



**T. C.
YEDİTEPE UNİVERSİTİ
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE 2003 IRAQ WAR ERA
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS**

By

İ.Burak Küntay

**Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Ph.D. in
Political Science and International Relations,**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	vii
LIST OF TABLES	vii
ÖZET	viii
ABSTRACT	ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Introduction	1
1.2. Description of the Research	4
1.2.1. Title	4
1.2.2. Purpose	4
1.2.3. Scope of the Study	5
1.2.4. Structure of the Dissertation	6
1.3. Methodology	9
1.3.1. Data Collection Methods	9
2. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY	11
2.1. Introduction	11
2.2. American Foreign Policy Theory	12
2.3. Brief History of American Foreign Policy	15
3. FIRST REACTIONS AFTER 9/11	24
3.1. Introduction	24
3.2. Reaction of the Bush Administration	26
3.3. New Legislation and Law Enforcement	35
4. NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY	42
4.1. Introduction	42
4.2. Origin and Brief History of the Neoconservative Thought	44
4.3. Neoconservative Approach in Foreign and Domestic Policy	48
4.4. Neoconservative Influences in the Bush Administration	54
4.5. Neocons and the Iraq War Decision Making Process	59
5. THE BUSH DOCTRINE	67

5.1. Introduction	67
5.2. Political Doctrine – Definition and Previous Major U.S. Doctrines	67
5.3. Influence of 9/11 and Neoconservative Ideology on the Bush Doctrine	69
5.4. Principles of the Bush Doctrine Set Out in his Public Addresses	73
5.5. The National Security Strategy as the Bush Doctrine’s Main Document	76
5.6. Pre-emptive War as a Crucial Approach of the Bush Doctrine	80
5.7. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Bush Doctrine Era	85
5.8. The World’s Responses to the Bush Doctrine	89
5.9. Legitimacy of the Bush Doctrine	93
6. PLANNING THE IRAQ WAR: FROM THE GULF WAR TO THE 2003 IRAQ WAR	96
6.1. Introduction	96
6.2. The Gulf War	98
6.3. The Post-Gulf War Era	101
6.4. Future Iraq Project	105
6.5. Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD)	107
6.6. Decision Making Process before the Iraq Operation	110
6.7. Afghanistan Freedom Act 2001	113
6.8. Preparations for the Iraq War	121
6.9. Military Concerns	125
6.10. WMD Inspections	127
6.11. The United States without Major International Support	129
7. TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS	131
7.1. Introduction	131
7.2. The Pre-Cold War Period	131
7.3. The Cold War Era	132
7.3.1. NATO and Turkey	134
7.3.2. Baghdad Pact – Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)	136
7.3.3. 1962 Cuban Missile Crises and Turkey	138
7.3.4. Johnson’s Letter	140
7.3.5. Cyprus Weapon Embargo	141
7.4. The 1990-2001 Era	142
7.4.1. The Gulf War 1990-1991	143
7.4.2. Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and Kurdish Safe Haven	145

7.4.3. Kurds and the PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) Problem in Turkish-U.S. Relations	151
7.4.4. Turkish-U.S. Military Operations and Energy Cooperation	153
7.4.5. Turkish EU Membership	155
7.4.6. Turkish-U.S. Cooperation in Iraq	156
7.5. The Post-9/11 Era	158
8. U.S.'S EXPECTATIONS FROM TURKEY BEFORE THE 2003 IRAQ WAR	161
8.1. Introduction	161
8.2. U.S.'s Main Expectations	162
8.3. Approaching Turkey	163
8.4. Cheney's Visit	167
8.5. Talks with Turkey	170
8.6. Turkish Officials Giving Hope for Cooperation	175
8.7. The Pentagon, State Department and Turkey	181
9. TURKEY-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FIRST REACTIONS AFTER THE MARCH 1ST 2003 TEZKERE VOTE	183
9.1. Introduction	183
9.2. Negotiation Teams	183
9.3. Negotiations and the First <i>Tezkere</i>	184
9.4. First reactions after the March 1st <i>Tezkere</i> Vote	199
9.5. Accusations Towards the AKP	203
9.6. Second <i>Tezkere</i>	207
9.7. The Hood Issue	210
9.8. Third <i>Tezkere</i>	212
10. LEGITIMACY AND AFTERMATH OF THE IRAQ WAR	215
10.1. Introduction	215
10.2. Iraq Operation	215
10.3. United Nations and the Iraq War	218
10.4. U.S. Justifying the Iraq War	220
10.4.1. WMD	224
10.4.2. Supporters and Opponents of the WMD Theory	227
10.4.3. Iraq's Ties with Al-Qaeda	229
10.5. Aftermath of the War	233
10.6. UN: " <i>Iraq War was illegal</i> "	236
11. U.S. POST-IRAQ WAR POLICY	238

11.1. Introduction	238
11.2. Reaction to the U.S. Invasion	238
11.3. Kurdish Issue	240
11.4. The Postwar Planning	241
11.5. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)	244
11.6. The Role of Exiles	248
11.7. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)	249
11.8. Iraqi Interim Government (IIG)	254
11.9. Abu Ghraib Scandal: Damage to the U.S.'s Reputation	256
11.10. Nonexistent WMD	260
11.11. Five Mistakes of the U.S.	262
12. CONCLUSION	269
12.1. Summary	269
12.2. Turkish Mistakes: Approving the First <i>tezkere</i> and Two Headed Leadership	270
12.3. The Role of the Turkish Military	273
12.4. Accusations towards AKP	274
12.5. The U.S.'s Faults	276
12.5.1. Taking Turkey for Granted	276
12.5.2. Approaching the Turkish Military	278
12.6. Turkish Gulf War Experience	279
12.6.1. Security Issues	279
12.6.2. Economic Losses	280
12.7. Legitimacy Question	281
12.8. Postwar Concerns	284
12.9. Turkish Public Opinion and Miscommunication	285
12.10. Conclusion	288
REFERENCES	290
APPENDIX A: THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE	330
APPENDIX B: THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	331
APPENDIX C: LETTER TO PIME MINISTER İSMET İNÖNÜ FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON JUNE 5, 1964	332
APPENDIX D: ARTICLE 92 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC	335

APPENDIX E: U.S.’S DECISION REGARDING SPECIAL FORCES IN NORTHERN IRAQ AND THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE FROM THE PKK	336
APPENDIX F: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GÜL, FEBRUARY 24, 2003	337
APPENDIX G: THE MARCH 1ST <i>TEZKERE</i>	338
APPENDIX H: DECISION OF THE TBMM REGARDING THE SECOND <i>TEZKERE</i>	342
APPENDIX I: DONALD RUMSFELD’S MEMO	346

LIST OF FIGURES

6.1. Map of Afghanistan	113
6.2 Operation Enduring Freedom	119
7.1. Iraq: No-fly Zones	146
10.1. Operation Iraqi Freedom	216

LIST OF TABLES

1.1. The Order of Values Preferences: Bill Clinton and George W. Bush	22
4.1. Cabinet Members under George W. Bush	67

ÖZET

1946'dan bu yana Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri hem iki ülke, hem bölge hem de dünya için çok önemli olmuştur. 1946'dan bu yana devam eden ikili ilişkiler üç ana dönem altında incelenebilir: Soğuk Savaş dönemi, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem ve 11 Eylül sonrası dönem. İkili ilişkiler ve iki ülke arasındaki işbirliği Soğuk Savaş ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde çok üretkendi. 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında A.B.D.'nin Irak Operasyonu iki müttefik ülke ilişkilerinde belirgin oldu. 11 Eylül sonrası Amerikan dış politikası terörist saldırıların baskısı ve yarattığı psikolojik etkilerin yeni muhafazakar ideolojiyle birleşmesiyle şekillendi. Amerikan dış politikasında meydana gelen bu yeni anlayış Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine farklı bir boyut getirdi. Irak Savaşı sürecinde A.B.D.'nin uyguladığı bu yeni dış politika programı A.B.D.'nin diğer ülkeler ile ilişkilerini etkilemiştir. Irak Savaşı esnasında A.B.D. Kuzey Irak'ta ordusunu konuşlandırmak için Türk topraklarını kullanmak istemiştir. Uzun müzakereler, resmi ve resmi olmayan görüşmeler, diplomatik görüşmeler ve arka kapı diplomasisinin ardından T.B.M.M.'nin oylamasına sunulan 1 Mart Tezkeresi meclisten yeterli oyu alıp geçemedi. Böylece T.B.M.M. A.B.D.'nin Irak Operasyonu sırasında Türk toprakları üzerinden Kuzey Irak'ta konuşlanmasına izin vermemiş oldu. Bunun sebeplerini açıklamak için Irak Savaşı öncesi, Irak Operasyonu ve Irak Savaşı sonrası dönem Amerikan dış politikası ele alınacaktır. Bu tez çalışmasının cevap aradığı en önemli soru tezkerenin sonuçlarının ne olduğundan ziyade tezkerenin meclisten geçmemesinin sebep ve sonuçlarıdır. Tezkerenin meclisten geçmemesinin sebeplerini anlamak için 11 Eylül sonrası inşa edilen Amerikan dış politikası ve bu yeni dış politika anlayışının Amerikan dış politika yapım süreci ve karar alma sürecine etkileri analiz edilecektir. Irak Savaşı öncesi, sonrası ve savaş süresince izlenen Amerikan dış politikasını incelemek ve bu süreçte A.B.D.'nin Türkiye ile olan diyalogunu analiz etmek tezkerenin meclisten geçmemesinin sebeplerini anlamakta ve aynı şekilde ikili ilişkilerin geleceğine ışık tutması açısından büyük önem teşkil etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, tezkerenin geçmeme sebeplerini analiz etmek Türk-Amerikan müttefikliğinin geleceği içinde önemli bir dönüm noktasıdır.

ANAHTAR SÖZCÜKLER: AMERİKAN DIŞ POLİTİKASI, 2003 IRAK SAVAŞI, TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ, 1 MART TEZKERESİ, KUZEY IRAK, KÜRTLER, ASKERİ OPERASYON, KÖRFEZ SAVAŞI, SOĞUK SAVAŞ, SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEM, 11 EYLÜL, YENİ MUHAFAZAKAR, BUSH DOKTRİN, KİTLE İMHA SİLAHLARI, KARAR ALMA SÜRECİ.

ABSTRACT

Since 1946 Turkish-U.S. Relations have been very important for the two countries, the region and the world. These relations can mainly be classified under three eras: the Cold War, post-Cold War and the post-9/11 era. During the Cold War and post-Cold War era, the relations and cooperation of the two countries was very productive. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States-Iraq War became a critical issue between the two allies. A new U.S. foreign policy was shaped after 9/11 because of the psychological effects and the pressures of the terrorist attacks combined with neoconservative thought. The new policy brought up a very different approach towards Turkish-U.S. relations. This new foreign policy program of the U.S. during the Iraq War affected U.S.'s relations with other countries. Before the Iraq War, the United States requested to use Turkey's land in order to open a Northern Front. After long negotiations, official and unofficial talks, and the use of regular and backdoor diplomacy, on March 1st 2003 a resolution (*tezkere*) came before the Turkish parliament which failed to be approved. The Turkish parliament did not authorize the U.S. to use Turkish soil to open a Northern Front for the Iraq Operation. To explain why this was the situation, the pre-Iraq War period, the Iraq Operation and the post-Iraq War era will be discussed focusing on U.S. foreign policy.

In this dissertation the most critical question, more than focusing on the outcomes of *tezkere*, are the causes and reasons which brought *tezkere* to a failure in the Turkish parliament. In order to understand the causes of *tezkere*'s failure, the new U.S. foreign policy program designed after 9/11 and its effects on U.S. foreign policy making and decision making process is analyzed. Examining the U.S. foreign policy program before, during and after the Iraq War and analyzing U.S.'s dialogues with Turkey is very important to understand the causes of *tezkere*'s failure and what, in turn, can enlighten the future of this relationship. Moreover, analyzing those causes is critical for the future of the Turkey-U.S. alliance.

KEY WORDS: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, THE 2003 IRAQ WAR, TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS, MARCH 1ST TEZKERE, NORTHERN IRAQ, KURDS, MILITARY OPERATION, GULF WAR, COLD WAR, POST-COLD WAR, 9/11, NEOCONSERVATISM, BUSH DOCTRINE, WMD, DECISION MAKING.

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Policy Director of the Bipartisan Policy Organization), Clifford May (President of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies), Ambassador Ronald Neumann (President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan), Ambassador Mark R. Parris (Brookings Institute, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey), Ambassador W. Robert Pearson (U.S. Foreign Service Officer, former US Ambassador to Turkey), Richard Perle (Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee), Walid Phares (Senior Fellow in Foundation for Defense of Democracies), General Joseph W. Ralston (United States Special Envoy for Countering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Michael Rubin (Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute), Brent Scowcroft (former United States National Security Advisor under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush and a Lieutenant General in the United States Air Force), Ömer Taşpınar (Brookings Institute Fellow), John C. Wobensmith (Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council) and Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz (Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense), for taking the time to share their knowledge and experience and for all their support throughout my research.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
AOL	America Online
ATSA	Aviation and Transportation Security Act
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CBI	Central Bank of Iraq
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CCNY	City College of New York
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CHP	People's Republican Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
CPA	The Coalition Provisional Authority
DAB	Defense Advisory Board
DFI	Development Fund for Iraq
DOD	Department of Defense
DYP	True Path Party
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
EUCOM	United States European Command
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FP	Virtue Party
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
HLSD	Homeland Security Department
HOR	United States House of Representatives
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IALANA	International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
ICJ	International Commission of Jurists
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
IIG	Iraqi Interim Government
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Iraqi National Congress
INIS	Iraqi National Intelligence Service
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ITF	Iraqi Turkmen Front
JINSA	Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
KADEK	Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KFOR	Kosovo Forces
LCNP	Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

LON	League of Nations
MGK	Turkish National Security Council
MNP	National Order Party
MNTF-S	Multinational Task Force South
MSP	National Salvation Party
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical
NILE	Northern Iraq Liaison Element Teams
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODS	Operation Desert Storm
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONW	Operation Northern Watch
OPC	Operation Provide Comfort
OPLAN	Operation Plan
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSP	Office of Special Plans
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party
PNAC	Project for the New American Century
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
RP	New Welfare Party
SAMs	Surface-to-Air Missiles
SFRC	Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
SP	Felicity Party
SSIC	Senate Select Intelligence Committee
SSO	Special Security Organization
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TGS	Turkish General Staff
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TUSIAD	Turkish Industrialist and Businessman Association
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
U.S.	The United States of America
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
USMA	United States Military Academy

USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WP	Warsaw Pact
WSLF	Western States Legal Foundation
WTC	World Trade Center
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Turkish-U.S. relations became more intense during the Cold War era. The parameters of the Cold War were different than today. The world system was bipolar, divided under this balance of power. By joining NATO and taking its place in the western bloc, Turkey found itself standing on the western side and allied with the United States against the Soviet Union.¹ Until the end of the Cold War, the U.S. policy makers focused on Turkey in only one specific dimension: Turkey's problems with Cyprus or the Cuban Missile Crisis had mattered for the U.S. only within the wider picture of the U.S. policy concerning the Soviet Union. U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was using this approach not only with respect to Turkey. There was a tradition in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War to engage with countries as they related to the Soviet Union and the balance of power.

After the Cold War, just like everything else, U.S. foreign policy had changed. The world was no longer bipolar, but unipolar. The balance of power system crumbled, it left in its spot a hegemonic world order. In this era, U.S. foreign policy was also trying to reshape itself according to the new parameters of the world. The World Trade Organization (WTO), NATO, the EU and all other international organizations were evolving while the nations were changing their foreign policies.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks were one of the biggest tragedies in the world's history. On that morning the world's new order and its new rules began to shape. The new alliances, parameters, and engagement rules started to be designed. Being the world's authority and facing the historic tragedies pushed the U.S. to take some extreme actions in order to express its foreign policy. The new foreign policy of the U.S. was shaped under these unusual circumstances. Before the parameters of the new era were shaped, the U.S. had to take immediate actions to design its foreign policy. The newly elected George W. Bush government consisted of the neoconservative ideologists who served in the George Bush Senior's administration and shaped the new foreign policy values after the Cold War. The neoconservative ideology adopted itself to the post-9/11 era. In this new era actions of U.S.

¹ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p.19.

foreign policy makers were influenced by neoconservative thought. The neoconservative foreign policy was based on realism and the unilateral approach made the military option more important in foreign policy than diplomacy.

This new approach in U.S. foreign policy also affected America's immediate relations with other countries and in this case with Turkey. Turkey, by taking its side with the western world during the Cold War, has found itself in very critical situations. Turkey's immediate foreign policy concerns had never been the priority for the U.S. during the Cold War era. Starting from the Cuban Missile Crisis, through the Johnson Letter and the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, Turkey's immediate foreign policy concerns were always underestimated by the U.S. due to the parameters of the Cold War. Yet, Turkey never abandoned the alliance with America during and after the Cold War, especially right after the Cold War. Turkey cooperated with the U.S. in many different fields in order to take its place in the new world order.

The immediate post-Cold War era was a very fortunate time for Turkey and the U.S. The two countries had common interests. In addition to military cooperation in Europe and Africa, Turkey joined with the U.S. during the Gulf War.² Turkey could be considered the most cooperative country with the U.S. during the entire Gulf War. Even though Turkey's security and economic concerns became major questions in Turkish public opinion, the country never stepped out from the partnership. Obviously, Turkey was not the only side valuing the relationship and taking actions for it. Also the U.S. and its foreign policy makers during and after the Gulf War appreciated Turkey and showed their interest in Turkey. Even though Turkey experienced security problems after the Gulf War and its financial losses have never been compensated, the relations remained good.

The 9/11 era and the new U.S. foreign policy ideology did not only affect the U.S. alone but it also effected Turkish-U.S. relations. In the new foreign policy program Turkey's concerns or sensitivities were never seen as a major concern. It was always a secondary issue to consider. The new American way of approaching Turkey obviously affected the countries'

² Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım, Babıali Kültür* Yayıncılığı, İstanbul 2000, p.132.

Morton Abramowitz, "The Complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey", Chapter 6, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2000, p.158.

dialogue during the Iraq Operation process. While the U.S. was asking for Turkey's support for the Iraq War, the request looked simple and easy. The only thing the U.S. asked from Turkey was opening its borders for the U.S. soldiers who would use Turkish territories while conducting the Iraq Operation.³ This request might look simple but there were a number of questions and parameters behind this simple request. The entire Turkish public and the decision makers had many questions and concerns in mind. Turkish public opinion needed to be listened to and their questions needed to be answered.

Right after the failure of the March 1st *tezkere*⁴ in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkish-US relations moved into a very sensitive era. According to some analysts this new era would be the end of Turkish-U.S. relations. According to others this would be just a new beginning of a different kind of relationship.⁵ In this specific research it is very important to analyze the exact breaking point in the relations which is the March 1st *tezkere* crisis. In the immediate reactions to *tezkere*, both parties blamed each other for its failure. In this research the main objective will be to analyze the reasons, parameters, and the dimensions of the failure of the March 1st *tezkere*.

The March 1st *tezkere* is a milestone in the mutual relationship, and the way it failed will always be a major question in the minds of the people. In order to understand the future

³ Personal Interview with Ambassador James Holmes – U.S. Ambassador, former Deputy Chief of Mission in the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, currently Special Advisor for Southeast Europe in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State, Washington D.C., 13 February, 2008.

⁴ *Tezkere* – lit. memorandum, record, note. Translated as note, official message, permit, license, official memorandum, a receipt, order or certificate of any kind. In this work it is translated as resolution, as it regards to the Parliament's permission for Turkey's military's participation in the military operation or authorizing the foreign military to use Turkish lands.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.172.

Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, p.91.

William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 113.

⁵ Personal Interview with Mark Dubowitz – Executive Director of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington D.C., February 4, 2008.

Personal Interview with John C. Wobensmith – Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington D.C., 18 March 2008.

Personal Interview with Walid Phares – Senior Fellow in Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Arlington, VA, 25 March 2008.

Personal Interview with Brent Scowcroft - former United States National Security Advisor under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush and a Lieutenant General in the United States Air Force, Washington D.C., 24 February, 2008.

Personal Interview with Gen. Joseph Ralston – United States Special Envoy for Countering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., 30 June, 2008.

of Turkish-U.S. relations and their new impact, the reasons of *tezkere*'s failure must be analyzed. In this dissertation, more than describing both the U.S. and Turkey's foreign policy to understand the effects of *tezkere*, the focus will be on American foreign policy and its new dimensions. The U.S. is more powerful country that carries the economic and political international advantage. In this case, the U.S. is the decision maker in Turkish-U.S. relations. In these circumstances, research and focus on U.S. foreign policy will be important to understand the causes and effects of *tezkere*'s failure.

1.2. Description of Research

In this research U.S. foreign policy and its progress is analyzed in order to understand how it evolved in the post-9/11 era. Analyzing the changes in U.S. foreign policy and the subsequent political parameters contributing to a new foreign policy will contribute to understanding Turkish-U.S. relations in the 2003 Iraq War era. This new foreign policy program of the U.S. shaped by the neoconservative thought after 9/11 was analyzed to understand its possible effects, especially on the March 1st *tezkere*. In order to understand the difference in the post-9/11 and 2003 U.S. foreign policy program, the U.S foreign policy before, during and after the Cold War was analyzed. Moreover, Turkish-U.S. relations in the Cold War and post-Cold War era were analyzed to compare with post-9/11 relations. This will benefit in understanding the importance of the *tezkere* crisis.

1.2.1. Title

Title of the dissertation study is: ***“U.S. Foreign Policy During The 2003 Iraq War And Its Influence On Turkish-U.S. Relations.”***

1.2.2. Purpose

Turkish-U.S. relations are very important for the future of both countries. The relations carry a large significance on the region as a whole. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the mutual relations within all dimensions. The post-9/11 era is a time of great significance for the entire world. It changed foreign policy programs of many countries, but

especially the United States. The change in U.S. foreign policy programs obviously affected its relationship with Turkey.

In the post-9/11 era, the first immediate crisis both countries faced was the March 1st *tezkere* crisis. The decision of the Turkish parliament affected the mutual relationship not only for that time being but possibly the future of the relationship. The way U.S. foreign policy makers approached Turkey during the 2003 Iraq War era played a vital role in Turkey's decision making process for the *tezkere*. It is crucial to analyze U.S. foreign policy during the Iraq War and its effects on Turkey's decision making process. Studying U.S. foreign policy in the 2003 Iraq War and its effects on the March 1st *tezkere* will give an imperative perspective for the future of the relationship. Analyzing the causes and outcomes of U.S. foreign policy program towards Turkey will enlighten the relationship and can contribute to avoiding similar mistakes in the future.

1.2.3. Scope of Study

The March 1st *tezkere* had a momentous impact on Turkish-U.S. relationship. Since then, the *tezkere*'s effects on the two countries' relations were analyzed and many questions arose around that time. In order to understand the future of Turkish-U.S. relations and to secure the future of the relationship, investigating the causes of the *tezkere*'s failure as well as the consequences of its failure are vital. The March 1st *tezkere*'s failure could have been caused by the U.S.'s policy and approach, Turkey's policy, or some other reasons. In this research, the main focus will be on analyzing the changes in U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 and the influence on the Iraq Operation negotiations with Turkey and the March 1st *tezkere*'s failure. These changes and its effects on both Turkish-U.S. relations and Turkey's decision making process of the March 1st *tezkere* will be investigated. The way the U.S. handled its relationship with Turkey in this era, the negotiations followed by the new U.S. foreign policy mentality, and attempts to build a new approach in U.S. foreign policy have made huge impacts on the March 1st *tezkere*. Analyzing that specific era from the before-mentioned perspective could benefit the future of the mutual relationship.

1.2.4. Structure of the Dissertation

In Chapter 1, a brief introduction to the dissertation is made by giving a description of the research, title, purpose, and scope of the study, structure of the dissertation, methodology, the theory used and data collection methods.

In Chapter 2: **Brief Description Of U.S. Foreign Policy**, the background of U.S. foreign policy is given. In order to understand the major changes in U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 it is critical to know U.S. foreign policy from an historical perspective. It is also important to understand the origin and the traditions of U.S. foreign policy to notice the major changes taken place in the post-9/11 era. Analyzing U.S. foreign policy theory and presenting a brief history of U.S. foreign policy will help make the comparison.

In Chapter 3: **First Reactions After 9/11**, the major shift in U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 has been described. In order to understand the changes of U.S. foreign policy it is vital to research the first reactions after 9/11. In this chapter the background of the reactions will be given. The Bush Administration's immediate reactions and actions initiated by the President will be described. The new legislation and the law enforcement regulations passed with the pressure of 9/11 psychologies are discussed. In this part the first reactions after 9/11 will be analyzed in order to explain its effects on U.S. foreign policy and its influence on shaping new foreign policy.

Chapter 4: **Neoconservative Ideology**, will analyze the neoconservative ideology and its influence on the Bush Administration. The new U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 was shaped under certain factors. The changing world, the new parameters that occurred after the 9/11 attacks, and the first reactions of the people and government affected U.S. foreign policy. The neoconservative ideology played a significant role in the post-9/11 foreign policy program. In order to understand how the neoconservative ideology shaped U.S. foreign policy the origin of the neoconservative thought will be presented. Neoconservative ideology principles, both domestic and foreign, will be analyzed. The members of the neoconservative movement and their influences on the George W. Bush Administration will be discussed.

Finally neoconservatives' standing and their involvement in the Iraq War decision making process will be explained.

Chapter 5: **The Bush Doctrine** will describe George W. Bush's foreign policy principles and their influence on the U.S.'s foreign policy undertakings. One of the major clashes between the U.S. and Turkey was the new foreign policy program of U.S. during the 2003 Iraq War. In addition to the overall foreign policy conflicts President George W. Bush's pre-emptive war doctrine became very critical in the relations. The Bush Doctrine and its origin will be analyzed in order to foresee the possible conflicts between the U.S. and Turkey. Firstly, the previous major U.S. doctrines and their ideological backgrounds will be mentioned. Then, the influences of the 9/11 attacks, as well as the effects of the neoconservative ideology on the Bush Doctrine, will be analyzed. The main principles of the Bush Doctrine and George W. Bush's public statements briefly presenting his thoughts will be introduced. The National Security Strategy of the Bush Doctrine will be analyzed as the main document. The focus will be on explaining the pre-emptive war approach in the Bush Doctrine. The attempt to answer the main question of how U.S. foreign policy was shaped under the Bush Doctrine will be taken. The world's immediate responses to the Bush Doctrine and the doctrine's legitimacy will also be analyzed.

In Chapter 6: **Planning The Iraq War: From The Gulf War To The 2003 Iraq War**, the process of planning the Iraq War as an outcome of U.S. foreign policy making will be analyzed. This process clearly affected the overall U.S. foreign policy and America's relations with other countries, not only with Turkey. In order to understand the decision making process of the Iraq War it is critical to know the origin of the Iraq problem. In order to analyze the process better, first the Gulf War and then the post-Gulf War era will be explained. The future Iraq Project, which is the outcome of the Gulf War and the basis of the 2003 Iraq War, will be described. One of the most important reasons for the war was the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issue. WMD and the decision making process before the Iraq Operation will be analyzed. The Afghanistan Freedom Act of 2001 was considered as the possible beginning of the new U.S. foreign policy program for the Iraq War. This Afghanistan Freedom Act and preparations for the Iraq War will be described. The U.S.

military concerns and outcomes of the WMD inspections will be presented. The way in which the U.S. ended-up before the war without major international support will also be mentioned.

In Chapter 7: **Turkish-U.S. Relations**, the brief background of Turkish-U.S. relationship will be given. In Turkey's March 1st *tezkere* refusal, the roots of Turkish-U.S. relations might have played a very important role. Therefore, in this chapter, the background of Turkish-U.S. relations will be introduced. After shortly focusing on the pre-Cold War relations, the Cold War era will be discussed. NATO and Turkey, the Baghdad Pact, Cento, and the Cyprus Embargo issues were the main events between Turkey and the U.S. during the Cold War era. In order to understand the 2003 Iraq War era relations between the two countries, the Cold War era will be analyzed. The following era, 1990-2001, saw the issues of the Gulf War, Operation Provide Comfort, Turkey and the Kurds, U.S. and Turkey energy cooperation, joint military operations, Turkish European Union (EU) membership and U.S.'s standings for it, and finally the cooperation in Iraq. Finally the post-9/11 era will be discussed.

Chapter 8: **U.S.'s Expectations From Turkey Before The Iraq War**. U.S. demands and expectations from Turkey before the Iraq War were critical. These expectations directly affected Turkey's decision on the March 1st *tezkere*. Therefore, in this chapter, the U.S.'s main expectations from Turkey, the ways the U.S. was approaching Turkey, and U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney's visit to Turkey will be discussed. Moreover, the official and unofficial Turkish-U.S. talks, the possibilities of cooperation in the Iraq Operation, and the relations between the State Department, the Pentagon and Turkey will be analyzed.

Chapter 9: **U.S.-Turkey Negotiations And The First Reactions After The March 1st Tezkere Vote**. The main focus of this chapter will be the negotiations and the approval of the first *tezkere* (February 6th). The negotiation teams and the official Turkey-U.S. negotiations over the March 1st *tezkere* will be presented. After the failure of *tezkere*, the first reactions, U.S. accusations towards Turkey's government and approval of the second *tezkere* issue will be described. The Hood Issue which negatively affected Turkish-U.S. relations and the third resolution will be analyzed.

Chapter 10: **Legitimacy And The Aftermath Of The Iraq War.** After giving a brief introduction, the Iraq Operation will be explained. The standing of the UN on the Iraq War will be analyzed and the efforts of the U.S. to justify the Iraq War, namely presenting the WMD theory to its supporters and critics, and Iraqi ties with Al-Qaeda will be discussed. The aftermath of the Iraq War and the UN response to the Iraq War years after will be presented.

Chapter 11: **U.S. Post Iraq War Policy.** In this chapter the immediate outcomes of the Iraq War will be shown. The Iraq Operation, Turkish-U.S. relations, U.S. war planning, U.S. foreign policy, the decision making process and the Bush Doctrine outcomes will be seen in this chapter. The Iraqis' immediate reactions to the U.S. invasion are mentioned as well as the post war planning. Later on, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the role of exiles and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will be analyzed. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), the Abu Ghraib scandal, its damage to the U.S. reputation and the nonexistence of WMD will be discussed. Finally the five main mistakes of U.S. which affected the post War Iraq era will be analyzed.

Chapter 12: **Conclusion.** In this chapter the outcomes of U.S. foreign policy during 2003, its effects on the March 1st *tezkere* and immediate Turkish-U.S. relations will be analyzed. Turkish and U.S. mistakes during the Iraq War era, which affected the outcome of the March 1st *tezkere*, will be analyzed. Finally the importance of the March 1st *tezkere* and the importance of analyzing the failure for *tezkere* will be explained.

1.3. Methodology

In this dissertation a mixed study approached benefiting more from the qualitative methods will be used.

1.3.1. Data Collection Methods

In this research literature reviews were made and many books, documents, reports, papers, analysis and articles were used. In addition to the sources focusing specifically on the March 1st *tezkere* crisis era and the Iraq War, many different resources analyzing Turkish-

U.S. relations, U.S. foreign policy, the Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq War, political ideologies, U.S. foreign policy ideologies, the U.S. governmental system, and the Turkish political system were used. The research benefited also from Internet sources and some documents from the Library of Congress. In addition to the materials mentioned, interviews with certain politicians, diplomats, analysts, scholars, think tank experts and bureaucrats greatly contributed to the research. Most of the interviewees were the people actively involved in foreign policy making after 9/11 and played important roles during the Iraq War decision making process and the March 1st *tezkere* negotiations.

2. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

2.1. Introduction

Foreign policy is an important issue for any nation. Yet, some countries, due to their geographical location or global aspirations, devote more time and resources for foreign policy. The United States is the best example of a country which greatly values the international spirit and foreign policy. The U.S.'s interests reach every part of the world and therefore its foreign policy budget exceeds \$50 billion.⁶

William O. Chittick (2006) in his textbook on U.S. foreign policy defines foreign policy as any policy, as a “set of behaviors used to obtain a desired result – that is a policy maker selects a particular method to achieve a particular objective in a particular situation.”⁷ In the case of foreign policy, the actors are most often sovereign states, but also non-state actors, such as international organizations, and their area is the international arena.

Different philosophical schools explain foreign policy in different ways. Rationalists, who emphasize the physical environment, believe that it is the environment that creates incentives accounting for the behaviors of foreign policy actors. They believe in one standardized, consistent, and stable model of behaviors that can be used in foreign policy.⁸ Political Psychologists look more at the relationship between the environment and behavior. They believe that the incentives mentioned by rationalists are nothing else but the creation of a human mind. As Chittick (2006) writes, “they emphasize the relationship between motives and both cognition and affect.”⁹ This school identified three basic human motives: power,

⁶ Office of Management and Budget, 2010, “A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise”, Available at the White House Official Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf>, Department of State and Other International Programs, p.87-90, Accessed on Jan. 15, 2010.

This amount includes: administration costs; U.S. foreign assistance; worldwide operations of the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development; non-military aid to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq; key programs advancing U.S. foreign policy – energy initiatives, programs addressing climate change, agricultural investments and the Peace Corps; payments to the Multilateral Development Banks; U.S. quota to the International Monetary Fund; U.S. financial commitments to the United Nations and other international organizations; support for the UN peacekeeping activities; counterterrorism and law enforcement aid for critical partners; funding for non-proliferation activities; aid for refugees and natural disasters’ victims.

⁷ William O. Chittick, *American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis*, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2006, p.4.

⁸ Ibid. pp. 11-12.

⁹ Ibid. p. 12.

achievement and social affiliation. All of these we can observe in foreign policy making processes. We can recognize many of them behind the most important foreign policy decisions made by the U.S. Presidents during American history.

2.2. American Foreign Policy Theory

In order to understand American foreign policy, it is necessary to analyze particular ideological schools, approaches and thoughts shaping this policy. There have been three main ideologies influencing U.S. foreign policy: Realism, Liberalism, and Idealism or Constructivism.

The Realist School in U.S. foreign policy agrees that states are the key factors in world politics. In order to provide their security and prosperity the states seek to increase their power. Usually, realist policy makers in the U.S. wanted to use military power to increase their countries position in the world. Some of the critics of the Realist School say that sometimes its followers make very Machiavellian decisions. For example, during the Gulf War, Bush encouraged Shi'as and Kurds to rise up against Saddam. The Bush camp promised them support and when the actions began Americans were not there to stop Saddam from fighting them. Bush's actions were criticized by neocons throughout the Gulf War.¹⁰

Realists agree that international institutions are not the main actors, but they can be used in order to ensure the power of leading states. From time to time, they choose the way to use or to ignore the international institutions according to their current policies. They believe in the importance of international events more than domestic ones. Furthermore, their policy actions are mainly affected by international policies rather than domestic ones. President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephan Walt and John Mearsheimer can be named as the main realists in U.S. Foreign Policy.¹¹

¹⁰ Personal Interview with Mark Dubowitz - Executive Director of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington D.C., February 4, 2008.

¹¹ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, Introduction, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p.19.

Tayyyar Ari, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri; Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, 2. Baskı, Alfa Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2002, pp.163-164.

Faruk Sonmezoğlu, Ülke Arıboğan, Güliden Ayman, Beril Dedeoğlu, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Sözlüğü*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 554.

The Liberal School usually disagrees with realists. Liberals also believe that the states are key actors in U.S. foreign policy making, but they think that the institutions could be used more in order to better serve their interests. They agree that international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations (UN) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) can help the states effectively be more transparent and organized. Another disagreement the Liberal School has with the Realist School is connected with domestic policies. The Liberal School believes that domestic policies effects foreign policies. President Wilson, President Carter, John Ikenberry, Michael Doyle and Robert Kaohane are the leading figures of the Liberal School in American foreign policy making.¹²

The third school is the Constructive School. Constructivists are different from realists and liberals. They believe that states often are the key actors but not all the time and they might not be in that role for a long time. This idea derives from the belief that interactions occur due to constructive social behavior of the social actors. Constructivists agree that the institutions, behaviors and patterns in the relations are shaped due to the actions of various international actors.¹³ Ronald Reagan and Theodore Roosevelt were the main constructivists among U.S. foreign policy makers.

It is obviously not easy to put any policy maker or any administration as a whole under any of these schools. Even though a couple of presidents might have seemed to be realists, they sometimes acted like liberals or constructivists. It is very common to see the mixture of these ideologies under certain administrations. In George W. Bush's administration all three schools and their styles can be identified. Even though the post-9/11

Howard Williams, Moorhead Wright, Tony Evans, *Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Siyaset Teorisi Üzerine Bir Derleme*, Siyasal Yayınevi, Ankara, 2007, pp. 273-288.

Ellen Grigsby, *Analyzing Politics*, Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont-Canada, 1999, pp. 277-280.

Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 250.

¹² Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, Introduction, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p.20.

Tayyyar Ari, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri; Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, 2. Baskı, Alfa Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2002, pp. 354-386.

Aytekin Yılmaz, *Çağdaş Siyasal Akımlar: Modern Demokraside Yeni Arayışlar*, 2. Basım, Vadi, Ankara, 2003, p. 48-52.

Ellen Grigsby, *Analyzing Politics*, Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont-Canada, 1999, pp. 102-110.

¹³ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, Introduction, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p.20.

era puts the Bush Administration close to realism, it is easy to see parts from the other ideologies.¹⁴

In addition to these three main schools, there are four approaches which should be overviewed in order to identify the foreign policies of certain administrations: internationalism, isolationism, multilateralism and unilateralism.

Internationalists or globalists believe that the U.S. should play a bigger role in the international arena. Isolationists on the other hand, believe that the U.S. should be far from the international events and deal with domestic issues like during George Washington's days.¹⁵ These two schools created a historical pattern for U.S. foreign policy. Hans Morgenthau called it a swing "back and forth between the extremes of an indiscriminate isolationism and an equally indiscriminate internationalism or globalism."¹⁶ The third ideology which is called multilateralism, agrees that the U.S. should cooperate with international institutions and create and maintain worldwide alliances. Unilateralists agree to handle foreign policy with their own sources without engaging others.¹⁷

These four approaches also shape foreign policy decision makers' beliefs. They can be seen as a mixture of foreign policy schools. Multilateral decision makers might have different approaches, like isolationism or internationalism. Other liberal decision makers can, in some cases, show multilateral or unilateral behaviors. Therefore, in order to better understand U.S. foreign policy making, these three main schools must be analyzed together with all of the main approaches.

We can define three schools of thought in U.S. foreign policy: Jacksonian, Hamiltonian and Neoconservative thoughts. None of these, however, could easily fall under the three main schools.¹⁸ We must, therefore, examine these U.S. schools.

Jacksonians receive their name from President Andrew Jackson and his approach. They prefer to focus on domestic issues. Unless there is a necessity or a threat to national

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Maxime Lefebvre, *Amerikan Dış Politikası*, 1. Basım, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 14.

¹⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, Praeger, New York, 1969, p. 15.

¹⁷ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, Introduction, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p. 21.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 22.

Personal interview with Mark Dubowitz - Executive Director of Foundation for Defense of Democracy, Washington D.C., 4 February, 2008.

security, they prefer to stay back. Otherwise they do not hesitate to use force.¹⁹ Hamiltonians are mainly internationalists. They use power in order to maintain national security. Their primary aim is not to promote democracy, but to keep financial interests and the economy stable and secure. George Walker H. Bush is a good example of this school.²⁰

Neoconservatism is another example of U.S. foreign policy that is very important for the post-9/11 era. This thought affected the overall behaviors of U.S. diplomacy after 9/11 and during the War on Terrorism. First of all, neoconservatives believed that the U.S. is the preeminent power and that U.S. power should be exercised either in combination with other countries or alone in order to promote American values and a democracy.²¹ The actions of President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz are considered as common behaviors of the neoconservative thought, even though some of them were not neocons.

American people accuse neoconservatives of playing a negative role in U.S. policies during the Iraq War. Yet, others find them as the protectors of the world's new order. Without focusing on which of these two views is the right one, the real question is what was the role of this thought in shaping U.S. foreign policy during the Iraq War? How did this ideology affect not only the future of the U.S. but also the new world order? To understand the United States foreign policy logistics during that era, the neoconservative ideology will be analyzed carefully.

2.3. Brief History of American Foreign Policy

There were several milestones in U.S. foreign policy and U.S. diplomatic history. Foreign policy programs, also known as doctrines, played a tremendous role in shaping the diplomatic agenda of the United States.

The French Revolution and the era of Napoleon lasting from 1792 to 1815 triggered a serious debate in the United States about the future direction of foreign policy.²² Different

¹⁹ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, Introduction, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p. 22.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Personal Interview with Mark Dubowitz - Executive Director of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington D.C., 4 February, 2008.

²² Robert G. Kaufman, *In Defense of the Bush Doctrine*, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 2008, p.2.

visions of foreign relations clashed. This was seen especially between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton was known as a supporter of Great Britain (GB) and Jefferson was the former Ambassador to France²³. When they became members of George Washington's executive cabinet the quarrels intensified. Jefferson was the Secretary of State and Hamilton was the Secretary of Treasury in Washington's Cabinet.

Right after the John Jay Agreement, in order to establish new and fresh relations with the old rival Great Britain, Cabinet members started to create a strategic agenda for foreign policy. Debates started between two separated groups led by Jefferson and Hamilton.²⁴ When George Washington saw this situation he announced the United States Foreign Policy Doctrine right before he left office. The principles submitted in that doctrine were followed by policy makers for almost 150 years²⁵. The main principle of the Doctrine was Isolationism, which can be best defined as opposition to U.S. intervention outside the Western Hemisphere and not becoming involved in any of the European conflicts. Neutrality and non- involvement in any military alliances and not participating in any collective-security organizations were to be the ways to preserve the nation's freedom of action.²⁶ Isolationist foreign policy was followed until the attacks on U.S. ships by Barbary Coast corsairs that resulted in the Barbary War in 1801 and the later involvement in conflict with France and the War of 1812 with Great Britain.²⁷

In 1823, the United States announced the Monroe Doctrine, through which it had officially declared that America belongs to Americans. The U.S. officially became the guardian and protector of the American continent.²⁸ This doctrine was a response to the new independence of the Spanish colonies in Latin America. The U.S. wanted to emphasize the opposition to any European intervention on its lands. Some experts on this doctrine emphasize the continuation of isolationist politics, since the U.S. also pledged no political

²³ Maxime Lefebvre, *Amerikan Dış Politikası*, 1. Basım, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 14.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Robert G. Kaufman, *In Defense of the Bush Doctrine*, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 2008, p. 2.

²⁶ Maxime Lefebvre, *Amerikan Dış Politikası*, 1. Basım, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 14.

Paul S. Boyer, *The Oxford Guide: United States History*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2001, p.397.

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 814-815.

²⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dis Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.218.

intervention in Europe, yet others disagree. After this doctrine the U.S. started acting as the world police, beginning with its own continent.

Even though Washington's isolationist doctrine lasted for almost 150 years, it came to an end after the World Wars. During World War I (WWI) the U.S. avoided direct involvement and limited its help providing loans to allies. It entered the war front only after German U-bots interfered with American ships.²⁹ At the beginning of the war President Thomas Woodrow Wilson issued a proclamation of neutrality, which was welcomed by his fellow citizens with relief.³⁰ When he ran for re-election in 1916 his campaign slogan proclaimed that he succeeded and kept his nation and his country out of the World War.³¹ However, in his second term he realized that the U.S. could not avoid the war any longer. As the situation grew more dangerous, and his position of 'peace without victory' was not accepted by any of the fighting countries, he urged the U.S. Congress to declare war on Germany, which finally happened in 1917.³²

After World War I, during the joint session of Congress in 1918, President Wilson proclaimed his famous Fourteen Points in which he included his foreign policy views.³³ He believed that if implemented, the Fourteen Points³⁴ would help to achieve world peace. Wilsonianism, as Wilson's foreign policy ideology was titled, was in opposition to imperialism. It advocated self-determination of ethnic groups, nationalism, embraced the spread of democracy, and capitalism. Also, what is most important, it ended U.S. isolationism and emphasized the need for intervention in order to create peace in the world

²⁹ Paul S. Boyer, *The Oxford Guide: United States History*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2001, p. 843.

³⁰ Woodrow Wilson, 1914, "Message to the Senate, August 19, 1914", Available at the Sage History Website <<http://www.sagehistory.net/worldwar1/docs/WWNeutral1914.htm>>, Accessed on Nov. 2, 2009.

³¹ Carter Smith, *Presidents: All you need to know*, Hylas Publishing, New York, 2008, p. 170.

Paul S. Boyer, *The Oxford Guide: United States History*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2001, p. 831.

³² Paul S. Boyer, *The Oxford Guide: United States History*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2001, p. 831.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

³⁴ President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918), Available at the Our Documents Website <<http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=62#>>, Accessed on Nov. 10, 2009.

and spread freedom.³⁵ Some analysts of George W. Bush foreign policy program were seeking relationships between Wilsonianism and the Bush Doctrine.³⁶

World War II (WWII) brought another change for the U.S. with President Roosevelt's 1941 War Declaration on Nazi Germany³⁷ and the attack to Pearl Harbor made a huge impact on foreign policy decisions. American policy makers realized that it is not possible to keep threats away from America without interventions and a direct involvement in world policy.³⁸ The changing circumstances pushed the U.S. to obtain a new foreign policy program and different foreign policy behaviors to protect American soil.

The main change in U.S foreign policy took place after the World War II. America found itself as the leader of the Western World in a bi-polar global order where the U.S. was re-building its foreign policy program. The Cold War challenge and the new balance of power between The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the U.S. influenced foreign policy makers to advocate their national interests in a more persuasive way. President Harry Truman wanted to defeat the USSR by using the containment approach. The new doctrine was announced in March 1947 by President Truman during his State of Union Address. The main principles of the Truman Doctrine were to support the international alliances and the countries under the Soviet threat.³⁹ Truman saw nuclear weapons as a major threat for global and domestic security. He insisted that the Soviet Union wanted to dominate Greece, Europe, the Middle East and Asia by using civil war.⁴⁰ He asked Congress for \$400 million in economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey. Through these economic, social, political and military alliances, Truman aimed to defeat the Soviet Union.⁴¹ After 1947, because of the Truman Doctrine, the U.S. became the protector of Greece and Turkey. The

³⁵ Tony Smith, "Wilsonianism", Available at the American Foreign Policy Relations Website <<http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Wilsonianism.html>>, Accessed on Nov.1, 2009.

³⁶ Singh, R., "The Bush Doctrine", Chapter 2, Ed. M. Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.13.

³⁷ U.S. Declaration of War Against Germany, Available at the U.S. Embassy in Germany Official Website, <<http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-411211.htm>>, Accessed on Oct. 28, 2009.

³⁸ Robert G. Kaufman, *In Defense of the Bush Doctrine*, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 2008, p.2.

³⁹ Maxime Lefebvre, *Amerikan Dış Politikası*, 1. Basım, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 36.

⁴⁰ Paul S. Boyer, *The Oxford Guide: United States History*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2001, p. 786.

⁴¹ Robert G. Kaufman, *In Defense of the Bush Doctrine*, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 2008, p.2.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949. Over the next ten years, it helped to connect the U.S. and the rest of the capitalist world.⁴² NATO formally ended a long-standing commitment of the U.S. to unilateralism.⁴³ From the contemporary perspective this approach could be seen as the mixture of George W. Bush's unilateralism and Clinton's multilateralism.

Many authors writing on U.S. history emphasize the importance of World War II and its influence on shaping foreign policy. Steven Hook and John Spanier (2007) in their book on U.S. foreign policy since World War II argue:

American foreign policy since World War II has reached a historic crossroads. The 'promised land' aspires to lead by example and otherwise leave the outside world to its own devices is also the 'crusader state' whose fortunes, political structures, and moral ideals are inextricably linked to all others. Despite their contradictions, both impulses stem from the same source: a sense of national exceptionalism that views the United States, in the language of the Monroe Doctrine, as 'essentially different' from other countries. The crucial dilemma of the past-between detachment and the activism as the best route to preserve this exceptional character-formerly played out in cycles and spasms of discordant foreign-policy behavior. Today, both impulses reveal themselves at once. Even as the United States rejects the established means and institutions of statecraft, its leaders seek nothing than the final redemption of global politics.⁴⁴

The Cold War period was the time when U.S. foreign policy was focused on fighting against the totalitarian regimes of the East. It was the time of creating the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Truman Doctrine brought a new philosophy into foreign policy. The U.S. government presented to the world its mission of helping all the countries threatened by foreign aggression and internal subversion.⁴⁵ The U.S. was seeking to limit Soviet influence in the world and this objective caused U.S. involvement in the Korean War, the overthrow of the Iranian government, the Vietnam War, the Six Day War and Yom Kippur War in the Middle East,

⁴² Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dis Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p. 224. Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemony or Reluctant Sheriff?*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p.8.

⁴³ A. Gitelson, M.J. Dubnick, R. Dudley, *American Government*, 7th Edition, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 2004, p.454.

⁴⁴ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 376-379.

⁴⁵ Lloyd C. Gardner, *The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present*, The New Press, New York-London, 2008, p.15.

and later, the policy of aiding anti-Soviet Mujahedeen forces in Afghanistan.⁴⁶ Active foreign policy actions and all efforts to undermine the Soviet position helped the U.S. to establish a strong international position. By 1990, when the Soviet Union collapsed the U.S. had interests in every part of the world.

After the Cold War, great expectations were seen in the U.S., especially in March 1991, when George Bush Senior, who was the first U.S. President to serve in the aftermath of the Cold War said, “We can see a new world coming into view, a world in which there is a very real prospect of a new world order, a world where the United Nations – freed from Cold War stalemate – is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders; a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nation.”⁴⁷ This statement opened a debate about the U.S.’s role in the post-Cold War era.

In the midst of these discussions, the country was already involved globally, especially in the Middle East. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President Bush was in a very difficult situation. Until then, Iraq was an American sponsored bumper in the Middle East to control the Soviet Union’s influence. The Reagan administration in the 80’s provided Saddam with intelligence, military equipment and credits;⁴⁸ it removed Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and closed its eyes on attacks made by Saddam’s people on Kurdish citizens. In return Saddam was to keep the Persian Gulf free from Soviet influence and give the U.S. a discount on Iraqi oil.⁴⁹ Therefore, after attacking Kuwait, Saddam had not expected a big resistance from the US. However, the situation required the U.S. to take action. When Iraq chose not to comply with the UN deadline to withdraw from Kuwait (January 15), the U.S. began an aerial bombardment on January 17, 1991.⁵⁰ However, the Gulf War did not result in Saddam’s removal from power and he remained a threat in the region.

⁴⁶ A. Gitelson, M.J. Dubnick, R. Dudley, *American Government*, 7th Edition, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 2004, pp. 452-459.

⁴⁷ Quoted in Stanley R. Sloan, *The U.S. Role in a New World Order: Prospects for George Bush’s Global Vision*, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, 1991, p.19.

⁴⁸ Bruce W. Jentleson, *With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1882-1990*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1994.

⁴⁹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 273.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 274.

Some experts, like Paul Wolfowitz, the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, see the 2003 Iraq War as the end of the 1991 Gulf War. Wolfowitz claims that the Gulf War had actually never ended since Saddam Hussein never abided by the ceasefire terms, so the U.S. had a continuing low level war throughout the 1990's.⁵¹

When Bill Clinton took the presidential office, a new era started. As Clifford May said, it was a 'holiday from history' – the U.S. had no more declared enemies after the Soviet Union collapse.⁵² So the administration could slightly reduce the intelligence agencies and the military. Clinton focused more on domestic affairs. He did understand the global situation and had been undertaking actions to support American business in the world. He had diplomacy serving businessmen. As Ambassador Chamberlin, who served in the Foreign Service during the Clinton era said, there was more of a business approach and globalization was more visible and important than ever before. There was also recognition of the importance of transnational threats like the global narcotics trade, human trafficking, terrorism and international crime. There was a growing understanding of all these issues in the post-Cold War era, Clinton's era.⁵³ However, not much was being done to resolve them.

Clinton was not a foreign policy president in a sense that any of his predecessors were or his successors would be. He was focused on the U.S.'s domestic situation and internal political issues. The international actions he undertook in Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Ireland were rather 'signature victories' he was looking for rather than real leader involvement in international affairs.⁵⁴ He basically had to get involved in those actions as they were taking the world's attention and keeping him distracted from the domestic issues. Thus he wanted to successfully resolve them as soon as it was possible. Yet, as Mark Parris summarized, the American interest in that era was defined as multilateral. There was a positive value assigned

⁵¹ Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

⁵² Personal Interview with Clifford May – President of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington D.C., 9 February, 2008.

⁵³ Personal Interview with Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin – the President of the Middle East Institute, Washington D.C., 9 February 2008.

⁵⁴ Personal Interview with Mark Dubowitz – Executive Director of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington D.C., 4 February, 2008.

to working with the international community and organizing it, which was a distinction from the Bush Administration's approach.⁵⁵

The priority of domestic interests remained until the 9/11 attacks. As described in the previous part, these tragic events have forever changed the U.S. foreign and security policy approaches. America paid for years of ignoring accruing global threats. U.S. foreign policy entered a new era. Bush and his advisors changed the course of policy from the multilateral legacy of Clinton to a radically unilateral approach and pre-emptive war fully manifested in the decision to start a war against Iraq even without the support of most members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).⁵⁶ Bush changed the order of U.S.'s preference for foreign policy objectives from Clinton's fostering prosperity values to security values.

Table 1.1. The Order of Values Preferences: Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

Order of Preference for Foreign Policy Objectives	Clinton's preferences	Bush's preferences
First preference	"Engagement and enlargement" (Prosperity values)	"War on terrorism" (Security values)
Second preference	Control rogue states (Security values)	Protect "American freedom" (Community values)
Third preference	Strengthen global environment and human rights (Community values)	Help those who are prepared to help themselves (Prosperity values)

For Clinton "engagement and enlargement" was the most important foreign policy objective because although it primarily enhanced American prosperity, it contributed to all three aspects of foreign policy because the advanced economies were democracies and were the basis for projecting American security worldwide, controlling rogue states was the second most important because it provided security for the realization of the first objective, and strengthening the global environment and human rights, the community value dimension, was least important because it was viewed as unachievable in the short-term.

For Bush the war on terrorism was the most important foreign policy objective because the security threat appeared imminent, American freedom was the second most important because, rhetorically at least, this was what was ultimately at stake, and helping those who were prepared to help themselves was the least important because we first had to save ourselves.

Source: William O. Chittick, *American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis*, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2006, p.117.

⁵⁵ Personal Interview with Ambassador Mark Parris – Brookings Institute, former US Ambassador to Turkey, Washington D.C., 13 February, 2008.

⁵⁶ Abraham Ben-Zvi, "The Foreign and Defense Policy of the Bush Administration", Ed. Shai Feldman, *After the War in Iraq: Defining the New Strategic Balance*, Sussex Academic Press & JAFFEE Center For Strategic Studies, Brighton & Portland, 2003, p.17.

Abraham Ben-Zvi (2003) in his text on American foreign policy after 9/11 writes, “The tragedy of 9/11 can be viewed as a traumatic, formative event that precipitated a profound and immediate change in the longstanding, traditional modus operandi of American foreign policy, from the conservative pole of an effort to defend the status quo to the revisionist extreme of seeking to transform the entire international system so that it conforms to American ideas, values and institutions.”⁵⁷

The U.S. understood that it must get more involved in international politics, only if the actions undertaken to do so bring desirable results. As both Mark Dubowitz and Omer Taspinar analyzed, after 9/11 the Bush Administration realized that the past 60 years of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East had not worked; it had failed. There were radical Islamists in the region. The regimes that the U.S. supported during the Cold War – Egypt and Saudi Arabia were ‘politically bankrupt’. People outside of the government, think tank analysts, and journalists began to argue that the foreign policy of realism contributed to Middle East authoritarianism and radical Islam and ultimately allowed Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to gain power and organize the 9/11 attacks.⁵⁸ So the discussion about the need of a significant change in foreign policy toward the Middle East, and foreign policy in general, was on. The attacks and the public argument over foreign policy gave a kind of platform to the president for political leadership and creating a new doctrine which will be further described in this research.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.19.

⁵⁸ Personal Interview with Mark Dubowitz - Executive Director of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington D.C., February 4, 2008.

Personal Interview with Ömer Taşpınar – Brookings Institute Fellow, Washington D.C., 10 July, 2008.

3. FIRST REACTIONS AFTER 9/11

3.1. Introduction

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York were the biggest terror attacks in U.S. history. It was a major shock for the nation which was formed under an isolationist ideology.⁵⁹ A nation, which was considered by the entire world to be untouchable, had been attacked by 19 terrorists who turned 4 hijacked planes into Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).⁶⁰ Immediately after the attacks, the first concern was to rescue the civilians and find out the number of casualties. 3000 people lost their lives in these violent attacks.⁶¹

As Douglas Feith (2008) writes, in the decades before 9/11 America had suffered a series of attacks by terrorist groups. He lists among them inter alia bombings of U.S. military personnel in Beirut in 1983, attacks targeting civilians like the Black September hijacking of civilian airliners in 1970, the assassination attempt against former president George H.W. Bush in 1993, the first World Trade Center attack in 1993 and the destruction of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.⁶² None of them, however, had the scale of 9/11 which had successfully (for the terrorists) taken place on U.S. soil.

Compared with other world tragedies, like the firebombing of Dresden, Hiroshima or Nagasaki, the 9/11 attack was not an obscenity.⁶³ Yet, the fact that terrorists took the lives of American people, not outside of the country, but on American soil was an unexpected event for the U.S. citizens. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, in one of her interviews emphasized, that after 9/11, Americans felt vulnerable and afraid for the first time. Moreover, the U.S. had not been attacked by a state, government or a nation, but by a group of terrorists. It was a

⁵⁹ Maxime Lefebvre, *Amerikan Dış Politikası*, 1. Basım, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 14.

⁶⁰ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.314.

⁶¹ Richard A. Clarke, *Your Government Failed You*, 1st Edition, Harper Colins Publishers, New York, 2008, p.1. Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 2004, p.24. Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p.134.

⁶² Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 17.

⁶³ Frank Lentricchia, "Introductory: Notes from the Editors", Ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Frank Lentricchia, *Dissent from the Homeland: essays after 9/11*, Duke University Press, Durham & London, 2003, p.5.

new transnational threat.⁶⁴ Ambassador Ronald Neumann, when asked about the first reactions after 9/11, described a mixture of sadness and anger.⁶⁵

The 9/11 attacks aimed to destroy the security, economy, welfare and prosperity of the American people. Until 9/11, the U.S.'s reactions to terrorist attacks were only limited to bombings and minor operations. After 9/11 the overall strategy for this type of situation had changed completely. The people and the Bush Administration started to consider the fight against terrorism in the same category as war. That is why George W. Bush started calling this period as a Global War on Terrorism.⁶⁶

The attacks paralyzed life in the U.S. for a while. After the attacks the New York Stock Market, located just few blocks away from ground zero, was shut down. Even though it did not last long, it still showed its economic effects on the market. Due to security reasons Disney World, Gate Bridge and Sears Tower were also closed. The schools and private businesses around the country were also closed. All 4546 airplanes already in the air were recalled immediately.⁶⁷ As Paul Wolfowitz said in one of his speeches, "The economic losses alone from the attack have been measured in the hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars. And there is no way to put a price on the lives of the Americans who were lost."⁶⁸

Peter Dale Scott (2007) writes about this tragedy as about the turning point in U.S. security and its external relations. He asks important questions about how the U.S. will handle this approaching change:

9/11 represents a double challenge to the American way of life: the external threat of terrorist attacks and also the internal threat of subversion of the Constitution by cabals and a deep state that are threatening to get out of control. The United States faces a fundamental choice of what and in whom to trust. Will we deal with the problem of terrorism primarily by working to resolve issues that provoke conflict and projecting values that the rest of the world will wish to share? Or will we trust primarily in our own military power and become increasingly a garrison state and empire, conducting more and more of our global strategies

⁶⁴ Personal Interview with Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin – President of the Middle East Institute, Washington D.C., 9 February 2008.

⁶⁵ Personal Interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann – President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Washington D.C., 3 July 2008.

⁶⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dis Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.264.

⁶⁷ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.316-317.

⁶⁸ "Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Wednesday, November 14, 2001 at the Fletcher Conference", Ed. Lee Crane, *Wolfowitz on Point: Reorganizing World Reality*, Pavilion Press, Philadelphia, 2004, p.79.

in secret and projecting our military and covert strength into further and further corners of the earth?⁶⁹

To find the answers to his questions we need to analyze the Bush Administration and the American people's reactions to that severe tragedy.

3.2. Reaction of the Bush Administration

In the night of the incidents, on 9/11 2001, President George W. Bush addressed the nation about the attacks. He stated that the main priority would be to search and rescue the people who were lost during the attacks. Afterwards, he has also stated that the financial institutions and Government Agencies would not stop working in order to show that the U.S. had no fear of terrorists. During his speech, maybe the most important point was his assurance that the US will take immediate actions toward the ones responsible for these attacks and especially the countries hosting terrorist.⁷⁰ The words of President Bush were very important indicators that the United States would begin significant actions towards some countries and not only the terrorist organizations.

On September 12 2001, President Bush chaired a National Security Council (NSC) meeting during which the Director of CIA presented a report to the National Security Agency (NSA). According to this report possible suspects were terrorist organizations Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.⁷¹

While shock and anger were the public opinion, the administration took some actions in order to respond to the tragedy. The *9/11 Commission Report* (2006) summarizes the immediate responses at home. The most important was to:

Help the victims and stanch the flowing losses to the American economy, such as:

⁶⁹ Peter Dale Scott, *The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America*, Conclusion, University of California Press, Berkley-Los Angeles-London, 2007, p. 246-247.

⁷⁰ George W. Bush, 2001, Address to the nation following alleged terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., Available at the PBS Official Website, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/terroristattack/bush_speech.html>, Accessed on Nov.9, 2009.

⁷¹ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.175. Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p.72.

- Organizing federal emergency assistance. One question was what kind of public health advice to give about the air quality in Lower Manhattan in the vicinity of the fallen buildings.
- Compensating victims. They evaluated legislative options, eventually setting up a federal compensation fund and defining the powers of a special master to run it.
- Determining federal assistance. On September 13, President Bush promised to provide \$20 billion for New York City, in addition to the \$20 billion his budget director had already guessed what might be needed for the country as a whole.
- Restoring civil aviation. On the morning of September 13, the national airspace reopened for use by airports that met newly improvised security standards.
- Reopening the financial markets. After extraordinary emergency efforts involving the White House, the Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange Commissions, and aided by unprecedented cooperation among the usually competitive firms of the financial industry, the markets reopened on Monday, September 17.
- Deciding when and how to return border and port security to more normal operations.
- Evaluating legislative proposals to bail out the airline industry and cap its stability.⁷²

The US government was working on all these issues while simultaneously it had to take stock of its intelligence and plan a military response to the 9/11 attacks.

Between 9/11 and September 20 the US Congress passed a \$40 billion military aid bill.⁷³ This bill was immediately prepared and passed by the U.S. Congress in order to expand the operational budget of the army. On September 18, President George W. Bush signed Senate Joint Resolution 23 which is also named the “Authorization for use of Military Force”.⁷⁴ As it is explained in the resolution’s foreword, it was issued to authorize the

⁷² National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, pp. 326-327.

⁷³ Michelle Ciarrocca and William D. Hartung, 2002, “Increases in Military Spending and Security Assistance Since 9/11”, Available at the World Policy Institute Official Website, <<http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/SpendingDOD911.html>> Accessed on Nov. 9, 2009.

⁷⁴ Alison Mitchell and Philip Shenon, 2001, “After the Attacks: Congress; Agreement on \$40 Million for Aid and a Response”, Available at The New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/us/after-the-attacks-congress-agreement-on-40-million-for-aid-and-a-response.html>>, Accessed Nov. 1, 2009.

Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p.317.

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.321.

President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”⁷⁵ The immediate release was announced by the White House. The importance of this bill is obviously seen in the remarks of President Bush. He said that the US will give permission to the military to use its power in order to stop the terrorist threats against the U.S. Threats listed by Bush were coming not only from the terrorist organizations, but also their aids, planers and the countries harboring them.⁷⁶ That was the second time President Bush stated that the responsive actions were aimed at terrorist but not limited to them. He was especially focusing on the countries that harbors terrorist.⁷⁷ It was a major implication to the world that the U.S. was already focused on a large scale war against terrorism.

On September 15, Bush ordered his war cabinet to meet in Camp David. During this meeting CIA Director George Tenet, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were present to discuss the plan of action. While the U.S. was trying to recover emotionally, socially and economically; preparations for the counter strike had begun.⁷⁸ During discussions at Camp David Wolfowitz was arguing to expand the War on Terror to other rogue states – he specifically meant Iraq. But Bush and Cheney at that time had some reservations about that approach. Powell argued for attacking only Afganistan. Consensus was reached to attack Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroy the Taliban regime. But soon it became clear that Afghanistan would not be the last target during the War on Terror.⁷⁹

On September 20, 2001 President George W. Bush delivered another speech about the terrorist attacks in the U.S. Congress. During his speech President Bush officially held

⁷⁵ 107th Congress, 2001, “Authorization for Use of Military Force”, Available at the Find Law Official Website, <<http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/terrorism/sjres23.es.html>> Accessed on Nov. 9, 2009.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.317.

⁷⁸ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 350.
Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p.73.

⁷⁹ Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p.73.

Al-Qaeda responsible for 9/11. He named Osama Bin Laden as the Al-Qaeda leader.⁸⁰ That was the first time the U.S. officially announced who was responsible for the tragedy. The President also stated that Al-Qaeda was located in Afghanistan. He also included in his address an official demands toward the Afghanistan government. He announced:

It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And tonight the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban:

- Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al-Qaeda who hide in your land.
- Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned.
- Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country.
- Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities.
- Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion.⁸¹

After this announcement President Bush officially said that the failure of implementing any of these demands would end with diplomatic, economic or military leverages.⁸² The most sensitive part of the speech was when he said, “Either you are with us or against us”.⁸³ This was unique for the United States. It was a country formed under the

⁸⁰ CNN, 2001, “Transcript of President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001”, Available at the CNN Official Website <<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>>, Accessed on Nov. 6, 2009; Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 578.

⁸¹ CNN, 2001, “Transcript of President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001”, Available at the CNN Official Website <<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>>, Accessed on Nov. 6, 2009; George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.179.

⁸² Elisabeth Bumiller, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: The Overview; Bush pledges attack on Afghanistan unless it surrenders Bin Laden now; He creates cabinet post for Security”, Available at The New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/world/nation-challenged-overview-bush-pledges-attack-afghanistan-unless-it-surrenders.html>>, Accessed on Nov. 9, 2009.

⁸³ CNN, 2001, “Transcript of President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001”, Available at the CNN Official Website <<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>>, Accessed on Nov. 6, 2009; Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 317.

Mary Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p. 202.

Declaration of Independence Bill of Rights, The Federalist Papers and a democratic constitution fostering human rights. Diplomacy was everything for the U.S. under the principles in the listed documents. For the first time ever, the U.S. showed a different face and announced that there will be another way to solve these issues. That behavior affected U.S. foreign policy for the upcoming 8 years and caused the country to lose its popularity.

These two main speeches George W. Bush gave on 9/11 and September 20 and also the bill signed on September 18 were main indicators of America's future policies. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime were the first targets. By saying that the war will be long, Bush gave the message that Afghanistan and the Taliban regime would be just the beginning of the War on Terror. President Bush also said the war that the U.S. was getting involved in was a war between good and evil. In his State of the Union Address in January 2002, he emphasized that idea and named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the "*axis of evil*" countries⁸⁴.

The above mentioned "Authorization for Use of Military Power" passed in Congress was open-ended legislation. According to most of the experts in the U.S. it was "nearly as wide-ranging as a declaration of war"⁸⁵. The President could declare a war if he found it necessary. This opinion was shared also by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He prepared a strategic presentation for President Bush after the attacks. As the man in charge of the entire defense of the United States of America, Rumsfeld's opinion was very important for immediate U.S. policies. He believed this would be a war against a global enemy. According to him, the first target should be the Taliban camps in Afghanistan but it definitely shouldn't be the end.⁸⁶ Some members of the Bush Administration, like Paul Wolfowitz

⁸⁴ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.325.

George W. Bush, 2002, "President Delivers State of the Union Address", Available at The White House Official Archives, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>>, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 376.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.579.

⁸⁵ Neil A. Lewis, 2001, "A Nation Challenged: The Resolution; Measure Backing Bush's Use of Force Is as Broad as a Declaration of War", Experts Say, Available at The New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/18/us/nation-challenged-resolution-measure-backing-bush-s-use-force-broad-declaration.html>>, Accessed on Nov. 9, 2009.

⁸⁶ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, Doğan Kitap, 1st Edition, Istanbul, 2006, p.35.

argued that Iraq was the source of the terrorist problem, yet at that point there was no evidence to support that theory.⁸⁷

After the attacks, the Bush Administration was not the only power thinking about an immediate response. Between 9/11 and September 20, most of the American people started to demonstrate and call for revenge. People were impatient and expected an immediate response from their government. They were expecting a strike as the U.S. response to 9/11 and they did not want to wait long.⁸⁸ In order to meet the nation's expectations and prove once again the U.S.'s position in the world, the Bush Administration was working to create a plan of action.

Simultaneously, we could observe very interesting and somewhat natural post-9/11 social reactions towards Muslim populations in the U.S. and all over the world. Since all of the hijackers were Muslim men from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt⁸⁹, the people started treating Muslims with reserve and distrust. This was especially the case in the U.S. but also in Europe and other Western countries. There were even cases where Arabs and Muslims become target of hate crimes.⁹⁰ Despite Islamic society voices condemning the terrorist attacks, 9/11 aggravated the situation of Muslim people and Islam's reputation. After 9/11, being a Muslim in the U.S. was not as easy as before. American society was expecting strong reactions towards countries with terrorist ties, and most of these countries were states with a majority of Muslims. The Bush Administration needed to continue its post-9/11 actions and sooner or later it would face the clash not only with terrorism but also with the ideology.

Within the two month following the attacks, approximately 1200 foreign nationals residing in the U.S. were arrested and detained by the federal law enforcement agencies. 718 out of the 1200 were immediately arrested on immigration charges, the remainder on

⁸⁷ National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, p. 335.

⁸⁸ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 263.

⁸⁹ National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, p. 231.

⁹⁰ Ralph De La Cruz, 2007, "Years after 9-11, American Muslims Increasingly Targets of Hate", Available at the Religious Diversity News Website, <<http://pluralism.org/news/view/16361>> Accessed on Nov. 1, 2009.

criminal charges. Nearly 40% of the detainees were either Pakistani nationals or of Pakistani descent and most of the rest were citizens of other Islamic countries.⁹¹

Five weeks after the 9/11 attacks, on the 19th of November 2001, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in order to create The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the Department of Transportation.⁹² Later on, the administration focused on securing the U.S. borders by preparing the Homeland Security project. The Department of Homeland Security was one of the first projects implemented as a reaction to 9/11.⁹³ This institution was established to ensure fostering a new security approach within U.S. territory.⁹⁴ When President Bush proposed the creation of the Homeland Security Department on June 8, 2002 he called it “the most extensive reorganization since the 1900’s”.⁹⁵ In a year the department brought together twenty two federal agencies and more than 170.000 employees. It had been the largest restructuring since the Department of Defense (DOD) creation.⁹⁶

As soon as the new department was organized, it took some immediate initiatives on its agenda. Aviation security, immigration, the coordination between state and local governments and, finally, intelligence research and coordination became the top priorities of the department.⁹⁷ The collection of intelligence, analysis and its coordination were extremely important issues.

After the attacks, the American public opinion lost its confidence towards the U.S security agencies. Some said, the attacks were obvious and the U.S. security agencies failed

⁹¹ Stephen J. Schulhofer, *The Enemy Within: Intelligence Gathering, Law Enforcement, and Civil Liberties in the Wake of 9/11*, A Century Foundation Report, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2002, p.11.

⁹² Donald F. Kettl, *The Department of Homeland Security's First Year*, Century Foundation Press, New York, 2004, p. 29.

⁹³ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, Introduction, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p. 23.

Mary Beth Brown, Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p.214.

⁹⁴ U.S House Resolution, H.R.3026, Title: “To establish an Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President to lead, oversee, and coordinate a comprehensive national homeland security strategy to safeguard the Nation”, Introduced by Rep. Gibbons, Jim, Nevada, 10-04-2001.

⁹⁵ Donald F. Kettl, *The Department of Homeland Security's First Year*, Century Foundation Press, New York, 2004, pp.1-52.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.1.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.2.

to predict them.⁹⁸ Robert Bellah (2003) in his essay incorporated in the *Dissent from the Homeland*, a set of essays on 9/11, writes about it.

In spite of our enormous military budget, in spite of the lavishly funded efforts of the FBI, the CIA and other intelligence agencies, nineteen men, utterly ruthless with respect to the lives of others and willing to sacrifice their own lives, carried out a devastating and totally unexpected attack, whose consequences we will be living with for many years. In the patriotic euphoria that has swept the country since 9/11, the extent of the defeat we suffered has been downplayed to the point of denial. Polls indicate that trust in government is up since 9/11, after having been in decline for decades, though why confidence in a government that failed to protect us from such an attack in spite of our enormous expenditures on 'defense' should be trusted is far from clear.⁹⁹

The Press reported that both the CIA and FBI knew about Al-Qaeda and that possible attacks could take place on U.S. soil, but they didn't act efficiently to stop them.¹⁰⁰ As a matter of fact, these opinions were not entirely wrong. Right before the 9/11 attacks, former President Bill Clinton's National Security adviser Richard Clarke briefed Powell and the rest of the administration about the Al-Qaeda threat on U.S. soil. He also mentioned that the terrorist might have already been in U.S. territory. Clarke suggested an early action plan towards Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda but it was never considered or accepted by the decision makers from the administration.¹⁰¹

Furthermore, Colin Powell and the State Department were not the only ones warned about the possible Al-Qaeda threat. When newly appointed NSA Advisor Condoleezza Rice met with Richard Clarke the same issue was presented. After getting briefed by Clark, in January 2001, Rice announced that there may be a serious threat coming to U.S. soil from Al-Qaeda.¹⁰² In addition, Powell, Condoleezza Rice, the Defense Department and the President were also aware of the possible high threat level. The State Department warned all the embassies overseas and the Defense Department took some security measures in the U.S. Obviously no one was expecting an attack the level of the 9/11 attacks.¹⁰³ Unlike the

⁹⁸ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p.67.

⁹⁹ Robert N. Bellah, "Seventy-Five Years", Ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Frank Lentricchia, *Dissent from the Homeland: essays after 9/11*, Durham & London, 2003, pp.16-17.

¹⁰⁰ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p.320.

¹⁰¹ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, pp. 344-345.

¹⁰² Mary Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p.194.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.199.

information given by the press, the high level U.S. government officials were briefed on the possibility of the attacks. Yet, they were not aware of the exact time and location of such actions. As Mark Lowenthal (2006) describes in his book on intelligence, the 9/11 attacks were more of a tactical than a strategic surprise.¹⁰⁴ The administration must have known about the possible threat, but most likely did not have enough information on the exact plan of the attack.

In Seymour Hersh's *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* (2004), the 9/11 attacks are described as nothing else than an intelligence failure. Hersh writes:

During my three years of reporting on 9/11th and its aftermath, one consistent theme has been a lack of timely and reliable intelligence about the other side – the Al-Qaeda terrorists who planned and executed the hijackings, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the insurgents who turned the neoconservatives' dreams about Iraq into a reality of daily violence and casualties. The problems were apparent long before the summer of 2004, when the 9/11 Commission and the Senate Intelligence Committee published their critiques. The intelligence community didn't have the essential information when it counted – in real time.¹⁰⁵

Even if the CIA had some information about a possible attack, there was not much of a follow up with significant details and a tactical plan essential to stop the terrorists. This finding is confirmed by Richard Clarke, who asks a question "Could we have stopped the 9/11 attack?"¹⁰⁶ The answer is not obvious. He continues: "I would be facile to say yes. What is clear is that there were failures in the organizations that we trusted to protect us, failures to get information to the right place and the right time, earlier failures to act boldly to reduce or eliminate the threat."¹⁰⁷

In the past, in addition to the before mentioned information provided to the Bush Administration from the intelligence agencies, the CIA had warned the Clinton administration that Al-Qaeda might plan something bigger and thus the CIA would need \$2 billion for a better surveillance and general improvement in intelligence. That request was not satisfied by any of the administrations – neither Clinton's nor Bush's. The funds the CIA

¹⁰⁴ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, Chapter 1, 3rd Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2006, p.2-3.

¹⁰⁵ Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, Penguin Books, London, 2004, p.73

¹⁰⁶ Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*, Free Press, London, 2004, p.238.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.238.

was given was just a small portion of what was really needed to improve the CIA and conduct effective surveillance of Al-Qaeda.¹⁰⁸

Not many people know that Condoleezza Rice took some extended measures to prevent the Al-Qaeda attack. She organized a group from the State Department, Defense Department, Finance Department, FBI, CIA and Army. She gathered leaders of the departments and presented the new plan for preventing the Al-Qaeda attack. She wanted to use the CIA and the Defense Department to contain Al-Qaeda's actions more aggressively and the Finance Department to cut the terrorists' financial ties. The plan was officially approved on September 4, 2001.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, seven days later the attacks took place. The general belief that the U.S. did not know about the upcoming attacks might be wrong to a certain extent. Yet, even if the government had known what was about to happen, it did not take timely and efficient actions to prevent the upcoming danger.

3.3. New Legislation and Law Enforcement

One of the first actions the administration tried to accomplish after the attacks was to fix the security problems within the U.S. territories. As President Bush mentioned at the conference organized by the White House for the attorneys from Washington D.C., the concept of Homeland Security was changing in the U.S. – starting from FBI and through the other security units a new approach would be implemented. The restructuring of the intelligence agencies had begun.¹¹⁰ The training processes, the way the agents tackle disputed cases and the investigation and surveillance process was to be improved. In this new strategy the U.S. focused on counter terrorism actions. It mainly focused on achieving a

¹⁰⁸ George Tenet, At *The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, pp.117-147.

¹⁰⁹ Mary Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p.200.

¹¹⁰ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, Introduction, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p.23.
The New York Times, 2001, "A Nation Challenged: Bush Speaks of Security to Group of U.S. Attorneys", Available at The New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/30/us/a-nation-challenged-bush-speaks-of-security-to-group-of-us-attorneys.html>>, Accessed on Nov. 2, 2009.

better understanding of the Arab world and the terrorist mentality. Priorities of intelligence changed with this new strategy.¹¹¹

Homeland Security was being improved in every possible way. Richard Perle mentioned an interesting fact in an interview. He explained how the overall idea of a terrorist attack has changed after 9/11. As Perle said, the main change was to recognize that there were extremists who wanted to kill Americans. And they would go to extreme lengths to do that, and they would carry out suicide attacks in order to do it. The U.S. was completely unprepared for that because its security systems were based on the idea that people are not going to commit suicide. His example was the way airport security dealt with the possibility of bombs in the airplanes. Before 9/11, airport security did not inspect luggage, they were just making sure that the owner of the luggage was on the plane. In their minds, if somebody wants to bomb a plane, he won't be on it. After 9/11, everything changed. Security became the administration's priority.¹¹² A similar view was presented by Soner Çağaptay, who also stated that the 9/11 attacks had changed the idea that Americans have about terrorism.¹¹³

The way to establish effective security and to keep U.S. soil safe was a new legal issue.¹¹⁴ The administration believed that the current ways of dealing with terrorist under the existing laws were not effective enough in securing U.S. territory. The new legal approach, initiated by the Bush Administration, put new limits on public information, expanded the scope of domestic surveillance and curbed the legal protections of suspected terrorist.¹¹⁵ All these new measures were legalized under the USA PATRIOT Act, officially entitled "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001"¹¹⁶, passed by the House of Representatives on October 24 and by Senate the

¹¹¹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 320.

¹¹² Personal Interview with Richard Perle – Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reagan Administration), former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (George W. Bush Administration), Washington D.C., 2008.

¹¹³ Personal Interview with Soner Çağaptay – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 6 February, 2008.

¹¹⁴ The New York Times, 2001, "A Nation Challenged: Bush Speaks of Security to Group of U.S. Attorneys", Available at The New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/30/us/a-nation-challenged-bush-speaks-of-security-to-group-of-us-attorneys.html>>, Accessed on Nov. 2, 2009.

¹¹⁵ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 322.

¹¹⁶ "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act", Public Law 107-56, U.S. Statutes at Large 115 (2001).

next day.¹¹⁷ As Stephen Schulhofer (2005) writes, the PATRIOT Act was, “one of the most controversial and possibly one of the most misunderstood laws Congress ever enacted, the US Patriot Act remains at the forefront of public debate about security and civil liberties in twenty-first-century America.”¹¹⁸ This document was very complex, it covered sixteen broad topics, included 161 separate sections and many subsections. Attorney General Ashcroft played an important role in bringing this law into being. He supported it before the House Committee. Many people were critical of Ashcroft and the administration argued that the PATRIOT Act was the basis for the administration to exercise its power against enemy combatants and immigrants incommunicado, detain them for a long period of time charged with terrorism.¹¹⁹ However, critics of the Act are not right in this case. If we read the main rules of the Act we see that if mandated that every alien detained as a terrorist suspect must be charged within seven days, if not he should be released.¹²⁰ It “also suspended ordinary immigration rules and granted special protection against deportation for surviving relatives of foreign nationals killed on 9/11.”¹²¹

But the PATRIOT Act had some severe defects that launched the public discussion after its acceptance by Congress and its public announcement. It granted the intelligence organizations more surveillance powers than was necessary and the transparency of actions to be undertaken within these powers were not guaranteed. Furthermore, as Schulhofer (2005) writes, “the pervasive absence of adequate structures of accountability” was also a major problem.¹²²

Three days after signing the PATRIOT Act, on November 29, George W. Bush delivered a speech at the U.S. Attorney Conference. He thanked Attorney General John

¹¹⁷ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 322.

U.S House Resolution, H.R.3162, Title: “The USA Patriot ACT”, Introduced by Rep Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr., WI-9, 10-23-2001.

Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, Introduction, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p. 23.

¹¹⁸ Stephen J. Schulhofer, *Rethinking the Patriot Act*, Introduction, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2005, p. 1.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., pp.38-39.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 4.

¹²² Ibid., p. 6.

Ashcroft for his leadership and talked about American security. Maybe one of the most important remark Bush said during his speech was, “ours is a great land, and we'll always value freedom. We're an open society. But we're at war. The enemy has declared war on us. And we must not let foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself. Foreign terrorists and agents must never again be allowed to use our freedoms against us.”¹²³ These remarks were the main indicators of the future policy of the Bush government.

Financial security was also an important issue for the administration. In order to cut the financial sources of terrorism the U.S. Congress passed the H.R.3004 “Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001”. The bill was focused on a new approach in order to stop the money laundering, smuggling and unlawful money transfers. The Bush Administration wanted to stop these kind of offences which provide financial support for terrorism.¹²⁴

The President focused on the War on Terror strategy and upgrading the U.S. security laws, but had not forgotten about his country. Simultaneously, the administration took actions to prepare a new economic support plan which main purpose was to keep the U.S. economy running in the time of a national security crisis. As it is known, the entire financial world and especially the stock market was affected seriously from the attacks. That's why both executive and legislative branches prepared aid bills and planned to restore the economic resistance in New York.¹²⁵

While these internal security and economic solutions were being prepared, the Bush Administration was in need of an immediate action towards the suspects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Obviously, the administration's belief was that the immediate military response to 9/11 was needed. As mentioned before, President Bush and his cabinet were focusing on Taliban Camps in Afghanistan as a primary target. It was certain that it would not be the only target. The operation in Afghanistan was just the beginning of major challenges the U.S. was to face.

¹²³ George W. Bush, 2001, “President Says U.S. Attorneys on Front Line in War”, Available at The Homeland Security Official Website, <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0041.shtm>, Accessed on Nov. 2, 2009.

¹²⁴ U.S House Resolution, H.R.3004, Title: “To combat the financing of terrorism and other financial crimes, and for other purposes”, Introduced by Rep. Oxley, Michael G., Ohio, 10-03-2001.

¹²⁵ The New York Times, 2001, “A Pragmatic Aid Plan”, Available at The New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/26/opinion/a-pragmatic-aid-plan.html>>, Accessed on Nov. 2, 2009.

The *9/11 Commission Report* (2006) shows there was confusion over which country is the source of a real terrorist problem, and which should be attacked first:

Secretary Powell recalled that Wolfowitz – not Rumsfeld – argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the terrorist problem and should therefore be attacked. Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq was behind 9/11. Paul was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with’, Powell told us. ‘And he saw this one way of using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem’. Powell said that President Bush did not give Wolfowitz’s argument ‘much weight’. Though continuing to worry about Iraq in the following week, Powell said, President Bush saw Afghanistan as the priority.¹²⁶

And he implemented his priorities through the military campaign in Afghanistan named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The U.S. was adducing it to the world as setting the Afghan nation free from the cruel Taliban regime.

President Bush approved the military plans to attack Afghanistan during his two meetings on September 21 and October 2nd with General Franks and other advisers. The original name of the operation “Infinite Justice” was changed to “Enduring Freedom” due to sensibilities of Muslims associating the infinitive justice with God’s power.¹²⁷ After the resolution passed by the legislators and the executive decision was made by the President’s cabinet, the U.S and the Northern Alliance forces attacked Afghanistan on October 7 2001. Bombings of Afghanistan started Operation Enduring Freedom.¹²⁸

The reactions of the American people and the government were normal and understandable after such a violent terrorist attack. After the attacks not only foreign policy of the U.S but also the public opinion of the people were changed. The public understood that the U.S cannot prevent incidents happening all over the world.¹²⁹ It was time for America and Americans to show action towards a new enemy called terrorism. This strong public opinion helped President Bush to shape the new foreign policy of the U.S. The Bush Doctrine on pre-emption was slowly making its presence in the administration’s undertakings.

¹²⁶ National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, p. 335.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 337.

¹²⁸ CNN, 2001, “Afghanistan wakes after night of intense bombings”, Available at the CNN Official Website, <<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/gen.america.under.attack/>>, Accessed on Nov. 1, 2009.

¹²⁹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.317.

The following days after 9/11 showed that the entire world sympathized with the U.S. and its citizens. The headline of *Le Monde* newspaper in France is just one example of this support. *Le Monde* wrote: “*We Are All Americans*” in the September 12th issue.¹³⁰ The first time in its history the executive body of NATO invoked Article 5 of its Charter and declared that an attack to a member will be considered as an attack on the entire organization.¹³¹ These are just a couple examples of the global support and sympathy towards the U.S. The only country that praised the 9/11 attacks was Iraq. Saddam Hussein did applaud the attacks, which only worsened its already bad relations with the United States.¹³²

General Joseph Ralston shared his memories of 9/11, and he happened to be in Europe at that time. He had a meeting in Brussels, while his colleagues in the Pentagon were about to start their normal day of work. He was shocked with what he saw on CNN news. He explains why this tragedy is hard to understand for people from outside of the U.S.:

I was stunned by how much the attack affected my colleagues emotionally. (...) My counterparts in Pentagon Gen. Richard Myers, Gen. Peter Pace and all had similar views. Well intellectually we come to the same conclusions, emotionally huge difference. And I think that is true for most Americans. We are just profoundly impacted emotionally, in a way that is hard for me to understand and I know that it is also hard for my European counterparts to understand.”¹³³

This was an emotional tragedy not only for the people who actually directly suffered from the attacks. It was a tragedy for the entire nation which demanded a strong response from its leaders.

The world expected from the U.S a response which would be similar to America’s previous actions towards terrorism. However, in the long run after 9/11 the U.S. – a country which believed in diplomacy, power of international organizations and alliances--was driven by force and revenge, and acted unilaterally and not in a democratic way. The invasion of Afghanistan, as it was launched immediately after 9/11 could be understandable for part of

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 316-317.

¹³¹ Ibid., p.317.

¹³² Personal Interview with Douglas Feith – Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the George W. Bush Administration, Washington D.C., 1 February, 2008. Personal Interview with Richard Perle – Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reagan Administration), former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (George W. Bush Administration), Washington D.C., 2008.

¹³³ Personal Interview with Gen. Joseph Ralston – United States Special Envoy for Countering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., June 30, 2007.

the international community. It was even supported in some part by its allies. Yet, the following actions that the U.S. took, especially the Iraq War, caused a significant loss of international sympathy and the world's trust. As Paul Wolfowitz said during one of his interviews, the war is never a popular thing – this might be a part of the explanation of this phenomenon.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Iraq Operation, which will be described in the following chapters, has changed America's image in the world's eyes forever.

¹³⁴ Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

4. NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

Neoconservative thought has shaped U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. Therefore, it is vital to analyze it in order to understand the ideological background of U.S. foreign policy.

Is 'neoconservatism' more an ideology or an implicit direction? Irving Stelzer (2004) argues that it is more a tendency than a movement. It is the tendency to support using American economic, social and military power to bring liberalism, democracy and human rights to other countries.¹³⁵ The neoconservatives or neocons are those who follow this philosophy. Clifford May (2009) defined their views as, "the views of those from the left who became disenchanted with policy prescriptions that had good intentions but negative consequences; they therefore moved to the right where some conservatives, not all but many, were eagerly seeking creative policy solutions to pressing problems."¹³⁶ It's a well-chosen definition, if we consider the origin of neoconservatism, its evolution and anchoring in the domestic and state policy through its followers.

Francis Fukuyama (2006) writes that the roots of neoconservatism are connected with the group of largely Jewish intellectuals attending the City College of New York (CCNY) in the mid to late 1930's and early 1940's. Shoshana Bryen, the Senior Director for Security Policy in the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), confirms it in an interview.¹³⁷ The group of mostly Jewish Democrats included: Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, Irving Howe, Seymour Martin Lipset, Philip Selznick, Nathan Glazer and later Daniel Patrick Moynihan.¹³⁸ Yet, the word "neoconservative" was coined in the 1970's by Michael Harrington, a democratic socialist and the editor of *Dissent* magazine to describe the

¹³⁵ Irwin Stelzer, "Neoconservatives and their critics", Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 8.

¹³⁶ Clifford May, 2009, "Notes and Comments: RIP Irving Kristol", Available at the Foundation for Defense Democracies Official website, <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11786774&Itemid=105> Accessed on Sept. 22, 2009.

¹³⁷ Personal Interview with Shoshana Bryen, Senior Director for Security Policy in Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington D.C., 17 March, 2008.

¹³⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*, Profile Books, London, 2006, p.15.

proponents of American modern liberalism who had “moved to the right”.¹³⁹ It was a term describing a process which the left considered as an intellectual betrayal, not an explicit ideology.¹⁴⁰ One of the first major neoconservatives, called later “the godfather of neoconservatism”¹⁴¹, who embraced this term was Irving Kristol. In his book *Two Cheers for Capitalism* (1978) he formulated the famous definition of the Neoconservatives as “liberals mugged by reality”.¹⁴² In 1979 Kristol described his neoconservative views in the article “Confessions of a True, Self-Confessed – Perhaps the Only – ‘Neoconservative’” which he later confirmed in *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea*.¹⁴³ Another theorist of neoconservatism, who publicly called himself a neoconservative in a New York Times magazine article: “The Neoconservative Anguish over Reagan’s Foreign Policy,”¹⁴⁴ was Norman Podhoretz, one of the supporters of George W. Bush’s policy.

As Adam Wolfson (2004) explains,

The basic contours of neoconservatism emerge against the backdrop of its two main conservative rivals: libertarianism and traditionalism. These three conservative approaches – traditionalism, libertarianism and neoconservatism – first began to take the form we recognize today shortly after the II World War. However, each also has deeper historical and philosophic roots. Generally speaking, traditionalists look to Edmund Burke, libertarians to Adam Smith (more so today) to Friedrich Hayek, and neocons to Alexis de Tocqueville.¹⁴⁵

Most forerunners of neoconservatism were liberals or socialists influenced in the way by some ideas of the New Deal, trade unionism, Trotskyism Marxism or Shachtmanism. Some

¹³⁹ Jonah Goldberg, 2003, “The Neoconservative Invention”, Available at National Review Official website, <<http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q=MzY2NzJiNjk2MzgxZjYjNkNDkxMmVjZjRjMjQ>> Accessed on Sept. 22, 2009.

¹⁴⁰ Jonah Goldberg, 2003, “The Neoconservative Invention”, Available at National Review Official website, <<http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q=MzY2NzJiNjk2MzgxZjYjNkNDkxMmVjZjRjMjQ>> Accessed on Sept. 22, 2009.

¹⁴¹ Ronald Bailey, 2001, “The Voice of Neoconservatism”, Available at ReasonOnline Website <<http://www.reason.com/news/show/34900.html>> Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009. Personal Interview with Shoshana Bryen, Senior Director for Security Policy in Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington D.C., 17 March, 2008.

¹⁴² *The Washington Times*, 2009, “Political writer Irving Kristol dies at 89”, Available at The Washington Times Official Website, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/19/political-writer-irving-kristol-dies-at-89/> Accessed on Sept. 20, 2009.

¹⁴³ Neil Jumonville, *The New York Intellectuals Reader*, Taylor and Francis Group LLC, New York, 2007, p. 411.

¹⁴⁴ Norman Podhoretz, 1982, “The Neoconservative Anguish over Reagan’s Foreign Policy”, Available at the New York Times Official Website, <<http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/02/magazine/the-neo-conservative-anguish-over-reagan-s-foreign-policy.html>>, Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009.

¹⁴⁵ Adam Wolfson, “Conservatives and Neoconservatives”, Part IV, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 216.

other intellectuals like Lionel Trilling also contributed to shaping the neocons' ideas. Irving Kristol cites a number of influences on his own thought in the before mentioned *Neoconservatism: Autobiography of an Idea* (1999).¹⁴⁶

4.2. Origin and Brief History of Neoconservative Thought

The origin of neoconservatism is connected also with the charismatic political philosopher Leo Strauss from the University of Chicago who was a teacher of many political theorists. As Irving Kristol (1999) describes him, “he defended liberal democracy as the best alternative among modern political regimes, even while keeping it intellectually at a distance. He was no right-wing ideologue, as some of his critics claimed, nor did he fit easily into contemporary conservative discourse.”¹⁴⁷ Strauss and his followers (Straussians) were trying to take pre-modern philosophers seriously and understand their approach. It does sound easy, but really it is a true challenge that Strauss had taken up. Many of Strauss’s students stated that he was the one who taught them how to read, how to understand the author, and look at his text from his perspective. Straussians accounted for a real phenomenon. As Anne Norton (2004) describes in her book *Leo Strauss and the Politics of the American Empire*, Strauss’s students significantly influenced U.S. policy. She writes, “as Straussians themselves note proudly, there have been many Straussians in Washington. One list was supplied by Straussians in note to a 1999 book entitled ‘Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime’. The list is by no means complete, but it gives one a sense of the number and significance of Straussians in Washington.”¹⁴⁸ The author gives a long list of names and their positions within the governments. Some of the Straussians mentioned by her are: Mark Blitz, David Epstein, Robert Goldwin, William Kristol, Gary Schmitt, Paul Wolfowitz, John Walters, Leon Kass and Francis Fukuyama.¹⁴⁹

Neoconservatives grow from the anti-Stalinist left and opposed *détente* with the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Their position on the Vietnam War was

¹⁴⁶ Irving Kristol, *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea*, Elephant Paperback, Chicago, 1999, p.6.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p.9.

¹⁴⁸ Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and Politics of American Empire*, Yale University Press, New Haven&London, 2004, p.14.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, pp.14-16.

disliked by public opinion which leaned towards the love and peace philosophy of the 1960's. In time, they became convinced about the efficiency of the aggressive militarism. Jimmy Carter (2005) elaborates in his book *Our Endangered Values. America's Moral Crisis*: "although neoconservative definition is obviously complex and changeable, 'neocons' seem to embrace aggressive and unilateral intervention in foreign affairs".¹⁵⁰

Carter (2005) mentioned Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, as one of the representatives of this movement. Her beliefs for Carter were confusing:

Jeane Kirkpatrick, denounced me as having attempted to 'impose liberalization and democratization' on other countries. She derived 'the belief that it is possible to democratize governments anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances'. Democracy, she said, depends 'on complex social, cultural, and economic conditions', and takes 'decades, if not centuries.' She went on to extol 'traditional authoritarian dictatorship' like Nicaragua under Somoza, the Philippines under Marcos, and Chile under Pinochet. I remember that one of Kirkpatrick's first diplomatic missions was to the dictator in Chile and Argentina to assure them that my intrusive human rights policy would no longer be a problem for them. Since then, I have been confused about the definition of neoconservatives, who seem to have condemned the political policies of most other presidents, Democratic and Republican, and have not had permanent alliances with either liberals or conservatives.¹⁵¹

The lack of collaboration with liberals and conservatives was emphasized also by Stelzer (2004) in his compilation *The Neocon Reader*, "in short, just as neocons broke with conservatives in the foreign-policy arena when they adopted nation-building as a goal, they also broke with traditional conservatives in the domestic-policy arena by making their peace with the welfare state, on which conservatives had waged war for decades."¹⁵²

In the 1980's, representatives of the second-generation of neocons like Elliot Abrams, lobbied for the Reagan Administration to support democracy and fight against dictators.¹⁵³ Francis Fukuyama (2006) writes about Richard Perle – another influential neocon within the Reagan's administration, who would later play a significant role in the 2003 Iraq War preparation: "Reagan's assistant secretary of defense for international security policy,

¹⁵⁰ Jimmy Carter, *Our Endangered Values: America's Moral Crisis*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2005, pp. 99-100.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Irwin Stelzer, "Neoconservatives and their critics", Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, New York: Grove Press, 2004, p. 20.

¹⁵³ Tom Barry, 2005, "Elliott Abrams: the Neocon's Neocon", Available at the Counterpunch Magazine Official Website, <<http://www.counterpunch.org/barry02092005.html>>, Accessed on Sept. 22, 2009.

Richard Perle was denounced as the ‘prince of darkness’ for this uncompromising, hard-line position; his proposal for a double-zero in the intermediate-range nuclear arms negotiations (that is, the complete elimination of medium-range missiles) was attacked as hopelessly out of touch by the bien-pensant centrist foreign-policy experts at places like the Council on Foreign Relations and the State Department.”¹⁵⁴ The neoconservative tendency was finding its ways into the White House on both dimensions: in domestic and foreign policy. While Perle and Abrams were advising about foreign policy, Jack Kemp, another neocon mentioned by Kristol (2004), “almost single-handedly, converted Ronald Reagan to supply side-economics.”¹⁵⁵

After the Soviet Union dissolution, neoconservatives were accused of losing their *raison d’être* – reason for being. Their biggest enemy and the potential target of their reactionary policies were gone. They focused on analyzing U.S. foreign policy and criticizing both George Bush and Bill Clinton for reducing expenditures on military and not being successful in promoting American interests in the world.¹⁵⁶ Many of the neocons joined the first formalized group gathering followers of the neoconservative idea – the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) founded by William (Bill) Kristol – Irving Kristol’s son – in 1997 to ‘promote American global Leadership’. Its founders list includes Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Elliot Abrams.¹⁵⁷ PNAC members and other neocons particularly criticized George Bush and Colin Powell’s – back then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – decision for leaving Saddam Hussein in power after the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq. In 1998, members of PNAC wrote to President Bill Clinton to urge him to remove Saddam Hussein from office.¹⁵⁸ Famous European neocon and the British Prime Minister

¹⁵⁴ Francis Fukuyama, 2006, “After Neoconservatism”, Available at The New York Times Official Website, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/neo.html?pagewanted=all>>, Accessed on Sept. 20, 2009.

¹⁵⁵ Irving Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion: What it was, and what it is”, Ed. Irwin Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 35.

¹⁵⁶ Lynn Wolley, 2006, “Bill Clinton and the Decline of the Military”, Available at the Human Events Official Website, <<http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=18585>>, Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009.

¹⁵⁷ Irwin Stelzer, “Neoconservatives and their critics”, Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 20.

¹⁵⁸ Stephen Solarz, Richard Perle, Elliot Abrams, Richard V. Allen, Richard Armitage, Jeffrey T. Bergner, John Bolton, Stephen Bryen, Richard Burt, Frank Carlucci, Judge William Clark, Paula J. Dobriansky, Doug Feith, Frank Gaffney, Jeffrey Gedmin, Fred C. Ikle, Robert Kagan, Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Sven F. Kraemer, William Kristol, Michael Ledeen, Bernard Lewis, Frederick L. Lewis, Jarvis Lynch, Robert C. McFarlane, Joshua Muravchik, Robert A. Pastor, Martin Peretz, Roger Robinson, 1998, “Open Letter to the President”, Available

Margaret Thatcher had much earlier during the war recommended going into Baghdad and removing Hussein. At that time, however, as Murray (2006) describes, “the appetite for regime change was simply not there; the notion of a link between insecurity at home and hostile dictatorship abroad was not yet solid.”¹⁵⁹ This missed opportunity was summed up by Robert Kagan and William Kristol (2009) in the introduction to their compilation *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign Defense Policy*: “if the United States is prepared to summon the forces necessary to carry out a Desert Storm, and to take the risks associated with expelling the world’s fourth-largest army from Kuwait, it is absurd, and in the event self-defeating, not to complete the job.”¹⁶⁰ At that time many decision makers had not paid due attention to that fact. Even Paul Wolfowitz – Bush Senior’s cabinet member and later the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy – mentioned earlier as Strauss’s student, was not advocating overturning Saddam’s government.¹⁶¹ As mentioned in the part devoted to the background of U.S. foreign policy, during an interview, Wolfowitz said that the war with Saddam never really ended, it lasted throughout the 1990’s. He saw the 2003 Iraq War as the finale of the Gulf War.¹⁶²

Even during the Bush Senior era some officers made statements very close in their approach to the Bush Doctrine. Paul Wolfowitz was one of them. He stated, “our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any future global competitor. (...) American leaders must establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role.”¹⁶³ In this statement, the emphasis on American global leadership is clearly visible. However, in the personal interview long years after the Bush Senior and even Bush Junior’s eras, Wolfowitz

at IraqWatch.org Website, <<http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/rumsfeld-openletter.htm>>, Accessed on Sept. 16, 2009.

¹⁵⁹ Douglas Murray, “Neoconservatism: Why We Need It”, Encounter Books, New York, 2006, p.70.

¹⁶⁰ William Kristol, Robert Kagan, “National Interests and Global Responsibility”, Introduction, Ed. W. Kristol, R. Kagan, “Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign Defense Policy”, Encounter, San Francisco, 2009, p. 19.

¹⁶¹ Radoslaw Sikorski, 2004, “Interview: Paul Wolfowitz”, Available at the FrontPage official website <<http://www.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=10457>>, Accessed Sept. 19 2009.

¹⁶² Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

¹⁶³ The New York Times, 1992, “Experts from Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival”, *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, p. A14.

Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.32.

said something different, “sometimes I think neoconservatism is acquainted with believing that we should support democracy, but I see a lot of liberalism towards democracy too (...) I certainly don’t believe that we should impose democracy by using military force when people don’t want it. It’s nonsense.”¹⁶⁴

Neoconservatives and their thoughts were present in the American policy since the post-World War II period. This important ideology or movement, however we call it, brought a new power, democracy, patriotism and sovereignty oriented perspective into both domestic and foreign policies of the United States.

4.3. Neoconservative Approach in Foreign and Domestic Policy

Neoconservatism advocates change over stability. It is not a status quo ideology and it focuses especially on foreign policy and the U.S.’s role in world politics. Neocons argue that democratization of dictatorships and disarmament of hostile states can improve America’s safety and improve the world order.¹⁶⁵ In PNAC’s Statement of Principles, its establishers draw up their view on foreign policy. They say that America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and its foreign and defense policy should be changed accordingly.¹⁶⁶ As we follow Neocons reasoning, this change would be achieved via confrontational policy (Stelzer, 2004). “Neocons believe that a militarily powerful America must play what can reasonably be described as an imperial role if there is to be a new, peaceful world order. Many neocons – from the so-called ‘democratic imperialists’ wing – regret America’s unwillingness to adopt an explicitly imperialist role.”¹⁶⁷ They strongly promoted universal, democratic values and national interests in the world.

¹⁶⁴ Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

¹⁶⁵ Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p.145.

¹⁶⁶ Elliot Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Ikle, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Henry R. Rowen, Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weiber, Paul Wolfowitz, 1997, “Statement of Principle”, Available at the Project for the New American Century Official Website, <<http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>>, Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009.

¹⁶⁷ Irwin Stelzer, “Neoconservatives and their critics”, Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 18.

They particularly agreed with Theodore Roosevelt's statement: "A nation's first duty within its borders, but it is not thereby absolved from facing its duties in the world as whole, and if it refuses to do so, it merely forfeits its right to struggle for a place among the people that shape the destiny of mankind."¹⁶⁸ While praising Roosevelt they disagree with Wilson's belief that the objective of spreading freedom, democracy and liberalism can be achieved through powers of multinational institutions like the League of Nations (LON). As Stelzer (2004) explains, "neocons would make democracy possible by deposing dictatorial regimes that threaten American security and the world order – using military force if all else fails; they would follow regime change with nation-building; and they would rely on varying coalitions of the willing, rather than on the United Nations."¹⁶⁹ Nation building is a very famous neoconservative slogan. Neocons believe that implementing democracies in emerging nations and assisting countries in adopting democratic governments is a way to maintain your own country's security. One of the ways to implement nation building was military power, but as Stelzer continues his remarks we see that it is not just the military power at issue, there is also another avenue through which neocons try to achieve their goals –intellectual power. "*More troops, yes; but more seminars as well.*"¹⁷⁰

Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol in *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission* (2003) wrote about the democratization of other nations by the U.S. According to them, installing a democratic government in Baghdad after overthrowing Saddam Hussein should be a manageable task for the U.S. They did not agree with Shibley Telhami who wrote in *The New York Times* that, "democracy cannot be imposed through military forces, even if force is used successfully to oust antidemocratic dictators." They argued, "Really? What about Japan, Germany, Austria, Italy, Grenada, Dominican Republic and Panama? These are only a few of the nations whose democratic systems were at first 'imposed' by American arms."¹⁷¹ They later elaborate that Iraq more than any other country

¹⁶⁸ Theodore Roosevelt, 1899, "The Strenuous Life: speech spoken before the Hamilton Club", Chicago, April 10, 1899", Available at the Theodore Roosevelt Association Official Website, <<http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/research/speech%20strenuous.htm>>, Accessed on Sept.19, 2009.

¹⁶⁹ Irwin Stelzer, "Neoconservatives and their critics", Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 9.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p.11.

¹⁷¹ Lawrence F. Kaplan, William Kristol, *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*, Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2003, p. 98-99.

in the region is ripe for democracy. It illustrates the neoconservative approach in terms of spreading democracy.

Francis Fukuyama deliberated on neoconservative legacy in his book *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads* (2006), and he lists four basic principles in foreign policy:

- A belief that the internal character of regimes matters and that foreign policy must reflect the deepest values of liberal democratic societies.(...)
- A belief that American power has been and could be used for moral purposes, and that the United States needs to remain engaged in the international affairs. There is a realistic dimension to neoconservative foreign policy, which lies in the understanding that power is often necessary to achieve moral purposes. As the world's dominant power, the United States has special responsibilities in the realm of security.
- A distrust of ambitious social engineering projects.
- And finally, skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and institutions to achieve either security or justice. While neoconservatives have been labeled Wilsonian, Woodrow Wilson himself sought to promote democracy through creation of the League of Nations.¹⁷²

This reactionary foreign policy program described brought notoriety to the neocons. Stelzer (2004) deliberates on well-known myths on neoconservatives:

The myth about the neocons: neoconservatism as a cabal – an idea picturing neoconservatists as ‘a small group of intellectualists including many future members of the Bush Administration, plotted for years, in secret, to replace America’s long-standing multinational foreign policy, with its heavy reliance on the United Nations, with a more unilateralist, expansive, and muscular approach to world affairs. (...) Another [myth] is that neoconservative foreign policy is the invention of Jewish intellectuals whose primary interest is the survival and expansion of Israel, rather than the security of the United States. (...) Many Bush opponents have taken the arguing that George W. Bush has come under the control of a collective of Jewish advisers whose true purpose is not the defense of the United States but the furtherance of Israel’s security interests.’¹⁷³

Jacob Heilbrunn, senior editor at *The National Interest*, rebuts five myths about neocons in his article for *The Washington Times*. He argues that the neocons are neither the “chastened liberals who turned right” nor “Israeli lackeys”.¹⁷⁴ Neoconservatives who are Jewish and

¹⁷² Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*, Profile Books, London, 2006, pp.48-49.

¹⁷³ Irwin Stelzer, “Neoconservatives and their critics”, Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 5-6.

¹⁷⁴ Jacob Heilbrunn, 2008, “5 Myths About Those Nefarious Neocons”, Available at The Washington Times Official Website, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR2008020502852.html>>, Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009.

those who are not always supported Israel's right to existence. They sympathize with Israelis as it is a long standing democratic nation in a tough region.¹⁷⁵ Heilbrunn (2008) also express his belief that neoconservatives "had too much power and took over Bush's brain" is wrong. He discusses the statement that "the neocons are bloodthirsty ideologues, trying to impose a militant Wilsonianism on the United States that is alien to our foreign policy traditions." and that "the Iraq debacle has discredited the neocons."¹⁷⁶ Most of these ideas were based on neocons' foreign policy advances.

Some of the mentioned foreign policy programs were confirmed by Michael Rubin in an interview. According to him the neoconservative movement argues two things. First of all U.S. foreign policy should not be based just upon realistic, short-term calculations, but rather on an assumption that democracies around the world should be protected, embraced and encouraged. Neocons were the advocates of Ronald Reagan when he challenged Gorbachov to tear down the Berlin Wall. The other edge of the neoconservative philosophy is a belief that not only should the U.S. military act offensively, but that the U.S. needs to maintain a strong military. According to this belief, the U.S. faces ideological movements and the U.S. should at least be able to defend itself and its allies.¹⁷⁷ Mark Dubowitz added his thoughts to the discussion over neoconservatives. According to him we shouldn't exaggerate with their foreign policy program. Neocons would probably argue that the U.S. can't democratize the entire world. The democratization process must be done in stages.¹⁷⁸

Part of the intellectual bases for neoconservative reactionary foreign policy, reflected later by the George W. Bush Administration, came from Europe. They were supplied by Prime Minister Tony Blair. He brought a new impulsion to the neoconservative ideas. Both he and Margaret Thatcher appeared in Stelzer's *The Neocon Reader*.¹⁷⁹ Margaret Thatcher was a symbol of the neoconservative victory over socialist ideas and Tony Blair as an

¹⁷⁵ Douglas Murray, *Neoconservatism: Why We Need It*, Encounter Books, New York, 2006, p.51-52.

¹⁷⁶ Jacob Heilbrunn, 2008, "5 Myths About Those Nefarious Neocons", Available at The Washington Times Official Website, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR2008020502852.html>>, Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009.

¹⁷⁷ Personal Interview with Michael Rubin – Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., January 29, 2008.

¹⁷⁸ Personal Interview with Mark Dubowitz -Executive Director of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington DC, February 4, 2008.

¹⁷⁹ Irwin Stelzer, "Neoconservatives and their critics", Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 13.

advocate of a government engaged in world affairs. Stelzer (2004) strongly emphasizes values, what connects him with neocons. “Blair’s formulation that, since the cold war, ‘our actions are guided by (...) mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge’ is one that would be strongly supported by the neocons.”¹⁸⁰ Until the aftermath of 9/11, he was criticizing the U.S. for not being involved enough in world affairs. In many of his speeches we can find the neoconservative reflection. His thought, “in the end, believe your political leaders or not, as you will, but do so at least having understood their minds”¹⁸¹ is very much Strauss-inspired. According to some, Blair’s approach towards foreign policy can be considered as a *sui generis* European imperialism. In terms of Iraq, Blair for years had been warning about the threat posed by Saddam. And when Bush had given his ‘axis of evil’ speech, Blair was glad that the American President was taking the problems seriously.¹⁸²

However, the general European view on neoconservatism was not positive. European politicians and political philosophers – the ones before Tony Blair and many of his colleagues – rejected the neoconservative ideas. Irving Kristol and later Anne Norton in her book *Leo Strauss and Politics of American Empire* (2004) infer that it was a consequence of American character.¹⁸³

Also in the United States, analysts of neoconservative roots were in favor of its reactionary policy, and even the pre-emptive action. Charles Krauthammer, Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist of neoconservative beliefs, wrote about the pre-emptive concept and how it divided the political scene into Republican “hawks” endorsing pre-emptive actions and Democratic “doves” opposing war.¹⁸⁴ The pre-emptive war idea, one of the main principles of Bush’s ideology will be explained in detail in the Bush Doctrine chapter of my work.

¹⁸⁰ Ben Rawlance, 2004, “Tony Blair is the original neocon”, Available at The Guardian Official Website, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/oct/23/foreignpolicy.iraq>>, Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009.

¹⁸¹ Andreas W. Smith, 2004, “I do understand the Prime Minister's mind, but I still think he was wrong to go to war”, Available at The Independent Official Website, <<http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/andreas-whittam-smith/i-do-understand-the-prime-ministers-mind-but-i-still-think-he-was-wrong-to-go-to-war-565571.html>>, Accessed on Sept. 20, 2009.

¹⁸² Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 2004, p. 177.

¹⁸³ Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and Politics of American Empire*, Yale University Press, New Haven&London, 2004, p.177.

¹⁸⁴ Charles Krauthammer, 2002, “What Good Is Delay?”, Available at the Jewish World Review Website, <<http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/krauthammer100702.asp>>, Accessed on Sept. 20, 2009.

Where their domestic policy is concerned – their historical point of interest, later pushed aside by foreign policy issues – (Murray, 2006): “neo-conservatives are united by specific and general objections to the post-Sixties western status quo, to increasing secularism, to illiberalism masquerading as liberalism, and to the destructive effects of the counterculture.”¹⁸⁵ Murray further elaborates, “Neoconservative policies, reaching out beyond the traditional political and financial base, have helped to make the idea of political conservatism more acceptable to a majority of American voters. (...) One of these policies, most visible and controversial, is cutting tax rates in order to stimulate steady economic growth.”¹⁸⁶ Neocons supported a free market with acknowledgement of the role of the welfare state. In their social policy they were seeking support for solid education, preserving national identity and family values. Neoconservative ideology strongly opposed the vulgarity of mass culture. By enforcing morality, neocons were trying to create a more civil society. These approaches, especially the economic views as Murray wrote, were easily accepted by the public. There are, however, some neoconservative postulates that could sound less entertaining for the public, like strengthening military and the expansion of executive power up to the praise for authoritarian governments.¹⁸⁷ Anne Norton describes their domestic policy proposals in her book, mentioned above.

Paul Wolfowitz himself defines neoconservatism in terms of domestic policy. According to him, the term neoconservatism originated in U.S. domestic policy, where people who once had socialists ideas about managing the economy realized that marking economics was essential to achieving the social goals they believed in.¹⁸⁸

As for the partisan adherence Murray (2004) elaborates:

In the United States it was by no means inevitable that neoconservatism would find its home within the Republican Party. In neoconservatism’s formative years, the Democrats also provided a good and solid home for some neoconservative thinking. Yet, today neoconservatism’s natural home is in the Republican Party. This is perhaps most obvious on issues of foreign policy. But Republicans have also embraced (even if intermittently)

¹⁸⁵ Douglas Murray, *Neoconservatism: Why We Need It*, Encounter Books, New York, 2006, p. 45.

¹⁸⁶ Irving Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion: What it was, and what it is”, Part I, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 34.

¹⁸⁷ Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and Politics of American Empire*, Yale University Press, New Haven&London, 2004, pp.179-180.

¹⁸⁸ Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

neoconservative principles on domestic policy (lower taxes, for example, or issues of social justice) as well. One should be under no illusion here, though. There is no point in pretending that the neoconservative measures that the Bush Administration has adopted are due to any especially widespread appetite within the Republican Party for a forceful realist-humanitarian foreign policy. Far from it. Much of the current consensus relies simply on post-9/11 doggedness and a hope that the situation in Iraq continues to improve. As a party, the Republicans are still as commonly suspicious of neoconservative foreign policy ideas as are many members of the Democratic Party, albeit for different reasons. Many instinctive conservatives remain suspicious of a neocon foreign policy whose humanitarian impetus they think will make the American armed forces little more than the armed wing of the Red Cross. This suspicion remains at least as prevalent in the Republican Party as fear of militaristic expressions of self-interest (in which only 'convenient' humanitarian catastrophes are addressed) is among the party's opponents.¹⁸⁹

4.4. Neoconservative Influences in the Bush Administration

George W. Bush had not shared the neoconservative agenda during his first presidential campaign and right after taking the President's office in January 2001. He actually made the opposition for the "nation-building" in foreign policy as one of the main points of his campaign. He emphasized that the U.S. should conduct a "humble foreign policy".¹⁹⁰ During one of the presidential debates with Al Gore, Bush said, "He [Al Gore] believes in nation-building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation-builders".¹⁹¹ Bush didn't want to improve the imperialist image of America. His experience in foreign affairs was limited.¹⁹² During his Texas governor appointment he was involved in relations with Mexico, but except for that and a couple of international travels; he was not the international expert. Aware of his position, President Bush was very eager to increase his international knowledge and was willingly taking advantage of the daily briefings given by his foreign policy and security advisers and the CIA. Also, during his presidential campaign he had a strong group of foreign policy advisors calling themselves the Vulcans, in honor of

¹⁸⁹ Douglas Murray, *Neoconservatism: Why We Need It*, Encounter Books, New York, 2006, p. 159.

¹⁹⁰ Stefan Halper & Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p. 133.

¹⁹¹ Commission on Presidential Debates, 2000, "Election 2000 Presidential Debate with George W Bush and Al Gore", Available at <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html>, Accessed on Sept. 30, 2009.

¹⁹² Scott McClellan, *What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.85.

the Roman god of fire.¹⁹³ Among them was Condoleezza Rice, future National Security Advisor, Colin Powell's successor as the Secretary of State, Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, Dov Zackheim, Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Hadley, Robert Blackwill and Robert Zoellick.¹⁹⁴

At the beginning of his tenure, neocons charged Bush with insufficient support for Israel and repeating his predecessors' foreign policies.¹⁹⁵ They blasted him for his policy on China, and particularly for his reaction – his lack of confrontational position – towards the incident when the American plane was forced to land at China's Hainan Island and its crew imprisoned.¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, many of the neoconservative approaches at the turn of the century were acceptable for traditional conservatives and also for Bush. Thus, the experienced politics of those of the neoconservative persuasion--like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith or John Bolton--received government appointments in his administration. They were not, however, among the highest senior appointments (Wolfowitz was the U.S. Deputy Secretary Of Defense, Perle the Chair of the Advisory Defense Policy Board, Feith the Under Secretary of Defense for policy and Bolton the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security) and not in the majority. They still, however, were able to create an impact on the policy via their offices. Key figures of his administration: Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice were Republicans, traditionalists, but their beliefs fall far from neoconservatism.¹⁹⁷ Mark Dubowitz, in an interview, described them as realists.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹³ James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, Penguin Group USA Inc., New York, 2004, p. IX-X.

¹⁹⁴ Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p.54.

¹⁹⁵ Toby Harnden, Alan Philips, 2001, "Bush accused of adopting Clinton policy on Israel", Available at The Telegraph Official Website, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/1310538/Bush-accused-of-adopting-Clinton-policy-on-Israel.html>>, Accessed Sept. 21, 2009.

¹⁹⁶ CNN, 2001, "Damaged US Spy Plane Arrives in Georgia", Available at the CNN Official Website, <<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/07/05/spy.plane.return/>>, Accessed on Sept.30. 2009; and Washington Post, 2001, "China: Talks on Plane Costs Under Way", Available in Washington Post from July 20, 2001, p.A32.

Personal Interview with Ambassador Mark Parris – Brookings Institute, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Washington D.C., 13 February 2008.

¹⁹⁷ Douglas Murray, *Neoconservatism: Why We Need It*, Encounter Books, New York, 2006, p. 87.

¹⁹⁸ Personal Interview with Mark Dubowitz – Executive Director of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington D.C., February 4, 2008.

Table 4.1. **Cabinet Members under George W. Bush**

Secretary of State	<u>Gen. Colin L. Powell</u> , 2001–2005 <u>Condoleezza Rice</u> , 2005–
Secretary of the Treasury	<u>Paul H. O'Neill</u> , 2001–2002 <u>John Snow</u> , 2003–2006 Henry Paulson, 2006–
Secretary of Defense	<u>Donald H. Rumsfeld</u> , 2001–2006 Robert Gates, 2006–
Attorney General	<u>John Ashcroft</u> , 2001–2005 <u>Alberto Gonzales</u> , 2005 Michael Mukasey, 2007–
Secretary of the Interior	<u>Gale A. Norton</u> , 2001–2006 Dirk Kempthorne, 2006–
Secretary of Agriculture	<u>Ann M. Veneman</u> , 2001–2005 Mike Johanns, 2005–2007 Edward T. Schafer, 2008–
Secretary of Commerce	<u>Donald L. Evans</u> , 2001–2005 Carlos Gutierrez, 2005–
Secretary of Labor	<u>Elaine L. Chao</u> , 2001–
Secretary of Health and Human Services	<u>Tommy G. Thompson</u> , 2001–2005 Mike Leavitt, 2005–
Secretary of Homeland Security	<u>Tom Ridge</u> , 2003–2005 <u>Michael Chertoff</u> , 2005–
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development	<u>Melquiades R. Martinez</u> , 2001 Alphonso Jackson, 2003–2008 Steven C. Preston, 2008–
Secretary of Transportation	<u>Norman Y. Mineta</u> , 2001–2006 Mary E. Peters, 2006–
Secretary of Energy	<u>Spencer Abraham</u> , 2001–2005 Samuel Bodman, 2005–
Secretary of Education	<u>Roderick R. Paige</u> , 2001–2005 Margaret Spellings, 2005–
Secretary of Veterans Affairs	<u>Anthony Principi</u> , 2001–2005 Jim Nicholson, 2005–2007 James Peake, 2007–

Source: Information Please® Database, 2007 Pearson Education

Many members of Bush's Cabinet had served at prominent offices in past administrations: Colin Powell – Bush's Secretary of State served as United States National Security Advisor under Reagan; Donald Rumsfeld – Secretary of Defense in the Bush Administration served as White House Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defense under Gerald Ford; Robert Gates (Rumsfeld's successor) served as Director of Central Intelligence under Bush Senior; and Dick Cheney – Vice President in the Bush Administration, was the Secretary of Defense under Bush Senior.¹⁹⁹ From his people, Bush was looking for experience but also loyalty and dedication. Yet, as Halper and Clarke explain in their book: *America Alone. The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (2004), assigning the appointments was not bereft of controversy, like in the Wolfowitz case when he was under consideration for the top job at CIA and the U.S. post before he was appointed at the Defense Department.²⁰⁰ Halper and Clarke (2004) continue their analysis of Bush Administration appointments, they write:

Neo-conservatives also found themselves in position of great power beyond the State and Defense Departments. I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby (...) a Wolfowitz protégé, went from prior position on Capitol Hill, the State Department, and most recently, the Department of Defense to become the vice president's Chief of Staff. From early on in the administration, the vice president's office was a formidable presence, little short of a mini-National Security Council. (...) William Kristol (who had himself been a Chief of Staff to Vice President Dan Quayle) commented that it was clear that 'Cheney's going to be a real influence'. And he noted, 'they're serious experienced people.'²⁰¹

Early on in the Bush Administration, PNAC's neocons were very active in pushing for maintaining and improving the U.S.'s leadership position in the world. In their report titled: "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century", they stated that if other means – diplomacy or sanctions – fail, the U.S. must be ready to take military actions. Thus the country must invest in the military. According to

¹⁹⁹ The White House, 2007, "Government", Available at The White House Archives Official Website <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/>>, Accessed on Sept. 20, 2009.

²⁰⁰ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, pp.118-119.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p.120.

neocons peace keeping actions in Balkans of Iraq reduced the military's readiness in face of eventual danger.²⁰²

Neoconservatives within the Bush Administration, as Murray (2006) describes, "helped define George Bush's escape not just from the shadow of his father's style of politics, but from the whole oppressive status-quo American conservatism".²⁰³ Halper and Clarke (2004) describe neocons' achievements at the beginning of Bush Administration as follows:

The well-placed neo-conservative network delivered some important bureaucratic victories early in the administration. Within six months, the administration announced its intention to reject six international agreements [inter alia: Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court and the protocol implementing the ban on biological weapons] thus attracting charges of 'unilateralism' from the international community. Reflecting an important tenet in neo-conservative thinking, Washington had early demonstrated its aversion to new international agreements and organizations on.²⁰⁴

But as they continue, "it would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the neo-conservatives were the decisive force behind the administration's decision."²⁰⁵

Even though neoconservatives were influential in the Bush Administration, they couldn't push through all their proposals, especially for military spending. As James Mann writes in his book *Rise of the Vulcans* (2004):

In the early months of 2001 Bush and Cheney gave top priority not to defense but to the administration's \$1.3 trillion tax cut. They repeatedly turned aside Rumsfeld's requests for additional money for the Pentagon. (...) Tensions erupted between those Bush supporters who favored tax cuts and those who espoused an assertive foreign policy. Neoconservatives rushed to the support for Rumsfeld. Wolfowitz and Pentagon; they excoriated Bush and Cheney for their supposed stinginess on defense.²⁰⁶

Nevertheless, the neocons constituted a change in the general approach. But how dramatic this change was would be understood from the 9/11 aftermath. According to Stelzer

²⁰² Thomas Donnelly, Donald Kagan, Gary Schmitt, 2000, "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century: A Report of the Project for the New American Century", Available at the Project for the New American Century Official Website, <<http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>>, Accessed on Sept. 18, 2009.

²⁰³ Douglas Murray, *Neoconservatism: Why We Need It*, Encounter Books, New York, 2006, p 89.

²⁰⁴ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p.121.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p.129.

²⁰⁶ James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, Penguin Group USA Inc., New York, 2004, p. 290.

(2004), “the attack on the World Trade Center may have been the immediate cause of Bush’s adoption of many, although not all, of the doctrine that neocons had been pressing on successive administrations”.²⁰⁷ Bush had to take actions after the 9/11 tragedy and neoconservatism was there to provide the necessary ideological bases for the political moves. As Adam Wolfson (2004) states, “Bush’s foreign policy is in part informed by neoconservatism.”²⁰⁸ He carries on, “now, little of this neocon foreign-policy analysis seemed to have made much of an impression on George W. Bush or his advisors at the time – either during the election or in the early months of his administration. Before the election Bush had vocally called for more ‘humble’ foreign policy. But then the 9/11 came. It seems clear that the President and his closest advisors by temperament prefer to take the initiative, rather than be reactive.”²⁰⁹ It seems the neoconservative cabal which the media was feeding us during the Iraq War preparation, and right after the attack, might not exactly show the reality behind the facts. Bush might not have had another choice other than to start a military operation.

4.5. Neocons and the Iraq War Decision Making Process

9/11 marked a new era in U.S. foreign policy. Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Achcar write in their *Perilous Power* (2007), “(...) first reaction of the barons of Bush Administration after 9/11 could be summarized as ‘Great! We’ve finally got an opportunity to invade Iraq.’ There were disagreements within the administration, however, with Powell advocating Afghanistan first and Rumsfeld advocating Iraq first; we now know the rest of the story. So we can say, in a sense, that the United States invaded Iraq thanks to 9/11, although there is no connection whatsoever between Iraq and 9/11.”²¹⁰

The Bush Administration first created a totally new federal agency – Homeland Security – against perceived internal and external threats, and then pursued the Uniting and

²⁰⁷ Irwin Stelzer, “Neoconservatives and their critics”, Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p.13.

²⁰⁸ Adam Wolfson, “Conservatives and Neoconservatives”, Part IV, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 226.

²⁰⁹ Adam Wolfson, “Conservatives and Neoconservatives”, Part IV, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p. 228.

²¹⁰ Chomsky, N., Achcar, G., *Tehlikeli Güç ABD’nin Dış Siyaseti ve Ortadoğu*, İthaki Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.86.

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT Act), which gave more investigation freedoms to law enforcement agencies. The new pre-emptive strategy was announced. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan and then, on the grounds that Saddam Hussein had or was planning to acquire WMD, it invaded Iraq.²¹¹ The Bush Administration could easily justify some of these policies. As Francis Fukuyama (2006) writes, “It is common for Americans to say that ‘everything changed after 9/11’, by which is meant that a new, gravely serious threat emerged that required a very different set of policy responses. This is certainly correct to a point, and a measure of the change was the fact that the Bush Administration could persuade the majority of the American people to support two wars in the Middle East in the eighteen months following the attacks on the twin towers and Pentagon.”²¹²

George W. Bush had to take actions. The neocons' persuasion and the reactionary policies suited the new reality after 9/11. Summarizing Bush's foreign policy and neoconservative ideology after 9/11 William Kristol (2005) has written:

What was Bush's reaction to 9/11? (...) Bush's fundamental conclusion, which he came to pretty quickly, was that we not only had to go after the terrorist group that attacked us, but we also had to go after terrorist groups in general. We had to change or put pressure on regimes that hosted, harbored, sponsored or financed terrorist groups, and we had to worry a lot about the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, about terrorism and dictatorship, about terrorism and tyranny in the Middle East.²¹³

The objective had been marked. President Bush concluded that the status quo in the Middle East was unacceptable. The neoconservative voices calling to overthrow Hussein and clean up the Afghanistan yard gained a new meaning. Dealing with Al-Qaeda and going back to the old “order” in Afghanistan was simply impossible. Halper and Clarke (2004) write about Bush's change and the neoconservatives' empowerment after 9/11, “if the events of 9/11 represented a personal inflection point for Bush, they were also immensely empowering for

²¹¹ Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*, Profile Books, London, 2006, pp.1-2.

²¹² Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*, Profile Books, London, 2006, p.67.

²¹³ William Kristol, 2005, “William Kristol”, Ed. S. Kraus, Bush's Foreign Policy and Neo-Conservative ideology after 9/11, Available at the Tel Aviv University Official Website , <<http://spirit.tau.ac.il/government/downloads/Kristol.pdf>>, p.8, Accessed Sept. 19, 2009.

the neo-conservatives. In the tumultuous days following 9/11, the neo-conservatives were ready with detailed, plausible blueprint for the nation's response."²¹⁴

Bush presented his vision of the future in the State Union speech in January 2002.²¹⁵ This famous speech was written by a neoconservative, David Frum.²¹⁶ The President named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as states that "*constitute an axis of evil*" and "*pose a grave and growing danger*" and suggested the possibility of pre-emptive war: "I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."²¹⁷ He made clear that in a post-9/11 world, the strategic imperative and the moral imperative converge; the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. "The National Security Strategy" published on September 17, 2002, was a natural consequence of Bush's shift towards pre-emptive actions. It was described by neocons as "quintessentially neo-conservative document."²¹⁸

Many observers also commented that the Bush's presentation and his decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, was driven by ideology. Retired Ambassador Robin Raphael, who has been serving with the Foreign Service since 1977 and once served as Assistant Secretary of State and as a trade adviser to the Iraqi government from April to August 2003, said in an interview during the History Program at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP): "What one needs to understand is that these decisions were ideologically based (...) They were not based on an analytical, historical understanding. They were based on (...) The ideology was what has come to be called neoconservatism and the whole belief that this

²¹⁴ Stefan Halper, Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p.138.

²¹⁵ Bush, G. W., 2002, "State of the Union Address", Available at The White House Official Archives, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>>, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

²¹⁶ Matthew Engel, 2002, "Proud wife turns 'axis of evil' speech into a resignation letter", Available at The Guardian Official Website, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/feb/27/usa.matthewengel>>, Accessed on Sept. 16, 2009.

²¹⁷ Bush, G. W., 2002, "State of the Union Address", Available at The White House Official Archives, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>>, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

²¹⁸ Max Boot, 2004, "Think Again: Neocons", *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2004, p.18.

would be an easy war, that we would be welcomed with open arms.”²¹⁹ The diplomat also said that the political pressure of the Foreign Service officers was huge and persuasive.

On the other hand however, the real decision makers: the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor didn’t have neoconservative roots. Joshua Marshall in his article for *Foreign Affairs* says that the role of the neocons in driving administration policies has been greatly overstated: “The neocons, they say – referring to them as ‘democratic imperialists’ – may be powerful at magazines such as *The Weekly Standard* and think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, but key movements figures such as a Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Pentagon adviser Richard Perle missed out on the top appointments” in the Bush Administration.²²⁰ He continues his remarks, and appreciates the role of an ideological framework given by neoconservatism:

No matter who had occupied the White House on 9/11, it was all but inevitable that after addressing Afghanistan, the American government would pay increased attention to Iraq’s unconventional weapons programs. But absent the intellectual framework provided by the neocons, it is highly improbable that the result of this heightened attention would have been a rapid lonely march into an essentially unprovoked war. Not only the fact of the war, moreover, but also the way it was conducted, the Iraqi partners involved, the postwar planning (or lack thereof), and the theory that governed the whole operation all emanated from a relatively small and interlocking circle of thinkers, pundits, and policymakers.²²¹

Another analyst, Davis Brooks (2004) also states that the media and public opinion exaggerated the neocons’ role in the Bush policy and the Iraq War decision, “it’s true that both Bush and people labeled neocons agree that Saddam Hussein represented a unique threat to world peace. But correlation does not mean causation. All evidence suggests that Bush formed his conclusions independently. Besides, if he wanted to follow the neocons line,

²¹⁹ Agence France Press, 2005, “US Diplomat Points to Neocon Ideology Behind Actions in Iraq”, Available at the CommonDreams.org Website, <<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1022-06.htm>>, Accessed on Sept. 18 2009.

²²⁰ Joshua Marshall, 2003, “Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives”, Available at the Foreign Affairs Journal official Website, <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>>, Accessed on Sept. 18, 2009.

²²¹ Ibid.

Bush wouldn't know where to turn because while the neocons agree on Saddam, they disagree vituperatively on just about everything else.”²²²

However, as we look at the process of war decision making we see direct and indirect involvement of the neocons. Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith all agreed that the operation must be focused on Al-Qaeda but it should not be limited to that. The Pentagon group wanted to connect the 9/11 attacks with WMD. They knew that had the attacks been related with the WMD, the future of the War on Terror would not be limited to Al-Qaeda and it would have a broader perspective.²²³

According to George Tenet the former CIA Director, right after the 9/11 attacks, during a meeting in the White House, Richard Perle had told him that Iraqis would pay for what they did. According to Tenet the passenger logs of the four hijacked planes showed that it was Al-Qaeda that attacked and not Iraq.²²⁴ Through this statement, Tenet wanted to emphasize that neoconservatives were behind the Iraq War, since from the beginning they wanted to tie the 9/11 attacks with Iraq.²²⁵

Tenet brings up some important details about the decision making process for the Iraq War. According to many sources, the December 2002 Oval Office meeting is known as the meeting during which the Iraq War decision was made. Tenet disagrees with that assumption and he presents his point to prove the decision making of the war was made a long time before that Oval Office meeting. Tenet (2007) writes that the Oval Office meeting was made:

- Ten months after the president saw the first workable war plan for Iraq;
- Four months after the Vice Presidents Veterans of Foreign Wars speech in which he said, “no doubt” that Saddam had Weapons of Mass destruction;
- Three months after the president told the United Nations that the Iraqi regime should immediately and unconditionally forswear , disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of Mass Destruction, long-range missiles and all related material;
- Several months after the U.S. military began repositioning assets to be used in war to facilities through the Middle East;
- Two months after Congress had authorized the use of force in Iraq;

²²² David Brooks, “The Neocon Cabal and Other Fantasies”, Part I, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004 p.41.

²²³ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, I. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 41.

²²⁴ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Introduction, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.19.

²²⁵ There was mismatching information in Tenet's book. When he said he saw Perle in the White House in the morning of 9/11 and talked to him, he was corrected by Perle in the interview. Perle was in Europe at that time.

- Two weeks after the Pentagon had issued the first military deployment order sending U.S. troops to the region.²²⁶

This point brought up by Tenet shows that the Iraq War was not planned earlier.

The Bush Doctrine on pre-emptive actions if needed, coined after 9/11, was something that neoconservatives liked to hear. William Kristol (2003) discussed its significance. He claimed, “the world is a mess. And, I think, it's very much to Bush's credit that he's gotten serious about dealing with it... The danger is not that we're going to do too much. The danger is that we're going to do too little.”²²⁷ And here we are again at the benevolence of this empire. Seltzer (2004) describes policy undertaken by Bush as follows:

It includes the use of military force, with the approval of multilateral institutions if possible, without such approval if necessary; the use of pre-emptive strikes rather than conceding to terrorists a first-strike advantage; the inclusion of any nation-states that lend support to provide heavens for terrorists in an ‘axis of evil’, properly the objects of pre-emptive military strikes; and the pursuit of the ‘nation-building’ that George W. Bush once derided, and which Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to this day wishes would be stricken from the agenda of what one observer of the American scene calls the neocon ‘democratic imperialists’.²²⁸

Neoconservative influences can be seen also in efforts to legitimize the war. The CIA gave a report which does not show any evidence about the link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda. Even though most of the people were not convinced that there were any solid ties between Saddam and Al-Qaeda, some administration members were desperate to prove this link. These people were also the top decision makers in the Bush cabinet: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith. Even after the CIA report, they were still not convinced. They wanted to take over and control foreign policy decisions. Feith did not believe in the credibility of the intelligence information coming from the CIA. Therefore, he created a new division under the Defense Department called Office of Special Plans (OSP).²²⁹ The major goal of

²²⁶ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p. 360.

²²⁷ William Kristol, 2003, “Assessing Bush Doctrine”, Available at the Frontline PBS Official Website <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/themes/assess.html>>, Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009.

²²⁸ Irwin Stelzer, “Neoconservatives and their critics”, Introduction, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p.13.

²²⁹ 110th Congress, 2008, “Report on Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and The Office of Special Plans Within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy”, 2nd Session, Report S-110, Available at the United States Senate Official Website, <<http://intelligence.senate.gov/080605/phase2b.pdf>>, Accessed on Nov. 1, 2009.

Julian Borger, 2003, “The spies who pushed for war”, Available at the Guardian Official Website, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jul/17/iraq.usa>>, Accessed on Nov. 1, 2009.

this nondescript entity was to find linkages and associations between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda.²³⁰ Feith and other neocons thought that the CIA and the other intelligence divisions either missed or ignored the links between Saddam and Al-Qaeda. They were sure about the link.²³¹

Bush set up his strategy inspired by neoconservative leanings. But was it the right strategy? Was he experienced and knowledgeable enough to carry it out? Neocons have mixed feelings. William Kristol (2005) writes: “I have been critical of Bush in all kinds of ways, both tactical and operational. I think the first term suffered from a State Department that did not really believe in Bush’s foreign policy, and a defense department that did not really believe in parts of Bush’s foreign policy, but nonetheless, Bush deserves huge credit for staying the course in Iraq.”²³²

The opinions that Bush was used by neocons or vice versa are still alive.²³³ Their authors are the same individuals who believe in mentioning myths about neoconservatives. What is for certain is that both Bush and the neoconservatives wanted to see the U.S. strong. But we all know how they were implementing their wish. Didier Chaudet summarizes their impact on the Bush Administration and the War on Terror: “The neoconservative thinkers did not have complete power in the White House and in the Congress. But they helped to shape not only the debate, but the decisions that were made during the Bush Administration. Their ideas, and the ones of the assertive nationalists, had an impact in the way the War on Terror was made, and definitively, it was a negative influence. First and foremost, they pushed for the wrong strategic decisions in the War on Terror.”²³⁴ What could be the reason of all the wrong choices and decisions? While evaluating neoconservatives’ role in shaping

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.102.

²³⁰ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.102.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² William Kristol, 2005, “William Kristol”, Ed. S. Kraus, Bush’s Foreign Policy and Neo-Conservative ideology after 9/11, Available at the Tel Aviv University Official Website , <<http://spirit.tau.ac.il/government/downloads/Kristol.pdf>>, p.8, Accessed Sept. 19, 2009.

²³³ Jonathan Chait, 2006, “Neocons and Bush deserve each other”, Available at The Los Angeles Times Official Website, <<http://articles.latimes.com/2006/dec/24/opinion/op-chait24>>, Accessed on Sept. 18 2009.

²³⁴ Didier Chaudet, “The Neoconservative Movement at the End of the Bush Administration: Its Legacy, Its Vision, Its Political Future”, Available at All Academic Official Website, <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/4/3/2/pages254321/p254321-1.php>, p. 12, Accessed on Sept. 19, 2009.

U.S. international policy we must remember that this ideology simply had never had one fundamental idea for foreign policy. Moreover, as Adam Wolfson writes, “many of the neoconservative thinkers had rather different views on foreign policy issues of the day.”²³⁵ Fukuyama delivered the four principles, but Jeane Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol all had different views. While this argument could convince an academician that the neocon cabal is just a myth, an exaggerated story – how could these people with different opinions and beliefs first find consensus and then convince the president to follow their plan?

Yet, from the political view, none of these theorists served within the Bush Administration. Neocons within that administration were after one main thing – power. In the eyes of some American political and military advisors, like retired General William Odom – NSA Chief in Reagan administration – neoconservatives’ influence on Bush’s decision on the Iraq War was obvious. He said, “it’s pretty hard to imagine us going into Iraq without the strong lobbying efforts from AIPAC and the neocons.”²³⁶ War can never be the best way to address political problems. As Halper and Clarke (2004) summarize, “the corollary is that if neo-conservatives believe that war is the preferred option to resolve conflict, then they must also believe in sustaining the peace through nation building – but that is a technology that neither they nor anyone else understands.”²³⁷ And here we can catch the essence of how well the American society understands the neoconservative thought, which recapitulates the public notion about the neocons. Ambassador Robert Pearson confirmed it in one of his interviews. He admits that the anti-American vibes around the world seen after the 2003 Iraq War were primarily attributed to the fault of the neoconservatives who captured the ideology of intervention and ignored a lot of facts that people thought they should not ignore. As a result, the U.S. now needs to repair the damages.²³⁸

²³⁵ Adam Wolfson, “Conservatives and Neoconservatives”, Part IV, Ed. I. Stelzer, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p 226.

²³⁶ George Kenney, 2006, “General Condemnation”, Available at In These Times Website, <<http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2522/>>, Accessed Sept. 30, 2009.

²³⁷ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p.28.

²³⁸ Personal Interview with Ambassador Robert Pearson – US Foreign Service Officer, former US Ambassador to Turkey, Washington D.C., 14 March, 2009

5. THE BUSH DOCTRINE

5.1. Introduction

Inspired by the neoconservative thought and influenced by the events of 9/11 the Bush Doctrine has played a crucial role in U.S. foreign policy of the 2003 Iraq War era and in Turkish-U.S. relations. Therefore to understand the dynamics and ideological background of U.S. foreign policy of this era, in addition to analyzing the neoconservative ideology, the Bush Doctrine and its outcomes must also be discussed.

5.2. Political Doctrine: Definition and Previous Major U.S. Doctrines

Many world leaders in history set out their foreign policy objectives drawing the main approach and principles in a form labeled by the societies as a doctrine. Political doctrines, or in this case presidential doctrines, are especially linked with U.S. foreign policy. According to *The American Political Dictionary* (1997),

Presidential Doctrines are enunciations made by American presidents that relate to potential American foreign policy actions. Presidential doctrines are aimed at putting potential enemies and friendly allies on notice of American intentions to cope with certain situations that may arise as a result of actions undertaken by other states. Often, the press and other media have converted presidential statements into full-fledged “doctrines” merely by labeling them as such.²³⁹

It is then a policy position or principle advocated and most of the time also implemented by the leader.

Doctrines serve as a reflection of the leader’s beliefs, sets out the objectives and international policy directions. Simultaneously, the doctrine’s author sends a message to other countries--both allies and adversaries--about what they should expect as the future steps undertaken by his state. Therefore, as Mary Buckley and Robert Singh conclude in their book on the Bush Doctrine *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences* (2006), doctrines are “more than just political rhetoric or symbolic statements”, they “represent promissory notes and warnings alike” and are ready to be implemented. The authors emphasize also the unfinished character of doctrines, “Doctrines –

²³⁹ Jack C. Plano, Milton Greenberg, *The American Political Dictionary*, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, New York, 1997, p.188.

no more than specific foreign policies – are rarely complete ruptures with, or comprehensive rejections of, the past. Nor need they arise fully formed or be proclaimed with pristine clarity at the outset of a new political leadership.”²⁴⁰ It leaves a space for doubts and a possibility of public misinterpretation, but also gives the leader a freedom for implementing it according to a particular need.

One of the first American doctrines was the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, which “warned European powers not to meddle in the continental sphere of the Americas.”²⁴¹ After World War II we see the Truman Doctrine aimed against totalitarian regimes and setting out U.S. foreign policy principles for next four decades²⁴². The Eisenhower Doctrine defended the Middle East²⁴³; the Nixon Doctrine which argued for pursuing peace through regional powers and partnership with America²⁴⁴; and the Reagan Doctrine opposing the global influence of the Soviet Union were other famous doctrines of the U.S. Presidents.²⁴⁵ Not just did the U.S., however, have its well-known doctrines. In Europe, the Hallstein Doctrine named after Walter Hallstein and considered a key doctrine of West Germany in the 1950’s and the Brezhnev Doctrine which was the basis for Soviet hegemony within the Soviet Block, both contributed greatly to 20th century’s World history.

In this chapter the focus is on the most important doctrine we have had so far in the 21st century – the Bush Doctrine, which was implemented after the 9/11 attacks. But it was apparent in its shape at the beginning of Bush’s first term. In January 2001, the newly elected president Bush gave a statement. He clearly stated that the new approach in U.S foreign policy would be realism and not idealism and the first focus of the U.S. would be the nation’s self-interest²⁴⁶. That was a major shift compared with the Clinton Administration. Idealism to

²⁴⁰ Robert Singh, “The Bush Doctrine”, Chapter 2, Ed. M.Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, pp. 1-3.

²⁴¹ Robert Singh, “The Bush Doctrine”, Chapter 2, Ed. M.Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.2.

²⁴² Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 1994, pp.452-453.

²⁴³ Ibid., p.549.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., pp.707-709.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.744-745.

²⁴⁶ William O. Chittick, *American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis*, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 324.

realism, assertive multilateralism to unilateral action, the ideology and policy change was very visible.

Post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy principles set out in this doctrine created the intellectual basis for two wars: in Afghanistan and Iraq; and have changed forever the idea about preventive actions one country can take towards its potential foes.

5.3. Influence of 9/11 and Neoconservative Ideology on Bush Doctrine

Most of the critics argued that Bush's foreign policy changed after the 9/11 attacks. It is clear that the new Bush foreign policy was not exclusively determined by 9/11, but the attacks played a trigger role in justifying the new approach. As William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan (2003) write, "then came 9/11. That day may not have changed the views of some of the president's diplomatic counselors. It may not even have changed the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. But it did change the president, and therefore the direction of his foreign policy."²⁴⁷ It gave a kind of platform for a strong leadership and reactionary foreign policy.²⁴⁸ The 9/11 attacks and the American people's reactions to it contributed greatly to compiling this political approach. The U.S. was wounded and its citizens were waiting for the government's reaction towards these terrorist attacks. In his *Superpower on Crusade* Mel Gurtov analytically describes three effects 9/11 had, "first, it elevated neocon thinking – a vigorous US nationalism – to the intellectual center."²⁴⁹

The neoconservative idea and its people were depicted in the chapter about neoconservative ideology, in which the U.S. was seen as a strong leader with the mission of spreading democracy and liberalism in the world by using its influence and power. After 9/11 the neocon thought became a very "handy" tool in setting up the responses strategy. Gurtov (2006) continues, "second, 9/11 downgraded the particularities of traditional realism and globalism in favor of a new crusade akin to the Cold War crusade that fused anticommunism

²⁴⁷ Lawrence F. Kaplan, William Kristol, *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*, Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2003, p.71.

²⁴⁸ Personal Interview with Ian Lesser – Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, Washington D.C., 29 January, 2008.

²⁴⁹ Mel Gurtov, *Superpower On Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2006, p.37.

with an open-door world economy.”²⁵⁰ The U.S. identified a new enemy, which was no longer one country, or a block of countries like in the case of the Soviet Union. The enemy did not have its own state, but it was a mobile group of fundamentalists seeking to harm western civilization that the U.S. epitomized. Since their devotion had a religious base, U.S. efforts could be described as a “*crusade*”. The third point made by Gurtov (2006) is, “9/11 crystallized two simple but very expansive strategic objectives: winning the War on Terror and undermining rogue states that possessed, or might possess, weapons of mass destruction. In a world, the 9/11 terrorist attacks were a gift to the unilateralists – an once-in-a-lifetime chance to reshape the substance and objectives of US foreign policy.”²⁵¹

Richard Perle in one of his interviews confirmed that President Bush himself wasn’t really thinking about changing foreign policy course especially towards Iraq before 9/11. He stated that prior to the 9/11 attacks and after Bush became president the administration was conducting a review policy toward Iraq. According to Perle, the review was headed to the conclusion that the Clinton’s policy was essentially the right policy. At that point there was no interest of serious action against Iraq. The general view of the administration was that the situation in Iraq was under control and there things should be left as they were. It is true that Iraq was shooting down American planes and the administration was trying to find a way to deal with that, but there was no momentum toward a military action at that time.²⁵² The same thing was said by Ambassador Mark Parris, who said that the administration agreed that they should change the regime in Baghdad, but between January and September Bush did not move in that direction. He was not prepared to challenge Saddam Hussein more than Clinton. Things changed after 9/11.²⁵³

The tragedy of 9/11 brought an undisputed requirement to set up a new order in the U.S. politics, not only foreign policies but also domestic security policies. The unilateral idea of approaching foreign affairs individualistically, without consulting with any other

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Mel Gurtov, *Superpower On Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2006, p.37.

²⁵² Personal Interview with Richard Perle – Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reagan Administration), former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (George W. Bush Administration), Washington D.C., 2008.

²⁵³ Personal Interview with Ambassador Mark Parris – Brookings Institute, former US Ambassador to Turkey, Washington D.C., 13 February 2008.

international entity, as well as neoconservative thought seemed to get their “5 minutes” in the 9/11 trauma. It was a turning point in U.S. policy. Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Achcar in *Perilous Power* (2007) summarized, “the attacks on New York and Washington provided the ideological cover, which allowed the Bush Administration to invade [Iraq].”²⁵⁴

Late in the evening on the day of attacks, President George W. Bush delivered a speech to the nation. The *9/11 Commission Report* (2006) states that, “after emphasizing that the first priority was to help the injured and protect against any further attacks, he said: ‘We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.’”²⁵⁵ These words were later incorporated into “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” issued in September 2002. Back in 2001, the administration knew that strong actions must be undertaken as a response to 9/11. Bush stated that not only terrorists will be accounted for the attacks, but their supporters as well. Immediately, the Bush Administration started investigation and arrests, “beginning on 9/11, Immigration and Naturalization Service agents working in cooperation with the FBI began arresting individuals for immigration violations whom they encountered while following up leads in the FBI’s investigation of the 9/11 attacks.”²⁵⁶ Bush and his people started to implement their security plans and elaborate their strategy. They immediately prepared a plan for the invasion of Afghanistan and started implementing it on October 7, 2001.

Stephen Van Evera, contributor to the book edited by Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro (2008), *To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine*, emphasized the neoconservative view on pre-emption: “Neoconservatives argue that preventive war should be a regular tool of statecraft, but as noted earlier, the United States should wage preventive war only in extremes.”²⁵⁷ The “*preventive war*” was listed by Evera together with other policy approaches, such as “*unilateral actions*”, “*big-stick diplomacy*”, “*empire*” and the “*silent treatment*”²⁵⁸, which was a policy of refusing dialogues with other countries. As

²⁵⁴ Chomsky, N., Achcar, G., *Tehlikeli Güç ABD'nin Dış Siyaseti ve Ortadoğu*, İthaki Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.86.

²⁵⁵ National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, p. 326.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Stephen Van Evera, “A Farewell to Geopolitics,” Chapter One, Ed. M. P. Leffler and J. W. Legro, *To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, p. 28.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

for the extreme situations, Saddam Hussein's regime and the threat of WMD, for neoconservatives were the exact case. Charles Krauthammer, mentioned in the chapter on neoconservative ideology written in one of his articles, "I happen to believe that the pre-emption school is correct, that the risk of allowing Saddam Hussein to acquire his weapons will only grow with time."²⁵⁹ Neocons believed that the decision to invade Iraq was the only right choice for the U.S.

Unlike President George W. Bush, the neoconservatives did not see WMD as the biggest threat to the national security of the United States. Instead they believed that a state-sponsored terror is more threatening than any WMD.

Against Saddam Hussein, many neoconservatives believed that all else would fall into place once the United States defeated the Iraqi army. (...) Against Al-Qaeda, they have focused on the need to prepare to smash the armies of hostile states while neglecting the need to develop other tools of statecraft, including the capacity to wage a war of ideas, dampen conflicts among others, to prevent or address state failure, or to lock down loose WMD materials abroad. Their counter terror strategy rests on the false premise that only terror groups with state sponsors can really harm the United States, so defeating terror requires only defeating or deterring these state sponsors. Their belief in this false premise ensures that they will not develop an effective strategy for countering terror.²⁶⁰

On most other issues, however, Bush's and neoconservatives' approaches were very similar. Stephen Van Evera (2008) argues that neoconservative approach, from which Bush derived some principles, does not work well in the world's reality. He writes:

Neoconservative ideas are almost exactly wrong for the new age. Neoconservatives would reduce American cooperation with other major powers, instead featuring U.S. unilateralism, exactly when U.S. national security requires more cooperation. Neocons would fail to focus on the greatest threat to the United States, the WMD terror problem. Neoconservatives would pursue an American empire in the Middle East in an age when a reach for empire is no longer feasible and is also likely to worsen the terror threat to the United States by provoking more Muslims to join the jihadists. It is ironic that neoconservatives have risen to power at the moment at which their ideas least fit the times.²⁶¹

Maybe their ideas indeed did not fit the times, but they definitely fit Bush's agenda.

²⁵⁹ Charles Krauthammer, 2002, "What Good Is Delay?", Available at the Jewish World Review Website, <<http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/krauthammer100702.asp>>, Accessed on Sept. 20, 2009.

²⁶⁰ Stephen Van Evera, "A Farewell to Geopolitics", Chapter One, Ed. M. P. Leffler and J. W. Legro, *To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, p.29.

²⁶¹ Stephen Van Evera, "A Farewell to Geopolitics", Chapter One, Ed. M. P. Leffler and J. W. Legro, *To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, pp.29-30.

Foreign policy is a subject of most of the above listed approaches, yet neocons were also pushing for improvements in domestic security. After the immediate foreign policy actions, the administration started improving interior security. Before the attacks the law enforcement and intelligence agencies were not priorities for the government, but the attacks brought it back to administration's agenda. In the weeks following 9/11, the Bush Administration started preparing a legal document setting up a security strategy and procedures in case of terrorist threats which are outlined in the USA PATRIOT Act signed on 26th of October 2001²⁶². As it is stated in the text of this document, it was, "an Act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes."²⁶³ The President and his team began to set up and formalize the U.S. strategy, which was to affect U.S. foreign relations and its position in the international community.

Both the 9/11 attacks and neoconservatives surely had great influence on U.S. foreign policy. There were cabinet members that were known for their neoconservative influence on policies and not just on policies but also in the decision making part of declaring a War on Terrorism, which was a consequence of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.

5.4. Principles of Bush Doctrine Set Out in his Public Addresses

The War on Terror started with attacking Al-Qaeda, and became the main topic in U.S. policy and media after George W. Bush's State of the Union Address inspired by the 9/11 attacks and delivered on January 29, 2002. It is commonly known also as the "axis of evil" speech.²⁶⁴ As Ivo H. Daalder writes in the overview *for Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World* (2007), "the scale of destruction caused by the 9/11 attacks raised the immediate and important question of how best prevent another catastrophic event in the future – be it a terrorist attack, use of weapons of mass destruction, or a combination of

²⁶² Stephen J. Schulhofer, *Rethinking the Patriot Act*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2005, p.3.

²⁶³ 107th Congress, 2001, "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001", Public Law 107-56, Available at the Center for Democracy and Technology Official Website, <<http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/011026usa-patriot.pdf>>, Accessed on Oct. 23, 2009.

²⁶⁴ Micah L. Sifry, Christopher Cerf, *The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions*, A Touchstone Book, New York, 2003, p. 250-252.

the two. For the Bush Administration as well as others, the answer was to act before another threat could materialize.”²⁶⁵ This position was emphasized in Bush’s address. He said, “our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorist to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorist and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.”²⁶⁶ He later called North Korea, Iran and Iraq, states constituting “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world”.²⁶⁷ But most importantly, Bush declared, “(...) I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”²⁶⁸ He announced that his strategy would no longer be to react, but from now on he would prevent and pre-empt. The topic of prevention and pre-emptive strikes will be developed in the next parts of this chapter.

In the State of the Union Address, Bush did not explain in detail how the U.S. would fight against terrorism. Yet, the people could predict that military force would become involved. Especially, after his commencement address at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, where he clearly stated, “yet the War on Terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”²⁶⁹ He announced that the U.S. would take strong military actions towards its enemies named earlier as “*the axis of evil*” states. According to President Bush, the United States had the right to protect itself from countries supporting terrorist groups – it was the main principle of his foreign policy idea used to justify the invasion of Afghanistan.

²⁶⁵ Ivo H. Daalder, *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p.4.

²⁶⁶ George W. Bush, 2002, State of the Union Address, Available at The White House Official Archives, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>>, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

Micah L. Sifry, Christopher Cerf, *The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions*, A Touchstone Book, New York, 2003, p. 250-252.

²⁶⁹ George W. Bush, 2002, “Graduation Speech at West Point”, Available at the White House Archives <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

As Mary Buckley and Robert Singh (2006) write, the Bush Doctrine has four key elements, “preventive war, confronting the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and catastrophic terrorism, ‘regime change’ for ‘rogue states’ and democracy promotion.”²⁷⁰ They elaborate further that, “four events during 2001-2 outlined the key elements of the Bush Doctrine before they were more or less concisely crystallized in the National Security Strategy. First, Bush took the strategic decision immediately following the attacks to declare this a ‘war’ rather than a criminal act and to cast states that harbored or assisted terrorists as de facto terrorists themselves.”²⁷¹ The authors mean that in the State of the Union address, where, as written above, Bush said that his administration would hold responsible regimes harboring terrorists. This argument was used to target Afghanistan and created a facility for further military actions in different countries linked with terrorists. Buckley and Singh continue:

Second, the world was divided into a simple and binary ‘us versus them’ division on the basis of states’ position on the War on Terrorism – at once providing the clear threats to ‘rough states’ such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea (...). Third, the threat served to legitimize Bush at home and unify the nation against a shared enemy (...). Fourth, the Doctrine assumed what its critics viewed as an openly messianic form in identifying the spread of a ‘balance of power that favors freedom as the ultimate solution to the growth of ‘super terrorism’.”²⁷²

For Bush and his administration the obvious terrorist nest was the Middle East. Therefore, ‘super terrorism’ originated there, and even though it was not directly named as Islamic terrorism, it was inevitably connected with Islamic fundamentalism.

According to Bush, the traditional ways to keep up U.S national security was no longer possible due to the new world circumstances. The rise of global terrorism, the suicide bombers, proliferating weapons of mass destruction and their state sponsors, changed the way of handling the National Security.²⁷³ It became impossible and unacceptable for the U.S.

²⁷⁰ Robert Singh, “The Bush Doctrine”, Chapter 2, Ed. M.Buckley, R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.12.

²⁷¹ Ibid., p.17.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 326.

¹⁸ Robert G. Kaufman , *In Defense of the Bush Doctrine*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2008, p1.

to wait until the assault was made. Therefore, the Bush Doctrine requires the U.S. to strike first before attacked by the enemy.²⁷⁴

Bush wanted to combat terrorism. He went so far as to define international relationships through the labels for those supporting the War on Terrorism and those who did not; he wanted to prevent ‘*rogue nations*’ from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.²⁷⁵ These were the main intentions of the Bush Administration, and even though officially neither President Bush nor key people from his administration referred to it as to a doctrine, the world described his principals as such.

5.5. The National Security Strategy (NSS) as Bush Doctrine’s Main Document

The Bush Doctrine was further explained in “The National Security Strategy of the United States”, signed by President Bush a year after the 9/11 attacks, on September 17, 2002. It outlined the U.S.’s major national security concerns and listed ways to tackle them. Ivo Daalder (2007), writes that the National Security Strategy “touched off a vigorous debate in the United States and abroad over whether and when it is appropriate to use force other than in response to an attack (imminent or actual).”²⁷⁶

President George W. Bush strongly argued the importance of having a Pre-emptive Strategy in his National Security Strategy. The doctrine of pre-emptive attack was formalized in the NSS.²⁷⁷ Bush believed that rouge states already showed a potential to have biological, nuclear and chemical weapons. Due to this, the U.S. must be ready for this threat before it becomes destructive.

According to the NSS, during the Cold War the circumstances were different. Due to the nuclear and conventional weapons balance during the U.S.-Soviet challenge, the

¹⁹Mart Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1.Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p.204.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.163.

²⁷⁵ Gerry Warren, 2004, “The Bush Doctrine”, Available at the American Thinker Official Website, <http://www.americanthinker.com/2004/02/the_bush_doctrine.html#>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

²⁷⁶ Ivo H. Daalder, “Beyond Preemption: An Overview”, Chapter 1, Ed. I. H. Daalder, *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p.19.

²⁷⁷ Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p.106.

Global Security.org, 2002, “National Security Strategy Report - September 2002”, Available at the Global Security Website, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.htm>>, Accessed on Dec. 17, 2009.

possibility of war could be foreseen. And in case of a war two states would approach it openly. Also, during the Cold War, Soviet leaders would be sensitive about protecting the lives of their people and the power of their country. Therefore, any attack from the Soviets could easily be identified.²⁷⁸

The post-9/11 era would be totally different according to the National Security Strategy (NSS) approach. There was no way a containment doctrine like it could have been used towards the Soviets during the Cold War. According to the NSS unpredictable conditions need unusual protections. The rogue states and the threat that comes from them are not the same as the Soviet Union threat. In the new era, with the new approach, terrorists supported by rogue states are willing to sacrifice their lives to inflict damage to the U.S. Terrorists can attack at any time in any condition without long preparations. The American people are damaged without differentiating between civilians or military and the attacks can come from anywhere. In addition to the use of conventional weapons there is another threat. The possibility of the existence of WMD can challenge the U.S.'s power and the rogue states can easily threaten their neighbors. Even without using WMD, the possibility of using them can bring unbalance and instability to neighboring countries and to the U.S. Therefore, the attacks and the threats cannot be predicted or contained like during the Cold War era. Thus, President Bush wanted to handle the situation with a totally different approach namely the pre-emptive approach explained in the NSS.²⁷⁹

Some commentators view NSS as a document, by which the Bush Administration wanted to legitimize war, yet, the word 'peace' was used many times both in President Bush's foreword and in the main text. In the overview, the U.S. strategy was set forth as follows:

²⁷⁸ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, pp.16-17.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

Fred Barnes, 2002, "Bush's Big Speech", Available at the Weekly Standard Official Website, <<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/348rvbyb.asp>>, Accessed on Nov. 12, 2009.

James B. Steinberg, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption", Brookings Policy Brief Series # 110, Available at the Brookings Institute Official Website, <http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2002/12terrorism_ohanlon.aspx>, Accessed on Nov. 12, 2009.

The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. And this path is not to America's alone. It's open to all. To achieve these goals, the United States will:

- champion aspirations for human dignity;
- strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and
- transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.²⁸⁰

According to Buckley and Singh the 'messianic' role of the U.S. is visible in this section. The U.S. introduces itself as a state, which will work to make the world a better place. It refers to 'American internationalism', yet reflecting American values and implementing its interest. In other words, there will be international cooperation, but only if it is in America's interest. In the second part of the document, titled "Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity", the administration elaborates on 'expanding liberty' and declares,

We will:

- speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to advance freedom;
- use out foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it (...);
- make freedom and development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations (...);
- take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.²⁸¹

Both of these fragments depict what America's plans were at that point. It was announced in very sophisticated language, with words full of pathos, and again showed the U.S. as an

²⁸⁰ "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", September 2002, Available at The White House Official Website, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>>, p.1, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

international leader, whose mission it is to improve the world through promoting freedom, “building a balance of power that favors freedom”²⁸² or “building the infrastructure of democracy.”²⁸³

Except for the U.S.’s imperialistic role, authors of the document write also about its allies. “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism” is the title of document’s third chapter. “we will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. (...). The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism”²⁸⁴ the document says. However, they also give a clear message that in the case that the U.S. will not be able to obtain support for its plans from allies, it will go ahead and pursue them even without the international community’s blessing, “while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.”²⁸⁵ This strong statement provided an ideological base for future intervention in Iraq. But there is still a question whether the U.S. has the right to a pre-emptive strike, and the answer is not as obvious as Bush would like it to be.

The National Security Strategy mentions the major issues in international politics and tells how the U.S. will deal with the weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is said in the document that regional conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, India-Pakistan disputes and regional issues in Latin America and Africa must be resolved as soon as possible, before their further escalation. The U.S. would encourage all the parties to seek settlement.²⁸⁶ As for the WMD, which as President Bush said, are the dangers laying at the crossroads of radicalism and technology²⁸⁷, the administration announced that it would tackle

²⁸² George W. Bush, 2002, “Foreword, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, Available at The White House Official Website, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>>, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

²⁸³ “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, Available at The White House Official Website, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>>, p.21, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ George W. Bush, 2002, “Graduation Speech at West Point”, Available at the White House Archives <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

it by “proactive counter proliferation efforts”, “strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapon of mass destruction”, and “effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.”²⁸⁸

As Mel Gurtov (2006) summarizes, “the National Security Strategy of the United States sanctified preemption (...). And it backed the case for preemptive attack by arguing that it would be exercised on behalf of all states and persons.”²⁸⁹ The strategy was updated and given more multilateral overtone in the second term of President George W. Bush, in March 2006.

5.6. Pre-emptive War as a Crucial Approach of the Bush Doctrine

One of the major differences of President Bush from President Clinton was the way he looked at the military’s role in peace making and nation building. Unlike Clinton, Bush never believed that the military’s job was nation building and negotiations. He was convinced the military should have been trained for war. Soldiers must get involved in war and win the war. He always criticized Clinton’s Balkans policy and the role of the military in Clinton’s foreign policy.²⁹⁰

The first principle of the Bush Doctrine was willingness to acknowledge the requirement of pre-emptive actions under certain circumstances.²⁹¹ Pre-emptive war, known also as the pre-emptive strike was connected strictly with the usage of soldiers and the military power. It actually kindled hot discussions both in the U.S. and all around the world. It is an approach according to which the U.S. has the right to anticipatory self-defense. The U.S. can strike another country, which it thinks is a ready to materialize as a threat to its security. In other words it is a strike when the attack is imminent. The Bush Administration argued that in face of the terrorist threat it would be ‘suicidal’ to wait until the danger

²⁸⁸ “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, Available at The White House Official Website, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>>, p. 14, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

²⁸⁹ Mel Gurtov, *Superpower On Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2006, p.40.

²⁹⁰ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, I. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.37.

²⁹¹ Lawrence F. Kaplan, William Kristol, *The War over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission*, Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2003, p.79.

materializes.²⁹² As James Mann (2004) writes, “America would no longer rely on strategies of containment and deterrence to prevent war from breaking out. The United States was discharging, or at least redefining, the principle it had helped enshrine in the United Nations Charter: that a nation should go to war only in self-defense.”²⁹³

However, the concept of pre-emption, as many experts say, was neither well explained nor properly understood in the international community. Many people confuse pre-emptive with preventive war, which according with the international law is an act of aggression. Noam Chomsky (2003) writes, “Preventive war is, very simply, the supreme crime that was condemned at Nuremberg”²⁹⁴. In his book *Preemptive War*, Eric Labara (2004) distinguishes pre-emption from prevention:

The distinction between pre-emption and prevention is cardinal. The former could be perceived as an aggressive sword and the latter as a defensive shield, but such an approach is wrong. Indeed, pre-emption implies the imminence of threat whereas prevention deals with holistic danger, though not imminent. So prevention, of itself, is more aggressive than pre-emption. Pre-emption can be considered as a natural reflex, prevention as a response to a distant danger, a matter of foresight and free choice. The distinction, which contains elements of paradox, has not been understood and this had added to the confusion surrounding the *casus belli* for the recent war in Iraq manifested by quizzical ignoramuses.²⁹⁵

In this context Labara could definitely enter into discussion with Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, who listed “preventive war” as one of the key elements of the Bush Doctrine.²⁹⁶ Yet, Buckley and Singh did that on purpose, as they really thought the Bush Doctrine said pre-emption but does prevention. Both of these words are rooted in the Latin verbs *praevenire* – to forestall and *praemere* – to buy before others. The verb prevent has two meanings: first is “to deprive of power or hope of acting or succeeding” and second “to keep from happening or existing.”²⁹⁷

²⁹² David Holloway, “Deterrence, Preventive War and Preemption”, Chapter 2, Ed. George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy*, Brookings Institute Press, Washington DC, 2006, p.51.

²⁹³ James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet*, Viking Penguin, New York, 2004, p.328.

²⁹⁴ Noam Chomsky, 2003, “Preventive War ‘The Supreme Crime’”, Available at the Information Clearing House Website, <<http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4416.htm>>, Accessed on Oct.26, 2009.

²⁹⁵ Eric Labara, *Preemptive War*, Global Security Press, Washington D.C., 2004, p.13-14.

²⁹⁶ Robert Singh, “The Bush Doctrine”, Chapter 2, Ed. M.Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p. 12.

²⁹⁷ *Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*, <<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prevent>>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

The classical example of pre-emptive attack is Israel's strike which started the 1967 war. It was a response to the immediate threat of invasion by its Arab neighbors.²⁹⁸ The U.S. also has a history of using pre-emption. Gerry Warren (2004) reminds us that "between 1800 and 1934 Marines staged 180 landings abroad. Some were in response to attacks on United States citizens and property but many were launched before such attacks occurred".²⁹⁹ He also gives the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of pre-emption. But as Warren continues, "the Bush Doctrine has been criticized as being more on the preventive side than the preemptive side, as the Bush Administration has argued."³⁰⁰ This fact became clearer for the international public after the invasion on Iraq when WMD were not found. It gave an extra argument to the Bush Doctrine critics. The same opinion was presented by Mel Gurtov (2006), who said: "a preemptive strike is defensive, undertaken first reasonable expectation of being attacked almost immediately. What Bush Administration was really touting was preventive war, which is waged offensively to destroy an enemy's war-making assets and its government so as (presumably) to render it unable to become strong enough to attack."³⁰¹

In an interview, John Bolton – Bush's Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security said that the Bush Doctrine remains a doctrine about how to deal with WMD and the principle point of it is that, as the President was saying in many occasions: you do not allow the world's most dangerous weapons to get into the hands of the most dangerous people. In his opinion, despite all the critics, the military operation against Saddam Hussein was very good.³⁰² He still supports pre-emption and the decisions made by the administration.

²⁹⁸ Ivo H. Daalder, 2002, "Policy Implications of the Bush Doctrine on Preemption", Available at the Council on Foreign Relations Official Website, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/5251/policy_implications_of_the_bush_doctrine_on_preemption.html>, Accessed Oct. 26, 2009.

²⁹⁹ Gerry Warren, 2004, "The Bush Doctrine", Available at the American Thinker Official Website, <http://www.americanthinker.com/2004/02/the_bush_doctrine.html#>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Mel Gurtov, *Superpower On Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2006, p.41.

³⁰² Personal Interview with John Bolton – American Enterprise Institute, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (2001-2005) and Permanent US Representative to United Nations (2005-2006), Washington D.C., 10 July, 2008.

Pre-emption became a dividing issue for Republicans. Krauthammer named those supporting the concept of pre-emptive war “hawks”, and Democratic “doves”.³⁰³ We could see the difference clearly during the presidential elections in 2004. Candidate John Kerry was saying that he will not hesitate to use force if the U.S. is attacked by the enemy. He declared, “I will never hesitate to use force when it is required. Any attack will be met with a swift and a certain response. I will never give any nation or any institution a veto over our national security.”³⁰⁴ Later, in the presidential debate in Florida he said, “(...) whether pre-emption is ultimately what has to happen, I don't know yet. But I'll tell you this: As president, I'll never take my eye off that ball.”³⁰⁵ Kerry gave the Americans an impression that he would be able to make tough decisions, but he would do that after the danger is obvious, after the U.S. is attacked. Bush's philosophy, which he had showed already before the election of 2004, went further in that respect. He was able to attack before the enemy took any actions towards assaulting the U.S. Bush's pre-emption kept enemies away from American soil. The *9/11 Commission Report* (2006) summarizes the difference between reactionary strike and pre-emptive action very well: “once the danger has fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier – but it than may be too late.”³⁰⁶

Condoleezza Rice also believed in fast action. As she stated at John Hopkins University, the new strategy of US foreign policy must change. According to Rice the first implication of 9/11 became to understand the new defense approach. After 9/11, the U.S. agreed that foreign policy starts at home. After 9/11 airport security, visa requirements, protection of nuclear power plants, and cyber security infrastructure became important.³⁰⁷ Rice believed the best defense is a good offense. Therefore, the U.S stopped waiting for the

³⁰³ Charles Krauthammer, 2002, “What Good Is Delay?”, Available at the Jewish World Review Website, <<http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/krauthammer100702.asp>>, Accessed on Sept. 20, 2009.

³⁰⁴ John Kerry, 2004, “2004 Democratic National Convention Acceptance Address”, Available at the American Rhetoric Official Website, <<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/convention2004/johnkerry2004dnc.htm>>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

³⁰⁵ CNN, 2004, “Transcript: What is Kerry's position on pre-emptive war?”, Available at the CNN Official Website, <<http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/01/debate.transcript.13/index.html>>, Accessed on Oct.27, 2009.

³⁰⁶ National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, p.350.

³⁰⁷ Mart Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p. 204. Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 163.

threat to come but to go after the threat before it happens. This also became a very important pillar in the Bush Doctrine.³⁰⁸

The pre-emptive war simultaneously caused unease in Congress, which in the face of pre-emptive war it would lose some of its influence. Warren explains this issue in his article:

Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress alone is granted the power to declare war. But under Article II, Section 2, the President is designated as the Commander in Chief. This historical tension in the Constitution is the natural by-product of a checks-and-balances system of government. (...). In the new security environment, this tension is likely to get worse rather than better, since the enemy we seek will be fought often in a stealth manner below the threshold of public scrutiny. The enemy to be engaged will hardly allow for months of Congressional debate on the advisability of using force. As Congress loses influence in this area, the free nature of our political system virtually ensures such that some politicians will present this to the public as executive overreaching, instead of a policy driven by strategic concerns. A policy of active preemption must therefore keep the public fully informed. However, intelligence considerations and other factors do not always allow information to be shared with the public. This creates potentially important problems.³⁰⁹

So the decision makers should be very careful when using pre-emption as a ground for strike resolution.

Another thing is that the U.S. would be able to use pre-emptive strikes in very few situations. As Condoleezza Rice said, “the number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small.”³¹⁰ Daalder also elaborated on the Bush Doctrine weaknesses. According to his view, the strike is not always the only and the best options. Many times there are some alternatives. However, often the strike is the only way to deal with the danger and, “when it is, it often is best used early, before threats have been fully formed, since this way likely reduce the associated costs and enhance the probability of success. The problem with the Bush Doctrine, then, is not that it relies on preemptive force too much but that it has conceived of its use too narrowly – primarily to deal with terrorism and as means of forcible

³⁰⁸ Mart Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p. 204.

³⁰⁹ Gerry Warren, 2004, “The Bush Doctrine”, Available at the American Thinker Official Website, <http://www.americanthinker.com/2004/02/the_bush_doctrine.html#>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

³¹⁰ Condoleezza Rice, 2002, “A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom”, Available at the Manhattan Institute Official Website, <<http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/wl2002.htm>>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

regime change.”³¹¹ It is reserved only for exceptional situations. Therefore, we can treat the Bush Doctrine as a “*prudential strategy*”³¹² using pre-emption and many other tools in the War on Terror. According to Hook and Spanier (2007), “the new path the U.S. followed under the Bush Doctrine and Pre-emptive War approach was uncertain and treacherous. Because of its nature War on Terrorism became impossible to win decisively, demeaning the prospects for the return to normalcy that Americans expected.”³¹³

The philosophy of St. Augustine of Hippo matches our topic greatly. He said, “peace is not sought in order to provide war, but war is waged in order to attain peace.”³¹⁴ Bush had been attaching a great importance to his ultimate goal – peace. And he deeply believed that pre-emptive strikes would be not only the way to defend the U.S., but also to bring peace and freedom to the world. How his doctrine corresponded with the international law and the international community will be explained in the next sections.

5.7. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Bush Doctrine Era

George W. Bush said, in the previously quoted State of the Union Address, “for too long our culture has said, ‘If it feels good, do it’. Now, America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: ‘Let’s roll’.”³¹⁵ He emphasized the belief of American exceptionalism and its mission to governing the world. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (2007) write, “in the Bush Doctrine, there are no universal norms or rules governing all states. On the contrary, order can be maintained only if the dominant power behaves quite differently from the others. Thus the administration is not worried that its preventive war doctrine or attacking Iraq without Security Council endorsement will set a precedent for others because the dictates that apply to them do not bind the United States.”³¹⁶ We have the U.S. then as the “*dominant power*”, a

³¹¹ Ivo H. Daalder, *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p.12.

³¹² Robert G. Kaufman, *In Defense of the Bush Doctrine*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2007, p.128.

³¹³ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press,

³¹⁴ Eric Labara, *Preemptive War*, Global Security Press, Washington D.C., 2004, p.97.

³¹⁵ George W. Bush, 2002, “State of the Union Address”, Available at The White House Official Archives, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>>, Accessed on Oct. 12, 2009.

³¹⁶ Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, Pearson Longman, New York, 2007, p.423.

world leader who can abide by the rules or break them, depending on the situation. And even though both Donald Rumsfeld and Bush said that they do not seek to build an empire, most of the analysts labeled the Bush Doctrine as a “*neoimperial*”.³¹⁷

The Bush Doctrine derived from other intellectual and political schools. Many analysts see great influence of Wilsonianism, democratic-realism and Reagan’s influences in Bush’s ideology. Robert Singh (2006) writes, “(...) the Bush Doctrine represents an intellectually coherent amalgam of traditional ‘realist’ approaches to international relations and an expansively muscular Wilsonianism.”³¹⁸ Mel Gurtov sees the Bush Doctrine’s basis in the Reagan administration, “the Reagan presidency contributed in three specific ways to the national security policies of George W. Bush. It brought into government service some of the same neoconservatives who would populate Bush’s national security staff. Reagan also activated elements of the Bush Doctrine – unilateralism, pre-emptive attack, and regime change. And the Reagan administration planted the seeds for a global crusade against an amorphous transnational threat, terrorism.”³¹⁹

Robert Singh is not alone in his beliefs. Francis Fukuyama and George Shultz have also noticed the similarities between Reagan and Bush’s approach from the neoconservative perspective. Robert G. Kaufman in his book with the revealing title *In Defense of the Bush Doctrine* (2006) also writes about Reagan and Bush:

Like Reagan with regard to nuclear weapons and strategic defense, President George W. Bush concluded that the events of 9/11, 2001, rendered obsolete defensive strategies that assumed our adversaries always calculated risks rationally, especially with the ominous conversions of the proliferation of the WMD and the rise of fanatical movements devoted to destroying American freedom. Like Ronald Reagan and Harry Truman with regard to the Soviet Union, and Franklin Roosevelt with regard to Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, President Bush sought to inject moral clarity into the struggles with our enemies. Like his great predecessors, he defines regime change and the spread of the stable, liberal democracy to address the real root cause of aggression as the ultimate goal in the War on Terror.³²⁰

³¹⁷ Mel Gurtov, *Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2006, p.42.

³¹⁸ R. Singh, “The Bush Doctrine”, Chapter 2, Ed. M.Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.13.

³¹⁹ Mel Gurtov, *Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2006, p.32.

³²⁰ Robert G. Kaufman, *In Defense of the Bush Doctrine*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2007, p.125.

This was visible in his public speeches in which he often referred to American exceptionalism, spreading democracy and freedom.

The Bush Doctrine and Bush's foreign policy as a whole was then not innovative, but rather "*inherited*". Singh (2006) attempts to list elements, which made Bush's approach unique and recognizable in the eyes of its supporters and critics:

First, and most notable was the openly positive embrace of what has commonly been termed 'pre-emptive action' but is more accurately known as 'preventive' war. (...) Second, the refusal to allow peaceful coexistence with rouge states prioritized regime change and recognized that America's national interests were best pursued by spreading democratic forms of governance (...). Third, these and other second-order goals required the US vigorously to preserve and enhance its global military pre-eminence as the surest route to maintaining – depending on the author – its 'primacy', 'hegemony' and 'empire'.³²¹

Bush had new perspectives about leading the world in his mind and in his agenda; but 9/11 had brought up lots of questions. The Bush Administration dealt with two major dilemmas. The first one was stepping aside from the international organizations by implementing the new unilateralist approach which would cause the U.S to lose some alliances. In order to fight against a major challenge like global terror, a global alliance is needed. The approach considering self-interest and national priorities as a higher weight than global issues would cause losing allies and support in the international community.³²²

The second problem was the moral leadership of U.S. During the Cold War the U.S. played a moral leadership role for the Western World. After the Cold War this spectrum expanded and the U.S became the moral leader of the entire world. After 9/11 the new laws and approaches for homeland security contributed to the limitation of freedom of some people. The actions undertaken in foreign policy affected the core values of the U.S internally and externally. A country based on human rights, liberties, equal rights, economic freedom and spiritual tolerance started to struggle with its core values after the implication of the new domestic and foreign policies.³²³

³²¹ Singh, R., "The Bush Doctrine", Chapter 2, Ed. M.Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.18-20.

³²² William O. Chittick, *American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis*, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2006, p. 324.

³²³ William O. Chittick, *American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis*, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2006, p. 324

As for the principles guiding U.S. foreign policy, Mel Gurtov (2006) has named two of the most important ones: realism and globalism. “Realism urges the pursuit of national interest by acquiring strategic advantages and political influence in the world – in a word, geopolitics. Globalism speaks for the virtues of the market (geo-economics) and the spread of US ideals, such as democracy, that free markets will encourage, though often depicted contradictory and therefore mutually constraining impulses, realism and globalism are really two sides of the same coin.”³²⁴ Spreading democracy and liberalism, however, was being done in a very specific unilateral way. The U.S. in the Bush Doctrine era was conducting its foreign policy very individualistically, with minimal international consultation. It started from implicating the neoconservative skepticism towards international organizations by George W. Bush, whose administration did not sign six international agreements at the beginning of his term.³²⁵ The unilateralism performed by the U.S. did not mean, however, completely walking away from the international community. After all, the U.S. needed allies during its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Art and Jervis (2007) clarified the U.S.’s actions in terms of unilateralism, “these [assistance from other countries] should not be mistaken for joint ventures as the United States did not bend its policy to meet others’ preferences. In stressing that the United States is building coalitions in the plural rather than alliances (the mission determines the coalition, in Rumsfeld’s phrase), American leaders have made it clear that they will forego the participation of any particular country rather than compromise.”³²⁶

With Art and Jervis’s help we have approached the most important issues in U.S. foreign policy of the Bush Doctrine era: wars. First the Afghanistan invasion took place. “President Bush approved military plans to attack Afghanistan in meetings with Central Command’s General Franks and other advisers on September 21 and October 2nd. Originally titled ‘ Inifinitive Justice’ the operation’s code word was changed – to avoid the sensibilities of Muslims who associate the power of infinite justice with God alone – to the operation

³²⁴ Mel Gurtov, *Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 2006, p.17.

³²⁵ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p.121.

³²⁶ Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, Pearson Longman, New York, 2007, p.422.

name still used for preparations in Afghanistan: “Enduring Freedom.”³²⁷ That operation was supported by the international community, because at that time, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the world still felt very sympathetic towards the U.S. This success, however, did not continue as the second strikes based on the pre-emptive war philosophy did not have that much legitimacy in the eyes of the world.³²⁸

5.8. World’s Responses to the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine has had its coming from every corner of the world, especially after the Iraq invasion. The Buckley and Singh book *The Bush Doctrine and The War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences* (2006), quoted many times in this chapter, was written to depict the world’s responses to the Bush Doctrine. O’Connor (2006) writes, “the Bush Doctrine has caused alarm among many of America’s traditional allies, from its continental European NATO allies to its ANZUS partner New Zealand. One obvious exception, however, has been the Australian government, which has offered almost unreserved support for the US in recent years and seen remarkably comfortable with Bush’s National Security Strategy and its much talked of notion of pre-emption.”³²⁹ Ultimately the world’s response to the Bush Doctrine was also its attitudes towards the potential Iraq Operation.

In Western Europe the U.S. had to deal with different responses. “One group of nations – led by the United Kingdom (UK) – joined the American effort to achieve regime change. A second group – dominated by Germany and France – voiced determined opposition to the Iraqi invasion.”³³⁰ A third group of nations [Sweden, Finland, Austria] also

³²⁷ National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, p 337.

³²⁸ Ivo H. Daalder, *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p.vii.

³²⁹ Brendon O’Connor, “Australia”, Chapter 10, Ed. M.Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.136.

³³⁰ Simone Schlichting-Artur, “The Germans Protest: Still a country of Pacifists?”, Chapter 9, Ed. Alexander G. Nikolaev and Ernest A. Hakanen, *Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p.149.

voiced opposition, but in less strident language of internationalism.”³³¹ Dominic McGoldrick writes about the division to ‘New Europe’ – Spain, Italy and mostly the new EU members or applicants, like Hungary or Poland which supported the intervention and ‘Old Europe’ – France and Germany which openly opposed it.³³²

It was written in the neoconservative ideology chapter that Tony Blair was one of the best, if not the best, allies of the U.S. He was encouraging Bush to undertake stronger actions towards terrorism. However, the other countries that sided with Germany and France opposed the Bush Doctrine. Frank Vibert in his article “Three Cheers for Bush Doctrine” (2002) tried to explain why Europe was having a hard time understanding the Bush Doctrine and security policy based on power. “While European countries are painfully constructing legalistic, treaty-bound common foreign, security and defense policies for themselves in the context of the EU, they do not seem to have noticed that this is not the way to achieve effective actions in today’s world. (...) The shock and dismay expressed in Europe in response to the Bush Doctrine is likely to come across to Americans as patronizing and cynical and will encourage a ‘go it alone’ mentality.”³³³ So this attitude of Western European countries would only encourage the U.S. to take more unilateral actions instead of taking allies into account.

Most of the Central European countries like Poland –a major player in the ‘coalition of willing’ in Central Europe – and the Czech Republic committed their troops to help Americans in Iraq. In this case, as George Blazycha (2006) summarized in his chapter in the Buckley and Singh book, there was many reasons for that, and of the most important were local interests: “(...) a loyalty to the superpower, the U.S., as ultimate guarantor of security, able to keep Russia in its place, was paramount.”³³⁴

³³¹ M. Donald Hancock and Brandon Valeriano, “Western Europe”, Chapter 3, Ed. M. Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.32-33.

³³² Dominic McGoldrick, *From 9-11 to the Iraq War 2003: International Law in an Age of Complexity*, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2004, p. 13.

³³³ Frank Vibert, 2002, “Three cheers for the Bush Doctrine”, Available at the Open Democracy Website, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-war_on_terror/article_79.jsp>, Accessed on Oct. 28, 2009.

³³⁴ George Blazycha, “Poland and Central Europe”, Chapter 4, Ed. M. Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.54.

Russia on the other hand, another state aspiring for the superpower position, didn't receive the Bush Doctrine very enthusiastically. Many factors contributed to that response: such as geopolitical aspirations, the Russian interior issues and the strategic security of Central Asia where U.S. and Russian interests meet. But as Buckley explains, "Russian leaders have pragmatically not condemned the Bush Doctrine outright. Rather, they have agreed with many of its points where they suit Russian interests. While the doctrine's application to Iraq was opposed, it does not follow that Russia would necessarily oppose another war or incursion against another state, depending upon its location and the wider context."³³⁵

In the North-East Asian region China – as always very suspicious of the U.S. politics – had some concerns about the growing U.S. influence in the world. While Japan – staunch U.S. ally – offered its help in the War on Terrorism. Rex Li, who analyzed North-East Asian responses to the Bush Doctrine, wrote: "China is apprehensive of the strengthening of US-Japan defense cooperation in the light of 9/11 and Iraq war, while Japan and America are uncertain of the security implications of rising China. Despite their different perceptions on various issues, the three major powers share common interest in maintaining regional security and economic prosperity."³³⁶

We could observe one of the most interesting and complex responses to the Bush Doctrine in the Middle East – George W. Bush's main point of interest. The Middle East cannot of course speak with one voice. It is a hybrid, and every part of it has its own agenda. Anoushiravan Ehteshani, when asked to summarize the Middle East response to the Bush Doctrine wrote:

On the whole the actual responses have been less than positive, but in practice it is possible to argue that the Bush agenda of reform, as democratization – security nexus, has been yielding impressive results. (...) the Bush Administration's emphasis on democratization and wholesale reform has helped in pushing the agenda forward within the region, shifting the mindset of all players, leaders and activists alike. While the responses to the War on Terror have been rather defensive, at the policy level, several Arab states – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,

³³⁵ Mary Buckley, "Reaction in the Russian Federation and security in Central Asia", Chapter 5, Ed. M. Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.71.

³³⁶ Rex Li, "North-East Asia", Chapter 6, Ed. M. Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.85.

Morocco, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Council neighbors, Tunisia, Yemen – have chosen to bandwagon with the U.S. and curry favor with it by joining in the battle to contain and then defeat Islamic-inspired violence at home.³³⁷

Iran was counting to make some strategic gains from Afghanistan and Iraq, yet hadn't supported the U.S. and became one of the next target countries in the U.S.'s eyes. Turkey didn't feel weak in the face of the U.S; it had proven this especially by not allowing the U.S. to use its soil to attack Iraq. But the Turkish government had some serious concerns over Kurdish resurgence entering Turkey.³³⁸

The U.S. brought great instability to the Middle East region. The two wars, which were supposed to bring freedom, democracy and liberalism to the countries they touched, only increased anti-Americanism among the Middle East nations. Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon, authors of *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security* (2006), wrote about the U.S.'s policy in the Middle East, "(...) despite its good initiatives toward the Islamic world on matters such as trade, the Bush Administration has not seized the historic moment to develop a wide-ranging policy for addressing the full breadth of the challenge. Most importantly of all, it has done little to help the Islamic world strengthen and moderate itself."³³⁹

One last – last but not the least – important player in international politics, the United Nations, could not ignore the Bush Doctrine because it had war included within its principles. Ivo Daalder (2007) explained the UN's logic very well:

If every nation decides solely on its own when and how to use force, anarchy would prevail – and the use of force might again, as in the past, become part of the natural order of things. Indeed (...) one of the most important developments of the past sixty years has been emerging global consensus that using force is not part of the natural order of things. Its use, at least as a means to resolve interstate differences, has become an extraordinary development. One reason for this change is that in the wake of history's most destructive conflict – World War II – the world adopted specific rules on the use of force. They can be found in the UN Charter, which explicitly prohibits the use of force in interstate relations and recognizes only

³³⁷ Anoushiravan Ehteshani, "The Middle East: Between ideology and geo-politics", Chapter 8, Ed. M. Buckley and R. Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p.104.

³³⁸ Ibid., p.105.

³³⁹ Kurt M. Campbell, Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security*, Basic Books, 2006, Cambridge, p.137.

two exceptions: when nations must defend themselves and when they have the authorization of the UN Security Council.³⁴⁰

And in this case both of these exceptions were in question.

5.9. Legitimacy of the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine and its pre-emptive war approach were a major shift in U.S diplomatic culture. In such a major change like this, policy makers wanted to justify the new approach. According to International Law there must be a solid reason for one country to attack another. International Law prohibits nations from attacking another unless attacked first or in the face of the certainty of an imminent attack.³⁴¹

International Law also rules that in order for a nation to restore a military force, the imminent danger must be recognized.³⁴² According to the Bush Doctrine this is almost impossible due to the nature of the new threats. Therefore, Weapons of Mass Destruction or state sponsor terror should be considered as imminent dangers because of the catastrophic results they may cause.³⁴³ This justification method has served as the reason for the U.S. to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. It was a major dilemma for the world.

During the discussions about the legality of the Iraq intervention, the U.S. Legal Adviser to the State Department, referred to the Iraq War as an example of the pre-emptive use of force, hence an extended right to self-defense.³⁴⁴

The United Nations and other international institutions noticed in the Bush Doctrine, especially in its pre-emptive strike approach, “fundamental challenges to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight

³⁴⁰ Ivo H. Daalder; *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p.viii.

³⁴¹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition , CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 339.

³⁴² Ibid., p. 326.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Dominic McGoldrick, *From 9-11 to the Iraq War 2003: International Law in an Age of Complexity*, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2004, p.53.

years.”³⁴⁵ Since post World War II nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states is a basic norm of international law. Sovereignty and nonintervention provide order in the world system.³⁴⁶ Ivo Daalder (2007) writes about sovereignty:

In short, the concept of an international system composed of wholly independent, autonomous nation-states that are fundamentally equal and pose a threat only when one state attacks another no longer accords with the real world of today. Therefore, the standards for intervention, as well as the structure for making decisions on whether to intervene, must be adapted to today’s realities. The notion of sovereignty as an absolute right to noninterference must be reformulated to recognize that sovereignty entails real responsibility (...).³⁴⁷

The world is changing and the threats change along with it. Thus, nowadays to deal with terrorism and WMD we must revise the international standards – this was the notion brought by supporters of the pre-emptive actions and the Bush Doctrine. Vibert (2002) wrote: “...in order to deal with terrorism, a modification of the ancient principle of non-intervention by one country or the international community in the affairs of other countries is needed.”³⁴⁸

For some analysts in order for the U.S to attack Iraq the official government of Iraq must have attacked the U.S. Considering the situation of Iraq under sanctions for the past decade it was impossible for Iraq to prepare a huge attack against the U.S. In addition to this, terrorist activities can be linked with various countries at the same time. Unless a country has prominent proof linking that specific terrorist organization with the state, pre-emptive strikes couldn’t be used. According to another group, the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization is based in Afghanistan and Iraq and it was financially and logistically sponsored by these two countries. Therefore, an attack from a terrorist organization can be considered as a main indicator of the harboring states involvement in the attacks. The world was stuck between these two different approaches.

There is no doubt that the international balance was changed by the Bush Doctrine, under which the United States is not a status quo power. Bush reshaped the world politics

³⁴⁵ Kofi Annan, 2003, “The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly”, New York, 23 September 2003”, Available at the United Nations Official Website, <<http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm>>, Accessed Oct.26, 2009.

³⁴⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and history*, Longman, New York, 2003, p.153.

³⁴⁷ Ivo H. Daalder; *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p.11.

³⁴⁸ Frank Vibert, 2002, “Three cheers for the Bush Doctrine”, Available at the Open Democracy Website <http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-war_on_terror/article_79.jsp>, Accessed on Oct. 28, 2009.

through pre-emption, which as Daalder (2007) wrote, “is here to stay. The hope for the future is that when it comes to making decisions on whether or not intervene preemptively, the process of deciding will involve detailed information, probing analysis, in-depth discussion and debate, and constant willingness to reassess the evidence. (...) When it comes to use of force, the American and global debate often narrows the choice to doing it within the framework of the United Nations or going it alone.”³⁴⁹

³⁴⁹ Ivo H. Daalder, *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p.17.

6. PLANNING THE IRAQ WAR: FROM THE GULF WAR TO THE 2003 Iraq War

6.1. Introduction

To fully understand the circumstances of launching the 2003 Iraq Operation and U.S.'s liability, we need to analyze the background of their Middle East interventions in the pre-1990 period.

After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. Iraq was a territory of the Ottoman Empire and it was ruled under British and French authority. The first Iraqi National Government was formed in 1921 by the Hashemite dynasty. It was still, however, under the great influence of Britain due to the rich oil resources. This situation lasted until the 1958 military coup.³⁵⁰ The Iraqi monarchy was overthrown and the Ba'ath Party started to gain power. The main objective of the Ba'ath Party was to unite the entire Arab World under one state. In 1968, the Ba'ath Party became powerful under President Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr's governance. Saddam Hussein was the right-hand of Al-Bakr. In 1979, after the resignation of Al-Bakr, Saddam Hussein replaced him. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran and the two countries started a war. Since Iran was an oil rich country in which anti-American movements started emerging, the U.S. was very concerned about the Iranian Revolution. Under these circumstances the U.S. started to support Iraq economically. It had also given intelligence and weapons assistance to Iraq, which was considered as a bulwark for Iran's expansion in the Gulf region.³⁵¹ Additional motivation to support Iraq was Saddam Hussein's promise to keep the Gulf free from the Soviet Union's influence.³⁵²

During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War the situation was balanced. When Bush Senior was elected as the U.S. President he decided to follow the footsteps of Ronald Reagan in

³⁵⁰ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, pp. 569-570.

Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.170.

³⁵¹ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p. 239.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, pp. 571-572.

Bruce W. Jentleson, *With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1882-1990*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1994.

³⁵² Steven W. Hook, John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2004, p. 273.

international politics. He saw Iran as a big and serious threat and he decided to establish more solid relations with Iraq. According to public opinion among the Washington policymakers, a powerful Iraq could have balanced Iran. For to this reason, the U.S. set up strong ties with Baghdad. During that era, Saddam Hussein had ordered the killing thousands of people in Halepce. Under Saddam Hussein's governance, human rights abuses were very common.³⁵³ Due to the balance of power in the region, none of these abuses were stopped or even attempted to be stopped by the U.S.³⁵⁴ James Carroll writes about Saddam Hussein and his relationship with the U.S. in his book *House of the War* (2006). He elaborates, "he [Saddam Hussein] had taken power by force and been supported by the United States in its power plays against Moscow and Teheran. His worst crimes, including his genocidal gassing of Kurds and Shiites in the early 1980s, had never drawn protests from Washington, but now those crimes were run up flagpole of American indignation as if committed yesterday. Suddenly Saddam Hussein was Adolph Hitler reincarnate."³⁵⁵

The Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988. After that war, the U.S. started to deal with the Iraq issue differently. Bush Senior wanted to establish economic contacts with Iraq. The main goal was to participate and take the leading role during Iraqi reconstruction. U.S. companies were encouraged to take part in this process. Bush officially announced this approach in the 1989 National Security Directive.³⁵⁶ In 1989 the total economic trade between U.S. and Iraq had already reached \$3.6 billion a year.³⁵⁷ In addition to that, the U.S. was encouraging allies to sell conventional arms and high-tech equipment to Iraq.³⁵⁸ Some of these materials were used by Iraqis to develop ballistic missiles and the components of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.³⁵⁹

³⁵³ Dov S. Zakheim, *Congress and National Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Nixon Center, Washington, DC, 1998, p. 39.

³⁵⁴ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 191.

Howard Tumber & Jerry Palmer, *Media At War*, Sage Publications, London, 2004, p.139.

Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım*, Babıalı Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2000, p.96.

³⁵⁵ James Carroll, *House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 2006, p. 435.

³⁵⁶ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 192.

³⁵⁷ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.239.

³⁵⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.171.

³⁵⁹ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p. 239.

6.2. The Gulf War

On August 2 1990, Iraqi forces invaded oil-rich Kuwait.³⁶⁰ After the invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council immediately applied sanctions to Iraq.³⁶¹ We have seen a lot of criticism of the U.S. operations during the Gulf War. Some historians argue that President Bush should have overthrown Saddam Hussein in the first place and not to wait to do that until 2003. When President Bush was asked why he didn't overthrow Saddam his answer was clear. He believed that after the Vietnam War, the American people were very sensitive when it comes to overseas operations and the death of American soldiers. Therefore, Saddam remained in his office. The President claimed: "in order not to lose U.S. soldiers or Iraqi civilians U.S. did not went through Baghdad".³⁶² Yet, Bush's argument did not satisfy the experts.³⁶³

One of the most important differences between the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War was the importance given to diplomacy before the operations. No matter what the diplomatic approach the U.S. had been taking during the Gulf War process, it was remarkable. Ambassador Ronald Neumann called it a 'diplomatic masterpiece' because the administration recognized that it needs to deal with a much larger issue and with other situations.³⁶⁴ The Bush Administration did everything possible to keep the UN and the other allies in the Gulf War process. Right before the Gulf War, Jim Baker – the U.S. Secretary of State spent almost three weeks around the world visiting 12 capital cities. He and his team made serious efforts to present to the world the U.S. position. But the case was different in 2003. In the Gulf War there was an aggression of Iraq against Kuwait. The Arab world didn't want to see Saddam taking over the 19 provinces of Kuwait. Therefore, states like Syria, Egypt and others in the region joined the U.S. coalition.³⁶⁵

³⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 280-281.

Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2000, p. 95.

³⁶¹ Noam Chomsky, *What Uncle Sam Really Wants*, 5th Edition, Odonian Press, Arizona, 1995, p. 60.

³⁶² Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2000, p.155.

³⁶³ Ibid., pp. 155-173.

³⁶⁴ Personal Interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann – President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Bahrain and Algeria, Washington D.C., 3 July, 2008.

³⁶⁵ Personal Interview with John Bolton – American Enterprise Institute, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (2001-2005) and Permanent US Representative to United Nations (2005-2006), Washington DC, 10 July, 2008.

The first immediate resolution passed from UN was Resolution 660 calling Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.³⁶⁶ On November 29, 1990 Baker's diplomatic efforts paid off and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678 by the vote of 12-2-1.³⁶⁷ Yemen and Cuba voted against the resolution and China abstained. That was a major diplomatic victory of Bush and Baker.³⁶⁸

This resolution was very important for the United States. The UN Security Council asked Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait otherwise the use of power against Iraq would be authorized by the UN. This ultimatum meant that the U.S. had the world support for its actions.³⁶⁹ After the approval of Resolution 678, on January 12, the U.S. Congress approved President Bush's war decision. The UN resolution helped the Bush Administration to gain domestic support. On January 15, President Bush ordered General Powell to make sure The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) took the war position on the following day.³⁷⁰

Another important point is the meeting between Baker and Tarik Aziz in Geneva. Even though the U.S. Congress gave the President permission to use force, the UN approved the resolution in Security Council, and the Pentagon made final preparations, the U.S. tried one last diplomatic effort towards Iraq. When Secretary of State Baker and Iraq's Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz met in Geneva it was the last chance to resolve this conflict without involving the military. However, the meeting did not help to finish the dispute peacefully.³⁷¹

³⁶⁶ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 36.

Noam Chomsky, *What Uncle Sam Really Wants*, 5th Edition, Odonian Press, Arizona, 1995, p. 63.

³⁶⁷ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 201.

John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 36.

³⁶⁸ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 37

³⁶⁹ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 36

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 572.

Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p. 281.

³⁷⁰ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, pp. 203-204.

John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 38.

³⁷¹ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 38.

On January 17, 1991 the Desert Storm Air Campaign had officially started.³⁷² It was followed by a ground campaign starting on January 24. The fourth day of the war there were 70,000 prisoners. The Ground War ended on February 28 with the defeat of the Iraqi forces. Kuwait was liberated and Saddam Hussein withdrew his forces.³⁷³

George Bush Senior was criticized for the post-war policy he implemented. As said earlier, according to some officials the U.S. should have had overthrown Saddam Hussein and destroyed the Iraq army. However, Bush did not want to destroy the Iraq army. He always wanted to keep Iraq as a barrier against Iran.³⁷⁴ As Carroll (2006) writes, “the war for Kuwait’s sovereignty, in other words, made a joke of Arab sovereignty. It ended with Saddam still in place as an American-sponsored bulwark against Iran free to savage his Shiite and Kurdish minorities without a hint of U.S. objection.”³⁷⁵ In addition to that, Bush Senior wanted to keep Iraq controlled – weak but united. He was aware of the fragile status of Iraq and his biggest fear was southern Iraq. He did not want the south of Iraq to split and form an Iranian-sponsored new state. That possibility was conflicting with the U.S.’s overall interests in the region. And the Northern Iraqi Kurds were another issue. Bush was aware of Turkey’s concerns about Northern Iraq’s situation. He knew that if there is any possibility of an independent Kurdish state in the north it would badly affect Turkish-U.S. relations. Thus he was careful. He did not want to lose Turkey as an ally.³⁷⁶

Once the goal was achieved, the U.S. finished the war. There were 150 war casualties, which was not a large number. The U.S. kept its promise to withdraw its forces as soon as Kuwait was liberated, which brought it popularity.³⁷⁷ The approach Bush Senior took during the first war was totally different from the 2003 Iraq War. These differences will be evaluated in detail in future chapters.

³⁷² Engin Güner, *Özal’lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2000, p. 97-132.

³⁷³ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 38.

Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p. 282.

³⁷⁴ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p. 283.

³⁷⁵ James Carroll, *House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 2006, p. 437.

³⁷⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Amerika’nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.171.

³⁷⁷ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 208.

6.3. The Post-Gulf War Era

In 1991 General Norman Schwarzkopf signed the agreement which kept Saddam in power.³⁷⁸ The U.S. did not want to overthrow Saddam using force. The Bush Administration preferred that the Iraqis complete this project. After the Gulf War, the main plan was to keep Saddam under pressure and control.

In 1991 Saddam Hussein accepted the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in Iraq.³⁷⁹ Under UN Resolution 687, a new ceasefire resolution was created by UNSCOM. The UN special commission started to work to find and destroy Saddam's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The UN officers cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Economic sanctions against Iraq were implemented immediately under resolution 661. The UN also passed the Non-Proliferation Act in 1992.³⁸⁰ Immediately after the operation in the Gulf, no-fly zones were established both in north and south of Iraq in order to protect Kurds and Shiites from Saddam Hussein's aggression.³⁸¹

The United States was expecting that these measures would weaken Saddam's position and bring about his eventual removal from office by his opposition.³⁸² Bush Senior expected that not only the opposition but also the returning prisoners would overthrow Saddam.³⁸³ However, Saddam never received enough resistance from the opposition in Iraq. He was a tyrant and a relentless dictator. The opposition was very well aware that if the rebellion started by them was unsuccessful, the price they would have to pay to Saddam

³⁷⁸ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 21.

³⁷⁹ Daniel L. Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, Introduction, Rand, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 14.

³⁸⁰ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 131.

Howard Tumber & Jerry Palmer, *Media At War*, Sage Publications, London, 2004, p. 139.

Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.172.

³⁸¹ Daniel L. Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, Introduction, Rand, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 14.

³⁸² Personal Interview with Wendy J. Chamberlin, Former U.S. Ambassador for Pakistan-President of Middle East Institute, Washington D.C., February 9 2008.

³⁸³ Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı , METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.171.

Daniel L. Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, Introduction, Rand, Santa Monica, 2000, p.14.

would be too high. Therefore, Saddam had not been overthrown from his office by interior insurgency.³⁸⁴

The Head of Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell played an important role during this process. The rebels and insurgents in Iraq expected help from the U.S. in overthrowing Saddam after the Gulf War. This issue was discussed in Washington. Powell's position was very clear. He always had in mind the Vietnam issue and did not want to risk the gains of the war. Therefore, after the Gulf War the U.S. did not support the rebellion with enough resources.³⁸⁵

The U.S. plans after the Gulf War were not fully achieved. There were three main approaches on Iraq and Saddam. The first approach was prepared and handled by the CIA. The agency had tried to support anti-Saddam forces inside and outside of Iraq. The obvious goal was overthrowing Saddam in collaboration with his opposition. The U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act in order to fund this plan³⁸⁶. In effect of this piece of legislature \$100 million was released to fund Saddam Hussein's opposition in Iraq. One of the most significant efforts was the creation of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) by the CIA. The opposition in Iraq was led by Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of Iraqi National Congress.³⁸⁷ Also, a possible future leadership team in exile was organized. However, this plan did not work for the U.S. efficiently. Saddam used harsh policies and stopped the opposition in the country. He closed the door to the exiles.³⁸⁸ This approach was criticized and strongly opposed by many Republicans. They considered this plan a very weak solution.

The second plan was organized under the Pentagon's command. Military containment was prepared for Iraq. The U.S. and British forces organized no-fly zones in the north and south of the country. By implementing this plan they wanted to keep Saddam and his military power under pressure.³⁸⁹ Of course not everyone was supporting the containment strategy

³⁸⁴ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 42.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 43.

³⁸⁶ United States Congress, H.R 4664, S.2525, Sponsor Rep Gilman Benjamin A. NY.

John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 39.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.74.

³⁸⁷ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 49.

³⁸⁸ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 313.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

towards Saddam. Some officials were repeating that the only way to deal with Saddam was to remove him from power. 'Iraq Hawks' like Douglas Feith and Paul Wolfowitz wanted to remove Saddam instead of organizing the military containment of Iraq.³⁹⁰

The U.S. State Department prepared the third approach to the Iraq problem. As it is known, immediately after the Gulf War there were strict economic sanctions put on Iraq by the United Nations. These sanctions were especially severe when it comes to Iraq's oil export. UN Resolutions 706 and 712 were specifically passed to regulate these economic sanctions. The aim was to keep Iraq's oil trade only as strong enough to sustain the Iraqi people's needs. In 1991, the details of the sanction were clarified. According to the clarification, Iraq wouldn't make any trade except for food or materials essential for civilians. In addition to this, the UN declared it would lift the sanctions only if specific conditions were made. First, Saddam had to accept Kuwait's sovereignty and settle the borders between the two countries. Second, he had to release Kuwaitis and people of other nationalities that he still kept in custody. Third, he had to prove the destruction of all WMD. Fourth, he had to pay for the war damage with Iraq's oil revenues.³⁹¹ Obviously it did not go as the UN planned. Saddam Hussein immediately rejected Resolutions 706 and 712 and the economic sanctions remained.³⁹²

In time, the U.S.'s approach on Iraq's economic sanctions started to change, especially during the Clinton era. Then, the new UN Resolution 986 was passed in April 1995 under which the Oil-for-Food Program was established. This plan intended to give humanitarian assistance to Iraq in trade for its oil revenues. It fit Saddam Hussein's interests

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 574.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.68.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 43.

³⁹⁰ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p. 69.

³⁹¹ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 573.

³⁹² John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 173.

and helped him to find a loophole within the sanctions. As a result the U.S. had lost its control over Iraq's economic sanctions.³⁹³

Saddam Hussein used sanctions and the Oil-for-Food Program in his favor.³⁹⁴ The new quota increased to \$6 billion. By the end of 2000, Saddam had made \$16 billion from the new agreement based on the Oil-for-Food Program. It strengthened his power.³⁹⁵ He also manipulated the sanctions in his favor and started using them in order to keep people's support. This kept Hussein's oppositions from gaining power and overthrowing him.³⁹⁶ In addition to this the way the embargo policy was handled by the United Nations and the United States led a half million Iraqis to death. Sanctions never bothered the leadership of Iraq – it was the nation which suffered from them.³⁹⁷ The country became extremely anti-American. This was another factor working for Saddam and helping him to gain the public support and sympathy of the anti-American movement.³⁹⁸ He was not very concerned about the suffering of his people. Sanctions did not lead Saddam Hussein to change his strategic objectives and plans.³⁹⁹ At that point some countries started to lift sanctions. However, they didn't end until the Iraq War.

During the discussed period Saddam had four main objectives:

- Maintaining the current regime and holding on to power.
- Ending the UN sanctions.
- Achieving regional hegemony.
- Building NBC (nuclear, biological, or chemical) weapon capacity.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹³ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, pp. 174-212.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.68.

³⁹⁴ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 337.

³⁹⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.173.

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p. 331.

³⁹⁶ Parag Khanna, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*, Random House, New York, 2008, p. 221.

³⁹⁷ Personal Interview with Shoshana Bryen, Senior Director for Security Policy in Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington D.C., 17 March, 2008.

³⁹⁸ Chalmers Johnson, *Geri Tepki: Amerikan İmparatorluğu'nun Bedeli ve Sonuçları*, Salyangoz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 43.

³⁹⁹ Eric D. K. Melby, "Iraq", Ed. Richard N. Hass, *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, A Council on Foreign Affairs Book, New York, 1998, pp. 112-113.

⁴⁰⁰ Daniel L. Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, Introduction, Rand , Santa Monica, 2000, p. 13.

After the 9/11 attacks the approach towards Iraq changed. Some top U.S. officers started to call Iraq a second target after Afghanistan. The sanctions suddenly became more important again. In November 2001, the United Nations Security Council immediately passed Resolution 1382 which renewed the Oil-for-Food Program.⁴⁰¹

In addition to the sanctions on Iraq there were other approaches undertaken. The military option started to be articulated by the officials.

6.4. The Future Iraq Project

With the pressure of some conservative officials, the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998.⁴⁰² Bill Clinton signed the bill and he officially stated that the objective was to remove Saddam Hussein from office and install a democratic regime.⁴⁰³ After that bill changing the Iraqi regime became an official goal of U.S. foreign policy. Congress allocated \$100 million to the State Department to end Saddam's regime. In December 1998, in response to Iraq's failure to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their interference with the United Nations Special Commission inspectors, the bombings of Iraq started.⁴⁰⁴ In *Before & After: US Foreign Policy and War on Terrorism* Phyllis Bennis (2003) writes:

The immediate pretext for the intensive four-day bombing campaign Washington launched against Iraq in December 1998 was UNSCOM's late November report on its progress. Richard Butler's [UNSCOM chief] report was deliberately ambiguous, describing a few examples of Iraq's non-compliance with UNSCOM. The report recognized, however, that those isolated instances of defiance took place in a broader context of overall Iraqi

⁴⁰¹ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 578.

⁴⁰² U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, "IRAQ LIBERATION ACT OF 1998", CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Oct. 5, 1998, Available at <<http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec98/cr100598.htm>>, Accessed on Oct. 10, 2009.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p. 69.

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p. 302.

⁴⁰³ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 421.

⁴⁰⁴ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p. 69.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 44.

compliance, stating that ‘the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq’s cooperation’,⁴⁰⁵

Most of the public criticized the Bush Administration in 2003 for starting an operation in Iraq without UN approval. It is a sound criticism. What must be emphasized is that neither 1998 Clinton’s bombings (Operation Desert Fox) nor the Iraq War were authorized by the UN.⁴⁰⁶

The only difference between the 1998 bill and 2003 invasion was the general approach. In 1998, Congress allocated money to the State Department and expected joint operations with the CIA. Right after the legislation passed in Congress, Clinton decided to go after Hussein and Bin Laden. He was willing to use force against Saddam Hussein and capture Bin Laden through the CIA. Clinton launched air strikes to weaken Saddam and he achieved it. After the air strikes Saddam Hussein lost part of his power and credibility. Clinton was satisfied and he wanted the CIA to end Saddam Hussein’s regime. He didn’t want to invade Iraq. In his foreign policy agenda he didn’t include such an option. Therefore, he left things up to the CIA and the State Department. Of course these actions were not supported by conservatives. They were not satisfied with Clinton’s decisions.⁴⁰⁷

Bill Clinton’s plan was to end Saddam’s regime without a war or invasion. The Hawks in Washington saw the only way to change the regime was a military intervention, which they proved in the Bush Administration. Their mentality eventually brought the U.S. to a war. David Rothkopf in *Running the World: The Inside Story of The National Security Council and The Architects of American Power* (2004) pertinently compares Clinton’s and Bush’s approaches to foreign policy, “the Clinton era foreign policy might, in a nutshell, be described as ‘making globalization work for us’. During the first term of the Bush Administration, that policy might have been defined as ‘assuring American leadership by

⁴⁰⁵ Phyllis Bennis, *Before & After: US Foreign Policy and War on Terrorism*, Chapter 2, Olive Branch Press, New York Northampton, 2003, p.71.

⁴⁰⁶ Chalmers Johnson, *Geri Tepki: Amerikan İmparatorluğu’nun Bedeli ve Sonuçlar*, Salyangoz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.313.

⁴⁰⁷ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p. 70.

Henry Kissinger, *Amerika’nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p. 173.

asserting American power'. One stressed interdependence, the next our ability to assert ourselves unilaterally.'»⁴⁰⁸

After 9/11, the policy became harsher. Diplomacy lost its meaning and the military approach became the primary option. Rumsfeld had already informed the Pentagon about a possible war plan. Meanwhile, the State Department's top Middle East experts were also organizing a Future Iraq Project. In March, Congress authorized a \$5 million budget for the Future of Iraq Project.⁴⁰⁹

The Future of Iraq Project was not the only study on post-war reconstruction. Some Foreign Service officers in the State Department were working on post-war scenarios. They were aware of the challenge the U.S. would face after a possible military conflict. During the fall of 2001, a conference was organized at Columbia University to talk about the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. Some former Iraqi military officers attended and made suggestions about the military reconstruction. This meeting started a large scale discussion about this issue. Later on, Congress allocated \$5 million to fund these studies. This study group was run under the State Department by Thomas Warrick. The work was split among 17 sub-committees each with 10-20 members. The project was announced by the State Department's Spokesman on October 4, 2002.⁴¹⁰

6.5. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The WMD issue was as important as the economic sanctions. Saddam was not cooperating with the UN in order to reveal his WMD. In 1998, Saddam forced the UN inspectors to leave Iraq.⁴¹¹ Afterwards, the UN forced Iraq to work with UNSCOM, which as mentioned before, was the UN Special Commission established to inspect Iraq's WMD capabilities. The group worked between 1991 and 1999. Still, Saddam wasn't very cooperative and helpful to the UN officers. During their research they reported inter alia that

⁴⁰⁸ David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of The National Security Council and The Architects of American Power*, Chapter 13, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p. 449.

⁴⁰⁹ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 578.

⁴¹⁰ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p. 106.

⁴¹¹ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 197.

Daniel L. Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, Introduction, Rand, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 14.

Saddam Hussein could be in possession of big amounts of anthrax.⁴¹² When Great Britain and the U.S. launched Iraq bombings in 1998, the UN inspectors left the country. Until 2002, Saddam Hussein didn't allow for any inspections in Iraq.⁴¹³

The new State Department's approach was designed to contain Iraq diplomatically and secure the sanctions' existence. These sanctions were called 'smart sanctions'. The main subject of the sanctions was oil. Saddam managed to take advantage of this situation and argued that sanctions brought about famine to Iraqis. It was a tough diplomacy challenge for the U.S. State Department.⁴¹⁴

When the Bush Administration took over, the Iraq approach was affected by the neoconservative ideology. Long before the 9/11 attacks, Condoleezza Rice briefed the cabinet about the situation in Iraq. During that meeting, many different approaches were brought to the table. The first proposal was to continue the status quo. Under this approach Saddam was supposed to be kept on a short leash and be pressured by sanctions and no-fly zones. In addition, the Iraqi opposition was to be supported in its efforts to overthrow Saddam. The second approach was Colin Powell's economic and diplomatic sanctions plan. Powell wanted to renew the old sanctions as 'smart sanctions' and use them against Saddam Hussein.⁴¹⁵ He argued that the UN restrictions were punishing Iraqi people rather than their leaders.⁴¹⁶ The third approach was proposed by Donald Rumsfeld. First he supported Rice's view. She concluded that the sanctions were useless and the law in this issue was full of loopholes. After her statement, Rumsfeld brought up the idea of overthrowing Saddam by using military power. According to him, the sanctions were not necessary. Saddam was building WMD and sanctions were just giving him time to achieve his goal. He preferred military action instead of economic sanctions. This view has contributed to the conflict accruing between Rumsfeld and Powell.

⁴¹² General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 268.

⁴¹³ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 574.

⁴¹⁴ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, pp. 313-314.
George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.303.

⁴¹⁵ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 45.

⁴¹⁶ Stephen F. Hayes, *Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President*, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2007, p. 318.

This can be a good example for the analysts who agree that the Iraq Operation was organized after the 9/11 attacks. Among the top officials, however, overthrowing Saddam was discussed long before the 9/11 attacks.⁴¹⁷

After February 5, the NSA meeting of the George W. Bush Administration was held. Although Rumsfeld and neoconservatives thought the same way, he did push for a military response. The decision was to keep all three approaches running but keeping them strict. Sanctions were to be restructured under the name of ‘smart sanctions’.⁴¹⁸ The new challenge was to limit the sanctions to the materials which could be used for WMD. The main goal was to prevent Saddam from using the imposed sanctions against the U.S. and gaining popularity among Iraqis.⁴¹⁹ Unfortunately, the 9/11 attacks happened right after the decision of ‘smart sanctions’ and the plan didn’t have a chance to show its effect on Iraq’s future. In addition, the CIA started to work harder to support the opposition against Saddam. The Pentagon became stricter about the no-fly zones and military containment.⁴²⁰ However, in time, instead of being weakened, Saddam Hussein gained his power back.

In 1998 Saddam sent away the UN weapon inspectors. After that, the WMD process of Iraq became uncertain. Even though the UN controllers found and removed Saddam’s WMD after the Gulf War, there was still no proof that he wouldn’t bring the program back. In addition, Operation Desert Fox was approved by the President. The operation mainly aimed to destroy suspected WMD facilities.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁷ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, pp. 315-316.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, I.Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006.

⁴¹⁸ “The Experience of The United Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions”, First Expert Seminar, Bonn, November 21-23, 1999, Available at the United Nations Official Website, <<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/background.doc>>, Accessed on Nov. 18, 2009.

⁴¹⁹ BBC, 2001, “How smart are smart sanctions?”, Available at the BBC Website, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1207742.stm>, Accessed on Nov. 18, 2009.

Personal Interview with Shoshana Bryen, Senior Director for Security Policy in Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington D.C., 17 March, 2008.

⁴²⁰ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 316-317.

⁴²¹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 341.

6.6. Decision Making Process before the Iraq Operation

There is one important issue which needs to be evaluated prior to discussing the decision making process of the Iraq War. Even though the U.S. claimed Saddam's ties with Al-Qaeda, Iraq's WMD and the violent dictatorship of Saddam were the main reasons of the Iraq War; it is necessary to look at some administration officers' opinions prior to the war.

Way before 9/11, Condoleezza Rice was a part of George Bush's campaign team. She was seen as one of the top administrators in the future Bush Cabinet. Her opinions about U.S. foreign policy expressed in that period are essential. She presented to Governor George W. Bush five main priorities at that time. According to Rice, "Saddam has no useful place in international politics. The U.S. must mobilize and use whatever resources are available to remove him from power."⁴²² Her view was important. She played a very significant role in Bush's political life and the decision making process. For Rice, WMD carried a tremendous danger for the future U.S. defense policy. She believed that dealing with rouge states, terrorist groups and countries that are potential holders of WMD must be stopped by using all possible ways.⁴²³

During the Iraq War, Bush wanted to achieve all these goals expressed earlier by Condoleezza Rice. In the short run, the goal was to remove Saddam from his office, prevent the construction of WMD and cut the support to terrorist organizations. These objectives were implemented in the Bush Doctrine. After achieving these goals, in the long term, the administration wanted to change the undemocratic Iraqi systems to a more democratic state as stated in the second pillar of the Bush Doctrine.⁴²⁴

According to the chronology of the war, it was said that the decision of invading Iraq was made after the operation in Afghanistan. But frankly, some of the officials in the Bush Administration were supporting the operation in Iraq way before 9/11. But the convenient time to implement their plans came after the 9/11 attacks. The leading members of the Bush Cabinet like Douglas Feith and Donald Rumsfeld voiced their opinion during the first

⁴²² Mart Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, pp. 184-185.

⁴²³ Ibid., p. 185.

⁴²⁴ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 330.

National Security Council meeting after the attacks on New York.⁴²⁵ This meeting, held on September 12, was organized to talk about the possible response options to the attacks. Douglas Feith in his book *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism* (2008) descriptively shows the atmosphere of that meeting:

The President, I noticed had already adopted the tone and the attitude of a wartime Commander in Chief. He confined himself to presidential and strategic remarks, avoiding details and extraneous chat. 'We believe we are at war and we'll fight it as such. I want us to have mindset of fighting and winning war.' He wanted the Defense Department, and especially our military leadership to know that he expected us to present military options that were designed to achieve important results: 'We won't just pound sand.' He would see to it, he promised, that our men and women in uniform had whatever they needed for the fight, but he also noted that the war would mean casualties.⁴²⁶

During that meeting Rumsfeld officially stated that Iraq was behind the attacks. He said that Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were allies and the U.S. should remove Saddam from power as soon as possible.⁴²⁷ He expressed this opinion, but Colin Powell refused to agree and suggested a diplomatic solution. According to Powell, the administration and the U.S. had the public support to attack Al-Qaeda. But the situation was not the same for Iraq. The U.S. didn't have the American public and international community support to attack Iraq. Therefore, invading Iraq was not an option to consider.⁴²⁸ President Bush agreed with Powell's opinion.⁴²⁹ Yet, he still asked Condoleezza Rice to prepare a contingency plan in case of a possible invasion. Bush upheld his view on Iraq during the September 18 War Council meeting.⁴³⁰

Many years after the Iraq War, Douglas Feith wrote that throughout the 1990's Saddam Hussein was widely recognized as a danger to his region and to U.S. interests in

⁴²⁵ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 3.

⁴²⁶ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 12.

⁴²⁷ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.76.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., p.77.

⁴²⁹ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, pp. 11-12.

⁴³⁰ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.80.

general.⁴³¹ He elaborated his thoughts in an interview where he explained why the U.S. decided to attack Iraq. He stated that Iraq was a threat to its neighbors and to the region. Hussein launched a war against Iran and Kuwait, he was threatening Saudi Arabia, had fired missiles into Saudi Arabia and Israel. He deployed WMD against both the Iranians and Kurds. He had supported various terrorist groups – he supported them financially and trained them in Iraq. He gave financial rewards to Palestinian suicide bombers and was the only government leader in the world to praise 9/11.⁴³² Feith described all the facts which contributed to the final decision. Yet, before the Iraq War, there were also many individuals – analysts, politicians, academicians, who argued that Iraq posed no serious threat. But most of their opinions did not seem relevant both for the decision makers and for the media.⁴³³

The Iraqi involvement with international terrorism, as discussed by Feith, was described in the Yoram Schweitzer's article included in the book *After the Iraq War: Defining the new Strategic Balance* (2003). Schweitzer writes that Saddam, from the very beginning, of his presidency nurtured a large number of Palestinian terrorist organizations and supported their activities. In the years before the Iraq War, the Iraqi regime was financially supporting suicide bombers' families.⁴³⁴ Also Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol (son of Irving Kristol) devoted an entire chapter to describe Saddam Hussein's tyranny both at home and abroad.⁴³⁵ The western world, especially the U.S., was giving Saddam warnings which he was continuously ignoring. The situation reached the unacceptable according to the U.S. criteria for danger levels in 2003.

Even though the decision was not yet made for the Iraq Operation, President Bush gave a secret directive to review war plans for the possible invasion of Iraq.⁴³⁶ Donald

⁴³¹ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. xi.

⁴³² Personal Interview with Douglas Feith – Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the George W. Bush Administration, Washington D.C., 1 February, 2008.

⁴³³ Marilyn G. Piety and Brian J. Foley, "Their Morals are Ours: The American Media on the Doctrine of 'Preemptive War'", Ed. Alexander G. Nikolaev and Ernest A. Hakanen, *Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p.69.

⁴³⁴ Yoram Schweitzer, "The War in Iraq and International Terrorism", Ed. Shai Feldman, *After the War in Iraq: Defining the New Strategic Balance 2003-2004*, Sussex Academic Press and JAFFEE Center for Strategic Studies, Brighton & Portland, 2003, pp.47-48.

⁴³⁵ Lawrence F. Kaplan, William Kristol, *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*, Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2003, pp.3-33.


⁴³⁶ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.89.

Rumsfeld gave an order to the U.S. military to plan possible operations in Iraq in December 2001.⁴³⁷ After Bush's and Rumsfeld's preparation orders, the Defense Advisory Board met on September 19 and 20 in order to discuss the possible invasion plans. This group was chaired by Richard Perle.⁴³⁸

6.7. Afghanistan Freedom Act 2001

After the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan, which was ruled by the Taliban, became the first targets of the U.S.⁴³⁹ As President Bush stated in his speech, war against terror wouldn't be limited to the terrorist organizations only. It would also focus on the countries which harbor terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda was the main suspect of the attacks and the Taliban's Afghanistan was its major benefactor. After the attacks the U.S. asked the Afghanistan regime to hand over the terrorist to the U.S.⁴⁴⁰

Figure 6.1. Map of Afghanistan



Source: Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, Pan Books, London, 2000, Introduction.

⁴³⁷ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 24.

⁴³⁸ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.89.

⁴³⁹ Robert I. Rotberg, *Building A New Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 22. George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.175.

⁴⁴⁰ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 331.

Al-Qaeda was not innocent before the 9/11 attacks. The organization was responsible for a number of previous attacks. The truck bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were major catastrophes. Hundreds of people died in these attacks.⁴⁴¹ When it was clear that Al-Qaeda stood behind these attacks, the countries which harbored the group became enemies for the U.S. And obviously, Afghanistan under Taliban rule became the imminent target. Most people saw the Afghanistan Operation as the first challenge of the Bush Doctrine and the consequence of the new U.S. foreign policy. As a matter of fact, President Bush ordered to strike Afghanistan before he proclaimed his new doctrine. Therefore, it is the Iraq War which can be considered as the first target the U.S. used the new doctrine to justify.⁴⁴²

Afghanistan had been at war for the past two decades. During nearly the entire Cold War era, Afghanistan was the center of the U.S.-Soviet Union conflict. In order to gain more influence and control, both superpowers allocated money to Afghanistan. Between 1956 and 1978 the Soviet Union gave a total of \$1.26 billion for economic aid and \$1.25 billion for military aid. In addition to that, the U.S. had given \$533 million in total aid to Afghanistan.⁴⁴³

In 1978 a bloody *coup d'état* had taken place in Afghanistan. The Soviet trained Marxists took over the government, which triggered the Islamic resistance.⁴⁴⁴ Soviets wanted to preserve the Marxist regime and saw the Islamist resistance as a serious threat. Consequently the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979.⁴⁴⁵

After that, starting from the Carter Administration to the Regan Administration the U.S. refused to accept the invasion. The CIA prepared and organized many covert operations in Afghanistan. The CIA also supported the Mujahidin of Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. The U.S. spent billions of dollars to support the Mujahidin. Between 1980 and 1992, the U.S. gave \$5 billion to the Mujahidin. Together with the support from Islamic

⁴⁴¹ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 339.

⁴⁴² Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 330.

⁴⁴³ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords*, Pan Books, Oxford, 2001, p. 13.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.223.

countries and Europe, the total financial help the Mujahidin received reached \$10 billion.⁴⁴⁶ Even figures like Osama Bin Laden benefited from these funds in the 1980's.⁴⁴⁷

Both economic and military support by the U.S. provided to the Mujahidin during that period contributed to defeating the Soviets on their very first front. That victory of the U.S., however, did not last long. Less than 15 years later, the people economically helped and militarily trained by the U.S. prepared the 9/11 attacks.

After the 1989 Soviet Union withdraw from Afghanistan, the U.S. lost its interest in Afghanistan. As soon as the Soviets withdrew, civil war started in the country.⁴⁴⁸ In time, Afghan warlords that fought together with the United States moved against the U.S. During these years, Afghanistan was under the Marxist regime. In April 1992, the Mujahidin invaded Kabul and the Najibullah's Government collapsed.⁴⁴⁹ After February 1992, the regime was overthrown by northern rebels led by Ahmad Shah Massoud. The main income in Afghanistan became heroin and opium exports.⁴⁵⁰

The chaos in Afghanistan started in 1993 and continued until 1996 when the Taliban took over and brought a new order to Afghanistan.⁴⁵¹ The main mentality of the Taliban was a strict Sharia rule and Islamism.⁴⁵² These ideologies and the new order were imposed by the Taliban shortly after they took over the country. Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban became a sanctuary of Al-Qaeda.⁴⁵³ During the Taliban era, wealthy Saudi militant Osama Bin Laden became a major player and financial supporter. In order to financially backup the Taliban, Bin Laden used Afghanistan as a base and training camp for the Al-Qaeda terrorist group. After that point, the link between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban contributed to the

⁴⁴⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords*, Pan Books, Oxford, 2001, p. 18.

⁴⁴⁷ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 330.

Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords*, Pan Books, Oxford, 2001, p.18.

Robert I. Rotberg, *Building A New Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.25.

⁴⁴⁸ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords*, Introduction, Pan Books, Oxford, 2001, p. 7.

⁴⁴⁹ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p. 278.

⁴⁵⁰ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 330.

⁴⁵¹ Anita Pratap, 1996, "Who are the Taliban of Afghanistan?", Available at the CNN Interactive Website, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9610/05/taleban/>>, Accessed on Dec. 10, 2009.

⁴⁵² Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.343.

⁴⁵³ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.197.

instability and chaos in the region.⁴⁵⁴ According to CIA Director George Tenet, for the first time ever, instead of having state sponsored terrorism, Afghanistan became a terrorist sponsored state.⁴⁵⁵

Even though Bill Clinton was concerned about the new regime, he wanted to keep the relations as moderate as possible because the drug problem in Afghanistan was as bad a threat to the U.S. as fundamental Islamism. Therefore, the Clinton administration did not pressure the new regime for democratic cooperation. But later on, when terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda became more dangerous for the US and the anti-Americanism increased, Clinton offered a new deal to the Taliban regime. The President promised full U.S. economic and political support to Afghanistan in exchange for Bin Laden's surrender. Obviously this offer was refused by Mullah Muhammad Omar.⁴⁵⁶

The Al-Qaeda attacks became more and more dangerous for the U.S. Unlike the attacks to the U.S. Marine Barracks in Lebanon in the 80's, the new attacks were not receding.⁴⁵⁷ The World Trade Center Attacks in 1993, the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and finally the attacks to the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 all began to show a pattern of Al-Qaeda attacks against U.S. interests.⁴⁵⁸ The U.S. had to take immediate actions towards Al-Qaeda. During the Clinton Administration, the U.S. had bombed Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan after the truck bombings in Africa in 1998.⁴⁵⁹ Yet, Clinton failed to eliminate Bin Laden and the leadership of Al-Qaeda during these bombardments. The bombings did not help the Clinton Administration to destroy Al-Qaeda as an entity. It has just helped Bin Laden and his organization to rise and became more visible on the world stage.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁴ Robert I. Rotberg, *Building A New Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.23.

⁴⁵⁵ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.102.

⁴⁵⁶ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 333.

⁴⁵⁷ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.99.

⁴⁵⁸ Daniel L. Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, Rand, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 2.

General Tommy Franks, *American Solider*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.555.

Chalmers Johnson, *Geri Tepki: Amerikan İmparatorluğu'nun Bedeli ve Sonuçları*, Salyangoz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.16.

⁴⁵⁹ Robert I. Rotberg, *Building A New Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.26.

Chalmers Johnson, *Geri Tepki: Amerikan İmparatorluğu'nun Bedeli ve Sonuçları*, Salyangoz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.16.

⁴⁶⁰ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.343.

From 1992 to 2001, Afghanistan became the scene of a civil war. The war was fought not only between the internal armed forces but also with foreign powers.⁴⁶¹ Due to Afghanistan's strategic importance, some extra regional powers and neighboring countries tried to influence Afghanistan during the civil war. For instance, Pakistan tried to manipulate Afghan politics in order to gain ideological and geopolitical advantages.⁴⁶² Obviously one of the most important reasons for the desire to influence Afghan politics was the natural gas resources. Almost every gas pipeline from Turkmenistan was to go through Afghanistan. Therefore, the strategic value of Afghanistan became imminent.⁴⁶³

On February 2 of 1999, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott met with Taliban officials in Islamabad. He asked the Taliban to extradite Osama Bin Laden. On February 9, the Taliban refused the offer. They told the U.S. officials that they would warn him and impose restrictions. However, they couldn't force him out. Finally, on February 13, Bin Laden hid and the Taliban announced they did not have information on his whereabouts.⁴⁶⁴

On January 19 of 2001, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 13333 – complete arms ban for Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. In addition, the Taliban members were banned from international flights.⁴⁶⁵ On July 31 of 2001, the UN Security Council passed another resolution, 1363, in order to place monitoring procedures to watch the Afghan borders. Monitoring was set up by the UN in order to control the weapons embargo.⁴⁶⁶

Secretary of State Colin Powell started an immediate diplomatic process to make sure Al-Qaeda was out of Afghanistan. The Taliban regime did not accept the United States request. Afterwards, Colin Powell asked Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to convince the Taliban to hand over Al-Qaeda immediately. In 2001, President Bush sent a letter to Mussaref with the same request.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶¹ Robert I. Rotberg, *Building A New Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.26.

⁴⁶² Ibid., p.27.

⁴⁶³ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords*, Pan Books, Oxford, 2001, p.23.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., p.232.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., p.8.

BBC, 2001, "New UN Sanction start against Afghanistan", Available at the BBC Official Website, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1125356.stm>, Accessed on Dec. 18, 2009.

Mohammad Bashir, 2001, "Afghan Capital Tense as the UN", Available at the Global Policy Forum Official Website, <<http://globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/afgnstan/010119.htm>>, Accessed on Dec. 18, 2009.

⁴⁶⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords*, Introduction, Pan Books, Oxford, 2001, p. 9.

⁴⁶⁷ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.346.

Even President George Bush did not consider Al-Qaeda or the Taliban as the U.S.'s first security concern. Bush considered it as a serious threat but not an urgent one. He adopted a strategy to solve this problem by using Massoud's rebel armies. On September 9 of 2001, when Massoud was murdered by Arab journalist, Bush's plan had failed before it started.⁴⁶⁸

This was a very important indicator for U.S. foreign policy before 9/11. In both the Clinton and Bush eras, the U.S. administrations did not see radical religious terror as a main threat to U.S. security. Therefore, the new U.S. foreign policy was shaped immediately after the attacks without long preparations.

After the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan became the U.S.'s top target which was attacked shortly after the first shock of the 9/11 attacks. On September 12, during the National Security Council (NSC) meeting, the Taliban was shown as the primary target. The NSC was briefed by the CIA about the possible plan of invading Afghanistan.⁴⁶⁹ In addition, on September 14, the final war plan was shaped. According to CIA director George Tenet, Afghanistan was the only target of the U.S.'s War on Terror. The war was limited to Afghanistan and the Taliban.⁴⁷⁰ Even though Tenet's opinion was such, President Bush stated the opposite during his speech on September 20. He openly said that neither Al-Qaeda nor the Taliban were the end of War on Terror. They would be just the beginning. He stated that he did not know when and where it would stop.⁴⁷¹

After the plans were made, President George Bush made a statement and officially asked the Taliban to hand over Al-Qaeda members to the U.S.⁴⁷² As everyone expected this request was refused. The preparations for war continued – Powell had contacted 58 of his foreign counterparts and received offers of general help. The operation began as planned.⁴⁷³ Donald Rumsfeld ordered Franks to prepare a plan to remove the Taliban from power and

National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, p. 331.

⁴⁶⁸ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 334.

⁴⁶⁹ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.174.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., p.176.

⁴⁷¹ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.17.

⁴⁷² National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Barnes & Noble Publishing Inc., New York, 2006, p. 333-333.


⁴⁷³ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.353.

destroy Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.⁴⁷⁴ The main reason for the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was to destroy the terrorist link between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban because, according to the Bush Doctrine, they were both responsible for the 9/11 attacks.⁴⁷⁵

There were two main stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. First of all, U.S. forces would help anti-government militias to overthrow the Taliban regime and round up the terrorists responsible for the attacks. The second stage was to create a new government and a new regime in Afghanistan under the auspices of the U.S. and the UN. Principles of the new government were important. Having a democratic regime would be a great asset for the world. It would end the threat of Afghanistan harboring terrorists.

Not even two weeks after 9/11 – on October 7, the U.S. operation started.

Figure 6.2 Operation Enduring Freedom



Source: Operation Enduring Freedom Chronological Maps Showing Air strikes, Airdrops and other Military Actions of Operation Enduring Freedom, Available at the Global Security Website, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom-maps.htm>>, Accessed on Dec, 18, 2009.

⁴⁷⁴ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.277.

⁴⁷⁵ Robert I. Rotberg, *Building A New Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.23.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 578.

The operation was generally successful. Within weeks after the operation, major cities in Afghanistan were surrounded by coalition forces. After Kabul, Mazhar Al-Sherif fell on November 13.⁴⁷⁶ Kandahar was taken over on December 7.⁴⁷⁷

The only problem was Bin Laden's escape from Afghanistan. On November 12 2001, all of Afghanistan was freed from the Taliban regime.⁴⁷⁸ The Taliban regime was not the only thing that fell after Operation Enduring Freedom. Ties between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were also broken. The operation destroyed the link between the two groups.⁴⁷⁹ After the invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda leaders and Osama Bin Laden retreated towards the mountains close to the border of Pakistan.⁴⁸⁰

The Afghanistan War was supported by the international community, even countries outside of NATO, and it was a legitimate use of force. Ambassador Ronald Neumann called it a 'defensive war' since it was the U.S. which was attacked first by the terrorists. He argues that it was not an example for pre-emption.⁴⁸¹

Initially the U.S. entered Afghanistan really just hunting terrorists and without an interest of building a government. Being an occupying power was not in the U.S.'s plans. The American troop presence was not heavy. Ambassador Neumann considers this as a mistake. According to him, the biggest tactical mistake was to push the Taliban into Pakistan instead of destroying them. They had a place from which they reconstituted themselves and could continue being a threat.⁴⁸²

In time, U.S. interests changed. After overthrowing the regime the U.S. wanted to establish an immediate government in Afghanistan. The Bonn Accord was designed to

⁴⁷⁶ Robert I. Rotberg, *Building A New Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.56.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.85.

⁴⁷⁷ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.85.

⁴⁷⁸ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.336.

Mart Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p.202.

⁴⁷⁹ Robert I. Rotberg, *Building A New Afghanistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2007, p.29.

⁴⁸⁰ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.85.

⁴⁸¹ Personal Interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann – President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Washington D.C., 3 July 2008.

⁴⁸² Personal Interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann – President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Washington D.C., 3 July 2008.

achieve that purpose and it was signed by the leadership of United Nations. The document was also approved by regional leaders. The proposed agreement was to set a gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative Afghan government. Hamid Karzai Pashtun from south Afghanistan, who was educated in India, was brought into power as the new leader⁴⁸³. Former King Mohammed Zahir Shah gave his blessings to the Bonn Accords and was granted with a ceremonial title of “Father of the Country”.⁴⁸⁴ Soon after, in 2004, Hamid Karzai became the new President of Afghanistan and then the Afghan people elected the parliament in 2005.⁴⁸⁵

Even though the so-called nation building process in Afghanistan run by the UN and the U.S. looked successful, the footprints of the Taliban regime were seen around the country, especially getting close to 2006 when the terror attacks in Afghanistan organized by the Taliban escalated.

When the Afghanistan issue was over, the administration started to analyze the next possible target. Soon after that Colin Powell lost his power and the neoconservative group started to be more influential in suggesting foreign policy solutions. The conflict started between the old Realist School and the new Bush Doctrine supporters. They all knew that Iraq wouldn’t be an easy sell as Afghanistan.⁴⁸⁶

6.8. Preparations for the Iraq War

There were four main goals of the Iraq Operation. By using military power the first goal was to send a signal to the rogue states and show that the U.S. was becoming offensive. Secondly, as for a long term War on Terror, Iraq would be a great base for the U.S. for future actions in Middle East. Third, establishing a new regime would spare Iraqi people from

⁴⁸³ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.353.

⁴⁸⁴ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 337.

⁴⁸⁵ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.316.

CBC News, 2004, “Afghanistan's presidential election”, Available at the CBC News Website, <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/afghanelection.html>>, Accessed on Dec. 10, 2009.

⁴⁸⁶ Mart Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p.109-210.

Saddam's dictatorship. And last, the democratic processes in Iraq would be a role model for other Middle East states.⁴⁸⁷

But these were not the only reasons. There was a serious economic dimension of the war. Due to the sanctions and Saddam's policies, oil production in Iraq was down to half its capabilities compared to before the Gulf War. Therefore, some supporters of the regime change in Iraq believed in the importance of the oil in Iraq. Also, most of the big companies aimed to take part in the reconstruction of Iraq. These possible economic opportunities secured businessmen's and investors' support for President Bush.⁴⁸⁸ Even though most of the decision makers were certain about the Iraq Operation, Saddam's removal and a permanent regime change, there were still two important bodies which needed to support that initiative: the U.S. Congress and the United Nations.

The Bush Administration needed the support of Congress, which was already supporting the War on Terror, but the war against Iraq and overthrowing Saddam caused lots of questions and concerns. For instance, Democrats kept on asking if there was any way to deal with Iraq's WMD without a military operation. Democratic research for an alternative way was emphasized in John Bolton's Heritage Foundation speech on May 6, 2002. During his speech many Democrats raised the question: Is there a way to prevent the Iraqi danger without a war?⁴⁸⁹ Seymour Hersh also mentions about the second thoughts of some Democratic Party representatives. During President Bush's presentation before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) on September 24th of 2002, some Democrats were publicly questioning the President's claim that Iraq possessed WMD that could pose an immediate threat to the U.S. Few Democrats were even considering putting an alternative resolution before the Congress.⁴⁹⁰

Yet, after the CIA reports and Pentagon's briefings Congress was almost convinced. The Bush Administration felt Congress's support especially during the midterm elections when an important resolution was passed. That resolution allowed the U.S. government to

⁴⁸⁷ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 342.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 342-343.

⁴⁸⁹ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 175.

⁴⁹⁰ Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, Penguin Books, London, 2004, p. 203.

use military action towards Iraq even without the UN's blessing.⁴⁹¹ On September 10, the House of Representatives (HOR) passed the resolution by 296 supporting out of 435. Immediately after, the Senate passed the same resolution by 77 supporting votes out of 100.⁴⁹² Senior Republicans were fully supportive and a number of senior Democrats were also in favor of the Iraq War resolution.⁴⁹³ The 107th Congress authorized the President to "use the armed forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq."⁴⁹⁴ "The Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002" had become public law.⁴⁹⁵

Secretary of State Colin Powell was not opposed, at least in principle, to military intervention in Iraq, but he favored close collaboration with the United Nations.⁴⁹⁶ Working with the UN had many advantages. First of all, it would open the possibility for the U.S. to solve the issue through diplomatic means. Under UN jurisdiction, the United States could ask for enforcement in Iraq. If Iraq failed to fulfill the demands, then the U.S. would have bigger support from the UN. Also, the issue of the war's legitimacy would have been removed from the scene. Powell supported this option from the beginning.⁴⁹⁷

Unlike Powell, others in the Bush Administration were not supportive of the UN option as much as Powell. For instance Dick Cheney believed that the U.S. already had the *casus belli*. He claimed that Gulf War ended with the ceasefire. One of the major requirements of this ceasefire was for Saddam to open the country to U.S. weapons inspectors. Cheney believed that by failing to do so, Iraq did not obey the ceasefire rules and

⁴⁹¹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 344-345.

⁴⁹² Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.152. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p.63.

⁴⁹³ Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p.119.

⁴⁹⁴ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p.63.

⁴⁹⁵ 107th Congress, Public Law 107-243-OCT.16, 2002, "The Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002", Available at CSPAN Office Website, <<http://www.c-span.org/resources/pdf/hjres114.pdf>>, Accessed on March 1st1, 2010.

Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p.123.

⁴⁹⁶ James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, Penguin Group, New York, 2004, p. 351.

⁴⁹⁷ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 97.

that causes *casus belli*.⁴⁹⁸ As Stephen F. Hayes (2007) writes, “Cheney had been skeptical of going to the UN. Over the previous few weeks, he had several discussions with Colin Powell about the wisdom of seeking a new resolution from the UN Security Council. In Cheney’s eyes, the Security Council had already passed seventeen resolutions that Saddam had violated. Why get another one? If we try and fail, he argued, it will be much harder to do what we may need to do.”⁴⁹⁹ Obviously Colin Powell and Dick Cheney had a major difference of opinion in this specific matter. Because of this discrepancy, a conflict started between these two officials and it lasted until the end of Bush’s first term.

As Robert Draper (2007) writes, Powell said to Bush, “go to the UN, ...challenge the United Nations. Tell them: it is not about us and Iraq. This is a challenge to the international community. Sixteen resolutions. Twelve years of diplomacy. Appeal to their pride as leaders.”⁵⁰⁰ President Bush agreed with Colin Powell and started seeking back up from the United Nations. After getting support of the U.S. Congress, the second phase of seeking back up had started for the Bush Administration.

Bush was also trying to convince the United Nations to accept his plans. The importance of UN support was seen in the Gulf War when Bush Senior was the president. Therefore, Bush put forth effort to gain UN approval. Powell was negotiating with the members of the UN Security Council and he scored a big victory. The first attempt was positive. On November 8 2002, the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed.⁵⁰¹ This resolution stated that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Government must cooperate with inspectors otherwise there will be “*serious consequences*”. In addition, Iraq had to disarm immediately.⁵⁰² This resolution was supportive of the U.S.’s opinion, but the actions that the United States had taken during that period turned the world’s public opinion against the Iraq War.

⁴⁹⁸ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 97.

⁴⁹⁹ Stephen F. Hayes, *Cheney: The Untold Story of America’s Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President*, Harper Colins Publishing, New York, 2007, p. 381.

⁵⁰⁰ Robert Draper, *Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush*, Free Press, New York, 2007, p.180.

⁵⁰¹ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p. 116.

Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 2004, p.226.

General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 405.

⁵⁰² United Nations, 2002, “Security Council Resolutions: Resolution 1441”, Available at the United Nations Official Website, <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm>>, Accessed on Nov. 28, 2009.

6.9. Military Concerns

There is a very important issue connected with the deployment of forces in the 2003 Iraq Operation. This detail affected the outcome of the war. During the 1990 Gulf War President George Bush Senior deployed 250.000 soldiers just for defensive purposes. General Schwarzkopf led an army of 250.000 soldiers just to protect Kuwait.⁵⁰³

On November 27 of 2001, General Franks received a call from Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld asked Franks to prepare a plan for a possible Iraq Operation. Franks suggested the plan the Pentagon had already had – OPLAN-1003.⁵⁰⁴ The Operation Plan (OPLAN) was last revised in 1998 after Operation Desert Fox.⁵⁰⁵

The New Iraq invasion plan was prepared based on the previous plan prepared by CENTCOM in 1998 called OPLAN 1003-98.⁵⁰⁶ This plan was revised by General Zinni and presented to Secretary Rumsfeld. During the meeting General Newbold made the presentation. The suggested number of troops proposed was 500.000.⁵⁰⁷ This was not exactly what Rumsfeld wanted. Rumsfeld wanted to finish the operation with a smaller number of troops than the original plan was suggesting.⁵⁰⁸

At the beginning Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld wanted to deploy 100.000 to 125.000 troops.⁵⁰⁹ However, the military officials were deeply concerned with this number. They stated several times that this number would not be sufficient for the reconstruction of Iraq.⁵¹⁰ General Anthony Zinni offered 380.000 to 400.000 troops instead.⁵¹¹ According to Zinni the original plan was prepared for 500.000 troops for contingency reasons. Therefore, he

⁵⁰³ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.200.

⁵⁰⁴ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.315.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., p.329.

Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.26.

⁵⁰⁶ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.90.

⁵⁰⁷ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p.36.

⁵⁰⁸ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.90.

⁵⁰⁹ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p.36.

⁵¹⁰ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1. Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.25.

⁵¹¹ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.333.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.73.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p.56.

suggested the new number as the minimal option for the operation.⁵¹² The main purpose of Zinni's suggestion was not only for the operation, but especially the post-war period. Zinni was aware that the Iraq Operation was not going to end with taking over Iraq. The real operation would start after the war ends. The reconstruction of the country and securing peace and order was to be a difficult process. Therefore, Zinni offered this amount of troops especially for the aftermath of the war.⁵¹³

Rumsfeld did not agree with the military's rationale. He re-sent the plan to Franks and Zinni to reduce the troops for the invasion. After the new calculations, the plan was prepared for 145.000 troops. With reinforcements, the suggested number would be 275.000 troops. Rumsfeld refused to accept this plain once again.⁵¹⁴

The military concerns and the post-war planning issues were brought up again on February 21 and 22, 2003 by Lieutenant Jay Garner who organized meetings with the U.S. government officials to discuss postwar Iraq. As Thomas Ricks (2007) describes, this official group was set up too late and had to deal with serious issues. There were not enough troops in the war plan "for the first step of securing all the major urban areas, let alone for providing an interim police function."⁵¹⁵ The meeting notes included a comment that the "humanitarian, reconstruction and civil affairs efforts will be tremendously expensive." And what Ricks emphasizes, these conclusions stood in contrast with the public statements of the Bush Administration.⁵¹⁶ It was a month before launching the Iraq Operation, but not much had been done to increase the number of troops or improve the post-war strategy.

While the military decisions were being made, the President had Feith working on post-war planning. He was working on a paper entitled, "U.S. and Coalition Objectives". He briefed the President and the National Security Council on March 4th, and presented the following objectives:

⁵¹² Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.92.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap , Istanbul, 2006, p.57.

⁵¹³ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap , Istanbul, 2006, pp.80-81.

⁵¹⁴ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.94.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.59.

⁵¹⁵ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p.101.

⁵¹⁶ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p.102.

- Iraq's territorial integrity is maintained and the quality of life is improved visibly.
- Iraq is seen to be moving toward democratic institutions and serves as a model for the region.
- The U.S. and coalition maintain freedom of action to carry out the global War on Terrorism and WMD capture and destruction activities.
- Obtain international participation in the reconstruction effort.
- Obtain the support of the Iraqi people.
- Obtain the political support of the international community including the regional states, preferably through a U.S. Security Council resolution.
- Place as many Iraqi in positions of physical authority as quickly as possible.
- Accomplish the above urgently.⁵¹⁷

On Thursday March 20, after an overnight bombardment made by the U.S., the ground campaign started. The ground forces marched from Kuwait into Iraq. The force of 241,000 was ready to deploy in Iraq. The support units and combat forces were both included in this number. Yet, other sources state that for most of 2003, the actual number of U.S. troops in Iraq, which includes support units from Kuwait, was only about 150,000.⁵¹⁸ It was not enough. In the first Gulf War, the U.S. had used almost twice this number just to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This time, forces of half of this number were expected to fight, invade and restore an entire country.⁵¹⁹ According to the CENTCOM's plan, the Marines were starting the operation from east and taking over Nasiriye and the oil mines. They were also to secure the Iranian border. At the same time the rest of the army was going to move from the west to Baghdad. Special Forces were going to cooperate with Kurds in the north. The Air force was to support the grand operation.⁵²⁰

6.10. WMD Inspections

After this resolution Saddam Hussein agreed for weapon inspectors to enter Iraq.⁵²¹ The first inspection was carried out by Hans Blix, Swedish diplomat and politician, and the Head of the Inspection team in the UN Security Council. However, his report was not that

⁵¹⁷ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 2004, p.328.

⁵¹⁸ Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*, Free Press, London, 2004, p.270.

⁵¹⁹ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 457.

⁵²⁰ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, I. Basım, Doğan Kitap , Istanbul, 2006, p.65.

⁵²¹ Ibid., p. 141.

promising for the Bush Administration. During his presentation to the UN, he officially stated that besides minor obstacles he did not have huge problems during the inspections. He also mentioned that Iraq was fully cooperative during the process of inspections⁵²² and there was not enough evidence to prove Iraq's WMD capacity.⁵²³

Even though the reports were in favor of Saddam, the question was raised. The U.S. wondered what happened to the biological and chemical weapons Saddam used before the Gulf War. As it was known, Saddam used mustard gas against Kurds in Northern Iraq. Even Hans Blix and the other members of Security Council had doubts about what happened with the biological weapon.⁵²⁴ There was a serious dilemma at this point. The CIA, Blix and ElBaradei's reports openly showed that there were no WMD found in Iraq and Saddam was cooperating with the UN inspectors. On the other hand, the question about what had happened to the WMD from the pre-Gulf War period remained unanswered. These two conflicts gave both sides legitimacy to their view. The U.S. argued that if there is no evidence or proof of what happened to WMD, then Saddam was hiding them. The other side believed that the war would not be legitimate. They claimed that if there is no WMD to be found, then there are no WMD. For the U.S., Iraq was a threat even if Hussein's possession of WMD was not proved. The Iraq Operation was planned and organized under these circumstances.

President Bush, in one of his televised press conferences, on March 6, 2003 stated, "we will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction."⁵²⁵ He was convinced that the U.S. should take actions. The day after, on March 7, 2003, Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, the Chief inspector of the IAEA, issued a statement. His

⁵²² Hans Blix, 2003, "Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC", Available at the United Nations Official Website, <<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdelivered.htm>>, Accessed on Nov. 28, 2009.

Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, November 2007, New York, p. 438.

⁵²³ Hans Blix, 2003, "Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC", Available at the United Nations Official Website, <<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdelivered.htm>>, Accessed on Nov. 28, 2009.

⁵²⁴ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.421.

⁵²⁵ Greg Mitchell, *So Wrong for so Long: How the Press, the Pundits and the President failed in Iraq*, Union Square Press, New York/London, 2008, p.31.

views were similar to Blix. ElBaradei reported that he and his team did not have any evidence that Iraq is in possession of any nuclear weapons.⁵²⁶

However, these statements were not accepted by the U.S. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. started losing great sympathy in the world, especially when it involved preaching about Iraq's possession of WMD. The UN Resolution was passed, Saddam opened the doors to the UN inspectors, and the ElBaradei and Blix reports were against the U.S. claims so the Bush Administration was losing its handy reason for the military operation in Iraq. Yet, eventually WMD, or to be more specific the desire to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons, was one of the motives for invasion.⁵²⁷

Simultaneously with publication of the UN reports on WMD in Iraq, the U.S. was sending 200,000 troops to the Persian Gulf.⁵²⁸ These actions taken by the U.S. offended the international public. They started to rally against the war. The French government officially opposed the U.S. operation in Iraq without the UN approval. This opinion was quickly supported by Russia and China. It was an important step, because all three countries were permanent members of the UN Security Council which have veto power. This opposition was also backed up by a couple of NATO members. Belgium, France and Germany opposed using NATO powers during the possible U.S. operation in Iraq.⁵²⁹

6.11. The United States without Major International Support

As mentioned before, the new U.S. foreign policy proclaimed U.S. self-interest and national security above other issues. In addition to this approach, the pre-emptive war strategy left the U.S. alone in the world except for the support of the Great Britain and a couple of other allies. Even though the general opinion was that Afghanistan was the first challenge for the pre-emptive war, it was Iraq that was the first test of the new doctrine.

⁵²⁶ Mohamed ElBaradei, 2003, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update, Available at the International Atomic Energy Agency Official Website
<<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml>>, Accessed on Nov. 28, 2009.

⁵²⁷ David Holloway, "Deterrence, Preventive War and Preemption", Chapter 2, Ed. George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy*, Brookings Institute Press, Washington D.C., 2006, p.61.
Hans Blix, *Disarming Iraq*, Pantheon Books, New York, 2004, p. 266-67.

⁵²⁸ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 346.

⁵²⁹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 348.

The meeting with President Bush and Russia's representative Igor Ivanov was a unique and a good example for the United States new foreign policy program. During the Gulf War the U.S. was seeking support first from the allies and the UN. However, this time the U.S. wanted to attack no matter what and then tried to find followers. In John Bolton's book, he talks about what Bush said to Ivanov in the UN meeting. Bush told Ivanov: "let's not wait for the Europeans, let's lead them."⁵³⁰ This sentence might look innocent, but it shows the way the U.S. foreign policy looked at the Iraq situation. The U.S. did not care about multilateralism, but definitely focused on a unilateral approach as seen in the words of President Bush.

According to Hook and Spanier (2007), "the U.S war in Iraq which started March 2003, would consume the attention of the White House, along with the immense share of the nation's military power, economic wealth and diplomatic clout. Invading Iraq without the UN Security Council's blessing would leave U.S. isolated beyond a meager and largely symbolic coalition of the willing."⁵³¹ His prediction partially materialized, as the Iraq problem and U.S. approach towards that problem divided Europe, which might have supported the U.S. in a heartbeat. But a year and a half later, the U.S. and Europe clashed over Iraq. When in March 2003 over 70 % of Americans were supporting George Bush and his decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, over 70 % of Europeans opposed that plan. Some governments, namely Great Britain, Spain, Poland and Italy, were able to overcome the public protests and sent their troops to Iraq and others, like France, Germany and Russia, strongly criticized the U.S.'s use of force in Iraq.⁵³²

⁵³⁰ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 68.

⁵³¹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 330.

⁵³² Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*, A Brookings Institution Book, The McGraw-Hill Company, New York, 2004, p.1-3.

7. TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS

7.1. Introduction

In order to understand the conflict between Turkey and the U.S. during the 2003 Iraq War, it is necessary to understand the two countries' relations. Before 9/11, the relationship will be briefly analyzed in two parts: prior to 1990 and between 1990 and 2001. This brief background information will be helpful to better understand the 2003 events. How did the relations start between the two allies? How did they struggle during turbulent times? How did they overcome difficulties? And finally, what had changed after 1990? In order to understand the differences before and after 9/11, all these parameters must be carefully evaluated. Therefore a brief background will be presented.

7.2. Pre-Cold War Period

Turkish-U.S. relations started officially in the 19th century. On May 7th of 1830 the Trade Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and United States of America began the relations.⁵³³ Since then, there have been multiple interactions between the two states. The famous Chester Project directed by Admiral Colby M. Chester and associates was a big program for railroad and mining ventures in the Ottoman Empire.⁵³⁴ It was not really successful, yet it still helped to launch business relations between the U.S. and the future Turkish Republic.

One of the most burning issues in Turkish-U.S. relations started during President Wilson's era. After World War I, President Wilson declared his Fourteen Points before the U.S. Congress on January 8 of 1918. Point no. 12 considered self-determination, territorial integrity and sovereignty.⁵³⁵ It was directed towards the Ottoman Empire's minorities; especially to the Armenians in the east. Wilson wrote that "nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested

⁵³³ Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, İleri Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.152.

⁵³⁴ John A. DeNovo, *U.S. Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939*, North Central Publishing Company, United States, 1963, p.58.

⁵³⁵ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.10.

opportunity of autonomous development.”⁵³⁶ Since that day, Wilson’s principles were considered a source of tension between Turkey and the United States. Every time the Armenian Genocide Bill was in the U.S Congress’s session, Wilson’s Fourteen Points were recalled.

7.3. The Cold War Era

The Cold War era is considered as the real beginning of Turkish-U.S. relations. Even though Turkey managed to overcome World War II without an active involvement, the social and economic impacts of the war affected the entire country. Turkey had chosen to stay neutral and peaceful during the İsmet İnönü Administration. That was the legacy of Atatürk and also after a very tough salvation war Turkey did not want to get into a war again.

After World War II, the Soviet Union refused to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey.⁵³⁷ In the late 1940’s, the Soviet leadership started to be more demanding of Eastern Europe and soon their imperial ambitions reached Turkey and Iran. In March of 1946 the Soviets articulated their demands from Turkey. They claimed some eastern cities, such as Kars and Ardahan.⁵³⁸ Additionally, they wanted to get NAVAL bases in the Mediterranean region of Turkey.⁵³⁹ To reinforce the demands and intimidate Turkey, they sent troops to the Bulgarian border.⁵⁴⁰ Shortly after, British Foreign Minister Bevin and then President Truman and Attlee immediately rejected the boundary adjustment bid and the NAVAL base demands.⁵⁴¹ Turkey’s protection was important for the U.S. to prevent the Soviet Union from

⁵³⁶ Oxford University Press, *A History of US: Sourcebook and Index*, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p. 213.

⁵³⁷ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-U.S. İlişkileri*, 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p.18.

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish-U.S. Political Relations”, Available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa>, Accessed on March 1st, 2010.

⁵³⁸ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 111.

⁵³⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p.11.

⁵⁴⁰ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p.26.

⁵⁴¹ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.68.

John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p.28.

reaching the oil fields in the Middle East. Therefore, the USS Missouri which was the most powerful battleship in the world was sent to Turkey in order to show U.S. support.⁵⁴²

This situation pushed Turkey to ally itself with the Western block and especially with the United States. Other factors like Turkey's strategic and geopolitical importance, Turkey's need of military and economic support and the U.S.'s willingness to cooperate with Turkey contributed to building a long-term alliance between the countries.⁵⁴³

Until that time, Great Britain was one of the main powers in the region. It was assisting Turkey and Greece economically and militarily. In February 1947, Great Britain officially declared that continuing with the status quo in the region would no longer be possible.⁵⁴⁴ After the British government's statement was issued to the U.S. State Department, the U.S.'s foreign policy shifted. The U.S. immediately assumed Great Britain's role in assisting and protecting Turkey and Greece, the two countries which were perceived as most threatened by communism.⁵⁴⁵ On March 12, 1947 President Truman made a powerful speech before the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress and asked for \$300,000,000 to support Greece and \$100,000,000 for Turkey.⁵⁴⁶ The President said, "(...) Turkey needs our support. (...) If Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. (...) We must take immediate and resolute actions. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey

⁵⁴² Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.69.

⁵⁴³ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-U.S. İlişkileri*, 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p.19.

⁵⁴⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p.31.
Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.72.

⁵⁴⁵ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p.28.

Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.72.

Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p.8.

Lloyd C. Gardner, *The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present*, The New Press, New York-London, 2008, p.15.

⁵⁴⁶ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p.28.

John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p.31.

Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaştan Sıcak Savaşa*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.19.

Mehmet Saray, *Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi: III.Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeleri*, AKDİTYK Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi, Ankara, 2000, pp.109-120.

Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, İleri Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp.99-100.

in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948.”⁵⁴⁷ Truman’s speech set out the basis for how the Truman Doctrine influenced U.S. foreign policy in a very powerful way. It resulted with the Marshall Plan, named after Secretary of State George Marshall, and was ratified by Congress in 1948. The Marshall Plan aimed to contain communism by helping the economies of some European countries, which, just like Turkey, allied them with the United States. This economic aid significantly helped Turkey until 1952. By 1952 the total economic aid given by the U.S. to the allies reached nearly \$12 billion.⁵⁴⁸

The new balance of power in the region changed the world dynamics. Turkey found itself alongside the Western block against the Soviets. The new U.S. strategy was shaped under the Truman Doctrine. The main principle of the plan was to contain the Soviets through economic support of European allies.

7.3.1. NATO and Turkey

In order to contain the Soviet Union under the Truman Doctrine, the United States and its western allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty and established NATO. Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg signed this common defense treaty on April 4, 1949.⁵⁴⁹ The Brussels’ signatories signed also the NATO mutual security pact. The United States, Norway, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and Canada were the first participants.⁵⁵⁰

In 1950, Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister of Turkey and made the Turkish accession to NATO his priority. According to Menderes, Turkey, as a country which just became a multi-party democracy, must become a member of a multi-national democratic

⁵⁴⁷ 80th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, 1947, ‘Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey: Address of the President of the United States delivered before a Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey’, Available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf#zoom=100>, Accessed on March, 1, 2010.

⁵⁴⁸ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.73.

Mehmet Saray, *Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye’nin NATO’ya girişi: III.Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar’ın Hatıraları ve Belgeleri*, AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi, Ankara, 2000, p.120.

Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, İleri Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.123.

⁵⁴⁹ Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, İleri Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.135.

⁵⁵⁰ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p.33.

Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.76.

alliance. He believed that membership in NATO would contribute to Turkey's democratic processes and Turkey as a strong country would greatly support the alliance.⁵⁵¹ In May 1950 Turkey applied for NATO membership, but it was denied.⁵⁵² The Turkish public and politicians were disappointed with the decision of NATO. Celal Bayar's conversation with U.S. Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Mr. McGee was an occasion to explain Turkey's current opinion about the U.S. and confusion caused by NATO's decision. Bayar said:

Mr. McGee we are very pleased that United States has been helping Turkey with our democratization process. You supply military aid to us. You also provide economic aid to our country. You do anything to help us renew our economy, social life and military. We are feeling your close support and friendship and we are very happy about it. We are really glad to have United States as our friend and ally. By saying that, I would also mention another issue. By getting your economic and military aid we already showed our place in the divided world. We have been acting together and united with the western world. Still we are not accepted to the NATO. What else should have been done to show we are to gather with the western world?⁵⁵³

This comment of Bayar shows the warm feeling of Turkey towards the United States. In the future chapters the main question will become how that close and warm relation became tense and cold.

On June 25, 1950 North Korean armies invaded the South Korean territories and crossed the 38th parallel with the support of China.⁵⁵⁴ Soon after the invasion, the international community mobilized under the United Nations and sent troops to South Korea. The U.S. led the UN forces intervening on South Korea's behalf.⁵⁵⁵ During that time, the Menderes government sent 4500 soldiers to Korea and applied for NATO membership again.⁵⁵⁶ That was the first official military cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. under the new principles. The Korean War opened up the path towards NATO and closer links with

⁵⁵¹ Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaşın Sıcak Savaşı*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.19.

⁵⁵² Ibid., p.20.

Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 112.

⁵⁵³ Mehmet Saray, *Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi: III.Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeleri*, AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi, Ankara, 2000, p.109.

⁵⁵⁴ "Korean War Chronological Concise Battle History", Available at the Korean War website, <<http://www.korean-war.com/TimeLine/KoreanWarChronology.html>>, Accessed on March 1st, 2010.

Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.86.

⁵⁵⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p.43.

⁵⁵⁶ Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaşın Sıcak Savaşı*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.20.

the U.S.⁵⁵⁷ Even though the U.S. Senate accepted the resolution to invite Turkey and Greece to NATO in 1952, some NATO member such as the Scandinavian countries blocked the U.S.'s offer.⁵⁵⁸ Yet after the war, NATO members decided to expand the organization and on February 18 of 1952 Turkey and Greece officially became members of NATO.⁵⁵⁹

NATO membership was important for Turkey not only due to the geopolitical or strategic reasons. It was also significant because of political and social reasons. With membership Turkey was considered as a loyal and trustworthy member of the 'Western club'. This image of Turkey brought Turkey politically, socially, culturally and of course strategically closer to Europe and the Western world. It played a big role in creating Turkey's status during the Cold War.⁵⁶⁰

During the entire Cold War era, due to its geopolitical location and strategic importance, Turkey was a valuable U.S.'s ally.⁵⁶¹ The relations between Turkey and the U.S. were also important for military reasons. Turkey's capability of purchasing military equipment and weapons from the U.S. was indispensable for the relationship. During the Cold War era, after Egypt and Israel, Turkey was the third country that received military aid from the U.S. This arrangement survived the Cold War – between 1991 and 1995 the U.S. provided Turkey with 4/5 of the weapons the country needed.⁵⁶²

7.3.2. Baghdad Pact – Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

After 1953 the U.S. policy towards the Middle East started changing. The U.S. began to attach greater importance to the Middle East regions because of its strategic location and oil resources. Also the Soviet threat of expansion in the region contributed to increase the

⁵⁵⁷ Aylin Güney, 2005, "An Autonomy of the Transformation of the Turkish-U.S. Relations Alliance: From 'Cold War' to 'War on Iraq'" in *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pages: 341-359, p.342.

⁵⁵⁸ Mehmet Saray, *Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi: III.Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeleri*, AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi, Ankara, 2000, p.129.

⁵⁵⁹ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union ,1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.91.

Mehmet Saray, *Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girişi: III.Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeleri*, AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi, Ankara, 2000, p.132.

Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaştan Sıcak Savaşa*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.20.

Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, İleri Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp.194-195.

⁵⁶⁰ Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaştan Sıcak Savaşa*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.18.

⁵⁶¹ Chalmers Johnson, *Geri Tepki: Amerikan İmparatorluğu'nun Bedeli ve Sonuçları*, Salyangoz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.50.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

diplomatic relations with Middle East countries.⁵⁶³ In 1953, the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Greece and Libya. During his tour he also paid a visit to Ankara invited by the Turkish government, which was anxious to take part in the regional defense organization.⁵⁶⁴ He met with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who assured him of Turkey's assistance.

After Dulles's Middle East tour and consultation with all the regional leaders, U.S. policy makers decided to create a regional defense alliance in order to extend the influence of NATO in the Middle East. Strategically, Turkey was the best country to lead such an initiative. It had the biggest army in the region, it was willing to take a lead and at that time it was already a member of NATO.⁵⁶⁵

In cooperation with the U.S., Turkish diplomats headed by Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü negotiated a series of regional agreements which resulted in the Baghdad Pact signed in February 1955 by Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Great Britain.⁵⁶⁶ It was sort of a new expansion strategy adopted and implicated not under NATO's flag, but under the name of the Baghdad Pact. It was a mutual security agreement that aimed to contain the Soviets.⁵⁶⁷ Shortly afterwards it was turned into a regional military organization. After the withdrawal of Iraq from the pact the name was changed to CENTO.⁵⁶⁸

The United States never signed the pact to avoid the reactions of the Arab States and Israel. The U.S. government was afraid that official participation in the pact and siding with particular country members of the alliance would damage its interests in the Middle East and relations with others who chose not to participate. Despite not being a full member of the

⁵⁶³ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 116.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 117.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaştan Sıcak Savaşa*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.20.

⁵⁶⁷ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p.67.

⁵⁶⁸ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.117.

Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 134.

Baghdad Pact, the U.S. encouraged member countries to cooperate, supported the cause financially and was taking part in various aspects of the organization.⁵⁶⁹

One would expect that Turkey's involvement in the Baghdad Pact could strengthen its position in the region, yet the immediate effect was placing Turkey in the opposition to the Arab world and isolation from Arab states. It appeared that Turkey was proving itself to be a part of the imperialist Western world. The Turkish government believed in the alliance and thought that the Arab states did not realize the Soviet threat, which was the main cause of the defense alliance.⁵⁷⁰ On the other hand, through participation in the pact, Turkey provided itself with U.S. trust and support. Nevertheless, the Baghdad Pact is considered by many analysts as a big foreign policy debacle of republican Turkey.⁵⁷¹

7.3.3. 1962 Cuban Missile Crises and Turkey

Under the Eisenhower Administration the United States deployed Jupiter Missiles to Britain, Italy and Turkey in order to build a missile defense system against the Soviet Union.⁵⁷² As a response, President Khrushchev decided to send missiles to Cuba.⁵⁷³ When U.S. planes spotted Soviet SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) on Cuban soil the longest hours in the Cold War history started. President Kennedy decided to enforce a naval blockade of Cuba. The situation was very dangerous and close to escalating into conflict.⁵⁷⁴ Turkey supported the U.S. during the crisis, even though it could easily become a target in the possible war itself. President Cemal Gürsel, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and the Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin expressed their support and sympathized with the U.S.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁶⁹ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 122.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 123.

⁵⁷¹ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, Hurst and Company, London, 2003, p. 99.

⁵⁷² John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p.76.
Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.123.

⁵⁷³ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p.90-91.

John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p.77.

⁵⁷⁴ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-U.S. İlişkileri*, 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p.72.

⁵⁷⁵ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 155.

At the end, the Soviets agreed to recall their missile from Cuba if the U.S. accepted to remove their Jupiter missiles from Turkey. It was a request noted in Khrushchev's private letter to Kennedy. President Kennedy and his brother Attorney General Robert Kennedy decided to remove the missiles from Turkey.⁵⁷⁶ Later, the U.S. officials said that the removal of the Jupiter missiles had nothing to do with Soviets demand. The Jupiter missiles belonged to NATO not to the U.S.⁵⁷⁷

The Turkish media showed great anger towards Khrushchev's proposal. According to Turkish officials' the decision of removing missiles from Turkey was up to NATO, not the U.S. alone. Also, as Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin said, any decision regarding Turkey must have been taken with its participation.⁵⁷⁸ Even though an explanation was delivered by the U.S. government, the trust between the allies was broken. Turkey felt itself left alone in an international crisis. It caused great resentment in the Turkish public which accused the U.S. that for sake of its own interests closed a deal with Soviets and made a decision without consulting with Turkish government. It became clear that in the future the U.S. would not hesitate to engage in deals with other powers at the expense of Turkey.⁵⁷⁹

As Nasuh Uslu (2003) writes, Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü has made remarks about the past crisis in the Turkish Parliament in 1970. He said:

The U.S. told the Turkish leaders that they wanted to remove the Jupiter missiles in Turkey because they were outdated and obsolete and to replace them with Polaris submarines carrying nuclear missiles. The Turkish rulers found the U.S. proposal reasonable. Therefore, they accepted it without hesitation. But later they found out that the U.S.s had made a deal with Soviets on the missiles. Keeping this fact in mind the present Turkish leaders should be careful about not allowing the U.S. to involve in unwanted crisis situations against its will.⁵⁸⁰

It seemed like the Cuban Missile Crises was a problem between the U.S., the Soviets and Cuba. But it was not entirely the case. Turkey was right in the middle of the problem and

⁵⁷⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p.78.

Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.40.
Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 135.

⁵⁷⁷ Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p.94.

⁵⁷⁸ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 156.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid., 157.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid.

after the way the U.S. handled the situation in the crises the first problems in the Turkish-U.S. relations occurred.⁵⁸¹ Nevertheless, the overall relations continued on a regular path.

7.3.4. Johnson's Letter

In 1964, the Greek Cypriot administration took rapid militarization efforts in what caused a crisis in Turkey-Cypriot relations. Due to the massacres of the Turks in Cyprus by Greek Cypriots, Turkey wanted to intervene. On 2 June 1964, the Turkish National Security Council decided to intervene militarily in Cyprus.⁵⁸² Turkey decided to use the guarantor rights provided to Turkey in 190 agreements. The U.S. administration wanted to prevent Turkey from taking action. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his team prepared a letter that was to be sent to the Turkish Prime Minister.⁵⁸³ **(APPENDIX C)**

President Johnson's letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was a turning point in Turkish-U.S. relations – one of the first big breaks.⁵⁸⁴ In his harsh letter, Johnson expressed his concern and claimed that Turkey's action was “inconsistent with the Treaty of Guarantee because it did not consult with other guarantor powers and its action would result in partition of the island, which was excluded by the Treaty.”⁵⁸⁵ He basically threatened Turkey to cut weapon sales and NATO's help against the Soviets if Turkey intervened in Cyprus.⁵⁸⁶

From the U.S. point of view, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus would create an international tension and could even encourage the Soviet Union to get involved. This is what the U.S. wanted to avoid. Moreover, if Turkey would intervene without NATO's consent, then the U.S. and NATO would not have the intent to protect Turkey against the

⁵⁸¹ Zeynep Dağı, *AK Partili Yıllar*, Orion Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, p.125.

⁵⁸² Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 170.

⁵⁸³ Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaştan Sıcak Savaşa*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.21.

⁵⁸⁴ Personal Interview with Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, former U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation, Washington D.C., February 13, 2008.

Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-U.S. İlişkileri*, 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p.177

⁵⁸⁵ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 171.

⁵⁸⁶ Yalım Eralp, “An Insider's View of Turkey's Foreign Policy and its U.S. Connection”, Chapter 5, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, p.110.

Soviets.⁵⁸⁷ U.S. officials explained the harshness of the letter as a necessity and didn't regret it. They actually thought it was successful since no military actions were taken in Cyprus.

The bitter resentment over this letter in Turkey rendered criticism and question marks whether the "U.S. is our ally since they agree with our enemy."⁵⁸⁸ Turkey interpreted the letter as a betrayal and abandonment in favor of Greece. The Turkish government lost its trust in the U.S. and NATO, since it was forced to give up its national interests for NATO's sake. The U.S. has already decided for Turkey without consulting Turkey regarding its allies and enemies.⁵⁸⁹

7.3.5. Cyprus Weapon Embargo

In 1974 Turkey carried out an operation to stop the massacres in Cyprus. Turkey was preventing the "Enosis"⁵⁹⁰ and used the guarantor agreement of 1960 while intervening.⁵⁹¹ As soon as Turkey's operation ended the U.S. passed a resolution in Congress and stopped the entire arm sales and military aid programs to Turkey.⁵⁹² Initially, President Ford vetoed similar bills, but in this case very strong pressure from Congress forced him sign the resolution banning U.S. assistance to Turkey. Turkey could have expected such a reaction since it had been warned once during the Johnson's Administration.⁵⁹³ Yet, the country felt a victim of a Greek-dominated U.S. Congress.⁵⁹⁴ The weapons embargo to Turkey started in 1975. Soon after, the U.S. realized the importance of Turkey once again and signed a new

⁵⁸⁷ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-U.S. İlişkileri*, 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, pp.177-178.

⁵⁸⁸ Zeynep Dağı, *AK Partili Yıllar*, Orion Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, p.125.

⁵⁸⁹ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-U.S. İlişkileri*, 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p.178

⁵⁹⁰ Modern Greek: from Greek *henoun* to unite, from *heis* one; the union of Greece and Cyprus: the aim of a group of Greek Cypriots.

⁵⁹¹ M. James Wilkinson, "The United States, Turkey, and Greece – Three's a Crowd", Chapter 7, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *Turkey's Transformation and U.S. Policy*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2000, p.190.

⁵⁹² Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-U.S. İlişkileri*, 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p. 200.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁴ Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaştan Sıcak Savaşa*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.21.

Yalim Eralp, "An Insider's View of Turkey's Foreign Policy and its U.S. Connection", Chapter 5, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, p.112.

Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 211.

agreement with Turkish government in 1976. Finally in 1978 the weapons embargo was fully lifted by the U.S.⁵⁹⁵

The upcoming developments in the Middle East – revolution in Iran and Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, suddenly made Turkey more valuable to the western world again. After the 1980 *coup d'état* Turkey withdrew its rejection and accepted Greece's return to NATO.⁵⁹⁶ The Cyprus question was a big test of the Turkish-U.S. alliance. In principle the interests of both sides were very different in this case. The U.S. embargo did not succeed in forcing Turkish leaders to stop their Cyprus operation, but rather convinced Turkey that their alliance with the U.S. is an “*alliance in need*” and the circumstances can change it at any time.

7.4. The 1990-2001 Era

On November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall collapsed and by the end of 1989 communism in Eastern Europe was finished.⁵⁹⁷ The balance of power in international relations had changed. One of the most important relations between Turkey and the U.S. was under NATO alliance during the Cold War era. This alliance kept both countries linked to each other. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (WP) the situation was different. The enemy against who NATO was established was gone. Therefore, the beginning of the 1990's passed by as NATO tried to develop a new mission. The organizational goals of the alliance had to be established again. Debates over the new role of NATO were carried on during those years.⁵⁹⁸ For Turkey it signaled an end to the military and economic benefits. Aside from the end of the Cold War era' Turkey was going through its own frustrations connected with the hopes to join the European Communities. Yet, the developments in Eastern Europe undermined Turkey's chances of accession, as it was obvious that priority would be given to the newly democratic East European countries.⁵⁹⁹ Nevertheless, after some difficulties in the

⁵⁹⁵ Zeynep Dağı, *AK Partili Yıllar*, Orion Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, p.125.

⁵⁹⁶ Musa Ceylan, *Yeni NATO Soğuk Savaştan Sıcak Savaşa*, Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.22.

⁵⁹⁷ Ronald E. Powask, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.268-269.

⁵⁹⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p. 34.

⁵⁹⁹ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991*, Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The U.S. University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.2.

Turkish-U.S. relations in the Cold War, the two allies entered a new era side by side. As both Richard Perle and Marc Grossman emphasize, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey, in many ways, became a more important country for the U.S. due to its strategic location and trust gained during the defense cooperation in the Cold War.⁶⁰⁰

7.4.1. The Gulf War 1990-1991

The Gulf War was one of the most significant issues for Turkish-U.S. relations. It marked the most important international development since World War II and it was the first joint cooperation between the two allies after the Cold War. It proved their strong ties during that era. With the real enthusiasm of President Özal and President Bush's respect for Turkey, they carried the friendship to its highest standards. After the Gulf War, Turkish-U.S. relations lived its golden days. But due to the unpredicted economic and political outcomes of the Gulf War the relations started to change after a few years in a negative way. As a matter of fact, this war was one of the most important reasons of the March 1st, 2003 crisis. The outcome of the war affected Turkey's decision during the Iraq War in 2003. Therefore, due to its importance and impacts for the future of the relationship that era must be analyzed carefully.

Before Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm (ODS), President George H. W. Bush and President Turgut Özal were in a very good relation. Özal warned Bush several times about Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship which was creating danger for the region. According to Özal, Saddam was a greater threat to the Middle East peace than Iran and he had to be stopped.⁶⁰¹

After the invasion, the liberation plan was up to the United Nations. President Özal saw that oil resources played the main role behind the invasion. According to him, the western world wouldn't sacrifice Kuwait. He believed that Turkey should have to act quickly

⁶⁰⁰ Personal Interview with Marc Grossman - former United States Ambassador to Turkey, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Washington D.C., 10 March, 2008.

Personal Interview with Richard Perle – Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reagan Administration), former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (George W. Bush Administration), Washington D.C., 2008.

⁶⁰¹ Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul 2000, pp.96-97.

Yalın Eralp, "An Insider's View of Turkey's Foreign Policy and its U.S. Connection", Chapter 5, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, p.114.

together with European allies and U.S.⁶⁰² The Gulf Crisis provided a good opportunity for removing Saddam Hussein and for Turkey to prove its strategic importance to the West. Therefore, Özal wanted Turkey to take a side and some limited risk. As Richard Perle said, “Özal understood immediately that that it was Turkey’s interest to be not only the part of the coalition that draw Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, but a leading part of the coalition. So he did not hesitate. It was a carefully reasoned judgment on his part.”⁶⁰³ Despite the domestic opposition, he joined the U.S. coalition.⁶⁰⁴ He agreed to close the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline and allowed the use of its territory by the coalition forces.⁶⁰⁵ The pipeline was a source of about \$300 million per annum income in transit fees and another \$50 million for port handling. Furthermore, the bilateral trade with Iraq in 1989 totaled \$2.1 billion.⁶⁰⁶ President Özal’s only condition was to see the UN approval for the sanctions and operation. During this time, President Bush called President Özal and told him that Secretary of State James Baker would visit him. Since the invasion of Kuwait, Bush and Özal were frequently talking on the phone and discussing the situation in the Middle East.⁶⁰⁷ On August 7, 1990, the United Nations Security Council passed the Resolutions and on August 9, 1990, James Baker visited President Özal in Ankara.⁶⁰⁸ Baker said that Turkey’s economic losses -- results of closing the pipeline -- would be taken into consideration. He not only promised one billion dollars from the U.S., but also another billion from the World Bank (WB). President

⁶⁰² Engin Güner, *Özal’lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2000, p.98.

⁶⁰³ Personal Interview with Richard Perle – Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reagan Administration), former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (George W. Bush Administration), Washington D.C., 2008.

⁶⁰⁴ Yalım Eralp, “An Insider’s View of Turkey’s Foreign Policy and its U.S. Connection”, Chapter 5, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, p.114.

⁶⁰⁵ Engin Güner, *Özal’lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2000, p.99.

Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991*, Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The U.S. University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.22.

Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 293.

⁶⁰⁶ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991*, Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The U.S. University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.18.

⁶⁰⁷ Personal Interview with Brent Scowcroft - former United States National Security Advisor under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush and a Lieutenant General in the United States Air Force, Washington D.C. February 24, 2008.

⁶⁰⁸ Engin Güner, *Özal’lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 99-100.

Özal had also heard from Baker that Turkey's application to join the European Communities was formally endorsed by the U.S. government.⁶⁰⁹

On January 19, 1991, the Turkish government gathered and passed Resolution 126, which officially gave Turkey's support to the U.S. under UN Resolution 678.⁶¹⁰ President Özal played a huge role in the Gulf War. According to his advisor Engin Güner, Bush was consulting with Özal many times and followed his suggestions in the decision making in the region.⁶¹¹ On 20 July, 1991, President Bush visited Turkey and met with President Özal in Çankaya before the operation.⁶¹² Since the Korean War the eastern allies of Turkey were meeting with Turkey once again after a long time. It was a new beginning for Turkey and the U.S.⁶¹³ After the war Özal was considered as the coordinator between the western world and the Middle East countries. Turkish-U.S. relations entered its golden days of trust, friendship and cooperation much thanks to President Özal, who shared the same thoughts with the U.S. on the Saddam Hussein problem and the risk of controlling the Kuwait oil supply. He was a powerful figure in the Turkish political scene and having him as an ally was an asset for the U.S.⁶¹⁴

7.4.2. Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and the Kurdish Safe Haven

The Kurdish issue and Saddam Hussein's regime were upcoming points in the U.S. Congress's agenda. There were many discussions about the situation of Iraqi Kurds, especially before launching Operation Provide Comfort. Congress Representatives were urging the U.S. government to stabilize the situation of Kurdish people in Iraq and deal with Saddam's regime once and for all.⁶¹⁵

⁶⁰⁹ Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, *War in the Gulf 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and its Implications*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p.125.

⁶¹⁰ Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul 2000, p.132.

Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, *War in the Gulf 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and its Implications*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p.150.

⁶¹¹ Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul 2000, p.101.

⁶¹² Ibid., p.102.

⁶¹³ Ibid., p.105.

⁶¹⁴ Personal Interview with Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, former U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation, Washington D.C., February 13, 2008.

⁶¹⁵ Lokman I. Meho, *The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook*, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, 2004.

With the Gulf War, the U.S. wanted to solve the Saddam problem for good. Unlike George W. Bush, Bush Senior did not prefer to invade and stay in Iraq for a long time. After he had accomplished his primary objective he wanted to withdraw the U.S. forces from Iraq. Before he pulled the forces back he wanted to secure the Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north. Therefore, a no-fly zone was established in the northern part and southern part of Iraq in order to protect the Shiites and the Kurds. It aimed to provide relief aid to the refugees and intended to assist them with returning home.⁶¹⁶

Figure 7.1. Iraq: No-fly Zones



Source: Michael Knights, *Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq: Insights and Forecast*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004, p.6

⁶¹⁶ Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, *War in the Gulf 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and its Implications*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p.207.

Right after the Gulf War, Secretary of State James Baker pushed a new resolution in the United Nations to handle the immediate refugee problem that occurred in Iraq. Resolution 688 was passed by the UN in April 1991 aimed to organize a new deal for Iraq's internal repression and refugee overflows. This resolution paved the way for the establishment of the OPC. It insisted that Iraq should allow immediate access of international humanitarian organizations to all the refugees in need. The concern of minority and human rights justified the outside intervention.⁶¹⁷

By April 1991, 460.000 Iraqi refugees came to the Turkish borders. The first priority was the Kurds. The U.S. needed the help of Turkey in order to establish a parameter and a no-fly zone over Northern Iraq. The plan was called OPC and it was to be directed from the south east region of Turkey.⁶¹⁸ On January 17, 20.000 thousand troops landed in Silopi in order to secure the no-fly zone area and in July 1991, after the Turkish government's approval (91/1993), the rest of the forces located in the İncirlik base were to oversee Operation Provide Comfort (OPC).⁶¹⁹ Not only the U.S., but also France and Britain took part in OPC.⁶²⁰ Through the decision from July 12 of 1991 Turkey authorized the above mentioned foreign troops to conduct OPC from its territories until September 30 of 1991. While the operation was in process the participating countries requested extensions from the Turkish authorities, which was granted first for three extra months and then five times for six months. OPC was carried on until 1995.⁶²¹

From the Turkish government point of view, this resolution was important as the situation deriving from the refugee crisis was a direct threat to the country's peace and

⁶¹⁷ Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, Frank Cass, London, 1997, p.32. A. Nazmi Çora, *Tarihimizdeki Kara Leke Çekiş Güç*, Toplumsal Donüşüm Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 44.

A. Nazmi Çora, *Tarihimizdeki Kara Leke Çekiş Güç*, Toplumsal Donüşüm Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 42.

⁶¹⁸ Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım*, Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul 2000, p.133.

Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, *War in the Gulf 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and its Implications*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p.207.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.31.

⁶¹⁹ William Hale, *Turkey the U.S. and Iraq*, SAQI Press, London, 2007, p.50.

⁶²⁰ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Middle East Challenges: Towards a New Beginning?", Chapter 17, Ed. Idris Bal, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold Era*, Brown Walker Press, Boca Raton Florida, 2004, p. 363.

⁶²¹ A. Nazmi Çora, *Tarihimizdeki Kara Leke Çekiş Güç*, Toplumsal Donüşüm Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 42-43.

security.⁶²² It brought a hope to resolve that problem. President Özal made it clear that Turkey – NATO member and loyal Gulf War ally – was waiting for the U.S. support in that matter. He had in mind creating a safe zone along the Iraqi border that would allow keeping Kurdish refugees safe but away from Turkish land. Özal did not want a repetition of the 1987 refugee crisis when 40,000-50,000 Iraqi Kurds crossed the Turkish border and many became permanent refugees.⁶²³ Kurds were the largest refugee group in Northern Iraq. They had already suffered a lot under Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and were looking for a place to settle.

To avoid that problem President Özal called on the UN on April 17 to establish safe havens in Northern Iraq.⁶²⁴ President Bush sent James Baker to Turkey to investigate the situation. When creating an UN-sanctioned safe haven failed as a result of Soviet, Chinese and Indian objections, Bush announced that U.S. troops would enter Northern Iraq to create a 'safe area.' This was a little different than Özal's plan.⁶²⁵ President Turgut Özal indeed proposed an establishment of a safe haven in Northern Iraq to prevent the exodus of Iraqi Kurds to Turkey, but not independently from UN and in a little different form.⁶²⁶ As *The Economist* wrote, the Turks had, "decided that the emergence of some sort of a Kurdish enclave in Iraq would be little less dangerous than the arrival of millions of Kurds inside Turkey itself."⁶²⁷ Turkey provided assistance to the U.S. in this specific matter. For the U.S., it was a golden opportunity to initiate the force deployment project. Baker made several trips

⁶²² Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991*, Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The U.S. University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.49-53.

⁶²³ Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, Frank Class, London, 1997, p.159.

Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, Hurst and Company, London, 2003, p. 313.

⁶²⁴ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991*, Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The U.S. University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.53.

⁶²⁵ Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, Frank Class, London, 1997, p.160.

⁶²⁶ Ibid.

Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 280.

⁶²⁷ *Economist*, 13 April 1991, p.53

Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, Frank Class, London, 1997, p.160.

to Ankara, Diyarbakır and other cities in south-eastern Turkey during that time.⁶²⁸ As a result of OPC, Saddam Hussein withdrew the central government administration from some Kurdish populated areas. The Kurdish enclave was created below the 36th parallel in the northeastern part of Iraq.⁶²⁹ The no-fly zones were also imposed above the 36th parallel. President Özal was disappointed that it did not include Kirkuk.⁶³⁰

OPC was a very big question for Turkey since then. In addition to major disadvantages for Turkey, it also had some advantages; for instance, resolving the refugee problem and stopping them from entering Turkish territories.⁶³¹ It did bring some stability to the region. OPC enabled the Kurds to reclaim much of their territories and allowed refugees to return home. By the end of May, the refugees started moving back to their homes. Even though the Turkish parliament had to vote for it once every six months, it passed every time. During the negotiations in parliament, big crises and conflicts had been occurring between the government and the opposition.⁶³² Many Turks believed that with OPC the U.S. wanted to build a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.⁶³³

OPC, while mitigating – but not eliminating as the refugee problem was an issue throughout the 1990's⁶³⁴ – one big concern for state security, engendered another one. Iraq lost its sovereignty in its northern part due to the presence of foreign military troops and the establishment of the Kurdish 'state'.⁶³⁵ It had some immediate repercussions, like the

⁶²⁸ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p.39.

⁶²⁹ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Middle East Challenges: Towards a New Beginning?", Chapter 17, Ed. Idris Bal, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold Era*, Brown Walker Press, Boca Raton Florida, 2004, p. 364.

⁶³⁰ Personal Interview with Richard Perle – Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reagan Administration), former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (George W. Bush Administration), Washington D.C., 2008.

⁶³¹ William Hale, *Turkey the U.S. and Iraq*, SAQI Press, London, 2007, p.50.

⁶³² Yalım Eralp, "An Insider's View of Turkey's Foreign Policy and its U.S. Connection", Chapter 5, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, pp.114-116.

⁶³³ Ibid., pp.114-217.

⁶³⁴ Personal Interview with Shoshana Bryen, Senior Director for Security Policy in Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington D.C., 17 March, 2008.

⁶³⁵ Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, Frank Cass, London, 1997, p.161.

uneasiness caused by continuing allied flights through Turkish airspace and occasional bombings⁶³⁶, but it would have more serious repercussions for Turkey's future.

Aside from OPC, Turkey carried on several other boundary operations, like the continuation of OPC called Operation Poised Hammer, and then Operation Northern Watch (ONW) in Northern Iraq.⁶³⁷ Operation Poised Hammer as OPC-2 again aimed to protect Northern Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein's regime. Poised Hammer was the name of the air force conducting OPC-2.⁶³⁸

After a while, Turkey gained significant influence in that region. Turkey was the major player in Iraq due to its military presence. During all those operations, Turkey received the support and approval from the U.S.⁶³⁹ Yet, even though OPC created an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen its position in Northern Iraq and gain influence on Northern Iraqi leaders, Turkey never took advantage of that opportunity.⁶⁴⁰

The Gulf War economic and political aftermath concerning Turkey didn't bring many benefits. Instead it lost billions of dollars by the end of 1991 in remittances, oil transit dues, building contracts, unemployment, and lost debt repayment that Iraq withheld.⁶⁴¹ Furthermore Saddam Hussein remained in office while removing him was one of President Özal's hopes. The U.S. did not want to occupy Baghdad and therefore decided to leave Saddam alive thinking that ultimately he would be gone with another uprising. It did not happen and this 'unfinished business' resulted in the Iraq War.⁶⁴²

⁶³⁶ Yalım Eralp, "An Insider's View of Turkey's Foreign Policy and its U.S. Connection", Chapter 5, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, p.115.

⁶³⁷ Personal Interview with Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, former U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation, Washington D.C., February 13, 2008.

⁶³⁸ A. Nazmi Çora, *Tarihimizdeki Kara Leke Çekiç Güç*, Toplumsal Donüşüm Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 42.

⁶³⁹ Zeynep Dağı, *AK Partili Yıllar*, Orion Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, p. 18.

⁶⁴⁰ A. Nazmi Çora, *Tarihimizdeki Kara Leke Çekiç Güç*, Toplumsal Donüşüm Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 54.

⁶⁴¹ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991*, Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The U.S. University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, pp.49-53.

Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-U.S. Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 308.

F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, RAND National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, 2003, pp.133-134.

⁶⁴² Personal Interview with Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, former U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation, Washington D.C., February 13, 2008.,

Personal Interview with Douglas Feith – Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the George W. Bush Administration, Washington DC, 1 February, 2008.

7.4.3. Kurds and the PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) Problem in Turkish-U.S. Relations

Since 1984 Turkey had good relations with regional Kurdish leaders such as Barzani and Talabani. They were travelling to Turkey and visiting government officials. The *peshmerga* had even helped Turkish forces to fight against the PKK.⁶⁴³ In 1995 Turkey granted Turkish diplomatic passports to Iraqi Kurdish leaders and allowed them to open liaison offices in Ankara.⁶⁴⁴ Even though the relations were good with the tribal Kurdish leaders, the situation changed in the late the 1990's and especially after 9/11.

Since 1991, the Kurds in Northern Iraq had autonomy. The new generation could not speak Arabic anymore. They were speaking Kurdish. They had their own parliament, flag and protocol. Their Regional Government had been making important decisions since 1991 and acting like an independent governing body. Many times Barzani or Talabani were talking about an independence of the Kurdish state even though most of the U.S. policy makers kept on pricking the bubble of their dreams about an independent state.⁶⁴⁵ Besides the currency, passport and the UN membership Northern Iraqi Kurds kept on acting as an independent state since 1991. It was not a desired situation for Turkey which did want to see Kurds gaining power. The demographic changes in traditionally Turkic Kirkuk, and the increasing Kurdish population alerted Turkish leadership even more.⁶⁴⁶ Turcomans considered Kirkuk to be their own ancestral capital and competed with Kurds for the right to control the city's authority.⁶⁴⁷ That would lead to potential problems and tensions in Northern Iraq.

The PKK terrorist organization was Turkey's main problem since 1984. It became one of the burning issues in domestic security and defense politics. In time it also became a significant part of Turkish foreign policy, especially in relations with the U.S. Between 1984 and 1998, the PKK killed a total of 5314 members of the Turkish security forces and 4630

⁶⁴³ Chris Morris, *The new Turkey: The quiet Revolution on the edge of Europe*, Granta Books, London, 2005, pp.108-109.

⁶⁴⁴ William Hale, *Turkey the U.S. and Iraq*, SAQI Press, London, 2007, pp.50-53.

⁶⁴⁵ Parag Khanna, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*, Random House, New York, 2008, p.224.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁷ Yücel Güçlü, *The Turcomans and Kirkuk*, Xlibris Corporation, Philadelphia, 2007, p.96.

civilians.⁶⁴⁸ With the help of the CIA, terrorist and separatists Kurdish organization PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya and handed in to Turkish authorities.⁶⁴⁹ Handing over Öcalan was a very important gesture which helped to strengthen Turkish-U.S. relations.

Yet, later during the negotiations prior the 2003 Iraq War, the situation changed. The U.S. did not show enough attention and sensitivity to the PKK problem that Turkey was facing. Turkey was always cautious about the PKK's presence in Northern Iraq. Since the 1990's the no-fly zone plan operated by the U.S. did not help Turkey's terror problem. In the first five years of Operation Provide Comfort, the number of terrorist attacks made by the PKK in Turkey increased. Between 1991 and 1995 the number of terrorist activities increased enormously.⁶⁵⁰ This happened mainly due to the power vacancy in Northern Iraq. After the establishment of the no-fly zones, the Kurdish leadership couldn't fill the power vacancy in Northern Iraq and efficiently manage the region. Therefore, the PKK had a chance to conduct their operations close to the Turkish border. The safe haven that the PKK was taking advantage of became more dangerous for Turkey.

Turkey kept asking for more cooperation from the U.S. but couldn't get what was expected. As mentioned before, since 1990 Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Northern Watch, the PKK found more free space to establish camps and train its people for terrorist activities. This was monitored by Turkey. Since 1990, the PKK border crossing activities increased. Turkey informed the U.S. about this situation several times. Even though Turkey made several border crossing operations to Northern Iraq, Turkey kept informing the U.S. it was not all enough to end the PKK terror. Thus Turkey was seeking a solid support from the U.S.

The U.S. was always using the same arguments - We are one of the first countries to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization, and we are the ones who gave Öcalan to

⁶⁴⁸ Chris Morris, *The new Turkey: The quiet Revolution on the edge of Europe*, Granta Books, London, 2005, p.97.

⁶⁴⁹ Chalmers Johnson, *Geri Tepki: Amerikan İmparatorluğu'nun Bedeli ve Sonuçları*, Salyangoz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.50.

Chris Morris, *The new Turkey: The quiet Revolution on the edge of Europe*, Granta Books, London, 2005, p.47. Yalın Eralp, "An Insider's View of Turkey's Foreign Policy and its U.S. Connection", Chapter 5, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, p.117.

⁶⁵⁰ Hüsnü Mahalli, *Tezkereden Tezkereye Gerçekler*, Iskele Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 49.

Turkey.⁶⁵¹ These two main arguments were totally right, but not satisfactory for Turkey and the Turkish public. In the minds of the Turkish public there have always been conspiracy theories about the U.S. These theories included the possible U.S. support for the PKK. Although it has been a conspiracy theory it spread throughout Turkey. Solid help from the U.S. to Turkey in this matter would have affected the Turkish public opinion and the outcomes of Turkish-U.S. negotiations prior to the 2003 Iraq War.

7.4.4. Turkish-U.S. Military Operations and Energy Cooperation

If the post-Gulf War military cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey is analyzed, the major joint action within NATO took place in Yugoslavia in the 1990's. The most important development in the Balkans was the collapse of Yugoslavia and the invasion of Bosnian lands by the Serbian army. Serbia wanted to maintain control over Bosnians, Croats, Kosovans and other ethnic groups. Thus, it wasn't only a territorial conflict but rather based on ethnics, culture and traditions. Christian Serbs attacked Muslim Bosnians. This had a wide impact on other Christian and Muslim countries.⁶⁵²

Due to the historic ties between Turkey and Balkans from the Ottoman times and the large number of Turkish citizens of Balkan-origin, the Turkish government sympathized with the Bosnians and aspired for peace and stability in that region. Therefore, the U.S. had interest in involving Turkey in the operation in the Balkans, especially during the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-95 and later in Kosovo in 1999.⁶⁵³ In contrast with the Serbian and Albanian conflict, Turkey's involvement would heighten the already serious tensions between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea and thus the

⁶⁵¹ Personal Interview with John C. Wobensmith – Vice President of the U.S. Foreign Policy Council, Washington D.C., 18 March 2008.

Personal Interview with Ilan Berman – Vice President of the U.S. Foreign Policy Council, Washington D.C., 29 January 2008.

⁶⁵² Idris Bal, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold Era*, Brown Walker Press, Boca Raton Florida, 2004, 38.

⁶⁵³ Igor S. Oleynik, *US-Turkey Economic and Political Cooperation Handbook*, International Business Publications, USA, Washington DC, 2005, p.237.

U.S. was afraid of it.⁶⁵⁴ Turkey took part in the NATO peacekeeping operations in Balkans.⁶⁵⁵

In December 1992 the Turkish government approached the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi - TBMM) to authorize sending troops to Bosnia. As Philip Robbins (2003) writes, the timing of the move had less to do with the Bosnian issue than with that of Somalia.⁶⁵⁶ The U.S. had asked Turkey to send a contingent of troops to Somalia where the civil war was taking place.⁶⁵⁷ While the parliament and public approval for Bosnian intervention was not an issue, the Somalia operation was. TBMM cast 44 votes against dispatching troops to Mogadishu, Somalia.⁶⁵⁸ Robbins (2003) continues, “Abdullatif Şener implied that the government was more interested in executing U.S. strategic plans in Africa than in intervening to end strife and starvation, and compared the positive decision with Turkish inaction in Bosnia.”⁶⁵⁹ Thus, the U.S.’s military requests were causing quarrels in the Turkish government. Nevertheless, despite the opposition, the permission to send Turkish soldiers to Somalia was granted. Turkey did also support and later led the Multinational Task Force South (MNTF-S) within the Kosovo forces (KFOR) in Kosovo. Over 700 soldiers were stationed in Prizren, Kosovo.⁶⁶⁰ Again, the U.S. could count on Turkey as a loyal ally. After the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and defending Muslims from the regime of Milosevic, the U.S. was very popular in Turkey. Bill Clinton was highly praised in Turkish media.⁶⁶¹

⁶⁵⁴ U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, 1998, “Bosnia II: The Clinton Administration Sets Course for NATO Intervention in Kosovo. Goals, Potential Costs and Motives all Uncertain”, Available at <http://rpc.senate.gov/public/_files/81298NATO.pdf>, p.271, Accessed on March 1st5, 2010.

⁶⁵⁵ Morton Abramowitz, “The Complexities of U.S. Policymaking on Turkey”, Chapter 6, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *Turkey’s Transformation and U.S. Policy*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2000, p.158.

⁶⁵⁶ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, Hurst and Company, London, 2003, p.348-49

⁶⁵⁷ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p.20-22.

⁶⁵⁸ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, Hurst and Company, London, 2003, p.348-49

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid., p.364

⁶⁶⁰ CNN Turk, 2007, “Türk Birliği komutayı devraldı”, Available at CNN Turk Official Website, <<http://www.cnnturk.com/2007/dunya/05/29/turk.birligi.komutayi.devraldi/352833.0/index.html>>, Accessed on March 1st5, 2010.

⁶⁶¹ Kemal Kirişçi, 2006, *Turkey’s foreign policy in turbulent times*, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris, p.83.

The U.S. and Turkey cooperated not only within the military sector. Their energy cooperation started back in the Cold War era. As Ambassador Ross Wilson said, “Central Asia, the Caspian, the Caucasus and Iraq all have great potential for supplying and participating in the world’s rising prosperity – Turkey’s role is central” for those regions.⁶⁶² Therefore the U.S. had been supporting Turkey’s involvement in Central Asia and the Caucasus’s energy transport to Europe and other markets. The U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement in 1999 about the Baku-Ceyhan crude-oil pipeline project.⁶⁶³ They also agreed to promote a trans-Caspian gas pipeline that would carry Turkmenistan gas to Turkey.⁶⁶⁴ Both projects carry a strategic importance for Turkish energy security and could bring significant revenues on energy transport to the Turkish territories. The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was completed in 2005 and the first oil reached Ceyhan in May of 2006.⁶⁶⁵

7.4.5. Turkish EU Membership

Turkey’s strivings to join the EU started shortly after joining NATO in 1952. Adnan Menderes’s government applied in 1959 to join the European Community (EC), which languished until 1963 when Turkey and the EC signed an Association Agreement on trade and economic cooperation setting up a framework for the future customs union which came into effect on December 31 of 1995.⁶⁶⁶ The U.S. had provided Turkey with its active support in the EU accession process. It was encouraging EU leadership to pay attention to Turkey

⁶⁶² Ross Wilson, 2008, “Turkish-U.S. Energy Cooperation” – speech at the Marmara Foundation 11th Eurasian Economic Summit, 2008, Available at the U.S. Consulate General Official Website <http://istanbul.usconsulate.gov/amb_speech_050108.html>, Accessed on March 1st5, 2010.

⁶⁶³ Mark Parris, 2003, Starting Over: Turkish-U.S. Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era, in *Turkish Policy Quarterly* Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2003.

⁶⁶⁴ Ziya Öniş, “The Turkish Economy at the Turn of a New Century: Critical and Comparative Perspectives”, Chapter 4, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *Turkey’s Transformation and U.S. Policy*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2000, p.114.

⁶⁶⁵ ITAR-TASS, 2006, “Kazakhstan starts transporting oil by Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline”, Available at the Itar-Tass Official Website, <<http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=13236773&PageNum=0>>, Accessed on March 1st6, 2010.

⁶⁶⁶ M. Abramowitz, R. Burt, D. Bandler, F. Burwell, W. Drozdiak, E. Melby, “Turkey on the Treshold: Europe’s Decision and U.S. Interests”, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington DC, 2004; p.2 ; 18 Sept. 2009, <http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/2004-08-Turkey_on_the_Threshold.pdf>, Accessed on March 1st6, 2010.

and treat it seriously.⁶⁶⁷ The Clinton Administration was mediating with the EU over the Cyprus issue during the EU summit in December 1999 in Helsinki. The talks met U.S. and EU minimal requirements and the summit declared Turkey as a candidate for membership.⁶⁶⁸

In 2002 President George W. Bush sent his Deputy Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz to London to lobby for Turkey.⁶⁶⁹ The U.S. wanted to use Turkey as an example for the Muslim nations – tell that they can be treated as “*neighbors and partners*”. The U.S. considered Turkey as a natural bridge between Europe and the Middle East geopolitics. Turkey could be a natural energy transit corridor to Europe and the first army of the EU. Even if EU membership would mean increasing tendency to award big contracts to European companies, for the U.S. it was better to have Turkey in the EU than outside of it.

7.4.6. Turkish-U.S. Cooperation in Iraq

When Süleyman Demirel was the President, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited him in Çankaya. He brought a letter from President Clinton. He was asking for Turkey’s support in Iraq.⁶⁷⁰ In the letter Clinton wrote:

“Dear Süleyman,
From our point of view we believe that we cannot find any solutions to Iraq with diplomacy anymore. We believe that Saddam will be a bigger treat to his people, to the region and to you. Situation is serious. We have an alliance with you for 50 years. We value your support and cooperation since 1991. In order to make sure Iraq follows up with the UN procedures we will need a military solution. We need your support in this matter. Still if he keeps on insisting not to obey the U.S. regulations. The ground forces and military operations will step in.”⁶⁷¹

⁶⁶⁷ Ziya Öniş, “The Turkish Economy at the Turn of a New Century: Critical and Comparative Perspectives”, Chapter 4, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *Turkey’s Transformation and U.S. Policy*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2000, p.114.

⁶⁶⁸ Alan Makovsky, “U.S. Policy towards Turkey”, Chapter 8, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *Turkey’s Transformation and U.S. Policy*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2000, pp.264-65.

⁶⁶⁹ Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Presses Turkey’s Case on Europe and Cyprus Issues,” New York Times, 03.12.2002, Sept. 19, 2009, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/03/international/europe/03WOLF.html>>, Accessed on March 1st8, 2010.

⁶⁷⁰ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.11.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

When Cohen gave the message to Demirel, Commander of CENTCOM Antony Zinni and General Wesley Clark were present. After reading the letter, Demirel acknowledged the opinions of Clinton. He said, “the instability in Iraq is a major treat to Turkey. Since 1991 PKK have been using Northern Iraq as a safe haven. Since 1984 PKK keeps on making bloody attacks.”⁶⁷² Even though Demirel agreed with Clinton’s opinion he told a story about Saddam:

“In 1967 I went to visit Iraqi leader Al-Bakir. In the meeting there was a man at the far side of the room on the corner. They told me that man is Saddam Hussein and he was the real power in the regime. In Middle East, leaders learn about the coup’s five minutes before it happens. People got used to it. So if you already have a man standing on the far side corner of the Saddam’s room smoking a cigar go ahead. Otherwise this will be a bloody, costly and a hard war.”⁶⁷³

The projections of Demirel happened to be right but surprising for the U.S. side. On November 6 of 1998, the U.S. officially asked Turkey to support them to change the regime in Iraq. The U.S. was willing to overthrow Saddam and the Ba’ath regime and replace it by using military approaches and openly asked Turkey for help.⁶⁷⁴

In October 1997 Saddam Hussein expelled the UN weapon inspectors from Iraq. He accused them of spying for the U.S. After this incident, countries like Russia, China and France got involved in the process. They tried to stop the U.S.’s military operation.⁶⁷⁵ Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright started a 3-day-5-country tour of the Middle East and Europe. During her trip, Albright did not visit Turkey. This caused bitterness in Turkey.⁶⁷⁶ The U.S. was cooperating with Turkey about the Iraq issue since 1991. They were using Turkish soil and the İncirlik base for the operations. Despite all of those facts, the U.S. did not feel it was necessary to visit Turkey and consult Turkey about Iraq. The U.S. saw Turkey as a done deal. Prime Minister Yılmaz and Deputy Prime Minister Ecevit were upset with the situation and they decided to send Foreign Minister İsmail Cem to Iraq in order to open a dialogue with the Iraqi government.⁶⁷⁷

⁶⁷² Ibid., p.12.

⁶⁷³ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.13.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., p.14.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid., p.15.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid., p.16.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid., p.17.

After the crisis visit, Yılmaz and Albright spoke on the phone. Albright repeated the U.S.'s support request from Turkey. Yılmaz told Albright the major concerns of Turkey in case of an operation. According to Yılmaz:

- Turkey could face a refugee float through Turkish borders like 1991.
- Turkey is concerned about the unity of Iraq.
- Possible economic damages Turkey might face.
- The possible use of Iraq's WMD to Turkey if Iraq has any.⁶⁷⁸

7.5. The Post 9/11 Era

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. immediately prepared for the invasion of Afghanistan. The details of this topic were discussed in the previous chapters. The U.S. prepared a "NOTA" from its allies. Turkey was expecting one too. Soon the U.S. asked Turkey to use some of the bases and airspace in order to attack Afghanistan.⁶⁷⁹

President Sezer called President Bush. He gave his condolences for the victims of 9/11 and the permission to use Turkish airspace. In addition to Sezer's phone call, Prime Minister Ecevit wrote a letter to President Bush and told him that Turkey supported the U.S. in the War on Terror.⁶⁸⁰ Also the Turkish public support for the U.S. increased. As Nur Bilge Criss (2007) writes, "given its own immediate past history of fighting against the separatists Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), it is not surprising that Turkey stood by the United States in its fight against terrorism."⁶⁸¹

Soon after that, the U.S. asked for Turkish military support for the Afghanistan War. Turkish military officers were invited to the Headquarters of CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida. The U.S. asked Turkey to send an officer in order to be present during the Afghanistan Operation planning. On November 1 with the advice of the Turkish National Security

Office of the Prime Minister Directorate of Press and Information, 05.02.1998, General of Summary of the political and economic news in the Turkish press this morning, "Cem Makes Contacts in Iraq", Available at <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING98/02/98X02X05.HTM>>, Accessed on March 1st5, 2010.

⁶⁷⁸ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.17.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., p.35.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid., p.35.

⁶⁸¹ Nur Bilge Criss, "Turkish Perceptions of the United States", Ed. David Farber, *What They Think of US: International Perceptions of the United States since 9/11*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2007, p.57.

Council the Parliament approved a bill to allow Turkish troops to take part in the Afghanistan Operation.⁶⁸²

Colin Powell's speech delivered on November 8 of 2001, gave a serious indication to Turkey that the U.S.'s next step would definitely be Iraq. He said, "nobody should think we forget about the countries like Iraq which has WMD." In response to Powell's comments the Head of Turkish General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu said, "in the Gulf War we lost 30-40 billion dollars. Iraq is our immediate neighbor. We do not wish to see a war next to us."⁶⁸³

In everybody's mind there was a question about Iraq. What would be the scenario if the U.S. decided to attack Iraq? Turkey's response and reactions were uncertain. This was not only within the U.S.'s concerns but it also kept the Turkish side confused, especially given the difficult situation in Northern Iraq and the PKK problem. Possible military intervention would increase the terrorist danger on the Turkish borders.

The U.S. did not really understand Turkey's PKK problem. After the Cold War, during the 2003 Iraq War negotiations and after the Iraq War the U.S.'s lack of understanding of this burning issue and double standards in perceiving terrorism by the U.S. was visible.

The U.S. started the global War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. invaded two countries in a short time by using the argument of the global War on Terror. When the circumstances were different and the terrorist organization was not the U.S.'s primary objective like Al-Qaeda, for instance the PKK, the U.S.'s actions also differed. This double standard approach of the U.S. was not new. The U.S. acted like this for a long time. Yet after the 9/11 attacks these policies became more noticeable.

After the refusal of the March 1st *tezkere* the U.S. did not fight against the PKK in Iraq at all. When this situation became an argument, some experts claimed that the policies of the U.S. changed after the refusal of The March 1st *tezkere*. But this was not the case. The U.S. supported Turkey in most of its foreign policy issues since the 1950's. This time the situation was different.

⁶⁸² Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.38.

William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 91.

⁶⁸³ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.39.

The number of terrorist activities showed that Turkey's concerns were not nonsense. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq the numbers of terrorist activities were as follows:

- Total of 6 soldiers died in 2002, while in 2003 this number increased 4 times.
- In 2003 the total of 24 members of security personnel and 12 civilian were killed, 161 members of security personnel were injured.
- In 2004 the numbers of casualties were: 77 soldier and police officers, and 21 civilians. There were also 468 people injured.
- In 2005, 104 soldier and police officers, 34 civilians were killed. 568 people were injured.⁶⁸⁴

These numbers kept on rising. The U.S. government committed itself to a global war, changing regimes, invading countries and witnessing many casualties after the 9/11 attacks. 3000 people lost their lives in one day – it was a great catastrophe and a violent act. There is no doubt about that. But Turkey's situation was not so different. There were at least ten times more casualties because of terror. The U.S. underestimated Turkey's terrorism problem. This lack of understanding caused questions in the minds of Turkish people since the 1990's.

⁶⁸⁴ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.171.

8. U.S. EXPECTATIONS FROM TURKEY BEFORE THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

8.1. Introduction

When analyzing Turkish-U.S. relations during the Iraq War, the first question to be asked is what the U.S. wanted from Turkey before the Iraq Operation. This question is not only the beginning of the relations during that era but also the key question on every single step during the interactions between the two countries. Did the U.S. know what to ask from Turkey? Did the U.S. really ask what it wanted? In order to understand these questions it is necessary to analyze the circumstances of the events preceding the Iraq Operation.

When the plans for the Iraq Operation were clearer, Turkey became the key factor. General Franks insisted on opening a Northern Front in order to start the operation in Iraq.⁶⁸⁵ The critical part of Franks's plan was to shock the Iraqis from the south and the north at the same time. Obviously the northern front depended on Turkey's approval. The U.S. never thought that Turkey would cause any problems allowing U.S. to use its territories to open the northern front.⁶⁸⁶

When looking at the past, Turkey was the solid supporter of the U.S. during the 1991 Gulf War. After 9/11 when the U.S. asked for permission to use Turkey's fly zones to attack Afghanistan the permission was granted immediately. Considering these facts, the U.S. had no doubts about Turkey's cooperation regarding the Iraq Operation. Maybe that was the biggest fault in the relationship of two allies since 1946, because this time Turkey was thinking differently about the Iraq issue and had a number of concerns.

As Meliha Altunışık (2006) writes in her article on Turkey's policy on Iraq,

Turkey's view on possible US war on Iraq was ambivalent, as indeed its overall Iraq policy had been ever since the Gulf War. The status quo in Iraq was not considered in Turkey's interest. The aim of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity had become increasingly difficult during 10 years of Kurdish autonomy in the north. Thus ending the status quo was in Turkey's interest, but Ankara was equally concerned about the aftermath of a war with Iraq, which might aggravate instability in the region.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸⁵ General Tommy Franks, *U.S. Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.334.

Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.27.

⁶⁸⁶ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p. 69.

⁶⁸⁷ Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, pp.183-196.

Turkey was especially concerned with the territorial integrity of Iraq, and the potential dangers deriving from the separatist movements. Hersh (2004) writes that one of the Turkish diplomats compared the Iraq situation to the breakup of Yugoslavia and he added, “in the Balkans, you did not have oil. The lesson of Yugoslavia is that when you give independence to one country, everybody will want it. If that happens, Kirkuk will be the Sarajevo of Iraq.”⁶⁸⁸ Therefore, Turkey was not eager to promise its full and unconditional cooperation to the U.S.

8.2. U.S.’s Main Expectations from Turkey

Basically, the U.S.’s main expectation from Turkey was the approval of the U.S. troops to use Turkish territory to conduct military operations in Iraq. The U.S. expected that the Turkish government would authorize U.S. troops’ transit through Turkey to Northern Iraq.⁶⁸⁹ As John Bolton specified, the U.S. wanted the access for the 4th Infantry Division as they had during the Gulf War.⁶⁹⁰ The communication between the two countries regarding the Iraq Operation started way before March 1st; it started right after the 9/11 attacks. U.S. officials were discussing what Turkey could do if the U.S. decided to go into Iraq and how much support the U.S. could expect from the Turkish government.⁶⁹¹

According to General Tommy Franks’s plans, there would be two main fronts for the operation. The first front was planned to be in the south, and Kuwait would be the country from which U.S. soldiers would depart. The second front would be in the north, and here Turkey was the ally country. Franks planned to move at least 40,000 of his troops from Turkey to Iraq. The deployed forces would land in the Mediterranean region in Turkey and

⁶⁸⁸ Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, Penguin Books, London, 2004.

⁶⁸⁹ Personal Interview with Ambassador James Holmes – U.S. Ambassador, former Deputy Chief of Mission in the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, currently Special Advisor for Southeast Europe in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State, Washington D.C., 13 February, 2008.

⁶⁹⁰ Personal Interview with John Bolton – U.S. Enterprise Institute, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (2001-2005) and Permanent US Representative to United Nations (2005-2006), Washington D.C., 10 July, 2008.

⁶⁹¹ Personal Interview with Ömer Taşpınar – Brookings Institute Fellow, Washington D.C., 10 July, 2008.

move hundreds of miles to the Northern Iraq border and deploy the forces from there.⁶⁹² In order to be more specific, CENTCOM made the possible plan in 2001 and projected to open two fronts for the Iraq Operation. Even though at the beginning CENTCOM planned for 40,000 soldiers, at the final phase of the plan the number of soldiers mentioned in the request for the permission to use Turkish territories was smaller. The U.S. asked for a total of 23,788 soldiers to be able to get into Iraq from the Habur border.⁶⁹³ 15,817 land forces, 17,415 air force, 800 navy and 3,710 Special Forces personnel were to be based in Turkey for back up. The total demand was about 37,742 soldiers.⁶⁹⁴

8.3. Approaching Turkey

During this process the State Department's ultimate job would be to convince Turkey about this operation. Colin Powell was not in favor of this move, but the last word was not his on this matter. He officially requested from the administration the foreign bases he would like to use during the operation. Obviously Turkey was on the top of the list for the Northern Front.⁶⁹⁵ General Franks was supported by General Myers, General Pace and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.⁶⁹⁶

Even though this plan seemed acceptable and doable, the reality was different. The background of Turkey and U.S. in Iraq, the PKK situation, Barzani and Talabani's past ten years of policies, the Gulf War's economic hit on Turkey, the change of the Turkish public opinion towards the U.S. and many other reasons affected the outcome of this matter.

In order to convince Turkey for the Iraq Operation, the talks started long before the UN resolution was passed. Turkey was pressured for several reasons. International politics: the Cyprus situation as well as the European Union membership talks were keeping Turkey busy and under pressure. Domestically, too, Turkey was in turbulence. Its economic situation was also in a trouble: the upcoming elections made the instability in the domestic politics more visible. The casual talks and official negotiations lasted throughout the summer of

⁶⁹² Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.427.

⁶⁹³ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, p.18.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁵ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.401.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid., p.427.

2002. Turkey asked for certain things during these negotiations. Turkey had its own financial, political, strategic and logistic demands during that process.⁶⁹⁷

The Pentagon considered Turkey indispensable. Hence, they wanted to give whatever Turkey wanted. Donald Rumsfeld sent Paul Wolfowitz to Turkey several times to meet with the political leaders, and those visits were not limited only to political leaders. Wolfowitz also met with military leaders during his trips. These direct contacts with the military concerned the State Department. Turkish democracy, in terms of the military-politics relation, has always been fragile. The State Department knew about this and did not like the approach. Additionally, the State Department was also aware of the huge disapproval of the Iraq Operation in the Turkish public. They also considered the Kurdish situation. Turkey's involvement in the Iraq Operation would cause serious clashes between the U.S., Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. The State Department considered all those issues to be great dangers. Therefore, Powell delegated Marc Grossman to accompany Wolfowitz during his travels to Turkey.⁶⁹⁸

One of the first Turkey-U.S. meetings was between Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Marc Grossman and Paul Wolfowitz.⁶⁹⁹ Grossman told Ecevit that the U.S. thought the leadership and the regime in Iraq must be changed and all of Iraq must be taken under control.⁷⁰⁰ After listening carefully Ecevit replied "Iraq shouldn't be separated or divided. This can cause serious problems for Turkey. The breakdown in Iraq can affect the region. The region would end up in big destabilization and chaos. This can affect the security and future of Turkmens too. Also Shiites in Iraq might get closer to Iran. Therefore, the unity of Iraq is indispensable."⁷⁰¹

After the visit of U.S. officials to Turkey, Prime Minister Ecevit went to the U.S. to meet with President Bush. After the meeting, on January 31 of 2001, The New York Times

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., p.427.

⁶⁹⁸ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 427.

Personal Interview with Marc Grossman - former United States Ambassador to Turkey, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Washington DC, 10 March, 2008.

⁶⁹⁹ Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, 183-196.

⁷⁰⁰ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.48.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

columnist William Safire wrote, “I can bet that Turkish tanks and the U.S. Special Forces will be in Iraq soon. Saddam will run away and join Bin Laden to hide”⁷⁰²

This article in New York Times could easily show the overall environment in the U.S. before the negotiations. The politicians, military, diplomats, journalist, think tank analysts and the general public were convinced that Turkey would approve the Iraq Operation. No one was expecting a “NO” from Turkey. Everyone was very confident that Turkey and the U.S. would act together to defeat Iraq. Still after the article in New York Times Ecevit made a comment, “I can’t believe how such a respectful journalist like Safire can write such a thing. There is no agreement between the U.S. and Turkey. We have been arguing that an operation to Iraq would have serious consequences for the world. We don’t support a war like this and we are trying to inform the U.S. officials about that.”⁷⁰³ Ecevit’s comment showed the future of negotiations. That was the very first time a Turkish Prime Minister publically argued against the operation.

Returning from the U.S. to Ankara, Prime Minister Ecevit wrote a letter to Saddam Hussein. Ecevit suggested Saddam Hussein open his country for weapon inspectors. Otherwise he would give the U.S. a reason to attack Iraq.⁷⁰⁴ Ecevit especially noted that if it didn’t feel necessary enough he wouldn’t write this letter to him.⁷⁰⁵ He was expecting Saddam to take this letter seriously, but he was mistaken as Saddam replied to Ecevit by saying, “don’t kneel in front of the rude Americans.”⁷⁰⁶

Ecevit repeatedly expressed apprehension about the Iraqi regime change.⁷⁰⁷ In an interview with the Cable News Network (CNN), he said that the attack on Iraq, “could lead to the portioning of Iraq, which could create problems for Turkey and Turkey’s territorial integrity.”⁷⁰⁸ According to him Turkey’s involvement in such an operation would be strongly opposed by the Turkish public and argued that it can’t be carried out with the UN back up.

⁷⁰² Ibid., p.54.

⁷⁰³ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.55.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid., p.58.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, pp.41-42

Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, “Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond”, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, 183-196.

⁷⁰⁵ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.41.

⁷⁰⁶ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.59.

⁷⁰⁷ Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, “Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond”, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, pp.183-196.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

Even when he was handing over his office to Abdullah Gül, his advice was not to get involved in Iraq Operation.⁷⁰⁹

The timeline and consequences were pressuring Turkey. Saddam did not want to cooperate with the weapon inspectors, the Kurds were trying to show to the U.S. that they were in charge of the region and they didn't need Turkey to get into Iraq. The U.S. was looking for an immediate answer from Turkey. Turkey was under big pressure and the time window was closing for everyone.⁷¹⁰

The demands, requests and needs from Turkey were not that clear. The basic demand was obviously easy to figure out: opening the Northern Front. But the more Turkey was going into the details of the operation and asking questions, the U.S. had fewer answers.

The U.S. did not speak with one voice during the process. The State Department had a different approach and the Pentagon was in opposition of the State Department. Even the White House was sometimes getting lost during the battles of the two departments. Obviously the situation was not promising for Turkey. The domestic conflict between the Pentagon and the State Department resembled to the negotiations with Turkey.

Generals Ralston and Franks met with Hilmi Özkök. Franks was in charge of CENTCOM and Ralston was the head of the United States European Command (EUCOM).⁷¹¹ CENTCOM was overseeing the Iraq Operation and it was the unit that had certain demands from Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey had been dealing with EUCOM since the Cold War and had established good relations with that unit. EUCOM understood Turkey's situation and its military traditions. Even though Franks was the one who would make the requests, Ralston accompanied him to Özkök. Franks explained the situation to Özkök and asked for the permission for the U.S. 4th Infantry to use the Turkish borders.⁷¹² Özkök heard the requests of both generals and told them that before he can give the answer he had to wait for the next week's elections. After the talks with the new government he

⁷⁰⁹ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 99.

⁷¹⁰ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.84.

⁷¹¹ CENTCOM – United States Central Command was established January 1, 1983. As its name implies, it covers the “central” area of the globe located between the European and Pacific Commands.

EUCOM – United States European Command was established on 1 August 1952 to provide “unified command and authority” over all U.S. forces in Europe.

⁷¹² General Tommy Franks, U.S. *Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.407.

would answer their request. Ralston and Franks were already authorized to offer a deal to Turkey. Secretary Rumsfeld unofficially allowed them to talk about the economic aid to Turkey. After hearing the offer, Özkök told the generals that even though their claims are persuasive, he could not make promises for the newly elected government. After the meeting General Franks was pretty sure that Turkey would cooperate with the U.S. in the Iraq Operation.⁷¹³

In the first letter the U.S. listed its immediate needs from Turkey. The surprising part was that there was no information in the letter about the Turkish troops going into Iraq. Nowhere in this first document was Turkey's military involvement in the Iraq Operation mentioned. The first official visit to Turkey to mediate about the Iraq Operation was paid by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney.

8.4. Cheney's Visit

Before the operation U.S. administration officials made several visits to Turkey. Yet, Vice President Cheney's visit was different than others. He was the second man in the U.S. executive branch. He was serving as the Secretary of Defense during the Gulf War and he was known as the brain of the neoconservative team in Washington. Therefore, his visit was far more important than the others. His aim was to convince Turkey to support the Iraq Operation.⁷¹⁴

Before Cheney arrived in Turkey, he asked for appointments both from Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the Chief of the General Staff of Turkey – General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu.⁷¹⁵ During his visit Cheney wanted to meet with General Kıvrıkoğlu alone. This was not an option for a democratic country. An U.S. politician shouldn't meet with a Turkish general face to face without the presence of civil political representation. Cheney was informed about the situation. He still insisted on meeting with Kıvrıkoğlu. Then a dinner was

⁷¹³ General Tommy Franks, U.S. *Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 408.

⁷¹⁴ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.26.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.40.

⁷¹⁵ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p.71.

organized for Cheney that both Kıvrıkoğlu and Foreign Minister Cem were present.⁷¹⁶ These were the circumstances of the Kıvrıkoğlu-Cheney meeting.⁷¹⁷

Cheney visited Ankara on 19-20 of March, 2002, and the two politicians – Ecevit and Cheney met.⁷¹⁸ During the meeting Cheney’s message was clear “there is no way out for Saddam.”⁷¹⁹ Ecevit was concerned about the kind of dedication the U.S. had for the Iraq Operation. It seemed that there is no way for the U.S. to change its plans. Yet, Ecevit still gave his anti-war messages to Cheney. President Ahmet Sezer and General Kıvrıkoğlu’s messages were similar too.⁷²⁰ During his visit, Cheney asked for Turkey’s support. He promised Turkey full involvement in the planning and decision making process. Ecevit and Kıvrıkoğlu explained to Cheney Turkey’s major concerns. Except from the economic concerns, at the top of the list was Iraq’s unity, which was Turkey’s priority as a crucial matter for the country’s security.⁷²¹ In addition, Ecevit brought up the concern over the legitimacy of the Iraq Operation and asked for support from the world and especially for the United Nations approval and support.⁷²² Cheney left Turkey without meeting his expectations. This was the first time the U.S. administrators realized that Turkey’s cooperation can’t be taken for granted.

Right after this visit the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman visited Turkey on July 16 of 2001.⁷²³ Comparing with Cheney’s message, Wolfowitz and Grossman were clearer about the U.S. needs. They openly explained the current situation of the U.S. They were seeking

⁷¹⁶ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, pp.64-65.

⁷¹⁷ Before Cheney came to Turkey he asked for a meeting with General Kıvrıkoğlu alone in addition to Prime Minister Ecevit. Kıvrıkoğlu refused the appointment by saying that in Turkish protocol it is not appropriate for a general to meet with a foreign politician without the Government officials’ presence. Both Kıvrıkoğlu and Ecevit’s Government were upset about the request. It was giving an impression that Turkey has been ruled by army. Both sides did not want to give that impression and finally a consensus was found. According to Gordon and Trainor’s book Cheney met with Kıvrıkoğlu at the airport. According to Deniz Bölükbaşı’s book they met in a private room during the reception Ecevit has given for Cheney in the Prime Minister’s residence.

⁷¹⁸ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 96.

⁷¹⁹ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 65-66.

⁷²⁰ Ibid., p.66

⁷²¹ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p.69-70

⁷²² Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.27.

⁷²³ Ibid.

Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.141

William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 98.

help from Turkey and emphasized that if Turkey provided support to the U.S. the war would be over faster and with smaller losses. Wolfowitz was an expert on Turkey in Washington and Grossman was the former ambassador to Turkey. They were very capable of understanding Turkey's political dynamics. During the meeting they brought up the issue of Turkey's 'red lines'. They told Turkish officials that if Turkey cooperates with the U.S. the 'red lines' would be secured. Therefore Turkish national security would increase. During this visit the U.S. officials stated that Turkey's support was extremely important, but even without Turkey the operation would be carried out.⁷²⁴

Grossman and Wolfowitz delivered the following message:

The United States sees the Iraqi regime as a threat to the U.S. due to their support of terrorism and their WMD capabilities. The U.S. is certain about removing the regime and replacing the leadership.

- What the U.S. wants is an Iraq without WMD, democratic, multi ethnic representation, unified and peaceful with Turkey and the U.S.
- The U.S. is aware of the possible effects of such an operation on Turkey.
- A possible operation would be done with or without Turkey's support. If Turkey doesn't support it, it will be harder but it will still be done. In that case Turkey's presence in the postwar Iraq, participation in the decision making process and its help during the construction of Iraq would not be significant.
- U.S. is fully aware of Turkey's major concerns and wants Turkey to join the process from the very beginning.⁷²⁵

In addition to these arguments Wolfowitz handed a message from President George W. Bush. The message included Bush's assurances for Turkey regarding the operation:

The military operation would not be interrupted. It would be completed until the goal is achieved.⁷²⁶

- After Saddam the U.S. would cooperate with Turkey and other international allies in order to build a multi ethnic and democratic regime. In this regime the rights of Turkmens would be protected.
- No Kurdish independent state would be established and no agreements with Kurds would be made regarding this issue.

⁷²⁴ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.27.

Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.143.

⁷²⁵ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.144.

⁷²⁶ President Bush especially put this statement to his letter in order to prevent Turkey's possible concerns caused by the experience of the 1st Gulf War. According to Bush the 1st Gulf War operation did not ended. His approach was always to overthrow Saddam and change Iraqi regime. That was considered as the main goal for the upcoming war.

- U.S. is talking not only with specific opposition parties but all of the parties of post-Saddam era. The U.S. would not allow Kurdish intentions to be achieved in Kirkuk and Mosul.
- The U.S. would cooperate with Kurdish Parties for the unity of Iraq.
- The military operation would be designed to prevent any possible refugee problems for Turkey.
- The U.S. would try to compensate Turkey's financial losses caused by the war. This was not carried out successfully in the 1st Gulf War. This time it will happen. Turkey would be first country benefiting from a regime change in Iraq.
- The U.S. is ready to exchange intelligence with Turkey about WMD.
- In order to protect Turkey from Iraqi missiles, the U.S. would place Patriot missiles in Turkish territory.⁷²⁷
-

In addition to the two statements prepared for Turkey, Wolfowitz had a suggestion for Turkey. On behalf of the U.S., Wolfowitz asked Turkey to start secret talks between the two countries.⁷²⁸ This request was discussed in July 2002 and approved by the Turkish National Security Council. The reasons to approve secret talks were as follows:

- Opening the talks will help Turkey to improve relations with the United States.
- This will not bring big responsibilities or commitments to Turkey.
- Turkey will keep its right to decide in any direction.
- Turkey's 'red lines' must be recognized, understood and respected in case of any operation.
- Turkey and U.S. should work together to reconstruct postwar Iraq
- Talks must remain secret.⁷²⁹

8.5. Talks with Turkey

After this visit, Prime Minister Ecevit agreed to have talks between Turkey and the U.S. After his approval Deputy Foreign Minister Uğur Ziyal traveled to Washington DC on 26-30 August 2002. During his meetings Ziyal talked with Vice President Dick Cheney, NSA Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.⁷³⁰

During the meeting, for first time Ziyal was officially informed about the U.S.'s Northern Front plan. The Northern Front meant opening a front from Turkey and sending U.S. troops

⁷²⁷ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.144.

⁷²⁸ Ibid., p.145.

⁷²⁹ Ibid., p.146.

⁷³⁰ Ibid., p.165.

to Iraq through Turkish territory.⁷³¹ During Ziyal's meetings with Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz they briefed him on certain issues. They told Ziyal that "U.S. does not see any other alliance more important than the one with Turkey. An independent Kurdish state is not an option for the United States. The U.S. government understands the concerns of Turkey about the possible economic damages after the war. Due to these reasons, the U.S. fully commits to cover the economic losses that Turkey might experience."⁷³²

Ziyal listened all the information and opinions. His answers were cautious. He briefly told to all the counterparts, "Turkish people still feel the social, political and economic damages of 1991 Gulf War. Yet, with the assurances and guarantees given by the U.S., Turkey could support the ally. However, the final decision can only be made by the Turkish Parliament, and it will be formed after November 3rd, 2002. That is why Turkey needs time."⁷³³ According to Article 92 of the Turkish constitution (**APPENDIX D**), the final decision on involvement in this intervention was up to the TBMM.⁷³⁴

Upon his return to Ankara, Ziyal reported to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. In his report he clearly indicated that the U.S. would support Turkey in any case. Economic losses would be compensated, unity of Iraq secured, support to Turkey's EU membership would continue, more active cooperation against the PKK and Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK) provided. Finally the anti-Turkey lobbying in the U.S. Congress would be managed with the support of the administration. All these assurances were given to Ziyal under one condition: Turkey's full support for the Iraq Operation.⁷³⁵

One month after Ziyal's visit to the U.S., Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel, went to the UN meeting in New York and met with the U.S. officials. He also met with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. Gürel was briefed by the Pentagon on the Iraq War and the Northern Front plan.⁷³⁶

⁷³¹ Ibid., p.166.

⁷³² Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.75

Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.75

⁷³³ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.75.

⁷³⁴ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 101.

⁷³⁵ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.166

⁷³⁶ Ibid., pp.170-171

In addition to all the listed meetings during Kıvrıkoğlu's visit to Washington, in November 2002, he was briefed by his U.S. counterparts on a possible U.S. strategy for the Northern Front.⁷³⁷

In September of 2002, the Turkish National Security Council prepared an answer for the U.S. regarding the first official requests from Turkey. The U.S. requests were as follows:

- The U.S. wanted to use Turkish airfields for U-2 planes.
- The U.S. wanted the intelligence teams (NILE-Northern Iraq Liaison Element Teams) to go to Iraq from Turkey.
- Site survey for some Turkish ports and airports.
- The U.S. asked Turkey to allow 40-60 Kurdish rebel movement members to go to the U.S. from Turkey in order to get training.
- Start cooperation and an advising committee between the U.S. and Turkey in order to coordinate Iraq Operation.
- U.S. seeks for an immediate answer from Turkey about the Northern Front operation.⁷³⁸

Turkey answered as follows:

- Turkey would allow the U.S. U-2 planes to use Turkish air field.
- The cooperation committee and advising committee formation can be done within the foreign ministries existing talks.
- Permission for the U.S. intelligence teams to go to Iraq can only be given with the assistance of Turkish teams, and site surveys in the ports and air ports issues can be discussed and agreed later on. Meanwhile the advisors talks can be started.
- Approval to send 40-60 Kurdish people to the U.S. over Turkey would only be given under the condition of full information sharing with Turkish officials about the details of the training operation.⁷³⁹

Meanwhile President Bush called President Sezer and gave him the same assurances his administration has given before. Bush was trying to convince Sezer to cooperate by saying:

- There will be no Kurdish state after the operation.
- The oil in Kirkuk and Mosul would not be used by one ethnic group but the Iraqi people as a whole.
- The U.S. would provide Turkey with financial aid due to possible losses in the Iraq Operation.⁷⁴⁰

⁷³⁷ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.28.

⁷³⁸ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.171

⁷³⁹ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.172

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.81.

Turkish officials were thinking to accept the U.S.'s immediate needs like U-2 plane flights and NILE teams transfers to Iraq. Meanwhile, Turkish officials were gaining time to discuss and analyze the outcomes of the possible further cooperation. During that time, new requests came from the U.S. that shocked Turkey. The requests of the U.S. presented by EUCOM to the Turkish General Staff (TGS) were extreme:

- 80,000 U.S. soldiers to be located in Turkey.
- 250 U.S. planes to be located in the Turkish Airports.
- To let the U.S. use six main airports (Batman, İncirlik, Diyarbakır, Afyon Antalya and Sabiha Gökçen) and eight reserve airports.
- To let the U.S. use three main ports (Mersin, İskenderun, Samsun) and two reserve ports (Trabzon, İzmir)
- To use all the roads, railroads and water transportation between these ports.
- To spare an area for the U.S. soldiers' training purposes.
- Provide security and support to the U.S. during the transfer of the U.S. soldiers to Turkey.
- Transportation support for the U.S. tanks.
- Site survey for the ports, airports and bases that the U.S. soldiers would use after their arrival.
- To provide 4 million gallon of gasoline for the U.S. army.
- To allow the U.S. to use Turkish soil for the Iraq Operation.⁷⁴¹

These requests were not the kind of requests that could be discussed, analyzed and decided upon immediately. The requests obviously shocked the Turkish officials. They also showed problems with the decision making process in Washington.

Meanwhile, there was a government change in Turkey. Ecevit's government was replaced with Gül's government. Even though Tayyip Erdoğan was the chairman of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP), due to his legal status he couldn't form the cabinet and his vice chairman Abdullah Gül took the responsibility to form the government.

In October, a meeting chaired by Rice took place. During this meeting the U.S. promised Turkey \$3 billion in economic aid and oil credit from the Gulf countries.⁷⁴² At 11 o'clock at night the Turkish delegation asked \$25 billion in order to get into Iraq.⁷⁴³

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid., p.86.

⁷⁴¹ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.177-178
Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.45-81.

On November 4 of 2002, the Head of TGS Hilmi Özkök and Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Taygun started talks with the U.S. officials including U.S. Head of Joint Chiefs Dick Myers, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.⁷⁴⁴

The window was closing for the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. officials were acting fast and impatient. After Abdullah Gül became Prime Minister, Grossman and Wolfowitz once again paid a visit to Turkey on December 3. During their visit they met with Prime Minister Gül, Foreign Minister Yakış, Head of Turkish TGS Özkök, and the Leader of the AKP Erdoğan.⁷⁴⁵ Wolfowitz officially renewed U.S. requests to Turkey which were given in the September before. He outlined three-stage processes to be undertaken by the U.S. military in Turkey.

If Turkey agrees,

- Site survey for the ports and airports in Turkey will be carried out. This will help U.S. personnel to understand the needs and the capabilities of the ports.
- Site preparation is needed. According to the situation of the ports and airports the U.S. would prepare or renovate the sites for operational needs.
- Transferring and locating the troops, tanks, artilleries, weapons and planes to the sites in order to prepare for the Iraq Operation.⁷⁴⁶

Gül responded to the requests presented by Wolfowitz:

- Turkey would give permission to site surveys. It shouldn't be a problem.
- If the U.S. uses the existing U.S. soldiers and personnel in İncirlik it would be better. In that case the permission from Turkish parliament wouldn't be necessary which saves time. During the surveys Turkish officials and personal must accompany U.S. soldiers and personnel.⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴² Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p.346.

⁷⁴³ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁴ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.89.

⁷⁴⁵ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.185

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.99.

William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 102.

Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, pp.87-88.

⁷⁴⁶ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.100.

William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 102.

⁷⁴⁷ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.101.

During the meetings Turkish officials brought up certain concerns of Turkey. They asked if Turkey could take its place during the planning phase of war. There was also a question about the potential economic damages created during the war. Would they be compensated? And finally, would Turkey be a part of the reconstruction process in the postwar Iraq?⁷⁴⁸

8.6. Turkish Officials Giving Hope for Cooperation

Some statements and comments made by Turkish officials delivered a wrong signal to the U.S. side. Foreign Minister Yakış said, “we do not wish to see the Iraq Operation. Yet, if it comes to that point we won’t disappoint our ally and allow the U.S. to use our airfield and bases.”⁷⁴⁹ Gül told Wolfowitz that the government could not commit to anything that needs Turkish Parliament permission. Besides that, the government could allow the U.S. to survey Turkish airports.⁷⁵⁰

AKP leader, Tayyip Erdoğan gave more hope to the U.S. than anyone else. Erdoğan and his advisors: Ömer Çelik, Cüneyd Zapsu and Egemen Bağış joined the dinner in Pearson’s house. He told Wolfowitz that from December 15, the U.S. could start base surveys and the construction work could begin in mid-January.⁷⁵¹

On December 10 of 2002, Erdoğan met with President George Bush in the White House.⁷⁵² After the meeting, both leaders delivered cooperation messages. The U.S. side actually gained an impression that Erdoğan would give full support for the U.S.’s plans involving Turkey. Yet, in interviews with the Turkish press, he later denied that he gave any

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁹ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.185

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.101.

⁷⁵⁰ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.186.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., p.187.

⁷⁵² Even though Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the leader of AKP, he could not hold a political office due to the earlier conviction for reading a poem ‘inciting religious hatred’ at a rally. Therefore, Abdullah Gül took over the Prime Minister’s office. Then the AKP pushed through parliament a constitutional amendment that would allow him to run for the office. The invitation to the White House came to Erdoğan when he was still banned from holding political office.

Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, “Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond”, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, pp.183-196.

Personal Interview with Richard Perle – Hudson Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reagan Administration), former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (George W. Bush Administration), Washington D.C., 2008.

promises to the U.S. President. Instead he just mentioned that it would be good to persuade other Muslim countries to support the coalition.⁷⁵³ Behind the closed doors, the U.S. side was asking when Turkey would give its final answer.⁷⁵⁴

These comments made by the top officials of the Turkish government gave a huge hope to the U.S. Most of the U.S. officials were convinced that Turkey would allow the U.S. soldiers to use its soil for the Iraq Operation. This was the first wrong signal to the U.S. before the February 5 bill.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and Turkish officials started talks about the economic aid plan for Turkey for the possible losses caused by the Iraq War. As mentioned, these were only preliminary talks, not yet the official negotiations.

On December 20 President Bush met with President Sezer in Prague during the NATO summit. Bush told Sezer that “the U.S. is expecting full support from Turkey. The U.S. values Turkey’s opinions and attached importance to Iraq’s unity after the war.” Sezer told Bush that “Turkey is an ally of the U.S. but Turkey is in favor of diplomatic solutions. Iraq War must be legitimate.”⁷⁵⁵

After this the U.S. officially brought about their military needs before Turkey on December 21 of 2002. The message of President Bush was given to Prime Minister Abdullah Gül by the U.S. Ambassador Bob Pearson.⁷⁵⁶ The United States requests were as follows:

- Turkey should provide the U.S. full permission to use Turkish land and airfield, and open their bases.
- Allow 40,000 soldiers to enter Iraq from the Turkish soil and the similar number (another 40,000 or so) of back up forces to base in Turkey for logistic purposes.
- To let 275 U.S. planes to base in 6 different Turkish airports in order to join the air attack on Iraq.
- A base in Silopi for tactical purposes and a base in Mardin for logistic and supply backup purposes,
- To let Mersin, Taşucu and İskenderun ports to be used as a deployment ports for the U.S. military.

⁷⁵³ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 102.

⁷⁵⁴ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 2007, pp.188-189.

⁷⁵⁵ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.91.

⁷⁵⁶ Personal Interview with Ambassador Robert Pearson – US Foreign Service Officer, former US Ambassador to Turkey, Washington D.C., 14 March, 2009.

- To let 3,500 military personnel to come to Turkey beforehand for the infrastructure setting and engineer work in the bases that the U.S. troops would stay during the operation.
- To let 600 Special Forces personnel to pass through Turkey to Iraq and allow of U-2 spy planes to fly from Turkey.
- To let the CIA to distribute weapons to Iraqi opposition groups.⁷⁵⁷

The requests from the U.S. were clear and open but unacceptable in many ways. After this point, Turkey made a serious mistake. Instead of clearly declining the U.S. and explaining its reasoning, Turkey opened a possible window for the U.S. side. This unsuccessful diplomatic approach allowed the U.S. side to think that Turkey would cooperate no matter what. It was a major Turkish mistake prior to the Iraq War.

As Hale (2007) writes, after receiving this letter, at the December 23 meeting with Gül the General Staff of Turkey concluded that “even it would be highly unwelcome the US would invade Iraq anyway, so Turkey should not stand aside. The number of US troops allowed to enter Turkey should be reduced from the 80.000 proposed by Pentagon. Gül’s reaction is reported to have been that he could never explain this to his own party.”⁷⁵⁸ Despite Gül’s comment, Turkish military chiefs were pressing the U.S. plan, and the proposal that the Turkish army should occupy a ‘security belt’ stretching 30-40 kilometers into Iraq.⁷⁵⁹ Also the Turkish National Security Council during its meeting on January 31 advised that if Turkey wants to avoid damage caused by the Iraq Operation it should join the U.S.-led coalition.⁷⁶⁰

Yet, the U.S. was thinking that the Turkish military was not in favor of the Iraq Operation. Wolfowitz said that Turkish military attitudes were extremely unhelpful during the talks. He stated, “the military is an important voice and everyone knew they were against it.”⁷⁶¹

⁷⁵⁷ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.28-29.

Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.189

⁷⁵⁸ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, pp. 103-104.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 104.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.142.

⁷⁶⁰ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.143.

⁷⁶¹ Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the U.S. Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

Turkey officially gave the answer during Grossman's visit to Ankara on 27-28 December of 2002. The answers were as follows:

- Turkey would not close the option for the U.S. to open the Northern Front after the approval from Turkish parliament.
- Turkey will allow information gathering operations immediately. In order to specify U.S. soldiers' status modus operandi would be signed immediately.
- As for the construction issues, Turkey would allow the process after the number of military personnel was decided between the two parties.
- Turkey will not let 80,000 to 90,000 U.S. soldiers to station on its territory, but the issue of Special Forces personnel is to be discussed.⁷⁶²

Through this answer Turkey had not said 'NO' to all the U.S. requests. Still however, the most critical issue for the U.S. was the approval for its soldiers to pass through Turkey. But Turkey was not planning to agree to this part of plan.

After Turkey's answers Secretary Powell called Minister Yakış and told him "we understand your needs and concerns. That's why we are sending two officials to Turkey to discuss the issues. Meanwhile, make your decision. We are under the time pressure. Otherwise, we will be forced to choose an option excluding Turkey."⁷⁶³ Yakış's answer was clear: "Turkey follows the democratic process. The decision is up to the Turkish parliament."⁷⁶⁴

After not receiving the expected answer from Turkey, the U.S. started putting more pressure on Turkey by playing economic cards. The U.S. linked Turkey's support to the operation with economical support given to Turkey. During his 28 December 2002 visit to Turkey, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Treasury John Taylor made a critical statement. He openly explained that if Turkey cooperates with U.S.s during the Iraq War it would make the U.S. financial support of Turkey easier.⁷⁶⁵ This was an open threat to Turkey. The U.S. was saying that if Turkey did not let them in they would not provide financial support. The pressure from the U.S. was not only limited to the economical leverages. Military officials were also giving some possible post-war scenarios to their Turkish counterparts to convince them.

⁷⁶² Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.29

⁷⁶³ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.120

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁵ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.29-30

During Taylor's visit Turkey suggested to open three-way negotiations. Political, military and economic negotiation would be started immediately. These suggestions were given to Taylor and Wolfowitz. It seemed like they were accepted and agreed to by the U.S.⁷⁶⁶

On January 3 of 2002 General Sylvester told Turkish officials that if Turkey did not open the borders for the U.S. soldiers it would be hard to stop the Kurdish Turkmen ethnic conflict in Northern Iraq and the problems would occur regarding the Mosul Kirkuk oil fields.⁷⁶⁷ Even though the general's remarks seemed friendly, it was still a kind of a warning to Turkey about the possible outcomes of the war. Turkey was sensitive about the safety of Turkmens and equal distribution of oil in Iraq. These were important issues for Turkey and the U.S. was very well aware of it.

Meanwhile, the pressure on both Turkey and the U.S. was becoming heavier. In order to commit Turkey the U.S. backed out from the demand of 40,000 thousand soldiers' deployment on the Turkish soil. Instead the U.S. suggested a new proposal and asked Turkey to be able to send 5,000 paratroops from Turkish airfields to Iraq. According to Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı, who later led the negotiations: "the proposal given by the U.S. to Turkey on January 3rd was not agreed upon, but on 26 of March 2003 the same paratroops agreement came into effect. So what all the crises and chaos was for?"⁷⁶⁸

The first official written request from the U.S. was the letter dated 13 January of 2003. It was handed to Uğur Ziyal, Deputy Secretary of State. The letter was named as the official "cooperation and support document between the U.S. and the Turkish governments for the Iraq Operation."⁷⁶⁹ In this first document the U.S. government asked their needs from Turkey and listed the U.S. troops' needs:

- The U.S. wanted to use the total of twelve Turkish airports (Afyon, Adana Batman, Çorlu, Diyarbakır, Erhaç-Malatya, Erzurum, İncirlik, Mardin, Muş, Oğuzeli-Gaziantep and Sabiha Gökçen) and four sea ports (Iskenderun, Mersin, Taşucu, İzmir),
- In order to provide logistic backup for the troops which would be sent to Iraq, use of the following places was requested: Logistical Support Base near Mardin, Tactical

⁷⁶⁶ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.121.

⁷⁶⁷ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.30

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid., p.24

Information Base near Midyat, Army Support Base near Silopi, and one other base to be used as the maneuver base in southeastern Turkey.

- The U.S. asked Turkey to apply a special law toward its soldiers while in Turkey. The law the U.S. wanted to be applied was basically same as the one designed in 1950s for the NATO bases. In this privileged case the U.S. troops would be in a different status under Turkish criminal, tax and custom laws.
- The U.S. also asked for significant privileges and exceptions of the Turkish customs while transporting military material into the U.S. bases in Turkey.⁷⁷⁰

On January 10 U.S. Ambassador Pearson asked for an appointment from Prime Minister Abdullah Gül. During the meeting, Pearson stated that “the U.S. would carry out the operation regardless of the permission to use the Turkish soil. In the operation like this however, the U.S. wanted to act together with Turkey no matter what. On December 28 of 2002, Turkey officially stated that the U.S. should not be left without the Northern Front option. The U.S. is thankful for that, but the northern front issue cannot happen unless there is a military presence in the north. We believe, he said, that Turkey would make that happen.”⁷⁷¹ After hearing these comments Prime Minister Gül just said that he would think about it.

During the process the visit of the U.S. Joint Chief Chairman General Dick Myers was important. Myers explained the situation to his Turkish counterparts and politicians. Soon Turkey’s standing for the land forces issue became more flexible. Turkey stepped back from its previous statements. In a way the U.S. convinced Turkey to allow for the U.S. troops to enter Iraq from Turkish land.⁷⁷² At the end of January 2003, Turkey and the U.S. agreed on the following issues and soldiers’ numbers that would pass through Turkey to Iraq:

- 3,497 personnel for the infrastructure and logistics. Also constructions for ports, airports and military bases,
- 37,742 personnel for back up and logistics during the Iraq Operation,
- 15,817 Army personnel,
- 800 Navy personnel,
- 17,415 Air Force personnel,
- 3,710 Special Forces personnel,
- 23,784 soldier will pass through Turkey to Iraq.

⁷⁷⁰ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.25.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid., p.31.

Personal Interview with Ambassador Robert Pearson – US Foreign Service Officer, former US Ambassador to Turkey, Washington D.C., 14 March, 2009.

⁷⁷² Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.30

- The U.S. troops should pass to Iraq in 12 to 15 days after they arrive in Mersin and İskenderun ports,
- U.S. fighter planes and helicopters would use Muş, Batman, Diyarbakır and İncirlik as bases,
- Logistic and back up Air Force would have use the Oğuzeli, Sabiha Gökçen, Çorlu and Afyon bases,
- Total number of planes and helicopters would be 320 (255 planes and 65 helicopters),
- The 160 U.S. fighter jets based on two U.S. ships in the east Mediterranean Sea would join the Iraq Operation and use the Turkish air base for support.⁷⁷³

These agreements brought Turkey and the U.S. to the official negotiations. As showed above, even before the official negotiations started between Turkey and the U.S, the prearrangements can be called as fully cooperative from both sides. The question is what happened during the dialogues that affected Turkish-U.S. negotiations and pushed the Turkish parliament not to allow the U.S. to use Turkish soil to conduct military operation on Iraq. Was it because of the Turkish government's uncooperative acts as the U.S. side claimed for a long time, or the lack of understanding about Turkey's past, present and future situation by the U.S. side? The answer of this question can be given after evaluating the negotiation process.

8.7. The Pentagon, State Department and Turkey

The ultimatum prepared by Cheney's office was a good example of this issue. While Turkey was negotiating with the U.S. about the Iraq War, Powell was attacked by the Pentagon. The Pentagon and neoconservative leaders in the administration accused him of not making enough efforts to convince Turkey. Unlike James Baker in the Gulf War, Powell did not visit Turkey even once during the negotiation process.⁷⁷⁴ He paid a brief visit to Ankara in 2001, the same year that Turkey passed *tezkere* for the Afghanistan operation. Public support for the U.S. was very strong in Turkey after 9/11. At that time Powell suggested that Turkey should take over the command of the International Assistance Force in

⁷⁷³ Ibid., p.32.

⁷⁷⁴ Michael Rubin, 2005, "Comedy of Errors: Turkish-U.S. Diplomacy and the Iraq War", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 4, No.1.

Kabul, which took place in June of 2002.⁷⁷⁵ Yet, during the pre-arrangement talks and official Turkish-U.S. negotiation, he did not come to Turkey until after the TBMM's vote in March of 2003. This manner was considered as a bad move by the Pentagon. And it was indicated as a failure of U.S. diplomacy under Powell.⁷⁷⁶ As Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview, Powell was not devoted to the issue. He actually fed the opposition of the Iraq Operation. He fed the idea that this was a terrible mistake. His statements were anonymously attacking presidential policy, hence feeding the anti-U.S. feelings abroad.⁷⁷⁷ In December of 2002, over 85% of the Turkish public was opposed to the planned Iraq Operation. The number had risen to 94% in January 2003.⁷⁷⁸

The State Department-Pentagon conflict affected the talks with Turkey. In the midst of the negotiations Cheney called one of his assistants and dictated a letter from the Vice President's office. The letter was an open ultimatum to Turkey. Powell learned about this later on. Cheney bypassed the State Department during the negotiations. He created his own foreign policy without discussing it with the State Department or Powell. After Turkey received the ultimatum, the government responded that the request would be considered and it was immediately sent to the parliament for an approval. This specific example shows that the U.S. administration did not speak one voice during the process. The internal political conflicts, diplomatic errors and miscalculations on both sides affected the Turkish-U.S. relations and the negotiation process.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁵ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 91.

⁷⁷⁶ Michael Rubin, 2005, "Comedy of Errors: Turkish-U.S. Diplomacy and the Iraq War", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 4, No.1.

Douglas Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p.395.

⁷⁷⁷ Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the U.S. Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

⁷⁷⁸ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 103.

⁷⁷⁹ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 428. Michael Rubin, 2005, "Comedy of Errors: Turkish-U.S. Diplomacy and the Iraq War", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 4, No.1.

9. TURKISH -U.S. NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

9.1. Introduction

The unofficial talks as well as the official negotiations between Turkey and the United States before the Iraq War were an example of how the new U.S. foreign policy approach affected the pre-war dialogues with the U.S.'s closest ally - Turkey. It also shows Turkey's confusing policy towards the U.S.'s Iraq Operation plan. This period must be analyzed in order to understand the causes of the March 1st *tezkere* failure.

9.2. Negotiation Teams

The official negotiations between Turkey and the U.S. started on February 11 of 2003 in the Turkish Foreign Ministry Ismail Erez Hall. Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı was leading the 27 member Turkish negotiation team.⁷⁸⁰ In addition to the diplomats, military officials were also on the negotiation team. The U.S. side included diplomats, Pentagon Officials, EUCOM Officials, military intelligence officials and CIA representatives and was led by Ambassador Marisa Lino.⁷⁸¹ The team led by Bölükbaşı and Lino was responsible for technical and military negotiations and agreements, while the group with Ahmet Davutoğlu, Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Tuygan and U.S. diplomats, like Matthew Bryza who was the White House representative during the negotiations, was discussing the political issues.⁷⁸²

In addition to the military and political talks there were also economic negotiations in which Turkish politicians: Ali Babacan – Minister of State with special responsibility for the economy and Yaşar Yakış were discussing Turkish economic demands. All three teams started their talks and ended them in parallel. Obviously the most difficult ones were the military negotiations.⁷⁸³

⁷⁸⁰ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, pp.207-208.

Personal Interview with Matthew Bryza – former member of the U.S. National Security Council, specialist on Turkey, currently Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington D.C., 4 August 2004.

⁷⁸¹ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.207.

⁷⁸² Personal Interview with Matthew Bryza – former member of the U.S. National Security Council, specialist on Turkey, currently Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington D.C., 4 August 2004.

⁷⁸³ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.65

The actions and the manners of the U.S. military negotiation team was a reflection of the White House and Pentagons' instructions. During the negotiations, talks came to a breaking point several times. Most of those crises took place either due to lack of understanding of Turkey's standing in the region or a lack of sensitivity and patience. During the talks the U.S. negotiation team showed a lack of patience several times. The U.S. wanted to finalize and end the talks as soon as they could. The U.S. thought its perspective and the timeline drawn for the operation was understandable, but considering Turkey's thin red lines and sensitivities the matters could not been sealed easily by Turkey.

At the beginning of the negotiations the U.S. side based their arguments on the January 13 agreements with Turkey. Through depending on this open check agreement, they wanted to meet immediately. Their aim was to seal the deal as soon as possible. They had already started to deploy forces in the south of Iraq. The war ships came and docked on the Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. was already in action. They saw the negotiations with Turkey as a requirement that they had to finalize as soon as possible. Even during the opening statements Ambassador Lino officially stated that, "they did not come to Ankara for detailed negotiations."⁷⁸⁴ Obviously the situation was not same for Turkey. According To Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı: "The way the U.S. negotiation team was dealing with them made Turkish side worried and irritated."⁷⁸⁵

9.3. Negotiations and the First *Tezkere*

The first talks were about the preparation and personnel planning. This part was separated from the overall military presence in Turkey. The planning and personnel preparation talks did not take long. On February 5, Tayyip Erdoğan told the AKP parliamentary representative that Turkey could not afford to stay out of the planned Iraq Operation if it thinks about having any influence on the U.S.'s undertakings in the region.⁷⁸⁶ On February 6 of 2003, the government laid a resolution before the parliament to authorize

⁷⁸⁴ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.33.

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁶ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 106.

the U.S. military to start planning, personnel preparation and upgrading Turkish ports, air bases and transportation links in the south of the country. The resolution neither definitely committed Turkey to support the U.S. attack on Iraq, nor gave the permission for military transit to Iraq through the Turkish border. It went into effect on February 10 for the upcoming three months.⁷⁸⁷

This resolution and permission to the U.S. to start planning and personnel preparation was criticized in Turkey. According to many experts, Turkey gave a wrong signal to the U.S. regarding the Iraq Operation. In particular, the hawks in Washington always claimed that they were cheated by Turkey during this era. According to the U.S. officials Turkey first allowed them to prepare the infrastructure for their soldiers than it refused to allow the troops to use its soil to enter Iraq.

In order to understand the real issue with the February 5 resolution its details must be understood. The resolution in the Turkish parliament included the following points:

- Turkish Parliament officially agreed to authorize the U.S. planning, preparations, logistics and infrastructure personnel to come to Turkey for three-month period.
- Total of 3,497 personnel would come to Turkey.
- The personnel started to come to Turkey from February 11.
- The personnel would be located in Mardin, Dicle, Oyalı, Nusaybin, Diyarbakır, Kızıltepe, Oğuzeli, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Viranşehir, İskenderun, Mersin, Yenice, Ağalar, Taşucu, Afyon, Batman, Muş, Çorlu, Sabiha Gökçen and İncirlik.
- The contracts were signed to renovate and improve the infrastructure of İncirlik, Sabiha Gökçen, Afyon, Çorlu, Diyarbakır and Batman Airports and Mersin, İskenderun, Ağalar, Seka, Taşucu Ports.
- The total infrastructure and renovation cost would reach almost \$220 million. Most of this money was already spent for the renovation.⁷⁸⁸

This resolution was passed on February 6, with 318 votes of the 517 deputy present (193 opposing and 16 abstentions).⁷⁸⁹ The Turkish parliament passed it knowing that these preparations and renovation were done for the U.S. troops, which were to arrive in Turkey

⁷⁸⁷ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.34.

Arşiv Belgeler, 2003, "Irak Krizi... ABD'li askeri ve teknik personelin 3 ay süreyle Türkiye'ye gelmesine ilişkin izin tezkeresi..", Available at <http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/izin_050203.html>, Accessed on Feb. 14, 2010. Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, p. 178.

⁷⁸⁸ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.34-35.

⁷⁸⁹ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 106.

Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.206.

after the final decision was made. By passing this resolution, Turkey raised the hopes of the U.S. side for cooperation.⁷⁹⁰

No one in Washington ever thought that the resolution of March 1st would fail, especially after passing the February 5 resolution. It was certain that Turkey gave the U.S. a green light. Yet it was actually a wrong signal that raised the hopes for successful closure of a very important deal for the U.S. that Turkey was not fully committed to. This resolution was very significant for the relationship, as it made the U.S. side more reactive after the March 1st resolution failed. Furthermore, the ballot, especially 193 opposed votes, proved that there was much reluctance within the parliament to support the U.S. plan. Many members of the parliament were opposed to Turkish involvement in the Iraq Operation. Yet, this fact was not properly communicated to the U.S. government.⁷⁹¹

During the negotiations U.S. had several demands from Turkey:

- The status of the U.S. forces in Turkey was a major issue. The U.S. wanted to have a privileged status for U.S. troops and personnel.
- The legal status of the U.S. troops must be as within the NATO and SOFA agreements, soldiers cannot be prosecuted under the Turkish law.
- Turkish military should not be involved in Northern Iraq, but secure the borders for the war aftermath and help with the refugee issue.
- The entire U.S. operation from Turkey to Iraq must be under the full control and responsibility of the U.S. command without the necessity of reporting, consulting and discussing with Turkish counterparts.
- The U.S. must be able to use Turkish air, sea and land transportation without any restrictions.
- The common trade agreements between two countries must be suspended during the Iraq War.
- All the permits and other legal documents needed from the Turkish authorities for U.S. weapon transportation and transiting military equipment should be suspended for the duration of the Iraq War.
- CIA was to distribute weapons to the Kurdish forces in the Northern Iraq and these actions should not be under the control or supervision of Turkey.⁷⁹²

There were some more requirements that the U.S. had, but these were the most critical ones and they irretrievably affected the future of Turkish-U.S. negotiations.

⁷⁹⁰ Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, Istanbul, 2007, p.16.

⁷⁹¹ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 106-107.

⁷⁹² Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, pp.37-38

Several times during the negotiations and several times the talks were adjourned in a tense atmosphere. All the main and critical issues causing disruptions were listed by Bölükbaşı (2008):

- The presence of Turkish soldier in Northern Iraq, their responsibilities, duties, responsibility area, chain of command, the right to fire, also the procedures of entering Mosul and Kirkuk.
- The weapon distribution, military and intelligence training and the overall role of the Barzani Talabani forces in Northern Iraq.
- Turkey's role during the operation and its responsibilities and role during the decision making process.
- The legal status of the U.S. troops in Turkey.⁷⁹³

As mention before, Turkey's presence in the Northern Iraq was a major issue between Turkey and the U.S. Turkey wanted to send forces into Northern Iraq for several reasons:

- To stop the refugee flow to Turkey and to keep people on the Iraq soil,
- To ensure of the Turkmen's safety and protection,
- To prevent the PKK and other Northern Iraqi terrorist groups from entering Turkey.⁷⁹⁴

Even though Turkey's reasons were crucial for the country's security the U.S. did not want Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq. As a matter of fact, the U.S. did everything to prevent Turkey's presence in Iraq. The U.S. was in need of the Northern Front, but did not want Turkey to be in the war and in Iraq. The main reason for that was obviously the Kurdish factor. The U.S. based their Northern Front plan mainly on the Kurdish groups and their support. The U.S. was more committed to the Kurds than Turkey. Therefore, the U.S. did not want to upset the Kurds. Obviously the Kurds were also not in favor of seeing Turkey in Northern Iraq. This issue became one of the most critical points during the negotiations. Several times Ambassador Pearson, Deputy Secretary of State Grossman, and George Bush's special Envoy Zalmay Halilzad explained to the Turkish side that the only way for Turkey to send troops to Northern Iraq was as joint forces under a cooperative operation. Yet, Turkey insisted for a national chain of command.⁷⁹⁵

⁷⁹³ Ibid., p.39

Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.214

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.125.

⁷⁹⁴ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.40

⁷⁹⁵ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.40-42

Another issue was the role and limits of the Turkish forces in Iraq. An official suggestion by Ambassador Lino almost finished the negotiations. In the proposal the U.S. side suggested that when Turkish forces are in Northern Iraq, if any PKK terrorist was seen, unless there was open fire by the PKK first the Turkish side could not open a fire.⁷⁹⁶ **(APPENDIX E)**

As Bölükbaşı (2008) commented, “the U.S. was invading Iraq in order to fight with terrorism, but on the other hand they were asking Turkey not to fight with terrorism.”⁷⁹⁷

This example clearly shows the U.S. side’s lack of understanding of the political pressures and security issues in Turkey and in the region. The U.S. comes from the other side of the world and seeks support from its allies in order to attack Iraq. The main principle of seeking support was war against terrorism, but at the same time this country does not allow its allies to fight with terrorist issues. These actions and behaviors were making the Turkish negotiation team and the Turkish community think that is this not a global War on Terror, but just a U.S. War on Terror, aimed towards terrorists that hurt the United States. This attitude was seen as selfish and it also affected the decision of the Turkish parliament.

After this issue the talks were adjourned for a while. After consulting with Washington, the U.S. side came back with a new deal for Turkey. In the new plan:

- Turkey could fire in any self-defense situation,
- Turkish forces can fire and fight against and destroy any terrorist group, including the PKK-KADEK they cross paths with,
- If the Kurdish groups pass the green line, the action will be taken as listed above.⁷⁹⁸

Through this agreement, the negotiation teams dealt with the first critical obstacle. Later during the negotiations, a second crisis regarding the weapon distribution to the Kurdish groups occurred. Since the initial plans for the Iraq Operation, the CIA wanted to distribute weapons to Northern Iraqi Kurds. The CIA thought that these weapons would strengthen the Barzani and Talabani forces against Saddam Hussein. But that was not the only reason the U.S. wanted to distribute weapons to the Kurds. The U.S. wanted Barzani forces to be stronger towards the Al-Qaeda linked Asnar al-Islam organization. Yet, this action was not supported by Turkey. Turkey knew that the weapon distribution was going to

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid., p.42

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid., p.45.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, pp.125-126.

happen no matter what, thus at least it wanted to keep itself in the loop to prevent these weapons to be transferred to the PKK in the future.⁷⁹⁹

As mentioned before, the weapon support that the U.S. would provide to the Kurdish alliance in Northern Iraq was a sensitive matter for Turkey. If the weapons would be given to Talabani and Barzani's forces without Turkey's involvement, Turkey was concerned about the aftermath of the war. After the invasion the weapons given to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) might be given or sold to the PKK. This possibility concerned Turkey's security. Thus the government wanted to get involved during the weapon transportation process and keep up with the quantity of the weapons. While this issue was on the table, the U.S. has already promised Kurds the weapons' transport. Furthermore, the shipments were prepared.⁸⁰⁰

The Turkish negotiation team did not agree on the way the weapons distribution was going to be handled. Turkey wanted to be more involved in the distribution process. Ambassador Pearson explained to the Turkish officials that the CIA insisted on distributing the weapons by itself. This caused another crisis during the negotiations. Soon however, a compromise was reached and the sides agreed on the following proposal:

- Turkey agreed to send an official to the weapon distribution and training meetings organized together with Barzani and Talbani forces.
- These training and weapon distribution would be organized and facilitated with Turkey's cooperation,
- The weapons distributed to the Kurds would be limited. The quantity of the weapons would be proportional to their responsibilities and duties. No heavy weapons would be given to Kurds.
- The weapons distributed to Kurds would be collected after the operation. The quantity of the weapons and distribution records will be monitored by Turkish military officials and the copy of the records would be given to the Turkish officials.⁸⁰¹

Another critical issue during the negotiation was the Turkmen issue. One of the reasons Turkey wanted to be present in Northern Iraq was because of the Turkmen. The Turkish government long claimed the presence of over three million of Turkmens in Iraq. After the 1991 uprising and establishment of safe-haven several Turkmens groups created the Iraqi

⁷⁹⁹ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.48-49.

⁸⁰⁰ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.390.

⁸⁰¹ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.50.

Turkmen Front (ITF), which despite of being an independent group stayed in close relations with the Turkish military.⁸⁰² The security of Turkmens was very important to Turkey. Seeing them affected by the bombings was the last thing Turkey wanted. Therefore, Turkey wanted to reach the Turkmens' areas and protect them in case of any problems. The U.S. team's statement cleared the questions.⁸⁰³ According to the statement:

- The U.S. would provide Turkey with information about the strategic targets, which will help Turkey to protect the Turkmens and prevent any potential attack,
- No bombardment zone would include the nearby areas of Mosul and Kirkuk (Turkmen areas),
- The U.S. military would provide Turkish military with damage reports for the territories north of the 35th parallel.⁸⁰⁴

Another critical issue during the negotiations was the legal status of the U.S. troops in Turkey. The U.S. insisted to have privileged status for its troops. The U.S. officials desired the status based on NATO agreements. The Turkish side did not agree to this; obviously the Iraq Operation was not a short term NATO exercise. Turkey was concerned about the size of the troops and duration of their presence within its borders. This caused another conflict between the negotiation teams. Similar to previous problems, this one was also solved through a new agreement accepted by both parties. In this specific case the compromise served Turkey's demands.⁸⁰⁵ According to the agreement:

- The use of power by the U.S. soldiers on Turkish soil is limited to self-defense, with proportionality, fairness and no harmful intentions.
- Aside from their official military duty responsibilities, in case of a crime the U.S. soldiers would be prosecuted in Turkish courts under the Turkish law.
- Even if a crime was committed during their official duty, the soldiers would not only be prosecuted under the U.S. law by the U.S. courts, but it would take place in cooperation with Turkish courts.⁸⁰⁶

⁸⁰² Yücel Güçlü, *The Turcomans and Kirkuk*, Xlibris Corporation, Philadelphia, 2007, p.28.

Michael Rubin, 2005, "Comedy of Errors: Turkish-U.S. Diplomacy and the Iraq War", in *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 4, No.1.

⁸⁰³ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.50-51.

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid., p.51.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid., p.53.

⁸⁰⁶ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.54.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.124.

On February 4 during the meeting in the Prime Minister's office the military agreement was changed once again. In the case of the resolution's approval by the Turkish parliament the final agreement was to be as follows:

- 23,784 U.S. soldiers would pass through Turkey to Iraq.
- 17,415 Air Force personnel
- 15,817 Army Logistic personnel.
- 3,710 Special Forces.
- 3,497 Renovation personnel.
- 2,000 personnel would work on the ports' preparation.
- Total number would be 66,223 U.S. soldiers and military personnel.⁸⁰⁷

The political negotiations were led by Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Tuygan. After the talks, both the U.S. and Turkey agreed on a common political statement. The document was prepared for the signature of Ali Tuygan and Robert Pearson before the March 1st resolution. The statement was considered as the red line of Turkey and projected the future of Iraq agreed upon by both parties.⁸⁰⁸ The statement was as follows:

- The unity, sovereignty and legitimacy of the Iraqi state will be important and must be secured after Saddam Hussein's overthrow. Postwar Iraq should not be organized under ethnic infrastructure. The ethnic separation of the sovereign Iraqi state would cause serious chaos and catastrophe for Iraq and the entire region.
- Turkmens have been one of the three founding ethnicities of Iraq. They should play a major role in the decision making process in the postwar Iraq. Their rights and territorial integrity must be secured. Mosul and Kirkuk must not controlled by Kurds. Additionally, the natural resources of Iraq must be used by the entire Iraqi nation not only by one ethnic group. This must be secured by laws and regulations.
- PKK terrorist organization, which have been a threat for Turkey must be eliminated and removed from the region. It should not be allowed for PKK to settle and use Northern Iraq as a safe haven.⁸⁰⁹

The unity of Iraq was especially important for Turkey. Yet, in the affirmation of its foreign policy principle of non-involvement in the domestic affairs of its neighbors, Turkey was also emphasizing that no other country has the right to decide on behalf of Iraq. Knowing Turkey's own interests in the unity of Iraq and the safety of Turkish ethnic minorities,

⁸⁰⁷ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.151.

⁸⁰⁸ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, p.66

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid., p.66-67.

Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 2007, p.225.

Turkish policy towards Northern Iraq was a mixture of influence attempts and sovereignty tribute.⁸¹⁰

This political agreement provided Turkey with almost everything it asked for from the U.S. The statement was ready to be signed. Yet, after the refusal of the March 1st resolution, the political leaders did not sign the agreement.

The economic negotiation team handled very important Turkish financial security issues. The country has had a bad experience from the first Gulf War. As President Özal, using a gambling metaphor, stated before the Gulf War: “I will put one take out three”. He expected that the U.S. would reward Turkey for its support.⁸¹¹ Yet, Özal’s calculations did not work out economically for Turkey. The embargo on Iraq and shutting down the pipelines put Turkey in a very bad economic position. The country had learned its economic lesson from the Gulf War and therefore these negotiations were critical for the future of the Turkish-U.S. cooperation on Iraq. The Turkish financial negotiations team led by Deputy Foreign Minister Ugur Ziyal had a main goal – to make sure that Turkey’s possible losses caused by the upcoming Iraq War would be covered.

The plan of economic support for Turkey was set up under two conditions. The first was Turkey’s full cooperation in the Iraq Operation and the second one was Turkey’s full compliance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rules and regulations. The U.S. had offered Turkey economic aid in return of using its soil to open the Northern Front in the Iraq Operation.⁸¹² Details of the approved plan of economic support were as follows:

- The U.S. will spend \$250 million to renovate the military bases in Turkey,
- In order to provide Turkey an immediate economic and military security, the U.S. would grant \$4 billion to Turkey. If Turkey wishes, this grant could be transformed to a \$34 billion loan. \$8.5 billion out of this loan would be paid to Turkey in a short-term.

⁸¹⁰ Asa Lundgren, *The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey’s Kurdish policy*, I.B. Tauris, London-New York, 2007, p.94.

⁸¹¹ Alan Makovsky, 1999, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, in *The SAIS Review*, Volume 19, Number 1, pp. 92-113.

⁸¹² Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, p.70.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.580.

- The U.S. would grant Turkey \$2 billion dollars for the purpose of renovation and modernization of Turkish military.
- The U.S. would provide some custom and taxation privileges for imported Turkish products such as gold and jewelry. Soon, the approach would be expanded also for other products.
- The U.S. President would seek support from the U.S. Congress to open several privileged industry and techno parks in Turkey.
- The U.S. President would seek support from U.S. Congress to lift the limitations for the military purchases and set up Turkey as a main textile provider for the U.S. military.
- The U.S. Department of Defense assures that it will purchase from Turkey \$750 million worth of products and supplies for the U.S. military needs in the region.
- Turkey would be included in the Oil-for-food Program. Turkey and the U.S. will cooperate under this plan to ensure that the Iraqi people's needs are satisfied on time.
- The U.S. would support Turkey's economic presence in the postwar Iraq. Turkish companies would be involved in telecommunications, construction, infrastructure and logistic needs of the postwar Iraqi state.
- The U.S. and Turkey would generate a common economic platform and cooperation in the region.
- Turkey and the U.S. would cooperate in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline projects.
- Turkey-U.S. partnership provided Turkey many contracts in the postwar Afghanistan. The U.S. would support Turkey the same way in the postwar Iraq.
- Both the U.S. and Turkey would coordinate workshops for Turkish and U.S. businessmen in order to prepare an economic network for the postwar Iraq.
- The U.S. economic support would also include the renovation of the Turkish cultural sites and touristic areas.
- The U.S. would coordinate with oil producing countries and seek for a billion dollar oil grant for Turkey.⁸¹³

The above were just some of the agreed upon economic subjects. The U.S. promised Turkey significant economic aid.⁸¹⁴ It was obviously a great opportunity for Turkey to balance the internal economy by using low interests U.S. loans and U.S. grants. Due to the refusal of the March 1st resolution, none of the listed economic deals were adopted.

The economic talks were not only discussed on the negotiation table in Turkey. It was also discussed in mid-February in Washington D.C. by Yaşar Yakış, Ali Babacan, Colin Powell, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney. It was one of the most disturbing meetings

⁸¹³ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.74.

Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.209.

⁸¹⁴ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p.135.

during the negotiation process. Afterwards, Turkey was blamed for ‘acting like a belly dancer’ and asking for huge economic compensation for predicted war losses.

The Turkish delegation visited Washington on 13-14 February of 2003. After the meetings it was reported that the Turkish side asked for \$92 billion in aid compensate for Turkey’s estimated losses during the five years following the expected war. The U.S. officials’ aid proposals were not even close to Turkish expectations. By February 20, the U.S. was offering \$6 billion in grants, \$10 billion in loans, \$3 billion in military and economic support, \$1 billion in oil support and \$1 billion for renovation and base construction in Turkey.⁸¹⁵

After the meeting with John Taylor, Babacan was not satisfied with the economic aid plan. He shared his thoughts with Yakış after the meeting. Murat Yetkin writes about Babacan’s concerns as follows:

It is tough to deal with Taylor. He doesn’t step back from what was told to him. There are some problems in what they suggest to us. First they tied everything under IMF regulations. They keep on saying that we shouldn’t delay or get out of the program otherwise they claim they would stop the credit.

Second problem is about the release of the credit. The exact time of the release is not certain now. They say that the Congress must approve it first. Committees, talks, negotiations and then the final decision. It can take even up to 6 weeks. By that time the war is over and so are we. We would be losing money since the first day of the operation we can’t hold ourselves economically for that long.

Third thing is this \$92 billion request scared them and they were not happy with that. Finally, they say the economic aid would be given under the condition of full cooperation until to the end of the war. This is risky. The circumstances might change and they might ask different things from us. If we don’t comply the credit might be cut.⁸¹⁶

Babacan’s conversation with Yakış shows clearly that the Turkish side was not happy with the details of the economic aid plan. But it was not only the Turks who were unhappy and disappointed. The U.S. officials were shocked with Turkey’s \$92 billion request. It caused accusations and serious tension between the two allies. In order to understand the \$92 billion issue, arguments of both sides must be explained carefully and understood.

⁸¹⁵ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 108.

Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.69.

⁸¹⁶ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.153.

Firstly, the international and even Turkish media claimed that one night in Washington D.C. Yakış and Babacan went to Powell's house and asked for \$92 billion. No one bothered to get the explanation of where this amount really came from. In Murat Yetkin's book, Babacan clearly explains how this amount was calculated.

The Turkish Ministry of Economy made estimates for the Iraq War. In these estimates it was considered that the Iraq War would start in 2003 and its effects would last until 2007. In this five year period the war effects on trade, export, import, tourism, financial and income changes, etc. were analyzed. Within this framework the estimates were made, it became clear that during the five years period Turkey would be in need of \$92 billion in order to balance its economic losses.⁸¹⁷ This amount came to \$18 billion a year and considering the effects of the war it wouldn't last more than six months and the number would go down to \$9 billion a year. So Turkey was suggesting that instead of getting anywhere from \$4 to \$15 billion one-shot credit from the U.S., \$9 billion credit on an annual basis was needed.⁸¹⁸

This was the calculation of Turkey. Obviously, there were major differences between what Turkey asked for and what the U.S. was offering. However, the numbers showed by the media without any legitimate explanation looked like a real exaggeration. As soon as the U.S. officials heard the amount that Turkey was requesting it shocked them and they did not want to even listen about the breakdown of the \$92 billion. The Turkish delegation wanted to explain this issue. Late at night Yakış called Powell. Powell invited Babacan and Yakış to his house. They had a chance to explain to him their reasoning and the breakdown, and afterwards he agreed with the Turkish delegation and told them to present the breakdown to President Bush at the White House meeting the following day.⁸¹⁹

The next day during the meeting with President Bush neither Yakış nor Babacan got into details, but the "*horse trading*" expression used by the President during the meeting was a major accusation towards the Turkish delegation.⁸²⁰

The consensus on economic issues was not reached until the last minute. Protracting economic talks seriously delayed the decision making process in the Turkish parliament.

⁸¹⁷ Ibid., p.154.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.

⁸¹⁹ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.155.

⁸²⁰ Ibid., p.155.

Finally, after a tough 3-month negotiation on military, political and economic aspects of the Iraq Operation three Memoranda of Understanding were signed.⁸²¹ The Turkish Foreign Ministry wrote a concluding report for the Turkish National Security Council. On February 23 of 2003, the report was presented to Prime Minister Abdullah Gül.⁸²² The report listed benefits negotiated by Turkey. The Ministry listed the following points as benefits:

- Any possible threat of the unity of Northern Iraq would be prevented and Turkey's position in negotiation with the EU would be stronger.
- Turkish-U.S. partnership would be stronger,
- Turkey could easily protect the rights of Turkmen,
- Turkey's military existence in Northern Iraq would be strengthened and Turkey's operational capacity in the area would increase.
- Turkey could easily prevent possible terrorist actions in Northern Iraq and it would gain an advantage to fight against the PKK.
- Turkey would be included in planning of the postwar Iraq,
- The U.S. economic support would help Turkey to prevent possible losses caused by war.
- Turkish relationship with the IMF would continue on stronger basis.
- Turkey could play a bigger role in the Middle East peacemaking process,
- Turkey would use the possible advantage for rebuilding the postwar Iraq,
- Turkey would gain more support from the U.S. in its EU accession process.
- The U.S. through considering Turkish side's opinion would take more active role in solving the Cyprus issue,
- Turkish-U.S. military and industrial partnership would become stronger.
- There would be more favorable opinions about Turkey in the U.S. Congress and the White House.
- Turkey would gain more influence on the U.S. Congress, thus it would deal more effectively with the Armenian and Greek lobbies.
- The U.S. would provide more support for Turkey in its own fight against terrorism.
- Turkey would use more support from the United States in a larger scale.⁸²³
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The report of the Foreign Ministry also listed the possible consequences if the resolution was refused by the Turkish parliament:

- Turkish-U.S. strategic partnership would be damaged.
- In any case the U.S. would be pushing to open the Northern Front, even if Turkey refuses to give the permission to use its land to enter Iraq, the U.S. would still be

⁸²¹ Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, p. 189.

⁸²² Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.77-79.

⁸²³ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.78-80.
Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.116.

requesting the approval for air space usage and the special forces to join the operation through Turkey, what would create more problems.

- Turkey would not get any kind of economic support from the U.S. for the losses caused by the Iraq War.
- The U.S. support for Turkey in the IMF and other financial institutions would be lost.
- Turkey would not operate in the Northern Iraq and would lose its influence in the region.
- PKK problem originated in the Northern Iraq would become more critical and dangerous for Turkey,
- With the lack of the Turkish military involvement in the Northern Iraq, the possibility of creating an independent state would increase. The support of this entity from the EU countries wouldn't be prevented. Also the U.S. would cooperate more with the ethnic groups in the Northern Iraq. The ties between them would become stronger thus the U.S. would delegate more tasks to these groups after the war.
- Turkmens and their future would be left at the mercy of Arabs and Kurds,
- The defense industry cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. would be damaged.
- Greek and Armenian lobbies in the U.S. would gain more opportunities to lobby against Turkey.
- The U.S. support for the Turkey's EU accession would decrease.
- There would be a significant decrease of the U.S. political, military and economic support for Turkey.
- The U.S. considered that Turkey's allowance to renovate and modernize the military bases would be the first step for cooperation. The resolution refusal would be understood as Turkey's back out of the cooperation, thus would cause trust issues.
- The U.S. would not support Turkey's Cyprus policy.⁸²⁴

The Turkish Foreign Ministry's official report carried a very important value for the decision making process. The report openly explained all the pros and cons of the decision. Even though it was not openly stated, the Foreign Ministry clearly suggested that Turkey should pass the resolution.

After publishing the report during the evaluation meeting with the military diplomats, Prime Minister Gül said, "I understand the consequences. I can explain this to the opposition, but not to my party."⁸²⁵ This honest comment showed the future of the resolution.

The final suggestion came from the military. The Turkish military made it clear that the U.S. would have the capacity to attack Iraq with or without Turkey's support. Therefore, not

⁸²⁴ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.80-81.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.116.

⁸²⁵ Ibid., p.117.

cooperating with the U.S. would cause Turkey to be left alone. The military leaders made a suggestion to the government to participate in the Iraq Operation together with the U.S.⁸²⁶

After the evaluation of the report and government discussion about the process on February 24 of 2003, President Bush wrote a letter to President Gül. In this letter Bush congratulated Gül for accepting the February 6 *tezkeresi* and openly accepted the outcomes of three separate Memoranda of Understanding and promised his support after the decision was made.⁸²⁷ **(APPENDIX F)**

During the negotiation process, the U.S. was in touch with other regional allies as well. Paul Wolfowitz made several trips to Mosul, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil to meet with the Kurdish regional leaders.⁸²⁸

The U.S. was pressuring Turkey from the highest levels.⁸²⁹ Zalmay Khalilzad was in Ankara to convince Turkey to take part in the operation.⁸³⁰ The U.S. confidentially showed the war plans to Turkey which included a point where 20,000 Turkish troops would get involved in the operation.⁸³¹

Turkey was also concerned about the possible WMD or scud attacks on Turkish territories. Therefore, it asked for Patriots and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes in order to prevent the attack. Turkey also wanted to use its protection rights as a NATO member. As it is known, if an attack occurs on a NATO member country, NATO immediately defends that nation. In order to make Turkey comfortable about its concerns, the U.S. gathered members to seek support for Turkey. Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg did not approve any possible NATO intervention within this conflict. Once again the U.S. saw the opposition to the operation from close allies – from its fellow Europeans and NATO members.⁸³²

In his book Henry Kissinger stated the importance of Turkey in the possible Iraq War. For Kissinger, Turkey was indispensable for the U.S. He believed that the U.S. must show

⁸²⁶ Ibid., p.119.

⁸²⁷ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.84.

⁸²⁸ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.21.

⁸²⁹ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2006, p.135.

⁸³⁰ Ibid., p.319.

⁸³¹ Ibid., p.135.

⁸³² Ibid., p.136.

value and interest in Turkey in order to strengthen the ties before the war. He thought that Turkey would play an important role during the war and therefore the U.S must start to focus on Turkey and show more care and attention.⁸³³ Obviously, the U.S. did not follow Kissinger's suggestions.

9.4. First Reactions after the March 1st *Tezkere* Vote

The resolution was presented before the TBMM on March 1st 2003 (**APPENDIX G**). The meeting was chaired by Bülent Arınç. The meeting has started at 2 p.m. and there were five sessions. The first four sessions were closed to the public.⁸³⁴ Prime Minister Gül and AKP Chairman Erdoğan made comments in favor of the resolution.⁸³⁵ Finally, after the voting procedure was over at 7:37 p.m. Chairman Bülent Arınç announced the result. According to the record 533 parliamentarians were in the session; 264 of them voted in favor of the resolution and 250 against it; 19 members abstained.⁸³⁶ Even though the result might have looked like the resolution was passed the amount of supporting votes did not meet the constitutional majority rule.⁸³⁷ The Turkish parliament did not allow the U.S. to use Turkish soil for the Iraq Operation.⁸³⁸ In addition to the opposition party – the People's Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) and also 99 members of the ruling party the AKP -- voted against the resolution which exposed the division within the party. Many blamed the party's leader, Erdoğan, who had a greater influence on its members than Gül who has avoided public speeches on the subject for a very long time. Others were pointing out the

⁸³³ Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Varmı?*, 1.Baskı, METU Press, Ankara, 2002, p.269.

⁸³⁴ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.172.

Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.90.

⁸³⁵ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları, Güncel Yayıncılık*, İstanbul, 2007, p.217.

⁸³⁶ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.172.

Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.91.

William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 113.

⁸³⁷ Hurriyet Gazetesi, March 2, 2003, "Kabul: 264, Hayır: 250 ve Tezkere ret", Available at <<http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/03/02/255872.asp>>, Accessed on Feb 15, 2010.

Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, p. 189.

Personal Interview with Marc Grossman - former United States Ambassador to Turkey, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Washington D.C., 10 March, 2008.

⁸³⁸ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.580.

lack of international support for the operation as one of the reasons for resolution's failure in the parliament.⁸³⁹

After the 3-month long negotiations Turkey refused to allow the U.S. soldiers' deployment from its soil. This refusal shocked the U.S. As Ambassador Grossman said, there was a lot of disappointment and surprise, yet this vote has proved that democracy rules in Turkey. Even though the decision hurt the U.S. it is still good for the U.S. that Turkey is a democratic country, more democratic than three or four decades earlier. There were many disappointed and angry people in the U.S. This decision created difficulties for the U.S. military, but it was a democratic decision and if one believes in democracy, he has to believe in it without exceptions.⁸⁴⁰ Yet, it was a surprising and significant deviation in the traditions of Turkish-U.S. relations.⁸⁴¹

Michael Rubin agrees with Grossman, but adds an important comment, "both Turkish and U.S. commentators – especially those opposed to the war in Iraq – trumpeted the vote as an example of democracy. While true, the machinations leading to the motion's defeat were far more complex, a combination of AKP disorganization, internal political machinations, and misguided U.S. diplomacy."⁸⁴² Rubin compares U.S. diplomacy efforts prior the Gulf War under James Baker's leadership and those in the Powell era. Powell obviously loses this competition. According to Rubin, the State Department failed to build strong connections with Turkey in terms of the Iraq Operation. He also points out wrong choices made by the U.S. representation in the negotiation process. He states that "Lino was the wrong woman for the wrong job."⁸⁴³ She did not have substantial experience in Turkey. She did serve in Syria, Iraq and Albania, but never in Turkey. She was antagonistic and dishonest. Also the attitude of the Turkish negotiation team, especially as led by Deniz Bülükbaşı, was not helping to

⁸³⁹ Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, p. 189.

⁸⁴⁰ Personal Interview with Marc Grossman - former United States Ambassador to Turkey, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Washington D.C., 10 March, 2008.

⁸⁴¹ Cengiz Çandar, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq", Chapter 4, Ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England, 2004, p.48.

⁸⁴² Michael Rubin, 2005, "Comedy of Errors: Turkish-U.S. Diplomacy and the Iraq War", in *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 4, No.1.

⁸⁴³ Michael Rubin, 2005, "Comedy of Errors: Turkish-U.S. Diplomacy and the Iraq War", in *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 4, No.1.

achieve compromise. Rubin describes Bölükbaşı as a nationalist who soured the atmosphere.⁸⁴⁴ On the other hand Matthew Bryza, who took part in the negotiations as a member of the U.S. delegation, said that there was not a good exchange of information and some trouble in the timing, yet the negotiations were conducted in the atmosphere of mutual respect and the ally of friendship.⁸⁴⁵

The lack of significant input of the U.S. diplomatic missions in Turkey and Ambassador Pearson is also pointed out by Rubin. Ambassador Pearson made some derogatory comments about Turkey during the pre-war negotiations. He and his staff “failed to make the case for U.S. policy to the Turkish press.”⁸⁴⁶ Rubin adds that Pearson shirked in his own responsibilities. The day before the *tezkere* vote Ambassador Pearson was playing golf with Mustafa Koç.⁸⁴⁷

The operation plan got affected by the Turkish parliament’s decision. The problem not only affected General Raymond T. Odierno’s 4th Infantry Division’s entrance to Iraq from Turkey. The U.S. was also planning to secure Special Forces’ entrance to Northern Iraq.⁸⁴⁸ The decline of the resolution was totally the U.S.’s problem. It was not possible for them to send troops from Turkey, to fly U.S. search and rescue planes from Turkish airfields, or fly the bombardment planes to Iraq. None of these were possible under the denied resolution.⁸⁴⁹ After the denial from Turkish parliament, the 4th Infantry waiting at the coast of Mediterranean sea was immediately ordered to move and deploy from Kuwait.⁸⁵⁰

The Turkish parliament’s decision was a shock for both the U.S. and Turkey. Robert Pearson, former U.S. Ambassador to Ankara described the moment when he found out about the decision, “I was watching the voting on TV. After the vote, I saw some members of the parliament smiling. I thought that was a positive sign for the resolution. Yet, when the results were announced for a moment I thought it was passed. Yet, after a second we realized that it

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁵ Personal Interview with Matthew Bryza – former member of the U.S. National Security Council, specialist on Turkey, currently Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington D.C., 4 August 2004.

⁸⁴⁶ Michael Rubin, 2005, “Comedy of Errors: Turkish-U.S. Diplomacy and the Iraq War”, in *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 4, No.1.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁸ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.340.

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁰ General Tommy Franks, *U.S. Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.429.

failed. I immediately called the State Department and informed them about the developments.”⁸⁵¹

In the Pentagon the moods were also bitter. Paul Wolfowitz described the decision of the Turkish parliament as a ‘*big mistake*’. He said that he understood the constitutional limits on the decision making, yet it was in Turkey’s interest to be involved. He criticized the Turkish military for not having played a leadership role and argued that Turkey should admit making a mistake. The U.S. carried out the Iraq Operation even without Turkey. It would be better if Turkey had a strong say in the decision making process during the war. Yet by refusing the resolution on March 1st, Turkey lost a chance on a great deal –a deal that many officials in the U.S. consider more beneficial for Turkey than for their own country.⁸⁵²

The U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, as mentioned earlier, was never an outspoken supporter of the Iraq Operation. He thought that Turkey did not have to apologize for its decision. Yet, he admitted that many people in the State Department were deeply disappointed by the Turkish parliament decision. Prime Minister Gül called Colin Powell. Gül told Powell: “our relations shouldn’t be stopped.” Powell replied, “we respect your decision”, but he also asked if there is a chance for another resolution.⁸⁵³

Immediately after the vote everyone started to talk about a possible second resolution. CHP started opposing any possible motion. Not only CHP, even the AKP vice president Eyüp Fatsa said there is no possible way a second motion could be passed. Yet, Robert Pearson was positive about the second resolution.⁸⁵⁴

⁸⁵¹ Personal Interview with Ambassador Robert Pearson – US Foreign Service Officer, former US Ambassador to Turkey, Washington D.C., 14 March, 2008.

⁸⁵² William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 114.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.211.

Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the U.S. Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

Bill Park, *Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p.26.

⁸⁵³ Hurriyet Gazetesi, March 2 2003, “Kabul: 264, Hayır: 250 ve Tezkere ret”, Available at <<http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/03/02/255872.asp>>, Accessed on Feb 15, 2010.

Fikret Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.218.

⁸⁵⁴ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.185.

Hurriyet Gazetesi, March 2 2003, “Kabul: 264, Hayır: 250 ve Tezkere ret”, Available at <<http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/03/02/255872.asp>>, Accessed on Feb 15, 2010.

While the discussions about the second resolution started, U.S President George W. Bush's letter was a first shock for Turkey. Bush openly explained in his letter that the U.S. would not allow the Turkish military to get into Northern Iraq.⁸⁵⁵

Certain incidents in Northern Iraq increased the tension between Turkey, the U.S. and the Kurds. On March 4 of 2003, 50 thousand Kurds started to rally against Turkey. The rally was organized by Barzani's party. The ties between Barzani and the U.S. Special Forces were very close. During the meetings the Kurds were burning Turkish flags⁸⁵⁶ and chanting that "Kurdistan will be a grave for Turkey."⁸⁵⁷ Turkey could not ignore these developments. The need of its presence in Northern Iraq was becoming the priority.

9.5. Accusations towards AKP

As mentioned before after the failure of the March 1st *tezkere* the U.S. officials were disappointed and angry at Turkey. Through approving the first *tezkere* Turkey would have given a signal of possible future cooperation in the Iraq Operation. Thus the officials were surprised by the parliament's decision. Moreover, the ruling party was accused of not speaking with one voice during the negotiations. While Prime Minister Gül was very cautious in promising anything, Erdoğan was giving hope to the U.S. for the cooperation.

But this confusion of signals and inconsistency of the Turkish political leadership was not the only accusation. Many of the analysts in the U.S. and Europe linked AKP's March 1st decision with its Islamic background. Even though the AKP was a very young party (created less than two years earlier) when the decision was made its origin was connected with Necmettin Erbakan's National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi – MNP). MNP was established in January of 1970 and its political life did not last long. It was banned from Turkish politics on the grounds of acting against the nature of the secular state.⁸⁵⁸ Soon after the ban, Erbakan and his National View (Milli Görüş) supporters formed The National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi - MSP) in May 1971. MSP joined several coalitions

⁸⁵⁵ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.97.

⁸⁵⁶ Hüsnü Mahalli, *Tezkereden Tezkereye Gerçekler*, Iskele Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.48.

⁸⁵⁷ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.184.

⁸⁵⁸ Angel Rabasa, Stephen Larrabee, *The Rise of Political Islam In Turkey*, RAND Publishing, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 40.

under Demirel and Ecevit in the 1970's and supported the idea of Muslim Common Market with Muslim Dinar and Muslim Defense Alliance.⁸⁵⁹

After the military *coup d'état* in 1980, all the parties were banned and a new era started for Turkey. In 1983, the New Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was founded.⁸⁶⁰ Soon after the elections, Erbakan's New Welfare Party took its place in Turkey's political life again. Erbakan regained his position as the official leader of New Welfare Party. The overall support for the New Welfare Party was increasing in time. In 1994 the local elections New Welfare Party got 19% of the votes. In addition they won elections in the two largest cities in Turkey: both Istanbul and Ankara.⁸⁶¹ Finally in the 1995 Elections they got 21.6% of the votes and became the leading party of the coalition formed with True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi).⁸⁶² After long years of political life Erbakan became the Prime Minister.

When the first actions of Erbakan were analyzed, he seemed to move in a pro-Islamist direction. He wanted to create an Islamic Economic Group as an alternative to the European Union.⁸⁶³ His trip to Libya and his comments about more Islamic foreign policy gave a signal about the possible direction Turkey was heading.⁸⁶⁴ The actions of Erbakan were criticized by the secularist groups in Turkey and also by the western world.

Not only in the foreign policy but also in domestic politics Erbakan was showing the pro-Islamists attitude. He met with the leaders of religious cults in Turkey in the Prime Ministers' Residence. Once he said, "rectors have to kiss hands of the girls who wear head scarves."⁸⁶⁵

Finally on 28 February 1997 the Turkish National Security Council (Turkish: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) declared its demands from the government. The era starting with that meeting caused the New Welfare Party to lose the power. A post-modern *coup d'état* was conducted towards Erbakan's government. After those events, Erbakan's legacy started to lose support among the religious voters. The New Welfare Party voters, National View's supporters and religious voters wanted to see a new face leading the Islamic movement.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 41

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁶¹ Ibid., p. 42.

⁸⁶² Ibid., p. 41.

⁸⁶³ Ibid., p. 44.

⁸⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 43.

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 43.

Trials followed the 1997 *coup* and Erbakan lost the government, party and his political life.⁸⁶⁶ In January of 1998 the New Welfare Party was closed and Erbakan and his collaborators were banned from politics.⁸⁶⁷

Erbakan's followers immediately formed the Virtue Part (Fazilet Partisi - FP), which was soon closed by the Constitutional Court. After the closing the FP the movement formally split into two. One was the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) and the other was AKP.⁸⁶⁸ Soon the supporters on the Felicity Party started shifting towards AKP. Tayyip Erdoğan became the leader of the new AKP movement. In 1991 Erdoğan was a candidate in the general elections, but he was not successful. Three years later, in 1994 he was elected as the mayor of Istanbul.⁸⁶⁹

While in office he presented his most famous speech. He said, "the mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers."⁸⁷⁰ After this speech he was convicted and imprisoned. No one before declared himself and his party as Islamist in Turkish politics so openly.

His return to political life became a sensation. Due to his legal situation he couldn't run for the Parliament. He was the president of AKP which had won the elections with a large majority. Due to Erdoğan's legal situation, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer gave Abdullah Gül duty to form the new government on November 16 of 2002.⁸⁷¹

The question in people's minds was if Erdoğan would be another Erbakan? Would he act in anti-western and pro-Islamic ways? Even though Erdoğan was coming from an Islamic background he claimed that he was different. Unlike Erbakan, he did not define himself and his movement as Islamist. He preferred the name "*Conservative Democrat*".⁸⁷² Erdoğan followed totally a different path. Even though he came from an Islamic background and

⁸⁶⁶ Chris Morris, *The new Turkey: The quiet Revolution on the edge of Europe*, Granta Books, London, 2005, p. 42.

⁸⁶⁷ Angel Rabasa, Stephen Larrabee, *The Rise of Political Islam In Turkey*, RAND Publishing, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 44.

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 45.

⁸⁶⁹ İhan Taşcı, *Af Dağının Ardındaki AKP*, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2005, p. 29.

⁸⁷⁰ Chris Morris, *The new Turkey: The quiet Revolution on the edge of Europe*, Granta Books, London, 2005, p.60.

İhan Taşcı, *Af Dağının Ardındaki AKP*, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2005, p.29.

⁸⁷¹ İhan Taşcı, *Af Dağının Ardındaki AKP*, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2005, p.30.

⁸⁷² Angel Rabasa, Stephen Larrabee, *The Rise of Political Islam In Turkey*, RAND Publishing, Santa Monica, 2008, p.47.

during his entire political life he criticized the western world, he was not doing so when he became the leader of the new movement. He established close ties with the western world. Before he became the Prime Minister he visited the U.S. several times and together with his advisors he attended many meetings with the U.S. officials and analysts. They attended the meetings with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), RAND Corporation, American Jewish Congress and other think tanks and organizations. They also met with experts on Turkey in Washington D.C., such as Morton Abramovitz, Henri Barkey, Graham Fuller and Richard Perle.⁸⁷³ The details of the meetings are not the concern here. The important issue is that, unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan was willing to lobby in Washington D.C. and preferred to cooperate with the western world. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan was not opposed to the westernization process. He wanted to establish solid relations with the west and at the same time he wanted to strengthen Turkey's position in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region.⁸⁷⁴

Erdoğan was willing to be in a dialogue with the western and international finance institutions. He did not turn his back to the IMF, Wall Street or the WB. He was trying to understand the dynamics of the world economy.⁸⁷⁵ The AKP had promoted the liberal market policies designed to attract foreign investment and integrate Turkey more closely into the global economy.⁸⁷⁶ Domestically, soon after the elections, AKP gained support of the Turkish economic world too. The most prominent business organization in Turkey – the Turkish Industrialist and Businessman Association (TUSIAD) was supporting AKP policies.⁸⁷⁷

Erdoğan was also willing to cooperate with European countries. Unlike his predecessors, he wanted to see Turkey as a European Union member. His words were followed by actions. Soon, the traditionally western parties in Turkey started to oppose the

⁸⁷³ Merdan Yanardağ, *Bir ABD Projesi Olarak AKP*, Siyah Beyaz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.20.

⁸⁷⁴ Angel Rabasa, Stephen Larrabee, *The Rise of Political Islam In Turkey*, RAND Publishing, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 75.

⁸⁷⁵ Merdan Yanardağ, *Bir ABD Projesi Olarak AKP*, Siyah Beyaz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.16

⁸⁷⁶ Angel Rabasa, Stephen Larrabee, *The Rise of Political Islam In Turkey*, RAND Publishing, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 47.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid., p.52.

EU process. Meanwhile the AKP was the one party trying to achieve the goal of EU membership.⁸⁷⁸

Many analysts thought that the March 1st decision of AKP was related with the Islamic background of AKP more than with anything else. Tayyip Erdoğan's prior statements and speeches were not opposed to this argument since Erdoğan always declared his reference is Islam.⁸⁷⁹ Yet, due to all the arguments above, the religious factor was not the reason for the failure to accept the March 1st *tezkere*. It did play a role in case of some individual members of parliament. Yet, it did not motivate the entire assembly. It was just one of many components of a bigger picture.

9.6. Second *Tezkere*

Both sides tried to recover from the disturbing outcomes of the parliamentary decision. Turkish Foreign Ministry officials started talks with Pearson and Grossman in order to seek an option for Turkish military presence in Northern Iraq. The U.S. side was opposed to Turkey's presence in the region, yet ready to hear Turkish arguments. They agreed on several points with some conditions. U.S. diplomats were thinking:

- There might be some Turkish troops in the Northern Iraq. Turkish forces would be located in small valley in order to prevent the leaks to Turkey. No heavy weapons would be allowed.
- The actions of U.S. and Turkish forces would be coordinated by a joint team based in Silopi,
- Turkish airfield would be open to U.S. planes, yet the U.S. wouldn't use the bases in Turkey in order to carry out the attack plans.
- The modernization of Turkish bases and ports would be stopped and the bases would be used after the war for the humanitarian purposes.⁸⁸⁰

The Turkish General Staff insisted on sending a minimum of 20,000 soldier to Northern Iraq, but the U.S. side refused and explained that the only way this amount of Turkish

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁹ Chris Morris, *The new Turkey: The quiet Revolution on the edge of Europe*, Granta Books, London, 2005, p.60.

⁸⁸⁰ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, pp.100-101.

soldiers would get into Iraq would be only under the condition of U.S.'s use of the Turkish land to send troops to Iraq, which was refused in the Turkish parliament.⁸⁸¹

The U.S. was still trying to get support from Turkey at least for the airfields. Turkey eventually did allow the usage of Turkish airfields for the U.S. planes. This decision really helped the U.S. logistically. It especially helped during the B-52 bombardments of Iraq and transportation of the Cleveland Special Forces teams.⁸⁸² Even though the airports were not included in the agreement, Turkey opened the air bases to the U.S. planes in case of emergency.⁸⁸³

Cengiz Çandar (2004) describes the Turkish position in the U.S. foreign policy in that era,

During the second week of the Iraq War, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Ankara, as he had not prior to the war, and declared Turkey 'an important member of the coalition [against the Saddam regime].' Turkey had been relegated to the position of the 'important coalition member' rather than that of 'strategic partner' of the United States, the more prestigious status it had enjoyed in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 1990-91 Gulf War.⁸⁸⁴

Soon, Turkey was seriously considering allowing the U.S. to use its airspace. After the talks between Gül and Powell, Turkey and the U.S. agreed on the second resolution that would give the U.S. permission to use Turkish airfields. On March 19 of 2003 the second *tezkere* – 763 (**APPENDIX H**) was presented before the TBMM. It was approved on March 20 with 332 supporting votes.⁸⁸⁵ This resolution allowed Turkish soldier to go to Northern Iraq and allowed the U.S. to use Turkish airfields for war purposes.⁸⁸⁶ On March 22 the U.S.

⁸⁸¹ Ibid., p.101

⁸⁸² Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.340
General Tommy Franks, *U.S. Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 428-429.

⁸⁸³ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.340

⁸⁸⁴ Cengiz Çandar, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq", Chapter 4, Ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England, 2004, p.50.

⁸⁸⁵ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 2007, p.230.

⁸⁸⁶ Cengiz Çandar, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq", Chapter 4, Ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England, 2004, p.49.

planes started to use Turkish airfields.⁸⁸⁷ According to Mahalli and some other journalist, the AKP government had to accept this resolution under a heavy pressure from the U.S.⁸⁸⁸

As soon as the airfields were opened to the U.S., Turkey wanted to deploy forces in Northern Iraq. As mentioned in the prior agreements both the air operations carried out by the U.S. and the land operations carried out by Turkey were supposed to start simultaneously. The U.S. started the air operation two days prior finalizing the plan. Turkish officials kept on pressuring the U.S. side for a joint military deployment to the region, but the U.S. did not wish to let Turkey to enter Northern Iraq.⁸⁸⁹ For the U.S. it would be a nightmare to send Turkish troops to Northern Iraq. The war has already started without Turkey and the sudden appearance of the Turkish military would cause a ‘war within a war’. Moreover, the Iraqi Kurds already declared that they would fight against the Turkish military.⁸⁹⁰ The U.S. was in a difficult situation. It did need Turkish airspace, but it did not want Turkish soldiers in Iraq.

Talks with Pearson, Grossman, Wolfowitz, Khalilzad and directly with Powell and Rumsfeld did not help Turkey send troops to Northern Iraq. The U.S. kept postponing the decision and cooperating with the Kurds more than ever. It was the time when the U.S. was using its ties with Talabani and Barzani forces. During this conflict, the Kurds were the best allies of the U.S.⁸⁹¹

Since that moment, the U.S. started cooperating closer with Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq and upsetting Kurds just to keep good relations with the U.S. was no longer an option. The continuous Turkish demands to get into Northern Iraq did not bring any results. Even though the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House kept on negotiating terms of sending Turkish troops to Northern Iraq, they did not want to disappoint the Kurds. The U.S. started to prefer and value Erbil more than Ankara. Only one side of the second resolution was enforced and that was the one allowing the U.S. to use Turkish airfields. Turkey did not have the possibility to send its troops to Northern Iraq. On March 29 of 2003, Khalilzad came to Ankara from Erbil and explained the standings of the Kurds in Turkey’s

⁸⁸⁷ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.102.

⁸⁸⁸ Hüsnü Mahalli, *Tezkereden Tezkereye Gerçekler*, Iskele Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.57

⁸⁸⁹ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.106-107.

⁸⁹⁰ Cengiz Çandar, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq”, Chapter 4, Ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England, 2004, p.49.

⁸⁹¹ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, pp.106-110.

situation. He openly stated that Kurds would not be pleased if Turkey sent troops to Northern Iraq. Therefore, Turkey couldn't send its troops to Iraq.⁸⁹² The Kurds gained the advantage of influencing the U.S. decision making process in this case. Turkey officially started paying the price for not accepting the March 1st resolution.⁸⁹³

9.7. The Hood Issue

The Hood Issue of July 2003 was the greatest crisis of confidence between Turkey and the U.S.⁸⁹⁴ The Turkish public learned about the incident from the Hurriyet Newspaper column of Sedat Ergin.⁸⁹⁵ The Hood Issue was very important for *tezkere* relations. Since the 1990's, the Turkish military had lots of bureaus and soldiers located in different parts of Northern Iraq. Most of the operations or issues they were dealing with the U.S. knew about. Some of the issues were even handled together.

According to some intelligence reports, Celal Talabani had informed Paul Bremer and the U.S. military that Turkish Special Forces' officers would be planning an assassination on the Kurdish Governor of Kirkuk.⁸⁹⁶ The intelligence gathered by Talabani was evaluated by the U.S. side.⁸⁹⁷ Soon after, the U.S. military organized an operation directed towards the office of the Turkish Special Forces in Suleimaniah. On July 4, one hundred U.S. officers carried out an operation and captured eleven Turkish soldiers.⁸⁹⁸ They were put in the back of

⁸⁹² Ibid., pp.118-120.

⁸⁹³ Ibid., pp.106-115.

⁸⁹⁴ Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, p. 190.

⁸⁹⁵ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.237.

Sedat Ergin, *Hurriyet*, Column, June 5, 2003.

Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.6.

⁸⁹⁶ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.241

Hüsnü Mahalli, *Tezkereden Tezkereye Gerçekler*, Iskele Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.113.

⁸⁹⁷ As mentioned before the United States did not want to see the Turkish troops in Northern Iraq since the beginning of negotiations. Even though it was agreed during the negotiations and passed twice after the March 1st resolution failure, the U.S. never let Turkish troops go to into Northern Iraq. In addition to several other reasons the U.S.'s ties with Kurds affected this outcome. Before the war, the U.S. was really close with Talabani and Barzani. After the refusal of the March 1st resolution this close relationship was used as a backup. As seen in this example the U.S. was listening to Talabani and his intelligence more than to anybody else. Due to the close ties between the U.S. and Kurds the Hood incident happened. Obviously that was not the only reason but the effect of the Kurds over the U.S. decision making was also important at this point.

Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.236.

⁸⁹⁸ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.242.

a truck with hoods on their heads. In addition to the Turkish Special Forces soldiers, thirteen civilians were also arrested.⁸⁹⁹ Among them there were inter alia four Turkmen people visiting the office for lunch, two women, a cook and a child. There were three *pesmerge* guards at the door, two Kurdish civilians passing through the street and finally a British citizen Michael Todd. All of them were arrested.⁹⁰⁰ After the arrest they were first taken to Kirkuk for interrogation and later transported to Baghdad.⁹⁰¹ The operation was organized with the intelligence gathered by the Kurdish leadership.⁹⁰²

This incident shocked Turkey. Right after the arrests, the Turkish TGS contacted NATO Headquarters and the Turkish Foreign Ministry got in touch with both the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and the U.S. State Department. Turkey immediately protested the situation and demanded from the U.S. the release of the Turkish soldiers.⁹⁰³

The first reply from the U.S. side did not satisfy the Turkish officials. The U.S. explained to Turkey that the reason of the arrest was the intelligence they got about the possible assassination of the Kurdish Governor of Kirkuk.⁹⁰⁴ This explanation was not satisfactory for Turkish officials because Kirkuk was on the south of the green line that Turkish offices were located.⁹⁰⁵ The involvement of Kurdish intelligence in the affairs raised the temperature. In response to the incident, Talabani's visit to Turkey was cancelled.⁹⁰⁶

General Yaşar Büyükanıt was asked to about the Hood Incident. He confirmed that the incident indeed has taken place and protested against the U.S.'s action.⁹⁰⁷ Additionally,

Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.6.

⁸⁹⁹ BBC, "2003 Regret over Turkish troops' arrest", Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3067319.stm>, Accessed on March 1st7, 2010.

⁹⁰⁰ Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.22

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.220.

⁹⁰¹ Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.26.

⁹⁰² Hüsnü Mahalli, *Tezkereden Tezkereye Gerçekler*, Iskele Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.147

⁹⁰³ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.238.

Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, pp.7-8.

⁹⁰⁴ Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.68.

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid., p.8.

⁹⁰⁶ Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, p. 190.

⁹⁰⁷ Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p.8.

Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.238.

the Head of TGS Hilmi Özkök met with Ambassador Pearson and told him that this incident was the biggest catastrophe since the beginning of the relationship.⁹⁰⁸

The soldiers were released after sixty hours of detention. After their release, General John Sylvester considered the situation as unfortunate.⁹⁰⁹

Even though the issue was presented as an unfortunate event that happened for the first time it was not actually the truth. In April of 2003 a similar incident occurred. The U.S. soldiers captured six Turkish Special Forces soldiers and arrested them based on the accusation of providing weapons to Turkmen. They were released a couple days later.⁹¹⁰ It shows that the Hood Issue was not the only incident between the U.S. and Turkey after the refusal of the March 1st resolution.

9.8. Third Tezkere

Before the third resolution, Paul Wolfowitz supported Turkey's involvement in the peacekeeping forces. He was still blaming Turkey for the refusal of the resolution. As mentioned earlier, more than anyone Wolfowitz was blaming the Turkish military for not showing enough leadership.⁹¹¹

On May 1 of 2003, the coalition forces declared victory. After that moment they wanted to establish a multinational peacemaking and peace building force. Turkey was interested to joining it since the beginning.⁹¹²

This request from Turkey was given to General Abizaid by General Hilmi Özkök. Foreign Minister Gül emphasized Turkey's interest to join the force during his Washington visit on 22-26 July 2003.⁹¹³ The U.S. was acting positive about Turkey's interests. They asked Turkey to join the coalition under the following conditions:

- Turkish forces would be located in the north-western part of Iraq. Ramadi and Fallujah were the center of Iraqi insurgency.

⁹⁰⁸ Melih Meriç, *Cüval Günü 4 Temmuz*, Guzel Dunya Yayınları, Istanbul, 2007, p.82.

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.28.

⁹¹⁰ Ibid., p.8.

⁹¹¹ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.211.

⁹¹² Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, p.121.

⁹¹³ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p.225.
Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, p.122.

- A specific area in this region would be given to Turkey and the command of that region would be in the hands of the Turkish military.
- One brigade and one division would be the only forces Turkey shall send. The rest of the brigades would be constructed by the other volunteer countries.⁹¹⁴

Under these circumstances the third resolution was presented to the Turkish parliament. The parliament discussed and passed the resolution on October 7 of 2003. This bill approved sending Turkish troops to Iraq for one year for peacemaking and peacekeeping purposes.⁹¹⁵

There was a strong opposition from the Kurdish side to Turkey's military involvement in Northern Iraq. Yet, Kurds were not the only ones opposed to the Turkish military deployment. Also the Arabic mayor of Fallujah said "bringing Turkish troops to Iraq would be a punishment for the Kurds."⁹¹⁶ Talabani officially stated that the Iraqi people did not want Turkey's involvement in the peacekeeping process.⁹¹⁷

The U.S. was struggling to convince the Kurds about Turkey's military involvement in the peacekeeping process. Yetkin explains in his book the reasons for the struggle:

1. The U.S. underestimated the power of Iraqis. The council members were appointed by the U.S. and led by Bremer. Still, they were representing Iraqi people. They showed resistance for Turkey's involvement.
2. Kurds believed that peacekeeping was not the real reason for Turkey's military deployment to Iraq. They suspected that Turkey would like to control Northern Iraq.
3. Washington was confused about the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. The decision makers were asking themselves if getting into Iraq and Afghanistan was the right thing to do.⁹¹⁸

Once again the same thing happened just like with the second resolution. Even though the negotiations were done and the bill was passed, the U.S. did not deliver its promise and stepped back from the decision. Once again the U.S. was under the pressure of the Kurds. The Kurds did not want to see the Turks in northern Iraq. Therefore, again Turkey couldn't send its soldiers to Northern Iraq. This was the second time Turkey felt the consequences of the March 1st resolution.

⁹¹⁴ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.122.

⁹¹⁵ Ibid., p.127.

Hüsnü Mahalli, *Tezkereden Tezkereye Gerçekler*, Iskele Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.168.
Meliha Bilge Altunışık, 2006, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No.2, p.191.

⁹¹⁶ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.255.

⁹¹⁷ Hüsnü Mahalli, *Tezkereden Tezkereye Gerçekler*, Iskele Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.151.

⁹¹⁸ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.257.

General Franks was still not in good standings with Turkey. He was still angry with the March 1st resolution and concerned about Turkey's relationship with Kurds. He was making impolite comments about Turkey.⁹¹⁹ And Turkey had been criticizing CENTCOM and the Kurds. Unlike Franks, General James Jones tried his best to recover the relations between the U.S. and Turkey.⁹²⁰

As a matter of fact, the U.S. saved a lot of money thanks to Turkey's non-involvement in the Iraq Operation.⁹²¹ Additionally, due to Turkey absence in Iraq, the U.S. could work more closely with Kurds in Northern Iraq. After the operation the Kurds became the main allies of the U.S.⁹²² After the operation, Turkey wanted to get involved, but this time the U.S. was not willing to cooperate with Turkey.⁹²³

⁹¹⁹ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, pp.348-349.

⁹²⁰ Ibid., p.346.

⁹²¹ Ibid.

⁹²² Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.346.

⁹²³ Ibid.

10. LEGITIMACY AND AFTERMATH OF THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

10.1. Introduction

One of the most important issues connected with U.S. foreign policy towards Iraq was obviously the legitimacy of the war. The Iraq War was criticized by almost the entire world. It is obvious that the standings of the U.S., its international alliances and foreign policy parameters were in question due to the Iraq Operation. The main question was not about the operation or the 9/11 attacks, but the legitimacy of this war. Due to poor explanations of the *casus belli*, the U.S. lost a lot of trust and support of the major players of the world politics. Even the relations with Turkey were negatively affected by the U.S. war plans.

The Bush Administration claimed several reasons for the war. Firstly, the possibility that Iraq had WMD production capability and that it could potentially use the WMD. Secondly, that Saddam's regime has ties to terrorist organizations, especially those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, there were also some sub-files for Saddam: being a tyrant, killing thousands of his people with biological and chemical weapons, preventing the potential emergence of democracy. Obviously it would be impossible to say that Saddam did not commit any these crimes. But no matter what, the real question was not about Saddam. The question asked by the entire world was could the U.S. stop these actions without using military power and invading Iraq? The answer of this question has changed world politics. Alliances shifted and the balance of power was changed. Therefore, it is most beneficial to analyze these claims and come to some judgment about the U.S. decision. This analysis will not only answer this specific question, but also show the outcome of the alliances.


10.2. The Iraq Operation

After Turkey's refusal to let the U.S. troops use its land to get into Iraq, Saddam Hussein felt more comfortable. He thought that there was no significant attack coming from the north of Iraq.⁹²⁴ On March 17 of 2003 the U.S. Government gave an ultimatum on TV to

⁹²⁴ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.349.

Saddam Hussein. He was to leave Iraq and surrender within the following 48 hours. Otherwise the U.S. would take actions.⁹²⁵ On March 19 of 2003 the Operation Iraqi Freedom started.⁹²⁶

Figure 10.1. Operation Iraqi Freedom



Source: General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, Reagan Books, New York, 2004, p.470.

⁹²⁵ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.3.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.128.

⁹²⁶ BBC, "2003: US launches missiles against Saddam", Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/20/newsid_3495000/3495453.stm, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

The number of troops on the ground was 145,000 – far below Zinni’s recommendation.⁹²⁷ The *shock and awe*⁹²⁸ bombardments towards Iraq targeted the five key players of the regime. On March 21 the ground forces started to move from Kuwait to Baghdad.⁹²⁹ Soon after the ground operation started and the British forces took control over Basra. The resistance was not visible. On April 9 of 2003 the U.S. Marines took down the statue of Saddam in Baghdad.⁹³⁰ Technically, in less than a month the U.S. took over Baghdad. By April 14 the rest of the troops arrived in Baghdad and the next day President Bush convened the National Security Council to discuss the peacekeeping period.⁹³¹ Bush also wanted other countries to participate in the peacekeeping period operations. On May 1, President Bush announced the end of the operation by saying, “Mission accomplished.”⁹³²

Right before the war most of the people were saying that the operation would be very tough for the U.S. Most of the analysts and authorities considered this operation to be as hard as the one in Stalingrad and Vietnam. The U.S. showed its military supremacy during this operation. In less than two months the U.S. invaded the Iraqi territories. But the real struggle for the U.S. had just begun. Even the U.S. administration was not aware of how big the challenge they were to face. The invasion was the easy part, but rebuilding and establishing a new state needed solid planning. It became clear that the U.S. did not have one specific plan for the post-war era.

After the military operation was accomplished the reconstruction became the U.S.’s first focus. Retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner was appointed as the person in charge. His

⁹²⁷ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.128

⁹²⁸ *Shock and awe* - technically known as rapid dominance, is a military doctrine written by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in 1996 based on the use of overwhelming power, dominant battlefield awareness, dominant maneuvers, and spectacular displays of force to paralyze an adversary’s perception of the battlefield and destroy its will to fight.

⁹²⁹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p.350.

CNN, 2003, “U.S. launches cruise missiles at Saddam”, Available at <<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/19/sprj.irq.main/>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

⁹³⁰ Fikret Bila, *Ankara’da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.231.

⁹³¹ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.129.

⁹³² Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 350.

Mary Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p.210.

Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.3.

term did not last longer than a month and he was replaced by Paul Bremer.⁹³³ The first two institutions Bremer established: Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) gathering regional leaders were important for the reconstruction.

10.3. United Nations and the Iraq War

To summarize the UN work in Iraq, prior to 2002 the Council passed 16 resolutions on Iraq. None of the resolutions, except the resolution 678 passed on November 29 of 1990, authorized the member states to use of force. Resolution 678 was issued to authorize member states to “use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 from 1990 and all subsequent relevant resolutions to restore international peace and security in the area.”⁹³⁴ This resolution was connected with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and such wording was never again repeated. Some members of the Bush Administration argued that Iraq had not complied with the terms of Resolution 678, thus member states had sufficient legal authority to use force –“*all necessary means*” against Iraqi regime.⁹³⁵

In 2002 Resolution 1441, “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” was passed.⁹³⁶ While recalling Resolution 678 and other UN decisions made on Iraq, Resolution 1441 does not authorize international military actions against Iraq.

General Secretary of United Nations Kofi Annan opposed the plans of attacking Iraq. On September 12, 2002 he delivered a famous speech through which he hoped to influence the rising debate over the Iraq issue. He emphasized the importance of multilateral actions and peaceful international cooperation. He said, “any State, if attacked, retains the inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, But beyond that, when States decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by United Nations.”⁹³⁷ After the Iraq War in

⁹³³ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p.351.

⁹³⁴ World Press Review, The United Nations, International Law and the War in Iraq, Available at <<http://www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq/>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

⁹³⁵ Ibid.

⁹³⁶ UNDemocracy.com, 2002, “General Assembly Verbatim Report Session 57 meeting 2”, Available at <http://www.undemocracy.com/generalassembly_57/meeting_2>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

⁹³⁷ Micah L. Sifry, Christopher Cerf, *The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions*, A Touchstone Book, New York, 2003, p.310.

2004, Annan concluded, “from our point of view, and the charters point of view, the U.S. military action without UN approval is illegal”.⁹³⁸

The last diplomatic attempt to resolve the Iraq problem in the UN was undertaken on January 27, 2003. There were long and harsh discussions. According to Powell, it could be a last diplomatic chance for the U.S. to gain international support, but it did not finish successfully. As soon as the meeting started, the U.S. delegation asked the Security Council for an immediate action. For the U.S., Iraq failed to comply with the UN resolutions. Obviously other members were thinking that the talks just started and must not end yet. Dominique de Villepin started the meeting. After the short presentations of Kofi Annan and Jack Straw, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer took his turn. He stated that WMD are serious threat to world peace, but it wouldn't be proper for the U.S. to take military action towards the Baghdad regime. According to Fischer, the outcome would be catastrophic.⁹³⁹

That was not a very bright beginning for Powell, who was not in favor of military action. After Fischer, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov spoke. He mentioned that unity is important for the world. Therefore, any kind of unilateral step taken as an action would cause major disputes and conflicts among countries. According to Ivanov, even if Iraq fails to comply with the UN resolution, there are still things that can be done. Therefore, he strongly opposed the idea of a unilateral U.S. military approach to Iraq.⁹⁴⁰

French Foreign Minister De Villepin was harsher than his colleagues. He openly said that any kind of unilateral military action taken towards Iraq without UN approval would be unlawful. He said that any kind of unapproved attack made by the U.S. would cause serious moral damages in the world and the international law.

Chinese Foreign Minister Tand Jiaxuan said that if the U.S. finds any kind of evidence, it must be turned over to the inspectors immediately. According to the Chinese point of view, the solution to this matter must be done politically. All the political channels must be tried first before the military measures are undertaken.⁹⁴¹

⁹³⁸ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 274.

⁹³⁹ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 432.

⁹⁴⁰ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 433.

⁹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 450.

After these statements, everyone was waiting for President Bush's State of the Union Address on January 28. The entire world was wondering what the U.S. would do. Bush officially stated that the U.S. is sure about Iraq's link with Al-Qaeda. They also had evidence that Saddam was acquiring WMD and prepared to enrich his capacity.⁹⁴² Bush even mentioned that Saddam was acquiring "yellowcake" uranium from Niger.⁹⁴³ The most important part of his speech was about the Iraq Operation. He said that the U.S. would expect support from UN. If the UN would fail to endorse a military operation in Iraq, the U.S. would act alone.⁹⁴⁴ This statement of President Bush was the main indicator that the U.S. would attack Iraq with or without UN support.

The U.S. was not happy with the situation in the UN, and the resolution according to which the U.S. operation in Iraq could happen would be difficult to pass. The situation was getting more complicated and the process was overrunning. The Bush Administration wanted to end it and start the operation. They thought that the longer the wait, the more time Saddam would gain.⁹⁴⁵ Bush himself hasn't had a very good opinion about the UN and its leader Kofi Annan. This, without a doubt, contributed to his final decision to invade Iraq. As Scott McClellan, former Bush's Press Secretary describes in his book, *What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception* (2008), "the president viewed Annan as a weak leader who epitomized the ineffectual body he served. Ever the soft-spoken, low-key diplomat, Annan did not inspire confidence in the assertive, action oriented, result-centered Bush. Nevertheless, their relationship was cordial and respectful."⁹⁴⁶

10.4. U.S. Justifying the Iraq War

On February 3 of 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave his long awaited speech in the United Nations, in which he presented the U.S.'s position on Iraq and listed reasons

⁹⁴² Personal Interview with Mark Dubowitz - Executive Director of the Foundation of Defense for Democracies, Washington D.C., February 4, 2008.

⁹⁴³ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.121.

⁹⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁵ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap , Istanbul, 2006, p.112.

⁹⁴⁶ Scott McClellan, *What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.194.

why the U.S. shouldn't let Saddam Hussein to be in office any longer.⁹⁴⁷ This presentation got the attention of the world policy makers. The claims, sources and accusations Powell made during his speech were the key factors of the criticisms that happened later.

Stephen F. Hayes has written regarding Powell's preparation to his speech:

President Bush decided that his chief diplomat, Secretary of State Colin Powell, would represent the United States at the Security Council. Almost immediately after he was chosen, Powell rejected the proposal for two-day presentation. He wanted something short and hard-hitting. The address would focus on Iraq's proscribed weapons, he decided, because most of the UN resolutions on Iraq related to its WMD programs. It was a logical decision, given his audience, but a second departure from the presentation envisioned by Cheney's staff, which would have devoted considerably more time to Iraq's support for terrorism and Saddam Hussein's history of brutality. In the end, Powell's presentation took less than three hours. He spent 80 % of his time discussing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.⁹⁴⁸

Powell defended the case with the earlier reports that Blix and ElBaradei delivered. Dr. Blix reported to UN Security Council on January 27, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it." And as Dr. ElBaradei reported that Iraq's declaration of December 7, "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998."⁹⁴⁹

Powell presented to the UN evidence provided by U.S. Intelligence. The evidence was satellite photos, technical research and telephone conversations. According to Powell, these were solid and sufficient evidence. He also presented a tape. The conversation was between a colonel, republican guard and two senior officials from the Iraqi Army. According to the conversation it was a proof showing that Saddam's regime was hiding the weapons

⁹⁴⁷ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.110.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap , Istanbul, 2006, p.156. The Guardian, 2003, "Full text of Colin Powell's speech: US secretary of state's address to the United Nations security council", Available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.427.

The Guardian, 2003, "Full text of Colin Powell's speech: US secretary of state's address to the United Nations security council", Available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

⁹⁴⁸ Stephen F. Hayes, *Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President*, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2007, p. 390.

⁹⁴⁹ The Guardian, "Full text of Colin Powell's speech: US secretary of state's address to the United Nations security council", Available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.49

from the UN inspectors.⁹⁵⁰ Powell also presented evidences showing that the officials tried to thwart the inspection. Another claim was Saddam's efforts to prevent the inspectors and speaking with scientist. In addition to these claims, Powell tried to show proof of the existence of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. In his speech, more than presenting solid evidence, Powell tried to explain the fact that there was no evidence and that the ones known about during the Gulf War were removed. Instead of explaining that they are still there he tried to change the approach and say there is no evidence that the weapons were not there.⁹⁵¹ Powell also asked evidence from the Iraqis that they removed their weapons program after the Gulf War.

In addition to that, Powell brought up the link between Saddam Hussein's government and Al-Qaeda through Ansar-al Islam which was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.⁹⁵²

During his speech the most convincing part was when he brought up the attempts of Iraqis trying to clean up WMD sites. According to the evidence, Iraqis were trying to remove the possible evidence from the previous sites. The U.S. considered this as sufficient evidence to show there have been WMD in Iraq. Even though this claim was more reasonable than the others, it still did not convince the majority of the UN members to support the U.S. initiative.⁹⁵³

The way he approached this did not influence the world leaders and the other countries. Before his speech the overall expectation was to see some solid evidence. But instead of having trustworthy evidence, Powell preferred to show pictures, phone conversations and videos which did not answer the questions the UN decision makers had in mind. A common fact in the law is that you are innocent until your guilt is proven. The way

⁹⁵⁰ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.427.

The Guardian, 2003, "Full text of Colin Powell's speech: US secretary of state's address to the United Nations security council", Available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

Howard Tumber & Jerry Palmer, *Media At War*, Sage Publications, London, 2004, p.91.

⁹⁵¹ The Guardian, 2003, "Full text of Colin Powell's speech: US secretary of state's address to the United Nations Security Council", Available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.110.

⁹⁵² General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.427.

⁹⁵³ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, I. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.156.

Powell handled the situation was different from this expected approach. Obviously this approach failed.⁹⁵⁴

It is very interesting that the criticisms showing that the war was not legitimate were based on the same arguments used by the supporters of Iraqi intervention – people who claimed the invasion was legitimate. Both sides used the words of ElBaradei, Hans Blix and David Kay in order to defend their cases. The only difference was the timing of their statements. The ones who thought the war was legitimate usually used the earlier reports of two inspectors. The ones who did not believe used the later statements which were issued right after the last inspection and just before the operation.

To be frank, Powell's presentation did not satisfy many people. For instance, as soon as the presentation was done, Hans Blix stated that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspectors had already visited the sites Powell mentioned. The outcome of the search was negative. The UNMOVIC team did not find any evidence showing that WMD existed in the specific sites mentioned by Powell.⁹⁵⁵

On Monday March 17, the United States and Great Britain declared that the Security Council negotiations were over. Obviously they did this not because they wanted to, but because the votes in favor of the operation were only four before the count. There was no other option left for the two allies and they declared the end of the negotiations.⁹⁵⁶

In the past, both the Bush Senior and Clinton Administrations received support from the U.S. Congress, UN, European allies and world public in order to stop Iraqi aggression.⁹⁵⁷ George W. Bush however, did not have the same support from the UN and the international public. The UN did not approve the operation to Iraq. Even though the U.S. Congress passed the resolution to send U.S. soldiers to Iraq, there were lots of oppositions and major questions in people's minds. Also, the public support that Bush received from Americans and the

⁹⁵⁴ GlobalSecurity.org, "Video Footage Shown during the Remarks to the United Nations Security Council", Available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030205-powell-un-17300pf.htm>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

⁹⁵⁵ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.454.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.106.

⁹⁵⁶ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, pp. 433-456.

Mart Beth Brown, *Condi: The Life of Steel Magnolia*, 1st Edition, Thomas Nelson, Tennessee, 2007, p. 210.

⁹⁵⁷ Daniel L. Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, Introduction, Rand, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 15.

international community was definitely not comparable with Clinton's or Bush Senior's public support. Finally, Bush did not get necessary support from European allies or fellow NATO members for the Iraq Operation. There were lots of doubts and concerns about this operation.⁹⁵⁸

Later on, the general belief of the people and other countries and the opposition against the Iraq War became visible. The U.S. looked like a country which would attack Iraq no matter what. This actions cost the U.S. a lot. A nation which had the sympathy and support of the entire world suddenly became alone. The victim has become the aggressor.

10.4.1. WMD

After the invasion the real challenge for the U.S. was not only the future of Iraq, but also explaining the legitimacy of the operation. The world was still asking how legitimate the Iraq War was. The main reason why George W. Bush launched the military action towards Iraq was the Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. According to President Bush and the key foreign policy makers in the U.S., it was the key factor for the operation. It was also important for the new National Security Strategy and Bush's pre-emptive strike doctrine described in the previous chapter.

The Bush Administration, including Powell, was sure about the WMD even before the U.S.'s presentation. Powell's October statement shows how sure the administration was about the WMD's existence and how serious they were about the extent to which they could take these measures. Powell said, "we do know that he has stocks of biological weapons, chemical weapons. One thing you can be sure of: he isn't going to disarm; he is not going to let inspectors in, unless he is fearful of a conflict that would remove him from power.... If peace can be maintained while disarming Saddam Hussein and disarming the Iraq regime, fine. But if it takes conflict, we must keep the prospect of conflict there or else he will not cooperate."⁹⁵⁹

Even Hans Blix's and Mohammed ElBaradei's statements in the UN did not satisfy the Bush Administration. George J. Tenet who was the director of CIA stated that the

⁹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

⁹⁵⁹ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, pp. 412-413.

inspectors did not find any weapons of mass destructions in Iraq after such a long search. In addition to Tenet, the official report of the CIA in 2000 stated that there was no solid evidence for WMD in Iraq.⁹⁶⁰

Debates started far before the Iraq War. The U.S. Energy Department raised a question about the WMD's in Iraq. The question was clearly about Saddam Hussein's attempt to purchase uranium from Niger in 1999. After reviewing it in The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the question was dismissed by former Foreign Service officer Joseph Wilson who was sent to Niger by the CIA to investigate this matter in 2002.⁹⁶¹ According to the CIA reports it was shown that Saddam Hussein had access to 550 tons of yellowcake which was enough to produce almost 100 nuclear weapons.⁹⁶² However, the rest of the reports showed that Saddam did not have nuclear weapons at all. The CIA officially stated that in the reports. The only assessment was Saddam's desire to gain nuclear weapons. The CIA was sure that Saddam was willing to continue a nuclear program, at least in a limited capacity.⁹⁶³ Nevertheless the report was not accusing Iraq of having any nuclear weapons.

Right after Tenet and the CIA's statements, David Kay, the chief weapons inspector, stated before Congress that there were no weapons of mass destructions found in Iraq.⁹⁶⁴ Kay also clearly stated that Iraq had intentions of building WMD. He asked for the additional time for 6-9 month for a complete search.⁹⁶⁵ Kay's reports and statements must be analyzed carefully. The press and television point out that Kay did not find any WMD. This was true. People who believed that the WMD issue was an artificial reason created by the Bush Administration used Kay's report. That was not the only thing Kay said. After his return from Iraq, he made an interview on NBC Nightly News on May 11, 2003. He openly said that the materials he personally found could not be used anywhere but for biological weapon construction.⁹⁶⁶ He stated the same thing on CNN on June 8, 2003.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 422.

⁹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 423.

⁹⁶² George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.326.

⁹⁶³ Ibid., pp.326-327.

⁹⁶⁴ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 351.

⁹⁶⁵ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, pp.404-405.

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid., p.402.

The legitimacy issue started right here. The administration was saying that Saddam had WMD in his stockpiles. Even though war supporters wanted to use Kay's statements as evidence they couldn't because Kay actually could not prove that Iraq had any WMD.⁹⁶⁷

In January of 2004 Kay was replaced by Charles A. Duelfer – the new chief inspector of the Iraq Survey Group. Duelfer stated similar facts like Tenet and Kay. He concluded the case by saying there were no WMD found during the search.⁹⁶⁸ Actually Duelfer's presentation before the Senate was clearer and certain compared to Kay's speech. After receiving the question from Senator Kennedy, Duelfer explained that there had been no active WMD programs in Iraq and finding the possibility of finding stockpiles of WMD in Iraq was equal to less than 5 %.⁹⁶⁹

These comments left no doubt for the people and the countries against the war that the U.S. conducted a non-legitimate operation based on poor evidence. After this the U.S.'s popularity started to decrease more than ever.

The politicians were not the only ones who had different views on this issue. The media interpreted and commented from a totally different perspective, even in countries that joined the U.S. coalition like the UK. For instance *The Daily Telegraph* which covered Norman Miller's speech accused President George W. Bush of being as imperialist. Also *The Daily Mirror* was supporting and covering anti-war ideas.⁹⁷⁰

The reports of Blix and ElBaradei were interpreted differently by most of the people and especially the media. Dr. Hans Blix's report to the UN Security Council on 27 January 2003 was used as significant evidence and often it was misinterpreted by the media. The Daily Mirror stated that Blix's report did not justify the war in Iraq. In addition, The Daily

⁹⁶⁷ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 546.

⁹⁶⁸ Howard Tumber & Jerry Palmer, *Media At War*, Sage Publications, London, 2004, pp.145-146.

Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, 2004, "U.S. 'Almost All Wrong' on Weapons", Available at Washington Post, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12115-2004Oct6.html>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

BBC, 2004, "Report concludes no WMD in Iraq", Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3718150.stm>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, pp. 407-408.

Charles A. Duelfer, 2002, "Weapons of Mass Distraction Program in Iraq: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, February 27, 2002", Available at the U.S. Senate Official Website <<http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2002/Duelfer.pdf>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

⁹⁶⁹ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p. 415.

⁹⁷⁰ Howard Tumber & Jerry Palmer, *Media At War*, Sage Publications, London, 2004, p. 87.

Mail reported that the report did not reveal the “*smoking gun*” in Iraq.⁹⁷¹ On the other hand, newspapers like The Guardian and Daily Telegraph reported the opposite view. According to The Guardian, Blix’s report was a justification of the Iraq war. The Daily Telegraph also reported that Blix’s report supported the UK-U.S. policy towards Iraq.⁹⁷²

Sir Richard Dearlove, the Head of the British MI-6 traveled to Washington D.C. to get some information about the proceedings. After meeting with Condoleezza Rice, Hadley, Scooter Libby and Congressman Porter, he told his counterpart George Tenet that the war is not about WMD. It is about something bigger like shaping the Middle East.⁹⁷³

General Brent Scowcroft, former NSA advisor to President Ford, and Bush Senior made a statement in The Wall Street Journal. He said, “Don’t attack Saddam.” According to Scowcroft attacking Saddam would badly affect the right cause of the U.S.’s War on Terror.⁹⁷⁴

10.4.2. Supporters and Opponents of the WMD Theory

Even though there were no WMD found in Iraq, some U.S. scholars such as Robert Kagan and William Kristol argued for the legitimacy and importance of the Iraq invasion. They argued that the possibility of having WMD is a sufficient reason to invade Iraq. According to them, the possibility of having WMD or the potential to gain one was as dangerous as the actual possession of WMD.⁹⁷⁵

The belief of Kagan and Kristol reflects the overall opinion of the Bush Administration. In order to understand the reasons of war from the Bush perspective, a different approach must be taken. Like President Bush, most of the supporters of the Iraq War saw the proof of WMD as accurate and sufficient. They gave Berger and Clinton as the references for this action. It might sound awkward that neoconservatives use President

⁹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 88.

⁹⁷² Ibid.

⁹⁷³ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, pp.309-310.

⁹⁷⁴ Personal Interview with Brent Scowcroft - former United States National Security Advisor under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush and a Lieutenant General in the United States Air Force, Washington D.C., 24 February, 2008.

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.313.

⁹⁷⁵ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, 3rd Edition, Introduction, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, pp. 24-25

Clinton and his NSA Advisor Sandy Berger in order to show the legitimacy of war. During the 1990's both Clinton and Berger saw Saddam as a threat and they wanted to contain him. They actually implemented a policy to contain Saddam's activities and keep his action less dangerous. They believed that Saddam was a potential threat not only to his people and neighbors but to the entire region. Yet, they did not consider Saddam as an urgent matter.⁹⁷⁶ As it is known Saddam, expelled the international inspectors in 1998 and recalled them in 2002 right before the war. According to Kristol and Kagan this era was a dark era for the inspectors.

The Bush Administration policy on this issue differed from the Clinton Administration. They believed that it was just a matter of time for Saddam to develop WMD if the U.S. kept on implementing its containment policy. According to them, the actions must be taken immediately. They saw Saddam and his regime as a serious threat to the Middle East, allied countries and the U.S. existence in the region.⁹⁷⁷

According to the defenders of the Iraq Operation, the 9/11 attacks accelerated the process for Saddam. After the terrorist attacks the U.S. policy makers started to connect Saddam's potential of gaining nuclear weapons with providing them to terrorist.⁹⁷⁸

As mentioned before both sides used the same documents and report as their evidence, only the interpretations differed. Kay's reports played an important role during and after the operation. As it is known right after the operation Kay stayed in Iraq for 8 months and prepared his report on WMD in Iraq. Analysts who found the operation not legitimate used parts of his reports, but there were also parts useful for the supporters of the operation.⁹⁷⁹

The Bush Administration and the ideologists that supported the war present some of Kay's statements as evidence:

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 54-55.

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 55-58.

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 56-57.

⁹⁷⁹ Richard W. Stevenson, 2004, "Iraq Illicit Arms Gone Before War, Inspector States", Available at The New York Times Official Website, <<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E2DD1F39F937A15752C0A9629C8B63>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

- A clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within Iraqi intelligence service that contained equipment suitable for research in production of chemical and biological weapons.
- A prison laboratory complex, which may have been used in human testing of biological weapon.
- So-Called “Reference Strains” of biological organisms, which could be used to produce biological weapons.
- New search on agents applicable to biological weapons, including Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever, and continuing research on ricin and aflatoxin.
- Plans and advanced design work on new missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 kilometers, well beyond the 150 kilometer limit imposed on Iraq by the UN⁹⁸⁰

The main point is clear. The people who believed that the Iraq War was legitimate looked from a different perspective. They argue that the evidence was sufficient to stop the potential threat. They claimed that any minute that passed without any action was contributing to the expansion of the capabilities of Saddam’s regime to restore its former WMD potential. Even this possibility was a reason for military operation.

From the media perspective, as mentioned before, unlike The Daily Telegraph or Daily Mail, The Guardian supported the idea of a regime change in Iraq from the beginning of the discussions.⁹⁸¹ Yet, the world did not share the opinion of the Iraq War supporters. The evidence was not found solid and sufficient.

10.4.3. Iraq’s Ties with Al-Qaeda

Another reason for the war presented by the Bush Administration was the connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. During Colin Powell’s speech in the UN the last part of his presentation regarded Saddam’s ties with Al-Qaeda. The U.S. based the Iraq’s ties with Al-

⁹⁸⁰ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, 3rd Edition, Introduction, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p. 59.
 Fred Kaplan, 2003, “The Iraq Sanctions Worked, and other revelations from David Kay's report”, Available at Slate Website, <<http://www.slate.com/id/2089471/>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

The Guardian, 2003, “Iraq weapons inspector David Kay's congressional testimony (part 2)”, Available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/03/usa.iraq2>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

⁹⁸¹ Howard Tumber & Jerry Palmer, *Media At War*, Sage Publications, London, 2004, p. 87.

Qaeda on the meeting between Mohammed Atta and the Iraq official in Prague. Powell renewed this statement during his speech in the UN.⁹⁸²

That was the weakest part of his presentation. Before the operation, President Bush and the U.S. officials claimed the ties with Al-Qaeda as one of the most important factors of the operation. Therefore, the entire world was expecting solid evidence supporting this claim. Unfortunately the evidence and the proofs Powell presented were weak. Powell based his case on Iraq's ties with Zarqawi who is one of the known Al-Qaeda members. He was talking about Zarqawi being located in Northern Iraq and documented it with pictures of Al-Qaeda camps in that region. Just a reminder, for almost 15 years Saddam was not in charge of Northern Iraq since the existence of the no-fly zones were established after the Gulf War. The only proof of Saddam's ties with Al-Qaeda was statements of some Iraqi officials. There was no proof of Saddam's financial support of Bin Laden during Powell's presentation.⁹⁸³ Therefore, Colin Powell's speech at the UN played a tremendous role for some U.S. allies. It shaped their opinions about the Iraq Operation. It is obvious that these opinions were not shaped the way the U.S. wanted.

Scholars like Stephan Hayes believed in strong ties between Al-Qaeda and Iraq.⁹⁸⁴ Even though 2/3 of the Americans strongly agreed and believed in that connection, the U.S. government and Bush Administration officials like Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld never used this argument in front of the public.⁹⁸⁵

Scholars who believed that Saddam Hussein supported Al-Qaeda brought up three important points; the first one was the common enemy theory. Even though Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden were different on most of the issues, their common enemy was the U.S. They both agreed that U.S. involvement in the Middle East was not in their interests.

⁹⁸² Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.111

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.347.

⁹⁸³ GlobalSecurity.org, "Video Footage Shown during the Remarks to the United Nations Security Council", Available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030205-powell-un-17300pf.htm>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

The Guardian, 2003, "Full text of Colin Powell's speech: US secretary of state's address to the United Nations Security Council", Available at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa>>, Accessed on April 10, 2010.

⁹⁸⁴ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, 3rd Edition, Introduction, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p. 25.

⁹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 74.

Therefore, they might have decided to unite powers against the common enemy. The second evidence was the dialogue between Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein's high officials. In the *9/11 Commission Report* it was noted that Osama Bin Laden sought for support from Iraq through top Iraqi intelligence officers. Bin Laden had a meeting with the intelligence officer while he was in Sudan. According to Stephan Hayes, between 1998 and 1999 Saddam offered Bin Laden a safe haven in Iraq. Hayes noted that Saddam Hussein also offered Bin Laden assistance in weapon development as long as Al-Qaeda won't use it against Iraq.⁹⁸⁶ The last point was also brought up in the 9/11 report. According to the intelligence, one of Saddam Hussein's high officers from the Republic Guards--Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani were with Mohammed Atta in Prague twice in 2000 and 2001. This evidence was also brought up by Colin Powell during his United Nations presentation.⁹⁸⁷

Except for these opinions and evidence in favor of Iraq and Al-Qaeda ties, there were also opposite views and evidence. Scholars like John Judis and Spencer Ackerman believed that the U.S. exaggerated Saddam Hussein's connections with Al-Qaeda.⁹⁸⁸ In their analyses there are some important points worth evaluating. Even though Saddam Hussein was in conflict with the U.S., supporting Al-Qaeda would be a huge risk for Iraq. Even though Bin Laden and Iraq had a common enemy, they still had huge ideological differences. Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party were secular nationalist believing in the unity of the Arab world on the ethnic level not the religious one. Obviously Osama Bin Laden believed in religious unity. He considered religion over national unities. Saddam Hussein saw that religiously powerful Al-Qaeda might cause bigger problems to his regime. He was also concerned about a possible extreme Islamic movement in Iraq. Also, helping Al-Qaeda would direct the attention to Iraq and the U.S. would attack it as it had already.⁹⁸⁹

Another point was noted in the 9/11 report. According to the report, there had been no solid evidence that Iraq provided weapon development support to Al-Qaeda. In addition, there was no evidence showing the official link between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin

⁹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 74-75.

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 75.

⁹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

⁹⁸⁹ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.345.

Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p. 75.

Laden. Reports argued that the dialogue between Atta and Samir could have been only a personal cooperation. There was also no solid evidence showing that Iraq provided training to Al-Qaeda.

The Saddam's high officials captured after the Iraq Operation have denied having any connections with Al-Qaeda. According to John Judis and Spencer Ackerman, CIA and FBI officials were under pressure. Even though both the CIA and FBI were not convinced about the strong ties between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, they still worked hard to prove it. Judis and Ackerman state that this pressure on the CIA and FBI was coming from the Bush Administration leaders such as Donald Rumsfeld.⁹⁹⁰

The new division Office of Special Plans (OSP) which was formed in the Pentagon by Douglas Feith started an investigation. The intelligence gathering was started by the OSP because the administration was not convinced by the intelligence provided on this matter by the CIA. One of the first reports was written by General Myers. When Myers was questioned about the link between Al-Qaeda and Saddam his answer was not good for the Pentagon. Myers said, "I never saw compelling evidence that there was a strong link between the Iraqi leadership and Al-Qaeda leadership before the major combat."⁹⁹¹

Another contrary opinion about this issue came from Deputy Director of the CIA John McLaughlin. He stated that there is no known Iraqi association with Al-Qaeda. He argued that the terrorist groups, such as Abu Nidal, which used Iraq as their base, were out of commission for a decade.⁹⁹²

George Tenet's CIA reports are very important for this issue. According to Tenet, Iraq and Al-Qaeda ties go back all the way to the time when Bin Laden was in Sudan to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi finding a safe haven in Iraq. Even some Egyptian Islamic Jihad militants showed up in Baghdad in the Spring and Summer of 2002.⁹⁹³ These were the possible contacts between Iraq and Al-Qaeda but that was not the case according to the U.S. Both President Bush's claims and Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation officially

⁹⁹⁰ Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American Foreign Policy*, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/ Dushkin, Iowa, 2006, p. 75.

⁹⁹¹ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.102

⁹⁹² Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 345.

⁹⁹³ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.341

indicated that Iraq had the ties with Al-Qaeda. Even more so, they suggested that Iraq was behind the 9/11 attacks. The U.S administration was certain about this. However, CIA reports and Tenet's presentation before the U.S. Congress and the administration's official statements were different. According to Tenet, the CIA never found any kind of official connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. Iraq had no power or direction on Al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks.⁹⁹⁴

10.5. Aftermath of the Iraq War

It was not easy for the U.S. to ensure security in Iraq. After the operation, 300,000 Iraqis became unemployed. It created a significant backup for the resistance groups, especially because of Rumsfeld's misjudgment of the number of troops needed in Iraq for the post-war reconstruction.⁹⁹⁵ The desperate need of troops on the ground became obvious. The U.S. had a hard time fighting against the resistance.⁹⁹⁶ The more battles took place the more the world and the American public demonstrated its opposition to the operation.

In November of 2004, during the NSC meeting Richard Armitage told President Bush, "We are not winning", Bush replied, "Are we loosing?" Armitage answered "Not yet."⁹⁹⁷ The situation in 2004 was not promising.

In April 2004 the Abu Ghraib scandal compounded the situation. The photographs were upsetting to the entire world. The torture and the abuse of the prisoners were all over the newspapers and in the public eye. The anti-U.S. rallies emerged once again all over the world.⁹⁹⁸

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp.341-345

⁹⁹⁵ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p. 36.

⁹⁹⁶ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 352.

⁹⁹⁷ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.505.

⁹⁹⁸ Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, 05.10.2004

Luke Harding, 2004, "After Abu Ghraib", Available at The Guardian Official Website <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/20/usa.iraq>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

Philip Gourevitch and Errol Morris, "Abu Ghraib Prison", Available at the Washington Post Official Website <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/linkset/2006/02/15/LI2006021501067.html>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 352.

As mentioned before, the invasion was the easy part for U.S. The after-war scenarios were the problematic part. The days after the invasion showed the U.S. government that rebuilding a nation like Iraq was not as easy as it seemed. The main challenge became the establishment of democracy. During Saddam's era all the opposition groups in Iraq were gathered under one flag – Saddam's removal. After the new structure was established, the groups started to divide themselves and seek power for their own ends.

On January 30 of 2005 eight million Iraqis voted in general elections. The Shias got more than 70%; Kurds also received many votes while Sunnis boycotted the elections.⁹⁹⁹ This election showed the ethnic and religious fragmentation in Iraq. In October 2005, Iraqi people voted for the new constitution.¹⁰⁰⁰ In December of 2005, a new election was held and this time the majority of the Sunnis voted. Even though there were a lot of Sunni voters in the elections, just 44 out of 275 parliament seats were won by Sunnis. The second election also showed that the votes in Iraq are always diverse according to the ethnic and religious partition.¹⁰⁰¹ Can democracy in Iraq become mature one day without defeating religious and ethnic partition? The answer of this question was most likely 'no'. Moreover, the Iraqi people became very pessimistic about the future of democracy in their country.

During the first two years of the Iraq War 24,865 civilians were killed. 20% of them were women and children; 37% were killed by the U.S. led coalition forces. 36% were killed due to violent terror attacks. 42,500 people were wounded. More than 40,000 U.S. soldiers

⁹⁹⁹ Today's Zaman, 2004, "Joint Kurd-Shiite List for Iraqi Elections", Available at <<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=14388>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010. CNN, 2005, "January 30 Iraqi elections facts", Available at <<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/25/iraq.election.facts/index.html>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 354.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Edward Wong, 2005, "Iraqi Constitution Vote Split on Ethnic and Sect Lines; Election Panel Reports No Major Fraud", Available at the New York Times Official Website, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/23/international/middleeast/23iraq.html>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010. CNN, 2005, "Iraqi constitution passes, officials say Vote was close in key Sunni Arab province of Nineveh", Available at <<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/25/iraq.constitution/index.html>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

Jonathan Steele, 2005, "Iraqi constitution yes vote approved by UN", Available at The Guardian Official Website, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/26/iraq.unitednations>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

¹⁰⁰¹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 356.

were killed. 60,000 to 80,000 were wounded.¹⁰⁰² These numbers were not only bad for the Iraqis but also bad for the Americans and the entire world. The war generated over 4,000 external refugees and thousands of people that have been displaced from their homes – internal refugees. The political system and the infrastructure were destroyed and the situation became unstable.¹⁰⁰³

Moreover, most of the Iraqis preferred to live under Saddam's rule than the U.S. occupation. This is not a good sign for the improvement of Iraq's infrastructure, economy and stability. If an ordinary citizen prefers to live in a dictatorship than a democracy than there is a problem with that 'democracy'. Today the most important question in Iraq is if the invasion worked out and improved the ordinary Iraqis lives. Most of the Iraqis would answer 'no'.¹⁰⁰⁴

The financial losses were also significant for the American people and their government. The cost of the Iraq War reached \$250 billion since its beginning. If we include the Afghanistan operation, the total cost reached over 2 trillion. This cost started to affect the U.S.'s economy and the ordinary Americans' lives.¹⁰⁰⁵

If we try to evaluate the outcome of the Iraq War we do see that the U.S. achieved its immediate goals – it did overthrow Saddam Hussein and installed a 'democratic government'. Yet, the price of the Iraq Operation – civilian and military casualties, refugees, a devastated country, astronomical expenses of the war, damaging the U.S.'s global standings

¹⁰⁰² Iraq Body Count, "A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003–2005", Available at <<http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/press-releases/12/>>, Accessed on April 15, 2010. Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 356.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.409.

¹⁰⁰³ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 409.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Parag Khanna, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*, Random House, New York, 2008, p. 222.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2008, "The three trillion dollar war, The cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have grown to staggering proportions", Available at Times Online, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article3419840.ece>, Accessed on April 15, 2010.

Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 355.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.409.

and relationship with important allies like Turkey and increasing the terrorist danger instead of defeating it – all those costs were immensely disproportional to the immediate benefits.

The popularity of George W. Bush started to fall down from 40% in 2005 to 30% in 2006. The opposition to the Bush Administration was growing. Not only the Democrats but even some Republicans argued to end the war in Iraq. Congress started to pressure the government.¹⁰⁰⁶

President Bush's support was also decreasing in the international arena. Some allies withdrew their forces from Iraq in 2004. Spain, New Zealand, Netherlands, Portugal, Thailand, Ukraine and other countries decided to pull back from the alliance.¹⁰⁰⁷

All these numbers and actions show that the war and the way the U.S. handled it was not approved by the world and by the American people. It was not only the Iraq conflict where the U.S. handled lots of diplomatic and strategic issues incorrectly. Turkey is just one example. The unusual way the U.S. handled the situation caused serious damage to the alliance.

10.6. UN: "Iraq War was illegal"¹⁰⁰⁸

The Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, in an interview with BBC in September 2004 said that US-led invasion of Iraq was an illegal act that contravened the UN charter, "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the *UN Charter*. From our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was *illegal*." He added: "I hope we do not see another Iraq-type operation for a long time - without UN approval and much broader support from the international community."¹⁰⁰⁹ His words met a strong response from the U.S. Randy Scheunemann, a former advisor to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld replied, "I think it is outrageous for the Secretary-General, who ultimately works for the member states, to try

¹⁰⁰⁶ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 356.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 17th Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 356.

¹⁰⁰⁸ BBC, 2004, "Iraq war illegal, says Annan", Available at the BBC Official Website, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3661134.stm>>, Accessed on Oct. 26, 2009.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ibid.

and supplant his judgment for the judgment of the member states.”¹⁰¹⁰ It didn’t change the fact that many of the member states shared Annan’s opinion.

Also the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) condemned the attack as an illegal invasion of Iraq.¹⁰¹¹ Many other similar responses came after the invasion. Jim Lobe describes law groups calling the invasion illegal:

The UN Security Council’s refusal to approve a resolution proposed by the United States, Britain and Spain clarified that the weapons inspection process initiated by Security Council Resolution 1441 last November should have been permitted to continue before military action could be authorized, added The Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and the Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF). The two groups, the U.S. affiliates of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), supported an open letter signed by 31 Canadian international law professors released Wednesday that called a U.S. attack against Iraq ‘a fundamental breach of international law (that) would seriously threaten the integrity of the international legal order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War.’ Such an action ‘would simply return us to an international order based on imperial ambition and coercive force,’ they added.¹⁰¹²

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹¹ Administration of Justice, 2003, “Iraq – ICJ Deplores Moves Toward a War of Aggression on Iraq”, Available at the International Commission of Jurists Official Website, <http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=2770&lang=en>, Accessed Oct. 28, 2009.

¹⁰¹² Jim Lobe, 2003, “Law Groups say US Invasion Illegal”, Available at the The Global Policy Official Website, <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/167/35756.html>>, Accessed on Oct. 27, 2009.

11. U.S. POST-IRAQ WAR POLICY

11.1. Introduction

Knowledge of the immediate outcomes of the Iraq War and the post-Iraq War policy of the U.S. contributes to an understanding of how the U.S. rushed into the war without a solid post-war plan. The problems which arose after the invasion, especially the Kurdish issue and the Northern Iraq problems, continued to negatively affect Turkish-U.S. relations. Finally, the nonexistence of the WMD in Iraq creates further doubts about the legitimacy of the war in the first place. Describing the post-war situation in Iraq and U.S. policy towards post-war Iraq contributes to understanding the U.S.'s diplomatic and strategic mistakes made during the 2003 Iraq War era.

11.2. Iraqi Reaction to the U.S. Invasion

After the Iraq invasion, the general expectations on the U.S. side were positive. Americans thought they would be welcomed as the liberators and savers of the Iraqi people.¹⁰¹³ That was the idea Americans had about the situation.¹⁰¹⁴ Henry Kissinger noted that the Iraq War must be kept short, otherwise the image of this war would be damaged and soon it would be considered as the Western world's war against Islam.¹⁰¹⁵ This pre-war judgment of Kissinger turned out to be right. After the invasion, every day and every American intervention in the country worsened Iraqi's attitudes. The Middle East and even the Western world started criticizing the U.S.

Another of Kissinger's opinion about the post-war era considered the post-war planning. Kissinger thought the possibility of creating an independent Kurdish State would cause problems in Turkey. Also, an independent Shia state would be a threat the peace in Saudi Arabia's Dhahran region. Therefore, a very detailed, careful and visionary post-war plan had to be done.¹⁰¹⁶ Kissinger was right again. The failure of the U.S. started with lack of

¹⁰¹³ James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration*, Free Press, London, 2006, p. 135.

¹⁰¹⁴ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 33.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid., p. 272.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid., p. 273.

post-war planning. The U.S. planning was weak and unfocused. The reason was that the U.S.'s future goals and targets in Iraq were not clarified.

Right after the operation, the main responsibility was in the hands of CENTCOM. Its first priority was to secure the infrastructure of Iraq. Defending the oil fields was the main objective. The post-war restructuring budget depended on the security and the effective exploitation of Iraq's oil resources.¹⁰¹⁷

Iraqis were upset about their losses during the operation while Americans considered losses as collateral damages. Iraqi citizens were very cautious in their relations with the U.S. They had reasons to be pessimistic about the U.S. invasion. The failure of America's support in 1980, Shiite's betrayal in 1991 and the effects of sanctions after the Gulf War made Iraqis skeptical about American promises. In turn, Iraqis attitudes made a bad effect of the U.S.'s view on Iraq. Still, some of the decision makers were optimistic about the invasion and its future results.¹⁰¹⁸ Soon, in face of the insurgency movements, militias, terrorist attacks and sectarian violence, the optimism vanished. The early assaults towards invasion forces were made by Sunni insurgencies. More organized and stronger attacks were coming from Shia militias organized by Muqtada Al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.¹⁰¹⁹

There were two important Shia militias in Iraq that emerged after the invasion. One of them was the Badr Brigade founded and organized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The other was the Mahdi Army of Muqtada Al-Sadr. The situation in the south of the country became so violent because of the internal fights because these two groups were not only fighting with the U.S. forces but also with Sunni insurgencies. But more than anything they were fighting against each other in order to gain the control over the oil rich south.¹⁰²⁰ This war between the sects and the U.S. forces brought violence to the south of Iraq causing chaos.

¹⁰¹⁷ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.186.

¹⁰¹⁸ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 15.

¹⁰¹⁹ Ibid., p. 312.

Patrick Clawson, "Security and Politics", within: Edited by Michael Knights, *Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, U.S.A 2004, pp. 184-185, (originally published in the *National Review*, May 3, 2004).

¹⁰²⁰ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p. 326.

11.3. Kurdish Issue

After the invasion, Kurds preferred not to be part of Iraq.¹⁰²¹ Kurdish separatism and the reactions of Northern Iraqi Kurds were creating risks for the U.S. Doug Feith in his book *War and Decision* (2008) included the questions and concerns the U.S. government had in terms of the Kurdish and Shia's possible rebels.¹⁰²² He was right – as soon as the U.S. secured its victory Kurdish attitudes went out of control. The Iraqi authority was lost in Northern Iraq while Kurds were celebrating on the streets. There was a governance hole in North Iraq. Kurds started to migrate to the south of Iraq and the Turkmen areas. This fact concerned Turkey and the country started raising its voice which was not something that Americans wanted. Therefore, CENTCOM tried to keep Kurds in their region, out of sight for a while, to prevent any possible clashes with Turkey.¹⁰²³ In order to secure the relation, Secretary of State Powell called Foreign Minister Gül and promised him that within 48 hours, the Kurds would be out of Kirkuk and there was no reason for Turkey to worry. As a matter of fact, within 48 hours the U.S. took over more than 300 oil fields in Iraq and Kirkuk. Gül called back Powell and thanked him for his actions.¹⁰²⁴

But the Kurdish 'issue' has another face described in the book *Hell is Over: Voices of the Kurds after Saddam* (2004) by Mike Tucker. The author tells stories of Kurdish people, veterans of the Kurdish uprising, and members of *peshmerga* who helped U.S. forces take over northern cities. The bigger picture is that the Iraq War and removing Saddam Hussein – the greatest weapon of mass destruction¹⁰²⁵ from power brought a hope for Kurdish people that the Ba'athist regime would be over. However, as Tucker writes, “unfortunately, since May 2003, the Bush Administration has allowed key Ba'athist generals to return to power in Mosul and Fallujah, and in government positions throughout Iraq.”¹⁰²⁶ It was not acceptable for Kurds who suffered many years under Ba'athist regime. They have even warned the U.S.

¹⁰²¹ Peter W. Galbraith, “What Went Wrong”, Chapter 10, in Ed. Brenden O’Leary, John McGarry, Khaled Salih, *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2005, 242.

¹⁰²² Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 202.

¹⁰²³ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, pp. 460-461.

¹⁰²⁴ Ibid., pp. 460-461.

¹⁰²⁵ Mike Tucker, *Hell is Over: Voices of Kurds after Saddam*, The Lyons Press, Guilford, Connecticut, 2004, p.47.

¹⁰²⁶ Ibid., p.47..

Army, with which they cooperated, that “the failure to strike and kill Ba’athists, disarm Iraqis and crush the Iraqi Army would not go unnoticed by the Iraqi insurgency and radical Islamic terrorists.”¹⁰²⁷ However, Americans failed to listen to them.

11.4. The Post-War Planning

On August 13 of 2002, the CIA prepared a detailed report about the war aftermath called “The Perfect Storm: The Negative consequences of Invading Iraq.” Negative consequences of the war were in the main focus.¹⁰²⁸ In the report main concerns were listed as:

1. Anarchy and the territorial breakup of Iraq.
2. Regime threatening instability in key Arab states.
3. A surge of global terrorism against U.S. interest fueled by deepening Islamic antipathy toward the U.S.
4. Major oil supply disruptions and severe strains in the Atlantic alliance.¹⁰²⁹

Most of the events mentioned in the report actually happened or were very close to take place. The Pentagon did not pay attention to the suggestions for the aftermath of the war. Both the CIA and the State Department’s suggestions remained on the paper. The Pentagon was not even planning for CENTCOM to be responsible for the peacekeeping process and rebuilding the infrastructure. In the official Pentagon agenda, CENTCOM was just going to get in, win the war and get out.¹⁰³⁰ That was the job of CENTCOM. Therefore, the Pentagon did not pay attention to the suggestion. Rumsfeld and his crew followed their own path, just like they did before the war. Due to that fact, we have the Iraq situation as it today. And the Pentagon has found all the peacekeeping, nation building and the infrastructure building on its table. CENTCOM was in charge of something, which they were never prepared for.

Right after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, new challenges emerged for the U.S. forces. The victory euphoria did not last long for the U.S. because the real challenge appeared: the post-war situation. Before the war it was widely discussed if the U.S. had a good post-war agenda. Invading Iraq was one thing, but taking it to the next phase was the challenge. Restructuring a country was not an easy thing, especially with 241,000 troops. The number of troops was

¹⁰²⁷ Ibid., pp.157-58.

¹⁰²⁸ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.317.

¹⁰²⁹ Ibid., p.318.

¹⁰³⁰ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.112.

important for the U.S. because the environment was not promising a lot. The violence of the Saddam loyalist had already been present. Domestic challenges and battles among different religious and ethnic groups in Iraq were expected. Neighboring countries kept their eyes on Iraq due to their own national interests. The economy, health, security, education and social policies had to be restructured immediately.

Under all these circumstances, the main question about the U.S. plans for the post-war period remained. Soon it became clear that things were not as well planned in advance as most of the people desired. Current issues and urgent matters were on the agenda. The policy makers simply just followed the happenings without a deeper strategy. David Rieff has written a very detailed article for *The New York Times*, published later in March of 2004 in *The Foreign Service Journal*.¹⁰³¹ In the answer to the administration claims that no one could predict the chaos after the fall of Saddam Hussein, he said that it was simply not true. The planning could have been done much earlier and in a detailed and analytical matter. He elaborates further:

In fact, many officials in the United States, both military and civilian, as well as many Iraqi exiles, predicted quite accurately the perilous state of things that exists in Iraq today [November, 2003]. There was ample warning, both on the basis of the specifics of Iraq and the precedent of other post-war deployments – in Panama, Kosovo and elsewhere – that the situation in post-war Iraq was going to be difficult and might become unmanageable. What went wrong was that no one could know or that no one spoke out. What went wrong is that the voices of Iraq experts, of State Department almost entirely and, indeed, of important segments of the uninformed military were ignored. As much as the invasion of Iraq and the rout of Saddam Hussein and his army was a triumph of planning and implementation, the mess that is the post-war Iraq is a failure of planning and implementation.¹⁰³²

Thomas Ricks also accuses the Bush Administration of incoherent planning for the war aftermath. According to him Franks, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith and other top officials spent over a year preparing the attack, but “treated almost casually what come after that.”¹⁰³³

The U.S. had prepared for the Iraq Operation and achieved the short-term objective of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Yet, as the unsuccessful attempts of creating peace and order in Iraq showed, the U.S. administration did not have a detailed, long-term reconstruction plan

¹⁰³¹ David Rieff, 2003, “Blueprint for a Mess”, Available at the New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/magazine/02IRAQ.html?pagewanted=1>>, Accessed on Feb. 8, 2010.

¹⁰³² Ibid.

¹⁰³³ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Press, London, 2007, p.78.

prepared prior to the invasion. As Ali Allawi writes in his book *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (2007), “the realization that Iraq would need massive funds for reconstruction only dawned on the Coalition nearly four months into the occupation.”¹⁰³⁴ The illusion that Iraq’s reconstruction would be financed from its oil resources was not realistic. Billions of dollars were needed to bring that country to the pre-invasion state. Good post-war planning and a smart strategy were vital to implement the reconstruction of Iraq.

As Ricks writes, the Bush Administration had “extraordinary ambitions for Iraq”, yet it failed to provide resources needed to materialize that vision – “partially because Wolfowitz and others had said that Iraqi reconstruction would be largely self-financed.”¹⁰³⁵

Allawi describes the reconstruction policy the U.S. government and the military set out. All the contracts including Iraq’s electricity distribution infrastructure were given to the U.S. ‘military’ contractors – “favored companies that formed a charmed circle and seemed to follow the US military around the world.”¹⁰³⁶ Those companies and also individuals favored by the Pentagon were based in the Gulf, Turkey or Lebanon and as Allawi says, they would get great fortunes on Iraq while most of Iraqi entrepreneurs and companies were kept away from the most profitable contracts.¹⁰³⁷

Lack of good planning and difficulties with the reconstruction efforts were one of the biggest problems after both the Afghanistan and the Iraq Operations. This was the major issue the U.S. administration had to face. Afghans, Iraqis and the entire world lost its trust in the U.S.’s leadership. The problem was that the U.S. did not plan the war aftermath. According to some experts, the Bush Administration was not sure what they wanted to do after the war. Their objectives were not clear.¹⁰³⁸ A military operation is one thing, but the post-war reconstruction is a totally different thing. The U.S. did not plan the war aftermath in both cases – Afghanistan and Iraq. ‘Small details’ like e.g. what governments, administrative

¹⁰³⁴ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 289.

¹⁰³⁵ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Press, London, 2007, p.213.

¹⁰³⁶ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 252.

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid., p. 253.

¹⁰³⁸ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, pp.83-84.

systems, religion issues, finance, infrastructure, reactions of the neighboring countries, social and militia resistances and many other issues were simply ignored or the leadership was procrastinating in dealing with them. Apart from some minor projects, like the Future Iraq Project prepared by the State Department, nothing was carefully planned and prepared for upcoming difficulties and problems.

11.5. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)

On January 20, National Security Presidential Directive Number 24 gave the Pentagon the power to create an organization for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.¹⁰³⁹ The immediate action taken by the U.S. was creating ORHA.¹⁰⁴⁰ It had four line departments which focused on humanitarian relief, reconstruction, civil administration, logistics and finance. The main objective of that body was to restructure Iraq after the invasion. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith was working to found this organization. He describes the circumstances of creating ORHA:

Rumsfeld had been compiling lists of candidates to run the post-war planning office. In early January 2003, he called me down to his office and said he had a good person in mind for the job: retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, with whom he had served in the 1990s on the Space Commission. Garner had experience in Iraq, having helped with reconstruction in the Kurdish region after the Desert Storm. (...) Rumsfeld asked me to call Garner and press him to take the job – stressing that it wouldn't last long, because soon after Saddam's overthrow the President would be sending someone with a political or diplomatic background to become the senior U.S. civilian in the country.¹⁰⁴¹

Soon General Jay Garner was appointed as the head of ORHA.¹⁰⁴² In the past he was also responsible for the humanitarian operations in Northern Iraq.¹⁰⁴³ Garner's dialogue with Kurdish leaders and favoritism towards them started during his service in Northern Iraq.

¹⁰³⁹ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.72.

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, 2007, London, p. 419.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p. 118.

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, 2007, London, p. 420.

¹⁰⁴¹ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 348.

¹⁰⁴² Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p. 462.

Dough Feith had taken many steps to overthrow the Ba'ath regime. He and his people included the establishment of a commission to write a new constitution and make significant personnel changes. Allawi wrote about the commission and Feith's work:

From their testimony, it was evident that Grossman [Marc Grossman – Undersecretary of State] and Feith had no idea about functioning of the state that the USA and its allies were going to inherit inside Iraq. The working model had been that of a quick war, followed by a seamless assumption of power by Iraqis from inside and outside of a country, all working under the benign tutelage of a short-term occupation authority. (...) The entire process of managing the affairs of a country of over twenty-five million people that had been enmeshed in wars, sanctions and dictatorship was reduced to an office that had been established less than eight weeks before the invasion of the country.¹⁰⁴⁴

That says a lot about the mentality of U.S. officials managing post-war Iraq. They actually thought all the things would be done smoothly – the reconstruction, services, oil production, etc., with only a limited number of troops, and they would be able to leave Iraq. It did not happen.

Establishing ORHA was considered as a victory of the Defense Department. Through organizing, controlling and instructing ORHA, Rumsfeld showed his power in the post-war Iraq. He was the major decision maker for the post-war period. According to some views the failure of the post-war process took place because of Rumsfeld and his control in Iraq. It was believed that his agenda was only concerned invasion and he didn't have any specific plans or post-war scenarios in mind. He was not interested very much in the war aftermath. According to some views that was the main reason of the failure.¹⁰⁴⁵

Due to Garner's close relations with Kurdish leaders, he made his first meetings with Barzani and Talabani. Later on, he met with other opposition leaders like Chalabi and Allawi. He suggested to them that they should cooperate with each other to reconstruct Iraq. The reality was far from his hopes. All the opposition leaders had been pressured by Saddam for years – he was the only figure uniting them. As soon as he was overthrown they formed

¹⁰⁴³ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.72.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.119.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 97.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.71.

their initiatives, they stood up and started fighting for their own goals. Soon the ethnic clashes and conflicts occurred between the opposition groups.¹⁰⁴⁶

During the first meetings held between the delegates from different ethnic groups, their demands and hopes were outrages. The exile Shiites in Iraq were the representatives of the Shiite population. The Shiites insisted on an immediate interim government designed with democratic distribution. This meant that due to their majority, Shiites were seeking to be the government in Iraq.¹⁰⁴⁷ The Kurds were expecting more than before. During the meeting they insisted on expanding their land and inheriting Kirkuk into the Kurdish area.¹⁰⁴⁸

According to Kubat Talabani the first mistake was done by the Iraqis. He claimed that by focusing too much on who got what and under what circumstances, made them incapable of forming the government. Therefore, the world got an impression that Iraqis were unable to rule themselves.¹⁰⁴⁹

One of the biggest challenges of ORHA was definitely the financial struggle. Right after the invasion the minimum amount of money needed for ORHA's objectives was \$130 million for a week or two.¹⁰⁵⁰ The financial support was expected from Washington. For the reconstruction purposes the budget allocated by Washington was \$1 billion per year. Obviously Washington was expecting allies and UN support and Iraq's own resources. The projections made prior to the war did not meet the current calculations. UN support and the allies cooperation was not at the level of the U.S.'s expectation. Using Iraq's own resources was very difficult to turn into the financial resource. Finally, it was far more than a billion dollars per year that was spent in Iraq. The pre-invasion estimations were wrong.¹⁰⁵¹

While the chaos of the war aftermath was going on, another clash took place between the Pentagon and the State Department. When Garner wanted to appoint Thomas Warrick as a member of his team, this appointment was vetoed from Washington. Warrick was the Director of Future Iraq Project and he was a member of the State Department. Powell and Armitage thought this was Cheney's decision under the advisement of Rumsfeld. Afterwards

¹⁰⁴⁶ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.481.

¹⁰⁴⁷ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.527.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibid., p.527.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.481.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Ibid., p.174.

¹⁰⁵¹ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim II, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.174-175.

they argued how the new reconstruction would happen without the consent of the State Department.¹⁰⁵² Dough Feith (2008) explains this situation further. He writes, “(...) when Jay Garner was seeking personnel, Warrick got himself recruited to a position in ORHA. I heard Wolfowitz inform Rumsfeld about Warrick. I don’t know if anyone else spoke with Rumsfeld about him, but Rumsfeld himself later told me that urged Garner to un-hire Warrick, Garner did so.”¹⁰⁵³ Feith explains also that keeping Warrick out of ORHA wasn’t ignoring the entire project of Iraq’s future. He says that Rumsfeld supported the appointment of Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Garner’s top political adviser.¹⁰⁵⁴

This was not the only conflict between the Pentagon and the State Department. One of the most important projects organized by the State Department was the Future Iraq Project. Some important Middle East experts from the State Department gained tremendous experience during the Future of Iraq Project studies. Even though they gathered essential knowledge on the post-war Iraq’s options, they were not a part of ORHA.¹⁰⁵⁵ The Pentagon was excluding the State Department players from the decision making process. This ‘cold war’ between Powell and Rumsfeld started because of the appointments. The crisis lasted while the U.S. was trying to establish order in Iraq. The crisis between the two secretaries and two departments significantly affected U.S. foreign policy in the region.

One of the first goals ORHA tried to achieve were creating an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), restoring basic services and recalling the Iraq Army.¹⁰⁵⁶

Yet ORHA was not successful in post-war Iraq. One of the most important reasons was obviously the lack of resources and background clashes of the two major U.S. Departments. Due to these two obstacles ORHA was not receiving enough funds, human resources or attention from the administration. Even Jay Garner admitted failure during his interviews.¹⁰⁵⁷ The lack of post-war planning showed its negative affect starting with ORHA.

¹⁰⁵² Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.462.

¹⁰⁵³ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 377.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 378.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.82.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.89.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Ibid., pp.73-76.

11.6. The Role of Exiles

The role of exiles was another issue before and after the Iraq Operation. Dough Feith describes how the U.S. leadership wanted to implement the “*liberation*” policy. “The way to implement this policy would be to enter into a working partnership with some Iraqis before the war began. The only Iraqis available to work with us, of course, were the externals – the Kurds in Northern Iraq and the exile abroad. My office looked for ways to get Iraqi externals involved in the liberation of the country. We proposed that they served as advisers to our war planners and encouraged the U.S. intelligence community to seek information from all the external groups.”¹⁰⁵⁸

Before and during the war, Ahmad Chalabi¹⁰⁵⁹ was very important for the U.S. Since the Iraq Liberation Act signed by President Clinton, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) led by Chalabi was seen as the major post-war player.¹⁰⁶⁰ Chalabi was the President of the INC and had been working actively to start a rebel movement against Saddam since 1991.¹⁰⁶¹ Even though Colin Powell was not in favor of giving him U.S. money to control Iraq, the resistance stopped Powell. Chalabi and his 600 men militia arrived in Iraq immediately after the invasion. They landed in Northern Iraq to take the office with the support of the U.S.¹⁰⁶²

Powell responded to this issue. His view was different than the Pentagon’s. He was asking, how come the U.S. made the entire world believe in itself unless they allowed Iraqis

¹⁰⁵⁸ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, pp. 368-369.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ahmad Chalabi was born in Iraq, but grew in Great Britain and in the United States. He had a PhD from University of Chicago. He had absolutely no back up of the Iraqi people. He did not have a following community in Iraq. His only support was the United States. For years he had been friends with influential people from the State Department and Pentagon – people like Richard Parle, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. After the Gulf War, CIA cooperated with him in order to establish the Iraqi National Congress. Soon after, even the CIA pulled back its support for him. Even though he did not have any polls in Iraq and he lost most of his support in U.S., Vice President Cheney, Wolfowitz and Feith kept on introducing him as the future of Iraq. After a while even they gave up on him.

George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007

Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, Penguin Books, London, 2004, p.164-165

David Rieff, 2003, “Blueprint for a Mess”, Available at the New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/magazine/02IRAQ.html?pagewanted=1>>, Accessed on Feb. 8, 2010.

¹⁰⁶⁰ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.421.

¹⁰⁶¹ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.397.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.34.

¹⁰⁶² Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.462.

to elect their own leadership? If the U.S. would not allow them to elect their own leaders, then the entire world would have doubts about American leadership and the U.S.'s democratic intentions of the invasion. This opinion was backed up by Wolfowitz long after the invasion. Wolfowitz said that they should have let Iraqis govern themselves the minute they arrived in Baghdad.¹⁰⁶³

Powell immediately sent Ryan Crocker and Zalmay Khalidzad to Iraq as special envoys of the President. In addition, Garner announced that an IIG will be in office within less than two months.¹⁰⁶⁴ Garner was thinking about ruling the country with Iraqis and their American advisers until the exiles like Ayad Allawi and Chalabi took over power and a new government would be established.¹⁰⁶⁵

Meanwhile, serious resistance and violence by Saddam loyalists and U.S. opposed groups started taking place in Iraq. These attacks suddenly came to an enormous level – bombings of the government buildings, electricity and phone lines destructions, assassination attempts. Water and medical care problems emerged. During this time Wolfowitz was called up to report to Congress.¹⁰⁶⁶

11.7. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

It would not be fair to put the entire blame for the failure of ORHA on Garner. The real reasons of failure were in Washington. Too little of the prewar planning, disregard of the post-war analysis, sending too few troops and allowing the looting caused the eventual failure of ORHA and Garner.¹⁰⁶⁷ Even though most of the people said Garner was fired, it was not the case.¹⁰⁶⁸ As mentioned before, and noted by Dough Feith in his book, Garner was

¹⁰⁶³ Ibid., p.462.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.463.
Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 441, 443.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.474.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.465.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.141.

¹⁰⁶⁸ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.531.

Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 423.

sent to be the director of ORHA temporarily. He knew about this before he went there.¹⁰⁶⁹ The failure and the bad news coming from Iraq to DC fastened the process of a new approach. Therefore, Garner was immediately replaced by L. Paul Bremer.¹⁰⁷⁰ A month before the appointment Bremer was a former U.S. Ambassador working in the private sector.¹⁰⁷¹ Thus, for some, his appointment was surprising. Yet, it was significant in Washington politics. Bremer was President Bush's personal envoy – 'the American viceroy' to occupied Iraq.¹⁰⁷² This also meant that Khalilzad's status was changing. He was not the man in charge anymore.¹⁰⁷³ There was to be one boss in Iraq and that was Bremer. As Feith (2008) writes, "a few days before the Baghdad conference convened, President Bush decided to appoint former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as the new senior U.S. civilian official in Iraq. My understanding was (and remains) that this was done at Rumsfeld's initiative, with encouragement from Rice."¹⁰⁷⁴ Feith summarizes that Bremer's appointment meant that the Iraq's occupation government was now passing from military to civilian hands.¹⁰⁷⁵

It was most likely the first time since the Iraq invasion that the Pentagon and the State Department agreed on something. ORHA was replaced by CPA.¹⁰⁷⁶ A twelve-member council consisting of Iraqis would be the IGC. Colin Powell approved this idea. He thought that it would be better than handing the country over to the exiles.¹⁰⁷⁷ The CPA was authorized under UN Resolution 1483, on May 22. The nature of the CPA was ambiguous so it helped to deflect criticism and lawsuits. The resolution also allowed creating the

¹⁰⁶⁹ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 348, pp.422-423.

¹⁰⁷⁰ L. Paul Bremer was the director of personnel under Kissinger. Later he was appointed as the Ambassador of Holland. Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.141.

Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.486.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.140.

¹⁰⁷¹ L. Paul Bremer III, Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Built a Future Hope*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2006, p.4.

¹⁰⁷² Ibid.

¹⁰⁷³ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.386.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 422.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.465.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid.

Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) which would serve as a sort of bank account for the Iraq's oil money.¹⁰⁷⁸

On May 12 of 2003, Bremer took over.¹⁰⁷⁹ Instead of reshaping ORHA he constructed a new organization called The CPA. It was created as a division of the U.S. Department of Defense. It consisted of mostly temporary employees from which only few had overseas experience. Most were former Republican campaign workers or supporters.¹⁰⁸⁰ On the day of his appointment, before leaving for Baghdad, Bremer met with Feith and told him about his immediate plans upon arrival. The two men worked together prior to Bremer's appointment, as Feith and his team was briefing Bremer of the Iraq's post-war situation.¹⁰⁸¹ Bremer wanted his arrival in Iraq to have a theme: "The Ba'athists are not coming back". At that time the U.S. forces had not yet captured Saddam Hussein and Iraqis who were afraid of the Ba'athists made them unwilling to cooperate with the U.S. forces. Therefore to gain trust, Bremer wanted to first offer Iraqis the assurance that the CPA and coalition military would not only capture Saddam, but also eliminate his apparatus of tyranny and make sure that they wouldn't take the government back.¹⁰⁸² This theme of De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society was made CPA Order No.1. The Order banned top Ba'ath Party members from holding government positions then and in the future.¹⁰⁸³ Despite of the wise 'arrival theme', Bremer made some immediate and sharp decisions. Since the first days in office he did not build a good reputation.¹⁰⁸⁴

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 106.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Michael Skiff, David Corn, *Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2006, p.224.

¹⁰⁸⁰ James Stephenson, *Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider's View on Iraq's Reconstruction*, Potomac Books, Washington D.C., 2007, p.16.

¹⁰⁸¹ L. Paul Bremer III, Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Built a Future Hope*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2006, p.39-40.

¹⁰⁸² Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 427.

¹⁰⁸³ Ibid., p. 429.

Peter W. Galbraith, *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence created a war without end*, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 2006, p.119.

¹⁰⁸⁴ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.417.

Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.278.

On May 19 of 2003, Rumsfeld announced that he was planning to disband the Iraq Army. Later, on May 23, Bremer made his first important decision.¹⁰⁸⁵ By CPA order No. 2 – that Feith was familiar with back on May 9, Bremer disbanded a whole list of Iraqi military and national security entities, including: Defense Ministry; Ministry of Information; Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS); Special Security Organization (SSO); Saddam’s bodyguards; Army, air force, navy, and other regular military services; Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard, Fedayeen Saddam and other paramilitaries; Revolutionary Command Council (RCC); Revolutionary, Special, and National Security Courts.¹⁰⁸⁶ CPA decided to replace these with a new Iraq army called New Iraqi Corps.¹⁰⁸⁷ Of course disbanding the army was criticized by many people. After disbanding the army, all of the soldiers were left without a job and money. For most of them being a soldier was everything. They found themselves in a humiliating position. Some of the soldiers moved to insurgency and to the militia movements. Instead of helping to stop the violence, this decision just provided a backup for the insurgency movements.¹⁰⁸⁸

After this decision insurgency movements started increasing their power and influence. According to some views, disbanding the army ended up triggering the insurgency movements. U.S.’s wrong decisions in the post-war Iraq provided opportunities for insurgencies. Soon, the Shiite militias and Sunni insurgencies emerged more organized and powerful.¹⁰⁸⁹ Their attacks became more violent and destructive.

There was also another reason for dissolving the Iraqi army instead of restructuring and using it for U.S. purposes. Feith describes a meeting over this issue where the pros and cons of Iraqis Army dissolution were talked about. The plan of disbanding the Iraqi military

¹⁰⁸⁵ George Tenet, *At The Center of The Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Harper Press, London, 2007, p.428.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 429.

L. Paul Bremer III, Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Built a Future Hope*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2006, p.54-59.

Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Books,

¹⁰⁸⁷ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.163.

Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.148.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.148.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.314.

was prepared by Bremer and Walter Slocombe¹⁰⁹⁰, the adviser to the CPA recruited by Rumsfeld. Feith (2008) writes:

Bremer and Slocombe argued that it would better serve U.S. interests to create an entirely new Iraqi army. (...) In any event, Bremer and Slocombe reasoned, calling the old army back might not succeed – but the attempt could cause grave political problems. As Bremer reported Kurdish leaders ‘made it clear’ to him that recalling Saddam’s army would cause their region to secede from Iraq, ‘which would have triggered a civil war and tempted Turkey and Iran to invade Iraq to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.’ Shiite leaders, he said, would have stopped cooperating with U.S.-led forces and taken up arms against us.¹⁰⁹¹

Feith has written that critics commonly suggested that every problem is the result of some policy maker’s error. But policy making often involves choosing to accept one set of problems over another.¹⁰⁹² And this was exactly that kind of situation; where the decision makers must choose between bad and worst.

At that time the CPA seemed completely “disorganized and out of touch”. James Kimsey, a founder of America Online (AOL) and America’s most successful businessman contributing to the Republican Party got involved in the post-war efforts. He traveled to Baghdad and he was shocked and disappointed by the American leadership in Iraq. After he returned, he sent a letter to President Bush, in which he said, “a certain miasma of fear and uncertainty emanating from Baghdad.”¹⁰⁹³

In addition to the military dissolution, the CPA made some even sharper decisions. Bremer officially limited the role of Iraqis in the political and strategic decision making process. The CPA’s decisions became supreme law. Bremer wanted to set a time line to restore the system and hand over the administration to Iraqis. He did not want the U.S. to be seen as long time foreign occupiers. He took actions involving re-shaping the alliances with

¹⁰⁹⁰ Walter Becker Slocombe was the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in Clinton administration, Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Defense Ministry, CPA Adviser

¹⁰⁹¹ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 432.

¹⁰⁹² Ibid., p.xiv.

¹⁰⁹³ Michael Isikoff, David Corn, *Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2006, p.427.

exiles. He considered the alliances with exiles as bringing more harm than good.¹⁰⁹⁴ The strategy of cutting off the cooperation with exiles was also the end of Chalabi's dream.

The CPA also relinquished the control over key aspects of the Iraqi economy. In terms of the Iraqi debt, it entered into a series of binding agreements with investment banks and lawyers, and in what was the most important CPA cooperation with the US Treasury, acknowledged the legitimacy of the debt of the Saddam Hussein era.¹⁰⁹⁵ The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) and Ministry of Finance couldn't question the U.S.'s decisions. The 'big economical issues' diverted the CPA's attention from Iraq's biggest problem: the fuel and food subsidies, which were unbalanced with salaries. The CPA never addressed this problem.¹⁰⁹⁶

Yet, the President Bush was happy with Bremer's leadership in the CPA. During the meeting with Kofi Annan, he said that the "coalition was slowly getting the upper hand" and that he felt that "Paul Bremer was doing a 'hell of a job' in overseeing the early days of Iraq's fledgling democratic transition."¹⁰⁹⁷

Meanwhile, the meetings in Washington had not been brining much hope for the current and future situation in Iraq. In a closed meeting, General Abizaid told Secretary Powell, "in the Iraqi population we are outsiders. Unless we move the issue to international level and seek for UN's support that would be really hard for us. Staying in Iraq longer would be madness."¹⁰⁹⁸

11.8. Iraqi Interim Government

As Paul Wolfowitz said in an interview regarding the plan of reestablishing Iraq, the U.S. was clear that its objective was to have a government that would preserve the unity of

¹⁰⁹⁴ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.266-267.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 201.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Peter W. Galbraith, *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence created a war without end*, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 2006, p.132.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Scott McClellan, *What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.194.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.183.

Iraq and represent the Iraqi people.¹⁰⁹⁹ President Bush also said that, “we will not impose a government on Iraq. We will help that nation build a government of, by and for the Iraqi people.”¹¹⁰⁰ Bush was not happy with the mistakes of ORHA’s leadership followed by the CPA. Bush was seeking a way out from this catastrophic situation. Until that time Rice was trying to stay objective in the Powell vs. Rumsfeld conflict. She did her best not to take any side, but it was becoming hard for her to make any decision or advise the president. In June 2004 the new IIG was created. This was technically the end of the CPA and a major change in the White House policy.¹¹⁰¹ More important tasks of CPA were transferred to the newly established U.S. Embassy, led by former UN ambassador John Negroponte. Both the embassy and IIG took over a whole range of difficult and unresolved issues.¹¹⁰²

After creating IIG, President Bush gave a Presidential Directive (NSPD-36).¹¹⁰³ This directive significantly changed White House policy. When the war started, Bush had given another presidential directive to ORHA under the Defense Department. It meant that the reconstruction of Iraq would be done by the Pentagon and not the State Department. After an unpleasant experience with ORHA, President Bush gave another directive to hand things over to the State Department. The new era started with the new presidential directive. IIG replaced CPA and the State Department took the lead in Iraq. The new IIG did not exclude Ba’athists. Moreover, some of them joined it. Interim Prime Minister, a Sunni Arab Ayad Allawi, despite of the Kurdish leaders’ opposition, took oath on June 2, 2004.¹¹⁰⁴ The Kurds

¹⁰⁹⁹ Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

¹¹⁰⁰ “Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Wednesday, November 14, 2001 at the Fletcher Conference”, in Ed. Lee Crane, Wolfowitz on Point: Reorganizing World Reality, Pavilion Press, Philadelphia, 2004, p.187.

¹¹⁰¹ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.174.

¹¹⁰² Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 287.

Personal Interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann – President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Washington D.C., 3 July 2008.

¹¹⁰³ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.174.

¹¹⁰⁴ Associated Press, 2004, “Profiles: Key Figures in Iraq interim government”, Available at the Guardian Official Website, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/28/iraq1>>, Accessed on Feb. 9, 2010.

The New York Times, 2004, “Iraq’s Interim Government”, Available at The New York Times Official Website, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/02/opinion/iraq-s-interim-government.html>>, Accessed on Feb. 9, 2010.

threatened non-cooperation, but Washington and Allawi himself were able to convince them to participate in the IIG. The Kurds accepted many senior positions in the government including the vice-presidency.¹¹⁰⁵

Allawi called Iraqis to rally around the new government and the new system. He promised them to organize free elections by January 31, 2005.¹¹⁰⁶ Soon after, Paul Bremer returned to the U.S. It was the end of an era and the beginning of a new one – a major change in U.S. foreign policy towards Iraq. Rice, Powell and the Iraqi people were in charge of the new situation. The power of Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith was decreasing in Washington.¹¹⁰⁷ The major policy shift was visible, especially since the UN returned to the center stage in Iraq. It was an outcome of rethinking the situation by the U.S. leaders. The insurgency and hostility from the Sunni Arabs was a real, burning problem. The U.S. government understood that stability couldn't be achieved without the involvement of the Sunni Arabs and even the props of the Ba'athists regime.¹¹⁰⁸ The U.S. strategy in Iraq asked for significant changes.

11.9. Abu Ghraib Scandal: Damage to the U.S.'s Reputation

The United States wasn't prepared for the flood of prisoners after the Iraq invasion. By fall of 2003, the Abu Ghraib prison contained some ten thousand prisoners and soon it became one of the hot spots of the Iraq War.¹¹⁰⁹ Saddam supporters and resistance forces were incarcerated. The American Government had been aware of the problems at Abu Ghraib since January of 2004. The leadership knew that tangible proof of prisoner abuse

¹¹⁰⁵ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 285.

¹¹⁰⁶ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.174.

CNN.com, 2004, "New Iraq leaders get cleric's nod", Available at the CNN International Website, <<http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/03/iraq.un/index.html>>, Accessed on Feb. 10, 2010.

¹¹⁰⁷ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.175.

¹¹⁰⁸ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 289.

¹¹⁰⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Press, London, 2007, p.238.

(videos, photographs) existed and that they might get leaked to the press.¹¹¹⁰ On Wednesday April 28, Colombia Broadcasting Systems (CBS) broadcasted a 60 minutes video about American soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners. Many photographs were showed on TV. Iraqi prisoners were handcuffed and hooded. They were nude and piled one on another. The U.S. soldiers were pointing at them and laughing. The soldiers were posing for the cameras with victory smiles.¹¹¹¹ The story made the cover of almost the all major American and international newspapers.¹¹¹² Everybody's eyes turned to Abu Ghraib and people reacted immediately by asking for the responsible decision makers heads – Donald Rumsfeld saw his name in the headlines.¹¹¹³ As Feith has written, "I never saw any news hit Rumsfeld so hard. Though he had no personal culpability, he submitted two letters of resignation over it."¹¹¹⁴

All the reports from Abu Ghraib were deeply shameful for the U.S., the Pentagon and the Defense Department. This type of scandal was not expected from the U.S. Not only the Muslim world or Arab world, but even the most solid allies of the U.S. started to rally against the abuse of Abu Ghraib prisoners. The U.S. army and the administration agreed that the Abu Ghraib scandal was a violation of the Geneva Convention about prisoners of war.¹¹¹⁵

¹¹¹⁰ Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, Penguin Books, London, 2004, p.361-362.

Greg Mitchell, *So Wrong for so Long: How the Press, the Pundits and the President failed in Iraq*, Union Square Press, New York/London, 2008, p.74.

¹¹¹¹ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.501-502.

¹¹¹² Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p.485.

Julian Borger, 2004, "US General linked to Abu Ghraib Abuse", Available at the Guardian Official Website, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/22/iraq.usa1>>, Accessed on Feb. 10, 2010.

Seymour M. Hersh, 2004, "Torture at Abu Ghraib", Available at the New Yorker, <http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact>, Accessed on Feb. 10, 2010.

Adam Zagorin, 2005, "Abu Ghraib Scandal You Don't Know", Available at the Time Official Website, <<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1025139,00.html>>, Accessed on Feb. 10, 2010.

¹¹¹³ The New York Times, 2004, "The New Iraq Crisis: Donald Rumsfeld Should Go", Available at the New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/07/opinion/07FRI1.html>>, Accessed on Feb. 10, 2010.

The Boston Globe, 2004, "Rumsfeld Must Go", Available at the Boston Globe Official Website, <http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2004/05/07/rumsfeld_must_go/>, Accessed on Feb. 10, 2010.

¹¹¹⁴ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p.484.

¹¹¹⁵ Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st Edition, Vintage, New York, 2007, p.505.

Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p.485.

Doug Feith writes, about the situation of detainees from Abu Ghraib from the decision maker's point of view:

The Pentagon's leadership appreciated the importance of honoring the Geneva Convention, but issues arose time and again that required the very difficult balancing of weighty but competing interests: on interrogation methods, on transferring detainees to their home countries, and on whether to prosecute individuals as criminals or simply continue to hold them as enemy combatants. And, apart from the policy dilemmas, there was the potential for abusive treatment that would materialize disgustingly at Abu Ghraib. Despite of Rumsfeld's astute forebodings about becoming the world's jailer, he was not able to head the problems off.¹¹¹⁶

As he further explains, Al-Qaeda personnel had been trained to resist standard questioning techniques. Therefore, the U.S. leadership investigated the available and alternative techniques and their legality. After the legal review, Rumsfeld authorized only legal interrogation techniques.¹¹¹⁷

However, in the book *Torture Team* by Philippe Sands, Jim Haynes's (2008) memorandum signed by Donald Rumsfeld is published. **(APPENDIX I)** Attached to that memo was a paper trail of four documents including a list of eighteen techniques of interrogation, set out in a three-page memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer. The techniques were divided into three categories: Category I, characterized by two techniques yelling and deception, Category II which included twelve techniques based on humiliation and sensory deprivation and Category II used for only a very small %age of the most uncooperative detainees described as 'mild, non-injurious physical contact'.¹¹¹⁸ Haynes memo went against long-standing U.S. military practice and the army manual. They were inconsistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, prohibiting cruel and inhumane treatment. As Sands writes, "by the time Haynes sent this memo to Donald Rumsfeld, FBI had expressed concerns to Haynes's office, down the corridor from Rumsfeld."¹¹¹⁹ Rumsfeld did not see anything unusual in that memo. He signed it and even added a note on the bottom of the page: "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing

¹¹¹⁶ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 165.

¹¹¹⁷ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 165.

¹¹¹⁸ Philippe Sands, *Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values*, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2008, pp.1-4.

¹¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.5.

limited to 4 hours?”¹¹²⁰ This memo was communicated to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami and then later to Major General Geoffrey Miller, who later ‘achieved notoriety’ for his actions at Abu Ghraib prison.¹¹²¹

Michael Ratner, in his book *The Trial of Donald Rumsfeld* describes how some of the commanders authorized the use of cruel and inhumane interrogation methods against prisoners that went beyond the army regulations and violated the Geneva Conventions – including “isolation for long period of time, exposure to extreme temperatures, reversal of sleep patterns, sensory deprivation, stress positions, shackling, forces stripping and manipulation of nutrition.”¹¹²² Ratner depicts shocking stories of particular prisoners. He says about the Taguba, Report, which investigated the abuse and torture of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad back in 2003. The report found that torture and abuse were widespread, and recommended increased training for interrogators and adherence to the Geneva Convention.¹¹²³ Rumsfeld has challenged this report during his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC).¹¹²⁴ The Taguba Report is also mentioned in the *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* – Seymour M. Hersh’s book (2004).¹¹²⁵ Feith doesn’t mention that report in his book.

President Bush commented on Abu Ghraib scandal in June 2004 and cut the speculation that the tortures were ordered by him. He said:

Let me make very clear the position of my government and our country. We do not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture. The values of this country are such that torture is not a part of our soul or our being (...) The United States will continue to take seriously the need to question terrorists who have information that can save lives. But will not compromise the rule of law or the values it occurs, and the United States will continue to lead the fight to eliminate it everywhere.¹¹²⁶

¹¹²⁰ Ibid., pp.3, 5.

¹¹²¹ Ibid., p.5.

¹¹²² Michael Ratner and the Center for Constitutional Rights, *The Trial of Donald Rumsfeld: A Prosecution By Book*, The New Press, New York, London, 2008, p.82.

¹¹²³ Ibid., p.89.

¹¹²⁴ Ibid., p.176.

¹¹²⁵ Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, Penguin Books, London, 2004, p.22

¹¹²⁶ James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration*, Free Press, London, 2006, p. 24.

It, however, does not change the fact that torture occurred in the Abu Ghraib jail and was performed by the American soldiers serving the U.S.

The President's words did not have the power to vanish the disappointment over United States, the nation formed under Bill of Rights and Constitution based on human rights and freedom. For years, the U.S. had been fighting against the countries violating human rights. The U.S. carried the flag of human rights for years. Americans has been fighting for liberty and freedom all over the world. After publishing photographs and tapes from Abu Ghraib the image of America changed.¹¹²⁷ The liberator image started to vanish¹¹²⁸ while the U.S. enemies were using the proof of American soldiers' brutality to further damage the country's reputation.

11.10. Nonexistent WMD

After the Iraq Operation, Powell's comments about the WMD were very interesting. As described in the "Planning the Iraq War" part, Powell was the one who stood up before the United Nations Security Council and claimed that Iraq has WMD.¹¹²⁹ He was the one who defended the existence of WMD in front of the entire world. He was the spokesman of the case. After the war, his statements were totally different than prior to the Iraq Operation. Powell said, "Iraq's WMD program intelligence we had was inaccurate and wrong and in some cases deliberately misleading."¹¹³⁰ The words of Secretary of State Powell were unfortunate considering the people who lost their lives in the name of a wrong claim. Feith also includes wrong intelligence on WMD on the long list of CIA sins connected with the Iraq War.¹¹³¹ He mentions the Key Report, which revealed that the coalition investigators had not found the chemical and biological weapons stockpiles that administration officials had

¹¹²⁷ Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.393.

¹¹²⁸ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.160.

¹¹²⁹ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.543.

¹¹³⁰ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 340.

¹¹³¹ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.562.

¹¹³² Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, pp. 491, 518.

believed Saddam possessed. This document was cited by many journalists, members of Congress and people around the world as proof that there was no case for war.¹¹³²

Some analysts, like David Albright and Michael Eisenstadt who have been writing about the Middle East weapons proliferation, ask a question: “if the former regime possessed WMD prior to the invasion, why did it refrain from using them against coalition forces during the war?”¹¹³³ One of the answers they gave was that the pre-war predictions that the regime would deploy WMD have been incorrect as the Iraq did not have such capabilities.¹¹³⁴ Similar opinions were expressed by Ömer Taşpınar. In one of the interviews he stated that except for poor planning, the intelligence errors on WMD and Saddam’s connections with Al-Qaeda cost the U.S. its reputation in the world’s eyes.¹¹³⁵

Michael Mann in his book, *Incoherent Empire* (2003), also talks about the WMD issue and again, as all the analysts quoted above, articulates that WMD should not have been mentioned as one of the reasons for the war against Iraq. He goes further and says that it could have been just a cover for real reasons behind the Iraq War. According to him, “the invasion was fueled by a mixture of motives to which the new imperialists would not openly admit. Some of them might be considered as suspect motives – oil, revenge and belief that it could dominate the Middle East by military force. The desire to dominate also had mixed motives – oil again, defense of Israel, but it also contained a genuine desire to bring freedom and democracy to the region.”¹¹³⁶ Whatever the real reasons could be, it looks like they weren’t among the ones stated by Powell before the UN Security Council. Time has shown that one of the most advertised reasons – the WMD-- was a wrong assumption that cost the lives of innocent people. Yet, as Ambassador Neumann has stated, the Bush Administration at the time was convinced that the weapons of mass destructions were there.¹¹³⁷

¹¹³² Ibid., pp. 473, 475.

¹¹³³ David Albright and Michael Eisenstadt, “Middle East Weapons Proliferation: Lessons from Iraq and Beyond”, within Edited by Michael Knights, *Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Iraq: Insights and Forecast*, The Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC, 2004, p.66.

¹¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹¹³⁵ Personal Interview with Abdullah Akyüz – TUSIAD's Washington Representative. Washington D.C., March 1st3, 2008.

¹¹³⁶ Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire*, Verso, London-New York, 2003, p.218.

¹¹³⁷ Personal Interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann – President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Washington D.C., 3 July 2008.

11.11. Five Mistakes of the U.S.

When the U.S. first made the decision to intervene in Iraq, the hopeful outcome was different. The general expectation was that the U.S. would be welcomed as liberators. As a matter of fact, most of the people were tired of Saddam Hussein's tyranny. They were trying to find a way out, but it was impossible within that regime. Therefore, when Saddam was removed from power everyone was happy about the final outcome. Soon after the invasion however, with the wrong decisions made by the Pentagon, ORHA and CPA, the image of the liberators turned upside down. Some Iraqis stated that, "every Iraqi leader, including the most pro-American ones says it was Bremer's decision to keep power that changed the United States from being seen as liberator to being universally regarded as an occupier."¹¹³⁸ Also Shoshana Bryen from JINSA, admitted in an interview that the entire Bremer era in Iraq was a disaster for the U.S. and more problematic for the Iraqi people.¹¹³⁹

According to Gordon and Trainor, authors of the book *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (2006) there were five big mistakes the Bush Administration made. These mistakes have affected the outcome of the Iraq Operation and the post-war era.

The first mistake was misjudging the enemy. Before the war, the United States war planners were considering the Republican Guards as the major enemy. The entire planning was organized under that assumption. As a matter of fact, the Iraq Army distributed most of the weapons to the civilians and to the former army officials. During the attacks, it turned out that neither the Iraq Army nor Republican Guards accounted for the biggest struggle. The real problem showed itself after taking over Baghdad. Militia attacks and insurgencies became a major struggle for the U.S. Army. Another mistake, a strategic one that the U.S. military made, was focusing mainly on the capital city Baghdad. The war planners thought

¹¹³⁸ Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, p.140.

¹¹³⁹ Personal Interview with Shoshana Bryen – The Director of Special Projects for the Jewish Institute for National Security Issues (JINSA), Washington DC, March 1st7, 2008.

that taking over Baghdad would put an end to the resistance, yet but the real confrontation came from the nearby cities and villages.¹¹⁴⁰

Wrong intelligence has also affected war aftermath scenarios. It caused the U.S. to stay in Iraq longer and to face with a lot of insurgencies right after the operation. As Feith writes:

The broader intelligence issue was that the CIA actually knew very little about Iraq. (...) the list of important items the CIA got wrong is a long one:

- U.S. intelligence incorrectly assessed that the Iraqi military would remain largely intact and that we could expect whole units to defect to us.
- It incorrectly assessed that the Iraqi police would stay on the job and remain usable after Saddam overthrown.
- It did not discover before the war the planning Saddam's regime had apparently done to launch guerilla-type fighting in the event of a U.S. invasion.
- It did not predict that the Ba'athists would be able to promote and sustain an insurgency as they have.
- It wrongly assessed that the secular Ba'athists would not cooperate strategically with jihadist religious extremists.
- It did not report that Iraq's economic infrastructure was in disastrously bad shape.
- It did not know much about the background or view of many Iraqis (internal or external) who had the potential to be leaders in the post-Saddam era.
- It was wrong in insisting that the externals would not be able to win political support among internals.
- For months after Saddam's removal, it persisted in severely underestimating the size of the insurgent forces.
- And, of course, it made the now well-known serious errors regarding WMD.¹¹⁴¹

The failure of planning was also emphasized by James Risen, the author of *State of War* (2006). He wrote that the CIA, just like the Pentagon, failed to plan ahead in terms of both invasion and post-war strategy. It was not helpful for the U.S. Military.¹¹⁴²

The second mistake the U.S. made, according to Gordon and Trainor, was connected with technology. It was depending too much on technology and forgetting about the real

¹¹⁴⁰ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, pp.507-508.

¹¹⁴¹ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 517-518.

¹¹⁴² James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration*, Free Press, London, 2006, p. 137.

soldiers. As mentioned before, Rumsfeld challenged Pentagon generals about the number of soldiers to be sent to Iraq. Rumsfeld always believed that technology must be used more affectively in the military. In order to send large numbers of troops to the field and ensure their success, the use of technology was indispensable. As a matter of fact, this strategy worked pretty well during the Afghanistan War. Small number of troops achieved some successes in Afghanistan by using high levels of technology. Even during the invasion of Iraq the U.S. soldiers were experiencing the benefits of technology and effectively used it to their advantage. Rumsfeld's plans worked in Afghanistan and also during the Iraq invasion.¹¹⁴³ Yet, the real technological problem came with Iraq's reconstruction. The post-war situation was totally different than pre-war set up and the actual invasion. During the war, technology provided advantages, but during the post-war era technology was not that important. In order to secure the fields, fight the militia and keep the peace and prosperity the important thing was the number of soldiers present in Iraq. The size of the peace keeping and peace making military was important during the post-war period. Rumsfeld's dependence on technology was a major mistake. The reason for loses and the length of the campaign was the outcome of this decision and the dependence on technology.¹¹⁴⁴ David Rieff confirmed Gordon and Trainor's analyze in his article "Blueprint for a Mess". He also noticed that there were too few troops in Iraq and they were too constricted to successfully overview the reconstruction process.¹¹⁴⁵ Too little troops in Iraq affected the number of soldiers who were killed. In the first year of the occupation, by April 2004, approximately 722 American soldiers have been killed. But April of 2004 was the deadliest month of the war – more than one hundred killed and nine hundred wounded.¹¹⁴⁶ It was the time of battle at Fallujah. Had the Pentagon approved sending more troops to Iraq and improved the coordination, the number of killed soldiers would be smaller.

The third reason was adopting a new war style. As mentioned before, the intelligence during the war planning caused wrong decisions and ended up setting up the wrong strategy.

¹¹⁴³ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.509.

¹¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁵ David Rieff, 2003, "Blueprint for a Mess", Available at the New York Times Official Website <<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/magazine/02IRAQ.html?pagewanted=1>>, Accessed on Feb. 8, 2010.

¹¹⁴⁶ Lloyd C. Gardner, *The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present*, The New Press, New York-London, 2008, pp.177-178.

During the war, the U.S. met with an enemy whom they never expected to see. The U.S. Army was prepared to fight against the regular organized military before the war, but what they found were militias and insurgencies who exercised guerilla-type fighting.¹¹⁴⁷ This unexpected fighting style, which actually could easily be predicted if the intelligence did its homework, caused the coalition forces to lose many soldiers. Starting from General Franks, other commanders failed to adapt their troops to the new situation and carry on the fight according to the new rules. This lack of adaptation caused big damages to the U.S. forces.¹¹⁴⁸

The fourth reason was the ineffective actions of the U.S. military and the coordination problems within the leadership. Dick Cheney was an experienced person in Iraq. He used to be the Secretary of Defense during the Gulf War. Colin Powell was also a very important figure for the U.S. Army. He was the head of the Joint Chiefs and Director of NSC. The combination of Powell and Cheney's ideas might have contributed to the overall success, but it did not happen. Even General Richard Myers was out of the scene. The war planning was under Rumsfeld and Franks. That team went through with what they have already believed. They did not take any advice or suggestions from other departments. This action put the U.S. in a dangerous and critical position both before and after the war.¹¹⁴⁹ What was also widely discussed after the war, and what shows another proof of the lack of coordination and some personnel issues, was the Rumsfeld-Powell conflict. Feith (2008) depicts the differences between Rumsfeld's and Powell's work styles. He writes:

It was typical of Rumsfeld and his team to introduce concepts and principles into policy discussions and consider ways to influence public thinking about strategic matters. And it was typical of his State Department counterpart, Colin Powell, to dismiss such generalities and address policy questions within what he saw as the status quo. The conceptual intellectually ambitious, strategic talk that Rumsfeld brought into policy debates met with little patience from Powell, who made it clear that he viewed such discussion as so much theory and ideology. Powell presented himself as the practical man of affairs, taking the world as he found it, focused on the here and now, intent on getting organized for the next day's set of meetings on whatever crisis was at hand."¹¹⁵⁰ He continues, "Journalists have depicted Principals Committee and National Security Council meetings as a soap opera of nasty clashes between Powell and Rumsfeld. It is true that there were policy difference

¹¹⁴⁷ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 517.

¹¹⁴⁸ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.510.

¹¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.511.

¹¹⁵⁰ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 59-60.

between them (and among other at those meetings), but their personal interactions tended to be cordial and their policy differences generally produced no actual clash. When the Secretary of State and Defense disagreed, each would make his point, but those points rarely banged into each other. Though they were often headed in different directions, Rumsfeld and Powell tended to move on different planes.¹¹⁵¹

The fifth reason was undermining the nation building approach. During his 2000 campaign Bush criticized Bill Clinton for his actions in Europe. Clinton spent a lot of time and money nation building actions in Europe after the war. Bush underestimated this notion and focused on the pre-emptive war approach instead.¹¹⁵² Yet, every war has its end and the leaders should have a plan on what to do after the fight is over. Rumsfeld was thinking similarly to Bush. He called Clinton's actions in Balkans as the biggest mistake of U.S. foreign policy ever. For instance, before the war the dialogue between Franks and Rumsfeld was interesting and it shows clearly that the main objectives of U.S. were far from nation building. When Franks asked Rumsfeld what are the main objectives Rumsfeld replied, "first we need to remove Saddam from power, than we need to leave Iraq without military capacity to stop threaten its neighbors with other conventional weapons and WMD."¹¹⁵³ This statement shows Rumsfeld's main objective for the war. Doug Feith (2008) on the example of Afghanistan War explains the reasoning behind that strategy:

I recommended reassuring the Pashtuns that 'notion-building is not our key strategic goal. The term 'notion-building' had bad baggage. In 2000 election campaign, Bush criticized the Clinton Administration for its policies in Bosnia in 1996 and in Kosovo in 1999, which had effectively turned those areas into long-term wards of the international community. Large numbers of U.S. and outside forces were involved for many years in both places. Civil reconstruction was slow, inadequate, and directed largely by foreigners, not the locals. When Rumsfeld sounded out our European allies about reducing the U.S. presence there, they warned that such a move could bring about wholesale collapse: Years after the U.S. military had helped to save those regions' victimized Muslims, civil government had not yet been established in either place. We did not want the Afghans to think we intended to take the same approach to their country.¹¹⁵⁴

With the same logic, the Bush Administration had been planning the Iraq War aftermath. They did not want to involve that approach. And as Feith (2008) has written later in the post

¹¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 62.

¹¹⁵² Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.37.

¹¹⁵³ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.330-331.

¹¹⁵⁴ Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism*, Harper, New York, 2008, p. 101-102.

Afghan War summary, after Bush had criticized the nation building approach, “we now faced the challenge of reconstructing the Afghan community after regime change – a task the U.S. government was not well organized to carry out. Our armed forces and civilian officials lacked the institutions, authorities, and resource needed for reconstruction work. This problem would bedevil us also in the post-Saddam Iraq.”¹¹⁵⁵

This was indeed the biggest problem for the Iraq Operation. The Bush Administration never believed in the importance of nation building. Therefore, they never prepared themselves well for the post-war scenarios. Even though there were some plans made for after the war, none of them was efficient and detailed enough to work properly after the war. When the post-war period was fully analyzed, it was easy to see that the U.S. had failed during the reconstruction of Iraqi police, army, bureaucracy and civil life. It did not happen due to bad luck or one time mistakes. All this has happened because of poor post-war planning, as David Rieff has written “too little planning, too late”.¹¹⁵⁶ Had the Bush Administration valued the importance of nation building the outcome of the Iraq war would be less cruel and catastrophic compared with what actually happened after the war.¹¹⁵⁷

According to General Franks, the post-war planning was shaped by considering Germany or Japan as examples after World War II¹¹⁵⁸. That was a major mistake too. Both Japan and Germany were totally different cases than Iraq. Both countries were industrially well improved and economically rich. Their wealth was not depended on natural resources, but their industrial capacity and capability. They were technologically better developed than most of the countries before the war. In addition to that, these were Western civilizations. The nation, democracy, culture, history, unity and traditions were already well absorbed by their people. On the other hand, Iraq was a country which was formed by British geographic experts after World War I. The country was a combination of many ethnicities. It was not created based on cultural or historical ties, but drafted according to British geographical interests. Therefore, it was a great error to consider Germany and Japan as the models for the

¹¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.139.

¹¹⁵⁶ David Rieff, 2003, “Blueprint for a Mess”, Available at the New York Times Official Website

<<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/magazine/02IRAQ.html?pagewanted=1>>, Accessed on Feb. 8, 2010.

¹¹⁵⁷ Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basim, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.512.

¹¹⁵⁸ General Tommy Franks, *American Solider*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p. 419.

Iraq case. It shows once again the lack of expertise in the Bush Administration when planning the post-war era.

Former Bush's Press Secretary Scott McClellan in his book about the Bush Administration described how the President was dealing with the Iraq War and the occupation. According to him, "Bush's way of managing the problems in Iraq was proving inadequate to the task."¹¹⁵⁹ Bush failed to consult more with independent experts from outside of the White House, including those with different political views, and see the fresh perspective. Instead, he chose to rely only on the small group of his advisors.

¹¹⁵⁹ Scott McClellan, *What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.253.

12. CONCLUSION

12.1. Summary

September 11 of 2001 was a major catastrophe for the U.S. and for the entire world. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. planned a major operation in Iraq in order to change Saddam's regime. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the U.S. was seeking help from its long-time ally – Turkey. The U.S. and Turkey cooperated in many wars, international joint operations and they had been partnering in international organizations like NATO.

It was a very important for the U.S. to see Turkey by its side during the Iraq Operation. As a matter of fact, the U.S. was positive that Turkey would cooperate and act together with the U.S. no matter what the circumstances would be. The U.S. based its predictions on the previous cooperation between the allies. But this time the situation and the circumstances were different. It was no longer the Cold War era or the pre-9/11 era.

Immediately after the U.S. decision to hold an operation in Iraq, the U.S. government approached Turkey. According to some sources, the only thing the U.S. expected from Turkey was opening its borders to the U.S. military for the Iraq Operation. It would help the U.S. to create the Northern Front and start the Iraq invasion.¹¹⁶⁰

Obviously the situation was not that easy and simple. In the previous chapters it was discussed that the main problem in the operation was that the U.S. did not successfully answer the questions in Turkish officials' minds regarding the operation. The U.S. was not certain about their exact demands from Turkey. We can identify this problem during the visits of Paul Wolfowitz, Marc Grossman and Dick Cheney to Turkey. But the real uncertainty about Turkey's role in the operation became clear during the negotiation process led by Ambassador Bölükbaşı and Ambassador Marisa Lino.¹¹⁶¹ When these crucial issues were discussed at the negotiation table some suggestions were made to the Turkish parliament. Yet, at the end of the day, the final decision was up to the Turkish parliament.

¹¹⁶⁰ Personal Interview with Ambassador James Holmes – U.S. Ambassador, former Deputy Chief of Mission in the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, currently Special Advisor for Southeast Europe in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State, Washington D.C., 13 February, 2008.

¹¹⁶¹ Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.207.

During the vote on March 1st 2003 the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted against the resolution permitting the opening of the Turkish borders to the U.S. troops. This was a very important event in U.S.-Turkish relations. Following the vote, the U.S. official--especially the Pentagon--started blaming Turkey, the Turkish government, and even the Turkish military for the situation. Considered as a major fault of Turkey was the decision to allow the U.S. military personnel to renovate and reconstruct some of the forts and airports, and not following up by approval of the real *tezkere* on March 1st. This was the real grievance of the U.S. In addition to this the U.S. side immediately blamed Turkey for not acting according to the code of partnership, but emphasizing the financial demands more than anything else.

12.2. Turkish Mistakes: Approving the First *tezkere* and Two Headed Leadership

In the first months after the March 1st *tezkere* the reactions of the disappointed U.S. side were strong and full of anger. Turkey was on the spot. The U.S. officials were blaming Turkey for not cooperating with the U.S. on the basis of democracy and freedom. Paul Wolfowitz was one of the people who criticized the Turkish military and called the parliament decision, “a big mistake”.¹¹⁶² The U.S. military was also accusing Turkey of its decision for contributing to the U.S.’s financial losses caused by not opening the Northern Front. The AKP government was blamed for acting dishonestly towards the U.S. administration and for not pushing the *tezkere* in the Turkish parliament.

But as mentioned before, the real reason for the U.S. criticisms about Turkey was Turkish inconsistency and unpredictability. By approving the first *tezkere* on February 6 of 2003, the Turkish parliament agreed for 3,497 of the U.S. military personnel to start the renovation works in the Turkish bases and ports.¹¹⁶³ The first *tezkere* was misunderstood by the U.S. administration. The Bush Administration believed that this was a signal to the U.S. that

¹¹⁶² William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 114.

¹¹⁶³ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, pp.34-35.
William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 106.
Fikret Bila, *Ankara’da Irak Savaşları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 2007, p.206.

Turkey would cooperate in the Iraq Operation. That was the main reason of the U.S. officials' anger and grievance. They believed that Turkey cheated the U.S. by allowing the U.S. to come, research, invest and renew the bases, and later changing their minds and not opening the Northern Front.

If we look at this issue without analyzing the talks between Turkey and the U.S., then the U.S. would be right about the situation. But when we analyze the communication between the Turkish and American officials the situation becomes more confusing for both sides. The U.S. administration was pushing hard for Turkey's involvement in the Iraq Operation. More than convincing Turkey, the U.S. was pressuring Turkey to get involved. But the answers to the Turkish government's questions were not given. Even before the negotiations, during the unofficial talks between the U.S. and Turkey, the U.S. stepped forward with many demands and expected immediate feedback.¹¹⁶⁴

During Prime Minister Gül's visit to Washington or the State Department's official talks with the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Turkish side stated that Turkey would like to allow the U.S. to conduct the research and renovation works in Turkish ports and bases. This was a good intention for diplomacy from the Turkish side. Turkish officials understood the concern of the U.S. and allowed them to start preparations to gain time. But in every meeting between the Turkish and American officials the Turkish side was always stating that the main decision would only be made by the Turkish parliament and without consulting with the parliament, Turkey could not commit to participating in the Iraq War. In other words, Turkish officials stated that the first February 6 *tezkere* should not be understood as the signal for certain cooperation in the Iraq Operation. Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, the Deputy Secretary of State Uğur Ziyal, and other Turkish officials stated this several times.¹¹⁶⁵ Even though Turkish officials warned the U.S., the U.S. side still saw the first *tezkere* as a deciding step for the Turkish cooperation in the Iraq War.

However given Turkey's official standing in this matter, the U.S. was not entirely wrong to understand the first *tezkere* as a positive signal. At that specific time Turkey just went through a general election and the Turkish parliament was full of new faces. Not only was the legislature new, but also the executive branch. The Turkish government was

¹¹⁶⁴ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p.171

¹¹⁶⁵ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.75.

inexperienced. The leader of the ruling party – Tayyip Erdoğan should have been the Prime Minister, yet due to his legal situation Erdoğan could not get into the general election and become a Member of Parliament. Therefore, the 58th Government of the Republic of Turkey was formed by the Vice President of AKP Abdullah Gül. Even though Erdoğan was the leader and the president of AKP his Vice President Abdullah Gül became the Prime Minister of Turkey. Gül as the Prime Minister and Yaşar Yakış as the Foreign Minister were warning the U.S. that the first *tezkere* shouldn't be seen as the signal for definite cooperation.

Yet, Gül and Yakış were not the only ones approaching the U.S. about the Iraq Operation. There were other voices coming from the real leadership of AKP. Tayyip Erdoğan and his main advisor Cüneyd Zapsu were in touch with the American officials as well.

According to Fikret Bila (2007) and Murat Yetkin (2004) Gül and Yakış were more cautious about promising the U.S. Turkey's cooperation, and Erdoğan and Zapsu were more encouraging to the Americans.¹¹⁶⁶ According to some sources, when AKP president Erdoğan made the visit to Washington along with his advisors Cüneyd Zapsu, Egemen Bağış and Ömer Çelik, he gave hope to the U.S. officials about the possible cooperation of Turkey in the Iraq War. It definitely gave a wrong signal to the U.S. government. Everyone hears what they want to hear. Therefore, the Americans preferred to listen to Erdoğan instead of Prime Minister Gül and Foreign Minister Yakış.

It would be unfair to say that the Turkish government cheated the U.S. by approving the first *tezkere* on February 6 and failing to give the final permission on March 1st. But also it was entirely wrong for the U.S. to get the wrong impression from the Turkish side. This specific issue might have been the only fault of Turkey. The outcome of this misunderstanding happened mainly due to Turkey's approach to the U.S. Most of these approaches unintentionally gave the wrong signal to the American government.

First of all the reasons were clear. The Turkish government was new and inexperienced in dealing with issue such the involvement in the international conflict. The two headed leadership of Turkey carried on contrary statements and this caused confusion during the months before March 1st. On one side, the official Turkish government led by Gül and on the other side the AKP's real leader Erdoğan were giving conflicting statements about the same

¹¹⁶⁶ Fikret Bila, *Ankarada Irak Savasları*, Güncel Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007.

Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2004.

issue. This uncertainty and the two headed leadership in the Turkish government caused a misunderstanding in the *tezkere* issue.

This situation gave the base for American officials' defense and criticism towards Turkey. After the *tezkere* crisis the U.S. was blaming Turkey for its inconsistent policy. As mentioned before this might have been the only serious mistake Turkey made during the process. Still, it would be totally unfair to say that Turkey promised the U.S. its cooperation in the Iraq War by approving the first *tezkere* on February 6.

12.3. The Role of the Turkish Military

Even though the U.S. considered some other issues as a mistake of the Turkish side, it would not be totally true considering those two factors as mistakes. Obviously the first disappointment the U.S. had was about the Turkish military.

Since 1946 Turkish-U.S. relations were based on military cooperation. Even though the U.S. has been officially in touch with the Turkish politicians and the civil leadership, still the army was playing an important role in the process. The weapon sale agreements between the U.S. and Turkey, cooperation in NATO and cooperation during the Gulf War, made the military relations more binding. The U.S. was used to dealing with the Turkish military and even in the Iraq Operation it was seeking for their support more than any other institution in Turkey.

The 2003 Iraq Operation was obviously a military program, not political a political one. In this case, the U.S. leadership expected the Turkish military to be more active and support the U.S. plan for the Iraq War. As mentioned in the in the previous chapters, in the Ecevit and Gül's era, the Turkish military together with the civil leadership as the National Security Council (MGK), analyzed the possible outcomes of the Iraq War and made its suggestions to both Prime Ministers.¹¹⁶⁷ Even though the Turkish military was not the biggest supporter of the Iraq War, still they considered that Turkey should not be out of the equation especially if Turkey's national security was concerned. According to the Turkish military, no matter what the circumstances were, the U.S. would start the operation and if Turkey stays outside, it

¹¹⁶⁷ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, pp.141-142.

would be a strategic mistake. In other words, the military was not welcoming the Iraq War, but when they considered the outcomes and possibilities with a realistic point of view, they officially stated that Turkey should take its place in the operation.

Yet, the American officials still blamed the Turkish military for not supporting the operation and trying to affect the public view. In Washington, most of the analysts were stating that the Turkish military did not support the U.S. in the operation.¹¹⁶⁸ As mentioned before, that was not the case. Both the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the military in their official reports analyzed the benefits and the possible losses Turkey would experience due to the operation.¹¹⁶⁹ In both analyses they stated that Turkey's benefits would be bigger than losses if Turkey took its place in the operation. It would be true that the Turkish military did not support the Iraq Operation loudly, did not lobby in favor of war, and was not convincing the Turkish public opinion. Obviously this was not the military's job or its primary duty. The Turkish military made its official suggestions which were not against the U.S.'s plan and left the final decision up to the civil government which was a normal procedure in the democracy.

Finally, it wouldn't be fair for the Turkish military to take on all the blame for not supporting the U.S on this issue. The Turkish military and the Turkish Foreign Ministry might have been the only institutions in Turkey which conducted realistic and logical analysis of the possible outcomes of the Iraq Operation.

12.4. Accusations towards AKP

Another U.S. accusation towards Turkey was directed at the AKP government. U.S. policy makers implied that due to the religious background and origin of AKP, Erdoğan and the rest of the AKP leadership looked supportive but acted against the operation.

It would not be right to say that the AKP government did not support the resolution due to its religious background. As mentioned before AKP's religious origin is closely connected

¹¹⁶⁸ Personal Interview with Paul Wolfowitz – Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 24 November, 2008.

¹¹⁶⁹ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 103.

Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2008, pp.79-80.

with Necmettin Erbakan and his Milli Görüş School. Still, Erdoğan and his AKP followed a different path than Erbakan. In his statements in Washington, Erdoğan and his advisors stated their positive standing for the operation. However, Prime Minister Gül mentioned that despite of his understanding of the possible outcomes of the operation, he would have a hard time to explain to his party and his voters.¹¹⁷⁰ That was absolutely true from his point of view. The way AKP acted in the *tezkere* vote, the undisciplined style they showed in the vote in the parliament, was not determined by their origin and beliefs. The Islamic background of AKP and its influence on the vote was the case for some members of the parliament but not the leadership or the party as a whole.

The main cause for AKP's undisciplined actions during the process was connected with other factors. As stated before, the two headed leadership in the Turkish decision making affected the outcome of the process. The differences between Gül and Erdoğan approaches, and their conflicting statements influenced the AKP and the parliament. Members of the party were confused and did not know who to listen to. The two headed leadership and the inconsistency brought Turkey into a loose decision making process.

Even right before March 1st the two headed leadership became spread out even more with the different opinions of Bülent Arınç, the Speaker of the Parliament, and Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, the Deputy Prime Minister. While Yalçınbayır and Arınç were openly against the resolutions, Gül and Erdoğan were more unpredictable about the process. This problematic decision making structure was not caused by the party's religious background. The two main reasons that caused this process were Erdoğan's unofficial situation and the inexperienced status of the government, which did not manage to unite the party and vote with one voice. The leadership confusion caused misperceptions and loose decision making.

Obviously if Erdoğan were both the President of AKP and the Prime Minister the leadership and the decision making would be totally different. So the idea of the AKP acting against the resolution due to religious reasons is not correct. The real problem was lack of unity in leadership and inexperience. These two reasons cannot be considered as a lack of support for the U.S., but rather the internal problems Turkey experienced.

¹¹⁷⁰ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, pp. 103-104.

12.5. The U.S.'s Faults

The three major accusations for Turkey for failing *tezkere* were mentioned and analyzed before. When analyzing the U.S. foreign policy during the Iraq War era – the actions, reactions, statements and intentions--it was clearly seen that the U.S. carried more faults the Turkish side for the failure of *tezkere* and disturbing the relationship between the two countries.

12.5.1. Taking Turkey for Granted

One of the main reasons that *tezkere* failed was the U.S. foreign policy approach towards Turkey in the specific era, especially prior and during the negotiations. The first mistake of the U.S. was obviously taking Turkish cooperation in the Iraq Operation for granted.

During the 1990 Gulf War the U.S. spent a lot of time trying to convince Turkey to join the coalition and take part in the war, even though Turkey did not need special encouragement due to the great standings of the relationship and Turgut Özal's connection with U.S. President George Bush Senior. Özal was a major supporter of the idea of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Still the U.S. executive and legislative branches and their bureaucracy worked more than usual to secure Turkey's partnership in the operation. President George Bush and President Özal had a very good relationship and special channel of communication. This direct president to president communication channel was established right before the war and lasted a long time afterwards. Through this channel, Turkey was immediately finding answers for its concerns from first sources.

President Bush was not the only one who valued Turkey and established the best relations as possible. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Turkey several times to meet with Turkish officials, his counterparts.¹¹⁷¹ Through the visits of Baker, who was the highest voice

¹¹⁷¹ Engin Güner, *Özal'lı Yıllarım*, Babiali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2000, p.99.

Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991*, Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.22.

Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 293.

in the State Department, Turkish officials were kept updated, Turkey felt involved in the Gulf War and the people, government, bureaucracy, media felt a real partnership between Turkey and the U.S. Including the political opposition in Turkey, certain generals in the military and some public opposition, Turkey found itself next to the U.S. in the Gulf War preparation process. To be frank, if the U.S. did not show that much attention and did not give that much value to Turkey during the Gulf War period, the outcome of the public opinion wouldn't be much different than during the 2003 Iraq War.

Obviously in 2003 the situation was totally different. Prime Minister Gül or President Sezer had very limited direct connection with President George W. Bush. Unlike James Baker in the 1990's, Secretary of States Colin Powell had not visited Turkey between 2002 and 2003 before or during the negotiation process. Instead of President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney briefly visited Turkey.¹¹⁷² During his visit Cheney acted totally different than Turkey was expecting. Unlike prior to the Gulf War, instead of giving Turkey assurances or explaining the details of the war, Cheney only brought the U.S. demands from Turkey and expected immediate answers. Compared with the Gulf War, instead of the President Turkey got the Vice President; instead of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and the Undersecretary of Political Affairs Grossman approached Turkey. This clearly showed the decision makers and to the public value of Turkey in the eyes of the U.S. The U.S. was taking Turkey for granted. Unlike during the Gulf War, the U.S. administrators were just making demands and requests from Turkey. The foreign policy officials did not spend much time to understand Turkey's position and concerns and answer its questions. Instead, they tried to push their uncertain agenda on to Turkey. This foreign policy mentality did not pay off. It did not clear the question marks in the minds of Turkish policy makers, it did not make the Turkish public feel secure and it did not make the Turkish people feel that the alliance of the two countries would benefit Turkey.

¹¹⁷² William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 96.

12.5.2. Approaching the Turkish Military

As mentioned before, since 1946 the U.S. got used to engaging with the Turkish military in order to apply its agenda while dealing with Turkey. The U.S. had very close relationships with the Turkish military that was fostered under NATO. According to some analysts, the U.S. officials considered the Turkish military as the main decision maker in Turkey during the Cold War era.¹¹⁷³ But after 1990, with the end of the Cold War, the situation changed and the military to military relations between Turkey and the U.S. shifted to government to government relations. Especially during Bill Clinton era, public and civil diplomacy was ahead of everything between the two countries. After the new neoconservative government took over in the U.S. and with their new foreign policy ideology the U.S. officials again preferred to simultaneously deal with the Turkish military and the government.

The visit of Dick Cheney to Turkey was a very good example that behaviors and policy shift. During the visit he insisted to meet with General Kırıkoğlu, Chief of the General Staff of Turkey. Kırıkoğlu's presence at the official meeting was one thing, but the Vice President of the U.S. meeting with the top Turkish military official alone was a totally different thing. This foreign policy behavior of the U.S. became annoying for the Turkish leadership. Considering the military as a major decision maker in Turkey rather than the civilly elected government did not give the right implications to Turkish decision makers about the U.S.'s approach. It was equal to considering Turkey as a military ruled state instead of a modern democracy. After that moment the Turkish decision makers became more cautious about the U.S. approach. This was a fatal error of the U.S. while approaching Turkey. It gave an impression to Turkey that meeting with civil government would be just a formality and the real decision would be made by the military.

¹¹⁷³ Personal Interview with Gen. Joseph Ralston – United States Special Envoy for Countering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., 30 June, 2008.

12.6. Turkish Gulf War Experience

One of the major reasons of the March 1st *tezkere* failure was the bad experience after the Gulf War. Turkey and the U.S. cooperated very intensely during the Gulf War. Not only during the operation, but before and after the Gulf War, Turkey was one of the closest allies of the U.S. Turkey supported nearly all the U.S.'s actions towards Iraq, including operation Provide Comfort and sanctions to Iraq. During this era the U.S. assured Turkey of its support for the Turkish economic losses and help in the security issues. The U.S. was supposed to compensate Turkish economic losses after the war and prevent any kind of security threats towards Turkey. Both of these promises and assurances failed in the years following the Gulf War – Turkey lost billions of dollars and it experienced many security issues.¹¹⁷⁴

The Gulf War affected Turkey negatively in two different ways, economically and security wise. The security issue became the major problem after the Gulf War. Turkey had an imminent Kurdish problem coming from Northern Iraq. This problem was considered as two separate issues. One of them was the PKK problem and the second one was the possibility of the foundation of the independent Kurdish states.

12.6.1. Security Issues

The PKK problem originated in Turkey. Later on, this terrorism threat started to hit Turkey from the PKK camps in Northern Iraq. During Saddam Hussein's era both Saddam's forces and Barzani-Talabani groups - *peshmergas* pressured the PKK and tried to push their own agendas. Founding an independent state in Northern Iraq was another issue. Because of Saddam's tyranny, the Kurds never had the chance to claim their independence and never found enough space to organize in Northern Iraq. After the Gulf War, things changed a lot for Turkey, PKK and the Kurds. As soon as the Gulf War was over, the U.S. suggested to

¹¹⁷⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991", Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, pp.49-53.
Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, p. 308.
F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, RAND National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, 2003, pp.133-134.

Turkey the new Operation Provide Comfort described before. The two countries jointly carried out the operation. Through the OPC a safe haven was given to Kurds in Northern Iraq and to the PKK. Thanks to the safe haven, the PKK established new camps in Northern Iraq and organized attacks towards Turkey from these bases. While the OPC was protecting the rights and lives of Kurdish people in Northern Iraq, the PKK was attacking Turkey and killing Turkish people.

The PKK was not the only Turkish security problem caused by OPC. Because of the no-fly zones Saddam lost control over Northern Iraq. Talabani and Barzani forces organized themselves better and got close to establishing an independent state. This issue was also a major security threat to Turkey. After the Gulf War these became serious security concerns for the Turkish decision makers.

12.6.2. Economic Losses

Security was not the only problem and concern caused by the Gulf War. While Turkey was cooperating with the U.S. during the Gulf War, Turkey had to take some actions towards Northern Iraq. These actions affected Turkey's economic development and progress. With the UN decision Turkey closed its borders to Iraq. This caused shutting down the Yumurtalık-Ceyhan pipeline and stopping trade with Iraq. The post-war sanctions against Iraq created even more losses for the Turkish economy. According to the estimate numbers, by 1991 Turkey lost \$2.1 billion.¹¹⁷⁵ And if we look at the entire post-Gulf War period the loss was anywhere from \$40 to \$50 billion.¹¹⁷⁶

The U.S. had given assurances to Turkey that it would compensate Turkey's losses. In 1991 Turkey received 2.2 billion dollars in economic aid from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In 1992, this amount dropped down to \$900 million and in 1993 Turkey got nothing.¹¹⁷⁷ The only help that came to Turkey from the U.S. support was \$3.5 billion of economic aid.

¹¹⁷⁵ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991*, Cairo Press in Social Science, Volume 21, Number 1, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.18.

¹¹⁷⁶ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p. 39.

¹¹⁷⁷ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p.55.

Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, *The Özal Bir Davanın Öyküsü*, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2001, p.449.

Obviously the economic help that Turkey received was much less than what was needed and Turkey had lost because of the involvement in the Gulf War. These losses created serious economic problems in the 1990's. Both the elites and the people blamed the Gulf War for the economic breakdown. The consequences of the Gulf War played a significant role for Turkish decision makers and the public to not support the 2003 Iraq War.

The rise of the PKK terror, the possible independent state in Northern Iraq and serious economic losses were the outcomes of the Gulf War for Turkey. The Turkish public lost its confidence for the U.S. after that period. Even though Turkey supported the U.S. in every decision before and after the Gulf War, consequences of those decisions did not bring any good for Turkey. In other words, the outcomes of the Gulf War were a win-win situation for many countries, but for Turkey it was a double lose.

When the 2003 resolution came about in the Turkish parliament, members of the assembly had many concerns and questions. For instance – how can we be sure that through cooperation with the U.S. Turkey won't go through the same scenario like during the Gulf War? This question was a fair question to be asked. The real question is if the U.S. had worked enough to address Turkish concerns and win the Turkish community's trust. Instead of trying to answer these questions the U.S. officials were pushing Turkey to make an immediate decision. Clearly the U.S. didn't work at convincing Turkey and giving real assurances of securing Turkey's possible economic losses and security threats.

The day of the vote, members of the parliament sat in their chairs without any answers to their questions. The U.S. foreign policy makers did not find it necessary to put much diplomatic effort in convincing Turkish officials and Turkish public to accept their plan.

12.7. Legitimacy Question

Out of all the reasons which affected Turkey's decision to not support the U.S. in the Iraq Operation, one of the most important was the legitimacy of the Iraq War. Had the legitimacy question been answered by the U.S. decision makers, the decision of the Turkish parliament could have been different. Obviously the international support behind the Iraq War would have been stronger.

Right after the 9/11 attacks almost the entire world was sympathetic to the U.S. and supportive for the American cause. Even during the Afghanistan Operation the global support for the U.S. was major.¹¹⁷⁸ Turkey also supported the Afghanistan Operation. On October 10 of 2001 the Turkish parliament easily passed a *tezkere* authorizing sending Turkish troops to Afghanistan to support the U.S.-led coalition.¹¹⁷⁹

The breaking point of the world support for the U.S. was the 2003 Iraq War. As mentioned in the previous chapters, for the neoconservative foreign policy makers in Washington conducting the Iraq Operation was almost an obsession. The neocon foreign policy makers designed and rallied for the Iraq War before they had any relevant reasons and proof to attack Iraq even before 9/11. The neoconservative ideology, as explained before, considered the military option as the main international instrument. In addition to the overall neoconservative approaches, the Bush Doctrine shaped under the neocon ideology preached about pre-emptive war.¹¹⁸⁰ Given the neocon plans, Afghanistan should not be considered as the first target of the U.S. within its pre-emptive strategy. Al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks and its bases were located in Afghanistan. Even though the Bush Administration wanted the Afghanistan government to hand Al-Qaeda members to the U.S., Afghanistan failed to do so. Therefore, for most of the analysts, the invasion of Afghanistan could be justified. Yet it was not the same with the Iraq War.

The two main reasons for the Iraq War were WMD and Saddam's regime ties to Al-Qaeda. As discussed in the previous chapters, Saddam's ties with Al-Qaeda were not proved by the U.S. foreign policy makers. Colin Powell's speech before the United Nations in February 2003 failed to present solid proof of ties between Al-Qaeda and Saddam's regime. The same thing happened in the WMD case.

From the beginning of the Iraq War scenario, the main reason for the U.S. starting an operation in Iraq was about the WMD. Yet, neither the UN nor the CIA inspectors proved the existence of WMD in Iraq. Even after Saddam Hussein gave permission for inspections, both

¹¹⁷⁸ Ivo H. Daalder, *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p.vii.

¹¹⁷⁹ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, Soas Middle East Series, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, London, 2007, p. 91.

¹¹⁸⁰ David Holloway, "Deterrence, Preventive War and Preemption", Chapter 2, Ed. George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy*, Brookings Institute Press, Washington DC, 2006, p.51.

Blix and ElBaradei couldn't find any solid evidence that Iraq had and would be using WMD. This information was not only shared with the U.S. officials but also reported to the United Nations. In addition to Colin Powell's weak presentation before the UN Security Council, the report of ElBaradei and Blix further undermined the U.S. reasoning. Their reports did not prove that Iraq has or will be using WMDs.

There had been no resolution passed by the UN Security Council approving the U.S. military intervention in Iraq. The world decision makers saw Colin Powell's speech in the UN, read the reports of Blix and ElBaradei and couldn't get a binding resolution from the UN. Under these circumstances--without evidence and legal approval--the U.S. invited Turkey and other allies to attack Iraq because of WMD possession and Saddam's Al-Qaeda ties. The U.S. expected Turkey to cooperate just like during the Gulf War. In addition to many differences between the Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War the main distinction was the legitimacy of the war.

With the legal approval of the UN (Resolution 678) based on legitimate reasons, the Gulf War was supported by Turkey and the international coalition.¹¹⁸¹ With the United Nations permission the entire world backed the intervention.

The 2003 Iraq War was a different scenario--no solid evidence, and no UN support. Under all these circumstances, the U.S. expected that Turkey would cooperate like it did in the Gulf War. But the basis of the war was totally different in 2003. Any elected government would have a hard time explaining to its constituencies why the country should support the Iraq Operation. Moreover, not only the world did not support it, but even some officials within the U.S. administration did not fully believe in the legitimacy of the war they were planning. As stated before, within the U.S. Congress, among the US public and finally in the executive branch, anti-war voices were raised due to the legitimacy questions. Even the top diplomat of the U.S. Colin Powell, whose job it was to convince the world to support the Iraq Operation, was not convinced himself.

¹¹⁸¹ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not An Option: Defending America At The United Nations And Abroad*, Threshold Editions, New York, 2008, p. 36.

Noam Chomsky, *What Uncle Sam Really Wants*, 5th Edition, Odonian Press, Arizona, 1995, p. 63.

Therefore, it wouldn't be fair to expect from Turkey to believe in the legitimacy of the war while the U.S. as a whole was not united for this operation. The lack of evidence and the division in the world made Turkey cautious about the Iraq Operation. This situation affected the public opinion in Turkey in a negative way towards the Iraq Operation and eventually affected the votes of the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

12.8. Post-War Concerns

When the U.S. foreign policy makers approached their Turkish counterparts, one of the first questions that came up was about possible outcomes of the Iraq War. When Paul Wolfowitz approached Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit about Turkey's possible cooperation in the Iraq War, the first question Prime Minister Ecevit asked was about the U.S.'s plans for post-war Iraq. Ecevit's question was a very important point for Turkey's involvement in the Iraq War. This issue was brought about by the Turkish officials before and during the negotiations. Even Prime Minister Abdullah Gül repeated it to the U.S. officials, yet it had never been answered clearly by the Americans.

Since the beginning of the Iraq War planning, Turkey was concerned about the post-war situation. In the Gulf War, Turkey faced the refugee problem, economic and security issues which disturbed the country's economy and contributed to burning security and terrorism problems. During several meetings between Turkish and U.S. officials, Turkey was seeking answers for its questions about the post-war Iraq. The U.S. officials never answered these questions clearly and did not present their post-war plans.

In the previous chapters it was mentioned that during the war planning process there were serious clashes between the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the U.S. military officials. While for the post-war planning, the military was suggesting a minimum of 500,000 troops in order to secure the perimeter and reconstruct Iraq, Rumsfeld was pushing for an effective but small army of operation with a maximum of 125,000 soldiers.¹¹⁸²

¹¹⁸² Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E Trainor, *Kobra II*, 1. Basım, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2006, p.36. Dale R. Herspring, *Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2008, pp.73, 92. General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 10 Regan Books, New York, 2004, p.333.

According to the neoconservative belief, using a small and effective army was a major concern. After the war it was clearly seen that small and effective army might be helpful to win the war, but it was certainly not enough to reconstruct and redesign an invaded state. This obsession of Donald Rumsfeld was a fatal error for the U.S. in the post-war era.

Rumsfeld's clash with his own army was not the only problem in the U.S. post-war planning. Similarly, serious conflicts between the State Department and the Pentagon were not contributing to the unity of the Bush Administration. While the State Department had been working on the post-war planning, the Pentagon had its own agenda organized by Douglas Feith. It had been clearly seen that after the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. failed to imply a solid plan. There was many personnel and administration changes, the appointment of Jay Garner as the head of the post-war administration who was soon replaced by Paul Bremer.¹¹⁸³ The founding of ORHA and replacing it by the CPA and Interim Government were changes in post-war Iraq that clearly show that the U.S. foreign policy makers failed to prepare for the post-war era.

When the Turkish officials asked the questions to their American colleagues about the aftermath of the war and the possible scenarios, they did not receive clear and logical answers. While the U.S. was asking for Turkey's support it did not have a solid plan for the post-war Iraq to present to the Turkish officials. This lack of planning and unprepared approach to the Iraq War did not quash Turkey's concerns. In turn, it affected the Turkish parliament's vote. Members of the TBMM had questions in their minds concerning the post-war situation and Turkey's role in it. These questions have never been answered and Turkish officials were left with their post Iraq war concerns.

12.9. Turkish Public Opinion and the Miscommunication

Since the beginning of this research the most visible claim the U.S. had towards Turkey about the failure of *tezkere* consisted of the lack of the AKP government and military support for the operation. A very interesting environment was formed in that specific era. It

¹¹⁸³ L. Paul Bremer was the director of personnel under Kissinger. Later he was appointed as the Ambassador of Holland. Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos*, 1st Edition, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.141.

was claimed that the Turkish military and the AKP government acted against *tezkere*, and therefore the resolution failed. As a matter of fact, the military, Turkish Foreign Ministry and the government were the only institutions in Turkey who actually supported *tezkere*. The U.S. officials miscalculated and failed to see that reality.

As mentioned before, the Turkish population was concerned about the possible outcomes of the Iraq War. The concerns of the Turkish public were namely the PKK issue, the Kurdish question and the economic problems. At the beginning of the decision making process the public was cautious about the war, but still open minded. The public was expecting answers to their specific questions. Unfortunately, these questions had not been answered by the U.S. and the reasons why were explained.

But in addition to this failure, there was another problem between Turkey and the U.S. This problem was mainly happening due to the miscommunication between the two countries. One of the visible miscommunications was between the Turkish side and the U.S. military represented by CENTCOM. Since Turkey's involvement in NATO, it had been interacting with EUCOM, which is the Europe Command of the American military.¹¹⁸⁴ Since the Turkish military had been dealing mainly with EUCOM, the members of EUCOM were more aware of Turkey's priorities, sensitivities and strategic importance for the U.S. EUCOM and Turkish military got used to working with each other and they spoke the same language. Turkey's EU accession efforts and Turkey's involvement in southern European crises together with the U.S. made the Turkish military and EUCOM more familiar with each other.

Yet this close connection was ignored by the American officials during the Iraq Operation negotiations. Turkey had to deal with CENTCOM official instead of EUCOM. The priorities of CENTCOM were different. Their way of approaching Turkey, their leadership style was far more different from EUCOM. The only goal of CENTCOM during the process was to overthrow Saddam as soon as possible, without many casualties and destroy the state. Therefore, Turkey's priorities and concerns were not the priority for CENTCOM. Even though during the official negotiations and prior to the negotiations in

¹¹⁸⁴ Personal Interview with Soner Çağaptay – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 6 February, 2008.

almost every single meeting--in addition to the CENTCOM representatives—members of EUCOM were also present. Still the decision makers in those meetings were the CENCOM members. During that time it was clear to see the conflicts of interests between the Turkish military and CENTCOM. The unfamiliarity of these two sides affected the Turkish-U.S. partnership in the Iraq Operation. Unlike EUCOM, the CENTCOM and Turkish officials couldn't establish a real connection and this caused serious misunderstandings during the Iraq Operation process.

This was just one example of miscommunication between the two countries, but a major one. It affected the U.S. policy makers' ability to answer the questions of the Turkish public. Even though the Turkish public started this process with an open mind, soon, their unanswered questions grew and fed the opposition to the war. These circumstances pushed the Turkish public opinion makers to a massive anti-war rally that affected the entire population of Turkey. The voice raised by the people was seized by the Turkish opposition parties in the parliament, NGOs, the media, academicians and even by the business world. In addition to the positive and supportive analysis of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Turkish military, the government's push for the *tezkere* became ineffective compared with the public opinion about the war. The question is clear – what would have happened if the U.S. foreign policy makers stopped taking Turkey for granted and started working to convince the public? What would be the case if the U.S. foreign policy makers cleared the questions in the minds of the people, namely: the legitimacy of the war, possible post-war scenarios, economical compensations and security concerns? Yet, instead of doing all these, the U.S. pushed Turkey for an immediate decision by using certain political threats and available economic pressures. This approach towards Turkey became so visible in this process that the entire public opinion rallied against the war and against the U.S. Pushing Turkey was a major foreign policy error that the U.S. made during the preparations for the Iraq War.

12.10. Conclusion

The Turkish-U.S. partnership, its basis, its origin and its future were discussed. Failure of the March 1st *tezkere* and the U.S. foreign policy during the Iraq War had a big impact on this partnership. As mentioned before, since 1946, Turkey and the U.S. went through many crises. These crises were always overcome because of one important reason. That reason was the Soviet Union which was seen as a common enemy, and a common threat. For instance in 1946, Johnson's letter caused many questions in the minds of Turkish decision makers. With Johnson's letter, the U.S. basically told Turkey that it could not fight using American weapons with anyone without the U.S. approval.¹¹⁸⁵ This was a major breakdown in Turkish-U.S. relations. Still everyone regarded this breakdown as circumstances of the Cold War and by using this excuse the crisis was overcome. Yet the Iraq War proved that it was wrong. In 2003, the U.S. wanted to intervene in a country for its own agenda similar to 1964. This time the roles were changed and the U.S. was the action taker. This time there was no balance of power, a bipolar world and Cold War circumstances. Still, the outcome was similar to 1964 – even though the roles were different, again the power was on the U.S.'s side.

After the U.S. foreign policy approach during the Iraq War, the Turkish public and the decision makers realized and understood once again that whoever has the power can realize its own agenda no matter what the law and the circumstances are. This approach and this mentality affected the general perception of the U.S. in Turkey. The relations started to be questioned. After the Iraq War, the decision makers realized that whenever the interests of the two countries are similar, the alliance becomes more effective like with the Afghanistan Operation. But in the case of a conflict of interest, like in 2003 Iraq War about the Kurds and Northern Iraq, the U.S.--without any sentiments--would use its economic, military and political power to pursue its agenda. It might have not been like this in the past and it may not happen in the future, but in 2002-2003, during the Iraq War, the U.S. foreign policy

¹¹⁸⁵ Yalın Eralp, "An Insider's View of Turkey's Foreign Policy and its American Connection", Chapter 5, Ed. Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, p.110.

approach was as described. And this caused the Turkish-U.S. relationship to be suddenly questioned by both sides and to lose its solidity and firm standings.

The failure of the U.S. to convince Turkey to pass the March 1st *tezkere* has changed many things in this relationship. This issue has created big waves on the ocean of the Turkish-U.S. relationship. Even though since 2003 we could observe examples of cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey, not limited only to Iraq, the relations have lost their old solidity and trust.

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
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APPENDIX A: THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Source: Amos A. Jordan, William J. Tylor Jr., Michael J. Mazar, American National Security, Fifth Edition, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1999, p. 106.

The Department of Defense

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graph TD
    SecDef[SECRETARY OF DEFENSE] --> SecDef2[DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE]
    SecDef2 --> SecNavy[SECRETARY OF THE NAVY]
    SecDef2 --> SecArmy[SECRETARY OF THE ARMY]
    SecDef2 --> SecDefOffice[OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE]
    SecDef2 --> SecAir[SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE]
    SecDef2 --> JCS[JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF JCS]

    SecNavy --> UnderSecNavy[UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY]
    SecNavy --> ChiefNav[CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS]
    SecNavy --> ComMarCorps[COMMANDANT OF MARINE CORPS]
    UnderSecNavy --> NavyMajCom[NAVY MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES]
    ChiefNav --> NavyMajCom
    ComMarCorps --> MarineMajCom[MARINE CORPS MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES]

    SecArmy --> UnderSecArmy[UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE ARMY]
    SecArmy --> ChiefStaffArmy[CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY]
    UnderSecArmy --> ArmyMajCom[ARMY MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES]
    ChiefStaffArmy --> ArmyMajCom

    SecDefOffice --> UnderSecDef[UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE AND EQUIVALENTS]
    SecDefOffice --> IG[INSPECTOR GENERAL]

    SecAir --> UnderSecAir[UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE AIR FORCE]
    SecAir --> ChiefStaffAir[CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE]
    UnderSecAir --> AirMajCom[AIR FORCE MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES]
    ChiefStaffAir --> AirMajCom

    JCS --> Chairman[CHAIRMAN, JCS]
    JCS --> JointStaff[THE JOINT STAFF]
    JCS --> ViceChairman[VICE CHAIRMAN, JCS]
    JCS --> ChiefStaffArmy2[CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY]
    JCS --> ChiefNavOps[CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS]
    JCS --> ChiefStaffAir2[CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE]
    JCS --> ComMarCorps2[COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS]
    JCS --> UnifiedCom[UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDS]

    SecDef2 --> DODField[DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES]
    SecDef2 --> DefAgencies[DEFENSE AGENCIES]
    SecDef2 --> UnifiedCom
  
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The organizational chart of the Department of Defense is structured as follows:

- SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**
 - DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**
 - DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**
 - SECRETARY OF THE NAVY**
 - UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY**
 - NAVY MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
 - CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS**
 - NAVY MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
 - COMMANDANT OF MARINE CORPS**
 - MARINE CORPS MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
 - DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
 - SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**
 - UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE ARMY**
 - ARMY MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
 - CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY**
 - ARMY MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
 - OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**
 - UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE AND EQUIVALENTS**
 - INSPECTOR GENERAL**
 - DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**
 - SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**
 - UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE AIR FORCE**
 - AIR FORCE MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
 - CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE**
 - AIR FORCE MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
 - JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)**
 - CHAIRMAN, JCS**
 - THE JOINT STAFF**
 - VICE CHAIRMAN, JCS**
 - CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY**
 - CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS**
 - CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE**
 - COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS**
 - UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDS**
 - ATLANTIC COMMAND
 - CENTRAL COMMAND
 - EUROPEAN COMMAND
 - PACIFIC COMMAND
 - SOUTHERN COMMAND
 - SPACE COMMAND
 - SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
 - STRATEGIC COMMAND
 - TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
 - DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES**
 - AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE
 - DEFENSE MEDICAL PROGRAMS ACTIVITY
 - DEFENSE POW/MIA OFFICE
 - DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
 - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SERVICE
 - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY
 - OFFICE OF CIVILIAN HEALTH AND MEDICAL PROGRAM OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES
 - OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
 - WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
 - DEFENSE AGENCIES**
 - BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
 - DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
 - DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY
 - DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
 - DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
 - DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY
 - DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 - DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
 - DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY
 - DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
 - DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
 - DEFENSE SPECIAL WEAPONS AGENCY
 - ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY
 - NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY*
 - NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE*
 - *REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

331

**APPENDIX C: LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER İSMET İNÖNÜ FROM
PRESIDENT JOHNSON JUNE 5, 1964**

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your government to consult fully in advance with the United States. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.

It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting an attempt by Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that treaty requires consultation among the guarantor powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.

I must call to your attention also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the ministerial council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as "literally unthinkable". Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.

Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the island to keep

the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.

I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.

Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion that fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe.

You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregarding of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentment in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as chief of the government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council.

I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have-in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.

Sincerely.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Source: Cyprus-Dispute.org, Available at <<http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html>>, Accessed on May 5, 2010. Turkish translation available in Farih Armaoğlu, Belgeler Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları VII. Dizi – Sa. 119, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1991, pp.267-269.

APPENDIX D: ARTICLE 92 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

F. Declaration of State of War and Authorisation to Deploy the Armed Forces

ARTICLE 92. *The Power to authorize the declaration of a state of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law and except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.*

If the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Source: The Constitution of Republic of Turkey, Available at the Office of the Prime Minister Directorate General of the Press and Information official website, <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/sayfa.aspx?Id=78>>, Accessed on March 19, 2010.

APPENDIX E: U.S.'S DECISION REGARDING SPECIAL FORCES IN NORTHERN IRAQ AND THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE FROM THE PKK


7 (b) (3)

TU Special Forces will not be involved with any armed engagement against Iraqi forces or any Iraqi opposition groups except in situations requiring the ~~exercise~~ exercise of the right of self-defense, including combatting terrorists, such as PKK/KADEK, or in circumstances enshrined in paragraph 4 below.*

* Türk Özel Kuvvetleri, PKK/KADEK gibi teröristlerle mücadele dahil kendini savunma hakkını kullanmayı gerektirecek durumlar ve aşağıdaki 4 paragrafda yer alan şartlar dışında Irak kuvvetleri veya merkezi Irak muhalif güçleriyle askeri çatışmaya girmeyecektir.

Source: Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.183.

**APPENDIX F: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GÜL,
FEBRUARY 24, 2003**



Source: Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, p.191.

APPENDIX G: MARCH 1ST TEZKERE

TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Irak konusundaki endişe verici gelişmeler çok hızlı bir seyir izlemekte ve kriz ortamı giderek ağırlaşmaktadır. Sorunun barışçı yollarla çözümü yönündeki çabalar bugüne kadar ümit edilen sonuçları vermemiştir.

58 inci Cumhuriyet Hükümeti gelişmeleri başından beri yakından ve hassasiyetle izlemiş, barışçı çözüme katkıda bulunmak amacıyla yoğun çaba harcamıştır. Bu amaçla başta bölge ülkeleri olmak üzere ilgili tüm ülkelerle ve uluslararası kuruluşlarla temas ve istişarelerde bulunmuştur.

Irak'a ilişkin gelişmeler 6 Şubat 2003 tarihli kapalı oturumda, TBMM tarafından değerlendirilmiş ve her ihtimale karşı gerekli güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması ve hazırlıkların yapılması amacıyla Hükümete yetki verilmiştir. TBMM, bu çerçevede, Türkiye'deki askeri üs ve tesisler ile limanlarda gerekli yenileştirme, geliştirme, inşaat ve tevsi çalışmaları ile alt yapı faaliyetlerinde bulunmak amacıyla ABD'ye mensup teknik ve askeri personelin 3 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına, bununla ilgili düzenlemelerin Hükümet tarafından yapılmasına Anayasa'nın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesini kararlaştırmıştır.

Hükümet gerekli hazırlıkları buna uygun olarak sürdürmüştür ve bu faaliyetlerin hukuki ve teknik çerçevesini belirleyen Mutabakat Muhtırası, ABD ile 8 Şubat 2003 tarihinde sonuçlandırılarak alt yapı çalışmaları başlatılmıştır.

Öte yandan, Türkiye için güvenlik riski oluşturan olumsuz gelişmelerin yoğunluk kazanması üzerine NATO Andlaşmasının 4 üncü maddesi çerçevesinde gerekli istişareler başlatılmış ve NATO Savunma Planlama Komitesi 19 Şubat tarihinde Türkiye'ye NATO desteği verilmesini kararlaştırmıştır.

Bu kapsamda, Türk hava sahasının bütünlüğünün korunması ve gözetimi için savunma amaçlı olarak NATO havadan erken ihbar uçakları ile NATO hareket alanı füze savunma sistemlerinin Türkiye'de konuşlandırılması ve kimyasal ve biyolojik silahlara karşı koruma desteği sağlanması kararlaştırılmıştır.

Bugün gelinen noktada, bölgede hüküm süren krizin bir çatışmaya dönüşmesi ihtimali giderek güçlenmektedir. Ağırlaşan ortam ve şartlar karşısında Türkiye'nin güvenliğine yönelik tehdit ve risklerin ciddi boyutlar kazandığı bir sürece girilmektedir.

Türkiye'nin milli birliğini ve toprak bütünlüğünü hedef alan terör unsurlarının bölgede yuvalanmaları Irak'taki durumun Türkiye için teşkil ettiği güvenlik tehdidinin çok önemli bir boyutunu oluşturmaktadır.

Aynı şekilde Irak'ta etnik, din ve mezhep temelinde bir parçalanmaya yol açabilecek gelişmeler de çok ciddi bir endişe kaynağıdır.

Bunun yanı sıra geçmişte yaşanan müessif tecrübeler Kuzey Irak'tan ülkemize toplu göç hareketi ihtimaline karşı da hassas ve hazırlıklı olunmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu amaçla sınır bölgelerimizde muhtemel yığılmaları önlemek ve insani mülahazaları dikkate alarak bu göçün sınırlarımızın mümkün olduğunca ilerisinde uygun bir bölgede durdurulmasını sağlamak için gereken tedbirlerin alınması kaçınılmaz olacaktır. Bu konuda başlatılan hazırlıklar sürdürülmektedir.

Türkiye, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün ve milli birliğinin korunmasına ve sorunun barışçı yollardan çözüme kavuşturulmasına büyük önem vermektedir. Kuvvet kullanımı son çare olarak görülmelidir. Giderek tırmanan krizin bir savaşa dönüşmeden çözümü için zaman

giderek azalmaktadır. Savaşın önlenmesi için Irak yönetiminin tam ve etkin silahsızlanma konusunda Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararlarında yer alan yükümlülüklerini tam icaplarıyla yerine getirmesi kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir.

Irak'ın, durumun vahametini idrak etmesi ve sorunun barış ortamı korunarak çözümünün önünü açması için uluslararası toplumun kararlı tutumunu sürdürmesi büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkeler ile aday ülkelerin 17-18 Şubat 2003 tarihlerinde Brüksel'de yaptığı ve Türkiye'nin de katıldığı zirve toplantısı ortak bildirisinde de vurgulandığı üzere, bu konuda sergilenecek kararlılık ve dayanışmanın yanı sıra somut ve fiili askeri caydırıcılık tedbirlerinin alınması, Irak'ın bu konuda ikna edilebilmesinde çok etkili bir vasıta olacaktır.

58 inci Cumhuriyet Hükümeti bu olumsuz gelişmelerin karşımıza çıkarabileceği bütün risklere ve ihtimallere karşı Türkiye'nin temel hak ve menfaatlerini korumak amacıyla gereken bütün güvenlik tedbirlerini almakta ve uygulamaya koymaktadır.

Irak'a karşı askeri caydırıcılık tedbirleri kapsamında yabancı silahlı kuvvetler unsurlarının Türkiye'de geçici olarak konuşlandırılması için TBMM'nin izin ve yetki vermesi; bugünkü kriz ortamında muazzam bir baskı unsuru olarak çok önemli ve etkili bir fonksiyon icra edecektir.

Aynı şekilde, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin en kötü ihtimale karşı hazırlıklı olarak zamanında ve süratle hareket etmesini ve gerekli tedbirleri almasını sağlamak bakımından Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesi konusunda TBMM'nin izninin alınması hükümetin etkili bir siyaset izlemesini sağlamak açısından büyük önem taşıyacaktır.

Bu kuvvetlerin, gelişmelerin seyrine göre gerektiğinde kullanılmaları hükümetin belirleyeceği esaslara ve bu konuda yapılacak düzenlemelere bağlı olacaktır.

Bu mülahazalarla; gereği, kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı Hükümetçe belirlenecek şekilde,

1- Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine ve bu kuvvetlerin gerektiğinde belirlenecek esaslar dairesinde kullanılmasına,

2- Uluslararası meşruiyet kuralları çerçevesinde en fazla 62.000 askeri personelin ve hava unsurları olarak 255 uçak ve 65 helikopteri aşmamak kaydıyla yabancı silahlı kuvvetler unsurlarının Hükümetin tespit edeceği mücavir bölgelerde geçici olarak konuşlandırılmak üzere 6 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına; bu amaçla Türkiye'ye gelecek yabancı kara kuvvetlerinden destek unsurları dışındaki muharip unsurların geçici olarak konuşlandırıldıkları bölgelerden Türkiye dışına intikallerinin en kısa sürede tamamlanması ve yabancı hava ve deniz kuvvetleri ile özel kuvvetler unsurlarının muhtemel bir harekatta kullanılmalarını sağlayacak şekilde konuşlanmaları ve yabancı silahlı kuvvetlere mensup hava unsurlarının Türk hava sahasını üst uçuş amacıyla kullanmaları için gerekli düzenlemelerin yapılmasına; bu yabancı silahlı kuvvetlerin Türkiye'ye gelişiyle ilgili hazırlıkların yürütülmesine, Türkiye ülkesinde tabi olacakları statü ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleriyle işbirliği esas ve usullerine ilişkin düzenlemelerin Hükümetin belirleyeceği esaslar çerçevesinde yapılmasına,

Source: BelgeNet, Available at <http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/izin_250203.html>, Accessed on May 6, 2010.

Translation:

TO THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY

The alarming developments on the issue of Iraq are moving very rapidly and the crisis environment is becoming graver. The efforts towards finding a peaceful solution did not turn the way it was hoped to turn.

The 58th Turkish Government has observed the developments closely and sensitively from the beginning and has spent efforts to contribute in finding a peaceful solution. For this purpose, the government has especially been in contact with the regional countries, related countries and international institutions.

The developments on the issue of Iraq have been evaluated in the closed meeting of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the date of February 6, 2003, where the government was empowered, in order to take security precautions to be prepared for any possible events that may occur. In this context, the decision to allow the government to do the preparations of the U.S.'s technical and military staff to be accommodated in Turkey for three months in order to start infrastructural developments to the bases, facilities and harbors according to Article 92 of the Constitution was made by The Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The government has pursued the preparations accordingly and has started the infrastructural developments by concluding a memorandum of understanding, which determines legal and technical sides of these proceedings, on the date of with the U.S. on the date of February 8, 2003.

On the other hand, the ascending risks towards Turkey's security that is caused by the negative developments lead to the decision of NATO support according to the 4th Article of the NATO Treaty by the NATO Defense Committee on the date of February 19, 2003. In this context, to protect Turkish airspace's unity and surveillance, the decision to provide early notice NATO airplanes with NATO operational area missile defense systems to be deployed in Turkey and to provide protection from chemical and biological weapons was made.

In the point reached today, the crisis that has been going on in the region creates the possibility of this crisis turning into a battle. A process is being entered where the risks and threats towards Turkey are increasing because of the graver environment and conditions. The settlement of the terrorist elements in the region which target Turkey's national unity and territorial integrity shows that the situation in Iraq forms a very important dimension of the threat that it creates towards Turkey's security.

Likewise, the developments that could lead to a breaking point on the basis of the ethnic, religious and sectarian groups in Iraq create a very serious source of concern. In addition, the deplorable past experiences of collective migration from Northern Iraq to Turkey makes it necessary to be sensitive and prepared about this issue. For this purpose, to prevent the possible accumulation, and taking humanitarian thoughts into considerations, precautions must be taken in order to halt such an event as far as possible from our borders and stop it in an appropriate place. The preparations on this issue have begun to be pursued. Turkey gives much importance to keeping Iraq's territorial integrity and national unity and solving the problem in a peaceful way. The use of force is seen as the last option. The time is

decreasing in finding a solution for the crisis that has been escalating into a war. In order to prevent the war, it has become inevitable for the Iraqi government to fulfill the obligations of the United Nations Security Council's decisions in terms of a full and effective disarmament. The international society's stable attitude carries great importance in terms for Iraq to realize the gravity of the situation and to solve the problem with peaceful solutions.

In the summit meeting that was held among the European Union countries and the candidate countries as well as Turkey in Brussels on the date of February 17 and 18 of 2003, a joint statement was stressed as follows; besides the stable attitude and solidarity shown towards this issue, the precautions that will be taken towards concrete and actual military deterrence will be very effective in terms of convincing Iraq on this issue.

In order to protect Turkey's fundamental rights and interests from the risks that may occur from these negative developments, the 58th Turkish Government has taken all security precautions and has put it into practice.

The decision of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey allows and gives authorization for the Foreign Armed Troops to be accommodated in Turkey temporarily in the context of military deterrence towards Iraq and will carry a very important and effective function. This function will be an enormous pressure element as well as being an effective function because of the current crisis.

Likewise, in order to take the necessary precautions and to act speedily and timely in the worst case scenario the authorization to allow sending the Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries by The Grand National Assembly of Turkey carries great importance in terms of allowing the government to proceed with an effective policy.

On these thoughts; the due, the content, the limit and the time will be determined according to the government:

- 1- Turkish Armed Forces to be sent to foreign countries and to be used when necessary with the rules to be determined,
- 2- Within the context of the International legitimacy rules, the decision of allowing Foreign Armed Forces to temporarily accommodate in Turkey with the contiguous areas determined by the government for six months, and by not exceeding 62,000 military staff, 255 aircraft and 65 helicopters; with this aim. Besides the supporting elements of the foreign military forces who will come to Turkey, to complete the process of the foreign military forces to move out from Turkey as soon as possible, in order to prepare the necessary arrangements for foreign armed forces to use Turkish airspace with an upper air flight purpose, to deploy the foreign air, sea forces and special forces for a possible operational use, to carry out preparations about these foreign armed forces in Turkey, the status that the foreign armed forces will be subject to in Turkey and the cooperation with the Turkish Armed Forces will be determined by the fundamentals of the government,

The verdict to request permission from The Grand National Assembly of Turkey in the meeting of the cabinet councils on the date of February 24, 2003 by the Article 92, of the Constitution was reached.

APPENDIX H: DECISION OF THE TBMM REGARDING SECOND TEZKERE

İKİNCİ TEZKERE VE MECLİS KARARI

Irak konusunda yaşanan gelişmeler ve hızla tırmanan gerginliğin Türkiye'nin karşısına çıkarması muhtemel güvenlik riskleri Yüce Meclisimiz tarafından hassasiyetle izlenmekte ve değerlendirilmektedir. Son dönemde Irak'a ilişkin gelişmeler iki kez TBMM'nin gündemine gelmiş ve bütün yönleriyle tezekkür edilmiştir.

Bu çerçevede, TBMM'nin 6 şubat 2003 tarihinde yapılan kapalı oturumunda, yaşanan olumsuz gelişmeler ışığında her ihtimale karşı hazırlıklı olunması bakımından gerekli güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması amacıyla hükümete yetki verilmiş ve Irak'a karşı muhtemel bir askeri harekatta kullanılabilecek askeri üs ve tesisler ile limanlarda altyapı geliştirme çalışmaları için Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne mensup teknik ve askeri personelin üç ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına, Anayasa'nın 92. maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi kararlaştırılmıştır.

Bunu takiben, 58'inci Cumhuriyet Hükümeti'nin sürdürdüğü hazırlık ve çalışmalar ile alınan tedbirler hakkında 25 şubat 2003 tarihli ve 3/189 esas numaralı Başbakanlık tezkeresiyle Yüce Meclisimize bilgi sunulmuş ve tezkerede yer alan gerekçelerle Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine ve yabancı silahlı kuvvetlerin 6 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına Anayasa'nın 92. maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi Yüce Meclisimizin takdirlerine arz edilmiştir.

TBMM'nin 1 mart 2003 tarihinde yapılan 39'uncu birleşiminde Başbakanlık tezkeresi görüşülmüş, ancak yapılan oylamada, Anayasa'nın 96'ncı maddesinde öngörülen karar yetersayısı için gerekli salt çoğunluk sonuçlandırılmamıştır.

Irak'a yönelik askeri müdahale konusunda yaşanan gelişmeler artık geriye dönüşü imkansız bir noktaya gelindiğini göstermektedir. Birleşmiş Milletler sürecinin de tüketilmesiyle barışçı çözüm çabaları sonuçsuz kalmış, askeri müdahale kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir. Bugün geline aşamada Türkiye, Irak topraklarının topyekun bir askeri hareket alanına dönüşeceği savaş durumu şartlarıyla karşı karşıyadır. Bunun sonucu Türkiye'nin güvenliğine yönelik tehdit ve riskler endişe verici boyutlar kazanmış ve ciddi biçimde ağırlaşmış bulunmaktadır.

Bu çerçevede, Kuzey Irak'ta barınmakta olan silahlı PKK-KADEK militanlarının kriz ortamından yararlanmak amacıyla faaliyetlerine hız verdikleri ve yeni tertipler için girmeye çalıştıkları görülmektedir.

Bunun yanı sıra, Irak'ın etnik temelde parçalanmasına yol açacak siyasi oluşumlara zemin kazandırmak amacıyla sürdürülen çabaların yoğunluk kazandığı görülmektedir. Bu durum Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün ve milli birliğinin tehlikeye düşmesi ve bölgedeki diğer milli grupların güvenliğini de tehdit edebilecek bir istikrarsızlık ortamının ortaya çıkması riskini de beraberinde getirmektedir.

Öte yandan, Irak'a muhtemel askeri bir müdahalenin ortaya çıkması beklenen Türkiye'ye yönelebilecek toplu nüfus hareketlerinin sınırlarımızın ötesinde İnsani Destek Toplama Bölgeleri'nde durdurulması, yerlerinden edilmiş kişilerin insani yardım ihtiyaçlarının yerinde karşılanması ve hareket sonrası geldikleri bölgelere geri dönmeleri için gerekli tedbirlerin zamanında ve etkin biçimde alınması büyük önem taşımaktadır. Büyük

sayıda göçmen ve sığınmacının Türkiye'ye yönelebileceği göz önünde bulundurularak bu konudaki ihtimaliyat planlaması yapılmış ve kriz yönetimi mekanizmalarının süratle harekete geçirilmesi için gerekli son hazırlıklar da tamamlanmıştır.

Türkiye'nin güvenliği için ciddi bir tehdit potansiyeli bütün bu olumsuz gelişmelere karşı etkili bir caydırıcılığın sürdürülebilmesi evveleminde Kuzey Irak'taki fiili askeri mevcudiyetimize bağlı olacaktır. Aynı şekilde göçün önlenebilmesi için ileri bir hatta gerekli tedbirlerin alınabilmesi de bölgede askeri mevcudiyetimizi gerekli kılmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'taki caydırıcı askeri mevcudiyetinin amacı ve fonksiyonu bu temel hedeflerin gerçekleştirilmesiyle sınırlı olacaktır. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri unsurları mecbur kalmadıkça Irak Silahlı Kuvvetleri'yle bir çatışmaya girmeyecek, bölgede buna uygun olarak konuşlandırılacaktır. Aynı şekilde, bölgedeki geçici askeri mevcudiyetimiz Kuzey Irak'taki milli grupların güvenliği için de munzam bir teminat teşkil edecektir.

Öte yandan, Irak'ın Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararlarına uygun olarak silahsızlandırılması için askeri harekate katılacak ülkelere sağlanacak destek ve kolaylıklar konusunda bir karar alınması da önem ve müstecaliyet kazanmıştır. Bu çerçevede, başta NATO üyesi ülkeler olmak üzere birçok ülke müttefik hava kuvvetleri unsurlarının milli hava sahalarını bu amaçla kullanmalarına izin vermiş bulunmaktadır.

Şartların süratle değiştiği dinamik bir süreç sonrası gelineen bugünkü aşamada ortaya çıkan fiili durum ve yeni şartlar ışığında, yeni bir değerlendirme yapılması kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir. 59'uncu Cumhuriyet Hükümeti, bu yeni durum ve şartlar karşısında, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin Kuzey Irak'a gönderilmesi ve bu aşamada yabancı silahlı kuvvetler hava unsurlarının muhtemel bir askeri hareket çerçevesinde Türk hava sahasını kullanmalarına izin verilmesinin Yüce Meclisimiz tarafından tezekkür edilmesinin yerinde olacağı sonucuna varmıştır.

Bu mülahazalarda gereği, kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı Anayasa'nın 117'nci maddesine göre milli güvenliğin sağlanmasından ve Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin yurt savunmasına hazırlanmasında Yüce Meclis'e karşı sorumlu bulunan hükümet tarafından belirlenecek şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin Kuzey Irak'a gönderilmesine, etkili bir caydırıcılığın sürdürülmesi amacıyla Kuzey Irak'ta bulunacak bu kuvvetlerin gerektiğinde belirlenecek esaslar dairesinde kullanılmasına ve muhtemel bir askeri hareket çerçevesinde yabancı silahlı kuvvetlere mensup hava unsurlarının Türk hava sahasını Türk makamları tarafından belirlenecek esaslara ve kurallara göre kullanmaları için gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına, Anayasa'nın 92'nci maddesi uyarınca altı ay süreyle izin verilmesi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurulu'nun 20 mart 2003 tarihli 51'nci birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.

Source: Deniz Bolukbasi, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008.

Translation:

THE SECOND RESOLUTION AND THE DECISION OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY

The possible risks that may arise against Turkey from the developments and the rising tensions about the Iraq issue are being sensitively followed and evaluated by our Supreme Assembly. The latest developments on the Iraq issue have been brought to the agenda of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey twice and have been fully debated.

In this context, a closed meeting was held in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the date of February 6, 2003, where the government was empowered, in order to take security precautions to be prepared for any possible events that may occur because of the light of the latest negative developments and the decision to allow the U.S.'s technical and military staff to be accommodated in Turkey for three months in order to start infrastructural developments in the bases, facilities and harbors which are likely to be used in the case of a possible military operation against Iraq, was made according to Article 92 of the Constitution.

Following this, the Supreme Assembly has been informed about the 58th Turkish Government's ongoing preparations, studies and the precautions it has taken with the Prime Ministry's resolution on the date of February 25, 2003 with the number of 3/189 and with the reasons within the resolution, the proposal to the Supreme Assembly was made about the Turkish Armed Forces' being sent to foreign countries and foreign armed forces staying in Turkey for six months, under the Article 92 of the Constitution.

The Prime Ministry's Resolution was discussed during The Grand National Assembly's 39th coalescence on March 1st, 2003, however during the voting the full majority which is described in the Article 96 of the Constitution was not found.

The latest developments about the military operations towards Iraq show that taking a step back is impossible. The peaceful solution efforts have been left inconclusive because the process of the United Nations ran out. Therefore a military operation has become inevitable. Today, Iraq is facing a war state and a possibility of its overall territories' turning into a military operation area. As a result, the threats and the risks against Turkey's security have reached concerned levels and have been seriously aggravated.

In this context, the PKK-KADEK's militants in Northern Iraq took the advantage over a crisis environment in order to fasten their activities and worked on getting into new arrangements.

Furthermore, efforts were increased to accelerate political formations which lead to Iraq's fragmentation due to ethnic reasons. This situation also brings Iraq's territorial unity and national unity into jeopardy and carries the risk of an instable situation which creates a threat to the security of the other national groups in the region.

On the other hand, in the case of a possible military intervention in Iraq, precautions that ought to be taken are critically important in case of an emigration from Iraq to Turkey, which includes stopping the emigrates before they have reached Turkish borders, keeping them in the borders of Humanitarian Support Internment Camps, providing the emigrated people with the necessary humanitarian needs in these locations and provide necessary precautions in order for the emigrated people to return to the regions they came from. Taking large amounts

of emigrates into consideration, the probability planning on this issue was made and the final preparations in order to fasten the activation of conflict management mechanisms have been completed.

In spite of all these negative events which are a serious potential threat against Turkey's safety maintaining this dissuasive stance is related to our actual (de facto) military existence in Northern Iraq. Similarly, our military existence has become obligatory in order to take precautions to further prevent the emigration.

The purpose and the function of a dissuasive military existence of Turkey in Northern Iraq will be restricted to the actualization of these basic aims. The Turkish Armed Forces will not be in conflict with the Iraqi Armed Forces unless not obligated, and will be deployed expediently in the region. Similarly, the temporary military existence of our troops in Northern Iraq will represent a supplemental assurance for the security of the national groups in the region.

On the other hand, the decision of providing support and easiness to the countries which will join into the military operation of the disarmament of Iraq in accordance with United Nations Security Council's decision, had gained priority and importance. In this context, all the countries especially NATO member countries, have been given the permission to use the allied air forces' and the national airspace.

With the actual condition that emerged under the new developments in the present day's stage that came with the following process of these rapidly changing circumstances, a new evaluation was inevitable. In the perspective of these new conditions and facts, the 59th Turkish Government came into a conclusion that the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces' to Northern Iraq and on this process allowing foreign armed forces to use the Turkish airspace, in the context of a possible military operation, was appropriate for the Supreme Assembly to evaluate it.

Due to these considerations, limitations and timing, the decision of sending the Turkish armed forces to Northern Iraq will be made by the government who will be responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and for the preparation of the Armed Forces for the defense of the country according to Article 117 of the Constitution. In addition, using the Turkish Armed Forces with the determined purposes of maintaining an effective deterrence while their accommodation in Northern Iraq and in case of a possible military operation, the governments allowance of foreign armed forces' air components' usage of Turkish air space for six months according to regulations and rules made by the Turkish officials, was made according to Article 92 of the Constitution during the meeting of the Turkish Great Assembly's General Council's 51st session which was held on March 20, 2003.

APPENDIX I: DONALD RUMSFELD'S MEMO

UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2002 DEC -2 AM 11: 03
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

November 27, 2002 (1:00 PM)

DEPSBC

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Techniques

- The Commander of USSOUTHCOM has forwarded a request by the Commander of Joint Task Force 170 (now JTF GTMO) for approval of counter-resistance techniques to aid in the interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay (Tab A).
- The request contains three categories of counter-resistance techniques, with the first category the least aggressive and the third category the most aggressive (Tab B).
- I have discussed this with the Deputy, Doug Feith and General Myers. I believe that all join in my recommendation that, as a matter of policy, you authorize the Commander of USSOUTHCOM to employ, in his discretion, only Categories I and II and the fourth technique listed in Category III ("Use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing").
- While all Category III techniques may be legally available, we believe that, as a matter of policy, a blanket approval of Category III techniques is not warranted at this time. Our Armed Forces are trained to a standard of interrogation that reflects a tradition of restraint.

RECOMMENDATION: That SECDEF approve the USSOUTHCOM Commander's use of those counter-resistance techniques listed in Categories I and II and the fourth technique listed in Category III during the interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

SECDEF DECISION

Approved DA Disapproved _____ Other _____

Attachments
As stated

cc: CJCS, USD(P)

However, I stand for 8-10 hours
A day. Why is stand, limited to 4 hours?

D.A. DEC 0 2 2002

UNCLASSIFIED

X04030-02

Declassified Under Authority of Executive Order 12958
By Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of Defense
William P. Marriott, CAPT, USN
June 18, 2004

Source: Philippe Sands, *Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p.3.