

**THE ROLE OF AFRICAN UNION IN RESPONDING TO
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA:
MALI CASE**

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ETİK İLKE VE KURALLARA UYGUNLUK BEYANNAMESİ

Bu Tezin Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Bilimsel Araştırma ve Yayın Etiği Yönergesi hükümlerine göre hazırlandığını; bana ait, özgün bir çalışma olduğunu; çalışmanın hazırlık, veri toplama, analiz ve bilgilerin sunumu aşamalarında bilimsel etik ilke ve kurallara uygun davrandığımı; bu çalışma kapsamında elde edilen tüm veri ve bilgiler için kaynak gösterdiğimi ve bu kaynaklara kaynakçada yer verdiğimi; bu çalışmanın Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi tarafından kullanılan bilimsel intihal tespit programıyla taranmasını kabul ettiğimi ve hiçbir şekilde intihal içermediğini beyan ederim. Yaptığım bu beyana aykırı bir durumun saptanması halinde ortaya çıkacak tüm ahlaki ve hukuki sonuçlara razı olduğumu bildiririm.

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İmza

ÖZET

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Bu çalışma, Afrika Birliği'nin kıta barışına sağladığı katkıyı tartışıp, bu konudaki başarısızlığını nasıl giderilebileceğini ve kıtanın güvenliğine nasıl katkı sağlayabileceğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Kıtadaki çeşitli güvenlik sorunları ele alınmış ve Afrika Birliği'nin bu sorunlar ile mücadeledeki rolü incelenmiştir. Örgütün Sudan, Somali ve Burundi'de gerçekleştirdiği barış koruma misyonları tahlil edilmiş ve bu tahliller sonucunda örgütün karşılaştığı meydan okumalar ortaya konulmuştur. Bunlardan en önemlisi: iyi yönetim sorunu, siyasi sorunlar, lojistik ve finansal sorunlar olarak sıralanmıştır. Bir diğer önemli faktör de kıtanın alt bölgesel örgütlerinin barış korumadaki rolü ve Afrika Birliği ile iş birliğine değinilmiştir. Kıtanın alt bölgesel örgütlerinin barış koruma operasyonlarında Afrika Birliği ile ortak hareket etmeyip bağımsız bir şekilde hareket etmesi Afrika Birliği çabalarını sabote eden en önemli faktörlerden biri olarak saptanmıştır.

Son olarak, Mali operasyonlarını beşinci jenerasyon çerçevesinde ele alıp, Batı Afrika Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun (ECOWAS) Batı Afrika'da gerçekleştirdiği operasyonlar incelenerek Mali'de Afrika Birliği ile iş birliği üzerinde durulmuş ve sonuç olarak kıtada ECOWAS gibi alt bölgesel örgütler barışı tesis etmede sorun yaşadığı anlaşılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu hususta Afrika Birliği'ne tam yetki devri verildiği takdirde barış koruma misyonları daha aktif bir hal alacağı yönünde sonuca varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış Misyonları, Güvenlik, Afrika Birliği, İstikrar

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF AFRICAN UNION IN RESPONDING TO SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA: MALI CASE

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This study aims to discuss the contribution of the African Union to the peace of the continent and to reveal how it can overcome its failure in this regard and contribute to the security of the continent. Various security problems in the continent were discussed and the role of the African Union in combating these problems was examined. The peacekeeping missions of the organization in Sudan, Somalia and Burundi were analyzed and the challenges faced by the organization were revealed due to these analyses. The most important of these are: the problem of good governance, political problems, logistics and financial problems. Another important factor is the role of sub-regional organizations of the continent in peacekeeping and cooperation with the African Union. The fact that the sub-regional organizations of the continent do not act together with the African Union in peacekeeping operations but act independently has been identified as one of the most important factors sabotaging the efforts of the African Union.

Finally, considering the Mali operations within the framework of the fifth generation, the operations of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa were examined, and cooperation with the African Union in Mali was emphasized, and as a result, Sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS have problems in establishing peace. Therefore, it is concluded that peacekeeping missions will become more active if full authority is given to the African Union in this regard.

Keywords: Peacekeeping Operations, Security, African Union, Stability

TEŞEKKÜR

Bu çalışmada değerli görüşlerini ve sabrını, hoşgörüsünü benden esirgemeyen saygıdeğer danışmanım Doç. Dr. Mustafa YETİM'e teşekkürlerimi sunar, desteği ve öğretme isteğinden dolayı minnettar olduğumu belirtmek isterim. Sonrasında savunma süreci boyunca destek olan saygıdeğer Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Veysel TEKDAL'a, ve her zaman yanımda olan değerli arkadaşlarım Mohamed EL Bennany, ve İmam Hüseyin'e teşekkürlerimi sunarım.



Table of contents

ETİK İLKE VE KURALLARA UYGUNLUK BEYANNAMESİ.....	iii
ÖZET	iv
ABSTRACT	v
TEŞEKKÜR	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
ABBREVIATION LIST	ix
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER ONE: PEACEKEEPING.....	6
1.1. Definition	6
1.2. Successful Peacekeeping Criteria.....	8
1.3. Five Generations of Peacekeeping	10
CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICTS IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT	20
2.1. Peace And Security Facility in Africa.....	20
2.2. Types of conflicts in Africa.....	24
2.2.1. Border disputes	25
2.2.2. Political conflicts	28
2.2.3. Identity conflicts	30
2.2.4. Civil Unrest.....	32
2.2.5. Terrorism.....	33
2.2.6. Coup D'états	35
2.2.7. Security Management and Restrictions of the AU	41
THIRD CHAPTER: CONFLICTS RESOLUTION IN AFRICA.....	52
3.1.The AU Conflict Resolution Mechanism.....	53

3.2. The African Union Peace and Security Architecture.....	53
3.3. The ECOWAS and Security challenges.....	56
3.4. The Background of Mali Conflict.....	60
3.5. ECOWAS and African Union Intervention in Mali.....	64
CONCLUSION	71
REFERENCES.....	75



ABBREVIATION LIST

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

UN: United Nations

AU: African Union

OAU: Organization of African Unity

EAC: East African Community

SADC: South African Development Community

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

REC's: Regional Economic Communities

UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

UNEF: United Nations Emergency Force

UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Cote D'ivoire

UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNOGIL: United Nations Monitoring Group in Lebanon

UNIPOM: United Nations India-Pakistan Monitoring Mission

UNAVEM: United Nations Angola Verification Mission

SWAPO: Southwest African People's Organization ()

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SWAPOL: Southwest African Police Force

UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

KFOR: Kosovo Force

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

GPS: Global Positioning System

UNAMID: United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur

DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operation

PSC: Peace and Security Council

ASF: African Standby Force (ASF)

CEWS: Continental Early Warning System

ICJ: International Court of Justice

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

ICG: International Crisis Group

CRR: Centre for Reproductive Rights

EEBC: Ethiopian Boundary Commission

CRR ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

AMIB: African Union Mission in Burundi

AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations

ONUB: United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB)

UNAMID: African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur

MNLA : Mouvement pour la liberation de l'Azawad (

MCPMR: Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

MOT: Military Observer Team

PSOD: Peace Support Operations Division

AUC: African Union Commission

POW: Panel of Wise Men

PSD: Peace and Security Directorate

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

RM: Regional Mechanisms

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

AQIM: Maghreb Al Qaeda

MUJAO : Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest

AFISMA: International Support Mission in Mali

CEN-SAD: Sahelo-Saharan Community

EU: European Union

MNLA: Mouvement National de L'Azawad

MSC: Mediation and Security Council

MICEMA. Mission de la CÉDÉAO au *Mali*

INTRODUCTION

African countries have found themselves in conflict since gaining their independence. Unfortunately, the modern political history of Africa is associated with war and conflict. In the last half century, civil wars have been experienced frequently in almost all countries of the continent and this situation continues today. The United Nations (UN) frequently takes initiatives to prevent and stop conflicts on the continent. Recently, the European Union and the African Union have also been trying to be active in undertaking this task. The African Union, unlike the Organization of African Unity, has the right to intervene in conflict zones, therefore, it is trying to find solutions to the problems of the continent (Dinçer, 2015).

In this context, the Union has a great responsibility. Therefore, contributing to the peace and stability of the continent and minimizing foreign interventions are the priorities of the African Union. Additionally, it has been trying to fill this gap by playing an active role in recent years. However, due to the capacity of African countries, the African Union cannot find an adequate solution to the security problems of the continent (Alabduljabbar, 2021). The origins of this failure of the Union and how to address its shortcomings is within the scope of this study. In recent years, many articles have been written on this subject from different perspectives. There are studies that base the African Union's failure on this issue on internal, external, economic, and political factors.

This study differs from other studies in sub-regional studies in Africa. It is based on the hypothesis that African subregional organizations Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) East African Community (EAC) (South African Development Community (SADC) can work together more efficiently by collaborating with the African Union and remaining under the umbrella of the African Union. Because the states that are members of sub-regional organizations pay contributions to the African Union, but also allocate budgets to the military wing of these organizations. This naturally creates a heavy economic burden on these countries, and as a result, regional peace cannot be achieved. Therefore, under the umbrella of the African Union or when authority is transferred to the Union, the Union will be able to play a more active role in the resolution of conflicts and make greater

contributions to the peace of the continent. Thus, the African continent will be freed from foreign interventions. Our study is different in this aspect, and it can contribute to the literature in this way.

The first chapter of the study is devoted to the concept of peacekeeping operation, the history of the concept and the phases it went through were examined in detail. Five generations of peacekeeping operations are discussed. Generations of peacekeeping operations have evolved over time. It has been seriously given since the second world war. In the beginning, it was set out to prevent and reduce conflicts between states with a collective security understanding and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. But over time, this understanding has completely changed. It has been people oriented rather than state oriented. Additionally human rights and humanitarian crises began to be prioritized (Diehl, 1994).

First generation peacekeeping operations are described as traditional peacekeeping operations which are conducted between 1948-1990. The main purpose of the operations in this period was to stop the conflicts and prevent their escalation by respecting the sovereignty of the state. The use of force was prohibited in the operations carried out in this period, impartiality was essential, and the consent of the states was required (Kenkel, 2013).

1948 Middle east Truce Supervision Organization, United Nations Monitoring and Observation Group in India and Pakistan, 1964 Cyprus peace operation can be given as an example of the first generation. Second generation peacekeeping operations took place from the end of the cold war to the mid-1990s. With the end of the cold war, civil wars increased in the unipolar international order, especially in the third world countries, because of which the UN peacekeeping operations department was established. With the increase in wars in failed states, it has made it necessary to change the existing doctrine and the structure of peacekeeping operations. These peace operations are described as wider and multidimensional peacekeeping. Contrary to the first, the use of force was also allowed in the second, and the purpose of the operations was not only to stop the existing conflicts but also to help establish the civil order. It undertakes basic activities such as disarmament, humanitarian aid delivery, demobilization, human rights promotion, and reintegration. In this context, the Somali operation in 1992 is the most striking example of this. Due to the absence of a central authority, it was started by citing humanitarian reasons and internal conflicts without

waiting for the consent of the host country (Demir, 2019).

Third generation peacekeeping operations began in the mid-1990s. After the crises in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia, it was necessary to use more force in UN operations. Due to the increasing civil wars, peace operations began to be questioned and the "UN peace operations panel" was formed under the leadership of the UN Secretary General Koffi Annan. It is envisaged that it should be at the level of protection. Thus, the interpretation of using force without seeking the consent of the third party in the name of humanitarian intervention has been expanded and brought forward concepts such as humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect. Eventually, more force was used in these operations and humanitarian interventions were prioritized and it was decided that in cases where a state could not protect its own citizens, this responsibility should be taken by the international community, which caused the traditional principles of peacekeeping operations to be questioned (Diehl, 1994).

In the fourth generation, which started at the end of the 1990s, the rate of use of force is as high as the previous period, and it is described as robust peacebuilding. The fourth industrial revolution has accelerated technological developments and the phenomenon of globalization, because of that the conflict environment also changed. Threat patterns changed as well, terrorist, and criminal organizations and non-state armed organizations started to rise. With the changes brought by technology, conflicts became more complex. Physical boundaries lost their importance and societies became more sociocultural connected. In such a complex environment, with the changing and intensifying threats, a multidimensional, more effective, and appropriate intervention method was needed. In the operations of this period, the peacekeepers had more armed force and higher military capacity than the previous ones. In the early 2000s, it evolved into the fifth generation. Such peacekeeping operations are more comprehensive and more complex and are described as hybrids. They are a type of peacekeeping that has developed recently and has not been studied much in the literature. In this generation, as in the 4th generation, "excess" power is allowed to be used. Besides the UN, other regional organizations also participate. These operations are carried out by civilian personnel, soldiers, and police in the same chain of command under different authority forms and have a hybrid structure (Lijn, 2014).

After the 1990s, some operations carried out by the African Union and the

European Union under the umbrella of the UN can be defined as 5th generation peace operations. The Kosovo operation, which is carried out under NATO priority, is an example of this. Again, the 1999 operation in Sierra Leone carried out with the priority of the United Kingdom, the Ivory Coast operation in 2010 carried out with the priority of France, and the Darfur and Somalia operations carried out by the African Union with the UN are also 5th generation operations. The case of Mali (2013), which we have discussed, also falls into this category. Particularly France, the UN and the African Union participated in these operations. Again, high force is used to stop and reduce conflicts. It is carried out in cooperation with the UN and regional organizations (Woodhouse, 2011).

In the second part, the peacekeeping missions of the Organization in Burundi (2003) and Sudan (2004) were analyzed as they were the first challenges after the establishment of the African Union, which replaced the African Union organization, so these operations were examined as an example and the challenges faced by the organization were: problem of good governance, political problems, logistics and financial problems. In the last chapter, the case of Mali is discussed. It is an ongoing problem for nearly 60 years, and it is a problem that the African Union and ECOWAS also intervened in. For this reason, the Mali case was chosen.

After these analyses, it is emphasized that sub-regional organizations should cooperate fully with the African Union. The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) played significant roles in maintaining peace and security in Africa's conflict zones. The transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the AU in 2002 brought renewed hope for peace, security, and stability across the continent. Efforts by African organizations have emphasized the importance of African ownership and African-led solutions to African problems. However, the success of these efforts relies on strong political will. There is a need to strengthen inclusive relations among African states to improve the well-being of African people and uphold peace and security. Implementing effective peace and security policies is a challenging task for African organizations due to various obstacles. These obstacles include external actors and internal factors within Africa, such as poverty, mismanagement, unemployment, natural disasters, and geopolitical competition between states. Additionally, the economic and political interests of external actors in Africa can also undermine peace and security efforts. Addressing

these challenges requires collaborative efforts and a commitment to African solutions. African states and organizations must work together to overcome these obstacles and create an environment that promotes peace, security, and prosperity for the African continent.

CHAPTER ONE: PEACEKEEPING

1.1. Definition

Peacekeeping is a process that involves the prevention, resolution, and cessation of armed conflict, and is generally carried out by the United Nations (UN). There is no common definition on the concept of peacekeeping (Goulding, 1993). According to the UN, it is a process involving conflict prevention and mediation, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement by the UN to maintain international peace and ensure international security (UN, 2021). The very first defined peacekeeping operation was recorded to be the "UN Truce Supervision Organization / UNTSO" in Palestine in 1948. This operation is still up to date. Throughout history, 71 protection operations have been carried out under the roof of the UN or by its decision. While 51 of these ended, 14 are still in progress. (Goulding, 1993).

United Nations peacekeeping operations undergone several major alterations from their original character and purpose during their 65-year history. These missions must be well understood by making a strong connection between them and both conceptual developments and empirical happenings in international politics since they are deeply ingrained in the practices of international politics. A few major axes of change occurred in peace efforts. The higher-order conceptual shift, which can be described as a transition from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian viewpoint on the world order, provides a shared perspective for succeeding axis.

This change manifests itself in a few cutting-edge modifications that are practical in nature and philosophical, and they were reflected inside peace operations practices. The transition to a "post-Westphalian" order typically involves rearranging the relationships between key components sovereignty: states right, particularly the right to refrain from interfering in their internal affairs, and the rights of individuals to human rights (Kenkel, 2013).

The recent changes in intervention practices, particularly observed in fourth-generation peacebuilding operations, signify significant progress in redefining the concepts of peace and security. Concepts like human security and Johan Galtung's positive peace played a crucial role in shaping these advancements. The inability of international community to respond effectively to international catastrophes, such as those in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia, led to a reevaluation of the inviolability of

borders and a greater emphasis on human rights. Humanitarian concerns have gained increasing prominence, both in terms of severity and global reach, leading to a heightened focus on finding effective ways to address humanitarian crises within the framework of peacekeeping operations. This shift aligns with the transition to a post-Westphalian approach, challenging the traditional notions of state sovereignty. Peace operations have undergone a cumulative tripartite evolution, encompassing collective security concerns, conflict resolution, and humanitarian considerations. These changes reflect a broader understanding of peace and underline the need for comprehensive approaches in addressing the complexities of modern conflicts (Diehl, 1994).

Furthermore, peacekeeping operations have undergone a transformation in their role and purpose as well. Initially conceived as a tool for limited conflict resolution, they have evolved into a crucial mechanism for restoring the central tenets of Westphalian sovereignty, which were challenged by internal conflicts and crises. However, the atrocities witnessed in events like Rwanda and Srebrenica prompted a reevaluation of the traditional understanding of sovereignty. The emphasis shifted from the horizontal notion of non-interference to the vertical component of sovereignty, focusing on human rights. As a result, humanitarian issues, such as safeguarding of civilian populations as well as the provision of international aid, became primary justifications and motivations for deploying numerous peacekeeping missions. This shift reflects the recognition of the importance of upholding human rights and addressing the needs of affected populations in conflict-affected areas (Kenkel, 2013).

The classification of peacekeeping generations is based on three key factors: the level of military force utilized, the scope of responsibilities undertaken by the civilian component, and the increased collaboration between the United Nations and regional organizations in the most recent generation. Over time, UN peacekeeping operations transitioned from a reactive approach, focused on containing or reducing conflicts, to a proactive approach aimed at influencing their outcomes. Moreover, the shift from interstate conflicts to internal conflicts diminished the moral impact of UN presence, leading to a greater reliance on the use of force, particularly for humanitarian purposes. In recent years, the international community has shown an increased willingness to employ force for the purpose of collective security. The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations has been the subject of extensive debate, and various

approaches to achieving successful outcomes will be explored in the following section (Tshiband, 2010).

1.2. Successful Peacekeeping Criteria

There is not much common opinion on successful criteria of peacekeeping operations, scholars and peacekeeping committees have different opinions on this issue. What is important and most accepted by the majority is the successful performance of the mission. However, some authors also present criteria such as "*human rights, justice, and prosperity*" as fundamental conditions of success. Because in addition to preventing and stopping conflicts, it should also include elements such as "*protecting civilians from threats, socioeconomic equality, political participation, ensuring the rule of law, etc...*". Nevertheless, the successful execution of the mission remains the most fundamental element, and attention should be paid to this issue in the first place when evaluating the success of peace operations. Yet some writers such as Willian Dixon, Bratt, and Paul Diehl "*prioritize elements such as justice and prosperity rather than reaching peace*", while for other ceasefires and an end to the conflict are important (Pushkina, 2006). According to Pushkina a mission must fulfill the following conditions:

- Conflict prevention: The main task of the missions is to prevent and stop conflicts in the host country.
- Protecting Civilians: One of the main objectives of UN operations is to protect civilians from dangers and threats.
- Preventing the spread of conflicts, as it is known, a conflict in the host country can spread to neighboring countries or the region for certain reasons, and UN missions also include preventing conflicts from spreading.
- Ensuring negotiation: This criterion can be described as a final success criterion of peace operations. Because it can help negotiations by first stopping the existing conflict and preparing a suitable ground. However, it is difficult to talk about an effective intervention before the conflict is stopped and the skepticism between the parties is over (Powel, 2005, s. 134). Additionally, consent, neutrality, and non-use of force (except when necessary) logistics and financial support, gaining the trust and legitimacy of the local people and involving local people can be

considered among the most important factors of a successful peacekeeping operation (UN, 2021).

According to Delhi, the first criterion of success must be conflict prevention, as this is the sole purpose of peacekeeping missions. However, it is not a correct idea to delegate this responsibility entirely to the authority that carries out the mission. In other words, the mission team alone cannot be held responsible for making peace. However, the conflicting parties may request the withdrawal of mission officials, as was the case with United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1), which served between Egypt and Israel, before the outbreak of the 1967 war, Egypt requested the withdrawal of the mission, which had served successfully for 11 years (1956-1967). Therefore, as can be seen, it is not correct to dedicate the "task of ending conflicts" to the mission team alone. Facilitating the negotiations with the conflict parties: International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and African Union (AU) play an important role in putting the conflicting parties on the table. Delhi considers these international organizations to be unsuccessful if they fail to establish a suitable negotiating ground or if they cannot bring the conflicting parties to the table (Diehl, 1994).

Third-party pressure to end an internal conflict is also important; participation of regional organizations such as UN global organizations, the European Union, the African Union, and neighbors of the host country is essential. These actors can stop conflicts by force, by convincing their superiors in the mediator role to dialogue with the conflict parties. In addition, depending on the situation, they can sometimes impose financial incentives and sometimes economic sanctions by using sticks and carrots. In this way, they can deter the conflicting parties and ensure that the conflict in question ends. Ultimately, the decision to intervene is also an extremely important deterrent method, a very important factor that allows the conflicting parties to lay down their weapons (Hartzell, 2001).

Meanwhile one of the successful UN operations was the United Nations Operation in Cote D'ivoire (UNOCI) in 2004. In the civil war in 2004, the country was divided into two, the north was controlled by the rebels and the south by the government, there was an authority vacuum in the country, so the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intervened to end the conflicts in the country. UNOCI started with 6000 soldiers, in 2011 this number increased to 11,792. Mission officers

managed to reduce the tension between the two sides by protecting the safe zones, as well as disarming 7000 people and rehabilitating them in society. At the same time, the UN Monitored both elections (2011-2016), ensuring the opposition's participation, and succeeded in reducing violence by strengthening the human rights committee in the country. In this way, more than 250,000 refugees were made to return to the country and various activities were carried out to ensure unity and solidarity in the country. In addition, it has provided support in the fields of training, logistics, etc. to strengthen the military and police organization of Ivory Coast (UN, 2021).

As can be observed, there are many criteria for successful peacekeeping. However, the first point to note here is that the peace operation protects the civilian population from danger, risk, and violence. In addition, it is extremely important to alleviate conflicts and invite the conflicting parties to diplomacy. Essentially, the life and protection of civilians are important. Therefore, it can be said that an operation is successful if these basic tasks can be fulfilled. In addition, as it is known, peacekeeping operations have evolved over time, all phases will be discussed below.

1.3. Five Generations of Peacekeeping

During the Cold War, when the world was divided into two blocs, peacekeeping operations primarily served the purpose of containment. The main objective of UN peace operations was to address minor disputes and prevent them from escalating into larger conflicts. It was widely believed that these operations also served the geopolitical interests of Western powers. As a result, the Soviet Union held suspicions towards the organization during its early years (Kenkel, 2013).

In June 1948, the United Nations (UN) Security Council established the inaugural UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Middle East called UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization). Its primary aim was to oversee the ceasefire between Arab nations and Israel by deploying military observers and a UN mediator. Subsequently, in January 1949, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was formed to monitor the ceasefire between the two countries amidst their dispute over the sovereignty of Kashmir and Jammu. These operations set the foundation for additional observation missions, including United Nations Monitoring Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the

Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in 1965, and (United Nations India-Pakistan Monitoring Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965. These missions exemplified the growing use of UN-led observer teams to monitor conflicts and facilitate resolution efforts globally at that time (Goulding, 1993).

As mentioned above, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established. Subsequently, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan was established in 1949 as a solution to the Kashmir issue. The main purpose of the operations in this period was to prevent conflicts between states and to protect and maintain the existing system. The objective was to lay the groundwork for peaceful conflict resolution. Thus, it includes several elements such as disarmament, observing, and controlling the borders by taking positions between the conflicting parties.

The first challenge of traditional peacekeeping operations was the Suez Canal operation in 1959. Operation officers were forced to withdraw from this operation, which was carried out with 6000 soldiers by the UN decision (Demir, 2019, s. 1). Meanwhile, the blue beret, which became the symbol of the UN, was used for the first time in this operation. The first major change in traditional peacekeeping occurred with Operation Congo (United Nation Operation in Congo). These operations, which are normally limited to observation and monitoring, entered the stage of forcing peace in the above-mentioned case. In this operation carried out between 1960 and 1964, the main target was to restore order in the target region and help the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, when they encountered unexpected problems in the field, the mission was changed and the mission officers were authorized to take all necessary measures to ensure security in the Congo's capital, Katanga (Wedgwood, 1995). It can be argued that there was a change in understanding in UN peace operations as the principle of peaceful resolution of conflict cannot always be followed. There would be a limited use of force to urge peace if necessary, however we witnessed this in Congo as well. These operations of the UN were carried out by the former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld article 6.5 of the UN agreement. The first golden age of UN peace operations was between 1956-1978. During this period, 10 operations were carried out in different parts of the world. The years 1979-1988 can be described as a period of stagnation for UN operations (Demir, 2019).

The political changes introduced by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988 led to a thaw in relations between the East and the West. This shift created an

opportunity for resolving conflicts in the Third World that had been fueled by the superpower rivalry. The USSR and its allies stopped supporting armed movements with pro-communist ideologies, and the Soviet Union adopted a more cooperative stance towards the United Nations. The end of the Cold War sparked optimism regarding the UN's role in conflict resolution. In 1988, the United Nations established observer missions such as UNGOMAP, which oversaw the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and UNIIMOG, deployed to monitor the Iran-Iraq ceasefire. Meanwhile, the UN also focused on peace processes in Central America and South Africa. In 1966, SWAPO's armed struggle for independence began, with the organization establishing bases in Zambia and Angola, becoming significant regional players (Woodhouse, 2011).

In 1978, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 435, which called for an end to South Africa's control over Namibia, declaring it illegal since 1971. It was not until after more than a decade that the resolution could be fully implemented. On December 22, 1988, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed a peace agreement, along with the United Nations, aiming to initiate Namibia's independence and bring about peace in Southwest Africa. Subsequently, the Security Council established the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers from Angola. This observer mission successfully supervised the withdrawal of 50,000 soldiers and marked the first United Nations peacekeeping operation involving Spain's participation. In January 1989, seven military observers were deployed. Additionally, the Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), the first peacekeeping operation with a mandate for peacebuilding. UNTAG had a civilian component and was responsible for organizing Namibia's first democratic elections and facilitating the country's proclamation of independence (Kenkel, 2013).

The civilian component of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) consisted of several parties working in coordination. The United Nations Special Representative led the mission and coordinated operations among other sections, including the South African government, Namibian political parties, local and international organizations. An independent legal expert provided guidance on the release of Namibian prisoners held by the Pretoria regime. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) organized the repatriation of over 40,000 Namibian refugees. The Electoral Commission provided technical expertise and

monitored the elections, which had over 800 international observers in attendance. The administrative division operated from Windhoek, the capital of Namibia. A contingent of 1,500 civilian police units ensured professionalism, impartiality, and respect for human rights, replacing the Southwest African Police Force (SWAPOL) until independence was declared (Demir, 2019).

The military section of UNTAG, comprising more than 4,000 military personnel, was responsible for overseeing the withdrawal of South African soldiers from Namibia. Spain also contributed air support and 250 soldiers from its air force to the peacekeeping mission. The elections, held in November 1989, were successfully organized without significant issues, and the South African army left the country on November 22nd. In February 1990, Sam Nujoma, leader of the SWAPO, was elected as the first President of the newly independent Republic of Namibia.

The success of UNTAG in fulfilling its military and political mandate was largely attributed to international support for Namibia's independence, particularly from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) under the advocacy of the United Nations. The easing of tensions between the two blocs, along with the pressure exerted on their allies, also contributed to the peaceful transition and pacification of Namibia.

With the end of the Cold War, the second generation of peacekeeping operations began. The increase in the number of civil wars with the end of bipolarity and the increase in the number of failed states triggered the formation of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Office. But in this generation, peacekeeping was conducted in more difficult and complex environments than before. In addition, since the only purpose of the operations was not to stop the war, it also assumed the role of transformation into peace. Therefore, civic duties also became so important. These operations, which began to be treated in a broader sense and took the shape of “wider peacekeeping” began to incorporate actions such as conflict prevention, demobilization, and military aid. classic and transformative operations are done in hostile situations by adhering to classic peacekeeping principles in this generation of peace missions (Tshiband, 2010).

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which began in Somalia in 1992, is one of the most visible examples of this. The most crucial element that sets this mission apart from others is that it was founded on internal conflicts and humanitarian concerns. It is also worth noting that the consent of the host country was

not sought due to the absence of a ruling authority in Somalia. For these reasons, UNOSOM took on responsibilities such as emergency help and the maintenance of legal order (Diehl, 1994). These characteristics indicate that the usual organization of peacekeeping operations has been violated. During this period, when failures in UN operations were also on the agenda, examples such as the end of the Somali mission with heavy casualties and the silence of UN in Srebrenica and Rwanda against massacres in front of peacekeepers fueled doubts about the operations' efficacy and future. These debates prepared the foundation for the third generation of peacekeepers to emerge.

Concerning the efficiency of peacekeeping operations Kofi Annan, the then-UN Secretary General, organized a high-level 'UN Peace Operations Panel' to assess the current system and explore potential changes. The final report, dubbed the 'Brahimi Report' after the working group's leader, Lakhdar Brahimi, offers significant conclusions in terms of present situation analysis and the future predictions. Besides, the report stressed the importance of UN employees being capable of protecting themselves, fulfilling mission-assigned tasks, and protecting people in combat zones (Lijn, 2014).

A decade after the initiation of full-scale peacekeeping missions, the failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia shed light on the limitations of such interventions. The Rwandan genocide, in particular, stands out as one of the most horrific crimes of the 20th century, resulting in the deaths of approximately 800,000 people between April and July 1994. Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, serving as the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeeping mission, provided a comprehensive and impactful account of the genocide in his renowned work, *"Shake Hands with the Devil."* The book offered a poignant perspective on the tragic events and their implications for peacekeeping efforts (Woodhouse, 2011).

A year after the Rwandan genocide in 1995, another grave war crime took place in Srebrenica, Bosnia, where Serb militias attacked the demilitarized city and killed approximately 8,000 Bosnian Muslims. This incident occurred despite the United Nations declaring Srebrenica as a demilitarized security zone in its Resolution 819 of 1993, aimed at protecting the civilian population. These events led to criticism from institutions and academics, calling for reform within the United Nations regarding the preparation, creation, and deployment of armed forces. Issues such as the identification

of armed forces and operational matters were also addressed. The coordination of missions from United Nations offices in New York and the lack of sufficient field support were significant challenges. Coordination and logistical problems were especially evident in operations involving troops from different countries. The catastrophic failures in Rwanda and Somalia prompted a re-evaluation and radical change in the military doctrine of peacekeeping operations. Efforts were made to develop a third-generation peacekeeping model that addressed these challenges (Woodhouse, 2011, s. 9-15).

In the mid-1990s, there was a shift in peacekeeping doctrine towards more effective operations that prioritized the protection of civilians and the security of peacekeepers. This change was prompted by incidents like the abduction and killing of UN personnel in Sierra Leone and East Timor by militias. These new operations, known as peace assist operations or third-generation peacekeeping, evolved through the doctrines developed in the military academies of countries actively involved in major peacekeeping missions of that era. The main objective was to prevent the deployment of untrained or unsupported forces in areas of armed conflict. These doctrines recognized that traditional peacekeeping approaches were no longer suitable in a world characterized by civil wars, states in turmoil, and a decreasing regard for international law and human rights. The evolving doctrines aimed to adapt to the evolving nature of conflicts and the complex challenges faced by peacekeepers (Demir, 2019).

Under the new doctrine, future peace operations were required to possess strength, flexibility, and military capabilities to effectively navigate diverse situations. They needed to be equipped to counteract actors who aimed to disrupt peace processes through violence, intimidation, or threats against local populations and personnel, with the intention of discrediting international organizations. The Kosovo Force (KFOR), established by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was one of the earliest operations to be built upon this new strategy.

In the current classification, the fourth generation of peace operations is characterized by robust peacebuilding operations. These missions involve a combination of increased authorization to use force and expanded civilian engagement that has a more noticeable impact on local autonomy compared to the second generation. They are often referred to as peace support operations in both national doctrines and analytical literature. While there is ongoing debate regarding the

analytical framework of peacebuilding as a concept, the widely accepted definition of peacebuilding as a UN practice continues to draw from Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "*Agenda for Peace*." (Kenkel, 2013). The fourth-generation peacekeeping operation has characteristics that have been incorporated into peacekeeping operations to make them more effective, successful, and sustainable. First, the Fourth generation of UN peacekeeping is frequently recognized as robust peacekeeping in which there is authorization for use of force to improve civilian tasks. As the scale of peace operations changed dramatically, as witnessed in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were seen massive human rights violations, international human rights law and standards therefore recognized the need and value of a strong approach to protection. Mechanism for Peacekeeping as use of force in peacekeeping operations, as provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is often criticized as not serving the Security Council's objectives of maintaining international peace (Diehl, 1994).

Secondly, one of the essential cause and device of fourth era peacekeeping operations are 'peacebuilding'. The purpose of peacebuilding missions is reaching their end that is through a two-tier manner of political institutionalization and monetary liberalization. These need direct involvement in shaping authorities' establishments which changed into a part of peacebuilding hobby regularly regarded as 'state constructing'. These immoderate sorts of country constructing sports have additionally by some means shifted the dreams of worldwide intervention. Fourth era operations are designed to clear up the basic reason of the war and authoritatively attempt to construct a condition for peace.

Third, the mandates change with the scale of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping organizations must go after United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on women, peace, and security in all peacekeeping operations. The department of peacekeeping operations encourage gender equality by supplying the use of qualified female caparisoned civilian or military personnel for administrative, managerial, or secretarial positions. Female peacemakers often become role models, inspiring local women, or girls in often male-dominated societies to fight for their own rights and engage in the peace-building process (Kenkel, 2013).

Fourth, it is critical for peacekeepers to master an official UN language that is at most the same language as the local language of the crisis-affected countries (English, Arabic French, etc.), depending on the geographic position. The lack of a common language as a tool of communication could lead to misunderstandings and

distrust among the local population affected by the crisis. Not only that different battalions, brigades, and sector operate together interdependent where conformity is mandatory. Therefore, language learning activities have proven to be a paramount aspect of pre-deployment training.

Fifth, as the world advances in technology, the United Nations must keep pace to deliver technology-enabled peacekeeping. Therefore, fourth-generation peacekeeping is also known as "*intelligent peacekeeping*", in which countries that provide troops or police officers who are generally from low-tech developing countries. These joint contributions resulted in the UN Peace continuing to provide security and reach people on the ground in new ways, using Global Positioning System (GPS), smartphones, internet-based equipment, satellite imagery, drones and ensuring safety from mines and explosive residues of war (Woodhouse, 2011).

Sixth, in the era of fourth-generation peacekeeping, various countries are training their peacekeepers in pre-deployment training to prepare them for “robust peacekeeping” or “peacemaking” activities. These deployment preparation training materials are based on various topics such as peacekeeping discipline, human rights, child protection, sexual abuse, and exploitation environmental protection, etc. Nonetheless quality of reimplementation training differs as UN has not provided a comprehensive training architecture and only provides pre-implementation training materials (Demir, 2019).

Finally, the United Nations' difficulty in dealing with the multifaceted demands of peacekeeping operations led to a greater focus on regional organization. These include regional organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) etc. Operations are a mix of military, police, and civilian guided activities under a mixed order mechanism where the UN and other regional or international organizations deploy troops and civilian personnel for the same mission under a different chain of command known as "*Missions/Hybrid Operations*". In this sense, hybrid missions are very distinct from "*joint missions*" or "*joint (multinational) operations*". These hybrid operations differ, of course, from UN Charter Chapter VII missions, which do not involve heavy use of force or robust peacekeeping. The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) can be seen as a good example of a hybrid mechanism that contributed further cooperation between participating countries. Efforts were undertaken to identify and bolster structures that would

contribute to the reinforcement and sustainability of peace, aiming to prevent a relapse into conflict. Comprehensive measures were implemented to identify and support mechanisms that would solidify peace and foster a sense of trust and well-being among the population. These measures encompassed a range of actions, such as disarming former combatants and restoring order, securing and potentially disposing of weapons, facilitating the return of refugees to their homes, providing advisory and training support to security personnel, overseeing electoral processes, advancing initiatives to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting both formal and informal avenues for political participation (Goulding, 1993).

Empirical evidence suggests the emergence of a fifth generation of peacekeeping operations, although there is still limited analytical literature on the topic. What sets this type of mission apart is its hybrid nature, where soldiers and police personnel are deployed under a combined command structure. In these missions, both the United Nations and regional organizations deploy troops to the same operations but under different chains of command and with distinct mandates. Unlike traditional Chapter VIII missions that involve a time-limited "handover" of predominantly forceful peace enforcement mandates, hybrid missions entail the simultaneous deployment of UN forces alongside contingents from other regional organizations.

These missions reflect a growing trend in the division of labor within the global peacekeeping system. The primary driver of this change is the evolving perspective of Western states on global interventions, particularly in the past 15 years since the mid-1990s. Western powers, haunted by the failures of UN peacekeeping in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia, gradually scaled back their involvement in peacekeeping missions toward the end of the 1990s. This shift in perspective has influenced the distribution of responsibilities and contributions among different actors in the peacekeeping landscape (Kenkel, 2013).

After the USA attacks of Iraq and Afghanistan in the beginning of 2000's, the makeup of the UN force changed, leading to the rise of the Global South as the dominant source of peacekeeping forces and solely 5% from Scandinavian troops. Additionally, more than 40% of UN troops came from the Indian subcontinent at certain times in the 2000s (Woodhouse, 2011). Differences in views toward intervention specifically in relation to peace enforcement and sovereignty interpretations meant that this progressively fragmented origin of the troops was

translated into an increasing division of labor within peacekeeping operations. There has been a noticeable change towards NATO countries and other Western nations that increasingly embrace the use of force to protect civilians and uphold human rights. These countries are actively engaging in robust interventions beyond the United Nations framework, such as the invasion of Iraq, the UN-supported International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and military actions based on Security Council Resolution 1973 in 2011. In contrast, Southern states exhibit hesitancy in endorsing forceful measures solely for human rights and civilian protection, instead focusing on addressing underlying causes of conflicts through expertise in development, poverty reduction, and institutional strengthening. In response to this shift, the United Nations, through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), recognizes the necessity of a broader range of contributing countries and organizations for an integrated global peacekeeping system, as outlined in the "*New Horizons Report*." (Lijn, 2014).

The allocation of tasks occurs both within hybrid missions and among different missions. Hybrid missions involve the participation of various regional organizations, particularly in Europe and Africa. In the case of Kosovo, NATO, through the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR), operates under a separate command structure and focuses on security, while the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) addresses institutional development. Additionally, individual Western countries provided significant support to UN peacekeeping missions, with notable troop contributions from the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone in 1999 and France in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010.

In line with the United Nations' commitment to seeking "*African solutions to African problems*," the African Union (AU) assumed an increasingly prominent military role in conflict resolution. The AU deploys troops to the joint African Union-United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and independently, albeit as part of an internationally supported effort, in Somalia through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). (A.Hussine, 2012).

CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICTS IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

2.1. Peace And Security Facility in Africa

From the second half of the twentieth century to the present day, gunfire has never ceased across the continent. As a matter of fact, the civilian population is always the primary victim of conflicts. According to Ache Aniche, 25% of African people have been affected by conflict in some way. The conflicts experienced caused mainly loss of life, internal and external migration, and the disability of many people. These wars are dependent on economic, social, political, and religious reasons, heavily affect the development of the continent and unfortunately do not come to an end. The continent is also associated with underdevelopment, poverty, hunger, thirst, corruption, instability, and colonialism. Despite its advantages and resources, the African continent, which has a population of approximately one billion, an area of 30 million square kilometers and many underground and above resources, still has not achieved prosperity and stability (Aniche, 2016).

International organizations, non-governmental organizations and African Union are making great efforts to end the continent's endless conflicts. In this context with the slogan of “*African solutions to African problems*” the union tries to do its best to ensure peace and stability. There are many expectations in this regard by the member states and the international community (Dinçer, 2015, s. 62). Reasons for instability in the continent can be reduced mainly to internal problems rather than conflicts between continental countries. When we look at the continent, the number of weak states is high, a state with a weak state structure cannot solve any problems. In addition, there are political and socioeconomic reasons. In the continent there is no regime that cover and appeal to all the society in general. due to corruption and mismanagement and arbitrary political decisions, people are deprived of their rich resources and prosperity. All of these are among the reasons that cause problems between the regimes and the citizens, and it is possible to say that the biggest cause of African problems lies here (Söner, 2010). It is possible to say that it is almost like a

dream to achieve stability in the continent without a solution to the reasons. The African Union also bears this great responsibility. Additionally, wars between the 1960s and 1990s were based on the ideological competition of the cold war, the number of internal conflicts increased and became more severe in the 1990s (Apuuli, 2020)

Between 1991 and 2008, conflicts were recorded in 33 countries of the continent. In other words, one third of the wars between non-state armed actors/armed opposition/insurgent groups and states in the world between these periods took place in the African continent. In the Ethiopian case, armed conflicts were seen simultaneously between non-state armed groups and between states. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the conflicts that have been going on for nearly a century have not yet come to an end (Bamidele, 2017, s. 125). These conflicts which are based on political, ethnic, socioeconomic etc. reasons unfortunately continue and worsen. It is possible to see this easily when we look at the numbers and statics. For example, 64 violent conflicts were recorded in 30 African countries in 2012 alone. Even in the Maghreb countries, which are described as partially stable states, 14 conflicts took place in 2012 (Söner, 2010).

In fact, to avoid such problems, Kwame Nkrumah proposed a full integration idea to African leaders since the years of independence of African countries, but it was not accepted. Instead of full integration, the Organization of African Unity (the recent AU) was established in 1963, representing all continental countries. Since its establishment, Organization of African Unity took steps to prevent conflicts on the continent and to end current conflicts. In the first years of the organization; 1963; there were security problems such as border disputes between newly independent states; it focused on solving them. The first step taken within this framework was the establishment of “*Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*”. The purpose of this institution, as the name suggests, is to prevent and resolve conflicts, build peace, and contribute to this purpose. Unfortunately, this mechanism has not been successful enough to ensure peace. Because the African Unity Organization's principles of “*respect for sovereignty and not interfering with its internal affairs*” were being strictly adhered to. For this reason, it cannot be said that the institution has been successful in maintaining peace throughout the 1990s (Apuuli, 2020).

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2002 as a replacement for the ineffective Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. Serving as the continent's early warning and collective security unit, the PSC plays a crucial role in managing crises more efficiently and swiftly. It holds a significant position within the African Security Architecture and functions as an early alarm system, responsible for preventing and resolving conflicts. Instead of meeting twice a year, the PSC convenes regularly to advise the AU General Assembly on peace and security matters and takes action on its behalf (Chika Njideka Oguonu, 2014).

The PSC operates under the oversight of the commission's leader, who holds responsibility for significant matters like peace and security. It receives support from various sub-units, including the African Standby Force (ASF), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Peace Fund, and Panel of the Wise. These entities work collaboratively to enhance conflict prevention and resolution efforts. Upholding principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity is of utmost importance to the African Union. Consequently, the organization generally disapproves of interventions that infringe upon these principles. Because in the third article of the founding agreement, the *"sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states would be respected and their independence would be protected"*. Therefore, it has a pro-sovereign attitude and does not look very warmly to interventions. But this is not the case in the African Union, which replaces the Organization of African Unity. It imposed a condition for sovereignty so much so that in cases where the state cannot protect its own integrity and citizens, the African Union can intervene militarily. Therefore, sovereignty here is linked to the state's own integrity and its capacity to protect its citizens (A.Badmus, 2015).

The African Union uses military intervention as a last resort in resolving conflicts. As mentioned above, a member state can take on the union protection responsibility when it is unable to protect its own citizens. As in the fourth article of the founding agreement of the union, the union can even carry out military intervention by taking all kinds of measures with the decision of the general assembly in *"war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity"* (Söner, 2010). In 2003, a regulation was made in the fourth article of the union founding agreement. *"If there are serious situations threatening peace and security in a 4(H)-member state, military intervention may be carried out at the request of the council" as a 4(j)-member state may request an intervention from the union to maintain its own peace and stability."*

Unlike its predecessor, the African Unity Organization, the African Union does not receive approval from the member state in question for military intervention, it intervenes with two-thirds of the member states' votes. This is one of the biggest differences between the two organizations (Sarkin, 2009). In 2005, the responsibility to protect was reinforced with Ezulwini agreement. With this agreement, the African Union executive council underlined that the responsibility to protect will be carried out in accordance with the criteria of the UN and the UN will act together. Concepts such as "*crimes against humanity, war crimes, responsibility to protect*" are open to discussion, and the language used by the African Union founding agreement, PSC protocol, and AU commission is different. It can be said that there is no consensus over the concept. While intervention is a "*right*" in the PSC protocol and the AU founding agreement, the commission uses the word "*responsibility*". While the AU's principles of intervention are enshrined in international law, its responsibility to protect remains ambiguous. Within the African Union, there is still no consensus on controversial concepts such as "*crimes against humanity, war crimes, responsibility to protect*" (Desmidt, 2016).

At the same time, the right to intervene in the event of a "*threat to the legitimate order*" as amended in the 2003 founding agreement is a controversial concept and suitable for use for political purposes as the authorities put forward this to legitimize and consolidate their own regimes. In this case, the security of the regime is above the national security. (Desmidt, 2016, s. 5-7)

However, the OAU decided to become the continental African Union (AU) on July 9, 2001, after most of states and governments adopted the Union's Constitutive Act in Zambia. Nevertheless, it remains to be viewed whether the AU will match the conflict avoidance, management, and resolution abilities of its forerunner. The AU's founding act, in contrast to the OAU Charter, permits involvement in domestic policies of member nations in instances of unlawful government changes, mass murder, and wars that endanger stability of the region. The bill also established a pan-African parliament, funds an economic and cultural commission, and permits the involvement of members of African civil society in the organization's activities (A.Badmus, 2015).

2.2. Types of conflicts in Africa

In Africa, a combination of factors including bad governance, historical animosity, exclusionary policies, legitimacy concerns, resource competition, globalized conflicts, external influences, and extremist religious ideologies contributed to numerous incidents of violent conflict since most states gained independence in 1960. Millions have died and conflicts have costed African states billion in wanton destruction and lost economic gains, despite many attempts to promote sustainable peace. With time, the nature and causes of violent conflict have altered as political, social, economic, and environmental circumstances have evolved (Gluhbegovic, 2016).

The number of African states engaged in violent conflict increased significantly in the 1960s as groups questioned the legitimacy of postcolonial governmental structures. Nigeria's Biafra War is a big example. In other cases, the challenged legitimacy took the form of struggles for independence and liberation that were long and costly in lives and treasure. This second surge of violence occurred with the Cold War era in, which gave legitimacy to several hateful regimes (such as Mobutu's Zaire and the apartheid regime in South Africa). The proxy wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Liberia are examples of Cold War-related conflicts. With the end of the Cold War African economies started to open gradually, sat out more pluralistic governance, and further globalization. The vacuums left by decades of weak governance were filled by non-state actors, most of which were transnational. After a relative dormancy of more than a decade, terrorist groups such as Al Shabab in East Africa, Boko Haram in West Africa, and a number of groups in north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gave rise to a resurgence in post-2010 violence, also the conflict after independence in South Sudan, the Mali crisis and Libya after Gaddafi (Gilpin, 2019).

Although a clear governance problem seems to be at the heart of most conflicts on Africa since the 1960s, it is worth noting that a combination of economic, social, and external factors helps understand the complex chaos that exists over time. Attempts to classify violent conflicts in Africa have therefore always encountered difficulties. Most definitions of violent conflict are based on Carl von Clausewitz's idea that war is "*the continuation of politics by other means*". While they rightly

emphasize the governance gap, they tend to focus too much on how the riots affected the states claimed to be Westphalian or pre-Westphalian. The political frame for such an analysis is derived from the idea of the Westphalian nation state. While this notion can be useful at some level of analysis, it does not explain a complete picture of violent conflicts in the continent. First, the concept of the state in Africa is being severely challenged. African countries are considered as geographic entities struggle to bring together the “*nations*” that live within their borders. Colonial conflicts were mainly not about statehood, but about freedom from oppression and group survival. Postcolonial uprisings were not merely domestic uprisings in the classic sense, as most of them widespread in the region. Furthermore, proxy wars during the Cold War had more to do with geopolitics than with state politics in Africa (Lukman, 2020).

The distinction between state and non-state in Africa does not make sense because in most cases it does not consider the underlying dynamics. Experts advocate against reductionist state-centric definitions of violent conflicts and for the appropriation of a “*social theory of warfare*” that emphasizes the social organization of actors, their desire, and motivations end states. This might be correct in Africa, as group dynamics are more relevant than constructs of state. Therefore, the distinction between states and within states became an important theme, which is rarely useful in the African context (Gilpin, 2019).

Another reflection on categorizing violent conflicts is the number of deaths per year, which leads to the distinction between low and high intensity conflicts. Approximately 1,000 deaths from “high-intensity conflict” could be a useful data point for assessing when and how international organizations (like UN) intervene, but it introduces some difficulties in African context. It should be noted that the quality of data related to the conflict is problematic, and the issue is generally politicized. This makes it difficult to do the right categorization. In addition, low-intensity conflicts increase over the years, especially as these conflicts go unnoticed and can remain unresolved because they go unnoticed (Rustad, 2022).

2.2.1. Border Disputes

Many border disputes in the continent of Africa emerged during the 1950s, a period when numerous countries were gaining their independence from colonial rule.

Some of the issues contained two or three states in a region or regions of the continent (Teshome, 2009). The colonial history of Africa is a significant factor behind the continent's border conflicts, as many of these disputes arise from the arbitrary boundaries imposed during the colonial era. During the colonial era, European powers defined boundaries arbitrarily without regard for the existing ethnic, linguistic, or cultural affiliations of the local populace. Borders were frequently drawn to promote the interests of conquerors, ignoring traditional territory and tribal boundaries. As a result, as people split by arbitrary lines struggle for resources, access to land, and political representation, these artificial borders are now sources of friction and violence between neighboring African nations (Paul, 2006). Another factor is natural resources such as oil, minerals, fertile grasslands, and bodies of water abound in Africa. The unequal distribution of these resources across borders can escalate disputes and tensions. As governments compete for control and access to valuable assets, rivalries over areas rich in resources can rise to border disputes. Clashes over resources can occur because of imprecise or poorly defined borders, giving rise to territorial claims and disputes that, if not addressed diplomatically, might evolve into larger conflicts (Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Ethnic and tribal divisions are among the reasons behind border disputes. Africa is home to a diverse range of ethnic groups and tribes, each having its own cultural heritage, customs, and territorial claims. As populations are separated between countries, ethnic and tribal divisions might intersect with border issues. As communities aspire for autonomy or unification, a sense of identification and belonging to a specific location can heighten tensions and spark conflict. Historical rivalries and resource competitiveness can intensify these divisions, resulting in protracted disagreements and unrest. Additionally, Political instability and inadequate governance systems in certain African countries contribute to border disputes. Border disputes may be used as a diversionary tactic by governments facing internal issues such as corruption, political persecution, or weak institutions to strengthen power or raise patriotic feelings. Furthermore, a lack of strong government and dispute settlement systems may hinder peaceful conflict resolution, causing border disputes to persist and develop (Paul, 2006).

African border disputes are complicated and multifaceted, impacted by a mix of historical, socioeconomic, and political variables. To address these problems, comprehensive methods that encourage communication, regional cooperation, and the

adoption of fair and transparent settlement systems are required. Recognizing historical legacies, addressing resource disparities, and developing inclusive systems of government are all critical stages in preventing and resolving border conflicts in Africa. In doing so, the continent will be able to realize its enormous potential for economic expansion, social advancement, and regional stability.

Ethiopia–Eritrea Border Dispute over Badme

The Ethiopia-Eritrea territorial dispute is one of the African Union's (AU) most successful border dispute resolutions. The dispute began in 1998, right after Eritrea declared independence from Ethiopia. The conflict grew into a full-scale war, which led to the deaths of thousands of people and displacements of hundreds. The AU was crucial in fostering dialogue and mediating the conflict. The body of African Union (OAU), the AU's precursor body, sent former Algerian President Bouteflika as a special envoy to arbitrate between the two countries in 2000. Ethiopia possessed a strong desire to gain control over the abundant resources in the region. As Astill reports, the Eritreans argue that the Ethiopians, who had previously subjected the Eritreans to enslavement, aimed to deceive Eritrea further, leading to a conflict initiated by the Eritreans. This violent confrontation occurred from 1998 to 2000, during which Eritrea mobilized its forces to safeguard its sovereignty and historical borders. However, Eritrea's militarily superior Ethiopia defeated their forces on multiple occasions. The loss of life was significant, with approximately 100,000 casualties on both sides, according to the ICJ. This demonstrates that the dispute was not solely centered around the absence of a clearly defined boundary to determine control over the area, but also driven by the expansionist policies and economic interests pursued by both nations (Kornprobst, 2002).

Under the leadership and efforts of the OAU, the international crisis group and the US convinced the Eritrea to agree on the Algerian peace agreement. This treaty, also supported by the UN and the EU, it was signed in 2000 and it was decided that Ethiopia should relinquish control of Badme to Eritrea. (Mulindwa, 2020).

Despite the verdict, both countries encountered difficulties with the implementation of the decision, and tensions remained. The AU and the international community, on the other hand, remained engaged in encouraging compliance with the

EEBC decisions. The situation gradually improved because of continuous diplomatic efforts, included mediation by the AU along with other regional actors. A breakthrough happened in 2018 when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship, which effectively ended the two countries' state of war. This historic accord resulted in the re-opening of embassies, the restarting of diplomatic relations, and the resumption of trade and people-to-people exchanges (Widstrand, 1969).

The successful resolution of the border issue between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a significant milestone for the AU, demonstrating its competence in managing conflicts and promoting peace on the continent. It emphasizes the importance of diplomatic dialogue, international mediation, and the parties' commitment to finding peaceful solutions to border conflicts.

2.2.2. Political Conflicts

political conflicts arise when there are significant disparities in viewpoints among multiple actors within a society. These conflicts encompass struggles for power, and the politicization of different ethnicities, the misuse of authority and power, the presence of armed groups within political structure, and limited political participation. The competition and power struggles inherent in such conflicts often serve as the catalyst for these issues, creating an environment where political tensions escalate, and societal divisions deepen (Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Political conflicts can take various forms, including coups, clashes between traditional and formal authorities, disputes between political parties, rivalries between individuals and their supporters, and more. In many African nations, political conflicts are often exacerbated during transitions from one-party to multi-party systems, from authoritarian rule to democratization, or from conflict to peace. These periods of change are often characterized by instability and tensions, which can create power vacuums or challenges to existing power structures from new players. As countries undergo varying degrees of democratization, elections can become battlegrounds for power, and scenes of political conflicts, including instances of electoral violence, can arise (Gilpin, 2019).

Rivalry between different political parties is a prominent type of political conflicts. This can be exemplified by the ongoing tensions between Mozambique's ruling party, Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and the opposition party, Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). These two groups have been engaged in clashes since the post-independence era, despite signing peace agreements. The underlying issue lies in unresolved reconciliation matters from the civil war, which contribute to the prevailing mutual distrust. As a result, sporadic episodes of violence emerged. To mitigate the risk of disagreements and escalating opposing loyalties into violent conflict, it is essential for political parties to assume responsibility in defusing tensions and fostering dialogue and cooperation. By addressing reconciliation issues and promoting open communication, political parties can work towards reducing the potential for conflict (Aremu, 2010).

In certain states, the space for opposition politics and peaceful power transitions is limited, leading to a perception that alternative means of addressing political injustices and gaining power exist beyond armed rebellion. As mentioned earlier, electoral violence is a recurring issue in various reports. Lesotho provides an example where post-election violence has a destabilizing impact, driven by opposition parties feeling marginalized and refusing to accept the election outcomes. To address the political conflict in Lesotho, the country made changes to its electoral system, aiming to promote more inclusive representation and diversity in parliament. On the other hand, in Kenya, political conflicts, the manipulation of identity issues, and the misuse of power were recognized as factors contributing to violent conflicts. A striking example of this was the eruption of extreme violence in 2007 following the elections (Gluhbegovic, 2016).

According to several reports, conflicts can arise due to tensions between formal government structures and traditional leadership structures as well. In Ghana, for instance, issues emerge from traditional chieftainships, the lack of a well-defined mandate for traditional leaders, along with tensions between traditional and national authorities regarding legal matters and the subordination of traditional structures to national ones, illustrates the existence of parallel systems in several countries and the resulting power struggles. In certain nations, traditional leadership is formalized and integrated into state structures. In some nations, traditional leadership is formalized and integrated into state structures. It is suggested that there should be greater cooperation and interaction between the two systems, allowing for a mutually

beneficial relationship. Effective and genuine implementation of such interaction can help consolidate the relations between formal politics and traditional structures, which are often more accessible and influential, particularly in certain regions (Rustad, 2022).

2.2.3. Identity Conflicts

Identity conflict refers to conflicts that arise when exclusive identities, such as religious, ethnic, or racial affiliations, become the basis for contention. These identities can be reinforced by socioeconomic, cultural, and political grievances, leading to the marginalization or "*otherness*" of certain groups. In Africa, ethnic and regional identities are particularly significant social bonds. Many African countries experience competing allegiances based on ethnic, national, religious, and other affiliations. Countries like Rwanda, Nigeria, Mali, and Kenya witnessed conflicts rooted in identity issues. These identities are often politicized, either due to their co-optation by colonial powers and subsequent mismanagement, or because of power struggles within the country. Some identities are privileged while others are marginalized, leading to tensions and potential conflicts fueled by perceptions of unequal advantages. The drawn borders across the continent demonstrate that diverse groups can coexist within the same country, distinguished by various ethnic, linguistic, religious, and spatial characteristics. Nigeria, for instance, is known for its immense diversity, encompassing a wide array of ethnicities, cultures, languages, and traditions, making it one of the most heterogeneous nations globally (Kornprobst, 2002).

The Nigeria Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR) emphasizes the differentiation between 'ethnic' citizenship and 'civic' citizenship in Nigeria. Citizenship in Nigeria is primarily associated with the national level, while indigeneness is linked to the local level. This divide between 'indigenous peoples' and 'settlers' is founded on notions of clan and ethnic exclusivity, which can result in restricted or denied access to state power and resources. Navigating this diversity demands a sensitive approach to mitigate tensions and promote cooperation. Algeria serves as an example where conflict arises due to the marginalization of Imazighen citizens. The government took some steps to address these tensions, like recognizing the Tamazight language and implementing other measures. However, experts criticize the implementation process, stating that there is still room for improvement. The case

of Imazighen also highlights another identity dynamic relevant to conflicts: certain ethnicities can inhabit in multiple nations. For example: Imazighen are present in whole North African region as well can be found in Mali, Niger, and others (Sone, 2017).

Another type of identity conflict is xenophobia. recently is being witnessed widely in Zambia and South Africa. In Zambia, the influx of refugees and the employment of foreign workers by companies resulted in local discontent and xenophobic attitudes. The South African CRR highlights xenophobia in both political and cross-sectoral contexts and emphasizes the need to address it before it escalates into violence. However, despite these warnings, xenophobic violence erupted in South Africa in 2008 and continued to occur in subsequent years. Similarly, Zambia experienced xenophobic violence in 2016. The South African government acknowledges xenophobia as a problem and commits to addressing it, as stated in the South African CRR. However, little has been done to effectively tackle the issue. This highlights the importance of not only making recommendations and issuing warnings in CRRs but also taking concrete actions to address and prevent xenophobia (Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Governance systems play a crucial role in either promoting cooperation or exacerbating identity conflicts. In Ethiopia, the federal system allows each region to have representation and a certain degree of autonomy. While this form of governance can be refreshing, it is also important to manage the system effectively to prevent divisions and conflicts based on identity. On the other hand, Nigeria experiences divisions among different identity groups, as described by the CRR, which are fueled by illegal and divisive politics. This case highlights the intersection between political and identity-based conflicts (Aremu, 2010).

Marginalization is an important factor that contributes to identity conflicts and other forms of conflict. In many countries, injustices experienced by ethnic minorities are recognized as potential sources of conflict. For example, the Batwa group denounces marginalization through land deprivation and exclusion from accessing social services. These injustices can lead to conflicts rooted in identity or can transform into other types of conflicts, such as resource-based conflicts or civil unrest. It underscores the importance of addressing marginalization and ensuring equitable distribution of resources and services to prevent and mitigate identity-based conflicts (Apuuli, 2020).

2.2.4. Civil Unrest

Civil unrest includes protests, revolts, riots, uprisings, and demonstrations initiated by sections of the public regarding socioeconomic and political injustices. Actions that can lead to civil unrest in Africa are often launched by organized or non-organized groups and may target both governmental and non-governmental entities. These actions can sometimes turn violent. The risk of riots is particularly high in urban areas with high levels of unemployment, marginalization, and inequality. Civil unrest occurs in various African countries due to civil issues, political, and socio-economic marginalization. Some of these riots met with violence from the central authorities or have escalated into violence themselves. For instance, in South Africa, there are recurring violent protests and demonstrations against inadequate service provision. These protests have involved trespassing on properties and the eviction of community officials. The fact that these protests persisted over the years indicates that the underlying problems are not being adequately addressed. Similarly, in Ethiopia for instance, riots are generally encountered with violence. In the anti-government protests that took place June 2016, it was reported that around 400 people were killed. While the reports may provide limited direct coverage of civil unrest across the continent, they do mention potential causes of such unrest, providing an opportunity to further discuss these root causes and their connections to current or future civil riots (Aremu, 2010).

One of the reasons for the uprising, as observed in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, is youth unemployment. If job opportunities are not created for this young population, they find themselves unemployed and this leads to social discontent. Youth unemployment must be seen in the context of Africa's under-18 population growing to 1 billion by 2050. If strong strategies are not implemented now, indeed, the consequences of civil unrest can extend beyond mere disturbances, potentially leading to radicalization, increased crime rates, and other scenarios that may escalate conflicts. (Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Indeed, inequality and injustice are substantial catalysts for civil unrest. Sub-Saharan Africa, known for its rapid growth, frequently faces rising inequality and an imbalanced distribution of resources, encompassing natural and financial resources, as well as opportunities. These disparities inevitably give rise to social conflicts and

tensions. Furthermore, macroeconomic factors can fuel civil unrest, with food prices being a prominent example. The fluctuation of food prices is influenced by international markets, climate change, and weather patterns, which profoundly affect the livelihoods of a considerable portion of Africa's population situated at the lower end of the income spectrum. As a result, increases in food prices have a profound impact on the region and can contribute to social unrest and discontent. Although reports may not explicitly mention food insecurity as a source of conflict, several countries experienced food riots and dissatisfaction with rising prices for other commodities. Examples include Burkina Faso in 2008, Uganda, Mozambique in 2010, and Sudan in 2011. These instances highlight the link between economic factors, such as rising prices, and civil unrest (Gilpin, 2019).

The lack of attention given to civil unrest may indicate that countries do not perceive it as a significant threat or that they lack the political will to address its underlying causes. This poses a danger as civil unrest can escalate and evolve if the existing socio-economic, political, or other underlying issues are left unresolved. The riots in North Africa serve as a pertinent example, where neither the governments nor the African Union were willing to confront the situation adequately, allowing the unrest to persist and worsen. It is crucial for governments and regional organizations like the African Union to recognize the potential consequences of civil unrest and take proactive measures to address its root causes and prevent its escalation. Failure to do so can have serious implications for stability and security in the region.

2.2.5. Terrorism

Terrorism is a problematic term. It is often an apt definition of vulgar acts of violence against unarmed people, but it is also a fact that weak and corrupt colonial regimes throughout the 20th century labeled their opponents "*terrorists*" to delegitimize their goals. Colonial powers, particularly in Africa, there were instances where pro-independence movements were branded as terrorists by the ruling powers, enabling them to maintain control, vilify their adversaries, and justify the use of excessive retaliatory measures. This was evident in cases such as the French authorities in Algeria, the British in Kenya during the 1950s, the Rhodesian government in the 1970s, and the apartheid regime in South Africa. These labels allowed the authorities

to employ brutal tactics, including torture, mass killings, and widespread repression, to suppress the movements and preserve their power (Akanji, 2019).

The perception of terrorism in Africa by Western nations often centered around the issue of Islamic Jihadism. An event that significantly impacted this perception was the 1998 truck bombings targeting the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which resulted in the deaths of over 200 individuals and brought the group al-Qaeda to the forefront of the American public's attention. Subsequently, with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there emerged a dominant narrative of a global jihadist threat. This narrative has at times led to calls for international intervention in local conflicts, even when the underlying causes may have little to do with religious indoctrination or global terrorism (Boukhazara, 2021).

“Terrorism is described in Article 1(3) of the 1999 OAU Convention on the Combating and Prevention of Terrorism as:”

“(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: (I) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (iii) create general insurrection in a State; (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii) (OAU, 1999).

Africa faced its share of terrorism, particularly in regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, as well as in major countries like Nigeria, Mali, and Algeria. Terrorism in Africa often takes on a transnational nature, with groups operating across multiple countries and drawing recruits from various nationalities. However, it is worth noting that the reports do not extensively delve into this issue, even in countries that have been heavily impacted by terrorism. Only Algeria's report examines terrorism, recognizing it as a significant source of conflict since 1992. However, the focus in Algeria's report is primarily on political and legal mechanisms for countering

acts of terrorism, with limited consideration given to the root causes that contribute to radicalization. In Nigeria, for example, the Boko Haram group, founded in 2002, has been active within the country and poses a significant security threat (Sturman K. , 2002).

Countries like Tanzania and Kenya in East Africa have been targets of terrorist attacks for an extended period, primarily from groups like Al-Shabaab based in Somalia, and domestic sympathizers. The Ethiopian CRR report highlights the potential link between transnational criminal activities and the emergence of terrorism as a threat. It also acknowledges the regional dimension of terrorism, particularly in Somalia, which poses a terrorist threat to Ethiopia and Eritrea. The presence of a robust state security apparatus and control mechanisms indirectly relates to the issue of terrorism. Additionally, attentions ought to be paid regarding the repression of media and the excessive use of security regulations, as they can lead to human rights violations and contribute to cycles of radicalization and grievances that may spark new conflicts. Similar concerns have been raised in Kenya, where accusations of human rights abuses by security forces have been reported (Abrahms, 2021).

The reports often fail to emphasize the linkages between the causes of radicalization and terrorism. Specifically, in Nigeria's Niger Delta region, activities associated with oil exploration and the resulting detrimental impact on people's livelihoods, coupled with widespread poverty, have contributed to grievances that have sparked conflicts and, in certain instances, given rise to terrorism. One notable example is the movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta, although it may not be explicitly mentioned in the reports. When terrorism is addressed, the focus tends to center around anti-terrorist conventions and protocols, primarily highlighting the political dimensions. However, this approach falls short in providing a comprehensive understanding of the actual terrorism threat, its underlying dynamics, and the practical measures that can be undertaken to effectively combat it (Africa, 2022).

2.2.6. Coup D'états

Military coups have been a recurring theme in Africa's history since the 1960s. African nations have experienced more than 200 coups, attempted or successful, since the continent gained independence from colonial powers. Coups have had devastating

effects on the social, economic, and political development of many African countries, leading to violence, instability, and the suppression of democratic processes (Thyne, 2011).

The history of military coups in Africa is rooted in the continent's colonial past. Most African nations gained their independence in the 1960s after decades of colonial rule. However, the newly independent African states inherited political and economic systems that were not designed to serve the interests of their citizens. Instead, they were built to maintain the power and privilege of the colonial authorities and their local collaborators. The post-colonial African states were characterized by weak institutions, corruption, ethnic divisions, and the concentration of power in the hands of a few elites. Many African leaders, mostly military officers, viewed themselves as the only ones capable of correcting the ills of their societies. They saw coups as a means of taking power, purging the corrupt elites, and implementing radical social and economic reforms (Ncube, 2012, s. 2). In the 1960s and 1970s, the ideology of African socialism, which promoted state control of the economy and the redistribution of wealth, gained popularity among African leaders. Military coups were often used to overthrow governments that were perceived as pro-Western or capitalist and replace them with socialist regimes. In many cases, the socialist policies implemented by military rulers led to economic stagnation, widespread poverty, and social unrest.

The motivations behind military coups in Africa are diverse, but they can be grouped into several categories. First, many coups have been motivated by a desire to overthrow corrupt, authoritarian, or incompetent governments. Military officers often see themselves as the only ones capable of cleansing the political system and restoring order. Second, coups have been motivated by ethnic or regional tensions. In multi-ethnic societies, some groups may feel marginalized or discriminated against by the ruling elites. Military coups have been used to overthrow governments dominated by a particular ethnic group and replace them with a more representative administration. Third, coups have been motivated by ideological differences. In the past, coups were often used to replace pro-Western or capitalist governments with socialist or Marxist regimes. Today, religious extremism and the threat of terrorism have also become a motivation for military coups (Schultes, 2022).

Military coups have had devastating consequences for Africa's development. Coups have led to the suspension of democratic processes, the suppression of civil liberties, and the violation of human rights. In many cases, military rulers have

engaged in arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings of their opponents. Coups have also led to economic instability and stagnation. Coups often result in the suspension of foreign aid and investment, leading to a decline in economic growth and an increase in poverty. The uncertainty and instability caused by coups also discourage foreign investors, leading to a further decline in economic activity (Aremu, 2010).

In addition, coups have led to the displacement of populations and the exacerbation of humanitarian crises. In some cases, coups have triggered civil wars and ethnic conflicts, leading to the loss of lives and destruction of property. There have been many coups d'état (sudden and illegal seizure of power) in Africa throughout its history. Some of the most notable ones include:

Ghana (1966): Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, was overthrown in a coup led by the military and police.

Nigeria (1966): A group of military officers overthrew Nigeria's first post-independence government in a coup that resulted in the deaths of many senior government officials.

Uganda (1971): Idi Amin seized power in a coup against Uganda's president, Milton Obote.

Ethiopia (1974): Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in a coup led by a military junta known as the Derg.

Liberia (1980): Samuel Doe led a coup that overthrew the government of President William Tolbert.

Burkina Faso (1983): Thomas Sankara came to power in a coup that overthrew the government of Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo.

Mali (2012): Amadou Sanogo led a coup against President Amadou Toumani Toure.

Zimbabwe (2017): Robert Mugabe was removed from power in a coup led by the military.

These are just a few examples of coups that have taken place in Africa. While some coups have led to positive changes and progress, many have resulted in instability, violence, and the erosion of democracy (Thyne, 2011, s. 250).

While coups are generally seen as a disruption to democratic governance and stability, there have been instances where military interventions have led to positive changes and contributed to the advancement of Africa's political landscape. It is important to note that these cases are exceptions rather than the norm, as coups often

result in negative consequences for governance, human rights, and socio-economic development. Nonetheless, the following examples highlight instances where military coups have led to positive transformations in Africa. One notable example is the military coup in Ghana in 1981, led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. Rawlings, who initially came to power through a coup in 1979, staged a second coup in response to perceived corruption and economic mismanagement. The coup aimed to clean up the Ghanaian political system and address socio-economic inequalities. Rawlings implemented radical reforms, including purging corrupt officials, instituting economic austerity measures, and promoting grassroots participation in decision-making processes. Under his leadership, Ghana experienced a period of stability, economic growth, and social development, which earned him recognition as a transformative leader (Rustad, 2022).

Another case is the military coup in Burkina Faso in 1983, led by Captain Thomas Sankara. Sankara's coup aimed to address systemic corruption, poverty, and dependency on foreign powers. He implemented progressive policies focused on social justice, including land reform, women's rights, and education. Sankara's regime prioritized self-reliance, and he actively encouraged citizens' participation in decision-making processes. His tenure as president brought about significant positive changes in Burkina Faso, leading to improvements in healthcare, education, and infrastructure. In Mali, a military coup in 1991 led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré brought an end to decades of autocratic rule. The coup was largely peaceful and enjoyed popular support from civil society, political parties, and the international community. Touré initiated a transition to multiparty democracy, implemented political reforms, and facilitated the organization of free and fair elections. His coup marked a turning point in Mali's history, leading to a period of political openness and democratic consolidation. It is important to recognize that military coups should not be glorified or seen as a preferred means of political change. They often undermine democratic processes, violate human rights, and can perpetuate cycles of violence. The positive changes resulting from coups mentioned above were exceptional cases where leaders had a genuine commitment to social justice, good governance, and people-centered development (Schultes, 2022)

Another important factor that affects the disputes in Africa is geopolitical competition. In recent years, Africa has witnessed a surge in geopolitical competition as major global powers seek to expand their influence, secure access to resources, and

assert their strategic interests on the continent. China has emerged as a dominant player in Africa, employing a comprehensive strategy that encompasses economic, political, and diplomatic engagement. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has invested heavily in infrastructure development projects across the continent, including ports, railways, and telecommunications networks. This economic expansion has been accompanied by resource extraction agreements, trade partnerships, and development aid. China's engagement in Africa is driven by its quest for resources, access to new markets, and geopolitical influence. However, critics argue that China's investments may exacerbate debt burdens for African countries and raise concerns about labor practices and environmental impact (Sturman J. C., 2010).

The United States, traditionally a significant player in Africa, has sought to maintain its influence and counter the growing presence of China. The U.S. has focused on security cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and supporting peacekeeping efforts. Additionally, the U.S. has emphasized economic engagement through initiatives like the Prosper Africa program, aimed at promoting trade and investment partnerships. However, the Trump administration's "*America First*" policy and reduction in foreign aid created an opportunity for other players to expand their influence in the region. Russia, seeking to regain its global status, has also reasserted its presence in Africa. It has pursued military partnerships, arms sales, and security cooperation agreements with various African countries. Russia's involvement in conflicts, such as its support for the government in Libya, has added a new dimension to the geopolitical competition in Africa. While Russia's engagement in the region is primarily driven by its desire to enhance its global standing and secure economic interests, it also seeks to counter Western influence and exploit potential divisions among African states. Regional powers, such as South Africa and Nigeria, have their own geopolitical aspirations and vie for leadership roles in Africa. These countries seek to leverage their economic and political influence to shape regional dynamics and foster regional integration. Their engagement is driven by a desire for economic growth, increased regional cooperation, and the projection of their national interests beyond their borders. The recent geopolitical competition over Africa has both positive and negative consequences for the continent (Wiharta, 2005).

France, as a former colonial power, maintains a significant presence in Africa. Its engagement is driven by historical, economic, and security ties. France maintains

military bases and deploys troops in various African countries to support peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts. It also plays a role in regional diplomacy and has been involved in resolving conflicts in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic. France's engagement has been a subject of debate, with critics arguing that it perpetuates neocolonial relationships and hinders African agency. The United Kingdom, with historical ties to several African countries, has also been active in its engagement with the continent. The UK's interests include promoting trade and investment, development cooperation, and addressing security challenges. It has initiated programs like the "*Africa Investment Summit*" and the "*Building Resilience in African Economies*" initiative to enhance economic ties and support sustainable development. The UK's approach is influenced by post-Brexit considerations, seeking to establish new trade partnerships and enhance its global influence. Lastly, the United Arab Emirates has emerged as a key player in Africa, driven by economic interests, particularly in sectors like energy, infrastructure, and real estate. The UAE has invested significantly in African countries, providing financial resources, technology, and expertise. It has also engaged in strategic initiatives, such as establishing military bases and supporting peace processes in conflict-affected regions. The UAE's engagement is aimed at diversifying its economy, securing energy resources, and expanding its global influence (ACSRT, 2020)

On one hand, increased competition has spurred economic development, infrastructure investments, and expanded trade opportunities. It has also created leverage for African states in negotiating favorable terms and diversifying their international partnerships. On the other hand, the competition can exacerbate conflicts, undermine governance, and perpetuate a neocolonial relationship between external powers and African nations. The exploitation of natural resources without adequate benefit sharing, interference in internal affairs, and the potential for proxy conflicts are major concerns. To navigate the challenges posed by geopolitical competition, African countries must assert their agency, strengthen regional cooperation, and pursue a balanced approach in engaging with external powers. Enhancing good governance, promoting transparency, and prioritizing sustainable development will be crucial in ensuring that Africa maximizes the benefits of its resources and maintains peace and stability. Furthermore, multilateral cooperation and partnerships with international organizations can provide a platform for African countries to assert their interests and

influence global discussions on African issues. In conclusion, the recent geopolitical competition over Africa reflects the continent's growing significance on the global stage. As major powers seek to secure their interests, African nations face both opportunities and challenges. By navigating this competition through strategic engagement, regional unity, and sustainable development, Africa can shape its own future and emerge as a key player in the global arena (Oluwadare, 2014).

2.2.7. Security Management of the AU

The OAU's founding on May 25, 1963, as the first intergovernmental institution in Africa, marks the continent's first sincere attempt to address difficult African peacekeeping issues through continental agreements. During the Cold War era, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) emerged as the primary institution in Africa that responded to armed conflicts. The OAU's Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration was established to address the peacekeeping needs of the continent. However, in 1977, the Commission was disbanded due to its perceived inefficiency and reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of member nations. As an example, in October 1963, the OAU passed a resolution to deploy a military observer to demilitarize the territory between Morocco and Algeria. Nevertheless, this decision was never implemented due to a lack of political will and interest from OAU member nations. Moreover, during the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, the OAU chose not to intervene as it did not want to interfere in the domestic affairs of the country (Kenkel, 2013, s. 123).

The abolition of all kinds of colonial or foreign domination of the continent was the OAU's main concern. African peacekeeping missions weren't initially given much importance. Additionally, state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference were used as ineffective justifications for the OAU's engagement in African peacekeeping. The OAU had a primary objective of safeguarding the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of its member states. In return, member states committed to respecting the sovereignty of other African nations, with the expectation that other countries would refrain from interfering in their own internal matters. The concept of sovereignty was strictly interpreted and applied within the organization,

emphasizing non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states (K.Mathiews, 1977).

African nations utilized international concerns about democracy and human rights as justification for undermining their own sovereignty. As a result, it is not surprising that major violations of human rights occurred in Uganda in the 1970s, when Idi Amin was in power. The perils of adhering strictly to the ideas of sovereignty and non-interference are highlighted by Amin's atrocities. The OAU occasionally participated in African wars to its benefit, but with mediocre outcomes. Chad was a good illustration. Nigeria was the first peacekeeping force to be stationed in Chad in 1979 because of getting OAU support in retrospect. In the early 1980s, an Inter-African force was subsequently sent to Chad but left as the civil conflict broke out once more. The OAU was unable to sufficiently fund the peacekeeping operation (PKO), thus other African nations joined in with foreign assistance. (OAU provided just 400,000 utilized of the anticipated \$192 million expenditure.) The OAU withdrew in June 1982 due to logistical problems and an unrealistic election and troop pullout schedule (Kenkel, 2013).

Therefore, the Chad peacekeeping mission was a complete failure. As a result, the organization's first peacekeeping mission and the first instance of inter-African peacekeeping collaboration were failures that followed the group for ten years. It failed because of inadequate preparation, uncertainty regarding the mission, a lack of an OAU command and management structure, the partiality of a few troop-contributing states, a lack of adequate financial and logistical resources, and most importantly, a lack of political will. The failure had an impact on post-Cold War peacekeeping efforts on the continent. Only in 1990 did the OAU decide to send another peacekeeping force to Rwanda. In April 1991, a Military Observer Team (MOT) consisting of personnel from Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Uganda, and Burundi was deployed to Rwanda. The purpose of their deployment was to monitor the situation following a period of unrest. Subsequently, a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) was formed, which included 240 personnel from Nigeria, Senegal, Congo Brazzaville, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. The NMOG was tasked with observing and reporting on the situation in Rwanda. There were also additional forces involved, referred to as NMOG II, which included observers and a follow-up force. The composition and involvement of these observer groups aimed to maintain a neutral stance and contribute to stability in Rwanda (Matthews, 2009, s. 7-9).

Despite this commitment and the mechanisms of the OAU to manage and prevent and manage disputes, the genocide in Rwanda took place solely to illustrate the factual significance of the Unity once again. This failure by the OAU showed that Unity did not have adequate financial capacity to manage large scale peacekeeping operations, in addition to its ability to conduct observation missions, together with diplomatic or political efforts.

Due to a lack of resources, it was unable to decide on its own when to initiate any strategic, operational, or tactical aspect of peacekeeping operations. Demands for peacekeeping operations in Africa overwhelmed the OAU, changing the character of security with its complex cast of players. Farther pressures on the OAU came from escalating internal conflicts and pressing issues of state sovereignty, globalization, human rights abuses, and poverty in the continent. The Organization was not able to act successfully with well-staffed teams, while the insufficiency of the OAU charter no more addressed the latest security and peace challenges in Africa when the fights against colonialism and apartheid concluded. The OAU was renamed the AU on September 9, 1999, during an extraordinary session of the African Council of Heads of State and Government in Libya (Matthews, 2009).

The African Union's peacekeeping operations in Burundi (AMIB) and Sudan (AMIS) marked significant achievements as they were the first missions to be launched, planned, and executed solely by AU member states. These operations served as valuable learning experiences for the AU, enabling them to understand their role better, prepare for future operations, and assess the realities on the continent. The effectiveness of AMIB and AMIS operations demonstrated the AU's capability in executing peacekeeping missions, providing a tangible indication of the continent's peacekeeping capacity. The regionalization of contemporary complex peace missions in Burundi and Sudan, carried out amid ongoing armed conflicts, had a notable impact on the evolution of the traditional concept of peacekeeping. These operations showcased that, in the current geopolitical framework, African peacekeeping operations may not always follow a sequential and linear approach of preventative diplomacy, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and security-building. This highlighted the need for flexibility and adaptation in addressing multifaceted challenges faced in African peacekeeping contexts. The experiences gained from these missions contributed to redefining and shaping the understanding of peacekeeping practices within the AU and the broader international community. In the other side,

peacekeeping PKO can now be used as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, either to enforce peace or to prevent armed conflicts from flaring up again. This generally comes about without an agreed truce and the consent of the belligerents in these concepts, which include impartiality and neutrality, no longer have a commonly accepted meaning, and are no longer valued as they were before (A.Hussine, 2012).

AMIS and AMIB departed from traditional peacekeeping norms by not seeking consensus from all conflict parties before intervening in domestic affairs, and without a pre-existing ceasefire agreement. However, the permission of the ruling government was obtained for both missions, and the AU peacekeeping forces operated within limited mandates. In the case of Sudan, the AU forces faced limitations in their ability to counter and disarm groups like the Janjaweed due to their mandate focusing on peace observation rather than active implementation. These instances highlight the challenges the AU encountered in effectively carrying out peacekeeping operations, particularly with constrained mandates and resource capabilities.

The success of the AU's engagement in Sudan and Burundi can be measured by three factors: adherence to the established peacekeeping mandates, resolution of key disputes contributing to the conflict, and the PKOs' role in maintaining peace and security by containing and minimizing casualties. These criteria help evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the AU's peacekeeping missions and provide insights into their effectiveness. Additionally, the AU's capacity in overseeing successful PKOs can be assessed through considerations of organizational readiness, performance, and competence. Evaluating these factors provides a comprehensive analysis of the AU's involvement in Sudan and Burundi, highlighting their strengths, weaknesses, and overall ability to conduct effective peacekeeping operations (Paul, 2006). In April 2003, AMIB was sent to Burundi because there was no all-encompassing and inclusive ceasefire. AMIB had a multifaceted mission that aimed to achieve several objectives in Burundi. Firstly, it focused on facilitating the implementation of ceasefire agreements, ensuring that the parties involved adhered to the agreed-upon terms. Secondly, AMIB was responsible for guaranteeing the security and defense of Burundi, providing a stable environment for the country. Another crucial aspect of AMIB's mission was the protection of returning politicians from exile who would assume positions in the government. Additionally, AMIB aimed to create favorable conditions for internally displaced individuals and refugees to return to their homes. This involved addressing the challenges faced by those affected and promoting a safe

and supportive environment for their reintegration. The mission encompassed the eight provinces of Burundi and the three refugee camps located in Tanzania (A.Badmus, 2015). The UN was reluctant to engage in a situation that could relapse into conflict, thus the AMIB mission was also entrusted with establishing the prerequisites for a UN peacekeeping force to enter the nation. A complete ceasefire agreement was concluded on November 16, 2003. After AMIB's mandate expired on May 31, 2004, UN Operations in Burundi (ONUB) took over peacekeeping duties. Despite significant obstacles, the AMIB may be credited for stabilizing almost 95% of Burundi, facilitating the distribution of humanitarian relief, and offering sufficient safety for the exiled returned leaders designate. AMIB during its period of operation achieved in alleviating the volatile situation and without its Burundi could have been left to its own devices, likely leading to an escalation of the violent conflict.

When evaluating the achievements of AMIB based on the three metrics, it can be concluded that the mission successfully accomplished its goals in Burundi. Despite facing significant constraints in terms of policy, institutions, and concepts, AMIB played a vital role in resolving the conflict, promoting stability, and achieving peace in the region. Despite challenges in funding, logistics, and planning, the AU's presence in Burundi had a positive impact, particularly in preventing violence against women, reducing child recruitment into armed groups, providing aid to displaced individuals, and ensuring the safe passage of humanitarian aid. AMIB's success demonstrated the AU's commitment to peacekeeping missions and set the stage for potential UN intervention. Overall, these accomplishments underscore the AU's effectiveness in conducting successful peacekeeping operations, despite the limitations it encountered (Svensson, 2008, s. 11).

The AU's intervention in Sudan (AMIS I and II and subsequently independently - African Mission in Darfur AMID) can be seen as one of the most important tests of the AU's role in African Peacekeeping operations, on the other hand. Darfur's war had repercussions on both a local and global scale. Expanded and intensified into a major humanitarian crisis in Sudan and its surrounding nations, which resulted in the deaths of over 200,000 people, the displacement of over two million people, and a security danger to those nations. To find a deal to arm the Janjaweed, rebuild Darfur, and incorporate other armed groups into the national army, the AU intervened by deploying a peacekeeping force and starting peace talks. With a 120-person ceasefire monitoring panel and more than 6,000 AU personnel, the AU

first had no mandate for enforcing the ceasefire. However, on July 31, 2007, the Security Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1769, which authorizes the AU peacekeeping operation to grow into the intended combined peacekeeping force (UNAMID), which will consist of 26,000 UN and AU forces. The AU peacekeeping mission initially had a strength of 7,400 troops. As other governments sent representatives to the operation, the AU Monitoring Mission continued to expand to its intended size (A.Hussine, 2012).

Contrary to AMIB, it was found that the assessment of the success of the AU Peacekeeping operation in Sudan using the three identified metrics did not adequately consider the suitability of the AMIS structure and the effectiveness of its operations. The initial deployment of AU forces in Sudan had a restricted and inadequate mandate, as negotiated with the Sudanese government, which failed to address the root causes of the conflict adequately. AMIS faced criticism for its delayed deployment, limited ability to protect civilians in danger, and its focus on protecting military and civilian observers only. Furthermore, the AU peacekeeping operation made little progress in resolving the underlying conflicts and ensuring peace and security in the region. This was primarily due to a lack of sufficient personnel and essential resources, such as helicopters and armored vehicles, necessary for even basic peacekeeping operations. However, it is important to note that the political nature of the Darfur issue, international community polarization, and obstructionist actions of the Sudanese government were significant factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of the AU peacekeeping mission.

The AU's intervention in Burundi can be considered a success, whereas the peacekeeping operation in Sudan achieved only limited success due to various shortcomings. In Sudan, the AU force was insufficient in size and lacked a strong mandate, limiting its ability to effectively protect civilians from attacks by armed groups like the Janjaweed. Furthermore, resource constraints further hampered the mission's effectiveness. In contrast, the operation in Burundi had a clear mandate, political support from key stakeholders, and a well-defined strategy for peace. However, AMIS in Sudan lacked a distinct objective, a compelling mandate, and a comprehensive strategy. Throughout the mission, manpower, funding, and resource limitations persisted, posing significant challenges to the mission's effectiveness. While the AU's involvement in Burundi showcased success, the peacekeeping operation in Sudan faced notable obstacles and limitations in achieving sustainable

peace in the region. Furthermore, no real commitment was made to halt the mission. In response to deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions in Sudan, the UN eventually convinced the Khartoum government to recognize an African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeeping force. Due to AMIS's limited mandate, staff, and resources, the crisis quickly grew out of control. The instability in the region has been impacted by the Darfur crisis, which was also escalating the wars in Sudan and Chad. In these circumstances, UNAMID remained ineffectual due to a lack of personnel, equipment, and resources (Murithi, 2008, s. 77).

AMIB and AMIS demonstrated that institutional, political, and conceptual issues are the main difficulties and restrictions on AU competence in African peacekeeping missions. Both missions highlighted the AU's shortcomings in adapting to the new strategic environment. The purpose and capability of AU peacekeeping operations are significantly impacted by these political, conceptual, and institutional limits and challenges. The AU is occasionally held hostage by internal politics, the interests of member states, foreign nations, and host governments. Due to concerns about reactions from important African member states or foreign states, such the government of Sudan, these events prevented it from being perceived appropriately. This ambiguity accurately undercuts the credibility of AU Peacekeeping and highlights OAU's shortcomings. One of the main challenges to the effective deployment of peacekeeping missions is the erosion of political will among member nations. Furthermore, neither African nor non-African leaders are likely to take a chance on a lack of infantrymen in unfamiliar foreign territories where there may be no recognized strategic local interests.

Accordingly, the OAU's equal shortcomings and weaknesses are reflected in the ad hoc method in which African peacekeeping requirements are being identified, with nations emerging on their own. Therefore, rather than the organization, capacity-building tasks for African peacekeeping reflect the objectives of the global player and the local actor. (A.Hussine, 2012). The difficulty of balancing the seeming consistency between the need to participate in domestic disputes and the necessity for state sovereignty was another political dilemma for AU peacekeeping missions, particularly in Sudan. The operation in Sudan revealed the AU's recognition of the OAU's political fragility, which stemmed from its strong emphasis on the principle of sovereignty and resulting indifference towards intervening in the serious humanitarian and human rights situation in the country. Despite being viewed as a significant step by the AU to

engage in Sudan and Darfur through AMIS, the operation highlighted the limitations in addressing such challenges. Notably, the AU continued to provide protection for African presidents, even when concerns arose about their legitimacy. This underscored a complex dynamic within the AU, where considerations of sovereignty and political stability sometimes overshadowed human rights concerns and interventions in certain situations (K.Apuuli, 2020).

The Sudanese case exposed a lack of political will and leadership within the AU, which contradicted the organization's aspirations when it transitioned from the OAU to the AU. This fragility had detrimental effects on the effectiveness of AU peacekeeping efforts. The principles of sovereignty, consensus, and territorial integrity continued to exert influence on AU peacekeeping operations, resulting in constrained mandates that limited the power and operational effectiveness of the deployed troops. Despite claims that the AU is recognized as the only regional organization in the world explicitly acknowledging the right to intervene in a member country's serious humanitarian and human rights issues, the AU maintained an interventionist and activist stance that often clashed with the host country's preferences for limited mandates. This dynamic resulted in a state of paralysis within the organization's peacekeeping endeavors (Alabduljabbar, 2021).

Due to improperly addressed strategic objectives, the African Union Peace Support Activities Division (PSOD) was unable to organize and oversee African Standby Force (ASF) activities at the strategic level. For instance, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) found weaknesses in strategic planning and leadership. It also encountered difficulties combining the mission's many different elements, including political, military, police, and humanitarian activities. The provision of insufficient strategic direction or guidance, the late filling of crucial strategic-level positions during peacekeeping operations, the undertraining of seasoned strategic leaders, and the ambiguity of the duties of international allies are further issues. These AU difficulties in Sudan's peacekeeping were pitifully revealed. Furthermore, there was an inadequate correlation between the peacekeeping department and other departments of the AU Commission. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) lacked experience in managing complex peacekeeping operations, which became evident through its involvement in conflicts in Africa. The PSC's inability to adequately prepare and support African armed forces for AU peacekeeping missions was apparent. This deficiency at the institutional level of the AU had repercussions on the operational level, particularly in

terms of operational leadership and combat readiness. Without effective planning and clear strategic objectives, even with a capable AU peacekeeping corps, conducting successful AU peacekeeping operations becomes extremely challenging. The limitations in strategic leadership and planning impact the readiness of the African Standby Force (ASF), including its rapid response capability and ability to conduct robust and multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Proper strategic leadership is crucial for the ASF's readiness and capability to effectively carry out AU peacekeeping missions (Alabduljabbar, 2021).

Another institutional flaw in AU peacekeeping operations is the presence of financial, logistical, and human resource constraints. There was a lack of adequately equipped and trained soldiers available for quick deployment, resulting in challenges in forming a capable and credible peacekeeping force. Additionally, the AU faces limitations in air transport and rapid response capabilities, hampering its ability to project power and respond swiftly. As a result, the AU often relied on external allies for crucial support in these areas. Furthermore, delays in mobilizing member countries for peacekeeping operations were exacerbated by differences in decision-making procedures, timelines, and national interests within the governments of member states. These factors contribute to the overall constraints and challenges faced by the AU in effectively conducting peacekeeping operations (Alabduljabbar, 2021).

The shortcomings in political, institutional, and conceptual aspects, as observed in the cases of AMIB and AMIS, indicate that the AU is not yet fully prepared to undertake autonomous interventions and multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Due to limited financial and logistical capacities, the AU must continue to collaborate with organizations like the UN to conduct successful operations in complex African contexts. This reliance on external partners results in moderate implementation times and necessitates greater policy coordination. Furthermore, the case studies demonstrate the formidable challenges in realizing the AU's goal of having the ASF ready for multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Africa, primarily due to strategic and operational limitations. Addressing these drawbacks and enhancing strategic planning, operational leadership, and resource capabilities are crucial for the successful implementation of the AU's peacekeeping objectives (Kenkel, 2013).

The early stage of the AU's involvement in complex peacekeeping operations and its ongoing operational development do not allow for a definitive assessment of

the organization's effectiveness in these situations. The case studies presented highlight that the AU still has a significant distance to cover in terms of fulfilling its role and achieving readiness in African peacekeeping operations. The current strategic landscape in Africa suggests that the AU is unlikely to achieve complete self-sustainability in managing peacekeeping operations soon. The organization will continue to rely on external support for conducting and monitoring peacekeeping operations. However, this reality has implications for other crucial factors influencing the role and readiness of AU peacekeeping operations, including the organization's political, institutional, and policy capacities. These aspects will require continuous development and strengthening to enhance the AU's effectiveness in fulfilling its peacekeeping mandates (Matthews, 2009).

To enhance future peacekeeping efforts, the AU should prioritize upgrading its policies, institutions, and concepts at the strategic and operational levels. Key considerations include addressing political uncertainties surrounding issues like sovereignty and human rights abuses, ensuring accountability to relevant stakeholders such as host countries, combatants, regional actors, and the international community, and confronting challenges related to political will and consensus among African leaders on collective security principles. By actively tackling these areas, the AU can avoid the pitfalls that plagued its predecessor, the OAU, and improve the effectiveness of its peacekeeping operations. This entails fostering transparency, engaging in open dialogues, and promoting shared understanding to strengthen the AU's overall peacekeeping framework in Africa (A.Hussine, 2012).

Political disparities also impact AU peacekeeping operations at the operational level. While military interventions may be used, the lasting solution to armed conflicts in Africa lies in political resolutions, such as implementing sustainable peace agreements supported by credible AU peacekeeping efforts. Addressing these political challenges requires a comprehensive global approach that establishes collective priorities in peacekeeping, optimizes resources, and allows for greater African ownership of these operations, despite their inherent weaknesses. Given the limited availability of resources, particularly in terms of finances and logistics, the AU should explore support arrangements to define a division of labor among Africa's security actors, including the UN, EU, US, and other influential powers. By collaborating and sharing responsibilities, the AU can mitigate resource constraints and enhance the effectiveness of its peacekeeping operations. Recognizing the intersection of political

dynamics and resource limitations, the AU can navigate these challenges more effectively and strengthen its capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations in Africa (Apuuli, 2020).

THIRD CHAPTER: CONFLICTS RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

3.1. The AU Conflict Resolution Mechanism

The OAU presidents acknowledged in the 1990 proclamation that their efforts to solve the economic problems facing the African continent were greatly hampered by the presence of conflict throughout the continent. As a result, they made the decision to cooperate to resolve disputes quickly and amicably. During the Cairo Summit in 1993, the OAU leaders formed the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR). They thus acknowledged that resolving conflicts is a requirement for the establishment of peace and stability as well as a requirement for economic and social growth. Peacekeeping was a contentious issue from the beginning that divided participants in the OAU process. Political leaders in the OAU believed that peace and security belonged only to the United Nations, which had the authority and resources to uphold peace throughout the world (Söner Karagül, 2010).

The OAU, in line with its primary objective of conflict anticipation and prevention, primarily delegated comprehensive peacekeeping responsibilities to sub-regional African organizations and the UN. The organization outlined three objectives for reducing and resolving conflicts: predicting and preventing potential conflicts, engaging in peace-making and peace-building efforts during ongoing conflicts, and undertaking pacification activities in post-conflict eras. While this initiative positioned the union as a leader in African conflict management, it did not play a significant role in actual peace processes on the continent. Nonetheless, the OAU was able to coordinate emerging early warning systems across different sub-regions of Africa, serving as an information hub. Although the OAU had its flaws, it made efforts to enhance coordination and information sharing among African nations. This laid the groundwork for future developments in conflict management and prevention within the AU (Bamidele, 2017).

However, the OAU decided to become the Continental African Union (AU) on July 9, 2001, after most of states and governments adopted the Union's Constitutive Act in Zambia. Nevertheless, it remains to be viewed whether the AU will match the conflict avoidance, management, and resolution abilities of its forerunner. The AU's founding act, in contrast to the OAU Charter, permits involvement in domestic policies

of member nations in instances of unlawful government changes, mass murder, and wars that endanger stability of the region. The bill also established a pan-African parliament, funded an economic and cultural commission, and permitted the involvement of members of African civil society in the organization's activities (Bamidele, 2017).

After the African Union (AU) was formed, African leaders ratified a protocol in Durban, South Africa, which established the Peace and Security Council. This protocol reaffirmed the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution and laid out essential procedures and structures for the continent's collective security and early warning system. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) became the primary decision-making body for conflict prevention, management, and resolution within the AU. It received support from various institutions, including the African Standby Force (ASF), which includes a Military Staff Committee. The AU Commission (AUC) played a pivotal role in supporting these efforts and was assisted by a continental early warning system, a Panel of Wise Men, and a Special Peace Fund. These organizations and mechanisms were put in place to equip African states with a comprehensive set of tools to address their security needs. The creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was a result of the PSC protocol, outlining the interconnected components of APSA. Through APSA, the AU aimed to strengthen its capacity for conflict prevention, early warning, mediation, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. These initiatives demonstrated the AU's commitment to proactive and comprehensive approaches in tackling the security challenges faced by African countries (K.Apuuli, 2020).

3.2. The African Union Peace and Security Architecture

The decision to transform the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) during the Fourth Extraordinary Summit in Sirte in September 1999 laid the foundation for the creation of a new African Security Mechanism. This decision marked a significant shift in the objectives, mission, and roles assigned to the newly formed pan-African institution. The enactment of the AU Constitutive Act in July 2000 represented a crucial milestone in this transformation. Over the past 40 years since its establishment in 1963, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

evolved and developed in response to changing security challenges on the continent. Despite this evolution, the AU continued to uphold some core principles inherited from its predecessor. These principles include a focus on sovereignty, advocating "*African solutions to African problems*" respecting non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and avoiding the use of force to mediate crises in Africa. These values continued to guide the AU's approach to security matters. Through APSA, the AU aimed to enhance its capacity to address security issues more effectively, including conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. The establishment of APSA reflected the AU's commitment to finding comprehensive and African-led approaches to tackling security challenges in the continent. (Badejo, 2008).

However, the law brought about significant regulatory changes, especially in the areas of democracy, human rights, and respect for the value of human life as well as opposition and denunciation of unlawful administrations and interventions. The Union's agenda shifted to emphasize security and peace because of the new law. The PSC Protocol and the African Common Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) would be implemented based on these new principles and norms. In actuality, the APSA's legal foundation might be deemed to comprise both the PSC protocol and the CADSP (Chika Njideka Oguonu, 2014).

The AU's new framework introduced a significant departure from the OAU by including the principle of the right of intervention. This principle is clearly articulated in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, granting the AU the authority to intervene in a member state when grave events such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity take place. This represents a shift from the OAU's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The inclusion of this provision reflects the AU's commitment to addressing and preventing mass atrocities and human rights abuses within its member states. Additionally, the Protocol amended the Article in 2003 to address additional grave risks to the rule of law to address security issues in AU member states in accordance with PSC recommendations and Article 4(j) allows "*the right of Member States to request the Union to intervene to restore peace and security.*" With the provisions of the various Article 4 parts, the continent transitioned from a position of unwavering respect for state sovereignty to one where the right to safeguard the populace and the right to act to influence the security management agenda are prioritized (A.Badmus, 2015).

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is a permanent decision-making body within the AU that plays a central role in the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The PSC is responsible for setting the agenda and providing direction for conflict prevention, resolution, and management efforts within the AU. It operates in line with the African Common Defense and Security Policy (ACDSP), which aims to protect human life and promote development across the continent. This Protocol recognizes that the PSC operates within the scope of the UN, acknowledging the UN's primary responsibility for maintaining global peace and security. Also, the Protocol recognizes the UN's admission of the responsibilities of regional organizations, such as the AU, in addressing security challenges within their respective regions. This demonstrates the AU's commitment to working in collaboration with the UN and other regional organizations to enhance peace and security in Africa. According to Article 7 of the PSC Protocol, the PSC is tasked with essential tasks such as anticipating and averting crises, maintaining peace, and fostering peace, among others. Clearly, the PSC has significant autonomy in decision-making over a wide variety of security-related matters on the continent, from preventive diplomacy to peacebuilding after conflicts (Fisher, 2010).

However, only the AU assembly has the authority to decide based on the PSC's recommendations in emergency circumstances, such as those mentioned in Article 4(h), or where action is needed in a non-consenting member country. The council is also promoting strong collaboration with the UN, regional economic communities, and regional organizations. The Council also made critical policy choices about threats to Africa's peace and security, with a mixed track record of successes and failures (Munya, 1999). It is known that most of these responses focused on denouncing and applying economic and political sanctions against illegitimate political regime changes. In addition, the council approved peacekeeping operations in Kenya to deal with post-election unrest, as well as in Sudan, Burundi, the Comoros, and Somalia (Engin Akçay, 2015).

The establishment of the ASF faces various obstacles, such as regional disparities, coordination issues, financial limitations, capacity building, training needs, equipment, and logistical challenges. The PSC Secretariat plays a crucial role in supporting the PSC by providing organizational and operational assistance. It serves as the PSC's institutional memory and facilitates the PSC's interactions with other institutions. Additionally, the Secretariat oversees conflict anticipation and prevention

through the CEWS, which collects and analyzes data to enable swift conflict management. Overcoming these obstacles and strengthening the support provided by the PSC Secretariat are essential for the successful implementation of the ASF and the effectiveness of the APSA in advancing peace and security in Africa (Söner, 2010).

Based on the current analysis, the founding of APSA demonstrates the commitment of the continent's leaders to proactively address and settle security challenges on the continent. This reflects a shift from reactive approaches to a more comprehensive framework aimed at ensuring legitimate peace and security as a foundation for Africa's development. It also represents a shift from the previous extemporary responses under the OAU, offering a unified and structured approach to address security issues specific to Africa. Despite being relatively new, the APSA already showed progress through its initiatives and interventions in various hotspots across the continent. The AU adopted new standards and norms, condemned unconstitutional changes of regime, and implemented measures such as suspension of membership for violating countries. The AU took decisive actions, including peacekeeping missions and electoral observation, in countries like Burundi, Somalia, the Comoros, and Darfur, demonstrating its commitment to implementing the APSA and addressing African security challenges (Sarkin, 2009).

However, some of the AU peacekeeping operations are being conducted by the UN, which converts AU peacekeeping forces into multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions. The AU's dynamic approach in disposing peacekeeping missions to stabilize the security situation in Sudan and Burundi is widely acknowledged. These deployments were aimed at addressing the security challenges in these regions and filling the gaps left by the United Nations' hesitation to intervene before reaching inclusive peace agreements. The AU's willingness to act in these cases demonstrates its commitment to promoting stability and security in Africa, even when the UN's involvement is limited.

3.3. The ECOWAS and Security challenges

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established through a treaty signed in May 1975. The process leading to the formation of ECOWAS involved significant diplomatic efforts over a three-year period, with

Nigeria playing a crucial role. However, since its inception, ECOWAS encountered various economic, political, and security challenges. These challenges arose from the inability of member states to effectively address these issues individually, necessitating collective action and regional cooperation through the establishment of ECOWAS (Adebajo, 2018).

Indeed, the member countries of ECOWAS face significant challenges, including widespread poverty and weak state capacities. While the primary objective of ECOWAS was initially focused on harmonization and coordination of national economic policies, the treaty endorsers also expressed their commitment to principles such as “*collective solidarity, self-reliance, non-aggression between member states, regional peacekeeping, and the protection of human and individual rights as outlined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*”. ECOWAS recognized the importance of addressing not only economic issues but also goals associated with security and human rights, which have historically been challenging for the sub-region to achieve (Clute, 2013).

When the original ECOWAS treaty was signed, promoting, and protecting human rights were considered crucial for achieving good governance, as it was a chronic shortcoming in the region. Many of the governments that signed the treaty were characterized by autocratic rule, and the presence of ruling military autocracies in some ECOWAS member countries made it challenging to secure these nations from internal uprisings, particularly as ethnicity based politics plagued countries like Mali, Senegal, and in Nigeria's case, it had led to civil war (Arthur, 2010)

Since its establishment in the mid-1970s, ECOWAS faced significant challenges in achieving its objectives of ensuring social and political stability, security, and the integration of member states. The West African sub-region is confronted with various development crises that pose obstacles to the effectiveness of the organization. These challenges include soaring levels of illiteracy, unproductive bureaucracies, incompetent leadership, and corruption. The complexity and depth of these problems exceed what a regional organization can easily resolve. Throughout its existence, ECOWAS encountered unique problems that raised doubts about its viability and reputation. Assessing the organization's success in addressing the political and security issues of the sub-region in the new millennium is a worthwhile research endeavor (Sarkin, 2009).

The West African countries, like many other regions in Africa, faced significant security challenges, particularly in the form of civil wars. While inter-state conflicts in the region were relatively rare, there were notable cases of irredentist wars in Africa, such as the conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and border disputes involving Libya, Egypt, Chad, and Niger. However, the countries of ECOWAS recognized that the costs of war, both financially and in terms of human lives, far outweigh any potential benefits. This understanding led to a general trend of restraint and non-mobilization of troops for conflicts, as seen in the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over Bakassi and border disputes involving Chad and its neighboring countries. The disputed territories in these conflicts were generally relatively small in comparison to the vast land area between the state borders (Keita, 1998).

According to Zartman, the lack of well-established states in Africa contributed to the absence of large-scale wars and effective state control over borders. However, he predicted that as borders become more clearly defined, there may be an increase in border disputes in the future. There were instances where neighboring countries provided shelter and support to rebels or individuals seeking to undermine their home governments. For example, during Eyadema's rule in Togo, he accused Ghana of harboring rebels plotting against his government. Similarly, the Senegalese government conducted operations against Casamance separatists, causing both civilians and rebels to seek refuge in neighbor countries (Zartman, 1984).

The main security problem that proceeds to threaten the regional countries is the outbreak of internal disputes between ethnic groups. The way in which the government shares out budget revenues, with a resource-rich region suspecting that the government is diverting revenues to regions with few facilities. Many civil servants and individuals felt they had a share in the Nigerian government's income. The cause was the lack of money that governments can allocate to the regions, as well as the perennialism of governments, which is described as the sense of authority that many civil servants and private individuals believed they had over Nigerian state revenues. In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, militias often resort to kidnapping oil workers and sabotaging oil facilities as a means of protest transnational oil companies and the central government. The MEND emerged as an umbrella organization for such activities. These insurgents attempt to frame the situation in the Niger Delta as a conflict, portraying oil workers as enemies. This perception allows them to justify their violence as a legitimate form of protest (Keita, 1998).

Religion has often been a cause of tension among local populations, as there can be disagreements and clashes between followers of Christianity and Islam in West Africa. These conflicts often arise from differences in religious beliefs and cultural norms brought by immigrants to the communities they settle in. Coastal regions in certain West African countries are primarily Christian, with access to better educational institutions, fertile lands, and industries. Consequently, these regions have traditionally attracted migrants, particularly Muslims from the northern areas, who come in search of employment opportunities as itinerant traders, day laborers, or herders. The differing religious and cultural backgrounds of these groups can contribute to social and religious tensions within these communities.

Clashes took place in several West African countries and there are few encouraging signs of slowdown. The Ivory Coast and Nigeria are hardest hit by such religious conflicts. The 2002 Ivory Coast Civil War was triggered by tensions between southern Ivory Coast leaders, who were predominantly Christian, and their opposition to a northern candidate running for the presidential election. The conflict resulted in the division of the country along what can be seen as a "*civilizational dividing line*" between the Muslim-majority north and Christian-majority south. It is important to note that the conflict did not involve violent mobilization between the north and south. This illustrates that the mere existence of a religious divide does not automatically lead to bloodshed. Rather, factors such as political systems, misinterpreted religious values, and escalating divisions can help explain the differing outcomes. It is worth mentioning that disputes between Christians and Muslims have been escalating since the 1980s, with instances of violent clashes such as the clash between a Maitatsine Movement and the Maiduguri police in Nigeria in 1982 (Adebajo, 2018).

Indeed, the Maitatsine Movement serves as a significant example in this context. The movement sought to establish an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria and attracted followers among students, farmers, and the urban poor with its vision of Islamic revival. The government encountered this challenge by engaging in confrontation, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people at the hands of the military and the police. The Maitatsine Movement later evolved into the extremist organization known as Boko Haram. Boko Haram adopted an ideology, organizational structure, and approach like that of the Taliban, and it carried out some of the most brutal and dangerous attacks in Nigeria, surpassing other militant groups in terms of their impact on the Nigerian population (Arthur, 2010).

Since 2009, Nigeria experienced significant disruption due to the large-scale bombings carried out by the Boko Haram movement. While Boko Haram shares similarities in ideology and goals with the Maitatsine, its organizational structure, military resistance, and methods are reminiscent of the Taliban. Moreover, the attacks conducted by Boko Haram have been exceptionally brutal and destructive. Initially confined to the northeast region of Nigeria, the group's attacks have progressively spread to the central and southern parts of the country (Arthur, 2010).

3.4.The Background of Mali Conflict

One of the largest pre-colonial Sahel empires inspired the name of Mali. Ancient Mali covered an area four times the size of contemporary France at its height in the 14th century, from the heart of the Sahara to the Atlantic Ocean. In the Islamic world, Timbuktu and Jenne, two of the empire's main towns, were renowned for their richness and knowledge. But ancient Mali gradually disintegrated into several successor empires. The majority of West Africa was subject to French colonial administration by the end of the 19th century. The borders that today separate the autonomous French-speaking nations of the sub-region were established by the French when they determined the limits of their colonies. With 3.7 million people when it emerged from French colonization in 1960, Mali was substantially smaller than the former empire, inherited a very big region, more than double the size of contemporary France. The nation's post-independence history had a terrible past. After independence, the country's development was severely constrained by European colonization, and many of its citizens were pastoral nomads or subsistence farmers, with a life expectancy of about 45 years (Clute, 2013).

Only a small percentage had access to contemporary education and medical services, and the country's brightest students had left for Europe by the end of the colonial period, the brightest Malian students had left for Europe. There were relatively few chances for employment because the country's manufacturing sector was so small, underdeveloped, and had a weak export economy. Daringly, France had left behind a sizable civil service that the new Mali could not easily replace but that was too powerful to be scaled back (Keita, 1998).

Modibo Keita, the first president of Mali, pursued a foreign policy characterized by extreme measures, aiming to develop his nation throughout an authoritarian government based on scientific socialism. He sought assistance from the Eastern Bloc countries to support his goals. In the early 1960s, the Keita regime managed to suppress a Tuareg uprising. However, in the late 1960's, Mali was in a dire state of poverty and bankruptcy, leading Keita to seek assistance from the West, primarily France. In 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traore, successfully overthrew Keita's government. Following 1968, Moussa Traore's administration tried to move the nation more firmly in the direction of the West and economic reform based on the free market. However, there was little foreign investment, and a severe drought quickly engulfed the area. Development of the country's infrastructure happened relatively slowly and unevenly. The Malian government was unable to reduce an overextended civil service or privatize the politically influential but economically ineffective public sector, which resulted in a rise in the national debt. In the meantime, Mali's high natality rates prevented it from creating enough jobs to support its expanding population. Government official corruption became more pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s. A second Tuareg revolt confronted a politically and economically weak Mali in 1990 (Caprini, 2015).

Social conditions, government policies, and the nation's economic issues all became contentious in 1991, sparking a violent government response as well as a populist rebellion. The nation had just started a shaky truce that ended the war with the Tuaregs in the north. Quickly, a new national leadership group with the moniker "*Transitional Committee for People's Security*" appeared. Amadou Touré, a lieutenant colonel in the Malian Army, was a significant committee member. Following the ousting of Modibo Keita's government in 1968, the new administration led by General Moussa Traore swiftly initiated political and economic reforms. One of the significant steps taken was the convening of a national convention to establish a new constitution. These reforms paved the way for democratic elections, which took place a year later. In those elections, Alpha Oumar Konaré, a former opposition leader, emerged victorious and assumed power as the new president of Mali.

Konaré persisted in pushing his ambitious reform program. He was elected president in 1997's second presidential election. Konaré was well-known for drawing attention to the achievements of his government during a visit to the US in late 1997. He described his country as an African nation that had achieved considerable economic

transformation and was democratic and stable. Since 1992, no one has contested his assessment, and the nation is widely regarded as a promising new multiparty democracy. Mali's political revolution took place at a period of conflict and disaster, making it more remarkable. However, the nation had been struggling with a weak economy, significant political and social unrest, and daunting problems left over from previous battles (Benjaminsen, 2008).

Mali faced development obstacles because of its ecology, ethnography, and political history. The climate of Mali spans the area between the Sahara itself and the dry savannah of the Sahel. Periodic, extremely dry periods impact the area. Mali is a multicultural nation. There are numerous different peoples and dozens of different languages spoken by millions of people in five or six distinct ethnolinguistic groups. The socioeconomic divide between the nomadic pastoralists of the north and the urban, rural, and farmer populations of the south, which together make up roughly 80% of the population, is the most significant component of the country's cultural variety. Despite making up fewer than 10% of Mali's overall population, live in northern part of the country, the Tuareg make up a sizable portion of the population (Wing, 2013).

Mali has a diverse population, yet it has typically stayed out of the ethnic strife that several other African countries experience. Apart from the Tuareg, Mali's numerous ethnic groups cooperatively work in both the public and commercial sectors. However, just like in most African nations, ethnic tensions are ingrained in society and no national government is permitted to alienate ethnic groups. To prevent the rise of ethnic patronage, senior leaders in Mali adopted a policy of tolerating certain forms of "*ethnic advocacy*" However, when it came to infrastructure development, previous governments predominantly prioritized southern parts of the country. As a result, the desert regions received significantly less attention and investment compared to other regions, a situation that persisted until the 1990s (Kone, 2017)

Since Mali gained independence, Tuareg rebels posed a significant threat to the country's stability. To examine this threat, it is crucial to investigate the group's history and ethnography. They are a pastoral desert people of North Africa, often known as the "*Blue Men of the Desert*" and share ethnic ties with the Berbers of the North Africa, evident in their language (Tamasheq) and cultural traits. However, unlike the sedentary and agricultural societies, the Tuaregs maintain a nomadic lifestyle that is adapted to the hard desert environment (A.Emerson, 2011).

The Tuaregs are segregated by clan and tribe even though they speak the same language and claim the same ethnicity. In the Tuareg society, there are distinct caste divisions that include classifications for slaves, freemen, and nobility. Nobles and freemen in traditional Tuareg culture relied on their slaves to perform manual labor. According to Tuareg narratives, tribes and clans contended with one another and other nearby populations for meager water resources, pasture, and control of Saharan trade corridors up until the arrival of the colonial period. The Tuareg were formerly well-known for being traders, warriors, and desert rovers. Even while they only sporadically assimilated into established state institutions (such as the Air Sultanate in the Niger region surrounding Agadez), their propensity (as non-autonomous groups) for smuggling, banditry, and slave raiding did not make other Sahelian businesses vulnerable to them. The archetypal Tuareg were dispersed nomads who lived comfortably in a hard climate thanks to their abundance of livestock. In general, they believed that they were superior to their agricultural counterparts in the desert who had darker skin. The Tuareg tradition consistently makes light of smuggling and banditry, which is not effective to endear the Tuaregs to the central authority (Kone, 2017).

In the late 19th century, when they consolidated their West African empire, French defeated and exerted its influence over the group. Nevertheless, Tuareg society shown great adaptability and resistance to change and appeared to be mostly refractory to inculturation by colonial authority. In their pursuit of a traditional nomadic lifestyle, Tuareg herders also tended to disregard the artificial borders drawn by European powers, they frequently moved between colonies, and France was unable to fully integrate them into the social structure of colonial system (Keita, 1998).

The Tuareg and sedentary agricultural peoples had a complex and symbiotic connection. The Tuareg formerly relied on farmers to provide them with grains like millet, the region's staple food, as they did not engage in crop production. According to (Clute, 2013), some Tuareg (and other Sahelian herders) also relied on farmers' seasonal access fields that were harvested. Prior to the arrival of the colonizers, the aggressive During the French colonial period, Tuareg leaders were able to levy taxes from the peasants residing the Niger River. The colonial authorities, in their efforts to sustain peace with the tribes, did not challenge them to own lands and collect taxes. This arrangement allowed for a certain degree of autonomy and self-governance for the Tuareg within their territories, while also contributing to a relatively peaceful coexistence between the Tuareg and the colonial administration. As a result, the

Tuaregs' relationships with their neighbors would deteriorate. Most Tuareg tribes remained outside of the political network relationships and material advantages of the new states when West African nations gained independence in the 1960s. They frequently viewed their nation's new African leadership with outrage and disdain. For them, the country's new leaders were seeing them as socially backward. The Malian government misunderstood the customary agricultural production relationships between the Tuareg and their neighbors, interpreting their demand for "taxes" as nothing more than extortion. The new administration also thought that those who farmed the land owned it, therefore ownership of the property remained a contentious issue (A.Emerson, 2011, s. 672).

3.5. ECOWAS and African Union Intervention in Mali

The wave of changes that swept over the continent between the 1940's and 1950s also influenced the Tuareg people, leading some of them in Mali and neighboring nations to envision a sovereign state called "Azawad." This state would encompass the northern regions of Mali, Niger, and Algeria, which are predominantly inhabited by the Tuareg. However, it is important to note that the Tuareg people did not have an integrated military or political structure as a group, and their loyalty primarily lay with their regional traditional leaders. Following Mali's independence on June 20, 1960, there was a sense of disappointment and sadness among all Malians, including the Tuareg. The new national administration faced challenges due to administrative inexperience and unsustainable economic and social policies, which negatively impacted the people's civil liberties and economy. In addition to these broader issues, there was a perception among the Tuareg that they were disproportionately marginalized and discriminated against in the distribution of governmental subsidies, further contributing to the overall discontentment (A.Emerson, 2011).

Naturally, the Tuaregs desired advantages and chances, but they disapproved of the state's surveillance of their way of life. They noted that most these postcolonial Mali's senior leaders belonged to southern ethnic groups that were at odds with the pastoral way of life of the country's northern desert nomads. The land reform that threatened the Tuaregs' preferential access to agricultural products alarmed them as

well. Some Tuareg leaders started to have doubts about the new national elite who wanted to obliterate their culture in the name of "*modernization*". Beginning in early 1962, sporadic attacks against the national government marked the beginning of the first wave of Tuareg rebellion. Up until 1963, attacks increased in size and ferocity, creating very unstable conditions in northern Mali. However, there was little indication of a unified leadership, a defined strategic goal, or a well-coordinated strategy in the Tuareg attacks. Because they were armed with crude, relatively outdated, ineffectual small arms rather than sophisticated weapons, the insurgents typically employed their camels as transportation. Additionally, they failed to organize in the Tuareg people's uprising against the central government. Although estimates of their size are largely speculative, they were made up of roughly 1,500 warriors (Keita, 1998).

It is possible to say that the Mali Tuareg problem dates to ancient times. The country's mismanagement of the 70s-80s, politics based on ethnicity, political and socioeconomic injustice, exclusion, and nominal democracy far from institutionalization are among the reasons for the Tuareg rebellion. This problem later escalated to separatism. In 2012, when the "Jihadist" group joined the Tuareg rebels, the rebel group made itself felt heavily with the operation launched. According to Møller, due to the country's lack of inclusive democracy and the lack of services in the northern regions, the people of the region feel excluded and unfairly treated, and for this reason they rebel against the central government. With the 1992 and 2006 Algerian agreements, the Bamako government tried to improve the situation by including the Tuareg people more in the state staff, especially in the police and military, and by providing more services to their regions, but an ultimate solution could not be found. The central government was unable to rectify the situation, was still struggling with the rebels (Møller, 2009, s. 420-422).

At the point of military security in Mali, not only did the Tuareg the movement pour la liberation de l'Azawad (MNLA) rebels fight, but there are other groups besides them. Mainly Maghreb Al Qaeda (AQIM) and there are "*jihadist*" groups with "*religious*" motifs such as Mouvement pour L'unicite et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, and Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), affiliated with Boko Haram and ISIS. Especially after the death of the overthrown former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the Sahil-Sahara region became quite unstable. Many weapons and fighters infiltrated Mali through Libya. In

this way, the "*jihadist*" groups that tried to make the sharia rule dominant in the region were able to gain strength.

In 2012, all these groups, which we mentioned above, launched an attack on the army of Mali at the same time. As a result of these heavy attacks, the central government army weakened and found the solution in foreign intervention. In this difficult environment, the Tuareg rebels unilaterally declared the independence of the so-called independent state of Azawad. On the other hand, "*jihadist*" groups carried out serious attacks against the central government with the support of Boko Haram. Furthermore, due to the absence of central authority and the unstable environment in Mali, which was going through the coup process, the government was off balance and could not stop the attacks. For this reason, the regional organization ECOWAS took the initiative and declared that a military intervention was necessary in Mali, and in this context, it intervened with 3000 soldiers. On the other hand, it forced the MNLA and Ansar Dine organizations to negotiate (Keita, 1998)

In the post-2012 Mali coup d'état period, the Malian army found itself in the middle of war, while fighting the rebels, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and MUJAO. Thousands of people died in these conflicts and caused thousands of people to flee to neighboring countries. It dealt a blow to the stability in the northern part of the country and even the most important historical monuments of the country were destroyed in these conflicts. At that time, the neighboring countries (Mauritania-Algeria and Niger), which might be affected by these conflicts at first, reached a summit to dominate the situation. African Union and European Union also attended these summits later; secondly, it entered preparations for a joint international operation in Mali, stating that an urgent intervention is essential to improve the situation in Mali, to ensure peace and stability, and to organize elections. Since Mali is a West African country, ECOWAS also took an important initiative, and France, which has influence in the country, also displayed a very determined stance on the intervention and involved in this process (Sandor, 2013, s. 2-4). Thus, to establish order and stability in the north of the country, ECOWAS took the initiative for the intervention and carried out the intervention with the help of international organizations such as the EU, UN, and AU. These organizations came together to support the Malian army and called the "*African-led*" Mali Operation. They took the first step of the International Support

Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The purpose of this operation was to ensure stability in the north, to retake the captured regions and to curb international terrorism.

In 2012, under the leadership of France, the ECOWAS countries came together and decided to intervene. ECOWAS was authorized with the consent of the UNSC (Sandor, 2013). In this context, the restructuring of the Malian army took action to establish authority in the north, protecting civilians and spread stability. An international intervention led by the AU, and with the approval of the AU ECOWAS response plan; demanded the participation of 3300 military and police officers (Kwesi Aning, 2014, s. 9-10).

In response to the situation in Mali, the African Union's Peace, and Security Council (PSC) issued a high-level alert and called for the establishment of a joint coordination mechanism between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) Commission to address this threat. On March 20, 2012, the 314th AU PSC created the Support and Monitoring Group on the Situation in Mali, which included neighboring countries, ECOWAS, the Sahelo-Saharan Community (CEN-SAD) and interested international partners. On March 22, 2012, the military in Mali staged a coup and took over control of the country. So, in response, ECOWAS reacted similarly to previous conflicts by imposing sanctions on Mali, appointing Burkina Faso president Compaoré as the mediator, and threatening to use military force against the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg rebel group. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, the former president of Nigeria, was later appointed as Deputy Mediator (Human Right Watch, 2022).

ECOWAS sent a high-level delegation which constitute of ECOWAS President Ouattara, included AU President Yayi, Nigerian President Issoufou Mahamadou, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Compaoré, and Jonathan. These efforts were aimed at swiftly addressing the crisis and supporting the reestablishment of stability and constitutional governance in Mali (Caprini, 2015).

The Mali conflict was acknowledged by ECOWAS as posing a security risk not just to West Africa but also to the area's neighbor, the Sahel. Your handling of this conflict demonstrates this strategy. First, ECOWAS tried to contact nations that did not contribute ECOWAS actors to their own initiatives during the conflict's early stages. Officials from Mauritania and Algeria, both of which had concerns and

interests regarding national security in relation to the Mali issue, were present at their emergency meeting on March 27. Second, AU was invited to travel to Mali with the high-level mission. The African Union supported ECOWAS activities, like deploying military to Mali and its request for UNSC approval, in contrast to its efforts during the Côte d'Ivoire crisis. The ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC), the organization responsible for ECOWAS' security, calls for the sending of a regional armed force to Mali in April 2012. To resolve the Mali situation, ECOWAS President Kadré pleaded with the UN Security Council to support regional efforts, particularly the proposal to send an ECOWAS regional force. (Morten Bøås, 2013).

The AU-founded Mali Monitoring and Assistance Group urged ECOWAS to take the necessary actions to ensure the security of the transition leader at its meeting in June. This was done with the assistance of the AU, the UN, and other international actors. The plan to activate the ECOWAS military wing was also accepted by the organization. This was followed by decisions made by the AU's 323rd PSC, which gave ECOWAS permission to implement the military and security arrangements required to accomplish the following aims, where appropriate working with Algeria, Niger, and Mauritania, the core states:

“(i) ensuring the security of the transitional institutions; (ii) restructuring and reorganizing the Malian security and defense forces; and (iii) restoring state authority over the northern part of the country and combating terrorists and criminal networks.”

The AU also urged the UNSC to support the disposal of an ECOWAS armed force that was slated to take place. Additionally, at its 41st Summit, ECOWAS opted to hasten the deployment of the Mission in Mali (MICEMA), ordering an immediate technical assessment mission to lay the groundwork for MICEMA's impending arrival. Despite the appeals for assistance from ECOWAS and the AU, the United Nations Security Council firmly prohibited the deployment of this mission and any subsequent armed interventions in Mali by ECOWAS through Security Council Resolution 2056 of the 5 July 2012. France, the permanent member of the council most actively involved in the Mali issue, made pressure to get a resolution that could preclude the swift deploying of a strike force; the decision, which simply recognized the ECOWAS-AU proposal, was in line with France objectives (Human Right Watch, 2022).

While this was going on, ECOWAS made a concerted effort to win over Algeria and Mauritania to the deployment of MICEMA. The ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff suggested sending a significant mission to Mauritania and Algeria, two close neighbors, on August 14, 2012. The Mali conflict saw ECOWAS take on a larger role after deciding to utilize MICEMA. The joint chair of the Mali Situation Monitoring and Support Group, which had previously only been run by the AU, was called by its MSC. The group met on October 19, 2012, with ECOWAS and the AU serving as co-chairs. This call was positively received. The committee agreed on the "Draft Strategic Concept" in response to UN Security Council Resolution 2071, which demanded a thorough plan of involvement (Bamidele, 2017).

In November 2012, the Strategic Concept for the Deployment of an International African-led Force in Mali (AFISMA) was agreed upon by the AU 339th PSC and the ECOWAS Summit. The UNSC was called upon to study and approve this concept, and in December 2012, Resolution 2085 was passed, granting approval for the deployment of AFISMA. The force was named AFISMA to signify its joint effort between ECOWAS and the AU. In January 2013, ECOWAS deployed over 3,300 soldiers from countries like Burkina Faso, Senegal, Nigeria, and Niger to Mali, following the dispatch of French forces from Burkina Faso. Subsequently, Resolution 2100 of the UNSC allowed AFISMA to join the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), providing a framework for the French intervention. The Malian government sought military assistance from abroad to reclaim the north from Islamist control. The French military initiated operations against the Islamists on January 11, 2013, and other African nations' troops soon joined in. By February 8, 2013, with the support of the international coalition, the Malian army successfully recaptured the territory held by the Islamists. Despite accusations against the MNLA for attacking the Malian military, Tuareg separatists continued their fight against the Islamists. The situation in Mali remains complex, with ongoing efforts to address security challenges and stabilize the region (Keita, 1998).

The government and the Tuareg rebels signed a peace accord on June 18, 2013. On September 26, 2013, the rebels announced their withdrawal from the peace agreement, claiming that the government had broken its promises. The French troops left Mali in the middle of 2014 and began Operation Barkhane, a larger regional counterterrorism effort. Despite a 2015 cease-fire agreement, the conflict went on.

Rebel attacks in the Sahel have increased since 2018, and French forces have also increased since that time. Two successful military coups were carried out in Mali in 2020 and 2021. Following the coup in Mali in 2021, tensions developed between the country's leadership and the French military there, with the former demanding the latter leave. French military completely withdrew from Mali amid widespread protests from the Malian people and the growing involvement of the Russian mercenary company Wagner in the conflict. Termination of its presence in the nation on August 15, 2022 (Voa News, 2022).

CONCLUSION

Evidence suggests the emergence of a fifth generation of peace operations characterized by their hybrid nature. These operations involve the deployment of troops and police forces under a mixed command structure involving the United Nations and multiple regional organizations. Unlike earlier missions, which had time-limited peace-enforcement mandates, fifth-generation operations combine UN and regional organization forces with separate chains of command and diverse mandates. Unlike traditional Chapter VIII missions, these hybrid operations emphasize collaboration and coordination between the UN and regional organizations. By leveraging the strengths and resources of each entity, this approach allows for a more comprehensive and effective response to complex peace and security challenges. The DPKO's *"New Horizon"* Report put forward a recommendation for the establishment of an integrated global peacekeeping system that involves a wider range of contributing countries and organizations. This approach includes task separation within hybrid missions and across other peacekeeping operations. Specifically, regional organizations play a significant role in hybrid missions, particularly in Europe and Africa.

In the context of the fifth generation of peace operations, the case of Mali exemplifies the collaboration of three organizations: ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN. Their cooperation was driven by the fact that Mali is situated in both West Africa and the Sahel, making the African Union's engagement more legitimate. This collaboration allowed ECOWAS and the AU to jointly make requests to the UN. The study suggests that ECOWAS should work in coordination with the African Union in addressing regional security challenges and delegate authority to the AU. Thereby, it is believed that more objective and effective operations can be conducted.

African countries have found themselves in conflict since gaining their independence. Unfortunately, the modern political history of Africa is associated with war and conflict. In the last half century, civil wars have been experienced frequently in almost all countries of the continent and this situation continues today. For the prevention and cessation of conflicts on the continent, the United Nations frequently are taking initiatives. Recently, the African Union has been trying to find solutions to the problems of the continent. Therefore, contributing to the peace and stability of the continent and minimizing foreign interventions are the priorities of the African Union.

In this context, the African Union has been trying to fill this gap by playing an active role in recent years. However, due to the capacity of African countries, the African Union cannot find an adequate solution to the security problems of the continent.

One of the biggest obstacles to peacekeeping of the African Union limited resources. The AU frequently encounters budget, equipment, and people shortages for its peacekeeping deployments and security efforts. Contributions from member states to the AU budget can be generally inconsistent, that makes it difficult to sustain and appropriately support security operations addressing security problems. Building African states' capacity in terms of military, intelligence, and law enforcement capacities is critical for effective security responses. Many African countries, however, confront obstacles due to inadequate resources, antiquated infrastructure, and insufficient skills. The African Union is tasked with assisting member nations in strengthening their capacity to meet security concerns. Additionally, Peacekeeping Operations; the AU oversees conducting peacekeeping operations in various conflict zones. Peacekeeping missions, on the other hand, can be logistically challenging and pose security hazards. Inadequate soldier contributions, logistical obstacles, and insufficient resources can all undermine the success of these missions. Lastly, coordination with foreign Actors also is important. To address security problems, the AU frequently engages with foreign actors such as the United Nations and regional organizations. Due to various perspectives, priorities, and mandates, coordinating with numerous players, aligning plans, and maintaining successful collaboration can be difficult.

To address all these problems, the AU, member states, and regional partners must work together. Some of the initiatives that can assist the AU overcome these issues and respond more effectively to security crises in Africa include increasing resource mobilization, boosting capacity-building programs, promoting confidence and collaboration among member states, and improving coordinating structures.

On the other hand, African subregional organizations are crucial in dealing with the continent's security issues. These organizations, which aim to advance regional integration, collaboration, and stability, are created by groups of neighboring nations within a certain geographic region. They work to keep member states out of conflict and mediate disagreements. Also, advocate for using negotiation, mediation, and discourse to settle disputes effectively. The Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the East Africa region, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are a few examples of subregional organizations engaged in conflict prevention and settlement. Additionally, they send peacekeeping troops into their respective regions' conflict-affected areas. These troops work to maintain political processes, protect civilians, and bring about peace. For instance, peacekeeping operations have been carried out by the African Union (AU) and its subregional organizations in nations including Somalia, the Central African Republic and Mali.

Subregional organizations participate in the creation and implementation of regional security architectures as well. To deal with security issues, these frameworks incorporate methods for collaboration, coordination, and teamwork. They support information exchange, collaboration in intelligence, and coordination of policies and tactics. To strengthen collective security efforts, the AU created frameworks like the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in collaboration with subregional organizations such ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC.

Furthermore, they offer member nations assistance and capacity-building programs in a variety of security-related fields. This includes instruction in border control, law enforcement, counterterrorism, and the maintenance of peace. These measures to create capacity are designed to improve member states capacity to effectively address security issues. Besides, they keep track of political, economic, and social developments inside their territories, they set up and run early warning systems. These systems gather and examine data to spot potential security risks and send member nations prompt alerts. This facilitates preventive actions and enables proactive responses to developing problems.

Subregional organizations are essential in fostering African peace, stability, and security. Their efforts at border management, security cooperation, political mediation, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping help to stabilize and develop the region. It's crucial to remember that difficulties still exist, and that for member nations to effectively manage the intricate security dynamics in the region, more cooperation and commitment are required. Sub-regional organizations face similar problems with African Union, such as a lack of strong political will, effective coordination, and logistical support in peacekeeping. Therefore, to overcome these problems member nations should demonstrate a serious commitment to peacekeeping operations. This includes providing the resources (people, money, and political backing) necessary to

support persistent peacekeeping missions. Also, they ought to encourage regional cooperation and a coordinated peacekeeping plan. This can be accomplished through regular consultations, joint training exercises, and the establishment of regional peacekeeping training facilities. Finally, they should work closely with international partners including the African Union, the United Nations, to obtain financial, logistical, and technical support. A more successful and long-lasting peacekeeping deployment is ensured through coordinated efforts.

Both ECOWAS and the AU are legitimate regional organizations with the capability to intervene in conflicts in West Africa, but their intervention strategies may vary. West African countries often seek assistance from ECOWAS when facing security threats, which has significantly influenced ECOWAS's approach to intervention. Simultaneously, the AU, as a broader regional actor, pursues its own security interests, shaping its intervention approach accordingly. Depending on the conflict's nature, both the AU and ECOWAS have multiple intervention tools at their disposal. As their relationship is not hierarchical, they independently choose their intervention methods and may also form committees or joint groups. While their individualistic decisions can lead to harmony between the two organizations, there is also the possibility of certain decisions exacerbating conflicts between them. This has resulted in a somewhat ambiguous division of labor between the two organizations. Emphasizing the concept of fifth generation peace operations, this work advocates for both organizations to work in tandem, coordinating their efforts to achieve more effective results and address the continent's security issues without the need for intervention from foreign states. Collaborative and coordinated action between ECOWAS and the AU can lead to improved outcomes in resolving security problems in Africa.

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