IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MASTER THESIS

RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS OF DHKP-C

MÜCAHİD KESKİNOĞLU

THESIS SUPERVISOR
PROF. TALHA KÖSE

ISTANBUL, 2023

IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MASTER THESIS

RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS OF DHKP-C

by

MÜCAHİD KESKİNOĞLU

A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations

THESIS SUPERVISOR

PROF. TALHA KÖSE

ISTANBUL, 2023

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations.

Thesis Jury Members

Title – Name Surname	Opinion	Sign
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the School of Graduate Studies of Ibn Haldun University.

Date of Submission Seal/Signature

ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name Surname: Mücahid KESKİNOĞLU

Signature:

ÖZ

DHKP-C'NİN RADİKALLEŞME VE ELEMAN KAZANMA SÜREÇLERİ

Keskinoğlu, Mücahid
Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı
Öğrenci Numarası: 194022001
Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORC-ID): 0000-0002-1309-0100
Ulusal Tez Merkezi Referans Numarası: 10508195

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Talha Köse
Mart 2023, 141 Sayfa

Radikal devrimci sol görüşe sahip bir terör örgütü olan DHKP-C, kurucu ideolojisinin iddia ettiği enternasyonal bir hareket olarak faaliyetlerini yürütmek yerine, Türk toplumu içerisinde kendine has etnik ve sekteryen bir kimliğe sahip olan Alevi toplumu ile çeşitli düzeylerde bir organik bağ arayışına girmiş ve Alevi toplumunu hedef alan radikalleştirme ve eleman kazanma faaliyetleri yürütmeye başlamıştır. Bu durumun en temel sebebi ise Türk siyasetinde ve uluslararası politik düzlemde yaşanan gelişmeler ve bunlara bağlı olarak sol ideolojinin ve komünizmin aldığı darbelerdir. DHKP-C terör örgütü, ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde yaşanan bu gelişmeler karşısında bir refleks olarak kendi varlığını korumak ve devamlılığını sağlamak adına Alevi toplumuna yönelik yürüttüğü manipülasyon ve politizasyon faaliyetlerine ağırlık vermiştir. Bu tezin çıkış noktası: "DHKP-C'nin Alevi toplumuna yönelik bir radikalleştirme ve eleman kazanma girişimi var mı? Varsa, bunun sebebi nedir?" soruları olmuştur. Bu sorulara yanıt aranırken öncelikle, radikalleşme ve eleman kazanma (recruitment) kavramları teorik düzeyde açıklanacaktır. Daha sonra DHKP-C terör örgütünün kuruluşundan itibaren yaşadığı değişim ve dönüşümler tarihsel bağlamda ele alınacaktır. Son bölümde ise özellikle 'söylem analizi' (discourse analysis) yöntemi kullanılarak DHKP-C terör örgütünün söylemleri ile eylemleri arasındaki zıtlık ortaya koyulmaya ve radikalleşmeden eleman kazanmaya geçiş sürecinin örgüt içinde ne şekilde işlediği açıklanmaya çalışılacaktır. Sonuç olarak iddia edilecektir ki terör örgütleri, konjonktürel gelişmelere bağlı olarak ve varlıklarını

tehdit altında gördükleri anda kurucu ideolojilerine aykırı şekilde hareket edebilmekte, faaliyet ve etki sahalarını genişletebilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Alevilik, DHKP-C, Eleman Kazanma, Radikalleşme, Terörizm

ABSTRACT

RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS OF DHKP-C

Keskinoğlu, Mücahid
MA in Political Science and International Relations
Student ID: 194022001
Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORC-ID): 0000-0002-1309-0100
National Thesis Center Reference Number: 10508195

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Talha Köse
March 2023, 141 Pages

DHKP-C, a terrorist organization with a radical revolutionary left-wing view, has sought an organic bond at various levels with the Alevi community, which has a unique ethnic and sectarian identity in Turkish society, instead of carrying out its activities as an international movement claimed by its founding ideology and it started to carry out radicalization and recruitment activities targeting the Alevi community. The main reason for this situation is the developments in domestic and international politics and, so the blows that the left ideology and communism received. The DHKP-C terrorist organization focused on its manipulation and politicization activities against the Alevi community to protect its existence and ensure its continuity as a reflex in the face of these developments at the national and international levels. The starting point of this thesis is 'Is there an attempt by DHKP-C to radicalize and recruit the Alevi community? If so, what is the reason?'. First of all, while seeking answers to these questions the concepts of radicalization and recruitment will be explained at the theoretical level. Then, the changes and transformations that the DHKP-C terrorist organization has experienced since its establishment will be discussed in the historical context. In the last section, the contrast between the discourses and actions of the DHKP-C terrorist organization will be revealed, and how the process of transition from radicalization to recruitment works within the organization will be tried to be explained, especially by using discourse analysis. As a result, I argue that terrorist organizations, can act against their founding ideologies and expand their fields of

activity and influence when they see their existence under threat depending on cyclical developments.

Keywords: Alevism, DHKP-C, Radicalization, Recruitment, Terrorism

DEDICATION

It is dedicated to Turkish citizens who died due to terrorist attacks.

APPRECIATION

In order to complete an academic study, a student and a supervisor are sufficient in the first place, but beyond that, there is a much wider audience in the background.

So, I would like to say a sincere thank you;

To my dear mother and father, **Hatice & Muammer**, for all the financial and moral support they have given me so far.

To my dear wife, **Reyhan**, for always supporting me in completing this work despite all the difficulties we experienced in Karachi,

To my dear classmate, **Ahmet Safa Hüdaverdi**, for his experience sharing support during the writing of the thesis.

To my thesis supervisor, **Prof. Talha Köse**, for guiding this study with his academic competence.

Finally, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to all **our security institutions and their valuable personnel** who working day and night to fight terrorism by putting their lives on the line.

And of course, all praise belongs to God.

Alhamdulillah.

Mücahid KESKİNOĞLU

ANKARA, 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF VISUALS

LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASALA	The Secret Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia
DEV-GENÇ	Türkiye Revolutionary Youth Federation
DHKP-C	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front
FETO/PDY	Fetullahist Terrorist Organization/Parallel State Structure
FKF	Federation of Idea Clubs
IBDA/C	Islamic Great Eastern Raiders/Front
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Damascus
JCAG-ARA	Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide-Armenian Revolutionary Army
LTTE	The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam
MIT	National Intelligence Organization
MKP	Maoist Communist Party
MLKP	Marxist Leninist Communist Party
NYPD	New York Police Department
PASS	Politicized Military War Strategy
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PYD	Democratic Union Party
RAF	Rote Armee Fraction (Baader-Meinhoff Group)
THKO	Turkish People's Liberation Army
THKP-C	The People's Liberation Party-Front of Türkiye
TİKKO	Workers Peasants Liberation Army of Türkiye

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Who does the DHKP-C terrorist organization recruit? Does it try to radicalize and recruit individuals with a particular identity? As a terrorist organization claiming to have a leftist ideology, does DHKP-C have a tendency and strategy to target the Alevi community while recruiting or choosing militants? These questions are important in revealing the difference between the discourses and actions of a left-wing organization claiming to have an international mentality and ideology and showing its point of view towards an ethnic-sectarian social group such as Alevism. In addition, it is important to understand the organization's working logic, radicalization, and recruitment protocols to be able to make a move against the terrorist organization and to operate the de-radicalization processes.

Contrary to the leftist organizations before it, the DHKP-C terrorist organization was not founded in an international conjuncture with bipolar and a strong state like the Soviet Union. Therefore, unlike the organizations before it, it developed some unique reflexes. For this reason, DHKP-C has developed a discourse towards the Alevi community, considered one of the sensitive points in Turkish society in the recruitment processes and radicalization stages since the 1990s. The national and international conditions of that period also had a great impact on this. Because at the international level, the cold war was over, and communism had taken a big blow. In domestic politics, the changes and transformations experienced in the social and political field with the 1980 coup made their effects felt. In addition to all these, the Alevi community wanted to exist with its Alevi identity in the social and political arena. For this reason, DHKP-C changed its perspective and approach as a 'learning organization' in order to survive (Bayer, 2007; C. K. Demir, 2008; Ekici et al., 2010).

While seeking answers to the important questions this thesis focuses on, the '12-Stages Mechanism Model of Political Radicalization' created by McCauley and Moskalenko to explain the path to radicalization and terrorism will be used (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Unlike other theories, this theory aims to explain the concepts of radicalization and terrorism rather than focusing on a specific terrorist organization, type of attack, or attacker. The authors first break down the process leading to radicalization and ultimately terrorist acts at the level of the individual, group, and mass, and then deal with the process through the mechanisms that trigger these three stages.

It is the common opinion of those working in this field that there is no definite method or theory to explain a concept whose main actor is human, such as radicalization and terrorism, but it is also a necessity to choose the model that is closest to the reality of the field of study. Therefore, it is clear that a model created to explain homegrown terrorism in the USA cannot be used while conducting a DHKP-C focused study.

1.2. Background and Significance of the Research

When we search an academic source for the recruitment processes of terrorist organizations, we can easily find different sources (Knapton, 2014), methods (Scott & Podder, 2015), and target groups (Shelley, 2015) for it. But if the issue is a leftist-revolutionist terrorist organization in Türkiye (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front – 'DHKP-C' nickname will be used in my thesis because it is a specific name) and its recruitment strategies (Ekici et al., 2010)[1] we could not find a sufficient academic study. The results of my research fill a gap in our knowledge about the recruitment strategy of DHKP-C toward the Alevi society.

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (briefly DHKP-C) was established by Dursun Karataş leadership on March 30 in, 1994 with the decision which has taken by Revolutionist Left to become a party. It is a Marxist-Leninist party and is accepted illegally in Türkiye. The Party (DHKP) is responsible for political activities and

[1]There is a study about DHKP-C's recruitment strategy, but it is a comparative work between DHKP-C and Hezbollah. The effect of ideology and organizational structure of terrorist groups on recruitment: Turkish Hezbollah and Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C).

propaganda, and the Front (DHKC) is responsible for military organization and armed actions.

Because of their nature, leftist movements are far from religious and racial affairs. They see the world as an ongoing class struggle. Marx describes religion as 'opium' (Marx, 1997, p. 192) for societies (Belge, 2017). For example, leftist leader Stalin tried to destroy religion in Russian society but failed. Leftist thinkers support that religion is also a tool for the dominant class. Because of these reasons, leftist-revolutionist movements had not close relations with religions within society before. Moreover, leftist-revolutionist ideology is international; they just see classes, neither religions nor ethnicities.

But when we look at the DHKP-C organization, we see a different relationship with Alevi society. According to historical meaning, Alevi means anyone attached to Ali (fourth caliph of Islam State, cousin, and bridegroom of Prophet Muhammad) and is on his side. Alevism, on the other hand, can be defined as loving Ali in general and following the path of his descendants, 'Ehl-i Beyt.' However, the meanings of the words Alevi and Alevism are different for each of the different Alevi groups living in different parts of the world today. But according to sociocultural meaning,

> The Alevi identity traditionally has been a strong communal group identity with cultural boundaries, moral values, rituals, and shared collective emotions. This identity, historically and culturally, has origins as an esoteric Shiite madhab under Islamic belief system. Alevi identity has been maintained for centuries through an endogamous social order in rural contexts (Kehl-Bodrogi 1996, pp. 64–67). Specific rituals and cultural practices have played important roles in the maintenance of Alevi identity. Alevi's identity has ethnic/madhhabs origins in rural contexts, but it has taken on a multiplicity of forms during the ongoing process of identity transformation, which is marked by modernization and urbanization (Köse, 2012, p. 576).

So, Alevism is an ethnoreligious identity (Celia et al., 2017). Moreover, there is an ongoing debate about being or not a minority of Alevi society in Türkiye. Especially European organizations have shown them as a 'minority group' contrary to the Republic of Türkiye (Minority Rights Group International, 2007, p. 8). Even that debate demonstrates a sensitivity to the issue. So, we can openly say that these ongoing debates about who the Alevi is, create an opportunity for terrorist organizations in the recruitment process.

Although Alevism means “subordinate to Ali” in the dictionary and expresses a sociocultural identity, it also gained a political identity as a result of the ethnic and religious fusion in Anatolia since the 13th century and the propaganda of the Safavids in the 15th century. It is possible to address the traces of Alevism’s position in today’s Turkish social and political life and to find its origins here (Ocak, 2022).

With the coup of September 12, 1980, the military government hit hard the extreme leftist terrorist organizations’ activities. Moreover, they were hit hard by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ideologically. Then, they came to the end of the 1990s and attempted to speed up their activities. The Marxist-Leninist ultra-left organizations in Türkiye continue their activities by focusing on problems such as environmentalism, human rights, ethnic and religious problems, and democratization to get rid of the void they have fallen in parallel with the collapse in the Eastern bloc (Çiçek, 2008, p. 40).

Terrorist organizations are known to exploit sexuality, cultural differences, social classes, economic opportunities, political preferences, denominations, various hobbies, and similar phenomena to include student youth and especially university students. In addition, members of terrorist organizations trying to bring young people into their traps exploit supreme values such as bravery, compassion, sacrifice, and loyalty to a case and shoot the youth from the house of life. In the university and especially around friendships, young people fall into the trap of terrorist organizations, stated in other words, in the form of hunting (Köse & Coşkun, 2019).

1.3. Problem Statement

Is DHKP-C trying to manipulate and recruit Alevi society for its purpose? According to Dursun Karataş, the aim and strategy of the DHKP-C organization are as follows:

> DHKP-C is a party that has adopted and fought for the Marxist-Leninist worldview. Its ultimate goal is to create a classless, exploitative order and world. But today’s goal is to establish the Revolutionary People’s Power, which is the power of all community forces against imperialism and oligarchy. Türkiye’s revolution will have an anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic character. In our country, it is not possible to change the quality of power by election. The war of the people, led by the DHKP-C, will establish the revolutionary people’s power, with the development of the guerrilla army in the city and the countryside, the development of the guerrilla war, the popular guerrilla army, and the eventual total uprising,

> with the rise of the popular army and ultimately the total uprising. The DHKP-C perceives the first phase of the popular war as a vanguard guerrilla warfare based on armed propaganda. Although the basic form of popular war is an armed struggle, this is not the only form of struggle. People's war is based on the 'Politicized Military War Strategy' (PASS) under the conditions of our country (Çiçek, 2008, p. 47).

According to the organization's strategy, PASS consists of two stages.

The first stage is the leading war process that the organization conducts on the basis of armed propaganda and will continue until the regular armies' stage in order to politicize the masses and include them in the war. According to the DHKP-C organization, it is not possible for a public war strategy that does not go through the pioneering war stage to succeed. The Pioneer War is a struggle phase that will be pursued by considering all forms of an economic, democratic, and peaceful struggle depending on armed propaganda.

The second stage is turning the guerrilla army into a popular army, establishing and expanding the popular revolutionary power, and the morale of the ruling forces to be prepared for the final attack with constant attacks. The leading force of the public war of the DHKP-C is the working class. The basic classes are the peasants, the working class, and the small bourgeoisie. Generally, it is aimed to treat rural areas as the main struggle area (Karataş, 1989, p. 512).

The founder of the organization Dursun Karataş mentioned the primary purpose of DHKP-C is to start a public war. So, if the public does not start it, then the organization manipulates and politicizes the public for a domestic war. So, the effective strategy of DHKP-C has three pillars.

Firstly, a social group is chosen. They have aggrieved feelings, and if they do not have this kind of feeling, they manipulate them. In this thesis, I claim that some marginal members from the Alevi community have been chosen by DHKP-C for manipulating and politicizing. Alevi people are not actors but victims in this kind of relationship. There are some examples of this 'manipulation.' For example, some of the people pointed to a red sign[2] to Alevi people's houses were related to DHKP-C (Güncel

[2] 'Red sign on the door' has a bad historical heritage for the Alevi people who live in Türkiye.

Haber, 2013; Karakuş, 2013). Or a suspect who threatened an Alevi preacher (Dede) with death was detained. It turned out that the suspect is the region responsible for the terrorist organization DHKP-C (Gazete Vatan, 2021).

Secondly, if the organization succeeds in manipulating and politicization or finding manipulated people, go to the second stage of PASS. When recruited Alevi members of the organization died, they propagated 'state terror against a minority group.'

Thirdly, (in my opinion, it is the most impertinent strategy of DHKP-C) the organization is using Alevi civil society organizations, including some of the praying places (Cemevi), cultural houses[3] and associations as its emplacement for propaganda and manipulating masses. Moreover, non-Alevi DHKP-C members are used for this purpose, even its founder Dursun Karataş (DHA, 2008). He is not an Alevi, he was a Sunni from Elazığ province of Türkiye, but his funeral organized at Gazi Cemevi[4] and he was buried in Gazi Cemetery. Likewise, a funeral was organized for the last dead members of the protest music group Grup Yorum, related to DHKP-C, members Helin Bölek (She was Shafii from Diyarbakır) and İbrahim Gökçek (He was Sunni from Kayseri) at the same place, Gazi Cemevi. Some Alevi people and the public are curious about this behavior of DHKP-C (Kocaova, 2020; Türkmen Aleviler, 2020).

What is the reason for that? If they are not Alevi, so why was a funeral organized in Gazi Cemevi or some other praying places of Alevi society? Even some cemevis refused to organize a funeral for terrorists (Ensonhaber, 2016; Milliyet, 2016). Moreover, some Alevi associations are interrogating DHKP-C's on Alevi youth. "DHKP-C and MLK-P take the Alevi youth to Diyarbakır - Sur. Why is that? Because if Alevi youth die in clashes there, then Alevi society gets off the street, so there could be a domestic war." These statements belong to Özdemir Özdemir, President of the Turkmen Alevi and Bektashi Foundation (Özdemir, 2016).

[3] As mentioned above, Alevi's belief occurs in ethnic-sectarian and cultural pillars.
[4] Gazi Neighborhood is like a ghetto fortress for DHKP-C, located in Okmeydanı / İstanbul.

1.4. Purpose of the Study

The primary purpose of the study will be to reveal the aim of DHKP-C that, which is manipulating and politicizing Alevi society against the Republic of Türkiye. There is a contradiction between the discourse and action of the organization. They claim themselves as a leftist-revolutionist organization in discourse, but in reality, the organization is trying to appropriate its acts to Alevi society in Türkiye.

In every society, there are some social and political cleavages and various soft areas that can be called social fault lines. Such groups or areas are targeted within the scope of activities to destabilize the target country, such as terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence services, and pressure is created on them by using various means. This targeting does not make these groups criminals. These groups are used to undermine or threaten social stability, sometimes by being victimized and sometimes instrumentalized. There are dozens of events in this context from past to present in Turkish society (Can & Taşcı, 2016). Therefore, we think that the Alevi belief, which is a part of the Turkish mosaic, and the people who hold this belief are the target of the DHKP-C terrorist organization, and in this way, it is aimed to destabilize the social space in Türkiye.

My topic is radicalization and recruitment strategies of DHKP-C intended for Alevi people. This thesis will be covered other related issues of this primary topic like terrorism, radicalization and recruitment process, leftist movements-organizations, and Alevi beliefs. How does DHKP-C try to recruit militants among Alevi youth? What are their recruitment mechanisms and discourses?

This kind of study is needed so much because the public war aim of DHKP-C is threatening the security and stability of Turkish society. When I was making searching for this issue, I saw that a study had not been made within this context. There are 7 Master of Arts theses about the DHKP-C terrorist organization on YÖKTEZ (*Ulusal Tez Merkezi*, 2022). They are mostly descriptive and about the communication strategies of the organization.

Therefore, it is possible to say that this research is the first thesis-level study focusing on the radicalization and recruitment strategies of the DHKP-C terrorist organization targeting Alevi people.

1.5. Literature Review

After the 9/11 (2001), Madrid (2004), and London (2005) attacks, terrorism, and radicalization studies leaped forward. Governments, security forces, intelligence services, and academia have tried to understand root causes and preventive precautions. There are different models and mechanisms for understanding the radicalization process prepared by Fathali Moghaddam (Moghaddam, 2005b), Marc Sageman (Sageman, 2004), Quintan Wictorowicz (Wiktorowicz, 2004, 2005), and Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). But there will be studies that see radicalization as a social notion like Clark McCauley - Sophia Moskalenko (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011) and Donatella Della Porta's (Della Porta, 1995) approaches. McCauley and Moskalenko's twelve-stage mechanism model's radicalization process is more suitable for this thesis. They emphasize that radicalization can be developed through interactions at the individual, small group, or mass level.

There are three levels of the radicalization process: individual, group, and mass. And there are pull and push factors in this process (Vergani et al., 2018). What kind of causes make people radical, and what kind of people are recruited by organizations? Moreover, there are two parties to radicalization.

The first one is individuals who target groups of terrorist organizations. The organization also provides solutions to the subconscious needs of individuals, which they do not obtain legally. Terrorist identity gives the individual a role even negatively in society following their past expectations and losses even. Group membership also ensures that the person feels influenced, has social status, acquires a social environment close to him, and has the potential to meet his financial needs. All these psychological features that a person gains with group membership are seen as sufficient reasons for him to resort to violence (Shaw, 1986).

The second one is terrorist organizations. On the basis of the second approach, which is not used much in the literature on terrorism, why does the organization want to add a person to its ranks? It is asked by the group to be a member of the organization due to which characteristics of the person, what are the criteria that organizations consider when choosing the elements, do these criteria differ from organization to organization, and are there similarities between the organizations in this regard? Answers to questions such are sought (Sageman, 2004).

Another important issue about the radicalization process is that what are the stages and methods of becoming members of organizations (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006). Faria and Arce stated that members in a terrorist organization could occur in two ways (Faria & Arce, 2005).

Organizational ideologies, goals, and structures are primary influences in selecting staff. Terrorist organizations based on ethnic origin have their criteria for selecting personnel. The first condition to be a member of an organization in Tamil Tigers is to belong to the same ethnicity (Alptekin, 2018).

While researching the field of terrorism in the last 40 years, Laqueur stated that while the main causes of terrorism are generally covered, organizations' dynamics to choose staff, stages of joining the organization, and effective methods of preventing terrorism have not received as much attention as they deserve or have not attracted the attention of researchers (Laqueur, 2004).

While researching this thesis, many books were read about different types of radicalization and terrorist organizations. The starting point was the Engineers of Jihad book. This book seeks to explain that point that the authors call "a surprising fact: engineers are overrepresented among violent Islamist extremists." (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016). Then, we read Violent Radicalization & Far-Right Extremism in Europe. It tries to understand both the generic and context-specific dynamics of the violent radicalization of individuals and groups belonging to the far right (Aristotle et al., 2018). Then we focused on terrorist organizations (Alptekin, 2018), the radicalization process, and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in Türkiye (Altun & Yalçın, 2018).

One of the other important books was written by Talha Köse and İpek Coşkun, which is about the radicalization process in Turkish universities (Köse & Coşkun, 2019). This book is also related to my topic because leftist-revolutionist movements are enormously powerful in Turkish universities.

1.6. Research Objectives, Questions, and Hypothesis

My hypothesis is that: "Terrorist organizations act pragmatically about their strategies, even against their founding criteria because of political alterations." In this study, there will be used DHKP-C terrorist organization's recruitment strategy and its approach to Alevi people as variables. For this reason, the dependent variable of the hypothesis is the 'recruitment strategy of the extremist/terrorist organization.' The independent variable is the 'identity of the recruited people.' And the intervening variable is 'using of Alevi society's aggrieved feelings or manipulating and politicizing Alevi society for creating a public war. Making them feel to be locked out from Turkish society by DHKP-C'.

This research tries to find answers to these questions in general terms.

- Why members of the Alevi community are overrepresented in DHKP-C's militant recruitment? What is the reason behind this? Identity, norms, the economy, which one matters?
- Why DHKP-C targets members of the Alevi community as part of its recruitment strategy? How does the recruitment process work?
- What characteristics did DHKP-C consider when recruiting staff (what are the socio-demographic characteristics of the terrorist organization staff, which the organization preferred),
- What is the role of ideology and organizational structure in selecting staff?
- Does DHKP-C show loyalty to their constituent ideology or act pragmatically?

- How does the DHKP-C recruitment process work?
- What are the motivations of people who are recruited by terrorist organizations?
- What are the causes behind of contradiction of DHKP-C acts against its founding criteria?
- Why does DHKP-C have many Alevi members?
- Why does DHKP-C turn his face to Alevi society?
- What is DHKP-C trying to do through the Alevi community?
- Does DHKP-C represent Alevi society?
- Are Alevi people a purpose or tool for DHKP-C?
- Is DHKP-C a fruit of the Alevi issue or not?
- What do Alevi people think about DHKP-C?
- What is the underlying factor of the Alevi person living in Türkiye to participate in DHKP-C? Which factor is more inclusive and more explanatory?
    - Relative Deprivation
    - Negative Experiences
    - Poverty
    - Ideological Reasons
    - Religious Reasons
    - Sectarian Causes
    - Social Status
    - Sexual Orientation (Honey trap etc.)

As a consequence of their nature, terrorist organizations are tough actors in conducting research on them, especially their strategies because they do not make a press release because they take their power from unpredictability. People can think that a small terrorist organization like DHKP-C is not remarkable by comparison with other organizations like PKK, DEASH, or Tamil Tigers. Yes, it is true, but my focal point on the issue is the recruitment process of DHKP-C towards Alevi society.

1.7. Methodology

The methodology of this research will be mostly discourse analysis because the main part of the study is the recruitment strategy of DHKP-C's towards Alevi society, but there are no proper sources that explain the relation between them broadly. Moreover, I will utilize previous studies about DHKP-C (Avcı, 2019; Aydemir, 2019; Çiçek, 2008; Ekici et al., 2010; Işık, 2013; Karabudak, 2000) and Alevi society also (Celia et al., 2017; Ertan, 2016; Köse, 2011; Mahïr, 2017; Massicard, 2007; Tol, 2009, 2016; Watters, 2015; Yüz, 2019). Furthermore, the sources of the study will be collected from the primary sources, like publications of the organization (*Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Programı*, 1995; "Devrimci Sol," 1980a; "DHKC Milis," 2021; "Halk Okulu," n.d.; "Kerbela Dergisi," 1996; "Kurtuluş," 2013; "Yürüyüş," 2018) and news, and secondary sources, like books, academic dissertations and articles about the organization and Alevi society.

In this study, the analysis unit is not individuals but DHKP-C and the Alevi community. Since the focus of the research is which individuals join the organization and why, there is a research direction from the organization to the individual. Secondly, there will be used discourse analysis mostly in this study because of the lack of academic resources about the main purpose of this study. Because we here argue that the DHKP-C terrorist organization acts contrary to its founding ideology, so, there is a great contradiction between its rhetoric and actions, and it has a hidden agenda and recruitment strategy for the Alevi community.

Since terrorist organizations such as DHKP-C derive their strength from their unpredictability and attempts to create an asymmetric multiplier effect, we think that it would be more appropriate to use the discourse analysis method to strengthen this idea we advocate. Here, we will especially focus on the expressions used in the organization's publications and the kind of message they are conveyed. Therefore, we need the discourse analysis method due to the expressions, language, and messages used in the publications (Saraisky, 2015). Actually, there will be used an indirectly hybrid method for proving the hypothesis. For example, there are many studies about Alevi society and neighbors (Tol, 2016), and they were analyzed with software like SPSS and Atlas.ti (Mahir, 2017).

On the other hand, other chapters like general briefing about radicalization and recruitment process and strategies of terrorist organizations, leftist-revolutionist organizations, and Alevi society in Türkiye will be mostly analyzed by reviewing academic publications and open sources because we can say that there are proper academic sources about these subjects. The data used for these chapters will be collected from the primary resources; press releases, founding works (like Dursun Karataş's, Marx's (Marx, 2018) or Lenin's (Lenin, 2010) book, and news and secondary resources; related articles and books.

First of all, I will do a broader literature review, and I will try to get the articles, books, and primary sources about my thesis until July 2020. Secondly, I will read the sources and assort them concerning subjects until September 2020.

1.8. Structure of the Study

This thesis consists of five main chapters. Although the first chapter is the introduction, it includes the outline of the study, its methodology, research questions, the literature related to the study, research questions, in short, the essence of the thesis, which includes its aims and objectives. In the second part, the concepts of radicalization and recruitment will be discussed theoretically. What radicalization is the prominent and frequently cited radicalization models in the literature will be included. In the second phase of this chapter, recruitment and recruitment strategies will be examined. In the third chapter, the changes and transformations that the DHKP-C terrorist organization has experienced since its establishment will be discussed in chronological order and, the reasons for these changes will be focused on. The fourth chapter will focus primarily on how radicalization and recruitment processes work in terrorist organizations, which are well-known by the world community. The second phase of the fourth chapter will focus on the radicalization and recruitment processes of the DHKP-C toward the Alevi community. The fifth and final chapter is the concluding chapter of the thesis, which will include the findings obtained during the research and the recommendations to be made for new studies and policy implementations based on these.

1.9. Ethical Issues

There are several ethical issues in this study. Firstly, my research was built upon a terrorist organization's recruitment strategy and the Alevi people, an ethnoreligious society in Türkiye. So, I tried to be very careful about the research direction. Because these kinds of issues are like a 'pressure point' for societies, and the Alevi issue is one of them for Türkiye.

Secondly, in the matter of academic property, I never plagiarize or copy other people's work and try to pass it off as my own. I will refer to or ask for permission before using other people's tools or methods, unpublished data, or results. I respect copyrights and patents, together with other forms of intellectual property, and I always acknowledge contributions to my research.

CHAPTER II

RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT

2.1. Introduction

If terrorism were a machine, its gears would be terrorist organizations, and its fuel would be humans. Therefore, the terrorist machine is stopped by preventing the radicalization of individuals and the prevention of their recruitment by terrorist organizations. Aggressive defense policies, modern technical support tools, and conventional weapons of security forces can slow the terror threat to a point, but the human resources of terrorist organizations must be drained for a final solution. At this point, understanding the radicalization and recruitment of a person by terrorist organizations and taking precautions against these situations before a person becomes a member of terrorist organizations are the most cost-effective counter-terrorism strategies. In this context, this chapter aims to examine the factors behind the radicalization and recruitment of individuals. We will try to answer questions such as: 'What is radicalization?', 'What are the models used to explain radicalization processes?', 'What is the recruitment of individuals by terrorist organizations?', 'What are the strategies used by terrorist organizations in recruitment?'.

In the first title of this chapter, we address the concept of radicalization. A single and precise definition of radicalization has not yet been achieved today. For this reason, in the radicalization section, we focused more on including definitions that we compiled from different studies and different perspectives to draw attention to the uncertainty of the concept and the complexities experienced in defining it. In this way, we aimed to create a general framework based on similar and different approaches to understanding. In addition, we tried to list the conditions that feed the radicalization process at different levels. Throughout the radicalization department, we have included the most cited and known definitions in the academic field, so we have tried

to address the definition of radicalization as broadly as possible through different processes, different actors, and different perceptions.

In the second title of this chapter, we touched on the most cited radicalization patterns created by security forces, intelligence organizations, and academics and examined them one by one. We tried to explain the models of radicalization through the most known and cited examples in the radicalization literature. In this way, it will be possible to analyze the similarities or differences between the radicalization models created by different actors.

In the third title of this chapter, we tried to define the concept of recruitment in general terms. We examined what recruitment meant for different terrorist organizations and its importance attributed to the organizational level. We tried to determine the recruitment process, how it works and the elements it contains, and to what extent these elements are valid in an organizational sense.

In the fourth title of this chapter, we tried to explain recruitment strategies in the organizational dimension and the recruitment strategies that organizations apply. First, we examined the vulnerable personality and the impact of this situation on recruitment. We have categorized the tools and environments that terrorist organizations use for recruitment, which play an important role in their recruitment strategies.

Finally, in the first part of this study, we aimed to analyze the definition of radicalization and models of radicalization, as well as the definition of recruitment and recruitment strategies. Because in the next parts of our study, the awareness of these concepts occupies a key place.

2.2. What Is Radicalization?

Defining the radicalization process and its models has a prominent place in terrorism and radicalization studies. First, giving a background on the subject and pointing out the well-known mistakes or little-known important points is essential for a full understanding of the subject. In this section, we aim to examine the effects of threat perceptions on the concept by considering the concept of radicalization from the

perspective of different actors. While we refer to the reports prepared by the New York Police Department and the Turkish Police Service, we also give the opportunity to compare the perspectives of the USA and Türkiye on radicalization.

In this section, we will define radicalization from the point of view of academics, security forces, and members of intelligence. Next, we will examine the radicalization patterns created by Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, Fathali Moghaddam, Marc Sageman, and The New York Police Department (NYPD) and the factors that trigger radicalization.

Although bloody attacks, various acts of violence, and the chaos they cause come to mind when they are called terrorist organizations, the process leading to all this essentially begin with the radicalization of the individual/group. So, to understand a terrorist, an act of terrorism, or a terrorist organization, we can say that the keyword is 'radicalization process.' The process of radicalization is the starting point for decision-makers in both counter-terrorist actions and preventive processes of terrorism. Because ignoring the processes of radicalization when analyzing a terrorist or terrorist organization will decouple the issue from its original context and essence, as well as prevent the right moves from being made.

Even though the radicalization process retains its importance in the eyes of decision-makers, there are fundamental interpretations and differences of opinion experienced by the definition of radicalization. This can be caused by many different reasons, from actors' perception of threats to situations they have experienced up to that time and differences in interpretation of issues. Some countries may prioritize foreign fighters, some may prioritize 'homegrown' terrorists, or some may even consider 'reasonable suspicion' as part of counter-terrorism (Silber & Bhatt, 2007; T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, 2005). Therefore, all these internal and external factors lead actors/decision-makers to make a definition according to their perceptions and priorities and to take action based on it.

Although the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) specifies the responsibilities that states must take in the fight against terrorism and introduces

binding obligations, governments continue to use the uncertainties arising from definitions as a means of flexible decision-making. These are:

- Refrain from providing any support, active or passive, to entities or individuals involved in terrorist acts.
- Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism.
- Suppress the recruitment of members of terrorist groups.
- Eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists.
- Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups.
- Deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens.
- Ensure that anyone who participates in the financing, planning, preparation, or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice.
- Afford each other the greatest measure of mutual legal assistance in connection with criminal matters related to terrorism (Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa & Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2014, pp. 31-32)

Radicalization is now intensively discussed in other branches of social sciences, such as psychology and sociology, apart from political science (Lobato et al., 2018; Moghaddam, 2005b; Rousseau, Hassan, et al., 2019; Rousseau, Oulhote, et al., 2019). Although there are differences in interpretation due to the nature of the 'social sciences,' this, at some point, prevents the formation of unity of ideas and actions in the fight against international terrorism and extremism.

As a result, structures that some countries consider terrorist organizations may be considered legitimate actors or opposition groups by other countries. If we get to the bottom of the matter, decision-makers can open up space for themselves through definitions. For example, although the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), on which this thesis focuses, is recognized as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States of America (USA), and the European Union (EU), there are

still more various associations, cultural centers and institutions in Europe and maintains its activities through media organs. Although, DHKP-C continues to exist as a threat to the public order in Türkiye and Europe because countries do not even recognize it as a terrorist organization or implement the decisions they accept. For instance, "although the threat of a terrorist attack by DHKP-C in the EU is at a low level, its members continued to use the EU Member States as a logistical base to support the group's operations in Türkiye" (EUROPOL, 2020) or Iran and Syria regimes are providing different kinds of support to terror organizations (BBC News Türkçe, 2019; U.S Department of State, 2019).

Radicalization is a process, not a consequence. The concept of radicalization has many different varieties as subheadings. These subspecies can also appear as a spiral structure that intertwines occasionally. For example, a radical left-wing organization can also have ethnic tendencies at the same time, and therefore this can complicate the definition (T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2020).

As we mentioned above, there are many different descriptions of the notion of radicalization. The most important part of this classification is the decision-maker's attitude to the issue. In that, they are the authority to fight against this issue in the first degree. However, we want to mention some descriptions of the notion of radicalization.



Figure 2.1. Radicalism Conceptual Category (Lucas, 2018)

Researchers are referring the radicalization generally as an ideological process that results in political violence or terrorism against their objectors (Porta & LaFree, 2012; Schmid, 2013, p. 217).

According to Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, radicalization is a process of enhancing beliefs, emotions, and practices to reach an acquisition on behalf of a group or cause. Radicalization is not only observed in people with psychological disorders or people with a demonic character. It can happen to anyone under the appropriate circumstances and conditions. There is no guarantee that no one will ever experience this condition. Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog underline that wealthy, talented, successful, or idealistic people can also be radicalized or recruited by terrorist organizations (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016), and even a nation can be radicalized (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011, p. 4). Essentially, this description makes it harder to distinguish radicalized people from nonradical people because, according to their characterization, everyone can be a potentially radical, but the latest studies have shown the validity of their approach.

As Bertjan Doosje, Fathali Moghaddam, and others describe radicalization as an evolution process that motivates people to turn a representative of violent activities against their opponents or possible high-valued objectives. In addition, the most important part of their characterization is achieving the 'political goals of the action' and 'behavioral change' (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 5).

Moreover, Marc Sageman maintains that there is confusion about describing radicalization. People commonly assume that radical ideas and violent actions driven by radical ideas are the same notions, but he defends the idea that they are not the same. He focuses on the final point of the issue and uses 'terrorism' for political violence. In other words, Sageman says radicalization is a concept that does not resort to political violence and remains only in the intellectual dimension. When the radical idea has resorted to political violence, it becomes terrorism (Sageman, 2017, pp. 9-10). It is a process and an ideological position, but with the use of politicized violence, it turns into a terrorist action (Sageman, 2008, p. 8).

Donatella Della Porta and Gary LaFree also point out a decoupling between behavior and thought/perception. This concept, defined as radicalization, is all about differences in the level of discourse and action, but they do not act in the same direction or against each other. An ordinary person can become radicalized at the end of a linear radicalization process and resort to political violence or an act of terrorism, and either this happens in the opposite way and become involved in an intellectual/perceptional radicalization process after the action has been carried out.

There is no guarantee that people or groups with radical ideas will put these thoughts into action, and all violent political actions do not contain radical ideas (Porta & LaFree, 2012). These are concepts that must be carefully separated from each other. Otherwise, freedom of expression and terrorist organization propaganda are intertwined. Since radicalization is not a monolithic process and concept, it is useful to distinguish micro, meso, and macro levels. It is essential to separate the radicalization processes that develop at the group and organizational level from the radicalization processes that occur at the individual level (Porta & LaFree, 2012, p. 7). Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko also use a *"two-pyramids model that distinguishes radicalization of opinion from radicalization of action"* (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 69). They describe radicalization as the peak of rising challenges within non-state actors and against state authority. In addition, they argue that radicalization is in a key position to understanding the origins of terrorism. (C. McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 415-416).



Figure 2.2. Opinion Radicalization Pyramid (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014)



Figure 2.3. Action Radicalization Pyramid (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014)

According to J. G. Horgan (2009), "radicalization can be defined as a psychosocial process that entails an increase in the commitment to some kind of extremist ideology" (Lobato et al., 2018). J. Horgan, like Della Porta and LaFree, emphasizes this point, arguing that anyone who resorts to violence may not have radical ideas, and even an act of terrorism can be committed before the terrorist has yet to have radical ideas. Even this situation is important in terms of giving an idea of the complexity of the concept of radicalization (J. Horgan, 2012).

In the workshop report on the "Prevention of Radicalization and the Phenomenon of Terrorism" prepared by the General Directorate of Police – Police Academy Department (Gunn & Demirden, 2019), radicalization is defined as acts of violence against symbolic targets adopted by the majority outside the group. In a nutshell, it refers to the deconstruction of motivational elements in the process that resulted in the act of terrorism. In addition, it points to the need to distinguish between radical ideas that are not involved in violence and violent actions motivated by radical ideas. While one is legal and considered within the freedom of expression, the other means hostile actions toward the inner workings of societies (Gunn & Demirden, 2019, p. 33).

A report prepared by the New York Police Department (NYPD), "Radicalization in the West: Homegrown Thread" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), stated that terrorism came as a result of the radicalization process. In terms of its purpose and scope, the report, which focuses on homegrown terrorism, which began to be spoken about in the West, especially after the September 11 and London-Madrid attacks, states that citizens of Western states adopt extremist ideologies and ideas hostile to the West to achieve

social change. Expressing that this anti-Western attitude is strengthened by various extremist influences, the report argues that "even internalizing this extreme belief system on his/her own is radicalization" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 16).

According to the report, "the progression of searching, finding, adopting, nurturing, and developing this extreme belief system to the point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act defines the process of radicalization" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 16). Finally, to put it, this report, which reads radicalization in the West more through 'homegrown threats,' focuses on a narrower environment compared to the definition of the Turkish Police Academy Department and cannot take radicalization in the West beyond the context of Islamist radicalization.

Although there is a wide range of reasons that cause the radicalization of the individual, they can be classified under three main headings: micro, meso, and macro levels. These are:

- **Micro-level explanations** look at the individual level, such as identity, integration, alienation, deprivation, rejection, and moral outrage.
- **Meso-level explanations** examine supportive or complicit social surroundings, such as a reference group or terrorists' broader constituencies.
- **Macro-level explanations** look at a wider level, such as the role of government, society, public opinion, minority relationships, and so on. (Schmid, 2013a)

In addition to all this, there are also pull and push factors of the radicalization process. One or both of these factors can contribute to the radicalization of the individual. Examples of push factors are grievances and adverse economic, political, or sociological conditions. For pull factors, socio-political contributions such as attractants, that is, 'money or perceived importance' that being a member of the organization will provide, can be given as examples (Borum, 2011b). The person may enter the process of radicalization with the effect of the conditions they are in, their psychological state, or by thinking that the material and moral conditions offered by the organization are advantageous for them.

Table 2.1. Paths of Radicalization (Bosi & Porta, 2012, p. 3)

Path	Dominant motivations (Micro level)	Recruitment-relevant networks (Meso level)	Perception of context (Macro level)
Ideological	Ideological, identity	Family and territorial traditions	Potential revolutionary situation
Instrumental	Aspiration to change	Political groups	Closed opportunities
Solidaristic	Experiential cognition	Peer group	Escalation of political conflict

2.2.1. What Are the Radicalization Models?

Academicians, security forces, and intelligence personnel have developed various radicalization models to provide a simpler understanding of the radicalization process and a guide to similar processes that will occur in the future. Although the purpose of these models is the same, the creation methods differ. Some of them were prepared based only on a specific terrorist organization, while others tried to resolve only the process of uniform radicalization, and others tried to develop a model that dealt with radicalization in a more general sense.

For example, the radicalization model developed by New York Police Department officers Silber & Bhatt (2007) examines more homegrown and jihadi-oriented terrorism, while Wictorowicz focuses more on the radicalization processes experienced by members of the Al-Muhajiroun organization in the UK (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Or Horgan's use of the field of psychology, such as approaching radicalization through different areas and trying to analyze it from a different point of view (J. G. Horgan, 2009, 2019). There are many models and explanations that approach different situations, different organizations, and different points, such as these examples that we consider.

It is a fact that radicalization requires a separate approach to every organization, every society, every situation, and even every person, as it does not have a precise definition or process based on general acceptance. Therefore, various mechanisms have been developed by academics, security forces, or intelligence elements to perceive and understand the processes of radicalization (The models created by the New York Police Department and by Marc Sageman, who served as an analyst at the CIA, can be cited as examples).

As mentioned above, these mechanisms should be used under the conditions that best suit them. For example, adapting the model of radicalization that the NYPD has designed for homegrown jihadist terrorists in America to radical left-wing organizations in Türkiye will not yield the desired result, and the key will not open the lock that is not suitable for itself. From a different perspective, it would be pointless to use a model that is not suitable for the conditions since the process of radicalization of right-wing organizations in Europe is inherently different from the process of radicalization of jihadist organizations in the Middle East. If it is the most appropriate model for the person, group, or process being focused on (although it does not show 100% compliance due to the human factor), it can be used as a functional tool to explain the radicalization process.

In this chapter, we will consider some of the most cited models in radicalization and de-radicalization, and we will briefly mention which model and why we use it for the DHKP-C terrorist organization, which is the main backbone of this thesis. We will try to make a more detailed explanation of the radicalization processes of DHKP-C in the third part of this work.

2.2.1.1. McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko – 12 Stages Mechanism of Radicalization Process

Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko's 'Twelve Stages Mechanism of Political Radicalization Process' represents a pyramid model for radicalization from base to apex. The base level of the pyramid composes of very large groups of people, while these numbers fall as it rises, and by the top of the pyramid, at the apex, it becomes a

small, refined group that shares very largely the same ideas (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011, 2017).

People on the ground floor of the pyramid can be any person from any segment of society. For example, the authors give us two examples from the United States and Northern Ireland. For example, 40% of the American people believe that the powers of the federal government are excessive, which in turn becomes a threat to the freedoms of ordinary citizens. These people can be considered at the beginning of the path to illegal action against the government. But few reach the top of the pyramid and commit an illegal act of political violence. Or in Northern Ireland, the common denominator of those who support the IRA is 'Brits Out' (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 417).

These examples point to common denominators on the road to political violence. There is no such thing as anyone uncomfortable with the growing powers of the federal government in America or those who don't want Britain in Northern Ireland turning to political violence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 416-417).

According to the authors, radicalization can occur at the level of individual, group, and mass. The causes of radicalization at these levels are different from each other. Therefore, these differences also require to be examined separately within themselves. So, they conceptualize '12 Stages of Mechanisms of Political Radicalization' (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).

At the stage of **'individual level radicalization,'** a person may become radicalized as a result of events on their own (*personal grievance*) or because of the negative experiences experienced by the group to which they belong (*group grievance*) and may have entered a process that will result in the act of terrorism in the process (*slippery slope*). They can also be radicalized because of the group of friends they belong to or the person they care about (*love*). In addition, it can only be due to the search for power (*status-seeking*). Eventually, he/she completely severed his ties with the group they previously belonged to and became part of this new group (*unfreezing* and *re-freezing*) (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 209).

At the stage of **'group level radicalization,'** although the individual is included in a group of people who are mostly like-minded at the group stage, it is possible that there are various fractional discussions within the group (*group polarization*) and radicalization moving in different directions (*group fissioning*). In addition, reasons such as the rise of intra-group solidarity and integrity against a non-group threat (*condensation*) and the struggle for the group's supporters are also factors affecting the radicalization process (*outbidding*) (C. McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 209).

At the stage of **'mass level radicalization,'** one of the biggest motivations of individuals in the process of radicalization is their hatred of the enemy, rather than their belonging to the group, and is fueled by this group (*hate*). An individual's sense of intra-group belonging, the integrity of their discourse, and actions in favor of the group are riveted by the sacrifice of a martyr (*martyrdom*). And finally, the violence that the state exhibits in response to an act of terrorism is again used as an asymmetric tool to fuel violence and hatred against the state (*jiu-jitsu politics*) (C. McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 209). And the process continues to work that way.

Table 2.2. McCauley and Moskalenko's 12-Stages Mechanism Model of Political Radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 418)

Level of Radicalisation	Mechanism
Indiviual	1. Personal victimisation 2. Political grievance 3. Joining a radical group-the slippery slope 4. Joining a radical group-the power of love 5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups
Group	6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat 7. Competition fort he same base of support 8. Competition with state power 9. Within group competition-fissioning
Mass	10. Jujitsu politics 11. Hate 12. Martyrdom

2.2.1.2. Fathali Moghaddam - The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration

Fathali Moghaddam tried to explain the process of an ordinary individual reaching the level of committing an act of terrorism with a ladder metaphor. This is such a ladder that as a person climbs up, it consists of preferences that cause either himself or someone else or both to be destroyed and the psychological reasons for these preferences, which are defined separately for each stage. This staircase has one ground floor and five upper floors. As a person climbs up, his options decrease, and he is thrown toward the inevitable end (to terrorism), so to speak (Moghaddam, 2005b). The key word in Moghaddam's model is perception. Perhaps the most important force multiplier in the ladder paradigm is the individual's perception of the conditions in which they are located. In other words, it is as important -even more so- as the circumstances in which the individual feels and evaluates them. The psychological dimension of the model also essentially comes from here.

The ground floor consists of people dissatisfied due to the negative effects of the social, political, economic, or other conditions in which they are located. But some from this dissatisfied community will go upstairs to seek solutions to their troubles, which they feel are so (Moghaddam, 2005a, p. 1040).

When the person goes to the **first floor**, they continue to seek solutions to the problems they are in. But on this floor, they continue to climb, and as soon as they realize that they cannot find a solution to their problems and that existing procedures cannot help with the solution they need (Moghaddam, 2005b, p. 162).

Despite reaching the **second floor**, the individual unable to solve the injustice they feel, and they feel anger and frustration. In this case, this potential force is directed at an 'enemy' that has been targeted through a leader. At this point, something critical happens; those who are conducive to maintaining aggression in the physical dimension make their way upstairs (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 71-83).

The most important change in individuals reaching the **third floor** is the process of moral engagement with terrorist organizations. The potential of an individual to act on

behalf of a terrorist organization is measured here. A person who is morally and intellectually aligned with a terrorist organization and accepts that political violence can be used to achieve the desired goal goes upstairs (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 83-97).

The individual who reaches the **fourth floor** is now ready to be recruited by the terrorist organization. At this stage, the most important change in the individual is that they begin to evaluate the outside world as *'us-versus-them.'* For this reason, the terrorist organization is internalized and considered a legitimate actor (Moghaddam, 2005b, p.162).

On the fifth and last floor, individuals participate in a physical act of violence and are subjected to indoctrination at a level that can attack the people determined by the organization as the target group. At this point, all barriers that would prevent the person from participating in a terrorist act against living targets are removed. And finally, the individual is sent to carry out the terrorist attack by being trained and equipped (Moghaddam, 2005b, p. 162).



Figure 2.4. Fathali Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005b)

Another 3 Stage terrorism model prepared by Moghaddam and others, which can be a summary of Moghaddam's 'staircase model,' and again inspired by this model, is as follows: 1. Phase expresses sensitivity to radical ideology; 2. Phase is the phase in which an individual's predisposition to the radical organization is tested and recruited by the terrorist organization. 3. Phase is in which the individual performs a planned attack by reaching the level of being able to carry out a terrorist attack in the name of the group ideology (Doosje et al., 2016).



Figure 2.5. The (De)Radicalization Process and Its Determinants

(Doosje et al., 2016, p. 23)

2.2.1.3. Marc Sageman – Understanding Terror Networks: The Road from Disappointments to Terror

Marc Sageman, like Fathali Moghaddam, initiates the radicalization of the individual from the injustices that arise in the social sphere and the levels of the individual's perception of them. In doing so, he created his model focusing on Salafi jihadist understanding, albeit influenced by his work on the Afghan mujahideen while he was at the CIA in the 1980s.

One of Sageman's most important claims is that he defends the idea that even an organization that exists on a global scale, such as Al-Qaeda, is created not by a chain of command from top to bottom but by a flow from ground to apex (Sageman, 2004,

2008). About this working order of terrorist organizations, he argues that the next risk of terrorism will act as a snowball's growth by finding each other unannounced radicalized, cell-level groups in society instead of organizations that are managed from a single center, has a strong chain of command (Sageman, 2004, 2008; Schmid, 2013, p. 33). According to him, it will be very difficult to get a positive result in the fight against terrorism without controlling the reasons and conditions that lay the groundwork for radicalization, which arises in this disorganized and devoid of leadership command (Köse & Coşkun, 2019). But Sageman has done more research on the way Salafi jihadist terrorist organizations operate. From this point of view, we can say that the 4-Stage radicalization model created by him is more suitable for Salafi jihadist radicalization processes. Sageman lists the four conditions that would lead a Muslim living in the West to an act of terrorism as follows:

> (1) seeing world events and the war on terrorism as a war on Islam; (2) personal experience of discrimination while living in the West; (3) moral outrage in response to stories, especially videos, of Muslims suffering from Western violence; and (4) face-to-face or Internet contacts that connect an individual with the means and opportunity to attack (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 208).

Sageman chose to focus on the impact of psychological conditions and perceptions such as identity, seeking justice, feelings of revenge, and disappointments, rather than a result-oriented approach such as rational choice explanation.



Figure 2.6. Marc Sageman's 4-Stage Process (Lucas, 2018)

2.2.1.4. New York Police Department - Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat

In this model, developed by New York Police Department officers Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, the focus has been on explaining the radicalization processes experienced by individuals belonging to the Salafi jihadist movement. The most striking aspect of this model is that it aims to identify the individual who is going toward committing a radical act. The authors stated that it is difficult to identify individuals who are just at the beginning of the radicalization process, and therefore it will not be possible to carry out a legal process or intelligence activity against them and aim to identify individuals who are heading toward radical action through certain behaviors through their profiling study on radical individuals (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The clearest aim of this report is to take measures by diagnosing radicalization through the individual's attitudes before radical action takes place.

According to this model, which is a security-oriented approach, security forces will gain an advantage by early identification of individuals showing signs of radicalization. However, the biggest limitation of this model is that it puts jihadist radicalization, which is a threat to the West, at its center and defines a process for it. We can say that the reason for this is the perception of security in the West caused by the September 11 and Madrid-London attacks.

According to the NYPD model, the individual goes through 4 stages in which they do not have to follow a linear process before becoming radicalized. These are:

- Pre-Radicalization
- Self-Identification
- Indoctrination
- Jihadization (Silber & Bhatt, 2007)



Figure 2.7. NYPD Model for Radicalization Process (Lucas, 2018)

2.3. What Is Recruitment?

In the previous section, while giving examples of radicalization models, we mentioned some points at which the stage of radicalization recruitment takes place and the processes that lead the individual to recruitment. In this section, we will first define recruitment and briefly address what it means for terrorist organizations and security forces. Then, in the second part of recruitment, we will include various strategies that terrorist organizations use to recruit new members. The recruitment strategies of the DHKP-C terrorist organization, which is one of the focal points of this study, will be detailed in the third chapter.

Recruitment, in the terminology of terrorism and radicalization, refers to the entire process of involving an individual in an organization to participate in various activities carried out by a terrorist organization, within the organization, or on behalf of the organization (Yayla, 2020). We can say that the 'recruitment process' is the most vital stage for both terrorist organizations and counter-terror units because the individual has entered or been prevented from entering a path that is very difficult to return to from this point on. An organization is aware that if it wants to be long-lived, it needs to open up to new members. For this purpose, it allocates at least as many resources as it spends on taking action for the recruitment process. For terrorist organizations, dedicated individuals who have adopted the goals of the organization, who are ready to take all kinds of steps on this path and act almost like the organization's bodies are ahead of all other sources.

In addition, although the security forces are aware of this situation, they make great efforts to prevent individuals from being recruited by terrorist organizations. The first contact between the security forces and terrorist organizations takes place at this point and in a cold way: the process of recruiting or preventing the individual. In addition, it is possible to say that there is no definitive theory or definition of recruitment processes, as there is radicalization (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006; Neumann & Rogers, 2007). Identifying who is a sympathizer of the organization, who is a militant, or who is a stooge can become complicated. As a simple example, children who throw stones at security forces are treated as members of a terrorist organization in Israel (Fırat,

2019), while in Türkiye, they are treated as individuals who have been ‘deceived or used by a terrorist organization’ (Durna & Kubilay, 2010).

According to classical understanding, recruitment is a set of ways and strategies that terrorist organizations resort to win sympathizers, militants, or supporters. Under this approach, individuals are identified, monitored, and manipulated primarily as recruitment-oriented (Neumann & Rogers, 2007). According to Michael Taarnby, “recruitment is the bridge between a personal belief and violent activism” (Jensen, 2005, p. 6). Recruitment is the point at which the process that begins with the radicalization of the individual evolves into political violence. Although recruitment and radicalization go hand in hand up to a point, the recruitment phase involves the radicalized individual’s rise to a higher level and being accepted by the terrorist organization. Of course, terrorist organizations do not recruit every individual following the principle of confidentiality and internal security they should have. At this point, the radicalized individual and the terrorist organization subject each other to a mutual evaluation process. Can the individual meet the organization’s demands, or can the organization respond to the individual’s personal or political expectations? (Jones, 2017, p. 322)

Of course, recruitment is also a separate process that needs to be focused on itself. Some conditions must be formed for the recruitment to take place. For example, based on Michael Taarnby’s studies of the Hamburg cell of al-Qaeda, which planned and carried out the September 11 attack on the United States, he states that the recruitment process includes the following elements:

- individual alienation and marginalization
- spiritual quest
- process of radicalization
- meeting and associating with likeminded people
- gradual seclusion and cell formation
- acceptance of violence as legitimate political means
- connection with a gatekeeper in the know
- going operational (Taarnby, 2007, p. 172)

To indicate the intricacy of the process, it is worth underlining the following point: these criteria apply to the Hamburg cell of al-Qaeda, while they do not apply to the recruitment processes of the Central Committee of the organization. The Central Committee of al-Qaeda is not applying for a top-down recruiting process (Sageman, 2004). In the opposite direction of the classic recruitment process, the bottom-up recruitment process can also occur. For instance, Al-Qaeda is a good example of this process. Because Al-Qaeda has been working with the philosophy of 'one person, one bomb' for many years, it's enough to put a bomb somewhere to be a member of the organization (Reşit, 2011). Marc Sageman even portrays Al-Qaeda as the "Harvard of jihadism" and states that some young Muslims wanted to join al-Qaeda because of its fame. Therefore, al-Qaeda has for many years been choosing from candidates who want to join the organization, as opposed to classic recruitment processes (Sageman, 2008, p. 70).

When there are such differences in recruitment processes, even within the same organization, developing a precise theory of recruitment processes or determining the recruitment strategies of organizations becomes a difficult action.

Recruitment is the first step in becoming a member of a terrorist organization, and not every radicalized person is recruited by terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda may not be conducting a traditional recruitment process as it has become a center of attraction for jihadists all over the world, but this is not the case with other terrorist organizations because most of them have not gained an international reputation like al-Qaeda (Borum, 2011, pp. 13-14).

Terrorist organizations aim to build a pool with qualitative and quantitative depth to create human capital for themselves (Hunter et al., 2017, p. 244). For example, when terrorist organizations in Africa recruit child soldiers, they conduct a recruitment process focused on quantity, not quality (Aktaş, 2017; F. Demir, 2018). But when it comes to a more technical job, such as bomb-making or hacking, a qualification-based recruitment process is targeted (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016). These two points can also be operated together according to the goals and planning of the organization.

For example, on the one hand, the terrorist organization PKK is trying to recruit child fighters into its ranks, and on the other hand, it is conducting recruitment processes for more technical and complex processes (Usul, 2020; Yürük, 2021). Likewise, it is known that architects and engineers who are members of the DHKP-C operate in a formation called 'Architects and Engineers of the People,' and the organization uses this group for issues that require technical knowledge, such as digging tunnels (Akbulut Yazar, 2021). Moreover, as in the example of DHKP-C, which is the focal point of this thesis, sometimes even being an artist can be a technical competence in recruitment processes or can be used as a strategy. In the indictment prepared by the Prosecutor's Office for DHKP-C, 'Grup Yorum,' which appears to be a music group when viewed from the outside, is evaluated in the light of documents that it is one of the staff and financial resources of the DHKP/C terrorist organization and that it is an illegal structure that provides personnel for the armed struggle has been called (T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2020).

As a result, recruitment is perhaps the most critical phase in terms of terrorist organizations and the fight against terrorism because it is very difficult for an individual to come to this stage and be recruited by a terrorist organization. Terrorist organizations, like other organizations or institutional structures, aim to create human resources pool for themselves. And from this pool, they recruit according to the field they need. Sometimes recruitment can take the form of child abduction or forced recruitment, as the PKK did in the Southeastern provinces of Türkiye, Syria, and Northern Iraq, but terrorist organizations such as DHKP-C, which are focused on cell structure and act within a narrow group, are more strategic and tactical about recruitment processes.

2.3.1. What Are Recruitment Strategies?

All terrorist organizations implement various proactive recruitment strategies according to their ideology, political goals, the audience they address, and the types of actions. Even not following a classic recruitment process, as in the case of al-Qaeda (Sageman, 2004, 2008), is a strategy. Even this has become a choice because of al-Qaeda's unique characteristics. In the same way, other terrorist organizations follow the recruitment process that best suits the qualities they have and the audience they

address. Just as fundamentalist religious organizations want to attract individuals in places such as mosques and churches with religious campaigns, terrorist organizations with racist or left-wing ideology also focus on areas where they can most easily reach their target audience (Hunter et al., 2017, p. 244). According to Burcu Alakoç and her colleagues, "terrorist groups that combine violent and nonviolent strategies, or as we call it a mixed strategy, are able to cast a wider recruitment net and carry out deadlier attacks" (Alakoç et al., 2021, p. 2).

Terrorist organizations are pragmatic structures. When they feel their existence is in danger or if they realize there is an opportunity to expand their sphere of influence, they can change their behavior, discourse, and actions. This situation is expressed by the definition of 'learning organization' (C. K. Demir, 2008). Terrorist organizations can make practical decisions, just like sovereign states, due to the conjuncture they are in. The history of terrorist organizations includes many such 'U-turns.' If we give an example of the terrorist organizations operating in Türkiye, the PKK, which has a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideological view, takes advantage of the power vacuum in the Middle East after the Arab Spring receives economic and military aid from the USA (Misto et al., 2020). Therefore, in an atmosphere where the concept of a learning organization is valid, it is not possible to make a modeling of the 'one size fits all' type related to recruitment strategies and processes. But in this part of our study, we will draw a general framework for recruitment strategies and models and include common examples.

First of all, the recruitment process begins with identifying potential candidates for membership, sympathies, or militancy of the organization. A terrorist organization does not intend to mobilize all individuals it can reach because the provision of various logistics services to militants operating in the illegal field is provided by members of the organization operating in the legal field. For this reason, the first step is to discover vulnerable individuals prone to exposure to organizational propaganda (Cole et al., 2009, p. 6; Lobato et al., 2018, p. 2).

Cole and his colleagues rank vulnerable individuals for recruitment by the following criteria:

- Cultural and/or religious isolation
- Isolation from family
- Risk-taking behavior
- Sudden change in religious practice
- Violent rhetoric
- Negative peer influences
- Isolated peer group
- Hate rhetoric
- Political activism
- Basic paramilitary training
- Travel/residence abroad (Cole et al., 2009, pp. 7-13)

Moreover, they open a separate title as 'Red Category Behaviors' for the classification of the individuals that are "displaying strong behavioral indicators that they may already be on the way to become involved in violent extremism" (Cole et al., 2009, p. 13).

These are:

- Death rhetoric
- Being a member of an extremist group
- Contact with known recruiters/extremists
- Advanced paramilitary training
- Overseas combat (Cole et al., 2009, pp. 13-16)

Individuals identified as vulnerable by the terrorist organization are subject to indoctrination by the organization. The recruiter handles the physical and mental conditions of the individual in favor of the organization with the rigor of a goldsmith when indoctrinating. To break the social ties of the individual and replace them with the organization, the social cracks that the person has are deepened or produced. The process experienced here is the metamorphosis of the individual. In the process of identity change, the individual's thoughts are reformed and replaced by the truths of the organization (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006, p. 86). After the indoctrination by the organization, they come to a critical threshold to becoming a violent extremist. This threshold is the legitimization of violence. Because once violence against the targeted symbols and masses is normalized, it is much easier to take action (Lobato et al., 2018, p. 2).

The recruitment process can be from the outside in (from the individual to the organization) or the inside out (from the organization to the individual) and can be three-way. First, the individual is recruited by the organization as a result of a radicalization process that develops 'independently' of an organization **(independent-recruited)**. Secondly, the individual is radicalized and recruited by the organization by being exposed to 'indoctrination and organizational propaganda' through a process under the supervision of the organization **(indoctrinated-recruited)**. Thirdly, the individual is radicalized by the process that develops outside the organization but commits a terrorist act on behalf of the organization **(inspired-recruited)** (Hunter et al., 2017, p. 243). The first two types can be considered organic, and the third one is inorganic recruitment.

When it comes to generating influence with limited resources, we can say that terrorist organizations are cost-effective structures. They aim for the maximum benefit they can get with the scarce resources they have. This also manifests itself in recruitment processes and strategies. All recruitment processes involve various persuasive recruitment strategies, either directly (face-to-face meeting) or indirectly (political articles shared on a website). All the mass media and all the socialization environments that exist today can be used for this purpose. Moreover, especially during the indoctrination phase, terrorist organizations make their target audience read the publications they have published or the documents they have created (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006, p. 80).

Terrorist organizations use various tools to reach individuals when conducting recruitment processes and concentrate them in some locations. The tools used can be a social networking site (Alakoç et al., 2021, p. 7) or a military training camp (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006, p. 74), while the venues can be places of sanctuary (Taarnby, 2007) or concert halls. For example, Al-Qaeda uses the internet extensively for recruitment and organization propaganda (Schweitzer, 2010, pp. 56-57). In contrast, DHKP-C focused on art-cultural activities for recruitment (T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2020) and ghettos where the Alevi community lived extensively (Tol, 2016, pp. 12-13).

Researchers from RAND Corporation, Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly, conducted a study in which they categorized the tools and environments used in the recruitment process. They separate the field where the recruitment takes place as 'public and private' and the type of message used in the recruitment as 'mediated and proximate' (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006, pp. 80-81).



Figure 2.8. Types of Communication in Recruiting (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006, p. 81)

- **Public and Proximate:** Recruitment in this quarter occurs face-to-face or in a narrow circle, where officials and the public can see it.
- **Public and Mediated:** Recruitment in this quarter is openly appealed to a broad audience.
- **Private and Proximate:** Recruitment this quarter is done outside of public scrutiny and in secret. For example, an individual's participation in an armed training camp takes place in this area.
- **Private and Mediated:** Recruitment in this quarter is carried out on a limited group basis and through mass media (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006, pp. 80-84).

As a result, recruitment strategies vary depending on the resource management strategy, potential, and target audience of terrorist organizations.

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, we first tried to explain radicalization. Because there is no agreed exact and clear definition, we have included definitions made by different perspectives and approaches. So, we created a general framework for the lines of radicalization. In particular, we have included the most well-known and cited definitions in the literature. So, we have drawn a barrier to defining the concept. The separation of radicalization in discourse and action is an important point, and we are particularly focused here.

Then, we looked at the radicalization models of these names, which we mostly studied the definition of radicalization, and we focused on them. This is because, again, due to different approaches and perspectives, the exact modeling of radicalization processes has not been established. To ensure that conceptual modeling is embodied with visual supports, we have added each model to our work in the form of figures.

Third, we tried to explain the recruitment process according to extremist organizations. We touched on the importance it has for terrorist organizations and security forces. We included the factors that are important for recruitment and emphasized that they vary from organization to organization, and we gave examples of PKK and DHKP-C terrorist organizations operating in Türkiye and al-Qaeda, which has a global reputation for embodying this situation.

Fourth, we focused on the strategies used by terrorist organizations in the recruitment and development of the recruitment process. We have classified the tools and environments used in recruitment. In this section, we have stated that terrorist organizations specifically target vulnerable people for recruitment, and for this reason, we have listed the characteristics of vulnerable people at different levels. This classification and awareness are an approach that will strengthen the hand of the security forces in the fight against terrorism. Thus, it will be possible to take precautions before it is too late and before the individual enters irreversible paths.

As a result, we have seen that terrorist organizations prefer the most optimal option for them in terms of radicalization and recruitment of individuals. We stated that the inability to make a precise definition of concepts such as radicalization and recruitment, which are open to relative and perceptual differences, also negatively affects the counter-terrorism processes. There is no doubt that the definitions and models of radicalization and the definitions and strategies of recruitment are much more diverse than what we have included here. We had to make such a restriction to keep the study within a reasonable framework. Finally, we preferred to embody the elements of modeling and processes using figures.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY OF DEVRİMCİ HALK KURTULUŞ PARTİSİ-CEPHESİ

3.1. Introduction

The leftist organizations in Türkiye did not last long due to the ideological struggles, internal conflicts, and counter-terror operations of the security forces. Yes, left-wing thought movements and radical leftist-revolutionary organizations have existed in Türkiye for many years, but it is impossible to talk about continuity in an organizational sense. However, when it comes to DHKP-C, we see the opposite of this situation. The DHKP-C terrorist organization has continued to exist in one way or another since 1994, when it declared its establishment with the 1st Congress held in Syria. Although domestic and international developments impact this, this situation stands before us as a reality. In this chapter of our study, we aim to focus on the differences in ideas and action plans to understand the continuity of the DHKP-C terrorist organization.

In this section, we will first examine the historical and ideological developments of radical leftist-revolutionary movements in Türkiye from a chronological point of view because the gain or loss of power of leftist movements is a phenomenon too broad to be explained only by socio-political developments in Türkiye. Then, we aim to give a background on the historical-ideological development and structural change of the DHKP-C, which this study also focuses on.

As David Rapoport puts forward in his categorization of 'the four waves of modern terror,' terrorism is a 'cycle of activity in a given time period with expansion and contraction phases' (Rapoport, 2004, p. 47). These four waves are **'Anarchist, Anti-Colonial, New Left and Religious Wave.'** The period defined by Rapoport as the New Left Wave covers the years 1960-1980 and is a period in which left movements

started to gain power with the influence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The intellectual background of the New Left Wave consists of Marxism-Leninism and Communism, which emerged in the USSR, and Maoism, which emerged in China. In the action dimension, the background is the Six-Day Wars in the Middle East in 1967, the murder of Ernesto Che Guevara in Bolivia, the student events in Paris in 1968, and the Vietnam War, in which the United States was involved between 1963-1973 (Avcı, 2019, p. 142).

It is claimed that around 100 leftist ideology-based terrorist organizations were founded in Türkiye until the 1980s, including the first organizations and the organizations founded by new factions derived from them.

> The ultimate goal of these organizations is to establish a socialist regime in Türkiye. These organizations, which see the state as a tool of oppression by the ruling class (bourgeois), aim for the working class (proletariat) to come to power in order to bring the socialist regime. For this purpose, they form units called 'revolutionary vanguard units' in order to politicize and mobilize the masses and to provide a military organization... It is aimed to force the people, who have been politicized and miserable by methods such as psychological warfare and propaganda, to violence through armed propaganda and to turn to the alternative regime by giving up hope in the current regime. The final stage is aimed at organizing the working class under a political party, starting a revolutionary war against the current regime by establishing a regular people's army, to overthrowing the regime, and establishing a socialist regime (Avcı, 2019, p. 143).

Table 3.1. Types of Terrorism and Terrorist Organizations in Türkiye (Avcı, 2019, p. 142)

Type of Terrorism	The Main Terrorist Organizations
1. Left-Wing Ideology-Based Terrorism	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP/C), Communist Party of Türkiye / Marxist Leninist (TKP/ML), Maoist Communist Party (MKP), Marxist Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), Turkish People's Liberation Army (THKO)

Table 3.1. (cont.)

2. Ethnic Nationalist / Separatist Terrorism	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane, PKK), The Secret Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), Justice Commandos for Armenian Genocide-Armenian Revolutionary Army (JCAG-ARA)
3. Religion-Based Terrorism	Hezbollah of Türkiye, Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front (IBDA/C), Islamic Movement Organization, Union of Islamic Communities and Anatolian Federal Islamic State, Fetullahist Terrorist Organization/Parallel State Structure (FETO/PDY)
4. Global Terrorism	Al-Qaeda, DAESH / Islamic State of Iraq and Damascus (ISIS)

In this part of our study, we will examine the ideological and historical origins of leftist organizations in Türkiye and the transitions in their organizational structures. It is important to identify the changes within the radical revolutionary-leftist movement in Türkiye, the similarities and differences between the organizations established before and after them, and thus to understand the reflexes of DHKP-C as a terrorist organization. By identifying these changes and transformations, we aim to show that terrorist organizations are also living structures and have various reflexes to maintain their organizational existence or expand their sphere of influence due to developments in the socio-political field.

3.2. Historical Background of the Revolutionist-Leftist Terrorist Organizations in Türkiye

The events of political violence in Anatolian geography in the modern period date back to the last periods of the Ottoman Empire. The first illegal left organizations in this

region were embodied in small-scale labor movements and organizations in 1820, 1845, 1872, and 1908 (Atar, 2005, p. 74). In addition, the Bolshevik Revolution, which took place during the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Türkiye, also strengthened the left-wing movement in the Anatolian territory. After the Bolsheviks came to power, they exposed the secret agreements made by the Tsarist regime and its allies and, on several occasions, supported the Turkish War of Independence against these allied forces. This struggle against the imperialist forces caused sympathy for the Bolsheviks in Anatolia, and finally, the Communist Party of Türkiye (TKP) was founded on September 10, 1920. "TKP left its mark on the Turkish communist movement until 1960" (Çiçek, 2008, pp. 20-21).

But the country's sharp political changes and the transition 'from empire to nation state' and to the organization of a new system can be defined as the process of social and political transformation, especially in rural areas; there have been dissenting voices rising from several. The tone of these voices has grown and grown to the extent of the rebellion. The Young Republic seriously tried to suppress various rebellion movements with an ethnic-sectarian identity in the countryside. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Turkish government sharply showed that a newly established state system could not tolerate such cracked voices and rebellion attempts. The biggest and most influential of these popular movements, the effects and traumas of which will come to this day, are the rebellion initiated in 1925 by Sheikh Said of Kurdish origin with Islamic concerns and the 'Dersim Rebellion' led by Seyid Rıza of Zaza-Alevi origin in 1937-1938 (Jenkins, 2019, p. 267). These events can be seen as simple developments in the course of history, but even though they occurred in the early years of the Republic of Türkiye, it is still possible to say more influence today. Currently, Sheikh Said remains important to the conservative Kurds, while Seyid Rıza remains important to the Alevi people and especially to the people of Tunceli,[5] and the debate on these two is not over.

These two mentioned initiatives were made with ethnic-sectarian motivations and maintain their vitality in the minds of the masses in a socio-political sense; in addition,

[5] The name of the region was changed from Dersim to Tunceli with the 'Law of Tunceli,' which entered into force on December 25, 1935. It is even possible to say that popular movements have increased with the passage of this law. So here, we will use Tunceli, the legal name of the city.

they can be defined as an insurgent movement, not as an act of terrorism. Although there were leftist movements of ideas from the last period of the Ottoman Empire to the 1960s, they mostly remained on the basis of discourse and did not reach the level of terrorist acts. However, since the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, initiatives that can be described as an act of terrorism have begun to be experienced (Atar, 2005, pp. 74-75). As a reason for this situation, we can show the generation that grew up during the Cold War and under the influence of political events on an international scale. This generation, also called the '68 Generation', established the first leftist terrorist organizations in modern Türkiye. Both intellectually and in terms of armed movement, these names became the founding leaders of leftist terrorist organizations: Deniz Gezmiş, Mahir Çayan, İbrahim Kaypakkaya, Hüseyin İnan and, Yusuf Aslan.

3.2.1. Period Between 1960-1970

The 1960 and 1980 coups and the twenty-plus year period covering them led to huge and lasting developments in Turkish political life and sociology. Although it is possible to evaluate the developments under the umbrella of 'political violence,' the reasons are more extensive. Although the first reason that comes to mind for political violence is political factors, in addition to this, factors such as economic, sociocultural, educational system, the use of ethnicity as an element of discrimination, and international factors can be shown (Atar, 2005, pp. 23-32). With these factors, the leftist movement in Türkiye entered a new breakthrough period.

In this period, the Turkish left movements made various intellectual initiatives, and print media elements such as Yön, Ant, and Turkish Left, which reached a high number of readers, started their broadcasting life. Although these publications were made domestically, they were directly affected by international developments such as the political events during the Cold War period and especially the student movements at the Sorbonne University in France, and these publications also affected the student masses in Türkiye, which is their primary audience (Işık, 2013, pp. 7-8).

In 1960, the Federation of Idea Clubs (FKF) was established by merging student clubs in various universities. Acting as a youth structure of the Turkish Workers' Party

(TİP), the FKF adopted the idea that socialism could not come to power peacefully due to events such as the bloody overthrow of Chilean leader Allende by US intervention, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the occupation of French students at the Sorbonne University, the myth of Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution that arose in Latin America, and the TİP failed to keep this student formation on the legal level (Işık, 2013). Although FKF initially argued that the road to socialism could be achieved through democratic means, it distanced itself from TIP and even began to accuse it of passivity due to the intellectual transformation it experienced since 1968. FKF changed its name to Türkiye Revolutionary Youth Federation (Dev-Genç) in October 1969. In this period, the group moved away from being a party movement and aimed to gain an intellectual movement form that appealed to the whole public and youth. With its expansion and initiative, Dev-Genç has become the first stop of all left movements to be formed after this point, and the militant wings of the illegal left movements The People's Liberation Party-Front of Türkiye (THKP-C) and People's Liberation Army of Türkiye (THKO) have also emerged from here (Çiçek, 2008, p. 26).

The period between 1960 and 1970 was a term when left-wing movements in Türkiye and around the world manifested decisively and gained strength on various occasions, such as trade unions, student clubs, and popular movements because even the existence of a regime like the Soviet Union had become a reason for left-wing movements to gain power (Yüz, 2019, p. 52).

3.2.2. Period Between 1970-1980

It is possible to say that 'the period when the left movement in Türkiye gained momentum was the 1960s and saw its peak in 1968'. By the 1970s, the left movement was strong again, but the environment of freedom provided by the 1961 constitution began to shrink (Yüz, 2019, p. 57). In contrast, the debate about 'whether the path to revolution will be bloody or bloodless' in the left movement takes the movements of the 1970s to a completely different point. Since 1970, terrorist organizations such as THKO, THKP-C, and TKP ML-TIKKO have started acts such as kidnapping (including Israeli Consul General Efraim Elrom and three British and one Canadian radio technicians working at the NATO radar base in Ordu-Ünye, who were kidnapped

and executed), bank robbing, and engaging in rural guerrilla activities. In this period, when the tension in the country was rising, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) first issued a memorandum in 1971 and then declared martial law on April 26, 1971, and started to organize operations against leftist organizations that carried out terrorist acts. A while later;

> Sinan Cemgil, one of the leading staff of THKO, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, and Hüseyin İnan were captured. Mahir Çayan and his friends, one of the leaders of the THKP-C terrorist organization, which was active in the same period, were also caught and put in prison. However, they escaped after a while and were captured dead in the clash they entered with the security forces in the Kızıldere village of Niksar district of Tokat. With the execution of Deniz Gezmiş and his friends in May 1972, the 'heroes phase' ended (Işık, 2006, pp. 10-11).

Despite the intellectual-scale leftist movements of the 1960s, the leftist ideas of the 1970s preferred the path of terrorism and escalated the tension with their terrorist acts (Çiçek, 2008, p. 29). When those members and leaders of terrorist organizations arrested during the March 12 period were released with amnesty in 1974, they continued their terrorist activities from where they left off. However, this time, they face nationalists rather than the state. At this point, left-wing movements aimed to make a socialist revolution, and nationalist groups aimed to defend the homeland against the communists, while the conflicts became like a civil war. In addition, the inter-factional struggle in the left movement has also weakened organizations. However, terrorist incidents in Türkiye, which decreased after 1972, began to escalate again after the 1974 amnesty, and by 1975, universities, high schools, labor unions, and political parties were decisively polarized (Işık, 2006, pp. 11-12). In the period between 1971 and 1980, far-left organizations decamped to new organizations. These emerging new organizations have intensified their terrorist actions by changing their nature. Due to differences in leadership and strategy within leftist organizations, the following illegal organizations have emerged.

- Communist Party of Türkiye (TKP)
- Turkish People's Liberation Army (THKO)
- People's Liberation Party of Türkiye (THKP-C)
- Revolutionary Workers' Peasant Party of Türkiye (TIIKP)

- Communist Party of Türkiye / Marxist - Leninist (TKP/ML) (Çiçek, 2008, p. 39)

3.2.3. Period After the 1980s

The social tension, polarization, terror, and anarchy environment that was increasing daily throughout the 1970s resulted in the Turkish Armed Forces' seizing of power on September 12, 1980. After the military coup, the leaders of leftist terrorist organizations were arrested and put in prison, but the leftist terrorist organizations could not be completely finished. In addition, illegal leftist terrorist organizations have again changed their strategy and continued their activities under the umbrella of legal organizations, and terrorist acts have again risen with the escape of terrorist organization leaders from prison in 1988 (Çiçek, 2008, p. 40).

Just as the left movements were effective when the Soviet Union was strong, in the same way, the left movement in Türkiye received a deep wound with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 1980s can be counted as ten lost years for leftist terrorist organizations. Therefore, the left terrorist organizations, which aimed for a breakthrough in the 1990s, suffered a major ideological blow with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and they identified new target audiences and focal points like environmentalism, human rights, ethnic and religious issues, democratization, etc. (Çiçek, 2008, p. 40). It was at this point that leftist terrorist organizations began to use their founding ideology as just a label to hide their new focal points. This strategy that leftist terrorist organizations have been following since the 1990s, or in other words, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, reveals the situation that 'leftist terrorist organizations have taken some initiatives despite their own ideologies,' which forms the basis of this study. Because at this stage, it is possible to talk about a big contradiction of discourse and actions.

With this new roadmap, they determined, leftist terrorist organizations re-emerged in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, but this time they were in a weaker position than in the pre-coup era. The most active organization in the post-1990 period was Revolutionary Left (Turkish: Devrimci Sol, aka. Dev-Sol), whose attacks

primarily targeted soldiers and retired personnel of the Turkish security forces (Jenkins, 2019, p. 268).

By 1992, the inter-factional conflict within Dev-Sol resulted in the decoupling of the organization. From the time of the emergence of this terrorist organization to the time of the split, it had killed tens of people; 35 Policemen, 23 Soldiers, intelligence officers, retired security forces, and 240 citizens, including Former Prime Minister Nihat Erim and Former Minister of Customs and Monopolies Gün Sazak, were killed by the actions of the illegal armed organization called 'Fascist Anti-Terrorist Fighting Teams', which was established in 1979 within the body of Dev-Sol (T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2020). In 1994, a new organization was founded by a larger group headed by Dursun Karataş (1952 - 2008), and this new formation was called "The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front" (Turkish: Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi or DHKP-C) (Jenkins, 2019, p. 268).

3.3. DHKP-C: Development and Ideological Structure of the Organization Over Time

DHKP-C is not an organic and new type of organization. It is a structure that has largely adopted the ideas and action types of leftist terrorist organizations before it. Although it naturally has some differences, it is largely a copy of the radical left terrorist organizations established before it. In addition, it contains some differences due to the national and international conjuncture in which it carries out its activities. Therefore, under this heading, we will try to examine the historical background and perception of the organization in terms of ideas and actions to understand the similarities and differences between the organization with the other organizations that were established before it. It will be seen that the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front is a continuation of the THKP-C and Dev-Sol terrorist organizations and is not much different from them in both ideological and structural terms (Işık, 2006, p. 13).

3.3.1. The Historical Background of the Organization

It is possible to take the origins of the DHKP-C in a historical context to the Federation of Idea Clubs (FKF), which was established on October 17, 1965, to gather the masses of students of Marxist-Leninist thought under one roof. However, on October 17, 1969, the Federation changed its name to the Revolutionary Youth Federation (DEV-GENÇ), and due to disagreements within the movement, various ruptures occurred. After the differences of opinion deepened, Mahir Çayan and his friends announced the establishment of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C), a terrorist organization with a theoretical framework inspired by China, the Soviet, Cuba, and Vietnam, with a statement called 'Open Letter to the Aydınlık Socialist Magazine' (T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2020).

Like its contemporaries THKO and TKP-ML, THKP-C has matured and radicalized within the FKF - Dev-Genç line and started terrorist acts. The foundations of the THKP-C were established in 1969 by Mahir Çayan and his friends İrfan Uçar, Münir Aktolga, Ulaş Bardakçı, Yusuf Küpeli and Hüseyin Cevahir (later, Ertuğrul Kürkçü also joined this team) who accused Mihri Belli of 'having rightist ideas,' as the leader of the National Democratic Revolution (Turkish: Milli Demokratik Devrim, aka. MDD) movement aimed to achieve the revolution without blood and within democratic borders (Işık, 2006, p. 14).

The young wing of the leftist movements defended the idea that the revolution would only take place as a result of armed struggle; in other words, they aimed to try the tough option. But they also differed when the conditions for this armed struggle were ripe. For example, THKO, founded by Deniz Gezmiş and his friends, started robbing banks because they thought they had the necessary conditions for an armed struggle (Çiçek, 2008, p. 30). These actions were important in making money for the organization and hitting the banks, which they saw as the bastions of capitalism. On the other hand, THKP-C initially thought there was no favorable environment for armed struggle, but later they could not stand the attraction of these actions carried out by THKO, and THKP-C committed various bank robberies (Işık, 2006, p. 14). However, these actions did not remain as bank robberies and reached a completely different dimension due to the kidnapping and execution of the Israeli Consul General

Efraim Elrom (May 17, 1971). Upon this development, the security forces intensified their operations, seized Mahir Çayan as injured in the house where they were hiding, and sent him to prison after his treatment (Çiçek, 2008, pp. 33-34).

Mahir Çayan escaped from Istanbul Maltepe Military Prison with some THKO militants on November 30, 1971. Çayan and THKO member militants, who escaped from prison, first aimed to prevent the execution of Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan, and Yusuf Aslan. For this reason, on March 25, 1972, three British technicians were kidnapped from the NATO radar station in Ünye and brought to Kızıldere Village of the Niksar district of Tokat. As a result of the operation of the security forces on March 30, 1972, ten militants, nine of them THKP-C and two of them THKO, were captured dead at the end of the operation. Of this team, only Ertuğrul Kürkçü survived because he hid in the hayloft of the house that they were in (Işık, 2006, p. 15).

The Kızıldere Incident is a momentous event because it is a 'common pain' for radical left organizations in the historical context, and it shows the ability of these organizations to act together. Later, it was seen that these types of organizations cooperate with each other at the level of discourse and action (Karataş, 1989, pp. 296-297).

With the Kızıldere Incident and the execution of 3 militants, who were the ringleaders of THKO (Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, Hüseyin İnan), the founding-leader cadres of radical left organizations in Türkiye and, moreover, their ideologists were eliminated; thus the left movement received a major blow (Çiçek, 2008, pp. 33-34; Yüz, 2019, pp. 91-92).

Left organizations that lost their leaders almost entered an interregnum period after the Kızıldere Incident (Karabudak, 2000, p. 103), and as a result of the evaluations and restructuring of their members who were released from prison with amnesty in 1974, they established a new formation called the Federation of Revolutionary Youth Associations (DGDF). The formation, which was renamed Dev-Genç (Revolutionist Youth) in 1977, was divided into two, Revolutionist Path (aka. Dev-Yol, Ankara-based group) and Revolutionist Left (aka. Dev-Sol, Istanbul-based group) due to the differences of opinion. The origins of Dev-Sol in an organizational sense are based on

the Salvation Group (Turkish: Kurtuluş Grubu) of 1974-75. According to Dursun Karataş, the founder of DHKP-C, the Kurtuluş Group has acted within Dev-Genç since 1974, but it has never felt ideologically belonging here. Finally, Dev-Yol in 1977 and Dev-Sol in 1978 left this organization. At this point, the origins of DHKP-C are based on Dev-Sol. Dev-Sol is the defender of the ideological-political line of the THKP-C; in this sense, Dev-Sol is THKP-C's historical heir (Karataş, 1989, p. 52).

Dev-Sol, with the effect of the anarchy environment in Türkiye, has carried out terrorist attacks that have caused the death of hundreds of people since the day it was founded. The organization, which suffered a major blow, like other terrorist organizations, due to the September 12, 1980 coup and the operations carried out by the security forces in the following period, made an assessment that it did not have enough militant staff and knowledge experience for a struggle in the sense of armed action, and in the first half of the 1980s, the organization started a tactical retreat process by freezing its activities in the illegal area. For this reason, the organization took a break from the classical sense of armed terrorist acts but continued its political propaganda activities to gain a base, especially among the university youth, through its legal structures (Işık, 2006, pp. 17-18). Understanding that terrorist organizations do not only consist of illegal and armed organizations is an important point in the fight against terrorism. Already, terrorist organizations see masking illegal activities through legal institutions and activities as a strategic move and aim to act this way. Dursun Karataş, the founder of DHKP-C, expresses this situation as "The Marxist-Leninist party will be opened to large masses through many illegal, semi-legal and legal forms of organization that will be in an organization in accordance with the requirements of the political struggle in our country and take root in the working masses" (Karataş, 1989, p. 426).



Figure 3.1. Organizational Structure of DHKP-C Terrorist Organization (*Bir Terör Örgütünün Bitmeyen Senaryosu: Nuriye Gülmen ve Semih Özakça Gerçegi*, 2017, p. 32)

3.3.2. The Process of Switching From DEV-SOL to DHKP-C

Meanwhile, the Dev-Sol terrorist organization carried out various bank robberies between 1987 and 1990 during the tactical retreat. Thus, it aimed to create financial resources to start the breakthrough process. In addition, since 1988, terrorist acts have increased with the escape of many senior executives of the organization from prison. Since the 1990s, the organization has started to organize bloody actions again. This

time, the organization began to be managed by leaders who fled abroad. In 1991-1992, the organization killed more than 100 soldiers, police, members of the National Intelligence Organization (Turkish: Milli İstihbarat Teşkilâtı, aka. MİT), and retired security guards, which it saw as a threat to its existence (Işık, 2006, p. 18). With the security forces' harsh response to the bloody attacks of the terrorist organization, especially targeting the security bureaucracy, the organization again entered a leadership crisis, and intra-organizational conflicts began to occur. This leadership crisis, as it is frequently experienced in left movements, has again evolved into an intra-organizational conflict, and this separation within the Dev-Sol, the organization has been divided into two poles called the 'Leadership Group' (Turkish: Önderlik Grubu) and the 'Coupers Group' (Turkish: Darbeciler Grubu). As a result of the bloody conflicts within the organization, these two groups could not gain superiority over each other, but when Bedri Yağan, the leader of the Coupers Group, was killed during a police raid in Istanbul (March 6, 1993), Dursun Karataş, the leader of the Leadership Group, established his superiority within the organization and gathered the organization under his leadership.

Dursun Karataş went to Damascus – Syria, in March 1994, after ensuring the integrity of the organization, and at the 1st Congress of the organization held between March 30 and May 9, 1994, with the members of the Leadership Group, they changed the name of the Dev-Sol organization to the 'Revolutionary People's Liberation Party – Front' (Turkish: Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi – Cephesi, aka. DHKP-C). The main purpose of the organization taking the name of DHKP-C with the change made in Dev-Sol; is to give the organization a dual structure and to carry out the political processes under the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party (DHKP) and the military-armed activities under the Revolutionary People's Liberation Front (DHKC). As can be seen here, the strategy of the organization is to gather legal (DHKP) and illegal (DHKC) structures under one roof and to ensure that these structures are maintained in a way that feeds each other (*Country Reports on Terrorism*, 2019, p. 296).

DHKP-C carried out its first terrorist attack by killing former Minister of Justice Mehmet Topaç in its Ankara office on September 29, 1994. Evaluating 1995 to strengthen the organizational structure of the organization, DHKP-C carried out one of its most sensational acts by killing Sabancı Holding Board Member Özdemir

Sabancı, Toyota-Sa General Manager Haluk Görgün, and secretary Nilgün Hasefe on January 9, 1996, at Sabancı Center. Despite the operations carried out by the security forces and the blows it suffered, the DHKP-C continued its bloody actions in the 2000s (For example, Prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz was taken hostage in his office on March 31, 2015, by DHKP-C terrorists and was later martyred), despite being included in the terrorist list of Germany (1998) (Işık, 2006, pp. 19-20) and later European Union (May 2, 2002) (EUROPOL, 2020) and USA (October 8, 1997) (U.S Department of State, 2019) but it continues its activities abroad comfortably, especially in EU.

3.3.3. The Ideological Structure of the Organization

DHKP-C is a continuation of THKP-C and Dev-Sol terrorist organizations in an ideological sense as well as in a historical sense. Although the organization has minor differences from its predecessors in terms of perspective, it mostly has the same ideas. According to Dursun Karataş, what should be understood from Mahir Çayan's determinations about PASS is the following: The people's war that will take place within the borders of Türkiye differs from the revolutions in China and Vietnam, as well as the formation of stages and the tactics to be followed from revolutions such as Cuba and Nicaragua that achieved victory with PASS. There will inevitably be differences in terms because the first stage of the people's war is the pioneer war, and then the regular armies stage comes, but these processes are also not mechanical and therefore vary according to the conditions of the people (Karataş, 1989, p. 421).

Dursun Karataş describes the pioneer war as a stage of attracting the masses to the ranks of the revolution. At this stage, the masses of the people are politicized and manipulated to fight themselves (Karataş, 1989, p. 421). The radicalization and recruitment processes of DHKP-C, which is the main focus of this study, mainly focuses on this point: as will be discussed in the third part of this study, does DHKP-C have a purpose of politicizing and manipulating the masses, especially Alevis? Because the weakening of the state authority by entering into an environment of conflict by the politicized and manipulated masses is one of the most critical thresholds on the road to revolution. And it is impossible to predict when and under what conditions this phase will end.

DHKP-C is a formation that adopts the Marxist-Leninist ideology and therefore defends the idea of the people's revolution (dictatorship of the proletariat) to reach a socialist regime in the final sense. In the program of the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party, the founding purpose of the party is clearly stated as follows:

> Our party is a party that defends the Marxist-Leninist worldview and 'fights' for it. Its ultimate goal is to create a classless, exploitation-free order and world. However, this is not its goal today, but the Revolutionary People's Power, the primary goal of which is the power of all people's forces against imperialism and oligarchy (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Programı, 1995, p. 3).

As clearly stated in the party program, DHKP-C is a terrorist organization that aims to overthrow the existing constitutional order within the borders of the Republic of Türkiye with a revolution they describe as a popular uprising, to establish a proletarian dictatorship instead, to reach a socialist order with the goal of a 'classless world' and to use violence as a tool for this.

In addition, we can say that Dursun Karataş, the founder of DHKP-C, stated from the very beginning and in advance that the organization would use violence as an instrument in achieving the political goals it has set (Karataş, 1989).[6] According to Dursun Karataş, this revolution (revolution of people's); is neither a bourgeois (or national democratic) revolution, the essence of which is the land question, nor a socialist revolution in which socialist ownership of all means of production will take place. The DHKP-C revolution will be an anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution.

> It will put an end to the economic and political oppression and exploitation of all the oppressed people; it will bring people's democracy by **'destroying the fascist state,'** it will put an end to imperialist relations, it will liberate the oppressed nations and remove the obstacles to the construction of socialism… And for this reason, socialist initiatives will be started in sectors where conditions are suitable. In other words, the anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic people's revolution has a wider content than the national democratic revolution and a narrower scope than the socialist revolution (Karataş, 1989, p. 443).

[6] As we mentioned in the first section, the attitude of an individual and a political movement towards using violence to achieve their political goals to qualify as a radical and a terrorist or terrorist organization is decisive. For this reason, with the declaration of the fight against the constitutional structure of the Republic of Türkiye, the DHKP-C structure will be referred to as a 'terrorist organization' in this study.

At this point, we will include their perspectives on Turkish political life to take a closer look at how DHKP-C sees and gives meaning to the Turkish political system at the organizational level. According to the opinion of the DHKP-C organization:

Due to the analysis of Türkiye's economic, social, and political situation, this revolution (revolution of people's) will have an anti-oligarchic, anti-imperialist character (Çiçek, 2008, p. 47) because the decision process in Türkiye is not feudal but capitalist. However, the capitalist model in Türkiye has not developed with its own internal dynamics as in the USA-Japan and Europe; it has emerged and shaped as an extension of imperialism. For this reason, this form of government, dominated by distorted capitalism, contains various crises within itself, which are covered by strict measures by the fascist state. The legitimate and rightful demands of the people and their struggle to obtain these legal rights were suppressed with blood by the fascist governments. While this was happening between the people and the government, economic, democratic organizations, and political parties did not defend the people's interests but tried to strengthen the order by being the watchdog. These organizations are like buffer zones established to prevent the people's struggle from uniting under one roof and seizing power, and they are pro-establishment structures.

It is not possible for the masses of the people, whose legitimate attempts are bloodily suppressed by counter-attacks, to change the nature of the fascist governments through elections within the violent exploitation system of imperialism and oligarchy. At this point, DHKP-C believes that the people oppressed by fascist governments under the bloody wheels of imperialism and oligarchy can only change this order through armed struggle.

The war of the people's movement, which is shaped based on armed propaganda, is called the **'Pioneer Guerrilla War.'** Under the leadership of the DHKP-C, the launch of armed propaganda and guerrilla warfare in the city and the countryside and the strengthening of a guerrilla army. With the establishment of the **'Guerilla Army,'** the People's Army is formed with the increasing **'popular movements and local uprisings.'** Thus, with a total uprising, the oligarchic state was destroyed, and the **'Revolutionary People's Power'** was established in its place (*Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Programı*, 1995, pp. 5-7; Karataş, 1989).

We can find the general lines of the people's war in Mahir Çayan's 'Politicized Military War Strategy' (Turkish: Politikleşmiş Askeri Savaş Stratejisi, aka. PASS), which he adapted based on 'the principle of the unity of political and military leadership' of Leninism and considering the conditions in Türkiye. So, he specified the PASS as the 'strategy of the revolution' (Çayan, 2019, p. 292). According to Çayan, a people's war is a politicized military war. Socialists apply the military method of warfare as the main method of struggle in the people's war. "This war is not waged with the classical war method but with the politicized military war method. In this war, all democratic and economic movements, mass demonstrations, and other tools are subject to politicized military struggle" (Çayan, 2019, p. 226). At this very point, we see that legal and illegal structures are intertwined, and in fact, even civilian initiatives are used as tools by terrorist organizations within the scope of the PASS strategy on the road to revolution.

According to the party program of DHKP, the basic form of people's war is an armed struggle, but it is not the only option. While PASS defends the dialectical unity of guerrilla warfare in rural areas and cities, it also leads the people's daily, economic, and democratic struggle, but it propagates that final liberation cannot be achieved with this struggle and shows the target of power. However, it treats all forms of struggle other than armed struggle as empowering and dependent on the armed people's war (*Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Programı*, 1995, pp. 5-8). Developed by Mahir Çayan, inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology, PASS aims to channel a dialectical unity in which the legal and illegal spheres are melted in one pot for the goal of a common revolution. For this reason, he considers even the strike of factory workers or the demonstration of civil citizens for a democratic demand as initiatives that have the potential to strengthen the armed struggle.

As can be seen, the ideological roots of DHKP-C are also based on the Marxism-Leninism ideology, THKP-C, and Dev-Sol terrorist organizations.

3.4. Conclusion

In this section, we primarily aimed to analyze radical and revolutionary leftist terrorist organizations operating in Türkiye, their establishment stages, and their development

and dissolution in chronological order. Thus, we tried to understand the reasons for the emergence of radical left movements in the modern sense and their effects on Turkish political life. At this stage, we saw that radical left organizations were in close contact with each other and had a common goal in general, apart from minor nuances: to overthrow the current constitutional regime in the Republic of Türkiye and to establish a form of government that puts socialism as the ultimate goal. However, when viewed from the outside, the differences of opinion, which we can express as 'minor nuances,' have mostly caused a disintegration and internal conflict within the left movement.

As a second step, we tried to explain the historical and ideological origins of the DHKP-C terrorist organization, which is also the main element of this study. Thus, we tried to show the position of the DHKP-C organization within radical leftist-revolutionist organizations, the process of its development, and, more importantly, the changes that the organization is experiencing within itself. While discussing radical left organizations and DHKP-C, we tried to include founding names such as Mahir Çayan and Dursun Karataş and founding works such as the DHKP Party Program.

As a result, it is possible to say that DHKP-C has a historical and ideological continuity with the radical leftist-revolutionary terrorist organizations established before it. Although the signs have changed, the content has remained the same. However, DHKP-C has directed its initiatives to areas such as environmentalism, human rights, ethnic and religious issues, and democratization since it is in a different socio-political atmosphere (i.e., with the collapsing of the Soviet Union) than the national and international conjuncture in which its predecessors continued their activities (Çiçek, 2008, p. 40). In addition, we can state that the terrorist organization aims to blend its legal and illegal activities and to act in a way that feeds each other. Therefore, this structure, which was established by intertwining the legal and illegal spheres, increases the DHKP-C's range of action in the social and political atmosphere while hindering counter-terrorism attempts.

CHAPTER IV

FROM RADICALIZATION TO RECRUITMENT

4.1. Introduction

In the first section of this chapter, 'from radicalization to recruitment,' we first aim to give various examples of the transition from radicalization to recruitment in different terrorist organizations. Then we will focus on the DHKP-C terrorist organization and how this process works there.

All terrorist organizations have different motivations, expectations, and methods. There are no general standards for terrorist organizations, and therefore each of them should be considered an independent and unique structure (Seren & Aslan, 2018, p. 36). For this reason, we will try to embody the stage from radicalization to recruitment processes by focusing on terrorist organizations that are well known by the world public, such as Al-Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, PKK/PYD, DEASH, and Baader-Meinhof Group.

In the second section of this chapter, radicalization, and recruitment process of DHKP-C, we will examine the radicalization and recruitment strategies in the focus of DHKP-C. We will seek answers to which radicalization model and recruitment strategy are more appropriate and explanatory for the DHKP-C terrorist organization. Again, we will examine the radicalization processes in the organization and the recruitment strategies applied through examples.

In the third section of this chapter, leftist terrorist organizations' and DHKP-C's perspective towards Alevi people, we will try to explain the perspective of the DHKP-C terrorist organization towards the Alevi community and the change in this perspective over time. While doing this, we will examine the reasons for this change.

In the fourth and last section of this chapter, recruitment activities of DHKP-C for Alevi people, we will focus on the recruitment activities of the DHKP-C terrorist organization for Alevis. We will seek answers to the questions of 'which methods and strategies the organization uses to recruit Alevis? and 'which structures and tools are prominent in the recruitment phase of Alevis?'.

4.2. From Radicalization to Recruitment: Examples from Terrorist Organizations

In the first part of this study, we examined the radicalization and recruitment processes in detail and highlighted the critical points regarding these phenomena. Therefore, to avoid repetition, we will not present a theoretical approach to radicalization and recruitment in this section. But we will try to give examples on the subject concerning more open and secondary sources. We aim to embody the transition from radicalization to recruitment through the exemplary processes of terrorist organizations and examples that can shed light on this process. Thus, we aim to embody the radicalization and recruitment processes described on paper about individuals and to provide an understanding of the way it works.

Terrorist organizations are living and learning organizations (C. K. Demir, 2008), and in a way, because they have a lively structure, they closely follow the political, military, and technological developments in the world. Otherwise, they know that if they do not keep up with developments, they will lose their effectiveness and are in danger of extinction. This reflex possessed by terrorist organizations manifests itself in all their actions and planning processes, including organization management, communication tools, weapons used in terrorist acts (Balkan, 2019), and recruitment processes (Duran & Yeşiltaş, 2018). For this reason, terrorist organizations are very successful in keeping up with the innovations and necessities of the era in radicalization and recruitment processes, and they even act in a hybrid war to optimize the level of effectiveness.

> Hybrid warfare is a combination of conventional and irregular warfare. General characteristics of conventional military vehicles, guerilla warfare, changing flexible and adaptable techniques that can be applied pragmatic strategy, mobile cells, extremely violent terrorist campaigns, social media networks that actively make use of propaganda, information warfare

> techniques, and the ways to reach all illegal sources of income that refer to a communication strategy are based on using a mixture of a criminal network (Duran & Yeşiltaş, 2018, p. 26).

The areas where the 'flexible and adaptable pragmatic strategy' mentioned as a feature of non-state armed actors (NSAAs) makes itself felt most clearly are the processes of radicalization and recruitment. When the sense of disenfranchisement and grievances of individuals or groups that they have experienced or think they have, are combined with an adaptive context, the way for their radicalization and recruitment is opened. The complaint that individuals or groups feel facilitates the path to radicalization, and the adaptive context is used in the format in which these complaints are appropriate by the recruiter, such as a card that strengthens his hand (Hoffman, 2018, pp. 18-19).



Figure 4.1. Ideal Conditions for Radicalization (Hoffman, 2018, p. 21)

"All disenfranchised individuals or communities become radicalized and start fighting under the umbrella of a terrorist organization" cannot be used as a precise expression, but we can say that grievances combined with a sense of disenfranchisement are the most effective factors that lead individuals or societies to become radicalized and recruited by a terrorist organization (Hoffman, 2018, p. 20). Grievances may have

arisen as a result of a certain conflict or friction or as a result of a systematic pressure regime that has lasted for generations against a minority group (Gurr, 1974). Regardless of the cause, such experiences or perceptions transmitted from generation to generation can activate fault lines in society and cause a social or political fracture.

According to Rachel Hoffman, all radical recruitment processes can be explained by **Seduce, Induce and Produce model (SIP)**. This three-stage modeling covers both radicalization and recruitment processes. The seduce stage is when an individual is persuaded to join a radical organization using propaganda or close relationships. Induce stage is the encouragement of the individual with the material or spiritual gains they will obtain as a member of the radical group. The produce stage is when the organization transforms the individual into a sympathizer, militant, or martyr (Hoffman, 2018, pp. 22-25).

Figure 4.2. SIP Radical Recruitment Model (Hoffman, 2018, p. 25)

If we look at how terrorist organizations radicalize and recruit individuals, it is possible to see different processes. As we mentioned in the first part of this study, all organizations approach these stages differently due to their political, religious, and sociocultural backgrounds. At this stage, we will try to give examples of the radicalization and recruitment processes of the most well-known terrorist organizations.

4.2.1. Self-Recruitment: Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization that has adopted the compartmentalization strategy and is organized accordingly. Finance, training, recruitment, and other activities were

handled by different departments. This situation brought practicality and mobility to the organization, as the department managers were directly subordinate to the leader of the organization, Bin Laden. Although intra-organizational communication was limited, it was used effectively. This structure, which was established, prevented dissolution in case of an external attack, and in addition, the members of the organization were paid (Strozier, 2007, p. 30).

After Al-Qaeda gained a global reputation, it did not try to recruit like other terrorist organizations. Because, as Marc Sageman put it, Al-Qaeda had become the "Harvard of global jihad, and individuals were now attempting to enter Al-Qaeda" (Sageman, 2008, p. 70). As a matter of fact, Al-Qaeda has been working with the philosophy of 'one person, one bomb' for many years. It's enough to put a bomb somewhere to be a member of the organization (Reşit, 2011). In the same way, the number of Palestinian suicide bombers (Istishhadis) and suicide bombings (Istishhadia) have also increased in direct proportion to popular support. In contrast to the early periods, this type of tough action has become more and more preferred by volunteers day by day. Volunteers have started to find their recruiters themselves (Schweitzer, 2007, p. 95). This is important for us in terms of showing the impact of social support on terrorist incidents and terrorists.

Marc Sageman, a former case officer of the CIA, who mostly focuses on Al-Qaeda, has made significant contributions to the profiling of the organization's members as a result of his longstanding studies. Those who joined the organization were mostly people in their early twenties and generally with expatriate identities (Sageman, 2004, p. 111). The militants were mostly raised in secular education and belonged to middle-class families (Sageman, 2004, p. 65, 2008, p. 51). On average, they had a high school education but were not employed in qualified jobs. They were mostly married and had children (Sageman, 2004, p. 60). Before they joined the organization, they rarely had a significant criminal record (Sageman, 2017, p. 45). There was often a moral rage and personal grievances in the radicalization processes, but Islamic doctrines were less influential on them than Anti-American and Anti-Semitic thought (Borum, 2011, p. 47; Sageman, 2004, 2008, 2017).

4.2.2. Suicide Bombers: The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - Tamil Tigers

One of the longest and bloodiest civil wars of modern times is the conflict between Sri Lanka's majority Buddhist Sinhalese and the Tamil minority, the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), on ethnic-nationalistic grounds (Vaughn, 2011, p. 2). These kinds of armed movements "generally seek the separation of a territory from a state to form either an independent entity with self-determination or to accede to another state with which they identify on ethnic or religious grounds," and they can receive support from third-party countries that support them, from diasporas abroad, or from the enemies of the country in conflict (Charvat, 2008, p. 25). As like that, "the LTTE also raises $7-22 million a year from the Tamil diaspora in Canada" (Freeman, 2008, p. 91). Moreover, like other terrorist organizations, LTTE also engages in other illegal activities such as drug trafficking (Pek & Ekici, 2007, p. 140) and bank robbery (Freeman, 2008, p. 85) to finance its operations.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was the main actor in a bloody war that led to the loss of more than 70,000 lives and hundreds of thousands of migrants from its inception in 1976 until 2009 (Vaughn, 2011, p. 2); when it was eliminated by Operation Iron Fist launched by the Sri Lankan Army. According to the US State Department's Counterterrorism Bureau, the LTTE is a well-known terrorist organization, especially in suicide bombings (Kronstadt, 2008; Owen, 2008, p. 25). LTTE is a terrorist organization that uses suicide bombers very effectively and intensively. It has been observed that the organization mostly prefers to use female terrorists in suicide bombings (Owen, 2008, p. 32; Smith et al., 2007, p. 78). In fact, according to the FBI, 'the suicide bomber vest' used in suicide attacks was also invented by the LTTE. According to Kronstadt;

> The US Federal Bureau of Investigation has listed the Tamil Tigers "among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world," crediting the rebels with inventing the suicide belt and perfecting the use of suicide bombers, murdering some 4,000 people since 2006 and being the world's only terrorist organization to assassinate two world leaders (Kronstadt, 2008, p. 12).

“Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have committed more suicide attacks since the 1980s than any other group,” says Amy Zalman in her study examining whether suicide bombings were carried out with religious motivation (Saruhan, 2008, p. 127).

The LTTE organization often forcibly mobilized child fighters to recruit for itself, and it is held responsible for the abduction and forced recruitment of thousands of children as soldiers (Kronstadt, 2008; Ulusoy, 2008, p. 3). In addition, the LTTE organization prevented civilians from escaping from conflict zones by using them as a human shields (Vaughn, 2011, p. 3). According to Fidan K. Owen, children who grow up in Tamil society have no choice but to join the LTTE organization. Because throughout their childhood and adolescence, their entire social life has been enslaved by the organization’s propaganda. Those who died are blessed as ‘martyrs,’ posters of martyrs are hung in playgrounds, commemorations of martyrs are organized in schools, and thus, they are often made to want to join the organization due to an ongoing propaganda activity. Moreover, child soldiers are included in an intense indoctrination process since their participation in the organization, and they are put through a series of inter-organizational training processes in which they are filled with the thought of hating the enemy (Owen, 2008, p. 37).

4.2.3. Child Soldiers: PKK / PYD

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan - PKK) and Democratic Union Party (Kurdish: Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat – PYD) are terrorist organizations that adopt Marxist-Leninist ideology and act in focus on Kurdish nationalism. They are using different names for acting freely in Europe and the US. The leaders of the PKK established a new organization called the PYD in order to gain a foothold in Europe and America. The PYD acts as the Syrian extension of the PKK and takes its instructions directly from Qandil (Acun, 2018).

Since it is a Kurdish nationalist terrorist organization, the main focus in the recruitment process has been especially on Kurdish youth and children living in the Southeastern provinces of Türkiye (Sümer, 2018). However, due to the power vacuum that emerged in the Middle East after the Arab Spring (Seren & Aslan, 2018, p. 36) and the intense operations initiated by the Turkish security forces in 2015 and after the failed coup

attempt on July 15, 2016, it directed its activities and recruitment processes to the north of Syria.

The PKK/PYD terrorist organization saw the loss of state authority and the power vacuum in Syria as an opportunity, and its approach to this situation was also reflected in its recruitment processes. The PKK/PYD's recruitment of child soldiers dates back to 1994 when the PKK systematically used child soldiers (Sümer, 2018, p. 329), but the Syrian civil war has reinforced this situation. Hüseyin Alptekin, who carries out academic studies on terrorism and radicalization, stated that the PKK recruited 3,000 children, excluding the child militants in Türkiye, and these were mostly under the age of 15 (Alptekin, 2017).

> A study conducted in 2012 revealed that 33.41 percent of 1,362 members of the organization who lost their lives between 2001 and September 26, 2011, were between the ages of 16-18, and 9.25 percent were under the age of 15. According to the report, the youngest age to join the organization is 9. In 2012 data, it was stated that the participation rate of children in the PKK was 36 percent (Sümer, 2018, p. 329).

Child soldiers are mostly recruited by kidnapping or force, and sometimes they join the ranks of the organization as a result of various socio-psychological processes, propaganda, or persuasion efforts (Alkan & Çıtak, 2007, p. 291). The terrorist organization proceeds in a certain systematic way and uses various strategies while persuading children. Children are persuaded by offers or threats such as taking an active role in the liberation of their people, threatening to harm their families if they do not join the organization, they will become heroes, or they can save their families from poverty. The PKK/PYD makes these threats and offers by targeting the children of disadvantaged groups and families with a traumatic past (Sümer, 2018).

According to the study conducted by the Counter Terrorism and Operation Department of Turkish National Police on 262 PKK militants, 54% of militants are between the ages of 14-25. Of the 216 people in the album prepared by the PKK for its killed militants, 77% are between the ages of 14 and 25. Of these 216 militants, 46.5% were killed within 0-2 years of joining the organization, 21.3% within 2-4 years, and 21.3% within 4-8 years in clashes with the security forces (Alkan & Çıtak, 2007, pp. 287-288). Looking at the participation and survival rates of individuals in the PKK terrorist

organization, it would be correct to say that; most of the terrorists in the ranks of the terrorist organization consist of children and young people between the ages of 14-25, and 70% of the terrorists who join the ranks of the organization die in clashes with the Turkish security forces within the first four years.

4.2.4. Foreign Fighters: Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)

The chaotic environment and the authority vacuum that emerged with the American intervention in Iraq gained a new civil war dimension with the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In addition to the chaotic situation in Iraq, the weakening state authority in Syria has given non-state armed actors and terrorist organizations unique opportunities. Violations of border security in this region, especially in Iraq and Syria, created a ground where all kinds of smuggling and illegal activities became a daily routine. This situation not only opened up a space for illegal activities such as weapons or smuggling but also caused the emergence of untraceable human activity in the region (Dodwell et al., 2016, p. 1). Refugees trying to escape the conflict environment and radicals and militants trying to go to the conflict area started to cross the borders easily.

At this point, the messages given by radical-Islamist terrorist organizations such as ISIS to the international public were received by individuals far from the conflict zones for various reasons (Öztürk & Tetik, 2018, p. 205). People who have adaptation problems in the society they live in, suffer from poverty, belong to the lower strata of the society, seek a new beginning, or just want to live in the caliphate lands respected the message given by ISIS and showed a positive reaction (Öztürk & Tetik, 2018, pp. 199-200).

Contrary to popular belief, individuals joined ISIS not to die or be killed but to live under the caliphate. Only 12% of their militants stated that they preferred suicide over a traditional method of conflict (Dodwell et al., 2016, p. 29). According to Dodwell et al., unlike other jihadist structures before, ISIS declared that it established a caliphate state over a certain region and invited people to live there. That was the message given to people living far from conflict zones. This message also directly concerned the supply and demand aspects of recruitment (Dodwell et al., 2016, p. 29). The number

of individuals who go to conflict zones intending to join armed terrorist organizations is about the same as a small army. “According to the sources of the US intelligence, the number of foreign fighters who went to Syria until 2015 exceeded 30 thousand. And in total, people from more than a hundred countries have reached the conflict zones” (Öztürk & Tetik, 2018, p. 224). According to data covering 4,173 terrorists, compiled by Dodwell and others from open sources, and their classification, 3,244 were citizens of 77 different countries (it was not determined which country 929 of 4,173 were citizens of) (Dodwell et al., 2016, pp. 8-9).

Then they set out to join the organization. In addition to all these, as stated in the first part of this study, no clear demographic definition of radicalization and recruitment and potential candidates can be identified (Hoffman, 2018, p. 6). This uncertainty regarding potential candidates for participation in terrorist organizations remains valid with the same certainty in the case of foreign fighters. Individuals who are well-educated, integrated into the society they live in, and who do not experience a socioeconomic and psychological crisis can also choose this way. For example, a Canadian Muslim named Salman Ashrafi, who fits this profile, joined ISIS and died as a suicide bomber in Iraq in 2013 (Dandurand, 2015; Dodwell et al., 2016, p. 32). The process of joining a terrorist organization varies depending on the way individuals perceive the message given by the terrorist organization and filter the conditions they are in through their personal experiences.

4.2.5. Urban-Based Terrorism: Baader-Meinhoff Group

Baader-Meinhoff Group or the RAF group (Deutsch: Rote Armee Fraction - RAF) is a terrorist organization that has existed for nearly 30 years from the1970 to the second half of the 1990s, has a Marxist ideology and is defined by its founders as ‘an urban guerrilla’ and they are educated, about 80% of Baader-Meinhoff militants were university graduates (İ. Yılmaz, 2009). Yılmaz points out that terrorist organizations such as the RAF, which operate as urban guerrillas, recruit more middle and upper-class militants than terrorist organizations such as PKK, IRA, or FARC, which operate mostly in rural areas (Yılmaz, 2009, pp. 44-45).

The RAF group received a 2-month training at the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrilla camp in Jordan in 1969 and then returned to West Germany. This group consisted of 9 people, including the organization's leaders Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, and Gudrun Ensslin. According to David Rapoport, "this development marked a significant milestone in the history of terrorism since it was probably the first time that one terrorist group had trained another" (B. Hoffman, 2017, p. 32).

But this was not the only institutional support the RAF received. After the merger of the Eastern and Western Blocs in 1990, information emerged that The German Democratic Republic (GDR), or DDR (German: Deutsche Demokratische Republik - DDR), provided logistical and financial assistance to the RAF through the Stasi, the secret police service of the DDR, and assisted in processes such as the issuance of a new identity (Bjørgo, 2013, pp. 87-88). The RAF group can be cited as an impressive example of how developments at the international level affect the internal politics of countries. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the idea of a communist regime was greatly damaged ideologically; with the reunification with the Federal Republic of Germany and the collapse of the DDR, these developments eliminated the reasons for the existence of the RAF and the organization declared "the urban guerrilla in the shape of the RAF is now history" in April 1998 (Bjørgo, 2013, pp. 87-88).

According to McCauley and Segal's study (1989), examining how individuals eventually join organizations such as the RAF group, the influence of pull and push factors in radicalization and recruitment processes should be considered. The socioeconomic problems, grievances, and ideological ideas of the individual are push factors, while the organization's identification of vulnerable people and intensifying recruitment processes on them pull factors (Richards, 2017, pp. 31-32). There is no need for the individual to experience a personal crisis, as is the case with the RAF group.

4.3. Radicalization and Recruitment Process of DHKP-C

In the first part of this study, we explained the processes of radicalization and recruitment and examined the theoretical approaches to these notions. Under this title,

we will discuss the radicalization and recruitment processes in the context of DHKP-C and examine which modeling is more explanatory and applicable to this organization.

4.3.1. Which Radicalization Model is More Suitable for DHKP-C?

Firstly, we will ask this question: "Which modeling is more suitable for DHKP-C?" There will be no definite answer for it because there is no radicalization model that has been created by focusing on the DHKP-C yet, so even the mechanism that we will examine here as the 'optimal model' will have some gaps.

Secondly, in general terms, we think the '12 Stages Mechanism Model of Radicalization Process' (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008) developed by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko is the best study that can be used to explain the radicalization processes of DHKP-C militants. Moreover, we think that the broad framework on which this modeling is based, and the individual, group, and mass-level radicalization steps are inclusive. For these reasons, we will use McCauley and Moskalenko's modeling here to examine the radicalization processes of DHKP-C militants on a theoretical level.

4.3.1.1. DHKP-C: 12 Stages Mechanism Model of Radicalization Process

In this part of the study, we will try to apply the mechanisms and radicalization levels of the "12 Stages Mechanism Model of Radicalization Process" model developed by McCauley and Moskalenko, which we explained while giving examples of radicalization models in the first part of this study, to the example of DHKP-C.

Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko's modeling of radicalization starts with 'the level of all people.' This means everyone and all individuals are candidates for radicalism, but very few of them take it to the final stage and become terrorists. Their radicalization model is like a pyramid, and as you go up, the number of people decreases, but the number of radicals also increases, and the person finally performs the act of terrorism at this peak that they have come to (McCauley & Moskalenko,

2008, 2011, 2014, 2017; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Quantitative researches based on DHKP-C terrorists also show that, although there are proportional variations from organization to organization, it is not possible to make a definite judgment about the basic characteristics of individuals participating in the terrorist organization, such as gender, age, education level, criminal record, occupation, and marital status (Ekici et al., 2010; Sevinç, 2008; Teymur, 2004, 2007; Teymur et al., 2007; Yayla, 2001).[7]

4.3.1.1.1. Individual Level Radicalization Process of DHKP-C Militants

The individual-level radicalization process contains personal grievance, group grievance, slippery slope, power of love, status-seeking, unfreezing, and refreezing (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). In general, the individual level refers to the traumatic, negative, troublesome processes or grievances that affect the private life of the person.

At the individual level radicalization process, the person's socioeconomic status, education level, family and friend relations, number of siblings, and job status are directly effective. According to the quantitative study conducted on the data of 75 DHKP-C militants, about 50% of their fathers are farmers, 12% are workers, and only 5% work in formal jobs. Likewise, the mothers of 93% of these militants do not work in any job, and only 1-2 mothers work in office work (Teymur, 2004, pp. 50–51, 2007, pp. 72–73). Therefore, even looking at the working status of their parents, it is possible to say that DHKP-C militants have low-income family backgrounds (Teymur, 2004, p. 53; 2007, p. 74).

The number of children in families is also an important indicator in terms of showing the economic background of the families of the militants, and 95% of these families have at least three children. During the research, it was seen that this number increased

[7] These people are fugitive FETO/PDY members. They took this data, obtained during the raids of the General Directorate of Security on terrorist cells, to the USA with them. Since this information was captured as a result of the institutional capacity and efforts of the Turkish Police Organization and through the operations it carried out, it was cited even if it was included in the sources written by fugitive FETO members. Since this is the only available data that is collected with official capacity, we will refer to this with a note of caution.

to 12 (Teymur, 2004, p. 52; 2007, p. 73). This situation directly and negatively affects the amount of expenditure per capita in already low-income families and the level of care of parents to their children.

While only 15% of DHKP-C militants were born in metropolitan cities (Teymur, 2004, p. 58), 60% of militants said that they migrated to a larger city (Teymur, 2007, p. 81). Again, this situation may have caused some psycho-social ruptures in Türkiye, which can be evaluated in the context of urbanization processes and social effects. In the 7th Five-Year Development Plan published by the State Planning Organization in 1997 (Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, 1995), attention was drawn to the impact of migration on the socioeconomic structure and the shocks, internal conflicts, and depressions caused by the encounter with a new culture of those who migrated from the rural areas to the cities had a deep impact on individuals and societies. It has been pointed out that there are consequences that have an impact on them and that these lead especially young people to withdraw into themselves or, on the contrary, to radical organizations, illegal activities, and committing crimes (Yıldırım, 2004, p. 51).

Finally, we will look at the employment and educational status of DHKP-C militants, as well as cases involving contacts with the security forces before joining the organization, such as being arrested (direct contact) or losing a friend or relative due to terrorism-related activity (indirect impact). Because the conditions in which the individual lives and the events they experience are directly effective in radicalization and participation in terrorist organizations.

Only 7% of militants have a bachelor's degree, and 3% have completed postgraduate education. While the rate of high school graduates is 23%, 67% have an education level below this (Teymur, 2004, p. 60). While only 8% of militants had a regular job, %5 had a part-time job, and 70% of those who had a job worked in jobs that required physical strength. And 80% of militants are unemployed (Teymur, 2007, p. 79).

More than 70% of the militants had been arrested before joining the organization, and 69% had relations with other terrorist organizations (Teymur, 2007, p. 82). The three most important reasons that push individuals to join terrorist organizations are "the loss of a family member or friend due to a terrorism-related event, political closeness

to a terrorist organization, and injustice. Another important factor is family problems" (Teymur, 2004, p. 67). 44% of DHKP-C militants lost a family member or friend due to a terrorism-related incident; in addition, 31% of the militants said they joined the terrorist organization because of political affinity and 14% because of social injustice. Another important factor in the participation of individuals in the organization is family problems, with 11% (Teymur, 2004, pp. 67-68).

Table 4.1. Facilitating Conditions for Joining the DHKP-C Terrorist Organization (Teymur et al., 2007, p. 165)

Means which introduced the respondent to terrorist group	Percentage of respondents	Facilitating conditions for joining terrorist organization	Yes	No	Family members political party affiliation	Percent of respondents
Friend	32	Loss of relative or a close friend	40%	50.7	Left	41.3
Relative	24	Prior contacts or relationship with a terrorist group	65.3%	29.3	Right	1.3
Prison Related	6.7	Police prior arrest of respondents	69.3	26.3	Radical Left	33.3
Organizational publications	14.7	Family members relationship with terrorist groups	50%	33.3		
Demonstration	1.3	Family members ever arrested or jailed	48%	30.7		
Organizational association	5.3					
Social problem, unhealthy mental status	2.7					
Identification and sympathy with the organization values and ideals	2.7					
Loos/arrest of close circle	1.3					
Total	90.7					
Missing responses	9.3					

As seen in the academic studies prepared based on the information and documents obtained during the operations carried out by the Turkish Police Service against terrorist organizations, the people who join the DHKP-C are individuals who have personal problems, and they are vulnerable to the propaganda of the terrorist organization. For this reason, the individual level, the first step of the radicalization model designed by McCauley and Moskalenko, can be used to explain the radicalization and recruitment processes of individuals by DHKP-C.

4.3.1.1.2. Group-Level Radicalization Process of DHKP-C Organizations

The main focus of the group radicalization phase, which is the second step of Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko's radicalization model, is that the individual who enters the path of radicalization, although surrounded by like-minded people, takes the process of radicalization to the next stage due to various intragroup differences of opinion, such as polarization, splitting into factions, or leading a group (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 209). This stage is more difficult than the previous one because this time, there is a struggle between radicalized individuals against each other.

What we call conflict and fracturing due to intra-group radicalization or violent disagreements has become a norm for leftist movements in Türkiye (Atar, 2005, pp. 97-98; Avcı, 2019, p. 162; Çiçek, 2008, p. 118). It is possible to see many examples of this schism, and we have already touched upon these disagreements and conflicts while describing the establishment process of DHKP-C in the second part of this study.

However, if we examine the group-level radicalization process in the context of DHKP-C at this stage, we see that this organization was also established because of an intra-organizational disagreement and conflict environment. After the Dev-Genç organization split into two as Dev-Yol and Dev-Sol, two different factions were formed within the Dev-Sol, namely the Leadership Group (supporters of Dursun Karataş) and the Coupers Group (supporters of Bedri Yağan), and this situation started the bloody conflict process within the organization (Çiçek, 2008, p. 44). Because Bedri Yağan aimed to overthrow Dursun Karataş and bring the organization under his leadership, using a debate over the necessity of the organization's leaders to reside

outside of Türkiye (Karabudak, 2000, pp. 123-124). Bedri Yağan, who raided Dursun Karataş's house in Berlin and kept him in the basement, was declared a traitor when Karataş escaped after 22 days, and Karataş demanded that all groups within the organization renew their allegiance to him (Demirel, 1995).

This radicalization process within the DHKP-C includes various fractional discussions within the group, the radicalization process towards different goals, and gaining the support of the organization's members to seize the leadership. The series of events that started with disagreements within the organization and evolved into bloody actions taken by the factions against each other is a common example of **group-level radicalization** in the leftist movement that DHKP-C came from. For this reason, we can say that the second stage of the radicalization model (group-level radicalization stage) developed by McCauley and Moskalenko is applicable at the level of the individual and the DHKP-C organization.

4.3.1.1.3. Mass Level Radicalization Process of DHKP-C Organization

The third and final stage of McCauley and Moskalenko's radicalization model is the 'mass level radicalization' stage. At this stage, there are three very important topics; to hate the enemy more than belonging to the group *(hatred)*, to be a 'martyr' for the cause, and to ensure the continuity of the conflict with asymmetrical methods of struggle (*jiu-jitsu politics*) (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 209). The DHKP-C terrorist organization is adept at using asymmetrical means to hate the enemy, the position of martyrdom for the benefit of the cause, and it sees the struggle as an instrument for creating new hostilities against the state.

The DHKP-C terrorist organization and its militants harbor a strong sense of grudge and hatred against the state. The source of this hatred is the existence of the state itself. According to Dursun Karataş, the oligarchic state order, which is monopolized by the sovereign powers, will first encounter the hatred of the people, and a spark will be started with the belief that this order has to change (Karataş, 1989, pp. 404-405).

Firstly, the expressions **'class hatred'** and **'people's hatred'** appear in almost all publications of DHKP-C (Çayan, 2019, pp. 333-334; "DHKC Milis," 2021; "Halk Okulu," 2021a; "Halk Okulu," 2021b; "Halk Okulu," 2021c; "Halk Okulu," 2021d; "Halk Okulu," 2021e; "Kurtuluş," 2021; "Yürüyüş," 2018; Karataş, 1989, p. 198). These statements are a relentless hatred of the people who are oppressed by oligarchic fascist governments against the cruel power. And only with the coming together of the entire popular stratum and the overthrow of this tyrannical power will they be at ease. In these publications, DHKP-C emphasizes the need for this hatred to continue in an organized and planned manner. This feeling of hatred, which is harbored by individuals and masses who think they are oppressed, is an indispensable building block of radicalization and recruitment in terrorist organizations.

Secondly, **'martyrdom'** is usually a religious term, although it means witnessing an event or being present at a place in a dictionary meaning. In Islamic terminology, it refers to a Muslim killed by unbelievers in the way of Allah and for the sake of lofty values. This concept is also included in Judaism, Christianity, and the Sikh religions and meets almost a similar meaning (F. Atar & Gürkan, 2021).

Because of their nature, leftist movements are far from religious and racial affairs. They see the world as an ongoing class struggle. Marx describes religion as 'opium' for societies (Belge, 2017; Marx, 1997). As a requirement of the religious perspectives of leftist ideologies, DHKP-C is expected not to use the concept of martyrdom, but it uses the concept of martyrdom for all its militants who died in a clash with the police or as a result of a hunger strike, to show its struggle under a holy and lofty roof. As in the common pain of the Turkish left, in the Kızıldere Incident, all terrorists are referred to as such, from those killed as a result of an armed conflict with the police to militants who lost their lives due to the hunger strike they started in prisons ("Devrimci Sol," 1980, p. 82; "Karanlıktaki Meşale," 2017, p. 8; "Tavır," 2011, p. 59).

Finally, the reaction of the security forces against terrorist organizations is used by these organizations as an asymmetrical tool to incite hatred and violence against the state and its rulers **(jiu-jitsu politics)** (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 209). The philosophy of Jiu-Jitsu, which means 'fine art' in Japanese, as a martial art, is that an agile and flexible (soft-muscled) person may have the opportunity to defeat his strong

opponent, even if he is weak. According to Jiu-Jitsu philosophy, a relatively weak person can defeat a strong opponent without exerting great strength. In this context, it aims to dominate with strategies such as flexibility, high mobilization of the actor, and repetitive movements (*Jiu-Jitsu Nedir*, 2021).

All strategies used by structures that do not regularly act, such as terrorist organizations, derive their power from their unpredictability, have high mobility, and have adopted asymmetric warfare to combat states comply with this logic. However, Jiu-Jitsu techniques are vitally important for terrorist organizations such as the DHKP-C, which act at the level of cell structure and are smaller in terms of the resources they have compared to organizations such as the PKK. They owe it to these methods to maintain their presence and recruitment.

DHKP-C mostly alleges the poor conditions of its imprisoned militants, the excessive use of force in operations or raids by the security forces, and the state's extrajudicial executions. When the propaganda publications published by DHKP-C from the past to the present are examined, it is seen that it constantly assumes the role of the 'victim.' There is no exception to this. If a DHKP-C militant is arrested or killed in a clash with the security forces, they are definitely the victim; the state made this arrest unjustly or used excessive force ("Halk Okulu," 2021a, p. 6; "Karanlıktaki Meşale," 2017, p. 8).

After an ordinary arrest or neutralization of a terrorist in the conflict, DHKP-C agitates this situation and tries to keep the ranks within the organization tight ("Halk Okulu," 2021a, p. 6). Because as we mentioned above, the arrest of family members or a friend for a terrorist-related crime or murder by the security forces has a great impact on the radicalization of individuals and their participation in the organization (Teymur, 2004, p. 67). The organization realizes this strategy of agitation and keeping the ranks tight through democratic field structures (see Figure – 9) such as the Solidary Association for the Families of Prisoners and the Convicted (Turkish: Tutuklu ve Hükümlü Aileleri ile Dayanışma Derneği, aka. TAYAD), Association for Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Turkish: Temel Haklar ve Özgürlükler Derneği) and People's Law Office (Turkish: Halkın Hukuk Bürosu, aka. HHB).

4.4. Case Study: Which Recruitment Strategies Are Used by DHKP-C?

As we mentioned in detail in the recruitment title in the first chapter, terrorist organizations use all channels and tools they can reach to radicalize individuals and make them suitable for recruitment. Again, in this part of the study, we talked about the similar strategies of terrorist organizations while describing the transition processes from radicalization to recruitment. When we look at the basic idea of the radicalization and recruitment processes of the DHKP-C, it will be seen that there is not much difference between ISIS and DHKP-C or PKK and LTTE. That is, ISIS has songs and anthems praising jihad and martyrdom, while DHKP-C has marches and ballads praising the revolution and revolutionaries. Just as the PKK kidnaps Kurdish children and takes them to the mountains, LTTE abducts Tamil children and makes them fight against the soldiers. While the radicalization and recruitment processes of terrorist organizations are similar in form, their contents are shaped in line with their ideology, audience, and organizational goals. At this stage of the study, we will mostly examine the methods and discourses of the DHKP-C that are uniquely used while recruiting individuals.

Terrorist organizations first identify potential candidates for radicalization and recruitment. While doing this, they evaluate the past, current situation, and future projection of the individual. As we said above, individuals who have a previous criminal record, migrated from the village to the city, left their family to study at the university, or lost a family member or friend due to a terrorist connection (sense of revenge against security forces and the state), or have various family problems are quite prone to join the ranks of the DHKP-C (Teymur, 2004, pp. 67–68, 2007, pp. 79–82). Such recruitment can be considered opportunities that come to the fore without the terrorist organization's effort. There is no need to make great efforts to radicalize and recruit an individual whose family members or close friends are DHKP-C sympathizers or militants or to abduct them forcibly into the mountains as the PKK does.

According to the organizational documents and archives that the DHKP-C organization asked its militants to answer, and which were seized during the raids

carried out by the Turkish Police Service,[8] the first contact of individuals with the DHKP-C terrorist organization was as follows:

32% of the militants were drawn to the ranks of the organization by their friends, 24% of them were introduced to the organization by a relative for the first time, 15% of the militants met through the publications of the terrorist organization, 7% of them they met during their stay in prison, 5% of them said that they met the terrorist organization through NGOs that are legal field structures (Teymur et al., 2007, p. 164).

It should be noted that individuals who meet the organization through their family members and are involved in the recruitment processes draw a different profile from the 'classical' radicalization processes. Because in this type of recruitment, individuals adopt the organization as a family institution and join the ranks of the organization to avenge those who entered this path before them or to be worthy of them. Here, the terrorist organization has turned into a kind of family company.[9]

People often think that individuals have been deceived by the terrorist organization and therefore join the organization's ranks because it seems like it is not a rational choice to join terrorist organizations, to live in a mountain or city in a constant state of vigilance. However, contrary to the general belief, this assessment is not valid for the radicalization and recruitment processes that develop, as mentioned above, and occur within family ties. At this point, the individual is subjected to a certain doctrine by family, starting from childhood. Maybe this also applies to how other families in the society convey their non-violent political views to their children, but there is no critical

[8] Data, as mentioned above, was obtained during the raids carried out by the Turkish Police Organization on the DHKP-C cells and consisted of the terrorists' handwritten answers to the questions the organization asked its militants. However, later on, this data was extracted from the police archives by former FETO police officers such as Ahmet Sait Yayla and Samih Teymur and used in their academic studies. These former police officers, who are members of FETO and are currently on the run, have used this archive, which can be called an "intra-organizational survey" based on 28 questions asked by DHKP-C to 75 militants, in their Master of Arts and Ph.D. theses and dozens of academic studies at universities in the USA. Therefore, we have used this data, which the Turkish police obtained by risking their lives with their resources and personnel, by citing in this study (Sevinç, 2008; Teymur, 2004, 2007; Teymur et al., 2007; Yayla, 2001).

[9] There are many examples of how the DHKP-C terrorist organization recruited militants on a family basis. However, at this point, we can give an example of some terrorists pardoned by Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the 10th President of the Republic of Türkiye, and their families. For example, there are strong allegations that the family members of the pardoned terrorists Faik Önder, Doğan Karataştan, Nihat Sönmez, and Mehmet Şahin also served in various levels of the organization and therefore faced various legal processes.

threshold to be a member of an armed terrorist organization. These families, who maintain their connection with the terrorist organization, are mostly within the legal field structures of the organization. For example, they continue their activities under the Families of Prisoners and Convicts Association for Assistance and Solidarity (TAYAD). With this reflex, the organization maintains the relationship of both its militants in prison and the families of the militants with the organization and continues its propaganda activities through TAYAD (see Figure-9), which is the legal field structure (TAYAD, 2021).

The organization's recruitment of individuals through NGOs operating in the legal field may seem low at a rate of 5%, but these structures carry out much more effective activities. The DHKP-C terrorist organization sends the names of the militants who died in the past and the relatives of these militants as a list to associations operating in the legal field at the beginning of each academic year. Then, these associations start to contact young people through the names on the list sent to them. The individuals recruited in the organization may not be aware of the organization for the first time due to their family, relatives, or friendship relations, but these associations, which operate in the legal field, are in a very critical position in terms of the evolution of individuals from the organization's sympathizers to militants (Aksiyon Dergisi, 2015).

At this point, we will focus on two names that are well known to the public to give hybrid examples of the reasons behind DHKP-C's recruitment of young people: Elif Sultan Kalsen and Şafak Yayla.

Elif Sultan Kalsen is the middle daughter of a family of Tunceli origin living in Burdur. His father was a public sector manager in Burdur. After she got into Kocaeli University, Department of International Relations, she came to this city and settled in a girls' dormitory. The private dormitory where Elif Sultan settled was facing an association of the DHKP-C operating in the legal field. Elif S. Kalsen became involved in the organization through this association, but more than that, her older sister Fidan Kalsen burned herself to death in Çanakkale Prison on December 19, 2000, to protest the operations against the prisons. (Aksiyon Dergisi, 2015; Habertürk, 2015; odatv4.com, 2015). Finally, Selda Kalsen, Elif Sultan's sister, fled abroad illegally because she was wanted for membership in the organization (Aksiyon Dergisi, 2015).

When her name was revealed among the suicide bombings of DHKP-C, Elif S. Kalsen stood before the cameras with a friend and claimed that she 'continued her struggle legally and there was no suicide bomber' (Sözcü, 2015). However, in April 2015, she was found dead, together with the bomb mechanism, in the armed and bomb attack on the Istanbul Security Directorate (Euronews, 2015).

For this reason, the causes for Elif S. Kalsen to join the organization are, firstly, it could be that she was affected by her sister's tragic death in prison or that she joined DHKP-C to avenge her death. Secondly, the friendly environment at the university she started and, in the dormitory, where she stayed can be shown. Finally, we can say that the DHKP-C affiliated association located directly opposite the dormitory where she was staying caused her to be recruited.

Şafak Yayla took the Chief Public Prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz hostage at the Istanbul Courthouse, where he came with Bahtiyar Doğruyol on March 31, 2015, and they executed the prosecutor with a gun after negotiations that lasted for about 9 hours. Then, two terrorists were captured dead in the clash with the security forces. Şafak Yayla and Bahtiyar Doğruyol first met in Tekirdağ Type F Prison. Şafak Yayla was arrested in 2013 for an alleged suicide bombing, and he was released from prison three months before the attack. Bahtiyar Doğruyol was caught in Edirne in 2012 while trying to go abroad illegally. B. Doğruyol, who tried to go to 'Lavrion Camp' in Greece,[10] was arrested and put in prison. He was released from prison in 2014, a year before the attack (NTV, 2015).

Şafak Yayla's two older brothers, Mehmet Yayla and Bulut Yayla, are also militants of the terrorist organization DHKP-C.[11] His older brother, Mehmet Yayla, was wanted on suspicion of taking part in the simultaneous attacks on the Ministry of Justice and

[10] DHKP-C has three camps in Greece, namely Lavrion, Kinesa, and Dileysi. Militants are trained in weapons, bombs, and assassination in these camps on the Aegean coast. For detailed information, see (Köroğlu, 2012).

[11] Former police officer Ahmet Sait Yayla, the cousin of the Yayla brothers, is also the fugitive senior manager of the FETO terrorist organization. There are allegations that the murder of Prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz, who was working on the death of Berkin Elvan of Alevi origin, who died due to the gas canister fired by the police during the Gezi Protests, and that the case was completely plunged into darkness through A.S. Yayla's cousins. There are doubts that Ahmet Sait Yayla is the liaison between FETÖ and DHKP-C. The Berkin Elvan issue is an important breaking point in the DHKP-C's relationship with the Alevi community. We will address this issue in the next section (Dede, 2018; Kıran, 2017).

AK Party Headquarters in Ankara on March 19, 2013. Mehmet Yayla was caught off Chios Island in the Aegean Sea while trying to enter Türkiye on an inflatable boat loaded with ammunition on July 30, 2013 (Kırbaki, 2021). His other brother, Bulut Yayla, was included in the terrorist list by the US Department of State after the attack on the US Embassy in Ankara on February 1, 2013, as DHKP-C's 'Okmeydanı Area Representative.' He was caught in Edirne and taken into custody. The statement made by the Ministry of Interior has been said: "It is thought that Bulut Yayla illegally crossed into Europe and received training with weapons and bombs, and entered our country illegally in order to carry out an action such as an armed, bomb or suicide bomber in the coming days against our law enforcement units or foreign country representatives in our country" (Kırbaki, 2021).

For these reasons, Şafak Yayla's participation in the ranks of the terrorist organization may have been through her brothers. In addition, it is another fact that Şafak Yayla became radicalized after going to university and joined the ranks of the DHKP-C. Therefore, the university environment can be shown as another factor. In addition, he may have planned to take the prosecutor hostage and kill him by taking radicalism one step further with Bahtiyar Doğruyol, whom he met in prison. The same possibilities can be applied to Bahtiyar Doğruyol.

In addition, the Yayla brothers' parents' perspectives towards the organization changed after Şafak Yayla's death. When Şafak Yayla was arrested in 2013, her father said, "I am glad he was caught. I believe he will not harm anyone, but if he does, it is better for me to be caught" ("Savcıyı şehit eden terörist Şafak Yayla'nın ailesi böyle feryat etmişti," 2015). However, after his son was killed in a confrontation with the police after his son murdered the prosecutor, he greeted the crowd as "hello revolutionaries" at a Grup Yorum concert by phone and said, "I send you the greetings of Şafak. Şafaks never die, let them know that. After that, maybe we will have many more Şafak Yayla. Goodbye, big-hearted revolutionaries" used expressions (*Grup Yorum Konseri'nde Savcı Kiraz'ı Öldüren Teröristin Ailesinden Skandal Sözler*, 2016). These changes in the parents of the Yayla brothers about the DHKP-C and terrorist acts are important in showing the reflexes of the families of terrorists who were imprisoned for terrorism-related crimes or died in conflict with the security forces. In this incident, a father who described himself before as a religious person

who loved his country had to become radicalized due to the political preferences of his children. If families turn their backs on the organization and try to distance themselves from the organization, the organization first punishes the families by verbally abusing them through their associations operating in the legal field, such as the People's Law Office (HHB) or TAYAD, and if that doesn't work, by activating the instrument of physical violence. We will give three examples to show the organization's approach to families.

The first one is Berkin Elvan, who was taken to the hospital with injuries and died here due to the gas canister fired by the police hitting his head during the Gezi Protests, which has almost become a symbol of the revolutionary-left terrorist organizations in Türkiye. Berkin Elvan's family was disturbed by this situation, and they were threatened by the lawyers sent by HHB, although they agreed with a famous lawyer to follow the case. The lawyers said, "Berkin is no longer your son," and said that Berkin would openly be a part of the organization's advertising campaign (Haber 7, 2015).

The second one is Güven Abalay, the father of the terrorist named Sıla Abalay, who was captured dead in an operation carried out by the security forces in the cell house of the organization, was beaten by another DHKP-C militant while trying to save his daughter from the organization. After the death of their daughter, her family did not give Sıla Abalay's body to the terrorist organization and took her to their hometown. The family decided not to allow members of the organization to attend the funeral (Abalay, 2020; Super Haber, 2017).

The third one is İsmail Ercan, the father of Berk Ercan. His son was indoctrinated and recruited by the organization in the summer camp he went to when he was a first-year high school student, and then he was imprisoned for participating in illegal activities on behalf of the terrorist organization. His father, İsmail Ercan, was subjected to verbal and physical abuse and various insults by TAYAD members while he was making a press statement to draw attention to the DHKP-C terrorist organization's recruitment of young people. In the video shared on YouTube, İsmail Ercan, who wanted to save his son from the organization, was insulted by being called a 'police collaborator and inglorious' (Ercan, 2013, 2020).

These examples lead us to the ‘unfreezing’ of the social ties of the individuals mentioned in the ‘individual level radicalization process’ of McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko’s radicalization model and the ‘refreezing’ of the relations that the organization evaluates as appropriate (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). The terrorist organization DHKP-C draws the families of the militants to its line and uses them as long as it works for the organization. At this point, the organization offers families two options: carrots and sticks. If the family embraces the child’s ‘cause’ and stands behind it, they will be seen as a member of the organization and honored at the organizational level, applauded by the crowd like the Yayla brothers’ father, or the family rejects the organizational legacy from the child and is booed as a ‘traitor and coward’ wherever they are encountered like Berk Ercan’s father. If the family goes further and tries to remove their child from the organization, they may be exposed to physical violence like Sıla Abalay’s father.

Finally, we would like to mention the university environment, which has a very important place in terms of its direct impact on the recruitment processes of DHKP-C militants. The radicalization and recruitment processes of more than 50% of the members of the DHKP-C terrorist organization (32% due to the friend environment, 15% due to the terrorist organization publications, and 5% due to the NGOs that are the legal field structure of the terrorist organization) are directly related to the university environment. Although the processes of radicalization begin before universities, the fact that individuals go out of the city for university education, family relations are broken at a certain level, and families lose their control over their children. After this break, the individual’s relationship with his family is replaced by his friends or the city environment. Again, due to the university and metropolitan environment, terrorist organization publications are in a very accessible position. It is almost impossible for a university student in Türkiye to graduate without being exposed to any organization’s propaganda.

In particular, it is seen that the founders of radical left organizations are university graduates and even established these organizations while they were still students. Therefore, the main target audience of leftist organizations has been the youth of high school and university age since their establishment. This traditional recruitment process of leftist organizations still exists. Today, 65% of the members of leftist

organizations are composed of high school and university youth between the ages of 14-25 (Güngör, 2010, p. 53; Köse & Coşkun, 2019, p. 138).

Social and psychological factors come to the fore regarding the participation of young people in terrorist organizations in Türkiye. Examples of social factors include unemployment, employment, injustices in the income distribution of society, unplanned urbanization, negative effects of migration, institutional problems in the education system, and cultural problems (Güngör, 2010, p. 51). Psychological factors are an important factor in the radicalization of young people because these terrorist organizations fill the gaps in this period when individuals are constantly changing and transforming. For example, a young person experiencing psychological difficulties such as youth depression, migration from the village to the city, or the exclusion brought about by the ghetto life, can be caught on the radar of a terrorist organization recruiter when they do not receive the support they need from their family or close circle, and can easily be drawn into the ranks of the organization by making them feel important and not alone (Güngör, 2010, pp. 51–55). In addition, Talha Köse and İpek Coşkun listed the radicalization of young people in universities under two headings as pull and push factors, as a result of their field research, in their work called Radicalization and Universities in Türkiye.

Accordingly, the **push factors** are:

- Insufficient guidance support in the pre-university and higher education process,
- hopelessness for the future
- Growing up in conflict and intense political environments
- exclusion-alienation,
- Weakening of belief in political authority and justice,
- role model crisis
- Weak dynamism in the academic and social environments of universities,
- Weak awareness of universities and related structures against radicalization,
- The prejudices of the city population towards university students and their exclusionary attitudes towards being integrated into the city (Köse & Coşkun, 2019, p. 228).

And the **pull factors** are:

- Communication tools used effectively by radical groups,

- Economic persuasion methods of joining radical groups (For example, if your sibling's or a relative's joining the PKK is grounds for positive discrimination in finding a job in HDP municipalities or someone convicted of DHKP-C is recruited in Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality) (A Haber, 2021; Sabah, 2021),
- The social structure that celebrates and rewards participation in radical groups,
- The social and psychological reputation of joining the group (Köse & Coşkun, 2019, p. 228).

The DHKP-C terrorist organization recruits individuals it deems suitable for recruitment through various activities. At the forefront of these are culture-art events, youth camps, and concerts of music groups directly related to the organization, such as Grup Yorum (Ercan, 2013). In the case opened after the investigation carried out by the security forces due to the murder of Prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz in his office by DHKP-C terrorists, "DHKP-C uses art as a tool for recruiting staff. Young people coming from Anatolia to study are attracted by Grup Yorum. The organization is brainwashing young people with 'free guitar and *saz*' courses," it was said (A Haber, 2015). The organization also recruits young people using the opposite sex (honey-trapping). The emotional bond established between male and female individuals is used to strengthen individuals' belonging to the organization (Selçuk Haber, 2013). In the study conducted by the Turkish Police Service to warn university youth against the engagement of terrorist organizations, the following methods used by marginalized groups and terrorist organizations to deceive young people were explained to the students:

- Tea is offered to the student to meet for the first time,
- The student is asked where he is staying,
- The question of whether he received any scholarship for his school needs is asked,
- It is stated that scholarships and different opportunities can be offered,
- After the promise of granting scholarships, they become members of illegal associations,
- Finally, students are directed to small-scale street actions,
- Young people become militant after street protests (Medya 24, 2013).

At this point, the criminal record of young people is a critical threshold. The fact that individuals commit a small crime on behalf of the organization and therefore think

they have been blacklisted by the police causes them to be more attached to the organization.

In the activities of DHKP-C, the concepts of culture, art, law, and terrorism are intertwined in a spiral, and there is intense abuse. In the report prepared by the Ministry of Interior on DHKP-C, illegal organizations with a legal appearance were mentioned, and the organization's "Idil Cultural Center" and "Grup Yorum" in the field of culture and art, "People's Law Office" in the field of law, "Federation of Youth Associations" in the field of civil society and it has been stated that DHKP-C is engaged in recruitment and propaganda activities under organizations such as "Association for Assistance and Solidarity with Prisoners' Families (TAYAD)" and "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Association" (Gemici & Bulur, 2020; T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2020, p. 14).

4.5. Leftist Terrorist Organizations and DHKP-C's Perspective Towards Alevi People

The period covering the years 1960-1990, on a global scale and in Türkiye in particular, was when radical left organizations expanded their sphere of influence like never before, with the material and moral support of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The propaganda and terrorist activities supported by the Soviet Union, which acted with the motto of 'exporting revolution to the capitalist world,' increased its dose daily and caused anarchy to prevail. This situation remained valid as long as the Soviet Union maintained its existence and power (Aydemir, 2019, p. 142; Bjørgo, 2013, pp. 87–88).

Likewise, with the counter-effect of internal developments such as NATO's anti-communist initiatives and the September 12 Coup in Türkiye, and collapsing of the Soviet Union, radical left organizations began to lose ground by taking their share of the fate of the Soviet Union (Avcı, 2019, p. 144; Jenkins, 2019, p. 268; Kalaycıoğlu, 2019, p. 94).

As David Rapoport describes in his conceptualization called “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” the third of these waves, and the period between the 1960s and 1990s, is the ‘new left wave,’ which has a global impact (Rapoport, 2012, p. 56). However, radical left organizations have dramatically lost their influence in Türkiye since the beginning of the 1980s due to the September 12 Military Coup and its effect on political and social affairs. In addition, it is possible to say that leftist organizations, which were disappointed with the third wave, adapted to the new developments in the world and made themselves suitable for the fourth wave. Because in these periods of change and transformation, two options were waiting for the leftist terrorist organizations; they would risk their extinction by insisting on their previous behavior and strategies, or they would continue their existence by keeping up with these transformations.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the left ideology, which received a global blow in ideological and financial terms, began to seek new ways out and expand areas for itself. These searches and ideological ruptures have directly affected and changed the political approaches of leftist organizations, their practices at the organizational level, and even their recruitment strategies. Terrorist organizations, aware of the conditions that threaten their existence and provide new opportunities, can improve themselves by adapting to new situations by changing their organizational structure and functions, discourses, and actions. These organizations are called ‘learning organizations’ (C. K. Demir, 2008, p. 57).

In the same way, we can clearly say that DHKP-C also fits this definition of learning organization exactly. It has chosen the path of adaptation in order to survive and keep up with these global changes and transformations. Their activities are focused on and continue to address more minor subjects like environmentalism, human rights, ethnic and religious problems, and democratization to get rid of this vacuum in which terrorist organizations fall (Çiçek, 2008, p. 40). These kinds of subjects, like minority rights or sectarian tensions, give a unique opportunity to DHKP-C terrorist organization to raise its sphere of influence and tender particular potential profiles for recruiting. Because every crisis or potential fault line experienced in the public sphere presents a great opportunity to revive the organization, in this way, the expansion of the recruitment

base and the expected increase in the attack-action intensity pushed the DHKP-C to this path.

The contact between leftist terrorist organizations and the Alevi community goes back a long time ago. However, we must define and analyze the causality of these contacts well. The motivation and direction of the relations in the 1960s and 1970s, and the form and content of the rapprochement from the 1990s to the present, express a situation that is opposite to each other.

The process of migration from the village to the city since the 1960s and the adaptation, ghettoization, and cultural conflicts experienced by the Alevi community during the transition from rural to the urban milieu, and in addition to these, in the historical context, with the effect of ethnic-sectarian conflicts from earlier periods, Alevi society found itself approaching illegal and radical left organizations (*Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Raporu Üstüne Bir Değerlendirme*, 2011, p. 42; Ertan, 2016, p. 3; Köse, 2010, p. 8; Subaşı, 2010, pp. 46–163; Watters, 2015).

In fact, leftist terrorist organizations have met with interest from the Alevi community since their early establishment processes (Celia et al., 2017, pp. 3–4; Ertan, 2016, p. 51). The reason for this situation is the internal developments of Türkiye and the effect of the socio-political outlook (Jenkins, 2019, p. 267). Individuals belonging to the Alevi community generally describe themselves as 'the oppressed and those who are on the side of the oppressed' (Tol, 2016; Watters, 2015, p. 110). Likewise, there is the dialectic of labor-capital or the oppressed-oppressor at the base of leftist thought (Işık, 2006). Therefore, the most common denominator of the Alevi society with leftist thought and leftist organizations stems from this point of view (Ertan, 2016, p. 76; Yüz, 2019, pp. 72, 88–92).

At this stage, there are also claims that the articulation of the Alevi society with the left politics is as follows: The Alevi society has also been included in the processes of urbanization and domestic migration from the village to the city (Köse, 2010, p. 8). However, the migration process from the village to the city weakened the ethnic-sectarian rural relations and institutions of the Alevi community and created a Turkish-style ghetto culture, squatter or '*gecekondu*' in Turkish. (Ertan, 2016, pp. 9, 43, 48, 49,

160; Tol, 2016). As Sunni Islamic figures became more dominant and visible in Turkish politics as we entered the 1950s, the Alevi society also articulated itself to secular left politics between the 1970s and 1980s, which promised to remove religious figures from the public sphere and to be more egalitarian (Watters, 2015, p. 100).

The ability of the Alevi belief to feed the left ideology has manifested itself in several points. While this ability is a phenomenon revealed by the side effects of modernization for the Alevi society, it contains the feature of being a reference point in the context of a local political language and historical origin for leftist ideology. It can be said that the community organization and belief characteristics of the Alevi people are compatible with the discourses of the left and that the two sections can be articulated much more easily, thanks to the points of agreement (Yüz, 2019, pp. 72–90).

So far, it can be said that the process has been formed by a natural social reflex. However, the point where things get complicated is that the right-left fights that started in the 1960s have evolved into a sectarian conflict, an Alevi-Sunni tension in this context (Köse, 2010, p. 9; Türkiye Barolar Birliği, 2006, p. 532). Therefore, it can be said that the Alevi society, which is mostly located under the umbrella of leftist ideas, remained an ethnic figure in the middle of right-left ideological conflicts. After this point, Sunnism on the right and Alevism on the left began to form the center of gravity of these thoughts (Subaşı, 2010, p. 56). The fact that Alevis are much fewer in number than Sunnis in Türkiye's population (Akgönül, 2019, pp. 334–335) has also increased the rate of harm. The attacks on the Alevis in Malatya (1978), Sivas (1978), Maraş (1978), and Çorum (1980) and the leftist organizations' showing themselves as a haven against the tension with the Sunnis caused the Alevis to get closer to the left organizations in a massive way (Çiçek, 2008, p. 53; Ertan, 2016, p. 80).

After the Alevi community was integrated into leftist politics, neighborhoods such as Gazi, 1 Mayıs, Gülsuyu, Gülensu, and Nurtepe, where Alevis are concentrated, have become an oasis for illegal leftist organizations since the 1970s (Ertan, 2016, pp. 48–50). Although their activities have decreased due to urban transformation projects and population movements over time, for example, Gazi, Gülsuyu, and Gülensu neighborhoods still draw attention as areas where illegal leftist organizations are still

active (Tol, 2016, pp. 12–15). This situation directly means that Alevis are a potential target group for the recruitment processes of leftist organizations.

The process of articulating the Alevi society with leftist politics has become such that secularism and leftist thought preceded Alevism, the ends fell behind the means, and Alevism began to be put in the background. Here, the following question awaited the Alevi community: Is Alevism for left-secularism or left-secularism for Alevism? At this point, since the 1980s, when left-wing thought suffered major blows in Türkiye and globally, the Alevi society has also started to move away from the left-wing thought, in a way, to turn within itself and prioritize the idea of Alevism (Tol, 2009, pp. 5–13).

The part that forms the focal point of this study begins at this stage. Because of this alienation environment experienced in the relations between urban Alevism and leftist organizations in the period covering the 1980s and 1990s also reversed the size of the relations and caused the left organizations to determine the Alevi society as the target audience for their recruitment processes since the 1990s. The Alevi community has started to be seen as the first mass whose door is stolen during the recruitment phase for leftist organizations.

Thanks to this win-win relationship, the Alevi society was protected under the umbrella of leftist organizations, while leftist organizations found the opportunity to organize within the Alevi society. When Sevim Belli visited the members of the Turkish Labor Party, which was trying to organize the villagers against the problems experienced in sugar beet production, in Tokat, she said that the leftist movements were organized in the Alevi villages. Gün Zileli also states that a wide range of socialist movements, such as Aydınlık, TKP-ML, and People's Liberation, could be organized in Pazarcık, where Alevis live (Ertan, 2016, p. 79).

> While THKO, THKP-C, and TKP-ML found their first opportunity to organize in Alevi settlements, Deniz Gezmiş and Ulaş Bardakçı explored Alevi settlements in Maraş and Kayseri through Hüseyin İnan and Sinan Cemgil, one of the important figures of THKO, invited his friends to gather on Nurhak Mountain, where Alevis live… Neighborhoods such as Gazi, 1 Mayıs, Okmeydanı, and Gülsuyu, where mostly Alevis lived, were both the discourse of the socialist movement met by the people here and provided a class base for the socialist movement. The places chosen (for organization)

> were Tunceli and the Alevi settlements of Gaziantep, Malatya, and Elazığ. Attempts of THKO, THKP-C, and TKP-ML were suppressed, and Ali Haydar Yıldız, İbrahim Kaypakkaya, and THKP-C leadership staff were killed. While the organization in the countryside was rural areas where Alevis lived, the socialist movement found the opportunity to organize in Alevi neighborhoods, especially in big cities (Yüz, 2019, p. 91).

DHKP-C is a terrorist organization that continues the line of THKP-C and Dev-Sol today. Therefore, the founders of the organization were familiar with this relationship between leftist organizations and the Alevi community, but they intended to continue it as before. Because they were aware that, thanks to this relationship, they could reach critical elements such as financing, human resources, and social base, which are vital for terrorist organizations, from a single source.

However, the part that forms the focal point of our thesis, namely the attempt and approach towards Alevis from leftist organizations, started at this stage. Because the Alevi society was no longer making class and economic demands before the 1980s and when the USSR continued to exist, in this new period, Alevis began to express their demands with the politics of identity and belief (Levent, 2020). Therefore, there would be no gain for Alevis by walking with leftist organizations. The Alevi and Leftist ideology identification began to be seen as a disturbing phenomenon for Alevis after the 1980s (Levent, 2020, p. 87; Massicard, 2007, p. 87).

> Feelings of permanent marginalization, victimization, and humiliation, together with the discourses of revolutionary resistance, have motivated the massive involvement of Alevi youth in extreme left organizations. Most of the members and supporters of the revolutionary leftist organizations, such as DEV-SOL, TIKKO, and TKP, were Alevi. Almost all of these organizations have been involved in certain violent practices. TIKKO has a more specific membership and militant profile, and in particular, its members are from the Tunceli (Dersim) region (Kurdish Alevi) (Köse, 2011, p. 11).

In the 1990s, TİKKO lost almost all its non-Alevi terrorists (Massicard, 2012, p. 143). In addition, DHKP-C started a propaganda process directly targeting Alevis and even published a magazine called Kerbela[12], breaking new ground in this field ("Kerbela Dergisi," 1996; Massicard, 2012, p. 72).

[12] The Karbala Incident or the Battle of Karbala or the Karbala massacre took place on October 10, 680, in the city of Karbala within the borders of present-day Iraq, between a small unit loyal to Hussein bin Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, and the army of Yazid I, the Umayyad caliph. Hussein and everyone in his caravan were killed. The Karbala event is considered to be the birth of Shi'ism.

The main reason why a terrorist organization established after the cold war, such as the DHKP-C, is engaged in activities that directly focus on Alevi identity (Massicard, 2012, pp. 143-144) and not with ideological goals, unlike organizations such as the THKP-C and Dev-Sol before it (Aydemir, 2019, p. 142); the left ideology has difficulty finding a social base as a result of losing altitude after the cold war by striking globally. For this reason, DHKP-C aims to provide convenience to the Alevi community by presenting itself as a protector and shield in the processes of financing, maintaining human resources, and building a social base that will legitimize its initiatives (Aydemir, 2019, pp. 138–142; Köse, 2011, p. 11; Massicard, 2012, p. 72).

Although it presented itself as an organization with Marxist-Leninist ideological roots and aiming for a socialist revolution in Türkiye, this situation remained at the level of discourse. However, in practice, it has become an organization that aims to radicalize or politicize the Alevi society with every action and initiative it takes and tries to open space through cemevis (Gazi Cemevi, Armutlu Cemevi, etc.) and Alevi associations (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Dernekleri[13]) that have close ties with the organization. Thus, DHKP-C has gained the appearance of an ethnic-sectarian organization by turning its back on internationalism and class conflict, which are the main arguments of leftist ideology, or at least limiting its influence at the level of discourse (Aydemir, 2019, p. 142; Massicard, 2012, pp. 143-144).

The critical point here is that while there was a convergence between the Alevi society and the left ideology arising from cyclical requirements in the pre-1980 period (Levent, 2020, pp. 81–82), since the 1990s, there have been various attempts by leftist organizations such as manipulation, politicization and recruitment towards the Alevi society, which has begun to distance itself from the leftist organizations. DHKP-C, acting with the misconception that the religious teachings of Alevis necessitate revolt and rebellion against the authority (the state), is to perpetuate the relationship and interaction ("Kerbela Dergisi," 1996, p. 22; Yüz, 2019, p. 89). It is possible to see this

[13] *Four main groups emerge in Alevi politics, which are (1) leftist Alevis using Alevism as a liberation theology represented by the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Associations; (2) heterodox, mystical Islamist Alevism surrounding the Hacıbektaş Veli associations; (3) Shii-inclined Alevism; and (4) the Cem Foundation's notion of Alevism as Turkish Islam* (Ertan, 2016, p. 17). So, mentioning the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Associations means referring to the revolutionary-leftist side of the Alevi community.

perception of the organization intensively in the publications and statements it makes ("Devrimci Sol," 1980b, no. 2; "Halk Okulu," 2020f, p. 42; "Kurtuluş," 2013, no. 6).

It is claimed that Alevis have been assimilated and alienated from their essence by the Republic of Türkiye, and as a solution, rebellion against the authority is encouraged through the metaphor of Imam Hussein's willingness to fight by refusing to surrender against an army very much larger than his caravan ("Armutlu Haber," 2017, p. 3; "Kerbela Dergisi," 1996, pp. 9–15).

The DHKP-C often references the culture, faith, and literature of the Alevi community when creating the content of its discourses (Işık, 2006; Yüz, 2019, pp. 88–92). This situation is essentially a legacy of the leftist organizations before it (Ertan, 2016, pp. 76–77). Although the organization says in its publications and statements that the state is inciting Sunni and Alevi people against each other, it puts Alevi people in a separate position from Sunnis and describes them as 'modern and progressive.' DHKP-C has never used such a positive qualification for the Sunni faith or its members ("Devrimci Sol," 1980b, no. 2; "Halk Okulu," 2020f, no. 17). The DHKP-C terrorist organization tries to build a common denominator between itself and the Alevi community and defines it with adjectives such as "revolutionary, democrat, progressive and contemporary," which it never uses for Sunnis ("Kerbela Dergisi," 1996, p. 7; "Yürüyüş," 2018, p. 38). At best, it is stated that Sunnis are incited against the Alevis and progressive people due to fascist demagogy ("Devrimci Sol," 1980b, p. 42). In addition, the organization sees and protects the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associations, which continue their activities in a way that is engaged with the revolutionary left ideology, and the cemevi that carry out their activities under this association, as if it were its organization ("Yürüyüş," 2018, p. 38). The organization presents every event under the roof of cemevi, especially in which the security forces are involved, as a tragedy and operates in its publications through a dialectic like the fascist state and the oppressed Alevis and revolutionaries ("Yürüyüş," 2018, p. 37).

However, it would be wrong to say that DHKP-C considers all members of the Alevi community under the same category (who are close to or sympathize with leftist ideology). Because according to the perspective of the organization, Alevi people who do not have revolutionary feelings, object to the methods used by the organization, or

avoid being involved in the idea of revolution, which is the main goal of leftist organizations, are also the direct target of the organization as a *collaborator* ("Kerbela Dergisi," 1996; Koç, 2020; Küçük, 2020) and they are tried to be deterred by various methods (Dişkaya, 2018; Gazete Vatan, 2021; Koç, 2020; Küçük, 2020). In addition, if it is considered from a much broader framework, it is a fact that DHKP-C has built a dictatorship within the organization and in its sphere of influence and tries to maintain its authority with fascist attempts and intra-organizational punishments (A. Yılmaz, 2014, 2021). DHKP-C cold-bloodedly orders its militants to carry out the impossible actions, which means to die trying, and demands that they be carried out without question (Şen, 2022; Takvim, 2022). Otherwise, the judicial process within the organization comes into play; militants are asked to self-criticize, they are questioned and punished[14] (A. Yılmaz, 2014, 2021).

The main motivation underlying the DHKP-C's perspective on Alevis is an emergency strategy that the organization embarked on with the reflex of maintaining its existence due to the changing national and international conjuncture after the cold war. However, in addition to all these, it is necessary to draw attention to the following issue: The organization's choice of Alevi-Sunni relations, which is one of the fault lines in society and a sensitive issue, as its focal point, is a pragmatic and opportunist approach it has taken against its values, concepts, and claims (Aydemir, 2019, p. 142). Because DHKP-C's radicalization and recruitment strategies targeting the Alevi community, the ethnic-sectarian members of the Turkish society, and the processes it follows for these strategies are all decisions taken against the fundamental paradigms of the left ideology (Aydemir, 2019, p. 142). For this reason, due to the contradiction of DHKP-C terrorist organization discourses and actions, it should be examined in detail, and its reflexes at the organizational level should be analyzed.

[14] On August 21, 1994, while asleep in Bayrampaşa Prison, 17-year-old Şimel Aydın was strangled to death by other DHKP-C women in the ward, alleging that she was a spy (A. Yılmaz, 2021). For more information about intra-organizational dictatorship implementations and executions, please check this out Aytekin Yılmaz – Yoldaşını Öldürmek (Killing the Comrade), İletişim Yayınları, 2021.

4.6. Recruitment Activities of DHKP-C Towards Alevi People

While the DHKP-C terrorist organization carries out the recruitment processes for the Alevi society, its focus is on cultural-art-oriented activities (Gemici & Bulur, 2020; T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2020) such as '*deyiş*, *ozan* and *türkü*'[15] which have very important positions in the Alevi culture and sociology in Türkiye, and it bases its strategies on the concerns of the Alevi community at a mass level, such as the past dramas and tragedies ("Halk Okulu," 2020f, p. 42; Işık, 2006, p. 129). The DHKP/C terrorist organization carries out propaganda and recruits the Turkmen Alevis living in Tunceli and Istanbul (Çiçek, 2008, p. 121).

> On the other hand, it has been learned that the cadres of the organization are making efforts to develop a dialogue with Alevi groups in the country and abroad. DHKP/C prepared a series of training programs on the approach of the Alevi organizations, associations, cemevi, and leaders to shape these views as a revolt against the state and the system by addressing the theme that they are excluded by the Sunnis (Çiçek, 2008, p. 53).

Leftist organizations used Alevi sayings and folk songs for propaganda by blending them with leftist ideology due to the ideological convergence with the Alevi society before the 1980s, and there are many examples of this strategy (Köse, 2011, pp. 11–12). In addition, various far and near-tragic events experienced by the Alevi community during the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Türkiye ("Kerbela Dergisi," 1996; Köse, 2011) were also kept alive by the organization through attacks that may have come from outside, like the previous ones, to ensure that the reaction distance of the Alevis against the state and the Sunni community is maintained and that the Alevis see the organization as their protector ("Devrimci Sol," 1980b, pp. 79–80; "Kerbela Dergisi," 1996). Here, the main purpose of the organization; is to keep the Alevi community close to itself by keeping the threat of attacks and massacres against Alevis alive and to make it accept the existence of a necessary relationship with the DHKP-C ("Kerbela Dergisi," 1996, p. 22).

[15] *Ozan* is the name given to the person who sings *türkü* (Anatolian style poetry) accompanied by kopuz in Anatolian folk literature. The *Deyiş* is known as all of the mystical works sung by Alevi-Bektashi ozans and used in the *cem* (Alevi praying) ritual (T.C Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Eğitim Genel Müdürlüğü, 2022).

Therefore, the recruitment strategies of the organization for Alevis is to create a 'Leftist-Alevi discourse' by using various metaphors like Hüseyin (the grandson of Prophet Muhammed), Pir Sultan Abdal (legendary rebellious folk hero, sometimes he raises his baglama, a traditional musical instrument, from time to time, a Kalashnikov replaces the baglama) (Hamurcu, 2017, p. 40) and Hızır Paşa (He is considered to be the archetypal image of a traitor within Alevi community) (Köse, 2011, p. 21), that will identify the Alevi society with the oppressor-oppressed dialectic, and to realize these through revolutionary-Alevi associations (Devrimci Aleviler Birliği (DAB), 2015b), *cemevi* (Doğan, 2008; Milliyet, 2016) and other platforms (Halkın Sesi TV, n.d.). While doing this, various tragedies experienced by the Alevi community are used as cement between the organization and the Alevis.

In this section, while examining the recruitment strategies of DHKP-C for the Alevi community, we will divide the issue into sub-titles and try to show the practical equivalent of recruitment strategies in the field by giving examples suitable for these titles. The activities in which the DHKP-C terrorist organization implements its recruitment strategies for the Alevi community can be examined under the following 5-headings.

Table 4.2. DHKP-C Members List

DHKP-C Members List						
No.	**Name-Surname**	**Home Town**	**Role in the Organization**	**Education Level**	**Sect**	**Funeral Place**
1	Dursun Karataş	Elazığ	Founding Leader	Istanbul University Facultyof Forestry	Sunni	Gazi Cemevi
2	Helin Bölek	Diyarbakır	Grup Yorum	Çanakkale 18 Mart University	Sunni	Armutlu Cemevi
3	İbrahim Gökçek	Kayseri	Grup Yorum	Anadolu University Department of Tourism and Hotel Management	Sunni	Gazi Cemevi
4	Sıla Abalay	Ardahan	Revolutionist-Youth	Silivri Anatolian High School	Alevi	Cemevi

Table 4.2. (cont.)

5	Günay Özarslan	İstanbul	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	Gazi Cemevi
6	Murat Çuhacı	Tokat	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	N.A
7	Haydar Başbağ	Tunceli	Public Front	Lise	Alevi	N.A
8	Dursun Çakır	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	Istanbul University Engineerin gFaculty	Alevi	N.A
9	Veli Güneş	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
10	Ebru Timtik	Tunceli	People's Law Office	Law Faculty	Alevi	Gazi Cemevi
11	Onur Polat	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	Sarıgazi Cemevi
12	Çiğdem Yahşi	Eskişehir	Public Front	University Student	Alevi	Eskişehir Cemevi (Cemevi administration refused because it was a terrorist
13	Birsen Kars	N.A	Revolutionist-Youth	Istanbul University	Alevi	Gazi Cemevi
14	Aysun Saban	Hatay	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
15	Berkan Abatay	Erzurum	Public Front	Primary School	Alevi	N.A
16	Dilek Doğan	Kahramanmaraş	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	Cemevi
17	Mustafa Koçak	Tokat	Prisoner	N.A	Alevi	Gazi Cemevi
18	Zeliha Ertürk	Sivas	Prisoner	N.A	Alevi	Gazi Cemevi
19	Oğuz Meşe	Tokat	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	Esenyurt Kıraç Cemevi
20	Celalettin Ali Güler	İstanbul	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
21	Zeki Öztürk	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	Gaziantep University	Alevi	N.A
22	Rıza Boybaş	Tokat	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	Alibeyköy Cemevi
23	Kalender Kayapınar	N.A	Prisoner	Medical Faculty	Alevi	N.A
24	Turgay Koç	Malatya	Revolutionist Officer Movement	Fırat University	Alevi	N.A

Table 4.2. (cont.)

25	Cömert Özen	Tokat	Rural Area Structuring	Balıkesir University	Alevi	N.A
26	Muharrem Özdemir	Tokat	Rural Area Structuring	Tokat University	Alevi	N.A
27	Ali Duran Eroğlu	Tokat	Public Front	Tokat Commercial High School	Alevi	N.A
28	Fuat Berk	Tunceli	Public Front	High School	Alevi	N.A
29	Ayten Korkulu	Erzincan	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	N.A
30	Meral Akpınar	Erzurum	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	N.A
31	Ali Hüseyin Avcı	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	Hozat High School	Alevi	N.A
32	Yusuf Kutlu	Hatay	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	N.A
33	İbrahim Devrim Top	Çorum	Revolutionist-Youth	Çorum Eti High School	Alevi	Haci Bektas Veli Anatolian Culture Foundation Cemevi
34	Zeynel Kızılkaya	Malatya	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
35	Tuncay Karaman	Amasya	Rural Area Structuring	Tunceli University	Alevi	N.A
36	Ali Çelik	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
37	Hatice Yıldız	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
38	Aydın Bulmak	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	Elazığ Atatürk High School	Alevi	N.A
39	Kamer Güneş	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
40	Selhan Top	Çorum	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
41	Ali Demiralp	Elazığ	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	N.A
42	Birol Karasu	Giresun	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	N.A
43	Melih Işık	Kocaeli	Public Front	Gebze Martyr İlhan Küçüksolak Anatolian High School	Alevi	N.A
44	Aysun Saban	Hatay	Rural Area Structuring	Muğla University	Alevi	N.A
45	Hünkar Derya Güneş	Erzincan	Rural Area Structuring	Marmara University	Alevi	N.A
46	Cihan Gürz	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	Primary School	Alevi	N.A
47	Zeliha Ertürk	Sivas	Public Front	N.A	Alevi	N.A
48	Zeki Öztürk	Tunceli	Rural Area Structuring	N.A	Alevi	N.A
49	Özlem Türk	Amasya	Public Front	High School	Alevi	N.A
50	Mehdi Duran Alkan	Tokat	Revolutionist-Youth	KTU Electronics Engineering	Alevi	N.A
51	Zeynep Yıldırım	Ankara	President of Armutlu Cemevi	N.A	Alevi	N.A

Table 4.2. (cont.)

52	Haydar Yıldırım	Ankara	Public Front	N.A.	Alevi	N.A
53	Hüseyin Cevahir	Ankara	THKP-C Founder	Ankara University	Alevi	N.A
54	İpek Yücel	Tokat	Rural Area Structuring	Primary School	Alevi	N.A

4.6.1. Grup Yorum and İdil Cultural Center

Grup Yorum concerts, culture and art events held under the roof of İdil Cultural Center, and various youth camps are among the most important fields of organizational propaganda. As we mentioned before in Figure-9 (Organizational Structure of DHKP-C Terrorist Organization), the organization has more numerous democratic location structures than illegal fields. These are the People's Front (Halk Cephesi), Revolutionary Youth (Dev-Genç), Revolutionary Workers' Movement (Devrimci İşçi Hareketi), Revolutionary Public Cervants Movement-Public Laborers Front (Devrimci Memur Hareketi-Kamu Emekçileri Cephesi), Solidarity Association for the Families of Prisoners and the Convicted (TAYAD), İdil Culture Center-Band Yorum (İdil Kültür Merkezi-Grup Yorum), People's Law Office (Halkın Hukuk Bürosu), Association for Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Temel Haklar ve Özgürlükler Derneği), People's Assembly (Halkın Meclisleri) and Marching Magazine (Yürüyüş Dergisi) (T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-Araştırma ve Etütler Merkezi, 2017, p. 32).

The method most frequently used by DHKP-C as a recruitment strategy is concerts, youth camps, instrument courses, and cultural and artistic activities, which we can define as 'youth activities' (Bağcı, 2015; Çolak, 2014; *Grup Yorum Konseri'nde Savcı Kiraz'ı Öldüren Teröristin Ailesinden Skandal Sözler*, 2016; Güngör, 2010; Habertürk, 2017; Selçuk Haber, 2013). At this stage, it is necessary to focus on Grup Yorum and İdil Cultural Center because Grup Yorum is the most well-known and active structuring of the organization in the legal field. There are strong claims by the security forces and families that DHKP-C has launched the organization for young people through Grup Yorum concerts and that the organization's first contact with militant candidates on the way to recruitment was at these concerts (A Haber, 2015; Ercan, 2020; *Grup Yorum Konseri'nde Savcı Kiraz'ı Öldüren Teröristin Ailesinden Skandal*

Sözler, 2016; Selçuk Haber, 2013). Likewise, İdil Cultural Center and Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Center are the most well-known centers within the legal field structures of the organization. Idil Cultural Center gained its fame with the raids carried out by the counter-terrorism teams, the terrorists caught in the secret compartments here, and the intra-organizational documents seized. For example, with the police operation on the İdil Cultural Center on February 9, 2019, the names for whom an arrest warrant was issued were seized alive in the secret compartments where they were hiding. Although the names captured in this operation are People's Engineers and Architects, People's Law Office, Grup Yorum, and DHKP-C members, it is very important to reveal the organic ties between the terrorist organization's legal and illegal spheres (Ulusal, 2019).

> 1) Ümit İLTER (So-called DHKP-C Secretary General), who is in the "green" category on the terror wanted list prepared by the Ministry of Interior.
> 2) Caferi Sadık EROĞLU (So-called DHKP-C Türkiye Officer), who is in the "grey" category in the terror wanted list prepared by the Ministry of Interior and wanted for founding or leading an armed terrorist organization.
> 3) Emel YEŞİLIRMAK (Grup Yorum Member), who is in the "grey" category on the terror wanted list prepared by the Ministry of Interior.
> 4) İbrahim GÖKÇEK (Grup Yorum Member), who is in the "grey" category in the terror wanted list prepared by the Ministry of Interior.
> 5) Barkın TİMTİK (So-called People's Law Office Officer) wanted to found and manage an armed terrorist organization.
> 6) Barış YÜKSEL (So-called People's Engineer Architects Officer), who has a warrant for organizing and leading illegal meetings and demonstration marches, participating in their movements, making propaganda for a terrorist organization, and establishing and managing an armed terrorist organization (CNN Türk, 2019, 2021; Hatipoğlu & Demir, 2021; Ulusal, 2019).

In the 42-page indictment prepared after the operations against DHKP-C due to the martyrdom of Prosecutor Mehmet Selim KİRAZ in the Istanbul Palace of Justice and the armed attack on the Istanbul Police Department, it was emphasized that the DHKP-C terrorist organization brainwashed the young people who came to Istanbul from Anatolia to study, especially by using cultural-art activities, and thus recruited by the organization (A Haber, 2015).

In the indictment, it was also stated that the İdil Cultural Center carried out activities on behalf of the DHKP-C.

> İdil Cultural Center uses the mask of art with Grup Yorum's backing. Students who come to Istanbul to study are deceived by the organization's members in the university they study under the name of 'cultural events' and brought to İdil Cultural Center. Students under the influence here are housed in dormitories. Young people who are far from the family environment are gradually brainwashed and removed from their families by the members of the organization, who know human psychology well and have made it a profession to influence people by speaking the statement said (A Haber, 2015).

There are many examples of the organization engaging young people through Grup Yorum concerts, youth camps, and various art and culture events. Families of terrorists also have various claims that their children's participation in the organization is through such activities.

The organization comes between the young people it sees as militant candidates and their families, such that the individual becomes alienated and even hostile to his parents (Milliyet, 2001). As we said before in the section "What are the recruitment strategies?", the organization first breaks the existing social ties of the individual it sees as a militant candidate and replaces it with the organization and its intra-organizational relations (Cole et al., 2009, pp. 7–13). However, if the individual's family already has a left-wing or sympathetic ideology, this process can be overcome easily and without conflict. As seen in the example of Yayla Brothers, the radical environment in the family makes it natural and inevitable for children to engage in the organization (*Grup Yorum Konseri'nde Savcı Kiraz'ı Öldüren Teröristin Ailesinden Skandal Sözler*, 2016; Habertürk, 2015; Kırbaki, 2021).

Contrary to these two examples, families who notice and observe the radicalization of their children and who want to take care of their children or break them off from the organization by being involved in the process are faced with the harsh and ruthless face of the organization (Abalay, 2020, 2020; Haber 7, 2015; Super Haber, 2017). At this stage, the organization becomes aggressive, ignoring family integrity and the parent-child relationship. The attitude and aggressive attitude of Ebru Timtik, who was a lawyer at the People's Law Office and died as a result of the hunger strike, she started due to an incident that took place in front of the cameras, shows that the organization is so audacious to steal her child from a mother's hand (Kıran, 2020). Likewise, the attitude and harassment attempts of the sympathizers of the organization against Ercan E., who wanted to make a press statement on one of the busiest streets of Istanbul

(İstiklal Street) to save his son from the organization, should also be evaluated in this context (Ercan, 2013, 2020). Or, as in another example, Güven Abalay, the father of Sıla Abalay, joined the ranks of the organization through the culture and art course she attended when she was a very successful student at her school and was killed as a result of the clash with the security forces, also states that she could not break away from the organization despite his long efforts and even meeting with the rulers of the organization (Habertürk, 2017).

4.6.2. Presenting or Adapting *Deyiş, Türkü,* and Figures

Presenting or adapting *deyiş, türkü,* and figures, which have an important place in the Alevi belief, to serve the propaganda of the organization, and marketing the discourse of the organization to the members of the Alevi community with this identification. Since the 1960s, leftist terrorist organizations have relied on Alevi's history, figures, and culture to build a social base for themselves and to ground their struggle against the dominant powers (Yüz, 2019, p. 90). This process went to such a point that left organizations tried to tell Alevis 'who they really are' and to reconstruct Alevi's history with this revolutionary approach. It has been tried to create a perception as if Pir Sultan Abdal, Sheikh Bedrettin, and other Alevi figures who lived during the Ottoman and Seljuk empires were the revolutionary leaders of leftist organizations in Anatolia and started a communist revolutionary movement against the system (Ertan, 2016, pp. 76–77).

This situation not only provided the organization with a wide range of benefits while making propaganda but also made it a channel for Alevis to express themselves freely. Therefore, as stated earlier, this relationship was mutually developed during the 1960s and 1970s. Both sides had various gains in the social and political fields. DHKP-C made its propaganda based on Alevi poems (deyiş), which have a deep-rooted history and can establish partnerships with its political position and gain a position in the socio-political field. On the other hand, the Alevi society started to take place in areas where it did not have the opportunity to show itself much, and this situation became a source of self-confidence for them. Alevi's sayings have become the backbone and main reference point of the propaganda processes carried out by leftist political actors.

The influence of Alevi poems (deyiş) spread rapidly among left-wing artists such as Ruhi Su (Ertan, 2016; Yüz, 2019).

> The process that started with Ruhi Su and other socialist intellectuals gained great visibility when TİP contacted the Alevis. The phrase "Come, souls, let's be one" by Pir Sultan Abdal, sung by Ruhi Su, was used as the election music of TİP (Ertan, 2016, p. 77; Yüz, 2019, p. 90).

During this period, the relationship between leftist organizations and Alevism did not remain at the level of idioms, but settlements, where Alevis were the majority, turned into a recruitment paradise for leftist organizations. In other words, the process that started under the influence of culture and art progressed in recruiting militants to the organization beyond sympathy. Numerous lament works were written by Alevi poets as a reaction to the killing of the founding leaders of leftist organizations in various operations of the security forces. The most well-known of these is the Kızıldere Lament, which was written due to the Kızıldere Incident. Aşık İhsani's lament for Kızıldere was sung by Selda Bağcan, and the laments that Zülfü Livaneli sang for Sinan Cemgil, Ulaş Bardakçı, and other murdered revolutionaries in his first album (Chants Révolutionnaires Turcs) are arranged in the style of Alevi poems. (Yüz, 2019, p. 92).

The DHKP-C terrorist organization continues this approach of leftist organizations, which has been going on since the 1960s, and there are efforts to get closer to the Alevi community through sayings. Many Grup Yorum works, such as "Gelin Canlar Bir Olalım[16] (Kalan Müzik, 2015b), Ey Şahin Bakışlım[17] (Kalan Müzik, 2015c), Hasretim Dağ Oldu[18] (Kalan Müzik, 2016), Dünyanın Üzerinde[19] (Kalan Müzik, 2015a)" directly address the Alevi community. Or they attend Alevi festivals to make propaganda and ensure the continuousness of the relations (Pir Sultan Kültür Merkezi Londra, 2020). Many other examples like these can be given to the organization's attempts through Grup Yorum towards Alevi's poems.

[16] The words of the poet belong to Pir Sultan Abdal.
[17] Its words are written for Ali, the 4th Caliph.
[18] Its words are written for Kerbela Incident.
[19] The words of the poet belong to Pir Sultan Abdal.

At this stage, it is necessary to draw attention to the following important point; the DHKP-C terrorist organization has never said that "We are trying to recruit Alevis, so we will create instability by starting a sectarian war in Turkish society." However, based on its attempts, we can say that it has a clear aim.

> At the same time, the limitation of the activity areas of the organization and the actions that were stuck in certain neighborhoods were obstacles to the growth of DHKP-C. In this context, although the organization was not included in its publications nor reflected in its discourses, it was desired to transform into a Marxist-Leninist organization through its Alevi identity (Çolak, 2014).

However, as stated above, when the content of the discourse of the organization is examined, it will be seen that; although DHKP-C defines itself as a revolutionary left organization in theory, in practice, it carries out propaganda activities towards Alevis and through Alevism (Aydemir, 2019, p. 142).

4.6.3. Funeral Ceremonies and Other Religious Events

Funeral ceremonies and other religious events held in cemevi, such as the Gazi Cemevi and Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Center, where the organization has nested and radicalized, are used to consolidate the Alevi community under the organization's roof. Funeral ceremonies have a special place in DHKP-C's propaganda activities (Aydemir, 2019, p. 142). The organization has developed a funeral ceremony format of Alevi origin but built in a unique style. Although the organization tries to hold the funerals of its militants or members of its affiliates in a cemevi, this attempt has created various criticisms and objections from within the Alevi community. There are even cemevi administrations that refuse to hold the funeral of terrorists killed in clashes with the police (Ensonhaber, 2016; Milliyet, 2016).

Organization propaganda is carried on through cemevi located in the squatter settlement where the organization is nesting, such as Gazi Cemevi, and associations, such as Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Associations, participate in the legal field of the organization with the revolutionary Alevi idea. The militants who died in the clash with the police or as a result of the death fast are brought to the cemevi, and a 'Revolutionary-Alevi' funeral ceremony is organized for them by the organization

(Aydemir, 2019, p. 142; Çelikdönmez, 2014; Kocaova, 2020). It is noteworthy that there are red belts here, especially due to the effort to create a common denominator between Alevism and Communism. The face of the deceased militant is left exposed and buried with revolutionary marches, even though he does not believe in or is not a member of Alevism (Devrimci Aleviler Birliği (DAB), 2015a).

Visual 4.1. Grup Yorum Member İbrahim Gökçek's Funeral at Gazi Cemevi

These revolutionary Alevi-looking funeral ceremonies of the organization have some strategic goals. If the organization manages to intimidate or influence the militant's family, they will bring the body to the cemevi, regardless of whether it is Sunni or Alevi. If the organization succeeds in performing the funeral ceremony under these conditions, they will have added another stone to the wall in order to strengthen the 'Revolutionary-Alevi' phenomenon. However, if the police intervened in the funeral due to shouting slogans in favor of the organization or various tensions with the police, this time, a classical sense of victimization would be created, and the propaganda process would be carried out on behalf of the organization. As a result of this propaganda process, some Sunnis have also bequeathed that their funeral ceremonies be held in a cemevi when they die. It was stated that the Sunni people whose funerals were taken from the cemevi were generally from the left tradition ideologically and were close to the secular worldview (odatv4.com, 2020).

> The DHKP-C ensured activity only in certain neighborhoods among the citizens it was trying to decoy, abusing their Alevi identity. The districts such as Gazi Mahallesi, Maltepe, and Gülsuyu in Istanbul were defined by

> the organization with expressions such as ‘castle, liberated district, our quarter.’ This is reflected in the symbols used by the organization. The use of red belts and tapes, the frequent use of the figure of the ‘sun’ in visual propaganda works, and the burial of militants of the organization who lost their lives, usually after ceremonies held in cemevi, attracted attention (Çolak, 2014).

Alevi’s participation in DHKP-C and other leftist organizations is a known fact (Çelikdönmez, 2014; Ertan, 2016, p. 76; Yüz, 2019, p. 92). If the deceased militant or sympathizer is an Alevi, the organization tries to have this funeral held under the roof of the cemevi, which has a close relation with the organization. In cases where the organization’s member is not an Alevi, the organization tries to have the funeral held in cemevi close to it, again contrary to the Alevi-Sunni belief. The most striking example of this situation is the funeral ceremony of Dursun Karataş, the founder of the organization. Although he was originally a Sunni person from Elazığ city of Türkiye, and of Zaza descent, Karataş was buried in the Gazi District Cemetery after the funeral ceremonies held in Gazi Cemevi according to Revolutionary-Alevi rituals because of the organization’s procedure and Green Mosque in consequence of his family’s request (Hürriyet, 2008). In addition, there are various objections from the Alevi community to using Alevi funerals as a propaganda tool for terrorist organizations. The perception of “Alevis are members of DHKP-C” and “DHKP-C is the protector of Alevis,” which the organization tries to create on the social level, is criticized by Alevis, who are nationalist, distant from radical left politics, and loyal to the state of the Republic of Türkiye, and various objections are raised (Ensonhaber, 2016; Kocaova, 2020; Milliyet, 2016; odatv4.com, 2020; Türkmen Aleviler, 2020).

4.6.4. The Claim of DHKP-C and Alevi Similarity

With the claim of DHKP-C and Alevi similarity frequently emphasized in the organization’s publications, the partnership ground between the two groups is tried to be established.

The DHKP-C terrorist organization constantly uses expressions in its publications to establish a close relationship between the Alevi community and the organization. For example, a propaganda process is being carried out that the organization and the Alevi

community are modern, progressive, and targeted by fascist attacks ("Halk Okulu," 2020f, pp. 41–45; "Halk Okulu," 2021e, pp. 18–20; "Halk Okulu," 2021f, p. 25).

This strategy is primarily based on the 'us and them' dialectic and an attempt is made to build a partnership between the organization and Alevis in order to strengthen the perception of 'us.' The biggest common denominator of these alleged similarities is that both groups are contemporary and progressive. In addition, the other side of this 'us and them' dialectic, 'they,' is collectively expressed as fascist ("Yürüyüş," 2018, pp. 4–11). Therefore, if the friends and enemies of the DHKP-C and the Alevi community are the same, they will also become the same.

By including itself in this progressive community ("Halk Okulu," 2020f, p. 42), DHKP-C builds a broad-based common ground between itself and the Alevi community ("Yürüyüş," 2018, p. 4). However, with one difference; the Alevi community are a clear target in the face of fascist attacks provoked by the state and lacks the organizational ability to defend themselves and the consciousness of collective resistance (Ertan, 2016, p. 147; "Kerbela Dergisi," 1996, p. 31; Köse, 2010, p. 14, 2011, pp. 17–20; Tol, 2016, pp. 17–18). This is where DHKP-C comes into play and promises to protect the Alevi people against such reactionary and fascist attacks that may come from outside (Tol, 2016, pp. 12–13). At this stage, the organization aims to keep the threat and the need for protection alive by constantly referring to the events in Çorum, Maraş, Sivas, and Gazi District, which have an important place in the memory of the Alevi community ("Armutlu Haber," 2017, p. 3; Ertan, 2016, p. 308). It started to be organized in the Alevi ghettos in order to protect the Alevis against these attacks the obvious reason and to find a financial, human resource, and social base for the background reason ("'Alevileri devlet değil sol örgütler asimile etti,'" 2013; Aydemir, 2019, p. 142). The first priority of DHKP-C is to ensure that the Alevi community is in the same ranks as the organization by politicizing and manipulating them (Dişkaya, 2018; Gazete Vatan, 2021; Karakuş, 2013; Özdemir, 2016). For this purpose, it does not hesitate to use the cemevi worshiped by Alevi people, figures, metaphors, and events that have an important place in Alevi teaching within the framework of demagogy (Aydemir, 2019, p. 142; Haber 7, 2015). This double-edged knife will either result in Alevi people getting closer to the organization by sympathizing with the organization or creating a wave of reaction from other segments

of the society towards the Alevi society, resulting in the isolation of Alevis from the social sphere (Ertan, 2016), both of which are based on the fact that Alevis are removed from the legal field and establish an inevitable relationship with the DHKP-C (Doğan, 2008; Koç, 2020; Küçük, 2020).

4.6.5. The Agitation Discourses Built on the Tragedies

The fifth and last strategy of the organization is the agitation discourses built on the tragedies that Alevis have experienced in the past and that the only actor that can prevent them is the organized militia of the DHKP-C. Emotional factors have an important place in the construction process of ethnic and sectarian identities (Köse, 2015, p. 171). Narratives built on collective experiences such as war, conflict, uprising, rebellion, genocide, various acts of violence, or pogrom are frequently used tools in identity construction processes (Köse, 2015, p. 174). These narratives are used to reinforce the understanding of the common destiny of the masses, to trigger emotions such as fear, victimization, and anger, to include individuals in a certain group, or to provide in-group consolidation (Köse, 2012). The concepts of "psycho-cultural narratives" and "psycho-cultural interpretations" developed by Marc Howard Ross (Ross, 1997, 2001, 2007) can be used to understand the agitation discourses of DHKP-C against the Alevi community. For Ross, psycho-cultural dramas are about the polarization of events related to indisputable cultural arguments, perceived threats, and rights to narratives and tropes that underlie group identity (Ross, 2001).

As mentioned, DHKP-C constantly brings up and talks about the tragedies that Alevis have experienced in the past or the revolts ("Kerbela Dergisi," 1996, p. 22); they led against the authority. This strategy of reminding the past is a double-edged sword, and any output is beneficial to the organization ("Halk Okulu," 2020d, pp. 36–38; "Halk Okulu," 2021f, pp. 24–46).

Firstly, the purpose of constantly presenting the tragedies in the past in the organization's media and bringing them to the agenda is to keep the Alevi community's memory of tragedy alive and to prevent social peace from prevailing ("Halk Okulu," 2020f, pp. 41–42). While doing this, the organization identifies itself with the Alevi community and invites them to cooperate with the organization against

such fascist attacks ("Halk Okulu," n.d., no. 82, pp. 5–6; "Halk Okulu," 2021e, pp. 10–11). The organization already uses the metaphors and elements of the Alevi culture and the Alevi belief for its interests at the point of discourse, and all that remains is for the Alevi society to respond to this invitation and act together with the DHKP-C ("Halk Okulu," 2021f, p. 25). This style of discourse, which finds its place in the publications of the organization, is intended to use the tragedies of the Alevi society as cement for the purpose of providing unity with the organization ("Halk Okulu," n.d., no. 30, p. 22; "Halk Okulu," 2020e, p. 8; "Halk Okulu," 2021f, p. 46). The message is given to the Alevi community that if they do not cooperate and act in coordination with the DHKP-C, they will be alone against the fascist attacks, like Hüseyin in Karbala, and that only the organized armed struggle of the organization can protect them from these attacks.

Secondly, various rebellion movements that developed around the Alevi society from the Ottoman period to the modern Türkiye era are constantly brought to the agenda by the organization to refresh the memory of the people belonging to the Alevi faith and remind them of their identity ("Halk Okulu," n.d., no. 74, p. 12). The aim of the organization here is to remind the Alevi community of the rebellion movements it has led against the authority in the past and to encourage them to display the same approach today ("Halk Okulu," n.d., no. 27, p. 12; "Halk Okulu," 2020b, pp. 5–20; "Halk Okulu," 2020e, p. 45).

Radical leftist organizations, as a result of their field research, realized that left ideology and socialist thought were adopted in villages where Alevi citizens were concentrated. It is not a coincidence that the structuring of leftist organizations in rural areas are located in regions where Alevis live intensely. They saw the rebellion movements initiated by the Alevis in the Anatolian geography as a basis from the past for the idea of 'starting the revolution from the rural,' and then presented their initiatives to the Alevi community ("Halk Okulu," 2020a, p. 16; "Halk Okulu," 2021b, p. 40; Yüz, 2019, pp. 91–92). The Kızıldere Incident was turned into the intersection set of these two stages. The members of the radical left organization, who wanted to start the revolution from the rural, both took the Alevi revolts as an example and presented the Kızıldere Incident to the Alevi community as the last link of these rebellion attempts, although the reason for it was different ("Halk Okulu," 2020b, p.

31). This strategy is why Alevi poets and singers compose laments, poems, and folk songs due to the Kızıldere Incident ("Halk Okulu," 2020f, no. 80; Yüz, 2019, pp. 91–92).

4.7. Conclusion

In this section, we tried to examine it by following a process from general to specific and concretizing with examples. Firstly, we aimed to explain the process from the radicalization process to the recruitment phase by focusing on specific terrorist organizations. While doing this, we examined terrorist organizations that are well known by the world public, such as Al-Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, PKK/PYD, DEASH, and Baader-Meinhof Group, and the radicalization/recruitment strategies associated with them. Thus, before focusing on the DHKP-C terrorist organization, we aimed to provide a background on international terrorism, radicalization, and recruitment processes.

Secondly, we focused on the radicalization and recruitment processes in the DHKP-C. We tried to understand which radicalization model is more appropriate to examine the terrorist organization and which recruitment strategy it uses more. For this reason, we tried to explain why McCauley and Moskalenko's "12 Stages Mechanism Model of Radicalization Process" would be more appropriate to explain the radicalization processes in DHKP-C by giving examples. Then, "Case Study: Which recruitment strategies are used by DHKP-C?" Under this heading, we aimed to identify the strategies DHKP-C followed to recruit members to the ranks of the organization, focusing on pull and push factors and again through examples. We tried to understand what might have attracted or repulsed individuals who were found to have joined the organization's ranks or died while fighting on behalf of the organization.

Thirdly, we tried to determine the perception of the DHKP-C terrorist organization towards the Alevi community and the changes over time. We aimed to show the impact of Türkiye's domestic political activity and developments in the international arena on these changes. We aimed to show the validity of our hypothesis by drawing attention to the contrasts displayed by DHKP-C based on discourse and action.

Fourth, we tried to identify the recruitment strategies of the DHKP-C terrorist organization specific to the Alevi people and the tools of these strategies. As a result, we determined that the five items listed below were used as a tool for Alevi citizens to join the ranks of the DHKP-C terrorist organization.

a- Grup Yorum and İdil Cultural Center
b- Presenting or adapting *deyiş, türkü,* and figures
c- Funeral ceremonies and other religious events
d- The claim of DHKP-C and Alevi similarity
e- The agitation discourses built on the tragedies.

Finally, as a result of the research we have done and the case studies we have examined, it is possible to say that the DHKP-C terrorist organization carries out a practical recruitment process for the Alevi people, an ethnic-sectarian community, contrary to the socialist ideology and leftist idea that it claims to represent.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1. Results and Contributions

As an international relations student closely interested in the concepts of terrorism and radicalization, I have always been interested in the process of an individual's participation in terrorist organizations and committing a terrorist act. I tried to understand and make sense of the factors that affect an individual's radicalization and transformation into a terrorist in the context of their internal dynamics. When I first read the book *Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education* (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016), I discovered the surprising presence of a large number of well-educated people, rather than ignorant and uneducated people, contrary to popular belief. Likewise, a similar subject was covered in the book *Universities and Radicalization in* Türkiye (Köse & Coşkun, 2019), and it was revealed that terrorist organizations recruited many university students. At this point, I realized that some phenomena, surprisingly, took place in the opposite direction of what the general public thought. Events and facts continue to be true in the opposite direction of what we expect and, in fact, right before our eyes, but we cannot see these obvious realities because we are led to think in certain patterns at the individual or social level.

Secondly, I realized that terrorist organizations, known as very conservative and radical, actually exhibit very pragmatist attitudes, and in this context, they position themselves in alliances that should not take place. For example, I saw that the PKK/PYD, which claims to adopt a Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary idea, received thousands of trucks of equipment and ammunition from the United States, which cannot be explained in an ideological context, and that the organization is another source of motivation. Likewise, I realized that the DHKP-C terrorist organization had developed a different relationship with Alevis than other layers of society, or at least

made such an effort. As a result of my readings and research, I discovered that the terrorist organization DHKP-C has various initiatives targeting the Alevi community, which has an ethnic and sectarian identity, contrary to the leftist ideology that it claims to be representative of.

In this study, I examined whether terrorist organizations acted contrary to their founding ideologies, focusing on the DHKP-C terrorist organization and its attitude towards Alevis. First, I dealt with the radicalization and recruitment processes conceptually and tried to embody them. Then I focused on the history of DHKP-C, and tried to convey the history of revolutionary left organizations in Türkiye, the changes and transformations that took place, and the process leading up to the establishment of DHKP-C. Then, I aimed to explain with examples the stages of radicalization and transformation of an individual into a terrorist in various terrorist organizations, which are well known by the world public opinion. Then, by focusing on the DHKP-C terrorist organization, I tried to explain which radicalization and recruitment processes are more suitable for this organization.

In the chapter on radicalization and recruitment, I first tried to explain what radicalization is and its layers. There are two points we draw attention to here; firstly, radicalization is a process, not a result. Secondly, the individual can commit a terrorist act without being radicalized. Therefore, we underline the necessity of good analysis and evaluation of individuals who are not involved in violence but have radical ideas and individuals who have committed acts of violence but have not yet formed radical ideas. The point to be noted here is that not everyone with radical ideas becomes a terrorist. In addition, the radicalization process of an individual who commits a terrorist act may begin after the act. At this point, decision-makers and security forces should be aware of this distinction and act accordingly. Finally, we mentioned that radicalization occurs at micro, meso, and macro levels. We included four different radicalization models that are frequently cited in this field and tried to explain the common and different aspects of these models.

In the recruitment part of this chapter, I drew attention to the fact that recruitment is one of the vital stages in the radicalization processes for individuals, terrorist organizations, and security forces. I stated that the distinction between individuals with

radical ideas and individuals who are militants or guerrillas by joining a terrorist organization begins at this point. When the individual climbs up the radicalization pyramid and becomes a militant by being recruited by the terrorist organization, the choices they can make decrease. At this point, I focused on the eligibility criteria for the recruitment of the individual and the common attitudes of the individuals who came to the recruitment stage. Finally, I explained recruitment strategies, recruitment tools, and milieus.

In the history of the DHKP-C chapter, I first explained the history of leftist ideology in Türkiye and the changes and transformations of revolutionary left terrorist organizations in a chronological context. My purpose in doing this is to convey to researchers the position of the organizations known as the ancestors of DHKP-C, the ideological line it followed, and its predecessors in Turkish political life. Thus, I aimed to better understand the organization's behavior and its reflexes in the face of developments because DHKP-C is a pragmatist formation that can be evaluated within the scope of the 'learning organization' phenomenon. DHKP-C has chosen to continue its existence by adapting to the changes and transformations in Türkiye and the international arena. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the restrictions imposed by the 1980 military coup on Turkish political life dealt a heavy blow to the theoretical and practical aspects of leftist ideology. For this reason, DHKP-C has also started to develop close relations with the Alevi community in a direction contrary to the leftist ideology. The critical point here is: While Alevis existed in leftist organizations before DHKP-C, the direction of this relationship with DHKP-C changed from organization to Alevis. In fact, the focus question of this study is why the organization feeds the aims of radicalization and recruitment toward Alevis.

From radicalization to recruitment chapter is divided into two in itself. First, I covered the recruitment processes and leading techniques in some terrorist organizations that are well-known by the world community. Then I focused on DHKP-C and tried to explain how the recruitment processes work in this organization. Here, of course, the radicalization and recruitment activities of the organization, which is also at the center of the work, for the Alevi community formed the main backbone.

While focusing on the DHKP-C terrorist organization, I have two questions; 'Which radicalization model is more suitable to explain DHKP-C, and which recruitment strategies does the organization apply?' For the first question, I explained why the '12 Stages Mechanism Model of Radicalization Process', which I also included in the radicalization and recruitment section, is more suitable for the DHKP-C terrorist organization. I applied the model's definition of radicalization at micro, meso, and macro levels to the DHKP-C terrorist organization. I consider that this model is more suitable than the others for the radicalization and recruitment processes carried out by the DHKP-C terrorist organization since it explains radicalization at the level of individuals, groups, and societies. In addition, I chose this model because it does not reduce radicalization and recruitment to a single source and draws a broader conceptual framework due to its human origin.

In this context, I argue that terrorist organizations are not conservative and stable organizations, contrary to popular belief. They can take a position according to the conditions they are in, the internal political balance of the country in which they carry out their activities, and the systemic changes and conjuncture in the international arena, and they can take pragmatist initiatives as a requirement of their reflex to maintain their existence. For the same reasons, they can establish various alliances and collaborations, which may be contrary to their founding ideologies, and carry out radicalization and recruitment processes. This is what the DHKP-C terrorist organization did. Although it says that it is an organization that adopts leftist ideology and aims at socialist revolution, it has a very clear radicalization and recruitment tendency toward the Alevi community, which has an ethnic and sectarian identity. In doing so, it employs various strategies to manipulate and politicize the Alevi community.

Finally, it shows the pragmatic reactions of DHKP-C to national and international developments and the contradictions that arise between its discourse and actions as a result of this situation. The DHKP-C terrorist organization carries out radicalization and recruitment activities toward the Alevi community, which maintains its existence with an ethnic and sectarian sub-identity among the Turkish people, although it claims to adopt the left-wing idea, which is an international ideology and evaluates the world in the focus of class conflict and the tension between labor and capital. While doing

this, it effectively uses many instruments such as culture-arts events, training camps, illegal demonstrations, organization broadcasts, funerals, and legal organizations engaged in the organization. If the organization cannot get close to the target audience with soft methods, this time, it uses more aggressive methods. Here, the organization's aim is to manipulate and politicize the Alevis and to open their way with the state, even if they cannot join them in the first place. From this point of view, it is understood that this initiative developed by DHKP-C for Alevis is like a double-edged sword. As a result of these activities that the organization carries out against the state and towards the Alevi community, it will either gain militants from the Alevi community or turn the Alevis into a mass hostile to the state. At this point, it is possible to say that the participation of Alevis in the DHKP-C terrorist organization or the rate of adoption of its ideas remains at a very limited level, but as we said before, the radicalization and recruitment attempts of DHKP-C, which is the focus of this study, towards Alevis are just as real and is serious.

First of all, this study contributes to the radicalization and recruitment process of DHKP-C. Previously, studies on Universities and Radicalization in Türkiye (Köse & Coşkun, 2019) and Universities in the Terrorist Clamp (Çolak, 2013) were conducted in Türkiye, and these focused mostly on the radicalization and recruitment processes of terrorist organizations targeting university youth. However, there was no study at the thesis stage in terms of revealing the radicalization and recruitment processes of DHKP-C and drawing attention to the organization's initiatives, especially toward the Alevi community. Cases such as radicalization and recruitment, which vary from individual to individual and from organization to organization, should be studied as specifically as possible. Therefore, this study will shed light on the radicalization and recruitment processes of the DHKP-C terrorist organization. In addition, I expect this study to guide future studies due to the aspect that touches on Alevism, which is seen as a sensitive issue in Turkish society.

Secondly, this study is important in terms of showing the reflexes developed by terrorist organizations depending on domestic and international developments and filling the concept of the learning organization.

Thirdly, this study makes a modest contribution to the terrorism and radicalization literature by using the 12 Stages Mechanism Model of the Radicalization Process to explain the radicalization processes of the DHKP-C terrorist organization.

Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the radicalization and recruitment processes of terrorist organizations with the discourse analysis method. In addition, it brings a different perspective to this field in that it focuses specifically on DHKP-C's radicalization and recruitment processes targeting the Alevi community.

5.2. Limitations and Recommendations for Policy Implementations Future Research

Conducting research focusing on terrorist organizations contains various challenges in itself due to the nature of the work. Terrorist organizations are structures that are closed to the outside, and being unpredictable creates a huge multiplier effect in their asymmetrical struggle. Therefore, they do not issue press releases or publish monthly newsletters. Since the publications of the organization are propaganda-oriented, it becomes impossible to know what the real strategy of the organization is.

Primary sources are invaluable when examining human-based phenomena such as terrorism and radicalization. However, it is almost impossible to interview or survey members of active terrorist organizations for an academic study, and such an attempt poses a high-security risk for both parties. In such a study, it is not easy to reach primary sources, and the cost is high. Therefore, in this study, we had to focus mostly on secondary sources and organizational publishing for the discourse analysis method.

In the first place, I aimed to collect the data we will use in this study through semi-structured interviews and surveys with former members who were convicted of membership in the organization, Alevi leaders, and police officers working in the anti-terrorism department of the police force. However, the pandemic started in 2019, and because I went abroad to work, this method was not used. So, we have decided that this method could not be applied to this study and turned to secondary sources. In my opinion, the two most significant limitations of this study are the main theme of the study is that the security risks such as terrorism and radicalization are high, and it is

not possible to reach primary sources for these issues. If a study can be made on this method in future research, I am sure the most realistic and specific outputs will be obtained.

Studies in this field should be increased horizontally and vertically in order to multiply the accumulation of knowledge of interest in phenomena that do not depend on a general process, such as radicalization and recruitment, which vary depending on people, organizations, geographical regions, political and economic conditions.

In the focus of the results in this study, parents, community leaders, security forces, and decision-makers can understand the radicalization and recruitment strategies of the DHKP-C terrorist organization, and individuals' participation in the organization can be reduced by taking preventive measures.

Understanding the processes of radicalization and recruitment is important in two ways; first, preventive measures can be taken by analyzing the processes leading to radicalization and recruitment. Secondly, individuals and societies can gain resistance against the propaganda and manipulations of terrorist organizations. It should not be forgotten that it is a much easier and more cost-effective solution for individuals never to be involved in terrorist organizations and to keep their distance than the de-radicalization of individuals who have joined the ranks of the terrorist organization once, who have been indoctrinated and perhaps have committed terrorist acts. For this reason, channels of cooperation and coordination between parents, leaders of the Alevi community, and security forces should be open. It should not be forgotten that the propaganda carried out by the terrorist organization is based on provoking other segments of society against Alevis or isolating Alevis from society and provoking them against the state.

REFERENCES

A Haber. (2015, August 27). *"DHKP-C Grup Yorum'la kandırıyor" iddiası*. A Haber. https://www.ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2015/08/27/dhkp-c-grup-yorumla-kandiriyor-iddiasi

A Haber. (2021, December 13). *CHP'li İBB'nin terörist çalışanlarının listesi! PKK İşte CHP'nin terör örgütü PKK ile olan kirli bağlantıları! Günah galerileri gün yüzüne çıktı...* A Haber. https://www.ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2021/12/13/chpli-ibbnin-terorist-calisanlarin-listesi-pkk-iste-chpnin-teror-orgutu-pkk-ile-olan-kirli-baglantilari-gunah-galerileri-gun-yuzune-cikti

Abalay, G. (2020, August 31). *Terör örgütü DHKP-C ailelerin ocağına ateş düşürüyor! Acılı baba böyle feryat etti: Ne yaptıysam kızımı kurtaramadım.* [Sabah Gazetesi]. https://www.ahaber.com.tr/yasam/2020/08/31/teror-orgutu-dhkp-c-ailelerin-ocagina-ates-dusuruyor-acili-baba-boyle-feryat-etti-ne-yaptiysam-kizimi-kurtaramadim

Acun, C. (2018). PYD-YPG'nin Ortaya Çıkışı ve Dönüşümü. İn B. Duran & M. Yeşiltaş (Eds.), *Ortadoğu'da Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler* (1. Baskı, pp. 295–319). SETA Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi.

Akbulut Yazar, B. (2021, March 23). *DHKP/C operasyonunda ele geçirilen SD kart örgütün şifrelerini açığa çıkarttı*. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/dhkp-c-operasyonunda-ele-gecirilen-sd-kart-orgutun-sifrelerini-aciga-cikartti/2184912

Akgönül, S. (2019). Religious Minorities. In A. Özerdem & M. Whiting (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics* (1. Baskı, pp. 328–338). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Aksiyon Dergisi. (2015, October 2). *Bilinmeyen yönleriyle Elif Sultan Kalsen*. Özgür Kocaeli Gazetesi. https://www.ozgurkocaeli.com.tr/haber/4450558/bilinmeyen-yonleriyle-elif-sultan-kalsen

Aktaş, T. (2017, February 23). *Dünyadaki çocuk askerlerin yüzde 40'ı Afrika'da*. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/dunyadaki-cocuk-askerlerin-yuzde-40i-afrikada/756697

Alakoç, B. P., Werner, S., & Widmeier, M. (2021). Violent and Nonviolent Strategies of Terrorist Organizations: How Do Mixed Strategies Influence Terrorist Recruitment and Lethality? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1935706

Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Raporu Üstüne Bir Değerlendirme (pp. 1–128). (2011). Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı.

"Alevileri devlet değil sol örgütler asimile etti." (2013, April 5). [Canlı Yayın]. İn *Erkam Tufan İle Analiz*. https://www.haber7.com/televizyon/haber/1022159-alevileri-devlet-degil-sol-orgutler-asimile-etti

Alkan, N., & Çıtak, M. C. (2007). Youth and Terrorism. In H. Durmaz, B. Sevinç, A. S. Yayla, & S. Ekici (Eds.), *Understanding And Responding to Terrorism* (pp. 285–304). IOS Press.

Alptekin, H. (2017, January 16). The PKK's Child Soldiers [Özel]. *Politics Today*. https://politicstoday.org/the-pkks-child-soldiers/

Alptekin, H. (2018). *Etnik Terör ve Terörle Mücadele Stratejileri: IRA, ETA, Tamil Kaplanları ve PKK*. SETA.

Altun, F., & Yalçın, H. B. (2018). *Terörün Kökenleri ve Terörle Mücadele Stratejisi*. SETA.

Aristotle, K., Zieger, S., & Öztürk, B. (2018). *Kallis, A., Zeiger, S., Öztürk, B. (2018). Violent Radicalization & Far-Right Extremism in Europe*. SETA.

Armutlu Haber. (2017, March 14). *5*, 1–4.

Atar, F., & Gürkan, S. L. (2021, November 29). *ŞEHİD*. TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi. https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/sehid

Atar, O. (2005). *Türkiye'de Yıkıcı ve Bölücü Terörizmin İdeolojik Kökenleri* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. Polis Akademisi.

Avcı, E. (2019). Yeni Sol Dalgadan Küresel Dalgaya Türkiye'de Terörizm. *Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi*, *29*(1), 139–166.

Aydemir, S. S. (2019). DHKP-C and Its Desctructive Activities. In Ö. Akman, M. M. Çay, F. Bozbayındır, & E. Tunç (Eds.), *Social, Educational, Political, Economic and Other Developments Occurred in Turkey Between the Years of 1938-1980* (pp. 129–147). The International Society for Research in Education and Science (ISRES).

Bağcı, İ. (2015, May 5). DHKP-C'nin yanlış yapmayan gençleri (!). *Star Gazetesi*. https://www.star.com.tr/yazar/dhkpcnin-yanlis-yapmayan-gencleri--yazi-1017610/

Balkan, S. (2019). *Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler ve Terör Örgütlerinin Yeni Aracı: İHA* (978-605-7544-21-6; No. 130; SETA Yayınları, pp. 1–66). Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (SETA).

Bayer, E. (2007). *Terörist Örgütlerde Örgütsel Öğrenme* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi.

BBC News Türkçe. (2019, October 25). *Yerel bir örgüt olarak kurulan YPG, NATO ülkelerinin desteklediği bir güç haline nasıl geldi?* BBC News Türkçe. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-50180068

Belge, M. (2017, November 28). *Solun Dine Bakışı*. Birikim Dergisi. https://birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/8625/solun-dine-bakisi

Bjørgo, T. (2013). *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*. Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137355089

Borum, R. (2011a). Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories. *Journal of Strategic Security*, *4*(4), 7–36. https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1

Borum, R. (2011b). Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research. *Journal of Strategic Security*, *4*(4), 37–62. https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.2

Bosi, L., & Porta, D. D. (2012). Micro-mobilization into Armed Groups: Ideological, Instrumental and Solidaristic Paths. *Qualitative Sociology*, *35*(4), 361–383. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-012-9237-1

Can, A., & Taşcı, U. (2016). Teoriler Işığında Toplumsal Olayların Gelişimi ve Yönetimi. *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, *26*(1), 151–170. https://doi.org/10.18069/fusbed.44546

Çayan, M. (2019). *Bütün Yazılar* (2. Baskı). Ortadoğu Devrim Cephesi Basın Bürosu.

Celia, J., Aydın, S., & Çetin, Ü. (2017). Alevism As An Ethno-Religious Identity: Contested Boundaries. *National Identities*, *20*(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2016.1244934

Çelikdönmez, Ö. (2014, June 26). *Türkiyeli Alevilerden Suriye'de savaşanlar.*. Timeturk Haber. https://www.timeturk.com/tr/makale/omur-celikdonmez/turkiyeli-alevilerden-suriye-de-savasanlar.html

Charvat, J. P. I. A. G. (2008). Terrorism; Today and in the Future with Possible Aspects (Conventional, Bio, WMD, Cyber, etc.). In Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (Ed.), *Organizational and psychological aspects of terrorism* (pp. 23–36). IOS Press.

Çiçek, Y. (2008). *Türkiye'de Faaliyet Gösteren Yasadışı Sol Örgütlenme Olarak TKP/ML-TİKKO* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. Fırat Üniversitesi.

CNN Türk. (2019, February 3). *Son dakika: DHKP/C operasyonunda yakalanan 6 şüpheli tutuklandı*. CNN Türk. https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/son-dakika-dhkp-c-operasyonunda-yakalanan-6-supheli-tutuklandi

CNN Türk. (2021, February 15). *DHKP-C'nin Sözde Türkiye Sorumlusu Caferi Sadık Eroğlu tutuklandı*. CNN TÜRK. https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/dhkp-cnin-sozde-turkiye-sorumlusu-caferi-sadik-eroglu-tutuklandi

Çolak, B. (2013). *Terör Kıskacında Üniversiteler PKK'nın Üniversitelerdeki Yapılanması Tüm Belgeleriyle* (1. Baskı). Altınpost Yayınları.

Çolak, B. (2014, March 14). *DHKP-C Terörünün Tarihi, Stratejisi ve Gençlik Üzerindeki Faaliyetleri*. https://www.haberdokuz.com/2014/03/14/dhkp-c-terorunun-tarihi-stratejisi-ve-genclik-uzerindeki-faaliyetleri/

Cole, J., Alison, E., Cole, B., & Alison, L. (2009). *Guidance for Identifying People Vulnerable to Recruitment into Violent Extremism* (pp. 1–16). University of Liverpool, School of Psychology. https://preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/IVP_Guidance_Draft_v0.3_web_version.pdf

Dandurand, Y. (2015). Social Inclusion Programmes for Youth and the Prevention of Violent Extremism. In M. Lombardi, Ī. A. Rajab, V. Chin, Y. Dandurand, V. de Divitiis, & A. Burato (Eds.), *Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism* (pp. 23–36). IOS Press.

Dede, E. (2018, March 30). *Ersoy Dede—Savcı Suikasti, FETÖ ve DHKP-C İşbirliği*. Sabah. https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/aktuel/ersoy-dede/2018/03/30/savci-suikasti-feto-ve-dhkp-c-isbirligi

Della Porta, D. (1995). *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/social-movements-political-violence-and-the-state/86E3EC7576CAFEF483DBADBC5C06EAF4

Demir, C. K. (2008). Öğrenen Örgütler ve Terör Örgütleri Bağlamında PKK. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, *5*(19), 57–88.

Demir, F. (2018, July 21). *Afrika'da Çocuk Askerler: Sorunsalın Siyasal ve Sosyal Kökenleri*. AFAM - Afrika Araştırmacıları Derneği. https://afam.org.tr/afrikada-cocuk-askerler-sorunsalin-siyasal-ve-sosyal-kokenleri/

Demirel, E. (1995). *Kapanmayan Yara: Terör*. GHMD Yayınları.

Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı. (1995). *Yedinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1996-2000)* (https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Yedinci-Be%C5%9F-Y%C4%B1ll%C4%B1k-Kalk%C4%B1nma-Plan%C4%B1-1996-2000%E2%80%8B.pdf; 5 Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, pp. 1–319) [Resmi]. Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı.

Devrimci Aleviler Birliği (DAB). (2015a, May 27). *Devrimci Aleviler Birliği (DAB) Alevi Cenazelerinin Nasıl Olması Gerektiğinin Tanımını Yaptı*. www.alev-i.com. https://alev-i.com/devrimci-aleviler-birlig%CC%86i-dab-alevi-kizilbas%CC%A7-bektas%CC%A7i-pir-sultan-cem-hz-ali-12-imam-semah-feramuz-s%CC%A7ah-acar-alevi-cenaze/

Devrimci Aleviler Birliği (DAB). (2015b, May 27). *Devrimci Aleviler Birliği (DAB) dernekleşti*. www.alev-i.com. https://alev-i.com/devrimci-aleviler-birligi-dab-derneklesti/alev-i/

Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Programı. (1995). Halk Kurtuluş Yayınları.

Devrimci Sol. (1980a, March). *3 Aylık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *1*, 1–81.

Devrimci Sol. (1980b, May). *3 Aylık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *2*, 1–161.

DHA. (2008, August 15). *Dursun Karataş toprağa verildi*. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/dursun-karatas-topraga-verildi-9672457

DHKC Milis. (2021, May). *Aylık Dergi*, *19*, 1–28.

Dişkaya, N. (2018, September 28). *Alevi evlerinin işaretlendiği yerde elinde sprey boya ile yakalandı*. HaberTürk. https://www.haberturk.com/alevi-evlerinin-isaretlendigi-yerde-elinde-sprey-boya-ile-yakalandi-2160541

Dodwell, B., Milton, D., & Rassler, D. (2016). *The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail* (pp. 1–46). United States Military Academy - Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Doğan, İ. (2008, August 16). *Alevi değil ki tabutu niye cemevine getirildi!* [Haber 7]. https://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/338797-alevi-degil-ki-tabutu-niye-cemevine-getirildi

Doosje, B., Moghaddam, F. M., Kruglanski, A. W., de Wolf, A., Mann, L., & Feddes, A. R. (2016). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *11*, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008

Duran, B., & Yeşiltaş, M. (Eds.). (2018). *Ortadoğu'da Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler* (1. Baskı). SETA Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi.

Durna, T., & Kubilay, Ç. (2010). BASININ ŞİDDETİ: SİYASAL GÖSTERİLERDE "POLİSE TAŞ ATAN ÇOCUKLAR" ÖRNEĞİ. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, *65*(3), 51–84. https://doi.org/10.1501/SBFder_0000002173

Ekici, N., Sözer, M. A., & Atak, S. (2010). İdeoloji ve Örgütsel Yapının Örgüte Eleman Kazanma Üzerindeki Etkisi: Türkiye'de DHKP/C ve Hizbullah Örneği. *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm Dergisi*, *1*(1), 37–57.

Ensonhaber. (2016, July 3). *DHKP-C'li teröristin cenazesini cemevi kabul etmedi*. Ensonhaber. https://www.ensonhaber.com/gundem/dhkp-cli-teroristin-cenazesini-cemevi-kabul-etmedi-2016-03-07

Ercan, İ. (2013, July 28). *Terör örgütleri çocukları iki etkinlikte kandırıyor* [Haber7]. https://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/1055714-teror-orgutleri-cocuklari-2-etkinlikte-kandiriyor

Ercan, İ. (Director). (2020, May 7). *Grup Yorum DHKPC'dir—Grup Yorum Terör Örgütüdür*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJzLvinCTyk

Ertan, M. (2016). *Alevism in Politics: Possibilities and Limits of Alevi Identity Politics* [Phd Thesis]. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk Enstitüsü.

Euronews. (2015, April 1). *Emniyet müdürlüğü saldırganı Elif Sultan Kalsen çıktı*. euronews. https://tr.euronews.com/2015/04/01/emniyet-mudurlugu-saldirgani-elif-sultan-kalsen-cikti

EUROPOL. (2020). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT)* (pp. 1–98) [Official]. EUROPOL. https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2020

Faria, J. R., & Arce, D. (2005). Terror Support And Recruitment. *Taylor & Francis Journals*, *16*(4), 263–273. https://doi.org/10.1080/1024269052000344855

Fırat, E. (2019, July 30). *İsrail polisi 4 yaşındaki Filistinli çocuğu ifadeye çağırdı*. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/israil-polisi-4-yasindaki-filistinli-cocugu-ifadeye-cagirdi/1545182

Freeman, M. (2008). Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations. In Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (Ed.), *Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism* (pp. 81–94). IOS Press.

Gambetta, D., & Hertog, S. (2016). *Engineers of jihad: The curious connection between violent extremism and education*. Princeton University Press.

Gazete Vatan. (2021, September 29). *Alevi dedesini tehdit eden DHKP-C'li yakalandı*. Gazete Vatan. https://www.gazetevatan.com/gundem/alevi-dedesini-tehdit-eden-dhkp-cli-yakalandi-991023

Gemici, O. O., & Bulur, S. (2020, April 6). *DHKP/C'nin "terör için" kültür-sanat döngüsü İçişleri Bakanlığı raporunda*. Anadolu Ajansı. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/dhkp-cnin-teror-icin-kultur-sanat-dongusu-icisleri-bakanligi-raporunda/1865475

Gerwehr, S., & Daly, S. (2006). Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment. In D. Kamien (Ed.), *McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook: Strategic Guidance for a Coordinated Approach to Effective Security and Emergency Management* (2nd ed., pp. 73–89). McGraw-Hill.

Grup Yorum Konseri'nde Savcı Kiraz'ı Öldüren Teröristin Ailesinden Skandal Sözler. (2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=auBlncOS5sI

Güncel Haber. (2013, August 2). *Alevi evlerini DHKP-C'liler işaretlemiş*. https://www.guncelhabergazetesi.com/alevi-evlerini-dhkp-c-liler-isaretlemis-8167-haber/

Güngör, U. T. (2010). *Türkiye'de Gençlerin Terör Örgütlerine Katılma Nedenleri Ve Sonuçları* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. Selçuk Üniversitesi.

Gunn, A., & Demirden, A. (2019). *Radikalleşmenin Önlenmesi & Terörizm Olgusu* (Çalıştay Raporu No. 24; Polis Akademisi Yayınları, p. 33). Polis Akademisi. http://opac.sdu.edu.tr/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=158597

Gurr, T. R. (1974). *Why men rebel* (4. Printing). Princeton University Press.

Haber 7. (2015, May 4). *DHKP-C'den Berkin'in anne-babasına tehdit*. Haber7. https://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/1337472-dhkp-cden-berkinin-anne-babasina-tehdit

Habertürk. (2015, April 3). *Canlı bombanın ablası da kendini yakmış*. www.haberturk.com. https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1061550-elif-sultan-kalsenin-kendini-yakan-fidan-kalsenin-kardesi-oldugu-ortaya-cikti

Habertürk. (2017, July 18). *DHKP-C operasyonunda öldürülen Sıla'nın babası Habertürk'e konuştu*. www.haberturk.com. https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1567029-dhkp-c-operasyonunda-oldurulen-sila-nin-babasi-haberturke-konustu

Halk Okulu. (n.d.). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*.

Halk Okulu. (2020a, January 26). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *11*, 1–48.

Halk Okulu. (2020b, February 16). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *14*, 1–48.

Halk Okulu. (2020c, April 19). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *23*, 1–48.

Halk Okulu. (2020d, May 7). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *34*, 1–48.

Halk Okulu. (2020e, May 17). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *27*, 1–48.

Halk Okulu. (2020f, August 3). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *17*, 1–48.

Halk Okulu. (2020g, December 13). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *57*, 1–48.

Halk Okulu. (2021a, February 28). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *68*, 1–46.

Halk Okulu. (2021b, March 21). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *71*, 1–46.

Halk Okulu. (2021c, April 7). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *86*, 1–42.

Halk Okulu. (2021d, April 25). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *76*, 1–46.

Halk Okulu. (2021e, June 20). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *84*, 1–46.

Halk Okulu. (2021f, June 27). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *85*, 1–46.

Halkın Sesi TV. (n.d.). *Devrimci Alevi Komiteleri*. Retrieved December 7, 2021, from https://halkinsesitv1.org/category/haberler/devrimci-alevi-komiteleri/

Hamurcu, İ. O. (2017). *ALEVİ SİVİL TOPLUM ÖRGÜTLERİNİN AKP HÜKÜMETİNİN ALEVİLERE İLİŞKİN POLİTİKALARINA YAKLAŞIMI (İZMİR İLİ ÖRNEĞİ)* [Doktora Tezi]. Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi.

Hatipoğlu, M., & Demir, H. (2021, December 2). *DHKP/C'nin sözde Türkiye sorumlusu yakalandı*. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/dhkp-cnin-sozde-turkiye-sorumlusu-yakalandi/2142245

Hoffman, B. (2017). *Inside Terrorism* (Third Edition). Columbia University Press.

Hoffman, R. E. (2018). *Determining Who is Vulnerable to Radicalization and Recruitment* [Master Thesis]. School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College.

Horgan, J. (2012, September 28). *Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization?* [Edu]. Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization? https://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-end-radicalization

Horgan, J. G. (2009). *Walking Away From Terrorism Accounts of Disengagement From Radical And Extremist Movements* (1.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203874738

Horgan, J. G. (2019). Psychological Approaches to the Study of Terrorism. In E. Chenoweth, R. English, A. Gofas, & S. N. Kalyvas (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism* (pp. 206–223). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198732914.013.51

Hunter, S. T., Shortland, N. D., Crayne, M. P., & Ligon, G. S. (2017). Recruitment and selection in violent extremist organizations: Exploring what industrial and organizational psychology might contribute. *American Psychologist*, *72*(3), 242–254. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000089

Hürriyet. (2008, August 14). *Karataş'ın cenazesi ailesine verilmedi*. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/karatasin-cenazesi-ailesine-verilmedi-9664670

Işık, M. (2006). *Terör Örgütlerinin Söylem Stratejileri ve Eylemlerini Meşrulaştırma Yöntemleri* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. Kara Harp Okulu.

Işık, M. (2013). *Şiddetin Dili Değişmez: DHKP-C ve İBDA-C Terör Örgütlerinin Söylemlerinin Benzerliği Üzerine Bir İnceleme*. Zinde Yayınları.

Jenkins, G. (2019). Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency, And Societal Relations. In A. Özerdem & M. Whiting (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics* (1. Baskı, pp. 266–274). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Jensen, M. T. (2005). *Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives* (pp. 1–57). Research Report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice.

Jiu-Jitsu Nedir? (2021, January 12). [Www.dovussanati.com]. dovussanati.com | Geleneksel ve Modern Stiller. http://www.dovussanati.com

Jones, E. (2017). The reception of broadcast terrorism: Recruitment and radicalisation. *International Review of Psychiatry*, *29*(4), 320–326. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540261.2017.1343529

Kalan Müzik (Director). (2015a, March 2). *Grup Yorum—Dünyanın Üzerinde [Türkülerle © 1989 Kalan Müzik]*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZpmYunbSrZg

Kalan Müzik (Director). (2015b, June 8). *Grup Yorum—Gelin Canlar [Dünden Yarına Ustalarımız | Ruhi Su © 2015 Kalan Müzik]*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZrN4-IBhQsM

Kalan Müzik (Director). (2015c, August 20). *Grup Yorum—Ey Şahin Bakışlım [Aleviler'e Kalan II © 2015 Kalan Müzik]*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzC7SnT1_tE

Kalan Müzik (Director). (2016, January 16). *Grup Yorum—Hasretim Dağ Oldu [Yıldızlar Kuşandık © 2006 Kalan Müzik]*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_vxzxRoABzk

Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2019). Elections, Parties and the Party System. In A. Özerdem & M. Whiting (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics* (1. Baskı, pp. 83–102). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Karabudak, N. (2000). *THKP-C'den DHKP-C'ye Devrimci Sol Örgütü Üzerine Bir İnceleme* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü]. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezDetay.jsp?id=XaWyAmWMrDwNE2rW72MxOQ&no=XaWyAmWMrDwNE2rW72MxOQ

Karakuş, Ö. (2013, April 10). *Alevilerin evlerini işaretleyen kişi ortaya çıktı!* https://www.internethaber.com/alevilerin-evlerini-isaretleyen-kisi-ortaya-cikti-520324h.htm; Internet Haber. https://www.internethaber.com/alevilerin-evlerini-isaretleyen-kisi-ortaya-cikti-520324h.htm

Karanlıktaki Meşale. (2017, May 13). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *4*, 1–8.

Karataş, D. (1989). *Haklıyız Kazanacağız*. Halk Kurtuluş Yayınları.

Kerbela Dergisi. (1996, Nisan). *Özgürlük Yolunda Alevi Gençlik Dergisi*, *1*, 1–19.

Kıran, K. (2017, August 16). *DHKP-C'li teröristle FETÖ'cü polis kuzen çıktı*. Sabah. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2017/08/16/dhkp-cli-teroristle-fetocu-polis-kuzen-cikti

Kıran, K. (2020, August 29). *Ebru Timtik, kızını DHKP-C'den kurtarmaya çalışan anneye engel olmaya çalışmış!* Sabah. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/08/28/ebru-timtik-kizini-dhkp-cden-kurtarmaya-calisan-anneye-engel-olmaya-calismis

Kırbaki, Y. (2021, May 11). *Şafak Yayla'nın ağabeyleri hakkındaki müthiş detaylar*. Hürriyet. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/safak-yaylanin-agabeyleri-hakkindaki-muthis-detaylar-28614399

Knapton, H. M. (2014). The Recruitment and Radicalization of Western Citizens: Does Ostracism Have a Role in Homegrown Terrorism? *Journal of European Psychology Students*, *5*(1).

Koç, Y. (2020, September 2). *Bunu neden yapıyorlar?* https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/yazarlar/yucel-koc/612129.aspx

Kocaova, K. A. (2020, September 5). *DHKP-C, Alman İstihbaratının Güdümündedir*. Twitter. https://twitter.com/kutlualtay/status/1259119164930867206

Köroğlu, U. E. (2012, December 20). *Komşuda DHKP-C'nin 3 kampı var*. Sabah. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2012/12/20/komsuda-dhkpcnin-3-kampi-var

Köse, T. (2010). *Alevi Opening and the Democratization Initiative in Turkey* (Özel No. 3; Policy Report, pp. 1–24). SETA.

Köse, T. (2011). *Psychocultural Dynamics of Ethno-Sectarian Identities: Understanding the Emotional Dimensions of Alevi Identity Revival in Turkey*. 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1866651

Köse, T. (2012). Ideological or Religious? Contending Visions on the Future of Alevi Identity. *Identities*, *19*(5), 576–596. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2012.734767

Köse, T. (2015). Etno-Dinsel Kimliklerin Psiko-Kültürel Dinamikleri: Türkiye'de Alevi Kimliği Uyanışının Duygusal Boyutları. *Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaşi Veli Araştırma Dergisi*, *74*, 171–197.

Köse, T., & Coşkun, İ. (2019). *Türkiye'de Üniversiteler ve Radikalleşme* (1. Baskı). SETA Kitapları.

Kronstadt, K. A. (2008). *Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations* (Resmi No. RL31707; CRS Report for Congress, pp. 1–40). Congressional Research Service. https://web.archive.org/web/20090511072650/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31707.pdf

Küçük, C. (2020, January 22). Alevi Sünni çatışmasını kim istiyor? *Türkiye Gazetesi*. https://m.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/yazarlar/cem-kucuk/611851.aspx

Kurtuluş. (2013, Ekim). *Aylık Siyasi Dergi*, *6*, 1–250.

Kurtuluş. (2021, ubat). *Aylık Siyasi Dergi*, 1–154.

Laqueur, W. (2004). *The Terrorism to Come* [Policy Review]. Hoover Institution. https://www.hoover.org/research/terrorism-come

Lenin, V. İ. (2010). *Bolşevikler ve Proletarya Diktatörlüğü*. Agora Kitaplığı.

Levent, R. (2020). Sınıf Siyasetinden Kimlik Syasetine Türkiye'de Aleviliğin Siyasal Değişimi. *Dicle Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi*, *10*(19), 79–103.

Lobato, R. M., Moya, M., Moyano, M., & Trujillo, H. M. (2018). From Oppression to Violence: The Role of Oppression, Radicalism, Identity, and Cultural Intelligence in Violent Disinhibition. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*, 1505. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01505

Lucas, J. L. P. (2018, February 7). *Situational Understanding on Violent Radicalization that Results in Terrorism. Two Graphic Models that Provide Clarity on the Topic* [Özel]. El Grupo de Estudios Sobre Seguridad Internacional (GESI). http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/?q=es/content/situational-understanding-violent-radicalization-results-terrorism-two-graphic-models

Mahir, Y. E. (2017). *Differentiation of Political Opinions Among the Alevi Youth in İstanbul* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. Marmara Üniversitesi.

Marx, K. (1997). *Hegel'in Hukuk Felsefesinin Eleştirisi* (K. Somer, Trans.). Sol Yayınları.

Marx, K. (2018). *Komünist Manifesto*. İletişim Yayınları.

Massicard, E. (2007). *Alevi Hareketinin Siyasallaşması* (A. Berktay, Trans.; 1. Baskı). İletişim Yayınları.

Massicard, E. (2012). *The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and managing territorial diversity* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203111246

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *20*(3), 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2011). *Friction: How radicalization happens to them and us*. Oxford University Press.

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2014). Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *26*(1), 69–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849916

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2017). Understanding political radicalization: The two-pyramids model. *American Psychologist*, *72*(3), 205–216. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000062

Medya 24. (2013, September 15). *Üniversiteliyi Nasıl Kandırıyorlar?* https://www.medya-24.com. https://www.medya-24.com/haber-universiteliyi_nasil_kandiriyorlar-4291.html

Milliyet. (2001, July 24). *Annenin yardımıyla DHKP-C operasyonu*. Milliyet. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/annenin-yardimiyla-dhkp-c-operasyonu-245358

Milliyet. (2016, July 3). *Teröristin cenazesini cemevi kabul etmedi*. Milliyet. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/teroristin-cenazesini-cemevi-kabul-etmedi-2205458

Minority Rights Group International. (2007). *Bir Eşitlik Arayışı: Türkiye'de Azınlıklar* (pp. 1–48). Minority Rights Group International; 1 904584 68 3.

https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MRG_Rep_Turk2007_TURK.pdf

Misto, M., Allahverdi, S., & Hocaoğlu, M. T. (2020, March 10). *ABD'den terör örgütü YPG/PKK'ya 400 milyon dolarlık destek*. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/abdden-teror-orgutu-ypg-pkkya-400-milyon-dolarlik-destek/1994279

Moghaddam, F. M. (2005a). Psychological Processes and "The Staircase to Terrorism." *American Psychologist, 60*(9), 1039–1041. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.9.1039

Moghaddam, F. M. (2005b). The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration. *American Psychologist, 60*(2), 161–169. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161

Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). *From the terrorists' point of view: What they experience and why they come to destroy*. Praeger Security International.

Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 21*(2), 239–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550902765508

Neumann, P., & Rogers, M. B. (2007). *Recruitment and mobilisation for the Islamist militant movement in Europe* (pp. 1–36). European Commission. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/recruitment-and-mobilisation-for-the-islamist-militant-movement-in-europe(e33f186a-cc24-4763-b0f2-dff18767d7e5)/export.html

NTV. (2015, January 4). *İki terörist Tekirdağ'da tanışmış (Şafak Yayla ve Bahtiyar Doğruyol kimdir?)* [NTV]. https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/yollari-tekirdagda-kesismis,2fJiIGaEz0K6QcJL8ujryQ

Ocak, A. Y. (2022, June 9). *Alevî*. TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi. https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/alevi

odatv4.com. (2015, July 1). *Emniyet ne dedi, DHKP-C ne dedi, Cemaat ne dedi*. https://www.odatv4.com//guncel/bombaliyi-saldiriyi-ustlendiler-0701151200-69747

odatv4.com. (2020). *Alevi olmayanlar cenazelerini neden cemevinden kaldırıyor*. https://www.odatv4.com//guncel/alevi-olmayanlar-cenazelerini-neden-cemevinden-kaldiriyor-21122052-198482

Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, & Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Eds.). (2014). *Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: A community policing approach*. OSCE.

Owen, F. K. (2008). Political Violence, Psychology and Youth. In M. D. Ulusoy (Ed.), *Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism, and Youth* (pp. 22–40). IOS Press.

Özdemir, Ö. (2016, July 1). *Alevi gençleri "ölsün" diye Sur'a götürüyorlar!* [Sabah]. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/01/07/alevi-gencleri-olsun-diye-sura-goturuyorlar

Öztürk, B., & Tetik, Ü. (2018). Yabancı Terörist Savaşçılar. İn B. Duran & M. Yeşiltaş (Eds.), *Ortadoğu'da Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler* (1. Baskı, pp. 197–227). SETA Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi.

Pek, A., & Ekici, B. (2007). Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of PKK-KONGRA GEL from Illicit Drug Business. In Ö. Nikbay & S. Hançerli (Eds.), *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective* (pp. 140–152). IOS Press.

Pir Sultan Kültür Merkezi Londra (Director). (2020). *Grup Yorum | Pir Sultan Kültür Merkezi 1. Kültür & Sanat Festivali*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbRymSpUihg

Porta, D. D., & LaFree, G. (2012). Guest Editorial: Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, *6*(1), 1–7.

Rapoport, D. C. (2012). Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. In A. K. Cronin & J. M. Ludes (Eds.), *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (pp. 48–65). Georgetown University Press.

Reşit, A. (2011, May 2). *El Kaide şimdi ne yapacak?* BBC News Türkçe. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2011/05/110502_rashid_analysis

Richards, J. (2017). *Extremism, Radicalization and Security-An Identity Theory Approach*. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55203-3

Ross, M. H. (1997). The relevance of culture for the study of political psychology and ethnic conflict. *Political Psychology*, *18*(2), 299–326.

Ross, M. H. (2001). Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas: Identity Dynamics in Ethnic Conflict. *Political Psychology*, *22*(1), 157–178.

Ross, M. H. (2007). *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge University Press.

Rousseau, C., Hassan, G., Miconi, D., Lecompte, V., Mekki-Berrada, A., El Hage, H., & Oulhote, Y. (2019). From social adversity to sympathy for violent radicalization: The role of depression, religiosity and social support. *Archives of Public Health*, *77*(1), 45. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13690-019-0372-y

Rousseau, C., Oulhote, Y., Lecompte, V., Mekki-Berrada, A., Hassan, G., & El Hage, H. (2019). Collective identity, social adversity and college student sympathy for violent radicalization. *Transcultural Psychiatry*, 136346151985365. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461519853653

Sabah. (2021, December 13). *Polisimizin şehit edildiği olaya karışan DHKP-C'li terörist de İBB'de işe başlamış! Belediye terör yuvasına döndü...* Sabah. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2021/12/13/son-dakika-polis-katili-dhkp-cli-terorist-ibbde-ise-baslamis-belediye-teror-yuvasina-dondu

Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhfxz

Sageman, M. (2008). *Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sageman, M. (2017). *Turning to political violence: The emergence of terrorism*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Saraisky, N. G. (2015). Analyzing Public Discourse: Using Media Content Analysis to Understand the Policy Process. *Current Issues in Comparative Education*, *18*(1), 26–41.

Saruhan, M. S. (2008). Religion, Terror and Suicide Attacks. In Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (Ed.), *Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism* (pp. 119–129). IOS Press.

Savcıyı şehit eden terörist Şafak Yayla'nın ailesi böyle feryat etmişti. (2015, April 1). İn *Yeni Şafak*. Yeni Şafak. https://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/haber/savciyi-sehit-eden-terorist-safak-yaylanin-ailesi-boyle-feryat-etmisti-2011403

Schmid, A. P. (2013a). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies*. https://doi.org/10.19165/2013.1.02

Schmid, A. P. (Ed.). (2013b). *The Routledge handbook of terrorism research* (First published in paperback). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Schweitzer, Y. (2007). Palestinian Istishhadia Campaign: A Dynamic and Practical Tool. In Ö. Nikbay & S. Hançerli (Eds.), *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective* (pp. 91–102). IOS Press.

Schweitzer, Y. (2010). *Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-Radicalization and Disengagement* (White Paper: Counter Terrorism, pp. 1–379). Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment and Air Force Research Laboratory. https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/protecting-homeland-international-and-domestic-terrorism-threats-current-multi

Scott, G., & Podder, S. (2015). Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *9*(4).

Selçuk Haber. (2013, February 12). *Hangi Terör Örgütü Ne Yöntemle Gençleri Kandırıyor?* Selçuk Haber. https://www.selcukhaber.com/hangi-teror-orgutune-yontemle-gencleri-kandiriyor-51464.html

Şen, Ş. (2022, May 8). *DHKP-C'de büyük çözülme böyle gerçekleşti* [Text]. Yeni Şafak; Yeni Şafak. https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/dhkp-cde-buyuk-cozulme-boyle-gerceklesti-3818677

Seren, M., & Aslan, M. (2018). Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler ve İstihbarat. İn B. Duran & M. Yeşiltaş (Eds.), *Ortadoğu'da Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler* (1. Baskı, pp. 31–72). SETA Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi.

Sevinç, B. (2008). *Participation in terrorist organizations—An analysis of left wing DHKP-C and religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations* [Phd Thesis]. Michigan State University.

Shaw, E. D. (1986). Political Terrorists: Dangers of Diagnosis and An Alternative to the Psychopathology Model. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, *8*(3), 359,368. https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-2527(86)90066-x

Shelley, L. I. (2015). Corruption and Youth's Recruitment Into Violent Extremism. In M. Lombardi, E. Ragab, & V. Chin (Eds.), *Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism* (pp. 37–47). IOS Press.

Silber, M. D., & Bhatt, A. (2007). *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. New York Police Department.

Smith, C. J., Nikbay, Ö., & Muş, E. (2007). Suicide Attacks as a Devastating Terrorist Modus Operandi: An Updated Evaluation of Turkish Cases. In Ö. Nikbay & S. Hançerli (Eds.), *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective* (pp. 73–90). IOS Press.

Sözcü. (2015, July 1). *Elif Sultan Kalsen'in ailesi iddiaları yalanladı*. Sözcü. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/elif-sultan-kalsenin-ailesi-iddialari-yalanladi-702447/

Strozier, C. B. (2007). Historical and Psychological Reflections on the Emergence of the New Terrorism. In Ö. Nikbay & S. Hançerli (Eds.), *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective* (pp. 28–34). IOS Press.

Subaşı, N. (2010). *Alevi Çalıştayları (Nihai Rapor)* (pp. 1–126) [Resmi]. T.C Devlet Bakanlığı.

Sümer, F. (2018). PYD-YPG'nin Çocuk Askerleri. İn B. Duran & M. Yeşiltaş (Eds.), *Ortadoğu'da Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler* (1. Baskı, pp. 321–360). SETA Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi.

Super Haber. (2017, June 5). *Öldürülen DHKP-C'li terörist Abalay'ın ailesinden terör örgütüne tepki!* [Text]. Super Haber; Super Haber. https://www.superhaber.tv/oldurulen-dhkp-cli-terorist-abalayin-ailesinden-teror-orgutune-tepki-haber-53012

Taarnby, M. (2007). Understanding recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe. In M. Ranstorp (Ed.), *MAPPING TERRORISM RESEARCH: State of the art, gaps and future direction* (pp. 164–186). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Takvim. (2022, January 30). *DHKP-C'li terörist her şeyi itiraf etti! Dilek Doğan dosyasına bakan savcının iple boğulması, Taksim'de polis memurunu rehin alma...* takvim.com.tr. https://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2022/01/30/dhkp-cli-terorist-her-seyi-itiraf-etti-dilek-dogan-dosyasina-bakan-savcinin-iple-bogulmasi-taksimde-polis-memurunu-rehin-alma/6

Tavır. (2011, Haziran). *Aylık Yerel Süreli Kültür Sanat Dergisi*, *6*(109), 1–66.

TAYAD. (2021, October 12). *TAYAD (@TayadliAileler2) / Twitter*. Twitter. https://twitter.com/TayadliAileler2

T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi. (2005, January 6). *Adli ve Önleme Aramaları Yönetmeliği* [Resmi]. T.C Cumhurbaşkanlığı Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi. https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=8203&MevzuatTur=7&MevzuatTertip=5

T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-Araştırma ve Etütler Merkezi. (2017). *Bir Terör Örgütünün Bitmeyen Senaryosu: Nuriye Gülmen ve Semih Özakça Gerçeği* (pp. 1–56) [Resmi]. T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-Araştırma ve Etütler Merkezi.

T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı. (2020). *Bir Terör Örgütünün Çöküşü: Ölüm Oruçları Ve DHKP/C'nin Kanlı Geçmişi* [Resmi]. T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı-İç Güvenlik Stratejileri Dairesi Başkanlığı. https://icisleri.gov.tr/icguvenlik/bir-teror-orgutunun-cokusu-olum-oruclari-ve-dhkpcnin-kanli-gecmisi

T.C Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Eğitim Genel Müdürlüğü. (2022, July 6). *Deyiş* [Remi]. T.C Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Eğitim Genel Müdürlüğü. https://aregem.ktb.gov.tr/TR-12614/deyis.html

Teymur, S. (2004). *An Analysis of Terrorist Recruitment by Observing the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) Terrorist Organization in Turkey* [MA Thesis]. University of North Texas.

Teymur, S. (2007). *A Conceptual Map for Understanding the Terrorist Recruitment Process: Observation and Analysis of DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah Terrorist Organizations* [Doctor of Philosophy]. University of North Texas.

Teymur, S., Sahliyeh, E., Yayla, A. S., & Yılmaz, İ. (2007). The Recruitment Process of Terrorist Organizations: A Case Study of Devrimci Halkin Kurtulus Partisi Cephesi (DHKP/C) Revolutionary People's Liberation Party Front. In S. Özeren, İ. D. Güneş, & D. M. Al-Badayneh (Eds.), *Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological Aspects* (pp. 161–166). IOS Press.

Tol, U. U. (2009). *The Sustainability Crisis of Alevis* [Doktora Tezi]. ODTÜ.

Tol, U. U. (2016). *Kentsel Alevilik ve Alevi Gençlerin Kimlik Arayışları* (İstanbul Gençlik Haritası Serisi, pp. 1–42). PODEM & Berghof Foundation. http://podem.org.tr/researches/kentsel-alevilik-ve-alevi-genclerin-kimlik-arayislari/

Türkiye Barolar Birliği. (2006). *Türkiye ve Terörizm* (Özel No. 107; Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayınları, pp. 1–634). Türkiye Barolar Birliği; 975-668941-5.

Türkmen Aleviler. (2020, May 8). *Türkmen Aleviler, DHKP-C'li Teröristlerin Cenazelerinin Cemevlerinden Kaldırılmasına Tepkili*. https://www.facebook.com/857574497622121/photos/a.857660214280216/2945469282165955/

Ulusal. (2019, February 26). *İstanbul'da İdil Kültür Merkezine operasyonda DHKP-C'li teröristler Ümit İlter, Caferi Sadık Eroğlu, Emel Yeşilırmak, İbrahim Gökçek, Barkın Timtik ve Barış Yüksel yakalandı* [Www.ulusal.com.tr]. Ulusal Kanal. https://www.ulusal.com.tr/haber/8462451/istanbulda-idil-kultur-merkezine-operasyonda-dhkp-cli-teroristler-umit-ilter-caferi-sadik-eroglu-emel-yesilirmak-ibrahim-gokcek-barkin-timtik-ve-baris-yuksel-yakalandi

Ulusal Tez Merkezi. (2022, August 17). [Resmi]. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezSorguSonucYeni.jsp

Ulusoy, M. D. (Ed.). (2008). *Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism, and Youth*. IOS Press.

U.S Department of State. (2019). *Country Reports on Terrorism* (pp. 1–305) [Resmi]. Bureau of Counterterrorism. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/

Usul, A. S. (2020, December 9). *Terör örgütü PKK/KCK'nın 'hacker'larına yönelik operasyonda 11 tutuklama*. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/teror-orgutu-pkk-kcknin-hackerlarina-yonelik-operasyonda-11-tutuklama/1970852

Vaughn, B. (2011). *Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations* (Resmi No. RL31707; CRS Report for Congress, pp. 1–12). Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL31707.pdf

Vergani, M., Ilbahar, E., Barton, G., & Iqbal, M. (2018). The 3 Ps of Radicalisation: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence About Radicalisation Into Violent Extremism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, *43*(10), 1–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1505686

Watters, S. (2015). A Nation Contested: Alevi Identity as a Response to Turkish Nationalism. *Columbia University Journal of Politics & Society*, 92–123.

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). *Joining the cause: Al-Muhajiroun and radical Islam. Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism* (pp. 1–29). Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSICT).

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Yayla, A. S. (2001). *A Case Study of Leftist Terrorism And Its Prevention in Turkey: DHKP/C* [MA Thesis, University of North Texas]. http://rgdoi.net/10.13140/RG.2.1.4973.8484

Yayla, A. S. (2020). Prevention of Recruitment to Terrorism. In A. P. Schmid (Ed.), *Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness* (1st Edition, pp. 412–463). ICCT Press.

Yıldırım, A. (2004). *Kentleşme ve Kentleşme Sürecinde Göçün Suç Olgusu Üzerindeki Etkileri* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. Ankara Üniversitesi.

Yılmaz, A. (2014, April 13). *PKK, DHKP-C, TİKKO: Yoldaşlarını nasıl öldürdüler?* (H. Özvarış, İnterviewer) [T24]. https://t24.com.tr/haber/pkk-dhkp-c-tikko-yoldaslarini-nasil-oldurduler,267458

Yılmaz, A. (2021). *Yoldaşını Öldürmek*. İletişim Yayınları.

Yılmaz, İ. (2009). Terrorist Profiling: Characteristics and Motivations by Arrest Rate. In S. Ekici (Ed.), *Building terrorism resistant communities: Together against terrorism* (pp. 34–58). IOS Press.

Yürük, B. (2021, May 20). *BM raporu, YPG/PKK'nın Suriye'de çocukları savaştırmaya devam ettiğini bir kez daha ortaya koydu*. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/bm-raporu-ypg-pkknin-suriyede-cocuklari-savastirmaya-devam-ettigini-bir-kez-daha-ortaya-koydu/2248086

Yürüyüş. (2018, December 8). *Haftalık Süreli Yerel Yayın Siyasi Dergi*, *79*, 1–56.

Yüz, M. B. (2019). *Türkiye'de Alevilerin Sol Siyaset İle Eklemlenmesi: İnanç ve Topluluk Örgütlenmesinin Etkileri* [Yüksek Lisans Tezi]. İstanbul Üniversitesi.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information:

Name - Surname: Mücahid Keskinoğlu

Education:

2013-2018 BA in Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Turkey