

**THE SECOND INTIFADA (UPRISING) IN PALESTINE;  
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY AND SECURITY  
CONSEQUENCES 2000-2005**



**ISLAM H. M. ASALYA**

**YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY**

**JANUARY, 2019**

THE SECOND INTIFADA (UPRISING) IN PALESTINE;  
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY AND SECURITY  
CONSEQUENCES 2000-2005



BY

ISLAM H. M. ASALYA

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MA IN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL  
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER THESIS

YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY

JANUARY, 2019

---

Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. M. Fazıl GÜLER  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master.



[Prof. Dr. Cengiz Erişen]  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts



[ Prof. Dr. Seda Ünsar ]  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

[ Prof. Dr. Seda Ünsar ] [ Yeditepe University ]

[ Dr. Melih Görgün ] [ Yeditepe University ]

[ Prof. Dr. Emin Gürses ] [ Sakarya University ]




"I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work"

DATE: 07.01.2019

Name Surname: Islam H. M. ASALYA

Signature;

Islam



## ÖZET

Filistin Ortadoğu'nun kalbinde yer alan ve Batı Asya ile Kuzey Afrika'yı birbirine bağlayan bir Arap ülkesidir. Filistin tarih boyunca birçok dini ve uygarlığı bünyesinde barındıran bir ülke olmuştur. Filistin önemli konuma sahip bir ülke olarak Akdeniz'in doğal güzelliğini ve atmosferini yansıtmaktadır. Bu karakteristik özellik ülkenin kontrolünü elinde tutmak isteyen işgalciler için Filistini daha cazip hale getirmiştir.

Bu çalışma Filistin'in iç gelişmeleri ile 2000-2005 yılları arasında İkinci İntifada olarak bilinen olayın ekonomik, toplumsal, siyasi ve askeri olarak nasıl dallanıp budaklandığına odaklanmaktadır. Bu doğal karmaşıklığın sonucunda ortaya çıkan İkinci İntifada'nın, Filistin Halkı üzerinde önemli bir etkisi olmaktadır. Bu çalışma İkinci İntifada'nın sebep olduğu psikolojik baskı ve endişe sebebiyle Filistinlilerin moral düşüşünü de odaklanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, İkinci İntifada Filistinliler ve İsraililerin arasındaki çatışmadan farklı değerlendirilememektedir. Bu çalışma İkinci İntifada süresince Filistinlilerin insani durumu ile birlikte Gazze ve Batı Şeria'daki ekonomik çöküşe ve birçok ölüme de ışık tutmaktadır. Bu minvalde bu çalışma İkinci İntifada'ya derinlemesine odaklanarak Filistinlilerin uygulanan politkalardan nasıl etkilendiğini de irdedeleyecektir. Bununla beraber, Filistinliler ve İsraililerin arasındaki müzakerelerin başarısız olması sonucu başlayan İkinci İntifada ile birlikte Filistinlilerin siyasi haklarını almayı umut etmesini de irdedeleyecektir. Ek olarak, İsrail'in Batı Şeria ve Gazze'deki askeri baskısının güvenlik sorunlarına sebep olması da tartışılacaktır. Bu gelişmelerin ışığı altında, bu çalışma İkinci İntifada sonucu olarak yaşamın sosyal, askeri, ekonomik etkileri de irdedeleyecektir. Bununla birlikte, 2005 yılında İsrail'in geri çekiliş sebepleri de sosyal, askeri ekonomik ve güvenlik bazlı değerlendirilecektir. Bu çalışma geri

çekilmenin sosyal, askeri, ekonomik etkileri çerçevesinde de konuyu ele alacaktır.

Bu tezde İkinci İntifada ve bunun sosyal, askeri, ekonomik etkileri 2000-2005 iki hipotez çerçevesinde incelenecektir. Bu hipotezler: İsrail'in sivillere karşı tepkisi İkinci intifada ve geri çekilmenin İsrail işgal kuvvetlerinin üzerindeki negatif etkinin sonucudur. Aynı zamanda şu sorular cevaplanmaya çalışılacaktır. İkinci İntifada ve sonrasındaki geri çekilmenin yerel ve küresel ölçekte ekonomik, siyasi, askeri ve güvenlik sonuçları nelerdir?

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Filistin, Batı Şeria, Gazze, İsrail, Hamas, El Fetih, İntifada, Geri Çekilme

## ABSTRACT


Palestine is an Arab country located in the heart of the Middle East, which links West Asia and North Africa. It is one of the countries that had embraced many civilizations and had been a cradle for various religions during the course of the history. Therefore, Palestine is endowed with an important location and characterized by the beautiful nature and atmosphere of the Mediterranean Sea. These characteristics have always made it an attraction center for occupation forces with an aspiration to control the country.

This study dwells upon domestic development of Palestine and particularly the ramifications of the case known as the Second Intifada between 2000 and 2005 in terms of economy, society, politics and military. Due to its nature of complications causing a substantive effect on the Palestinian society, the Second Intifada addresses in this study bears great importance. The study further touches upon the decline of Palestinians' morale during the Second Intifada due to being subject to psychological pressure which caused nervousness. In this regard, the history of the second Intifada in Palestine is a case that cannot bear indifference since it is also a part of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. This study sheds light on the compelling humanitarian situation as well as devastated economy in Gaza and West Bank during the Second Intifada showing the severe death toll for Palestinians particularly in Gaza and West Bank. In this context, the study examines the Second Intifada in-dept and focuses on how this incident affected politics towards the Palestinians residing in the region. Nonetheless, the failure of negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis during the Second Intifada led Palestinians to give up hope for their political rights. Moreover, Israeli military oppression on

Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza has increased along with repression, which has led to serious security concerns. In the light of these developments, the study elaborates on the severe effects imposed by the Second Intifada on the Israeli political reality in terms of social, economic, military and other aspects of life. In addition, the main reasons for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip in September 2005 is also explored in the study as well as its political, economic and security-related implications. Thus, this study is essentially developed within the framework of monitoring and analyzing the political, military and economic implications of the withdrawal.

In this thesis, the Second Intifada (uprising) in Palestine and its social, economic, political, military and security effects between the years 2000 and 2005 and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 will be explained in detail under the framework of two hypotheses. My hypotheses are Along with the increase of violence, Israel's campaign of revenge against civilians is also incrementing and Violence by the Israeli occupation forces against civilians can be referred to a negative effect on high morals during the Second Intifada and the Withdrawal. Furthermore, the following questions are targeted to be answered: What are social, economic, political, military and security effects of the Second Intifada as well as the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 in local and global scale?

**Keywords:** Palestine, West Bank, Gaza, Israel, Hamas, Fatah, Intifada, Withdrawal



*I dedicate my thesis to*  
*my dear brother SABRI ASALYA*  
*and to*  
*all my friends who were martyred in Palestine.*

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The deepest and humblest appreciation goes out to Prof. Dr. SEDA ÜNSAR, who has been unbelievably helpful throughout my thesis process. Because her support to me, I was able to achieve my goals. Also, I want to thank professors such as Prof. Dr. EMIN GÜRSES and Dr. MELİH GÖRGÜN who have helped me during the thesis process and give me more and more positive advice as a student of Yeditepe University. I also want to thank my wife who was always there giving me support in everything. Thank you all and I will be forever grateful.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL .....	i
PLAGIARISM .....	ii
ÖZET .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	viii
1. LITERATURE REVIEW .....	1
2. INTRODUCTION .....	4
3. THE SECOND INTIFADA AND ITS THEORETICAL BACKGROUND .....	13
3. 1. Violence Against Palestinians In Relation To The Development Of The Conflict .....	13
3. 2. The Impact of the Second Intifada and the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza on the Society .....	14
3. 3. The Impact of the Second Intifada and the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza on the Economy .....	25
3. 4. The Political Impact of the Second Intifada and the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza ....	43
3. 5. The Military Impact of the Second Intifada and the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza .....	61
4. CONCLUSION.....	89
REFERENCES .....	91

## **1. Literature Review:**

It becomes rather clear through this research that there is no immediate solution to the issue of Palestine occupied by Israel, which poses a regional, intellectual, legal, cultural, historical, religious and geographic dispute. It may well be found in the violent acts against Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the occupied territories that the Israeli is not trying to reach any peace agreement with Palestinian politicians. It is necessary to recognize that the Israeli occupation was forged at a time when fear prevailed immediately after the World War II, where nearly six million Jews were exterminated. For this reason, the Israeli occupation had severe repercussions of the concern over security and stability which were evident in the Israeli government's policies towards Palestinians as well as other populations. The Jewish founded their country on the basis of the belief that the establishment of a Jewish state was the only way to protect Jews from murder and displacement, nonetheless this belief was at the expense of the land of Palestinian people, which led to killing and displacement many Palestinians. The Israeli occupation forces evolved from a very small Jewish institution to a Zionist military government which happened to repress the original inhabitants of the land in order to build their Jewish state on the lands of Palestine. In this context, this study includes compilation of data to show the history of the Israeli occupation and how it affected Palestinians in a way that led to the First and Second Intifada successively in 1987 and 2000. Factors that contributed to the inability of the parties to reach any permanent peace agreement are also elaborated in depth (Gelvin, 2005, pp. 4-5). Economic, political, social, military and safety related circumstances in the context of

Israeli withdrawal from Gaza are also explored to provide a background for the developments in the region (such as low-income levels or rising levels of unemployment during the Second Intifada). As a matter of fact, these factors caused political violence and frustration, despair and instability to recover (Berman & Laitin, 2008, pp. 1-7). Many studies have focused on the effectiveness of the military, economic and social measures taken by Israel in its conflict with Palestinians during the Second Intifada as well as the overriding circumstances during the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, several researches point out to arbitrary mass arrests of Palestinians by the Israeli forces during the Second Intifada which exacerbated the conflict between the two sides (Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal, & Samban, 2005). Israeli assassinations of military leaders in Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Palestinian organizations during the Second Intifada further led to increased violence between Palestinians and Israelis (Sussman, 2006, pp. 303-315). Despite the withdrawal from Gaza, demolition of Palestinian homes during the Second Intifada inflicted serious negative effects on Palestinian social life (Benmelech, Berrebi, & Klor, 2010). Focusing on the history of economic, social, military and security activities during the Intifada, it is of note to point out to nearly four decades of positive and negative developments. Within this framework and to ensure stability in various spheres of life, there was a period of mediation by a group of peace-builders composed of European, American, Arab, and Islamic representatives in academies outside the Middle East to offer a solution for the conflicts caused by the Second Intifada. However, all such efforts failed (Kaufman & Salem, 2006, p. 7). However, literary work is quite rare on the role of economic, social, military and security initiatives to address the Israeli violence against Palestinians during the Second Intifada or during the withdrawal of Israel from

Gaza in 2005 (Berrebi, 2007, pp. 1-30). Yet, a study exploring the Palestinian-Israeli conflict demonstrated a positive correlation between investigations of Palestinians and the death toll in the West Bank and Gaza during the Second Intifada as well as the withdrawal period from Gaza (Miaari, Zussman, & Zussman, 2014, pp. 24-40).



## 2. INTRODUCTION

Palestine fell under British occupation in 1922 after the First World War. The Balfour Declaration was held in 1917 to divide the land of the Middle East and to allocate Palestine as a national homeland for Jews. In the following process, Jews began to take the land of Palestinians and established Jewish settlements in these lands. Therefore, it can be uttered that the Zionist target has since then been to get rid of Palestinians, settle Jewish immigrants in their lands, and possess the Palestine territories. On November 29, 1947, UN Resolution 181 was issued to divide Palestine into two states: Jewish and Arab. This led to the proclamation of the Jewish State as an independent state in Palestine on May 15, 1948 (UN General Assembly Resolutions 181, 1947). The establishment of the State of Israel in Palestinian territories has caused many wars between the two sides, for example, the tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956. After the June War in 1967, the Security Council's Resolution No. 242 was issued on November 22, 1967, which laid the groundwork for Israeli's withdrawal from Arab territories it occupied as a result of the recent war. After the end of the war, however, Israel achieved a great victory that had important consequences in military, political and economic terms since Arabs lost more lands in favor of Israel. The results also included the occupation of large areas of the land. The Zionist government took control of the inlands however, it was not content and tried to strip Palestinians of their land and even aspired to prevail in Syria and Sinai to restore its incomplete sovereignty (Quandt, 2005, p. 2). Due to extensive protests by Palestinians starting on March 30, 1976<sup>i</sup> this date is recognized by Palestinian state as the "memory of the land". Yasser Arafat took the leadership of the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) in 1969 following the clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces in Jordan in 1968 and later confirmed the organization's independence from Egyptian control. The negotiation between Egypt and Israel in 1971 did not succeed in yielding any positive result due to the fact that Israel refused to withdraw from the Egyptian territories. Following that, Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Al-Assad decided to declare war against Israel (the October War) to regain the territories that had been occupied by Israel in 1967. The October War ended on May 13, 1974, with the signing of the cease-fire agreement and disengagement between Egypt and Syria on the one hand, and Israel on the other. Israel restored Qunaytirah to Syria, withdrawing to Golan Heights, and stationed peacekeepers in ceasefire line to ensure the implementation of the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, Egypt restored the entire Suez Canal and Sinai, following an agreement between Israel and Syria. Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel known as The Camp David Accords in 1977 under the auspices of the United States of America (Rowley & Taylor, 2006, pp. 77-90). Following the killing of four Palestinians on December 9, 1987 by Israel, Palestinians waged the first Intifada against Israel, the repercussions of which continued from 1987 to 1992. Palestinians made use of stones as weapons during the incidents. This Intifada included many regular Palestinian people and children who showed great courage. In fact, almost the entire Palestinian community is said to take part in the resistance posing a truly popular Intifada. However, Israel responded by shooting Palestinians in front of cameras which the international community denounced and regarded it as disgraceful Israeli violence. Israel subsequently expanded its land confiscations, house demolitions and arbitrary arrests against which resistance by Palestinians continued with semi-peaceful methods such as the use of stones

and Molotov cocktails. Afterwards, the Intifada was added an economic boycott on all Israeli goods, which caused huge losses to Israel. Yet, hundreds of Palestinians were continued to be killed by soldiers, police and Israeli settlers; half of the dead were children and hundreds of Palestinians were left wounded any many were suffering from diseases as well as psychological and physical stress during the first Intifada. Thus, the first Intifada had exacerbated negative impacts on social, economic and political life of Palestinian people (Lustick, 1993, pp. 561-562). Following such arduous armed conflicts, the Oslo Agreement was signed between Israel and the PLO as a peace agreement in Washington, United States, on September 13, 1993. Among the most important provisions of the Agreement are as follows:

- 1) Israel recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representative of Palestinian people.
- 2) The PLO recognizes the State of the Israel (which composes 78% of the territory of Palestine excluding West Bank but including East Jerusalem and Gaza).
- 3) It is decided to establish an elected legislative council for Palestinians in the territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority.
- 4) The Agreement grants autonomy to Palestinians in their lands as Palestine (though this rule does not have full sovereignty).
- 5) Identity cards, passports and Palestinian flag for Palestinians shall be granted as indications of sovereignty for 55,000 Palestinians living in West Bank and Gaza Strip (King, 2009, pp. 1-2) The summit at Camp David in 2000 failed to produce a peaceful solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. For this summit, the US President Bill

Clinton invited Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat to negotiate a final outcome for the Palestinian issue. The summit lasted two weeks without yielding a result. The Western media later blamed President Yasser Arafat for rejecting the Israeli and US proposals especially after the eruption of the Second Intifada (Yehoshua & Chernitsky, 2003). The Second Intifada in Palestine (Al-Aqsa) was a peaceful Palestinian popular resistance across Palestine (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Galilee, Triangle, Niqab and Sahel) against the Israeli occupation. This Intifada (uprising) broke out from the third holiest Islamic area in the world, the Al – Aqsa Mosque on September 28, 2000 when Ariel Sharon, the leader of the opposition Likud Party under the leadership of Ehud Barak’s labor party visited al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. The popular character of the second Intifada appeared when Muslim worshipers threw Sharon in the courtyard of the Al – Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem with shoes and shingles. This upsurge was named after differently: It was called the Al Aqsa Intifada since it started in Al- Aqsa Mosque. It was also called as Intifada of Jerusalem since the upsurge was regarded as a call for independence and freedom of Palestinians erupting in the city of Jerusalem, which was expected to be the capital of Palestine. It was also called as the blood and anger Intifada, or the second major Palestinian Intifada (Yehoshua, 2007). There are several reasons and factors for the outbreak of the Al- Aqsa Intifada (the second major Intifada in Palestine), which erupted at the end of September in 2000, and the most important of these factors are formed around social, economic and political reasons. The second intifada is considered to stop the Palestinian regression in negotiations, although the outcome of the Intifada was a large number of martyrs, (over 4,412) including more than 100 children. Among those martyrs was Mohammed Al-

Durra, a girl Sarah and a baby Iman Hijo, who was only four months old. In this regard, the effect of Zionist attacks on the Palestinian society was great with high numbers of martyrs and over 15 thousand wounded. On the other hand, approximately 1,000 Israelis died and 6,700 were wounded during the Second Intifada (Tucker, 2013, p. 267). All Palestinian forces participated in the Second Intifada including the Fatah movement. In response, the Israeli occupation forces used oppression methods individually and collectively to suppress this second Intifada. Among such measures were enclosing the West Bank and Gaza Strip tightly, isolating the West Bank from Gaza and declaring a Palestinian city as a closed military zone with prohibiting any entry or exit. Israeli military officials were tasked in several checkpoints to humiliate Palestinians and to disrupt their work through preventing them from crossing the checkpoints in order to reach their houses, work centers, schools and universities. Palestinians were treated as foreigners traveling abroad and were being delayed for long hours by standing in long queues. In areas where there were military barriers, a state of tension was imposed. Furthermore, Palestinians faced interruptions in their domestic or cell phone calls which varied according to the mood of the Jewish military personnel. To add to that, the Apartheid Wall was constructed between Palestine and Israel (along the Green Line) following the occupation of Palestine in 1948 and the later expansion of Israel in 1967. The Wall was built on the pretext by the Israeli government to prevent terrorist incidents by means of this Apartheid which would accordingly serve as a fence against terrorist outbreaks from the Palestinian side to prevent military, political, economic, social and psychological harm. Nonetheless, this separation wall has destroyed all economic ties between Palestinian businesses across the West Bank and Jerusalem. The Wall further

cuts off lands and resources from Palestinians and this has been reducing land development activities and agricultural practices throughout the West Bank causing heavy losses (UNOCHA, 2012, pp. 46-52). The fact that the Eastern Jerusalem was closed to the West Bank and Gaza caused has been the root cause of grave losses inflicted upon Palestinian businesses and enterprises. The reason for this is that the East Jerusalem market was a significant and major part of the greater market such businesses were operating in. Millions of dollars are estimated to be lost per year, which for Palestinian producers was a large sum of business that was not easily recoverable (Arnon & Bamy, 2015, p. 51). The Israeli occupation forces confiscated tens of thousands of dunums of Palestinian land as buffer zones between Jewish settlements and Israeli military checkpoints (Saddiki, 2017, p. 15). Also, the average Palestinian income declined to its half in the West Bank and Gaza and real GDP per capita fell to 37% compared to the pre-Intifada period by the end of 2002. Unemployment was about 31% of the labor force (increasing from 12% in September 2000) in the West Bank where investment and trade volume was far below the pre-Intifada period. Indeed, unemployment rate peaked at 34% by 2004 and poverty rate was 60% in the entire population. Foreign trade as well remained weak: Palestinian exports fell by 4% in 2003. In light of this gloomy picture posing many difficulties, it is crystal clear that the Second Intifada had wide scope of economic implications in many cities within the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza (Bank, 2004, pp. xiii-xiv). Negative effects were observed in social life, public education, higher education, housing, welfare and specifically in tremendous losses in various sectors. Due to the Israeli siege in the West Bank and Gaza, students were unable to attend school, which had a hindering effect on particularly higher education. Official staff was also

prevented from their service in ministries and governmental institutions, and civil as well as public life was disrupted especially in Jenin city in the West Bank. Moreover, medical personnel and ambulances were unable to access their work station in Jenin city as well as several other Palestinian cities, which contributed to the deterioration of the general health situation in the country paving the way for increase in epidemics, environmental pollution among many other problems. In addition, grief and sorrow for friends and relatives who died in the second Intifada also posed a negative social effect (BRYM & MAOZ-SHAI, 2009, pp. 611-612). An important issue is that builders of the separation wall in the West Bank were reported to violate human rights and officers at checkpoints often stole lands from citizens by violating their rights to work, education, medical care and most importantly their right to life. House searches and shooting people became a widespread Israeli practice during the second Intifada (Hareuveni, 2012, pp. 55-60). There had also been a lack of social life for many citizens due the intensification of violent clashes between Palestinians and Israelis as well as the continued curfew imposed on Palestinian cities by the Israel Defense Forces during the Second Intifada. The West Bank is regarded to possibly receive the greatest social impact by the Second Intifada (Jacobs, 1998, p. 431) (Jacobs, 1998: 4-5). In addition, politics became a hot topic in many cities within the West Bank and Gaza at a higher rate compared to the history. Many cities witnessed establishment and increased support of guerilla warfare groups affiliated with the Al- Aqsa Brigades, Fatah, Hamas, Jihad Islamic and others within the West Bank and Gaza. According to Palestinian consensus formed by leaders, citizens, movements, factions and parties, peaceful solution must be combined with an armed force to achieve national aspires of Palestinians. Within this context, the armed Jihad

escalated against the Jewish – Zionist – Israeli colonial – settler presence in occupied Palestine in defense of the Palestinian self and the blessed land of Palestine (Jacobs, 1998, p. 431) (Rabbani, 2008, p. 69). The Israeli – Palestinian peace negotiations at Camp David under the US auspices in July 2000 failed due to the fact that Israeli refused to recognize the rights of the people of Palestine, while also rejecting possible return of Palestinians to their original lands and homes where they had been in 1948. Furthermore, Israel insisted on having Jerusalem as their united capital, denied Jerusalem as the capital of Palestinians and strongly rejected the idea of placing Islamic and Christian holy sites under Palestinian national sovereignty. Deterioration continued severely as the Israeli government also refused to implement the UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 and 338 which required it to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories. On the contrary, Israel insisted on expanding Jewish settlements (Sontag, 2001, pp. 75-85). In this regard, the Second Intifada was ignited due to the fact that Israeli forces expanded their practices of racial discrimination against Arab citizens in Galilee, Triangle, Negev and coastal areas while the Israeli government refused to recognize these citizens' political rights. It is also significant to take note of the military impact where Israel's military oppression on Palestinians increased security concerns since Palestinian national and Islamic factions were subject to repression during the self-rule period in the country. As a matter of fact, Palestinians had been unable to establish even a single political, administrative or economic institution until the intervention to the Israeli occupation. Let alone establishment of any unit, a policy of iron fist was imposed by means of military operations and the vast siege by Israel to ensure strict control over Palestinians.

On September 15, 2005, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza Strip, evacuating Israeli

settlements and military positions (Stein, 2013) was completed in official terms. In fact, Gaza was evacuated from Israeli occupiers and military forces by September 12, 2005, however those forces were redeployed again outside the northern and eastern borders which indicates remaining of occupying forces (Israeli control over crossings to the Gaza Strip, airspaces and territorial waters). The withdrawal was completed by a process that Israelis called the unilateral disengagement plan, which meant the Israeli side will not be responsible for what happens in the Gaza Strip after its withdrawal and that it will return to occupation at any time when deemed necessary (Nofal, 2004). This means that the withdrawal is not real since it was not performed under a treaty between two parties, but rather as an impromptu act by Israel. On the other hand, the reality of the situation concerning security in the region after the evacuation demonstrated that Israel supervised sectoral activities in the border areas of the territory and had an absolute control over airspaces, while also continuing its military operations in maritime trade to the Gaza Strip. Indeed, Israel continued its invasive activities, assassinations, kidnappings and shelling without any deterrent force (PCHR, 2006, pp. 11-15). It is important to note that Sharon insisted on withdrawing despite the security, economic, media, political and social warnings over the negative effects on the Zionist project, the Jewish community and the future of Israel and Palestine (Proschauer, 2006, pp. 4-10).

### **3. THE SECOND INTIFADA AND ITS THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **3.1. Violence Against Palestinians In Relation To The Development Of The Conflict**

Due to violent acts during the Second Intifada, it is possible to observe that the occupation forces in particular and the Jewish community in general suffered from multiple issues in terms of politics, society, economy, culture, military and morality. In this regard, the Israeli violence was in two forms: Individual and collective. Many Palestinians were arrested at military checkpoints, at the entrances of towns, villages and Camps. The Israeli occupation forces carried out daily arrests at long queues of vehicles belonging to Palestinians and this included children, young people, and adults - both men and women. Among healthy and sick individuals, many died due to prevention by the Israeli military at checkpoints to access hospitals or medical clinics for treatment against the spread of diseases. Many pregnant women were placed in vehicles at the entrances to Israeli checkpoints, resulting in many cases in the death of infants alone or together with mothers due to lack of medical attention. The forms of physical and psychological torture in Israeli prisons included: Freezing in refrigerators, beatings, shaking, violent harassments, long-standing, sleep deprivation, food deprivation, isolation, pressure on testicles, broken ribs, beating and torturing relatives in front of detainees, spitting in the face, and hitting and kicking especially in the stomach and back of the head. Collective violence, on the other hand, included bombardment of ministry headquarters, the police, security services, Palestinian governorate buildings and civil institutions over the years of the Second Intifada. Bombardments were also inflicted on the headquarters of President Yasser Arafat in Gaza, Nablus, Ramallah and his civilian plane and the building where

Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh was located as well as the buildings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Economy in Gaza. The violence by the occupation tanks deliberately destroyed thousands of public and private cars, ambulances and emergency vehicles on Palestinian streets, being aware that these Palestinian cars were parked on the sidewalks of the streets far from the area where those tanks were deployed. Furthermore, the conflicts were exacerbated during the Second Intifada after confiscation of large tracts of land by the Israeli occupation forces, destruction of thousands of houses, infrastructures, streets, electricity, water, sewerage and telephone networks, and hundreds of shops in the Palestinian territory. Travelling was obstructed by curfews, deportations, torture and abuse, arrests and parting family members, which pictures the severe face of the real conflict during the Second Intifada which hampered social, economic, political and military life.

### **3.2. The Impact of the Second Intifada and the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza on the Society**

For many years after the Intifada in 1987, Palestine was relative peace. As a matter of fact, many Israelis and Palestinians lived in relative stability after the first Intifada. This continued until the year 1990, yet this state of relative peace did not last long. After the Second Intifada many areas in the West Bank and Gaza turned into ghost towns (Miles, 2006, p. 10). Many people, particularly the elderly and children, were afraid to leave their houses due to the concern over slipping into armed battles between Palestinians and Israelis during the Second Intifada. Also, the Palestinian cities were placed in detention for several days by the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), which prevented Palestinians from

leaving their houses. Many Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza felt as if they were living in prison and isolated from the rest of the world due to the curfew, build-up of the Israeli wall and the establishment of checkpoints. During the Second Intifada, many Palestinians lacked any kind of social and humanitarian aid. Many residents of the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem were spending days and even months without seeing any family member due to the Israeli army's curfew in cities (Mikus-Kos, 2005). The Israeli - Palestinian conflict, and the second Intifada in particular, can be analyzed as an example of civil war, ethnic conflict, or state repression. Violence against civilians affected social life across the lands of Palestine during the Second Intifada, which was the reason why social inequality broke out between Arabs and Jews (Hamilton & Kelman, 1989, p. 222). The negative social effects included tremendous losses in multiple sectors, public education, higher education, housing, health and welfare. Schooling and university education were negatively impacted, and students were unable to attend school. As shown in a Palestinian field study, 47% of students were affected by the incidents and attendance level reduced by 42% compared to the past. Israeli violence caused insecurity, vulnerability, hatred, fear and mistrust. According to Yasser Arafat, the threat of using force undermined diplomacy, Israel may have seen threatening with violence against Palestinians as an alternative to diplomacy (Snyder & Jervis, 1999, pp. 15-37). Force against civilians was Israel's strategy during the Second Intifada. Moreover, denial of access to universities had a negative impact on higher education in the country, where more than 80 thousand students were left injured in their seats at 11 Palestinian universities and 25 colleges of secondary school. The occupation forces closed the universities of Hebron and Polytechnic Palestine for seven months since the beginning of

2003. Aqsa Mosque in Gaza Strip with an area of 3 thousand square meters within an area of 5 acres was also closed in mid - March 2004. As well as the inability of staff to work in ministries and institutions, government and civil organizations were also inhibited in public life. In addition, signs of mass exodus of Palestinians emerged as a result of the pressure by the Israeli occupation (Alawneh, 2013). Israeli checkpoints further separated Palestinian southern cities and Palestinian northern neighborhoods from each other. In order to cross the checkpoints, the Palestinians in West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem were required to show their identity cards and permits, and their bags and vehicles were subject to search. For many Palestinians, checkpoints in Gaza and West Bank are a contemporary incarnation of Israel's occupation and denial of the collective and individual rights of Palestinians to a living space. The Separation Wall, also known as the Apartheid Wall, which separates Palestinians from Israelis, was built as a result of the incidents. This Israeli separation wall has a clear historical character associated with the Berlin Wall, which affects Palestinians in their life (Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, & Eckret, 2009, p. 83) (Parry, 2003). For many Palestinians living in the West Bank and surrounding areas, the constructing of the Wall came at a great psychological cost. In fact, the wall influenced the way of life in Palestine. Particularly many of those who lived in Ramallah, Jenin, Hebron and other cities struggled to travel within the West Bank. The construction of the wall prevented some families in the West Bank from seeing family members outside the Bank. It also prevented civilians from enjoying normal social life. Before the starting of the Second Intifada, traveling to Jerusalem from Palestinian cities was relatively easies for the Palestinians. Residents living in the West Bank were not worried about being harassed for hours at Israeli

checkpoints, but during the Second Intifada this situation changed abruptly (Dowty, 2012, p. 12). Before the Second Intifada began, it would take a Palestinian who lives in Ramallah no more than thirty-eight minutes to get to Jerusalem. However, once the Israeli checkpoints were established, it would take more than two hours to get to Jerusalem. On many days during the Second Intifada, Palestinians trying to travel from Ramallah, Jenin and Hebron to Jerusalem were not allowed to cross the checkpoints at all and were ordered to return their houses without justifiable reasons. Many Palestinians believe that the real motive behind checkpoints is to prevent citizens living in the West Bank and other neighboring areas from reaching the holy sites within Jerusalem, such as the Al-Aqsa Mosque for Muslims and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher for Christians. The construction of the related checkpoints also prevented many residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from going to their lands to collect olives from olive trees. During autumn each year, families, friends and children usually meet there, since Palestinians enjoyed social interactions among family and friends. Palestinians also believe that olive picking is what makes family bonds stronger in the West Bank, thinking that it is the olive tree that maintains the power of the family in Palestine. Before the starting of the Second Intifada, women were leaving their homes almost every day to visit their friends and relatives for a cup of tea. After the emergence of the Second Intifada, however, families were forced to stay at home, and people were no longer able to walk daily to wander around (Keshet, 2013, p. 55). The Second Intifada made people feel powerless and also feel like prisoners in their own houses, which made it impossible to live a normal life in their own country (Farhud, 2016, pp. 13-14). Buying foods and supplies also became a challenge during the Second Intifada, preventing fresh products from

reaching local grocery stores. Many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza raised concerns regarding social life during the Second Intifada. Also, children were not able to enjoy their childhood the way they wanted to. There were many days where they were not allowed to step outside to play in front of their houses or go to the metropolitan park in central cities due to the constant fear their parents had. They were afraid a bullet would hit them or their children would be abducted by Israeli soldiers during the Second Intifada. The year of 2000 with the starting of the Second Intifada witnessed an unprecedented escalation in Israeli human rights violations since the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords. Since the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in 2000, the Israeli occupation forces have used excessive force against Palestinian civilians. Palestinian children were particularly affected by that violence. Just in 2000, more than 105 children were killed (under the age of 18). The vast majority of these cases were during the confrontations with the Israeli army and settlers or directly by Israeli snipers. There were 94 deaths during the Intifada in the last three months of that year. This number shows a distinct proportion of the total number of martyrs during the Intifada, and about 30% of the total martyrs included children under the age of 18 (DCI-Palestine, 2011). As shown before, students are still unable to attend school due to the IDF curfew in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. Schools are closed until a future notice. This will absolutely have a negative effect on the early education as well as social life. Due to the siege on the West Bank, many children are unable to identify each other and establish friendship. Another important issue is that many teenagers living in the West Bank and Gaza during the beginning of the Second Intifada were more focused on the clashes between the two sides rather than their education as the result of closing schools constantly during the

Second Intifada (Farhud, 2016, p. 27). Many Palestinians believe that the closure of schools during the Second Intifada was the main reason for many Palestinian students not completing their education during the five years of the Intifada. The life of Palestinian students was in danger when they were going to schools in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. And in the Second Intifada, more than 801 students were killed by Israeli occupation forces. The schools in the West Bank and Gaza Strip suffered a new level of violence with a series of night bombardments from Israeli tanks and armed helicopters. As a result, parents' psychological well-being was very poor, and the number of enrollment to schools dropped dramatically as families moved to Arab, European and other places to escape the violence in Palestine. Many Palestinians have not seen any hope of living in the West Bank and Gaza because of the security chaos, the construction of the Separation Wall, which hindered the functions of Palestinian labor markets and destroyed the reliable education system in Palestine. And the Palestinians are of the opinion that their social, political, economic life and safety deteriorated due to the lack of peace efforts between the two states and the ongoing curfews forced upon the West Bank. From 2000 to 2005, more than 34,700 Palestinians migrated from the West Bank to European countries in order to have better education and a better way of life as a result of the repressing occupation. Indeed, this result was one that was desired by the Israeli occupation forces – to banish Palestinians from their land (Bayat, 2010, p. 117).

Another troublesome result of the developments is the inability of thousands of young Palestinians to make use of opportunities to strengthen their work, which decreased marriage rates in the society. There is also the social effect of grief and sorrow for friends and relatives who died during the Intifada. The multifaceted siege imposed a state of

general social isolation among Palestinian people inside and outside the country. Another negative effect on social life was the destruction of thousands of Palestinian homes, and families previously living in those houses had to stay in the open areas and in tents for certain periods. In addition, the phenomena of spies siding with the occupation forces – referred to as devils – increased, contributing to physical liquidation of the cadres of occupation forces against the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Again during the Second Intifada, the Palestinian Authorities spotted dozens of such traitors and prisoned them. However, such people were freed after the invasion of the occupation forces of the Palestinian lands. This security dilemma is one of the most dangerous social effects on Palestine. As for physical liquidation, political leaders and activists in Palestinian national and Islamic factions were hampered by means of detonation of their vehicles, use of mobile phones to launch missiles from Apache planes or warplanes, or artillery shells bombing their houses. These military operations resulted in the death of many activists and hundreds of civilians sleeping in their homes. In addition, the Israeli occupations were reported to have arrested and prisoned more than 50,000 Palestinians in detention centers located in Jalameh, Shatta, Negev, Atlit, Majdou and others. The number of the Palestinian political prisoners peaked at 300 and 10 thousand detainees were kept, while administrative detainees were convicted without trial. The occupation forces also kidnapped about 70 officials from the Hamas movement during the Second Intifada, including 8 ministers in the Palestinian government and 31 deputies in the Legislative Council as well as elected academics and mayors. After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip in 2005, life became unbearable for Palestinians in this region contrary to expectations. Indeed, the region witnessed mass and extrajudicial executions, starvation, external and internal blockades

and indiscriminate attacks against civilians (Bar-Siman-Tov & Michael, 2007, pp. 261-282). The Gaza Center for Human Rights confirmed its report on the legal dimensions of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza:

1) The withdrawal from Gaza did not undermine Israel's legal and civil responsibility for the crimes and violations committed against innocent Palestinian civilians since the beginning of the occupation of Palestine.

2) The Israeli withdrawal does not negate the right of Palestinian civilians to prosecute the Israeli occupation for compensation, and to use their private property for military or settlements purposes.

3) The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza does not negate the Palestinians' right to try war criminals who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity by inflicting violence on Palestinians (Ben-Naftali, Gross, & Michaeli, 2005, pp. 555-612). The Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip will be prevented and independence as well as freedom of movement will be ensured to start rehabilitation in life spaces. Further, cities will be reconstructed to enjoy sovereignty and independence as well as citizenship rights to allow people to continue their regular lives and perform economic, social and cultural activities (COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON THE SIXTY-FIRST SESSION, 2005, p. 16) (Independent Commission on Human Rights, 2005: 5). The problematic of the withdrawal from Gaza from the legal point of view is that the Gaza Strip is surrounded by a large number of prisons. The occupiers do not bare the sole responsibility and the situation is not independent from the conflict of sovereign states. Indeed, there is also the effect of being surrounded by enormous military power in land, air and sea. However, Palestinians do not enjoy any legal personality in their relations

with the neighboring countries. After the withdrawal from Gaza, Israeli informed the Palestinian authorities as well as Egypt that these countries would not have the right to open the Rafah crossing without an agreement and they would not have the right to operate this crossing, but only Israel would have the right to open this crossing. In addition, Israel closed the Beit Hanoun crossing in the north of the Gaza Strip and decided to approach this point as an international crossing. In this regard, Palestinians are regarded as foreigners trying to reach international outlets. Within this scope, the buffer zone extending 300 meters along the eastern and northern borders of the Gaza Strip was occupied as well, which poses illegality of Israeli forces. This means that Palestinians were under Israeli shelling and threat every day. The sound barrier in the Gaza Strip was frequently bombarded and children as well as women and the elderly were intimidated. Aircrafts were on mission almost every day. Leaders or non-leaders picked a security location in the Gaza Strip frequently to ensure tight control. In this regard, particularly reconnaissance planes also knew no break. Following the withdrawal, the Israeli navy continued its control over the coastal strip of Gaza, and further intensified its arbitrary measures against civilians. They were reported to attack fishermen and fire missiles at Gaza Strip (Al-Quds Newspaper, 2006). A very important issue related to the legal status of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal was about the population registry. Indeed, the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip is completely controlled by Israel. Israel has been the decision-maker in granting Palestinians identity card or citizenship rights. Palestinian citizens in Gaza have to negotiate with Israeli public officials for civil registry which has been among the significant indications of the Israeli occupation in Palestine (Palestinian Planning Center, 2001). Israel's occupation policies fall within the scope and

meaning of the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, leading to forced displacement in Jerusalem and the West Bank to increase the proportion of Jewish settlers in Palestinian territories (Nizar Ayoub). Many Jewish strategists have written about the negative impact on the Palestinian community as well as the Israeli society by the unilateral withdrawal plan from the Gaza Strip. The unilateral withdrawal of Israel has raised reactions in the shape of movements harming peaceful settlements such as Hamas, Jihad and Fatah. Accordingly, an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation – instead of negotiations – in the hope of victory cannot guarantee evasion from violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the wake of Israeli practices that amounted to committing war crimes and mass killing of Palestinians, as well as Israel's rejection to appeals or defiance by the UN resolutions and Arab initiatives caused Palestinians to find themselves alone in their fate and these people's future depended only on their ability to exert certain security, military, economic, social and political pressure on the Israeli side so that the occupation forces withdraw from the Palestinian territory – the Gaza Strip and the West Bank – without further harm (Murtada, 2010, pp. 92-99). There has been a debate in the Palestinian community about the reasons that led the Israeli occupation to withdraw from the Gaza Strip between within the framework of two different aspects where Palestinian President Abbas urged that the withdrawal was the result of the truce between the two sides, while Dr. Zahar, a leader in Hamas, asserted that it was the result of attacks by the Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation (BBC News, 2005). In fact, the separation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from each other has caused great damage to the Palestinian's situation. These damages have been comprehensive in all aspects of life: political, social, cultural and economic. The Israeli withdrawal has led to the creation of

two separate Palestinian entities, each of which has their own independent administrations according to their programs, which demonstrates Sharon's success in dispersing Palestinians (Hanoud, 1998). After the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and full takeover of the Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Authority, citizens in this area have not yet acquired an improvement in their situation although they have waited long for such an improvement basically due to many external obstacles inflicted by the occupation forces as well as practices against Palestinians particularly in Gaza (11th Annual Report, 2006). Sharon's genius in tactics in putting forward the plan to withdraw from Gaza in its essence was a plan get rid of 1,3 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip. Sharon first intended to divide the Palestinian territory by isolating one-third of Palestinian population from their relatives in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the former lands which were Palestinian soil until 1948. Most importantly, the occupation delayed Palestinians' coming together to form a major force for nearly half a century. In this regard, Israel reserved its right to intervene in the Gaza Strip anytime it deemed necessary (Fahmy, 2006). In short, the Gaza Strip became a failed entity restricting people's life in social terms on the eve of the Israeli withdrawal in 2005.

According to demographic predictions with regard to the Israeli occupation, it was estimated that the Palestinian population would surpass the Jewish population in numbers across the Gaza Strip and the West Bank when it came to the year 2010. For many, it seemed that the only possible way to ensure a long-term Jewish majority in the Israeli occupation was by withdrawing from Gaza as a whole. Thus, the withdrawal from Gaza is regarded by some to improve the demographic situation in Israel (Galili, 2002). On the other hand, the Intifada and the Israeli withdrawal have had some notable consequences

for the Palestinian society. Israeli measures against people, including the disruption of movement between the different areas of Gaza and the West Bank, have led to disturbance since Palestinians had to wait for a long time at Israeli checkpoints in Gaza and the West Bank. More severely, people have been shown to be punished for their support to the Palestinian resistance (Harari & Heller, 2005, pp. 1-9).

### **3.3. The Impact of the Second Intifada and the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza on the Economy**

Before the Second Intifada began, the West Bank was economically stable. People were able to earn a decent living. Citizens were able to travel without the fear of being harassed at Israeli checkpoints or tension due to the construction of a Wall, which prevented many Palestinians from reaching certain areas within the West Bank after the Second Intifada. The 1993 Oslo Agreement was an important step in the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis and aimed at ending the conflict between the two sides. An economic protocol was formed to restructure the economic system between Palestinians and Israelis, while maintaining the freedom of movement of goods and labor between the economies of the two parties within the framework of a 'non – existent' customs union. This Protocol is known as the Paris Protocol (PP). Nonetheless, this did not achieve any good results due to the Israeli control over a large portion of Palestinian financial revenues. Moreover, many administrative and bureaucratic restrictions were inflicted upon Palestinian investments by the effect of the Israeli occupation regime in Palestinian territories. As a matter of fact, the occupation forces prevented Palestinian investments as well as obstructing importing of certain goods and machinery equipment due to "dual use" claims. There were also restrictions on access to land, roads and

infrastructure as well as entrance of international investors and experts to Palestine (Arnon & Bamyra, 2015, p. 39). Many investments after the Oslo Agreement in the West Bank were negatively affected by high risks, which were also the results of the Israeli occupation and violent actions. Also, the economy declined during 1994 -2004, and this decline is intertwined with the growing restrictions on freedom of movement between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the decline in average growth rates in Palestinian economy was largely due to the Israeli occupation during the Oslo Agreement process that does not mean that there are no mistakes or failures on the Palestinian side. It is therefore hard to ignore the fact that Israel largely controls most of the conditions in which the Palestinian economy operates in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. Or it certainly controls the ability to invest and transport goods across Palestinian areas without accountability. The economic shocks to Palestinian labor markets were an important catalyst for violence in the First Intifada and Second Intifada. In particular, reduction in private sector employment in local areas were associated with a decline in Palestinian trade with the Israeli occupation in 1990s in the wake of high level of violence in Palestine. Moreover, restrictions were imposed on Palestinian employment inside and outside Israel at the beginning of the Second Intifada with the rise of violence in the West Bank and Gaza. In both cases, the low income increases in the desire of individuals to participate in the Palestinian - Israeli conflict (Cali & Miarri, 2015). The construction of the partition Wall in the West Bank is one of the clearest correlations with violence during the Second Intifada Period. This construction has been stimulating popular demonstration and violence as well as injustice. Moreover, the occupation caused grievance through the confiscation and access restriction of Palestinian lands during the

Intifada. In this regard, Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has consistently fed grievances among Palestinians. The presence and expansion of settlements increased Palestinian - Israeli displacement during the Second Intifada. This extremism in the West Bank appears to be due to the confiscation of the Palestinian lands and violence against Palestinians associated with settlements (Zussman, 2014, p. 3). Unemployment also fell from 18,2% in 1995 to 11% by the year 2000. In 1995, the Israeli army abandoned the center of some cities and withdrew from some towns. Once the Israeli army left those cities in 1995 in the West Bank, life in these cities became more normal with shops being opened all day and schools being fully functional without any problems. Moreover, there was a surge in the number of new restaurants in the West Bank. For instance, in the year 1995 it is estimated that there were approximately ninety restaurants within the city of Ramallah before the Second Intifada. With the beginning of 2000, this number increased to 105. However, this slight growth soon slowed down and only two restaurants remained in Ramallah after the starting of the Intifada. Before the Second Intifada, Ramallah was a city of offices, trade, culture, art, entertainment, beauty and naturalism while all the optimism felt by Palestinians soon disappeared as soon as the Second Intifada broke out (Cork, 2011, pp. 18-19). The cities began re-experiencing the challenges that occurred during the First Intifada, such as curfews, checkpoints, road closures, shutting down of schools and also public institutions such as hospitals, charities, governmental and non- governmental institutions. In addition, establishing checkpoints and the Apartheid Wall made it impossible for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza to get to their jobs outside the city's borders. As a result of that, many Palestinians were fired from their jobs and left on the streets struggling to make ends meet during the

Second Intifada. Before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, about 11% of Palestinians were unemployed in Palestine. This rate increased to 41% during the Second Intifada, especially in 2002. In order to reach to Jerusalem, special permits were required from Palestinians by the Israeli occupation forces, making it difficult to reach the Holy City. The number of Israeli settlements also increased around the Palestinian cities during the Second Intifada. During the time of incidents taking place, the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip increased by more than 52%. This is the fastest rate of settlement growth since the occupation of the Palestinian lands by Israel in 1967. Settlements were built in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip during the Second Intifada by confiscating private and public Palestinian land by force, and uprooting olives, citrus and other orchards, and razing agricultural fields, which was the main income of Palestinian farmers (Taraki, 2006, p. 104) (Kober, 2009, p. 87) (Aljuni, 2003, p. 69). The beginning of the uprising in the late 2001 and early 2002, widespread sieges on the Palestinian population centers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted in virtual town arrest from most of the citizens in Palestine. That served further to dampen economic activity, employment and income in Palestine, resulting in the radical spike in Palestinian poverty rate in all Palestinian cities (Palestinian Textbooks 2000-2002). In early 2002, Israeli occupation forces reoccupied major cities, towns and certain villages in the West Bank and some towns in the Gaza Strip and imposed a 24 - hour curfew. Thus, the economy became paralyzed in all Palestinian cities. Also, the scale of Israeli raids or curfews in the West Bank and Gaza increased throughout the remainder of 2001-2002 and further disrupted economic activity for the vast majority of the population in Palestine during the Second Intifada. The Gross National Income is estimated to have

fallen from about \$6,1 billion in 1999 to \$5 billion in 2001-2002, a decline of more than 17%. Per Capita Income fell by 23% during the first 15 months of the Second Intifada. With the intensification of violence and restrictions on movement during the Second Intifada, according to the World Bank, real GDP and Gross National income (GNI) fell by another 20% in 2002. The realigned economic losses suffered by Palestinians resulted from the protracted crisis, which may well be assessed by comparing pre - crisis growth expectations with actual developments. The actual results can be seen as loss in equal opportunity stemming from the border closures, movement restrictions and the siege of the Palestinian population centers in the West Bank and Gaza during the Second Intifada (Fifteen Months - Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment, 2002, pp. 66-67). The Palestinian decision was to respond to violation during the Second Intifada by means of Palestinian boycott over the Israeli economy as much as possible – mainly boycotting Israeli industrial and agricultural products and giving priority to Palestinian products followed by Arab Islamic and Western products. That period was marked as a central boycotting by Palestinians against products made in Israel. However, Israel strongly responded to these initiatives. The Israeli government made various political decisions from time to time to prevent more than tens of thousands of Palestinian workers from reaching their work centers in Jewish enterprises, factories, and farms for security reasons, fearing economic sabotage and military strikes. In addition, the most important economic impacts during the Second Intifada were the confiscation of large tracts of land, the destruction of thousands of homes, the destruction of infrastructure on streets, electricity and water networks, sewage and telephone networks, and demolition of hundreds of shops in all Palestinian governorates. The number of houses and buildings

which were destroyed during the Second Intifada was more than 27 thousand houses and Palestinian buildings, including 3,700 houses completely destroyed and the rest partially destroyed. And more than 15,000 Palestinians were left homeless and damage amounted to more than \$375 million. The number of government premises, security sites, public and private facilities destroyed was 1193. As a result, 56 thousand Palestinians were displaced to find other residential areas to flee the effect of blockades. Only in 2002, more than 1,000 houses were destroyed in Jenin refugee camp when Israeli tanks and aircraft broke into this camp during the Second Intifada (Alawneh, 2013). The destruction of Palestinian industry and agriculture, and the prevention of Palestinian workers from going to work in Jewish factories and farms caused severe damage on the economy of Palestine. The economic loss of Palestinian workers was estimated to be around 5 billion Shekels (\$2 billion) during the three years of the Al - Aqsa Intifada or the Second Intifada, and more than 400,000 Palestinian workers were denied entry to their working places. The construction of the Israeli Apartheid Wall between the Palestinian territories occupied in 1948 and the territories occupied in 1967 represented a major economic loss by confiscation of more than 200,000 dunums of land in the West Bank. The continued Israeli blockade over Palestinian territories paralyzed economic life and paved the way for low-income levels due to high unemployment rates and weak household purchasing power. Employers were forced to reduce wages of workers first and then to dismiss thousands of them, as happened in the factories of Nablus and Hebron and many others. In addition, tens of thousands of dunums of area planted with fruit trees were destructed and razed, depriving farmers from harvesting the fruits from their trees and crops and causing heavy losses. Again during the Second Intifada, the loss in the Palestinian

agricultural sector increased by more than \$1 billion. The number of uprooted olive trees reached more than thousands of various tree types including citrus, palm, and olive with varying numbers. As a matter of fact, uprooting even one olive tree cost Palestinian farmers about \$700. When they are to plant a new tree, it takes more than five years before the tree yields any crops and another five years for mature tree production.

The Second Intifada period, in this regard, witnessed great harm to economy and specifically agriculture due large confiscations of private and public Palestinians lands, uprooting trees in orchards and agricultural zones to destroy olive, citrus and other crops to prevent agricultural industry for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, large areas of agricultural fields were bulldozed, which eliminated the main source of income of Palestinian farmers. According to Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), there were around 144 Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank during the Second Intifada and of these 144 settlements, 24 were located in the city of Ramallah (Taraki, 2006, p. 104). During the Second Intifada, the number of poultry and farm birds killed by the Israeli aggression was 1,5 million. 3,713 sheep, cows and 637 farm animals, 7,505 bee hives, 806 water wells/ponds and 296 stores were destroyed according to various reports. Only in Ramallah city, the current unemployment rate has risen to 34%, while the rate of poverty has peaked at 51% due to the severe clashes during the Second Intifada. Further, Ramallah suffered from isolation and economic deterioration and the city is still endeavoring to fix its infrastructure where the recovery process takes time. Tourism in the city of Ramallah and some Palestinian cities also declined. Most tourists were attracted to the comfortable religious atmosphere of the city of Ramallah as well as its cafes along its main streets. 1,222 tourist trips were estimated to flow to this city from

and outside Palestine before the starting of the Second Intifada. However, the numbers dropped dramatically after the emergence of the Second Intifada. In 2002, it was estimated that there were only 210 trips within the Palestinian Territory (Department, 2011). Before the Second Intifada, the hotel industry within the Palestinian territories, especially in the West Bank and Jerusalem, was relatively stable due to the calm between the Palestinians and Israelis. There were more than 100 functional hotels in Palestine, however this number fell down when the Second Intifada broke out in 2000. The number of hotels in Palestine fell to less than 85 since many hotels were either damaged or destroyed by the Israeli army during the Second Intifada. Many tourists feared traveling anywhere within the Palestinian territories due to the establishment of checkpoints in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza. Many of the buildings and areas which were visited by tourists in the West Bank were destroyed during the Second Intifada by the Israeli occupation. One such building was Arafat's headquarters, one of the main political buildings inside the city of Ramallah (Naqib, 2007, p. 30).

As referred to in the evaluation of the damage to agricultural industry, olive oil production in the region decreased due to the uprooting of olive trees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Plant Production Department was producing and exporting approximately 15,000 tons of olive oil annually. However, these exports ceased as soon as the Second Intifada broke out. During the first four years of the Second Intifada, approximately 4,000,000 olive trees were destroyed by the Israeli forces. The estimated value of those destroyed olive trees is more than \$60 million. The systematic attack by the Israeli occupation during the Second Intifada on olive groves in Palestine caused a huge economic and environmental disaster that will affect the Palestinian

society for years to come. It is estimated that the annual income generated by the olive production for Palestinians was about 40% of gross product of fruit trees in Palestine before the Second Intifada started. However, the production of olive decreased tremendously after the Second Intifada broke out (Monitoring Israeli Colonization Activities, Olive Harvest in Palestine Another Season, Another Anguish, 2004) Many citizens in Palestine have reached an unprecedented level of poverty together with their families. The Second Intifada has increased poverty in the cities of West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. Before the starting of the Second Intifada, poverty did exist in Palestine, however as severe as during the Intifada. The cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem – which were considered to be among the most prosperous cities in the West Bank – lost their significance due to the incidents taking place during the upsurge by Palestinians. Particularly Ramallah city suffered greatly due to the fact that Arafat's headquarters were located there. In this city, gun battles were intense between the Israeli defense forces and the Palestinian resistance fighters. Also because of Arafat's policies against Israel, curfews were frequent and intense in the city. Consequently, the city of Ramallah's residents could not go to work and there was no income to household to pay for food, utensils, and clotting, etc. The independent business owners in the West Bank were affected as well since they were not allowed to open up their shops on a day to day basis to make a living. Many families living in Ramallah and other cities in the West Bank and Gaza struggled to find a job during the Intifada (Farhud, 2016, p. 24).

The numbers of closed schools in Palestine reached to more than 580 and 240,000 students and about 9,700 teachers were unable to attend their schools. And the additional financial burdens incurred by the Palestinian National Authority and financial

entitlements held by Israeli government amounted to more than \$960 million in 2004 and more than \$600 million in 2006. Import and export rates through Israeli ports were reduced and the total closure contributed to the shortage of quantities of vegetables and fruits which consequently increased prices. There were also medical and economic losses resulting from the destruction of more than 36 ambulances and destroying more than 424 beds in hospitals during the Second Intifada.

As a matter of fact, large groups of Jewish imposed war against the Palestinian Arabs in Galilee, Triangle, Naqab and Sahel as well as a comprehensive economic boycott. Those Palestinians were deprived of their political, economic and civil rights during the Second Intifada. Residents in Palestinian cities were separated from those in villages and camps as a form of collective punishment. Local and cellular telephone communications were confiscated by the Jewish military. And during the Intifada, the Israeli occupation resorted to demolition of thousands of Palestinian homes in the territories occupied in 1967. Residential towers and popular neighborhoods were also destroyed on the excuse of punishing perpetrators of bombardments during the military incursions into cities, villages and camps. They also used the pretext to destroy laboratories where explosives were manufactured as well as killing military leaders of the Palestinian resistance force (Alawneh, 2013). Due to the long-term curfews during this Second Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza, many Palestinian business owners permanently closed their stores and migrated to other countries around the world to start a new life away from the conflict in Palestine. Closing businesses and enterprises in Palestinian cities caused deep economic harm during the Second Intifada, which affected Palestinian families to a great extent. However, the Palestinian market was thriving before the outbreak of the Second Intifada

by means of high number of visitors in all cities on daily basis. When the clashed between the Israeli and Palestinian sides started in the year 2000, economic conditions as well as social life in these cities deteriorated in a short time (Miller, 2005, p. 127). In addition to vast number of evidences with regard to the impact of the Second Intifada on the Palestinian economy, there is clear proof that the sanctions imposed on territories under the Palestinian control drastically reduced economic activity and living standards of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank was affected by Israeli closures than Gaza since income rates dropped significantly since the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The average household income decreased by 50% in the years of the Second Intifada compared to the year 2000. Furthermore, 46% of Palestinian population lived under the poverty line. To cope up with the reduction in incomes, households were forced to sell family jewelry, postpone paying bills and borrow money during the Second Intifada. In addition, Israel suspended transfer of funds accrued to PA. It is estimated that Israel withheld more than \$600,000.000 of export tax receipts from Palestinians in the year 2000. Thus, the Second Intifada had great economic effects in Palestine and also caused emigration of Palestinians in search for better economic opportunities abroad. With the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from the Gaza Strip on September 12, 2005, the Gaza Strip remained effectively and legally under the Israeli occupation. It was not liberated, and its inhabitants did not feel liberated or independent. Gaza turned into a sort of large jail with wires and barriers from all walks of life (Saleh, 2009). When an issue was raised due to payment of taxes and fees collected from Palestinians, a decision was taken to impose a blockade on Palestine (Saleh M. M., 2006). The Israeli government ratified these punitive measures demanding that the international community

should stop providing financial aid to the Palestinians (Abu-Saad & Champagne, 2006, pp. 1035-1042). In light of the collapse of the infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and large increase in population during the years of the Intifada, people's needs increased in parallel to housing, school, hospitals, etc. This fact manifested the negative effect of the upsurge on Palestinian citizens, which exacerbated through daily crises and acute shortage in fulfilling basic needs. The rate of poverty increased significantly after the imposition of the siege on Gaza in 2005 and 2006. The rate of people living below the poverty line also decreased about 30% due to the restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on Gaza (The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, 2011).

Israel adopted a new policy against the Gaza Strip, by tightening the restrictions on freedom of movement for merchants and businessmen through the Beit Hanoun crossing, and expanded such measures by arresting dozens of merchants and businessmen. Israel also added many goods to the lists of prohibitions. All these measures came within the framework of Israel's policy of tightening the siege and strangling the Gaza Strip. According to the World Bank, the unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip is the highest globally, and the unemployment rates among young people and graduates in the Gaza Strip exceed 60% (MA'AN NEWS AGENCY, 2015). Al-Khudari uttered that the continuation of the siege and the closure provisions after the Israeli withdrawal led to a difficult economic reality in which the average per capita income per day fell below \$2; unemployment rate rose to 60%, while 80% of people lived below the poverty line and about 1 million Gazans lived only on international aid (al-Khudari, 2018). It can be said that the tight siege on the Gaza Strip caused a decrease in employment opportunities and an increase in the volume of unemployment especially in the construction sector where

building materials was not brought to the country. Many other industrial sectors also ceased to function due to lack of raw materials.

Healthcare is one of the most important sectors in need of investments since it is directly related to survival of people. In Palestine, the healthcare sector continued to suffer from severe and serious crises throughout the Second Intifada as a result of the Israeli restrictions imposed after the Israeli withdrawal. Restrictions included denial of access to medicine and medical supplies as well as prohibition over Palestinian patients to receive treatment outside Gaza. As a result of restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation following the 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the health sector remained very limited in its function and could barely provide basic services to the growing number of patients in Gaza. Therefore, many patients are often referred to Egypt for treatment. However, with the Rafah crossing still closed, patients have to postpone or even cancel their transfers abroad. Dozens of patients died as a result of the violation of their rights to medical care since 2005. The health sector suffered after the Israeli withdrawal from other crises due to the shortage of specialized medical personnel and prevention of traveling out of the Gaza Strip. Currently, more than 1,000 patients are referred monthly for treatment in hospitals outside the Gaza Strip, whereas most of them are often denied travel permit from East Jerusalem or the West Bank (The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, 2011). Milk and medicine for children were not exempt from the Israeli siege. Many medical supplies and equipment for treatment were not available in hospitals in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In addition to the deterioration of the diagnostic laboratory equipment, many medical instruments such as magnetic resonance and imaging, X-ray, are not functional and cannot be fixed due to lack of spare parts as border

crossings for receiving such instruments are blocked by the occupation forces. The six land crossings letting to the Gaza Strip are the only ones allowing movement of people and goods. Egypt controls the Rafah crossing, while the Israeli occupation controls the remaining five crossings, linking the Gaza Strip to the territories occupied since 1948. Since the Israeli withdrawal, the Israeli occupation authorities have prevented movement from the Gaza Strip through the sea and air and imposed strict restrictions on movement through the crossings to the Gaza Strip (PCHR, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Annual Report 2013, 2013).

The Israeli siege after the withdrawal caused a crisis in the education sector, as well, due to the repeated Israeli attacks that exacerbated the crisis. Israel confiscated the right of Palestinians to education by targeting and destroying educational institutions without taking into account the basic principles. The education sector was affected by the siege policy, where the educational process in Gaza was interrupted, especially in light of the inability to rebuild destroyed schools or build new schools. The dual crisis affected the lives of half a million students, more than 130,000 university students, and has made it difficult for students to reach their schools and universities (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Annual Report 2011, 2011). Furthermore, reconstruction of the schools targeted during the Second Intifada in Gaza and the West Bank was interfered. And even after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, 26 schools under construction have been suspended because of the Israeli blockade. It is clear that the Israeli siege deprives Palestinians of the right to education through the closure of the crossings, where students are prevented from completing their studies, as they are also banned from participating in scientific conferences outside Palestine. All of these incidents have negative repercussions on

education in the country. As a result of the continuing challenges faced by the residents of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, schools are unable to raise their educational standards. The siege and repeated Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank cause interruptions in education as these attacks prevent students and teachers from accessing schools. Following the Israeli withdrawal in 2005, the service and environmental sectors did not become immune to effects of the Israeli blockade as well. The fuel crisis was reflected negatively and seriously to the public health, healthcare and environmental infrastructure. Due to the Israeli blockade during the Intifada, the reduction of fuel and electricity supplies in Gaza hampered the desalination plant and occasionally prevented access to essential chemicals such as chlorine. Al-Khudari pointed out to the fact that the situation in Gaza is becoming increasingly complicated with a significant decline in the economic, health, electricity, sanitation and water sectors as well as with the population increasing by about half a million in eight years (al-Khudari, 2018). According to the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility in Gaza, 30% of local people in Gaza receive water for 4-8 hours once a week and 40% one time every four days, and 30% once in every two days (Amnesty International Annual Report 2008, 2008). In an interview with the Director General of the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility in Gaza, he confirmed that 97% of the water in the Gaza Strip has become unfit for human use. In addition, pumping of wastewater into the sea caused considerable pollution after the Israeli withdrawal. The blockade exacerbated the already deteriorated situation in the water sector, which resulted in many health problems and diseases that spread among consumers, including: diarrhea and hemorrhagic diarrhea (Amnesty International Annual Report 2009, 2009). The Israeli siege has negatively affected the movement and construction and reconstruction process

in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well, exacerbating the housing crisis in the Gaza Strip with the demolition of tens of thousands of houses, apartments, factories and facilities. And thus, this has led to the complete paralysis of the construction sector, where construction industries have stopped to produce concrete, tiles, brick factories and others. It is reported that the value of construction projects that were stopped due to the prevention of entry of building materials is estimated as 200 million dollars, in addition to the suspension of the many private projects. Israeli restrictions on the entry and exit of goods and the movement of individuals in and out of the Gaza Strip have caused a serious deterioration in the humanitarian and human rights situation in the Gaza Strip, particularly in the context of food insecurity and the severe lack of medical and pharmaceutical goods. According to Al-Khudari, The Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip is part of a larger siege targeting all Palestinians, which has recently escalated and imposed more closures on cities, towns and villages where hundreds of checkpoints are built in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Al-Khudari stressed that the occupation besieges each area and paralyzes life there (al-Khudari, 2018). Abdu, the head of the Euro-Mediterranean Observatory for Human Rights, said that the Israeli occupation is well aware of the seriousness of the crimes perpetrated and sort pushes the international community to present a different picture than what the occupation forces do on the ground, trying to change the name of the blockade so as not to harm its international image (The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, 2011).

The Israeli occupation forces demolished more than 226 houses in the Gaza Strip, uprooted 26,000 trees and razed approximately 3.5 million square meters of agricultural land (Shehadeh, 2017). The fact that the Gaza Strip has not been occupied since the Israel

withdrawal in 2005 is wrong, since the Israeli occupation forces still control all aspects of life through imposition of a suffocating siege on land, sea and air. In addition, the Israeli occupation forces control the quantities of goods entering the Palestinian market through management of all its competitors. Fishermen are not allowed to fish freely in the territorial waters of the Palestinian territories in the Mediterranean after a decision following the Israeli withdrawal in 2005. The Israeli occupation, through its siege of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, reduces or prevents the entry of many foods and medical supplies (International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report 2016, 2016). The US State Department led the efforts to block the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Palestinian government. The US State Department issued two statements following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2006, announcing the cessation of all financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. The value of programs that were suspended or canceled was \$509 million. The United States also enacted a law that prohibits the US government, institutions and bodies from providing direct economic assistance to the Palestinian government as well as granting funds to private organizations and bodies working in the field of humanitarian assistance in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Abu-Saad & Champagne, 2006). Therefore, the US position towards the siege on Gaza and the West Bank was clear from the beginning by supporting the blockade and obliging the countries of the world not to support the government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The American position is more stringent towards the imposition of the blockade, and thus the United States may well be regarded to be biased against Israel and to bear the responsibility of the siege and aggression on the Palestinian people (Fair, 2008). On September 12, 2005, the day of the last Israeli soldier leaving the Gaza Strip, President

Abbas told to journalists that “The Israeli left the Gaza, but did not end the occupation in Palestine through their control of the airspace, the sea, the borders, the airport, the crossings and lands” (Al-Quds Newspaper, 2006). And Prime Minister of the time Dr. Qurei stressed that without opening the Rafah border crossing to Egypt in the southern Gaza Strip and allowing freedom of movement in both directions, the Gaza Strip would become a large prison (Al-Ayam Newspaper, 2005). And the Supreme Follow-up Committee of the National and Islamic Forces, which includes more than 13 factions, issued a statement on the day of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, which the parties called for pressure on the occupation government to make the withdrawal completed from the Gaza Strip, including the Rafah crossing, the Gaza Strip's airspace and borders, and improving the economic situation (Forces, 2005). And the international and Israeli siege against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal caused a humanitarian crisis that led to a serious shortage of medical supplies and essential medicines (UNOCHA, 2006, p. 88). The blockade included preventing entry of fuel, electricity and many goods such as biscuits to the Palestinian territory, as well as preventing fishing in the sea, functioning in the poultry and meat businesses, and closing the crossings. According to certain scholars, Egypt is largely involved in the siege of Gaza in an informal way, as the Rafah crossing has closed the Strip's only outlet to the outside world (Al-Quds Newspaper, 2006). The Israeli occupation controls the provision and entry of quantities and types of good, food, fuel, medical supplies into the Gaza Strip, and this isolation has plunged the region into a large scale humanitarian crisis. Israel is also in full violation of the international humanitarian law in the Gaza Strip (International Committee of The Red Cross, 2007, p. 3). On the eve of the withdrawal from Gaza, the

city was suffering from economic depression with over 65% of the population living under the poverty threshold and its workforce being overwhelmed under severe unemployment (International Committee of The Red Cross, 2007, p. 3). Problems emerging after the Second Intifada included damage on the infrastructure of the city. In addition, there was further Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement between Gaza and the West Bank, which led to a decline in domestic private investments and a lack of social fabric (Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 2018). The economic crisis in Gaza and the West Bank became a terrible burden for ordinary Palestinians after the withdrawal. In this regard, it is possible to argue that the purely developmental approach to post-withdrawal Palestine is never enough.

### **3.4. The Political Impact of the Second Intifada and the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza**

The local government responsible for policies in Palestine was the Fatah movement. Fatah is a political party that started as a Palestinian National Liberation Movement in 1965 outside Palestine. The founder of Fatah was Yasser Arafat, who later became President of the Palestine Liberation Organization and also President of the Palestinian National Authority. Arafat spent most of his life being dedicated to fighting the Israeli occupation. For more than 60 years, Arafat's main political agenda was the annihilation of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. However, Arafat's agenda gradually changed during 1990s. During 1990s, Arafat wanted to take a different approach and establish peace between Palestinians and the Israeli. In 1994, Yasser Arafat and Rabin shared the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts in the Oslo peace process and there was hope to open a new chapter in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Unfortunately, efforts to establish peace between

Palestinians and Israelis failed once the Second Intifada ignited in 2000s (Rosen, 2015). Among political reasons for the Second Intifada are as follows: The Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations at Camp David sponsored by the United States in July 2000 failed as Israel refused to recognize the rights of Palestinians as well as establishment of the Palestine as an independent state. Israel also refused to approve the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes in the lands they were living prior to 1948. Israel insisted that Jerusalem was their united capital city and denied Palestinians to have the city as their capital. Furthermore, Israeli authorities refused to place Muslim and Christian holy sites under Palestinian national sovereignty or elsewhere. In contrast, the Palestinian delegation headed by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO and President of the National Authority rejected a US proposal to pay 40 billion dollars in exchange for approving the suggested Israeli control of Palestinian crossings and borders, abandoning the idea of ensuring return of Palestinian refugees, Israeli supervision of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the supervision of the Palestinian National Authority over Al - Aqsa Mosque from the top.

As a matter of fact, one of the important reasons why the Second Intifada broke out was that the Israeli government refused to implement UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 and 338 to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories, on the other hand, Israel insisted on expanding the Jewish settlements across the entire land. Another reason was the isolation of Palestinian families from each other and the desire of the Israeli government to retain 58% of the West Bank under its control by building the Apartheid Wall. Particularly the end of the self-rule period for Palestinians fueled great anger in Palestinian authorities. The self-rule period last only 5 years, indeed. And with the

decision to implement the Oslo Agreement on May 4, 1994, the maximum period of self-government expired on May 4, 1999. Thereby, the Independent Palestinian State was not established as planned by the Palestinian leadership. The Israeli expansion of racial discrimination against Arab citizens in Galilee, Triangle, Naqab and Sahel was exacerbated by the denial of recognizing their political rights by the Israeli government. It is observed through a Jewish and Arab public opinion survey in occupied Palestine in 1948 that the rate of Arabs, who attributed the reasons for the outbreak of the Second Intifada to discrimination and inequality between Arabs and Jews was 50%. Ariel Sharon visited the Al-Aqsa Mosque in 2000, and there is no doubt that this visit was an element of provocation, perhaps intended by Sharon, who wanted to disrupt the peace negotiations and discredit then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak's government. This was a rather successful political tactic, indeed. However, it may be difficult to understand why the Israeli government allowed Sharon to visit the Temple Mount (Al-Aqsa Mosque). However, many Palestinian sources and the former PA Minister of Communications have explicitly acknowledged that violence had been planned since President Arafat returned from Camp David in July. Therefore, it would be wrong to believe that the Second Intifada broke out because of Sharon's visit to the Aqsa Mosque, even though this visit was what ignited incidents. Within this framework, the Intifada was planned in advance before President Arafat returned from the Camp David negotiations, turning the table upside down on President Clinton. During that time, Arafat remained steadfast and challenged President Clinton by rejecting the American stipulations and actions in the heart of the United States (AS-Safir, 2001). In this regard, the Second Intifada created certain positive political achievements for Palestinians.

Violence caused the evacuation of the Gaza Strip by Israel, yet the settlement project and the dream of the "Greater Israel" were impossible to be achieved during the Second Intifada. The outbreak of the Intifada essentially killed the Palestinian - Israeli peace movement. Many Israelis who believed in the possibility of peace with Palestinians felt disappointed and betrayed (Ha'aretz, 2008). Although it was intentional, a number of Palestinian organizations and leaders, including leaders of the Palestinian Authority, hailed the idea of launching an armed uprising. Fatah declared that protests would ignite the land under the feet of the settlers and Jews throughout Palestine. As long as there is no real violence, this can only be understood as rhetoric, or perhaps as a threat used to convince for concessions, even though the Palestinians have explicitly pledged to stop violence and incitement under the agreements in Oslo (Al-Safir, 2001, Translation). A series of Israeli mistakes contributed to the creation of the Second Intifada and also helped it to grow. The government in Israel was given orders to build settlement units and steadily expand the population in these settlements in the West Bank and Gaza in the spring of 2000. The useless and futile brutality of suppressing the demonstrations in the early Intifada days undoubtedly helped fuel violence and extremism. More than once, the Palestinian Authority offered non - violence through negotiations, however the Israeli government did not accept this offer during the Second Intifada. Israel had an ongoing policy of building settlement units in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem through punitive and security measures, demolishing houses, confiscating Palestinian lands and destroying olive trees. All these contributed to the misery and resentment on the Palestinian side (see below the Second Intifada Timeline). The most important political event during the Second Intifada was that Israel took over a boycott against Palestine and

Yasser Arafat's building, while placing Yasser Arafat under house arrest for more than a year. As a result, many Palestinians viewed the boycott as a destructive incident symbolizing Israel's invasion and all-out war against Palestinian people. The boycott became the symbol of Yasser Arafat, who remained trapped during the Intifada and became mysteriously ill and later died on November 11, 2004 at the Percy military hospital outside Paris (Roberts, 2012, p. 29).

During the Second Intifada, many of the governmental buildings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were destroyed or severely damaged, such as the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Central Office of the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture (Jerusalem, 2002). Palestine did not have an active government, which paved the way for them to believe that leaders of the government failed to contribute in their favor and thus allowed the Intifada to play in Israel's hands. Due of the lack of political leadership in the beginning of the Second Intifada, many Palestinians began to blame the Palestinian political leadership for the upcoming incidents and their suffering. In this context, many political and Islamic groups began to make a name for themselves during the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. One of the political groups that received the greatest political support from Palestinians during the Second Intifada was Hamas due to its violent ideology towards Israel (Walther, 2012, p. 81). Hamas, the Arabic word for Enthusiasm, is a shortcut to the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine. Hamas is a more of a radical Palestinian political group formed in late 1987 during the First Palestinian Intifada. The group was founded by the Palestinian branch of Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. In order to provide means for the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the

confrontation against Israel without exposing the Muslim Brotherhood, a wide network of social welfare and religious institutions participated to the group to respond the Israeli violence. It also known that Hamas has a military wing in Palestine known as the Izz Al - Din Al - Qassam Brigades. Israel and the United State consider it a terrorist organization, though (Satloff, 2006, p. 5). In a collective charter in published in 1988, Hamas called for the independence of Palestinians and the destruction of the Israeli occupation forces. Due to the policies of Hamas against Israel, many Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank joined Hamas, but not Fatah (Lynn Docherty, 2007: 31). With the outbreak of the Second Intifada, Hamas became politically, militarily and socially active. Yet, Hamas was not very popular among Palestinians before the Second Intifada. When Hamas was first established, it was only popular in the Gaza Strip. When the Second Intifada began, Hamas saw the Intifada as an opportunity to spread its effect on Palestinian people, especially those living in the West Bank and Jerusalem. While Hamas gained considerable support from Palestinians, Fatah lost many of its followers during that time as many Palestinians accused Fatah of corruption. Certain documents have been released exposing the corruption of PA before and after the Second Intifada. One Palestinian resident in the West Bank whose name was Jalal showed his frustration with the Palestinian political system. Jalal lived in the city of Ramallah. During an interview with Jalal, he spoke about the frustration he was suffering due to the political system in Palestine. Accordingly, Fatah was the main body of the government for Palestinians before the Second Intifada started. But as soon as President Yasser Arafat died in the city of Ramallah, Mahmoud Abbas became President of Palestinian people. During his first years in office, many Palestinians began to show their anger and dissatisfaction with

Abbas and Fatah. Many people in Palestine believed that the Palestinian system was corrupt and also Abbas was working with the Israeli occupation forces against Palestinians (Farhud, 2016, p. 32). After the Intifada and the disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Hamas succeeded in taking advantage of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as proof of its success. Hamas claimed that the Palestinian Authority which was controlled by Fatah retracted its commitment to resist the Israeli occupation and became the biggest failure in giving Palestinians any hope. However, according to PA President Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian National Authority had been resisting the Israeli occupation for more than forty years and of course, there was no alternative authority (Erlanger & Sayare, 2011). These statements by President Abbas cannot be underestimated in the battle for popularity between Hamas and Fatah. Moreover, Fatah showed signs of fragmentation, chaos and disappointment after Arafat's death in 2004 ('with corruption spreading and failure to achieve any positive results for Palestinians through the peace process with Israel'). Hamas obtained an opportunity to place itself as a real initiative for Palestinians against Israel (Erlanger & Sayare, 2011). In addition, the Intifada succeeded in building a strong national alliance on Palestinian streets that included all political actors and forces, and in sending a specific message to Israel that there would be no security or stability without recognizing the right of Palestinian people to a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital on the territories occupied in 1967. As per the refugee problem, the conflict continued to revolve around the borders of Israel and Palestine. Sovereignty, as well, continued to be a problem for both sides. Nonetheless, it is not possible to deny the role of Fatah and the Authority in the Intifada. Moreover, the PNA was involved in the Intifada through active participation to the Fatah movement,

which had been the backbone of the Authority operating independently but closely. Fatah had its presence in all security units.

What President Arafat sought as an achievement during the Intifada was to secure international protection of Palestinians in the conflict zone. He endeavored to use the prevailing international concepts such as “intervention for humanitarian considerations”, “opposition to ethnic cleansing and genocide” as implemented in former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Kosovo, etc. Yet, the US-Israeli coalition resisted that these concepts or trends have reduced the chance of success and they would not work. Nonetheless, Arafat continued to focus on the Israeli repression and harm to Palestinian people by aggressive attacks through his political, diplomatic and media movements. He further called for international protection forces to the Palestinian lands.

There were two trends with regard to the function of the Intifada pertaining to Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authorities. First was to use the Intifada as a tool to challenge the negotiations and the second was to continue the Intifada and to strengthen its popular base to gain victory against Israel. This second trend also required an institutional change within the PA. And President Arafat did not join any of those calls (Beauchamp, 2018). As per the political siege, the following can be explained:

The aim was to impose a political siege on the Palestinian National Authority and to launch effective political and diplomatic campaigns in the international arena. The United States responded to calls by the Israeli government to limit the institutions and apparatus of the Palestinian National Authority. Thereby, political changes instigated by Israel, America and Europe were imposed (democratic reforms). Political siege was also imposed on President Yasser Arafat on the grounds that he supported the Palestinian

resistance. And the military wings of the Palestinian resistance such as the Al - Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Izz al - din al - Qassam Brigades, and the Jerusalem Brigades factions were included in the black lists of Israel, the US and Europe.

With regard to political repercussions during the Second Intifada, it can be observed that Palestinian National Authority lost its status internally and externally due to the Israeli political siege imposed on the PNA institutions such as President's building where Yasser Arafat was detained at his headquarters in the city of Ramallah and obscuring freedom of movement between Palestine and Israel between 2001 and November, 2004. Furthermore, it can be seen when scrutinizing the political situation that the Palestinian Legislative Council as well as ministers at the Palestinian government (both the government of the Fatah or Hamas) were prevented from their official work and convening for meetings. Since they were also banned from moving between Gaza and Ramallah, there was a direct negative effect on ministerial activities as well as public institutions and security services (Text of Arab peace initiative adopted at Beirut summit, 2008). The decline of the status of the Palestinian civil society organizations supported the emergence of the military role of the fighting factions over the society. The Israeli occupation forces delayed Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections as well as local elections. Conflicts were also triggered among various Palestinian organizations to effect times of peace and war (Gaza: PM candidate unveils \$1 billion investment fund, 2011). International protection was requested for Palestinians from the Israeli oppression. The United Nations was submitted requests by Palestinian, Arab and Islamic representatives for help. Help was also requested from major powers through the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. These requests were rejected because the

US was biased against the Zionist entity (Alawneh, 2013). The Second Intifada undermined the foundations of the Jewish community by means of certain media activities across the country (Al - Aqsa massacre - blood and anger uprising, the Six-day war No.2) and the scope of these media effects in political, economic and social spheres grew exponentially. The Jewish claims affected the geographical separation between Arabs and Jews within occupied Palestine. One of the most prominent events of the Second Intifada was the assassination of Tourism Minister of the Israeli government (Rehavam Ze'evi) by the resistance of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Israeli minister assassinated, 2001). The international community made its desire clear to support Palestinian demands for an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital if violence stopped. In 2002 when the Second Intifada was ongoing, the UN Security Council passed Resolution No. 1397, which affirmed a vision for a region where two states, Israel and Palestine, would coexist within secure and internationally recognized borders (UNSCR, 2002). The United States started to deplore and disturb Yasser Arafat as President of Palestinians, although he was a democratically elected leader. In this regard, the US offered to form an alternative leadership “capable of bringing peace between Palestine and Israel”. Both Israel and the United States promoted the idea that Yasser Arafat was deeply involved in terrorism and posed obstacles to the peace process (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014).

The European position towards the Palestinian issue and the peace process in the Middle East have undergone important stages. Various developments have taken place on the political and economic levels, especially after the Israeli withdrawal in 2005 (Meeting, 2005). The most significant development with regard to the role of Europe in the conflict

between Palestine and Israel was that Europe launched the Venice Declaration in 1980, which supported the rights of Arabs and Palestinian people to self-determination and establishment of an independent state (Venice Declaration , 1980). Ralph Tarraf, an EU representative, called for Israel to end its occupation, saying: “The Israeli occupation must end from all Palestinian territories. There is no difference between East Jerusalem and Area C and Gaza. They are all occupied territories. Palestinian people waited a long time for peace and it is high time for ending the injustice” (Lovatt, 2016, p. 3). This clearly emphasized the European position which entailed that the relevant settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories including East Jerusalem and the West Bank were illegal settlements in accordance with the international law (Special Committee Chair Cites Discrimination, Excessive Force, Collective Punishment as Fourth Committee Tackles Israeli Practices in Arab Lands, 2018). Between the years 2006 and 2008, France continued to call for the establishment of a Palestinian state as soon as possible and demanded the Israeli occupation to be ceased through removing the illegal settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank since those settlements undermined the future of the Palestinian state with regard to its survival (CHALLENGE OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE IS TO BUILD ON PROMISE ESTABLISHED IN 2008, SPECIAL COORDINATOR TELLS SECURITY COUNCIL, 2008). It is noteworthy that Germany was the least critical of Israeli policies towards Palestinians during the Second Intifada as well as after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This approach by Germany is often linked to the legacy of relations between the two parties and the role Merkel played in European policies towards the Israeli occupation (Beauchamp, 2018).

It is well known that Britain is directly responsible for the establishment and emergence

of the State of Israel and is the main cause of the emergence of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Developments in the Demographic Status of Palestinian Residents of Lebanon during 1948-1988, 1988, p. 23). It is important to note that the British Labor Party leaders are sympathetic to the Israeli project. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is also an honorary member of the Board of Trustees of the Jewish National fund (Al-Quds Newspaper, 2008). By reviewing the different positions and roles of many EU countries following the Israeli withdrawal in 2005 from Gaza, it is observed that there is a disparity between different European countries due to the divergence in their orientations towards the conflict based on their interests in the region. The European Union's role is also observed to be weak and ineffective when it comes to practice, since the Union has failed to exert practical pressure on the Israeli occupation to change the Israeli behavior towards Palestinians (Israel completes Gaza withdrawal, 2005). A resolution was issued by the EU Foreign Ministry after convening in Luxembourg in 2006. This resolution stressed the need to renounce violence, recognize Israel and abide by previous commitments as a condition for continued assistance to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Cosultations, 2010, pp. 32-36). Swiss President Morenz-Leuenberger expressed early this year that prevention of aid to the Palestinian Authority after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was a mistake (Shehata, 2012, p. 73). The European Commission condemned the collective punishments imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in a statement issued by Benita Ferrero- Waldner: "I am against this collective punishment of the residents of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. I urge the Israeli authorities to resume fuel supplies and open the crossings for the passage of humanitarian and commercial supplies" (Leading article: An unlawful policy of collective punishment, 2008). In a brief

statement to the European Union's External Relations Commission, Benita Ferrero-Waldner uttered: "The Israeli and Palestinian sides have to keep their responsibilities very carefully" (Special Coordinator Urges Israel, Palestinians to Contemplate Future Carefully amid Extremism, Displacement in Middle East, 2017). Waldner also expressed his deep concern about the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, stressing that the EU is continuing to work to ease the suffering of the residents of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank through several measures including humanitarian assistance (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2018). Within the framework of the French diplomatic efforts after the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, French Foreign Minister Kouchner stressed that the Israeli siege measures directly affected the Palestinian economy as a whole and the living conditions in Palestine. He called for improving the conditions for freedom of movement in the West Bank and lifting the siege on the Gaza Strip. Pointing out to the fact that Israeli settlements were obstacles to the peace process, he urged dismantling of all illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and reopening of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. He also gave hope for the establishment of a Palestinian state before the end of 2008 (Al-Quds Newspaper, 2008). The weak and contradictory position of the European Union towards the suffering of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, prompted many news agencies and writers to compare the bold Swiss position that condemned Israel's violations of international law and considered that Israel was committing a grave violation of the international law by imposing collective punishment on Palestinians (Matar, 2011). This European failure to protect Palestinian civilians from repeated Israeli violations following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza prompted Human

Rights Watch to express its disappointment at the low common denominator among the EU countries on the protection of human rights (Network, 2009, pp. 42-52). However, it is important to note the extent of interaction among Europeans with the crises in Palestine, such as the siege of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and other Israeli attacks. This reaction was echoed in Europe through demonstrations and sit-ins in front of Israeli embassies. The Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip after its withdrawal is a form of collective punishment imposed on the civilian population in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law. The Israeli aggression on Gaza is a flagrant violation of international conventions for the use of internationally prohibited weapons, the brutal war and the use of prohibited means of warfare under international humanitarian and environmental law, including the bombing of civilian targets, targeting mosques, schools and homes of the civilian population, killing women, children, ambulances, convoys of humanitarian and food supplies of international humanitarian organizations and killing of their staff, as well as the use of internationally banned phosphorus bombs. This further included destruction of residential and agricultural areas, natural environment, and pollution by the use of toxic and environmentally harmful weapons and materials and the displacement of thousands of civilians from their homes. The Israeli occupation forces believed that the siege would be a way out of the predicament that it found itself after the withdrawal from Gaza and has since sought to isolate the Gaza Strip from the occupied territories, especially the West Bank. The blockade has been a continuation of the criminal policies of the occupation forces against Palestinian people, having left its mark on all areas of life in the Strip (United Nations Security Council Resolution 8256th Meeting, 2018). Although the Israeli

occupation forces committed war crimes in Gaza before and withdrawing, the ICC does not have the legal jurisdiction to prosecute Israeli war criminals. In the accordance with Article 13 of the Rome Statute, the Court exercises its jurisdiction with regard to crimes if such crimes are referred by a State ratifying the Statute. Indeed, Israel is not a party to the Treaty of Rome since the country has not ratified it although it signed the treaty. Therefore, ICC prosecutors do not have legal authority to prosecute the Israeli war criminals or initiate an investigation into the Israeli violations in Gaza (Al Leewa Newspaper, 2018). In this sense, Israel is a State which is outside the scope of international legality with its grave violations of international humanitarian law in the Palestinian territories. In light of the daily displacement of Palestinian people from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and elsewhere, the Palestinian diplomatic performance has witnessed a decline due to the absence of a governing body representing Palestinians outside Palestin. After the death of Yasser Arafat, presidential elections were held in 2005 and Mahmoud Abbas was elected as President. Following that, negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli occupation forces were stalled after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, which contributed to the deterioration of the Palestinian diplomacy (Abbas Declares Victory in Palestinian Presidential Vote, 2005).

Palestinian diplomatic movement continued through several consulates, representations and embassies in many countries in the world being particularly the European Union countries. However, the level of influence and interaction between Palestine and international community remained modest. This is reflected through the unflinching attitudes of country leaders to support the Palestinian cause in general and to work to end the siege of Gaza in particular, although the blockade is a matter of human rights and

civil rights issues that are recognized in international humanitarian law. Consequently, there has been no significant international breakthrough in favor of the Palestinian cause, with the exception of some shy positions by certain countries. During and after the Intifada, the European Union's position towards the Palestinian issue was different and hesitant in taking serious practical steps according to its principles and theoretical positions. This affected the Palestinian diplomacy. The EU failed to implement serious pressure on the Israeli occupation, forcing it to respect human rights and stop its daily attacks on the Gaza Strip especially after the Israeli withdrawal from it. It seems clear that the EU's theoretical position after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is contradictory to its practical policy. This is indicative of the weakness of the Palestinian diplomatic machinery in influencing the decision makers in the EU (Fayyad, 2009). Statements by the Israeli occupation leaders on the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 are as follows: The former Chief of Staff, Moshe Ya'alon, who opposed the plan to withdraw from Gaza said, "The more time passes, the more dangerous we will be." "We will find ourselves facing a kingdom of terror capable of launching more far-reaching and more effective missiles on Israel, which will bring the missile threat to the Israeli depth" was another explanation (New Life Newspaper, 2008). Avi Dichter, former head of Israel's Shin Bet intelligence service, said that "No one can deny that Palestinians have achieved a major achievement by forcing Israel to evacuate its settlements from the Gaza Strip without political or economic compensation." And he continued, "the conclusion reached by Palestinian people confirmed that their armed struggle had produced a great victory over Israel." General Shlomo Gazit, the former Commander of Military Intelligence Service, believes that Israel must learn the lesson from its withdrawal from Gaza, that sooner or later it will

have to evacuate the occupied territories in the West Bank, Jerusalem and elsewhere (Amer, 2012). Uzi Landau, the current Infrastructure Minister, says that Israel's need to withdraw from the Gaza Strip at a time of the continuing armed operations demonstrates the victory of the Palestinian resistance and Hamas and a historic defeat by Israel. Netanyahu, the current Israeli Prime Minister, who resigned from the government in 2005 to protest the plan to withdraw from Gaza, says: "The plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip represents an important victory for the Palestinian resistance and Hamas, and the Palestinians can express their joy in this great victory (Amer, 2012). Tzvi Hendei, the leader of the settlers in the Gaza Strip and a member of the Knesset, says that: "They always told us, they called the Israeli army to win, but what happened was that the Palestinian resistance and Hamas won. Why did they make us invest all this effort in building these settlements in the Gaza Strip and making sacrifices for them?" Yoram Ben Nour, a Palestinian affairs correspondent for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, commented on the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as follows: "Whether we accept or reject it, Hamas will show the Arab and European world that it brought us out of the Gaza Strip!" (US pressuring Arab allies to back anti-Hamas resolution at UN, 2018). The position of Yuval Diskin, head of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) was opposed to the Israeli plan, as well and he is reported to say, "Removing settlements from Gaza is a matter of uprooting." And Diskin said that he believed Sharon had made a mistake by withdrawing from Gaza. "On the security, political and military side, I oppose the handing over of land to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank" (Barak, 2018). On the other hand, the process of withdrawal from the Gaza Strip deepened the process of the separation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the occupied territories to

the maximum extent. The Israeli policies deepened the separation and fragmented the idea of establishing an independent and viable Palestinian state. After the withdrawal, the separation between the West Bank and the city of Jerusalem as well as Gaza became a harsh reality imposed by Israel since its negative effects has on Palestinians continued ever since (al-Jarbawi, 1994, pp. 127-154). As a matter of fact, Israel did not decide to withdraw from Gaza in accordance with an agreed political framework at regional or international level. The reason for this was that Israel did not wish the Palestinian Authority to take a political step which could have risen pressure from the United States and the European Union in the future (Top PM Aide: Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the Peace Process, 2004). And Sharon bet on the continued absence of a unified Palestinian strategy and the multiplicity of Palestinian national decision-making centers (Hilal, 2007, p. 5). The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza therefore, has been one that served to the interest of the Israeli occupation forces. It is not a matter of sudden faith in the peace process or a kind of show of good faith towards Palestinian people or even a response to the pressure from Arab countries with good relations. The idea of the unilateral withdrawal destroyed the road map at hand and the withdrawal was completed without coordination with any Palestinian party, as if Palestinian people did not exist. According to a researcher, the Zionist government wanted to withdraw from Gaza without political, security and economic coordination with the Palestinian Authority, with an impending condition to dismantle and weaken the Palestinian resistance and make it clear to the world that it does not deserve to be a partner in the political process between the two countries. Furthermore, Israeli forces also desired to drop the political option for negotiating with Israel which undermined the confidence of Palestinian citizens in political programs. As

per the Israeli vision for the future of Gaza after its withdrawal, it can be observed that Israel achieved its goal of turning the Gaza Strip into a large prison through its control of border crossings, land and sea borders in a systematic and tight manner. Israel led Sharon to draw the borders of the State of Israel as well as the borders of the Palestinian State with temporary borders. The withdrawal process came to impose new realities on the ground (Musa, 2005). In this context, the disengagement had a negative impact on the Palestinian economy, especially in Gaza. The result was the loss of jobs within the Gaza Strip for more than 5,000 Palestinian workers. And many people serving at industrial, agricultural and commercial zones along the Gaza-Israeli border were dismissed.

The withdrawal process became a part of the construction of a separation Wall in the West Bank. This was an attempt to eliminate the gray-black economy in entire Palestine. This fact suggests that the immediate economic impact of the Israeli withdrawal was negative (Harari & Heller, 2005). In addition, Israel fired at Palestinian fishermen on the sea and hindered the reconstruction of Yasser Arafat International Airport in Gaza. Israel still continues to exercise control over all borders. A year after the withdrawal, the economic situation in the Gaza Strip continued to deteriorate in all aspects largely because of the economic boycott imposed by the Quartet and led by the United States in Gaza. Since then, any form of economic growth in Gaza has been hampered (Political-Security Cabinet resolution, 2006).

### **3.5. The Military Impact of the Second Intifada and the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza**

An increasing military repression of Israel had been observed over Palestinian people, while Palestinian national and Islamic groups fled this repression throughout the period

of self-rule in the country. And people of Palestine were unable to establish a single political, administrative or economic unit as a result of the intervention of the Israeli occupation. Israel, in fact, imposed an iron fist policy by means of shutting down military and security related premises and inflicting a comprehensive and strict Israeli siege on Palestinians. The Israeli-American and Western cooperation to remove holy Jihad from the liberation of Palestine hampered the attempts to a peaceful solution to end the Israeli military occupation.

The activities of the Second Palestinian uprising included personal or collective military operations through armed military cells that struck the Israeli strategic depth in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Netanya, Safed, Afula, Beersheva, Kfar Saba and other areas of Israeli civilian and military gatherings through mutual military clashes and individual suicide bombings which terrified Jews and contributed to the rise of Jewish migration to areas outside the conflict zones. In this light, Palestinian security officials were boycotted in their attempts for joint bilateral meetings with the Israeli side of the conflict. The acquisition of weapons by the Palestinian resistance groups increased while operations in self- defense against Israeli military also incremented (Caspit, 2003). On May 18, 2001, Israel launched F – 16 warplanes against Palestinian targets in Gaza for the first time during the Second Intifada. After this incident on June 1, a suicide attack on a Tel Aviv city-mall killed more than 21 people and wounded more than 60 in response to the Israeli violations of rights of Palestinian people in 2001 during the Second Intifada (BBC, 2004). In the first year of the Second Intifada, Molotov cocktails were used, and dozens of fighters resisted through militia cells where national and Islamic groups were deployed from the Palestinian side. This is a qualitative evolution from the previous phase and this

stage enabled the forces of the Intifada to confront the occupation forces more strongly to reach more sophisticated and effective levels from being light maneuvers (Caspi, 2003). In the wake of killing eight soldiers and civilians when a Palestinian bus driver took his car to a passenger line in 2001, Israel re-imposed a comprehensive siege on the occupied territories particularly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinians claimed that the siege of Palestine prevented the access of medical and humanitarian supplies as well as hindering Palestinians from going to their work places in the occupied territories. In the same year, the EU accused the Israeli occupation of using force in the occupied territories and called for dismantling of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. Furthermore, the Israeli cabinet voted to grant the IDF a broader license to target Palestinian militants in the same year. The IDF was also allowed to assassinate Palestinians who were already on their way to carry out an attack (World, 2005). Israel also contributed to the escalation of the conflicts by continuing its targeted killings of Palestinians without any guilt, taking this target to refugee camps in Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, Gaza and others. Raed Karmi, a senior Fatah leader in Tulkarem in the West Bank, was assassinated in January 2002. Before his assassination, Israel unilaterally froze the procedure for more than two months. The Israeli Chief of Staff, Shaul Mofaz urged attack on “armed Palestinians” wherever they were and especially in the West Bank and Gaza.

In response, Palestinian attacks against the Israeli occupation forces accelerated to stop the grave violations. The head of the GSS at the Herzliya Conference asked the Israeli public to apologize for the failure in establishing security for them (Eiland, 2010, pp. 28-31). Since the beginning of the Second Intifada, the Israeli army has shown its real

military options and it is crystal clear that it was ready to exercise these military operations a long time ago. The IDF Spokesperson provided certain details pertaining to an Israeli plan to reoccupy the West Bank in a statement issued in June 1997. And Israel began implementing several of these measures in 2000-2001. Such measures included mobilization and deployment of ground forces and armored vehicles throughout the West Bank and sieging Palestinian regions. Indeed, a large number of IDF forces were reinforced at several points during the Second Intifada and thousands of citizens were arrested. Other Israeli forces were used to secure settlements in the West Bank. Military helicopters were used to scare the people in West Bank. Weapons, artillery and tank fire were used to suppress demonstrations. Valuable infrastructure belonging to Palestinians were stricken to punish Palestinians for their attacks during the Second Intifada. Leaders in the West Bank were assassinated and stand-off tactics such as unmanned drones and remotely controlled explosive devices were used. A new military administration was imposed in the West Bank during the Second Intifada. Fences, security zones, corridors were constructed and other measures were taken to separate Israelis from Palestinians. And Palestinians were forcefully evacuated from “sensitive areas of the West Bank” during the Second Intifada (Jane's Defense Weekly, 1997-1998, pp. 183-184). As a result, the IDF demonstrated that it could establish control by its military presence in all Palestinian territories within the West Bank only in 48-96 hours after the outbreak of the Second Intifada (Chapman, 2004, p. 179). The most important battle in the West Bank was the battle of Jenin on April 3, 2002. More than 1,000 Israeli soldiers entered the Jenin refugee Camp in the West Bank, where more than 14,000 Palestinians were living. Their attacks were supported by Apache attack helicopters, bulldozers and tanks. The

Israeli troops razed a large part of the Camp that harbored Palestinians militants in it. During the battle, more than 52 Palestinians were killed in Jenin in the West Bank and 22 of them were civilians while more than 23 Israeli soldiers were killed during the same battle. More than a quarter of the camp's residents became homeless after the battle (Mitchell, 2004, p. 612). In addition, a group of human rights defenders, media associations, non-governmental organizations and European governments addressed the violence of the Israeli occupation during the Second Intifada, calling for a restraint and reminding Israel that military violence by a state against civilians violates the international human rights standards. It is reported that some of the civilian deaths in the Camp during the battle of Jenin were willful and intentional killings (UNHRW, 2002). In the Second Intifada, women's roles were shaped in a way radically different from that of the first Intifada. Due to injustice, siege and murder inflicted by Israel on Palestinians, martyrdom operations started in Palestinian territories against the Jewish. The first martyrdom operation was called Wafer Idris in 2002, possibly referring to the intensification of participation by Palestinian women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the national struggle (Al Labadi, 2004, p. 121). The martyrdom operations were a successful strategic threat to Israel since they were able to 'threaten' Israel's ability to maintain the routine of daily life (Al Labadi, 2004, p. 121). During the Second Intifada, Palestinians were heavily militarized since the Palestinian Authority believed that it would put greater pressure on the Israel occupation forces to change the conditions of the negotiations as soon as possible (Johnson & Kuttab, 2001, p. 21). With their heroic actions during the Second Intifada, female suicide bombers were elevated to the celebrity status. Social support was shown in public assemblies, protesters of the Shahadat

everywhere including public funerals and enthusiastic parades (Zedalis, 2004, p. 22). The military development of women in the West Bank and Gaza emerged due to their suffering from the Israeli siege and injustice. Egyptian People's Newspaper praised the suicide bombers as women who could teach all the Arab and Islamic peoples a lesson about the heroic defense of the land of Palestine with their thin and weak bodies, indicating that women patriots were ready to do anything for Palestine (Israeli, Palestinian Women's question). There is documented evidence that women's political, militant and social roles during the Second Intifada improved their status as they continued to fiercely fight in any way against the occupation forces (Pressman, 2003). In this regard, the Second Intifada was a semi-armed upsurge in 2002 since there had been a military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. More than 100 tanks, armed personnel vehicles, hummers, small military jeeps, Apache helicopters, and F-16 fighters launched a full - scale military assault the city of Nablus in the West Bank (Abujidi & Verschure, 2006, pp. 126-150). During the invasion of the city of Nablus in the Second Intifada, fierce clashes took place in the city and the destruction of the city was dramatically wrought (Ma'an News Agency, 2008). A 55-year-old Palestinian merchant from Nablus said the Nablus area after the Israeli military invasion was like a rubble-filled desert. He said, "I could not distinguish between the streets, sidewalks and the circle because of the great destruction. I could not stop myself from crying, and this was not my city which I had lived in – not my city that I knew before."

The Israeli occupation destroyed everything that was beautiful in the city before the Second Intifada started and a war was waging the city to annihilate the entire Palestinian resistance. The military sites were kept secret for security reasons and to prevent

Palestinian armed resistance from attacking Israelis in the city of Nablus during the Second Intifada. A young woman living in the city of Nablus said that these military sites were created to control, supervise, kill and arrest Palestinians who resisted the war during the Intifada. The Israeli military occupation imposed a curfew on Nablus for long periods, imprisoning families in their homes and putting an end to public life on streets during the Intifada. Under the circumstances of curfew, families stayed at homes due to the threat of the being killed if anyone was to be seen at their balconies or windows. They were denied access to their public places. The division between people was used as a method and strategy during the various Israeli military operations (UNOCHA, UNOCHA Annual Report 2005, 2005). The development of the military conflict between Palestinians and Israel in August 2001, the Israeli occupation forces assassinated Abu Ali Mustafa, Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), with two missiles fired by Israel at his office in the city of Ramallah, just a few feet away from the President Arafat's office in Al Maqta'a (Presidential Headquarters in the Ramallah). The fact that a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) assassinated the right-wing Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavam Zeevi with three bullets to the head and chest in front of his room in the Hyatt Hotel in occupied Jerusalem became the first of its kind in resistance of Palestinians against the most severe Israeli aggression since 1948. This act was in retaliation for the late leader Abu Ali Mustafa who was assassinated by Israeli occupation forces.

On January 3, 2002, the Israeli occupation forces seized a ship called 'Karen A' carrying more than tons of weapons. Israel claimed that the shipment came from the State of Iran and was heading to the Palestinian shores of the Gaza Strip. Sharon accused Arafat of

planning the latest ceasefire to buy time to import weapons from outside Palestine (Farsoun & Zacharia, 1998). In the same year, Operation Defensive Shield of Israel took place on March 28, 2002. With the aim of re-occupying the Palestinian territories, the Israeli occupation forces carried out an aggressive military operation, claiming to eliminate Palestinian activists in the West Bank and Gaza. This military operation damaged and destroyed the Palestinian population and this alleged 'defense operation' culminated in the reoccupation of the West Bank and the destruction of the infrastructure of Palestinian towns and villages. In addition, Israel violated the Oslo Accords by ignoring Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. On March 29, 2002, the day following the Israeli invasion of the Palestinian territories, the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1402 was adopted where both sides were demanded to complete an immediate transition to a cease-fire: Israeli forces were called to withdraw from Palestinian cities and both parties were requested to establish full cooperation in the resolution of the conflict. However, this resolution did not yield positive results, either (UNSCR, 2002). During the same year – 2002 – the Zionist occupation forces besieged the Church of the Nativity in the city of Bethlehem. Previously, local civilians and many Palestinian militants took refuge in the Church of the Nativity against the campaign of the protective wall launched by Ariel Sharon. Father Sabpara estimated that there were 240 people in the Church some of whom were armed, while not using their arms. Among them, there were also 12 international peace activists (AGENCY, 2017). Bethlehem was not the only city under siege; Nablus, Ramallah, Jenin, Hebron, and many others in the West Bank were in the same case. There was fire everywhere launching rockets and destroying various areas. The intensification of the siege on Bethlehem and Old City

resulted in the fall of many martyrs and wounded without any assistance. Some Palestinian fighters were inside the Church could not keep the Israeli fighters outside. Palestinian fighters were near the old town and besieged the entire residents. Yet, suffering increased day by day. There was no medicine, no help for the wounded, no food, no drink and nothing at all. All elements of normal life were cut off from the Church estimated to be around a thousand square meters. After 39 days, on May 10, 2002, the Israeli siege of the church ended and all the Palestinians left the church after a series of negotiations at the Peace Center in Bethlehem. 8 People were martyred inside the Church and more than 20 Palestinians were injured. The negotiations ended with a plan to allow the free release of civilians from the Church, while 26 Palestinian militants would be transferred to Gaza under guard, while 13 other wanted Palestinians would be deported to Israel and then abroad (BBC, 2004). On March 29, 2002, Israeli tanks moved towards the headquarters of the Presidency in the city of Ramallah, where they surrounded and closed the building's all entrances. President Yasser Arafat was staying there with about 480 military personnel, civilians and foreign solidarity activists. Prior to this siege, many threats were launched by the occupation leaders, headed by Sharon who implicitly vowed to assassinate President Yasser Arafat. He said Arafat would get what he deserved and calling him an "enemy of Israel and an obstacle to peace, a threat to the stability of the entire region". Israel encircled the headquarters of the Palestinian Presidency and occupied all the buildings surrounding it. As bulldozers demolished the outer walls, the Israeli army used dozens of men and young people as human shields to facilitate the storming of the headquarters. Israeli soldiers and their tanks as well as heavy military vehicles began firing, bullets and missiles in all directions. About 20 thousand

Israeli soldiers were accompanied by 500 tanks, in addition to 50 fighter planes and 80 military bulldozers that participated in the siege of President Arafat. During this time, water and electricity were cut off from the besieged headquarters, in order to push the besieged presidency to surrender. However, President Arafat replied in his famous statement, "They want me either as a prisoner, fugitive or dead. I tell them; Martyr, Martyr, Martyr!" This made Israel threaten him through loudspeakers to bomb his headquarters in case he did not deliver the names of those wanted. And Israel did not allow medical and relief teams to enter until more than 10 days after the blockade. On May 1, 2002, in the first hours of the morning, the Israeli tanks withdrew from the presidential headquarters after the bombing of the last building there and lifted the siege on President Arafat and left his destroyed headquarters on the shoulders of his companions, where they roamed him raising the signal of victory and saluting hundreds of Palestinians (Guardian, 2002). Yet, the PA created the potential for a complete collapse of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, or at the least the collapse of agreements resulting from the Oslo process between Israel and Palestine. Unfortunately, Sharon had no problem with this possibility (Eiland, 2010, p. 35) since more than 600 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces during the Second Intifada, and many of these were indiscriminate civilian casualties (Matta & Rojas, 2016, pp. 65-100). In the 2002 period, Israel carried out several assassinations against military leaders in the West Bank and Gaza, including leaders of the Al-Qassam Brigades and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. After these assassinations, the Palestinian society was very angry, and they demanded an immediate reply to the crimes of the Israeli occupation (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 66). Although these assassinations wiped out Israel's enemies during this period, they

often united Palestinians after the death of prominent people. Such assassinations also concerted efforts by Palestinians to increase Palestinian attacks against Israel. This made 2002 the bloodiest year for Jewish citizens because of the Palestinian suicide attacks that killed more than 220 Israelis (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 66). This was a stage with strong military engagement, organized armed resistance against Israeli soldiers as well as settlers in Israeli military checkpoints in Palestine, storming Jewish settlements, shooting at Jews on streets and public places, and confronting the Israeli occupation forces in the shape of 'encroachment on the reoccupation of the Palestinian cities'. These powerful armed operations against the occupation soldiers and their colonization led to many of the Jewish settlers leave the colonies. These strong clashes mostly took place in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. The militias of the armed uprising considered that every Jew (a soldier and a colonizer) was a target until the end of the occupation and the evacuation of the colonists. These operations were highly supported by the people of Palestine, and condemned the least at the international political level and media circles. The most effective Palestinian organizations in that time were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Islamic Resistance Movement (AL- Quds Brigades), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Salah Al-Din and others. The Izz Al-Din AL - Qassam Brigades ranked first in the organization of armed operations and massive human explosions during the Second Intifada (Alawneh, 2013). The explosions varied to include the placing of bombs or improvised explosive devices and detonation of cars remotely or deriving a Palestinian to a car bomb filled with explosives or resorting to some Palestinian resistance fighters' explosive belts weighing between 5 kg to 10 kg per belt

according to the estimates of the Palestinian and Israeli military. Furthermore, buses were also frequently bombed. People in cafes, restaurants, or road intersections as well as parked vehicles were also targeted. The assassination of Hamas' founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004 and Rantisi in April 2004 had a significant impact on Palestinians. According to Hamas's statement after the assassination of its leaders Yassin and Rantisi, "Sharon opened the gates of hell and will not prevent us from cutting off his head" (Daily, 2004). The funeral was attended by more than 150,000 people. After Yassin's death, Rantisi immediately took command of Hamas, but his term was short-lived. Less than a month after Ahmed Yassin was martyred, the Hamas leader in Gaza, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, was killed in an Israeli raid on a car he was traveling at north of Gaza City while two others were also murdered along with him. The fact that Mantissa was targeted by the occupation forces had already been expected after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his military commanders openly declared that all Hamas leaders were on their list of targets. Israel was pleased to witness the assassination of Ahmed Yassin and Rantisi and the Israeli government set up celebrations. This enabled the IDF to remove the main leaders responsible for Palestinian activities in Palestine (BBC, 2004). During the Second Intifada, Israel made use of all its operations on the grounds of ensuring security to its citizens. According to Jews, Arabs outside Israel had been composing a threat against Israel's security. And when it came to that specific time, they started to pose a main threat inside the country. During this period, the objectives of the Israeli army were to expose the terrorist affiliations of the Palestinian Authority, to prevent the Palestinian attacks on Israel, and to dismantle the infrastructure of the Palestinian organizations inside the occupied territories (BBC, 2004). In less than a month, the Israeli occupation

allowed the detention of 4, 258 Palestinian suspects, 396 of whom were wanted. In addition, more than 4,000 rifles, 781 pistols, 388 sniper rifles, RPGs, mortars, machine guns, explosives and additional equipment were also seized. More than 29 Jews were killed and 127 wounded by the IDF during an operation in the West Bank (Weizman, 2007, p. 68). They targeted the policy-makers of IDF, including Prime Minister Sharon and Moshe Ya'alon, which manifests that the Second Intifada was a war (Weizman, 2007, p. 69). Although the IDF tried to improve the national military training center and enhance efforts for joint coordination with other countries to eliminate dissidents in Palestine during the Second Intifada, these tactics, techniques and procedures turned out to be failure for the Israeli army (Pressman, 2003). Yet, the IDF tactic was somewhat successful in Nablus. The Israeli occupation killed many Palestinians and very few IDF casualties. The result was a reduction in the number of the IDF casualties and an increase in the Palestinian casualties in the West Bank during the Second Intifada. The Israeli occupation boasted that within 24 hours more than 80 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank and Gaza (Weizman, 2007, pp. 69-70). And then, the decision was made by the Israeli occupation to build the security fence, also known as the separation barrier or the seam line barrier in the Gaza Strip during the Second Intifada. By then, the IDF had significantly reduced Palestinian operations inside Israel. In 2004, however, Israel suffered more than 14 suicide bombings (Weizman, 2007, p. 70). In these years, the Israeli army repeatedly adopted a curfew on the Palestinian people, limiting the movement of hundreds of thousands of people in Palestine for several weeks or perhaps months in an attempt to contain the escalation of violence in the West Bank. The military curfew further led to the complete isolation of movement between the West Bank and

Gaza Strip.

2005 was an important year for the Gaza Strip. The Israeli occupation forces withdrew unilaterally from the Gaza Strip by re-reducing its military presence and evacuating Israeli settlers from Gaza. There was no capacity or strength to maintain a network of roadblocks within the Strip (BBC News, 2005). Among the main reasons for Israel to withdraw from Gaza was that the Gaza Strip had been nuisance to the occupation forces for a long time.

While the Israeli repeatedly offered Egyptians salvation, Yitzhak Rabin personally wished to wake up from his sleep one morning to find being sunk into the sea! This explains the burden of the Gaza Strip in principle, while the burden was increased after the start of Hamas and Jihad guerrilla war against the occupation forces in early 2000. In terms of security and military, Sharon could not enter the Gaza Strip and occupy it for days or weeks as he did with other cities in the West Bank due to the strength of the Palestinian resistance. In light of these developments, Sharon failed to secure its strength in the Gaza Strip. Here, the Israeli streets began to declare their boredom from Sharon, as well as the political and military elite. Former leaders of the Shin Bet security service issued many warnings, yet strikes by pilots and special units continued, which deteriorated the overall economic situation. Israeli analysts unanimously called it a defeat against the Palestinian resistance. After suffering and killing of many Jews at the borders of Gaza and losing control, Sharon decided to withdraw from the city (Zaatara, 2004). Between 2000 and 2005, an Israeli killed more than 3,000 Palestinians, two-third of the killed were children and women. Also, more than 1,000 Israelis were killed as a result of violence. Civilians bore the brunt of the violence during the Intifada, which included two

third of the Palestinian casualties. Palestinian civilians witnessed a sharp increase in Israeli military control particularly in the West Bank and Jerusalem, resulting in total loss of movement, extensive destruction of property, continued threat of arrest and verbal assault. As a matter of fact, children, women and the elderly were often arrested during the Second Intifada. In addition, Israeli civilians suffered a major blow to their sense of personal security because of the IDF's inability to protect them. Cafes, buses, shopping centers and police stations were taken under the control of the Palestinian resistance. The Israeli economy suffered a great loss, and Jewish life became stalled at the height of the uprising. The Second Intifada brought Israeli soldiers to contact Palestinian civilians at checkpoints in the West Bank, Gaza and elsewhere at roadblocks, houses and streets. This contact created incentives for violence against Palestinian civilians authorized by Israeli military leaders (Yehoshua, *Controversy Among Reformists in the Arab World Over Dialogue With Islamist Groups*, 2007). The Second Intifada also led to a wide range of new structural barriers. For example, travel between the Palestinian territories in Israel and the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem became impossible. Traps and missiles were also used between the years of 2005 and 2006. This stage included the planting of explosives in public or private vehicles and their remote detonation, as well as the firing of the Qassam 1 and Qassam 2, mortars, anti-tank missiles and others. Explosive devices were manufactured to respond to the "hell of Sharon" advocated by the operations of Ehud Olmert, the new Prime Minister of Israel. After Sharon became ill, Olmert took over his post formally on January 4, 2006 following the elections on March 28, 2006.

After this, incidents continued. The Palestinian resistance used the method of firing Qassam rockets with a range of 10-20 km. Some of those rockets carried 3-5 kg of

explosives to bomb Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. As well, they bombed certain military barracks near Ashkelon and the Jewish settlement of Sderot in Negev. The rocket fire continued until the end of the Intifada (Alawneh, 2013). The occupation forces spent a large part of their military structure or capacity (hard core) in security forces in various configurations: The security forces and militias of the national and Islamic factions, and weapons from the hands of the Palestinian Mujahideen. And Arabs were unable to deliver effective weapons in operation Al-Aqsa Intifada, which paved the way for self-reliance for Palestinians in their resistance movements (US pressuring Arab allies to back anti-Hamas resolution at UN, 2018).

The unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip in 2005 was the result of a decision by only one person: Ehud Barak in the case of Lebanon and Ariel Sharon in the case of the Gaza Strip. These two decisions were central and the withdrawals were also expressions of the fatigue of Israeli society, politicians and their military due to the bloodshed in Lebanon and the long-term preoccupation with the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip (Erlich, 2011, p. 2). The plan of the military commander Ariel Sharon to withdraw from Gaza was associated with demonstrating the failure of the political theory of the Zionist movement, which claimed for many years that the land of Palestine was free. Thus, decision-makers in the Israeli society were pushed by the overwhelming Israeli majority to rid of the Gaza Strip which had been a heavy burden on Israelis both in demographic and security terms (Thrall, 2017). Sharon's position and plan raised many questions as follows: Did he put forward his plan after his failure to fulfill his commitment to eliminate the Palestinian resistance and decided to flee the settlements in Gaza? Had the "Palestinian armed Intifada" and the high rate of population growth in

Gaza succeeded in forcing the occupation forces to change their ideological conviction and to relinquish their idea of "cradle of Jews and their historical treasures"? Or was his plan a political maneuver aimed at overcoming political and personal difficulties? Was the plan a political solution or a security and military arrangement?. The announcement of Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, in a move that shocked the Israeli army and the Israeli people, was carried out by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in accordance with the unilateral disengagement plan. This entailed withdrawing all the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip included in the geopolitical maps of the Israeli occupation (Mark, 2005, pp. 1-6). Ironically, it was Sharon who publicly spoke of Israel's "occupation" of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, he was the same person who was elected Prime Minister thanks to his slogan that there was no solution with Palestinians and Arabs in general except for use of armed forces. Sharon did not imagine himself to be a man of peace and did not had the honor of searching for this status, but he was constantly declaring deep distrust in Arabs. Sharon did not come to solve the problems with Palestinians, but to create difficult facts on the ground, facts of the kind that can never be repaired, or at least the kind that required years of bloodshed. There were many views on the objectives that Sharon wanted to achieve, in the framework of his right-wing government policy toward Palestinian people particularly pushing forward the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. However, the interpretations of his policies were proven wrong after a time, as his plan and implementation of withdrawal changed the Israeli overall strategy. It seems that Sharon aspired to achieve five strategic goals by withdrawing from Gaza: To accept the binational state option, to consolidate the Jewish state principle, to limit the choice of a Palestinian state, to ensure permanent temporary

borders, and to take control over its military, political and economic fields. Over the past two decades, the Israeli occupation had undergone very complex changes in terms of size, trends and balance. Strong currents, camps, partisan blocs and foundations had been subject to vibration and ideological transformations that had been reflected on the movement of many eminent personalities in camps. The Israeli occupation forces, in this regard, faced a difficult and harsh reality by having to choose between two options: First, to withdraw from the areas controlled by the Israeli occupation since 1976 and second, to establish a Palestinian state next to an Israeli state within the confines of preserving its democratic system and a Jewish majority. The second option comes to mean continuation of the Israeli occupation of the entire region between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River even at the cost of losing the numerical superiority of Jews in this region, which in turn would lead to the end of Israel as a democratic state. The strategy of Sharon's "disengagement from Gaza" plan was to form a new frontier for Israel, encompassing as much of the Palestinian land as possible and excluding as many Palestinian people as possible under the slogan of preserving the Jewishness of the Zionist state (HERZOG & GAZIT, 2015, p. 17). The goals of the unilateral separation plan with regard to Palestinians were not only about the land but also demography. Within this scope, the rate of seized Palestinian lands increases every day, without any sovereignty over crossings, corridors or airspace. The Israeli forces have ever since sought to freeze the peace process and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For that reason, many Israeli settlements were established in the West Bank, settlement blocs and large areas in the West Bank were annexed to the area of authority by the Israeli occupation forces and the Gaza Strip was

sieged on land, sea and air. This has made Israel guarantee its right to continue its attacks and invasions in Gaza (BBC, 2004).

On the other hand, the withdrawal came as a result of Israel's concern about the demographic imbalance caused by the Palestinian population density, the serious confusion caused by the Palestinian resistance, and the security, military and economic fears it created (UNHRW, 2002)). From Sharon's military perspective, the annexation of the Gaza Strip, with a land area of no more than 360 km<sup>2</sup> inhabited by 2 million Palestinians, was a threat to the Jewish state and the Zionist project, as well as a military, financial and moral burden of guarding and providing sustenance to the settlements. The Israeli occupation government sought to destroy the Palestinian national project by abolishing the binational state option by isolating the Gaza Strip, separating the West Bank, building the Apartheid Wall, Judaizing Jerusalem and encircling many of the settlements, so that the struggle for a bi-national state became impossible. This also poses the goals of Judaizing Jerusalem: "Encapsulating" it with a separation wall, and expelling many Palestinians from Jerusalem outside their holy city and Judaizing the remaining inhabitants (BBC, 2004). The fact is that while Sharon evacuated more than 2,000 housing units in the Gaza Strip, he also built more than twice the number of housing units in the West Bank and Jerusalem settlements, under the guise of maintaining Israel's security and alleged Jewishness (Hilal, *Hamas's Rise as Charted in the Polls, 1994–2005*, 2006). Building the separation wall, expanding settlements in the West Bank after the withdrawal from Gaza and bypassing roads all contributed to make the "interim state " a long-term solution, in which the state remains an Israeli entity controlled by security and militarism (Hilal, *Hamas's Rise as Charted in the Polls, 1994–2005*, 2006, p. 11). For

decades, the Gaza Strip has been a nuisance to the Israeli occupation, as mentioned earlier. Certain Israelis had repeatedly offered the Egyptians' salvation. Yitzhak Rabin personally wished to end the war as the operation Fedayeen in 1970s and 1980s increased inconvenience for Israel followed by the beginning of the Palestinian resistance operations against Israel in early 1990s (Website of the Qassam Brigades, the Military Wing of Hamas, 2005). Prime Minister "Ariel Sharon" acknowledged that the resistance caused the withdrawal from Gaza, saying it came under the pressure of the deteriorating security situation, "and what he called" the suffering of the settlers there (Le Monde Newspaper, 2005). Sharon's security and military failure proved to be incapable of suppressing the Palestinian resistance. Thus, the idea of the establishment of the security Wall in a desperate attempt by Sharon to get rid of the Palestinian resistance failed. As a matter of fact, Israeli analysts unanimously described the unilateral disengagement plan as defeat against the Palestinian resistance. Benny Lieberman, chairman of the Yesha Council of settlers, and Yossi Beilin, the well-known "dove" of the left agreed that Sharon presented his project as a gift to the Palestinian resistance in Gaza yet proved his defeat (Zaatara, 2004). If it were not for the struggles of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian resistance operations, otherwise the Israeli occupation would not have thought of this step at all. Thus, the withdrawal is deemed a kind of Zionist escape from Gaza in the final analysis. The proposal of the Zionist Sharon surprised everyone, even the optimists did not think that Sharon would abandon the slogan "Netzarim rule as the rule of Tel Aviv". They never thought that Sharon would announce his decision to evacuate the Zionist settlements from Gaza unilaterally, causing a severe shock. Even senior Jewish officials preferred not to believe this at first, and considered it a hoax (Shaked,

2003). The real reason for the withdrawal, as referred before, was the security and military failure of Israel and recognition of the Palestinian resistance, which was discussed by the Hebrew press as well. This even reached the Head of the Israeli Intelligence, Major General Aharon Zeevi and during his interrogation in 2004 in Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, he acknowledged that the withdrawal from the settlements in Gaza was victory for the Intifada and the Palestinian resistance. Therefore, the main reasons for Sharon's plan for the withdrawal process were as follows:

- 1- The failure of the military option to eliminate the Intifada and the resistance.
- 2- The demographic factor (Increasing number of people joining Palestinian resistance forces)
- 3- The realization that time was not in favor of "Israel" and that taking the initiative was better than waiting.
- 4- The economic deterioration accompanying the deterioration of security, which in turn affected investments and migration.
- 5- Sharon's personal factors and low popularity, which dropped to less than 33% before the launch of his plan.
- 6- Reaching long-term goals beyond the narrow range of the Gaza Strip was a better option (Hamami, 2006).
- 7- They wanted to reduce the cost of security and military resulting from the Palestinian resistance, and perhaps the main reason was that Israelis were worn off and implemented a sudden unilateral withdrawal without a comprehensive peace plan, which constituted a heavy price paid by the Zionist group as a result of the Second Intifada.

8- From the point of the Israeli occupation forces, in this regard, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were the heaviest costs of their policies and military operations.

This can be exemplified by several incidents:

- a) The security Wall between the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian territories aimed to prevent the Palestinian resistance from entering Israel, and the government had allocated 5,3 billion Shekels to build the Great Wall which was a heavy financial burden.
- b) The most important price was the death toll, the wounded and the compensation: The human loss resulting from occupation and the Palestinian Intifada. From September 1987 to December 2004, Israel suffered from over 6709 civilian and military casualties (Roth, 2018). The total compensation in 2003 was about \$80 million, with the IDF paying compensation to the dead and injured soldiers.
- c) Decline in growth: The overriding figures indicate a decline in annual GDP growth and GDP per capita, and increase in the unemployment rate for Israeli citizens (Nations, 2012).
- d) Social services for Jews were hampered and poverty rates increased tremendously during the Second Intifada. In this regard, social services in Israel suffered a severe blow due to budget cuts.
- e) The withdrawal was undertaken to appear keen on the peace process and open the door to normalization with the Arab and Islamic countries.
- f) The aim was to isolate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank to put an end to the Intifada and to neutralize industrial sectors from the effects of confrontations

and thus, turning the conflict again into an Israel-West Bank conflict instead of Gaza.

- g) Another aim was to dispose of the population in Gaza which would provide the largest area of land with low population so as to establish Jewish majority in the historic Palestine. This would entail acquisition of Jewish immigrants.
- h) An important aim was to reduce the lines of confrontation with Palestinians and to prevent Palestinians from achieving economic, political media-related or military success.
- i) The Israeli occupation forces endeavored to eliminate any settlement and resolve final status issues especially in Jerusalem pertaining to its borders. This would curb the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, as aimed by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian factions.
- j) Israel kept the door open for resumption of negotiations and signing a long-term interim agreement with the Palestinian Authority. This way, the Palestinian side would be weak and besieged in all aspects including political, economic, security and military, in addition to being vulnerable in international and regional scale.
- k) Palestinians were dragged to internal bloody confrontations by means of planting sedition between the two sides (Nations, 2012). Israel sought to achieve its malicious goals of withdrawing from the Gaza Strip, bringing Palestinian people into a civil war by sieging, strangling, controlling, and arresting to pay the price of their existence dearly. The Israeli occupation

wanted the withdrawal to look like an end to the military occupation in Gaza, however it continued on the ground in an innovative and new Israeli style which fostered control over the borders, air and sea, and thus control all social elements of Palestine including structural, economic and security resources (Palestinian Planning Center, 2001). In practice, the status of Gaza as an occupied territory by Israel has never changed after the implementation of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and what happened on the ground is the redeployment of the Israeli occupation forces from one location to another. Furthermore, the Israeli military's plan after the withdrawal was the creation of buffer zones between the Palestinians of the West Bank, Gaza and Israel, declaring a closed military zone. As a matter of fact, 18 military checkpoints were established between the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. The task of Israeli occupation forces was to carry out security and military activities in a variety of pedestrian crossing points, or other transfer areas for cars and other vehicles. Indeed, aircrafts were used for permanent monitoring through observation points. And after the withdrawal from Gaza, Palestinians were prevented from entering the Palestinian territories especially the West Bank.

The separation of Jerusalem from the West Bank prevented Palestinian activities after the withdrawal from Gaza (al-Jarbawi, *The Remaining Palestinian Options*, 2005). And the actions taken by the Israeli occupation after the withdrawal from Gaza included the destruction of the headquarters of the Palestinian Authority, and its rehabilitation centers in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as frequent invasions of Palestinian lands and preventing the Palestinian police from performing their duties with their weapons and

uniforms. Therefore, a large number of the police forces were removed from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Security services were hampered by arrests and all these measures contributed to serious obstacles faced by Palestinian security services in their role in maintaining security and order in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the resistance factions bore the primary responsibility for security in the absence of rule of law in the areas of the Palestinian Authority. Thus, the resistance forces were entrusted with the maintenance of security and order in the occupied Palestinian territories, to which the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 applies. And after the withdrawal from Gaza, Israel kept the airport, the Rafah crossing, the port and the crossing between Gaza and the West Bank, and the security strip erected by the Israeli occupation within the borders of the Gaza Strip from the east and the north. In fact, the military commander Sharon wanted the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip to focus on the issue of settlements in the West Bank and support the Judaization of the city of Jerusalem. Shaul Mofaz uttered, “The disengagement plan is aimed at creating a huge boom in the settlement project in the West Bank, Jerusalem and elsewhere”. Also, the construction of the Israeli separation Wall in the West Bank, and then the completion of the Israeli goal forced the vast majority of the Palestinians into the smallest scattered canton area. Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was part of the well-planned Israeli plan aimed at aborting the idea of an independent Palestinian state. In this regard, if they created new realities in the rest of Palestinian territories it would be difficult to eliminate those realities such as Judaization of Jerusalem, expansion of the settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem and completion of the construction of the apartheid wall (Allabadi & Hardan, 2016, pp. 69-80). Another important point was the vision of the Palestinian resistance factions in

particular after the Israeli withdrawal which became clear than their official political position. Its vision was to hold on to the resistance as a strategic option for as long as the Israeli occupation remained and to adhere to the resistance's weapons even in the Gaza Strip and West Bank to face possible Israeli attacks. This included supporting the Palestinian resistance program by all means, and the need to involve all political forces in the Palestinian national decision, as well as participation of the resistance in the management of Palestinian daily life). In this regard, no one had the right to curb the option of resistance which was supposed to continue as long as the Israeli occupation existed. This means establishment of the Palestinian independent state and obtaining full withdrawal of Israel from all Palestinian territories. Thus, the expectation is that Jerusalem will be liberated, and refugees will be ensured to return to their homes (Guardian, 2002). Another important point is that the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation from the Gaza Strip constituted a qualitative and historic shift in the Palestinian consciousness towards the Palestinian resistance and this was adopted as a strategic option at the expense of the option of failed negotiations and concessions. The Palestinian resistance forces, within this framework, did not stop finding mechanisms to provide weapons, either by smuggling from abroad or by producing them locally (Special Coordinator Urges Israel, Palestinians to Contemplate Future Carefully amid Extremism, Displacement in Middle East, 2017). Providing the Palestinian resistance forces in Gaza and West Bank with necessary weapons after the Israeli withdrawal included working on domestic and external financial sources to buy arms; developing resistance missiles and local rockets which were regarded to be the strategic weapons for the upcoming period after the withdrawal. Furthermore, the support provided to resistance forces incorporated

training young Palestinians to use and store these local weapons, diversifying the strategic ammunition stocks in Gaza for upcoming possible wars or violent confrontations, and exchanging opinions among Palestinian task forces with regard to the development and manufacturing weapons (Special Coordinator Urges Israel, Palestinians to Contemplate Future Carefully amid Extremism, Displacement in Middle East, 2017).

From the perspective of Arab and Islamic countries, it is revealed Israel faced failure in the face of Palestinian resistance. In addition, the Palestinian leadership used the withdrawal as evidence of success in its futile struggle to galvanize other radicals in the region. In Egypt, the withdrawal from Gaza has had far-reaching consequences, which forced Israel to evacuate the border area as well, allowing increased smuggling from Sinai to Gaza, particularly by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. At that time, Egypt suffered from the rise of Islamic terrorism after the withdrawal from Gaza, especially in Sinai which is close to the border. After the end of Israel's military presence in Gaza, it became clear that Hamas was doing everything it wanted in the Gaza Strip. The remaining houses and buildings were destroyed in the settlements, a quantity of arms was brought from Egypt, while the Palestinian security forces stood still without doing anything (Hareuveni, 2012). This is the first major Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. It is important to note here that Israeli withdrawal was made by a unilateral decision and without specific demands from the Palestinian side. The West and the Palestinian arena witnessed a wide-scope debate about the reality of this withdrawal as well as its motives. There are those who attribute the Israeli withdrawal from the Strip to the Palestinian resistance. At the last moment, a large number of Likud members refused to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, even after the occupation army tried everything possible

to turn the lives of Gaza residents into a hell of death, destruction and lack of pension. The Gaza Strip has been subjected to oppression, poverty and death that any other place in the world has witnessed so far since the beginning of the modern colonial era. On the other hand, the armed resistance environment where the Palestinians live today in Gaza will undoubtedly leave a heavy nightmare for them. To add to that, this will not reduce the scale of the challenges, be it rebuilding life in Gaza or liberating the West Bank – which are issues that are becoming more complex day by day. And since Palestinians have learned from their bitter history that their demilitarization has always been a prelude to a new national catastrophe, it is unlikely that the Palestinian forces will respond to the calls to give up their weapons at any time.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

The Intifada played a fundamental and social role in the lives of many Palestinians living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the territories occupied in the year 1948. The economic, political and social life of Palestinians was relatively stable before the Second Intifada, however their lives changed for the worse during and after the two Intifadas. It is estimated that more than 100,000 Palestinians left the West Bank and Gaza Strip from the late 2000 to 2006 due to the unstable economic, security and military situation during the Intifada. In contrast to the Palestinian expectations of greater political freedom, the deepening of the Israeli occupation during the years of the Oslo Accords, economic gains and psychological pressure by the occupation forces and increasing number of checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza have all led to popular discontent throughout Palestine. As soon as protests against Sharon's entry into the Al- Aqsa Mosque began, the violent Israeli response led to a rapid escalation and a rise in the number of martyrs from the Palestinian side. Within this scope, the Israeli policy of retaliation during the Second Intifada led to heavy losses on the Palestinian side in all spheres of political, social, cultural and psychological life not to mention the heavy economic losses. Infrastructures, water and sewage networks were destructed; hundreds of shops, mosques, organizational buildings, hospitals and Palestinian governorates were demolished irreversibly (Hammad & Al-Efranj, 2003). During the Second Intifada, the Israeli occupation forces arrested thousands of Palestinians and placed them in prisons and detention centers without trial, treatment, healthcare and food. They were prevented from seeing their families who tried to visit these prisoners. Further, Israel arrested more than 1,000 political figures during the Intifada. From 2000 until now, there have been more than 7 thousand prisoners in

Israeli jails. During the same years, Israeli individual and collective punishment acts varied throughout checkpoints in all Palestinian areas (Al - Jazeera, 2004).

The history of the Second Intifada in Palestine did not receive a good study of several problems as many were busy focusing on studying and writing about the US invasion of Iraq 2003. Nonetheless, certain international journalists who supported the Palestinian cause managed to shed light on the Palestinian voices during the Second Intifada, although this has not been enough. There is no disagreement over the right of Palestinians to adopt the Palestinian armed resistance to free themselves from the Israeli occupation. However, this problematique is not to be discussed only from this perspective, since righteousness, legitimacy and justice do not mean achieving goals. This means Palestinian people endeavor to reveal their victimhood in an attempt to expose the essence of Zionist colonization in Palestine in the form of oppression and mass torture. And the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has deepened the process of separation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to the maximum extent with the effect of Israeli policies to ensure this isolation so as to eradicate the expectations for establishing an independent and viable Palestinian state, arguing that it is impossible to fulfill this Palestinian claim on the ground. It is crystal clear that the separation between the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal has become a reality imposed by Israeli and posed negative impacts on the future of Palestinians (Ali Al-Jarbawi, 1999: 51).

## REFERENCES

- (2006). *11th Annual Report*. Ramallah: The Status of Palestinian Citizens' Rights During 2005. August 2, 2018, Retrieved from [http://www.piccr.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=130&Itemid=187&lang=en](http://www.piccr.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=130&Itemid=187&lang=en)
- Abbas Declares Victory in Palestinian Presidential Vote*. (2005, January 9). The New York Times: , Retrieved from Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/09/international/middleeast/abbas-declares-victory-in-palestinian-presidential.html>
- Abujidi, N., & Verschure, H. (2006). Military Occupation as Urbicide by "Construction and Destruction": The Case of Nablus, Palestine. *The Arab World Geographer*, 9(2), 126-154.
- Abu-Saad, I., & Champagne, D. (2006). Introduction: A Historical Context of Palestinian Arab Education. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 49(8), 1035-1051.
- AGENCY, M. N. (2017, April 3). *Palestinians mark 15th anniversary of Israel's deadly siege of the Nativity Church*. MA'AN NEWS AGENCY Web Site: Retrieved from <http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=776238> .
- Al Labadi, F. (2004). Palestinian Women's Emancipation and the Uprising for Independence. *Resources for Feminist Research*, 30(3-4), 121-136.
- Al Leewa Newspaper*. (2018). Al Leewa Newspaper Web Site: Retrieved from <http://aliwaa.com.lb> .

Alawneh, Y. G. (2013). *Palestine as a Non-Member Observer State at the United Nations*. The Independent Commission of Human Rights.

*Al-Ayam Newspaper*. (2005). Al-Ayam Newspaper Web Site: Retrieved from <http://www.alayam.com> .

al-Jarbawi, A. (1994). The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine Israel Accord. *The Muslim World*, 83(1-2), 127-154.

al-Jarbawi, A. (2005). The Remaining Palestinian Options. *The Arab World Geographer*, 8(3).

Aljuni, S. (2003). The Palestinian Economy and the Second Intifada. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 32(4).

al-Khudari, J. (2018, August 24). *Gaza to be uninhabitable in less than two years*. Press TV Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/08/24/572059/Gaza-Palestine-Israeli-siege> .

Allabadi, F., & Hardan, T. (2016). Marriage, Split Residency, and the Separation Wall in Jerusalem. *Jerusalem Quarterly*(65), 69-85.

*Al-Quds Newspaper*. (2006). Al-Quds Newspaper Web Site. .

*Al-Quds Newspaper*. (2006). Al-Quds Newspaper Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.alquds.co.uk> .

*Al-Quds Newspaper*. (2008). Al-Quds Newspaper Web Site. .

Amer, A. A. (2012). Adnan Abu Amer "Talks about impending Israeli attack on Gaza".

Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ps5R5bNwOHI> .

(2008). *Amnesty International Annual Report 2008*. Amnesty International.

(2009). *Amnesty International Annual Report 2009*. Amnesty International.

Arnon, A., & Bamy, S. (2015). *Economics and Politics in the Israeli Palestinian*

*Conflict* . Aix Group.

AS-Safir. (2001). *Faisal al-Husseini: Sharon Must not Get a Chance*. Beirut: Middle

East Media Research Institute.

Bank, W. (2004). *Four Years – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis An*

*Assessment*. World Bank. Retrieved from

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/wbgaza-4yrassessment.pdf> .

Barak, O. (2018). Israel's Policy in and toward the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. R. Y.

Hazan, A. Dowty, M. Hofnung, & G. Rahat içinde, *The Oxford Handbook of*

*Israeli Politics and Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., & Michael, K. (2007). The Israeli Disengagement Plan as a Conflict

Management Strategy. Y. Bar-Siman-Tov içinde, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*

*From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management* (s. 261-282). New York:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Bayat, A. (2010). *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South*

*and North*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BBC. (2004, September 29). *Al-Aqsa Intifada timeline*. BBC Newspaper Web Site:

Retrieved from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/3677206.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677206.stm) .

*BBC News*. (2005, February 8). Mid-East leaders announce truce: Retrieved from

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4245353.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4245353.stm) .

Beauchamp, Z. (2018, May 14). *What were the intifadas?* Vox Web Site: Retrieved from

<https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080066/israel-palestine-intifadas-first-second>

.

Beckmann, F. v., von Benda- Beckmann, K., & Eckret, J. (2009). *Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling on the Governance of Law*. London: Ashgate.

Beinin, J., & Hajjar, L. (2014). *Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict A Primer*.

Middle East Research and Information Project. December 20, 2018 tarihinde

Retrieved from <http://www.merip.org/primer-palestine-israel-arab-israeli-conflict-new-adresinden-alindi>

Benmelech, E., Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2010). The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(2), 331-353.

Ben-Naftali, O., Gross, A. M., & Michaeli, K. (2005). Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory. *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, 23(3), 551-614.

Berman, E., & Laitin, D. (2008). *Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model*. Cambridge: NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH.

Berrebi, C. (2007). Evidence About the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians. *The Berkeley Electronic Press*, 13(1), 1-36.

BRYM, R. J., & MAOZ-SHAI, Y. (2009). Israeli State Violence during the Second Intifada: Combining New Institutional and Rational Choice Approaches. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32, 611-626.

Cali, M., & Miarri, S. H. (2015). *Should I trade or should I go (to war)?* The Doha Institute: Retrieved from [https://www.dohainstitute.edu.qa/MEEA2016/Downloads/Sami%20Miaari\\_Final.pdf](https://www.dohainstitute.edu.qa/MEEA2016/Downloads/Sami%20Miaari_Final.pdf) .

Caspit, B. (2003, January 1). *Ma'ariv Newspaper*. Ma'ariv Newspaper Web Site. .

*CHALLENGE OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE IS TO BUILD ON PROMISE*

*ESTABLISHED IN 2008, SPECIAL COORDINATOR TELLS SECURITY*

*COUNCIL*. (2008, December 18). United Nations Security Council 6049th

Meeting: Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9544.doc.htm> .

Chapman, C. (2004). *Whose Holy City?: Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Oxford: Lion Publishing.

*COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON THE SIXTY-FIRST SESSION*. (2005,

March-April 14-22). United Nations Web Site: Retrieved from

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/2005/135](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/2005/135) .

Cork, D. (2011). *The Palestinian Economy Post-Oslo: Unsustainable Development*. Washington D.C.: Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine.

- Cosultations, A.-Z. C. (2010). *Turkya wa al-Qadiyyah al Filastinyah* . Beirut:  
Information Department Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Cosultations.
- Daily, C. (2004, March 22). *Hamas founder Yassin killed in Israeli air strike*. China  
Daily Web Site: Retrieved from [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/22/content\\_316929.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/22/content_316929.htm) .
- DCI-Palestine. (2011). *Voices from East Jerusalem: The Situation facing Palestinian Children*. Defence for Children International Palestine.
- Department, M. (2011). *Utilizing the Palestine Simple Poverty Scorecard: Baseline Poverty Study of UNRWA Microfinance Clients in the West Bank*. United Nations.  
Retrieved from <http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011050234417.pdf> .
- Developments in the Demographic Status of Palestinian Residents of Lebanon during 1948-1988. (1988). *United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia*.
- Dowty, A. (2012). *Israel/Palestine*. London: Polity Press.
- Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*. (2018, September 27).  
World bank Web Site: Retrieved from  
[http://www.lacs.ps/documentsShow.aspx?ATT\\_ID=36718](http://www.lacs.ps/documentsShow.aspx?ATT_ID=36718) .
- Eiland, G. (2010). *Regional Alternatives to the Two-State Solution*. *Ramat Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*.
- Erlanger, S., & Sayare, S. (2011, October 31). *Unesco Accepts Palestinians as Full Members*. The New York Times Web Site: Retrieved from

<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/world/middleeast/unesco-approves-full-membership-for-palestinians.html> .

Erlich, R. (2011, June 21). *Israel's Unilateral Withdrawals from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip: A Comparative Overview*. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center: Retrieved from [https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF\\_11\\_174\\_2.pdf](https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF_11_174_2.pdf) .

*European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*. (2018, September 28). European Commission Web Site: Retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/printpdf/where/middle-east/palestine\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/printpdf/where/middle-east/palestine_en) .

Fahmy, K. (2006). Muhammad 'Ali. T. Benjamin içinde, *The Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism* (s. 808-809). Detroit: Macmillan.

Fair, V. (2008, April). *THE GAZA BOMBSHELL*. Vanity Fair Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/04/gaza200804> .

Farhud, S. (2016). *The Second Intifada in the Palestinian City of Ramallah: Social, Economic and Political Consequences*. New Orleans: University of New Orleans.

Farsoun, S., & Zacharia, C. E. (1998). *Palestine And The Palestinians*. Westview Press.

Fayyad, S. (2009). A Palestinian State in Two Years: Interview with Salam Fayyad, Palestinian Prime Minister. (K. Farraj, C. Mansour, & S. Tamari, Röportajı Yapanlar) Retrieved from <https://www.palestine-studies.org/jps/fulltext/42234> .

(2002). *Fifteen Months - Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisisi An Assessment*. World Bank.

- Forces, N. a. (2005, December 5). *Statement by the Palestinian National and Islamic Forces in Hebron on the CPT Hostages in Iraq*. International Solidarity Movement Web Site: Retrieved from <https://palsolidarity.org/2005/12/statement-by-the-palestinian-national-and-islamic-forces-in-hebron-on-the-cpt-hostages-in-iraq/> .
- Galili, L. (2002). A Jewish Demographic State. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 32(1).  
*Gaza: PM candidate unveils \$1 billion investment fund*. (2011, May 26). Weebly Web Site: Retrieved from <https://insekten.weebly.com/-palestinian-new-buildings-2011.html> .
- Gelvin, J. L. (2005). *The Modern Middle East: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guardian, T. (2002, June 26). *Middle East timeline 2002: part two*. The Guardian Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jun/26/israel> .
- Hamami, I. (2006). *Al-Jaliyat al Filistiniyah fi Uroppa*. Palestinian return Centre: [prc.org.uk/data/aspx/d5/925.aspx](http://prc.org.uk/data/aspx/d5/925.aspx) .
- Hamilton, V. L., & Kelman, H. (1989). *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hanoud, H. A. (1998). *A Report on Legislations and Processes within the PNA, Ramallah*. Ramallah: Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights.
- Harari, S., & Heller, M. A. (2005). The Effects of Disengagement on Palestinian Politics and Society. *Strategic Assessment*, 8(2), 1-9.

- Hareuveni, E. (2012). *Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank*. BTSELEM. Retrieved from [https://www.btselem.org/download/201210\\_arrested\\_development\\_eng.pdf](https://www.btselem.org/download/201210_arrested_development_eng.pdf) .
- HERZOG, C., & GAZIT, S. (2015). *Look Inside The Arab-Israeli Wars WAR AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Hilal, J. (2006). Hamas's Rise as Charted in the Polls, 1994–2005. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 35(3), 6-19.
- Hilal, J. (2007). *Where Now for Palestine?: The Demise of the Two-State Solution*. New York: Zed Books.
- International Committee of The Red Cross*. (2007). International Committee of The Red Cross Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/annual-report/icrc-annual-report-2007.htm> .
- International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report 2016*. (2016). International Committee of the Red Cross Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.icrc.org/data/files/annual-report-2016/ICRC-2016-annual-report.pdf> .
- Israel completes Gaza withdrawal*. (2005, November 12). BBC News Web Site: Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4235768.stm> .
- Israeli minister assassinated*. (2001, October 17). The Guardian Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/17/israel2> .

Jacobs, D. (1998). *Israel and the Palestinian Territories: The Rough Guide*. London: Rough Guides.

Jane's Defense Weekly. (1997-1998). *Jane's Defense Weekly*.

Jerusalem, P. N. (2002, April 22). *Palestinian Governmental Institutions in Ramallah:*

*Report on the Destruction*. Palestinian Governmental Institutions in Ramallah:

Report on the Destruction Web Site: Retrieved from

<http://www.jnul.huji.ac.il/ia/archivedsites/gushshalom010204/www.gushshalom.org/terror/report2.html> .

Johnson, P., & Kuttab, E. (2001). Where Have All the Women (and Men) Gone?

Reflections on Gender and the Second Palestinian Intifada. *Feminist Review*, 69(1), 21-43.

Kaplan, E. H., Mintz, A., Mishal, S., & Samban, C. (2005). What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28(3), 225-235.

Kaufman, E., & Salem, W. (2006). Looking Back, Looking Forward: Toward transforming the conflict. E. Kaufman, W. Salem, & J. Verhoeven içinde, *Bridging the divide: peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict* (s. 1-10). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Keshet, Y. K. (2013). *Checkpoint Watch*. London: Zed Books.

King, M. E. (2009). *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*. New York: Nation Books.

Kober, A. (2009). *Israel's Wars of Attrition: Attrition Challenges to Democratic States* .  
London: Routledge.

*Le Monde Newspaper*. (2005). Le Monde Newspaper Web Site: Retrieved from  
<https://www.lemonde.fr> .

*Leading article: An unlawful policy of collective punishment*. (2008, January 22).

Independent Newspaper Web Site: Retrieved from  
<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/leading-article-an-unlawful-policy-of-collective-punishment-771720.html> .

Lovatt, H. (2016). EU DIFFERENTIATION AND THE PUSH FOR PEACE IN  
ISRAEL-PALESTINE. *EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS*, 1-  
16.

Lustick, I. S. (1993). Writing the Intifada Collective Action in the Occupied Territories.  
*World Politics*, 45(4), 560-594.

*MA'AN NEWS AGENCY*. (2015). MA'AN NEWS AGENCY Web Site: Retrieved from  
<https://www.maannews.com> .

*Ma'an News Agency*. (2008). Ma'an News Agency Web Site: Retrieved from  
<https://maannews.com/Default.aspx> .

Mark, C. R. (2005). *Israel's Proposal to Withdraw from Gaza*. CRS Report for Congress.

Marston, D., & Malkasian, C. (2008). *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Osprey  
Publishing.

- Matar, D. (2011). *What It Means to be Palestinian: Stories of Palestinian Peoplehood*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Matta, N., & Rojas, R. (2016). The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena. *European Journal of Sociology*, 57(1), 65-113.
- Meeting, S. C. (2005, August 24). *ISRAEL'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, NORTHERN WEST BANK 'WATERSHED', UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL TELLS SECURITY COUNCIL*. United Nations Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8479.doc.htm> .
- Miaari, S., Zussman, A., & Zussman, N. (2014). Employment restrictions and political violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 101, 24-44.
- Mikus-Kos, A. (2005). Activating Community Resources for Well Being of Children and Stability. M. Friedman, & A. Mikus-Kos içinde, *Promoting the Psychosocial Well Being of Children Following War and Terrorism* (s. 11-32). Ljubljana: IOS Press.
- Miles, H. (2006). *Al Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World*. London: Hachette Digital.
- Miller, J. (2005). *Inheriting the Holy Land: An American's Search for Hope in the*. New York: Ballantine.
- Mitchell, N. J. (2004). *Agents of atrocity: Leaders, followers, and the violation of human rights in civil war*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Monitoring Israeli Colonization Activities, Olive Harvest in Palestine Another Season, Another Anguish.* (2004, June 11). Poica: Retrieved from <http://www.poica.org/details.php?Article=376> .
- Murtada, I. (2010). Israeli International Security Umbrellas. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 134, 91-112.
- Musa, H. (2005, June 22). *Palestine*. Al Ayam Newspaper. .
- Naqib, D. F. (2007). *Quarterly and Economic Social Matter*. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
- Nations, U. (2012). *The Palestinian Economy in East Jerusalem*. United Nations. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/qpal/docs/2014Ankara/P2%20MAHMOUD%20ELKHAFIF%20gdsapp2012d1\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/qpal/docs/2014Ankara/P2%20MAHMOUD%20ELKHAFIF%20gdsapp2012d1_en.pdf) .
- Network, E. -M. (2009). *Active but Acquiescent: The EU's Response to the Israeli Military Offensive in the Gaza Strip*. Copenhagen: Euro - Mediterranean Human Rights Network.
- New Life Newspaper*. (2008). New Life Newspaper Web Site. .
- Nofal, M. (2004, December 17). *The Development of the Palestinian Position Concerning Refugee Rights*. Mamdouh Nofal's Web Site: Retrieved from <http://www.mnofal.ps/en/2004/12/the-development-of-the-palestinian-position-concerning-refugee-rights/> .

(2011). *Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Annual Report 2011*. Gaza: Palestinian Centre for Human Rights.

*Palestinian Planning Center*. (2001). Palestinian Planning Center Web Site: Retrieved from <http://ppc-plo.ps/ar/home> .

*Palestinian Textbooks 2000-2002*. (tarih yok). EU Website: Retrieved from <http://www.eufunding.org/Textbooks/default.html> .

Parry, N. (2003, August 1). *Electronic Intifada*. November 12, 2018 tarihinde Electronic Intifada Web Site: Retrieved from <https://electronicintifada.net/content/it-fence-it-wall-no-its-separation-barrier/4715> adresinden alındı

PCHR, A. R. (2006). *Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Annual Report 2006*. Gaza: Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. Retrieved from <http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/Reports/English/Annual%20Report2006-eng.pdf> .

PCHR, A. R. (2013). *Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Annual Report 2013*. Gaza: Palestinian Centre for Human Rights.

*Political-Security Cabinet resolution*. (2006, August 9). Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs : Retrieved from <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2006/pages/political-security%20cabinet%20resolution%209-aug-2006.aspx> .

Pressman, J. (2003). The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, 23(2).

Proschauer, R. (2006). *Reut Institute - From Vision to Policy 2005 Annual Report and 2006 Strategic Plan*. Tel-Aviv: The Reut Institute.

- Quandt, W. B. (2005). *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Rabbani, M. (2008). The Making of a Palestinian Islamist Leader: An Interview with Khalid Mishal: Part I. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 37(3), 59-73.
- Roberts, P. (2012). *Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Essential Reference Guide* . Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
- Rosen, S. J. (2015, January 7). *Are Palestinian Offensives Inviting Israeli Reprisals?* Gatestone Institute: Retrieved from <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5010/palestinian-offensives-israeli-reprisals> .
- Roth, K. (2018). *Israel and Palestine Events 2017*. UNHRW.
- Rowley, C. K., & Taylor, J. (2006). The Israel and Palestine Land Settlement Problem: An Analytical History, 4000 B.C.E.-1948 C.E. *Public Choice*, 128(1/2), 41-75.
- Saddiki, S. (2017). *World of Walls: The Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers* . Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.
- Saleh, M. M. (2006). *The Executive Summary of the Palestinian Strategic Report 2006*. Al-Zaytouna Centre.
- Saleh, M. M. (2009). *The Executive Summary of the Palestinian Strategic Report 2009*. Al-Zaytouna Centre.
- Satloff, R. (2006). *Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy*. The Washington Institute: Retrieved from

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus53.pdf>

Shaked, R. (2003, April 25). *Yedioth Ahronoth* . Yedioth Ahronoth Web Site. .

Shehadeh, R. (2017, June 1). *ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION: 50 YEARS OF*

*DISPOSSESSION*. Amnesty International Web Site: Retrieved from

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/06/israel-occupation-50-years-of-dispossession/> .

Shehata, S. (2012). *Islamist Politics in the Middle East: Movements and Change*.

London: Routledge.

Snyder, J., & Jervis, R. (1999). Civil War and Security Dilemma. B. F. Walter, & J.

Snyder içinde, *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (s. 15-37). New York: Columbia University Press.

Sontag, D. (2001). Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why It Failed. *Journal of*

*Palestine Studies*, 31(1), 75-85.

*Special Committee Chair Cites Discrimination, Excessive Force, Collective Punishment*

*as Fourth Committee Tackles Israeli Practices in Arab Lands*. (2018, November

13). United Nations General Assembly Fourth Committee 73 Session: Retrieved

from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gaspd686.doc.htm> .

*Special Coordinator Urges Israel, Palestinians to Contemplate Future Carefully amid*

*Extremism, Displacement in Middle East*. (2017, February 16). United Nations

Security Council 7885th Meeting : Retrieved from  
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12720.doc.htm> .

Stein, K. W. (2013). *History Politics and Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Source Document Reader for College Courses and Adult Education*. Atlanta: Center for Israel Education.

Sussman, G. (2006). The Challenge to the Two State Solution. J. Beinlin, & R. L. Stein içinde, *The Struggle for Sovereignty Palestine and Israel, 1993-2005* (s. 303-315). California: Stanford University Press.

Taraki, L. (2006). *Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resistance, and Mobility Under Occupation*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

*Text of Arab peace initiative adopted at Beirut summit*. (2008, March 28). European Parliament Web Site: Retrieved from  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/empa/dv/1\\_arab-initiative-beirut\\_/1\\_arab-initiative-beirut\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empa/dv/1_arab-initiative-beirut_/1_arab-initiative-beirut_en.pdf) .

*The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor*. (2011, November). The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor Web Site: Retrieved from  
<https://euromedmonitor.org/en> .

Thrall, N. (2017, May 16). *Israel-Palestine: the real reason there's still no peace*. The Guardian Web Site: Retrieved from  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/the-real-reason-the-israel-palestine-peace-process-always-fails> .

*Top PM Aide: Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the Peace Process.* (2004, October 6). Haaretz

Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.haaretz.com/1.4710372> .

Tucker, S. C. (2013). *Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A New Era of Modern Warfare*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

*UN General Assembly Resolutions 181.* (1947, November 29). UN Web Site: Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/181\(II\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/181(II)) .

UNHRW. (2002). *Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian Authority Territories*. United Nations Human Rights Watch Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/mena5.html> .

*United Nations Security Council Resolution 8256th Meeting.* (2018, May 15). United Nations Security Council Web Site: Retrieved from [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/s\\_pv\\_8256.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/s_pv_8256.pdf) .

UNOCHA. (2005). *UNOCHA Annual Report 2005*. UNOCHA Web Site: Retrieved from [https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/ocha\\_ar2005\\_web\\_low.pdf](https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/ocha_ar2005_web_low.pdf) .

UNOCHA. (2006). UNOCHA Web Site: Retrieved from <https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/OCHAin2006.pdf> .

UNOCHA. (2012). *Occupied Palestine Territory*. Palestine: UNOCHA. Retrieved from [https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/CAP\\_2012\\_oPt.pdf](https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/CAP_2012_oPt.pdf) .

UNSCR. (2002). *United Nations Security Council Resolutions*. United Nations Security Council Resolutions Web Site: Retrieved from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1397> .

*US pressuring Arab allies to back anti-Hamas resolution at UN.* (2018, December 5,).

Press TV Web Site: Retrieved from

<https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/12/05/582042/Palestine-Hamas-resolution> .

*Venice Declaration* . (1980, June 13). European Union Web Site: Retrieved from

[http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice\\_declaration\\_1980\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf) .

Walther, M. A. (2012). *Hamas Between Violence and Pragmatism*. Stoughton: Books on Demand.

Weizman, E. (2007). *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*. London: Verso.

World, 2. i. (2005). *Freedom House*. Freedom House Web Site: Retrieved from

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/israeli-occupied-territories> .

Yehoshua, Y. (2007). *Controversy Among Reformists in the Arab World Over Dialogue*

*With Islamist Groups*. The Middle East Media Research Institute. The Middle East Media Research Institute. Retrieved from

<https://www.memri.org/reports/controversy-among-reformists-arab-world-over-dialogue-islamist-groups> .

Yehoshua, Y., & Chernitsky, B. (2003, September 18). *Middle East Media Research*

*Institute*. December 1, 2018 tarihinde Middle East Media Research Institute

Inquiry & Analysis Series: Retrieved from [https://www.memri.org/reports/ahmad-](https://www.memri.org/reports/ahmad-qurei-abu-alaa-brief-political-profile-nominated-palestinian-prime-minister)

[qurei-abu-alaa-brief-political-profile-nominated-palestinian-prime-minister](https://www.memri.org/reports/ahmad-qurei-abu-alaa-brief-political-profile-nominated-palestinian-prime-minister)

[adresinden alındı](https://www.memri.org/reports/ahmad-qurei-abu-alaa-brief-political-profile-nominated-palestinian-prime-minister)

Zaatara, A. (2004). *Y. Sharon and exit from Gaza... Palestinian causes and response.*

Aljazeera News Web Site: [www.aljazeera.net/portal](http://www.aljazeera.net/portal) .

Zedalis, D. (2004). *Female Suicide Bombers.* Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.

Zussman, A. (2014). The effect of political violence on religiosity. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 104*, 64-83.

