**T.C.**

**ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY**

**INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

# THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION ON DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA AN ENQUIRY ON THE ROLE OF ANTI-GRAFT AGENCIES BETWEEN 2011-2019

**PH.D. DISSERTATION**

**Solomon OTUBO**

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**(Y1614.930002)**

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**Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Hatice Deniz YÜKSEKER TEKİN**

**MARCH, 2023**

**TEZ SINAV TUTANAĞI**

# DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results, which are not original of this dissertation. (06/003/2023)

Solomon OTUBO

# FOREWORD

At the early stage of this program, my intention was to academically improve myself and to conduct research that would let me express myself, however the rigorousness of the processes that comes along with a PhD program both in and outside the class was more enlightening and interesting than I had expected.

I wish to express my special thanks and grateful senses to my advisor Prof. Dr. Hatice Deniz Yükseker Tekin for her constant help, guidance and suggestions, without whom the present work would not have been accomplished. Professesor Yükseker Tekin is a rare academic gem. I also acknowledge the support and especially the patience of members of my thesis monitoring committee, Dr. Filiz Katman, and Dr. Ayşem Biriz Karaçay both of whom have constantly assisted me in shaping my thesis into a suitable academic document. I would also like to thank Dr. Zafer Çeler and Dr. Mustafa Poyraz Kolluğlu for their constructive comments on my thesis. I also wish to acknowledge other lecturers of the Political Science and International Relations Department of Istanbul Aydın University like Prof. Dr. Celal Nazim İrem and Dr. Gülay Uğur Göksel whose academic mentorship has helped my academic formation.

March, 2023 Solomon OTUBO

# THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION ON DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA AN ENQUIRY ON THE ROLE OF ANTI-GRAFT AGENCIES BETWEEN 2011-2019

## ABSTRACT

This dissertation is about the complex relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. It seeks to explain the impact of this complex relationship between the two identified variables that is, political corruption and democratic performance by introducing a new analytic model in the discussions of political corruption. These include using a case study research approach to explain the degree and nature of political corruption in Nigeria. While the dissertation acknowledges that existing studies on political corruption are empirically useful, however their methodologies which were based on cross-country surveys, and their data based on perceptions are inadequate. I demonstrate my argument through a qualitative research design. I first discuss earlier studies on corruption, and explore the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. The dissertation argues that political corruption in Nigeria is inimical to democratic survival. In order to demonstrate this argument, the dissertation focuses on political institutions in Nigeria, and the work of anti-graft agencies between 2011 and 2019. The dissertation also focuses on the actual cases of political corruption in the country by analyzing prominent court cases. It argues that within the Nigeria's context, there's no clear-cut explanation on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance since the analysis of the dissertation reveals that either of the variable can influence each other.

**Keywords:** Political Corruption, Democratic Performance, Political Institutions, Anti-Corruption Agencies in Nigeria.

# NİJERYA'DA SİYASİ YOLSUZLUĞUN DEMOKRATİK PERFORMANS ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: 2011-2019 YILLARI ARASINDA YOLSUZLUKLA MÜCADELE AJANSLARININ ROLÜNE İLİŞKİN BİR ARAŞTIRMA

## ÖZET

Bu tez, siyasi yolsuzluk ve demokratik performans arasındaki karmaşık ilişki üzerine yazılmıştır. Ayrıca, siyasi yolsuzluk tartışmalarına yeni bir analitik model geliştirerek, tanımlanan iki değişken arasındaki bu karmaşık ilişkinin yönetişim üzerindeki etkisini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu model, Nijerya'daki siyasi yolsuzluğun derecesini ve doğasını açıklamak için bir vaka çalışması araştırma yaklaşımını kullanmaktadır. Tez, siyasi yolsuzlukla ilgili mevcut çalışmaların ampirik olarak yararlı olduğunu kabul etse de, ülkeler arası anketlere dayalı metodolojileri ve algılara dayalı verileri yetersiz bulmaktadır. Argümanımı kalitatif bir araştırma tasarımıyla ortaya koyuyorum. İlk olarak, yolsuzluk üzerine yapılan önceki çalışmaları ele alarak politik yolsuzluk ile demokratik performans arasındaki ilişkiyi inceliyorum. Tezim, Nijerya'daki politik yolsuzluğun demokratik hayatta kalış açısından zararlı olduğunu iddia ediyor. Bu argümanı kanıtlamak için, tez Nijerya'daki siyasi kurumları ve 2011-2019 yılları arasında yolsuzlukla mücadele eden kuruluşların çalışmalarını odak noktası haline getiriyor. Ayrıca, ülkedeki önemli mahkeme davalarını analiz ederek politik yolsuzluk örneklerine odaklanıyor. Tez, Nijerya bağlamında politik yolsuzluk ile demokratik performans arasındaki ilişkinin net bir açıklamasının olmadığını savunmaktadır. Çünkü tezin analiz sonucu, her iki değişkenin birbirini etkileyebileceğini göstermektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Siyasi Yolsuzluk, Demokratik Performans, Siyasi Kurumlar, Nijerya’daki Yolsuzluk Karşıtı Ajanslar

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# ABBREVIATIONS

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **AP** | **:** | Appeals Court |
| **APC** | **:** | All Progressive Congress |
| **ASSU** | **:** | Academic Senior Staff of Universities |
| **BBC** | **:** | British Broadcasting Cooperation |
| **BBOG** | **:** | Bring Back our Girls |
| **BPI** | **:** | Bribery Perception Index |
| **CBN** | **:** | Central Bank of Nigeria |
| **CCB** | **:** | Code of Conduct Bureau |
| **CDA** | **:** | Chief of Defense Staff |
| **CIFIPN** | **:** | Chartered Institute of Forensic Investigative Professionals of Nigeria |
| **CNN** | **:** | Cable Network News |
| **DFID** | **:** | Department for International Development |
| **DSS** | **:** | Department for State Security |
| **ECOWAS** | **:** | Economic Community of West African States |
| **EFCC** | **:** | Economic Financial Crimes Commission |
| **EIU** | **:** | Economic Investigative Index |
| **FEC** | **:** | Federal Executive Council |
| **FH** | **:** | Freedom House |
| **FIRS** | **:** | Federal Inland Revenue Service |
| **GBD** | **:** | Global Boarding Disease |
| **GDP** | **:** | Gross Domestic Product |
| **GMM** | **:** | General Method of Moment |
| **HC** | **:** | High Court |
| **ICPC** | **:** | Independent Corrupt Practices Commission |
| **ICRG** | **:** | International Country Risk Guide |
| **IFRI** | **:** | Institute Francaise des Relations International |
| **IGP** | **:** | Inspector General of Police |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **IMF** | **:** | International Monetary Fund |
| **INEC** | **:** | Independent National Electoral Commission |
| **IPOB** | **:** | Indigenous People of Biafra |
| **ISWAP** | **:** | Islamic State of West Africa Province |
| **IV** | **:** | Instrument Variable |
| **JTF** | **:** | Joint Task Force |
| **MSMEDF** | **:** | Micro Small and Medium Enterprise Development Fund |
| **MTS** | **:** | Macro Trade Survey |
| **NBS** | **:** | National Bureau of Statistics |
| **NEITI** | **:** | Nigeria Industry Transparency Intiative |
| **NIMASA** | **:** | Nigerian Maritime Administrative and Safety Agency |
| **NLC** | **:** | National Labour Congress |
| **NMA** | **:** | Nigeria Medical Association |
| **NNPC** | **:** | Nigeria National Petroleum Cooperation |
| **NOA** | **:** | National Orientation Agency |
| **NSA** | **:** | National Security Adviser |
| **NTUC** | **:** | Nigeria Trade Union Congress |
| **OLS** | **:** | Ordinary Least Square |
| **OPEC** | **:** | Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| **PACAC** | **:** | Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption |
| **PCC** | **:** | Public Complaint Commission |
| **PDP** | **:** | Peoples Democratic Party |
| **PIB** | **:** | Petroleum Industrial Bill |
| **PRTT** | **:** | Pension Reform Task Team |
| **PWT** | **:** | Penn World Table |
| **SARS** | **:** | Special Anti-robbery Squad |
| **SGF** | **:** | Secretary to the Government of Federation |
| **TI** | **:** | Transparency International |
| **TRN** | **:** | Trillion |
| **TSLS** | **:** | Two Stages Least Square |
| **TW** | **:** | Transparency Watch |
| **UG** | **:** | Unknown Gunmen |
| **UK** | **:** | United Kingdom |
| **UKAID** | **:** | United Kingdom Aid. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **UN** | **:** | United Nation |
| **UNCTAD** | **:** | United Nations Conference on Trade Development |
| **UNICEF** | **:** | United Nations International Children Emergency Fund |
| **UNODC** | **:** | United Nation office on Drug Crime |
| **USA** | **:** | United States of America |
| **USD** | **:** | United States Dollar |
| **VAT** | **:** | Value Added Tax |
| **WB** | **:** | World Bank |
| **WHO** | **:** | World Health Organization |
| **WPC** | **:** | World Poverty Clock |

# I. INTRODUCTION

*"Our country must not have leaders whose greatest claim to fame is ill-gotten wealth and bellicose speeches at funeral"*
Prof. Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba (2021)

On the 10th of May 2016, former British Prime Minister David Cameroon was caught on video addressing the Queen of England about having invited Nigeria and Afghanistan Presidents, "the two most fantastically corrupt countries" to the UK anti-corruption summit (BBC News, 2016). David Cameroon's statement received a heavy backlash from both the UK, and Nigerians alike. However, it informed my opinion on studying the systemic and persistent nature of corruption in Nigeria's political system.

Corruption is a ubiquitous social phenomenon which has existed in many parts of the world, but its degree or nature varies across different societies. It has become one of the major areas of interest within the field of social sciences especially in the discipline of political science which specializes in the study of politics and governance. Therefore, understanding the complexity of corruption in politics is important when studying issues relating to democracy and good governance in a country.

Nigeria's democracy grapples between corruption and good governance. In Nigeria, corruption is seen as an elite disease because of its prevalence within the public life. It has become a fundamental issue that manifest itself as an indictment of a political problem. The most prominent indictment of corruption in Nigeria is the rapid erosion of the core principles of democracy through abuse of office by public officials. Therefore, in the context of this study, corruption in Nigeria will be critically investigated through the lens of politics and public life. Thus, political corruption will be used to explain the abnormal actions of public officials who deviate from the rules and regulations guiding the conduct of public office. Public officials in this context are either elected, or appointed officers who are selected to represent the interest of the public. There are three generic terms here, which spells out or describes the legal authority of the public officials whose actions tends to violate the norms of public

service; first, elected public officials; second, appointed public officials; third, selected to represent the interest of the public. These three terms can be said to constitute a system of government largely referred to as democracy (Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Dalton, 2001; Weale, 2007).

In this perspective, democracy is explained as an institution of governance with clearly defined principles, which regularly supply itself representative leadership either directly or indirectly through the people's mandate (Held, 2006; Philipa, 2017). The term democracy here is used to describe a set of guiding principles and policies through which government responsibility is defined and conducted. Thus, this dissertation will focus on assessing the performances of these guiding principles of democratic institutions, and the behaviours of the political elites vested with the public trust to promote governance.

On this backdrop, the goal of this dissertation is to use case study approach to analyse the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. This became necessary since most of the attempts from the existing studies on political corruption have failed to produce a model on how to successfully analyse the relationship between the two political constructs. One of the identified problems among the existing studies on corruption and democracy has to do with their overarching methodologies, and convenient generalization. This study believes that such problems can be avoided with case study research design. Although, it appropriates some of the existing methodologies on corruption studies, which are deeply based on cross-sectional surveys. It rejects a sampling technique where datasets are largely based on selected opinions in cross-sectional studies on corruption. Instead, this new approach proposes a case-study based investigation on corruption studies, which allows the use of actual/reported cases of corruption for data gathering.

This new approach will be used for an extensive study on two political constructs, political corruption and democratic performance. By so doing, the dissertation will conduct three important analyses, first, by replicating the past-research on the meaning, causes, measurement, types and relationship of political corruption and democratic performance, second, by using Nigeria as a case-study to test the existing empirical measurement versus the actual/reported cases of corrupt practices on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance.

Third, I will use some of the identified variables to analyse the impacts of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria.

Perhaps, there are a growing number of studies focusing on corruption. However, only a handful of them focused on the predictors of corruption and causes of corruption. None of them directly utilize good measures of democratic performance as a predictor of corruption. Scholars like Treisman (2000), Montinola and Jackman (2002) Anderson and Tverdova (2003), Atkinson and Seiferling (2006) and Lederman et al. (2005) have come close. For instance, Treisman (2000) introduced a dichotomous variable for uninterrupted democracy between 1950 and 1995. He argued that countries with established democracy are not likely to be corrupt. Hence, accountability to the public will create incentives for politicians seeking office to win elections.

The dissertation proposes that this argument of accountability will hold for all time democratic levels. Thus, the impact of accountability on political corruption is not limited to long term established democratic institutions. Accountability at any democratic level will not inhibit the traces of corruption. Even though Treisman's survey is cross-sectional, however, political institutions do not necessarily need to be longitudinal before its system produces accountability. Whereas longitudinal democratic institutions do not guarantee accountability. Nigeria for instance, has maintained a stable electoral democracy for more than two decades, and yet the political landscape of a country considered as Africa's largest democracy is as complex and enigmatic as ever. Its political institutions remain weak and vulnerable to political corruption, no thanks to a political system/culture that protects impunity. Although these undercurrents have been argued to be relative especially among developing democracies, yet different theories have since indicated that countries vary systematically, thanks to the type of political system it operates and the incentives of politicians and policy makers to either promote accountability or corruption. This dissertation argues that an unchecked presidential system, bi-cameral legislative, and federal system of government inhabit corruption. It as well considered other political economic variables, like the system of resource control, rents, government budgeting, and allocation among government institutions.

Secondly, if indeed periodic elections as claimed by Treisman (2000) creates incentive for accountability and transparency among politicians, then countries with

periodic elections like Nigeria ought to have achieved corrupt free political society. Consequently, his hypothesis ignored that politicians divert public resources into influencing elections for personal gains. Hence, when electoral system illegally produces unpopular leaders, the administration may not guarantee accountability.

On the issue of democratic performance, this dissertation argues that while there are sufficient studies on democracy and democratic patterns, however, most of the democratic theorists are yet to consider corruption as an important predictor of democratic performance. Thus, there is scarcity of empirical literature that analyzes the impact of corruption on democratic performance. For instance, Warren (2004) theorizes that corruption is inherently undemocratic. Warren's theory argued that in a democracy, public goods and services are made accessible to everyone and not just for those who paid the price. Therefore, it is undemocratic to transfer public goods to the hands of a few officials because the public will suffer the implication. For this reason, he concluded that corruption is undemocratic. Following Warren's premise, it applies that where corruption appears, democratic performance suffers. This dissertation will capitalize on Warren's theory to examine the causal relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. Similarly, Treisman (2000) explained that a more politically open society such as democracy will exhibit lower level of corruption since freedom of the press and association not only put pressure on illegal political transactions but also exposes abuse of public trust. Literature that evaluated democratic performance is extensive. Thus, the dissertation considers those indicators that its absence could be explainable through political corruption, which are: freedom, accountability, equity, transparency, and justice. These values, as argued by Morris (2009), are antithetical to corruption.

On the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance, the dissertation will examine three existing hypotheses, which are: linear model, it states that, democratization reduces the level of political corruption; Non-linear model, which states that, democratization does not have an immediate effect in reducing the level of corruption, and the conditional effect model, which states that, Political corruption will be lower in advanced democracies with stronger economy and political institutions. These hypotheses will reflect throughout the entire analyses of this dissertation.

## A. Significance of the study

This research is premised on investigating the complex relationship between political corruption and democratic performance, and how this perceived relationship affects good governance. Therefore, the primary purpose is anchored on answering the following research questions: *Does political corruption in a country hinder democratic performance? In particular, what is the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance in Nigeria?* Although related issues have been discussed across the literature, yet most conclusions were either fragmented or complex. For instance, as discussed earlier Treisman (2000), Warren (2004), and Morris (2009) argue that corruption automatically disappears whenever democracy is introduced. Though each of them chose a different methodological approach however, their studies find a significant effect of democracy on political corruption. While others argued that there are no significant relationships between the two but that at the long run, weak institutions will inhibit political corruption, (e.g. Fishman and Gatti, 2002). Thus, as indicated above, researchers have not done a thorough analysis on the relationship between democratic performance and political corruption.

Therefore, the aim of this research is to use a case specific analysis to add some evidence to the literature, since most similar literary undertakings have been based on cross-country studies. To achieve this aim, the dissertation will be structured to meet five analytical objectives:

*First,* to analyze different competing debates and interpretations of literature over the meaning of political corruption and democratic performance, and by extension, types, causes, and the relationship between the two variables.

*Second,* to provide an alternative research methodology approach on explaining corruption as a political problem.

T*hird,* to analyze the perceived impact of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria.

*Fourth,* to examine the role and place of political institutions in promoting democracy and fighting corruption in Nigeria.

*Fifth,* to draw the findings gathered from the study and make tentative recommendations on strategies of anti-corruption policies. Consequently, one of the significances of the dissertation will be centred on the research's ability to circumvent

the mainstream narrative on political corruption as only a rent seeking behavior, into a broader analytic perspective.

## B. Structure of the study

This dissertation consists of nine chapters. Chapter one and two play an important role on the overall thematic development of the study. Both chapters outlines some of the complex academic and political debates surrounding the context of the study which is investigating the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. In particular, chapter one introduces the key elements and motivations of the study which relates specifically to corruption and debates surrounding democratic performance in general, with special reference to Nigeria. These elements consist of some of the overarching problems of the study which was identified to include methodological errors from existing studies on corruption, overgeneralized findings, and lack of clear theoretical framework on the problems of corruption in democracy. It also outlines and highlights the conceptual context within which the study has been situated, and from which the research questions and hypotheses have been derived. It discusses in brief the main objectives of the study which centres on an attempt to explain the overarching issues of corruption as a political problem and how it colludes with democratic performance. These objectives were further made visible in the study as a way of interrogating the roles of democratic institutions in delivering accountable governance in Nigeria.

Chapter two deepens the theoretical background of the study by reviewing some important literature. This was done to build a broader theoretical perspective, expand the scope of the debates, and also to further the theoretical analysis of the study. The chapter consists of three sections, the first section reviews literature on corruption, and political corruption, which includes scholars' definition of political corruption. Two important perspective drawn from Heidenheimer's (1970) definition of political corruption, was used in categorizing scholars' views on political corruption; (i) scholars who defined political corruption as abuse of public office, (ii) scholars who perceive political corruption to also include actions that undermines public interest. Types of political corruption, causes of corruption, and empirical measurements of corruption. The second section reviews literature on democracy and democratic performance. It starts with the debates and competing arguments on the meaning of

democracy. It also develops and analyses some of the related factors on democratic performance and how it shaped democratic principles. The third section utilized theoretical framework in analysing the perceived relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. It examines three hypotheses developed on the effects of these variables, which includes: (i) the linear model effect hypothesis; democratization reduces the level of political corruption, (ii) the non-linear model hypothesis; democratization can only reduce corruption only at an advanced stage, (iii) the conditional model effect hypothesis; political corruption will be lower in advanced democracies with stronger economies and political institutions. Each of these hypotheses was analysed based on scholars' views on how political corruption and democracy interacts in a political system.

Chapter three, four, and five are related with the research methodology of the study. Chapter three explains the research method of the study. The research utilized a qualitative research method, which it considered as the most suitable for this kind of research, especially as it concerns the interpretation of conflicting data in the literature where disputes occur regarding how concepts are defined, measured, and compared. Using a qualitative research method allows the study to use a case study research approach which enables the research to have a country-specific analysis of the study. Case study approach allowed the research to focus on an in-depth analysis of the two main variables, political corruption and democratic performance. This chapter also highlightes the choice of using Nigeria as a case study, due to the high level of political corruption and the dwindling of democratic performance as a factor. It discusses the history of modern Nigeria state. The discussions start from the post-independence political events, highlightes the stages of political developments in Nigeria uptill the fourth republic. It also discusses Nigeria's demography, regions and culture, where it highlighted the role of traditional institutions in government. It points out some of the social factors and challenges which characterized the Nigerian state.

Chapter four deepens the research methodology approach on data analysis. It starts by explaining the weakness in the existing sources of data on corruption which are based on perceptions. It highlights the gaps created by previous studies on corruption that relied on index studies. The chapter utilizes the actual cases of corruption as its primary source of data. It analyses different high profile corruption cases in Nigeria. It applies some of the key theoretical derivatives from chapter two to

analyze the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance through actual cases of corruption. The sources of data used in generating these cases was mainly secondary, e.g. court cases documents, anti-corruption agencies records, Journals, news media etc.

Chapter five builds upon these strands from chapter two, three and four discusses the research findings. It highlights some major historical high-profile cases of corruption in Nigeria. It also compares the anti-corruption drives during the terms of office of President Goodluck Jonathan between 2011 to 2015, and President Muhammadu Buhari betwwen 2015 to 2019. It discusses the two major tools for analyzing the impacts of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria, namely, political institutions and economy. It treats factors like, free and fair elections, political rights independent institutions, executives, legislature, and judiciary.

Chapters six, seven and eight move the research focus from the complexities surrounding the debates and measurement with which the previous chapters were preoccupied to the more robust and germane issues of political corruption and democratic performance. Chapter six expands the scope of the research to accommodate other factors impacting the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. It discusses the perceived determinants of political corruption and democratic performance to include, rent, democratic institutional factors, military spending, and structure of governance.

Chapter seven discusses political institutions in Nigeria. It highlights various scholars' views on political institutions. It examines the role of political institutions in either fostering or eliminating corruption. It discusses the nature political institutions arrangements in Nigeria, namely federalism, presidential system of government, and bi-cameral legislative system. Each of these political institutions was used to describe the inimical role of political corruption in Nigeria. This chapter also examines the various roles of anti-corruption agencies in the fight against corruption in Nigeria.

Chapter eight explaines the perceived major impacts of political corruption and its consequences. It treats some of the identified key factors such as the impact of political corruption on socio-economic development in Nigeria, the impact of political corruption on insecurity in Nigeria, impact of political corruption on ethnic

polarization in Nigeria, and the impact of political corruption on the negative national image of Nigeria.

Chapter nine draws the general conclusion, where it highlights the major findings of the study. It also discusses the limitations and challenges of the study. It also suggests tentative recommendations with more emphasis on strengthening the political institutions and eliminating the politics of elitism. The dissertation concludes by suggesting possible directions for future research.

# II. POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

*"If we don't kill corruption, corruption will kill us"*

President Muhammadu Buhari (2015)

## A. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to put the title of this dissertation into a broader theoretical perspective, using the views from different literatures to theoretically contextualize the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. As a matter of fact, there are several studies, which already identified and utilized some of the main variables of this dissertation. However, many studies in similar perspective came up with different conclusions on the findings, and implication regarding the relationship between these variables. Hence, it is important to acknowledge and review these literatures in order to have a better understanding of this research and how best to describe the mixed predictions. Also, examining and analyzing these existing literatures will enable us to determine the research's independent variables. Since there are far too many proposed variables as determinants of political corruption in most of these studies, which, only a few subsets have a significant effect on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance.

In view of these purposes, this chapter will build on those theoretical discussions by focusing on the key elements of the broader analysis over political corruption which relates specifically to democratic performance. The chapter will consist of three sections. (1) will begin by analyzing theoretical definitions of political corruption as offered by different scholars and related developmental institutions. (2) will discusses different empirical views on measurements of political corruption, highlights different types/forms of political corruption, and theories on causes of political corruption. (3) examines theoretical debates on democratic performance, and the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance.

## B. Conceptual analysis and theoretical definitions

### 1. Corruption

What is corruption? Generally speaking, the term corruption denotes an ambiguous and controversial phenomenon. However, as an English word, the Oxford English Dictionary identified nine most suitable meanings of corruption. These nine may be grouped into three categories with the first referring to the process of decay, putrefaction, and decomposition. The second meaning of corruption signifies moral deterioration and decay; a decline or loss from innocence. However, it is the third general meaning of corruption that this research is primarily concerned with: one that involves dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those entrusted with public power. This third meaning led Robin Theobald (1990, p. 2) to define corruption as "perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor". A view which was upheld by different institutional organizations that study the phenomenon, define "corruption as the abuse of public office for private gains" (World Bank, 1999; United Nations, 2004; International Country Risk Guide, 2004; Transperency.org, 2011).

From this perspective, the meaning of corruption was more related with the negative practicality of activities within the public sphere. However other scholars and public institutions have since criticized this definition of corruption of being too public sector focused and thereby ignoring the problems of corruption within the private sector, or the role of private sector in fostering corruption in the public sphere. For instance, Asian Development Bank (1998, p. 9) defined corruption as the "abuse of public or private office for personal gain". In support of this view, Brown and Cloke (2004) argued that the public sector meaning of corruption is narrow and limited. They pointed out that private individual gains from corruption are not entirely for personal and monetary interest, hence the abuse of political position in a way of subverting or imposing a particular ideological agenda for either personal or group interest against the will of the majority was ignored by public sector definition of corruption. Both approaches to the general meaning of corruption are correct in their directions, however the salient characteristics of corruption anchor on the realms of public affairs with private bargain which is dictated by the policies made by public officials. In this view, this research focuses on corrupt activities within the sphere of governance,

involving public officials elected or appointed to represent public interest otherwise referred to as political corruption.

## 2. Definitions on political corruption

As indicated in the preceding paragraph, political corruption deals with corrupt activities within the public office. This type of corruption is corruption which happens within the corridors of political order. Its main aspects are that it takes place at the highest level of political system, and it involves political officers both elected and appointed, senior public office holders, and those within political powers. It occurs when these officials who make and enforce the laws in the name of the people, choose to act in an inappropriate manner in such a way that it violates the public trust on them.

A comprehensive study that studied the meaning of political corruption was Arnold J. Heidenheimer's (1970) book on political corruption. In his writing, Heidenheimer (1970) offered three most cited definitions of political corruption which are public-office centered, public-interest centered, and market-place centered definitions. Therefore, this dissertation will examine the definition of political corruption within this orientation with a special emphasis on the normative aspect which includes public-office centered and public-interest definitions. The public-office centered definition of political corruption is exemplified in the works of Nye (1967), Huntington (1968), Myrdal (1968), Khan (1996), Amundsen (1999&2006), Morris (1991&2008).

Joseph S. Nye (1967, p. 419) conceptualized the meaning of corruption within the public office domain and exemplified the term political corruption. Nye defined "corruption as a behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close, family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence". This view inspired Khan (1996, p. 12) when he defined "corruption as behavior that deviates from formal rules of conduct guiding a public official in public responsibility". In addition, Nye summed up three behaviors which according to him, may lead to corruption by public officials, and they are: bribery, nepotism, and misappropriation.

While Nye's definition seems to capture the narrow meaning of political corruption, it however, appears to have some weaknesses. First, the three behavioral

indicators he listed (bribery, nepotism, misappropriation), do not constitute enough behaviors which could be considered offensive to moral standards, nor does he explicitly show if those behaviors are not in public interest. In fact, Nye explicitly avoided the use public interest to avoid confusing the concept with its effect. Position that scholars like Rose-Ackerman (1978), Amundsen (1999) have since challenged. Second, Nye's definition again fails to look into traditional/cultural attitude of the people by which this definition can be applied to. For instance, some of his designated behavioral indicators may not be considered as corruption if tested on different cultures. The implication of using certain relativism in this definition makes it difficult for other norms across culture to be accepted as corrupt. Perhaps, we could say that his definition is attempting to impose western values in judgment of other people's tradition, or he is being a bit cultural biased (Huntington, 1968; Myrdal, 1968.) Third, we can clearly see that the definition ignored the fact that corruption is systemic and has a lot do with institutional structure, which its weakness and legitimacy breeds corrupt acts (Warren, 2004; Shah, 2006). Although, while we may argue that Nye's definition is not entirely satisfactory, in terms of its behavioral inclusiveness, handling of cultural relativism, and ignoring institutional structure, it has its merits on dictating certain behaviors as corrupt, especially by a public official.

Nye's hypotheses, which he used to demonstrate how corruption could impact political development vis-à-vis democracy implicitly recognized public-interest dimension by insisting that deviation must be for private regarding. His hypothesis suggested a cost and benefit analysis of corruption. He believes that outside the moralist condemnation of corruption in a negative sense of political development, a reverse looks on corruption could produce some benefits. Nye (1967, p. 419) identified three areas where corruption can enhance democratic performance, 1, economic development; in his words, "if corruption can help promote the essentials for economic development, which is generally necessary to maintain a capacity to preserve legitimacy in the face of social change, then it is beneficial to political development". But my question to this claim is how long can this preservation last? Because once the people become conscious of these incentives used to manipulate them, it is highly unlikely that it will not lead to social turmoil. 2, national integration; Nye argued that political elites who are corrupt often share a sense of community within the hierarchy of political structure. Hence, the notion of public interest often led to protection of

legitimacy and national integration which is one of the main scales used in measuring democratic performance (Przeworski, 1997). 3, government capacity: He believes that countries with weak institutions can strengthen government capacity through corrupt incentives received by political leaders. It can equally lead to creation of supporting institution such as political parties. This could be as a result of external influence seeking political interest in the government. Apparently, on a face-value, Nye's second hypothesis is meaningful especially within the environment where he conducted his studies in East-Africa. However, the consequential impact of corruption is much more disastrous than he can imagine. For instance, the benefits of the study on corruption Nye conducted in East Africa may be possible given the fact that most East African countries at the time of his research were economically and political fragile. Hence, generalizing this method in a resource-rich Nigerian state involves a countervailing cost to survival of democracy. The adverse effect of corruption in Nigeria seems to outweigh any benefit, because political corruption is economically wasteful, weakens political structure and damages government capacity (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

In a similar view, Huntington (1968, p. 66) defined political corruption as "behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends". Huntington seems conscious that narrowing his definition of corruption equally ignored the role of public-interest and marketplace explanation of corruption. Instead, unlike Nye (1967), he employed a cultural explanatory approach using his modernization hypotheses to explain the foundation of political corruption. Huntington suggested that every society developed by passing through different process and stages of political development. Hence, different political societies evolved through different political stages with different experiences. He believed that corruption obviously exists as a result of these modernization effects, and that it became more common at a certain stage of political evolution in the society. Huntington (1968, p. 61) argued that "modernization contributed to corruption by developing new sources of power and wealth, the relation of which to politics is undefined by the dominant traditional norms of the society and on which the modern norms are not yet accepted by the dominant groups within the society". Thus, the conflict of interest between the traditional norm and modern values results into change in the behavioral pattern of individuals and groups in the society, and often lead to corruption. In line with this, Huntington (1968, pp. 59-60) listed three processes

through which modernization breeds corruption. First, modernization leads to a sudden change in the basic values of the society. Second, modernization creates a new dominant class with resources and desperate to assert political influence. Third, modernization encourages corruption by the changes it produces on the output side of the political system. Any society with prior exposure to modernization will likely face the conflict of incorporating new values with existing standard of behavior.

Meanwhile, Huntington's approach which distinguishes corruption levels in both modernizing and modernized societies indirectly recognized the public-interest meaning of the term. Thus, distinguished between corruption in modern and politically developed societies, and corruption in modernizing societies. In the former, he argued that it is more likely for individual use of private wealth to obtain political power, while in the modernizing society, political corruption is seen as an act of individual using political office to acquire private wealth. Perhaps, he acknowledged that in both forms, political corruption involves exchange of political action for private interest (Heidenheimer, 2001).

Gunnar Myrdal's (1968, 937) book equally highlighted the meaning of political corruption through the lens of public office perspective and he defined "corruption as improper or selfish exercise of power and influence attached to public office or to the special position one occupies in public life". Myrdal's definition ignored the use of both public-interest and marketplace meaning of corruption, instead he observed that the challenging factors to the definition of corruption are often caused by sentiments. Myrdal is of the opinion that many discussions on corruption center on the inappropriate action performed by the public officials or politicians, and at the same time ignoring the entire parties involved in the corrupt practices. He believes that much of Western scholars, especially the European scholars deliberately ignored the question about bribe-givers as part of corruption so as to protect their interest. Myrdal (1968, p. 937)wrote, "the fact that Western enterprise are in league with corrupt elements in South-Asia on a large scale explain the disinterest of Western scholars in the problem of South Asian corruption, for business has not been that influential in guiding research". This is in line with the idea that corruption exists only if there's someone willing to corrupt, and someone willing to be corrupted.

Myrdal's corruption definition tried to identify the general bias held by researchers when it comes to dealing with studies like corruption, especially in

developing countries. He believes that most of the corruption labeling to developing democracies are either exaggerated or studied in such a manner that it favors the researcher's narrative, amounting to what he characterizes as "diplomacy in research." In cognizance of these, he developed what he considered as two ways through which the evidence of corruption can be explained. First: "folklore of corruption", according to him, corruption is often seen in people's beliefs, and emotions they attached to these beliefs. This kind of beliefs are often seen on criticism against government, opposition party rhetoric, gossips, and public debates. Hence, with the flourishing of public debates and gossips, it is easy to hear an individual wrongdoing. It equally has to do with how individuals view their government and political leaders. Second, "Public policy, (anti-corruption)" in his view, the incidence of corruption can be exposed as a result of public institutions set up by government to maintain government integrity. In his understanding, the first approach of research on corruption should be to establish the ingredients of the folklore of corruption and the anti-corruption campaigns. These understandings would help in systematic observation of the indebt problems. Myrdal's theory is not far-fetched especially in a political society like Nigeria. The notion of corruption in Nigeria has almost become a cheap talk, and yet no concrete research has been developed outside people's behavioral perception of officials. Equally, the condition of recognizing bribery and the receiver as corruption, and no one is yet to investigate the role of international agents, which in most cases, are the biggest bribe-givers to local counterparts.

Inge Amundsen (1999, p. 3) offered yet another public office-oriented definition of political corruption and defined "political corruption as the manipulation of the political institutions and rules of procedures, and therefore it influences the institutions of government and the political systems as it frequently leads to institutional decay". He argues that previous studies on political corruption had focused on the general causes of corruption and its consequences without showing the mechanisms and level at which such corrupt acts take place. Although "previous definitions and explanations on political corruption were able to establish the necessary involvement of state and state agents in corruption, however, they did not indicate the level of authority at which corruption takes place". This suggests that a distinction between state agents such as political or bureaucratic authority will enhance a proper understanding on the impact of corruption on governance. Although such distinctions are difficult since it involves

separation of politics from administration, and in general sense both political and bureaucratic authorities are both state agents, and as such, act in similar capacity. However, it is important to understand that their methods of administrative performances differ and hence, the level of corruption and its institutional impacts are totally different. Political corruption occurs at the highest level of state institutions, and it involves deviation of authority from the instituted state responsibilities. In his quest to distinguish state agents involved in public office, Amundsen (2006, p. 5) later explained that "political corruption takes place at the highest level of the political system, that it involves major government stakeholders, both elected, appointed and nominated, government ministers, and senior public officers".

Furthermore, Amundsen pointed out that the activities of these actors on political corruption involve two processes. First, the demand side of corrupt transaction: According to him, this process involves a systematic abuse of power by ruling elites as a means of extraction and accumulation of public resources into their individual or group interest. Second, purpose of power preservation: He argued that after illegal conversion of public resources into private interest, these officials seek to extend their hold on power by means of these resources or other corrupt means. In this understanding, Amundsen presented two main factors influencing political actors to act corruptly: first, self-interest, as demonstrated by these literatures, political actors abuse the privileges of their office by seeking to accumulate personal wealth at the expense of public resources. In his analysis on the method of this wealth accumulation, he argued that there are different techniques through which these actors can extract state resources in an illegal way, and they include: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, privatization, land allocation, public contracting, and bidding. Amundsen's classifications clearly capture the various corruption techniques that most Nigerian political actors have been either charged or widely accused by the anti-graft agencies as a method of political corruption in the country. Second, political power: The quest to capture state power or retain power often leads political actors into various levels of political corruption. Amidst the prevalence of political corruption in most of developing countries, it is highly unlikely that incumbents will lose an election. This is because they use all forms of illegal means to maintain power and these means include electoral fraud like: rigging, vote buying, patronage, voter inducement, manipulation of electoral institution and voters' harassment. These behaviors are

equally rampant among developing democracies and are very much the root causes of producing corrupt political actors.

So far, Inge Amundsen's approach on definition of political corruption which is public office centered clearly attempted to distinguish the use of public office agents, especially from the social science-oriented Max Weber's ideal type of rational legal bureaucracy. That is a bureaucracy which is run by hierarchically ordered corps of government or private officials who are recruited and promoted based on objective requirements such as educational qualifications and professional experience and are paid a regular salary which is graded according to ranks (Weber, 1947). Amundsen explicitly discussed public office corruption with a direct link to high level political office holders both elected or appointed.

Other scholars like, Friedrich (1966), Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999, 2014&2018), Warren (2004&2007), Philip (2002&2014) conceived the meaning of political corruption in the public interest perspective. They argued that corruption does not only include abuse of public office but also involves actions which are inimical to public interest and the subversion of public interest to personal gain.

Carl Friedrich's (1966, p. 74) book offered what has been widely considered as the best represented public-interest based definition of political corruption and according to him "corruption exists whenever a power-holder who charged with doing certain things, that is a responsible functionary or office-holder is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for induced to take actions which favors whoever provides the reward and thereby does damage to the public interest". This definition highlights the responsibility of a public agent as a private citizen striving to accumulate personal or group interest at the expense of public good. It somehow points out the intention and consequence of both the actions and inaction of a public official deviating from public trust.

Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999, 2014&2018) captured more objectively the public interest centered approach on corruption when Rose-Ackerman (2018, p. 2) defined political corruption as a condition that "occurs when an official charged with a public responsibility operates in his or her own interest in a way that undermines the program's aim whatever they may be". Rose-Ackerman (2018, p. 3) went further to state that "corruption is one aspect of the tension between private wealth and public

power, and it highlights the limits of self-interest as a model of behavior". This understanding points out that some of the high-level government officials (politicians) do not necessarily need to pay bribe to be acting in a corrupt manner; some of their corrupt acts are furnished with fulfilling their 'self-interest'. For example, let us consider a head of state (president), who in his/her capacity is supposed to effectively manage government institutions, but intentionally ignored it so that at the long run it would be declared incapacitated and consequently privatized. Hence, having Been in the position of power and knowing that he would use his proxy company to acquire such asset during the privatization. Such an act is not motivated by bribery but for fulfilling of self-interest.

Although in her early work on corruption, Rose-Ackerman (1978, p. 11) was very explicit, when she stated that, "the case for corruption often presupposes a strikingly undemocratic standard for government action". A situation where democratic agents (legislator), who were given mandate to represent the objective of the superior (voters), instead embrace third party incentive (bribe), ahead of the principal's aim. According to this understanding, the influence of "bribe" as an incentive becomes an instrument of distortion, and abuse of public interest.

In discussing the effect of bribery, Rose-Ackerman appeared to use a very narrow explanation of corruption, by insisting that any payments that conflict with the principal's goals, and consequently do not pass through the superior, instead made through third party agent to principal agent are illegal payments. Bribery in this perspective, is illegal and has the capacity of corrupting the entire government system by neglecting distributional objectives which outweighs outcome in favor of the few (see also Nye, 1967). Therefore, Rose-Ackerman (1978, p. 8) noted that a "corrupt system of government has distributional disadvantages of benefiting unscrupulous people at the expense of law-abiding citizens who would be willing to purchase the services legally". The illegality of this process produces inefficiencies in managing state transactions, since resources are wasted on corrupt ventures.

Rose-Ackerman (1999, p. 9) states that "corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of the state". She identifies four dimensions of problems of political corruption: first, the background organization of the state and society. Here, Rose-Ackerman argues that the impact of corruption increases the inefficiencies and inequities in the state. Consequently, the state thereby pursues

reforms that aim at reducing the incentives for bribery but ends up increasing the risk for corruption. Second, corruption has different meaning in different societies. It is hard to explain what one considers corruption in different political settings, she notes: "that one person's bribe is another person's gift", therefore, when discussing corruption, cultural dynamics must be considered to avoid pursuing a universal standard in determining people's norm. Corruption is ambiguous and complex and can be better explained specific to each case. Third, structure of the society produces and reduces corruption. This idea points at the functionality of democratic institutions, constitutional structure, and the disposition of anti-graft agencies. She examined the relationship between corrupt incentives and democratic forms and discussed the relative bargaining power of individual and public actor. Fourth, difficulty in achieving reforms: different factors were hindering the anti-corruption drive amongst which the role of external agents, including international actors. As it is witnessed in Huntington's theory on corruption, much attention is often being paid to bribe and its effect without considering the source of the bribe. International businesses in collaboration with local agents usually undermine any efforts to eliminate corruption, since they create incentives through bribes, and in some cases sponsor election campaigns to gain easy access for doing business (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 5). These four conditions highlighted the ambiguities surrounding political corruption, and further allowed a detailed approach in examining the upward impact on democracy.

Mark E. Warren's (2004&2007) writings on corruption further highlighted the scope of public-interest oriented meaning when discussing political corruption. Warren (2004, p. 332). defined "political corruption as the inappropriate use of common power and authority for the purpose of individual or group gain at common expense". In addition, Warren (2004, p. 332) offered four propositional meaning of political corruption. 1) "An individual or group of individuals is entrusted with collective decisions or actions. 2) Common norms exist regulating the ways individuals and groups use their power over collective decisions or actions. 3) An individual or group breaks with the norms. 4) Breaking with the norms normally benefits the individual or group and harms to the collectivity". Warren believes that the disconnects or the challenges of political corruption originated from weak political institutions. He further argued that the problems of political corruption escalated from the modern period when students and scholars started to measure corruption in terms

of moral conditions between people's collective will in the form of trust, and individual moral standard in the form of obligation. He argued that the modern approach in explaining corruption was dominated with ambiguities and complexities, and therefore failed to connect practice with theory.

For Warren, the modern society's conception of corruption was dominated by moral judgments, which were too broad and focused primarily on individual behaviors towards the services of institutions and society without clearly showing the specific political standard enough to judge those behaviors. For instance, Warren (2004, p. 329) noted that some of the modern literature on political corruption conceived it as "abuse of public office for private gain," or "deviation of public trust for personal or group interest," but the evolutions of events in "contemporary democracies have outgrown such conceptions. Although, he insisted that such conception is not entirely irrelevant, yet it does little to identify and clarify common intuitions into the nature of corruption in democratic institutions". What Warren's theory attempts to show here is that it is not enough to only analyze corruption with the moral framework of judgment without connecting it with a specific political approach. For him, political corruption in a democracy is beyond moral conception, because it indicates a deficit in democracy. Therefore, if modern democracies emerged as a result of complementing institutions and associations, a discussion of political corruption must first consider these principles. Part of his arguments indicated that the development of political corruption in democracy was facilitated by two modern conditions of liberal revolutions. First, is what he called *rationalized bureaucracy*. That is a political system where the institution is established with explicit written and publicly available codes that define the norms of public office. Thus, every notion of deviation can only be considered corrupt if it does not follow the codes established for the purpose of this institution. Such acts could be considered as an outlawed behavior. Second, Warren argued that the modern conception of corruption follows the notion that the institution is bigger than the individual that constitutes it.

In this perspective, democratic institutions are circumscribed with distributive powers of decision making which allows public officials the responsibility of promoting and promulgating public interest. Under these circumstances, he believes that the power of checks and balances are with the citizens acting as public officials with the motive of flushing out any conspiracies against public interest. Amidst this

approach, he argued that it is impossible to define corruption in politics with moral conception since it is assumed that individuals naturally pursue their self-interest even against the public interest. In his view, the modern approach therefore attempted to discover behaviors which are enough in defining corruption as a conflict between private and public regarding motivation. The implication of these two conceptions according to Warren's theory is that political corruption within the modernist perspective lacked adequate normative values in judging social conduct. Since according to most modern scholars paid no attention in analyzing norm creating processes at the heart of democracy, instead focused more on explaining individual behaviors. However, Warren noted that the "advantage of modern conception is that by measuring individual behaviors against norms, it can be operationalized into laws, rules and offices, which can guide policy makers on how to design institutions to resist corruption" (Warren, 2004, p. 330).

Furthermore, in his later work, Warren discusses the nature of political corruption in a democracy. First, he acknowledges that political corruption thrives in a democracy, and its adverse effect is a precursor for democratic failure. But then his idea of political corruption slightly differs from the traditional narrative on corruption. Secondly, he identified two understandings of political corruption in a democracy which he explained as both normative and structural. In the former, he argued that both democracy and corruption are endogenous concepts, and its practices are intrinsically normative. For instance, he argued that democratic system comprises of institutions and practices that enable inclusion, such that those who are potentially affected by collective decisions and actions have some influences over them. Therefore, any actions that influence these institutions to undermine the principles of inclusion in the form of exclusion are considered corrupt. In this perspective, political corruption occurs when there is a breakaway from principal and agent relationship from promoting inclusion in the form of exclusion. The latter understanding of political corruption in a democracy according to Warren's theory is structural approach. He argued that modern democracies consist of highly differentiated systems of institutions, which includes executive, legislative, judiciary, civil organizations and market-oriented firms. Each of these institutions operates within collective efforts of achieving inclusiveness in ways that are distinctive to their responsibility. Therefore, the exclusion that political corruption entails in democratic institutions is not unique,

rather they are normatively distinctive based on the domain of practice (Warren, 2007, p. 42). What this means is that corruption within democracies operates with specificity according to the institutions of practice.

However, there is another group of scholars who approached the definition of political corruption by combining both the public-office and public-interest definition (Heidenheimer, 1970, 2001&2007; Philip, 2002&2014; Aktan, 2015). These definitions of political corruption have had a greater emphasis upon the legal and moral aspect. For instance, Heidenheimer (1970) argued that the corruptness of political action is determined by the interaction between the judgement of a particular act by public and by the public elite or by public official. Consequently, he emphasized that the main area of problematic concern in terms of normative value is the meaning of corruption in the area of public office, and public interest. Based on this idea, political behaviors are adjudged corrupt if public officials and the public judge it so and wish it restricted. On the other hand, Heidenheimer identified a more extreme political behavior which is most difficult to judge based on the interaction between these groups, and labeled it as gray corruption. This occurs when either the public officials or the people want an action punished, while the other group does not, or it may be that one group is intense about the issue and the other group is unconcerned.

This criterion of political behavior based on the assessment of a particular political behavior may rest on violation of legal norms or a threat to public interest. In his later works, Heidenheimer (2001) argued that actions which are considered corrupt by norm enforcers in every political system are basically varieties of 'exchange transaction'. The use of exchange transaction in this context represents a technique in influencing a political action. He argued that these techniques vary depending on the specificity obligation of the exchangers. Thus, he noted that the most frequently used technique in the form of exchange transaction in political system is bribery. Understanding, that 'bribery' itself has become a contested concept within the typologies of political corruption. However, unlike Nye (1967) and Rose-Ackerman (1999), Heidenheimer insisted that bribery as a technique of political transaction exchange creates a very specific obligation which directly involves the public officer. Moreover, the more political transaction exchange deals with specific obligation, the more it involves economic transaction. In essence, the public official who accepted bribery as a reward at the same time consented to undermine the public interest. Any

political transaction exchange which is conducted with a specific obligation of subverting public interest to personal gain is considered illegal.

Interestingly, Heidenheimer's work maintained that though political obligations vary in societies, however, bribery is more likely to happen in developing societies. Heidenheimer (2001, p. 142) wrote that "apolitically developed societies are also more highly integrated societies; their citizens are more socialized against any temptation of material gain. In such a society, their civic and social norms are effectively internalized by their members; they tend to give a greater subjective reality to community interest". This view reconciles the fact that the more politically advanced a society attains, the lesser chances of political corruption.

This review finds a similar approach of public-office and public-interest centered definition of political corruption in the works of Philip (2002&2014). Philip sets out what he considered as core criteria for explaining political corruption, and the difficulties of finding a coherent explanation of the concept. At the center of Philip's theory on political corruption was his explanatory design, which he developed as the 'triadic' relationship of political corruption. In this method, Philip (2002, p. 42) argued that for an action to be considered as politically corrupt, three incontestable agents must be involved: "1) Public official as agent A. 2) The Public, as agent B. 3) Third party, as agent C. Thus, in combination of the activities of these agents, he argued that the process of corruption takes place when public official (A) violates the trust placed on him by the Public (B), and in a manner that harms the public interest so as to benefit a third party (C) by providing C with access to a good service which in otherwise C would not have obtained". In this understanding, he argued that most of the existing theories on political corruption had focused on pursuing the ambiguities of defining corruption instead of a clear-cut explanation involving the primary actors as listed above.

Using Heidenheimer's three models' approach (public office, public interest, and market place) analysis, Philip (2002, p. 51) argued that both public office and public interest must be involved in such an action which would be deemed illegal to be considered as politically corrupt. Hence, he contends that, "political corruption is identified mostly with the exercise of public office in violation of public interest for private gain". This explanation sound ambitious and broad, hence if we were to engage Philip in normal students to teacher conversation, we may not be restricted to asking

him, what constitute this violation of public interest by a public official? And to what extent is this violation considered politically corrupt? And are there any limitations of these violations by public officer to be considered politically corrupt? In response to what could have been our questions, Philip (2014, p. 22), in his later work, discussed what he considered as four structures of political corruption. "1) Recognition of formally renounced responsibilities attached to an idea of office or a position of trust. 2) Violation of rules and norms concerning the exercise of that office or trust. 3) The intention of harming of one set of interest identified by the rules and norms as legitimate, to serve others deemed illegitimate. 4. The benefitting of those not formally entitled to benefit, and thereby the subversion of the legitimate ends of the office". This response exposed Philip's theory to different arrays of normative and ethical universalism such as rules and norms, intention, trust, legitimate and illegitimate. It is an approach which seeks to generalize norms and values. Although Philip was very clear that what count as corrupt may be relative, nevertheless our knowledge of it is rooted in an understanding of politics which sees it as a distinct sphere of allocation and exchange and one which can be deposed in ways that attack its basic nature and that we can call corrupt. So, in his view, if we study corruption within the circle of state structure especially one which occurs at the very highest level, there are those incontestable elements of corrupt act which cut across culture and undermines politics in governance. Hence once we acquaint ourselves with studying the rules of politics, one must as well accept its defects in general terms. Furthermore, Philips's theory equally discussed how we can measure corruption, and identified three models, which include: public opinion, legal norms and modern western democratic system. These models go beyond perception of people's behavior as just enough criteria to classify them as corrupt.

Coskun Can Aktan (2015) conceives political corruption as a violation of political ethics. He maintains that in general sense, every behavior which includes bribery, embezzlement, and favoritism has often been referred to as corruption. However, the concept of corruption is much narrower than political corruption. He argued that "the word political corruption is an umbrella concept which also includes corruption" (Aktan, 2015). Thus, he defined political corruption as "the behavior and action of violating the contemporary laws, ethics, religious and cultural norms of the society by actors (voters, politicians, bureaucrats, interest and pressure groups) which

has a role in the decision making" (Aktan 2015). Even though Aktan's work follows the line of traditional pessimism in the definition of political corruption, however he offers a detailed examination especially by highlighting the typologies of political corruption. Similarly, his argument admitted that the name corruption is the name given to certain type of corruption, while maintaining that political corruption differs because of its institutional characteristics. He further enumerated what he classified as properties of political corruption as follows: political corruption appears in the political structure of governance where decision making takes place, political corruption is the activity of a political actor who violates the rules of engagement, political corruption is confidential and illegal, political corruption shows characteristics that extend to other institutions of the society. Finally, he listed types of political corruption to consist of the following: Bribery, extortion, embezzlement and peculation, favoritism, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, pork-barreling, and lobbying (Aktan, 2015). On the overall, Aktan argued that, though the concept of political corruption is universal but is wrong to explain corruption in a general approach. The meaning of political corruption is relative to various institutions of political community depending on the problem definition. Having discussed the general understanding on different views on political corruption, I will now discuss various different methods on how to measure political corruption.

## 3. Political corruption: empirical discussions on measurement

The concept of corruption is by indication a behavioral action that violates sets of moral or legal principles, which are considered as unethical actions. Much of its indicative variables are illegal and abnormal. Therefore, all parties accused of it usually have a strong incentive to deny it or defend themselves of any wrongdoing. Yet, its consequences have been felt in both governances, and the disposition of institutional structures. This understanding has since become a historical debate among scholars of different research approaches focusing on corruption. Many research on corruption have been predominantly dominated by theoretical debates on the meanings and methods of corruption, and in most cases, conclusions are often contested and as such seem unending. Nevertheless, some researchers in the late 1990s deviated from much of the theoretical narratives and brought empirical methods to the discussion on the problem of political corruption. With this emerging trend, some of the contested issues in the debates like, the 'institutional benefits of corruption' were eroded, yet the

methodology encountered a major problem, which we treat here as the problem of measurement.

Corruption as we understand it occurs along the chain of actions between agents' relations. In this perspective of political corruption, these agents-relations as discussed by Philip (2002), operate in a triadic formula, which includes: public officials as agent A, the public, as agent B, and the third party, as agent C. Thus, the traditional mechanism of corruption involves a breach between the will of agent B (public) on Agent A (public official) in favor of agent C (third party). Majority of studies supported that the incentives that lead to these breaches often end in private gain. Hence, since the 'exchange-transaction- between agent A and agent C remains private, the traditional approach of direct measurement of corruption through self-report is not likely to be dependable as it will under-report the nature of corruption due to some socially desirable response. Since in a general sense people would not easily admit that they have broken the law.

Similarly, some of the theoretical arguments on corruption argued that the norms that constitute public office behaviors must be formally written and coded for public consumption, likewise the violation of those norms to be reported and recorded (Amundsen, 1999; Philip, 2002; Warren, 2004). But measurement of political corruption through public records is not feasible, because cases of corruption are private and not reported to public organizations. Public records on corruption only contain a small fraction of exposed cases and it is impossible to ascertain the amount of corruption which has gone unnoticed.

The most used index in the measurement of political corruption in a country is the indirect method. In this method, data gathering is done by means of surveying experts' opinions about the level of corruption that is in the country of interest. The method is widely used by organizations like Transparency International (TI), World Bank (WB), Bribery Perception Index (BPI), Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), etc. It been argued that one of the advantages of using this method is that it eliminates social desirability bias through the means of surveying experts, or public officials, as against the general public, and thus increases construct validity.

However, this dissertation will show that is not true, as the mechanism of this method is faulty. It is difficult to generalize the level of corruption through experts' or people's perception. Most of these surveys are conducted electronically, and there is a high possibility that those whose perceptions are recorded are biased against government policies and may not be presenting the facts. Equally, the method resorts to universal judgement of norms as a yardstick for measuring people's behavior which may not represent the true facts in individual countries.

One of the main controversies militating against corruption research in general is the problem of cross-cultural analysis. The process of using a normatively universal yardstick to detect behavior as corrupt in all countries otherwise refers to as Western Bias. An action perceived to be corrupt in Turkey, might be considered normal in Nigeria. Therefore, the utilization of information generated from both international and local experts guarantees a more homogenous understanding of corruption. However, the weakness of this approach is that its measurement is based on hearsay. People's perceptions about corruption levels in a country might not reflect the actual facts of corruption level. There is a question of whose perception was used to determine the level of corruption. It could have come from political opposition members, press bias, expert pessimism, and even from ethnic sentiment. Most of the existing studies are yet to control these characteristics, and this dissertation can only examine a handful of them especially the ethnic variable as in the case of multi-ethnic Nigeria.

The methodology used by Atkinson and Seiferling (2006), offers an alternative approach in the study of political corruption. In their research, they used a World Values Study which surveyed 52 countries using a random sample of the public perception. One of the questions in their survey was about the level of corruption in the selected country. The result indicated that public perception of corruption correlates with expert reviews. Furthermore, their research utilized a multi-level analysis that analyzed the level of corruption perception between the individual and the state level. Their results indicated that 77% of individual level variation in corruption perception. Majority of people in a country do not agree on the level of corruption in their country while 23% indicated state level variation in the level of corruption perception. The outcome of their research demonstrates the need to focus more on individual level of analysis in dealing with corruption perception. One of the

main weaknesses of their research was ignoring the corruption perception level among different groups in the country. Therefore, for the sake of this dissertation, our level of analysis will be based on group level analysis. This approach will allow us to examine anti-corruption manifestos of the main political parties in Nigeria and look at the ethnic sentiments on corruption perception in ethnically polarized societies such as Nigeria.

Another alternative measurement of corruption was proposed by Andrew Wedeman (2004). In his research, Wedeman proposed the use of public records in measuring corruption in a country. In using this method to determine the level of political corruption in a country, public records can be operationalized to include indictment from anti-graft agencies, court cases, public opinion, and legislative or judicial committee reports. Although this method has been criticized as to capture only a limited incident of corruption, however, this dissertation considers it as the most reliable technique in measuring the level of political corruption in Nigeria. This is because it deals with the real cases of corruption, and as well avoids researchers' bias that is often seen in different research results. Since we believe that corruption is unique to specific political culture, measuring corruption with specific public record will show high level of accuracy determining the level of political corruption in a particular country.

Daniel Treisman (2000) offers a more comprehensive measurement in the study of political corruption. In his studies, he utilized three cross-sectional analyses between 1996,1997, and 1998, and concluded that political culture arising from colonial heritage is a strong indicator of corruption in a country. He observed that countries with British colonial pasts and operate common law system have less incentives for corruption. In addition, he discovered that 46 years of uninterrupted democratic performance that is between 1950-1995 was a strong correlate of corruption. Treisman analysis demonstrated that between 10-30 years of democracy does not consistently correlate to corruption in the three cross sections. While on the other hand between 40-46 years of democracy does. His interpretation of this shows that the current level of democratic performance does not impact corruption. Although his measurement does not indicate current measure current democratic performance, he utilized the measurement of years of democratic stability and consolidation. His studies equally made use of extensive set of political and economic controls of which some of them affected the level of corruption in a country. For instance, he suggested that countries

with large number of natural resources might be more corrupt, than the ones with lesser amount of that. This view lets this dissertation to dissect the relationship between the concept of rentier state and political corruption especially as it is the economic status of the Nigerian state. In the subsequent section of this dissertation, we will use some of these concepts such as rentier state, resource course, democratic stability and political culture as control variable to study causes of political corruption in Nigeria.

In contrast to the view of Treisman (2000), Daniel Lederman et al. (2005) argued that when political institution is introduced as explanatory variable to corruption, the idea of transcended colonial heritage and political cultures disappeared. He suggested that in dealing with democratic performance, democratic institutions operationalized as freedom of the press, legislative structures: including parliamentary and non-parliamentary, institutional stability are more correlate to regime type than to the measurement of corruption. In this perspective, once a country acquires political independence and is able to establish its own democratic institutions, the influence of colonial heritage no longer plays a substantive role. The actions of public officials are to be measured based on the present conditions of institutional norms. Lederman et al, were very sensitive to observe that at the center of democratic institution is press freedom. Hence, determinants of political corruption among democracies are to be measured with how they handle the freedom of the press. In addition to this, they recognized Montesquieu's idea of separation of powers, when they used the presence of legislative institutions as a determinant of corruption. If legislatures are not free to make laws, or do not make laws that promote the public interest, in their view, corruption might have occurred. If freedom of information and legislative freedom are the main tenets of democratic principles.

Mintola and Jackman's (2002) study on corruption provides another basis for this research. Using natural resource as a correlate, they found that low-income countries are more corrupt. They found that countries with low income often have difficulty running the cost of government, and public officials use their office as incentive for personal gain. They tested the size of government and concluded that it does not influence the level of corruption, but discovered that low wages increase the chances of corruption. There is not enough empirical backing for Mintola and Jackman's (2002) thesis. They failed to control other variables that cause corruption outside wages, like power grab through fraudulent elections, nepotism, diversion of

contract, ethnic factor, and historical conditions. History has shown that there is more to corruption than rents from public office.

So far, all the empirical studies reviewed suffered both ideological and methodological weaknesses. Ideological, because all of them have the rooted idea that corruption must be reduced. Normatively, it is a valid argument, because the relationship between historical and political economic factors needs to be examined deeply to understand the effects and causes of political corruption. Evidently, the empirical studies reviewed showed that corruption is either a cause or an effect of democratic regression. However, none of them tested it to be empirically significant.

If political corruption is a cause of poor democratic performance, reducing corruption would be necessary before a country can achieve democratization. But what if the relationship is the other way? That is, if corruption is natural in an undemocratic country? That means, it is poor democratic performance that should be reduced, and political corruption level would reduce naturally. The implication of this would be that a well-articulated and concise reform will be an effective measure needed to reduce low democratic performance. Unfortunately, many of these studies lack this perspective. The evidence from these studies does not show the possibility of reverse effect in the hypothesis on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance that either could affect the performance of each other.

In addition, the empirical research literature has shaped the hypothesis on the direction of causation thereby reducing it into empirical question of whether corruption corrodes democratic performance or vice versa. While in this research, the dissertation may not compete their view, however the dissertation will show that a valid theoretical approach that is enough to explain the hypotheses in terms of its relationship and effect.

Methodologically, most of the problems in this literature were based on cross-sectional sampling and analysis using sectional data. One of the weaknesses of cross-sectional analysis is research bias, or heightened ecological fallacies also known as aggregation bias. What is means is that both cultural differences, geographical and environmental factors influence people's behavioral pattern, hence it is not enough to judge one political culture with another. Instead, a comparable principle can be applied in form of a case study to determine the merits of a research problem. This dissertation

utilizes case study approach to study the degree of influence between political corruption and democratic performance, and how this effect impacts good governance in Nigeria.

## 4. Types of political corruption

As discussed in the preceding sections, different scholars recommended various activities which may be labeled as illegal or corrupt and are used to identify different types of political corruption. As we discussed earlier that corruption is a universal phenomenon which can occur in all sectors of human life. However, this research focuses on political corruption or grand corruption as some studies call it. In the early part of this research, political corruption was conceived as those types of corruptions which happen within the corridors of political power. Its main aspects are that it takes place at the highest level of political system, and it involves political officers both elected and appointed, senior public office holders, and those within political powers. It occurs when these officials who make and enforce the laws in the name of the people, choose to act in an inappropriate manner in such a way that it violates the public trust on them.

According to Aktan (2015), there are different ways through which public officials or those entrusted with public responsibility can illegally abuse the trust vested on them to satisfy either their personal interest or group interest. These include but are not limited to the following activities: bribery, lobbying, embezzlement, graft, electoral fraud, nepotism, patronage, and cronyism. The following tabula design consists of the classification and characterization of these listed types of political corruption.

Table 1 Types of Corruption

| Classification | Characterization |
|---|---|
| Bribery | Bribe is the most referred corrupt practice (Nye, 1967; Heidenheimer, 1968; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Nye (1967) defined "bribery as the use of reward to pervert the judgement of a person in a position of trust". It is illegal transactions between parties with the purpose of gaining favor as against the due process. It involves two agents: the giver, and the receiver. The receivers are often people in the position of authority who act against the defined norms guiding the position they occupy. |
| Lobbying | Lobbying has become a generic term in modern day politics. Its meaning changes across political culture. According to Rose-Ackerman (1978), lobbying occurs especially within the legislative arm of government. In her analysis, she identified the influence of interest group (third party) in the form of an organization (or lobbyist group) seeking to pressure an elected official to represent their interest. The pressure on elected official as she noted, often come in the form of campaign financing, or direct payment to the agent. While the former may not be considered illegal in some political societies, but its activities and objectives are to protect a group interest. The latter is considered illegal and distorts the main objective of the majority. When a person or a group of persons attempts to influence the rule of law through a legislation to favor their interest and distort public interest, it may be considered abuse of trust on the side of a complying public officer. |
| Electoral Fraud | Corrupt politicians hiding under the banner of democratic elections to commit different kinds of corruptions. These include election rigging, annulment of unfavorable election results, vote buying through fraudulent campaigns, manipulation of election results, and arbitrary tenure elongation by political incumbents (Hill, et.al., 2017). |
| Nepotism | Nepotism occurs when people in the position of power arbitrarily share political power with their relatives as a means of favor (Roy, 2021). |
| Cronyism | Khatri et.al (2006) defined cronyism as a reciprocal exchange transaction where party A shows favor to party B based shared membership in a social network at the expense of party C's equal or superior claim to the valued resource. It is an illegal practice that sees those vested with public power appointing their friends into public offices regardless of their qualification for such duties. |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from various sources.

The above highlighted corruption indicators are common at the highest levels of government, which in the other words are considered as political corruption. As Aktan (2015) noted that one of the common features among these types of political corruption is that it violates the contemporary political laws, ethics and the norms of the society. Central to the consequences is that it undermines the effectiveness of governance and weakens political institution. In line with these undertakings, the following sections will consider some theoretical debates on the causes of political corruption.

## 5. Theories on the causes of political corruption

The preceding section attempted to contextualize different theoretical definitions and empirical measurement perspectives on corruption, specifically political corruption. Such efforts have seen a flood of different meanings, approaches, and diverse methods of measurement of political corruption. These clusters of multiple meanings and definitions of political corruption are also closely related to the identification of causes of political corruption. So far, there are no commonly accepted causes of political corruption in the literature, instead as suggested by Huntington (1967) and Aktan (2015) the problems and symptoms of corruption are better understood on country specific basis. Therefore, this dissertation will highlight a couple of suggestions and debates on the causes of political corruption from the existing literature. In the mainstream literature, there are considerably three factors that have been identified as the main causes of political corruption which are, historical, structural/institutional, and cultural. But there is mounting evidence which suggests that the development of political corruption cannot be limited alone to these three variables. Hence, other literatures suggested that motivations like opportunities, risk and consequences of detection, size of government, are all influential factors that cause corruption. This section explores various theoretical discussions on the causes of political corruption, which will set a premise for contextualizing the main causes of political corruption within the Nigeria context in the subsequent chapter.

### a. Historical factors as a cause of political corruption

Some studies have proposed that the nature and level of political corruption in a country can be directly related with their history of political development (Huntington, 1968; Morris, 1991). Three different theoretical explanations can be associated with this idea. First is the notion of legal theory. This theory suggests that the kind of legal codes in a country affect the quality of governance including the control of level of corruption. Treisman (2000, p. 4) argues that countries who inherited "common law legal system, found mostly in Britain and its former colonies is associated with superior government." Hence, countries with the history of British rule are considered less corrupt, compared to others. He argued that this system is possible because of the common law legal culture which consists of a distinctive procedural justice system. This system was designed to accommodate civil service code due to the nature of British bureaucracy. Second theoretical explanation is the idea of Protestant tradition.

This theory argues that countries with protestant tradition are less corrupt. This being that protestant churches have remained historically opposed to abuse by the government. They are less prone to tolerance toward any form of power abuses and corruption. Third is the notion of ethnic fractionalization. This theory suggests that countries that were formed along ethnic lines tend to exhibit higher level of corruption compared to unfragmented societies, (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). Ethnic communities and their politicians are expected to pursue politics that promote their group interest, including illegal awards of contracts and unmerited appointment into public office. This type of politics is a recipe for cronyism and patronage.

**b. Political structure/institutions as a cause of political corruption**

In this perspective, corruption is associated with the deficit in good governance, and weak political institutions. Different studies (Treisman 2002, Fisman & Gatti 2002, Warren 2004, Pellegata, 2012, Acemoglu & Robison 2013) all concluded that weak state institutions characterized by mismanagement, abuse of institutional norms and unaccountability are a recipe for political corruption. There are different theories that associated institutional/political structure to political corruption. For instance, government structure: Treisman (2002) and Fisman and Gatti (2002) agreed that decentralized or federal system of governments are less corrupt compared with unitary or centralized ones. This view is also linked with the size of government. It argues that creating regional or small units of government will help to reduce power concentration at the center and increase high level of transparency and accountability. Additionally, the view contends that a federal structure makes for more efficient and honest government by providing competition between levels of government. Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (1994, p. 27) argued that federal structure in which each level has its own law enforcement agency will reduce the vulnerability of a single law enforcement agency and increase risk of state agents to be caught in illegal act.

As discussed earlier, corruption is an individual or minority action opposed to the majority interest. Hence, once democracy is considered from procedural perspective as being the case that is, free elections and electoral competition, then the association to corruption is less straightforward. Under this condition, several literatures measured different democratic indicators to determine at what point democracy reduces or leads to corruption. There are different opinions about the transitional stage, duration and stability.

Other institutional theories also considered the economic structure of a state. Some of the literature analyzed earlier suggested that richer countries can afford strong institutions with anticorruption incentives, while poor countries are more vulnerable to weak institutions, which breeds corruption. Additionally, studies on rent seeking suggest that politicians in weak political institutions find the opportunity to gain access to sources higher than average rents. Others equally identified countries that highly depended on rents to be more vulnerable to corruption.

**c. Political culture as a cause of political corruption**

Other studies have found a direct link with the level of corruption and the nature of existing political culture in a country (Tanzi, 1994; Rousseau, 2008). Richard Rousseau (2008, p. 86) argues that "development of cultural practices is more likely where cultural practices is not strongly in support of country's democratic institutions". Culture is considered as the subtotal of people's way of life. This means people's political behaviors are shaped by the kind of societal culture they practice. It has been discussed that societies with particularistic culture are more likely to be more corrupt, especially with the practice of pork barrel politics where law and order are negotiated on individual basis. In addition, societies whose culture is characterized by patron-client relationship, and where personal connections are high is likely to exhibit a high level of corrupt exchange.

**d. Rentierism as a cause of political corruption**

The term rentierism is a major attribute of the concept of a rentier state. According to Hossein Mahdavy (1970) rentier state is used to refer to a "state that receives a substantial amount of external rents (natural resources such as oil and gas, and forign aid) as the main part of its budget. Mahdavy identified external rents as those rentals paid by foreign individuals or governments to individual, concerns or governments of a given country" (Mahdavy 1970, p. 1). In the same vein, Beblawi (1990) expanded the definition of rentier state into four categories; first, a rentier economy is one where "rent situation" predominates and in which the creation of rentier wealth is centered around a small fraction of the society, the majority of the population being engaged in the distribution and utilization of the revenues derived from the rent; second, unlike internal rent (land, real estate, etc.), "external rents" can, when they are substantial, sustain the economy "without" the need for a strong productive domestic sector; third, in a "rentier state" only a very tiny part of the

revenue derived from the rent is intended for the regeneration of rentier wealth, most of the profit having to be allocated for "distribution"; fourth, in a rentier state the government is the direct, if not the exclusive recipient of the external rent which thereby falls under the control of a small group (Beblawi 1990, p. 51-2). Beblawi underscored that economies of this nature creates a rentier mentality which contradicts both production and internal taxation ethics. Similarly, Altunışık (2014) defined rentier states in terms of the percentage of total government revenue made up by oil rent. Altunışık identified three key characteristics of rentier states: "First, oil revenues are paid to governments in the form of rents; this means the relationship between production price and market price is very weak due to the fact that oil is a strategic commodity. Second, oil revenues are externally generated through marketing in the global economy. Third, oil revenues are directly accrued by the state" (Altunışık 2014, p. 77). Jenkins et. al., (2011) conceived rentier state as a government that uses its legitimate monopoly over territory to extract significant rents from international transactions and thereby becomes the dominant actor in the political economy.

In this perspective, rents refers to all earnings in excess of all relevant costs. According to Idahosa et. al., (2003), rent is defined as the "difference between the real accrued revenues generated and all real accrued costs of obtaining that revenue which can be termed the net value of particular resources" (Idahosa et al., 2003, p. 106). Rents include revenues generated from exploiting and exporting natural resources. For example, oil, gold, iron etc. Payments to countries that have oil pipelines passing through their territories, payments for the passage of ships through countries water ways. Rent includes among others the payments received as aid from international donor agencies or foreign government and foreign loans. Idahosa (2003) argued that the main purpose of rent collection is to serve as a recompense for environmental degradation and provide aminities essential for quality of life of citizens of the benefiting country. Revenue generated through rents accrues directly to the government not through any productive process but from mineral extraction taxes. Jenkins et. al., (2011) identified two types of rent, direct and indirect rents. Direct rents are those that provide the elite with centralized control. For instance, countries where mineral rights are state owned, production structures are centralized and required for export of such minerals like oil, iron, and natural gas. In addition, 'strategic and political rents' such as; foreign economic aid, humanitarian aid, foreign laons, and

international health assistance, are concentrated in the hands of central government. Indirect rent are rents accrued from a more dispersed and privatized means. Its involves a process where remittances are channeled through a range of private and public financial institutions. For example, remittances earned through export of labour, and tourist revenues. In the later, the state elites benefit from public/private partnerships in resort development, and collection of special hotel and transit fees, which also benefits the government by the large inflow of foreign currency (Jenkins et al., 2011, p.8).

There is scanty literature that directly links rentierism with political corruption. However, growing number of studies like Rose-Ackerman and Coolidge (1995), Rose-Ackerman (1997), Dincâ et al. (2001) and Lambsdorf (2002) associated the seriouness with which state accumulates rents to corruption. For instance, Rose-Ackerman (1997) used "rent-seeking" interchangeably with corruption. Dincâ et al. (2001) used public choice theory to argue that corruption and rent seeking behaviour are specific to the state. They pointed out that rent seeking and corruption are both symptoms of state failure. Whereas, Lambsdorf (2002) argued that the state monopoly of rents invites disputes regarding their distribution. In this circumstance, public interest is often sacrificed by public officers who seek protection of private interest either legally or illegally. Perhaps, as argued by Idahosa et al, (2003) "Legal rent-seeking is the effort by the state to acquire access or control over opportunities for earning rents. While the illegal rent-seeking is the decentralized search for private gain by those entrusted with public responsibility (Idahosa et al., 2003, p. 107). In this perspective, one of the major characteristics of a rentier state is that, public sectors receive rents on a scale that the pace and pattern of their economies are adversely affected. The government in receiving such funds, embark upon large public expenditure programmes without resorting to taxation and without running into serious balance of payments and expenditure problems.

In addition, in a rentier dependent economy, there is no connection between production and income distribution; neither is there any connection between the output and promotion of workers or upward review in their renumeration since revenue is generated directly to government not through any production process but comes from outside the economy (Idahosa et al., 2003, p. 107). In support of this view, Hachemaoui (2012) proposed three causal mechanisms that summed up the behaviour of a rentier state. First, a government that receives a significant part of its revenue through taxing

its population will be confronted by the inevitable development of a strong demand for democracy. On the other hand, when a state receives most of its revenue from external resources, it becomes autonomous from society; the rent, by reducing if not removing the tax burden, neutralizes the demand for accountability in accordance with a rule of the political game contrary to what governs the production state. Second, rentier economy by providing government adequate funding for budgets which ensures the distribution of profits to social groups, enables it, if not to buy domestic peace and attain popular consent, then atleast to suppress opposition. Two effects explains the character of rentier state in this perspective, while the governments through its fiscal autonomy distributes the profits from rents as goods and services (social welfare), (i) the population will progressively depoliticised, (ii) it will grant political autonomy to the state. Third, the clientilist distribution of rent revenues to the population prevents the formation of independent social classes and groups (Hachemaoui 2012, p.5). The outcome of these combined effects produces two results, first, revenue generated through rents does not go through internal taxaton processes, hence creates incentive for corruption and weak political institutions where government lacks accountability. Second, renteir wealth creates a corrupt political elits who stabilizes political authority by buying legitimacy through competitive authoritarianism.

**e. Clientelism as a cause of political corruption**

According to Yildirim (2019), clientelism involves an exchange between patrons (that is, individual politicians seeking electoral office or teams running under a party brand name) and individual or small groups of citizens. Yildirim idenfied two modes of clientelism, relational clientelism and spot-market or "vote buying" clientelism. She explained relational clientelism as a clientelistic relationship which involves a continuous exchange engagement between political patron and clients throughout electoral terms. These exchange engagements are often motivated by substantial benefits such as patronage jobs, social welfare schemes, and pensions. Whereas, spot market or vote buying clientelism involves a process where political patrons provide some level of intermittent inducements to electorates as means of generating electoral support (Yildirim, 2019, P. 22).

In a similar view, Kramon (2017) identified vote buying and patronage as two common type of clientelism in West Africa. According to Rauschenebach & Paula (2019), Vote buying is often directed towards mobilization of supporters of a political

party with an attempt to swing votes in an election. Whereas, Hale (2014) pointed out that political patronage involves the use of state resources to reward individuals who are instrumental to bringing a political party or candidate to government. Regardless of divergent views on its illegality, scholars like Berenschot & Aspinal (2020) argued that clientelism has become an effective and popular electoral strategy in many democracies across the world. For instance, it is legal for loyalist of the incumbent political parties to be appointed as heads of government agencies in Nigeria.

Furthermore, Singer (2014) proposed three ways in which clientelism are directly linked to corruption. First, the link between perceived level of corruption and clietelism in a country may be superficially driven by the fact that clientelism and corruption partially overlap. This premise indicates that many forms of clientelism are illegal. For instance, providing money or other material consideration in direct exchange for a voter's support is illegal in many countries. Awarding outrageous government contracts to political godfathers without due as a means of compensation is illegal and corrupt. The second link between clientelism and corruption is that clientelism creates a political structure in which corruption can flourish. Clientelistic relationship requires that discreation in the allocation of resources and programs where exchanges are directly conducted with little or no oversight. Geddes (1994) pointed out that clientelism creates incentives for politicians to resist reforms that would increase transparency and accountability. In other words, politicians can always undermine existing institutional restrictions that would curtail clientelistic activities. Third, clientelism is linked to corruption because of the high cost in financing political campaigns. Clientelism requires that partie have enough resources to distribute during political campaigns and rallies. There are two possible ways politicians can pay for materialistic handouts. First is by directly diverting of state resources into personal interest, such as manipulation of welfare programs for political opportunism. Second is by diverting state resources into election processes (Singer 2014, p. 6-7). Prevelance of clientelism is further intensified by increased monization of the electioneering process.

Lindberg et al. (2022) studied the relationship between clientelism, corruption and rule of law using cross-country panel data for 134 countries for the period 1900 to 2018. The study distinguished between vote buying and non-programmatic party linkage. Findings from the study revealed inverse relationship between political

clientelism and governance outcome. The study also revealed that non-programmatic party linkages as a form of clientelism is more inimical to governance than vote buying.

Enojoh and Ekele (2021) studied political clientelism as a challenge to good governance in Nigeria using descriptive survey research design to analyse the data of 400 registered voters in Kogi state, Nigeria. Findings from the study suggested a significant negative relationship between political clientelism and governance. The study concluded that political clientelism promotes corruption in a weak political institution.

### C. Democratic performance

As discussed in the introductory part of this chapter, this section focuses on the theoretical discussions on democracy. This includes relevant theoretical debates and arguments on the meaning of democracy, analysis on the related indicators in measuring democratic performance, and finally, a study on the hypothetical relationships between democratic performance and political corruption.

In explaining democracy one can rightly say that it is no longer new to argue that democracy is an elusive phenomenon, which lacks a consensus on a specific meaning. No wonder Birch (2007, 111) insisted that "it is not possible to arrive at a universally acceptable definition of democracy by simply explaining the intrinsic meaning of the term", instead Birch identified two conditions under which democracy can be explained. First, democracy can be explained by observing political exercise and its common application. Second, democracy can be explained by pointing out democratic ideals, and subsequently measure the extent of its practical implication (2007, p. 111).

In line with Birch's (2007) second premise on how democracy can be explained, Clack (2007) suggested that "democracy may be a word familiar to most but it is a concept still misunderstood and misused" especially during a time when political actors assert popular support by claiming the mantle of democracy. Just like Birch (2007), Clack argued that the meaning of democracy rests upon certain values and practical principles, which maybe expressed differently in various cultures and societies. Therefore, to have an objective explanation of democracy, Clack (2007) listed 6 core values that can be used to identify a democracy. 1. Democracy is a government in which power and civic responsibilities are exercised by all adult

citizens, directly, or through their freely elected representatives. 2. Democracy rests upon the principle of majority rule and individual rights. It guards against all-powerful central government, by decentralizing governments into regional, state and local levels, thereby making government accessible and responsive to the people at all levels. 3. Democracy produces government whose ultimate functions is the protection of basic human rights such as freedom of speech, association, religion, identity, and equal rights of all citizens. 4. Democracy is a system of government that conducts the selection of its leaders through election, by allowing all citizens permitted by law to participate in the political process.

Both theoretical explanations offered by Birch (2007) and Clack (2007) on the general meaning of democracy can be summed up into two distinctive approaches through which the meaning of democracy can be explained, which are empirical and idealist approach.

The empirical approach on the meaning of democracy tends to explain democracy in relation to the existence of institutions of governance, principles of governance, government performance, separation of powers, rule of law, election and civil responsibility. While the idealist approach focuses on explaining democracy based on its normative values. These values as was exemplified in the classical ancient texts and political philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle focused on issues of justice, equality, liberty, citizenship, and individual freedom. Whereas most modern scholars for example: (Lipset, 1959; Pzerworski and Limongi, 1997; Whitehead, 2002; Grindle, 2002; Held, 2006; Birch, 2007; Diamond, 2008; Palmer, 2008; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013), explain democracy using empirical approach, these two approaches can be said to capture the constant dynamism of the unending debate on the meaning of democracy.

Held (2006) in his “liberal analysis of democracy” offered yet another approach in explaining democracy. Held agrees that the important thing about democracy is not its definition but explaining how the concept works. According to him, democracy as a political system consists of three models. (i) Direct/participatory democracy, based on Held’s view, this is the first version of democracy as was practiced in ancient Athens. It involves a political system where decision making as it regards the state directly involves the participation of all citizens. (ii) Liberal/representative democracy, according to Held, this is a model of democracy which involves the election of public

officers by the citizens to represent their interest in government. (iii) Variant of democracy, in Held's explanation, this model of democracy consists of a one-party political structure in the process of governance. it involves little or no competition in running the affairs of the state. an example of this model includes communist countries like China, North Korea and Cuba. Following Held's theoretical analysis, this dissertation focuses on representative model of democracy, hence examining the activities of the elected representatives of the people.

This research will utilize relevant explanatory information in Held's version of liberal democracy that are useful to understanding the context of this study. Liberal democracy is a political system that operates through separation of powers, independent judiciary, and offers checks and balances between various units of government (Morris 2009). It is a system of government that relies on accountability and transparency as its tool of governance. In this study, the idea of democratic performance is introduced to examine how the principle of democracy works. Although, I'm aware that the the idea of democratic performance is studied more widely in comparative politics than in other fields of political science. For this reason, a review on democratic performance will be more helpful. Since the central objective is to find a significant link that predicates political corruption.

Theoretically, it is no doubt that democracy is multifaceted, and there is not enough ground to theoretically combine all the dimensions into a common measure of idea. Therefore, this research aims at highlighting and analyzing different dimensions of aggregate indicators of democratic performance, starting from the foundational indicators to the principal indicators.

The takeoff stage in the study of democratic performance on comparative politics started in the works of Seymour Lipset (1959), where democratic performance has been consistently linked to economic development. Although Lipset could not categorically differentiate between the period of democratic transition and democratic stability, his modernization theory served as theoretical evolution in the study of democratic performance.

In his words, "modernization process may be viewed as a historical phase, with democracy as a part of later development" (Lipset, 1959). In a clearer understanding, "modernization consists of a gradual differentiation and specialization of social

structures that culminate in a separation of political structures from other structures and makes democracy possible" (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Lipset (1959) argues that "economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society is the basic condition sustaining democracy, and a mark of efficiency of the total system". In a further add to his view, Lipset (1959) was quick to draw an empirical comparison between European democracies and Latin American countries, and hence conclude that "the more well to do a nation, the greater chances it sustains democracy". Although Lipset was not ignorant of other factors, which he labeled as exogenous explanation, however he was explicit that the measure of democratic performance depends more on the endogenous explanation of modernization theory. While it is not possible to ignore the implicit role of economic development variable, unfortunately it is not an enough indicator to generalize democratic performance. First, at a transitional level, Lipset's theory is wrong because some emerging democracies did not emerge as a result of improved economic wellbeing. He completely ignored the wave of decolonization, and revolution. Second, at stability level, while it is possible that economic development plays a role but unfortunately there's little agreement on what measure of economic development is necessary for democratic stability. He also ignored the notion of resource curse, and increased levels of misappropriation, diversion, and misallocation of public wealth for personal gain.

Another possible way of approaching democratization is Wallerstein's World System Perspective (1980), whereby he categorizes the capitalist world economy into peripheral states and core states. The countries at the peripheral level of world economy are after authoritarian and the power of the elites is partially dependent on their affinity with the core states. A practice which has often been traced to most African countries especially the former French colonies. In this lens of understanding, the important variables of democratic performance in peripheral countries are dependent on the interest of their alliance with the core states, a position the dependency theory of development had earlier articulated, thanks to Andre Gunder Frank (1969).

Consequently, numerous studies of comparative politics have since acknowledged the importance of the world economy in the measurement of democratic performance in a country. For instance, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) conducted

cross-national empirical research of 130 countries on democratic performance, using economic development as their independent variable, which after their operationalization they find out that world the position in the world economy is statistically significant. Hence, they argued that a nation's chances of democracy may depend largely on where it is placed in the world economy. In their analysis they emphasized that "the core economies which are characterized with high wages, high profits and capital-intensive industry are bound in a lopsided exchange with periphery economies known for low wages, low profit and labor-intensive industry, thus the constraints imposed by the international economy seriously diminish the likelihood of successful democracy in periphery" (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994, p. 905).

In essence, this line of thought upholds that the impact of economic development on democracy is conditioned by a country's position in the world economy. The problem with this perspective, using status in the world economy as a variable, is that it completely undermines political particularities of individual countries.

Some studies find a strong connection between traditional political culture and democratic performance. The central arguments anchor on the premise that the condition of pre-democratic institutions influences the outcome of democratic performance. For instance, the first debaters of cultural ties with democratic performance like Bollen (1979), find a strong tie with countries with protestant culture and democratic performance. Protestantism was a revolt against Catholic hegemony, and challenge against absolutism in the leadership of the church as seen in Martin Luther, and John Calvin Reformation (Selderhuis, 2017). This position was amplified by Lipset when he claimed that, "Protestant colonial heritage made it easier for their colonial peoples in developing democratic politics, which already have systems of electoral representation and local governance prior to independence" (Lipset, Seong, and Torres, 1996).

Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) argued that existing traditional institutions before the introduction of democracies determine whether the political system would survive. In their words, they argued that strong pre-existing traditional institutions created a "background through which inclusive regimes could develop", and consequently, countries without such historically traditional institutions would find it harder and unlikely to move towards inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013, p. 363).

According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), observed that nations without strong political traditional institutions are often drenched into extractive institutions. The basis of extractive institutions is "an elite who design economic institutions in order to enrich themselves and perpetuate their power at the expense of the vast majority of people in the society" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013). Thus, the different histories of social structures of the countries lead to the differences in nature of the elites and in details of the extractive institutions. This understanding supports the views of colonial perspectives on development which maintains that the nature of institutions inherited by colonies after decolonization determine the future of political development in a country, an argument which led Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) to compare the political development between British colonies of North America and West African states.

The third wave of democratization process which started in 1974 shifted slightly from the traditional discourse on democratic performance indicators into measuring variables of existing democracies. This approach separated the idea of democratic performance from the idea of transition to democracy. The first methodology employed was to categorize democracies as established and non-established democracies, an Approach Lipset (1959) already undertook when he classified democracies into ranked and non-ranked democracy. Gwangeun Choi (2016) argued that democratic performance of established democracies is both uniform and superior to non-democracies. Perhaps, it would be inconceivable to measure democratic performance determinants at similar level across the two categories.

Hence, explaining democratic performance within the context of established democracy has since increased democratic performance variants, especially with the minimalist perspective. For instance, Foweraker and Landman (2002) identified three determinants for measuring democratic performance: regime endurance, government efficacy, and quality of democracy. They operationalize the quality of democracy by measuring media freedom, human rights, the rights of the minorities, and equality among the citizens. But they ignored the significance of regime endurance, and government efficacy because of the following reasons, (i) "It is not evident that regime endurance provides a measure of democratic performance," (Foweraker and Landman, 2002, p. 45). This opinion is vague as it cannot be tested to be true since it is not possible to test the quality of democracy without first considering the survival rates of

different political regimes across different political cultures. (ii) Foweraker and Landman's thesis ignored "government efficacy" in their assessment of democratic performance. This, therefore, made their analysis to be self-contradictory, since it is not possible to study democracy without considering the effectiveness of the government. Therefore, it is not enough for Foweraker and Landman (2002, p. 46) to have concluded that "quality of democracy, understood as the degree to which a system meets such democratic norms as representativeness, accountability, equality and participation" as the only measure to democratic performance, which are largely dependent on their so-called intrinsic variants of established democracy.

The third of wave of democratization process implies that to understand the outcome of democracy we must first study its processes. Thus "democratization is far from a linear process as it involves complex dynamics, timing and sequences between transition, liberalization, and consolidation" (see Sanchez and Macuane, 2019: 19 citing, Schneider & Schmitter, 2004). While this research considers the Foweraker and Landman's method as over ambitious, their important theoretical contribution cannot be ignored. In the following paragraphs, this research will deepen its analysis on the three identified determinants for measuring democratic performance, regime endurance, government efficacy, and quality of governance.

The idea of regime endurance measures the period of uninterrupted democracy. Uninterrupted democracy can be operationalized in terms of political stability, existence of periodic election, political turnover, and electoral reforms. Tom G. Palmer (2008) argued that a stable democracy is that which periodically organizes elections where one party replaces another with a healthy opposition. The important factor of explaining democratic performance within the scope of third wave democratization is that it opened ways to understanding the internal functionality of democratic performance through accessing the core values and principles of democracy. Hence, in accessing democratic performance as Lipset (1959) argued "one must be able to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries and say democracy has emerged out of these conditions and has become stabilized because of certain institutions and values, as well as because of its own internal self- maintaining processes". These internal self-maintaining processes must include periodic elections, freedom of the press, rule of law, separation of powers, independent judiciary, minority

rights, transparent governance and equity. Therefore, any measure of democratic performance must be based on these factors, which raises more questions than answers.

Huntington (1991, p. 359) argued that elections are "the vehicle of democratization as well as the goal of democratization". Democratization in this research has been explained based on certain social requisites such as economic development, pre-democratic political culture, power sharing, political institutions and international context (Norris, 2008; Teorell, 2010). Whereas, democratic performance, as it is used here is analyzed as a reference to political rights, checks and balances, civil liberties, rule of law, and the quality of elections (Schneider & Schmitter, 2004). Elections among democracies operate as a way of either seeking or renewing legitimacy by politicians who seek political offices. This proposition has been contested by different scholars, hence raising a prolific debate as to how election affects democratization process. Lindberg (2006, p. 149) argues that "regular elections in new electoral regimes fosters democratic qualities". Using Lindberg's main argument, even if regular elections held in Nigeria were flawed, it contributes to democratic development in the long run as it stimulates processes and behavior that influences citizens and institutions, practices and attitudes toward democracy. Following this perspective, it is expected that elections prompt voters to hold their representatives responsible by demanding accountability and effective governance.

Bogaards (2013) argues that while it is true that election legitimizes democracy but insists that multiparty elections can also produce different political outcomes, as it flourishes non-democratic leaders. In Bogaards' 2011 survey where he analyzed 43 countries in sub-Saharan Africa that conducted about 324 multiparty elections, he concludes that only five of those that held at least two consecutive multiparty elections went through democratization process by election, and two of these reverted to electoral authoritarianism. Following his findings, Bogaards suggested that democratization by election debate requires a new approach that will enable a combined electoral reform that favour alternation to power. Sanches and Macuane, (2019, p. 21) argues that democratization through election has different patterns of stability and change, with free countries remaining free and electoral autocracies remaining autocracies.

On the other hand, Levitsky and Way (2002, p. 52) disagree with the idea of democratization by election and argue that such notions amount to "democratization

bias" and makes the word "transitional" misleading. In their view, elections can both be used by democracies and nondemocracies, especially what they referred to as "competitive authoritarianism". According to Levitsky and Way (2002, p.53) in competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are used as a means of obtaining and exercising authority, however the regimes fail to meet the minimum standard requirements for democracy, and they enumerated four minimum requirements of modern democracy: "(i). Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; (ii) All adult citizens possess the right to vote; (iii) Political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal are protected; (iv) Elected authorities possess real authorities to govern in that they are not subject to tutelary control of military or clerical leaders" (2002, p.53). Levitsky and Way argue that competitive authoritarian regimes violate every one of those criterion and create an uneven playing field between opposition and government. In this instance, they argue that elections are regularly held and are generally free from massive fraud, incumbents abuse state resources, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, deny opposition of adequate media coverage, in some cases spy on oppositions and journalist, manipulate election results through state agents. They conclude that a regime with such abuses cannot be called democratic even if it operates under the guise of democratic institutions. Under Levitsky and Way's arguments, even if "political turnover" as is in the case of Nigeria's presidential election in 2015 occurred, it does not amount to established democracy. On the contrary to the views of Levitsky and Way, Lodge (2013) argues that democracy establishes itself when an incumbent party loses an election and consolidates when at least two turnover occurs after the introduction of election. This means that, if an incumbent party, despite its abuse of power fails in an election, it shows that voters demonstrated their lack of trust to the incumbents and therefore held them accountable through the election. Under this circumstance, it can be said that democratic development is in effect.

On government efficacy, the question of whether government effectiveness can be used to measure democracy has been around for decades. As captured by Lee and Whiteford (2009) effectiveness is a measure of the quality of output or of the extent to which desired outcomes are achieved. According to Classen and Magalhaes (2022, p. 872) there are two main trajectories of democratic attitude in explaining government

effectiveness. 1. democratic support, it refers to "the extent to which a public approves of a democratic system and rejects any autocratic alternative. 2. democratic satisfaction, it refers to capturing an instrumental or performance-based appraisal of the regime". While both approaches seem to correlate in measuring democratic performance, yet different studies treated them separately. A large number of literatures treated democratic support in line with its antecedence and consequences on democratization (Rose-Ackerman et al., 1997; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011; Magalhaes, 2014; Classen, 2020). Democratic support has equally been linked with positive economic growth, and control of criminal violence (Kotzian, 2011; Visconti, 2019).

There is also a large number of literature which treated democratic satisfaction in terms of performance appraisal and support for incumbents (Waldron-More, 1999; Klingeman, 1999). Democratic satisfaction was also used to relate evaluation of economic situation and economic vitality. The distinction between these two approaches shows that, democratic support is an attitude derived from citizens' level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction that comes from the ability of the government to satisfy their demands. A "quid pro quo" kind of relationship between the citizens and those in government while on the other hand, democratic satisfaction indicates an attachment of the citizens to political objects for their own sake. In a multiparty democracy, members of the ruling party are often satisfied with the performance of those in government.

In a similar view, Classen and Magalhaes's (2022) research identified three indicators of government effectiveness that measure democracy, "(i) economic performance, (ii) quality of health care, and (iii) control of violent crimes" (2022, p. 879). In measuring economic performance, Classen and Magalhaes (2022) used three indices, (i) GDP per capita, measured per annum. This was used to control the level of economic development per annum. Utilizing data from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Penn World Table. (ii) Inflation rate, they used data from IMF and sign-log transformation which was applied to prevent episode of hyperinflation. (iii) unemployment rate. (ii) Quality of health care; to measure the quality of health care provision, Classen and Magalhaes (2022) utilized Healthcare Access and Quality Index from "Global Burden Disease" (GBD) where "age-standardized and risk standardized death rates for 32 causes from which death should not occur in effective

healthcare system" (2022, p. 879). They also measured infant mortality and the condition of primary healthcare. (iii) Control of violent crime; Classen and Magalhaes's (2022) measure on violent crime was based on the log of deaths attributed to violent crimes based on interpersonal violence or victims of homicide. One of the features of Classen and Magalhaes (2022) analysis is an addition of new indicators in measuring government effectiveness which was explained as quality healthcare and control of violent crimes.

Furthermore, Classen and Magalhaes (2022) used corruption perception as a control variable of government effectiveness in measuring democracy. They adopted Bayesian Corruption Index BCI where measurements of corruption perception were based on data from 17 of 110 survey questions about perceived abuse of power for private gain. Classen and Magalhaes (2022) argue that corruption perception is used to measure support for democracy, in rejection of previous studies that finds corruption perception as correlate of democratic perception. Following the views of Classen and Magalhaes (2022, p. 886) on government effectiveness in measuring democracy, "it is believed that citizens support for democracy makes a difference for democratic survival". This support for democracy they argued, rest upon the effectiveness of the government. More so, "government inability to tackle corruption in the eyes of the citizens undermines democratic satisfaction". The following section will analyze the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance in line with the literatures reviewed.

## D. Theoretical framework

### 1. Relationship between political corruption and democratic performance

The studies reviewed above have shown the arguments and empirical viewpoints on analyzing the nature of political corruption. Although corruption is an encompassing phenomenon which is believed to cut across all fields of human endeavor, however, its impact on regime formation is perceived to pose disastrous consequences on political stability. Thus, studying the relationship and effect between political corruption and democratic performance is in order.

The first theoretical attempt to explain the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance came into light in the work of Mark E. Warren (2004), who insisted in his studies that corruption is inherently undemocratic, since its

existence deteriorates democratic performance. In addition, he argued that corruption undermines democratic procedures as it breaks the connection between collective decision-making and people's power to influence collective decisions through freedom of speech and citizens' voting rights. As Nye (1967) indicated, political corruption breeds inefficiencies in governance, and reduces government effectiveness. Hence, Warren is of the opinion that political corruption is inherently undemocratic and therefore its existence degenerates democratic performance. In line with this mode of thought, several studies have since emerged with different hypotheses about whether political corruption affects democratic performance or vice-versa. In the following section, I will briefly summarize the main theoretical models with each of the hypotheses put forward to enable us to understand what is known so far, and what is yet to be discussed based on problems of this research.

## 2. The linear model effect hypothesis

H1 = Democratization reduces the level of political corruption.

This means democracy has a linear negative effect on corruption: the more democratic a country becomes, the less corrupt it becomes. This hypothesis forms the most common argument among democratic crusaders and advocates. For example, the George W. Bush administration considered the spread of democracy as a primary global goal. This objective was initiated to foster good governance and increase checks and balances to reduce corruption. Some of the democratic optimists would argue that this reason is the very essence of democratic ideals, which in principle is based on justice, accountability, equality, citizenship, freedom and transparency. These values, as argued by Morris (2009) are antithetical to corruption. Similarly, Treisman (2000) explained that a more politically open society such as democracy will exhibit lower level of corruption since freedom of the press and association not only puts pressure on illegal political transactions but exposes abuse of public trust.

This hypothesis is also associated with the public choice literature, which investigated how the introduction of elections and political competition changes the incentive structure of politicians (Montinola &Jackman, 2002). Under this assumption, it shows that the desperation by politicians to be elected or retain power has the incentives to create transparent political transaction. Since politicians anticipate that their corrupt political antecedence could be sanctioned by voters and therefore act in a way that represents public interest and shun corruption (Pellegate, 2012). In addition,

electoral competition would give the opposition parties the incentives to expose the corrupt involvement of their adversaries, thereby creating awareness for transparency. As noted by Kefer (2005), democracy forces public officials to be accountable to voters, and presumably, voters prefer less over more corrupt officials. The assumption in this hypothesis is that democracy, through the use elections as its tool of governance breeds competitiveness among officials, hence, lack of competition encourages corruption (Sahel et al., 2009).

A similar proposition to this hypothesis points out that the duration of democratic regimes is negatively linked with corruption. Literatures supporting this argument explored how democratic consolidation in the long term will increase in the stability of democratic norms, foster mechanisms for accountability, decrease the level of corruption (Lederman et al., 2005; Pellegata, 2012). The philosophical discussion surrounding this hypothesis resonates the argument that democratic regimes are less corrupt in comparison to non-democracies. This argument has in recent times become one of the most heated debates in comparative politics. To this effect, recent empirical surveys utilized 'continuous indicators' of democracy or the strength of democratic institutions, hence tested for the effect of variant degrees of democracy and comparing corruption levels not only between democracies, but across different stages of democratization. The outcomes of most of these studies are inconclusive, or rather produced mixed finding according to different measures of democracy.

### 3. The non-linear model effect hypothesis

H2 = Democratization can only reduce corruption only at an advanced stage.

Different studies have proposed a non-linear model effect of democracy on corruption, thus suggesting that democratization at early stage exacerbates the level of corruption in a long period, and only reduces corruption at an advanced stage. This hypothesis can be explained using two sets of theoretical approaches. First, the non-linear effect is explained by a lagged negative effect of democratization on corruption, this means that, the mechanisms through which democratization reduces corruption takes a longer period to be effective. This approach was first captured in the work of Huntington (1968) as was discussed earlier. He perceived corruption as a resultant effect of "rapid modernization" of the underdeveloped societies, which introduces normatively ideological confusion and as well introduces the possibilities of influencing public choice. In his perspective, the transition to democracy by evolving

modern societies creates new political roles to the people, and a larger more diversified, and systematic political societies are created. Thus, the original and communal foundation of trust built on patrimonial/traditional society is lost. In this new social system, public transactions are no longer being guided by trust, but by contracts and rule of law, which may not be fully developed. Hence, these interim periods create opportunities for public officials to abuse public trust or engage in corrupt activities. Furthermore, Huntington (1968) argues that democracy creates frequent platforms for writing new laws and constitutions, thereby enabling environments for new sources of wealth and power. Similarly, Pellegata (2012) supported this hypothesis by explaining that at the early stages of democratic transition, the mechanisms for electoral control are usually weak and are not able to sustain an effective accountability between politicians and voters.

In addition to the staggering institutional structures among new democracies, and the lengthy period of norm stability which aids in exacerbating political corruption, is the attitude of political rent seekers whose actions are often aggressive and divert resources from public goods. This behavior is prompted by "top-down control effect" being exercised by the previous regime which had authoritative control on the structure of governance. Therefore, a transition to democracy creates some sort of lacuna in the chain of control, which offers weak checks and balances lack of accountability structure thereby nourishes corruption in the short term (Bäck&Hadenius, 2008). Lack of checks and balances in the early stage of democratization is an important factor why one should expect higher level of corruption in nascent democracies. Apparently, if the punishment of politicians depends on the actions and activities of politicians themselves, then the threat of punishment is not credible.

The second theoretical approach to explaining this hypothesis is linked to the assumption that most of the development indicators of democratization may have contradictory effects on corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). This view challenges the notion of the first hypothesis that suggested that electoral competitiveness in democracy creates incentive for transparency. Instead, it suggests that electoral competition and its political uncertainties create incentives for politicians to engage in different forms of political corruption such as thuggery, clientelism, vote buying, illegal party financing, and other form of electoral frauds, (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

However, on the long run when the mechanisms of checks and balances stabilize through strong institutions, it is expected that transparency will increase.

Similarly, Mungiu Pippidi (2006) offered an alternative explanation of the non-linear model effect hypothesis. She explained that the transition period to democracy does not necessarily disorganize the social norms and condition of the governing structure. Instead, the introduction of political competition breaks the monopoly of power by the ruling elite, only to allow new elite groups to compete for state rents. In her view, democracy increases "competitive particularism" which exacerbates the level of corruption, except until stronger checks and balances are introduced to control accountability and transparency.

**4. The conditional model effect hypothesis**

H3 = Political corruption will be lower in advanced democracies with stronger economies and political institutions.

The assumptions of this hypothesis show that the level of political corruption in a democracy is dependent on other factors instead of only direct linear or non-linear effect models of explanation. Two sets of theoretical approaches can be associated with this idea. First one implies that democratization leads to a more transparent and accountable governance, but the structure of country's economy creates incentive for high level of corruption. This notion is supported by the proponents of 'rentier state theory'. Rentier states according to its first proponent Hossein Mahdavy (1970) are states which depend heavily on external rents as primary source of income. In this perspective, "external rents" are attributed to transactions conducted with foreign enterprises in the form of revenue or political aid. However, this approach is linked with countries which depend heavily on the revenue generated from the export of their natural resources. The argument behind this hypothesis is that democracies with this type of economic structure breeds more corruption. For instance, Acemoglu and Robison (2013) argue that countries that are heavily dependent on natural resources, especially for financing of government budgets breed unaccountability since the state does not need the help of its citizens to run its affairs. In a circumstance like this, a country may have a flourishing democracy with other strong democratic indicators but have very high level of political corruption.

In addition, Charron and Lapuente (2010), using classical political economy perspective, suggest an alternative explanation. They argue that, though democratization increases political consciousness and more responsiveness to citizens' demands, however those demands vary based on the level of economic development of a country. In countries with poorer economies, people's demands are likely to favor immediate consumptions, like food, and money, instead of future consumption. Hence, citizens would be more likely to demand the provision of immediate needs through clientelist exchange and patronage networks, in preference to allocation of public resources that will benefit the public in the long run. Perhaps, in countries with richer economies, citizens' demands will be to pressure government to invest in public goods that will improve the quality of government and reduce the level of corruption (Charron and Lapuente, 2010, p. 451).

In conclusion, this chapter draws together major themes that have emerged from the review of literature on political corruption and democratic performance. The chapter dealt extensively with debates relating to how to define and measure corruption and in extension political corruption. It started with debates on the general definition of corruption, before it swiftly shifted to political corruption, together with debates on the types of corruption, causes of corruption and empirical measurements of corruption.

The second section of the chapter was also dominated with debates on the meaning, procedure, measurement, and application of democracy. It discussed the related definitions of democracy before shifting to the meaning of democracy based on its evolving periods. Two categorical approaches were used to explain the evolution of democracy, the idealist and the empirical meaning of democracy. While the idealist approach was used to sum up the normative meaning of democracy where factors like justice, equity, equality, liberty and freedom. The empirical approach was used to sum up the meaning of democracy based on certain factors that affects political institutions such as, principles of governance, government performance, separation of powers, rule of law, election and civil responsibility. The third wave of democratization however shifted slightly from focusing on the ideals rather defined democracy based on process and principles.

The third section of the chapter drawing form the two strands together focused on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. It

utilized the three existing hypotheses from theoretical frameworks which are linear, non-linear and conditional hypothesis to explain the interactable relationship between political corruption and democratic performance.

# III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

## A. Introduction

The preceding chapter of this dissertation has attempted to theoretically contextualize the main thematic elements of this study, which are political corruption and democratic performance. It offered insights on the various methodological approaches used by studies that were reviewed. This chapter focuses on the research methodology. It analyzes relevant information that significantly affects the research approach. It adopts a qualitative research method, which allows the use of the case study approach to be used in introducing new research dynamics that this dissertation aims at achieving. The use of case-study method is necessary to extract both primary and secondary data of the study. The primary data of the study will be gathered through an analysis of some actual cases of political corruption in Nigeria, which is made available as court documents, newspaper reports, and other published cases under investigation by the anti-graft agencies in Nigeria (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC)), party manifestos, presidential speeches. Whilst the secondary data will be analyzed based on existing data from relevant research documents like Transparency International (TI), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the World Bank (WB), published research, journals, and text-books. Both approaches aim to eliminate the data crisis posed from the existing studies which relied on perception surveys, especially corruption rating organizations. Therefore, the following sections of this chapter will focus on these identified methods for data gathering of the study.

## B. Methodological techniques

### 1. Qualitative research and the choice of using case study analysis

The literatures consulted in the preceding chapter of this dissertation on the impact relationship between political corruption and democratic performance were not explicit about which particular methodology should be applied on this study. Instead, some of their findings consists of a combination of theoretical and empirical

approaches in dealing with related outcomes. The consulted literature indicates that political corruption and democratic performance are culturally normative, thus dealing with human behaviors, interpersonal relations and moral judgements. In this circumstance, this research adopts qualitative case study design which it considers as the most suitable methodological technique that will robustly investigate the research problems in line with its objectives.

Qualitative research method involves the process of accurately describing, decoding, interpreting and assigning meaning to concepts in their social contexts (Fryer, 1991). It is suitable in interpretation of conflicting data in literature where disputes occur regarding how concepts are defined, measured and compared. It allows for subjective and independent study which is beneficial in conducting case study research. Qualitative research method is open to interpretation of social data where disputes occur in literature regarding how concepts are defined and measured.

Another important advantage of using qualitative research is that it offers the researcher an opportunity to gain a complete picture of the issue under investigation. In particular, it asks questions on how and why decisions are made. Qualitative research is suitable in investigating social and cultural relationships of behaviors and its consequences within the society. This research aims at utilizing this priviledges by critically exploring the relationship between democratic performance and political corruption and the consequences of its impact in the society. Therefore, the best approach to investigate such relationship and performance of the two phenomena at society level would require a case study analysis.

Similarly, as pointed out by Gerring (2007), that part of the advantages of using case study in research is that it helps in generating new hypotheses, explains causal mechanisms, overcomes heterogeneity in population samples, provides deep scope of proposition, and produces strong internal validity with causal strength. Thus, employing a case study approach in this dissertation offers an intensive study into examining existing gaps in the previous study of this sort and how best it can tackle the research questions.

Stake (1995) suggests that a “case study is both the process of learning about the case and the product of our learning” 1995, p. 237). Stake’s work characterizes three main types of case study: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. Intrinsic case study is

conducted to learn about a unique phenomenon. Using intrinsic case study approach, the researcher should be able to define the uniqueness of the phenomenon, which makes it different from existing phenomenon. Meanwhile, the instrumental case study studies a particular case to gain broader knowledge of a phenomenon. The collective case study involves the process of studying multiple cases simultaneously in an attempt to gain broader knowledge of a particular issue or phenomenon. This dissertation uses the later type of case study, collective case study which involves studying one phenomenon with multiple cases in other to gain access to more information. This approach in this study focuses on different arrays of information of political corruption in Nigeria, which involves data from different documents such as court cases, newspapers, published index studies and surveys.

Crowel et al. (2011, p. 1) point out that a case study approach is "particularly useful to employ when there is a need to obtain an in-depth appreciation of an issue, event or phenomenon of interest, in its natural real-life context". Hence using a case study approach allows this dissertation to focus on an in-depth analysis of both individual and group political behaviors especially as it affects governance in Nigeria. This is a view that Yin (2018, p. 45) agrees with when he defined a case study as "an empirical method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon ("the case") in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident". In this perspective, case study approach is necessary for a study of this nature since it investigates real life social phenomenon like political corruption and democratic performance and aims at conducting an in-depth analysis on how the relationship of this variable affects governance in Nigeria.

Furthermore, Yin (2018) identified three reasons why case study approach would be suitable for this dissertation, (i) the form of research question posed: one of the research questions of this dissertation deals with the critical exploration of the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance? In particular, are there any significant effects of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria? This is related to what Yin (2018) calls descriptive case study. Descriptive case study involves the process of observing and gathering information about the subject of research and comparing them to existing pre-existing theories to determine the outcome of events. (ii) The control a researcher has over actual behavioral events:

Yin (2018) suggests two sources of evidence in case study approach (a) direct observation of events being studied, and (b) interviews with persons who may be involved in the events being studied. However, this dissertation relies on data generated through proven court cases on political corruption, and other reported cases of political corruption on news-medias and index studies. (iii) Focus on contemporary phenomenon: both phenomenon investigated in this study, political corruption and democratic performance, are contemporary social phenomenon that describe political life of Nigerian state.

Case study approach arises in this study out of the desire to understand a complex social phenomenon. It is also a way of attempting to introduce a new research mechanism for explaining complex and enigmatic social phenomenon such as corruption. This method allows the researcher to have an actual understanding of the subjects being studied, especially dealing with sensitive social phenomenon like corruption which its practices are performed in secrets. A proper and comprehensive research on such a concept requires a case study approach which enables data gathering from different sources. As indicated earlier, the primary source of data for this research depends on various sources which includes, reports from actual court cases on corruption; these reports are in form of documents from court judgements, court proceedings, and testimonials, corruption prosecution reports from different anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria (for example: EFCC and ICPC), corruption cases documentaries and reports from different news and print medias both domestic and international, index studies on democracy and corruption, and other existing researches on corruption.

Irrespective of the stated advantages of qualitative research method and its case-study approach to this research, there are still some limitations of the method to the study. For instance, qualitative research method does not support statistical representation of data in such a way that it can be measured or tested mathematically. It also requires a labour-intensive analysis which in most cases are too rigorous and boring in data presentation. The method is time consuming, and the process of data interpretations are limited. Despite some of these limitations, qualitative case study designs can also be beneficial due to its ability to limit subject matter into a small sample size.

## C. The choice of using Nigeria as a case study

Corruption is gradually becoming a new national caricature identity of Nigeria. Hence, It is easy to say that any discussions on the effects of political corruption on governance without reference to Nigeria render such a discussion inconclusive. It is on this backdrop that a former British Prime Minister David Cameron was on the 10th of May 2016 caught on video addressing the Queen of England about having invited Nigeria and Afghanistan Presidents, "the two most fantastically corrupt countries" to the UK anti-corruption summit (BBC News, 2016). Previously, other high-profile remarks were made about Nigeria and incidents of corruption. For instance, Elizabeth Donnelly who is the Coordinator of the African Program, Chatham House, in an interview with Mike Sidwell of the Transparency Watch (TW) in 2007, had underscored the bitter experience of corruption in Nigeria. In the interview (Sidwell, 2008), the following was discussed:

> TW: Is corruption evident in Nigeria and what are the effects? Elizabeth Donnelly responded the following: "I think most visitors to Nigeria come away with stories of their experience of corruption whether it is being asked to pay an "entry fee" at the airport, or to pay to pass a police roadblock. I think the most obvious way in which corruption is evident in Nigeria is the clearly staggering wealth of a handful of people in the face of the poverty of the majority. It manifests itself in other ways, also the regular power cuts and lack of infrastructure and basic services. Billions of naira is ploughed into promised improvements on roads, power supply and so on, but the tangible changes that these promises would deliver are often very slow in coming. The effects of corruption in Nigeria are considerable. Of course, Nigeria faces great challenges to its development, but the biggest hurdle is the corruption. Nigeria is not a poor country; it is not aid dependent and has all the components necessary to be more developed and more successful. Yet an estimated 70 million Nigerians live below the poverty line. There are however even more profound effects than those physical ones such as lack of basic healthcare and education. I'm thinking here about the impact corruption and unaccountable government has on the psyche of a nation. Corruption breaks trust and destroys faith in the state; it creates cynicism and muddles expectations. So, in Nigeria corruption is in fact strengthened by the fact that people come to expect less and less from the state the more they are disappointed by it. This presents problems for Nigeria's democratic transition."

Both David Cameron and Donnelly's speeches portray the international perspective on the experience of political corruption in Nigeria, especially the paradox of poverty amidst the fabulous natural resources in the country. No wonder General

Muhammadu Buhari during the 2015 general elections anchored his campaign slogan on anti-corruption drive and consequently stated that "if we do not kill corruption in Nigeria corruption will kill us" (APC Rally, 2015). Hence, there is every negative permutation that surrounds the image perception of the country both in the domestic and international perspectives pointing at corruption as the bane of poor governance and underdevelopment in Nigeria (Muhammed, 2013; Okolo & Okpokighe, 2014). For instance, according to the data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) about poverty and inequality from September 2018 to October 2019, 40.1% of Nigerians were classified as poor that is about 82.9 million people (NBS, 2020). A similar data published by World Poverty Clock (WPC), indicated that 50% of Nigerians live below poverty line which is approximately 102,125,917 of the country's population (World Poverty Clock, 2020). These data seem to justify the initial contested World Bank 2006 report which indicated that 80% of Nigeria's oil wealth is concentrated in the hands of 1% of the population mainly public officials and few business elites, whereas over 70% of the population lives below the poverty line, (World Bank, 2006). These figures highlight the huge disparity in wealth distribution as a result of poor governance caused by political corruption.

In addition, the evidence surrounding some of the high-profile cases of political corruption in Nigeria makes the country a more interesting subject especially regarding level of democratic performance in the country. For example, in February 2014, Nigeria's former Central Bank Governor, Emir Sanusi Lamido Sanusi reported that $20 billion proceeds from oil revenue disappeared among the officials of the Nigeria National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC) (Financial Times 2014). Likewise, the $1.5 million contract scam involving the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), Babachir Lawal was uncovered by the anti-graft agencies (PUNCH NEWS, 2018). And also, in 2016 $34 million embezzlement charges were brought against the former first lady Patience Jonathan (Quartz Africa, 2016). These identified issues and more form the basis of selecting Nigeria as a suitable case study choice for this research.

The next chapter will highlight some court cases of political corruption in Nigeria as the actual incidence of corruption to show how it affects democratic performance. However, it is important to understand that using only legally proven cases of corruption to investigate the overall incidence of political corruption in a

country could be partial or limited effort compared to the perception mechanisms used by the mainstream index methods (Transparency International TI, International Country Risk Guide ICRG, World Bank etc.) as against cross-sectional approach. However, it will help to reduce research bias incurred as a result of measurement generalization by these existing methodologies. Hence in the next chapter, this research will analyze the existing data methods based on (perception) in relation with the specific case.

**D. Nigeria: a brief history**

In this section, I shall be discussing a brief history of Nigeria and its evolution to its present state. A study on the background of Nigeria will help in understanding both the foundation of political system of the country, cultural setting and mindset of the citizens. It will also assist in explaining how political corruption has evolved to its current state and how it affects democratic performance.

Nigeria is a country geographically located in West Africa, lying across the Gulf of Guinea, sharing common boundaries with Niger, and Chad Republic on the North, Benin Republic on the West, and the Republic of Cameroon on the East and South-East. Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, is a modern state, which is a creation of European imperialism, which is a "policy of forcefully extending power and dominion of country by a means of either direct territorial acquisition, or indirect control over a political and economic life of people and their geographical heritage" Toyo (1999, p. 8).

The name "Nigeria" was believed to have been first used by Flora Shaw, an African correspondent for the London Times 1989, in an article where she used the name Nigeria to refer to "British Protectorates on the river Niger" (Wiseman, 1990). Similar account to the name Nigeria, indicated that the name "Nigeria" first appeared in the Times of London on 8$^{th}$ January 1897 in an article by the same Flora Shaw (Omoruyi, 2002), who later became the wife of the first colonial Governor of Nigeria Lord Frederick Lugard (1914-1919).

The history of Nigeria before its formative years extends back to some three millennia. Hence prior to the arrival of the British colonialist, present-day Nigeria was made up of tribes and ethnic villages which spread across different parts of the country. The original archeological discoveries of people made within the Nigerian territory

were said to be the Nok people, who settled in the central of Jos Plateau along the coast of River Niger and River Benue between 300 BC and 200 AD. The Nok are the first known societies in Nigeria, and the first known West African iron-smelting civilizations. Other contemporary ethnic groups existed before 1500 (Fafunwa, 2002). Pre-colonial communities in Nigeria had kingdoms with distinct political systems based on different communities but they are largely monarchical. They interacted with each other through trade. The arrival of the British in 1851, changed the political statuesque as they gradually started to gain stronghold on the ownership of land. To safeguard their trade, the British established a colony in Lagos 1861, and a British company, Royal Niger Company was chartered in 1886 for the purpose of coordinating trades between people of Niger basin areas and Britain (Voloshina, 2019).

By 1899, the British government had taken over the administration of Nigeria from the private companies that ran it. By 1906, three different states had emerged, namely, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the Colony of Lagos. In 1900, the British government appointed Lord Fredrick Lugard as the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Part of Lugard's administrative policy was introduction of indirect rule to govern the Northern Protectorate. This policy involves the use of community chiefs and traditional rulers as government agents to keep order and collect taxes from the locals. Between 1906 to 1913, the three states were reduced into two: the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria (Voloshina, 2019).

On January 1, 1914, Lord Fredrick Lugard amalgamated the two Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria into one and became the first Governor General of Nigeria. The amalgamation of Nigeria was done for the easier administrative and economic advantages to the British colonizers. However, by 1939, Nigeria was divided into three regions, Eastern, Northern, and Western Regions because of the administrative pressure being mounted by locals (Wiseman, 1990).

"The end of the second World War marked the beginning of a period of organized resistance to the colonial regime in the country" (Voloshina, 2019). Nigerian activists began calling on the people to oppose the current condition of the state. in 1945, forty thousand workers in different sectors embarked on a general strike which lasted more than one month. Their demand was increase in wages and improvement of working conditions. The approval of their demands prompted further demands

which includes building of more schools, hospitals, markets, and inclusion of locals in central government. Therefore, towards the early 1950s, the British colonialist were experiencing difficulties in managing and maintaining colonial rule in Nigeria and came to an agreement to maintain a dialogue culture with anti-colonial leaders in Nigeria. One of the first step to the dialogue was an agreement on the process of decolonialization which started as a form of introducing a self-government as a state, with the process of gaining a fully independent Nigeria. By 1957, the Eastern and Western regions of Nigeria became self-governing. In 1959, the Northern region achieved its self-governing status, followed by first general election which determined the structure and composition of a Nigerian state.

**1. Post-colonial/independent Nigerian state**

On October 1, 1960, Nigeria gained its political independence from the British, and achieved the Federal Republic status in 1963. Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first President of Nigeria, while Tafawe Balewa was elected as the prime minister. In 1966, General Yakubu Gowon sacked the democratically elected government and took over-power in a military coup d'état, on the grounds of corruption and mismanagement of government. In 1967, the Eastern region attempted cessation from Nigeria, which led to the Nigerian Civil War. Prior to the civil war, General Yakubu Gowon in 1967, collapsed the regional governments and sub-divided the country into 19 states. In 1987, General Ibrahim Babangida created two additional states, and an additional nine states in 1991. In 1996, General Sani Abacha created additional six states.

Currently, the federating political units of Nigeria consist of 36 states, 774 local governments, over 250 ethnic groups with over 521 dialects among which three languages, Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba, are officially adopted as ethnic languages. The official national language of Nigeria is English, with unofficially but generally spoken pidgin English. Pidgin English is a mixture of local language slangs with English language for a common means of communication among ordinary citizens.

According to a more recent data from the World Bank (2022) the population of Nigeria has been estimated to be about 206 million, and an estimated poverty level of 45% of the population, 92.7 million Nigerians live below the poverty line (Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2021). Nigeria is endowed with vast deposits of different mineral resources, making the country a natural-resource-based economy. The most valuable mineral resources in Nigeria include crude oil, gold, natural gas, coal, tin, led,

columbite, limestone, gypsum, and zinc. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) annual quarterly report, the oil sector accounted for 42% of the total revenue collection in 2020 (Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report, 2020). Similarly, Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reports that, crude oil accounted for 80% of Nigeria's exports, and 90% of its foreign exchange earnings (Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2020). These indicators show that Nigeria's economy heavily depends on rents, especially from oil. However, agriculture remains the major means of livelihood for about 80% of the population (Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2022).

Nigeria is a multiethnic and multicultural society. No wonder, the most popular slogan in Nigeria is the notion of *Unity in Diversity*. This notion is formed from the inscription of Nigeria's official Coat of Arms, where the motto reads: Unity, Faith, Peace and Progress. This recognition helps to form the idea of one nation project of the Federal Government. Currently, there are three different religions in Nigeria, and they are Christianity, Islam, and African traditional religion. According to 2019 religious population survey conducted by Pew Research, Nigeria's religion statistics is as follows: Islam 50%, Christianity 48.1%, Africa traditional religion 0.6% (Pewresearch.org, 2019). Whereas, based on the regional distribution, most Nigerians living in the Northern region are predominantly Muslims, while the Southern region is predominantly Christians although there are minorities of each of these religious worshipers in each of these regions. However, each region is characterized by a specific religion. In the past, there were records of religious violence especially within the Northern region often caused by ignorant youths of both Christian and Muslims.

Nigeria is rich in culture and conservation of other traditions. Most of the pre-colonial cultural iheritage and cultural practices are still visible within Nigerian communities.

In Northern Nigeria, the Sokoto Caliphate, which was founded in 1817, and was first ruled by Sultan Muhammed Bello (1781-1837). It is still active and very much influential within the North. For instance, the current Sultan of Sokoto, Sa'adu Abubakar is known and respected as the most powerful person in Northern Nigeria. In Western Nigeria, the Kingdom of Ife is believed to have been founded around 500BC. The Kingdom survived western civilization and still controls major influence among the Yoruba ethnic group in Nigeria. Currently, the Onni of Ile Ife Adeyeye Enitan Ogunwusi, whose reign began on 7 December 2015 after inheriting the throne from

his late father, is as well considered the most powerful leader in the Southwestern region of Nigeria.

In the Southern region, the Benin Kingdom which was believed to have been founded around 1200 C.E. (Nationalgeographic.org, 2021) is still in existence and its Oba (King) still asserts a high level of influence within the boundaries of his kingdom. In the Eastern region, the decentralized monarchical traditional system is still active. The Igwes (Kings) of several Eastern community kingdoms still commands some level of influence within their political geographical areas, such as: Igwe Achebe of Onitsha Kingdom, Igwe Kenneth Onyeneke Orizu III of Nnewi Kingdom, Igwe Charles Arizechukwu of Nnsuka Kingdom, Igwe Charles Mkpuma of Ezzama Kingdom, among others. Perhaps, the diversity and uniqueness of cultures has remained one of the prides of the Nigerian state.

## 2. The nature and characteristics of the Nigerian state

Nigeria is a democratic state which periodically selects its leaders through contested elections. Democracy in Nigeria was acquired through the process of British colonial transition of power. It operates a presidential system of government, with a bi-cameral legislative organ. Its federal system comprises of three units of government; the federal, the state, and the local government with each unit having independent elected executives and legislatures at their levels. Federalism in Nigeria is reflected in Nigeria's constitution for more than six decades, starting from the British colonial constitution of 1954, the independence constitution of 1960, the republican constitution of 1963, the presidential constitution of 1979, the 1999 constitution, and the 2022 constitution as amended. However, the main objectives of federalism as put forward by Wheare (1963) which focused on a system of government with division of state functions between the center and the sub-ordinate units without any part encroaching on the activities of the other. Have failed in the all-powerful central government being practiced in Nigeria.

The Nigeria state is a product of dialectical acts ranging from the colonial and postcolonial politics. The state has a central role in the production of social systems and corruption. The Nigerian state is polarized among the elites who are constantly corrupting it with all sense of impunity. The elites who took over political power depend so much on the wealth of the state for their survival. Fadakin (2002) argues that after independence, the class character of the political elites became very glaring

as they did not use their privileged positions in the state to acquire wealth, but cared less about the sustainability of the state, and the political injustice endured on the society by exiting forces of colonialism.

The political elites that took over power following the limited autonomization of the Nigerian state could not develop any social structure. Perhaps, the Nigerian social formation was then and now an amorphous formation which became polarized along factional lines that struggle for political hegemony. This social behaviour among the political elites has continuously deteriorated the postcolonial Nigerian state from achieving significant political development or gaining the confidence of the governed. The Nigerian state has also failed to achieve acceptable pattern of political inclusion, tolerance and culture among its contending groups (Julius, 2000, p. 76). Hence, the brief analysis of some social indicators highlights the failing conditions of the Nigerian state.

For instance, on health sector, despite the huge financial investment the Federal Government of Nigeria makes annually on the sector, the condition of health system in Nigeria remains in a poor state. For instance, between 2015 to 2019, the government of President Buhari spent over 1.193 trillion naira (3.3 billion USD) on health sector. According to the survey from Statista.com, life expectancy in Nigeria in 2021 is 60 years, where males are expected to live up to 59 years and females 63 years (Statista.com, 2021). Similarly, as reported by Macro Trends survey 2021, the infant mortality in Nigeria is 57.7 deaths per every 1000 births (MacroTrends.net, 2021). Whereas the World Health Organization (WHO) report on maternal mortality of Nigerians, is 1 per 22, that is 814 per every 100,000 live births (World Health Organization, 2021). Meanwhile, the state of primary health care system in rural areas in Nigeria is in shambles. Then one wonders where the government spends the annually allocated funds, let alone the foreign aids it receives for health sector.

On education, Nigeria after independence pursued different policies that were targeted at promoting quality education. Part of these policies include the 1973 National Curriculum Conference, where Nigerian government introduced its first indigenous education policy, National Policy on Education, which was subsequently adopted in 1977. Different successive governments in Nigeria, including the military regime, all understood the importance of education, and have made efforts to promote quality education among Nigerians. However, these efforts are short of its investment.

Between 1999 and 2021, since political power shifted back to civilians, education in Nigeria has been on the decline. For instance, a survey conducted on the number of out of school children in 2018 in Nigeria by UNICEF, indicated that 13.2 million children in Nigeria are not enrolled into basic formal education. The report went further to indicate that there is possibility that some of these children are in school, but they are learning nothing (UNICEF, 2018). A position the Nigerian Minister of State for Education, Dr. Chukwuemeka Nwajiuba further confirmed when he stated that over 10 million Nigerian children are out of school, which according to him is the highest number in sub-Saharan Africa (Premiumtimesng.com, June 29, 2021). More so, tertiary education in Nigeria is in a state of collapse, owing to poor funding and inadequate facility by those who are given the responsibility of managing government education. For instance, the incessant industrial action regularly embarked by Academic Staff Union of universities (ASSU) and other related tertiary institution bodies over non-payment of salaries, arears, or research fundings is crippling the standard of education in public universities.

On security, Nigeria today faces a dire security situation across the country. The Biafra civil war, which took place between 1967 to 1970, and cost over 2 million civilian lives (New York Times, 1970). There is a growing armed violence across Nigeria, ranging from different terrorist organizations like Boko Haram, Islamic State of West Africa (ISWAP), Fulani Herdsmen, Bandits, especially in the Northeast Nigeria. Within the Southern regions, there are other armed violent groups like Niger Delta Militants, Criminal Cultist gangs, Unknown gunmen. Within the Southeast region, there's a growing tension from Biafra separatist groups, especially the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) a group that has in recent times started issuing public laws like a compulsory sit at home orders every Monday within the region, with high level of kidnapping and killings within the Southeast often credited to a group called Unknown Gunmen.

Insecurity has become a norm in Nigeria. According to Sahara reporters, over 2,287 Nigerians were killed in the third quarter of 2021 by different violent armed groups (Sahararepporters.com, 2021). Between 2011 to 2019, security has received the highest quota of government annual budget. For instance, according to Premium Times newspaper report, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's government spent 4.62 trillion naira (12.8 billion USD) on security between 2011 to 2015 (Premiumtimesng.com,

2015). While, according to Daily Post Newspaper, President Muhammadu Buhari's government spent over 4,591 trillion naira (12.7 billion USD) on security between 2016 to 2019, (Dailypostng.com, 2021). Despite the huge financial spending on security by successive governments, insecurity in the country is on the increase. Many critics have asked where those huge government budgets on security are spent since the level of insecurity is on the increase.

In conclusion, this chapter started by explaining the research methodology of the study. It defined qualitative research method as the most suitable research technique for the study. It highlighted different advantages why qualitative research is beneficial to the study. This include offering the researcher an opportunity to gain a complete picture of the issue under investigation. It also allows the use of case study approach in research, which the research adopted based on the nature of the study. The importance of the case study approach to the study was also highlighted by Gerring (2007) by suggesting that part of the advantages of using case study in research is that it helps in generating new hypotheses, explains causal mechanisms, overcomes heterogeneity in population samples, provides deep scope of proposition, and produces strong internal validity with causal strength. The chapter explained that the research used both primary and secondary sources of data gatherings which include, court cases documents, information from anti-corruptions agencies, reports from newspapers, journals, textbooks, articles, and researches.

The chapter also explained the choice of using Nigeria as a case study, which it concluded as a way investigating the prevailing circumstances of poor governance, failing state institutions and increasing level of corruption in the country. It also discussed the political history of Nigeria starting from independence to the present.

# IV. THE DATA ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE

## A. Introduction

The chapter three of this dissertation focused on the methodology of this study. Hence, informed the research that a case study approach is a suitable qualitative methodological approach for answering this type of research questions since it allows for an in-depth analysis of both individual and group political behaviors in the Nigerian state. Seemingly, as (Yin, 2018) suggested that a case study approach is convenient in investigating contemporary phenomenon both in-depth and within the context of a real-world analysis, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clear. Consequently, case study approach became necessary to the study as it attempts to explain contemporary phenomenon such as political corruption and democratic performance, also analyzes the complexity on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. It explained the choice of using Nigeria as a case study, and briefly highlighted the political history of Nigeria. Since case study approach allows for both in-depth and context analysis, the chapter utilizes an in-depth approach by examining the existing research surveys on both political corruption and democratic performance which are largely based on index methods.

Part of the objectives of this research is to prove that most of the existing studies on political corruption and democratic performance erred by generalizing the outcome of their study which was based on perception and relied on cross-country and longitudinal surveys. Hence, its outcome cannot be accurate when applied to case study problems such as Nigeria. Thus, this chapter focuses on analyzing the actual cases of political corruption in Nigeria to determine how it affects democratic performance. The actual cases of corruption in this instance consists of prosecuting and prosecuted cases of political corruption, published corruption cases, and political corruption cases under investigation. Prior to analyzing the actual cases of corruption, the chapter begins its analysis by reviewing the existing data on political corruption in Nigeria, which relied on perception index

## B. Existing data sources

### 1. Analyzing existing data on political corruption and democratic performance: 'perception'

The most tasking aspect of this research is choosing between the most suitable dataset to use. Especially with the common knowledge that issues on political corruption are behavioral and as such, a private action judged with public norms. The most commonly used data sources on corruption are from both the organizations of Transparency International (TI) and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Scholars like Treisman (2000), Rousseau (2008), Rose-Ackerman (2018) all used the TI dataset in their studies. However, there are three common problems with TI dataset in this kind of studies. *First* is that its measurement methods are more suitable with cross-national studies other than a national study approach such as this. *Second,* TI dataset are widely based on public sector corruption perception across countries generated mainly from experts and business elites' opinion. Hence, they do not consider the actual cases of corruption in a country and other consequential effects. *Third,* the datasets from TI sources are often longitudinal that is, they cover a certain minimum of time to be able to draw comparisons on corruption performance. For instance, this research covers a nine year period which covers three general elections and changes of government. However, the TI data do not consider some these other indicators such as election, political stability and economic transition. Nonetheless, the table below shows Nigeria's performance in the TI statistical index.

Table 2 Nigeria's Corruption Performance Between 2011-2019

| Year | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rank | 143/183 | 139/198 | 144/198 | 136/198 | 136/198 | 136/198 | 148/198 | 144/198 | 146/198 |
| Score/100 | 24.49 | 27.00 | 25.00 | 27.00 | 26.00 | 28.00 | 27.00 | 27.00 | 26.00 |
| Point | | +4 | -5 | +8 | = | = | -12 | +4 | -2 |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from Transparency International web page, May 2022.

The data displayed on the table above shows the level of inconsistency in Nigeria's corruption performance. The data indicated that between the years 2014, 2015, and 2016, Nigeria maintained consistency in TI index ranks, retained the positions of 136th after gaining significantly between 2013 to 2014 with +8 changes. However, the score level of these periods was inconsistent. The periods of 2017 and 2019 recorded the highest level of corruption with the former outrageously high with

148 which is the highest since 2011, and the later 146 even dropping -2 from the gains made in 2018 by +4. Interestingly, both 2011, 2015, and 2019 witnessed general elections which were expected to either increase or decrease the levels of corruption based on party politics. However, both 2015 and 2019 remained constant at the score level of 26 with 2011 being different at 24.9. Although between 2011 to 2015 is the period ruled by the People's Democratic Party (PDP) government led by President Goodluck Ebere Jonathan, whereas between 2015 to 2019 is ruled by the All-Progressive Congress (APC) government led by General Muhammadu Buhari. However, the corruption level according to TI index did not show any significant difference.

Similarly, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) offers a closer dataset opportunity to this research, being that it utilized many variables including 22 indices grouped into three subcategories of risk (political, financial, and economic). Their survey sampled 146 countries, between 1984 and 2019. Data are based on annual averages of the components published in the ICRG risk ratings (International Country Risk Guide: Researchers Dataset, 2020). This study, the ICRG dataset utilized cross-sectional measurement levels but, in this research, four points of ICRG corruption ratings will be utilized which are "government stability, ethnic tension, natural resources, and foreign debt" (International Country Risk Guide: Researchers Dataset, 2020). These variables are selected because of their peculiarity to the Nigerian state and evidence from the literature reviewed. I will further discuss these factors in the proceeding sections of this chapter.

On democratic performance, there are two main sources of datasets widely used: Freedom House (FH), and Polity Set. The Freedom House (FH) data ratings have so far proved to be more appropriate because it can be used on a case specific study such as this. Freedom House data ratings utilize two set variables on a scale of 7-point scores for each country. The independent variables are political freedom and civil liberty, whereas the scores are between 1 as most democratic and 7 as least democratic. In the dataset of the FH democratic ratings, 186 countries are annually sampled. Each country is scored based on the performance of the two variables. The following table shows tabular data on democratic performance in Nigeria between 2011 and 2019.

Table 3 Nigeria's Democratic Performance Between 2011-2019

| Year | Political Right | Civil Liberty | Score/status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 4/7 | 4/7 | ⬇ |
| 2012 | 4/7 | 4/7 | ⬇ |
| 2013 | 4/7 | 4/7 | ⬇ |
| 2014 | 4/7 | 4/7 | ⬇ |
| 2015 | 3/7 | 3/7 | ⬆ |
| 2016 | 4 | 5 | ⬇ |
| 2017 | 25/40 | 25/50 | 50/100 |
| 2018 | 25/40 | 25/60 | 50/100 |
| 2019 | 22/50 | 25/50 | 47 /100 |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from Freedom House web page, May 2022.

The data displayed on the table 3 above shows Nigeria's democratic performance between the period of 2011 and 2019. This period was selected because it covers what could be considered as the peak of democracy in Nigeria in the "fourth republic." It covered three consecutive general elections seen as "consolidation of democracy" and as well a peaceful and successful transition of presidential power between the so-called major party (PDP) to the then opposition party (APC). The data from Freedom House democratic performance measurement scored Nigeria as partly free in the entire period. In their assessments different indices are considered ranging from press freedom, internet freedom, free and fair elections, and minority rights etc. In the table, two measurement scales were used. Between 2011 and 2016, their data ratings were based on the scale of 1 to 7: 1 represents the freest and 7 the least free. As it is shown Nigeria's democracy only appreciated in 2015 when it climbed to 3 mainly because of the 2015 general elections that saw the political incumbents lose power to the opposition both in the presidency and gubernatorial. However, Freedom House data assessment of other period indicated that the country is partly free. The second measurement scale used by Freedom House data ranking were between the periods of 2017 to 2019. The scores are based on the scale from 0 to 100. 0 is measured as least free and 100 as most free. Both periods equally maintained an aggregate of 47% to 50% which were scaled as partly-free. On the average, the Freedom House ranking scored Nigeria's democratic performance between the selected years as partly-free.

Existing datasets from both corruption and democratic performance index groups as shown above were mainly based on cross-sectional data and do not necessarily represent the fact on the period. However, it has its own comparative advantages especially as foundational approach in sectional research. In this study a consideration of any dataset must involve that which simultaneously correlates with both political corruption and democratic performance. This implies conducting data gathering and analysis based on both relationship and consequences of corruption on democratic performance. For instance, Treisman's (2000) measurement was based on correlates of corruption.

As indicated in the literature review chapter, Treisman (2000) developed different indicators to explain the correlates on political corruption and democratic performance. But when compared with the indices from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), it gives a different outcome. Let us start with Treisman's "time-varying factor," that is the duration of government which can be replaced by (ICRG) indicator on government stability, a function of the leader's ability to democratically stay in power between 2011 and 2015. The incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP lost re-elections due to his assumed inefficiencies and poor governance attributed to high level of corruption. Whereas between 2015 and 2019, the incumbent President Muhammed Buhari of the APC won the elections a second time on the grounds of his assumed strong anti-corruption drive, however, based on the data supplied by TI data ranking there were no significant changes in the corruption level in Nigeria. But on the other hand, Freedom House democratic performance ranking saw a slight increase in Nigeria's democracy but the facts on ground say the opposite. This shows the gap between the perception index survey and the practical experiences of average Nigerians. The data from different court cases as will be shown in this research reveals that the President Buhari's government's iron fist on corruption has no direct impact on democratic performance in Nigeria, as most of the high-ranking corruption cases being prosecuted are either members of opposition party or perceived political adversaries, and at the same time truncating rule of law, and outright abuse of constitution in terms of compliance with federal character policies. Whereas, in the President Jonathan's government, where perception index rankings on corruption scored Nigeria high in terms political corruption, in practice, democratic performance based on Freedom House variables as seen in table 4 seem to be high. There was clear

definition of rule of law, freedom of the media, lack of animosity to political enemies, and respect to federal character policies as enshrined in Nigeria constitution.

Treisman (2000) controlled ethno-linguistic fragmentation using the dataset of Atlas Narodov Mira measurements which suggested the probability of two randomly selected individuals will not belong to the same ethnic group (Bruk, 1964). But using the ICRG corruption indicator which was measured as ethnic tension, it shows that the degree of ethnic tension among groups (language, religion, race) in a country affects both corruption level and democratic performance (Fearon, 2003). In Nigeria, between 2011 and 2019, the undercurrents of ethnic tension have become one of the defining factors in governance. Irrespective of the party line politics, people are more loyal to their ethnic affiliation especially region and religion. Between 2011 and 2015, outside the constitutional statutory based appointments from states, 80% of President Goodluck Jonathan appointments were based on his ethnic interest. Likewise, the periods between 2015 and 2019, President Muhammed Buhari's federal appointments which consisted of about 90% ethnic interest. Thus, it is possible that the ethnic tensions which have been largely ignored contributed to the high level of corruption within these periods in Nigeria.

Another important indicator used by Treisman (2000) is natural resources. He measured natural resources such as fuel, metal, and mineral production as part of the GDP. But if natural resources are operationalized in the case of Nigeria as rent, then fuel (oil) will be selected. As indicated by Montinola and Jackman (2002), when they suggested that OPEC countries are more likely to be corrupt, it shows that Nigerian politicians are more likely to steal money because of the high level of revenue being generated from oil. This is like the idea of "resource curse" or "paradox of plenty" (John, 2010; Akylbekova, 2015) which indicates that oil-rich countries have the tendency to overspend on the cost of governance, subsidies, large monuments, consumption and underspend on education, health, and social welfare (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015).

So far, the existing data reported from index studies in the preceding section on both corruption and democratic performance in Nigeria suggested a mixed conclusion. This is partly due to controversies and inconsistencies about these indices. The following section will analyze some cases of corruption in Nigeria as a way of measuring the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance.

## C. Data exploration: "actual cases"

### 1. Exploring some of the high-profile cases of political corruption in Nigeria

Given its illegal nature, measurements of corruption are not so straightforward. Perception has overtime become one of the most accessible tools for measuring corruption especially by index survey groups (Transparency International TI, International Country Risk Guide ICRG, World Bank WB, etc.). Although as I indicated earlier that these index surveys present many advantages on cross-sectional studies however they are mainly ordinal measures presenting only the ranking of each country measured (Olken, 2009; European Commission, 2014). Moreover, its data are based on perceptions from selected experts which may be inaccurate, or biased, therefore it has chances of ignoring the actual corruption itself.

In this section, this research will instead focus on actual cases of corruption which will have the advantage of capturing the actual corruption transactions between public officials and government. This research will use relevant high profile court cases on corruption and related scandal publications between 2011 and 2022.

Despite the burgeoning campaign rhetoric pointing at anti-corruption from different political parties vying for government offices, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and respected citizens, the incidence of corruption is not in decline. As Amundsen (1999) and Warren (2004) would say political corruption threatens the very fabric of democracy. In the case of Nigeria, political corruption does not only affect government performance, but it has to a large extent affected citizens' trust in government, thereby posing itself as an existential threat to government survival.

It is easy to say that the incidence of political corruption has become a defining factor in the issue of political governance in Nigeria. Perhaps, it has become a norm in Nigeria's democracy that political parties which demonstrate a strong anti-corruption agenda in their party manifestoes stand chances of winning elections, evidence which was demonstrated in 2015 presidential election when the opposition party, All Progressive Congress (APC) which campaigned heavily on anti-corruption crusade defeated the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) viewed by many critics to be weak in tackling issues of corruption. However, these rhetoric's of anti-corruption drives are yet to be translated into addressing issues of good governance. There has been a perceived disconnect between the governed and the political elites who are

entrusted with public trust on service delivery. A gap which many have been often perceived to exist because of abuse of trust by those at the helm of political decision making. This position can be corroborated with evidence of reported cases of political corruption in Nigeria. Let's take for example the so-called "#GANDUJEGATE" (Daily Nigerian Newspaper, 2018; The Guardian Newspaper, 2018):

> On the eve of October 2018, an online news publisher (Daily Nigerian) published a video clip purportedly showing Kano State Governor, Abdullahi Umar Ganduje, stashing a huge number of US dollars in his natively sewn babariga dress being received from a contractor as part payment for kickback in awarding a state project. But unknowingly to him, the frustrated contractor was wearing a hidden spy camera to record the illegal payments. There is a further revelation that indicated that the total billable in the kickback was in total payment of $5 million, that is about 25% of the total cost of the contract.

The video elicited a national outcry from citizens calling for the alleged corruption to be investigated. That necessitated the Kano State House of Assembly to constitute a seven member committee to investigate the bribery allegation being levelled against Governor Ganduje. Unfortunately, a Kano State High court ordered the assembly to suspend the investigation because the office of the governor which Mr. Ganduje occupies enjoys the privileges of political immunity which shields him from any criminal investigation.

There are three important findings from the incidence of bribery allegations against Governor Ganduje to this study. First is the notion of political immunity to executive office holders. Second, is the concept of "separation of powers" among the three arms of government. Third, is the idea of awarding contracts by political office holders. Political immunity is an "exemption that precludes a designated person from legal prosecution or investigation of any wrong doings" (Free Dictionary online, 2012). Section 308 (1) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution as amended, grants full political immunity to executive political office holders (President, vice President, Governors, Deputy Governors) during their tenure in office. This was designed to avoid distraction in conduct of their official duties. However, it contradicts the very principles of democracy which is transparency and accountability (Lipset, 1959; Birch, 2007; Kekic, 2007; Diamond, 2008). Democratic principle indicates that an office holder must be always accountable to the electorate.

The second important issue is the notion of "separation of powers" in a democracy. Separation of power according to Anne Dennett (2021) emphasizes that the three powers of government should be used differently by three organs of government. Legislatures should make laws; executives should enforce the law, while the judiciary should interpret the law. Dennett argued that this is essential for protecting the liberty of the people. The essence of separation of powers in democracy is to effect checks and balances between the three organs to avoid tyrannical exercise of power. It is on this principle that section 83 of the Nigerian constitution of 1999, as amended, vested oversight functions on the legislative arm of the government which gives them the power to investigate the executive. However, the judiciary which has powers to adjudicate the laws sits above both the legislative and the executive. Thus, the extra-judicial actions of the Kano State High Court by suspending the investigation of Governor Ganduje by the legislatures brings into question the limits and functions of separation of powers in a democracy. I will further discuss the concept of separation of powers in a democracy further in chapter 7.

Third, the discussion on whether the executives should have the solemn power for government financial transactions. Max Weber (1968) when defining "modern bureaucracy," said that institutions must have a defined hierarchical structure with clear rules, regulations, and the line of authority that governs it. Part of the characteristics of Weber's "modern bureaucracy" includes specialization of duties and tasks and impersonality in the application of rules. In the case of Nigeria, these responsibilities are often violated by the composition of the executive powers who often hijack the roles of the government ministries responsible for such functions. There are two key reasons why the elected executives abuse the functionalities of modern bureaucracy. First, the constitution empowers the elected executive to appoint and sack heads of parastatals and ministries, in the form of ministers, directors, and permanent secretaries. These political appointees act in a manner that they represent the interest of their appointor even at the cost of subverting justice. Second, criminal immunity, the Nigerian constitution grants criminal immunity to elected executives which makes it impossible for them to be prosecuted while they are in office, therefore gives them the arbitrary power to abuse the functions of the bureaucratic processes. These factors was demonstrated on Governor Ganduje's arbitrary exercise of power as seen in the corruption allegation proffered against him.

Similarly, was the Case between Senator Orji Uzo Kalu, former Abia State Governor and his company Slok Nigeria Limited versus Federal Republic of Nigeria. Orji Uzo Kalu was Governor of Abia State between 1999 and 2007 but was arraigned to answer cases bothering on corruption. The following passage details the case:

On Thursday 5th December 2019, Orji Uzo Kalu former Abia, State governor was convicted to 12 years in prison on a 34 count charges on fraud, abuse of office and money laundering to the tune of 7.65 billion naira (21.1 million USD) at a Federal High Court in Lagos. Senator Kalu was prosecuted by Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and part of the charges brought against him read as follows:

That you ORJI UZOR KALU, UDEH JONES UDEOGU, SLOK NIGERIA LIMITED, EMEKA ABONE (now at large) and EUNICE AGWU (now at large) on or about July 7th 2005 within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court did transfer through Manny Bank Ltd, (now Fidelity Bank Plc) the sum of N12,500,000:00 (Twelve Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) into Slok Nigeria Ltd's account with First Inland Bank PLC (a company solely owned by Orji Uzor Kalu and members of his family) which formed part of the funds you illegally withdrew from the account of Abia State Government with the aim of concealing the illicit origin of the said funds and you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 14(1 a) of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004." The ingredients of the offence under section 14(i) (a) of the money Laundering (Prohibition) Act (Supra) reproduced above, and as submitted by ROTIMI JACOBS SAN of counsel to 1st Respondent (EFCC) are that:

"(i) the accused converted transferred resources or property, (ii) the resources or property must have been derived directly or indirectly from drugs related offences or any other crimes or illegal acts, (iii) the conversion or transfer of the resources or property must be with the aim of: (a) concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the resources or property or (b) aid any person involved in any of the acts of drug related offences or any other crime or illegal act so as to evade the illegal consequences of his action (Federal High Court Lagos, 2019; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 2019).

The pronouncement of Kalu’s conviction by the appellant Court excited many Nigerians who saw it as a victory for democracy, since he (Orji Uzo Kalu) was perceived as one of the untouchables. There are two important findings from the

conviction of Orji Uzo Kalu to this study. *First*, the type of corruption allegation EFCC brought against Kalu (embezzlement, conversion of public property into personal interest, abuse of public trust). *Second*, the duration of the trial between the times of the said crime and the period when the suspect was prosecuted.

In view of this case, part of the charges against Mr. Kalu was based on the arbitrary use of the powers of his office as the governor of Abia State to covetously transfer twelve million five hundred thousand naira (#12.500, 000) to his personal company account was seen as a clear embezzlement, and violation of public interest for personal interest (Amundsen, 2006; Aktan, 2015). The said money was meant for the development of impoverished citizens of Abia State but it ended up into corrupt purposes of a public official which was largely an exhibition of poor governance.

Second, the issue of timing of the prosecution. There are two possible reasons with the time dimension of this case. First deals with the issue of political immunity. The EFCC may have waited until the expiration of Kalu's tenure in office as governor before arresting him for prosecution. Second deals with the judicial processes and power in Nigeria. Even John Lock was very clear when he suggested that the "supremacy of judiciary" is the soul of state. Likewise, Montesquieu's separation of powers. However, the judicial rigor and delay is seen as complacency with the executive interest. In Nigeria, the judicial arm is not in a full autonomy from the control of the executives since both their appointments and budgets are all under the powers of the executive. Hence it will be difficult for democracy to thrive under such circumstance without personal interest or group as against public interest.

In addition, another interesting high-profile case on political corruption in Nigeria is the case between Mr. Jonah Jang, versus the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Mr. Jonah Jang was the Governor of Plateau State between 2007 to 2015 but was arrested and prosecuted by the EFCC on charges related to corruption and abuse of office and consequently was imprisoned. He was alleged to have siphoned off special funds released to the state by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) for disbursement to small and medium enterprises in the state under the program of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Funds (MSMEDF). In particular, 2 billion naira was allegedly pocketed from the fund by Jang just three months to the expiration of his tenure. The following shows an overview on the prosecution (EFCC, 2018; Federal High Court Jos, 2018; Sahara reporters, 2018):

> On 7th of May 2018 Mr. Jonah Jang alongside him was Yusuf Pam, a cashier at office of the secretary to the government, was arraigned by EFCC before Federal High Court Jos on a 12-count charge bothering on diversion and misappropriation of public fund to the tune of 6.3 billion naira. Count 8 of the charge read: That you Jonah David Jang, whilst being the Governor of Plateau State between May 2015 in Jos, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, used your office as Executive Governor of Plateau State to confer unfair advantages upon yourself by collecting the sum of N4,357,195,000 (Four billion, Three Hundred and Fifty-Seven Million, One Hundred and Ninety-Five Thousand Naira) from the cashier office of Secretary to the Plateau State Government, and you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 19 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000.

Ex-Governor Jang's case offered this study another analytic approach looking at the actual incidence of corruption transactions. The corruption charges on which Jang was prosecuted of concerned mainly on misappropriation and direct embezzlement of state funds. Two important findings interest this study on Jang's case. First misappropriation and embezzlement of state resources. Second, abuse of public trust by Mr. Jang, an elected public officer.

On the issue of Governor Jang's conduct by conniving with his subordinate to divert relief funds meant for state action into personal benefit amounted to corruption, therefore validates Nye (1967)'s approach on corruption. Considering the timing of his act, which was three months before the end of his tenure in office the source of the fund, which was directly outside the State billed budget, it further validates the opinion that political rents operationalized as aid, contributes to political corruption (Rimmer, 2000; Isbister, 2001).

The second consideration looks at Governor Jang's gross abuse of public trust. By covetously "converting public goods into private interest" violates his oath of office. His action constituted to a setback in development since the intended beneficiaries of the fund has been denied their social privileges for personal establishment, an exercise which already amounted to poor governance and distribution of public goods.

The case of Colonel Sambo Dasuki, former National Security Adviser (NSA) to President Goodluck Jonathan between 2012 and 2015, also known as (#DASUKIGATE) also provides resourceful information. President Muhammadu Buhari on assumption of office on the 29th of May 2015, being confronted with two

glaring problems, corruption and security, made security his first focus considering the threat posed by Boko Haram in the North-East of the country. He quickly appointed a presidential advisory committee to investigate government role in the fight against terrorism. The following were public statements made by Special Adviser on Media and Publicity, Mr. Femi Adesina, to President on the findings of the committee:

The findings indicated that, the committee reviewed several interventions from various organizations that provided funds both in local and international currencies to the office of the National Security Adviser to the president, Defense Headquarters, Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters and Nigerian Air Force Headquarters. It reported that the total extra budgetary expenditure collated by the committee was #643.8 billion with its foreign currency value of $2.2 billion. It stated that the amounts do not include financial contributions from the state governments and funds collected by the directorate of State Services and the Police. The committee observed that despite the huge financial intervention, very little was done to support procurement of defense assets in the fight against terrorism. The committee reported that 513 contracts were awarded at the financial cost of $8,356,535,184.32, #2,189,265,724,404.55, and 54,000.00 euros. 53 of those contracts were failed contracts amounting to $2,378,939,066.27 and #13,729,342,329.87. The committee noted that the amount of foreign currency spent on failed contracts was double the $1,000,000,000.00 loan approved by the National Assembly to fight insurgency in the Northeast. The committee discovered that the former National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki made a single payment of #3,850,000,000 to a company without documented evidence of contracts, or fulfilment of tax obligation to the government. the findings revealed that March 2012 and March 2015, the office of the National security Adviser awarded fictitious contracts with financial values of #2,219,188,609.50, $1,671,742,613.68 and 9,905,477.00 euros. “The contracts, which were said to be for the purchase of four Alpha Jets, 12 helicopters, bombs and ammunition were not executed, and the equipment were never supplied to the Nigerian Air Force, neither are they in its inventory. Even more disturbing was the discovery that out of these figures, two companies, were awarded contracts to the tune of #350,000,000.00, $1,661,670,469.71, and 9,905,477.00 euros alone”. This was without prejudice to the consistent non-performance of the companies in the previous contracts awarded.

In addition, the committee discovered that the office of the former National Security Adviser requested the Central Bank of Nigeria to transfer the sum of $132,050,486.97 and 9,905,473.55 Euros to foreign accounts domiciled in the United Kingdom, the United States of America without any official purpose, or contract documents. The statement noted that the findings made so far are extremely worrying considering that the interventions were granted within the same period that the nation's troops fighting the insurgency in the Northeast were in desperate need of platforms, military equipment and ammunition. Yet the funds were siphoned to these non-performing companies been properly used for the purpose they were meant for; thousands of needless Nigerian deaths would have been avoided. Furthermore, the ridicule Nigeria has faced in the international community would have been avoided, the statement said. The committee noted with disappointment that those entrusted with the security of this great nation were busy using proxies to siphon the national treasury, while innocent lives were being wasted daily. In the light of these findings, President Muhammadu Buhari has directed the relevant organizations to arrest and bring to book, all individuals who have been found complicit in these illegal and fraudulent acts (Premium Times, 27 November 2015). Following President Buhari's directives, the combined team of EFCC and DSS on 1st of September 2015 arrested Col. Sambo Dasuki on charges of misappropriation and misallocation of arms deal at the tune of $2.1 billion. EFCC investigation further revealed that Col. Sambo Dasuki shared the funds among his cronies and party loyalists. The following are the breakdown on how the money was distributed (Ventures Africa 2015, see also EFCC, 2015):

1. **N1.5 billion:** An agreement between Dasuki and a former minister of state for finance, Bashiru Yuguda. Bashiru Yuguda also gave a breakdown on how he spent the fund: **N600 million:** This amount was sent to the chairmen of the Contact and Mobilization Committee of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) for the 2015 general election, Bode George, Yerima Abdullahi; Peter Odili; Attahiru Bafarawa; Jim Nwobodo; and Ahmadu Ali. **N300 million:** He instructed Jabbama Limited to transfer N300 million to BAM Properties whose account detail was given to him by a former National Chairman of PDP, Bello Haliru. **N200 million:** He sent this amount to the former PDP Governorship candidate in Kebbi State, Bello Sarkin Yaki. **N100 million:** This amount was given to a former Governor of Zamfara

State, Mahmud Aliyu Shinkafi. **N100 million:** He also instructed Jabbama Limited to transfer the sum of N100m to Dalhatu Limited on the request of Attahiru Bafarawa.

2. **4.6 million:** Attahiru Bafarawa. According to him, Dasuki gave the money to him for spiritual purposes.
3. **N1.45 million:** Transfer to Acacia Holdings Limited's for special prayers
4. **N1 million:** Transfer to DAAR Investment and Holding Company Limited for publicity
5. **N750 million:** Transfer to Reliance Referral Hospital Limited account for special prayers
6. **N380 million:** Transfer to support re-election of members of the House of Representatives
7. **N550 million:** Transfer to This day newspaper. According to the Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of Thisday newspaper, Nduka Obaigbena, the money was a compensation for attacks on his newspaper's offices in Abuja and Kaduna in 2012.
8. **N120 million:** Sent to Nduka Obaigbena as compensation for 12 newspaper houses whose copies soldiers seized in June 2014. The newspapers are Thisday, Vanguard, The Sun, The Nation, New Telegraph, Daily Trust, People's Daily, Leadership, Daily Independence, Nigerian Tribune, The Guardian and Business Day.
9. **N170 million:** Purchase of a four-bedroom duplex
10. **N260 million:** Sent to Tony Anenih
11. **N345 million:** Sent to Sen. Iyorchia Ayu for Jabi mall
12. **N90 million:** Payment for Dasuki's son's house.

DASUKIGATE as it was tagged in the media appeared to be one of the groundbreaking high-profile cases of political corruption in Nigeria. Reason being that it unearthed a lot of fraudulent transactions going on within the government. There are three important findings this case can suggest to this study. First, the correlation between corruption and security; second, cronyism and patronage; third, U-reverse on

government stability. Corruption and security: Col. Sambo Dasuki illegally diverting the money budgeted for arms in the fight against terrorism, hence causing the increase in the Boko Haram attacks within the Northeast due to lack of arms for Nigerian soldiers to defend the country shows how corruption can exacerbate insecurity in a country. Other studies had suggested that insecurity breads corruption. However, in the case of Nigeria, the evidence suggests the reverse. According to Onuoha (2009, p. 8) "corruption constitutes a threat to national security especially when the actions and inactions of certain individuals or organizations, particularly security personnel are oriented towards the satisfaction of personal gains in a way that subverts or undermines the integrity and effectiveness of persons, institutions or authorities charged with the responsibility of protecting lives, and property or assets within or belonging to the country" (2009: 8). The profound misappropriation of public fund by those entrusted with political responsibility for providing security or procuring the necessary arms as seen in the Nigerian Case of Sambo Dasuki, the former National Security Adviser is a clear indication of how corruption exacerbates insecurity in a country.

Second suggestion validates cronyism and patronage as one of the fuelling points on corruption. Dasuki, by misallocating money meant for state action into awarding contracts to friends and even for prayers shows the evidence of executive rascality and its roles on corruption. It suggests that political corruption is more of an issue with the executives rather than legislatives and judiciary. Third, U-reverse on government stability. Both ICRG (2004) and Treisman (2000), suggested that the stability of government minimizes the level of corruption. However, the evidence on Nigeria case suggests the opposite because the change of government in 2015 revealed and exposed the #Dasukigate especially its effects on democratic performance in Nigeria.

Similarly, the corruption case of Air Chief Marshal Alex S. Badeh former Chief of Defense Staff to ex-president Goodluck Jonathan, between April 2014 to July 2015, also known as #Armsgate, offers this research an important resource in examining the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. As indicated in the previous pages, that part of President Buhari's anti-corruption crusade upon assumption of office in 2015 was a direct order to Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and other related agencies to investigate issues of corruption in the countries defense and military institutions. Thus, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission on 7th of March 2016, arraigned the former Chief of Defense

Staff (CDA), Air Chief Marshal Alex S Badeh alongside Iyalikam Nigerian Limited before a Federal High-Court Judge, Justice Okon E. Abang on a 10 count charges relating to corruption, criminal breach of public trust, money laundering, financial misappropriation and embezzlement to the tune of N3.97 billion (EFCC gov. ng, June 7, 2022.)

One of the charges reads as follows:

> "That you Air Chief Marshal Alex S Badeh (whilst being the Chief of Air Staff, Nigerian Air Force) and Iyalikam Nigeria Limited between March 28th and December 5th 2013, in Abuja within the jurisdiction of this honourable Court, did use an aggregate sum of N878,362,732.94 removed from the accounts of the Nigerian Air Force and paid into the account of Rytebuilders Technologies Limited with Zenith Bank Plc for the construction of a shopping mall situated at plot 1386, Oda Crescent Cadastral Zone A07, Wuse II, Abuja for yourself, when you reasonably ought to have known that the said funds formed part of the proceed of unlawful activity (to wit: criminal breach and corruption) of Air Chief Marshal Alex S Badeh and you thereby committed an offense contrary to Section 15(2) (d) of the Money Laundering Prohibition Act, 2011 (as amended) and punishable under Section 15 (3) of the same Act" (EFCC gov. ng, June 7, 2022).

The outcome of Mr. Badeh trial resulted in Court ordering for the forfeiture of some of his illicit acquired properties. "On 4th of March 2019, Justice Okon Abang of a Federal High Court, Abuja has ordered the forfeiture of a property situated at No. 6 Ogun River Street, off Danube Street, Maitama Abuja traced to Late Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh, and $1, million, recovered from the property to the Federal Government. Also, a shopping mall, and 4 private duplex buildings located in different locations of Abuja" (EFCC.gov. ng, March 4, 2019). There are two important findings that this research can benefit from Mr. Badeh's corruption case. First, the relation between corruption and insecurity, second, Misappropriation and embezzlement of public fund.

On the first factor, the relation between corruption and insecurity: Musa (2013) suggests that "the high level of corruption in Nigeria is one of the factors responsible for the high level of insecurity in the country" (2013: 65). Similarly, as noted earlier, Rose-Ackerman (1999) argued that corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of the state, and further contends that corruption weakens state institution. Hence, as noted by Transparency International (TI) that when a country's institution is weak, its security forces are not trusted and its borders are not strong, as in the case of Nigeria, giving terrorist organizations room to flourish" (TI,

May 21, 2014). Mr. Badeh's action which amounts to subversion of public interest to personal gain contributed to weakening the public institution that is responsible for providing security to the people.

Second, misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds: one of the charges that Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) levelled against Mr. Badeh, was misappropriation of public funds for personal use. Therefore, they reported that Mr. Badeh, while in charge of Nigerian Air force, transferred public funds from the institution account worth N878,362,732.94, to a private company account owned by Rytebuilders Technologies Ltd for his personal use, is clear evidence of embezzlement and misappropriation. Subsequent testimonies obtained from witnesses by the EFCC revealed how Mr. Badeh "between November 2012 and November 2013, deposited the sum of $900,000 cash into his personal accounts" (EFCC.gov.ng, 2017).

The case of former Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Adesola Amosu who was prosecuted by Economic Crimes Commission (EFCC) on corrupt offences relating to criminal conspiracy to misappropriate public fund, abuse of trust, and money laundering to the tune N21 billion. Air Marshall Adesola Amosu was the former Chief of Airforce to president Goodluck Jonathan between 2014 to 2015. Prior to his appointment as the Chief of Air Staff, he was the director of operations and air officer commanding tactical air-command. Therefore, his appointment was applauded to be on merit based on his experience and years of service. However, within a shortest period of one year and few months, Mr. Amosu illicitly accumulated enormous wealth from public treasury, hence forms basis for his investigations. The following are the charges brought against Air Marshall Amosu by EFCC before Justice C.J. Aneke of federal High Court, Lagos (EFCC, November 13, 2018):

> "That you, Air Marshal Adesola Amosu on or about 5th day of March, 2015 in Lagos within the jurisdiction of this Honourable court conspired among your colleagues Air Vice Marshall Jacob Bola Adigun, Air Commodore Gbadebo Owodunni Olugbenga, to convert the total sum of N21,467,634,707.43 (Twenty One Billion, Four Hundred and Sixty seven Million, Six Hundred and Thirty Four Thousand, seven Hundred and Seven Naira, forty three Kobo), property of the Nigerian Air Force which you reasonably ought to have known forms part of the proceeds of your unlawful activities to wit: criminal breach of trust, and thereby committed an offence contrary to section 18(a) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (as amended) and punishable under section 15(3) of the same Act".

Following Mr. Amosu's arraignment in court and detention in prison custody, a "Lagos division of the Federal High Court ordered the final forfeiture of funds worth N2.7 billion recovered from the former Chief of Air staff, Adesola Amosu, to the Federal Government of Nigeria" (Nation Newspaper, 16 January 2019). Meanwhile, during the trial, Mr. Amosu, through his Lawyer requested for a plea bargain in three occasions (The Guardian, April 17, 2019). Plea bargain is a process that would have allowed Mr. Amosu to admit he is guilty and reach an agreement with federal government through EFCC how much he would refund back to the government. There are three important findings this research can benefit from this case. First, corruption increases inefficiency, second, corruption causes abuse of trust, and third, corruption causes poor institutional performance.

First, corruption causes inefficiency: The United Nations Office on Drugs Crime (UNODC) 2019 reports suggests that corruption in developing countries may cause underdevelopment. The report notes that this can occur as "funds disbursed from loans and aids are embezzled or handed out to inferior contractors who have won their bids through corrupt means" (UNODC, 2019). While Nigerian government was struggling in foreign debts and borrowing to fight insurgency, Mr. Amosun the appointed Chief of Air Staff, and his subordinates diverted the funds meant for Air Force fight against terrorism, thereby creating inefficiency in government, and exacerbating insecurity in the country.

Second, corruption causes abuse of trust. Part of the constitutional requirement after being appointed into the position of the Chief Air Staff in Nigeria is to take an Oath of Office which guarantees commitment to public trust. Thus, the seventh schedule of the Nigerian constitution which affirms the oath of services states as follows: "I do solemnly swear/affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. I will discharge my duties to the best of my ability, faithfully and in accordance with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the law, and always in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, solidarity, well-being and prosperity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that I will strive to preserve the fundamental objectives and directives principles of state policy contained in the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria; that I will not allow my personal interest to influence my official conduct or my official decisions, that I will do the best of my ability to preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the federal republic of

Nigeria; I will abide by the code of conduct contained in the fifth schedule to the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Mr. Amosun, being aware that his action as Chief of Air Staff in charge of Airforce of Nigerian military, which is strategic in providing security, yet decided to divert public funds into private interest, does not only violate his oath of office; thereby abusing the law, but betrays public trust.

Third, corruption causes poor institutional performance. Mr. Amosun's action of diverting public funds into personal benefits was aimed at undermining the programs and objectives of government. Hence the consequences are the weak performances of the government institution which he was charged to protect.

In addition, the case being prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), between Babachir Lawal versus Federal Republic of Nigeria, which was reported on the 12th of February 2019, also offers this research a resourceful information. Mr. Babachir Lawal is a former Secretary to the Government of Federal Republic of Nigeria, appointed by President Muhammed Buhari between 2015 to 2017. Babachir Lawal was arraigned alongside five others by the EFCC before Justice Jude Okeke of a federal capital territory High-Court Maitama on a 10-count charges relating to fraud, diversion of funds, and criminal conspiracy to the tune of 1.1 billion Naira. Thus, the case reads as follows (EFCC, 5 June 2022):

> "That you, Hamidu David Lawal, being a director of Rholavision Engineering Ltd, Suleiman Abubakar, being a staff of Rholavision Engineering Ltd, Apeh Monday John being the managing director of Josmon Technologies Ltd, and Rholavision Engineering Ltd on or about the 4th of March, 2016 at Abuja in the judicial division of the High Court of the federal capital territory did abet the holding indirectly of a private interest by Engineer Babachir Lawal in the award of contract to the Josmon Technologies Ltd for the removal of the invasive plant species and simplified irrigation by the office of the secretary to the government of the federation through Presidential Initiative for North West, to the tune of N272,524,356.02 which Rholavision Engineering Ltd executed and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 26 (I) (c) of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 and punishable under Section 12 of the same Act".

Following the corrupt indictment of Mr. Babachir Lawal, President Buhari on 19th April 2017, directed the immediate suspension of the former secretary to the federal government. Mr. Babachir's suspension by the president was based on the

recommendation of a committee set-up by the president to investigate the corruption allegation against him. The committee, which was made up of the Vice-President, the Attorney-General of the federation, and the National Security Adviser, upon its findings recommended the suspension of Mr. Babachir Lawal (Punch Newspaper, 2017).

There are three important findings this case can suggest to this study. First, correlation between corruption and good governance; second, embezzlement and patronage; third, abuse of office. First, correlation between corruption and good governance, the purpose of the contract which is, "the removal of 250 kilometers of invasive plant species along the river channels and simplified village irrigation scheme in Komadugu basin in Yobe State" (The Guardian Newspaper October 7, 2016), was aimed at assisting farmers in the rural areas of the targeted community with proper irrigation system. However, the corrupt actions of the former secretary to the federation subverted the intention of government, thereby bridging the gap of governance.

Second, embezzlement and patronage; Amundsen (2006) argued that embezzlement is a systematic abuse of power by the ruling elites as a means of extraction and accumulation of public resources into individual or group interest. On the Federal High-Court record, Mr. Babachir Lawal admitted holding a private interest in Rholavision Engineering Ltd, the company whom he awarded the contract. The Presidential committee constituted to investigate the contract reported that N272,524,356 which was the total sum of the contract was transferred into an account owned by Rholavision Engineering Ltd. Sadly, irrespective of the fact that the amount awarded the contract was excessive, yet the project was not executed. Seemingly, Hamidu David Lawal who is also a shareholder of Rholavision Engineering Ltd. is a brother to Mr. Babachir Lawal, likewise Suleiman Abubakar, and Apeh Monday John of Josmon Technologies Ltd who were his personal friends, which amounts to political patronage. Third, abuse of office, Mr. Babachir Lawal who was the former secretary of the government is vested with public trust and responsibility. Hence, absconding to his official duties for the purpose of personal interest amounts to abuse of office.

Another interesting case to this study, is the corruption case between former chairman of the Pension Reform Task Team (PRTT) Abdulrasheed Maina, and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). On November 8, 2021, an

Abuja Federal High Court led by Justice Okon Abang, convicted the former chairman of the Pension Reform Task Team, Mr. Abdulrasheed Maina on charges relating to corruption, money laundry, misappropriation, embezzlement, and forgery. Mr. Abdulrasheed Maina was appointed by former president Goodluck Jonathan as the chairman of presidential Taskforce Team on Pension Reforms to oversee the execution of pension fund in the country. However, barely one year in office Mr. Maina was alleged to have misappropriated public fund to the tune of 195 billion naira and was declared wanted by Nigerian police (Daily trust Newspaper, October 24, 2017). On October 25, 2019, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) arrested and arraigned Mr. Maina before Justice Okon Abang of the Federal High Court Abuja on a 12-count charges relating to corruption. Thus, one of the charges reads as follows (EFCC, 13 June 2022):

> "That you Abulrasheed Addullahi Maina between 2012 and 2016, within the jurisdiction of this Honourable court, took possession of an aggregate sum of N1,822,074,690.00 (One Billion, Eight Hundred and Twenty two million, Seventy four Thousand Six Hundred and Ninety Naira), through your fidelity bank account in the name of Dr. Abdullahi A. Faizal when you reasonably ought to have known that the said funds formed part of the proceeds of the unlawful activity to wit: corruption, and you hereby committed an offense contrary to Section 15(2)(d) of the Money Laundering prohibition Act, 2011 as (amended) and punishable under Section 15(3) of the same Act".

Prior to Mr. Maina's arrest and arraignment in Court, the EFCC through Justice Folashade Ogunbanjo of the Federal High-Court Abuja had obtained an order for the forfeiture of 23 properties seized from Mr. Maina. The EFCC through its sworn affidavits, proved that the 23 properties linked to Mr. Maina were all proceeds of the illicit activities generated from pension fund. Alongside Mr. Maina's travail is the arrest and arraignment of his son (Failsal Abdulrasheed Maina) by the EFCC, who is charged as an accomplice to the corruption case. Hence, his charges, which run concurrently with his father Mr. Maina reads as follows (EFCC, 13 June 2022):

> "That you Faisal Abdulrasheed Maina, between October 2013 and June 2019, within the jurisdiction of this honourable court, controlled an aggregate sum of N58,111,585.00 (Fifty-eight million, one hundred and eleven thousand, five hundred and eighty-five Naira), paid through the United Bank for Africa (UBA) account of Alh. Faisal Abdullahi Farms, to wit: corruption of one Abdulrasheed Abdullahi Maina, who is facing a separate charge and thereby committed an offence, contrary to Section 15(3) and (4) of the same Act".

Mr. Maina and his son were both found guilty on corruption charges brought against them by the EFCC. Therefore, the trial judge Justice Okon E. Abang, while delivering judgement on the case of Mr. Maina ruled that the prosecution was able to successfully establish the essential ingredients of the offences contained in the charge beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the first defendant on count 2,3,6,7,9 and 10 of the charge and sentenced him to eight years imprisonment. The count added that the sentence shall run from October 25, 2019. The court also ordered defendant and his firm, Common Input Property and Investment limited, to restitute about N2.1 billion that was traced to their bank accounts to the federal government, after which it ordered that the company should be wound up (Corruptioncases.ng, 13 June 2022). Mr. Maina having been appointed to sanitize a system that was considered corrupt, through his illicit actions became the agent of corruption. There are two important findings this research can benefit from this case. First, corruption thrives in weak political institution; second, corruption affects social welfare system.

First, corruption thrives in weak political institutions: The 2015 report on corruption from the Department of International Development, United Kingdom Aid (UKaid), notes that "the nature of political and economic opportunities available in different political systems, as well as the strength and effectiveness of state institutions shapes the conditions in which corruption can thrive" (UKaid, 2015, p. 18). The report recognizes that centralization of power in the executive and in accountability mechanisms that are deficient gives actors too much discretion, a key distinction Acemoglu and Robinson (2011) identified in their historical analysis between "extractive and inclusive institutions" on why nations fail, and others succeed. Thus, it evident that lack of accountability in Nigeria's political system creates incentives for political corruption to thrive as seen in the corruption case of Mr. Maina, where he misappropriated pension. In addition, as can be deducted from the preceding literature in the chapter two of this study, Nigeria's political system depends heavily on neo-patrimonial systems, where politics are still organized around personalism which reflects in the centralization of power in the hands of presidential loyalists, and government appoints are based on the primacy of personal relationships. These policy does not promote efficiency in the political institution/system since there's a patron-client based relationship between the appointees and the appointed.

Second, corruption affects the social welfare system Chang (2007) argues that due to political corruption, social welfare program spending is misallocated from those who are truly in need to those inside the patronage system. At a time when pensioners are owed 24 months salaries, Mr. Maina, who is the head of Presidential Pension Taskforce Team charged with the responsibility of making sure pensioners are dully paid, instead chose to misappropriate the allocated pension fund into his personal benefits, thereby denying the pensioners from benefiting from the government welfare scheme.

So far, the few selected high profiled cases of corruption in Nigeria discussed above highlighted the actual incidence of corruption transactions among government agents. Whilst the perception measurement index studies only highlight the ordinal measures of corruption which are based on cross-section ranking, the data collections which are based on expert's opinion may be vulnerable to shared bias. The legal case approach seems to offer a clearer understanding on the relationship between the variables.

So far, the actual cases of corruption identified in this chapter revealed the extent of how political corruption undermines government performance, abuse public trust, abuses rule of law, violates constitution, creates insecurity, causes waste of public resources, creates inefficiency, weakens political institutions and destroys welfare system.

In conclusion, this chapter started by highlighting the existing data from various studies that focused on this subject. Existing data were largely based on cross-country survey which depended on index studies generated through convenient samplings. The chapter contends that while there are advantages of this type of methods, however it is not suitable for this type of study considering the fact that the subject of study which is political corruption involves actions of human behaviour that are done in secret and involves sensitive outcomes. The chapter based its analysis on actual cases of political corruption in Nigeria to determine how it affects democratic performance. The actual cases of corruption in this instance consists of prosecuting and prosecuted cases of political corruption, published corruption cases, and political corruption cases under investigation. It analyzed different cases of political corruption involving high level political office holders. The cases were explained to determine the impact of political corruption on democratic performance. It cases revealed that the common corruption

type that public office holders engage is embezzlement, misappropriation, kickbacks, and budget paddling. It also determined that the abuse of office carried out as a result of engaging in corrupt activities diminishes democratic performance.

# V. DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND ITS IMPACTS ON DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA

> "Fellow citizens, in every decision I shall always place the common good before all else. The bane of corruption shall be met by the overwhelming force of our collective determination, to rid our nation of this scourge. The fight against corruption is a war in which we must all enlist so that the limited resources of this nation will be used for the growth of our commonwealth," President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Inaugural speech (Vanguard, May 29th, 2011).
>
> The judicial system needs reform to cleanse itself from its immediate past. The country now expects the judiciary to act with dispatch on all cases especially on corruption, serious financial crimes or abuse of office President Muhammadu Buhari Inaugural Speech (Guardian, May 29th, 2015).

## A. Introduction

Chapter one, two, three and four have so far attempted to offer some important insights into the core objectives of this research, which center on finding the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. Whilst chapter one and two offered a theoretical road map through review of existing literatures on this subject, chapter three focused on the research methodology Chapter Four treated the data of research by reviewing the existing data and analyzing the actual cases of corruption. The dataset presented in chapter four was of two source categories, first one focused on analyzing existing data from previous index studies of some research organizations dealing with corruption and democracy ( e.g. Transparency International T.I. International Country Risk Guide I.C.R.G., and Freedom House F.H). The data from these organizations were mainly ordinal and largely based on perceptions, which in many cases, are criticized as not representing the facts especially when applied to a selected case such as this. However, some of their advantages are considered enormous. The second dataset treated mainly in chapter four, was based on the reports of actual cases of political corruption, and analysis of how it affected the principles of governance. The later data source formed the basis of this study, which also

encouraged the use of qualitative research method. As was explained in chapter three is believed to be the most suitable in investigating a complex and conflicting study such as this.

This chapter will consolidate on these pieces of information by expanding discussions on the major findings on the impact of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria. This will be done through a comprehensive analysis of some of the key data of the study. It will compare prosecuted cases of corruption of the two existing political tenures in the selected period of study, to determine how democracy performed during their so-called anti-corruption drive. It will start by highlighting in a tabular form the proven cases of political corruption in Nigeria.

## B. Cases of political corruption in Nigeria

In chapter two, different theoretical expositions were presented on the meaning, types, and causes of political corruption and democracy. It also reviewed existing measurements, and debates of the two concepts. At the background of this analysis is Heidenheimer's (1970) explanatory theory on political corruption which offered three conceptual meanings to include, the definitions of political corruption in terms of public office, public interest, and market-place. The public office and public interest based definitions were selected owning to the scope of the study. Therefore, scholars opinions was categorized alongside the two theoretical genre, for instance, the first group comprising theories from Nye (1967), Huntington (1968), Myrdal (1968), Khan (1996), Amundsen (1999 & 2006), Morris (1991 & 2008), defined political corruption in terms of abuse of public office or personal or group gain.

Whereas, the second approach comprising Friedrich (1966), Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999, 2014&2018), Warren (2004 & 2007), and Philip (2002 & 2014) conceived the meaning of political corruption in the public interest perspective. They argued that corruption does not only include abuse of public office but also involves actions which are inimical to public interest and the subversion of public interest to personal gain.

To further the discussions, chapter four analyzed some major political corruption cases in Nigeria where both premise on abuse of public office, and subversion of public interest for personal gain was established. It also reviewed the types of corruption committed in each case. This chapter will consolidate on the efforts by analyzing the

key findings and how it shaped the study. It will start by highlighting the proven cases of political corruptions in Nigeria to show the degree at which incidence of corruption was detected and reported. The chapter will start by displaying the historical cases of corruption in Nigeria, high profile corruption cases in Nigeria, and also high-profile corruption cases between 2011 and 2019. The intension of using this corruption cases review is to have an understanding of the impact of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria. The following table highlights the proven cases of political corruption in Nigeria:

Table 4 Major historical cases of political corruption in Nigeria and the proceeds of crime between 1960 to 1999.

| SN | Names/Position Held. | Amount in London Banks | Amount in Swiss Banks | Amount in USA Banks | Amount in Germany Banks | Total in Nig. Naira Equivalent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Former Military Head of State between 1985 to 1993. | £6.256 billion | $7.416 billion | $2.00 billion | Dm9.00 billion | ₦2.4635 trillion |
| 2 | General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Former Military Head of State between 1998 to 1999. | £1.131 billion | $2.33 billion | $800 million | Dm16 million | ₦0.4938 trillion |
| 3 | Vice Admiral Mike Akhigbe, Former Military Vice President between 1998 to 1999. | £1.24 billion | $2.426 billion | $671 million | Dm9.00 million | ₦0.8059 trillion |
| 4 | General Jeremiah Useni, Former Military Minister of Federal Capital Territory between 1993 to 1998. | £3.0 billion | $2.01 billion | $1.03 billion | Dm900 million | ₦0.059 trillion |
| 5 | General Yakubu Gowon, Former Military Head of State between 1966 to 1975. | £1.03b | $2.00b | $1.03b | Dm700m | ₦0.50176 trn |
| 6 | Umaru Dikko, Former Minister for Transportation between 1979 to 1983. | £4.4b | $1.46b | $700m | Dm345m | ₦0.89465 trn |
| 7 | Dr. Paul Agbai Ogwuma, Former Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, between 1993 to 1999. | £300m | $1.42b | $200m | Dm500m | ₦35 billion |
| 8 | General Sani Abacha, Former Military Head of State between 1993 to 1998. | £300m | $1.09b | $800m | Dm3.01m | ₦1.2107 trn |

Table 4 (continued) Major historical cases of political corruption in Nigeria and the proceeds of crime between 1960 to 1999.

| SN | Names/Position Held. | Amount in London Banks | Amount in Swiss Banks | Amount in USA Banks | Amount in Germany Banks | Total in Nig. Naira Equivalent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Mohammed Sani Abacha, Son of Former Head of State | £300m | $1.2b | $150m | Dm417m | ₦1.2107 trn |
| 10 | Abdul Sani Abacha, Son of Former Military Head of State | £700m | $1.21b | $900m | Dm417m | ₦0.3384 trn |
| 11 | Wada Nas, Former Minister of State for Education between 1993 to 1998 | £300m | $1.32b | -- | Dm300m | ₦0.2374 trn |
| 12 | Tom Ikimi, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs between 1995 to 1998. | £400m | $1.39b | $153m | Dm371m | ₦0.252553 trn |
| 13 | Dan Etete, Former Minister of Petroleum between 1995 to 1998. | £1.12b | $1.03b | $400m | Dm1.72b | ₦0.32743 trn |
| 14 | Donald Etiebe, Former Governor of Cross River State between 1983 to 1983. | £2.5b | $1.06 | $700m | Dm361m | ₦0.56747 trn |
| 15 | Major Hamza al-Mustapha, Former Chief of Staff to the Military Head of State between 1993 to 1998. | £600m | $1.001b | - | Dm210 | ₦0.199793 trn |
| 16 | Bashiru Dalhatu, Former Minister of Power and Steel, between 1993 to 1997. | £2,9b | $1.09b | $360m | Dm1.66b | ₦0.68895 trn |
| 17 | Mohammed Inuwa Wushishi, Former Nigeria Chief Army Staff, between 1981 to 1983 | £32.3b | $1.1001b | $161m | Dm1.43b | ₦0.1305 trn |
| 18 | Hassan Adamu | £300m | $200m | $700m | - | ₦0.1305 trn |
| 19 | Theophilus Danjuma, Former Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff, between 1975 to 1979. | £1.36b | $1.02b | $300m | Dm1990m | ₦0.3427 trn |
| 20 | Ishaya Bamayi, Former Chief of Army Staff, between 1996 to 1999. | £120m | $800m | - | - | ₦94.0 billion |

**Source:** Financial Times, 23 July 1999, Adopted in Nigeria Commentator – Vol 2 No 4 1999.

Table 5 High profile cases of political corruption in Nigeria between 2011 to 2019

| SN | Name/Position Held | Summary Case | Year Case was Filed or charged in Court | Amount Involved | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Murtala Nyako<br><br>Former democratically elected Governor of Adamawa State, 2007-2014 | Mr. Nyako is standing trial for allegedly using his companies between 2011 and 2013 to illegally divert funds belonging to Adamawa state government | 2015 | ₦29 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC. Ongoing Trial at Federal High Court Abuja |
| 2 | Orji Uzo Kalu<br><br>Former democratically elected Governor of Abia State 1999-2007 | Convicted for using his company Slok Nigeria Limited to divert funds belonging to Abia state government into his personal use. | 2007-2019 | ₦7.65 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC and Convicted by Supreme Court of Nigeria |
| 3 | Rochas Okorocha<br><br>Former democratically elected Governor of Imo State. 2011-2019. | Mr. Okorocha is standing trial for diverting funds belonging to Imo state government into his personal use | 2019 | N7.6 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC at Federal High Court Abuja |
| 4 | Jonah Jang<br><br>Former elected Governor of Plateau State. 2007-2015 | Mr. Jang is standing trial for allegedly using his position to defraud the state and enrich himself after diverting fund release to the state by central bank of Nigeria for welfare programs. | 2018 | ₦6.32 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC. Ongoing Trial at Federal High Court |
| 5 | Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu,<br><br>Former elected Governor of Niger State. 2007-2015 | Mr. Aliyu is standing trial for allegedly diverting ecological funds released to the state by federal government to the state in 2014. | 2017 | ₦ 5 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC. Ongoing Trial at Federal High Court |
| 6 | Ayo Fayose<br><br>Former elected Governor of Ekiti State. 2014-2018 | Standing Trial for diverting state funds into his personal use. | 2018 | ₦2.2 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC. Ongoing Trial at Federal High Court |

Table 5 (continued) High profile cases of political corruption in Nigeria between 2011 to 2019

| SN | Name/Position Held | Summary Case | Year Case was Filed or charged in Court | Amount Involved | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | Jolly Tavoro Nyame<br>Former elected Governor of Taraba State. 1999-2007 | Convicted for diverting state funds into his personal use. | 30th May 2018 | ₦1.64 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC and Convicted by Federal High Court |
| 8 | Joshua Chibi Dariye<br>Former elected Governor of Plateau State. 1999-2007 | Convicted for diverting state funds through phony contracts for his personal use. | 12th June 2018 | ₦1.6 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC and Convicted by Federal High Court |
| 9 | Temisan Omtseye,<br>Former Director of Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) | Convicted for corrupt practices under Public-Procurement Act. | 2016 | ₦1.5 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC and Convicted by Federal High Court. |
| 10 | Ezekiel Bala Agaba<br>Former Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) 2012- | Convicted for corrupt practices committed while in office as NIMASA director | 15th July 2020 | ₦ 1.5 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC and Convicted by Federal High Court. |
| 11 | Sule Lamido<br>Former elected Governor of Jigawa State. 2007-2011 | Standing Trial for corrupt practices committed while in office as governor | 2015 | ₦1.35 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC. Ongoing Trial at Federal High Court |
| 12 | Dr. Sani Teidi Shaibu<br>Former Director of Pension | Standing Trial for corrupt practices committed while in the office as Director of Pension fund. | 2013 | ₦1 billion | Prosecuted by EFCC. Ongoing Trial at Federal High Court |
| 13 | Olisa Metuh<br>Former Publicity Secretary of People's Democratic Party, 2011-215 | Convicted for corrupt practices committed while in office as PDP publicity Secretary | 2018 | ₦400 million | Prosecuted by EFCC and Convicted by Supreme Court of Nigeria |
| 14 | Steve Orosanye<br>Former Head of Service of the Federation | Standing Trial for corrupt practices committed while in the office as head of service to the Federation | 2015 | ₦240 million | Prosecuted by EFCC. Ongoing Trial at Federal High Court |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from EFCC web page, 2020.

The listed names in the above table are known political office holders in Nigeria, who are either convicted or being prosecuted by anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria- the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which is saddled with responsibility of investigating corruption cases. The amounts as being reported in the judicial prosecution process are part of state funds, illegally diverted for personal interest. It is evidence of the actual cases of corruption and does not depend on perception or opinion of experts to measure. As indicated in chapter two, corruption is a complex phenomenon, covering a wide range of illegal behavioral practices, and as such very difficult to measure. However, in this circumstance, this research focuses on the relationship of political corruption on democratic performance. Democratic performance as noted earlier is measured in terms of core democratic principles, norms and values, which chief among it is good governance. Hence, my assessment here is to determine how the activities of these individuals who were entrusted with state responsibility affected democratic performance in Nigeria.

Below will show table on the prosecuted high-profile cases of corruption from 2011 to 2019. Where 2011 to 2015 covers President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP regime, and 2015 and 2019 covers President Muhammadu Buhari of the APC government, the selected periods cover eight (8) years of elected government, and accumulated consolidation which saw a peaceful and successful transfer of power between opposition parties.

**1. Prosecution of high-profile cases of political corruption between 2011 and 2019**

Much has been said on the role of government in either preventing or fostering corruption. A common conclusion on this view maintained that strong democratic institutions with modern bureaucracy can hinder corruption thereby foster good governance (Treisman, 2002; Fisman&Gatti, 2002; Warren, 2004; Pellegata, 2012; Acemoglu and Robison, 2013). Based on this view, it is necessary to comparatively access two different democratic governments in Nigeria, to determine whether strong democratic institutions can eliminate corruption. As expressed in the introductory section of this chapter, both presidents in their individual inaugural speeches highlighted the pervasiveness of corruption in the country and the urgent need to eradicate it. However, this study investigated their actions on anticorruption agenda and how it fosters democratic performance. Below is a table that contains information

on President Goodluck Jonathan's efforts on fighting corruption in Nigeria between 2011 and 2015.

Table 6 High profile cases of political corruption charged under President Goodluck Jonathan between 2011-2015

| | Defendant | Political Office held | Crime / Date Charged |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Demeji Bankole | Speaker of the House of Representative (2007-2011). | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged June 2011 |
| 2. | Usman Nafada | Deputy Speaker of the House of Representative (2007-2011) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged June 2011 |
| 3. | Hassan Lawal | Minister of Works and Housing (2008-2010) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged May 2011 |
| 4. | Danjuma Goje | Former Governor of Gombe State (2003-2011) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged 2011 |
| 5 | Audu Abubakar | Former Governor of Kogi State (1999-2003) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged 2013 |
| 6. | Timipre Sylva | Former Governor of Bayelsa State (2008-2012) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged 2015 |
| 7. | Temisan Omatseye | Former Director NIMASA (2011) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged 2011 |
| 8. | Esan Dangabar | Former Director Police Pension Fund | Embezzlement of Police Pension Funds. Charged 2012 |
| 9. | Gbenga Daniel | Former Governor of Ogun State (2003-2011) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged 2011 |
| 10. | Aliyu Akwe Ndoma | Former Governor of Nasarawa State (2007-2011) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charged 2011 |
| 11. | Dr Sani Teidi Saibu | Former Director at Office of the Head of Service of the Federation (2013) | Embezzlement of State Funds. Charge 2013 |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from EFCC and ICPC web page, 2020.

Similarly, President Muhammadu Buhari of the APC who was elected under the banner of anti-corruption revolution in Nigeria on his campaign promised to salvage the country from corruption, has since claimed to have channeled huge state resources in the fight against corruption. Below is a table that contains the records of the prosecuted cases between 2015 to 2019.

Table 7 High profile political corruption cases charged under President Muhammed Buhari between June 2015-2019

| | Defendant | Political Office Held | Crime/Date charged |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Colonel Sambo Dasuki | Former National Security Adviser (2012-2015) | Misappropriation/Embezzlement Charged 2015. |
| 2. | Ibrahim Lamorde | Former EFCC chairman (2012-2015) | Diversion of recovered asset. Charged 2015 |
| 3. | Senator Bukola Saraki | Former Senate President (2015-2019) | False Asset Declaration Scam. Charged 2016 |
| 4. | Abdulrasheed Maina | Former Chairman Pension Commission (2011-2015) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2015 |
| 3. | Orji Uzo Kalu | Former Abia State Governor | Misappropriation/Embezzlement Charged and convicted 2019. |
| 4. | Olisa Metuh | Former PDP publicity Secretary (2012-2015) | Embezzlement. Charged and convicted 2018 |
| 5. | Murtala Nyako | Former Governor of Adamawa State (2007-2015) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2015 |
| 6. | Ayo Fayose | Former Governor of Ekiti State (2014-2018) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2018 |
| 7. | Jonah Jang | Former Governor of Plateau State (2011-2015) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2018 |
| 8. | Jolly Tavoro Nyame | Former Governor of Taraba State (2003-2011) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged and convicted 2018 |
| 9. | Joshua Dariye | Former Governor of Plateau State (2003-2011) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged and convicted 2018 |
| 10 | Sule Lamido | Former Governor of Jigawa State (2007-2015) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2015 |
| 11. | Andrew Yakubu | Former NNPC Director (2011-2015) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2017 |
| 12. | Steve Orosanye | Former Head of Service of the Federation (2011-2015) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2015 |
| 13. | Babangida Aliyu | Former Governor of Niger State (2011-2015) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2017 |
| 14. | Rochas Okorocha | Former Governor of Imo State (2011-2019) | Embezzlement of State funds. Under-investigation 2019 |
| 15 | Ezekiel Bala Agaba | Former Director of NIMASA | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2016, convicted July 2020. |
| 16. | Abdullahi U Ganduje | Governor of Kano State (2015-present) | Embezzlement of State Funds as kickbacks for awarding Contract. Not investigated 2018 |
| 17. | Babachir Lawal | Former Secretary to the Government of the Federation (2015-2018) | Embezzlement of State funds. Charged 2019 |
| 18. | Akinwunmi Ambode | Former Governor of Lagos State | Embezzlement of State funds. Under-investigation 2019 |
| 19. | Lawal Daura | Former Director Department of State Security (2015-2018) | Abuse of Power. Indicted 2018. |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from EFCC and ICPC web pages, 2020.

The tables represent each government's performance on the fight against corruption. As shown above, between 2011 to 2015, there are fewer reported or prosecuted cases of corruption compared to the period between 2015 to 2019. Many factors may be responsible for the differences. For instance, the previous administration before President Goodluck Jonathan's government was the same party (PDP). Therefore, it is unlikely that President Jonathan would fully prosecute members of his own party who committed corruption. An example of this was the presidential pardon that President Goodluck Jonathan granted to some high-profile cases convicted by the previous administrations. Notable among those was, the pardoning of "Ex-Governor of Bayelsa State late Diepreye Alamieyeseigha who was convicted and jailed for two years on charges bothering on embezzlement, money laundering, and abuse of power while in office as Governor" (BBC News, 2013). Another reason could be that President Goodluck Jonathan, who succeeded, Late-President Umaru Musa Yar'adu, was not elected on a popular vote. That is, President Goodluck Jonathan first emergence as a president happened as result of a constitutional course. President Goodluck Jonathan who was elected on a vice presidential ticket in 2007, to late President Umaru Musa Yar'adu, who died during his term in the office and was immediately replaced by President Goodluck Jonathan as a result of constitutional provision. Therefore, he represented the interests of his so-called political godfathers. Whilst the government of President Muhammed Buhari who won the general election as opposition candidate sought to prosecute his political rival as a way of maintaining his own political influence and party interest. The below table shows the distribution and the actual prosecuted cases of corruption between the two selected periods: (2011-2015 and 2015-2019).

Table 8 Distribution of prosecuted corruption cases under President Goodluck Jonathan between 201-2015

| Total Number of cases | | Charged to Court | Under Invest. | Not Invest. | On Trial | Convicted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 7 | 7 | - | - | 6 | 1 |
| 2012 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 1 | - |
| 2013 | 2 | 2 | - | - | 2 | |
| 2014 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2015 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 1 | - |
| Total | 11 | 11 | - | - | 10 | 1 |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from EFCC and ICPC website, 2020.

Table 9 Distribution of prosecuted corruption cases under President Muhammed Buhari between 2015-2019

| Total Number of Cases | | Charged to Court | Under-Invest. | Not-Invest. | On Trial | Convicted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 6 | 6 | - | - | 6 | - |
| 2016 | 2 | 2 | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| 2017 | 2 | 2 | - | - | 2 | - |
| 2018 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 | - | 2 |
| 2019 | 4 | 4 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 19 | 17 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 4 |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from EFCC and ICPC web page, 2020.

The data submitted in both tables clearly indicate both governments' performance in anti-corruption fight in Nigeria. From 2011 to 2015, a total of eleven (11) high profile cases of corruption were prosecuted. However only one case was convicted, while 10 of the cases were tied to judicial process which is a way of validating "justice delayed is justice denied" aphorism. Between 2015 to 2019, a total number of 19 cases were prosecuted, 17 of the cases was charged to court, 10 remained on trial, 5 of them placed under investigation, 2 was never investigated, while 4 of the cases were convicted and jailed respectively.

Interestingly, while the threat of prosecution for abuse of power by illegally diverting public resources into private gain maybe gaining momentum among those in the corridors of political power, yet it is legitimate to ask, are there any significant relationship between these judicial prosecutions of corrupt politicians on democratic performance? To answer this question, there is a need to compare some democratic performance variables in relation to the two selected periods.

## C. Assessing the impact of actual cases of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria

To investigate whether there is a significant relation between political corruption and democratic performance in Nigeria, it shall explore the two theoretical approaches offered by the conditional hypothesis of this study. The conditional hypothesis states that political corruption will be lower in advanced democracies with stronger economies and political institutions. There are two explanatory approaches to this theory: first, institutional approach; second, economic approach. Institutional approach can be explained in relation with Freedom House's definition of democracy.

According to the Freedom House (2016) report, "when we talk about democracy we mean, free and fair elections, strong and independent institutions, political rights like right to protest, civil rights like access to a free trial" (Transperency.org, 2018). Following this explanation, democratic performance can be operationalized in terms of commitment to free and fair elections, strong and independent institutions, political rights; rights to protest, right to religion, minority rights, civil rights like right to free trial. In addition, Acemoglu and Robinson (2011) argue that lack of institutional accountability, especially in societies with extractive institutions may increase the incidence of corruption. Economic approach can be explained in relation with Lipset's (1959) social requisites for sustainable democracy. Lipset suggested that a strong economy measured in terms of industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society is the basic condition for sustaining democracy, and a mark of efficiency of the total system" (Lipset 1959). According to this theory, economy is operationalized in terms industrialization, urbanization, high education standard, and the overall increase in wealth of the society; explained in relation with gross domestic per capita (GDP).

**1. Institutional approach as a tool for assessing the impact of actual cases of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria**

Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) suggest that strong institutions are recipe for functional government. Nations without strong political institutions are said to often drench into extractive institutions. The basis of this extractive institutions is "an elite who design economic institutions in order to enrich themselves and perpetuate their power at the expense of the vast majority of people in the society" (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). They suggest that lack of accountability in the political institutions enables corruption. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) identified nations which depends on extractive economy, that is; nations that generates revenue from natural resources through foreign earnings, aids, or donations are more susceptible to corruption.

In Nigeria, as it is evident in the corruption cases analyzed, lack of accountability in government institutions are primary recipe for corruption. Part of the identified reasons for lack of accountability in Nigerian state, is the nature of wealth accumulation and distribution. Nigeria is an oil-based economy, hence generates its revenue through export of oil. The proceeds from this revenue are distributed among the federating units and parastatals for efficiency and effectiveness of government in

form of revenue allocation. According to Ohiomu and Oluyemi (2019, p. 144) "revenue allocation refers to the redistribution of fiscal capacity between the various levels of government, or disposition of fiscal responsibilities between tiers of government". However, lack of proper management and accountability of these resources among various government agencies creates incentives for politicians to misappropriate and divert public funds into personal interest. Below is an example of how monthly revenue allocation is distributed in Nigeria among the federating units:

Table 10 Revenue Allocation Formula in Nigeria

| S/N | Beneficiary | Percentage of Revenue Allocated |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Federal government | 48.50% |
| 2 | 36 states | 26.72% |
| 3 | 774 local governments | 20.60% |
| 4 | Centrally controlled special fund | 4.18% |
| | Total | 100% |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2022.

The table above illustrates how revenue allocation is distributed in Nigeria every month. In Nigeria, it is a matter of a constitutional provision that every government establishment, including the three tiers of government as displayed on this table receives monthly financial allocation. For instance, the federal government which receives 48.50% of the stipulated allocation distributes this money within federal parastatals, for instance; financial allocation for defense is allocated to Ministry of Defense, for internal security including police and other paramilitary agencies is allocated to Ministry of Interior, for road construction and maintenance is allocated to Ministry of Works, etc. Each of these institutions within the federal government in Nigeria has full financial autonomy on how to spend the allocated resources, likewise the state and local governments. Therefore, lack of adequate supervision on how these allocated resources are spent among these institutions and parastatals creates incentives for misallocation and abuse of public trust by those responsible for the management of state resources. Most of the high profile cases of corruption reported in chapter four demonstrates the abuse of office and subversion of public interest by those entrusted with public trust to administer leadership through political institutions.

The institutional impact of actual cases of political corruption on Nigeria's democratic performance cannot be overemphasized. According to Freedom House

(2016) explanation of democracy, democratic institutions can be measured in terms of free and fair election, political rights; like right to protest, civil rights; like access to free trial, strong and independent institutions.

**a. Free and fair elections**

Robert Dahl (1989) defined free and fair elections as an election in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. An election is said to be free and fair only when it recognizes the fundamental rights of all the adult suffrage, abide by the stipulated electoral laws, free from intimidation, violence, rigging, and vote buying. To investigate the impact of actual cases of political corruption on free and fair elections in Nigeria, the arguments from the existing hypotheses; linear model effect hypotheses which states that, democratization reduces the level of political corruption, can be helpful.

The evidence from the actual cases of political corruption in Nigeria contradicts the theories which supported the proposition of this hypothesis. For instance, public choice literature argued that political participation through election creates incentive for political accountability thereby minimizing the effects of corruption. In line with the argument, (Montinola and Jackman, 2002) suggested that the introduction of election and political participation changes the incentives of politicians from engaging in corrupt practices. Pellegate (2012) shared the same argument when he noted that politicians seeking to be re-elected into public office shun corrupt practices and protect public trust. In the same vein, Kefer (2005) argues that democracy through elections forces public officials to be accountable to voters, since voters prefers less over more corrupt public officials.

In Nigeria, elections are neither free nor fair. It is free, if the political party and their aspirants have enough financial resources to induce the electorate for votes. That is why Olurunmola (2016) suggests that money is considered a crucial factor for political parties and contestants during elections in Nigeria. It is fair, if the incumbent and the political party in power is contesting for office, since those who control the electoral institution determines the process. Therefore, electoral participation through elections in Nigeria, only acts to exacerbate the level of political corruption in the country.

Onapajo et al. (2015, p. 2) notes that, “electoral process in Nigeria is known for its chaotic nature and at the heart of it, is the notion of vote buying, a phenomenon which arguably reflects the nature of politics and election”. Similarly, Amao (2020) argues that electoral process in Nigeria has frequently been identified for its violent, chaotic and corrupt tendencies through the utilization of thugs, intimidation of political opponents by those seeking elective offices through fraud.

The high financial cost of electoral process in Nigeria exposes politicians to engage in all forms of political corruption and abuse of public trust. Politicians resort to political corruption through the means of embezzlement and misappropriation as seen in the cases examined in the preceding in other to maintain their political status. Sarkariyau et al. (2015, p. 5) observed that “elective offices in Nigeria are mere commodities to be purchased by the highest bidder, and those who invest in politics see it as an avenue to make profit. Thus, politics becomes business, and the business of politics is simply to divert public funds”. The financial demand required to contest an election in Nigeria, creates incentives for public office holders to either illegally recover the money they spent during the election from public funds, or embezzle state funds to use and run for elections. Thus, it is safe to say that with way elections and electioneering process are conducted in Nigeria stimulates corruption.

**b. Political rights**

According to the charter of Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (2016) “political rights is defined as an individual’s ability to participate in the civil and political life of the society and state without fear of discrimination or repression and is tied closely to citizenship status. These rights include the rights to vote in an election, the rights to join political party; run for office, rights to participate freely in political rallies, events, and protests” (CSCE, 2016). Section 33 to 44 of Nigeria constitution guarantees fundamental human rights of its citizens, and in particular, section 35, emphasized right to personal liberty, while section 40, guaranteed right to peaceful assemble and association. Nigeria’s constitution provides a general framework for equal participation in political life by all citizens of the country irrespective of gender, ethnic identity and religious affiliation. The constitution also guarantees freedom of speech, expression, press, and religion.

Although, corruption pervades the elites dominated political structure in Nigeria, the civil organization has so far become the voice of ordinary Nigerians. Between 2011

to 2020, Nigerians through various civil society groups, and agencies have successfully influenced governments decisions through protests and civil mobilization. The three prominent among these protest are, Occupy Nigeria 2012, Bring back our girls 2014, and ENDSARS 2020. Below is a brief review of the protest details:

*Occupy Nigeria 2012*

The term Occupy Nigeria was used by civil rights groups who mobilized citizens to protest and resist the federal government action on removal of fuel subsidy. On January 1, 2012, the federal government of Nigeria led by President Goodluck Jonathan announced government decision to remove fuel subsidy provided by government. By fuel subsidy we mean that "a fraction of the price that consumers are supposed to pay to enjoy the use of petroleum products is paid by the government so as to ease the price burden" (Onyeizugbe and Onwuka, 2012). The government stated that the removal of the subsidy would provide funds for other public services such as health, infrastructure and improve education, and importantly create a full liberalization of the oil sector to improve the economy. However, the announcement was met with stiff resistance by Nigerians who argued that the fuel subsidy is the only benefits from corrupt government known for inefficiency in managing public resources. Even though Nigeria has enormous crude oil and depends on its export for foreign earnings, however, over "70% of refined petroleum products are imported" (Statista, 2022). Nigerian activists also pointed out on the rise of cost of fuel subsidy from the previous administration which clearly shows a high level of corruption from the government officials. Between January 2 and 5, a mass protest was organized across the country, which followed by industrial action (strike) by different labor unions including Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC), Nigerian Trades Union Congress (NTUC), Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), and the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA). On the 16$^{th}$ of January, following the increasing threats from the protesters to sack the government, President Jonathan announced the partial reinstating of the fuel subsidy, which led to the end of the protest and strike respectively.

*Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) Protest 2014*

On the 15$^{th}$ of April 2014, the Boko Haram terrorist sect abducted over 200 schoolgirls from Girls' Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State in the North-East Nigeria. The abduction received a global outcry as barbaric and inhuman, and thus the

bring back our girl's protest was launched (The Guardian, 2014). Different civil society organizations converged from different parts of Nigeria and initiated a nationwide protest against the government of President Goodluck Jonathan. The protests was aimed at expressing the citizen's resentment on the poor security situation in Nigeria, lack of government attention on girl child education in the northern Nigeria, and demand of government's action on the rescue of the abducted girls. The protests received global support through social media with hashtag #bringbackourgirls, tweeted in different countries with a demand to Nigerian government to rescue the girls. Although the government could not rescue the girls, however, the protest forced President Goodluck Jonathan's government to respond with increased fight against Boko Haram within the North-East of Nigeria. Seemingly, the bring back our girl's protest led to increase in activism by many Nigerian women activists.

*ENDSARS 2020*

On October 8, 2020, Nigeria youths came out on the street to protest police brutality regularly occasioned by a criminal police unit called SARS (Nairametrics, 2020). SARS is an acronym for Special Anti-Rubbery Squad. Created by Nigerian police force with the aim of combating an armed robbery attack but was accused by many Nigerians of different incidence of criminal harassment especially on the youths (Aljazeera, 2020). On October 11, 2020, the protesters submitted a list of five demands which includes, immediate release of all arrested protesters, compensation for the victims of police brutality, independent body to investigate and prosecute all reports of police misconducts, psychological evaluation of all police members of SARS and disbarment of the unit, increase in police salary. In response to some of the demands, the inspector general of police (IGP) banned the SARS unit and announced immediate removal of roadblocks on federal highways. In spite of the IGP actions, the protesters insisted that all their demands must be met. On the 19$^{th}$ of October, President Muhammed Buhari in his address to the nation warned that the government would deal decisively with those attempting to hijack the protest and anarchist. In addition, the Central Bank of Nigeria governor, Godwin Emefiele on 20$^{th}$ of October, announced freezing of accounts of those believed to be supporting the protest. Similarly, Lagos state governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu imposed a one-day curfew to disperse the protesters and further instructed military to take over the streets of Lagos. This led to soldiers and police shooting at innocent protesters who refused to disperse from the

Lekki Toll Gate where they occupied. The incidence led to the death of 102 protesters as was reported by the police. The toll gate shooting resonated even a wider civil unrest which forced President Muhammadu Buhari to announce implementation of all protesters demand. Thus, achieving the main goal of the protest with huge human cost (Nairametrics, 2020).

The three cases of political protest in Nigeria as discussed above, offers this research three important insights on the impact of actual cases of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria. First, vested interest in political institution; second, lack of trust in governance; third, weak political institution.

First, vested Interest in political institutions. In the Occupy Nigeria protest, one of the government reasons for removal of fuel subsidy was corruption. President Goodluck Jonathan pointed out that, "we cannot continue to waste resources meant for a greater number of Nigerians to subsidize the affluent middle class, who are the main beneficiaries" (Vanguard Newspaper, 2013). The government also accused the corrupt elites who benefit from the fuel subsidy to be the major financiers of the fuel subsidy protest. House of Representative committee that investigated the incidence of corruption in subsidy and the cause of the protest submitted that, several operators and players in the country's downstream petroleum industry were involved in the loss of over N1 trillion which was stolen through misappropriation of public funds.

On the Bring Back Our Girl's protest, the Chibok school girls were abducted because of the failures of political elites responsible for providing security of life and property, to judiciously utilize the fund meant for security. The deterioration of security situation in country is a direct consequence of misappropriation and abuse of power by public officials. In addition, Nigerian government led by President Goodluck Jonathan was very reluctant to order for the search of the abducted girls. For instance, former British Prime Minister, David Cameron, accused President Jonathan to be "sleeping on the wheel" while also criticizing the "bring back our girl's campaigners of politicizing the tragedy" (Punch Newspaper, 2019).

The EndSARS protest which was targeted on fighting police brutality and criminality by some sections of the police, indeed exposed deeply the corrupt system in the entire police institution in Nigeria. Sections of the Nigeria police system have a vested interest in maintaining and protecting police interest than that of the citizens.

Senior ranking officers are known to maintain a perverse bribery pyramid which requires that poorly paid rank and file officers transfer bribes extorted from citizens up the chain of command. Irrespective of the disbarment of SARS by the inspector general of police, yet the culture of corruption is deep rooted in the institution.

Second, lack of trust in governance: the three selected protest in Nigeria demonstrated an expression of frustration from Nigerians. It clearly showed lack of trust in governance. Occupy Nigeria protest was a challenge and a rejection against government policy, which president Goodluck Jonathan acknowledged to be influenced by corruption of the elites. Whereas the bring back our girl's protest was a demonstration of government failure to provide security for school children. The ENDSARS protest showed lack of government capacity to reform police institution accused of unprofessionalism and corruption. Third, weak political institution; as indicated earlier by Rose-Ackerman (1999) that corruption weakens state institutions, the three protests in Nigeria exposed how political corruption have weakened the state institutions. The Occupy Nigeria protest was necessitated by high level of fraud in governance, which caused the misappropriation and diversion of fuel subsidy funds. Bring Back Our Girls revealed how corruption in the defense industry have weakened the state security structure, likewise, the ENDSARS protest showed the incapacity of police as a public institution.

**c. Independent institutions**

There's a agreement among scholars writing on democracy and democratization process that strong and independent institutions among democratic states reduces political corruption and increases efficiency in governance (Treisman 2002, Fisman & Gatti 2002, Warren 2004, Pellegata, 2012, Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). This view was reflected in the inaugural speeches of both President Goodluck Jonathan (2011-2015), and President Muhammadu Buhari (2015-2019). For instance, President Goodluck Jonathan in his inaugural speech stated the following (Vanguard Newspaper, 2011):

> Your Excellencies, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, this is a new dawn for Africa. We fought for decolonization. We will now fight for democratization. Nigeria, in partnership with the African Union, will lead the process for democracy and development in Africa. In particular, we will support the consolidation of democracy, good governance

> and human rights in the continent. Africa must develop its vast resources to tackle poverty and under-development.

In a similar language, President Muhammadu Buhari who between 1984-1985 was a military dictator, in his inaugural speech reaffirmed his commitment to building strong and independent political institutions that will enable deeper democratization in the country. Thus, he stated the following (Vanguard Newspaper, 2011):

> There is now a national consensus that our chosen route to national development is democracy. To achieve our objectives, we must consciously work the democratic system. The Federal Executive under my watch will not seek to encroach on the duties and functions of the Legislative and Judicial arms of government. The law enforcing authorities will be charged to operate within the Constitution. We shall rebuild and reform the public service to become more effective and more serviceable. We shall charge them to apply themselves with integrity to stabilize the system.

Each of these leaders at the time of their inauguration to office promised to build strong and independent political institutions. However, their style of governance does not seem to support their promises. This research will assess the impact of actual cases of political corruption as indicated on the preceding sections on democratic performance in Nigeria, using the three branches of government, the executive, the judiciary, and the legislative as point of analysis.

**The executive:**

The executive is a key institution of democratic rule that is saddled with the responsibility of implementing the law, and conducting other administrative businesses of the government, hence, (Heywood, 2007) conceives it as an irreducible core of government. In Nigeria, at the federal level, the chief executive is the president, who is responsible for appointing members of cabinets or heads of agency, and these appointees are constitutionally liable to the president. The impact of political corruption with the executive institutions of government in Nigeria has been corrosive. Most of the actual cases of political corruption cited in this study are tied to public officers within the executives. For instance, on October 25, 2017, a Federal High Court Judge, Justice Abang Okon issued a subpoena compelling ex-president Goodluck Jonathan to testify in the case of corruption hearing, which accused Olisa Metuh pointed his as a witness to his crime. In addition, former security adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan, Sambo Dasuki admitted claimed that the President knew about the purported 2 billion dollars arms corruption transaction (DW Africa, 2017).

Similarly, the Nigerian director for United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), Debbie Palmer, revealed that Nigeria lost 32 billion dollars to corruption within the six years of President Goodluck Jonathan led government (The Nation Newspaper, 2017). This is the resources that would have been channeled to development but was misappropriated by those directly appointed by President Goodluck Jonathan.

Corruption has weakened almost every sector of administrative institution in Nigeria. The government lacks capacity to provide basic social needs of the people. Poverty and insecurity are on the increase. The gap between the haves' and the have-not are on the increase, gradually creating an antagonizing class society. The citizens no longer have trust in the government, and in most cases no longer believe in the supreme of government. The evidence of government incapacity in Nigeria, is the proliferation of violent crime in the country, like, kidnapping, banditry, communal crisis, Fulani herdsmen attacks, and terrorism.

**Legislature:**

The legislative branch of government is another key institution of democratic rule. It is one of the important political institutions that distinguishes democratic regime from military rule, because it makes law through popular representations of the people.

In Nigeria, the legislative as an institution of government has also contributed in squandering the hopes of democracy in the country, through policies that promote political corruption. While the statuary duties of legislators in Nigeria is to make law, Section 88 of Nigeria's constitution gives the legislative branch of government an investigative responsibility through its' oversight function. Section 81, makes the legislative branch the custodian of revenue in Nigeria, thereby giving the legislators the power to approve budgets. Section 147 confers the legislative branch the power to approve and disapprove any minister appointed by the executives (Nigeria Constitution, 1999). These responsibilities were delegated to the legislative branch of government as a means of distribution of power, and to prevent the arbitrary use of power by other branches of government. However, the corrupt practices among Nigerian legislators have completely eroded efficiency in their constitutional responsibility. For example, on December 18, 2018, President Muhammadu Buhari in

his letter to the National Assembly, accused the legislatures of budget padding. Part of the letter reads "You may wish to refer to the letter from National Assembly REF: NASS/CAN/106/VOL.10/277 dated 27th July 2018 which communicated the approval by the National Assembly of the promissory note programme and a bond issuance to settle inherited local debts and contractual obligation on refund to state governments on projects executed on behalf of the federal government in the sum of N488,743,526,204.77. The senate may wish to know that in view of the approval by the National Assembly, the following were observed: while the Federal Executive Council (FEC) approved the total of N487,842,888,574.74 only, as reimbursement to the state governments, the National Assembly approved N488,743,526,204.77, implying that the amount approved by the National Assembly was N890,537,630.03 higher than the amount approved by FEC" (Premium Times Newspaper, 2018). The corrupt actions of Nigerian legislatures in increasing the budgets and mandating the executives to inflate contracts clearly undermine good governance, and abuse transparency.

Another important corrupt exercise displayed by Nigerian legislators, is the delay in budget approval. These delays are intended to force the executives for inclusion of huge funds in their constituency projects in the yearly budget approval. Delays in budget approval from the legislators sometimes last up to first quarter of the year. For instance, President Muhammadu Buhari on November 2, 2018, states the following: "if the National Assembly takes seven months to pass a budget, then we should be commended for the much that we have achieved and still achieve" (Channels Television, 2018).

In addition, the legislators in exercising their constitutional responsibilities of approving appointments of public officials, cabinet ministers, and directors, it is becoming a norm that the legislators are expected to be lobbied before giving their consent of approval.

Similarly, the legislators often approve for themselves outrageous salaries, which are not in line with the stipulated public service earnings. For example, former senate member, Shehu Sani, revealed that Nigerian senators are entitled to monthly expenses of N13.5 million ($37,500), in addition to their monthly salaries of $2,000 (BBC News, 2018). The huge payments make cost of governance in Nigeria, higher than the actual amount spent on development. Nigerian democracy is threatened by

the corrupt attitudes of the political elites like the legislators, who are elected to represent the interest of the people but betrays those interest into self-serving actions.

**The judiciary:**

The judicial institution operates as an arbiter of justice in a democracy. Its primary responsibility is to interpret the law, settle disputes, and adjudicate on the policies of government. In Nigeria, the judiciary have been seen as the last hope of ordinary citizens. Yagboyaju (2011, p. 183) acknowledged that Nigerian Judiciary has played a "significant role in moderating the activities of individuals, groups, and agencies during the country's 11 years of democracy". Although, the members of the judiciary institutions in Nigeria are considered apolitical, because they are not allowed to participate in election to attain their position. However, the judicial institution plays a vital role in managing and moderating political behaviours that affects governance.

Nigerian Judicial institution through its court processes has contributed to so many areas in sustaining Nigeria's democracy, especially on its primary responsibility of interpreting the law. For instance, the recent judgement and pronouncement by Federal High Court River State, on the tax dispute between River State government, and the Federal Government through its agency, Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), is a laudable step that gives credit to Nigerian democracy. The following are the details of the court judgement and pronouncement.

In a lawsuit filed by River State government at Federal High Court Portharcut, against the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and the Attorney General of the Federation, requesting the Court to answer the following questions (Aluko and Oyebode, 2021):

> "1. Whether upon a correct interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Federal Government of Nigeria was empowered to make tax laws outside the scope of stamp duties, taxation of incoming profits and capital gains? 2. Whether the legislative competence of the National Assembly to impose duties and taxes on matters enumerated in the exclusive and concurrent list of the 1999 constitution includes the power to levy any form of sales tax including VAT?".

Upon hearing the matter, the Federal High Court proceeded to answer the questions as determined in its judgement as follows (Aluko and Oyebode, 2021):

> "That the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has specifically set out the taxes that the federal government is empowered to impose and collect in items 58

and 59 of part 1 of the second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, and these must be read to exclude other taxes like VAT, withholding tax, education tax, and technology tax. Hence, the Federal Government lacks the authority to impose and collect these taxes".

This case, and similar others, including many labor related issues, elections cases, and corruption cases that were resolved in courts shows the significance of judiciary in democratic development in Nigeria. However, there are reported cases of corruption against some members of the judicial officials, and other allegations against the judicial process, which undermines effectiveness of democracy. But its interesting to know that incidence of corruption within the judicial system, especially among the high ranking judicial members including judges and court officials in Nigeria are often swept under the carpet. It follows the saying that judges protect their own. For instance, on October 8, 2016, it was reported that, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), on part of its "crackdown on corruption within the judiciary arrested two judges of Federal High Court, justice Mohammed Nasir Yunusa, and Justice Hyeladzira Ajiya Nganjiwa, for allegedly receiving bribes from two lawyers, Rickey Tarfa, and Joseph Nwobike" (This Day Newspaper, 2016). This cases was never proceeded neither did the In addition, the reported role played by some lawyers, and some corrupt Federal High Court judges, in handling corruption cases of some former governors, like Peter Odili, Chimaraoke Nnamani, and Saminu Turaki, who reportedly entered plea bargain, and secured unnecessary stay of execution against their prosecution, showed how corruption in judiciary affects transparency in governance.

## 2. Using economy as a tool for assessing the impact of actual cases of political corruption on democratic performance in nigeria

As highlighted above, economy is one of the key sectors used in measuring democratic performance of a country (Lipset, 1959). Economy has also been identified as a significant tool used in fighting corruption. For instance, as suggested by Busse and Gröning (2013) countries with high level income have more financial resources to deploy in the fight against corruption. In Nigeria, one of the key aspects of the economic tools that reflects and determine the outcome of democratic performance, is the country's annual budgeting process. In this perspective, a budget is an "official statement a government makes about how much it tends to spend and what taxes will be necessary" (Longman English Dictionary, 2022).

The outcome of government's annual performance is determined by how much it effectively designed and implemented its budget. However, the budgeting system of Nigeria's economy has often been ripped with controversies of corruption, mismanagement and lacks implementation. According to a report from the Chartered Institute of Forensic and investigative Professionals of Nigeria (CIFIPN), it states that, "between 70 to 75 percent of Nigeria's national budget is lost to corrupt practices at all levels of governance in the country" (Daily Trust Newspaper, 2022). Similarly, the Anti-Corruption Network, a civil society organization states that, "60 percent of corruption issues in Nigeria are built and legalized through the nation's budgetary system. In their example, they noted that in the 2022 Nigeria's national budget, the federal government presented the following budget for a single government agency, Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), 2.5 billion naira for purchase of land, 3 billion naira for office furniture, 1.5 billion naira for office photocopy machines, 500 million for the construction of sports facilities" (The Guardian, 2021). Perhaps, it is worth to note that these budgets do not reflect on the living conditions of ordinary Nigerians, instead, it is a political ploy by the elites to justify misappropriating public funds. There are three main reasons why national budgeting process in Nigeria encourages corruption, first, Issues dealing with budget preparation and legislation; second, budget financing; third, lack of accountability in budget implementation.

First, issues dealing with budget preparation and legislation: in Nigeria, the process of budget development, deliberation and passage are both the constitutional responsibility of both the executive and the legislature. While the executives through the president as prescribed by Section 81 (1) of Nigerian Constitution, which states that, "the president shall cause to be prepared and laid before National Assembly at any time in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the federation for the next following financial year" (Nigerian Constitution, 1999), prepares the budget. The legislatures in Section 59 of the Constitution are vested with the responsibility of deliberation and passage of the budget into law. Hence, the budgeting procedures and participation represents one of the checks and balances of democracy. The budget in its sense is expected to guide the financial responsibility of the government in providing the needed services for the citizens, but it worthy to note that Nigerian budgets between 2011 to 2019 does not have any real impacts on the welfare of Nigerians. For instance, Nigeria poverty ratio rose from "61% in 2011, to

82% in 2019" (Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2022). This indicates that huge financial spending of the government does not reflect in improving the living standards of average Nigerians. In addition, as indicated earlier, both the members of the executives and legislatures designs and approves the national budget in such a way that it protects and promotes their interest. This is done by inflating the financial cost of expected government expenditures.

Second, budget financing: another area that increases corruption and affects governance in Nigeria is the process of budget financing. Between 2011 and 2019, Nigeria's national budget operated through fiscal deficit. This means that, government budgets in these periods are higher than the expected revenue. For example: the 2011 Nigeria national budget passed into law by the National Assembly was 4.972 trillion Naira, and the government aggregate expenditure is 4.485 trillion naira which is 487 billion lesser than the approved budget, governments expected revenue within the fiscal year is 3.348 trillion based on the oil benchmark, hence the fiscal deficit of the budget is above 1.1 trillion naira (Vanguard Newspaper, 2011). To source funds for these fiscal deficits, the government is allowed to secure loans both in domestic and international market. These loans are unaccounted for and in most cases an avenue for politicians to steal public fund. According to World Bank debts report, Nigeria's external debt rose from "21 billion US dollars in 2011, to 60.05 billion dollars in 2019" (World Bank, 2022). These loans are borrowed to be shared among political elites as reported in the actual political corruption cases.

Third, lack of accountability in budget management: even though Section 88 of the Nigerian Constitution, vested an oversight function on the legislature, which empowers them to investigate and supervise how budget funding are implemented by the executive. Yet, there's been countless cases of abuse of power, and misappropriation of public fund by those responsible in implementing budget duties. Lack of accountability in the implementation of national budgets is one of the major breeding grounds for political corruption. Political elites within the executives acts as a demigod with public funds, since there are no functional checks and balances.

In addition, it is interesting to note that some members of the executives often refuse to submit themselves for legislative supervision. For example, the Comptroller General of the Nigerian Custom, Mr. Hameed Ali in several occasions refused to appear before the Senate Committee on Public Accounts, who had summoned him to

explain the alleged financial controversy in the agency (Premium Times Newspaper, 2020). Similarly, the Central Bank of Nigeria governor, Mr. Godwin Emefiele, and the Chairman Niger Delta Development Commission, Mr. Robert Tyough refused to appear before House of Representative summon over various explanations concerning their agencies. The net effects of the impact of actual cases of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria, is the rising level of poverty and general deprivation of public goods by those entrusted with public responsibility.

In conclusion, this chapter discussed the major findings on the impact of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria which are drawn from the preceding chapters of the study. It started by drawing out some of the prosecuted cases of corruption between President Jonathan of 2011to 2015, and President Buhari of 2015 to 2019. The chapter attempted a comprehensive analysis of some of the key findings of the study. It analyzed political institution as a tool for assessing the impact of political corruption on democratic performance. It finds that weak political institutions enable incentives for corruption. It also finds that lack of transparency in the electoral process produces corrupt public officials. It concludes that once the processes of checks and balances are not observed in a democracy it creates windows for abuse of public trust. States with weak political institutions cannot reproduce systems that guarantee state survival.

# VI. DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE

## A. Introduction

So far, the incidence of political corruption treated in chapter four and five of this research, offered useful information into looking at broad range of issues of the study. The use of actual case of corruption in those chapters offered three important features. First, it exposed the gap in most of the commonly used studies on corruption, which previously based its data assessment on perception, and as such produces either overgeneralized or understudied results. Second, it reveals that inefficient democratic institutions such as the judiciary, legislature, and electoral umpires contributes to corruption. It also revealed that political corruption create inefficiency within democratic institutions. Third, the use of actual/legally reported cases of corruption in the study allowed for detailed independent analysis of incidence of corruption and its impact on good governance vis-à-vis democratic performance. This chapter builds upon these findings and evaluate the impact of political corruption on democratic performance through theoretical analysis of determinants of political corruption and democratic performance. It considers certain variables which have been cited in the preceding chapters especially in the literature review section.

## B. Major determinants of political corruption and democratic performance in Nigeria

As was evident in the literature reviewed in the chapter two of the study, different variables were utilized by different scholars on the determinants of corruption in a country. Also it reviewed the findings of different empirical measurements on corruption and democracy. This section will compile and display in a tabular form some of the empirical literature and their findings to enable a more comprehensive analysis of the study. It will further use the empirical findings to discuss the determinants of political corruption and democratic performance in line with the

theoretical framework of the study. Below is the compiled lists of empirical findings on determinants of political corruption and democratic performance.

Table 11 Empirical literature on determinants of political corruption

| Authors | Country/region | Method | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atkinson and Seiferling (2006) | Cross-Country 33 out 53 countries | Multi-level Analysis | Public perception of corruption correlates well with expert reviews. |
| Busse and Gröning (2013) | 129 countries (1984-2007) | System GMM | Export of natural resources encourages corruption, but rising income reduces corruption. |
| Daniel Treisman (2000) | Cross-sectional (1950-1995) | Multilevel analysis | Countries with British colonial past are less corrupt. Countries with huge natural resources are more corrupt. |
| Kolstad and Wiig (2015) | Cross-country (1946-2008) | OLS and IV | Democracy reduces corruption |
| Daniel Lederman et al (2005) | Cross-country (1975-1999) | OLS regression | Strong political institutions reduce corruption. |
| Mintola and Jackman (2002) | Cross-country | Multilevel analysis | Low-income countries are more corrupt, OPEC countries are likely to be corrupt. |
| Ades and Di Tella (1999) | Cross-country (1980, 1983, 1989-1990) | OLS, TSLS, and fixed effects | Rents are positively related with corruption, while income level and competition reduce corruption. |
| Evrensel (2010) | Cross-country 154 countries (1998-2000). | OLS | Corruption is high in countries with high inflation rates, ineffective judicial system, low level education. |

**Source:** Compiled by the author by the author from different sources.

**Note:** GMM= Generalized Methods of Moment; OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; IV= Instrument Variable; TSLS= Two Stages Least Square.

As indicated earlier, majority of existing empirical literature on corruption were mainly based on cross-country analysis, which relied mainly on perception or expert review to draw their findings. There are only but few research on political corruption and democratic performance that followed the line of case study method to investigate the impact and determinants of corruption as was shown in chapter 2 and 4 of this study. The following section of this study will analyze these identified determinants of corruption using Nigeria as a case study. These determinants are as follows, rent, democratic institutional factors, military spending, and structure of governance.

**C. Rent**

One of the widely cited variables in both the empirical and theoretical literature reviewed in the study as a determinant of political corruption is economic rent. Scholars like Hossein Mahdavy (1970), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Treisman (2000), Mintola and Jackman (2002), John Di Jonathan (2010), Dani Rodrik (2011), Gatti (2000) and Walter Rodney (1972), agreed that a country's level of corruption will be high, if government's revenue largely depends on income from natural resources. For example, Ades and Di Tella (1999), hypothesized that any economy that is fully dependent on natural resources or raw materials (oil, metals, and mineral) and exports these resources in order to generate revenue, will promote rents and therefore encourages high level of corruption. A position Mintola and Jackman (2002) equally affirms, when they argue that members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are likely to be corrupt as similarly captured by John Di Jonathan (2010) as "resource curse". While in a different approach, Rodney (1972) as well, considers foreign aid as rents which end in the pockets of politicians because they are largely unaccounted for since it does not fall within government budget or expenditure.

Following these understandings, there are three possible explanations to these suggestions: First, exploration and management of natural resources are mainly conducted by multinational and public enterprises who in most cases serve as middlemen to governments. Such processes and its activities are rent-seeking practices, hence provides recipe for corruption from foreign firms to political office holders. Under this circumstance, the practice of bribery and lobbying is common among political leaders and its negotiators. Second, the expected revenues from exploration and export of natural resources are often conducted in foreign currencies and mostly abroad. Hence, the greater proportion of its proceeds is usually undeclared, and huge sum of it stolen by the intermediaries. Third, governments' dependent on rents creates weak institutions, since both political office holders and the public servants are not working for their earnings rather depend on government received revenues.

Nigeria is largely a rent-dependent country. To the extent that, the most recent report, published by National Bureau of statistics (NBS, 2019), claimed that the oil sector is only 8% of the GDP, whereas it contributed 70% of government revenue, and as well produced 90% of foreign exchange over the years. Similarly, the country's

foreign debts stood at $85.9 billion (Nairametrics, 2020). This shows that greater percentage of the country's budget is financed through rents. Perhaps, as suggested by Ades and Di Tella (1999), who state that countries whose economy heavily depends on natural resources are likely to experience corruption. It further justified the act of corruption as was cited in the chapter four of this study, when Nigeria's former Central Bank Governor, Emir Sanusi Lamido Sanusi reported that $20 billion proceeds from oil revenue disappeared among the officials of the Nigeria National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC), (Financial Times 2014). In this perspective, there are two main sources of rents as means of revenue to Nigeria government, first, revenue generated from natural resources, in particular, oil. Second, revenue generated through borrowing, that is, from both domestic and foreign loans.

First, revenue generated from natural resources, in particular oil: to investigate the role of Nigeria's oil sector in encouraging activities of corruption in the country can be the subject matter of a different study, however, I am going to focus on relevant issues that benefit this study. One of the major domains of corruption through the oil sector in Nigeria had to do with oil theft and embezzlement of funds during legal sales, facilitated by the issue of vested interest by those within the corridors of political power.

According to a report made by Nigeria Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) in July 2021, it indicated that "Nigeria lost 42.25 million barrels of crude oil to oil theft, which was valued at 2.77 billion US dollar in 2019" (This Day Newspaper, 2022). The process of oil theft in Nigeria is a well sophisticated industry run by both oil mafia, and local militia, who are protected by those with political authorities. Oil theft in Nigeria is known as bunkering. Bunkering is a technical term which is used to refer to trans-shipment of crude oil between two boats (IFRI, 2018). The stolen oil boats are either transferred into super tankers for transnational transactions or illegally refined locally for domestic sales.

The concept of oil bunkering in Nigeria, is an age long criminal activity, which seems impossible to control because of the huge pay-cheque it provides for political elites. According to IFRI (2018, p. 15) he stated that, "it is very difficult to evaluate the quantities of crude oil which are stolen in Nigeria, due to lack of measuring instruments to estimate the volume of stolen oil". Similarly, the contradictions between the 2012 report by the Joint Task Force (JTF), who are responsible for oil security, and

Shell oil company, on the amount of oil stolen per day, is evident on how the sector has been criminalized. The JTF report estimated that 10,000 barrels of oil is stolen per day. On the other hand, Shell, reported that the amount of bunkered oil is between 150,000 to 250,000 barrels of crude oil per day (IFRI, 2018). This demonstrates the criminality within the extractive industry in Nigeria and shows the absolute lack of wiliness by those in authority to fight it. For example; according to Wikileaks release, the Former US Consul General to Nigeria, Donna M. Blair, in one of her transmitted letters affirms that, "oil theft, widely referred to as illegal bunkering in Nigeria, represents significant economic activity with serious ramification for Nigeria's economy, democracy, security and environment. It added, Nigeria's political elites and soldiers have profited from large scale oil theft, that may have cost the country up to a tenth of its production" (Reuters, September 7, 2011). Although it could be argued that bunkering is illegal, and only deprives a chunk of intended government revenue, yet the influence of its actors has on government is enormous. According to Nwajiaku (2012), she contends that, the menace of "bunkering and Nigeria's rentier economy are two sides of the same coin. The insecurity and violent in the Niger Delta serve the interests of all those who have invested in the illegal extraction and resale of stolen oil" (2012: 306). Within the Niger-Delta area of the South-South region of Nigeria, which comprises of the oil producing states, the oil bunkery militias are so influential and powerful that the federal government through its agency, the Nigeria National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC), secretly award security contracts of guiding the oil pipeline to the oil mafias (The Guardian Newspaper, June 15, 2015). In addition, because of the enormous financial influence of the militias, political candidates in the area often seek their electoral endorsement during campaigns, hence protects their interest while elected to public offices.

In view of this background, the illegal theft of crude oil is only one side of many issues of corruption in the oil sector industry. The legal process of crude oil production in Nigeria also provides opportunities for embezzlement of public funds by political elites and their agents in the sector. The embezzlement and misappropriation of oil funds in Nigeria works at two different levels. First, at the international level: the process of allocation of oil exploring or operating rights, often involves paying handouts which fuels corruption networks. For instance, the 182 million US dollar Halliburton oil bribery scandal of 1994 in Nigeria. The Halliburton scandal is

concerned with the alleged payment of $182 million to senior Nigerian government officials by an American oil firm, to secure contract on construction of liquefied natural gas plant in Nigeria (Premium Times Newspaper, February 13, 2016). Second, at the national level: local contractors seeking government contracts of oil rigs, or oil mining licenses also pay kickbacks and commission into foreign accounts of politicians, for example, "Halliburton bribery case (Reuters November 27, 2010)". It is worthy to note that, the indigenization policy of 2000s which transferred majority of oil rigs into indigenous ownership, and further saw the creation of indigenous companies as key players in the oil extraction business, only served the interest of corrupt elites. Most of the indigenous oil companies operate as brief case companies who just take commission for politicians and conduct intermediary shady businesses for businessmen. Similarly, Ifri (2018) contends that, "Briefcase companies fulfil many functions which include, legally selling of stolen oil, receiving fees for fake consultant services, international money transfers, and act as middlemen for politicians in the sector" (2018: 20). In reality, many of these so-called briefcase companies contribute in raising the production cost of crude oil, by increasing cost of required exploring equipment's to suit the interest of their pay masters.

In addition, the greatest level of embezzlement of oil wealth in Nigeria, is through the export of crude oil. At the helm of this criminal activity is the government owned oil company, the Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC). The NNPC is responsible for managing 43% of the country's production, and 61% of total government revenue (Sayne et al. 2015). The sale and export of crude oil by the NNPC is discretionary without request for tender. The proceeds are sometimes sent into offshore accounts irrespective of the law that prohibits it. Nigeria is the only country in the world that sells 100% of its oil production to private traders, and yet, the NNPC cannot account for 100% of its proceeds. For example, as reported earlier, on February 2, 2014, the former Central Bank of Nigeria governor Lamido Sanusi accused the NNPC of failing to account for $20 billions of oil revenue (Premium Times Newspaper, February 4, 2014).

Similarly, the office of the Auditor General of Nigeria, on March 27, 2016, also accused NNPC of not remitting 3.2 trillion Naira of government oil revenue in the federation account (The Guardian Newspaper, 2016). This report indicates how reckless the Nigerian government is in managing oil rents. In addition, the direct sale

of crude oil to traders by NNPC also paves way to all level of fraudulent activities. Some of the patronizing private companies are owned by high level political elites and are not known in the oil business.

Second, another aspect of economic rent in Nigeria that promotes corruption is government borrowing, in particular, foreign loans. Between 2015 to 2019, President Muhammadu Buhari led government increased Nigeria's debt portfolio from $7.3 billion to $28.57 billion, which means Nigeria incurred about $21.27 billion dollars, on foreign loans alone (The Cable News, 2021). "Why does Nigeria need to borrow money?" (BBC News, 2016). My answer to the question would be "to fund corruption," although the government claim it borrows money to fund budget deficit, in reality the hugely financial approved budgets do not provide the needs of ordinary Nigerians. For example, on February 6, 2015, the federal government announced through its Ministry of Transport to have secured $7.5 billion loan for the construction of standard rail gauge from Lagos to Kano (Premium Times Newspaper, 2017). However, up until to this date, such projects were never executed, and yet loans were fully funded into the federal government accounts.

So is the case with the $470 million Chinese loan borrowed by the federal government to finance Close Circuit Television (CCTV) camera in Abuja (The Guardian, 2016). The project was never executed and yet, the government is repaying the loan. There are too many examples on how Nigeria governments secures foreign loans tied to a project but only to end up in the accounts of politicians and deny average Nigerians the value of such services. Hence, the government borrows money as a way of having easy access to funds that can be shared among politicians not necessarily to sponsor budget deficit.

### D. Democratic Institutional factors

Democracy has become a key concept at the center of this study. Different theories and empirical measurements are offered to understand the impact of democracy in dealing with corruption. In the literature review section, three important hypotheses were formulated to explain this condition. First hypothesis states that, democratization reduces the level of political corruption. This hypothesis was supported by scholars like Treisman (2000) Montinola & Jackman (2002) Kefer (2005) Lederman et al. (2005) Morris (2009) Sahel et al. (2009) Pellegata (2012)

Kolstad and Wiig (2015), who agreed that the level of democracy measured by political rights and civil liberties can affect the level of corruption. Political rights allow people to freely participate in the political process, and as well exercise those rights to vote and be voted for, elect representatives who make and implement policies and are held accountable for their decisions in the course of governance. Similarly, civil liberties guarantee people freedom of expression, equality, equity, association, personal autonomy, rights to application of rule of law, and resistance to unlawful violation of those rights. It is on this note that Kefer (2005) argues that democracy forces public officials to be accountable to voters, and presumably, voters prefer less corrupt officials over more. A view supported by Sahel et al. (2009) where he affirms that democracy through the use elections as its tools of governance breeds competitiveness among officials, hence, lack of competition encourages corruption. These in turn reduces corruption in a democratic country.

Whereas the second hypothesis states that, democratization does not have an immediate effect in reducing the level of corruption. However, in the long run or advanced stage of democracy, it reduces corruption. This view was supported by scholars like Rose-Ackerman (1999) Mungiu Pippidi (2006) and Bäck&Hadenius (2008). For instance, Rose-Ackerman (1999) believes that democracy at an early stage does not have strong political institutions and lacks stability thereby exacerbates corrupt practices. However, at an advanced stage when democratic institutions are stabilized and the instruments of checks and balances are effectively introduced, it is expected that the level of corruption will reduce. In similar view, Mungiu Pippidi (2006) argued that introduction of democracy as a system of political competition breaks the monopoly of power by the ruling elite and allows new elite groups to compete for state rents. Hence, except until stronger checks and balances are introduced to control accountability and transparency, the level of corruption is not reduced. This view suggests that greater democracy with strong political institutions with well-structured checks and balances increases transparency and reduces corruption.

Under these two circumstances, it could be assumed that Nigeria is a democratic country, since it recorded uninterrupted democratic regime for over two decades. In Nigeria's democratic composition, there are designed and functional political institutions, with periodic elections, rule of law enshrined in the constitution, and civil

liberties. Nigeria's 2015 presidential election, when the incumbent President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan lost the election to General Muhammadu Buhari on the accusation of corruption and on the surface seems to justify the argument of the first hypothesis. However, irrespective of how advanced Nigerian democracy appears to attain with functional political institutions and the crusades of anti-graft agencies on corruption it appears the second hypothesis is yet to attain its purpose.

There are two main democratic institutional factors that can be used to interpret this debate, first, the idea that democracy through election reduces corruption (Kefer 2005, Sahel et al. 2009, Pellegata 2012 and Kolstad and Wiig 2015). This statement is in not accurate as was demonstrated earlier in chapter five, that lack of transparency in the election process, and the issue of money politics breed corruption. Also, electoral democracies do not guarantee strong political institutions. Second, the idea that democracy at an advanced stage create system of checks and balances that reduce corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999, Pippidi 2006 Bäck&Hadenius 2008). In the case of Nigeria, democracy has survived for more than two decades with successive elections and other democratic institutions, yet the reported incidence of corruption has continued to weaken political institutions. This implies that both H1 and H2 hypotheses are incorrect.

**E. Military spending**

One of the major reported actual cases of corruption in chapter three of this study, has to do with military spending. We look at military as an institution of government that is exclusive from political influence. However, greater part of the budgeting allocation is usually channeled into military. Thus, politicians capitalize on the less scrutiny of military spending to divert or loot state resources. The below chart shows military budgeting and expenditure of the government:




Figure 1 Nigeria Military Expenditure

**Source:** Tradingeconomics.com

The data from Trading Economics, Macro Trends and World Bank suggest that between 2011 to 2019, Nigeria spent over 18 billion USD on military expenditure. Yet most of these spending ends in the pockets of few corrupt politicians through embezzlement, misappropriations, diversion funds, as is evident in the corruption cases analysed in chapter four of this research. Similarly, a report by Transparency International (2002) cited in the empirical study of D'Agostino, Dunne, and Pieroni (2012) explained that major allegations of corruption against the military sector are to be anticipated from time to time because of the relatively low competition in the military.

The monopolistic nature of the sector makes it highly susceptible to corrupt activity, hence provides ground for secrecy in conducting military contracts such as, arm deals and budgets for foreign military training to corruption. The military institutions have become a cash crunch for corrupt government officials who hides behind military deals to misappropriate public funds. For instance, the so-called #DASUKEGATE scandal as reported in chapter four of this study, was a tip of an iceberg on the ongoing and unquestionable corrupt activities in the military spending. Studies like Abu and Karim (2015) Abu, Karim & Aziz (2015b) argued that in Nigeria, and other Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries where military dictators ruled for many years, they institutionalized corruption. There are two possible ways corruption was institutionalized in Nigeria's security sector, first, the

issue of overarching independence of military institution; second, vested interest of the political elites.

First, the issue of overarching independent of military institution in Nigeria: the military institution in Nigeria comprises of Ministry of Defense, Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, and Nigerian Air Force. At the hierarchy of command, is the President of Nigeria, who functions as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and discharges his constitutional authority through the Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Defense is constitutionally responsible for managing Nigerian military and its personnel. Within the Nigerian Armed Forces institutions, the Chief of Defense staff serves as the operational head of the military, and subordinate to both the President and the Minster of Defense.

In view of this background, the command structure of the military institution connects its authority with the civilian institutional authority, which is similar with Huntington's 1957 description of the relationship between the soldier and the state and emphasizing that "professionalism entails a mutual binding relationship between the society and its professionals. Therefore, Huntington argues that the military profession requires that military officers to fulfil their duties to its country by compliance with political officers running the state and government" (Huntington, 1957). However, the Nigerian military institution operates a certain level of institutional autonomy. One of the areas of interest that Nigerian military institutional autonomy contradicts with democratic principles, and promotes corruption is the military's continuous contempt of public accountability. Hence, its' accountability of public funds allocated to the institution for security purposes remain problematic. One of the reasons for military institution restiveness to political institutions absolute control may relate to the historical development of institutional governance in Nigeria. Prior to the so called Fourth Republic in Nigeria, that is the return to democracy for the fourth time, Nigeria's governance structure was dominated by military autocracy. Irrespective of the country's transformation to democracy, most of the political elites were members of military regime in the country. For example, President Olusegun Obasanjo who ruled between 1999 and 2007, and President Muhammadu Buhari who is currently the serving president of the country. Both democratically elected president of Nigeria, and so many others, were in the past military heads of state, and thus, maintains their close affinity to the military institution. As indicated in the chapter four of this research, it

is evident that corruption in the military institution enables insecurity in the country. The evidence of this can be seen on the high-profile cases of political corruption involving high ranking military officials, and members of Military Défense as reported in chapter four of this study.

Second, the issue of vested interest among the political elites: the sensitivity of security sector in Nigeria makes it nearly unquestionable. For the last 10 years, Nigeria's Defense sector received 29.5% of the country's budget (Dataphyte, October 20, 2021). Most of the budget allocation channelled through Ministry of Defense is targeted on arms procurement, yet as seen in the case of Sambo Dasuki, former Security Adviser to the President, who misappropriated over $2 billion dollars meant for arms deals into the pockets of politicians. It is evident that the political elites only use the military institution as a cash cow to steal public funds.

**F. Structure of governance**

One of the determinants of political corruption and democratic performance is the structure of governance in a country. For instance, Rose-Ackerman, in her four-dimensional model, identified that both "the background organization of the state and society, and the structure of the society produce and reduce corruption" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 9). Similarly, studies like Treisman (2002) Fisman and Gatti (2002) Pellegata (2012) identified that decentralized or federal system of governments are less corrupt compared with unitary or centralized ones. It also considers the size of government and submits that a functional regional or small unit of government will reduce the concentration of power at the center and in return increases higher efficiency, transparency and accountability in the system. Thus, a federal structure of the state was highly recommended as a means of reducing corruption since it produces competition between levels of government. A position Rose-Ackerman (1994, p. 27) observed by arguing that a federal structure in which each level has its own law enforcement agency will reduce the vulnerability of a single law enforcement agency and increase risk of state agents to be caught in illegal acts.

Nigeria by its political structure is considered to operate a federal system, consisting of 36 states, and 774 local governments. The aim of breaking the political structure as contained in the Nigerian constitution was to increase transparency and bring the government closer to its people. However, the real principles of federal

structure are not effectively in existence. There's been an agitation to decentralize the law-enforcement agency into state structures and increase more economic dependence by states. The system of absolute power concentration in the centre is still in existence, to the existent that states depend on monthly allocation from the federal government to conduct their activities. The said allocation comes as rent; thus, the local politicians are in flagrant abuse of state resources without any element of accountability. This failure in actual decentralization of power has overtime created a recipe for political corruption in Nigeria.

There are two important discussions on the role of political structure in Nigeria, and how it encourages political corruption. First, lack of fiscal federalism; second, weaker sub-ordinate institutions. First, lack of fiscal federalism: while Nigeria operates a federal structure of governance, yet it practices unitary federalism. I refer Nigerian political structure as unitary federalism because by the arrangement of its political structure, it seems to have a devolution of power among its sub-ordinate levels, that is, the state, and the local government. However, the extent to which these powers are devolved is not clear, because the central government is vested with almost all the state powers, and unilaterally takes decision for the rest of the government levels. For instance, the central government oversees all the security community, the police, Army, Custom and Immigration. It is also responsible for the overall sector of the country, including primary health care, and secondary health care. The central government is also in charge of education, natural resources, including waterways and oil. Thus, over centralization of power within the central government in Nigeria without proper accountability creates recipe for political corruption.

Second, weak sub-ordinate institutions: it is easy to argue that because of the over centralization of power within the central governments, the sub-ordinate levels like states and local governments are ineffective. Every state and local governments in Nigeria depends on the monthly revenue allocation from the central governments to run the affairs of the state. Politicians within the state and local government levels has grown too powerful with state resources, since there are no proper checks and balances at the local level. For instance, office of state governors are mere financial portfolios to loot state funds. For example, Table 4.4, listed how state governors embezzled and mismanaged public funds. Yet, they are entitled to criminal immunity while in active service as state governors.

Inconclusion, this chapter examined some of the determinants of political corruption and democratic performance. The determinants include rent, institutional factors, military spending, and structure of governance showed how other factors which are intrinsic to democratic institutions creates incentives for corruption. On rent, it argued that countries whose revenues depends largely on rent both as means revenues from natural resources, foreign aid, and external borrowing are more vulnerable to corruption. On institutional factors, the study reveal that lack proper democratic ideals creates inefficiency and leads to corruption. On Military spending, the study finds that lack of accountability and transparency in the military institutions especially in the area of arms procurement leads to corruption. On structure of governance, the study finds that lack of proper devolution of power and implementation of policies leads to corruption.

# VII. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA: FEDERALISM, PRESIDENTIALISM, AND BI-CAMERA LEGISLATURE

## A. Introduction

In dealing with the 'why questions' of this research, the previous chapters so far attempted

to theoretically and empirically examine the impact and relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. Thus, it started by investigating the premise of the existing theoretical assumptions. However, unlike other existing studies, this dissertation tried to chart its route by utilizing the actual/proven cases of political corruption as a way of measuring the level of democratic performance in a country. Moreover, by applying a case study analysis approach to the study, other determinant variables were considered. For instance, in chapter six of this study, there are other existing socio-political factors which was analyzed as possible determinants of political corruption and democratic performance in a country. These approaches extend seemingly to a wider discussion on the complexity that surrounds the existing debate on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance in a country vis-à-vis Nigeria as a case study. Thus, political institutions in a country, as was identified in the works of Rose-Ackerman (1999) Konicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) Treisman (2002) Fisman and Gatti (2002) Pellegata (2012) is an important explanatory factor in highlighting the persistent level of political corruption in a country such as Nigeria.

This chapter builds on these developments to examine the implication of weak political institutions in a country on political corruption and democratic performance. Thus, it explains the structural arrangements of Nigeria's political institutions, which in principle are indicators of a functional democracy but in practice exacerbate the "folklore" of political corruption. The chapter starts by conceptualizing political institutions, where it identifies the two existing theoretical assumptions, the structural and vertical distribution of power. The two theoretical assumptions were adopted for according to Moe (2005), political institutions may be structures of cooperation, but

may also be structures of power. The chapter uses Nigerian state as a case study, to reflect the core objective of the research. By so doing, it analytically explains those indicators such as, federalism, presidentialism, bi-cameral legislature, electoral system, and finally the anti-corruption commission in Nigeria.

## B. Political institutions: Brief analysis

The meaning and the usage of the term political institution as a concept in political science is said to be traceable to the works of social contractarian theories of early modern political philosophers like Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau. They conceive the formation of government as a binding agreement between citizens who seek protection of either life or property. As such, political institution becomes necessary as the arbitrator of both power and civil responsibility in the state. Similarly, Levi (1988) suggests that political institutions started "as the formal arrangements aggregating individuals and regulating their behaviours through the use of explicit rules and decision-making processes, maintained by an individual or a group of individuals who formally have been authorized to hold such power" (Levi, 1988, p. 160). Following Levi's approach to the meaning of political institutions, it shows that political institution serves as a pointer of political actions including relationship in human political behaviour.

In line with the forgoing, the content of this research is grounded in institutional theory, which argues in support of institutions having an influence on human behaviour and allows its outcomes to reflect in different political processes. In a clearer picture, political institutions as captured by Bell (2002, p. 2) and Lane (2008, p. 20) implies "rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals." Thus, political institutions determine participants in different political processes, and exerts the rules of engagement through which such processes are conducted. Therefore, it is the responsibility of political institutions to define how political power can and should be exercised, and by whom, that is pointing out what is otherwise and allowed within the political space.

The extent to which political institutions shape the behaviours of individuals and its relationship with the state determines the outcome of governance. Corruption is a subtotal outcome of human behaviour which occurs when interest overrides duty.

The figure below illustrates the possible linkages between political institutions and corruption in a state.




Figure 2 Possible linkages between political institutions and political corruption

**Source:** Compiled by the author

The figure displayed above illustrates the linkages between political institutions, and political corruption. However, as shown, individual behaviour influences the political outcome of institutional rules and policies. Thus, the object of discussion focuses on how political institutions shape and influence human behaviour. This issue has become a central challenge and as well-formed part of the unending debates among theories of political institutions. Chief among these debates is the historical institutionalism and rational choice theory of institutionalism. For instance, historical institutionalism developed a cultural approach to respond to the question of how institutions affect human behaviour. They argued that individual is by nature bounded by worldview, that is to say individuals express themselves through patterns of behaviours, which enables them to attain their purpose (Steinmo, 2015). Hence, the institution provides moral templates which guides and interprets human behaviour.

Hall and Tylor (1996, p. 8) suggested that "individual is seen as an entity deeply imbricated in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts, and routines, which provides the filters for both interpretation of both situation and one, out of which a course of action is constructed". This theory is of the view that institutions do not only provide behavioural templates for human conduct but also affect the very identities and self-image of the actors.

In contrast to the argument of historical institutionalism on how institutions affect individual behaviour, is the argument from rational choice theory. The rational choice theorists used what they call "calculus approach" to analyse how institutions affect individual behaviour. They argue that individual behaviours are based on

strategic calculations. That is acting in a manner that seeks to maximize the attainment of set goals given specific preference option, hence they seek to select those ones conferring maximum benefits. (Moe, 2005). Simply put, the rational choice theory view "political institution as structures of voluntary cooperation that resolves collective action problems and benefit all concerned" (Moe, 2005, p. 215).

In addition, Hall and Tylor (1996, p. 7) argue that "institutions shape individual behaviours primarily by availing actors with greater or lesser degree of certainty concerning the present or future actions of other actors". In this line of thought, institutions influence individual behaviour by providing information relevant to other people's behaviours, enforcement mechanisms for agreements, as well as penalties for defection of such. Institution structures interact between and among individual behaviours, thus, affecting range of sequential alternative on the choice agenda, which as well reduce uncertainty about corresponding behaviours of others and allow gains from exchange leading actors to a potential outcome.

This research subscribes to both point of views, which explains political institutions in terms of power and cooperation and will be considering political actors as influenced by institutional factors (rules and norms) within the society, as well as personal interest and consequences. It as well acknowledges that weak institutions encourage negative political outcomes.

### C. Categorization of political institutions in Nigeria: Its linkages to political corruption

Discussions from the two institutional theories briefly mentioned earlier exposed two important factors on the categorization of political institutions, which are formal and informal institutional structures. While the informal institutional structure depends on political roles based on tradition, custom, and moral values rather than written and unwritten rules Groop (2013) and Kaufman et al., (2018) formal institutions depend on written rules, operating practices, and compliance procedures of administrative governance (North, 1990; Kaufman and Van Witteloostuijn, 2016).

The context of this research focuses on the latter, that is, formal institutional structure. Hence, relates with Moe (2005) approach on Rational Choice Theory, which captured political institutions as a voluntary cooperation for collective action. It is both structures for cooperation as well as structure for power. Moe (2005, p. 215) further

states that, even though "political institution is a theory of cooperation, but with elaboration can be used to say something about power". The point here conveys two important factors about political institutions, which are, cooperation and power. Therefore, conversations on political institutions centres either on cooperation for power, or cooperation through power. Power in this perspective, becomes the most important emphasis in discussing political institution. In view of this, there two important ways through which categorization of political institution can be made. First, deals with vertical division of power: this involves the process of cooperation through building agreements between parties. Second, deals with structural division of power: this involves the exercise of power through delegated representatives. It is important to note that power in this perspective is the ability to control the behaviour of people or influence the outcome of events through collective bargains or delegated opinions. Therefore, in this study, the categorization of political institutions will be analysed in such a way that it reflects how political power is divided. Hence, the two approaches which are vertical division of power, and structural division of power will be utilized in this analysis. The following figure will show the hierarchy of political institutions and how power is exercised through them.




Figure 3 Institutional division of political power

**Source:** Compiled by the author

Most of the existing research on democracy and democratization processes has focused on the existence of political institutions such as the ones listed in figure 7.2 above. Thus, it is argued among scholars whether the existence of these type of political institutions in a democracy is prerequisite for determining a regime as democracy. In agreement with this view, Lipset (1959) pointed out that, "in dealing with democracy, one must be able to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries and say, democracy has emerged out of these conditions and has become stabilized because of certain supporting institutions and values, as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining process"(1959, p. 69).

In the context of this research, the importance of pin-pointing necessary political institutions cannot be ignored. As indicated earlier, Nigeria is a federal republic, comprising states as its subordinates, with federal executive powers vested on the president, while the legislative powers are shared between the Senate and House of Representatives. The president is both the head of state, and head of government, as well as the head of the multi-party system. The judiciary has the Supreme Court as its highest body, with Appeal Court and High Court as its subordinates. The federal bureaucracy is spread across government parastatals and agencies, which are directly under the control of the presidency. The states structures in Nigeria operate in similar executive and legislative model as that of the federal, however, with little political and none- economic autonomy from the federal government.

### 1. Vertical division of power

#### a. Federalism in Nigeria and political corruption

Nigeria became a federal state on 1st October 1954, while it was still under the British colonial rule, and subsequently became a federal republic on 1st October 1960 after it regained her political independence. Federalism represents a political system where there are at least two or more levels of administrative power; a central government otherwise called the federal government, and other subordinates labelled as either, states, regional, or union governments. According to one of the federalist scholars, Wheare (1963), federalism is a political arrangement that includes a central (federal) government, regional (states, region, provinces), and sub-regional (local, municipality, community) governments, each of these is independent within spheres of power and responsibilities stipulated and defined by the law (Wheare, 1963, p. 10). Therefore, a federation is an institutional pillar of vertical separation of powers aimed

at providing mutual checks and control between different levels of government in particular and political system in general (Nnoli, 2003, p. 141). In this reasoning, the concept of federalism means the principle of decentralization of power between the central and the component units to achieve effective governance.

In Nigeria, the main reason for adoption of a federal system was based on the political complexity of the society, stemming from its ethnic and geographical diversity. This simply means that federalism provides the needed institutional arrangements for effective governance between the various geographical poles of the country. Unfortunately, the recent agitation by both the secessionist movements and those clamouring for political restructuring of the country has once again brought in the question of the validity of federalism in delivering a functional political institution in Nigeria. For instance, on 13th May 2021, the organization of Southern Governors Forum in Nigeria, issued what they called Asaba Accord. The Asaba Accord involves the list of restructuring demands to the federal government, which includes a further devolution of powers among other things(Thisdaylive Newspaper, June 22 2021). Various political commentators and pundits have all pointed at these demands as lack of good governance emanating from high level of political corruption at all levels of government. Others have argued that lack of fiscal federalism in Nigeria is the bane of political corruption in the country amounting to the higher level of social vices (Egobueze and Ojirika, 2018).

However, the evidence from existing research results on federalism and corruptions is non-conclusive. For instance, some researchers maintain that federalism contributes to higher level of political corruption. These include Treisman (2000) Konicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) Gerring and Thacker (2004).

Treisman (2000) finds that federal states are more vulnerable to political corruption than states with unitary political system. He hypothesizes that the unhealthy competitions among different autonomous levels of government when it comes to extractive rents, something that often leads to over-ambitious are susceptible to corruption among officials. However, he emphasizes that more research is needed to understand the actual linkages of federalism to political corruption.

Konicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argues that due to the decentralization of power in federal states, local politicians may equip themselves with “monopoly of

power over voters, especially in systems with a history of local political or economic fiefdoms" (2005: 591). Using federalism as a control variable, they find out that decentralization of power increases uncontrolled economic rent opportunities for local politicians and party loyalists, thus abuses the management of public resources.

Gerring and Thacker (2004, pp. 324-325) note that federal states controlled by presidentialism are more vulnerable to corruption. Hence, they link federalism with fragmented elective branch and public service, something they argue can leads to divided authority, overlapping jurisdiction, mixed messaged, red tape and overall chaos. The authors argue that "malfeasance is easily buried in this chaos", which explains why corruption is to be rifer in federal states. They perceived federalism to be closer to intimate contacts and personalized relations, thus contributing to higher levels of corruption.

Meanwhile, some other research argues that federalism can contribute to lower level of corruption. For instance, scholars like Lederman, Loayza, and Reis (2001) Gagnon (2001) Weinstock (2001) Stepan (2001) Norman (2001) agree that federalism can reduce the level of corruption if certain conditions are met. These conditions are attainable through devolution of powers and authority between levels of government. Creating a system that allows coordinated autonomy, competences and promotion of competition among the levels of government. These scholars argue that excessive concentration of power at the central government increases the chances of corruption among the political elites.

However, the argument from the latter is yet to manifest meaningfully in Nigeria, since Nigerian state is yet to practice true federalism, which on one hand, exacerbates the consistent poor leadership, and on the other hand, has failed to eliminate or minimize the pervasiveness of political corruption on governance in the country. Consequently, Nigeria's federal system is surrounded with the challenges of how the various components of the union can accommodate each other in terms of resource distribution as well as power sharing among them. Perhaps, one problem confronting federalism is the method and the amount of power centralization at the centre, which has been apparent in Nigerian federalism experiences thus far. Federalism in Nigeria is a shadow of itself, since the very essence of federalism exists for devolution of power among the coordinate units. However, in Nigeria, the central government controls absolutely all the systems of state resources. Both the local and state

government are politically impotent, only exists to receive federal allocation. There's no real federalism, no proper devolution of power.

**b. Structural division of power: The executive: Presidentialism in Nigeria and political corruption**

Democracy in Nigeria is practiced under the political arrangement of presidentialism. Presidential System as we know is a democratic system that allows one individual to be elected in office as a chief executive (the President) of a country, by direct popular vote over a fixed period, to act as both the head of state and head of government. Similarly, Linz (1985, p. 3) rightly noted that:

> "Presidential systems are based on principle where an executive with considerable powers in the constitution is generally in full control of the composition of his cabinet and the administration is directly elected by the people for a fixed period of time, and is not dependent on the formal vote of confidence by the democratically elected representative in parliament. She further notes that, he is not only the holder of executive power but the symbolic head of state and cannot be dismissed except in the exceptional case of impeachment between elections."

Following Linz's explanation, there are two important institutional characteristics of presidential system. First, the claim on the full democratic legitimacy of the president by the majority vote of the people. Second is the fact that presidents are elected for a fixed period, that of which under normal circumstance cannot be modified or prolonged by the president himself. In the same vein, according to Linz (1985), there are two contradictory assumptions presidential constitutions are based on. First is the notion of creating a stable, powerful executive based on legitimacy capable of representing the common interest of the people. Second is based on the notion of suspicion of arbitrary use of power or personalization of power by president.

Awotokun (2020, p. 40) citing Nwabueze (1981) argue that "the rationale for adopting presidential democracy is based on the need of principle and probity in government and politics, the centrality of man's humanity, the notion of stability and national unity, the need for effective government, as well as economic development, and the need for limitations of government". Perhaps, it was based on both identified theoretical grounds, that Nigeria adopted the presidential system of government in (1975), as against the inherited colonial parliamentary system from the Westminster. Although there are scanty literatures linking presidential system of government with

political corruption, however, the period of this research in Nigeria is based on presidential institutions of government, and as such worth evaluating.

For instance, the research of Awotokun (2001, 2020) and Konicova & Rose-Ackerman (2005) linked presidential system of government with high level of political corruption. Konicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that presidential system is more prone to corruption than parliamentary system. Their results showed three important factors that links presidential system to corruption. First, the idea that presidential system is based on centralized control of power on the executive and allows a poor monitoring capacity. Second, the president who is vested with the executive power faces an abundant possibility to engage in activities that promote personal gain, and in most cases his/her decisions are based on these possibilities since there is a poor monitoring of his power. Thirdly, "the voting system produces powerful party leaders who are difficult to monitor and permits corrupt interaction to occur between them and directly elect presidents in systems with weak popular and political control" (Konicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 595). These findings are very familiar with the actual cases of corruption reported in the chapter four and five of this research. This research goes on to include that those within the presidency and his political party in Nigeria appear untouchable and are in safe-haven from anti-graft agencies investigation.

Awotokun (2001) emphasizes that "the major worry about presidential system is not so much about its suitability or workability, but people are concerned about the cost of governance" (2020: 41). In his early work, using Nigeria as an example, he enumerated how cost of governance weakens political institutions and makes it susceptible to political corruption. For instance, Awotokun (2001) noted that the cost of administering presidential system in Nigeria is prohibitive considering its fragile economy. According to him, the president has over forty (40) assistants, special assistants, senior special assistants each of about cabinet rank, thirty-six (36) ministerial positions; the presidential aids each have about twelve (12) personal staffs and a budget. Furthermore, he stated that, the federal ministers also have aids and personnel (2001, p. 40).

This system he argues, invariably translated the Nigerian democracy into a colossal and perhaps largely unwieldly presidentialism. Following this argument, there are two possible linkages between presidentialism with political corruption, of which Nigeria is a fertile example. The first has to do with the enormous political power that

is vested on the president, with so-called political immunity, which prevents the president to be investigated of corruption. Secondly, the cost of governance under presidential system is excessive, and hurts the overall system of governance.

On the contrary, some researchers find that presidentialism instead reduces the level of corruption. For instance, Shugart (1999, p. 54) argues that when analyzing political systems based on country context with concerns to inequality and regional disparity in terms of development, when discussing how best to avoid pork-barrel and patronage, presidential system remains the best option to counteract those political issues. He argues that "presidentialism may be the best option for countries characterized by parties which do not focus on national constituency, especially if the country faces the problem of uneven distribution of development". Shugart's (1999) hypothesis maybe wrong if applied in a multi-ethnic society such as Nigeria. Since the evidence in chapter four and five of this research suggested that Nigerian president seeks to pursue objectives that most likely favour his ethnic and regional identity. For instance, Vanguard newspaper (Vanguardngr.com 2020), reports that President Muhammed Buhari appointed 75% Northerners in his cabinet with only 25% from Southeast and South-West put together. Others also accused him of nepotism, since some of his cabinets are members of family or close friends. Hence, Shugart's argument that presidentialism could lead to even development maybe wrong if tested in case specific.

**c. Bi-camera legislature in Nigeria and political corruption**

The Legislative organ of Nigeria's democracy is structured under bi-camera legislative system. This organ comprises the two legislative chambers otherwise called the senate and the house of representatives. The Nigerian senate is referred to as the upper chamber, containing 109 elected members, 3 from each state of the federation. Whereas the house of representative is referred to as lower chamber, comprising of 306 elected members spread across different states of the federation. Hence, the total members of both legislative institutions are 469 federal legislators. Bicameralism is a legislative political arrangement involving dual legislative chambers. As pointed out by Muthoo and Kenneth (2007, p. 9) bicameralism is necessary in a larger and heterogenous society. Similarly, as Riker (1992) points out bicameralism is associated with splitting of legislative powers into two in other to contain absolute usurpation of

power, control tyranny of the majority, and as well eliminate the ambition of corruption.

In the issue of political corruption, Testa (2010) was the first to examine the impact of bicameralism on the level of corruption. Her findings conclude that, the effect of bicameralism on corruption depends on how power is divided between the two chambers and polarization in the elections. She argues that bicameralism increases the cost of buying legislators, and such reduces the level of corruption. However, she was specific that such effect can only be possible, when one party controls both chambers and party polarization is high. On the contrary, she argues that bicameralism is prone to corruption if the two chambers are controlled by different parties.

On bicameral practices in Nigeria's democracy, the issue of political corruption is unequivocal among public opinion. There have been several reported cases of political corruption among the members of the legislative organs in Nigeria. Although, it is a common knowledge that the ultimate responsibility of the legislative organ of government is to make laws nonetheless, the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria, delegated three important responsibilities to the legislatures. These are legislation, appropriation and oversight functions. Under the legislation, they are empowered to make and amend laws. Under the appropriation, they are empowered to approve the executive expenditures such as budgets. Whereas under the oversight functions they are empowered to supervise, monitor, and probe the activities of government parastatals and agencies (Agbo, 2012, p. 46).

On the contrary, as discussed in chapter five, this research investigation reveals that majority of the Nigerian lawmakers are often found culpable of their constitutionally delegated duties thereby betraying public trust on them. For instance, in 2011, the Nigeria's House of Representatives was expected to pass Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was earlier passed by the Senate. However, as was reported, that because of the interest of multi-national organizations who lobbied some members of the legislature to have their interest protected in the bill was thwarted. Similar incidence was again seen on a Sovereign Wealth Bill sponsored by the presidency which seeks to create more transparency and fiscal discipline on the utilization of excess crude account but was however thrashed because of the corrupt dealings by the legislatures (Suleiman, 2011; Agbo, 2012; Usman Umaru, 2017). It is important to note that excess crude account which was set up by the administration led by former

President Obasanjo, was intended to provide safety net for government savings from surplus of the estimated crude oil price per financial year.

## 2. Electoral system in Nigeria and political corruption

The legitimacy of every democratic regime is mainly guaranteed through the election process. It was on this basis that Lipset (1959, p. 71) argued on his social requisites of democracy, that "democracy is a political formula, which brings in one set of political leaders in office; and one or more leaders out of office, who act as legitimate opposition attempting to gain office". In with this view, electoral system is considered as one of the most sensitive and significant political institutions in a democracy (Rose-Ackerman, 2000; Persson et al., 2003; Konicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2015). A failure in the electoral process of country is often considered a failure to democracy. The failures on electoral systems are linked with political corruption, which different scholars identified as a bane to building strong democratic institutions.

On the linkages between electoral system in Nigeria and political corruption, there are two possible theoretical explanations offered by another existing research. On the one hand, is the argument based on closed and proportional representation (PR), while on the other hand, is the argument based on the impact of electoral system on political corruption. For instance, scholars like Carey and Shugart (1995) and Chang (2005) argue that political actors under proportional representation are faced with greater uncertainty of the electoral outcome, and as such face serious pressure to secure large number of personal votes due to intra-party competition. Consequently, candidates are in dire need of financial resources to fund their campaign which exposes them to risk of corrupt activities. According to Carey and Shugart (1995), proportional representation forces political candidates to inculcate personal rather than party reputation, and that increases level of political corruption like pork barrel. On the overall this group finds out that proportional representation system exposes high level of intra-party politics which increases the level of corruption.

On the other hand, are a group of scholars like Lederman et.al (2001) Rose-Ackerman (2001) Persson et al. (2003) and Konicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) who agree that electoral system has a direct influence on political corruption. For instance, Persson et al, (2003), argue that "details of electoral rules have a strong influence on political corruption" (2003:960). They argue that electoral system with party lists

exhibit higher level of corruption, while electoral systems where voters directly vote for their candidates maintain lower level of corruption. They also believe that the direct link between electorate and candidates minimizes the chances of corruption since the individual performance is used by voters as a reward for either rejection or reappointment. Consequently, political office holders have incentives to deliver. However, under party list, election outcome depends on candidates ranking on the list rather than performance (Person et al., 2003, pp. 961-968).

Rose-Ackerman (2001) who argued in line with the linkages between constitutional structures and their effects on public goods and corruption in an electoral system, finds that parliamentary system with party cantered proportional representation are most able to avoid corruption. According to her, the system can lower corruption because politicians have direct incentives to make policies that provide public goods. She equally suggests that parliamentary system with party cantered PR coupled with two alternating parties in power has fewer incentives to corruption compared to multi-party structures in power seeking coalitions. On the overall, Rose-Ackerman is very much suspicious of electoral system that is based on presidentialism, because she feels it produces opportunities for power grab by a set of political actors.

In support of this, Konicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that electoral systems based on plurality rule have lesser incentives for political corruption. They noted that in plurality rule, there's a stronger incentive to monitor incumbents. Although they recognized that, there are higher chances for incumbents to engage in activities that promote personal gains. However, their statistical results show that electoral systems which are based on proportional representation in general combined with presidential system in particular, increases the chances of political corruption.

In the case of Nigeria, there are two instances that explain the electoral system. First, it operates a presidential system, which allows a direct voting to individual candidates. Second, those candidates are nominated through political party process, hence intra-party selection arrangements are followed. These two procedures summarize the open and closed electoral system. In line with this complexity, Babayo Sule et al. (2018, p. 25) noted that, "corrupt political process has entirely corrupted the political, socioeconomic aspect of the country including election and electoral process in Nigeria".

Ogundiya (2010) notes that the major setback to free and fair election in Nigeria is political corruption. Corruption in the Nigeria's electoral system is so glaring that most of the citizens no longer believe in the electoral process. There are 3 corrupt factors that play a role in Nigeria's election: first, money politics; second, godfatherism; third, thuggery. First, money politics is visible starting from intra-party selection process, otherwise referred to as party primary election. Aspirants induce party officials with money to support him/her. Same financial inducement is also seen at most general elections where aspirants employ the vote-buying scheme. An example is a situation where a voter is given money in exchange for a vote. Second, godfatherism, the political godfathers are considered as wealthy and highly placed stateman. They invest on political aspirants, and in return expect loyalty. Thus, they must do everything politically possible to ensure the victory of their candidates during elections. Third, thuggery, the use of thugs and mafias are also a very strong factor during elections. Some political aspirants engage the services of thugs to either hijack the electoral materials or disrupt oppositions strong hold. This situation often led to electoral violence in Nigeria. In addition, (Ogundiya 2010) argue that the impact of such corrupt practices in Nigeria's electoral system are crisis of legitimacy, lack of party ideology, political violence, and weak political institution.

Additionally, Olurinmoye (2008) identified the root cause of political corruption in Nigeria to 'godfatherism'. He explained that the role of power brokers with sufficient financial resources to sponsor their candidates in election for political offices, which in return delivers lucrative government contracts and lists of interesting positions as compensation has deepened corruption in Nigeria. In a bid to deliver their candidates, these power brokers engage in various election malpractice such as vote buying, thuggery, bribery, electoral manipulation and all sorts of violence (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Other incidence of electoral corruption as noted by (Rose-Ackerman, 2001) involves party lists. This stems from the political party selection of candidates. In Nigeria, the electoral procedures require that different contesting political parties organize intra party primaries to select their candidates for the major elections. This process is often marred with corruption starting from party leaders who engage in rent extraction, and party delegates who requires bribes from candidates before receiving their support. More so, the cost of contesting for elections are high,

and the electoral body has little or no incentives to regulate party financing, these are major recipe for electoral fraud in Nigeria.

Furthermore, most of the mainstream theories on electoral system and corruption have also failed to address some other issues that undermine electoral legitimacy and influence corruption. Part of which includes the constitutional role of the electoral umpire; How independent is the electoral body? Are there interferences in the activities of the electoral body by the government? How are the rules guiding party funding made? These questions and more form the basis for future research.

## D. The role of Anti-Corruption Commission on political corruption in Nigeria

This section focuses primarily on various measures and strategies adopted by government to reduce or eradicate political corruption in Nigeria. It will as well examine the role of judiciary in the fight against corruption.

### 1. Anti-Corruption agencies and its initiatives in Nigeria

Despite the views articulated in the previous sections of this research, which suggested how weak political institutions in Nigeria contributed in flourishing the incentives of corruption, especially among the political office holders. However, there have been historical efforts from the Nigerian government in developing a strategy to combat the prevailing circumstances of corruption especially among the political office holders. While it is possible to argue that the anti-corruption actions of government are effective in principle than in action, yet its efforts and strategies cannot be ignored. These strategies can be captured into 3 main approaches, legal, institutional, and educational approach. The following sections will analyze each of these approaches as government's anti-corruption policy frameworks.

### 2. Legal approach of Anti-Corruption Initiative

The legal approach of anti-corruption initiative in Nigeria involves the enactment and promulgation of anti-corruption laws (Akhigbe, 2011, p. 210). These laws are meant to guide the conduct of both the political office holders and public officials. The idea of legal approach to anti-corruption in Nigeria was first conceived in the country's 1960s independent indigenous constitution. As a new democracy, it was believed that the best way to achieve transparency and good governance was to design laws that would guide the conduct and behaviors of public office holders, thus

enacting an anti-corruption law became a welcomed strategy on the side of the government.

However, over the years there have been a series of new laws and amendments of anti-corruption laws all targeting to prevent and eliminate incidents of political corruption. In this section, the research will examine the two most important constitutional periods of anti-corruption laws in Nigeria: The Criminal Code Act of 1960, and the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended). Each of these constitutional stages offered a glance on what the State considers as corrupt especially among public officials.

The first anti-corruption law promulgated in Nigeria was referred to as Criminal and Panel Code law (1960). In particular, chapter 12, section 98, 98a and 98b captured what is considered as an act of corruption. Perhaps, section 98d explained a "public official as anyone employed in public service" (Criminal Code Act, 1960). Whereas, section 98, 98a and b explained behaviors that are considered corrupt by a public officer in Nigeria, the section states as follows:

1. receives or obtains any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person; or (b) corruptly agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person, on account of (i) anything already done or omitted, or any favour or disfavour already shown to any person, by himself in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any matter connected with the functions, affairs or business of a government department, public body or other organisation or institution in which he is serving as a public official; or (ii) anything to be afterwards done or omitted, or any favour; or disfavour to be afterwards shown to any person, by himself in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any such matter as aforesaid, is guilty of the felony of official corruption and is liable to imprisonment for seven years. 2. If in any proceedings for an offence under this section of this Code it is proved that any property or benefit of any kind, or any promise thereof, was received by a public official, or by some other person at the instance of a public official, from a person (a) holding, or seeking to obtain, a contract, licence or permit from a government department, public body or other organisation or institution in which that public official is serving as such; or (b) concerned, or likely to be concerned, in any proceeding or business transacted, pending or likely to be transacted before or by that public official or a government department, public body or other organisation or

institution in which that public official is serving as such, or by or from any person acting on behalf of or related to such a person, the property, benefit or promise shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been received corruptly (Criminal Code Act, 1960).

This law in principle clearly shows the Nigerian government's willingness to detect and combat corruption among public office holders. Like Criminal Code Act (1960) where anti-corruption laws reflected in Nigeria's legal system included: The Public Officer Decree of (1966), the Corrupt Practices and Forfeiture of Assets Decree (1975), The Code of Conduct Bureau (1979), and The Recovery of Property Act (1984). But the most encompassing and comprehensive among these stages of anti-corruption law development are contained in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended.

The Nigerian 1999 Constitution contains in detail clearer legal provisions aimed at preventing political corruption. For instance, Section 15 (5) under the fundamental objective and principle of the state policy requires the abolishment of corrupt practices and abuse of power (1999, Article, 15.5). In the same vein, section 13 of the same constitution states that all the organs of government are required to conform with and observe the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy (1999, Article, 13).

On the issue of assets declaration and liabilities, Section 140 (1) and Section 185 (1) state that anyone elected to the office of the president will not begin to perform official duties until he/she has declared his/her assets and liabilities as required by the provisions of the Constitution and as well taken the Oath of Allegiance and Oath of office as prescribed in the seventh schedule. Same goes along with anyone elected to the office of the Governor of a state will not begin to perform official duties until he/she has declared his/her assets and liabilities as prescribed by the provision of the Constitution and as well have taken the Oath of Allegiance and Oath of office (1999: Article, 140 and 185).

Similarly, Section 149 and Section 194 state that, a Federal Minister of the Government will not begin the duties of his/her office, except that he/she fulfills a constitutional mandate of declaring his/her personal assets and liabilities, and as well taken the Oath of Allegiance and Oath of Office. Further, a State Commissioner will

not assume the duties of his/her office except that he/she fulfils the Constitutional mandate of declaring his/her personal assets and liabilities, and as well taken the Oath of Allegiance and Oath of office (1999, Article 149 and 194). The important of this Section of the Constitution on Political Office holders is to regulate and determine their income during and after office.

On the issue of bribing public officer and abuse of office, Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the 1999 Constitution are very explicit. They state, no individual or cooperate body is allowed to offer a public officer any property, benefits or gift of any kind as a bribe or inducement for granting favor in discharge of public duty. Further, a public officer will not do or directed to be done, actions that warrant abuse of his/her office, any other arbitrary act which is targeted at undermining the right of other person knowing that such act is unlawful and undermines the policy of the government. It further states that, a public officer shall not be part or member of any organization of which its functions are incompatible with the dignity of his/her office. (1999, Article 8, 9 and 10).

On the issue of punishment for corrupt practices, the 1999 Constitution in Section 18 (1) part 1, recommends that where the Code of Conduct tribunal finds a public officer guilty of contravening the provisions of the Constitution, it will impose on such officer any of the punishment specified under sub-paragraph (2). The sub-paragraph 2 states that the punishment the Code of Conduct tribunal will impose on a public officer who abused his/her Oath of office will include any of the following: vacation of office or seat in any of the legislative chambers, disqualification from legislative house, and from holding any public office for a period not less than ten years, seizure and forfeiture of assets acquired as a proceed of corruption to the Government.

Although, both the Criminal Code Act (1960), and the 1999 Nigerian Constitution may have done a good job in promulgating and enacting laws that aim to prevent the prevalence of political corruption from the State, however the Constitution contains several structural weaknesses. First, the constitution is very ambiguous in its definition of corruption, and at same time limiting the meaning of political corruption to only include bribery and abuse of office. On the contrary, most of the literature examined in chapter 2 of this research contested this view about political corruption. For instance, at the course of reviewing some literature in the chapter 2, the meaning

of political corruption was categorized into two approaches. First, public office-centered meaning of corruption: This meaning was exemplified in the works of Nye (1967) Huntington (1968) Myrdal (1968) Khan (1996) Amundsen (1999&2006) Morris (1991&2008) where political corruption is conceived as a behavior deviating from the formal rules guiding the conduct of public officials in a public responsibility. Whereas the second category on the meaning of political corruption as was examined in the literature included the works of Friedrich (1966), Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999, 2014&2018) Warren (2004&2007) and Philip (2002&2014). They conceived the meaning of political corruption in the public interest perspective. They argued that corruption does not only include abuse of public office but also involves actions which are inimical to public interest and the subversion of public interest to personal gain. If the meaning of political corruption from these theories is put in perspective, then it is right to say that the constitution failed to enumerate what it means by corrupt practices.

Secondly, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution contains several provisions that subject government and its officials for conduct of transparency and accountability. However, it is very contradictory to know that some of the provisions of the same constitution protect public officials from criminal investigation or civil proceedings for corrupt practices while they are in the office. For instance, Section 308 (1) offers political immunity to the executives. What this means is that elected executives like the President, Vice-President, Governors and Deputy Governors cannot be entered into any criminal investigation whilst still in office or compelled to appear in any court for criminal offences. The idea behind this so-called political immunity is to ensure that the executive head of government enjoys full concentration on the business of governance and not distracted by criminal cases while still in office. In the light of this, the anti-corruption agencies cannot interfere or take away these political privileges by investigating an executive irrespective of any crime committed. The provision of Section 308 (1) seems like a breeding ground for every form of political corruption in Nigeria, since it negates the legality and the right and duties of anti-graft agencies in investigating corrupt practices among the executives.

## 3. Institutional approach of Anti-Corruption Initiative in Nigeria

Over the years, several efforts and strategies have been made by successive governments in Nigeria through different policies to fight corruption. At the center of these efforts is the establishment of different anti-graft agencies otherwise referred to

as anti-corruption commissions. The duties of each of these commissions are simple: to investigate, arrest, prosecute and prevent corrupt practices in Nigeria. Presently, there are four main institutions whose duties are to prevent and prosecute corrupt practices in Nigeria, they are as follows: Public Complaints Commission (PCC), Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). In the following section, this research will analyze each of these institutions in accordance with their mandate and statutory duties.

**a. Public Complaints Commission**

Public Complaints Commission, also referred to as Nigerian Ombudsman, is an independent institution established by Federal Government of Nigeria in 1975, by means of Decree No. 31 of 1975, and was later rectified as Decree No. 21 of 1979, but amended into Cap 377 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990, now absolved into Section 315 (5) of Nigerian Constitution 1999 as amended.

The purpose of establishing PCC Act was to give the citizens an accessible link to report any act of public corruption to the commission. The commission is equally granted the constitutional privileges to investigate any reported cases of corruption, and if indicted charge the offender to court. As the first commission of its kind with regional and state networks, there was indeed a high expectation from Nigerians who expected the commission to match actions with words. Sadly, PCC has been reduced to dealing with petty issues such as individual matters and has since lost its reputations and could be as well considered a futile public institution.

**b. Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)**

The Code of Conduct Bureau is an anti-corruption institution established in 1989, which was subsequently adopted into law in Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act Law of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990. Under Section 58 of the Law, it empowers and mandates the Bureau to establish and maintain high standard of public morality in the conduct of government business and to ensure that the actions and behaviours of public officers conform to the highest standard of public morality and accountability (1990, Article, 58). Bearing in mind that Sections 172 and 209 of the Constitution, mandate persons in both federal and state public service to conform and observe the code of conduct.

Consequently, Section 3 of the 1999 Constitution empowers the Bureau to engage in the following activities: receive declaration from public officers; examine such declaration in accordance with the law; retain the custody of such declaration, and make it available to the public when necessary; ensure compliance with and where appropriate; enforce the provision of the code of conduct or any law relating to it; receive and investigate compliance; prosecute the offenders at the code of conduct tribunal (1999, Article 3). Other responsibilities of this institution include prohibiting public officials from running private businesses other than government official duty.

Irrespective of how mandating and transparent the activities of code of conduct bureau are supposed to be in fight against corruption, the bureau, unfortunately, is yet to successfully prosecute any public officer since its establishment. In fact, the activities of the bureau have only been reduced to a mere assets and liabilities declaration by political office holders.

**c. Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC)**

The independent corrupt practices commission was set up by Federal government through the confirmation of the National Assembly as Corrupt Practices Act (2000). It is actually the first anti-corruption institution set up directly by a democratic regime and is directly answerable to the National Assembly. The main purpose of setting up ICPC is to fight corruption. Acknowledging the pervasiveness of corruption, especially among top government officials, the Act grants the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) the power to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected persons of corrupt act. The Act "stipulates that the ICPC shall consist of chairman and twelve other members of the commission which shall be selected from the existing six geopolitical zones of the country" (Offenses Act no 5 of 2000). The Act further states that the Chairperson and other board members of the commission shall be persons of proven integrity and their appointment will be done by the President and approved by the Senate. Section 6 (a-f) of the Independent Corrupt Practices Act 2000 spells out the duties of the commission: to receive and investigate complaints from members of the public on issues bordering on corrupt practices, and prosecute the offenders; to re-examine the practices and procedures of public institution, hence directly review where the systems aid corruption; to instruct, advise, and assist any public officer, agency, or parastatals on ways through which fraud or corruption may be prevented or minimized by them; to advice head of public

institution of any changes in practice, system in procedures compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of public responsibilities, to reduce the likelihood of the incidence of bribery and other forms of corruption; to educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and other related illegal practices; to enlist and foster public support in fighting corruption.

The Act further invests additional powers on the chairman of Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, including "the powers to seize movable properties in custody, control a bank account, financial institution, or other assets that maybe proceeds of a corrupt investigation. The power to obtain relevant information from anyone including relatives, banks, and associates, suspected to have committed an offense of corrupt practices. The power to make an application to court to prohibit anyone from dealing with any property under investigation of corrupt offense" (ICPC Act. 2000, Article 44-46). Importantly, the ICPC Act in its various Sections of the Constitution redefined nine offences relating to political corruption, among which are:

- Accepting gratification (Section 8).
- Fraudulent receipt of property (Section 12).
- Making a false statement or return (Section 16).
- Bribing a public officer (Section 8)
- Use of office or position for gratification (Section 19).
- Bribery in relation to auction (Section 21).
- Bribery in relation to contracts (Section 22).
- Failure to report bribery transactions (Section 23).

The establishment of the ICPC as an anti-corruption institution was expected to be a turning point on the crusade against corruption and restore in the failing government institution. However, the proactiveness of the ICPC in tackling corruption failed beyond expectations as some critiques labeled them Presidential snakes against opposition. For example, in a letter written by former Senate President, Pius Anyim, to former President Obasanjo, accusing him of using ICPC to silence the voice of political descents and oppositions, he wrote:

> I regret to inform you that it is clear to us, now, that, while we have clear intentions that ICPC should be used to fight corruption, we did not know that the Presidency's intention is to use ICPC to protect its corrupt members on one hand. And use ICPC to fight real and perceived enemies of Mr. President (The Guardian, 2002).

Furthermore, other public opinion experts argued that the provision of the Constitution that set up the ICPC Act indeed meant well for the country, but the organization of its leadership allowed the control by the executive arm made its effort meaningless. The ICPC gradually lost the public trust which necessitated creating a new anti-corruption institution.

### c. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)

In response to the distrust and criticism against the operations of the ICPC, the Federal Government of Nigeria on December 2002, established a new anti-graft agency called, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Following its controversial establishment, the EFCC (establishment) Act was legislated into law in 2004. The EFCC was empowered by law to investigate, prevent and prosecute offenders who engage in financial crimes such as money laundry, bribery, embezzlement, and other corrupt practices within and outside the government.

As indicated in the chapter three and four, the EFCC recorded a tremendous success in the prosecution of high-profile corruption cases, especially securing convictions of ex-public officials. For instance, according to the data from EFCC and transparecIT research, it indicates the following chart:




Figure 4 EFCC convictions between 2010 and 2020

**Source:** TransparecIT research 2021

Figure 4 shows the level of prosecuted cases of corruption done by anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria. The establishments of both the ICPC and EFCC have to a large extent contributed in weighing down the culture of corruption. The presence of EFCC as well has created the fear and consciousness among politicians who may face public prosecution and harassment at the end of their tenure in office. Further, the ICPC and EFCC as well have contributed in increasing societal confidence on governance.

However, irrespective of the gains recorded by EFCC and ICPC on fighting corruption in Nigeria, the realities of political corruption are by no means in decline. One of the problems facing the anti-graft agencies in Nigeria is lack of absolute independence from the executive arm of government. In as much as the head of these commissions are appointed or can be removed by the president, it makes it hard to investigate corrupt persons of interest to the president. Additionally, the constitutional provision of Section 308(1) that grants political immunity to high profile members of the executives limits the powers of these agencies to properly investigate and prevent any reported cases of corruption against them. These issues allow remnants of corruption to be on the fight back. On July 6, 2020, the acting chairman of the EFCC, Mr. Ibrahim Magu was reportedly arrested on the orders of the Minister of Justice, acting on the direction from the President, who claims that Mr. Magu refused to heed to orders. An investigative panel was later constituted on the orders of the President. Following the Panel's report, the EFCC boss was dismissed without charges. A drama many critiques accredited to Magu's refusal to spare his anti-corruption fights against people loyal to the President. This further illustrated the partiality in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. The next chapter will highlight in detail the impact of political corruption on the socio-political survival of Nigerian democracy amidst the pervasiveness of poor governance caused by political corruption.

### E. Educational approach to Anti-Corruption Initiative in Nigeria

There have been countless efforts by government to permanently end the surge of corruption in Nigeria. Part of those efforts includes strategies that educate people on how to shun corrupt practices. For instance, Decree 100 of 1993 Act, set up a National Orientation Agency (NOA), whose main objectives are to ensure that Government programs and policies are better understood by the general public. Hence,

the National Orientation Agency has over the years engaged in organizing programs like seminars, symposium, and conferences that target on educating the public on issues bothering on corruption and other ethical related practices. Similarly, was the establishment of Anti-Corruption Academy of Nigeria. An educational institution founded under the Section of ICPC Act 2000. The mission of the academy is to a "center excellence, enhancing multi-disciplinary approach to the fight against corruption through training, research, documentation, and advisory services" (ICPC Academy website, 2021). There is an establishment of EFCC Academy, another anti-corruption institution dedicated on training and researching new mechanisms on the fight against corruption. Furthermore, the regular publication of Journal on Anti-Corruption Studies was done to promote new dynamics on the fight against corruption.

Other anti-corruption educational approach established by government includes public education/citizen enlightenment program organized nationwide in 2018 by the joint effort of Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC) and National Orientation Agency (NOA); Town Hall meeting on fight against corruption; November 2019, organized by NOA; 8TH Commonwealth Conference of Heads of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Africa held in Nigeria on 14th May 2018; IBA Anti-Corruption in Africa Conference held in Lagos, Nigeria on 25th February 2020. All these anti-corruption educational programs and more are all channeled at sensitizing people on the dangers of corruption in the country. Unfortunately, the Nigerian government is yet to conform to the realities of modern-day research on corruption especially by ignoring grants on research on corruption studies.

Conclusion, this chapter has been constituted in three main parts. The first part of the chapter began by briefly discussing the debates on the meaning of political institutions. It utilized Bell (2002) definition of political institutions where it defined political institutions as rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals. Institutions, in that sensed exists as link that mediate human behaviours. Having explained corruption as a subtotal outcome of human behaviour which occurs when interest overrides duty, it used figure 7.1 to describe the link between political institutions and political corruption. It also held a discussion where political institutions are categorized into formal and informal structures, and maintained that formal institutions depend on written rules, operating practices, and compliance procedures of administrative governance (North, 1990).

Other theories revealed that formal political institutions consist of both structure of cooperation and power.

The second part discussed how political power is distributed in political institutions to include structural division of power and vertical division of power, figure 7.2 illustrates the description. Federalism in Nigeria was discussed as source of institutional power. It finds that corruption thrives in Nigeria because there is no real devolution of power among the federating units. It also finds that the presidential system of government weighs a huge amount of power on one person who can act arbitrarily and abuses public trust. It also discussed that a proper functional bi-camera legislature can minimise corruption from the legislature. It finds that the legislative arm of government in Nigeria collude with the executives for commit corrupt activities.

The third part discussed the efforts of anti-corruption agencies in the fight against corruption. It highlighted different anti-corruption institutions set up by government. However, it finds that the incumbent government only uses anti-corruption agencies to witch hunt political enemies.

# VIII. POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: PERCEIVED MAJOR IMPACTS AND CONSEQUENCES

## A. Introduction

This chapter focuses on analyzing the impacts of political corruption on the social-political condition of the Nigerian state. These perceived impacts to be discussed in this chapter are drawn from various findings of the literature used in the study. It reflects on how the pervasive impact of political corruption impacts good governance.

The chapter consists of six sub-topics. It starts with the impact of political corruption on socio-economic development in Nigeria. It discusses the challenges of political corruption on insecurity in Nigeria. It examines the impacts of political corruption on ethnic politics and polarization. It also analyzes the impact of political corruption on negative national image of the country. It examines the role of political corruption on the political party polarization, and weak party system in Nigeria.

## B. The impact of political corruption on the socio-economic development in Nigeria

There is often a negative perception that connects discussions on corruption with low economic performance and underdevelopment. For instance, scholars like Kaufmann and Wei (1999) Knach and Perry (1997) Ayittey (2005) argues that corruption reduces economic growth by undermining rules and procedures of government. This premise reflects some of the key theoretical debates on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance across the preceding chapters of the study. Some of the theoretical findings revealed a negative impact of political corruption on the level of socio-economic development in Nigeria. For instance, as was discussed in chapter seven of this study, political corruption weakens political institutions. This shows that corrupt activities within the public sector erodes institutional efficiency, creates weak institutions and exacerbate low level of socio-economic development in a country.

In Nigeria, the evidence shown from the data sources compiled form World Bank surveys on economic performance in Nigeria between 2011 and 2019 in Table 4.7 gives an idea about economic performance. Outside of this survey, the economic impact of corruption in Nigeria can easily be felt across all social conditions of life. Sambo (2009) notes that corruption has real consequences on the life of Nigerians. The Nigerian economy has been in disarray despite its enormous resources and potential for growth and development. One of the attributing factors to the economic woes of Nigeria's economy is the issue of mismanagement of resources, in particular, misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds. For instance, the survey from Transparency International (2021) revealed that between 2014 and 2019, there is an increase in the corruption level, which also reflects on the level of unemployment. Asoebi (2012) points out that corruption redistributes income to favour the corrupt elites thus lowering income among the poor. According to reports from Human Development Report (2011), World Bank survey (2020) and Nigeria Bureau of Statistics report (2020), between 2011 and 2019, the poverty line in Nigeria grew between 70% to 40%, which in the later, represents 83 million Nigerians who live below $1.90 per day. Also, UNICEF (2021) report shows that "one in every five out of school children in the world is in Nigeria". That's an estimated of about 10.5 million children in Nigeria. Statista (2021) survey shows that infant mortality rate in Nigeria between 2011 and 2019 as 82.2% to 74.2%. That is "74.2 deaths per every 1000 live births".

The adverse effects of corruption on socio-economic development in Nigeria have pervasive and cancerous effect on human survival. Every sector of social welfare and human survival in Nigeria has been affected negatively by the precarious high incidence of corruption. Therefore, as submitted by Sambo (2020) "the spill over effect of political corruption in under-developing the Nigerian state include poverty, unemployment, failure to meet the target for Millennium Development Goals, poor power supply, low infrastructures and international image of the nation"(2020, p. 66). Political corruption is the bane of socio-economic development in Nigeria.

### C. The impact of political corruption on security in Nigeria

Taking Weber's (1918) definition of the "state as a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given

territory" as a yardstick for measuring a successful sovereign state, then it will be in line to say that Nigeria is on the verge of becoming a "failed state". Di John (2008) defined a "failed state as a condition of state collapse, e.g. a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that has no effective control over its borders and territory" (2008, p.10). Nigerian state can no longer guarantee the safety of life and properties of its citizens. It can no longer reproduce conditions necessary for its own survival. It is a "failed state" because, one of the single elements that guides the sanctity of a state – "monopoly of physical force" – is no longer within the confinement of the Nigerian state. Perhaps, the present Nigerian state can no longer claim the monopoly on the use of physical force within her territory. For example, between 2011 until 2022, the 36 states of the federating unit in Nigeria have either been attacked by arms-wielding non-state actors, or currently under the control of a certain militia group. The Nigerian government are either helpless or have been overwhelmed due to what many public opinions attribute to corruption. The level of corruption in the military institution contributes to the high level of insecurity that has overwhelmed the country. For instance, despite the huge amount of money, the government budget annually on defense and other security spending as was shown in the corruption cases in chapters four and five of this research are brazenly embezzled and misappropriated by politicians and top military officers. Oghuvbu et al. (2020) points out that both "corruption and insecurity in Nigeria are twin evils and hydra-headed monsters that held the country hostage. They argue that the consequences have plummeted institutional infrastructures and collapse of government" (2020, p. 95). Government Security & Defence Anti-Corruption Index (2021) which rated 82 countries in their anti-corruption ranking indicated that Nigeria is facing a very high risk of corruption across its defence institutions, with extremely limited means in operation and procurement.

Chapter four of this research, using corruption case analysis showed how public officials uses security as a trade-off for corruption. For instance, the case of "DASUKEGATE" as an example, together with other several scandals, reveals sharp practices and double deals that are coated in the so-called "security vote" which allows public officials (politicians) to appropriate billions of dollars by simply evoking national security as to divert public resources for private gains. These criminal activities against government by public officers prompted Oghuvbu (2020) to argue

that security sector in Nigeria has been diminished by corruption. The consequence of that according to Odia (2016) is that "security agencies are weak and faced with challenges that have made them not to be able to discharge their duties and responsibilities towards ensuring national security"(2016, p. 330). These challenges include inadequate manpower, obsolete equipment's, poor salary incentives, and of course corruption within the security community.

Insecurity has become a full-grown and a very prosperous industry in Nigeria. Many politicians exploit this opportunity for their personal interest. In different occasions, some high-ranking politicians in one time or another have been interrogated by law enforcement agencies over their reported links with militias. Even though none has been prosecuted by law, however the accusations are heavy. "Corruption is the source of instability in Nigeria. Socially, corruption and instability has done more harm than any other phenomena to Nigeria's reputation globally" (Oghuvbu, 2020, p. 97).

It is imperative to note that, political patronage has constantly put the security of the country in the pockets of some corrupt politicians. Hence, overstretching the functionality of the security architecture, this ordinarily could mitigate security challenges. For instance, a serving senate member, Senator Ali Ndume was arrested on 22 November 2011, for his alleged link with Boko Haram (BBC News, 2011), also Ex-governor Ali Modu Sherif was also accused of alleged link with Boko Haram (Premiumtimesnews, 2014), Former Central Bank of Nigeria deputy governor Dr. Obadiah Mailafia, allegedly claimed he have intelligence that a seating governor in Nigeria is the commander of Boko Haram (Vanguard Newspaper, 2020). All these and more demonstrates the deep root of insecurity in Nigeria with some highly placed members of the society.

Insecurity in Nigeria started to gain international attention after the incidence of "Chibok School girls" abduction from the Northeastern part of the country. As was reported by different international news agency and was later confirmed by the government after several attempts to cover it up. On the "16$^{th}$ of April 2014, a dreaded terrorist group known as Boko Haram stormed government girls' secondary school in Chibok town of Maiduguri and adopted over 200 schoolgirls" (CNN, 2014). The horrific incidents became the birth of more tragic attacks in both schools and other soft spot's locations in the region. Below is a list of handful attacks which occurred in Nigeria between 2011 and 2019.

Table 12 Some selected cases of violent attacks recorded in Nigeria

| Date | Location | Death | Group | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26/08/2011 | Abuja | 116 | Boko Haram | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Abuja_United_Nations_bombing |
| 04/11/2011 | Damaturu | 150 | Islamist Militant | https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/11/6/nigeria-group-threatens-more-deadly-attacks |
| 22/12/2011 | Damaturu Maiduguri | 68 | Islamist Militant | https://archive.is/20130416023844/http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/nigeria-sect-clashes-kill-at-least-68-officials/ |
| 25/12/2011 | Mandala Abuja | 41 | Islamist Militant | https://archive.is/20130113105453/http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/nigeria-church-bomb-death-toll-rises-to-37-wounded-57/ |
| 5/01/2012 | Mobi | 27 | Boko Haram | https://web.archive.org/web/20120113224320/http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/christians-flee-attacks-in-northeast-nigeria/ |
| 20/01/2012 | Kano | 185 | Boko Haram | https://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16155028 |
| 08/04/2012 | Kaduna | 38 | Boko Haram | https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0409/Suicide-car-bombing-kills-38-in-Nigeria-on-Easter-Sunday |
| 07/08/2012 | Okene | 19 | | https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19161082 |
| 06/07/2013 | Mamudo Government School | 30 | Boko Haram | https://www.smh.com.au/world/terrorists-kill-41-children-in-school-attack-20130707-2pjxd.html |
| 29/09/2013 | Gujba College Massacre | 50 | Islamist Militant | https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/172300#.Um3nNHCsi-0 |
| 25/02/2014 | Federal government college Buni Yadi | 59 | Boko Haram | https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence-idUSBREA1P10M20140226 |
| 05/06/2018 | Plateau State | 86 | Fulani Herdsmen | https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/muslim-herders-kill-86-mostly-christian-farmers-nigeria/ |
| 19/10/2018 | Kaduna State | 55 | Sectarian conflict | https://www.nation.co.kehttps//www.nation.co.ke/dailynation/news/africa/curfew-declared-in-nigerian-city-after-deadly-sectarian-violence-100878 |
| 18/01/2019 | Benue State | unknown | Egba Militia | https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/many-reported-dead-following-bloody-communal-clash-in-agatu-benue-state/gpsxpl6 |

Table 12 (continued) Some selected cases of violent attacks recorded in Nigeria

| Date | Location | Death | Group | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07/03/2019 | Kogi State | 20 | Egbura Militia | http://www.thetidenewsonline.com/2019/03/08/20-killed-in-kogi-communal-clashes/ |
| 19/03/2019 | Benue state | 5 | Fulani Herdsmen | https://www.legit.ng/1228873-herdsmen-reportedly-strike-benue-kill-10.html |
| 17/03/2019 | Cross River State | 4 | Ikwo Militia | https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/03/4-criver-communities-razed-in-communal-conflict/ |
| 21/05/2019 | Zamfara state | 23 | Bandits | https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nwest/332127-bandits-kill-23-people-in-zamfara-fresh-attack.html |
| 09/06/2019 | Sokoto State | 25 | Bandits | https://punchng.com/25-killed-in-sokoto-bandit-attacks/ |
| 09/06/2019 | Niger State | 47 | Bandits | https://dailytrust.com/niger-bandit-attacks-death-toll-now-70-senator.html |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from Nigeria Police Force and International Publications 2021.

Table 12 highlights the persistent and high level of insecurity in Nigeria, with over 20 different militia groups across the country. The analysis in this research revealed that when country's political institutions is weak, especially when they are borne out of corruption, its security architectures are not trusted, its borders become porous as in the case of Nigeria. This allows terrorist and other armed groups the opportunity to flourish, and constantly kill and destroy the innocent lives as it is currently ongoing in Nigeria.

### D. The impact of political corruption on the ethnic polarization in Nigeria

Nigeria is a heterogeneous society, borne out of ethnic formation through the British colonial policy of amalgamation. As indicated earlier, Nigeria has over 250 identified ethnic groups, which are spread across the 36 states of the federation, alongside 6 geopolitical zones with a federal center as its seat of power. In the recent time, studies on ethnicity and ethnic consciousness have dominated most of the mainstream research among students and researchers within the discipline of social sciences in Nigerian. Each of the research is in constant attempt to answer basic social questions and to unravel the socio-cultural challenges inhibiting the successful cohesion and development of the Nigerian state. Thus, it is noteworthy to say that the task of this research is not to participate in those debates of what constitute ethnicity

in Nigeria, but to show how personal interest drawn along ethnic or sectarian line has undermined the sense of good governance in Nigeria.

The concept of ethnic group or ethnicity is not limited alone to the Nigerian case. In fact, it has become one of the most researched topics across the field of social sciences. According to the study conducted by Fearon and Laitin (2000, p. 20), they identified "ethnic group as a group larger than a family for which membership is reckoned primarily by descent, and are conceptually autonomous, and has a conventionally recognized natural history as a group". In addition, Fearon (2003, p. 201) identified 7 features of an ethnic group:

1. The group membership is primarily linked by descent,
2. There is high level of consciousness of group membership among members which they consider as both psychologically and normatively important,
3. There are certain distinguishing features among members, these include language, culture, religion, and custom which are considered as a uniting factor,
4. The larger majority of the group holds these cultural features to be a value to the group,
5. There is a known ancestral homeland for the group,
6. The group shares a common ancestral history,
7. The group usually stands alone.

As illustrated above Fearon's 2003 thesis offers a good insight of the merits of an ethnic group, thus, it reflects primarily in the Nigerian case. Similarly, Nnoli (1978) agrees that ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by communal characters and boundaries, which may be distinct in terms of language, culture or both where groups of communal and tribal consciousness who shares common ancestral history and linguistic heritage, living in a natural homeland seek to dominate their interest beyond their boundaries. In this sense, as observed by Aghamelu and Udumaga (2016, p. 140), ethnicity becomes a "tool for the elite members of the society to hold on to their privileges". Ethnicity in Nigeria has become a means to an end. It is a political tool in the hand of corrupt politicians who uses ethnic sentiments as a means to exploit national interest. Politics of ethnicity in Nigeria is one of the most precarious and

dangerous instruments of national disunity. It promotes corruption through nepotism. For instance, between 2015 to 2019, the federal government led by President Muhammadu Buhari out rightly undermined the federal character principle as was contained in section 14 paragraph 3 and 4 of the Nigerian constitution, which states that: "the composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and to promote national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or a few other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies. 4. The composition of government of a state, local government council, or any of the agencies of such government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognize and the conduct of the affairs of the government or council the diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of the federation" (Nigerian Constitution 1999 as amended).

The purpose of this principle is to guide the conduct of governance in a multi-ethnic Nigerian state, which allows for equal participation of the various ethnic groups in the affairs of the state. The principle is equally aimed at preventing the domination by one or some ethnic groups in the official business of the country and minimize the exclusion of other ethnic groups. The violation of this principle by the government of President Muhammadu Buhari, between 2015 to 2019, in both the appointment of state officials and award of contracts, undermined the constitution. The data from federal character commission published on February 16, 2020, indicates that, the Northern region of Nigeria comprising of 19 states dominated by mainly Hausa-Fulani ethnic group received over 60.7% of federal political appointments. The Western region comprising of 6 states, dominated by mainly Yoruba ethnic group received 22% of federal political appointments. The Southeastern region comprising of 5 states, dominated by Igbo and other ethnic groups received 11.9% of federal political appointments. While the South-South region comprising of 6 states, dominated by numerous ethnic groups received 17.2% of federal political appointments. This clearly shows violation which again demonstrates the level of nepotism in the government.

There are other accusations against the anti-graft agencies, for not prosecuting political office holders who share the same ethnic group with the president and are

found wanting of corrupt practices. For example, as reported by Nations Newspaper on 19 December 2019, that a Federal High Court sitting in Kano dismissed a suit seeking the Court to compel an anti-graft agency the Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), to prosecute Abdullahi Umar Ganduje, the governor of Kano state, who was caught in a viral video stifling into his pocket huge amounts of dollar being proceeds of kickbacks from government contract. Despite a public outcry, and media reports, it was believed that the presidency ignored the case because the culprit shares same ethnic group with the president. In this regard, the distrust created by ethnic bigotry fuels corruption in Nigeria, and also threatens the very fabric of statehood in Nigeria. Lack of confidence in government by other non-active ethnic groups undermines trust, and as well, serves as a recipe for conflict. If political appointments and employments are not based on merits, it is difficult to achieve transparency in governance.

**E. The impact of political corruption on negative national image of Nigeria**

The most pervasive impact of corruption among Nigerians is the burden of negative national image of the country. The national image of Nigeria has been soiled in corruption. It is almost challenging and embarrassing for most Nigerian citizens to be proud of their nationality because of the negative stereotype and shabby treatments that come along with it.

As was narrated in chapter 4 of this research, the incidence that occurred when the former British Prime Minister David Cameron addressing the Queen in a leaked video to have invited Nigeria and Afghanistan Presidents, *"the two most fantastically corrupt countries"* to the UK anti-corruption summit (BBC News, 2016) indicated the level of international negative identity reputation that corruption has impacted on Nigeria. Prior to the Prime Minister's remark, the former deputy governor Central Bank of Nigeria, had narrated how he was embarrassed while in an international conference in America. The following was his experience:

"In April 2003, during a trip to the United States, Dr. Usman Shamsuddin was asked by one of the participants at the international conference, if he was the real Central Bank governor or the fake one" (The Anti-Corruption Crusader, 2003).

Similarly, on 26th January 2018, a French journalist in an interview asked a notable Nigerian novelist and writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adiche, "if they were

bookshops in Nigeria, and whether her books are read in Nigeria?" (CNN NEWS, 2018).

These negative images of the country being experienced by Nigerians are as a result of so many factors ranging from misrepresentation of the country by mainstream media houses, activities of internet fraud, reported cases of money laundry by Nigerian politicians, all shadowed under the influence of bad governance traceable to political corruption. In addition, an interview offered by Dr. Iremiren Benjamin Akhibe (2011, pp. 188-189), with a Director Non-Governmental Organization in Nigeria concluded that:

> Our battered international image was particularly tarnished by Abacha's monumental looting scandal, following the institutionalization of corruption in the IBB era that helped fuel notoriously dubious activities of the internet fraudsters. Apart from being a national embarrassment, this image problem has actually cost us a lot in terms of foreign direct investments, as most international businesses are reluctant to invest in Nigeria because of high risk associated with doing business in Nigeria.

These submissions indicates that outside of the shared embarrassment and abuse that corruption attracts to the image of Nigeria, it also affects the attraction of foreign investors to the country. Specifically, according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Report (January 2021), Nigeria's negative image problem contributed to the "drop of foreign direct investment by 42% from 1.2 trillion USD in 2019 to estimated 859 billion USD in 2020." (UNCTAD, 2021). Similarly, on 22$^{nd}$ of May 2020, World Bank on reasons of corruption, and the image it burdens on the Nigerian government declined the approval of loan request by country to tackle the effect of Corona Virus (Reuters, 2020).

The impact of political corruption on the national image of Nigeria is so damning that most critiques of the government resort into liking the country with a "Zoo republic". Others like tax consultant, Mr. Adeleye Jokotoye on June 3, 2021, submitted a proposal to Nigeria's national assembly, the House of Representative (Annex) to change the name of the country into "United Africa Republic" (BBC, 2021).

### F. The impact of political corruption on political party polarization in Nigeria

One of the important conditions of modern democracy is the presence of "healthy political oppositions" or "rival groups" in the form of political parties (see

Lipset 1959, p. 69; Diamond, 2000, p. 22). According to Collins English Dictionary, "political party means an organization of people who share the same views about the way power should be used in a country or society through government, policy making, etc." (Collins Dictionary 2021). In this line of thought, political party therefore represents a recognized but legal political institution or organization whose members share a common ideology on how political power can be acquired, used for the interest of their members, and for the common benefit of the society.

Different democracies practice relatively different political party structure, ranging from one party, two-party, to multi-party-political system. Democracy in Nigeria is practiced along the line of multi-party system. This system allows the registration and participation of different political parties in an election. As at 22 May 2021, "the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) revealed it currently has 18 registered political parties in Nigeria" (INEC, 2021). This revelation came as a result of "the deregistration of about 55 political parties who had participated in the 2019 general election exercise" (Punch Newspaper, 2021). Prior to 2019 general election in Nigeria, there were about "73 registered political parties" (INEC, 2019). One may ask why are there so many political parties in Nigeria? The answer may seem to be straight, "money politics". For example, Section 228c of the Nigerian Constitution, empowers the electoral umpire (INEC) to periodically disburse funds to political parties. Thus, it states as follows: "For an annual grant to the Independent National Electoral commission for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them in the discharge of their duties" (Nigeria Constitution 1999 as amended). The problem with the provision of this constitution is that it failed to create an accountability model for political parties. Hence, these amounts of money are unaccounted for. People dully registered as many political parties as they can not necessarily to seek election but as a business venture.

Another factor of political corruption on political party fractionalization in Nigeria has to do with the electoral rules which mandate political candidates seeking election to be attached to a political party. This system has led to a situation where political parties charges contestants too high that most of them resort to the so-called political godfathers to fund their candidacy. In addition, lack of proper regulation to monitor political party financing contributed to the money-bag politics in Nigeria. Money-bag politics is a corrupt system where political contestants are expected to hand

over huge amount of money to party officials for easy passage to contest through their political parties. In contrast, there are few people who believe that the functions of numerous political parties help to strengthen democracy by giving more opportunity for political participation. However, it is self-evident that the reasons for multiple political party in Nigeria if for personal aggrandizement of corrupt politicians.

Utilizing the vast theoretical resources in the preceding chapters, this chapter's analysis showed that other attitudes of political corruption which are not based on rents could have a significant impact on socio-economic indicators. The chapter revealed the pervasive and negative impact of political corruption on different political institutions in Nigeria. It started by highlighting the constant regressive nature of socio-economic development in Nigeria orchestrated by political corruption. It described how corrupt political office holders sabotages the government which leads to high level of unemployment, increased illiteracy level, poor health care system and weak institutions. The chapter also analyzed the negative identity burden that corruption imposes on Nigerians. It further analyzed how ethnic differences were used as a means of exploitation and constitutional violation. It revealed how abuse of office by public officers contributed to the high level of insecurity in Nigeria. Political corruption in all sense is harmful to democracy.

# IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## A. Conclusion

This chapter puts together the major findings of this dissertation and explores the contribution of this study to understanding the complex relationship between political corruption and democratic performance. To rehearse our mind on the research aims and objectives of this study is to thematically organize the discussions of this dissertation which were initially discussed in chapter one. The primary purpose of the study was anchored on answering the following research questions: Does political corruption in a country hinder democratic performance? In particular, what is the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance in Nigeria? To answer these questions the following objectives were sort after:

1. To analyze different competing debates and interpretations of literature over the meaning of political corruption and democratic performance, and by extension, types, causes, and the relationship between the two variables.
2. To provide an alternative research methodology approach on explaining corruption as a political problem.
3. To analyze the perceived impact of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria.
4. To examine the role and place of political institutions in promoting democracy and fighting corruption in Nigeria.
5. To draw the findings gathered from the study and make tentative recommendations on strategies of anti-corruption policies.

Before I explain these objectives in line with thematic structure and findings of this dissertation. I would like to assume that the most significant contribution of this dissertation to the broader perspective on the debate of political corruption and democratic performance, is that this dissertation represents one of the very few studies that have managed to put together variety of views and analysis that attempted to

interact with political corruption and democratic performance as an interplay of a political problem. The treatment of these issues in this dissertation has probably provided a unique contribution to the understanding of some complex political challenges underlying good governance in Nigeria. One of the major themes to arise from this dissertation, at least within the Nigeria context, is that there's no clear-cut explanation on the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance in Nigeria. The analysis of the study reveals that either of the variable can influence each other.

1. Competing Debates and Interpretations of Literature over the Meaning of Political Corruption and Democratic Performance, and by Extension, Types, Causes, and the Relationship between the two variables.

One of the central debates of this dissertation is anchored on the hypothesis that democracy reduces corruption. Chapter two and five of this study treated this hypothesis. In chapter two of the study, two theoretical explanations were proffered to respond to this hypothesis. First argument is related with public choice theory, which is associated with electoral democracy. On the one hand, competitive elections are likely to reduce democracy as corrupt politicians maybe voted out of office as a consequence for their non-performance. On the other hand, the need to finance political campaigns may induce politicians to trade political decisions for sponsorship. Second argument is associated with literature that argues on the longevity of democracy. It points out that the duration of democratic regimes is negatively linked with corruption. That is to say, democratic consolidation in the long term will increase in the stability of democratic norms, foster mechanisms for accountability, decrease the level of corruption Lederman et al., (2005) and Pellegata, (2012).

Chapter five of this study responded to this debate. It finds that, In Nigeria, elections are neither free nor fair. It is free, if the political party and their aspirants have enough financial resources to induce the electorate for votes. That is why Olurunmola (2016) suggests that money is considered a crucial factor for political parties and contestants during elections in Nigeria. It is fair, if the incumbent and the political party in power is contesting for office, since those who control the electoral institution determines the process. Therefore, electoral participation through elections in Nigeria, only acts to exacerbate the level of political corruption in the country. Onapajo et al. (2015, p. 2) notes that, "electoral process in Nigeria is known for its

chaotic nature and at the heart of it, is the notion of vote buying, a phenomenon which arguably reflects the nature of politics and election". Similarly, Amao (2020) argues that electoral process in Nigeria has frequently been identified for its violent, chaotic and corrupt tendencies through the utilization of thugs, intimidation of political opponents by those seeking elective offices through fraud.

The high financial cost of electoral process in Nigeria exposes politicians to engage in all forms of political corruption and abuse of public trust. Politicians resort to political corruption through the means of embezzlement and misappropriation as seen in the cases examined in the preceding in other to maintain their political status. Sarkariyau et al. (2015, p. 5) observed that "elective offices in Nigeria are mere commodities to be purchased by the highest bidder, and those who invest in politics see it as an avenue to make profit. Therefore, this study finds that this hypothesis is false.

2. An Alternative Research Methodology Approach on Explaining Corruption as a Political Problem.

One of the identified problems of the past studies on corruption has to do with methodology. Chapter two, three, and four of this study analyzed this problem and suggested alternative research method which is suitable for this kind of research. Chapter two points out that, the most used index in the measurement of political corruption in a country is the indirect method. In this method, data gathering is done by means of surveying experts' opinions about the level of corruption that is in the country of interest. The method is widely used by organizations like Transparency International (TI), World Bank (WB), Bribery Perception Index (BPI), Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), etc. It also has been argued by the proponents of this method that one of the advantages is that it eliminates social desirability bias through the means of surveying experts, or public officials, as against the general public, and thus increases construct validity.

This dissertation through chapter two, three, and four shows that this claim false, as the mechanism of this method is faulty. It is difficult to generalize the level of corruption through experts' or people's perception. Most of these surveys are conducted electronically, and there is a high possibility that those whose perceptions are recorded are biased against government policies and may not be presenting the

facts. Also, the method resorts to universal judgement of norms as a yardstick for measuring people's behavior which may not represent the true facts in case specific country. Chapter three introduced qualitative research method where case study approach is allowed. Yin (2018) suggests that the important of using a case study research approach is that it is convenient in investigating contemporary phenomenon both in-depth and within the context of a real-world analysis, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clear. Chapter four introduced the actual case analytic method. The actual case analytic method enabled the study to analyze the actual/proven cases of corruption in Nigeria. The actual cases of corruption in this instance consists of prosecuting and prosecuted cases of political corruption, published corruption cases, and political corruption cases under investigation.

3. Analyzing the Perceived Impact of Political Corruption on Democratic Performance in Nigeria.

Underlying all the discussions of this dissertation thus far is the problem of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria. In chapter one of this study, a report of how Nigeria was labelled fantastically corrupt was used to introduce this dissertation. Other external observers has also rated the level of corruption in Nigeria high, but a fewer research had explored the internal dynamics on the causes and impacts of political corruption in Nigeria. This dissertation has provided an in-depth analysis on the complexity and pattern of corruption in Nigeria. Chapter seven and eight offered a detailed analysis on the perceived impacts of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria. Chapter eight listed and briefly summarized six major impacts of political corruption on democratic performance in Nigeria. The lists include, the impact of political corruption on socio-economic development, on security, ethnic polarization, on negative national image, on political party polarization in Nigeria. Different explanations were offered on how political corruption negatively affects these factors.

On socio-economic development, it was determined that corruption has real consequences on the life of Nigerians. The Nigerian economy has been in disarray despite its enormous resources and potential for growth and development. One of the attributing factors to the economic woes of Nigeria's economy is the issue of mismanagement of resources, in particular, misappropriation and embezzlement of

public funds (Sambo 2009). Also, Kaufmann and Wei (1999) Knach and Perry (1997) Ayittey (2005) argues that corruption reduces economic growth by undermining rules and procedures of government.

On security, "Corruption is the source of instability in Nigeria. Socially, corruption and instability has done more harm than any other phenomena to Nigeria's reputation globally" (Oghuvbu, 2020, p. 97). The level of insecurity and instability posed by mismanagement of resources by those entrusted with security f life and property in Nigeria is alarming. In chapter eight, I compared and described the security situation as valid signal of a failed state. Since the evidence of violent from various armed group as displayed in table 12 suggests that Nigerian state has lost control of the monopoly of physical force.

On ethnic polarization, As indicated in chapter eight that Nigeria is a heterogenous society with multi-ethnic groups thus corruption constantly creates tension for ethnic bargain. Chapter eight also revealed how minority ethnic groups are treated unjustly, and how ethnic tensions exacerbates secessionist groups in the Southeast and Southwest part of the country.

On negative national image, chapter eight of this study revealed numerous reports of embarrassment reported by Nigerians as result of the impacts of corruption. It also noted that The most pervasive impact of corruption among Nigerians is the burden of negative national image of the country. The national image of Nigeria has been soiled in corruption.

On political party polarization in Nigeria, in Nigeria, unlike other democracies where political parties are formed to contest for elections and possibly win political power, is more or less a business enterprise. Politicians form political party to enable them receive government funding or sell nomination forms. This system has led to a situation where political parties charges contestants too high that most of them resort to the so-called political godfathers to fund their candidacy. In addition, lack of proper regulation to monitor political party financing contributed to the money-bag politics in Nigeria. Money-bag politics is a corrupt system where political contestants are expected to hand over huge amount of money to party officials for easy passage to contest through their political parties. The impact of political corruption on democratic

performance in Nigeria is pervasive and its effect is cancerous to the growth and development of the country.

4. The Role and Place of Political Institutions in Promoting Democracy and Fighting Corruption in Nigeria.

Political institutions are central to the development of this study. Chapter seven draw insights on the role of political institutions in promoting democracy and fighting corruption in Nigeria. The dissertation revealed widely held views that the capacity of most democratic institutions in Nigeria have been seriously undermined by corruption. For example, many Nigerians have lost confidence in the government do to the shadow nature of political institutions in Nigeria. Chapter seven analyzed different levels of political institutions in Nigeria which include, federalism, three arms of government; executive, legislature, and Judiciary, and anti-corruption agencies. Federalism in Nigeria was discussed as source of institutional power. It finds that corruption thrives in Nigeria because there is no real devolution of power among the federating units. It also finds that the presidential system of government weighs a huge amount of power on one person who can act arbitrarily and abuses public trust. It also discussed that a proper functional bi-camera legislature can minimise corruption from the legislature. It finds that the legislative arm of government in Nigeria collude with the executives for commit corrupt activities.

The third part discussed the efforts of anti-corruption agencies in the fight against corruption. It highlighted different anti-corruption institutions set up by government. However, it finds that the incumbent government only uses anti-corruption agencies to witch hunt political enemies.

5. The Findings Gathered From the Study and Make Tentative Recommendations on Strategies of Anti-Corruption Policies.

The study has presented actual cases of political corruption which shows the importance of the methodological advances this dissertation set out to achieve. The case study approach used, reveals the degree of the actual level of corruption in Nigeria. Multiple actual cases of political corruption analyzed in the study, made the model more generalizable than the existing studies, which was based on cross-country survey and their data sources based on perception. It shows the extent to which political corruption affected democratic performance in Nigeria.

The study traced some of the major causes of political corruption in Nigeria to be associated with the nature of political institutions associated with political behaviours of the citizens in the country. One of the major findings of this dissertation has to do with lack of political will and commitment by Nigerian political leaders to tackling the problem of political corruption. The unwillingness of Nigeria's political leaders to implement transparent and public interest oriented policies which will emilinate corrupt opportunities will continue to stimulate the incidences corruption in the country.

The study finds that lack of true federalism, which gives a substantial amount of autonomy to federal units like, states and local governments, and thereafter, allows states to generate revenue themselves, will continue to inhibit corruption. The practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria is fictitious, the centeral government controls all systems of revenue and revenue allocation to states are mere handouts distributed for administrative purposes which ends in the pockets of state governors.

The study finds that lack of true separation of powers between the three branches of government makes it impossible to achieve a transparent checks and balances among the institutions of government. In Nigeria, the executive arm of government through the presidency control and influences the functions of other branches of government. As indicated in chapter seven, there is no independence of the Judiciary, neither are the legislature free to make laws that are people driven thus, it creates an ominipotent executives that is not answerable to the constitution.

The study finds that weak electoral institutions stimulates political corruption. Chapter five revealed that in Nigeria elections are influenced by two factors, money and incumbacy. Elections are neither free nor fair. Political positions are purchased both through balloting and bribery to the electoral officers. The high level of money-politics experienced during elections, exposes politicians to trade off with public resources. Also, the powers of political incumbacy plays a role in deciding who gets what in an elections. Political office holders standing for elections or sponsoring party members manipulates the electoral system to to win elections.

The study finds that lack of transparency and accountability within the military institutions encourages corruption. Chapter four and five treated cases of public officers who either embezzled, misappropriated, diverted or lundered public funds

budgeted for security. The military institutions enjoys a certain level of unconventional immunity from institutional monitoring, thereby translating itself as an unchecked avenues for public officers to divert public resources.

The study finds that revenue generated through oil export is the major source of corruption in Nigeria. Lack of institutional accountability in the oil sector which is as a result in poor documentations of oil proceeds stimulates corruption in Nigeria.

The study identified eight most prevalent types of political corruption in Nigeria, and their mode of operations to include, inflated government contract, unremitted revenue by government agencies, bribery, misappropriation and conversion of public property, misuse of security vote by the executives (embezzlement), wastefulness of public resources, political patronage and clientelism, and electoral corruption.

In addition, the study in comparing the anti-corruption efforts made by both President Goodluck Jonathan, (2011-2015) and President Muhammadu Buhari, (2015-2019), finds that there was no much improvement in the fight against political corruption in Nigeria.

*Limitations of the Study*

This dissertation has made an attempt in suggesting a new way of analysing political corruption and democratic performance in a country. Perhaps it is not without limitations.

While the study made an in-debt analysis on the relationship between political corruption and democractic performance, it does not allow us make predictions on the future outcomes.

The case study approach employed in the study allows for interviews and questioners however I could’nt conduct interviews because of the distance between the place of the research and the country of selected case study. Also do to the sensitivity of the research topic, it is not possible to conduct interviews on public officers who has been indicted of corrupt activity.

## B. Recommendations

In view of the corruption cases analyzed in this dissertation, it is evident to suggest that the level of political corruption in Nigeria, outweighs all previously recorded corruption results in the existing studies. Therefore, the dissertation recommends the following as a way of strengthening anti-corruption strategy in fight against political corruption and sustaining democracy in Nigeria.

One of the observations strongly recognized in this dissertation is the lack of political will and commitment by governing class to fight the scourge of corruption. It is not enough to make campaign speeches and promises by the politicians on the fight against corruption without enabling a corrupt free environment.

It is also observed that political institutions in Nigeria have been compromised by those elected to represent the interest of the people. Therefore, there is a need for institutional reforms, which should reflect in all sectors of the political life of the country. The institutional reforms must be done in such a way that the principles of checks and balances, rule of law, accountability, transparency, equity, and merits are promoted.

It is also observed that lack of accountability by political office holders in Nigeria creates incentives for corruption. Therefore, a functional audit system should be introduced into government agencies, to annually audit government expenditures at the end of every financial year.

It is also observed in this dissertation, that one of the major channels of political corruption in Nigeria, is contract inflation. Therefore, it is recommended that government should institutionalized contract awarding process by making laws that requires government contracts to be officially published. In addition, contract tenders must also be made public, and contracts to be awarded with the direct supervision of anti-corruption agencies like ICPC and EFCC.

It is also observed that lack of remission of government revenue by different agencies of government is another source of corruption in Nigeria. Hence, it should be made mandatory that the central bank of Nigeria should be empowered by law to supervise all government transaction and conduct the remission of government revenues.

It is also observed that over dependent on rent, especially revenue from export of crude oil, creates all sort of financial racketeering by government agents. Therefore, a more transparent process should be included in government revenue processes. Introduction of a credible taxation system will make government revenue system more efficient. Government should be directly involved in the process of revenue generation, to eliminate the use of middlemen in collecting government revenues.

It is also observed in this dissertation that indiscriminate borrowing by government and its agencies increases incidence of corruption. Therefore, the National Assembly must make laws that restrict the government from unnecessary foreign borrowing to finance government expenditure.

The dissertation noted with keen interest the issues of corruption in the country's annual budget process. To curb the arbitral waste of government resources, the annual budgeting allocation to government parastatals and agencies must be stopped. The ministry of finance should be directly involved in every government transaction from all federal institutions. Likewise, the state ministry of finance should be involved in state transaction within its institutions. States and local government should be financially autonomous from the federal government. This will enable efficiency in management of the state.

*Directions for Future Research:*

This dissertation has attempted to establish a lead into understanding how the relationship between political corruption and democratic performance can impact governance. Nevertheless, it is not without gaps which requires future research to cover. A huge more efforts is required to study cultural attitudes towards corruption and how it shapes political culture. Also there's a need to expand research into the role of Nigeria's oil sector in fostering corruption in the country. This study only focused on public sector corruption without paying more attention into the role of private sector. Future research will have to expand the horizon to accommodating both the public and private sector roles in stimulating political corruption in a country.

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# RESUME

**Name:** SOLOMON OTUBO

**EDUCATION:**

- **Bachelor:** 2012, Ebonyi State University Abakaliki, Faculty of Arts & Humanities, Department of Philosophy
- **M.Sc:** 2016, Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey. Social Science Institute, Department of Political and International Relations
- **M.Sc:** 2015, Radom Academy of Economics, Poland. Institute of Social Sciences, Political Sciences (Erasmus Exchange program)
- **PhD:** 2023, Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey. Social Science Institute, Department of Political and International Relations

**PUBLICATIONS:**

- Otubo, S. (2015). Contemporary Democracy in Crisis, The Dilemma between Civil Disobedience and Resistance. *DAKAM (POLITSCI 15) 3rd international Political Science Conference*
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