

HOME(LAND)S AND NOSTALGIA IN VICTIM CINEMA IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

HOME(LAND)S AND NOSTALGIA IN VICTIM CINEMA IN TURKEY

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This thesis mainly looks at the representation of the relationship between belonging and social classes in the victim cinema in the context of displaced Kurds. In general, Kurds are generally considered as a monolithic and homogeneous nation in the literature, and the class dimension is ignored. In addition, it is assumed that the Kurds have a single identity as a homeland. In this direction, this thesis problematizes where the Kurds, who are included in different social classes, feel a sense of belonging in the victim cinema, how they relate to their homeland, and the representation of this form of relationship. In this direction, the concepts of social capital and cultural capital were used to determine the class positions of the characters in the victim cinema. Afterward, the concept of nostalgia was used to determine what the characters regards as a homeland in these films, that is, where they feel belonging. After the conceptual framework was created, the films included in the victim cinema were determined and the nostalgia scenes in these films were analyzed. As a result, it has been concluded that social and cultural capital is effective in the existence of different forms of belonging in the victim cinema. Also, the representation of the lower classes in the victim cinema as being unable to take action in the struggle against the sovereign and therefore having completely lost the position of being a political subject means a significant break from the cinema tradition and political position of Yılmaz Güney.

Keywords: Victim Cinema, Nostalgia, Social and Cultural Capital, Film Analyzing

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE KURBAN SİNEMASINDA YURT TAHAYYÜLLERİ VE NOSTALJİ

Aktay, Azat


Yüksek Lisans, Medya ve Kültürel Çalışmalar Bölümü

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Bu tez temel olarak kurban sinemasında aidiyet ve sınıf arasındaki ilişkinin temsiline yerinden edilmiş Kürtler bağlamında bakmaktadır. Aidiyet bağlamında yapılan tartışmalarda literatürde genel olarak Kürtler yekpare ve homojen bir ulus olarak ele alınmakta ve meselenin sınıfsal boyutu çoğunlukla göz ardı edilmektedir. Ayrıca genel olarak Kürtlerin tek bir yere aidiyet duyduğu kabul edilmektedir. Bundan dolayı bu tez farklı toplumsal sınıflara dahil olan Kürtlerin kurban sinemasında nereye aidiyet hissettiğini, yurt olarak kabul ettikleri yerle nasıl bir ilişki kurduklarını ve bu ilişki biçiminin temsilini sorunsallaştırmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda bu filmlerde karakterlerin nereye aidiyet hissettiğini ve burayla nasıl bir ilişki geliştirdiklerini belirlemek için nostalji kavramından yararlanıldı. Kurban sinemasına dahil olabilecek filmler belirlendikten sonra bu filmlerdeki nostalji sahneleri analiz edildi. Bu analizler neticesinde kurban sinemasında farklı aidiyet biçimlerinin olduğu ve bunda sosyal ve kültürel sermayenin etkili olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Altsınıfların kurban sinemasında egemene karşı verilecek mücadelede bir daha eyleme geçebilmesi mümkün olmayan ve bu yüzden de politik özne olma pozisyonunu tümüyle kaybetmiş olarak temsil edilmesi ise Yılmaz Güney’in sinema geleneğinden ve politik pozisyonundan önemli bir kopuş anlamına gelmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kurban Sineması, Nostalji, Sosyal ve Kültürel Sermaye, Film Analizi



To my dear mother Şemsihan and my grandmothers Naime and Dayika Zeyno.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Justice and Development Party

AYM: The Constitutional Court

DTP: Democratic Society Party

GBT: General Information Collection

HDP: People's Democratic Party

IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons

MKM: Mesopotamia Cultural Center

PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party

TESEV: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation

TOMA: Social Incidents Response Vehicles

TRT: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation

TSK: Turkish Armed Forces

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I'm going to try to look at the imaginations of different home(land)s in the victim cinema as a sub-branch of conflict cinema in Turkey. I will try to understand where/what is imagined as a homeland by looking at the nostalgic images in this cinema. Looking at Kurdish cinema by taking it as conflict cinema (Smets, 2015), this cinema consists of three groups such as battle cinema, victim cinema, and human rights cinema. The films that can be classified into the victim cinema will be handled in this thesis. In this cinema, filmmakers don't involve in the violent conflict (the conflict that has been going on for nearly forty years in Turkey) directly, but they aim to mobilize the audiences and document the violent conflict. Filmmakers, in this cinema, are directly or indirectly affected by the conflict ongoing. In other words, they experienced victimhood, so they also can be considered a victim. Therefore, this cinema was chosen rather than other cinemas in terms of representing the victim's point of view.

What kind of a homeland the Kurds have in Turkey (that is, where they belong) has been the subject of many different political and sociological studies (Ercan, 2009; Sarigil, 2010; Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2014; Sarigil and Karakoc, 2016; Gürses, 2018; Yarkın, 2019). In Turkey, especially during periods of heightened social tension and conflict, researchers try to measure the "attachment" of Kurds to Turkey and to understand what kind of continuities and breaks there are. In addition to disciplines such as politics and sociology, researchers/academics in the field of cinema have examined the imagination of the homeland in Kurdish cinema (Kennedy, 2007; Özdil, 2009; Şimşek, 2009; Yeğen, 2012; Şen, 2022). The conclusions drawn from these film analyses are generally problematic as they are generalized to all Kurds without considering the class dimension in Kurdish society.

In addition to that “the division of Kurdistan after the First World War and the structural diversity of the Kurdish society, which was governed by different political and economic regimes, deprived the Kurds of political unity and cultural cohesion” (Vali, 2017: 49). Therefore, generalizing statements that would lead the Kurds to be thought of as a homogeneous and unified nation in terms of political, cultural, and class are problematic. Even when we look at the Kurdish movements, which hold politically different ideological positions today, we see that the right to self-determination is sought to be determined in different ways. In this respect, it does not seem right for us to generalize the images of homeland that exist in Kurdish cinemas in different countries for all Kurds. Therefore, when looking at the homeland imagination (belonging) issue in Kurdish cinema, considering Kurdish cinema on a country (nation-state) basis rather than on a regional basis may allow us to reach more accurate results. Therefore, in this thesis, we are going to look at Kurdish cinema in Turkey. Therefore, Kurdish cinema in Iraq, Syria, and Iranian Kurdistan is excluded. We have stated that Kurdish cinema, as a conflict cinema, can be examined under three groups according to the distance of the directors to the conflict. In this thesis, we will look at the victim cinema, which is a sub-branch of Kurdish cinema.

As we will see in the following sections, when we look at the literature, the imagination of the homeland in Kurdish cinema has been examined in the context of fiction films. In this direction, we have classified the fiction films that we can reach based on the conceptual model (Conflict Cinema) put forward by Kevin Smets in the context of Kurdish cinema and discussed the ones included in the victim cinema. We looked at digital media platforms such as BluTV and MUBI, social media platforms such as Youtube, and pirated/illegal movie sites to find these films. In this thesis, we will analyze the films that deal with these issues, as we will look at the cinematic imagination of the Kurds of the IDPs and the linguistically displaced (assimilation) Kurds. Accordingly, our sample consisted of the following films: *Reç*, *Kilama Dayîka Min*, *Dengê Bavê Min*, *Zer*, *Fotograf*, *Bahoz*, *Di Nawberê De*, *Derbûyîna Ji Bihûştê*.

As can be seen from the above, this thesis has limitations like every other thesis. One of these limitations is related to the Kurdish question. Due to the Kurdish question in Turkey, Kurdish cinema faces many economic and political problems. It is not easy to

reach these films because the films of Kurdish directors are censored or prevented from reaching the masses in movie theaters. In this thesis, thus, I will not be able to examine every film that may be included in the victim cinema due to such obstacles. In order to detail such obstacles, I will focus on Kurdish cinema in general in this thesis and attempt to define it again. I will also try to frame the films that I will analyze in this thesis. Accordingly, one of the limitations of this thesis due to these political obstacles was that I could not access some films. Therefore, the arguments I will put forward are valid only for these films that I have access to.

Before attempting to define Kurdish cinema and victim cinema -as a sub-branch of it- which we will discuss in this thesis, it will be good for us to remember Yılmaz Özdil's warning in the context of Kurdish cinema at the very beginning: "Undoubtedly, it is necessary to be aware that the simple/general framework of the definition we will make will cause some contradictions and that none of the features we will mention can determine whether a film is a Kurdish film or not" (2009: 220). As another important reminder of the periodization of cultural movements, let us quote the following passage from Asuman Suner:

First of all, efforts to draw the periodic frameworks of cultural movements are always bound to remain somewhat random and arbitrary. Within the complex flows of culture, there can be no beginnings and endings that can be expressed with clear lines (2006: 42).

Considering these two "warnings", I am going to examine Kurdish cinema and its sub-branch, victim cinema.

However, at that point, it also should be stated that, in this thesis, I'm going to limit the research sample to films that regard Kurdishness as a political identity, not only a cultural identity. In other words, when I constitute the research sample, I took into consideration the filmmakers' political position that takes sides with affected groups. In this respect, the filmmakers who handle Kurdishness as a cultural identity, such as Yılmaz Erdoğan (Vizontele), Mahsum Kırmızıgül (Güneşi Gördüm), or Handan İpekçi (Küçük Adam Büyük Aşk), in their films, are not incorporated in this thesis. I do not include such films because they have more or less common perspectives with the state's official ideology/history that has denied Kurdish identity for a long time.

This thesis also does not include the Turkish filmmakers and their films that can be included in Kurdish cinema. The reason behind this is that in this thesis I'm trying to look at the self-determination (imagination of homeland) of Kurds, so it is their proper speak about their future. Up to now, Kurds are not allowed much to talk about their future by the establishment, so in this thesis, I am only going to look at Kurdish filmmakers and their films. Because of that such filmmakers like Yeşim Ustaoglu, Alper Özcan or Sedat Yılmaz, etc., and their films will not be handled in this thesis.

In this thesis, also, I will divide films that can be included in the victim cinema into two groups by taking into consideration the concept of displacement. Because without the concept of displacement, it is not possible to talk about nostalgia in the context of home(land). Here, in this thesis, I will consider the concept of displacement in two ways: 1- linguistic displacement (assimilation) and 2- physical displacement (forced or “voluntary” migration). To be able to talk about nostalgia, at least one of these two situations of displacement must be present. Therefore, the main reason behind this classification is to make it possible to handle films set in Kurdish-populated areas.

The first group of films discusses and tackles the traumatic events, and they are taking place in Kurdish-populated areas. In these films, it is not possible to deal with the home(land) understanding of Kurds in the context of nostalgia because these films are trying to narrate traumatic events such as forced disappearances, unsolved murders, and so on. These films do not look at the process after being physically displaced from their homeland. In other words, in these films, there is not an image of physical displacement which lead to nostalgia. For this reason, it is not possible to look at these films in the context of physical displacement.

However, as I stated above, in this thesis, I'm going to consider the concept of “displacement” not only in the sense of physical displacement but also linguistic displacement. As I will try to show, in the context of Arendt, language also can be considered as a home(land), and people, also, can be displaced from their mother tongues. That's why I took films about linguistic assimilation set in Kurdish-populated areas as a sample. In other words, I'm going to analyze films that deal with assimilation.

One of the main purposes of these films is to show the tragic consequences of the state's policies (denial of Kurdishness, assimilation, forced displacement, forced disappearances, etc.) in the Kurdish-populated areas in the process of conflict. Therefore, these films can be seen as a reflection of the affected groups to these state policies. In reply to these policies followed by the state, "Kurdish arts in Turkey serve as a medium through which Kurdish subjectivities and identities are defined and consolidated, and as such, they emerge as sites for the assertion and the articulation of the Kurdish identity" (Atlas, 2018: 819). They aim to mobilize the audiences and document the conflict against the policies of the state. As stated by Smets, "filmmakers in this sphere are involved in the conflict because of religious, political, or ethnic reasons, but they are not active at the violent front line" (2015: 2441).

On the other hand, the second film group (physical displacement) handles the process after traumatic events, and they are taking place in western cities, mostly İstanbul. In other words, I'm going to look at the films that Kurds physically displaced. These films usually handle the problem of identity or belonging/integration to Turkish society, or facing the traumatic past. In these films, there is a limited "interaction" between Kurdish people, who are forced to migrate, and Turkish society. In other words, not only the state and Kurds but also the Turkish society and Kurds come across in these films. At this point, it can be possible to talk about the different social relations such as marginalization, exclusion, demonization, and so on. This will let us mention how Kurds interact, how Kurds feel, how Kurds are treated in Turkish society, or what type of society they encounter in the western part of Turkey, and how this affect their homeland imagination. At that point, I'm going to try to answer this question: Do they (Kurds who were displaced physically) integrate and have a new sense of belonging (identity) to this society/Turkey or not? In this respect, these films will enable us to speak of the sense of belonging and the possibility of a second identity with respect to the home(land). Moreover, memory and remembering are other significant dimensions of these films. At this point, mourning (it also can be considered as "speaking, or not" about their traumatic past) will be an important indicator that helps us to understand why there is a single or double sense of belonging. While looking at these indicators, I will briefly try to show how important it is for the victims to mourn and talk about their traumas for social peace and "living together". After looking at these dimensions,

whether Kurds long for their home(land) or what they consider as home(land) will be more clear.

The nostalgic images in these films can be considered as signs that can help us to determine displaced Kurds' sense of belonging. In this thesis, I will borrow Barbara Cassin's concept of nostalgia (2016) and accordingly, I will accept nostalgia as a longing for the current state of the homeland rather than a longing for the idealized homeland that is in the past. Nostalgia in this sense also means the difficulty endured and the pain suffered to return home. According to Cassin, "nostalgia is the 'pain of return,' both the suffering that has a hold on you when you are far away and the pains you must endure in order to return" (2016: 5). Nostalgia as the pain of returning home is frequently encountered in the representations of displaced Kurds in the victim cinema. Nostalgia will appear in this cinema in two different forms (as stated above in the operational definition of the concept of displacement): nostalgia for the mother tongue as the homeland and nostalgia for a certain geographical region as the homeland.

While problematizing why there are different imaginations of homeland in the victim cinema, we will try to understand this phenomenon by referring to Bourdieu's social and cultural capital concepts. The films I will discuss in this thesis are also mostly films about a family. They deal with the experiences of the family, which is the victim of state violence, after the forced migration. In these films, however, we can talk about different homeland imaginations within the same family. To understand this difference, we need to take into account the class factor. Since there is no difference in economic capital within the same family, other forms of capital need to be taken into account. At this point, Bourdieu's concepts of social and cultural capital will be used to understand the underlying reason for these different imaginations of homeland(s).

In the literature, the class dimension is often overlooked when looking at the imaginations of the homeland. In such a case, the fragmentary structure of Kurdish society is ignored, and Kurdish society is considered a homogeneous whole. However, in the last twenty-five years, Kurdish society has undergone certain changes in terms of class. As a result of the forced migrations experienced in the nineties and the

following period, a new generation emerged and grew up in the western provinces of Turkey. Also, some classes in Kurdish society expanded and some narrowed. In addition, the Kurdish movement has undergone great ideological and political changes. It is important whether the imagination of the Kurds for the homeland has changed in the last twenty years when such sociological, economic, and political changes have been experienced. If the Kurds' homeland imagination has changed, it is equally important to understand to what extent it has changed. In this respect, this thesis focuses on the relationship between different classes and imaginations of different homelands in the context of physically and linguistically displaced Kurds in the victim cinema.

To conclude, I will handle these films by categorizing the victim cinema into two. In the victim cinema, the narrative of victimhood is constituted in two ways: Some of the films focus on the moment of trauma, and some of them narrate trauma by focusing on the process of post-traumatic events. Therefore, by taking this into account, I will divide them into two classes: the films set in the western part of Turkey (post-traumatic events) and the films set in Kurdish-populated areas (the moment of trauma). I will focus on the films dealing with linguistic and physical displacement due to traumatic events. In other words, films about physical (forced migration) or linguistic (assimilation) displacement will be examined. As stated above, the concept of displacement not only will be used to refer the physical displacement but also linguistic displacement. This thesis will look at the relationship between the homeland imaginations of the displaced Kurds and the social class they belong to. Cassin's nostalgia and Bourdieu's social and cultural capital concepts will be used to make sense of this relationship. This relationship will be looked at in the direction of victim cinema, which is a sub-branch of Kurdish cinema as a conflict cinema. The reason why victim cinema was chosen as a case is that the directors who can be included in this cinema have been affected by state violence. In other words, it is because these directors' films, as organic intellectuals, can most powerfully represent the homeland imagination of displaced Kurds.

CHAPTER 2

KURDISH CINEMA

2.1. Kurdish Cinema in Turkey as an Outdated Cinema and Its Historical Roots

Baker stated that “today, people live in an ‘imagosphere’ where everything passes through images and is ‘recorded’” (Baker, 2010: 301 cited in Sönmez, 2012: 86). On a planet surrounded by images, we both breathe and consume images produced by others. Cinema is also an important cultural area where these images are massively inhaled. However, the Kurds entered this field nearly a hundred years after the invention of the camera. There are many political, economic and other reasons behind this “lateness” (or rather, having been left behind). Although the first movie theaters were opened in the Kurdish populated areas in the beginning of the 1900s, in the following years assimilation policies, the pressures of the nation-states within their borders, wars and internal massacres did not allow the development of such modern arts, because of these reasons there was only sound for the Kurds (Arslan, 2009: XII). For this reason, the Kurds have lived for almost a century depending on inorganic respiration devices (or “pulmotor”) cinematically, because they have established their own image universe very late (more precisely, they are still trying to establish it) in the cinematic sense. For this reason, Kurds have always seen, heard and made sense of themselves from the eyes and perspective of others. For example, *Zarê*, which is considered to be the first film about Yazidi Kurds, was shot by Hamo Bektazaryan in Soviet Armenia in 1926, and Bektazaryan reports that at that time the Kurds told him: “People think we are bandits... Please show in your films that we are poor nomads who work all day” (Bakhchinyan, 2015: 107). Unfortunately, this reproach of the Kurds (representation of the Kurds by non-Kurds) will continue to exist for a very long time in history.

It was only much later, after the 1980s, that the Kurds began to have a say in the cinematic universe and to speak for themselves, despite many obstacles. As the first militant filmmaker of this period, Yılmaz Güney could not represent the Kurds as he wanted in his films (Kutchera, 2009). However, Yılmaz Güney used radical forms of representation compared to his period in order to show the “trap” in which the Kurds were condemned and to include Kurdish as background music or character names in his films. These radical forms of representation can be cited as a reason for including Yılmaz Güney in Kurdish cinema. Although a clear date regarding the beginning of Kurdish cinema cannot be given in the literature¹ (Koçer, 2014), it should be noted that a general trend in the literature accepts Yılmaz Güney as the main starting point of Kurdish cinema (Kennedy, 2009; Şengül, 2012). Şengül says that Yılmaz Güney's cinema differs from the Turkish national cinema of that period when its political and aesthetic characteristics are taken into account. According to Şengül, “the deconstructive turn in the representation of the region as Doğu has started with the films of Yılmaz Güney” (2012: 155). According to Şengül, until Yılmaz Güney, the “Doğu” (the East) was thought of as a part of the Turkish nation-space, but this representation was deconstructed with Güney. For example, in the movie *Yol*, Ömer returns to Urfa after he is released from prison on administrative leave. When the bus enters the Kurdish-populated geographies, in a different copy of the film² (Francken, 2018-2019), we see the inscription Kurdistan on a sign over the road. This frame in the movie has displaced the representation of “East” in Turkish national cinema until that time. In addition, the characters are given Kurdish names in the movie, and as Ömer walks towards his village after getting off the bus, a dengbêj³ sings in Kurdish in the background. When the cinema and political conjuncture of that period are taken

¹ The main reason why there is a disagreement about the beginning of Kurdish cinema stems from how Kurdish cinema is defined. See: Koçer, S. (2014).

² In the context of the relationship between different versions of the *Yol* and Turkey's socio-political problems, the following study can be looked at: Francken C (2018–2019) Yılmaz Güney's movie *Yol* within the Kurdish context of Turkey: A comparative study between different versions of *Yol*. Ghent, Belgium: Universiteit Gent.

³ Dengbêj, as stated by Schäfers, “Kurdish singer-poets who orally transmit nonfictional, usually tragic historical episodes ranging from tribal feuds and natural disasters, to failed romantic love (2019: 447).” For the article, see: Schäfers, M. (2019).

into consideration, such a film represents a radical break from Turkish national cinema.

As directors representing the emergence of Kurdish cinema, whether Yılmaz Güney or Nizamettin Ariç, they faced many problems⁴. Nizamettin Ariç had to flee abroad because of a Kurdish song he sang. Therefore, Ariç shot the movie *Klamek Jî bo Beko* in Armenia. Yılmaz Güney, on the other hand, stated in an interview with Chris Kutchera that he could never express himself as he wanted in the films he shot and expressed the obstacles he encountered in the field of cinema. In this interview, Yılmaz Güney says the following about the movie *Sürü*: “The Herd is actually the history of the Kurdish people, but it was not even possible for me to shoot this movie in Kurdish. If I had made my actors speak Kurdish, I'm sure they would all be imprisoned now” (Kutchera, 2009: 132). Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the birth of Kurdish cinema was very painful and faced many economic and political obstacles. However, the fact that the Kurds at least “intended” to speak on their own behalf and strove for this is very important in terms of the subjectivity and existence of a nation that had never been read (that is, recognized) in the cultural field. Therefore, Yılmaz Güney can be considered the beginning of Kurdish cinema, despite not being able to represent the Kurds in his films as he wishes due to all the structural (economic, political, and cultural) obstacles.

After Yılmaz Güney, Kurdish cinema remained silent for a long time in Turkey until the Kurdish Political Movement socialized the Kurdish issue. Kılıç states that “it is a fact that there is an indisputable link between the development of Kurdish cinema and the liberation process of the Kurdish people” (2009: 4). In the 1990s, with the Kurdish Political Movement's leading the “Serhildan's” (uprising) the social sphere and the socialization of the political struggle, there were also developments in the cultural field. Mesopotamia Cultural Center (MKM), which is among the founders of organic intellectuals such as Musa Anter and İsmail Beşikçi, has an important place as an institutional reflection of this socialization in civil society. In this respect, the origins of Kurdish cinema and the sources of its influence go back to Yılmaz Güney, the most

⁴ The reason why this film (*Klamek Jî bo Beko*) of Nizamettin Ariç is considered the first film of Kurdish cinema is that almost the entire film consists of dialogues in Kurdish.

important representative of militant cinema in Turkey, as well as other militant cinema movements that emerged in Turkey in the 1970s.

Ahmet Soner, Hüseyin Kuzu, Thomas Balkenhol and Eniz Rıza a member of the Young Cinema movement, is one of the pioneers in the training of important directors of Kurdish cinema in 1990s, such as Kazım Öz, Hüseyin Karabey and Özkan Küçük, in the MKM Cinema Collective which opened at the Mesopotamia Cultural Center in 1991. Therefore, it can be said that the legacy of militant-third cinema was taken over by Kurdish cinema in the 1990s. It is problematic that Örsler and Croombs (2020) included MKM Cinema Collective, the first seed planted in Turkey in the context of the organization of Kurdish cinema, into Turkish cinema. However, it is important in this respect that the authors state that MKM Cinema Collective is one of the important collectives of militant-third cinema:

The historical significance of the simple image for the Turkish artists and documentaries especially lies in the fact that it represents an attempt to achieve the impossible, despite financial difficulties and state-imposed censorship. For Can Candan, the young filmmakers, who were literally selling their blood to afford the necessary equipment to display the sociopolitical realities of Turkey, are still an inspirational source for contemporary film and video collectives with a profoundly similar agenda. One such Collective is Mezopotamya Kültür Merkezi Sinema Kollektifi (the Cinema Collective of Mezopotamia Cultural Center), particularly active in the late 1990s, when population shifts from southeastern Anatolia to the western metropolises accelerated (2020: 773).

Therefore, under the influence of both Yılmaz Güney, the most important representative of the militant-third cinema⁵ in Turkey, and the figures who pioneered the militant-third cinema movement in Turkish cinema (Ahmet Soner, etc.), Kurdish cinema in Turkey took over the militant-third cinema tradition. Therefore, the importance of the Mesopotamia Cultural Center's Collective shouldn't be ignored in the development of Kurdish cinema in Turkey. It is significant because its aim “was

⁵ Militant Cinema as an advanced category of Third Cinema emerged as a reaction to the cultural colonization of the Third World, as Smets (2015) points out. Therefore, it can also be seen as a reaction to Hollywood Cinema (First Cinema) and Auteur Cinema (Second Cinema). One of the main purposes of militant cinema, unlike First and Second Cinema, is to move the audience from a passive to an active position. Besides, another aim of this cinema is to make the audience an "actor" politically. The main tenets of "militant cinema" also flowed from this idea: on the one hand, the necessity of the cinema group's connection and integration with particular political organizations; and on the other, the instrumentalization of film in the liberation struggle (Mestman, 2011: 29).

protecting the cultural heritage and identity of Mesopotamia against the political and cultural assimilation policies of the Turkish state” (Candan, 2016: 5). Just as the roots of the Kurdish Political Movement are rooted in the young socialist movements and organizations (DEV-GENÇ) of the period in Turkey and this movement originated from the left of Turkey (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2015), we can also say that the roots of Kurdish cinema go back to the socialist militant-cinema movements in Turkey.

Kurdish cinema has carried the militant-cinema tradition forward with its approach to the Kurdish problem. One of the reasons why the Kurds are the largest stateless/statusless nation in the world is that the geography, where they have been populated for centuries, was divided into four after the First World War. Every time the Kurds made a demand for the right to self-determination, which is accepted as a national right in the world, they were suppressed with great violence. In this respect, the ignorance of the basic rights of the Kurds as a nation has led to great social traumas in the future. These traumas found their place in cinema through three basic codes: statelessness, border and death (Arslan, 2009).

Kurdistan, the geography where the Kurds, the world's largest stateless nation, have inhabited throughout history, was divided into four parts after the First World War. This fragmentation process, which was carried out without considering the sociological, cultural and economic structure of Kurdistan, has led to many internal borders. The Kurds, on the other hand, opposed the denial of their identity and the internal colonialization of the geography they lived in by others. That's why they rebelled in different forms (tribal form or political movement form and so on). However, these rebellions were suppressed in very bloody ways, except for the last one. In this respect, Kurdish cinema mediates the nation to rewrite its own history by telling such a historical reality that is not included in the official history of the four-nation state. In this respect, Kurdish cinema differs from the cinema of the other four nations. This can be stated as one of the main features of Kurdish cinema. Kurdish cinema, like other national cinemas, has been influenced by the cinema of other nations. But at the same time, as a national cinema, it created its own codes by looking at its national history and thus developed its own cinema language/code.

Therefore, as a national cinema, Kurdish cinema generally took over the socialist understanding of the Third-militant cinema and approached the national problem with this understanding/perspective and embarked on the path of creating a national cinema. In this respect, it can be said that Kurdish cinema has a method similar to the approach of the Kurdish Political Movement to the Kurdish problem. Cemil Bayık, one of the important figures of the Kurdish Political Movement, rejected the criticisms of being “nationalist” directed against their parties and stated that they grasped socialism before the national question and therefore approached the national question with the “socialist concept set”: “We arrived at the understanding of nation from socialism; not the other way around. We first met with socialism and grasped the national question in this way” (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2015: 496).

As a sub-branch of Kurdish cinema, the victim cinema uses a similar method. The features of the victim cinema, such as its choice of form, being biased (in favor of the oppressed), that is, speaking from a certain political-ideological position and instrumentalizing the cinema in line with this political position, bring it into the Third-militant cinema and “talk” about the national problem from there. While doing this, they have transferred the statelessness, fragmentation and massacres, which have turned into the historical “reality” of the Kurds as an oppressed nation, to the cinema through codes such as “statelessness, border and death”.

2.2. Kurdish Cinema as Political Cinema

Based on what we have tried to explain above, we can define Kurdish cinema as political cinema (Arslan, 2009; Çiftçi, 2015; Smets, 2015). After this “determination”, we can start to dig into the issue with a shovel, since not discussing where the political nature of the issue comes from will make our claim seem unfounded. We can start with a few general questions and work our way to the specific ones: What is a political film? Where does the political nature of a film come from? Does it make a film political in content or form? And finally: How can such general questions be answered in the context of Kurdish cinema? In this section, I will try to briefly answer these questions.

With the concept of “culture industry”, Adorno and Horkheimer drew attention to the economic-political nature of the issue by looking at the production process as well as

the consumption process of the mass culture of the period. Stam indicates that “deploying such Marxist concepts as commodification, reification, and alienation they coined the term ‘culture industry’ to evoke the industrial apparatus which produced and mediated popular culture, as well as the market imperatives underlying it” (2000: 68). In this way, thinkers have shown that the main ideology underlying the works of the culture industry is the ideology of capital. According to Comolli and Narboni, “Every film is political, inasmuch as it is determined by the ideology which produces it (or within which it is produced, which stems from the same thing” (2014: 30). The culture industry organizes the leisure time of the society according to the logic of capital by mass producing works/commodities for consumption. While society thinks that it experiences its leisure time “freely” by consuming the commodities of the culture industry through “entertainment”, in fact, it is becoming increasingly homogeneous and massive. According to Bernstein, “while Adorno nowhere identifies the culture industry with the political triumph of fascism, he does imply, both directly and indirectly, that the culture industry’s effective integration of society marks an equivalent triumph of repressive unification in liberal democratic states to that which was achieved politically under fascism” (2001: 13). A cultural “production model” based on industry, i.e. technique, was found problematic by Adorno and Horkheimer because it replaces the activity/power of man/society by technique. Since the technique is also in the hands of the economically advantageous, this power indirectly means bourgeois power. This concept was important in terms of showing how people lose their subject position from being the producer and consumer of culture and fall into a passive position only as a consumer. While the thinkers pointed to the monotonous and familiar structure of the films that pushed the audience into a passive position, they also showed their (films) relationship with capitalism.

They are so constructed that their adequate comprehension requires a quick, observant, knowledgeable cast of mind but positively debars the spectator from thinking, if he is not to miss the fleeting facts. This kind of alertness is so ingrained that it does not even need to be activated in particular cases, while still repressing the powers of imagination (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2017: 45).

Their ideas are very important in that they show that such a homogenized cultural production pacifies the audience by preventing them from thinking. However, it should be noted that although Adorno and Horkheimer have attributed a completely passive

position to the audience who consume the films, which are the commodities of the cultural industry, the audience actually has a certain autonomy. In addition, it cannot be said that every film has a complete ideological consistency (bourgeois ideology) within itself. “What the camera in fact registers is the vague, unformulated, untheorized, unthought-out world of the dominant ideology” (Comolli and Narboni, 2014: 30). As Hall (2003) states, films as cultural products emerge as a result of a collective and complex production process. This production process also causes contradictory and different ideological discourses to find their place in films. Therefore, it should not be forgotten that there are different ideologies and meanings that conflict with each other, which films try to convey and invoke (“interpellation”, Althusser, 1994), both in their form and in their content. According to Althusser, “ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called *interpellation* or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’” (1994: 130-131). At this point, there is a classic objection to Althusser; We don't look back every time ideology “calls” us. In other words, we are not entirely enslaved by the dominant ideology. However, it should not be forgotten that although there is a relative autonomy, we can say that the dominant ideology is the dominant ideology in the last instance (Kazancı, 2002). Therefore, the quality of making the cultural field subject by “interpellation” should not be ignored. Hall (2003) showed us how complex this process is in the context of television audiences in his short article Encoding and Decoding. Therefore, it should not be forgotten that the cultural field is a complex but equally important hegemonic field of struggle in terms of subjectivation and meaning production/consumption processes. Because of that as Comolli and Narboni (2014) indicate the first task of the filmmaker has to be displaying the cinema’s so-called “depiction of reality”.

In a movie, ideology can call the audience through content and form. But let's say that the important thing here, even the basic one, is the form. Because a film can absorb the political nature of a political issue by dealing with it in a very apolitical way. An example of this is the films that Comolli and Narboni show in the fourth category in

their famous article *Cinema/Ideology/Criticism*: “those films, increasingly numerous today, which have an explicitly political content (Z is not the best example as its presentation of politics is unremittingly ideological from first to last; a better example would be *Le Temps de Vivre*) but which do not effectively criticize the ideological system in which they are embedded because they unquestioningly adopt its language and its imagery” (2014: 32). Therefore, it is important to change the grammar of the language in terms of form in the criticism of ideology. Content/subject alone is not a sufficient criterion for determining whether a film is counter-hegemonic or whether it criticizes ideology. If a director who wants to approach a subject from a critical point of view adopts the cinematic language of the sovereign in terms of form, it will lead to a deficiency in terms of ideology criticism. Therefore, although the films deal with a political issue, if they cannot go beyond the borders of the dominant language, it cannot be said that they criticize ideology. Therefore, they actually remain intra-system.

As a result, films have ideological qualities as cultural commodities that emerge as a result of very different and long processes, and they “call” the audience to a certain ideological position with their content and form. Hence, according to Stam, “both technological *and* libidinal/ erotic components intersect to form the cinematic apparatus as a whole, producing a definition of the entire cinema-machine that goes beyond films themselves to the whole range of operations involved in their production and consumption, and one that places the spectator- as unconscious desiring subject- at the center of the entire process” (2005: 146). Therefore, we can actually see cinema as a field of hegemonic struggle where the audience is “called” to subjectification through the camera apparatus. Because of that, by giving reference to Kellner, it can be stated that “films may be a less sublime mode of culture, although they have their aesthetic moments of beauty and transcendence, and modernist moments of style, innovation, contestation, or resistance” (2009: 16).

Kurdish cinema, as a political cinema, has an ideological character and is in a hegemonic struggle. The victim cinema, which we will discuss in the context of this thesis, reveals its own side from the very beginning as a cinema that the directors

directly take sides: “Victim cinema highlights the perspective of one particular side of the conflict (usually the side of the ‘oppressed’)” (Smets, 2015: 2443).

Kurdish cinema is defined in different ways in the literature. Most of the scholars, while defining it, use the concept of Hamid Naficy’s “accented cinema”⁶. However, Kevin Smets (2015) offers a different concept such as “conflict cinema.” According to Smets, by giving a reference to Suner (2006), there are some commonalities between the Kurdish cinema and accented cinema, but not well-suited because the definition that made by Naficy can be seen in some other filmmakers who are not exile such as Bahman Ghobadi, Nuri Bilge Ceylan and Wang-Kar Wai. Therefore, Smets criticizes the concept of the accented cinema and adds that “cinemas of conflict are much less concerned with geographical spaces (in contrast to ‘accented cinema’), yet it does not ignore the impact of physical displacement and the intricacies of transnational cultural production” (2015: 2239). For Smets, Third Cinema (especially more radical form of it: militant cinema) is more convenient for Kurdish cinema than “accented cinema.”

⁶ As stated by Suner, “often, inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s conception of ‘minor literature’, theorists of ‘exilic/diasporic cinema’ argue that new cinematic languages articulated by members of diasporic communities in the West can be conceived as a distinct body of work with peculiar cultural, aesthetic and political characteristics” (2006: 365). As a cinema theorist, Hamid Naficy examines “exilic/diasporic cinema” in his book “An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking”. By the concept of “accented cinema”, Hamid Naficy refers to the films of Third World authors who went to the West as refugees, immigrants, and exiles, which became visible after the 1960s. According to Naficy, “these filmmakers are a prime example of the new postcolonial, Third World, and non-Western populations in the West whose work forms the accented cinema” (2001: 17). Therefore, it can be said that “displacement” appears as one of the basic codes of this cinema. In addition to this, Naficy also looks at the artistic and/or collective production of this cinema and reveals the difference of this cinema from other cinemas in these respects. Accented cinema does not represent a radical break with other cinemas, on the contrary, it has a symbiotic relationship with them: “Although it does not conform to the classic Hollywood style, the national cinema style of any particular country, the style of any specific film movement or any film author, the accented style is influenced by them all, and it signifies upon them and criticizes them. By its artisanal and collective mode of production, its subversion of the conventions of storytelling and spectator positioning, its critical juxtaposition of different worlds, languages, and cultures, and its aesthetics of imperfection and smallness, it critiques the dominant cinema” (Naficy, 2001: 26). In addition to this, it is worth mentioning the basic difference between “Accented Cinema” and “Third Cinema”, albeit briefly. The main difference between the two cinemas is their view of society, that is, the way they problematize it. While the Third Cinema looks at society with a socialist perspective and the class struggle (the people/mass versus others) forms the basis of this cinema, the Accented Cinema deals with social issues through individuals, “displacement”, nation, and identity rather than taking such a class perspective as a basis. Therefore, the class perspective does not form the basis/backbone of the accented cinema. As stated by Naficy, “if the Third Cinema films generally advocated class struggle and armed struggle, accented films favor discursive and semiotic struggles” (2001: 30-31).

By giving a reference to Mestman (2011), Smets says that “the main hypothesis of militant cinema is, ‘on the one hand, the necessary involvement and integration of the cinema group with specific political organizations; on the other, the instrumentalization of film in the process of liberation’” (2015: 2439). If it is remembered, when talking about the roots of Kurdish cinema, the political nature and importance of MKM Cinema Collective were mentioned. MKM Cinema Collective is an example of such a specific political organization.

In addition to Mestman, by benefiting from Godard’s ideas that are about militant cinema, a twofold cinema, Smets states that the level of involvement of filmmakers in conflicts is a significant feature of conflict cinema. By giving reference to Galtung, Smets indicate that, in the context of the conflict cinema, “where filmmakers are located vis-a-vis the core of the conflict -the position that Galtung calls contradiction- determines the way in which the conflict is imagined and what kind of film is made” (2015: 2240). This dimension has a significant impact on the topic handled by filmmakers. As stated by Smets (2015), the position of actors within a dispute is crucial, as Galtung’s (1969, 1996) conflict dynamics show. This has an impact on the films that are made about the war since those who are more directly involved in it often make movies that aim to mobilize and document, while those who are farther away make movies that reflect or inform (Smets, 2015: 2240).

According to Smets, four cultural fields can be mentioned within the framework of the relationship with conflict, and each of them corresponds to a different level of engagement with conflict as well as different cinematic language and production contexts: “1) Culture of death/battle cinema 2) Culture of violence/victim cinema 3) Negotiation culture/ human rights cinema 4) The culture of indifference” (Çelenk, 2022: 358). Victim cinema, put forward by Smets, is at the center of this model. The filmmakers in the victim cinema are those who are directly or indirectly affected by the current conflict. In this respect, these directors can be considered victims themselves. They also have experienced victimhood. They don’t take part in the front where there is a violent conflict like the filmmakers in battle cinema. However, these filmmakers get involved in the conflict with their cameras for ethnic, political, or other reasons. The fact that these filmmakers are not far from the center of the conflict leads

them to have or witness many traumatic experiences. “The cinema that is thus created is called here *victim cinema* and is made by *affected parties*” (Smets, 2015: 2442). It can be said that victim cinema has some common features with Hamid Naficy's accented cinema. As in accented cinema, this cinema also deals with issues such as journey narratives, traumatic events, and integration into the host country. Of course, as mentioned above, victim cinema, unlike accented cinema, does not limit itself to a certain geography. In other words, victim cinema has a wider geographical area than accented cinema. Therefore, this thesis is not limited to films set in geographies inhabited by Kurds. Films set in the western provinces of Turkey, and which can be included in the victim cinema will also be discussed in this thesis.

According to Wayne, “all films are political, but films are not all political in the same way” (Wayne, 2001: 1). The political character of Kurdish cinema stems from the political nature of the form it uses, as well as its contribution to the struggle for existence of a people whose existence is denied. In this respect, Kurdish cinema is a cinema that is directly involved in politics. Films that directly or indirectly focus on the Kurds in Turkish cinema are mostly based on the official ideology and history of the state in terms of representation. Thus, these films have contributed to the denial, ignoring, and assimilation policies of the state, knowingly or unknowingly, and ensured the continuity of these policies. In these films, Kurds are mostly represented in forms such as speaking distorted and dialectal Turkish, primitive, feudal, reactionary, and so on (Yücel, 2008). On the contrary, Kurdish cinema is political in that it expresses the “desire of a people to be visible” (Arslan, 2009), which has been denied, destroyed, and assimilated since the foundation of the Republic. They began to speak for themselves. Therefore, one of the reasons why Kurdish cinema is political is that it narrates the Kurdish Question and the Kurds from the perspective of the oppressed/Kurds, different from the official ideology and history of the state. To sum up, the political nature of Kurdish cinema is not only due to the fact that it deals with the subject from a different perspective in terms of form but also from a different point of view in terms of content.

2.3. The Structural and Institutional Barriers to Kurdish Cinema

There are a lot of structural deficiencies (such as lacks of institutional structure, nation-state and national territory) of Kurdish cinema that prevent regarding it as a nation cinema. However, as stated by Şengül, “recent works on the nation and globalization’s effect on cultural production allow us to reevaluate the scope of cinematic production and its relation with space” (2012: 33). These changing conditions offered the Kurds the opportunity to express their 'statelessness' through the art of cinema (Kılıç, 2009: 4). Changing economic, political conditions and technical developments on a global scale have led to the emergence of Kurdish cinema in a transnational space.

As indicated by Kılıç, “although cinema is an artistic endeavor, it is also an industry that rises above the economic and technical infrastructure” (2009: 14). As Devrim Kılıç stated, when talking about a national cinema, it is necessary to look not only at the language that distinguishes it from other cinemas, but also at its economic and technical infrastructure, which is an important determinant on this language. Considering this economic and technical infrastructure, it is obvious that Kurdish cinema is deprived of the most basic elements of this industry (Kılıç, 2009). Considering international festivals such as the London Kurdish Film Festival, the Berlin Film Festival, and the New York Kurdish Film and Culture Festival in recent years, it can be said that certain structural problems that hinder the development of Kurdish cinema have begun to be overcome with globalization. We can say that through such festivals, Kurdish cinema tries to overcome various nation-state pressures (especially Turkey and Iran today). In addition, Suncem Koçer's (2014) naming of Kurdish cinema as “transnational cinema” stems from the fact that such obstacles have been overcome to a certain extent together with the technical developments in the global arena. “Starting from in the second half of the 20th century, transnational mobility and electronic mass media opened up new imaginary spaces for individuals, through which they have been able to challenge and contest the discursive boundaries imposed by nation-states” (Koçer, 2014: 475). Thus, the negative influence of nation-states on the development of Kurdish cinema has lost its effect, albeit to a certain extent. Therefore, some developments in science and technology have led to the emergence of Kurdish cinema in a supranational area.

Although such positive developments have reduced the impact of the structural problems in front of Kurdish cinema to a certain extent, the negative impact of these structural problems still continues. It should be noted that from the end of the 2000s, the period that Kılıç refers to, to the beginning of the 2020s, there has not been a remarkable development in Kurdish cinema -with the exception of international film festivals--in the context of economic and political emancipation. Directors and producers face many economic and political challenges while making films.

For example, Hüseyin Karabey is just one of the important Kurdish directors struggling with economic difficulties like many other directors. After making his first movie (Gitmek, 2008) with funding from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism as well as many other international institutions, Karabey never received government support again (Sert, 2019). Due to economic problems, he was able to shoot one of his next films, Were Dengê Min (Come to My Voice, 2014), in only four years. In a newspaper where he talked about the movie “Come to My Voice”, Karabey says that they have applied to the Cinema Support Board of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism three times, but they could not get a result (Güvenç, 2013). In addition, Kazım Öz, in his statement to the internet newspaper Independent Turkish, expresses the effect of his oppositional stance on his art with these words:

Because I have an oppositional stance, I faced serious obstacles in reaching the masses for the films I made. Many of my movies have been officially and de facto blocked. Again, due to political obstacles, I had a hard time finding the budgets for the films I made. This also prevented me from making films in the quantity and quality I wanted. But we did not give up, of course, with the support of our people, friends and colleagues, I continued to make films under all circumstances, and I still do (Öksüz, 2021).

Politically, Kurdish directors (and directors of movie theaters where their films are screened) are accused many times of “propagandizing for a terrorist organization” and “membership of an armed terrorist organization” and are subjected to pressure. Ertuğrul Mavioğlu and Çayan Demirel were prosecuted for allegedly “propagandizing for a terrorist organization” because of the documentary Bakûr, in which they framed the Kurdish Political Movement. During this process, at a press conference held in solidarity with the directors, actress Nur Sürer stated that such lawsuits violate the freedom of expression and constitute a kind of threat to the directors (Sinemacılar

Yargılanıyor, 2022). As another example, Kazım Öz was sentenced to imprisonment from 7 years, 6 months to 15 years for joining the political academy of the BDP, which was closed in 2014, and for supporting the Gezi resistance. Therefore, since the political nature of Kurdish cinema and the militant stance of the directors pose a threat to the sovereign, these cinemas and directors are tried to be prevented. The directors both face shortage of funds to shoot films and are exposed to many political pressures.

In addition to such economic and political pressures, direct or indirect censorship can be counted as one of the important obstacles to the development of Kurdish cinema in Turkey. As stated by Akçalı, “even though there is no official film censorship in Turkey at present, political subjects always have been under scrutiny by the government, by financiers in the film industry, or by the filmmakers themselves throughout a film's production, distribution, and exhibition processes” (2019: 21). In other words, although there is no official censorship institution in Turkey, the state indirectly prevents the development of Kurdish cinema and the screening of Kurdish directors' films, too. For example, the “exhibition certificate” is actually an official document that fulfills the censorship function. Every film needs to take this certificate from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and after taking this certificate film can be shown at festivals. Therefore, as Akçalı state, it is “a regulated form of censorship” (2019: 21).

However, we have seen that the situation regarding censorship has become even more critical and grave recently. Apart from the state institution, a “de facto” censorship has begun to be applied to Kurdish directors and their films by the film festivals themselves in Turkey. This de facto censorship is broken from previous eras so that there is no need to hide. The statement made by the Kurdish-Alevi director from Dersim, Kazım Öz, on his social media account shows that there is such a censorship (Tuncel, 2022). In his statement, Kazım Öz states that he has received many awards from many important international film festivals and asks why none of his films pass the Pre-Selection Committee at festivals in Turkey (Golden Boll and Golden Orange Film Festivals) and draws attention to this de facto censorship. Considering how important the festivals are in terms of meeting the films with the audience and thus creating economic resources for the director for other film projects, it can be understood how

this kind of de facto censorship regime affects Kurdish cinema negatively. This situation is very important in terms of showing how big problems Kurdish cinema still has to deal with and what kind of structural obstacles it has to overcome in Turkey. As Akçalı stated:

If a filmic representation is based on an actual event or a character and it is inconsistent with official history, then it is likely to be scrutinized, criticized, and censored. This censorship is frequently unofficial, realized by minimal support in sponsorships, distribution networks, and exhibition venues as well as difficulty in obtaining shooting permissions in certain locations and in getting coverage on media (2019: 20).

Therefore, it can be stated that unless the structural (economic and political) obstacles in front of Kurdish cinema are overcome, its development will be slow.

It should be noted here that the political conjuncture is also important in the development of Kurdish cinema. An example of this is the increase in production in the Kurdish cultural field during the peace processes⁷. For example, Duygu Atlas (2018) look at the different peace processes, and she claimed that, about the “democratic opening” process, there are two significant developments (1-strengthening of Kurdish identity and 2-making possible to handle different dimensions of the Kurdish reality such as artistic and cultural production) in Kurdish area. The most important one is the second one which is about artistic and cultural production:

Secondly, the relaxation of the restrictions on the markers of Kurdish ethnic identity, most specifically the use of Kurdish, and the emergence of a political atmosphere which allowed relative freedom to discuss the different dimensions of the Kurdish reality, engendered a surge in artistic and cultural production among the Kurds (Atlas, 2018: 822).

⁷ Negotiation/peace processes also accompany the violent conflict between the state and the Kurdish Political Movement, which has been going on for almost forty years. The "democratic opening" announced in 2009 was one of these negotiation processes. The "democratic opening" (demokratik açım) project, started by Turkey's ruling AKP in the middle of 2009, represented a change in the official Turkish stance on the matter from the historical denial of the existence of the Kurdish people and attempts at assimilation to that of a limited acknowledgement of the Kurdish reality (Atlas, 2018: 821). The closest to peace in these negotiation processes is the process called "Peace Process" (Barış Süreci) or "Solution Process" (Çözüm Süreci), which was announced on March 21, 2013.

As can be seen, in periods when certain structural problems are tried to be overcome (negotiation processes between the state and the Kurdish Political Movement), the Kurdish cultural sphere in general and Kurdish cinema, in particular, are revived.

Some Kurdish directors dealing with political issues resort to using a different cinematic form/language in order to overcome the increasing obstacles, especially during conflict processes. According to Akçalı (2019), one of the reasons for the emergence of the “essayistic tendency” in the films about conflict in the recent Kurdish cinema is to overcome such political obstacles. “[T]he functions and consequences of their essayistic expressions ... that essayism allows the filmmakers to deal with political matters on a personal level and to pose challenges to what is considered taboo without directly exposing sides and making accusations” (Akçalı, 2019: 21). According to Akçalı, such a hybrid cinema language has some important functions. On the one hand, this language of cinema provides the opportunity to discuss subjects that are taboo in Turkey through individual issues, on the other hand, this language of cinema provides an opportunity to overcome existing political and economic obstacles. The likelihood of scrutiny, citation, and censorship increases if a filmic representation of an actual event or character differs from accepted history (Akçalı, 2019: 21).

The existence of the directors' personal opinions and autobiographical connections to the stories, combined with the films' in-between quality, are two crucial factors in identifying those with essayistic representations (Akçalı, 2019: 20). Akçalı lists a series of films in this direction. Among these films, there is only one that we will discuss in this thesis: *Voice of My Father*. Although this film is a fictional film from beginning to end, the real voice of the director's father has an important place in the film. There is acting from start to finish in this film, even though the characters represent themselves. From this point of view, we can say that the film is fiction, although it is the real voice of the director's father recorded in the past as an element that adds a documentary quality to the film. At this point, it will be useful for us to make a comparison between two films (*Voice of My Father* and *On the Way to School*) with essayistic representation. While there is full acting in the film *Voice of My Father*, there is no acting in the film *On the Way to School*. The camera only moves around the village and the village school, just like Dziga Vertov's camera (*Man with a Movie*

Camera). Directors don't tell anyone what to do. Due to these features of the film, *On the Way to School* is shown as a documentary in Amsterdam. On the other hand, *Voice of My Father* is based on fiction, and there is all the acting in this movie. What the characters will say, how they should behave, and so on is predetermined. Therefore, we can say that; While the camera goes after the image (reality) in the film *On the Way to School*, the image is brought in front of the camera in the film *Voice of My Father*. Although both films refer to the personal lives of the filmmakers, there is such a cinematic difference between them. Based on this difference, we considered and analyzed the film *Voice of My Father* as fiction.

As a result of the long-range struggle of the Kurds in response to the denial and assimilationist policies, the state had to de facto accept the existence of the Kurds ("Kurdish reality") in the 1990s. As Güneş cited the work of Bahcheli and Noel (2011: 101-2): "In 1991, the veteran politician Süleyman Demirel announced, 'we recognize the Kurdish reality'. And, in 1995, the Motherland Party's Mesut Yılmaz linked Turkey's EU prospects to solving the Kurdish question" (2014: 269). However, as stated by Yeğen this recognition didn't mean that Turkish nationalism recognise both cultural and political rights of Kurds: "You, but not your rights, are recognized" (2007: 137). For example, Bayir looks at the AYM's case law (Constitutional Court) in the context of the right of self-determination of Kurds, and, as Bayir shows, AYM doesn't consider Kurds as a distinctive nation: "The Kurds have often been mentioned by the Turkish judiciary euphemistically with reference to a particular 'region' and, alongside their being described as nomadic and tribal people, their particularities have been explained as being a result of 'regional formations'" (2013: 19). Therefore, it can be said that the denial policy of the state has no longer been valid as of the 1990s, even though the Kurds have not officially had a status that would legally guarantee their own existence and be accepted as equal citizens. However, the next period, namely the 2000s, will be a period in which contradictory political developments (conflict and resolution are intertwined). Intense conflicts that continued throughout the last quarter of the 20th century (not counting the periods when the Kurdish Political Movement declared a unilateral ceasefire) have been replaced by processes in which "open" negotiations and conflict are intertwined in the 21st century.

The negotiations, which were held in Oslo in 2009, defined by concepts such as “Kurdish Opening”, “Democratic Opening” and so on, continued for a certain period of time and then left their place to intense conflicts. In this process, as Güneş indicate, the AKP used the establishment of the first Kurdish-language channel, TRT6, as proof of their “democratic” approach to the Kurdish question. The AKP's persistent failure to commit to the complete acceptance of the Kurds' linguistic rights, including as the provision of education in the Kurdish language, raises questions about the level of its tolerance, nevertheless (Güneş, 2014: 270). Right after that, a new negotiation process started in 2013, expressed with concepts such as “Solution Process” and “Peace Process”. It can be said that this new process is much more advanced than the others in many respects (“opening” negotiations, Wise People Committee and Dolmabahçe Agreement, etc.). However, with the end of the period in which social peace is most approached, the period in which social peace is most distant has started at the same time. This conflicting process continues to the present day. In this period, the approach of the state has evolved to deny the existence of the Kurdish problem rather than the existence of Kurds. As a result, the AKP period of the last twenty years has been the closest and the furthest to a solution to the Kurdish problem. In some periods, it was seen that big steps were taken, but then it was seen that the state (or the AKP as a state power) approached the issue instrumentally. In other words, when the existence of the Kurdish problem was acknowledged, the state's approach to the issue was instrumental and insincere. The state consciously tried to avoid the political nature of the issue and insisted that the issue was not of a political nature. In this way, the strategy of the state, which tried to monopolize and a-politicize the issue, was to try to compress the Kurdish problem into an individual and cultural field. Harun Ercan calls this approach adopted by the state on the Kurdish issue during the AKP period as “making do with Kurdish question”. Let's quote a long quote:

The Turkish state's decision to reduce the cultural rights of the Kurds to the category of ‘individual rights’ by keeping the political power sharing out of the consensus ground and opening up space for Kurdish culture can also be included in the scope of the strategies to make do with the Kurdish problem. Therefore, it is possible to interpret a framework in which only the cultural rights of the Kurds are established as the expansion of the repertoire of administrative strategies of the Turkish State (Ercan, 2009: 111).

Ercan claims that the policy followed by the state regarding the Kurdish language to find a place for itself in the public and media are actually a management strategy. He supports this claim with the example that Ahmet Türk's speech in Kurdish in the DTP parliamentary group in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was not broadcast on TRT state television. This is a contradiction, and under this contradiction lies this management strategy. While the state opens a space for Kurdish on the one hand, it also determines the boundaries of this area on the other hand. As long as Kurdish is limited in the cultural field (TRT 6) and does not spread to the political field, there is no problem for the state. However, the moment the Kurdish language becomes politicized, the state's "old" policies of oppression and ignorance come into play. Like Ercan, according to Güneş (2014), the main purpose of this approach of the AKP ("solving" the Kurdish question through small and symbolic political reforms) is to reduce the influence of Kurdish nationalism on the Kurds and to depoliticize the Kurdish question.

During the AKP rule, the existence of the Kurdish problem -in parallel with the AKP's ideologically contradictory and inconsistent understanding of politics- was occasionally instrumentalized in line with its short-term political interests, but it was also denied. Therefore, it can be said that the state and AKP approached the issue in a frivolous, insincere, and instrumental way. However, while acknowledging the existence of the Kurdish problem, as Harun Ercan puts it, a "making do with Kurdish problem" logic is at play, there is also a case of narrowing the scope of the issue and liquidating the Kurds politically. There is a situation where the political nature of the Kurdish problem is cut off and it is wanted to be handled only as an individual and cultural issue and this is imposed on the society.

As a result, Kurdish cinema is faced with many structural (economic, political, etc.) problems in Turkey. With the technical and scientific developments, access to international funds and the proliferation of co-productions, some obstacles to the development of Kurdish cinema have been neutralized. However, due to the oppression and (de facto) censorship policies of the sovereign nation-states, Kurdish cinema still progresses slowly and continues on its way as an "audienceless" cinema in the Middle East. Kurdish directors make films, but their films are not seen within

the borders of the nation-state in which they live, because the audience is denied access to these films, and these films are mostly overshadowed. One of the limitations of this thesis is the difficulty in accessing these films. I couldn't find every movie I wanted. Therefore, the obstacles in front of Kurdish cinema prevent it not only from reaching the audience, but also from being talked about and written about in the field of literature such as academic, and so on.

2.4. Which Directors Can Be Included in This Cinema?

Due to the political and economic barriers mentioned above, this study does not include films (and their directors) that ideologically overlap with the state's approach to the Kurdish issue, without considering the ethnic identity of the director, within the boundaries of Kurdish cinema. Films that look at the Kurdish problem within the framework of the state discourse were excluded. “Whenever the Kurdish question was mentioned in TSD (Turkish State Discourse), it was mentioned as an issue of either reaction, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but never as an ethno-political question” (Yeğen, 1999: 555).⁸ In other words, films representing Kurds as primitive, patriarchal, traditional, feudal, reactionary, etc., and their directors are out of the scope of this study. In this respect, the films of Kurdish or Turkish directors who point their cameras at Kurds, which overlap with the official ideology and history of the state, by directors such as Mahsun Kırmızıgül, Yılmaz Erdoğan, Reis Çelik, Gani Rüzgâr Şavata, etc., are not included in Kurdish cinema.

Not all of a director's films have to be about Kurds in order to be included in Kurdish cinema. For example, Hüseyin Karabey's movie “Inside People” (İçerdekiler) is not about Kurds. However, we still include Karabey in Kurdish cinema because of the Kurdish representations in his other films. On the other hand, when we look at Yeşim Ustaoğlu's films, the director's only film *Journey to the Sun* is about the Kurds. Yeşim Ustaoğlu can be included in Kurdish cinema with this movie, as she is in conflict with the official ideology/history understanding of the state in this movie. In this film, Ustaoğlu criticizes state policies by addressing the unsolved murders, the pressure on

⁸ For Mesut Yeğen's book in which he analyzes such state discourses in much more detail, see: Yeğen, M. (2011). *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* (5th edition). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

the press, the evacuation of villages, the pressures on detention in prisons, the mother tongue problem, and does not reduce the Kurdish issue to a simple cultural issue. In other words, Ustaoglu also points to the political nature of the Kurdish question. To the extent that this is the case, Ustaoglu's film can be included in Kurdish cinema.

Therefore, it is a director's film that can be included in Kurdish cinema as long as it deals with the Kurdish problem from a political perspective. A director can be involved in two different cinemas, as Hamid Dabashi (2009) states in the preface to the book *Kurdish Cinema: Homelessness, Border, Death*. Therefore, if Kurdish directors can be included in other cinemas, directors of other cinemas dealing with the Kurdish issue can also be involved in Kurdish cinema. The distinction to be made here is the following: Films or directors that thematize the Kurdish issue using a discourse that takes into account the political demands of the oppressed apart from the state discourse, that is, the dominant discourse, can be included in this cinema.

However, since this study revolves around concepts such as homeland and belonging, the films of the directors who define themselves as Kurds will be examined, since the Kurds' right to self-determination will be taken into account and what the Kurds want will be examined. In another study, the perception of Kurdistan and Turkey among the Kurds in the films of Turkish directors who accept the political nature of the Kurdish problem can be looked at separately. Therefore, the films of directors such as Yeşim Ustaoglu, Özcan Alper or Sedat Yılmaz were also excluded from the scope of the study. Others have always spoken on behalf of the Kurdish people - in terms of self-determination - until today. In this study, we will listen to the “voice” of the Kurds in the films of Kurdish directors who consider the Kurdish problem as a political issue and who have been affected (victim) by this problem in one way or another.

To further clarify the distinction here, let's add the following: The way the director is involved in the conflict is important to us. Based on the model that Smets (2015) put forward by considering the distance of the director to the conflict, we stated that Kurdish cinema is classified in three different ways: Battle Cinema films by fighting parties, Victim Cinema films by affected parties, and Human Rights Cinema films by concerned parties. In addition, as mentioned above, this thesis does not examine films

that deny the Kurdish question or that deal with the Kurdish issue in the context of state discourses (reactionaryism, tribal resistance, banditry, provocation of foreigners and regional backwardness) as stated by Yeğen. At the same time, it excludes films parallel to the official ideology of the state, which reduces the issue to an individual and cultural problem, as Harun Ercan states. While determining the films included in Kurdish cinema, it is an important criterion that “the Kurdish question and Kurdish identity are told in a context that surrounds the film from the outside, and even being a party/engagement in it” (Özdil, 2009: 222). Therefore, in this study, Kurdish cinema and the directors to be included in it are defined, not the fact that the film deals with the Kurds, but how it deals with the Kurds. As Ayça Çiftçi (2015) stated, since Kurdish cinema is a political and national cinema, we need to state that it respects the right of a particular nation to self-determination and therefore takes sides like all other cinemas.

In conclusion, let us state the following: The debates on the nature and limits of Kurdish cinema in the field of cinema and academia can be read as a struggle for discourse. As Suncem Koçer (2014) stated, the answers to the question of what determines whether a film will be included in Kurdish cinema show that there is a discursive struggle in this area. “‘Kurdish cinema’ emerges as a genre, an orienting framework for the production and reception of films by and about Kurds, and the discourse that generates this genre simultaneously unifies and fragments it, as discursive agreements and disagreements about the past and present of Kurdish cinema materialize” (Koçer, 2014: 486). It is these discursive struggles that define the boundaries of Kurdish cinema. Although this elimination process is carried out over three basic claims/criteria (1-Identity of the director of the film, 2-The subject of the film, 3-Language of the film), the criteria can be reviewed in the context of the subject discussed. In this thesis, I have limited Kurdish cinema to the identity of the directors (Kurd) and the distance of the director to the conflicts (the organic relationship between the subject he deals with in the film) due to the subject I have dealt with.

2.5. Nationalism and Imagining Nation Through Cinema

The cultural field (popular forms of representation such as novels and newspapers etc.) is important in that it enables one to imagine oneself as a member of an “imagined

community” (Anderson, 1991). In other words, the cultural sphere has great importance in terms of national consciousness. In the modern period, for Benedict Anderson, this collective consciousness was made possible by a common language and its expression in “print capitalism” (Stam, 2014: 101). “[N]ationality, or as one might prefer to put it in view of what word’s multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefact of a particular kind” (Anderson, 1991: 4). Nationalism and “national consciousness” as an “artefact”, that is, cultural construction, have been produced in Kurdish society through different forms of cultural representation, especially after the 1990s, with the development and spread of science and technology.

For instance, the late 80s and the early 90s was a period when the video revolution was coming to Turkey, first with relatively low-quality consumer, prosumer, semi-professional analog video (VHS, Video8, S-VHS, Hi8, U-matic etc.), quickly followed by better quality digital tape-based video (mini-DV, DVCAM, etc.) and desktop editing (Candan, 2016: 5).

With the development of these and similar communication technologies and the “democratization” of these technologies in parallel with globalization, the Kurds have more easily reached the tools that will allow them to think of themselves as an “imagined community”. The ease of access to such technological tools helped the Kurds to create a sovereignty area in the sky, if not on earth. The channel overcame the international boundaries that have divided the region in which Kurds live since 1918 and allowed them to establish a strong form of internal communication for the first time in their history, undermining the state-centered geopolitical order that has reduced them to the status of powerless minorities (Hassanpour, 1998: 53). The majority of Kurdish media today may be seen as being a part of a culture of resistance against the hegemony of national governments and the dominating historiography of Kurdish ethnicity from a Middle Eastern perspective. Mass media have played a significant role in developing Kurdish nationalism (Smets and Akkaya, 2016: 193). Especially with the opening of Med TV (and with the closure of this channel as a result of the pressure of the state, Medya TV and its successor Roj TV and today Medya Haber), the first Kurdish channel, in the early 90s, this imagination got stronger. In addition to mass media such as TV and radio, after the 2000s, cinema, which is an

important form of cultural representation, started to support this imagination from a different front.

With the success of Iranian Kurdish director Bahman Ghobadi's 'A Time for Drunken Horses' (2000), Kurdish cinema has grown to be a significant component of Kurdish cultural production and has achieved internal visibility (Smets and Sengul, 2016: 251). In order to maintain their political existence within the various nation-states that separate them as a people and subject them to a variety of assimilation policies, Kurds, a transnational people without a nation-state of their own, have produced films (along with other forms of artistic and cultural productions) (Koçer and Candan, 2016: x). For example, by means of cinema self-identification and recognition processes can be constructed. By referencing Barker and Galasinski (2001), Şimşek state that a relative conceptualization of self-identification and social recognition, as distinct from and in opposition to imaginative identifications with the nation-state icons and discourses, is provided by linguistic action (diegetic use of the Kurdish language) and the interaction of particularly located speaking subjects (2021: 761). Therefore, as Çiçek quotes Kılıç (2009) “cinematic art, similar to other art forms, is the action of reproduction life in the format of film with image and sound. In this respect, cinema provides an opportunity for Kurdish people ... to reproduce and present to the world their own identity and culture (2011: 2).” After the 2000s, Kurdish cinema has adopted certain cinematic codes (with the contributions of young directors such as Bahman Ghobadi from Iran-Kurdistan, Hiner Saleem from Iraq-Kurdistan, and Kazım Öz and Hüseyin Karabey from MKM Cinema Collective Center in Turkey), who received awards from many international festivals. By creating *-Statelessness, Border and Death* (Arslan, 2009)- it enabled the Kurds to gain existence/representation in the cinematic image universe. Kurdish national identity has gained a historical presence in the field of cinema with these codes. Films arrange events and activities in a chronological narrative that proceeds toward fulfillment, just as nationalist literary fictions inscribe on a multitude of occurrences the Notion of a linear, intelligible destiny, and therefore mold thinking about historical time and national history (Stam, 2014: 102). In short, Kurdish filmmakers have built a new front of resistance by giving historical visibility to the Kurdish nation in response to the denial, annihilation and assimilation policies

of the culturally dominant nation-states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) through the camera apparatus. The geography of Kurdistan, which was divided into four parts after World War I, was reunited with Kurdish cinema as an “imaginary”. However, the geography of Kurdistan has been constructed as a national geography in different ways in cinema (Yılmaz, 2009).

We said above that Kurdish cinema has formed certain basic codes over time. These codes have expanded over time. For instance, these codes of Kurdish cinema are enlarged by Soner Sert in his book which name is “Cinema of the Stateless Nation) (2019). According to Sert, in addition to statelessness, border and death, there are also three important elements of the Kurdish cinema: mountain, snow, and road. While “statelessness” has an important place among these codes, it expresses a concrete reality: Kurds are the largest stateless nation in the world. However, this does not mean that the Kurds as a nation do not envision a homeland (homeland) on earth. In other words, the fact that the Kurds are stateless does not mean that they do not have a dream of a homeland, a place where they feel they belong. As a form of cultural representation, Kurdish cinema is not only a political cinema, but also a national cinema. As a nation's cinema, it is also important to understand who (or what) within this nation (or where) they regard as their homeland. On the one hand, Kurdish cinema uses the code of statelessness to describe the “statuslessness” of the Kurdish nation as a concrete reality, on the other hand, it also constructs a national identity by pointing out the reasons for this. For example, while looking at the identity construction process in Kurdish cinema through sound and image, Şimşek says the following about this cinema: “[T]he primary characteristic of a Kurdish cinema is its potentials as a self-reflexive means for self-identification and social recognition in terms of transforming and transcending the trauma experience through an impure production of meaning informed by both sight and sound” (2016: 367). While we are looking at the imagination of the homeland in the victim cinema, we will take the scenes where the characters express the nostalgia of the homeland or that point to the nostalgia of the homeland. Thus, we will try to understand where is envisioned as homeland and what is considered as homeland (a certain geographical region or language).

2.6. Imagination of the Fixed Homeland in the Literature

After the 2000s, with the emergence of Kurdish cinema as a form of cultural representation where Kurds speak for themselves, a new “academic research object” has emerged for Kurdish studies in the academic field. Parallel to the development of Kurdish cinema, studies on Kurdish cinema have also made progress in the academic field. In these studies, it is generally understood that Kurdish cinema is a political cinema, has a transnational character (Kılıç, 2009; Gündoğdu, 2010; Şengül, 2012; Koçer, 2014; Çiftçi, 2016; Şimşek, 2018) and has a close connection with the Kurdish issue (Özdil, 2009; Atlas, 2018; Hussain, 2020). Therefore, although Kurdish cinema, as a political cinema, feeds on transnational areas, it stands before us as a form of representation that should be carefully considered to the extent that it is deeply connected with the Kurdish problem. In other words, the intertwining of Kurdish cinema with the Kurdish problem means that Kurdish cinema cannot be understood without considering the political sphere. That's why we think it would be beneficial for those who are “interested in the Kurdish issue” to look here. Based on this thought, I wondered where the Kurds, the world's largest stateless nation, envision as their homeland. In other words, I questioned what and where is imagined as the homeland in Kurdish cinema.

In the literature, “Kurdistan as a cultural geography” has always been considered as a fixed and unchanging Kurdish geography. What kind of images about the geography of Kurdistan are produced (Özdil, 2009; Sert, 2019) has been the subject of some studies, but whether there is a sense of belonging to another place outside the borders of Kurdistan, except for a few studies, has not been mentioned in general. The progress of Kurdish cinema through codes such as “statelessness, border and death” in the early periods led academic studies to naturally concentrate on the borders dividing Kurdistan from within. Where the outside begins or what the interior includes has often been overlooked. However, while the Kurdish Political Movement has undergone a paradigm shift in real politics after the 2000s, political discourses such as “Türkiyelileşme” (Turkeyfication), “Common Homeland” and “Living Together” have started to become more audible in Kurdish politics. Since the HDP (People's Democratic Party), which entered the general elections on June 7, 2015, with such

statements, it has been the party that received the highest number of votes in Kurdish politics (we do not claim that such a vote was received only with such a discourse). Considering the HDP's organic bond with its base, this situation indicates that there has been a change in the sense of belonging/homeland of the Kurds in general (I leave the question of which Kurds are for later). In other words, it has been ignored that the sense of belonging or the understanding of the homeland of the Kurds may change. In addition, the fragmentation within the Kurds has been ignored and the Kurds have always been handled as a single and holistic one, and as a result, an important factor/determinant such as class in the expansion or contraction of the borders in the imagination of the homeland has been constantly ignored. Therefore, we can talk about the existence of a methodological problem in the literature.

As a result, what kind of effect the class formation of the Kurds has on their imagination of homeland or belonging remains an important question. In this thesis, we will try to look at where/what Kurds who were displaced after forced or “voluntary” migration in the victim cinema, which is a sub-branch of Kurdish cinema, consider as their homeland. In other words, we will try to look at where they feel they belong, starting with the concept of nostalgia.

Before moving on to the discussion of Belonging and Nostalgia in the next section, it would be helpful to take a brief look at the conflict in Turkey and the displaced Kurds. By doing so, we can have a historical perspective on the issue of belonging of displaced Kurds. In addition to that, we will have a certain historical background for the films that we will examine in this thesis.

2.7. Warfare, Internally Displaced Persons, and Social/Cultural Capital

In the history of Turkey, there can be seen many insurgents or movements that were made by the leadership of different Kurdish organizations. The last insurgent, the Kurdish Political Movement (from now on “the Movement”) has been continuing for more than forty years. Therefore, the state has been trying to annihilate the Movement for many years. The Turkish state has historically used a variety of forceful and "benevolent" methods of political control in its attempts to quell the long-running Kurdish unrest (Özsoy and Yörük, 2013: 153). However, when looking at the

repertoires used or policies that are produced by Turkish state it can be understood that the state hasn't only target the Movement, it also targets Kurdish people who are located in the conflict area. In other words, concordantly with targeting the annihilation of the Movement, Kurdish people who live in Kurdish-inhabited areas have also been targeted by the state for many years. According to a study conducted by KONDA in 2011, only 6 percent of the Kurds are unaffected by the conflict that has been going on for the last 30 years.⁹ Işık (2021: 5) points to human rights violations involving Turkish soldiers in the reports of Human Rights Watch (1995) and quotes the following from the report: "Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were able to identify Bolu and Kayseri soldiers, and reported that they were involved in numerous violations of the laws of war, including village destructions, indiscriminate fire, and kidnapping civilians who were then forced into serving as porters during Army patrols". The main reason for these violations of the state is to change and rebuild the area in line with its own interests. Jongerden expresses the main purpose of the state in evacuation and destruction of villages, with reference to Özdağ (2003) and Pamukoğlu (2003):

The Turkish state's evacuation and destruction of villages was not simply punishment, nor a mindless response, or collateral damage. On the contrary, it was constitutive of the counter-insurgency strategy of the Turkish military to change the space of combat to its favor (2010: 3).

As a result, historically, looking at the Kurdish Question in Turkey, it can be seen that every insurgent is quashed violently by the state, but the violence of the state does not only target people who participate in the insurgency, but also civilians who lived there. Hereby, these policies cause massive, forced migration from Kurdish inhabited areas to the west of Turkey.

The state to prevent the growth of the Movement in Kurdish inhabited areas has been trying to dehumanize the Kurdish inhabited areas. Because, as stated by Jongerden;

During the course of the 1980s, the PKK sent militants educated in guerilla warfare in northern Lebanon to the Kurdistan Region in Turkey, and started to rebuild up forces in the countryside. In this build-up of forces, villages in the countryside become for the organization what the houses had been in the urban

⁹ KONDA, A. (2011). *Kürt Meselesinde Algı ve Beklentiler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

environment: the nodes in an extended network. They were both steppingstones for swift movement as well as resources, the villages now providing the guerilla with shelter, logistical support, recruits and intelligence (2010: 2-3).

For the dehumanization of the Kurdish-inhabited areas, the state applies distinctive methods, such as using legal and illegal strategies, to break the logistic support of the Movement. For example, the state first declared the State of Emergency in Kurdish populated areas. Government directives, regional governorship orders under the state of emergency, and political documents from the National Security Council were used to manage the region (Kurdish populated areas) (Şahin Fırat, 2016: 85 cited in Çelik, 2016: 76). In addition, the state forced Kurdish people to be village guard to fight against the Movement. The state first legalized the temporary village guard and later made it permanent. When people reject the state's "propose" of being a village guard, the state applied to evacuating/burning the village (Çelik, 2016).

On the other hand, to annihilate the Movement, the state also applies some illegal methods. For instance, Göral and others' report (2014) on forced disappearances can be more helpful to understand the annihilation repertoires (1-Denial, 2-Threat, 3-Criminalization, 4-Ensuring Institutional Cooperation) of the state used against Kurdish people. Especially work done by Ayhan Işık (2021), too, can be helpful to see the types of paramilitary violence (unsolved political murders, enforced disappearances and the forced evacuation of villages, and so on) and paramilitary groups (the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Organization, an informal death squad established in the late 1980s; the Village Guards, a semi-formal organization and the largest paramilitary group in Turkey, established on 28 March 1985; the Police Special Team, established in the mid-1980s as a semi-legal unit; and Hizbullah, which emerged in the early 1980s and side with the state against the PKK, particularly in the first half of the 1990s) that used by the state in the war with the Movement. Paramilitary forces were created and existing groups with paramilitary characteristics were activated by the state agencies in the initial stage of the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state (Işık, 2021: 14). Shortly, the state tried to dehumanize the Kurdish inhabited areas by means of legal and illegal strategies, and by this way, it aimed to cut the umbilical cord of the Movement.

As a result of these legal and illegal strategies of the state, there occurred massive and forced migration from the east and south-east parts of Turkey to the west part of it.

The most crucial outcome of forced migration is the resettlement of rural Kurdish people in major cities, including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Izmit, Mersin, and Adana. In other words, the Kurdish question has become an ethnopolitical and urban/metropolitan issue instead of remaining within regional limits (Göral, 2016: 114).

The rapid Kurdish migration into these [western cities] has caused the "problem" of the Kurds to expand beyond the armed conflict in eastern and southeastern Anatolia between the PKK and the Turkish state to now include the social interactions of the Kurdish migrants there (Saraçoğlu, 2011: 241). After migration to the west side of the country, Kurdish people encounter(ed) many difficulties there. The socio-cultural contrasts they confront in the city they came from and the "exclusion" and "stigmatization" they are exposed to are another cause of stress for the Kurdish subalterns, who lack even the bare minimum social and cultural capital to facilitate their hold on the city (Şen, 2019: 282).¹⁰ "Kurdishness, which has been 'marginalized' through 'kıro, hanzo, etc.', has become the focus of these stigmatization techniques and racist dominant discourses" (Sustam, 2020: 25). Since the 1990s, Kurds who have immigrated to Turkish regions have been called a variety of additional racial epithets, including "dirty Kurds," "bigot Kurds," "terrorists," "Armenians," "kıros," and "kekos," as well as the phrases "Go back to where you came from!" and "Don't speak Kurdish here!" and "The best Kurd is a dead Kurd" (Yarkın, 2022: 84). As seen in these racist slurs, being anti-Kurdish and anti-Armenian are quite common in Turkish society.¹¹ For example, looking at another Yarkın's (2020) article, it can be seen that

¹⁰ It should be noted here that the Kurds, who have a certain socio-cultural capital, are also exposed to discrimination and see their unemployment as either their ethnic identity or not having "sufficient" socio-cultural capital. For example, Faruk, who also has a certain socio-cultural capital but considers himself inadequate because he is unemployed, explains his unemployment in Turkey as follows: "Being from Bingöl is a disadvantage, not having the view of the government is a disadvantage, not having a foreign language is a disadvantage, I'm not an expert in any subject, and I don't like my job. I see myself at a wholesale disadvantage." For this important study on white collar unemployment in Turkey, see: Bora, A., et al (eds.). (2017). *Boşuna Mı Okuduk?: Türkiye'de Beyaz Yakalı İşsizliği*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

¹¹ Being Armenian is used as an insult by racists in Turkey. Turkish President R. T. Erdoğan said that in 2014: "Some called me a Georgian. Other called me even, excuse me, an Armenian in a shameful way. I am a Turk!" (Bianet, 2014).

Kurdish people were exposed to many minor racist practices in everyday life at that time. After forced migration to the western cities, many Kurdish families didn't find a house for rent during this process. Therefore, they worked hard to buy or built their own house. The reason behind this phenomenon (the phenomenon of "prevalence of Kurdish home ownership" in the west) is the exclusion of Kurdish people because of the criminalization of them in Turkish society by the state's ideological apparatuses. Another example of such social relations is that Delal Aydın (2009) points out the criminalization of Kurdish children in Turkish media by using interchangeably the terms such as "street urchins" and "huffer-child" after the migration of Kurds to west part of the country. IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) are frequently viewed as enemies rather than as citizens who need to be protected, particularly whether they are members of a national minority or a marginalized group distant from the dominant identification group (Ayata and Yüksek, 2005: 8).

Therefore, it can be said that the social connections/relations between Turkish and Kurdish people were so weak and sensitive during this process. In other words, it wasn't possible to talk about the objective conditions of "living together" or the integration of Kurdish people into the society in the west by protecting their identity that was rejected by the state¹². Mustafa Şen states that in the context of Ayazma, one of the poor neighborhoods of Istanbul, here, there is a "natural" territory between subaltern Kurds and Turkish-Sunni people. The proposal of the subalterns stigmatized as Shafi-Kurds to build a mosque together was rejected by their Sunni-Turkish neighbors as follows: "We do not pray behind your back" (Şen, 2019: 285). İlknur Üstün states that ethnic discrimination in blue-collar jobs is more visible than in white-collar jobs and lists the examples of ethnic discrimination that subaltern Kurds are exposed to as follows: "Employment of Kurdish workers working in seasonal jobs for lower wages than local workers, tagging [ethnic profiling] of those who come, not letting [Kurds] into the city centre, even efforts to not employ Kurdish workers and bring workers from Georgia" (2017: 157). Such practices are carried out by employers

¹² Here it can be mentioned about the phd thesis of Cenk Saraçoğlu which handle the perception of Kurdish people in İzmir; and also, for looking the important criticize of this thesis: Küçük, B. (2015). "Yerleşmenin ve evrenselleşmenin ötesinde Kürt sorununu yeniden düşünmek". *Mülkiye Dergisi*, 39(2), pp. 61-84.

and public officials of the state. Hence, in addition to traumatic past, the policies, such as criminalization, exclusion, marginalization, etc., that followed by the state (and society) and its ideological apparatuses prevent(ed) to have a sense of belonging to Kurdish people in the west. Besides these hostile policies of the state and society, living under the bad economic conditions where Kurds migrate has effect on their integration into Turkish society.

After the migration to the western or eastern city centers, Kurds mostly worked and lived under bad living conditions. As stated in TESEV reports:

IDPs received almost no aid during the initial years of displacement from the authorities for resettlement in other areas in terms of assistance for housing, food, cash, access to education, health care, and employment opportunities. Therefore, the displaced have often joined the ranks of the urban poor in south-eastern cities (such as Diyarbakır, Batman, Hakkari and Van) as well as metropolises (such as İstanbul and Ankara) (2006: 26).

With the depopulation of the Kurdish countryside in the 1990s, when the state evicted or burned down over 4,000 Kurdish villages to weaken the socioeconomic base of Kurdish support for the PKK's guerilla warfare, unemployment is mostly concentrated in Kurdish metropolitan centers (Yörük and Özsoy, 2013: 154). The same but so much worse condition was in force for Kurds in the west. With a sizable Kurdish immigrant population in major cities, the social and economic divide between the Kurds and "the others" became more pronounced, with the former having fewer socioeconomic assets (such as financial capital and education) and less access to social and economic resources, in part because of linguistic barriers (Çelik, 2005: 981). Internally displaced Kurds were treated poorly among the emerging urbanities due to the abrupt land confiscation and the existing unwelcoming nature of the urban housing and labor markets in the 1990s (Ayata and Yüksek, 2005: 21).

The fact that the Kurds lived under bad economic and social conditions in the west changed the structure of the working class in Turkey. "[T]he rapid proletarianization of the Kurds and the growth of the informal proletariat have turned out to be two converging processes: the war in the southeast has changed the ethnic composition of the working class in Turkey by proletarianizing the Kurdish population, and Kurdicising the expanding informal proletariat" (Yörük, 2014: 238). To put it

differently, some jobs (especially construction) gained ethnic characteristics just after huge migration in the 1990s. To conclude, as stated by Necmi Erdoğan (2012), Kurds live under the “state of exception” conditions in the western cities. In the area of Kurdish inhabited areas, they were forced to migrate, and, in the west, now, they are displaced from where they lived for gentrification by the collaboration of capitalist classes and the state.

As a result of the traumatic past, the hostile policies of the state and bad economic and social conditions, many Kurds who could not resist against these policies and countered many minor racist attitudes in everyday life wanted to return to their home(land), but it was not allowed to these people by the state. As stated by Cassin: “Nostalgia. The right of return. To return home is a right. Resolution 194 of the United Nations, adopted on December 11, 1948, resolves that ‘refugees to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date’” (2016: 61). However, in the case of Kurdish people, it is clear that they even weren’t allowed to benefit from the “Law of Return.” Numerous regional return initiatives were announced between 1995 and 2000, including the "East and Southeast Anatolia Village Return and Rehabilitation Project Sub-Regional Development Plan" (Doğu ve Güneydou Anadolu Bölgesi Köye Dönüş ve Rehabilitasyon Projesi Alt Bölge Gelişme Planı) in 2000 (Jongerden, 2006: 3). However, none of these initiatives were ever implemented.

They migrated to the west with great social traumas, but few people or institutions cared about their trauma. In addition to the traumas they experienced, marginalization, targeting, exclusion and poor economic conditions prevented them from developing a sense of belonging to the place they migrated to. However, Kurds gave different reactions to these policies followed in the west. Some of them politicized their demands and resisted against these policies that followed by the state. Therefore, they can be regarded as a subject who can interact with space dialectically. For example, Saturday Mothers can be given an example of this. Saturday Mothers try to constitute the space in terms of their political demands, and this can lead to producing space identity for them. They appeared with their own identity in the space, albeit the countless attack of the state.

Saturday Mothers are the group constituted by the close relative of people who were disappeared and the victims of unresolved murders by the paramilitary groups of the state in the 1990s to clarify their aftermath. As stated on the website of the Hrant Dink Foundation:

They were not only asking for the bones of their relatives, but also for those responsible of these cases of enforced disappearance to be brought to account and justice, so that path towards a new Turkey would open. For this purpose, every Saturday, they sat for half an hour at the same location under the rain, snow, wind or sun. They carried their 'disappeared' relatives' photos glued to cardboards, and they silently dispersed after reading out press releases. This silent struggle grew with the participation of the relatives of the forcibly disappeared in Diyarbakır, Batman, Urfa and Cizre. Before the end of its first month, the action was attacked by the police. The pressure and threats were repeated every week. Human rights defenders who joined them in solidarity were subjected to various methods of oppression (hrantdink.com).

After these attacks and oppressions of the state, Saturday Mothers decided to stop gathering at Galatasaray Square (Galatasaray Meydanı) in 1999, but they decided to continue their action in 2009 again. Although the state has systematically tried to prevent the Saturday Mothers from meeting since 2009, it has failed to digest this social resistance.

Or some Kurds tried to rebuild the area in line with their political demands. For example, in 1991, Mesopotamia Cultural Center (MKM) was opened to Kurdish cultural production under the leadership of figures considered as organic intellectuals by the Kurdish society, such as Musa Anter and İsmail Beşikçi. Many filmmakers who were influential in the emergence of today's Kurdish cinema also came from MKM.

On the other hand, most Kurds usually hid and couldn't speak of their past because of avoiding of being the target of racist attacks. As Sönmez (2015) pointed out by giving a reference to Judith Herman, there are some levels of trauma treatment, and the first and most significant one is ensuring security. However, looking at Turkey, it can be seen that the state/society was not even close to the first stage yet. Hence, this group of people/Kurds cannot be regarded as a subject in society. They were forced to live in the "place" where they were marginalized, longing for their country. Thereby, it can be said that, for these people who couldn't live and resist the attacks, where they were

forced to live can be regarded as “place”, not “space” because they weren’t subjects/agents who had asserted to speak on the “space.” In other words, they couldn’t speak about their trauma or identity where they migrate. For example, as stated by Mustafa Şen, subaltern Kurds living in western cities call themselves as “Doğulu”, and there are two reasons behind this phenomena: One reason for this is the tactic of generalizing the issue under the heading of "east" and safely voicing it rather than emphasizing the Kurdish identity; On the other hand, for many Kurdish subalterns, the terms "eastern" and "Kurdish" already function as synonyms (2019: 292).¹³ By taking into account their class position with their traumatic past, these group of people can be named as subaltern, who cannot speak (Spivak, 2010) and have not right to the city (Lefebvre, 1996). They were in a difficult situation economically, socially, politically, and culturally.

In light of this information, it can be stated that, to annihilate the Movements, the state aimed to dehumanize the Kurdish inhabited areas. To do that, it used many different strategies, such as evacuation and burning of villages, enforced disappearances, unsolved murders, etc., and these strategies of the state led to the forced migration of Kurds to the west. In the west, because of the demonization (don’t have the right to speak) and marginalization of Kurdish people by the state ideological apparatuses, they faced a lot of minors (in everyday life by society) and majors (systematically done by the state institution) racist attacks. Some of them weren’t allowed to talk about their trauma by the state (and implicitly Turkish society), but they resisted against it by politicizing their demands. However, most of them couldn’t speak, so they were acted as “ghosts”. Both of them couldn’t mourn the traumatic events: the group who politicized their demands resisted mourning but prevented and face the oppressions; subaltern groups couldn’t do anything, so there wasn’t attempted to do that. Therefore, in the context of the subaltern groups, the integration into Turkish society wasn’t possible. However, the politicized group can produce an identity where they live because of actively participating in the space by attempting and resisting to speak.

¹³ Subaltern groups also have numerous tactics to challenge power/sovereign, so they are not completely passive against sovereign. For the tactics followed by the subalterns in the Ottoman period, see: Erdoğan, N. (2000). “Devleti ‘idare etmek’: Mâduniyet ve düzenbazlık”. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 83, pp. 8-31.

Shortly, having a sense of space identity (double identity) for Kurds is related to politicizing their demands.

One of the important factors at the point of subjectivation is capital. As stated by Bourdieu, “capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its “incorporated,” embodied form)” (Bourdieu, 1986: 15). When capital is appropriated privately, that is, exclusively, by agents or groups of agents, it enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor. Contrary to previous thinkers, Bourdieu does not consider/limit the concept of capital only to economic/ material capital. According to him, capital can take different forms. Bourdieu lists these forms of capital as: economic capital, social capital, cultural capital and symbolic capital.

Depending on the field in which it functions, and the const of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations (“connections”), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility (Bourdieu, 1986: 16).

According to Bourdieu, each capital is related to each other, and social and cultural one can be turned into economic one. Also, these different forms of capital can be transformed into symbolic capital. Çelik, in the context of the social capital, states that: The quantity and kind of social capital are determined by the size of the network and the capital assets (economic, cultural, or symbolic) of the relationships within the network (2017: 1008). In other words, there is a strong relationship between social capital and person’s identities or class position. Social capital is crucial for comprehending how people are positioned in various sectors (Erel, 2010: 646). However, the importance of capitals varies from game to game. While economic capital is important in some fields, cultural capital may be more important than it in some other areas. However, all these capitals are important for obtaining a “position” in the games.

After looking at the effect of the social and cultural capital on educational resilience in the context of Turkish, Çelik (2017) claims that Turkish ethnic identity provides an advantage in the current system. It can be argued that a similar situation is valid in other playing fields besides the educational game. Even if a Kurd who does not speak Turkish has as much Kurdish cultural capital and intellectual knowledge as s/he wants, it will not make any sense for the employer. It is clear that the vast majority of Kurds who had to immigrate in the 1990s are peasants and therefore do not have the “intellectual” accumulation required by the capitalist system and the state. Such a system has led subaltern Kurds to work that requires “manual labor” rather than “intellectual labor” (Yörük, 2014). Therefore, being Turkish or speaking Turkish can be considered as an important cultural capital in Turkey when considering minorities or disadvantaged ethnicities such as Kurds.

It was mentioned above that the Kurds faced many problems as a result of their forced migration to western metropolises in the 1990s. In addition to the reasons mentioned above (exclusion, stigmatization, racist attacks, etc.), neo-liberal policies in the 1990s led to the isolation of Kurds in these metropolitan cities. Therefore, Kurds mostly lived in a narrow social environment limited to themselves and faced many economic problems (Saraçoğlu, 2011). Speaking Turkish in such bad conditions is an important cultural capital for Kurds to be included in the game on the social field. If Turkish is not spoken, social integration (joining the game) is not possible for the most Kurds. Therefore, one of the basic conditions necessary to survive in the western provinces of Turkey for Kurds is knowing Turkish. If an individual does not speak Turkish, it is not easy for them to find a job. Mostly they are condemned to work in informal jobs under bad conditions. When parents who lack social and cultural capital cannot find a job, children are forced to work by the system. Kurdish children or youth, who speak Turkish and have the opportunity to develop their cultural capital by going to university, can gain a position in the field more easily than subaltern Kurds through this capital. Therefore, speaking Turkish is of vital importance for the Kurds who went to the west as a result of forced migration.

As stated above in the context of the stigmatization and exclusion of subaltern Kurds in the western cities, subaltern Kurds lack the minimum level of cultural and social

capital to hold on to the western cities. The structurization of neoliberal economic policies has made it impossible to manage the mass forced migrations that emerged as a result of the security policies followed by the state. Such bad economic and social conditions also caused the subaltern to feel nostalgic for their home(land). They wanted to return to their home(land) even though they knew that their situation before they migrated was not very good. For example, in a family that migrated from the Eruh district of Siirt to Istanbul/Tarlabaşı due to political reasons, the mother expresses her desire to return to her home(land) as follows: “The village was beautiful... I don't like Istanbul... we were farmers in the village, we had land, we had small cattle... materiality was not very important in the village... we had a yard and a garden” (Şen, 2019: 281). Even if they lived in poor conditions in their homeland before forced migration, they at least have a certain amount of economic and social capital (kinship and neighborly relations). However, with the forced migration, they were completely dispossessed in the place they came from. They have lost both their limited economic capital (houses and yards) and social capital (kinship, neighborhood, tribal relations, etc.). They have begun to feel nostalgia for their homeland, as they lack all kinds of capital that can adapt to the materialistic social relations that exist in urban life. As a result, both the security policies pursued by the state, the stigmatization, exclusion and lynchings they faced in Turkish society, and the unmanageable economic situation triggered the subaltern Kurds to return to their homeland. This caused nostalgia for the homeland.

CHAPTER 3

BELONGING AND NOSTALGIA

3.1 Single Belonging or Double Belonging? Belonging to Where and What?

Mesut Yeğen (2012), in an essay he wrote on the film *Bahoz*, claims that the Kurds have a dual belonging in this film. On the one hand, Kurdistan, which has historically been Kurdish-inhabited geography, and on the other hand, “Istanbul-as-Turkey” are places that Kurds feel as belonging. Yeğen says that the song “Bekle Bizi İstanbul” (Wait for Us Istanbul) playing in the background in one scene of the movie represents the second belonging of the Kurds. There was a belief in coexistence or “living together” “despite” (that is, “despite everything”) all the denial, annihilation and assimilationist attacks pursued by the state. However, Yeğen adds that this dual identity, which continued to exist in the Kurds despite the security policies followed by the state in the 90s, began to change after the 2000s. He says that Istanbul-as-Turkey is not as “spacious” as it used to be, and the Kurds also no longer have the feeling of “despite everything”. Although Mesut Yeğen does not explain the reason for this sociological “emotional” break or loss of faith, this issue, which he points out, is very important.

Devrim Kılıç (2009) also looks at the issue of belonging among the Kurds in the context of other films. Kurds, who left their villages and cities for economic, political or social reasons, also express their longing for their homeland, where they were born and raised, through the art of cinema. For instance, *Yol*, a film directed by Yılmaz Güney, deals with the subject of homeland love (Kılıç, 2009: 22). While Kılıç focuses on the subject of belonging in Kurdish cinema in a one-page article titled “love of the country”, she discusses this issue through “kissing the ground”, a common image in the films of Yılmaz Güney (*Yol*, *The Road*), Hiner Saleem (*Sıfır Kilometre*, *Zero Kilometer*) and Samira Makbalbaf (*Kara Tahta*, *Blackboards*). When Ömer arrives in

his country in Güney's *Yol*, he bends down and kisses the ground and goes to his village with a happy expression on his face. Referring to Hamid Naficy, who defines Kurdish cinema as “accented cinema”, Kılıç says the following about this scene in the movie *Yol*: “It reflects the country longing of Yılmaz Güney in the person of Ömer and the Kurds who were forced to leave their natural places” (2009: 22). Although we are against the definition of Kurdish cinema in “accented cinema” in this thesis (Smets, 2015), we think that this determination made by Naficy is important. While a single-layered belonging appears in these films, Kurdistan is considered as the homeland of the Kurds (after the Ottoman Empire, Kurdistan is considered as the homeland that is kept alive by the people through cultural narratives “as a cultural geography” - especially by means of dengbej’s songs- even though it does not have a status (Özdil, 2009)).

In addition to Yılmaz Güney's film *Yol*, Devrim Kılıç also states that the “love of country” or longing for home in the context of spatial belonging in Kurds is also seen in Samira Makbalbaf's film *Blackboards*. In the film, we see elderly Kurds who have come a long way to arrive in Halabja bending down and kissing the ground as they enter the borders of Halabja (Kurdistan). Therefore, we can say that a similar single-layered belonging also appears in this film. Everywhere except Kurdistan is a foreign land and they feel as an other/foreigner there. The place where they feel they belong is the lands they long for deeply, and those lands are Kurdistan, which has been encoded as a cultural geography in memory since the dengbêjs (Özdil, 2009).

Yılmaz Özdil, on the other hand, analyzes the *Dol* film of Hiner Selam, who conducts his film studies in the diaspora, and tries to reveal how Kurdistan is imagined - represented-in this cinema. Özdil looks at the reconstruction of Kurdistan as a cultural geography that has historically been inhabited by Kurds in Hiner Saalem's film “*Dol*”. It focuses on how this cultural geography is reconstructed in different forms in cinema. “Cinema always refers directly or indirectly (symbolically, connotatively, etc.) to a source/collective memory in order to give the homeland identity to this geography [Kurdistan], to which it gives a visual face” (Özdil, 2009: 219). When we look at Özdil's article, we see that in the movie *Dol*, there is actually only one belonging to the Kurds as a homeland, and this belonging is a Kurdistan that has been torn apart as

a historical and cultural geography and is “escaped because it has been made uninhabitable”. It is simple to assert that the "ethnic identity and nostalgia for the homeland," which characterize all diaspora films, also make up the filmography of Hiner Saleem (Özdil, 2009: 228). In this respect, *Dol* is a film in which no place other than Kurdistan is accepted as a homeland as a cultural geography and there is a single layered belonging.¹⁴ Of course, in the context of this thesis, let us state that the movie *Dol* is not included in the films we will discuss, because in this thesis, we will not look at diaspora cinema. Our basic sample consists of Kurdish cinema in Turkey. In addition, considering Kurdish cinema both in four different countries and in the diaspora would exceed the dimensions of a master's thesis.

Sabahattin Sen (2022), unlike Mesut Yeğen, claims that Istanbul is a diasporic city for Kurds in Kurdish films or films about Kurds. According to Şen, Istanbul is a colonialist metropolis. Therefore, Istanbul is the “temporary environment” of the longing for the “country left behind”, and it appears as “the place of disintegration, insanity and fragmentation”. Therefore, Şen's interpretation of the *Bahoz* film differs from that of Yeğen: “in *Bahoz*, Istanbul is neither a city of cleaning Kurdish women, displaced Kurdish immigrants, nor of elderly women longing for a country” (2022: 30). Şen admits that the camera and the director show an affinity for Istanbul, but this affinity does not mean that Istanbul is seen as a homeland, that is, as a “home” to which one feels belonging. It is, after all, a city of hope and a future utopia. But on the other hand, he says that the young people have nothing to do with Istanbul. So why is the song “Wait for Us Istanbul” playing in the movie? If the characters in the movie do not have an “interest/concern” with Istanbul, why do they have a hope and a utopia about it? Şen answers these questions as follows: “an ambivalent view directed towards Istanbul; on the one hand, the film has a leftist sensibility, on the other hand, it is related to the effort to include the Kurdish national struggle in the narrative at the same time” (2022: 30). Şen also looks at the movie *The Song of My Mother* and says that for Nigar, Istanbul has never been considered a homeland, and for Ali, Istanbul is “any

¹⁴ See Özgür Çiçek's article in the journal *Kurdish Studies* on the relationship of Kurds with space and time in diaspora cinema: <https://www.kurdarastirmalari.com/yazi-detay-oku-178>

place”. Here, we can say that since Şen considers Istanbul as a colonial metropolitan city, he claims that the Kurds have not developed a sense of belonging here.

Bahar Şimşek (2016) also looks at the film *The Song of My Mother* and makes the following comment about Ali, which Şimşek describes as an “reflexive nostalgic” based on the dual distinction made by Svetlana Boym (2006) about the concept of nostalgia. Ali is split between modernism and tradition as a displaced Kurdish man interested in literature rather than oral culture. As a result, he is positioned as a new subject lacking either a high ideal of a homeland or the urge to build one from scratch (Şimşek, 2016: 361). When we look at this approach of Şimşek, we understand that Istanbul is seen as “any place” for Ali. Istanbul is neither a place of belonging where Ali feels himself to belong, nor a place where he feels himself to be a stranger. Istanbul is a place where Nigar feels like a stranger. “Nigar’s domestic rituals, outdoor destinations and oral history perform the possibility of rebuilding the symbols and rituals of the lost home with reference to the nation” (Şimşek, 2016: 362). Although Şimşek has discussed the issue of belonging through Ali and Nigar around dimensions and dualities such as traditional-modern, woman-man etc., she has ignored the class perspective. The tension between Ali and his mother Nigar also has a class side. Although Ali is in the same class as his mother in terms of economic capital, he is in a higher class than his mother in terms of social and cultural capital (teacher, writer, multilingual etc.). This is important in terms of integration and dis-integration, and therefore it is effective in the development of a sense of belonging to the place.

As can be seen, the imagination of homeland and the form of belonging in Kurdish cinema are discussed in different ways by researchers. Mesut Yeğen analyzes Bahoz’s film in terms of camera angles and music and discusses whether Istanbul-as-Turkey can be considered as a second place of belonging for Kurds outside of Kurdistan. He states that the dual structure of belonging (Kurdistan and Turkey) that existed in the 90s disappeared after the 2000s. Şen, on the other hand, discusses the image of Istanbul, which he defines as a colonialist metropolis, in Kurdish films or films about Kurds. According to Şen, Istanbul has a “diasporic image” as a place of disintegration, insanity and death as a result of violence spreading from the state and society. Therefore, according to Şen, we cannot talk about any spatial belonging of the Kurds

to Istanbul. Şimşek, on the other hand, states that the motherland (Kurdistan) is fetishized in these films, in her article in which she looks at the construction of the national subject in the context of three films with the method of audio-visual analysis. The reason behind this is recognition and self-identification. According to Şimşek, homeland has been lost for Nigar, a character representing tradition (and restorative nostalgic). For this reason, Nigar was exiled from Kurdistan, and, in Istanbul, she tries to restore the past with symbols that remind her of her homeland. The meaning Ali attributes to Istanbul is different from Nigar's. After being exiled from his country, Ali has no destination. In this respect, according to Şimşek, while Istanbul is “any place” for Ali, it is a foreign place for Nigar. Therefore, Istanbul is not considered a place of belonging for Kurds. Kılıç, on the other hand, speaks of a common image (kissing the ground) that expresses the “love of country” in the films of three directors (Y. Güney/Yol, H. Saleem/Zero Kilometer, S. Makbalbaf/Blackboards) from different parts of Kurdistan. In Kılıç's analysis, only Kurdistan was considered as the homeland of the Kurds in these films. Yılmaz Özdil also discusses how the geography of Kurdistan has been reproduced by Kurdish directors based on Hiner Saleem's film *Dol*. According to Özdil, Kurdistan has been made uninhabitable as a “border without an interior” in Bahman Ghobadi films. “In Hiner Saleem's *Dol* film, Kurdistan is ‘connected to each other through different stories as similar cinematic spaces’, that is, ‘territorialized and integrated into a socio-political and ethnic one’ (Özdil, 2009: 232). In other words, discussions usually proceed through Kurdistan and only Kurdistan is considered as the homeland. It has been ignored that another place could be accepted as homeland or that such a tendency may have arisen.

In addition to these, Kennedy (2007) discusses Kurdish cinema in the context of the “accented cinema” category, based on Hamid Naficy, in his doctoral thesis. According to Kennedy, in addition to prison and claustrophobia, “nostalgia” is one of the important accents of Kurdish cinema. Kennedy looks at Nizamettin Ariç's *A Song for Beko*, Hiner Saleem's *Kilometer Zero* and Ibrahim Selman's *A Silent Traveler* in the context of nostalgia. He claims that in these films there is a desire to return to a completely lost past and an idealized nostalgia for the future. Although these films are out of the scope of this thesis (because these directors and their films can be considered

as diaspora cinema; Ariç filmed in Armenia because he is in exile, Hiner Saalem has been living in France for many years), at least a few things can be said in the context of nostalgia.

Looking at the movie, *A Song for Beko*, in this movie, after the war is declared over, displaced Kurds come together and talk about what to do. Should they go back to their homes or stay a little longer in the mountains? After a short discussion, the decision to return home is made immediately because the longing for home has increased. One woman among them expresses that she wants to return to her home, even though there is a danger of Saddam attacking them. When they come to their house, they encounter a destruction. This is not a surprise to them because they are aware of this when the decision to return is being made. For example, at the meeting where the decision to return home is taken, the teacher says that everything in the village, including the school, has been destroyed. However, they want to return. After returning to the village, they settle in their demolished house and continue their lives from where they left off. The next children are running around laughing. Therefore, on the way home, the villagers are aware that the house is actually in ruins and that they may be attacked. This, as Cassin stated, is to prefer “death” instead of “immortality” like Odysseus. In other words, it is to prefer the material/real instead of the ideal, to the present instead of the past. Therefore, contrary to what Kennedy expressed, we can say that the Kurds are longing for the current state of their homeland (they want to return to it) rather than longing for the past homeland. We can talk about a displaced Kurd who is aware of the material conditions he is in and makes a choice accordingly, rather than an idealized vision of a homeland and a return there.

In addition to taking part in the process of constructing Kurdish identities, Kurdish film also reconstructs the political and cultural landscapes of Kurdistan(s) by exploring the idea of a homeland for this identity (Özdil, 2009: 230). Although Özdil talks about the search for a homeland for the Kurdish identity, he limited the concept of homeland to “Kurdistan as a cultural geography” in his article. Although Özdil questioned how Kurdistan, as a geographical region with a definite border, was coded and represented in different ways in cinema, he did not look at whether there was a sense of belonging to another place (or place) for Kurds as a homeland. A similar approach exists among

other researchers themselves, with the exception of Mesut Yeğen. In addition, when talking about the homeland in the literature, the Kurds are generally considered as a total, monolithic. Therefore, in this case, it has been ignored how the imagination of the homeland has changed or transformed considering dynamics/variables such as class, gender, etc. So, let's ask: What kind of a homeland imagination can be talked about for the displaced Kurds in the victim cinema? What is envisioned as the homeland in this cinema? Is there a sense of belonging to any place other than "Kurdistan as a cultural geography"? (Is it "coexistence" ("living together") / "common homeland" or "secession"?) Is it possible to talk about a dual form of belonging in the context of the homeland? What kind of belonging has developed in the context of the homeland after forced or "voluntary" migration? If there are different forms of belonging among displaced Kurds, what is the relationship between these different belongings? Why did different forms of belonging arise? What kind of processes are effective in the decision of "living together" (dual belonging) or "separation" (single belonging) of displaced Kurds in the victim cinema? Do the social traumas caused by the security policies pursued by the state regarding the "solution" of the Kurdish problem have an impact on the belonging or homeland imagination of the characters in Kurdish cinema?¹⁵ If so, what kind of effect is this?

While seeking answers to these questions, we will basically use Barbara Cassin's concept of nostalgia. According to Cassin, "nostalgia is the 'pain of return,' both the suffering that has a hold on you when you are far away and the pains you must endure in order to return" (2016: 5). The concept of nostalgia comes across as an important

¹⁵ We are not claiming that the independent variable that is effective in the way Kurds self-determination is only state violence. Of course, many different national or international parameters can be effective in changing the way of self-determination. The reason why we base the policies followed by the state here is that we consider Kurdish cinema in the context of "victim cinema". In other words, it is to look at how the violent policies pursued by the state affect the imagination of the homeland for Kurds who are victims. We are not looking at the parties directly involved in the conflict, but at the segments that are victims of state violence. Victim cinema is important from this point of view in terms of being a form of "visual thinking" (Erdogan, 2020) that shows us how state violence is represented in cinema and how this violence affects the people's imagination of the homeland in cinema. Therefore, we are not claiming that the imagination of the homeland in the films we will discuss here reflects the understanding of the homeland of all the Kurdish people. We will only try to understand how the imagination of the homeland (as a language or as a certain geography) is in people who are victims of state violence in Kurdish cinema - whether it changes, if it does, how does it change, if not, what is the reason. In other words, we will try to determine what the physically and linguistically displaced people envision as their homeland and what kind of variables affect the understanding of homeland in the context of cinema.

indicator in terms of pointing out the place where displaced people feel belonging as a result of forced or “voluntary” migration. In other words, the concept of nostalgia is important in terms of showing where it is imagined as the homeland and allowing us to discuss the issue of belonging. In addition to the concept of nostalgia, Bourdieu's concept of social capital is also one of the important concepts that we will apply to make sense of the different forms of belonging in the victim cinema. Since the victim cinema mostly describes the life of a family after migration, it is hardly possible to mention different economic classes. But at this point, Bourdieu's concepts of social and cultural capital are also important in terms of allowing us to make a class assessment between members of the same family. Now let's take a detailed look at concepts such as nostalgia, belonging, and social and cultural capital.

3.2. Belonging and Fixation

Belonging can be used in many different contexts, but in this thesis, the concept of belonging will be used in the context of belonging to the homeland. When we look at the homeland belonging in the Kurdish victim cinema, we are actually looking at the homeland belonging of the Kurds who have been displaced (linguistically or physically), as mentioned earlier. In this respect, one of the basic questions to be asked in the context of Kurdish victim cinema is: Can we talk about different forms of belonging in Kurdish victim cinema? If so, what is the relationship between these different forms of belonging? Is there tension between these different forms of belonging?

As Suner (2006) states, “belonging” is not seen as a “natural” and spontaneously formed concept by contemporary critical cultural theorists. Belonging is something that has been constructed discursively in the historical process and is perceived as a truth after a long continuity. In other words, as a result of long historical and cultural processes, miracles began to be seen as something self-evident. Belonging, as a social construction, is a process that will never be completed. As long as society and culture exist, it will be reproduced in different forms. Therefore, the forms of belonging are never fixed, unchanging and pre-given. Cassin says that Lacan sees “origin” as a fiction, that is, a fabrication: Etymology takes the role of genealogy when people start to realize that the origin is a fiction—Lacan advises writing “fixion” to demonstrate

that it is a fabrication and not something that is given, a fiction that one chooses to fix—and cross-breeding becomes the norm (2016: 38).

One of the things necessary for a national identity is the homeland/origin narrative as the grand national narrative. In this respect, the “house”, which has been the home of the nation from past to present and has an ancient past/history, is one of the main indicators of being a nation. In this respect, each nation creates for itself an earthly root (genesis). In other words, the nation takes a certain geography as its home and takes root there. In a sense, this is a certain nation's private ownership of a certain geography on earth. It is always believed that the nation has the right to have priority over this geographical area, which it has acquired privately due to the fact that it has been living in a certain geography for a long time or that this region is the lands promised to it by the god, etc. (Schlesinger, 1991). As an expression of this priority right, a person coming from abroad is referred to with different adjectives (tourist, refugee, fugitive, etc.), thus emphasizing that the nation itself is permanent and the other is temporary. In other words, the boundaries of the other's activities are drawn. When there is an attack on this geography, it is called an invasion, and everyone is invited to fight against the invaders.

“Kurdistan” is also a historical fiction, and it is reconstructed in the oral or written culture in the historical process and is always in a formation. “All borders belonging to the states or commonwealths, provinces, districts as a form of governance within the states are also a variable, subjective fiction in that they are imaginary and imaginary to a certain extent” (Öğür, 2014: 117). A cultural aspect of Öğür's discussion about the map of Kurdistan, which changes according to the local, regional, or global political conjuncture, can also be made. Because “Kurdistan” is not just a fictional place where political actors “play” with its borders. In addition to political actors, the actors of the cultural sphere as an area of hegemonic struggle also play a role in narrowing or expanding these borders. One of the key areas where social power relations are created and sustained is the cultural sphere (Özçetin, 2019: 186). Since the cultural field is a hegemonic struggle field, we can also trace the political tensions and discourse struggles that have taken different forms here. Therefore, the boundaries of the “home”, which is a fiction, are constantly changing and transforming in line with these

struggles. Where the boundaries of the “home” begin, and end can have an impact on our material life. In other words, the fact that the boundaries of the “home” are imaginary does not mean that it cannot have an impact on our lives. These imagined boundaries can have an impact on our physical reality over time.

With the penetration of the state into every area as a form of power, the signs indicating sovereignty ceased to be the natural environment and were replaced by political signs determined by sharp boundaries, such as capitals and centers of influence. The last link of this change has ceased to be the way maps read geography, and the power (nation-state) has established the world politically on the map, and then the map reality has built the physical reality (Öğür, 2014: 121).

When the emergence of Kurdish nationalism is in question, it is not possible to talk about a state. In the nationalism debates, a debate like “does the state create nationalism or does the nation create the state” is invalid in the context of the Kurds. There is no state, but there is a Kurdish nation. However, modern nationalist approaches claim the opposite. Let's say here that Kurdish nationalism is a stateless nationalism, as Fred Halliday (2017) points out, and in some respects, it expresses the “black swan” for all the nationalist theories that have been put forward so far. That is why, according to Halliday, “the situation of the Kurds constitutes an example that no theory of nationalism can or should refrain from examining” (2017: 13). With the development and spread of science and technology, Kurdish nationalism has established and maintained its existence largely in the “sky” (“sovereignty in the sky”), as stated by Amin Hassanpour (1998), rather than through a nation-state. As Can Candaş (2016) stated, technological progress and easy access to communication devices contributed to the establishment of this sovereignty. Thus, this “sovereignty” has been tried to be strengthened not only on television, but also in the field of cinema. In other words, cinema emerges as a cultural construction site that constantly reminds us of the boundaries of the “home”, that is, of the place we think we belong to, by repeating it in different ways.

The terms "homeland," "hometown," "country," and "fatherland" come as a form of extension of the concept of "home" when we define "home" as a symbolic cosmos that influences our perception of the world and our position within it (Suner, 2006: 17). In this respect, while the Kurds fix themselves in a certain place on earth as

home/homeland, they also acquire a subject position in the age of nationalism. In other words, the Kurds acquire a national identity in this way, just like other nations. This home preference made by the Kurds by fixing their own roots also leads them to obtain a subject position. The subject position that appears with admission into the symbolic order is reportedly acquired as a result of selection, according to the framework of psychoanalytic theory (Suner, 2006: 18). However, this home, which is a fiction on earth that we feel we belong to, is built continuously and in different ways. In this respect, home, which is a form of social and spatial belonging, contains many tensions as a process that is never completed. This tension may arise not only between the dominant identity and the oppressed, but also between the oppressed nation itself. Many factors such as class, sexuality, etc. may cause Kurds to develop different forms of belonging to their homeland.

It is obvious that the social traumas (forced migration, forced disappearances, unsolved murders, burning and evacuation of villages and so on) experienced in Turkey's recent or distant past, but never confronted, have great effects on Kurds. When we look at Kurdish cinema, we often see that such social traumas are told through individual stories. In this respect, let us repeat that there is a political cinema, even though “personal” stories are being told. It is possible to talk about a crisis of belonging caused by such social traumas in Turkey.

To put it in Lacan's terms, trauma always refers to a fixation or blockage. Fixation [obsession] also always includes something that is not symbolized, not included in the symbolic order. It is precisely in this sense that language constitutes the most essential antithesis of fixation, creating a space and opportunity for transposition and replacement. When such transposition and replacement is not possible (for example in melancholia), fixation is at work (Özmen, 2009: 27 cited in Kablamacı, 2016: 269).

There are many social traumas that Kurds have been facing in their social life from the past to today such as unsolved murders, forced disappearances, torture, evacuation and destruction of villages, assimilation, and denial (unrecognizing or misrecognizing) of Kurdish identity.

The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror

back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being (Taylor, 1994: 25).

Therefore, it can be said that the Kurdish identity is always non-recognized or misrecognized in Turkey through means of denial policies of the state. The state has always denied the Kurdishness, or their other social traumas caused by itself. Due to nationalist, militarist and denial policies of the state, Kurds cannot mourn for their loss or trauma, and this has led to fixation in the place where the trauma took place.

When Freud talks about mourning, he emphasizes that people will never recover from events that are not mourned. So, is it possible for a trauma narrative to emerge in an environment where even mourning is prohibited? There is a possibility, an area, a very important area for this, in fact. Narratives form an important space that helps to express suffering; Talking and starting to tell leads to mourning and reconciliation with the past (Sönmez, 2015: 14-15).

In this respect, victim cinema can be considered as a specific tool for mourning where the mourning prohibited. On the other hand, in this thesis, I will also use this relationship between belonging and trauma when analyzing the characters' imagination of home(land). It is particularly useful for understanding the characters who cannot develop a sense of belonging to Turkey. Characters who feel nostalgic for Kurdistan as their homeland are important in this respect.

In the case of Freud, nostalgia was not a specific disease, but a fundamental structure of human desire linked to the death alive: 'The finding of an object is always a refinding of it.' Freud appropriates the vocabulary of nostalgia; for him, the only way of 'returning home' is through analysis and recognition of early traumas (Boyms, 2001: 53-54).

From this point of view, this can be understood in the context of traumatized person, it is not possible for he/she to integrate/adapt anywhere without mourning. Traumatized person's traumas should be recognized, and there should be suitable conditions for mourning. After that it will be possible to "return home" or getting a new or second identity. In short, both "trauma" and "belonging/origin" are related with "fix": "fixation" and "fixion". To recover the trauma, it should be symbolized. In other words, it should be included in the symbolic order. Thus, the victim can get rid of

being obsessed with something or someone. After the victim is freed from fixation by means of language, there constitutes a space and opportunity for transposition and replacement for the victims. In other words, without symbolizing the trauma, victim cannot exist in society because they cannot have useful means to represent themselves in society. Therefore, because of the barrier that is in front of expressing (symbolizing) the trauma in society, the victims remain fixed on the past, so time doesn't move forward for them. For this reason, the victim cannot adapt to society. To overcome this circumstance, self-expression mechanisms need to be established for the victim to adapt to society. By doing so, the victim can have a sense of belonging to society with the onset of recovery. To put it another way, the victim's alienation from society ends, so the victim can have a new identity or sense of belonging by freely expressing her/his trauma in a safe environment.

Suner expresses the crisis of belonging in Turkey as follows:

Perhaps we can define the “crisis of belonging” in Turkey as the inward explosion of a house. In this process, we witness the struggle of the excluded identities to make their voices heard, to make their differences visible and against discrimination, while the new dominant Turkish identity is constantly trying to reproduce its position of sovereignty by excluding social differences (2006: 27).

In this respect, Kurdish cinema has emerged as a struggle for counter-hegemony, confirming what Suner has stated. However, the thing that needs to be questioned here is this: While putting all identities in the same pot, Suner keeps the home in an unquestionable position, reducing the crisis of belonging to just a matter of “not being able to assert oneself”. By equating the Kurdish problem with traditional-modern, east-west or urban-rural problems, it ignores the “right to self-determination” of a national question. Suner accepts staying at home as a priori for those experiencing a crisis of belonging and points out that there is a struggle for an equal voice only within the boundaries of the home. While we accept that there is such an equal-voice struggle for the Kurds, we must say that the whole struggle is not limited to this. As a political right, Kurds, like other nations, may want to use their right to self-determination in another home direction. As Ercan (2013) stated, the thesis of “Kurdistan is a colony” was accepted in the political program of the Kurdish movement until the 2000s, and

in this direction, it demanded a fully independent home. We have mentioned above that this changed in the 2000s, but that it continued to exist at a discourse level. Therefore, these demands, which continue to exist in the political arena, are also reflected in the cultural field. As Suner correctly identified: If "feeling at home" is a result of belonging, and belonging is built in relation to place and community, then in modern-day Turkey, this sensation is becoming more and more problematic, albeit for various reasons for various groups (2006: 28).

Spatial belonging in its simplest sense is the state of not being excluded in the place where one lives, not being other, not feeling outside/ alien. Territorially, existentially, and culturally, our home is where our own neighborhood is, where our family and loved ones live, where we can trace our ancestry, and where we yearn to go when we are somewhere else in the world (Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002: vii cited in Suner, 2006: 17). The belonging crisis, on the other hand, is something that occurs when people who do not see themselves in the system, who think that the system excludes them, become visible as a result of "making a sound". In the context of "space" / home, the belonging crisis shows itself as the longing for another space of people who feel "other" in space and think / see that they do not have equal rights with others. In other words, nostalgia appears as homesickness in those who do not feel at home. Therefore, nostalgia appears as a feeling of otherness in a place in the context of spatial belonging.

As can be seen from the studies in the literature, although a single place (Kurdistan) predominately comes to the fore in the issue of "home", it has been claimed that a dual belonging structure once existed. This situation in the literature tells us that when we look at the forms of belonging as a "homeland" in Kurdish cinema, different forms of belonging are in competition with each other. "Belonging is never a problem-free category. All forms of belonging to a community, a place contain a certain tension" (Suner, 2006: 18). In this thesis, we will look at it in the context of nostalgia, how the displaced Kurds established a relationship with their homeland after they migrated. What kind of belonging form(s) do we encounter among the forcibly displaced Kurds? Is there a new home? Want to return to the old home? Or is a dual belonging being developed? If there are different forms of belonging, what is the relationship between them? Is a more universal definition of home possible? The answers to these questions

are important in terms of showing us what kind of home (homeland) belonging the Kurds have caused by state policies, as well as pointing out where and in what circumstances the desire to “live together” in the Kurds has been broken or strengthened in the historical process.

There are many reasons (depending on national and international developments, the nation's choice of homeland may change) that push these different preferences of belonging. What we will basically look at here is the effect of the state's policies on the Kurdish issue on the choice/belonging of the homeland. Because the Kurds were subjected to forced migration by the state. In other words, while examining the issue of belonging in the victim cinema, we will look at the home belongings of Kurds who were displaced as victims of state violence. In doing so, we will consider both films about forced migration and its aftermath, as well as films about assimilation as a linguistic trauma (“exile from language to language”).

As a result, it is obvious that the security policies followed by the state regarding the solution of the Kurdish problem and the problems caused by these policies such as unemployment, poverty, discrimination, etc. are effective in the Kurds' choice of “home” (Ercan, 2013; Sarigil and Karakoc, 2016; Gurses, 2018; Yarkin, 2019). These Kurdish preferences for the homeland appear in different cultural forms. Cinema is also one of the important cultural forms in which this preference gains visibility. From this point of view, Kurdish cinema is a political cinema and participates in the conflict between the state and the Kurdish movement with its camera. While the camera is involved in this conflict, it positions itself against the violence policies pursued by the state against civilians. In this direction, we stated that the camera in the victim cinema can be read as a reaction to the policies followed by the state. Kurdish cinema often shows this kind of political reaction by dealing with traumatic events that have not been confronted, accounted for, ignored or denied. Therefore, the policies of the state regarding the Kurdish question tell us something about belonging in the context of home(land) in Kurdish cinema. In other words, it discusses the extent to which this home is reliable and suitable for living. Now, before moving on to the analysis of the films, let's look at how we will deal with the concept of nostalgia, which is the indicator of homesickness in these films, in this study.

3.3. A Short Historical Background of the Concept of Nostalgia

Homeland nostalgia is an important indicator of the feeling/state of “not feeling at home”. “This feeling, at once overwhelming and gentle, is, like, every origin, a chosen fiction that constantly gives clues so as to be taken for what it is, an adorable, human fiction, a cultural fact” (Cassin, 2016: 3). However, this fiction is important in terms of showing the “emotional geography of the homeland” (Boym, 2009; Yüksel and Yüksel, 2020) that “belongs” to the nation as an “imagined community”. In other words, nostalgia as an emotion tells us a lot about where the boundaries of the home begin and end, and how these boundaries change and transform over time.

The word nostalgia, which is derived from the Greek word's nostos, "return," and algos, "pain," "suffering," has a distinctively Greek tone (Cassin, 2016: 5). The word nostalgia was first used to refer to a medical illness. But there are different claims about the origin of the word. Svetlana Boym (2009) states that the word was first used by a Swiss doctor, Johannes Hofer, in a medical thesis written in 1688. On the other hand, Barbara Cassin (2018) says that according to the “Dictionnaire historique de la langue française”, the word was coined by a doctor named Jean-Jacques Harder in 1678 to describe a disease that mercenaries suffered. But Cassin also mentions another claim about the origin of the word that matches Boym's. Cassin states that there is also information that the word was used “as early as 1688” by Johans or Jean Hoffer in his medical thesis. Therefore, it can be said that the word nostalgia was first used in the literature to express “longing for home” in medicine. In this respect, we see no problem in citing Boym's on-the-spot determination: Contrary to what one might expect, medicine, not poetry, nor politics, was the source of nostalgia (2001: 3).

The Swiss would desert whenever they heard the “ranz of the cows,” the song or air from the Alpine pastures, a “celebrated Air,” as Rousseau writes in his Dictionary of Music, that “was so generally beloved among the Swiss that it was forbidden to be play’d in their troops under pain of death, because it made those who heard it burst into tears desert or die so great a desire did it excite in them of returning to their country” (Cassin, 2016: 5-6).

Patients began to confuse the past with the present and actual occurrences with imagined ones, developing "a lifeless and haggard countenance" and "indifference towards everything" (Boym, 2001: 3). Since this situation, which Swiss mercenaries

lived away from their hometown, became a military problem in the future, stimulants to remind them of their home were forbidden to the soldiers. Hearing shepherd's tunes or Alpine songs created a strong "will to return home" in the soldiers and made the soldiers realize that they were strangers where they were (Boym, 2009: Cassin, 2018). When the soldiers realize that they are in foreign territory, that is, they are far enough away from home, they cannot resist the violence of the desire to "return home" and flee. Home withdrawal depleted the "vital spirits," resulting in nausea, vomiting, weight loss, lung pathology, brain inflammation, cardiac arrests, high temperature, marasmus, and a tendency toward suicide (Boym, 2001: 4).

For each language has its own way of saying nostalgia, of locating the malaise in a specific place in the body (melancholia: black bile; spleen: the spleen; anxiety: the throat), so as to inscribe it within a cultural register as a password, even if it is imported, as was spleen, from Shakespeare to Baudelaire, to link it, in relation to the past or to the future, to an event or an expectation, to make of it an individual, historical, ontological, religious, social, or patriotic illness -acedia, dor, saudade, Sehnsucht, desengano, etc. (Cassin, 2016: 8).

After the Enlightenment, which emphasized the universality of reason, romantics began to emphasize the particularity of emotions. In this respect, nostalgia as an emotion was very useful for them. Longing for homeland evolved as a major romantic nationalist motif (Boym, 2001: 12). Now, what Swiss soldiers feel nostalgia for (that is, the homeland) has changed in quality, although it has not changed in quantity. This homeland, where they will feel nostalgia, will begin to be expressed more with adjectives that define the national identity. With the emergence of nationalism, the "nation" as an imaginary community began to be defined and imagined within certain geographical boundaries. In addition to this, different nations have started to claim that they have an expression that cannot be translated into other languages for the word nostalgia, perhaps to emphasize the national differences and the uniqueness of their homeland. Curiously, intellectuals and poets from various national traditions started to assert that they had a unique word for homesickness that was utterly incomparably difficult to translate (Boym, 2001: 12). This is an important expression of creating and showing that you are from here/there, that is, the distinction between "us" and "other". With this linguistic maneuver ("untranslatable"), it was aimed to emphasize that we

are different from other nations, and a new identity (national identity) was tried to be created.

3.4. Cassin's Reinterpretation of the Concept

After a brief introduction to the historical development of nostalgia in the context of nationalism, different interpretations emerge when we look at how the concept is treated today. Although Svetlana Boym's concept of nostalgia often appears in the literature, we will take Barbara Cassin's concept of nostalgia as the basis of this thesis. The main reason why we use Cassin's concept of nostalgia is that she aims to give the concept a universal quality, as well as to separate the concept from traditional forms of use with the intervention of "time" that it comprehends. Boym defines nostalgia as "nostalgia for the past"; Cassin states that nostalgia is nostalgia for the "present", not the "past". We can say that the reason for this fundamental divergence is hidden in the response to the recovery of nostalgia. We'll open it below. But now let's take a look at the usefulness of Cassin's concept.

With this "time" intervention in the concept, Cassin blocks the way of resorting to the nostalgia narrative in the sense used by fascist regimes. This "time" intervention for the definition of the concept (longing for the "present" rather than the "past" state of the nostalgic object) prevents the idealization of the nostalgic object. In addition, Cassin allows us to consider the concept from a material point of view with such a definition. Instead of an idealized "past" that never existed, it invites us to look at the "present" that is in front of us materially. This situation also invites us to understand this "illness" instead of reducing the situation of nostalgic people to romance. The object of nostalgia is in the present in its changed, mortal and incomplete form. In this respect, Cassin's interpretation of nostalgia calls for a more careful understanding of nostalgic rather than seeing them as romantic and naive. In other words, we can say that Cassin urges nostalgic to take them seriously. Cassin invites us to understand why the nostalgic wants the mortal "present" rather than the ideal "past". In this respect, Cassin's concept of nostalgia, while useful, also differs from Boym's.

Both Boym and Cassin look at the same text but arrive at different conclusions. While Boym (2001) calls the story of Odysseus a "myth of homecoming" rather than

nostalgia, Cassin comments on the opposite: “The *Odyssey*, which recounts the adventures of Odysseus and his endlessly delayed return, is the very poem of nostalgia” (2016: 7). Boym first makes a distinction between “modern nostalgia” and the ancient “myth of homecoming,” and then explains modern nostalgia as follows: Modern nostalgia can be a secular expression of a spiritual longing, a nostalgia for an absolute, a home that is both physical and spiritual, the edenic unity of time and space before entry into history, or it can be a mourning for the loss of an enchanted world with clear borders and values (2001: 8).

Both Cassin and Boym look at the homecoming story of Odysseus. But while Boym sees the *Odyssey* story as a “myth of homecoming,” she associates nostalgia with the modern era. Cassin, on the other hand, sees nostalgia as a longing for the present. Cassin does not limit nostalgia to the modern era. Cassin cites Odysseus' refusal of Calypso's offer as a basis for this claim. Kalypso offers Odysseus immortality and becoming his wife so that he can stay with her. Odysseus, on the other hand, rejects this offer as follows:

Goddess and queen, do not be angry with me. I myself know that all you say is true and that circumspect Penelope can never match the impression you make for beauty and stature. She is mortal after all, and you are immortal and ageless. But even so, what I want and all my days I pine for is to go back to my house and see my day of homecoming (V, 215-220) (Cassin, 2016: 12).

Based on this answer, Cassin says that contrary to Kant's claim, nostalgia chooses the “mortal” rather than the “immortal”. According to Kant, the reason for the recovery of nostalgia is that people are disappointed when they reach what they long for. Disappointment means that what is longed for is not perfect as idealized. As a result of this disappointment, people are freed from their desires and healed. Instead, Odysseus provides evidence to the contrary: despite her old age, Penelope is the one he desires (Cassin, 2016: 12). The fact that the nostalgic chooses finitude (Penelope) rather than eternity (Kalypso's beauty), that is, preferring what they desire despite knowing that it will not be the same as before, is actually the nostalgic choosing mortality by saying “despite everything”.

Boym's goal is to save nostalgia from becoming a tool of political manipulation. Boym explains her intention as follows: "Instead of a magic cure for nostalgia, a typology is offered that might illuminate some of nostalgia's mechanisms of seduction and manipulation" (2001: xviii). In this direction, Boym divides nostalgia into two as "restorative nostalgia" and "reflective nostalgia". Boym makes this distinction through the words "nostos" and "algia", which make up the word nostalgia. While the restorative nostalgia emphasizes "nostos", that is, "return" more; on the other hand, the emphasis on "perception" (pain, torment) prevails more in reflective nostalgia. On the other hand, Cassin's goal is similar to Boym's at some point (against the danger of fascism). However, Cassin questions the relationship between nostalgia and the concept of belonging and seeks to draw the concept to a more universal mentality:

I will ask if and how it is possible to rework this relation between nostalgia and the native land or patriotism, in order to make of nostalgia a completely different adventure, one that would lead us to the threshold of a much broader and more welcoming way of thinking, to a vision of the world freed from all belonging (2016: 8).

As a result, we can say that the main difference between Boym and Cassin is whether nostalgia is a longing for the past or a longing for the present. This separation occurred with a new intervention by Barbara Cassin on the concept. In addition to this intervention, Cassin also talks about different types of nostalgia in the context of home(land). In other words, nostalgia can have different forms as the form of belonging to the homeland differs. But it is never nostalgia for the same place as in the past.

3.5. Nostalgia in Turkish and Kurdish Cinema

Asuman Suner (2006) talks about "home" that is haunted by "ghosts" in the context of the New Turkish Cinema. According to Suner, these ghosts are resurrected from the dead because they are persecuted by the state. On the other hand, she also talks about "the spectral home" that can be seen in the new popular Turkish cinema. Suner states that:

Although these films are all about the past, and often about past political events, it would be misleading to call them 'historical films,' since they do not intend to produce an objective account of the past. Instead, they emphasize

subjective accounts of memory shaped around a strong sense of nostalgia. I will discuss these films under the category of “nostalgia cinema” (2010: 26).

There is also nostalgia in Kurdish cinema, but not in the same sense. Here, I prefer to use a different meaning of nostalgia. When Suner (2006; 2010) uses the concept of nostalgia, she gives a reference to Svetlana Boym. According to this approach, nostalgia is the longing of the past. Therefore, Suner analyzes the new Turkish popular cinema around two modes of nostalgia that are defined by Boym: restorative and reflexive nostalgia. However, I prefer to use the concept of nostalgia in the same sense Barbara Cassin uses. According to Cassin, nostalgia is the longing for now. To put it in different way, nostalgia means “the ‘pain of return,’ both the suffering that has a hold on you when you are far away and the pains you must endure in order to return” (Cassin, 2016: 5). Using the concept in this way helps us to understand the sense of belonging that exists in Kurdish cinema in the context of the home(land).

By giving a reference to Hamid Naficy, Çiçek states that “one typical cinematic response to the rupture of displacement is to create a utopian chronotope of the homeland that is uncontaminated by contemporary facts” (2014: 136). However, when taking into account Cassin’s nostalgia term it could be understood that there is not utopian chronotope of the homeland in recent Kurdish cinema, but the desire to return home. Unlike Naficy’s claim, this mode of nostalgia in recent Kurdish cinema doesn’t have any utopian features. Because, in Kurdish victim cinema, we encounter characters who want to return to their homes, even though they know their homes were burned and destroyed. These characters know that their home(land) has been burned, but they still want to return there. “Nostalgia is what makes one prefer going home, even if it means finding there a time that passes by death -and, worse, old age- rather than immortality” (Cassin, 2016: 12). The return is always a troublesome and painful one for characters. Which, most of the time, they die before they can return.

3.5.1. Historical-Nostalgia Films in Kurdish Victim Cinema

Nostalgia films in Kurdish cinema are not objective, but not in the sense of the new popular Turkish cinema. As Suner stated:

The social critique that nostalgia films voice is problematic in the sense that they seek to resolve the tensions, anxieties, and contradictions that arise from complex social and political processes within a simple dichotomous structure based on before/after and inside/outside. In this structure, while malice is externalized, the presumed innocence and integrity of the 'inside,' of 'home,' is left intact. In this regard, the emphasis imagining of the past as collective childhood (2010: 40).

This situation can create some problems in terms of being critical. Films about the past that equate childishness with innocence absolve society of responsibility for past tragedies by equating childishness with innocence (Suner, 2010: 41). In other words, it doesn't activate the spectacles, and it makes everything comfortable for the spectacle to avoid from the responsibility. Therefore, it is not possible to say they have a critical point of view.

However, on the other hand, as indicated by Kevin Smets, in Kurdish victim cinema, "filmmakers who are closely involved in the conflict tend to make films that seek to mobilize and document, while those who are further removed from the core of the conflict make films to reflect or inform (2015: 2240)." Therefore, especially in Kurdish victim cinema, the filmmakers' aim is to "highlight the perspective of one particular side of the conflict (usually the side of the 'oppressed')" (2015: 2443). A similar comment made by Sönmez in the context of the films about trauma is valid for this victim cinema: Films use their depictions of traumatic events to either force the spectator to adopt a particular stance in the face of events or to offer a context for knowing and understanding events (2015: 32). However, at that point it should be kept in mind what Çiçek state: "Kurdish cinema is in a continuous stage of becoming and it urges identification with its stage of "becoming" through its challenging narratives, which embody the archival absence of Kurdish history" (2011: 15). Hence, it can be possible to say that today's Kurdish cinema is used by filmmaker as a significant apparatus to show and document in order to activate the audiences what denied and hided, such as massacres, unsolved murder, forced disappearances or migration, assimilation, by the state. Therefore, I will propose to call these films as "historical-nostalgia films" because these films also can be regarded as counter-hegemonic films in terms of giving a reference to a collective memory that tries to deconstruct the

discourse of the official history/ideology of the Turkish nation-state. Besides, at this point, it can be more helpful to give a reference to Marc Ferro:

The effect of film is to de-structure what several generations of men of state and thinkers have built into such a beautiful harmony. It destroys the alter image that every institution and every individual composes for itself in the face of society. The camera reveals their real functioning and tells more about each of these than they could want. It unveils secrets and show the underside of a society and its lapses (1988: 29).

Before the 1980s, in Turkey, everything wasn't good, or there wasn't "a beautiful harmony" in the society, unlike what claimed in the nostalgic films of New Turkish popular cinema. For instance, Suner states the circumstance of the subject in these nostalgia films like that "the relationship of the subject to his/her homeland is envisioned as that of complete harmony, unity and inclusion" (2010: 28). However, as stated above, in Kurdish cinema, we witness the opposite situations. Therefore, Kurdish victim cinema, because of having a shocking impact on the official history/ideology of the state, can be differentiated from the nostalgic films mentioned by Suner.

Ferro writes that by giving a reference to Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce: "History is always contemporary" (1988: 25). According to this approach, unlike Suner, every film can be regarded as a history because "film, image or not of reality, document or fiction, true story or pure invention, is History" (Ferro, 1988: 29). Therefore, the significant difference among Kurdish historical-nostalgia films and nostalgia films in the new popular Turkish cinema is that the second one doesn't challenge to the official history or ideology. Therefore, they represent to one face of History. On the other hand, Kurdish historical-nostalgia films, too, represent the one face of History, but the critical one. For example, in *Vizontele*, Kurds are represented as people who talks different Turkish accent. At this point, this film cooperates with the official ideology of the Turkish nation state. However, Kurdish historical-nostalgia films deconstruct the official history /ideology of the state by emphasizing the existence of Kurds and the Kurdish language. In light of this information, it can be said that it is possible to look at the relationship between home(land) and the sense of belonging in the context of the Kurdish victim cinema.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE FILMS

4.1. Rêç (The Trace) (Tayfur Aydın, 2011)

It is a road film that is about fulfilling the wish of Şaristan Aydın, who is an old woman forced to migrate with her family (The Aydın family) to the west by the state. “The most objective representation of the road in terms of cinema is its interpretation as a return to essence, especially in Kurdish cinemas. The road marks the past, the quest, the state of completing the missing” (Sert, 2019: 84). Şaristan has brain metastases and wants to see her village/home before she dies. In other words, Şaristan is on her last legs, and she is longing for her home. Therefore, she wants to see her village for the last time. The film is about the process of Şaristan being taken to his village by his son Mirze and grandson Hêvî. Encountering several obstacles while trying to return home is the main theme of this film. To overcome these obstacles Şaristan’s son (Mîrze) and grandson (Hevî) will have to make a great effort because both natural and systemic obstacles stand in their way.

The Aydın family was forced to migrate from the Kurdish populated areas, and they went to İstanbul the biggest city of Turkey. Members of the Aydın family are quite passive, according to the action image, in İstanbul. Şaristan is an old woman who spends her time at home by looking at her packing case which includes the memory stuff. She is always sad and lifeless. One of the members of the family (Şaristan’s daughter-in-law) was death a long time ago. Mirze, the son of Şaristan, is an unemployed man. Hêvî is going to a university, and he is falling in love with Buse, a Turkish girl. Any effort of Hêvî cannot be successful to have a good relationship with Buse. Hatice is married to Bekir, who is a Turkish man. Mirze’s other two daughters (don’t hear their names throughout the film) work in textile, and there are not any signs

of happiness with them, too. In addition, members of the family have a bad relationship with each other. For example, there is always a conflict between Mirze (father) and Hêvî (son). Also, Hatice (Mirze's daughter) and Bekir cannot have children, so they have an unhappy wedding. Besides, Hêvî has a bad relationship with Buse. Also, the Aydın family has little or no relations with other people too. Except for Hêvî, we do not see a single friend of any of the family members throughout the whole movie. As has just been stated, Hêvî's existing relationship is also going bad. The family is in an inward state, and mostly alone. It is the unhappy, lifeless, and secretive Kurdish family in İstanbul.

However, it should be stated that there are very few affection scenes. For example, after taking issue with Hêvî, Mirze goes to Hêvî's room and overlaps while he is sleeping. Or Hêvî gets angry with the police when he saw that they were checking his father (Mirze) in the general information system. To conclude, it can be stated that İstanbul-as-Turkey is a catastrophic and suffocating city for them. It is as if they are trapped in unhappiness in Istanbul. They cannot establish or construct a new life there. There is not any sign of a sense of belonging for all of them, but Hêvî.

Shortly, it should be stated that while the efforts in Istanbul are completely fruitless in the film, the effort made on the way home is successful despite all the obstacles. Therefore, while Istanbul represents a negative space in terms of action image, geographies populated by Kurds represent a positive space. Because of that it can be claimed that the film affirms a sense of belonging to Kurdish populated areas, not İstanbul-as-Turkey. However, the film does not deny the existence of different forms of belonging in the Kurds. The film, also, emphasizes that Hevî is located in a different place from his family in terms of belonging to Turkey-as-Istanbul.

Hevî goes to the university, so he has an opportunity to gain social and cultural capital that helps him to integrate or socialize into Turkish society. As stated above, there is always a conflict between him and his family members, especially his father (because of Hêvî's integration efforts). In other words, his relationship with his family is not so strong in the film. Main reason behind this bad relationship is that they are differ from each other in terms of socio-cultural capital. "Schooling provides not just the

transmission of technical knowledge and skills, but also socialization into a particular cultural tradition” (Swartz, 1998: 191). While Hêvî acquires technical knowledge and skills through school, on the one hand, he also engages in social interaction, albeit to a limited extent, with classes that are higher than him in terms of economic capital at school. In this socialization process, he also deals with his body to gain social acceptance. He tries to discipline his body (language, clothing, etc.) according to the codes of the upper class.

Hêvî partially can share and speak about his trauma with other people thanks to his socio-cultural capital. For example, when Hevi and Buse are in Buse’s car, he tells his family’s forced migration process to Buse. He doesn't remember much about that period, as he was still a small child at that time. However, he got traumatized when he started school in İstanbul. While he is talking about his memory about his education, he complains about the unjust situation that is derived from denying the Kurdish language in the Turkish education system. By sharing his feelings with Buse/ “other”, the traumatic past is mourned. Thus, there occurs an opportunity to develop a second sense of belonging for Hêvî. The university as an institution has an important role in this process because without going to university it is not possible for Hevi to speak with “others” about his trauma. Speaking Turkish and reaching a certain extent integration mechanism lead Hêvî to have a sense of belonging to Turkey-as-İstanbul. However, it doesn’t mean that he integrates into the Turkey entirely. The problems are not totally solved. In short, in the case of Hêvî, sharing the trauma with others by means of some integration mechanisms and a certain socio-cultural capital led to another sense of belonging to another place.

As stated above, one of the reasons for the conflict between Hêvî and his father stems from the cultural capital between them, and this also has an impact on their understanding of the homeland. As a young university student who speaks Turkish, Hêvî has a certain cultural capital, and this is reflected in his lifestyle. He wears trendy slit pants, earrings, and tattoos and tries to speak better Turkish (Istanbul Turkish). Hêvî reads a grammar book to improve his Turkish accent to integrate into Turkish society. He is in love with Buse, whom he knew from university in Istanbul, and wants to spend time with her. On the other hand, his father does not have any cultural capital

and, because of that, finds Hêvî's behavior wrong. It can be said that he sees Hêvî's way of life as a kind of "cultural corruption", and because of this, there are always problems with Hêvî. This lifestyle of Hêvî also triggers a kind of fear of assimilation in his father. The scene that turns out to be unnecessary because of this fear is Hêvî's running towards the house after seeing their ruined house in Batman. In this scene, Mirze looks at her son with a smile. Hêvî continued to be a hope for his father. Hêvî still has not lost its original (roots).

It can be said that there is a difference between family members in terms of belonging to Istanbul. Hêvî can reach some means of integration or socialization -studying at university- into Turkish society. However, the integration form of Hêvî into Turkish society is not approved in the film. Thus, Hêvî generally has a negative representation in the film can actually be read as a criticism of his integration efforts. The reason behind this disapproval in the film is that Hêvî tries to develop a relationship of belonging to a place where he does not belong. Even if he is not accepted by Turkish society (in this case Buse, who ridicules, underestimates, or disregards Hêvî, represents Turkish society), he tries to integrate into Turkish society (or has a sense of belonging to İstanbul). Therefore, Hêvî is represented as a naive and childish person lacking in national consciousness.

Hêvî opposes his father when his father says that they will take Şaristan to the village and that Hêvî will come with them. Hêvî doesn't want to go to the village, and he wants to stay in İstanbul. In other words, the relationship between Hêvî and his homeland (Kurdistan) has weakened. Therefore, his father gets angry with him and forces him to go to their village with them. Also, he generally gets angry and crosses with people. For example, even if Hêvî and Buse are not lovers, Hêvî gets Buse's name tattooed on his arm. When Buse sees his tattoo, she grins contemptuously. Hêvî takes offense to the reaction shown by Buse. Because of being injured by Buse, he gets cross with her and cover his arm. Also, he is constantly in conflict with his father, and he is reprehended and acted like a child by his father. Despite being old enough to go to college, Hêvî quarrels with his siblings like a child, as well. To conclude, Hêvî who doesn't have political consciousness is represented as immature (infantilization of

(semi) assimilated characters) because of semi-assimilated, he doesn't aware of what is going on in his environment. Thus, he gives some naive and childish reflexes.

As stated above, Hêvî also has a sense of belonging to his village. Because, on their return from the burial, they came across their home that was destroyed. Hêvî recognizes their home and runs home. At this point, Mirze become happy to see that Hêvî hadn't forgotten his home. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that he is assimilated completely because he doesn't forget his identity/home. Thus, it can be said that Hêvî has two different senses of belonging. However, both of them are weak. His sense of belonging to Kurdistan was weakened as a result of the assimilation and dehumanization of the Kurdish populated areas. When he was a child, they were forced to migrate. Therefore, he doesn't have a strong sense of belonging to Kurdistan. Secondly, Hêvî realizes he is the "other" in Istanbul when he starts school. In school, he didn't speak Turkish at first, so he had to deal with a lot of difficulties. In this process where Hevi struggles with the difficulties of learning a new language, he realizes that he is the "other" through Turkish, which he could not speak before. However, during this process, Hevi has some wounds, and these wounds originate from not recognition of his identity (Kurdishness). These wounds don't stem from learning a new language, the reason behind these wounds is the rejection and denial of the Kurdisness of Hevi. Because of that Hevi hid his Kurdishness by changing his name. For this reason, it can be claimed that he cannot adapt to Turkish society totally and don't have a complete sense of belonging.

Şaristan, whose Turkish name is Sultan, is a monolingual (she speaks only Kurdish) and old woman. She does not have any socio-cultural or economic capital. She stays at home all the time in Istanbul. We do not see her anywhere other than the house (except the hospital). She is an introverted and melancholic woman. She has a serious health issue (brain metastasis disease), and the doctor says that there is no cure for her. After this scene, Şaristan requests her son, Mirze, to take her to the village. Because she has only one wish in this world, and it is that she wants to bury in the cemetery in her village. Previously, Şaristan wanted to go village, but her son got angry with her. However, later, it will be understood that the reason behind bringing Şaristan to her village is a secret told by Şaristan to Mirze.

Mirze takes Şaristan to the village with Hêvî. When they are on road, Şaristan dies. After that Mirze and Hêvî encounter a lot of obstacles during bringing Şaristan's funeral to her village. Mirze's children try to convince him to bury Şaristan's funeral at some other place because of political reasons, but he doesn't accept, and insists to bring her funeral to her village. While trying to reach the village, nature and the state appear as obstacles in this process. The weather is cold, rainy, snowy, and overcast. On the way, their car breakdown. There is also a military checkpoint, and they don't allow them to pass. Then, they take the coffin by loading it on a horse and using a ridgeway. However, after a certain time, the horse gets tired from the snow and cannot move forward. They just stay on the mountain slope. After that, they carry the coffin themselves. When they have to cross a river, they find that the bridge has collapsed. Therefore, they use an old and unstable bridge. In the end, they reach the village and bury the coffin. On the way back, they come across their village/home, but it was destroyed. In other words, the state has made the geographies populated by the Kurds uninhabitable.

As stated above, the reason why Mirze insisted on taking Şaristan's body to the village is the secret that Şaristan revealed to him. Şaristan told a secret that she is Armenian and got around the Armenian Massacre in 1915. She suffered from her identity too much when she was a young woman. For instance, when Şaristan's mother-in-law got angry with her, she called Şaristan as "qîza gavura" (giaour's girl) to insult her. The audiences learn this secret after Şaristan funeral is buried in her village at the end of the film. In other words, the secret comes to light when they reach the village. The voice of Şaristan and the image of the village are superimposed. In other words, the voice of those who have suffered injustice and persecution in the past and the geographical space coincide. Thus, the audience is called to confront the trauma of the past with the voice of the victim.

After learning about Şaristan's trauma, Mirze decides to take her to the place where she feels belonging (to her village). We can say that since Şaristan has not been able to return to her home for a long time (in fact, she was not allowed to return), she fell ill with nostalgia. Like Odysseus (as Cassin states Odysseus slowly dies when he cannot return to his home), Şaristan cannot live permanently outside her home,

otherwise, she dies from nostalgia. She tells her son Mirze that her only wish is to return to her country and die there. Unfortunately, on the way home, Şaristan dies. Therefore, Mirze resists the obstacles and persists to take her funeral to her village. When Odysseus returns home, he is recognized by people, and he realize his home through his bed (“the bed in the olive tree”). However, in the case of Şaristan, it is not possible to talk about something like that because her village was destroyed by the state.

It can be stated that nature and the state appear as obstacles for the Kurds to reach/return to their home(land) in this film. “It is always difficult to reach the Kurdish geography” (Sert, 2019: 123). However, Kurds hold their head up high and try to reach their home. When considered from this point of view, the film can be related to Odysseus’s journey that he encounters and challenges numerous difficulties to reach his home. Şaristan gets sick because of longing for home. When she starts off to return home(land), there occurs many obstacles and difficulties for her (funeral). However, her son (Mirze) doesn’t give up and resists nature and the state’s barricades. Unfortunately, when they reach the village, there is no one to recognize/notice them because the home was destroyed. As stated by Cassin: “we all know that our mother is mortal. But none of us knows that our home is mortal” (2016: 62).

The bond that Şaristan established with her country is also valid for Mirze. He is upset, alone, and unemployed in İstanbul. He doesn’t have any social or cultural capital to integrate into Turkish society, like Şaristan. As stated above, Mirze (and Şaristan) differentiates from Hêvî in terms of his socio-cultural capital, and this create a tension among Hêvî and Mirze. Since Mirze does not have such a cultural capital, he does not find Hêvî’s lifestyle correct. For example, when Hêvî puts on an earring (or wearing ripped jeans), Mirze gets angry with him. In terms of Mirze, we can say that cultural difference corresponds to ethnic difference. The loss of this cultural difference also means the loss of national identity. Therefore, he doesn’t want Hêvî to adapt Turkish society in this way. To put it in different ways, he is not at peace with losing their identity. Therefore, this can be read as a reflex to assimilation. Apart from these, there is not any friend of Mirze. For instance, after learning that there is no solution to Şaristan’s illness, he feels bad. So, he goes to the coffeehouse. He greets the people

inside. Then, he sits alone and gives an order angrily in Kurdish. There is a place where he can express himself, albeit to a certain extent. In fact, this (speaking Kurdish in the coffeehouse) is an indicator of the large number of a Kurdish immigrant population in İstanbul. They live under bad living/economic conditions, so most of them are unemployed. The coffeehouse is the place of the army of the unemployed who lost their passion for life mostly. In this respect, it can be claimed that Mîrze doesn't have enough means to participate in the "field", and also there are not democratic integration mechanisms as well. Therefore, he doesn't have a sense of belonging to İstanbul. Like Odysseus, Mirze is wasting his "sweet lifetime" in İstanbul. However, Şaristan criticizes him. As said by Şaristan, Mirze worked very well in the past when they were at their home(land), but, today, he doesn't work. Thus, it can be said that Mirze doesn't want to contact Turkish society. Mirza has closed himself in. He is secretive and doesn't speak too much. In other words, he doesn't have any sense of belonging to İstanbul-as-Turkey, like Şaristan. He feels nostalgic (longing for his home), but he couldn't return there because of political reasons.

When looking at the representation of the trauma in this film it could be said that the "witness" position is chosen to represent the trauma. Kaplan and Wang (2008) offer four types of positions for audiences in terms of cinematic strategies: cure, shock, voyeur, and witness positions. According to them, the last position, witness, is the most effective in this foursome. "This position of "witness" may open up a space for transformation of the viewer through empathic identification without vicarious traumatization- an identification which allows the spectator to enter into the victim's experience through a work's narration" (Kaplan and Wang, 2008: 10). On the one hand, this position aims to effect on the viewers of the trauma films emotionally, but on the other hand, it prevents the viewers to be identified with the victim. In this way, the viewer is kept in the position of the witness. This situation helps the viewers to understand the victim even if there is not narration of the traumatic event. "The victim in the narration bears witness to the catastrophe, but the viewers become the point of communication that reasserts the continuity and humanity" (Kaplan and Wang, 2008: 10).

In this film, there are several traumatic events that the Aydın family went through such as the Armenian Massacre in 1915, forced migration and assimilation. Throughout the film, the audiences see the victims that bear witness to these traumatic events. Due to the forced migration from their home and lack of democratic integration mechanisms, they cannot adapt to the Turkish society. Therefore, they are so melancholic, secretive, and alone. They don't and cannot speak of their traumatic past, but Hêvî. As stated above, Hêvî talks about his trauma with Buse. Kablamacı by giving reference to Sancar state that "reconstructing the past through remembering also allows a person to face the pain that they have suppressed, that they cannot face, that they have postponed, that they cannot express" (2016: 273). Therefore, this event helps Hêvî to get a new sense of belonging to İstanbul. In other words, İstanbul appears as the established place of a new life for Hêvî. On the other hand, Şaristan and Mirze cannot speak of their trauma, they keep their trauma a secret from their family members too. For example, when Şaristan realizes that she is going to die, she discloses her secret to Mirze for taking her to the village. After learning this secret, Mirze doesn't share this secret with any other. Not being able to talk about trauma affects Şaristan's sense of belonging to İstanbul. She couldn't symbolize her trauma due to political, socio-cultural and economic reasons, and so she cannot acquire a new sense of belonging where she lives.

By giving reference to Lacan, Cassin states that "the origin is a fiction," and Lacan offers the "fixion" instead of "fiction." Besides, trauma always points out fixation or blockage and the fixation always requires something that cannot be symbolized (Kablamacı, 2016). Therefore, language constitutes an essential anti-thesis of the fixation by creating an opportunity and space for translocation and replacement. In other words, to get rid of the fixation and get a new place (or replacement), it should be symbolized. In the case of Şaristan, it couldn't be symbolized until her funeral reached her village. It is kept as secret by Şaristan because of the lack of a safe environment. As stated by Herman the first stage of recovery from trauma is establishing safety (Sönmez, 2012). Because of a lack of a safe environment in Turkey, Şaristan cannot talk about her traumatic past and keeps it a secret as it could get her in trouble. Therefore, the audiences don't know anything about the past of Şaristan until she was buried in the Armenian cemetery.

Şaristan keeps his traumatic past as a secret, but the audiences learn it towards the end of the film. When her non-diegetic or acousmatic voice is heard on the screen, the camera slowly begins to show the geography where Armenians were exiled and massacred. Bahar Şimşek states that in the context of the film, *Dengê Bavê Min*: “The uncanniness of the separation of voice from body seems to be dissolved in the embodiment of past experience through present images” (2016: 359). The same situation can be said for *Rêç/Trace* as well. Şaristan's voice identifies with the place as the ghost of those who have suffered injustice and persecution. By this way, the audiences bear witness what Şaristan went through in the past. There is not any image of massacre, but the mournful voice of Şaristan. Şaristan's voice is accompanied by background music for emphatic identification with the character.

This film shows us, in the context of Şaristan and Mirze, how returning home is difficult for Kurds who have a sense of belonging to their home where they were displaced due to conflict. Even if many Kurds know their home(land) was burned and destroyed they want to return their home(land). Looking at displaced Kurds in the 1990s, it can be easily seen that. A survey of 1,097 residents from the 297 chosen villages found that 93.6 percent of respondents said they wanted to return to the evacuated communities, and an even higher percentage, 98 percent, said they rejected the idea of being relocated to a community other than their own (Jongerden, 2006: 9). However, it does not run only for Kurds, but also others, in this case, Armenians who were slaughtered and exiled in 1915 by the Ottoman state with the help of many Kurdish tribes. Therefore, this film can be thought of as a self-reflexive one because, as stated by Şimşek, “the primary characteristic of a Kurdish cinema is its potential as a self-reflexive means for self-identification and social recognition in terms of transforming and transcending the trauma experience” (2016: 367). In short, if nature and the Turkish are regarded as obstacles/status quo, in this case, Kurds who are resisting to pass over these obstacles become the subject of history, not the object. In this respect, indeed, this film can be thought of as counter-hegemonic cultural production.

The integration to the society by means of state ideological apparatuses, such as schools and universities, can lead to interaction between Kurds and Turks, albeit to a

limited extent. This is a forced form of integration, and it mostly aims to assimilate Kurds. However, these apparatuses cannot be regarded as a mechanism for Kurdish identity to express or re-produce itself. Therefore, these existing institutions/apparatuses lead to disintegration, or the interaction between Turks and Kurds remains so weak. Because the integration capacity of these mechanisms is not so strong and democratic. In this respect, to strengthen this relationship, as pointed out by Yeğen (2006), there should be opportunities for Kurdish identity to express and reproduce itself. In other words, there should not be unequal situations among different identities. In addition, speaking about traumatic past affect having a sense of belonging where they live. Thus, constituting a safe environment and improving their economic (and capital) conditions are so important for this. For example, Şaristan or Mirze doesn't have any means, such as social and cultural capital, to express themselves, so they cannot participate in the reconstruction of the space in the western cities. To feel a subject/agency in western cities they need to "speak" about their right and trauma. For this, first of all, there should be a safe environment, and Kurdish language must be recognized. Because of the lack of a safe environment, Şaristan only can speak when her dead body "arrives" in the village. Therefore, nobody knows about her secret, but Mirze. Because of that reason, Şaristan and Mirze have only a sense of belonging to Kurdistan. In other words, she puts roots down there. On the other hand, Hêvî can integrate into Turkish society through the socio-cultural capital that he gets from the school, the most important ideological apparatuses of the state. Although he has a certain socio-cultural capital, he is not yet able to live completely freely (for example, she does not use her Kurdish name in the public sphere) in İstanbul. On the other hand, it still has a certain sense of belonging to Kurdistan, but unfortunately, Kurdistan has been destroyed and depopulated. Although Hêvî has certain shortcomings in terms of national consciousness, Kurdistan still preserves the quality of being "home" for him. Therefore, it can be said that Hêvî has two senses of belonging, but these two senses of belonging remain too weak.

4.2. Dengê Bavê Min (Voice of My Father) (Orhan Eskiköy and Zeynel Doğan, 2012)

The film is about the traumatic past of the Kurdish-Alevi family. Members of the family are Basê (mother), Mustafa (father), Hasan (son) and Mehmet (son). Due to an unknown event, Mustafa had to leave his home: “They’ve robbed me of my home and country. I’ve been miserable since the day I got here. It makes me cry when I think of what I’ve been through. But don’t say a word to the kids. Ok?” Mustafa was forced to work far away from his home, and he tried to manage Basê and their children from a distance to protect them. Mustafa warned Basê many times to be careful about their past, and he commended Basê to be silent about it. In other words, Mustafa dictated to them to forget the past. Otherwise, their children may get angry with something or someone, so they may engage in behavior that will cause problems for themselves. Mustafa does not want their children to get into trouble like him: “Go to the school and come straight home again. Don’t get mixed up in any trouble. Ok?” However, Hasan, who is a witness to the past event, could not forget it. Thus, after growing up, he joins to the guerrilla movement. After this event, on the one hand, Basê awaits Hasan’s return. During this process, when the phone rings at home, she answers it as if Hasan is calling. She is obsessed with the return of Hasan. On the other hand, Basê worries about his other son (Mehmet) and, as a secret, she hides the events of the past from Mehmet. Mehmet asks Basê some questions to remember the past, but Basê insists to keep the past away from him. Mehmet doesn’t stop to trace the past, and, finally, he finds a huge yellow suitcase on the basement floor. After Mehmet found the suitcase, Basê is obliged to disclose the secret on the basement floor: their family got out alive from the Maraş Alevi Massacre in 1978 by hiding their religious identity.

The subaltern characters, like Basê and Mustafa, cannot construct a new life in the film. They find it very difficult to establish a new order/life. All their actions and efforts in rebuilding their home remain fruitless. Therefore, it can be claimed that, in terms of action images, the subaltern characters are sterile. As long as there is no reconciliation with the trauma, and they are not recognized, they have difficulty establishing a new life. For example, in the film, during Basê hanging wet clothes on the balcony, the clothesline breaks. Then, she sits down on the balcony seat as if

exhausted, without collecting the laundry that has fallen to the floor. In addition, Mehmet asks Basê by pointing to the dried tree why she does not look at the trees in the garden, during painting the trunks of the trees. Then two plainclothes police come to the garden and ask about Hasan. Basê and Mehmet's work is interrupted by police. The police turn to Mehmet and ask him why he went back to Elbistan. Mehmet gets angry with their questions and goes inside. After, the plainclothes police go, and the audiences hear Mustafa's voice again: "Look Basê. ... Be sure they get along with everyone. ... The kids need to fit in. Don't let them stand out." After these events, in the evening, it rains and washes the paint off the trunks of the trees. Thus, their actions remain fruitless. Every action taken for the construction of a new life does not change the current situation. As they try to settle down, a problem always arises. Because the system does not allow them. There is not reconciliation and facing the traumatic past. The victims cannot construct a new life because they are stuck in the past. Keeping the past as a secret prevents them to adapt to Turkish society, as well. There is not still a safe environment for them. For instance, the police come to their home because some people denounce Mehmet due to likening him to Hasan. The conditions necessary for Turks and Kurds to "live together" are still very weak.

There is the traumatic past, 1978 the Maraş Alevi Massacre, that as a secret is kept by Mustafa and Basê (like Şaristan and Mirze). Mustafa always prescribes Basê to not speak about their past to protect their children from getting into trouble. Lack of a safe environment (no favorable conditions for reconciliation) have different implications for Basê and Mustafa. On the one hand, this condition prevents them to speak clearly with their children about their traumatic past, and this situation creates a conflict between Basê/Mustafa and Mehmet. On the other hand, both Basê and Mustafa cannot get rid of their traumatic past. If there was a safe environment, they could recover from their trauma by symbolizing it. The reconciliation that can let a new fixation can be possible in this way.

When Mehmet finds the suitcase while searching for old tapes belonging to his father, the cat is out of the bag. After this event, Basê starts to speak of her traumatic past and why they hide this past from Mehmet. If Mehmet learns about their traumatic past, he could give a reaction like Hasan. Basê explains the reason to hide this secret from

Mehmet like that: “What would I have done if you’d gone off like Hasan?”. Therefore, to protect Mehmet from getting into trouble or to prevent him from joining the guerrilla his family kept the traumatic past as a secret.

At that point, it should be mentioned about the trauma and reconciliation/ “speaking”. Basê and Mustafa are subalterns who cannot “speak” about their traumatic past. They even hid their own social history/past from their children. They have not forgotten this past, but they do not have the means to express it. They kept their social history/past a secret because they thought that they would be defenseless as soon as they revealed their position in the face of power (the state). Because they do not have sufficient socio-cultural and economic capital to become a subject and challenge the power in the social field. To talk about reconciliation, the so-called "other" must come face to face with the victim. Therefore, when Basê tells Mehmet about their traumatic past, she didn’t recover. In other words, there is not reconciliation. Because Mehmet is not someone who can be thought of as “other”, their trauma remains a secret among them.

As pointed out above, the same situation can be seen in Rêç/Trace as well. In this film, Şaristan only tells his son, Mirze, about her traumatic past. Neither Mirze nor Mehmet cannot speak of this secret, and they hide it as their mothers did. Therefore, it can be said that the reason why Mirze could not belong to Turkish society is also valid for Mustafa and Basê: not having a democratic integration mechanism and expressing themselves freely. According to Kablamacı (2016), after Basê spoke with Mehmet about the traumatic past, she recovers. Therefore, for Kablamacı, in the film, the clock that was broken is fixed by Mehmet. Contrary to what Kablamacı (2016) stated, Mehmet cannot fix the clock in the film. Base still stuck to the past. Time does not move forward because Basê speaks with Mehmet about their traumatic past. However, to recover she must talk to someone who can be considered “other”. For example, in Rêç/Trace, Hêvî tells Buse about his traumatic past, and, in this respect, he has a sense of belonging to Turkish society (and İstanbul). In other words, he gets rid of the trauma by expressing/symbolizing it to the other. The healing process has begun for Hêvî, and this has allowed a partial sense of belonging to develop. It is an artificial belonging, because social traumas are caused by structural problems (Kurdish problem) and in order to heal these traumas, arrangements that go beyond individual tolerance must be

made. However, Basê (or Şaristan) did not recover. To have a sense of belonging where they live, they should symbolize their traumatic past. Sönmez (2012) indicates that by giving reference to Freud, for recovery the victim should speak about their traumatic past. Therefore, the characters cannot have sense of belonging (fixing) to the city. For instance, throughout the film, there are not any friends of Mehmet (or Basê) who is from Turkish society. When Mehmet strolls through Elbistan, his hands are in his pockets, and he looks around. He is alone in the city center where they moved later.

Moreover, Mustafa thinks that, by learning Turkish, their children will integrate into Turkish society easily. In other words, he tries to integrate his children into Turkish society through assimilation. To make easy integration into Turkish society and stay below the radar, Mustafa also asks family members to forget their traumatic past. In this way, family members won't get into trouble. Unlike what was claimed by Yıldız (2017) and Kablamacı (2016), Mustafa doesn't represent the state authority in this film. Kablamacı (2016) makes the following claim in her article in which she examines the representation of trauma, the relationship between forgetting-remembering, social memory, and cinema, as well as how the film establishes a formal structure: The parent takes on the role of infiltrating the state's text and speaking for it (Kablamacı, 2016: 282). Yıldız (2019) examines the sound in the movie *My Father's Voice* and discusses what kind of sound the director uses and the ethical-political effect of this sound on the audience. According to Yıldız, "The call of the law/father to forget and ignore makes Basê's testimony silent. However, this silence, which makes the transmission of trauma and confrontation impossible, is displaced by Basê's narrative about the massacre" (2019: 142). Father/Mustafa is someone "exiled" from his home, so how he can be regarded as the law of authority or the state. Mustafa is a subaltern, and, as indicated above, the main purpose of Mustafa recommends learning Turkish, forgetting the past to protect family members is important for staying below the radar of the state. While the government advises to forget the traumatic event to ensure homogenization, Mustafa advises forgetting so as not to be subjected to further persecution. Therefore, this can be taken into account as a tactic used to be more imperceptible by the subaltern.

Shortly, it can be stated that there is not a democratic adaptation mechanism to Turkish society, and Alevis and Kurds haven't mechanisms to re-produce or express themselves freely in the society. There is oppression on them to forget and assimilate into the Sunni-Turkish society. They are in a “minority” position where they live. To put it in a different way, they are subordinate where they live. Therefore, they cannot speak and are forced to forget their language and stay silent. However, if they forget their language and the past and stay silent, they won't be able to symbolize their trauma. This prevents them to have a sense of belonging to where they live. As stated above, therefore, neither Basê nor Mehmet hasn't any friends who can be considered as other/majority group (Sunni-Turks).

However, the past resists getting lost. “The first generation, who witnessed the events and preferred to forget in order to survive, experiences tension first with Hasan, who is a witness, resisting to forget and cover up, and then with Mehmet, who asks the question of what happened” (Kablamacı, 2017: 258-9). As indicated by Özmen (2018), repression and the return of the repressed are one and the same thing. In other words, the repressed always returns. Mustafa and Basê forced Hasan to forget what happened in the past, but Hasan got angry with the system, so he participated in the guerrilla. The past that is oppressed by the state is revealed by the new generation (Mehmet), as they look for their “roots” because they don't feel sharing the same root with Turkish society. The new generation, due to the denial, destruction, and assimilation policies of the state, cannot integrate into the system. In other words, these undemocratic integration policies of the state are not accepted by Kurdish youth. Therefore, they resist against these policies, like Hasan who rejects to forget the traumatic past. On the other hand, due to not being aware of the traumatic past of his family until this age, Mehmet doesn't react as much as Hasan. As indicated by Walter Benjamin (2007) in the context of the working class, what makes us (the working class) resist and struggle against the unjust system is not the dream of good days that our children will have, on the contrary, the suffering of our ancestors in the past triggers us to resist and struggle against this unjust system. Therefore, Benjamin criticizes the Social Democrats for assigning to the working class the role of the redeemer of future generations, and he states: “This training made the working class forget both its hatred and its spirit of

sacrifice, for both are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren” (2007: 260). Hasan is one of who cannot forget the traumatic past. Even if his parents had tried to placate him, it didn’t work. Therefore, he decided to participate in the guerrilla movement because there are not any reconciliation or democratic integration mechanisms that lead to the re-production of their identity or expression of their thoughts. Looking at the Rêç, the same situation can be seen, as well: in Rêç, what activates Mîrze to take Şaristan her village even if there are a lot of obstacles in front of them is the traumatic past of Şaristan that he recently learned. Therefore, he insists to take Şaristan’s dead body to her village.

Mustafa is longing for his home, but because of political reasons, he couldn’t return home permanently. He had to flee abroad. While he was away from his home, he was pitiful there: “How are you? Are you ok? How’s Hasan? I really miss you all. Do you have snow? ...They’ve robbed me of my home and country. I’ve been miserable since the day I got here. It makes me cry when I think of what I’ve been through.” In other words, like Odysseus, Mustafa wanted to return home. Due to political reasons, he couldn’t return his home(land). In other words, there were some obstacles in front of Mustafa to return to home. While he was away from his home, he was upset. Because of that, like Odysseus, he consumed his “sweet lifetime” while away from home. He didn’t make a life for himself when there, like Odysseus. In this respect, it can be claimed that he was fixed/rooted in the village where they live. “It has been three years already. I think of you fifty times a day.” Later, he got the opportunity to return to his home from time to time but could not stay at home permanently. Therefore, he doesn’t die for nostalgia, unlike Şaristan. However, after arriving, he must come back again. Otherwise, he could get into trouble. Therefore, he was suffering from nostalgia when there. Towards the end of the film, the audiences learn that Mustafa died in a work accident when he was away from his home.

It is significant to state that besides not having a sense of belonging to where Mustafa work, Mustafa does not have anything in common with the Turkish-Sunni community in Maraş either. Mustafa has a problem with the oppressive and denial policies of the state, and there are not remarkable social relations between Kurdish-Alevi and Turkish-Sunnis in Maraş. The most important indicator of not being able to integrate

into the Turkish-Sunni society is, as stated above, this: Mustafa always advises his family to hide and forget their identities. Basê and Mustafa are also like this, and they don't have a sense of belonging to Turkish society. Looking at the film, it can be seen that there is not an interaction between these two ethnicities in the film. As pointed out above, Basê and Mehmet don't have a friend who can be considered as "other" in the city. Their only family friend is a Kurdish-Alevi family, whose daughter joined the guerrilla and lives in the village. The village is the only space where they have a sense of belonging because they can share their trauma with each other. Therefore, they had a sense of belonging to the village where Kurdish-Alevis live. In light of this information, it can be claimed that the city center, where they cannot speak about their traumatic past, represents the state space, but the village, where they can speak about it, represents the Kurdish space.

Just like his father, Hasan was forced into "exile". Shortly after returning from Maraş to convince Basê to live with them in Diyarbakır, plainclothes police came to their house and asked about Hasan. When they realize that Hasan is not at home, they ask Mehmet why you returned to Maraş. Since the family is perceived as a danger and threat by the state, returning to their own homes is seen as a problem. Therefore, "unofficial" exile was imposed on the family which was in the "minority" position after the Maraş Alevi Massacre. The family has been driven from their homes. For instance, due to social exclusion and the Maraş Alevi Massacre, Hasan couldn't stay at home, and he decided to join the guerrilla movement. Later, the audiences learn by letter that Hasan is fine and working in somewhere. When Mehmet tells what Hasan wrote in the letter to Basê, he says that "he is obviously missing home." However, like Mustafa, he cannot return home because of political reasons, so there are some significant obstacles in front of Hasan to return home, as well. Therefore, it can be claimed that Hasan feels nostalgia when there. So, at that point, it should be asked that question: How can Hasan live even if he cannot return to his home?

As stated in the theoretical part, Odysseus, Aeneas, and Arendt are all "exiled", but there are some differences between them. Odysseus feels like he belongs at home. In other words, Odysseus is rooted here, in his home. Therefore, if he cannot return his home, he dies. On the other hand, Aeneas is also exiled from Troy, but he can live

when he is away from his home. The reason behind this circumstance is that Aeneas assimilated wherever he went. He forgot his mother tongue in Rome where is his new home. Arendt was also “exiled” from her home, but her situation is different from Aeneas’s. Arendt didn’t die when she was away from her home, as well. However, the reason behind this situation is not the same as Aeneas. Contrary to Aeneas, Arendt resists being assimilated into the USA (English language). She clings to her mother tongue while in America. To put it in a different way, she considers her mother tongue as “home.”

Hasan clings to his mother tongue when he is away from his home, like Arendt. Therefore, he can live everywhere. Because of this reason, he didn’t die even if he is away from his home. When he is away from his home, he writes letters to his family in Kurdish. Some words that he used in these letters are not known by Mehmet. Like Arendt, Hasan embraces tightly his mother tongue when he is exiled from his mother tongue. Therefore, even if Hasan is away from his home for a long time, he speaks his mother tongue, Kurdish, better than Mehmet.

Because of being a Kurdish-Alevi, Hasan was attacked and tried to be assimilated by means of ideological and repressive state apparatuses. The state attacks the Kurdish-Alevi populated areas many times and denies and does not recognize the existence of their identity. Therefore, Hasan politically embraced his Kurdish-Alevi identity and mother tongue. In other words, Hasan defends and resists against these policies of the state by embracing his mother tongue. Therefore, he politically considers the Kurdish language as his home. This is the reason why Hasan did not die while he was away from home(land), although he cannot return there. By clinging to his mother tongue Hasan can live even if he is away from his home. He is just nostalgic about speaking his mother language. To overcome this circumstance, he writes letters to his family in Kurdish. Instead of forgetting his mother tongue where he was exiled, he clings to his mother tongue. By giving a reference to Cassin's philosophy of language, it can be said that Hasan works hard not to lose his mother tongue, even though he is far away. In this sense, he is like Arendt. Because of having “airborne roots” Hasan can live everywhere, but not Turkey due to political conflict. In the context of Hasan, Kurdishness is produced through the mother language, not territorial space. Therefore,

when Hasan says, "I miss home", he actually means that he misses the socio-cultural environment where Kurdish is spoken. This is not a mere reference to a physical space.

Even if there is not enough information about why Mehmet and his wife moved to Diyarbakır, looking at their home stuff, it can be understood that they have a certain amount of social and cultural capital. Therefore, they can live where they move. On the other hand, Basê and Mustafa, who don't have any socio-cultural capital (and cannot "speak" about their traumatic past), feel nostalgia when they become distant from their home. Basê and Mustafa are fixed where they were traumatized. Due to a lack of socio-cultural capital that can lead them to be an agent/subject in the social field where they live and despite all these problems (massacre, marginalization, assimilation, etc.), they do not want to move to another place. Because the space/home they know is the safest place for them. For example, Base can share her affliction with those who have the same affliction as her. It can be claimed that, for Base and Mustafa, they have "earthy roots", and there is a strong relationship between their Kurdishness and Kurdistan. Thus, they have a single sense of belonging. On the other hand, Mehmet is the one semi-assimilated, but he tries to return to his homeland by ascertaining his past. Because of having a certain amount of socio-cultural capital, he can live everywhere, and he can get to some extent a position in the social field. Therefore, he doesn't have a fixed home(land). Looking at Hasan is in the opposite position against the state. Because of that, he cannot be regarded as a subaltern. He embraced his mother tongue as home(land) when he is away. In other words, Hasan reproduces his Kurdishness by means of his mother tongue. Therefore, they can have multiple senses of belonging.

4.3. Kilama Dayîka Mîn (Song of My Mother) (Erol Mintaş, 2014)

The film is about a Kurdish family that was forced migration, to İstanbul, due to the evacuation and demolishing of their village by the state. The main characters of the film are Nigar (mother) and Ali (her son). Nigar is an old woman, who doesn't like to live in İstanbul. She has three children. One of them was a teacher, and he disappeared by the state's paramilitary forces in 1992. He was kidnapped in a village school. When he was telling the Kurdish fairy tale, "Qijik" (Crow), in the village school, some men in the White Taurus (Beyaz Toros) came to the school and kidnaped him. Then, the

White Taurus disappeared into the steppe field. The second son of Nigar (Haydar) was exiled from Turkey, and he lives in Europe, so they can only meet online. Ali (the third son) is Nigar's younger son, and he is a Turkish teacher in a public school. Also, he is teaching Kurdish to children voluntarily in an institution (Mesopotamia Cultural Center- MKM). He has a girlfriend whose name is Zeynep, and Zeynep is pregnant. Ali and Nigar lived in Tarlabası, which is one of the poor neighborhoods of İstanbul. By giving reference to Perouse (2011), Şimşek indicate that "with the rise of the urban transformation projects in Tarlabası, a kind of Kurdish ghetto in İstanbul, the family finds itself forcibly displaced in İstanbul, from a Kurdish neighborhood into apartments in a remote district" (2016: 360). After moving to an apartment, Nigar becomes increasingly moody and her desire to return to her home(land) increases. Ali tries to rule Nigar because there is no homeland to go to. Their homeland was destroyed by the state long ago and people were forced to migrate.

Looking at the narrative structure of the film, it can be seen that the main conflict is structured between Ali and Nigar. Nigar is not happy to be and live in İstanbul, and she wants to return to her village. IDPs are frequently thought to wish to return home (Ayata and Yükseler, 2005: 13). On the other hand, Ali knows that their home(land)/village was demolished by the state, so, due to this reason, he tries to establish a new life in İstanbul. Nigar always complains about being in İstanbul, and she believes that everyone who was forced to migrate returned to their home/village. Therefore, she insists to return their village. Ali cannot convince Nigar that nobody returns their home. Hence, there is always conflict among them. Ali is always concerned about his mother, but he is not able to do anything about this problem. Nigar collects the household items to return to the village several times, but each time Ali puts these items back in their place. Ali tells Nigar that nobody returns their home(land) several times. However, because of not believing in Ali, Nigar tries different ways to convince Ali to return to their home. Nigar grinds Ali down in the matter of returning home. For example, she sometimes goes to the house of acquaintances without informing Ali, and Ali supposes that his illiterate old mother is missing. Once, Nigar tries to return to her village/home(land) by herself, but Ali catches her at the bus terminal. Nigar gets bored in İstanbul even though there are some

acquaintances with that she can spend time. In other words, she doesn't have a sense of belonging to İstanbul. Therefore, she stands out for returning to their home/village.

Ayata and Yükseler state significant comments on having different meaning of home among Kurds:

Therefore, there is a need to go behind the surface level of the prevalent discourse and carefully delineate what "return" to original homes means for different people. For instance, for many IDPs who were forcefully evicted, "returning home" might have more than a simple signification. At one level, returning home is returning to the homeland. As such, it is a widely shared political demand by Kurdish IDPs for the removal of the violation of the right to live in one's homeland. But at another level, returning home is an important decision about livelihood, which may depend on a variety of factors. Indeed, our interviews with forced migrants in İstanbul and Diyarbakır, albeit not based on a representative sample, demonstrate the diversity of their aspirations based on age, gender and location. Only elderly people and men expressed a firm wish to return to their villages. Young adults of both genders and married women, on the other hand, saw their future in the city. For instance, in İstanbul, young working men and women did not want to go back to the village since they were unaccustomed to rural life. Yet they wanted their villages to be rebuilt for visits during summer (2005: 35-6).

To solve this problem, Ali decides to take Nigar with him to the place where he will go. Nigar tells Ali: you always leave me at this small home, but you go and walk around. Therefore, Ali takes Nigar with him to school and the institution (MKM) where he works voluntarily. However, this also does not work, and Nigar's mind does not relax. In other words, Nigar cannot adapt to society. For instance, in the school, where Ali is an official teacher, nobody cares or talks with Nigar when she is in the teacher's room. Teachers have fun watching something on phone, but Nigar is sitting alone a little far from them. In addition, when she goes to the institution (MKM) where Ali thought Kurdish, she gets bored there, as well. She is disturbed by the metal music made by the young people at MKM and goes to the class where Ali teaches Kurdish. Neither inside (home/private sphere) nor outside (public sphere) can satisfy Nigar's longing. In other words, her longing for their village won't go away despite all Ali's efforts.

Throughout the film, Nigar always asks Ali where Seydoye Silo's tape is. Seydoyê Silo is a denbêj -Kurdish voice singer- who sang songs in Nigar's village. Nigar and Ali

look for this tape throughout the entire film. Ali searches for this tape to satisfy Nigar's longing, but he couldn't find it. Then, he goes to a dengbêj, Mam Egid, and asks him about Seydoyê Silo. However, he doesn't know about Seydoyê Silo, but Mam Egid sings a song for his mother to record on a tape. When Nigar listens to Mam Egid's song, she starts to cry. Like Odysseus, her tears are the symbol of her longing for home. Therefore, it can be claimed that she consumes her "sweet lifetime" in İstanbul where she doesn't have a sense of belonging. In the film, Nigar is mostly filmed in claustrophobic areas. The camera often shows Nigar alone looking out the window at Istanbul. Through these scenes, it is tried to emphasize that Nigar does not feel belonging to Istanbul. Hence, she is always sick and unhappy at home. She cannot sleep well at night. For instance, one day, when she is sick, she falls asleep on the sofa. Ali comes to her aid. He takes Nigar to the hospital. At the end of this tough process, Ali decides to take Nigar to their home/village. In this way, Nigar may be convinced that nobody returns home. Unfortunately, the next day, when Ali wakes up, he sees that Nigar is dead. At this point, it can be claimed that the reason behind Nigar's death is nostalgia, like Swiss soldiers. In light of this information, it can be claimed that Nigar has an Odysseus way of nostalgia, so she is rooted in her village (Kurdistan). Therefore, she cannot completely live in other places where she doesn't have a sense of belonging.

As stated by Boym by referring to Freud, the only way to return home is to analyze and recognize the traumas: "Freud appropriates the vocabulary of nostalgia; for him, the only way of 'returning home' is through analysis and recognition of early traumas" (Boym, 2001: 54). In this film, Nigar's trauma is not analyzed and recognized by someone. She cannot "speak" with someone from "other" who recognizes her trauma. As stated above, she mostly filmed in claustrophobic spaces. In this way, the filmmaker emphasizes the outsidership of Nigar. Because of a lack of socio-cultural capital, Nigar cannot get a position in the social field. She is old, traditional, and subaltern who hasn't opportunity to take an action. She is an object in space, not a subject/agent. Nobody recognizes and pays attention to Nigar in İstanbul. On the other hand, Ali is a writer and teacher at a public school. In other words, he has a certain amount of socio-cultural capital that provides an opportunity to him to participate in

the game and struggle through his interests in the social field. Ali writes/speaks about his trauma to people for recognition and reconciliation of his trauma, albeit to a limited extent.

The state reject to recognize their trauma and tries to assimilate the Kurdish language. Therefore, Ali does not feel a complete belonging to Turkey. He interacts to some extent with Turkish society. However, due to the oppression of Kurds and the Kurdish language, he hesitates to establish a new life there. For example, he becomes upset when he hears that Zeynep is pregnant. For the constrained spaces of enunciation, Istanbul is the contained space of the embodied subject of Kurdish identities (Şimşek, 2016: 362).

Hence, for Ali, İstanbul is a city where Ali himself limitedly participated in the production of İstanbul as a space, rather than being a diasporic city, as Sebahattin Şen (2022) stated. Şen is right about Nigar with respect to not having a sense of belonging to İstanbul. However, it is not possible to agree with his claim of; Ali as a colonial Kurdish subjectivity is divided between Turkishness and Kurdishness. By doing this Şen ignores the socio-cultural differences between Ali and Nigar. Therefore, this argument is an overstatement. Ali is capable of being a subject to a limited extent in İstanbul because he has the socio-cultural capital to challenge and participate in the reconstruction of the homogeneous national-space of Turkey by creating differentials in this space. On the other hand, Nigar is not “enough” to do the same thing because she does not have the socio-cultural capital to stand against (that is, to challenge) the power. Therefore, it can be said that having different social class backgrounds has an effect on displaced Kurds in terms of developing a new sense of belonging.

Also, according to Şen, İstanbul is not a city that Ali would like to settle in. However, looking at Ali’s practices in İstanbul, it is not possible to agree with Şen because Ali can be seen as a subject who participated in the reproduction of İstanbul as space. He thought Kurdish voluntarily in MKM. In addition, he is political and joins the strikes for having a better life in İstanbul. As I mentioned above, Ali politicized his mother tongue by associating it with his traumatic past. He resists the state’s assimilationist policies by embracing his mother tongue and Kurdisness by following his

“disappeared” brother’s pathway in İstanbul. Moreover, he is a writer, and his books are translated into Turkish. In other words, he relates and speaks (mourns) with people like Merve, who is Turkish, and recognize his identity by writing. Merve (Ali’s friend) felicitates Ali for his book and invites Ali to meet her student. Although it is not possible to say that Ali completely belongs to Istanbul, it can be claimed that he is in an effort to transform Istanbul into his own space as a subject. Therefore, it is not just an “intermediate space” as Şen claims. In this respect, it is possible to say that the colonial thesis is not sufficient to understand the Kurdish question, as Yeğen (2006) stated. The Indian-English, Algerian-French, and Kurdish-Turkish conflicts bear little resemblance to one another, and neither party to the Kurdish conflict has ever experienced the kind of estrangement that comes in such circumstances (Yeğen, 2006: 18).

“When are we ever at home?” (Cassin, 2016: 63). When we are welcomed, we come alone, with those closest to us, in our own language, in our own language. According to Cassin, when people are accepted with their language(s) and family, they are at home. Looking at Kurdish films’ themes, such as forced migration, forced disappearances, unsolved murders, evacuation and burning villages, and so on, these films mostly are about the socio-political traumas of Kurds. When Kurds migrate to the western cities of Turkey, they go there with these traumas. If they are not accepted with their languages and families, they start to feel nostalgic. For example, Nigar doesn’t talk about his “disappeared” son in the film. If they cannot talk about their traumatic past, it is possible to state that Kurds cannot have a sense of belonging to the west. To “live together”, there should be democratic mechanisms that can lead to integrating Kurds into Turkish society by symbolizing their trauma. Due to the lack of these democratic mechanisms in the state and society, Kurds are not accepted with their language and those who are close to them, too.

The film starts with the traumatic event, the forced disappearance of Ali’s brother (the teacher-no named). “In the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which became an armed conflict in 1984, Turkish paramilitary units and death squads committed extensive violence against civilians, especially in the 1990s” (Üngör and Işık, 2021: 28). Throughout the film, nobody talks about this

traumatic event, but photos of “disappeared” man. At the end of the film, Ali tells children the Kurdish fairy tale that was told by his “disappeared” brother too. In this way, it can be understood that Ali is following his brother’s pathway by teaching Kurdish to children. In other words, by politicizing the Kurdish language, Ali challenges the assimilation and destruction policies of the state. Therefore, he can be considered as a subject, unlike Nigar.

In addition to this, Ali considers his mother tongue as home, like Arendt. Her (Arendt) homeland is defined by her mother tongue, not by the country of her fathers; rather than accepting Latin in order to create Rome, German resistance in New York defines the homeland (Cassin, 2016: 42). According to Cassin, this conception of the homeland emerged after the terrible World War II. The same thing can be said for Ali’s situation, as well. When Kurds (in this case Ali) are not allowed to speak their language freely, again they are longing for their mother tongue. However, there is a significant difference between Ali and Arendt. Ali cannot speak Kurdish in İstanbul owing to the state repression, and the state has been trying to assimilate their mother tongue. Therefore, by politicizing his mother tongue in the national context, Ali resists against these policies of the state. By referring to Arendt, Cassin states that: “if one is attacked as Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew” (Cassin, 2016: 42). As stated above, Ali is following his “disappeared” brother pathway, and he politicizes his nostalgia (longing for his mother tongue) by this way. On the other hand, in the USA, German is not banned, so Arendt and Ali differentiate in this regard. One of them, Arendt, defended herself by embracing her Jewish identity, and another one, Ali, defends himself by embracing his mother tongue -besides his Kurdish identity. However, both of them resist forgetting their mother tongue wherever they live in. The following words of Cassin, quoted from Arendt's letter (July 6, 1967) to Ernst Johans, are meaningful at this point:

You know I had to leave Germany more than thirty-four years ago; the mother tongue is the only thing you can take with you from the old country, and I have always tried to keep this irreplaceable thing intact and alive (Cassin, 2016: 45).

Language something that cannot be regarded as private property as compared to land. Like Arendt, Ali takes his mother tongue away with himself and re-produces his Kurdishness by giving a reference to his mother tongue.

According to Şimşek (2016), by giving a reference to Boym, Nigar and Ali can be thought of as the subjects of, respectively, “restorative nostalgia” and “reflexive nostalgia”. However, as stated in the section on the theoretical framework, Boym's concept of nostalgia does not mean a return to the present state of the "thing" for which nostalgia is felt. Cassin's concept of nostalgia, on the other hand, is more appropriate to the current understanding of nostalgia. Therefore, I propose to rethink them in the context of Cassin's concept of nostalgia and say that Nigar and Ali's nostalgic state, respectively, coincide with that of Odysseus and Arendt. Nigar doesn't want to return to the past or former state of her homeland. She just wants to return there. In one scene, the view changes as Nigar looks at Istanbul from the window of the tall apartment. A dengbej sings from behind while a person is riding a horse in Kurdish populated areas. A parallel is created between this image and Ali riding a motorcycle in Istanbul traffic. By this scene, the difference between the two places is emphasized rather than Nigar's longing for his homeland. This world (Istanbul) is a world where Nigar is unfamiliar. Therefore, even if Nigar knows her homeland is not the same, she wants to return there.

That is how I would take account of what I suggest calling the disparity between the two nostalgias: Arendt, as a refugee and thinker of the political, is nostalgic for German and is exiled from one language among others; Heidegger, as a philosopher, is nostalgic for Being and is exiled from logos—better yet, from die Sprache (“Language,” the “Said”), ‘the house of Being’ and “the home of man’s essence” (Cassin, 2016: 50).

Nigar is rooted in her homeland, so she must return to her homeland to live. In this respect, in the context of Nigar, it can be said that Nigar's nostalgia can be named as an “ontological nationalism.” Nigar was exiled from “the house of man's essence.” However, as pointed out by Cassin, this “ontological nationalism” cannot be reduced to National Socialism. On the other hand, Ali accepts his mother tongue as his homeland (instead of “fatherland”) because he was exiled from his mother tongue, like Arendt. At the beginning of the film, his brother was “disappeared” due to telling the Kurdish fairy tale. After this traumatic event, they were exiled from Doğubeyazıt. In

other words, the reason behind their exile is their mother tongue. Therefore, he embraces the Kurdish language and resists forgetting it during exile by politicizing it.

In light of this information, home-seeking is one of the most common topics in the victim cinema. Every character endeavor to return to their home(land)s (language as a homeland and specific geographical areas as a homeland) where they will be accepted with their families and language(s). Ali and Nigar are both nostalgic characters who looking for a home. However, looking at the bond they have established with the homeland, it is seen that the two differ from each other. Their social class background plays an important role in having a different understanding of home(land). Ali regards his mother tongue as home(land) after being exiled from Kurdistan. To put it in different way Ali has “airborne roots” instead of “earthy roots”. He has a certain socio-cultural capital to take a position in the social field in western cities. In other words, he takes the opposite position against the sovereign, and re-built his socio-cultural space because of being a subject/agent. Therefore, Ali, who has a socio-cultural capital, resists against the sovereign by embracing his mother tongue. When he is teaching Kurdish to children in MKM, the police raid MKM and say that they will search the classroom due to receiving a report. Besides, his “disappeared” brother, because of teaching Kurdish in class, was kidnapped by the state’s paramilitary groups. So, his brother wasn’t accepted with his language too. In other words, Ali is not accepted with his language and family. However, he insists to stay and resist to create a new home(land) in İstanbul by embracing his mother tongue and Kurdishness. Hence, Kurds who are displaced from their mother language are looking for a home both in the west and east part of Turkey because there is assimilation on both sides. The state attacks them because of speaking Kurdish, so they defend themselves by embracing their mother tongue. On the other hand, Nigar can be considered as an “ontological nationalist” character who is rooted in the Kurdish populated areas with “earthy roots.” Therefore, she must return home, otherwise she will die due to nostalgia. She is an old, traditional, analphabetic woman who hasn’t the socio-cultural capital to live and integrate into Turkish society. Unlike Ali, Nigar (subaltern Kurds) is not a subject/agent in İstanbul, so she cannot force the state to reconcile and face with her (social) traumas. Therefore, she wants to return to her homeland (Kurdistan).

In short, as a political cinema deeply connected to the Kurdish question, victim cinema can be called the home-seeking cinema. It expresses the homesickness of the (linguistically or physically) displaced Kurds, who are not accepted with their language or their families wherever they go. In this sense, homelessness (Arslan, 2009) appears as a basic code of the victim cinema.

4.4. Zer (Kazım Öz, 2017)

The film is about an old song that reveals the secret that has been covered by the official history/ideology of the state. Zarife is an old woman who has a health problem with her lungs. To be treated, she goes to the USA where her son (Sertaç) is engaged in banking. In the USA, while Zarife is being treated at the hospital, her grandson (Jan -means pain in Kurdish-) keeps her accompanied. One day, while Zarife and Jan are in the hospital room, Zarife asks her grandson, Jan, to sing her a song. Then, Jan sings the song (Boat on the River, Styx) which is about longing for home. After that, Jan requests Zarife to sing a song for himself, and Zarife sings the song “Zer” to Jan. When Jan hears the song, he is very impressed with this song, which he does not understand at all. Jan insists Zarife for singing the song again, but Zarife cannot sing the song again due to her illness. After a short time, Zarife dies due to this illness. Then, her family takes her funeral in Afyon Karahisar, Turkey. During Zarife's condolences, Jan asks his aunt if she knows the song Zer sang by her grandmother Zarife. His aunt says she doesn't know about the song. However, Jan continues to talk about the song, Zer. His father gets angry with him and slaps him in the face because Jan gets on the bad side of his father by saying the song is Kurdish in the middle of the Turkish people. With this scene, it is understood that they disguise their Kurdish-Alevi identity in Afyon due to a past traumatic event. The next day, when Jan has breakfast, his aunt tells a secret that is about the song. Zarife is a Kurdish-Alevi woman, who is a survivor of the Dersim Massacre in 1937-8. She was adopted by a high-ranking officer who participated in the Dersim Massacre and brought to Afyon. Zarife's real name is Zer, and it is the name of the girl who is the hero of an old love epic. Before the massacre, her uncle, who came to their house as a guest, always sang the Zer song to them. Zarife lost all her relatives in the massacre. When Zarife was alive, she wanted to go to Dersim and see it. Her wish is to be buried in Dersim when she dies, but she cannot

share this with anyone except his daughter. After learning this secret, Jan goes/returns to Zarife's village. Therefore, with this journey, Jan actually fulfils Zarife's unfulfilled wish. During this journey, Jan encounters many difficulties to reach Zarife's village. When he arrives there, he sees that Zarife's village is underwater. In other words, it was destroyed.

Zarife is longing for her village, but she cannot return there due to political reasons. When she was a child, she was adopted by a soldier who participated in the Dersim Massacre and taken to Afyon Karahisar. She had to hide her Kurdish identity, and she wasn't allowed to talk about her trauma. She didn't even tell her trauma to anybody except her children. Both Zarife and her children keep Zarife's traumatic past as a secret. She longs for her village secretly. Therefore, she didn't have a sense of belonging to the west because she pretends to be someone else when she's in Afyon.

Although Zarife and her family do not have an economic problem (because her husband is a Turkish officer who participated in the Dersim massacre) in Afyon, Zarife always wanted to return to her village (Dersim) and see it. She kept her wish to see this village and be buried there after her death as a secret throughout her life and did not tell anyone but her daughter. The past is full of many social traumas for which redemption is not paid (Erdoğan, 2020) or accounted for. It is hardly possible to think that "living together" would be possible without facing these traumas experienced in the past. In other words, "living together" based on consent is hardly possible without expiation for all the injustices experienced in the past. Therefore, reconciliation of trauma is necessary, otherwise, it is not possible to gain a new belonging because the past is not settled. However, Zarife is not a subject, so she cannot challenge the state to force reconciliation with the traumatic past. Therefore, as a subaltern woman, Zarife had to hide her identity for years. In these conditions, it is not possible for Zarife to have a sense of belonging to Turkey. On the other hand, Jan who has a certain socio-cultural capital can resist against the sovereign. For example, Jan doesn't hide his Kurdishness in the funeral house, and he insists that the Zer song that Zarife sang to him is in Kurdish. Although Jan's father and aunt are afraid to reveal their identities, Jan does not hesitate to reveal his identity. Jan's father Sertaç is a person who always avoids facing the past. In other words, Sertaç avoids his Kurdishness and adopts the

dominant identity of Turkishness. Jan, on the other hand, is someone who is curious about the past and insists on messing with the past. In this scene, we see that Kurdish-Alevis cannot freely express their identity. To illustrate this, the director records the fear and anxiety on Jan's father and aunt's faces with close-up shots.

Like Şaristan, Zarife also wants to see her village before she dies, and she wants to be buried there when she dies. Although Zarife could not go to her village, Jan realizes her wish by going to Dersim. Thus, through Jan, the "earthy roots" of Zarife are not dried up. In other words, Jan keeps this "root" alive by going to Dersim. Thus, Kurdistan continues to exist as a homeland. In this way, like Hêvî, Jan also acquires a second belonging as a result of his grandmother's death. The death of his grandmother brings Jan back to his first "roots". Jan is someone who will gain national consciousness in the film by following the "roots" indicated by the song, Zare, after the tragic death of his grandmother, Zarife. By tracing this song, he will witness the injustices suffered by his grandmother Zarife and her relatives in the past. Thus, Jan will learn about the past (witnessing the past) and have national consciousness.

At this point, it should be asked that questions: Why was Jan influenced by this song too much even though he didn't know what the song meant? Why did he go to Dersim after the song he heard for the first time? Cassin's nostalgia concept helps us to find answers to these questions. Jan can be considered as the Swiss soldier who would like to return home when they hear the song from the Alpine pastures.

The Swiss would desert whenever they heard the "ranz of the cows," the song or air from the Alpine pastures, a "celebrated Air," as Rousseau writes in his Dictionary of Music, that 'was so generally beloved among the Swiss that it was forbidden to be play'd in their troops under pain of death, because "it made those who heard it burst into tears, desert, or die, so great a desire did it excite in them of returning to their country" (Cassin, 2016: 5-6).

Looking at Jan's life in New York, it can be seen that he is also like Odysseus he is not happy there. He has a monotonous and boring life in New York. He is studying at the conservatory there. When he is in class, he sits in the back row in class and doesn't listen to the professor. Or, when we see him out having fun, he dances alone at a nightclub. He accompanies the song sung right in front of the soloist in the bar, alone. Through camera shots, his loneliness is always emphasized. This loneliness, boredom

and rootlessness are emphasized in the scenes where he dances alone away from the crowd or walks the streets of New York with his hands in his pockets and stops and looks at the city as if he were a stranger. There is a girl he likes, sometimes they make love. But they are not lovers. They have an ambiguous relationship. We do not see any of Jan's friends during the whole movie. Until he doesn't listen to the song Zer from Zarife, New York is a city where he consumes his "sweet lifetime" for him. The song leads Jan to return to Zarife's (or his) home following the song's trail. After hearing this song, his route become his home (Dersim), and he follows the trace of the song that takes him to his roots. Jan goes from America to Afyon and from there to Dersim, following the footsteps/traces of this song. This journey also will lead to the exposure of the secret that has been covered by the state. As stated above, Jan faces many difficulties and obstacles when he tries to return to Zarife's home.

There are also many obstacles in front of Zarife (and Jan) to return home. Zarife wants to go back to her hometown, but she cannot tell this wish to anyone, but her daughter. After the traumatic event she experienced in the past, she kept silent and retreated into her shell. She suffered a lot because of this, and that's why she named her grandson "Jan". As stated above, Jan means pain in Kurdish. Only her daughter knows her wish. There is not any tangible/concrete ban on Zarife to return her village. However, there is an invisible obstacle that prevents her/them (Şaristan, Zarife, Nigar) to return her/their home(land). This invisible obstacle can be named as "invisible wall", and this "invisible wall" is something that can be felt by minority/exiled people when they would like to return to their home in Kurdish cinema.

No one had told the oppressed that they should not return to their homes. So why do these characters (Şaristan and Nigar) keep their desire to return home as a secret? Because power (that is, the state) tells them in different ways that they cannot return to their homes or that they should not freely express their identities. For example, the state's refusal to confront social traumas and settle accounts is one of the main reasons why the oppressed/victims develop such an attitude. In addition, the micro-fascist oppression regimes that exist in the social sphere prevent such a desire from being freely expressed. The oppressed prefer to remain silent because of concerns such as being excluded from the social sphere, marginalized, or attacked. That's why the

characters keep their desire to return home as a "secret". They only tell these "secrets" to those they can trust. It is not possible for them to share this secret with the "Other" because they know that they are not in a safe environment. Therefore, an invisible oppression regime is in effect in the social sphere as well. Neither Şaristan nor Zarife can develop a sense of belonging to Turkey because they cannot "speak". Hence, it cannot be said that, in the case of Zarife, she has a sense of belonging where she lives. In other words, Zarife was forced to live in Afyon.

In addition to this, there are also concrete obstacles in front of them when they would like to return to their home such as military forces, nature, and the underdevelopment of the Kurdish inhabited areas. For example, when Jan (like Hêwî, Mirze, Hasan, Mustafa) goes to the Zarife's village, he encounters such obstacles. Because of underdevelopment, there is not good transportation in the Kurdish populated areas for civilians. During his journey, Jan uses different means of transportations, such as train, dolmuş, ferry dock, horse, and his foot, to reach Zarife's village. In the films such as *Reç* and *Kilama Dayîka Min*, the same situation can be observed, as well. When characters decide to return home, they face such obstacles that prevent them to return their home. These obstacles lead to death by preventing characters to return their homes in the victim cinema. Zarife is one of these characters who would like to return home, but, due to political reasons, she cannot return. There are many obstacles in front of her, so it isn't possible for her to return her home(land). Hence, it can be claimed that she is suffering from nostalgia, and she dies due to this illness.

Here, also, it should be stated that Sertaç (Jan's father), like Mustafa (My Father Voice), warns his family for not to speak about their past and identity as well. With this kind of action, the father tries to protect his family from a similar traumatic event that was experienced in the past, which may repeat. Therefore, it can be said that the father figure appears in both films as a figure that serves the continuity of the system, albeit unintentionally, because they impose forgetting. They are forced to do that by the system. However, it should be stated that there is a fundamental difference between Sertaç and Mustafa. Sertaç, as a middle-upper class person, adopted the dominant identity of Turkishness. On the other hand, we cannot talk about the situation of Mustafa adopting the dominant identity. On the other hand, as seen in the case of

Mehmet and Jan, the new generation is also wondering about their past. They resist power and try to find their roots by looking at the past. In this way, the victim cinema creates a counter-memory against the official ideology/history of the state by dealing with past traumas.

In addition to that, delusions and nightmares in dreams are prominent features of traumatized individuals. Şaristan, Nigar, Zarife, and Basê, as witnesses who directly experienced the traumatic event, are delirious in their sleep and have nightmares. They all have sleep disorders. Therefore, in the victim cinema, it can be said, in the context of these films, that women are represented as the gender in which the negative consequences of the traumatic event are observed. As Şimşek states, in the context of the film, *Voice of My Father*, that “the muted body of the mother(land) employs the whole violation of the trauma experience” (2016: 358). The same situation can be said for other women, as well. In women, this suppressed trauma appears as a sleep disorder such as delirium or nightmares during sleep.

The traumatic event cannot be symbolized because victims do not have mechanisms to freely express themselves or reproduce their own identity in the social sphere. This situation leads to a lack of social integration. This situation leads to the alienation of the displaced Kurds from the society where they migrated. In other words, the problem of belonging arises. Nostalgia emerges in such socio-political conditions. It becomes important how those exiled from their homeland establish a relationship with their homeland wherever they go. Do they want to return to their homeland, or do they acquire a new home, or do they change their understanding of homeland? In the interior-migration cinema that we have looked at so far, we encounter nostalgic characters in different forms.

Young people, who are lacking in terms of national consciousness, try to find roots for themselves by raking their traumatic past up. In other words, unlike their parents, young people -those who have to some extent socio-cultural capital like Mehmet, Hêvî, and Jan- try to remember and find their roots (gaining a national-consciousness) and fix themselves somewhere. Also, they are looking for their national identity. On the other hand, young people like Ali, who already has a national consciousness, have

made their mother tongue their home and have “airborne” roots, like Arendt. Because, rather than taking root in a certain piece of land and owning a certain geography, it has adopted its mother tongue as its homeland. Such characters are already political. By politicizing their mother tongue and identity/Kurdishness, these characters create a new understanding of their homeland.

The nostalgic approach of the characters shows us their relationship with their homeland. Characters (Nigar, Şaristan, Zarife etc.) like Odysseus accept a certain geography as a homeland. When it is not possible to return to their homes after the exile, they get sick with nostalgia and die abroad. Therefore, these characters are connected to their homes with “earthly roots”. That's why they only feel a sense of belonging to one place. On the other hand, characters like Aeneas can be regarded as “assimilated ones”, because he accepts a certain geography where he has been exiled. There are semi-assimilated characters (who are lacking in terms of national consciousness) in the victim cinema like Hêvî, Mehmet, and Jan. However, they cannot be regarded as Aeneas, who is assimilated and given up his homeland completely. They are looking for rooting by raking the traumatic past of their ancestors up. In other words, they are on the road to gaining political consciousness. Lastly, characters like (Ali) Arendt have a different understanding of their homeland. These characters accept the language as a homeland. For these characters, it is not their ancestral land that determines their homeland, but their mother tongue: “It is the mother tongue, not the land of her fathers, that constitutes her homeland: instead of agreeing to Latin in order to found Rome, it is the resistance of German in New York that makes the homeland” (Cassin, 2016: 42). In this respect, they differentiate from other characters. Young people like Ali mostly resist the state's assimilation policies, and they look for somewhere rooted. They have already political (class and national) consciousness. For instance, Ali participates in the strike. By embracing their class and national consciousness (language), they struggle against the system in civil society. They can live everywhere, but they take their mother tongue (homeland) with them. By politicizing their language, they are trying to establish the possibility of living together without losing their identity.

4.5. Bahoz (The Storm) (Kazım Öz, 2008)

The film is about the Patriotic Youth of the Kurdish Movement in universities in the 90s. The film is the story of emerging of a political (class and national) consciousness. Cemal is a Kurdish-Alevi young who is from Dersim. He just passed the university entrance exam. In the room where he works at home, both Atatürk and the Hz. Ali's photo is hanging. He wins the economics department of Istanbul University and go to Istanbul. There, he meets the Patriotic Youth of the Kurdish Movement. At first, he hesitates from the Patriotic Youth and tries to stay away. Even though the patriotic youths see this attitude of Cemal, they insist to organize him. Their approach to Cemal is problematic at first. They have difficulty approaching a person like Cemal who has a false conscious (in the context of the national consciousness). Because he has been assimilated, so he doesn't have any national or class consciousness. He does not admit that he is Kurdish because he does not know that he is Kurdish, and he believes that the Kurds have Turkish ancestry. However, after the self-criticism process, they develop a more rewarding approach. Helin, who has a troubled approach to Cemal, apologizes to him. Other members of the Patriotic Youth begin to establish a more careful and patient relationship with Cemal.

However, what plays a more effective role in raising Cemal's awareness/consciousness than the organizing efforts of Patriotic Youth are the events he witnessed in the everyday life in Istanbul. Seeing Kurds being excluded, lynched, murdered in public, or the Kurdish language being denied affects Cemal. For the first time, he realizes that he is the "other" as a result of these events he witnessed. After witnessing these events, he starts to wonder about Kurds and read books and magazines about them. On the other hand, he improves his relationship with the Patriotic Youth, and he starts to participate in political actions with them. Therefore, it can be said that he takes the theoretical and practical processes together. After a certain period, he is taken into custody by the Turkish police. He is released soon after but does not give up the political struggle. After that Cemal begins to believe more and more in struggle and becomes radicalized. However, in parallel with his radicalization, the state also increases more raids.

In addition to the efforts of the Patriotic Youth to organize Cemal and the exclusion and attacks that Cemal witnessed in everyday life, the impact of the Kurdish movement, which has become increasingly active in civil society, is also important in raising Cemal's awareness. The 1990s, it is a period when the political activities of the Kurds began to increase in civil society. As seen in the film, an important figure of protest-arabesque, such as Ahmet Kaya, express his objections to the period with his music. Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals such as Musa Anter and İsmail Beşikçi also contribute to the struggle for the recognition of Kurds and the Kurdish language in civil society. However, such political activities result in unsolved murders. Kurdish intellectuals like Musa Anter or Kurdish businesspeople like Mehmet Sincar and Savaş Buldan are murdered. Also as stated by Mesut Yeğen, “detentions with tortured interrogations and the murder of friends in the middle of the street shortens Cemal's path to the center of the storm” (2012: 180). Therefore, not only the youth cadres of the Kurdish movement, but also the increasing political struggle, and repressive policies that are followed by the state in civil society have an effect on Cemal's politicization. As a result of such a storm of politicization, Cemal also gains national and class consciousness. The response of the state to this storm of politicization would be very harsh. Young people are shot in the middle of the street, or there are too many arrests and detentions. Realizing that it is not enough to struggle politically in civil society, he turns his direction to the mountains to become a professional revolutionary.

Cemal was assimilated by the state. At first, he had a sense of belonging to Turkish society. However, after encountering the exclusion, marginalization, and lynching practices of the Turkish people in public space, he realizes that he is the “other” or a stranger in the society he lives in. Witnessing these discriminatory practices creates huge effects on him. In addition, unsolved murders also make Cemal realize that he is the “other”. Therefore, it can be stated that Cemal is not recognized and accepted with his Kurdish identity by the state and Turkish society. For instance, in the film, when Cemal goes to his home by minibus, there are two men talking and laughing in Kurdish on the minibus. After a short time, passengers start to get bored and angry with these two men, and they are forcibly gotten off the minibus by passengers. During this event, some passengers say the following things addressed to these two men: “Boor men. Do

you think this is your village? Why are you bothering us? ... Either you came from the East, and you destroyed this place. ... This is Turkey, Turkish is spoken here. Separatist men. ... We will not let you divide the country.” Beginning in the 1990s, many localized racist mob attacks against Kurds broke out in various locations, running concurrently with the state's forced transfer of Kurds to Turkish regions (Yarkin, 2022: 86). As these sentences of passengers show us, Kurds are not accepted by the Turkish society, and this cause Cemal to politicize. This process of politicization will result in becoming a professional revolutionary and Cemal will return to his hometown as Mahmut (the code name used by the Kurdish Movement militia in the film). In this respect, it can be said that, due to exclusion, discrimination, marginalization, unsolved murders etc., it is hard for Kurds to have a sense of belonging to Turkish society in the west.

This situation leads to nostalgia. At this point, we encounter two types of nostalgia. (1) People who are not political feel nostalgic in Odysseus's way, and their relationship with their home(land) is like Odysseus's. They cannot live in any other places permanently, except their home(land). These figures as stated before is an old, traditional, monolingual, (mostly) women who experiences traumatic event directly. They have “earthy” roots and are rooted in Kurdish-inhabited geographies. When they cannot return to their home, they die due to nostalgia. (2) People who are political feel nostalgic in the Arendt way, and their relationship with their home(land) is different from the first group because by politicizing their demand they can express themselves everywhere, albeit at the expense of being subjected to oppression and attacks by the state. For example, when students, at home, sing a song in Kurdish, one of them warns other friends to be silent: “Friends lower. Don't let the neighbors hear. He sings in Kurdish.” They are afraid of being reported because they are at home where they carry out organizational activities. On the other hand, they do not hesitate to express themselves in common areas such as the dormitory's canteen. They express themselves without any hesitation. For instance, when Cemal and Orhan are watching Tv at the dormitory, someone, who speak in tv, denies the Kurdish language. Thereupon, Orhan curses the person speaking on the television in Kurdish. Some Turkish students sitting at their next table also curse Orhan and tell him to speak Turkish. A fight breaks out

over it. Moreover, when Musa Anter was killed by the paramilitary organizations of the state, they protest these attacks in the streets. According to Taylor:

The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being (1994: 25).

People who are political revolt against this damage and distortion by politicizing. Therefore, it can be said that these group of people who are young, multilingual, and modern can symbolize their traumas to a certain extent through political struggle and even try to change the current bad conditions so that similar traumas do not happen again. Therefore, they can live everywhere, unlike Odysseus.

According to Şen, in this film, İstanbul is not a place where a new life will be established for the characters; It is a city to be left behind by returning to the country, to the “mountain” (2022: 30). Moreover, for Şen, Istanbul is a post-colonial space where Kurds do not feel a sense of belonging.

In the film, there is a kind of tension between the expressions ‘wait for us in Istanbul’ and ‘the mountain's call’. This ambivalent view towards Istanbul; The film is about a left-wing sensibility on the one hand and an effort to include the Kurdish national struggle in the narrative, on the other hand. ... Istanbul is a post-colonial space left behind to once again go to the mountains, to return to the country (Şen, 2022: 30).

On the other hand, Yeğen (2012) points out that Kurdish youth in this film have two senses of belonging, both Turkey and Kurdistan. The film also turns its camera to Istanbul with this perspective. As Yeğen stated:

Bahoz is a movie full of scenes like Istanbul's beautification. Boats, seagulls, streets, mosques, and the Bosphorus are shown with deep affection and devotion throughout the film. ... The view of Cemal's and Bahoz's camera on Istanbul, despite the worst experiences, continues to be a look full of affection, which does not give up the feeling that “Here, İstanbul is our home, our place”. ... The country desired and desired to be liberated is İstanbul as much as Kürdistan, perhaps rather than Kürdistan, Turkey as Istanbul. ... “Country”, Kürdistan, is very metaphorical throughout the movie compared to Istanbul (2012: 181-2).

In the film, MKM (Mesopotamian Cultural Center) was opened by Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals like İsmail Beşikçi and Musa Anter. In other words, Kurds replaced in İstanbul, and they participate in the political struggle by structuring/constructing of their space. As a political subject, they reproduce their space in İstanbul. Therefore, it is not possible to agree with Şen at this point. As a movement that deals with both the national question and the class question, the Kurdish movement does not position İstanbul as a foreign and temporary space. As Yeğen stated, Cemal's view of Istanbul is like Turkey's Kurd.

Looking at the action image of the film, it is seen that another world is possible. The movie calls to action. On the way from Dersim to İstanbul, Cemal coincides with a funeral on the ferry. But when he decides to become a professional revolutionary and returns from İstanbul to Dersim, there is a wedding this time on the same ferry. While the funeral on the ferry represents Cemal's assimilation and false consciousness, the wedding represents Cemal's political consciousness. In this respect, as Yeğen states, the film becomes a beautification of action and decision in many places. Both Istanbul and Kurdistan are spaces where actions yield results and another world can be made possible, as long as the person is political. Therefore, being political enables the person to develop a sense of belonging by reproducing the space where s/he lives in.

“Purely political”: Arendt defends her Jew identity, not because of thinking that I’m a Jew, on the contrary, she is attacked because of being Jew. Therefore, she embraces her Jew identity as “purely political.” She doesn’t say I’m a German because nobody attacks her because of being German, but Jew. Arendt doesn’t reject her German identity, but there is a subtraction of German identity. After World War II, the same subtraction is also valid for her Jewish identity. “Outside, therefore, even vis-à-vis the Jewish community and vis-à-vis Israel, each time it become necessary, that is, politically necessary” (Cassin, 2016: 44). Without doing this, according to her, it is not possible to be an intellectual: Intellectual achievement almost requires nonconformism as a *sine qua non* (Cassin, 2016: 44). Therefore, Arendt uses the concept of “the conscious Pariah” to name this situation. As a result, it can be said that, for Arendt, identity is an 'assignment', not an essence, but a political predicate. From this point of view, Arendt separates the mother tongue from the people. In other words, while

Arendt embraces German as her mother tongue, she “purely politically” disables her German identity.

Looking at the film, V.K. (Vedat Kaya) can be regarded as “the conscious Pariah.” He is Turkish, but he never talks about his identity. Everyone in the group knows that he is Turkish (except Abdalbaki), but V.K. does not feel the need to express it because he has not been attacked because of being Turkish. However, being Kurdish is under attack and that is why V.K. is purely politically in solidarity with the Kurds. For example, in a meeting where the Patriotic Youths give criticism and self-criticism, it is V.K.'s turn. Abdalbaki takes the floor and criticizes V.K. for “incorporating deep features of the classical Kurdish personality”. Thereupon, other friends tell Abdalbaki that V.K. is Turkish and therefore his criticism is baseless. Abdalbaki laughs and says: “So, he became a Kurd by staying among the Kurds.” Therefore, it can be stated that V.K. has politically disabled the Turkish (not Turkish in the sense defined by power/sovereignty) identity to show solidarity with the Kurds, an oppressed nation.

In addition, politicizing of Kurdishness can be considered in this context, as well. The main reason behind embracing Kurdishness is that Kurdishness is under attack, and it has been tried to assimilate by the state for a long time. In response to this policy of the state, Kurds embrace and defend their Kurdish identity and Kurdish language. They refuse to be on the side of the dominant identity by assimilating. For this reason, they “purely politically” emphasize and embrace the Kurdish identity. At this point, it can be stated that this group of young people is exiled from their Kurdish language and Kurdishness. Therefore, they are longing for speaking their mother language without being a target of any attacks. However, to do that they have to overcome several obstacles that are constructed by the state.

In light of this information, it can be stated that Kurds who are political can have a sense of belonging everywhere because, as a political subject, they can reproduce their own spaces, albeit to a limited extent, despite all the pressures of the state. They talk and resist discrimination, marginalization, exclusion, assimilation and so on. They are trying to prevent the recurrence of traumatic events and they struggle for it, and they are trying to create a new world. Therefore, their understanding of the home(land) is

different from other people who are not political. Political ones have different relationship with their home(land), like Arendt. They resist and embrace whatever they are attacked on (mother tongue, ethnicity, etc.) as a “political predicate”. Thus, rather than being tied to the home(land) by earthy roots (and thinking of the home as a specific geographic area from which roots originate), people who are political are attached to the home by “airborne roots” (and think of the home as “mother tongue”). Therefore, they have a sense of nostalgia like Arendt. When they speak Kurdish in public space, they are attacked by people. Or they are attacked because of being Kurdish. Hence, they embrace their Kurdishness and mother tongue against these attacks, instead of being assimilated. In this respect, the political consciousness that Cemal gained by becoming politicized is actually equivalent to the consciousness of “the conscious Pariah”. Cemal resigns from Turkishness which is the dominant identity, and he embraces Kurdishness and the Kurdish language that is denied and oppressed by the state. Therefore, Kurdish cinema can be considered as the tool used to create awareness or “consciousness” among the Kurds assimilated. An Arendt-style political understanding of nostalgia is affirmed rather than Aeneas-style nostalgia. This type of nostalgia is prioritized, and this led to living together albeit the repressive policies of the state.

4.6. Fotograf (The Photograph) (Kazım Öz, 2001)

The film is the story of two young men, Ali and Faruk. Both of them were born in İstanbul. Ali is Kurdish young, and he is a student in law. He decides to participate in the guerrilla movement because he thinks there is not justice in the state. Therefore, he returns his face to the Kurdish inhabited areas to resist against the unjust system. On the other hand, Faruk is a Turkish young, and he goes to Dersim to do his mandatory military duty. On the way to geographies inhabited by Kurds, their paths cross on the same bus. Both of them don’t know each other, and they sit side by side on the bus. Throughout the journey, they have a good relationship with each other, but both of them hide their identity from each other. The director describes the two sides of the conflict in the person of these characters. Also, the director problematizes the reason behind the conflict. At the end of the film, Ali dies in combat, and Faruk sends the

photos that he took with the dead guerrillas' bodies to his family as a memory of bravery.

Ali was born in İstanbul in 1973. He is a political one, and he doesn't comfortable with the current system. Therefore, he decides to participate in the guerrilla movement to change the current system, even if it means leaving his loved ones behind. He is a person who adheres to his political principles, and because of these principles, he does not even hug his lover, who came to see him while getting on the bus, when leaving. On the other hand, Faruk is born in 1975 in İstanbul. He is not political, so he doesn't have any problem with the system. Ali does not hug his lover when he is leaving his girlfriend to get on the bus, and Faruk sees this situation. Shortly after the journey begins, he asks Ali why. Ali tries to pass it off by saying I didn't hug him so as not to miss him too much. Faruk then begins to tell his opinion about the woman: "Nothing has value in this world, bro! They are ungrateful. In fact, you must be cruel to them. ...Love is also a matter of interest." It is understood from these sentences that Faruk does not believe in love and does not trust people. Unrequited love is impossible for him. In other words, he can be called a nihilist and pragmatist. However, on the other hand, Ali has believed in unrequited love (or he is a person of faith), so he answers Faruk as follows: "Maybe you're right, but there is also unrequited love." In the person of Faruk, the state can be understood as an enemy of humanity and love. In other words, the partial dehumanization of Faruk in the film is actually an emphasis on the inhumanity of the state.

In fact, it is militarism itself that is shown and represented by his body. Representing a change and transformation, the uniform skillfully carries the naked person's adventure of being someone else to the screen. What is told in the person of Faruk is the process of turning a person into a machine, and now Faruk has become that machine (Sert, 2019: 120).

Also, parallel to this, it can be stated, in terms of the film, that while the ideology of the state dehumanizes and devalues the person, the ideology of the Kurdish Movement humanizes the person and increases the belief in humanity.

To emphasize this characteristic of the state, the director uses many militaristic symbols in the films. For example, at the beginning of the film, there is a huge statue

of two men, one standing next to the other while the other is lying dead. The statues are surrounded by Turkish flags. While the camera is making a circular movement around this statue, the 10th Anniversary Youth Anthem is playing in the background. In addition to this generic of the film, the nationalist ideology of the state can be seen in the slogan that people chanted at the soldier's farewell ceremony. During this ceremony, people are very happy and enthusiastic. And they chant this slogan: "What a great soldier our soldier." This slogan and the statue shown in the credits of the film coincide with each other. The film leads us to the conclusion that the state represents a militarist and masculine mentality, with scenes showing the passion for war accompanied by the desire for victory. This approach, which goes hand in hand with the masculine mentality, sees love as a weakness and identifies cruelty and violence with being strong. For example, Faruk tells Ali about women: "If you value them too much, they will be spoiled." Caring and loving is seen as a weakness by Faruk. In fact, the masculine-militarist-nationalist ideology of the state underlies Faruk's view of life. Therefore, it can be said that, in Faruk's person, the militaristic and violent desire of the state is actually represented. As a result, it can be said that these two characters (Ali and Faruk) are allegorical figures. As an allegorical character in Mehmet Uzun's novel *Ronî Mîna Evînê Tarî Mîna Mirinê*, Kevok represents the image of the oppressed land and Baz represents the actor of the sovereign country. The same is true for Ali (Kevok) and Faruk (Baz) (Sustam, 2014).

İstanbul appears in the film as a city that must be abandoned in search of justice. The way to fight injustice is through the mountains. Therefore, Ali turned his direction towards the mountains. In this respect, İstanbul emerges as a city/space that falls short in the struggle against injustice. The people in the city are seeking justice. For example, when the bus, which Ali and Faruk are on, stops at the resting facilities, the news is on the television. It is said in the news that the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) is carrying out a successful fight against terrorism. Then the news gives the Gazi neighborhood events. Real documentary footage is used in this scene. During the Gazi neighborhood events, a man looks at the camera and says, "we want justice, only justice, only justice". The way to stop this injustice is to join the guerrilla.

It is morning when the bus reaches the geographies inhabited by Kurds. Ali woke up in the morning due to the shining of the sun, he understands that they arrive in the Kurdish inhabited areas. He starts to smile and watch in admiration the geography. In this part of the film, the camera affirms the home(land), and the director uses long-shots to show the geography inhabited by Kurds. After a short time, the bus coincides with the military checkpoint. After that, the camera shows a mountain that says, “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk”. The same sentence is written on the overpass in the Kurdish cities. There are many soldiers and military vehicles in the Kurdish cities. With this montage, it is understood that Kurdish inhabited areas are under the oppression and control of the state, like west part of the country. Kurdishness is rejected and denied by the state. The Kurdish language is also under the oppression of the state. For example, while driving from Diyarbakır to Van in a minibus to join the guerrilla, Ali stumbles upon a military checkpoint on the way. Şivan Perver's song is playing in the minibus. When they come across the military checkpoint, they immediately change the song and put on a tape of İbrahim Tatlıses. This shows us that the Kurdish language is oppressed by the state, and Kurds cannot speak their mother tongue freely. As a result, the repressions of the state on the Kurdish identity and Kurdish language show us why Ali decided to join the guerrilla movement. In other words, in response to these unfair practices of the state, Ali chose to fight in the mountains. Therefore, it can be said that the camera/director affirms the perspective of Ali. In other words, Ali's consciousness is affirmed by the camera because he represents a man who desires justice and freedom.

During the journey to the Kurdish inhabited areas, in the road films, there occurred several obstacles that characters try to tackle, and the same situation can be seen in other films such as *Rêç*, *Zer*, and *Bahoz*. As stated before, when the Kurds travel to inhabited geographies, nature and the state appear as two important obstacles for the characters to reach the geographies inhabited by the Kurds. As stated before, characters encounter several military checkpoints. For example, when Ali goes from Diyarbakır to Van, one passenger says that “what a disgrace is this, 18 checks are made between two cities!” TOMAs (Social Incidents Response Vehicles) and armored vehicles have inhabited the streets of the city.

Identity checks, GBTs (General Information Collection Systems), roadblocks, and searches are a fact of life for Kurds. It is possible to see soldiers and policemen in all of the films that make up Kurdish cinema... Soldiers and police are the constant actors in both the Kurds' war against the state and their social life (Sert, 2019: 83).

There is a state of emergency in the Kurdish inhabited areas. Militaristic-nationalist practices of the state can be seen in every part of the Kurdish populated areas. The appearance of soldiers, police, and military vehicles in the public sphere has become normal. However, this is never accepted by the Kurds, and this situation is objected to in a low and secret voice. For example, when Faruk lands in Elazığ to go to Dersim, the orphan boy lying on the ground immediately raises his head and looks at Faruk carefully. The orphan boy understands that Faruk is not from there. Also, when Faruk sits on a bench and ties his shoelaces, the old woman sitting on the bench realizes that Faruk is not around and gets up from the bench. Or, when people come across military checkpoints in the minibus, they reproach these practices of the state in Kurdish.

In light of this information, it can be said that it is not easy to return to Kurdish inhabited areas for Kurdish people. Also, it is not easy for Kurds to speak their mother tongue or express their Kurdish identity freely. There is great pressure on ethnic or religious “minorities” such as Kurds and Alevis. In other words, there is not justice. The state uses militarist, nationalist and masculine ideologies to maintain the unjust order. This ideology is the main reason behind the conflict in Turkey. Through these ideologies, the state maintains the current system by creating nationalist, masculine, and militarist individuals who desire violence: “Every Turkish person born as a soldier.” On the other hand, Kurds fight against this unjust system by embracing their Kurdishness and mother tongue. To get these rights they have to resist against this system. People in the cities or rural areas (both the west and east side of Turkey) cannot defend themselves, they need justice. Cities are not a place where an adequate response can be given to the violent policies of the state. It is a limited space of resistance. Therefore, İstanbul or cities in the Kurdish inhabited areas can be considered as the city abandoned due to political reasons. Both İstanbul (Turkey) and Kurdish inhabited areas regarded as home(land). Because Ali decided to join the guerrilla movement due to an unjust system, not only for the repression of the Kurds. In other words, he has

two senses of belonging: İstanbul-as-Turkey and Kurdistan. Because of being politicized, he has these two belonging.

4.7. Di Nawberê De (In Between) (Ali Kemal Çınar, 2018)

The film focuses on the bilingual life of Osman who is a car fixer. Osman can speak Turkish, but he doesn't understand when people speak Turkish. On the other hand, he cannot speak Kurdish, but he only understands when people speak Kurdish. In other words, Osman cannot do two things at the same time. For example, he cannot speak during the meal. After the meal is over, he starts talking. Or he can't talk while repairing the car. After he's done, he starts talking. Or he cannot talk while driving. These tragicomic circumstances create a lot of problems in Osman's life. For example, his girlfriend breaks up with him because of this complicated/absurd situation. Therefore, Osman decides to overcome this complicated situation. When he takes action to overcome this problem, he realizes that he's not the only one with such a problem. Many people have such problems, and these problems become in different forms. For instance, some people (İbrahim) use Kurdish and Turkish words in the same sentence when they are speaking. Or some people (Erdal) are embarrassed when they speak Kurdish, so they whisper into people's ears. For Osman, this problem arose when he went to primary school because his teacher gets angry with the students when they speak Kurdish. While Osman is trying to overcome this problem in the following process, after a certain point, everything gets mixed up while talking. He cannot hear those who speak, and those who speak do not understand what he is saying. In the last scene of the movie, there is a person trying to park his car between two cars, but he cannot park his car correctly. Osman's situation is like this car that couldn't be parked properly: In between.

In this film, Osman, like Arendt, is exiled from his mother tongue. However, there is a significant difference between Arendt and Osman, Osman is a semi-assimilated person by the state. In other words, at the beginning of the film, it is understood that he couldn't resist the assimilation policies of the state. He had "chosen" to be assimilated due to being afraid of his teacher when he was a child. On the other hand, when Arendt was exiled from his mother tongue, she was aware of what happened. Therefore, when she went to New York, she embraced and protected her mother

tongue there. Osman, on the other hand, is aware of his mother tongue's importance later.

At this point, it should be stated that Arendt has a different understanding of “homeland”. While grounding this approach, she separates the ancestral land from the homeland. She doesn’t only distinguish between the land of ancestors and homeland, but also distinguishes between people and language.

It is the mother tongue, not the land of her fathers, that constitutes her homeland: instead of agreeing to Latin in order to found Rome, it is the resistance of German in New York that makes the homeland. By the same token, Arendt teaches us how to detach from people even more radically. The German language and the German people are not identical or superimposable in any way, especially not politically. It is another conception of the homeland that comes to light after the horrors of the war (Cassin, 2016: 42).

The same circumstances can be seen in the film too. In the last part of the film, the following expressions of Emil Cioran appear on the screen: “One does not inhabit a country; one inhabits a language. That is our country, our fatherland - and no other.” Unlike Arendt, although Cioran gendered language by saying “fatherland”, both strategically make the same distinction. The appropriation of a language as a homeland rather than a specific geographical area. This is an approach that emerged in the post-war period, as Cassin stated. In the context of the Kurdish problem, it can be said that the intimidation caused by the war that has been going on for more than a century has also led to a change in the understanding of the homeland of the Kurds and has led to the emergence of a different understanding of homeland.

A similar situation can be seen when looking at the Kurdish movement. At the beginning of the 2000s, the Kurdish movement took the concept of the state in a different context and rejected the classical understanding of the nation-state. By looking at Öcalan’s defends it can be seen this.

The democratic solution option, in general as well as in the case of the Kurdish question, is the only option. Separation is neither possible nor required. The interests of the Kurds definitely lie in a democratic union with Turkey. If the democratic solution is duly implemented, it would be a more successful and realistic model than autonomy and freedom (Öcalan, 1999b: 32 cited in Jongerden and Güneş, 2021: 9).

After this, Jongerden and Güneş comment that:

The initial articulation of the democratic solution put forward the view that the Kurdish question can be solved through the democratization of the republic within the territorial integrity of Turkey and by removing the legal obstacles to Kurdish language rights and cultural development and expression (2021: 9).

For the Kurdish movement to “live together” the legal obstacles in front of the Kurdish language should be removed. It is significant for living together in the same country. Instead of territorial and national separation of Kurds and Turks, removing obstacles in front of the democratic society can be a solution. Therefore, the Kurds have decided to use their right of self-determination in favor of the Democratic Republic so that every different identity can express and re-produce their identity by taking place in participating politics through local organizations. Therefore, the cultural right has an important role in this decision of self-determination. Consequently, the home(land) understanding of the Kurds changed (rejection of nation-state) after this decision.

Without understanding Kurdish, it is not possible for Osman to put bread on the table in Kurdish populated areas. If Osman lives in one of the western cities, like İstanbul or somewhere else, it is not possible for Osman to live off as he doesn’t understand Turkish. In other words, Osman doesn’t have enough socio-cultural capital to live in western cities where people don’t speak Kurdish. This situation is the most important obstacle in front of him to getting a position (or having a sense of belonging) in the field in western cities. Thus, Osman cannot integrate or live where people don’t understand Kurdish. He can only live in Kurdish populated areas because those around him speak and understand both Kurdish and Turkish. However, in Kurdish populated areas, Osman faces some difficulties due to his “stammering existence” as well. Because of this “stammering existence”, he cannot do two things that create problems when he communicates with other people. In other words, being semi-assimilated creates significant difficulties in his life when he socializes. Osman is not recognized by other people because his stammering existence differentiates him from other people. Therefore, he decides to return to his mother tongue (Kurdish) as a home(land).

Osman's country is his mother tongue. Osman has nostalgia for his mother tongue. Because of this, he tries to return to his mother tongue in the film. To do this, he starts

to learn his mother tongue by helping of one of his clients who teach Kurdish. When he starts to learn his mother tongue, he is aware that many people have the same problem. Therefore, it is understood that this problem is political, not personal. At this point, it can be said that Kurdish people are not just exiled from their home(land), but also their mother tongue too. Cassin, by referring to Günter Anders, states that:

Günter Anders, her [Arendt's] first husband, talks about the "stammering existence" of exiles who are tossed about 'not only from country to country, but language to language'- many of us became real stammerers- even in both languages. And it's probably with Hannah in mind that he speaks of those who, noticing the danger, "devoted themselves fanatically to the mother tongue ... because language was the only thing that could not be taken away from them, the only part of their home they still mastered" (2016: 46).

Osman (and other assimilated people) being stuck between two languages and not being able to use both languages can be given as an example of this "stammering existence" of exiles. While trying to learn his mother tongue, Osman starts to look for the reason behind this "stammering existence". One day, he asks his mother when he started speaking Turkish. His mother tells Osman that, one day, after he comes home from school, he will no longer speak Kurdish because his teacher is angry with those who speak Kurdish in the classroom. After that day, Osman did not speak Kurdish. In other words, Osman was exiled from his mother tongue after the incident he experienced at the school, which was one of the most important ideological apparatuses of the state that day. After this incident, the "stammering existence" of Osman began to emerge. Therefore, at this point, it can be said that assimilation can be regarded as a social trauma in this context.

Osman's personal effort to overcome this problem is insufficient, as seen at the end of the film. Because the problem is political and has structural origins, it is not an issue that can be solved by individual efforts. As his brother tells him: "This is a general problem, you can't fix it. ... But it's okay, go ahead anyway. ... may be of benefit to you. The rest is politics. You cannot do anything. Nobody can do anything. Unless the Kurds stand on their own feet, this problem will not be solved." At his point, it can be stated that the problem can be solved by politicizing their demands. Through politicizing their mother tongue, it can be possible to return to their home/mother tongue. Otherwise, (linguistically) displaced Kurds will always long for their mother

tongue, and this “stammering existence” of them will continue. They won’t completely be able to speak and understand both languages. Shortly after Osman starts learning Kurdish, his voice becomes inaudible when he speaks. While talking to his mother and father at home, his lips move but no sound comes out. At the end of the movie, he is left alone with his problem in his car, as if stuck. To overcome this problem he must politicize, like Ali in *Song of My Mother*. However, Osman is not subject like Ali because he doesn’t speak both Kurdish and Turkish fluently. In other words, as stated above, Osman is lacking in terms of socio-cultural capital that can be useful for him to live both in Turkey and Kurdistan.

In light of these comments, it can be said that exiling from their mother tongue leads to emerging of the “stammering existence” of exiles who has an incomplete and sketchy belonging. When assimilated one tries to overcome this problem/trauma with personal efforts, s/he becomes unsuccessful because the problem is political. Therefore, the system should be changed to overcome this trauma or “stammering existence” that leads to staying in between. Besides Turkish, Kurdish should be taught in schools as an official language. In this way, it can be possible to overcome this trauma/problem, and “living together” can thus become possible by speaking both languages fluently. Because of having lack of socio-cultural capital (Turkish) which is the means of living, linguistically displaced Kurds cannot have a sense of belonging to Turkey. At the end of the movie, while Osman is sitting helplessly in his own car, a person tries to park his car, but he cannot park it properly. Osman's situation is like this car that cannot park. He's in between. Osman was neither fully assimilated nor was he able to preserve his mother tongue. At the point of belonging, Osman does not fully belong to Kurdish or Turkish. Osman does not negate Turkish when he starts learning Kurdish. He is not against either, but he does not feel completely belonging to either.

4.8. *Derbûyîna Ji Bihûştê* (The Fall from Heaven) (Ferit Karahan, 2014)

The film is about the consequences of military conflicts stemming from the Kurdish question in Turkey. The film deals with the impact of the Kurdish issue on society through two different families in İstanbul and Muş. In İstanbul, Emine is a Turkish electrical engineer and all the workers working in the construction are Kurdish. In the

beginning, there is not any conflict between Emine and the workers. Kürşat who is sixteen years old is one of the construction workers. He falls in love with Emine, but Emine is not aware of him. Emine's brother is doing his compulsory military service in Kurdish inhabited areas. One day, Emine receives the news that her brother died in a clash. Then, everything starts to change in the construction area. The ethnic identity of the construction workers starts to bother Emine from now on, and she starts to be harsh towards the workers. One day, Kürşat falls from the construction site and dies. His corpse remains on the ground. In other words, no one owns the funeral. The foreman disappears because Kürşat is not yet old enough to work. Thereupon, Emine decides to take Kürşat's body to Muş, even though her father tells her not to do it.

On the other hand, in Muş, village guards (paramilitary force of the state) oppress the people with the support of the soldiers and apply pressure on them to leave the village. Mehmet, a member of the family that is oppressed by the village guards in Muş, is studying at a university in Istanbul. He is a villager of Kürşat. Sometimes he goes to the construction site to organize Kürşat. One day, a comrade of Mehmet tells him that he attracts some attention, so it will be good for him to disappear for a while. Mehmet then returns to his hometown. However, shortly after returning to his hometown, he is killed by people in a White Taurus (Beyaz Toros, the car identified with the unsolved murders in the 1990s). After this incident, Mehmet's family migrated to Istanbul, and his brother and sister joins the Kurdish Political Movement. At the end of the film, on the way to Istanbul, Mehmet's family comes across Emine's bus loaded with Kürşat's funeral. The film makes a mythological reference (the expulsion of Adam and Eve from heaven) through the story of these two families: both parties were expelled from heaven and condemned to pain for their crimes.

According to Althusser (1994), the school is the most effective ideological apparatus of the state in the modern era. Undoubtedly, this ideological apparatus has many functions, but when we look at the issue in the context of Turkey, one of the most important of these functions is the symbolic violence that the state secretly applies to Kurdish children in line with its homogenization policies. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) look at the performance of students from different social strata in classes while theorizing symbolic violence. When students from lower grades admit that they are

not good at French, they take responsibility for their failures and accept the legitimacy of the system at the same time (Yücel and Bourse, 2017). In other words, they are convinced that they have “failed”. However, they do not know that successful students acquire this knowledge more through familial education. Considering the language capital, it is possible to say that a similar situation is also valid for the Kurds. The author of this thesis learned Turkish at the school he went to after his family migrated to Bursa due to the burning of their village. Here he continued his education as a dull and even lazy student. Four years later, when his family returned to their hometown for economic and political reasons, he completed primary school in a village school but emerged as a “brilliant” student in the process. So how could a boy who was a dull student in the west be a “bright” student in the “east”? The impact of linguistic capital, which is especially noticeable in the early years of education when language comprehension and use are the primary criteria used by teachers to evaluate students, is always felt: style is always taken into account, either implicitly or explicitly, at every level of the educational system and, to varying degrees, in all university careers, including scientific ones (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 73). Based on this study of Bourdieu and Passeron, the answer can be given as follows: The author of this thesis has a certain language capital (Turkish) and the vast majority of other students lack this language capital! One of my old “class” friends, who had to drop out of school because he did not speak Turkish, said when he saw me: “our minds weren't working, so we dropped out.” As can be seen from this sentence, the subaltern undertakes the responsibility of dropping out of school and justifies the system by legitimizing it without realizing it. This can be considered as the clearest indicator of symbolic violence. A child/student who is “unsuccessful” in the lessons in the villages mostly works as a lamb shepherd, etc., and goes to work as a seasonal worker or a construction worker in the western provinces of Turkey in the future. Thus, they lose their social mobility opportunities. In this respect, for the vast majority of low-class Kurdish students who lack the language capital (Turkish), public schools are generally a means of accepting staying as a low-class, rather than being a tool for social mobility.

One of the reasons why the school has such a place in Kurdish cinema is that it is an ideological apparatus that is so widespread and has such a powerful effect that it can

cause similar “wounds” to everyone. In *The Fall from Heaven*, a village school and the negative effects of this school are also discussed as a sub-story through the character of Ayşe. She is the youngest child of her family and goes to primary school. She has a great curiosity and love for Istanbul. For example, Ayşe's father is a truck driver, and when he takes goods to Istanbul, Ayşe asks her father to take her to Istanbul as well. She asks his sister to tell him about Istanbul. The reason for Ayşe's curiosity and love for Istanbul is what her teacher told her and the other students in class.

In the classroom, the students are talking among themselves in Kurdish, and the teacher enters. “Be quiet. Didn't I tell you to speak Turkish? Now everybody be silent. Take out your books quickly.” After silencing the students, she continues: “Listen children. You think that there is no world beyond this village! But there are different places, different cities that are much nicer, right? Yes, there are!” Meanwhile, the camera watches Ayşe close up. Showing herself with her hand, the teacher continues: “Look at me.” And waiting for answers from the children, she asks the question: “What do you need to do to learn and have a job?” Students answer this question as follows: “We need to learn Turkish. Turkish!”. The teacher approves the common answer given by the students collectively and says: “Yes. You need to learn Turkish.”

This dialogue between the teacher and the students is of great importance for us to understand the character of Ayşe in the film and her relationship with her mother tongue. The “disqualification” of Kurdish against Turkish by being banned at school allows us to understand why Ayşe is uncomfortable with her mother tongue Kurdish in the future. As long as students are within the boundaries of the school, they cannot speak Kurdish either in class or during breaks. Kurdish never finds a place for itself in state institutions¹⁶. Although the teacher seems to ban Kurdish so that students can learn Turkish more quickly and have better living conditions in the future, in fact, the teacher consciously or unconsciously secretly serves the state's “single language policy” and the “disqualification” and “discrediting” of Kurdish.

¹⁶ For an important recent study on the problems caused by the prohibition of Kurdish in state institutions, see: Bayram, T. and Sakarya, S. (2023). “Oppression and internalized oppression as an emerging theme in accessing healthcare: findings from a qualitative study assessing first-language related barriers among the Kurds in Turkey”. *International Journal for Equity in Health*, 22:6. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-022-01824-z>

Spivak examines the sati tradition in India (widows commit suicide after their husbands' death) in the context of subaltern Indian women. Spivak mentions that the colonial British (white men) prohibition of this tradition is expressed as follows: "White men are saving brown women from brown men" (1994: 92). On the other hand, the Indian nativist argument is: "the women actually wanted to die (Spivak, 1994: 93)." Spivak, of course, does not agree with either of these statements. Because, according to her, both sentences legitimize each other and, there is no "the testimony of the women's voice-consciousness" in these sentences. This "recovery operation" (the task of recovering subaltern subject) by white men can invite the affirmation and justification of colonial activities. In other words, this discourse also contributes to the development of a different story that honors white people's civilizations (Kirel, 2018: 445). The defense of these actions by white men also serves to legitimize colonial activities based on the "savage" and "civilized" dichotomy of the colonists. On behalf of subaltern Indian women, either native Indians or white British men, who forbid this tradition, speak. However, subaltern Indian women cannot speak.

When we look at the film, although the teacher seems to be banning Kurdish for the sake of the students, in fact, this discourse also serves to legitimize the banning of Kurdish. Turkish is the only official language due to legal regulations in Turkey, and it has a key importance for other people to achieve certain socio-economic welfare. For example, a person who does not speak Turkish cannot work in any state institution. Therefore, Turkish is guaranteed as a language that must be learned by the system. To put it another way, speaking Turkish means "money". In this respect, speaking Turkish is important in terms of acquiring socio-cultural and economic capital. Speaking other languages is also effective in acquiring socio-cultural and economic capital, but the point we want to emphasize here is that the preference for Turkish as a result of being appointed to a higher position than other languages by legal and constitutional regulations has been made compulsory for other ethnicities. Therefore, speaking Turkish is important as a language capital in order for a person to find a position in the social field. In this respect, Turkish is the entrance ticket to the social field. In other words, it is necessary to take part in any game in the social field. To be a subject, it is necessary to speak Turkish. For this reason, those who do not speak Turkish can be

defined as subalterns because they are deprived of the opportunity to move upwards (social mobility) by being included in the social field.

We can also make sense of what the dialogue between the teacher and the students in the film means in terms of Kurdish, by looking at the certain dichotomy established during this dialogue. In this scene, Turkish represents development, prosperity, and the west of Turkey (for Ayşe, Istanbul) as “better worlds”. Kurdish, on the other hand, represents backwardness, poverty, and geographies (Ayşe's village) inhabited by Kurds as “small worlds” (space). Leaving aside the fact that the equation established by the teacher as a “small world” and a “better world” reveals the uneven development between regions in Turkey, the Kurdish language is emptied against Turkish through such dichotomy (contrasts) established by the teacher.

The Kurdish language is being disabled (making Kurdish nonfunctional) in this way and is being de-qualified and discredited. When we look at the issue in the context of such a “discrediting operation”, the discourse that the teacher creates by creating dichotomy can be called “epistemic violence” because it is a “representation regime” that serves the interests of a certain group (sovereign/Turkishness). With this discourse, Kurdish is reconstructed by the sovereign. Such epistemic violence has an ideological negative impact on the perception of Kurdish. In other words, the state “calls” (interpellated) the Kurds to leave their mother tongue (exile) together with the “discrediting operation”. Ayşe and other students, whose mother tongue is Kurdish, are reconstructed as “subjects” every day at school with this reconstruction project, and their mother tongue is disqualified.

At school, Ayşe listens to this ideology that her teacher secretly “calls”. In other words, Ayşe listens to the interpellation of official ideology as a reconstructed subject. One evening, all the family members are sitting together at home. While Ayşe's older brother and sister are chatting among themselves, Ayşe is watching television from a close distance. Yeditepe Istanbul TV series starts on TV. Meanwhile, Ayşe's older sister and brother laugh at something while talking in Kurdish among themselves. Thereupon, Ayşe turns to her older sister and brother and shouts: “Don't speak Kurdish!” The roots of Ayşe's reaction to speaking Kurdish stems from this

reconstruction project of the official state ideology. This ideology secretly “calls” Ayşe to abandon her mother tongue and consent to assimilation through school.

At this point of the discussion, it is useful to look at what Cassin said about “cliche language” to understand another aspect of the reason for Ayşe's anger at speaking Kurdish. In her discussion on mother tongue, Cassin says that what makes a language a mother tongue is the “invention”. We both create and invent our mother tongue and are reconstructed by it while we use it. In other words, we are the “auteur” of our own mother tongue. In this respect, the loss of the mother tongue also means the loss of inventiveness, productivity, and authority, that is, of the subject position. As a result, the person begins to speak in a “cliché” language (not an ordinary language).

This cliché language is the language of Nazi Germany and is exactly the same as the “official language” in Eichmann's defenses in Jerusalem. The banality of evil -think of Eichmann, the specialist- is not without relation to the banality of the language one speaks (Cassin, 2016: 47).

A cold, clear, hierarchical, and soulless language that has lost its inventiveness. This is the reason why Arendt insisted so much on not forgetting German language while in exile. According to Cassin, this fear lies at the bottom of this insistence. When a mother tongue is no longer a tongue or a language, there is only propaganda since there is no mother tongue (Cassin, 2016: 48). Ayşe's anger at being spoken in Kurdish at home and her commanding prohibition of Kurdish is important in terms of seeing what kind of “anthropological mutation” the official ideology has caused. Ayşe's expulsion from her mother tongue or her muteness had such a negative effect. In post-fascist Italy, Pasolini states that the “new fascism” not only made the lower classes mute but also caused an anthropological mutation (Erdogan, 2020). At home, Ayşe does what the official ideology does not say openly, with anger and with order, which is the language of bureaucracy. In this respect, Ayşe actually propagandizes the official ideology without realizing it.

When we look at another scene in the movie regarding the cliché language, we see that after Ayşe becomes mute, she starts to speak with the “sovereign's throat” (Erdogan, 2020) (the language secretly dictated to her and the cliche form of this language rather than her mother tongue). We can look at the scene where Ayşe plays house, as an

example of cliché language usage. House play is an important indicator of how children perceive the daily life they witness. With this game, the perceived world is performed through the eyes of children. While Ayşe is playing house with her friend, the broken phone in front of her rings. The caller is her friend Şule: “Hello Şule, how are you dear? Are you well? ... We are fine, too. Just pass the bridge without columns, and the biggest house is ours. Then ring the bell. The doorman will open the door. Come on, we are waiting for you, honey.” When we look at Ayşe's performance to symbolize Turkish here, we see that she speaks with cliché expressions such as “dear” and “honey” (let's say that using such expressions in Turkish in daily life is considered insincere and artificial by most people in internet communities¹⁷). When Ayşe speaks her mother tongue, Kurdish, she does not use such expressions, but when she speaks Turkish, such cliché expressions become inevitable for her because she loses her productivity and inventiveness when speaking Turkish. Ayşe cannot be a subject/agent but can imitate the language slightly dictated to her. When Ayşe speaks Turkish, she cannot go beyond speaking clichés.

We mentioned above that the characters who are “deficient” in terms of national consciousness appear in the form of infantilization representation in the victim cinema. These characters were generally fragile, feisty, and whiny types. Their families did not see these people as adult individuals. For example, Hêvi was a fragile, whiny character, while Jan was someone who did not know where to speak and how. Basê, on the other hand, was afraid that his son, Mehmet, would react irrationally when he found out what his family had experienced in the past. In the film, *Fall from Heaven*, Ayşe is a character who lacks national consciousness. Ayşe's lack of national consciousness is represented through a disease. His brother Mehmet, who is a revolutionary, knows the way to get rid of such a disease.

Ayşe's eyes constantly hurt, and her mother tries to treat Ayşe's eyes with cures she prepares at home. Just after the scene where Ayşe gets angry with her older sister and brother, comes the scene where her mother treats Ayşe's eyes. While applying treatment, her mother says: “Watching TV is not good for her.” Ayşe's older sister

¹⁷ <https://www.uludagsozluk.com/k/can%C4%B1ml%C4%B1-cicimli-konu%C5%9Fan-k%C4%B1z/>

says, “She is almost blind, and you still talk about TV.” Anne objects to what Ayşe's sister said and says that this illness is caused by watching television: “It is because of TV! This will be good for her eyes.” Besides school, television is one of the important ideological devices. “One of the elements frequently used to strengthen the narrative in Kurdish films is television” (İpek, 2016: 338). The reason for Ayşe's curiosity and love for Istanbul is not only due to her teacher, this interest and curiosity are also reinforced by television. For example, while Ayşe is watching TV, the camera focuses on the TV, and we see the Yeditepe Istanbul TV series on the screen. Both the educational apparatuses of the state, such as the school, and the media apparatuses, such as television, lead to the assimilation and “blindness” of Ayşe. Ayşe's recovery from such a “blindness” will happen as a result of a trauma (the murder of her brother Mehmet by the paramilitary forces of the state).

In the next stage of the movie, Ayşe “wakes up” when her brother Mehmet, who was studying at the university in Istanbul, was murdered before her eyes in Muş. Mehmet has a national consciousness. Due to his political activities in Istanbul, he attracted the attention of the law enforcement forces of the state. Therefore, Mehmet's comrade tells him that it would be better not to be seen for a while. Thereupon, Mehmet returns to his hometown. While in his hometown, he takes Ayşe to the hospital one day. After leaving the hospital, he leaves Ayşe in a café house. While going to the pharmacy to buy medicines, Mehmet is killed when a person descending from a White Taurus shoots him. During Mehmet's murder, the camera focuses on Ayşe. While the people in the coffee house go out to understand what is going on, Ayşe watches the events from where she is in a frozen state.

Ayşe froze with her eyes open. After the murder of her brother, we no longer see Ayşe speak Turkish. Ayşe's older brother and sister decide to join the guerrilla after their fields, where they have been working for many years, are given to the head of the village guard, and after the elder brother is beaten by the village guards and their younger siblings are killed. Also, the family decides to migrate to Istanbul as a result of the pressure of the village guards, a semi-official paramilitary force supported by the state. Ayşe, who used to want to go to Istanbul and was curious about it, does not want to go to Istanbul anymore. While her father and mother are about to leave, Ayşe

insists on staying at home. Unfortunately, Ayşe is “freed” from assimilation as a result of the trauma she experienced. In other words, as a result of this traumatic event, national consciousness was revealed.

In forced migrations (physical displacements), the violence applied by the state through repressive apparatuses is obvious and visible, while in assimilation (linguistic displacement), the state usually does not use repressive apparatuses. In other words, assimilation as linguistic displacement cannot be sustained by the state using only repressive apparatuses. While assimilating the Kurds, the state mostly resorts to its ideological apparatuses. Linguistic displacement takes place through these ideological apparatuses. Therefore, we can say that the main difference between linguistic displacement and physical displacement emerges at the point of visibility (recognition) of violence. The linguistic displacement process is not seen as a trauma by the person because the person does not realize the different types of violence that accompany the linguistic displacement, such as “epistemic violence” or “symbolic violence”. This is something that makes it difficult to return to the mother tongue (to “gain” national consciousness) because by the time one realizes the importance of one's mother tongue, it may be too late. As seen in the example of Osman in the film *In Between*.

Those who have a certain socio-cultural or economic capital can reach certain tools and opportunities to return to their mother tongue after gaining national consciousness. For example, Osman is a person who lives in the city (Diyarbakır) and therefore has the opportunity to access certain vehicles (Kurdish courses). He also has the opportunity to meet different people due to his job (auto mechanic). For example, the teacher whose car he repaired tells Osman that she can help him learn Kurdish. Osman gets the opportunity to return to his mother tongue with outside support (social capital). Let's say here that this opportunity is an opportunity that is accessible to an individual and a certain group. Unless this issue is resolved as a political issue, it is not possible for everyone to return to their mother tongue. That's why Osman's brother says: “As long as the Kurds do not stand on their feet, this problem will not be solved.”

On the other hand, Ayşe, as a child of the lower class, has neither socio-cultural capital nor economic capital. She is gradually moving away from her native language because

she is not aware of the symbolic violence and epistemic violence she was subjected to at school. It is not possible for her to return to her mother tongue by herself and love her mother tongue. Therefore, Ayşe's return to her mother tongue can only be realized with an intervention from outside. As stated above, this intervention is nothing but the naked violence of the state. Ayşe has witnessed this violence with the murder of her brother Mehmet and has now given up her passion for Istanbul. When Ayşe was about to be exiled from her mother tongue, her eyes were opened as a result of a trauma, and she was reconnected to her mother tongue. Therefore, people from the lower classes who are linguistically displaced or about to be displaced has no desire to return to their home unless they are directly or indirectly exposed to the state's naked violence. In other words, one of the main conditions for the emergence of linguistic nostalgia in the lower-class Kurds, who lack social, cultural, and economic capital in victim cinema, is to witness state violence directly or indirectly.

In conclusion, let's change Derrida's question in the context of the ethnocentric subject and ask it in the context of the subaltern. "The question is how to keep the ethnocentric Subject from establishing itself by selectively defining an Other" (Spivak, 1994: 87). Let's change this question a little and ask it as follows for the subaltern: What are the obstacles(s) in front of the subaltern Kurds to choose and define an Other that will allow them to establish themselves? What prevents the subaltern Kurds from defining the Other that allows them to establish themselves? At this point, when we look at the movie *The Fall from Heaven*, we see this: In the classroom, the teacher organizes a "recovery operation" to make the students speak Turkish (which means also the banning of Kurdish). While doing this recovery operation, the teacher speaks of "better worlds" within reach and at the same time promises economic prosperity on the condition of learning Turkish.

The teacher resorts to certain dichotomies when doing this. She points to Turkey (the West) as a "more beautiful world" and underestimates the place where children are located by calling them "small worlds" (Kurdistan). The teacher refers to this dichotomy as students speak Kurdish. Therefore, when we look at the issue through language, it is Kurdish, the language of "small worlds" that has been discredited here. Therefore, according to the teacher, in order to reach "better worlds", first of all, the

“useless” Kurdish language should be abandoned. Thus, we can call this effort of the teacher an “operation to discredit the Kurdish language”. With this operation, the teacher encourages the lower-class Kurds, an Other, to abandon their mother tongue and prevent them from establishing themselves as a Subject. In this way, the teacher calls the students for identifying with her. Thus, she acquires the right to speak for them, and the subaltern is left mute.

Subaltern does not have the possibility of social mobility in the capitalist order. One of the obstacles to the social mobility of subaltern Kurds in Turkish society is that their mother tongue does not correspond to any linguistic capital. In other words, their mother tongue has been rendered “ineffective” in terms of being able to sustain their lives¹⁸. Since Kurdish is not a legally recognized language, it has been rendered dysfunctional. This situation (not recognizing Kurdish) forces the Kurds to abandon their language, that is, to assimilate. This assimilation is presented as a “rescue operation” by the state. However, as you can see, this is not just a simple recovery operation.

This recovery operation is also accompanied by a “discrediting operation”. Kurdish is being coded as a dysfunctional language and is being de-qualified and discredited. As a result of such operational processes, assimilation is made attractive for Kurds. As a conscious or unconscious agent of the system, the teacher presents herself to Kurdish students as a figure who must be identified (the “hero” who liberated them). The teacher stands before the Kurdish students as the “hero” who should be identified with herself. With this process, the mother tongue is taken from the hands of the students who try to identify themselves with the teacher. Making students mute is also preventing them from establishing themselves and speaking for themselves. As a result, it is understood that the way subaltern Kurds can speak for themselves is possible with an end to assimilation policies and an end to discrediting operations against their mother tongue. Another point that is at least as important as this is the establishment of a system that will enable Kurdish to gain the quality of a language

¹⁸ Speaking Kurdish becomes a language capital for university graduate Kurds to work in NGOs that Europe funds to keep Syrian refugees in Turkey. In this respect, the perception and experience of the mother tongue in the context of the “white-collar” precariat Kurds is worth studying.

capital. As long as their mother tongue is rendered dysfunctional, assimilation (exile from their mother tongue) will inevitably impose itself on subaltern Kurds who want to get out of the hell of poverty they are in. Because Kurdish is rendered useless and dysfunctional by invisible violence types such as symbolic violence and epistemic violence within the system and Turkish is presented to subalterns as a “recovery language”. The emergence of national consciousness takes different forms for different social classes. For subaltern Kurds, this happens as a result of the intervention of an external factor (the state's naked violence), while for Kurds who have a certain socio-economic capital, it happens through their social capital. According to the film, since subaltern Kurds do not have any cultural, social, and economic capital, they can attain national consciousness only if the violence they suffer everyday gains visibility.



CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to understand how the displaced Kurds in the victim cinema, which is a sub-branch of Kurdish cinema, establish a relationship with their homeland while they are away from their homeland, considering their class characteristics. In other words, in this thesis, taking into account the class dimension, I focused on the homeland issue of the displaced Kurds in the victim cinema. I tried to understand how and to what extent the sense of homeland and belonging of the displaced Kurds, who are in different social class positions, changed in the victim cinema. I also tried to look at how the linguistically and physically displaced Kurds' relationship with their homeland is represented in this cinema.

In this cinema, although there is not much difference between characters in terms of economic capital, the level of social inclusion (or the position they have acquired in the social sphere) of these characters, who differ from each other in terms of social and cultural capital (especially with the decadent generation after migration), affects the relationship they establish with their sense of belonging, their homeland. In other words, in this cinema, the social class positions of the characters have a significant impact on where/what they will imagine as a homeland. I tried to analyze the nostalgia scenes in the films to embody the way the displaced Kurds establish their relationship with their homeland (where and what – language or a certain geographical region – they envision as their homeland).

What is the reason(s) for people who are far from their homes to feel nostalgic for different homelands (homeland as a language and homeland as a specific geographical region) and have different imaginations of homeland (Turkey and/or Kurdistan) in the victim cinema? It was seen that there are two general reasons that cause nostalgia for the homeland in the victim cinema. The first of these is the racist, denialist,

marginalizing, criminalizing, labeling practices, and lynching attacks that all displaced Kurds are exposed to in daily life in these films. A second reason for the emergence of nostalgia for the homeland (which is also one of the main reasons for the change in the understanding of the homeland) is the different class positions of the displaced Kurds in society. In the victim cinema, it was shown that displaced Kurds must have a certain socio-cultural capital in order to have a subject/agency position to talk about the traumas they have experienced. In other words, it was pointed out that creative agency in this cinema is possible only with a certain socio-cultural capital. In addition, and related to this, it was shown in this cinema that the displaced subaltern Kurds - unlike the Kurds who have a certain social and cultural capital- are in a blockage or infertility in terms of action images.

Considering the nostalgic characters that Barbara Cassin discussed in her book when we look at the nostalgia for the homeland in the victim cinema, we can say the following: Odysseusian characters (Nigar, Şaristan etc.,) in the victim cinema (i.e., those who accept a certain piece of land as a homeland) are usually monolingual, traditionalist, elderly, (mostly) women and lack socio-cultural capital and national consciousness. Arendtian characters, on the contrary, are multilingual, modern, young, (mostly) male, and people with a certain socio-cultural capital and national consciousness. Odysseusian characters lacked socio-cultural capital, so they also lacked the means to integrate into the social field in this cinema. In addition, they are also socially condemned to stay on the shore, in the corner, because they are not recognized in the social field and cannot “speak”. Because of this, these characters usually appeared in closed areas in this cinema. These characters are also represented as prisoners because they are forced to live in a place they do not want. In this way, the “convictions” of these characters were emphasized. Because of this, these characters longed to return home and were constantly striving to return home. Home(land) refers to Kurdistan as a certain geography for these characters.

Arendtian characters in this cinema, on the other hand, are nostalgic for something else rather than a certain geography or piece of land as a homeland: the Mother Tongue. These displaced characters, who are bilingual, feel nostalgia for their mother tongue. In other words, they imagine the nation/community through language rather than

imagining it through a piece of land whose borders are defined and whose property has been acquired. One of the requirements of this linguistic nostalgia, as Cassin notes, is to be at least bilingual. For Cassin, her only knowledge is that we need to speak (or simply love) at least two languages in order to recognize that we are speaking one of them, that it is a language that we are speaking, and that an exile has the chance and the nostalgia to recognize that there is a language that is more maternal for her or him than another (Cassin, 2016: 56). Therefore, considering the displaced Kurdish characters in this cinema, we can say that there is a direct relationship between socio-cultural capital and linguistic nostalgia. The form of capital possessed by the characters in the victim cinema changes the imagination and understanding of the homeland of the displaced Kurds. In other words, in this cinema, we have seen that the class differentiation created by socio-cultural capital in the context of displaced Kurds has also led to a change in the understanding of the homeland.

In addition, it was shown that characters like Odysseus, who feel nostalgic for their homeland, feel a sense of belonging to one place (Kurdistan), cannot live far from their homes for a long time, and always want to return to their homeland. These characters have earthy roots, that is, we can say that they are embedded (emphedon) in a certain geographical area. The character, who is like Arendt in terms of nostalgia, has “airborne roots” and they want to keep their mother tongue alive everywhere. The mother tongue is unique from all others not just because it is the mother's language or tongue—and a person only has one mother—but also because it completely creates one's self with nature and culture (Cassin, 2016: 49). Therefore, they try to create the socio-political spatial conditions necessary for the survival of their mother tongue. Assimilation has been problematized in the victim cinema in general because the Kurdish language has been systematically subjected to great pressure and has been denied for a long time. For this reason, these characters, who are creative agents in the victim cinema, “politically” embrace their Kurdishness and Kurdish identities in an Arendtian way and resist assimilation and denial through it. Since they choose their mother tongue as their homeland, they come face to face with the system through language. They try to transform the space by democratizing the homogeneous nation-state space through Kurdish. As a result, we tried to show that one of the main reasons for this differentiation in the context of homeland nostalgia is the class differences

among the displaced Kurds arising from the socio-cultural capital they have. In other words, class differences caused by the unequal distribution of social and cultural capital are one of the main reasons for the tension and conflict between different homeland imaginings in this cinema.

When we look at the film analysis, we see that certain themes come to the fore. As the main themes, we can list the following: Belonging, Nostalgia, Trauma/Reconciliation, Social-Cultural Capital, Mother Tongue, National Consciousness, and Subjectivity. Considering the way these themes are represented cinematically in these films and the economic and political difficulties that Kurdish directors face in the production process in general, it can be thought that at first sight, victim cinema is within the tradition of modern (political) cinema. However, when we look at the factor that makes the cameras of the filmmakers political (the camera calling the audience to action), it will be seen that the victim cinema expresses a break from this tradition (and naturally Yılmaz Güney's cinema tradition). This break will also be seen when we look at which social class the camera calls to action. The main reason for this break is the preference for identity conflict/perspective instead of class conflict/perspective, which is the basic code of militant cinema tradition. It is a kind of cinema of justifying the abandonment of the lower classes. This can be seen when we look at the representation of the social class that the characters in the films have established with their homeland. Characters who become subjects, because they have a certain socio-cultural capital and have multiple belonging in this direction (the ones who already have national consciousness or those who have gained national consciousness later), have a positive representation and affirmation in the films. Therefore, such characters are imagined as political subjects in the struggle against the sovereign in these films. On the other hand, because of a lack of socio-cultural capital, the characters who are completely represented as objects/passives (as those representing past social traumas) have completely lost their ability/possibility to be subjects. While the filmmakers called the characters with educational capital to action in these films, they coded the lower-classes as "destined to die". Therefore, such a representation regime caused the audience to remain in a passive position rather than activating it.

The characters in these films can be divided into three groups in terms of national consciousness, socio-cultural capital, belonging, and being a political subject: 1- Characters, who have a certain socio-cultural capital as well as national consciousness, are imagined as political subjects in the struggle against the sovereign, and these characters have multiple forms of belonging. 2- Although they have a certain socio-cultural capital, the characters who are deficient in terms of national consciousness are imagined as "hopeful" characters, as candidates for political subjects in the future struggle against the sovereign, and these characters also have a multiple belonging. 3- Characters, who do not have any socio-cultural capital and national consciousness, do not problematize their economic or political issues, and only carry the social trauma of the past in their bodies but never talk about it, have a single form of belonging. It is clear from this short description (which we will discuss in more detail below) that when we look at the relationship between belonging/nostalgia (Homeland) and class (Subject) in victim cinema, it is the characters with multiple belongings that are politically affirmed. The sub-classes, who have a single belonging, have lost their qualifications to be political subjects in the struggle against the sovereign as "death-destined" characters. In such a case, it becomes clear that the victim cinema, a sub-branch of Kurdish cinema, is political, but whose side it is on in this struggle (in the context of class politics). Therefore, we can say that this cinema is about the belief (hope) of those who have a certain educational capital rather than the belief in the people (i.e., the lower classes, the oppressed).

In these films, the characters, who have a certain socio-cultural capital and national consciousness, appear as a new political subject that is preferred in the struggle to be carried out against the sovereign, since they have a certain position in the social field. Here, the sovereign, against which the struggle is waged, refers to the state rather than to a social class (the ruling class). As a result of the struggle, they wage with their capacity to act, these characters democratize the homogeneous space of the sovereign nation-state, participate in the reconstruction of the space and try to build a "common homeland". This is why they have multiple belongings. That's why in the films, this character also appears in public spaces or government institutions (usually schools or universities). In this respect, we do not see any action crisis in these characters. It is the educational capital and national consciousness that they have (the action image)

that puts them into action in the films. In line with this national consciousness, they fight against the sovereign by using their socio-cultural capital. They fight against the sovereign to face the traumas of their ancestors in the past, and they do not give up their struggle in the face of oppression. We can show the character of Ali in the film *Kilama Dayîka Min* (Ali in the film *Photograph*, Cemal and his friends in the film *Bahoz* can be given as an example) for this representation. Ali has both national consciousness and a certain socio-cultural capital. On the one hand, he is a writer (he writes short stories in Kurdish and Turkish). On the other hand, as a political character, he gives voluntarily Kurdish lessons in a cultural center and also teaches Turkish in a public school. When the police raid the institution where he works voluntarily, he teaches Kurdish to the children in the class and objects at the police for interrupting his class. He also writes in Kurdish as a writer. While carrying out these activities, we do not see Ali enter into any action crisis in these scenes.

The characters who have a certain socio-cultural capital but lack national consciousness in the film, as a result of the death of the characters who do not have any socio-cultural capital, necessarily end up in geographies populated by Kurds. In other words, it is the code of death, which is one of the basic codes of Kurdish cinema that enables these characters to take action. As a result of their journey to the Kurdish-populated areas, these characters acquire national consciousness. As a result of this journey, these characters learn about the past traumas of their ancestors, acquire a collective memory and thus “wake up”. Thus, these characters are represented/constructed as candidates for political subjects in the struggle against the sovereign. For example, in the film *Rêç*, the character's name is *Hêvî*, meaning "hope". Whose hope is *Hêvî*? In the film, *Hêvî* represents the hope of the family (Kurds) as the person who will hold her oppressed grandmother and her family accountable and struggle “on their behalf”. When we look at how the characters *Şaristan* (a passive, melancholic, old, death-destined person who has completely lost her capacity for action) and *Hêvî* (a young person with a certain educational capital) are represented in the film, it can be possible to say that *Hêvî* represents the hope not only of the family but also of the filmmaker. After seeing the Kurdish-populated areas, *Hêvî*'s national feelings rise again. *Hêvî*, who did not want to return to Batman while in Istanbul, runs towards his home when he sees his destroyed and evacuated village. In this scene, we

see that Hêvî continues to be a hope for both filmmakers and his family. Although they encounter many obstacles on their way back to their homeland, they arrive at their homeland at the end of the day. There is a similar situation for the character of Jan in the film *Zer*. Jan also returns to the homeland upon the death of his grandmother. He also acquires national consciousness in this process. When his father denies that they are Kurds, he objects to his father by saying "I am not a child". This is the scene where Jan's national consciousness comes to light. In this film, there is a trauma that has been experienced in the past but has not been confronted (reconciliation), and this remains a pain (Jan) in Zarife until she dies. Jan is encoded as a person who will relieve this pain in the film. Gaining national consciousness upon the death of his grandmother also paves the way for him to become a political subject in the struggle against the sovereign. While returning to the homeland, Jan encounters many difficulties, but he never gives up and finally manages to return to the homeland. Therefore, we do not see any action crisis in these character(s).

On the other hand, characters (Nigar, Saristan, Basê, Zarife, etc.) who do not have any socio-cultural capital and national consciousness are represented as "death-destined characters" who are completely devoid of the power to overcome the difficult conditions they are in. They keep their past traumas a secret. They have no power to oppose the sovereign. These characters also function as a historical "document/proof" of past traumas in the films. So they are just an object. They function as an "intermediary" that will serve to transfer the injustices experienced in the past to today's younger generations who have a certain socio-cultural capital and thus to the subjectivization of these generations in the struggle against the sovereign. These elderly characters never talk about the past despite having experienced such traumas. They keep the past a secret and only reveal it to some of their children. They are usually old, quiet, stubborn, melancholic, and lack the capacity for action. In this respect, they appear as characters who are unlikely to be subjects in the political struggle against the sovereign.

We mentioned above that death emerges as an important code for the semi-assimilated character to gain national consciousness and to put the character into action. As a result of the death of a member of the family, the characters take action and acquire national

consciousness as a result of their journey to their homeland. Ulus Baker (2015) states that the death of the mother's child is effective in the emergence of class consciousness in Pudovkin's *Mother* film (in Soviet cinema). Classical political cinema, as in Pudovkin's *Mother*, told the story of a mother who is unconscious, living with the narrow mind of her daily poor life and trembling over her son, who becomes conscious to take over the flag after the loss of her son (Baker, 2015). At this point, the difference between the representation of the "mother" character (that is, the lower classes) in the victim cinema and the classical political cinema says something important about the political character of the director's camera in the victim cinema. While the subject of the revolution in classical political cinema is the people (lower-classes) who become subjects despite all their deficiencies at the end of the day -they do not have any socio-cultural or economic capital, etc.-, in the victim cinema, the subject of this political/identity struggle is the classes that have a certain educational capital. Therefore, when we look at the representation of the "mother/grandmother" (lower-class) character in the victim cinema, we see that the mother has completely lost her capacity to act in the face of the sovereign, thus rendering her passive and ineffective. These characters even become a "burden"/obstacle for the characters who have educational capital in the struggle against the sovereign. In the film *Kilama Dayîka Min*, we saw that Ali has no problem in terms of action capacity. We stated that Ali was involved in many actions at the same time (teaching at school, volunteering as a teacher of Kurdish in an institution, writing, participating in a strike, etc.) and that he had no problem with his capacity to act. However, as if it were not enough for Ali to deal with the sovereign, he also has to deal with his mother, Nigar, who is an old and stubborn woman. Nigar, as a stubborn woman, constantly creates problems for Ali. In addition, one of Nigar's sons has disappeared as a result of an unsolved murder, but (unlike the mother in Pudovkin's *Mother*) we do not hear Nigar utter a single word throughout the film. Nor do we see her trying to take any action for her missing son. She is a passive, usually quiet, and melancholic woman. She insists on returning to her village all the time because she can't keep up with Istanbul. No matter how much Ali says that their village has been evacuated and that no one has returned to the village, she does not believe Ali. In this respect, Nigar is almost a burden for Ali. Therefore, the lower classes are represented as an "obstacle" in front of the political struggle rather

than being the subject of the political struggle (as opposed to Classical Political Cinema).

There is also a struggle in the victim cinema, but this struggle is not a class struggle. To the extent that this is the case, the mother/grandmother character in the victim cinema is not a character that will gain consciousness and become a subject, but rather "destined to die", passive, ineffective, objectified, and in this respect, "unpromising" characters for the future. Their only function in the political struggle against the sovereign in the film is to die. As a result of the death of these characters, national consciousness emerges in the characters who have educational capital, that is, a new political subject (or candidates) who will continue the political struggle is born. The traumatic past of their families, which has been kept a secret from them until that day, has an impact on the action of these characters, as well as the "death code". "Another reason why the past cannot be ignored is that quite simply the struggles, the toil, the injustices and hopes of the majority of all the accumulated dead generations have yet to be redeemed" (Benjamin, 1999: 252 cited in Wayne, 2001: 30). In this respect, it should be noted that the victim cinema is in common with militant cinema, which is a sub-branch of modern political cinema, in that it indicates that people are obliged to salvation.

However, it is at the same point where victim cinema differs from militant cinema. In militant cinema (unlike classical political cinema) the people as the revolutionary subject do not exist, so the people must first be created. For the people to be a revolutionary subject, the audience must act in solidarity with these people, who have been deprived of their capacity for action by being surrounded by different structures (feudalism, tradition, religious superstitions, etc.). This is what the political eye of the camera of militant cinema calls for. In the victim cinema, however, this political subject (not the revolutionary subject) already exists, or it will exist by acquiring national consciousness as a result of the death of the mother/grandmother who represents the oppressed/lower classes in the later parts of the film. In such a case, the victim cinema leaves its audience in a passive position again, as in the dominant cinema.

At this point in the issue, it would be useful to look at Yılmaz Güney, who is referred to in the films of the victim cinema and accepted by many researchers as the beginning of Kurdish cinema, and his cinema in this context. Thus, we can better see the continuity and breaks between the victim cinema and the militant cinema tradition, which is the tradition embraced by Yılmaz Güney cinema. Because the filmmakers' representation of those who do not have any socio-cultural capital and national consciousness as having completely lost their capacity to act represents an important break with Yılmaz Güney's cinema tradition. Yılmaz Güney looks at the oppressed in his films and points out the mechanisms that inhibit their capacity to act. Thus, in his films, Güney invites the audience to believe in the people. For example, in the film *Umut*, Yılmaz Güney's hope is Cabbar and his family. However, in the films of the victim cinema that we have examined, this hope is for those who have a certain socio-cultural capital and national consciousness.

It would be useful to look at Yılmaz Güney's cinema (in *Umut*, *Sürü*, and *Yol*) in the context of class consciousness. As stated above, in Yılmaz Güney cinema, unlike Classical Political Cinema (and the victim cinema), this consciousness/action is intended to be created in the audience rather than the character. In his films, Güney includes absurd coexistences to create awareness in the audience and activate them. Yes, the characteristic of Güney's cinema is that it presents the absurd coexistence of the old and the new, feudal and bourgeois, ideology and thought, consciousness and unconsciousness, awareness and the former, rather than their succession (Baker, 2015). Such combinations create small but constant shocks in the audiences and call them to action by making the invisible visible. By doing this, Güney shows that the poverty, violence, unconsciousness, and crisis of action that exist in the private sphere are caused by such dominant structures. In other words, it reveals that what is private is public/political and what is public/political is private in Güney's cinema. In this respect, it is called a minor cinema (Deleuze, 2013). Güney points to public and political issues through personal/family stories. The call made by Güney is for the solidarity of the audience with people/classes (quantitatively the majority) who were surrounded by religious, feudal, or traditional structures and whose activity was restricted. Güney calls the audience to solidarity with the people by pointing out the action crisis of the people who are struggling to get out of all this poverty, violence,

and misery, but cannot get out. He tries to create affection not in the character but in the audience. In this respect, Güney's camera is political, and this camera looks at society based on class conflict.

It cannot be said that such a representation regime exists in the victim cinema. Those who do not have sociocultural capital and national consciousness do not have any objections/capacity to take action against the economic or political conditions they are in. These characters only desire to return home due to nostalgia for their homeland. They lack the power to struggle against the sovereign in line with their desires. For example, Nigar struggles with his son rather than against the sovereign to return home. She believes that the sovereign allowed the displaced to return to their villages, but that her son did not want to return home. They can't have any sociocultural capital to integrate into the society they live in because of their age, and, therefore, they do not have the strength to talk about the traumas they have experienced. They are in the position of objects, and their subjunctivization is impossible. As stated before, these characters are always at home, melancholic, stubborn, and sick. They do not make any effort to get out of the situation they are in and only desire to return to their homeland. While the desire of subaltern characters to return to their homeland creates problems for characters with national consciousness (for example, Ali), it serves the birth of a new consciousness for characters who lack national consciousness (for example, Hêvî). In this respect, these films directly position the oppressed as having completely lost their capacity for action, thus turning their face to the class with educational capital. For this reason, it would be more accurate to say that the victim cinema is a cinema that focuses on the belief in those with educational capital rather than the belief in the people. Although this cinema shares with Yılmaz Güney a point of belief in the world, it is obvious that they differ in the subject that will build this world.

It seems that the social classes, which have a certain socio-cultural capital and are thought to represent the Kurds politically, are considered as political subjects rather than the "Kurdish people" in the struggle that the Kurds will wage against the sovereign, in terms of the filmmakers' camera. To the extent that this is the case, multiple belongings are affirmed, while those with a single identity are coded as "outdated". It seems impossible for those who do not have any socio-cultural capital

to take action. In fact, they are even considered as a "burden" (obstacle) for those with educational capital. According to this cinema, asking for reconciliation of the past traumas, protecting the mother tongue (Kurdish), and defending the Kurdish identity is the work of the classes that have this educational capital, which is thought to represent the Kurdish people politically. The biggest problem of such a representation regime is that it ignores the Saturday Mothers who have been resisting for years in Galatasaray Square to come to terms with the sovereign and find their missing children, or the Peace Mothers Initiative, which has been struggling for social peace. Although such a reality has been in the spotlight in the social struggle against the sovereign for years, it is an important problem for the filmmakers to represent the traumatized characters in their films as completely passive, silent, and a "burden".

Güney's cinema is a cinema of conflict, but this conflict is a class conflict. The revolutionary subject of this conflict is "lost people" (Erdoğan, 2020) that need to be found. He uses his camera to ensure the audience's belief in the people (and the world), that is, he instrumentalizes his camera. It also deals with the Kurdish issue, which is a national issue, from this perspective. Even though Yılmaz Güney was not able to shoot the film "Sürü" as he wanted due to political reasons, this class perspective/understanding is at the heart of the film: "When I present the Kurdish issue, I present it as a Turkish citizen (Türkiyeli olarak). "Because I am essentially a person who believes in class struggle" (Güney, 2004: 130 cited in Soner, 2019: 68).

When we look at the exile from the mother tongue (assimilation) in the victim cinema, we see that the school and the media, which are important ideological apparatuses of the state, have an important role here. In this cinema, teachers always tell children that they need to learn Turkish in order to have a good standard of living in the future. Not having this "language capital" was coded as subordinate living, that is, losing the possibility of social mobility. By pointing out these political structures behind assimilation, the directors make visible how it is experienced by Kurdish students in school. As we stated before, in these films, this discourse produced by the teacher can actually be called a "rescue operation". This rescue operation also goes hand in hand with the "discrediting operation" of the Kurdish language. Turkish appeared as a "savior language" for Kurdish students to get rid of their "small villages". The

language spoken by Kurdish students was thus rendered dysfunctional and discredited. After Their mother tongue was positioned as an “unnecessary” language, Kurdish students from lower-classes were “voluntarily” exiled from their mother tongue. We stated that in addition to the rescue and discrediting operations, the epistemic and symbolic violence that Kurdish students from lower-classes are exposed to every day at school also plays an important role in their exile from their mother tongue. Therefore, according to this cinema, which establishes such a relationship between Turkish and Kurdish in terms of social mobility, in order to prevent the assimilation of the Kurds, it is necessary to build a new system in which Kurdish is also a language that provides social mobility, and the operations to discredit the Kurdish language should be ended.

Assimilation is handled as a trauma (linguistically displacement), and as a trauma, it has two tragic effects in the victim cinema. Unless the assimilation policies and the pressures on Kurdish as a mother tongue end, this trauma will not be overcome. In such a situation, “stammering existence” (Cassin, 2018) becomes inevitable for many linguistically displaced Kurds. This leads to the inability to express the trauma experienced and the inability of the person to express themselves as they want, leading to the lack of a sense of belonging. Because a person who has forgotten their mother tongue or has a weak relationship with it will represent themselves through a “cliche language”.

The second effect of assimilation is “cliché” (not ordinary) language. Arendt says that people who speak foreign languages better than their mother tongue speak a “cliché” language. Cliché language lacks creativity and vitality, and people who express themselves with this language become passive individuals because they lose their creativity (that is, agency) power. I mentioned that Arendt gave Eichmann (and her “Official language”) as an example of this situation. When we look at such a situation in the context of Kurdish in the victim cinema, we can say that as a result of assimilation policies, when a person assimilates (the language s/he is creative in), s/he becomes to hate Kurdish, and this can lead the person to turn to her/his native language with fascistic violence, and this may push the person to love slavery/passivity. We showed the best example of this in the character of Ayşe in the movie *The Fall* from

Heaven. As it will be remembered, in one scene of the movie, Ayşe warned her brother and sister who spoke Kurdish at home, shouting angrily, “Don't speak Kurdish.” As Anders underscores: “we become the way we speak” (Anders, 1962: 106 cited in Cassin, 2016: 47).

With the mother tongue Kurdish being rendered dysfunctional against the official language Turkish, we have seen characters who lack national consciousness feel ashamed to speak Kurdish (Erdal in the movie *In Between*) and even hate Kurdish (Ayşe in *The Fall from Heaven*). The moment when the desire to return to the mother tongue arises, that is, the moment when national consciousness emerges, occurs as a result of another traumatic event (death; unsolved murder, etc.) or situation (the situation where it becomes increasingly difficult to continue living without speaking the mother tongue). In other words, when a person is exposed to the naked violence of the state (or when a person realizes that the policies pursued by the state negatively affect her/his life), s/he wakes up from this “slavery”/ “blindness” and decides to return to her/his mother tongue.

When the characters have the desire to return to their mother tongue in order to resist assimilation after gaining national consciousness, it is not easy to return to the mother tongue. There are certain obstacles in front of this. Osman, who has a certain economic and social capital, can reach opportunities to learn Kurdish when he decides to return to his mother tongue. Therefore, he has the means of returning to his mother tongue, albeit to a certain extent. On the other hand, for Ayşe, who is studying in the village, returning to her mother tongue is only possible as a result of being exposed to or witnessing the state's “naked” violence. In other words, it was an external factor (the murder of her brother Mehmet by paramilitary forces) that prompted Ayşe to gain national consciousness and then return to her mother tongue. Ayşe did not want to return to her mother tongue based on her own consciousness, external factors pushed her to return home. On the other hand, Osman decides to return to his mother tongue due to the economic and social capital he has. Therefore, it is not possible for subaltern Kurds to have the desire to return to their mother tongue (to have a national consciousness) unless there is an external (“stimulating” or “arousing”) factor. In addition, they do not have the means and opportunities to return to their mother tongue.

On the other hand, those who have a certain socio-economic capital have these tools and opportunities, albeit at a partial level. As a result, we do not yet encounter Aeneasian heroes (wholly assimilated and adopted elsewhere) in the victim cinema. Although the characters are assimilated to a certain extent, they try to return to their mother tongue/homeland by gaining a certain national consciousness afterward. Therefore, completely assimilated heroes do not exist in the victim cinema.

When we look at the victim cinema, we can talk about a struggle, but this struggle is not a class struggle based on irreconcilable interests. This fight is not a revolutionary struggle but a struggle for political identity. As such, the most important code (class perspective) that defines the cinema tradition embraced by Yılmaz Güney is abandoned.

Third Cinema however would want to point the finger, it would want, in Espinosa's words, to 'show the process which generates the problems' (1997: 81). But to do that requires taking a position, making a commitment. Thus, Third Cinema has an entirely different epistemological foundation to Second Cinema and the critical discourse which frames and interprets such films (Wayne, 2001: 13).

In the section where we discussed Kurdish cinema, we stated that this cinema was influenced by Third Cinema and its sub-branch, militant cinema (Smets, 2015). Based on what we have said here, we can say that victim cinema has abandoned class conflict, which is the basic code of militant cinema, or has reduced it to one of the conflicts. In this conflict, the position of being a political subject was taken away from the people/sub-classes and given to the classes that have a certain socio-cultural capital and are supposed to fight/will fight on behalf of the Kurds. In other words, rather than addressing the Kurdish issue from a militant perspective in cinema, it has been handled from the perspective of the middle class, which has a certain educational capital. As such, it appears as a cinema that expresses the concerns of this class and points out the structural problems in front of it.

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APPENDICES

A. TÜRKÇE ÖZET/ TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezde temel olarak kurban sinemasında aidiyet ve sınıf arasındaki ilişkiyi yerinden edilmiş Kürtler bağlamında sorunsallaştırdık. Bir başka ifadeyle, kurban sinemasında karakterlerin toplumsal alandaki sınıfsal konumları ile aidiyet/anayurt biçimleri arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl temsil edildiğine bakmaya çalıştık. Kurban sinemasında belli bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel (veya eğitsel) sermayesi olanlar “ikili-aidiyete” sahipken, herhangi bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayesi olmayanların ise “tekli-aidiyete” sahip olduğu görülmektedir. Aidiyet ve sınıf arasındaki bu ilişkide kurban sinemasında çoklu aidiyete sahip olan karakterler “hareket imajları” açısından pozitif bir temsile sahipken, tekli aidiyete sahip olanlar ise negatif bir temsile sahip olmasa da “ölüme-yazgılı” karakterler olarak tümüyle pasifleştirilmiş ve nesneleştirilmişlerdir. Böylesi bir temsil rejimi ise belli bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayesi olanları egemenin şiddetine maruz kalmış “ezilenler adına” mücadele yürütecek olan politik-özne olarak olumlarken, herhangi bir sosyo-kültürel sermayesi olmayan karakterleri ise eylem kapasitesini tümüyle yitirmiş ve bir daha eyleme geçme imkânı olmayanlar olarak kodlamakta ve böylece bu karakterleri nesneleştirerek politik mücadeleyi belli bir eğitsel sermayesi olanlara mal etmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, belli bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayesi olanlar “Ortak Vatan” ve “Birlikte Yaşamın” kurucu politik-öznesi olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Çoklu aidiyete sahip olan bu karakterlerin pozitif bir temsile sahip olmasının nedeni anayurt olarak kabul ettikleri yere dönmek için aktif olarak mücadele etmeleridir. Öte taraftan, tekli aidiyete sahip olanlar ise anayurtlarına dönmeyi arzulamakta ama bu arzusunun gerçekleşmesi için harekete geçememektedirler. Onları harekete geçmekten alıkoyan şey ise sosyal ve kültürel sermayeden yoksun olmaları ve bu tür sermayeleri de edinebilmelerinin artık mümkün olmamasıdır. Kurban sinemasındaki bu kodlar dikkate alındığında bu sinemanın Yılmaz Güney’in

sinema geleneğinden (Militan Sinema geleneğinden) önemli bir kopuş gösterdiği iddia edilmektedir. Üçüncü Sinema “kayıp halk” arayışındayken yani devrimin öznesi olarak altsınıflara/halka olan inancı sağlamanın peşindeyken, kurban sineması altsınıflardan ziyade belli bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayesi olanlara yüzünü dönerek belli bir eğitsel sermayesi olanlara dair olan umudu sağlamaya çalışmaktadır.

Aidiyet/anayurt bağlamında literatüre baktığımız zaman birbiriyle ilişkili olan iki temel sorun karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki anayurt bağlamında yapılan tartışmalarda Kürtlerin yekpare ve homojen bir ulus olarak ele alınmasıdır. Böylesi bir durumda sınıfsal boyut göz ardı edilmekte ve içine dahil olunan toplumsal sınıfın aidiyet üzerindeki etkisi gözden kaçırılmaktadır. Bir ikinci sorun ise literatürde Kürtlerin tek bir aidiyet/anayurt tahayyülünün olduğu ön kabulüdür. Mesut Yeğen (2012) her ne kadar İstanbul’un 1990’lı yıllarda Bahoz filminde iki katmanlı bir aidiyetin kendini gösterdiğini ifade ederek önemli bir noktaya parmak basmakla birlikte bu iki katmanlı aidiyetin hangi Kürtler için geçerli olduğunu açmamasından dolayı eksik bir tespitte bulunmuştur. Bu ise yine literatürde sınıf gibi önemli bir boyutun göz ardı edilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu iki sorunu dikkate alarak Kürt sinemasında sınıf ile aidiyet/anayurt arasındaki ilişkiyi ve bu ilişkinin nasıl temsil edildiğini yerinden edilmiş Kürtler bağlamında ele almaya çalıştım.

Bu doğrultuda ilk olarak Kürt sinemasını yeniden tanımladım çünkü literatürde Kürt sinemasının ne olduğu ve hangi filmlerin/yönetmenlerin bu sinemaya dahil edileceği üzerine bir söylem mücadelesi vardı. Bir filmin Kürt sinemasına dahil edilmesi için yönetmenin Kürt mü olması gerekliydi? Film dilinin Kürtçe olması mı gerekiyordu? Kürt temsiline diğer ulusal sinemalardaki temsil biçimlerinden farklı mı olması gerekiyordu? Yoksa hepsi birden mi olmalıydı? Bu gibi sorular çoğaltılmakla birlikte ben yerinden edilmiş Kürtlerin aidiyet/anayurt biçimlerine bakacağım için doğru bir araştırma örneklemini oluşturmak için aşağıdaki yöntemleri izledim.

Kürt sineması Kürt sorunuyla göbekten bağlı bir sinemadır. Bu yüzden de Kürt sinemasına dahil olacak olan sinemanın ilk olarak bir ulus olarak Kürtlerin varlığını kabul etmesi ve sinemada Kürtleri bir başka ulusun gölgesi veya uzantısı olarak temsil etmemeliydi. Bu doğrultuda Kürtleri sinemasından bir ulus olarak ele almayan, temsil etmeyen bir yönetmen ulusal kimliği ne olursa olsun Kürt sinemasına dahil edilemez.

Dolayısıyla, Yılmaz Erdoğan, Mahsun Kırmızıgül, Sinan Çetin veya Handan İpekçi gibi yönetmenler bu sinemanın dışında tutulmuştur. Bu filmlerde karakterler Kürtlerin ulusal dili olan Kürtçe yerine doğu şivesiyle konuşan egzotik bir halk olarak temsil edilmektedir. Kürtçenin bu yönetmenlerin filmlerinde dışarda bırakıldığı için bu yönetmenlerin filmlerini Kürt sinemasının dışında bıraktım.

Hamid Dabaşı'nın (2009) belirttiği üzere bir yönetmen birden fazla sinemaya dahil olabilir. Bundan dolayı Kürt sinemasına sadece Kürt yönetmenlerin değil aynı zamanda Kürtleri konu alan Türk, Laz, Ermeni veya bir başka ulustan yönetmenlerin filmleri de dahil edilebilir. Bu doğrultuda Yeşim Ustaoglu veya Özcan Alper gibi yönetmenlerin Kürtleri konu alan filmleri bu sinemaya dahil edilebilir. Lakin bu tezde aidiyet/anayurt meselesini ele alacağımız için Kürtlerin bu konudaki görüşlerine başvurmamız gerekmektedir. Tam bu noktada araştırma örneklemimizin sınırları belirginleşmektedir. Kendi kaderini tayin hakkı açısından her ulus kendi adına karar verme hakkına sahiptir. Bu yüzden bu tezde araştırma örneklemi yönetmeni Kürt olan filmlerle sınırlandırdım.

Bu tezde Kevin Smets'den (2015) yararlanarak Kürt sinemasını bir "çatışma sineması" olarak ele aldık. Smets Kürt sinemasını bir çatışma sineması olarak formüle ederken yönetmenlerin çatışmaya dahil olma biçimlerini temel alarak üç gruba ayırmaktadır: Savaş Sineması, Kurban Sineması ve İnsan Hakları Sineması. Ben bu tezde çatışmalardan etkilenmiş olan Kürtlerin aidiyet meselesini ele aldığım için Kurban sinemasını örneklem olarak ele aldım çünkü kurban sineması çatışmalardan doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak etkilenmiş olan yönetmenlerin (yani çatışmanın doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak kurbanı olan yönetmenlerin) filmlerini kapsamaktadır. Smets bu sinemada temel amacın seyirciyi harekete geçirmek ve çatışmayı belgelemek olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Tam bu noktada araştırma örneklemini açısından önemli bir noktayı daha belirtmek gerekir: Literatürde aidiyet/anayurt meselesi kurgu filmler üzerinden ele alındığı için de kurban sinemasına dahil olabilecek belgesel filmleri devre dışı bıraktım.

Bu noktada analiz edeceğim filmleri belirlenmesinde "yerinden edilme" kavramının önemli bir yere sahip olduğunu da belirtelim. Bu kavramı iki anlamda kullandığımızı belirtelim. Bu anlamlardan ilki "fiziksel olarak yerinden edilmeyi" ifade etmektedir.

İkinci anlamda ise “dilsel olarak yerinden edilmeyi” yani asimilasyonu kastetmekteyiz. Ele aldığımız filmlerde de hem dilsel olarak yerinden edilme hem de fiziksel olarak yerinden edilme temalarını ele alan filmleri inceledik.

Bu doğrultuda filmleri belirlemeye çalışırken temel bir sorunla karşılaştım. Kürt sineması kapsamına giren filmlere ulaşmak kolay değildi. Filmler birçok kez resmi veya de facto olarak sansüre uğradığı için filmlere ulaşmak kolay olmamaktaydı. Bu yüzden ancak ulaşabildiğim filmleri inceleyebildim. Araştırmam sonucunda sosyal medya platformlarında, dijital medya platformlarında ve korsan film sitelerinde ulaşabildiğim filmler şunlar oldu: Rêç, Dengê Bavê Min, Kılama Dayîka Min, Zer, Bahoz, Fotograf, Di Navberêda ve Derbûyîna Ji Bihuştê.

Araştırma örneklemini oluşturduktan sonra kurban sinemasında yerinden edilmiş Kürtlerin anayurt(larıyla) kurdukları ilişkiyi sınıf bağlamında ele almak için belli kavramlardan yararlandık. Bu kavramlardan ilki Barbara Cassin’in (2018) nostalji kavramıydı. Nostalji kavramını bu tezde özlem duyulan şeye (bu tez bağlamında anayurda) geri dönerken çekilen acı olarak ele aldık: “hem insanın uzakta olduğunda çektiği eziyet hem de geri dönmek için katlanılan sıkıntı” (Cassin, 2018: 16). Bunun yanı sıra Cassin’in nostalji kavramı zaman açısından geçmiş değil şimdiyi ifade etmektedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle geçmişte idealize edilmiş bir anayurda nostalji duymaktan ziyade anayurdun şimdiki haline nostalji duymak anlamına gelmektedir. Nostalji hasreti çekilen yerde sonsuzluk veya ölümsüzlükten ziyade, ölümü veya ondan da beteri yaşlılığı yani geçen zamanı bulmak pahasına da olsa eve dönmeyi tercih etmektir (Cassin, 2016: 29).

Cassin nostalji kavramını ülkelerinden sürgün, mülteci veya göçmen olarak uzak düşmüş ikisi kurgusal (Odysseus ve Aeneas) biri gerçek karakter (Arendt) üzerinden ele almaktadır. Bu karakterlerden ilki olan Odysseus belli bir coğrafi bölgeyi (İthaka’yı) kendisine anayurt edinmiştir ve İthaka’dan başka bir yere aidiyet hissetmemektedir ve geliştirememektedir. Bu açıdan Odysseus anayurduna “topraksı köklerle” bağlı bir kurgusal karakterdir ve anayurduna dönmediğinde nostalji hastalığından ölebilir. Aeneas ise anayurdundan bir daha geri dönmek üzere kökünden koparılmıştır yani sürgün edilmiştir ve sürgün sonucunda anayurdunu ve anadili terk ederek kendine kök saldıgı yeni bir yeri (Roma) anayurt edinmiştir. Aeneas

ise anayurduyla ailesi ve dini inancı üzerinden ilişki kurmaktadır. Bu yüzden ailesiyle gittiği ve dini inancını özgürce yaşadığı her yer onun anayurduna dönüşür. Bu doğrultuda Cassin, Odysseus'un anayurda “tanrısallık” bağlarla bağlı olduğunu, Aeneas'ın ise anayurduna “dindarlık” bağıyla bağlı olduğunu ifade eder. Öte taraftan Arendt ise her iki kurgusal karakterden farklı bir anayurda bağlıdır. Arendt belli bir coğrafi bölgeyi kendine anayurt olarak kabul etmekten ziyade anadili olan Almancayı anayurt olarak kabul eder. Alman faşizminden kaçarak gittiği ABD’de de Almanya’dan ziyade anadili olan Almancaya özlem duyduğunu ve anadilini unutmaya direndiğini ifade eder. Vatanını belirleyen ataların toprağı değil, anadilidir: Roma’yı kurmak için Latinceye razı olmanın aksine Almancanın New York’ta direnmesi vatanını meydana getirir (Cassin, 2018: 70). Dolayısıyla Arendt bir entelektüel yani “kendini dışarda, kurumun ve *doxa*’nın dışında tutan” bir “bilinçli parya” (Cassin, 2016: 72-73) olarak anayurduyla kurduğu ilişkide “havai köklere” sahiptir.

Ele aldığımız filmlere bu açıdan bakıldığında da karakterlerin aidiyet hissettikleri anayurtlarının şimdiki haline dönmeyi arzuladıkları ve bazılarının bu arzuyu gerçekleştirmek için harekete geçtikleri görülmektedir. Anayurtları fiziksel olarak her ne kadar yıkılmış, yıkılmış ve harabeye uğramış ya da dilsel olarak anadillerinden uzaklaştırılmış olsalar da karakterler anayurtlarına dönmeyi arzulamakta veya aidiyet hissettikleri anayurda dönmek için birçok zorluğu göze aldıkları görülmektedir. Bu noktada anayurda dönmeyi sadece arzulayan ama bu arzuyu gerçekleştirmek için eyleme geçme kapasitesini tümüyle yitirmiş olan altsınıf karakterler ile anayurduna dönmeyi arzulayan ve bunun için zaten eylemde olan veya ulusal bilinç kazanarak harekete geçen karakterler arasında ayırım yapmak lazım. Filmlerde anayurda dönme noktasında kendini gösteren bu farkın nedeni karakterlerin toplumsal alandaki sınıfsal konumlarından/pozisyonlarından kaynaklıdır.

Bu karakterlerin dahil olduğu toplumsal sınıfları belirlemek için Pierre Bourdieu’nun sosyal ve kültürel sermaye kavramına başvurduk. Ele aldığımız filmlerde genel olarak bir aile konu edinilmiştir. Bir ailenin üyeleri her ne kadar ekonomik sermaye bakımından aynı toplumsal sınıfa dahil olsa da sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermaye dikkate alındığında aile üyelerinin farklı toplumsal sınıflara dahil olduğu görülecektir. Dolayısıyla, Bourdieu’nun sosyal ve kültürel sermaye kavramı bu filmlerdeki

karakterlerin hangi toplumsal sınıfa dahil olduğunu belirlemede kullanışlı bir araç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu kavramlar doğrultusunda filmdeki temel karakterler analiz edildiğinde karşımıza temel olarak iki sınıf çıkmaktaydı. Birinci sınıf belli bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayeye (veya eğitsel sermayeye) sahip olan eğitilmiş sınıflar ve ikincisi ise herhangi bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayesi olmayan alt sınıflardır.

Farklı toplumsal sınıflara tekabül eden karakterlerin anayurtlarıyla kurdukları ilişkiye baktığımız zaman belli bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayesi olanlar genç ve çoğunlukla erkektirler. Bu karakterler de kendi içinde ulusal bilince sahip olanlar ve sonradan ulusal bilince sahip olanlar olarak ikiye ayrılmaktadır.

Hem eğitsel sermayeye hem de ulusal bilince sahip olan karakterlerin eylem kapasitesi açısından herhangi bir sorunları yoktur. Anayurt olarak iki katmanlı bir aidiyete sahiptirler. Hem Türkiye’yi hem de “kültürel bir coğrafya olarak Kürdistan’ı” (Özdil, 2009) anayurt kabul etmektedir. Aileleriyle ve anadilleriyle kabul görmek için egemene karşı politik bir mücadele yürütmektedirler. Bu karakterler anadillerini ve Kürt kimliğini politik bir “yüklem” olarak sahiplenmekte ve bunlar üzerinden kendilerini savunmaktadırlar. Bu filmlerde hem hareket imajı hem de zaman imajları iç içedir. Hareket imajının karşımıza çıktığı yerler belli bir eğitsel sermayesi ve ulusal bilinci olan karakterlerin anayurtlarına dönmeye çalıştığı nostalji sahneleridir. Kılama Dayıka Min filminde Ali’nin abisinin köy okulunda öğrencilere Kürtçe bir masal olan “Qijik” masalını anlatırken Beyaz Toros ile gelenler tarafından kaçırıldığını görürüz. Sonrasında Ali’nin abisinin kayıp olduğunu anlarız. Ali de kayıp abisi gibi anadili olan Kürtçeyi sahiplenir ve egemene karşı abisinin mücadelesini devam ettirir. Abisinin ölümü (yani geçmişte yaşanmış olan bir toplumsal travma olarak kayıplar) Ali’nin harekete geçmesini sağlamıştır. Ali İstanbul’da bir taraftan bir devlet okulunda Türkçe öğretmenliği yaparken öte taraftan da gönüllü olarak bir kültür merkezinde Kürt çocuklarına Kürtçe öğretmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra aynı zamanda Kürtçe öyküler yazmaktadır. Diğer bir ifadeyle Arendt gibi anadilini unutmaya direnen bir bilinçli paryadır. Belli bir sosyal ve kültürel sermayeye ve ulusal bilince sahip olan bir karakter olarak ulus-devletin homojen mekânında çatlaklar yaratarak onu demokratize ederek “birlikte yaşamı” ve “Ortak Vatani” inşa etmeye çalışan bir politik özne olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Ali gibi karakterler bu filmlerde harekete geçmesi mümkün

olmayan ve eylem kapasitesini tümüyle yitirmiş olan kurbanlar/altsınıflar adına egemene karşı mücadele yürütecek olanlardır. Böylesi bir temsil “birlikte yaşamın” inşa edilmesinin ancak belli bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermaye ve ulusal bilince sahip olan karakter ile mümkün olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Bu anlam özellikle aşağıda belirteceğimiz üzere bu filmlerdeki altsınıfların böylesi bir sermayeye ve ulusal bilince sahip olmamalarından dolayı eylem krizi içinde olmasına işaret etmesi noktasında daha da belirgin hale gelmektedir.

Belli bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayeye sahip olup ulusal bilinç açısından noksan olan karakterlerin anayurtlarıyla kurduğu ilişkinin temsiline baktığımızda ise bu karakterlerin filmin başında anayurtlarıyla ilişkilerinin zayıf olduğunu görürüz. Fakat filmin ilerleyen sürecinde altsınıfları temsil eden anne veya nenelerinin kaybedilmesi veya altsınıfların anayurtlarına dönme arzusunu yerine getirmek için (çünkü altsınıflar eyleme geçme kapasitelerini bir daha kazanmamak üzere tümüyle yitirdikleri için anayurda tek başına dönmeleri mümkün değildir) “kültürel bir coğrafya olarak Kürdistan’a” dönmek zorunda kalırlar. Bu yolculuk sonucunda ulusal bilinç kazanırlar ve egemene karşı verilecek olan anayurda dönme mücadelesinde geleceğin umut vaat eden politik özne adayları olarak karşımıza çıkarlar. Bu karakteri harekete geçiren şey altsınıfları temsil eden ve geçmişte yaşanmış olan toplumsal travmaları bedeninde cisimleştirmiş olan karakterlerin ölümü veya anayurda dönme arzudur. Bu alt sınıf karakterlerin geçmişte yaşadıkları toplumsal travmalar, ölümleri veya anayurda dönme arzuları bu karakterlerin harekete geçmesini sağlar. Diğer bir ifadeyle eğitsel sermayesi olanlar altsınıflar adına anayurtlarına dönmeye çalışır ve bu dönüş yolunda ulusal bilinç kazanarak politik özneye dönüşürler. Bu karakterler bu açıdan filmin ilerleyen sürecinde pozitif bir bilince sahip karakterler olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Örneğin Rêç filminde üniversiteli bir genç olan Hêvî ailesinin/altsınıfların umudunu temsil etmektedir. Üniversiteye gittiği için belli bir kültürel sermayeye sahiptir. Lakin ulusal bilinç açısından noksan bir karakterdir. Hêvî’nin babası Mirze ona annesi Şaristan’ı Batman’a götüreceklerini söylediğinde babasına karşı çıkar. Batman’a dönmek istemez Hêvî. Lakin babasının zorlaması üzerine babası ve nenesiyle Batman’a gitmek üzere yola çıkarlar. Eve dönüş yolunda iki kişi Mirze’yi durdurur kimlik sorar. Mirze bu kişilere kimliğini verir ama kimliğinde vatandaşlık numarası yazmaz. Bunun üzerine Mirze’ye kızmaya başlarlar. Mirze bunlar karşısında sessiz ve

güçsüzdür. Kendisini savunamaz. Bu kişilere ne diyeceğini, nasıl cevap vereceğini bilmez. Hêvî onları görür ve yanlarına gelerek ne olduğunu sorar. İki kişinin polis olduğunu belirtmesi üzerine onlardan kimliklerini göstermelerini ister. İki polis sinirlenerek Hêvî'ye polis kimliklerini gösterir. Sonrasında Hêvî kendi kimliğini gösterir ve babasıyla birlikte trene tekrar binerler. Batman'a dönüş yolculuğunda Hêvî'nin nenesi Şaristan'ı kaybetmesi ve nenesinin cenazesini köye götürme sürecinde karşılaştıkları engeller Hêvî'nin ulusal bilinç kazanmasına yol açar. Yani nenesinin ölümü ve eve dönüşteki zorluklar Hêvî'de niteliksel bir sıçramaya/değişime yol açar. İstanbul'dan Batman'a gidişle sadece mekân katedilmez aynı zamanda niteliksel bir değişim/dönüşüm de gerçekleşir. Hêvî Batman'da bir harabeye dönüştürülmüş olan köylerini gördüğünde koşarak köye doğru gider. Tam bu noktada kamera Mirze'nin yüzüne odaklanır, Mirze'nin yüzünde hafif bir tebessüm belirir. Oğlu Hêvî'nin evlerini/köklerini hatırlaması hoşuna gitmiştir. Hêvî egemenin karşısında hareket edemeyen babası için gelecekteki kurtuluşu ifade eder.

Bu eğitsel sermayesi olan sınıfın/karakterlerin dışında bir de altsınıfları temsil eden ve ne sosyal ve kültürel sermayesi ne de ulusal bilinci olan karakterler vardır. Altsınıfları temsil eden bu karakterler çoğunlukla yaşlı ve kadındır. Herhangi bir sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayeleri olmadığı için toplumsal alanda etkinleşemezler. Bu yüzden bu karakterler filmlerde genellikle kapalı alanlarda karşımıza çıkar. Belli bir eğitsel sermayesi olan karakterlerin aksine bu karakterler tek katmanlı bir aidiyete sahiptirler. “Kültürel bir coğrafya olarak Kürdistan” dışında başka bir yere aidiyet geliştiremezler. Onların harekete geçmesini sağlayacak herhangi bir sermaye türüne sahip olmadıkları için de anayurtlarına dönmeye çalışmak yerine sadece dönüşü arzularlar. Eylem kapasitesini tümüyle yitirmiş olan içe kapalı, melankolik, hasta, yaşlı ve çoğunlukla inatçı olan bu karakterler yukarıda ele aldığımız eğitsel sermayesi olan karakterler için bir taraftan “yük” olarak temsil edilirken öte taraftan da bu eğitsel sermayesi olan karakterleri geçmişte yaşanmış toplumsal travmaların/adaletsizliklerin hesabını sormak için harekete geçirecek olanlar olarak temsil edilmişlerdir. Çoğunlukla ölüme-yazgılı (Şaristan da Zarife de Nigâr da ölür) olan bu karakterler filmlerde nesneleştirilmişlerdir ve geçmişteki toplumsal travmaların ve adaletsizliklerin cisimleşmiş halidirler. Bu yüzden hem sosyal ve/veya kültürel sermayeye hem de ulusal bilince sahip olan karakter bu altsınıfları temsil eden karakterler adına egemene

karşı mücadele yürütecek olanlar olarak karşımıza çıkar. Çünkü altsınıfları temsil eden karakterler eyleme geçme kapasitesini bir daha kazanmamak üzere tümüyle yitirmiştir. Belli bir sosyal/kültürel sermayesi olan karakterler ile hiçbir sermayesi olmayan karakterler arasında kurulan böylesi bir denklem sonucunda egemene karşı verilecek mücadelede altsınıfların artık etkisiz olduğu anlamını inşa eder. Örneğin Şaristan da Zarife de tek başlarına anayurtlarına dönemezler. Eğitsel sermayesi olan oğullarının/torunlarının yardımına muhtaçtırlar. Bu yaşlı, melankolik, hasta ve inatçı karakterlerin eve dönüş arzusunu gerçekleştirmeleri belli bir eğitim sermayesine sahip olan karakterler sayesinde gerçekleşir.

Bu alt sınıf karakterlerin filmlerdeki önemli işlevlerinden birisi seyircinin geçmişle yüzleşmesini sağlamasıdır. Bu karakterler aracılığıyla geçmişte yaşanmış zulümler hatırlatılarak bugün ile geçmiş yan yana getirilir ve seyircinin bu zulümlere şahitlik etmesi sağlanır. Bu açıdan bu filmlerde zaman-imge (rüya ve hafıza) bu karakterlerin olduğu sahnelerde karşımıza çıkar. Bu karakterler filmlerde rüyalarında geçmiş travmalarını yaşarlar ve sürekli sayıklarlar veya bir sır olarak sakladıkları geçmişteki toplumsal travmaları açık ederek geçmişi hatırlatırlar. Rêç filmine baktığımızda Şaristan öldükten sonra cenazesi gömülürken kamera genel çekimle boş bir coğrafyayı gösterir ve tam bu noktada Şaristan'ın sesini duyarız. Şaristan'ın sesi ile insansızlaştırılmış olan coğrafya birbirinin üstüne bindirilir. Böylece Şaristan Ermeni Katliamında yaşadıklarını anlatırken boş olan coğrafya adalet bekleyen hayaletlerin kol gezdiği bir coğrafyaya dönüşür. Geçmiş anı-imgelerle bugüne taşınarak kronolojik zaman algısı paralize edilir. Böyle yaparak seyircinin de bu travmalarla yüzleşmesi sağlanır. Dengê Bavê Min filminde de filmin başında 1990'lı yıllara gideriz. Ali'nin öğretmen olan abisinin Beyaz Toros aracından inenler tarafından kaçırıldığını ve arabanın boş bir coğrafya içinde kaybolduğunu görürüz. Boş olan coğrafya Beyaz Toros imgesiyle adalet bekleyen hayaletlerin mekanına dönüşür. Veya Zer filminde Jan Dersim'e tren ile gider. Bu yolculukta tren mola verdiğinde Dersim Katliamında esir düşmüş çocukların batıya götürüldüğünü görürüz. Böylece geçmiş ile bugün yan yana getirilerek kronolojik zaman anlayışı bozulur.

Dilsel olarak yerinden edilme bağlamında iki filmi ele aldık: Di Navberê De ve Derbûyîna Ji Bihuştê. Derbûyîna Ji Bihuştê filminde yönetmen (Ferit Karahan)

asimilasyon sürecine ve asimilasyonun ne tür iktidar teknikleriyle arzulanabilir kıldığına odaklanmıştır. Film bunu yaparken Kürtçe bilmek ile Türkçe bilmenin hayatta ne tür imkanlar sağladığına bir ilkokul öğretmeni üzerinden eğilir. Dolayısıyla filmin Türkçe ile Kürtçe arasında kurulmuş olan eşitsiz ilişkinin toplumsal alanda da eşitsizlik ürettiğini ve bu eşitsizliğin ne tür yapısal etmenlerden kaynaklandığını göstermesi ve eşitlik/hak talebinde bulunması açısından politik bir niteliği vardır. Asimile olmanın temel nedeninin bireylerden ziyade sistemden (Türkçe ile Kürtçe arasında kurulmuş olan asimetric ilişkiden) kaynaklandığını göstermektedir. Bu asimilasyon (dilsel yerinden edilme) sürecindeki rıza üretim mekanizmalarına işaret etmiştir. Altsınıflar içinde bulundukları kötü ekonomik koşullardan kurtulmak için anadilleri olan Kürtçeyi terk etmekte ve toplumsal alana giriş için “anahtar” işlevi gören Türkçeye kaçmaktadırlar. Öte taraftan Di Nawberê De filminde ise yönetmen (Ali Kemal Çınar) asimilasyon sonrası sürece odaklanmıştır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, asimilasyonun Kürtleri ilerleyen süreçte gündelik hayatlarında nasıl etkilediğine odaklanmıştır. Asimilasyon arada/arafta kalmış karakterler yaratarak gündelik hayatı olumsuz etkilemekte ve dilinden sürgün edilmiş olan kekeme varlıklar yaratmaktaydı. Bu filmde asimilasyonun nedeni ise öğretmenden duyulan korkudur. Dolayısıyla her iki film de asimilasyon sürecinde devletin ideolojik aygıtı olan okula dikkat çekmektedir. Bu filmde Osman karakteri her ne kadar kültürel sermayeye sahip olmasa da kentli bir orta-sınıf insanıdır. Belli bir sosyal sermayesi vardır. Bu sosyal sermaye onun hayatındaki sorunların temel kaynağının asimile edilmiş olmasından kaynaklı olduğu bilgisine ulaşmasını sağlar. Dolayısıyla Osman’ın bilinçlenmesine (anadiline dönmesine) yol açan şey sahip olduğu sosyal sermayedir. Öte taraftan, Derbûyîna Ji Bihuştê filminde ise altsınıfları temsil eden köylü bir çocuk olan Ayşe’nin bilinçlenmesi ancak abisi Mehmet’in Beyaz Toros aracındakiler tarafından gözleri önünde katledilmesinden sonra gerçekleşir. Dolayısıyla altsınıfların bilinçlenmesi için egemenin çıplak şiddetine uğramaları gerekmekte olduğu anlamı çıkar. Altsınıftakiler herhangi bir sosyal/kültürel sermayeye sahip olmadığı için kendi başlarına bilinç edinmeleri yani anadillerine dönmeleri mümkün değildir. Bu yüzden altsınıfların bilinçlenmesine yani anadillerine dönmek üzere harekete geçiren egemenin çıplak şiddetidir.

Bu belirlemeler doğrultusunda kurban sineması yönetmenlerin filmlerinde sıklıkla göndermede bulundukları Yılmaz Güney’e ve onun sinema geleneğiyle arasındaki ilişkiye bakarak bir sonuca varabiliriz. Yılmaz Güney filmlerinde de ele aldığımız filmlerde olduğu gibi altsınıflar açısından bir eylem krizi vardır. Karakterler içinde bulundukları yoksulluğun yarattığı yakıcı/zorlu koşullardan kurtulmak için çabalarken her seferinde bu çabalar boşa düşer. Bu çabaların boşa düşmesinin nedeni ise feodalite, gelenek ve hurafeler tarafından kuşatılmış oldukları yapılardır. Böylesi engellerle kuşatılmış olan yoksulların içinde bulunduğu zorlu koşullardan kurtulması için ise seyirci eyleme çağrılmaktadır. Bu engeller seyircinin pasif konumdan aktif konuma geçip yoksullarla dayanışmaya geçmesiyle aşılabılır ancak. Güney filmlerinde geçmiş ile bugünü, eski ile yeni, modern olan ile geleneksel olanı yan yana getirerek izleyicide yarattığı küçük ama sürekli şok etkileriyle izleyiciyi bilinçlenmeye ve harekete geçmeye çağırır. Seyirciye pozitif bir bilinç olarak filmlerinde birkaç saniye yer almış olan devrimcileri yani devrimci safları gösterir. Güney sinemasının politik karakterini/niteliğini oluşturan seyirciyi bu şekilde eyleme çağırmasından kaynaklıdır. Güney filmleriyle karakterin bilinçlenmesinden ziyade seyircinin bilinçlenmesini amaçlar. Yani karakterin bilincinden ziyade seyircinin bilincine hitap eder. Bilinçlenerek harekete geçmesi gereken seyircidir, karakter değil. Güney yoksul dünyalara bakarken orada var olan şiddet, açlık, hırsızlık vesaire gibi sorunlarının nedeni olarak, eylem krizi meselesinde olduğu gibi, yoksulları bütünüyle sarmış olan yapılara işaret eder. Böylece bireysel/özel olan politik/kamusal olanla iç içe geçer. Bireysel/özel olan ile politik/kamusal olan arasındaki ayrım onun filmlerinde ortadan kalkar. Bireysel/özel olanın politik niteliği ortaya konulduktan sonra bu yapıların kaldırılması için çözüm olarak devrimci mücadeleyi gösterirken, bu devrimin öznesi olarak da halkı/ezilenleri işaret eder. Bu açıdan filmleri halka olan inancı sağlar.

Öte taraftan kurban sinemasına bakıldığında anlaşılıyor ki yönetmenler açısından Kürtlerin egemene karşı yürüteceği mücadelede “Kürt halkından” ziyade belli bir sosyo-kültürel sermayeye sahip olan toplumsal sınıflar politik özne olarak düşünülmektedir. Böyle olduğu ölçüde de çoklu aidiyet olumlanırken tekli aidiyete sahip olanlar olarak kodlanır. Herhangi bir sosyo-kültürel sermayeye sahip olmayanların eyleme geçmesi imkânsız görünmektedir onlar açısından. Hatta yeri geldiğinde eğitsel sermayesi olanlar için bir “yük” (engel) olarak dahi

düşünülmektedirler. Bu sinemaya göre geçmişte yaşanmış zulümlerin/travmaların hesabını sormak, anadile (Kürtçeye) sahip çıkmak ve Kürt kimliğini savunmak ve dünyaya ayak uydurmak Kürt halkını temsil ettiği düşünülen bu eğitsel sermayeye sahip olan sınıfların yapabileceği iştir. Böylesi bir temsil rejiminin en büyük sorunu ise yıllardır Galatasaray Meydanında egemenle hesaplaşmak ve kayıp çocuklarını bulmak için direnen Cumartesi Annelerini veya toplumsal barış için mücadele eden Barış Anneleri İnisiyatifini görmezden gelmesidir. Egemene karşı yürütülen toplumsal mücadelede böylesi bir gerçeklik yıllardır göz önünde bulunmasına rağmen yönetmenlerin filmlerinde travma mağduru olan karakterleri bütünüyle pasif, sessiz ve bir “yük” olarak temsil etmesi önemli bir sorundur.

Böyle olduğu ölçüde de Yılmaz Güney’in sahiplendiği sinema geleneğini tanımlayan en önemli kod (sınıf perspektifi/anlayışı) terk edilmiş olunur. Kürt sinemasını tartıştığımız bölümde bu sinemanın Üçüncü Sinemadan ve onun bir alt dalı olan militan sinemadan etkilendiğini belirtmiştik (Smets, 2015). Burada ifade ettiklerimizden yola çıkarak kurban sinemasının militan sinemasının temel kodu olan sınıf çatışmasını terk ettiğini veya onu çatışmalardan birine indirgediğini söyleyebiliriz. Bu çatışmada da politik özne olma konumu halkın/alt-sınıfların elinden alınmış ve belli bir sosyal/kültürel sermayeye sahip olup Kürtler adına mücadele edeceği varsayılan sınıflara verilmiştir. Yani Kürt sorununu sinemada militan bir perspektiften ele almaktan ziyade aktivist bir perspektiften ele alınmıştır.

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