

THE USE OF THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE IN  
ANTHROPOCENTRIC AND NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC APPROACHES  
IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: A METAETHICAL INVESTIGATION

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SELMA AYDIN BAYRAM

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

FEBRUARY 2016



Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

|                                |                     |       |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Prof. Dr. Harun Tepe           | (Hacettepe U, PHIL) | _____ |
| Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan         | (METU, PHIL)        | _____ |
| Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan  | (METU, PHIL)        | _____ |
| Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman | (METU, PHIL)        | _____ |
| Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünder          | (Ankara U, CFE)     | _____ |





**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name : Selma AYDIN BAYRAM

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE USE OF THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE IN ANTHROPOCENTRIC AND NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: A METAETHICAL INVESTIGATION**

Aydın Bayram, Selma

Ph.D., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

February 2016, 236 pages

The concept of intrinsic value is one of the most disputed concepts of ethics, and in particular, environmental ethics. The traditional approaches towards nature are anthropocentric, attributing intrinsic value merely to human beings. Nowadays, environmental philosophers mostly try to distance themselves from anthropocentric attitudes, and they introduce ethical reasons, which do not consider nature merely instrumentally valuable. In general, environmental ethicists are prone to appeal to the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ to justify the necessity of enlarging the scope of moral concern. For this reason, in this dissertation, I aimed to clarify the role of the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ in environmental ethics and I present a metaethical analysis of this concept within

anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches. I discuss whether intrinsic value exists independently of a valuer, and specifically a human valuer, examining what ethicists mean by 'intrinsic value' and what they mean when they call something 'intrinsically valuable'. In light of these discussions, contrary to defenders of objective value, like Moore, I defend the view that there would not be a value independently of a valuer and attribution of a value is a subjective act. I express that the subjective act of attributing value is related to the agent, but it need not be always for-agent's-own sake. In other words, what I mean with 'intrinsic value' is not the value that is 'in-itself' owned by an object because of the object's intrinsic properties; but the value ascribed to something 'for-its-own-sake', not for sake of consequences it might bring. Besides, on the basis of moral contractarianism and depending on Y. S. Lo's "dispositional theory" grounded on Hume's moral philosophy, I assert that subjectively attributed values can be universalized.

**Keywords:** Intrinsic Value, Environmental Ethics, Anthropocentrism, Subjectivism, Metaethics

## ÖZ

### ÇEVRE ETİĞİ BAĞLAMINDA İNSANMERKEZCİ VE İNSANMERKEZCİ-OLMAYAN YAKLAŞIMLARDA ÖZSEL DEĞER KAVRAMININ KULLANIMI: METAETİK BİR İNCELEME

Aydın Bayram, Selma

Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü


Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

Şubat 2016, 236 sayfa

‘Özsel değer’ kavramı, etiğin, özellikle de çevre etiğinin en tartışmalı kavramlarından biridir. Çevreye yönelik geleneksel yaklaşım ‘özel değer’i sadece insana atfeden insanmerkezci (antroposentrik) yaklaşımdır. Günümüzde, çevre etiği kuramcıları çoğunlukla geleneksel insanmerkezci tutumdan uzaklaşmakta ve doğayı sadece araçsal değeriyle ele almayan ahlaki argümanlar ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadırlar. Çevre etiği kuramcıları genelde ahlaki sorumluluğun kapsamının genişletilmesi gerekliliğini ‘özel değer’ kavramına başvurarak temellendirme eğilimindedirler. Bu sebeple, bu çalışmada, ‘özel değer’ kavramının çevre etiğindeki rolünü açık kılmayı amaçlıyorum ve bu amaçla antroposentrik ve antroposentrik-olmayan

yaklaşımlarda özsel değer kavramının kullanımının metaetik çözümlemesini yapıyorum. Düşünürlerin, ‘özel değer’ ve bir şeyi ‘özel olarak değerli bulma’ ile neyi kastettiklerini irdeleyerek, özel değer, değer verenden, özellikle değer veren olarak insandan bağımsız olarak var olup olamayacağını tartışıyorum. Bu tartışmalar ışığında, Moore gibi objektivist değer savunucularının aksine, değer verenin varlığından bağımsız bir değer olamayacağını ve değer atfetmenin subjektif bir edim olduğu görüşünü savunuyorum. Subjektif değer atfetme ediminin, eyleyenle bağlantılı olduğunu ama her zaman eyleyenin yararına odaklı olmayabileceğini dile getiriyorum. Başka bir ifadeyle, ‘özel değer’ ile nesnenin bir takım özel özellikleri üzerinden sahip olduğu ‘kendinde değer’ yerine; aracılık ettiği sonuçlarından dolayı değil, ‘kendisi için’ (*for-its-own-sake*) değerli bulunmasını anlıyorum. Ayrıca, Y. S. Lo’nun Hume’un ahlak felsefesi üzerinden temellendirdiği “yatkınlık kuramı”na dayanarak, ahlaki sözleşmecilik temelinde subjektif değer atfetme edimiyle oluşan değerlerin evrenselleşebileceğini savunuyorum.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Özel Değer, Çevre Etiği, İnsanmerkezcilik, Subjektivizm, Metaetik



*“the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me...”*  
I. Kant

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are a number of people without whom this dissertation might have not been written, and to whom I am greatly indebted.

Firstly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan for his consistent support, encouragement, and invaluable advices. This study would not have been possible without his support.

I would also like to thank examining committee members Prof. Dr. Harun Tepe and Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünder for their suggestions and insightful comments.

I am particularly grateful to Prof. Dr. David Grünberg, member of my dissertation advisory committee, for his continuous encouragement, kindness, and support throughout all these years. He believed in me.

I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman for being on my committee and for her support through the hard times.

I wish to express my most sincere gratitude and appreciation to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan. It is surely beyond doubt that without her it would be impossible for me to finish this study. I am indebted to her for her guidance, criticism, immense knowledge, insight, encouragement, motivation and patience throughout this dissertation. She provided me an excellent atmosphere for finishing this dissertation and kept a sense of humor when I had lost mine.

Special thanks go to Leyla İpek for always being with me; I always felt her support whenever I needed. I would like to thank her for tremendous support and friendship.

I also thank my family and friends and those who, knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly helped me in these times.

Last but not least, my husband Levent Bayram... He was always there and unconditionally stood by me through the good times and bad. Great patience at all times.

As a last word, I want to say that, in this prolonged process of writing this dissertation, a lot has changed in my life; I have learned a lot, both in the academic sense, and with respect to life in general. In a Nietzschean sense, I experienced transvaluation of my values.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                                               |      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| PLAGIARISM.....                                               | iii  |
| ABSTRACT .....                                                | iv   |
| ÖZ .....                                                      | vi   |
| DEDICATION.....                                               | viii |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....                                         | ix   |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS .....                                       | xi   |
| CHAPTER                                                       |      |
| 1. INTRODUCTION .....                                         | 1    |
| 2. ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME ANTHROPOCENTRISM.....                 | 13   |
| 2.1 Anthropocentrism .....                                    | 15   |
| 2.1.1 Anthropocentrism and Human-Nature Duality .....         | 17   |
| 2.1.1.1 Ancient-Medieval Period and Abrahamic Religions ..... | 18   |
| 2.1.1.2 Modern Period.....                                    | 23   |
| 2.1.1.3 Contemporary/Weak Anthropocentrism .....              | 26   |
| 2.1.1.4 Intrinsic Value of Human Beings.....                  | 30   |
| 2.1.2 Problems of Anthropocentrism .....                      | 31   |
| 2.2 Attempts to Overcome Anthropocentrism .....               | 38   |
| 2.2.1 Sentiocentrism (Sentientism) .....                      | 38   |
| 2.2.1.1 Singer’s Utilitarianism .....                         | 40   |
| 2.2.1.2 Regan’s Right Base Approach .....                     | 43   |

|                                                                                               |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 2.2.1.3 Problems of Sentiocentrism.....                                                       | 52  |
| 2.2.2 Biocentrism.....                                                                        | 54  |
| 2.2.2.1 Albert Schweitzer .....                                                               | 55  |
| 2.2.2.2 Paul W. Taylor .....                                                                  | 58  |
| 2.2.2.3 Problems of Biocentrism .....                                                         | 64  |
| 2.2.3 Ecocentrism .....                                                                       | 65  |
| 2.2.3.1 The Land Ethic .....                                                                  | 66  |
| 2.2.3.2 Deep Ecology .....                                                                    | 70  |
| 2.2.3.3 Holmes Rolston III .....                                                              | 74  |
| 2.2.3.4 J. Baird Callicott.....                                                               | 76  |
| 2.2.3.5 Problems of Ecocentrism.....                                                          | 79  |
| 2.2.4 Ecofeminism .....                                                                       | 82  |
| 2.2.4.1 Objections to Ecofeminism .....                                                       | 87  |
| 2.2.5 Environmental Pragmatism .....                                                          | 90  |
| 2.2.5.1 Objections to Environmental Pragmatism.....                                           | 95  |
| 2.3 Extrapolations for What is Needed for an Adequate Theory of<br>Environmental Ethics ..... | 97  |
| 3. THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE IN RELATION TO<br>SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM .....        | 104 |
| 3.1 Metaethical Conceptual Background.....                                                    | 107 |
| 3.1.1 Value: Subjective or Objective?.....                                                    | 108 |
| 3.1.2 Intrinsic Value/Worth .....                                                             | 113 |
| 3.1.2.1 General Overview of Prominent Theories of Intrinsic<br>Value .....                    | 114 |

|                                                                                                                |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 3.1.2.2 Kant.....                                                                                              | 118 |
| 3.1.2.3 Moore.....                                                                                             | 122 |
| 3.1.3 A Tentative Defense of Intrinsic Value .....                                                             | 127 |
| 3.1.3.1 How do We Know the Existence of Intrinsic Value?.....                                                  | 127 |
| 3.1.3.2 Why do We Need the Concept of ‘Intrinsic Value’? .....                                                 | 132 |
| 3.1.4 Conclusion: Intrinsic Value in Relation to the Question of<br>Objectivity or Subjectivity of Value ..... | 136 |
| 4. ANTHROPOCENTRISM vs. NON-ANTHROPOCENTRISM .....                                                             | 143 |
| 4.1 The Anthropogenic and Non-Anthropocentric Approaches .....                                                 | 144 |
| 4.1.1 Callicott’s Anthropogenic Approach .....                                                                 | 146 |
| 4.1.2 Hargrove’s Weak Anthropocentrism .....                                                                   | 152 |
| 4.2 Non-anthropocentrism.....                                                                                  | 154 |
| 4.2.1 The Obscurity of the Concept of Non-Anthropocentrism .....                                               | 155 |
| 4.2.2 Why We Need ‘Non-anthropocentrism’? .....                                                                | 156 |
| 4.2.3 Non-anthropocentric Valuation.....                                                                       | 160 |
| 4.2.3.1 The Question of Whether Non-humans can Value.....                                                      | 161 |
| 4.2.3.2 Is Existence of Non-human Valuers Essential for<br>Environmental Ethics? .....                         | 166 |
| 4.3 Universalization of Subjective Intrinsic Valuation .....                                                   | 168 |
| 4.3.1 How Could Universal Subjective Values be Possible? .....                                                 | 169 |
| 4.3.2 The Social Consensus.....                                                                                | 171 |
| 4.3.3 Callicott and Lo’s Adoption of Humean Axiology .....                                                     | 174 |
| 4.3.4 Change in Values .....                                                                                   | 182 |
| 5. CONCLUSION .....                                                                                            | 186 |

|                    |     |
|--------------------|-----|
| BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... | 196 |
|--------------------|-----|

## APPENDICES

|                           |     |
|---------------------------|-----|
| A. CURRICULUM VITAE ..... | 208 |
|---------------------------|-----|

|                          |     |
|--------------------------|-----|
| B. TURKISH SUMMARY ..... | 211 |
|--------------------------|-----|

|                                    |     |
|------------------------------------|-----|
| C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU ..... | 236 |
|------------------------------------|-----|



# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Environmental<sup>1</sup> disasters have increased rapidly in the past century, especially following World War II. Every day an email, a message from social networks or a solicitor on the street tells us about or asks for our support to stop an environmental disaster such as desertification, oil spills, gas leaks, nuclear accidents, acid leaks, radioactive leaks, magnetic pollution, water and air pollution, and endangered species.<sup>2</sup> The list can be extended.

All of these environmental disasters show us that the existence of wars is not the only or worst thing threatening life on earth. In previous decades, our grandparents' nightmare was the possibility of a war. However, nowadays, we can be faced with such situations that, although their reasons alone may not sound as atrocious as those of war, their outcome may be even more dreadful, even if only because they are more pervasive, resilient and long-lasting. The critical point is that when compared to something like war, which individual efforts and lobbying by well-meaning citizens are rarely able to prevent, it is relatively more likely to

---

<sup>1</sup> Even though they have different references, the notions of nature and environment are used interchangeably. While 'nature' is used to refer to, in the broadest sense, the natural world, physical universe; 'environment' refers to the totality of objects or the region that surrounds an entity. The definition of environment is given in the Turkish environmental law as; "the biological, physical, social, economic, and cultural milieu in which all living beings maintain their relationship and are in interaction with each other throughout their lives." (Environmental Law, the Law no. 2872, Article 2 (as amended by the Law no. 5491, Article 2 - 26/4/2006)) <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2872.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> These environmental disasters can be exemplified as follows: desertification of Aral Sea, Kuwait Oil Fires (1991), Bhopal gas leaks (1984), Tokaimura nuclear accident (1999), Love Canal (1978), the Chernobyl disaster (1986), Chisso-Minamata disease (1956), Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989), and so on.

prevent environmental disasters by the precautionary actions of individuals. Indeed, some of these problems might be resisted by public pressure or loud “No” responses.

There are many environmental predicaments, which have arisen because we as human beings have valued our own interests above the interests of other entities in nature and have not done enough to prevent those crises as we focused on protecting our own interests.

It is very difficult to get a competent grasp on environmental issues because of their multidimensional and multifaceted nature. Environmental problems are often intertwined with other social problems such as globalization and the distribution of resources, benefits and burdens on a global level. It is known that environmental resources are not used or shared equally by all people. People of developed countries consume and benefit from the environmental resources much more than the people of underdeveloped/third world countries. Therefore, people of the underdeveloped countries are suspicious of the idea of suspending their economic development activities in order to prevent possible environmental disasters while more developed countries resist taking preventive measures due to economic reasons. For example, it is known that the USA, which is greatly responsible for the emissions of greenhouse gases, rejects to sign the Kyoto Protocol, which is an international agreement aimed at reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases.

What is important for all involved to realize, however, is that because of globalization and technological and scientific developments, environmental issues are not local issues anymore. For example, an environmental disaster might occur at a specific location of the world; at first sight, politically or economically, it might be seen as a local problem, i.e., a specific problem of that country, and of its citizens and government. However, ecologically it cannot be a local problem. That is, although a disaster occurs at a local place, its further results unfortunately affect the whole world. It is obvious that such grand-scale disasters can only be

prevented by grand-scale policies that require supranational political decisions. Therefore, it will be insufficient to address environmental problems by focusing on local values, policies, and solutions. Hence, there is need for theorizing on environmental issues on a universal level.

Since political decisions require an ethical framework, there is need for environmental philosophy, possessing all the essential conceptual equipment, to enter the debates taking place around such decisions. Furthermore, it should be recognized that, technological and scientific developments, governmental policies, or legal restrictions are not capable of overcoming the environmental problems on their own unless people change their current ethical attitude to nature. There is no law that can penetrate every detail of life and direct all the behaviors of people; only ethics has such a power on human life. In short, I think philosophy, particularly environmental ethics, can provide the necessary theoretical ground to the resolution process.

Environmental ethics developed as a new discipline in the 1960-70s to cope with the increasing amount of environmental problems. When environmental ethics first began to emerge as an independent discipline, the initial tendency of those who wanted to address environmental problems was to appeal to traditional interhuman ethical theories. Actually, environmentalists and ethicists were expecting to handle these environmental issues quite easily. Thus, they applied the concepts of traditional moral philosophies to the –problematic– environmental issues. That is, instead of introducing new ethical theories that focus on the reason(s) behind these problems, they tried to overcome them with introducing some traditional anthropocentric (human-centered) ethical perspectives. In addition, until recent times, the economic side of environmental issues always took precedence over the moral side. However, problems were deeper than they appeared.

Admittedly, since the environment is one of the biggest sources of income, the environment cannot be considered without its relation to other disciplines and values such as economics. However, treating nature as a never-ending resource or like a machine has resulted in the exploitation of nature as well as neglect of future generations. Even if nature is merely an economic resource, it has to be kept in mind that it is a resource not only for present generations, but also for future generations. Even this feature alone underlines the distinctively ethical nature of all environmental issues, extricating it from the domination of economic considerations alone. I want to finish this paragraph with the words of environmentalist Guy McPherson: “If you really think the environment is less important than the economy, try holding your breath while you count your money.”

The forethought of this dissertation is that, as long as people value nature only instrumentally, these problems will persist and even increase in numbers, and that a strong traditional anthropocentrism that treats nature as merely a resource is incapable of producing long-term and real solutions to environmental problems.

Many environmental philosophers argue not only that it is problematic to treat nature as only a resource, but that it does not have to and hopefully will not continue like that. In his landmark book *A Sand County Almanac*, Aldo Leopold reminds us of the positions of slaves and women. They were also seen as a means to the goods of their masters and regarded as a resource, and their economic values had precedence over their intrinsic value. Nevertheless, Leopold and many other environmentalists inspired by him argue that just as this situation has changed for women and slaves today, so can it also change for the environment (assuming, of course, that free wage laborers and women are not treated *merely* as an economic resource today).

Leopold compares the positions of animals, plants, and the land with the position of women in earlier times. He says that, in ancient times for example, when

Odysseus returned from the Trojan War, he killed some of the women slaves because of their misbehaviors. However, nobody morally condemned him or that situation because those women were regarded merely as his property.<sup>3</sup> In the same vein, what people do with the land was not condemned morally until recent times. Similar to the position of the women in earlier times, land was seen as no more than just a property. Starting from this point of view, Leopold argues that, in a similar way to women's position, the limits of ethics can be extended so as to embrace the non-human parts of nature, more precisely, the land. He says that, "Land, then, is not merely soil; it is fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals."<sup>4</sup>

This dissertation leans toward a position that the growing amount of environmental problems cannot be handled by staying within the current understanding of nature-human relationship and without encapsulating non-human parts of nature through broadening the boundaries of ethics.

Of course, scholarly attention to human beings' relationship to nature is not something new. However, the damage done to nature because of human beings' desire to realize their short-term interests, the increase in environmental problems because of that or other reasons, the reckless exploitation of natural resources and risk of their extinction have forced people to think more deeply on our relationship with nature and to approach these issues in a different way than we did before. Although what lies at the ground of scholarly attention to environmental philosophy and environmental issues in general is the need to postpone the extinction of natural resources or to constrain the mindless exploitation of nature, there is also an ethical side to the issue. That the issue has an ethical side and that ethics can provide a contribution to the solution of problems has gradually become

---

<sup>3</sup> A. Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River*, New York, The Random House Publishing Group, 1966, pp. 237-238.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

a commonly accepted belief. Importantly, although the reasons that forced people to critique their relationship with nature and led them to environmental ethics was anthropocentric at first, as I stated in the previous paragraph, this does not have to continue in this way, and indeed, it has not.

In light of these considerations, one of the most important issues in environmental ethics emerges as the scope of moral consideration. We know that anthropocentrism is woven into the fabric of traditional ethical theories, which involve only rational, healthy (i.e., not mentally ill) and adult people into their scope of moral consideration, and treat merely these people as objects of moral concern. But the majority of recent environmental ethicists seem to agree on the necessity of extending the scope of moral consideration for a proper relationship with nature. Further, there is a tendency now among environmental philosophers to abandon the anthropocentric attitude towards nature in order to cope with environmental problems. Nevertheless, there are some theoretical problems in front of such a widening of scope, and there are deeper problems still with including non-living things (inanimate things) into the moral realm.

According to the traditional understanding, morality is only peculiar to humankind. Only human beings can have mutual moral responsibilities and duties to each other. Therefore, a moral relationship could only happen between people. This emphasis on mutual moral responsibility poses a problem with the valuation of non-human entities. Since it seems odd to mention responsibilities or duties of non-humans towards humans, they are not regarded as one of the sides within an ethical relation. Thus, it is believed that only humans can be members of the ethical realm. People are seen at the center of the moral sphere while non-human entities are, at best, placed on the peripheral. More often, they are altogether left out of the scope of moral consideration.

I think such anthropocentrism is one of the major challenges in front of environmental ethics. Since non-humans are not seen as the main components of

an ethical relation in anthropocentrism, instead of the traditional anthropocentrism or a new version of it, completely new perspectives, namely, non-anthropocentric perspectives are required in environmental ethics.

One may question why we should extend our moral consideration to encapsulate these non-human entities? Why should human beings be morally responsible to non-human entities? Do people have a duty to nature regardless of reciprocity? Actually, as I will discuss in chapter 2, a response can be formulated to such questions and the problem with regard to 'moral responsibility' towards non-humans can be overcome (such as with the distinction between moral-agent and moral-subject/patient). Further, people have moral responsibility to a child, an insane person, a person in coma regardless of reciprocity. So, in a similar way, why should we not have responsibilities to nature?

Considered from a meta-perspective, the relationship between environmental ethics and traditional accounts of ethics is problematic, because they are misplaced in relation to each other. Until recent years, environmental ethics was regarded as a subdivision of traditional ethics. But traditionally, what people implied with the term 'ethics' was interhuman ethics. While traditional ethics, i.e., interhuman ethics, merely embraces humans; environmental ethics involves non-human entities, such as animals, plants, and holistic unities in addition to human beings. Hence, it would be a category mistake to subsume environmental ethics to traditional ethics because the moral scope of traditional ethics is narrower than the ethics that is called 'environmental ethics'. Considering environmental ethics, which has a broader moral scope than an interhuman ethics, as the subdivision of interhuman ethics would be logically implausible.

Therefore, environmental ethicists urge the reconceptualization of the subject matter of ethics as humans' relation with their environment, broadly their biotic community and all its components. Accordingly, what is morally good or bad,

right or wrong should be determined according to humans' relation with their environment, not only humans' relation with other humans. In other words, although until recent years, when people were talking about 'ethics', they were merely implying the human-to-human ethics, it should be changed into 'ethics' with this broadened moral scope.

Thus, studies in environmental ethics have been progressing rapidly along several lines. While some of the discussions center around the need to extend the scope of morality, how far it can be extended, and by what criterion, others focus on the concept of 'intrinsic value', what it means, its source and ground.

This is because environmental ethicists often invoke the concept of intrinsic value when searching for possibilities of making room for non-human parts of nature and trying to present moral reasons for not merely focusing on the instrumental value of nature. However, the concept of intrinsic value<sup>5</sup> is one of the most problematic and obscure concepts of value theory. Undeniably, it has an important place in human-to-human ethics, and it has been substantially examined in traditional ethics and metaethics. To give an example, the idea of 'human rights', which it is believed that every individual person has regardless of further details, is grounded on the intrinsic value that all human beings are supposed to have. What makes it a current issue is the environmentalists' desire of ascribing it to non-human entities in order to admit them into the ethical sphere. It is believed that if it can be shown or convincingly argued that nature has intrinsically valuable entities other than human beings, then, any claim of intervention to it would need to be justified. The current situation is the reverse: people are asked to justify their claim of non-intervention to nature.<sup>6</sup> For example, if the majority of people accept the idea that biodiversity has intrinsic value then conservation of species will

---

<sup>5</sup> Throughout this study, unless otherwise stated, what I mean with the intrinsic is 'for its own sake'. In addition, I will use the term 'intrinsic value' as opposed to 'instrumental value'.

<sup>6</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, pp. 245-246.

require less justification. The intrinsic value that nonhuman entities allegedly have is the most powerful tool that may prevent the exploitation of nature with its non-human parts.

On the other hand, while environmental ethicists focus on “what has intrinsic value?” they often neglect the fundamental questions: “what is intrinsic value?” and “what does it mean to be intrinsically valuable?” I think more urgent attention in environmental ethics should be devoted to the concept itself, before the attribution of such a value to various entities. Most of the theoretical problems in environmental ethics arise from attempting to constitute a normative environmental ethics on ill-defined concepts, such as ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘non-anthropocentrism’. That is, even when environmental ethicists use the same terms, what they mean with these terms varies. This situation causes confusions at the fundamental level. Therefore, I argue that environmental ethicists should first focus on meaning and justification problems in relation to fundamental concepts. Further, I argue that to contend with the conceptual confusions, the first step that should be taken is to consider these issues differently. Thus, I think that discussing the issues separately at metaethical and normative levels (as far as it is possible) will provide clarification.

Therefore, in my dissertation, I will conduct a metaethical analysis of the concept of intrinsic value in anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches in environmental ethics. To make this analysis complete, I will also discuss the terms ‘anthropocentrism’ and ‘non-anthropocentrism’. I will try to clarify the role of intrinsic value in ethics, particularly in environmental ethics. In addition to these, I will defend a subjective account of intrinsic value in opposition to an objective account of it. I will proceed as follows:

In **second chapter** of this study, I discuss how the human-nature relationship developed over time by presenting the prominent theories in environmental ethics. This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss

anthropocentrism, reviewing both traditional/strong and weak versions of it. Since anthropocentrism has developed in close interaction with a dualistic understanding of the relation between human beings and nature, I take these two issues together. Firstly, I present the traditional anthropocentric attitude toward nature from the perspective of Abrahamic religions as well as traditional philosophers who are counted among strong anthropocentrists, such as Plato, Kant, Aquinas, and Descartes. Then, I explain the position of contemporary weak anthropocentrism. Lastly, since ‘human life’ is mostly given as the sole or main example of an intrinsically valuable thing, I briefly question the grounds for attributing intrinsic value to human life and human life alone in traditional anthropocentric theories. I conclude the first part of this chapter by surveying the problems of anthropocentrism, and explaining why there is need for a new and non-anthropocentric approach.

In the second part of this chapter, I present the major non-anthropocentric theories introduced in environmental ethics to overcome the problems that emerge from anthropocentrism. While presenting them, I focus on identifying what their moral scope is and how they delineate this scope (that is, what environmentalists regard as intrinsically valuable and on what ground) and draw attention to the gradual extension of the scope of morality in environmental ethics. For that reason, I mention *sentiocentrism*, which is morally concerned with sentient animals, considering their capacity for pleasure and/or pain; *biocentrism*, which argues that since all living beings are teleological centers of life, all of them have goods of their own and therefore should be subjects of moral concern; *ecocentrism*, which is a holistic approach, and is morally concerned with the biotic community as a whole. As a nature-centered view, ecocentrism values both the organic and the inorganic parts of nature intrinsically. *Ecofeminism* also defends the necessity of extending the scope of moral consideration to embrace the non-human parts of nature, but not in the same way as ecocentrism. Although ecofeminism is not a single view, in general, ecofeminists focus on the connection between the

domination and exploitation of women and the environment by the patriarchal power/system. Lastly, *environmental pragmatists* mainly defend the plurality of values in handling environmental problems and do not consider the discussion of the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values, or anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism to be necessary for developing better environmental policies. I conclude this chapter by summarizing what emerges from this overview as the requirements that an adequate environmental ethics theory should meet. Since one of the main problems of current environmental theories is the obscurity surrounding the notion of intrinsic value, I proceed to devote the third chapter to an analysis of this concept.

In the **third chapter**, I discuss the concept of intrinsic value at the metaethical level. Firstly, I give a broad overview of the discussions on the nature of value and valuation/to value. Then, I discuss what intrinsic value is and what ethicists mean when they call something ‘intrinsically valuable’. In doing so, I pay special attention to the theories of hedonism (more specifically, utilitarianism), Kant and Moore since the use of the concept of intrinsic value by environmental ethicists seems to refer to the conceptualization of intrinsic value by one or more of these three positions. In the context of my discussion of Moore, I clarify my own position, which holds that valuing always requires a valuer so that it is not possible to talk about the value of an entity in isolation from its relations and independently of a valuing agent. After that, I also develop a tentative defense of the concept of intrinsic value, handling objections from those philosophers who question the existence of or the need for a concept of intrinsic value. I discuss whether a defensible environmental ethics really needs the notion of intrinsic value. In the conclusion of this part, I further clarify my understanding of value as subjective while rejecting the concept of an objective account of intrinsic value. However, I argue that a subjective account of intrinsic value can be given and extended to the non-human parts of nature.

Finally, in **chapter four**, I bring the insights gained from Chapter 3 to bear on the question of non-anthropocentric values. With that aim, I draw attention to the use of the term ‘non-anthropocentric’/‘non-anthropocentrism’. Then, I discuss whether there are non-anthropocentric values, and how they are possible. Since I defend a subjective account of value, I discuss how we can make sense of subjective non-anthropocentric value, and I present Callicott’s anthropogenic subjective account of value depending on his truncated intrinsic value theory. I also discuss Hargrove’s weak anthropocentrism in more detail. I emphasize that human beings have a tendency to value the things around them, that they are prone to protect what they consider as valuable, specifically intrinsically valuable, and argue that this capacity for valuation can be improved so as to extend our attribution of intrinsic value to nonhuman parts of nature.

Finally, in the second part of this chapter, I discuss how subjective intrinsic value can be universalized in order to refrain from subjective/individual moral relativism. To do so, I make use of social contract theories as well as Callicott’s and Lo’s adoption of Humean axiology to develop an evolutionary account of universal human values (by means of the biogenetic structure’ and ‘psychological disposition’ that human beings share, and the ‘social consensus’).

In conclusion, therefore, I claim that, instead of arguing that there are intrinsically valuable things in nature independent of human valuation, the idea that humans confer value and human’s valuation capacity can be improved should be adopted. The scope of things that human beings value can be enlarged in a way that encapsulates the non-human entities on both an individualistic and a holistic level.. In my opinion, the first view, that is, an objective value independent of human judgement is not plausible.

## CHAPTER II

### ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME ANTHROPOCENTRISM

*“We are discussing no small matter, but how we ought to live.”*

Plato, *Republic*, Book I:352d

*“We have the capability and the responsibility. We must act before it is too late.”*

The Dalai Lama

When environmental ethics first began to emerge as an independent discipline, it began approaching environmental problems by utilizing traditional theories, which were anthropocentric. Consequently, only humans were treated as intrinsically valuable and the rest of nature was treated as if it is supposed to serve as a means to humans' goals. However, as anthropocentrism remained incapable of solving the environmental problems, the main motive of environmental ethics has become introducing alternatives to traditional anthropocentrism such as weak anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. While the traditional anthropocentric approach to nature is regarding it as a resource, which should be conserved for a fair distribution between the members of present generations, the non-anthropocentric theories argue that all living and nonliving beings should be protected and preserved because of the intrinsic/inherent value they have.

Although the proposed theories of environmental ethics seem to serve the same goal, these theories differ in their fundamental assumptions concerning key issues such as the subjects of moral concern and the source of values, and they propose quite different solutions. In general, thinkers, who work on environmental ethics, tend to ground their theories on the concept of 'intrinsic value'. However, which

part of nature they consider as intrinsically valuable differs. While the traditional account of anthropocentrism attributes intrinsic value only to humankind, one of the main topics of research for environmental ethicists seeking for alternatives to anthropocentrism has become looking for rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to non-human parts of nature.

According to some environmental theorists, such as B. Norton, A. Light, E. Katz, and E. C. Hargrove, we do not need a new, non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. They claim that, for practical purposes, such as policy-making, anthropocentric ethical theories can be more effective than the non-anthropocentric ones because they do not have the theoretical burden of providing sound arguments for the –from their perspective– more radical view that the non-human environment has intrinsic value. They offer a weak version of anthropocentrism, which is also called ‘enlightened’ or ‘prudential anthropocentrism’.

In this chapter, I will discuss the prominent views in environmental ethics, and mention the approaches of the main environmental philosophers, who are identified with those views. The chapter will be divided into two main parts. In the first part (section 2.1), I will give a brief overview of anthropocentrism. In the more extended second part (section 2.2), I survey the recent history of attempts to overcome anthropocentrism, which has followed a line of increasing comprehensiveness, proceeding from extending the scope of moral concern to sentient animals to all living beings, and eventually to nature, with its organic and inorganic parts as a whole. Finally, in section 2.3, I draw my own conclusions concerning this brief history with a view to underlining the main problematic points that my argument on intrinsic value is trying to address.

There is of course, an extensive range of theories developed on environmental ethics, all of which are not mentioned in this dissertation, since none of these theories and philosophers is exactly the main subject of my dissertation. What I

do in this chapter is merely to give an overview of some of the most prominent positions in order to provide a background for and make more understandable the argument I develop in the next two chapters.

## 2.1 Anthropocentrism

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines anthropocentrism as “the assumption that man is the center of all things”;<sup>7</sup> thus, it is also known as human-centeredness. The focus of anthropocentrism is humans and their interests. According to it, since only humans have the capacity of reasoning, only they are subjects of moral concern, and the environment is only instrumentally valuable in relation to human interests. Humans’ interests are regarded as the sole measure of right and wrong. Further, it is believed that the capabilities of humans, which non-humans lack, are somehow more valuable than the capabilities of non-humans, which humans lack. Further, the traditional account of anthropocentrism what we shall call ‘strong’ anthropocentrism leaves future generations out of the ethical realm as well.

*Encyclopedia Britannica* defines anthropocentrism as “the philosophical viewpoint arguing that human beings are the central or most significant entities in the world,” noting that “this is a basic belief embedded in many Western religions and philosophies”.<sup>8</sup>

Anthropocentrism regards humans as separate from and superior to nature and holds that human life has intrinsic value while other entities (including

---

<sup>7</sup> Available from <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8420?redirectedFrom=anthropocentrism#eid> (accessed 1 June 2014)

<sup>8</sup> S. E. Boslaugh, ‘Anthropocentrism’, *Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.*, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropocentrism> (accessed 1 June 2014).

animals, plants, mineral resources, and so on) are resources that may justifiably be exploited for the benefit of humankind.<sup>9</sup>

Some environmentalists, such as weak anthropocentrists, claim that anthropocentric reasons are good enough for the protection of nature. Since the interests of humans are closely tied with non-humans' interests, weak anthropocentrists claim that anthropocentrism can provide a sufficient ground for environment protection policies. Actually, even the first principle of Rio Declaration,<sup>10</sup> which is one of the earliest studies on the environment, states: "Human beings are at the centre of concerns". Although the main motive in this conference was to draw attention to the increasing amount of environmental problems, the anthropocentrism that lies at its base can easily be deduced from this sentence/principle.

Hereby, weak anthropocentrism might seem to provide the sufficient reasons for the protection of nature, and justification of such a protection can be done more easily when compared to non-anthropocentric theories. However, the reasons, which (weak) anthropocentrism asserts to explain why interests of humans are always prior to interests of non-humans, are not always convincing enough. Further, many environmental ethicists worry that the implication of weak anthropocentrism is that, in the case of conflict of interests, the anthropocentrist will automatically take sides with humans' interests, not the non-humans'.

---

<sup>9</sup> S. E. Boslaugh, 'Anthropocentrism', *Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.*, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropocentrism> (accessed 1 June 2014).

<sup>10</sup> Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) is a document on environment produced at the *United Nations Conference on Environment and Development* (UNCED). The conference, also known as "Earth Summit", was held in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It was aimed to "reconcile worldwide economic development with protection of the environment." The full content of *Rio Declaration* is available at:

<http://www.unep.org/Documents/Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163>

### 2.1.1 Anthropocentrism and Human-Nature Duality

R. E. Purser *et al.* claim that, “the problematic issue is not so much one of human centeredness, for it seems perfectly natural for human beings to place themselves at the center of their concerns.”<sup>11</sup> However, “[w]hat is problematic is humankind’s structure of values as they are deeply rooted in a human-nature dualism.”<sup>12</sup>

When we examine the primitive tribes and societies (especially societies before the Christian tradition), we see that their attitudes to nature were in the form of admiration of, worship, respect towards, and sometimes fear of the power of nature, which they did not understand. In those times, people were living under life-threatening conditions and were defenseless in the face of natural events such as fire burns, cold freezes, and wind wafts.<sup>13</sup> E. Baylan expresses the basic perception and the first impressions of humans in consequence with their first experiences with nature as a feeling of ‘powerlessness’ and vulnerability. Additionally, J. Passmore says that, in earlier times, people believed that nature had an intention. For example, when someone damaged a river, it was thought that the river will seek revenge,<sup>14</sup> or in the case of the explosion of a volcano, people thought that nature had gotten angry and claimed a victim, etc.

---

<sup>11</sup> R. E. Purser, C. Park, and A. Montuori, ‘Limits to Anthropocentrism: Toward an Ecocentric Organization Paradigm?’, *Academy of Management Review*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1995, p. 1054.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> E. Baylan, ‘Doğaya İlişkin İnançlar, Kültür ve Çevre Sorunları Arasındaki İlişkilerin Kuramsal Bağlamda İrdelenmesi’, *Ankara Üniversitesi Çevrebilimleri Dergisi*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, p. 69.

<sup>14</sup> J. Passmore, ‘Attitudes to Nature’, in R. Elliot (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 130.

After agriculture became the dominant mode of production, changes in methods of tillage had a big influence on people's lives and society.<sup>15</sup> With developments in agriculture, "distribution of land was based no longer on the needs of a family but, rather, on the capacity of a power machine to till the earth".<sup>16</sup> That is, humans were motivated and forced to produce and hunt more than they can eat and they need. Consequently, the relation of humans with soil/nature changed from being a part of it, to being the exploiter of it.<sup>17</sup>

Today we are prone to believe that we are superior to other living beings. As L. White expresses, "Despite Copernicus, all the cosmos rotates around our little globe. Despite Darwin, we are not, in our hearts, part of the natural process. We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim."<sup>18</sup>

In what follows, I will delineate the growth and transformation of this dualistic structure by focusing on three main periods: ancient-medieval, modern and contemporary.

#### **2.1.1.1 Ancient-Medieval Period and Abrahamic Religions**

L. White argues that Abrahamic Religions also have great influence on people's perception of nature. Indeed, passages from Deuteronomy (20:19-20) and Talmud - Baba Kamma (91b) grant human beings a privileged position over non-human entities, and nature is seen as something in service of humankind. Nature is

---

<sup>15</sup> L. White, Jr., 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis', *Science*, vol. 155, no. 3767, 1967, p. 1205.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

deemed valuable only as long as it is useful for human interests. Deuteronomy (20:19-20)<sup>19</sup> plainly states that one should not cut down the trees as long as they give fruit, but if they do not give fruit, then you can cut them down to meet some other needs of man. Talmud - Baba Kamma (91b) reveals that trees or other non-human entities in nature can be expendable, if a greater interest is at stake. Of course, the mentioned interest is the interest of human beings.<sup>20</sup>

Some may argue that the Christian tradition has also defined the ethical responsibility of human beings towards nature, particularly towards animals, albeit again according to humans' interests. In other words, responsibilities to animals do not arise from respecting nature or respecting animals themselves; they are not cared for for their own sakes. As a matter of fact, it would not be wrong to say that Christianity is the most human-centered religion among others. In this respect, Lynn White distinguishes Christianity from ancient paganism and Asian religions,

---

<sup>19</sup> "When you lay siege to a city for a long time, fighting against it to capture it, do not destroy its trees by putting an ax to them, because you can eat their fruit. Do not cut them down. Are the trees people, that you should besiege them? However, you may cut down trees that you know are not fruit trees and use them to build siege works until the city at war with you falls." Deut. (20:19-20), Available from <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy%20&version=NIV>. (accessed 28 June 2013)

<sup>20</sup> "Rab said: A palm tree producing even one *kab* of fruit may not be cut down. An objection was raised [from the following]: What quantity should be on an olive tree so that it should not be permitted to cut it down? A quarter of a *kab*. — Olives are different as they are more important. R. Hanina said: Shibhath my son did not pass away except for having cut down a fig tree before its time. Rabina, however, said: If its value [for other purposes] exceeds that for fruit, it is permitted [to cut it down]. It was also taught to the same effect: 'Only the trees of which thou knowest' implies even fruit-bearing trees; That they be not trees for meat, means a wild tree. But since we ultimately include all things, why then was it stated, That they are not trees for food? To give priority to a wild tree over one bearing edible fruits."

Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Kamma (91b) Available from [http://www.come-and-hear.com/babakamma/babakamma\\_91.html](http://www.come-and-hear.com/babakamma/babakamma_91.html) (accessed 28 June 2013)

arguing that, in addition to establishing human-nature dualism, Christianity also “insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends.”<sup>21</sup>

Christianity sees humankind as definitely superior to all living beings, because, according to the Christian myth of creation, “although man’s body is made of clay, he is not simply part of nature: he is made in God’s image.”<sup>22</sup> Passages from Luke<sup>23</sup> also imply that animals have a lower status than humans do.

One of the major ways in which Abrahamic religions create the human-nature duality is through the threefold religious understanding, which is: God (*creator*)-humans (*higher-level creatures*)-nature (*lower-level creatures*). Just as decisive is these religions’ promise of life after death, so that life on earth is regarded as finite/limited. God promises heaven to humankind in return for the miserable, unhappy, and short life that is a kind of test by God of his believers. Because of such an understanding, in the eyes of human being, life and nature on earth are regarded as not intrinsically, but only instrumentally valuable. This finite and temporal life is regarded as a means to an eternal life after death, which is perfect

---

<sup>21</sup> L. White, Jr., ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis’, *Science*, vol. 155, no. 3767, 1967, p. 1205.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> “What’s the price of two or three pet canaries? Some loose change, right? But God never overlooks a single one. And he pays even greater attention to you, down to the last detail—even numbering the hairs on your head! So don’t be intimidated by all this bully talk. You’re worth more than a million canaries.” Luke (12:6-7)

“Has anyone by fussing before the mirror ever gotten taller by so much as an inch? If fussing can’t even do that, why fuss at all? Walk into the fields and look at the wildflowers. They don’t fuss with their appearance—but have you ever seen color and design quite like it? The ten best-dressed men and women in the country look shabby alongside them. If God gives such attention to the wildflowers, most of them never even seen, don’t you think he’ll attend to you, take pride in you, do his best for you?” Luke (12:28)

Available from <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke%2012:6-7,Luke%2012:28&version=MSG> (accessed 28 June 2013)

in terms of its heavenly beauties (rivers, delicious fruits, etc.), and other gifts by God.

As a second reason of human separation from nature, we may mention the effect of dualist philosophies. Starting with Plato, there has developed a long line of dualistic thinking in the Western tradition, which, instead of regarding humans as part of nature, put humans and nature on opposite poles. J. Passmore claims that the Stoic-Christian tradition sees nature as subject to human interest, even domination and exploitation.<sup>24</sup>

As Passmore states, according to the Stoic-Christian tradition, God created nature for the sake of human beings. The justification behind this attitude is that nature does not have rationality and intention.<sup>25</sup> Plato believed that what is real are not physical objects, but the eternal forms which physical objects are imperfect copies of and knowledge of which can only be attained by reason. Aristotle's writings also reveal that he sees a hierarchical relation between human beings and nature, again, owing to human reason. In *Politics*, he claims that:

[A]fter the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing

---

<sup>24</sup> J. Passmore, 'Attitudes to Nature', in R. Elliot (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 131.

<sup>25</sup> This belief introduced two different approaches along with it. One is that, since nature is served to man, man can use it as a tool, and he can modify it, as he likes. The other is, since God knows the best for man, to modify nature is to defy the will of God. Thus, it will not be wrong to say that, Christianity cares about nature to the extent that it is the sign and work of God.

*Ibid.*

incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man.<sup>26</sup>

The same attitude continues in the writings of medieval philosophers such as Aquinas. When we examine Aquinas's writings, we see that he sees no harm in killing animals.<sup>27</sup> Although Aquinas does not object to the killing of animals, cruelty to animals is not allowed according to him. Nevertheless, his reasons are instrumental, and cruelty towards animals, simply put, is instrumentally wrong. Making an analogy between animals and humankind, he argues that cruelty towards animals desensitizes us to cruelty towards humans; a man who is cruel to animals may also be cruel to human beings. The ultimate goal is humankind, so, animals can only be a means to that end. He argues as follows:

Indeed, if any statements are found in Sacred Scripture prohibiting the commission of an act of cruelty against brute animals, for instance, that one should not kill a bird accompanied by her young (Deut. 22:6), this is said either to turn the mind of man away from cruelty which might be used on other men, lest a person through practicing cruelty on brutes might go on to do the same to men; or because an injurious act committed on animals may lead to a temporal loss for some man, either for the agent or for another man; or there may be another interpretation of the text, as the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:9) explains it, in terms of "not muzzling the ox that treads the corn" (Deut. 25:4).<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, Book 1, Part 8, § 1, 350 BCE. Available from <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

<sup>27</sup> After presenting a passage from the Holy Book, he says: "Through these considerations we refute the error of those who claim that it is a sin for man to kill brute animals. For animals are ordered to man's use in the natural course of things, according to divine providence. Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing them or by employing them in any other way. For this reason, God said to Noah: 'As the green herbs, I have delivered all flesh to you.'" (Gen. 9:3).

T. Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa Contra Gentiles)*, Book Three: Providence (Q. 84-163), trans. V. J. Bourke, in J. Kenny, O. P. (ed.), New York: Hanover House, 1955-57, (ch 112 §12). Available from <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#112>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

<sup>28</sup> T. Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa Contra Gentiles)*, Book Three: Providence (Q. 84-163), trans. V. J. Bourke, in J. Kenny, O. P. (ed.), New York: Hanover House,

### 2.1.1.2 Modern Period

Following the Medieval period, anthropocentrism was not challenged but in fact further strengthened by the development of Renaissance Art and Enlightenment thought.<sup>29</sup> In their article “Limits to Anthropocentrism: Toward an Ecocentric Organization Paradigm?” R. E. Purser *et al.* claim that Renaissance art gets anthropocentrism off the ground. The creation of linear perspective as an artistic technique by Filippo Brunelleschi in 1425 had a significant influence in changing people’s perception of their surroundings. Linear perspective mediated people to conceive of their surroundings differently from before in an irreversible way.<sup>30</sup> That is, according to R. E. Purser *et al.*, with the help of geometry and linear perspective, people come to calculate spatial distance between objects. Linear perspective enables a person to see and perceive an object at a distance as if the person is looking through a window to it. Thus, linear perspective became an indispensable artistic and scientific tool.<sup>31</sup>

Purser *et al.* regard the development of perspective as a precursor to scientific conceptualizations of the environment. With the linear perspective, people managed to produce maps, charts, graphs, etc. Purser *et al.* say that, “the world seen as a distant spectacle and the viewer as an immobile spectator [is] a precursor of the view that humans could locate themselves at the apex and center of the natural world.”<sup>32</sup> However, while humanity gained much with the invention of perspective, it also lost something. According to Purser *et al.*, “the other sense

---

1955-57, (ch. 112 §13). Available from <http://dhspritory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#112>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

<sup>29</sup> R. E. Purser, C. Park, and A. Montuori, ‘Limits to Anthropocentrism: Toward an Ecocentric Organization Paradigm?’, *Academy of Management Review*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1995, p. 1056.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

faculties and bodily-felt presence in the world increasingly became attenuated. Emphasis centered on what was visible to the eye, that is, sense data that lent themselves easily to observation, measurement, quantification, and, [...] domination of nature.”<sup>33</sup> Further, humanity begins to become alienated from sensation. This new, mechanical way of knowing became dominant and privileged in society, and while people gave much importance to charts and graphs, they almost ignored the actual.<sup>34</sup>

Even though a mechanistic and materialistic worldview was developed during the modern period, modern thinkers, such as Descartes and Kant, somehow managed to position human beings outside the materialistically explained world and thus maintain the human-nature dualism.

I think it would not be wrong to consider Descartes as the philosopher who deepens the separation between human and nature. Descartes’ dualistic philosophy is reflected in his perception of nature. He regards animals as automata, and argues that, “since art copies nature, and men can make various automata which move without thought, that nature should produce its own automata, much more splendid than artificial ones. These natural automata are the animals.”<sup>35</sup> He also adds, “it is more probable that worms and flies and caterpillars move mechanically than that they all have immortal souls.”<sup>36</sup> Animals are only complicated machines, that is, they can do many things even better than human beings can, but cannot think. They cannot communicate through language and cannot use speech or other signs

---

<sup>33</sup> R. E. Purser, C. Park, and A. Montuori, ‘Limits to Anthropocentrism: Toward an Ecocentric Organization Paradigm?’, *Academy of Management Review*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1995, p. 1056.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1057.

<sup>35</sup> R. Descartes, ‘Animals Are Machines’, in S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., New York, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004, p. 277.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

that human beings use which distinguish them from nonhumans. Thus, animals cannot have a rational soul. Descartes claims that even though animals act as if they are conscious, in fact, they are not. They only “imitate or surpass us in those of our actions which are not guided by our thoughts.”<sup>37</sup> And, he says, “I know that animals do many things better than we do, but this does not surprise me. It can even be used to prove they act naturally and mechanically, like a clock which tells the time better than our judgement does.”<sup>38</sup> The influence of the Judeo-Christian tradition easily shows itself in Descartes’ thoughts on nature; he claims the main task of man is “to make himself master and possessor of nature”.<sup>39</sup>

Kant also attributes only instrumental value to animals. In Kant’s view, “Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man.”<sup>40</sup> Thereupon, according to Kant, we ask, “Why do animals exist?” while we do not ask, “why does man exist”; he even considers such a question to be meaningless.<sup>41</sup> Kant’s argument for why human beings are ends-in-themselves is that they are autonomous beings and they are capable of reasoning. Like Aquinas, Kant objects to cruelty to animals and does not approve of acts of torment to them. However, his objection also does not depend on a non-anthropocentric ground. He focuses on the similarities between humans and animals. He gives the example of an aged dog: since human beings do not have direct responsibility to animals, a

---

<sup>37</sup> R. Descartes, ‘Animals Are Machines’, in S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., New York, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004, p. 276.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> J. Passmore, ‘Attitudes to Nature’, in R. Elliot (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 134.

<sup>40</sup> I. Kant, ‘Indirect Duties to Nonhumans’, in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 82.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

man may kill his dog when the dog cannot serve him because of its old age. He says we cannot judge the man because of that behavior. However, this behavior injures his humanity; his treatment is cruel and inhuman. Thus, he claims that treating animals badly may dull someone's conscience, and it may encourage the man to treat badly people as well.<sup>42</sup> According to Kant, humankind has immediate duties only towards other human beings, not to animals or other non-human entities. Furthermore, he says that, "The more we devote ourselves to observing animals and their behaviour, the more we love them, on seeing how greatly they care for their young; in such, context, we cannot even contemplate cruelty to a wolf."<sup>43</sup>

Lastly, Passmore also observes anthropocentrism in Hegel's thought since, according to Hegel, only nature modified and transformed by human beings deserves appreciation, not wild nature.<sup>44</sup>

### **2.1.1.3 Contemporary/Weak Anthropocentrism**

The authority of traditional anthropocentrism was displaced with the increasing frequency of environmental problems. Since criticisms against anthropocentrism increased due to its being incapable of coping with the increasing amount of environmental problems, defenders of anthropocentrism introduced a new, moderate version to handle environmental problems in a better way. Thus, while traditional anthropocentrism is called 'strong anthropocentrism', the moderate version is called 'weak anthropocentrism'.

Weak anthropocentrism can be considered as a middle position between strong anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. B. G. Norton and E. C. Hargrove are

---

<sup>42</sup> I. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. P. Heath, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 212-213.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 212.

<sup>44</sup> J. Passmore, 'Attitudes to Nature', in R. Elliot (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 135.

the most notable thinkers among the defenders of weak anthropocentrism. According to weak anthropocentrism, while humans are placed at the center of the moral sphere, non-humans are placed at the peripheral. Weak anthropocentrism values non-human parts of nature as well as humankind. However, not surprisingly, humankind has a higher moral status than the non-humans do. Further, some of weak anthropocentrists also refrain from ascribing intrinsic value to non-humans. They believe that, an ethical perspective, which places the self-interests of humans at the center, is enough to protect the non-human parts of nature, as long as people are aware that their interests will be saved more with the saving of nature. Weak anthropocentrism bases its objection to the exploitation of nature and ruining the environment on the interconnectedness of humans' interests with the non-humans. In addition, contrary to the traditional one, weak anthropocentrism is concerned with the interests of future generations.

As a defender of weak anthropocentrism, B. Norton explains the difference between weak and strong anthropocentrism in terms of 'felt' and 'considered' preference as follows:

A value theory is strongly anthropocentric if all value countenanced by it is explained by reference to satisfactions of felt preferences of human individuals. A value theory is weakly anthropocentric if all value countenanced by it is explained by reference to satisfaction of some felt preference of a human individual or by reference to its bearing upon the ideals which exist as elements in a world view essential to determinations of considered preferences.<sup>45</sup>

By 'felt preference', Norton means "any desire or need of a human individual," and what is at stake when a felt preference is formulated is merely the "at least temporary" satisfaction of that desire or need. Further, the satisfaction must be ascertainable in terms of some "specifiable experience" of that individual. What he means by 'considered preference', on the other hand, would be desires or needs

---

<sup>45</sup> B. G. Norton, 'Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1984, p. 134.

that are formulated after a more careful deliberation, with reference to a “rationally adopted worldview”, aesthetic and moral ideals, etc. and a consideration of whether the desire in question is compatible with that worldview and those ideals.<sup>46</sup>

I want to draw attention to the fact that, B. Norton objects to non-anthropocentrism’s appeal to the idea of attributing intrinsic value to non-human entities. He says that, we do not need anything more for a proper/plausible environmental ethics than the satisfaction of considered human preferences. He asserts that, when formulated in this way, the weak anthropocentric attitude can be in harmony with nature. Appealing to Hinduism and Jainism and assuming that these religions are anthropocentric, Norton argues that both of these religions are examples of well-developed worldviews, which “explicitly teach nonharming: we should not kill other nonhuman creatures such as cows or even insects, and we should not harm the natural environment either.”<sup>47</sup> However, James E. White<sup>48</sup> objects to Norton’s examples from religion by claiming that Hinduism and Jainism are not anthropocentric religions.

For (weak) anthropocentrism, it is not difficult to justify saving a fish or a marsh as long as it is valuable in terms of human ends. On the other hand, it is believed that he supporters of non-anthropocentrism have to justify why people have to protect the non-human parts of nature, mostly by depending on the intrinsic value that they are claimed to have. As can be guessed, to justify that they are intrinsically valuable is not always an easy task; it is a challenging position. That can be regarded as the strongest side of anthropocentrism.

---

<sup>46</sup> B. G. Norton, ‘Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism’, *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1984, p. 134.

<sup>47</sup> J. E. White, ‘Article Review of Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism, *Environmental Ethics*’, *Ethics and Animals*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1984, p. 76.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

One of the differences between the weak and strong anthropocentrism arises mainly from their attitudes to the issue of future generations and sustainability. The future generation problem is briefly the question of whether environmental destruction caused by present people violates the rights of future people or whether present people have ethical responsibility concerning the environmental resources towards people of future generations. Strong anthropocentrism claims that people do not have any responsibility to future generations, and humans rightfully can do whatever they like. Their only responsibility is to provide that the environmental resources are sustainable over the long-term for the people of the current generation. On the other hand, weak anthropocentrists argue that people have responsibility to future generations. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that future generations will have access to the same resources we have today; it is enough to be sure that we leave them something. Their main argument is that the acts of today's people do not violate the rights of future people because if the people of current generation changed their policies and did something differently, then the people of future generations, whose rights are supposedly violated, would most likely not exist as they would not be the same people. In short, there are no identifiable 'person's of future generations whereas rights are traditionally assigned to identifiable individuals.

While there is no consensus among defenders of weak anthropocentrism on this point, a version of weak anthropocentrism introduced by some current weak anthropocentrists claims that we can extend intrinsic value to non-humans as well, even though lesser intrinsic value than human beings.

If only humans are of intrinsic value, then human exploitation of nonhumans is restricted only by the potential for direct or indirect harm to fellow humans. In the absence of that, nonhuman nature can be used for any purpose. ... [s]o that the most defensible version anthropocentrism is one which attributes intrinsic value to the members of nonhuman species, albeit, lesser intrinsic value than that of members of the human species.

Given this, exploitation of nonhuman species in order to satisfy human needs requires justification.<sup>49</sup>

#### **2.1.1.4 Intrinsic Value of Human Beings**

One of the main points of contention for non-anthropocentrists is the exclusive ascription of intrinsic value to human beings alone. When an example is asked for an intrinsically valuable thing, the first thing that comes to people's minds is human life. This section opens up the question of what the reasons behind such special treatment of human beings may be. Four main arguments of the western philosophical tradition for the superiority of humans over non-humans are following:<sup>50</sup>

1) The first reason depends on the classical Greek definition of human, that is: Human is a rational animal. Accordingly, human beings having such a distinctive feature are regarded as superior to other existences. Rationality is regarded as a distinctive feature that (it is believed) other living things lack or "have little use for". Therefore, owning 'reason' as a distinctive feature is seen as a source of the intrinsic value humans have.

2) The root of second claim depends on the concept of the "Great Chain of Being", which starts from the perfect existent (God) and progresses downward to the imperfect one. This chain involves infinitely many existents. Within this chain, humans are placed hierarchically over the other non-human entities. This argument

---

<sup>49</sup> B. K. Steverson, 'On the Reconciliation of Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics', in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 2001, p. 284.

<sup>50</sup> In his book, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, P. W. Taylor presents these four arguments and claims that they are actually groundless arguments. For the further information see:

P. W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 129-156.

also finds support by religions. Since humans are created in God's image, they are located above the other existences in the hierarchical structure.

3) Another argument for humans' superiority and due to intrinsic value they have depends on Descartes's body-mind dualism. That is, owning both body and soul, humans are seen superior to non-humans (plants and animals), which have bodies only.

4) The last argument is Lois G. Lombardi's argument, which is a contemporary defense of humans' superiority to non-humans. According to Lombardi, non-humans are not merely instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable. On the other hand, he claims that their intrinsic value is not and cannot be as much as or equal to humans' value. As expressed by Taylor, Lombardi argues that, "the greater the range of an entity's capacities, the higher the degree of its inherent worth".<sup>51</sup> Thus, according to him, since human beings have a greater range of capacities in relation to other entities, humans will always have higher value than non-humans do.

Nevertheless, attributing intrinsic value merely to humans because of owning rationality as a distinctive feature cannot be a satisfactory reason. If the matter is having a distinctive feature, then, nonhumans also have some distinctive features that humans lack. For example, chameleons have the ability to change their colors; cheetahs are the speediest creatures that their speed can reach 120 kilometers within 3 second.

### **2.1.2 Problems of Anthropocentrism**

Many environmental thinkers believe that the separation of self from nature is the reason that lies behind environmental crises. Thus, one of the problems of

---

<sup>51</sup> P. W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, p. 147.

anthropocentrism is the dichotomy it creates between humans and nature. According to anthropocentrism, in situations of value conflict, the interests of humans, no matter how trivial, inarguably have priority over those of non-humans. Nonanthropocentrists question this presumption. On what ground are the interests of human beings superior to those of non-humans? If we dismiss the religious reasons, such as the idea that humans are endowed by God with intrinsic value, anthropocentrists have difficulty explaining why only humans have intrinsic value, and what the ground of the value they have been ascribed is. Having self-consciousness, reason, self-control, and the ability to communicate cannot be acceptable reasons. Additionally, these reasons leave some human beings out of the ethical realm, such as mentally ill people, infants, and people who have lapsed into a vegetative state, people in coma, etc.

Singer finds the attempts to justify the assigning of a higher moral status to human beings over other entities in nature based on Kant's morality (more precisely, on the dignity that merely humans are claimed to have) to be problematic. If a highly sophisticated capacity like moral reasoning and autonomy, which indicates self-consciousness, is taken as a basis for considering human beings as ends-in-themselves, then it follows that not all human beings, but only rational human beings are ends-in-themselves. Singer points out that some people may be so "profoundly mentally retarded" that they will not qualify as rational human beings.<sup>52</sup> He says:

Once we ask why it should be that all human beings – including infants, the intellectually disabled, criminal psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin, and the rest – have some kind of dignity or worth that no elephant, pig, or chimpanzee can ever achieve, we see that this question is as difficult to answer as our original request for some relevant fact that justifies the inequality of humans and other animals.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> P. Singer, 'Speciesism and Moral Status', *Metaphilosophy*, vol. 40, nos. 3-4, 2009, p. 573.

<sup>53</sup> P. Singer, *Animal Liberation*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2002, pp. 239.

Furthermore, I think attributing intrinsic value to humans simply because they were born human is not something that can be easily acceptable. Being human cannot be regarded as a self-evident criterion of being the only creature that has intrinsic value.

In ethics, when the matter is non-humans, one of the most raised questions is why we should care about the interests or desires of non-human entities. What do people lose when a species, a part of wild nature disappears? Routley's Last Man Argument, which asks, "What is wrong with the act of the last man of the world, who destroys all before he dies?" seems to me to be a big challenge in front of anthropocentrism. I think this question has a critical importance. The answer is also the indicator of one's moral perspective: anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric, whether one considers non-human parts of nature as instrumentally or intrinsically valuable.

Routley<sup>54</sup> proposes a thought experiment known as "the last person/man argument". In this example there is only one person left in the world. He knows that he will die soon. From an anthropocentric perspective, there is nothing wrong in his destroying all plants and animals before he dies, because a world without human beings has no value. The last person argument can be a foundation for a non-anthropocentric ethics. The important point is that when you attribute intrinsic value to something, you refrain from damaging it regardless of whether its existence serves any purpose for your ends. For example, if you attribute intrinsic value to a tree, you do not think that after you are gone, the tree will lose its value, so it can be destroyed. On the contrary, you believe that if you were alive, you

---

<sup>54</sup> R. Routley states that, "The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic [human] chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong".

R. Routley, 'Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?', *Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy*, Varna, Sofia Press, 1973, pp. 205-210.

would find it valuable regardless of what it does for you; thus, it seems that it has intrinsic value.

The following considerations will further elaborate the intuition behind this thought experiment and explain why we need a new and non-anthropocentric moral approach to justify the value of non-human parts of nature and nature itself.

Why should humans extend their moral consideration in a way encapsulating the non-human parts of nature? Why do human beings have to feel responsibility to nature? The first thing that comes to mind may be that it is because of their contributions to human survival, to make human life better. Thus, from the perspective of anthropocentrism, what restrains people from exploitation of nature is just the consideration of the long-term interests of humans. Therefore, the achievable last point with anthropocentrism is to treat nature in such a way that the long-term interests of human kind will not be damaged. It is thought that such instrumental reasons are enough to protect/conserves<sup>55</sup> them. For environmental suitability and protection/conservation of the non-human nature (up to some extent), in addition to instrumental anthropocentric reasons (such as further interests of humans or consideration of future generations), aesthetical reasons can be enough to introduce sound arguments, which can be accepted by the majority of society.

---

<sup>55</sup> Conservationism and preservationism are two different approaches in environmental ethics. According to conservationists, “the environment and its resources should be used by humans and managed in a responsible manner.” Conservationists “see the value of the environment as the goods and services that it can provide to people.” Further, conservationism “requires that the environment be used in a way that is sustainable.”

Preservationists, on the other hand, believe that, “humans can have access to the land, but they should only utilize it for its natural beauty and inspiration. They think that the value of the land is not what you can use from it, but instead that land has an intrinsic value, meaning that it is valuable in itself simply by existing.”

Available from <http://education-portal.com/academy/lesson/land-conservation-preserving-and-restoring-ecosystems.html#lesson> (accessed 1 December 2013.)

However, for many environmentalists, the aim is not merely to find a way of securing the lives of non-humans and/or suitability of the environmental resources. The concern is also to involve non-human entities into the ethical realm because of the right reasons, not only due to their instrumental values to humanity, i.e., instrumental reasons.

I object to the claim that anthropocentrism can provide good reasons for the valuation of non-humans in for two reasons. Firstly, it merely includes humans in the ethical realm and non-humans are regarded just as instrumentally valuable. Thus, in any case of conflict of interests, nonhumans or their interest are seen as easily expendable. Within a relation, if the interests of one of the sides are always superior the other's interests or the interests of one of the sides are always seen as expandable over the other, then, this is not a fair relation. For instance, when it comes to the interests of an individual person and the cutting down of a tree, anthropocentrists beforehand take side with the human's interests without questioning why humans' interests are always superior. Hence, the problem with strong anthropocentrists is their valuation of non-human entities merely instrumentally.

The anthropocentric approach to a moral relation between humans and non-humans is like a moral relation between an individual human and another human(s) from the perspective of ethical egoism. Ethical egoism advises giving priority to self-interests over interests of others, or considering others' interests as long as they are related with your own interests. Replacing humans with that individual person and non-humans with other humans, we can make an analogy between the anthropocentrism and ethical egoism. Thus, while ethical egoism prescribes the pursuit of one's self-interest(s) as the primary goal, anthropocentrism prescribes the pursuit of the interests of humans as the primary goal of humans. Therefore, the possible problems of ethical egoism and anthropocentrism are common. A person, who pursues the doctrine of ethical egoism, is accused of selfishness.

Similarly, anthropocentrism is a kind of selfishness on a large scale. Although, a moral relation occurs between two sides as the very nature of definition of a relation, selfishness may ignore one of the sides, and that applies to anthropocentrism as well. In fact, such a line of reasoning eventually leads to speciesism. Because, anthropocentrists (at the heart of the issue) would claim that their own species is better than the other species.

Secondly, although what is done might seem to be the same eventually, doing something for the right reason -without considering its instrumental outcomes- is important. One must not only do the right thing, but have, in Callicott's words, the "right reasons for doing the right thing".<sup>56</sup> On this point, Kantian view, according to which morality is about having a 'good will' and not merely achieving good results, seems to give the right picture about morality. For instance, which one do you prefer? A friend helps you, since your family is rich, you may provide financial support to him/her in the forthcoming days, or just for the name of friendship. Alternatively, your boss provides coffee break to his workers including you just because he thinks it is your right; or because, if you are tired out much, you cannot work efficiently. Consequently, valuing non-human entities just for the sake of their instrumental values to humans does not seem to provide the right motivations for me. Therefore, I think anthropocentrism (neither in a weak, nor in a strong form) fails to provide the right reasons.

Let's examine the issue of doing something for the right reason from the perspective of interhuman ethics. It can be asked (in fact, it has been asked for centuries) why black people should have same rights with white-skinned people? Why do we consider them equal? On what ground? Or, why do we consider women and men equal? Why do we fight for women's rights, their right to work, equal pay, etc.? Why does a woman need to work instead of staying at home and

---

<sup>56</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 244.

caring for their children, if her husband already works and makes good money and fulfills his family needs? Or, do girls need to go to school for education, if their needs are satisfied by their fathers and will be satisfied by their husbands in future? Consequently, questioning why do we should still strive for a non-anthropocentric ethics or try to justify the intrinsic value of nonhumans as long as people are trying to conserve the non-humans and the environment, is similar to the questions in the examples. The valuation and preservation that anthropocentrism promised to non-humans, in principle, is not different from the care provided to women by husbands or fathers. Both are problematic approaches.

Moreover, I think the ‘supposed’ valuation of anthropocentrism is similar to the situation in the following example. Assume that two women live in a villa, one is the owner of the villa, and the other is the nanny of the children. The valuation anthropocentrism promises to non-humans is like the position of these two women. Both might live in the same house, eat the same food on the same table, sit on the same couches, join the same activities/events, etc. However, eventually while one is owner of the house, the other woman is merely a worker. If their interests conflict, it is obvious beforehand whose position is always superior. Everybody knows and is aware of the situation, but they behave as if it is not the case until a conflict case arises. Comparing to the owner of the house, the nanny is the person who will be sacrificed first without any hesitation. Consequently, I argue that an anthropocentric approach to non-humans and nature cannot provide the value they deserve, so, we need something different from an anthropocentric attitude to nature to act from right reasons.

As a matter of fact, as stated by Callicott, some environmental ethicists such as Tom Regan “den[y] that an anthropocentric environmental ethic is an environmental ethic at all. [Regan] prefers to call an anthropocentric environmental ethic ‘a management ethic,’ ‘an ethic *for the use* of the

environment’ as opposed to a genuine environmental ethic which is ‘an ethic of the environment’”.<sup>57</sup>

## **2.2 Attempts to Overcome Anthropocentrism**

Environmental philosophers attempt to disclose ethical reasons, which do not consider nature merely instrumentally valuable to protect it. Consequently, it can be said that, nowadays, the primary motive of seeking intrinsically valuable things in environmental ethics concerns those non-human values in nature.

In the following sections, I will go over some of the most prominent approaches in environmental ethics, which have been introduced to overcome anthropocentrism.

### **2.2.1 Sentiocentrism (Sentientism)**

Sentioentrism, also known as sentientism, claims that all and only sentient beings can be morally concerned. It can be regarded the first attempt to overcome the anthropocentric approach to non-humans, and the basic form of non-anthropocentrism. Although it is not good enough to grasp the environmental issues and to be a remedy to environmental problem, it is important. Because -it may not be wrong to say that- it is the first outstanding approach that challenged the anthropocentric approach to non-humans. Since, in general, it puts the capacity for pleasure and/or pain as the moral criterion; contrary to anthropocentrism, it includes the sentient animals in the ethical realm, as well as human beings. The most prominent approaches, which are grounded on sentioentrism, are animal welfare, animal liberation, and animal rights. Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Joel

---

<sup>57</sup> J. B. Callicott, ‘Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 306, notes 3.

Feinberg can be counted as the central figures of sentiocentrism.<sup>58</sup> Although they share the main claim of sentiocentrism, their approaches differ in details. That is, while Singer introduces a utilitarian approach, Regan introduces a rights-based approach based on Kantian ethics, and while Singer's criterion for being counted as a member of a moral community is being "capable of feeling pleasure and/or pain"; Regan's criterion, on the other hand, is to be a "subject of a life".

However, claiming that the expansion of moral consideration beyond humans begins with Singer would be injustice to utilitarian J. Bentham and J. S. Mill. Contrary to most of his contemporaries, Bentham refused to exclude animals from moral consideration, and he defended the inclusion of the pleasures and pains of all sentient beings in the calculation of the total happiness of society. I think it would not be wrong to say that utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill constitutes the basis of the Singer's sentiocentrism. I am quoting Bentham's famous passage as follows:

It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of

---

<sup>58</sup> Although sometimes Regan and Singer are not regarded as sentiocentric, I will count them among the prominent defenders of sentiocentrism, like Gary Varner, Raffaele Rodogno, and some others did.

Gary Varner says that, "While Peter Singer [...] uses the term to refer to consciousness of pleasure and pain, Joel Feinberg [...] and Tom Regan defend sentient ethics but make animals' moral standing depend on their consciously striving for things in the future, a capacity which may be less widespread in the animal kingdom than is bare consciousness of pain." G. Varner, 'Sentientism', in D. Jamieson (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 192.

Additionally, Raffaele Rodogno says that, "I will take the views of Peter Singer, Joel Feinberg, and Tom Regan to be representative of sentientist ethics."

R. Rodogno, 'Sentientism, Wellbeing, and Environmentalism', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2010, p. 84.

Another reference where Peter Singer is regarded as sentiocentric: M. Bekoff and C. A. Meaney, (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare*, New York, Routledge, 1998, p. 159.

reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?<sup>59</sup>

### 2.2.1.1 Singer's Utilitarianism

With his well-known book, *Animal Liberation*, Peter Singer has drawn attention to the moral status of animals. The book is celebrated as “the bible of the animal liberation movement.”<sup>60</sup> According to Singer, being capable of suffering and/or enjoyment of happiness is a prerequisite deserving moral consideration. He gives the example of stone, that is, since it does not suffer, we cannot mention interests of a stone that is kicked along the road by a child. It is nonsense to speak of torturing a stone. It possibly will not make any difference to the stone what people do to it. On the other hand, when it comes to a mouse, any harm to it will cause suffering of it.<sup>61</sup> Singer claims as follows:

If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering –in so far as rough comparisons can be made– of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience [...] is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this boundary by some characteristic

---

<sup>59</sup> J. Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chapter XVII: of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, 1. Limits between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation, § 1, XVII.6, footnote: 122. Library of Economics and Liberty, 1907, Available from <http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML18.html>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

<sup>60</sup> After speaking of the positive changes in attitudes towards animals, Singer states, “I am not sure how much credit *Animal Liberation* can take for this change. Popular magazine writers have given it the tag line “the bible of the animal liberation movement.” It is a line that I cannot help finding flattering, but it makes me uncomfortable at the same time. I don’t believe in bibles: no book has a monopoly on truth. In any case, no book can achieve anything unless it strikes a chord in its readers.” P. Singer, *Animal Liberation*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2002, p. xv.

<sup>61</sup> P. Singer, ‘All Animals are Equal’ in P. Singer (ed.), *Applied Ethics*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 222.

like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary way.  
Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin color?<sup>62</sup>

While forming his Animal Liberation view, Singer inspired by the liberation movements of women, black, gay, etc. Thus, what lies at the heart of Singer's animal liberation approach is the concept of 'equality'. However, the equality in his mind is not the 'equality of treatment', but the equal 'consideration of interests', i.e., he does not say that we should treat both animals and humans exactly in the same way. He contends that, animals' interests deserve the equal consideration with the interests of human beings. That is, the interest of a cat, a child, or a famous scientist should be equally considered, and none of the interests can be neglected comparing to the other(s). For example, the interests of a cat should not be discounted while comparing with the interests of Mother Teresa; both of them deserve equal moral respect. Thus, Singer claims that people should cease the discrimination based on 'speciesism'.

Actually, the term speciesism appeared firstly in 1970 in the pamphlet named as 'speciesism' that was written to protest against experimenting on animals by British psychologist and an animal-liberation activist Richard D. Ryder.<sup>63</sup> However, the term is popularized by Singer. He contends that, "'speciesism' [...] is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species", and asks, "If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit non-humans for the same purpose?"<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> P. Singer, 'All Animals are Equal' in P. Singer (ed.), *Applied Ethics*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 222.

<sup>63</sup> A. Taylor, *Animals & Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., Canada, Broadview Press, 2009, p. 9.

<sup>64</sup> P. Singer, *Animal Liberation*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2002, p. 6.

Depending on the main utilitarian precept, Singer claims that, a morally right act is to decrease the pain as much as possible regardless of whether a human or an animal is suffering; to be a sentience being is enough for this. Thus, pain of humans and animals should be concerned equally. On the other hand, for example, watching a play at a theatre may give much pleasure/pain to me. However, it might not make any difference to a pig. Humans and animals value the acts/events differently. Singer accepts that, it is not easy to compare the pleasure or pain of different species, but he argues that, pain of different people cannot be easily compared, either.<sup>65</sup> For example, listening classical to music gives me pleasure and I like it much, but it may not give that much pleasure to my mother; even, it may give pain to her.

Singer objects to attribution of intrinsic worth/value merely to human kind as follows:

There is another claim that one often hears: that humans and no others have intrinsic worth and dignity, and that is why humans have superior status. This is really just a piece of rhetoric unless it is given some support. What is it about human beings that gives them moral worth and dignity? If there is no good answer forthcoming, this talk of intrinsic worth and dignity is just speciesism in nicer terms. I do not see any argument in the claim that merely being a member of the species *Homo sapiens* gives you moral worth and dignity, whereas being a member of the species *Pan troglodytes* (chimpanzees) does not give you worth and dignity. Something more would need to be said.<sup>66</sup>

Thus, Singer claims that sentient animals can also be regarded as intrinsically valuable as well as rational human beings depending on his criterion, which is “capable of feeling pleasure and/or pain”, to be morally concerned.

Singer asserts, while it is a matter that will result in suffering of a human or an animal, before giving your decision, consider the total effect of your decision. He says assume you are faced with such a situation: a normal adult human and a dog

---

<sup>65</sup> H. Ünder, *Çevre Felsefesi: Etik ve Metafizik Görüşler*, Ankara, Doruk Yayıncılık, 1996, p. 170.

<sup>66</sup> P. Singer, ‘Speciesism and Moral Status’, *Metaphilosophy*, vol. 40, nos. 3–4, 2009, p. 573.

are in danger of losing their lives. Nevertheless, you can save only one of them, and you need to choose whom you will save: the human or the dog. He argues that, the right decision is to save the life of the normal adult human over the dog. According to Singer, although this decision may appear speciesist at first glance, in fact, it is not. The decision is not given because this person is a member of our own species, but in this specific case, the total utility ought to be on side with the human interests. Singer says that, while he is taking that decision, he took both human's and the dog's interests into account equally. This person has "capacity for self-awareness and the ability to plan for the future and have meaningful relations with others",<sup>67</sup> his family, and friends will suffer more than the dog. Further, this person has the potential of increasing the happiness in future more than the dog has. In another case, the reverse may hold true. For example, a chimpanzee, a dog, or a pig might deserve right to live comparing with a severely retarded infant or senile humans.<sup>68</sup> Singer introduces some criteria that make an individual's life more valuable than lives of others. Those criteria are to have higher degree of self-awareness and greater capacity for meaningful relations with others.<sup>69</sup> Consequently, according to Singer's animal rights theory, "As long as we remember that we should give the same respect to the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those human beings at a similar mental level we shall not go far wrong".<sup>70</sup>

### **2.2.1.2 Regan's Right Base Approach**

Tom Regan, a contemporary of P. Singer, has also great contribution to moral philosophy with his attempts including the 'higher' animals<sup>71</sup> to moral realm by

---

<sup>67</sup> P. Singer, *Animal Liberation*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2002, p. 19.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>71</sup> According to Regan, not all of animals and plants, but just higher-order animals are intrinsically valuable.

means of his animal rights theory, especially with his book, *The Case for Animal Rights Theory*.

Regan presents his animal rights theory mainly by introducing two major objections to utilitarianism. According to the first one, although utilitarianism seems to care for individuals, actually it regards them merely as replaceable receptacles of value. He makes an analogy with a cup. That is, a cup is only a receptacle for its content. The liquid that constitutes the content of the cup can be sweet, bitter or a mixture of both. The value of cup comes merely from its content; the cup itself has no value. In the same way, utilitarians treat individuals like this cup. Individuals themselves have no value; like the cup, they are seen only as receptacles. Thus, he says that, from the utilitarian perspective, our values come from “what we serve as receptacles for; our feelings of satisfaction have positive value, our feelings of frustration negative value.”<sup>72</sup>

According to Regan’s second objection, by nature, utilitarianism allows to justify any evil means for the sake of total satisfaction/happiness of others/society. (For example, Killing Aunt Bea for the name of helping children). Regan speaks of that, two main and also appealing principles of utilitarianism are equality and (total) utility. It is expected that because of its egalitarianism, –that is, everyone’s interests count and none of them is more important than the other one, no matter whose interests they are, all have equal weight or importance– in principle, utilitarianism will not allow the discrimination. However, since utilitarianism is an aggregative theory, the consequence, which concerns the whole people’s benefit, would not be good in terms of each individual. To clarify what is wrong with the aggregative aspect of utilitarianism, Regan gives an example about his old and rich Aunt Bea. Aunt Bea will leave all of her money to him after her death. He says if he would manage to get the money sooner, then he plans to donate some

---

<sup>72</sup> T. Regan, ‘Animal Rights: The Kantian Case’ in M. J. Smith (ed.), *Thinking through the Environment: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 157.

money to a local children's hospital to decrease the amount of tax bite that he will have to pay. Then, he begins to think killing Aunt Bea. And, he believes he can manage to kill her with the help of her doctor, who also has an eye on her money. Hence, this help will decrease the chance of being caught in a considerable amount. Regan asks, according to utilitarianism, whether there is any moral wrong if he kills Aunt Bea and donates some money to the hospital. In terms of an aggregative theory, if we consider the total satisfaction, then Regan did not do something wrong.<sup>73</sup>

However, Regan claims that, killing Aunt Bea for the sake of increasing the total satisfaction of others/society is morally wrong. Because, you treat her as mere means to some others' ends that violates her rights. Therefore, concerning this example, it is morally wrong to kill Aunt Bea. Good results cannot justify use of an evil means by violating the rights of any individuals; this would be a disregardful treatment to Aunt Bea and her rights. If we do not respect the inherent value of an individual, then we violate its rights. So, in this respect, Regan did not regard utilitarianism as an adequate moral theory.<sup>74</sup>

Thus, Regan adopts right base approach rather than utilitarianism. Regan's animal rights theory gets its strength from Kantian principles, which lie at the heart of it. Like Kant, he also believes in the blessedness of life, and recommends that, while acting towards others, treat them as ends-in-themselves, not merely as a means to an end. So, contrary to Singer, he rejects utilitarian approach. Regan's criterion for being an object of moral concern is being a "subject of a life". He says that, the "subject of a life" is something more than just being alive and conscious, and explains what he means with the "subject of a life" as follows:

Individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires;  
perception memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future;

---

<sup>73</sup> Regan, 'Animal Rights: The Kantian Case' in M. J. Smith (ed.), *Thinking through the Environment: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 157.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests.<sup>75</sup>

Regan claims that, everything that is a "subject of a life" has inherent value. He says that, "To say we have such value is to say that we are something more than, something different from, mere receptacles."<sup>76</sup>

Concerning the environment, Regan defends the objectivity of values. Instead of intrinsic value, he uses the term inherent value. Nevertheless, being a subject of life is just a sufficient condition, but not the necessary condition of having inherent value. The inherent value is not given or something individuals earned because of their species or their race, religion, sex, etc. or some special abilities, intelligence, talents, etc. they have. He says as follows:

The presence of *inherent value* in a natural object is independent of any awareness, interest, or appreciation of it by any conscious being. This does not tell us what objects are inherently good or why, only that *if* an object is inherently good its value must inhere in (be in) the object itself. Inherent value is not conferred upon objects in the manner of an honorary degree. Like other properties in nature, it must be discovered.<sup>77</sup>

Additionally, he claims "inherent goodness depends on an object's own properties" and "inherent goodness is a value possessed by the object

---

<sup>75</sup> T. Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, California, University of California Press, 1985, p. 243.

<sup>76</sup> T. Regan, 'Animal Rights: The Kantian Case' in M. J. Smith (ed.), *Thinking through the Environment: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 158.

<sup>77</sup> T. Regan, 'The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1981, pp. 30-31.

independently of any awareness is reemphasized.”<sup>78</sup> Further, “The inherent value of a natural object is an objective property of that object.”<sup>79</sup>

According to Regan, “Inherent value, then, belongs equally to those who are the experiencing subjects of a life/Whether it belongs to others - to rocks and rivers, trees and glaciers, for example —we do not know and may never know.”<sup>80</sup> If an individual has inherent value, then it also possesses the right to be treated with respect. And, it is wrong to treat in a way that as if it is merely a resource, or an instrument. Its value is independent of its usefulness to others.

Furthermore, concerning animals, Regan says that, they might not have higher capabilities/abilities those humans have, such as reading, doing mathematics, speaking, reason, etc. However, it is morally wrong to violate their rights, not respecting their values, or claiming they have less inherent value than human beings. Because, many human beings (a child, a mentally ill person, etc.) already lack such capabilities. Furthermore, Regan does not make any gradation among inherently valuable things; inherent value does not come in degrees. That means every individual, which is inherently valuable, has that value equally.

Depending on his rights theory, Regan presents some principles to apply when we need to make a decision about individuals with inherent value. In the case of conflicts, if it is inevitable that some innocents will have damage/harm, he suggests to apply to the miniride (minimize overriding principle) and worse-off

---

<sup>78</sup> T. Regan, ‘The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic’, *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1981, pp. 30-31.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>80</sup> T. Regan, ‘Animal Rights: The Kantian Case’ in M. J. Smith (ed.), *Thinking through the Environment: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 159.

principles to make a decision.<sup>81</sup> When harms are comparable *prima facie*, it is advised to apply the miniride principle, if not then to apply the worse-off principle.

The miniride principle is that:

Special consideration aside, when we must choose between overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights of few who are innocent, and when each affected individual will be damaged in a *prima facie* comparable ways, then we ought to choose to override the rights of the few in preference to overriding the rights of the many.<sup>82</sup>

Regan explains the worse-off principle as follows:

Special consideration aside, when we must decide to override the rights of many or the rights of few who are innocent, and when the harm faced by the few would make them worse-off than any of the many would be if any other options were chosen, then we ought to override the rights of the many.<sup>83</sup>

Presenting the example of miners, he argues that, in some cases, it is permissible to harm or to allow the death of innocent people. Assume that, after a disaster at a mine coal, you are put in a position that you have to choose one of these situations: if you allow one of miners to die, then rest of them will be rescued, or if you do nothing, then fifty of them will die. He says that, in such cases, according to miniride principle, it is the right decision to sacrifice one miner for the sake of the other miners. Because, in that case, you will just override the rights of one person, the rights of fifty miners will not be overridden, and if you do not take this decision, then fifty people will die and rights of fifty people will be overridden.

In the second version of the example, he assumes either you allow one of miners to die and rest of them will be rescued without any harm, or you also save this one miner for the expense of that, the other miners will have some broken arms, legs,

---

<sup>81</sup> T. Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, California, University of California Press, 1985, pp. 302, 305, 308.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, p. 305.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*.

etc. Regan says that, in this case, according to worse-off principle, the right decision is saving this one person for the expense of the rest of them paying a price. Because, fifty broken arms, legs, etc. can be an affordable price if the alternative is the death of a person.

With another example, Regan argues that, death of an animal is not as bad as the death of a human being. Because, as stated by him, comparing to death of a human beings, death of an animal forecloses fewer opportunities for satisfaction. That is, suppose you are left in an unavoidable position that you have to choose between allowing an animal or a human to die. It is advised to choose let the animal to die. He presents the example, known as lifeboat case. Regan says assume that there are four people and a dog on a lifeboat. However, boat has difficulty to support all of them. So, one should be thrown to the sea, otherwise all will die. According to Regan, in such a situation, the right action is to throw the dog over boat. Since their harm cannot be comparable, we cannot decide the right action based on the miniride principle. On the other hand, according to worse-off principle, the death of a dog would not lead to as great harm as the death of a human. So the dog must be thrown.

Related with this example, Angus Taylor criticizes Regan's attitude, and states, "Even in a case where we must choose between four humans and a million dogs, the million dogs should be sacrificed because death would be less of a harm for any of them than it would be for any of the humans."<sup>84</sup> So, it seems, this principle requires throwing of all dogs, it does not matter how many dogs exist. Nonetheless, I think this seems contradictory with Regan's equal inherent value theory. Additionally, Dale Jamieson criticizes this case saying that, "in a case like this,

---

<sup>84</sup> A. Taylor, *Animals & Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate*, Canada, Broadview Press, 2003, p. 70.

one feels as though the principle of equal inherent value is sliding from our grasp. Like the animals in George Orwell's book, *Animal Farm*, "all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others".<sup>85</sup>

Consequently, as a general characteristic of animal rights movement, it is not opposite to or the alternative of human rights movement. On the contrary, they rest on same theoretical ground. The people, who struggle for animal rights, also struggle for human rights, e.g., the rights of women, blacks, or minorities, etc.<sup>86</sup>

Furthermore, criticizing the indirect duty views towards animals, Regan claims we have some direct duties towards animals, as we have some direct duties to human beings.<sup>87</sup> Further, he mentions two approaches, which defend the direct duties towards animals. Although mainly they defend direct duties to animals, Regan did not find their position good enough for the protection the animal rights. According to the first one, which Regan calls as "the cruelty-kindness view", people have a direct duty to be kind and not be cruel towards animals. Regan says that, "There is no guarantee that a kind act is a right act."<sup>88</sup> He says that, for example, I might be a generous racist. Then, within a group of people, I will be disposed to behave kindly to the people, who are members of my own race comparing the other people. Therefore, to be kind towards animals is not alone good enough to apply as a decision criteria.<sup>89</sup>

Regan's second critic is about experimenting on animals in laboratories for the scientific purposes. He says that, some people think that we have direct duties not

---

<sup>85</sup> D. Jamieson, *Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 120.

<sup>86</sup> T. Regan, 'The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights' in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2001, p. 329.

<sup>87</sup> T. Regan, 'Animal Rights: The Kantian Case' in M. J. Smith (ed.), *Thinking through the Environment: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 155.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

to be cruel towards animals. Actually, they conditionally defend this argument. While researchers do experiments on animals, values of these animals reduced to merely usefulness to others, and their rights routinely and systematically violated. However, according to people, who conditionally defend the view of direct duty towards animals, these experiments should be abolished if the animals are used in trivial, duplicative, unnecessary, or unwise researches; but, if animals are used in a research, which seems to bring great benefits to humans/humanity, then such an experimenting on animals should be tolerable and can be permissible. On the other hand, Regan harshly rejects the use of animals in laboratories for whatever reason it might be. He claims the reasons those make why experimenting on animals is wrong are also covered by the reasons those make why it is wrong to experiment on human beings. Consequently, he says that, “The best we can do when it comes to using animals in science is not to use them. That is where our duty lies, according to the rights view.”<sup>90</sup> He also takes similar abolitionist position for the commercial animal agriculture, factory farming. The fundamental moral wrong here is not that “animals are kept in stressful close confinement or in isolation, or that their pain and suffering, their needs and preferences are ignored or discounted”, etc.<sup>91</sup> The fundamental wrong is, these animals are “viewed and treated as lacking independent value, as resources for us - as, indeed, a renewable resource.”<sup>92</sup> Regan contends that providing them with larger space, better nourishment, cleaner cages, etc. does not repair that fundamental wrong done towards them. Consequently, we can say that, since using animals in scientific researches violates the respect principle, it cannot be defended by miniride, worse-off, or liberty principles. So, it is clear that, Regan categorically opposes it and defends the total abolition of animal researches, contrary to Singer, who permits

---

<sup>90</sup> T. Regan, ‘The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights’ in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2001, p. 329.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

the use of animals and also humans in researches if the possible outcomes, benefits are reasonably good enough.

### 2.2.1.3 Problems of Sentiocentrism

Many objections are raised against the animal rights and animal liberation approaches. Here I will mention the prominent ones. The main criticism to sentiocentrism is about the narrowness of its scope of moral consideration. Since sentiocentrism only values the sentient beings, it does not morally concern some of humans and animals, which do not feel pain, and plants, and the other entities in nature. According to this criticism, since the animal rights or animal liberation movements are essentially individualistic, they ignore and are also incapable of providing justification for the protection of species, biodiversity, ecosystems, etc.

Callicott examines and criticizes the ethical hedonism theories. According to him, classical utilitarianism as ethical hedonism is simply non-anthropocentric<sup>93</sup> because, it extends the limit of moral considerability into some of nonhumans. On the other hand, it limits moral considerability to only those beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain”, thus it is insufficient in terms of environmental ethics demands. Thus, non-anthropocentrism is simply assumed/regarded as non-instrumental valuation of non-human entities. However, classical utilitarianism “limits moral considerability to only those beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain”.<sup>94</sup>

Additionally, Callicott says that, “Like both the utilitarian and deontological variations of normal ethics, it assigns intrinsic value to *discrete individuals*”<sup>95</sup> Hence, they are inadequate to embrace the holistic unities in nature; they cannot

---

<sup>93</sup> J. B. Callicott, ‘Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 300.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 301.

be an alternative to be an environmental ethics. In reference to this inadequacy, Callicott puts 'land ethic' against the 'animal liberation' movement that will be discussed as follows:

The ethical foundations of the "animal liberation" movement are compared with those of Aldo Leopold's "land ethic," which is taken as the paradigm for environmental ethics in general. [...] While only sentient animals are morally considerable according to the humane ethic, the land ethic includes within its purview plants as well as animals and even soils and waters. Nor does the land ethic prohibit the hunting, killing, and eating of certain animal species, in sharp contrast to the humane ethic. The humane ethic rests upon Benthamic foundations: pain is taken to be the ultimate evil and it is reductive or atomistic in its moral focus. The land ethic, on the other hand, is holistic in the sense that the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community is its *sumum bonum*.<sup>96</sup>

Further, he argues that the "animal liberation" movement in particular (but in general all ethical hedonistic approaches) depends on the principle of feelings of "pain and pleasure" are inadequate to morally concern collective or holistic entities such as species, biocoenoses, biomes, and the biosphere itself.<sup>97</sup>

On the other hand, supporters of animal rights or animal liberation state that, being an individualist does not mean that people ought to be indifferent to the extinction of a species. Nevertheless, animal rights supporters have some reservations on this issue. If people begin to think that it is worse to kill an animal that belongs to a species which is about to go extinct than it is to kill an animal that belongs a species which has plenty of members, then people might wrongly start believing that killing animals that belong to unthreatened species is acceptable.

---

<sup>96</sup> J. B. Callicott, 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1980, p. 311.

<sup>97</sup> J. B. Callicott, 'Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 301.

In general, animal rights defenders believe that animals are raised to a higher status, to the level of humans, with the attribution of rights to them. However, in fact, they treat animals like disabled people or babies/infants, and their different nature is ignored. Their different biological nature is not seen just as difference but as if they are handicapped.<sup>98</sup>

Lastly, what is suggested as animal rights, are rules that are constituted from human's perspective, so that what is done with those rules is nothing more than the domestication of animals. So, it is claimed that, the right behavior is to leave them alone, respecting their life area.<sup>99</sup>

### 2.2.2 Biocentrism

Biocentrism enlarges the scope of moral consideration of the sentiocentrism, and claims all individual living beings have intrinsic moral worth. Therefore, it is also called a life-centered position. Since all living beings are teleological centers of life, all of them have goods of their own. Paul W. Taylor and Albert Schweitzer are the prominent supporters of biocentrism.

Both biocentrism and ecocentrism are life-centered approaches. Therefore, some philosophers, such as Sahotra Sarkar,<sup>100</sup> Holmes Rolston III, make no distinction between them, and call both approaches under name of biocentrism (or both are called ecocentrism by some others). However, I share the same opinion with the philosophers, who prefer to distinguish them, such as P. S. Wenz. Because, while

---

<sup>98</sup> H. Ünder, *Çevre Felsefesi: Etik ve Metafizik Görüşler*, Ankara, Doruk Yayıncılık, 1996, pp. 178-179.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> H. Rolston III, *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988, cited in S. Sarkar, *Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy: An Introduction*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 68.

biocentrism attributes values to individuals, ecocentrism attributes values to collective or composite entities such as species, communities, ecosystems, etc.<sup>101</sup> Consequently, according to biocentrism, “living organisms all possess self-awareness, reason, sensitivity, a memory, psychological identity and desires, etc. in the same way or in varying degrees (slight differences).”<sup>102</sup>

### 2.2.2.1 Albert Schweitzer

Albert Schweitzer one of the earliest biocentrists, is known for his principle, the ‘reverence for life’. Schweitzer defines his principle of ‘reverence for life’ as, “It is good to maintain and to encourage life; it is bad to destroy life or obstruct it.”<sup>103</sup> Schweitzer explains the fundamental and absolute principle of ethics as follows:

At the same time the man who has become a thinking being feels a compulsion to give to every will to live the same reverence for life that he gives to his own. He experiences that other life in his own. He accepts as good preserving life, promoting life, developing all life that is capable of development to its highest possible value. He considers as evil destroying life, injuring life, repressing life that is capable of development. This is the absolute, fundamental principle of ethics, and it is a fundamental postulate of thought.<sup>104</sup>

If we analyze the dictum of “reverence for life”, we see that, the notion of reverence includes respect and awe, ethics and spirituality; and with the life, Schweitzer implies the individual humans, animals, and plants, which are also

---

<sup>101</sup> P. S. Wenz, *Environmental Justice*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1988, p. 272.

<sup>102</sup> G. G. Arsene, *The Human-Nature Relationship: The Emergence of Environmental Ethics*, p. 27. Available from [http://bioethics.agrocampus-ouest.eu/infoglueDeliverLive/digitalAssets/57485\\_51EN-human-nature-relationship.pdf](http://bioethics.agrocampus-ouest.eu/infoglueDeliverLive/digitalAssets/57485_51EN-human-nature-relationship.pdf) (accessed 11 February 2013).

<sup>103</sup> A. Schweitzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization*, trans. C. T. Campion, New York, Prometheus Books, 1987, p. 309.

<sup>104</sup> A. Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought: An Autobiography*, trans. A. B. Lemke, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, p. 157.

interconnected.<sup>105</sup> Concerning the principle of reverence for life, Schweitzer asserts that, it arises from the will to live that is inspired by thought of acceptance of the life and ethics, which are interconnected, too.

Further, Schweitzer adds,

The most immediate fact of man's consciousness is the assertion "I am life that wills to live in the midst of life that wills to live," and it is as will to live in the midst of will to live that man conceives himself at every moment that he spends meditating on himself and the world around him.<sup>106</sup>

A. Schweitzer did not develop his principle as a response to increasing amount of environmental problems; instead, his aim was to provide another perspective(s) to the people, who want to reorient their values against the increasing amount of destructive attitudes of humans towards nature.<sup>107</sup> Schweitzer claims that, since Western civilizations abandoned affirmation of life as the ethical foundation, they have been decaying.<sup>108</sup> He believed human activities degrade the environment. Thus, he focused on reconnecting the relation between the humans and nature. Additionally, he defends to enhance the awareness and respect of people for the intrinsic value of each member of environment and for the environment as a whole. Furthermore, he defends to enhance the awareness of people on environment, and to provide that people show respect for the intrinsic value of each member of environment and for the environment as a whole.

---

<sup>105</sup> M. W. Martin, *Albert Schweitzer's Reverence for Life: Ethical Idealism and Self-Realization*, England, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007, p. 1.

<sup>106</sup> A. Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought: An Autobiography*, trans. A. B. Lemke, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, p. 156.

<sup>107</sup> J. C. Evans, *With Respect for Nature: Living as Part of the Natural World*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2005, p. 77.

<sup>108</sup> J. Brabazon, *Albert Schweitzer: Essential Writings*, 1977, New York, p. 122.

Schweitzer's principle requires respecting all life forms without any distinction between the valuable and more valuable, high or low, rich or poor, etc. In other words, it is nonhierarchical. As Mouchang Yu and Yi Lei stated, Schweitzer regards such distinctions as too subjective, because he thinks they just depend on feelings of people. Furthermore, Schweitzer believes that such kind of distinctions seems to imply that there are some individuals, whose lives have no value and therefore those individuals can be injured or harmed.<sup>109</sup> Moreover, making such distinctions is morally wrong; a genuine moral person respects all life forms. Schweitzer believed in the sacredness of all life forms and all living things. The sacredness brings about a sense of responsibility that characterizes a genuine ethical stance; and ethics is responsibility to all living things.<sup>110</sup>

I should remind that, Schweitzer did not present the "reverence for life" as an ethical rule, which determines what we should do; he regards it as an attitude towards the environment/nature that determines who we are.<sup>111</sup> With that principle, he only aimed to establish a positive worldview. I think, for that reason, he did not suggest any rules to apply in the case of conflicts. M. Yu and Y. Lei briefly summarize the Schweitzer position as follows:

[T]he ethic of reverence for life or loving all life forms must make us realize that we can not avoid destroying and harming life. If we are not callous, we will experience considerable mental conflict. To avoid such conflict, we should be fully aware that life is sacred and all lives are an inseparable whole and have the desire to survive, which we should respect. This is the basis of the ethic of reverence for life. The protection, flourishing, and increase of the value of life should be regarded as the basis

---

<sup>109</sup> M. Yu and Y. Lei, 'Biocentric Ethical Theories', *Environment and Development*, vol. 2., Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, pp. 253-261.

<sup>110</sup> P. Cicovacki, 'Reverence for Life – A Moral Value or the Moral Value?', *Lyceum*, vol. 9, no. 1, Fall 2007, p.3, <http://lyceumphilosophy.com/9-1/Lyceum-9-1.pdf>, accessed 1 June 2014.

<sup>111</sup> J. R. Desjardins, *Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy*, 4th edn., Canada, Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, p. 133.

of morality, and as the starting point of the ethic of reverence for life as well.<sup>112</sup>

Such an ethics of reverence is reminiscent of an alternative interpretation of the Christian doctrines on non-human parts of nature and on human relation to nature that is practiced by Saint Francis of Assisi. As L. White explains, Saint Francis of Assisi “tried to substitute the idea of the equality of all creatures, including man, for the idea of man’s limitless rule of creation.”<sup>113</sup> He explains:

Francis tried to depose man from his monarchy over creation and set up a democracy of all God’s creatures. With him the ant is no longer simply a homily for the lazy, flames a sign of the thrust of the soul toward union with God; now they are Brother Ant and Sister Fire, praising the Creator in their own ways as Brother Man does in his.<sup>114</sup>

Consequently, White says that, “I propose Francis as a patron saint for ecologists.”<sup>115</sup> However, as White states, Francis failed in his aim; he was not understood in his time.

#### **2.2.2.2 Paul W. Taylor**

P. Taylor introduced a much more inclusive and broad account of biocentrism than Schweitzer did. His position is known as biocentric egalitarianism, which demands respect for all living organism. Like Schweitzer, Taylor defends a nonhierarchical approach.

He regards human beings as members of a community just like other living beings, and contends that none of the living beings has a privileged position over the others. Anthropocentrists can easily object to such egalitarianism by pointing out

---

<sup>112</sup> M. Yu and Y. Lei, ‘Biocentric Ethical Theories’, *Environment and Development*, vol. 2, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, pp. 253-261.

<sup>113</sup> L. White, Jr., ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis’, *Science*, vol. 155, no. 3767, 1967, p. 1207.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1206.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1207.

that nonhuman human beings do not have the moral capacities that human beings have and therefore they are not morally equal to human beings. Thus, for example, it would be problematic, according to anthropocentrists, to grant rights to nonhuman entities because they are not capable of respecting human's rights or reciprocating our moral consideration of them in a similar way.

In response to this objection, Paul W. Taylor introduces a distinction between what he calls a 'moral agent' and 'moral subject' (moral subject also known/calls as moral patient). He explains, "What is moral agent?" as follows:

A moral agent, for both types of ethics (*human ethics and environmental ethics*<sup>116</sup>), is any being that possesses those capacities by virtue of which it can act morally or immorally, can have duties and responsibilities, and can be held accountable for what it does. Among these capacities, the most important are the ability to form judgments about right and wrong; the ability to engage in moral deliberation, that is, to consider and weigh moral reasons for and against various courses of conduct open to choice; the ability to make decisions on the basis of those reasons; the ability to exercise the necessary resolve and willpower to carry out those decisions; and the capacity to hold oneself answerable to others for failing to carry them out.<sup>117</sup>

Thus, not all human and non-human beings are moral agents, but all of them are moral subjects. Taylor says that, "In the role of moral *subjects* they can be treated rightly or wrongly by others (who are then moral agents with respect to them)."<sup>118</sup> He defines 'moral subject' as "any being that can be treated rightly or wrongly and toward whom moral agents can have duties and responsibilities. Now it must be possible for such beings to have their conditions of existence be made better or worse by the actions of agents."<sup>119</sup> What makes a moral subject worthy of moral concern, according to Taylor, is that it has a good of its own. Taylor does not make

---

<sup>116</sup> Italics mine.

<sup>117</sup> P. W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, p. 14.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

any distinction among living beings as anthropocentrism and sentiocentrism do. Every organism has a purpose and reason for existence. Thus, Taylor asserts that all living organisms are 'teleological center of life'. Their actions are directed toward the accomplishment of their distinctive goals during their lives such that their conditions "can be made better or worse" by our actions. In other words, "moral subjects must be entities that can be harmed or benefited"<sup>120</sup> and towards which, therefore, we have moral duties.

While moral agents are bearer of moral responsibilities, "moral patients are things towards which moral agents can have moral responsibilities."<sup>121</sup> Consequently, distinction of the moral agent and moral subject can make it possible to involve non-human entities into the ethical realm.

Taylor presents the moral rules, which a moral agent ought to follow, after introducing firstly the moral principle as *respect for nature* and secondly *biocentric outlook* on nature and four beliefs that establish the core of the biocentric outlook, as the third part of his moral theory.

The principle of 'respect for nature' states that all living things have inherent worth. Taylor explains what it means to possess inherent worth for a living thing as follows:

To say that it possesses inherent worth is to say that its good is deserving of the concern and consideration of all moral agents, and that the realization of its good has intrinsic value, to be pursued as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is.<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>120</sup> P. W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, p. 17.

<sup>121</sup> M. Winston, *Moral Patients*, 2008, § 2, <http://ethicsofglobalresponsibility.blogspot.com/2008/02/moral-patients.html>. (accessed 1 July 2013).

<sup>122</sup> P. W. Taylor, 'The Ethics of Respect for Nature', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1981, p. 201.

As we can see from this quote, the principle of respect for all living organism is an extension of the Kantian principle of respect for persons.

According to biocentrism, there is an interconnection between all members of nature; everything in nature is connected to everything else. Therefore, every member needs others in order to survive. Taylor presents his philosophical worldview under the name of the “biocentric outlook on nature”. If people properly comprehend the biocentric outlook, it will provide them with the required background for the explanation and justification of the respectful attitude towards nature.<sup>123</sup> He presents four main beliefs arguing that being in accord with these beliefs will help people to develop a coherent outlook on natural world, to grasp the proper place of human beings in the natural world, and to establish a fitting human-nature relation. Those are as follows:<sup>124</sup>

1. Human beings are members of earth’s community of life just like all other living things.

(According to biocentrism, there is an interconnection between all members of nature; everything in nature is connected to everything else.)

Therefore,

2. All species are part of a system of interdependence such that in addition to the other physical conditions of their environment, the survival of each living things depends on others.

(Every member needs others in order to survive).

---

<sup>123</sup> P. W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, p. 99.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

3. All living things are teleological centers of life, that means, each of them have their own goods in their own ways.
4. Humans are not inherently superior to other living things; they have no greater inherent worth than any other living thing.

Biocentrists, especially Taylor, object to the anthropocentric assertion, which ascribes a superior position to the humans. Non-humans also have some distinctive abilities that humankind does not possess, such as the ability to fly, to breathe under the water, to change the skin coloration, etc. Thus, why are humans' abilities considered more valuable than the abilities of others, in what aspect(s) are they more valuable? Hence, role of man changed from being a master of nature to just being a member of it. According to Taylor, "the claim that humans by their very nature are superior to other species is a groundless claim [...] must be rejected as nothing more than an irrational bias in our own favor."<sup>125</sup>

Taylor also objects to giving priority automatically to the interests of humans when a moral conflict arises. He introduces several principles to apply in the case of moral conflicts. These principles are self-defense, proportionality, minimum wrong, distributive justice, restitutive justice.<sup>126</sup>

He prescribes four general duties, which are ranked in order of importance in case of conflict situations:<sup>127</sup>

1. The rule of nonmaleficence: It recommends not harming any organism with a good of its own.

---

<sup>125</sup> P. W. Taylor, 'The Ethics of Respect for Nature', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 3, no: 3, 1981, p. 207.

<sup>126</sup> P. W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, p. 263.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172.

2. The rule of noninterference: It recommends not interfering with the freedom of individual organisms, and of ecosystems and biotic communities.
3. The rule of fidelity: Do not deceive or betray the wild animals.
4. The rule of restitutive justice: When a moral agent does wrong to a moral subject,<sup>128</sup> in order to restore the balance of justice, it requires making restitution to the moral subject.

He says that, the “right actions are always actions that express the attitude of respect, whether they are covered by the four rules or not.”<sup>129</sup>

It should be noted that Taylor’s biocentric egalitarianism is an individualistic approach. It defends, since only individuals are alive, only individual organisms have inherent worth, not the species, ecosystems, habitats, etc.

Taylor and Schweitzer covered significant ground toward extending the scope of moral concern in environmental ethics. They convincingly argued that since humans share the same biological requirements of life with other living beings, both humans and other organisms have equal moral worth. Going beyond traditional ethics, they developed approaches that are nonhierarchical, and also more inclusive of the non-human parts of nature.

---

<sup>128</sup> Taylor makes a distinction between the moral agent and moral subject. A moral agent is accountable for his deeds, and has duties and responsibilities. On the other hand, a moral subject is an individual to whom, can be treated as right or wrong. Additionally, moral agents have duties and responsibilities toward the moral subject, but the moral subject has no such moral duties and responsibilities towards anyone.

For further information, see: P. W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 16-17.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 171.

### **2.2.2.3 Problems of Biocentrism**

As with anthropocentrism, the major problem of biocentrism is the separation it leads to. Since it is a life-centered view, the non-living parts of nature are not treated as objects of moral concern. However, unlike anthropocentrism, the separation biocentrism leads to is between the living and the non-living parts of nature, not human beings and from rest of nature. The non-living things are morally considerable only so long as they are instrumentally valuable to living-beings' interests. Because, it is thought that the non-living things have no good of their own; they are not considered to be intrinsically valuable. Further, it is believed that their goods are reducible to goods of the individual living things.

Another objection to biocentrism is about its being too individualistic. Biocentrism concerns only individuals, for this reason, species, ecosystems, etc. are concerned only instrumentally and excluded from the moral sphere.

According to biocentrism, humans are regarded as members of earth's community of life just like all other living things. If it is so, then, one may ask why are humans' activities not regarded as natural and a part of a natural process, while non-humans' activities in nature are seen as natural and a part of a natural process? Why are the activities of humans and non-humans assessed differently? For example, flood, volcanic disasters, or earthquake might cause death/destroy of tens of, hundreds of people, animals, and disappearance of plants, etc. While we encounter with these events, we regard them as natural. On the other hand, if human causes the death of another human, animal, or plant, the situation is assessed differently, of course, in general, it is not regarded as natural or normal.

Concerning Taylor's distinction between the moral agent and moral subject, it is argued that, at the bottom, biocentrism is still human-centered. Because, it takes only the rational adult human beings to the center of ethics; other living things apart from the rational normal humans are only regarded as moral subjects. Thu,

although they are included into the moral sphere, actually this is not a real inclusion.

Lastly, I want to mention a dilemma that is introduced as an objection to Taylor's theory. Assume that, I want to build a patio at my garden just by digging a small part of it. However, this will cost destroying countless living things, that is, from the individual blades of grass to millions of macrobiotic organisms. It is asked, whether that situation causes a moral dilemma in terms of Taylor's theory.<sup>130</sup> If I am not allowed to build the patio, then Taylor's view requires too much of us, in other words, it is too strict. If I am allowed to build the patio, Taylor must explain how an insignificant human interest can override the value of the lives of countless blades of grass, and many other macrobiotic organisms. In the case of permitting to build the patio, then this will contradict Taylor's rule of nonmaleficence, which recommends not harming any organism with a good of its own. On that condition, applying to the rule of restitutive justice may be suggested in return. However, making restitution is not possible for the insects, which are already dead. Further, in the case of being allowed to build the patio, one might ask: if I want to build a patio for cost of killing more than one person then is it still permissible to build the patio? If not, then, on the contrary to his claims Taylor's theory makes human's life superior to non-human's lives, that contradicts fundamental principles of his theory. Additionally, we come again to the problem of value conflicts, that is, if non-human living beings have the same inherent value with human beings, then how do we solve the conflict of interests?

### **2.2.3 Ecocentrism**

In contrast to the individualism of biocentrism, ecocentrism is a holistic approach. Both organic and inorganic parts of nature are morally concerned. Thus, species,

---

<sup>130</sup> J. R. Desjardins, *Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy*, 4th edn., Canada, Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, p. 142.

ecosystems, habitats, etc., and also nature itself are intrinsically valued. Ecocentrism considers the biotic community as a whole. Hence, it does not conceive people as separated from the other parts of nature; the whole parts are encapsulated by the biotic community itself, and are regarded as inseparable from each other. With regard to the holistic perspective, the species are important, not the individuals. While individuals are ephemeral, species are permanent. Holists, in a sense, abide by Noachian principle. Noah did not take animals to his ark arbitrarily; he took one pair from each species, i.e., one male and one female animal to prevent the extinction of their species. He cared for the species, not the individuals. So, in such a case, it is expected to save the member(s) of species who are in danger of extinction. Even if there is a large number of humans whose lives are about to be destroyed, the member of the species which must be represented will be prioritized over the human being.<sup>131</sup> Aldo Leopold, Arne Naess, and J. Baird Callicott are major supporters of ecocentrism, and ‘the land ethic’ and ‘deep ecology’ are the prominent approaches.

### **2.2.3.1 The Land Ethic**

The term land ethic is introduced by Aldo Leopold in his book *A Sand County Almanac*. Leopold describes the land ethic as “simply enlarge[ing] the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.”<sup>132</sup> He defines the land as “all of the things on, over, or in the earth”<sup>133</sup> and conceives it as one organism.

---

<sup>131</sup> H. Ünder, *Çevre Felsefesi: Etik ve Metafizik Görüşler*, Ankara, Doruk Yayıncılık, 1996, pp. 210-211.

<sup>132</sup> A. Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River*, New York, The Random House Publishing Group, 1966, p. 239.

<sup>133</sup> A. Leopold, *Round River*, L. B. Leopold (ed.), New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 145.

According to Leopold, with the Land ethic, the role of humans is changed from a conqueror to a plain member or a citizen of the community.<sup>134</sup> Thus, just being a plain member of biotic community, humans lost their superiority over non-humans. Additionally, a shift from an individualistic ethic to a holistic ethic can be observed. I think the great success of Taylor's biocentrism and Leopold's ecocentrism, in other words, of the life-centered ethics, is that, they have taken a big step in the way of eliminating the gap between the humans and nature by regarding people just as the plain members of the biotic community instead of masters or controller of nature.

For Leopold, an ethical relation with the land should contain the love, respect, admiration to it, and an appreciativeness of its value. He says that, "It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land and a high regard for its value."<sup>135</sup> However, he continues as follows:

[B]ut just what and whom do we love? Certainly not the soil, which we are sending helter-skelter downriver. Certainly not the waters, which we assume have no function except to turn turbines, float barges, and carry off sewage. Certainly not the plants, of which we exterminate whole communities without batting an eye. Certainly not the animals, of which we have already extirpated many of the largest and most beautiful species. A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, management, and use of these "resources", but it does affirm their right to continued existence, and, at least in spots, their continued existence in a natural state.<sup>136</sup>

As it is understood from the quote, Leopold does not object to the use of animals, plants, nature, etc. as a 'resource'; contrarily, he regards them as a 'resource'.

---

<sup>134</sup> A. Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River*, New York, The Random House Publishing Group, 1966, p. 240.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 261.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

Leopold presents the fundamental moral precept of the Land ethic: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”<sup>137</sup> Thus, this principle implies that people have some responsibilities towards land as preserving the integrity, stability, and beauty of the land, while they are benefiting from it, especially economically. Hence, his use of the notion of value does not refer merely to the economic value of land, but he intends the value in philosophical sense. It is time to cease exploiting it and to be aware of the ethical and aesthetic values of land as well as its economical values.<sup>138</sup>

As I said in the previous paragraphs, Leopold defends holism. Concerning this point, I think Leopold’s environmentalist position cannot be equated with the positions of animal rights defenders such as Regan, Singer. Although Leopold’s attitude contradicts with the individualism of biocentrism, it is compatible with holism. Actually, by defending the holistic approach, Leopold has avoided criticisms, which are raised against individualistic biocentrism. For instance, Leopold did not have to cope with criticisms similar to the ones raised against Taylor that I explained in previous pages, which was related with digging the garden in expense of killing many biotic organisms. However, he is charged with ecofascism, misanthropy.

According to Leopold, what is morally right or wrong is not determined concerning the member of the community those constitute the community, but according to the community itself. For instance, it is permissible to kill some individual white-tailed deer in order to solve problem of increasing amount of deer

---

<sup>137</sup> A. Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River*, New York, The Random House Publishing Group, 1966, p. 262.

<sup>138</sup> M. Özer, ‘On the Possibility and Necessity of the Land Ethic’, *Kaygı*, Vol. 17, 2011, p. 95.

population as long as integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community is ensured.<sup>139</sup> So, individuals can be sacrificed in order to protect the biotic good and continuity of the community.

Callicott reminds us that, the evolutionary and ecological biology unveil the situation,<sup>140</sup> with Leopold's words, "We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect."<sup>141</sup> As stated by Callicott, the holistic dimension of the Land ethic, that is, respect for community itself as well as for the fellow-members, is something that is foreign to modern mainstream ethical philosophy going back to Hobbes. However, it is not foreign to the Darwinian and Humean theories of ethics, which are constructed on a holistic ground.<sup>142</sup>

Leopold defines ethics; "An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing."<sup>143</sup> Depending on this definition he says that, while the ethics according to the first definition deals with the relation between individuals; the ethics with the second accretions deals with the relation between the individual and society, i.e., it attempts to integrate the individuals to society. However, still we do not have such

---

<sup>139</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 70.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>141</sup> A. Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River*, New York, The Random House Publishing Group, 1966, pp. xviii-xix.

<sup>142</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 67.

<sup>143</sup> A. Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River*, New York, The Random House Publishing Group, 1966, p. 238.

an ethical theory, which studies humans' relation with land, and with the animals, plants, which grow over land. Unfortunately, the humans' relation with land is merely economic, that is, "entailing privileges but not obligations."<sup>144</sup> According to Leopold, the Land ethic, which will focus on humans' relationship with land, is both "an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity."<sup>145</sup>

### 2.2.3.2 Deep Ecology

Deep ecology, introduced by Arne Naess, is another contemporary ecological movement. Apart from Naess, Bill Devall and George Sessions are the other names that are associated with deep ecology. Since the reasons of degrading the environment are regarded as activities of humans, deep ecologists aim to change people's way of approaching to the environmental issues from 'shallow' to 'deeper', and to more spiritual. Two main features of this movement are its spiritualist approach to nature, and its suggestion of deep questioning on environment, nature, human life, and so on. Devall and Sessions explain what they mean with "deep questioning" by quoting from Naess: "we ask why and how, where others do not. For instance, ecology as a science does not ask what kind of a society would be the best for maintaining a particular ecosystem – that is considered a question for value theory, for politics, for ethics."<sup>146</sup>

Deep ecologists attempted to cultivate people's ecological consciousness. Deep ecologists think that they can find solutions to environmental issues "by changing policies and economic, technological and ideological structures. This would require significant changes such as appreciating the quality of life rather than

---

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>146</sup> B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'Deep Ecology', in D. Schmidtz and E. Willot (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: What Reality Matters, What Really Works*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 120.

aspiring to a more material lifestyle, [...] being obliged to participate in implementing the necessary changes.”<sup>147</sup>

While deep ecology is grounded on the idea of ‘ecological attitudes towards nature’, Naess contends that the norms/principles of deep ecology cannot be derived from ecology science by logic or induction.<sup>148</sup> Devall and Sessions present these eight principles of deep ecology, which are in fact formed by Naess and Sessions, as follows:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human Life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy *vital* needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating *life* quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an

---

<sup>147</sup> G. G. Arsene, *The Human-Nature Relationship: The Emergence of Environmental Ethics*, pp. 15-16. [http://bioethics.agrocampus-ouest.eu/infoGlueDeliverLive/digitalAssets/57485\\_51EN-human-nature-relationship.pdf](http://bioethics.agrocampus-ouest.eu/infoGlueDeliverLive/digitalAssets/57485_51EN-human-nature-relationship.pdf) (accessed 11 February 2013)

<sup>148</sup> A. Naess, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary’, in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2001, p. 52.

increasingly high standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.

8. Those who subscribe to the forgoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.<sup>149</sup>

Naess introduces two main norms of deep ecology as biocentric egalitarianism and self-realization. It is claimed that, these two norms can be reached by deep questioning, and of course, they cannot be validated by methods of modern science.<sup>150</sup> Naess defines 'biocentric equality' as that, all living things in the earth have an equal right to live and blossom, and all of them deserve respect, and have moral worth. Although all living things have moral worth, it does not mean that each living thing is valued equally. The 'equality' in 'biocentric equality' refers to "equal right" to live and blossom.

Deep ecology focuses on the inherent/intrinsic value of non-human beings apart from their instrumental value. B. Devall and G. Sessions says that, "insofar as we perceive things as individual organism or entities, the insight draws us to respect all human and non-human individuals in their own right as parts of the whole without feeling the need to set up hierarchies of species with human at the top."<sup>151</sup> Additionally, all of living things have equal right "to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realization within the larger Self-realization."<sup>152</sup> On the other hand, while mentioning biocentric equality, Naess specially adds 'in principle' phrase just after the 'biocentric equality'. Because, "in the process of

---

<sup>149</sup> B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'Deep Ecology', in D. Schmidtz and E. Willot (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: What Reality Matters, What Really Works*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 123.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>151</sup> B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'Deep Ecology', in D. Schmidtz and E. Willot (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: What Reality Matters, What Really Works*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 122.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc. Mutual predation is a biological fact of life, and many of the world's religions struggled with the spiritual implication of this."<sup>153</sup> Thus, if humans intervene in nature in order to satisfy their vital needs, then, from the viewpoint of deep ecologists, such intervention is permissible. To put in a different way, with the use the phrase of 'in principle', Naess leaves with some room for choice to kill and/or eat animals (in some instances), and it would not be morally a wrong act.

The other main component of deep ecology is self-realization: seeing oneself as a part of the interrelated whole. According to Naess, "we can reach higher levels of being through a process of deep questioning, a kind of spiritual journey ending in an ecologically conscious self."<sup>154</sup> In terms of deep ecology, each individual is not a separate existence; every organism is interconnected to others with the ecosystem. Biocentric equality is essentially closely related with self-realization. That is, the harm we do to the rest of nature, in fact, is seen as the harm that we do to ourselves. Thus, the self can be actualized by passing beyond "narrow contemporary cultural assumption and values, and the conventional wisdom of our time and place, and this is best achieved by the meditative deep questioning process. Only in this way can we hope to attain full mature personhood and uniqueness."<sup>155</sup> B. Devall and G. Sessions explain self-realization as follows:

A nurturing nondominating society can help in the "real work" of becoming a whole person. The "real work" can be summarized symbolically as the realization of "self-in-Self" where "Self" stand for organic wholeness. This process of the full unfolding of the self can also

---

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> V. Davion, 'Ecofeminism', in D. Jamieson, (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 243.

<sup>155</sup> B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'Deep Ecology', in D. Schmidtz and E. Willot (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: What Reality Matters, What Really Works*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 121-122.

be summarized by the phrase, “no one is saved until we are all saved,” where the phrase “one” includes not only me, an individual human, but all humans, whales, grizzly bears, whole rain forest ecosystem, mountains and rivers, the tiniest microbes in the soil, and so on.<sup>156</sup>

To summarize, since deep ecologists assert that the “Whole system is superior to any of its parts”, they are against humans’ exploitation of nature regarding it as a resource bestowed to them. They believe in the necessity of equality and the interdependence of humans and non-humans the members of the biotic community. They claim diversity and symbiosis is the mutual advantage of both humans and other organisms. In terms of human relation with nature the cooperation and symbiosis is better than the domination and control of the nature. Finally, B. Devall and G. Sessions state, “we recognize that deep ecologists can offer suggestions for gaining maturity and encouraging the process of harmony with Nature, but that there is no grand solution which is guaranteed to save us from ourselves.”<sup>157</sup>

### 2.2.3.3 Holmes Rolston III

As one of the main defenders of the existence of intrinsic value in non-human parts of nature, H. Rolston also needs to be mentioned in this section. In the article, “Value in Nature and the Nature of Value”, Rolston, a vigorous advocate of objective value, claims that value is not something bestowed upon an entity by a valuer; it is already possessed by the object itself.<sup>158</sup> Thus, it cannot be said that there were no values before humans came in. Rolston argues that, existence of a value does not presuppose the existence of a valuer; he says that, “there can be

---

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>158</sup> H. Rolston III, ‘Value in Nature and the Nature of Value’, in A. Light and H. Rolston III (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 146.

law without a lawgiver, history without a historian; there is biology without biologists, [...] story without storytellers”.<sup>159</sup> Rolston claims that man’s function in value judgments is to reveal the value that is already possessed. Therefore, value needs only the consciousness of a valuer that comprehends and discloses its value. Humans merely shed light on the values that are already there; in Rolston’s words, “we carry the lamp that light up value, although we require fuel that nature provides.”<sup>160</sup>

Rolston argues that human beings are not the unique valuer; animals, organisms, species, etc. can also create value, i.e., they are also value-able. When we look at the animals, we see that, animals defend themselves against any danger. It can be said that an animal values its own life for what it is in itself. They care for their young, and nourish them, etc. Their young are valuable for animals. For example, a mother cat is able to value its kitty. As a result, Rolston states that, “valuing [is] intrinsic to animals life”.<sup>161</sup> When we look at organisms, we see that, they are self-maintaining systems, sustaining, reproducing themselves, spontaneous, etc. So, the question of whether a plant is able to value itself can be answered that the plant is able to value sun, water, rain, nutrients, etc. because, they are necessary for the plant’s existence. Since it defends its life for its own sake, defending is the valued state of an organism. Concerning the species, Rolston claims they are value-able, too. Reproduction and continuity of species are the values in the species. Each individual sacrifices himself for the persistence of the species, for the next generations. Rolston also talks about the value-ability of the ecosystems. He says that, humans value ecosystem intrinsically as well as instrumentally; however, the

---

<sup>159</sup> H. Rolston III, ‘Value in Nature and the Nature of Value’, in A. Light and H. Rolston III (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 152.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

important question is whether ecosystems are themselves able to value?<sup>162</sup> As we can guess it, he asserts that ecosystems are value-able, too. If we examine the ecosystems, they do not defend themselves, they have no self-identification, and they have no interest about which we can care. Nonetheless, evaluating ecosystem from an individualistic approach is a mistake for Rolston. He states that, ecosystems have neither intrinsic nor instrumental value but systemic value. He states that, “the selective force in the ecosystem produces the lives of individual plants and animals”. So, what the thing that is able to create value in ecosystems is the productivity of ecosystems that brings into existence such a system.<sup>163</sup> In other words, the process in the ecosystem is valueable. It can be said that, Rolston regards almost whatever in nature as valuable.

#### **2.2.3.4 J. Baird Callicott**

J. B. Callicott defends Leopoldian ecocentrism. He claims that the new non-anthropocentric environmental ethics should concern not only individuals, but the holistic unities and attribute intrinsic value to them as follows:

An adequate value theory for non-anthropocentric environmental ethics must provide for the intrinsic value of both individual organisms and a hierarchy of superorganismic entities- populations, species, biocoenoses, biomes, and the biosphere. It should provide differential intrinsic value for wild and domestic organisms and species. It must be conceptually concordant with modern evolutionary and ecological biology. And it must provide for the intrinsic value of *our present* ecosystem, its component parts and complement of species, not equal value for any ecosystem.<sup>164</sup>

---

<sup>162</sup> H. Rolston III, ‘Value in Nature and the Nature of Value’, in A. Light and H. Rolston III (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 148.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>164</sup> J. B. Callicott, ‘Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 304.

In fact, Callicott defends a variant of the Leopoldian land ethic, the philosophical ground of which rests on Hume's axiology, supported with a Darwinian evolutionary explanation. In addition to this, later, he appeals to quantum physics to overcome the separation between the nature and human.<sup>165</sup>

Callicott introduces a non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, which is anthropogenic and based on what he calls 'truncated' intrinsic value theory. He grounds his subjective theory on Hume's subjectivist sentimental axiology. According to him, Humean axiology is enough to develop an adequate environmental ethical theory, "because it provides a very genuine and vivid distinction between instrumental and inherent value."<sup>166</sup> A more detailed account of this Darwinian-Humean axiology will be given in chapter 4.

Since J. B. Callicott defends a variant of the Land ethic, he struggles to overcome the charge of ecofascism to land ethic. He answers, "It is obvious that with the advent of each new stage in the accreting development of ethics, the old stages are not erased or replaced, but added to."<sup>167</sup> For example, I am a citizen of my country

---

<sup>165</sup> J. B. Callicott, 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Ethics*, vol.7, 1985, 257-275.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 263.

Callicott says that, "Facing up to these apparently insurmountable logical impediments to axiological objectivism, I have attempted, in a recent series of papers, to elaborate a less ambitious, but also less problematic, subjectivist approach to the problem of an appropriate axiology for environmental ethics based upon and inspired by the land ethic of Aldo Leopold.<sup>6</sup> Working backward historically, I have traced the axiological kernel of the land ethic through Darwin (whose thought about the nature and origin of ethics manifestly influenced Leopold) back to Hume (whose analysis of ethics Leopold may or may not have known or consciously considered, but which certainly, in turn, directly informed Darwin). If my historical reading is correct, the seminal paradigm for contemporary environmental ethics, the Leopold land ethic, rests upon Humean axiological foundations."

*Ibid.*, p. 260.

<sup>167</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 71.

but at the same time, I am a member of my family, and resident of a municipality, too. He says that, it is obvious that duties (such as paying taxes, serving military duty) that come with being a citizen of a country do not cancel or replace the duties that accompany being a member of a family (such as honoring parents or educating one's own children). Callicott claims that "the duties attendant upon citizenship in the biotic community do not cancel or replace the duties attendant on membership in the human global village."<sup>168</sup> In other words, being equally a plain member of the biotic community does not mean that people will abandon their status in the human community; they are still humans, and the Land ethic does not abolish the status that is gained with the human-to-human ethics. Therefore, people could not easily give permission to or tolerate the killing of other people just for the sake of preventing loss of diversity, and/or preserving the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.

Additionally, Callicott presents two principles to prioritize the duties generated by membership in multiple communities in the cases of moral conflicts. He calls those principles as 'the first second-order principle' (SOP-1) and 'the second second-order principle' (SOP-2). According to the SOP-1, "obligations generated by membership in more venerable and intimate communities take precedence over those generated in more recently emerged and impersonal communities."<sup>169</sup> He says that, most of us think that since we cannot perform both family and civic duties instantly, our family duties take priority over our civic duties. Consequently, Callicott asserts that, since our closest community relationship takes precedence over more distant ones, "when holistic environment-oriented duties are in direct

---

<sup>168</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, pp. 71-72.

<sup>169</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 73.

conflict with individualistic human-oriented duties, the human-oriented duties take priority. The land ethic is, therefore, not a case of ecofascism.”<sup>170</sup>

#### **2.2.3.5 Problems of Ecocentrism**

The main objection to ecocentrism, particularly, the Land ethic is the accusations of ecofascism raised by Tom Regan. Since ecocentrism concerns the species, biotic community, etc., it might necessitate sacrificing of individuals to preserve biodiversity or to provide the integrity, stability, and beauty of biotic community. Regan criticizes Leopold’s approach based on his main ethical principle; “It is difficult to see how the notion of the rights of the individual could find a home within a view that, emotive connotations to one side, might be fairly dubbed ‘environmental fascism’.”<sup>171</sup> Because of its disrespectful attitude to the rights of the individual, Regan condemns the holistic attitude of the Land ethic with “environmental fascism”. For example, assume that we are faced with an inevitable position: we have to either choose to allow a rare wildflower or a person, who is a plain member of the plentiful human population, to die/perish. Leopold’s precept requires saving the one, who, would contribute more to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. Thus, if the wildflower, which is the member of biotic community as well as this person, would contribute more to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community than the person would, then it would not be morally wrong to kill this person in order to save the wildflower. So, the excessive form of this approach may turn into that: “kill yourself to save the planet”.

---

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid*, p. 76.

<sup>171</sup> T. Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, California, University of California Press, 1985, pp. 361-362.

Additionally, since, according to Leopold, humans and other members of nature have the same status, that is, they are merely plain members of the biotic community, it seems that if the human population reaches an excessive amount, then, the Land ethic, in principle, allows the culling of some humans in the name of protecting the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. In other words, if human individuals are just plain members of the biotic community, and humans are the reasons of many environmental problems, then why do we not kill some humans to reduce the human population so that the amount of environmental destruction would also decrease? Hence, according to the precepts of the Land ethic, it seems that there is no reason for not acting that way. Tom Regan called this implausible implication of the Land Ethic as ‘environmental fascism’; he asserts as follows:

The rights view cannot abide this position, not because the rights view categorically denies that inanimate objects can have rights (more on this momentarily) but because it denies the propriety of deciding what should be done to individuals who have rights by appeal to aggregative considerations, including, therefore, computations about what will or will not maximally “contribute to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.” Individual rights are not to be outweighed by such considerations (which is not to say that they are never to be outweighed). Environmental fascism and the rights view are like oil and water: they don’t mix.<sup>172</sup>

The objection is raised in another form. If a tree has equal rights with a human being, are we or are we not committing murder when we cut down a tree? In this new formulation, what is criticized is the notion of ‘right’s. Deep ecologist Bill Devall gives an account of this criticism. As Bill Devall says, “it seems, in speaking of ‘rights’ is that many people trained in Western philosophy interpret ‘rights’ in terms of natural rights theory and the doctrine of universal human rights extended to include other animals.”<sup>173</sup> He objects to this interpretation, and claims

---

<sup>172</sup> T. Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, California, University of California Press, 1985, p. 362.

<sup>173</sup> B. Devall, ‘Deep Ecology and its Critics’, *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1988, p. 57.

that when deep ecologists use the word ‘right’, indeed, they are aware of the inadequacies of the term ‘rights’. He says that deep ecologists use the notion of ‘rights’ to convey the meaning of ecocentrism as forcefully as possible. He reminds that Naess uses these notions/metaphors (such as rights, biocentric equality, etc.) carefully. For example, he says that, “all beings have a ‘right’ to life, *in principle*”.<sup>174</sup> Devall asserts that, “In sum, our language has so much baggage of anthropocentric philosophy that it is difficult to express the intuition of deep ecology without inviting misinterpretation. Poets are able to call up meaning through metaphor and poetic expression.”<sup>175</sup> This means that the word ‘right’ has merely a rhetorical use in Devall’s account.

Another difficulty with ecocentrism is that, it is extremely challenging to explain the interests of some non-human entities. For instance, what is good for mountains? Richard Watson, who criticizes non-anthropocentric ethical theories, claims those so-called non-anthropocentric ethics are actually anthropocentric at heart: “What would it be, after all, to think like a mountain as Aldo Leopold is said to have recommended? It would be anthropocentric because mountains do not

---

<sup>174</sup> Italics mine.

<sup>175</sup> B. Devall, ‘Deep Ecology and its Critics’, *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1988, p. 58.

Devall continues his defense as, “Native Americans use the phrase “all my relatives” to refer to their sense of kinship with bears, eagles, and other beings. When we honor our animal and plant “relatives,” we invoke the metaphor of a family. Some critics of deep ecology might object to the metaphor of the biotic family, however, because of the historical association of the family in European culture with patriarchy. In sum, our language has so much baggage of anthropocentric philosophy that it is difficult to express the intuition of deep ecology without inviting misinterpretation. Poets are able to call up meaning through metaphor and poetic expression.”

think, but also because mountains are imagined to be thinking which human interests in their preservation or development they prefer.”<sup>176</sup>

Social ecologists also reject deep ecology. It is believed that, deep ecologists ignore the connection between the environmental problems and authoritarianism, and social hierarchy. According to them, the actual reasons of the exploitation of the environment, and environmental crisis reside in humans’ social interaction. Therefore, while the environment is ecologically sustainable, it might still be socially mistreated.<sup>177</sup> Consequently, Bill Devall tries to fend off criticisms against ecocentrism, peculiarly deep ecology as follows:

Yet, philosophical arguments are only part of the deep ecology movement. Practicing deep ecology includes affirming our identification and solidarity with wild Nature. It is doubtful that critics of deep ecology understand the meaning of deep ecology, unless they touch the Earth in what Gary Snyder calls the “real work” of deep ecology. The “real work” includes connecting with our roots through direct action. Direct action includes deep ecology rituals, dwelling in place (bioregionalism), defending ecosystems, and restoring human damaged ecosystems.<sup>178</sup>

#### **2.2.4 Ecofeminism**

Concerning environmental ethics, ecofeminists agreed with the environmentalists who defend extending moral consideration in a way that would also embrace the non-human parts of nature. However, they differ at one point. That is, they claim, “an adequate environmental ethics must include a reconception of what it means

---

<sup>176</sup> R. Watson, ‘A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics’, in L. P. Pojman and P. Pojman (eds.), *Environmental Ethics, Readings in Theory and Application*, 6th edn., Clark Baxter, USA, 2012, p. 157.

<sup>177</sup> B. Devall, ‘Deep Ecology and its Critics’, *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1988, p. 57.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

to be a human being, and of what criteria are necessary for the recognition of moral value to begin with.”<sup>179</sup>

In general, deep ecology and (eco)feminism are seen compatible in many respects. Further, some deep ecologists, such as W. Fox, M. E. Zimmerman, claims deep ecology movement encapsulates ecofeminism through the main norms of deep ecology, those are the biocentric egalitarianism and self-realization.<sup>180</sup> Holding these two norms, deep ecology, does not set up hierarchies among the members of the biotic community, in which humans are placed mostly at the top. However, both some ecofeminists and social ecologists such as Murray Bookchin, object to this opinion. Victoria Davion articulates that, they criticize the deep ecology due to failure to question deeply the role of social hierarchies within human society as a part of environmental problems.<sup>181</sup> While deep ecologists, Naess, Sessions, Syner and Devall, are criticized by ecofeminists as ‘sexist pigs’”, Bookchin dismisses the deep ecology movement as ‘eco-la-la’”.<sup>182</sup>

According to some (eco)feminists, deep ecologists underestimate the discussion of gender, which is an important variable. (Eco)feminists believe that, men and women experience the world differently, and women are closer to nature than men are. Moreover, they assert that non-anthropocentrism of deep ecology is actually

---

<sup>179</sup> V. Davion, ‘Ecofeminism’, in D. Jamieson, (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 242.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 243.

<sup>181</sup> V. Davion, ‘Ecofeminism’, in D. Jamieson, (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 243.

<sup>182</sup> B. Devall, ‘Deep Ecology and its Critics’, *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1988, p. 57.

superficial, and state that, “the notion of self-realization is both vague and masculinist.”<sup>183</sup>

Ecofeminism is developed in late 1970s, and the term ecofeminism was introduced by French writer Françoise d'Eaubonne in 1974.<sup>184</sup> It is an environmental movement, which drew a connection historically and conceptually between the domination and exploitation of women and the environment by the patriarchal power/system. Actually, there is not only one but many different kinds of ecofeminist positions.<sup>185</sup> Each of these positions contributed to the ecofeminist movement in different ways and levels. For example, while some ecofeminists, such as V. Pumwood, are concerned about the historical and/or conceptual explanations for the oppression of both women and nature, basing their arguments on the dualism of humans and nature, some others, such as M. Mies, V. Shiva, are concerned about the goddess-based spirituality and still some others, such as C. Merchant, are concerned about the disappearance of female values and the domination of the male values as the result of scientific revolution. Nonetheless, their main claim depends on the connection between the oppression of nature and woman, and also other minorities (racial, sexual, etc.).

It is claimed by ecofeminists, in order to overcome the ecological crisis, we need to recognize and praise ‘femininity’, ‘feminine values’, which are devaluated in western patriarchal context.

Cultural ecofeminism posits, especially with the transition to Judeo-Christian tradition, replacing female deities with the male gods is the main reason of the oppression of nature and woman. It is believed that in ancient cultures, societies

---

<sup>183</sup> V. Davion, ‘Ecofeminism’, in D. Jamieson, (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 243.

<sup>184</sup> C. Merchant, ‘Ecofeminism and Feminist Theory’, in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2001, p. 77.

<sup>185</sup> Such as radical ecofeminism, socialist ecofeminism, cultural ecofeminism, constructivist ecofeminism, vegetarian ecofeminism.

were more women-centered; people were living in close harmony with nature, and they worshipped female deities. Therefore, the roots of the feminist spirituality depend mostly on pre-Abrahamic religions, nature-based religions, paganism, and witchcraft, etc. As said by N. Sturgeon, these religions and worldviews hold the female deities, goddess, and strong image of female power.<sup>186</sup>

In general, ecofeminists reject dualistic ways of thinking. However, modernity and progress essentially involve the desire of domination and controlling, which causes dichotomy and dualism. According to M. Mies and V. Shiva, this dualism can be seen in the form of female and male, nature and human, production and consumption, local and global, white and non-white, etc. Mostly, the first parts of these separations are subordinated to the second part, and that kind of dichotomies always involves a hierarchical superiority. Moreover, as the result of traditional worldview, instead of seeing the 'other' (part) just as 'different', it is seen as if it is an 'enemy'. Therefore, ecofeminism proposes a new worldview, which grounded on cooperation, mutual care, and love. Further, Mies and Shiva claim that, "liberation of women cannot be achieved in isolation, but only as a part of larger struggle for the preservation of life on this planet."<sup>187</sup> They state as follows:

Only in this way can we be enabled to respect and preserve the diversity of all life forms, including their cultural expressions, as true sources of our well-being and happiness. To this end ecofeminists use metaphor like "re-weaving the world", "healing the wounds", and re-connecting and interconnecting the "web". This effort to create a holistic, all-life

---

<sup>186</sup> N. Sturgeon, 'The Nature of Race: Discourses of Racial Difference in Ecofeminism', in K. Warren and N. Erkal (eds.), *Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature, USA*, Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 264.

<sup>187</sup> M. Mies and V. Shiva, 'Introduction to Ecofeminism', in S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, 3rd edn., McGraw-Hill Companies, New York, 2004, p. 434.

embracing cosmology and anthropology, must necessarily imply a concept of freedom different from that used since the Enlightenment.<sup>188</sup>

Mies and Shiva state, different from the women of developed (maldeveloped) countries, the third world women consider the earth as a living being to which they owe to their survival. Therefore, they respect to earth's sacredness and diversity of nature. They want to keep it alive, resist its turning into dead and losing its divinity by becoming merely raw materials for the industry, a property, and a commodity production.<sup>189</sup>

Ecofeminists criticize mainstream environmental ethics in many respects. They are uncomfortable with much emphasis on reason. In general, while reason is associated with man, masculinity; feelings are associated with femaleness. They object to the environmental ethics theories that are grounded on rationality and ignore the emotions. Actually, ecofeminists do not defend the abandonment of reason completely; on the contrary, they say human beings have emotional sides as well as rational sides. They defend an environmental ethics, which is grounded on the care relationship between humans and non-humans. Val Plumwood claims:

If rationality is to have any function for long-term survival, it must, as ecologists have been telling us, find a form which encourages sensitivity to the conditions under which we exist on the earth, one which recognises and accommodates the denied relationships of dependency and enables us to acknowledge our debt to the sustaining others of the earth. This implies creating a democratic culture beyond dualism, ending colonising relationships and finding a mutual, ethical basis for enriching coexistence with earth others.<sup>190</sup>

Another criticism of ecofeminists against environmental ethicists, who defend mainstream environmental approaches, is about their separation of problems and

---

<sup>188</sup> M. Mies and V. Shiva, 'Introduction to Ecofeminism', in S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, 3rd edn., McGraw-Hill Companies, New York, 2004, p. 434.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 436.

<sup>190</sup> V. Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, USA & Canada, Routledge, 1993, p. 196.

questions of human-to-human ethics from those of environmental ethics. According to Victoria Davion, Peter Singer claims that, while other forms of discrimination among people, such as racism, sexism, classism, etc. is not tolerable; discrimination against non-human animals is tolerable. However, Davion argues, this is not the real portrait of today's America, the assumption about the disappearance of discrimination (racism, Anti-Semitism, etc.) among people, is not true. Thus, such assumption makes it impossible to make a social critique on ecofeminists' claims that, to exemplify, on how racism and sexism are closely connected with exploitation of animals or nature.<sup>191</sup>

Finally, according the ecofeminists, all forms of oppression are connected. It is claimed that, since oppression of women and nature are conceptually and historically interconnected, feminism must embrace the ecological feminist movement, and reciprocally, a responsible environmental ethics must embrace feminism.<sup>192</sup> As it is stated by Mies and Shiva, "Women liberation cannot be achieved without a simultaneous struggle for the preservation and liberation of all life on this planet from the dominant of patriarchal/capitalist worldview."<sup>193</sup>

#### **2.2.4.1 Objections to Ecofeminism**

The main objection to ecofeminism is its essentialism. Victoria Davion says that it seems ecofeminists make an assumption, that is, woman and nature are metaphysically real categories with essential qualities. Assuming all women share

---

<sup>191</sup> V. Davion, 'Ecofeminism', in D. Jamieson (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, pp. 242-243.

<sup>192</sup> K. J. Warren, 'The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism', in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2001, p. 88.

<sup>193</sup> M. Mies and V. Shiva, 'Introduction to Ecofeminism', in S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, 3rd edn., New York, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004, p. 434.

some essential attributes and ignoring the differences between them, ecofeminists tend to put individual woman of different racial, class, and cultural identities under the category of 'woman'. Similarly, they seem to regard the category 'nature' as if it is static, real, metaphysically given, and unproblematic.<sup>194</sup> Although not all of ecofeminist perspectives are essentialist, many of them are grounded on essentialist notions of woman and nature. Because of such an essentialist position, some theorists, such as Janet Biehl,<sup>195</sup> reject ecofeminism. She says that, ecofeminists have an acceptance that "women have an exclusive role in developing a sensibility of 'caring' and 'nurturing'; and that they are unique in their ability to appreciate humanity's 'interconnectedness' with the natural world".<sup>196</sup> However, on the contrary to Biehl's remarks, this is a mistake, because, not all of ecofeminist perspectives are necessarily essentialist,<sup>197</sup> especially the recent ones. For example, socialist ecofeminists reject the essentialist perspective. According to them, the belief that women and nature are interconnected is a social construction. In other words, while women are close to nature in a culture; in another culture, men might be closer to nature. The closeness/interaction with nature is something that can be learned; so, every person can do it. Along with the same line, they believe that any kind of discrimination, domination, or degradation can be changed, and they struggle to realize such changes.

Another way of putting the criticism raised against ecofeminism is 'false generalization'. That is, for ecofeminists, woman and nature are closely tied. Thus,

---

<sup>194</sup> V. Davion, 'Ecofeminism', in D. Jamieson (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 241.

<sup>195</sup> J. Biehl, *Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics*, Boston, South End Press, 1991, p. 3.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>197</sup> V. Davion, 'Ecofeminism', in D. Jamieson (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 241.

in general, women are seen closer to nature than men. Nevertheless, as stated by many others, this is a false generalization about women. Because such an approach ignores the racial, class, cultural, ethnic, sexual preferences, and some other differences between the women.<sup>198</sup>

Ecofeminism, especially cultural ecofeminism, is criticized because of its emphasize on spirituality, mainly goddess-based spirituality. For example, both Bookchin and his student Janet Biehl reject ecofeminist spirituality. They think spiritual ecofeminism is irrational and incoherent,<sup>199</sup> because it focuses too much on so-called mystical connection between the women and nature. According to Bookchin, “feminist spirituality is the worst form of apolitical mysticism. He cannot see that their rituals are helpful in producing group coherence.”<sup>200</sup> In her book *Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics*, Biehl also harshly criticizes ecofeminism, and claims that, ecofeminism “situates women outside Western culture altogether, associated with a mystified notion of ‘nature’”,<sup>201</sup> and continues her charges as follows:

---

<sup>198</sup> V. Davion, ‘Ecofeminism’, in D. Jamieson (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 241.

<sup>199</sup> She explains that irrationalism and incoherence of ecofeminism as follows: “Ecofeminism has also become a force for irrationalism, most obviously in its embrace of goddess worship, its glorification of the early Neolithic, and its emphasis on metaphors and myths. It has also become irrational in another sense: that is, by virtue of its own incoherence.” (p. 2)

“Ecofeminism, far from being healthily diverse, is so blatantly self-contradictory as to be incoherent. As one might expect, at least one ecofeminist even rejects the very notion of coherence itself, arguing that coherence is “totalizing” and by inference oppressive. Moreover, because ecofeminists rarely debate each other, it is nearly impossible to glean from their writings the extent to which they agree or disagree with each other.”

J. Biehl, *Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics*, Boston, South End Press, 1991, p. 3.

<sup>200</sup> J. Nhanenge, *Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development*, Maryland, University Press of America, 2011, p. 136.

<sup>201</sup> J. Biehl, *Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics*, Boston, South End Press, 1991, p. 1.

In a time of sweeping mystification, when reality is transformed into myth and myth transformed into reality-indeed, when even the very reality of the world itself is challenged as merely subjective, as Collard does-one may reasonably wonder whether ecofeminism is clarifying the relationship of women to nature or muddling it.<sup>202</sup>

As a last critique, I want to quote from Shamara Shantu Riley, who rejects the label of ecofeminism and defends Afrocentric ecowomanism. She says:

Many ecofeminists when analyzing links between human relations and ecological degradation, give primacy to gender and thus fail to thoroughly incorporate (as opposed to mere tokenism) the historical links between classism, white supremacy, and environmental degradation on their perspectives. For instance, they often don't address the fact that in nations where such variables as ethnicity and class are a central organizing principle of society, many women are not only viewed in opposition to men under dualism, but also to other women.<sup>203</sup>

### 2.2.5 Environmental Pragmatism

Environmental pragmatism is not a single view; it involves several different approaches, which are all mainly grounded on pragmatic philosophy. Antony Weston, Bryan Norton, Andrew Light, and Eric Katz are listed among the major environmental pragmatists. Although, their approaches differ in details, a common pragmatist ground underlying their views can easily be recognized. Kelly A. Parker states, "First, all agree in their rejection of foundationalist epistemology. There are no innate beliefs, intuitions or other indubitable 'givens' upon which

---

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>203</sup> S. S. Riley, 'Ecology is a Sistah's issue, too: The Politics of Emergent Afrocentric Ecowomanism', in C. J. Adams (ed.), *Ecofeminism and the Sacred*, New York, Continuum, 1993, p. 197, cited in V. Davion, 'Ecofeminism', in D. Jamieson (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, pp. 245-246.

our knowledge is built, or in terms of which the truth or meaning of concepts can be analyzed.”<sup>204</sup>

A. Light and E. Katz express, methodological dogmatism is the main reason of failure in environmental ethics. According to Light, the monist environmental ethicists strive for a single environmental ethical framework that will embrace all values in nature, and all duties and obligations to nature.<sup>205</sup> I think the reason that pushes ethicists towards monism, is the fear of falling in to ‘ethical relativism’, to be unclear, and to make ambiguous moral decisions. Therefore, ethicists attempt to find the objective values, and a single unified and coherent moral theory. On the other side, environmental pragmatists compel us to think on the possibility of more than one moral truth, in other words, plurality of moral truths. Environmental pragmatists believe that, committing to a specific theory or value is not an appropriate way of struggling with environmental problems. In general, they defend the plurality of values, in other words, moral pluralism, for long-term solution for the environmental issues. Concerning environmental problems, it is stated there can be multiple correct solutions, and each of these solutions can be equally reasonable to apply.<sup>206</sup>

Thus, environmental pragmatists, such as A. Light and E. Katz, reject methodological dogmatism and suggest applying the pragmatist methodology to

---

<sup>204</sup> K. A. Parker, ‘Pragmatism and Environmental Thought’, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 22.

<sup>205</sup> A. Light, ‘Methodological Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Environmental Ethics’, in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 321.

<sup>206</sup> J. R. Desjardins, *Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy*, 4th edn., Canada, Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, pp. 265-268.

focus on the practical issues.<sup>207</sup> They refrain from controversial theoretical discussions about environmental issues such as “what is intrinsic value?”, “is nature intrinsically valuable?”, and so on.<sup>208</sup> It is believed that instead of making an effort for the theoretical debates, environmental ethicists should concern themselves of the real problems of the environment, such as climate change, pollution, animal rights, and environmental justice.<sup>209</sup> As stated by Light and Katz, “Pragmatists cannot tolerate theoretical delays to the contribution that philosophy may make to environmental questions.”<sup>210</sup>

Suggesting methodological pragmatism, A. Light argues that, when environmental philosophers, such as deep ecologists, confront an issue of public policy, for the better public policies, they can apply the methodological pragmatism, but at the same time, they can still hold their core philosophical worldviews.<sup>211</sup> He does not contend that environmental ethicists should leave their theoretical studies, such as searching for a justifiable ethical ground for an environmental ethics or non-anthropocentric natural values. He just claims that, in addition to this purely philosophical task, some environmental ethicists might have another public task.<sup>212</sup> That is, even those ethicists may support a worldview, which based on

---

<sup>207</sup> A. Light and E. Katz, ‘Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Ethics as Contested Terrain’, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 2.

<sup>208</sup> L. Samuelsson, ‘Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Philosophy: A Bad Marriage’, *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 32, no. 4, 2010, p. 406.

<sup>209</sup> A. Light and E. Katz, ‘Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Ethics as Contested Terrain’, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 4.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>211</sup> A. Light, ‘Methodological Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Environmental Ethics’, in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 324.

<sup>212</sup> A. Light, ‘Methodological Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Environmental Ethics’, in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 322-323.

non-anthropocentric natural value; they require translating their moral views about the value of nature to the policy-makers and to the public.

Light states that methodological pragmatism does not require a full commitment of a particular stance to environmental ethics, such as an anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric one for a better environmental policy.<sup>213</sup> He says that, for instance, in terms of adaptation of methodological pragmatism, both of these reasons are applicable for the protection of endangered species; that is, human may introduce some precautionary principle, which essentially involves human self-interest or they might accept trade-offs that prevent the loss of a species.<sup>214</sup>

In general, environmental pragmatists abstain from taking side with discussion of whether the anthropocentric or the non-anthropocentric approach is better for environment. According to B. Norton, the distinctions such as objective-subjective or anthropocentric-non-anthropocentric are unnecessary. Instead of these distinctions, he introduces the distinction of 'strong anthropocentrism' and 'weak/extended anthropocentrism'. Since the aim is to protect the environment, he proposes weak anthropocentrism as a solution for the well-being of the environment and sustainability of the environmental resources.<sup>215</sup>

As it is stated by Anthony Weston, environmental pragmatism sounds like as if it is exactly against what the environmental ethicists are trying to do since it brings anthropocentrism, instrumentalism and the shortsightedness to the minds of

---

<sup>213</sup> A. Light, 'Methodological Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Environmental Ethics', in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 323.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup> H. S. Afeissa, 'The Transformative Value of Ecological Pragmatism. An Introduction to the Work of Bryan G. Norton', *S.A.P.I.E.N.S.*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2008, p. 74.

people.<sup>216</sup> On the contrary, he claims that, what pragmatism suggests for environmental ethics has nothing to do with crude anthropocentrism, any anthropocentrism at all.<sup>217</sup> He explains what he means as follows:

Pragmatism is a form of subjectivism —it makes valuing an activity of subjects, possibly only of human subjects— but subjectivism is not necessarily anthropocentric. Even if only humans value in this sense, it does not follow that only humans have value; it does not follow that human beings must be the sole or final objects of valuation. Subjectivism does not imply, so to say, *subject-centrism*; our actual values can be much more complex and world-directed.<sup>218</sup>

However, environmental pragmatists object to grounding environmental ethics on intrinsic value. They think the distinction of means and end is grounded on human's striving. That is, when environmental ethics is at stake, recreational and aesthetics values attributed to nature become prominent as the objective values it has. Weston states that people are mostly prone to say that aesthetic experience is valued intrinsically. However, what is intrinsically valued, in other words, what is valued for its own sake is not nature itself. Nature is still valued instrumentally; it only satisfies the human end of enjoyment, and of aesthetics appreciations.<sup>219</sup> Thus, aesthetic appreciation of the nature is not necessarily for the sake of nature itself. Weston states that, "Beauty is in the mind of beholder, aesthetic objects are only means to it."<sup>220</sup> What Weston means I think is that, people do not intrinsically

---

<sup>216</sup> A. Weston, 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics', in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 311.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>218</sup> A. Weston, 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics', in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 285.

<sup>219</sup> A. Weston, 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics', in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 312.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*

value nature; contrarily, nature always remains as an object of the humans' experience of aesthetic pleasure, and thus it is merely instrumentally valued.

Environmental pragmatists do not believe in the universality and timelessness of values, they regard the role of ethics as “creative mediation of conflicting claims to value, aimed at making life on the planet relatively better than it is.”<sup>221</sup> According to pragmatists, since world the changes, what people value also change. There are no universal, no fixed/timeless values. They believe in the interrelatedness of values.<sup>222</sup>

It is believed that moral pluralism would improve the environmental ethicists' capacity to develop better environmental policies. However, “Pluralism does not mean accepting everything, which is eclecticism. Building knowledge requires structure and selection criteria and there are limits to explanations of environmental change.”<sup>223</sup>

#### **2.2.5.1 Objections to Environmental Pragmatism**

The main objection to pragmatism is its embracement of moral pluralism. It is stated that, moral theories are embraced by moral philosophies. Changing of moral theories requires changing the metaphysical assumptions that lie behind these theories.<sup>224</sup> Quoting from Callicott, K. A. Parker says that, “We cannot in good faith be Kantians in the morning and Leopoldians in the afternoon.”<sup>225</sup> In order to overcome the ethical problems that we face, what moral pluralism recommends is

---

<sup>221</sup> K. A. Parker, ‘Pragmatism and Environmental Thought’, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 27.

<sup>222</sup> A. Weston, ‘Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics’, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 285.

<sup>223</sup> C. L. Spash, ‘The New Environmental Pragmatists, Pluralism and Sustainability’, *Environmental Values*, vol. 18, no. 3, 2009, p. 256.

<sup>224</sup> J. B. Callicott, ‘The Case against Moral Pluralism’, *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 12, no. 2, 1990, p. 99.

<sup>225</sup> K. A. Parker, ‘Pragmatism and Environmental Thought’, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 32.

to consider each situation as if it is a unique situation. If we want to reach a solution for any moral problem, then we need to tackle each problem carefully without preconceived and having generalized ideas, that is, being unbiased towards each situation. Further, we need to discuss each possible solution without any preconceived opinion. Eventually, moral pluralism might require applying different values/theories in our relations with the different people, at different times. Callicott criticizes this approach as follows:

Moral pluralism [...] invites us to adopt one theory to steer a course in our relations with friends and neighbors, another to define our obligations to fellow citizens, a third to clarify our duties to more distantly related people, a fourth to express the concern we feel for future generations, a fifth to govern our relationship with nonhuman animals, a sixth to bring plants within the purview of morals, a seventh to tell us how to treat the elemental environment, an eighth to cover species, ecosystems, and other environmental collectives, and perhaps a ninth to explain our obligations to the planet, Gaia, as a whole and organically unified living thing.<sup>226</sup>

The other objection is related with the possible danger of moral relativism. Even though he is one of the environmental pragmatists, E. Katz objects to the pragmatic approach, and claims that, an environmental ethics, which is entirely grounded on pragmatic value theory, would be inevitably and inherently anthropocentric and subjective, and lead to moral relativism.<sup>227</sup> He says the source of moral obligations to nature cannot be human's desires, interests, or experiences. If we ground environmental ethic on "an 'articulation' of human desires and experiences related to a plurality of human values, then it becomes extremely important *who is*

---

<sup>226</sup> J. B. Callicott, 'The Case against Moral Pluralism', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 12, no. 2, 1990, p. 104.

<sup>227</sup> E. Katz, 'Searching for Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despair in Environmental Ethics', in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 307-308.

articulating the values; *whose* desires and experience are being used as the source of moral obligations?”<sup>228</sup>

However, E. Katz does not reject pragmatism completely. He says a justifiable form of an environmental ethics should make use of pragmatic elements;<sup>229</sup> he supports a holistic environmental pragmatist approach, and value pluralism. E. Katz regards such an environmental ethics as well suited to handle environmental issues.

E. Katz puts two reasons why the intrinsic value cannot be the source of the environmental ethics: “it [intrinsic value] implies that individual entities -and not whole systems- are bearers of value; and it tend to focus on attention on anthropocentric values such as sentience and rationality.”<sup>230</sup>

### **2.3 Extrapolations for What is Needed for an Adequate Theory of Environmental Ethics**

In this chapter, I tried to examine the main theories and views on environmental ethics, and tried to present the prominent strong and weak sides of them. When the idea of environmental ethics got off the ground, ethicists tried to address environmental problems by introducing some anthropocentric ethical perspectives instead of introducing a new ethical theory that would focus on the main reason(s) behind these problems. As the suggested anthropocentric approaches failed to circumscribe environmental problems in all their complexity and problems persisted, and even increased in numbers, new ethical perspectives began to proliferate, some of which involved and offered radical changes in people’s lives compared to traditional moral views.

---

<sup>228</sup> E. Katz, ‘Searching for Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despair in Environmental Ethics’, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.). *Environmental Pragmatism*, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 315.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 313.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 311.

These theories, which are presented in the second half of this chapter, succeeded in pointing out the issue that anthropocentric approaches to nature remain incapable of solving the environmental problems and there might be intrinsically valuable things apart from human beings. Nonetheless, it seems that none of these new views could sufficiently cope with the environmental problems while remaining consistent with our established values. Even though all of these approaches have made great contributions to the development of a proper environmental ethics, these presented environmental worldviews have some defects and may not successfully provide the necessary conditions to protect the environment.

It may then be asked: why do these suggested views remain incapable of producing effective solutions to environmental problems. I have already mentioned some of those difficulties that a possible new environmental ethics would face in this chapter. Now, I will give a short overview of them.

It seems that the major challenge in front of environmental ethics is strong anthropocentrism. We know that traditional ethical theories arise out of anthropocentrism and, in so far as non-humans are not seen as vital components of an ethical relation in anthropocentrism, the majority of recent environmental ethicists agree on the need to extend the scope of morality. Nevertheless, there are some theoretical problems in front of such a widening of scope, especially with including non-living entities (inanimate things) into the moral realm.

One of the problems with the valuation of non-human entities results from the concept of 'moral responsibility'. According to the traditional understanding of morality, moral responsibility is peculiar to humankind and thus only human beings can be moral agents. However, it is obvious that criteria such as reason or capacity for moral reasoning exclude not only non-human entities, but also some people, such as mentally ill people, infants, and people who have lapsed into a vegetative state. This suggests that maybe the problem of moral responsibility with

respect to non-humans can be overcome in the same way that it is overcome in human-to-human ethics. We do not turn our backs on mentally ill people, disabled people, infants, or people who are in a vegetative state. We do not believe or claim that they cannot have rights, because they cannot take responsibility for their conducts. On the contrary, all of these human beings have the same moral rights as other human beings. The only difference is that, while they have moral rights, they do not have moral duties to others.

Concerning this issue, in my opinion, the best solution introduced until now is Taylor's distinction between 'moral agent' and 'moral subject'. However, if we address the issue of non-humans, as I mentioned in the related parts of this chapter, Taylor's distinction has some problematical aspects –especially concerning animals. This distinction eliminates the assumption of humans' superiority to non-humans by regarding all living things as just plain members of the biotic community rather than regarding human beings as masters of nature. However, it introduces another hierarchical distinction, which may lead to a mistake of ignoring the biological differences between the humans and non-humans, and perceiving these differences of non-humans as if these differences are some kind of handicaps. Thus, it is assumed that non-humans have the same moral status only with mentally ill persons or babies/infants; as if they are in a lower status than the normal, adult, rational people are. As a result, even though non-human beings are included in the ethical sphere, with this distinction, there is a hierarchical classification among them (to prevent the probable conflict cases). Therefore, I think we need an environmental ethics that will search for an approach, which will pay attention to their different nature and their differences, without 'othering' non-human beings.

The subject of individualism and holism is another difficulty an adequate environmental theory will have to face. Individualistic ethics, in general, defends egalitarianism with respect to the members of the moral sphere. Thus, while

individualists are, in general, morally concerned with and equally care about every member of the biotic community; holists regard egalitarianism to be a mistaken approach with respect to the well-being of the ecosystem. According to holists, the ecological value of some individuals is greater than some others', and they believe that this situation should be taken into account by environmental ethicists. Instead of focusing on individuals, holists concern themselves with the biotic community itself. In the case of moral conflicts, they prioritize the interests of the biotic community over the individuals, and determine the moral priority of things in terms of their ecological contributions. On the other hand, individualists accuse the proponents of holism of being disrespectful towards the rights of individuals, overriding their rights, and more importantly, being ecofascists or misanthropists. Consequently, I think, we need a new ethical approach that values individuals, species, biodiversity, and the biotic community as a whole; and which should take account of the interests of all of human and non-human entities in nature and nature itself.

Another controversial point is the question of moral pluralism and monism. According to some environmental philosophers, such as environmental pragmatists, a monist approach, which seeks timeless, universal value(s), cannot be sufficient to meet the continually changing needs of the environment. They claim that the time of moral monism is over. On the other hand, moral monists charge pluralists with being eclectic. Further, they claim that, in the case of moral conflicts, pluralists will have to face the problem of inconsistent practical imperatives of different moral theories. I agree with the pluralists in that it seems difficult to address all environmental issues under a unique, universal value or value-theory. However, I disagree with the pragmatic stance in so far as it undermines the importance of developing a consistent theoretical framework. I think an engagement with environmental ethics with the motive of solving problems (such as air pollution, desertification, climate change, or noise pollution)

in practice alone (i.e. policymaking) cannot be an appropriate or adequate method. For example, today we are in danger of water shortage, but this situation might change (probably it will); tomorrow, in some parts of the universe, we might be in danger of excess amount of water because of global warming, etc. So, while today we try to find solution of water shortage, in the future, excess amount of water might come back as an environmental problem. Alternatively, excessiveness of something that we complain about today might become scarce in the future and that might cause an environmental crisis. Consequently, an environmental ethics producing principles to solve the problematic issues people face in their relation with the environment, will in long term, drag us into the circularity of having to produce new principles as every new problem arises. So, in environmental ethics, what we need to do, must be something more fundamental than introducing normative principles or focusing on policymaking. I think it would be better, and serve the purpose to seek an attitude change. What is important is that the framework that is developed is one that takes into account the changing nature of values and problems and sees environmental ethics as a matter of process.

As a matter of fact, a problem with such predominantly goal-oriented approaches is that, since they are concerned with the further interests of present and future generations, if we examine them in depth, we can see that most of them are anthropocentric in essence. In short, I hold that these problematic issues should not be the primary concern of environmental ethics as a philosophical discipline. (As I will argue in the next chapter, each of these issues can at most be a subject of subdivisions of environmental ethics, more precisely, subjects of an applied ethics).

How to conceive of nature is another challenge in environmental ethics that complicates the evaluation of human-nature interaction. Some environmental philosophers believe that humans are the masters or controllers of nature, and therefore, they can rightfully do everything they like. I have already discussed the

problems of this anthropocentric approach. The second point of view, which is an ecological attitude, regards people as a part of nature, similar to the non-human parts. Yet that can again lead to the justification of human manipulation of nature, including environmentally destructive acts, as such acts can be seen as merely 'natural' by those environmentalists. Since both humans and non-humans are members of nature equally, there is no major distinction to be drawn between the conducts of humans and non-humans. For example, cutting of all trees in a forest is regarded as an act similar to that of a lion's killing and/or eating all deer, and both are seen normal/natural as a result of nature's process. In other words, it is claimed that, if we do not regard the acts of non-humans in nature as blameworthy, then since humans are also members of nature similar to non-humans, we should not morally condemn humans because of their acts against nature, either. They also express that, it is contradictory to regard human beings as parts of nature and request limitations on some human actions in the name of protecting the environment at the same time. For example, since animals are seen as a natural part of nature, goats that destroy nature by eating trees are not accused of disturbing the natural balance; it is seen as natural. Herewith unfolds one of biggest challenges in environmental ethics; that is, how to decide/determine the proper limit of human intervention to nature that can be regarded as 'natural'.

Related to this point, it can be argued that, to be normal/natural and to be moral are two different things, and they are not necessarily related. For example, the death of a person is normal/natural and a necessity of nature; however, how a person dies can be morally problematic. Thus, I think what we need as a new approach, which stays somewhere between these two end views. Although, these two approaches *prima facie* seem to be different, if both of them are saying that humans can rightfully do with nature as they wish, in terms of practical consequences what they are in essence are same.

Finally, both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theorists mention the intrinsic value of things. Attempts overcome anthropocentrism in the extant literature on environmental ethics almost invariably involve reference to some concept of intrinsic value. It is believed that, if nature is intrinsically valuable, then, it would be considered as a proper subject of moral concern by people. However, the concept of intrinsic value is one of the most problematic and obscure concepts of value theory. What is intrinsic value? What does it mean for something to be intrinsically valuable? When we look at the short history of environmental ethics, we face with many different understandings of intrinsic value. According to which criterion or criteria one adopts in defining something as intrinsically valuable, (such as having reason, being the subject-of-a-life, being a teleological-center-of-life, etc.) what one considers as intrinsically valuable differs. As a result, depending on these different descriptions, people suggest different environmental ethics; some are human-centered, some are life-centered, others are ecocentric.

Since I believe that this is one of the most vexing questions in environmental ethics, the rest of this dissertation is devoted to a more careful and detailed analysis of this concept and its application. Thus, in the next chapter, I will proceed to present a metaethical analysis of the concept of intrinsic value.

## CHAPTER III

### THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE IN RELATION TO SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM

*“Man is the measure of all things” Protagoras*

At the end of Chapter 2, I discussed the possible challenges that an environmental ethics has to deal with, at the ground of which lie some critical theoretical issues. When environmental ethicists touch upon or run into these theoretical issues, they usually treat them in rather arbitrary and sometimes even poetic ways, rather than adequately addressing the historical background and systematic complexity of these issues. In this chapter, I will identify and clarify these theoretical issues and present a more careful historical analysis of them.

The important issue, which lies at the bottom of other theoretical problems in environmental ethics, is ignoring the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics. As it is well-known, moral philosophy is divided into three areas: metaethics, normative ethics and applied ethics. This threefold classification of moral theory enables us to distinguish and theorize moral problems at different levels.<sup>231</sup>

Applied ethics is the branch of moral philosophy that deals with particular moral problems, such as, are humans morally responsible to animals, to nature? How

---

<sup>231</sup> H. J. McCloskey, *Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Netherlands, 1969, p. 1.

should people treat animals? Is euthanasia a right? Is euthanasia morally wrong or permissible?, and so on. In order to figure out such problems, applied ethics mostly resort to some underlying principles of normative ethics.

Normative ethics does not particularly focus on euthanasia, abortion, animal rights, or environmental problems. It attempts to offer more substantive moral principles to apply in case of need, such as, the utilitarian principle of the *greatest happiness of the greatest number*, the Kantian Categorical Imperative, Aristotelian temperance, etc. In other words, normative ethics focuses on offering practical/general principles to guide us in response to the questions of “what ought I to do?” or “What should I do?”

The concern of ethics at the metaethical level is not to introduce the principles that would apply to our daily moral problems. Metaethics is the branch of moral philosophy that deals with the meaning, nature and foundation of moral statements, properties, objects and values. H. J. McCloskey draws the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics via two questions. According to him, while a question like ‘What kinds of things and actions are good and obligatory?’ is the subject matter of normative ethics, a question such as ‘What am I doing when I make a moral judgment?’ is the subject matter of metaethics.<sup>232</sup> That is, while normative ethics concerns itself with what makes a person/an act good or bad; metaethics focuses on the terms ‘good’ or ‘bad’ itself. As stated by Robert Cavalier, “drawing the conceptual distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics is itself a ‘metaethical analysis.’”<sup>233</sup> While metaethics

---

<sup>232</sup> H. J. McCloskey, *Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Netherlands, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>233</sup> R. Cavalier, *Online Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy*, § 1. [http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/cavalier/80130/part2/II\\_preface.html](http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/cavalier/80130/part2/II_preface.html) (accessed 1 August 2015).

gained its popularity at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century with G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*,<sup>234</sup> it is in fact not a new field; its roots go back to ancient Greek philosophers.<sup>235</sup>

Although these three branches of morality address moral issues at different levels, they are substantially connected to each other. Thus, a deep moral analysis of a subject matter requires examining the matter in terms of all three aspects.

Focusing mostly on introducing normative principles, environmental ethicists tend to overlook the importance of the metaethical side of the issue. At their best, they seem to be looking for an ethical perspective, which will do both normative ethics and metaethics simultaneously. That is, environmental ethicists attempt to complete a two-steps process in a single-step. Considering the current understanding of environmental ethics, the aim of the first step (meta-ethics) should be to extend the scope of moral concern to nonhumans as well as humans and to focus on the justification of encapsulating non-humans into the moral world. The second step should focus on what we should do in the case of value conflicts, in light of our main principles (normative ethics applied to environmental problems).

I argue that more urgent attention should be given to the metaethical aspect of environmental ethics. With normative ethics, we can introduce principles and rules to solve the moral dilemmas and conflicts we may face, but it is with the metaethical part of ethics that we can achieve enlarging the scope of ethics, and moral concern. Not distinguishing the metaethical questions from normative questions causes not only the question of the moral status of non-humans, but also the questions of intrinsic value to get more complicated than they already are.

---

<sup>234</sup> A. Fisher, *Metaethics: An Introduction*, New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 2.

<sup>235</sup> K. M. DeLapp, 'Metaethics', *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/metaethi>, (accessed 1 August 2015).

If we introduce principles in the name of a quick fix without discussing the problem at the metaethical level, what we are doing will be similar to the environmental policies introduced by the politicians and legal experts, which are merely result-oriented solutions. Such policies cannot provide long-term solutions, because they cannot develop the right point of view on the issue, and cannot evaluate the matter adequately. What they are doing is just like giving a painkiller to a patient to relieve the pain without diagnosing the reasons behind that pain. So, like the painkiller, introducing moral principles without analyzing the matter at the metaethical level is a temporary solution, not a real one. In order to prevent another painful case, a deeper analysis, and another method is required to reveal the reason of the problem that lies beneath the surface.

### **3.1 Metaethical Conceptual Background**

Lack of precision in regard to two metaethical questions in particular is responsible for major conceptual confusions in environmental ethics: (1) the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of values; (2) the concept of intrinsic value. To disentangle these confusions, in this section, I will try to present these questions as they appear in metaethical theories and the history of philosophy independently of their appearance in environmental ethics. As we shall see, these two topics are confusing enough within the scope of traditional ethics without the additional extension of their application to the nonhuman realm. In section 3.1.1, I will address the question of whether there are objective values. Then, in section 3.1.2, I will discuss the concept of intrinsic value at length by presenting a brief history of how it has developed in the Western philosophical tradition. Since Kant's and Moore's accounts are the most influential conceptualizations of intrinsic value, that underlie the assumptions of environmental thinkers, I will devote separate sections to them (section 3.1.2.2 and section 3.1.2.3, respectively). In section 3.1.3, I will also present the controversy on whether such a thing as intrinsic value exists, and if it does, how we can know about it. Lastly, in section 3.1.4, I will

present my own conclusions, which I derive on the basis of the arguments put forward in these controversies.

### **3.1.1 Value: Subjective or Objective?**

The following are some of the most prominent questions dealt with by metaethicists: Can moral statements be true or false? Are there objective moral facts that exist independently of human valuation? If yes, how do or can we know them? What is the source and foundation of moral values?

These questions, especially the question of whether there are objective moral facts existing independently of the valuation of human subjects, play a big role in environmental ethics as discussions in environmental ethics revolve mainly around the question of whether nature and non-human entities have value independently of human beings or whether they have value only for us. In the event that a “yes” answer is given to the former question, then the question of how we can know about such values or moral facts is a further metaethical question that an adequate environmental theory would have to address.

There are various positions within metaethics that are developed in relation to the answers given to these questions. Unfortunately, most environmental ethicists do not enter into dialogue with these broader metaethical discussions.

Most classifications of metaethical positions begin by dividing them into cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism mainly relies on the difference in understanding of the metaphysical and epistemological status of moral terms and properties. Cognitivism claims that moral statements are propositions that describe the world. Thus, any moral statement is either true or false. “The world is round” and “killing animals for fur is wrong” are fundamentally the same types of statements for cognitivists. Both describe the world, and both statements can be either true or false. On the other

hand, according to non-cognitivists, moral statements do not express propositions; they are not truth-bearers. They are just expressions of feelings, emotional approvals or disapprovals.

There are different versions of non-cognitivism such as. A. J. Ayer's *emotivism*, and C. L. Stevenson's *expressivism*, which are based on the view that moral statements express our emotions or R. M. Hare's *Prescriptivism*, which holds that moral statements are commands or prescriptions, such as "Do not kill". However, for purposes of this dissertation, we do not need to go into a discussion of these various positions. A more recent metaethical position, Gibbard's *norm expressivism*, which asserts that moral statements express our acceptance of certain norms, may be closer to what I will argue for in this dissertation. However, it should be important to note that it is not uncontroversial to consider Gibbard a non-cognitivist. Recently his position, along with Simon Blackburn's, has been labeled as quasi-realism, which concedes some ground to cognitivist realist positions.

Similarly, the classifications within cognitivism are not equally agreed upon by all ethicists. Some begin by distinguishing between moral realism and anti-realism; while others first make a distinction between objectivism and subjectivism; with others yet, proceeding from a distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism. The classification that is most suitable for my purposes in this dissertation is the one offered by Sayre McCord in the "Introduction" to *Essays on Moral Realism*. McCord divides cognitivist positions into three: 1) Subjectivism, 2) Intersubjectivism, and 3) Objectivism.

Mostly **objectivists** presuppose value/moral realism. They believe that moral propositions are made 'true' by certain features of the world that exist independently of human valuation. In other words, according to objectivists, values exist 'out there' and their existence is independent of a valuer.

For instance, Platonic realism, which depends on the world of ideals, is a form of moral objectivism. Another proponent of moral objectivism is G. E. Moore, who held that the ‘goodness’ referred to in moral judgments is a non-natural but objective property, which is simple and unanalyzable. Moore defends that even though we cannot define or analyze ‘the good’ we can somehow recognize it by our moral intuition—a position, which has come to be known as “ethical intuitionism”.

However, these two examples should not lead to the mistaken impression that moral objectivists are all non-naturalists. While Moore strongly objected to what he called ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ in ethics, arguing that it is not possible to analyze the term ‘good’ by breaking it down into natural components that comprise the property of goodness, there are still many contemporary moral objectivists who are also naturalists.<sup>236</sup>

While the defenders of objective value claim that values exist ‘out there’ in the world independently of valuers, the defenders of **subjectivism** claim values are projected or constructed by humans, not discovered in nature; in other words, values arise only through human responses to the world.

One of the best-known defenses of the subjectivist position is J. Mackie’s ‘argument from relativity’. This argument mainly underlines “the well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another”.<sup>237</sup> It raises the legitimate question: If valuation were objective, meaning, if there were values in nature apart from humans’ valuation, why does the value of a thing alter in different societies? Why is it regarded differently throughout in history?

---

<sup>236</sup> See for instance Richard Boyd or David Wiggins.

<sup>237</sup> J. L. Mackie, ‘The Subjectivity of Values’, in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), *Essays on Moral Realism*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 109.

For example, think about incest. In some societies, such as Turkish and Islamic cultures, marriage and sexual relationship with first cousins is permitted. However, in some western societies, it is called incest and regarded as taboo. Further, in the early ages, in some ancient societies, such as Ancient Egyptians, especially in royal classes, marriage with close relatives was acceptable including brothers and sisters. For example, Tutankhamun married his sister. Or the marriage of an aunt with her nephew or an uncle with his niece was acceptable by Trobriand Islanders. It was even encouraged with the aim of keeping the family blood 'pure' or keeping the wealth within the family. However, marriage with aunts, uncles, brothers, or sisters is mostly considered as incest and it is taboo in today's world.

Furthermore, early marriage, or age disparity in marriage, is mostly not approved within western-oriented cultures. But, a man's marriage with a girl 20-30 years younger than him or vice versa is still fairly common in eastern-oriental cultures.<sup>238</sup> Child brides are not considered odd even in eastern regions of Turkey; on the other hand, an old man's marriage with a young girl is equated almost with pedophilia in western societies.

Thus, contrary to the assertion of objectivists, the differences/alterations in people's values presented through these examples show us that we cannot defend the universality of ethical values by themselves, i.e., spontaneous universality of values. Objectivists appeal to the universality of values to prove that values are independent of a valuer, especially, of a human valuer, and of humans' judgement.

---

<sup>238</sup> A nine-year-old schoolboy married his 62-year-old bride, he renewed his marriage with his old wife for the second time in South Africa.

A. Molloy, 'Saneie Masilela, 9, marries Helen Shabangu, 53 years his senior, for the second time', *The Independent*, 21 July 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/saneie-masilela-9-marries-helen-shabangu-53-years-his-senior-for-the-second-time-9618146.html>, (accessed 25 July 2014)

8-year-old bride was forced to marry a man nearly five times elder than her, a man in his 40 in Yemen, and she has died of internal bleeding sustained during her wedding night. "Yemeni child bride, eight, 'dies on wedding night'", *The Guardian*, 11 September 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/11/yemen-child-bride-dies-wedding> (accessed 25 July 2014)

Contrarily, many different examples can be given to support the claim that values are rarely uniform, even within same society, clan, or country. The differences in people's valuation in different societies support the subjectivity of values. That is, people of close geographical places, of similar societies based on religion, ethnicity, etc. and of same age share similar moral values. Therefore, that can be a sign of the subjectivity of values, not the objective reality of values.

We should be careful to note, however, that subjectivism does not necessarily need to be limited to moral relativism. A subjectivist may hold that the truth of moral claims depends on the subjective states of individuals, without claiming that they are therefore relative to 'judgers'.<sup>239</sup>

Also, as becomes obvious from the examples given above, relativism doesn't necessarily imply subjective/individual relativism (subjectivism); it can also denote cultural relativism (also known as conventionalism). In addition, there is a fine line between cultural relativism (or conventionalism) and intersubjectivism. According to **intersubjectivism**, what makes value judgements true are the conventions or practices of a group of people. So, while intersubjectivism (along with ethical subjectivism and conventionalism) can grant "that people figure in the truth-conditions" of moral statements, it holds that "the truth of moral claims doesn't turn on facts about particular individuals"<sup>240</sup> either. Therefore, it cannot be easily classified as a relativistic position.

Intersubjectivism can even come close to being a kind of objectivism, depending on the account it gives of how the conventions or practices of a group of people come to be agreed upon. For example, the given account can point to the 'psychological disposition' or even the common 'biogenetic structure' of the

---

<sup>239</sup> G. Sayre-McCord, 'Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms', in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), *Essays on Moral Realism*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 17

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

human species, which may allow for the universalization of cultural values. Contractarian views of morality can be cited as examples of intersubjectivism in ethics, which are not relativistic. Further, as I will argue in Chapter 4, such universalization of values can be argued to be not an eternal fact about human species, but one that develops in time, along with the history and evolution of our ideas and practical engagements.

### **3.1.2 Intrinsic Value/Worth**

Unresolved metaethical questions become most pronouncedly visible in environmental ethics with the pervasive use of the term ‘intrinsic value’ as attempts to overcome anthropocentrism in the extant literature on environmental ethics almost invariably involve reference to some version of this concept. I see two main reasons why those who want to extend the scope of ethics to non-humans appeal to the concept of intrinsic value.

1) As Bill Devall says, “it seems, in speaking of ‘rights’ is that many people trained in Western philosophy interpret ‘rights’ in terms of [...] the doctrine of universal human rights extended to include other animals.”<sup>241</sup> Since traditionally human rights are substantiated on the basis of Kant’s notion of intrinsic value and dignity, those who want to extend rights to nonhumans implicitly or explicitly appeal to this Kantian notion.

2) Many other nonanthropocentrists, who do not focus on rights as much, on the other hand, still find the need to appeal to the notion of intrinsic value because they want to claim that nature has value independent of human interests and human valuation. In this case, the conception of intrinsic value that they seem to be

---

<sup>241</sup> B. Devall, ‘Deep Ecology and its Critics’, *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1988, p. 57.

appealing to seems more related to Moore's conception of intrinsic value than Kant's.

Therefore, in this section, after presenting a general overview, I will focus on Kant's and Moore's conceptions of intrinsic value.

### **3.1.2.1 General Overview of Prominent Theories of Intrinsic Value**

In general, intrinsic is used in the sense of 'in itself' or 'for its own sake'. It can be said that, if X is valuable for the sake of something else, it is instrumentally valuable, but if X is valuable for its own sake, then it is intrinsically valuable. History of the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values goes back a long way.

Even though Plato himself does not use the terms 'intrinsic value' and 'instrumental value', one can locate the origin of this distinction in Plato's *Republic*. In the *Republic*, Socrates' dialogue with Glaucon that is an inquiry on "what is justice", Glaucon mentions three kinds of good. The first kind of good is "that we would choose to have not because we desire its consequences, but because we delight in it for its own sake". According to Glaucon, pleasures are such intrinsic goods (even though this by no means seems to be Plato's own position).<sup>242</sup> The second kind of good is that which we "like both for its own sake and for what comes out of it, such as thinking and seeing and being healthy."<sup>243</sup> The third kind of good, are those "which we would not choose to have [...] for themselves but for the sake of [...] whatever else comes out of them."<sup>244</sup> Glaucon gives gymnastic exercise and medical treatment as examples to this third kind of good. Thus, although Plato does not use the term 'intrinsic value', we see that

---

<sup>242</sup> A. Bloom, *The Republic of Plato: Translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay* by Allan Bloom, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., HarperCollins Publishers, USA, 1991, p. 35.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

here, an attempt is already made to distinguish between things that are desired “for their own sake” and those that are desired “for the sake of what comes out of them”.

Like Plato, **Aristotle** also does not use the term ‘intrinsic value’. However, Aristotle’s discussion of two kinds of good in *Nicomachean Ethics*, and his definitions of them correspond to the division between the concepts of ‘instrumental good’ and ‘intrinsic good’ in the sense that we use them nowadays.

At the beginning of ‘Book I’ of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argues that, everything, which we do or pursue, aims at some good. Thus, he begins an inquiry on the concept of ‘good’. He mentions two kinds of good: good, which is for the sake of something else, and things that are ‘good in themselves’. He describes things that are ‘good in themselves’ as the things that are pursued apart from their consequences, such as wisdom, some pleasures and honor.<sup>245</sup> Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not mention a universal idea of good/a concept of good that can be applied to all of different things, which are regarded as good. He thinks good is different in each different case, such as in medicine, in war, in building, etc.<sup>246</sup> Further, he argues that, even if such a universal, absolute good exists, it cannot be realized or attained by man. So, the kind of good that we should focus on is the one which is attainable and realizable by man.<sup>247</sup>

Aristotle says that while some of the ends we pursue are chosen only as means, such as wealth, flutes, and the whole class of instruments, some of them are final ends.<sup>248</sup> Thus, he asks, “What is the highest of all realizable goods?”<sup>249</sup> Although

---

<sup>245</sup> F. H., Peters, *The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, 5<sup>th</sup> edn., London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1893, pp. 10-11.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>247</sup> F. H., Peters, *The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, 5<sup>th</sup> edn., London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1893, p. 12.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

they are mainly two different types of good, actually, Aristotle mentions three kinds of goods. Those are, good that is pursued as means to something else, such as playing music on the street to earn money, learning mathematics to pass exam; good that is chosen as means and also good in themselves, such as honour, wisdom, certain pleasures, etc.; and good that is pursued as an end in itself, i.e., the final end.

Aristotle claims that, what is regarded as –final– good is always the end, and “it is always for the sake of the end that all else is done.”<sup>250</sup> Further, “The final good is thought to be self-sufficing [or all-sufficing].”<sup>251</sup> As a result of his discussion on the good, he argues that happiness seems to be the final end more than anything else; in other words, it is the final good that all other ends are desired for. He says that, goods such as honor, pleasure and reason are chosen partly for themselves apart from their consequences and also “partly for the sake of happiness, supposing that they will help to make us happy”.<sup>252</sup>

To sum up, according to Aristotle, some goods are just means to reach some other ends. Although some goods are also ends, they are also means to other ends. And, there are some goods which are merely ends, not means to further ends. They are final ends/goods. While the first kind of good is instrumental good, both second and third kinds are intrinsic goods with the single difference that while the second kind of good is partly instrumental and partly intrinsic, the third kind is merely intrinsic good.

A more straightforward positing of intrinsic value is seen in **hedonism**, the roots of which go back to Epicureanism. Hedonism regards pleasure as the only thing with positive intrinsic value and pain as the only thing with negative intrinsic

---

<sup>250</sup> F. H., Peters, *The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, 5<sup>th</sup> edn., London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1893, p. 13.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*

value. However, Gilbert Harman objects to this approach of Hedonist's. He says there are some pleasures, which are not intrinsically worthwhile such as malicious pleasures. The pleasure attained from torture cannot have any value. Additionally, he says there are some other things apart from pleasure that are intrinsically worthwhile, for example knowledge and justice, etc.<sup>253</sup>

Although the discussion of hedonism starts in Ancient Greek, Bentham and Mill are modern defenders of hedonism. We find a distinction between instrumental value (something that is valued as a means to something else) and something valued as an end-in-itself in Bentham and Mill's version of hedonism, namely **utilitarianism**, as well. Bentham and Mill claim that happiness is the only thing desirable, and they put it as an end-in-itself.<sup>254</sup> Bentham argues that, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do."<sup>255</sup>

Additionally, the greatest happiness principle of Mill commands that, what is right is determined on the basis of whether it leads to happiness and what is wrong is what leads to the reverse of happiness. With happiness, he means pleasure or freedom from pain, and with unhappiness, he means the pain or absence of pleasure.<sup>256</sup> According to Mill, all of the desirable things "are desirable either for

---

<sup>253</sup> G. Harman, 'Intrinsic Value', in G. Harman (ed.), *Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 137, 140.

<sup>254</sup> J. S. Mill, *The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill*, J. B. Schneewind (ed.), New York, The Modern Library, 2002, p. 244.

<sup>255</sup> J. Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chapter I: of the *Principal of Utility*, § 1, I.1. Library of Economics and Liberty, 1907, Available from <http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML1.html>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

<sup>256</sup> J. S. Mill, *The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill*, J. B. Schneewind (ed.), New York, The Modern Library, 2002, p. 239.

the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain”.<sup>257</sup> Thus, Mill regards happiness or pleasure and prevention of pain as intrinsically good things.

What the Utilitarian Greatest Happiness Principle recommends to us is that: the ultimate end of human life, in other words, the whole other things are desired for the sake of it, requires the prevention of pain and promotion of pleasure as much as possible both in quantity and quality considering either our own good or that of some others.<sup>258</sup> In the case of comparison, for a test to measure the qualities, we may apply to feelings and judgments of the people who experienced both positions equally and competently.

One of the most important implications of this utilitarian approach for environmental ethics is that, with the emphasis of utilitarianism on pleasure and pain as the criterion of value, the Benthamian question “Can it suffer?” took the place of the Cartesian and Kantian question “Can it reason?” Thus, the source of intrinsic value is changed from Kantian rationality to Utilitarian ‘sensation/sentience’.

### **3.1.2.2 Kant**

Kant’s moral philosophy has a determinative role in my understanding of instrumental and intrinsic value, especially his distinction of ‘dignity’ and ‘price’. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant’s starts with the concept of ‘good will’ claiming that “It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except

---

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 244.

a good will.”<sup>259</sup> Other goods such as courage, honor, judgement, etc., may become extremely evil without the principle of the good will.<sup>260</sup> Accordingly, ‘good will’ is the precondition of an act to be morally good/to be moral. The good will is the only thing to which Kant attributes unconditional moral worth. Actions and personal qualities are merely morally valuable when they are carried in accordance with good will. Thus, the good will is the only unconditionally good thing, and it is the condition of all value/conditionally valuable things. According to Kant, ‘will’ is a capacity, which is peculiar only to rational beings, to act in a self-determining manner, conforming to the representation of a certain law. He says if the ‘will’ is motivated by duty/the sense of duty then it is a good will. Another implication of Kant’s description of ‘good will’ is that, the worth of good will is independent of anything external to it; it does not depend on the consequences of any action, whether that action turns out to be successful or unsuccessful. A good will is not good for what it produces; it is good in itself, it is intrinsically good.

Since this focus on the conception of intrinsic good is one of the central axes of Kantian morality, the distinction between ‘means’ and ‘end’ has a significant role in his moral philosophy also. He defines ‘an end’ as “what serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination”. ‘A means’, on the other hand, is “[w]hat [...] contains merely the ground of possibility of an action the effect of which is the end”.<sup>261</sup> Depending on that distinction, he ascertains the position of human beings within the second formulation of the ‘Categorical Imperative’. That is: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of

---

<sup>259</sup> I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, p. 49.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>261</sup> I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, p. 78.

any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”<sup>262</sup> This second formulation, makes explicit the intrinsic value that Kant ascribes to ‘rational’ human beings in such a way that, he draws a distinction between ‘persons’ and ‘things’. He says that, by their nature, all rational beings as ends in themselves have a capacity that may not be used merely as a means. Hence, rational beings are called ‘persons’. Rational human beings, as persons, are objects of respect.<sup>263</sup>

Kant calls the union of moral and autonomous rational beings the ‘kingdom of ends’.<sup>264</sup> The Categorical Imperative allows one to see whether he or she can will the maxim of his/her acts become a universal law in a world, namely, ‘kingdom of ends’, in which he/she is going to be a part. It is important to notice that the kingdom is not real; it is merely an ideal community, i.e., an intelligible world.

In the kingdom of ends, “everything has either a price or a dignity”.<sup>265</sup> Kant states that, what has a ‘price’ can be replaced by another thing, that is, with its equivalent. However, if something has no equivalence, then it has ‘dignity’.<sup>266</sup> What he means with dignity is an unconditional and incomparable worth, i.e., an intrinsic worth.<sup>267</sup> Kant argues that, since they have the capacity to be autonomous, all rational human beings have dignity. Moreover, human beings should act and be treated in ways that make them aware of these capacities. Further, he argues that, “autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature”.<sup>268</sup>

---

<sup>262</sup> I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, p. 80.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

Through this analysis of Kant, there emerges two distinct possible ways of grounding a claim that something has intrinsic value. The more obvious way is the view that what grounds intrinsic value is the capacity for moral reasoning. Briefly the argument is: The only thing that is “good without qualification/good in-itself” is good will. The will is our faculty of moral reasoning, and good will is acting from duty, i.e., in accordance with and for the sake of the categorical imperative. Since it is human beings that are endowed with the faculty of moral reasoning, it is only human beings that are capable of having good will. And, since good will is the only thing that is good-in-itself, —i.e. intrinsically valuable— it follows that only human beings can have intrinsic value. I will call this the “rationality argument”.

But as we have seen just above, in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant also makes a distinction between ‘dignity’ and ‘price’. Depending on Kant’s analysis of these concepts, we can say that, an intrinsically valuable thing is something that cannot be replaced by something else. Contrarily an instrumentally valuable thing can be replaced by something else that is considered as an equivalent to it. For example, ‘human life’ cannot be replaced by something else, and it has no equivalence, therefore, it is intrinsically valuable. This explication of the concept of dignity suggests an alternative way of grounding a claim to intrinsic value: if one cannot put a price on something because it cannot be exchanged for something else because it is irreplaceable, then it has intrinsic value. I will call this the ‘replaceability argument’.

Since Kant appears to consider only ‘human life’ as opposed to other living beings as non-replaceable by something else that can be considered as an equivalent of it, he is counted among the prominent anthropocentrists. I, on the other hand, will argue that intrinsic value can be attributed to nonhuman beings as well. Thus, in the next chapter, in trying to talk about the possible applications of the concept of intrinsic value in environmental ethics, I will have in mind the “replaceability

argument” that underlies the distinction between ‘dignity’ and ‘price’ that Kant made in the *Groundwork*, arguing that it is possible to consistently extend this understanding of intrinsic value to nonhumans.

### 3.1.2.3 Moore

G. E. Moore makes a deep analysis of intrinsic value applying the concepts of intrinsic nature and intrinsic property. However, he defines intrinsic value as well as intrinsic nature and property in a complicated way. He defines intrinsic value as follows: “To say that a kind of value is ‘intrinsic’ means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.”<sup>269</sup> With this definition, he implies two different points. The first point: the intrinsic value of a thing would not be different at different times or in different circumstances as long as it has the same intrinsic nature. In other words, unless its intrinsic nature changes, a thing would always have the same intrinsic value. The second point: two exactly similar things would necessarily have the same value in exactly the same degree.<sup>270</sup> Another point related to Moore’s understanding in intrinsic nature is that the intrinsic nature of a thing is determined by its intrinsic properties, which are non-relational properties.

What Moore means by ‘intrinsic value’ is ‘good in itself’ or ‘good’.<sup>271</sup> He makes a distinction between ‘good as means’ and ‘good in itself’. The difference between them is explained as follows. If we judge a thing regarding its causal relation then

---

<sup>269</sup> G. E. Moore, ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’, *Philosophical Studies*, Paterson, N.J., Littlefield, Adams, 1959, p. 260.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 260-261.

<sup>271</sup> R. E. Carter, ‘Intrinsic Value and the Intrinsic Valuer’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 34, no. 4, 1974, p. 504.

it is ‘good as a means’, but if we judge a thing independent of all its relations then it is ‘good in itself’. As Moore claims, “a thing would have the same intrinsic nature if transferred to another world or placed in a different set-up of causal laws”.<sup>272</sup>

Moore introduces the “isolation principle” for the recognition of intrinsically valuable things. He asserts that if a thing has intrinsic value, it has that value even when it is isolated from all of its relations and all other things that exist in the universe.<sup>273</sup> Thus, Moorean intrinsic value does not depend on relations and is also independent of people’s desires and interests.

Guy Fletcher clarifies the implications of Moore’s definition of intrinsic value as follows:

So, on Moore’s view, if Y possesses intrinsic value today, then all of the following must be true:

- (a) Y’s intrinsic value depends solely upon its intrinsic properties.
- (b) Y must also possess intrinsic value (and to the same degree) at any other time or place at which it exists.
- (c) Anything with the same intrinsic properties as Y must possess intrinsic value (and to the same degree) as Y.<sup>274</sup>

Nevertheless, Moorean intrinsic value is criticized from two respects that I also agree with: its being non-relational and the isolation principle itself. Noah M.

---

<sup>272</sup> G. E. Moore, ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’, *Philosophical Papers*, Paterson, N.J., Littlefield, Adams, 1959, p. 256, cited in C. M. Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 92, no. 2, 1983, p. 175.

<sup>273</sup> B. Bradley, ‘Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?’, *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 107, no. 1, 2002, p. 23.

<sup>274</sup> G. Fletcher, ‘Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value’, *Social Theory and Practice*, vol. 34, no.4, 2008, p. 519.

Lemos regards the Moorean isolation principle as an ontological isolation. He claims that an intrinsically good thing cannot exist alone. For example, although John's being happy is good, it cannot be thought independently of the existence of John or the things that cause his happiness, etc.<sup>275</sup> James Ward Smith also argues that Moore's isolation principle is not satisfactory because, according to this definition, one could never determine whether a thing X has intrinsic value or whether it is intrinsically good. Therefore, he called Moore's isolation principle as "ill advised".<sup>276</sup>

In addition to this ontological problem, Darlei Dall'Agnol adds that although John's being happy is good, it cannot be said that it is unconditionally good. John can be a serial killer who enjoys killing innocent people. In that case do we still call John's happiness intrinsically and unconditionally good/valuable? Thus, the application of the isolation principle in an absolute way evidently leads to an error in one's moral evaluations.<sup>277</sup>

D. Dall'Agnol emphasizes that intrinsic value is a relational concept as follows:

x has intrinsic value, that is, that A is having x for its own sake. Intrinsic value, here, is a practical concept: good-as-an-end is contrasted with good-as-a-means. In other words, it says that A is having x not in an instrumental way, but for itself. This requirement makes clear that intrinsic value is a property of things which is agent-related. But, it is agent-related and neither agent-relative nor agent-neutral. Consequently, it is clear that intrinsic value is a relational concept.<sup>278</sup>

Dall'Agnol's point here that intrinsic value is an agent-related property can in fact be generalized to all kinds of value. As a matter of fact, this is one of the main reasons why I shall argue for a kind of subjectivism (or intersubjectivism) as

---

<sup>275</sup> N. M. Lemos, *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 10-11.

<sup>276</sup> J. W. Smith, 'Intrinsic and Extrinsic Good', *Ethics*, vol. 58, no. 3, 1948, p. 201.

<sup>277</sup> D. Dall'Agnol, 'Intrinsic Value: Analysing Moore's Aristotelian approach', *Ethic@*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2003, p. 63.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

opposed to objectivism. As Dall'Agnol emphasizes, this agent-relatedness does not imply relativism ('agent-related' isn't the same as 'agent-relative') but it does imply that value cannot be 'agent-neutral' (objective)—i.e., value always requires a valuer.

Darlei Dall'Agnol also points out that, the values that a valuer already has cannot be excluded during application of the isolation test. "For example, a hedonist would consider only pleasure as good in itself."<sup>279</sup> The test would also either presuppose or overlook certain metaphysical questions, even questions concerning whether the valuer considers existence as good or bad in-itself. "A nihilist could reject the existence of anything as good, preferring an empty universe as intrinsically good."<sup>280</sup> Thus, Moore's isolation test is in fact of no use in enabling us to make correct evaluations, and is a completely misleading and misconceptualized approach to understanding what "intrinsic value" is about.<sup>281</sup>

Further underlining the agent-relatedness of value is the question of whether the properties of something which render it intrinsically valuable might themselves not be relational properties. As I mentioned in the previous pages, according to Moore, the intrinsic value of a thing depends on its intrinsic nature and intrinsic properties. Nevertheless, some people question whether there might be an intrinsic value that depends on the extrinsic properties of a thing.<sup>282</sup> Shelly Kagan, who is one of them, claims that some extrinsic properties such as the historical importance

---

<sup>279</sup> D. Dall'Agnol, 'Intrinsic Value: Analysing Moore's Aristotelian approach', *Ethic@*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2003, p. 63.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>282</sup> B. Bradley, 'Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?', *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 107, no. 1, 2002, p. 24.  
S. Kagan, 'Rethinking Intrinsic Value', *The Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1998, pp. 277-297.

and rarity of a thing could render it intrinsic valuable. According to Kagan, the uniqueness of a painting, such as Mona Lisa, will increase the intrinsic value of it. If we suppose that da Vinci had painted another one just like it, then obviously it would have less intrinsic value. Another example of Kagan is about the pen that is used by Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation. He claims that this pen is more valuable than one with intrinsically similar properties.<sup>283</sup> Moreover, thinkers, who argue that only states of mind have intrinsic value, maintain not the pen itself has intrinsic value; what is intrinsically valuable is knowing that it is used by Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation.

In his article “Intrinsic Value”, Monroe C. Beardsley also gives a good counter-example, the example of a misprinted stamp, to object to the non-relationality of Moorean intrinsic value. Beardsley expresses that in general intrinsic value is defined by whether it is valued ‘for its own sake’ and ‘in itself’. Since a misprinted stamp is valued for its own sake, not something else, it is obvious that the misprinted stamp has intrinsic value. It is also known that the philatelic value of a stamp arises by its rarity. However, rarity is something relational and contextual. If the post office prints these stamps in excessive amounts, then it is clear that it would not have as much value as in its previous states.<sup>284</sup> Consequently, although the misprinted stamp seems intrinsically valuable, this value is relational. This example is a counter-example to Moore’s definition because according to Moore, intrinsic value is the value that a thing possesses even if it is isolated from all of its relations, causes, effects, and other connections with other things or events. If that were so, in this example, we would find ourselves in a contradictory situation: the value of the stamp seems neither intrinsic nor extrinsic if we base it on Moore’s definition.

---

<sup>283</sup> S. Kagan, ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’, *The Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1998, pp. 285-286.

<sup>284</sup> M. C. Beardsley, ‘Intrinsic Value’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1965, pp. 1-2.

### 3.1.3 A Tentative Defense of Intrinsic Value

#### 3.1.3.1 How do We Know the Existence of Intrinsic Value?

The problems with Moore's conception of intrinsic value (and perhaps ungrounded assumptions in Kant's notion as well) lead us to the question of whether it is legitimate to even talk about the existence of something like intrinsic value. How do we know that intrinsic value exists? Metaethicists are divided on the issue. While Moore, Zimmerman and Kagan can be cited as defenders of the existence of intrinsic value, others such as Beardsley, Harman, and pragmatists deny the existence of intrinsic value and claim that all values are instrumental or extrinsic.

Dewey suggests a pragmatist approach to the problem of intrinsic-instrumental/extrinsic value. In fact, the pragmatist approach problematizes the means-end distinction more generally. Pragmatists emphasize that, as the world constantly changes, the solution of a problem may turn into the source of another problem or what is an end in a situation can become a means in another situation. Thus, according to Dewey, suggestion of a timeless list of intrinsic goods and evils in such a dynamic world is a mistake.<sup>285</sup>

Beardsley also claims that we do not need the concept of intrinsic value in our ethical or aesthetic judgments, "the concept of intrinsic value is inapplicable – [...]even if something has intrinsic value, we could not know it, and therefore [...] it can play no role in ethical or aesthetic reasoning."<sup>286</sup> In his article "Intrinsic Value", Monroe C. Beardsley conducts his attack on the notion of intrinsic value by identifying three arguments that are given in favor of intrinsic value: 1) Argument from definition 2) Dialectical demonstration, and 3) Empirical

---

<sup>285</sup> M. J. Zimmerman, 'Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 24 December 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic>, (accessed 1 February 2015)

<sup>286</sup> M. C. Beardsley, 'Intrinsic Value', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1965, pp. 12-13.

confirmation. Examining these, he attempts to refute them in order to show that all values are instrumental.

So, to present arguments supporting the existence of intrinsic value, I will follow in Beardsley's footsteps and explain these three arguments.

1) The first argument about existence of intrinsic value is analogous with the Aristotelian First Cause argument. If there were no intrinsic value, then all values would be instrumental value. That is, an instrumentally valuable thing X would get its value from its being useful for another instrumentally valuable thing Y. But then, Y must get its value from another instrumentally valuable Z. This chain of instrumental values goes on like this. Nevertheless, we necessarily stop somewhere. Because we would be forced to recognize that, we reached such a point where a thing in question does not derive its value from something else. We will reach a non-derivatively valuable thing that has its value is for its own sake. Existence of that intrinsically valuable thing saves us from an infinite regress. Put differently, to get out of an infinite regress, there must be a first intrinsically valuable thing that does not get its value from somewhere else; it should be the reason of its own value.<sup>287</sup> Consequently, if an object X has instrumental value, then, there should be another object that has intrinsic value, which is implied by the instrumental value of X.<sup>288</sup> Beardsley calls this argument **the argument from dialectical demonstration**. He presents a similar semantic argument which he calls the "the argument from definition."

2) According to the **argument from definition**, if an object X has instrumental value, then, there should be another object that has intrinsic value that is implied

---

<sup>287</sup> M. C. Beardsley, 'Intrinsic Value', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1965, p. 6.

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

by the instrumental value of X. In other words, the existence of extrinsic value presupposes the existence of intrinsic value.

Beardsley objects to both of these arguments. He rejects the argument from definition by saying that the existence of an instrumental value only means that there is an instrumentally valuable thing, which is conducive to another value. However, its being an intrinsic value is not compulsory; it may also be an instrumental value. Thus, existence of an instrumental value does not require existence of an intrinsic value; it only presupposes the existence of another value.<sup>289</sup>

Similar to Beardsley, G. Harman also rejects the argument from definition. He gives the possible definition of instrumental value as follows:

We can suppose that x has instrumental value to the extent that x has value that is due to x's being possibly instrumental in bringing about something else. Or, in terms of valuing, x is valued instrumentally to the extent that x is valued because x is (or would be) instrumental in bringing about something else.<sup>290</sup>

Harman asserts that the definition does not necessarily lead to the existence of intrinsic value, and explicates this with an example. Since it can be used to purchase things, obviously money has instrumental value. We can assume that money has instrumental value even if we do not have any particular purchases in mind and do not suppose that the items to be purchased are valued intrinsically. Many of the items to be purchased, such as food, shelter, medical care, transportation, and clothing, are highly valued; however, they may be valued only instrumentally rather than intrinsically.<sup>291</sup>

---

<sup>289</sup> M. C. Beardsley, 'Intrinsic Value', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1965, p. 6.

<sup>290</sup> G. Harman, 'Intrinsic Value', in G. Harman (ed.), *Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. 143.

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid.*

Michael J. Zimmerman, one of the philosophers defending the existence of intrinsic value, joins the debate by objecting to Beardsley's claim as follows:

[E]ven if it could somehow be shown that nothing *does* have such value, this would still leave open the question whether something could have such value. If the answer to this last question is 'yes,' then the legitimacy of the concept of intrinsic value is in fact confirmed rather than refuted.<sup>292</sup>

Beardsley objects to the application of the First Cause argument to the instrumental-intrinsic value problem (the dialectical demonstration). He says philosophers still discuss whether there is any thing that has an intrinsic value, and likewise whether pleasure is the only thing that has an intrinsic value. On the other hand, in daily life we do not need to wait for them to make a decision. It is not necessary to go forward to find a First Cause in each case. We need to stop somewhere. For example, it is enough to know being healthy is better than being sick. We do not need to know whether being healthy is an intrinsic value, or it is best for us, etc. In daily life, we do not search for a fundamental intrinsically valuable thing that lies at the ground of our other values. If we wait to find such a fundamental value, then we may not make even a single decision in our value problems.<sup>293</sup>

3) The last argument, **empirical confirmation**, asserts that, direct experience and state of mind can give us the intrinsic value.

Gilbert Harman objects to thinkers who regard desirability as the evidence of intrinsic value. He claims that desirability may exist without intrinsic or instrumental value. He gives the example of a man expecting to hear his health

---

<sup>292</sup> M. J. Zimmerman, 'Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 24 December 2014, Section 3, § 5, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic>, (accessed 1 February 2015)

<sup>293</sup> M. C. Beardsley, 'Intrinsic Value', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1965, pp. 6-8.

condition from his doctor, that is, although hearing that is something he desires, it is not something he values:

You want very much for the doctor to say that you are in good health. This is not something you want intrinsically, but it also does not have to be something you want for its expected effects either. It need not be an instrumental desire on your part. You want the doctor to say you are in good health because you want to be in good health, but you do not expect the doctor's saying so to have a beneficial effect on your health. Rather: you take what he says as a sign or indication of the state of your health. [...] You want the doctor to say that you are in good health, but you do not exactly value the doctor's saying that.<sup>294</sup>

Nevertheless, I believe it can still be argued that the existence of intrinsic value can be known through experience. As Callicott says, "The question how do we know that intrinsic value exists? is similar to how do we know that consciousness exists? We experience both consciousness and intrinsic value introspectively and irrefutably".<sup>295</sup> He says that, "this is the phenomenological proof for the existence of intrinsic value."<sup>296</sup> Thus, our experiences show us that not all our valuations are instrumental. For example, when we hear an announcement on TV about a fire in a pet shop, we feel bad for the sake of those animals, not for the money the owner of the shop may lose or for any other things that are for the benefit of human beings. Thus, we value these animals not merely instrumentally, but also intrinsically. Furthermore, for everyone, there are some valuable things that are not given up easily for the sake of something else. In fact, people may sacrifice all the other things they have for what they hold intrinsically valuable; they even venture to sacrifice their own lives, which is the last thing that one can lose. Thus, it is obvious that people intrinsically value something(s). For example, a mother values her child's life intrinsically; a patriot values his country intrinsically.

---

<sup>294</sup> G. Harman, 'Intrinsic Value', in G. Harman (ed.), *Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 143.

<sup>295</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 240.

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240.

Hargrove also claims that the existence of intrinsic value is unquestionable, claiming that “ [w]e do not need to begin [...] with a proof that intrinsic value exists” since “intrinsic value is the product of human valuing, human decision making, and everyone already knows what valuing, deciding, and judging means.”<sup>297</sup>

### **3.1.3.2 Why do We Need the Concept of ‘Intrinsic Value’?**

Why do we need the concept of ‘intrinsic value’? As I mentioned previously, the main reason is if something is considered intrinsically valuable, then any violation of it requires substantial justification. As one of the most important problems of environmental ethics is the justification of protection/conservation and valuation of biotic ‘fellow citizens’, I can say that we need the concept of intrinsic value to justify our protection/conservation of the non-humans and environment.

P. W. Taylor presents a helpful explanation of why ethicists appeal to intrinsic value in environmental ethics. Depending on the positive and negative duty distinction, Taylor claims that, “intrinsically valuing something is the recognition of a negative duty not to destroy, harm, damage, vandalize, or misuse the thing and a positive duty to protect it from being destroyed, harmed, damaged, vandalized, or misused by others”.<sup>298</sup>

Hargrove also criticizes the environmental pragmatists’ account of intrinsic value. He says that, “Before pragmatism created the confusion about the relationship of intrinsic and instrumental value, the distinction was clear and serviceable to ordinary people.”<sup>299</sup> Unlike some pragmatists, Hargrove believes in the necessity

---

<sup>297</sup> E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 199.

<sup>298</sup> P. W. Taylor, ‘Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants?’, *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1984, p. 151.

<sup>299</sup> E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 197.

of making distinction the between instrumental and intrinsic values. He objects to the pragmatists' attempt to focus on the instrumental valuation of nature instead of its intrinsic valuation. He says that, "the reduction of intrinsic value to instrumental terms demeans and trivializes it, giving a counterintuitive advantage to (instrumental) resource exploitation by turning nature preservation into a peculiar, and largely indefensible, special case of resource exploitation and consumption."<sup>300</sup> He also adds that, "the instrumentalist approach to valuing natural objects is the primary approach in economics, the valuable contribution that can be made by an intrinsic value approach has been neglected."<sup>301</sup>

When the topic is environmental ethics, those who are alien to the subject, especially if they have not given much thought to the human-environment relation, are prone to ask, "Why should we care about the interests or desires of non-human entities? What kind of value, what do human beings lose when a species, a part of wild nature is lost?" Such questions might be more biased/loaded with secret presumptions than is realized. When the question of why we might want to attribute intrinsic value to nonhuman entities is asked, it seems that the questioner, who is expecting to hear something other than "because, they are intrinsically valuable", is intentionally or unintentionally is asking for the instrumental value of the entity in question. That is, the questioner was mostly expecting to hear instrumental reasons. You can easily notice that by remembering the definition of intrinsic value: Valuable for its own sake, not the sake of something else. So, different from an instrumentally valuable thing, you cannot give an answer easily to a 'why' question about an intrinsically valuable thing. Most of the time, the given answers would not be convincing and/or satisfying enough. The intrinsic value is the last answer that can be given when one asks why something is valuable. As explained in the previous section, one of the proofs of existence of

---

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*

intrinsic value is that: We would reach such a point that we would be forced to recognize that a thing in question does not derive its value from something else. We will reach a non-derivatively valuable thing the value of which is for its own sake. For example, why is human life valuable? Why is happiness valuable?, etc. Because, they are not merely means for some further means or ends, they are ends-in-themselves.

There is a critical point, which should not be ignored: searching the ground of intrinsic value/valuation and searching the reasons of attributing intrinsic value to something are different. While the first one is a 'how' question, the second one is 'why' question, the answer of which can change according to the answerer. While to answer the first one is philosophically possible, seeking to an answer the second one cannot be done easily because of the nature of 'being intrinsically valuable', which I tried to present. In this study, my concern is the first problem.

Think about that case that is related by Callicott: Edwin P. Pister,<sup>302</sup> who worked hard to save several species of fish from extinction, frequently undergoes that question: Finally, he found a way of successfully handling the difficulty with the justification of value that fishes have, asking: "What good are you?"<sup>303</sup> It is clear that, if we set aside the religious reasons, the value both human and non-human entities have depend on ultimately the same unexplainable and elusive ground. So, asking why questions would not take us to the necessary ground.

Almost all defenders of intrinsic value accept that human life is intrinsically valuable. Let us ask a why question about it: Why is human life intrinsically valuable, why do we intrinsically value human life? Assume that, while you are walking alone on a beach, you see a man, who is just about to drown and asking

---

<sup>302</sup> He is a now-retired Associate Fishery Biologist with the California Department of Fish and Game.

<sup>303</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 240.

for help. In order to save his life, it is enough to transmit the life buoy on the coast to him. Transferring to life buoy to him does not risk your life, but you would get wet. Why should you save the life of that drowning man? Besides, there is nobody is around, who might see and blame you for not helping the man if you do not help the man. If it were asked that, “Would you save him, if you were in such a situation?” I guess most of the answers would be “Yes, I would”. As I stated before, there is no one who can see you, so you lose nothing in terms of instrumental aspect. In fact, if he dies, he would not be dead because of something that you did to him, then, why do you not leave him there without helping him? What is the reason that prevents you from leaving him there without helping him? Even if your answer would be “I do not help him”, what is the reason that causes you to hesitate, even, if it would be momentary; what leads you to think it for a while? As you may have noticed, you cannot give an answer to a why question easily. Apart from all the possible instrumental reasons, if your answer is “Yes, I help him”, then we can conclude that easily, the valuation in that case is not instrumental, but intrinsic. I think because we –somehow– believe that human life is intrinsically valuable; we intrinsically value human life.

Further, we do not know anything about the drowning man. He might be a good or a bad person. In addition, if he were a serial killer, violent criminal, rapist, etc., then possibly, majority of society would not consider you as a hero. However, despite all, if a larger number of people would answer, “Yes, I help him”, (as I think they will), then that would be the sign of our unconditional, intrinsic valuation of human life. As a result, if we could not involve the non-humans into the scope of moral concern just because of such questions, “why should we care about the interests or desires of non-human entities/nature? What did human beings lose when a species, a part of wild nature is lost?”, then the same questions also damage the ground of human-to-human ethics, according to which human

beings are regarded as intrinsically valuable. Briefly, I argue that such “why” questions are not a good starting point.

#### **3.1.4 Conclusion: Intrinsic Value in Relation to the Question of Objectivity or Subjectivity of Value**

When philosophers accept or reject the existence of intrinsic value, actually, they do not do this through the same understanding of intrinsic value. Although intrinsic value is widely understood as ‘non-instrumental value’ or ‘value for its own sake’, indeed, there is no common use of the term among ethical theoreticians. John O’Neill claims there are at least three different kinds of intrinsic value: 1) Intrinsic value that is used as synonymous with non-instrumental value. 2) Intrinsic value in a Moorean sense, that is, the value that an object has solely in virtue of its ‘intrinsic properties’. 3) Intrinsic value that is used as interchangeable with objective value, that is, the value that an object possesses independently of the valuations of valuers.<sup>304</sup> It rejects the subjectivist approach to value, that is, the view that the “source of all value lies in valuers- in their attitudes, preferences, and so on”.<sup>305</sup>

The first kind of intrinsic value that O’Neill mentions (as synonymous with non-instrumental value) seems to refer back to Kant’s conception of intrinsic value. When this conception is used in environmental ethics, the idea behind extending the concept of intrinsic value to non-humans is to obliterate a certain application of Kant’s means-end distinction, which sees only human beings as ends-in-themselves while non-humans are treated as means. In other words, by arguing for the intrinsic value of nonhuman entities, some environmentalists are trying to object to the instrumentalization of nature. (A related point that we will see in

---

<sup>304</sup> J. O’Neill, ‘Value in Nature and the Nature of Value’, in A. Light and H. Rolston III (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 132.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*

chapter 4 is that, when attempting to avoid instrumentalization of nature, many/some environmentalist ethicists conflate the instrumentalization of nature with anthropocentrism.)

Yet sometimes, when environmental ethicists try to find intrinsic value in nature, they are operating not with Kant's but with Moore's conception of intrinsic value with its focus on the isolation test. In this case, the goal is to rescue the value of non-human beings from being dependent on human valuation. By doing so, they conflate the notion of intrinsic value with the notion of objective value (the third type of value that O'Neill mentions).

Hence, a question that also calls for a metaethical clarification is the relation between the understanding of 'intrinsic value' and the question of 'objective value'. Is intrinsic value the same thing as objective value, so that defending the existence of intrinsic value also implies defending the existence of objective value? Or can we talk about different conceptions such as 'objective intrinsic value' versus 'subjective intrinsic value'?

As a final remark, I argue that intrinsic value cannot be objective. As we have noted before, defenders of objective value claim that value inheres in objects themselves; it is already involved by object itself. Thus, the objectivist account of intrinsic value excludes the relation between the valuer and the thing valued. While objectivists defend the existence of intrinsic value without a valuer, a subjectivist account of intrinsic value, which I also defend, claims that every value implies the existence of a valuing subject, who evaluates it. A valuable thing has to be valued by someone in order to be regarded as a value or valuable. As I mentioned in the context of Dall'Agnol's objection to Moore, since value always requires a valuer, it cannot be objective. This is the case regardless of whether the value in question is intrinsic or not. But that does not mean that a subjectivist account of intrinsic value cannot be given. I argue that we can distinguish between upholding the existence of an 'intrinsic objective value' and the possibility of 'intrinsically

valuing something’ while not admitting that value is objective. In other words, intrinsic value is also not independent of the valuation of a valuer. There is still room for arguing that the valuer whose valuation is intrinsic can value entities for their own sake, not for some other ends.

In this context, a terminological clarification may be in order. There are various applications of the term ‘intrinsic value’ in the context of metaethical discussions such as ‘in itself’, or ‘for its own sake’, or ‘as such’ or ‘in its own right’.<sup>306</sup> Among them, I prefer the expression ‘for its own sake’, which I think corresponds to my understanding of value better than the others do. So, what I intend to say with the term ‘intrinsic value’ is ‘value for its own sake’, and I would like to warn against a misinterpretation of this usage: to speak of ‘value for its own sake’ does not imply that there is value without a valuer. Contrarily, when we make a sentence, which involves a moral judgement, something like “we value something for its own sake” or “it is valued for the sake of something”<sup>307</sup>, in fact, we imply the existence of a valuer. Furthermore, the structure of such evaluative sentences implies their subjectivity, such as “*someone* values *something* for its own sake”, or “*something* is valued for the sake of something else by *someone*”. In addition, structure of the sentence implies that value is attributed by a valuer. However, while I am saying that a value requires a valuer, I do not assert that a value is always attributed by a ‘human’ valuer or by only human valuers. I will say more on this subject in the next chapter.

---

<sup>306</sup> Further information on different uses of the term can be reached by following reference: M. J. Zimmerman, ‘Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value’, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 24 December 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic>, (accessed 1 February 2015)

<sup>307</sup> Depending on the structure of the sentence, the expression “for its own sake” can be comprehended in both means, a value without valuer, and value with a valuer. So, the part of the sentence before the term “for its own sake” is important, and determinative in that sense. Think about this sentence: “there are some values in the world for their own sake”. Within such a sentence, the expression “for its own sake” does not imply the existence of a valuer (implicitly or openly).

However, in the examples, those presented above in the main text, a valuer is supposed.

A corollary to the claim that value always requires a valuer and hence is agent-*related* is the claim that valuation is always a relational process. The relational nature of value has also already been argued for in the objections to Moorean intrinsic value.

The notion of “relational intrinsic value” might at first seem to be an oxymoron. But I think this impression is a result of differences in the use of terms. Each philosopher has his own definition of ‘intrinsic value’ and therefore, what she/he considers as intrinsically valuable varies. While some conceive of ‘intrinsic value’ as the opposite of ‘instrumental value’, others mistakenly take the term ‘extrinsic’ to be the opposite of the term ‘intrinsic’. Thus, Taylor, Beardsley and Harman identify extrinsic value with instrumental value. When so understood, the notion of intrinsic value inevitably seems to involve ‘non-relationality’. However, this is a mistake. The following example will clarify my point: As stated by Zimmerman, while Korsgaard regards a gorgeously enameled frying pan as intrinsically valuable, “if there is any intrinsic value to be found here”, according to Ross, it will “not reside in the pan itself but in the fact that it plays a certain role in our lives, or perhaps in the fact that something plays this role, or in the fact that something that plays this role exist”.<sup>308</sup>

Thus, the pan itself has only ‘extrinsic’ value, in other words, it is instrumentally valuable for Ross. Ross mistakenly concludes that if the value of something is dependent on its relational properties, it cannot be intrinsic. Nevertheless, it should be obvious that just because the value of something is relational, it does not follow that it is therefore instrumental. Ross draws this mistaken conclusion only because

---

<sup>308</sup> M. J. Zimmerman, ‘Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value’, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 24 December 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic>, (accessed 1 February 2015)

he took the term ‘extrinsic value’ to be the opposite of ‘intrinsic value’ when in fact the proper opposite of the term ‘intrinsic value’ is ‘instrumental value.’<sup>309</sup>

In short, the intrinsic nature or intrinsic properties cannot be the sole reason of the worth that a thing has. For example, although what makes a diamond ‘a diamond’ may be its intrinsic nature and its intrinsic properties, its value is not independent of humans’ desires, interests, needs, etc. As another example, think about a mother and her children. The mother does not value her own children just because of their intrinsic properties, which make them who they are. On the contrary, the mother values her children in virtue of the relation between her and them, that is, she gave birth to them, they are a part of her, they carry her genes, etc.

While philosophers such as Moore and Korsgaard claim that intrinsic value is non-relational, there are also some others, such as Kagan, who posit the existence of relational intrinsic value as well as non-relational intrinsic value.

In addition to being relational, I also argue that intrinsic and instrumental values are contextual. People may value the same thing differently in different time and conditions. For example, in the middle of a desert, to have a bottle of water, people can be ready to renounce what they have, maybe everything other than their life. However, under their home city conditions, the value of a bottle of water is not

---

<sup>309</sup> M. J. Zimmerman, ‘Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value’, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 24 December 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic>, (accessed 1 February 2015)

In the article “Two Distinctions in Goodness”, Christine M. Korsgaard calls attention to such differences about the definition of extrinsic, and objects to the identification of ‘extrinsic value’ with ‘instrumental value’. She claims that the opposite of an intrinsic value is regarded as an instrumental value that something has in virtue of being a means to an end. However, she says this is a misleading view. The opposite of instrumental value is the final value; it is the value that something has as an end or for its own sake. She argues that since intrinsic value is contrasted with extrinsic value, intrinsic value is defined as a value that something has in-itself, i.e., in virtue of its intrinsic and non-relational properties, and defines extrinsic value as a value that something has in virtue of its extrinsic and relational properties.

more than the market price of it. Also, the same thing can be valued differently by different people. Another person with you in the desert, who is not as thirsty as you are, would not value a bottle of water as much as you would. The objectivist understanding of intrinsic value seems to suggest that the values in question are universal. According to the Moorean understanding of intrinsic value, two exactly similar things have the same value in exactly the same degree.<sup>310</sup> From this, it follows that, every time a situation occurs, its value should be the same like good or bad, right or wrong. Nevertheless, this is not the case. For example, although we value human life intrinsically, we do not assess the death of everyone as bad or good isolating him/her from his/her relations. The objectivist understanding of value cannot account for the change in the relation between the valuer and valued thing within time depending on a context.

To take another example, it is believed that the artistic value of paintings is independent of human valuation; it is an objective value. Artistic, aesthetics values are mostly given as examples for the existence of objective values independent of a human valuer, of human judgments. But, think about the painting of modern artists, such as Franz Kline, Cy Twombly, or Mark Rothko. What would be their assessment of these paintings if we asked people who had not known or heard anything about those painters and their paintings before? One might safely guess that they would hardly find these paintings beautiful or would not be able to distinguish those very expensive and important artistic paintings from the drawings that are created by a child. Sometimes even art historians and experts have difficulty in determining whether it is a famous piece of modern art or art created by a child. Because people's tastes, which determine their valuation, are not entirely independent of the social criteria, standards both in ethics and aesthetics. What we find good or beautiful does not objectively exist out there, "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". Further, "Art, and what we do and do not

---

<sup>310</sup> G. E. Moore, 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value', in *Philosophical Studies*, Paterson, N.J., Littlefield, Adams, 1959, pp. 260-261.

consider to be art, has changed a lot” over time; so, the thing which is regarded as valuable changes by our subjective valuation. Consequently, I can say that valuation is not an agent-neutral process and value is not a property of an object that is independent of evaluation of a valuer.



## CHAPTER IV

### ANTHROPOCENTRISM vs. NON-ANTHROPOCENTRISM

*“Never underestimate that a small group of dedicated people can change the world; indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”* **Margaret Mead** (Anthropologist)

In the previous chapters, we have seen that the main motivation for attributing intrinsic value to nonhuman parts of nature is mainly the desire to resist the excessive instrumentalization and exploitation of nature. Because of a long tradition of seeing only human beings as ends-in-themselves, environmental thinkers have developed a tendency to equate anthropocentrism with treating nature merely as an instrument. Further, because of errors in reasoning, similar to those committed by Moore (who believed that in order to be intrinsic, value must be non-relational), there is a tendency to believe that ascription of intrinsic value to nature can only be possible on the basis of believing that value exists in nature independently of human valuation. Consequently, there has developed a tendency to believe that the most viable opposition to exploitation of nature would be based on defending the existence of objective nonanthropocentric intrinsic value. At the risk of seeming to argue against a strawman, Holmes Rolston’s theory may be given as a primary example of such conceptual confusions.

E.C. Hargrove and J. Callicott are two environmental thinkers who distinguish themselves among other environmental thinkers in this respect. Hargrove’s weak anthropocentrism and Callicott’s anthropogenic account of value differ from the other accounts surveyed in this dissertation with their careful framing of their understanding of the notions of ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘non-anthropocentrism’,

which consequently brought them closer to my understanding of intrinsic value. Therefore, in order to lay out a conceptual framework that avoids the common conceptual confusions concerning the attribution of intrinsic value to nature, in this chapter, I will begin by presenting Hargrove's and Callicott's theories in section 4.1. Then, in section 4.2, I will try to clarify what non-anthropocentrism means, building on conceptual clarifications provided by these two thinkers. Since I have already argued in chapter 3 that there are no objective values, I will also question the possibility of a subjective account of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. Finally, in section 4.3, I will argue that this understanding of subjective valuation does not have to lead to relativism and will try to show how subjective intrinsic valuation can be universalized.

#### **4.1 The Anthropogenic and Non-Anthropocentric Approaches**

In his article "Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value", E. C. Hargrove draws our attention to one of the main problems that results from these definitional confusions: "A nonanthropocentric value was simply assumed to be the opposite of an instrumental value, making *anthropocentric* for all practical purposes a synonym for the word *instrumental*".<sup>311</sup> Hargrove says that, "Although this definition is implicit in virtually all the writings of the deep ecologists, it has been explicitly stated by J. Baird Callicott (who is not a deep ecologist)"<sup>312</sup>, and to give an example to confusion with the use of terms, he quotes from Callicott as follows:

An anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), by common consensus, confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things, including other forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e., valuable only to the extent that they are means or instruments which may

---

<sup>311</sup> E. C. Hargrove, 'Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value', *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 183.

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204, notes 5.

serve human beings. A nonanthropocentric value theory (or axiology), on the other hand, would confer intrinsic value on some non-human beings.<sup>313</sup>

“Nevertheless”, Hargrove states, “*anthropocentric* is not and has never been a synonym for *instrumental*. It simply means “human-centered,” and refers to a human-oriented perspective—seeing from the standpoint of a human being.”<sup>314</sup> Thus, it is implicitly assumed that being non-anthropocentric will automatically lead to attributing intrinsic value to nonhuman entities.

Further, as anthropocentrism can be seen as the view that the existence of value judgements depends on human beings, it is also often mistakenly assumed that to be non-anthropocentric, one would have argue that value is objective (see, for instance, Rolston). In short, there is widespread perception that to stand against the exploitation of nature one must hold that the value –that nonhuman entities have– is objective.

Hargrove presents four kinds of value that are possible. I think this classification is quite important for further discussions of intrinsic value and non-anthropocentrism. 1) Non-anthropocentric instrumental values are the “instrumental relationships of benefit and harm between nonhuman plants and animals”. As Hargrove notes, such values “are quite common and completely uncontroversial”.<sup>315</sup> 2) Anthropocentric instrumental value judgments “are simply the same relationships” as the non-anthropocentric instrumental values described

---

<sup>313</sup> J. B. Callicott, ‘Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, 1984, p. 299, cited in E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 204, notes 5.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

<sup>315</sup> E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 187.

above “applied to humans”. They are also “common and uncontroversial.”<sup>316</sup> 3) Anthropocentric intrinsic value is value that is “assigned or attributed by a human being or a group of human beings”<sup>317</sup> Then, 4) we finally ask, how shall we understand non-anthropocentric intrinsic values? Are non-anthropocentric values values that are “assigned or attributed by a human being or a group of human beings”<sup>318</sup> to nonhuman entities? Or are they values that are assigned or attributed by nonhumans? This question is the main concern of this chapter.

Actually, for the current aims of environmental ethics,<sup>319</sup> both theories, which are Callicott’s ‘anthropogenic’ perspective and Hargrove’s ‘weak anthropocentrism’, might work well to establish a proper human-nature relationship to embrace the non-human parts of nature through intrinsically valuing them. Hargrove and Callicott argue that although there are things in nature that have intrinsic value independent of their usefulness (i.e., non-instrumental value), this value is not independent of human beings. Both Hargrove’s and Callicott’s arguments rest on the claim that human beings’ capacity for intrinsic valuation can embrace non-humans. However, while Callicott calls himself ‘non-anthropocentric’, Hargrove calls himself ‘anthropocentric’.

#### 4.1.1 Callicott’s Anthropogenic Approach

Callicott defends the subjectivity of valuation/value and rejects the possibility of non-human valuers claiming that: “I concede that, from the point of view of scientific naturalism, the source of all value is human consciousness”.<sup>320</sup> Although

---

<sup>316</sup> E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 187.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>319</sup> Without including humanlike-robots (*androids*, *gemonoids*) which are output of artificial intelligence technology into our environment actively.

<sup>320</sup> J. B. Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989, p. 133.

Callicott's position with defending the subjectivity of value has been coherent, in relation to the concept of intrinsic value, a variation in his position was marked by his alternating use of the terms 'inherent value' and 'intrinsic value' in time, until he finally settled, with his terms, in 'truncated' intrinsic value theory. I try to point this up in following pages.

In his article, the "Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics", which is published in 1984, Callicott uses the concept of 'being intrinsically valued' in the sense of being valued 'for the sake of itself'.<sup>321</sup> In this article, he does not yet make a distinction between the terms 'intrinsic' and 'inherent'; he does not mention the term 'inherent' at all. In an article, which is published one year later, we encounter, in addition to the concept of 'intrinsic value', the concept of 'inherent value'. In this article, what Callicott means with the term 'intrinsic' is being 'ontologically objective', and he rejects the existence of such value in nature. As a matter of fact, he argues that "no properties in nature are strictly intrinsic."<sup>322</sup>

Callicott makes it clear how he defines the terms 'inherent' and 'intrinsic' as follows: Something possesses *intrinsic value* "if its value is objective and independent of all valuing consciousness." On the other hand, something possesses *inherent value* "if (while its value is *not* independent of a valuing consciousness) it is *valued for itself* and not only and merely because it serves as

---

<sup>321</sup> The following quotation can be given as an example to Callicott's use of the intrinsic value in the meaning for its own sake: "Miller [...] does not adequately *explain why* richness should be valued *for the sake of itself*, or, more concretely, why a rich [...] biota is *intrinsically* better than a simple, impoverished, or catastrophic one."

J. B. Callicott, 'Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 303.

<sup>322</sup> J. B. Callicott, 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1985, p. 271.

a means to satisfy the desires, further the interests, or occasion the preferred experiences of the valuers.”<sup>323</sup>

And, later, in *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, which is published in 1989, he defines ‘being intrinsically valuable’ in opposition to ‘being instrumentally valuable’ as follows: “something is intrinsically valuable [...] if its value is not derived from its utility, but is independent of any use or function it may have in relation to something or someone else”.<sup>324</sup>

Contrary to the claim of objectivists, that is, existence of value objectively out there without a valuer, Callicott claims that, “no value can, in principle, from the point of view of classical normal science, be altogether independent of a valuing consciousness”.<sup>325</sup> He argues for the subjectivity of value as follows:

Value is, as it were, projected onto natural objects or events by the subjective feelings of observers. If all consciousness were annihilated at a stroke, there would be no good and evil, no beauty and ugliness, no right and wrong; only impassive phenomena would remain.<sup>326</sup>

He further explains what he understands by “the subjectivity of value” by objecting to what Rolston, who is an objectivist, understands from subjectivism. Rolston claims that, according to subjectivists, “value like a tickle, must be *experienced* to exist: No *experiencer* (no *conscious* subject), no feelings and no value”. Callicott claims that, *contrary to* what Rolston thinks, value “is not, primarily, a subjective experience, but a subject’s intentional act: No intending

---

<sup>323</sup> J. B. Callicott, ‘Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics’, *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1985, p. 262.

<sup>324</sup> J. B. Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989, p.131.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147.

subject, no value.”<sup>327</sup> He goes on to add that, “some intentional acts, even those of highly evolved self-conscious subjects, may not be experienced as such. A philanderer, for example may not realize that he loves his wife until she leaves him”.<sup>328</sup> Concerning intrinsic value, Callicott rejects objective intrinsic values that are independently of a human valuer, says that, “An intrinsically valuable thing [...] is valuable *for* its own sake, *for* itself, but it is not valuable in itself, that is, completely independently of any consciousness”<sup>329</sup>

In one of his later works, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, we can observe Callicott’s renunciation of focusing on the difference between inherent and intrinsic value as follows:

The term intrinsic value and the less-used alternative term inherent worth mean, lexically speaking, pretty much the same thing. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, tenth edition, defines intrinsic thus: “belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing.” And it defines inherent thus: “involved in the constitution or essential character of something: intrinsic. The English word value comes from the Latin word *valere*, “to be worth, to be strong”; and worth comes from the Old English word *weorth*, meaning “worthy, of value.” Lexically speaking, thus, to claim that the value (or worth) of something is intrinsic (or inherent) is to claim that its value (or worth) belongs to its essential nature or constitution.<sup>330</sup>

Instead, he introduces his understanding of intrinsic value with his terminology ‘truncated intrinsic value’. That intrinsic value is anthropogenic but non-anthropocentric, that is: “Truncated intrinsic value is the value we ascribe to

---

<sup>327</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 260.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>329</sup> J. B. Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989, pp. 133-134.

<sup>330</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, pp. 246-247.

something for itself even if it has since nothing does, in my honest opinion no value in itself.”<sup>331</sup>

In reference to Callicott’s truncated intrinsic value, Hargrove states that, “it is truncated because although human valuers value things *for* themselves, nonhuman things are not valuable *in* themselves-because there is no objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value *in* nature.”<sup>332</sup>

Callicott objects to objective intrinsic value theories. Hence, instead of suggesting an ethical theory basing on the “conjure objective intrinsic value out of self-valuing subjects and our capacity to realize that others value themselves as we value ourselves”,<sup>333</sup> he suggests that, “we base environmental ethics on our human capacity to value nonhuman natural entities for what they are irrespective both of what they may do for us and of whether or not they can value themselves”.<sup>334</sup> He, thus, claims that our intentional act of intrinsic valuation can extend to and encompass as diverse entities as species, ecosystems, the oceans or the atmosphere.<sup>335</sup> In relation to objective intrinsic values, Callicott objects to being regarded as intrinsically valuable because of some distinctive features, he claims as follows:

It seems arbitrary to say, following Kant, that only rational beings are intrinsically valuable because reason is objectively good, or following Bentham, that only sentient beings are intrinsically valuable because

---

<sup>331</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 260.

<sup>332</sup> J. B. Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989, pp. 133-134, cited in E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 195.

<sup>333</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 224.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid.*

pleasure is objectively good, or following Plato and Leibniz that only ordered things are intrinsically valuable because order is objectively good and so on. A sincere skeptic is always entitled to ask why reason, pleasure, order, or whatever is good and/or why rational, sentient, organized, etc., beings should therefore be intrinsically valuable.<sup>336</sup>

According to Callicott's subjective anthropogenic but not anthropocentric position, while "the source of all value is human consciousness", it does not follow that "the locus of all value" is human consciousness. He also explains that valuing something "for itself" need not imply that it is valued because of some subjective experience afforded the valuer such as aesthetic or intellectual satisfaction (which was what Rolston implied).<sup>337</sup>

In this context, Callicott's use of the term 'anthropogenic' is intended to prevent confusions between terms such as 'anthropocentrism' and 'anthropomorphism'. 'Anthropogenic' in Callicottian sense "simply means 'human-caused' rather than produced by natural forces." This is the sense in which we use the term when we speak of, for example, "anthropogenic climate change".<sup>338</sup>

I believe that Callicott's anthropogenic attitude to the environment can provide us with a defensible, sound ethical theory, which takes nonhumans as well as humans into moral consideration; it values them not only instrumentally but also intrinsically. Nevertheless, I think the important deficiency of Callicott's theory is his strict rejection of the valuation capacity of nonhumans –even 'instrumental' valuation.

The last criticism that I want to mention is Rolston's criticism of Callicott's. Callicott claims to have overcome the dualism corollary of the human-nature

---

<sup>336</sup> J. B. Callicott, 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1985, pp. 258-259.

<sup>337</sup> J. B. Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989, p. 133.

<sup>338</sup> J. B. Callicott and R. Frodeman (eds. in chief) *Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy*, Gale, Cengage Learning, Macmillan Reference, USA, 2009, p 59.

dichotomy, which is believed to lie at the bottom of environmental problems. On the other hand, in relation to Callicott's attempts, H. Rolston claims that, Callicott's theory is dualistic at heart. Rolston's criticism is as follows:

Although Callicott is resolute about not being a dualist and separating humans from nature, he nevertheless makes a rather striking separation between humans and plants or animals. According to his value theory, nature comes to have intrinsic value only on human encounter and habitation. [...] prevents disconnecting nature from humans so that it can have any intrinsic value on its own—and that is disconcerting. Nature only comes to have such value when humans take it up into their experience.

Suddenly, the dichotomy comes back with a vengeance. Only humans produce value; wild nature is intrinsically valueless without humans. All it has without humans is the potential to be evaluated by humans, who, if and when they appear, may incline, sometimes, to value nature in noninstrumental ways. [...] That is quite separatist. Maybe we humans are metaphysically different after all [...], if we have such a remarkably different capacity.<sup>339</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Hargrove's Weak Anthropocentrism

Hargrove built his understanding of anthropocentrism, which he calls “weak anthropocentrism”, into “Callicott's anthropogenic position that ‘the *source* of all value is human consciousness’ and Rolston's aesthetic position that ‘the experience of beauty is something that humans bring into the world.’”<sup>340</sup>

While Hargrove defends the necessity of the concept of intrinsic value, he argues that we do not really need the concept of ‘non-anthropocentric intrinsic value’. He claims that contrary to what is believed by some environmental ethicists, an understanding of anthropocentric intrinsic value is adequate. For that purpose, he discusses and objects to both an objective account of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value (such as that grounded on Taylor's ‘inherent value’ or Rolston's approach),

---

<sup>339</sup> H. Rolston III, ‘Naturalizing Callicott’, in W. Ouderkirk and J. Hill (eds.), *Land, Value, Community: Callicott and Environmental Philosophy*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002, p. 112.

<sup>340</sup> E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 201.

and also Callicott's subjective account of non-anthropocentric value in the article "Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value". He introduces 'weak anthropocentric intrinsic value' as both a counter-position and a complementary to these non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theories.

The point to which Hargrove draws our attention is that being non-anthropocentric does not ensure that the valuation will be intrinsic and the thing in question is intrinsically valued. A non-anthropocentric value/valuation can also be instrumental. For example, banana is instrumentally valuable to monkeys. As stated by Hargrove, such non-anthropocentric instrumental valuation can also be expressed as facts or "can easily be converted into facts, are indeed discovered in the world".<sup>341</sup> Conversely, being intrinsically valuable does not have to accompany being evaluated non-anthropocentrically. Someone can be an anthropocentrist and still attribute intrinsic value to nonhumans.

Actually, E. C. Hargrove's examination on the nature of intrinsic value and non-anthropocentrism is one of the most successful ones. However, as the reason underlying his objection to non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theories is his quest of arguing for/justifying the adequacy of his (weak) anthropocentrism, I think he missed some crucial points.

According to E. C. Hargrove, the word 'non-anthropocentric' is supposed to refer to the type of valuation that is "not human centered and independent of human judgment."<sup>342</sup> He agrees with the first of part of the definition ('not human centered'), but finds a problem with the second part of it ('independent of human

---

<sup>341</sup> E. C. Hargrove, 'Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value', *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, pp. 186-187.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

judgement'). According to him, a non-anthropocentric approach does not necessarily have to be 'independent of human judgment', in other words, without a human valuer. He claims for that reason that the terms 'non-anthropocentric' and 'anthropocentric' are almost redundant.<sup>343</sup> He argues that the concepts of 'intrinsic value' and 'non-anthropocentrism' can be substituted for each other. I agree with the claim that a non-anthropocentric approach does not necessarily have to be 'independent of human judgment'. However, if we make it completely dependent on human judgement, then we run the risk of glossing over the possibility of there being non-human valuers as well.

## **4.2 Non-anthropocentrism**

Hargrove and Callicott's theories seem adequate to defend as an environmental position, which are -more or less- capable of handling the problems related to environmental ethics that I mentioned in the summary part of chapter 2. However, I think, in essence, they are openly or implicitly anthropocentric because of positioning human beings at the center of their theories. That is, while Callicott denies the existence of non-human valuers, Hargrove openly defends anthropocentrism.

While presenting an ethical theory as a variant of anthropocentrism, namely 'weak anthropocentrism', through claiming that human beings' capacity to value something intrinsically might also embrace nonhuman part of nature, what Hargrove suggests is actually the conclusion which has been desired by non-anthropocentric environmentalists since the emergence of environmental ethics as a new branch of ethical theory.

---

<sup>343</sup> E. C. Hargrove, 'Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value', *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 202.

#### 4.2.1 The Obscurity of the Concept of Non-Anthropocentrism

Although the definition of the term ‘non-anthropocentrism’ is not specifically given and there are slight differences between what environmental philosophers imply with that term, the simplest definition of ‘non-anthropocentrism’ is just the opposite of anthropocentrism. However, it is not clear what part of the definition of ‘anthropocentric’ the prefix ‘non-’ is supposed to negate. Actually, I believe that it is this obscurity with the terms ‘anthropocentrism’ and ‘non-anthropocentrism’ that causes many of the confusions in environmental discussions.

I shall examine how the term ‘human-centered’, which is mostly stated to explain anthropocentrism, has a determinative role in discussions about the distinction between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism in environmental ethics. In Merriam-Webster, ‘anthropocentrism’ is defined as follows: “1. considering human beings as the most significant entity of the universe 2. interpreting or regarding the world in terms of human values and experiences”<sup>344</sup> These two different definitions imply two different understandings/approaches to the issue. The critical point in here is the distinction between the ‘scope’ and ‘source’ of the value, particularly the ‘intrinsic’ value in terms of our discussion. Actually, this distinction is addressed in different ways to draw an attention to different things by environmental philosophers, such as, Callicott, O’Neill —locus/object and source of value.

Within some discussions, the distinction between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theories is discussed with regard to the scope of value. That is, what is questioned is whether a given theory attributes intrinsic value (i.e., intrinsically values) merely to human beings, or non-humans as well as human

---

<sup>344</sup> ‘Anthropocentric’, *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, Available from [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric) (accessed 1 April 2014)

beings. In this distinction, which is done in terms of the scope of value, anthropocentrism is used in the sense of “considering human beings as the most significant entity of the universe”. After examining the theories that I mentioned in chapter 2, I can say that, this understanding of anthropocentrism is the one that prevails in earlier discussions in environmental ethics, that is, which part of nature environmental philosophers regard as intrinsically valuable: merely humans, or nonhumans in addition to human beings. Furthermore, the ‘scope of valuable things’ as a criterion, was used to distinguish, not only anthropocentric approaches from non-anthropocentric ones, but also to differentiate various kinds of non-anthropocentric theories from each other. That is, non-anthropocentric theories have also been differentiated from each other depending on to which part of nature the entities they regarded as intrinsically valuable extended.

Another distinction between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism has been made concerning the ‘source’ of value, in other saying, in terms of concerning the position of the ‘valuer’. That is, when, the distinction is made from a subjective perspective (that value requires a valuer), it is done according to whether there are nonhuman valuers in addition to human valuers. Alternatively, when it is made from an objective perspective, it is done according to whether there are nonhuman values in nature independent of a valuer —both human and non-human valuers. Within discussions that depend on these kinds of distinctions, the term ‘anthropocentrism’ has been understood/used in the meaning of “interpreting or regarding the world in terms of human values and experiences”.

#### **4.2.2 Why We Need ‘Non-anthropocentrism’?**

Concerning the distinction between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, B. Norton argues that, “Environmental ethics is seen as distinctive vis-à-vis standard ethics if and only if environmental ethics can be founded upon principles which assert or presuppose that nonhuman natural entities have value independent

of human value.”<sup>345</sup> And, he claims that, “I argue that this equivalence is mistaken by showing that the anthropocentrism/nonanthropocentrism debate is far less important than is usually assumed.”<sup>346</sup>

According to Norton’s well-known ‘Convergence Hypothesis’, the difference between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theories is a theoretical issue; they “converge” in practice. That is, both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theories will recommend the same environmental policies and behaviors in practice, have the same practical implications; thus, they differ only verbally. As stated by Callicott, Norton thinks that, “environmental philosophers alienate themselves from the ‘real world’ of environmental affairs [...] because of our interminable bickering about such abstruse problems, without apparent practical moment”.<sup>347</sup>

Nevertheless, I do not agree with Norton. I regard non-anthropocentrism as a position that challenges anthropocentrism. That is, even if what anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theories recommend would converge in practice, i.e., their implications would be same in practice as argued by Norton, the perspective you have is important because of the reasons that I discussed in chapter 2 in relation to the ‘right reason’ issue. Further, most of the suggested anthropocentric theories underline the human-nature dichotomy. Because, “Many ethicists find the roots of anthropocentrism in the Creation story told in the book of Genesis in the Judeo-Christian Bible, in which humans are created in the image of God and are instructed to ‘subdue’ Earth and to ‘have dominion’ over all other living creatures.

---

<sup>345</sup> B. G. Norton, ‘Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism’, *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1984, p. 132.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>347</sup> J. B. Callicott, *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, pp. 222-223.

This passage has been interpreted as an indication of humanity's superiority to nature and as condoning an instrumental view of nature, where the natural world has value only as it benefits humankind."<sup>348</sup>

As the reasons have been discussed by many ethicists, environmentalists, I do not think that humans are unconditionally superior to all other existences. Therefore, instead of a top-down hierarchical structure, in which human beings are placed above all other creatures (mostly, with the effect of 'Abrahamic' religions), this dissertation sides with biological egalitarianism. That is, instead of regarding humans as the "most significant entity of the universe", it sees human beings just as plain members of nature like animals, plants and nonliving entities of nature. Environmental ethics' distinctiveness "vis-a-vis standard ethics" (as Norton puts it) will emerge only if it manages to institute a horizontal structure in relation to members of nature, instead of a top-down structure. Anthropocentrism with its lexical meaning<sup>349</sup> is far beyond this. With regard to human's relation to nature, in my opinion, non-anthropocentrism would be the right approach. And by 'non-anthropocentrism' I mean "nature-centeredness" instead of "human-centeredness".

---

<sup>348</sup> S. E. Boslaugh, 'Anthropocentrism', *Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.*, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropocentrism> (accessed 1 June 2014)

<sup>349</sup> According to Merriam-Webster, anthropocentrism is "1. considering human beings as the most significant entity of the universe 2. interpreting or regarding the world in terms of human values and experiences".

'Anthropocentric', *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, Available from [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric) (accessed 1 April 2014)

According to Oxford English Dictionary, anthropocentrism is "the assumption that man is the center of all things".

Available from <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8420?redirectedFrom=anthropocentrism#eid> (accessed 1 June 2014)

According to Britannica, anthropocentrism is the "philosophical viewpoint arguing that human beings are the central or most significant entities in the world."

S. E. Boslaugh, 'Anthropocentrism', *Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.*, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropocentrism> (accessed 1 June 2014)

I agreed on the point, which is claimed by both some non-anthropocentrists and ‘weak’ anthropocentrists, that the valuation capacity of humans can be cultivated in such a way that, people can value both human and nonhuman parts of nature (including living and nonliving entities) not only instrumentally but also intrinsically.

Concerning the value of non-living parts nature, E. C. Hargrove objects to Taylor, who is a biocentrist, is as follows:

Currently, nonanthropocentric theory, based as it is on the goods of individual organisms, leaves nonliving natural objects out of the moral account. As Taylor notes in his definition and discussion of inherent worth, cited above, the “class of entities having inherent worth is extensionally equivalent to the class of living beings.” Thus, nonliving objects can only be defended on the grounds that they are instrumentally valuable to living centers of purpose that use them for their own intrinsically valuable ends.<sup>350</sup>

Like Hargrove, I object to merely instrumentally valuation of non-living parts of nature. It does not have to be like that. For example, I am sad about the children dying in Syria. Because of the intrinsic value I attributed to human life, I value those children intrinsically. In the same way, I am sad about the destruction of a lake in South America, and the killing of seals just because of their fur, even though I will never be there and I will never see them up close. So, in order to value (more specifically intrinsically value) living or non-living things, we do not necessarily have to have a direct interest in them. People can value things without any interest; indeed, this is what I mean by the “intrinsic valuation of non-humans”. Keeping Kant’s replaceability argument in mind, I argue that intrinsic value can be attributed to nonhuman beings as well. Thus, in order to distinguish instrumental and intrinsic values or instrumentally and intrinsically valuable

---

<sup>350</sup> E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 192.

things, I am mainly appealing to this distinction between ‘dignity’ and ‘price’ that Kant made, arguing that it is possible to consistently extend it to nonhumans.

#### **4.2.3 Non-anthropocentric Valuation**

Defenders of anthropocentric perspectives (strong or weak forms) merely focus or prefer to focus on human’s capacity to value. In relation to the environment, they claim that such a valuation capacity can be extended in a way so as to encapsulate non-human entities into the ethical realm as well as human beings, regarding them either as instrumentally valuable (as with *traditional anthropocentrists*) or as intrinsically valuable (as with *weak anthropocentrists*, such as *Hargrove*). They reject or—for a reason—neglect the existence of non-human valuers and their valuation capacity independent of human judgements. On the other hand, some non-anthropocentrists like Rolston argue that nonhumans can also value. I believe that neither side has sufficiently proved their case. Let’s examine this question of the possibility of nonhuman valuation more closely.

For the name of clarity; I am taking non-anthropocentric value in the sense that, it is the value that is neither directly related to human beings’ interest nor results from the instrumental valuation of human beings; it is the value that arises from intrinsically valuation of nonhuman part of nature for their own sake, not the sake of human beings.

In relation to non-anthropocentric values, first of all, as I have discussed in chapter 3, I object to the existence of objective values, meaning, value without a valuer. Therefore, I think, we cannot mention the existence of objective non-anthropocentric values. All value arises from subjective valuation of a valuer.

Depending on what has been discussed until now, I can say that there are two possible sources of subjective non-anthropocentric values. 1) They might emerge from the intrinsic valuation of human beings. In other words, as a valuer, human

beings can attribute intrinsic value to non-human entities. Callicott's understanding of anthropogenic but non-anthropocentric intrinsic value can be given as an example to such kind of non-anthropocentric value. Additionally, although, they insist on being named as 'anthropocentrists', the value proposed by some weak anthropocentrists –such as Hargrove– as intrinsic valuation of nonhumans is another example to such kind of non-anthropocentric value.

Additionally, aesthetic valuation of the nonhuman part of nature might also be given as an example to non-anthropocentric value/valuation as long as the nonhuman part of nature/environment is valued just for its own sake, i.e., without further interest of human beings.

2) The non-anthropocentric values might also emerge from the intrinsic or instrumental valuation of non-human valuers. I think, although he calls himself "an objectivist", the values Rolston introduced can be given as an example of such kind of non-anthropocentric values.

#### **4.2.3.1 The Question of Whether Non-humans can Value**

In reference to non-anthropocentric values, contrary to Callicott's assertion that only human beings value, I think the possibility of nonhuman valuers should not be rejected. In fact, we already have examples to instrumental valuation of non-human valuers, which are also exemplified by Hargrove. For example, a dog can value its owner because of the food or shelter, etc. the owner supplies to it. Alternatively, a tick may value a dog, on which it lives, because of food and shelter provided by the dog. So, this is an example for the valuation without a human valuer, namely, 'non-anthropocentric instrumental valuation'. Regarding this issue, Rolston, defends the existence of objective value as follows:

There is no better evidence of non-human values and valuers than spontaneous wildlife, born free and on its own. Animals hunt and howl, find shelter, seek out their habitats and mates, care for their young, flee from threats, grow hungry, thirsty, hot, tired, excited, sleepy. They suffer

injury and lick their wounds. Here we are quite convinced that value is non-anthropogenic, to say nothing of anthropocentric.<sup>351</sup>

Additionally, concerning the valuation capacity of non-humans, particularly of animals, Rolston asks, “Do animals value anything intrinsically?” and answers it as follows:

Mostly they [animals] seek their own basic needs, food and shelter, and care for their young. But then why not say that an animal values its own life for what it is in itself, intrinsically, without further contributory reference? Else we have an animal world replete with instrumental values and devoid of intrinsic values, everything valuing the resources it needs, nothing valuing itself. That is implausible. Animals maintain a valued self-identity as they cope through the world. Valuing is intrinsic to animal life.<sup>352</sup>

In this respect, the dog’s appreciation (*for lack of a better word*) of its owner, due to the owner’s sympathy, friendship, affinity towards itself, on the other hand, might be considered as an example to existence of ‘non-anthropocentric intrinsic value’. Alternatively, the mother cat’s caring for its kitty can be given as a proof for the intrinsic valuation of nonhuman valuers. Nevertheless, since caring for her young is something that a human being values, while observing the mother cat caring for its kitty, a person attributes the value to that relationship between them. In other words, the value that a person ascribes to them is the result of the reflection of human valuation. In this example, since caring for the young is something valuable for human beings, a person regards the relationship between the mother cat and the kitten as intrinsic valuation. Thus, the valuation here is independent of human’s interest, but it is not human-neutral either; the whole valuation process is human-related. Since human beings are indirect valuers in this example, it misleads us to the idea that these values exist independently of human beings’ moral reasoning. Further, I believe that, giving such examples for intrinsic

---

<sup>351</sup> H. Rolston III, ‘Value in Nature and the Nature of Value’, in R. Attfield and A. Belsey (eds.), *Philosophy and the Natural Environment*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 36, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 15.

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

valuation by nonhumans can only be anthropomorphisms. We cannot know or be sure that these examples illustrate the presence of nonhumans' intrinsic valuation. Further, the current technological and scientific knowledge, equipment cannot provide any information to make such a claim. When the matter is evaluation of something, human beings' perspectives are always involved in their observations and their claims concerning valuation, implicitly or explicitly, i.e., directly or indirectly. Thus, within a valuation, or an evaluation issue, human beings can be a direct valuer or an indirect valuer. In such examples, human beings get involved in the valuation not as direct valuers but as indirect valuers.

Additionally, the deep ecologists' and ecofeminists' attempts of equating wilderness with 'freedom', or regarding earth as endowed with 'wisdom', and especially, ecofeminists' association of nature with femininity may also be considered as a kind of anthropomorphism.

Some ethicists also attribute moral reasoning to animals. For example, on a web site, which makes the promotion of the book, *Can Animals Be Moral?*, it is stated that, "The book, [...] suggests social mammals such as rats, dogs and chimpanzees can choose to be good or bad. And because they have morality, we have moral obligations to them, said author Mark Rowlands."<sup>353</sup> Further, as an example to moral behavior of animals, Hal Herzog, "a psychologist, at Western Carolina University who studies how humans think about animals" states that, "Male bluebirds that catch their female partners stepping out may beat the female."<sup>354</sup> Another example is given that, "In one experiment, hungry rhesus monkeys

---

<sup>353</sup> T. Ghose, 'Animals Are Moral Creatures, Scientist Argues', *LiveScience*, 15 November 2012, § 3. Available from: <http://www.livescience.com/24802-animals-have-morals-book.html>, (accessed 1 June 2014)

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid.*, § 7.

refused to electrically shock their fellow monkeys, even when it meant getting food for themselves.”<sup>355</sup> Further, Mark Rowlands, who is a philosophy professor, claims that, “Animals are owed a certain kind of respect that they wouldn’t be owed if they couldn’t act morally.”<sup>356</sup>

However, the observation of such behaviors by itself cannot prove that animals have a moral reasoning. I think it is more likely that we as human beings try to comprehend the situation in question inevitably from a human perspective, projecting our values on to what we observe, and then interpreting it from our human point of view. I think when people see humanlike attitudes and behaviors in nonhumans, because of an analogy they make with the attitude and behavior of human beings; they claim that nonhumans have a sense of justice, sense of remorse, kindness, fairness, etc.

Furthermore, to claim that non-humans intrinsically value the things around them requires us to place ourselves in their positions and imagine their perspectives. As also stated by many anthropocentrists, we are humans and we only comprehend the things from humans’ point of view. Concerning that point, A. T. Nuyen claims as follows:

[W]e cannot see animal dignity as animals, we can only see it as human beings. If we should think that animal dignity should be enhanced and fostered too, that will be a distinctly human thought. It is logically impossible to know how an animal thinks about itself and about human beings.<sup>357</sup>

---

<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.*, § 8.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*, § 4.

<sup>357</sup> A. T. Nuyen, ‘An Anthropocentric Ethics towards Animals and Nature’, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 221.

As a defender of anthropocentrism, Hargrove also states that, since we are humans, while we value something we unavoidably do it from a human point of view, in other words, from an anthropocentric perspective. He argues that, “Even when we try to imagine what it might be like to have the point of view of (or be) a bat, a tree, or a mountain, in my view, we are still looking at the world anthropocentrically—the way a human imagines that a nonhuman might look at the world.”<sup>358</sup>

Hargrove clarifies that he does not have a “desire to bring the quest for nonanthropocentric intrinsic value to an end.”<sup>359</sup> He merely states that he is “not very optimistic that a nonanthropocentric theory will be successfully formulated, [...] To succeed, the anthropocentrists apparently need to go beyond valuing based on the human perspective—which seems impossible.”<sup>360</sup>

I agree with Hargrove, Callicott, and also some others that, as being human valuers, we can only value from a human perspective. So, it may be true that attempts to capture the perspectives or valuations of nonhumans are bound to remain insufficient or even meaningless. However, given that our knowledge and understanding is limited by what the current level of technology and science provides us with, I argue that, instead of rejecting that possibility, it is better to suspend judgment on this issue. The fact remains that, if the increase in the rate of current technological change throughout history and the current advancements are considered, it can be seen that the probability of existence of nonhuman valuers - as an output of artificial intelligence technology- is closer than it is thought.

---

<sup>358</sup> E. C. Hargrove, ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’, *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 201.

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 191-192.

I think technology and science have a bigger influence on humans' relationship with nature than it is supposed. With respect to this relation, Werner Heisenberg states —cited by Rolston:

When we speak of a picture of nature provided us by contemporary exact science, we do not actually mean any longer a picture of nature, but rather a picture of our relation to nature [...] Science no longer is in the position of observer of nature, but rather recognizes itself as part of the interplay between man and nature.<sup>361</sup>

#### **4.2.3.2 Is Existence of Non-human Valuers Essential for Environmental Ethics?**

At this point, I am raising the question again, that is: is speaking of the existence or nonexistence of a non-anthropocentric intrinsic valuation essential for the purpose of extending the scope of moral consideration in -environmental- ethics?

In relation to environmental ethics, I think it is important that, for our own part, we, as human valuers, do not need to know whether non-humans can value something or not within our moral relationship with our environment; we do not need such knowledge to include non-humans into the scope of moral consideration by conferring/attributing intrinsic value them.

As I tried to present until now, in order to attribute intrinsic value to nonhumans, it is not necessary to know that they also –intrinsically– value themselves or other things around themselves. However, while I agree that seeking the example of non-anthropocentric intrinsic valuation by nonhuman valuers is a Sisyphean challenge, I do not see the 'traditional' anthropocentrism as an alternative to it.

For a sound environmental ethics, I have rejected the anthropocentric theories in the sense that I mentioned in the previous sections. Thus, bearing Hargrove's fourfold classification of values in my mind, I argue that adopting a non-

---

<sup>361</sup> W. Heisenberg, 'The Representation of Nature in Contemporary Physics,' *Daedalus*, vol. 87, no. 3, 1958, p. 107, cited in H. Rolston III, 'Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 4, 1982, p. 128.

anthropocentric approach is one of the necessary steps to encapsulate the non-humans into the ethical realm, i.e., to extend the scope of moral concern, but it is not sufficient by itself. While a non-anthropocentric approach is a prerequisite for valuing non-humans intrinsically, as stated by E. C. Hargrove, a non-anthropocentric approach does not necessarily ensure that nonhuman entities will be intrinsically valued. A non-anthropocentric perspective can value non-humans both instrumentally and intrinsically. Thus, we may have a non-anthropocentric perspective, but we can still value non-humans instrumentally. Therefore, if we are seeking for a sound ethical perspective, in addition to being non-anthropocentric, that new understanding of ethics should value intrinsically both nature itself and non-human entities in nature, in addition to human beings.

In short, depending on the conceptual clarification that Hargrove provided us with, but contrary to Hargrove's opinion, I do not think that the term 'non-anthropocentric' is redundant. On the contrary, I claim that we should keep/preserve it.

I have been arguing that even though there has to be a valuer for there to be intrinsic value (or any kind of value, for that matter), this valuer does not necessarily have to be human. I thus support the view that value can only be subjective without thereby being an anthropocentrist. The subject can be a human or nonhuman.

My other objection to defenders of objective intrinsic value and their quest of such value is the following. It is supposed that, if there would be some intrinsically valuable things without needing human's subjectively valuing of them, i.e., if they exist objectively (without needing a human valuer or any kind of valuer), then that would be enough to provide a ground to extend our scope of moral concern beyond human beings and would also justify the quest of protection of nonhuman parts of nature. However, I think it would not be as it is expected. Thus, contrary to what is believed, I think having the knowledge that some non-anthropocentric intrinsic

values exist there objectively is useless by its own. People should also subjectively value them. For example, in relation to aesthetic value, paintings of Franz Kline are considered as intrinsically valuable by some. However, having knowledge that they are intrinsically valuable, without a valuer, that they have objective intrinsic value, would not automatically lead to intrinsic valuation of them by some others or me. Maybe I just instrumentally value these ugly scrawls (!) just because of the money they make to me. Thus, it is not enough to know that something has value *objectively* —if it could have such an objective value— it is also required to be valued *subjectively* by a valuer. In relation to the environment, for example, think of a person, who has information about that, a specific kind of tree almost extinct; it is ecologically regarded as valuable in terms of biodiversity/ecosystem. Nevertheless, if s/he does not believe in its value wholeheartedly and if s/he does not subjectively intrinsically value these trees, then, when s/he is ensured that no one will see what s/he is going to do and no one will know it, probably, s/he will cut these trees for their instrumental values to her/him. Hence, having knowledge that the thing in question has -objective- intrinsic value, i.e., that it is objectively valuable, does not accompany the intrinsically valuation of it, and also does not ensure our universality regarding it as intrinsically value. I agree with I. T. Nuyen on that, “We should not be cruel to animals not because there is something in the animals (and there could well be) but because there is something in us that forces us to behave morally in a certain way.”<sup>362</sup>

### 4.3 Universalization of Subjective Intrinsic Valuation

Now it might be asked that if moral valuation is entirely a subjective agent-related process, then what will hinder people from falling into the trap of an excessive amount of subjectivity that may drag them into a moral solipsism or subjective relativism. This is a serious challenge since extreme individualistic subjectivism

---

<sup>362</sup> A. T. Nuyen, ‘An Anthropocentric Ethics towards Animals and Nature’, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 221.

may lead to chaos rather than a solution. Attempting to ground environmental ethics on moral relativism will worsen and complicate the issue. It does not seem possible to produce environmental policies on the local and global level to or to reach a consensus on a decision as a solution to a global environmental problem with too many moral perspectives. Thus, it should be granted that an entirely subjectivist account of value cannot be a defensible position for environmental ethics.

In fact, I do not engage in subjective valuation in the individualistic level, such as, the necklace, which is inherited from my grandmother, that I value intrinsically, or my cat that is intrinsically valuable to me. I am searching for the possibilities of universally subjective values, in other words, a ground for universalization of subjectively attributed intrinsic value. I am in pursuit of subjective intrinsic values that are valued by humanity in general, such as freedom and justice.

With this challenge in mind, in this section, I will move to the question of finding a ground which, starting from a subjective valuer at the base, both accounts for the intrinsic value that humans have and also has the capacity to embrace non-humans morally.

#### **4.3.1 How Could Universal Subjective Values be Possible?**

I think it is uncontroversial that human beings have a tendency to value. As I have discussed in the previous sections and in chapter 3, people can value something intrinsically, i.e., they can ascribe intrinsic value to something. As a consequence of such an entirely subjective valuation, we can mention many intrinsically valuable things around. But what can be the conditions that make a thing universally intrinsically valuable?

To develop an answer to this question, I will resort to two conceptual strategies: the notion of the social contract or consensus and an appeal to the biopsychological nature of human beings. Before elaborating this account, however, I will indicate

a deeper ground for these two approaches: what I consider to be the non-anthropocentric version of Kant's conception of intrinsic value—i.e., the non-replaceability argument.

Survival is a biological instinct peculiar to all living beings. Because of the necessity of their biological nature, all people value their lives, their existences for their own sake. Since life cannot be replaced with something else, in terms of the Kantian replaceability argument, every individual human being ascribes value to his/her life intrinsically, and in that way, every individual person takes his life under protection in a sense. Nevertheless, we still do not know how such a subjective individual valuation makes people's lives universally valuable.

Let us begin by saying that it is plausible to say that this subjective act of attributing intrinsic value can be universalized since humans have a shared biopsychological tendency to attribute intrinsic value to various things. For example, motherhood or fertility is valued intrinsically almost in all societies throughout history; they can serve as an example for revealing the relation between our biogenetic structure and the biologic possibility of the universalization of our values. Values and norms such as not lying, telling the truth or justice show the evolutionary possibility of universalization. Further, I think looking through history of philosophy and of humanity will provide the necessary support. For example, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter of this study, I tried to present how people's moral values on nature have changed in time and how a subjective value can become universal in time. These examples can also be a promising indicator of the possibility of the universalization of humans' intrinsic valuation of the non-human parts of nature.

Here, biopsychological subjectivism and intersubjectivism as a metaethical position can provide the necessary framework we need. According to such a biopsychological subjectivism (or inter-subjectivism) intrinsic value is not an intrinsic property of objects. But what will prevent people from falling into the

trap of an excessive amount of subjectivity is the ‘biogenetic structure’ and ‘psychological disposition’ that human beings share, and the ‘social consensus’ between them.

In general, life is placed at top of the intrinsically valuable things. It would not be wrong to claim that, the instinct, which pushes people to a mutual, reciprocal moral relation, is the biological instinct of survival in question. Owning the same biological instinct to survive, people are aware that, all other individual persons will value themselves in the same way. In other words, the person, who intrinsically values his/her own life, will recognize that every other individual person will also have the same instinct to survive, and they will value their lives intrinsically. The power of the desire to survive will push humans as rational beings to respect other people’s desire of survival. As a result, cooperation between those people will increase their survival rate. To put it slightly differently, fear of losing their lives pushes people to a moral contract.

#### **4.3.2 The Social Consensus**

G. Harman claims that, morality “arises when a group of people reach an implicit agreement or come to a tacit understanding about their relations with one another.”<sup>363</sup> Instead of the reasons that have been presented by traditional anthropocentrists in (which I have discussed in chapter 2, section 2.1.1.4), I argue that the intrinsic value humans have depends on a hypothetical moral contract, which is similar to the Hobbesian and the Rousseauian social contract theories. Thus, I argue that moral contractarianism can account for the intrinsic value human beings have and can also be a ground to further extension of intrinsic value to

---

<sup>363</sup> For a further reading on moral contractarianism/agreement as foundation of morality, see, G. Harman, ‘Moral Relativism Defended’, *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 84, no. 1, 1975, p.3.

embrace the non-human entities of nature, without the need to appeal to objective intrinsic value theories or even the capacity of intrinsic valuation by nonhumans.

Think about the Hobbesian or Rousseauian social contract theory. In the Hobbesian state of nature,<sup>364</sup> being physically powerful means almost nothing since even a weak person may kill you when you asleep. Hence, all men are equal by nature.<sup>365</sup> Being naturally equal and having the right to do all things, everyone may attack others and even kill them for the sake of defending himself or herself. Hobbes states that, the first foundation of natural right is that “each man protects his life and limbs as much as he can.”<sup>366</sup> Thus, people cannot be blamed for desiring what is good for them or for avoiding what is dangerous for them. This state of nature is obviously the state of war. Hobbes describes life in the state of nature as “savage, short lived, poor and mean and lacked all the comforts and amenities of life which peace and society afford.”<sup>367</sup> It can be comprehended easily that this state of war is not congenial to preserving one’s life or the human race/species. This state of “war of every man against every man” does not accord with the desires or interest of those who want what is good for themselves. Consequently, Hobbes says that, “all men, by necessity of their nature, want to get out of that miserable and hateful state, as soon as they recognize its misery. But they can only do so by entering into agreements to give up their right to all things.”<sup>368</sup>

Possibility of being attacked or even killed by others in the name of defending their life in the state of nature pushes people not only to a legal contract, but also

---

<sup>364</sup> Hobbes calls the situation before the agreement, in which everybody has right to do everything against others, “*natural state*” or “*state of nature*”.

<sup>365</sup> T. Hobbes, *On the citizen*, trans. R. Tuck and M. Silversthorpe, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 26.

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>368</sup> T. Hobbes, *On the citizen*, trans. R. Tuck and M. Silversthorpe, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 36.

to a moral contract. Without moral norms, principles, in a Hobbesian sense, people would have to face with the state of nature and its dangers; it would be a state of war, a “miserable and hateful state”. In order to get out of such a “miserable and hateful state”, people need some principles to appeal to in their relationships with other people, for their social lives. One might claim that life can be secured by positive laws. Nevertheless, positive laws alone cannot be enough to make people’s lives better or even to secure their survival in some cases. There is no such law, which has a power of sanction on every detail of life, such as on the daily relationship of people. Further, the sanction power of laws is limited with their legal controllability. For example, what prevents people from stealing is not just a fear of being caught by the police and/or being punished legally. Moral sanctions have a significant power to put social life in order. Additionally, lying, breaking a promise, etc. might not be regarded as a crime legally. Nevertheless, people still try to accord with these rules, which result from an implicit moral agreement among them.

Consequently, I can say that what lies behind people’s ascribing intrinsic value to their lives is the instinct of survival. Since such a disposition is shared by all human beings, it pushes people to a moral contract to protect their most valuable things, namely, their lives, of which security is assured by the contract.

So, we can say that, ethics is an artificial construction for survival, and it is a contract, a social agreement to higher the survival rate. Further, with such a contract, a subjective intrinsically valuable thing would be universalized. Consequently, intrinsic valuation of a thing might be essentially artificial, but it can still be regarded as ‘natural’. Further, as the rest of this chapter will try to illustrate (drawing on Callicott and Lo’s adoption of Humean axiology), the biological instinct that underlies morality and intrinsic valuation is susceptible to cultivation and universalization evolutionarily.

### 4.3.3 Callicott and Lo's Adoption of Humean Axiology

Both Callicott and Lo take the Humean sense of justice as a model for their theories. As I stated in chapter 2, the foundation of Callicott's subjective value theory resides in Hume's sentimental ethics. David Hume's moral philosophy finds the tendency of humans to attribute value to objects in moral sentiments. According to Hume, moral right and wrong inheres in subjective feelings of approval and disapproval that we have when we observe certain kinds of behavior/action.

Callicott has further observed that, Darwin provides "Hume's subjective and affective axiology with an evolutionary explanation"<sup>369</sup> and that it was Leopold who extended "Darwin's development of Hume's axiology to establish inherent value in nature."<sup>370</sup> He calls this line of thought "the Darwin-Leopold environmental ethic" and claims that this ethic is both non-anthropocentric, "since it provides for the intrinsic value of non-human natural entities" and humanistic,

---

<sup>369</sup> J. B. Callicott, 'Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 263.

<sup>370</sup> J. B. Callicott, 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1985, p. 263.

Callicott says that, "Facing up to these apparently insurmountable logical impediments to axiological objectivism, I have attempted, in a recent series of papers, to elaborate a less ambitious, but also less problematic, subjectivist approach to the problem of an appropriate axiology for environmental ethics based upon and inspired by the land ethic of Aldo Leopold.<sup>6</sup> Working backward historically, I have traced the axiological kernel of the land ethic through Darwin (whose thought about the nature and origin of ethics manifestly influenced Leopold) back to Hume (whose analysis of ethics Leopold may or may not have known or consciously considered, but which certainly, in turn, directly informed Darwin). If my historical reading is correct, the seminal paradigm for contemporary environmental ethics, the Leopold land ethic, rests upon Humean axiological foundations." *Ibid.*, p. 260.

“since intrinsic value ultimately depends upon human valuers”<sup>371</sup> and continue as follows:

Contemporary human beings are genetically endowed with the affective capacity to value unselfishly evolved by our tribal ancestors. Who or what is valued for the sake of itself, however, is determined as much by culture as by genes.<sup>372</sup>

As Callicott explains, this Darwin-Leopold environmental ethic enables us to see how subjective valuation can become universal in time. Callicott begins by pointing out that, while Hume’s theory of value is compatible with evolutionary biology, it has one shortcoming in so far as the requirements of an adequate environmental ethics is concerned: “it is not non-anthropocentric”.<sup>373</sup> This is because Hume insists that value depends on human sentiments, as the famous Hume quote cited by Callicott illustrates “you can never find it [value]” Hume claims that, “till you turn your reflection into your breast.”<sup>374</sup> However, Callicott goes on to respond to Hume to show how this anthropogenic orientation is nonetheless other-oriented, thus developing his adoption of Humean axiology to show how it can meet the requirement of non-anthropocentrism that an adequate environmental ethics would be expected to meet. Callicott’s response to Hume is as follows:

Value may be grounded in human feelings, but neither the feelings themselves nor, necessarily, the breast or self in which they reside are their natural objects. The *moral* sentiments are, by definition, other-oriented. And they are intentional, that is, they are not valued themselves, or even

---

<sup>371</sup> J. B. Callicott, ‘Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 305.

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>374</sup> D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I*, pp. 468-469 cited in J. B. Callicott, ‘Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 305.

experienced apart from some object which excites them and onto which they are, as it were, projected. Their natural objects are not limited, except by convention, to other human beings. They are, rather, naturally excited by fellow social members (and by society itself) which may include, as in both contemporary ecological thought and tribal representation, non-human beings and a larger than human social order.<sup>375</sup>

Humean axiology can also be employed to show how culture can be brought into this evolutionary account. Hume regards certain universal values, such as justice, as “artificial virtues.” According to Hume, the motive behind justice is actually egoistic, in other words, self-centered; herewith, he regards justice as an artificial virtue. Let me explain what he means with the artificiality of virtue. Hume argues that, although a single act of justice may be contrary to one’s interest, in the long term, outcomes would be good for both society and also for that individual person. If every individual person looks out for his/her own interests, and does not pursue justice, then society will dissolve and people would become savage, miserable, solitary that is the worst state for a society that can be imagined.<sup>376</sup> Without a society, individuals are weak, they are not capable of doing all things on their own and any particular skill they possess cannot reach the level of perfection. They are “constantly at risk of ruin and misery.”<sup>377</sup> Therefore, according to Hume, justice is not a natural virtue, i.e., it is artificial. He says that, fundamentally, it depends on mutual convention of people at the formation of the society. However, as long as people pursue it, it is internalized, cultivated, and regarded as an intrinsic value as if it were a natural virtue.

Similarly, people can generate intrinsic environmental values to cope with environmental problems, like the Humean understanding of justice, which is an

---

<sup>375</sup> J. B. Callicott, ‘Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, p. 305.

<sup>376</sup> D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), London, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 485.

<sup>377</sup> D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), London, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 485.

artificially introduced value. In this context, making an analogy with Hume's value Lo claims as follows:

However much a single exercise of environmental virtues, such as modesty and thoughtfulness, may be contrary to personal interest and short-term human interests, it is certain that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, and indeed absolutely requisite, to the support of the Earth's natural environment, the human civilization, the survival of the Homo Sapiens species, and the well-being of every human individual. [...] Every individual person must find themselves a gainer, on balancing the account; since, without the rules and conventions of those environmental-virtues, the natural environment and human society must soon dissolve, and every one must soon fall into that savage and impoverished condition, which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be supposed in an environmentally virtuous society.<sup>378</sup>

Here, the 'dispositional moral theory' Y. S. Lo proposes, which is also substantially based on Humean principles will help elaborate our points further. In the article "Making and Finding Values in Nature: From a Humean Point of View", Y. S. Lo proposes a metaethical analysis of Humean value: "X is (relatively/universally) valuable/disvaluable if and only if (some/all) human subjects are disposed, under the conditions C1, C2, and C3, to feel the sentiment of approbation/disapprobation towards X."<sup>379</sup> C1, C2, C3 are three favorable conditions Lo derives from Hume, which a Humean subject must fulfill in order to make "correct or close-to-correct moral evaluation".<sup>380</sup> These three conditions are ideal/standard conditions that one should have to evaluate something. She explicates C1, C2 and C3 as follows:

---

<sup>378</sup> Y. S. Lo, 'Empirical Environmental Ethics', in K. T. Ip (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: Intercultural Perspectives*, Amsterdam & NY, Rodopi, 2009, p. 68.

<sup>379</sup> Y. S. Lo, 'Making and Finding Values in Nature: From a Humean Point of View', *Inquiry*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2006, p. 131.

<sup>380</sup> Y. S. Lo, 'Empirical Environmental Ethics', in K. T. Ip (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: Intercultural Perspectives*, Amsterdam & NY, Rodopi, 2009, p. 58.

C1. The condition being empathetically aware of relevant facts and relations, vis-à-vis the object under evaluation (object-awareness condition),

C2. The condition being empathetically aware of basic facts about human nature (Human-nature-awareness condition),

C3. The condition of non-egocentrically considering one's particular interests and relations vis-à-vis the object under evaluation (decentering condition).<sup>381</sup>

Y. S. Lo says that, if these conditions are not satisfied there happens to be an error in our moral judgments, and as long as we meet these three conditions, our moral judgments become more reliable. These conditions may not be satisfied in every moral judgment, but as long as we have more knowledge about the basic facts of human life (and thereby better satisfying condition C2), people “might give up their originally negative moral judgment of some kind of behavior (for example, homosexuality)”.<sup>382</sup>

While Callicott regards Humean valuation as subjective, Lo regards it as both subjective and objective. According to her, it is “ontologically objective” but “conceptually subjective”.<sup>383</sup> As I stated previously, C1, C2, and C3 are ideal/standard conditions. Thus, she states that, it can be that “no one actually has the sentiment of approbation towards X. For it might be the case that no one has yet actually met all the ideal conditions for giving reliable sentiments, but if they had met those conditions they would have approved of X. Hence, the actual lack

---

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>382</sup> Y. S. Lo, ‘Empirical Environmental Ethics’, in K. T. Ip (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: Intercultural Perspectives*, Amsterdam & NY, Rodopi, 2009, p. 59.

<sup>383</sup> Y. S. Lo, ‘Making and Finding Values in Nature: From a Humean Point of View’, *Inquiry*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2006, pp. 132.

of approval from people towards X does not imply that X is not valuable.”<sup>384</sup> Similarly, people might consider something as a value, which is not genuinely valuable because of not satisfying the conditions. So that, she infers, Humean value is a kind of value that can exist without a valuer and without being valued; therefore it is objective in that aspect.<sup>385</sup> On the other hand, “H\*<sup>386</sup> analyzes value in terms of subjects and so makes the former conceptually dependent on the latter.”<sup>387</sup> Hence, in that aspect, it is subjective.

Fortunately, Hume’s approach finds support in evolutionary biology as well. Evolutionary biology argues that the tendency of human and also some non-human animals to form communities must be the result of altruistic feelings that increased the fitness of these communities, and these feelings might have evolved as a result of their contribution to the fitness increase in these communities. As stated by Y. S. Lo, as human communities have evolved and expanded, people have recognized that they were part of larger communities. As a result of this awareness, people were able to extend their social feelings towards the members of these larger communities, and ultimately (and hopefully not in a very distant future) to biotic communities.

The moral contract is an implicit moral agreement made mutually between individuals or groups. Since it is thought that non-humans lack moral reasoning and a mutual restraint required by contracting parties as sides of agreement,

---

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.

<sup>386</sup> “H\*: X is (relatively/universally) valuable/disvaluable if and only if (some/ all) human subjects are disposed, under the conditions C1, C2 and C3, to feel the sentiment of approbation/disapprobation towards X.”

*Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

ethicists reject the including of non-humans as direct subjects of morality. However, I think a social consensus has the power to extend the scope of our moral concern including the non-human parts of nature without changing the contracting parties as sides of agreement. Actually, Christopher Stone made a good argumentation for that issue in his article “Should Trees Have [Legal] Standing?”<sup>388</sup>

It can also be said that as much as people’s experience with nature and reflections on it increase, people’s knowledge of nature and their liability to value it will also increase. For example, we have a tendency to be able to value our dogs or cats more than a wild animal. Thus, frequency of relationship affects our value giving ability. Moreover, sometimes the size of entities also affects our value judgment. For example, one might value (not always consciously) the entities that can be seen by naked eyes more than the organism that are not seen without a microscope. In the previous sections, I mentioned some paintings of modern art painters. I stated that without knowing the criteria and standards, it is hardly difficult to call

---

<sup>388</sup> As stated by Christopher D. Stone, attributing moral or legal rights or attributing intrinsic value to non-human entities does not lead to the view that, for instance, since the tree has rights, it cannot be cut down anymore. Human life is valued and protected by legal and moral rights, but this does not mean that they cannot ever be killed, or that their lives are under an absolute protection. (Stone, p. 3.) On the contrary, when it is required, they are sentenced to life imprisonment or capital punishment, or they can be killed in the name of self-protection or during a war, etc. Thus, the same line of reasoning can be extended to non-human entities. Besides, since they are rights-holders, it does not mean that they would have the same rights with human beings, such as the right of voting. (Stone, pp. 3-4.) Nobody claims that it was an easy process to possess the rights that one deserves; throughout history, the process of having rights never happened easily. Sometimes it required a challenging struggle, even, sometimes people’s claim of their rights, made other people laugh, because, it seemed as utopia and was hard to believe. (C. D. Stone, pp. 3-4.)

Moreover, objections to non-human entities to be rights-holders, because of their lack of ability to talk, think, etc., seems to be a manageable problem. Corporations, infants, physically or mentally disabled people, vegetables also cannot talk, but there are lawyers, who talk, claim a right on behalf of them. These lawyers protect the rights of those people. Why should the same situation not apply to non-humans? (C. D. Stone, p. 8.)

C. D. Stone, *Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality, and the Environment*, 3rd edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 8.

them beautiful, valuable. However, think about the painting, Mona Lisa, which is known by most of the people over the world. Although people might not understand all of the artistic standards to evaluate it, all of the people, who somehow know it and would have it; they would care about the painting and would value it (it does not matter intrinsically or instrumentally). So, acquaintance and social moral criteria, which are inherited from generation to generation or culture to culture are factors in the universalization of a value.

Since value is analyzed into moral sentiments, it is possible to connect the expansion of moral sentiments to different communities with our changing evaluative attitudes toward new communities. Y. S. Lo also states, values that we attribute to a community and its members change by the appearance of new communities.<sup>389</sup>

Concerning human beings' tendency to valuation Y. S. Lo claims as follows:

People's evaluative dispositions are evolutionary and cultural products, and the products of personal history. They are not fixed absolutes but malleable to some extent. If T<sup>390</sup> is right in understanding value as fundamentally anchored by people's evaluative dispositions, then value can be created and relative values can become more universal, to the extent

---

<sup>389</sup> How this change takes place is, of course, an empirical matter. "Facts about human values are ultimately reduced to facts about the psychological dispositions of human beings so that the method of acquiring knowledge about values is not mysterious, but empirical and potentially scientific." Y. S. Lo, 'Making and Finding Values in Nature: From a Humean Point of View', *Inquiry*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2006, p. 132.

Hume also said that the job of the moral scientist is "to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence. We consider all the circumstances, in which these actions agree: And thence endeavour to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments." D. Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), 3rd edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 289.

<sup>390</sup> Y. S. Lo defines T: X is (relatively/universally) valuable/disvaluable just if (some/all) human subjects are disposed, under favorable conditions {C}, to feel the sentiment of approbation/disapprobation toward X.

Y. S. Lo, 'Empirical Environmental Ethics', in K. T. Ip (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: Intercultural Perspectives*, Amsterdam & NY, Rodopi, 2009, p. 57.

that people can cultivate, negotiate about, and converge in, their evaluative dispositions.<sup>391</sup>

She claims that, human beings' psychological dispositions can successfully be cultivated and internalized.<sup>392</sup> Biologic, ecological and also social changes that human beings have had until now, lead to an increase in their tendency to value nature and also to protect what they value in nature. Compared to before, they rarely sacrifice the things they value. For example, arbitrary hunting is banned in many countries, and just in case, it is done as painlessly as possible.

If we have a tendency to value others for the sake of themselves, we may also learn to say "the biotic community" as we learn more about ourselves, other beings, and the consequences of our life styles. As I stated before the current environmental ethical approaches may not be so successful to reach the intended target, but they had great influence on people's perception of nature; their contributions are undeniable.

#### **4.3.4 Change in Values**

Values of an individual person are not shaped independent of the value system of the family or society that s/he lives in. Having similar backgrounds is a factor in sharing/ having similar moral values and standards to make similar moral judgments.<sup>393</sup> E. C. Hargrove explains that as follows:

Human values are not entirely dependent upon the arbitrary value preferences of individuals. In an Aristotelian sense, there are cultural values that are the product of social evolution. These values are not

---

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>393</sup> However, it should not be missed that, I am not claiming that moral values and standards are absolute. These standards and values might be rejected by any average person, and instead of them, some new ones might be adopted.

entirely subjective. (At any given moment in the history of a particular society they can be objectively identified and described. Moreover, in most cases they are the foundation for the values of individual people. It is no accident that nearly all people in a particular society share the same values. They pick them up as children without formal teaching. They are the context and starting point out of which individual differences develop. Simply to call these social values subjective misrepresents their very substantial objective character.<sup>394</sup>

In short, boundaries of morality can be extended beyond human beings and human beings can construct an ethical life, which is concerned with non-human beings in addition to human beings. What can be reasons of intrinsic value that human beings subjectively attribute to nature and non-human entities in nature? I think, respect (of, for example, their will to survive); admiration (of the stability and integrity of the ecosystem, of diversity); sympathy (based on feeling pain and pleasure) can be the reasons behind that valuation. Consequently, we can say that morality is no more an issue merely among human beings; it covers the relation of a person with his/her environment.

I agree with the pragmatists that there are no fixed, timeless values. What people value, changes with their relation to the world as time passes. The world evolves and the moral problems we face change. Hence, our values change, evolve over time in order to comprehend and handle these problems. What causes that change is the society we live in. One of the foundations of all moral judgments is the perception of the situation at hand; what is going on around us affects our moral judgments.

Actually, concerning the environmental ethics, within very short time, a huge progress has been shown. Until very recent times, even mentioning animals' equality to humans was out of question. For example, the book, *Alice in Wonderland* was banned in Hunan, China in 1931 by General Ho Chien because

---

<sup>394</sup> E. C. Hargrove, 'Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value', *The Monist*, vol. 75, no. 2, 1992, p. 196.

of animals being portrayed on the same levels as humans. General claimed that, attributing human language to animals is an insult to the human race. The statement of General Ho Chien was given in the newspaper as follows:

“Bears, lions, and other beasts,” he points out. “cannot use a human language, and to attribute to them such power is an insult to the human race. Any children reading such text-books must inevitably regard animals and human beings on the same level, and this would be disastrous.”<sup>395</sup>

Change in the social life leads to change in the values of that society, and mutually a change in values causes change in the general structure of the society. When we review history, we notice many examples of these mutual changes. In Ancient Greek, most probably, it was not thought that slavery, which was a common practice throughout their history, would disappear. Owning slaves was seen as natural, even by the philosophers and writers of the time. Another example is endorsement of the slavery of people in American culture just because of the skin color of those people. Alternatively, think about the progress in the positions of females, or the relationship of males and females in ancient Arabic societies. We see always a change in values, in the general structure of society, a change in the world. The scope of our moral concerns is always broadening (I am leaving out a few narrowing cases because of some special reasons, such as religious, or racial groups, communities, etc.).

Further, values continue to change, and our world of value continuously enlarges its boundaries. For example, although homosexuality was socially unacceptable and criminal in the 1950s and 1960s, today, gay marriage is legal in some countries. My last example is from Australia. A judge from district court equated incest and pedophilia to past attitudes towards homosexuality, claiming that they may no longer be a taboo; the consensual sexual relationship between adult siblings might be accepted by the community in the forthcoming days/years. He

---

<sup>395</sup> ‘Ban on ‘ALICE’’, *The Straits Times*, 22 May 1931, <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19310522.2.19.8.aspx> (accessed 1 June 2014).

said that, “a jury might find nothing untoward in the advance of a brother towards his sister once she had sexually matured, had sexual relationships with other men and was now ‘available’, not having [a] sexual partner.”<sup>396</sup> And he also added that, the only reason it is criminal is the high risk of genetic abnormalities, which can be solved by contraception or abortion.

To sum up, I can say that, while humans’ valuation capacity is a product of biological evolution, ethics and values are products of culture/society. Due to globalization of world and with the effect of internet/computational technology, people’s social lives change, and thus their values are not limited with their society’s value anymore; they can have a broader value-world. Consequently, all these examples/situations are promising us the possibility of universalization of our subjective valuation.

---

<sup>396</sup> A. Molloy, ‘Incest is no longer a taboo’, *The Independent*, 11 July 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/incest-is-no-longer-a-taboo-says-australian-judge-garry-neilson-9599552.html>, (accessed 11 July 2014)

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

What is discussed under the name of ‘environmental ethics’ until now has mediated radical changes in ethical theories. The pioneers in this journey of environmental ethics convincingly put forward the case that we need to cease limiting our understanding of ‘ethics’ to the current human-to-human ethics, which is what used to come to people’s minds when ethics was mentioned. Although, in general, what people imply with ‘ethics’ is still the human-to-human ethics, we are now at the point where we can begin to see the subject matter of ethics as the humans’ relation with their environment, broadly their biotic community, and its components. And, what is morally good or bad, right or wrong should be determined by humans’ relation with their environment, not humans’ relation with other humans only. In other words, although until now when people were speaking of ‘ethics’, they had in mind merely the human-to-human ethics, what people imply with the term ‘ethics’ should be changed into ethics with the broadened scope of moral consideration. In short, when we say ‘ethics’ it should be understood that ethics encapsulates the biotic community as a whole with both human and non-human parts.

Thus, in my opinion, the first positive step has been taken. The term ‘environmental ethics’ has completed its mission of drawing attention to environmental issues in a way that prompts an attitude change. That is, we have already moved beyond the discussion of whether non-human entities belong to the moral realm or not. Although this position may not be acknowledged or popularized among the public, and although we almost every day hear bad news

about the torture of animals or other environmentally insensitive atrocities, I think at least in academic philosophical circles, the idea that “non-humans are a subject of moral concern” has become accepted. In fact, since it has been opened to discussion for the first time, whether animals, plants, or other non-human entities are the components of a moral relation, they have been drawn into the ethical realm, and this means that, they are already parts of ethical discussions. If we look at the process of environmental ethics historically, we can easily see that. While scope of the discussions about morality was limited only with humans, later it has been enlarged to sentient beings (humans and some animals), then, to all living beings (humans, animals, and plants), and finally to the biotic community as a whole. By means of sentiocentric, biocentric, and ecocentric attitudes towards nature, respectively, the scope of ethics has already been broadened from involving merely the rational, adult people to encapsulating all living things and also the biotic community as a whole, such as the ecosystem, species, biodiversity.

It might be argued that, the idea that ethics should embrace all non-human entities in nature as well as humans is not accepted/admitted by everyone/largely. Under this circumstance, I want to remind that, there are still some people, who believe that blacks cannot have equal rights with whites, women with men, homosexuals with heterosexuals, atheists with theists, etc. However, we have already begun to discuss these, think on them, and it is recognized –more or less– what is wrong with these discriminations. This is good progress for a start.

Throughout this study, my interest in the topic of intrinsic value was motivated by the possibility that it may provide a ground for becoming morally engaged with the non-human parts of nature, for an adequate environmental ethics, which, in my opinion, is non-anthropocentric.

To explore this possibility, I tried, in this dissertation, to develop an adequate understanding of intrinsic value that could be non-anthropocentric. To prepare the

background for my argument, in chapter 2, I summarized a general overview of the outstanding theories and approaches in environmental ethics. In sections, 2.1.1.1., 2.1.1.2., and 2.1.1.3 and 2.1.2, where I discussed anthropocentrism, I maintained that the traditional anthropocentric perspective fails to provide the necessary theoretical framework to comprehend the human-nature relationship profoundly and deservedly, since its focus on nature is instrumental (not by definition of ‘anthropocentrism’, but because of the tradition of anthropocentrism). As I stated above, recent studies on environmental ethics mostly agreed on the need to extend the scope of morality; however, it is still a disputed point “how far the circle of moral concern should be expanded?” and how such an expansion is possible.

In section 2.1.1.4, I presented the most prominent arguments that are introduced to justify the intrinsic value of human beings, which provided human beings with a superior position over non-humans in anthropocentric theories. With presenting these, I argued that, on the contrary to what is believed the justification of intrinsic value of human beings is not much more strong and stable than the intrinsic value of non-humans, which are defended by non-anthropocentric theories. Further, if these arguments are sufficient for regarding human beings as intrinsically valuable, it becomes hard to see why one of the many arguments introduced to defend the intrinsic value ableness of non-humans should not also be acceptable—unless one is speciesist.

In short, as I also stated in the “Introduction”, I argued that strong anthropocentrism—as well as some of the weak anthropocentric theories, such as Norton’s theory—is not an appropriate approach to adopt in environmental ethics. Because, firstly, when interests of humans and non-humans conflict, anthropocentrism is bound to side with humans beforehand, regardless of further details, and nonhumans or their interests are seen as easily expendable. Secondly, in relation to this point, I maintain Callicott’s “right reason” argument which

underlines the importance of ‘doing right thing from right reason’. That is, not only consequence but also the motive behind it is important.

In section 2.2, I attempted to give a general overview of the outstanding environmental ethicists and their remarkable theories and views, which are noted with name of non-anthropocentrism. After an overview on anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches, in section 2.3., I tried to present extrapolations for what is needed for an adequate theory of environmental ethics.

For this aim, depending on Taylorian distinction between moral-agent and moral-subject, I opposed the view, which objects to including non-humans in the moral sphere because of the reason that they cannot take moral responsibility. In interhuman ethics, we have such circumstances in which people cannot be responsible for their acts, their evaluations, choices, lack of moral reasoning, but they are still treated as subjects of moral concern, regardless of mutuality. Further, I agreed with non-anthropocentric ethicists on extending the moral scope of ethics including the non-human parts of nature in order to develop a proper relation with nature. I tried to unfold the demand of gradually extending the scope of moral consideration with prominent theories and approaches of environmental ethicists.

Concerning moral pluralism and monism, I adopted the pragmatist perspective that, there are no fixes, timeless values; values change in time. Further, I am suspicious about that whether a monist value theory would be sufficient to comprehend the complexity and multidimensionality of environmental issues. Later, in chapter 4, I discussed the changing of values in time in a more detailed way, mentioning the banning of the book, *Alice in Wonderland* in 1931, which seems preposterous to us today.

Further, I questioned how we should conceive human relation with nature. That is, should we consider ourselves just as plain members of nature at any cost, or being rational and scientifically and technologically better equipped, should

we/humans consider ourselves as masters or controllers of nature, or at best, the guardians of nature? I maintained that, a new environmental ethical theory/approach, should stay somewhere between these two end views.

As a last point, since I observed an obscurity in the use of fundamental terms, especially with the term ‘intrinsic value’ within the views I examined, I argued that first attention should be devoted to the careful analysis of the terms used in environmental ethics.

In relation to individualistic and holistic theories, I agreed with Callicott that an adequate environmental ethics should concern nature as a whole including its human and non-human, living and non-living parts, individualistic and holistic.

In sum, after overviewing environmental ethical theories I surmised that, – probably– because of the priority given to practical issues, there remain some conceptual confusions in environmental ethics, which makes complex issues even more problematic than they already are.

Due to these reasons, in chapter 3, since value is the concept lying at center of moral issues, I tried to conduct a metaethical analysis of value, specifically intrinsic value. After giving a brief overview of the metaethical conceptual background of value, in section 3.1.2., I tried to relate the use of the term ‘intrinsic good/worth’ from the past to the present.

Because of the complexity of the concept, the existence of intrinsic value has been denied (e.g., by M. Beardsley) or at best considered as not necessary (e.g., by E. Katz) especially in terms of environmental ethics at times. Like the pragmatists, at the beginning of this study, I was also prone to ignore the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. If I had continued to ignore it, it would have been an unfortunate decision, because I realized that the existence of intrinsic value was crucial in terms of ethics. Therefore, in this dissertation I argue for the existence

of intrinsic value in addition to instrumental value. In section 3.1.3.1, I discuss how we know the existence of intrinsic value. Although I presented some other arguments (empirical confirmation, argument from definition, argument analogous with the Aristotelian first cause argument), the argument that depends on experiencing the existence of intrinsic value is one step ahead among others for me. That is, we do not value our money and freedom or justice in the same way. This provides us an insight that not all our valuations are instrumental.

After attempting to show the existence of intrinsic value, I discussed why we need the concept of 'intrinsic value' in terms of environmental ethics. I stated that such "why" questions questioning/inquiring the value of something are not a good starting point. Referring also to Pister's personal experience with such kind of questions, I argued that the reasons given to in return for "why do you intrinsically value it?" would not be convincing unless the questioner is also ready to be convince or/and to value it.

Finally, in the last section of this chapter (3.1.4), I questioned subjectivity or objectivity of intrinsic value. Moorean intrinsic value is known for being posited as objective. Therefore, examining his account of value, I argued that value is something relational, and contextual. Also drawing on D. Dall'Agnol's view to support my argument, I stated that valuation is not an agent-neutral process; contrarily, it is an agent-related issue. Thus, there is always a valuer; in the framework of metaethics, we cannot mention objective value independently of the evaluation of a valuer. The other notable name in this chapter was Kant. Because, I argue that, on the contrary to prevailing of anthropocentrism in his moral theory, what I call the 'replaceability argument', that Kant resorts to in order to make a distinction between 'dignity' and 'price', can provide the conceptual structure needed to attribute intrinsic value to non-humans.

The concept of ‘non-anthropocentrism’ is the backbone of chapter 4. As the reader could notice, intrinsic value was the focus of this dissertation from beginning to end but I tried to emphasize non-anthropocentrism, as well. Therefore, in this chapter I aimed to discuss their relationship in a detailed way in reference to the subjectivity of value.

In this chapter, I tried to lay out a framework to clear away such conceptual confusions concerning the attribution of intrinsic value to nature. First, I made use of E. C. Hargrove’s writings, to show that ‘being anthropocentric’ and ‘treating nature instrumentally’ are not synonyms; nor are ‘being non-anthropocentric’ and ‘defending the objectivity of values’. Since I have already argued in chapter 3, that there are no objective values, I tried to clarify in this chapter (chpt. 4) what non-anthropocentrism means so that we can question the possibility of a subjective account of nonanthropocentric intrinsic value.

Objectivists defend the existence of value objectively out there. I on the other hand, have already argued that valuation always requires a valuer, and rejected the possibility of the existence of a non-relational objective value. However, I do not assume that it is necessary to believe that value is objective to hold a non-anthropocentric position. If with ‘objective value’, environmentalists —such as Rolston— mean the existence of a value independent of a ‘human’ valuer, then, I think even such a value still implies a valuer but not necessarily a ‘human’ valuer.

Therefore, in this chapter, my aim is to question more closely the implications of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism with respect to the question of human and non-human valuers. Anthropocentrists reject the valuation capacity of non-human valuers. Although, I do not find the arguments presented to show the intrinsic valuation of non-humans convincing enough, I do not reject that possibility. I just argue to suspend judgement on this question until we have much more information on this by means of scientific and technological development.

If we consider the ethical studies on the environment since environmental ethics has appeared as a new kind of ethics, I can say that the difference between the claims of anthropocentric and of non-anthropocentric theories seems to almost disappear, especially with the maneuvers of weak anthropocentrists, such as Hargrove. That is, if we compare the anthropocentric theories, which prevailed when environmental ethics was first introduced with the current anthropocentric theories, namely weak anthropocentrism, we can see the huge difference between these anthropocentric theories. Further, although Hargrove calls himself as 'anthropocentrist', if I compare his position with earlier environmentalists, I can say that his position is closer to non-anthropocentrism than some other environmentalists' are, such as Taylor or Singer. On the other hand, although Callicott considers himself as a non-anthropocentrist, as claimed by Hargrove, his position can be regarded as close to anthropocentrism because of his claim that only human beings can value.

In relation to the subjective account of value, there is a risk of moral relativism, which urges environmental philosophers to search for the existence of nonhuman valuers, or objective non-human values in nature. However, while I am arguing for the subjectivity of value, concerning ethics, I do not limit subjective valuation to an individualistic level; I believe that such a very subjective account of value might cause environmental issues to be more problematic than they were before. Therefore, I examine the possibility of the universalizability of subjective valuation, which, as we know from the history of humanity, is possible. That is, in addition to the social consensus on the basis of moral contractarianism, human beings' shared 'biogenetic structure' and 'psychological disposition' can also provide us this possibility.

In section 4.3.4., I tried to present that values change, even radically, within time, and to show *human beings'* quick adaptation to environmental changes. And, I

argued that values change in time. Thus, this possibility gives us hope about the day when we would value nature and all its parts regardless of focusing on species.

In conclusion, I believe that the matter of environmental ethics is a matter of process and it is quite apparent that we are not at the beginning of this process. Evelyn B. Pluhar starts her article written in 1983 by asking, “What is an environmental ethic? Is it necessary for the preservation of nature? Is it even logically possible?”<sup>397</sup> Nowadays, we are far beyond questioning the logical possibility of environmental ethics. We have made a very good progress thus far, but we still have a long way to go. We still have difficulties in human-to-human ethics. There are many people exposed to discriminations because of their skin colors, sexes, religions, sexual orientations, etc., and many people, who even cannot express their rights claim. Of course, the assertion that “we will construct an ethical theory that will resolve all our moral problems” would be no more than a wish. If we think the history of humanity and the numbers of people wronged, mistreated, exposed to discrimination, etc. during that time, then, we can recognize that despite improvements, by ethics’ very nature, there will be always be morally unacceptable situations. Moreover, if we take the possible outcomes of technological and scientific progress into consideration, it is obvious that the adventure of ethics will continue. For instance, I think it is not so far that we will face such cases that, the interests of a human, a robot, a human-looking being with artificial intelligence or an animal will conflict with the other’s interests. What will we do in such new cases? Maybe at that time, although nowadays it is being discussed whether to include or not to include the animals and plants into the moral sphere, we will give priority to the interests of these natural non-human entities over non-natural humanoid robots, cloned people, etc. In terms of ‘environmental’ ethics, I am not hopeless, as far as we continue to discuss these issues, and succeed

---

<sup>397</sup> E. B. Pluhar, ‘The Justification of an Environmental Ethic’, *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 5, no. 1, 1983, p. 47.

to include them into our agendas. At that point, it seems that ‘environmental’ ethics succeed a considerable amount of the intended aim.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Afeissa, H. S., ‘The Transformative Value of Ecological Pragmatism. An Introduction to the Work of Bryan G. Norton’, *S.A.P.I.EN.S*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2008, pp. 73-79.

‘Anthropocentric’, *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric) (accessed 1 April 2014)

‘Anthropocentrism’, *Oxford English Dictionary*, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8420?redirectedFrom=anthropocentrism#eid> (accessed 1 June 2014)

Aristotle, *Politics, Book. 1*, 350 BCE. Available from <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

Aquinas, T., *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa Contra Gentiles), Book Three: Providence (Q. 84-163)*, trans. V. J. Bourke, in Kenny, J., O. P. (ed.) New York: Hanover House, 1955-57, <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#112>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

Arsene, G. G., *The Human-Nature Relationship: The Emergence of Environmental Ethics*. [http://bioethics.agrocampus-ouest.eu/infoGlueDeliverLive/digitalAssets/57485\\_51EN-human-nature-relationship.pdf](http://bioethics.agrocampus-ouest.eu/infoGlueDeliverLive/digitalAssets/57485_51EN-human-nature-relationship.pdf) (accessed 11 February 2013)

‘Ban on “Alice”’, *The Straits Times*, 22 May 1931, <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19310522.2.19.8.aspx> (accessed 1 June 2014)

Baylan, E., ‘Doğaya İlişkin İnançlar, Kültür ve Çevre Sorunları Arasındaki İlişkilerin Kuramsal Bağlamda İrdelenmesi’, *Ankara Üniversitesi Çevrebilimleri Dergisi*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, pp. 67-74.

Beardsley, M. C., 'Intrinsic Value', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1965, pp. 1-17.

Bekoff, M. and Meaney, C. A., (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare*, New York, Routledge, 1998.

Bentham, J., *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Library of Economics and Liberty, 1907, Available from <http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPMLCover.html>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

Biehl, J., *Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics*, Boston, South End Press, 1991.

Bloom, A., *The Republic of Plato: Translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay by Allan Bloom*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., HarperCollins Publishers, USA, 1991.

Boslaugh, S. E., 'Anthropocentrism', *Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.*, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropocentrism> (accessed 1 June 2014)

Brabazon, J., *Albert Schweitzer: Essential Writings*, New York, 1977.

Bradley, B., 'Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?', *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 107, no. 1, 2002, pp. 23-44.

Callicott, J. B., 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1985, pp. 257-275.

Callicott, J. B. and Frodeman, R., (eds. in chief) *Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy*, Gale, Cengage Learning, Macmillan Reference, USA, 2009.

Callicott, J. B., 'Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4, 1984, pp. 299-309.

Callicott, J. B., *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999.

Callicott, J. B., 'The Case against Moral Pluralism', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 12, no. 2, 1990, pp. 99-124

Callicott, J. B., 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1980, pp. 311-338.

Callicott, J. B., *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989.

Carter, R. E., 'Intrinsic Value and the Intrinsic Valuer', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 34, no. 4, 1974, pp. 504-514.

Cavalier, R., *Online Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy*, [http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/cavalier/80130/part2/II\\_preface.html](http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/cavalier/80130/part2/II_preface.html) (accessed 1 August 2015).

Cicovacki, P., 'Reverence for Life – A Moral Value or the Moral Value?', *Lyceum*, vol. 9, no. 1, Fall 2007, pp. 1-11, <http://lyceumphilosophy.com/9-1/Lyceum-9-1.pdf>, accessed 1 June 2014.

Dall'Agnol, D., 'Intrinsic Value: Analysing Moore's Aristotelian approach', *Ethic@*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2003, pp. 59-82.

Davion, V., 'Ecofeminism', in D. Jamieson (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, pp. 233-247.

DeLapp, K. M., 'Metaethics', *Internet Encyclopedia Philosophy*, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/metaethi>, (accessed 1 August 2015).

Descartes, R., 'Animals Are Machines?', in Armstrong, S. J. and Botzler, R. G. (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., New York, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004, pp. 274-278.

Desjardins, J. R., *Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy*, 4th edn., Canada, Thomson Wadsworth, 2006.

Devall, B., 'Deep Ecology and its Critics', *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy*, vol. 5, no: 2, 1988, pp. 55-60.

Devall, B. and Sessions, G., 'Deep Ecology', in D. Schmidtz and E. Willot (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: What Reality Matters, What Really Works*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 120-125.

Environmental Law, the Law no. 2872, Article 2 (as amended by the Law no. 5491, Article 2 - 26/4/2006))  
<http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2872.pdf>

Evans, J. C., *With Respect for Nature: Living as Part of the Natural World*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2005.

Fisher, A., *Metaethics: An Introduction*, New York, Routledge, 2014.

Fletcher, G., 'Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value', *Social Theory and Practice*, vol. 34, no.4, 2008, pp. 517-532.

Ghose, T., 'Animals Are Moral Creatures, Scientist Argues', *LiveScience*, 15 November 2012, <http://www.livescience.com/24802-animals-have-morals-book.html>, (accessed 1 June 2014).

Hargrove, E. C., 'Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value', *The Monist*, vol. 75, no: 2, 1992, pp. 183-207.

Harman, G., 'Intrinsic Value', in G. Harman (ed.), *Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. 137-148.

Harman, G., 'Moral Relativism Defended', *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 84, no. 1, 1975, pp. 3-22.

Hobbes, T., *On the citizen*, trans. R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), London, Oxford University Press, 1960.

Hume, D., *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), 3rd edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975.

Jamieson, D., *Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Kagan, S., 'Rethinking Intrinsic Value', *The Journal of Ethics*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1998, pp. 277-297.

Kant, I., 'Indirect Duties to Nonhumans', in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 82-83.

Kant, I., *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. P. Heath, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991.

Katz, E., 'Searching for Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despair in Environmental Ethics', in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 307-318.

Korsgaard, C. M., 'Two Distinctions in Goodness', *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 92, no: 2, 1983, pp. 169-195.

'Land Conservation: Preserving and Restoring Ecosystems', <http://education-portal.com/academy/lesson/land-conservation-preserving-and-restoring-ecosystems.html#lesson> (accessed 1 June 2014)

Lemos, N. M., *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Leopold, A., *A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River*, New York, The Random House Publishing Group, 1966.

Leopold, A., *Round River*, L. B. Leopold (ed.), New York, Oxford University Press, 1993.

Light, A., 'Methodological Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Environmental Ethics', in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 318-326.

Light, A. and Katz, E., 'Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Ethics as Contested Terrain', in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 1-17.

Lo, Y. S., 'Empirical Environmental Ethics', in K. T. Ip (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: Intercultural Perspectives*, Amsterdam & NY, Rodopi, 2009, pp. 55-73.

Lo, Y. S., 'Making and Finding Values in Nature: From a Humean Point of View', *Inquiry*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2006, pp. 123-147.

Martin, M. W., *Albert Schweitzer's Reverence for Life: Ethical Idealism and Self-Realization*, England, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007.

Mackie, J. L., 'The Subjectivity of Values', in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), *Essays on Moral Realism*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 95-118.

McCloskey, H. J., *Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Netherlands, 1969.

Merchant, C., 'Ecofeminism and Feminist Theory', in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2001, pp. 77-83.

Mies, M. and Shiva, V., 'Introduction to Ecofeminism', in S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, 3rd edn., McGraw-Hill Companies, New York, 2004, pp. 429-437.

Mill, J. S., *The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill*, J. B. Schneewind (ed.), New York, The Modern Library, 2002.

Molloy, A., 'Saneie Masilela, 9, marries Helen Shabangu, 53 years his senior, for the second time', *The Independent*, 21 July 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/saneie-masilela-9-marries-helen-shabangu-53-years-his-senior-for-the-second-time-9618146.html>, (accessed 25 July 2014)

Molloy, A., 'Incest is no longer a taboo', *The Independent*, 11 July 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/incest-is-no-longer-a-taboo-says-australian-judge-garry-neilson-9599552.html>, (accessed 11 July 2014)

Moore, G. E., 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value', *Philosophical Studies*, Paterson, N.J., Littlefield, Adams, 1959.

Naess, A., 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary', in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2001, p. 49-53.

Nhanenge, J., *Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development*, Maryland, University Press of America, 2011

Norton, B. G., 'Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1984, pp. 131-148.

Nuyen, A. T., 'An Anthropocentric Ethics towards Animals and Nature', *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 215-223.

O'Neill, J., 'Value in Nature and the Nature of Value', in A. Light and H. Rolston III (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, pp. 131-142.

Özer, M., 'On the Possibility and Necessity of the Land Ethic', *Kaygı*, Vol. 17, 2011, p. 95.

Parker, K. A., 'Pragmatism and Environmental Thought', in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 21-37.

Pascal, P., *Pensées* (Thoughts), Available from <http://www.bartleby.com/48/1/5.html>, (accessed 11 December 2015).

Passmore, J., 'Attitudes to Nature', in R. Elliot (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 129-141.

Peters, F. H., *The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, 5<sup>th</sup> edn., London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1893.

Pluhar, E. B., 'The Justification of an Environmental Ethic', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 5, no. 1, 1983, pp. 47-61.

Plumwood, V., *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, USA & Canada, Routledge, 1993.

Purser, R. E., Park, C., and Montuori A., 'Limits to Anthropocentrism: Toward an Ecocentric Organization Paradigm?', *Academy of Management Review*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1995, pp. 1053-1089.

Regan, T., 'Animal Rights: The Kantian Case', in M. J. Smith (ed.), *Thinking through the Environment: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 152-159.

Regan, T., 'The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights' in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2001, p. 320-330.

Regan, T., *The Case for Animal Rights*, California, University of California Press, 1985.

Regan, T., 'The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1981, pp. 19-34.

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163> (accessed 1 June 2014)

Rodogno, R., 'Sentientism, Wellbeing, and Environmentalism', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2010, pp. 84-99.

Rolston, H. III, 'Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 4, 1982, p. 125-151.

Rolston, H. III, 'Naturalizing Callicott', in W. Ouderkirk and J. Hill (eds.), *Land, Value, Community: Callicott and Environmental Philosophy*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002. pp. 107-122.

Rolston, H. III, 'Value in Nature and the Nature of Value', in A. Light and H. Rolston III (eds.), *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, pp. 143-153.

Rolston, H. III, 'Value in Nature and the Nature of Value', in R. Attfield and A. Belsey (eds.), *Philosophy and the Natural Environment*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 36, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 13-30.

Routley, R., 'Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?', *Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy*, Varna, Sofia Press, 1973, pp. 205-210.

Samuelsson, L., 'Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Philosophy: A Bad Marriage', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 32, no. 4, 2010, pp. 405-415.

Sarkar, S., *Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy: An Introduction*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Sayre-McCord, G., 'Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms', in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), *Essays on Moral Realism*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 1-23.

Schweitzer, A., *The Philosophy of Civilization*, trans. C. T. Campion, New York, Prometheus Books, 1987.

Schweitzer, A., *Out of My Life and Thought: An Autobiography*, trans. A. B. Lemke, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.

Singer, P., 'All Animals are Equal' in P. Singer (ed.), *Applied Ethics*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 215-228.

Singer, P., 'Speciesism and Moral Status', *Metaphilosophy*, vol. 40, nos. 3-4, 2009, pp. 567-581.

Singer, P., *Animal Liberation*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2002.

Smith, M. J., (ed.), *Thinking through the Environment: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 1999.

Smith, J. W., 'Intrinsic and Extrinsic Good', *Ethics*, vol. 58, no. 3, 1948, pp. 195-208.

Spash, C. L., 'The New Environmental Pragmatists, Pluralism and Sustainability', *Environmental Values*, vol. 18, no. 3, 2009, pp. 253-256.

Steverson, B. K., 'On the Reconciliation of Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics', in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2001, pp. 277-288.

Stone, C. D., *Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality, and the Environment*, 3rd edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.

Sturgeon, N., 'The Nature of Race: Discourses of Racial Difference in Ecofeminism', in K. Warren and N. Erkal (eds.), *Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature*, USA, Indiana University Press, 1997, pp. 260-278.

Taylor, A., *Animals & Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., Canada, Broadview Press, 2009.

Taylor, P. W., 'Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants?', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1984, pp. 149-154.

Taylor, P. W., *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989.

Taylor, P. W., 'The Ethics of Respect for Nature', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 3, no: 3, 1981, pp. 197-218.

Ünder, H., *Çevre Felsefesi: Etik ve Metafizik Görüşler*, Ankara, Doruk Yayıncılık, 1996.

Varner, G., 'Sentientism', in D. Jamieson (ed.), *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, pp. 192-203.

Warren, K. J., 'The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism', in M. Boylan (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2001, pp. 84-91.

Watson, R., 'A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics', in L. P. Pojman and P. Pojman (eds.), *Environmental Ethics, Readings in Theory and Application*, 6th edn., Clark Baxter, USA, 2012, p. 156 – 163.

Wenz, P. S., *Environmental Justice*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1988.

Weston, A., 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics', *Environmental Ethics*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1985, pp. 321-339.

Weston, A., 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics', in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.), *Environmental Pragmatism*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 285-306.

Weston, A., 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics', in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 311-318.

White, J. E., 'Article Review of Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism, Environmental Ethics', *Ethics and Animals*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1984, pp. 75-77.

White, L. Jr., 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis', *Science*, vol. 155, no. 3767, 1967, pp. 1203-1207.

Winston, M., *Moral Patients*, 2008, <http://ethicsofglobalresponsibility.blogspot.com/2008/02/moral-patients.html>. (accessed 1 July 2013).

“Yemeni child bride, eight, ‘dies on wedding night’”, *The Guardian*, 11 September 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/11/yemen-child-bride-dies-wedding> (accessed 25 July 2014)

Yu, M. and Lei, Y., ‘Biocentric Ethical Theories’, *Environment and Development*, vol. 2, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, pp. 253-261.

Zimmerman, M. J., ‘Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value’, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 24 December 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/> (accessed 1 February 2015)

## APPENDICES

### A. CURRICULUM VITAE

#### Personal Information

Surname, Name: Aydın Bayram, Selma

Phone: +90 532 626 4677

e-mail: selmaaydin@gmail.com

#### Education

| Degree                                                   | Institution                                              | Year of Graduation |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Associate                                                | Anadolu University,<br>Department of Jurisprudence       | 2015 – present     |
| MA                                                       | METU, Philosophy                                         | 2006               |
| Academic Deficiency<br>Prg. ( <i>Bilimsel Hazırlık</i> ) | METU, Philosophy                                         | 2004               |
| BS                                                       | METU, Computer Education and<br>Instructional Technology | 1999               |

#### Work Experience

| Year                  | Place                          | Enrollment         |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|
| September 2001–       | METU, Department of Philosophy | Research Assistant |
| July 1999–August 2001 | Büyük Kolej – Ankara           | Computer Teacher   |

#### Foreign Languages

English

## Publications

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘On the Role of Intrinsic Value in terms of Environmental Education’, *Cyprus International Conference on Educational Research, Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Elsevier, vol. 47, 2012, pp. 1087–1091.

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘İnternet’in Sebep Olduğu Etik Sorunlar’, *II. Ulusal Uygulamalı Etik Kongresi Bildiriler Kitabı*, Dumat Ofset, Ankara, September 2007, pp. 196-201.

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘An Investigation on Conceptions of Freedom and Right’, *International Congress on Intercultural Dialogue and Education: Human Beings, Society, Intercultural Dialogue and Education at the Beginnings of the 21st Century*, 8-11 October 2009, Uludağ University, Bursa, p. 18. Available from <http://nidetr.uludag.edu.tr/doc/Abstracts.pdf>

## Translations

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘Levinas’ın Canlandırma Felsefesi’, translated from Cathryn Vasseleu, *MonoKL*, 2010 Autumn, vol. VIII-IX, İstanbul, pp. 255-256.

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘Öznellik ve Örgütlü Başka: Simgesel Otorite ve Fantazmatik Jouissance Arasında’, translated from Yannis Stavrakakis, *MonoKL*, 2009 Summer, vol. VI-VII, İstanbul, pp. 496-515.

## Presentations

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘‘Çevre Hakkı’ Kavramına Felsefi Bir Bakış’, *Hukuka Felsefi ve Sosyolojik Bakışlar–VI*, 26-29 November 2012, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kongre Kültür Merkezi ve Hukuk Fakültesi, Beyazıt, İstanbul.

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘On the Role of Intrinsic Value in Terms of Environmental Education’, *Cyprus International Conference on Educational Research*, 8-10 February 2012, Middle East Technical University Northern Cyprus Campus, Güzelyurt, TRNC.

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘J. S. Mill’in Felsefesinde Özgürlük ve Güç İlişkisi’, *Hukuka Felsefi ve Sosyolojik Bakışlar–V*, 13–17 September 2010, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kongre Kültür Merkezi ve Hukuk Fakültesi, Beyazıt, İstanbul.

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘An Investigation on Conceptions of Freedom and Right’, *International Congress on Intercultural Dialogue and Education: Human Beings, Society, Intercultural Dialogue and Education at the Beginnings of the 21st Century*, 8-11 October 2009, Uludağ University, Bursa.

Aydın Bayram, S., ‘İnternet’in Sebep Olduğu Etik Sorunlar’, *Uluslararası Katılımlı II. Ulusal Uygulamalı Etik Kongresi*, October 2006, METU, Ankara.

### **Editor of Conference Proceeding**

Kibar, S., Aydın Bayram, S. and Sol, A. (eds.), *Anlam Kavramı Üzerine Yeni Denemeler (New Essays Concerning the Concept of Meaning)*, Legal Kitapevi, İstanbul, 2010.

Aydın Bayram, S. (ed.), *Book of Abstracts of Second National Applied Ethics Conference*, Dumat Ofset, Ankara, 2006.

Aydın Bayram, S. (tech. ed.), *The Proceeding of Second National Applied Ethics Conference*, Dumat Ofset, Ankara, September 2007.

Arıcı M, Aydın, S., Barın Ö., et al. (ed.), *The Proceeding of First National Applied Ethics Conference*, TUBA, 2003.

### **Organization of Academic Events**

Member of Organizing Committee National Conference on ‘Meaning’, December 17–19, 2008, METU, Ankara.

Member of Organizing Committee for the Second National Applied Ethics Conference, October 16–18, 2006, METU.

Member of Organizing Committee for the First National Applied Ethics Conference, November 12-13, 2001, METU.

### **Areas of Research and Teaching Interests**

Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Metaethics, Political Philosophy, I. Kant, J. J. Rousseau, J. S. Mill, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Technology, Computer and Information Ethics.

## B. TURKISH SUMMARY

İnsanın doğayla olan ilişkisi üzerine felsefi düşünme eylemi elbette ki yeni bir şey değildir. Fakat insanın kısa vadeli çıkarlarını gerçekleştirme hevesi yolunda doğanın zarar görmesi, bu veya farklı sebeplerden artan çevre sorunları ve doğal kaynakların tükenmesi riskiyle karşı karşıya kalınması, insanı çevresiyle, doğayla ilişkisi üzerine daha çok düşünmeye itmiştir. Çevre meselelerine verilen akademik dikkatin temelinde bu tükenmeyi erteleme ve/veya önleme hedefi olsa da konunun daha derinlikli, bir etik boyutu bulunmaktadır: Hem her bir sorun etik bir yön barındırmaktadır, hem de etiğin bu sorunlar karşısında bir çözüm oluşturabileceğine inanılmaktadır.

İnsanın doğayla ilişkisi üzerine düşünmesinin yeni bir şey olmaması gibi, ahlak ve değerler üzerine düşünmesi de yeni değildir elbet. Fakat daha önce ele alınmış konular ve kavramlar çevre etiği kapsamında özellikle de gerek niceliksel, gerekse niteliksel olarak artan sorunlara bir çözüm yolu bulma çabası ve ümidiyle tekrar ele alınmıştır.

Çevre etiği kapsamında yapılan tartışmaların en kritik kavramlarından biri ‘özel değer’ kavramıdır. Bu çalışma boyunca özel değer kavramına olan ilgim, onun çevre ile ilişkimizde ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ bir yaklaşım için, başka bir ifadeyle, çevremizde yer alan insan haricindeki varlıkların araçsal olmayacak bir biçimde ahlaki ilginin konusu olması için gerekli zemini sağlayıp sağlayamayacağı ve eğer sağlayabiliyorsa, bunu hangi koşullarda sağlayabileceği üzerinedir.

İnsanın doğa ile ilişkisine geçmişten günümüze hızlıca baktığımızda, sıklıkla insan ve doğanın birbirinin karşısında konumlandırıldığını, bu ilişkinin düalist bir karaktere sahip olduğunu görüyoruz. İlkel dönemlerde, insanın, sınırlarını

keşfedemediği, ne olduğunu bilemediği doğa karşısındaki tavrı, hayranlık, tapınma; kontrol edemediği, anlayamadığı doğa olayları karşısında korku; onun gücü kudreti karşısında saygı duymak olmuştur. Hatta Passmore'un dile getirdiği gibi, kimi zaman doğanın işleyişine bir niyetlilik atfedilmiştir. Örneğin, insanlar, volkanın patlamasını “doğa bize kızdı” ya da bir nehrin taşıp insanların ölümüne neden olmasını “nehir intikam aldı” biçiminde yorumlamıştır.

Fakat insanlar bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişmeler ışığında doğa olaylarının sebeplerini ve işleyişini anladıkça, doğal olaylardaki rutini fark ettikçe, ‘korkulan/korkulması gereken doğa’ anlayışı yerini, ona sahip ve hakim olma isteğine, onu istediği biçimde kullanma arzusuna, hatta meydan okumaya bırakmıştır. Lynn White’ın dile getirdiği gibi, insanlar artık sadece yiyecekleri kadar alıp geri kalanına dokunmamazlık etmeyip, ihtiyaçtan fazla ürettikleri üzerinden kar etme yoluna gitmişlerdir. İlk zamanlardaki, kendilerini besleyen, doyuran ‘toprak ana’ anlayışı yerini, kendilerine kapital oluşturan bir doğa anlayışına bırakmıştır. Bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişmelerin de etkisiyle, doğa zaman içinde hiç tükenmeyecek bir kaynak olarak görülmeye başlamış ve sömürülen bir şeye dönüşmüştür. Dönemin önde gelen bilim adamları, düşünürleri ve din adamları, kısaca dönemin paradigmasını belirleyen ve yayan kişiler bu anlayışa zemin hazırlamış ve hatta onu pekiştirmişlerdir. Kısaca, insanın doğa ile ilişkisinin şekillenmesinde düşünürlerin ve dinin oldukça belirleyici bir rolü olmuştur.

Fakat bu ‘sömürü’ durumu, özellikle içinde bulunduğumuz son yüzyılda öyle bir hal almaya başlamıştır ki, insanlar artık, bilimsel ve teknolojik bilgi ve donanım sayesinde sahip oldukları gücün de doğayı istedikleri biçimde kullanmaya yetmediğini fark etmişlerdir. Artık insanın emrine sunulmuş, sınırsız bir kaynak olarak görülen doğanın kaynakları tükenme riskiyle karşı karşıyadır. Nehirler, göller kurumaya, çölleşmeye başlamıştır; hava, su, gürültü kirlilikleri tolere

edilemez boyutlara ulaşmıştır; sonrasında doğanın -kolayca- eski haline dönüşemez olduğu çevre felaketleri yaşanmaya başlanmıştır.<sup>398</sup>

Doğal kaynakların tükenme riskiyle karşı karşıya olması, çevre felaketlerinin artmaya başlaması ve asıl önemlisi bunların birçoğunun insan eliyle sebep olunan felaketler oluşu ve birçoğunun da mevcut teknolojik ve bilimsel gelişmelerle aslında önlenabilir oluşunun fark edilişiyle, insanın bu meselelere daha fazla dikkati çekilmiş ve insanlar tarafından bu meseleler karşısında bir adım atma gereği hissedilmiştir. Bu durum, insanları çevre/doğa ile ilişkileri üzerine önceki yüzyıllara nazaran daha fazlaca düşünmeye, doğa ile ilişkilerini gözden geçirmeye sevk etmiştir.

Çevre etiğinin yeni bir disiplin olarak ortaya çıkışı, 1960'ların sonu 70'lerin başı olarak görülür. Bu dönemlerde, her ne kadar kimi düşünürlerce farklı yaklaşımlar ortaya konmuş olsa da, insanın çevresiyle ilişkisine genel itibariyle 'insanmerkezci'/'antroposentrik' bir yaklaşımın hakim olduğu söylenebilir; yani sadece insan ötsel olarak değerli görülüp, doğanın diğer bileşenleri insanın amaçlarını gerçekleştirmesi yolunda araç olarak görülmektedir. Bu yaklaşımda, dönemin filozoflarının etkisi kadar, insanı yaratılmışların üst noktası olarak gören/gösteren semavi dinlerin etkisi de yadsınamaz.

Açıktır ki, doğayı insanın amaçlarını gerçekleştirmesi, onlara ulaşması yolunda bir araç olarak gören katı insanmerkezci anlayış, artan çevre sorunlarını ele almada kavramsal olarak yetersiz kalmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, çevre etiğinin yeni bir alan olarak ortaya çıkışıyla 'sömürü'nün yerini, doğanın insan dışındaki bileşenlerine de yer açma, onların da varlığını kabul etme tavrı almakta ve bunun için uğraşılmaktadır. Bu sebeptir ki, çevrebilimciler ve çevre etiği kuramcıları

---

<sup>398</sup> Örneğin, Aral Gölü'nün çölleşmesi, Kuveyt petrol yangınları (1991), Bhopal gaz sızıntısı (1984), Tokaimura nükleer kazası (1999), Love Canal felaketi (1978), Çernobil nükleer felaketi (1986), Chisso-Minamata hastalığı (1956), Exxon Valdez petrol sızıntısı (1989) ve daha niceleri.

geleneksel insanmerkezci anlayışa alternatif, farklı teorik olasılıklar üzerinde tartışmaktadırlar.

Geleneksel, katı insanmerkezci/antroposentrik anlayışın temelinde, doğanın şimdiki ve gelecek kuşaklar arasında adil bir biçimde paylaşılıp kullanılabilecek bir biçimde korunması düşüncesi yatar. Hatta doğa sınırsız bir kaynak olarak görüldüğünden, bir dönem, gelecek kuşakların dahi göz ardı edilmiş olduğu söylenebilir. Buna karşılık, ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ yaklaşımlarda, doğanın tüm canlı ve cansız bileşenlerinin ‘kendileri için’ (*for-their-own-sake*) ya da insandan bağımsız sahip oldukları ‘kendinde değer’ (*value-in-itself* ya da *inherent value*) için korunup kollanmaları gerektiği düşüncesi egemendir.

Geleneksel insanmerkezci değer kuramlarına alternatif olarak sunulan görüşler, her ne kadar birbirinden oldukça farklı olsalar da genel itibariyle ‘özel değer’ kavramı temelindedir. Geleneksel yaklaşım sadece insanı özel olarak değerli görürken, yakın geçmişte düşünürler doğada insan dışında da özel olarak değerli şeyler olduğunu savunmuşlar ve/veya insan dışındaki doğa bileşenlerinin sadece araçsal değerine odaklanmayan ahlaki sebepler ve argümanlar sunmuşlardır. Dolayısıyla, doğada insan dışında özel olarak değerli varlıklar aramaya yönelmenin temel nedenlerinden biri olarak, doğanın insan dışındaki bileşenlerini koruma, kollama ve -bu sebepten- ahlaki sorumluluk alanına dahil etme isteği öne sürülebilir.

Tezin ikinci bölümünde, insanın çevre/doğa ile ilişkisine yönelik felsefi yaklaşımların özellikle çevre etiği kapsamında yapılan çalışmalar üzerinden zaman içinde nasıl bir değişikliğe uğradığını ortaya koymaya çalışıyorum. Çevre etiği kuramlarında, ‘insanmerkezci’ ve ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ olmak üzere iki temel yaklaşım hakimdir. Bu bölümde, bu iki yaklaşım adı altında öne çıkan temel görüşleri yine bu görüşlerle öne çıkan isimler üzerinden ele alıp inceliyorum. Bu bölüm, üç ana alt bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde, isimleri, ‘katı

insanmerkezcilik’ ile anılan filozofların doğaya ve doğanın insan dışındaki öğelerine dair görüşlerini dönemsel olarak ele alıyorum.

İnsanı doğadaki diğer varlıklardan daha değerli gören ve insana bir üstünlük atfeden geleneksel insanmerkezci değer kuramlarının ‘türcü’lüğüne bir karşı duruş olarak, insanmerkezci-olmama iddiasıyla ortaya çıkan çevre etiği kuramlarına rağmen insanmerkezcilik tamamıyla terk edilmemiştir. Geleneksel insanmerkezci görüş evrilerek ‘zayıf’, ‘genişletilmiş’, ‘aydınlatılmış’ insanmerkezcilik gibi farklı isimlerle önerilmeye devam etmiştir (*weak, extended* veya *enlightened anthropocentrism*). Bu sebeple, tezin bu bölümünde ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ yaklaşımlara alternatif olarak öne sürülen ‘zayıf insanmerkezcilik’ görüşüne de değiniyorum.

Bu bölümde ayrıca, neredeyse tüm filozoflarca özsel olarak değerli görülen ‘insan’ın özsel değerinin zemininin ne olduğuna dair öne sürülen argümanların önde gelenlerine değiniyorum. Burada amacım, insan haricindeki varlıkların da özsel olarak değerli olabileceğini yadsıyarak öne sürülen “sadece insan -hayatı- özsel olarak değerlidir” argümanına istinaden, insana atfedilen, sadece insanın sahip olduğu düşünülen özsel değer zemininin, tartışmaya açık olmayan dini sebepleri bir kenara koyarsak, düşünülenin aksine pek de sağlam ve sarsılmaz olmadığını göstermektir. Ayrıca, insana ayrıcalıklı bir ontolojik statü tahsis etme konusunda ısrarcı olabilecekler için, eğer bu argümanlar insanın özsel olarak değerli olduğunu kabul etmemiz için yeterli ise, benzer argümanlar ile doğanın insan dışındaki öğelerinin de özsel değere sahip olabileceği görüşüne yer açmaktır. İnsan haricindeki varlıkların özsel olarak değerli görülebileceğine ya da sahip oldukları iddia edilen özsel değerlerine dair sunulan argümanlar da en az insanın değerine dair sunulan argümanlar kadar geçerlidir; ret edilmeleri makul görünmemektedir –eğer kişi ‘türcü’ değilse.

Bu bölümü, insanmerkezci yaklaşımların ne tür sorunları olabileceğine, kısıtlılıklarının neler olduğuna değinerek bitiriyorum. Bunlardan biri, diğer doğa üyelerinin çıkarlarının insanın çıkarlarının karşısında ya yok sayılması ya da her zaman insanın çıkarlarının öncelenmesi durumudur. Doğanın insan dışındaki öğelerinin sadece araçsal değerleri nedeniyle ahlaki ilgi konusu olarak görülmeleri sorunlu bir yaklaşımdır. Çevremizdeki insan haricindeki varlıklar özsel olarak değerli görülmedikçe ya da sadece araçsal olarak değerli görüldükçe, başka bir ifadeyle, insan haricindeki varlıkların çıkarları insanla eşit biçimde dikkate alınmadıkça, çıkarlar çatıştığında ve bir tercih gerektiğinde, insan haricindeki varlıkların çıkarları hep gözden çıkarılan taraf olma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya kalacaktır. İkinci olarak, Callicott'un “doğru sebep” (*right reason*) dediği, “doğru şeyin, doğru sebepten dolayı yapılması”nı salık veren argüman sunulabilir. Bu argümana göre, pratikte fark yaratmayacak olsa bile, sadece benimsenen bir ilkenin sonuçları değil, arkasındaki niyet de önemlidir. Sonuç olarak, çevreye sadece araçsal değeri üzerinden yönelmelerinden dolayı, katı insanmerkezci değer kuramlarının çevre ile ilişkimizin derinlikli ve incelikli bir biçimde kurulmasında gerekli teorik çerçeveyi sağlamada yetersiz olduğunu göstermeye çalışıyorum.

Bu bölümün ikinci kısmında (bölüm 2.2), sadece insanın özsel olarak değerli olduğu temeline dayalı geleneksel etik kuramlara alternatif olarak, ahlaki sorumluluk alanının kapsamının doğanın insan dışındaki bileşenlerini de kapsayacak biçimde genişletilmesi gerektiğini savunan, insanmerkezci-olmayan bir etik arayışının sonucunda ortaya çıkan görüşlere ve bu görüşleri dillendiren düşünürlere değiniyorum. Bunu yaparken, ahlaki ilginin kapsamının insanmerkezci, “sadece insan özsel olarak değerlidir” argümanından, sadece insanların değil, insan dışındaki varlıkların da özsel olarak değerli olduğunu ya da olabileceğini savunan çevremerkezci, “doğa, canlı ve cansız tüm bileşenleriyle özsel olarak değerlidir” argümanına doğru genişlemesini, aşama aşama, bu genişlemeyi ortaya koyabilecek biçimde sunmaya çalışıyorum.

Hem subjektivist değer savunucuları, hem de objektivist değer savunucuları, insan dışındaki varlıkların da özsel olarak değerli olduğunu ya da olabileceğini, Kant, Moore gibi düşünürlerin değer kuramlarından da yararlanarak özsel değeri farklı biçimde tanımlama ve/veya farklı bir ‘özel değer’ ölçütü (haz/acı hissedebilme, canlılık, deneyim, vb.) sunma yoluyla göstermeye çalışmışlardır. ‘İnsanmerkezci-olmayan’ bir çevre etiği kuramı peşindeki düşünürlerin, doğanın insan dışındaki öğelerinin de özsel olarak değerli olduğunu ya da olabileceğini, genel itibarıyla, 3 farklı biçimde öne sürdüğü söylenebilir. Bu üç görüş;

—Değer oluşturabilen tek varlık olan insanın, insan dışındaki varlıklara, insana sağladıkları çıkarlardan dolayı değil, bu varlıkların kendileri uğruna/kendileri için değer atfetmesi sonucunda doğanın insan dışındaki üyelerinin de özsel olarak değerli addedilebileceği görüşü,

—Değer oluşturabilen tek varlığın insan olmadığı, dolayısıyla doğada insan dışında da değer oluşturabilen varlıkların (çoğunlukla canlılar kast edilerek) bulunduğu görüşü,

—Doğada, değer veren birinin varlığından (değer verenle kast edilen çoğunlukla insandır) bağımsız olarak, sahip olduğu özsel özelliklerden dolayı, ‘kendinde iyi/değerli’ varlıkların bulunduğu görüşüdür.

Bunların yanında, öne sürülen görüşlerdeki “ahlaki sorumluluk alanının genişletilmesi” talebini haklı ve gerekli bulurken, barındırdığı kavramsal zorluklardan dolayı ‘özel’ (*intrinsic*) ve/veya ‘özel değer’ kavramlarını tamamıyla ya da kısmen reddeden görüşler de bulunmaktadır.

Hem insanmerkezci hem de insanmerkezci-olmayan, *sentiocentrism*, *biocentrism*, *ecocentrism*, *ecofeminism*, vb. görüşlere ve bunların olası problemlerine, bunlara getirilen eleştirilere değindikten sonra, bu bölümün üçüncü kısmında (bölüm 2.3),

bu eleştirileri savuşturabilecek, ihtiyaçları karşılayabilecek, makul/akla yatkın bir çevre etiği teorisi için nelere ihtiyaç duyulduğuna dair kestirimlerimi sunuyorum.

İnsan dışındaki doğa bileşenlerinin ahlaki sorumluluk üstlenemeyeceklerinden dolayı ahlaki ilginin kapsamı dışında tutulmaları gerektiği iddiasına, sorunlu taraflar barındırmasına rağmen, Taylor'ın ahlaki-özne/fail, ahlaki-nesne ayırımına dayanarak karşı çıkılabilir. İnsanlararası etikte, ahlaki yargılamadan, karar verebilme yetisinden yoksun kişiler söz konusu olduğunda, eylemlerinin ve kararlarının ahlaki sorumluluğunu taşıyamayacak dahi olsalar, bir karşılıklı gözetmeden ahlaki sorumluluk sınırları içine dahil ediliyorlar. Bu sebeple, bu tür bir karşı çıkış tek başına yeterli değildir.

Ahlaki çoğulculuk/plüralizm ve tekçilik/monizm sorunsalına ilişkin olarak, zaman üstü ve durağan/sabit değerlerin olmadığını, değerlerin zaman içinde değişebileceğini savlayan pragmatist perspektifi benimsiyorum. Monist bir değer kuramının, çevre ile ilgili meselelerin çok boyutluluğunu ve karmaşıklığını kavramada yeterli olabileceği hususunda şüpheliyim.

Bir başka önemli nokta insanın doğa ile ilişkisinin nasıl ele alınacağıdır. İnsan her ne pahasına olursa olsun doğanın sıradan bir üyesi olarak mı görülmelidir, yoksa teknoloji ve bilimle donanmış, rasyonel bir varlık olarak kendini doğanın efendisi veya denetçisi ya da doğanın koruyucusu olarak mı görmelidir? Bu iki uç konumlandırma yerine, insanın kendisini doğanın sıradan fakat sorumlu bir üyesi, yani, yaptıklarının ve yapacaklarının olası sonuçlarını öngörecektir bir biçimde hareket eden bir varlık olarak konumlandırması taraftarıyım.

Bir diğer soru, bireyci (*individualistic*) bir çevre etiği kuramı mı yoksa bütüncül (*holistic*) bir çevre etiği kuramı mı ihtiyaçları karşılayabilecek, yetkin bir çevre etiği kuramı olacaktır sorusudur. Bu konuda, Callicott gibi yetkin bir çevre etiği kuramının hem tek tek bireyleri hem de bir bütün olarak doğayı gözetmesi gerektiğine inanıyorum.

Çevre etiği bağlamında öne çıkan insanmerkezci ve insanmerkezci-olmayan görüşlere değinmiş olarak -tahminimce çevre etiğinin hızlıca gelişen bir alan oluşunda dolayı- temel kavramlarda bir takım muğlaklıklar, iyi veya açık bir biçimde tanımlanmamışlık olduğunu görüyorum, özellikle de ‘özel değer’, ‘antroposentrik’ ve ‘antroposentrik-olmayan’ kavramlarında. Bu muğlaklıklar, zaten çok yönlü ve karmaşık bir alan olan çevre etiğindeki tartışmaları daha da zorlu bir hale getirmektedir. Bu sebeple, tartışmaların merkezindeki kavram olan ‘özel değer’ kavramının daha detaylı bir biçimde ele alması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Ayrıca, açıklık ve netlik sağlamak adına, çevre etiği meselelerinin metaetik ve normatif etik bağlamlarında ayrı ayrı ele alınması gerektiğine inanıyorum. “İnsan ve insan haricindeki varlıkların çıkarlarının çatışması durumunda hangi ilkelere başvurulabilir?” gibi meselenin pratik yönlerine dair normatif ve uygulamalı etik bağlamında ele alınabilecek sorgulamaların aksine, temel kavramların tanımlanması ve temellendirmesine yönelik metaetik bir çözümlemenin daha öncelikli olarak ele alınması gerektiğine inanıyorum.

Çevre etiğindeki meselelere dair daha sistematik ve açık bir felsefi sorgulama yapabilmek ve konuları daha derinlikli bir biçimde ele alabilmek adına temel kavramlara dair bir metaetik çözümleme yapma gereği görüyorum. Bu tür bir çözümleme ile çevre etiğindeki sorunları olabildiğince açık bir şekilde belirleyebilmeyi ve kavramları açık ve net bir biçimde ortaya koyabilmeyi hedefliyorum.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde, değer kavramının, özel olarak da ‘özel değer’ kavramının metaetik bir çözümlemesini yapmak amacıyla öncelikle ‘değer’ ve ‘değer vermek’ kavramlarını sorguluyorum. Etik kuramcılarının bir şeyi özel olarak değerli görmekle neyi kastettiklerini tartışmaktayım ve şu sorulara cevap bulmaya çalışıyorum: Değerler arasında ‘araçsal’ ve ‘özel’ değer biçiminde bir ayrım var mıdır? Neden böyle bir ayrıma gereksinim duyulmuştur? Özel değer varlığını nasıl biliyoruz?

Belirgin bir biçimde, metaetik ve normatif etik ayrımı 20. yüzyılın başlarında Moore tarafından yapılmıştır. Fakat bu demek değildir ki bugün metaetiğin alanına dahil edilen ahlaki değere ilişkin sorgulamalar Moore'dan önce yapılmamıştır; Moore öncesi dönemde bu sorgulamaların daha iç içe bir biçimde ilerlediği görülebilir. Normatif etik, genel prensipler oluşturmaya odaklı iken; metaetik, değer ve değer yargılarının doğasına, temeline ilişkin sorgulamalar içerir.

Metaetik kuramlar, en temelde, bilişselci (*cognitivist*) ve bilişselci-olmayan (*non-cognitivist*) kuramlar olarak ikiye ayrılır. Bilişselcilik savunucuları, ahlaki yargıların dünyayı betimleyen birer önerme olduğunu savlar. Yani, her bir ahlaki yargının 'doğru' ya da 'yanlış' biçiminde bir doğruluk değeri vardır. Tıpkı, 'dünya yuvarlaktır' yargısı gibi 'kürkü için bir hayvanı öldürmek yanlıştır' yargısı da ya doğrudur ya da yanlıştır; bu iki cümle temelde aynı tip önermelerdir. Diğer yandan, bilişselciliği yadsıyanlara (*non-cognitivist*) göre, ahlaki yargılar doğruluk değeri taşımazlar, sadece hissettiklerimizin bir ifadesidir; duygusal onaylama ya da onaylamamadır. Bir diğer temel ayrım ise, değer(ler)in ontolojik statüsü üzerinden realist kuramlar ve anti-realist kuramlar biçiminde yapılmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda, ben, objektivist/nesnelci yaklaşıma karşı çıkarak, ahlaki değerlerin olgusal olmadığını savunuyorum ve anti-realist, bilişselci-olmayan subjektivist bir yaklaşımı benimsiyorum.

Özsel değer denilince ilk akla gelen isimlerden biri Moore'dur ve Moore'un özsel değer anlayışı realist, objektivist yaklaşıma bir örnek teşkil eder. Bu sebeple, bu çalışmada objektivist yaklaşımı, Moore'un değer anlayışı üzerinden ele alıp tartışmaktayım. Natüralist temelli bir değer anlayışına karşı çıkan Moore, 'özel değer'i, analiz edilemeyen/basit, ilişkisel olmayan ve özel olarak sahip olduğu özelliklerden ötürü 'iyi', başka bir ifadeyle, 'kendinde iyi' biçiminde tanımlar. Böylesi bir yaklaşımla aslında Moore'un karşı çıktığı, 'iyi' ve 'kötü'yü, acı ya da haz üzerinden tanımlayan hedonistlerdir, özellikle de Bentham ve Mill gibi

Hedonizm geleneğinin modern faydacı temsilcileridir. Moore böylesi bir iyi/değer tanımlama çabasını “Doğalcılık Yanılgısı” (*Naturalistic Fallacy*) olarak adlandırır.

Bu bölümün sonunda savunduğum subjektivist pozisyonu açık bir biçimde ortaya koymaya çalışıyorum. Moore’cu özsel değer anlayışının en temel özelliği ilişkisel olmayışdır. Moore’un aksine, değer ilişkisel ve bağlamsal olduğunu öne sürüyorum. Bir şeyi değerli yapan, o şeyi değerli gören, ona değer atfeden faildir. Her bir değer verme ediminde bir değer veren varsayılır. Değer verenin değerlendirmesinden bağımsız, objektif bir değer yoktur. İlaveten, Dall’Agnol’un dile getirdiği üzere, değer verme fail-nötr bir edim olmanın aksine faille ilişkili bir edimdir. Fakat değer, değeri atfeden fail ile ilişkili olmakla beraber, illa ki değer atfedenin/verenin yararına-odaklı ve sınırlı olmak zorunda değildir. ‘Özsel değer’ ile özsel özellikler üzerinden ‘kendinde değer’li (*in-itself* ya da *inherent*) olmayı değil; aracılık ettiği sonuçlar yerine, ‘kendisi için’, ‘kendisi uğruna’ (*for-its-own-sake*) değerli olmayı kastediyorum. Dolayısıyla, Regan ya da Taylor gibi düşünürlerin aksine, ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ bir çevre etiği kuramı için objektivist bir değer anlayışının gerektiğini düşünmüyorum. Hem subjektivist hem de insanmerkezci-olmayan bir değer anlayışı benimsenebilir.

Objektivist bir yaklaşımı reddetmekle birlikte, çevre etiğinde objektivist yaklaşımın önemli bir yeri ve rolü olduğunu düşünüyorum. Özellikle, “sadece insan özsel değere sahiptir” görüşünün hakim olduğu, çevre etiğinin bir felsefi disiplin olarak yeni ortaya çıktığı dönemlerde, “Neden ahlaki sorumluluk alanına dahil edilsinler?”, “Neden sadece araçsal değerleri yeterli olmasın?” biçimindeki soruları savuşturmada, doğanın insan dışındaki bileşenleri, insanın değer vermesinden bağımsız bir biçimde özsel olarak, ‘kendinde’ değerlidir savının oldukça güçlü bir kalkan görevi gördüğünü düşünüyorum. Ayrıca, tamamen insanın değer vermesine/atfetmesine bağlı subjektivist bir değer anlayışına ilişkin, “bir gün, insanlar gerçek, canlı ağaçlar yerine plastik ağaçları daha değerli

görmeye başlarsa, o zaman böyle bir toplumda, doğayı ya da vahşi hayatı korumak için bir sebep kalmayacak” benzeri düşüncelerden dolayı bir takım çekinceler görülebiliyor. Hargrove’un da dile getirdiği bu türden endişeleri/çekinceleri bertaraf edebilme yolunda da objektivist yaklaşımın önemli bir yeri olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Yukarıda bahsettiğim, doğalın yerine yapayın tercih edilmesi riski rahatsız edici olsa da, bu durum, değer söz konusu olduğunda, değeri atfeden bir failin varlığını yadsıyan ve ahlaki realizm üzerinden temellenen objektivizmi/nesnelciliği tercih edilebilir bir pozisyon haline getirmek için yeterli ve geçerli sebep değildir. İlişkisel olmayan, özsel özellikler üzerinden ‘kendinde iyi’ olarak öne sürülen Moore’cu özsel değer anlayışının kavramsal zorluklarıyla başa çıkabilmenin, “Bir gün gelir de insanlar değerli bulmazsa ...” türünden soruları savuşturmaya nazaran çok daha zorlayıcı bir iş olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Bu bölümde ayrıca, ‘araçsal değer’ ve ‘ötsel değer’ kavramlarına ve ayrımlarına odaklanıyorum. Ötsel ve araçsal değer ayrımı sadece çevre felsefesi içinde yapılan bir ayrım değildir; kökleri Antik Yunan dönemine kadar uzanır. Bu ayrımın gerekli ve kritik olduğunu düşünenler kadar tanımlanmasındaki kavramsal zorluklardan dolayı, özellikle çevre etiği açısından gereksiz olduğunu düşünen (örn. E. Katz) ya da özsel değer varlığına dair öne sürülen argümanları yeterince ikna edici bulmayan düşünürler de (örn. M. Beardsley) olmuştur. Bu sebeple bu bölümde, felsefi gelenek içinde, Platon’dan günümüze, öne çıkan isimler üzerinden, tarihsel olarak özsel ve araçsal değer ayrımını kabul eden ve etmeyen düşünürlerin görüşlerine değiniyorum. Ötsel değer varlığına dair öne sürülen argümanları, Beardsley’in karşı çıkışlarıyla birlikte sunuyorum.

Platon’un, *Republic* eserinde, Sokrates’in Glaucon’la ‘adalet’ üzerine yaptığı sohbetin içerildiği diyalogda, her ne kadar bu isimlendirmeleri kullanmasa da, ‘ötsel’ ve ‘araçsal’ iyi olan arasında bir ayrım yaptığı net bir biçimde görülebilir.

Diyalogda, üç tür iyiden bahsedilir; kendisi için istenen ve ‘iyi’ addedilen şeyler, yani, özsel olarak değerli şeyler; sonuçlarından dolayı ‘iyi’ addedilen şeyler, yani araçsal olarak değerli şeyler ve hem kendisi için hem de sonuçlarından dolayı istenen ve ‘iyi’ addedilen şeyler, yani hem özsel hem de araçsal olarak değerli şeyler. Glaucon ‘adalet’i sadece sonuçlarından dolayı değerli görürken, Sokrates hem sonuçlarından dolayı hem de kendisi uğruna (*for-its-own-sake*) değerli görür. Aristoteles da değere, değerli olana dair bu ayrıma sadık kalır, fakat hocası Platon’dan farklı olarak, iyunin, değerli olanın kaynağını idealar dünyasında değil, bu dünyada görür.

Özsel ve araçsal değer ayrımı Kant’ın ahlak felsefesinde de yer alır. Kant’a göre, sonuçlarından bağımsız ve koşulsuz olarak, ‘kendinde’ (*in-itself*) iyi olan tek şey, “iyi isteme” (*good will*)’dir. Geleneksel katı insanmerkezciliğin önde gelen isimlerinden biri sayılan Kant, ‘kişiler/*persons*’ ve ‘şeyler/*things*’ arasında bir ayrıma gider. Kant her bir rasyonel varlığın kendinde-amaç olduğunu söyler.<sup>399</sup> Sahip oldukları rasyonaliteden dolayı her bir insan sadece araç olarak değil, kendinde amaç olarak görülmelidir der. Bu sebepten, rasyonel varlıkları “kişiler” olarak görürken, rasyonel varlıklar dışındakileri ‘şeyler’ olarak addeder.

Kant, özsel ve araçsal değerli şeyleri ayırt etmede, kendi yaptığı tanımlamalar üzerinden “değer/*dignity*” ve “fiyat/*price*” ayrımına başvurur. Rasyonel ve özerk insanlar topluluğundan oluşan ‘düşünürlü dünya’yı “amaçlar krallığı” olarak adlandırır. Buradaki her şeyin ya bir fiyat’ı ya da değeri’i vardır.<sup>400</sup> Eğer bir şey

---

<sup>399</sup> Kant, Immanuel, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, s. 79.

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*, s. 84.

başka bir şey ile takas edilebiliyorsa bir fiyat'ı vardır; takas edilemiyorsa, yani yerine konulabilecek bir eş-değeri yoksa o şey 'değer'e sahiptir.<sup>401</sup>

Değer (*dignity*) ile Kant'ın kast ettiği, koşulsuz ve kıyaslanamaz değer, yani özsel değerdir.<sup>402</sup> Kant, özerk olabilme kapasitesine sahip oluşlarından dolayı, başka bir ifadeyle, kendi kendilerine yasa koyabilmelerinden dolayı her bir rasyonel varlığın değer'i olduğunu ileri sürer. İnsanların da bu kapasitelerinin farkında olduklarını gösterir bir biçimde davranmaları gerektiğini söyler. Özerkliği, insan doğasının ve her bir rasyonel doğanın değerinin temeli olarak betimler.<sup>403</sup>

Kant'ın 'değer' ve 'fiyat' arasında yaptığı ayrımı, sadece insanlararası etik bağlamında değil, çevre etiği açısından da önemli buluyorum. 'Değer' ve 'fiyat' ayrımı için yaptığı betimlemelere, doğanın insan dışındaki bileşenlerine özsel değer atfetmede de başvurulabilir. Her bir ağacın tekliği, herhangi başka bir ağaç ile ikame edilemezliği farkına varıldığında, onun hak ettiği, araçsal olmayan, özsel değeri teslim edilmiş olacaktır; aksi takdirde hep bir fiyat'a sahip 'şey' olmaktan öteye geçemeyecektir.

Tezin bu bölümünde, araçsal ve özsel değer ayrımına ve özsel değer varlığına dair ileri sürülen farklı argümanlara (*empirical confirmation argument, argument from definition, dialectical demonstration argument*) değinmiş olsam da, özsel değer varlığını deneyimlemeye dayalı, Callicott'un "Fenomenolojik Kanıt" olarak adlandırdığı argüman benim için diğerlerinden bir adım öndedir. 'Para' ve 'özgürlük' üstüne düşünüp, her ikisini aynı biçimde değerli bulmadığının farkına varmam, bana tüm değer vermelerimizin araçsal olmadığını ve/veya olmayabileceğini göstermiştir. Bundan dolayıdır ki, tüm kavramsal zorluklarına

---

<sup>401</sup> Kant, Immanuel, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, s. 84.

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*, s. 85.

rağmen, özsel ve araçsal değer ayırımına ve bu ayrımı dillendirmenin gerekliliğine inanıyorum.

Bu bölümde ayrıca, neden çevre etiğinde “özel değer” kavramına ihtiyaç duyulduğunu ve onun çevre etiğindeki rolünü sorguluyorum. Çevre etiğinde özel değer kavramının gerekliliğini sorguladığımda, temel olarak “neden” sorusuyla karşı karşıya kalındığını görüyorum. Doğanın insan dışındaki bileşenlerinin özel değerini sorgulamaya yönelik sıklıkla yöneltilen “Neden” soruları çoğu zaman bir önyargı barındırır. Doğaya ilişkin bu tür sorular sorulduğunda, soruyu yönelten çoğunlukla bir cevap isteğiyle sormaz. Kanaatimce, eğer soruyu soran kişi yeterince açık değilse, ikna edilmek istemiyorsa ve bir önyargı ile bu tür bir soru yönelttiyse verilebilecek hiç bir cevap yeterince tatmin edici olmayacaktır. Edwin P. Pister, bu tür önyargılı ve alaycı bir biçimde yöneltilen sorularla başa çıkmanın yolunu, benzeri bir karşı soru yöneltmekte bulmuştur: “Neden balıkları koruyalım ki?”ye karşılık “neden insanları koruyalım ki?”

Ayrıca, neden/niçin soruları özel değer söz konusu olduğunda çok da anlamlı olmayabilir. Özel değer varlığına ilişkin argümanlardan, Aristoteles’in ‘ilk neden’ görüşüyle benzerlik kurularak ileri sürülen argümanı hatırlayalım. Bir takım şeyler, değerli, ya da iyi addedilen başka bir şeye ulaşmaya aracılık etmelerinden dolayı ‘aracsal değerli’dir. Dolayısıyla, iyi bir okul, iyi bir eğitim alabilmeye; iyi bir eğitim, iyi bir iş bulabilmeye; iyi bir iş, iyi para kazanmaya aracılık ettiğinden araçsal olarak değerlidir. Fakat bu araçsal değerlilik zincirinde öyle bir noktaya gelinir ki, aracılık ettiği başka bir ‘iyi’nin bulunmadığı, kendisinin değerinin nihai olduğu görülür. Bu zinciri daha ileri götürmek adına sorulan ‘neden’ soruları bir noktadan sonra cevap bulamaz olur, hükümsüz kalır. Özel olarak değerli olan, sadece iyi bir şeye aracılık etmesinden değil, o, ulaşmak istenen şeyin bizzat kendisi olmasından dolayı değerli görülendir. Mesela, ‘mutluluk’ söz konusu olduğunda ‘neden değerlidir?’ sorusu, bir noktada cevapsız kalır. Dolayısıyla, çevrenin insan dışındaki bileşenlerine atfedilen ya da

atfedilecek ötsel değere ilişkin yöneltilen ‘neden’, ‘niçin’ soruları, bir anlamda, hükümsüzdür.

Ötsel değer kavramı kadar, ‘antroposentrik’ ve ‘antroposentrik-olmayan’ kavramları da bu çalışmanın ana kavramlarındandır. Fakat her ne kadar bu kavramlar “insanmerkezci” ve “insanmerkezci-olmayan” biçiminde anlaşılsalar ve kullanılsalar da, bu kavramların da yeterince açık olmadığı gözlemlenebilir. Bu çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde değindiğim çevre etiği kuramları söz konusu olduğunda, çevre etiği kuramcılarının, insanmerkezciliğe karşı çıkarken veya ondan destek alırken aslında ‘insanmerkezcilik’ ile farklı şeyleri kast ettikleri görülebilir. Bu sebeple, bu tezin dördüncü bölümünde, ‘insanmerkezci’ ve ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ kavramlarının ne anlama geldiğini ve benim bu kavramlar ile ne kastettiğimi subjektivist/öznelci değer anlayışıyla ilişkili bir biçimde tartışıyorum.

E. C. Hargrove çevre etiği tartışmalarının merkezinde yatan ve önemli bulduğum bir noktaya dikkat çeker. Hargrove kavramsal olarak ‘insanmerkezcilik’in beraberinde doğaya sadece araçsal değeriyle yaklaşmayı gerektirmediğini ileri sürer. Ayrıca, insanmerkezci-olmayan bir yaklaşımın, otomatikman doğa bileşenlerini ötsel değerli görmeyi, onlara ötsel değer atfetmeyi sağlamadığını dile getirir. Yani hem insanmerkezci ‘ötsel’ ve ‘araçsal’ değer verme, hem de insanmerkezci-olmayan ‘ötsel’ ve ‘araçsal’ değer verme durumlarının olduğunu dile getirir.

İnsanlar çevrelerindeki şeylere değer verme ve değer verdiklerini de koruma eğilimindedirler. Callicott ve Hargrove başta olmak üzere, kimi çevre etiği kuramcıları tarafından savunulduğu üzere, ben de insanın bu değer verme kapasitesinin, doğanın insan dışındaki bileşenlerini de değerli görebileceği bir biçimde geliştirilebileceğine inanıyorum.

Aslında, özellikle de zayıf insanmerkezcilik savunucularının manevralarının bir sonucu olarak, çevre etiğinin ilk ortaya çıktığı dönemdeki insanmerkezcilik yaklaşımları ile günümüzdeki insanmerkezcilik yaklaşımları arasında epeyce bir fark olduğu görülebilir. Hatta ‘zayıf’ insanmerkezcilik adı altında öne sürülen birçok görüş, neredeyse ‘insanmerkezcilik-olmayan’ bir etik arayışındaki düşünürlerin hedeflediğini kuramsal olarak karşılıyor. Özellikle Hargrove’un, insanın, doğanın canlı ve/veya cansız tüm bileşenlerine özsel değer atfedilebileceği iddiasını barındıran ‘zayıf’ insanmerkezcilik görüşünün, insanmerkezcilik-olmayan bir çevre etiğini amaçlayan canlılık-merkezli Taylor’ın görüşüne veya (acı-haz) hissedebilirlik-merkezli Singer’ın görüşüne nazaran daha ‘insanmerkezcilik-olmayan’ bir yaklaşım olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmaz.

Her ne kadar çevre etiği kuramcıları çalışmalarında desteklemek ya da karşı çıkmak için ‘insanmerkezcilik’ kavramı adını sıkça geçirseler de, bu kavram ile neyi kast ettikleri aslında farklılaşıyor. Bu farklı anlamlardaki kullanım, insanmerkezcilik kavramı, değer ‘kaynak’ı ve ‘kapsam’ı gözetilerek ele alındığında açıkça görülebilir.<sup>404</sup> Özsel değer söz konusu olduğunda, geleneksel, ‘katı insanmerkezcilik’ değer kuramı savunucuları, hem değer ‘kaynağını’ hem de kapsamını insan ile sınırlı tutmuşlardır. Diğer yandan, ‘zayıf insanmerkezcilik’ yaklaşım savunucuları ve Callicott gibi insan-kökenli (anthropogenic) yaklaşım savunucuları değer ‘kaynağını’, ‘insan’ ile sınırlarken, yani sadece insanı ‘değer verici’ olarak kabul ederken, değer ‘kapsamının’, insanın haricindeki varlıkların da özsel olarak değerli görülebilecek bir biçimde geniş tutulabileceğini veya tutulması gerektiğini ileri sürmüşlerdir. Dolayısıyla, bir karşı tavrı olarak ‘insanmerkezcilik-olmayan’ bir yaklaşım ile ne kast edildiği, insanmerkezciliğin nasıl anlaşıldığına bağlı olarak farklılık gösterir. Mesela, değer ‘kaynağı’ ve ‘kapsamı’ konusunda aynı görüşü paylaşsalar da, Hargrove kendini ‘insanmerkezcilik’ olarak görürken, Callicott,

---

<sup>404</sup> İnsanmerkezcilik kavramı çoğunlukla bu ayrım göz ardı edilerek kullanılmasına rağmen, aslında değer ‘kaynak’ı ve ‘kapsam’ı ayrımı, Callicott ve O’Neill gibi kimi düşünürler tarafından farklı şeylere dikkat çekmek amacıyla farklı isimlendirmelerle dile getirilmiştir.

‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ bir yaklaşım savunduğunu ifade eder. ‘İnsanmerkezci-olmayan’ bir etik arayışı ile karşı çıkılan ‘insanmerkezcilik’ anlayışı sıklıkla, ilk türden, yani, özsel değerın kaynağını ve kapsamını insanla sınırlayan anlayış iken, Rolston gibi kimi objektivistler bu iki türlü insanmerkezcilik anlayışına da karşı çıkmışlardır.

İmdi, insanmerkezciliğin, değerin kaynağı ve kapsamı bağlamlarında nasıl farklı biçimlerde değerlendirilebileceğine değinmiş olarak, “‘insanmerkezci-olmayan değer’ ne anlama geliyor?” sorusuna yöneliyorum.

Değerin ilişkisel olduğu kabul edildiğinde, bir değer verenin varlığının kabulü de buna eşlik eder. Başka bir ifadeyle, değerin ilişkisel oluşunun kabulüyle, değer veren birinin varlığı da ima edilmiş olur. Bu sebepten ötürü, değer verenin varlığını yadsıyan, objektivist, ‘kendinde’ değer anlayışına karşı çıktığımı daha önce dile getirmiş olarak, değer verenden bağımsız, objektivist insanmerkezci-olmayan değerlerden bahsedilemeyeceğini düşünüyorum.

‘İnsanmerkezci-olmayan değer’, subjektivist bir perspektiften ele alındığında, değerin birkaç farklı biçimde oluştuğu söylenebilir. Öncelikle, değer verenin insan olduğu ama doğanın diğer bileşenlerine özsel veya araçsal değer atfedilmesiyle doğada özsel değerlerin ortaya çıktığı söylenebilir. İnsanmerkezci-olmayan bir değer yaklaşımını savunan Callicott’un değer anlayışı bu türden ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan değer’lere örnek verilebilir. Ayrıca, insanmerkezcilik konusunda ısrarcı olmasına rağmen, Hargrove’un değer anlayışının da bu türden bir ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan değer’e örnek teşkil edeceğini düşünüyorum. İlaveten, doğanın insan dışı bileşenlerinin sadece kendileri için/kendileri uğruna (*for-their-own-sake*) değerli görüldüğü estetik değer(ler) de bu gruba dahil edilebilir.

İnsanmerkezci-olmayan değerlerin oluşmasının bir başka yolu olarak, doğadaki insan haricindeki varlıkların özsel veya araçsal değer atfetmesiyle

insanmerkezci-olmayan deęerlerin oluřtuęu ileri srlebilir. Rolston'un, doęada insan dıřında da deęer retebilen canlılar olduęunu savladığı objektivist yaklařımı bu trden bir insanmerkezci-olmayan deęer anlayıřına rnek oluřturur.

Bu durumda, ele alınması gerekli bir dięer soru, "insan dıřında deęer atfedebilen varlıklar var mıdır?" sorusudur. Bu trden bir soruya cevabım, "insan dıřındaki varlıklar deęer atfedemez" deęildir. Araçsal olarak deęer verdikleri çok açıktır (barınma, yeme-içme, vb.). Dięer yandan, "insan haricindeki varlıklar zsel olarak deęer verebiliyorlar mı?" sorusu sz konusu olduęunda, bizler insan olduęumuz iin buna verdięimiz olumlu cevapların, çoęunlukla hsnkuruntu (*wishful thinking*) olduęunu ve aslında antropomorfizmden bařka bir řey olmadığını dřnyorum. 'İnsani perspektif', insan oluřumuzun doęal ve kaınılmaz bir sonucudur. Dolayısıyla, bir anne kedinin yavrusuyla iliřkisini ona 'řefkat' gsteriři, yavruları arasında yiyecek daęılımında belli bir sıra gzetmesini 'adil' oluřu ya da bir kurdun doęal hayata yneliřini 'zgrlk' tercih ediři biiminde yorumlarken, aslında kaınılmaz olarak onlara sahip olduęumuz insani (ahlaki ya da deęil) deęerlerimizle ynelip, onlara bu deęerleri yansıtıp, grdklerimizi yine kendi 'insani' deęerlerimiz zerinden deęerlendiriyoruz.

Bařka bir biimde ifade etmek gerekirse, hayvanlarda ahlaki sezgi/his/yargı var mıdır yok mudur'dan baęımsız olarak, belki de adalet, adil olmak ya da řefkat sadece biz insanlar iin bir deęerdir; insan haricindeki varlıkların pek de nemsemedięi bir řeydir. Bu bilebileceęimiz/bilinebilir bir řey deęildir. İnsan dıřındaki varlıklar da, insanın deęer vermesinden baęımsız olarak, zsel deęer atfedebiliyor ve ahlaki kararlar verebiliyor ya da ahlaki bir iliřki kurabiliyorlar iddiasında bulunmak, řu anki bilimsel ve teknolojik kořullarda mmkn grnmyor. Ayrıca, bu trden bir iddia antropomorfizm (insanbiimcilik) tehlikesi tařıyor.

Özsel olarak değerli addedilen varlıklar kapsamının insan haricindeki canlı ve cansız varlıkları da kapsayacak bir biçimde genişletilmesi gerekliliğine ve bunun olabilirliğine inanarak, çevre etiğiyle, amacımız bir insanın çevresiyle ilişkisini ahlaki yönüyle ele almak olduğu sürece aslında insan dışındaki varlıkların insanın değer vermesinden bağımsız olarak değer verdiğini ya da verebildiğini göstermeye veya değer verip veremediğinin bilgisine ihtiyacımız olmadığını düşünüyorum. Değer atfeden varlıklar olarak, insanın onlara özsel değer atfetmesinin mümkün olması yeterli olacaktır.

Kavramsal sadeleşme adına, Hargrove, çevre etiği tartışmalarında geline nokta da ‘insanmerkezci’ ve ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ ayrımına gerek olmadığını, ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ kavramının neredeyse bir fazlalık olduğunu dile getirmiştir. Hargrove’un görüşünün aksine, hala ‘insanmerkezci-olmayan’ kavramına ve bu türden bir etik yaklaşıma gerek olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bu çalışmanın önceki evrelerinde, birçokları gibi ben de, çevre etiğini, bir insanın çevresiyle kurduğu ilişkinin etik yönünü konu edinen bir felsefe disiplini olarak değerlendirmekteydim. Bunun bir sonucu olarak, doğada/çevrede yer alan özsel değer atfedilecek varlıkları da insanlar ve insan olmayan canlı ve cansız varlıklarla sınırlı tutmaktaydım *-kimileri için fazlasıyla geniş olsa da*. Oysa ki, teknolojik ve bilimsel ilerlemelere bakılacak olursa, oldukça yakın bir gelecekte, çevre bileşenlerine, yapay zeka donanımlı insansı robotların da<sup>405</sup> (*humanoid, android, vb.*) dahil olacağı görülecektir. Bu insansı robotlar ya da benzeri varlıklar daha aktif bir biçimde çevreye dahil olduklarında, değer verici/atfeden olarak sadece insandan değil, insan olmayan ‘değer verici’lerden de bahsediliyor olunacaktır.

Bu dahiliyetle, ahlaki bir ilişkide değeri veren taraflardan en az birinin insan olmadığı ahlaki ilişkilerden bahsedilecektir. Dolayısıyla, artık çevre etiğini, daha

---

<sup>405</sup> Bu tür robotların fiziksel becerilerinin yetkinliği kadar ahlaki karar verip veremedikleri ve/veya veremeyecekleri ve bunun ne denli özgür ve özgün bir karar olabileceği, vb. alan içi tartışmalarda genişçe bir yer tutar.

doğru bir ifadeyle etiği, “bir insanın -tüm bileşenleriyle birlikte- çevresiyle ilişkisi ...” biçiminde tanımlamak yetersiz kalacaktır; etik tartışmalarda çevre bileşenlerinden biri olacak yapay zekalı varlıkların, insanla ve diğer varlıklarla ilişkisi de yer alacaktır.

Bu sebepten Callicott’un “-ahlaki- değeri üreten insandır ama sadece insan için üretmez” argümanı ile temellendirdiği insan-kökenli (anthropogenic) yaklaşımının ve Hargrove’un özsel değeri doğadaki insan haricindeki varlıkları da kapsayacak bir biçimde revize ettiği zayıf insanmerkezcilik yaklaşımının, her ne kadar şu an için yeterli gibi görünse de, yakın bir gelecekte yetersiz kalacağı açıktır.

Subjektivist bir -özel- değer anlayışını savunuyorum fakat savunduğum değer anlayışı, her ne kadar subjektivist bir biçimde değer atfetme üzerinden temellense de, ahlaki bir ilişki söz konusu olduğunda, bireysel düzeyde özel olarak değerli görülenlerin, bireysel özel değerlerin, başvurulacak bir ahlaki ilke olarak değerlendirilmesini kast etmiyorum. Başka bir ifadeyle, bireysel ahlaki göreceliği savunmamaktayım. Aksine, ahlaki alanda tek tek bireylerin özel değer vermeleriyle değil, bireylerin tek tek özel değer vermelerindeki ortaklık ile ilgilenmekteyim, yani evrensel olarak değerli gördüğümüz, özgürlük, adalet, dürüstlük gibi değerlerin olabilirliği ile ilgilenmekteyim. “Nasıl olur da subjektivist bir değer temelinde böyle evrensel değerler söz konusu olabilir?” ve aynı yolla “Çevreye ilişkin insanmerkezcili-olmayan, evrensel olarak da kabul görebilecek değerlerin ortaya konulması söz konusu olabilir mi?”

Buradan hareketle, bu bölümün ikinci yarısında, özel olarak atfedilen özel değerlerin evrenselleştirilebilirliğinin olanağını araştırıyorum. Kısaca, bir şeyin evrensel bir biçimde özel olarak değerli bulunmasını/görülmesini sağlayanlar koşullar neler olabilir? Ayrıca, bu evrensel değerler, ahlaki göreceliğin yaratabileceği sıkıntılardan da uzaklaşabilmenin bir yolu olacaktır diye düşünüyorum.

Etigin sözleşmeci bir temeli olduğunu, başka bir ifadeyle, ahlaki sözleşmeciliği savunmaktayım. Bununla beraber, yukarıda bahsettiğim amaç doğrultusunda, Callicott'un Hume ve Darwin temelli değer anlayışını ve özellikle de Lo'un 'yatkınlık teorisi'ni ele alıp, inceliyorum. Lo, bizlere, Hume'cu subjektivist değer anlayışı üzerinden, Hume'un, adaleti, bencilce bir temele dayalı yapay bir değer olarak gördüğünü fakat buna rağmen adalet'in onun ahlak kuramı içinde nasıl olup da doğal ve evrensel bir değere dönüştüğünü göstermektedir. Bu da bize subjektivist bir temele dayanan bireysel düzeydeki özsel değerlerin, yani özsel olarak değerli görülenlerin, tıpkı adalet gibi, özgürlük gibi evrensel bir nitelik kazanabileceğini göstermektedir.

Pragmatist düşünürlerin savunduğuna benzer bir biçimde, değerlerin zaman üstü olmadığını düşünüyorum. Bu bölümde buna tekrar değinerek, değerlerin ve değer attettiklerimizin zaman içinde değiştiğini göstermeye çalışıyorum. Bu değişmişlik, yine aynı biçimde değişebileceğine işaret eder. Değerlerin değişebilirliğini, zaman üstü ve sabit olmayışını, savunduğum subjektivist görüş bağlamında çevre etiği için önemiştir. Çünkü bu türden bir yaklaşım, bizlere, bugün değerli görülmeven, insan haricindeki doğa bileşenlerinin zaman içinde değerli görülebilişirliğinin imkanını sağlamaktadır.

Bu teoriler ışığında, bu bölümde, evrimsel olarak da geliştirilir olan, insanlardaki ortak biyogenetik yapı, psikolojik yatkınlıklar ve sosyal uzlaşısı üzerinden, öznel değerlerin ve öznel olarak değerli bulunanların sadece bireysel düzeyde kalmayıp evrenselleşebileceğini ve çevre ile olan ilişkilere yön vermede başvurulabilecek insanmerkezci olmayan özsel değerler ortaya konulabileceğini ortaya koymaya çalışıyorum.

Sonuç olarak, Y. S. Lo'nun Hume'un ahlak felsefesi üzerinden temellendirdiği "yatkınlık kuramı"na dayanarak, ahlaki sözleşmecilik temelinde subjektif değer atfetme edimiyle oluşan değerlerin evrenselleşebileceğini savunmaktayım.

Çevre etiği, yakın bir zamana kadar etiğin bir alt dalı olarak görülmekteydi, hatta kimilerince hala da öyle değerlendirilmektedir. Bunun sebeplerinden biri olarak, çevre etiğinin, yeni bir disiplin olarak ortaya çıktığı dönemlerde, kendine konu edindikleri itibarıyla geleneksel anlamıyla etiğin bir dalı olacak kadar sınırlı kapsamının olması ileri sürülebilir. Daha çok, artan çevre sorunlarıyla nasıl baş edileceğine odaklı bir alan olarak görüldüğü söylenebilir.<sup>406</sup> Şu an gelinen noktada, kapsamı karşılaştırıldığında, geleneksel anlamıyla etik ve çevre etiği arasındaki bu ilişkilendirmenin değişmesi gerektiği çok açıktır. Şöyle ki, mevcut durumda etik denilince, insan dışındaki varlıkları kapsayan bir ahlak teorisi anlaşılmamaktadır ki, çevre etiği de onun bir alt dalı olarak görülebilsin. Aksine, genel itibarıyla, etik denilince, insanlar arası ilişkileri konu edinmişliği anlaşılıyor. Diğer yandan, günümüzde çevre etiği denilince, insanın, çevrenin tüm bileşenleriyle -buna insan da dahil- olan ilişkisinin ahlaki boyutuyla ele alınması anlaşılıyor.

Dolayısıyla, artık, sadece insanlararası ahlaki ilişkiler kast edilerek ‘etik’ ve insanın, -canlı ve cansız tüm bileşenleriyle birlikte- çevresiyle ahlaki ilişkisi kast edilerek ‘çevre etiği’ kavramlarının kullanması yerine, ‘insanlararası etik’ ve -tüm çevre bileşenlerinin birbiriyle ilişkisinin ahlaki boyutuna vurgu yapacak bir biçimde- ‘etik’ kavramları kullanılmalıdır. Etiğin amacı, Y. S. Lo’nun ifade ettiği biçimiyle, ‘insanların kesintisiz, sürdürülebilir olarak mutlu ve kendilerini geliştirebilecekleri bir biçimde nasıl bir arada olabileceğine cevap vermek ve bunu yapabilmelerinde onlara yardım etmektir.’<sup>407</sup> Bu tanımdaki ‘insanların’ ifadesi sonrasına ufak bir ekleme yaparak, etiğin amacını, “insanın doğanın tüm bileşenleriyle beraberce mutlu ve kendilerini geliştirebilecekleri bir biçimde nasıl

---

<sup>406</sup> Her ne kadar kimi düşünürler tarafından özsel değerli addedilmenin kriterinin –mesela Bentham tarafından Kantçı rasyonaliteden acı ve haz duyabilme kapasitesine sahip olmaya- değiştirilmesinin gerekliliği dillendirilmiş olsa da.

<sup>407</sup> Y. S. Lo, ‘Empirical Environmental Ethics’, in K. T. Ip (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: Intercultural Perspectives*, Amsterdam & NY, Rodopi, 2009, s. 56.

bir arada olabileceğine cevap vermek ve bunu yapabilmelerinde onlara yardım etmektir” olarak ifade etmeyi uygun buluyorum.

Sonuç olarak, çevre etiğinin, etiğin bir süreç meselesi olduğunu düşünüyorum ve açıktır ki bu sürecin başında değiliz. Evelyn B. Pluhar 1983’de yazdığı makalesine “Çevre etiği nedir? Doğayı korumak gerekli midir? Mantıken mümkün müdür?” sorularıyla başlamıştır. Günümüzde artık, çevre etiğinin, doğayı korumanın mümkün olup olamayacağını sorgulamanın çok ötesine geçtiğimize inanıyorum. İnsanın çevresi ile olan ilişkisinin doğru bir biçimde ele alınması yolunda ümit verici gelişmeler yaşandığını düşünüyorum ama yine de kat edilecek epey bir yol var. Bununla beraber, tabii ki, “çevreyle kurulacak ilişkide tüm ahlaki sorunların üstesinden gelebilecek” bir kuram peşinde olmak naif bir dilek olarak kalmaktan öteye gidemez. Onlarca ahlaki görüşe, kurama rağmen, hala insanlararası ahlaki ilişkilerde sorunlar yaşanmaktadır -*ahlaki ilişkinin doğası gereğidir denilebilir*. Geçmişten günümüze insanlık tarihi ele alındığında, görülebilir ki, birçok insan derilerinin renklerinden, cinsiyetlerinden, cinsel yönelimlerinden, dini tercihlerinden ve bunun gibi tercihlerinden dolayı ayrımcılığa maruz kalmaktadır, haksızlığa uğramaktadır, hatta birçok insan hak talebini dahi dile getirememektedir. Diğer yandan, tüm bu kötü sayılabilecek durumlara rağmen, açıktır ki bir takım iyileşmeler ve ilerlemeler görülmüştür. Ahlaki ilişkinin doğası gereği, istenmeyen ve onaylanmayan durumlar her daim olacaktır. Ayrıca, bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişmelerin olası sonuçlarını da hesaba kattığımıza, etiğin kestirilemez serüveni devam edecek görünmektedir. Örneğin, bir insanın, insansı bir robotun ve bir hayvanın çıkarlarının ahlaki olarak çatıştığı durumlar olabilecektir. Böyle bir durumda ne yapacağız? Nasıl karar vereceğiz? Böylesi bir çatışma durumunda, şimdilerde ahlaki alana dahil edilirliliği tartışılan hayvanların çıkarları, kim bilir belki o zaman bir robotun çıkarları karşısında, canlı ya da doğal oluşlarından dolayı öncelenecektir. Çevre etiği açısından bakıldığında, bu konular tartışıldığı sürece gündeme dahil edilmiş olacaktır. Bu açıdan, insanmerkezci-olmayan yaklaşımların bence en büyük başarısı, insanı merkeze

alan geleneksel yaklaşımlarda yarattığı kırılma, onların sarsılmaz sanılan yerlerinde yarattığı sarsıntıdır.



## C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : AYDIN BAYRAM

Adı : Selma

Bölümü : Felsefe

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) : The Use of the Concept of Intrinsic Value in Anthropocentric and Non-Anthropocentric Approaches in Environmental Ethics: A Metaethical Investigation

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☒

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**