

ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL

**HUBRIS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETIES**



M.A. THESIS

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Department of Political Studies

Political Studies M.A. Programme

JULY 2023

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İSTANBUL TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ ★ LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ

**HUBRIS: BİREYLER VE TOPLUM ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE
KAVRAMSAL BİR ANALİZ**

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FOREWORD

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HUBRIS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETIES

SUMMARY

This thesis aims to investigate whether the concept of hubris is inherently political in nature, by highlighting the role of individual and social influence intertwined with power. Hubris is known to cause social injustice and monotony as it stems from the desire to assert one's superiority by suppressing others. Thus, this study contends that the nature of hubris should be primarily discussed within the realms of ethics and politics.

To achieve this, a methodological discussion is undertaken to demonstrate the interdependent effects of the individual and social manifestations of hubris, culminating in an integrative approach. The ideas on hubris from ancient, theological, enlightenment scholars, and contemporary thinkers are then explored to establish a solid foundation for the ensuing analysis. Utilizing the method of conceptual analysis, this study integrates auxiliary concepts such as arrogance, pride, vanity, narcissism, and pathological grandiosity, which share distinct parallels with hubris, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the concept.

The thesis proceeds to examine the immorality of hubris through the lenses of three major ethical theories and ethical egoism, as well as the concept of pride as a virtue. By employing these theoretical frameworks, particularly MacIntyre's idea of justice as a virtue, it becomes evident why hubris contributes to injustice. Furthermore, the study delves into various examples of social hubris, illustrating its political nature and its inclusiveness at both the individual and social levels, as emphasized in the methodological approach. A close examination of the relationship between political hubris and politics as a form of friendship reveals the damaging effects of hubris on politics, solidarity, and ultimately, the common good. Finally, drawing on these insights, the dissertation proposes solutions to address the social injustice and monotony engendered by hubris, rooted in the principles of dialogic and deliberative democracy.

Overall, this dissertation contributes to the ongoing discourse surrounding hubris, shedding light on its political nature and providing ethical insights that may help foster a more just and harmonious society.



HUBRİS: BİREYLER VE TOPLUM ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE KAVRAMSAL BİR ANALİZ

ÖZET

Bu çalışma hubris konseptinin güçle olan direkt ilişkisi sebebiyle bireysel ve toplumsal etkisinin rolünün altını çizerek onun doğasının özünde siyasi olup olmadığı sorusuna cevap bulmayı amaçlamıştır. Hubris, kişinin ötekini bastırarak kendi üstünlüğünü kabul ettirmesi arzusuna dayandığı için toplumsal adaletsizliğe ve tek sesliliğe sebep olmaktadır. Buradan hareketle, hubris, özellikle etik ve siyaset alanında tartışılması gereken bir kavramdır. Bu sebeple, bu çalışma, temelde, hubrisin doğasının siyasi olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Bu amaçla, ilk olarak, kavramın bireysel ve toplumsal seviyedeki uygulamalarının birbirinden ayırtılamayacağı ve birbirlerine olan bağlı etkilerini gösterebilmek amacıyla, metodolojik bir tartışma yürütülmüş, sonuç olarak integratif bir yaklaşım önerilmiştir. Daha sonra, bu tartışmayı doğru bir zemine oturtabilmek amacıyla, antik, teolojik, aydınlanmacı ve çağdaş literatürdeki düşünürlerin hubris fikirlerinden yararlanılmıştır. Yukarıda belirtilen amaç doğrultusunda bu çalışmada kavramsal analiz yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Hubris ile belirli paralellikleri bulunan küstahlık, gurur, narsisizm ve patolojik büyülenmecilik gibi literatürdeki yardımcı kavramlar, bu tez çerçevesinde kapsamlı bir hubris anlayışı oluşturmak için kullanılmıştır.

Tez, hubrisin ahlakiliğini üç ana etik teori ve etik egoizm ve ayrıca bir erdem olarak gurur kavramı aracılığıyla incelemiştir. Bu teorik çerçeve yoluyla, özellikle de MacIntyre'ın bir erdem olarak adalet fikrini kullanarak, kibrin neden adaletsizliğe katkıda bulunduğu açık hale getirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Ayrıca çalışma, metodolojik yaklaşımda vurgulandığı gibi, toplumsal hubrisin çeşitli örneklerini derinlemesine inceleyerek, bunun politik doğasını ve hem bireysel hem de toplumsal düzeylerdeki kapsayıcılığını göstermektedir. Siyasi hubrisin ile bir dostluk biçimi olarak siyaset arasındaki ilişkinin yakından incelenmesi, kibrin siyaset, dayanışma ve nihayetinde kamu yararı üzerindeki zararlı etkilerini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Son olarak, bu kavrayışlardan yararlanan tez, hubrisin yol açtığı sosyal adaletsizliği ve tek sesliliği ele almak için, kökleri diyalojik ve müzakereci demokrasi ilkelerine dayanan çözümler önermiştir.

Genel olarak, bu tez hubris literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı, hubrisin politik doğasına ışık tutmayı amaçlamakta ve daha adil ve uyum içinde bir toplumu geliştirmeye yardımcı olabilecek etik içgörüler sağlamayı hedeflemektedir.



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of Thesis

Hubris is a type of state of the human character, mainly discussed as a vice. This concept has been discussed in various contexts throughout history by numerous thinkers, highlighting its individual and social effects. In ancient Greek society, hubristic behavior was associated with violence, as it was believed to incite excessive actions aimed at humiliating others, therefore, it is connected to honor and shame (Cohen, 1991). It was recognized as the motivation behind criminal acts, and penalties were imposed due to the perceived devastating social consequences of such behaviors (Cohen, 1991).

The concept is frequently used to discuss political issues in the contemporary period. For instance, Walt (2019) and Fettweis (2014) employ the concept of hubris to analyze how America perceives itself in a divine position. Walt used hubris to describe the United States' perception of itself as an essential nation, one makes interfering with other nations a duty because of their profound and unique thoughts. On the other hand, Fettweis explores American foreign policy through the lens of hubris, conceptualizing it as a situation where America becomes enamored with its perceived strength and begins to behave like a superhero, detached from reality. However, while the discussions on hubris in ancient and modern times do not entirely overlap within this context, it is evident that power dynamics lie at the core of both dialogues. The assertion of superiority by an individual outside the realm of politics, their delight in undermining the honor of others, and their belief in the United States as a superhero, all contribute to the establishment of dominance over other actors, drawing upon power as the driving force behind their actions.

In essence, the presence of hubris across diverse domains where power is enacted raises the question of not only its political manifestation but also the inherently political nature of hubris itself.

Four key factors have propelled my pursuit of this inquiry. Primarily, I wanted to delve into the political dimensions of hubris and comprehend its contextual inclusion. While hubris finds application across various disciplines, the fundamental linkage between hubris and power became the pivotal impetus for undertaking this thesis. As I reflect upon the recurrent encounters within my daily life and contemplate the underlying “how,” it becomes evident that hubris often underlies such occurrences. At times, I discern a shared concept embodied in behaviors witnessed across disparate settings, be it within a newspaper article, educational institutions, or the realm of business. This observation arises from scrutinizing individuals’ conduct in their everyday lives, whether it be evaluating the reactions of fervent supporters during a sporting event, detecting analogous patterns in the attitudes of religious groups or political leaders. For instance, the aspiration for superiority leading some professors to demean their students within university relationships, employers’ domination over employees in the workplace, or the motivation of political leaders to insult their citizens—all unveil a similar inherent political nature. These instances serve as prime motivations propelling my authorship of this thesis.

The second impetus, closely aligned with my initial rationale, stemmed from the urge to highlight the necessity for a contemporary conceptual framework within the current literary discourse. As hubris represents an ancient term that manifests itself in various facets of modern-day existence, it becomes crucial to emphasize its relevance in present-day scholarship. On the other hand, in the past, this concept held such significance that it was even legally recognized, as it was perceived as a socially critical matter to prevent the misuse of power by others. As emphasized by Mark Button (2016), although the concept continues to be used in the contemporary period, its political interpretation has been “abused” (p. 33). Another motivating factor driving my exploration of the concept of hubris within an academic framework is the prevalence of abusive situations. By comprehending the essence of hubris and recognizing the necessity of its contemporary application, I aim to shed light on this subject. To achieve this, I intend to build upon Aristotle’s concept of hubris while incorporating Rousseau’s notion of *amour propre*, a form of self-love, as well as Mark

Button's understanding of hubris as a political vice. Hence, one of the primary motivations underlying my decision to undertake this thesis is the conviction that a comprehensive understanding of hubris necessitates its conceptual utilization. While existing literature encompasses the political aspects of hubris, its inclusion within the context of relationality I have discussed, fails to fully account for its moral dimensions and the detrimental impact it generates through the abuse of power, leading to dishonor and humiliation inflicted upon individuals or groups.

However, this phenomenon is not limited to individuals alone; similar situations can also be observed among social groups. This tertiary motivation has propelled me to pose my research question. I firmly believe that hubris extends beyond individual actors and encompasses the political nature of social identities. Thus, it is imperative to uncover its presence within these identities. One catalyst for this line of thinking is my observation that as a political party gains strength and transforms into a mass party, the level of tolerance among its supporters may decrease. This shift can lead to a propensity to oppress and disdain those who hold differing views. For instance, when comparing past elections to the period before the Justice and Development Party (AKP) became a mass party, it is evident that the party's supporters did not engage in celebrations involving firearms aimed at provoking other groups¹. However, similar actions were performed by certain social groups, as witnessed in the post-election celebrations on May 28, which included threats and featured loud music and gunfire targeting the Nesin Foundation in İstanbul-Çatalca. Erdoğan Özmen (2023) analyzed this event without explicitly employing the concept of hubris, but his assessment encompasses all the characteristics associated with this concept: "enjoying the act of humiliating, devaluing, and weakening others on various occasions".

My fourth and final motivation stems from the observation of hubris' far-reaching effects in various individual and societal domains. This has led me to question its origins and contemplate its influence on social injustices, prompting a deeper exploration and discussion of this concept. The examples I provided earlier illustrate this phenomenon. I argue that such a dynamic, where the powerful oppress and

¹ Upon examining newspaper archives, YouTube footage, and Google search results from previous years, it becomes evident that this type of celebratory gun display occurred in Rize's Kendirli Town eight years ago when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected President. However, it is important to note that this event can be considered an isolated occurrence.

humiliate others, can hinder the affected individuals from fully exercising their social existence as equal citizens. Moreover, this situation can give rise to ethical quandaries. It represents a factor that enforces the sovereignty of the privileged and contributes to the social exclusion of the marginalized individual. Unlike other similar concepts, hubris has direct political effects due to its influence on self-admiration and insolence fed by power, resulting in the destruction of others. For example, what brought forth the concept of “insult politics” today, especially populist political leaders making insults a part of their politics (Winberg, 2017). It is seen that this is used as a tool which leads to polarization. For example, Donald Trump insulting women² calling them “fat pigs, dogs, slobs, and disgusting animals” (p. 21) is an example of this type of leadership (Winberg, 2017). However, Aristotle asserted that rulers must regulate their behavior, otherwise, these hubristic attitudes of rulers, that is, the practice of “disgrace or humiliation” in order to affirm a person or group’s superiority, will feed social conflict (1926, 1378b20, 1374a13). What distinguishes this attitude is its reliance on power, and the humiliated party is acutely aware of this power dynamic, resulting in damage to their dignity. Consequently, it fosters emotions like anger and a desire for revenge (Aristotle, 1932, 1315a27-8). This rhetoric, effortlessly employed by political leaders empowered by their position and shielded from significant consequences, has become one of the driving forces behind the urgent need to discuss hubris within political discourse today.

In the final point, I have highlighted the necessity of discussing why the concept of hubris is political in nature for a contemporary study with examples exhibiting the actions of both political leaders and political masses along with everyday relationships. It underscores the significant influence of this concept in the political realm, both at an individual and societal level. In conclusion, this thesis endeavors to make a meaningful contribution to the realm of social justice by exploring potential remedies to mitigate the adverse consequences of hubris and its resulting impact.

² When this question was asked of him, Trump stated that he made these statements only to a specific person, not to all women, but then to the woman who asked him this question, he stated that that woman was hostile to him and that this was because that person was in a menstrual period, so he maintained a similar behavior.

1.2 Methodology

I will employ two methodological approaches. Firstly, I will utilize an integrative methodology that encompasses both the micro and macro levels, as well as methodological individualism and holism, to demonstrate the interconnectedness of the political impact of hubris in individual and social spheres. Secondly, building upon Button's insights, I will employ conceptual analysis to propose a comprehensive conceptualization for hubris, aiming to address surrounding its political nature. This method is valuable for "determining the logical geography of concepts" (Ryle, 1951, p. 8), as it allows for an examination of the concept's coherence and inconsistencies within the contexts in which it is employed (Ryle, 1951), thereby providing a guide to its boundaries. It has been consistently used in literature alongside auxiliary concepts such as pride, arrogance, and narcissism, which can result in the blurring of specific contexts to which the concept applies.

In order to delve into the moral implications of hubris on individual and social behavior, I will conduct a conceptual analysis of moral hubris. Firstly, employing a vice-based approach, I will question the relationship between hubris and concepts such as justice, reverence, dialogue, and shame. Secondly, from a deontological perspective, I will discuss the immorality of hubris based on considerations of universality, impartiality, respect for reason, and self-constitution. Thirdly, I will explore the consequentialist understanding and its connection to concepts such as agreement, conflict, and the moral dimension of the harm caused by hubris. Finally, I will analyze the feasibility of hubris from the standpoint of concepts such as egoism and pride.

In order to conduct a conceptual analysis of the macro-level effects, I will examine concepts such as group dynamics, collective emotions, collective pride, narcissism, destructiveness, threat, and the relationship between collective hubris.

In the concluding section, the concepts of political hubris with friendship, the common good, and solidarity will be considered. Additionally, within the framework of the relationship between the "will to power" and political hubris, I will explain the concept of political hubris by highlighting the similarities between hubris and concepts like envy and shame.

1.3 Outline of the Thesis

In pursuit of this objective, the second chapter will aim to synthesize the approaches of methodological individualism and holism, illustrating the interplay between the micro and macro levels through this synthesis.

In the third chapter, I will examine thinkers who directly utilize the concept of hubris in literature, as well as those who elucidate its meaning through related concepts. By analyzing the points of convergence and divergence in these ideas, I will present a conceptual framework. These thinkers will be classified into four categories: ancient Greek thinkers, theologian thinkers, enlightenment scholars, and contemporary thinkers. Furthermore, this classification will be focused on philosophical debates encompassing moral philosophy, theological philosophy, enlightenment philosophy, and contemporary political discussions. I will first discuss the conceptual framework proposed by Plato and Aristotle, who viewed hubris as a vice and a state. Secondly, I will explore the concept of pride as presented by Aquinas and Pascal. This analysis will shed light on how Pascal's concept of pride and Rousseau's conceptual exploration of amour propre indirectly relate to the concept of hubris, highlighting both the similarities and divergences. Then, this synthesis will be supported by the argument put forth by Nick Fisher, a contemporary thinker, who suggests that the concept of hubris extends beyond religious or tragic narratives and finds relevance in everyday life. Additionally, I will enrich the discussion by incorporating Mark Button's concept of hubris as a political vice, thus analyzing its impact on the political sphere.

In the fourth section, I will explore the moral vices associated with hubris. This discussion will be framed around three primary ethical approaches: virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. Furthermore, I aim to deepen the discourse by examining ethical egoism, a consequentialist perspective, and objective ethics within the context of selfishness as a virtue. The ethical discussion will be enriched by examining the interplay between hubris and the key concepts within each ethical approach. Firstly, from a vice-based perspective, we will draw upon Alasdair MacIntyre's "After Virtue" approach, Paul Woodruff's proposal on virtue ethics with a focus on reverence, and Frank C. Richardson's ethical understanding centered around dialogue and reverence. Secondly, within the deontological framework, I will discuss the concept of hubris through Immanuel Kant's principles that determine the

morality of actions from their foundations. Additionally, I will explore Christine Korsgaard's analysis of the relationship between action and self-constitution in relation to the morality of hubris. Thirdly, I will assess whether hubris is immoral within the consequentialist perspective, particularly in terms of an outcome-oriented understanding. John Stuart Mill's concept of freedom will also be examined in relation to the morality of hubris. Lastly, I will argue that hubris is deemed immoral even when evaluated from the standpoint of ethical egoism and Ayn Rand's notion of the virtue of selfishness.

In the fifth chapter, I will explore the concept of collective hubris and its presence at the societal level. This investigation will be based on Erich Fromm's thesis regarding the influence of human destructiveness on social narcissism, as well as the work of Eker et al. on collective narcissism, which encompasses concepts such as "excessive reactions to threat" and "generalized prejudice". Furthermore, I will examine the military, architectural, political, and cultural manifestations of collective hubris, and analyze the resulting outcomes. As I aim to demonstrate the pervasive presence of hubris across diverse domains, this serves as a crucial foundation for my thesis.

The sixth chapter will serve as the focal point for analyzing the ramifications of political hubris while delving into the concept itself. It will explore the interconnection between political hubris and Hobbes's notion of the desire for power, as well as Nietzsche's concept of the will to power. Within this framework, the chapter will initially incorporate Hobbes's thesis, emphasizing the indispensability of power for individuals to sustain their social existence, thereby unraveling the societal origins of power. Subsequently, building upon Nietzsche's concept of the will to power, the discussion will elucidate how this will can fuel political hubris, particularly within the context of its manifestations in various individual reflections, such as the dynamics of master-slave morality. Additionally, the chapter will examine how political hubris undermines the essence of politics as a form of friendship, drawing upon Aristotle's concept of friendship, Durkheim's notion of solidarity, and Rousseau's understanding of the common good.

Finally, in the concluding section, I will provide recommendations for resolving the repercussions hubris has on the political landscape in order to resolve the social injustice and conflicts created by hubris.



2. ANALYZING HUBRIS: THE METHODOLOGICAL INTEGRITY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DYNAMICS

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, methodological individualism and holism approaches will be analyzed. Within the framework of this analysis, John Coleman's understanding of methodological individualism and purposive action, focused on functional explanation, will be examined first. Following this, John Elster's view of casualty will be analyzed and the missing points of this analysis in explaining social events will also be pointed out. Secondly, the methodological holism approach will be discussed on the axis of Russell Hardin's social behavior and dynamic relationship. Then, Harold Kincaid's causation approach will be discussed, and this approach will focus on the reductionist understanding which ignores the reflections of the micro-level effects of individuals on the macro. As such, two methodological approaches will be synthesized in the analysis of the concept of hubris due to the interrelationship of the impact it has on both the individual and social levels. Namely, Alexander Jeffrey's understanding between micro and macro will be considered along with List and Spiekermann's two methodological approaches. This hybrid methodological understanding will be proposed within the framework of the abovementioned synthesis.

2.2 Methodological Individualism

Methodological individualism is a method that claims that social phenomena can be explained in relation to the actions of the individual and their motivations. It is claimed that this method is the most meaningful category as a science of analysis in understanding the individual's social life, or deciphering the organism's behavior (Schumpeter, 1990). The sociological "action-theoretic" basis of this understanding is based on Weber's claim that, in relation to the term *verstehen* (understanding), it is possible to understand why actions are performed by individuals' mental motivations (Weber, 1922). Since the motivation behind the action cannot be a reality, called the collective mind, it cannot be fed from it. Therefore, what is attributed to the social is based on highly subjective realities.

This dynamic can be seen in Weber's assertion that there is a relationship between Protestant ethics and capitalism in the literature (Weber, 2001). Coleman (1986) supports that there are some values produced by the protestant religion, and the adoption of these values in society has also impacted people's economic behaviour. One can consider the duty of consciousness as an example here (p. 1321). In the third step, people's adoption of economic behaviors leads to the emergence of capitalist organisation. An examination of this system reveals the macro effect of behaviors adopted by individuals (p. 1321).

Coleman (1986) proposes an alternative methodological understanding of individualism, criticizing the Weberian approach because of its focus on the individual and the weakness of the connection between the micro-macro relationship which reduces the reason behind the behaviour to the action of the individual (p. 1323). He (1986) suggests that the system should be explained through an internal analysis, starting at the individual level even when the implications come from the top level. The person's motivation, or their orientation, could be a decisive factor in trying to understand their actions.

Accordingly, social science differs from others in using theory as a purposeful method, and it leads to a paradoxical relationship for social scientists, given the intention to explain one's action (p. 1312). It develops its theories from an objective and neutral perspective. For this reason, social science needs to build the theory according to teleological principle (p. 1312).

Nonetheless, purposive action, as a teleological principle, is defined as problematic for functional theory because it takes a holistic approach to explain action as opposed to a teleological one. However, the methodological individualistic approach asserted by Coleman (1986) does not explain action solely on the level of social organisation. According to Coleman (1986), one can only clarify people's behaviour on a social or individual level, based on a rational perspective; whether one can understand the motivation and the cause behind a person's actions. This theory argues that if actions do not have rational justifications, this could only be because rational justifications have not yet been discovered. The theory does not give space to irrational behaviors (Coleman, 1986). Understanding the reasons for the emergence of a social organization is only possible through the discovery of the motivations of its components and how the continuity of this system is ensured (Coleman, 1986, p.

1312). In other words, to analyze an organisation, it is necessary decipher the motivations of the individuals within it. This includes questions such as the how people have joined the organisation, their position, and what they seek to get from the organisation. This allows us to examine the social organisation to which people are devoted to, and are proud to be in (Coleman, 1986).

One can consider political party organisations as an example of this, whereby people acquire the party identity with different motivations, such as ideological commitments and personal interests. Further to this, it is also interesting to examine the growth process of a party and its impact on the members; such as the power relationship its members establish with the party during this process, the formation of an identity based on their membership to the party, and the right to boast people obtain with the party's growth along with the shifts in their behaviour such as the tendency to humiliate the members of other parties. It can also be seen that the members' tolerance levels tend to become more authoritarian as the party gains more power, which is an example of the relationship this dynamic has with the members' behaviors as the party itself becomes more powerful and authoritarian. As such, although Coleman's theory claims that actions have purposes, and proposes a richer individual-group relationship analysis by enabling the analysis of the motivations of different people who perform the same action at the individual level, it is necessary to reduce the size of this analysis only to the individual components that make up the concept of that social group. Therefore, it compresses the cause-effect relationship into a one-way field.

The "all explanation is causal" (2007, p. 7) thesis of Jon Elster, another prominent methodological individualist in the contemporary period, can be evaluated both for the effects of hubris at the individual level and for the working principle of the social mechanism that creates this effect. However, this does not mean that all explanans are well-established (2007, p. 7). His theory is case oriented and individualistic, so the explanations only consider individuals and their actions.

Elster discusses the responsibility of providing explanations for events based on their outcomes in the cause-and-effect relationship (p. 163). While he acknowledges that result-oriented explanations can sometimes be beneficial, his main argument revolves around the cycle that connects the results back to their causes. It is for scenarios which can be explained with consequences. An explanation of an event is possible only with causal propositions that are related to each other (pp. 21-22). However, in order to do

this, there must first be a 'real' case, so the reality of the event should be questioned in the first stage (pp. 21-22). In order to provide these causal propositions, his methodological proposal consists of five steps to assert these reasons (pp. 9-31).

Firstly, the theory that can provide the most successful explanation for the case should be determined. Then, steps should be taken to ensure a consistent relationship between the theory and the problematic, alternative definitions should be established for the development of similar relationships, these alternatives should then be tested and refuted, and lastly, the assumption that is deemed to work should be strengthened with additional indicators. According to Elster (2007), this is the mechanism to be followed for the explanation of social phenomena. For this reason, for the mechanism to work correctly, the testing and verification phase of the explanatory content must be strongly established, because understanding will only be possible with a correct mechanism (pp. 36-37). In this framework, he analyses the collective actions. While explaining collective action as individual-oriented, he states that what constitutes collective action is the combination of different motivations of both the people and the relations between people (p. 36).

One of these is the motives that are related to social norms, such as the fear of being excluded from a group. The possible exclusion of those who do not participate in the action is seen as a factor that pushes people to act afterwards even though they had no intention to be involved in the first place (p. 12). However, there are also reasons for participating in the action with simpler personal motivations, people may be involved in action for reasons such as a search related to their own character or finding the action enjoyable (p. 182). These exemplifications provide a basis for understanding the mechanism by which a successful action is successful.

The desire to submit to the authority given to this mechanism and the example of relationality established through the allegory of sour grapes are striking (Elster, 2016, p. 116). What Elster defines as a sour grape is one's effort to harmonize. Although the authority is satisfied with the obedience of the people it governs, the main issue here is that the people show this behavior because they believe that it is good for them to comply with the authority (p. 117). That is, people show this behavior because they prioritize their own well-being (p. 117). In sum, the rational ground Elster established between the individual and the collective relationship suggests a clearly defined methodology in explaining concepts and cases.

As a result, the methods used by these two thinkers will be effective in analyzing hubris, which is a state at the individual level. However, both Coleman's and Elster's theory lacks a sufficient explanation for behaviors, associated with social identity, which people carry out automatically and with no purpose. Their explanations at the micro level are limited. The explanations, which are limited to the individual's motivation in their theories, have always been led by purpose or reason. Unfortunately, this has led to a weaker foundation for discussing the concept of hubris through an analysis of social actors or groups.

2.3 Methodological Holism

Methodological holism is an approach that proposes to examine social dynamics while explaining social phenomena, rather than focusing on the individual and the impact of one's actions (Zahle, 2014, p. 9). Considered one of the founding names, Durkheim (1938) underlines why it is necessary to have a holistic understanding, on the basis that social facts have an importance beyond what individuals do. According to him, when these elements combine, new formations emerge, so what these elements reveal when they combine, their reflections, are the critical things rather than their importance separately. In addition, it will be insufficient to explain social characteristics by reducing these to the individual alone. Russell Hardin (1982), one of the modern holistic thinkers, shares a similar view.

Acquiring an understanding of how an individual acts in any given situation does not provide an adequate basis to explain social behaviour because of the complexity of the relationship in question (Hardin, 1982, p. 2). Whilst this reasoning may work in some scenarios, whereby both the individual and society in general may have similar reasoning in their action, there must be more than assumptions for the theory to be valid (Hardin, 1982). Hardin agrees with the understanding of methodological individualism, in that an individual's actions can be considered either a rational choice or a final result (p. 2). However, he does not think this works on the social level because the rational choice for society cannot be determined with a similar mechanism. Whilst rational theory may work for social mechanisms in some scenarios, this does not necessarily make the theory itself valid (Hardin, 1982). It should be noted that collective action is only rational because individuals themselves are rational. In

contrast, even if it can be said that people are rational, this does not necessarily mean that group behaviour will also be rational.

In examining social behaviour, the matter in question is not a singular act or a lone situation, it is continual (pp. 12-13). Therefore, it should first be accepted that social behaviour is dynamic and not static (pp. 12-13). Thus, it is not possible to analyze this situation, which creates social costs, with a static element, similar to Hardin's proposition that social phenomena cannot be understood solely in an individual-oriented manner due to their complexity. It is possible to talk about the strong influence of social institutions and structures on the behavior of these individuals in society that Hardin mentions. As a result, Hardin argues that collective behavior is a dynamic process and cannot be evaluated by looking at a single moment, person or situation.

Further to this, Harold Kincaid's (2009) causation approach is noteworthy in explaining the mechanism of holistic understanding. While the social can be used to explain individual behavior, the inability of individual influence to directly explain the systemic structure is consistent with the understanding of causation in social sciences (Kincaid, 2009, p. 726). This is because explaining the social in the context of causality is a symbolically identical situation that includes the sum of each individual who is the subject of this causal explanation, whereas an individual-oriented causality explanation is not parallel to explaining social characteristics and structure (Kincaid, 2009). However, in contrast to Elster's argument, the fact that the mechanism established for this causality relationship only concerns lower levels in social explanation underlines that these have a vertical relationality (p. 730). This is because trying to explain the social facts directly with the attitudes of individuals will cause different collective variables to be missed (Kincaid, 2009). His claim is, contrary to individualism, that causality can work without this mechanism, which Elster (2015) also mentions, in the relationship between social beings. In simpler terms, Kincaid and Elster both address similar points within the context of the causality principle. However, their approaches to individualism and holism, which are fundamental principles in their methodologies, are completely opposite. Despite this contrast, Kincaid has developed a sequential and logical analysis method that allows for the examination of direct or complex relationships among events occurring at the community level, aligning with his causation approach.

The approaches of the thinkers, whose claims are included in both the methodological individualism and methodological holism sections, are structuralist or functionalist, and that the social theories they have established are based on rationality. However, in these approaches, they explain the main point of the first group only from the individual perspective, while the relations in the second group are only explained from a social level. As it is seen, when examining the approaches of the 4 underlined thinkers, these two approaches are not completely separated from each other, even though adopting one of these two methodological approaches means prioritizing micro or macro perspectives in the first place. In other words, the common point of these four approaches is that they distinguish between micro and macro relations and do not establish a synthesis point between these two directly related situations. However, the fact that the hubris is a sociological concept that covers these two dimensions and is fed by the intertwining of micro and macro relations necessitates its evaluation with a synthesis approach that includes both micro-macro perspective.

2.4 Exploring the Interconnection Between Micro and Macro Perspectives

Micro perspectives are understood through the interaction of people with each other and the outcome of their relations. Alexander (1987) criticizes the focus these relationships have on size, and how micro has been equated with a specific level of individual interaction that is “in competition with others” (p. 291). Therefore, it is important to clarify how the transition from micro to macro will be evaluated. The main point is the individual, it is not whether action and interaction matter, but whether theory should focus on this level in a way that resists the structuring of “homology and analytic interpenetration rule” (p. 292). Although the action and interaction structure of the individual is important, the most important thing is to understand that this is intertwined with a systemic understanding at every level, only in this way can a broader social theory be claimed.

While we see micro theory as analytical elements of a more general theory, it is possible to explain all of the macro theories by the fact that social systems or institutions make assumptions about how individual behavior and interactions are, even if they are not explicit indications (Alexander, 1987). In addition, it is now understood that theory has an important role in the creation and explanation of objects. However, it is necessary to discuss the claim that society can be understood with a

structure-based understanding and to establish its relationship with observational data (pp. 289-315). Although the emphasis on the rationality of the individual is seen in both methodological individualism and holism, Alexander claims that this understanding can also be developed with a more “synthetic” understanding. This is because, while the pure rationalist understanding approaches the relationship with the symbols or values that affect the individual, the collective understanding ignores the individual’s involvement in it (pp. 289-315). Therefore, it is necessary to synthesize the theoretical tradition and empirical understanding between the two understandings. This understanding is based on an analysis on the axis of action and culture, action and personality, and proposes a micro-empirical mode which covers both areas.

In order to claim this, the micro and macro must be understood conceptually because these two terms are relative concepts, shaped according to the discussion ground (pp. 289-315). The distinctive features of the ground under discussion, its relationship with the parameters and the variables it contains while being discussed, in other words, the environmental impact, are key. Calling this relationship environmental indicates that the interrelationships of these relations are not empirically independent of each other. Beyond the reality of the content of these analyses, these facts allow for assertions of varying degrees of study, thereby enabling the development of claims. That is, the micro and macro levels should be understood as having their own characteristics and as having a highly dependent relationship with each other. Unless this reciprocal relationship is brought to light, it will not be possible to synthesize the opportunities provided by the new solutions and understandings produced separately by these two fields. This is both the micro-social relevance of individual-centered analysis, and the synthesis of empirical influences at the institutional level, that transcends the individual level. Appreciating that all this relationality includes the action of the individual and the relationships one establishes, only a holistic and sustainable understanding of social analysis can be developed which includes holistic understandings in different dimensions. That is, it draws attention to the importance of understanding these actions correctly because a holistic, macro understanding makes hypothetical approaches to the explanation of actions at the individual level. However, since this reciprocity relationship is already included in certain theories, the foundation of micro-sociological understanding has been laid. In doing so, he proposes a model of the sources of action, drawing on Parson and the arguments against him. This model

is remarkable in that it contains micro-elements and understands the functioning of the individual's action. However, "contingent action" (p. 303), which has orientations in the focus of limitations in its relationship with the environment, and its relationship with the environment in the opposite position, include the dimensions of this dynamic structure and the transformations it contains. This action-based model also provides analysis and insights into the collective environment by focusing on the actions and interactions of the individual. This is because the environment and its products, or actions and its consequences, can only be understood when this model is structured correctly (pp. 289-315).

The production of hubris in the social system can be evaluated from this point of view. Taking the example of far-right movements, the focus should be on what the objects of the social structure provide the actors within the scope of the social system, within the framework of the system and actor relationship, because this is how an environmental analysis can be established. Although this object can be anything, animate or inanimate beings, it is seen that the system establishes human beings as its object (p. 304).

There are two key concepts which can be employed to explain social hubris, namely, labor distribution and institutions of political authority. This is because both systems refer to the position and interactions of the individual that provides this relationality (p. 304). While the workforce has a critical role in determining one's own personal history, authority has both positive and negative effects which determine the relationship between all members of the society. In particular, Alexander focused on how these systems affect the actions of individuals.

Alexander's example can be considered within the framework of social hubris. Whilst social hubris is a collective action, the conditions of this action are highly related to the power and control of the powerholders. Therefore, one can argue that this control and unifying power is allocated to the powerholder or the person who requests it. It is these two forces that provide people with this object. Further to this, solidarity is also key for social hubris as it is one of the dimensions that shapes and develops this effect. Solidarity shows how a behaviour does not remain with the individual but turns into a social performance. Alexander underlines that solidarity reflects the behaviour of the individuals within society and is affected by the actions of the people (p. 304). Nonetheless, the same trait cannot be attributed to all communities because the type

and size of the community will impact the conditions for this action to occur. This is because the objects of the social system can differ, and this shows that the social cost of the action depends on the social system one is in (Alexander, 1980). It should be noted that the concept of social hubris can have different meanings in different societies, all referring to different objects. Therefore, the mechanism that power will use to reinforce this will also differ. This shows the necessity of focusing primarily on the heritage of symbols and objects in society to make an analysis.

The last element of this mechanism to consider is the social roles that individuals assume in the system. This is because, similar to authority figures, people will establish their ties with these objects in line with their personal social roles. These roles are not chosen, but rather assigned to people by the system. In line with these roles, people relate to the objects and contribute to the sustainability of the social system. The two main components of the system are norms and sanctions which produce these social roles, and they contribute to the functionality of the system (p. 306). This functioning mechanism enables cultural systems to produce their own reality, but beyond that, this system evaluates the reality it creates, which is adorned with symbols and norms (p. 306). Therefore, it is necessary to be aware that this established reality is not pure and static, but rather established in the context of the actor-environment relationship.

Within the framework of the analysis of the cultural system, the evaluation of symbolic reality will emerge from the understanding of analogies and negative positionings (p. 308). This is because his approach to emotional and moral positioning of good and bad understandings for the symbolic systems is a sign of how a society shows hubristic features and makes them a legitimate discourse for themselves. In the description of this symbolic system, this two-pronged system description is a nurturing root that strengthens the relationality between analogs (pp. 307-315).

The fact that he tells this through myths is also remarkable for the understanding of hubris. The understanding of the myths that Alexander (1987) mentions with reference to Ricoeur (1969) is that it presents a narrative that includes the distinction between good and evil, the myths of Icarus and Narcissus, and this is evident in the different interpretations of these myths. These narratives can become symbols of the culture whose existence is accepted by everyone in social life, by enabling people to make these experiences meaningful and typical. These symbols make the social system on which they are built intelligible to everyone and thus they provide the visibility of the

elements in the construction of these social systems. Explaining the causal relations of the cultural system is only possible with values (Alexander, 1987). This relationality will provide a framework for understanding hubris at both the individual and societal level. Appreciating that the values are like the common set of social processes and social systems, they emerge as a result of the evaluation of symbolic processes and social processes. As Alexander underlines, values have direct effects on political systems due to their effects, such as defending a democracy or advocating authoritarianism. As a result of this effect, the relationship between the concept of hubris and values needs to be evaluated within this framework.

This is because whilst it is possible for a leader with hubristic attitudes to be dismissed in a democratic value system, these attitudes may be desired in another culture where the values are different. As a result, this relationality shows the necessity of a synthesis understanding. For this reason, it should be discussed in a methodologically integrative manner, including the synthesis approach.

2.5 Towards an Integrative Methodological Approach

List and Spiekermann (2013) suggest that there is a need to establish a reconciliation between these two theories for political science (p. 629). This is because the effect of individual attitudes and behaviors is seen as the reason behind political occurrences but describing these situations through this effect alone does not provide a comprehensive enough explanation (List & Spiekerman, 2013, p. 629). They underline that this is only possible by using non-reductionist approaches on common ground (List & Spiekermann, 2013, p. 630). These two points, individualist rational choice theories and the status of collective entities, should be brought together on a common discussion ground, and the understandings produced by both approaches should be taken into account (List & Spiekermann, 2013). Rather, the approach they propose can be considered as the synthesis of the “causal-explanatory” (p. 634) tool, provided through a holistic understanding and methodological individualism, with the concept of supervene individualism (List & Spiekermann, 2013).

They find the systematic casual relations understanding, which the holistic understanding provides in explaining social phenomena, very powerful for social sciences. Whilst their argument underlines the influence of systems, which are closer to a mediated position than holistic understandings, they do not ignore the influence

of these phenomena in the behavior of the individual (List & Spiekermann, 2013). Therefore, even if the individual effect is prioritized, the necessity of holistic understanding is the confusion that will be created by explaining social phenomena only with an individual focus (List & Spiekermann, 2013). As a result, the understanding they propose is a structure that only works with three conditions within the framework of causal explanatory holism: “multiple levels of description, multiple realizability of higher-level properties, micro realization-robust causal relations” (p. 639).

The first of these synthesizing conditions, as the name suggests, refers to two different levels, it includes individuality with a lower level and social structures with a higher level (p. 639). The second refers to how different clusters of individual influences have structural effects, which can be thought of in terms of people with different profiles voting for the same party (p. 639). Finally, the third demonstrates the resilience of this high-level causal explanation, even though there may be divergences in relationalities at the micro level (p. 639). It is argued that, with reference to Fearon and Laitin (2013, p. 640), the causal relationship between the emergence of rebellion because the state is weak is explained by a holistic approach that is free from the interaction of individuals. What this provides is that it helps explain what happened before, while also providing a foresight of what will happen to it in the future when a weakening state is seen. As such, within the context of relationality, both the effects of the institutions’ hubristic attitude on the individual, and the social effects on the individual’s actions can be seen clearly.

As a result, hubris can emerge both at the individual level and in the collective area. Therefore, the concept needs to be analyzed at both the macro and micro level. This can be achieved through a reconciliation between methodological individualism and holism, as suggested by List and Spiekermann. The connection between micro and macro levels can be established through an analysis as suggested by Alexander.

2.6 Conclusion

In this section, methodological approaches are discussed. first of all, it has been discussed with the methodological individualism approach within the framework of the individual and the actions of the individual. In accordance with this purpose, first, the methodological individualism approaches of Coleman and Elster are examined.

In the second part, Hardin and Kincaid's methodological holism understandings of social groups and the existence of collective hubris at the institutional level are analyzed.

Beyond these two approaches, due to the necessity of explaining the concept of hubris in micro and macro dimensions, Jeffrey Alexander's connection thesis between micro and macro has been utilized as a synthesis approach. Finally, the search for a common ground between these two theories and the reconciliation approach was used to benefit from the possibilities of both theories.





3. WHAT IS HUBRIS?

3.1 Introduction

The main goal of this chapter is to clarify the concept of hubris, which is frequently misinterpreted because of its ambitious nature. Appreciating that this term is used and is often associated with various contexts, there is a need to establish a clear frame of reference for its use. With this as its goal, this chapter will examine how hubris was conceptualized philosophically during the ancient times, looking at the different circumstances in which these scholars elaborated on the idea.

Firstly, this chapter will draw special attention to Plato and Aristotle, who viewed the idea that hubris is a vice in moral philosophy. Additionally, the concept of pride, which pertains to an individual's sense of superiority over others, and rebellion against God in the context of religion, will be explored through the works of Thomas Aquinas and Blaise Pascal. Thirdly, this chapter will highlight the similarities between J.J. Rousseau's concept of amour propre and the concept of hubris. Finally, the concepts of arrogance, pride, and vanity will be used to argue that these are proposed to be manifestations of an attitude driven by a desire for self-love, as individuals exhibiting such behavior may find love only in themselves through these traits as posited by Friedrich Nietzsche.

The impact of hubris on politics will also be discussed. Starting with its impact on American society, as argued by Peter Beinart, then, the corrupting effects it has on democracy, as posited by Mark Button, and the syndrome experienced by political leaders, as presented by David Owen, will be considered. These works will be employed to provide insight into hubris as an attitude that manifests itself through gaining power. Moreover, this chapter will analyze hubris as discussed by Cynthia Willett to elucidate the social origins of hubris, which modern liberal democracies claim to demonstrate towards other communities. This chapter will offer a comprehensive understanding of hubris which manifests in everyday life at different levels. This chapter will assert that hubris is not only about an exaggerated sense of self-conceit, but rather a form of self-love that is overly reliant on external validation.

This type of self-love can drive people to take extreme actions and attitudes in their pursuit of approval, without any regard for the impact on others. This can lead to harm and destruction for both the person and those around them. In conclusion, this chapter will consider the historical, philosophical and contemporary manifestations of hubris to present a nuanced understanding of the concept.

3.2 The Conceptualization of Hubris in the Classical Period

The Oxford Dictionary defines hubris, which has Greek origins, as extreme pride which leads to defiance of laws and warnings. The term is often used in line with concepts of overconfidence, vanity, arrogance, amour-propre, self-indulgence, narcissism and pathological grandiosity. Historically, there appears to be many different mythological narratives and stories surrounding hubris. These narratives, which are mostly based on teaching lessons to people, are about ignoring warnings and the defeat that follows. The overconfidence and excessive pride these individuals exude leads them to think they can face no harm, as if they are God, and eventually takes them to their downfall.

This can be seen in the myth of Icarus, which has famously given its name to a syndrome in literature today. Icarus, a historical figure, met his tragic demise due to his own hubris and overconfidence. His father, Daedalus, had warned him about the dangers of flying too high and too low because his wings were made of wax (Mitchell, 1986). However, Icarus chose to disregard his father's cautionary advice and his wings melted when he flew too close to the sun. He plummeted into the ocean, never to be seen again, leaving only his feathers behind (Mitchell, 1986). This story serves as a timeless reminder of the consequences of hubris and the importance of following wise counsel. Whilst the myth does not expand on why Icarus acted in this way, the later interpretations claim that he fell into narcissism, pathological grandiosity, and with this effect, as a consequence of not listening to warnings, he disappeared (Mitchell, 1986).

The punitive effect of hubris, self-indulgence and godly hysteria can also be seen in the myth of Narcissus. Although the precise origins of the myth between Nemesis and Narcissus are debatable, there is a common understanding around its basic framework (Sheard et al., 2012, p. 326). Narcissus is a character who has many lovers, but he does not necessarily like any of them (p. 326). Eventually, he develops a relationship with

a voice, Echo, coming from the nymph without ever seeing her (p. 326). When he sees Echo, he rejects and belittles her; heartbroken, Echo turns to Nemesis for help. Nemesis punishes Narcissus and makes him fall in love with his own reflection in the river (p. 326). Narcissus admires his own reflection so much that he cannot leave the riverside, and he finally falls into the river, drowns and dies whilst looking at himself (p. 326). This can be regarded as the first account of how self-admiration can end in disaster (p. 326). The myths of Icarus and Narcissus illustrate the destructive consequences of hubris and the importance of recognizing the limits of one's power and self-importance. These timeless cautionary tales continue to resonate with us today and serve as reminders of the dangers of overconfidence and self-indulgence.

Beyond the harm that hubris can cause to oneself, Sophocles' *Antigone* discusses the harm hubris can cause to others as it considers the political origins of hubris in King Creon's tragedy (Marden, 2015, p. 77). In this story, the character of the hubristic person is not restricted to the narrative of an overconfident person, instead King Creon is a rather fragile and cowardly character (Marden, 2015, p. 77). Despite his mighty position, his anxiety leads him to political isolation as he refuses to listen to his advisers, and he eventually loses all his power (Marden, 2015). The main theme of this tragedy is the courage to tell the truth despite the hubristic character with moral cruelty (Button, 2016). King Creon's hubris, which led both himself and his country to disaster, makes it difficult to obtain outside advice and apply a common political judgment (Button, 2016). The story shows that the person is so poisoned by power that this hinders his courage to speak the truth, and so "hubris breeds tyranny" (Button, 2016, p. 34). Antigone, Creon's niece, opposes one of his edicts. However, the people around Creon are reluctant to inform him of this (Marden, 2015). His son, Haemon, points at Creon's hubris as he pleads his father to consider the thoughts of other people (Marden, 2015). Despite this, Creon refuses to listen to Haemon which leads to the destruction of his family and his country. This work emphasizes the consequences of the irrationality and stubbornness that is caused by grandiosity (Marden, 2015).

Examination of these historical examples and their distinct narratives shows that hubris manifests through the individual's perception of themselves as distinct from others, whilst simultaneously encountering challenges, and these challenges have been explained through different perspectives.

According to Plato, hubris should be evaluated in different contexts and that there are 4 types of hubris; namely, religious, sexual, legal and psychological (Lohman, 2014, p. 1). The first of these can be found in *Phaedrus* (1993), whereby Socrates conceptualizes hubris and the second can be seen in *Symposium*, where Alcibiades (1970) considers Socrates as hubristic. An evaluation of hubris in the legal context can be seen in the work of *Philebus* (1975) where he conceptualizes hubris over pleasure. Lastly, hubris is conceptualized over sexuality in *The Laws* (1926). These are explored in more detail below.

Hubris is portrayed as a forbidden act, examples of which include disobedience God, arrogance and succumbing to desire. It is conceptualized as a self-indulgence which harms both the person and those around them, as opposed to *sophrosyne*, which is about moderation and balance.

In *Phaedrus*, Socrates uses the term *sophrosyne* to refer to those who are able to apply self-constraint and not act on their impulses for gratification before beauty (Cairns, 1996, p. 25). He contrasts *sophrosyne* with hubris which refers to people's loss of control and urge to seek pleasure regardless of the consequences of their actions (Cairns, 1996, p. 25). In *Symposium*, Alcibiades defines Socrates as hubristic, but his conceptualization of hubris differs from previous references (1970, 215b7, 219c5, 222a7-8). This is because, whilst hubris is often attributed to the young, rich and beautiful, this is not the case for Socrates. His conceptualization of Socrates as hubristic relates to philosophical eros, which is about the rejection of values (Desmond, 2005, p. 57). Alcibiades comments on the attitude of Socrates, his dishonoring of traditional desires, belittling of people in the hall and mocking of Agathon, a traditionally rewarded poet (Desmond, 2005, p. 57). He argues that these behaviors are what makes Socrates a hubristic person.

In *Philebus* (1975, 26b7, 45e2), similar to Socrates in *Phaedrus*, Plato conceptualizes hubris with reference to loss of control, desire for pleasure and manic dominance. Examples of these include gluttony, drunkenness and lust (Cairns, p. 172). Lastly, in *The Laws*, hubris is seen, not only as an act of violence, but also as an attack on one's dignity with reference to rape as an infringement of sexual dignity (Plato, 1926, 874c4). This piece also states that wealth produces hubris, which can be seen in the insulting attitudes of the rich (1926, 874c4).

Whilst Plato draws attention to the different impressions of hubris in varying contexts, the underlying issue in all of them is that hubris is an immoral state, and that people commit these cruel acts as a result of their loss of control. Unlike Plato, whose focus is on acts, Aristotle focuses explicitly on the concept of hubris (2006, 1374a 11-15). According to Aristotle (1893), hubris is a vice, based on personal attitude and character traits, related to honor and shame. Individuals of this character take pleasure from embarrassing others and attacking their honor (Aristotle, 1893). The desire to act in this way is rooted in the wish to appear superior to others (1893, 1124a 26-b1). This can be seen in the hubristic behaviour of the young, or in the contemptuous attitude of the wealthy towards the lower classes. They want to perform the pleasure they feel from this superiority (1893). Whilst this pleasure is natural, acting with the uncontrolled emotion of this pleasure is what makes a person hubristic. Apart from the young and the wealthy, he also speaks of those who were born lucky as another group with hubristic tendencies (1909). These people, who have good fortunes, cannot comprehend the experiences of others and view their own experiences as their own strength (1909, 1378b 23-35). For this reason, they look down on others with pity.

Hubris causes injustice especially by manifesting itself in 2 groups: the first class are those who are economically weaker, such as lower classes, and the other refers to those who are in good physical or financial position from birth (195b 6-25). In line with his advice on being virtuous through moderation, he explains that people from the middle class are least likely to be hubristic (195b 6-25). Being hubristic is dangerous because it is the main source of civil wars and coups and it is also the source of injustice. This is because those with power despise and humiliate those they deem inferior (195b 6-25). The grounds on which Aristotle built the concept of hubris can be seen clearly through the examples he provided; he conceptualized the state of embarrassing others and attacking one's honor based on his superior qualities as hubris. Aristotle and Plato share several similarities in their perspectives on the understanding of hubris, particularly regarding the emphasis placed on insult and excessive attitude which are key aspects of the concept.

Whilst the examples above portray hubris as exclusive to those in higher classes, the conceptualization of hubris as an attack on democracy and free speech in *Antigone* shows that the manifestation of hubris is not conditional on class or lifestyle (Button, 2016). Although Aristotle and Plato allude to hubris against the Gods in their work,

these philosophers do not concentrate on person's self and identity as the underlying cause of this. The relationship between hubris and the self, and their theological standing, are better in line with the concept of pride developed by Aquinas and Pascal.

According to Thomas Aquinas (1947), the perception of pride as a sin is analogous to the Greek notion of hubris. For Aquinas, pride is a root cause and therefore it cannot be conceptualized as a means to an end (Aquinas, 1947, p. 2483). Pride is perceived as the original sin in that it represents both breaking away from God and confronting God (Aquinas, 1947). Thinking that original sin should be the root cause, he says that this can only be self-love, and expresses this with reference to Augustine, in which he states that it was excessive self-love that destroyed the city of Babylon (Aquinas, 1947, p. 1217). He further explains that the underlying reason for why people want better for themselves, or see themselves as superior to others, is the love they have for themselves. As such, he considers pride to be a sin and claims that this is rooted in self-love (Aquinas, 1947). This view of pride is similar to that of Rousseau's, albeit Rousseau emphasizes the social aspect of pride whilst Aquinas concentrates more on the religious implications of pride and its moral significance.

The concept of pride was also examined by Blaise Pascal (1999) who considered pride to be a spiritual vice. This is because, he believes that no vice or virtue can be interpreted outside the framework of being human (1999). He conceptualized an idea of self, similar to *amour-propre*, as one that is dependent on the thoughts of others. He explains that this idea of self is a "parodic imitation of God" (Wood, 2011, p. 13). This is because the false self is hypocritical and this fictitious self-construction imitates God's creation process (Wood, 2011, p. 9). As such, Pascal sees it as a perverted imitation of God, from which one can understand the tendency to construct false self-based on concepts of pride and dignity. This imitation of God manifests itself through the desire to prove oneself and be respected by others. This creates a dependence whereby one's self-worth relies on the approval of others. This dependence on the other turns into denial of one's own identity, and an obligation to glorify oneself to realize this desire for approval.

As an example, he highlights the distinction between thinking about how to become a king versus simply thinking about being a king (Pascal, 1999, p. 27). Instead of thinking about themselves, people live their lives through the thoughts and opinions others have of them. This is because we are not concerned with the virtues themselves,

but with the acknowledgment of the virtues. This mindset directs our attitudes and it is what makes a person prideful (Pascal, 1999). This is also how we interpret the relationship we have established with knowledge itself; our reason for learning is also rooted in pride in that we learn to teach others (Pascal, 1999). This feeling has taken over us in such a way that we easily let go of our own lives as long as others talk about us (Pascal, 1999). This is why pride is one of the two sources of our sins (Pascal, 1999, p. 78). Pascal states that justice is a feeling given to us by God to free us from captivity. However, people prefer pride over justice and this keeps one in this confinement as their behaviors continue to be dictated by how they are perceived from the outside (Pascal, 1999, p. 78). This takes liberation away from the individual. Justice can only be achieved through getting rid of pride (Pascal, 1999, p. 78). Ultimately, pride is seen as a spiritual vice whereby one abandons self-reflection and creates a false self through how they are perceived by others.

In contrast to earlier thinkers, enlightenment theorists have developed a distinct conceptualization of hubris which is primarily attributable to the inclusion of two key elements: a recognition of the concept's ancient origins, and the impact of socialization on people. As Neuhouser's (2008) interpretation of Rousseau's work, the term 'amour-propre' refers to the concepts of pride in Augustine, and glory in Hobbes. Rousseau does not directly use the concepts of hubris and pride, nor does he use any other related terms with comparable connotation. However, his conceptualization of self-love parallels hubris. Neuhouser (2008) agrees that early thinkers did not use the concept of amour-propre, but instead used pride and vanity.

According to Rousseau, there are two different kinds of self-love. The first is 'amour de soi' which refers to the inner love that is inherent in a person in their natural state. This is a more primitive emotion found in nature where one has to protect itself. This feeling, which is attributed to the state of self-love, is based on the idea that a person can only exist in nature by protecting oneself (Rousseau, 1889). This is a well-intended and non-interest-oriented feeling unless in the absence of an outside threat. It is love that only focuses on self and does not seek validation from the outside (Rousseau, 1889, p. 491). However, once a person starts to socialize, this feeling is replaced by 'amour-propre'. According to Rousseau, the difference between the two is that selfishness and egoism emerge with the development of reason (Rousseau, 1889, p. 493). Once a person starts to socialize, their mind starts to develop and they begin

thinking about themselves, which in turn increases selfishness and corruption (Rousseau, 1889). *Amour-propre* arises with the individual's ability to compare themselves with another, and one's opinion of themselves depends on how they are perceived by others (Rousseau, 1889). In order to be a virtuous person, one should be aware of their limitations and make fewer comparisons because a self that is constantly compared to others can never be autonomous, happy or virtuous (Rousseau, 1889).

As opposed to a benign form of self-esteem, Rousseau's conception of *amour-propre* is posited as a malevolent force with multifaceted origins in domination, conflict, immorality and self-alienation (Neuhouser, 2008). On the other hand, Rousseau's distinctive contribution lies in his conceptualization of *amour-propre* as not only an evil force, but also as a potential source of salvation (Neuhouser, 2008). This viewpoint distinguishes Rousseau from other thinkers who view *amour-propre*, implicitly pride or vanity, only in negative terms (Neuhouser, 2008). Rousseau (2012) maintains that both the best and the worst aspects of human nature are owed to *amour-propre*. This is because while *amour-propre* can indeed lead to vice and immoral behavior, it also provides human beings with a distinct advantage over animals (Rousseau, 2012). Based on these ideas, a similarity can be established between hubris and *amour-propre*. Hubris harms the autonomy of others, and *amour-propre* harms one's own autonomy. Hubris prevents a person from being virtuous. In both cases, an excess of anxiety is seen, not the excess of self-love. While hubris has the anxiety of losing power, it is seen that they both have the common anxiety of not being recognized or seen. Given these similarities, it is important to comprehend Rousseau's concept of *amour-propre* to fully understand the concept of hubris.

Nietzsche uses vanity, arrogance, pride and presumption in his conceptualization of hubris. He posits arrogance as something that one must avoid, and as something that will harm what is good (Nietzsche, 1910). Hubristic people see themselves as more than they actually are, and because of their inability to evaluate themselves honestly, they are bound to make mistakes (p. 290). Nietzsche explains a person's attachment to an idea through two different states of arrogance (Nietzsche, 1910), namely, pride and vanity. The conceptualization of hubris through pride refers to situations whereby people deem themselves more valuable over their own understanding of a thought, with the presumption that others are not as intelligent (p. 363). While using this for both concepts, he talks about the idea of reinforcing one's opinion about oneself over

others (p. 367) and making oneself liked (p. 89). In both, the main goal is not for one to be liked by others, but rather to develop self-love through others. Meanwhile, vanity is conceptualized not as the effort to be superior to others but be perceived as such by others (p. 174). He considers this desire to be liked as the biggest “presumption” (p. 363) which is similar to Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre.

Lastly, Nietzsche considers conviction as one of the stages of obtaining knowledge. He defines the problems of perceiving acquisition of knowledge as reaching the absolute truth in three stages and explains that people with this perception have a problematic way of thinking because their learning processes are not about gaining knowledge, but rather the “desire to be right” (p. 398). For this reason, people who are convinced of the absolute truth do not give up on their opinions, and as a result, what we see in history is a conflict of people’s belief systems as opposed to their views (p. 398). He views the state of people keeping their own opinions superior as an arrogant attitude, and these thoughts as arrogant thoughts. According to Nietzsche, this is the obstacle to peace (Nietzsche, 1910). However, alongside the desire for superiority, the thought that fundamentally distinguishes Nietzsche from other thinkers is his consideration of the relationship with knowledge, and the connection between this presumption and the social conflict that arises from the desire to be right.

3.3 The Concept of Hubris in Contemporary Thinkers

N. R. E. Fisher (1976), a modern scholar, provided a conceptualization of hubris that links it to the notions of honor and shame (p. 177), yet dissents from the view that it should be understood exclusively through religious or tragic lenses (p. 178). In addition to agreeing with MacDowell’s understanding of hubris on many points, Fisher draws attention to its shortcomings (Fisher, 1976). According to him, hubris-induced actions occur with the aim of dishonoring and shaming others (Fisher, 1976). Appreciating that Fisher’s understanding of Hubris is developed through the ideas of MacDowell and Aristotle, these should also be examined for a comprehensive understanding.

MacDowell’s approach to hubris revolves around the idea of voluntary and bad behaviour which is typically found in the rich and the young and can be seen in activities such as bingeing food and alcohol, or may show itself to be sexual (Fisher, 1976, p. 177). Fisher agrees with MacDowell’s definition of hubris because he too

proposes that the concept should have no different meaning either in literature or in law (Fisher, 1976, p. 188). He finds it misleading that hubris has different narratives as a religious reference and criminal act, as it creates an inexplicable distinction (Fisher, 1979, p. 45). Hubris is not primarily a religious term, even if it is an act punished by the Gods (Fisher, 1979, p. 45). This attitude of the person who does not give in to the Gods, as he believes that all of his attributes and successes are deserved and personal, can be considered hubristic and will naturally be punished by the Gods (Fisher, 1979, p. 45). Essentially, this term is both an individual, and a societal attack on the values that holds it together and therefore cannot be restrained to merely a religious term (Fisher, 1979, p. 45). Secondly, he also criticizes the identification of this term with tragedy as he argues that, even if it is associated with tragedy, it should not be called tragic because of the pity it would generate for one's actions (Fisher, 1979, p. 45). According to Fisher, hubris is an immoral act which harms one's dignity by placing someone in a state of embarrassment at both the micro and macro levels (Fisher, 1976).

Mark Button argues that the greatest danger posed by hubris, which may not be sufficiently considered, is the danger it poses to democratic societies (Button, 2016, p. 34). The presence of hubris creates a hindrance to individuals' ability to receive external counsel and contribute to the collective political decision-making process (p. 34). Hubris, due to its corrupting impact, poses a challenge to the development of critical thinking among citizens in democratic societies (p. 34). Although arrogance and hubris are often linked, the author (2016) suggests that it is important to distinguish between these two concepts. Specifically, hubris holds a greater influence, particularly due to its assault on the moral equality and dignity of others (p. 38). Arrogance refers more to oneself while hubris feeds more on the other (p. 38). Similarly, arrogant people are often content with themselves, as they see themselves superior to others, whereas hubristic people actively work to create this superiority over others (p. 39). In doing so, they prioritize abusing and humiliation of others for their own interest (p. 39). Therefore, failing to differentiate between the concepts of arrogance and hubris makes the political and social dangers of hubris invisible (p. 38). A hubristic attitude will sooner or later create tyranny in the political sphere, eventually making it surrender everything to a single will (p. 39). Hubris is a concept that feeds more on fear (Button, 2016). From this idea, Button takes Aristotle's idea of the psychology of hubris a step

further and defines hubris as a situation in which the hubristic does not act with a motivation from dominating and enjoying others because one is powerful, but rather because one fears losing their power and position (p. 46). In sum, hubris is fueled by fear and defined as a moral cruelty, and ultimately leads to tyranny, functioning not only as a moral problem but also as an antipolitical concept.

David Owen (2008) uses the ancient Greek conceptualization of hubris as the excessive pride and self-confidence of strong figures, but according to him, a more detailed explanation is needed to understand hubris in a political sense (p. 428). He explains that these individuals start to show their hubristic side only after claiming power, which is then discarded once they depart from their political positions. Owen identifies 14 traits in leaders with hubris syndrome (Owen & Davidson, 2009, p. 2-3). These people change their perceptions of the world after obtaining power, so they instrumentalize power and view the world as a place to glorify oneself (Owen & Davidson, 2009). Their perception of reality distorts, and their behavior changes by removing the discussions on the ground of moral honesty to avoid being subject to rational evaluation (Owen & Davidson, 2009). This is because they believe they have a messianic superiority, and therefore they have a right to behave in a way that creates worry and shows disdain of others (Owen & Davidson, 2009). Examining these features, it is understood that these people are disconnected from the real world with the corrupting effect of power. They see themselves as separate from the rest of the world. This syndrome affects not only the leaders and the society they live in, but also other communities around the world depending on the leader's influence and power in the region.

Peter Beinart (2010) developed a thought for hubris as an affliction resulting from the effects of success (p. 15). He (2010) states that Americans are also inclined to this ancient concept due to their status as a superpower in the world and explains this tendency to hubris through the Icarus syndrome. Americans are under the spell of dominance, and that the danger of hubris shows itself with three basic signs (Beinart, 2010): overconfidence, unilateralism and excessive fear (pp. 24-26). In terms of unilateralism, this refers to whether the support of other countries for a decision made by the United States is used to justify the decision itself (Beinart, 2010, p. 25). Beinart says that this need for backing is not for the United States' need for support, but for the need for a measure as an indicator of whether the decision reached was rational or

not (p. 25). In terms of fear, he gives an example of the decisions made during a war, and how the shadow of hubris created an obstacle to making a rational assessment of the external threats (p. 25). Beinart claims that the more power American politicians believe they have, the greater is their perception of feeling threatened (p. 25). Similarly, the greater the level of these fears, the greater are the size and costs of actions taken to suppress the fear (p. 25). However, these signs are not sufficient on their own to indicate hubris as they are open to interpretation in any event and condition (pp. 24-26). Therefore, the presence of hubris must be evaluated according to these contexts.

Cynthia Willett (2001) differs from her contemporaries with the conceptualization of hubris. She views hubris as more than a moral problem or a wrongdoing, but as a crime and an attack on social bonds (Willett, 2001, p. 16). Willett draws attention to the fact that the crime of hubris can lead to horror, and it is not something that can be directly controlled due to the impact the fear hubris creates has on people (p. 201). Hubris was seen as a crime in ancient Greece, and the absence of this in liberal democracies today is problematic because the criminalization of hubris at the time meant the acceptance of recognition and autonomy against the class facing the problem of recognition, and the restitution of honor (p. 84). This is because the punishment for hubris acted as a deterrent as it prevented the upper class from acting carelessly and exploiting their power, which in turn prevented social destruction at certain levels (p. 84). Willett introduces the idea of imposing restrictions on hubris and greed in today's upper classes, similar to that in ancient Greece, as these people continue to prioritize themselves and their own power (Willett, 2001). She explains this further through the arrogance of white people, and the relationship the United States has established with Europe (p. 224).

Willett argues that that right approach was developed by African American writers (p. 5), who considered the concept of hubris through the context of care ethics. This approach draws attention to the person's social capacity and allows us to consider the struggle people have for recognition through the perspective of a mother-child relationship. She says that there is a need for regulation of ethical or legal codes to ensure this visibility (p. 14). She argues that this white arrogance can be seen through the discrimination against black people and the lack of visibility of the cycle of racial inequality they continue to face in the United States. Willett claims that white arrogance and racial inequality stem from the perception of the other as "needy" (p.

37) and incapable of being self-sufficient (p. 37). This view of the other as a child rationalizes their arrogance (p. 37).

According to Oliver, the desire for recognition has a narcissistic core, and therefore Willet (2001) highlights the act of knowing the other because she believes that the absence of encounters with the others is what feeds hubris in modern society (p. 22). In other terms, people rely purely on the narcissistic core if they are not given the opportunity to socialize with others. This bourgeois liberal understanding of law, on the other hand, draws attention to the lack of the spirit of justice that must be ensured in the social life contained in the old codes (p. 36).

As a result, Cynthia Willett's unique perspective on hubris focuses on its impact on social bonds, arguing that it is not just an individual moral problem or crime but also a means of exerting power and autonomy against those without recognition. She calls for regulations against the hubris and greed of institutional structures. In particular, she points at white people in America and uses their othering attitude against minorities as an example. She highlights the importance of knowing and witnessing the other in order to combat the narcissistic desire for recognition which feeds into modern society's power and hubris. At the same time, she also criticizes the bourgeois liberal understanding of law for lacking the spirit of justice found in the old codes.

3.4 Hubris: Conceptual Analysis

Hubris has been conceptualized as deeply affecting the individual and society both in ancient literature and in the history of philosophy. Firstly, hubris is referenced as a great threat, which manifests itself with excessive action, due to the social destruction it creates both in the individual and in society. Plato and Aristotle especially emphasize this excessiveness as a vice, and the reflections of this claim that they are performed because one takes pleasure in behaviors such as harming one's honor, embarrassing, and humiliating others. Although there are points where these two thinkers differ, they both claim that this destruction is caused by a person putting their own desires before others and seeing the damage they give the others as unimportant. However, the main sources of this state need to discuss self-love.

Although he does not use the term hubris, Aquinas considers pride as excessive self-love, and refers to it as the original sin because of the distance it cases away from

God. Whilst there is mention of self-love, the conceptualization only focuses on the relationship between the person and God. Therefore, I will refer to Pascal and Rousseau for the missing part. It can be claimed that Pascal's conceptualization has some parallels with Rousseau's concept of amour-propre, in the sense that people seem to have a self-love based on seeing themselves as superior to others, but in actuality their idea of self-love is dependent on their image and how they are perceived by others. This parallelism is similarly found in Nietzsche's concepts of pride and vanity. Unlike Rousseau, Pascal finds this type of self-love as completely evil and thinks of it as a concept with only negative outcomes, considering that it is the main cause of injustice for both the person and the society. Pride is the source of evil because people become dependent on their images, not on their plans, and are more concerned with positions they will achieve as opposed to their main duties. Despite this, Rousseau argues that it can also be a source of social development. That being said, this claim does not analyze the possible effects of hubris in different areas. While defining arrogance, Nietzsche also points out the conflict it creates in acquiring knowledge, and pointed out that the source of people's concern with being right rather than acquiring knowledge is arrogance, and therefore arrogance is the source of conflict. Thus, it is important to note that Fisher, while reviewing this concept in the context of its ancient origins, draws attention to the existence of it in everyday life beyond its religious and tragic meaning at that time.

In the second stage of this synthesis, attention is drawn to Button's understanding of the hubris as a political vice, in the context of the danger it poses for democratic societies because it creates obstacles in joint decision-making processes due to the obstacles that hubris creates to critical thinking. Additionally, to strengthen this understanding at the level of political analysis at the individual level, Owen's claim mentioned that hubris can be a syndrome which leads to power poisoning. This means that people with power do not necessarily have any mental health problems prior to obtaining power. Then, Beinart asserts that there is a correlation between success and hubris. If any group feels too proud of their success, then they can become blunt against the truth, grow deaf to the warnings of others, which leads to a disaster for them. In the final point of this analysis, Willett highlights that the lack of recognition of the other leads to injustice in society. For this reason, how hubris was managed in ancient times is examined, as this can provide a solution to this issue in modern society as well.

In light of all the elements of the authors above, it is seen that the concept of hubris is directly related to power at its core. However, the relationship established with this power is relational, as Rousseau underlines in the concept of amour-propre, because the person has a type of self-love that is dependent on the other. It could be argued that this is political in its nature.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the understanding of hubris through the lens of literature. The first part of the chapter focused on the myths that illustrate the downfall of individuals due to their self-admiration and the assertion of godlike qualities for themselves. The chapter also examined the philosophical conceptualizations of hubris, beginning with Plato and Aristotle's moral sense of hubris as an immoral state, followed by Aquinas and Pascal's understanding of pride as a sin. As part of the analysis in the context of classical thinkers, the study highlighted the similarities between Rousseau's concept of amour-propre and the concept of hubris. This section analyzes Nietzsche's claim that concepts of arrogance, vanity and pride can be posited as a demand for love because, as Nietzsche argues, this is the only way these individuals can achieve self-love.

In the second part of the chapter, I delved into the contemporary interpretations of hubris in relation to power relations. The discussion explored how power is a critical factor in the development of hubris in individuals and how it is also a political issue. The examination of how hubris manifests in American society, as argued by Beinart was also considered. I also explored Button's argument that hubris is antipolitical to democratic societies and how gaining power transforms political leaders into hubristic beings with reference to Owen. Finally, the chapter examined Willet's claim that modern liberal democracy has some issues with hubris due to some of their dynamics based on ignoring the other. In this regard, I drew attention to the importance of this considering the various contexts in which hubris manifests and understanding its social origins. In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of hubris, this chapter has also considered reflections of hubris at different levels in our daily lives. Furthermore, this chapter contended that hubris is not simply an inflated self-conceit, but rather a type of self-love that is excessively dependent on others. This leads to a love of oneself that is limitless in the actions and attitudes individuals will adopt in

order to obtain the affection they crave. As a result, people may neglect the well-being of others and even cause destruction for themselves and those around them.



4. MORAL HUBRIS

4.1 Introduction

Philosophers have approached the concept of moral hubris from various perspectives over the years. Vice-based approaches have scrutinized character traits and focused on the agent, or the telos in their analysis. Similarly, a vice-based approach will be used to explore the notion of hubris as a virtue ethics within the context of Alastair MacIntyre's school of thought, which identifies the three key elements of virtue ethics as courage, honesty and justice. This piece will examine the relationship between hubris and the modern individual through the lens of narrative history whereby MacIntyre critiques the modern individual and emphasizes the significance of understanding the individual's integrity.

This study will also delve into the concept hubris as discussed by Woodruff and Richardson et al. through notions of reverence, shame and dialogue. An academic approach will be adopted in analyzing these concepts, aiming to provide a comprehensive understanding of the notion of hubris within the context of virtue ethics and its relationship with the modern individual.

Whilst deontologists have focused on the action, consequentialist ethicists have prioritized the outcomes of actions concerning hubris. This piece aims to examine the concept of hubris, in relation to action and self-constitution, using the deontologist approach developed by Christine Korsgaard.

Alongside these theories, this study will also explore hubris within the context of universality, respect of reason and the end-means principle which are the three fundamental elements posited by Kant for moral duty. Additionally, in analyzing the moral implications of hubris, this study will use Kant's concept of unsociable sociability which bears resemblance to Rousseau's concept of amour-propre. Lastly, this piece will consider the consequentialist approach in discussing hubris in relation to individual and community benefit.

Finally, I will consider whether any moral theory can assert that immorality of hubris. In doing this, I will examine objectivist ethics and the virtue of selfishness by Rand. Whilst I am of the argument that this approach defines pride and selfishness as virtues, the concept of humility is not a virtue and it is not possible to accept hubris as moral. Providing the perspectives that have characterized hubris as an immoral state, this chapter will explore hubris from a moral standpoint.

4.2 Hubris in Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics consists of the concepts we use when we discuss how one should live well (Vaughn, 2015, p. 155). The answer to this question also relates to the question of how one should behave (Vaughn, 2015, p. 155). The virtue ethics thinkers referenced in this chapter have prioritized the common good in their thinking.

According to Alasdair MacIntyre (2007), virtue ethics have established the ground on honesty, courage, and justice with the same standard being applied to everyone. These virtues have these superior standards and internal goods (MacIntyre, 2007). In that sense, it is difficult to pose hubris as a virtue that serves the common good given it does not contain any of these elements (MacIntyre, 2007). In the absence of virtue, there is only space for external good which means that the dominant feature in society would be competitiveness. In that case, thinking that hubris will feed on an individual's competitive urge, means that hubris has no element of internal good. From Owen's perspective, the characters of political leaders may be impacted to the point that they do not face this syndrome. However, one may argue, through this perspective, that leaders have morally educated characters and therefore this syndrome would not arise under no circumstances.

Respectively, the hubristic does not value honesty because their priority lays with maximizing their own benefits in any given situation. This means that dishonesty is considered a genuine option, and they would not necessarily seek alternative paths to avoid telling lies. Whilst this does not mean that hubristic people deliberately tell lies, the examination of the telos of hubristic people provides no reason for why they should stop telling lies. This is because all means are deemed to be permissible to achieve self-love. For this reason, people may opt for honesty, only to make themselves look good in the eyes of the other people. As such, they do not have a superior standard for honesty. Further to this, the issue does not only lay with telling the truth, but with the

absence of consistency and integrity with principles. Therefore, these people should stay true to themselves when they make mistakes (MacIntyre, 2007). This is the fundamental sign of honesty. On the other hand, hubristic people do not claim to follow any specific principles, and therefore there is no need to search for any consistency in their actions. They are not willing to accept their mistakes because of their dependence on the grandiose image they have crafted.

Secondly, courage is also not a priority for hubris. One can assert that people with a hubristic disposition generally tend to be cowardly since they are anxious about the risk of losing their position in the eyes of others. One may argue that these people will take risks, only to protect their position, which may make them appear as though they have courage (MacIntyre, 2007). However, this is only an illusion. Another key point about courage is the openness to be challenged about one's beliefs and seeking different perspectives. This is not the case for hubristic people who are fragile about their opinions and themselves, because any damage on how they are perceived by others could destroy their lives.

Finally, when considered in the context of justice as mentioned by MacIntyre (2007), hubris completely falls apart. This is because MacIntyre asserts that justice is a must for a virtue, not only within the context of following rules, but also for the need to serve the common good of society. The common good does not only refer to the total benefit, but it should also guarantee the good for every individual, especially those in marginalized groups who are in need of support. In fact, hubristic people have a tendency to adopt their own culture and view the world through this perspective only, albeit this is similar to how MacIntyre (2007) defines the modern individual, it must be said that hubristic people are more adamant in this regard. Therefore, it can be argued that hubristic people are not meticulous about their backgrounds, but they are rather concerned with the illusion of it because of their need for acceptance in society. Their relationship with society is not through the common good, but their need of society for their own good. However, only then can the individual, viewed from the perspective of narrative history, gain a real meaning.

The understanding of these three elements of virtue implicitly shows why the modern individual has a problem with MacIntyre's definition of virtue (2007). It can be said that the modern individual, characterized by MacIntyre, shares many traits with the hubristic as they both have no established ethos. According to MacIntyre, virtue is

directly related to telos because virtue is seen as the telos of life. This is because, in order for a person to answer question of why they act with virtue, one must first find an answer to what the telos of their life is, and in this context, they must determine their life path (MacIntyre, 2007). In that sense, telos is a roadmap that guides and shapes behaviour in any given situation. Considering telos in depth reveals that we rank the various goods in a hierarchy, and whether we are capable arranging these particular goods in a rational way (MacIntyre, 2007). This explains how people can manage arbitrary decisions in line with virtues (MacIntyre, 2007). The source of this are integrity and consistency. This understanding shows that the source of one's life is narrative history within a compound. The modern individual cannot act as a virtue because they are detached from the perspective of narrative history (MacIntyre, 2007) because their decisions are based on their own interests.

This does not present a noble understanding because it perpetuates the idea that human nature is dangerous (MacIntyre, 2007). In actuality, both of these perspectives see the good as property because the altruistic perspective has an understanding that these two ideas are in conflict. Whilst one considers their own well-being, the other prioritizes the well-being of someone else. The distinction is important for hubris because MacIntyre's claim is about not putting one's own interest first, but about understanding the telos and the person right in their entirety. Furthermore, construing human nature as dangerous may legitimize hubristic acts, as these can be interpreted as the natural behaviors (MacIntyre, 2007). However, individuals cannot be considered separate from their own narrative history, they are embedded within a community that provided a shared sense of purpose and meaning (MacIntyre, 2007). Appreciating that every individual may think of things alike, regardless of their origin or how they were brought up (MacIntyre, 2007). According to MacIntyre (2007), by prioritizing their own desires and interests, the modern individual has lost their identity. Narrative history, in its essence, will give the modern individual a sense of knowledge about oneself and their identity. In order to attain this understanding of self, a person must first acknowledge that they are a social being within a community because one's own story is interconnected with those around them (MacIntyre, 2007). Only through understanding narrative history can one achieve a comprehensive understanding of why these virtues can be universalized and be woven into the fabric of society. All of the elements of society should be in a state of integrity (MacIntyre, 2007).

Another reason why hubris is not a virtue can be seen through shame and reverence as conceptualized by Woodruff (2001) and Richardson (2003). Virtue is not about self-control; it is the habit of feeling and the capacity to have true feelings. In contrast, hubristic people do not construct their feelings in a true way, which can be gained through reverence and shame (Woodruff, 2001). However, hubris, in its first sense, is a completely opposite capacity, causing one to be disgraced, both implicitly and explicitly, and to dishonor by acting disrespectfully. These people tend to rationalize and justify their own behaviour; therefore, they do not receive the benefits of reverence. Reverence creates a sense in their minds that their behaviour is wrong, and this is understood as the reason why leaders refrain from acting like Gods (Woodruff, 2001). Another obstacle that reverence provides for the domination created by hubris, is that an ordinary person cannot face emotional isolation and feel the society in which they reside. Hubris is a destructive feeling.

Hubris also harms dialogue because self-love depends on others, and there is no hesitation to harm others if it will lead to gaining more power. These people are not open to different ideas because they desire acceptance by others. For this reason, reverence is a necessity as it allows one to engage in dialogue, agree to disagree with people, without it gravely impacting one's understanding of self. It instead underlines their self-awareness and ability to stand their ground. It should also be noted that this is not solely about suppressing different opinions, but also that cowardly people do not listen to others, and actively prevent them from expressing themselves.

As explained by Willet, power holders in modern liberal democracies perform differently. Modern liberal democracies pretend to be communicating with children to try and legitimize their hubris, but despite trying to be perceived as respectful, their behaviour does not contain any shred of reverence. However, Richardson (2003) points out that one should be careful to interpret reverence as a virtue because keeping an open mind also means allowing the other's authority. This may lead to injustice and rise in authority.

There is an issue that needs to be discussed for the relationship between how people understand freedom for their own values, and how they perform this. This is because people often do not actively consider the importance of freedom. However, Woodruff (2001) argues that we should be serious about our understanding of freedom, and the failure to take this seriously can be seen in the lack of reverence people have for

opinions others. Whilst debates are expressions of freedoms, and not conflicts, these are disregarded due to the lack of respect people show for freedoms. Woodruff describes this situation as cowardice, the opposite of courage as a virtue, because people would rather allow the violation of their freedoms and boundaries than to face having problems. This can also be observed in Owen's approach for some political leaders. He (2003) explains that Thatcher was not permitted to perform hubris excessively and she was unseated. This shows how dialogue is a virtue, and ignoring those who are being cruel or narrow-minded, or acting in compassion toward them only makes hubris stronger.

4.3 Hubris in Deontology

Hubris is not directly mentioned, just hinted at, in deontology. In this approach, the main focus is on how the framework of the moral law can be set. However, the framework also includes some signs to conceptualize dispositional acts in terms of virtue. The deontologist understanding focuses on the question of how we should act in accordance with moral law, and that this must be followed strictly by everyone. In this regard, hubris as an act has no problems with any of its principles or moral motivations. Hubristic people can understand all principles as their own social acceptance that provides their rights. From a deontologist perspective, the moral law is connected to rightness, which is based on general rules called maxims, as deontology takes its source from reason (Kant, 1997). On the other hand, hubristic acts cannot be generalized for everyone, because the hubristic demands rules that are designed to protect their interests. This is because, unlike other people, hubristic people know what is right for them. Although maxim is a categorical imperative for everyone, people are rational beings with the ability to make objective principled choices due to their autocratic origins (Kant, 1997). Since these are sound and natural for humanity, they are deemed as a legal obligation for everyone (Kant, 1997). That is, all people have the same qualities, an autonomous and rational existence, and therefore the moral law applies to everyone (Kant, 1997).

Appreciating that moral law can be comprehended by reason, even though it is not written, Kant (1997) claims that it must therefore be developed and clarified further by reason. Thus, it has been shown that, irrespective of whether people follow it or not, the reasonable step to take for a good life is to live accordingly (Kant, 1997).

Although goodwill is fundamental in this understanding, hubris does not include any goodwill towards humanity or the people themselves (Kant, 1997). The problems can be seen clearly when hubris is considered action oriented.

As Christine Korsgaard (2009) argues, action and self-constitution always have intersectional activity because the unity of self and nature of action are the same thing. This is because self is constructed again in each action we take. Therefore, due to the nature of hubristic action, there is no intention to use their reason in regard to self-constitution. This is because their self-constitution is dependent on the outside opinion about themselves. They do not need to think about what is good or bad, they just adapt to the circumstances and constitute their image accordingly. However, if the mind establishes this system in line with goodwill, only then these outputs can have a real moral value (Kant, 1997). The prerequisite for being moral about something is that the motivation of the person is the goodwill of the action but performing that behaviour in this way can be considered a moral duty (Kant, 1997). Considering the thing that determines the moral duty is reason, it can be said that goodwill is actually the will to do the rational thing. Therefore, the rational moral agent, the human, is distinguished from other living things by having reason and will (Kant, 1997).

Bad actions can only be performed without free will because they are dependent on external reasons (Korsgaard, 2009). In that sense, it is obvious why hubris is conceptualized as morally bad because people can perform bad actions when the reason for their behaviour is not clear to them. She asserts that if the action can be accepted as what people perform, the motivation comes from their minds as a whole and this does not include any reflections from others. People can only be agents if their actions take place as a cause. The hubristic person does not subject itself to a moral law by distinguishing oneself from others with their self-oriented understanding and claim to being superior to others.

Nevertheless, since all people are rational beings, it is possible for everyone to comprehend the law in this direction. The 3 basic principles that should be followed to establish this law make no distinction between individuals, these are universality, impartiality and respect for reason or means-end principle (Kant, 1997).

Firstly, maxims are rules that apply as long as they are universal, and therefore, they should not contain any exceptions (Kant, 1997). This general rule and its application,

regardless of any person or situation, also requires it to have an imperial feature (Kant, 1997). While it is valid for a person to be in a very difficult situation and not be subject to any exceptions, it is not sufficient for another person to be male or female, upper class or lower class to create an exception (Kant, 1997). Kant did not view any conditions for maxims. According to him, maxims can be constructed assuming that all people are equal, otherwise, the maxim will become invalid (Kant, 1997). Therefore, he asserted maxims as categorical imperatives (Kant, 1997). Even when looking at the first principle of Kantian understanding, it is seen that the hubristic person has a claim that is diametrically opposed to the demand for privilege.

The claim in the second principle is that because every individual has intrinsic value and dignity, the moral law is not allowed to instrumentalize any person without exception (Kant, 1997). People should be close to others as an end, not merely as a means, and should be capable and free to choose their end (Kant, 1997). Therefore, in deontologist understanding (1997) it is not possible for us to instrumentalize any human being, regardless of whether our intentions are good or bad, in order to achieve our own ends. However, the hubristic person may prefer to instrumentalize others easily. These people do not care about the feelings or values of others and treat them as they wish in line with their own interests. As such, it can be said that hubristic people are incompatible with the second principle.

In fact, the Kantian understanding (1997) is so strict that the perfect duties should not be violated, even for goodwill, this stems from the respect for each individual and their autonomous existence. All three of these rules show that the Kantian understanding of moral philosophy is completely different from the concept of hubris.

Virtue is about character, natural inclinations, how much and how one harmonizes their life with maxims in adapting to their life (Kant, 1997). Virtue is related to the respect that can be shown to moral duties and the development of the will to realize them (Kant, 1997). That is, while some people may find it easy to do moral duties in line with their innate maxims, some people have to make a different effort for this (Kant, 1997). It is related to one's intrinsic motivation to practice moral duty, because one's natural tendencies may be more prone to conflict with moral duties (Kant, 1997). According to Kant (1997), although individuals' innate predispositions are good, they still have evils to overcome in order to be virtuous. He defines moral perfection as having less inclination to conflict and more easily finding intrinsic motivation (Kant,

1997). It is described as the perfection of a person's will (Kant, 1997). The other is physical perfection, which is the development or progress to achieve a reason-oriented end (Kant, 1997). He claims that reaching these two types of perfection is a moral duty (Kant, 1997). Based on Kant's definitions of perfection, hubristic self-admiration, that is, seeing oneself as superior to other people, is fundamentally incompatible despite some similarities. For example, the fact that people are innately inclined to perform moral duties does not necessarily mean that they are superior others, or that we can perform our attitudes towards others out of perfection. Kant defines it as a duty that we should not do anything that would make others feel guilty or embarrassed, even morally. This is because moral duties are not only binding in an individual context, but we also have a moral duty to see how we affect other people's behaviour and emotions (Kant, 1997).

Another requirement of virtue is the possession of autocracy, the state of self-domination (Kant, 1997). This includes the management of our natural tendencies (Kant, 1997). Regardless of what our inner tendencies may be, achieving the states of perfection Kant (1997) defines and the happiness of others is a goal for which we are responsible, even if it is not a moral duty.

In addition, he mentions the concept of self-love as the predisposition to which the concept of humanity, one of the three predispositions that Kant claims exists in human nature, is necessary for the understanding of hubris. It is seen that there are some parallels between Kant's definition of self-love based on the term of the unsociable sociability and Rousseau's amour-propre. Kant mentions self-love as a result of comparing oneself with others, just as in Rousseau's concept of amour-propre. Both Rousseau and Kant discuss the state of comparison as related to socialization, with one key difference between their views. Kant does not make a distinction between the state of comparison as occurring before or after an individual becomes inherently good, as he believes that this state suddenly arises once a person exists in society.

In Kant's theory of history (1963), this self-conceit is related to the concept of unsociable sociability, both of which are natural inclinations. This self-conceit is similar to hubris, and it can be used to understand why hubris is immoral in deontology. Human being is a creature who wants to be superior to others, and has a tendency to competitiveness, not common interests (Kant, 1963). However, Kant conceptualizes the human being as a rational and moral actor with dignity. Based on

the principle of “respect for reason”, the principle of equal standing for all is what should limit and regulate this natural tendency, because these laws advise one to act in accordance with the shaping of one’s ends and do not allow acts of selfishness (Kant, 1963). Kant (1963) suggests that the relationship established by an individual with the other, outside of the moral law, may result in the emergence of evil within the person. This problematic relationship, as per Kant (1963), poses a significant challenge. The emergence of this situation is related to the fact that one looks at a scale result over how happy others are, even to decide about their own happiness (1963).

Whilst this seems like a claim for equal happiness for all, the focus on how they are perceived by others will likely lead to jealousy and dissatisfaction, therefore, a balance needs to be found with the moral law to avoid this (Kant, 1956). Otherwise, individuals may develop hostility towards others when they lack or are unable to obtain the same things (Kant, 1956). The concept of unsociable sociability, on the other hand, is the pursuit of honor, power and wealth (1963). For the importance people attach to the opinions of others, they need to look after their own fears and interests and believe they should be superior to them (1963). As a result, Kant refers to the three social passions as honor, power and wealth and whilst Kant does not refer to hubris, these elements are integral to the concept of hubris. These passions indicate a desire to be superior.

Behind the hubristic relationship with the outside is the demand to be loved, which is not truly self-love. This love is like a prison because the constant dependence on others is an obstacle to one’s liberation. The hubristic will never act solely on their own merits; they will always have to stick to that image that one feels loved. This situation causes the person to establish a hostile relationship with others. Despite the Godlike attitude hubristic people present, they actually turn others into Gods for themselves in this prison where they are dependent on others. This is because while they are behaving in this way, they are not actually behaving according to a principle they have adopted mentally, instead they are being shown how to behave.

Unsociable sociability is a tendency that develops over time and it has a natural purposefulness in itself. Whilst nature uses this condition for the progress of the human species, the desire for superiority over others actually causes the emergence of tendencies that we should condemn with reason (1963). Nonetheless, Kant also argues that the concept of unsociable sociability leads to the development of abilities that

advance human history (1963). That is, even if Kant mentions that it is beneficial to humanity, he also speaks of the desire for superiority as an irrational tendency. As such, it can be said that hubris is immoral in Kantian ethics. Based on the deontologist understanding, it can be argued that hubris is immoral due to its incompatibility with the three basic deontologist principles, the relationship between action and self-constitution and the concept of unsocial sociability.

For this reason, the claim of why hubris is immoral is related not only to self-constitution or “egology” (Levinas, 1991), but also the relationship with ‘the other’. This is particularly because, in these theories, the ‘self’ establishes its existence only with reference to itself and by destroying externality. This feeds the perception of “totality” of the concept of self (Levinas, 1991). These approaches place the ‘other’ in a position where it can become destroyed (Levinas, 1991). The drawback of this understanding is that in its explanation for why hubris is evil is reduced to the concept of ‘self’ only. This means this school of thought is stuck in a position that is independent of the ethics conceptualized by Levinas and interpreted through one’s own tyranny. However, the relationship established with the other on the basis of meaning and truth lies in this interlocution, because the ethical relationship established by one as a social being can only be explained through their relationship with the other (Levinas, 1991). In fact, there are some clues about the effects of this sociability relationship in both Rousseau’s amour propre and Kant’s unsocial sociability concepts. Therefore, an ethical understanding that reduces the ethical relationship only to the ‘self’ speaks of something impossible with the claim of totality. The ethical relationship can only exist by exceeding it beyond defining the ‘the other’ (Levinas, 1991) because the self-subject defined in these theories is regarded as the God of the world, equipped with unlimited freedom, whereas the self owes its existence to its relationship with the other (Levinas, 1991).

4.4 Hubris in Consequentialist Approach

The consequentialist theory does not take into account an individual’s character when determining a moral decision. The theory is centered around the outcome of a decision and the number of people who benefit from it, and the ultimate goal of this theory is to maximize the outcome (Vaughn, 2015). As a result, there is no direct correlation between the concept of hubris as a disposition and the consequentialist theory.

Nevertheless, it is possible to examine the relationship between the conditions of the hubris concept and the fundamental principles of the consequentialist theory regarding what constitutes moral behavior. Moreover, the consequentialist theory's emphasis on the outcome in deciding whether something is morally acceptable can be evaluated. It is seen that hubris is immoral when viewed morally within the framework of both utilitarian theories and consequentialist theories that prioritize the benefit of the individual.

In examining the morality of behaviour from a result-oriented approach, the two understandings to consider are act and rule consequentialism (Vaughn, 2015). Act utilitarianism evaluates a moral behavior decision in line with 4 basic criteria: scope, duration, intensity, and probability (Burnor & Raley, 2018). Starting from the idea of maximization, it evaluates the size of the impact area and how many people will be impacted (Burnor & Raley, 2018). Secondly, the impact of the behavior to be decided is one of the main factors in deciding how long people's lives will be affected (Burnor & Raley, 2018). For example, if this result is a war decision, the length of the behaviour and the impact it will have on people's lives will need to be taken into account when considering the total benefit (Burnor & Raley, 2018).

Thirdly, in some circumstances, a behaviour which affects many people may have a weaker impact than one that affects fewer people (Burnor & Raley, 2018). There are a number of factors that need to be considered, such as the number of affected people, the impact on people's quality of lives and level of well-being, when assessing whether a behaviour is moral or not. In addition, the behaviour will not impact everyone in a similar way (Burnor & Raley, 2018). For example, a person may be traumatized and severely affected by their quality of life when they are scolded, while a person may be much more insensitive to it. Similarly, considering the effects of behaviours on societies, it can be seen that not every society is affected in the same way either. As such, it is important to consider the society and the conditions in which the behaviour will be executed (Burnor & Raley, 2018).

Finally, it is necessary to calculate each possible effect of this behavior to be carried out. For instance, with the example of war, it is necessary to evaluate best and worst-case scenarios, along with the likely duration of war and its potential social benefit or cost (Burnor & Raley, 2018). As such, a certain added value should be given to each possibility and a decision should be made accordingly. Although these 4 factors cannot

always be expected to affect the decision with the same importance, each factor should be considered during the decision-making process and it should be decided which one will be more weight bearing according to the possible outcomes (Burnor & Raley, 2018).

Act utilitarianism does not prioritize the personal benefit of the actor, for them, if more people will benefit as a result of the behavior, the suffering of one is not important. This is because their main goal is to produce the best socially moral result, free of individuals, and therefore they should be objective when evaluating a moral behaviour and put their personal interests in the background (Slote, 2001). For this reason, this understanding is considered to have self-other symmetry, although social maximization is put first, it is actually a moral imperative to advance one's own well-being (Slote, 2001). For instance, if one's behaviour impacts their own life more significantly than it affects the lives of others, this understanding suggests that those acts are done for one's own benefit (Slote, 2001).

Unlike the deontologist understanding, it does not necessarily matter whether a behaviour is good or bad, moral or immoral as if it were a rule. Therefore, this theory does not necessarily classify the display of hubristic behaviour as unacceptable. In considering this principle, the elements that make up a hubristic person will be explained within the framework of the consequentialist theory. The hubristic person will be viewed in this theory within the framework of these basic characteristics as someone who claims self-rightness and embellishes it with the success they have achieved, are poisoned by power, but experience the fear of losing the position given by this power and success.

Firstly, the hubristic tends to take their own justification as a judgment in all circumstances, so they are not concerned with outside opinions when evaluating any behavior. Under these circumstances, there is only one condition for a hubristic person to make a correct moral judgment in terms of consequentialist theory, and that is that they have accepted the consequentialist understanding as purely true for themselves. The consequentialist theory should be the main insight that determines their life, so that it is always possible to reach the right conclusion with this calculation while making a decision. However, even if a person always adopts the principles of the consequentialist theory, it will not be possible to expect them to make an accurate calculation all the time. Their reluctance to accept outside ideas and their violent

tendencies as a hubristic person, coupled with their stance away from objectivity, will create obstacles for the person, who has accepted themselves as an authority, to make an objective evaluation of their circumstances.

Secondly, it may not be possible for a poisoned person to make the right cost and benefit assessment under all circumstances due to the success and power that has convinced this person of their rightness. This is because this is not the priority of this person when making a decision as the hubristic person tends to evaluate maximizing the social benefit from a self-centered point, as a character with a weakened connection with reality. However, although the consequentialist perspective also cares about the personal benefit, the prerequisite for this is that there is no conflict between this personal interest and maximizing social benefit. In addition, hubris, which arises out of success and intoxication created by power, will prioritize total welfare only as long as it nourishes one's own interests and power. This is primarily due to the obsession with one's own success. Thus, this might be the reason behind many of the investments that hubristic leaders make in favor of the people during election periods. Behind this attitude, which seems to prioritize social benefit, lies the idea of increasing their own self-interest and power.

In addition, consequentialism contrasts with the decisions that a hubristic person makes, with a viewpoint that prioritizes the well-being and happiness of others. However, if there is a social consensus about the decisions made by a hubristic person, it cannot be said that the consequentialist understanding will evaluate this decision as wrong. The person who makes a hubristic decision is not a problem for this theory, as long as it maximizes the social benefit. However, since this theory deals with the situation of the people affected by the decision taken, and because the attitude of a hubristic person naturally includes attacks and insults on the honor of people, it also includes behaviors that will harm social welfare as a result.

Another reason is that it may not be possible to argue that any decision made will be built on a rational outcome. This is because of the tendency of hubristic people to make decisions out of fear. Studies examining the decision-making mechanisms of people in a state of fear, especially the effect of narcissism, talk about the tendency to act with the intense fear of losing and the belief that they are perfect. This fear is an obstacle to rational decision-making (Ronningstam & Baskin-Sommers, 2013) and is associated with the possibility of being excluded, disconnected from reality and no longer being

an admired subject. This fear is different to that associated with a threat to evolutionary survival that is likely to benefit individuals or communities (Ronningstam & Baskin-Sommers, 2013). Once again, although there is a perception of danger, this is imaginary and therefore is separated from the concept of fear and is called anxiety (Ronningstam & Baskin-Some, 2013).

Anxiety under this narcissism is associated with a tendency to disregard the feelings and well-being of others, a condition that can lead one to sacrifice everything for one's own benefit (Ronningstam & Baskin-Sommers, 2013). For instance, we can use consequentialist theory, which focuses on the relationship between social cost and benefit, when examining the presidents of the United States. As Beinart (2010) claims, some hubristic leaders of the United States are so afraid of external threats that they can easily act out of fear, without objectively evaluating the possibility of causing great social costs and claim the need to take precautions to avoid bigger problems. This will result in going to war. Whilst it cannot be said that there is no threat, the main issue is that the perception of reality is often weakened with hubris, which creates a morphed perception of threat and leads to impulsive decision-making (Beinart, 2010). This is rooted in hubris as the perception of the threat is related to the power held by the leaders.

We can also use consequentialist theory to evaluate the results of the hubristic attitude. This attitude creates conflict and eliminates the possibility of agreement. Consequentialist theory, by contrast, needs great consensus in order to increase people's overall well-being. As long as the decision benefits the total welfare, a general consensus is not required. This is in conflict with the hubristic attitude as the self-oriented hubristic subject cannot be expected to make decisions to increase the total welfare. Finally, Button (2016) identifies antipolitical hubris as an impediment to free speech because it does not allow others to speak. This cannot be morally acceptable in a principle that prioritizes total welfare.

The hubristic attitude is associated with the concepts of domination and humiliation. That is, since a hubristic subject demands domination over others, and in doing so, humiliates others. This attitude would be expected to decrease, not increase, total welfare. In addition, while the consequentialist principle supports the idea of increasing total welfare, the assumption of hubristic institutions and practices may justify its ill-treatment of others based on the idea that they are superior to others.

The work of Mill (2003), the pioneer of individual based consequentialist theory, does not reference hubris directly. However, his considerations of how the power society has over an individual is restricted can be used to assess the immorality of hubris. This is because freedom only conceptualized through the need to protect against cruelty (Mill, 2003, p. 23). However, Mill focuses on the utility of the individual in the context of freedom based on the opportunity for the individual not to be constrained for the most part. If an act creates harm for an individual in any context, then it would need to evaluate the constraint for them (p. 108). However, individuals cannot harm others with their thoughts (p. 39), and for this reason, free speech should not be restricted in a way that prioritizes one's own voice, as one can also be easily silenced in a similar fashion. While doing this, it is as if they construct a scenario in which the freedom of speech of the other should be prevented for the benefit of others (p. 108-109). Therefore, for the benefit of the majority, they dominate the other by making them feel that they should not speak. Nonetheless, Mill claims that it is wrong for the majority to silence an individual, even when they are not deemed to be right, just as it is wrong for an individual to silence a majority based on their own deemed righteousness (p. 36). The reason why silencing is considered evil by Mill is that he considers this behavior to be bullying, not only to the individual, but to future generations as well, based on the probability that the individual may be right (p. 37). Thus, silencing will block any potential benefit that may be achieved from the individual's thought (pp. 51-52). Another reason is that, despite knowing that people are fallible, people are more inclined to restrict others if their thoughts are deemed dangerous but remain ignorant to the potential damages their own thoughts may cause (pp. 37-38). This behaviour and intrinsic motivation can be seen in hubristic people. As a result of this tendency of the individual, the other must be protected. Otherwise, no one will tolerate an opinion that is out of their personal line, and this is an obstacle to living together. In addition, this obstruction will create a common harm for each individual (p. 69). This is because if thoughts are blocked, everyone will have to conform to what is accepted by the majority and will live with an obstacle to their own character and moral development (p. 69). Within the framework of this thought, it will be seen why hubris, as an action in which the sovereign's idea suppresses the others, is morally dangerous both individually and socially. Mill has an individual-oriented perspective, but his understanding includes a limitation on the individual's freedom in matters that concern others. If the sovereign is actually seen as a responsible individual to the society, then,

as Mill said, their actions that harm others are the ones that should be limited. The reason for why the moral responsibility of hubris is not included in any sanctions may be that the sovereign is placed in a divine position, no longer perceived as an individual, and is therefore perceived as free from those harms.

Consequentialist theory has another individual-centered approach called ethical egoism. Ethical egoism has a similar understanding to consequentialist theory. However, this understanding is generally interpreted as a “wicked view” (Burgess-Jackson, 2012, p. 530) by some philosophers and “incoherent and immoral” (Burgess-Jackson, 2012, p. 530) by others, even when they agree on some points. The main difference between utilitarianism and egoism is that utilitarian theory has an impartiality principle, but egoism gives priority to a person’s own benefit.

In this perspective, given the focus on self-centrism, hubris can be interpreted as morally good through the perspective of egoism. However, it can be argued that no moral theory considers hubristic acts as moral, and an example of this can be ethical egoism which is based on the consequentialist approach. Even if this understanding is interpreted as dealing with the principle of self-interest, there is no room for hubris because hubris regarding “amour-propre” can only be related to social recognition and no consideration is given to moral duty. On the other hand, ethical egoism is centered on the self not because it is believed that this is the most beneficial for the individual, but for all. It is believed that people acting in this principle will prefer action for their own benefit to evil. It is not a question of whether this attitude can increase total good, but that behaviors that are beneficial to oneself may also benefit others. Nevertheless, in no scenario can hubris have any obligation to others simply due to the priority of amour-propre. On the contrary, it can easily entail the evil of others without any exception for their own so-called good.

However, ethical egoism has certainly formed their theory thanks to the consequences of the acting in self-interest. That being said, looking at the result of hubris, although the short term consequences may be good, it will often lead to disaster in the long term for the subject. This is because, unlike ethical egoism, hubris will never maximise the benefit for the individual. The immorality of hubris can be criticized via ethical egoism because ethical egoism has set principles which makes the people’s actions and their motivations predictable. This is how ethical egoism can be differentiated from hubris.

Firstly, it is different from hubris within the framework of predictability. Appreciating that ethical egoism has a certain ground in how people act, the action of a person embracing this understanding is predictable. However, because hubristic people get their motivation from others, it is not generally possible to predict their actions as these will often be affected by their anxiety or mania. Furthermore, the focus is not on the consequences of their actions, but rather on whether this will lead to social recognition. Whilst the following principle would provide maximum benefit for an individual, hubris has no principle. In this context, since ethical egoists have determined principles, it can be said that reconciliation is possible for them. This in contrast to the hubristic who do not have a consensus.

In conclusion, this section discusses ethical egoism and its difference from hubris. Ethical egoism prioritizes an individual's own benefit, while consequentialist theory has an impartiality principle. It argues that hubris cannot be considered morally good under ethical egoism because hubris is only interested in social recognition and does not consider moral duty. It highlights the unpredictability of hubristic people's actions compared to ethical egoists, who have a predictable principle guiding their actions. Overall, ethical egoism is criticized for being incoherent and immoral, and hubris cannot be justified under this theory.

4.5 Hubris in Virtuous Egoist

This understanding differs from the other three ethical theories in that it sees egoism as a virtue and is also referred to as rational egoism. Ayn Rand (1964), pioneer of this thought, builds this approach on 7 basic virtues: rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride.

In order to understand Rand's approach, it is necessary to be clear about how he defines the 3 key concepts. The concept of morality "is a code of values to guide man's choices and actions – the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life" (Rand, 1964, p. 26). The second concept is value, "that which one acts to gain and/or keep" (Rand, 1964, p. 50). This is particularly decisive because it builds the understanding of virtue on the ability to gain and to keep. What makes this possible is the ability to choose what is objectively valuable, and this value relationship is inherent and necessary for all living creatures, not only to achieve certain goals, but to survive (Rand, 1964). However, other non-living creatures cannot attribute values such as

good or bad to objects and they cannot have any self-interest in anything (Rand, 1964). The most fundamental determinant of people's purpose for this type of judgment is between life and death (Rand, 1964). Given that there are no threats to inanimate beings, for living beings the value depends on the struggle for survival (Rand, 1964). Therefore, the existence of events that follow and affect life one after another is evaluated as a struggle for survival as a result of these events (Rand, 1964). As such, morality is defined as a means to reach the values on which one's life depends, and the existing codes for this are also ethical (Rand, 1964). This theory prioritizes people's values and interest first, and within this ethical understanding, being selfish is virtuous (Rand, 1964).

Egoism is a necessary tool for one's own well-being, and one's own life (Rand, 1964). This struggle for life also points to the consequences of being indifferent to one's life (Rand, 1964). That is, if a person remains indifferent to the consequences of events, and naturally to life, he will not be able to survive in the end. If we had the option to be indifferent to the effects of events, if there were no fatal consequences, values could be based on pleasure, but for this reason, existence is dependent on the goodness that sustains life, without these values, humanity will cease to exist (Rand, 1964). Thus, values are objective, but not all values are universal (Rand, 1964). The objectivity of values requires a consensus on priorities and restricts the need for good as it eliminates variability between people (Rand, 1964). Values depend on desires, which are tools that individuals use for their core values (Rand, 1964). As these people are dependent on others, they should not abuse people as instruments for themselves, and instead show them respect on the grounds of objectivity (Rand, 1964). Therefore, Rand (1964) is completely against a pleasure-oriented approach, seeing it as a detriment to the person. He defines pleasure as the value that is appropriate for the person. It can be considered within this framework how this approach, which accepts egoism as the main virtue, can evaluate the concept of hubris.

The concept of hubris is based on prioritizing oneself, just like in the egoistic understanding, but when evaluated with the concept of self-harm, it can be thought that this theory will not support the hubristic attitude. This is because, as a result of hubristic attitudes, people will harm themselves as much as they harm their surroundings. For example, I claimed that there would be paranoia and extreme fear in the behavior of a hubristic person, this would be an obstacle to one's correct

assessment and would contradict the rationality principle. This is because, while Rand advocated rationality and pride as fundamental virtues, he also criticized the results of the emotion that pride would create.

This virtue is the commitment to achieve one's own moral perfection (p. 54). The essential guide to this commitment is unbreeched rationality, and moral ambitiousness. She argues that pride should be understood as a policy of action, not in relation to affect. The resulting emotion is just a by-product. Pride, unlike other schools seen as malevolent, in Rand's perspective (1964) is not just the satisfaction that emerges at the end of the passive act, but the driving force behind the behavior, the ambition. The resulting emotion itself is not called virtue, what is virtuous is the commitment to action under the influence of this driving force (Rand, 1964). The assertion of superiority and the resulting show, which I call what Rand means here as a hubristic act, are not of pride, but are related to one's moral or psychological shortcomings (Rand, 1964). For the expression of pride, which is a virtue, is not based on the idea that one is better than others, but on the individual thinking that one is good (Rand, 1964). She claims that aggression and humiliation that may arise due to this emotion are wrong alternatives, but the person who follows certain standards under the guidance of rationality will not act according to their emotions, but according to their judgments. Appreciating that emotions themselves are not the driving force for survival, they cannot count as virtues. Finally, the person will not be able to take consistent and appropriate action in line with this emotion, because this emotion will contain doubt and is not rational. As such, it will prevent the person from committing to their action, it will not provide a stable ground and is therefore not reliable (Rand, 1964).

Even if hubris provides a standard for one's feelings as an immoral attitude, the person cannot be expected to provide a standard in their attitudes because they have no guide or principle. However, Rand's egoism is founded on the idea of a standard value (Rand, 1964). In this understanding, what will set the standard is what emerges in line with the struggle for survival, which reveals what is good or bad for the person (Rand, 1964). Nevertheless, survival must also include development, both physical and psychological (Rand, 1964). However, beyond waiting for the psychological development of the hubristic person, it is expected that he will harm himself day by day due to the emotions of which he is captive. Meanwhile the egoistic person, in

contrast to the hubristic person, is the one who should adhere to their principles. This view does not support the idea of harming others in order to advance personal well-being. As Rand (1964) states, it collapses when the egoistic idea is evaluated with the principle of rationality. Rand's philosophy also shows why the hubristic attitude, which does not have any principles on the behavior of harming others, is immoral.

However, Rand considers the desire to pursue one's self-interest in the category of good, because to claim otherwise would also put one's desire to survive in the category of bad (1964). According to this school of thought, what makes hubris immoral is not the prioritization of self-interest. Rand (1964) explains that the basic distinction revolves around the question of how self-interest is defined, in that she frames it as a question of what will make one good or bad. Self-interest lies at the core of morality itself. This does not mean that the person is a prisoner of their own desires, instead that the principles that people need to discover will emerge under the guidance of rational principles. Given this understanding, one may argue the concept of objectivist ethics. As such, to find selfishness malicious is actually an attack on one's self-esteem. However, for the same reason, the hubristic attitude is morally problematic because what one sees as self-interest also includes an attack on one's self-esteem. This can be seen in Rand's answer to the question why Rand explains the concept of pride as virtue. This stands in stark contrast to hubris in that pride is moral and includes a goal of excellence.

The relationship established between the concept of pride and self in this understanding further highlights the immorality of hubris as this relationship is dependent on an intrinsic motivation. This underlying motivation is what the moral understanding considers the standard value. It considers the person as the most important value because only then will people fight for their own interest, which is vital for the struggle for life. A person who does not have self-esteem will not be able to trust their own abilities and will not be able to form an independent character because they have not developed self-respect. Unlike the concept of hubris, Rand's understanding of pride sees morality as a means for development. Pride is a virtue in that it is a moral ambition for self-improvement. In particular, it is referred to as moral perfection, which advises being egoistic because the key reason for one to achieve this is for one's own happiness (Rand, 1964).

There are two essential requirements that differentiate the concept of pride from that of hubris: intellectual and existential demands. Intellectual demands that one be active in acquiring moral principles, because morality demands rationality, and for this, one can neither be morally ambitious nor achieve moral perfection by hiding behind evasions (Rand, 1964). Therefore, she claims that a person with pride can achieve perfection only by being honest with themselves (Rand, 1964). Pride-based emotions may also be the reasons for these excuses, for example, lying to oneself with the claim of perfection about oneself (Rand, 1964). The other one refers to existential demands, because the main goal is to reach moral perfection, one should rely on pride to reach this goal and not settle for the mediocre (Rand, 1964). Consequently, an individual must consistently exercise sound judgment in decision-making processes, while simultaneously maintaining a strong sense of self-worth, in order to embody the essence of pride. However, what is claimed is unbreeched rationality, that is, doing the best one can do for oneself, according to one's own rationality, will make one morally right (Rand, 1964).

Humility is not a virtue because it means self-denial (Rand, 1964). She characterizes a person with humility with their willingness to be flawed, their indifference to moral values and themselves (Rand, 1964). These people do not have a goal of proving themselves, that is, they have nothing to do with progress in the struggle for life (Rand, 1964).

4.6 Hubris as an Immoral for the Other

I claimed that all four theories, including virtue ethics, Kantian ethics and consequentialism, and objectivist ethics, which define the concept of pride as a moral virtue, find hubris immoral. This is because all three elements suggest that the same standard must be provided for all individual to achieve common good. Hubris is immoral, not because of the focuses on virtues, but due to the holistic approach of life and the importance of a total consistency. On the other hand, if there is no virtue, there will only be external good. Honesty, courage, and justice are the building blocks that will ensure a coherent individual story around a telos for good life, meaning that it all relates to society. According to this approach, because the individual has a social identity for their own story, they are responsible for all of their actions. Upon examining both ethical approaches, the impact of hubris on the modern period is

discussed in two distinct contexts. The first relates to the disconnection of the individual from society, while the second relates to the promotion of disrespectful behavior as a commendable attitude in contemporary times.

For social cohesion, however, shame is absolute, but by its presence it can feel like part of an individual's community. For reverence, moderation is the main criterion, because its exaggeration not only causes the domination of the opinion of the powerful, but also hinders the dialogue, and causes people to become stupid and fall under the spell of these powers. Both virtue ethics view hubris as immoral through the argument that courage also includes the ability to oppose one's own views, the suggestion that dialogue can only occur with valuing differing opinions, and the notion that respect is the virtue which can keep people away from godly attitudes.

Although the Kantian understanding does not directly conceptualize the concept of hubris, it is seen that its three basic principles of universality, end-means principle, and respect for reason, do not allow space for hubris. This is because, moral principles can only be applied to everyone in common, valid if they are impartial, and it follows the understanding that no person is instrumentalized in order for these principles to be formed, and that they should be evaluated within the framework of respect for the value they have due to being human. Additionally, Korsgaard's claim is that action leads people to construct themselves all the time.

Lastly, unsociable sociability is similar to hubris due to the demand for love, dependence on what people think about them, and the desire for power. Interestingly, people's desire to be superior indirectly helps society advance as well. It is similar to the concept of pride argued by Rand in the context of further development. That being said, this approach suggests that pride is a virtue based on rationality with the aim of moral perfection. In line with this, hubris, which is based on emotions caused by aggression and humiliation, is not based on rationality and does not provide similar consistency and sound judgment.

The consequentialist understanding finds hubris immoral with the view that it cares about welfare for everyone and considers every individual as equal. Therefore, rational choice prioritizes making a cost and benefit calculation to maximize benefit, which is incompatible with hubris. Also, according to the harm principle, people should not

face discrimination and should be protected against hubristic people. This is because, even when one disagrees with the majority, their ideas should be protected.

The last ethical approach, which differs from these 3 basic understandings, but which I claim can be shared within the framework of the concept of hubris, is objectivist ethics. While this understanding defines self and self-interest as virtues, its main purpose is to reach moral perfection. For this reason, one's self-esteem must be high, but self-perception is rational.

It has been seen that hubris is immoral within the framework of all the ethical approaches which have been examined. In particular, vice-oriented approaches clearly show why hubris is bad. These modern virtue ethics approaches not only shed light on how the individual will live, but also offer a holistic understanding. However, they do not allow hubris, as they demand that the person build himself within the framework of his sociality because one's story is dependent on others. There is no place for hubris both within the framework of one's ethical responsibility to others and the responsibility towards one's own life.

4.7 Conclusion

Philosophers have approached the concept of hubris from various perspectives, with vice-based ethical approach focusing on character traits and directing their attention towards the actor or target in their analysis. This piece first aimed to explore the notion of hubris as a virtue ethics using the three essential elements of Alasdair MacIntyre. The study also delved into the concept of hubris as discussed by Woodruff, Richardson et al, within the framework of the notions of reverence, shame, and dialogue. Further to this, the study examined the concept of hubris in relation to action and self-constitution within the framework of deontological understanding, as espoused by Christine Korsgaard. Then, the piece explored the notion of hubris within the context of universality, respect for reason, and the end-means principle, which Kant posits as three fundamental elements for three moral duties. The analysis continued with the moral implications of hubris using Kant's concept of unsociable sociability, which bears resemblance to Rousseau's concept of amour-propre. Lastly, a consequentialist approach was considered in discussing hubris in relation to individual and community benefit understandings. Based on these, a conclusion was reached that all perspectives discussed have characterized hubris as an immoral phenomenon.

5. COLLECTIVE HUBRIS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will explore the phenomenon of hubris at the collective and social levels, encompassing these diverse areas of inquiry. For this purpose, the discussion will begin with an examination of collective action, social identity formation, and the factors that shape group dynamics. Following this, the framework will support those collective emotions and their consequences, with particular attention will be paid to the relationship between collective pride and hubris, as well as the relationship between collective narcissism and hubris, exploring both their intersections and divergences. The chapter will conclude by presenting four illustrative examples of the effects of social hubris, highlighting the key points of distinction.

5.2 Collective Action and Group Dynamics

It is noted that the literature on individual pride is quite large whilst the literature on collective pride is relatively lacking (Sullivan, 2012, p. 1). This can also be said for collective hubris. While hubris as an individual attitude has been extensively discussed in literature, the subject of collective hubris has not received comparable attention. On the other hand, the literature has extensively explored the concepts of collective pride and hubris in conjunction. Moreover, noteworthy parallels have been observed between collective narcissism and hubris, akin to those found in hubris analysis. Primarily, all three phenomena are intricately linked to elements of social identity. Social identity is formed through the individual's connection to a social group and the emotional capital they produce based on their membership to the said group. As such, people have positive bias towards the groups to which they belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this context, the attitudinal components of this dynamic must be analyzed in order to understand collective hubris. Collective feelings can often be generated through collective aims as this brings out the "we mode" (Salmela & Sullivan, 2022, p. 5). In addition to being determinative in attributing importance to the structure of society, cultural codes also cause the reflections of two identical attitudes and events

to differ in two different societies (Salmela & Sullivan, 2022). For instance, this can be seen in the attitudes of football teams with different cultural backgrounds, or between the emotional codes of right-wing and left-wing parties, along with the different attitudes found in the membership of a liberal political parties (Salmela & Sullivan, 2022, p. 6). As such, both the intensity of the reactions among these groups, and the content of what they will act on will change (Salmela & Sullivan, 2022). Nonetheless, in order to understand the source of this negative attitude, it is necessary to understand the concept of collective pride, which expresses both the positive emotions that people feel because of being in this community, and why this emotion arises (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014).

Perri (2007) schematizes the typology of emotion as its structure influences the sustainability of a community through intrinsic motivations of righteousness and roles of condemnation of the other. Whilst one may define the celebratory atmosphere within one group as 'pride', it can also be 'hubris' given the way it makes the other group feel.

According to Douglas, there are low-grid and high-grid structures, which refer to the hierarchical or egalitarian relations of people in social organisations, and low-group and high-group types, which refer to the inclusion of the organisation in people's action (Douglas & Wildaysky, 1983). This approach analyses the conditions under which collective emotions arise in a group. He proposes that high-group form is the one where collective pride is seen the most, however, whether an organisation will structure through a combination of high-grid or low-grid will change the emotions within the group. For example, in an organisation with a high-group and high-grid scheme, the role of the authorized person with success is at the forefront as opposed to the individual because a high-grid institution has a hierarchical structure (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). However, since the role of each person is of similar importance in terms of the sustainability of the organization, while the feeling of jealousy is not frequently seen, there is emotional homogeneity among the individuals in the group (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). Since a controlling and cold attitude is dominant in these structures, collectivity is reinforced with more official events (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). Parallel to this, if the institution cannot channel this emotion properly, it may lead to the emergence of collective hubris (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014).

In low-group and high-grid structures however, the feeling of individual pride outweighs collective pride and there is an emotional heterogeneity in the members of the group (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). In other words, people in this organisation have different emotional patterns. As such, collective pride emerges from the reflections of the characteristics attributed to the leader of the group on the individuals. Therefore, leaders in this type of organisations may show exaggerated attitudes based on pride to increase their influence on the group (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014).

On the other hand, collective pride emerges from the intense sense of togetherness in groups with high-group and low-grid schemes where more egalitarian organisations can be found. The collective pride here comes from the shared desire to achieve a goal. This emotion is expected to be identical in individuals and to emerge as a strong emotion. As such, individuals who lack this sense of togetherness and desire for the shared goal cannot live with this community (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). In other words, the high sense of togetherness increases the sense of collective pride. An example of this would be a group of football fans whose team have made it to the finals because the individuals within the group do not differ from each other hierarchically, and it is possible for a cheerleader to easily raise their sense of collective pride through sympathy. These types of organisations are fueled by their leaders' emotions, it is the leader's passion that mobilizes them. In this case, collective hubris may arise from not considering the internal and external conditions which may feed intra-group conflicts (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014).

Finally, low-group and low-grip structure is individual-oriented and depends on personal agendas and ambitions (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). As such, whilst emotional diversity among people is common, the level of interdependence and social organisation is relatively low (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). In addition, people in this schema will also meet on an emotionally similar denominator, depending on the organization, for a common goal and interest. This individual-oriented approach will cause the group to be composed of people who are afraid of the effects of social regulations due to their weak ties to social influence (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014).

5.3 Collective Emotions

Having schematized how social actions are formed within the framework of group dynamics, one should also examine the attitudes and feelings of the individuals along

with the effects of the organizations' attitudes. The analysis of collective emotion has also shown how different forms of organisations shape emotions in individuals. As such, collective hubris can also be analysed in a similar manner.

In their approach, Sullivan and Hollway (2014) suggest a synthesis of the schema approach with Perri's neo-Durkheimian top-down and bottom-up analysis of organisations due to the complexity of the analysis of collective sentiments. Appreciating that these forms of organization are seen not in separate institutions but more than once in an institution, the presence of these orders constitutes the components of the institution's legal, moral, political and social status in relation to the priorities and objectives of the institution (Perri, 2007).

This model consists of 4 stages. Firstly, creating a positive atmosphere to influence the individuals within the group; secondly, taking actions to increase the institutional power of the organisation and its associated norms; thirdly, ensuring the binding of the institution and, lastly, the development of the organisation in the process (Sullivan & Day, 2017). The extreme emotions that arise in groups show themselves through 'impulsivity' and 'mass contagion' and these occur when the individual acts alone (Sullivan and Day, 2017). On the other hand, lower emotions are more easily activated by a sense of community (Sullivan & Day, 2017).

Performances whereby pride and hubris develop in the group within the framework of "celebration, competition, conflict" (pp. 202-222) can be indicators of positive and negative attitudes and the relationship between them along with in-group dynamics and their reactions (Sullivan & Day, 2017). The source of these feelings is rooted in the relationship people have established with their group identity (Sullivan & Day, 2017). These collective feelings, arising from group identity, are based on the notion that the members of the group are perceived as one (Sullivan & Day, 2017). According to Sullivan and Day, the collective emotions and the sense of collective is related to the individual's personal history and goes beyond the collective experience. Erich Fromm (1973) argues the shared group narcissism is a way for people to compensate for the dissatisfaction they feel in their personal lives. For instance, this allows for a person from a lower middle-class background to have more dogmatic views of collective identity because collective narcissism makes them feel as though they have some other power despite being economically weak.

Nationalism is another notion that generates strong reactions, both positive and negative, associated with collective pride (Sullivan & Day, 2017, p. 206). However, it is difficult to distinguish between the direct positive and negative aspects of nationalism (Sullivan & Day, 2017, p. 208). This is because a positive attribution may be fed from an underlying negative emotion, whilst a negative attitude could be a positive emotion (p. 208). This may lead to conflict as well as celebration. Therefore, it is important to focus not on the separate analysis of the emotions in which the two actions arise, but on severity of the emotions as well the conditions in which they arise (Sullivan & Day, 2017). In order to analyze these feelings, one must also examine expressions and attributions, including implicit ones in daily life, in depth (Sullivan & Day, 2017). In other words, the source of the emotion should be considered because intense emotion can occur without distinguishing between the negative or positive contexts. For instance, the emotional intensity and direction will differ between the celebration arising out of a national holiday and a celebration arising out of an election victory. When the context in which these positive feelings emerge are examined, a binding attitude towards the other does not seem to manifest itself, but for a celebration to take place, the other must also exist and develop against another object.

In generating the collective positive emotion, the primary source is collective celebration from identity-based achievements. Daily achievements can also increase this emotion as they can be attributed to the identity of the nation in a nostalgic and perhaps unexpectedly prosperous time (Sullivan & Hollway, 2017). Examples of this can be traditions and rituals associated with national holidays along with ceremonies which reinforce national identity. The community's feelings and consciousness are used as the tools to influence this (Sullivan & Hollway, 2017). This is why creation of a perception of a shared identity is a priority for the formation of collective feelings. However, one cannot evaluate every celebration in the same context. Whilst similar and common feelings may emerge in someone who is attending the events, celebrations where collective feelings emerge are the ones where a common identity and agenda are shaped and shared by the other (Sullivan & Hollway, 2017). The existence of an atmosphere, whereby group identity is prioritized and celebrated before individual identity, will increase the possibility of the emergence of collective hubris on those who are not subjects of the group (Sullivan & Hollway, 2017). As an example, one can consider the political atmosphere in Türkiye where the party that wins the

elections will celebrate on the streets and in convoys. Although this celebration of an election victory is rooted in positive emotions, it also intends to belittle their rivals. In this context, hubris rises from the emotions produced collectively as opposed to individual identities. It is also important to examine the collective anger, which leads to aggressive behaviour, for the analysis of collective hubris. The source of the anger is one's desire to show their power against the other. The members of the rival group are devalued and despised, and turned into enemies (Sullivan & Hollway, 2017). The intention to celebrate the loss of the other party feeds on the feeling of revenge, giving rise to collective hubris.

Celebrations can be considered as part of collective hubris only if they have negative intentions and aim to provoke or vilify others. For instance, the celebrations held in the United States following the murder of Osama Bin Laden could have easily turned into collective hubris, had there been a party on the opposing end, whereby the shared joy came at their pain and defeat (Sullivan & Hollway, 2017, p. 218). Similarly, this can also be seen in sports competitions or rituals where anthems or songs may target minorities. The discomfort felt by the targeted groups may radicalize them to turn violent and seek revenge in the future (Sullivan & Hollway 2017). This theory shows how fear in politics has been instrumentalized in society to maintain social structure. The atmosphere of fear creates a 'perception of risk', which is used as a tool to perpetuate and subvert the political atmosphere (Sullivan & Hollway, 2014). The dimensions of this risk perception are also variable because the public reaction will depend on the degree of importance that is attached to the objects. As such, the perception of risk and subsequent emotions will be managed differently in different circumstances (Sullivan & Hollway, 2017).

5.4 The Relationship Between Collective Narcissism and Hubris: Understanding the Excessive Behavior on Groups and Society

Collective narcissism is a defensive, unrealistic position that exists with and is taken against the other (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). This position also includes the group's self-idealization, and national narcissism is one of the variants. Golec de Zavala et al. clearly distinguish between nationalism and national narcissism because, unlike nationalism, national narcissism demands the acceptance and appreciation of the nation's greatness. This demand can be seen in all groups with similar collective

patterns; there is a belief that one will socially benefit from this common feeling and identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Collective hubris is not fed with affirmative sentiments regarding a group's self-promotion, rather it is an attitude that includes negative attitudes such as humiliating and belittling others on the basis of a group's claim to superiority. In this context, collective pride and collective hubris are separated in this thesis. Collective narcissism, unlike pride, includes both positive and negative attitudes. However, unlike narcissism, the existence of collective hubris is a sign of the end that leads to destruction both structurally and socially. Attention will be drawn to the destructive elements created within the framework of the approach of Erich Fromm, who brought collective narcissism to the literature in a similar context.

5.5 Destructiveness

Erich Fromm (1973) mentions the change in the social structure as one of the reasons that increases human aggression. People are no longer able to establish real ties and become apathetic by losing their lives' purpose. He theoretically supports this with Durkheim's anomie, showing the disappearance of social characteristics and dissociation from sociality, except for the interests and financial reasons that people have to act with others. According to Fromm, the emergence of this aggression depends on "social, spiritual, cultural and economic conditions" (p. 108). It resolves this aggressive behavior within the framework of human social and political conditions (Fromm, 1973). In contrast, when individuals or societies want to legitimize aggression, and use it as a tool by defining the opposite group as a foreign object, they do so through preventing the formation of an emotional bond with the third party. This can be seen in the way Vietnamese dissidents in the American-Vietnamese war were referred to as "gooks" (Fromm, 1973, p. 121). Since people determine homogeneity through similarity, the differences they see in each other, ranging from changes in lifestyle, language and religion, cause them to perceive the other party as a separate species from themselves (Fromm, 1973).

As such, Fromm states that since aggression is seen as one of the symptoms of a syndrome, it should not be attributed as a character trait and its existence cannot be explained by a single reason. He sees aggression as an attribute of social character which manifests in elements such as "strict hierarchy, dominance [and] class distinction" (1973, p. 170) in society. He argues that aggression manifests itself in

fertile conditions rather than being something that exists by itself. Therefore, aggression is more common in humans than in animals due to the excess of these conditions occurring in humans (Fromm, 1973). For example, defensive aggression is seen in humans for basically three reasons (Fromm, 1973), all of which can correlate with political and social issues.

Firstly, as creatures with a highly developed sense of danger, people have the capacity to grasp not only visible threats, but also potential threats in the future (Fromm, 1973). Thus, this mechanism can come into play when a group or community feels threatened, even in the absence of a threat (Fromm, 1973), and examples of this can be seen in politics. Secondly, while individuals may not have any perception of danger, they can be persuaded or triggered by community leaders about dangers that do not yet exist (Fromm, 1973). The perception of a threat is used as a tool to canalize people in the desired direction. This can be seen in the security-oriented discourses of populist politics which creates hostility against the elite, who are perceived as a threat to the public (Wojczewski, 2020). Lastly, there is also defensive aggression which arises from the needs and interests of human beings to maintain functionality (Fromm, 1973). Fromm claims that this relates to the sense of identity, and that any threat to this identity is perceived as life-threatening, which in turn legitimizes people's aggression to protect themselves against such situations (Fromm, 1973). In this framework, the things people are attached to, such as religion, ancestors or nationalism, also become their vital resources and are seen as sacred by people. For this reason, attacks on things that are deemed sacred are perceived as attacks on their lives.

In group narcissism, it is seen that individuals do not show any hesitation when sharing these collective ideas because it is an idea shared by a community and this is rationalized through approval (Fromm, 1973). It may not always be possible for narcissistic people to show themselves in these discourses because expressing one's own superiority may cause social exclusion, whereas opinions on the superiority of the nation are more likely to be expressed because the community is in consensus on these matters. In addition, group narcissism is also functional because it provides group "solidarity and cohesion" (p. 204). Therefore, the narcissistic values of the group can be used to channel the group in the desired direction (Fromm, 1973). This is often used by religious communities, and even in religious sects where each sect increases solidarity within the group with the idea that it is the right one. In line with the

functionality mentioned above, a strong group narcissism created in a community is also useful due to its low cost to the social budget (Fromm, 1973). The authority can rely on the elements of collective narcissism to direct society as it wishes. In the event that these symbols are attacked, the group will swiftly become the biggest defenders of their symbols and demonize the attacking party without any need for direction from the authority (Fromm, 1973). This is because, much like the causes of individual's defensive aggression, group narcissism causes these intense reactions to awaken due to the relationship with the person's vital interest (Fromm, 1973).

5.6 From Prejudice to Threat: The Role of Perceptions within and between Groups

In their analysis, Eker et al note that collective narcissism exists both between-groups and within-groups. The examination of the dynamics between the groups reveals that collective narcissism has two components, namely, "excessive reactions to threat" and "generalized prejudice" (Eker et al, 2022, pp. 217-219). It has been observed that people with high collective narcissism also have a high perception of conspiracy against the group they are associate with (Cichocka et al., 2016; see also Biddlestone, Cichocka, Žezelj and Bilewicz, 2020). Similarly, these people have a high reflex of defending the group. This defense is an anger-related state, as seen in the collective pride and hubris studies.

Narcissism speaks of real or illusory anger towards the other based on the feeling that their successes are not envied or appreciated enough by others. In the Turkish political discourse, the claim that "Germany is jealous of us" emerged in the recent years and is an example of an imaginary anger produced to create a narrative. A study conducted in 2018 asked 2,662 Turkish people whether Germany was jealous of Turkey's third airport, and the results show that nearly 1 out of 2 people agreed with this statement (KONDA, 2018). On the other hand, hubris feeds the excessive celebration of this group along with the perception of possible aggressive discourse which may arise from posing the target group as a threat. Equally, there is a high tendency to maintain prejudices against groups with which there may be a history of conflict or problems. These negative feelings are rooted in the inability to forgive the past and result in humiliation and contempt for the group (Eker et al., 2022). Similarly, they tend to remain indifferent in situations whereby the other community is at a disadvantage

(Eker et al., 2022). A study conducted in Turkey shows that a high level of anxiety is felt by people from different ethnic and sectarian groups, and by those whose lifestyles do not align with the government's values. However, these concerns are not registered by the supporters of the government who expressed that there is no discrimination at all (Doğan, 2017).

In terms of in-group dynamics, there are two subjects; namely, 'perception of in-group' and 'treatment of other in-group members'. This section focuses only on the former.

The group's perception of their own influence has an unrealistic source (Zaromb et al., 2018). For instance, in a study a total of 6,185 students from 35 countries were asked to rate their country's contribution to the world history out of 100% (Zaromb et al., 2018). When these numbers were added together, the figure reached was around 1156% as opposed to 100%. In this scale Russia was in the first place with 61%, followed by Philippines at 41% and USA at 30% (Zaromb et al., 2018). Looking at the total, it is seen that people have a more exaggerated perception of their country's contribution (Zaromb et al., 2018). On a similar note, two studies on people with high national score for narcissism also showed that while people have a tendency to morally justify the actions of their own countries, they do not show the same tolerance to other nations (Eker et al., 2022). In fact, this position extends to the point of censoring the inappropriate actions of their own group whilst taking a much more judgmental position when similar actions are taken by other groups.

5.7 Social Hubris in High-Level: Exploring Examples and Implications

In the context of the effects of hubris at the social level, this thesis will discuss the kinds of emotions that can be produced in the groups as a result of the dynamics, along with the perceptions that are produced cognitively against both the group itself and others. Hubris occurs in collectively produced narcissistic or pride-related conditions, and whilst these conditions are necessary, they are not sufficient. Within the framework of the 4 grand level examples to be examined, the points where the social hubris diverge will be shown below.

Firstly, Johnson (2017) argues that social hubris is one of the reasons why ancient civilizations collapsed. He claims that their belief that everything will go well due to the rapid development of modern societies is sourced from hubris. This is because, as

a result of social hubris, societies turn a blind eye to their failures, instead of carrying out counter-preventative action, and instead focus on the things that go their way (Johnson, 2017). As such, the collapse of societies happens much faster and more suddenly (Johnson, 2017). In his work, Peter Beinart (2010) refers to this similar situation in the US as hubris and Icarus syndrome. Beinart (2010) drew parallels with the US's cyclical nature of hubris-tragedy and the pursuit of wisdom, and the wisdom and lessons promised to others by the tragicness of the Icarus myth. This is because US politicians and intellectuals fell under the spell of their success and the result of them falling into an omnipotent understanding of themselves were wrong decisions and eventually a defeat, which was not as tragic as the end of Icarus (Beinart, 2010). He claimed that this cycle continued because of the lessons not learned from this. The US was led to this tragedy by their overconfidence, and fascination by their own achievements, making them believe they are the rulers of the world, which eventually rendered them deaf to the outside world (Beinart, 2010). In that sense, even when there is an external threat, this cannot be rationally assessed under the shadow of hubris because of the fear deposited by the threat (Beinart, 2010). This is because, his claim is that the more power American politicians believe they have, the greater their perception of feeling threatened (Beinart, 2010). As the level of these fears increases, so does the size and cost of the moves made to suppress them (Beinart, 2010).

The magnitude of the social cost of collective hubris is evident in the example of the US military (Bakken, 2020). Although it is clear that this institution was defeated in wars and caused great harm to the public, it continued to be both the most powerful institution in terms of equipment at the state level, and a very popular and supported institution in the eyes of the public (Bakken, 2020). In addition to this, the military consolidated its highly autonomous position by separating itself from civil society and the justice system (Bakken, 2020). It continued to be supported despite its military failures, and the institution became an uncontrolled power (Bakken, 2020). This caused the institution to become authoritarian and not permit any contrary views (Bakken, 2020). As a result, the institution isolated itself from the outside, produced misinformation, and the development of a criticism mechanism within the institution was also prevented, which was reinforced with its narcissism (Bakken, 2020).

It should be noted that the military is an important part of collective identity (Bakken, 2020). This identity is fueled by an exaggerated and untouchable perception of an

idealized military that is removed from reality (Bakken, 2020). Despite the fact that the US military has not won a war for over 75 years, it is still perceived as an institution whose strength and reliability should not be questioned (Bakken, 2020). In the eyes of the public, the military is positioned in the highest moral level and this is exaggerated to the point that any criticism by anyone becomes a sufficient reason to turn hostile (Bakken, 2020). This excessive praise feeds the military's hubris (Bakken, 2020). However, research shows that despite the unlimited resources, there is an intellectual decline in the US military officers (Bakken, 2020). As a result of hubris, talented people were unable to advance in the army (Bakken, 2020). This can also be seen in the statement made by a lieutenant general on why the war in Afghanistan failed, where he stated that the reason for not getting what was expected was due to the army's lack of humility (Bakken, 2020). This is related to hubris and lack of humility, as the army repeats their mistakes under the guise that they can do no wrong which in turn leaves no room for improvement and makes them weaker (Bakken, 2020).

The last example that can affect social hubris through structural change at the grand level is urban hubris. This concept indicates that the behaviour of people living in cities change in parallel with the city's design (Bogomyakov & Chistyakova, 2022). The association with hubris comes from the ambition, rooted in the change, to also control and design the daily lives of people (Bogomyakov & Chistyakova, 2022). One of the best examples of this is Haussmann's project where the city of Paris was redesigned. The aim of this project was beyond reorganizing the city as it had underlying political and social intensions (Bogomyakov & Chistyakova, 2022). The works disrupted the entire city and the order to which people were accustomed to, and in the process destroyed neighborhoods along with people's personal and social ties to the place (Bogomyakov & Chistyakova, 2022). Historically, places were built to showcase the magnificence of their leaders or institutions, and to place them above the citizens, for both religious and political reasons (Bogomyakov & Chistyakova, 2022). Today's megastructures and city designs reinforce this idea of domination and ignore the residents. Gentrification projects in big cities or skyscrapers which are built without any consideration of public consent or city planning are examples of this approach.

The same pattern can be seen in all three examples; namely, the dominance established to encompass all components of the society and an obliviousness to the possible disasters that could be experienced by others.

5.8 Conclusion

In this section, social hubris was discussed within the framework of methodological approaches. It was shaped within the framework of two basic questions that examine the sources of the existence of hubris as a collective action in a community and its relationship with individual impact. The discussion began by exploring the emergence of collective action and group dynamics, with a particular emphasis on collective emotions such as anger and shame. Specifically, this analysis examined the relationship between collective pride and hubris, as well as the relationship between collective narcissism and hubris. While collective pride and hubris were analyzed in the context of celebration and conflict, narcissism and hubris were studied with reference to the sources of social mindset. Finally, the discussion culminated in an examination of 4 social implementations that exemplify social hubris, extending beyond the domains of pride and narcissism.



6. POLITICAL HUBRIS

6.1 Introduction

This section explores the concept of political hubris from two perspectives. The first will examine the concept of political hubris in light of Thomas Hobbes' notions of the state of nature and the desire for power. The second perspective will consider Nietzsche's concept of the will to power as an impulse that reveals political hubris.

In the second part, the obstacle posed by the concept of hubris to harmonious coexistence which constitutes the primary goal of politics, is elucidated. In order to accomplish this, the concept of friendship as a political form is initially examined through the lens of Aristotle, highlighting the distortions it creates within political systems. As the basis of this deterioration, the contrasts between the principle of equality, on which the friendship relationship is based and the attitudes produced by the political hubris, will be pointed out. Subsequently, the incongruity of political hubris with the egalitarian values of politics is explored within the framework of Rousseau's principle of the common good. The analysis delves into how political hubris utilizes emotions such as envy and shame, in contrast to political emotions like sympathy and solidarity that underpin the notion of the common good, thereby contributing to the creation of social inequality through the use of stigmatization as a mediator for these emotions.

6.2 State of Nature and Desire of Power

Thomas Hobbes explains human nature as one that is self-motivated and socialized for this specific purpose (2009, p. 199). This is because, in the state of nature, mankind is alone, in danger and in absolute chaos. Therefore, man is in search of permanent protection and welfare (p. 199). Since people are in a state of absolute equality, there are obstacles to their happiness due to competitive conditions and attacks from others (p. 110). However, these obstacles to people's desire for a good life threaten their assurance of obtaining better opportunities for themselves (p. 110). This triggers the need for security (p. 110). Another thing that creates this feeling of insecurity is the

conflict of interest that people experience with those who have similar desires to them (p. 110). For this reason, people hate those who have similar ambitions to them because they fear losing power, and this fear dominates their life (p. 110). Therefore, individuals need society, and absolute power to limit society as the only way out of this situation (Hobbes, 2009). Hobbes sees power as a tool that allows individuals to achieve what they desire for themselves and what they think is beneficial for them. Absolute hegemonic power, on the other hand, is the power of individuals to offer this power to a single person with their explicit consent for these desires (p. 159).

This power of the sovereign is reinforced by the love of others (Hobbes, 2009). Hobbes (2009) claims that the existence of this desire for power, which will ensure the satisfaction of the desires of individuals, is eternal and will only end with the person's death (p. 186). As such, this desire must be controlled and this can only be achieved through the existence of the state, Leviathan, in order to enable individuals to get rid of this insecurity. Although the Leviathan seems to be born out of a necessity for the individual's freedom, it is performed by the state apparatus in which political hubris is seen to be under the influence of an external force that completely suppresses the behavior of the individual, which Hobbes underlines as one of the two ways that prevent freedom.

In fact, Hobbes' idea that everyone is equal by birth can be used to understand the cause of the conflict and social tension caused by political hubris. Hobbes does not base social equality on the idea that all conditions of individuals are equal or that they have the same advantage in all matters. He claims that there is equality in terms of people being equally threatened against the dangers from the other, that is, in terms of power (p. 117). This is because even the physically strongest person will remain weak against a group united against them.

A state of equality can be found in the hope that people have for achieving what they desire (p. 10, p. 190). Therefore, one is always open to attacks from the other, which is another reason behind the desire for power (p. 10). Similarly, people are equal in nature in terms of their rights and powers (Hobbes, 2009). This triggers the idea that people are constantly uneasy, living under the rule of fear and insecurity (Hobbes, 2009). As such, they are continually under the threat of war (Hobbes, 2009). There are three things that lead to war, and these are competition amongst the people, insecurity and the desire for glory (p. 187). These are all natural impulses found in all human

beings. As such, even in societies that have developed into states with power, a return to a state of war is a possibility in the absence of absolute sovereignty (Hobbes, 2009).

Whilst Hobbes does not condone the restriction of the sovereign's power at any point, he emphasizes the importance of the advice the sovereign receives and compares this to the destruction experienced by hubristic leaders who are not open to outside advice. He highlights the importance of receiving counsel because, although recommendations are not absolute rules to be followed, they are needed for the sovereign to make the right decision based on specialist advice in differing fields (Hobbes, 2009).

Plato and Aristotle point out that hubris is related to self-insolence meanwhile Hobbes evaluates this concept based on its political impact. He claims that both the rich and the poor, the weak and the strong, should be protected for the security of the people and that this protection will be provided through subjecting these people to criminal sanctions. He explains that the failure to do this will lead to "insolence" (p. 212), which will lead to hatred and cruelty, causing the collapse of the state (Hobbes, 2009). Plato connects the feelings of "hate and lust" with hubris whereas Hobbes argues that these emotions relate to the weaknesses of the person, they make the person more susceptible to committing a crime (Hobbes, 2009, p. 183). As such, unless these feelings are scrutinized, their negative impacts will continue.

As such, Hobbes talks about the need for absolute sovereign power with social acceptance in order to get rid of the state of fear and insecurity arising from the conflict of desires in the state of nature. He underlines that each individual has the desire for power in order to achieve these wishes. This desire for power can turn into conflict and hatred due to the state of equality between individuals, which creates a state of war. An analysis of this state of war and the competition between individuals, which produce hatred and desire to suppress one another for their desired outcomes, show that they both have similar outcomes. However, whilst Hobbes implicitly cautions against the emergence of political hubris and its consequences, he does not focus on the potential destruction or the moral implications of giving unlimited power to a sovereign.

6.3 Will to Power

Nietzsche (1974) asserts that individuals possess an inherent will to power due to their existence as living beings (p. 184), thus laying the groundwork for the emergence of political hubris. This stems from the struggle for survival (p. 292), as the essence of vitality is centered around reinforcing this power when examining the motivation behind each behavior (Nietzsche, 1974). In other words, for this feeling of power, acts of both kindness and harm towards others share a common essence and do not differentiate in terms of motivation (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 86). Both positive and negative behaviors exert an influence on the recipient, fostering a bond between the individual carrying out the behavior and the person affected by it (Nietzsche, 1974, pp. 86-87). This causal relationship connects the other person to us, as they perceive us as the source of these impactful actions (Nietzsche, 1974). Similar patterns can be observed in the relationship between the masses supported by leaders exhibiting political hubris and the others they antagonize. For instance, when we perform acts of kindness towards someone else, it not only enhances our own power but also augments the power of the recipient. The resulting sense of satisfaction permeating the lives of these individuals fosters the development of the notion of a common good and a common enemy, influenced by the power dynamics at play. People rarely question the source of their behavior and are willing to make sacrifices to safeguard this sense of empowerment (Nietzsche, 1974, pp. 86-87). What propels individuals to engage in such behaviors is not a specific goal but rather the impulse to overcome obstacles and challenges.

Therefore, it can be asserted that this situation is inherently social in nature. Since an individual's existence is predicated on their interactions with others, both individual and social consequences arise. Consequently, the pursuit of power can be identified as a fundamental underlying cause that warrants scrutiny within numerous individual and social dynamics. Life as a whole is shaped by these dynamic processes of "becoming and transformation," (p. 315) highlighting the need to evaluate agreements and conflicts within this framework (Nietzsche, 1974).

Nietzsche (2006) perceives the origins of social morality as a system in which the strong exert dominance over the weak through power struggles, imposing their own rules. He views this weak will as reflective of slave morality, which is tied to the

dominance of their own will, free from the constraints of their social class (pp. 20-21). Hence, when examining individuals exhibiting political hubris, their position is more closely aligned with slave morality. A person with slave morality can only perceive themselves as good by comparing themselves to someone else who they believe is worse (Nietzsche, 2006). For instance, negative identification and the creation of imaginative enemies are tools employed by hubristic political leaders to mobilize the masses. Nietzsche (2006) summarizes individuals with slave morality as being unable to define themselves without the other, necessitating an adversary as they lack a self-generated value. However, a healthy individual does not harbor hatred towards any person or group, as they can forge their own sense of self without relying on external references, and differences do not pose a threat to them. This resentment against the other impedes personal liberation (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 48).

Similar elements emerge in Hannah Arendt's (2006) analysis of Hitler, who, driven by his desire for power, cultivated hatred by exploiting the discontent and anxieties of the masses. Hitler thereby nurtured a "hateful" hubris within the populace (Arendt, 2006). In doing so, Hitler elevated his own image to a divine status in the eyes of the masses, asserting that every word or political action he took could never be wrong (Arendt, 2006). This lust for power is wielded through malicious means by political leaders with slave morality, resulting in the social injustices stemming from political hubris.

6.4 Political Friendship and Solidarity

In addition to being a concept that should be sought in daily relations, friendship is also the main component of political communities, the basis that provides the formation of communities (Aristotle, 1893). The existence of a true friendship will ensure the existence of justice because friendship includes being just by its nature (Aristotle, 1893, 1160a).

Aristotle (1893) claims that love is the main virtue of a friendship, and that only through friendship can equality between persons be achieved (1159b). An examination of the concept of friendship, as a component of politics, reveals that it is against the nature of political hubris. This is because friendships are sourced from the similarities between people's virtues and spirits, and it provides a common ground for people to co-exist (Aristotle, 1893, 1159b). In contrast, political hubris stands as an obstacle to co-existence, which is the main purpose of politics.

People acting in line with their own interests will cause regimes to fall apart. Aristotle argues that there are three types of governments and regimes that emerged as a result of corruption (1160b). In doing this, he explains how the decisions of kings to depart from the basic components of political friendship to prioritize their own interests led to the corruption of kingdoms and rise tyrannical governments (1160b). However, what makes monarchies a form political friendship is the kings leaving the concept of common good and pursuing their own interests, which leads to the emergence of tyranny (1160b). As such, kingdoms are named as the worst form of government by Aristotle (1893). What political hubris reveals in leaders is similar. The tyrants' use of all means to consolidate their own power, for those who serve themselves and their interests, completely straying from the merits and giving administrative positions to those who support them, causes the political administration to be governed by a bad minority, not by good rulers (Aristotle, 1893). Similarly, actors with political hubris want to destroy the existence of the other in order to create their own identity; their existence depends on the other's disappearance. Thus, political hubris produces a culture of domination and hegemony. As a result, political hubris does not allow the construction of the ethical subject in political identification.

Although the concept attracted particular attention in antiquity and manifested itself in basically two ways (Farkash, 2001, p. 5), this situation has very effective reflections in the modern period, both with similar dynamics and tools, and with new tools developed in relation to the nature of the age. In ancient times, it showed itself as a result of imperialist domination with the growth of empires and tyrannies in monarchies (Farkash, 2001). This influence has been seen in various forms between the people and the elite, between the elite and the tyrant, with various repercussions among the people themselves and among different masses of people, and especially between the tyrant and everyone else (Farkash, 2001).

However, Aristotle claims that democracy is the system in which friendship is the most relevant, as it is the system that consists of the most equal people among all political systems. Appreciating that democracy is based on a culture of consensus it aims for the highest benefit for the public. However, it can be said that political hubris as a vice does not pursue the social good, which is in line with Aristotle's claim that immoral people are not interested in compromise and therefore do not pursue a political understanding on the basis of friendship.

Political hubris also challenges the love and solidarity upon which friendship is based. Solidarity is the basic tool for the individual to act as a part of society because individuals can only adapt to groups through solidarity (Scholz, 2008, pp. 18-19). However, since solidarity brings “positive obligations” (Borger, 2020, p. 55) to the person, it is not a concept that can be used for unity in groups that are clenched for a negative purpose (Borger, 2020, p. 55). Similar to Aristotle, Durkheim (2013) claims that the individual acts with a social impulse. A person receives a driving force from the bond he establishes with others (Durkheim, 2013). This driving force is the only thing that can separate a person from acting according to their personal interests, because their true happiness and power are derived from society (Durkheim, 1933). Additionally, Durkheim (2013) explains his theory on the concept of solidarity and social cohesion by establishing affinity with Aristotle’s concept of friendship. Parallel to Aristotle’s attention to similarity and difference as one of the foundations of friendship, he underlines the relationship of social cohesion with having a similar understanding, and the need for a common unity of belief and emotion that can be provided for the average citizen (Borger, 2020, p. 43). Social solidarity is based on these elements (Borger, 2020, p. 43). Contrary to the notion of positive obligation, which fuels a sense of solidarity through shared emotions within a group, there exists a partnership characterized by animosity and the act of ‘othering’, which thrives on negative sentiments (Borger, 2020, pp. 55-57). This form of association, fueled by political hubris, only serves to unite individuals with similar perspectives, while simultaneously excluding anything that deviates from their own.

6.5 Common Good

Rousseau (1997), similar to Aristotle, with his emphasis on the social aspect of human beings, underlines living together requires individuals to trust each other in order to meet the necessary things to survive (Borger, 2020, p. 36). He claims that the only thing that can provide this trust is the social contract (Borger, 2020, p. 36). Given that it is not possible for a human being, who is detached from the state of nature, to survive alone in the civil world, individuals are dependent on each other and this is only sustainable through establishing interpersonal trust (Borger, 2020, p. 38). This dependency relationship has created a pressure on people which has led to the emergence of unequal situations and moral deterioration (Borger, 2020, p. 39). Similar

to Rousseau's concept of amour-propre whereby the individuals who have moved from the state of nature to civil life depend on each other, political hubris also emerges from this dependency and threatens the common good. Therefore, since the arbitrariness of people's own will can cause such destructions, they have to be bound by a common good contract (Rousseau, 1997). This arbitrary will should be replaced by the common will, which can also ensure the freedom of the individual (Rousseau, 1997, pp. 14-16). Only in this way can the public interest be protected (Rousseau, 1997, p. 19). However, political hubris is a threat to both the freedom of the individual and equality, and the only condition for achieving these for each of the different wills in the society is the social contract that will ensure a common agreement.

This proposition points to democracy, the sovereignty of the people (Rousseau, 1997, p. 14), whereby the electoral system is dependent on both the individual and social interaction. Being an electoral system, while allowing the development of social consciousness, democracy also causes its regression (p. 34). In political communities where the system is not strongly established, the system will constantly be shaped by the reaction of the other, as it is based on the interaction between the electorate and the power (pp. 34-36). Where the system and principles do not develop, political feelings come to the foreground (pp. 34-36). These feelings are used as a tool by both the leaders who want to be elected, and by the political community to maintain their power (pp. 34-36). Hubris is a situation that is frequently encountered both at the level of political leaders and in the political community, as it is a self-love that one creates dependent on the other, beyond a state of grandiosity. Since self-love is completely dependent on the other, and politics is an area based on the relationship established with the other, the hubris manifests itself within the framework of this relationship, since the political person is in constant interaction with large masses.

It is therefore critical in democracies to draw attention to the consequences of hubris. For instance, hubris leads to the adoption of both legitimate and illegitimate means to influence the masses by those who want power and authority. Although democracy is essentially based on the representation of the people, the fact that it is used in this way by those who desire power means that the system is open to corruption and this can only be prevented by building strong institutions that will provide balance and supervision. However, this desire and struggle for power goes beyond individuals and spreads to institutional structures (Niebuhr, 1932). Therefore, although the possibility

of democracies is fundamentally related to the “human capacity for justice” (Rawls, 1944), democracy is needed because the same capacity also includes a tendency to injustice (Niebuhr, 1944). This tendency to injustice is directly related to political hubris because people with political hubris need to establish their hegemony in society for their desire for power. In order to do this, they suppress a part of the society and do not shy away from creating polarization or producing hate speech to intimidate people. Political hubris uses these feelings under the idea of political unity and power sharing, without showing that it abuses these feelings, and this situation creates social injustice.

6.6 Hubris-Driven Political Emotions Against the Common Good and

Friendship: Envy, Shame and Stigma

Political hubris is a dominant emotion, used to guide political communities with its relation to envy. Stigma is used as a tool to convey shame which is the resulting emotion felt by the others. Envy is a threat to the system by its very existence because democracies are systems based on inter-relationality (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 360). Given that this feeling is suffering for those who are not themselves, who constantly compare their own situation to others, focus on the superiorities and the opportunities available to others as opposed to themselves (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 360). As a result, they develop envy and hostility towards the person with whom they compare themselves to and this creates social conflict, causing problems on both an individual and social levels (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 360). This feeling will continue to exist even if one reaches the highest level in the society, because they remain dependent on others (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 360). As Rawls (1971) underlines in the group of envious people, one of the typologies for justice, the only thing that will satisfy these feelings of enmity will be the suffering of the other group. Rawls claims that besides the fact that it is not possible to eliminate this feeling, a society in which a correct justice system is established will be designed in such a way that people can tolerate it. Hubris, however, is built on constantly raising this feeling in a political society because it requires leaders to create the other or enemy to maintain their power.

There are two components, which are not present in the devastation and the sense of injustice created by hubris, but Rawls (1971) can remove these feelings of insecurity in a just society, and these are “a common sense of justice” (p. 536) and being

connected to each other through ties of civil friendship (p. 536). However, in communities which do not have these components, the sense of injustice in people will reveal anger and social conflict will be inevitable (Rawls, 1971). This political envy manifests itself with the hostility and factionalism experienced between the groups that the group that has the power cooperates to consolidate its own power.

For this reason, stigma is used as a tool to shame these groups and to label them so that this can be done (Nussbaum, 2013). The ruling class sees itself as normal, and marginalizes those they do not accept, labelling them as outsiders and shaming their identities because of their differences (Nussbaum, 2013). Thus, they strengthen their hegemony both for themselves and the ties within their groups (Nussbaum, 2013). By presenting themselves as unequivocally good and right, they actually hide the feelings that they doubt about themselves (Nussbaum, 2013). They impose on others that they should be ashamed of their own identity (Nussbaum, 2013). These people are reminded that they are a minority and remain intimidated by the ruling class (Nussbaum, 2013). Whilst those are stigmatized in this way are not inherently ashamed of their identity, they are made to feel this way by the hegemon (Nussbaum, 2013). This is in line with Owen's description of the hubris syndrome which includes a "contempt for the advice or criticism of others" (p. 2).

These new norms can turn into social norms if the dominant group uses this mechanism to have them accepted by society (Nussbaum, 2013). Political hubris manifests itself in the public sphere by humiliating the other. As a result, intergroup hostility is inevitable. Erich Fromm (1973) states in his group narcissism, in his claim to produce discourses that serve to make the other group hostile, the bad experiences of the stigmatized group are not met with empathy by the ruling class, they do not perceive their experiences as bad, because they already do not perceive them as the worst. They categorized it as "inferior" from the beginning. Moreover, there is a prevailing belief that this group is already defined as bad and abnormal, that they deserve what has already happened to them, and that this is related to their own wishes (Nussbaum, 2013). So, what they experience is fair in any event (Nussbaum, 2013). However, the requirement of justice at the constitutional level is to define what happens to these people as crimes. People's social feelings, such as nationalism, feelings under the umbrella of patriotic ideology, are open to being squeezed into a shallow and narcissistic field, and this will feed social injustice (Nussbaum, 2013). Therefore,

justice will emerge only with the presence of love, because it is in this way that interpersonal trust can develop, and envy does not (Nussbaum, 2013).

For this reason, in order for institutions to be strong and justice to be inclusive, social culture must be in accord and institutions must remain away from personal and intense feelings for individuals (Nussbaum, 2013). Institutions are not actually free from political feelings and the effect of hubris in institutions is an example of this. Envy feeds political hubris, and its influence spreads from the leaders to institutions and society. Shame and stigmatization are used as tools by political hubris to bring social injustice at every level.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the idea of political hubris from two angles. The first part centered on the connection between political hubris and the desire for power and the second part considered Nietzsche's concept of "will power" as an impulse that reveals political hubris.

The chapter began by investigating the concept of political hubris through the lens of Thomas Hobbes' ideas regarding the state of nature and the pursuit of power. Then, it examined how the idea of hubris is an impediment to co-existence, the primary goal of politics. For this, Aristotle's idea of friendship as a political form, and the distortions this causes in political regimes, were considered. The discrepancies between the friendship relationship's foundational equality principle and the mindsets brought on by political hubris were highlighted as the causes of this degradation.

The common good concept of Rousseau was then used to investigate how political arrogance conflicts with the egalitarian principles of politics. Political hubris was examined in terms of the social inequalities hubris causes by employing the idea of stigma, which serves as a mediator for these emotions, as well as how it employs the emotions of envy and shame in the face of political emotions like sympathy and solidarity that contribute to the common good.

Lastly, the contradiction of political hubris to the equality values of politics was examined within the framework of Rousseau's common good principle. Political hubris was examined through the contrast between feelings of sympathy and solidarity,

which make up the common good, and the feelings of envy and shame, created through stigmatization and social inequality.



7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis argues that hubris is political in nature, given its relationship with power dynamics. Power, as an inherently unequal element in society, can fuel hubris in individuals and social identities, leading to injustice and social conflict. This research aims to shed light on the significance of comprehending the political aspect of the hubris concept. By evaluating the social inequality and conflict generated by hubris within this context, this dissertation seeks to propose a solution to address these issues effectively. While hubris has been present in various historical contexts, its political nature has often been overlooked. Moreover, in contemporary times, the concept of hubris has primarily been explored within the realm of politics, with its moral and collective dimensions often relegated to a narrower perspective. Therefore, the central objective of this thesis is to underscore that hubris is inherently political, manifesting across domains where power is exercised, and to make its far-reaching effects apparent, both at the individual and societal levels, by understanding its impact on social identities.

The primary objective of this study is to examine the profound influence of hubris on both individual behavior and societal dynamics, establishing the premise that hubris is inherently a political concept. By developing a comprehensive understanding of hubris that encompasses its moral, collective, and political manifestations, this research aims to address the central question: Is hubris inherently political?

Consequently, this dissertation delved into the existing literature on hubris, seeking to elucidate its political dimensions and presenting a synthesized understanding in light of the scholarly discourse. Through this endeavor, the study seeks to make a substantial contribution to the academic literature. While the concept of hubris has been extensively discussed by various scholars, the political aspect of hubris has not received adequate attention in prior research. This thesis contends that hubris is not only a political phenomenon but also an integral part of politics, highlighting its significance in shaping individual actions and societal interactions. Prior to delving into the conceptual analysis of hubris, the methodological approach through which the

concept will be examined was established, drawing upon the discussion of methodological individualism and holism. I asserted that hubris is a sociological concept since it includes individuality and sociability. Within this framework, I provided a thorough methodological explanation of this concept and demonstrated that hubris cannot be dissociated from a sociological discourse.

In the third chapter, in order to determine the original points of the concept of hubris, the first uses of the concept in the literature were evaluated within the framework of the conceptualization of Plato and Aristotle. Later in this section, attention was drawn to Rousseau's concept of amour propre and Fisher's concept of hubris beyond its meaning as a symbol of tragedy or religious narratives. Finally, the political aspect of hubris was included in the synthesis in line with Button's analysis of the concept in terms of the threat it poses to modern democracies, along with Willett's need to evaluate hubris, which was considered a crime in ancient Greece, in a similar perspective in modern liberal democracies. The conceptual analysis has shown that this concept has similarities with these other concepts such as pride, arrogance, vanity, narcissism, but it is stated within the framework of this synthesis that it is a fundamental point of divergence.

In the fourth chapter, the morality of hubris was discussed. I claimed that all four theories, including virtue ethics, Kantian ethics and consequentialism, and objectivist ethics, which define the concept of pride as a moral virtue, find hubris immoral. All of these four understandings showcase how hubris is immoral. While these contemporary approaches to virtue ethics provide a complete knowledge as well as insight into how the individual will live, they do not tolerate hubris since they require that the individual construct himself within the parameters of their sociality. At last, it is asserted that hubris has no place in the context of a person's ethical obligation to another.

In the fifth chapter, within the framework of this synthesis, an analysis covering micro and macro methodological understandings is undertaken to show that hubris has both individual and social impacts. Further to this, group dynamics are also considered within the framework of the group-grid scheme whereby the collective pride and hubris produced by these schemes were examined comparatively. Then, collective pride and hubris were also studied in different celebration types, and the points that separate these two concepts were highlighted. The common components and divergence points of collective hubris and narcissism were also examined. Finally,

within the framework of this analysis, modern examples of hubris were used to showcase the effects of collective hubris.

The final chapter focused on how political hubris and its affects. In particular, the chapter used Hobbes's concept of desire of power and Nietzsche's concept of will power to show the relationship of hubris with power dynamics. Furthermore, the challenge political hubris poses against the nature of politics as a form of friendship was also discussed within the framework of concepts like Aristotle's friendship, Durkheim's solidarity and Rousseau's common good. This chapter concluded that hubris creates social conflict and causes problems at both individual and social levels.

Based on the information presented, two fundamental suggestions were put forward to address the injustice arising from hubris. As hubris is closely related to the concept of justice, it has been argued that it engenders social injustices within this context. The claim of superiority held by individuals or social groups over others leads to an unequal and imbalanced state. As posited by Aristotle, hubristic individuals attribute their perceived superiority to innate merit, overlooking the role of chance in their positions. Consequently, they place themselves in a superior stance vis-à-vis others, exacerbating the plight of already disadvantaged groups, further amplifying social injustice. In order to combat this situation, it is imperative to engage in more extensive discussions on hubris within the political sphere. Additionally, implementing legal reforms to mitigate the influence of hubris can prove instrumental in attenuating its impact on society. By doing so, society can strive towards a fairer and more equitable landscape, fostering a greater sense of justice and harmony among its members.

On the other hand, this situation also fosters injustice through the suppression of the voice of the other. In the final point, hubris was seen as a warning. This is because hubris is the rejection of "isonomia", meaning the hostile rejection of moral equality of others. As such, hubris leads individuals to act aggressively towards other people, leading to monologism and injustice (Button, 2016). In other words, the person who is in power surrenders their freedom in return for their power, and they create their own supports to consolidate their position. They impose their own norms and scrutinize others because of their fear of losing their power, which polarizes the political arena. (Button, 2016). In other words, it seems that hubris in political nature trivializes the concept of respect with its ignorant attitude towards the other with both individual behavior and social pattern, thus preventing the emergence of dialogue (Button, 2016).

However, preventing political hubris, which also causes a form of moral corruption, can only be possible with a deliberative democracy, which brings to the fore the questionability of moral values and creates a basis for the common representation of each of the citizens.

This model has consistently been advocated for due to the inherent presence of moral conflicts within the political sphere. Given that an immoral state, such as political hubris, results in the domination of both individuals and society, thereby disrupting the foundations of social coexistence, this model becomes imperative for the well-being of the community. While political hubris undermines the significance of consensus and dialogue, deliberative democracy, in contrast, prioritizes communication even in the absence of immediate agreement. Proponents argue that this ongoing dialogue process contributes to the strength of a democratic society as it is (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). In addition, deliberative democracy is beneficial, not only for democracy, but also for political hubris and communities to develop fairer relations for themselves.

According to Gutmann and Thompson (2004), this deliberative perspective may not resonate with individuals who lack the intention to cooperate, do not prioritize fairness, and reject such principles.

In parallel with the obstructive nature of political hubris that hampers constructive dialogue, I contend that it is essential to transform these individuals and make embracing the deliberative approach a necessity within the system. Otherwise, deliberative democracy will enter the paradox of tolerance, which will harm both the system and the intolerant, including those who perform or are exposed to it. Therefore, it can be considered to produce sanctions for things that hinder the negotiation conditions and to strengthen institutions and discourses accordingly. This is because the development of the dialogue process will allow people to find space for discourse even when they are in disagreement with others and develop respect for themselves and others as citizens even where they cannot get recognition or visibility. Negotiation also reminds people of their finitude, that they are fallible not in a position with absolute power (Dryzek, 2000). Only in this way will information be shared between communities, and pluralistic discourses will be produced in a common good (Dryzek, 2000). While this system allows for positive social outcomes, it will also enable conflicts and tensions within the community to be recognized and brought to light, and

these situations will also be investigated and solutions will be produced (Dryzek, 2000). In that sense, as argued by Eckersley in Smith (2003), public deliberation, a process whereby each entity within a community is taught to be recognized and respected, offers a solution to combat the emergence of political hubris.

Habermas (1984; 1989) highlights the necessity of a deliberative understanding of democracy through his theory of communicative action, which emphasizes that discourse is fundamental to politics. The destruction witnessed in the discourses perpetuated by political hubris underscores the significance of political discourse as a dominant mechanism for the proper functioning of democracy. This is evident both at the organizational level, during the formulation and adoption of laws, and in the production of politically acceptable discourse that emerges through dialogue among citizens and garners the acceptance of the political majority. Habermas (1984; 1989) posits that his theory of communicative power can be utilized to counteract the inequalities engendered by political hubris through discourse. By harnessing the transformative capacity of social discourse, its influence can be diminished solely at the social level, effectively preventing the emergence of political leaders driven by political hubris.

As a result, an in-depth analysis of the political nature of hubris, which permeates various aspects of societal life, has been extensively conducted. This analysis has been enriched by exploring perspectives from classical, theological, enlightenment scholars, and contemporary thinkers. It has been demonstrated that political hubris can indeed lead to social injustice, resulting in marginalization, social exclusion, and uniformity.

In conclusion, attention has been drawn to the importance of enacting legal measures that curtail hubristic behaviour to circumvent the problems caused by hubris. The development of deliberative democracy was considered as a crucial approach in dealing with the consequences of hubris, as through fostering open and inclusive discussions, deliberative democracy can provide a platform to address power imbalances and ensure that decisions are made in the interest of all members of society. These combined efforts aim to mitigate the detrimental consequences of hubris, foster societal harmony, and steer society towards a more just and equitable future.



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