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ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Ph.D. THESIS

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SUPERVISOR

ANKARA 2020

APPROVAL PAGE

The thesis prepared by Fatima Gülhan Abushanab titled "State Behavior of an Efficacious Actor in the Time of Global Power Transition Period: A Case Study of Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era" has been accepted by the jury members as a thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations.

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I certify that this thesis fulfills all the requirements to be deemed a doctoral thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Deparment of International Relations.

Director of the Institute of Social Sciences Assoc. Professor Dr. Seyfullah Yıldırım

PLAGIARISM PAGE

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

Fatima Abushanab

DEDICATION

To

Professor and Ambassador

Merve Safa Kavakci

Whose motherhood, sparkling smile and faith stand as the most beautiful pillar in my life…

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I would like to extend my most sincere gratitude to my family members and countless friends who cheered me on throughout a life-long educational journey from Ankara to Dallas to Washington D.C. to Istanbul and finally back to Ankara, where it all started.

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Principally, both my academic and professional experience have taught me that it is incumbent upon a global citizen to cross-examine and share knowledge bridging theory and practice towards the formulation of new praxis across the field of international relations. I feel blessed to have the opportunity to venture in this expedition and hope this thesis will contribute to new ways of imagining the transformation of humanity towards a better world for everyone.

ABSTRACT

This doctoral thesis examines the role of middle powers in academic literature as a departure point to analyze Turkey's case study in the post-Cold War Era. According to a vast amount of data and research, the analysis demonstrates that Turkey's categorization as a middle power does not do justice to the kind of transformation and image construction of the Turkish state since the end of the Cold War. The changes unfolding across the region and the international system in the aftermath of the Cold War have impacted the geopolitical landscape around Turkey leading to the development for it to become a catalyzer for the evolutionary change Turkey's image has undergone since the 1990s up to 2020 as analyzed under three periods. This change, hence, transformation is examined in this thesis through Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) as a means to explain the shift in identity and how the image construction has been an integral part of domestic political revision that continue to translate into the international *vis a vis* the interaction between the state actor, the state and the system as part of the Waltzian analysis. In this framework, international organizations serve as an opportunity space in which this interaction is made possible where Turkey is analyzed in its attempt to match discourse and material capabilities of the state to put pressure on the existing structure of the international system to reform. This is to say that in order to move towards a just and equity-based international system it must be inclusive and benefit many instead of the few where there can be equal reprsentation within the economic and security pie of the global community across international institutions.

Therefore, this doctoral thesis offers a fresh insight to explain that Turkey no longer fits into the classification of middle powermanship requiring a new kind of power identification as *the efficacious actor*. The reason that calls for a new conceptualization is due to Cold War conditions' insufficiency to explain Turkey's new position in international politics. As such, this calls for new parameters to be explored under this particular new conceptualization.

The thesis argues for a new type of conceptualization to describe Turkey's efforts to reform the world by presenting a moral and humanitarian approach. The discourse analysis provides a window of opportunity to examine Turkey's narrative of universal values couched within freedom, democracy and justice principles as part of the TFP agenda to offer its rare experience in the post-Cold War Era for other nation-states to adopt, emulate and contextualize within their own narratives in the struggle for democratization, emancipation and fair representation across international institutions.

The nexus of International Relations theories, history, sociology and the overarching perspective on the deteriorating situation of the international "liberal world order" under the light of Wallerstein's world system analysis provides a global panorama of the many values and norms the international system lacks to realize as a result of conflicts, wars, ideological disagreements and injustices across humanity that this thesis aimed to discover. The outcome of this analysis is premised on the nature of the competing civilizational experiences aiming to shape the emerging multipolar world order in the post-Cold War era where the ideational coupled with material capabilities can be a source of power for actors like Turkey ventoring to re-write a geopolitical narrative for itself within its neighborhood and across the global community through the role of international organizations and platforms at large.

Keywords: neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism, *efficacious*, Muslim, moral, humanitarian, geowelfare

ÖZET

Bu doktora çalışması Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrasında Türkiye vaka çalışmasını analiz etmek üzere akademik literatürdeki orta güçlerin rolünü başlangıç noktası alarak incelemektedir. Eldeki veri ve araştırmalara göre yapılan analiz Türkiye' nin orta güç olarak sınıflandırılmasının Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde geçirmekte olduğu değişim ve buna binaen gelişen imaj yapılandırmasını tam olarak yansıtmadığını göstermektedir. Araştırmada, 1990'lı yıllardan itibaren 2020' ye kadar 3 ayrı dönem için Soğuk Savaş sonrasında bölgesel ve uluslararası sistemde oluşan değişiklikler sonucunda Türkiye'nin jeopolitik alanının değiştiği ve bunun ülkenin imajının evrimsel olarak değişmesine bir katalizör olarak katkı sunduğu gösterilmektedir. Bu değişim ve dolayısıyla dönüşüm tezde Türk Dış Siyaseti üzerinden kimlik değişimi ve imaj yapılandırmasının Waltzian bir okumayla devlet aktörü, devlet ve sistem arasındaki münasebet üzerinden uluslararası alana yansıyarak iç siyaset revizyonunun integral bir parçası olarak incelenmektedir. Bu bağlamda, uluslararası örgütleri fırsat alanı olarak değerlendiren Türkiye, maddi imkanlarını diskur ile örtüştürme gayreti ile mevcut uluslararası yapısal sistemin reformu için baskı kurmaktadır. Uluslararası sistemde adil ve eşitlikçi bir yapıya doğru evrilebilmek için, Türkiye, kapsayıcı ve dünya ekonomisinde ve güvenlik alanında en büyük payı alan küçük bir azınlıktan ziyade uluslararası kuruluşlarda geniş kitlelerin de istifade edebileceği eşit temsiliyetin olduğu bir küresel toplum için çağrıda bulunmaktadır.

Bu noktada, çalışma, Türkiye'nin orta ölçekli güç sınıflandırmasına tam olarak oturmadığını ve güç üzerinden yapılan yeni bir okumayla *müessir aktör* tanımlaması vasıtasıyla yeni bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır. Buradaki yeni kavramsallaştırma ihtiyacı Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki şartların Türkiye'nin uluslararası siyasetteki yeni konumunu açıklamakta yetersiz kalmış olmasından doğmaktadır. Haliyle, bu yeni kavramsallaştırma yeni parametrelerin de devreye girmesi anlamına gelmektedir.

Tez, Türkiye'nin dünya siyasetini ahlaki ve insani bir bakış açısıyla reform etme gayreti çerçevesinde yeni bir kavramsallaştırmaya işaret eder. Yapılan diskur analizi, Türkiye'nin özgürlükler, demokrasi ve adalet gibi evrensel değerlerle şekillendirilmiş Türk Dış Politikası üzerinden taşıdığı anlatıyı değerlendirmektedir. Böylece, Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası nadir tecrübesinin diğer ülkelerin uluslararası örgütlerde demokrasi, özgürleşme ve adil temsiliyet alanlarında verdikleri mücadelelerde kendi anlatılarını oluşturmada rol model olarak kullanılabilir, alıntılanabilir ve uygulanabilir olmasına imkan sağlar.

Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri, tarih, sosyoloji ve Wallerstein' nın çökmekte olan liberal dünya düzenine atıfla yapmış olduğu dünya sistemi analizi perspektifi, yaşanan çatışmalar, savaşlar, ideolojik ayrışmalar ve adaletsizlikler sonucunda uluslararası sistemde eksikliği hissedilen değer ve normların resmini sunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrasını ele alarak, fikri ve beraberinde fiziki kapasitenin Türkiye örneğinde analiz edilmesiyle, çok kutuplu dünya düzenini şekillendirmeye talip, birbiriyle rekabet halinde olan ve uluslararası örgütler aracılığıyla kendine yeni bir jeopolitik anlatı yazmak isteyen ülkeler için, Türkiye'nin bir güç kaynağı olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: neorealizm, neoliberalizm, inşacılık, *müessir*, Müslüman, ahlaki, insani, jeorefah

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD :Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency

AK Party :Justice and Development Party

ASEAN :Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BRICS :Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Afirca

EU **:**European Union

IMF :International Monetary Fund

IO :International Organization

Kızılay :Turkish Red Crescent

NATO :North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD :Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE :Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

RSC :Regional Security Complex

SCO :Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SMT :Social Movement Theory

TFP :Turkish Foreign Policy

THY :Turkish Airlines

TIKA :Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

UN :United Nations

UNSC :United Nations Security Council

YEE :Yunus Emre Institute

YTB :Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

The problem this dissertation aims to explore is the role of Turkey as "more than just a middle power" in the post-Cold War era. The significance of this research lies in the observation of Turkey's two-tier approach to regional and international diplomacy which utilizes a critical and constructive strategy to influence a host of issues on the global scene. Turkey's growth of power in the international system has leveled up since the 1990s with the rise of AK Party in early 2000s. There has been a re-orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 90s by a constrained and limited approach contained to its region. This was followed by a leap under Erdogan where we observe a bold and assertive maximization of opportunities in the regional and international arena.

With respect to global governance we cannot overlook the fact that the 20th Century with the rise of League of Nations, ensued by the establishment of the UN, aimed at the purpose of bringing the international community under a single roof of common values in order to maintain peace and security in the international system. Yet today, in the 21st Century we witness these values and norms become obscure due to major stalemate. Why? Self-interest in gaining power and seeking to pursue regional hegemony has eclipsed the importance of the values that are meant to conjoin the international community.

The Responsibility to Protect (Bellamy, 2015, p.161-185) was formulated against the eroding effectiveness of UN in light of increasing conflict resulting in the loss of innocent lives. The R2P Doctrine was forged as a compelling act to bolster the efficiency and strength of the UN members to intervene at times of atrocities against civilians. But, in reality, it resulted in a flat out failure as in the cases of Libya and Syria. In Syria's case this did not only shake the sense of trust in the UN but, also pointed to the frustration that has permeated the Security Council as displayed in Russia's and China's veto decisions.

So, why is in this context global governance a critical issue to expound upon? This dissertation aims to respond to this question step-by-step. I believe this is an urgent topic to undertake because the world is experiencing re-alignments and shifts that can no longer be policed by a global hegemon like the US per se which is now under Trump's Presidency adopting an inward policy that veers away from excessive involvement abroad except Iraq

and Iran. This has given leverage to other major powers like Russia and China to challenge the liberal world order. At the same time, this shift in the global trend provided an opportunity for middle power actors to expand their opportunities to take on greater roles in their respective regions and the global stage. One of these critical actors on the international scene is Turkey which vies for further power, influence and decision-making within its neighborhood that is namely Syria. Turkey's state behavior as will be discussed in the thesis will map out how its foreign policy demonstrated a shift from middle power activism to gaining greater say in regional politics. This has in tandem led Turkey to acquire an activist role in refusing to be limited to just a middle power country. On the contrary, Turkey's state behavior testifies to the reality that middle power categorization does not suffice an exuberant country that aims for greater responsibility. Hence, Turkey's constructive approach to the Syrian issue with regards to the humanitarian crisis exhibits a sense of obligation to one's neighbors and the need to bring peace, security and stability to Syria first and foremost by establishing a safe zone for locals to be able to safely and voluntarily return to their homes. In these developments, Turkey is acting beyond the scope of middle power and it will require academics and policy-makers to explore definitions beyond this. Further into this study, as I shall argue, Turkey cannot be limited to middlepowermanship because its foreign policy activity and its state image disseminated in the international system diffuses an *"efficacious"* activity that shapes its activist character. This is mainly due to Turkey's will power to voice its challenge against the illiberal structure of the international system in "The World is Bigger than Five" campaign towards equity, justice an fairness for all instead of the few.

In this framework, Turkey's *efficacious* power conceptualization as an identity should not be perceived as Machiavellist nor as power-hungry over its geostrategic position. Rather, Turkey's *efficaciousness* is a sound demonstration of its strong will to maintain its security and national interests coupled with looking out for its allies. This conversation also opens up the window into the UN and R2P as one crucial part of the larger puzzle that ties in many pieces of the overarching construct of regional and global governance. If a dysfunctional institution like the UN does not succeed in containing conflict between competing sovereign states (Russia, China, US and others) --there is a high possibility that we are close to the brink of another major world war especially considering the turmoil in the Middle East (Bosco, 2009, 252-253). Its dysfunctionality has rendered the UN a symbolic institution because, members of the body are not able to resolve conflict-ridden

issues around the globe. The multipolar competition is more inflamed than before. This can be explained mainly due to the drastic changes in the relations of sovereign states today. It is reminiscent of the beginnings of the Westphalia system where there is multilateral competition that is far more dangerous due to expansion of nuclear arsenal.

Since the end of WWII, United Nations was meant to lessen hostilities and increase cooperation in the international system. So the question is what went wrong with a global institution like the UN Security Council? Why is it malfunctioning in the 21st Century? In this particular study, the unequal distribution of power that privileges the permanent five over the rest of the non-permanent and all in all the total of UN members has created a schism between the haves and the have-nots.

While the UN Security Council was formulated and constructed in the pursuit to maintain peace in the international liberal order, we have seen in the aftermath of the Cold War an aim of global powers attempting to influence a world based on self-interested goals. The problem is not so much about the liberalist, democratic principles and values that are being projected or more so imposed by the Western countries on the rest of the world. The issue rests on the fact that the liberal international order is a hierarchy that favors the interests of the more powerful states that are in reality the ones running the order themselves. In this framework, the weaker or emerging states which are viewed as the "small guy" are not only marginalized but, they are being silenced by the more powerful states that act as the "bully." This type of benevolent coercion of liberal values has today backfired in such a way that Western countries are scurrying around to find reasonable explanations to why the West is still the option to keep in sight when emerging powers establish their stance in the international system.

Therefore, these institutions including the EU per se, in time become counterproductive to the purpose in which they were founded. This is mainly due to the general consensus in non-Western countries that acceptance to the Western camp is only based on meeting the criteria in accordance with the "Western" standards. Today, the West is no longer the advanced option that other powers are considering within the international hierarchy. To put it differently, it is prevalently argued that there is a wide perception that there is "more to the world than the West." The "weaker, smaller or emerging states" that are considered to be more ambitious and want to position themselves as a legitimate voice

within their own geopolitical region no longer want to comply with a Western discourse that turns a deaf ear to the voices of those who have been ignored.

Consequently, a global institution like the UN has disappointed many of those who were silenced by the powerful states who veritably run these organizations based on their "own terms" (Walt, 2015). And because of this domineering approach the hierarchy of power, today, in the international system, is greatly challenged with changing perception of world leaders who want to have a bigger stake when it comes to decision-making and influence on the regional and global platform.

The Western countries, who are in charge of the flow of information and implementation of policies in organizations like the UN and who have more leverage in the Security Council, willingly chose to sit idly by as they abet to the horrors committed in the international system who de facto assume responsibility of leadership. The deficiency and inaction of the UN to what is going on in Syria is nothing new. The dilatory approach to Rwanda and Bosnia cost hundreds of innocent lives when intervention was too late for rescue (Nadin, 2016, p.1). In retrospect, the 1990s up to today do not allow us to praise the UN for its existence as an expeditious institution that solves the problems of the world. On the contrary, it is insufficient and faulty in all matters considering that it continues to fail at its major purpose: preventing the loss of innocent human lives and establishing peace and security.

Criticizing the United Nations should not be deemed as an objection to institutions which are the bedrock of the international system. But we must open our eyes widely to discern the need for an institution like the UNSC to continue and the exigency for them to be renewed in light of changing circumstances of global politics. Otherwise, they will be counterproductive to what needs to be done. Therefore, unless we bring change to our global institutions like the UNSC collectively from within, the 21st Century will be marked by enduring conflicts without the cooperative institutions needed to cultivate and preserve peace and security.

At this critical juncture between maintaining the status quo and progressing towards change in the international system there are three intertwined topics we are required to look deeper into for exploring the problem. These are security, development, democracy concepts and how they influence the operation of institutions at a time when global governance is

being shaped in the 21st Century. Although there are many different academic studies conducted on what global governance means in terms of how it is defined (and this is something I will explore in the introduction chapter), for the purpose of this study I will be putting forward a definition of global governance that explicates the three concepts in relation to Turkey as a case study. While these three concepts are discussed in academia and form the underlying basis of politics across the board, they in reality makeup the core of political institutions. These concepts which drive national and international policy are what gives the power of representation for the country and what makes the image of Turkey's image credible in the eyes of the international community.

1.1.Research Question

The research question this thesis aims to explore is "how do middle powers impact world politics in the period of global power transition?" The two sub-problems this thesis will expoud upon as a way to substantiate the research question are the following: How can we evalute Turkey's performance as a middle power? How is Turkey different than other middle powers in the international system?

1.2.Research Objectives

The aims of this thesis is to contribute to an area of research that has not been fully explored. In the post-Cold war era, Turkey's geostrategic location has enabled it to rise from a regional actor to an international actor with effective political force.

Turkey is in the making of its geographic destiny as an unrelenting emerging power against US hegemonic pressures in its own region. Meanwhile, warming up to Russia and Iran, China, Japan, Central Asia, Balkan, Latin America and African countries mark the rise of new actors having a say in region(s) dominated by US monopoly in the international realm.

Non-Western alliances are major underpinnings that make up the core of the new Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) approach. In a multipolar system one to one versus collective alliances are formed by Turkey's leadership. Multi-functional relations are being displayed by Turkey at a time when there is a trade war between the US and China. TFP aims to conduct bilateral relations across many regions while looking for alternative organizations

to be part of other than EU. ASEAN, SCO the aim to become a member of BRICS and more activity in OIC show a willingness to become member of organizations and platforms not particularly Western-led ones. NATO is no longer the sole security organization that is able to meet the needs of countries governing diplomatic and security relations. Countries such as Turkey who aim to bolster its defense industry sector could incline to form its own security organization to not just collaborate with "like minded-countries vis a vis national interests" but also include the security, trade, economic interests of non-Western actors as well In this regard, the dysfunctionality of the UN Security Council alongside NATO and the EU are challenged by Turkey with its unique, dynamic foreign policy approach such as the global campaign of "The World is Bigger than Five" which will further be analyzed within this study.

Turkey, which has always been referred to as a bridge between the East and West will not serve only as a country that is a place of transit. Turkey's geopolitical position in its region gives it a great advantage. The past decades have proven that it is no longer a bridge but a critical player with major decision-making power in its geography whose orientation can be described as ***"progression"*** with an ***"independent axis"*** that branches out to multiple directions, not just to the West, East, North or South, but all (Abushanab, 2016).

Turkey's Foreign Policy as a case study can contribute to scientific knowledge about a nation that is not just limited to its geography but is ambitious about shaping global politics. This is one aspect of expanding on Turkey's role within international relations academia. Another aspect is to open up a window to academic literature by offering an analysis of a post-1945 world order (Kissinger 2014, p.256). As was mentioned, the New Twenty Years Crisis is in the process of creating major power competition which encompasses middle power opportunity maximizers like Turkey. We can argue that multipolarity is the inevitable direction the world community is heading towards. The evidence for this palpable change can be seen in the search for different kinds of world orders that experienced shifts in the 19th and 20th Centuries. In 1815 with the advance of the Concert of Europe (Lascurettes, 2017) there was a Euro-centric world vision which showed a major shift with the onset of WWI and WWII towards an idealist world order design in which the League of Nations experienced a failure. The establishment of the United Nations and the duration of the Cold War between 1945-1990 led to a balance of power between th Soviet Union and the United States (Waltz, 1993). Between 1991-2001 there emerged a US centric unipolar power (Huntington, 1999) where greater insecurity and instability in the post-9/11 world resulted

in a lack of trust and security in the world order paving the path towards a rapid rise of multipolarity. The post-2008 global economic crisis (James, 2011) became an accelarator and majort catalyst in the dispersion of power among regional actors leading to the rise of emerging and middle powers to gain ascendancy in the system with the intention to shape the international world order.

The axis of power and leadership is an interesting phenomenon which has historically and continues to be in a gliding motion from past political empires to the the modern state system. Currently, the term "shift" is used predominantly to describe the changing bipolar balance of power between the US, Russia and China. A crucial part of the puzzle we have in front of us shows us that the term "shift" currently stands in stark difference to the reality of the multipolarity emerging in the international system. The power transition theory offers the idea of a shift in the global balance of power. But Turkey's case as a middle power demonstrates the will to have a position as this power shift takes place. Although power transition theory explicates the international framework to a large extent, we also must be aware about the way way we can re-define this global shift to include middle powers (Chan, 2008, p.2). Instead of analyzing the balance of power as a "shift", we can portray it as "a dispersed trend" since there will not be a direct conversion of power among major actors like the US, China, India or Russia. The role of middle powers in this context creates a complex and competitive scene on regional and global scale.

This is precisely why the post-1945 world order will be made of an international political scene where power, rather than being vested in a single hegemonic player, will now be distributed and shared among the powers consisting of regional rivalries. We have organizations like the NATO, EU, OECD countries, IMF, OSCE as the product of Western formulated institutions to further economic and security interdependence to guard and maintain cooperation. These institutions are not going to dissipate. Therefore, it is essential for the Western allies like the United States and Europe to adapt and be part of the change that is to come. The difficulties that will come with the transition of power across several axes can be overcome with cooperation by Western institutitons where agreements on issues like finance, terrorism, trade, etc. can be collaborated on mutual terms. But the change that requires for Western constructed global instituitons like the UN, IMF or World Bank require a change from within in order to tackle the growing issues of instability, distrust and apprehension. To alleviate these problems there have to be mutual trust and solidarity to ensure that marginalized powers are not subject to inequalities but are respected on equal

grounds. In this regard, Richard Haas's descripiton of World Order 2.0 lacks a very fundamental factor of a changing world order. Tackling issues like terrorism, cyberspace and global health are critical issues yet the institutions that deal with these problems are the main concern themselves. They need to be reformed as new realities will render new hurdles to overcome.

This is where a burgeoning multipolarity is a testament to a new kind of competition operating on a different level. The arguments put forth by Waltz and Mearshiemer who prefer a bipolar world for better security discuss the risks of international conflict. But there is very little advice offered on meeting the challenges of a multipolar world since that is the direction we are moving in. One can argue that the departure point for the kind of change towards multipolarity starts sith a structural change in a system's unit ensued by "unit-level and the structural causes" that emerge as part of this interaction (Waltz, 1993, p.49). Turkey's case study in the post-Cold War era will offer a one-of-a-kind experience of a unit level change and how this transformation is creating a challenge to the established system. It could be observed that multipolarity may not be the end of American hegemonic power but it is likely to restrain control and dominance to a certain degree (Dolan, 2018, p.16). This will facilitate for regional hegemons to emerge. In Keohane and Nye's conceptualization we are likely to see the complex interdepedence model turn into complex competitions of regional hegemonic power(s) marked by a tug-o-war principally in all areas especially concerning foreign policy.

Our belief rests on the values and norms which has manifested in our global institutions that intricately connect us today. The 20th Century developments are not ordinary because international institutions makeup the backbone of the international liberal order. According to Ken Booth:

> "Although twentieth-century international politics witnesses terrible levels of political and other forms of violence, it was also a period of international standard-setting, and historians in future may well come to identify this as a key feature, rather than the violence. This standard-setting was the primary manifestation of moral progress internationally, and even if governments did not live up to their pledges, their commitments were a measure against which they could be called to account" (Booth, 2007, p.129).

Despite the transition of power and its dispersion among new players we have to be cognizant of our interdependence and the alliances we have in tandem to the institution that

set the global agenda for democracy, liberalism, human rights. As long as we are interconnected liberalism will not fail because, the foundation is strong due to the standar-setting that was established in the twentieth century. But there is a caveat.

The international-standard setting is in jepoardy today with the failure of Western democracies to bring humanitarian justice in countries like Syria. The lack of political solution cases like Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Ukranian crisis which has already put Western countries on a time-out for the deficiency of "liberalist missions abroad" shows the urgency to redefine international standards. These failures require us to take accountability which can only be done by renewing our mindsets and the institutions we put our trust and confidence in. As we move forward to tackle the new challenges of our time we, as a collective community, have the drive and capacity to shape our institutions according to the needs of our time.

1.3.Theoretical Framework

The goal of the theoretical frameworks below is to provide the larger system level of unit analysis approach as a context and then use Turkey as a state level case study. The purpose of the thesis is to have a two-tier analysis: International system and state level. The latter will explore security concerns in Turkey's region. The former will then draw out from the latter to extrapolate on the world scale to depict its impact on the global scene. The state level unit of analysis will be defined by Waltz. By taking this approach we can make generalizations and predictions on world security from Turkey's example in Foreign Policy in its neighborhood. The set of theories explained in the ensuing paragraphs are all pieces of the larger puzzle that address the research question. The overall problem that is explicated by the more general theories include world system analysis, world security theory, power transition theory and global governance which all help frame problems of current world politics. The other set of theories that include regional security complex theory, securitization theory, emancipation theory and social movement theory all provide an analytical window into Turkey's case study in the post-Cold War era.

Wallerstein's world system analysis provides a holistic look at the world system to provide a general overview of the issues that surround the whole system. The Annales school, the Marxist tradition, and the dependency theory have all influenced Wallerstein to formulate his own theory. Wallerstein saw the 1970s as an "age of transition" paving the

future world system (or world systems) into something very different. Using this theory as a background framework can help the dissertation contextualize the world that we are transitioning into from the Cold War period to the post-Cold War era. The 21st Century has ushered in a host of conflicts, humanitarian crisis, inter and intra-state wars which calls heed to Wallerstein's idea of an emerging world system (s) (Wallerstein, 2004, p.28-31).

Booth's world security theory talks about an inclusive understanding of security that could possibly be equity based where everyone has a share in survival. The universality of human rights must also be accompanied by the universality of security. He offers an emancipatory -constitutive approach into a globally inclusive political project with the aim of inventing humanity (Booth, 2007, p.114-116). He argues that rights are not inalienable in the sense they were granted by revelation. Contrary, Booth referring to Donnely says, "human rights arise from human action and represent the choice of a particular moral vision of human potentiality and the institutions for realizing vision" towards the aim of establishing justice and equity among human relations. Within this context Booth describes a New Twenty Year Crisis in which there is epochal, structural and decisional crisis. He says universal vital interests are the key to tackling the Great Reckoning in the 21st Century to resolve the crises mentioned here. He argues for cosmopolitan norms and an egalitarian humanity to meet the challenges of evil and uncertainty that began with the New Twenty Year Crisis. Using world security theory by Booth's conceptualization allows the larger contextualization of a world system analysis by Wallerstein that brings into question the underlying issue at hand: what can Turkey offer to the formulation of regional and world security? Booth's approach can be used to open a window into this conversation.

In *regional security complex theory* regions are regarded as mini systems where many approaches can be considered from balance of power and polarity to interdependence and alliances. RSC is an important analytical tool to consider in this study because it focuses on particular geographic regions to tackle security issues. For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan poses a threat to the Middle East region while Boko Haram in the Sahel region of Africa also poses security threats (Martin, 2017, p.54). This theory defines security and its solutions based on cluster of regions and a categorization to a particular place. This thesis will argue that while security issues are regional and are particular to certain context and time since the post-Cold War era with the advancement of technology, human migration, and globalization, it has created a spillover in security risks around the world. Security issues can no longer be considered as place or time specific. Security risks are tied to one another.

For example, DAESH operates within the proximities of Turkish border yet it threatens peace across continental lines. In this regard, using RSC as a method to look for solutions to regional security issues can also provide an inductive method to generalize solutions for security threats in other parts of the world.

A segue into the act of *securitization* allows us to critically look at who defines security and for whom (Balzacq, 2011, p.57-76). The goal of securitization theory is to show how we conceptualize security in the world based on speech act. Securitization occurs when an actor rhetorically securitizes a problem through his or her speech. President Erdogan's rhetorical approach and critical outlook to security in the region will frame securitization concept from Turkey's perspective. Turkey as a securitizing actor in its own neighborhood is aiming to take measures that will create peace and security in its region especially in Syria. Turkey has been taking securitizing moves to balance the political situation in Syria with and its Russian counterpart. The act of defining the threat and then formulating the solution by including the term "ceasefire" at the roundtable demonstrates Turkey's leadership role to resolve the Syrian crisis. The fact that the US leadership was excluded from the table talks also shows a willingness of regional leaders to frame issues and solve them without Western contribution, particularly the United States. Securitization in its traditional sense of invention has been applied by Western policy makers in a morally and ethically laden way. However, with Turkey's approach to regional security, the act of securitization is primarily moral and ethical based with a concern for the loss of human lives in Syria. According to Michael Dillon, the story of security should always be an ethical one (Dillon, 1996, p. 202). Turkey exemplifies this ethical approach which will be explored by a discourse analysis of President Erdogan's speeches on regional and global security.

Emancipation theory is an important sub-theory to the ones mentioned above because it offers a discussion on the shift away from the system to the state level (Mouffe, 1996). It is an important part of the two-tier analysis between the system and the state level especially from Turkey's foreign policy approach. The reason is due to Turkish Foreign Policy method which elevates human rights, democracy and dignity of the human being to live freely without fear of life. TFP approach insists on the prosperity of all without subjugation to tyranny or despotic power. While the Turkish government vies for security in its own region when it comes to the Syrian war at the same time it grants a tremendous amount of importance to saving lives by hosting nearly 3.5 million Syrian refugees within its borders and up to 4 million refugees from other countries. Consequently, we can see that when

Turkey's President addresses other humanitarian crisis related issues such as in Mynnmar, Sudan, Somalia or Palestine and others, he offers a regional approach. He does this by being critical of international organizations and state leaders who turn a deaf ear to these atrocities. In this case, there is a system and unit level criticism from Turkey while at the core of the argument there is an emancipationist call for the dignity of human lives. This is a theory that can be explicated further by Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialect of Enlightenment (translated by Jephcott, 2002, p. 242) or Kant's cosmopolitanism (Kleingeld, 1998, p.72-90), But, importantly, the Islamic teachings embedded in President Erdogan's remarks to national and international audiences couple an emancipationist discourse within the framework of *social movement theory* (Tarrow, 1998, p. 1-4) in which local, grassroots mobilization in Turkey's AK Party has led the state actor to globalize its movement for justice and equity on a much larger scale. The message of an emancipated global community is an eye-opening analysis once taken into account of how SMT as a theoretical window allows scholars and policymakers to understand the trajectory of current Turkish national policy amplified into international policy.

Global governance of security brings us to the discussion about Durch, Larik and Ponzio's conception of "just security" (2016, p.95-112). In the preamble of the 1945 UN Charter one of the four preambles express the protection of future generations from the scourage of war. International law and global norms push nation-states to maintain peace and security in the world community, however, as discussed above the structural crisis argued by Booth and Wallerstein's prediciton of a changing world system requires a re-conceptualization of security in the world (Booth, 2007, p.395-426). Durch, Larik and Ponzio argue that the monopoly of security has been maintained by the powerful while this has caused backlash among emerging markets who want to have a say in the global security distribution. The R2P Doctrine and the ICC are important parts of the the UN as the broader international organization but they are also lacking. NATO and the European Union throughout the post-Cold War has had the upper-hand in defining security concerns in non-Western regions of the world. The African Union is, for example, an important manifestation of post-colonial African states coalescing to form policies. But in fact, they are inadeqaute due to the lack of a security organization within the African Union. In order for there to be a global security system that is justice-based, we must formulate or reform the UNSC system in a world that no longer sustains the conditions of WWII. The New Twenty Years Crisis as mentioned by Booth calls for the renewal of global norms to tackle nuclear weapons,

chemical attacks and authoritarian regimes in which the international community is inclusive of all states to collectively define and maintain global security. Turkey's new strategic approach to regional and global security since 2014 has been multilateralism and cooperation based on one-to-one and/or one-to-many alliances.

Power transition theory views politics as a hierarchy and looks at the interaction of nation-states within the international system. It looks at the formation of new political and economic entities. It argues that differential growth rate of one nation can become a challenger of the status-quo power which poses a threat to the hegemonic power (s) in the system. The rise of emerging powers like Turkey challenge a hegemonic power like the United States in terms of defining security and the measures needed to establish stability in its own region. This theory provides an important framework for analyzing large current events such as the rise of large powers like China, India and Russia. Organski & Kugler argue power relations in the international system can be analyzed by the hierarchy of states. In the game of international politics, the more powerful states determine the rules of the game. Turkey as a rising power is vehemently questioning and demanding a change in who leads the game (Tammen, 2001, p. 64 & Organski & Kugler, 1981, p.66-67). Turkey does this in two ways: 1) It is firm about its leadership in sectoral or regional security especially when it comes to Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. 2) Turkey argues against the WWII conditions that set up the UN Security Council and demands a reform for an inclusive and equity-justice based security system under the umbrella of the United Nations. It defies United States' decision to announce Jerusalem as the capital of Israel unilaterally. *Power transition theory* serves as an important framework for a rising emerging market like Turkey because the theory provides a prism into the change needed for the UN. It also supports the argument as to how relevant international organizations are in power transitions occuring around the world with the ascendancy of emerging markets. However, as explained in this thesis, power transition theory is not sufficient to depict the changing nature of middle power activism demonstrated by Turkey necessitating a new illustration of the hierarchy or relations from Turkey's vantage point.

In this context Rosenau's conceptualization of global governance is described as the "systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to the international organization—in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions" (1995, p.15). While global governance encompasses a range of human activities that are local, subnational, national, international and transnational, this thesis will

focus on this concept as a "political program" argued by Dingwerth and Pattberg who explore several definitions. The description most appropriate for this study is the following defined by Gordenker and Weiss. Global governance is the "efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond capacities of states to address individually." In this regard, global governance is not about the singular power of states to act alone in the face of challenges that threaten nations in their respective regions. Global governance requires partnerships, cooperation and alliances for countries to act in unison in dealing with the world's challenges. The major underpinning of global governance in addition to the multilayer relations is that it embraces multipolarity and accedes to other rising authorities in the emerging world. The world order is experiencing a major shift and transition away from what we traditionally perceive as unipolar or bipolar to what we now predict is a multipolar world that's intensified by transnationalism. The further discussion on global governance will be explained on several levels.

1. Define global governance.
2. What are the advantages it will bring for a more cooperative and interdependent international system?
3. How will global governance challenge the liberal world order and be shaped with the rise of multi-polarity?

Another aspect of this thesis looks at democracy as a variable in the way Turkey's state behavior is designed to compete in its region and around the world. In the Journal of Democracy a group of scholars posited whether there is a Decline in Democracy due to the rising instability in countries like Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq in addition to what is defined by the scholars as the ascending "authoritarian" powers like Russia and China. Larry Diamond's argument that there has been a democratic recession since 2006 is a significant departure point for the following question: are we at a juncture of history where democracy in whatever form it maybe is going through a transformation? (Diamond, 2015, p.141-155). The basic values of democracy are embedded in three particular institutions clearly defined as "the state, the rule of law, and democratic accountability." These institutions are intrinsic to the machinery of a successful democratic system. The study will also utilize discourse analysis as a way to measure how political rhetoric in Turkey's Foreign Policy encompasses democratic values and freedoms to expand its scope of influence and impact on global platforms through international organizations. In parallel to the discourse analysis,

constructivism will be a key theoretical perspective in looking out how Turkey has built its image in the international system throughout the process of its identity-formation.

Another critical pillar of Turkish Foreign Policy, in addition to the democracy variable is security and development—two sides of the same coin. We cannot have one advance without the other therefore, we must analyze them together. Heinbecker stated that security is about the "ability to protect people as well as safeguard states." Yet in today's chaotic political circumstances we are seeing the Heinbecker description of giving equal importance to the well-being of the people and protecting the state is inherently ***conflicting and paradoxical.*** This new challenge in the 21st Century calls us to look deeper into the relationship between human security and state security on a level that requires a sound understanding to resolving this dilemma. As mentioned previously the deadlock of the UNSC on Syria and the failure to secure stability in the aftermath of intervention into Libya calls into question the legitimacy and efficacy of organizations like the UN and NATO for their lack of will and capability. Will these organizations among the pillars of global institutions be able to fulfill the purpose in which they were created and will they be able to re-configure their strategies and vision to meet the needs of our time?

If the deficiency of the UN and NATO persist in times when terror is not dealt with and exterminated, new actors will rise to meet the challenge in such a way that it will obviously serve the interests of emerging powers. The only leverage the Western countries have today is their hegemonic power masked under "good intentions" to help "others" by facilitating the spread of democratic values with the aim of maintaining security at home. This approach has backfired in many ways because there is a rising distrust of Western countries who are perceived as Machiavellist rather than being identified under genuine leadership who uphold good-will behavior (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985). The refugee crisis spreading across the Middle East region has been a litmus test for Europe. They showcase an example where many countries turned their backs on the destitute and helpless citizens of Syria. This kind of attitude has certainly marred the image of the West and de-legitimized the Western world's role as a place of acceptance and diversity.

In an age where globalization has rendered trade, technology, education as an interlinked network in the global system in which no country is in isolation from interdependence, we are seeing more and more incorporation and inclusion. While it is argued here that multipolarity is giving rise to numerous voices competing to have a voice

in the international platform at the same time there are new alignments and cooperation that exceed the Western status quo. The West's failure to serve and protect people at home and abroad has furthered the schism between the East and the rest of the world. For many Western scholars there is the perception of a fading democracy around the world. This thesis argues for a more nuanced understanding of politics in non-Western countries in terms of a governing system. Democracy in the non-Western world does not have to be a clone of its counterparts in the West (Kinzer, 2006, p.291). On the contrary, against the backdrop of institutions that need to renew themselves during these times of gridlock we have to pay closer attention to the political developments occurring in neighboring regions.

Unlike what has been argued by Western-oriented scholars who claim that democracy is failing, democracy continues to be shaped according to some of the nations' own histories. It is important to note here that a Western-type of democratic straitjacket has failed in many ways by the very institutions like the UN and NATO whose goals to establish peace and security did not go as planned because it was deemed "too foreign" (Kinzer, 2006, p.2). Instead, what we will be witnessing with the rise of global governance in the 21st Century is the organic development of democracies of all experiences alongside non-democratic forms of rule in some countries.

By using the explanatory argument of power transition theory it can be argued that the rise of global governance in post-Cold War era is something in the process of crystallizing. Although a "structure" for global governance seems vague and hard to grasp, the theoretical approaches will facilitate a definition to formulize this concept as a reality that's no longer distant or hard to reach. We are currently living in a reality where states, individuals, institutions and non-state actors are actively contributing to the shaping of global governance.

1.4. Methodology

According to Guba, a worldview is "a basic set of beliefs that guide action" (1990, p.17) which can also be considered as paradigms, epistemologies and ontologies or research methodologies. This thesis will be employing qualitative analysis according to Creswell's description of the following:



Figure 1: The Inductive Logic of Research in a Qualitative Study (Creswell, 2009, p.63).

There are two philosophical perspectives to draw on in this study which are constructivist and transformative worldviews. According to Crotty (1998):

> "Human beings construct meanings as they engage with the world they are interpreting. Qualitative researchers tend to use open-ended questions so that the participants can share their views… they understand the context of the participants… by gathering information personally. They also interpret what they find, an interpretation shaped by the researcher's own experiences and background. The basic generation of meaning is always social, arising in and out of interaction with a human community. The process of qualitative research is largely inductive; the inquirer generates meaning from the data collected in the field where the inductive method used lets the researcher to derive meaning from the data collection" (Creswell, 2009. p.8-9)

The second philosophical perspective known as transformative allows the research to build on the constructivist worldview by undertaking an "action agenda" to help the marginalized. This is an important aspect of the methodology of the study because Turkey as a middle power is not just a power-maximizer actor seeking ascendancy in the international system. It is at the same time struggling against power competition that tries to marginalize it and constrain its role of influence in the system. According to Creswell and Creswell, "a research contains an action agenda that aims for some kind of reform in the researcher, participants of the research or institutions involved. This also includes social issues such as inequality, discrimination, oppression, domination, suppression and alienation." The researcher in this case provides a voice to those who do not have the power

to be heard. Or, in Turkey's case, political leadership is heard but disregarded by other actors in the international system.

In reference to the chart provided by Creswell and Creswell, this thesis intends to delve into academic literature on theories that explain particular phenomenon. By doing so, I intend to make generalizations based on Turkey's case study as a departure point for middle power activism. As I look for theoretical explanations to place Turkey within this category I also ask in the study whether Turkey is being too limited to the scope of middle powers and could there be more explanation to Turkey's state role which I would like to explore by analyzing its state behavior. As I begin the theoretical analysis, I shall look for broad patterns that explain Turkey's case study that is unique to middle power scholarship. The analysis will look at how an internal pattern within Turkey's identity-formation process in the post-Cold War era has led the state image to be transformed within the international system presented by Turkey's state behavior. The theme that forms as a result of the analysis is that Turkey exemplifies an ambitious case to develop and to break the middle power mold that has been placed into while aiming for greater decision-making power in its region and greater influence on the rest of the members of the global neighborhood disadvantaged by a pro-Western status quo of the liberal international world order. In the final part of the thesis there is a set of open-ended questions to interview Turkey's leading state actor and two other political elites as a reflection of the state's messages disseminated in the international system and in terms of how the image-making in the post-Cold War era has transformed Turkey's stance within the international system.

During this process narrative research and the case study will shed light on the research question of how Turkey as a middle power is rising in the Post-Cold War era and tranforming itself into something much greater and influential. The case study will involve an exploration of Turkey's Foreign Policy approach since the end of the Cold War divided into three periods of state behavior transformation as a way to surface its' intricacies, strategies and tactics that will be analyzed through a data collection; which includes academic books, journals, policy papers and speeches.

1.5. Limitations of Research

The difficulties that lie ahead in conducting this research include the limited number of academic research that has been done particularly on middle powers. The aim of this study

is to create a mosaic of IR theories to explore middle powers and to provide my own analysis for the research question through a case study. Power transition theory as a framework helps us understand the competition among big powers like the US, China and Russia but does not explore the role and struggle of middle power classified states like Turkey in the context of this current global power shift.

The post-Cold war era, as it is argued in this proposal, sets the framework for the power transition from the 90s and into the millenia. Turkey's role in terms of its foreign policy in the post-Cold war period has been about a search for a new identity. This is set against the backdrop of a world system that has been in flux with humanitarian intervention which has been in totality conducted by a cohort of Western nations.

Looking at the particular cases in the post-Cold War period we can ascertain the changes beneath the surface of state-centric discourse which has been used to legitimize humanitarian intervention. In some notable cases such as the one found in the Operation Provide Comfort, the intervention to Northern Iraq marked the beginning of a major shift from norms and laws into action, where international policy to "help" those in crisis became predominantly based on moral values towards ending injustice against innocents. This, of course, in the long run minimized the concept of sovereignty of a state in the context of major humanitarian violations committed against harmless citizens while at the same time this approach maximized the princple of protecting particular ethnic groups that are under threat from states or non-state actors.

While the humanitarian intervention cases of Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor or Sierra Leone became a precursor for the plan and initiation of Responsibility to Protect, the principle set out in the doctrine is up to critical debate based on the question to what extent it has been successful in securing peace and stability (Shattuck, 2005, p.105-117).

Therefore, we can argue that in a "post-humanitarian intervention" world we shall be more familiar to anarchy arising around different regions. There are two possible scenarios we can conclude from this type of major shift in global politics. One, a state-centric world system will slowly dissipate where an interdependent system will emerge tied by moral values and yet, will be in less agreement on how to avert crimes against humanity due to overriding national interests. Second, a state-centric policy based on national interest will

slowly shift towards a "renewed policy" in protecting state sovereignty by way of restrategizing one's geopolitical role within a particular region. In other words, the state-led policy's security and stability will very much depend on the connection to the regional developments. Unlike the case of the United States, countries that are interconnected and couched within regions that have turmoil will have to pursue regional politics as a priority to securing its own national will and stability. In either of these scenarios we will be looking for a new stage in humanitarian help that is much more embroiled in the outcome of regional issues.

In such a world where a post-humanitarian system is emerging we come more to the realization that liberal values have failed us. The global financial crisis of 2008 led us to understand the West can no longer carry the burden of the world in which it constantly disseminates information about its superior democratic system. The US failed economically at home and lost its legitimacy to prove its democratic values abroad. How? The West failed to chide the Sisi regime that took over a democratically-elected leader. On the contrary they have supported him (Arafat, 2018, p. 234). And more recently in Turkey, the West left another critical country by itself in its struggle to sustain democracy and freedom against a military-coup on July 15th 2016. The janus-faced behavior of the West has left no confidence in the Western countries. Yet, interestingly, these downfalls did not lead to the demise of democratic values. On the contrary, the more the West pushes itself away and retreats its support from emerging countries, we see the global system realigning itself and transforming from a hegemonic, hierarchical sytem to a multilateral playing field. The question is does this new trend produce a "democratic global scene" where competition will create balance or whether the power shifts will increase uncertainty? Turkey's Foreign Policy, as this dissertation's case study, will shed light on this question as we analyze the surge of a middle power that is adamant about bringing a new perspective on democratic and universal norms as part of its own national and global vision.

Currently, as we witness a global hegemonic breakdown and the shift in the balance of power political stability around the world is being disturbed and there is an increase in the number of fragile states with cultural, ethnic and sectarian divisons becoming rampant. In parallel, as there is upsruge in economic and political uncertainty these institutions that are the pillar of global stability are turning out to be weak without the accelaration of development. This has, in effect, created geopolitical fault lines in the context of US retreating and the UN being non-functional. This has unfortunately, left a major power

vacuum in the international system where uncertainty has led to interstate competition to become fierce and risky for regional conflicts to break out. This is especially true for countries of North and northeast of the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Middle East, South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), northern China and Central Asia and North Africa. These new scenarios beg the question of whether we are returning back to the beginning of the Westphalian system because according to realist assumptions the only way we can preserve the world is if we can maintain what we have today. Otherwise new states will emerge that foster their own conflicts and risk spillovers into greater regions. Part of the major failure of the Western governments deficient leadership rests on the fact democracy and freedom rhetoric was fashioned under the guise of stability and security. The promise of democracy and freedom could never be fulfilled because legitimacy was lost as the lack of of belief in liberal values declined. Words and actions created a contradiction which led to enormous backlash i.e. the Muslim world.

In these times of uncertainty, rising anarchy, power transitions, and geopolitical fault lines the global governance system is becoming obsolete therefore, losing its functionality and legitimacy. More doubts are cast over neo-liberal policies as Western economic and political systems go into turmoil. These tensions, undeniably, put forth a new reality for social scientists to hash out and search for new answers as the world rapidly transforms. At the basis of this conversation is the following question: how will the leadership of non-Western countries in dealing with the chaos, criminality and injustice of a what one would dub a post-humanitarian world bring sound solutions? Turkey's example can set forth some prescriptions to such gaps within the international relations literature on the role of middle powers.

1.6. Organization of Dissertation

The main research question addresses a major deficiency in academic literature about the changing role of middle powers. The literature review looks into traditional middle powermanship to set the framework for a more intricate analysis of Turkey's changing role on the international scene. Turkey's Foreign Policy as a case study contextualizes a middle power state that pushes the limits and boundaries imposed by the structure of the international system. Waltz' definition of theory and the unit levels allows this thesis to pursue TFP as a case study from the individual, the state and international level (Waltz,

2008, p.83-92). Constructivism is used as another critical theoretical purview to explain that the system is not just void of ideas. On the contrary, ideas, beliefs and actions of individuals dynamically shape the structure of the system. Turkey's approach to maximizing opportunities at home and abroad creates its own space within the system that is looking to have more expansive influence in the region and around the world. Waltz' concept of the individual role is an important signifier. Turkey's leadership agency with assertive discourse makes it possible for the state level to interact with the structure of the system on the international level entailing a challenge to the status quo of the internationl liberal world order. It does this by addressing the deficiencies of an order led in the favor of a few to the detriment of many who feel they are subject to compliance in return for benefits such as economic, trade and military assistance.

At this juncture in history, the more there is turbulance in the world order, the great power transition period is more likey to occur at a fastening speed. The role of "middle powers" in the traditional sense seek an active role through international and regional organizations to have more influence in the shaping of world politics during this critical period. For a country like Turkey, on the other hand, we have a case in which it exerts itself. It asserts leadership role while at the same time a reformist role when it comes to creating a better and just international order through international institutions and organizations by creating a reform agenda.

Against this backdrop, this Chapter explores the theoretical basis from Waltz' perspective and a constructivist approach to understand the structure of the international system as well as explore the academic discussions surrounding power transition theory. Definitions of sovereignty and the nation-state show the challenge of Westphalian system in the post-Cold War period as the rise of human atrocities have legitimated the violation of certain sovereigns around the world. Shadow of the future problem continues to lead uncertainty in the world. Therefore, the post-Westphalian multipolar world requires a better imagination and solution-oriented approach to dealing with a liberal world order in crisis. Wallerstein predicts that until 2050, the age of transition will come about at an increasing rate when more overlapping issues continue to rise.

Chapter 2 explores different definitions of middle power. Turkey's behavioral model consists of growing economic, political, diplomatic and military power despite the challenges. It's humanitarian diplomacy underscores the importance of duty to world

community as “a global citizen.” Turkey’s willingness to be active across various platforms and international organizations also asserts itself as an active participant in defending multilateralism. Turkey’s middlepower activism deems it to be more than just a “middle power actor.” Therefore, I propose to define Turkey as an ***“efficacious power.”*** Section 2.2 argues that middle Powers have to be redefined in the 21st Century in the context of middle Powers becoming more active and engaged in shaping regional and global politics. Section 2.3. explores how Turkey’s role is different compared to other middle powers and how it is achieving to make a difference as an assertive actor.

In this framework Chapter 3 addresses the research question by providing a critique of Western dominant actors over the international liberal order and the role of energy, security, poverty and development as factors that define political issues of our time. The competition for resources has enabled thirst for unlimited power for control and domination by a Western-led order. In this section, Organski’s power transition is discussed to delineate the competition between the US and China for dominance, yet at the same time it is also argued that Turkey’s drive to break out of the middle powermanship mold is a challenge from within the hierarchy of world powers as it demonstrates great power decision-making and actions in regional and global security, peace and stability. I also explore securitization theory whereby illocutionary act can securitize an issue (Buzan and et.al, 1998, p.32). This is in the context that “The choice of words employed in strategic historical analysis can matter deeply” (Gray, 2007, p.275). TFP as a case study offers an important window in the way issues such as UNSC reform and alleviating poverty and educating masses are a way to lessen inequalities, violence and terror. At the same time, Western nations’s process of threat construction has led to a discourse of “the need to stay in charge” to protect the wellbeing of the international system. The counter-securitization between the US and China through a trade war has also created a major atmosphere of rivalry in the great power transition period. Emancipation and world security theories, in tandem, shed light to the need to achieve a prosperous and secure international order that is equity-based. The great power transition period allows for middle power nations and an exceptional actor like Turkey to have an active input to the shaping of the next world order dominanted by multipolarity. The reform of global institutions and the world order will allow global governance to have a multi-level mechanism to tackle collective issues that concern all nations.

In Chapter 4 the reserach employs a discourse analysis to discuss and explore how Turkey is setting precedence as a country that is defying the limits of being a middle power

and is adoting an *efficacious* behavior by coupling TFP and religion as a policy agenda to advance its interests on the national and international level. I undertake one version of global governance as a reference point in unpacking security, development and democracy in TFP and its method in challenging the global power status quo. This is in the context of reshaping the relations between religion and the secular state (White, 2002, p.165) and how this has allowed Turkey to construct an image of an advacotate of *geo-welfare*. Then I continue with the discourse analysis of how Turkey changed the geopolitical imagination and its strategic culture within global politics as a result (Yavuz, 2009, p.45-48) of its *efficacious behavior*. According to the Cambridge Dictionary the term *efficacious* is defined as "able to produce the intended result" that is synonomous with the term effective meaning "sucecssful or achieving the result that you want". As the term *efficacious* will be used in this thesis as part of a new type of power conceptualization it will be useful for readers of IR took bear in mind the definitions of this particular term. In the context of this analysis, this section focuses on discourses regarding bilateral trade relations, defense industry and the fight against terror as part of the larger agenda to carry Turkey's success in the past 18 years to higher echelons as an *efficacious actor*.

In Chapter 5 there will be an analysis of Turkey's peformance by observing the state's opportunities, limitations in the region and around the world followed by a concluding section on the successes and failures. The critical part that will give direction to this chapter will include an interview with Turkey's state elites which will help to set the framework to distill the conversation on Turkey's image, its activism in the international scene and the prospects for Turkey's greater efficacy within the system. The interview based on open-ended questions will include my analysis and interpretation within the dissertation accompanied by policy recommendations for current and future academics and practicioners in the field. This will be ensued by Chapter 6 with concluding remarks on the research conducted throughout the dissertation.

1.7. Theories Introducing Readers to IR for State Behavior Analysis

1.7.1. Political Realism as a Context

The traditional figures in IR discipline such as those who make up the foundation of political realism of the 20th Century include Morgenthau, Carr, Herz and Aron who define this particular classification of realism through the lens of Thucydides, Machiavelli and

Hobbes. In exploring international relations from this standpoint, one can argue that the production of knowledge among realists focus on the Hobbesian nature of the world and the competition for power as the ultimate end rather than the use of power as a means for cooperation and mutual development. Therefore, the realist enterprise offers a strict view on the nature of humanity as a conflicting and warmongering space where competing ideologies, interests and the ego reign as opposed to attmepting to create an international sphere of politics of community in the same regard as domestic politics. Domestic politics is considered a political community for the realist. However, international politics is neither viewed as a community since self-interest of nation states are observed to be pursuing their survival in a system dominated by anarchy.

Scholars of this view argue that “coercive state apparatus” are power seeking in a world of anarchy that negatively views the lack of possibility for a collective action due to the “shadow of the future” problem. “The Hobbesian reasoning and anarchist thought,” (Alker, 1996, p.372) in reality, does not leave any room towards an optimistic view of the international arena since it is a pessimist view of the “state of nature.” The nation-state is viewed as a political organization that seeks the common interest of all of its member citizens. Yet, in the traditional realist approach, the world out there is not viewed as a community that seeks the common security of all. Hence, “Hobbes' state of nature is a world of egoistic, prideful, expansionistic, possessive individuals. Since it is a fundamental "right of nature" that every man there has a "right to every thing" there that he is strong enough to get and keep…” (Alker, 1996, 372). In order for survival, a sovereign state’s concern about its preservation, rights and interests are also pursued in what Morgenthau argues in reference to creating alliances “as a neccessary function of the balance of power operating in a multiple- state system” (Morgenthau, 1967, p.193).

When exploring the nature of interantional relations, indeed, the realist approach deems the world out there as dangerous and competitive. Yet, at the same time, survival does not mean the total rejection of cooperation with other state actors. Alliances in a Hobbesian state of nature require a “formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” (Walt, 1987, p.12). According to Mearsheimer “the structure of the international system is anarchic, not hierarchic, which means that liberalism applied to international politics cannot work” in which he argues that “nationalism and realism almost always trump liberalism” (Mearsheimer, 2018, p.3-4). The reason one can argue for the overarching domination of the realist approach could be based on the kinds of form that

power takes. "While it follows that power and power relations play the major roles in international affairs, power can assume the form of military, economic, and even psychological relationships among states, as E.H. Carr has pointed out" (Gilpin, 2001, p.17). According to Herz, "because no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on" (Herz, 1951, p.157)

In this framework, in order to be able to explain the oubreak and the end of WWII, WWII and the Cold War, once can look at the security dillemma theory within the realist realm as a "powerful theory of war and peace via interaction" (Tang, 2009, p.588). According to Aron, "the course of international relations remains supremely historical in all the meanings of this term: there are unceasing changes, the systems, which are multiple and fragile, suffer the effects of all the transformations, decisions taken by one man or a few set into motion millions of people and provoke irreversable mutations (Aron 1972, p.379-380, as cited in Hoffman, 1985, p.16).

Some of the perspectives of realism and its proponents contextualize the nature of the system in which states operate within. The purpose of defining realism as one could assert is to sketch the relations in which nation-states continue to interact upon within the 21st Century. In order to illuminate the centrality of realism within international relations, the aforementioned approaches by scholars who philosophize about the nature of the world, the nature of the human being and its impact on the relations within the interaction of states. Scholars and practicioners of the IR field will abe able to explore in this study the attempt to explain Turkey's state behavior in the post-Cold War era from within the realm of realism, but not limited to it. The following classification of the neorealist theory will be able to better explain Turkey's case study from a Waltzian perspective.

1.7.2. Neorealism to Explain the Case Study of Turkey

In order to understand power relations survival, conflict, cooperation over mutual interests require a further exploration and discovery in the way the units are organized and interact within the system. "Neorealism has an explicit ontology—a perverse form of Universality I—in which states, balance of power, Hobbesian power-seeking man, and the contractual basis of polity are presumed to be eternal interrelated components of world order" (Cox, 2001, p.46). Unlike Carr who believed that states were different in their forms

because of their historical past is an argument that neorealism rejects because it views units in the system as like one another.

Waltz's analysis of *The Man, the State and War* offers a theoretical and conceptual analysis for IR theorists to delve into and research what one might say as the technical approach to understanding the unit (s) and their interaction within the system. The purpose of this study is to adopt Waltz' approach of the individual, the state and the system as a systemic explanation for Turkey's case study in the post-Cold war era. In explaining and researching this case study, it is best for readers to keep in mind that the neorealist approach is pertinent in the 21st Century even in the changing and volatile structure of the system. Turkey's approach during this period as demonstrated in the image, actions and discourse representing the state offer a window to the changing relations of what Waltz deemed to be similar kinds of units. Turkey's within the system challenge may act within the classification of Waltz' theory. But, at the same time the post-Cold War era of the 21st Century requires a new kind of analysis in which one theoretical perspective is not sufficient to explain the causes and effects in regional and international politics.

1.7.3. Liberalism as a Philosophy

Locke's exploration of the human being in the *Essay Concering Human Understanding* in relation to one's position within one's community and in the political realm pointed to "two possibilities" which Dunn points out:

> "Either they are independent and gods to themselves, or they are dependent and under the direction of the God on whom they depend. He believed firmly that they are the second rather than the first: that their most fundamental characteristic is that they are dependent intelligent beings. What he needed to demonstrate epistemologically in his major mature works was that they are both dependent, and capable through their own intelligence of ascertaining exactly what God has directed them to do" (Dunn, 2001, p.47).

When we look at what exactly liberalism means from a philosophical point of view it will be easier to determine the underlying premise of the liberal approach in IR. Bell describes liberalism "as an embattled vanguard project and constitutive of modernity itself, a fine-grained normative political philosophy and a hegemonic mode of governmentality, the justificatory ideology of unrestrained capitalism and the richest ideological resource for its limitation" (Bell, 2014, 683). In addition to Locke the liberal tradition consists of thinkers such as Kant, Mill and Rawls whose contribution to conceptualizing liberalism has led to a

proliferation of debates and conversations surrounding values and norms and what it means for individuals to form their own political philosophy, hence, their won political liberalism.

"Comprehensive liberalisms effectively fail to respect the equality and freedom modern citizens enjoy when it comes to exercising their moral power to formulate their own conceptions of the good" (Abbey & Spinner-Halev, 2012, p. 126). From the perspective of Mill *On Liberty*, Gray argues that "Mill's affirmation points to the central and fundamental weakness of all liberalisms, which is that their claim to a universal authority rests on an anachronistic and parochial Eurocentric interpretation of history" (Gray, 2000, p.139). Thus, the Englightenment project on the development of reason and political philosophies have been undully based on Euro-centric hegemony that favors the construction of political institutions vis a vis a Western subjective point of view.

The same explanation could be made in the kind of liberalism that is depicted by Rawls as a response to problems from within a Euro-centric and Western narrative. Rawls in *Political Liberalism* ventures into political philosophy in order to "demarcate political from moral (or ethical) autonomy" while arguing that political liberalism "did not emerge simply as a response to the political problem of religious wars but also as a more wide-ranging set of responses to the problem of how moral knowledge can have a basis independent of ecclesiastical authority" (Hittinger, 1994, p. 589).

Rawls' skeptical approach to ecclesiastical points to an schism between moral and political authority viewed as the opposite of two ends. Yet, today, in current international relations in the post-Cold war era we see a growing importance of the role of religion and international security as two-sides of the same coin. From this point of view in IR, Rawls political liberalism focuses on the concept of justice while casting away the possibility of a society to come together on the basis of a "doctrine to govern social life more broadly" (Mitchell, 1994, p.1918). As it will be explained in this case study, this study will attempt to explain and exemplify from Turkey's experience that in recent period over the span of nearly two decades instead of a demarcation between the moral and political sphere, on the contrary, there appears to be a collaboration between the two on the domestic level and across international engagement. This is further evidenced in the work of Reidy who sets the premise that Rawls "offers too thin a doctrine of global economic justice" (Reidy, 2004, p.293). As Wallerstein's world system analysis framework has been used in the previous chapter 3 as part of an explanation for the unjust economic world system that has been

established by core states, this thesis attempts to unearth Turkey's exemplification of a moral political agency that emerged to challenge the undemocratic, unequal and Hobbesian behavior exerted within the region and around the world that requires some kind of confrontation.

From the perspective of Lockean civil society and Rawls' interpretation one could arrive at the assumption that "rational agents can reach consensus about the principles of justice for the purpose of political institutions" (Hittinger, 1994, p.586). However, realist and liberal thinkers would argue that it would be difficult for a society to arrive upon a mutual moral doctrine to agree upon due to the state of nature and competing ideologies. And this point, in reality, demonstrates the inevitability for the realist state of nature to continue its duration for a perpetual time.

> "A legitimate political authority can be an effective remedy for many of the inconveniences of the state of nature. But it cannot, of its very nature, hope to be a full and consistent remedy for all of them. It cannot hope to be so, fundamentally, because it cannot consistently and fully eliminate aspects of the state of nature from its own structures and procedures" (Dunn, 1996, p.117)

The reason behind realist and liberal political philosophy's greater relevance in the exploration and explanation of Turkey's case in the post-Cold War era is due to newer debates arising around concepts such as "justice," "equity," "fairness" while certain states disregarding international law are paving the way for possibly more enhanced political thoughts that could perhaps influence domestic and international institutions towards change and reform. One could argue that this is due to the continuing Hobbesian state of the nature where anarchy continues across the world. But, Turkey's exceptional experience in recent history demonstrates what once could argue and formulate as part of research program that can be explored under what one could perceive as a *Muslim Realism and Liberalism* as a response to anarchy. What one could conceptualize as Muslim realism as opposed to Classical realism can be seen in light of a different vision. As mentioned in earlier, modern political theory perceives the state of nature from Hobbes' perspective as "the war of all against all." Muslim realism as a new window of research could be constructed not as identifying the state of nature based on conflict per se but rather putting forward the potential for human cooperation. Muslim realism, as opposed to the Hobbesian belief of the "sole interest of the self" can be countered by what could be viewed as a new outlook on the state of nature that not only seeks the self-interest of the nation-state but all the interest of others

who are oppressed and downtrodden in need of progress and development. Muslim realism in essence could be seen as a scholarly perspective with the underlying notion that instead of Hobbes' state of nature there could be a humanitarian basis of collective interest to empower the global community based on mutual development and advancement. In brief, as opposed to the world vision based on the "war of all against all" it is possible to look through the lens of "cooperation on the commonality of differences" principle that one could argue for the formulation of Muslim realism. As this thesis will attempt to do in the following sections of Chapter 4 and 5, the discourse analysis and the speech-act will unravel the case for a Muslim Realism through the political messaging disseminated within the domestic scene against the backdrop of reaching out to an regional and international audience.

In this context, Turkey's case analyzed from the Waltzian perspective provides a "one-of-a-kind" experience whose domestic changes have led to much greater role within the system through its increase of material of capabilities coupled with its increasing discourse dissemination across international organizations. According to Finnemore, "IOs socialize states to accept new political goals and new values that have lasting impacts on the conduct of war, the workings of the international political economy, and the structure of states them- selves" (Finnemore, 1996, p.3).

As it will become clear in the case study of Turkey, the constant interaction between the state actor, the state and its communication within and across the system provides a challenge to not just the international institutions of the global community who lack reform. But, Turkey's case serves as a catalyst for all units within the system to become aware that the need to change the state of the international system requires a change within in order to attain better cooperative relations in the international arena. Therefore, the following section brings us to the discussion of the role of institutionalism as the key to reform international organizations for a liberal, equity-based and just system to take charge of the international system while mitigating the effects of anarchy. The next section discussing the role of institutionalism will further explain how Turkey's activism has paved the way for its role in attempting to reform international organizations.

1.7.4. Neoliberal Institutionalism As a Means to Reform IOs

Institutionalism as a theory can be accounted for the kind of impact it can have on the units in in the Waltizan sense and how the interaction between the units and the

institutions can render action and dialogue between them. For Keohane and Martin "institutions are created by states because of their anticipated effects on patterns of behavior (1995, p. 46). Realist scholarship asserts the minimal affect that international instiutions have on international relations due to its basic belief of the Hobbesian "war of all against all" and gives less significance to its efficacy to the possibility of enabling cooperation among states. Mearsheimer indicates:

> "When state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, we do not expect cooperation to occur, nor the institutions that facilitate cooperation to develop. When states can jointly benefit from cooperation, on the other hand, we expect governments to attempt to construct such institutions. Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity. By seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and cooperation can occur, institutionalist theory shows under what conditions realist propositions are valid. It is in this sense that institutionalism claims to subsume realism (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p.42).

Keohane and Martin argue that realist scholars like Mearsheimer presume that liberal institutionlism only deals with political economy and that it does not fit the realm of security policies. Institutionalist argue that both political economy and security can be explained within the same framework since "power and interests" can be said to consist across all spheres of socio-economic and political areas across the international system. While the realist school argues for expecting the worst and viewing the world in a pessimistic perspective, it is concerned more greatly about relative gains and cheating in cooperation. The constant fear and anxiety over losing one's security has led the realist scholarship to develop defensive and offensive realism (s). On the other hand, institutionalism has been established as way to mitigate that fear and to increase the likelihood of a positive view of cooperation via the mechanism of institutions and international organizations as a platform for common ground for diplomacy, mediation, dialogue and communication to take place.

Both scholars and practicioners of neorealism and neoliberal instituionalism would argue that national interest is their common denominator. However, their outlook on the world seems to be on two opposite ends of the spectrum. From this vantage point, Turkey's case study provides an uncommon analytical opportunity to explain the behavior of a state whose actions and speech can be contextualized in a neorealist school while at the same time pursuing national interest through an institutionalist mechanism approach. Turkey's strategem in its geopolitical position keeps in mind the reality of a prisoner's dilemma

context and lays out its strategy plan that can be explained vis a vis Waltz approach and the institutionalist theory both at the same time.

This case study presents a new outlook on analyzing Turkey through the prism of international relations theory through an amalgamation of neorealism and liberal institutionalism against the backdrop of an overarching perspective on realism. However, this analysis would not be sufficient without the contribution of another paramount theoretical approach that is widely accepted by scholars known as constructivism. The following section will analyze the role of constructivism in identity construction and the formation of values and beliefs as part of Turkey's foreign policy agenda that is actively being shaped and implemented in the international policy-making sphere.

1.7.5. Constructivism as a Method to Analyze Identity Formation

In additon to realism, neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism, it could be argued that "constructivism has succeeded in broadening the theoretical contours of IR" (Checkel, 1998, p.325). As one would observe and try to explain the developments occuring in international politics, constructivism provides a useful theoretical oulook on the "intersubjective dimension of knowledge" in which "the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure constraining and shaping behavior" (Copeland, 2000, p. 189) allows a close examination of states, their actors as leaders and their interaction within the international system as a useful tool for analysis.

In international relations and politics the main aim of states are to attain as much power, security and wealth. Therefore, "interests are not just "out there" waiting ot be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction" (Finnemore, 1996 p.2). In the post-Cold war era, there is a plethora of literature about the vigorous focus on the influence of "interest in culture and identity in the IR domain" (Lapid, 1996, p. 4). According to Wendt, "The structure of a states system is constituted as anarchic by member states having and acting on the identity of juridical independence and self-governance" which is a plausible argument that leads the scholar to argue that a "decentralized authority system" (Wendt, 1996, p.48) is possible which one can describe as neither "anarchy nor hierarchy." Wendt's conceptualization of an "international state" (Wendt, 1996 p.48) is something that could be akin to the concept of global governance as this thesis will also brush upon in this

Chapter for the purpose of offering the possibility at a collective arrival on the common understanding on development, democracy and security in a multipolar system.

In this context, traditional scholarship refers to realism and constructivism from different angles when it comes to the issue of balance of power:

> "In realism the balance of power is not necessarily a deliberately intended product, it is more of an inevitable consequence of states looking to take care of their own security needs. In constructivism, by contrast, the balance of power is a means or procedure for dealing with various shifts of capabilities: over time, countries get rich, countries get poor, countries develop bigger armies, countries develop smaller armies, so the capacities of states are often in flux. The balance of power is one important way of dealing with this flux" (Jackson & Jones, 2012, p.108).

Yet, in the post-Cold war the idea of an international state still offers little insight into the competing ideologies and civilizational backgrounds in which states may characterize these issues from different historical angles and how this creates change in the balance of power. Regardless, constructivism provides an abundant, rich and a wide perspective to analyze state behavior within the international system in order to "describe interlevel phenomena" (Wendt, 1996, p.49) considering that "The Cold War was at base a cultural rather than material structure, and thus the end of the Cold War was a "structural change" along that dimension" (ibid, p.49).

According to Finnemore:

> "State interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate. That normative context influences the behavior of decisionmakers and of mass publics who may choose and constrain those decisionmakers. The normative context also changes over time, and as internationally held norms and values change, they create coordinated shifts in state interests and behavior across the system" (Finnemore, 1996, p.2).

The decision-makers whose behaivor impact the system and in return the way the system constrains the decision-makers can be explained by the theoretical perspective that "All human actors—both individual and collective—have social identities that enable them to operate in a world of complex social processes and practices" (Reus-Smit, 1997, p.564). It could be argued from a neoliberal perspective that as interdependence increases the role of instiutions become more paramount as a means for a win-win understanding while reducing the relative-gain mindset. Collective action allows states to pursue collaboration

and mutual gain while it also minimizes the risk of conflict by utilizing the role of institutions as a means towards peace and stability.

In order to be able to better explain the approach of constructivism used in this study for analyzing Turkey's case in the post-Cold War era, its is best to refer to a claim that:

> "The relationship between state agents and systemic structures has something of this bilateral quality: The structure of the states system is supervenient on the properties of states, and the properties of states-including state identities-are, to a significant but lesser extent, dependent on properties of the states system. It is this (partial) mutual constitution that enables us to analyze structural change in terms of identity-change" (Wendt, 1996, p. 49).

In this context, international organizations play a significant role in the way actors within the structure engage one another on a common ground. Therefore, the behavior of actors are determined and shaped by an interaction with actors "through the media of norms and practices" where one could derive from this assertion that "In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning" (Hopf, 1998, p. 173). The main concern of constructivism used to address in this thesis is to allow one to explore "the black box of interest and identity formation" (Checkel, 1998, p.326) within Turkey's case study. In this attempt, as it will become more evident throughout the analysis in this thesis, constructivism can be viewed as "endogenous, exogenous and dialectical" where "Knowledge is achieved when the inner states of the individual reflect or accurately represent the existing states of the external world or when the mind serves as a "mirror of nature" (Yilmaz, 2008, p.164). In this thesis, in analyzing the case of Turkey within the Waltzian approach it is also possible to interpret a the constructivist perspective from an "endogenic view of knowledge (which) emphasizes the mental processes of individuals and the ways in which they construct knowledge of the world from within" (Yilmaz, 2008, p.164).

This is also to show that agains the backdrop of a realist theoretical outlook on the world and the liberal approaches to it does not mean that constructivism is "incompatible with intersubjective epistemologis and methodologies" (Barkin, 2003, p.326). On the contrary, both neorealism and neoliberalism offer an approach to de-constructing Turkey's case study in the post-Cold War from these points of view while at the same time utilizing constructivism as theory to explain the identity formation through beliefs, values and cultures of a new kind of power within the international system. This chapter will attempt to

analyze Turkey's behavior as a new pattern that is distinct from other actors within the system. In this line of argument, we would like scholars and practicioners to be able to look at Turkey in recent history from a perspective that provides an amalgamation of theories with a particular focus on constructivism. As Turkey constructs its image within the international system through its reforms at the domestic level it contemporaneously has been building its reformist and game-changer image across the international arena. Thus, international organizations provide an opportunity space for Turkey to demonsrate state behavior that is distinct in the way it challenges some of the failures of norms and values in which international institutions were founded upon. As Turkey in the post-Cold War era has sought to distinguish itself as an effective actor in its region and global politics to re-constitute what it means to be a "responsible and humanitarian state actor" in the international system. Hence, this kind of identity-construction approach "produces particular habits of thought and action and thereby certain practices, including actions toward other (which) seem self-evidently right and others unthinkable" (Dessler & Owen, 2005, p.605).

In this academic endeavour we want readers of international relations to be able to understand and examine Turkey from within the various theories of IR discipline. Our attempt to undertake this study is also an attempt to allow scholars and practicioners to be able to explore Turkey's case from a multiplex perspective rather than a one-dimensional or a single theoretical perspective. Therefore, one of the nascent aims in this study is to conceptualize Turkey's role in the post-Cold War era as a different and unique kind of power in contrast to its counterparts in the region and around the world. Hence, this a analysis will be an attempt at experimenting a qualitative approach at how one could define Turkey's role, its behavior, status and standing in global politics vis a vis its active assertiveness across international organizations and platforms as it continues to construct and build its image through a confident and decisive behavior that calls on the global community towards reform and change.

In this regard, Turkey as a state actor seeking to create a paradigm shift in international politics is a demonstration of a resolute venture at changing attitudes of other regional and global actors in the global community. How this venture will be met by actors within international relations will depend on the further development of theoretical analysis and an extensive study from within the IR discipline. However, as this thesis will attempt to examine Turkey under the variety of theoretical lenses, it will also seek to conceptualize Turkey's behavior as an effective and influencer rather than accepting to be subsumed under

great power politics. This kind of behavior analysis throughout this study will point to a present challenge Turkish leadership as an actor that redefines its role, geostrategic position and significance in regional and global politics. Consequently, before moving to Turkey's analysis of state behavior it is best to keep in mind for scholars and practicioners that:

> "When a novel conception is introduced it always elicits great resistance. Even as a transformation in general thinking and attitudes develops more support and adherents, there will continue to be resistance to the challenge to the existing order, the comfortable, existing ways of viewing the world. For example, the ideas of Galileo and Copernicus were met with disdain, anger and rejection. But, of course, with time, the established physical order of the universe did become accepted and the earlier views came to be seen as the quaint notions of an earlier uninformed era. Ultimately most if not all the ideas of the older paradigm will be discarded; and this is as it should be when the scientific evidence unequiovacally points to a more adequate explanation of certain phenomenon. As a new paradigm gains respect and acceptance, a gradual and sometimes relatively rapid process of intellectual disassociaton occurs. People take flight from the earlier, now prosaic and apparently inadequate ways of viewing the world with a lens that is no longer capable of clearly capturing "truth." A new, fresh conceptual rendering of a topic, phenomenon or means of investigation is promoted. A new theory is offered to supplant an older theory (Kuhn, 1970)" (Applefield, Huber & Moallem, 2000, p.36)

As the following Chapter 2 will attempt to "deconstruct" and analyze Turkey's case study within the scope of middle power scholarship, at the same time, this thesis will attempt to examine the interaction between the state actor, the state and the system towards a new conceptualization that distinguishes the Turkish state from other actors in the international system. In order to achieve this, the examination and analysis will rest on the "practice of the political agent" as it seeks to transform a structure that it deems unjust and unequal. In this regard, as it becomes more pertinent to this thesis, scholars and practicioners will be able to discern that "leadership exists in a dynamic and ongoing time frame in which individuals seek goals and try to channel the actions of others to their advantage and the advantage of those for whom they actor as political agents" through the method of "expending considerable physical and rhetorical energey" (Kurtz, 2001, p.41). The discourse analysis conducted in this thesis will aim to shed light on Turkey's case for demanding change in a world where the limitations of the structure are being challenged by a different type of power accumulation.

CHAPTER 2- CONCEPTUALIZATION OF MIDDLE POWERS

2.1. Academic Definitions and Reflection on International Hierarchy

In order to be able to define middle power in academic literature, it is critical to imagine where middle powers are positioned between small and great powers and what kind of criteria set them apart. While small powers have always been seen as actors that are under the subjugation of great powers with litle influence and effectiveness, at the same time, the "patron-client relationship" allows the former to dominate over the latter's foreing policy decisions in its regional context. But, in the post-Cold War period we see a change in the behavior of small states who are gaining more presence and voice in international organization and platforms as a way to put pressure on great powers.

> "In an ever-globalized international community, the role of small power has been magnified to an extent where their number alone may come to signify powerful coalitions capable of resisting and even curbing the influence of what are traditionally perceived as larger powers. The fact that both the European Union and NATO comprise a large number of small powers has certainly renewed the scholars' interest in this type of states. Small powers are ardent supporters of international organizations for the latter provide effective channels of communication, thus the voice of small powers today echoes the faintest political remark fittingly displaying power and antithesis to large power interests" (Kassimeris, 2009, p.96).

It seems quite evident that the current international environment fosters an atmosphere in which small states can gather and conglomerate to create a force of movement. In this framework, in contrast to what we shall see with middle power categorization that includes certain criteria, the 21st century ushered small power definition to not be limited to size, population nor geography. But, what has become more evident is the way it forms its state behavior on the international stage. Small states would depend their security on great power determination without the ability to set the agenda around their regional position giving way to the hegemonic establishment to pursue its foreign policy agenda. However, international organizations paved the way for small powers to voice their desire for full autonomy and sovereignty without great power interference. One cannot overlook the fact that the "economy and political infrastructure" (Kassimeris, 2009, p.92) play a significant role in the shaping of the state behavior. Yet, considering the times of crisis in the international system through trade wars, political instability, conflicts, poverty and climate change there seems to be an opportunity for small powers to use international organizations

to voice their right for political independence which was not fully realized in the interest of small powers their security in the de-colonization period.

According to Organski "relationship between the dominant nation and the lesser members of its international order varies from one order to another" (Organski, 1958, p.365). The following illustration depicts the power relationship from the Organski's perspective which will be helpful in how Turkey's role within the middle power category will be changed in the illustration of where *efficacious power* production can be placed in challenging the international world order in the post-Cold War era.



Figure 2: Organski's depiction of powers of hierarchy in the international order (Organski, 1958, p. 365).

The crux of the matter rests upon the proliferation of a legitimately-defined role perception that aims to create change in the system. In other words, what defines the states behavior in a globalized international community is the lack of delimitation of political discourse and therefore its unconfined impact beyond its immediate region. Hence, the 21st Century's "hyper-globalization" has led to a break up of a stark difference between small powers in the present day and middle and great powers which appeared to be a solidifed hierarchy in the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era as the international system shifts towards multipolarity it could be argued that it will be difficult for one particular nation to be the dominant state influencing the hierarchy of the international order. While in

Organski's analysis it has been presented that "the differential growth rate among peer states" would be the cause for a power shift to occur in the hierarchy of world power, however, he did not "go beyond to systematically explain how such a growth rate historically favors different states in different epochs of the modern era…" (Kachiga, 2018, p.x). This requires us to modify, change and look more in depth to the role of a country like Turkey which seeks to operate beyond the middle power realm as it challenges the structure of the world hierarchy from within. The pathway between small, medium and great power hierarchy is more fluid than the recent past as the vast advancement of technology and communication systems enabled weaker or small powers to demand more rights. Therefore, the unjust order is being challenged from the bottom-up and attempting to create change in the hierarchical mold.



Figure 3: Dimensions of International Hierarchy (Lake, 2009, p.53).

Hence, the role of great powers are being put to test in their "sincerity" of their mission to liberalize a world that has been intentionally built upon asymmetrical power relations. This can also be reffered to in David Lakes illustration of economic and security hierarchy. This leads scholars and practicioners to the question of what it means to be a great power. In retrospect, great power construction in world history can be found in in the Congress of Vienna when the term was used for the first time through the establishment of

The Concert of Europe ensued by "Leopold Ranke's seminal essay "The Great Powers" published in 1833" (Danilovic, 2002, p.27). Holbraad argued that "the number of great powers in the system and the political relations that exist between these chief actors determine the international environment of the lesser states and influence their behaviour, towards the great powers and among themselves (Holbraad, 1984, p.5). The importance of this study rests upon how middle power behaviour in Turkey's case study in the post-Cold War era transformed in the creation of a new "pattern of subsystemic conduct" (Holbraad, 1984, p.5). This infers to the reality that in post-Westphalian context the balance of power in the traditional sense is being challenged in the contemporary international system. This also points to the reality that systemic-structural approach by Holbraad where the balane of power mechanism is being impacted by new actors like Turkey aim for a more egalitarian international order rather than a strict hierarchical system.

Çelik, in her classification of traditional middle power theories lists the "functional model, the systemic-structural approach, the identity approach and the behavioral model" (Çelik, 2017, p.21). These categorizations are looked into in this thesis with the aim of conceptualizing a new kind of power identity for Turkey. It can be said by the observation that Turkey is categorized as a middle power treading the path to become a great power since it is exerting an effort beyond middle powermanship classification. It seeks to form an identity that is not limited to its geostrategic location but behaves as a norm and value diffusion actor conducted through its discourse across international platforms and organizations. According to Imai,

> "Middle power state is a matter of sate identity, and is formed through internal and external transformations. Material change is the trigger of change in self-perception and the perception of others. These perceptional changes encourage the crsytallization of state identity. Countries choose foreign policies alongside their state identities for reinforcement of their identities through liberal foreign policies such as functional diplomacy, mediatiaon, niche diplomacy, coalition diplomacy and norm diffusion" (Imai, 2018, p. 26)

In this ardous endeavour it does not seek to eliminate nor deter small powers from seeking the same kind of success in the path to development and growth. On the contary, this collective effort presented in the fortitude of discourse power utilized in international organizations and platforms is a momentous juncture in world history as Turkey, with an abecedary role, defies the hierarchy and perseveres for a unified change in the international system. In this regard, the underestimation of small powers has led to a greater mobilization

in international organizations where middle powers are leading a campaign to transform into a leveled international system that serves the benefit of both small and middle powers via the strive to hold great powers accountable for the lack of equity and justice in the system as realized in the last century. This realization in the 21st Century is experiencing a break-down through middle powermanship power that can no longer be sustainable in the traditional definition. The age of unequal powers is challenged as the periphery and semi-periphery exert their pressure on great powers at their failed attempt to 'disguise and normalize the concept of unequal powers'.

This is precisely where the role of middle power is re-shaped and changed as this research argues to unearth this reality by conducting a case study on Turkey in the post-Cold War era. The concept of middle power was originally coined by the16th Century philosopher Giovanni Botero who argued that middle powers "are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth and power being moderate, passion are less violent, ambition finds less supoprt and license less provocation than in largest states" (Botero, Waley, Waley, Peterson & Botero, 1956, p. 8). The description provided by Botero dating back to 16th Century may have been pertinent to the way the international and regional system was organized during according to that time. However, the concept of middle power is being drastically changed as Turkey's case study will argue in this research due to the changing condition of the international system in the 21st Century. The changing trend in intellectual and academic studies further proves this point with the onset of decolonization period in the 20th Century. Van Agtmael in 1981 used the term "emerging market" in order to help developing countries to progress and advance so they could prosper after centuries of colonization and exploitation that led to slavery of the current Global South countries who were considered to be lesser than the great powers. Agtmael argued that the term emerging markets "suggested progress, uplift and dynamism" which the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank would arrive at describing the developing economies (World Bank Group, 2016, p. 47). In international relations academic literature the term middle power was than associated with "pivotal states" (Chase, Hill & Kennedy) in a 1996 article where the authors argued that such states are not endangered by any kind of external threat but have the risk of falling trap to internal disorder. Looking at the timeline in which the term middle power has changed and transformed it is more evident that in today's circumstances the description of a "middle power" in the 21st Century requires a new outlook, a new definition and description.

A new geopolitical imagination shows us that the internal threat of military coups and numerous terror organization attacks and their infiltrations pose a risk both within a country and hinder a nation's "capacity to affect regional and international stability" (Chase, Hill & Kennedy, 1996, p.37). The increasing regional conflicts, violence, poverty and displacement leading to mass migrations are leading to a new window of a geopolitical imagination on what it means to be a middle power in today's context and even more so the emergence of new identities beyond the middle power concept.

When discussing the role of middle powers, academics provided typologies to position nations within this conceptual framework. Middle powers are not just challengers to the status quo, as mentioned earlier, but they compete next to great powers in shaping the international order. Academic literature has included a variety of definitions of middle powers at different junctures of international history. These definitions have to do with the economic and political capacity in addition to military might which results in the categorization of certain countries as 'middle' power.

> "The three broad categories of middle-power definition correlate with the prominent schools of thought in international relations at the height of their popularity: functional definitions correlate with the dominance of functionalism during the interwar and post-World War II period; capacity definitions correlate with the dominance of realism in the post-World War II period until the end of the Cold War period; and behaviour definitions correlate with the revival of liberalism and the growth of constructivism in the post-Cold War period…" (Robertson, 2017, p.364).

The great power transition or rivalry occcuring between the US and China allows middle powers like Australia, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and Malaysia to assume power in their regions and also take a leading role in the international system. The post-Cold War era signifies that middle power states are based on strong diplomatic discourses and greater integration into the international system with wider influence vis a vis economic, political and military means. Across academic literature the demarcation created between great, middle and small powers can slightly differ and is not necessarily clear. As Robertson discusses the differing periods in which middle power definition has varied, it is also important to note that "the middle-power role is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system" (Cox & Sinclair, 1996, p.242). The post-Cold war Era that has been marked by US unilateralism propelled other nations looking to gain an influlential position in the international system. Some argue that:

> "Candidates for middle power status could potentially include any of the states of Japan, Russia, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, the UK, France, Italy, and Turkey. There is no obvious demarcation between small and middle powers either, so where to end the list of middle power candidates appears little more than arbitrary" (Stephen, 2013, p.40).

In referring to James Manicom & Jeffery Reeves, Gilley & O'Neill discuss the threefold typology of middle powers:

> "positional middle powers'' that are expected to exercise influence due to their size and contribute to building international order in a way that promotes their interests; ''behavioral middle powers,'' which, in addition to exerting influence and promoting interests, build coalitions with the like-minded, engage in niche diplomacy, and build bridges between the great powers in pursuit of substantive ends, which Gilley and O'Neil identify as multipolarity, rules and institutions, and peace building; and ''ideational middle powers'' that also claim to be good international citizens and leaders, as well as adhering to liberal-internationalist ideals" (Gilley & O'Neil, 2014, p.240).

As Turkish Foreign Policy will be discussed in Chapter 3 and its active role in international organizations, we will see that Turkey's position among middle powers actually lies not only in a signle category listed above. Therefore, this research will argue for a new definition, or in other words, a new adjective to describe Turkey beyond middle power activisim in the international system. This does not mean the above definitions are disregarded. On the contrary, Turkey's geostrategic position and role comprises positional, behavioral and ideational as a congolemrate putting Turkey above middle powermanship. Turkey's role in all of these categories creates a new space that is indicative of the need for a new description. "For example, middle powers can adopt different approaches to multilateralism, global citizenship and coalition-building, and their assertive foreign policies might support or challenge major power preferences" (Efstathopoulos, 2018, p.53). The problem with behavioural model, however, is that it has been constructed based on Western conception of middle power. Therefore, in analyzing other middle power states actually requires "integrating new behavioural charactersitics distinctive to non-Western states" (Efstathopoulos, 2018, p. 51) as a way to update the behavioral model to be more encompassing and diversified when identifying middle powers across the spectrum. This ties in directly to the larger framework of great power transition period because multipolarity has rendered many middle powers to rise above the traditional definitions of middle powermanship that require coming up with and analyzing new criteria. The Western template of middle power framework can no longer sustain as a category for non-traditional middle powers like Turkey. The challenge being posed against the international liberal order

as a result of great power transition period has enabled middle powermanship to go beyond the limits of middle power role. This calls for the need to look for variation in Asian, Latin American or Nordic middle powers and others to see how their values are expressed and exercised through internationalism. This is specially urgent, at a time when the basis of internatitonal or cosmopolitan norms and values are being criticized for being co-opted by Western countries to advance national interests.

Turkey's position is far more different than other middle powers categorized within the literature. As I shall analyze further into the study, it will be more clear to see that Turkey's example requires tailoring a new concept beyond 'middlepowermanship'. This will in tandem require re-constructing and expanding the behavioural model in junction with the changing times and conditions of the international system. The fact that Turkish Foreign Policy, under Presidential leadership, with the "World is Bigger than Five" discourse in its domestic and international activites demonstrates the creation of more space and rhetoric aligned with its growing economic, political, diplomatic and military power. As we see with Turkey's foreign policy actvisim, the current great power transition period allows more room for internationalism and for states to engage and integrate further into the international system. Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy also exemplifies priveleging cosmopolitan norms in its own interpretation as opposed to putting national interest first. Turkey's foreign policy activism showcases a re-creation of being an active participant of the international community to include not just good citizenship but an activist role of defending multilateralism to solve global problems.

Therefore, as it is proposed in this study, Turkey enhanced its role as a middle power and now ranks as an ***efficacious power***. With increased multipolarity and questions of reshaping global governance in great power transition period, Turkey's role is increasingly significant as it is an exemplar for other actors. Turkey attempts to create various coalitions to balance its role in the region as a leader and decision-maker forcing great powers in the Western camp to seek consultation and approval through Turkey's leadership. However, the rise of China poses a critical question for rising powers like Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and others who will have to constructively look for strategies on whether to balance or bandwagong with China. Turkey, once again as an *efficacious power*, chooses a multi-coalitional approach to balance against both US and China in order to maintain its autonomy in foreign policy and to be an independent decision-maker when it comes to issues surrounding the Middle East and other regions. For middle powers and for an exceptional

efficacious power like Turkey the multilateral field is an important playground in which power maximization can be tested thorougly by means of economic, political and security engagement. In retrospect since the post-Cold war era began, we see more regional actors increasing their economic and military capabilities to engage in bilateral dilagoues to boost their role in the region. Western hegemony, in this regard, is challenged by middle powers and Turkey as not the first or second but a new generation of actors securing their national interest more ambitiously than the Cold War era. These actors are not latent or coy about pursuing their foreign policy agendas at a time when multipolarity rendered many regional actors to take up regional leadership roles.

Against this backdrop, those who have argued for the hegemonic stability theory can no longer sustain their position with the flux of many regional powers on the rise. The decline of American hegemony and the rise of China, India and the middle powers require the international community to reconsider the shaping of global governance where norms and rules will be refashioned accordingly. For example, both South Africa and Australia as middle powers had influence in the change brought by the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Through humanitarian interventions that have defined the post-Cold War era the idea of sovereignty has changed drastically. Today, sovereignty can be violated based on the condition that a state is conducting inhumane and anti-human rights treatment of its people. Middle powers play a mjor role in the humanitarian diplomacy that is happening under the umbrella of global governance. For Wang and French, global governance is the complex relations of institutions and they argue it has three distinct features: "1) it seeks to address the global (rather than the regional); 2) it involves transnational as well as intergovernmental institutions and processes; and 3) it aims to achieve goals not only at the international level, such as peace and trade, but also inside different societies, such as human rights and accountability" (Wang & French, 2013, p.986). From the definition of global governance here we can also ascertain that the idea of core, semi-periphery and periphery are also being drastically modified as the identity of middle power states become more ascertive and accumulate more military and economic wealth to enlarge their scope of power.

> "the division of the world into "great powers," "small powers," and "middle powers" would be called into question, since such terms usually connote generalized rather than situationally specific power. At the very least, users of such terms would be required to specify the issue- area they have in mind" (Baldwin, 1979, p.192).

Previously, Waltz' conceptualization of the international system was touched upon in which the individual, the state and the system utilized as a way to analyze the different levels. The distribution of power is critical in the categorization of units. As middle power activism shows there is a direct challenge against the bipolar world framework of distribution of power. There is a national will for middle powers to defy the current structure of the international system that only favors the core states. That is why in the great power transition period there is a dynamic process in which middle powers or an *efficacious power* like Turkey to ground itself in the debate for re-structuring the international order and in tandem the system itself. From bipolarity to hegemonic and to multipolarity, in a world that is becoming increasingly competitive actors of all levels created major hotspots across the world geography.

As Waltz has also argued, these attempts to create regional hegemony are parallel to maintaining political and territorial integrity. Turkey's cogent and potent power is an example of the case that middle powers are not just satisfied or limited to their geographic region but that they have global ambitions to change a world that is currently in transition. There are two critical reasons middle powers are acting in way to accrue more power: "1) it is in their national interst to do so, 2) they have the capacity to do so without undermining their security, 3) but they do not have the capacity to act autonomously…" (Wang & French, 2013, p. 990). The following pyramid offers a new insight with an improved and redesigned model that illustrates *efficacious power* in the transition from middle to great power in Turkey's case study while also keeping in mind that defining a role for a state is "largely a matter of definition and opinion" (Vital 2006, p.82):



Figure 4: A Revised Illustration of Organski's Hierarchy of Powers in the International System Challenged by an *Efficacious* State Behavior

Efficacious power definition includes a consolidation of descriptions which include involvement in great power politics; demonstration of a mobilizing behavior acting as a liason from the bottom-up of the international hierarchy to the top of the international system; trend-setter to popularize an inclusve global decision-making process as a multilateral interaction rather than top-to-bottom imposition; plays a balancing role as an axis-stabilizer reaching out to various geographies; strengthening its position as a leader in its geostrategic location; utilizes a transformative discourse where a national narrative for liberalization and democracy is extended to challenge an illiberal world order; defies a selectivist international hierarchy in the pursuit to re-structure an all-inclusive international world order based on mutual values and norms vis a vis its quest to unmask the paradox of the principle of "sovereign equality" (Viola, Snidal & Zürn, 2015). *Efficacious power*, thus, has elements of soft power (Nye, 1990) and hard power (Bilgin & Eliş, 2008) combination with an addititonal factor that distinguishes Turkey's case from other actors in the pyramid which is its utilization of *moral power* vis a vis ethical message disemmination across international organizations. One could argue in Turkey's case study that there is "some substantial degree of moral discipline over national power in the context of international politics" (Weber, 1964, p.21) and as such it is possible to examine whether "behavior is consistent with beliefs" and attempt to discover how practice can be consistent with "theory and knowledge" (Wilkinson, 2013, p.430) in its state behavior analysis.

The best way to delineate Turkey's *efficacious power* behavior is through role theory which draws a link between "agency and structure." The interaction between the agent and structure allows scholars and practicioners to analyze how identity-construction from the Wendtian perspective provides a window into Turkey's socialization in the international system. In other words, Turkey's socialization within the system through international organizations provides a solid ground for an identity-based leadership role construction as an exemplar for middle and small powers to draw a lesson to emulate. Turkey's state behavior coupled with a cultural, historical, material and ideational platform allows its national image in the international system to set a precedence for powers below the great power rivalry to mobilize under a leading state actor. In this case, role theory and constructivism are not mutually exclusive to one another. On the contrary "…constructivist work on identity, self-images, culture and even norms shares a close kinship with the literature on national role conceptions" (Breuning, 2011, p.22). Turkey plays a critical role in this regard as it will be further analyzed under Sadik's analysis on the role of religion in

foreign-policy making. In addition to this analysis the broader framework on religion as an implicit part of role theory within constructivist context in the national image formation points to an important reality. As argued by Warner and Walker (2011) "religious values and religious heritage" play a major role in the creation of national identity and this necessarily directs the nation's foreign policy image in reflection of past experiences and the values transmitted in retrospect.

In relation to the way that image is used to create an impact on the institutions within the state and across the international system vis a vis international organizations determines the perception formation about the Turkish state under study. In this regard Warner and Walker's analysis sheds light as to the influence of religion in foreign policy-making as a maginifying glass into religion as a factor in the image construction. Since leaders are the main actors who disseminate the narrative of the nation-state it is critical to pay attention to their discourse and the direction they aim to give to the international community. In this framework "…if a religion is regarded as an integral part of the state's identity and if particular mechanism are present, governments are more likely to take religion into account in formulating foreign policy (Warner & Walker, 2011, p.120).

This shows us that classification of middle powers in the traditional sense does not suffice, hence, requiring further study of what current literature identifies as "middle powers". The global South is an example of an alliance of nations under BRICS and MIKTA (as it will be discussed further) who do comprise of the category that Wang and French described. They do seek to establish regional dominance and expand their role of influence in the international arena. They do so by forming pacts that will strengthen and optimize the effectiveness through economic and diplomatic cooperation. Yet, Efstathopoulos argues "ideational and entrepreneurial resources" are critical in the way emerging states shape international regimes in addition to material capabilities. The author goes on to mention that some states (which are emergings states in the process of becoming middle power states) participate in international negotiations when it comes to issues of "global trade, climate change and humanitarian intervention" (Efstathopoulos, 2018, p.69). But at the same time, "such states are unwilling to fully mobilise their resources to transform international regimes and often remain confined to cautious middle power roles…" (Efstathopoulos, 2018, p.69).

The following section will look at the role of traditional middle powers and how the great power transition of the 21st Century ushered in a new era of defining middle powers.

Middle powers as the way they have been viewed in the Cold War era has led to a major change in the post-Cold War era in the changing circumstances of the international liberal world order. Middle powers are no longer confined to just material capabilities, but they demand a greater voice in the system that they believe has been an unjust treatment of the greater powers.

2.2. Re-imagining Middle Power (s) in the 21st Century

According to Jonathan H. Ping middle powers require a certain criteria in which he identifies as the following: (1) population, (2) geographic area, (3) military expenditure, (4) GDP, (5) GDP real growth, (6) value of exports, (7) gross national income per capita, (8) trade as a percentage of GDP, and (9) life expectancy at birth (2005, p.66-72). A critical aspect of middlpower activism is the practice of multilateralism. It is where at least three or more states coordinate and cooperate with one another based on national policies (Keohane, 1990, p. 731).

From an analytical perspective unpacking the role of middle powers is argued in the following way:

> "…middle powers are frequently presented as either pawns on the geostrategic chessboard or actors with extremely limited policy options. At best, middle powers in international relations theory are states that can influence the global order through alliances, security communities, or international organizations. At worst, middle powers are presented as having little choice outside bandwagoning or balancing" (Manicom & Reeves, 2014, p. 24).

The authors also underline that middle powers "lack agency" and therefore are dependent on great powers in they way they move about the international system. This comes from the general premise of Organski's power tranisiton theory which contends that material capability is a must in decision-making power and influence. It is asserted that middle powers do not have the material capability to strategically impact the developments occuring around the world. This trend has changed in the post- Cold War era as middle power foreign policy gained ascendancy. "Middle-power states typically adopt an activist style in that they interfere in global issues beyond their immediate concern" (Jordaan, 2003, p.167). In this respect, middle powers tend to play a mediator role between the global North and South. And as the "gravity of power" shifts from the Atlantic to Asia, middle powers as rising actors have the potential to take part in a changing international hierarchy (Stephen, 2013, p.36).

This is where middle power diplomacy becomes crucial in the intermingeling of institutions and organizations. Since 2010 the G20 became a platform for a third wave of middle powers like South Korea, Mexico, Canada, Australia and Turkey to assert their identities and national interest. In the framework of middle powers, the BRICS embraced the theme of "rising powers." When we look at MİKTA, for example, it is different than BRICS regarding the fact that the former is realatively marginal and inactive compared to the latter. Middle power identity requires a policy agenda and endorsement by the leaders of MIKTA in the direction that they fully identify as such and pursue diplomacy in line with this institutional identity. Turkey under MIKTA has not demonstrated a fully functioning organizational role because as we will see later in the next chapter, the leadership continues to pursue an independent character and decision-making role in its foreign policy. The latent behavior of Turkey in MIKTA showcases the unwilligness to fully identify with an instituional organization that is deemed to be a representation for the semi-periphery.

Turkey, for now, does not want to engage fully in an organizational umbrella that is not going to effectively benefit its role to act beyond middlepowermanship. The catalyst nature of Turkish Foreign Policy in the recent period also points to Turkey's willingness to define itself as "central country" but with much more to operate with across the region and the international system.

> "Parlar Dal and Kurşun ask to what extent Turkey can play a middle power role under the umbrella of MIKTA, and they argue that although Turkey possesses the proper goals, means, and impact to act in harmony alongside this third wave of middle powers, it needs to channel its capabilities with a solid road map regarding its future trajectory within MIKTA" (Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016, p.525).

If for Turkey, MIKTA is to become a more strategic alliance and platform over the next years, the nation's foreign policy is more likely to identify with a middle power platform. Until then, Turkey's leadership will continue to peruse and test the waters to see where it can find niche to exert as much power as possible. In order to achieve this goal, Turkey's tactical approach to utilizing international organizations, instititutions or platforms will largely depend on how much middlepower activism will augment its presence and fulfill its national and diplomatic goals.

Baba and Engin in their disucssion of "new" middle power-ism argue that MIKTA increases the influence and effectiviness of members in voicing their concerns in the international system (2015, p.1). In addition to MIKTA, they propose that BRICS and IBSA

"provide a guide while questioning the place and functionality of MIKTA in the evolution of "new"middle power-ism (Baba & Engin, 2015, p.3). The authors outline the function of G20, IBSA and BRICS as a way to showcase "new" middle powerism while arguing the challenges of these platforms as being amalgamated with great powers or just being purely middle power. Either way, the multilateral approach of all of them provide the weight of collective power to act in concert on common issues, despite the drawback of great power influence to impose its own weight on particular matters. Underscoring the role of MIKTA is critical in this research due to one particular reason. Common wisdom would state that the proliferation of inter-regional organizations will bolster multpolarity and increase the efficacy of multilateralism. But that alone is not sufficient. The geostrategic location of these states also enrich the cross-regional intereaction of states across many continents. MIKTA represents a crucial strand of this important initiative on the global stage.

Parlar Dal, in the context of middle power theory, points to different ways the concept has been used interchangeably in IR literature. These include "rising (or emerging) powers", "middle or middle range powers," and "regional powers" (Parlar Dal, 2014, p. 108). These differences in terminology has rendered a difficult terrain to analyze these concepts. For the purpose of this study, I shall not go into detail about the nuances, differences of comparative analysis of these terms. Instead, I intend to undertake a brief overview of Adam Chapnick's three distinct models as a crucial foundation to understanding what we generally accept as part of the middle power literature in the IR field. In addition, Parlar and Baba's analysis in this field will shed light on how Turkey differs as a middle power in the overal all literature. In tandem, I shall build upon these research perspectives to define Turkey as an *"efficacious power"* model in the post- Cold War international system of the the 21st Century.

Engin and Baba in disscussing "new" middle power-sim offer a clear analysis of Chapnick's functional, hierarchical and behavioral models to offer a window into understanding middle powers as best as possible. Functional model is somewhat on a weak ground due to an ambivalent international scene where rapid changes are occuring in the system. This model is about x country taking the initiative to respond to certain developments around the world. The hierarchical model, otherwise known as positional or structural, takes into consideration the materal capabilites of a given middle power country. They tend to be self-sufficient and they have certain criteria that they must meet (Engin & Baba, 2015, p.3-5). There is an important reference that Engin and Baba point to in the academic literature. Holbraad is said to argue that middle powers hold an "intermediate

position" within international hierarchy (1971, p.78). This negates the argument that there is anarchy in the international system. On the contrary, middle power analysis has consistently shown that there is a hierarchy in which small, middle and great powers occupy their place on the world stage. Against this backrdop, the behavioral model underpins middle powers as actors that contribute to the wellbeing of the international system. However, during the Cold War middle powers "supported the norms and rules of the international system" (Engin & Baba, 2015, 5).

In the post-Cold War era the scope of activity and power to influence the changes in the international system expanded to a greater degree. The differences in this new period marks middle power independence from constantly relying on great power agenda and direction. This is especially prevalent in multilateral approaches middle powers took in forming "multilateral schemes" that harbor national interest in the overarching international scene. Examples Engin and Baba include are the following:

> IBSA, MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey), EAGLES (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey), CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa), N-11 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, Vietnam), BRICS, SAMI (Saudi, Ankara (Turkey), Malaysia, Indonesia) and MIKTA (Engin & Baba, 2015, p.7).

In the atmosphere of changing times as we witness economic, political and military changes occuring among the middle power category states, this also requires a new angle to look at the subject with a wider purview. That is why Engin and Baba offer an "amalgam" to really understand the role of middle powers through the following model they propose:

> "Willing and able to be involved in certain international issues in order to increase their influence and power in the world agenda. Positioned between great and small powers in hierarchical world order based on some tangible criteria. Performing actively in the international system due to their economic, diplomatic, and political capabilities, coalition-building abilities, multilateral activities, mediation capabilities, moral power, reformist attitudes, and domestic and foreign policy choices-- all within the framework of their limitations" (Engin & Baba, 2015, p. 8).

The authors' construction of this new model from the functional, hierarchical and behavioral perspectives can be applicable to middle powers in the general sense. Yet, Turkey as a middle power performs at a greater latitude in foreign policy activism compared to its other partners or competitors. This has everything to do with the geostrategic location of Turkey, its history and capabilities in economic, diplomatic and military advancement. There

are certain empirical evidence that prove Turkey jumping up levels from being a smaller power during the Cold War to transitioning into a middle power and transforming its exuberent effort into becoming an ***efficacious power***. The following section will explain the difference that sets Turkey apart from other middle powers in the multilateral schemes described earlier. Turkey's uniqueness and leadership performance has much to do with the image of a nation that is willing to push more vigorously for greater engagement in the international system. It utilizes both the multilateral schemes, international organizations and robust bilateral relations to pursue national goals. Turkey may not be a "core state" today, but its achievements as a middle power in previous years prepared the state to act through humanitarian diplomacy and as an accelarator in demanding a change in the way norms and values should be practiced in politics.

2.3. What Differentiates Turkey from the Rest of the Middle Powers?

In these times of uncertainty, rising disturbances to the international liberal world order accompanied by great power transition and geopolitical fault lines, the global governance system is becoming obsolete. There emerges a threat to the functionality of globeral governance with respect to unilateral challenge to multilateralism. More doubts are cast over neo-liberal policies as Western economic and political systems go into turmoil i.e. the rise of far-right populism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, US support of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. At the basis of this converation is the following question: how will the leadership of non-Western countries in dealing with the chaos, criminality and injustice of a post-Cold War world lead to multilateral action to solve the crisis across various regions in the world.

Looking at the particular cases in the post-Cold War period in the 1990s we can ascertain the changes beneath the surface of state-centric discourse in which humanitarian intervention has been legitimized. This, in the long run, minimized the concept of sovereignty of a state in the context of major humanitarian violations committed against harmless citizens while at the same time this approach maximized the princple of protecting particular ethnic groups that are under threat from states or non-state actors. The humanitarian intervention cases of Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone became a precursor for the plan and initiation of Responsibility to Protect. The challenge today in the 21st Century is how the global system will be shaped from a

hegemonic, hierarchical system to a multilateral playing field. The following figure is an illustration of:



Figure 5: Illustration of the Rise & Fall of Humanitarian Norms (Abushanab, 2016).

> "The humanitarian intervention project that began post-Cold War aimed at bringing peace and stability to regions where failed states are becoming rampant. It was expected that democracy and liberal values would be used as tools to reconstruct failed states and incorporate them within the international order where global powers could watch over the growth of newly emerging democracies. This was the kind of wishful thinking harbored by the elite players of global politics. However, this was not the whole story behind intervention politics. Machiavellist policies overall have impeded the main intention of humanitarian intervention because they are not implemented solely out of good will except that it is believed to serve the self-interested goals of safeguarding national interest of liberal nations at home. It is in the framework of paradox of rights discourse that can clearly explicate the reasons for the downfall of humanitarian norms because the goals of humanitarian intervention were blended with interests in personal gains" (Abushanab, 2016).

The role of middle power states is important in this direction because they display a democratization role across the global scene. It can be argued that the international system is driven by anarchy with competing powers who rank differently based on material and securiy capabilities. The geopolitical faultines left a major power vacuum in the international

system where uncertainty has led to interstate competition to become fierce and risky for regional conflicts to break out. This is especially true for countries around the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Middle East, South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), Northern China, Central Asia, North Africa and Europe.

In this framework, the Western-centrism of military and security policies around the world experienced a gradual shift in power and legitimation as the Responsiblity to Protect Doctrine emerged with the ICISS Report in 2001. Its purpose was to bolster multilateralism to take action against crimes against humanity. It fostered an inclusive platform for nations to participate in having a voice on the UN platform and play a role on human rights agendas. This also provided the opportunity to display and practice "good international citizenship" (Cooper, 1993). In the line of reasoning of the doctrine, "collective decision-making processes proved an efficient way for burden-sharing and counter-hegemonic intentions" (Lopes et al, 2013, p. 5).

In a globalized world where individualism has taken the front seat in world affairs the protection of human rights became a fundamental goal in the Post-Cold War Era . This is precisely where Kofi Anan, the Secretary General at the time, voiced the need for a holistic approach to human rights violations across the globe. Anan emphasized the need for a doctrine of intervention to emerge so the international community could respond more effectively to gross human rights violations, such as mass killings, starvations, rapes or genocide. The R2P doctrine has since gained support within the international arena.

> "On April 28th 2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674, which reaffirmed the General Assembly decision to adopt the R2P concept. Later in a speech outlining his priorities during his term in office, Anan emphasized that one of his main priorities would be to see the R2P doctrine actualized in future crises" (Fishel, 2013, p. 204-218).

This type of multilateral and security based on cooperation is an important blueprint to prevent hegemonic ambitions of great powers to keep them in check from dominating small and middle powers. As mentioned earlier, the context in which middle power competition occurs is at a time when great power transition period allows room for other state actors to flex their muscles. They either balance with other like-minded states such as in the creation of South-South alliance, for example, between South Africa and Brazil on economic goals, or; some states choose to bandwagon with one of the great powers such as China or the United States. It is evident that protectionist policies will always sway middle

powers to look for a great power balance of bandwagoning depending on which choice benefits its national economic, military and diplomatic ambitions.

Turkey's case, as argued in this study, is different than other middle powers. According to the analysis of Parlar Dal and Oğuz Gök, Turkey is different than other challenger states like China, India and Brazil which can be attributed for their large populations and economic might. But they argue, Turkey's role as a "Rising Power" is structurally and ideologically different (2014, p.2).

> "Despite its increasingly critical stance in regard to the global governance institutions and their decision-making mechanisms in recent years, the normative challenges to Turkey and its behavioural posture within the current international order need to be nuanced from those of the other rising powers in the Global South. Turkey's complaints about the current international order are not informed by an anti-Western attitude or Third Worldist ideology, but clearly fall into the framework of a *within-system challenge"* (Parlar Dal & Gök, 2014, p.2).

The strategic discourse of Turkish Foreign Policy for more than a decade presented a forceful struggle to voice the nations's concerns about the international system, international economic subjugation by great powers, military interventions and grave human rights injustices. Middle power concept as formulized by Kevind Rudd for Australia's role can also provide a roadmap for Turkey's rise as an *efficacious power.* Australia's activism in the Asia Pacific region deemed itself to conduct diplomacy with nations of similar views. Gareth Evans as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia also urged middle powers to engage in multilateral activities "rather than multipolar bandwagoning or balancing" (Scott, 2013, p. 114). He also argued "by definition, middle powers are not powerful enough in most circumstances to impose their will," but "they may be persuasive enough to have like-minded others see their point of view, and to act accordingly" (Gareth Evans quoted in Scott, 2013, p. 113).

The features that set Turkey apart from the rest of the middle powers can be attributed to its activist role in foreign policy. The nature of its activism can be further analyzed in the framework of social movements. According to Tarrow, social movements are defined as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities. (Tarrow, 1998, p.4) There are symptoms and reasons in which why people choose to mobilize. In this case, Turkey's leading government in the post-2000s demonstrated a foreign policy that mobilizes on particular

grievances. These national and international concerns enabled Turkey to have a distinct voice on the international platform. Some of these concerns cover a range of grievances on Turkey's national and international scene. The concerns about local issues mobilized grassroots movements in Turkey over the strict divide between religion and the state. Erdogan's emergence as a leadership voice within this movement dates back to the early period of the (Milli Nizam) National Order and (Milli Selamet) National Salvation parties that transformed into Welfare and Vitrtue Parties in the 1990s. The formation of AK Party in 2001 and its election into the government in 2002 demonstrate a longstanding social movement in Turkey's modern political history. This social movement of the conservative right that coalesced into a center-right political movement in the early 2000s was anti-elitist, anti-military tutelage and anti-staunch Kemalist status quo that disenfranchised millions of low-middle income religious groups across Turkey. As the "black Turks" through multiple attempts took steps to create their own space within a tight-knit and strict political environment, they managed to carry their grievances to the national scene. The interesting anomaly in Turkey's AK Party case is the transformation from a grassroots movement (one that is normally meant to challenge the state) to becoming the state itself. The indelible power of the AK Party movement that began with its predecessors sought to give equal rights and opportunity for all of its citizens despite religious, ideological, political or ethnic background.

This exemplifies a unique case one that deviates from the norm of social movements and requires further exploration within deprivation theory (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1988). While it can be argued that grievances may not always result in a social movement, Turkey's Muslim, Alawite, Orthodox and Jewish communities' marginalization led to a Muslim social movement to emerge in defense of groups treated as outcasts by the secular state elites. It is a rare example in the sense that President Erdogan in his more than fourty year career in politics next to the disenfranchised masses achieved to forge a social movement and bring it to the level of the government. It does not end there. Erdogan's leadership, with the popular support of the nation, exceeded the level of the state to carry the grassroots concerns such as the Palestinian issue, the plight of the Rohingya and humanitarian aid to countries like Somalia as the cause of the Turkish nation. This kind of "politics of signification" (Hall, 1982) encompasses all levels of society and state to collectively take action that resonate with the concerns of the population. Therefore, the social movement that shaped grievances about the national concerns of Turkey found

reflection in the concerns of Muslim communities around the world. This propelled the movement to transform from the local to the national and toward the international scene.

According to political process theory (Foweraker, 1995) one could say that dissenting behavior can empower marginalized groups to stand up againt the oppression of the ruling class. In Turkey's case, the military tutelage since the 1960s kept a tight grip on all factions of society within the country to not allow a popular movement to emerge. However, Turkey's trajectory of Muslim dissenters against the military facilitated a critical social movement from the bottom-up to rise to the top. In the literal sense, this means a rise from grassroots activities in the politlcal field to seizing the state through democratic means. In this framework, another perspective to look for further exploration about the role of President Erdogan's leadership in the muslim movement in Turkey and one that consolidated into the modern AK Party is structural strain theory by Smelser.

> "The theory advocates that any nascent social movement needs six factors to grow. These six factors are: people in a society experience some type of problem (deprivation); recognition by people of that society that this problem exists; an ideology purporting to be a solution for the problem develops and spreads its influence; an event or events transpire that convert this nascent movement into a bona fide social movement; the society (and its government) is open to change for the movement to be effective (if not, then the movement might die out); and mobilization of resources takes place as the movement develops further" (Sen & Avcı, 2016, p.128)

This is quite an exceptional case because social movements are formed as organizations of resistance against the state. But in this particular example, one can observe that President Erdogan evolutionized the state and took the grassroots organization and social movement that his political views were shaped in and ushered it to nationl and the international level. The actors in the national and international scene can be "viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers" (Snow and Benford, 1988 in Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 613). President Erdogan's collectivist apporoach to mobilizing various ethnic, religious and ideological communities under a single umbrella can be interpreted through collective action frames. Benford and Snow argue that collective action frames "intend to mobilize potential adherents and constitutents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (1988, p. 198). The messaging and ways and methods the policies are relayed to the public have much to do in how it is perceived, received and integrated into the grand scheme of the political agenda of a nation. If we are to consider the rise of the far-

right populism across the West, in particularly the European countries, the narratives of "adversarial framing" (Gamson, 1995, p.85-106) where there is a construction between the good and evil camps.

Similar to the way securitization and counter-securitization occur in diplomatic discourse on global issues such as terror, climate change and in global economic crises, framing and counter-framing are strategies that are utilized by competing groups within national and international politics. There are three recent examples that demonstrate the framing processes and securitization are two sides of the same coin. One is the plight of the Palestinians who demand the right to return to the lands they were displaced from as a result of Israeli occupation. The constant rising death toll of Palestinians and the US move of its Israeli embassy to Jerusalem is an issue that propelled the emergency meetings at the Organization of Islamic Conference to be convened. These challenges to the human rights issue has been taken up by the United Nations as well as international human rights organizations and were deemed to violate international law. The second example is the Trump administration's official recognition of the Golan Heights as part of Israel's sovereignty which ignited much concern across some Muslim, Arab states as well as Russia, China, Iran and the European Union. The third example was the New Zealand terror attack on the Muslim community in Christchurch. All of these events that include the disenfrenchisment of the Palestinians, the rise of xenophobia, Islamophobia and far-right extremist politics all created the perfect storm for nationalist, religious and white-race-based populism to dominate the international scene. While further analysis would require an extensive and separate study to unpack the complexity of this issue, I will only underline some of the pressing points that are pertinent to understanding social movement in the case of Turkey's leadership with Erdogan and its leading government, the AK Party.

President Erdogan's political manuever to respond to these issues can be understood under framing amplification which "involves the idealization, embellishment, clarification or invigorating of existing values or beliefs" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624) that are said to be present within the Turkish culture. All of these recent issues show that securitization is a vital part of the political moves on the national level. They all pose a danger to the peace and security of Turkey. But Turkey alone is not the only concern for President Erdogan. As the term president of the Organization of Islamic Conference, he convened several emergency summits to address the issues above as a common cause that must be addressed by all Muslim leaders. He also used "frame extension" as a way to emphasize these issues

to be a universal problem rather than simply as local issues. This requires reaching out to audiences that are not necessarily in the immediate environment but it is about tapping into the minds of millions across the world who have similar worries. In this case, technological innovation allows political messaging to be easily diffused and enables a political opportunity space to be created beyond the traditional sense which, also, renders politician and activist leaders like President Erdogan to become "potential agents of their own history" (Gamson & Meyer, 1996, p. 285) along with the nation's collective narrative construction.

Such activism carries the masses and crowds to a level of leadership who have the aspiration to bring change as both "transformative" and "reformative movements" (Marx & Wood, 1975, p. 369). The anatomy of Turkey's muslim movement is one that requires extensive study. The nuances and differentiation with "Islamist" movements in other parts of the world places Turkey's disenfrenchised Muslims at another level of playing field. The "muslim crowd" so to speak was an outcasted faction within Turkish society who faced religious persecution and socio-economic barriers due to their practice of the Islamic faith but, were quite adamant about demanding justice from the AK Party government they put into power in the early 21st Century. AK Party's emergence as a movement to alleviate the economic and unstable political grievances came at a time in which Westernization "syndrome" (Mardin, 1973, p. 175) was crippling the Turkish public sphere with a top-dwon extreme secularization while "…the center's attitude toward the periphery has been marked more by patronizing advice than by identification with the plight of the lower classes…" Mardin discusses the relationship between the center and the periphery in the way the former shaped the latter's power to consolidate national unity and enabled a powerful base for the formation of the Democratic Party which represented the "democratic periphery" (Mardin, 1973, p. 186).

The center-periphery imagination undoubtedly can be analyzed in the long trajectory of politics in the Turkish Republic. The mass public in Turkey, who have been forcefully peripherized in the modern political history, began a soci-economic and political movement to reach the upper echelons of the state administration to create a structural transformation within society. The infrastructure of this grassroots political movement has been built over decades of a dire struggle for freedom since the 1950s onward. As this presents a critical analysis in the way Islam has been pushed into the periphery found in Mardin's analysis, at the same time, showcases this struggle to be continuing in the 21st Century. The forcible peripherized faction within the Turkish society undertook its experience of being

economically, politically and socially disadvantaged in order to overcome this challenge at home and internationally. The AK Party under President Erdogan's leadership as a nation and international state actor exponentialized the center-periphery struggle and relationship to a global level in which Islamic principles is openly advocated as a basis for justice and equity in the international system.

In the same vein, the demand of a "muslim crowd" to gain eminence within the center could be a descripiton we can adopt from Mardin. Turkey' role in this context both within the nation and across the international system, demonstrates a norm and value driven foreign and national policy which extends to international institutions like the UN, regional institutions like NATO and EU, and global economic platforms like the G20. The muslim movement of Turkey achieved to break down the barriers of a military establishment that kept the muslim power in check. Today, the movement exceeds the national boundaries and is iniating a global reform for justice, equality and freedom from western-dominated economic constraints. This is exemplified in President Erdogan's call to reform the United Nations Security Council in his recurring caution that the "World is Bigger than Five." His admonishment to the nations around the world is to trigger the masses to take action against the UNSC leadership of the Permanent Five. This also goes hand in hand, with a major criticism that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is futile at a time when US unilateralism is wrecking all the efforts of multilateral initiatives that should be taken collectively.

President Erdogan views this as unfair and unequal when only five members to the Council make decisions that determine the fate of the world. He petitions world leaders to take action in the establishment of an equity-based security system that is inclusive and well-represented. For this to happen, reform is incumbent on all leaders and nations to make this possible. Turkey's "muslim crowd movement" can be observed in today's turbulent and anarchic system as "universally ambitious;" one whose vision of peace, security, justice and equality is couched in Islamic teachings and values inter alia other movements within the international system. The belief of the "muslim crowd movement" in Turkey's case is one that resonates with other muslim crowds in the world. This bona fide movement is not to clash with western-origined universal values as harbored by the United Nations. On the contrary, it is meant to strengthen freedoms and achieve ultimate liberation from economic and military subjugation of Western nations over small and middle powers.

The middle power distinction is especially crucial for this study because Turkey is currently being led by a social movement that overcame major local challenges since the execution of the first democratically-elected Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in 1961. This long endeavour united not just those within Turkey but it managed to integrate its mission into the global cause of freedom and democracy. The "muslim crowd movement" in its attachment to democracy set the ground for the cooperation of democracy and Islamic values. This realization serves as a model and inspiration for other muslim-majority nations who aspire to create such a movement. It is important to keep in mind that the continuation and existence of such a movement in Turkey's case was never the beginning nor the end of a cause for freedom, justice and equality.

The "muslim crowd movement" is a special case to study among social movements because it is not just about attaining power and change in the vertical sense. It aims to horizantally and vertically spread while giving importance to assembling in various groups (ethnicities, nations, religions and languages) in a dispersed manner. It is not one bloc, but rather it is about variety of groups coming together on a common platform of peace despite all the discrepancies and differences. It is not about a movement of homogeneity but about heterogenous communities coming together on common grievances. For academics and analysts, Turkey's case is peculiar at the same time exclusive to its state tradition, history and geography. However, in the great power transition the major threat to competitors in the region is the exportation of the "muslim crowd movement" model to other parts of the world where it can become generic. It is at this juncture that the international liberal world order will go into further crisis as more leaders in the global south will demand equal opportunity in shaping an economic and value-based order that resonates with their "crowds."

Hence, Turkey's role across many academic literature has been identified as a middle power. The material capabilities reflect the degree of influence and power Turkey has in its geographic region and around the world. However, that alone is not sufficient to measure Turkey's role in the post-Cold War era. Turkey's ***efficacious character*** under the leadership of President Erdogan accounts for a belief-based value system that drives the nation's policies. His cogent style of speech echoes across audiences who view Turkey's success story as a driver of change. Collective behavior cannot necessarily link "beliefs and motivations" (Marx & Wood, 1975, p. 375) to provide an empirical test. Indeed, that is one of the weaknesses of this study because this research does not intend to measure Turkey's status from an empirical perspective. Nontheless, it is based on the constructivist approach

to highlight ipso facto that values, beliefs, ideology, religion, and developments in the region and around the world directly shape Turkey's role as an *efficacious power*. Therefore, Turkey's differentiation from other middle powers in the literature comes at a time of an urgent need to conduct discourse analysis. The following section will undertake a tedious study of the speeches in Turkish Foreign Policy which has afterall is the labratory that became the engineering mechanism of Turkey's image in the international system.

CHAPTER 3- INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER

3.1. The Post-Cold War International System

In order to create a mental image of the post-Cold War era students of international relations must look at the 'theoretical atmosphere' that dominated the global scene's international liberal order. Theory allows a window into understanding the developments that occur in international politics and guides the theoreticians to make certain assumptions and prescripitons to prevailing issues. There are multiple perspectives in IR due to a variety of theoreticians' background in terms of space, time and society that shapes personal views (Viotti & Kauppi, 2013). Therefore, theory becomes an intellectual tool for us to be able to explain reality. There are several theories we can consider for this study on a spectrum of international relations discipline.

> "Waltz viewed theory as an explanation of international politics and national behavior. Hollis and Smith argue theory is about predicting what is 'inside the heads' of actors. Wight assumed theory is the struggle for power and the nature of international society. For Doyle, theory consisted of analyzing empirical data to explain the lack of war among democracies. Critical theory employs theory as a way to criticze forms of domination while international ethics utilizes theory to focus on human rights and global injustices" (Burchill et. al, 2013, p.12).

The basis of this research will operate from Waltz conceptualization of theory as an explanatory approach while at the same time engage critical theory and international ethics as a crucial aspect of unpacking the crisis of the international liberal order.

Within reality, structure can constrain and create opportunities but, what is the decision-making factor in this scenario is the human agency. Marx argues that humans make history but not under the conditions determined by the structure. Constructivists on the other hand, argue, structure is established by the people. This school of thought sets the ground for human action as a way to transform structure since it's constituted by human agency. Constructivism rejected determinism that everything is bound by a determinate structure. If people change than so can the structure according to the decision-making power and will of the people. For constructivism the departure point is to see how people think and states behave in world politics. It calls into question what the states beliefs and identities are and in tandem to how that affects power relations on the international level. Distribution of

power, anarchy and sovereignty are all socially constructed processes with meaning behind them. Status, prestige, reputation, hegemony are all within the parameter of constructivism "in terms of either legitimated power or shared understandings" (Hurd, 2008, p.313).

It is useful to explore the definiton of sovereignty which is a central concern of the system where self-help and power of politics reign. In a system where realist philosophers like Hobbes, Niebhur and Morgenthau agree that the basis of human nature is couched in egoism and power politics, sovereignty becomes a terrain in which such self-interested policies are actively sought and translated to the interantional system. "Sovereignty, according to Bodin, is about the making and unmaking law in the national contex… Weber put forth the argument that it is about the legitimate use of force while Hinsley set sovereignty as the premise of final authority…Marx and Engels believed the modern state to be a committee for managing bourgeoisie" (Yurdusev, 2014, p. 104). These varying perspectives on sovereignty also constitute bilaterally the meaning of the nation as well. "For Hume the nation is about the interaction on common traits…For Diderot and D'alembert nations consist of people obeying the same government…For Sieyes, nations live under common law and are represented by a single political unit or the same legislature… Renan believed nation consists of a common will to be led by a common government (Yurdusev, 2014, p. 104-105). The definitions of nation are, also, a crucial part of the sovereignty and the system equilibrium because, the characterstics of a nation translate into the domestic and foreign policy of a state as an actor in the international system. In this regard, structural realists emphasize anarchy in the system where there are three patterns of state behavior: anticipate danger and act suspiciously, rely on self-help, maximize relative power to gain more military advantage to attain more security than others.

Another theoretical lens that digs deeper into the way states operate is by the ideas and norms of states in the constructivist purview. Constructivism here is an important theoretical lens to understand the way in which we perceive the global community as well as comprehend its conflicts and tensions. Constructivists, unlike neorealists who focus on material power, argue that ideas and beliefs inform the actors on the international fora. As mentioned earlier, states are believed to be historical constructs made by man. This means the state system is also constructed by man or woman. This renders the international system as a whole subject to change with new ideas, norms and beliefs as Nicholas Onuf posits the following question and anwer: "…what are the causes of the enduring patterns of behaviour and social structures of this 'constructed' social reality? The answer is provided by a key

sociological concept, that is the concept of social institutions" (Palan, 2000, p.581). Onuf argues that from a constructivist perspective "states cannot serve as units of analysis since they are nothing but social organizations" (Palan, 2000, p.584). This thesis, however, attempts to analyze state formation identity through a constructivist lens to examine the role values, beliefs and norms play in the image construction of a state in the internatiaonal system presenting "a radically new con- ception of power which is inherent in the linguistic practices by which agents are constructed and become articulated within particular discourses" (Doty, 1993, p.302) through language practices that will be analyzed in the discourse analysis across international organizations.

In this framework, as opposed to hard constructivists such as Onuf, Koslowki and Kratochwill "Soft constructivists are an eclectic lot consisting of practically anyone who shows interest in culture, identity, norms and accept the notion that 'actors' interests are not fixed but change and arise out of a social context" (Palan, 2000, p. 576). In this regard, this thesis aims to explain how the agent-structure relation has in its center the constructist approach in the relations between the two. Hence, "Theorizing the state" implies a research endeavor which seeks to develop a theoretically and empirically grounded understanding of the causally significant properties (such as powers, interests, practices) of the state as an organizational agent or entity (Wendt, 1987, p.365).

In this framework, it is noteworthy too understand that we are living at a time in the post-Cold War era in which ideas and practices are changing over time and is directly affecting the pattern of behavior of states on the international scene. A clear example that positions constructivism as the best explanatory theoretical tool is the change in understanding sovereignty. With Westphalia, sovereignty of nations were to be respected and not violated. However, in the post-Cold War era, with rampant human rights violation, massacres and genocides, the international community through international organizations and at other times unilaterally, decided that intervention is necessary to halt atrocities. One of the major symptoms of a breaking international liberal order is due to issues arising in which a unipolar power cannot tackle alone. According to structural theory, unipolarity is not durable because, the dominant power takes up too many tasks beyond its borders (for national interest), and weak states become too apprehensive and as a result choose to retaliate by demanding an equal share in the world order.

In attempting to analyze the world through constructivism we find that this theory focuses on all unit levels of analysis that includes state identity, meso level norms and the constitution of the international system. Therefore, as we can see changes in the practices of statecraft we can also see a direct change in the pattern of behavior of states within the international system. Constructivism, as we move forward in this study, provides ample evidence in terms of the framework to understand the state as an actor and its interaction with other state actors in the international system.

This brings us to the main discussion on how to pars out a variety of theories to mentally conceptualize and imagine the post-Cold War international system. The roadmap for this thesis, thereupon, requires us to look at a few approaches that will evaluate and be a prognosis to the issues arising at the forefront of the international system. The aim of the study is to discover the role of middle powers in the global power transition period while taking Turkish Foreign Policy as a case study in the post-Cold War era. This new era in Turkey's state behavior showcases a shift in the way Turkish politics was shaped and how that change has been translated into the international system.

> "Turkish foreign policy has long been shaped by Westernised political elites, who were impervious to changes in domestic politics and acted on their own perception of national interest. In the 1990s, however, Turkish politics has witnessed the rise of religious and nationalistic groups with differing preferences on Turkish foreign policy priorities" (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p.527).

As we explore and disect the case study, we shall be proposing a new window into looking at middle powers and offering a renewed interpretation exemplified by Turkey's idiosyncratic foreign policy moves in the international system. Before we delve into analyzing middle powers, we shall be setting out a framework to investigate the impasse in the international liberal order that has made it conducive for the rise of middle powers like Turkey to rise to the challenge.

Waltz' unit level of analysis allows one to analyze the relationship or the interplay between domestic and international factors. Waltz talks about 3 images that consist of the reflection in the way which levels interact with one another. 1) Cause of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. 2) War promotes internal unity where there is a move towards collective action rather than acting individually. 3) The structure of the international system is based on anarchy. Waltz in the Theory of International Politics sees the structure as "a set of constraining conditions." Robert Powell argues these constrains could be many factors

like distribution of power, military technology, comparative economic advantage. Waltz, in this direction, argues level of analysis to include a) the individual which focuses on people who are the drivers of action in foreign policy; b) the state level analysis examines foreign policy behavior of states where in fact history, religion, Social traditions, economy and geographic nature all influence and shape the behavior of a state; c) the system level looks at the international system as a whole where the system is the cause and the state behavior is the effect—in this interaction the change in the former will create change in the latter.

Singer, on the other hand, argues for a two-level system that consists of macro and micro levels. The latter looks at the state and the international system while ignoring the individual level. For Singer, the international system level of analysis requires the understanding of causal mechanism such as goals, motivation and purpose of national policy. This is an important aspect of Singer's analysis, yet, the ignoricing the role of the individual in the state and system-level interaction omits the actor or the human agency that is the driver of change within the state and the international system. Both Waltz and Singer put forward a solution to understanding the interaction among levels of interaction. However, Waltz suggests a comprehensive analysis by including the role of the individual while Singer lacks such a role in his unit level of analysis. The constructivist critique of Waltz structure is also worth mentioning since this study places an importance to this particular theoretical window towards a comprehensive view. Wendt argues the structure must also include "identities and interests" in the system where states are analyzed to be competitive in some relationships and solidary in others. Weldes argues national interest plays a crucial role in the international system because it accounts for state action. Constructivists argue the international system is a product of socialization where ideas create meaning for the international Context. They look at how states interact with one another, how ideas shape the world, how identities come together and negotiate and explore how individuals and social entitites look at the world. This is where foreign policy becomes a critical medium in the transfer of such ideas and norms into the international system. For Hollis and Smith, foreign policy is equated to internal language of decision within the state that becomes the output of foreign policy.

The agent and structure, according to constructivism, co-constitute one another for two reasons: humans are purposeful actors whose actions transform society and, the structure consists of interactions of these purposeful actors. Wendt points out that the agent-structure problems arises from the issue that the states as actors and the international system comprising of a societal structure are not closely analyzed. Wendt in Anarchy is What States

Make of It, the author underlines that the structure actually consists of identity-based approaches because they make up the basis of interests. He says actors don't have a portfolio of interests and that they define interests as they go along. The reason this is an important part in understanding international liberal order is due to the rise of extreme populism and far-right identity groups challenging cosmopolitanism and diversity of identities. For Wendt, identity-formation of states are directly linked to preserving the security of the self otherwise known as the state. In the continuum of security systems there are three types: a) competitive worries about relative gains, ego's gain and alter's loss within the context of Hobbesian war of all against all; b) individualistic treats security as one's responsibility requiring manipulation to serve own interests; c) cooperative looks at security of itself and others as part of shared norms. In line with this perspective, Weldes argues realist approach to national interest (which manifests in the international system through foreign policy) is problematic in two ways: 1) security and survival of the state is too indeterminate and, 2) it ignores process of interpretation to determine what exactly the threat is. Thomas Risse referring to Berger and Luckman state that human agents construct and reproduce reality through daily practices. This means that human gents are tied to the context of their social environment which is why there is a tight-knit interaction in the way structure and agent are mutually consituted.

As we pivot to our discussion of what the alarming concerns are about the international liberal order we find elements of both Hobbesian nature of the ego in a multipolar world against rising international and regional organizations. Ikenberry called attention to a 'crisis of authority' in the international order as we see multilateralism challenged by the United States. These one-sided efforts and protectionism of the US developed as we gained expediency into the post-Cold War era. Waltz in the Structural Realism after the Cold War posits about the factors that have brought change to the international political system. The end of the Cold War led to the dissipation of the bipolar structure wherein the United States rose to the international platform as the unipolar power. Waltz says that if America becomes preoccupied with issues of its own then this will give opportunity for other players in the international system to address their own problems. Yet, another issues the international community faces is the shadow of the future problem where states have too many anxieties about future balances. Due to the worry about precalculating the future of relations with other states and trying to predict the decisions of one another, states continue relations based on relative gains when in reality they could be focusing on

maximizing collective gains. Some of the trends that took over in the international system after the Cold War include the following:

- Democratic wave (Sanders, 1992).
- Pragmatic Liberal interventionism (Graubart, 2013).
- Asymmetric interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p.18)
- Power shift from states to world markets (Megginson & Netter, 2001).
- Survival of regional institutions like NATO and EU (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p.210).

Today, the non-western powers have an increasing role in calling the world order into question. They demand a more egalitarian and equity-based system the includes the participation and decision-making power of the many as opposed to the powerful few. In this framework, the United States and Europe are continuing to recede their role of influence in the international system due to an erosion of legitimacy in a rule-based international system. In the meantime, other rising powers like China and Russia are building up their economic and military power to tip the balance of power in favor of their interests to pursue their own global and regional ambitions. We see China seeking regional domination through hegemonic tactics over the South China Sea and Russia's Syria approach and annexation of Crimea demonstrate the exercise of a military hegemonic power (Duncombe & Dunne, 2018).

Challenges to the old world order is at the same time a direct defiance of the Westphalian system. World order can be defined according to three dimensions:

> *"Structure*, *mode of governance*, and *form of legitimacy*. Structure is the way the units of the system are related. Mode of governance refers to avenues of influence on decision-making and policy-making. Legitimacy is the basis on which the system is made acceptable (legitimisation) to the constituent units. On the structural dimension a distinction is made between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar; in the area of governance between unilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral. In terms of legitimisation, there is a declining scale from the universally accepted rule of international law, over hegemony exercised by one great power (which means 'acceptable dominance') to dominance, legitimised by the national interest and relying on coercion and preemption." (Hettne, 2005, p.271.)

Another useful and concise definition of world order includes how "…structures are shaped accroding to the values and belief systems of the dominant powers as well as of the short-term and long-term security interests of the dominant actors (Cox, 1987)"

(Abrahamsson, 2008, p.4). In order for us to be able to pinpoint or identify a world order we must in retrospect look back to recent history. One of the major reasons the world has shifted from bipolar world order to multipolarity is due to American unilateralism post 9/11 and US hegemony in different regions of the world. In the context of the post-Westphalian multipolar world order there is one critical issue to underline. Power is central to the role that nations play within international relations field and will seek to dominate through values, economic policies of subjugation and military coercion. At a time when there are competing actors within the international system, a variety of states will vie for economic and political power within their surrounding region and around the globe. We are living in an age of "over ambitious" anxiety to constantly expand influence through smart diplomacy and economic/trade tactics against the threat of unilateralism. In the North-South relations it is evident that the welfare income is not distributed based on equity. In the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, the global community witnessed Western failure to eradicate terror in addition to being held responsible to the rise of other terror organizations like DAESH, Boko Haram and wide extensions of Al-Qaida. In the new age of multipolarity and re-structuring of world order, US influence and decision-making has hit rock-bottom especially in the fight against terror. With this framework in mind,

> "if power has to be shared with other upcoming countries, then American 'shaping power' – its power to induce other countries and international organizations to engage in 'de-sirable' behaviour – will diminish. If this power is eroded, then other countries will also gain influence over the rules of the game, and the old centre of power will start to compete with emerging powers on world-views and norms" (de Wijk, 2015, p.23).

Therefore, it is best to keep in mind that the challenge rising against the world order can be percieved as a threat to end the American Century domination around the world. America's role to protect the world order, as a result of various regional growth and retaliation, has rendered the concept of United States as the sole security organizer and maintainer. According to some views who hold the American prevailing power as the ultimate pillar of world order, the significance of of other actors in the international order become subordinate to the core power;

> "World order requires keeping by some agent, agents, or agency. Every such order meriting the ascription needs guarding, and hence needs a guardian. In the absence of a super agent or agency keeping order on behalf of the international system, disorder prevails, to be partially overtaken by such order as the stronger players are able to impose and enforce. At present, and hopefully for many

years to come, the United States is the only possible super agent of world order" (Gray, 2004, p.50-51).

The sheriff or police of the world concept is not only akin to the US role of hegemony and unilateralism in the 21st century. The negativity accompanied by the domination of military activities became evident in the 1990s under the guise of humanitarian intervention that were conducted far away from American borders. Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo are cases demonstrating American willingness to go out of its way to establish order and halt human tragedies. In the 21st Century military domination in areas like Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Pakistan are viewed by Washingtonian policy-makers as a way that is conducive to "… creating stability, of successfully building nations, and of overcoming local tensions and conflicts and political dynamics to install democratic regimes, healthy economies and stable socieites" (Taw, 2012, p. 186). In the American purview, all of these military activities were a noble cause in the name of freedoms and human dignity. However, militarization in other regions of the world were precisely about the securitization of the above issues mentioned. US intervention with the rise of American unilateralism conflated values of freedom and humanitarian intervention by Western policy makers who are justifying it to use force abroad.

The major factor that drove the international liberal world order into crisis are due to the aforementioned military activities and the economic imbalance around the world. Immanuel Wallerstein in *The World-System after the Cold War* outlines 'three relevant pasts' in retrospect to how the world system came to be shaped the way it is now. This is an important outline that puts into perspective the developments that occured since 1450 up until today and why this order can no longer be sustained the way it is.

The Pax Americana, the **1789-1989** French Revolution that changed the world-system fundamentally because it legitimated popular sovereignty and the **1450** capitalism that emerged as a historical system all contributed to a changing cyclical order of the international system. By projecting to year 2050, Wallerstein underscores three major sources of instability in the world-system is likely to occur.

1) Khomeini option where the periphery rejects geocultural norms that govern the world-system.
2) Saddam Hussein option where there is an attempt to challenge the North militarily.

3) Mass movement of people from South to North. İmmigrants will create instability in the North by demanding political and economic rights

With such turmoil in the world-system, Wallerstein states that we are in a state of 'free will' whereby 2050 we can shape politics in such a way we will restructure our world-system. In another eye-opening analysis, Wallerstein also touches upon why there is a crisis in the international liberal order as pertaining to the international system of our time. Many scholars discuss the effects of globalization but, the author draws attention to another perspective. Wallerstein, in the *Globalization or the Age of Transition? A long-term view of the Trajectory of the World System,* states that "globalization is a misleading concept" and, that the 21st Century era we entered is marked by 'an age of transition.' 1450 to current day is characterized as the life cycle of the capitalist world economy. From 1945-to now is depicted as a Kondratieff cycle with two phases: Phase A economic expansion from 1945 to 1967-73 and Phase B is economic contraction from 1973 to today (Wallerstein, 2000, p.5-26).

The transition into a new system according to Wallerstein requires a political struggle between two camps. 1) those who want to retain the inegalitarian system and, 2) those who want a system that is more democratic and egalitarian. The first camp, however, is not going to appear in this guise. But they will disguise themselves as modernizers, democrats, advocates of freedom and progress. The author says we have to be careful because we shouldn't judge from the appearance but look at the substance of what's being offered. The competition in shaping the next historical system will be based on who can analyze the situation and mobilize the people. This will require knowledge, imagination and praxis.

The following section will explore the defective form of the international liberal world order that has created a space for middle powers to act more self-assured. It will also outline some of the reasons for this deficiency and the need to reform it urgently at a time when imbalance in the system is being overriden with suspicion, fear and violence. As a cause of these factors, power transition is being triggered at a time when there is dire need for cooperation while the embracement and practice of universal values is more imminent than ever.

3.2. Reasons for Restructuring of the Liberal International World Order

In order to discover the role of middle powers in the active attempt to shape world politics, we must first look at the inadequacy of the current international liberal world order that has triggered a global power transition. The underlying premise that academic literature points to regarding Western advancement of ideals, values and norms is the innner debate within liberalism itself. This is more or so about the discussion of values that dictate identity. The way a state identifies itself also becomes its marked vision in the way it operates in the international system and actively engages to shape the order through that particular vision. In today's world where state and individual actors analyze the international system through a critical lense the conversation about liberalism is being widely questioned. What is liberalism and whose liberalism is it and who is it for? "The problem is that liberal states have attempted to promote liberal values in ways that risk undermining these values because they can easily be shown to suffer from hypocrisy and doubletalk" (Sorensen, 2011, p.67). This current analysis of liberal values that falls in the traps of self-interested, egoist and power-hungry role of dominant actors in the international system requires us to look at how liberalism has been defined. The role of democracy which, goes hand in hand with liberalism, is also criticized for being used by Western dominant actors as a tool to achieve self-interest at the expense of others. For example, the democracy project aimed at Iraq or Afghanistan is a testament to American failure to understand that democracy cannot be deployed. It must develop organically from bottom-up through popular support. Nations can only transition to a well-adjusted governance system within their state if the customs and traditions align with Western-constructed cosmopolitan values. Given the fact that terror and Sunni-Shia divide dominate such a hostile region, it seems the liberalism and democracy project will always fall through the cracks.

Today, the national interest of Western-dominant actors have become lethal. Therefore, it requires us to go back to the origional materials in which values of freedom and democracy were discussed by the people who envisioned a cosmopolitan world of peace. The role of the state, however, is viewed by early philosophers as the ultimate manifestation of such values and practices. Hegel was one such scholar who ardently believed that the "state is the manifestation of the Divine on Earth" (Loewenberg, 1957, p. 443-444, 447).

His strong belief in a centralized powerful mechanism known as the state is something Hegel believed people should worship and serve in the name of a universal cause.

"The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer observed that "no other philosophical system has done so much for the preparation of fascism and imperialism as Hegel's doctrine of the state—this 'divine Idea as it exists on earth'" (quoted from Bovard 2005: 3)" (Sørensen, 2011, p.69).

Indeed, Hegel's ideological extremism of the state is very telling of an urgent issue of today's international politics in the context of the rise of far-right populism accompanied by the rise of religion, nationalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and discrimination against minorities. Liberalism and democracy are not eroding in the West due to the mentioned problems here, solely. There is a paralleling effect that is the reality of an extremist ideology of Western liberalism that is undertaking US and European foreign policy. Liberalism, democracy and free-capitalist market economy have all turned into a weapon in the hands of the powerful to subjugate the weak for national interest. Liberalism is no longer a set of values of freedom to promote harmony, peace, security and prosperity as we believe it to be the crux of the universal values. Liberalism has become an ideological tool in the hands of militarily and economically powerful states who want to establish hegemony in different parts of the world. That is precisely where the hypocrisy lies.

> "Ideology in the hands of power can be used and abused; the greater the power, the higher the risk of abuse in the domestic as well as in the international sphere. In the hands of power and interest, liberty is always in danger. Ideological principles, no matter how pure, can always be used as justification to bully, oppress, and torture" (Sorensen, 2011, p.69).

At the same time there exists a global security dilemma in which the US has been a leading actor in the international system but, is now struggling due to backlash against its heavy-handed foreign policy approach. In this case, the "Unilateral and Impositionist U.S. leadership has been rejected, while the conditions for creating a reformed liberal Restraint order are absent (Sorensen, 2011, p.143).

This is particularly why it is important to reach out and embrace universal values as promoted and advocated by a global international organizationl like the United Nations. The Liberalist ideology that has turned into a volatile and hostile national interest tool of Western states must be rescued by civil society organizations and freedom-advocating state actors. The hijacking of liberalism by the West has endangered the world and spun it into a whirlwind of chaos. The West still continues to hold on to the Westphalian system while the world is spinning into what Gramsci predicted as "organic chaos." In this chaos,

multipolarity being pulled from many different sides consist of regional actors playing extensive roles in global conflicts. In the meantime, it is more critical than ever to focus on international organizations as an important institution for the cooperation and dialogue of states to reduce tensions and resolve conflicts. It is possible that while Western hegemonic discourse is challenged by rising or challening powers like Russia and China, there will be a "clash of hegemonic discourses." At a time when international diplomacy is strained and heated, we urgently require state leaders' participation to reform the United Nations Security Council to lend a voice to the many in the cosmpolitan world rather than the few hegemonic powers. As a prognosis to the major skeweness in the international system in the 21st Century, we must be able to "equalize the distribution of power… where nations grapple with the tremendous asymmetries built into our current world order, from the existence of permanent members on the UN Security Council to weighted voting in the IMF and the World Bank (Slaughter, 2004, p. 218). According to Kagan,

> "So long as the United States remains at the center of the international economy and the predominant military power, so long as the American public continues to support American predominance as it has consistently for six decades, and so long as potential challengers inspire more fear than sympathy among their neighbors, the structure of the international system should remain as the Chinese describe it: one superpower and many great powers" (Kagan, 2007).

Nonetheless such a system can not promise everlasting peace with one superpower at the upfront. This would merely create a vicious circle which at first only would negatively affect the plight of smaller nations states until encompassing the entirety of the international system and devouring with one final blow to the hegemonic 'super power'. That is to say it would be counterproductive for all stake holders, namely for all nation states in the long run including the upper hand holder. Dispersing power in an equitable manner is the only way to dissipate the chaos and bring solace to the international arena. There must be room for contending powers to appease the tension. Zakaria also discusses how the decline of US power will lead to the "rise of the rest" in which countries such as China and India already started to gain an upperhand in geopolitical positioning and dominant influence in their respective regions. Zakaria argues,

> "The revelation that much of the financial innovation that occurred in the last decade created little more than a house of cards erodes American power. Selling American ideas to the rest of the world will require more effort from here on out. Developing countries will pick and choose the economic policies that best suit them, and with growing confidence (Zakaria, 2008, p.xxii).

Against this backdrop, it has been argued by practicioners and theoreticians that energy, security, poverty and development will play a major role alongside continuing ethnic and political issues of our time. At the same time, the balance of power will shift among major actors who will assume a more robust role in leading the world order that is likely to be more inclusive in decision-making power. Economic leverage has much to do with the tip of balance of power and increase in the capacity to act multilaterally. Two of these critical actors are "China and India which are believed to take the lead. Provided social stability, the economy of China measured in US dollars purchasing power parity will exceed that of the United States in 2020, and India is supposed to follow suit in the beginning of the 2040s" (Abrahamsson, 2008, p.38).

In the discussion of great power change or transition several theoretical analyses has been applied empirically to affirm or falsify hypothesis surrounding this particular topic. In the *Theories of General War* Jack Levy outlines a discussion of these theories to shed light on different perspectives. For the purpose of this thesis we focus on Wallerstein's explanatory theory as a background to why ineuqality in the economic system in the world has led to the rise of challengers to the status quo. At the same time, Gilpin's argument bolsters this thesis by arguing that the dominant power will do whatever it can to prevent the Challenger from taking over they system by initiating a preventive war. In the framework of great power transition, "the dynamics of the system tend to favor states on the periphery because states directly involved in the hegemonic struggle tend to weaken each other and thus pave the way for conquest by a peripheral power" (Levy, 1985, p.351). In this particular framework, it is also useful to look into Kennedy's description of the power hub formation in the world today which is a "dynamic involved, chiefly driven by economic and technological advances, although always interacting with other variables, such as social structure, geography and the occasional accident" (Kennedy, 1989, p.16-17).

In order to unpack the reality of change in the powerful actors in the international system, Organski's power transition theory provides an explanation to global power transition. "Organski and Kugler attempt to distinguish themselves from realists by asserting that power transition theory regards the international system as more ordered than anarchic" (Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 390) and they pinpoint five hegemonic transitions in world history which include, the Napoleonic, the Franco-Prussian, the Russo-Japanese and both World Wars (Lebow & Valentino, 2009). According to Organski and Kugler in *War Ledger:*

> "The fundamental problem that sets the whole system sliding almost irretrievably toward war is the differences in rates of growth among the great powers and, of particular importance, the differences in rates between the dominant nation and the challenger that permit the latter to overtake former in power. It is this leapfrogging that destabilizes the system" (Organski & Kugler, 1981, p.61).

"Power transition theory has two basic components that form its theoretical foundation: (1) the level of dyadic power parity between great powers and (2) the challenger's level of dissatisfaction with the status quo" (Hebron, James & Rudy, 2007, p.5). Through this theoretical basis Organski attempts to explain why great powers go to war. He "identifies three stages of power transition. First there is the potential power phase, when national power is latent and unrealized. Second there is the transitional growth stage, during which states might pursue domestic programs aimed at converting their latent resources into actual material power—for example by pursuing modernizing reforms or adroit industrial policies. Last there is the power maturity phase, at which point states have achieved their full potential in terms of aggregate material power—they are fully modern, efficient, industrialized, and operating at maximum economic output" (Organski, 1958, p. 306-307).

Hebron, James and Rudy explain Organski's theory in the following way:

> "The strongest state, the dominant power, establishes and maintains the status quo to further its long-term interests. States that benefit from the status quo will be satisfied with the system and war between them is unlikely. States that do not benefit from the international system or become unsatisfied with it for some other reason may attempt to challenge the dominant state for leadership. Weak states will have little chance of defeating the dominant state in the international system, so a challenger must attain relative power parity with the dominant state in order to change the status quo and challenge the domi- nant for system leadership. Once a dissatisfied state achieves relative power parity with the dominant state, the likelihood of war between these two states increases dramatically" (Organski, 1958).

In this context, power tranisiton theory provides an explanation in the rise of war among great powers as the pursuit for military and economic dominance begin to grow on many fronts. However, in empirical study conducted on verifying the power transition theory some scholars looked into the role of domestic politics as a variable in impacting the international system. In considering the relative power of nations and their stake in the international system scholars argued "findings demonstrate that not all international politics, as many contend, are a simple extension of local politics. Domestic politics and decision makers can influence the relationship between nations at times, but they are affected and constrained by the structure of the international system (Efird, Kugler & Genna 2003, p.

309). Despite the limitations in the structure of the system, the dominant power imposes its preferences and decision upon the weaker more subservient sates where in such cases "certain nations are recognized as leaders ... Trade is conducted along recognized channels ... Diplomatic relations also fall into recognized patterns ... There are rules of diplomacy; there are even rules of war" (Organski, 1958, p. 15-16), where the great powers benefit and enjoy the freedom to not be constrained by any other actor in the system. But, that does not mean that great powers do not keep a check on each other. The international distribution of power as we see today is being kept in balance by the North Atlantic Community and Asia (Harris, 2014, p. 246). Friedberg in *A Contest for Supremacy* describes seven factors that can determine US-Sino relations.

> "The first two factors (the "narrowing gap in national power" and "differences in regime type and ideology") portend conflict. The remaining five (economic interdependence, democratization, international institutions, common threats, and nuclear weapons) promise peace" (Harris, 2014, p. 246).

Weighing in on the issue of China and US in a battle to dominate the international order one has to look at the growing impact of the Asian economy that demands the Euro-Atlantic market to constantly compete and keep a check on a rising China. The perspective scholars seem to lose sight of is the reality of a rought power transition. Scholars have given examples that there have been peaceful global shifts between the United State and Great Britian in the late 19th and 20th Century (Harris, 2014, p.250). This is due to the Anglo alliance where both nations share similar values, economic interdependence and take part in the same security community. This is one example of a rather smooth or peacefull global power transition that vested more privilege for American preponderance in the post-Cold War era. Looking at the actors within the geopolitical map of the system, it is said that although it has innovative defense industry and strong financial system, China does not share Western values which will make it dificult for it to dominate the rule-based system in the future.

Lebow and Valentino argue:

> "Should war come between the United States and China in the future it will not be a result of a power transition. The greater risk is that conflict will result from the misperception that such a transition is imminent, and the miscalculation by decision- makers in the United States (or China) that China will

> soon be in a position to do what no state has done before – unilaterally dictate the rules of the international system (Lebow & Valentino, 2009, p.408).

China-US relations did meet an important level in the beginning of the 21st Century when the US looked for strategic ways to balance the power of its counterpart as it was militarily and economically growing. China began to have a more forceful and assertive role in the system as it exerted its own foreign policy ambition. It was using projects in the infrastructure development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as a way to boost its image regional and interantionally as an advanced economy. Some of these developments…

> "Over the course of the 2000s, China reached a number of material benchmarks: it overtook Japan in 2010 as the world's second largest economy, in 2009 it became the leading exporter of goods, it had the world's largest foreign currency reserves, and from 2013 had the world's second largest military budget following a decade and more of double digit increases in defence spending" (Foot, 2017, p. 8).

On both sides of the aisle between the US and China the development in diplomatic talks has always sought to establish somekind of balance to create security that required a certain amount of cooperation in the beginning period of the 21st century. Today's dialogue that is forecast by the rise of high tariffs from the US side send different signals in what we can refer to as a weak "management strategy" (Foot, 2017, p.12) on the part of Trump administration.

Power transition theory by definition does create an image to perceive global shifts from a bird-eye-view. But, what the great power transition or this global shift encompasses in the process is something that has been critiqued by certain scholars. This study views power transition theory as part of the research agenda but, at the same time it is critical to take into considerations the weaknesses of this theory. Organski and Kugler argue that the international system is characterized by a hierarchy that is in the shape of a pyramid—with great, middle and small powers—ranking states within these categories. They rely on Gross National Product (GNP) to measure state power as well as consider factors such as population that can support the consolidation of military build-up. There are examples from history where wars occurred leading to transition.

Gilpin argues that the Peloponnesian War, the Second Punic War, the Thirty Years War, the wars of Louis XIV, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and World

Wars I and II were about great power warfare as argued in *War and Change in World Politics.* However, Lebow and Valentino argue that power transition theory can be refuted by examples from the European system where compromises have been made among powers resulting in: Westphalia, the Peace of Utrecht's settlement, the Congress of Vienna and the Versailles Peace Conference and later the 1945 San Francisco Conference leading to the creation of the United Nations (Lebow & Valentino, 2009, p. 393). This begs an important question about power transition assumptions. Peaceful compromises and alliances can occur as we have seen in the settelements made mentioned above. But, when we consider to major powers like the United States and China who are politically and idelogically at the opposite ends of the spectrum, can there be a peaceful power transition? The purpose of this study is not to speculate on the process of the power transition necessarily. This thesis aims to use Organski, Kugler & Gilpin's assertion that power transition "includes hierarchy, economic growth, dissatisfaction, overtaking and parity" (Rapkin & Thompson, 2013, p.48) as a definition and framework for the study.

In reference to agency-structure framework it is argued that "the opportunities of international actors are constrained (or enabled) in various ways at various levels of analysis and that these contraints affect their willingness to act" (Starr, 1999). Power transition theory goes on to argue that that "an even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of nations is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations" (Organski & Kugler, 1981, p. 19). "The dominant country establishes an international order with rules that direct political, economic, diplomatic and military interactions. The dominant country establishes this order because it derives benefits in the form of wealth, security, and prestige from doing so" (Lemke, 1997, p. 24). The author underlines to reality that the war that occurs in the great power transition is about control and dominance over the "rules of the international system and the status quo." This means that the challenge of our time with great powers like US, China, India and competitive middle powers in the system point to the efforts in restructuring international, economic and military relations.

> "The dominant state prefers peace to enjoy the economic benefits of the international system it organized, but it is expected to be more discriminating in the distribution of the benefits created by its power. To maintain the status quo efficiently, it co-opts the aid of powerful allies and distributes to them private goods—benefits it denies to rivals and states too weak to affect the international balance

> of power… A major war is likely when a rapidly growing, dissatisfied contender challenges the dominant state in hopes of reconfiguring the world order so that its interests will be served" (Bussman, 2007, p.89).

In the empirical study of parity and dissatisfication variables, that go hand in hand with each other, war becomes a possibility among great powers. Lemke from an optimistic perspective argued that the post-Cold War era would witness a change from the past to the present. His departure point for the argument is the democratic peace theory. Western countries have relied on the fact that security communities consisting of democracies will not go to war with each other. That is why it was proposed that the world could be divided into 'zones of peace' and 'zones of turmoil' where US, Western Europe and Japan were categorized in the former group while the rest of the world fell in the latter category (Singer & Wildavsky, 1993, p. 29). The optimist view has been rendered futile considering today's conditions of international politics under the protectionist Trump era.

But, Mearsheimer was cautious about the stage the world would enter in the post-Cold War era warning that multipolairty could destablize the interantional system after a relatively peaceful bipolar system during the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 1990). Bipolarity benefited the great powers but with the rise of multipolarity there are no longer two actors vying for power and balancing each other. On the contrary, there is what we can call a "popcorn effect" where multiple and numerous states, who may have been considered pacifist, are no longe satisfied with bipolirity nor unilateral actions of the US. As a result they begin to challenge the status quo while demanding more voice on the say of the "rules of the game." Huntington was also apprehensive about not just the clash of civilizations thesis but, also, about the democratic peace theory. He argued that the democratic peace theory "is valid as far as it goes, but it may not go all that far." (Huntington, 1989, p.7) Along this line of argument, the question then becomes how long the power tranisition will take to claim a powerful position and leading role in the international sytem.

When we look at the aggressive behavior of western dominated powers like the US and the war of tarriffs with China and other NAFTA countries including the lack of responsibility of NATO members for not paying their share, we can see the US taking a resilient role. In this case, the dominant nation, in a desperate attempt to retain its superiority, will intercept these aggressive moves. The great power challenge comes in with economic and military strength to subdue and weaken the US presence in other parts of the world; and,

as a result, the great power transition might be quick or relatively slow, taking place over several decades (Hebron et al, 2007, p. 6). The authors go on to argue that "for power transition theory, two events must take place for the likelihood of conflict to increase: relative power parity and dissatisfaction of the challenger with status quo" (Hebron et al. 2007, p. 10). The challenge to the status quo, of course, comes from the maximization of opportunities and power of a particular state. National capabilities in determining power transition looks at several factors that include: military expenditures, military personnel, iron and steel production, energy consumption, urban population and total population (Kadera & Sorokin, 2004, p.216). Power transition theory, in this regard, sets the ground for exploring other theoretical views that will be helpful in the roadmap of this research. As it was mentioned previously, there are national capabilities that determine the strength and voice of a state actor in the system. Kadera and Sorokin underscore some of these qualities as a requirement of a state to maximize its power both within and without.

This brings us to the discussion of what was mentioned earlier about the change, re-structuring, chaos and conflict in the international order. For the purpose of this research, we looked at power transition theory as an explanatory framework to understand the shift in power and how that affects multipolarity and the balance of power. The imbalance and inequality in our current system points to an important observation: "Disequilibrium in the international system, where one nation or bloc of nations enjoys overwhelming power advantages, encourages conflict" (Tammen, 2008, p.315). The next section will explore the crux of the issue as to why the international liberal order is in crisis due to growing economic gap and inequality in the North-South relations.

3.3. An Analysis of an Uprising Against the "Liberal" International Order

In order to understand the resistance and demand for change in the current liberal international order we ought to look at some of the underlying issues that come with power politics. The way the current order has crystallized since the early-mid-20th Century is can be accounted to the way power has been defined and co-shared through a balance system in recent history (Kagan, 2013, p.4). In our contemporary time, the politics of power in terms of who has it and who does not lies at the heart of the crisis of today's order. With the proliferation of multi-ethnic groups as a cause of mass migrations from the South to the North accompanied by challenges against concepts of nation, citizen, democracy and

accountability, there are a host of issues that is transforming the international liberal order. Why? Since World War II up until today, there has been a transition from bipolarity to the sole hegemonic power of the US. Now, the mushrooming of multipolar system around the world is drawing attention to a particular epiphany: the system led by the so-called "liberal order" has never been liberal. The reason for this is due solely to the premise that power politics always hungry for hegemonic dominance will cast a shadow on the values deemed to be liberal. Values are not to be denied because they exist in all civilizations. However, the Euro-Atlantic communities own interpretation and implementation of values through force and expansiniost aims has negated the "Liberal" international order's foundation, all together. The crisis of the order owes it to the West's harsh enforcement of its of "liberal values" through military operations and at times through economic sanctions. Should liberal values and norms be rejected or should those who unjustly utilize values as a shield to pursue their personal gains be held responsible? It is important to see the nuance between the two where the actor (s) utilize values as a tool for national interest.

In this framework, there are developments occuring around the world specifically pertaining to Turkey's role in its geostrategic location as as well as its global leaderhsip role to fight injustices. Securitization offers a tool of analysis in which Waever argues that it is a (illocutionary) speech act. If one actor can point to an issue and say it poses a danger than that becomes a security issue (Waever, 2004, p.13). When this happens the particular "referrent object" than moves out of the sphere of normal politics and into the realm of emergency politics,

> "where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making. For security this means that it no longer has any given (preexisting) meaning but that it can be anything a securitizing actor says it is. Security is a social and intersubjective construction" (Taureck, 2006, p.55).

Securitization can be conducted by any actor in the system as long as there is an audience that is convinced by the argument and legitimates the threat to go beyond rules and regulations and into emergency mode (Taureck, 2006, p. 55). However, it is argued that in practice not everyone has the capability to securitize issues around the world. Actors who have leverage in the international system in terms of power, military and economic capability are the ones who can easily "socially and politically construct a threat" (Taureck, 2006, p.55) in a successful way that serves the interest of the status quo or the powerful. This discussion, of course, is not limited to just a theoretical analysis as Waever outlines. The reality of our

global politics reflect that securitization as a theory has overcome the boundaries of security studies from just being a theoretical tool to one that has become part of regional and global political agenda. “For Aradau, the co-constitution of political reality on the part of the analyst means that the analyst has a political responsibility” (Aradau, 2004, p. 389). From the perspective of a politician, a state actor, both securitization and the process of de-securitization widen the door for strategic decision-making and problem-solving. According to Diez and Higashino de-securitization consists of Habermas’ approach to an “ideal speech situation.” This, as we shall argue later, demonstrate the role of leadership in determing what is a threat and how states can return back to normal realm of politics to encourage a vision for peace and prosperity. International relations theories contend that alliances do occur within anarchic international system where there can be convergent of interests that bring states together on a common ground. Realists such as Morgenthau and Waltz specify self-help as states within the system look for survival and competition maintain independence from other state actors. When there is an extreme threat within the system then states are pushed to form alliances to collectively take action against that particular threat. Formation of organizations like NATO, EU, Shanghai, ASEAN, PESCO are indicators of Regional Cooperation to come together in tackling common issues that bind certain states together. In this thesis, the definition of securitization as a an act of speech is extended to also be defined as “an act of formation” vis a vis international and regional organizations, as noted earlier. The act of defining something as a threat through speech “leads to alliances” (Weber, 1997, pg. 325) as structures that have political, economic and security basis.

In securitization theory the audience plays a crucial role in the way securitizing move occurs. As the process of securitization occurs within a state, whether it be based on domestic or international policy, the critical decision-making factor lays on the domestic or international audience. If we are to look at the formation of regional organizations it is due to the result of an illocutionary speech act transformed into a concrete action. This kind of speech act or the securitizing move then can be considered within a particular soci-economic, political and security context. When discussing securitization theory, it is also beneficial to consider Vuori’s view that “assertive and declarative acts that alter the status functions of things so that they are thought to act as deterrents and bring about determent in someone or something” (Vuori, 2016, p. 23).

When we consider the role of regional organizations as a tool of national interest and as part of the collective self-help approach across the system, we are faced with the reality

of a changing global landscape in the way great power transition period is changing state to state relations. According to the Oxford Dictionary the English term deterrence refers to "the action of discouraging an action or event through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences." This study which, focuses on global power transition theory as a causal explanation for change in great power trends, also argues that deterrence is central to this transition. Deterrence across international relations theories has always been used in the context of nuclear missiles. But, today, deterrence is occuring through trade wars between great powers like US and China and economic sanctions that US is applying on Iran. Western-led interference on domestic politics of Venezuela also demonstrates great power oppression on a fragile oil-rich country. At the same time, this oppresive behavior is being conducted by Western countries through a securitization move on Venezuela as a way to marginalize the country and label it as an authoritarian state. Iny any case, from a post-colonial perspective, securitization comes with the justification to silence the sub-altern as a problem in of itself that needs some kind of intervention. This is an approach taken by great powers like Western countries who act under the guise of emancipation when in reality it is a form of subjugating the weaker party through "threat construction" (Aradau, 2004, p. 388). Great powers who have vested interest in natural resources like oil (Venezuela) or security incentives (Middle East or Africa) will tend to keep issues of threat within the securitization realm as opposed to move them into the realm of desecuritization. According to the Copenhagen school, desecuritization is to be accompanied with a path towards reform, change and independence resulting in emancipation. In Aradau's description, "Emancipation radically tackles the concept of democratic politics and the issue of institutional authority in claiming a voice for the silenced, for those whom Tim Dunn and Nicholas Wheeler (2004) have called the 'security have-nots'" (Aradau, 2004, p. 397).

The concept of emancipation which, has been derived from the Frankfurt school, has been adopted by critical security scholars and defined as "security in the sense of the absence of the threat of (involuntary) pain, fear, hunger, and poverty… essential element (s) in the struggle for emancipation" (Jones, 1999, p.126). When we analyze unit to unit relations within the international system, critical security analysts offer a perspective that is critical to note within this research. "Critical and feminist security studies function more as 'counter-securitization' and not desecuritization (Aradau, 2004, p.399). This serves as significant analysis in the framework of system-level analysis because while we discuss the change in the international liberal world order we lose sight of a critical component that is to serve the

purpose of the "liberalist agenda." Emancipation is conflated with democracy and therefore, those who are demeed to be un-democratic by the great powers in the West, securitize states as 'insecure' and thus, requiring intervention. As a result of the back and forth attacks between those who defend the liberal order and those who criticize it create an international system environment based on counter-securitization. The anarchic system that is hostile to attacks and requires the protection of the sovereign then ends up embroiled in constant conflict, frustration and distrust that creates an environment of competition for great powers to dominate the world. The act of securitization, as we have seen in academic literature, points to an interaction in which one agent is determined to securitize a problem. When this is done, this creates a retaliatory relation which the referrent object or subject becomes a target that needs to be changed, reformed or destroyed. Therefore, emancipation can be discussed on the individual level as well as regional and international levels. There is a struggle for emancipation on all of these levels of analysis. But as Ken Booth argues, "emancipation has to take precedence over concerns with power and order, given the inherent fragile nature of formations of power which are always at the expense of somebody" (Booth, 1991, p.319).

Booth's argument shed lights on the reality that power always comes with the expense of subjugating others. For there to be true emancipation, there must be a genuine effort by great powers who will create and promote an equity-based, just economic order where everyone prospers rather than just the few who are powerful. Today's liberal international order only serves emancipation for those who are democratic according to Western standards. Other democratic nations like Turkey, African nations or Middle Eastern countries are categorized as weak or a challenge to Western democracy for their defiance to be subservient to Western interests. Often time, due to non-Western backlash on Western domination, countries like Turkey will be branded as non-democratic because they refuse to acquise to Western authority. In the current system of the international order there is a hierarchy that serves the interests of the more powerful while the weaker states are expected to follow rules and guidelines accordingly. There is a rejection of the current order that favors the few. It is for this particular reason why we see the rise of regional actors criticizing and creating their own strategies to counteract Western influence and great power actors like Russia and China. In this context, Ranciere's definition is helpful in identifying the grievances of weak states, emerging markets or middle powers who want to have an equal opportunity in decision-making influence in the global political community. Ranciere states

that emancipation "is not secession, but self-affirmation as a joint-sharer in a common world" (Ranciere, 1995, p.49). This is an important view especially considering the growing interdependence across the international system as technology and communications continue to bind and bring individuals and states closer to one another.

In the recent period as we witness the growing rise of regional organizations, state actors are taking a leading role on regional and international platforms to as an opportunity to securitize domestic and international policies in pursuant of national interest. This development goes hand in hand with regional security complex theory. As we see the great power transition period unravel between the US, EU, China, Japan and Russia they are all competing for hegemonic power. We also see local or regional powers vying for more influence within their geostrategic region. Regional security complex theory provides somewhat of a divisonal analysis that is different than the neorealist approach of state level or system level analysis. According to Buzan and Waever, with the end of the Cold War and an exit out of the bipolar system there has occcurred a space for local or regional actors to take greater role in their situated region. Hence, the regional level becomes important in analyzing particular cases to look for patterns in which security is analyzed. This certainly does not mean that RSC ignores the system level approach which is crucial in understanding the global scene in which great powers compete. On the contrary, great powers' role on the regional level is a determining factor in the outcomes that occur. "…it is the regions that are the locus where actors link together and it also is the point where there is national and global security interplay" (Soltani et. al., 2014, p.169). These levels of interaction, in reality, point to the larger picture in the way different mechanisms in the world are linked to one another.

This opens a window into the discussion of global governance concept where power relations can be examined across a myriad of levels. "… the term global governance conceives of world politics as a multilevel system in which local, national, regional and global political processes are inseperably linked" (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p.192). The first analytical conversation of global governance emerged in the 90s with in the Post-Cold War Era ensued by the consolidation of Commission on Global Governance in 1992. Roseanua and Czempiel edited a nominal work titled *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics.* The definition and function of global governance is not to spur a debate in this study about the concept itself but, it is to lay the foundation for the argument that structures within the system across all levels have the capacity to solve problems through multi-level mechanisms. "Since global governance assumes as part of its

definition that power is shared among multiple "spheres of authority," it conceives of the emerging world order as essentially—and often radically—multipolar" (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p. 197). In the Waltzian sense, the complex and changing relations of the individual, the state and the system describe a unique change in the levels of interaction where the nature of international relations's landscape is becoming rife with challenges. "Thus, fundamental changes in the nature of core political concepts such as sovereignty and authority…" (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p. 197) require us to look deeper to redefine the concept of global governance in accordance with a multipolar world where many actors are competiting for regional and global ascendancy. This will in tandem draw up a crucial conversation about the norms, rules and standars that sustain a global governance that links many nations together towards a shared understanding of peace and security. The idea of global governance has also drawn in views regarding the possibility of a world government where nation-states would work and cooperate together in a cohesive manner.

> "The notion of a global government that would encompass all the nations and the peoples of the world, and that would therefore provide an especially effective means of curbing war and its associated and ancillary problems, has a long tradition in the history of ideas" (Yunker, 2004, p.505).

In this regard, the post-Cold War era emerged as an indicator of a new world system where some policy makers and scholars saw the possibility of a world order with some kind of a governance mechanism. When we look at today's anarchic international system, we do observe that a world government is non-existent but the function of international organizations exceedingly fill an important power and cooperation gap that did not exist prior to the 20th Century. The role of international organizations, in this framework, are the intricate mechanisms that bring policy workers, state actors and non-state actors to conjoin their efforts to realize mutual understanding when it comes to many issues ranging from socio-economic political to security, environmental issues, poverty, etc. As it will be discussed in the further chapters, international organizations are the core mechanism in which the value-based systems operate upon and disemminate policies around organized policy activities. IOs constrain national states to act in a certain way in the international system while at the same time gives the states a platform of legitimacy to voice national, regional and international concerns. As we shall see with Turkey as a case study, international organizations and the norms and standards they stand upon are vehemently challenged for obstructing a just and equity-based international order to emerge. The failure to democratize the UN Security Council is an example of this impediment that is pushing

many UN members outside of the P5 to question the legitimacy of a global institution that is defeating the very purpose it was founded upon—that is to establish security and peace through means of liberal democratic principles. Accompanied with this grievance of injustice is also worldwide economic disparity that has called for an awakening by the many who have been disadvantaged by economic tyranny.

> "A tremendous gulf has emerged between economic living standards in the rich nations and the poor nations. The rich nations are concerned that a global government would engage in drastic redistribution of world income; while the poor nations are concerned that a global government would become an instrument for the re-imposition of colonial- style economic exploitation" (Yunker, 2004, p.509).

One of the fundamental reasons behind the challenge against US domination emanates from the economic and security exploitation that it pursues around the globe. The transition to multipolarity, as a result, is an effort to embrace multilateralism and work together towards common problems where everyone cooperates and has equal share in the decision-making process on issues of security and peace in the world.

> "Embracing principles and practices of restraint, accommodation, reciprocity, and cooperation, the great powers will work in concert to establish mutually acknowledged roles and responsibilities to comanage an evolving but stable international order that benefits all of them" (Schweller, 2011, p.285).

This thesis takes into consideration the current international "liberal" order's crisis that is also challenging the notion of global governance. It is imporant to make a distinction between the two. The liberal order constructed and led by the West has been used as a platform to promote global governance under Western leadership. In today's great power transition or in other words the hegemonic crisis between the West and others like China, India and Japan there emerges a vital question as to whose perspective global governance will be shaped and implemented. This is a critical debate in which values, norms and a rule-based system will be open to transformation and criticism since the current Western led order has been created in exclusion by the West and applied as a vision for all the rest. Now, the great power transition or otherwise known as the rise of the rest is giving an opportunity for the emerging markets to resist the limits of power and defy the restraints on economic growth, development and expansion of security-based activities on a regional and global scale. The caveat according to existing literature is that

> "Rising non-Western powers do not always share the US view on global governance; it is unreasonable to expect them to adopt wholesale the principles, norms, and rules of an inherited Western order. And even when the basic interests of the established and emerging powers align, their priorities may differ" (Schweller, 2011, p.290).

It is criticized that within the liberal system the Western world's democracy promotion aims at a new type of colonialism. Yet, the current order which is argued to be liberal and sets forth the promotion of democracy around the world has been criticized for being hijacked by the one-sided neo-colonialist intentions of Western countries. It is observed that the West and more or less the United States alone takes on the burden to ensure public goods for all while holding onto security monopoly in different regions of the world. Unfortunately, while liberal values and norms are promoted at the outset we also see a parallel in the way liberalism is undermined for the sake of pursuing oppressive economic, military and diplomatic policies. Therefore, the challenge in the great power transition showcases the resistance and the need for modification to the current order's so-called "liberalism" used as a tool to advance freedoms and prosperity for all.

> "This order was constructed by and for the West and, especially since World War II, was meant to serve and to spread liberal values and practices. The defining features of the post-World War II order include liberal democracy, industrial capitalism, secular nationalism, and open trade. In order to defend and expand democracy, the rule of law, and free markets, the United States and its Western allies institutionalized this liberal, multilateral order, and then worked hard to extend the reach of Western institutions once the Cold War ended. NATO, the European Union, the World Trade Organization — these and other institutions born of Western initiative remain pillars of a liberal international order" (Flockart et. al, 2014, p.3).

As mentioned earlier the purpose of emerging markets and middle powers like Turkey are not to deny that there must be an order in the international system. On the contrary, the order is required to have a rule-based system where everyone participates. However, this can only be done if the international liberal order is reformed to be more inclusive and democratic by giving opportunities for all to prosper, develop and excel economically socially and politically. The post-Cold war era experienced a break away from bipolarity towards US unilateralism ensued by the rise of multipolarity. It is at this juncture that regional interests become paramount in the way global politics is being shaped in the 21st Century. The dissatisfaction with the unipolar power, the United States, propelled many challenger nations to address inequalities and regional conflicts through the purview of regional actors. Therefore, power transition in a deep and complex way very much involves

the regional context when we consider a holistic picture of the global hierarchy. In this direction, Organski's discussion of power transition theory implies that "power transitions should constitute necessary conditions for war, and at least one state's dissatisfaction with the status quo will determine whether these transitions will be violent or peaceful" (Danilovic & Clare, 2007, p.290). DiCicco & Levy in line with power transition theory address an important theoretical gap when it comes to the "challenger's evaluation of the status quo" where a "valid measurement" is necessary to be able to see how and why the dissatisfaction of the hegemon occurs (Danilovic & Clare, 2007, p.291). Authors Danilovic & Clare in referring to DiCicco & Levy also argue for the need to refine the concept of "status quo" by exploring whether it is meant to be systemic, regional or dyadic (Danilovic & Clare, 2007, p.292). While power transition is regarded as a condition of war between the Status quo and the Challenger (s) they do not clash in their respective regions but, in fact, have major influence in regions beyond their borders. As we analyze middle powers in this research, we will find that the status quo is not just about the hegemon being challenged by the emerging market (s). It is about regional powers seeking ways to revise the status quo of their region to have regional and global impact.

For this reason, leading economic and political institutions of the world controlled by the West has led to an objection by the global South. In these efforts by the global South, there is a compelling aim to re-order power and economic distribution in the global North to diversify and spread control to the global South. The transition from the North to the South does not signify a unipolar hegemonic power shift. On the contrary, it is about "emancipatory multipolarity" (Pieterse, 2011) veering away from a Western and US dominated global hegemony. When we analyze the South-to-South Cooperation we find that

> "…it is quite clear that the challenge that the rising powers pose to global governance is of a qualitatively different nature to that of previous Third World political movements, such as the Non-aligned Movement, the G-77, and their efforts in the 1970s to set an agenda for a 'New International Economic Order'" (Gray & Murphy, 2013 p.184).

What is also substantially different in the South to South Cooperation and its challenge of the global North from previous movements is the dissatisfaction with global norms and rules. States are becoming more and more involvded in the re-shaping of the international order and through the efforts of their national policies liberal norms are being questioned. This is mainly due to unilateralism and protectionist policies that are deterring

multilateral purpose of global institutions like the United Nations. In the post-Cold War era and the emergence of a new international terrain in the 21st Century, there exists more fears about lack of cooperation and compliance to international norms. The growth of emerging powers also open way to the rise of far-right extremisim and nationalist discourse leading to exclusionary and isolationist policies in the world. Yet, on the other hand the interaction or rather the interplay between the sovereign nation-state and institutions of the global governance umbrella has reckoned the importance of the relation between the two.

> "…the interaction between global and state governance will result in the creation of a "melting pot" of various world civilizations. With the interaction of the values and governance experience of these civilizations, inclusiveness, learning from one another, and making progress together through peaceful competition will bring a new global order, based on sharing, intermingling and symbiotic harmony" (Zhenye, 2016, p.195).

As Zhenye argues the interatction between the global and state governance creates an important space in which values and norms are debated and even contested as nations from different civilizational backgrounds compete for power and domination. However, what should not be missed in this context is the question of what the ideal concern of nation-states are. Liberal democratic values are the current norms that underpin the international liberal order. But in order for there to be a non-dominant, cosmopolitan democratic international order there must be an inclusive value-based system that captures the approaches of many civilizations and not just the Western civilization exclusively. In this multipolar moment of the world, more nations engaged in the revision of the international order are stating that the Western value system in the sense of Kant's cosmpolitanism is no longer universal. Universal no longer has a synonomous meaning with Western and vice versa. Universal values will not be protected and promoted by the Western powers, but, they will be revised and defended by a multipolarity of powers who will have an input in changing the international system and the norms and rules that govern it. In this context, in order to evaluate the shifting or transforming of the international liberal order from the demand of nations we have to closely look into the role of middle powers in this process. The literature provided for the middle power concept will create a framework in which why nations like Turkey or platforms like BRICS and MIKTA serve as potential challengers to the status quo regime change in the time of power transition of the 21st Century.

Against this backdrop, this study predicts that Turkish state behavior shift in paradigm and mentality is in actuality a part of the wisdom to contribute to a changing

international liberal world order in the grand scheme of global developments. It's zealous and ambitious approach in foreign policy in the recent years has rendered it a leader and its experienced state image has become an aspiration for other states to take example from. This will set the path of the thesis to explore middle power definition and the challenges that middle powers pose to the hegemonic stability theory. The reason for this argument is that the great power transition we are experiencing on the global stage between China and US offer new and more expanded opportunities for middle powers. This study attributes this opportunity expansion to an important development in the post-Cold War era. The earlier discussion about the challenge to the Westphalia system and the failure of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine under the auspices of the UN has widened the door for nation-states to take actions that are beyond their national limitations. This has led middle power states to take on a more assertive role in the international system. As it will be discussed further, Turkey's example in a driven foreign policy approach exemplifies an actor whose behavior is imperative at a time of increasing inequality and insecurity in its geostrategic location and the international liberal world order. In order to grasp the current direction of Turkey in the international system we must look in retrospect to 3 periods in the post-Cold War era: 1990-2001, 2002-2014 and 2014-2020. This particular task aims to answer the following core questions:

1) Explain the reason why and for what purpose Turkey has come to be identified as a middle power.
2) How Turkey's image and behavior contributed to developments in the neighborhood and beyond?
3) What prospects are there in the post-Cold era when Turkey's state behavior adopts a middle power role but t the same time operates far beyond the middle powermanship scope?

Setting the next section's framework in this regard will allow the possibility to understand where Turkey stands today from the past to the present. Its role and influence has shifted and multiplied as regional issues turned more volatile requiring the exerted struggle to be a conflict mediator, agenda setter and problem solver across the field and beyond. It will become more evident in Chapters 4 and 5 as I shall argue that Turkey has grown out of being a middle power and is in the pursuit of achieving greater tasks demonstrated by its effort and vigor.

CHAPTER 4- AN EFFICACIOUS POWER: THE CASE STUDY OF TURKEY

State Behavior of Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: a Middle Power or a different kind of power?

The concept of middle power was introduced to Turkish Foreign Policy literature under a comprehensive and detailed work edited by Baskın Oran. Analyzing Turkey's economic and military strength, he conceptualized Turkey as a Strategic Medium Power who he also classified among regional powers (Oran, 2010, p.9). He argues on the point that an SMP depending on its geostrategic location may have benefits and drawbacks but, it seems that Turkey during the Cold War was "valued from a strategic point of view" by the West and the East (Oran, 2010, p.10). Oran argues that national interest is the underlying premise in which foreign policy agenda is driven and he mentions three critical components: military, economic and political social, stating that a damage to any of these factors would harm national security. As Oran provides an analysis of these three components or circles as they interact with the larger international system, he says the "internal" and "external dynamics" must be kept safe under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Oran, 2010, p.11). While he acknowledges that the internal and the external impact one another, it is implied that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must keep these circles intact and operating in harmony. Later into the analysis as I shall come to the latest period between 2014-2019, the SMP identity offered by Oran will have retired and a new age in Turkish Foreign Policy will require a new conceptualization to define Turkey's agile role as a change-maker. Before coming to that point in the case study of Turkey, the following section in the aftermath of the Cold War will characterize Turkey using its geostrategic location as a launching pad to become active in international organizations as it sets on the path to discover its identity in its own region. The following three subsections will provide this thesis with ample academic knowledge to picture the conceptual transition and shift in Turkish Foreign Policy as we see change, continuity and reinforcement of past experiences in the state behavior of Turkey in the post-Cold War era.

State behavior analysis of Turkey's Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War era will be classified in accordance to a particular timeline and theoretical framework. In this direction, constructivism, realism and liberalism approaches will be used to explain Turkey's transition

since the end of the Cold war and towards establishing its image within the multipolar system of the 21st Century.

4.1. IOs as an Instrument: The Ways /Means Turkey is Impacting the System

Who is Turkey Aspiring to be? A Constructivist, Realist and Liberal approach between 1991-2001

Müftüler and Yüksel in discussing Turkey's position in the New Order argue that at the time the country's gross national product allowed it a position among middle powers especially considering its military capability within the scope of NATO (Müftüler &Yüksel, 1997, p.188-89). Its democratic and secular identity to a large extent allowed outside actors beyond Turkish borders to view the country as an example for the Muslim world despite its ongoing economic instability due to high inflation, foreign debt and terror. Turkey's image as a democratic and secular country was more paramount than the internal dynamics that were embroiling Turkey's domestic scene into greater instability. Despite these issues, Turkey managed to maneuver its foreign policy direction to international organizations as a way to boost its role in its region. Turkey's membership to IOs beginning with the League of Nations ensued by the United Nations, OECD, CSCE, EC, NATO, ECO, OIC, DECA and WEU were all pivotal in constructing Turkey's identity as a collaborator and partner in many of these organizations. Turkey's rapprochement to the region via Black Sea Economic Cooperation also deemed the country a leader in economic cooperation in the neighborhood and offered a constructive way to build relations in the region while setting precedence for Central Asian Republics (Müftüler & Yüksel, 1997, p.192-93). The 1963 Ankara Treaty may have been the most determining step that Turkey took during the Cold War which later in the post-Cold War era would be tested in the EU accession process. The post-Cold War era can be argued to have given a major start to Turkey in search for its assertiveness in the region since it was already a member of various international organizations prior to the breakup of the Soviet bloc. In reality, the breakup of the Soviet Union offered a new direction for Turkey to become further integrated into the West and the European Union while it sought to reassess its geopolitical approach to security and foreign policy between the two bipolar powers (Hunter, 1999, p. 67). In the same context, the disintegration of Communism created ethnic conflicts in the regional neighbors like the Balkans where the "liberation trend enabled Turkey to widen its scope" (Akgün, 2009, p.10).

Hunter argues, in the midst of re-arrangement of positions in the post cold-war era, Turkey repositioned itself towards the Middle East. President Turgut Ozal at the time decided to take part in the ani-Saddam coalition after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Hunter,1999, p.70). This changed Turkey's stance from being just a bridge between the East and the West and instead took an active policy stance. Turkey's approach to modify if foreign policy principles from the time of its establishment in 1923 shows that it has set on "a new course in the international system" (Sayari, 2000, p.170). According to Sayari, this step was taken by Ozal to "demonstrate his country's geostrategic importance to the West as a central player in the Allied coalition" (Ibid, p.171). The growing PKK terror threat, the competition for oil in accessing Caspian energy, the long-term Cyprus tension and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnians by the Serbs all became major policy issues that Turkey perceived as imperative to act upon as part of its national and regional interest.

Here it can be seen Turkey's role as a Muslim country, with a secular leaning at the time, was part of a Western inclination and a product of Pan-Turkism that provided a versatile and compact option to the region in the following aspect. It has been clearly observed that Turkey with a Muslim identity, secular in orientation and its route geared towards modernization and westernization provided the West with an advantage. Turkey served as a model for not only Turkic-speaking Republics but to the Muslim world in general. Turkey's emergence and its political formulation as a modern republic would serve as a litmus test in the larger framework and would be put to a test in the post-Cold War era. Turkey's case was especially driven forward in its proactive role towards the Caucasus and Central Asia (Hunter, 1999, p.71) while building on the kinship of Turkic-speaking identity as it left behind a reticent stance and employed a mobilizing type of state behavior.

This opened Turkey's path of foreign policy orientation to debates not limited to a continuity of Pan-Turkism in the region but also a fusion of concepts such as Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism. Turkey's strategic importance was well-known by policy-makers on both sides of the aisle who recognized a critical potential in realizing a cooperation in the region with Turkey on the pedestal. In the post-Ozal period, the concept eurasianism gained experience in the left circles within Turkey's domestic politics. The neo-nationalists who saw Kemalist principles endangered by the US and EU were beginning discussion that placed them in an anti-Western position (Erşen, 2013, p.31-32).

The power dynamics in the post-Cold War region between the United States, Russia and Iran, in reality, called for the need to recognize Turkey's not only geostrategic significance but its state identity, economic, military and political advantages provided in this context. Despite the Cold War being over, Russia still had growing influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. As Iran was seen in the eyes of the West as a belligerent, radical Islamic state, Turkey in this narrative was to provide an alternative to its Iranian neighbor. In the complex interdependent relations in the region, Turkey's fate was determined by policy-makers as a bridge or a place of transit for economic and trade relations. But Turkey's behavior during this time demonstrated more activism than was expected. Turkey's leadership at the time chose to build on bilateral relations with Turkic states despite the cautious acceptance of Turkish Foreign Policy initiative to the region that was already damaged by neo-colonial rule by the Soviets (Cinar, 2013, p. 267).

The collapse of the Eastern bloc led to the rise of the United States as a single superpower and this in tandem to US policy to the region required Turkey to take more action across the field. Turkey's foreign policy that reflected some kind of neutrality was abandoned at a period in which the US needed major leverage to maintain its strength and balance in favor of itself across the Middle East and the post-Soviet states. If a security or political vacuum were to emerge, the United States understood well that it direly needed Turkey to take on a role that favored US policy in the region. Turkey would not be considered just a "regional stabilizer or arbiter for its own security interests" (Onis, 1995, p.50-51) but it was to be treated as "a pawn on the geostrategic chessboard with extremely limited policy options… As having little choice outside bandwagoning or balancing" (Manicom & Reeves, 2014, p. 24) in line with Western interests.

Turkey's democratic recession due to the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 was intended to keep religion in check against military tutelage. Economic and coalition parties' instability was used as an excuse to militarily intervene. President Demirel sought to bring liberties at the expense of conservative muslims. The Welfare Party's victory of 60 seats in the parliamentary elections of 1991 became a major hallmark among muslim conservatives. President Ozal was a lenient Muslim liberal compared to his predecessor mainly due to two aspects of normalization he introduced to Turkey's 1990s period. He initiated economic liberalization while opening the path for the normalization of conservative muslims to be in the front lines of Turkish politics. The emergence of neo-Ottomanist world-view in this respect offered a "pragmatic approach to issues of religious, cultural and ethnic identity"

which viewed all “Ottoman Muslim populations” (Yavuz, 1998, p.24) beyond Turkey’s borders as part of the same civilization.

In the meantime, as the domestic political scene in Turkey was wrought with coming together and breaking down of coalitions in the late 90s, the post-cold war era definition of Turkey was quite limited. The state actors of the time were choosing “a liminal-marginal international identity” whose geographical imagination was being classified in a “bridge” metaphor (Yanık, 2009, p.532-34). As the frustration grew with the European Union prolonging the membership process of Turkey, the discourse surrounding Turkey’s identity, role and position as a “bridge between continents” (Ibid, p.540) expanded to becoming a “bridge between civilizations” (Ibid, p.540) with the advent of AK Party’s formation in 2001.

The implications for being a nexus between civilizations from the East to the West points to the unique vision of the Turkish nation with “people beyond national borders with whom they have religious, linguistic and racial ties" (Aras, 2000, p.32). The issues the Turkish nation adopted in the post-Cold war era included the grievances of people who share a like-minded faith and history dating back to the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish peoples and their representatives in government resonate an affinity to the historical ties Turkey has to Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Palestine which Aras argues has shaped the nation’s foreign policy agenda (2000, p.32). The identity based discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy incorporated a belief of responsibility and influence to other regions due to the Ottoman past. This was an idea that was becoming more and more apparent with the election of the Welfare Party in 1995 which later in 1996 formed a coalition with the True Path Party. The “Ottoman-Islamic worldview” (Yavuz, 1998, p.20) would become an important banner of identity for muslim conservatives to challenge despotic military power and usher the nation into a new era of identity politics.

With the emergence of Refah as a main political actor on the scene, there has been much speculation about an “Islamization process” (Rouleau, 1996, p.77) that Turkish Foreign Policy was undergoing. One could agree that there was a change in the discourse of TFP but instead of claiming it to be islamization in the hard core sense, it would be more accurate to look at it from a sociological perspective by looking into the past. The muslim conservatives that gained political recognition by the constituency in the post-Cold War era, were within the movement of an Muslim Enlightenment that sought to bring the origins of

humanity, its goals, means and ends. The best way to cater to the needs of a large faction within society that was demanding the right to live a pious life is through political means, whereby the governance system was to pave the path to such freedoms. Refah was par excellence a culmination of the socio-economic and political grievances that were translated into the political sphere of life. The term Islamization used in Western academic vernacular is too one-dimensional and does not have the explanatory power to understand the Islamic *weltanschauung.* The political approach does not just cover the revival of Islamic values in the public sphere and to repair the relations between state and society, but also influences the transformation of mentality, vision and the human character and behavior. In this framework, one is not only expected to scientifically dig deep into history to unearth what has already been established in the natural world but to bring this knowledge up to par with the journey toward spiritual excellence. Since the construction of state identity is a direct reflection of a society, it can be understood that the two create a mirror image of one another. In this dual process of identity construction it can be inferred that there is a challenge to the "Westphalian polity" which is argued to be "the basis of a secularist nationalist identity" (Yesiltaş, 2013, p.664). The clashing kulturkampf of the post-Cold war period of the 1990s included a divide between the positivist-secular versus the Islamic revivalist blocs that also included the rise of Kurdish nationalism (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009, p. 160).

According to Imai, Erbakan's National View Movement (Millî Görüş Hareketi) which emerged in the 1970s translated issues surrounding "culture, industrialization, social justice and education" into the political realm by the 1990s (2018, p.68). In line with the political messaging was the "Just Economic Order" used as a strategy to garner support from anyone who was economically disadvantaged due to unfair income distribution. However, in his effort to reach out to a muslim crowd, the rhetoric used by Erbakan against the backdrop of NVM and the Just Economic Order discourse made a clear distinction between what he saw as the Islamic civilization and Western civilization (2018, 69). As a counterpart to the EU and NATO, he initiated the D-8 (Developing 8) as a way to formulate a like-minded coalition with Muslim countries as an alternative to Western and non-Muslim alliances (2018, p.70) towards reconceptualizing national security in the interest of a Muslim Turkey based on economic cooperation. These efforts on Erbakan's part reflected a strong emphasis on Turkey's character and identity as Muslim, first and foremost, and indicated a prioritization of relations with similar nations as opposed to being inclusive of the West. The Turkish experience with modernity, secularization and modernization is quite different than

other muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia or far more different than the case of Gulf countries per se. While staunch secular interpretations in the early Republican period resulted in the mobilization of muslim political activists, at the same time this created an opportunity for dissidents to revive the Ottoman past in the context of modernity and changing geopolitical relations.

In this regard, taking the West out of the framework was not going to benefit Turkey and the region that was already embroiled in the post-Cold War competition between a growing Russian influence and Western interests already maintaining a stronghold on the region. Erbakan's discourse to exclude the West was never the wise choice. But one has to keep in mind that this was done as a way to counteract "Western universalism" (Kaya, 2004, p.139) which explicitly is based on excluding everything that is non-Western and caters to the dominance of Western interests based on the subjugation of regional powers. Turkey attempted to break this mold under Erbakan.

Within this context, modernity was seen as a unilinear historical development that emphasized Western way of life (Kaya, 2004, p.140), since Islam offers an approach to conceptualizing a universal world that is based on Islamic values that is not entirely different than liberal democracy that originated in the West. The goal of offering a new window into universalism from different Islamic experiences enriches democratic traditions instead of being limited to just a single interpretation from Western tradition. One must keep in mind the possibility that Western liberal democracy could converge with Eastern liberal democracy under the premise that Islamic values are harbored within its tradition. The nuance would not be based on difference in the structure of the governance system or the implementation of laws and regulations thereof. The difference would be the perspective and the universal applicability of Islamic values in a world constructed into a hierarchy that favors the powerful over the subjugated weak actors. Hence at this point in discussion, looking at Huntington's argument of the "clash of civilizations" (1993) and Fukuyama's interpretation of history as an "evolutionary pattern" (1992, p.48) could be brought forth. Their stance can be negated in two ways. The clash is not about the civilizations per se since history is rich with examples of cultural, intellectual and economic exchange between Eastern and Western civilizations that have more points of convergence than differences. The "clash" in Huntington's thesis referring to Islam as a competitor to the West is not necessarily on the premise of values such as inalienable rights, freedoms, law and justice. The "clash" has to do within the framework of economically and politically disadvantaged

state actors revolting and demanding the right to be on equal terms with the powerful. One can argue that Huntington's thesis about civilizational differences is not the factor of contention but it has to do more with the economic grievances. Furthermore, in a world where globalization has created intricate and unbreakable bonds of cultural and commercial ties, the civilizational differences seem to be less relevant today since popular culture led by the West is leading to various fusions of cultures around the world. Afterall, the "civilizational" blocs were constructed by Western geostrategic imagination as a way to categorize and polarize in order to keep a check on the proliferation of identities in the region. Along those lines, Turkey presented a unique example as the Anatolia harbored multiple identities, ethnicities, languages and beliefs as a cradle of civilization that has always been based on multiculturalism as opposed to a monolithic Western civilization.

Considering the vast Anatolian history and the Ottoman state's administrative rule in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucuses, Turkey as a Republic had emerged based on the condition of a single identity of Turkishness and a state controlled Islam. The post-Cold war era, however, provided a greater momentum on harkening back to Turkey's multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-lingual ethnic communities. For this reason, Turkey in the post-Cold War era was seen not only as an economic, political and strategic asset for the West but, also deemed a cultural treasure the West believed must be protected, promoted and contained.

Ismail Cem who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1997-2002, presented a contrary view to Erbakan's efforts to initiate a collective strength of Muslim countries. Cem offered an amalgamous portrait of Turkey as a "civilization melding Western and Eastern values, a multitude of beliefs and ethnicities" who saw being European and Asian at the same time as an asset (Cem, 1999, p.1) for peaceful coexistence among various communities. Turkey's long term goal and inclination to be in the Western camp by knocking at the door of the European Union signified its desire to be among the advanced and developed. The Turkish model represented an image something other muslim nations did not have. But at the same time, Turkey's vast civilizational past inherited from the Ottomans was to become the major stumbling block in the country's strong desire to become a member of the European club. Soon thereafter with the emergence of the AK Party in 2001, a strong willingness to head towards the EU would be justified under the democratic realm.

However, as it will become evident further into the thesis, the post-Cold War would be filled with degrees of change and continuity while also exploring new directions oriented to different regions that echoe an autonomous, independent and flexible Turkish Foreign Policy behavior. The context of 2008 global economic crisis set an important framework for middle power activism to become more critical players across the field. As Turkey seeks the opportunity to expand its foreign policy agenda in the midst of crises, this allows for a greater advantage on its part to assume a leadership role. In this vein, the question of "Who is Turkey aspiring to be?" is an answer that requires one to look at the trajectory of how its identity was developed over time which can be explained through a constructivist framework. Turkey's identity construction as an active participant in international organizations and as a leading agenda-setter in its region paved the way for its active role on the international stage. Hence, as Turkey plays a challenger role within the international system by adopting a challenger identity against the status quo, it also branded its self-image as an alternative power for the international community to listen to rather than for all state actors to willingly or unwillingly subsume under great power politics.

In this framework, the year 2008 brought forth the argument that a global hegemon like the United States could be questioned for its legitimacy and whether it had the full capacity to lead the international liberal world order. The economic recession in the US was a major propeller for states deemed to be middle powers to look for ways to establish autonomy within their own region. Turkey's example sets precedence in this regard because not only did it manage to avoid the economic crisis but at the same time, it used the crisis as an opportunity to maximize its strength in its own regional sphere. As Turkey's growth as a political, diplomatic and economic power grew over the decades with the end of the Cold War, it has wisely sought to perform more actively in international organizations.

In an eye opening article penned by Akgun, Turkey's Foreign Policy direction in the post-Cold War era has been interpreted by the author as heightened "awareness to prevent environmental dynamics and crisis" in a new age. These risks enabled Turkey to move towards "bilateral and multilateral active diplomacy" which has rendered new debates in the country's "political identity and foreign policy choices." Akgun in reference to Davutoglu's argument that Turkey must develop into a "core state" is part of a pivotal post-Cold War strategic policy. Akgun argues in order for this goal to come to fruition Turkey at the end of the Cold War became more engaged and took on various roles within multiple international organizations. The developments in Turkey's Foreign Policy in the past three decades

showcases the speedy approach in transforming the vision of the government from a purely secular view to a collaboration between religion and realism. This is a very critical nexus and a major paradigm shift in the history of Turkish Foreign Policy because it requires the state to shape its policies on a realist template yet at the same time include a principled demeanor inspired by theological morality. As I shall analyze some of the rhetoric of President Erdogan in the following pages, it will become more evident that religion and realism has molded in such a way that transformed Turkey into a unique actor in the international system: *an efficacious power.* In this context, the formulation of the state image is connected to the civilizational experience in one's geographic location as part of a change and continuity from the past. This can be better explained by Toynbee's analysis who has argued that "the journey of civilization is basically conceived as a successive series of encounters between man and the totality of his environment, both physical environment and human in the sense of the weight of the results of earlier encounters" (Sumberg, 1947, p.268).

Turkey's *efficacious* character as we described above lies within the methods and approaches to regional politics and the international system as a whole when considering Toynbee's approach to the way an actor within a civilization becomes a locomotive in which civilizational discourse is developed, constructed and transformed over time. In order to dissect this reformist and re-imaginative policy agenda, it will be useful to conduct a discourse analysis on how Turkish Foreign Policy transformed its rhetoric from an adaptable and conformist position in the past to one that is assertive and *efficacious* in the framework of setting its own rules within the game also known as game changer. The Turkish Foreign Policy roadmap has a long history since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Also, considering the changing governments from the 20th to the 21st Century, Turkey's geographical position has oftentimes required constant attention to volatile issues in its region. However, considering today's circumstances, the discourse analysis will focus on the political messaging exerted under President Erdogan's leadership. The discourse analysis will undertake messages given from within international organizations as a platform used to continuously assert Turkey's active and engaged character as an influential problem-solver. In order to unpack and shed light on Turkey's role in its foreign policy, I shall look at particular speeches given by President Erdogan between the years 2018 and 2019 at international organizations like the OIC and the United Nations.

On May 18, 2018 the Organization of Islamic Cooperation convened under Turkey's term leadership to discuss the state of Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinians. President

Erdogan underlines that Jerusalem holds an exceptional place in the hearts of Muslims as the "honor, dignity and the sanctity of virtue for all believers; which holds a mutual memory, mutual heritage and is based on mutual labor." Equally important is that in the history of religions Jerusalem is a holy site for all the Abrahamic faiths as underlined in President Erdogan's remarks. Therefore, any attack made against Jerusalem is deemed a threat to the values harbored by all. Any kind of coercion made against this holy site and the people who revere it are considered to be under duress due to their sentiment and sensitivity for the Holy Land. The following excerpt from the statements of President Erdogan touch upon a very critical interaction between religion and politics:

> "In this meeting here today we are not here to demonstrate our reaction to the occupation attempt of Jerusalem, but at the same time we are also owning up to the ideal that the three Abrahamic faiths should live in peace together. Today, we are staying stop to those who are trying to drench our region into bloodshed and tears. With this meeting, we are exclaiming that our Palestinian brothers and sisters are never alone in their struggle. Once again I want everyone to know of this reality. The Jerusalem mission is the mission of all Muslims." (Erdogan, 2018, May 18).

Giray Sadik by describing the "Right Combination of Religion and Foreign Policy" in the framework of "Magic Blend vs. Dangerous Mix" provides an important purview in the shifting dynamics regarding these variables. Sadik states that the structural dynamics in the international system can be a major influential factor in Turkey's relations vis a vis Middle Eastern countries rather than assessing the situation wholly based on religious affinity. This is certainly a pressing issue to consider now in Turkish Foreign Policy as we see the critical situation of Jerusalem unravel before the eyes of the international public. Analyzing Turkey's position on Jerusalem based on President Erdogan's statements helps us open a window into pinpointing the direction based on Sadik's two options. Is it a "magic blend" or a "dangerous mix"? In today's circumstances, Turkey is walking a fine line by both propelling to showcase a smart economic growth while at the same time defying the constraints within the international system dominated by status quo powers like the US and its unwavering position on Jerusalem. The magic blend can be said to be working in favor of Turkey not only in terms of relations with certain Middle Eastern countries but is also reflected in the new opening towards Asian markets for the past couple of years. Economic and trade relations with Latin America, for example, reflects the relationship beyond the religious boundaries and the umma discourse. That is to say religion in this case is not used

necessarily as a monotheistic tool but as a principle on amicable political relations beyond the boundaries of credo and a win-win understanding in economic relations.

The "dangerous mix" comes into the picture solely because Turkey stands its ground as a principled state that utilizes a collectivist effort to spark a movement of unity for Jerusalem. This movement is based on the sister/brotherhood of human dignity, where everyone can convene on an equal ground and therefore it is inclusive. The risk here is that the exclusionist approach taken towards those who are upsetting the balance in the Middle East and calling them out in the sight of the international community. Being a voice to the outcry and tragedy of the Palestinians puts Turkey's relations with Israel and the US at odds despite the continued efforts to have economic relations.

> "As you know when the United States of America's illegal Jerusalem decision first began to show signs, we gave the USA the necessary warnings and states that such a move would increase the tension in the region causing new stress and pave the way for new conflicts. We stated that even moving a stone from within the Holy Land could give birth to serious complications. We stated numerous times that this kind of unilateral attempt at trampling over international law and undermining the United Nations would not only harm Muslims and Christians but also Jews. Insistence on this wrongdoing the whole region would enter into a conflict and those responsible for this would be the ones implementing this decision. Unfortunately, our good-intentioned warnings did not resonate with our counterparts who almost had their reason eclipsed. Despite all the warnings, the USA became imprisoned in environments that feed off of tension and conflict." (Erdogan, 2018, May 18).

In the above remarks by President Erdogan it is useful to underline his strong assertion about the United Nations as an international organization which has been disregarded all together on the issue of Jerusalem. Turkey's intention on this sensitive issue is a growing concern for the nation of Turkey. Whether it be Kemalists, Liberals, Islamists or Nationalists. If there is one issue Turkey's political factions come together on it is their unified voice on Jerusalem. This provides a unified strength for the President of Turkey to willfully stand against the injustice inflicted on the Holy Land and Erdogan chooses to utilize international organizations not only as a means to legitimately and lawfully approach the matter but also as a "means to channel the enormous amount of religious energy that exists in a constructive direction" (James, 2011, p.5)

Despite the honest warnings given to Israel and the US, Middle East and the international system actors upholding the status quo refuse to listen. It is for this very reason that President Erdogan reprimands the US government and Israeli Prime Minister Netenyahu

for not taking heed of the decisions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations General Assembly. The excerpt below is a sound reflection of Turkish governments decry of the apartheid regime and its harsh criticism of it.

> "The American Administration which does not take into account the will of the OIC and the United Nations General Assembly, instead chose to follow the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and some radical Evangelicals. On May 14th despite the rising dissent America carried its Israeli Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine…
>
> The exiles, massacres and pressures that began with May 15th 1948 nakba are still continuing in multitude after 70 years. Monday May 14th is now recorded unfortunately as a new nakba in history…Looking at the point we arrived today, the USA has now awarded Israel which has surpassed the apartheid regime with its occupationist policies and has punished Palestine which has numerous times proved its desire for peace… As Islamic countries we will never forgo a sovereign and independent Palestinian State demand within the 1967 borders and Jerusalem as its capital." (Erdogan, 2018, May 18).

Turkey's leadership in the international arena against various kinds of injustices is a reflection of religion and foreign policy agenda meshing up together in different ways. It is useful to note that Turkey's utilization of religion and priniciples stemming from Islam are not a tool of coercion per se, but rather offer a universalist and cosmopolitan approach to unifying the international community. The fact that Turkey's collaborative efforts are not limited to one culture or one ethnicity or one race clearly speaks to that. From an international economic perspective, the current reality of nations divided into core, periphery and semi-periphery states alludes to the disenchantment of many neglected and downtrodden communities around the world. Therefore, when we are to say that Turkish Foreign Policy acknowledges the realist state of affairs in the world and uses religious rhetoric as a remedy to rising issues, it does so without distinguishing between Muslim or non-Muslim. For example, TİKA and the Red Crescent work relentlessly not only in Muslim countries but non-Muslim countries all around the globe. Another very telling scenario is President Erdogan's solidarity with the Venezuelan government when the US put sanctions on the Latin American state. Turkey has no vested interest in such a country but the fact that Venezuelan government was mistreated unjustifiably brought under attack propelled President Erdogan to stand by President Maduro. Turkey gained nothing out of this demonstration of support except abiding by its principle of faith *to stand with the right and to stand against injustice.*

Such principled positioning is not limited to the communities suffering from atrocities. The fight against terror, according to President Erdogan and people of Turkey, requires one to not make a distinction when it comes to the race, religion, gender, ethnicity or language of the perpetrator (s). That is why the biased view towards Muslims especially in the post-9/11 era requires the international community to undertake counter-terrorism more effectively since it has been paralleled with the rise of Islamophobia. This kind of risk overlooks the main causes of terror, the culprits and what could be done to prevent such atrocities. In a speech given by the President one day after President Trump made a declaration about the Golan Heights called on the global community to take heed. In the terror attack that occurred in Christ Church in New Zealand is also a part of the recent developments demanding urgency to address. President Erdogan, in the blow excerpt, speaks at the OIC on March 22, 2019 to help the world recognize that terror is terror despite the place, time, or who it was carried out by against whom.

> "In 1993, Neonazis brutally martyred five of our citizens by burning their houses down in Solingen. In 1994, an Israeli civilian occupier martyred 29 Muslims in the Khalil Ibrahim Mosque during dawn prayer and wounded 125 Muslims. In 2011 in the Utoya Island near Oslo 77 individuals were killed by a monster who believed in white supremacy. In 2015, 3 of our youth were shot dead in their homes in Chapel Hill by a racist. In 2017, in the attack against a mosque 6 Muslims lost their lives. In Western Europe, between 2013-2017 in the 113 Neonazi attacks that occurred 66 innocent civilians were massacred" (Erdogan, 2019, March 22).

At the 73rd United Nations General Assembly on September 25th 2018, New York, in line with the religious rhetoric of freedom, equality and justice President Erdogan calls upon the UN community to establish justice in the world. His call to organize the United Nations Security Council under the banner of "The World is Bigger than Five" draws attention to the extreme imbalance in global security. Erdogan said, "in order for a tranquil and secure world, we are required to establish justice." Turkey's religious rhetoric also parallels much of the humanitarian work that it accomplishes on its own. At the UNGA, President Erdogan sounded the bells for risks pertaining to new waves of migration that could jeopardize the balance and the peace of the region if war persists. In the meantime, he castigates the European Union for not doing its part in making the necessary payment to the non-governmental organizations in Turkey who are helping the 3.5 million Syrians and 500,000 refugees from other countries.

> "We are meeting the needs of the refugees living in the camps. For the help we are providing the support we get from outside our country in particular international institutions amount to 600 million dollars and from the European Union we have received 1.7 billion euros. Because the European Union promised 3 billion euros + 3 billion euros that would be supported through projects, we are not able to effectively use the funding for the refugees. Whereas in the services we provide to refugees we are continuing our uninterrupted support without the aid being tied to any kind of project. With the opportunities that are being provided to refugees and in the framework of preventing refugee influx into places like Europe in particular, we are expecting more support for Turkey with further flexible conditions" (Erdogan, 2018, September 25).

The discourse analysis provided in this section opens up a window into the challenges that Turkey faces as it unrelentingly continues to expand economically while bearing the burden of many religious and humanitarian issues such as refugees, Jerusalem and terror. As Turkey takes on these burdens because of the leadership belief "to stand by the just" it also advocates fundamental human rights and freedoms that must be shared and spread. In this context, Turkey's operation within the system under the umbrella of global governance provides it the freedom of navigation by creating its own space. Therefore, the next section will provide a conversation into how security, development and democracy are shaped with the instrumental role of religion across these important spheres within the international system.

As argued in Chapter 3, Constructivism provides an analytical and theoretical framework to understand how religion and its influence on identity can impact one nation-state's approach to conflicts in the region and around the world. Turkey's identity-based approach creates a competition against other identity-based actors in the international system within the context of civilizational values. The way Huntington argued for the clash of civilizations supports scholars and practitioners' arguments on the note that ideology becomes a marker for the identity and values that one nation-state adopts. But at the same time, Wendt explains that the international system's reality is based on self-interest in order to preserve one state's security and well-being. This provides a window into analyzing Turkey's case study in the post-Cold war era in which it has used the constructivist approach to build its image in the region and the world. Contemporaneously, Turkey between the 1990-2001 period has actively sought its self-interest within international organization activism as a way to create its own security agenda in relation to its neighbors and presented a determination for great power politics to not interfere within its own regional neighborhood.

In international relations when it comes to defining concepts there is always the impediment of theoretical complexity. This, in reality, points to how realism is always dominant and reigns international politics alongside both constructivism and liberalism. The critical importance of liberalism in this context is that within the global governance discourse and conversation in low and high politics, it provides space for nation-states to advance their economic and trade motives through interdependency while focusing on their security. Morgenthau, Mearsheimer and Waltz offer an analysis to explain the interaction among state actors while underlying the argument that at the core of international relations the Hobbesian nature of humankind is inevitable. Therefore, from a liberal position, the Kantian argument for a cosmopolitanism is an attempt to react to the Hobbesian classical realism by putting forward common universal values in which humanity can come together on a similar platform. In retrospect, the explanation put forth in this section for Turkey's drive and motivation to create an identity for itself is a way for the state to construct an image in which it is a decision-maker in its region. In order to be able to participate and become an agenda-setter, Turkey's state behavior demonstrates a realist approach that is shrouded within the liberal values system that has been asserted by the Western world. The question is how is this possible?

The post-Cold war era, in this regard, has been a critical turning point in Turkey's history since the establishment of the Republic, merely due to the observation that it accepted liberal values during this period as part of its agenda to come to par with its European and Western counterparts in order to strengthen its strategic role and significance in the regional and great power politics competition. But it did not accept a liberal approach at the behest of leaving its civilizational past which was seen by some Western scholars as a need to advance and modernize. On the contrary, as mentioned earlier, Ozal sought economic liberalization as a way to prove that religious values can also guide a liberal approach towards development and advancement. In this framework, the 1990s provided an opportunity for Turkey to reorient itself in its geostrategic location through international organization activism and reaching back to its civilizational past as a source of identity, strength and determination to advance economically, politically and diplomatically.

At this point in discussion, it is noteworthy to turn to the concept of Global Governance which is treated as part of a Western liberal mission to guide humanity towards a common understanding in which different identity-based nation-states can evolve to unite under an umbrella of security, peace and prosperity. However, looking at the literature

written in this field, it becomes apparent that while the concept of global governance is intended to gird realist ambitions by attempting to harness human Hobbesian nature, at the same time it aims to diffuse liberal values to create some kind of mechanism for multilateral cooperation.

4.2. A Search for a Niche and Aim toward becoming an Agenda-setter

A Constructivist, Realist and Liberal Perspective between 2002-2014

For the purpose of this study, one can turn to the definition of global governance created by Dingwerth and Pattberg as "not a value-free term, but rather a highly politicized concept in the midst of a discursive struggle about who decides what for whom" (p.196). The authors acknowledge that transnational politics are the major underpinning that allow political institutions in the international system to interact with one another. As this interaction occurs, this provides one a view of the global governance concept as "complex interlinkages between different societal actors and government institutions" (Dingwerth & Pattberg, p.197).

Global governance is a very tricky terrain in the sense that it requires to look back at the argument from Wallerstein's framework of core states. When core states predominantly Western and European are economically successful and tend to dominate the international system, this provides them easy leverage to establish and maintain the status quo that favors their interests over 'others.' Bülbül offers an insightful statement regarding how global powers can push aside morality, interests and values in the name of self-interested advancement. Especially when it comes to regional issues that global powers choose to intervene in it is "within their own framework because they have a foreign policy indexed on their self interest rather than value/justice and do not recognize any boundaries to reach their goal" (Global Perspective 5, Bülbül, p.2). While one may strongly argue that the purpose of global governance has been conceptualized as a way to mitigate crisis and conflicts in the world, there is in fact a paradox vis a vis Global Powers who want to keep the hierarchy of power in tact instead of having an equity-based, equal opportunity space for all actors to compete. The ideological differences of states of course exacerbate the discrepancy and the power rivalry becomes more fierce as complex military exercises create more aggravation and frustration among many actors.

By the beginning of the new millenium, it becomes more and more clear that such frustrations, more than ever, center around issues of identity reverberating into the international scene overtime to shape global politics. That is to underline that, for that particular time period, one can easily have a reading of Turkish Foreign Policy from the perspective of identity. While the discussion here begins with the topic of security, one cannot enter a discussion and analytical research about the matter without touching upon the term identity. Under President Erdogan's leadership Turkey's identity in the international scene has certainly changed with the religious rhetoric used in many occasions by the state leader. The leadership character of President Erdogan is a reflection of the constituent base who voted for him to serve the nation and to be the representative of Turkey as an active President in the international field. Religious values and principles also reflect in the behavior of the leader whose perceived character becomes the identity of the nation he leads in the system. According to Philpott, "the process of removing religion from international relations actually started with the Protestant Reformation and culminated with the Treaty of Westphalia" (Fox & Sandler, 2004, p.297). But only recently, since the beginning of the 21st Century along with the wake up call of 9/11 there was a trigger for scholars of IR to look into the impact of religion across many areas. As regional crisis are heating up and there is more disturbance to the balance of the international system, to name a few, such as the ones we see the in Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen), Pakistan and India conflict over Kashmir, Rohingya crisis in Myanmar or the Uygurs of China, the Westphalian template is receiving a major blow to the nation-state, sovereignty system. In the midst of these developments, Turkey is fashioning a foreign policy rhetoric that is based on justice and equity in the international system for all actors to come together and agree upon. President Erdogan's character, his demeanor, etiquette, style is a total package delivered to numerous nations as a wake up call for change, development and advancement.

This is an age in which we now clearly see religious elements permeate the international scene. Many among social scientists warned that religion has never been put away but it is fervently surfacing in a world where ideological competition in line with Huntington's thesis is becoming more fierce. Although the discourse surrounding the concept of global governance might appear to be vague due to the fact that its possibility to be fashioned, pulled and tugged in various directions or the term identity that is also malleable in its own time and space, we are in fact in the midst of a major shift in the "religio-secular world" (Marty, 2003, p.42-48). This calls scholars of international relations as well

as political practitioners to devise a method and rhetoric for a post-secular world order where religion will be the main impetus that drives foreign policy methods across the board. Therefore, the agency of Islam becomes more manifest in the leadership character, foreign policy discourse, identity, narrative as well as institutions and international organizations per Turkey's case.

This is a testament to the reality that when religion was to be constrained and contained under the Westphalia system, today, we see just the opposite trend in which religion is gaining an immense space across the international system. This study attempts to underline that this is not necessarily a cutting of ties with the secular world. What the IR theorists term as the supernatural world is something that has always been alive and grounded. Attempts to restrain and marginalize religion did seldom work since as more pressure was put on religion, it resulted in a major burst and an eventual spillover. In consequence, one can submit that religion is coming back stronger and more effective than in previous times. Thus the world is more prone to be subject to conversations on secularization and counter-secularization.

This is certainly an interesting debate that calls attention to the changing dynamics of a "religio-secular world" discussed by Marty. Turkey's case is a unique one in the sense that it has a past that is deeply and strictly embroiled in westernization and modernization since 1923. During the 20th Century period, several occurences such as the founding of the Leauge, the UN, NATO, decolonization movements, Cold War, the Iranian Revolution and post-Cold War period among many other developments; Turkey's political demography was rapidly changing with muslim movements building their economic and politial capacities in the late 1960s onward. In hindsight, the efforts that laid the foundation for major muslim political movements in Turkey is the manifestation of the changing image of Turkey from a secular nationalist to a muslim nationalist character in today's post-2020 era. According to Paipas, "theology is usually treated as an expression of metaphysical dogmatism, a witch's brew, perhaps too tied to mysticism and obscurantism to merit serious consideration" (p.270). However, this is the kind of theology that was invented, developed and disseminated across divergent and conflictual traditions within Christianity that called for a dire need to breakaway from the supernatural and to be grounded on human reason. The Post-Reformation period ushered in a new era in human development that eventually came to either denounce God all together or modify what was believed to be revelation. In both cases, the denouncement of God and the altercation of what was believed to be his word, became

the pinnacle of human advancement in scientific knowledge. The debate on whether the Enlightenment succeeded humanity or not is a long discussion that can be relegated to theologians and secular polemicists in which both sides of the aisle might be able to justify their reasons. Paipas goes on to argue that "…emerging theo-political outlook challenges the dominant narrative of Western Enlightenment and, by extension, the political structures and concepts used historically to think about the political and the international " (Paispas 270).

Nonetheless, the modern Republic never experienced the 18th Century Enlightenment similar to that of the French. Instead, in layman's terms, Turkey became the apprentice for a large cycle of movement in Europe that was believed to be intellectually galvanized by human reason. Shutting out religion in the Christian world did not mean the threat would diminish. For a sucessful global englightenment to be realized all faiths including Islam had to be tamed. According to certain historical interpretations if Turkey's exposure to crude westernization and top-down modernization were to succeed, the Enlightenment project as a byproduct of the French Revolution would put an end to the so-called fanatic return to theology.

In this regard, Turkey's domestic and international politics is characterized by this particular project's *undoing.* In other words, the reshaping of religion and secularism in Turkey started bearing fruit since the outset of the millennial age. As this is very evident in domestic politics, it is also quite explicit in Turkey's Foreign Policy rhetoric. Many critics worry about the encroachment of a theo-political bogeyman waiting to harness the nation-state. The fears of course are more or less legitimate, yet, what is so unduly misjudged are the concerns of a wide and growing community of pious world citizens demanding a balance between the secular and the religious.

Turkey's case makes up for a grave gap between the binary oppositions because it has indeed offered a practical solution for many who can take as an example. The collaboration of religion and the secular state has enabled a geopolitical approach that is based on a *Muslim Geopiety* which could be analyzed from the perspective of Wright (1966) or Tuan (1976). This is the kind of geo-welfare that is based on the understanding of a win-win understanding when Turkey's leadership sits down to converse and make deals that are benefiting all parties involved. This could be construed as the vision for human salvation where one's welfare and success is shared and deserved by all. It may seem altruistic but in

fact, this is the essential teaching of Islam that takes center stage in the policy agenda of a democraticaly elected leader, his governance.

Youde and Slagter's discussion on the notion of the "good international citizen" in tandem to middle power roles is timely within this discourse. While this research and data suggests that Turkey is in actuality putting an effort to break the middle power mold and rise above to be among great powers, it is doing so based on moral grounds. Democracy in Turkey enabled the state leadership to construct an identity based on Muslim and an enriched civilizational past heritage that became a marker of the image it presents in the foreign environment circles. Youde and Slagter in reference to middle powers assert:

> "Thus, we maintain that middle power identities are likely shaped by the experiences of social democracy at the domestic level. This means that the broader ideas of inclusion, equity, fairness, and redistribution that exist at the domestic level percolate up to the international level and produce a type of foreign policy unique to middle powers. Middle powers are good international citizens because, in general, they are good domestic citizens. Their domestic and the international identities are congruent" (Youde & Slagter, 2013, p. 131).

Accordingly, one can infer that Turkey's characteristics, its position, economic, social and military power can fall within the scope of middle powermanship. However, the nation's ambitiously eager leadership aims to carry Turkey beyond the middle power position by challenging the hierarchy and constraints placed by the great power status quo. While many Western countries make up the core states in the economic distribution of power in the international system, an important question arises about Turkey's challenge to the status quo. Turkey's westernization experience has deemed it a modern, western and democratic state in the Muslim world. The EU accession process in the context of enlargement was to give sort of the final touch on the process of Turkey moving towards the West. However, regarding the war in Iraq and the fight against multiple terror organizations in the past few years resulted in Turkey and the US per se to become more distant. Political and diplomatic factors were not the only cause to create adrift between these actors but certainly the lack of boost and support as well as the challenges about the EU accession process led Turkey to look for alternatives in places like Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. With the negative results received from Turkey's EU bid, this became a major propulsive force for the nation's leadership to expand all of its options and opportunities. The expedition to establish strong bilateral and multilateral ties became a blessing in which Turkey became an *efficacious power.* Meaning that it is establishing concrete relations while

at the same time setting the agenda for regional and global powers. The focus of Turkey's agenda on issues of minority oppression, the Palestinian cause, the Rohingya, the Syrian, Afghani and Iraqi refugees, and the fight against terror show an important dedication to the image of a "good international citizen." Many regard Turkey's move towards the Middle East as an assumption of moving away from the West. This is a counter-productive argument especially in a world where complex interdependence has tied many geographies intricately to one another. Turkey is in a volatile place due to its strategic location. However, its independent and agenda-setting character serves as a critical message to global actors that Turkey is not reluctant to be a decision-maker on its own and is always ready to look for new partnerships if the West is not willing to cooperate. Turkey's look towards the East is not necessarily based on its move to distance from the West. As Oğuzlu points out there are critics that view Turkey's activities in the Middle East as shifting the policy weight of the state towards a new direction. However,

> "… Middle Easternization does not suggest a break with the West but rather the growing salience of the Middle East in Turkey's relations with the West. The increasing Middle Easternization of Turkey's foreign policy has concomitantly resulted in the adoption of a more pragmatic/rational rather than an emotional/romantic approach towards the EU and the United States" (Oğuzlu, 2008, p.3).

Turkey offers a novel experience within the international system both as a state that harbors an East and West identity while establishing multilateral relations through institutions and other state actors. It is an *efficacious power* that is changing the dynamics of power relations within the international system. The swift economic development that will put Turkey among the top ten economies of the world in the next few years is rooted in the neoliberal policies of Erdogan's Ak Parti government during the first decade of 2000s His commitment to move away from protectionist policies paved the path for foreign direct investment to be channeled towards Turkey.Furthermore, in the political realm, Turkey's dominant presence in the region vis a vis the Syrian crisis concomitant with the war on terror, illustrate its persistence to be an autonomous or self-contained decision-maker in the international field.

In the framework of global governance, the role of security, development and democracy in relation to identity and religion provide an important backbone to the conversation in a transforming world. In a post-secular world the centrality of religion is inescapable and requires scholars of international relations to look deeper into the changing structure of the international system. Turkey as a middle power country that is fervently

outperforming others as an *efficacious power* serves as a litmus test for other actors desiring to move up in the global power scale from small to middle and to great power. In order for there to be an egalitarian system in the world, Richard Falk calls for a 'humane global governance' as opposed to the emergence of 'inhuman patterns' at the global level. Ferrera (2012, p.197)) referring to Falk in her article points to the significance of religion's role in this process.

> "Falk is persuaded that 'religious visions provide a potential political grounding for humane global governance that cannot arise otherwise'… Religions based on the paradigm of inclusivity can play an important role in strengthening 'globalization from below' and provide an alternative vision to the Westphalian tradition that usually associates solidarity with territorial sovereign states" (Falk, 2003, p. 196-197).

Turkey's case, especially in undertaking its foreign policy, offers us a tool to explore the state as an actor whose domestic and foreign behavior are in line with one another; and, how both sides of the coin can guide international relations scholars in the nation's aim for an amplified effort at home to the region and to the Global South. The role that actors aside from great powers have are the middle powers that act as a mobilization force to put together a support base for a reformed international system by way of economic solidarity. MIKTA serves as one important effort in this direction. But Turkey serves as a distinct partner in such a collaboration for its exerted effort to break the constraints of their status quo system from military might to energy resource collection. Turkey is set apart from other middle power status countries based on its proactive foreign policy that is self-assertive.

As Falk pointed out, the role of religion is inevitable in a transforming global governance. Moreover, the beliefs, values and traditions that have long been ignored in the modern conception of nation-state are making a fast comeback on the international scene with greater force. Turkey, for this reason, can be said to be the leading actor in the system that acts *efficaciously* without owning up a particular title for its foreign policy. The Ottoman past offers an insight and is reflected in many of the speeches and the discourse used to influence the masses by the Turkish leadership. The concept of umma, as it will be explained below, is also a part of the foreign policy strategy used as the driving force of a universal movement in the aim of a new cosmopolitanism.

To explore middle powers, therefore, is a serious endeavor because it is not the end result of the current state actors. Turkish Foreign Policy conducted under the leadership of

President Erdogan provides a grand narrative to a wide range of issues such as democracy, human rights, economic opportunity, war, terror, displacement, poverty, energy, and the like. It is able to set its discourse based on national interest that is exponentialized to include other actors to take initiative within their context and to rise above the phantom of middle powers. The narrative begins with the aim of coming up to par with great powers and Turkey believes that this is actually achievable. Hence, economic advancement, regional security policy initiatives as well as trade and investments are critical components driving Turkey's foreign policy agenda both regionally and globally. The remainder of this section will explore how the essence of Turkey's leadership role in the region and globally transform its relations and strategies with other actors.

Against this backdrop, the AK Party's foreign policy starting in 2002 made a considerable shift in its discourse for greater political and diplomatic interaction in its neighborhood and beyond. From the initial stages, there has been an assertive determination to intensify the high level and diplomatic interaction with the European Union for Turkey's highly intended desire to become a member of the Western and European constructed world. The Ankara Agreement signed on September 1, 1963 aimed at strengthening the economic and commercial ties between EU and Turkey by opening up the path for the latter to have full membership. In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership and was deferred. After the Customs Union agreement of 1995 Turkish economy was to advance its economic integration much further. At the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, the EU deferred Turkey's eligibility for accession under the pretext of not meeting political and economic conditions required to be a candidate (European Commission, 1989). In 1999, Turkey became a formal candidate and in 2001 the EU adopted an "Accession Partnership" that set the agenda for Turkey to follow guidelines in line with EU standards (Kanbur & Bernat, 2013, p.80). In 2002, Turkey responded to the Ankara Criteria and moved forward with its own policy view in response to a lack of agreement at the EU Copenhagen Summit. Later into the post-2007 period, despite an EU accession negotiator being appointed, regional issues with Southern Cyprus, Greece, Armenia, the Kurdish issue, religious minorities and the debate about whether Turkey can truly adopt a European identity became a stumbling block in Turkey's rigid path towards the EU.

Concurrently, as the developments with the EU seemed to stall Turkey towards economic and political integration, the AK Party sought an alternative path. During this period, Turkey maximized its geostrategic opportunities to boost its national image as a

regional actor and also presented itself as a political regime model (Baracani & Çalımlı, 2019, p.96). In this context, Ahmet Davutoglu (Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Prime Minister) discussed the indispensable role of Turkey in the region and around the world by putting forward an extensive discussion of what he called "Strategic Depth." Not only did he argue for an ethical foreign policy that must be driven by Turkey in its approach and behavior in its geostrategic location, but, also, realize the role of its centrality in the overarching Afro-Eurasian landmass. According to Ataç, "…if Turkey puts forward an updated image of its Ottoman past and complies with the Ottomanist mission of spreading order, it would act according to the dynamic requirements of a changing international" (2018, p.55). This would allow the post-Cold War order to "be better handled by Ottoman universalism" (2018, p.55) and "bring a fuller meaning to its memberships in international organizations" (Ataç, 2018, p.56). In this regard, Turkey's Foreign Policy discourse attempts to bring a civilizational view that it deems universal as part of its discourse within international organizations.

Within this context, the term umma which stems from "um" meaning mother, refers to all of humanity, creatures, organisms, animals, plants and everything and anything we perceive. In Turkish Foreign Policy, "umma" is wielded as an imaginative community that is adopted as an alternative to the world order. Furthermore, here, in the context of international relations, the concept should be expanded to include all states who can come together on the universality of the principles of Islam even if they are not Muslim. Instead of fragmented imagined muslim communities in the world, there should be a united, collectivist construction of an umma in the 21st century. This speaks to a multi-dimensional world order in which inter-civilizational interactions will continue to co-exist while there will be an contribution to a world value-based system informed through civilizational experiences in the context of a magnanimous tolerance, acceptance and recognition of pluralities within and outside of Islam.

The previous Ministers of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem and Ahmet Davutoglu (former Prime Minister), had two aspects in common in their approach to shaping TFP behavior that point to the future multipolar, multicultural and inter-civilizational shaping of the world order. The former looked at the way Turkey in the post-Cold War era brought both Eastern and Western values together that culminated in a Eurasian geostrategic location. The latter, in addition to the multi-ethnically rich Ottoman past added a religious dimension to interpreting a foreign policy behavior that would benefit Turkey's contemporaneous image

derived from its Ottoman past. The goal was not to benefit modern Turkey solely but to bring together previously administered Ottoman provinces to establish a coalition of like-minded states in the post-Cold war era in order to work together, prosper in unity and to create a counterbalance against Western aggression and encroachment on post-Ottoman lands.

The eye-opening question that can be posed at this point in discussion is what is Turkey's ideal image? The answer could be European, East Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, Western, Central Asian, a Black Sea actor. Or looking at power ranks, it could be categorized as middle power but, at the same time an *efficacious power* that reaches out to the Global South. For security analysts, who are invariably ensconced in realist perspective, Turkey's geostrategic location offers an ambivalence for scholars who can't specifically classify it in a particular region. This, in reality, works to the greater advantage of Turkey and its leading government, the AK Party, which provides an open-ended analytical case for scholars of international relations to explore. In this framework, Turkey's geostrategic strategy in the post-Cold War can be said to have shifted from Erbakan's period to a focus on just forming coalitions with Muslim countries as manifested in the D-8 to Cem's amalgamation civilization between the East and the West and Davutoglu's political imagination of Turkey as a rich civilization that has more to offer to its region and beyond.

Considering all of the interpretations of Turkey's strategic advantage, we can see that TFP can be used to shift the country's image and identity in a flexible way to meet its national interest in areas such as economic growth and political/diplomatic influence. Western policy makers like the EU or the US can view Turkey's flexibility as an opportunity or constrain to their own policies in the respective regions they have a stake in. According to Bilgin, "…alternative geopolitical images were almost always used to bolster Turkey's geopolitical location in Europe by enhancing its value for EU (or US) …" (2004, p.284). Turkey's appeal to regions outside of the Western world for a long time was deemed as a positive aspect for European and American policy-makers who might have seen this as a bridge-building opportunity. But, as the tides turned the other way, Turkey realized it is more beneficial for the country's foreign policy activism to be widened across its geostrategic location instead of being an actor that only favors Western policy. The opening towards Eurasia in this sense gained expediency through civilizational geopolitics in Huntington's thesis.

In analyzing current Turkey's political and social landscape, one can infer that values such as democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression, religion and press have become the central part of the Turkish nation-system's successful engine (despite the harsh Western criticism). These facets of the institutional system in Turkey have been continuing since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. The only change that has been seen is the introduction of religious practice in the public life which, has in tandem, led to a diversity of Muslim images to proliferate through the influence of Western popular culture. Turkey's foreign policy activism may incorporate Islamic values in its method and approach. Yet, the society in which youth are growing up there is a major merge between Islam and the West.

The speed of globalization with the dominant influence of Western culture has led to the diminishment of the concept of Dar al-harb (House of War) where there is an ever-present perception of Dar-al Islam (House of Islam). There are certainly distinctions to the way Islam has influenced, is being perceived and practiced across various geographies. Hence, Turkey's previous experience of Islam under the Ottoman civilization was based on a legal framework that was different than its predecessors. As discussed earlier, in the post-Cold war era and well-into the 21st Century, the discussion of Islamic values as an overarching system for varying civilizational experiences provides unity of differences. Thus, the cultural mesh of Islam with other communities around the world will bring forth a diversity of experiences under the overarching values. The same is valid for a dominant hegemon such as the US and its supporters, the European countries who have a major influence in the cultures beyond their region. As Western culture permeates a Muslim-majority country like Turkey, this will in effect bring changes to a nation's culture. The structure and culture of a nation might be modified but the essence of these two factors will continue to harbor Islamic values as the underpinning of its societal, economic and political mechanism.

Turkish foreign policy activism, therefore, has been operating within this period under John Agnew's description of civilizational geopolitics, alongside what one could describe as the re-identification of the self and its parameter "within the context of the geopolitical framework" (Agnew, 2001, p.3). The re-identification began with the harmonization of modernity and Western values such as economic, military and technological innovation and advancement as part of pursuing religious geo-politics. As it will be explored here in the ensuing sections the political discourse used in reference to the Ottoman past where religious values advocated are part of the reason and modernity

culminated in the essence of Islamic values. Turkish Foreign Policy approach utilizes concepts mentioned earlier such as justice and equity as the basis of its policy to ensure its regional and global counterparts an insight into Islam's universality and how the Muslim behavior should be. "Religion is not lived as a thing apart from other socio-cultural phenomena; it can be studied analytically separated from politics, for example, but it is always connected to it" (Sturm, 2013, p.136). The essence of Islam is that it informs all sphere of life from the political to the social and economic in which the individual has a set of values to adhere by and looks at the world from the prism of her/his belief. In the political sense as well as in international relations, embracing these values allows faith to become an integral part of the way an individual and collectivities of people act, behave and respond in the domestic and international scenes.

In regards to reconnecting with its past lineage, it can be said that Turkey wants to revive the spirit of multi-ethnic and multiculturalism as one might argue alongside the revival of Islamic values. But at the same time, it aims to influence values rather than instill and transform societies in a particular image. Islam as a world religion, "...adapted itself to local cultures and conditions, and its salience in politics derives to a considerable extent from this adaptability rather than its ability to transform local cultures into any unified world image" (Stone, 2002, p.124). The post-Cold War era has rapidly developed into a scene of identity politics with great, middle and small powers competing to find its strategic value across respective regions. In this context, Turkey's neo-Ottomanist identity formulated within Turkish Foreign Policy can be seen as a challenge to the Western dominated identity politics introduced through globalization. However, the difference in today's neo-Ottomanist vision is that it is no longer limited to the region but aims for a revival of values and self-confidence in a world where the international liberal world order has rendered some as disadvantaged. The atmosphere that Turkish Foreign Policy discourse operates in between realism and optimism in which there is an employment of heightened need for awareness of the self and one's geopolitical position. It was for this reason that Turkey increased its bilateral relations with the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans as opportunity spaces that allowed Turkey to explore and renew its connections from the past to the present. Rumelili discusses Turkish Foreign Policy transformation through a process of Europeanization but, at the same time points to a distinction of Turkey's identity based on a dichotomy.

> "Recent Turkish foreign policy initiatives are rooted in a role conception that stresses Turkey's hybrid identity as both Western/European and Islamic/Asian. This is regarded as an asset that orientates Turkey simultaneously towards the West and towards the Middle East and Asia" (Rumelili, 2011, p.241).

The change that AK Party and its democratically elected leader President Erdogan introduced to Turkey by a bottom-up demand is to reclaim the positive aspects of the Ottoman past. Reclaiming the past should not be read as an "undoing project" but, a reconstruction and re-alignment with past experiences on modernization, westernization harmonized with reconnecting with the past lineage as part of a holistic vision of advancement, development and achievement in socio-political and economic realms of modern Turkish society. There has been much discussion about multi-cultural and ethnic communities that co-existed in the Ottoman period. The same can be said of modern Turkey today, which co-exists with multiple experiences that rendered Turkey a unique character and position in its geostrategic location. The only difference being is the "Muslim" image taking on a greater role in domestic and international politics by a constituency that is not demanding re-islamization. The Turkish public who voted AK Party and President Erdogan into power for the past 17 years is evidence of a call for further awareness about Turkey's Muslim character from the past to the present without marginalizing Turkey's inherent multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious communities who are the essence of the Ottoman and modern Turkey's community structure. The aim of this approach is to create a continuity with Turkey's past identity by asserting a historical continuity. And one can argue that this is not re-islamization but rather the restructuring of an image to normalize the identity it represents historically and geographically.

This was not the only change that was under the AK Party's reform agenda during this period of post-Cold war activism. Civil-military relations of the 20thCentury based on military status-quo over politics and religion was assuredly challenged by President Erdogan, his party and cabinet members. As a leader who witnessed the destruction military's encroachment over civilian politics could entail, President Erdogan paid a special attention to doing away with the military tutelage. In his statement on the inauguration of the Democracy and Liberties Island (Aksut & Bayar, 2020), Erdogan stated that all coup de'tats have similar characteristics in nature:

> "All of the coups and junta movements in our country have the basic aim of being an enemy to our nation's values and history. Our people will not forgive not only the coup-plotters but also those who

> injected the coup virus into our army… One of the most striking example of coups is their primitive and bigoted views is their beliitelement and despisement of people's beliefs, their appearance and clothing. In whatever mindset they attacked Menderes, they attacked the late Ozal with the same dogma…" (Haberturk, 2020, May 27).

Keeping a check on the military was a major point in moving forward for Turkey in the international system because it envisioned a stable, democratic domestic scene in order to achieve its goals in the international system. The European Union especially played a vital role in pressuring Turkey to initiate reforms to democratize further and to restructure the Turkish political scene (Müftüler-Baç, 2011, p.286). Indeed, during the Cold War period Turkey kept its relations with the Middle East at a distance in order to protect its secular identity and to not become too enmeshed in the "Islamist" identity. One could even argue that in the post-Republican period up until the end of the Cold War in the 20thCentury, Turkey's position regarding the role of religion within its borders was protectionist and vanguarding against any kind of influence from the outside world especially from the neighboring Iran after the 1979 Islamist revolution. The post-Cold war era, subsequently, alongside economic liberalization reduced the Islamophobic apprehension to a lesser degree which allowed for the Welfare and Virtue Parties to take an active stance within Turkish domestic scene. The democratization of Turkey actually started bits and pieces with the onset of Muslim democratic politicians whose demand by the public gave them the vote to serve in the Turkish legislature through democratic elections. Despite encountering troubles due to the 1997 post-modern coup d'etat on democracy and against pious Muslim communities in the country, Turkey's Muslim democrats were able to rise above and form the AK Party and won the elections to form the government in 2002 as a way to shift the balance in domestic politics.

> "The shifting power balances in domestic politics and the relative power of different political groups in Turkey as a result of the Turkish democratisation process have created new bases for foreign-policy-making. Similarly, the democratisation process has also created a public space for Turkish citizens to become involved in foreign policy formulations, which they lacked in the Cold War years. Therefore, an analysis of domestic determinants of foreign policy would be incomplete without a look at the role of the public at large" (Müftüler-Baç, 2011, p.287).

Meral & Paris argue Turkey's direction of foreign policy must be evaluated based on its domestic socio-political context (2010, p.76). To understand the transformation that TFP has undergone during this period one has to recognize that Turkey is not going through an islamization but, rather a democratization process leading to the "emergence of a vibrant

society seeking to pragmatically advance Turkish interests beyond passe politics of Islamists versus secularists" (Meral & Paris, 2010, p.76). In their article, they continue to underline that the AK Party did not emerge with an interest in "radical Islamist or leftist revolutionary candidates" whose demise came towards the end of the first period of the post-Cold War era in 2002 when AK Party gained the majority at the behest of the Turkish nation. In the meantime, ANAP (Motherland Party), DYP (True Path Party) and DSP's (Democratic Left Party) political life ended with the rise of a reformist and a renewalist AK Party that had more to offer to Turkey other than a worn-out and archaic discourse on secularism. Similarly, CHP's (Republican People's Party) political leverage seemed to weaken due to its banal narrative that left millions of pious people marginalized for being considered a threat to the secular state. Against these downward political spirals, the AK Party offered a novel method of politics based on stability, prosperity and advancement for all without making any distinction between secular or pious nor distinguishing between ethnic or linguistically different communities. The advancement agenda was offered initially on the grounds of making strides in the EU accession which required a collective effort on the part of the nation to support this arduous process. Turkey's continued alliance with the Western did not change, for example, despite the Parliamentary decision to reject the March 1st, 2003 Bill to support the United States in the Iraqi War.

> "This is, of course, a consequence of the democratisation process and was less of a problem in the Cold War years, as the public preferences then were not reflected in government policy choices. Even though the public is not the key player in foreign-policy-making, the preferences of the public can no longer be ignored where there is no permissive consensus" (Müftüler-Baç, 2011, p.287).

The post-Cold war era has therefore ushered Turkey into a period of independent decision-making by the legislature representing the views and inclination of the greater nation as a whole. It could be said this has much to do with a muslim-majority country like Turkey to not allow another Sunni muslim country, in this case Iraq, to be meddled with as the global community, the Turkish public and the American public was coming to the realization that there were no weapons of mass destruction. Hence, the rejection of the March 1stBill demonstrated the Turkish nation's desire to withhold American interests in the region which has been operating at the expense of the Iraqi people. Therefore, the foreign policy making and behavior demonstrated by the AK Party reflected the people's desire to not play along with US policy on Iraq due to affinity with the Sunni population in Iraq. The decision against the bill was deemed as a demonstration of Turkish nation's will to determine its own

agenda in the neighboring region. This period would mark Turkey's launch not just as a regional actor but an actor whose decisions would impact the global scene. Turkey's goal here under the AK Party government has not been directed at isolating the US or creating a contrary atmosphere to its dynamic relations with the EU in its membership process. It was rather about a self-assertive behavior to send a message to its Western allies that Turkey can put forward counter-policies according to the wishes of the Turkish nation. This self-assuredness on the part of Turkey affirms its determination to act autonomously and independently despite pressures of coaxing to side with Western policy.

Referring to the developments in the Cold War period, Hobsbawm argued that "the combination of power, political influence, bribery, and the logic of bipolarity and anti-imperialism kept the divisions of the world more or less stable" (2011, p. 253-4). In a multipolar world, however, there's an urgency of state actors to engage in multilateralism that is more critical in the post-Cold War era since stability is dependent on re-structuring the world based on justice and equity. The participation of all states despite ideological differences should pave the way towards not just a world order that pays lip service to liberal values but is essentially made up of plurality of values across the international system where states recognize and respect such differences. Niblett even admits that a US-led world order has oftentimes favored national interest rather than looking out for the interest of all members in the order.

> "The United States and its allies may have generally promoted respect for the rule of law and liberal governance within their borders, but the dominant objective outside them has been to protect Western security and economic interests, even if doing so damaged the credibility of the liberal international system" (Niblett, 2017, p.21).

It would be accurate to discuss the discrepancy between philosophers who argue about human nature on one side and liberal values on the other. For policy makers, this terrain is only viewed from the prism of self-interest in which values can be sacrificed in the name of security and economic interest while upholding a poster of liberal values as a commercial campaign. This, in tandem, led to the upward mobilization of regional organizations and world leaders within their geostrategic positions to rise to the occasion at a time when the US and its allies can no longer hold the international liberal world order together. This trend is also putting a challenge to a global institution like the United Nations to be reformed to be inclusive and fair in terms of all state actors' participation. In this case, while regional actors attempt to take matters into their own hands and use their policy

experience as a tool to solve regional issues their prestige on the global stage also increases. It would be a correct observation to state that regional actors also are disassociated from Western imperial and interventionist image that is attached to the US-led order. The lack of sticking to the values and undermining them through imperialistic action has been a major cause in regional momentum to form for global competitors like Russia and China. Emerging power also "tend to see to see the current order as an extension of Western hegemony, and they favor a more equitable distribution of international authority" (Flockhart et.al, 2014, p.3) and, in order, to be able to deal with the increasing diversity in the international system some scholars argue "peacefully managing the onset of a polycentric world will require compromise, tolerance, and recognition of political diversity" (Flockhart et. al, 2014, p.4).

Buchanan and Keohane in discussing the role of global governance point out that the institutions that make up the pillars include the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court (2006, p.1). Their legitimacy is based on the membership of states who are expected to comply with rules, decisions and regulations where norms are reflected in behavior. The authors argue "global governance institutions, like institutions generally, should not persist in committing serious injustices and if they do we should not take their rules as binding or otherwise support them" (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 12). The degree of global governance institutions' successful performance requires their legitimacy based on trustworthiness and fairness. If they fail to perform at a level of inclusivity then global governance institutions will have solid pillars. But, if they are not sturdy in their function where institutions discriminate between stronger states (given more privilege) vs. weakers states that are provided with less opportunity and therefore subjugated, this will create a defect in the international system. For example, the purpose of the UNSC is to provide security, safety and prevention of grave injustices to populations around the world. The fact that the UNSC has been inert on the crimes committed in Syria is a major blow to the legitimacy and integrity of the institution for not being able to fulfill its purpose. These policy failures on the part of the global governance institutions call for the action of state actors to intervene and demand a change to improve and reform for the desired service to be made to the global community. Turkey's campaign, The World is Bigger than Five, is intended as a global movement for reform and change towards inclusiveness and fairness in conducting just-decision-making in the world.

Buckinx in her research on "Reducing Domination in Global Politics" delves into the topic of non-domination in the context of global governance. The scholar argues "if steps are taken to reduce domination in the global order, this will at the same time be a statement of respect for the peoples and cultures that are part of it" (Buckinkx, p.68). In this direction, in order to establish a non-dominated global order with equal members of a larger global political community there must be an understanding of not increasing one's freedoms at the expense of others. Respect is a principle that sets the premise for establishing a global order in which all state actors can have equal footing rather than powerful actors having advantage over others. According to Buckinx, this also calls into question accountability since within state structures this is much easier to do when elected officials can be voted in and voted out. However, in a global order, implementing accountability is much more difficult as in the failed case of Syria when Russia and China continuously used their veto power to prevent the international community from acting against gross human atrocities. So, who will be accountable for the lives lost in Syria? This is a difficult question to answer on a global level. Global actors have the responsibility to act in the interest of members and communities of the global order which do not have the freedom to exercise their rights. But, this criterion does not seem sufficient for members of the UNSC to take collective action to end the human massacre in Syria. This certainly calls into question the legitimacy of global institutions operating in the realm of global governance. Can institutions like the UNSC reform before it fails for good and loses its credibility all together? Of course, political or diplomatic dominance does not occur only in the sphere of global institutions as for the example provided in a security context here. Economic subjugation is also part of a domination strategy utilized through an institution like the IMF. In order for there to be a just and equity based world order where welfare and enjoyment of freedoms are granted to all world citizens a world state is not necessary. However, in an international system if like-minded states as actors can communicate and collaborate to form a just order then the viability of spreading democratic values will be better enhanced in the framework of competing ideologies.

Hence, in the face of grave injustices conducted within the world order, Turkey puts forward an idealistic behavior that is premised on moral and principled realism one could otherwise conceptualize as a typology of *Muslim realism.* One could argue from such a perspective from the stance that neorealism argues that "structure dictaces policy" (Jackson, Møller & Sørensen, 2013, p.81). Yet, as it will become evident further into this thesis examples of Turkey's humanitarian and security policy in its region and around the world

demonstrates a strong desire to challenge the structure through a re-newed vision of foreign policy. Turkey's approach of what scholars and practicioners could observe as a Muslim realism is also different than classical realism in the sense that its ethical approach is grounded on its civilizational past that is enriched with diversity and presents a holistic human security that looks out for the interest of all rather than seeking a self-interested view of survival in the classical realism purview. This behavior of Turkish foreign policy manifested differently in two major events that transformed Turkey's outlook on the region. In April 1991, Turkey supported UNSC resolution 688 for the establishment of a safe zone in Northern Iraq for displaced Kurds. The concept of safe zone which crystallized as a result of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine aimed to protect civilians during humanitarian wars. The War in Kosovo was a major propeller in which the R2P doctrine was launched in 2001. In analyzing Turkey's role in the Syrian quagmire, it would be useful to look at the theoretical underpinning of R2P and how the limits of sovereignty has eroded due to civilian atrocities. "Turkish representatives at the UN repeated in many occasions that the R2P was a necessary norm to protect the civilians, but it was perceived by many as a new form of colonialism since it had been misused in the past" (Harunoğlu, 2019, p.443).

The genocides that took place in Rwanda in 1994, Srebrenica in 1995 and in Cambodia earlier in 1975 attest to the failure of the international community to respond in a timely and effective manner to growing atrocities (TRT World, 2018). The ethnic cleansing that took place in Kosovo between 1998-99 marked a significant turning point in the history of humanitarian intervention because it was in this particular indecisiveness of the international community that led Canada to take the initiative to launch an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in the year 2000. This was an important step in considering that despite military intervention in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, which seemed controversial at the time there was also the contrasting example of Rwanda, which had been a total failure on the part of the international community's inaction.

In a seminar paper research for this doctoral thesis it has been argued that the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine from a Western purview has led to complications. However, Turkish Foreign Policy behavior adopted the R2P as part of a Muslim realism to assert a behavior that it takes responsibility when it comes to humanitarian crises. The nearly four million refugees hosted in Turkey due to the civil war in Syria and other refugees from the neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate Turkey's foreign policy activism as a responsible actor taking action to protect civilians in the region.

> "In the framework of R2P, Turkey's humanitarian-based operation in Syria sheds light on the difference between Western liberalist missions versus a peace-based strategy Turkey is implementing in the region. It may seem altruistic but it is important to consider the failure of the Libya operation from the Western stance. Against the backdrop of a world system that is in flux one can argue that humanitarian intervention has not been static. Looking at the particular cases in the post-Cold War period we can ascertain the changes beneath the surface of state-centric discourse which has been used to legitimize humanitarian intervention. In some notable cases such as the one found in the Operation Provide Comfort, the intervention to Northern Iraq marked the beginning of a major shift from norms and laws into action, where international policy to "help" those in crisis became predominantly based on moral values towards ending injustice against innocents. This, of course, in the long run minimized the concept of sovereignty of a state in the context of major humanitarian violations committed against harmless citizens while at the same time this approach maximized the principle of protecting particular ethnic groups that are under threat from states or non-state actors.While the humanitarian intervention cases of Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor or Sierra Leone became a precursor for the plan and initiation of R2P, the principle set out in the doctrine is up to critical debate based on the question to what extent it has been successful in securing peace and stability" (Abushanab, 2016).

In a "post-humanitarian intervention" world we shall be more familiar to anarchy arising around different regions. There are two possible scenarios we can conclude from this type of major shift in global politics. One, a state-centric world system will slowly dissipate where an interdependent system will emerge tied by moral values and yet, will be in less agreement on how to avert crimes against humanity due to overriding national interests. Second, a state-centric policy based on national interest will slowly shift towards a "renewed policy" in protecting state sovereignty by way of restrategizing one's geopolitical role within a particular region. In other words, the state-led policy's security and stability will very much depend on the connection to the regional developments. Unlike the case of the United States, countries that are interconnected and couched within regions that have turmoil will have to pursue regional politics as a priority to securing its own national will and stability. In either of these scenarios we will be looking for a new stage in humanitarian help that is much more embroiled in the outcome of regional issues.

In such a world where a post-humanitarian system is emerging we come more to the realization that liberal values have failed us. The global financial crisis of 2008 led us to understand the West can no longer carry the burden of the world in which it constantly brags about its superior democratic system. The US failed economically at home and lost its legitimacy to prove its democratic values abroad. How? The West failed to chide the Sisi

regime that took over a democratically-elected leader. And more recently in Turkey, the West left another critical country by itself in its struggle to sustain democracy and freedom against a military-coup. The janus-faced behavior of the West has left no confidence in the Western countries. Yet, interestingly, these downfalls did not lead to the demise of democratic values. On the contrary, the more the West pushes itself away and retreats its support from emerging countries, we see the global system realigning itself and transforming from a hegemonic, hierarchical system to a multilateral playing field. The question is does this new trend produce a "democratic global scene" where competition will create balance or whether the power shifts will increase uncertainty?

Currently, as we witness a global hegemonic breakdown and the shift in the balance of power, political stability around the world is being disturbed and there is an increase in the number of fragile states with cultural, ethnic and sectarian divisions becoming rampant. In parallel, as there is upsurge in economic and political uncertainty these institutions that are the pillar of global stability are turning out to be weak without the acceleration of development. This has, in effect, created geopolitical fault lines in the context of US retreating and the UN being non-functional. This has unfortunately left a major power vacuum in the international system where uncertainty has led to interstate competition to become fierce and risky for regional conflicts to break out. This is especially true for countries of North and northeast of the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Middle East, South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), northern China and Central Asia and North Africa. These new scenarios beg the question of whether we are returning back to the beginning of the Westphalia system because according to realist assumptions the only way we can preserve the world is if we can maintain what we have today. Otherwise new states will emerge that foster their own conflicts and risk spillovers into greater regions. Part of the major failure of the Western governments deficient leadership rests on the fact democracy and freedom rhetoric was fashioned under the guise of stability and security. The promise of democracy and freedom could never be fulfilled because legitimacy was lost as the lack of belief in liberal values declined. Words and actions created a contradiction which led to enormous backlash i.e. the Muslim world.

In these times of uncertainty, rising anarchy, power transitions, and geopolitical fault lines the global governance system is becoming obsolete therefore, losing its functionality and legitimacy. The reason for this decline is mainly due to economic despondency, as it has been argued previously in Chapter 3, and the rise of China and other emerging markets as

countries treading the path for power through the advancement of trade relations. One can also argue that the democratic and humane values the Western world represented have been in decline as a result of a failure in leading conflict resolution. In tandem, the military operations' failure to end conflicts on the ground and to not be able to establish a successful transition for local governments to take over has led to a distrust towards Western countries. More doubts are cast over neo-liberal policies as Western economic and political systems go into turmoil. These tensions, undeniably, put forth a new reality for social scientists to hash out and search for new answers as the world rapidly transforms. At the basis of this conversation is the following question: how will the leadership of non-Western countries in dealing with the chaos, criminality and injustice of a post-humanitarian world bring sound solutions?

The following section that I will evaluate between 2014 and the beginnings of 2019 will look at how Turkey seizes the moment to act as a leader among coalitions to do what international organizations like the UN failed to do regarding the Syrian case. Turkish Foreign Policy narrative since the start of President Erdogan's term in 2014 has been set on a humanitarian discourse between realism and morality that aims to tackle injustice and criminality in the international system that has become more rampant. Religious principles set the premise for values of freedom, justice and equity that has transpired Turkey as a model actor in the international system that has become a voice to the voiceless, the marginalized and the oppressed. In this earnest pursuit, Turkey refuses to be classified as a middle power or any other kind of description that will limit its actions and behavior into a single category. Instead, Turkish Foreign Policy approach has rendered the state of Turkey to define itself a path of ambitions and aspirations with "successful democratic consolidation and solid economic performance" (Grigoriadis, 2014 p.170). As a result, Turkey's state actor (s) refuse to comply with a particular definition on its state activism in the region and the international system. In lieu it chooses attention and focus be given to its approach as a grassroots political revival movement on a global scale. As I shall explore some of the causes in the following section, I will at the same time build on this argument in the way middle powers have traditionally been defined. Turkey might have been principally defined within the middle power category but it seeks to go beyond such categorization while aiming for greater power and influence in the region and across the international system.

4.3. TFP'S Analysis as Actor Changing the Geopolitical Imagination and Strategic Culture in Global Politics

A Constructivist, Realist and Liberal Approach to Redesigning Turkey's Global Image between 2014-2020

In the post-Cold War era, there has certainly been continuity and change. While Turkish Foreign Policy has been extending outward into the Black Sea Region and beyond in the 1990s-2000, the period between 2001-2014 has been shaped around finding a niche in the European continent while balancing a leadership role in the Middle East and the Islamic world. The alteration in foreign policy behavior as described in the previous two sections can be indicated by the following two transformative events: the 1990-91 Gulf War led to the closure of Kirkuk to Ceyhan pipeline which had major economic loss for Turkey and, later in 2003 the parliamentary decision to block UN invasion of Iraq from Turkey's border resulted in Turkey's assertion of having autonomous decision-making power within its region. Both of these events were pivotal in the way Turkish Foreign Policy behavior came to be shaped because it exhibited Turkey's willingness to take initiative in its region and at the same time block outside interference that is deemed detrimental to national and regional interests.

The year 2014 marks an important period for Turkey's realist and transformative state behavior as it gained momentum with the first direct-democratic election of the President in the history of the modern Turkish Republic. The state image and the foreign policy behavior is directly linked to the assertive leadership role of Turkey that has rendered it a pro-active and agenda-setter actor within the international system. Turkey's goal is not to become a hegemon but to build a coalition of hegemony that will balance against great powers to keep their strength at check. By doing so, gaining relative power will allow a coalition of powers to prevent domination of Western hegemonic powers from making gains at the expense of the weak. In this direction, state capabilities according to Mearsheimer are based on a state's economy, population and military power. These are areas in which Turkey is expanding on its capabilities and opportunities in order to have an independent axis while at the same time maintaining a balance through bilateral and regional relations. Turkey's aim in this context is to democratize the great power system through multipolarity and opening up space for the small and middle powers to compete in an equitable international system. It could be argued that Turkey seeks a great power status in which multiple powers

can collaborate in global decision-making rather than submitting to a single hegemonic power.

Turkish Foreign Policy as a tool and method of the state as an actor in the international system employs a vigilant diplomacy. It does this through a strong discourse on pointing out the inequalities, injustices and the corruption within a system that calls for an urgent transformation and reform based on justice. This kind of moral realism that is shrouded with liberal values is a kind of political messaging that one can say aims at bringing a holistic change in the international system. One can observe that this approach is quite constructive in the way Turkey's image over a period of three decades has been advancing through a formation process. In this case, in recent years the Turkish leadership demonstrates a circumspect approach because speaking against a non-egalitarian system requires one to take measures to face off the backlash from revisionist powers who want to maintain an elitist system that favors the few powerful over the subjugated. It can be said that Turkey's foreign policy orientation during this period has experienced a shift in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

> "The outbreak of protests in the Arab world, that resulted in a series of regime changes, was as unexpected for Turkey as for other countries, yet it did not take long for the Turkish leadership to seize the events as a golden opportunity to expand Turkey's role and influence in the region" (Ayata, 2014, p.95).

During the popular protests Turkey chose to side with the larger Arab public against the autocratic regimes that it viewed as a major hindrance to democracy. Turkey's image served as a non-Arab but a Muslim model of democracy that promoted freedoms and democracy to an Arab world that was decaying under authoritarianism. In this context, Turkey's increased advocacy and military operations in Syria were gaining strides. According to Yorulmazlar and Turhan, Turkish Foreign Policy orientation prior to the Arab Spring was geared toward the EU accession process where instability in the Middle East "recast Turkey as an effective regional actor" (2015, p.338). This is mainly due to the shift in axis of Turkish Foreign Policy behavior from "pro-regime policies to pro-people policies" (Özcan, Köse & Karakoç, 2015, p.202). Turkey's experience with the AK party movement also emerged due to popular unrest and grievances that involved major freedom and democracy deficits.

> "Turkey's ability to steer the region into its preferred course on its own is limited and hence, depends on building coalitions. Therefore, Turkey is well advised to seek closer cooperation and consultation with its Western partners. There is much room for joint action particularly on security, counterterrorism, refugees and economic development of the region. Turkey's quest for multilateral action on countering the crises also entails Western support especially in the UN Security Council, NATO and the EU. Moreover, the Turkish case for democratization in the region largely overlaps with the ultimate Western call for regional liberalization. However, given Western reluctance for further involvement, Turkey would have to work on a selective agenda with Western partners and, therefore, would need to keep a closer eye on regional balance of power" (Yorulmazlar & Turhan, 2015, p. 346).

As discussed in the earlier periods of the post-Cold War era, there was an approach of expanding opportunities and situating an identity-based actor within the Black Sea region followed by the pursuit of the EU membership process. Preferring the Ankara Criteria over the Copenhagen Criteria was an important signal in the move on Turkey's ambitions to go beyond the European Union scope. The goal of entering the European Union aside from expediting the process on further stability in the country and increasing trade/economic relations with European neighbors also included the need for a "secular alliance." Turkey has been subject to unfair criticism by the West for having democracy erode in the country and was castigated for shifting its international orientation from the West to the East. Instead, Turkey's goal in the 2014 post-Cold War era has been to reorient itself to pursue options that will not limit its security, economy and diplomatic relations to a Western dominated liberal world order that is based on containment. Regional influence, regional stability and prosperity for Turkey all depended on how much force it would exert within the international system by inspiring the Global South and Muslim nations to come together to make a successful leap possible. The Syrian case is a major litmus test for Turkey's goal to achieve humanitarian relief in a chaotic environment that requires military intervention in the region bordering Turkey and Syria. Turkey's attempt to bring regional security is through resolving the Syrian quagmire which has rendered Turkey a regional actor and leader to pursue a solution.

> "Just as in regional security complex theory, securitisations can be bound together positively (where a group of actors share, or partly share, a definition of threat and referent object), or negatively (where actors, or groups of actors, construct each other as threats) in the process forming potentially durable patterns of security interdependence" (Buzan & Waever, 2009, p. 256).

This is especially evident in the Astana Process where regional partners like Iran and Russia came together with Turkey at the same table to cooperate and coordinate on the Constitutional Committee. This is a major effort in aiming for regional stability where the Assad regime is being cornered and a popular bottom-up movement is garnered to confront the security and political crisis on the ground. A second factor that influenced Turkey's change in foreign policy behavior was the Fethullah Gulen Terror Organizations's attack on Turkish democracy on July 15th 2016. The coup d'etat that occurred reset Turkey's relationship with Western nations who stood quietly and waited until the outcome of the coup which drew major criticism from the Turkish public that the West was never genuine in supporting the advancement of democracy in Turkey. The Arab Spring and the failed coup attempt were major reasons that reinforced Turkey's shift away from Western policy in the region and in the Middle East. The period of the AK Party under Erdogan's leadership as Prime Minister reflected a stoic behavior when it came to a reluctant attitude throughout the EU membership process. However, the post-2014 period under Erdogan's Presidency reflected a concern for the deteriorating state of affairs in the Global South compared to the Global North that is economically and technologically advancing. Turkey's bottom-up and grassroots movement foreign policy approach to galvanize the global crowds is an attempt to create a wide-world global south coalition that will balance against the global north. In doing so, Turkey's representative role as a voice to the disenfranchised exerts a reformist behavior as a hope for those looking to economically, politically and militarily advance in the same manner. Turkey's anti-elitist behavior in the international system is inclusive of the downtrodden but at the same time plays a challenger role against the powerful who have a monopoly over the system's security and economy. The foreign policy behavior is, therefore, based on an anti-elitist approach but, in which Turkey continues to engage the elitist great powers as a way to keep them in check. In the meantime, building and solidifying bilateral relations act as a leverage for Turkey to advance its diplomatic relations.

In this process, Turkey's Western-oriented identity has been going through a change from its previous period that had a direct "Europeanized" foreign policy geared towards the West. Engagement with the Middle East meant Turkey's behavioral shift would be a way to widen its scope of activity based on its own agenda rather than being guided by Western policy. Aras and Gorener argue "…the active engagement of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East is best accounted for by the construction of a newfound national role that envisions Turkey as a global actor simultaneously fulfilling multiple roles in separate issue

areas and geographical regions" (2010, p.74). In the 74th United Nations General Aseembly, for example, Turkey, Malaysian and Pakistani leadership came together to discuss possible ways of tackling Islamophobia and hate speech toward Islam. It was later announced by Prime Minister Imran Khan that a joint English broadcasting outlet would be established in coordination by the three countries to address the grievances and injustices occurring in the Muslim world.

In the period between 2002-2014, Turkish Foreign Policy behavior was shaped around an image-creation process where Turkey in the international system sought to establish presence through amicable diplomatic relations with the West. In the post-2014 period we now see a more assertive behavior on the part of Turkey that seeks to utilize both hard power and soft power as seen in the case of Syria and in creating coalitions with Muslim majority countries like Pakistan and Malaysia. The driving forces behind the hard power are the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria causing a major burden on Turkey, the fight against terror networks such as the PYD-YPG and Daesh and including the terror threat of FETO both within and without the country. In fact, Turkey's multilateral activism and advocacy on international organization platforms is a reflection of the multilateral fight it is giving against terror networks. This activist behavior of Turkey is largely due to a belief in Turkey's civilizational role under the Ottomans who sought to preserve differences but promoted the unity under cooperation and coordination based on similar civilizational values. Regional and global level interactions have set Turkey apart from other neighbors who view Turkey's opportunity maximization as part of a soft power diplomacy and hard power military assertiveness. Keyman argues the post-2014 period is marked by "moral realism" (2017, p. 58-59).in which, one can add that in order to achieve freedom and democracy from Turkey's perspective there must be a foundation of principles that are informed by religious thought and values. This certainly points to the reality that Turkish Foreign Policy behavior would no longer operate within a Western-orientation and instead use a multidimensional foreign policy that exerts power and influence in various parts of the world. What set Turkey apart from the previous periods in its foreign policy behavior has been its outreach to regions like Asia, Africa and Latin America which are outside of its immediate neighborhood. However, the closer circle of neighbors tend to afflict Turkey with greater challenge but with the same latitude of opportunity at the same time. Turkey might be deemed Euro-centric and Western in its culture at home while seeking some of the remnants of its civilizational past to create a continuity in the development of its image and character as a state actor in the system. But,

at the same time, one cannot overlook the fact that Turkey's cultural and political life while being Western and Euro-centric also aspires modernization and advancement by bringing in the positive aspects of the past such as Islamic values, Ottoman cosmopolitanism and ideas of prosperity for all communities as a way to strengthen Turkey's multidimensionality at home. By reaching out into the past, Turkey seeks to establish a model of diversity, understanding and inclusiveness at a time when in its region there are neighbors wielding ideological flags aimed at dividing rather than uniting communities of ethnic and religious differences under a banner of unity.

Turkey's foreign policy behavior based on an assertive behavior with a regional and global aim for influence has been largely about an image construction meant to draw attention to the changing geostrategic landscape of world politics. Increasing diplomatic traffic, economic interdependence, military alliances and defense industry capacity building and trade in this particular sector has established Turkey as a major competitor in its region and beyond. Turkey's proactive diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific region is a testament to the concerted efforts of various organizations and institutions in Turkey working to boost economic relations, trade, humanitarian aid and conflict resolution mediator across regions. Turkey also strikes a balance in maintaining relations with Western Europe and North America per se while at the same time building bilateral relations with Eastern Europe and the Balkans all throughout. Turkey's role as a mediator in conflicts and its diplomatic leverage in political stalemate has rendered its bilateral engagements with other countries as a problem-solver. Hence, Turkey's solution-oriented foreign policy behavior has deemed Turkey a reputable place among leading countries with political, economic and military clout.

> "Turkey's active involvement in the resolution of political crisis in Iraq had led different political authorities including those of theIraqi Kurds to seek numerous bilateral engagements with the Turkish government. Similarly, several competing political actors from Syria, Libya, Lebanon, and Palestine sought to win Turkey's support considered that Turkey had been an active actor ready to mediate and promote conflict resolution in those countries" (Kuşku-Sönmez, 2018, p.387).

A recent example for the kind of mediation activity Turkey has performed is evidenced in the "Mediation for Peace" initiative it launched with Finland on September 24, 2010 as a way to guide peace efforts around the world:

> "The profile of mediation has been rising globally since Turkey and Finland led the way at the United Nations through the "Mediation for Peace" initiative. The initiative culminated in the establishment of the Group of Friends of Mediation. The Group now has 53 members, including 48 states and 5 international organizations. There has also been substantial improvement in international capacity for preventive diplomacy and mediation within the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society. The Group has become the leading platform at the UN to promote mediation. It has initiated the adoption of four UN General Assembly Resolutions, which lay the ground for the development of the normative and conceptual framework of mediation. The Group has also contributed to the 2012 "United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation", a fundamental document for those who practice and study mediation worldwide" (Cavusoglu, 2017).

In the 21st Century, refugee crises and terror pose a large risk that goes beyond the regions they are situated in. For example, the threat of terror emanating from Syria creates a spillover risk into the neighboring region with participation of individuals from Western countries in DAESH. In similar view, the refugee crisis that is resulting from the war on terror and against the despotic Assad regime has led to nearly 4 million refugees to leave their homes to find safety within the borders of Turkey. The refugee crisis poses even a greater spillover risk as Syrian and Iraqi people are fleeing their homes and looking for greater hopes for their future as they head to Europe and the West. Thus, one can argue,

> "Global turmoil, while paving the way toward feelings of uncertainty and insecurity for the future, also produces challenges that are global in nature and thus require global solutions. Nowhere in the world have the effects of the world risk society and the global turmoil been felt and experienced by people and states more than in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, especially in Syria and Iraq" (Keyman, 2017, p.2275).

The refugee crisis does not only have a humanitarian crisis dimension to it alone. There is a danger that emanates from this. In war and conflict, civilians being displaced and fleeing for their lives also create a power vacuum in which terror organizations can fester that will carry the country and the region into further crisis and instability. This creates a direct challenge to the neighboring states and other Western countries who have a vested interest in places such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Turkey continues to welcome civilians from these countries temporarily as it attempts to find a solution for refugees to return safely to their homes. The creation of the safe zone in Northern Syria, encouraging political stability in Iraq and supporting the peace process in Afghanistan are all efforts put forward by Turkey to regional conflicts that inhabit spillover risks. While the methods, the tools and strategies to tackle these local and regional issues may differ, the intended goal of Turkish

foreign policy is to stabilize the region through democratic consolidation and peaceful dialogue among various actors. It is also important to denote the importance of globalization in understanding terror movements that are formations of transnationality and transnationalism. Transnationality refers to the rise of new communities and the formation of new social identities and relations that can't be defined through the traditional reference point of nation-states which means that sub groups and communities can form sporadically without a connection to a ruling government in any part of the world. Turkey's challenge in this framework is much larger than just simply tackling terror networks such as Al-Qaeda or DAESH in which their methods are different. It is also quite different than tackling a terror regime such as the one in Syria. Turkey, through the Constitutional Committee has sought to form a civil society base that is prepared to have a democratic transition in Syria while at the same time it is facing the challenge of tackling terror movements whose behaviors are different.

According to Tarrow, social movements can be conceptualized as some sort of collective challenges with joint social solidarities who interact with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow, 1998). What we know so far about social movements is that they do not randomly spur up across the board. There are symptoms and reasons why people choose to mobilize. The context in which such movements emerge is due to particular grievances. In the particular case of the emergence of terror networks the consolidation of such organizations are due to rejection of political regimes and rampantly use terror and violent military approaches to depose, terrorize innocent civilians while legitimizing their actions through ideological means. Terror networks similar to other social movements that have been studied do not mushroom in a region over the night. Their ideological propaganda, weapons and ammunition support and their tactical plans to terrorize the regions' people beginning with a carefully planned agenda and the strategy to carry out terror activities.

Turkey's battle to eradicate terror networks such as the PKK-PYD-YPG, FETO (Erhan & Sıvış, 2017, p.108-109) and DAESH are all within the framework of one legitimate social/political movement as represented by Turkey versus the rest of illegitimate movements of terror. The terror networks that are a regional challenge and a threat to the peace and stability of their regions demand the greater participation of actors such as Turkey to take on more responsibility. While this requires global and regional institutions to take heed and provide more support on the ground, we tend to see a Turkey that is left to act with its own resources and capabilities. For a country like Turkey that harbors middle power

activism with *efficacious power* production towards great power status, one could argue that it present its own "strategic culture" with its own approach and interpretation of for "sustaining peace and preventing conflict" inthrough effective economic, political, diplomatic and military means to advance national and regional neighborhood interests with global aspirations as part of "new international conflict management" (Dal, 2018, p.2209)

The issue of Turkey launching Operation Peace Spring October 8th, 2019 also points to a unilateral effort to create Regional governance in the face of a growing PKK-PYD-YPG threat to Turkey's border in Northern Syria, Daesh threat against Syrian and Turkish civilians and the Assad regime's terror against the people of the country. The military offensive is meant to pledge Turkey's strong commitment to protect its sovereignty and the safety of the Syrian civilians in order for them to be able to return to their country without fear. The clash between Regional and global governance is more apparent today as Turkey moves into Northern Syria to deter a terror threat from its border. Turkey resorting to unilateralism is a sign of major disequilibrium in the regional system that can fulfill the state actor's security interests in its border. At the same time, this move on Turkey's part showcases a decisive behavior of an actor that is willing to rise to the occasion and take full responsibility for its nation's protection while disregarding regional and great power opposition. "The insatiable revisionism of the rising challenger triggers persistent crises that eventually ignite a hegemonic war" (Schweller, 2011 p.288). Turkey's case presents a contrary evidence to the argument by Schweller because instead of creating a crisis or a hegemonic war in Northern Syria, Turkey aptly managed to take initiative on its own to help Syrian refugees to relocate to their homes in their country while employing a security strategy by utilizing US and Russian actors to take responsibility in clearing out terrorists from the safe zone region on its watch.

While the global governance system is under heat for the lack of inaction and failure in places like Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, Turkey's behavior to exert a full operation based on its own principles of Responsibility to Protect against the backdrop of inaction by the international community. This is an important military task that will show the world that multipolarity is indeed a tough terrain and anything but smooth since power sharing and decision-making will be an arena of competition rather than coordination or cooperation. The trade war between great powers like China and the United States point to a crucial warring between economic giants as they go head to head against one another which certainly will have a direct effect on a changing international world order that might be on

the track of losing its liberal elements. Regardless, one has to look at power transition theory through a new lens in order to dissect the changes that are occurring on the global level and how that is reflected in opportunity maximization for actors on a regional level. According to Danilovic and Clare, "modification of the power transition theory can be based on (a) major powers identifying international positions in terms of their influences in different world regions; (b) not all regions are equally salient in major power policies;(c) dissatisfaction arises if two or more major powers clash over their influence in the same regional area" (2007, p.293). Therefore, scholars are required to look at how the roles of non-great powers are shaped within the context of power transition to better understand the potential, opportunity spaces and the influences that other actors such as Turkey may take advantage of to pursue greater power maximization.

Turkey's unique role as a state actor in its geostrategic location is that it behaves as a great power with a modus operandi based on its national security and regional interests. The upheaval in the region has caused a great degree of disturbance has also allowed the opportunity for Turkey as an actor to maximize its power and to demonstrate its military might while defying great power push and shove from countries like the United States. Although Russia and Iran who are part of the Astana Process also disagreed with Turkey's move into Syrian land, this did not deter the latter's notion of power advantage that could be put to use in ending the terror corridor and helping nearly 4 million refugees to reclaim their lands. The Challenger has shown the Defender of the Status Quo that it has the right, the will and might to make military moves that are suited for the regional interests even if that is at the expense of great power privilege which has since the start of the post-Cold War era caused dissatisfaction and negative impact in the regions they have been involved in.

Turkey's one of a kind case is in reality a demonstration of a state behavior that is veering away from its traditional role during the Cold War era which has almost without any reluctance chose to side with the West. The post-Cold War era began with an identity search, regional outreach, and perusing for options in the West while treading its own policy path in different regions of the world. The time has now come for Turkey to flex its muscles at a time when trade wars leading to power transition are opening a window into a global repositioning. Using global platforms like the United Nations serves as a tool for state actors in the international system to voice their grievances about the lack of justice and privilege over great powers over weak states. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), updated to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are formalized into a system to target

> "poverty reduction promoted by national governments and international organisations. While calling for distributive justice, the MDG/SDG amalgam privileges the norms of market behaviour. These values are in turn challenged by sundry global justice movements that advocate decentring within a more democratic globalisation, that is, tolerance for greater pluralism" (Mittleman, 2016, p.668).

Mittleman talks about the emergence of a Southern multilateralism against the undemocratic and unjust pressures imposed by the developed nations. Hence, the formation of groups

> "from NICs (newly industrialising countries), NIEs (newly industrialised economies), and lICs (low-income countries) or MICs (middle-in- come countries) to BRICS (with the addition of South Africa in 2010), the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) tripartite constellation for galvanising South–South coordination in sectoral areas, and the BASIC coalition (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) on climate change" (2016, p.669).

The above acronyms point to the reality that global repositioning has been occurring with the efforts of the Global South community that has ventured to counter economic imbalance and to de-link itself from Western subjugation. These asymmetric, yet regionally tactical alliance formations, is meant to destabilize a global governance system that has been dominated by the North since the establishment of the Bretton Woods system. Developing or third world countries have been able to voice their concerns about the state of their countries in international platforms and forums to bring attention to the inequalities they are suffering. The neoliberalist policies such as the Washington Consensus can no longer be sustained. Therefore, global governance can be "understood in terms of a highly uneven power structure for organising neoliberal globalisation. This arrangement permits limited policy space wherein national and local actors compete for upward mobility" (Mittleman, 2016, p.675) to take on a higher position within the world order that provides more freedom of maneuver and influence for newcomers.

The discussion about global governance imbalance and global repositioning is unduly pertinent to Turkey's activism in the international system as a reformer. While in 2008 the IMF went into a major crisis, Turkey was determined to pay off its debt by the year 2013. It was no coincidence that the global economic recession had slowly prepared the upheaval that was to come in the Middle East. The pressure point that gave rise to popular movements across the Arab world was part of the larger framework in which great powers and their institutions were the source that sustained authoritarian regimes around the world. The uneven nature of global governance was particularly due to lack of will on the part of

global economic institutions to delay economic growth and democratic progress as the desire of the Western world's determination to continue to have an upper hand. The development of the Global South has largely been prevented by economic programs that were not sufficient in understanding the local and regional context in which these countries were struggling as seen in the African and Latin American experiences which endured hardship as a result of colonial rule. According to Glenn, industrialized states established an "asymmetry of power" (Glenn, 2008, p.218) which was not successful in the management of power and did not aim for a pluralistic and democratic orientation. Instead of looking out for the interest of the all members within the global order, the Western countries took advantage of their core standing and established a political elite that legitimized the mistreatment of the economically and politically disadvantaged.

> "The World Bank and IMF have pursued a neoliberal agenda promoting both trade and capital account liberalisation which, with the exception of a few, has not served the interests of the developing countries…The World Bank and IMF have often been criticised for their 'one size fits all' remedy for the economic problems confronting most of the developing world. Rather than applying general economic policies, albeit with some recognition of local conditions, it would be better for states to have a much greater say in their own development" (Glenn, 2008, p.233-234).

Turkey which not long ago was considered among the third world developing countries took a 200 million dollar loan from the IMF in the 1980s in which İT was able to pay the debt off in 2013 under the AK Party government's leadership. Turkey's strong willingness to be debt-free from the IMF shows the credence the Turkish nation has in trusting the AK Party leadership to usher the nation into an era of independence and autonomy. Turkey's example also sets apart its narrative from being reformed within the country (with democratic consolidation, EU membership process, judicial reforms and the fight against terror networks) towards re-creating a narrative of being the voice of the reformer within the international system. Turkey is fighting a double edged-sword by bringing reforms into fruition at home while at the same time fighting an international battle against the Western-led status quo as a way to bolster a movement within the Global South to revolt against the North. The axis shift Turkey made under the AK Party government leadership has not so much been about changing direction from the West to the East. It has much more to do with supplanting the old narrative of being under pressure with one that calls for a global liberation.

Turkey's foreign policy behavior has been generated by the AK Party as a way to transform its narrative through a series of phases that had preceded the current government in the 1990s. The Welfare and Virtue parties' domestic endurance did not last very long. However, the political activism within these parties in the aftermath of the Cold War is now being re-packaged and delivered within the 21st Century as part of a national and international struggle's narrative. The interplay between the actors within the government, various representatives across party lines, and the steady leadership of Erdogan over the government since the formation of AK Party in 2001 underlies a consistent equilibrium when it comes to institutional reform. This has in tandem resulted in the reconfiguration and a shift in the image, state leadership behavior and the dissemination of the state's stance within the international system. As mentioned earlier, the 2008 global economic crisis that affected much of European countries left Turkey almost untouched. President Erdogan (the Prime Minister at the time) even acknowledged that Turkey despite the crisis was able to show resilience and growth in such dark times. This was a major impetus for Turkey to demonstrate its strength and employ the tools within its foreign policy kit to build its economic and trade capacity even further. This was a promising moment in which Turkey was beginning to show greater disposition to building relations with Middle Eastern countries. As the unrest among Arab countries led to revolutions under the Arab Spring, Turkey sought this as an opportunity to expand its sphere of influence. According to Hoffman and Cemgil, "the specific foreign policy strategy of the AKP government discussed here involves establishing a Turkish sphere of influence in the former Ottoman geography by exploiting the power vacuum after the so-called Arab Spring" (2016, p.1282)

The authors may have been too quick to assert Turkey's approach to Arab Spring countries as opportunistic in a hostile manner assuming that it might be an Ottoman expansionist project. Turkey indeed harbors an Ottoman legacy that is enmeshed with Turkish nationalism but its approach to inspiring Arab states to adopt democracy is an experience that has led Turkey to great success and semi-independence over the post-Cold War years. The concept of umma is an extensive project that Turkey believes can be re-imagined and re-constructed if stabilization can be achieved by alleviating democracy deficit. The primary goal of Turkey's foreign policy behavior in the post-Arab Spring has been to share its own experience and narrative to help consolidate Arab public support to develop, democratize and progress based on the values of Islam and the enriched civilization Arab nations inherited. Turkey's successful narrative is show down by the West and is

labeled as undemocratic, illiberal, backward and Islamist only due to the fact that it offers a narrative of liberalization that can become an inspiration to not just Muslim nations but to all Global South nations who are downtrodden and under Western economic subjugation for various reasons that mostly include natural resource and petroleum exploitation under the guise of allegations made by Western states and institutions about human rights violations, corruption and oppression on the ground. Turkey's experience to evolve out of a strictly secular nation that despised religion and its tolerance lack thereof, resulted in a successful combination in the cooperation of religion and state where the AK Party government made a considerable change in de-securitizing religion in the sight of the military, the state and the public. This, in reality, ushered Turkey into an era of political and economic emancipation that clearly stood as a threat against Western power that deems its experience in secularizing their societies' as the ultima ratio. In the broader scheme of world politics, looking at the Global South or Third World countries in general, Turkey's emancipation serves as a model that could be adopted and organically implemented according to the geographic region's history and local context.

In the case of Turkey, as a representative of the Global South that has the opportunity operate within the realm of Global North environment demonstrates its strong willingness to break the "illocutionary disablement" (Bertrand, 2018, p. 282) mode toward speaking up and securitizing issues that is relevant to its experience(s). Turkey under threat with allegations for false pretext on lack of democracy, freedoms and human rights is a clear attempt of Western countries and Western media that wants to silence a subaltern actor for defying the injustices of an international system in favor of revisionist powers. According to Bertrand, evaluating the situation of the subaltern requires looking at post-colonial theory which analyzes power relations based on the dominance of liberal ideology. The author in reference to Sharp puts forward the observation that in order for a state actor to be heard in the international sphere it must adopt "Western thought, reasoning and language" (2009, p.111) to be able to express concern and voice its views to be understood within the realm of the international system that has been shaped by Western norms, values and communicative methods in this framework. In other words, there is a status quo vocabulary and jargon produced and disseminated by the Western countries who have established such language, connotation and images as props to legitimize its source of power and dominance in the international system. Turkey's leadership and its foreign policy behavior acts contrary to this and therefore is subject to "Western-mass effort in being silenced."

The debates and allegations surrounding Turkey's domestic behavior sliding into democratic deficiency taking over is only a symptom of the changing nature of the world order that can no longer sustain illiberal practices. A nation whose economy is prospering, successfully battling terror networks and is speaking loud and clear about human rights injustices, wars and poverty is a major stab at the liberal world economy that has not been consistent in its commitment of economic openness. While the international liberal world order was built by the US and its allies as a way toward prosperity and equality in the framework of a rules-based system upheld by democratic principles, we now see that it has in fact failed in this project due to economic gap that is continuing to widen between the rich countries and the poor suffering from issues such as terror, economic instability and lack of growth. Wolf argues that countries like Turkey are falling into authoritarianism while failing to substantiate his argument. But, he does provide two explanations as to why there is a wide popular unrest in different parts of the world that is causing democratic instability:

> "Instead of complacency, we need to confront two fundamental questions. The first is which is the more important if it comes to a hard choice: domestic political cohesion or international economic integration? At the margin, it has to be the first. Economic life demands political stability. The range of policies —fiscal, monetary and financial —must make the bulk of the population feel their interests count. Otherwise, democratic stability is in peril.
>
> The second is where to focus efforts at global cooperation. The answer must be that managing the global commons and maintaining global stability comes first. While I would like to see further trade liberalisation, it has to be done in the right way and is no longer a high priority. Still less pressing is opening borders further to free movement of people or even maintaining free flow of global capital. Politics are overwhelmingly national. The results of political choices must satisfy the people of each country" (Wolf, Financial Times, 2018).

In Turkey's example, the political choice of leadership reflects the desire of a large portion of the nation to be led by a President whose policies at home and abroad reflect the values harbored by the people. The point about global cooperation is quite significant yet lacks the proper understanding as to how cooperation can be established when there is an asymmetric relation between the great powers, the middle powers and small powers. Turkey ardently defies this asymmetrical relation and calls for equal opportunity, respect and cooperation that is based on partnership within the same level of playing field. The monetary and financial interests are part of the broader problem in which some states are subject to scrutiny because they face domestic issues that impact their economic standing. In an interdependent and interlocked global politics it is imperative in Turkey's perspective to call

out for the rise of multi-polar powers to seek a win-win understanding that empowers not just the few but everyone with the aim of "democratizing the global space" for everyone to thrive. Despite the ideological differences, the rise of nationalism, religious resurgence and nuclear arms race, Turkey willfully calls out for moderation and dialogue to settle disputes that could possibly lead to an all-out conflict or war. We have seen this in the case of Kashmir in which we saw President Erdogan has called out to end hate speech that can spur populations into unwarranted conflict that can lead to millions of lives to be lost. Pakistan and India as state actors are called to reasonably think about what could be possible solutions to re-enter a dialogue to have both sides listen to each other rather than dividing the lines of communication that could have serious ramifications. Another example of Turkey's solid dedication to challenging the inequalities in the global system is the humanitarian foreign policy behavior of the country in the international system. Advocating and calling out on the international community to act by providing a lending hand to the people of Somalia, the Rohingya Muslims and calling for justice in the case of the plight of the Palestinians shape Turkey's image with a humanitarian behavior that not many Western states respond to. Turkey's political activism especially "on the Palestinian issue is an indicative example of domestic mobilization that pressures the government toward resolving the conflict" which is sometimes attributed by scholars who think "Turkey's altruistic engagement with post-Ottoman lands inter alia is a need to make its imperial history right (Akpinar, 2013, p.738).

The 1990s gave rise to several humanitarian interventions each of which generated sharp debate in civil society circles and widely divergent academic commentary. This was especially so in connection with Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, East Timor, and especially, Kosovo, and later Iraq. The debate focused on three kinds of concerns: was the intervention under discussion legally, morally, and politically justified and feasible? Did a refusal to intervene in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe expose a serious weakness in the structure of world order and the quality of global leadership? Were the real reasons for the intervention associated with strategic, not humanitarian, concerns? (Falk, 2008, p.6).

Falk asked accurate questions that explain the current state of humanitarian plight that is not being addressed by great powers but is instead being worsened. Humanitarian issues in the 21st Century have become a strategic policy card in the hands of leaders who use it every now and then to garner political support or pay lip service to such issues as a way to brush every underneath the rug. Falk's point about global leadership is an important discussion that sheds light on the dimension of the global structure and why it is actually

fragmented and ill-ridden due to self-interested nations who choose to hold on to power and domination while humanitarian crises continue to spread and grow. Part of the reason this is the case is that national interests play a vital and front role in garnering political support at home and therefore, humanitarian issues play a strategic role not for value-based reasons but for political reasons. "Morgenthau found it close to impossible to reconcile Western, Soviet, Chinese, and non-aligned nations' notions of these words, so, he asked, how could one say whether humanitarian intervention was 'just' either way" (Fiott, 2013, p.768). The argument made here supports the claim that nations with different ideologies and self-interested goals will never agree on acting against a humanitarian crisis let alone define such an issue unanimously. Hence, given the situation of Syria is a telling example of how despite the nearly 4 million refugees who flocked Turkey's borders and nearly 1 million death toll within Syrian lands, aside from Turkey other nations refused to call it a humanitarian crisis. Overall, the Syria response indicates how easily protection issues can be dropped in humanitarian settings when it does not suit Western state actors, and when they have limited leverage vis-à-vis other governments to reinforce these measures (Cetinoglu, 2019, p.291).

> "In 1979 Waltz had claimed in Theory of International Politics- in which he argued that in most cases international relations was explained by changes in the structure of the international system rather than by human nature or the character of individual states- that the major task was the maintenance of 'the balance and its by-product' and that this required 'the continuing efforts of America and Russia" (Fiottt, 2013, p.769)

Russia and the United States are competitors in the global power domination front along with China, India and rising powers across the board. The issue of Syria and Turkey's responsibility to care for so many refugees, however, is a testament to the changing trend of the world structure that is quite different from the one Waltz presented in his 1979 seminal work. Turkey's case sets a precedence in the modern international system of the 21st Century because its leadership has demonstrated that human nature and the character of the individual state embodied by a religious-value image is steadfastly challenging the unbalanced world system. The Cold war experience of balance of power can no longer sustain nor explain the turbulent changes occurring today in the proliferation of the multipower system which proves that circumstances of today's global politics is changing drastically.

Turkey plays a unique role in these circumstances through its humanitarian action based diplomacy, world-structure critical discourse and national security policy against terror, foreign policy behavior based on honesty and win-win understanding, bolstering its

defense industry and expanding economic opportunities and trade. These are all factors that play into Turkey becoming a pivotal actor within the international system in the changing nature of statesmanship that has endurance against Western pressure through political pragmatism while displaying a degree of self-abnegation in helping others through mediation and peace-building in various parts of the world like Africa or the Balkans. Despite the close proximity of states that globalization has rendered through economic interdependence, technology and academic advancement in social sciences and other fields, there is still a reluctance to recognize Turkey as part of the developed West. There is a Cold War mentality that still draws the line of Turkey's geostrategic location as a country that is a bridge between the East and the West but at the same time not part of the European continent. This could partly be explained as to why Turkey's refugee problem has not been supported and taken responsibility for by the European nations. Turkey's refugee crisis is deemed a middle Eastern or a muslim problem the West does not want to take part in solving. Turkey's attempts today can be interpreted as a way to break the distinction between the Global North and the Global South and call on the international community that this imaginary divide that has been imposed by the developed West has done a great injustice to other populations in the international system. Therefore, the refugee crisis although in reality is a burdensome issue for Turkey, at the same time it is an eye-opening experience the world is witnessing a shift or rather a merge between the Global North and the Global South. The main reason for his humanitarian activism on the part of Turkey is to draw attention that indeed Europe and the West do have a responsibility to take part in burden-sharing but because they feel as if they do not have a historical responsibility or connection to that geography they withhold financial support. Therefore, Turkey's humanitarian and moral responsibility is an exuberant example that serves as a paramount role model. Cetinoglu argues,

> "Its development as a humanitarian actor has thus allowed Turkey to carve out a role at the centre of global governance. Hosting both Syrian refugees and the first World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 helped to showcase Turkish state-led humanitarianism to a global audience and allow it to claim moral superiority over European institutions and their inaction" (Cetinoglu, 2019, p. 291).

As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Turkish foreign policy behavior has drawn much criticism for leaning into the Middle East causes and diverting its attention away from its goal of becoming a member of the European Union. The shift from a European foreign policy toward a Middle East foreign policy in Turkey's behavior can largely be explained

by the tumultuous state of affairs that has pulled the country into a sense of historical responsibility. The neo-Ottoman approach becomes more clear here but not at the expense of looking toward Europe since the Ottoman past also has strong ties to the European continent and influence.

> "…Turkey's relationship with the EU has significantly influenced state capacity and enabled Turkey to improve economic and political relations with the Arab Middle East. Turkey has been adapting to its integration with the EU through economic and political reforms since the 1995 customs union decision, but more extensively since the 1999 Helsinki decision of the EU to grant Turkey candidacy. This process of adaptation to EU integration has increased state capacity to implement foreign policy towards the Middle East and establish closer ties with the region" (Günay, 2014, p.221).

The Syrian quagmire is of a special importance in Turkey's relations with its Western and European counterparts along with its communication with other geographic partners. Turkish foreign policy behavior when it comes to Syria actually serves as a propeller for Turkey's independence activism pertaining to the fight against terror organizations like the PKK and its Syrian offshoots the PYD and YPG. At the same time Turkey's Syria policy serves as a litmus test in how far Turkey will carry the international community into taking action for the mass atrocity committed by the hand of the Assad regime.

> "Turkey's trajectory of increasing activism in the UN appears to be grounded in the following three interconnected drivers of motivation: the quest for a higher status; the quest for institutional design and equal representation and the quest for institutional power which directly impacts the way and the degree to which Turkey has been articulated to the UN's system in terms of contri- bution at the three main levels of financial, personnel and ideational" (Parlar Dal & Kurşun, 2018, p.1773).

While Turkey in the post-2014 period under President Erdogan's leadership has added a policy emphasis on its civilization identity which is reflected in its foreign policy behavior, it has also rendered its geostrategic location as a launchpad to boost the country's image, its role, influence and effectiveness in international platforms like the United Nations. In doing so, this draws attention to a major discussion on the role of identity in Turkey who some viewed as an obstacle for Turkey due to what could be argued as a schism between being Western and being Muslim. Turkey's Eurasian identity has been subject to a tug-of-war between civilizations and East and West strategists who have been attempting to use Turkey as a gimmick that would play into the hands of actors who want to meddle with and control its geostrategic location. Turkey's secular state with a majority Muslim society has never been fully embraced by the West as Western enough which has provoked a lot of

opposition among the public and leadership who have become critical of the European Union for delaying Turkey's membership process. This has, nevertheless, not deter Turkish public and the government's pro-EU orientation. It has, however, given a wake up call to Turkey that it cannot limit its options of being a member of a regional club that is solely Western. Multiple options create broader opportunity spaces in which diversification can bring stronger bases of political, economic and diplomatic engagement. The proliferation of options in which Turkey can insert itself as an effective actor in humanitarian issues, expansion of trade and economic relations and building upon historical ties through diplomatic initiatives in high politics all serve as an impetus for Turkey to take on a greater role within the global governance system. Turkey's assertiveness was not always possible, especially in the early foundation of the modern republic. This is explained by Parlar Dal and Kurşun in the following excerpt that has been paraphrased:

> "Turkey's low profile and cautious global governance policies since the Republican era can be attributed to three main factors. First, since the establishment of the Republic, Turkey has prioritised its relations with the West on ideational, political and economic grounds… This has at times turned Turkey into a legitimiser actor in global governance, leading it to avoid taking decisions independently from its Western allies. Turkey's constructed Western identity prevented it from assuming global responsibilities which may contradict Western interests. Second, Turkey's limited material power and economic impasses have made it difficult to deeply involve itself in the UN system at multiple levels. However, its recent rise, since the first decade of the 2000s, has increased its view of its capabilities…Third, Turkey's domestic and security problems have long prevented it from creating a new foreign policy agenda for deploying its capabilities in global governance to full effect. Although not grounded in a systematic framework, Turkey's increasing desire in the 2000s for a greater say in global politics drew on an increasing orientation towards global governance and international organisations" (Parlar Dal & Kurşun, 2018, p.1773).

President Erdogan's global campaign to reform and transform the United Nations Security Council with the "World is Bigger than Five" declaration is to trigger a global awakening to bring justice and equity to a system that is dominated by a few countries (Russia, China, France, United Kingdom and the United States). This is, in fact, seen as a corrupt system led by a powerful few in which other geographic regional representation is penalized for their economic and political weakness and thus, not included in the decision-making process on regional and global issues. It has been reiterated on many occasions by Turkey's leadership that the current world order and the UN Security Council can no longer sustain WWII condition and this requires an emergency action to reform immediately before the system becomes too inept and broken to be fixed. The reform process would require a

collective and inclusive effort to have all state actors take part in a democratic overhaul in the global system that would "democratize" otherwise what would remain as an illiberal world order and UN Security Council.

> "In this regard, the UN drew significant attention as the most proper arena for global activism in Turkey's effort to become a responsible stakeholder in global governance.7 Turkey's trajectory of increasing activism in the UN appears to be grounded in the following three intercon- nected drivers of motivation: the quest for a higher status; the quest for institutional design and equal representation and the quest for institutional power which directly impacts the way and the degree to which Turkey has been articulated to the UN's system in terms of contribution at the three main levels of financial, personnel and ideational" (Parl Dal and Kurşun, 2018, p. 1773).

Turkey's foreign policy behavior and its identity as a secular state with a Muslim image creates a challenging anti-thesis to the Western norm of what it means to be "secular" in the Western historical experience. Turkey is attempting not only to reclaim a past that has been marred and defamed by a staunch and authoritarian understanding of secularism in the early republic, but at the same time it is undertaking a grueling task to redefine its history that is beyond the Western, modernist project that was imposed by a top-down method. Turkey's civilizational history did not begin with the onset of the Republic but, in reality extends deep into the past. The aim of the current government and Presidency is to unearth the truth, success and endeavours of the past civilization and instead of creating a rift with the modern republic, on the contrary, there is an effort to emphasize the continuity. Turkey's pro-Western orientation in the early Republic toward a cautious approach to Western nations in the 21st Century, who tend to be skeptical about Turkey's geostrategic expansion and influence, showcase the surge of an Ottoman and prior civilizational ambitions making strides with expedience.

> "Hence, Muslim identity is not merely religious, but is an historical political marker and part of collective identity. Meanwhile, the (AK Party's) policies demonstrated that the public visibility of Islam usually functioned through ambivalence, which allowed a crossover between Islam and modernity and between secular and religious practices and identities" (Göl, 2009, p.807).

A major underpinning of hearkening to the past civilization of Turkey that is enriched and diverse is couched in the modern period's "Western-style democracy" (Weiss, 2000, p.801) that is surrounded by a burgeoning civil society making it possible to impact global governance on the international level through organizations and institutions. Turkey's foreign policy behavior, in effect, has not only a reformist and renewalist tone in its political

messaging in the international arena. Turkey's image in the international system today in the 21st Century harbors "the new frontiers of governance policy and support for institution building" (Weiss, 2000, p.804) through strengthening democracy with an Executive Presidency and separation of powers while encouraging civil society organizations to boom. The international activism made by Turkey in the international terrain is about the Global South or Third World countries to come together and to collectively create an initiative of capacity-building to reform the world order that is to the disadvantage of many aside from the Global North.

The "World is Bigger than Five" campaign is not just to rally the Global South countries to take the fate of their nations into control and drive toward a successful and prosperous future. This is at the same time about establishing a foundation for reform and running an advocacy case for "global liberation of disadvantaged countries" so they can be up to par with their Global North counterparts by establishing a desired democratic global order. Turkey's state behavior as an audacious actor that seeks to not only build on relations but to empower partner countries is a major focus of the post-2014 period in Turkish Foreign Policy. At the opening of the 2nd Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on November 21st 2014, Erdogan made a critical remark about Turkey's approach to the African continent. "The Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923, has maintained the same approach as the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires. Supporting independence, freedom, peace, security and the right to self-determination have been the basic principles of TFP in Africa" (Erdogan, 2017, p.76). Turkish foreing policy created a new vision in its state agenda that called for not only developing bilateral relations from trade and economics to defense and education but, at the same time there was a need for a "new partnership model" (Erdogan, 2017, p.77). The Turkish healthcare system has made significant progress in this particular sector to provide better services to the people of Turkey. However, this does not suffice as a local or national policy under Turkey's ruling government, the AK party and under President Erdogan's leadership. TFP behavior also demonstrates a goodwill approach in providing such health care services to countries who need it. This was especially the case when the Ebola outbreak led Turkey to lend a helping hand to train doctors and also "provide model healthcare services" (Erdogan, 2017, p.77). Turkey's altruistic state behavior is also a reflection of its utmost desire to carry its cooperation to areas such as "efforts to fight terrorism, organized crime, drugs, poverty, lack of education and epidemics (Erdogan, 2017, p.78).

In Mexico City, Mexico on February 12, 2015 President Erdogan shapes Turkish foreign policy behavior as an enterprising state that challenges the establishment of the world system after WWI. While "Turkey tries to be the conscientious voice of mankind" (Erdogan, 2017, p. 144) it does so on the grounds that there should be a democratic and equitable security system in the world where all religions and regions are represented at the UN Security Council. "We no longer live in a uni-centric world dominated by the West. Everyone should accept the fact that the world is now multi-centric with the east, north, South and west all playing a role. This not only applies to politics, but also to the economy and trade (Erdogan, 2017, p.145). As a reform of the UN Security Council, Turkey offers a solution that is inclusive and representative of all rather than just a few powerful countries who have held a hegemonic power over the global security system.

> "Permanent membership should be abolished. Perhaps there could be 20 countries that may change on a rotational basis. For example, each country may serve for 2 years every 20 years and a new group of 20 countries can step in for the following term. This way every country will have a cote. Such an arrangement ensures that the UN Security Council is made up of member countries from all religions and all continents" (Erdogan, 2017, p.144).

Turkey's ambition to transform the world is a multi-layered approach. While Turkey's state behavior presents a challenge to global great power actors at the same time Erdogan's leadership character demonstrates a strategic approach. The Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project is a major regional move that does not only impact Turkey's geostrategic position but also its neighborhood. "The entire Eurasia region needs this project more than Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey do. The contribution of this project to peace will surely attract as much attention as its economic impact" (Erdogan, 2017, p.162). During a time where strategic assets are important to utilize geographically, Turkey is at the same time cognizant of the challenges that are present in the post-Cold War era. The rise of terror, far right populism that has grown the cancer of Islamophobia are also regional and global problems that need to be tackled. Simultaneously, tackling such problems require the economic and political engagement of Turkey to introduce a face of Islam that people are not familiar with especially since local and international media is profusely producing Islamophobic rhetoric and the denouncement of Islam. Building up relations with Latin America and the Caribbean region has reached a "9 billion dollar trade volume with the region by 2014" (Erdogan, 2017, 342). At the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Conference in Santiago, Chile on February 1, 2016, Erdogan touched

upon the refugee crisis as a concern not only for the region but to all the international community.

Turkey's responsible and embracing position when it comes to the refugees is a reflection of its moral ground on helping people who need it. That is why a realistic solution was offered to "establish a city in Northern Syria… to build housing for refugees" (Erdogan, 2017, p. 346). As humanitarian crises continue to unravel and create a burdensome situation for Turkey's responsibilities in the region and around the world, it is at the same time a driving force for greater change and engagement. At the Opening Ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project in Baku, Azerbaijan on October 30th 2017, Erdogan underlines that the project has a "capacity of 1 million passangers and a cargo capacity of 6.5 million tons. Its capacity will reach 3 million passangers and 17 million tons of cargo in 2034. The significance of the project lies in the unprecedented advantages it offers to shipping agents in terms of saving time and mileage on the ancient Silk Road" (Erdogan, 2019, p.277). These projects and initiatives taken on Turkey's part demonstrate the state's image as a constructive and an entrepreneuristic behavior of the country that aims to take control over its geostrategic location rather than be influenced and controlled by other regional and global actors. In the post-Cold War era as we see the gravity of global politics and economic advancement shift towards the East and mainly in the Asian region economic and commercial relations become even more important in establishing bilateral relations. As Turkey's state behavior reflects a strong cognizance of this kind of shift and change, it aims to work on the principle of a win-win understanding to build and advance relations as the country moves up the global economic ladder to become more effective and influential on the global scene.

> "The New Silk Road initiative covers more than 60 countries around the world and extends across an area of more than 40 million square kilometers. It is a highly significant project that covers 4.5 billion people in the world. For countries that will benefit from the bilateral, multilateral and regional cooperation schemes, it is essential that this initiative is carried out with a "win-win" perspective. The setting up of such a system that is politically and economically compatible will open the door to a new era of stability and prosperity in our region" (Erdogan, 2019, p.171).

Indeed, as Turkey expands its role of influence to the East at the same time it espouses to bring nations and leaders of developing countries to "draw a roadmap for the future" (Erdogan, 2019, p.266). At the Developing-8 Summit in Istanbul on October 20th 2017, Erdogan calls attention to taking advantage of a young youth population and natural

resources that can enable these countries to make investment and further development in their respective regions. Such natural resources and human capital of course is not the only reason why there needs to be a collaboration among developing countries. There is also a moral basis in which mutual goals towards peace, security and stability call for taking power over one's geographic destiny and to create growth and strength across diverse sectors ``ranging from trade to agriculture and industry, from tourism to energy and transportation" (Erdogan, 2019, p.267).

The Alliance of Civilizations enterprise initiated as a critical foundation as part of an intellectual architecture for the realization of all of these projects mentioned here aimed to bring the international community into understanding the universally shared principles of "democracy, transparency, human rights, supremacy of the law and good governance…" (Erdogan, 2012, p.231) are part of a "Global Peace Project of the 21st Century" (ibid, p.249). The Alliance of Civilizatons aimed to bring the international community into solidarity with the "alliance of values" (ibid, p.232) which also serves as an important premise as to why Turkey has been so adamant about joining the European Union despite Western opposition and criticism of the country being too Muslim in its character. Erdogan on numerous occasions has argued that Islamic values are in reality universal values that are shared by all civilizations which is meant to unite different communities rather than divide them based on artificial differences and categorization created through the colonialist mentality. "Islam and modernity can coexist" (ibid, p.234) because they are not at the opposite ends of a spectrum. On the contrary, Islamic values set the framework in which modernization can advance within a society based on past experiences and in the age of new developments that can be enlightened through a prism of values. It is for this reason Turkey made its European membership process a dedication to the universal values that all of humanity shares. Erdogan states,

> "… our objective of joining the EU in particular becomes the symbol of an effort that has a special importance from the point of view of our country's global role as a unifier and contributor, and is also a striking and successful example of integration among different cultures on the basis of shared universal values" (ibid, p.234).

The following Section 4.4 will attempt to explain Turkish Foreing Policy behavior as a way to build on the analysis conducted in 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 on the country's political elite approach to shaping its policy agenda in the region and around the world through an

active engagement in international organizations as part of an overarching multilateral initiative across the international system.

4.4. TFP Behavior Exerting a Constructive Muslim Realism through an Efficacious Multilateralism

In the Pursuit of Becoming a Great Power

Turkish Foreign Policy approach as part of the larger state behavior of Turkey makes an important declaration to the global community through a strong state actor that disseminates messages about the need for a universal civilization that is enriched with differences. This is where one can pursue the idea of imagining an outlook on the nature of the global community based on what could be assesed and researched through the prism of Muslim Realism. As this concept was offered as a possible analysis in this study under *Theories Introducing Readers to IR for State Behavior Analysis* discussion, the aim of Muslim realism could be construed as a peace-based, cooperative nation-state relations based on human integrity and security. This is done on the occasion for a broader understanding of what it means to be emancipated in the post-Cold war era as developing nations or those who are deemed to be the Global South need to do for political autonomy and economic freedom based on interdependence and equal opportunity. The above mentioned statements by President Erdogan reflect upon the need for collective action in order to achieve collective emancipation. The post-Cold war scene in Turkey' s geographical location and in other regions is something that cannot be achieved individually that requires a joint effort to develop and advance by bringing the masses together.

The post-Cold War era is witnessing a transformative period and a new awakening in the 21st Century under Turkey's regional and global leadership in which the state leadership is giving a wake up call to many countries around the world as part of a unifying and courageous message to rise against injustices. This is in reality a counter-Enlightenment movement that does not seek to challenge modernization but to enhance its harmony with the modern world while posing a critical approach to westernization and its colonial extensions around the world. The aim of Enlightenment as a result of the French Revolution was to free human society from the shackles of despotic religion and to insert human reason and positivism to arrive at scientific knowledge. In today's circumstances, not only is there political and economic resistance to Western domination but also to the philosophical

underpinnings that have cast a shadow over the place of religion within human society is greatly challenged. This counter-enlightenment method that advocates a Muslim enlightenment through the cooperation of state and religion by popular will "must be carried out by the people itself" (Marey, 2017, p.173). The author goes on to argue that:

> "Once we notice that the tutors from which we must free ourselves are "institutions", "dogmas, statutes and formulas" that do not allow us to think for ourselves, and not mere arrogant individuals who take it upon themselves to teach us something we can simply reject learning, we see that emerging from immaturity demands, first of all, realising that one's free thinking is being deliberately hindered by a complex system of institutions and cultural phenomena… It is first and foremost a matter of realising that there are many hindrances to that very internal coming of age, and that these obstacles are external and produced under and by certain political conditions. Since its main object is culture, this awareness of cultural facts can only be brought about by a communal public effort" (Marey, 2017, p. 174).

There is an eye-opening remark made in the statement here regarding certain political conditions that have become an obstacle for the human mind and reason to be freed from institutional oppression as a well as certain dogmatic ways of thinking. The Turkish Foreign Policy behavior as a liberationist, justice and freedom advocate state actor in the international system touches upon this matter by denouncing a global western culture of domination. This kind of counter-enlightenment is different from the one that emerged under Western liberal circumstances where philosophers and learned men have been put to the forefront of such a movement.

Turkey's state behavior involves an activist and intellectual recognition that it is the laymen and women, or rather a bottom-up movement in which people at local and national levels can work together in cooperation to assume liberation from Western subjugation. This kind of counter-Enlightenment requires a change in the way the individuals think on an autonomous level and how that "way of thinking" (Marey, 2017, p.173) can organically transmit into policy changes in one's nation. While the French Revolution produced an Enlightenment movement that replaced the religious man with the philosophical/intellectual man it continued to use the previous despotic religious method in producing a Western doctrine of superiority over the laymen and women. This merely became a "vehicle of dominance" (p.176) of the Westphalian political system that sought to divide and impose different masses around the world into a system of categorization and limitation. "In a political present of despotism and manipulation of the general will, the motto "sapere aude!"

should be translated into political terms: emancipation is not to be expected from above" (Marey, 2017, p. 177).

In the Waltzian sense, the individual, the state and the system provides an important template for understanding Turkey's role from the leadership to the role of the state and its interaction within the international system. The French Revolution within the context of the Enlightenment eventually became "elitist" similar to the fight it gave against the church figures who saw themselves as the vanguard of religion. Turkey's Presidential leadership, the image of the state and its advent into changing the status quo of the Western dominated international system has all culminated in a popular, bottom-up movement for individuals to use their reason and to engage in local and national politics to bring change to one's state of affairs within her/his country as part of the broader movement for global liberation. The limitations of scientific knowledge is partly due to the disintegration of the Westphalian system in the post-Cold War era since now there are true and organic social/political movements exemplified by Turkey's case that emancipation can become a reality through grassroots efforts from the local to the top of the nation with the aim of fulfilling a collective liberation on an international level.

In today's regional and global politics, we witness Turkey as a new agent of Enlightenment that is not based on an elite intellectual class of politicians. On the contrary, the target of this new kind of Enlightenment are the public masses from all different socio-economic and political backgrounds who have been silenced and disadvantaged by national and international political despotism. Indeed, one can also observe that Turkey's liberation discourse that defines power as belonging to the people is a testament to a clash with the discourse of coercion by Western actors. "In brief, "emancipation" involves releasing people to exercise power over their thought processes, life-worlds and anyone who would intrude upon them, while empowering them individually with the abilities necessary to realize their true interests in practice" (Abel & Sementelli, 2002, p.260). Turkey's case presents a unique endeavour in this direction because while it is argued that emancipation cannot be a top-down process, it cannot be a strictly bottom-up process either. This requires a dual process in which a leader like Erdogan whose grassroots activity led him to be elected Prime Minister and President allowed for a bottom-up opportunity to be democratically elected as the leader of Turkey. Thus, the individual (state actor) carries the messages of the local peoples to the nation-state level as a mission to rearrange the role of the military in the state apparatus continued popular support and to voice local injustices around the globe as the grievances

that must be fought by all who wish for a just and democratic world order. With the re-identification of Turkey's image in domestic and international politics as a "genuine actor that paves the way for a holistic enlightenment", the state actor paves the way for popular will to manifest on the local, national and international levels.

Turkish Foreign Policy as a leverage mechanism of the Turkish state is making a call for all world citizens to be learned and informed about their position within the world order and to use their reason to empower the human agency through political and international engagement. "By re-conceptualizing power as not necessarily a dominant influence distorting both discourse and practice but as potentially enlightening and legitimate, it provides a means of going on discursively and rationally toward a positive future in a consensual society" (Abel & Sementelli, 2002, p.272).

Despite the nuances and their regional position throughout the Muslim World, the 20th Century of Islamic revivalism is much different in the post-Cold War period. At a time when globalization, technology, economic interdependence, transnational actors, nuclear arms race and greater political influence over borders has grown at a large rate, we see that the kind of Islamic revivalism under Turkey's state image and activity as cosmopolitan and inclusive of diverse communities around the world. While the anti-colonial struggle for political autonomy continues in the post-Cold War era, this is not just limited to the Muslim world as was the case in the previous century. The fervour for freedom encompasses all nations who are economically disadvantaged and whose political independence is jeopardized at the expense of rich and powerful countries of the North.

> "Economic development in the Muslim countries like elsewhere in the Third World was perceived as industrialization and that in turn was perceived as modernization. This strange identification of development with industrialization and modernization virtually meant the homogenization of the developing economies under the auspices of an imperial Western world order… Under colonialism, Muslim countries offered their economic resources cheaply to satisfy the production demand of colonial industries, and any income that accrued from this exchange went back to the coffers of the colonizer through domestic expenditure on imports. Independence brought little change to this pattern of economic dependence. They are still the suppliers of cheap resources and consumers of globally manufactured products" (Ali, 2000, p.18-19).

Turkey, which aims to rank among the top ten economies in the world by the year 2023, can be said to have warded off the challenge of economic pressure and its colonialist projects to a certain degree compared to its other counterparts in the Global South. The

counter-alliance that Turkey is aiming to mobilize in the new age of politics of the post-Cold War era is to create a buffer zone against Western pressure and dominance over the political economy of certain countries. In doing so, Turkey's state behavior showcases a humanitarian and diplomatic concern by emphasizing the significance of global ethics based on universal values that it claims comes from the roots *"s-l-m"* from Islam which means Peace. National security, according to Turkish leadership, does not necessarily mean the insecurity or instability of others. Rather, there is a positive argument made on the part of Turkey' state actor who argues on a win-win understanding. If the safety, security and stability of global neighbors nearby or far could be achieved there is a potential to come closer to a global stability in which everyone can thrive and prosper. This expression of strategy as part of new international politics aims to establish socio-economic and political justice where emancipation can be realized collectively.

> "Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security" (Booth, 1991, p.319).

Turkey does not create a dichotomy between domestic and foreign politics when it calls out for an egalitarian world order as it echoes the demand of its nation to become an effective decision-maker in the international arena. Order should not be polarized with categorization of powerful and weak. Justice cannot be distributed by the powerful in a selective manner that tends to ignore certain states and supports some over the others. On the contrary, security has to be comprehensive and equity-based to be inclusive of everyone's interests in order for there to be real emancipation that can only be actualized through what Turkeys promotes as "global community-building" (Booth, 1991, p324) whose domestic, foreign, economic and military policy as "serving a nascent world order" (Booth, 1991, p. 325). With the implementation of Quranic principles that set the basis for the religion of Peace, Islam serves as an comprehensive template in "defense of ethical universalism" (Brincat, 2013, p.227). Turkey' role is crucial because in the post-Cold War era it serves as the beginning of a new pattern of politics in the international scene. In an egalitarian world order that is democratic and equity-based, Turkey envisions a progress towards a universal civilization that recognizes citizens beyond one's borders with the same respect, dignity and rights as its own citizens within one's homeland. In any given case, the

suffering of a group of people in the hands of others makes it a moral duty of other states to act together to stop the injustice.

> "That is, the recognition of our humanly shared aversion to suffering provides both the individual and social rationalisation for moral development toward civilisation, a process by which the reduction of suffering done to others is made a conscious aim of an individual or a society's responsibility and action" (Brincat, 2013, p.244).

In this vein, Honneth also points toward a "moralising international relations" (2008, p.210-12) which is can be argued to be Turkey's global grand strategy in the "emancipatory struggle towards conditions of self-actualisation through the expansion of moral community" (Brincat, 2013, p. 250). As utopic and altruistic as it seems from the very beginning, Turkey's state image has also reflected that a universal community based on universal values can be achieved if Hobbesian and Machiavellian understanding of "war of all against all" concept could be minimized in order to elevate a sense of shared-unity and outlook to advancing international relations through amicable means rather than war or conflict. Self-preservation, in this regard, does not necessarily require the demise of the other but rather, the strengthening of global neighbors to have equal footing and fair competition as well as interdependence in collective security interests, trade, economics, education and many other areas of cooperation/exchange. Turkey's state image proliferated in the international system has much to do with the persona and character of Turkey's leadership who promotes a type of human-nature that is upright and non-violent except in cases that require self-defense. Turkey's state image exemplifies cautionary approach to harms and dangers that could hurt self-autonomy but at the same time gives off the message that Hobbesian-paradigm could be overturned with a neighborly-mindset that can reduce hostilities between states if states can achieve to act together based on common universal values through international consensus. "Thus, recognition theory can help further the emancipatory politics… because it gestures towards an ideal vision of a global recognitive sphere capable of affirming all aspects of human difference and individuality and which can be expanded to include all human-beings" (Brincat, 2013, p. 253). One can observe that as Turkey creates its own "historical narrative" in the international system concerning humanitarian crises, wars, and reform of the United Nations Security Council among other issues it actively seeks to introduce a "historical praxis" (Brincat, 2013, p.253) to the attention of all state leaders to take heed as part of the global emancipation process.

In the broader view of this initiative, one could argue that this paradigmatic and epistemological attempt at aiming for change is conducted by expressing Islamic values as part of a universal reality. It does so in retrospect with the past experiences of "political violence of colonialism" in sight where "parts of the global South have succumbed to Westernisation and the imposition of ways of thought, language, faith and social customs" (Castro, 2018, p.205). The "historical praxis" provided by the state narrative in the international system also disseminates messages of overcoming the traumatic experiences that the Global South had to endure under the hands of the Global North. Identities were altered and constructed based on the colonial mindset which rendered various communities around the world to endeavour the reconstruction of the self. Nation-state identity, reconciling with the past and building a future based on the freedom of acting autonomously are the ultimate agenda of reconfiguring one's future. In this task "the politics of emancipation draws on a politics of subjective identification as colonised individuals and collectives search to reconfigure their self borders – who I/we am/are; who I/we want to be – which have been obfuscated by the traumas of colonialism" (Castro, 2018, p. 205).

It could be argued from a particular stance that the 20th Century Islamic Revivalists who sought to bring awaraness about Islam in politics, society and culture did so throughout the Muslim geographies within the context of the "the colonial matrix of power that emerged during the sixteenth century and had become fully global by the end of the nineteenth century" (Ascione, 2016, p.137). Turkey's individual, state and sytem level interaction demonsrtates a strong determination to create awareness not just about Islamic revivalism but the universality of Islam based on the principles of a just and equity-based world order. It is with this intention, that Muslim geographies are not the limited to this global liberation advocacy. In fact, it is expanded to include all of the Global South in addition to calling the Global North to understand the need for a pivotal change in the making of international history in a new age.

It is worthy to consider that the global umma is not bound by religion per se but it is an amalgamation of peoples from different walks of life, ethnicity, religions, races and geographies who have a similar positioning within the world power structure. The intention is to re-configure a world order that is based on the concept of a global umma humanity that not only requires the greater struggle against the Hobbesian self but, also a struggle against those who are blindly committed to maintaining an unjust world order. The concepts of renewal, awakening and realization is the method of a struggle the Turkish state is giving

through international platforms and organizations to have the global community understand that the current international “liberal” world order is no longer sustainable in the new era of international politics.

Turkey’s state image making did not emerge out of the blue. It was a socio-economic movement that had major political grievances within Turkey that culminated into a broader political movement that came into power through democratic elections over the past seventeen years. It was “elite-challenging” (Driver et. Al, 2012, p.161) as a cause of “political opportunities” (Nakhaie, 2016, p.271-294) which have possiblysought to re-configure what it means to be “an elite within political power in the post-Cold by recalling “Ya valiyete kullu mazlûm” (the refuge of all the oppressed) as a continuity from the past to the present (Eyice, 1991) in which one could argue from a role theory perspective in international relations where identity construction is determined by the humanitarian role adopted by an actor. It is also noteworthy to refer to an ancient tradition as it resonates with the kind of “anima mundi” in the “patterning of spiritual intelligence within Earth that is simultaneously mirrored in the make-up of humans” (Bishop, 1994, p.53) where one can argue that there is a “collective consciousness” (ibid, p.54) that is being acknowledged in Turkey’s state image and activism. This could further be explained by the following discernable description of the relations between the individual state actor (man or woman) and one’s outlook on geography as:

> “President of the Royal Geographical Society, Sir Francis Younghusband, wrote about what he called a 'world patriotism’, a natural and all-pervasive *'esprit de corps'*, that provided creation, from electrons, to brain-cells, cultural associations, landscapes, solar systems and galaxies, with its cohesive energy and substance” as a recognition of the “omnipresent natural beauty” (Bishop, 1994, p. 55-56) as the ultimate power.

From an emancipationist as well as from the modern human security perspective provided by the United Nations Development Program (UDNP), one could argue that Turkey offers a view in line with the notion that “development must be focused on people (even though grouped by country) rather than the security of their national boundaries, and on advancing health, education, and political freedom in addition to economic well-being (King & Murray, 2001, p.587) as well as with a particular focus on environmentalism as a duty of protecting and preserving the sanctity of the creation. This could be argued from the perspective that:

> "Human mentality may have many different aspects. For example, a person or a group of people may be considered to have a political mentality by having certain fixed views in dealing with political affairs: some are conservative, others are liberal. Similarly, people may have a particular mentality about the geographical environment. We call this mentality dealing with land, "geomentality", and it is an integral part of individual or group mentality as a whole" (Yoon, 1991, p.388)

In order to unpack the role of Turkey in Waltz's conceptualization of the individual, the state and the system one ought to look at the organic formation of a socio-economic movement that transitioned into a political platform by the possible aforementioned views harbored within "an individual's or group's "geomentality" as argued by Yoon. The AK Party experience in Turkey demonstrates two game-changing moves on the national and international level. 1) the term "elite" came to be popularized to include the masses rather than the traditional republican understanding of the White Turk. The Black Turks castigated for their piety represented large swaths of groups who were deemed outcasts. From a constructivist perspective, this led to the formation of a new identity within high politics of Turkey that removed the perception of "elite" and replaced it with "integrity" based on "virtuous" intention to serve one's nation with the support of the popular will. 2) This standardization of "integrity" politics based on "virtuous" intention then eclipsed into a global movement for change. This movement started locally, reached a national climax and now endeavours to reach out to the global masses. The grassroots struggle was not only a struggle for local and national emancipation. It was contemporaneous with an intellectual struggle to liberate faith and human thought from the constraints of a strictly secular state mentality that was the subject of a "specific thought-practice" (Neocosmos, 2016, p.334). The Enlightenment in this context, failed to provide means and a path to the establishment of an ethical purview that is needed in support of the use of human reason.

> "The Enlightenment removed purpose and meaning from human existence, yet failed in its attempt to provide a robust epistemological framework that could take its place. Hence, one of the reasons for the loss of ethical guidance is the absence of any understanding of what human life is for; that is, a loss of teleology. A fully disengaged reason has failed to produce a universal and rational set of ethical rules and norms; reason is unable to define ends, it can only give means. Reason alone simply cannot provide an answer to the question, 'what is human life for?'" (Wight, 2006, p.35).

Turkey's individualistic movement within the international system is not to only draw attention to an existential problem in which states are constrained by greater power in pursuit of control and exploitation of natural resources. The Turkish state leadership is also dedicated to creating a paradigm shift by bringing forth a realization that the Enlightenment

project is flawed and incomplete whereby through collective action communities around the world can discover a "meta reality" that is encapsulating all humans, animals, plants, organisms and the whole universe in general. Turkey's endeavour to use knowledge as a key towards emancipation is "through a process of self-realization" (Wight, 2006, p.36). The process of coming to one's senses and realizing one's potential as a state also calls upon the individual to question her/his position in the world through reason and experience. Positivism provides scientific knowledge as a gateway to understand the world, the human power and wisdom to create change. Yet, it is not sufficient enough to answer the questions surrounding the human life.

Turkey's security concerns in the region and globally are not limited to a struggle of power to dominate militarily nor territorially. There is a struggle to transform the mindsets of state leaders to take action to change the state of the world from asymmetrical power towards an egalitarian and democratic world order. Confronting the Western economic domination of the world order is one step in challenging this neo-colonial system in the post-Cold war era. Turkey's mission in the international system is to transform the minds of local populations to demand of their leaders to say no to "elite domination at the national and world levels" (Fung, 2014, p.309). Analyzing the case of the Global South requires an extensive research and deliberation as to the reasons why the Global North believed that its advancement somehow provided itself with the prerogative of being superior. The West, indeed, advanced based on scientific knowledge and progress economically and militarily. However, it has never abandoned its colonial mindset and instead sought this approach as a guided weapon to its so-called development. This type of Western-led progress thesis is now being deteriorated as we see countries like Turkey heading the way for Global South countries who are attempting to actualize their power and capacity. The construction of political capacity is across all levels of society from the local to the national and international. When the Bretton Woods system, for example, was established after WWII as an economic bulk that expanded across a world order that placed the West superior to the rest of the world. This became "an instrument of domination" (Muldoon, 2001, p. 48) to give direction as well as shape and control the destiny of different parts of the world. The goal was never to establish a humane society in which all nations thrive and prosper with equal opportunity. On the contrary, subjugation and containment strategy of economic capacities provided the leverage for the Western world to grow at the expense of the intentionally-kept weak states.

> "At a given moment, politics assumes the faculties to subrogate, demand, direct and order the slavery of the majority in favor of an increasingly few individuals, who acquire a technique which appeared to become innate in some first as something natural and later as part of a social pact which turns into a learning process, into lessons on how to construct, destruct, reconstruct and acquire the power to govern. In these intertwining circumstances, soon counselors differentiate from executives with the ability in some to council, to be shrewd, to influence politics indirectly, while executives detain the power to decide in the context of a multiple and hierarchic structure" (Fung, 2014, p.312).

Turkey's leading government as a political organization and the image of the state in the international system emerged as a rival force to the dictatorial and colonialist treatment within the world order. Turkey's state behavior has been proliferating a counter-hegemonic trend to have other states also join in as a way to alter the global society culture that has been built on an unjust hierarchy. In this self-cognizant outcry to reform the world society there is a counter movement against the international liberal world order that continues to push for neo-liberal policies with the backing of the United States and the Western countries who chose to bandwagon with the former. Turkey's state behavior is demonstrating a protest against the current global infrastructure that has been built on the hardwork of periphery states and the slavery and containment of weak, small states whose agency has been intentionally-kept subjugated and destitute for far too long. Turkey's intention has been to create a global coalition of the South to reject the debasement of weaker states. In doing so, the coalition of nations will require a "mobilizing counter-hegemony that must extend beyond classes, to include various social forces—an alliance of class and social- democratic groupings" (Katz, 2006, p336). Recognizing that diversity in unity is a strength of such a counter- movement, Turkey's state behavior embraces differences based on common universal values in which individual identities become a source of strength for a greater global coalition. In this framework, "…emancipation is linked to the need for a notion of equality that does not presuppose homogenization, but rather accounts for diversity" (Montaldo, 2014, p.338).

It is a critical point to also keep in mind Kat's analysis about the dual process between counter-hegemony of the Global South and the hegemonic movement of the Global North.

> "Just as hegemony at the global level is produced by a dominant mode of production which is forwarded by dominant states and institutions, and permeates other states and institutions; so counter-hegemony needs to be a complex international social relationship by which the social classes in the different countries get connected, forming a global counter-hegemonic historic bloc" (Katz, 2006, p. 336).

Turkey's attempt to alter the global culture is also one of the intentions of using Turkish Foreign Policy as a method to exert a particular world-view and conception of a global society. As mentioned earlier, a vision of a global umma is to have an inclusive global society in which beliefs, ideologies and religions can make up the global infrastructure in a diverse world system under a set of universal values which Turkey proffers in its economic, social, political and diplomatic experience. It is not meant to be a top-down or a forced set of values for nations around the world to acquiesce. On the contrary, Turkey's state behavior offers the global community its holistic experience of development and advancement since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

In the post-Cold war era, Turkey's case is quite unparalleled considering that since the Enlightenment and the formation of the nation-state system there is a mission for national and international self-determination to free one's self (the state) from the shackles of an asymmetrical world order. With an open, frank and transparent national and international narrative, Turkey attempts to bring to the attention of the world that a true liberation of a state like Turkey cannot happen individually but by the collective will and attempt of all who are disadvantaged. This global protest or global riot is an initiative to bring awareness to an inequitable system. The aim is not a revolution but the evolution of the world order to transition into an international system that fosters a moral conscience. Peoples and their nations' leaders have the potential to expedite this process and add strength to the momentum towards shaping the world order into a constructive infrastructure that is equitable, democratic and even welfare based. The post-Cold War era in this regard can be described as the "Age of Alteration and Transformation through Awareness" in what could be delineated synonymously with a post-secular or post-hegemonic period.

Turkey's state behavior in the framework provided here endorses a moral obligation towards the global communities and an ethical message to transform the world into a system that looks out for the welfare of all and not just the few. Turkey's state narrative provides a "deliberative procedure" that can have nations "develop and accept universal norms" (McGraw, 2014, p.293). McGraw argues that "relying on religious reasons for political action would be tantamount to simply coercing citizens against their will and eviscerating the very possibility of political obligation" (2014, p. 294). Yet, he also succumbs to Habermas' point that the post-secular era "should be more open to religious influence" (McGraw, 2014, p.294). In Turkey's case to nationally and internationally gain expedience in its mission to liberate it uses the "faculty of speech" to garner support and rally other

nations by emerging as a subject "capable of representing or speaking for oneself" (Muldoon, 2001, p. 34). The socio-political movement in Turkey's experience began with the emancipation of the individual from strictly secularist constraints followed by a national emancipation of the state from the economic constraints of the IMF. This trend is followed by an "unfinished business in the task of emancipation" (Jones, 1999, p.77). Turkey does not argue that universal values are strictly Western because of the origins of a European traditional political philosophy. On the contrary, Turkey's state activism in the international system advocates the convergence of civilizational experiences where values diverge and enrich the universal value system that should not solely concentrate on the Western experience. Turkey's conception of the global umma therefore stipulates diversity and acceptance whose Islamic value system is premised upon a universal perception.

The process of Turkey's emancipationist project begins with human liberation in thought, faith and practice on the individual level followed by national and international levels. This self-realization attempt aims to also delve into the source of the problem that modern age has ushered with regards to human power. Where is the place of the human? Does revelation have jurisdiction over one's life? What are the responsibilities of individuals, states and global alliances in remedying the schisms of religion brought forth by the Reformation and Enlightenment? Plessner states:

> "If one realizes the importance of faith in an omnipotent God and His commandments for the attitude toward the secular state, one understands that the process of secularization which grows out of the religious schisms of the Reformation and the Enlightenment by necessity also alters the transcendental concept of power which is now brought closer to the human" (Plessner, 1964, p.156).

The dominant state strategy that fashions Turkey's international activism is the drawing of attention to the *agency of the oppressed*. Turkey, who has viewed the secularization processes in its past as a top-down desire to imprison religion, only had wiggle room enough for the pious within the country to act under strict parameters of secular norms. The draconian style-of-secularism intended to westernize, modernize and transform an economically and militarily degenerate Ottoman society into what was initially imagined to shape into a "civilized Republican Turkey." The social and political salons of the Ottoman intelligentsia engineered conversations around the need to leave behind the Eastern civilization and head towards a developed, civilized future with the West. The fabrication and dissemination of the phobia towards the East by European intelligentsia somehow propelled the politicians of the early Republicanists to ostentatiously initiate radical reforms

that was calculated to leave the Ottoman experience in the shadows of the past and never to be reflected upon with appreciation, admiration nor as a source of inspiration.

The AK party movement with liberal undertones, economic, political and judicial reforms managed to initiate reforms that took Turkey's standing in the international system into a position of "a justice advocate." In doing so, the political movement has re-configured its current position in its geostrategic region by harkening to the Ottoman state experience as a decision-maker as well as a Challenger against the status quo. Turkey's leadership envisaged and realized the goal of becoming a contender against the unjustified exploitation of the Global South nations by the West who disguised itself under the cloak of Enlightenment values while advancing its coercive agenda. The imperious attitude of Western regimes eventually has led to a crack in the international system that made it imperative for marginalized and controlled nations to question what it means to be civilized. Turkey's state behavior in its humanitarian, diplomatic, political military and economic progress with every opportunity has echoed that paying lip service to Enlightenment values does not suffice to become "civilized." The global communities are a collection of neighbors who must get to know one another, advise each other and act collectively to achieve peace, harmony and security for the well-being of not just a fraction of certain nations but for all members of the international system. The very essence of Turkey' state behaviorism in its advocacy showcases a renewed understanding of emancipation and what it truly means to be civilized. The earlier statement made about a crack in the international system is derived from the way the human being and its reason is placed within the Western civilization. For example,

> "…the Western learned mind has witnessed a sweeping liberation from the influence of the Christian Theological Thought since the Renaissance. Rational reasoning, experimentation, the collection of empirical data… have become the only basis for Western contemporary knowledge in the two cultures. Al-Jabri sees the difference between these two minds in the way each of them prioritizes the following: Man, Nature and God. On the one hand, the Greek European mind gives more importance to the first two, on the other hand, in the Muslim Arab mind, priority is given to God and Man" (Dhaouadi, 2005, p.588).

In the cyclical process of the rise and fall of sovereign powers according to Ibn Khaldun for example might provide an important analytical tool in the way the international system is experiencing the expansion and contraction of civilizational strength in today's global politics. Turkey's offer to reform and change a world order that is not based on justice

and equity, in reality, is an effective wake up call for global neighbors to pay attention and dare to take action on the fate of their nations. In an exceedingly globalized world where interdependence has turned the system into an inextricable interconnectedness, the fate of one nation can create a major impact influencing other neighbors. It is for this particular reason that Turkey's advocacy case communicates a compelling message to the world. "The World is Bigger than Five" is not only a pursuit to "democratize" an otherwise inefficient system of the world. It is a mission to speak to the hearts and minds of individuals across many nations to take a hold of their human agency and to lead their states within a possible global current to transform an undemocratic world order that has allowed the Global North to build its wealth and welfare at the expense of millions of people treated as inferior to the "Western civilization."

One could argue or state that this norm diffuser and value-cognizant behavior can provide an analytical window into how Turkey's image has rendered it to go beyond middle power borders to attain great power reflexes in a regionally and globally complex system. In order to understand Turkey's position there will be a discussion following how the post-Cold War era ushered this zealous nation to rank among the middle powers based on certain criteria. However, as this thesis attempts to analyze the state behavior of Turkey in the post-Cold war in the context of a post-secular and post-Enlightenment era, this ardent country's performance requires one to look at this case study more crucially and adamantly in order to really understand its changing position in the hierarchy of the international system. Turkey in the early post-Cold war era sought to create an image regionally which later in the post-2001 period expedited this process to create major economic growth for itself. The post-2014 period correlates with drastic changes in the system in which Turkey took the opportunity to take on the responsibility of a global mission for justice, equity and global liberation for all neighbors around the world. In this context, it will be helpful to explore the discourse, the meaning derived and the intention of Turkey's state behavior across international organizations as it will be delineated here in the following sections.

In the post-Cold War geopolitical framework, Turkish Foreign Policy harbors a multidimensional strategic approach with a main focus on trade, innovation and the defense industry. This section of the thesis will analyze some of the discourse used by President Erdogan in his addresses to domestic and international audiences which will allow one to unpack the meanings in the nation's image. In the Turkish Innovation Week on May 3, 2019 the President gave an address to members of the Turkish Exporters' Assembly and business

people from various parts of the country. His message was uplifting and resounding of the much more needed work to be done in trade. “Our country under the single roof of Turkish Exporters’ Assembly with its 83,000 membership has become Turkish Trade Diplomacy’s greatest power in the field…For us, goods and services exports alone do not suffice. In order to reach our 2023 goals we must increase the added value of our exports” (Tüfekyapan, 2019).

The success that President Erdogan’s administration expresses is based on the building block of previous leaders who came and did their best to carry Turkey to further advancement. Although Menderes was executed in the name of democracy and Ozal realized the economic liberalization of Turkey, their efforts made the leadership of today’s improvements and successes possible. In the same address mentioned above, President Erdogan acknowledges the years of dedication and sacrifice made by past leaders in order for Turkey to become a global competitor today.

> Turkey, since the establishment of the Republic, has made the greatest launch in the past 17 years. The democracy of the late Menderes and later Ozal’s initiative of opening our country to the outside world (meaning economic liberalization) and with the AK Party government our country reached a level of confidence that can compete with the world. Today, our diplomats and businessmen in particular including all our citizens are able to represent their country with pride (Tüfekyapan, 2019).

It was with these efforts that the AK Party built and realized its aspirations to move and shake the mold of being a middle power. It started on this path when it was founded in 2002. With three years down the road for the 2023 Centennial of the founding of the Turkish Republic, President Erdogan is pushing ahead a tough agenda where Turkey’ political and economic ascendancy is creating competition in the international field which is causing disturbance to the established status quo.

> Thanks to Allah, we ushered our country to a very important place. From this point onwards we will work harder all together. Our industrialists will produce more, our entrepreneurs will invest more, our exporters will find new markets and in doing so we will advance further. In order to increase the added value of our exports, we will give greater importance to innovation, design, technology, research and development… As we are doing today, we will be discussing and realizing production, export, growth, development, innovation, employment, education, investments and projects” (Tüfekyapan, 2019).

Alongside the use of innovation in economic advancement, the fight against terror also plays a major role. Turkey’s goal vis a vis the Syrian regime has been to allow the 3.5 million refugees to safely return to their homes and the rhetoric displayed by the Turkish

Foreign Policy team underscores this critical message at every opportunity it gets. Syrians are to return to their homes so they can build their country in the post-war period and contribute to the establishment of a democratic system in their country. Turkey could not have been an arbiter and supporter of such a process in Syria if it was not for the 17 year investment the Turkish people made in their nation's democracy. Democracy became a driving engine, a concrete platform in which the AK Party was able to use as a harness to battle the injustice aimed at it at home (with regard to the Party closure attempt in 2008), coup attempt in on July 15, 2016 and the economic terror inflicted upon only recently in the hike up of inflation. The below statement made in the Innovation Week event summarizes the stance of President Erdogan, the nation's foreign policy and the conviction to overcome challenges directed upon Turkey.

> "If the issue is political or diplomatic power, Turkey ranks at the top among those when it comes to being listened to in the region and around the world. If the issue is about economic power, in 17 years we multiplied the growth of our country 3 times, the exports multiplied by 4.5 times and succeeded in growing our tourism nearly 4 times. If the issue is about military power or security, we are a country that effectively defeated the most dangerous, bloody-handed terror organizations. If the issue is about unity and solidarity, thanks to Allah we are a nation that acted against tutelage and coup d'etats alongside many other issues as one heart and one command… With every opportunity we get we shall show those who can' t see that our people are clustered in close ranks around the maxim of One Nation, One Flag, One Homeland, One State" (Tüfekyapan, 2019).

The regional-level developments between Turkey and other regions such as Latin American states, Africa, Caucasus, Central Asia, Balkans, Middle East and including major great power competitors like Russia, China and India is indeed based on economic relations but also the promotion of its defense industry. Turkey's conflict-resolver identity alongside its humanitarian identity became an important image in its foreign policy approach. "International actors" as well as state actors, as one could argue, "increasingly view peace building as instrumental to the broader humanitarian and international peace and security agenda" (Barnett & Snyder, 2008, p.15-151). In this context, not only is Turkey presenting itself and performing as a mediator but at the same time is offering sophisticated products and transfer of technology with respect to its defense inventory through barter and offset trading. In the 14th International Defense Industry Expo on April 30, 2019, President Erdogan points out the success Turkish firms have demonstrated in this field as a debt to the Seljuki, the Ottoman and the Turkish Republics span of success over centuries. In the

modern times of today, the strength of the defense industry sector lies in the support and boost given to small and medium-sized enterprises as the foundational policy.

> "While Turkey in the global defense industry sector now has 4 firms included in the top 100 at the same time it continues to provide support for its main source of power as its foundational policy for the small and medium-sized enterprises… For the past one-thousand years in our geography as the Seljuki, the Ottoman and Turkish Republic we are indebted for our continuity with a strong presence due to many qualifications that includes an effective defense infrastructure" (Erdogan, 2019, April 30).

The path to success in the defense industry certainly did not come easy for the Turkish state. Turkey was largely dependent on outside sources to meet its military and security needs at a time in which global insecurity, conflicts and wars in the neighboring Middle East was pushing Turkey to equip itself. Western actors whose regional interests were growing from year to year required Turkey's leadership to take on responsibility in its own neighborhood. The below excerpt from the speech at the Defense Industry Expo by President Erdogan underlines the remarkable achievement made about local and national production of products and equipment in Turkey's defense inventory. It was a tough journey and still continues persistently with the belief that one has to take responsibility for one's own security. Otherwise, regional actors and middle power actors are doomed to be subservient and dependent on outside sources. Turkey's *efficacious* character has deemed it to become a major producer over the span of 17 years, nonetheless, a major exporter in defense industry products.

> "When we first came into power we said since our needs are not being met then we would take matters into our own hands and thus started a historic reform in the area of defense industry. When we first started our duty in the government our foreign dependency in the defense industry was around 80%. Today, we reduced the rate of dependency to around 30%. Aside from meeting our own demands every year we are also increasing the number of exports from our defense industry products" (Erdogan, 2019, April 30).

Turkey in terms of material and military power has been able to bolster its strength in many ways as seen in trade relations. Its foreign policy approach based on economic interdependence allowed for Turkey to look into new markets and options for military capacity building. The purchase of S400s in this framework from a purely realist sense geared Turkey with a weapon that is needed for security and protection if need be. The remnants of the Cold War bipolar competition between the US and Russia resulted in the

former to react aggressively by threatening Turkey, a NATO ally, with possible sanctions regarding its participation in the US led F35 program. It was rather an "us vs. them" kind of ultimatum that the Trump administration's lower echelons put on the table. This, in reality, is an argument that is couched on the long decades of competition between the West and the East. Turkey chooses to be an independent actor without necessarily choosing a particular side except focusing on its own geostrategic location. This is a location in which an *efficacious power* like Turkey can act, move, maneuver and pivot according to its own national interest. However, the global power status quo does not allow for such an independence in the further extension of a rise in multipolarity. The Western method of constraint and containment of other actors in various regions allowed for years of subjugation and dependence on the United States. This trend is being challenged directly by Turkey against the will of its Western counterpart. This conflictual and complex relation is not difficult to understand especially looking at the explanation provided by Yeşiltaş who argues,

> "The West…was constructed as a model and a reference point against which social progress in Turkey was measured as whole. For foreign-policy makers, the West was a state of soul and a process of development more than a geographical location. In terms of the geopolitical representation, from the very start the world was divided into two different civilizations in the defensive geopolitical imagination and Turkey was portrayed within the civilized, developed, and superior modern Western imagination against its Eastern antithesis" (Yesiltaş, 2013, p.49)

The move from a Western-orientation to a Eurasian axis allowed Turkey to continue its relations with the West but at the same time allow leverage for Turkish Foreign policy approach to expand the opportunity spaces in its own geostrategic location. This is an issue taken up by Western actors like the US and EU as a sort of distancing. As it was discussed in previous chapters Turkey's ad hoc move to deliberately widen its foreign policy scope comes at a time when the international liberal order is being challenged by the Global South. According to international relations literature Turkey does not follow within the category of the Global South and is rather placed among a group of middle powers. It is quite interesting to see in the recent development of Turkish Foreign Policy under the AK Party government, is that Turkey arduously and earnestly is working with state actors in the Global South to develop its own trade relations. At the same time Turkey is being a spokesperson for those state actors who are under economic subjugation by the West, for example, as in the case of Venezuela. Turkey's leadership in the past couple of years, despite the ups and downs on terror-related differences of view with the US on the PKK-PYD-YPG, has dynamically

continued its insistence on developing economic and trade relations to further levels. This demonstrates a smart and practical diplomacy with the Trump administration. The pragmatic side of diplomacy, in addition to a realist/humanitarian diplomacy presented in Turkish Foreign Policy, also played out in G20 Osaka, Japan when President Trump indicated that Turkey was not mistaken to purchase the S400s since they were not allowed to purchase the Patriots. The statement below from President Erdogan at the Defense Industry Expo puts the final touch on explaining the difference of opinion and Turkey's only option to move forward with Russia.

> "Throughout history we have been loyal to all the alliances we took part in and fulfilled all our responsibilities as a country. For example, due to the harassment made to our borders the first place we went to in order to meet our demands for an air defense system was our allies. But, unfortunately our demands have either been turned down all together or we have been presented with conditions that in fact made this process very difficult. And hence, it was clear that we would not remain silent to not only our defense rights to be disregarded but also the steps being taken to target the safety of our homeland. This is the process that is behind the S400 agreement we made with Russia. Even more importantly, we are making fast strides in producing our own air defense systems."
>
> Nowadays, we are facing injustice when it comes to the F35 issue and to be more correct we are being put into a difficult position for it. Despite being a project and production partner there are efforts to oust us from this program and from our perspective they are not able to see where this will end up. I am speaking frankly here, and the F-35 program that will oust Turkey is doomed to fail.
>
> We now started taking fast steps towards producing our own national fighter jet. InsAllah, our air forces in their fleet will include mostly national fighter jets. In this framework, we have intense work focused on unmanned fighters which is viewed as the future technology. Regarding the difficulties we faced with the helicopters we were able to leave them behind by producing our own atak helicopters.
>
> When we look at the world we see that the locomotive of technology is the defense industry. Looking across our country there are successful examples of the work being done in this area being adapted to the trade area. Technology due to its multiple dimensions requires cooperation, joint work and the development of collaborative business culture" (Erdogan, 2019, April 30).

In the 4th Trade Consultants Conference on April 30, 2019, President Erdogan asserts that within 18 years in government, the AK Party achieved a sustainable success in the Turkish economy and a major paradigm shift in diplomacy. The underlying factor that enabled this successful journey was to give a special importance to trade relations with African and Latin American countries. Expanding economic opportunities in the framework of a win-win understanding has led Turkey's diplomatic credibility to become even more

trusted and relied upon by the Global South. African and Latin American states represent only one angle of this multilateral initiative along with other state actors in other regions of the world.

> "Thanks to our Africa and Latin America Initiative Policies we have been able to do away with preconceived notions within our institutions and eliminated the prejudices in our society towards these geographies. That is to say, in all the countries we visited and in our interaction with State leaders and Prime Ministers, we put an effort to have our Turkish business people, investors and entrepreneurs be represented including those who want to invest in Turkey. Next to this, we initiated institutional structures to operate in order to provide advantage to our country in foreign policy and international trade.
>
> "Today, as a state we are not only represented by diplomats and attachees. With TIKA, Yunus Emre Cultural Centers, AFAD, YTB, AA, THY, DEIK, MAARIF we are conducting many important works across diverse areas. With our voluntary institutions we are realizing humanitarian aid and development projects even in the most distant parts of the region that have the most difficulty. We are also providing job opportunities to hundreds and thousands of people in the world through our business people. By doing so, we are increasing the brand-value of Turkey and at the same time contributing to our country's recognition in all four corners of the world" (Erdogan, 2019, April 30).

The enlargement and expansion of bilateral trade relations have also set the agenda for Turkey's economic development for the next few years. President Erdogan expressed in the Trade Consultants Conference that by 2021 the current deficit would be reduced to 2.6% in ratio to the national income which used to be 5,6% in the year 2017. Turkey is also decisive to exceed the 5% growth after reaching 2021. For the year 2023, it was announced that the administration's goal is to reach 500 billion dollars in exports.

These economic and trade relations in the context of Africa, Latin America and Asia Opening point to Turkey's development of political relations through these facets. The humanitarian aspect of Turkish Foreign Policy is a part of the same agenda to help end poverty, atrocities and injustices. This can only be done by garnering support through means of strong bilateral ties that are built on a win-win understanding on economic/trade relations in order to be effective at the table when discussing political issues. Turkey has been successful in bringing attention to the tragedies in Syria, Palestine, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, the Rohingya in Myanmar to name the least. "Despite the political and international nature of forced migration, there has been surprisingly little work within International Relations (IR) on refugees" particularly when considering that Turkey is the country hosting the most number of refugees on a global scale, the discipline of IR "has paid

comparatively little attention to the international politics of forced migration" (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p.3).

The goal of the Turkish administration under President Erdogan's leadership has been to bring state actors together to collectively address issues that are not just local but transnational. These issue require the attention of all state actors and it is believed this approach provides Turkey a regional and global vision on how to resolve these growing crises especially the one being faced with the influx of refugees to the country.

> "Although refuge and sanctuary have been provided by city states and religious groups throughout history, the basis of the refugee regime emerged alongside the creation and consolidation of the modern state system. The institution of refugee protection parallels the emergence and evolution of the international system. In many ways, changes in how states have collec- tively responded to refugees serve as a barometer of wider change in the state system" (Betts & Loescher, 2011, p.6).

In order to tackle such issues, Turkey's multilateral approach across international organizations has been growing and developing significantly. In order to be able to battle crises around the world from terror to poverty, economic injustices to political upheavels it becomes evident that increased activity in international organizations is an evidence of the influence of multilateralism on tackling diverse set of issues through mutual and collective initiatives. In this regard, Turkish Foreign Policy vision which as extended from the early period of the post-Cold Era led to a manifestation in Turkey's greater performance across international organizations such as being a non-permanent member of the UN between 2009-2010. The Turkish governments states that this step "remains as the most critical multilateral forum for ensuring and maintaining international peace and security, (while it) provided Turkey with further opportunities in the international arena and the UN" (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Next to a more effective and active role in the United Nations, Turkey's election to the Shanghai Cooperation "was also a confirmation of Turkey's growing weight in international politics and the trust that Turkey enjoys among a variety of different actors in international society" (Aral, 2009, p.155). p.7) Turkey's multilateral outreach to international organizations across various regions is not limited to the UN or SCO per se.

"Since 2005 the OIC has been undergoing a remarkable transformation. In that year, the foreign ministers of the member-states elected the OIC's first General Secretary – the Turkish science historian Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu" in which "the OIC's name was changed from 'Organization of the Islamic Conference' to 'Organisation for Islamic Cooperation' –

a programmatic title signalling the upgrading of the organization from conference to distinct entity" (Baumgart-Ochse, 2015, p.7-8). Under Turkey's leadership the Ten-Year Program of Action illustrated a major shift from the original Charter of 1972 towards a reformed and renewed understanding that included "prominent references to good governance and civil society" (Amelie, 2011, p.152).

The same year of 2005 marked "Turkey's opening up to Africa" when President Erdogan as Prime Minister at the time became the first leader in Turkish political history "visiting a country south of the equator" (Ozkan, 2010, p.534). "Turkey became an observer at the African Union in April 2005, before forming a strategic partnership with the AU in 2008" (Korkut & Civelekoglu, 2012, p. 194) towards a path of strategic partnership in cultural, educational, political and economic cooperation in order to enhance and focus on "existing shared goals and norms with African states…" (Korkut & Civelekoğlu, 2012, p. 190). According to Barnett:

> "…actors may engage in practices that attempt to rewrite the cultural landscape, and their motivation for doing so might stem from principled beliefs and/or instrumental gain… As actors ive over particular policies they frequently desire to change the social rules and norms in order to make a particular policy or outcome more legitmiate and acceptable. And they do so in a strategic way, strategies born not only from the normative structure but also from the formal poltical context in which they are located" (Barnett, 1999, p.7)

Turkey's geostrategic outreach can also be examined in its increase in regional activism as a strong opposition to colonial powers by "its strong show of respect for the politics of self-determination and the will of the people…" (Falk and Farer, 2013, p.358) in particular to the rise of its influence in the post-Arab Spring Middle East. More recently, with the Turkish state's initiative of the *Asia Anew policy* "the formulation of a new holistic approach toward Asia in a diverse set of areas from trade and defense industry to technology and culture" in order to diversify its partnerships to benefit "from the commercial and financial opportunities Asian economies present" (Alperen & Ersoy, 2019). One could argue that:

> "The upshot of this transformation in Turkish foreign policy is an increased eagerness both to engage the neighbourhood and to pursue an independent foreign policy. Unlike during the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath, when Turkish generals and diplomats could be counted on to support the west unconditionally, Turkey today responds to a diverse set of impulses that push for a greater and more independent engagement with all its surrounding regions" (Tocci, 2011, p.68-69).

The next chapter will evaluate Turkey's performance in the international system as a state whose enlarged foreign policy parameter has extended across multiple geographies. While it was asserted in the beginning of this thesis that Turkey is usually confined to the middlepowermanship category, the performance that it has demonstrated under the AK Party government and President Erdogan's leadership proves otherwise. Expressly, the enhancement of Turkey's activism through multilateral activities in its geostrategic location could be characterized as part of Turkish Foreign Policy initiatives based on grit, merit and trustworthiness in developing bilateral relations that has resulted in the expansion and leadership across a multilateral field. Thus, the aim of the study has been to explain Turkey as an *efficacious power* in pursuit of advancement, development and achievement that lies far beyond a middle power role. Turkish Foreign Policy has been fashioned in a way that is based on realism with focus on military exercises, humanitarianism in terms of poverty alleviation aimed at developing the Global South and vigorous bilateral trade across diverse state actors. All of these qualities render Turkey beyond a middle power classification and in which the evidence provided across diversified literature seem to substantiate and recognize Turkey among great power politics. Therefore, the next Chapter 5 will examine and evaluate the opportunities, limitations, the successes and failures of Turkey's endeavour with an *efficacious* character to challenge the international system's status quo and its defiant voice to resist the unfairness of the international liberal world order.

CHAPTER 5- ANALYSIS/EVALUATION OF TURKEY'S PERFORMANCE

5.1 Revisiting IR Therioes for State Behavior Evaluation

Acharya and Buzan in *The Making of the Global International Relations* in the Post-Western World Order: Deep Pluralism touch upon the dicussion of the growth of power and strength of the core as "China and India began to take up roles as great powers" not only through the means of wealth and power but vis a vis "cultural authority" (Acharya & Buzan, 2019, p. 261). As they argue that the Western domination of the international order is lessened in its imapct on the international system, at the same time, "the core package of sovereignty, territoriality and nationalism" (Acharya & Buzan, 2019, p. 264) will continue to remain as one could perceive the underlying reason for the continued state of anarchy and the Hobbesian state of nature's perpetual endurance. The global international system's multipolar characteristic will bear fruit to multiple centers "wealth, power and cultural authority" that is observed by the scholars as "deep pluralism" (ibid, p.265) meaning that "a strongly integrated and interdependent system" will pave the way for "different economic and political ideologies" (ibid, p.265) as one could argue which can result in the emergence of and competion of system(s)within the broder international system. Non-state actors will also be a part of this new fabric of systems who have the economic and political opportunity space to cooperate and collaborate with state actors in order to influence regional and global decision-making per se. Inherently, the debate about the emerging world order has been discussed by a variety of scholars with Acharya and Buzan offering a comendable analysis. Yet, it is also worth exploring other views such as a "multipolar future, a multi-partner future and a multi-cultural future" (Flockhart, 2016) to examine the possibility of a variety of international systems and orders that already harbor interwoven and intertwined relationships among states which are difficult to pars out.

This thesis, however, from the perspective of Acharya and Buzan provide a holistic approach in the transformation of the global international system, as they have argued where "the role of the emerging powers is based on what might be called the "hype of the rest"" (Acharya, 2014, p.5) The reason for the hype could be due to the overarhcing estimationg that "Norms are understood to have generally diffused from the Western center to the periphery. Non-Western actors either adopted or resisted such new ideas, but rarely were they the agents of progress" (Stuenkel, 2016, p.1). Today, the "rest" or the "emerging" states

are claiming and re-writing their agency, role and image in the way they want to shape their identity through their distinct and civilizational experiences that creates a nexus for a new world order to form and emerge. “The new regimes that emerge will not necessarily play by the West’s rules just because they are democratic. Put differently, democratization does not mean Westernization” (Kupchan, 2012, p.9)

Hence, the efffort towards a multipolar international order will require the participation of many states that is based on inclusivness rather than exclusivity which will also require many states, their actors, their agency to also either be in competition or acceptance of a multipolar world culture that is accepting of differences rather than visualizing a world the is based on a single hegemonic culture with wealth concentrated in the hands of strictly a few core states as opposed to economic power distributed across the international system. From the perspective of Waltz’ neorealism, one could argue that “Any material structure, in fact, will have no effect except insofar as it interacts with the ideational structure that is the distribution of interests” (Copeland, 2000, p.194). As far as this thesis has attempted to do this is to shed light on the reality that the changing nature of the structure is dependent on the changing nature of states that are intrinsically tied to the state actor’s image construction on the national level which then is translated to the international system through international organizations.

According to Wendt from the constructivist perspective “States are self-organized units constructed from within by the discursive practices of individuals and social groups” in which each possesses a "corporate" identity as a sovereign actor, an identity not tied to interaction with other states” (ibid, p.192). However, as one could see in Turkey’s case study in the post-Cold War era, the proliferation of cultures around the world have produced new types of identities of states for a unique actor like Turkey as one could argue to harbor an *efficacious* state behavior alongside its utilization of a new kind of approach to realism that could be identified as *Muslim realism* based on a moral and humanitarian doctrine whose tenets may lay under a universal set-of-values as a global perspective on a variety of issues such as socio-economic, political, educational, cultural, diplomatic and international politics per se. *Muslim liberalism*, along its counterpart of *Muslim realism*, could both be analyzed and examined further under a separate research program. However, the discourse analysis conducted throughout this thesis has attempted to unearth the liberal approach of Turkey as a state actor who is very keen on trade and economic relations as a way to build bilateral and multilateral relations to strengthen cooperation and collaboration across areas of security,

technology and development. A major composition of the Turkish state's foreign policy dimension, therefore, is the "politics of expertise" in which economic diplomacy serves as "the primary aspect of diplomatic influence and counterinfluence" (Tenzer, 2020, p.297).

From the foreign policy behavior analysis perspective, its is critical for scholars and practicioners to bear in mind that in analyzing a multipolar system the rise of new actors in the system began with the onset of decolonization during the Cold war era. Thus, in the transition to the post-Cold war era, newly engaged actors across international organizations led to the image construction of states like Turkey to take leadership in the international arena to vie for great power ideals and advantages as a way to gain influence and create impact in its geostrategic location and, therefore, be among great power decision-making in the longer term. Turkey's *efficacious* character as a state image displays great power characteristics in the policy-influence when it comes to security concerns in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and other regions since "There are three major areas of security concern in the present in the international system: domestic conflict in weak states, particularly in Africa; unstable regional security complexes, such as South Asia; and the threat from mass-casualty terrorism" (Sørensen, 2006, p.350) which are all issues that are creating interwowenly complex set of matters that have the quality of creating a domino-effect towards spreading instability and insecurity across a diversity of regions.

As the discussion on how and when exactly there could be a power transition among great powers, it seems that the mulipolar system's emergence will distribute power among not just a few but among more state actors in the global scheme. In the growing tensions between great power actors such as the United State and China, Ikenberry argues that "The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it" meaning that if "wealth and power become less concentrated" (Ikenberry, 2011, p.57-58) in the hands of great powers then there is the greater possibility of other actors to rise to the occassion of great power politics to influence, impact and shape the international order through what one could examine as *civilizational outputs within the international order.* This impact is particularly worth exploring further since the role of "glocalization" (Ritzer, 2003) that has provided domestic and foreign policy as intricately tied to one another can help to further unpack the "interrelated patterns of meaning" (Schultz, 1995, p.81) especially in the

development and advancement of state behavior in the simultaneous process of glocalization of politics in Turkey's experience as a cause of patterns of globalization.

This thesis argues on the basis that Turkey is such a power with an *efficacious* quality rising into becoming a great power within global-decision-making status with the ascendancy of a new kind of liberal Muslim culture that respects values and norm of international institutions but at the same time calls on international organizations to reform in order to meet the security needs of the post-Cold War era. Hence, one could argue that Turkey's approach to adopting a Responsibility to Protect doctrine as part of its state identity in helping more than 4 million refugees within its borders and in disseminating the "World is Bigger than Five" message is not necessarily a failure of the Wesphalian project but, more so as an intention to call upon the international community to find a solution for the intermixed an vary degrees of the "Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures" (Copeland, 2000, p.195) of the world society in order to arrrive at further cooperation and stability that the Westphalian concept was founded upon to begin with. The neorealist and constructivist explanations converge when considering that "the global transformation was as much ideational as material" (Buzan & Lawson, 2015, p.315).

It could be observed that across the international system in which multipolar system is gaining expediency in the recent years, "modernizing forces of economic growth and advancement" (Ikenberry, 2014, p. 84) are no longer concentrated within the hands of the core but there is the significant trend of "the emergence of a group of democratic middle powers, including Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey (ibid, p.85). However, in today's circumstances, the democratic mastery of Turkey's Presidential system in which the Turkish people could for the first time elect a President through direct democracy since 2014, the state's image, regardless of the Western media's backlash, has led to the resurgence of a democratic identity as a successful narrative in the impact the country is making in security gains in its geostrategic position. Turkey's striving effort in breaking the mold of middle powermanship and moving further up to great power politics via *efficacious power production* is aimed at galvanizing other nations across the system to take heed of its domestic policies as a propeller of a vibrant and impactful foreign policy agenda.

5.2. Decision-Maker Elites in Turkey shedding light on "Turkey's State Behavior" across the International System

The purpose of conducting interviews for this thesis is to look at Turkey's state behaviour from three different angles. The first one is from an academic perspective which provides a view on the theoretical level and is used to interpret the practical regional and international field. The second outlook signifies the evaluation of state behaviour from the purview of a diplomat who has long served the interest of Turkey in the European Union accession process. The first two interviews consist of four identical questions posed to an academic and to a diplomatic actor. The final overarching assessment is a direct political value judgement of a long-time serving state actor in Turkey whose leadership qualities have reflected in the policy-making decision of a country that seeks change within and without. The objective of these interviews are to garner views of state elites in the way Turkey's political stratagem has been shaped and implemented in the post-Cold war era of the country's state behaviour reflected in its foreign policy considering that "images and beliefs often form quickly, long before anything like full information is available. Once they take hold, they are not easy to displace" (Jervis, 1976, p. xxxvi) and hence "any explanation for a state's foreign policy must address what is going on in the decision-makers' minds" (Jervis, 1976, p.1xxx).



Figure 6: Diagram of the Components of the Mind Model (Hudson & Day, 2020, p.43)

Professor Cagri Erhan, Rector of Altınbaş University and member of the Turkey's Presidential Security and Foreign Policy Board, responded to the question of "What do you think are the first three most important impediments on the path of equity in international politics?" through a realist perspective arguing that "states within the international system struggle for their own national interests. The aforementioned interests are determined without considering other countries' priorities nor the mutual interests of humanity. In the past century the attempt to create a global order based on equality was left without a result for this particular reason. At the core of the United Nations system there lies the principle of "all sovereign states being equal." However, the prerogative given to the five permanent members on the first day of the Security Council has only paved the way for the equality argument to be left on paper." Erhan's view that the world continues to operate within the realm of realism requires one to look at how equality could be attained through the reform of institutions based on values and beliefs they were founded upon. His argument goes ahead in explaining the need to reform the United Nations Security Council from reflecting a constructivist view that the aim for peace, security and equity requires the participation of all state actors who can look out for the common interest of humanity via equal participation. Erhan states:

> If an equal and just system will be established in international politics the United Nations must turn back to its original function and the spirit of its original establishment. This can only be possible with an institutional reform. By increasing the number of permanent members at the Security Council, two-thirds of the global population represented and 85% of the grossp production coming from G20 countries must be provided a permanent membership. Other countries should be included into the council through a rotation. The veto mechanism must be lifted and the council should transition into a qualified majority. In instances where international peace and security is violated the United Nations effective intervention must be facilitated. The fight against terrorism and organized crime must be taken under the tasks of the United Nations. Poverty, spread of diseases, global warming, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are all mutual problems faced by humanity and are issues that should be taken under the heading of "threats to international peace and security issues" where there should be an effective fight given to these problems.
>
> Secondly, international trade must be brought to an equal footing. Since the World Trade Organization has been founded the developed countries put the rules and it can be seen that developing and least developed countries have been required to abide by these rules. Previously, "third world countries" identified as "South" countries were not limited to just their dependence on the "North" for industrial products. From agriculture to medication in order to survive these countries are dependent on many vital products. Unless this is changed it will not be possible for

the problems of the "South" to be solved. In world trade, developing and least developed countries' economies must be strengthened so that they can turn to a structure where they do not have to be suppliers to rich countries.

Third point is regarding the situation of refugees. According to the numbers given by the United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees there are more than 100 million people displaced around the world. This issue emerged as a result of wars, internal conflict, genocide, ethnic cleansing, oppressive regimes and economic issues. In the last 20 years the number of refugees doubled. The refugees can only return home by changing the conditions that led them to this situation on the other hand, the rising xenophobia, discrimination, Islamophobia and anti-semitism kinds of diseased ideas in developed Western countries are making the lives of refugees even more difficult. Across many places in the world, it is a basic human right to be able to live far away from prejudices."

In regards to the interview question of "what are the most significant traits of Turkish Foreign Policy that are different than the past, prior to 2 decades ago?" Erhan's response provides a comprehensive security perspective that underscores a realist approach while positioning Turkey's role within international organizations as a critical move on the country's path towards ascendancy in the system and the reason being that IOs are the main catalyzer that enabled this success. Erhan stated,

"Turkey in the past 20 years has become one of the leading actors in the international system. In comparison to prior years this ascendancy has three main dynamics. First, "Turkey's own project" perception. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the ensuing 10 years Turkish Foreign Policy acted on the paradigm that Western allies determined on issues such as Cyprus, the Aegean and Palestine with the exception of a few others. Without acting on its own priorities, Turkey acted according to the role designated by Washington and Brussels. Turkey's Foreign Policy was heavily determined by the framework of security concerns of Western allies. Starting from 2003 there was a multilateral transition process in Turkish Foreign Policy both in the region and in its agenda. In many of the Asian, African and Latin American countries embassies were opened where diplomatic representation was not present before. Turkey began to take place in regional cooperation organizations with an observer status in continents beside Europe. Turkey was nominated for non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Council and Organization of Islamic Conference in particular Turkey provided active contribution as a member to international organization agendas and decisions. Turkey diversified the content of its relations with the European Union, Russia and China. In the new term of Turkish Foreign Policy while on one side it continues its constructive consultation process with its allies and partners on the other hand, it started to present alternative policies under many headings to these platforms. Turkey stemmed ideas, such as Nuclear disarmament, the fight against terror, the plight of refugees, the fight against all kinds of

discrimination all of which closely concern the international community were brought to the agenda.

The second case is regarding the "humanitarian diplomacy leadership" of Turkey. In the last 20 years the bilateral, regional and multilateral steps taken on a global scale led Turkey to become a leading country in the area of humanitarian diplomacy. From Myanmar to Syria and from the Philippines to Libya, Turkey took action to protect people in conflict regions. This was not limited to just diplomatic initiatives. Maybe the matter that took Turkey to the forefront in this area is due to providing the most humanitarian aid in the world in ratio to its population and gross domestic product. Without differentiating between region, religion nor ethnicity Turkey's TIKA, Red Crescent, Yunus Emre Institute and Maarif Foundation are some of the leading works within Turkish Foreign Policy that provides help and aid through public and civil society organizations. While Turkish embassies are leading traditional diplomacy across the world, they are spending a larger part of their shift in exerting an effort to solve humanitarian issues.

The third case of Turkey is concerning "strong decision-making mechanism". Turkey in its foreing policy from the top to the bottom and from the bottom to the top is implementing a dual decision-making model in harmony. With strong leadership structure, the capability of a fast and effective decision implementation through executive presidential system and the formation of a working culture between the military and civil bureaucracy, the Turkish state's foreign policy capacity increased. Furthermore, the civil society comprised of organizations such as DEIK, TIM, and TOBB which are private sector representatives in trade diplomacy, university research centers, and think-tanks are producing an enriched content as to present alternative approaches to foreign policy decision-making processes at a greater level in comparison to past times.

To the question of "how do you see Turkey changing the course of the game of international politics?" Erhan posited Turkey's role as an actor that is challenging the status quo of the hierarchy of the international system through a regional security perspective which significantly couches Turkey's role in the fight against terror and Asad regime in Syria as well as its increased activities in the East Mediterranean both as realist ambitions. However, Turkey's security activism in the region is directly, as noted below, connected to the principles of international law as exemplified by its great willingness to resolve issues through international organizations like the United Nations. Erhan argues that Turkey's strategic importance from a realist purview has enabled it to take leadership in the security of the region while constructing its image as a legitimate leader by taking steps in its regional policies in alliance with international organizations.

"Turkey over time has come to be a state that "sets the rules" and "is a game changer". For example, in Northern Syria the power vacuum that emerged led Turkey to successfully be a

> "game changer" by using the military to intervene against DAESH and PKK-YPG organizations attempting to form a political entity. Likewise, in the East Mediterranean the illegal partitioning of maritime jurisdiction area that attempted to leave Turkey out was abolished through its drilling activities, search and rescue drills, military stratagem and recently the signing of a memorandum of Understanding with Libya on the sharing of maritime jurisdiction areas. The partition of the new maritime jurisdiction areas map was successfully registered by the United Nations. The Astana and Sochi processes regarding Syria's future was possible through Turkey's constructive and responsible contribution. Especially in the international developments taking place within the vicinity of its geography, Turkey displayed to other actors that any step taken without its consideration would be doomed to failure and that Turkey would directly intervene as it sees necessary.

As it has been explored in this thesis, Turkey's amalgamation of an approach that brings together constructivist image building through values and beliefs, its realist approach to regional security and its liberal approach through trade and economic relations has shaped Turkey into a kind of power combination rendering the state to be identified beyond the scope of a middle power country. In terms of whether Turkey' role could be defined or identified as a "soft power? Hard power? Both? Or a third kind of power and what is Turkey's characteristic tool of interaction?" Erhan's response focuses on Turkey's diplomacy efforts as part of a strategy that combines soft and hard power that establishes Turkey's image as a decision-maker, leader and smart actor within its geostrategic location. It seems that Turkey's stringent approach to confidently assert its policies for its own interest as well as the interest of the region is based on realism. Yet, at the same time, its bilateral and multilateral interactions continue to demonstrate Turkey's desire to continue its economic, trade, educational, cultural relations as part of a liberal and constructivist approach to establish and maintain ties with various state actors in the region and around the world. Erhan in response to how Turkey could be defined as a powerful actor argues that:

> "In this day and age, Turkey is one of the best countries that reflects the "smart power" concept. In the 21st Century, Turkey became the best country to act upon and be able to discern the needs pertaining to international balance and the global system. In its bilateral and multilateral relations, while Turkey in international politics successfully uses that compartment diplomacy approach of mutual interest and interdependence, at the same time, it does not shy away from using hard power when it sees necessary. Soft and hard power elements which are used right after one another or simultaneously have been successfully used in the face of many problems. Prior to the current government in power, in recent Turkish Foreign Policy the black and white approach vis a vis relations with countries has been abandoned. In other words, Turkey became an exceptional

country with an ability to cooperate with countries in certain areas despite enduring problems with the very countries in some other areas."

Ambassador Volkan Bozkir, diplomat and politician elected as the President of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly on June 12, 2020 provides a perspective on Turkey's regional and global activism starting from a historical point of view. He argues, that:

> "The international system that had been designed according to the balance of power among nation-states model until the SecondWorld War, shifted to a bipolar system after the War, which made the USA and the Soviet Russia two dominant actors of international politics, as leaders of the Western and Eastern Blocks during the Cold War. With the collapse of the USSR, which turned the word into unipolar, or "new world order" as President Bush referred, the US became the leader of the new world order and no other country, including the Russian Federation, could not respond to the leadership position of the United States. The US, as the superpower, had dominated the international system until 9/11. However, the terrorist attack of 9/11 also raised questions about the superpower position of the US, and doubts on the international system of the 21st century, which in fact, could be taken as another breaking point within the international system.

During the 2000s, while the whole world met new international actors who are different from states and international organizations, there were also new international powers emerging like Japan and Turkey. The world and its problems became more global, where no country could separate itself, from a problem that occurred anywhere in the world. Emerging economies became bigger stakeholders of the world economy, while interests of countries had multidimensional and multilateral character, connected to different international actors, instruments and principles. In brief, the world became more complicated in contrast to the simplicity of the Cold War era that defined the world as two parts or polar, namely, the West and the East.

Bozkir's focus on the reform of international institutions is argued to pave the way for a more effective multilateralism where equal participation within the establishment of peace and security in the world is an initiative that must be inclusive rather than exclusive.

> "Our world and the international system, are now not only more complicated but also multilateral, multipolar and multidimensional. However, we still want to run the international system with the means of the old system, i.e. the old world. The whole international system that we operate is, mainly designed according to the bipolar world order of the Cold War era. The UN, NATO, World Bank and IMF are the institutions of the world after the 2nd World War. Take UN Security Council, which shall be respected as in charge with international security and peace, has five

> permanent members, USA, China, Russia, France, and UK, who are the victors of the 2nd World War. Any decision that would come out from the Council can be vetoed by any of those members. No other country, obviously, has a voice in the Council. That is why President Erdoğan calls for "the world is bigger than five", which also reflects the belief of the world, which emerged after the 2000s.
>
> To sum up, the most important impediments of the path of equity in international politics are first, the attempts to respond to new and unique problems of the new world, with old fashioned instruments of the old world. International instruments of the Cold War era should be transformed into more capable and responsive institutions that would functionally deal with the new types of international problems. Secondly, the powers of the old world, USA, China, Russia etc. should make a shift from the understanding of the bipolar international system to a multipolar world perspective. There are emerging economies and powers who are becoming important stakeholders of the world order from day to day and demanding more. Finally, problems are no longer national or regional. If a country wants in its interest, it should also work for other countries' interest at the same time, since solutions are no longer unilateral. This brings collaboration and cooperation as significant means of resolving crises to the international agenda, which makes each country equal party to the solution."

In terms of the changes that occurred in Turkish Foreign Policy looking back at the past two decades, Bozkir states that the most persistent issues on Turkey's agenda have been the "Armenian and Cyprus issues." From a realist security perspective he argues that:

> "The decisions were mostly taken in line with the US foreign policy and the main efforts were mostly done to stay as part of Western pact. However, on the other side, Turkey was not too late to comprehend that the international system transformed into a more complex and multidimensional format that requires countries to be proactive in the face of new types of international developments consisting of the refugee crisis, climate change, pandemics, armed conflicts etc. And in fact, Turkey quickly adopted this transformation by developing proactive resolutions to the issues of international politics, which includes stipulating, profiling and initially responding to upcoming developments that have potential to affect the country. Some have defined this as "axial dislocation" but this was, in fact, not about the content of the Turkish foreign policy, but rather about its methodology. Turkey has transformed its methodology of foreign policy making into a proactive one. This did not only diversify instruments of the Turkish foreign policy but also its interests. This is why, foreign policy's attention has expanded from Europe to Southern America, from Middle East to Australia, from Northern America to Africa. Moreover, Turkey as an emerging international power, started to use varied forms of international means, as reflected by motto, "powerful diplomacy both at the table and in the field."
>
> Having said that, Turkey's significant traits of the foreign policy can be identified as proactive and humanitarian, which stipulates possible effects of international developments and pre-engages by soft and hard powers that include diplomacy as well as military intervention."

In terms of the changing terrain of international politics during a period of upheaval and a volatile diplomatic scene, Bozkir's perspective as a politician and a diplomat reflects Turkey's security and humanitarian concerns from a realist perspective while the state's strategy responses are couched within a continuous liberal approach vis a vis its engagement in international organizations and institutions. Both Erhan and Bozkir provide an analysis on Turkey's case in the post-Cold War as a geostrategic power that combines soft and hard power as a dual strategy to increase the Turkish state's significance in decision-making within its region and around the world. Yet, it seems that the shadow of the past or rather the old establishment of the international hierarchy seems to be challenged by regional and global actors like Turkey that are providing a challenge from within the system as the international arena is transitioning into a multipolar system. This, in reality, is to the advantage of Turkey which desires to expand its scope of include across the system. Turkey's political messaging and discourse in the international scene provides a renewalist and reformist approach that pushes forward the importance of engagement through multilateralism, an active role in conflict resolution and the essential need for all states to take responsibility as part of a humanitarian diplomacy. In this regard Turkey's responsible and problem-solver quality of leadership according to Bozkir serves an exemplar for other state actors to draw a lesson from and for others to adopt accordingly within their policies, approaches and solutions:

> "As I pointed out, most of the countries still tend to play the game by rules and means of the old-world order that existed between the post-Second World War and 9/11. However, the world and the international system is not the same any longer. Emerging economies like Turkey, want to have bold voice in international affairs. Turkey, as a member of the G20, emphasizes on its contribution to global economic development while the country also asks for more saying on political or peace and security issues and play the game accordingly. Besides, Turkish foreign policy is multidimensional that has interests in cooperating with different countries. Turkish foreign policy does not see it as conflict of interest to ally Russia and the USA at the same time. Turkey believes uniqueness of each cooperation in international politics and indeed, see cooperation necessary. Thus, we do not endorse partisanship and polarization in international politics, rather support open dialogue and cooperation if easy or hard to do. Additionally, Turkish foreign policy acts according to the principle of separation of issues, which does not hedge one's bets. Looking at Turkey-Russia relations gives the hints of this principle. While we had a strong disagreement, even contradiction with Russia on its Crimea policy, we achieved reconciliation in Syria. Moreover, Turkey takes its future interests into account and take prudential steps as such its investments in Africa, which is another game changer that makes Turkey not only regional but also a global actor."

In response to what kind of a power Turkey could be described as, Bozkir with a nuanced response to Erhan's observation argues that the states' main tool of interaction is through international organizations by implementing soft and hard power politics as a policy-agenda to assert not just its own national interest but also the interest of the neighboring countries and their people. Turkey has been able to pursue a difficult path towards its assertive policy by strengthening its economy and achieving growth despite the Covid-19 pandemic that has warped the global community. Despite the challenge that the pandemic has brought upon the world, Turkey' humanitarian and diplomatic missions to provide aid to countries showcases its willingness to be a leader in the world as a humanitarian actor. In the meantime, the military initiatives being taken regarding Libya demonstrate its unwavering position that it will engage, protect and conduct bilateral relations with a neighbor in which other regional actors attempt to dominate. Therefore, Bozkir's analysis that Turkey exerts a combination of soft and hard power is quite evident in the military operations under process in Syria as well. The advancement in bilateral relations through economic and trade relations, the increasing development of the defense industry while focusing on cultural and education ties with other states render Turkey's role and image as a humanitarian, multilateral actor that has coalesced multiple policy tools to construct an *efficacious image* for itself within the system. Bozkir states that:

> "Turkey's growing economy and its consolidation with international political power enabled the country to put soft and hard power together in action. By increasing its diplomatic missions and activities targeting public opinions all around the world, Turkey activated its soft power. At the same time, when Turkey sees a threat to its security and interests, it does not hesitate to use hard power, as the final solution following all diplomatic efforts, as so did in Northern Syria.
>
> One more thing in this regard, which is relatively new, is that Turkey has also become experienced to use international organizations as another type of power or tool of interaction, as well as an opportunity window to cooperate. Turkey's efforts to neutralize the US's decision on Jerusalem, at the UN General Assembly represent a perfect example of that."

The culmination of a realist, liberal and constructivist perspective on issues of advancement and development across all spheres can be further analyzed in the view of a state actor who along with his political party has in nearly two decades led the transformation of Turkey's image into what could be argued to be an *efficacious identity.* The following set of interview questions have been designed to be able to understand the political perspective of a state actor whose discourse and narrative has shaped the intellectual underpinnings of

trade, economic, security, and development policies that became a major locomotive for Turkey's image shaping in the region and the international system vis a vis effective message dissemination from within international organizations. The following interview conducted with the President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan reflects the views of a state actor whose leadership can provide scholars and practitioners a window into further analysis in academic and policy-research regarding Turkey's changing role and perception in the international system.

In order to further explicate and examine the views of President Erdogan, it would be most useful to refer to Turkey's change in international activism in the post-Cold War era as part of a link to the domestic changes that occured on the national level with the aim of reforming the international order based on equity and justice. In this context, there are two figures that have been analyzed by Waltz (1979) and Rosecrance (1963) that offer a window on the perception of relations between units (states) and their actions creating an impact in the international system during the Cold War period.



Figure 7: International political system depiction of (Rosecrance, 1963, p. 229) Figure 3.2 in (Waltz, 1979, p.41).



Figure 8: A system's approach conceives of the international political system in Figure 3.1 (Waltz, 1979, p.40).

Figure 7 showcases the regulator as an institution in "different historical periods" that "opposes the disturbing actions of others, perhaps through alliances and balance-power of power politics" (Waltz, 1979, p. 41). Rosecrance points out that "the balance of power system, the Concert of Europe, the binding force of ideolgy, alliances systems, the League of Nations, and the United Nations—all these may play a regulative role in the international system" (Jo, 2007, p.30). In today's circumstances during the post-Cold War era, in the changing nature of international politics with the proliferation of a multipolar system, Turkey's role as a reformer in reality targets the expected transformation of the "regulator." In this regard, Turkey's call for the "World is Bigger than Five" global campaign is to create awareness and mobilize various actors across the system to reform the United Nations Security Council that is no longer sustainable in the 21st Century due to the eroding effectiveness and deadlock created by the veto power of the Permanent Five. What makes Turkey's role as an *efficacious power* is its roles as game-changer which can be described from within middle powermanship scholarship but at the same time goes beyond such categorization by demonstrating a new kind of international behavior by pointing out the deficiency of the UNSC institution. In the framework provided by Rosecrance, "actors' behavior determines international outcomes" (Waltz, 1979, p. 42) where Turkey's efforts to draw attention to a global security institution's inefficiency requiring reform based on inclusivity in the context of a changing terrain of international politics in a multipolar system world.

Figure 8, thus, requires the formulation of a more fluid, flexible and shifting illustration of the relationship than the unit(s) and the system relationship as originally illustrated by Waltz in *The Theory of International Politics*. As part of a new endeavour to imagine the changing balance of power and the pressure put at the core of the system, namely the instiutition (s), by actors such as Turkey, there is a need to re-formulate the change within affecting the change across the whole system. The following Figure 9 illustrates this shift in the system as part of a new intellectual imagination of the relationship of (x) units, their interaction across the competition to shape the world order and the impact of new patterns of behavior on the re-shaping of the international structure.



Figure 9: Unit-level pattern of interaction impacting the larger international system

In reflection of the interview questions and responses from Erhan and Bozkir, one could observe that a within system change requires actors like Turkey to put pressure on the regulator to create a wave of change across the international system which, in the larger scheme of international politisc, points to the possibility of a competition of civilizational experiences to re-constitute a world order based on varying values, beliefs and ideologies in the Huntingtonian sense. Therefore, the explanatory power of structural theories such as in the one we can point to in the neorealist framework requires expansion and a re-formulation to include the causal relationship between the units and the system from a holistic perspective especially in analyzing the actor (s) at the state level and how their patterns of behavior influence change across the system. In order for a more adequate research program for future scholars and practicioners, it is important to delve into "how the structure affects the characteristics of states, or how structures are affected by variations in the international organization and behavior of states" (Topper, 1998, p.160) as this thesis aimed to explain with Turkey's case study in the post-Cold War era. The intellectual imagination as presented in Figure 8 aims to look at the interacting units and their affect on the changing system by pointing to the interconnectedness of domestic developments and its influence in the changing structure of the international system. Hence, "Successful foreign policy…is oriented towards an ability to present aims in language that speaks to the normative values that inform clustered states and, therefore, can form the basis for collective action" (Alden & Aran, 2017, p.97).

This can be best explained and analyzed in the interview conducted in this thesis with President Erdogan, the state actor leading Turkey's changing role and perception in the international system for nearly two decades. The change in Turkey's *efficacious* international behavior rests upon the changes that have occurred on the domestic scene. In President Erdogan's view "establishing an institutionalized stability and an active administration model" within Turkey has enabled "Turkish Foreign Policy to move away from passiveness and towards a more proactive trajectory" in addition to the accumulation of material power that has shaped the country's image in the region and the world as a humanitarian actor. One could argue that "the fundamental causes of national foreign policy behavior" (Cooney, 1975, p.133) can be attributed to the economic, educational, cultural and military strength accumulation within the context of national stability as a way to exert influence and power in its geostrategic position. In this direction, both cultural and humanitarian diplomacy (Rousseau & Pende, 2020) as critical tools of TFP agenda, renders the country's "increasing power of attraction and influence" (Kessler, 2020 p. 228) alongside its integration of diplomatic practices that aim to culturally, educationally and economically support the strengthening of bilateral ties through coordinated work of state-run agencies such as the ones seen in TIKA, YTB, Maarif Education Foundation and YEE. All of these aforementioned tools put towards the good use of an image construction of Turkey's role in its geostrategic region and its influence across international organizations and platforms which provide an analytical tool for the "interplay of structure, and agency, and of ideas, norms and interests" (Steans, Pettiford, Diez & El-Anis, 2010, p.183).

It could also be analyzed from President Erdogan's that in order for there to be an established stability both at home, the region and the world global institutions liked the United Nations must operate on the basis of justice. According to the President," …the United Nations Security Council is not able to fulfill its duty. Our problems in the world will continue to multiply if there is not a reform with an understanding of justice and equity in the system that is human-centered rather than harboring the interests of a few countries." Hence, it could be further analyzed that institutional change that is being desired in Turkey's case during the post-Cold War era can explain the nation's drive towards reform as "an autonomous agent" (Kelman, 1970, p.5) that is manifested by its foreing policy approach to reform global institutions. In this regard, it could be argued that tracing the framing of messages and the dissemination of discourse through international organizations and platforms can allow one to examine how material capabilities coupled with strategic

communication can render a state like Turkey's goal to achieve change from within institutions in the framework of a *renewed and updated* "behavioral power" (Ward & House, 1988). This analysis could be pursued further under a *neobehavioral approach* which "employs both the concepts of rationality and power and the concepts of beliefs, emotions, and motivations" which will allow an interwoven research program to deconstruct what seems to be two different research programs when in reality both programs show a greater convergence in the 21st Century "international relations and foreign policy" (Walker, 2011, p.7). As this thesis attempted to do in the earlier chapters and sections constructivism provides a significant analytical tool in which tracing the changes in patterns of state behavior on the individual, the state and international level can provide an outlook on the changing nature of the overall structure and how these levels of interaction produce new trends and changes.

In tandem to the interview responses from three different angles presented in this part of the thesis, the following sections will provide an analysis of Turkey's strengths and challenges in the path to becoming a global power as an *efficacious actor*. Turkey's geostrategic vitality and diplomatic wisdom has been a critical vehicle in the way that led to overcoming challenges within the country. Surmounting these hurdles provide a practical lesson for the global community, in particular the Global South, to take example in the drive towards economic, security and political development. Thus, Turkey's socio-economic and political narrative in advancement is a success story intended to be shared with the international audience.

The ensuing sections 5.2 Turkey as an Opportunity Maximizer, 5.3 Turkey's Internal Limitations in the Region and in Global Politics, and 5.5 Findings, Conclusions and Policy Implications will be explained under the light of analysis conducted in the chapters and also expand on the perspective put forth in the interviews. This will be done in order to embody a comprehensive framework in the continuity of state elite activism in Turkish Foreing Policy. It is argued that this continuity allowed a transformed discourse dissemination during the AK Party government to construct an empowered image of Turkey in the 21st Century.

5.3. An Analysis of Tukey's State Behavior as an Opportunity Maximizer

Turkey's search for an identity in its geographic location led to greater activity in regional organizations especially under Ozal's leadership. Between the East and the West

there was a greater effort to demonstrate Turkey's will to take part in strategic decision-making processes as part of, what later would be refered to as, a neo-Ottomanist character that vied for greater influence. In this new image of Turkey in the post-Cold war era "political leaders, most notably Turgut Ozal, quite explicitly identified themselves with Muslim symbols and policies" where this trend also confirmed that "…democracy reinforced indigenization and the return to religion" (Huntington, 2014, p.148). The continuity to redress the painful separation of religious practice and symbols from the Turkish people, in reality, dates back to the 1950s. The attempt to make amends with religious practice in public was quite evident in the democratic struggle that Menderes gave when he changed the call to prayer from Turkish Arabic after 18 years and, opened the Imam Hatip Schools as we know now and was executed in the hands of the military for doing so. It can be observed beyond dispute that "the return to religion" required freedom at home in order to undo a foreign policy bound by a vision that sought to contain Turkey within the Western realm of policy-making world. Hence, Turkey's multilateral activisim across various institutions has developed over time as Turkish Foreign Policy has been utilized as a means to increase Turkey's presence in regional and international organizations.

In this regard, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the country's foreign policy vision gradually developed over time as Ozal behaved with an expansionist vision. This was evident during the Gulf War period. But, the same kind of effectiveness towards joining the European Union was not successful due to the underlying reason of having a Muslim majority population. Once again, regardless of numerous pretexts put forth to Turkey, religion has always been a reason of prejudice it faced by its European counterparts. In 1997, Turkey was rejected by the European Union despite having asserted a strong willingness to be a part it. However, at the end of year 1999, Turkey's candidacy was finally officially recognized. As AK Party came into office by the end of 2002, it, with no respite, put EU processes to the very center of its international policy priorities. AK Party's reformist image corroborated the desire for a Muslim-majority society and religious minorities in Turkey that prosperity and democarcy in a country is possible while being in peace with religious values.

The idea of being Western and liberal was not an impediment to aligning religious values with democracy. On the contrary, this initiative sought to breakdown prejudices against members of a society who put their Muslim identity alongside their Western image. In retrospect, Turkey's political stage for more than three decades showcased an eagerness for, what would amount to, a neo-Ottomanist approach that revive the values of a recent past

and its application to its foreign policy agenda. The interaction with the Western world alongside high diplomatic initiative with the Global South led Turkey to enhance its foreign policy through moral, humanitrian, realist approach couched within a vision that is piety-based. In that long journey, AK Party government's alacrity for striving as an *efficacious power* towards becoming one of the greater powers sets precedence for other middle and small power states that economic growth, development and high diplomatic initiative can lead to greater success.

This breakthrough was especially expedited with the trigger of regional order brought about by the Arab Spring. Turkey's democratic progress served as an exemplar despite the intense criticism put forward by Western intelligentsia who viewed the country's rejuvenation and modernization vis a vis its cooperation of democracy and Islam as a threat to the "secular and laicite" type of Enlightenment. Post-WWII economic development and the gap between the North and South that brought further disparity to the international system required a new look at what civilizaton meant in the post-Cold War era. The polarization between the East and the West and the bipolar system was to be brought into question. Changes in the international system led to a manifestation of discussions on the viability of Westphalian system and the Enlightenment period that carried nation-states to pursue reason as opposed to religion. The French experience of Enlightenment viewed reason and religion as binary which was believed that the latter was in stark difference to human advancement and development. The post-Cold War era, however, proved that religous values could no longer be confined and kept out the discussion of development, democracy, globalization, etc.

In tandem, the reason for such harsh opposition from the Western democracies to Turkey's socio-political transformation in the 21st Century is due to this ascending potential of an alternative kind of Enlightenment, per se, emerging under a Muslim leadership. This is a new conditioning in which religious values are not discarded, but to a certain extent compouded with the policy-making processes. This study specifically attempted to deduce how the values of a piety-driven society like Turkey reflected such a behavior in its foreign-policy agenda. This is a critical stride in expanding on what it really means for a middle power state to be just a "good international citizen." Turkish Foreign Policy presents a case study that it is more than an actor that deems itself to be harboring good intentions. In order to be a robust role-model, Turkey's state behavior illustrates an "activist international citizen" persona at the forefront of its image which aims to bring about change to the benefit

of all states that deserve an equal-footing in the international system. Yet, in the struggle to transform its image Turkey is still facing an "Ottoman stigmatization" (Zarakol, 2011, p.124) as a cause of Western superiority that reigned over 19th Century towards the end of Ottoman Empire and the early 20th Century beginning of the Republican period. The post-Cold war era that led to multilateral activism to allow other actors such as middle powers to compete in the system led to an investigation. This long time inquiry, activism and campaign for reform in the international system rejected a Western-centric view and understanding on what it means to be advanced and developed. The changing power dynamics present in Turkey's efforts to reform a world in the international scene are more pertinent than ever to the re-thinking of the concept of civilization (s), their similarities, differences and the great possibility of their nexus in the 21st Century.

Therefore, Turkey's activism for reform and change are not limited to a renewal only within the country but within the global community, which by the way is becoming smaller by the moment. The few countries of great power who intentionally keep certain states subjugated to great-power determination do so, as argued in this study, at the expense of the many. Turkish Foreign Policy discourse analysis presented in the literature review throughout this research brought to light the reality of how Turkey's domestic transformation has been extended to democratize an "undemocratic international system." The kind of tectonic shift that will need to take place within the global system will require a trend-builder, an agenda-setter and a game changer such as Turkey.

Perusing across the international system, it is quite evident that Turkey stands out among middle powers such as those within the MIKTA, for instance. The raison detre for this can be explicated simply by the fact that Turkish Foreign Policy behavior shows a resilience to not succumb to the unjust international "liberal" world order. Turkish Foreign Policy discourse analyzed in the overview of the actor, the state and the system recounts a narrative of a nation that does not capitulate to an unfair treatment of nation-states. The hierarchy of the international system built by great powers continues to do disservice to humanity by strenously attempting to legitimize the international institiutions who do not practice the values they were founded upon. The discrepancy between values and practice are what is causing the constructive shift to take place in the first place. In order to understand the shift in the international system we must take a glance at some of the internal limitations Turkey defeated in the post-Cold War era.

5.4. Turkey's Internal Limitations in the Region and Global Politics

An important question to address in this section is "to what extent does capability match discourse and whether there is a capability gap?" This is a critique one ought to unpack in order to observe the challenges Turkey faced and is facing in today's regional and international context. The post-Cold war era for Turkey, as mentioned earlier, brought forth an opportunity for the country to shape a foreign policy agenda and identity based on regional leadership. The strategic environment was re-defined through a moral, humanitarian and international organization-based approach as a susbstance for a transformative Turkish Foreign Policy. This thesis argues that capability of a state such as its economy, defense industry, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and issues such as the fight against terrorism demonstrate a state's willingness to progress as an influential actor in the international system.

Any predicament that stymied the aforementioned capabilities gave way to the limitations. One of the major internal limitations dates back to the tutelage periods in which the military halted democracy from flourishing within the country. It was deemed by the military generals and officials in the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s and later seen in July 15th 2016 that the cooperation of religious values and politics in Turkey would impugn Western interests. It was this speficic type of limitation, the post-tutelage experience that re-occurred over the past and today became the propeller force for the vision at home to develop and progress. In other words, Turkey's success to build a free society from the shackles of a tutelage mentality is what drove the nation and the state to carry this narrative of struggle beyond borders, regions and across geographies. In doing so, Turkey at the same time is trying to overcome the "structural insecurity" (Çapan & Zarakol, 2019, p.6) of being viewed as a bridge between the East and the West. Instead, it is constructing an image based on the dovetail of tradition and modernity as part of a leading image of a Muslim-majority state that embraces religious, ethnic, political and language diversity.

Therefore, inferring back to the question about capability gap one can observe that military might, economic power and strong institutional foundations are the sine qua non for a strong democracy. However, what has further capacitated Turkey has been the incorporation and practice of Islamic values such as win-win understanding, cooperation/mutual advancement and prosperity by the appeal of various regional partners. The Easten and Western traditions that form the core of Turkey's image and identity is a

strength not just in terms of being only a gateway, but a center of cross-civilizational experiences of Afro-Eurasia landmass as well. The capability of the Turkish state's success in this regard requires students and practicioners across international relations field to analyze not just the material strength of a state but also the kind of discourse dissemination that is conducted through international organizations as a launching-pad to reach out to the international audience. This allows for a sound verification of the match between discourse and material capability since Turkey's expansion of diplomatic activity towards the Caucusus, Central Asia, Africa, Europe and many other regions is based on economic, trade as well as cultural and educational relationships.

In terms of the limitation in global politics, Turkey's case study analyzed within the middle powers literature substantiates the reality that it is a unique case study different than some other middle power activism because it directly challenges great power determination. The main limitation that is prevalent across international institutions is the absence of reform. The lack of reform is directly linked to the restriction inflicted by the limitations of mentality. Typically, a middle power can act as a reformist yet it is not expected to challenge the international hierarchy since it could pose a risk to the international order. However, in the 21st Century's circumstances, the re-organization or the tectonic shift that will take place will require the participation of all state actors across the system in a democratic manner where Turkey is expected to play a competent role in this process. In this vein, the Turkish nation's potency immersed the state actor leadership to change the state's perception as a middle power and hence, resulting in a metamorphic change in the international system.

This does not come easy for Turkey as the power relations in the international system is based on a demarcation of the "established-outsider" (Zarakol, 2011, p.58). Great power legitimacy in the international system was founded based on a hierarchy based on the "stigmatization" (Zarakol, 2011, p.62) of others who were seen as being behind. Those who were "later-joiners to the international society" (Zarakol, 2011, p.66) were not recognized as possible great powers but only meant to be followers of great-power agenda setters. The master-slave relationship that was localized in colonial states was the same kind of power projection that was constructed in small, medium and great power relations. Hence, as seen in the interview section of this research, the emphasis put on the inequality of the United Nations Security Council per se shows the opposition that Turkey has against great powers' colonial practices in international institutions. The awareness Turkey is forming globally also shows a 'limitation on the international-mindset' that requires a paradigm shift and a

new outlook on power relations among states in the system. Turkey's deliberate effort to recognize this problem is doubled with the global mission to democratize the hierarchy of the international system based on inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness.

5.5 Conceptual Blueprint for an Efficacious Power Identity

"Huntington's post-Cold War clash of civilizations thesis preoccupied with evolutionary processes… are not those occurring within states but between them" (Weber, 2005, p.157). This is an important claim referred to by Weber on Huntington's analysis, however, as this study aimed to discover how domestic politics from the purview of social movement theory has asserted to do in analyzing the state behavior analysis as a theoretical approach, it has at the same time, explained the interconnectedness of domestic political change as a catalyst and reflection in the international behavior both on the regional and global levels within the larger analytical framework presented in the interaction of the individual, the state and the international from the perspective of Waltz. The power of discourse along with augmentation of material capabilities has rendered Turkey's case study as a unique experience in its geostrategic position and its interaction with global audiences through international organizations, institutions and platforms.

Turkey's case study in the examination of the state behavior in the post-Cold War era opens up a window of opportunity to see how structure and the material interests of a nation impact one another within the framework of a behavioural approach demonstrated through a tranformation of Turkey's state identity formation from a constructivist theoretical perspective. As part of a power-status change the state behavior analysis provided throughout this study examines the need for a new conceptualization that goes beyond the scope of what is presented within middle powermanship literature across the International Relations academic discipline. In other words, instead of putting aside middle power framework as an analysis to be able to understand Turkey's case study in the post-Cold war, this study attempted to analye the unprecedented example of a state's behavioral transformation as a policy to move up and above the middle power classification vis a vis building or constructing upon middle power literature.

Therefore, as it has become evident throughout this study, Turkey had to be analyzed within middle power scholarship while also shedding light on how domestic, national, and

international behavior of Turkey is expressing a character and image that is far beyond the middle power categorization. Hence, TFP as a mechanism in the extension of state behavior in the international system with an in depth analysis from Waltz' perspective shows how the individual state actor, the state image and the system are simultaneously interacting in a dynamic setting through Turkey's role conception. Thus, this study also points to the academic literature reality that scholars analyzing Turkey's case study can only do so from within middle power literature. However, reference to Karim's analysis on the way role theory can inform a state's power conceptualization the following excerpt is worth pondering upon and analyzing in Turkey's state behavior variation in the post-Cold War era towards a blueprint in conceptualizing the theoretical foundation for what it means to be an *efficacious power* with the intellectual aim to free a state's image from the confines of middle power scholarship.

> "As an independent variable, role conception can be an explanatory variable with regard to the behaviour of states in the international order. As a dependent variable, role conception is formed through the dynamic interactions between states and the international system, as well as changes in the domestic political constellations within states. Arguably, the notion of role conception is important in bridging status-seeking activities and foreign policy agendas" (Karim, 2018, p.349).

This approach, in essence, can provide a new vision, a new area of academic space to discuss, analyze and examine a new power conceptualization such as *efficacious* in the post-Cold War era paving the way for new ways of identifying the changes in power perception across the international system. One can examine transformation in the way power is defined in changing times in particular to Turkey's case study due to a renewed and re-designed understanding of how one can percieve "self-help" across the system through the means of "collective help" of like-minded states aiming to collaborate based on mutual interests, vision, advancement, development and prosperity rather than just simply looking out for one's self-interest in the classical realist sense.

The attempt of this study has been to not simply analyze the state behavior to point out the changes and transformations occuring in Turkey's state behavior but also to contribute to developing a thought about a new perspective needed at a time when the current changes in regional and international politics call for a fresh insight. In this regard, "…concepts give us the language both for formulating the phenomena we seek to explain/understand and the frameworks we build to explain/understand them" (Berenskoetter, 2016, p.2) as part of a new research agenda to provide a direction for contemporary debates across the international academic community in new ways of

conceptualizing newly emerging types of power (s). *Efficacious power* conceptualization, as argued throughout this study, offers a novel insight into Turkey's case study in the post-Cold War from a state behavior analysis interpretation within international relations literature and how this new conceptualization could be further analyzed and delved into within the strand of power analysis "perspectives that include (1) power as identity; (2) power as goal; (3) power as means; (4) power as mechanism; (5) power as competition; and (6) power as capability (Baldwin, 2016, p.91.) All of the different perspectives regarding the way power is perceived will allow scholars and practicioners to unpack the complexity of different kinds of power (s) emerging at a time when the great power transition time creates an opportunity space for other actors to emerge in the way the new world order will be shaped. In this context, Turkey's case study offering a new perspective on power formulation and emergence can provide an opportunity to expand on IR academic literature.

In the examination of Turkey's state behavior throughout this study, the following figure illustrates a possible conditions on the role of an *efficacious power* in the post-Cold War era and how the changing nature of a middle power during this time could be applicable for other nation-states that could vie for a similar power-status change. The criteria referred to in Chapter 2 to as to certain requirements needed to become a middle power, Ping referred to "(1) population, (2) geographic area, (3) military expenditure, (4) GDP, (5) GDP real growth, (6) value of exports, (7) gross national income per capita, (8) trade as a percentage of GDP, and (9) life expectancy at birth" (2005, p.66-72). These may serve as critical markers as to what might determine a state's status as a middle power. However, it is important to bear in mind that Turkey is not only geostrategically different from other middle powers such as the MIKTA per se, but it also harbors a great power legacy from the past. Therefore, it is possible to observe that other middle power status states defined across IR literature might be comfortable with their categorization as a middle power in comparison to Turkey whose historical, civilizational, value and intellectual based enrichment and diversity offer a path towards a more renewed conceptual framework.

Based on the examination and analysis provided throughout this study, the proposed illustration below argues that in order for a nation-state to become *efficacious* during the great power transition time, it requires certain developments and trends to distinguish it from other middle power categorization. The following question, then, is pertinent in the context of changing times. *Do all states have to be efficacious within the given powers of hierarchy*

in international relations? The answer is a no. Turkey's case study examination only provides one example of an unprecedented case in today's world in which, the power of hierarchy is not only challenged from within its geostrategic position but also aims to change and overcome the limitations brought upon by institutions towards the mission of a greater awareness that collective prosperity, empowerement in the name of an inclusive economic and security global community is necessary for stability and peace in the global community.



Figure 10: Illustration of Proposed Conditions for the Efficacious Power Status

CHAPTER 6- CONCLUSION AND FURTHER EVALUATIONS

The aim of this thesis was to use certain theoretical perspectives to analyze Turkey's case study in the post-Cold war era as to how over the span of this period a country has been in the pursuit of transitioning from a middle power to an efficaicous power towards great power politics role in regional and global decision-making. The transition process which we identified in this study is through the descriptive term *"efficacious"* as a way to explain this endeavour. The certain criteria which authors like Chapnick, Baba, Parlar Dal and other scholars identified in this thesis who immensly contributed to middle power literature make an important case for middle power activism. Yet, in today's circumstances in the 21st Century where there is a bottom-up movement in the global system where the disadvantaged is demanding more voice and say in their success and future in actuality says a lot about the concern regarding the international hierarchy.

In order to able to unpack this critical concern and opposition by small and middle powers, this thesis attempted to create a two-tier theoretical analysis in which I first delved into explaining the deficit within the international system. The world system analysis (Wallerstein), world security theory (Booth), global governance (Roseanua) and power transition theory (Organski and Kugler) all provided a framework analysis to understand the whole of the problem in which Turkey as a case study can be analyzed. In other words, to be able to situate Turkey's place within the global context it was deemed necessary to frame the larger problem and move forward with dissecting the case for students, scholars and practicioners to be able to look at the case study one from a global level as a cause of the problem and secondly the national level through its foreing policy as a response or a panacea to the instability in the international system. In this part of the second-tier of theoretical framework, we utilized the regional security complex theory, securitization theory, emancipation theory and social movement theory in which Turkey's Foreign Policy approach was analyzed in the post-Cold War era. This was necessary for divulging the state's transition from the 1990s to the post-2014 period up to 2019. The time frame is lengthy and the years in which the analysis is conducted is through important turning points in Turkish Foreing Policy which came to identify the state's image in the region and around the world. I attempted to explain Turkey's foreign policy role through Waltz' analysis of the individual, the state and the system as a way to trace the dynamic relationship in which the three factors are interconnected. The way in which these elements are so interdependent formulates a

catalyst for the Turkish nation's successful motive in the international system: a just and fair international system in which all states can compete and thrive on an equal-footing.

We briefly touched upon Turkish Foreing Policy approach and intention as some would regard as altruistic. However, once bearing in mind the values and norms in which the international "liberal" world order has been founded, it seems inevitable to question the chasm between the principles and the practice of great powers within the world order. It is this particular problem which Turkey's case within the international system exemplifies a precedent in challenging the deficit of the world order. Small powers have been viewed as destitute and not self-reliant in the de-colonization period therefore their role in global decision-making was marginalized. Middle powers acting as intermediaries between small and great powers served an important purpose in the post-World War II era. They were viewed as balancers and served as a model for the developing of Third World countries who could advance in line with great power values and practice but, during these times, whose exploitation was intentionally used as great power tool to maintain and sustain the unjust world order. From bipolar, to unipolar transformation and in today's current context, the multipolar system is a manifestation of the symptoms of a deeply rooted illness in the international system that has been built for the powerful at the expense of weaker states.

"What is Turkey's role in this process?" is a question that triggers scholars of all disciplines especially politics and international relations due to one simple reason: Turkey's case study in the post-Cold war era from the 1990s to present day demonstrates almost three decades of a state strategy that has pinpointed the deficiency within the international system and the determination to expose it. This endeavour is traced within this study's inquiry "how do middle powers impact world politics in the period of global power transition?" To tackle this, the two sub-problems the thesis expounded upon as a way to substantiate the research question were the following: How can we evalute Turkey's performance as a middle power? How is Turkey different than other middle powers in the international system? Through a constructivist and transformative methodology approach, a narrative research and case study was utilized to explain the way in which Turkish Foreing Policy crystallized into challenging the unjust establishment of the international "liberal" world order.

Therefore, this thesis initially set towards the path of what middle powermanship entailed, looking into its definition provided by scholars across academic literature. Cox & Sinclair (1996), Stephen (2013), Wang & French (2013), Gilley & O'Neil (2014),

Efstathopoulos (2018) all provide an array of discussion on what it means to be a middle power. Yet they invariably face a challenge in defining. The difficulty in the authors lack of strong assertation in regards to a concrete definition is due to the changing nature of the world in terms of technology, communications, trade wars, diseases, poverty and conflicts which are continuously forcing global political terrain to be altered and reshaped. According to Ping (2005) certain criterias do set middle powers apart from their upper and lower tier as mentioned in Section 2.2 but according to Keohane (1990) its their "multilateral activity" that sets them apart from what Manicom & Reeves (2014) argue them to be "states that use alliances, security communities and international organizations in order to influence the global order." Platforms like G20, MIKTA and BRICS provide a space for states like Turkey to show their middle power activism. But, Jordaan (2003) argues that as middle powers "adopt an activist style" they in tandem "interfere in global issues beyond their immediate concern."

The argument provided by Jordaan is a testament to the reality that an issue, as argued in this thesis, concerning anyone within the global neighborhood is a concern of all. Therefore, as explained in this study, the hyper-globalization of the world is leading to spatial dimension to be less of a factor while pushing middle power activism to gain on the responsibilites and duties similar to great power concerns. In this regard, Turkey's case study in the orientation of its foreign policy is unique that during the Cold War Engin and Baba (2015) argue middle powers "supported the norms and rules of the international system". The post-Cold War era, at any rate, demonstrates that countries like Turkey have the strong desire to impact, change and shape the world agenda from their own geostrategic purview and experience within the world order. This research throughout the literature review, data analysis as well as interviews aimed at explaining Turkey's case as a breakthrough within middle power literature which extends beyond the traditional definitions. Turkey's advancement in its economy, defense industry, its role of regionally distributed organizations such as the Red Crescent, TIKA, Maarif, YTB, Yunus Emre and others are all critical tools forming the humanitarian and educational approach of its foreign policy.

Aside from the de facto extensions such as the aforementioned institutions that branch out as part of Turkish Foreign Policy, there is also another stimulating factor that has shaped Turkey's image in the international system. What differentiates Turkey from the rest of middle powers is the effort it has put into internalizing the concept of "Responsibility to Protect" through its humanitarian foreign policy mission. Turkey does not seek humanitarian

intervention similar to great power approach. The Syrian war, for example, resulted in nearly 4 million refugees to be displaced in which Turkey welcomed citizens from the neighboring country. While Turkey sought security measures to fight the Assad regime and terror organizations within Syria threatening Turkey's sovereignty, it did not spare any effort from providing protection to millions of Syrians and other minorities who escaped from conlfict in the region. In Cooper's descripiton (1993) "good international citizenship" showcased in Turkey's example sets it apart from other middle powers based on the reality of harboring, hosting, protecting and providing so many refugees despite the fact that economically it is a tough burden on the state. Military and security policies are of significant concern for all states just as middle powers also address such threats within their own region. But, Turkey's precedence in its geostrategic location presents a counter-hegemonic approach in the threats against its security while at the same time exerting its humanitarian aid appraoch to the forefront of its main international agenda.

As argued by Parlar Dal and Oğuz Gök (2014), Turkey's role as a "Rising Power" is different because it provides a "within-system challenge." Issues on international economic subjugation through various institutions and procedures, military interventions and grave human rights are matters that shape Turkish Foreign Policy to formulate its image as a defier, a resister to all kinds of extremist approaches in the international system. Former Minister of Foreing Affairs of Australia, Gareth Evans, urged middle powers to increase their multilateral activites "rather than multipolar bandwagoning or balancing." The multipolar system's emergence has ensued Turkey on an issue like Syria to pursue its military and strategic policy in its regional leadership while willing to cooperate with other powers to solve the humanitarian crisis. The leadership Turkey demonstrated on the ground operations in Syria also shows that its cooperation with Russia and the United States to fight terror is a mutual responsibility that involves parties whose presence in the region has exacerbated the situation in the regional instability. Within the Syrian quagmire, Turkey is required to protect its national security and to be able to do so it must be a leading actor in securing stability in the region. This is also an evidence to the kind of state behavior in security policy is showing continuity. That is to say, for instance, in comparison to the Johnson Letter that warned Turkey against military action in Cyprus is similar to the Trump Letter threatening Turkey's economy in its military operation in Syria. Similarly, Ozal's approach to the Gulf War was a testament to Turkey's continuity of a proactive security policy. Despite Western

domination, threats and chides, Turkish Foreign Policy has shown a consistency to expand and implement what is in the best interest of the Turkish nation-state.

The state behavior of Turkey in the post-Cold War era has shown a trend to expand its role in the region through active participation in international organizations. In doing so, Turkey sought to define its identity not only as a member of any international organization but also as a leader in its region. Most recently, Turkey's state behavior exemplified in its foreing policy shows a greater inclination to its humanitarian aid identity. Indeed, there is an emphasis on Turkey's role when it comes to its geostrategic location. However, at the the same time, state behavior of Turkey today represents the strength of a country whose mission of humanitarian aid is based on a global outreach. The hyper-globalization in today's context has rendered the spatial dimension less of a factor. Material wealth accompanied with the desire to create change and help those in need due to poverty, wars, natural disasters and conflicts shaped Turkey's image as a humanitarian aid worker within the international system. In the current pandemic caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19), Turkey has sent personal protective equipment to numerous countries that also include NATO Allies such as Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom and others such as Colombia, Israel, Iran, Bulgaria, Germany, Indonesia, Yemen, China, Pakistan, Montenegro which has sent aid to at least 57 countries after aid requests from 100 states (Aliyev, 2020) while the number of demands is growing while medical aid have been provided to 138 countries (Bir & Aliyev, 2020) . Recently, President Erdogan stated that even developed countries asked for support. "Most recently (he stated) we are sending medical aid supplies to the United States that incudes protective face masks, protective eye-gears, N95 masks, gowns and disinfectants" (Tayiz, 2020). As Turkey has constructed its image as a reliable partner within the global supply chain through its "health equipment" delivery to a numerous states around the world, at the same time, one can say that it utilizes a liberal approach in the sense that aid is giving to whomever it is demanded by whether it be NATO, Balkan, Asia or Middle Eastern or African countries.

Turkey's delivery of medical aid beyond its region surpasses any kind of middle powermanship which has also sent aid to the United States. This is a manifestation of greater leadership on the international stage by showing Turkey is well-equiped to provide aid it finds fit to any state within the global neighborhood. If Turkey did not have an executive presidential system of governance, it would have been challenging to act rapidly upon such

calamity as COVID 19 both within and with out. Without having to face the vagaries of institutional bureaucracy country's internal affairs, health affairs and foreign affairs particulary, to say the least, were overseen from one powerhouse. Therefore, one policy recommendation that can be offered here is to bring the presidential governance system to maturity to further expedite the process of bureaucratic efficiency among various ministries and related institutions. Hence, this will allow opportunity for Turkey to push forward global policies across international institutions like the UN, EU or NATO to act more efficiently in the face of global health crises. "In addition to Turkey's support for a comprehensive global representation within the United Nation's Security Council, the United Nations may bring up the issue of global pandemic threat to be added among security issues" (Sadık &, "Covid-19 Sonrası Küresel Güvenlik Trendleri", 2020, p.98) as a means to strenghten multilateral institutions for a more comprehensive fight against such global pandemics in the future. This could be further analyzed under what could be seen as a "*fostered multilateralism* in which states reform international organizations and pool their resources to find global solutions to global issue" in which "international organizations with ample abilities, resources and a strong will to tackle not only global political and economic problems, but also environmental, cultural and health-based issues" (Kıran, & "The World after COVID-19: Cooperation or Competition?", 2020, p.16) through various state capabilities, means and vision.

Turkey' national security policy concerns are asserted through international organizations and platforms as seen in the discourse analysis conducted in the thesis. The discourse that focuses on security, development and democracy are the pillars needed for a just and equitable system in which security issues with respect to Turkey's geostrategic location must be addressed. In this study, Turkey is assessed as an actor changing the geopolitical imagination and strategic culture in global politics. In order to effectively continue this process the international community can possibly look for alternative institutions on the global level that can serve peoples directly at a transnational level. This second policy recommendation would ensure some kind of a checks and balances system on global institutions like the United Nations Security Council to act for the interest of all rather than the few. That is to say the process of transnational activism could be augmented by continuing to establish alternative international platforms contemporaneously while reforming the ones in hand.

Turkey's perseverance in its humanitarian diplomacy sets a precendence for members of the international community that power is not always about gaining for "one's" interest. It is about serving the needs of the global neighborhood when responsibility rests on the shoulders of those who are more capable than some others. Turkey's *efficaciousness* accordingly shows a strong desire to be a voice for those who are impoverished and whose rights are disregarded by great power politics. The call for "the World is Bigger than Five" in this regard, is a game-changer campaign to address the inequality in the world towads an equal representation and for the majority to have a say in the remaking of the international world order based on mutual norms and values.

Finally, last but not the least, as a new policy implication this study argues scholars and practicioners, in the rapidly changing world, must be able to look beyond the traditional definition and conceptualization of middle powers. International organizations are the main centers that a state like Turkey is able to carry its message to the global community while also addressing the concerns of deficient international institutions that require up-to-dateness and change. In defining Turkey beyond middle power characteristics, it is argued that the state actor's discourse and the shaping of the country's image in the international system has rendered it more than just a middle power. The term *efficacious power* utilized a constructivist perspective to analyze Turkey's case study through values, beliefs, religion and changing developments within the region and globally.

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APPENDIX



The responses to the interview questions by the President of the Republic of Turkey

Recep Tayyip Erdogan:

1) Looking at the current state of world affairs in the global system, what kind of a role does Turkey as a state actor play in the region and around the world? How can you define Turkey's state image in the international system?

> With the end of the Cold War a system that would guarantee stability and ensure justice and equity could not be established. The United Nations Security Council to begin with many times international organizations could not renew themselves in accordance with the spirit and the conditions of their time. At a time when regional actors' effectiveness is increasing, people are being more interconnected to one another, in an age of globalization, it is an immense loss that the present system is not being subject to reform. We have seen the problems emanating from the system in numerous grievous events from the Rwandan genocide to the Srebrenica massacre, the Palestinian issue to Afghanistan, from the Syrian crisis

to the conflicts in Yemen and Libya. In the same vein, we are also witnessing unjust distribution of wealth/income, environmental issues, poverty, irregular migration continue to exponentialize.

In this picture, Turkey, a "strategic power" in its region has taken the initiative as one of the exceptional countries to exert an effort to bring the present system into a more justice and equity-based axis. Most particularly, in the past 17 years we demonstrated an exemplary stance. In our term chairmanship of or membership to international platforms we drew attention to the distress within the current system. Next to voicing these issues courageously we presented practical solutions as well. For example, in 2011 we extended a helping hand to Somalia which was identified as a failed state. We gave support for Afghanistan to reach stability once again. Regarding the irregular migration from Syria we opened our doors to nearly 4 million refugees by averting a colossal human tragedy. Standing against the unlawfulness towards our first qiblah, Jerusalem, we were among countries that gave the strongest reaction. Between May 9-13, 2011 we hosted the United Nations 4. Least Developed Countries Conference in Istanbul. Similarly, in 2016 we realized the World Humanitarian Summit along with the United Nations. From the Balkans to the Caucasus and many other places there is a reflection of Turkey's ensuing humane and conscience-based policies. The sincere struggle we are giving across diverse geographies has changed the perception of our country in the sight of many peoples and states. Compared to previous years our country's soft power increased even more. Today, Turkey's messages in the international arena are being listened to, whose views are wondered with keen curiosity and at the same time we have reached a position of being a "key country" in establishing peace and stability.

2) Does the current economic and security distribution in the international system hamper a democratic world order that should be based on equity and justice? Regarding the economic, political and security injustices around the world, what kind of a narrative is Turkey offering to the global community over the past 17 years that the AK Party has been in power?

As I expressed earlier, the existing global system is far from producing justice, peace and stability. In fact, the continuing crisis we are witnessing in Syria for

the past 9 years reveals how the decision-making mechanism is experiencing blockage due to the problems caused by the system in and of itself. There is a similar blockage in the Palestinian issue which for the past 70 years has been a bleeding wound for our region. Unfortunately, in the face of the Israeli regime's disregard of international law and United Nations resolutions no sanctions are being implemented. Nothing could be expected from a structure that leaves the destiny of 7 billion people to the mercy of only 5 countries.

What needs to be done here is very clear. We can neither overcome the trials of our time nor save our future with the previous century's institutions. A re-structuring of the global system is no longer a predilection, it is imperative. From economy to foreign policy, trade to agriculture we are in need of a paradigm that deservedly values and puts the human being at the center across many areas.

Throughout our 17 years in government as we ascertained our policies we adopted the principle of "let the human being live so that the state can live." From transportation to health across all areas we worked with sensitivity in abiding by this principle and put forth projects in this direction. In the past 17 years we have been leading an administration in our country with the understanding of an honest, responsive, responsible, transparent and strong institutional structure where people have the ultimate voice and there is zero tolerance to corruption. In lieu of a mentality that looks down upon its citizens, we built a system that constitutes an understanding of servitude to the nation. Through an entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign policy approach we are ranked number 5 when it comes to the most wide representative network in the world. In ratio to our national income we rank number one in the world when it comes to providing the most humanitarian aid. At the same time Turkey is the leading country in the world by hosting the largest number of refugees. We increased the number of our representation abroad from 163 to 246 while also increased the number of embassies from 93 to 142. As a result of our efforts we ushered our country to a level that cannot be compared prior to the 17 years. I believe that the success achieved within the span of 17 years in Turkey sets an example for everyone, particularly the Islamic world.

3) What do you think are some of the reasons why there's an unequal international liberal world order where the welfare of some are dependent on the disadvantage of others?

Those who built this system are the ones who prevailed in World War II. The main target of the system has been to protect the interests of a few countries and their hegemony. 1.7 billion people across the Islamic world do not have any say nor have any effect within the system. 54 African countries as well as Latin America and Southeast Asian regions' expectations and demands are unfortunately not taken as relevant within the current system. When we look from an economic perspective we witness that injustice still continues. While Western countries are prospering with no limit, the citizens of countries that have underground/natural resources are grappling with hunger and scarcity. While one of the biggest problems of the Western communities is obesity, today, in Africa and Asia hundreds of millions of children are going to bed at night in hunger. In our current day those who are forcefully displaced since the time of World War II has reached a climax. The wealth of the 26 most rich people in the world is more than the total wealth of 3.5 billion people. The reason such a tableau is emerging is not due to lack of material opportunities, but due to the lack of mercy and empathy. Extreme avarice on rentier-ing, egoism, power concentration and the efforts to continue with new methods of colonialism is preventing justice distribution in the global system. Unless there is no change to this, without a humane and conscience-based mentality prevailing, it is not possible to obviate our existing distress. It is now more clear than ever that there is a need for a mentality change.

4) How can Turkey aid developing states to prosper and become autonomous by shaping their national, foreign, and regional policy without Western domination and threats?

From day to day we are seeing an increase in the demand to reform the established global order. There is a serious expectation for especially the United Nations Security Council to be re-organized within a more inclusive and equity-based framework. Many countries are trying to overcome the current quagmire through regional cooperation mechanisms. As Turkey our call across almost all platforms that "the World is Bigger than Five" harbors this reality. It is also noteworthy that African and Asian countries show great courtesy and declare their support to the

call our country is putting forth. With the contribution of our friends we are decisive in continuing this struggle until the end.

5) Is it possible to imagine a world community of the future in which natural resources and personal gains are set aside to establish cooperative relations where exchanges and interdependency is based on mutual respect and interests?

This is indeed possible… The existing resources are far more than enough for 7 billion people. In order to realize this first and foremost we must strengthen the cooperation between less developed and developed countries. Despite the official ending of colonialism in the last century, unfortunately, it is still present through new ways and means. The Western world is still approaching regions and peoples outside of its region with a superior and discriminatory point of view as a continuation of the old colonial times. As we witnessed the Arab Spring where societies are administered by dictatorships, the demand of freedoms and democracy were prevented through bloodshed, pressure and massacres. Countries that are democracies and defenders of human rights supported such oppression by keeping quiet. This is not just in domestic or foreign politics, we are faced with a similar picture in the area of economy as well. Countries that are rich in natural resources are not given the opportunity to manufacture their natural resources in order to transform them into high value added products.

As Turkey, we have shown the world the success that can be achieved with tenacity and decisiveness especially in the economy through the strides we made in the defense industry in particular. We increased our national income by four times, from 236 billion dollars to 950 billion dollars. We carried our exports from 36 billion dollars to 180 billion dollars. When we look back at the 17 years we drew 220 billion direct foreign investment. In the defense industry we reduced the foreign dependency rate from around %70 to 20%. Overseas Turkish investment has risen above 40 billion dollars. In unmanned aerial vehicles we are among 4-5 countries that have the most advanced technology in the world. In construction business services we rank number 2 in the world. In agricultural revenue we are leading the way in Europe. Last year 550,000 international patients came to our country to get treatment in our health sector. In development aid, once again we rank near the top. For nine years we have been hosting nearly

4 million Syrian refugees. Helping one another is a requirement in our culture. We are a nation that believes in the abundancy that comes through sharing. By spreading this cultural understanding around the world we can prevent hunger, income inequality and conflicts. We can build a 'humane' economic system only by prioritizing mutual/common participation and societal interest as a base instead of an interest-based economic system.

6) At a time in which conflicts, humanitarian crises, wars and instability in different parts of the world have become rampant, do you think there is a necessity for an effective global governance construction? If yes, how can Turkey contribute to this process? Would you identify Turkey's international activism as emancipationist? How would you describe this kind of advocacy?

Undoubtedly, the reason there is so much conflict and instability in the world is due to the issue I pointed out earlier about the signs seen in the global system's structural problems. Specifically, the United Nations Security Council is not able to fulfill its duty. Our problems in the world will continue to multiply if there is not a reform with an understanding of justice and equity in the system that is human-centered rather than harboring the interests of a few countries. Based on the principle of "a friend tells the bitter truth," for a long time we have been voicing the need for this kind of reform and also expressing ways to be able to solve this. Freedoms are indeed very important yet, at this time the biggest factor we lack in the global system currently is justice. We, as Turkey, defend the reinforcement of freedoms by prioritizing the establishment of justice by demanding that the global system is subject to a reform based on an axis of justice.

7) In much of the academic literature Turkey has been categorized as a middle power. Do you agree with this classification? Can Turkey rise above middle power status and if you believe that it can, how would you characterize that transformation or evolution?

The end of the Cold War with a bipolar world order resulted in the emergence of a multi-polar and multi-actor international relations system. Not only that but also the cruciality of organizations that foster regional cooperation has been increasing. During this process we see that Turkey has taken upon a more active and driven role. Undoubtedly, our country's geo-strategic location has a large

effect in what constitutes this role. Turkey' geostrategic position is a country that takes place in the heart of Asia, Europe and Africa. Not to mention the fact that we are a nation that has ancient history, human and religious ties with millions of people who live across these three continents. Turkey, during these turbulent times, is one of the exceptional countries that is a rising monument of safety in its geo-strategic location. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and as a part of Western Alliance we are in an effort to ensure our own safety as well as contribute to regional peace and stability. Likewise, we are among the countries giving the most effective fight against terror that is threatening international peace and security. We are the only country fighting DAESH face to face and have defeated this terror organization completely. Without a question this is a sign of Turkey's increased weight and further advancement of its gravity.

8) I describe in the dissertation that Turkey is an efficacious power; meaning that it is an actor that is able to produce the intended result of its actions. With this description in mind, what does Turkey aim to achieve by the centennial of the Republic in 2023 with the goals it aims to achieve and its plans for a post-2023 Turkey? What does Turkey's efficacious activism aim to achieve in the international system?

The year 2023 will mark the Centennial of the establishment of our Republic which is why it is a significant date. 2023 will not be just an anniversary but we also see it as a milestone/turning point for our future vision. With this understanding we determined our goals and announced it to the public. Right now our country ranks number 13 in the world vis a vis its purchasing power parity. In the year 2023, moving up at least three steps, we are aiming to be among the top ten economies of the world. We at the same time aim to increase our exports to 500 billion dollars and the per capita income to 25,000 dollars. On top of that all of our institutions have their goals for the year 2023 and aim to fulfill them. The successes we achieved over the past 17 years gives us hope and courage by inspiring us to reach these goals. InsAllah (God willing) once we reach these goals we will then realize our 2053 and 2071 vision.

The kind of stance that Turkey demonstrates regarding issues that concern all of humanity is also a concrete sign of the kind of policies our country will pursue as it continues to reach its goals. Material elements of power, in the context of 2023

goals, serve both as an ideal and a means to fulfill this task. Turkey will carry out its responsibility for fair/just gain and fair/just rationing and continue to be the voice of global conscience.

9) How would you describe the change in Turkey' state behavior post-2014 Presidential elections? From the Ozal era up to current day how has Turkey's state behavior in the region and around the world shifted, transformed, expanded?

Our country for many years in its economy, production, security and foreign policy experienced difficulties due to its foreign dependency. In the initial years of our Republic major moves carried out by idealists such as Nuri Demirağ, Nuri Killigil and Vecihi Hürkuş were unfortunately not completed, they were intentionally stymied. Likewise, in the automobile industry "the Devrim (Revolution) Cars" project was put away for simple reasons. Prior to our government coming into power, economic and democratic turning points were realized by the deceased Prime Ministerships of Adnan Menderes in 1950 and Turgut Özal starting from 1983. Especially, during Özal's time Turkey's domestic and foreign policy gained a new dynamism prioritizing free trade in the agenda by taking entrepreneurial and visionary steps. During Özal's time as Prime Minister and as the President, his visits to the Turkic Republic and Middle Eastern countries who had recently gained their independence strengthened ties with Turkey.

When we look at our country over the last century we see governments that drew their strength from the national will instead of tutelage while they followed a more active, comprehensive and embracive foreign policy. In our 17 years in government, by the direction of our people's demands and expectations, we adopted a national policy that prioritizes our country's continuation and interests. As the late Ozal had done with a wide delegation of business people we also organized visits to Africa, Central Asia, South Asia and Latin American countries of which were the first time visit made in the history of our Republic. Across international platforms we followed a more active and more liberated policy. We directed more attention to the challenges and issues the Islamic world has been facing. At the same time we took new initiatives in our foreign policy in regions like Africa and Latin America that have been neglected for many years. Next to

our Minister of Foreign Affairs our organizations such as TIKA, YTB, AFAD, YEE, Kızılay, THY, Turkish Maarif Foundation and Turkey Diyanet Foundation consolidated our presence in the field. We strengthened our friendships and brotherhood/sisterhood ties with countries as we increased the number of our trade attaches, by encouraging our business people to invest and by supporting our civil society organizations to be active. Thanks to Allah, these steps we took benefited us while also contributed immensely to our counterparts as well. While our bilateral trade has been increasing in a balanced way mutual investments also gained momentum.

Undoubtedly, for Turkey to demonstrate an active and independent foreign policy was only possible at the beginning of 2000s with the onset of political stability. In 2017, the administrative reform that was realized succeeded in institutionalizing this stability. Turkey, instead of losing its energy in domestic quarrels, has concentrated on more critical and strategic issues. By establishing an institutionalized stability and an active administration model Turkish Foreign Policy moved away from a passiveness and towards a more proactive trajectory. In this sense, the material power that has been built over the quarter of a last century enabled a foreign policy that rests upon a humanitarian understanding and revived its cultural strength.

10) What do you think are some present challenges holding Turkey back from fully realizing its potential to possibly become a great power in the trajectory of 2053 and 2071 state goals? How can these barriers be overcome?

In the past 17 years we introduced to our country the largest investments. From transportation to health, from education to trade we achieved to succeed in exponentialize across all areas in comparison to what was done before. During this process, we purified our democracy from the tutelage elements. As the outcome of April 16 Referendum the Executive Presidential System which de facto came into practice on June 24th 2018, is the greatest administrative reform initiated through democratic ways. With the new system political instability which was the most basic problem of our country was buried into history. Turkey in place of a dual-headed system transitioned into a new system that rests upon the absolute superiority of the national will and where power is not sought

through bargaining but in a transparent way at the ballot box. With the new system bureaucratic tutelage seen as the biggest barrier in front of Turkey's desire to meet its goals was totally demolished. From now on without being blocked by bureaucratic oligarchy we will be able to advance by focusing further on our goals and gain further momentum.

While we have a big advantage in our domestic politics we are facing a much different tableau unfortunately when it comes to regional and global developments. A significant number of our neighbors are in internal conflicts like in Syria and neighbors grappling with crises in Iraq and Iran. The political instability in these countries are causing our country to pay a heavy price due to issues such as irregular migration which comes at the top of the list. On the other hand, we see global powers support the separatist terror organization the PKK and its extensions in order to protect their interests. Even though we have been hammering this terror organization via cross-border military operations, we are, in consternation, watching the policies that strive to legitimize this terror organization. We are at the same time witnessing our country and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus being illegally excluded from the hydrocarbon resources sharing in the Mediterranean. The protectionist measures that became evident in the US-China trade war concerns us as well due to undermining global trade. Unfortunately, the coronavirus pandemic has come to threaten the unity of healthy economies.

As Turkey we are aware of the serious risk and trials that are facing us in the near future. However, we believe that every risk also harbors an opportunity. As long as our nation is united as one there is no barrier that Turkey cannot overcome.

Interview Questions and Responses from Volkan Bozkir, President of the 75th UN General Assembly:

1) What do you think is the first three most important impediments on the path of equity in international politics?

International system that had been designed according to the balance of power among nation-states model until the 2nd World War, shifted to bipolar system after the War, which made the USA and the Soviet Russia two dominant actors of international politics, as leaders of the Western and Eastern Blocks during the Cold War. The end of the 2nd World War was a break point of the international system.

The system faced another break point with the collapse of the USSR, which turned the word into unipolar, or "new world order" as President Bush referred. The US became the leader of the new world order and no other country, including Russian Federation could respond to the leader position of the US. The US, as the superpower, had dominated international system until 9/11. However, the terrorist attack of 9/11 also raised questions about the superpower position of the US, and doubts on the international system of 21st century, which in fact, could be taken as another break point of the international system.

During 2000s, while the whole world met new international actors who are different than states and international organizations, there were also new international powers emerged like Japan and Turkey. The world and its problems became more global, where no country could separate itself, from a problem occurred anywhere in the world. Emerging economies became bigger stakeholders of the world economy, while interests of countries had multi-dimensional and multilateral character, connected to different international actors, instruments and principles. In brief, the world became more complicated in contrary to the simplicity of Cold War era that defined the world as two parts or polar, namely, the West and the East.

Our world and the international system, are now not only more complicated but also multilateral, multipolar and multidimensional. However, we still want to run the international system with the means of the old system, i.e. the old world. The whole international system that we operate is, mainly designed according to the bipolar wold order of the Cold War era. The UN, NATO, World Bank and IMF are the

institutions of the world after the 2nd World War. Take UN Security Council, which shall be respected as in charge with international security and peace, has five permanent members, USA, China, Russia, France, and UK, who are the victors of the 2nd World War. Any decision that would come out from the Council can be vetoed by any of those members. No other country, obviously has voice in the Council. That is why President Erdoğan calls for "the world is bigger than five", which also reflects the brief of the world, emerged after 2000s.

To conclude up, the most important impediments of the path of equity in international politics are first, the attempts to respond new and unique problems of the new world, with old fashioned instruments of the old world. International instruments of the Cold War era should be transformed into more capable and responsive institutions that would functionally deal with the new types of international problems. Secondly, the powers of the old world, USA, China, Russia etc. should make a shift from the understanding of the bipolar international system to multipolar world perspective. There are emerging economies and powers who are becoming important stakeholders of the world order from day to day and demanding more. Finally, problems are no longer national or regional. If a country wants in its interest, it should also work for other countries' interest at the same time, since solutions are no longer unilateral. This brings collaboration and cooperation as significant means of resolving crises to the international agenda, which makes each country equal party of the solution.

2) What are the most significant traits of Turkish Foreign Policy that are different than the past, prior to 2 decades ago?

Referring to my response to the first question, as the international system and its characteristics have changed, Turkey's traits of foreign policy changed accordingly. As a senior diplomat, I can not say anything else that easy that Turkish foreign policy used to have two main concerns for long. Those were the Armenian issue and Cyprus issue. Moreover, the foreign policy was designed as reactive to the issues that might have effects on the country's future. Decisions were mostly taken in line with the US foreign policy and the main efforts were mostly done to stay as part of Western pact. However, on the other side, Turkey was not too late to comprehend that the international system transformed into more complex and multidimensional format that requires countries to be proactive in the face of new types of international

developments consisting of refugee crisis, climate change, pandemics, armed conflicts and etc. And in fact, Turkey quickly adopted this transformation by developing proactive resolutions to the issues of international politics, which includes stipulating, profiling and initially responding to upcoming developments that have potential to affect the country. Some has defined this as "axial dislocation" but this was, in fact, not about the content of the Turkish foreign policy, but rather about its methodology. Turkey has transformed its methodology of foreign policy making into a proactive one. This did not only diversified instruments of the Turkish foreign policy but also its interests. This is why, foreign policy's attention has expanded from Europe to Southern America, from Middle East to Australia, from Northern America to Africa. Moreover, Turkey as an emerging international power, started to use varied forms of international means, as reflected by motto, "powerful diplomacy both at the table and in the field."

Having said that, Turkey's significant traits of the foreign policy can be identified as proactive and humanitarian, which stipulates possible effects of international developments and pre-engages by soft and hard powers that include diplomacy as well as military intervention.

3) How do you see Turkey changing the course of the game of international politics?

As I pointed out, most of the countries still tend to play the game by rules and means of the old-world order that existed between the post-2nd World War and 9/11. However, the world and the international system is not the same any longer. Emerging economies like Turkey, want to have bold voice in international affairs. Turkey, as a member of the G20, emphasizes on its contribution to global economic development while the country also asks for more saying on political or peace and security issues and play the game accordingly. Besides, Turkish foreign policy is multidimensional that has interests in cooperating with different countries. Turkish foreign policy does not see it as conflict of interest to ally Russia and the USA at the same time. Turkey believes uniqueness of each cooperation in international politics and indeed, see cooperation necessary. Thus, we do not endorse partisanship and polarization in international politics, rather support open dialogue and cooperation if easy or hard to do. Additionally, Turkish foreign policy acts according to the principle of separation of issues, which does not hedge one's bets. Looking at

Turkey-Russia relations gives the hints of this principle. While we had a strong disagreement, even contradiction with Russia on its Crimea policy, we achieved to reconciliate in Syria. Moreover, Turkey takes its future interests into account and take prudential steps as such its investments in Africa, which is another game changer that makes Turkey not only regional but also a global actor.

4) Soft power? Hard power? Both? Or a third kind of power? What is Turkey's characteristic tool of interaction?

Indeed, Turkey uses all of them now as tools of interaction. Turkey's growing economy and its consolidation with international political power enabled the country to put soft and hard power together in action. By increasing its diplomatic missions and activities targeting public opinions all around the world, Turkey activated its soft power. At the same time, when Turkey sees a threat to its security and interests, it does not hesitate to use hard power, as the final solution following all diplomatic efforts, as so did in Northern Syria.

One more thing in this regard, which is relatively new, is that Turkey has also become experienced to use international organizations as another type of power or tool of interaction, as well as opportunity window to cooperate. Turkey's efforts to neutralize the US's decision on Jerusalem, at the UN General Assembly represent a perfect example of that.

Interview Questions (English) and Responses from Professor Dr. Cagrı Erhan (Turkish):

1) What do you think is the first three most important impediments on the path of equity in international politics?

Devletler, uluslararası sistemde kendi ulusal çıkarları için mücadele verirler. Söz konusu çıkarlar genellikle başka ülkelerin öncelikleri ve insanlığın ortak çıkarları dikkate alınmadan belirlenir. Geçtiğimiz yüzyılda teşebbüs edilen eşitlikçi küresel düzen kurma çabaları bu yüzden sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Birleşmiş Milletler sisteminin özünde "egemen devletlerin eşitliği" ilkesi yer alır. Halbuki daha ilk günden itibaren Güvenlik Konseyi'nin beş daimi üyesine verilen ayrıcalıklar, söz konusu eşitlik argümanının sadece kağıt üzerinde kalmasına yol açmıştır.

Uluslararası siyasette eşitlikçi ve adil bir düzen kurulacaksa, her şeyden önce Birleşmiş Milletler'in asli işlevine ve kuruluştaki ruhuna geri döndürülmesi gerekir. Bu ise ancak bir kurumsal reformla mümkün olabilir. Güvenlik Konseyi daimi üye sayısının artırılarak, dünya nüfusunun üçte ikisini temsil eden ve dünya gayri safi hasılasının %85'ini üreten G-20 üyelerinin daimi üye olmaları sağlanmalıdır. Diğer ülkeler de dönüşümlü olarak konseye dahil edilmelidir. Veto mekanizması kaldırılmalı, nitelikli çoğunluk yöntemine geçilmelidir. Birleşmiş Milletler'in, uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin ihlal edildiği durumlara etkin müdahalesi kolaylaştırılmalıdır. Terörizm ve örgütlü suçlarla mücadele Birleşmiş Milletler'in görevleri arasına sokulmalıdır. Tüm insanlığın ortak problemleri olan yoksulluk, salgın hastalıkların yayılması, küresel ısınma, kitle imha silahlarının yayılması gibi konular, "uluslararası barışı ve güvenliği tehdit eden konular" başlığı altına alınmalı ve bunlara karşı etkili mücadele yürütülmelidir.

İkincisi, uluslararası ticaretin eşitlikçi hale getirilmesidir. Dünya Ticaret Örgütü kurulduğu günden bu yana gelişmiş ülkelerin kuralları koyduğu, gelişmekte olan veya az gelişmiş ülkelerin ise bu kurallara uymak zorunda kaldığı bir görüntüdedir. Eskiden "üçüncü dünya ülkeleri" olarak nitelendirilen "güney" ülkelerinin, "kuzey"e olan bağımlılıkları sadece sanayi mallarından ibaret değildir. Tarımdan, ilaca insanların hayatta kalabilmeleri için vazgeçilmez olan bir çok ürün bakımından gelişmiş ülkelere bağımlı hale gelmiş durumdadırlar. Bu giderilmediği sürece,

"güney"in mevcut problemlerini çözmesi mümkün olamaz. Dünya ticaretinde, gelişmekte olan ve az gelişmiş ülkelerin ekonomilerini güçlendirecek ve bunları zengin ülkelerin tedarikçisi olmaktan çıkaracak bir yapı oluşturulmalıdır.

Üçüncüsü, mültecilerin durumudur. BM Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliğinin verdiği rakamlara göre dünyada 100 milyondan fazla yerlerinden edilmiş insan vardır. Bu durum savaşlar, iç çatışmalar, soykırım, etnik temizlik, baskıcı rejimler ve ekonomik sorunlar sebebiyle ortaya çıkmaktadır. Son 20 yılda mültecilerin sayısı ikiye katlanmıştır. Mültecilerin evlerine geri dönmeleri ancak bu duruma yol açan şartların giderilmesiyle mümkün olur. Diğer yandan, özellikle gelişmiş Batı ülkelerinde yükselişe geçen yabancı düşmanlığı, ırkçılık, İslam düşmanlığı ve antisemitizm gibi hastalıklı düşünceler, mültecilerin hayatlarını daha da zorlaştırmaktadır. Dünyanın her yerinde, ön yargılardan uzak biçimde yaşayabilmek temel bir insan hakkıdır.

2) What are the most significant traits of Turkish Foreign Policy that are different than the past, prior to 2 decades ago?

Türkiye son yirmi yılda uluslararası sistemin başlıca aktörlerinden biri haline geldi. Önceki dönemle karşılaştırıldığında bu yükselişin üç ana dinamiğinin olduğu görülüyor.

Birincisi, "**kendi projesi olan Türkiye**" olgusudur. Soğuk Savaş ve onu takip eden 10 yıl boyunca -Kıbrıs, Ege ve Filistin meselesi gibi bir iki istisna hariç- Türk dış politikası genellikle Batılı müttefiklerinin belirlemiş olduğu paradigma içinde hareket etmekteydi. Kendi öncelikleri doğrultusunda değil, Washington'da ve Brüksel'de kendisine biçilen role göre hareket etmekteydi. Dış politikası da, yine ağırlıklı olarak Batılı müttefiklerin güvenlik kaygıları çerçevesinde belirlenmekteydi. 2003'ten başlayarak Türk dış politikasında hem bölgesel hem de gündem anlamlarında gerçek bir çok yönlülüğe geçiş süreci yaşandı. Türkiye'nin daha önce diplomatik temsilciliği bulunmayan çok sayıda Asya, Afrika ve Latin Amerika ülkesinde büyükelçilikleri açıldı. Avrupa dışındaki kıtalardaki bölgesel işbirliği örgütlerinde Türkiye gözlemci statüsüyle yer almaya başladı. Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin geçici üyeliğine seçildi. NATO, Avrupa Konseyi ve İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı başta olmak üzere, üye olduğu uluslararası örgütlerin

gündemlerine ve kararlarına aktif katkı sağladı. Mücavir bölgelerde "oyun kurucu" rol oynamaya başladı. AB, Rusya ve Çin ile olan ilişkilerinin içeriğini çeşitlendirdi. Yeni dönem dış politikasında Türkiye, bir yandan müttefikleriyle ve ortaklarıyla yapıcı istişare süreçlerini sürdürürken, diğer yandan da bir çok başlıkta kendi ürettiği politika alternatiflerini bu platformlara sunmaya başladı. Nükleer silahsızlanmadan, terörle mücadeleye, mültecilerin durumundan, her türlü ayrımcılıkla mücadeleye kadar uluslararası toplumu yakından ilgilendiren her konuda Türkiye merkezli olarak üretilen fikir, proje ve eylem planları gündeme getirildi. G-20'nin aktif bir üyesi olarak projelerini daha geniş platformlara taşıdı.

İkincisi, "**insani diplomasinin liderliği**" olgusudur. Türkiye son yirmi yılda attığı ikili, bölgesel ve çok taraflı adımlarla küresel çapta insani diplomasi alanında lider ülke pozisyonuna oturdu. Myanmar'dan, Suriye'ye, Filipinler'den Libya'ya kadar bir çok çatışma bölgesinde insanların zarar görmemesi için devreye girdi. Bu sadece diplomatik girişimlerle sınırlı kalmadı. Belki de Türkiye'yi bu alanda en fazla öne çıkartan husus, kendi nüfusuna ve gayri safi hasılasına oranla dünyada en fazla insani yardım yapan ülke konumuna erişmiş olmasıdır. Bölge, din, etnisite farklılığı gözetmeksizin Türkiye'nin TİKA, Kızılay, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü ve Maarif Vakfı başta olmak üzere kamu ve sivil toplum kuruluşları üzerinden ihtiyaç sahiplerine götürdüğü yardımlar, Türk dış politikasının başlıca çalışma alanlarından biri oldu. Dünyanın tüm ülkelerindeki Türk büyükelçilikleri bir yandan geleneksel diplomasiyi yürütürken, mesailerinin önemli bir bölümünü de insani sorunları çözmeye yönelik çabalara ayırdılar.

Üçüncüsü, "**güçlü karar alma mekanizması**" olgusudur. Türkiye'nin dış politika konusunda tavandan tabana ve tabandan yukarıya iki karar alma modelini birlikte uyum içinde kullanmakta olduğunu görüyoruz. Güçlü liderlik yapısı, cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sisteminin sağladığı hızlı ve etkin karar alıp uygulayabilme kabiliyeti, askeri ve sivil bürokrasinin dış politika ve güvenlik konularında birlikte çalışma kültürünün oluşturulması gibi hususlar, devletin dış politikadaki yetkinliğini artırmıştır. Diğer taraftan sivil toplum kuruluşları, DEİK, TİM, TOBB gibi ticaret diplomasisinin özel sektör temsilcileri, üniversitelerdeki araştırma merkezleri, düşünce kuruluşları gibi yapılar dış politika karar alma

süreçlerine alternatifler sunma konusunda daha önceki dönemlerde olmadığı kadar zengin bir içerik üretmektedirler.

3) How do you see Turkey changing the course of the game of international politics?

Türkiye hem "oyun kuran" hem de "oyun bozan" bir devlet vasfına sahip hale geldi. Mesela Suriye'nin kuzeyinde ortaya çıkan otorite boşluğundan istifade etmek suretiyle önce DEAŞ akabinde de PKK-YPG terör örgütlerinin bir siyasi entite kurma girişimlerine askeri unsurları kullanarak müdahale etmesi, Türkiye'nin son dönemdeki en önemli "oyun bozma" başarısıdır. Keza, Doğu Akdeniz'de Türkiye'nin dışarıda bırakılmasıyla oluşturulan gayrimeşru deniz yetki alanları paylaşımı teşebbüsü, yine Türkiye'nin bu bölgede başlattığı sondaj faaliyetleri, arama-kurtarma tatbikatları, askeri manevraları ve son olarak Libya ile imzaladığı deniz yetki alanları paylaşımı mutabakat muhtırasıyla ortadan kaldırılmıştır. Yeni deniz yetki alanı paylaşım haritası BM'ye başarıyla tescil ettirilmiştir. Suriye'nin geleceğine ilişkin Astana ve Soçi süreçleri Türkiye'nin yapıcı ve sorumlu katkıları sayesinde oluşturulmuştur. Özellikle kendi yakın coğrafyasındaki uluslararası gelişmelerde Türkiye dikkate alınmadan atılacak adımların başarısızlığa mahkum olacağını, gerekli gördüğünde doğrudan müdahale etmekten çekinmeden, diğer aktörlere gösterdi.

4) Soft power? Hard power? Both? Or a third kind of power? What is Turkey's characteristic tool of interaction?

Türkiye günümüzde "akıllı güç" olgusunu en iyi yansıtan ülkelerden biridir. Türkiye 21. Yüzyıl uluslararası dengelerini ve küresel sistemin gereklerini en iyi algılayan ve onlara göre hareket eden devletlerden biri oldu. İkili ve çok taraflı ilişkilerinde, Uluslararası siyaseti; ortak çıkar- karşılıklı bağımlılık – kompartıman diplomasisi yaklaşımlarını başarıyla kullanırken gerekli gördüğü zamanlarda sert güç unsurlarına başvurmaktan da çekinmedi. Yumuşak ve sert güç unsurlarını hem birbiri peşi sıra hem de eşzamanlı olarak birçok sorun karşısında başarıyla kullandı. Daha önceki dönemden farklı olarak son dönem Türk dış politikasında, başka ülkelerle ilişkilerde siyah-beyaz yaklaşımının terk edildiğini gözlemliyoruz. Başka bir deyişle, Türkiye ikili ilişkilerinde bazı alanlarda problemler yaşadığı ülkelerle ilişkilerini, başka

alanlarda güçlü işbirliği şeklinde sürdürebilmeyi başarabilen nadir ülkelerden biri haline geldi.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Education

Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University — Graduated August 2020
PhD
International Relations
Concentration: Turkish Foreign Policy

Georgetown University — GraduatedAugust 2013
Master of Arts in Liberal Studies
Concentration: Muslim-Christian Understanding

George Mason University — Graduated May 2010
Department of Public and International Affairs
Bachelor of Arts in Government & International Politics
Concentration: Political Theory and Law

Work Experience

Turkish Presidency — July 2018- present
Advisor to the President of the Republic of Turkey

Turkish Presidency — March 2015- 21018
Global Research Center
International Relations Department
Specialist

Kartal Anadolu Imam Hatip High School — September 2014-March 2015
English Teacher

- Taught Cambridge IGCSE students with a focus on reading.
- Taught regular Turkish track students reading courses with some focus on poetry and literature.

SETA Istanbul March 2014-September 2015

Research Assistant

- Contributed to research in the following areas:
  - Syrian Foreign Policy in tandem to Russia, China, Iran and USA.
  - Democratization process and authoritarianism labels put on Turkey
  - Erdogan's role in the International Platform
  - Archival research on Turgut Özal's Presidency and his winning of the executive office.
  - Turkey's international role in the Western media.
  - Turkey's discussion in US think-tanks and their approach of criticism
  - Translation of Turkish articles to English

Jadaliyya March 2010- Spring 2013

Research Assistant

- Jadaliyya is an independent Ezine produced by ASI (Arab Studies Institute), a network of writers associated with the Arab Studies Journal (www.ArabStudiesJournal.org).
- Researching the impact of political uprisings in the Middle East.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars September 2012- May 2013

Research Assistant
European Studies Program
Washington, D.C.

- Assisted with research on the *Midnight at the Pera Palace: The Birth of Modern Istanbul* book project.
- Researched 1920s, 1930s, 1940s news archives of Istanbul's Metropolitan making in the early Republic. Utilized the Center's online database as well as the US Congress resources.
- Wrote short reports and compiled data for short research topics for graduate work.

United States Congress November 2009-May 2010

Office of Congressman Gregory Meeks, 6th District New York
Intern
Washington, DC

- Prepared memos and statements for the Congressman to address during his meetings
- Conducted research on area of Foreign Affairs interest in various countries such as Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.
- Attended briefings and hearings followed up with memos.
- Completed projects: Drafted a joint resolution between US and Colombia. Prepared Appropriations to be approved by the Congressman, focused on small business development within US, and drafted development plans for a greater interconnected African nations (energy, water, infrastructure, education, etc.)

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars January 15, 2009- November 1, 2009
Research Assistant
Southeast Europe Project
Washington, D.C.

- Conducted research regarding civil-military relations in Turkey and, the role of TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) in government affairs and public sphere.
- Conducted research regarding the process of constitutional reforms in the context of Turkey's progress towards EU membership.

Becket Fund Organization for Religious Liberty September 3, 2008- December 2008
Intern
Washington, D.C.

- Conducted research on legal cases in countries struggling with freedom of religion and expression
- Attended Congressional meetings regarding religious freedom issues in International countries
- Wrote summaries of reports and memos.

Publications

- "Turkish-Kurdish conflict through a woman's lens," *Common Ground News,* August 25, 2009.
- Contributed to SETA Reports (March 2014-September 2015)
- Daily Sabah Contributor
- Huffington Post Blog Writer

Foreign Languages

- Fluent in Turkish and English.