, 13(3), 371-394.

Cook, T. (2000). **The Rise and fall of Regimes, towards Grand Theory of Politics**, New York: Peter Lang.

Cooper, S. (2009). **Currency, Identity, and Nation-Building: National Currency Choices in the Post Soviet States.** Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Convention, Toronto.

Cotran, E. (1963), Legal **Problems Arising Out of the Formation of the Somali Republic**, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 12(3), 1010-1026.

Coyne, C. (2006). **Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy**, Foreign Policy Analysis, 2, 343-360,

Davis, D. (2003). **Contemporary Challenges and Historical Reflections on the Study of Militaries, States, and Politics,** In D. Davis & A. Pereira (Eds.), Irregular Armed Forces and Their role in Politics and State Formation (pp. 3-34). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diamond, L., Linz, J., &Lipset, S. (1995). **Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?** In L. Diamond, J. Linz & S. Lipset (Eds.), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing
Experiences with Democracy (pp. 1-66). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Dool, A. (1998). **Failed States, When Governance Goes Wrong,** London: Horn Heritage

Drysdale, J. (1964). **The Somali Dispute**, New York: Praeger.

Drysdale, J. (2000). **Stoics without Pillows: A Way forward for the Somaliland's**. London: Haan Associates.

Eggers, A (2007), **When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland**, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 30(211), 211-222.

Elmi, A., &Barise, A. (2006). **The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles, and Peace Building Strategies.** African Security Review, 15(1), 32-54.

Elmi, O. S. (1992). **The Somali Conflict and the Undercurrent Causes.** Mogadishu: Beeldeeq Printing Press.

Emerson, R. (1960). **From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples.** Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Eshete, T (1991). **The Root Causes of Political Problems in the Ogaden,** 1942-1960. Northeast African Studies, 13(1), 9-29.

Eubank, N. (2010). **Peace-Building without External Assistance: Lessons from Somaliland**. Center for Global Development (198),

Evans, P., Rueschmeyer, D., &Skocpol, T. (1985), **Bringing the State Back In.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Farah, A. Y., & Lewis, I. M. (1993), **the Roots of Reconciliation – A Summary of 'Peacemaking Endeavors of Contemporary Lineage Leaders**: A Survey of Grassroots Peace Conferences in North-West Somalia/Somaliland: Action Aid.

Farer, T. (1976), **War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Detente**. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Fukuyama, F. (2004), **State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century**. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2006a). **Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory**, In F. Fukuyama (Ed.), Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (pp. 1-16). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gabush, J. (2004). **Islamization and Democratization of Somaliland Politics,** In R. Ford, H. Adam & E. Ismail (Eds.), War Destroys: Peace Nurtures – Somali Reconciliation and Development (pp. 315-324). Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc.

Galaydh, A. K. (1986). **Democratic Practice and Breakdown in Somalia,** In D. Ronen (Ed.), Democracy and Pluralism in Africa (pp. 127-131). Hodder and Stoughton: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc

Galbraith, J. S. (1970). **Italy, the British East Africa Company, and the Benadir Coast**, 1888- 1893, the Journal of Modern History, 42(4), 549-563.

Gamst, F. C. (1986). **Conflict in the Horn of Africa, In M. Foster & r. Rubinstein** (Eds.), Peace and War: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (pp. 133-151). New Brunswick: Transaction Press.

Gardner, J., & El Bushra, J. (Eds.), (2004), **Somalia – The Untold Story: The War through the Eyes of Somali Women.** London: Pluto Press.

Gassim, M. A. (2002). **Somalia: Clan vs. Nation. United Arab Emirates:**Sharja, Haan, press.

Gersony, R. (1990). **Why Somalis Flee – A Synthesis of Conflict Experience in Northern Somalia By Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others**. International Journal of Refugee Law, 2(1), 4-55.

Ghalib, J. M. (1995). **The Cost of Dictatorship – The Somali Experience,** New York: Lillian Barber Press, Inc.

Ghani, A., & Lockhart, C. (2008), **Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World**. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Giddens, A. (1985). **The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism** (Vol. 2). London: Polity.

Gilkes, P. (1989). **Somalia: Conflicts Within and Against the Military Regime**. Review of African Political Economy, 44, 53-58.

Gilkes, P. (1994a). **Descent into Chaos: Somalia, January 1991 - December 1992**. In C. Gurdon (Ed.), the Horn of Africa (pp. 47-60), London: University College London.

Gilkes, P. (1994b). **Revolution and Military Strategy: The Ethiopian Army in the Ogaden and in Eritrea,** 1974-84. In B. Zewde, R. Pankhurst & T. Beyene (Eds.),

Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, II (pp. 721-726). Addis Ababa.

Goldsmith, A. (2007). **Does Nation Building Work? Reviewing the Record, In D. Brinkerhoff (Ed.), Governance in Post-Conflict Societies, Rebuilding Fragile States**, London and New York: Routledge

Greenfield, R. (1991). **Somalia: Siyad's Sad Legacy**. Africa Report, 36(2), 13-18.

Gundel, J. (2006). **The Predicament of the 'Oday' - The Role of Traditional Structures in Security**, Rights, Law and Development in Somalia; Report for the Danish Refugee Council &Novib-Oxfam: Danish Refugee Council.

Hagi, A. O., &Hagi, A. O. (1998), **Clan, Sub-Clan and Regional Representation in the Somali Government Organization 1960-1990: Statistical Data and Findings**. Washington, DC.

Hagmann, T. (2005a). **Beyond Clannishness and Colonialism: Understanding Political Disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region**, 1991-2004. Journal of Modern African Studies, 43(3), 509-536.

Hagmann, T., &Höhne, M. (2009), **Failures of the State Failure Debate: Evidence from the Somali Territories.** Journal of International Development 21, 42-57.

Hansen, P. (2010). **The Ambiguity of Khat in Somaliland, Journal of Ethno pharmacology**,132(3), 590-599.

Hansen, S. J., & Bradbury, M (2007), Somaliland: **A New Democracy in the Horn of Africa? Review of African Political Economy**, 34(113), 461-476.

Henze, P. (1985). **Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia – Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**. Santa Monica, CA: Rand

Hill, J. (2005). **Beyond the Other, A Postcolonial Critique of the Failed States Thesis**, African Identities, 3(2), 139-154.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). **Nations and Nationalism since 1780**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Höhne, M. (2006a). **Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia: Transformation of Positions and Powers.** Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Paper, 82

Holsti, K. J. (1996). **The State, War, and the State of War**, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Howard, M. E. (1978). **War and the Nation State**, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ignatieff, M (2002**), Intervention and State Failure, Dissent**, 49(1), 114-123.

Indian Ocean Newsletter (ION), (1997), Egal **Resigns** Indian Ocean Newsletter, 792(2 December 1997).

Issa-Salwe, A. (1994). **The Collapse of the Somali State – The Impact of the Colonial Legacy**, London: Haan Associates.

Jenkins, K., &Plowden, W. (2006), **Governance and Nation building: The Failure of International Intervention.** Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Jhazbhay, I. (2003). **Somaliland – Africa's best kept secret, a challenge to the international community?** African Security Review, 12(4), 77-82.

Kaldor, M, (1999), **New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge:** Polity Press.

Kaplan, S. (2008a). **Fixing Fragile States, a New Paradigm for Development**, WestPoint, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International

Laitin, D. (1979b). **The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyad's Role in Somali History**. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 17(1), 95-115.

Laitin, D. (1982). **The Political Crisis in Somalia,** Horn of Africa, 5(2), 60-64.

Laitin, D., &Samater, S. S. (1987). **Somalia: Nation in Search of a State.** Boulder and London:

Leander, A. (2004). **Wars and the Un-making of States, Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research** (pp. 69-80). London and New York: Routledge.

Levene, M. (2000), **the Limits of Tolerance: Nation-State Building and What It Means for Minority Groups.** Patterns of Prejudice, 34(2), 19-40.

Lewis, I. M. (1958a). **Modern Political Movements in Somaliland, I**. Africa – Journal of the International African Institute, 28(3), 244-261.

Lewis, I. M. (1958b). **Modern Political Movements in Somaliland, II**, Africa – Journal of the International African Institute, 28(4), 344-363.

Lewis, I. M. (1961), a **Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralist and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa.** London: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, I. M. (1963), **Pan-Africans and Pan-Somalis**, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1(2), 147-161.

Lewis, I. M. (1967a). **Recent Developments in the Somali Dispute**, African Affairs, 66(263)

Lewis, I. M. (1972), **the Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup,** the Journal of Modern African Studies, 10(3), 383-408.

Lewis, I, M (1979), the **End of Tribalism in W. Shack & P. Cohen (Eds.), Politics in Leadership – A Comparative Perspective** (pp. 13-44). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lewis, I. M. (1980), **A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa** (2 ed.). London: Longman.

Lewis, I. M. (1982b). **Nationalism Turned Inside Out.** MERIP Reports, 106, 16-21.

Lewis, I. M. (1988), **A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa** (3 ed.). London: West view Press.

Lewis, I. M. (1989), **the Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism**, African Affairs, 88(353), 573-579.

Lewis, I. M. (1993a). **Misunderstanding the Somali Crisis, Anthropology Today**, 9(4), 1-3.

Lewis, I. M. (1993b). **Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless Society,** London: London School of Economics, Center for the Study of Global Governance.

Lewis, I. M (1994), **Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society**, Lawrenceville NJ: Red Sea Press.

Lewis, I. M. (2002**), a Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa** (4 ed) Oxford: James Currey.

Luckham, R., &Bekele, D. (1984a). **Foreign Powers and Militarism in the Horn of Africa**: Part I. Review of African Political Economy, 30, 8-20.

Mann, M. (1984), **the Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results**. Arch. Europe. Social, 25, 185-213.

Mann, M. (1986), the **Sources of Social Power (Vol. 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D**.1760), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (1988), **States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology.** Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Mann, M. (1993), **The Sources of Social Power (Vol. 2, The Rise of Classes and Nation States**, 1760-1914), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mansfield, E., & Snyder, J. (1995), **Democratization and the Danger of War, International Security**, 20(1)

Mansur, A. O. (1995). **Contrary to a Nation: The Cancer of the Somali State**. In A. J. Ahmed (Ed.), the Invention of Somalia (pp. 107-116), Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, Inc.

Matthies, V. (1987), **Der Ogadenkriegzwischen Somalia und Äthiopien von 1977/78 [The Ogaden War of 1977/78 between Somalia and Ethiopia]** Africa Spectrum, 22(3), 237-253

Mayall, J. (1999). **Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Self-determination**, Political Studies, 47, 474- 502

Niemann, M. (2007) **War Making and State Making in Central Africa**, Africa Today, 22-39.

Nkaisserry, J. K. (1997). **The Ogaden War: An Analysis of Its Causes and Its Impact on Regional Peace on the Horn of Africa**. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Ododa, H. (1985). **Somalia's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations since the Ogaden War of 1977-78.Middle Eastern Studies,** 21(3), 285-297.

Ofcansky, T. (1993), **National Security, In H. C. Metz (Ed.), Somalia: A Country Study** (pp. 181-226). Washington, DC: Library of Congress/ U.S. Government Printing Office.

Osman, A. A. (2007a). **Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?** African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 7(2), 93-134.

Osman, A. A. (2007b). **The Somali Internal War and the Role of Inequality, Economic Decline and Access to Weapons,** In A. Osman &ISouare (Eds.).

Ottawa, M. (1982), **Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa**, Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies

Ottawa, M. (2002a), **Nation-building, Foreign Policy**, 132, 16-24

Ottawa, M. (2002b), Rebuilding **State Institutions in Collapsed States, Development and Change**, 33(5), 1001-1023.

Ottawa, M., & Ottawa, D. (1978), **Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution**. New York: Africana.

Putnam, R. (1976). **The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Englewood Cliffs**: Prentice Hall.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). **Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy**; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Putzel, J. (1997). **Accounting for the "Dark Side" of Social Capital: Reading Robert Putnam on Democracy. Journal of International Development**, 9(7), 939-949.

Putzel, J. (1999). **Survival of an Imperfect Democracy in the Philippines, Democratization**,
6(1), 198-223.

Rajagopal, B., & Carroll, A. (1992), the **Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland**
American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 8

Renders, M. (2006), 'Traditional' Leaders and Institutions in the Building of the Muslim Republic of Somaliland, Ph.D. University of Ghent, Ghent

Renders, M. (2007), **Appropriate 'Governance-Technology' – Somali Clan Elders and Institutions in the Making of the 'Republic of Somaliland**, Africa Spectrum, 42(3), 439-459.

Renders, M., &Terlinden, U. (2010), **negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order:** The Case of Somaliland, Development and Change, 42(4), 723-746.

Samater, Abdi I. (1985). **The Predatory State and the Peasantry: Reflections on Rural Development Policy** in Somalia. Africa Today, 32, 41-56.

Samater, Abdi I. (1988). **The State, Agrarian Change and Crisis of Hegemony in Somalia**, Review of African Political Economy, 43, 26-41.

Samater, Abdi I. (1989). **The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia**, 1884- 1986, Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press.

Samater, Abdi I. (1992a), **Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention**. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(4), 625-641.

Samater, Abdi I. (1992b), **Social Classes and Economic Restructuring in Pastoral Africa**: Somali Notes. African Studies Review, 35(1), 101-127.

Schlichte, K. (1996). **Krieg und Vergesellschaftung in Africa: EinBeitragzur Theories** desKrieges [**War and Socialization in Africa: A Contribution to the Theory of War**]. Münster: Indiana University.

Schlichte, K. (1998). **Why States Decay – A Preliminary Assessment Working Paper No**. 2,
Research Unit of Wars, Armament and Development. Hamburg: University of Hamburg.

Snyder, J. (2000). From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: Norton.

Snyder, R., &Bhavnani, R. (2005) **Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes – A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order** Journal of Conflict Resolution,

Spears, I. (2003), Reflections **on Somaliland and Africa's Territorial Order Review of African Political Economy**, 95

Spears, I. (2004a) **Debating Secession and the Recognition of New States in Africa**, African Security Review, 13(2), 35-48.

Spears, I. (2004b), **Reflections on Somaliland and Africa's Territorial Order** in R. Ford, H. Asmara: The Red Sea Press.

Spears, I. (2004c), **States-Within-States: An Introduction to Their Empirical Attributes**. Asmara, the red sea press

P. Kingston & I. Spears (Eds.), **States within States – Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era** (pp. 15-34), New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Sufi, M. A. (2003). **The Future Political Order for the Federal States of Somalia**, northeast African Studies, 10(3), 281-288

Tareke, G. (2000). **The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited**, the International Journal of African Historical Studies, 33(3), 635-667.

Tilly, C. (1975). **The Formation of National States in Western Europe,** Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tilly, C. (1985). **War Making and State Making as Organized Crime**, In P. Evans, D Rueschmeyer& T Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the State Back In (pp. 169-187), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (1990). **Coercion, Capital, and European States**, A.D.990-1990, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.

Tilly, C. (1992). **Coercion, Capital, and European States**, A.D.990-1990, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.

Ware, G. (1965), **Somalia: From Trust Territory to Nation,** 1950-1960. Phylon, 26(2), 173- 185

Warsame, A. A. (2001). **How a Strong government backed an African Language**: The Lessons of Somalia. International Review of Education, 47(3/4), 341-360.

Young, M. C. (2004). **Revisiting Nationalism and Ethnicity in Africa**, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Yusuf, H. (2010). **Peace-building in Somaliland**, SORADI Hargeysa

Zakaria, F. (1997), **the Rise of Illiberal Democracy,** Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22-4

List of Interviewee:

Interview No	Name of the Interviewee	Specification of interviewee	Venue	Date
1	XajiCumar	Author	Garoowe	25|01|2016
2	AbdirisaqAqli	Historian and Author	Hargiesa	26|02|2016
3	AbdiqadirMaxamudSalax	Lecturer	Garowe	27|01|2016
4	GaradMaxamudxajiSalax	Suldan	Bosaso	28|01|2016
5	Haji Abdikarim Haji Husien	Member of Somaliland Upper house (Guurti)	Hargiesa, Somaliland	02|02|2016
6	SuldanMaxamedAbdiqadir	Suldan	Hargiesa	05|02|2016
7	SuldanCumarSuldanMaxamed	Suldan	Hargiesa	06|02|2016
8	Ismail Ali Abokor	Ex. Vice Somali president	Hargiesa	06|02|2014
9	Boobe Yusuf Du,ale	SNM veteran	Hargiesa	07|02|2014
10	A. A. Ali, BBC	Ex. Somaliland president	London	September, 1998
11	Abdulahi Yusuf	Ex. Somali President	BBC London	07|10|2002
12	Muse Bixi	SNM veteran	Hargiesa	08|02|2016
13	Mohamed Kaahin	SNM Veteran	Hargiesa	25|02|2016
14	Cabdilahi Ibrahim Habane	Minister of education	Hargiesa	05|03|2016
15	Ambassador Awil	Ex. minister of Finance	Hargiesa	07|03|2016
16	Hassan EssaJama	Ex. vice President	Hargiesa	12|03|2016
17	Cabdilah sheikh Ali Jawhar	Religious man	Boram	15|03|2016
18	Ibrahim Dhagawayne	SNM veteran	Berbera	17|03|2016
19	Musa Ali	Cultural specialist	Hargiesa	18|03|2016
20	Abdilahi Yusuf Ahmed	Ex.Somalia President	BBC interview	25|07|2007

CV

Nationality

Somali

Qualifications

- Master of International Relation and Global Politics, ATILIM university, Ankara Turkey, 2014-2016
- Master of Science in Economics, Hacettepe University, Ankara Turkey, 2012–2015
- Degree of Economics, Admas University, Hargiesa Somaliland, 2009-2012
- Bachelor of Law, University of Hargiesa, Somaliland, 2005–2009

Country experience

Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Djabut, Kenya, Turkey

Key skills

- Strategic Thinking and development initiator
- Project design and Project Implementation
- Monitoring and evaluation of programmes/projects, including the development of M&E systems (monitoring plans, data collection tools and reporting mechanisms)
- Leading baseline data collection surveys
- Project design
- Identifying lessons learned and best practices

Language

- Somali: Mother tongue
- English: Fluent
- Arabic: Fair
- Turkish: Fluent

Profile

I have 7 years of experience in the designing, planning and Implementation of livelihood, Conflict resolution, Human right and recovery programmes in Somalia and Somaliland. I have worked on programmes funded by DFID, DANIDA, USAID, SIDA and the World Bank. During my work experience I carried out, I developed skills of cost benefit analyse and impact oriented, Implementation Plans, logical frameworks, monitoring and evaluation tools, data collection survey tools, and reporting formats.

I have strong and specific experience in the Project Planning and ImplementationSpecifically capacity building projects, having for example been engaged, as Senior Project officer of Somali Youth Livelihood and economic support initiative, funded by USAID with the Partnership of Mercy Corps and SONYO (Somaliland National Youth Organisation). Youth face to face with poverty reduction, project officer, funded by SIDA with the partnership of Care Nederland and SONYO.

Turnitin Orijinallik Raporu

Tez Ismail Omer Ibrahim tarafından

ÖDEV 2 (SBE TEZ 1) den

- 13-May-2016 15:29 EEST' de işlemekondu
- NUMARA: 673773982
- KelimeSayısı: 18509

BenzerlikEndeksi

%15

KaynağagöreBenzerlik

Internet Sources:

%13

Yayınlar:

%10

Öğrenci Ödevleri:

%8

T.C

YÜKSEKÖĞRETİM KURULU

ULUSAL TEZ MERKEZİ

TEZ VERİ GİRİŞİ VE YAYIMLAMA İZİN FORMU

Referans No	10108925
Yazar Adı / Soyadı	İSMAİL İBRAHİM
Uyruğu / T.C.Kimlik No	SOMALİ / 99679353708
Telefon	5535226328
E-Posta	ismailkallun2020@gmail.com
Tezin Dili	İngilizce
Tezin Özgün Adı	The implications of Somali Ethiopian war of 1977 on the fall of Somali state in 1991
Tezin Tercümesi	1991 yılında Somali Devlet yıkılma 1977 Somali Etiyopya savaş Etkileri
Konu	Uluslararası İlişkiler = International Relations
Üniversite	Atılım Üniversitesi
Enstitü / Hastane	Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Anabilim Dalı	Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı
Bilim Dalı	Uluslararası İlişkiler (İngilizce) Bilim Dalı
Tez Türü	Yüksek Lisans
Yılı	2016
Sayfa	82
Tez Danışmanları	Prof. Dr. HASSAN ALİ KARASAR 99679353708
Dizin Terimleri	
Önerilen Dizin Terimleri	: Somalia, Clan, state building and state breaking, Nation, Administration, Nepotism
Kısıtlama	Yok

Yukarıda bilgileri kayıtlı olan tezimin, bilimsel araştırma hizmetine sunulması amacı ile Yükseköğretim Kurulu Ulusal Tez Merkezi Veri Tabanında arşivlenmesine ve internet üzerinden tam metin erişime açılmasına izin veriyorum.

30.06.2016

İmza: