

Intentionality in Mullā Ṣadrā

Submitted by **Sümeyye Parıldar** to the University of Exeter

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ABSTRACT

The present study reconstructs psychological, linguistic and ontological aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy in the light of Brentano's theory of intentionality. Brentano used intentionality as a psychological term to denote the 'mental' as opposed to the 'natural'. Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an ontological commitment to assenting that 'there are things that do not exist'. The chapters that discuss Ṣadrā's philosophy reflect the two aspects with an investigation for the production process of intentional objects and an investigation of the status of these objects in ontology. The main aim of the research is to give an internalist and monist account for the nature intentionality demonstrating an alternative approach to the concepts of *existence* and the *soul*.

Ontologically, there is only one reality (existence) and nothing is left outside it. Accordingly, intentional objects are mental beings that are at a lower level of existence (*wujūd ḡillī*). The principles behind the monist ontology are: first, the gradational ontology (*tashkīk*) that all things are determined beings (*mutamayyiz*) and they are manifestations of a single reality at different levels of intensity (*mutashakkik*), and, second, the simplicity principle (*basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa*) in which existence is a simple reality that comprehends all beings whilst being the principle of multiplicity at the same time. Epistemologically, whole knowledge processes including external senses are regarded as internal processes in which the causal effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being an accidental preparatory tool and faculties for the soul. Perception is always completed with the touch of imagination and the real object of perception is internally created. The soul is not the receiver of forms, but is the active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes substantial change as the objects are being produced. The soul is then not a container of forms. It is rather the case that the forms themselves construct the soul. The last point is that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being (*knowledge*) indeed is the very existence of the human soul. In this explanation, the soul is neither material nor immaterial *per se*: the soul starts her journey as a material substance and becomes more delicate and immaterial through her journey. The soul's journey is made possible with the preparatory role of the perception processes.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Mullā Sadrā, Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī

- *Asfār* _____ *al-Hikma al-muta'aliya fī-l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a*
- *Mashā'ir* _____ *Kitāb al-mashā'ir*
- *Mashā'ir* tr. _____ *Metaphysical Penetrations*
- *Ḥudūth* _____ *Fī ḥudūth al-'ālam*
- *Ḥudūth* tr. _____ *Die Risāla fī ḥudūth al-'ālam*
- *RIAA* _____ *Risāla fī ittiḥād al-'āqil wa-l-ma'qūl*
- *RTT* _____ *Risāla fī-l-taṣawwur wa-l-tasdīq*
- *RTT* tr. _____ *Conception and Belief*
- *Iksīr* _____ *Iksīr al-'arīfīn fī ma'rifat ṭarīq al-ḥaqq wa-l-yaqīn*
- *Shawāhid* _____ *Al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya fī manāḥij al-sulūkiyya*
- *MQ* _____ *al-Masā'il al-qudsiyya fī-l-hikma al-muta'aliya*
- *Tanqīḥ* _____ *al-Tanqīḥ fī-l-mantiq*

Avicenna

- *ShN* _____ *Shifā' Nafs/ Avicenna's De Anima*
- *ShKat* _____ *Shifa Kategurias/ Maqūlāt*
- *ShST* _____ *al-Samā' al-Tabī'i*
- *ShST* tr. _____ *The Physics of the Healing*
- *Najāt* _____ *Kitāb al-Najāt fī al-ḥikmat al-mantiqiyya wa al-ṭabī'yya wa al-ilāhiyya*
- *Ishārāt* _____ *Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*
- *IshRT* _____ *Avicenna, Rāzī, Ṭūsī (1377-9) al-Ishārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt, ma'a al-sharḥ lil-muhaqqiq Nasīr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Tūsī wa-Sharḥ al-Sharḥ li-Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ja'far al-Rāzī/*
- *IshM Logic* tr. _____ *Remarks and Admonitions Part 1: Logic*
- *DnM* _____ *Avicenna's Treatise on Logic Part One of Dānish Nāma-i ala'i*
- *DnM* tr _____ *Danish Nama-i-ala i Mantiq*
- *Dānishnāme* _____ *The metaphysica of Avicenna (Ibn Sina) tr Morewedge*
- *ShI* _____ *Shifā'-al-Ilahiyyāt/*
- *ShI* tr _____ *The Metaphysics of the Healing*
- *ShMd* _____ *Shifā' Madkhal*
- *ShIb* _____ *Shifā' 'Ibāra*

Fārābī

- *Ib.FR* _____ *'Ibāra*

- Md.FR _____ *Madkhal*
- DI. FR _____ *De Interpretatione Short Commentary*
- Madīna _____ *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*

Suhrawardī

- HI _____ *Hikmat al-ishrāq*/tr. Wallbridge
- Hayākil _____ *Hayākil al-Nūr*

Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar

- Mabāḥith _____ *Kitāb al-mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya fī ‘ilm al-ilāhīyāt wa-al-ṭabī‘īyāt/ /*
- LI _____ *Lubāb al-Ishārāt*, in *al-Tanbīhāt wa al-ishārāt*/ ed. Mahmud Shahabi, Tahrān: Danishgah-i Tahrān, 1339.

Aristotle

In Aristotle, (1984, 1991) *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, (ed.) Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press):

- MR _____ *De Memoria et Reminiscentia/*
- DSS _____ *De Sensu et Sensibilibus/*
- DSV _____ *De Somno et Vigilia/*
- DA _____ *De Anima /*
- GA _____ *De Generatione Animalium/*
- DI _____ *De Interpretatione*
- Cat.AR _____ *Categories*

In (ed.) Badawī, A. R., *Mantīq Aristū*, (Cairo: Matba‘āt Dār al-Kutub al- Misriyya):

- Kat.AR _____ *Kategurias*
- IbAR _____ *al-Ibāra/ Peri Hermenias*
- PoAR _____ *Post Analytics*
- Paraphrase _____ *Aristoteles' De anima : eine verlorene spätantike Paraphrase in arabischer und persischer Überlieferung*
- K.RN _____ *Risala-i Nafs-i Aristutalis li- Kāshānī*
- Maqālāt _____ *Maqālāt al-islamiyyīn wa ikhtilāf al muṣallīn*
- PES _____ *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*

Other:

- fn. _____Footnote
- cit. _____cited in
- n.d. _____No date
- ed. _____ Edited by
- tr. _____ Translated by

1 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Yesterday upon the stair

*I met a man who wasn't
there*

*He wasn't there again
today*

How I wish he'd go away

Antigonish

1.1 WHY?

This thesis is a reconstruction of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy in the light of Brentano's theory of intentionality. Brentano used intentionality as a psychological term to denote the 'mental' as opposed to the 'natural'. Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an ontological commitment to assenting that 'there are things that do not exist'. Thus naturalists, in denying the independent notion of the mental, needed to engage with intentionality. Later still, Russell and in particular Roderick Chisholm introduced the term 'intentionality' into the analytical tradition and effected a linguistic turn with respect to its analysis.

This new linguistic-ontological part of the problem is discussed by philosophers from Russell onwards. Even today, we find similar discussions related to intentionality through propositional attitudes. Intentionality is related to many areas of philosophy including mind, existence, and language.¹ In its classical definition, it is 'aboutness for mental states', and 'reference to an object' or 'direction to an object', and it refers to the way in which things are thought to be in the mind. Different accounts with different positions on intentionality can be related, and the scope of the related topics can cover most philosophical territory from ontology to sets of belief and predicting human actions.² When Brentano presents intentionality, he also makes it a possible problematic issue for history of philosophy. Intentionality is not original, he claims; rather, it is a re-statement

¹ Jacob, Pierre, "Intentionality", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/intentionality/>>.

² As Dennett does in his *Intentional Stance* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).

of ancient and medieval concepts such as Aristotle's *inexistence* and Aquinas' *inner word*.

This study will limit the scope of intentionality to Brentano's definition of it as the aboutness of mental states. I will apply the question to a seventeenth century philosopher, Mullā Ṣadrā. Intentionality in its simplified sense concerns the relation of the human mind to the extra-mental world. As a result of this interaction, human beings have a mental world filled with mental objects that might or might not be the same as the extra-mental objects to which they are oriented. So my quest for finding Ṣadrā's intentionality will be through his definition of human interaction with the world, and how he explains the production of mental objects together with their ontological status in his ontology. Accordingly, my research is about Brentano's intentionality as applied to Ṣadrā's psychology, epistemology and ontology as a question of mental existence.

This question is important for a number of reasons. Methodologically, application of a contemporary question (e.g. intentionality) to a philosopher from the past and from a different tradition (e.g. Mullā Ṣadrā) brings with it both risks and opportunities. Secondly, the more comprehensive approach and less parsimonious vocabulary of the medieval philosophy is a linguistic opportunity to work with extended vocabulary. When scholars consider Ṣadrā, he is typically viewed as one of the late medieval thinkers known for his synthesis of *philosophy, illuminationist tradition and theoretical Sufism* (Nasr, S. Hossein, 1978, pp. 21-5; Rizvi, Sajjad, 2009³; Kalin, Ibrahim, 2010, xiv). In this late period synthesis of Ṣadrā, an extended vocabulary of the synthesis brought from the different traditions, and the comprehensive language of the medieval philosophy, are combined. Thirdly, Ṣadrā's most original contributions (being substantial motion, gradational ontology (*tashkīk*), and his unique definition of the soul) are closely related to my question, and his originality is an added value for the problem of intentionality. His fresh approach therefore offers the opportunity to escape the dichotomy of material/immaterial and could be an alternative to essentialist philosophies.

These reasons can apply to other medieval philosophers as well. However, my choice of applying the intentionality question to Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy is not at random. I think Ṣadrā's philosophy provides a fresh approach to these philosophical questions due to his unique approach to 'existence' and 'soul'. His ontology and psychology not only provide

³ 277. Rizvi, Sajjad, "Mulla Sadra", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/mulla-sadra/>>

a broader approach to intentionality, but also comes with unique answers to what intentionality is and what the nature of an intentional object is. His understanding of existence involves mental phenomena which emerge as a different ontological answer to that of Russell and Meinong as well as being different from Avicenna and Suhrawardī. Moreover, his idea of the creative nature of the human soul brings in an innovative explanation of how intentionality works. This is unique to him. His account is built on a dynamic and non-essentialist understanding of the human.

My interest in intentionality started with an essay on Quine's famous "On What There Is". After my first research on Islamic philosophy and Mullā Ṣadrā's ontology, this was my second Master's degree and I was trying to understand the different language of analytical philosophy. In comparison to Mullā Ṣadrā's approach to existence, Quine's attitude was strikingly parsimonious. Eventually, this study evolved from that initial curiosity as to whether the intentionality problem could be applied to Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy. The quest behind this research is, then, whether a more comprehensive understanding of existence can function as a base for a new approach to intentionality. In the main chapters I will discuss Ṣadrā's philosophy in detail. However, before that, I want to provide a brief summary of contemporary discussions on intentionality in this introduction in order to explore possible alternatives to basic approaches to intentionality. Modern discussions of intentionality start with Brentano's introduction of the term. He claims that

[e]very mental phenomenon is characterized by [...] intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, [...] reference to a content, direction towards an object, [...] or immanent objectivity [...] (Brentano, 1874, 1924-5, 1.124-25)

This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. Three basic claims can be extracted through these sentences (Jacob, Pierre, 2010)⁴:

1. It is constitutive of the phenomenon of intentionality that mental states are directed towards things different from themselves.
2. Objects that mind is directed towards are characterised by intentional inexistence.
3. Intentionality is the mark of the mental: all and only mental states exhibit intentionality.

⁴ Jacob, Pierre, "Intentionality", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/intentionality/>>.

Here we gather the three ingredients about intentionality: cognitive content, a possible relation to the extra-mental world, and mental phenomenon. In a more refined formula, the two claims are that intentionality is ‘non-physical’ and that intentionality defines what is mental. I will follow a restricted version of the intentionality question. At the centre of this research are the human being and her capacities. I will not follow the scepticism that requires including the aboutness of non-human agents. This scepticism is mainly raised after the dramatic developments in cognitive science and about artificial intelligence such as the results of Turing’s test opening the ‘uniqueness of human mind’ to suspicion. Similarly, a restricted approach to the mental will be taken. When the word ‘mental’ is used, it will be used in order to cover three processes in classical Islamic epistemology: sense perception, inner senses, and intellection.⁵ As mentioned above, Brentano’s introduction of intentionality includes various possible terms such as content, immateriality, reference, inexistence, aboutness, and object-directedness as the essential feature of intentionality. For this research, objects of cognition and aboutness are two central issues for intentionality.

Another possible content for intentionality discussions is through including consciousness. The reason for this is that Brentano’s approach embraces this kind of approach:

We have seen that no mental phenomenon exists which is not, in the sense indicated above, consciousness of an object. However, another question arises, namely, whether there are any mental phenomena which are not objects of consciousness. All mental phenomena are states of consciousness (Brentano, 1874, p. 79).

Moreover, self-knowledge and consciousness are important for Sadrian epistemology. However, due to constraints imposed by time, consciousness and self-knowledge will not be made part of the discussion in this research. The Sadrian account of the production process of objects of knowledge is as important and explanatory as the notion of self-knowledge. Indeed, an important insight into his understanding of the self and self-knowledge is established through the exploration of this production process. In this sense, it can be claimed that the process of perception is primary to the discussions on self-knowledge.

Returning to the summary of contemporary discussions on intentionality, they diverge into two different approaches of the analytical and the phenomenological after Brentano.

⁵ Ṣadrā uses this schema, however, it is merely for explanatory purposes, as he is radically monist in his psychology as well as in his ontology.

Consequently, the gap between the terminologies of intentionality becomes larger as time goes on. The phenomenological discussions are continued by Brentano's students. For analytical philosophy, the problem is introduced to analytical philosophers by Chisholm. Chisholm introduced Brentano's intentionality with a positive and new approach. In this new approach, he continued Brentano's claim that intentionality is not reducible to descriptions of behaviour or any non-intentional vocabulary. He, however, redefined the problem with a linguistic approach and intentionality is presented in the form of belief-sentences (Chisholm, 1957, pp.168 ff.). This philosophy of language approach transforms the problem of intentionality into a problem of *intensionality*. This is related to the dominant tendency at his time which gives explanations to all philosophical problems in the context of a problem of language. The philosophical approach in this era is commonly called the *linguistic turn*, a term made famous by Rorty and borrowed from Gustav Bergmann (Rorty, 1993, p. 337). Chisholm introduced the three criteria in order to distinguish intentional idioms: failure of existential commitment, failure of truth functionality, and failure of co-existive expressions *salva vitae* (Kaukua, Jari, 2007).⁶ 'Diogenes looked for an honest man' is intentional by the first criterion. 'James believes there are tigers in India' is intentional by the second. And with the last one, it can be said that certain cognitive sentences - sentences using 'know,' 'see,' 'perceive,' and the like are intentional (Chisholm, 1957, pp. 170, 171).

The problem in its ontological context for analytical philosophers is very often understood as a problem about intentional inexistence, and this is basically discussed around the concept of non-existence. One example is the question: how can we talk about things that do not exist? Moreover, in the context of psychology it is filled with the realist claim of a realm of consciousness which is different from the physical world. Both claims with their immaterialist implications, threatened the dominant naturalistic intuition in the analytical tradition. As a result, many philosophers tried to explain intentionality with descriptions which are compatible with physical explanations. This is made either with eliminativist or reductionist methods. Quine carried on Chisholm's linguistic approach by focusing more on the ontological implications of the intentionality thesis. Quine sees

⁶ For these criteria see: Roderick Chisholm, 1957, pp. 168 ff; Asher Moore, 1960, "Chisholm on Intentionality", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 248-254; Victor Caston, 1998, "Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 249-298; Jesse L Yoder, 1987, "Chisholm's criteria of intentionality", *Philosophia*, Volume 17, Number 3, pp. 297-305.

no benefit in the intentionality thesis other than a pragmatic necessity and rejects *the mental*:

One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano's, is the second. To accept intentional usage at face value is, we saw, to postulate translation relations as somehow objectively valid though indeterminate in principle relative to the totality of speech dispositions. Such postulation promises little gain in scientific insight if there is no better ground for it than that the supposed translation relations are presupposed by the vernacular of semantics and intention (Quine, 1960, p. 220).

In Dennett's taxonomy of intentionality, Quine's rejection of inner processes and intentionality is representing the eliminative view. Churchlands, Davidson, Haugeland, Millikan, Rorty, Stalnaker, Sellars, Douglas Hofstadter, Marvin Minsky are listed alongside Quine in their approach to intentionality. On the rival end, Dennett lists intentional realists who take the problem of intentionality more seriously such as Fodor, Kripke, Dretske and Burge (Dennett, 1998, p. 345). In the chapter on ontology, I characterize the realist and anti-realist camps with the addition of Meinong to the list. Differing from the dominant tendency in the analytical tradition, Meinong followed through the ontological implications of Brentano's thesis. He applied Mally's indifference (between the being and so-being) principle to this problem and defended an ontology of objects. So in the fifth chapter, Quine-Russell and Meinong are examined as two opposite ends to the ontological question. Yet both believe that a parsimonious ontology is important. Şadrā is important at this very point. His monism and his simplicity principle for existence - which bases existence at the centre of multiplicity and unity - is still successful in not making the cosmos ontologically crowded and yet posing a realist account of intentional objects. The realist analytical philosophers dealt with the problem in other ways though.

One of the strategies in order to deal with intentionality within the realist camp has been defining two types of intentionality, as derived and intrinsic intentionality. Intrinsic intentionality is a state that is really existent in the mind or the brain of the agent. Visual experience and beliefs are intrinsic. A written text, on the other hand, has derived intentionality. The meaning of the text can be shifted from one to another, as it is conventions that determine the meaning (Searle, 2002, p. 78; Manson, 2003, pp. 140 ff.). So in addition to realist and anti-realist accounts, we are introduced to dualist and monist

approaches to intentionality. According to one, there are two types of intentionality as derived and intrinsic, and according to the monist, there is only one⁷. Haugeland approaches the topic through a regress argument. All intentionality will necessarily be derived from another and due to the regress problem; some intentionality is necessarily 'original'.

Derivative intentionality, like an image in a photocopy, must derive eventually from something that is not similarly derivative; that is, at least some intentionality must be *original* (non-derivative)(Haugeland, 1998, p. 129).

In another causal approach which is realist, intentionality is accepted to be intrinsic but explained only due to its function. The subject matter in their research is the function of intentionality rather than the nature of intentional states. Putnam, Fodor, Lycan and Kim can be considered among these philosophers. With the cognitive revolution an explanation is demanded as well as a functional definition of the mental. Cognitive scientists and computational explanations saw machines and human beings in a similar manner, and thought that they both contain things about the world.

A different version of functionalism is representationalist theory. This gives an externally based theory of mind, in which phenomenal characters are in the form of representational content (Tye, 1995, Dretske, 1995). It can be claimed that the most popular medieval theories of mind resemble representationalism. The idea of finding representations of extra-mental things in mind in the form of imprints in mind (*āthār*) can be found in Avicenna's texts (Avicenna, '*Ibāra*', ed. Madkur, 1405, pp. 1-3) or in the shape of similar images (similitudes) to their extra-mental model can be found in Aquinas' theory (Pasnau, Robert, 1997, p. 13). Goldberg, for example claims a further point by assuming continuity between Aristotle's psychology and modern functionalism. He thinks that Putnam is influenced by Aristotle (Goldberg, 2004, pp. 48-63). Unless an interpretation provides a comprehensive and coherent reading of a philosopher, I think categorizations of past philosophers as defenders of contemporary theories can be misleading. On the other hand, innovative interpretations of great dead philosophers which engage their texts with modern issues are opportunities to arrive at fresher attitudes to both old and modern philosophical questions.

⁷ I think this classification of derived and intrinsic can be applied to the difference between mental and linguistic entities by the claim that the latter is secondary to the former. This does not necessarily imply that classical discussions are dualist in the sense discussed above though.

Some philosophers tried to solve the consciousness problem with a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy.⁸ According to these philosophers, consciousness is one thing, being ‘mental’ is another. The functionalist explanations suffice for the mental but not for consciousness. They introduce ‘mental-state consciousness’ as an additional property to mental-ness. In one approach, the additional property is gained when one has higher order thoughts. Others who are opposed to the higher-order thought accounts offer ‘first-order’ representational accounts. In both the higher-order and first-order representational theories, intentionality is independent of consciousness (Manson, 2003, pp135-140). To sum up, in higher order theories (HOT), consciousness is not intrinsic to mental states.

Searle belongs to another group of realists who also has a strong tendency towards the idea of speech acts. His realist understanding of this intrinsic concept is also closely related to consciousness: a mental state is intentional only if it is at least potentially conscious (Searle, 1992, pp.59ff.). He objected to HOT mainly because these followed a ‘divide-conquer’ strategy (Searle, 1991, p. 47)⁹: “There are not two types of states, consciousness and qualia. There is just consciousness, which is a series of qualitative states” (Searle, 1997, p. 9)

Despite his strong criticism of many analytical theories such as behaviourism, functionalism, and panpsychism, Searle remained within the context of the naturalistic project and claimed that a subjective and anti-reductionist explanation of intentionality is achievable. This approach appears to be a more complex and tangled version of reductionism. He rejects the idea of any form of dualism and thinks that eventually and fundamentally consciousness is supposed to be understood in physical terms and its non-reducibility is not to be taken as a second property which is distinct and over and above the neurobiological base (Searle, 2002 (b), pp. 60 ff.). He tries to keep the physicalist nature of his theory with a causal principle in which consciousness is closely related to its neurobiological base. Another term that Searle uses to explain intentionality in irreducible terms is ‘*aspectual shape*’. According to this, when I, for example, think of

⁸ For Searle’s criticism of these ‘divide and conquer’ tactics, see Neil C. Manson (2003) “Consciousness”, pp. 137-139.

⁹ “In recent decades, the connection between consciousness and intentionality is being gradually lost in theoretical writings in linguistics, cognitive science, and philosophy. There has been an effort of varying degrees of explicitness to try to separate the issues concerning intentionality from those concerning consciousness. I think the underlying and perhaps unconscious motivation for this urge to separate intentionality from consciousness, even among people who do not share the ideology of the behaviourist-materialist tradition, is that we do not know how to explain consciousness, and we would like to get a theory of intentionality which will not be discredited by the fact that we do not have a theory of consciousness” (Searle, 1991, p. 48).

something I always think about it in some particular way. Searle calls this particular way '*aspectual shape*' (Searle, 1991, p.51). What differentiates Searle's aspectual shape from ordinary representation and his intentionality from reductionist approaches is that it is not possible to translate them to explanations of a third person perspective. Now one last group needs to be talked about inside analytical tradition which is indirectly related to this thesis.

In a number of cases the dominant naturalistic nature of most analytic philosophers has been criticized with a charge of reduction, and as listed above some philosophers tried to produce alternative realist and anti-reductionist theories. These realist readings still kept the concern of compatibility with the naturalistic project at their core. One of the recent trends led by Chalmers, for example, combines functionalism and naturalism with dualism. Different from all these, a group of philosophers searched for a fundamentally monist explanation. They tried to do this by redefining matter. The slogan behind these theories is "nothing can give what it does not possess". In the case of the 'mental', when the inner world of the human is accepted to be real, there then occurs a problem. How can matter be able to produce the complex consciousness? For this production, matter needs to contain (at least in a primitive form) some form of mentality. One can trace behind these monist, emergentist and panpsychist explanations the need to have intrinsic explanations of the mental that go beyond the structural accounts given by science (and expressed in functionalist theories). This is an extreme physicalism that leaves nothing outside of matter. According to Galen Strawson, physics has a restricted area of explanatory power but the physical is wider and yet full of unexplained realities. Consciousness is one of them (Strawson, Galen 2008, p. 21): "For every concrete phenomenon in the universe is physical, according to materialists. So all mental phenomena, including experiential phenomena, are physical phenomena, according to materialists: just as all cows are animals" (Strawson, Galen, 2008, p.21). Both panpsychism and emergentism are built on strong materialist intuitions and share a similar explanatory base. However, Strawson is not happy with emergentist theories. He evaluates them in two groups.

The most common arguments for emergence, those about liquidity or unextended-to-extended arguments, according to him are not sufficient to explain experiential emergence from the wholly non-experiential because these phenomena are not comparable to the experiential (Strawson, 2008, pp. 60 ff.). The analogy of P-phenomena (physical features such as shape-size-mass-charge-etc.) is not adequate for experiential phenomena

(Strawson, 2008, p. 62). According to the second group who claim that experiential phenomenon is proto-experiential, wholly non-experientiality “at the very least [turns into being] somehow intrinsically suited to constituting experiential” (Strawson, 2008, p. 68). There are two possible interpretations of ‘proto-experiential’: first “not actually experiential but just what is needed for experience” and second “already intrinsically experiential, although very different, qualitatively, from the experience whose realizing ground we are supposing it be” (Strawson, 2008, p. 68).

Strawson rejects both of these replies and sees them as having the same value. The main argument against is that only experiential phenomena can emerge from experiential phenomena (as implied by the principle “nothing can give what it does not possess”). Accordingly, he is left with one choice. The physical ultimates of consciousness must be experiential and intrinsically experience involving. So real materialism must give up the non-experiential and accept *micropsychism*.¹⁰ This is a big step towards panpsychism. And this step allows Strawson to claim real materialism to entail panpsychism. A thorough analysis of this approach is far from my focus in this research. As a result, the details of this idea and further problematic issues such as composition problem, the problem about the transition from micro consciousness to macro consciousness and the problem about mental causation which are related to panpsychism will not be discussed.

These monist theories are important because of their different approach to what matter is. For example, the emergence theory assumes some kind of leap between material and mental. And for the panpsychist approach, consciousness is present at every level of matter as well as at the level of consciousness (micropsychism). Emergentist and panpsychist notions of consciousness bear resemblance to Şadrā’s idea of soul which starts as a material body and with substantial motion turns into conscious mind. Panpsychism also resembles his idea of matter which is conscious at all levels, since everything exists as manifestations of one single reality: existence. However, I think claims of parallelism require a more comprehensive research on both traditions; so I prefer to avoid the claim that Şadrā is emergentist or panpsychist. The difference is mainly due to theological differences because Şadrā talks with a theocentric and internalist intuition, whereas the others have the naturalist stance as their focus. Also Şadrā would deny that his philosophy is materialist. ‘Existence’ is the central term in his monist philosophy which is defined as a single reality that is manifested at different levels and

¹⁰ It must be remembered that micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, as “some ultimates” are regarded to be experiential.

intensities. Matter is one of the lowest of these levels. Yet, the methodological similarity of monism and the similarity of accounting for the mental with consciousness embedded in this reality is what make both these approaches valuable and equally unique. In general, I would like to avoid labelling Şadrā with one of these approaches. However, some contemporary scholars agree with me in terms of the resemblance between the theories and make further claims. Khatami, for example, considers Şadrā's psychology to be emergentist (Khatami, 2004). Emergentism is built on the idea that a leap from matter to consciousness is possible. Differentiation of the matter and consciousness is an essential part of this approach. This is not Şadrā's case. For him, it is intrinsic to every existent (including material existents) that they possess some level of consciousness. Considering this, if Şadrā is to be associated with any contemporary theories, it would be either proto-psychism or panpsychism.

In this research, the setting of the ontological problem of intentional objects is Russellian and Quinean at many points. This is mainly because I think the contrast between minimalist accounts and comprehensive accounts will make it easier for us to see the differences, advantages, and disadvantages of each theory in a simpler manner. Thus in terms of intentional objects the two extremes I chose for this kind of representation have been Quine-Russell versus Mullā Şadrā. Moreover, Mullā Şadrā's internalist tendencies in his understanding of the human and epistemological processes made me think this contrast can be pursued further in related discussions of materiality and immateriality of epistemological processes. Thus, behind some of the discussions about the immateriality of the human self and products of her actions, I have a similar goal to emphasize the difference of Mullā Şadrā's approach. I shall separate monist theories from other analytical theories though. As explained above, there is more than a superficial similarity between Şadrā and monist theories in contrast to other materialist theories. To sum up, in this research, the naturalist project has inspired some of the set up for discussions on immateriality of epistemological processes, and together with them there will also be occasional reference to Chisholm and his criteria for intentionality.

The discussion on nonexistence, existence and intentional objects together with existential import are more central discussions in analytical philosophy for this research and there will be more frequent use of them. The influence of the analytical setting can be observed further when I discuss linguistic issues about existence. On the one hand, I present the issue of the language of existence in the context of Aristotle's *Metaphysics Z* and *Organon* (*Categories* and *De Interpretatione* to be more specific) and I use Şadrā's

concept of *tashkīk* (gradational ontology) as the solution. Accordingly with the principle of *tashkīk*, existence is a simple reality that is the source of unity and multiplicity through degrees and intensities. On the other hand, I make use of Frege-Russell's ambiguity problem and discussions on existential import. An interesting aspect of similarity is that both Sadrian and Russellian philosophical theories of existence are applicable to a language-based discussion. One inquiry that attracts attention to the semantical nature of Sadrian ontology is Sajjad Rizvi's *Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics* in which the principle of *tashkīk* (modulation/gradational ontology) is placed centre stage.

Brentano's followers on the *phenomenological* side of philosophy developed different viewpoints to intentionality. Unlike the linguistic, reductionist, functionalist, teleological, and eliminative approaches in analytical philosophy, for phenomenological discussions experience, the first person perspective and consciousness, have been the predominant concepts. My initial intuition at the beginning of this research was to include discussions on self-knowledge and consciousness, and accordingly discuss phenomenological approaches.¹¹ Later a potential problem occurred to me that the scope of my thesis would then be too broad. As a result, I decided to restrict the intentionality question by Brentano's presentation and formularization. A detailed and insightful research on the phenomenological understanding of intentionality and consciousness in comparison to medieval and especially Neoplatonic traditions such as Mullā Ṣadrā's seemed to me to be productive.

Aristotle and medieval philosophers seem to have influenced Brentano to an important degree and another curious case is the specified reading that Brentano applies to the *history* of the discussions on intentionality. The idea of intentionality in relation to medieval and ancient theories of self, soul, consciousness and epistemology might be studied as an independent research topic with further historical and textual tools as well. Such a study is beyond the methodology and scope of this current investigation. I used

¹¹ This is also due to a similarity between phenomenology and Ṣadrā's philosophy in both of which the notions of consciousness and self-knowledge play fundamental roles. Self-knowledge is most important for direct knowledge. However, most discussion of mental existence belongs to a different category of knowledge which is indirect knowledge. The fundamentality of self-knowledge for intentionality has been argued for and against by various philosophers. Despite coming from different backgrounds, Searle, Kaukua and Black all argue for the centrality of self-knowledge for intentionality. It should be automatically accepted that many Neoplatonists are in this category too as they base any kind of knowledge on self-knowledge and moreover on the knowledge of the one. One exception is Dan Zahavi. Despite his phenomenologist tendency, Zahavi treats self-knowledge and consciousness as two different philosophical questions and does not agree with the centrality claims of self-knowledge for intentionality. See Kaukua (2007); Black (2011); Searle (1991); Manson (2003); Zahavi (2006); Williford (2006).

the short historiography that Brentano gives for intentionality in order to tailor the concept of intentionality in the thesis. And that brief presentation will appear in the historiography chapter.

Returning to the subject of intentionality in Mullā Ṣadrā, although this research owes its topic to the modern discussions on intentionality and its essential link to the modern discussions, the usage of them will be considerably limited. As well as the mapping of the modern discussions, from time to time I will also try to explore other medieval and ancient philosophers on ontology, epistemology and soul such as Aristotle, Suhrawardī, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, and Avicenna and so on. The aim of these comparatively short explorations will be to understand Mullā Ṣadrā better in his historical context. To make the scope of this research clearer, I make no claims of exploring what Ṣadrā's original idea of intentionality is. Moreover, I do not claim that Ṣadrā has a theory of intentionality. My reconstruction of his theories is not built on an assumptive state based on the question "How would Ṣadrā explain this were he asked about the question of intentionality?" It is not a comparison of Brentano with Ṣadrā as well. As a result, there will not be detailed evaluation of Brentano's own philosophy and comparisons between him and Ṣadrā. To sum up, the study is not a discovery of the original Ṣadrā or re-construction of Ṣadrā's original idea of intentionality. It is a reconstruction of Ṣadrā's ideas around the question of intentionality. With this reconstruction both Ṣadrā and the question of intentionality are reconstructed, tailored and should be accepted in advance as being *distorted*.¹²

This reconstruction will contribute to the limited literature on Mullā Ṣadrā's idea of intentionality. This study will also be a contribution to the history of sense theories. Less scholarly work has been on his sense theories. Generally the focus of most studies had been his ideas on vision and the faculty of imagination. However, my focus is upon the general structure of his explanation of knowledge processes especially when the source of the data is inevitably extra-mental. In addition to this, I try to show how his psychology, epistemology, and ideas of language and logic are constructed around his idea of *wujūd*. When combined with the question of intentionality, Ṣadrā's monist attitude contributes to the discipline with an extended idea of existence that makes objects of mental states share existence. I try to show how comprehensive his ontology and his idea of existence are with the section on ontology and mental existence.

¹² Distortion is used by other researchers to express the change in reconstructions such as van-Ketel (1991, p. 61ff) and Rorty (1984, pp. 14 ff)

One advantage of studying Şadrā is that his works on existence, knowledge and the soul are available in critical editions in Arabic. Moreover, it is promising that the translations into English have been increasing in recent years.¹³ On the other hand, the number of the translations is still not sufficient for a scholar to work on Şadrā solely with these English texts. Moreover, translations are often found to be confusing and inaccessible for those interested in philosophy.

In terms of Ṣadrā's notion of intentionality, I could find only one article in English (Gholam Reza A'wani, 2003). A'wani follows both Brentano and Husserl's definitions of intentionality (as aboutness as well as an act and directedness) and traces it back to concepts of "meaning" and "concept" in Islamic philosophical texts. He focuses on first and second intentions in Ṣadrā's writing and his presentation of mental existence. This informative article, despite its short discussions on Ṣadrā, focuses more on the Husserlian

13 (1964), *Kitāb al-mashā'ir*, tr. as *Livre des pénétrations métaphysiques* by H. Corbin (Tehran: L'Institut Franco-Iranien); (1981), *al-Ḥikma al-'Arshiyya*, tr. as *The Wisdom of the Throne* by James W. Morris (Princeton: Princeton University Press); (1986), [Shihab al-Din Yahya] Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, tr. as *Le livre de la sagesse orientale* by H. Corbin with the glosses of Mullā Ṣadrā (Paris: Fayard), pp. 439-669.; (2000a), *Risāla al-ḥashr*, tr. as *Se rendre immortel* by C. Jambet (Paris: Fata Morgana); (2000b), *Risāla fī ḥudūth al-'ālam*, tr. as *Die Abhandlung über die Entstehung* by S. Bagher Talgharizadeh (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz); (2003), *Iksir al-'arīfīn*, tr. as *The Elixir of the Gnostics* by W. Chittick (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press); (2004), *Khalq al-a'māl*, tr. T. Kirmani as *The Manner of the Creation of Actions* (Tehran: SIPRIn); (2006), *Risāla fī-l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq*, tr. J. Lameer as *Conception and Belief in Sadr al-Din Shirāzī* (Tehran: Iranian Academy of Philosophy); (2007), *al-Ḥikmat al-'arshiyya*, trs. A. Yousef & P. Moulinet as *Le Livre de la sagesse du trône* (Paris: Bouraq); (2008), *Kasr asnam al-jāhiliyya*, trs. M. Dasht Bozorgi & F. Asadi Amjad as *Breaking the Idols of Ignorance* (London: ICAS Press); (2008), *al-Ḥikma al-muta'āliya fī-l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a*, vols. 8 & 9, tr. L. Peerwani as *Spiritual Psychology: The Fourth Intellectual Journey* (London: ICAS Press). Rizvi, Sajjad, "Mullā Ṣadrā", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/mulla-Sadrā/>.

discussions than the Brentanian definition of intentionality. A'wani's take on the intentionality question is different from my approach in this research as well. The main difference in the article to my approach is that A'wani centralizes the ideas of self-knowledge and knowledge by presence in his search for intentionality. The centralization of self-knowledge reminds one of Jari Kaukua's approach to Avicenna's intentionality. I do not centralize self-knowledge in my search for intentionality. This is not because self-awareness is not important for Ṣadrā. But I think his idea of self-knowledge should be studied comprehensively as an independent research topic. Another reason is that not centralizing the question of self-knowledge opens up opportunities for seeing different aspects of Ṣadrā's philosophy. In this way, I have the flexibility to apply contemporary philosophical questions to his idea of the soul. Other works for understanding Ṣadrā and intentionality can be found as journal articles or chapters in compilations on his ontology, psychology, and epistemology.

One article that is closely related to my research in this sense is on mental existence by Marcotte.¹⁴ Marcotte traces the problematization of mental existence back to Rāzī and Ṭūsī and gives a special place to Ṣadrā in this history. His importance accordingly is due to the importance of mental existence for the primacy of being (*aṣālat al-wujūd*). As a result, Ṣadrā devotes much space to the discussions of mental existence as well as proofs of it. Marcotte focuses on the proofs mentioned in *MQ* and briefly summarizes proofs given in *Shawāhid* and *Asfār*. I agree with her that *MQ* gives a more complete discussion on mental existence. As Marcotte points out, some of Ṣadrā's proofs in *Shawāhid*, *Asfār* and *MQ* can be found in Rāzī and Ṭūsī's works as well. Marcotte thinks Ṣadrā's teleological proof is one of his innovations as well as providing a further insight into mental existence. Ṣadrā, according to the author, is mainly concerned with ontological issues rather than epistemological ones. Consequently, we do not find an elaborate discussion on the correspondence problem of the mental existents (Marcotte, 2011, p.155-6). I discuss in the fifth chapter how what makes his discussion of mental existence unique can be found only when Ṣadrā's philosophy is considered as a whole, and that the innovation is hidden in his notions of soul and existence.

Another relevant article is "How is it possible to see "ghouls" in the desert?" In this article, Bonmariage explores hallucinations and illusions and mistakes in sense perception as well as the judgements regarding them by focusing on the relevant section

¹⁴ Marcotte (2011) "al-Masā'il al-Qudsiyya and Mullā Sadra's Proofs of Mental Existence", *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 22 v. 2, pp. 153-182.

in *Sharh ‘Usul al-Kāfi* which is more related to the transmitted sciences rather than metaphysical issues. The article shows that the holist nature of the Sadrian project which embraces Islamic sciences as well as mysticism and philosophy, requires an attention to Ṣadrā’s seemingly non-philosophical books as well. This is because they too constitute an important source for understanding his philosophical ideas. In a short section in the fourth chapter, I draw upon his *Tafsīr*, for example. Bonmariage presents a taxonomy of the explanations about dreams and visions in relation to the faculty of vision given by Ṣadrā. This is given in two parts, one seen when the agent is awake and the other when they are dreaming. This article along with Yahya Michot (1985), Deborah L. Black (1997) and Jari Kaukua (2007, p.136 ff.) is one of the few written works on medieval Islamic ideas on fictional beings.¹⁵ The common interest of these three texts is “Avicenna’s letter on the disappearance of the vain intelligible forms after death”. I will base my discussion of fictionals mainly on this short Avicennan piece, together with Kaukua and Black’s interpretation of it.

Another relevant publication for my research is *Perception According to Mullā Ṣadrā* edited by Safavi (2002). This book has a collection of well-written articles that analyse different aspects of Ṣadrā’s notion of perception from psychology to epistemology and the afterlife. The previously mentioned article by Bonmariage is among these.¹⁶ Another article from the book is “On the teleology of Perception” by Chittick.¹⁷ This is important because he analyses sensation in relation to Ṣadrā’s notion of substantial motion (*ḥaraka jawharīya*) and his gradational ontology (*tashkīk*). As the title suggests, Chittick’s point of view is the teleological aspects of Ṣadrā’s theory of sensation. I think not only for the sensation theory, but in general as well, the originality of Ṣadrā’s psychology lies in these two principles. Thus, although I have avoided the centrality of self-knowledge in Ṣadrā, these two theories can be considered to be the most central and most original parts of his ideas related to intentionality.

In Persian and Arabic, Dinānī and Āmulī’s works are two of the main studies one can find on Ṣadrā’s ideas of copulative existence and mental existence. In terms of understanding *tashkīk*, I claim that Ṣadrā’s *tashkīk* is a different version of univocal understanding of

¹⁵ Michot, 1985, “Avicenna’s Letter on the Disappearance of the Vain Intelligible forms after Death”, *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, pp. 94-103; Black, “Avicenna on the ontological and epistemological status of fictional beings”, *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 8, pp. 425-453; Kaukua, 2007, “Avicenna on Subjectivity”, Jyväskylä).

¹⁶ This article was originally presented in *Transcendent Philosophy (An International Journal for Comparative Philosophy and Mysticism)* in 2000.

¹⁷ Chittick spares a chapter on Ṣadrā’s theory of sensation in his relatively recent book *In Search of the Lost Heart: Explorations in Islamic Thought* (2011, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press).

being. From this perspective, Mehdi Haeri Yazdi and his *Hiram-i Hastī* (*The Pyramid of Existence*) is an important source for his emphasis on the continuity and unbrokenness among different levels in the pyramid of existence. His claim about centrality of *wujūd* might not be found to be particularly striking. However, his claim of reflecting and applying the Sadrian ideas of *wujūd* not only to different areas of ontology but also other disciplines such as political philosophy can be seen as a challenging practical question in philosophy. Another interesting point is the centrality of copulative existence in Yazdi's analysis. His analysis of existence in general and his ideas on predication and copulative being in particular will be discussed later in the fourth chapter. For now, let it suffice that the importance of this book for my research lies in its connecting the semantic questions on predication and copulative being to ontology, and building up the big pyramid of being in inter-related levels of continuity through the concept of gradational ontology. *Tashkīk* in this analysis is different from analogy and ambiguity, and the term rather means that existence is a single reality that is manifested at different levels of intensities.

Al-insān by Hāshim Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī Ḥasan is one of the books containing different aspects of Ṣadrā's psychology. This book, however, is a basic introduction for understanding Sadrian psychology written in a descriptive style rather than an analytical one. The strength of this book is that it excludes no part of psychology and includes both sense theories and eschatology. A similar presentation of ideas on soul is by al-Muslim (2009) and his book *al-Nafs Numūzajan*. Muslim's focus is on exploring the originality of Ṣadrā's ideas on the soul. He starts with Qazvīnī's and Mutahharī's lists of original principles of Ṣadrā (Muslim, 2009, p. 59 ff). So, other than providing an elaborate presentation of Sadrian psychology, this book is important due to this focus on originality as well. I do not share the ideas that imply the world of similitudes is an essential part of Ṣadrā's philosophy. In that regard, the sections in this book where such principles are presented as part of Ṣadrā's originality are problematic. The main problem with these is that the stability implied by a realm of similitudes contradicts Ṣadrā's dynamic understanding of being in which all save God are in substantial motion. And second, primacy of being contradicts the idea of a Platonic world of similitudes which entails the primacy of quiddities. I think one should choose between two interpretative stances for Ṣadrā: either centralize the world of similitudes or centralize the primacy of being. His work is too obviously based on the need for the latter.

In terms of providing a reconstruction of Ṣadrā's philosophy in a modern scheme, there are a number of attempts, some more successful than others. I will mention one of these

books due to its relevance. Mahmoud Khatami tries to open a space for the subjectivistic self of Ṣadrā in modern, predominantly objectivistic theories. The author's attempt to picture Ṣadrā establishing a self that goes beyond the triplet in modern conception as scepticism, solipsism and idealism is noteworthy. This is important in two ways. First, he points to the opportunity of finding fresh answers to modern questions by the help of past philosophers. Second, and more importantly, I share his intuition that Ṣadrā offers original frameworks with his ontology and psychology and this framework generally is different from his contemporaries as well as from modern philosophers. With a similar approach, I too consider Ṣadrā's epistemology to be different from the idealist or realist frameworks.

Ṣadrā's ontological evaluations have a semantic nature as well. However, he does not pursue this to establish independent disciplines such as Suhrawardī does for logic. As a result, his works on logic do not constitute a major feature of his corpus. This affects the scholarly work on his logic. Among the few works which there are, one important work in English is Lameer's evaluation and translation of *al-Taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq*.¹⁸ Lameer's ambitious book traces the duo of *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq* back to Fārābī. He discusses how the question about the nature of these two terms was a well-established philosophical topic by Ṣadrā's time through an evaluation of the previous theories together with Ṣadrā's critique of these predecessors. Not only for the elaborate contextualization of the terms conception and assent (*taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq*), but also for the quality of the translation of Ṣadrā's treatise, this work is one of the most important books in English for Sadrian studies.

For a more general approach to Ṣadrā's philosophy, Fazlurrahman's early and comprehensive work on many aspects of Ṣadrā is still a good introduction in English. Together with Fazlurrahman's classic work, Rizvi's *Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics* and Ibrahim Kalin's *Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy* are two important scholarly works. Kalin not only includes translation of various Sadrian texts, especially his treatise on *Ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl*, but he also describes Sadrian epistemology within its historical and cultural context. Rizvi focuses on different aspects of Sadrian philosophy and presents a critical examination of Ṣadrā's *tashkīk* (*modulation* as Rizvi chooses to translate).

¹⁸ Lameer (2006), *Conception and Belief in Sadr al-dīn al-Shīrāzī*. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy.

Understanding Šadrā as well as reconstructing the question of intentionality in the context of medieval philosophy requires understanding other ancient and medieval philosophers. The literature on philosophies of mind is quite comprehensive and promising in this respect. Avicenna has a central place for the histories of psychology and thus there are more articles related to his idea of intentionality. Besides, many articles about the history of intentionality relate the concept to Avicenna's psychology even when they do not discuss his ideas in detail (Lyons, 1995, pp. 3-4). There are two parallel areas of publication which are related to my research on intentionality: one is on Avicenna's inner senses and the other is the scholarly work on the translation of *intentio* as *ma'na*, *ma'qul* and *qaṣd*. Moreover, I have not focused so much on the transition and the translations of *intentio*. This is mainly because there are already significant studies by scholars in both Latin and medieval studies using textual and historical analysis such as that by Dag Nikolaus Hasse. I have tried to find a larger base for discussions of intentionality related to Avicenna, thus I take all discussions on his ontology (mental existence in particular) and his psychology (his inner senses in particular) into consideration.

Turning now to medieval discussions of Avicenna, Kaukua lists two different opinions on Avicenna's importance in intentionality discussions. According to one group it is Avicenna's *ma'na* and its translation *intentio* that triggered most intentionality discussions after him. The other group writes the history of the concept independently from Avicenna (Kaukua, 2007, p. 38). Spiegelberg points to Latin *intentio* and Arabic *ma'na* and *ma'qul* as the sources of intentionality (Kaukua, 2007, p. 36; Caston, 2008). Gyekye points to the links between different translations and is one of the sources of the most common positions that intentionality is from Latin *intentio* and that *intentio* is a translation of *ma'na* (Gyekye, 1971, pp. 32-38).

Hasse gives an elaborate discussion of Avicenna's psychology and its impact in the Latin West. The book also has one of the largest sections on Avicenna's faculty of estimation. In terms of the history of intentionality, Hasse agrees with Caston that Avicenna is not a major figure for related discussions, and that a history of intentionality independent of Avicenna is possible. This might be related to his understanding of estimation. Many scholars relate the immateriality of the object of estimative power (which Avicenna names as *ma'na*) to the immateriality claim of intentionality. Hasse, on the other hand, has a narrow understanding of estimation: a psychological phenomenon of animal instincts. Kaukua himself thinks the argument is built on a confusion of intentionality with *intentio* (he translates *ma'na* not as meaning but as *intentio* (Kaukua, 2007, p. 35)).

Intention is in a strict sense the proper object of the estimative faculty. With his work, Kaukua has shifted attention in research on intentionality from estimation to self-awareness. In his stance, intentionality is an integral part of subjectivity.

Black, in contrast to Hasse, understands estimation more broadly (Kaukua, 2007, p. 39) and does not leave estimation out of her discussions of intentionality. However, she builds her concept of intentionality mainly on the indicators in Brentano's intentionality. As a result, four aspects of intentionality become related to intentionality such as object-directedness, mental existence, consciousness, and knowledge of non-existents (Black, 2010). Black and Kaukua share a similar approach to Avicenna's psychology which is based on active understanding of the soul in which self-knowledge is an essential constituent. In contrast to more particularist readings, they choose to solve alleged-discrepancies by harmonizing Avicenna's ideas with each other as it occurs for example in the discussion of abstraction versus emanation.

In addition to books on Šadrā and Avicenna, in relation to my research, compilations of articles that discuss the theories of different historical figure are one of the most useful materials among the literature on intentionality. I will discuss many of the other related literature in various parts of this thesis rather than here.

1.4 HOW?

Think now

*History has many cunning passages, contrived
corridors*

And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions,

Guides us by vanities. Think now

She gives when our attention is distracted

*And what she gives, gives with such supple
confusions*

T. S. Eliot "Gerontion"

With a research topic on Mullā Ṣadrā's intentionality, I am already inclined to the view that intentionality can be translated into medieval discussions by queries on "mental existence". Discussing a past philosopher's ideas on a modern topic needs a further justification. A sceptic would challenge the nature of such an inquiry first from a historical aspect: did Mullā Ṣadrā conceptualize intentionality originally? And a further concern can follow: does the question of intentionality emerge in any of the medieval philosophical texts? In terms of Mullā Ṣadrā, the problem was not yet formularized at his time. As far as the historical nonexistence of a concept of intentionality is concerned, the original presentation of the concept by Brentano posits intentionality as a continuum of ancient and medieval concepts such as inexistence and inner language.

A deeper concern can be raised in terms of commensurability issues: is the modern question of intentionality applicable to medieval psychologies? The ancient and medieval idea of human and cosmos is radically different from that of modern theories. Antony Kenny claims that a vast majority of works in analytical philosophy manifest this kind of misunderstanding caused by confusing the contexts of concepts in Descartes and philosophy of mind:

In other philosophical traditions since the Renaissance it is not so easy to identify, as a specific area of philosophical study, the field which bears the name 'philosophy of mind'. This is because since the time of Descartes the philosophical study of the operations of the human mind has taken place in the context of epistemology. Epistemology, as I have said, is the discipline which is concerned above all with the justification of our cognition, the indication of claims to knowledge, the quest for reliable methods of achieving truth. Epistemology, as contrasted with philosophy of

mind, is a normative rather than descriptive or analytic branch of philosophy (Kenny, 1993, pp. 18-19).

Kuhn presupposed coherence and homogeneity inside paradigms and this resulted in incommensurability of frameworks. As a result, between-paradigms translations are considered as impossible. Moreover, he denies any superiority assertion between paradigms. In order to solve the first denial of translation, a common vocabulary that combines common and disjunctive vocabulary is possible. Since intentionality is at the juncture of psychology and epistemology, it appears to be almost impossible to translate to ideas of soul and knowledge. I suggest this problem can be solved by finding a vocabulary that is emptied of both traditions' understandings together with sets of vocabulary that is filled with every possible vocabulary each tradition would include. This is a language based application similar to the mathematical GCF (Greatest Common Factor) and LCM (Least Common Multiple) to vocabulary of different philosophical traditions. In order to achieve this, first I need to investigate the largest possible vocabulary that covers discussions and concepts in both traditions' vocabulary. The result of this is "rational bridgehead" (Rorty, 1984, p. 2) which is maintaining a medium that bridges the different frameworks. At the second stage, the bare essentials of the concepts are extracted by a parsimonious scan of their terminology.

In terms of the second idea on denial of any superiority claim, the principle of charity can be useful in our readings for avoiding value-loaded or teleological interpretations. In a simple way, the principle of charity can be described as interpreting one's words in a way that favours the writer.¹⁹ Accordingly, even with discrepancies in the text which are very

¹⁹ There are different formulations of the principle in semantic theories, as the theory plays important role especially in behaviouristic theories of meaning. For the related discussions through Quine and Davidson see Ranganathan (2007), *Ethics and History of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi, pp. 116 ff; Speaks, Jeff, "Theories of Meaning", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/meaning/>>. Davidson's radical interpretation is sometimes connected to his principle of charity (Fodor and Lepore, 1994, pp. 101-119). Yet for Davidson it is important to emphasize that the radical interpretation is a possibility rather than a necessity for languages and that the principle of charity depends on the radical interpretation. Who the radical interpreter is and with which tools she is equipped are important for understanding Davidson. The interpreter is not a mind reader for him, yet she already has a language and a set of concepts that somehow match those of the interpretee. She has concepts of truth, intention, belief, desire, and attention. And she is aware of the circumstances and how human behaviours' change according to the circumstances (Davidson, 1994, p. 125). This last point is required as the meaning and interpretation is not merely an internal business, yet it is partially observational and behavioural. Davidson seems to inject the idea of intention into the behavioural theories of meaning. In this case, for interpretation, correspondence as well as coherence is abstracted from observation. In Quine's case, the principle of charity is applied by the idea of finding the interpretation that maximizes the truth of the interpretee's words (Quine, 1960). "The maxim of translation underlying all this is that assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language. This maxim is strong enough in all of us to swerve us even from the homophonic method that is so fundamental to the very acquisition and use of one's mother tongue. The common sense behind the maxim is that one's interlocutor's silliness,

obvious, the reader will try to harmonize the ideas with each other in the best possible way. When there are possible flaws in a theory, the reader tries to fill in the gaps, again in a way that favours the author. This principle is commonly mentioned as part of rational reconstructions of previous philosophers (van-Ketel, 1991, p. 120 ff.). The principle owes its commonness to Davidson. The main assumption is that the agent is rational. One can find this activity problematic. One problem is the harmonization of a philosopher's words, and that reconstruction is inevitably in accordance with what the reader's own idea of what is 'rational'. In this sense, one falls into the trap of superiority just by trying to avoid it.

Additional case against incommensurability claims can be built by a pragmatic argument as well. If we assumed that all the big thinkers in history faithfully worked on commensurable contexts, would we still have the rich picture of the history of ideas we have today or would we end up with a list of enclosed clusters of ideas (Rorty, (1984, 2004), p. 2)? The practices in philosophy draw attention to the loose, almost non-existent methodology used by practicing philosophers. The reason for the lack of interest in a methodology might be due to the nature of the methodological question being historical rather than philosophical.²⁰ So why did I feel the need to ask this historical question? Given that my work is on a seventeenth-century philosopher and that my claim is that his ideas can be reconstructed, I am forced to legitimize my treatment of Sadrian theories. I separate between the text and the context in which the text is written. As question-dependence defines the nature of the study I need to make sure that this research is not about the texts *per se* and the contexts *per se*. Let me discuss the idea of context-dependence in contrast to question dependence and historical methods further by evaluating one of the recent historical methodologies suggested by Quentin Skinner. According to Skinner, historical texts are embedded in their time and contexts just as speech acts are. He claimed that holistic approaches to historical literature as well as perennial approaches are fallacies (Skinner, (2002, 2010), pp. 57-89). As well as the

beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation - or, in the domestic case, linguistic divergence"(Quine, 1960, p. 59). Quine quotes the formulation of the principle of charity in this sense of maximizing and selecting the most rational interpretation from Wilson: "We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest possible number of ... statements true" (Quine, 1960, p. 59). Quine's application in particular is quite immune to anachronistic readings for my type of research and had been discussed in terms of its value-loadedness (van-Ketel, 1991, p. 53 ff.)

²⁰ One may argue that the metaphilosophy discussions in contemporary philosophy and the medieval discussion of the classification of sciences with specific relation to the nature of metaphysics are methodology discussions of philosophers. However, these two are more about the nature of philosophy and its place among other sciences rather than a discussion on how to analyse previous philosophers or historiography.

assumption of speech acts, Skinner also assumes that it is possible to uncover the author's intentions.

Skinner, influenced by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson (Skinner, 2002, pp. 4, 53; 27-40) focuses on speech acts and intentions. With the focus on speech acts, his theory emphasizes the importance of the locutionary force. In order to understand an utterance, it must be "located in the appropriate linguistic context" (Bevir, 2000, p. 395). Skinner criticizes two orthodox approaches. The first is the context of religious, political, and economic factors which determines the meaning of any given text, and so must provide the ultimate framework for any attempt to understand it (Skinner, 1969, p. 3). The second orthodoxy insists on the autonomy of the text itself as the sole necessary key to its own meaning, and so dismisses any attempt to reconstitute the "total context" as *gratuitous, and worse* (Skinner, 1969, p. 3). Accordingly, extracting a universal meaning out of any text in history is regarded as a mistake. This is the point where it becomes impossible to interact with historical texts and produce fresh ideas from them. Besides Skinner's extreme method, Bevir puts forward a more down-to earth theory: weak intentionalism.

Bevir defines text in such a way that it contains temporal features on the one hand and a-temporal features on the other (Bevir, 2000, p. 388). Bevir claims that meaning has no existence apart from the individuals. Accordingly, the meaning is dependent on both the author and the reader (Bevir, 2000, p. 387). Giving a place to the intentions of the reader together with the intentions of the author balances Skinner's strictly author-dependent method. Using Bevir's first differentiation of temporal and atemporal parts of the text together with the intentions of the reader opens more space for an idea of reconstruction. But more needs to be discussed on Skinner's method in order to go beyond his strong contextualism.

The main problem with Skinner's theory is that with his approach it is almost impossible to engage with a philosopher in history, and thus his ideas lead to antiquarianism. Moreover, it treats every piece of work in such a monadic way that none of the monads (texts from different contexts) can interact with each other. According to this, Aristotle cannot even interact, for example, with Thales. What is more central for my research is his idea of texts as speech acts. On this view, reconstructions become impossible. Giving an example from a different discipline, how can a play from the fourteenth century be performed in the twentieth century? From a different perspective, Skinner's approach can prove to be useful for a philosophical approach as well. Skinner's approach gives past ideas a chance to be listened to in their own holism. As much as I would love to, I cannot

reject this kind of a help in my research. This is the reason why I have chosen to refer to Ṣadrā and Brentano's historical connections from time to time.

A similar stance to Skinner's is supported by Seyyed Hossein Nasr in defence of the holism of Islamic philosophy (Nasr, 1972, pp. 53-61). According to Nasr, an attempt to interpret and be in communication with these texts when freed from their original contexts and backgrounds (be it cultural, religious or methodological, such as not focusing on the experiential nature of knowledge when an illuminationist philosopher is being discussed)²¹ is a reduction of these traditions to a branch of philosophy. With his fundamental separation of philosophical traditions from more experiential traditions, Nasr seems to express the problem of incommensurability from a different perspective:

To say that this or that statement of Hegel resembles the Upanisads or that Hume presents ideas similar to Nagarjuna's is to fall into the worst form of error, one which prevents any type of profound understanding from being achieved, either for Westerners wanting to understand the East or vice versa. Comparative study in this incommensurability serves no good when performed in a reductionist method. When each tradition is evaluated in its own context, comparative philosophy serves in a way to emphasise the differences and better understand the traditions: However, the function of comparative philosophy should be to serve the truth and to reveal contrasts and differences wherever they exist (Nasr, 1972, p. 58).

Nasr's and Skinner's approaches with their emphasis on context-dependence and incommensurability are important for a researcher dealing with different traditions and historical texts. On the other hand, from the perspective of a philosophical approach, their offerings are very limited and it appears that an inquiry of this nature is constrained by both textual or historical methods and antiquarianism. Even when a researcher aims to follow their contextualist methodology, it is difficult to master the necessary skills required for a well-executed antiquarian work. Nader el-Bizri expresses the gap between the capacities required for a full-grasp of a historical philosophical text in Islamic philosophy and the demands inherent in philosophical research itself (Bizri, 2010, p.5, 10).

²¹ First each tradition needs to be understood in its own structure of meaning of the religion "the first necessary condition for a meaningful comparative study will be a complete awareness of the structure and levels of meaning of the religious and metaphysical traditions of the East and West" *ibid.* p. 56. Additionally, the notion of man and its faculties in relation to knowledge is required: "Comparative philosophy between East and West is impossible without considering the hierarchic nature of man's faculties and the modes of knowledge accessible to him." (Nasr, 1972, p. 56).

The aims and objectives of such learned exegetes and custodians of archiving, differ from the purposes of philosophers per se, who focus on the evolution of concepts and on the questions of ontology, epistemology, logic, value theory, etc. (Bizri, 2010, p. 5).

The tension between the textual and historical requirements and the innovative nature of philosophy is recognized by many others:

Either we read the philosophies of the past so as to make them relevant to our contemporary problems and enterprises, transmuting them as far as possible into what they would have been if they were part of present-day philosophy, and minimizing or ignoring or even on occasion misrepresenting that which refuses such transmutation because it is inextricably bound up with that in the past which makes it radically different from present-day philosophy; *or* instead we take great care to read them in their own terms, carefully preserving their idiosyncratic and specific character, so that they cannot emerge into the present except as a set of museum pieces (MacIntyre, (1984, 2010), p. 31).

Similarly to Nasr, MacIntyre claims that the “habit of treating philosophy as an exercise which could be carried on in entirely contemporary terms [...] is very widespread” (MacIntyre, (1984, 2010), p. 17), and as a result, the chance to learn “what an alternative could look like is being missed” (MacIntyre, (1984, 2010), p. 19). Thus, in place of the antiquarian imprisonment, MacIntyre warns about the imprisonment of one in her/his own time’s model. Rorty takes the method of the analytical philosophers to be one of “rational reconstructions” in which the arguments of great dead philosophers are treated as colleagues with whom they can exchange views (Rorty, (1984, 2010), pp. 49, 53). Either by carrying contemporary vocabulary into the past or by interpreting the old vocabulary in terms of contemporary vocabulary, one big criticism of rational reconstructions - borrowing Rorty’s notion - and treating great dead philosophers as contemporaries, is the criticism of “distortion” (also van-Ketel, 1991, p. 61 ff).

Mostly, these criticisms imply that there is an original text or a whole entity of original vocabularies that is distorted when they are rephrased in the contemporary contexts. Thus, it is considered that contemporary vocabulary and previous vocabulary are incommensurable; similarly, it considers that notions from different traditions are incommensurable. In most cases, the implication of this verdict is that using one side of any of these parts to understand the other causes a distortion. But is that really the case? Is there really no other way, other than imprisoning one’s language with one of the side’s

vocabulary? Might there not be a third way in which a higher order or common ground is used to blend vocabularies of both languages of communication?

These discussions on historical context and the holism of traditions are related to different disciplines such as history, semantics, the history of ideas, philosophy, linguistics, and so on. A further claim on the issues, thus, would require a more discipline-based discussion and larger space rather than a short introductory discussion of a dissertation. In terms of my research and methodology, I have decided to develop it to be less concerned with these technical questions. It develops in two stages. The first part is about the way the text is made available and the way I understand and interpret it. Second comes a phase which is less dependent on the context and text. In this second stage the research question is at the centre and a reconstruction is built around it. This reconstruction is neither an historical investigation of a concept in the manner of extreme historicism, nor is it an independent interpretation that is ahistorical and that favours only the interpreter's view point. This is a reconstruction of a concept around a question which takes the coherence of the author's texts and the historical context of ideas as part of this reconstruction. The nature of the reconstruction is, however, defined by the nature of the question. Thus, my reconstruction is philosophical.

This research builds on the optimistic assumption that we are able to communicate with historical texts and that these texts contribute useful insights into the questions of our time as well. This is a dialogue in both directions from the past to the present, and from the present to the past. The principle of charity and the notion of "coherence" and the bridging of high order vocabulary will be useful in defining the basic material of a loose methodology.

Let me summarize the methodological issues with the help of a chart:

Problem	Resolution
1. Criticism of distortion	1. Constructive reading
2. Criticism of anachronism	2. Principle of Charity and Coherence Test
3. Incommensurability	3. Higher order Vocabulary

The texts and contexts are mere tools for the first stage of reconstruction which is reaching the ideas and understanding the texts. A study of historical texts can take different forms depending on the central approach of the researcher: it can be textual, systematical, and holist in the sense that it engages with each single idea of a philosopher in relation to the other ideas in that philosopher's system. It can be historical in which case the context and social conditions and the predecessors as well as the successors of a philosopher become important. The research can take an exegetical structure in which the historical text is reconstructed with updated explanations, comments or revised versions of the contents of the original text. The exegesis can occur in a more independent form and the original text can be used in a new context or with new goals. The research on a historical text, similarly can approach the text with less strict historical methodologies. In this, a reconstruction can take place in form of an independent study. We can remember contemporary example of this as Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Kripke combines Wittgenstein's discussions of private language (PL) argument and rule-following argument. He applies Wittgenstein's scepticism in PL to the rule-following discussions and reconstructs the sceptical Wittgenstein.

1.5 THE CHAPTERS

The introduction chapter is followed by the second chapter which is built on the methodological concerns mentioned above for the nature of this kind of research. This chapter is about the historiography of intentionality. What intentionality means for Brentano and how Mullā Ṣadrā builds his ontology around existence are the first to be explored in each philosopher's own words and worlds/contexts. The chapter tracks ideas in two parallel lines starting from Aristotle, one reaching Brentano and the other Mullā Ṣadrā.

One feature of intentionality which I emphasize is that it is about a human being's relation to the extra-mental world. The third chapter will focus on the production process of intentional objects through perception. The first part of this chapter aims to anchor the relation of the human to the world through a detailed analysis of the external senses. The framework in this chapter is Aristotelian. This is due to the centrality of *De Anima* (Aristotle's most influential book on the soul) to most discussions in ancient and medieval philosophies of the mind. Ṣadrā does not change this framework: his presentation and terminology is no exception to his contemporaries, and is similar to Aristotle and Avicenna. We also see the influence of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, especially in the sections where criticism of the peripatetic features is considered. In places, Ṣadrā's quotations mirror the paraphrasing of Avicenna found in Rāzī's books. Aristotle's sense perception is triggered by the extra-mental object which is the object of sense. For Ṣadrā however, the role of extra-mental object is reduced to preparing the soul for sense perception and the real sense object is created internally. As a result, the intervention of extra-mental object is reduced to a minimum.

In order to understand Ṣadrā's position, in addition to the process of perception, his ideas on the soul and substantial motion are studied in this chapter. I believe his approach to external senses is one of the most distinctive parts of his philosophy. And what attracts attention is that this part of his philosophy is little studied thus far. But when it comes to his approach to inner senses, it is a different story to that of the external senses.

With his internalist approach, for Ṣadrā the internal senses are not clearly distinguished from the external senses or the intellect. Recalling the threefold classification of classical knowledge as external senses, inner senses, and intellect, Ṣadrā claims that the active agent at all these levels is the soul. This monist approach to the soul is fundamentally different from the Peripatetics and even from Plotinus, to whom Ṣadrā seems to have had a strong loyalty. His stance regarding Plotinus is interesting because Ṣadrā quotes

Theology of Aristotle approvingly and claims to be following Plotinus' conception of the soul and his ontology. Yet he admits a strong monism in psychology and ontology which is essentially non-Plotinian.

The second part of the third chapter gives a general scheme of the classical understanding of the inner senses through Avicennian presentation and discusses how Şadrā places them in his philosophy. The difference becomes blurred between inner and external senses; we come to understand Şadrā's soul further by the soul being the active agent at all levels. Thus his principle of the unity of the soul and that "the soul is all its faculties" are discussed in detail in this chapter.

Chapter three not only aims to discover Şadrā's conception of knowledge processes and his idea of soul, but also to show the nature of the objects of senses. Being the active agent, the soul is the creator of the objects of senses and these objects are not extra-mental. Şadrā's accounting for the agent is important as well. He denies the materialist understanding in which the perception is explained through material bodily organs and the brain.

Chapter four starts with exploring the activity of the soul and the creative nature of a human further. This explains how a human can create a unique world of mental objects and, further, how she symbolizes this world and turns it into communication by logic and language. This chapter is mainly built on two aspects of the world created by a human, namely, language and logic. These two realms are conventionally established. As a systematic philosopher, Şadrā's approach to logic and language is parallel to his ontology. Accordingly, the language used for knowledge reflects the idea of ontological gradation (*tashkīk*) which is his central ontological principle.

With the process of object production investigated and the symbolism of this world already discussed, chapter five is more about the ontological issues related to intentional objects. I believe Şadrā's main contribution to the discussion of intentional objects is his comprehensive idea of existence. As a result of this, this last chapter is a detailed investigation on his conception of "existence".

Now, shall we begin?

2 CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON INTENTIONALITY AND THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY

In light of the discussions in the introductory chapter, in order to reconstruct Ṣadrā's philosophy around the question of intentionality I will use the historical context at the first stage of discovering the clusters of vocabulary. This will work in two dimensions: first, to explore the common historical discussions and concepts, between Brentano and Mullā Ṣadrā, and second, to translate the more comprehensive vocabulary into a transferable version applicable to modern discussions. Historically, the main characters in Brentano's presentation can be traced back and changed into two parallel timelines, both starting with Aristotle, but with one reaching Brentano and the other one through to Mullā Ṣadrā. The difference starts after Avicenna when his texts are transferred to the Latin-speaking world. Aquinas' and Ṭūsī's transformations and interpretations of Avicenna constitute two traditions of the philosophies of psychology.

For the line tracing back from Brentano, I selected the figures that appear in his presentation for his own historiography such as Aristotle, the Neoplatonists and Aquinas. This historiography connects medieval discussions of East and West since it regards medieval interpretations of *De Anima* (DA) as important, and theories in the east especially those by al-Fārābī, Avicenna, al-Ghazālī, and Averroes had been highly influential on development of later discussions in the west.

Mullā Ṣadrā, on the parallel line mentioned above, has been influenced by different traditions from those which influenced Brentano. His ontology and psychology are the main areas related to discussions of intentionality. Thus I will focus on the philosophers who have influenced him in his idea of *wujūd* (existence) and the notion of *nafs* (soul). The epistemological interest will be limited to certain issues that are related to the central ontological and psychological issues such as external senses. Other possible issues such as certainty, causation, and detailed discussion of self-awareness will be omitted.

My aim in this chapter is two-fold. One is to share the concerns (although at the minimal level) of authors such as Skinner and Pocock about the importance of historical contexts and linguistic conventions to understand historical texts of philosophy in order to avoid any teleological goals. As a result, part of my method has been reading the texts in their context with a loose sense of the historical method. In terms of the reconstruction of texts,

I use the clusters of terms with similar meanings, and concepts used under similar discussions. This second method of scanning vocabularies is applied to history in this chapter.²² Thus, whilst discussing each related philosopher's ideas on ontology and psychology, what I will collect is also large clusters of sets of vocabularies used by different philosophers in similar discussions. The first part of the chapter is Brentano's own historiography. The remaining sections will be on the soul, perception and imagination. These are the central notions that can be used to build a vocabulary pool of terms used for related discussions on intentionality. The philosophers mentioned are elected either in terms of their influence on Šadrā and Brentano, or because of their importance for medieval psychology.

2.1 BRENTANO AND HIS HISTORIOGRAPHY

It is undeniable that all contemporary discussions take Franz Brentano as the starting point for the problem of intentionality. Brentano himself, on the other hand, claims no originality for his conceptualization of intentionality. He mainly relies on Aristotle's theory on sensation, and the theories in medieval psychology that followed *DA*.

However, Brentano's own evaluation of Aristotle and the medieval theories is vague (Perler, 2001, p. 203). One of the reasons for this is that Brentano himself seems to have kept his reference to Aristotle obscure. The exact places of the referred discussions in Aristotle's books are not made clear and in most cases Aristotle is referred to without citations or quotations. However, in order to trace the problem of intentionality in Brentano's philosophy, Hedwig suggests that the very early statements about the problem of intentionality are to be found in Brentano's interpretation on Aristotle's *DA* (Hedwig, 1979, pp. 328-9). This sound claim also shows that Aristotle is the inspiration behind Brentano's articulation of the problem of intentionality. Aristotle's original theory can be different from Brentano's interpretation. However, Brentano's usage of Aristotle's philosophy links him to the problem of intentionality. In this early reference, Brentano evaluates Aristotle's *eidos aistheton* in *DA* 425b24. In the stated passage Aristotle "refers to an immaterial inexistence of sensible forms in the receiving and perceiving sense" (Hedwig, 1979, p. 329). There, a differentiation between the extra-mental forms found in the object and forms found in the mind of the perceiver is made. Hedwig points that this differentiation is a current terminology in the late Scotism and that it originated in Arabic

²² A sophisticated and systematized version of this approach has been part of some German philosophers' discussions. One central figure of this approach is Koselleck and his *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*.

Aristotelian and Augustinian epistemological traditions. In this case, Brentano can be accepted as reading Aristotle through the specific lenses of this late medieval terminology (Hedwig, 1979, p. 330).

However, Brentano's unfinished 1887 study *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* together with his 1889 and early 1890 lectures on 'Descriptive Psychology' at Vienna University are more famous for his introduction of the medieval notion of intentional inexistence of an object (McDonnell, 2006). Here is the famous paragraph in which Brentano introduces the problem of intentionality:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the middle ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves (Brentano, 1874, 1924-5, 1.124-25).

Brentano's historiography of this intentional inexistence is given just in the footnotes of the same pages of *PES* as:

Aristotle himself spoke of this *mental in-existence*. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. In Philo, likewise, we find the doctrine of *mental existence and in-existence*. However, since he confuses them with existence in the proper sense of the word, he reaches his contradictory doctrine of the *logos* and Ideas. The same is true of the Neoplatonists. St. Augustine in his doctrine of the *Verbum mentis* and of its inner origin touches upon the same fact. St. Anselm does the same in his famous *ontological argument*; many people have observed that his consideration of mental existence as a true existence

is at the basis of his paralogism. St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that the object which is *thought* is intentionally in the thinking subject, the object which is loved in the person who loves, the object which is desired in the person desiring, and he uses this for theological purposes. When the Scriptures speak of an indwelling of the Holy Ghost, St. Thomas explains it as an *intentional indwelling* through love. In addition, he attempted to find, through the intentional in-existence in the acts of thinking and loving, a certain analogy for the mystery of the Trinity and the procession *ad intra* of the Word and the Spirit (Brentano, 1874, 1924-5, 1.124-25)²³.

Brentano, with both his interpretation of Aristotle's *DA* and his *PES*, posits the problem of intentionality in terms of an already existing terminology of medieval psychology brought to his time through Philo, Neoplatonists, and Augustine (Caston, 2001, pp. 24-5). This line of history seems to be a parallel history to the terms *intentio*, *phantasma*, *ma'na*, *ma'qūl* and *qaṣd*. The answer to the question, "Is intentionality necessarily developed in this line of translation?" is arguable. On the one hand, some researchers such as Caston and Hasse claim that an independent history for intentionality from the Arabic philosophers is possible: a tradition that existed long before translations from Avicenna and others (Caston, 2001, p. 24; Hasse, p. 128); the more common historiography for intentionality regards Arabic philosophy conducting an important and determining role in the Latin west (McDonnell, 2006, p. 133; Hedwig, 1979, p. 327). But generally, *intentio* is tracked through Arabic translations of *ma'na*, *ma'qūl* (Hedwig, 1979, p. 327; Hasse, 2000, p. 128 see fn. 278) and *qaṣd* (Hasse, 2000, p. 128). These are used mostly in logical and psychological contexts.

Although there are parallels between the historiography of Brentano's intentionality and the terms stated above, it should also be kept in mind that the history of a word is not enough for tracking the history of a concept most of the time.²⁴ Thus, Brentano's main claims about intentionality must also be considered in order to extract main features of the notion of intentionality. What is the nature of the claims, and which clusters of questions do they contain? Brentano's famous paragraph can be revisited for this evaluation:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by [...] intentional (or mental)

²³ The italics added by me.

²⁴ Hasse gives an extensive evaluation of the relation of some of these notions to intentionality (Hasse, 2000, pp. 127-8).

inexistence of an object, ...reference to a content, direction towards an object, [...] or immanent objectivity [...] This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it.

As mentioned in the introduction, three basic claims can be extracted through these sentences (Jacob, 2010): Firstly, it is constitutive of the phenomenon of intentionality that they are directed towards things different from themselves. Secondly, objects that mind is directed towards are characterised by intentional inexistence. Thirdly, intentionality is the mark of the mental: all and only mental states exhibit intentionality.

As a result, the directedness of mental phenomenon and their relation to the physical world are important features of intentionality. Here we gather the three main ingredients about intentionality: mental phenomenon, content, and physical world. However, defining the limits for the mental is not clear. It might be obvious to the modern reader that the activities of bodily organs such as growth and movement are not mental (Bynum, 1993, pp. 90-108; Sorabji, 1972, p. 15; Sorabji, 1993, pp. 164-5; Shields, 2009, p. 243ff).²⁵ Yet, it can be asked: how will sense perception that is dependent on organs such as eyes be assessed? How will experiences such as pain and emotions be considered, while they might be discussed as being apart from our mental life and it is difficult to assign objects to them. On the other hand, totally *a priori* processes seem to be excluded from the philosophers' lists of main topics. These, at least superficially, appear to be non-dependent on the extra-mental world such as productions of judgement. However, they definitely have a content to be dealt with in discussions of intentionality.

Brentano's main claim is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. When we investigate this argument, we find that this presentation is circular: from mental to intentional and from intentional to mental. The scope of the mental can be further elucidated if we attempt to escape this circular reasoning by following discussions on the soul in ancient and medieval philosophies. In most of these, the soul is an umbrella concept. It covers physical and immaterial actions and features that can be thought of in relation to human. Pains, emotions, anger, intellection, contemplation, estimation, as well as looking for food, will, and heart beats and so on ...

²⁵ See DA 414a29-415a12 "Of the psychic powers above enumerated some kinds of living things, as we have said, possess all, some less than all, others one only. Those we have mentioned are the nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking. Plants have none but the first, the nutritive, while another order of living things has this *plus* the sensory."

2.2 ON THE SOUL

2.2.1 Defining the Soul and its Relation to Body and the Question of Immateriality

Aristotle's *On the Soul* is an intense evaluation of the concept of soul which starts with the criticism of his predecessors. He describes his idea of soul in three aspects of the soul: vegetative soul (capacity of life and growth), sensible soul (capacities of sensing in addition to vegetative capacities), and rational soul (capacity of thinking (rationality) in addition to the others). This taxonomy dominated discussions in the medieval ages. When it comes to Brentano's relation to Aristotle, we find a number of refinements, but not without quite frequent theoretical continuity (such as the idea of non-physicality of thoughts, and unity of the soul): his schema of discussion remains loyal to Aristotle. He continues to discuss the idea of soul, the sense perception and the thinking process with a similar flow of discussion. This influence of Aristotle on Brentano maintains the continuity in the discussion on the soul (the soul itself is not necessarily accepted by Brentano) and its faculties from Aristotle to Brentano, and we therefore we do not need to construct further bridges for the rational reconstruction.

Aristotle tries to find the most comprehensive *definition* of the soul possible that is applicable to all living things (*DA* 412a1). Thus, whatever the definition is, it needs to contain the most common feature of living things, which is life and growth. With this, we find that his idea of the soul is essentially physical: the body is alive and is a living body in virtue of the soul. In this form, the discussion of the soul is set within an anti-Cartesian frame. We cannot find the ultimate differentiation of soul and body in the form we find in Descartes. All living forms have a type of soul which is for their bodies and many bodily functions are explained in terms of the soul's actions, in contrast to Descartes.

Aristotle sees the soul as a *unity* which bears different functions differing from anger to contemplation. Aristotle accepts the physical explanation of (e.g.) anger, yet he thinks there is more to the soul or its actions than the body (*DA* I.1, 403a3-b19). As a result of this notion of unity, Aristotle talks about the interaction of body and soul more comfortably than Descartes:

The most important attributes of animals, whether common to all or peculiar to some, are, manifestly, attributes of soul and body in conjunction, e.g., *sensation, memory, passion, appetite* and *desire* in

general, and, in addition, *pleasure* and *pain* (*De Sensu et Sensibilibus*/DSS 436a6-10).

The starting point of his analysis is the completed composition of ensouled bodies. According to his hylomorphic language, every material thing is a composition of matter and form (*DA* II.1, 412a1-27). And ensouled ones are no exception:

Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth and decay. It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite (412a13-17).

He rejects the previous ideas that the body is something predicated on a subject. The relation of body and soul and the outcome, that is the life of the natural body, is explained with a definition of the soul as: “the soul is the actuality of the body”. In *Metaphysics* 1035b14-16 he says that the soul is the substance of the ensouled things. Both the soul of a composition, matter and form, are listed among substantial beings:

We say that substance is one kind of what is, and that in several senses: the sense of matter or that which in itself is not a this, and in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a this, and thirdly in the sense of that which is compounded of both (*DA*, 412a7-8).

When we investigate the given objects in this world, the soul is substance as form of a natural body having life in potentiality (*DA*, 412a19-27; Polansky, (2007, 2010), p. 154). Since soul is described mainly in its completed form as for an ensouled body, it is no surprise that Aristotle regards the soul and the body as inseparable (*DA* II.1, 413a5).

The relation of body and soul is connected to the idea of actuality:

Hence the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot *be* a body; it is not a body but something relative to a body. That is why it is *in* a body, and a body of a definite kind. It was a mistake, therefore, to do as former thinkers did, merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body, although evidently one chance thing will not receive another. It comes about as reason requires: the actuality of any given thing can only be realized in what is already potentially that thing, i.e. in a matter of its own appropriate to it. From all this it is plain that *soul is an actuality or account of something that possesses a potentiality of being*

such (DA II.2, 414a19-28).

The question about the soul and the body becomes unnecessary according to Aristotle, just like asking about wax and its shape (DA 412b6-9). As the paragraph above suggests, this does not mean that soul and body are identical or that they are one in a weaker sense of the word (DA 412a17, 414a1-20). In contrast to this, I previously focused on the composite: “It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite” (DA 412a17-22). According to this definition, a soul is “A substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it” (DA 412a20-22). The question then is, “What kind of actuality is the soul, if it does not maintain identification or a unity as an outcome?” Is it actuality corresponding to knowledge and to reflecting? He talks about sleeping and waking in order to explain this further. Sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of a soul where sleeping corresponds to knowledge possessed but not employed and waking to reflecting. As a result:

It is obvious that the soul is an actuality like knowledge; for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to reflecting, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed, and knowledge of something is temporally prior (DA 412a26-7).

This presentation is open to interpretations of soul as an *umbrella term* for a complex of different actual capacities, to a dual natured *compound*, a term of multiple substances, or a *unity* of some sort that sees the soul as the same as its capacities.

The discussion of a definition of the soul starts with the common feature that is *life* and motion. Aristotle talks about soul as the *form* of the body as well as the *actualization* of the body. Another definition mentions soul as the *substance*. His hylomorphism, on the one hand, denies the identification of the soul with the body and as a result, denies reductionist and eliminationist approaches to the soul. On the other hand, the soul is defined in a dependent way to the material constitution, i.e. the body (Shields, 2009, pp. 298-303). As a denial of his predecessors he claims that his approach is a third way between physical explanation and an idealist one.

But we must return from this digression, and repeat that the affections of soul, insofar as they are such as passion and fear, are inseparable from the natural matter of animals in this way and not in the same way as a line or surface (DA 403b16-403b19).

Aristotle's hylomorphism and explanation of the soul as being dependent on the body has been targeted by Platonist readers after him. For Neoplatonists, two issues are essential to prove regarding the soul: maintaining the immateriality and independent existence of the soul and maintaining the soul and the body as essentially two different natures.

Moreover, the definition of the soul with actualisation (*DA* 412a27-30) as sort of assimilation becomes a problem for Neoplatonists. This makes the soul's survival impossible after the body's death. Because of this, Plotinus favours separability at the expense of Aristotle's definitions of the soul.

If the soul is assimilated [to the body] with which it is associated in the way that the shape of the statue is related to the bronze, then when the body is divided, the soul will be partitioned with it, and when a part of the body is severed, a portion of the soul will join it; the withdrawal in sleep will not take place if the actualisation of – to be truthful there will not even be any sleep. Moreover, if the soul is an actualisation there will be no rational opposition to appetite, and the whole, being in consonance with itself, will undergo one and the same affection throughout (*Enneads* IV.7, 8 (5), 1984, Armstrong, pp. 375-7; tr. Sorabji, 2004, p. 245).

Plotinus rejected the idea of soul being the form of the body and being its actualisation. This approach separates body and soul dramatically in favour of the soul. It should yet be noted that in terms of the essential difference between natures of soul and body both Plotinus and Aristotle share same concerns and they adopt different versions of dualism. The main issues are the substantiality of the soul alone and its separability from the body and survival of the soul after the decay of the body. According to Plotinus, the compound of body and soul is different from the person, he identifies person with the cognizer.²⁶

The difference between the nature of the soul and that of the body makes the relation itself problematic as well. Let us remember that after Aristotle the image of the soul as imprisoned in the body is back in the picture with Platonist influence (*Phaedrus* 246-8). According to Plotinus, the descent into body is not necessarily evil, but still the soul is descended. It is also necessary for animation in the world (Steel, 1978, p. 34). Accordingly, the descent is in line with the world order.²⁷ Plotinus' explanation of

²⁶ For a detailed analysis of this twofold interpretative process see Peter Adamson, 2001, "Aristotelianism and the Soul in the Arabic Plotinus", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 62, Number 2, pp. 211-232.

²⁷ *Asfār*, v.8, p. 409; tr. Peerwani, p. 304; *Uthūlūjiyā*, p. 84.

descent is metaphorical and it is indeed the partial soul's experience of a temporary process of suffering and confusion (Shaw, 1995, pp. 64, 65). Steel explains that this is because the soul does not descend according to Plotinus in the strict sense, the soul's real habitat is the intelligible world and it remains there: "By reason of the soul's highest principle, it belongs to the intelligible world and is never separated from it even when it is bound to the mortal body" (Steel, 1978, p. 34). Plotinus does not differentiate between higher souls and human soul. As a result, the nature of the soul is homogenous (Steel, 1978, p. 28). Because the human soul is the same as higher souls, it is directly in relation to higher realms than the earth. A necessary consequence of this idea is that the soul cannot mix with the earthly and material things. This kind of exclusion between material nature and material activities from immaterial ones is followed by Avicenna.

A different view is held by Iamblichus who rejected the view that the human soul is always perfect; as a result, it is impassive when it is combined with the material body. This soul is not homogenous or same in essence with higher souls (Shaw, 1995, pp. 62-69).²⁸ Contrary to Plotinus' homogenous soul that remains unchanged in the human, Iamblichus claimed full descent of the soul and therefore it has to have undergone change. A radical claim follows this argumentation: even the substance of the human soul is liable to changes, not just its faculties or acts (Steel, 1978, p. 52). This idea of substantial change in the soul is one of the essential innovations that will be needed to explore Mullā Ṣadrā's theory later. The idea of descent of the soul brings out the idea of the elevation (*apotheosis*) of the soul to the higher realm as well. This will be relevant to discussions about the extra-mental senses and the possibility of perceiving the sound and smell of the higher realm. Iamblichus is important due to his revisions in Plotinian ideas of descent and *apotheosis* and as a result his explanation of change in the soul.²⁹

When we reach Avicenna, the influence of both Aristotle and Neoplatonists are observable in his theories. On the one hand, he perpetuates Aristotle's hylomorphic language. On the other, he admits distinction among different levels of the soul and accepts that the rational soul is immaterial. As a result, he maintains the idea of

²⁸ The similarity with the higher souls implies relevant discussion of the godlikeness of the human. The similarity is what makes it possible for human beings to perfect themselves. For a detailed discussion of the idea of godlikeness (*homoiosis theos*) see Sedley (1999) 'The ideal of godlikeness', in G. Fine (ed.), *Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 309-328.

²⁹ Shaw explains that Iamblichus changed the common ideas on ascent of his time into a correlative relation between descent and ascent (Shaw, 1995, p. 24). Iamblichus' importance in terms of change can be due to the influence of gnostic and especially of Pythagorean teachings in his thought (Shaw, 1995, p. 239).

separability of the soul.³⁰ His famous thought experiment, the “flying man”, is an important sign of the Platonist tendencies in his thought.³¹ His introspective proof of the soul also reminds one of the introspective proofs of the soul in Augustine who had been an interest for Brentano.³²

For Avicenna, the soul continues to be part of the investigation of living bodies. With the continuing hylomorphic terminology, the soul is “a form, or like a form, or like a perfection” (Avicenna, *ShN*, I.1, p. 6).³³ Avicenna, in contrast to Aristotle and Brentano, hesitates to define the soul as a form. Thus he focuses on the idea of the soul as the perfection of the natural body. Avicenna reflects the influence of Platonist approaches through Neoplatonists for which the soul is independent and immaterial. It has a different nature from the body. The human being, accordingly, is *isthmus* of material and immaterial through her combination of body and soul. Soul has an accidental relation to body, and the soul is of heavenly origin. The body causes the soul to become an individual soul.

Different mixtures of elements produce bodies which are recipients of the souls. The soul comes to existence only when it attaches itself to an appropriate mixture, and this attachment takes place with the intervention of heavenly bodies.³⁴

We are certain that when it happens that the soul exists, it has come to be with the coming to be of a certain mixture, and that in addition a certain configuration of rational actions and passions comes to be for the soul (*ShN*, V.3, p. 226 tr. Kaukua, 2008, pp. 79-80).

This attachment is the *first perfection* of the soul. As the soul takes action to actualize different particular souls in itself such as vegetative, animal, and so on, then the soul goes through *second perfection* (Marcotte, 2000, p. 93). Although Avicenna’s soul seems to be changing in the explanation, one should keep in mind that he rejects substantial change. Change in the soul occurs only in the accidents.

Rāzī summarizes Avicenna’s proofs of immateriality as being twofold: one is showing

³⁰ For Neoplatonic approaches to Aristotle and Plato’s ideas on soul see Gerson (2005) *Aristotle and Other Platonists*, pp. 131-173.

³¹ Šadrā quotes *Uthūlūjīyā* (pp. 22-3) in a similar context in which the author is reported to disengage himself from his body and explore his inner world (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 360).

³² O’Connor, 1921, *The Concept of the Human Soul according to Saint Augustine*, dissertation in Catholic University of America; pp. 34-46

³³ “هي الصورة او كالصورة او الكمال” *ShN* I.1, p. 6.

³⁴ For a detailed analysis on Avicenna’s notion of mixture see Stone, Abraham (2008) “Avicenna’s Theory of Primary Mixture” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, vol. 18, pp. 99–119.

difference between the constant part of the soul, the ego, and the changing part, the body. The psychological continuity, despite the constant change in body and corruption in organs etc., proves that the soul is immaterial and different from these corruptible parts of the human (*LI*, p. 233). What follows this is the claim that the soul is a being that does not occupy space.

In the second proof, Avicenna brings the awareness of bodily functions to our attention. We are aware of our soul's actions such as hearing, seeing, and so on; whilst we are not aware of the actions of the organs such as the heart (*LI*, p. 234). In addition, the functions such as imagination, dreams, and intellection cannot be found in the extra-mental world. Thus, they should be in the soul. And this proves that the soul should be different from the material beings of the extra-mental world.

A related notorious topic in Avicennan literature is *the flying man argument*.³⁵ However, what goal the flying man argument serves is as debatable as much as its source and the scope of its influence. As well as proving the existence of the soul, the flying man argument can be seen to serve as proof of the soul's independence from the body, or the substantiality of the soul, or even to manifest the centrality of self-awareness. In the case of self-awareness, the idea is that the human has privileged unmediated knowledge of the soul, so this knowledge is continuous and infallible. This is related to the idea of unmediated knowledge which is an important claim for illuminationist theories. This is also related to contemporary discussions on first person perspective and the privileged access to the self. The flying man argument has also been influential in the Latin world with a growing emphasis on the notions of incorporeality and self-awareness (Hasse, 2000, pp. 86-92; Marcotte, 2000, pp. 69, 71, 75).³⁶

We say: one of us must imagine himself as created all at once and perfect but with his sight veiled from observing external things, and as created floating in the air or the void so that he would not encounter air resistance which he would have to sense, and with his limbs separate from each other in such a way that neither meet nor touch each other. He must then reflect upon [the question] whether he would affirm the

³⁵ Black reports that the label "flying man" is not originally Avicenna's but Gilson's (1929–30), p. 41 (Black, 2008, p. 83).

³⁶ For more on the flying man see: Hasse, 2000, pp.80-92; Kaukua, 2007, p. 24, 71; Marmura, 1986, pp. 383-39. For Avicenna's influence in the Islamic world see: Muehlethaler, 2009, pp. 179-204. As for the influence in the Latin world see Hasse, 2000, p. 86-92. For the relationships between Augustine, Avicenna and Descartes see Sorabji, 2006, p. 212-229.

existence of his essence.

He would not hesitate to affirm that his essence exists, but he would not thereby affirm any of his limbs, any of his internal organs, whether heart or brain, or any of the external things. Rather, he would be affirming his essence without affirming for it length, breadth, or death. And if in this state he were able to imagine a hand or some other limb, he would not imagine it part of his essence.

Now, you know that what is affirmed is different from what is not affirmed and what is established is different from what is not established to him. Hence the essence whose existence he has affirmed is specific to him in that it is himself, different from his body and limbs which were not affirmed.

Thus, he who is attentive has the means to be awakened to the existence of the soul as something different from the body – indeed, as not body at all – and to be acquainted with and aware of it (*ShN*, I.1, p. 16, tr.

Kaukua, 2008, p. 72).³⁷

A similar argument is found before Avicenna in Augustine. Augustine is under the strong influence of Plato in defence of the independent existence of the soul from the body. A similar case to the flying man occurs in Augustine's writing in varied contexts or usages, two of which are continuous and direct knowledge of the self and the non-bodily knowledge of the self (Sorabji, 2006, pp. 212-223). Sorabji considers Avicenna's argument to be similar to the second usage. However, both usages (especially the idea of self-awareness) are at the centre of Avicenna's argument (Kaukua, 2008, pp. 81-82). In this sense, Sorabji's evaluation is a somewhat simplified examination of Avicenna's flying man. As discussed, there is not a single usage for Avicenna's flying man argument. Avicenna seems to be employing the argument in a pragmatic way and interchangeably in relation to a variety of cases on the soul. The ambiguity of applications of this continues when we read Ṣadrā as well.

We can find similar introspective thought experiments to the flying man argument in Plotinus, Augustine, and Avicenna's notions of the self-knowledge. Ṣadrā too quotes the author of *Uthūlūjiyā*. I think as well as self-knowledge and the privileged access and infallibility of direct knowledge, there is another layer to these discussions in the

³⁷ Marmura classifies three variations in Avicenna's texts in *ShN* and *Ishārāt* (Marmura, 1986, pp. 383-395); and Hasse finds similar discussion in *Mashriqiyyūn* and *Risāla al-adhawīyya* in addition to the previous texts in Marmura's analysis (Hasse, 2000, pp. 81-2).

Neoplatonic context: it is the homology of the human with the macrocosm.

At times I became solitary in myself and removed my body on a side and became as if I was a substance disengaged [from matter] without the body. I was inside my essence [or myself], outside of all things. I saw in myself beauty and loveliness, and I remained very much astonished at it. Then I learned that I was a part of the eminent divine world possessing active life. When I became certain of that, I elevated by my mind from that world to the divine Cause. I became as if settled in It and suspended by It. I was beyond the whole world of Intellect (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 360, tr. Peerwani, p. 267; *Uthūlūjīyā*, *Mīmar* I. p. 22).

To sum up what is discussed so far, Sorabji draws attention to the parallels between Augustine and Avicenna, and he claims that Porphyry is the possible source for both thought experiments of the flying man (Sorabji, 2006, pp. 212-229; Sorabji, 2004, p. 66). Bizri mentioned some other scholarly interest in Avicenna's flying man in relation to its influence and reported that it was the seeds of intentionality as well as foresight of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* and modern 'brain-in-vat' discussions (Bizri, 2003, pp. 82-3). Šadrā's quotation from the author of *Uthūlūjīyā* brings Plotinus into the picture as well as the idea of microcosm. Šadrā's take on the argument with an important twist will be given in the next section. Let it suffice for now to mention that what dramatically separates Avicenna and Šadrā is that there are strict boundaries between different levels of beings in Avicenna whilst in Šadrā's case, all share a single reality that includes consciousness. Returning our attention to the idea of immaterial soul, another influential philosopher on Šadrā's thought is Suhrawardī.

For Suhrawardī, knowledge processes in humans are explained as being closely related to *isfahbad light*. The one who really sees is not the material organ but the immaterial soul and its ruler, *isfahbad light*. Just as the sense perception is dependent on the self, all other types of knowledge depend on the knowledge of the self. Consciousness itself is one of the features of light. Light is evident to itself and not absent from itself (*HI*, p. 81). The human self is an incorporeal light (*HI*, p. 86) which is evident to itself and self-knowledge of which is never absent. Apprehension of oneself is neither superadded to the self nor part of one's self, and neither is it accidental. Human beings are unconscious about their organs because the body is not conscious, it is not light; it is darkness.

Self-knowledge is important for Suhrawardī's theory of knowledge. He establishes that self-knowledge is an unmediated, permanent knowledge that does not cease after death

of the body. Self is presented as being different from the body, the organs, or totality of the bodily parts; and the knowledge of the self is different from the awareness of body or the parts of the body (Marcotte, 2000, p. 181). Internal organs are defined as dark, just like the body and they cannot know themselves, this type of knowledge still contains some kind of objectification.

Moreover, self-knowledge must be unmediated; it should not take place through forms, universals, or particular perceptions. It is not reducible to anything else. Self has the capacity to know itself intrinsically (Marcotte, 2000, p. 192). Self-knowledge needs no external proof, thus it is self-evident (*HI*, p. 82). And as Suhrawardī states, "Whatever perceives its own essence is incorporeal light" (*HI*, p.79); self-knowledge therefore proves incorporeality.

Following his strong Neoplatonic tendency one can expect Suhrawardī to accept pre-existence of souls, and a universal soul which is the one main source of all human souls (Aminrazavi, 1996, p. 90; Roxanne Marcotte, 2000, p.205). However, his words in *Hikmat al-Ishrāq* prove otherwise (*HI*, pp. 131, 109). Suhrawardī thinks that the ruler light for human being exists simultaneously with the body:

This light [he means the dominating light of the human species] was not existent before the body, for each individual has an essence that knows itself and that those of its states are hidden from others. Thus, the human managing lights are not one, since otherwise that which was known to one would be known to all, which is not the case (*HI*, p. 132).

Some lights are real and others are only accidental. Accidental lights become dark when their contact to essential light is cut off. In this way, Suhrawardī links the existence of darkness to light as well. Darkness is the absence of light. Things exist hierarchically at different levels according to their intensity of light. The relation among different levels of light is *domination* when it is downwards and it is *love* when it is upwards (*HI*, p. 97).

A thing is either light and luminosity in its own reality or is not ... light is divided into light that is a state of something else (the accidental light) and light that is not a state of something else (the incorporeal or pure light). That which is not light in its own reality is divided into that which is independent of locus (the dusky substance) and that which is a state of something else (the dark state).

The barrier (*barzakh*) is the body (*jism*) and maybe described as a

substance that can be pointed to. Some barriers are seen to be dark when light ceases to shine on them. Darkness is simply an expression for lack of light, nothing more; and it is not one of the privates conditioned upon possibility. [...] thus, it is established that everything that is neither a light nor illuminated dark. If a barrier is cut off from light, it does not need something else to be dark. Therefore these bodies are dusk substances. There remain some barriers that never lose their light - the Sun, for example. These are like other barriers that may cease to have light in that they are barriers, yet they differ in having light continually. The light by which these barriers differ from the others is superadded to their being barriers and subsists in them. It is thus accidental light, and its bearer is a dusky substance. Therefore, every barrier is a dusky substance (*HI*, pp. 77-8).

The fundamental formula of Suhrawardī's theory is that everything is explained through a hierarchy of light. Aminrazavi points to this as an application of Avicennan ontology with a change in the matrix so that hierarchy of beings is turned into hierarchy of lights (Aminrazavi, 1997, p. 31; *HI*, p. 2). Things, according to their dependence on light or being light themselves, are called *incorporeal lights* and *accidental lights*, and the absence of light is named as *darkness*. Dark states are caused by light even though light itself may also be accidental (*HI*, p. 78). Incorporeal lights are in a hierarchy and divided into two as dominating lights (*qāhira*) (which are in no way in relation to barriers) and lights that control (*mudabbira*) the barriers (*barāzih*) (*HI*, p. 102).

The continuity of each species is not something that occurs by chance. Suhrawardī claims that individuals are not prior, rather some luminous species which are brought into being by dominating lights are prior to each individual and preserve the species even when the individuals cease to exist (*HI*, pp. 101-102). He claims the simultaneous existence of human soul, body, and ruler light of the particular human both in order to protect the difference of each individual human and also the difference between the world of pure lights and the ruler lights of human beings. In terms of the second claim about universal soul, Suhrawardī says:

[B]ut when they [i.e. the Ancients] said, "There is a universal man in the world of intellect", they meant that there is a dominating light containing different interacting universal - not in the sense that it is a predicate, but in the sense that it has the same relation of emanation to these individuals.

Some men adduce in proof of the forms the argument that humanity per se is not many, so it is one. This is not valid (*HI*, p. 109).

This discussion takes us back to the formation of the human self which is a combination of body and soul. The sensible soul is differentiated from the vegetative soul mainly by its ability of sense perception. Among the ideas mentioned so far, there are two important discussions for understanding Mullā Ṣadrā's notion of soul. One is the idea of change in the soul, and the immateriality of soul. In terms of the map of ideas before Ṣadrā's time, for the first one, we find that the hylomorphic Aristotelian approach survives in Avicenna's understanding of the human. Two parts of hylomorphism appear as two more distinguished parts: body and soul. In terms of the immateriality, the soul is – as Avicenna claims – an immaterial substance. He claims substantiality and immateriality of the soul and this makes his approach further from Aristotle and closer to Plotinus. In terms of the notion of change for the soul, Plotinus and Avicenna deny any substantial change for the soul. The real realm for Plotinus' high soul is the higher realm. Avicenna's proofs for the immateriality of the soul are followed by Suhrawardī.

Aristotle's idea of sense perception is one of the essential puzzles of Brentano's intentionality. This is because he makes Aristotle's sense theory one of the main examples of intentionality. Different historiographies of the term also go back to Aristotelian perception theory, some starting from sense perception and some others with his *phantasia*. In the next sections, first the theory of sense will be discussed, and second, an investigation on inner senses will follow.

2.3 SENSE PERCEPTION

Brentano starts the history of intentionality with Aristotle's concept of mental inexistence and talks about a special case of psychical indwelling. This indwelling should be somehow different from the physical and the extra-mental things which are manifested by ordinary objects. Brentano extracts two claims from Aristotle's *DA*; first, that sensing is an immaterial process that takes form without matter, and second, that the object sensed is *in* the sensing subject. We can thus say that Brentano's interest in Aristotle starts with Aristotle's theory of senses and cover different experiences of the self, up to conceptualization.

Aristotle had already spoken of this psychical indwelling. In his books *On the Soul* he says that what is experienced, as something experienced, is in the experiencing subject; that the sense receives what is experienced without matter; and that what is thought is in the understanding (Brentano, 1874, I.125).

Aristotle's physics rest on a hylomorphic theory of things, these things are separate existents composed of matter and form.³⁸ In this concrete unity, body can be stated to play the part of the matter and thus possesses the attributes. Soul plays the part of the form and thus is the essential attribute (Ross, 2004, p. 40). When it comes to epistemology, intellection is defined in totally immaterial terms. Physical things as being composed of matter and form on one side and intellection being purely immaterial and free from matter, knowledge turns into a process about distillation or abstraction of forms. This process is considered to happen in a number of stages (Leijenhorst, 2007, p. 84). The impression of signet ring in wax is a celebrated metaphor for the sensible forms being received without matter (*DA* III.4, 429b). Brentano discusses this example when he evaluates Aristotle's theory of sense perception:

Of course this metaphor is not absolutely perfect in that the formed wax does not individually bear the same form as the seal, but only one like it, while the sense which takes in the form of the sensible bears the same form. And for this reason the wax takes on the form of the seal as a physical subject and through a kind of corruption, for it had up to this point; but sense does not receive the sensible form through *actual alteration*³⁹, even if such an alteration may accompany the reception of the form through may accompany the reception of the form, [...]

³⁸ "The form and the matter are not separate from the thing, whereas the place can be separated" (*Physics*, 209b22-209b29).

³⁹ His explanation of the alteration also shows that he does not follow literalist readings of Aristotle.

(Brentano, 1997, p. 55).

Aristotle defines sense perception in relation to animal's capability of movement and nutrition. Sense perception is causally defined and triggered by an extra-mental object. The controlling organ that is the centre for all the senses is the *heart* and every sense organ is accepted to have their specific objects called the *proper sensible* (Aristotle, *DA* II.6, 418a7ff).⁴⁰

There are two main definitions of sense in the *DA*: sense as "abstraction" and sense as "actualization". For the first, Aristotle defines sense perception as *receiving the form (devoid of matter) of an extra-mental object*:

Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of ***receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring*** without the iron or gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not *qua* bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort and according to its form (*DA* II.12. 424a18-23).

The text is quoted in the same way when it is translated to Arabic. And the sections in bold can be found word by word in the Arabic sources⁴¹. The example of wax and ring is the same example Brentano uses to show the source of the idea of intentionality in Aristotle. Avicenna describes sensation in the same way, as the presence of the form of the sensed object in the soul and later this is repeated by Rāzī in his summary (*LI*, p. 234). As mentioned in the discussions regarding soul, Avicenna continues the hylomorphic language. Sensation as reception of forms without matter is built on the idea that things are a composite of matter and form, and that the form can be abstracted from the object and still be representative for the object from which it is taken:

This natural body has certain principles *qua* natural body, as well as additional principles *qua* generable and corruptible or in general alterable. The principles by which it acquires its corporeality include whatever are parts of its existence as actually present in [the natural body] itself, and these are more appropriately called *principles*, according to [the natural philosopher]. They are two: one of them is like the wood of the bed, while the other is like the form or shape of the bed. What is like

⁴⁰ For Aristotle's proofs that heart is more worthy of being the centre in place of brain see Gross on cell doctrine, 1999, pp. 31 ff.

⁴¹ See *Kitab al-naḥs li-Aristutalis*, 1949, p. 85; ed. Badawi, *Aristu fi Naḥs*, p. 60; *Paraphrase*, p. 285; *K.RN*, p.43, 45, 10-15.

the wood of the bed is called *material, subject, matter, component, and element*, according to various considerations, whereas what is like the form of the bed is called *form* (ShST I.2, p. 14).

Perception is a *change* that occurs *when substances with complementary capacities for acting and being acted upon come into contact* (Everson, 1997, p.26). But how are extra-mental objects turned into sense objects/mental objects (if they are ever internalized)?

The process is described as a change in the sense organ which is mostly interpreted as an immaterial change when *DA* is read by the Neoplatonists. The ambiguity of the nature of change in Aristotle's words has caused a debate among modern scholars as well. The literal readings of Aristotle (such as the notorious reading of Sorabji) find an immaterialized version of Aristotle in the commentators of the late antiquity. The original text is understood literally. Accordingly, the organ physically changes; such as in the case of seeing a red object, the eye becomes red. The interpreters such as Burnyeat find continuity in the texts of Aristotle and commentators of late antiquity (Burnyeat, 2001, pp. 29 ff.).⁴² According to them, Aristotle too claimed that the change is an immaterial one. However, the revisions by the commentators are not limited to describing the nature of change in sensation.

The idea that "sensation depends on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort of change of quality" (*DA* II.5, 416b32-33). This brings out the idea of some sort of difference of the sensed objects from the extra-mental objects. As a result this implies some level of immateriality.

Sorabji gives a long list of descriptions of the change during sensation made by the commentators and the obvious change that comes with the commentary tradition. According to his presentation, the change is described more and more immaterial in time. This, he thinks explains the immateriality claim that appears in Brentano's intentionality thesis. As mentioned before, one can also think that the emphasis of the immateriality in sensation process is originally found in Aristotle's text. The important thing (regardless the change being "spiritual" in Aristotle's text or not) is that when the theory reached to Mullā Ṣadrā or Brentano, we find the immaterial explanation attributed to Aristotle. In this spiritual understanding of change, we see Averroes rather than Avicenna is influential

⁴² I must mention here that Burnyeat's main aim to prove literal readings wrong is to show that Aristotle's philosophy is no longer credible for modern functionalist discussions. The title says the aim of the paper openly: M. F. Burnyeat, 'Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)' ['StillCredible?'], in *Essays on Aristotle's De anima*, eds. M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks), (1992, 1995), pp. 15–26.

(Knuuttila, 2008, p. 13). Albert the Great and Aquinas are among the philosophers who continued the idea of spiritual change in the western world. Moreover, it needs to be mentioned that the idea of a spiritual change in sense perception had remained as a commonly accepted idea in Latin scholasticism (Knuuttila, 2008, p. 14).⁴³

It is spiritual change when the form of the source of change is received in the subject of change supraphysically, the way the form of a colour is in the eye, which does not become the colour it sees. Sense activity involves supraphysical change. The intention of the sensed form comes to be within the sense organ (Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I.78.3, v.11, p. 131)

In Mullā Ṣadrā's version of sensation we find that the idea of change is inseparable from the identity principle and substantial change.

If not the immaterial nature of the change in the sense organ; other issues in the *DA* are revised by the Neoplatonists. A harmonization of the Aristotelian texts with each other has taken place as well as the harmonization of Aristotle with Plato. The Aristotelian ideas follow a more complicated path when the Neoplatonised Aristotle (commentators' texts as well as a *DA paraphrase* (including quotes from Plotinus' *Enneads*, yet received as Aristotle's *Theology*) are translated and interpreted in the Islamic lands (Adamson, 2001, p. 211). So we have *DA* translations beside the effect of its interpretations by the commentators, and the *DA paraphrase* which includes sections from *Enneads* and various partial texts quoted from Plotinus.⁴⁴ With this complicated list of books, the ideas are transformed in surprising ways: syntheses of texts that are naturalized versions of Plato and Plotinus as well as mystified versions of Aristotle become available (Adamson, 2001, pp. 211-232).

When we reach Avicenna, the process is explained more materially than the Neoplatonic tendencies. This shift in Avicenna's language can be sought through the influence of Galenian tradition on his thought and as a result of his profession of being a physician (Hall, 2004, p. 72). A duality of immaterial and material tendencies become clearer with Avicenna's centralization of *Active intellect* (*'Aql fa'āl*) and *the configuration of bodily elements* (*mīzāj*) in his philosophy.

⁴³ For a different view on Aquinas idea of change during sense perception, see Pasnau, 1997, pp.11-18.

⁴⁴ Zimmerman argues for existence of a lost original paraphrase of Plotinus that is the source of these various texts (Adamson, Peter (2001) "Aristotelianism and the Soul in the Arabic Plotinus", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 62, Number 2, pp. 211-232). Zimmerman, F. W. (1986) "Origins of the so-called Theology of Aristotle" in (ed.) Kraye, J., and Ryan, W. F., and Schmitt, C. B., *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages* (London: Warburg Institute), pp. 110-240.

The more developed idea of active intellect is also an influence of the Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle. Through different interpretations of Aristotle's *DA* 340a10-25,⁴⁵ different candidates for active intellect already are emergent before Avicenna. We find commentators discuss the *active intellect* being the rational soul, or, a separate intellect, or even the God himself. Active intellect can be seen as the cause of the knowledge in the first place and seen as the first mover. Sorabji reports this case from Alexander (Sorabji, 2004, p. 104). Active intellect can be the reason why the soul recognizes the matterless forms in the first place. In that sense it is an *agent intellect* (Sorabji, 2004, p. 109). We find this case in Aquinas, who talks about these with the influence of Avicenna as well. The source of both is Themistius' tripartite classification as potential, active and productive intellect. The productive intellect is the inspiration for agent intellect (Sorabji, 2004, p. 109). Another function related to the *agent intellect* is the ability to separate matter from the form. Thanks to this capacity, human beings *can* start the abstraction process during sensation.⁴⁶ One further function of active intellect is making concept formation possible (Sorabji, 2004, p. 104). The active intellect is considered by Alexander as a separate intellect because of Aristotle's *GA* 736b28. In this section Aristotle differentiates other parts of the human from his nous. And nous is given from outside.⁴⁷ Priscianus or the author of Simplicius (Sorabji, 2004, p. 115) regarded that it is the rational soul, as did Themistius and Philoponus (Sorabji, 2004, p. 104).

Avicenna's *active intellect* is the lowest of cosmological intellects. It is a cosmological principle as well as an epistemological one. Thanks to this principle, the rational soul becomes activated. Again, through rational soul's contact with the active intellect, *recognition of forms* as well as *formation of generalizations* becomes possible. When intellect takes control of compositive imagination, it turns into cogitative imagination. With this, it becomes prepared to receive the intelligible from the Active intellect. In a way, since the human soul becomes active when it is connected to the separate Active intellect, one can argue that Avicenna indeed synthesized the two previous ideas that active intellect is a separate intellect and that it is the rational soul in human. In his

⁴⁵ 'Aql munfa'il and 'aql fa'al in (1954) *Aristūṭālīs fī-l-naḥs*, p. 72-75; *DA* 429a10 ff, ed. Badawi, Cairo: Maktaba al-nahḍa al-Miṣriyya.

⁴⁶ This idea is reported from Alexander by Sorabji, 2004, p. 104.

⁴⁷ "It remains, then, for the reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for no bodily activity has any connexion with the activity of reason" (*GA* 736b26-28). "Just as the intellect acts thus from outside with a view to the growth of the persons concerned, so in the case of the embryo itself does nature form from the purest material the flesh and the body of the other sense-organs, and from the residues thereof bones, sinews, hair, and also nails and hoofs and the like; hence these are last to assume their form, for they have to wait till the time when nature has some residue to spare" (*GA* 744b22-28).

version, the actuality of the rational soul is dependent on human being's contact with the separate active intellect. According to this connection, the human intellect experiences different potentialities or actualities.

You will find that the acquired intellect to be the governor whom all the rest serve. And it is the ultimate goal. It is followed by the actual intellect, which is served by the habitual intellect, and the material intellect is entirely disposed to serve the habitual intellect. Then the practical intellect serves all these, because the bodily relation exists, as will become clear, for the perfection of the theoretical intellect and its purification, and the practical intellect is served by the faculty of estimation (*Najāt* VI, ed. Fakhry, p. 206; tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 37).⁴⁸

A further point about Avicenna's Active intellect is that it is both the cosmological and epistemological principle. The forms in the natural beings are given by active intellect. As the cosmological principle, it is called the 'giver of forms' (*wāhib al-ṣuwar*). By this conjunction of functions, active intellect is a necessary component for Avicenna's claim that certainty in knowledge is possible through the quiddities and forms.

So many aspects of the peripatetic explanation of cosmology and epistemology are built on hylomorphism. The mentioned differentiation between active and passive intellects is, similarly, necessitated by the hylomorphic and dualist nature of the peripatetic philosophy. The thinking part of the soul cannot mix with the body or the bodily things. As a result of this, the body is not a tool for intellectual part of the soul, either (*Paraphrase*, p. 311). In this sense, the famous Platonian idea that "soul as the place for forms" is in reality true only for the thinking part of the soul (*Paraphrase*, p. 307, 11; ed. Badawi, *Aristūṭālīs fī-l-nafs*, 1954, p. 73). The rational soul contains the forms in a potentially (*Paraphrase*, p. 307: "wa laysa as-ṣuwar fī-hā bi'l-fī'l"). Accordingly only the one who says that the *intelligible* soul is the house for forms is right (*Paraphrase*, p. 311). This is Aristotle's compromised denial of the Platonist approach that the soul as a whole is the house of forms. The necessity of Active intellect occurs at this point by the fact that there is no part of the soul, which can *store* the intelligible forms. The memory as well as the other inner senses is a material faculty that is located in the body. With exclusive understanding of body and soul (between material and immaterial; as well as between particular and universal) in which one does not mix with the other (as material with immaterial, for

⁴⁸ All references are from Fazlurrahman's translation which corresponds to the sixth article of the second section of *Najāt* (page numbers 196-232 in Majid Fakhry ed. (1982)). the roman numbers refer to chapter numbers in Fazlurrahman's translation. For example I. p. 24 would correspond to II.6.1, p. 196 in Fakhry's edition.

example), the intelligible forms cannot be stored by human beings. There is an excluding relation as well as a hierarchy between the abstraction of sensed forms and intelligibles. The sensible forms are particular and still related to particular material objects. Accordingly they cannot be received by the intellect. The important thing at this point is to point out the difference of dualism in Avicenna's epistemology from the monism in Mullā Ṣadrā's.

One related question that emerges from this first definition is about the relation of the form of the extra-mental object and the internalized object which is the sensible form: are they identical or not? In case of the internally received object, we know that it is somehow different from the extra-mental object: we can see a high mountain size of which is bigger than our eye. If the sensation were a direct reception of the object without any change, then this would not be possible. The peripatetic tradition explains this with the reception of the form alone. Thus the difference between the extra-mental object and the internalized object is that the latter is devoid of matter. Although this answer seems to solve the problem, the first question remains: what is the relation between the extra-mental form and the sensible form?

Despite this superficial reading of Avicenna that the form in his theory is the identical in the soul and in the extra-mental world that only their loci is different, the scholars have other opinions in relation to this matter. In my interpretation, I discuss that the forms are identical in Avicenna's theory and in that context, Ṣadrā and Avicenna have contrasting theories intrinsically mainly because of the role of imaginative power over sensation. My reading of Avicenna is built on a number of assumptions. First assumption is that giver of forms and the active intellect are identical. This entails that the forms present in the active intellect are the same as the forms that appear as the compounds of matter and form which are given by the giver of forms. The second is that the soul perceives the forms from the active intellect and that the soul is a passive receiver of forms. The details of this second assumption are that human soul is unable to retain intelligible forms. And that Avicenna also denies any form of unification with the active intellect.⁴⁹ As a result, human always and only have temporal access to the intelligible forms (Turker, 2010, p. 69). This is the idea of connection with active intellect in contrast to unification (*ittiṣāl* over *ittiḥād*) (Kalin, 2010, p. 49).

⁴⁹ For Avicenna's criticism of Porphyry on *the identity claim*, see Kalin, 2010, pp. 50-56; Rizvi, 2009, p. 91ff.

Avicenna talks about three different loci for universals (*ShI*, V.1, 1960, p. 196; 2005, p. 148). The universal itself, the universality of the universal, and something to which universality attaches are different. This might imply that each type of universal is different from the other. The universal can be considered as particular, as universal and as the thing itself without any conditions attached to it as of universality or particularity. In the exclusive ontology of Avicenna it is difficult to think of a single thing being particular and universal at once (*ShI*, V.2, 1960, pp. 207ff.; 2005, p. 157).

Moreover, Avicenna talks about activity of the imagination at the process of forms in the mind. Especially this idea of intrusion of imaginative powers at the process of sensation is close to the way Mullā Ṣadrā explains sensation. And some commentators of Avicenna have interpreted him in this way, such as Ṭūsī. Ṭūsī claimed that the sensible forms are shadowy versions of the extra-mental forms (*IshRT*, v.2, p. 308).

Yet, in favour of the identity claim (I mentioned initially) between the sensible form and the form in the extra-mental object, Avicenna also finds unity among these three loci of universals.

Avicenna also favours the idea of the passivity of soul and denies unification with the active intellect. It is essential for his quiddity-based (*māhiyya*) epistemology and ontology that knowledge is maintained through forms. The identity of the forms sensible and forms in the soul is crucial for possibility and certainty of knowledge. So through the connection of active intellect the forms are received and certainty is guaranteed by the identity of active intellect with the giver of forms. So the idea of quiddity-based knowledge requires identity of forms.

With the active intellect as the cosmological and epistemological principle, the forms are the main constituent and informative parts of the composite of matter and form. Thus, when the form is internalized, in terms of the informative value, nothing is lost from the essential meaning of the extra-mental object. Avicenna identifies quiddity (*māhiya*), reality (*ḥaqīqa*) and essence (*zāt*) (*ShMd*, I.7, p. 28). As the form is abstracted with the help of connection with the active intellect, the form abstracted is the *same* as the form in the extra-mental object.

According to this interpretation, Avicenna's sensed form is identical to the form in the extra-mental object and to the form in Active intellect. The sense is seen as a passive process of reception of forms. And as well as the extra-mental object, the connection with active intellect is necessary for the actualization of the reception of forms.

So far the peripatetic definition of sensation as a change in the sense organ caused by the sense object is discussed with its implications on the relation of the sense object and sensible form. The second definition of sensation found in the *DA* sparks another dimension of this relation. That is about the possible identity of the perceivable, the perceiver and the perception. In terms of the relation of sensation and its organ Aristotle expresses the identity as: “A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated. The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same” (*DA* II.12.424a24-424b19).

Let us now further discover this **second definition of sensation** and the *identity principle*. The second definition given by Aristotle for “sensation” is through actualization and alteration: “what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it” (*DA*, 418a3–6; *Kitāb al-naḥs li-Aristutalis*, 1949, p. 63).⁵⁰ The idea of assimilation is found in Arabic sources in a loyal manner to their Greek source (*Kitāb al-naḥs li-Aristūṭālīs*, 1949, p. 63; ed. Badawī, *Aristū fī-l-naḥs*, p. 44; *K.RN*, p. 46). The idea of identification is continued by Muslim thinkers such as Kindī. However, Avicenna and Suhrawardī rejected it strongly.

The identification principle requires presence of the extra-mental object as in the peripatetic version of the identity principle is “imprinting”. But for Mullā Ṣadrā, the identity is not between an extra-mental object and a mental one. Both the sensible objects and the created forms are internal in his theory.

Before Ṣadrā, the identification of the knower and the known is widely accepted by Neoplatonists and illuminationist school while Avicenna was strongly against it. Avicenna aside, we can still find peripatetic philosophers like Kindī, defending the identity thesis. Yet, the idea of change in substance caused by the sensation is originally Sadrian. At this point, the case of sense organ changing into the quality of sense object is interpreted as a kind of unification. Identification does not change the essence of the perceiver in Kindī:

⁵⁰ See also *DA* 425b27-426a1 “The activity of the sensible object and that of the sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains. Take as illustration actual sound and actual hearing: a man may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that which has a sound is not always sounding. But when that which can hear is actively hearing and that which can sound is sounding, then the actual hearing and the actual sound come about at the same time (these one might call respectively hearkening and sounding).”

When [the soul] unites with the intellectual form it and the intellectual form are not distinct, because [the soul] is not divided, such that it would undergo alteration. When it unites to the intellectual form it and the intellect are one and the same thing, subject and object of thinking [*‘āqila wa ma‘qūla*]. Therefore, the intellect and the intelligible object are one and the same thing with respect to the soul (*On the Intellect*; tr. Adamson, 2012, p. 97).

The identity thesis of Mullā Ṣadrā comes with the stronger idea of change than the notion of change in peripatetic tradition:

The human soul descends to the level of the sensible when it perceives it... [the soul] becomes the same (*‘ayn*) as the seer (*bāṣira*) whilst seeing, it becomes the same as the hearer while hearing, and the same goes on for the other senses (*Shawāhid*, v.1, p. 228).

The soul is united in some kind of unification with its faculties and their tools. That is why the existence of anything in them is identical to its existence for the soul. Perception consists of the existence of the perceptible thing to the perceiver. So inevitably the soul becomes aware of an existence by which the body and its faculties become qualified, not of that which is outside of it (*Asfār*, p. 193-4, tr. Peerwani, p. 143).

As a result of the discussions mentioned above, we reach an immaterial understanding of change in which the soul (rather than the extra-mental object) plays an active role and sensation is a more essential change than a change of accidents. Mullā Ṣadrā presents two principles to establish this sensation theory: the substantial motion (*ḥaraka jawharīya*) and a stronger identity thesis than already proposed Aristotelian one. This much suffices for the peripatetic notion of sensation in the Islamic world. To sum up, the theories of sensation discussed so far, the peripatetic tradition accepted that the process of sensation is explained as an imprint theory in which the matterless form is gained in the soul. In this process the soul is regarded as a receiver. Yet, this process is also defined as an entelechy in which the soul activates some possible inactive capacities of cognition. In Aristotle's case this is explained as the sensed organ being potentially the sensible object and this is considered as an early formulation of identity thesis. The explanation of imprint theory remained in Kindī and Avicenna's theories. The first one remained a follower of the identity thesis whilst the latter strongly rejected it. Other approaches to sensation emerged as the relational approach of Baghdādī in which abstraction is rejected. Suhrawardī explains sensation as a direct connection and as *unveiling*. He adopts and develops Avicenna's idea of immaterial soul and his denial

of identity thesis. So discussions on *immateriality* and *passivity* of the soul as well as the *abstraction* and *identity* during the process of sensation are the main points that will be shaping the theory proposed by Šadrā. We can now move on to the discussions as Avicenna's influence is carried to the Latin world.

Following medieval theories of sense perception after Avicenna in the Latin world, Aquinas is one of the main figures. He continues some Avicennan ideas in his psychology. However, it is not so easy to classify his philosophy with one characteristic alone. Some readers claim that Aquinas is a direct realist while some others think that he is a representationalist.⁵¹ This debate is mainly about the nature of the perceived forms and their relation to the extra-mental objects which are their source.

Aquinas presents two levels of cognition: sensory cognition and intellectual cognition. Sensory cognition is the product of physical organs (responsible for external and internal senses) while the intellectual cognition is not mediated by bodily organs (Pasnau, 1997, p. 12). This classification recalls Avicenna's differentiation between practical and theoretical intellect, and it can be assumed that the same worry about keeping the immaterial nature of intellectual cognition is lying behind both of these classifications.

He follows the Aristotelian terminology of hylomorphism. There are forms for the knower as all "cognition is according to some form, which is the principle of cognition in the knower" (Herrera, 2005, p. 6). Thus, the cognizer has two forms, its own forms and the forms of the thing it is thinking about. Robert Pasnau exemplifies this as intellect thinking about X having its own form on one hand and the form of X (Pasnau, 1997, p. 13). In order for knowledge to occur, there must be a *similitude* between the external and internal forms (Herrera, 2005, p. 7). However, these forms in the intellect do not bear all the features of the extra-mental object anymore. Although a stone outside is heavy and extends through space, the form in the intellect does not anymore. Here one important feature of Aquinas' theory is brought about: that the ways these forms exist in the intellect are special. Aquinas calls this *intentional* or *spiritual* existence.

A spiritual alteration occurs in virtue of a species' being received in a sense organ or the medium in the manner of an intention, not in the manner of a natural form.

⁵¹ Panaccio (2001) discusses different approaches in this sense, and the reason for labelling many peripatetic theories as representationalist is the idea that objects cause an imprint or image in the soul. Pasnau challenges the idea and claims that the strong relation between the sensation and the extra-mental object together with the notion of similitude require both direct realism and representationalism (Pasnau, 1997, pp. 197, 218-9).

For a species received in a sense in this way is not received in keeping with the existence that it has in the sensible object (*Sentencia libri De anima* II.14.268-73, tr. Pasnau, 1997, p. 14).

In this way, all cognition is claimed to occur through these species of the cognized thing in the cognizer. However, it is not the forms that are present outside and inside the mind that creates cognition alone. According to Aquinas, these species were generated by the object and multiplied through the medium and the percipient. Thus, cognition was created in a causal *chain* of species (Pasnau, 1997, p. 15).

Let's examine his theory of vision in order to see how this chain of species links the extra-mental and the mind. Here we need another term which is different from forms or species, namely, *ratio*. Species communicates a ratio to determine its subject. A *ratio* is a notion opposite to natural. Although actual fire contains heat, "a species of fire that is received in the air will not make the air hot, nor will a species of fire received into a sense organ make the sense organ hot, nor will a species of fire received into the intellect make the intellect hot" (Herrera, 2005, p. 11-12).

According to Aquinas, visible bodies multiply their species in the medium (air or water). In general, the medium potentially has species, and when a species is emitted from a visible body, the medium actually has the species. Aquinas calls these less material emitted species *in medio*. And they communicate *the intentio* or *ratio* that is present in the hylomorphic composite. The species *in medio* communicates the ratio, which is the medium for the sense organs. Like the air or water, sense organ has potentiality to receive the formality in the species in the medio and when communicated, this potentiality changes into actuality. These received species by the sense organs are called *sensible species*. Sense organs actually sense specific things through sense species. This species is more immaterial than the previous. Later, the sense organ communicates the common sense, which is unifying sense of the data coming from different senses. The common sense, in return, communicates the percept to the imagination where the percept will be called *phantasm*.

The chain of species from extra-mental realm to medium one, to sense organ, to common sense and to the imagination ends with the production of *phantasms*. It can be said that the role of the species is to communicate the ratio from one ontological level to the ontological level above it. Species loses its materiality at each level and the species in the intellect is the most spiritual (immaterial) being of all (Herrera, 2005, p. 10-12).

Causality includes only higher levels' influence over lower levels. Accordingly, *phantasms* cannot affect the higher level beings, such as the species in the intellect. On the other hand, the active intellect does not contain any *intentions* that can cause the actual knowing in human intellect. In this picture, neither the phantasm nor the active intellect can directly cause active knowing for the human. In order to solve the problem Aquinas proposes a solution which reminds Averroes:

In virtue of the agent intellect and by its turning to sense images [phantasms] (which, in turn, represent the realities of which they are images), a likeness [similitude] is effected in the possible intellect, but only with respect to the specific nature. And it is thus that species are said to be abstracted from sense images [...] (Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia q. 85 a. 1 ad. 3, v 12, p. 57).⁵²

He explains how intelligible species are abstracted from phantasms as follows:

Sense images are illuminated by the agent intellect and further, by its power, species are abstracted from them. They are illuminated because sense images, by the power of the agent intellect, are rendered apt to have intellectual intentions or species abstracted from them, [...]

The agent intellect, moreover, abstracts species from images, in that by its power we can consider specific natures without individuating conditions, and it is by likenesses of these natures that the possible intellect is informed (Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia q. 85 a. 1.ad. 4, v. 12, p. 57).

It is the sensible intentions that take place within phantasms. The same intentions exist in phantasms immaterially and they exist intelligibly in the intelligible species and subsequently in the concept. Herrera links Avicenna's notion of three aspects of a quiddity with Aquinas' theory. According to Avicenna, a quiddity (*māhiyya*) can be considered by itself, in a thing and in the mind. Herrera states that in a similar fashion, *intentio* is common among the different levels of species in Aquinas' theory. With such an understanding, Aquinas finds the ability to say that the ratio is uniform among ratio in intellect and outside existent's ratio:

In addition having distinguished between the ratio and its mode of being, Aquinas can have the same ratio existing in various modes of being: in the form-matter composite, in the species *in medio*, in the sensible species, in the phantasm, in the intellect as intelligible species, and in the concept (Herrera, 2005, p. 15).

⁵²

Sections in [] are from Herrera's translation Herrera, 2005, p. 13.

In sum, the gap between material beings in extra-mental world and the immaterial nature of their knowledge in the mind is linked by Aquinas through *species* (both intelligible and sensible). The idea that a *ratio* can exist under various modes of being seems to be influenced through Avicenna. Moreover, the notion of transferring the intention in the imagination seems to have been adopted from Averroes. Following Brentano, Averroes is the main influence on Aquinas. Aquinas' abstracted forms are the basis of knowledge and they constantly keep the connection between the intelligibles and the extra-mental objects:

Our intellect abstracts both species from sense images –in so far as it considers the natures of things as universal – and yet, at the same time, understands these in sense images, since it cannot understand even the things from which it abstracts species without turning to sense images (Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia q. 85 a. 1.ad.5, v.12, p. 57).

Averroes' more spiritual explanation of sensation than the materialist readings of Aristotle,⁵³ as well as the ontological contributions of Avicenna about the differentiation of quiddity and existence and three aspects of a quiddity, might have strengthened the idea of inexistence for Aquinas and thus caused the development of the conceptualization of intentionality by Brentano. If we search for the intentionality in this sense of immateriality, the origin is Averroes' sensation rather than Avicenna. In terms of the ontological implications, in contrast, Avicenna seems to be more important. As I have mentioned earlier, I accept a loose usage of immateriality which can be maintained by the notion of *abstraction*. Following this, I do not follow Black's strict classification in which only Averroes' sensation theory is a possible candidate for intentionality. However, I share the general concern that Avicenna's sophisticated approach to inner senses is a stronger candidate for intentionality. It must be noted still that if a strong notion of immateriality is going to be applied, then neither Avicenna's theory of inner senses nor his sensation theory would be eligible as a candidate. This is because Avicenna makes it clear that the inner senses are located in the brain which makes them material processes. Let me now discuss the next level of abstraction after the external senses. Following Aristotle's presentation, that is the imagination.

⁵³ See Black on this difference of interpretation of Averroes' sensation theory of Aristotle and its consequence in terms of the development of the notion of "intentionality": Black, (2011) "Averroes on the Spirituality and Intentionality of Sensation" in *In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century*, (London: Warburg Institute), pp. 159-174.

2.4 IMAGINATION

As implied in the evaluative paragraphs on Aristotle and immateriality of sense perception, a larger investigation can shed light on Brentano's reading. Caston claims that Brentano's evaluation is not limited to sense theory and intentionality seems to cover larger cognitive processes including all mental processes and experiences which go beyond sense perception and inner senses. In accordance with that, it is clear that the notion of intentionality requires including more of cognitive processes than *phantasma* alone. This section will deal with Aristotle's presentation with *phantasia* and its reception after him. I will follow Fazlurrahman's insight that the discussions on *phantasia* are the origin of Avicenna's inner senses. The irregular cases that are neither sensation nor intellection and the notion of proper sense object can also be added as two central issues that sparked the discussions on inner senses. In order sense perception to occur, there must be the *proper object* before the sense organ. This presence must somehow cause a change in the subject so that the organ gets active and it starts to operate.

For sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond the sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less the case (Metaphysics Γ 1010b35-1011a2).

This explanation of sense perception is highly object-oriented and causal. This causal explanation then is combined with his notion of proper objects in which certain faculties are related to specific objects:

Whatever is visible is colour and colour is what lies upon what is in itself visible; 'in itself' here means not that visibility is involved in the definition of what thus underlies colour, but that that substratum contains in itself the cause of visibility. Every colour has in it the power to set in movement what is actually transparent; that power constitutes its very nature (DA II.6, 418a26-b2).

The first chapters of the third book of *DA* are about irregular cases that are not classified as either sensation or intellection. The first case is the possibility of a sixth sense that is beyond the five external senses. The second issue is the awareness of the senses, such as in vision, when one sees other than the seen object we also perceive that we are experiencing vision. But this perception of the perception is not accountable with sensation. The third issue is incidental perception in which data of more than one sense is being analysed, combined or judged on. As each sense can only work on their proper

sense objects, the incidental perception is not sensation. The fourth issue occurs when the perception occurs without any object being present.

The irregular cases those fall unaccountable with the ordinary definition of sensation force Aristotle to create a more comprehensive system about senses and the knowledge process, rather than just the operation of the five senses and their organs. The sense organs owe their actions to being part of a system, *aisthetikon* that is composed of the senses and the heart as their governor and centre. As a result, the ability of the sense organs to perceive depends upon their connection to the heart (Everson, 1997, p. 141). In terms of the fourth issue, Aristotle presented imagination and memory as a solution. In that sense, these two faculties play the in-between role between sense and intellection.). Brentano evaluates the same topics but relates them to unity of the soul (Brentano, 1997, p. 58-65). He claims that these issues prove that the soul is not the subject of the senses and the sensory activities but the embodied soul is (Brentano, 1997, p. 66). Instead of accepting the multiplicity of the sense organs, or attributing different sense organs a common property, Brentano thinks, Aristotle solved these problematic cases through a notion of unity:

According to him [Aristotle], the sensitive part is single in its subject, just as the various radii of a circle meet in one centre, so the heterogeneous influences of sensory qualities meet finally in a single organ which alone has the special required for sensation (Brentano, 1997, p. 67).

The idea of a unified system goes parallel with our very first sentences about Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle, which does not radically separate any of these two sides. He doesn't want to lose the link between the physical and the immaterial or the body and the soul or the senses and the intellect. He sees that for Aristotle, "the entire body of living being belongs to one and the same substance [...] in man sensation is something bodily, and intellectual thought something mental; nonetheless, one and the same being thinks and senses" (Brentano, 1997, p. 67).

Aristotle denies sixth sense (*DA* III.1 424b20-21). This denial might be in order to avoid regression or having uncountable number of senses. Result of this restriction is being able to classify soul's faculties as sense, intellection and imagination (Polansky, 2007, p. 362). This rejection is continued in the later tradition by Avicenna, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (*Mabāḥith*, v.2, p. 318) and Mullā Ṣadrā. Ṣadrā summarizes this common stance as:

Likewise, the nature does not transfer from the level of animality to a level above it except when it has perfected all that is in that level. Hence, if there was the possibility

of another sense it would have been actualized for the animal. Since it is not actualized in man who is more perfect than animal qua animal, we learn that there is no other sense existent [in man] except these [five] (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 236).

Democritus among Presocratics is reported to claim that there are more than five senses and that some different species might have stronger powers of sense (Polansky, 2007, p. 362). In *Maqālāt al-islāmiyīn*, Asharī mentions sixth sense in relation to God's capacity to create a further sense in human and in relation to after world (*Maqālāt*, v.2, p. 32). Asharī concludes that majority of people denied the notion of a sixth sense. Despite the denial of a sixth sense, for Ṣadrā, a sense which is created in human for giving her the perception of the after world is important. Yet, he assigns imagination for this function; not a sixth sense. Also as extraordinary powers of sense, Ṣadrā follows Neoplatnists that there are higher senses as well as lower ones. Moreover, sensation can be attributed to celestial spheres. As these are higher levels of existence, the power they have should be higher and stronger than that of animals and humans.⁵⁴

Another denial in *DA* is possibility of perception of common sensibles. Aristotle explains that among the three types of objects (accidental, common and proper), only proper sensibles can trigger sensation. Accordingly a sense cannot be assigned to perceive common sensibles (*DA* III.2, 425a14-425a26).

Further, there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common sensibles either. [...]for each sense perceives one class of sensible objects. So that it is clearly impossible that there should be a special sense for any one of the common sensibles (*DA* III.1, 425a14-425a26)

This does not mean that *common sense* is wholly rejected in Aristotle's theory. He thinks *incidental* perception is possible because sensation is a unified system centralized by the heart. So, the word common in common sense does not refer to the common sensibles or common sensibility. It refers to the idea that the external senses have a centre and make up a unified system. This reference to a root and source is metaphorically described as common water, shared by all the houses in a street by Themistius, Peter of Spain and Albert the Great (Pasnau, 2004, p.188-9). In Avicenna's theory the word *common* refers to a common destination (*ShN* IV.1, p. 163).

The vague usage in Aristotle has resulted in different interpretations on what common sense is. It can refer to the unified system of the external senses, or to a central faculty

⁵⁴ Details of higher senses will be discussed in the next chapter.

that is post-sensory, one can even argue for identity of common sense with imagination. Aristotle does not enumerate common sense among the faculties which raises suspicion that it might be simply referring to the unified system of perception. In contrast to Aristotle, *common sense* is generally accepted and enlisted among the inner faculties in medieval ages (Wolfson, 1935, p. 86).

The discussion on perception of perception in *DA* III.2 can be regarded as one of the functions of common sense as well. First of all perception of perception is not part of sensation. Every sense has its proper objects, but the senses themselves do not carry the properties of being proper objects for themselves. Colours are proper objects for the sight, but the sight itself does not have any particular colour that is sensible to the eye. Aristotle moreover thinks that we simultaneously know our perception, so when we see, we perceive that we are seeing. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle claims this awareness emerges automatically with sense perception itself.

Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing, or by some sense other than sight. But the sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive both sight and its object, viz. colour: so that either there will be two senses both percipient of the same sensible object, or the sense must be percipient of itself. Further, even if the sense which perceives sight were different from sight, we must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so, we ought to do this in the first case (*DA* III.2, 425b11-17).

However, in *De Somno et Vigilia* (*DSV*), with particular example of hearing, he talks about awareness differently. Perceiving that one is hearing whilst s/he is hearing (or seeing) is related to common sense:

Now, since every sense has something special and also something common; special, as, e.g., seeing is to the sense of sight, hearing to the auditory sense, and so on with the other senses severally; while all are accompanied by a common power, in virtue whereof a person perceives that he sees or hears (for, assuredly, it is not by *sight* that one sees that he sees; and it is not by taste, or sight, or both together that one discerns, and that sweet things are different from white things, but by a part common to all the organs of sense; for there is one sensory function, and the controlling sensory organ is one, though differing as a faculty of perception in relation to each genus, e.g., sound or colour); and since this subsists in association chiefly with the faculty of touch (for this can exist apart from all the other organs of sense, but none of them can exist apart from it—a subject of which we have treated in our speculations

concerning the soul); it is therefore evident that waking and sleeping are an affection of this. This explains why they belong to all animals; for touch alone belongs to all (DSV 455a13-455a26)⁵⁵

I could not find a spacious discussion of perception of perception in Avicenna or Şadrā. Aquinas however makes revisions on Avicenna's discussion on common sense and discusses this function (perception of perception) as part of senses.

It belongs to *sense* to have cognition of sensibles inasmuch as they are sensible. For we have cognition of the difference between white and sweet not only with respect to the what-it-is of each thing, which pertains to intellect, but also with respect to the different impressions on sense. This can be brought about only through a sense (tr. Pasnau, 2004 p. 193).

The incidental perception and the perception of non-present objects are cases which can be considered related to imagination as well as common sense. Discriminating and combining of different senses such as white, and sweet is one example. Phantasia finds itself a larger place than common sense in the *De Anima*. Aristotle places phantasia in between external senses and intellect. However, whether *phantasia* is a faculty on its own or only a movement is not clear. Chapter three of book three is dedicated to phantasia. Phantasia is “that in virtue of which we say that a phantasm presents itself to us. It is one of the faculties or dispositions in virtue of which we judge, and judge truly or falsely (DA III.2, 427b30).”

Not only for the judgements, but also the problematic cases, such as dreams, where some sort of perception take place despite the absence of perceptual objects are accounted for due to phantasia. Aristotle posits “possibility of producing a false judgement” as one of the distinguishing features of phantasia. This is also presented in relation to common and accidental sensibles. Aristotle says that sense perception is always true. It is mainly because of the relation of proper sensibles to their sense faculties. On the other hand, the nonconventional relation of common and accidental sensibles creates opportunities to mistakes (DA III.3, 428a5-428a18).

This capacity is where many scholars find the connection between intentionality and

⁵⁵ One should draw attention to two points about these sections of *DSV*. First of all as the book is about sleep and sleeplessness, how these phrases relate to sleep must be considered. Aristotle discusses in this book the states of being awake and sleep closely related to senses. He claims that sleep and awake-ness are exclusively animal states which plants cannot have. The other thing is Aristotle's treatment of senses as a unity at these paragraphs. His treatment of common sense is no exception and also common sense is presented to be active at all stages of sense perception. This is a strong proof for those interpreters who claim Aristotle's perception is a unified system.

Aristotle's psychology. In terms of the relation to discussions on intentionality, the special cases where the object of experience is not present in the extra-mental world such as in dreams, future thoughts, hopes etc. are discussed by Aristotle. He criticized his predecessors and claimed to have an account comprehending these special cases. According to Aristotle, there are changes he called *phantasmata* in the receivers bodies that *represent or model* the objects in question, and by undergoing these changes the subjects become able to have thoughts with these contents "whether or not the corresponding objects exist in the world" (Caston, 2007). Thus, these representations – *phantasmata*-, are capable of retaining contents in the absence of objects of experience.

Whenever one actually remembers having seen or heard or learned something, he perceives in addition as we have already observed that it happened before; and before and after are in time.

Accordingly, if asked, of which among the parts of the soul memory is a function, we reply: manifestly of that part to which imagination also appertains; and all objects of which there is imagination are in themselves objects of memory, while those which do not exist without imagination are objects of memory incidentally (Aristotle, *On Memory* 1, 450a18-25).

Phantasia acts as an imprinting of the sensory stimulation, which it replicates like a kind of cast and helps remember something which is no more sensible. Fortunately, the strategy is not restricted to memory. This is why Caston thinks *phantasia* can be linked to intentionality.

Thought always requires a *phantasma*. Thanks to this ability, many features of the object can be ignored in the service of our purposes and we can use symbols and abstract content to understand one another (Caston, 2007). The relation among sense perception, phantasia and intellection is not so obvious in Aristotle's philosophy. There are different places in his works where Aristotle attributes different features to these capacities or where he uses these notions to account for different puzzles about the soul. We must remember however, a more systematic and hierarchical relation is established among these faculties only after Aristotle. One can refer to *phantasia* and sense perception as two separate faculties and place *phantasia* in-between sense perception and intellection as most commonly accepted. One can also take *aisthetikon* as a system which possesses the capacity of perception together with a further capacity of *phantasia* (Everson, 1997, p. 158). In any case one must not identify sense perception with *phantasia*: Aristotle apparently attributes sense to every animal while attributing *phantasia* to only some of them

(Everson, p. 185). With this in mind, it can be claimed that Aristotle's *phantasia* too performs interpretative work over sense data. However, in this way, *phantasia*'s role in non-present data, like in dreams and memory would be excluded (Everson, 1997, p. 166). In his evaluation of Aristotle's psychology, Everson suggests two meanings for Aristotle's usages of *phantasia*. In one, *phantasia* is "used in order to refer to all states in which there is a perceptual or quasi-perceptual appearance", and in the second and more restricted usage, it is used for "those states in which there is a quasi-perceptual appearance". In *DA* III.3, it is used in this restricted sense (Everson, 1997, p. 184-5).

Similar to sense perception, Aristotle's *phantasia* also had been interpreted in a more immaterial fashion by his commentators. The Neoplatonist Simplicius understands *phantasia* as a faculty "which has mental images", and Stephanus sees it as a faculty which "interprets the data of perception without recourse to mental images" (Sheppard, 1991, p. 168). The ideas of *phantasia* being different from sense perception and being capable of falsehood as well as truth seem to be retained.⁵⁶ Different activities of soul Aristotle writes about are considered as different faculties of the soul of different levels by Neoplatonists. With Neoplatonist influence, Aquinas for example, states that the vision is more spiritual than other senses. This idea is not found in Aristotle's text *DA* (Burnyeat, 2001, p. 130-137). *Phantasia* then, is considered as a higher faculty than sense perception (Sheppard, 1991, p. 168). Plotinus, taking this point further, claimed that there are two different *phantasia*, one lower than the other: "lower one which has *phantasmata* that reflect the impressions of sense perception" and a higher one "which uses verbal formulae to apprehend pure Forms" (*Enneads* 4.3.29-31).

Moreover, Plotinus develops a complex theory of intellection in which he talks about two types of intellectual activities: discursive and noetic (Crystal, 2002, p. 180). An important feature of these in relation to intentionality is that any intellectual act is a process in which the thinking subject comes to think some kind of object (Crystal, 2002, p. 181). Discursive intellection acts upon the external data, and thus is not generative of its own content; it combines, divides and compares incoming impressions which it receives from both the

⁵⁶ "That imagination is not sense is clear from the following considerations: Sense is either a faculty or an activity, e.g. sight or seeing; imagination takes place in the absence of both, as e.g. in dreams. Again, sense is always present, imagination not. If actual imagination and actual sensation were the same, imagination would be found in all the brutes: this is held not to be the case; e.g. it is not found in ants or bees or grubs. Again, sensations are always true, imaginations are for the most part false. Once more, we do not, when sense functions precisely with regard to its object, say that we imagine it to be a man, but rather when there is some failure of accuracy in its exercise—then it is either true or false. And, as we were saying before, visions appear to us even when our eyes are shut. Neither is imagination any of the things that are never in error: e.g. knowledge or intelligence; for imagination may be false" (*DA* III.3 428a5-428a18).

sensory and intellectual (noetic) worlds with ones which it had previously received (Crystal, 2002, p. 181). As there is no direct connection between discursive intellection and its content, Plotinus regards that this is where fallibility occurs from time to time in the intellection process. The noetic intellect, in contrast to the discursive one, is turned to itself. As a result, the content of noetic intellection is the One and the self (Crystal, 2002, 184-5).

Neoplatonism tends to accept the realm of independent forms. They shadow Aristotle in regarding knowledge as a kind of abstraction process of forms from things that are composites of form and matter. Intelligibles are treated as identical with the intellect at times and as prior. Thus, according to some scholars, Neoplatonists do not have intentional objects for intellection (Sorabji, 2001, 105-115).⁵⁷

Aristotle's Platonised interpretations through Neoplatonists have been very influential in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna has been one of the important figures at the conjunction of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian interpretations. His ideas show signs of developing many Aristotelian ideas although reviving them through Neoplatonic glasses. In relation to intentionality, many scholars seem to focus on his *estimative faculty* (*wahm*). This emphasis on the estimative faculty (*wahm*) would be followed because it carries a link between the human mind and the extra-mental world. The estimative faculty is assigned to detect and create immaterial features which are not detectable with the ordinary senses. Here it would attract attention that immateriality starts with this faculty for Avicenna. And the sense organ is still material. So instead of dematerialized version of sense perception in Avicenna's thought we find a sensation theory that is more loyal to Aristotle and more physical.

If we search for the traces of intentionality in relation to the nature of objects, then the inner sense of estimation is where a less material object is seen in the picture. The object of cognition in estimation is the *meaning* (*ma'na*). These are not sensible to the extra-mental sense faculties. Estimation is important for another reason. Most scholars argue that the estimative faculty is one of Avicenna's innovations that dominated medieval discussions in both the western and eastern traditions for centuries. I think it is more illuminating to see Avicenna's inner senses in their wholeness. One of the reasons is that it is easier to see the functions of different faculties of the soul in that kind of a presentation.

⁵⁷ I will argue further in the next chapter that these evaluations are not necessarily accurate.

Aristotle differentiates imagination and external sense in relation to their function and objects. Phantasia is generated by sense perception and it is different from sense perception in two ways:. First, it can be both a true and a false judgement, while sense perception is always true. Second, it can function when the object of perception is absent as well as when it is present, while sense perception is possible only with the presence of object. Phantasia, moreover, is related to animal movements. The desire of an animal to get closer to something useful for the animal is with the help of phantasia (DA 427a17-19; DA 431a15; Watson, 1982, p. 103, Wolfson, p. 89). Avicenna has even a more developed system of differentiation.

Avicenna's separation of the inner senses is not arbitrary. As Deborah Black successfully points out, Avicenna tries to consider different functions while also considering different types of objects. In *Ishārāt*, he says that every faculty has one function and furthermore, every faculty has one organ acting as a tool for this function (*Ishārāt*, v.2, p. 342). Accordingly he differentiates between receptive and retentive functions according to their work on forms and intentions/meanings (*ma'ānī*) (*ShN* I.5, p. 43). The soul can only perform one activity at a time (Black, p. 10; Kaukua and Kukkonen, 2007, p. 101), one faculty cannot be retaining and receiving those that comes through the external senses simultaneously (*ShN* V.4, p. 231-2). McGinnis develops Black's approach even further and talks about inner senses as a result of three principles of: 1. Differentiation between different cognitive objects, 2. Between receptive and retentive powers, 3. Between active and passive powers (McGinnis, 2010, p. 111-3). This idea of differentiation requires multiplicity of some sort for the soul. As I discussed in previous chapters, Avicenna's case is a separation of different parts of soul in their function and nature. This is a radical dualist separation of material and immaterial parts similar to Plotinus' dualism of noetic and dialectic soul. Šadrā reports a group that argued against differentiation of senses as it implied multiplicity of senses. In this case separate senses entail separate selves and this is opposite of unity of the soul. Interestingly Avicenna is quite strict in both differentiation of senses and unity of the soul. Another interesting point is similar issues come up as these two are being discussed and Avicenna seems to be taking two different stances in accordance with the topic being about unity and differentiation. He should be taking the soul as some sort of unity that is capable of some kind of multiplicity. In Šadrā's case we find a straight forward unity and monism instead.

To sum up, behind Avicenna's detailed classification of inner senses, there are three types of variables. The objects of the sense can be either a form or a meaning, it can be a passive

faculty and merely receiving or it can be an active one and works further on the material received by another faculty. The main point is that no two functions are performed by one faculty and every faculty has a body organ (*Ishārāt*, v.2, p. 342).

Regarding the proofs I will only mention the proofs for the common sense in order to showcase the nature of his argumentation. I previously mentioned two points for the necessity of common sense stated in Avicenna's texts. Mullā Ṣadrā repeats and discusses the arguments used in support of proving the existence of common sense. He lists three of these in *Asfār*. These proofs also give hints about the functions of the common sense.

The first argument focuses on the sense data and judgements on that data coming from different senses. The ability to say 'something white is sweet' requires some faculty that goes beyond the five senses; it must be different from the intellect according to these philosophers because it functions on the sense data. Thus there must be a faculty that exists and is beyond five senses and is different from the intellect (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 243). Ṣadrā finds this argument weak, because judgement is a function of the intellect in humans. It is the faculty of estimation (imagination) in animals that functions in the similar cases.

The second argument in support of common sense is our ability to connect particular data to universal quiddities. As it will be discussed further later, Ṣadrā finds the idea of the intellect to perceive particulars through the help of sense organs important. In the second proof the assumption is based on the dual nature of epistemology that separates particular data from the universal data dramatically. It implies that the functions and abilities that operate these functions are different as well. Whilst Mullā Ṣadrā rejects such dualist implications and assumes soul can know particulars as well as universals; he finds this argument weak too. The case of rain-drops and seeing them as a line is another example used to make a similar claim. Mullā Ṣadrā defends his point by proposing that intellect acts on the data of the vision and mends the image and the result would be the soul's perception of a line that does not exist in the extra mental world or that is not before the eye to be seen (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 244-247; *Ishārāt*, v.2, p. 332-3).

The third argument, which Mullā Ṣadrā thinks is the strongest among three, is that humans perceive forms which do not exist in the extra-mental world, or they can dream about things that do not exist in extra-mental reality (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 248). What makes this argument stronger is also the weakness of the refuting arguments. Two arguments set to objects this third argument rest on the vision as an imprint or the brain being the faculty.

Since Mullā Ṣadrā does not accept these assumptions, the arguments are not acceptable for him.

Similar cases to the ones argued in Avicenna's proof for differentiation will reappear in Sadrian text as proof of the unity of the soul. This is one of the contraries in Avicennan text that he argues for the differentiation of faculties together with unity of the soul. The discrepancy is observable when his sentences are compared in regards to similar cases. He discusses the role of bodily connection of inner senses when differentiation is the case and he argues for independence of soul from the body when the topic is the unity and immateriality of the soul.

Ṣadrā reads Avicenna favouring his arguments on unity over differentiation. Not only a developed idea of differentiation of senses, but also Avicenna's psychology gives a developed picture of human faculties relating human to a higher principle, active intellect.

Similar to Aristotle, abstraction is the main feature for Avicenna's epistemology: "All perception is but the abstraction by the percipient subject of the form of the perceived object in some manner" (*Najāt* VII, ed. Fakhry, p. 207, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 38). However, Avicenna presents intellect from two aspects showing that sources for human knowledge are twofold.

It is as if our soul have two faces: one – [which must not be receptive at all to effects to a bodily nature]–must be directed towards the body and another aspect must be directed toward the higher principles and it must always be ready to receive from what is in There in the Higher Plane and to be influenced by it (*Najāt* IV, ed. Fakhry, p. 203, tr. Fazlurrahman p. 33).⁵⁸

Avicenna's dualist epistemology is important. Avicenna's linking the extra-mental physical with a nonphysical higher realm to human knowledge is a nice example of his combination of Aristotle and Plato.

In terms of Aristotle's *phantasia*, Deborah Black points on an interesting debate between Avicenna and Averroes. Averroes sees Avicenna's estimation faculty as "a superfluous addition to the authentically the Aristotelian faculty (*phantasia*)" (Black, 2000, p. 59). Averroes says "[Avicenna] distinguished himself from the rest of philosophers by assuming in the animal another faculty than the imaginative, which he calls estimative

⁵⁸ This recalls the discussions on the nature and change of the soul among Neoplatonists. Avicenna seems to be willing to keep both the features of changeability and stability and immateriality of the soul with this twofold understanding. Note to the translation: Sections marked with "[]" belong to Khalidi translation, 2005, p. 28-9.

faculty” (cit. Kaukua, 2007, p. 27, *Tahāfut*). Interestingly, for a needless addition, estimative faculty has a quite central and important place in Avicenna’s psychology. The notion of *estimation* is used to explain human and animal cognition where the cognitive action is highly complex pre-intellectual but also more than merely sensible (Black, 2000, p. 59). This debate slightly reflects the difference of transmission lines where Avicenna follows a tradition that reads Aristotle with Neoplatonist lenses and Averroes tries to revive Aristotle without Neoplatonist tendencies.

What Avicenna does with Aristotle’s imagination seems to be to use the faculty as an umbrella notion that covers different senses under itself (Kaukua, 2007, p. 28). This new comprehensive notion can be divided into a number of inner faculties, such as estimation, imagination, memory, common sense and cogitative imagination.

In Avicenna’s hierarchy of different faculties of human soul, in which each lower faculty serves the upper one acquired intellect is the governor of all other intellects. After that actual intellect follows. Habitual intellect serves actual intellect while habitual intellect serves it. After them, comes estimation.

[...] and estimation is served by two faculties, one preceding it and one subsequent to it. The faculty that is subsequent to it is the one that preserves what it conveys, and the faculty that precedes it includes all the animal faculties. Then the faculty of imagination is served by two faculties that serve it in different ways, for the appetitive faculty serves it by carrying out its commands because it impels it to move, while the faculty of representation serves it by being receptive to the combination and separation of its forms.

These two faculties rule over two groups. The faculty of representation is served by phantasy, which is in turn served by the five senses. As for the appetitive faculty, it is served by the locomotive faculty that pervades and muscles, and this is where the animal faculties end. Then the animal faculties as a whole are served by vegetative faculties, first and foremost the reproductive faculty [...] (tr. by Muhammad Ali Khalidi, 2005, p. 32-3; *Najāt* VI, ed. Fakhry, p. 206; tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 37)

Faculties related to the vegetative soul are followed by animal soul’s faculties. Inner senses follow the five external senses, ending with the estimative faculty at the highest level.

According to *DA I.5*, first comes the phantasia, this is the common sense which collects the forms "imprinted (*muntabi‘a*) in the five senses" (*ShN*, I.5, p. 44). Secondly comes

imagery, the formative faculty that uses what common sense receives from the five senses, so that the images retained remains in it after the disappearance of those sensible (Kaukua, 2007, p. 39-40; *ShN* IV.1, p. 165). Avicenna presents one and the same compositive imagination in the animal and the human soul. The manifestations of imagination differ according to the controlling faculty, whether controlled by estimation or by the reason. Thus, retaining images, receiving intentions and keeping them in the memory and finally composition and division of the received forms and intentions become possible as a result of the cooperation of these faculties (Black, 2000, p. 60; Avicenna, *ShN* I.5, p. 43-46).

In order to understand the cooperation of these senses, consider someone seeing something yellow and judging that the thing is honey and sweet (Hasse, 2000, p. 137). The thing can be tasted and thus confirmed to be honey and sweet by the sense-data. But the judgement rests not on such a probable sense-data, judgement is made without "perceiving ... at the time of the judgement". Here, the actual data on sensing yellowness, intention 'honey' is "retrieved from memory by compositive imagination" (Kaukua, 2007, p. 55). A holistic theory of the internal senses is needed for this kind of an explanation: the former experiences about honey must have come together with some data about sweetness and yellowness, and then going under division and honey, sweet, yellow, and so on is separated. Eventually, later when yellowness is sensed the former combination is called back. And the yellow thing is judged to be honey.

Falsehood comes to the picture with the inner senses as well. In *ShN* IV.3 Avicenna explains this as follows: "when a man happens to find honey abominable because of its similarity to gall. Because estimation judges that it has the same qualities as that and the soul follows this estimation even though the intellect would deny it" (Hasse, 2000, p. 137). It appears that error occurs when there is combination of concepts, or previous data or judgement is in the picture. In the other cases, soul is passive and there is no space for error. The judgement is made by the faculty of estimation. Estimation is the highest and ruler faculty for non-human animals (Black, 2000, p.61). As the example shows for humans, estimation can sometimes come opposite to the intellect. In cases like the one stated above, estimation can be an impediment to rational act and wrong judgements. We can think of other cases in which estimation and intellect works in cooperation as well. In this case, human beings can grow a deepened understanding of the physical world around them (Black, 2000, p. 62). Falsehood cannot emerge from sense perception as Aristotle's understanding of sense is that it is infallible. And it cannot be from the higher realms as that is realm of perfections. In the middle stage human soul is active and

combines, analyses and reshapes the data coming from sense data. So it should be through imagination that falsehood is explained. This will be important later when the discussion comes to fictional beings.

In sum, Hasse can be followed in his remarks on that Avicenna's faculty of estimation is unique to Avicenna and he most probably took some of Aristotle's remarks on *phantasia* as a starting point (Hasse, 2000, p. 139). Moreover, he refined Aristotle's theory of soul as he distinguished between five internal and five external senses (Knuuttila, 2008, p. 8-9) which combined Aristotle with Galenic medicine (as seen in the change of the centre of the perceptual system from heart to brain) (Hasse, 2000, p. 138, fn. 338) and with Neoplatonist influence.⁵⁹

Apart from what Avicenna does with estimative faculty and inner senses, in order to avoid a one dimensional presentation of Avicenna's relation to mental states, his abstraction theory and explanation of intellection should be examined too.

Avicenna tells us that the intellect is a common name (*ishtirāk al-ism*) used for two faculties of human rational soul: the theoretical and the practical faculty. The practical faculty has dominance on the bodily faculties, so it is not affected by them, but rather bodily faculties should be affected by the practical (Anconna, 2008, p. 55). Since the soul is immaterial by its source, it is the practical faculty which is in contact with the body. Practical faculty is responsible of movements and is related to the animal faculty of appetite, to the animal faculty of imagination and estimation, and to itself.

It is related It is related to the animal faculty of appetite in that dispositions originate there that are specific to humans, which dispose it quick to actions and affections, such as timidity, shame, laughter, crying, and similar things. It is related to the animal faculty of imagination and estimation on so far as it uses it to discover measures pertaining to the realm of generation and corruption, and to discover the human arts. It is related to itself in that, along with the theoretical intellect, it generates the commonly held opinions, for example that lying is repugnant (*Najāt* IV, ed. Fakhry, p. 202-3, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 32).

With its dualist approach to different parts of soul on the other side the theoretical faculty deals with only the immaterial or higher realms. "[T]he theoretical faculty [...] is the faculty that is related to the realm that lies above it, being affected by it, benefiting from it and receiving from it" (*Najāt* IV, ed. Fakhry, p. 202-3, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 32). Different

⁵⁹ For details of Avicennan centralization of brain as the central organ for inner senses, see Pormann, 2013, pp. 91-108.

parts of soul have different functions and this requires that each one has different nature as well, some more material than the other. It equally requires that some are active and some others are passive faculties.

It is as though each one of our souls has two aspects: one aspect –which must not be receptive at all to effects of a bodily nature-, must be directed towards the body and another aspect must be directed towards the higher principles. This latter aspect must always be receptive to what lies there and be affected by it (*Najāt* IV, ed. Fakhry, p. 202-3, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 32).

As being totally immaterial, theoretical faculty has a tendency to be imprinted with the universal forms that are abstracted from matter. If the forms are not universal forms already the abstraction process from any material attachments is supposed to be carried by the lower faculties.

The function of the theoretical faculty is to receive the impressions of the universal forms abstracted in themselves, it simply receives them; if not it makes them immaterial by abstraction, so that no trace whatever of material attachments remains in them (*Najāt*, V, ed. Fakhry, p. 203-4, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 33).

The interesting point is that the idea of imprint is used even for immaterial stages of knowledge. Intellect as a theoretical faculty has two aspects, one aspect in relation to what is below it and the second in relation to higher principles. This reminds the exclusive explanation of Plotinus for the intellective faculty as noetic and discursive. Moreover, this is related to the transition of *DA*. Adamson points to how a stronger separation between rational soul and lower parts of soul is drawn in *DA Paraphrase* (Adamson, 2001, p. 228; *Paraphrase*, 117-120).

The rational soul does not perceive, in its essence, anything of the intelligibles, except through the meditation of the senses and the imagination. I would even go so far as to say that it will only have an intelligible form after this form has been sensible or imaginable (*Risāla fī al-naḥs*, tr. Kaukua, 2007, p.30).

The rejection of interaction for the higher part of soul with bodily functions requires a new account. And accordingly theoretical faculty's operation of abstraction is explained through levels.

It seems that every apprehension involves acquiring the form of what is apprehended. If what is apprehended is material then it is simply the acquisition of a form abstracted from matter in some way. However, the types of abstraction differ and their degrees are varied (tr. Muhammad Ali Khalidi, 2005, p. 28).

Avicenna is a synthesiser of Plato and Aristotle and his psychology and epistemology represents this combination. The contents at different levels of knowledge are brought about by abstraction from the outside world as well as the reception of intelligible forms from a higher world, the active intelligence. When we follow the ideas of inner senses after Avicenna, Suhrawardī is another important figure.

Suhrawardī's explanation of inner senses is closely related to theory of lights and his idea of the place of human in the hierarchy of lights. Similar to Averroes (with different intentions, though) he rejects the strict classification of inner senses. It is previously stated that everything comes out of lights and every corporeal individual is preceded by its luminous species that comes out of lights. Human beings, as part of the corporeal world have the most perfect constitution (*HI*, p. 131).

From one of the dominating lights, the incorporeal light that is the controlling light in the human fortresses is brought into being for the human –the most perfect- constitution. That dominating light is the lord of the talisman of the rational species. It is Gabriel –upon him be peace! - the proximate father among the mighty lords of the Kingdom of dominance. It is “Ravan-Bakhsh” the Holy Spirit, the bestower of knowledge and confirmation, the giver of life and virtue. This emanated light is the managing light, the “commander of humanity”, that which calls itself “I” (*HI*, p. 132).

Remembering lights' pure nature, they need a mediate to rule over the barriers and that mediacy is the spirits:

[T]he commanding light controls the body by its mediacy and gives it light. The propitious light that the commanding light takes from the dominating lights is reflected upon it from this spirit. Sense and motivation occur by that which ascends to the brain and is moderate. It accepts the luminous sovereignty and returns to all the organs (*HI*, p. 135).

Just as the human is explained in the frames of the light hierarchy, her faculties are no different. Suhrawardī posits every faculty of the human body as a shadow of what is in the commanding light (*HI*, p. 139). This fits well with the picture drawn about vision. Just because all faculties are shadows of the commanding light, the actions of these faculties are in actuality supposed to be referred to the light. That is why it is the light that really sees when human sees but not the bodily organ eye. Suhrawardī's immaterial account of sensation shows similarity to Ṣadrā's general theory of sensation.

Suhrawardī revises the division of imagination that Avicenna offers (*HI*, p. 136). Suhrawardī criticises Avicenna for his division of different inner senses such as common sense, imaginative faculty and estimative faculty. Instead he suggests that they are one and the same faculty which bears all three functions:

The truth is that these three [referring to estimative faculty, imagination and imaginative faculty] are a single thing and a single faculty, named differently depending on how they are considered (*HI*, p. 138).

It must however be noted that the statement above does not remain the same in some of his other books where he shows more loyalty to Avicennan classification of five inner senses. In *Hayākil*, Suhrawardī follows Avicenna's scheme, in *Hikmat al-Ishrāq* (*HI*) this loyal classification cannot be found (Roxanne Marcotte, 2000, p.158). Suhrawardī's passive imagination in *Hayākil* is still the storehouse for the common sense. Active imagination is identified with the cogitative faculty, thus functions of combining, separating and gathering meaning together with judging are contained. Estimative faculty is not in relation with cogitative faculty. Marcotte summarizes this change as Suhrawardī giving the positive function of Avicenna's estimative faculty to the active imagination and giving the negative functions of Avicenna's active imagination to estimative faculty (Marcotte, 2000, p. 159).

In *HI* Suhrawardī first reduces different inner faculties to one main *representative and imaginative faculty* and he reduces this to a rational faculty that unites all (Marcotte, 2000, p. 160). Eventually, one single faculty of representation bears Avicennan representative and passive imagination, faculty of estimation and active and compositive imagination (Marcotte, 2000, p. 161).

Because of the existence of some situations where intellect contradicts this representational faculty (similar to the situations where Avicenna talks about the estimative faculty contradicting intellect), Suhrawardī distinguishes this faculty from the ruling light. This point in his theory sounds a little contradictory. How can the faculty differ from its origin, i.e. the ruling light?

In relation to the discussions about materiality, the presentation of Suhrawardī's theory so far can be summed as well. The imaginative faculty derives from rational soul, and is away from any materiality. The products of this faculty (especially meanings) are immaterial as a result (Roxanne Marcotte, p. 165). Although the importance of Suhrawardī's theories on Mullā Ṣadrā the main sources for his inner senses seem to be Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. I will discuss Rāzī's influence when I present Ṣadrā's

psychology. This is mainly because he quotes and benefits from the material Rāzī maintained in *Mabāḥith* generously. Suhrawardī's main influence appears to be his idea of hierarchy of lights which Ṣadrā uses to explain the ontological gradation of *wujūd*.

Discussion of imagination will not be complete without mentioning one name that made *khayāl* the centre of his cosmological explanation. Ibn al-‘Arabī is this name, and he is important with his idea of *wujūd* and *khayāl* especially when Mullā Ṣadrā is considered. Ibn al-‘Arabī's theoretical mysticism is based on a peculiar study of human nature, and its goal is to track the path to perfect human thus we can say, his theory is among the prominent psychology theories of the medieval ages. In terms of explanation of imagination as a faculty, and in terms of proving mental existence Mullā Ṣadrā gives a long quote from him (*Asfār*, v.1, p. 317-8).

Human beings, according to this have this unique capacity to create imaginations through their imaginative faculties. Nonetheless these images are dependent on the activity of the mind. Thus; they do not have continuous existences. Moreover, they have no existence whatsoever outside the imaginer's mental world. Ability to create imaginations is common to every human (*Fuṣūṣ*, p. 102).“Through imagination (*wahm*), every human may create in the faculty of his imagination (*quwwa khayālih*) what has no being except in it [the faculty]. This is common to all humans” Different from the ordinary people, the wise person who purified his heart (or the gnostic) can use this faculty to create imaginations outside of the faculty.

The mystic (‘*ārīf*) creates through his spiritual concentration (*ḥimma*) what has being in extra-mental reality to act as a locus for his concentration; indeed, his concentration continues to sustain it and support the perpetuation of what it created. When oblivion from preserving what he created overcomes the mystic, that created thing becomes non-existent, unless the mystic commands all planes of existence in which case such oblivion does not arise since at all times he is present on some plane or another (*Fuṣūṣ*, p. 102-3).

However, this existence, too, is non-continuous. Similar to the imaginations of the ordinary people, it is dependent on the gnostic and it fades when the gnostic falls into ignorance.

When the mystic who has such a command creates something through his spiritual concentration, it is manifest in his form on every plane. In this case, the forms maintain each other so that if the mystic is absent on a certain plane or planes which present on another, all the forms are maintained by the form on the plane to which

he is not oblivious. Neither the commonality of people nor the elite are ever completely oblivious (*Fuṣūṣ*, p. 102-3).

Through estimation (*wahm*)—every human has the ability to create imaginations in their powers of imagination (*khayāl*). He also seems to talk about power of imagination as a kind of storehouse of sensible forms and *wahm* as the action that carries the abstraction of forms.

He seems to be attempting to answer the ancient question about how human beings manage to know extra mental realities and create forms, by presenting the notion of *isthmus* (also *barzakh*, some kind of in-betweenness). Imagination is this kind of a mediator where different kinds of worlds (sensible- intelligible in our case) can meet but not interact with one another. At this point, again, some continuity with Peripatetics can be claimed: Ibn al-‘Arabī follows their hylomorphic explanation and embraces the problem of how one manages to extract forms from the extra-mental world of form-matter combinations.

With this question in mind, we need to remember the different types of imagination as part of the answer. Imagination carries two features through all these levels of *barzakh* and creativity. How human carries creativity is also linked with the interaction between different levels of imagination. As Ibn al-‘Arabī claims, they don’t exclude but comprehend each other; human creates through contact with absolute imagination.

This interaction among levels is the key to understand human imagination having the creativity character besides being a medium. Ordinary imagination seems to be explained through the mediatory character of imagination to use the term of it being a *barzakh*. *Barzakh* makes it possible for new characteristics to come to existence. One of the points in Ṣadrā’s philosophy under the influence of Ibn al-‘Arabī is this idea of in-betweenness. Ṣadrā’s innovative idea of copulative being (*wujūd rābiṭī*) is explained with a similar function of isthmus-ness. Another point is the notion of human as *barzakh*. And lately *barzakh* is useful to explain in-betweenness of imagination (between sensation and intellection) dependent on in-betweenness of human beings. In the case of human imagination they are the places where knowledge starts to become possible as matter-less forms can be produced. In the case of gnostic; they actually can create outside the imagination too. This is through interaction with absolute imagination.

Imagination is a *barzakh*, and its nature of being in-between also makes its products have different features at the same time. In dreams for example, dreamer experiences seeing

corporeal things which are not corporeal. Ibn al-‘Arabī assumes a realm for these things that are bound between senses and intelligence. It is also through imagination that spirits establish contact with bodies. “The objects he sees possess corporeal forms, yet they dwell not in the world of corporeal bodies, but in that imaginal world which is the soul”(Chittick, 1989, p. 115). Similarly, meanings are realities from intelligible world; imagination can take meanings and give these meanings to sensory forms. Although both meanings are free from any matter and sensory forms are dependent on matter the product of imagination can mix different features of these two: “Part of the reality of imagination is that it embodies and gives form to that which is not a body or a form, for imagination perceives only in this manner. Hence it is a sensation not manifest and bound between the intelligible and the sensory (*Futūhāt* III.377.11; tr. Chittick, 1998, p. 332).

These created images of human mind maintain a reality of their own; thus, there are three levels of known things (*ma‘lūmāt*): rational, sensory and imaginal. The first is the level of meanings disengaged from substrata. Rational faculties receive the meanings directly (*bi tarīq al-bidāya*). The sensory level is perceived by the senses. And the inbetween level is perceived by neither. “They are meanings that assume shape (*tashakkul*) in sensory forms; they are given form by the form-giving faculty (*al-quwwa al-muṣawwira*), which serves the rational faculty” (*Futūhāt* II 66.14 , tr. Chittick, 1989, p.115).

To the question of how imagination finds the power to contradictory forms of meanings and senses, can be answered through God’s divine name ‘Strong’; that imagination possesses the strength to combine the two; hence he says it manifests the divine name the “Strong” (*al-qawī*) (*Futūhāt* IV 325.2).

Imagination is neither existent nor non-existent, neither known nor unknown, neither negated nor affirmed. For example a person perceives his form in the mirror. He knows for certain that he has perceived his form in one respect and not perceived his form in another respect [...] he cannot deny he has seen his form and he knows that his form is not in the mirror, nor is it between himself and the mirror [...] hence he is neither a truth teller nor a liar in his words "I saw my form, I didn't see my form" (*Futūhāt* I304.16; tr. Chittick, 1989, 118).

In terms of the truth value of those sentences about images, the same kind of in-betweenness applies. Propositions regarding imaginations can be said to be neither true nor wrong as the object of imagination is neither from one dimension or the other of its two faces.

Importance of the imagination for human beings can be explained at many different levels. When it is regarded as a faculty for human beings, the in-betweenness of imagination is what makes the passage from the sensory to the intelligible possible. Moreover, imagination is important for the metaphysical and mystical abilities of human beings and can maintain human beings a creative power. It gives human being a reach beyond the physical realities, even the realities about *after life*. Imagination gives gnostic the power to affect extra-mental realities but in such a way that is observable to only other gnostics. The creative powers both as the common imagination and gnostic's ability are made possible through God's imagination. Ibn al-ʿArabī presents different levels of imagination not in an exclusive but in an interactive way. This interaction gives human imagination the power to reach beyond the physical and the ability to create.

One important issue from Ibn al-ʿArabī's imagination is how he relates this faculty to other senses and to reality. His approach is that dreams and the faculty of imagination give us humans a better chance to be connected to the reality better than the senses do. Dreams as part of imagination are important for the human beings as they witness reality of the things: "Dreams are key lock to unlock mystery of cosmic ambiguity and the constant transformation of existence. New creation is never more clearly witnessed than in the world of dreams [...]" (*Futūḥāt*, III 198.23) Accordingly, the nature of the cosmos is to be verified truly by the knower as it is a form of imagination, and it needs interpretation like a dream needs interpretation. Moreover, the spectrum of imagination is not restricted with this world: not only the reality of this world as it is manifested to us now but also reality of the *barzakh* after death can be perceived through capabilities of imaginative power (Chittick, 1998, p. 337).

Ibn al-ʿArabī compares sense organs and attributes an in-between situation for imagination too. What happens in the process of sleep and dreams is imaginative power overcoming the animal spirit. Thus although an observer sees a sleeping person, the sleeper manages to experience herself in different realms, under different conditions, e.g. a ruler, in fear, so on although she is a teacher lying safely in her bed:

God appointed for human spirits natural instruments, such as the eye, the ear, the nose, and the palate. He placed within them faculties that He called "hearing", "eyesight", and so forth. He created for these faculties two faces, a face toward the sensory things, the world of the witnessed; and a face toward the Presence of Imagination. He made the presence of imagination an all-embracing locus, more all-embracing than the world of the witnessed. Within this Presence, He assigned a

faculty named “imagination” to many faculties, such as form giving, reflection, memory, fantasy, reason, and so on. Through these faculties the human soul perceives all the objects of knowledge given by realities of these faculties.

Through eyesight’s face toward the world of the witnessed, the soul perceives all sensory things and lifts them up to imagination. It preserves them in imagination through the preserving faculty [memory] after form giving faculty has given form to them. The form giving faculty may take affairs from diverse existent things, all of which are sensory and compound from them an alien shape, the totality of which the soul has never seen in the sensory domain. However, there is no part of it that it has not seen.

When human beings are sleep, eyesight gazes by means of the face that it has toward the world of imagination [...] (Ibn al-‘Arabī *Futūhāt*, III.38.12, tr. Chittick, 1989, p. 338; cf *Asfār*, v.8, p. 248).

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s explanation of imagination is highly influential on Ṣadrā. His alternative explanation of intentionality is built on the creative capacity in human which reflects Ibn al-‘Arabī’s insights on *ḥimma*. The two faces of sense are reminiscent to Ṣadrā’s immaterial explanation of sensation. The discussion on the faculty of imagination concludes with Ibn al-‘Arabī’s notion.

Returning to Avicenna’s classification the next faculty is the *mutakhayyila*. This faculty functions in relation to either intellect (in humans) or estimation (in animals). This is one of the active faculties and it combines different forms and meanings with each other or it separates them. One innovation of Avicenna is claimed to be the next faculty, which is the estimation. This faculty perceives the particular meanings which are not observable or sensible:

We judge on sensibles with meanings we do not sense, they are either [I] not sensible in their nature or [II] they are sensible; however we don’t sense them at the time of the judgement. [I] is such as hostility and inferiority that the sheep perceives from the form of the wolf, and all the meanings that alienates the sheep from the wolf, and the consent that the sheep receives from its owner, and all the meanings that makes the sheep love the owner.

And these are cases for the animal soul, the sense doesn’t lead to any of these cases, or anything like these. Thus, the faculty that perceives these is a different faculty and it is called estimation (*wahm*).

II such as we see something yellow and we judge that it is honey and it is sweet, but we do not derive it from tasting it at the time. This is from the sensible kind however, the judgement itself is not sensible apparently (*ShN* IV.1, p. 166).

The last of the senses, the retentive and the recollective faculty works in relation to estimative faculty. Memory is one of the basic three inner senses Aristotle mentions in *DA*. This is different from sense perception because sensation is for the present whilst memory is related to the past. In the sense that its object is not present and at the present time, it is similar to imagination. Memory too, is related to imprints in the soul. Though, Aristotle differentiates between different types of imprints and as a result, the imprints caused by sensation are different from those of memory. Aristotle makes it clear that memory is a physical faculty. When the agent is in movement the memory becomes. When the person is old, the memory becomes weak due to its relation to the body. Similar to imagination, memory is found in animals. This shows that it is different from the intellect as animals cannot possess intellect (*De Memoria et Reminiscentia/ MR* 449b4-451a1). The material nature of the faculty of memory continues in Avicenna's theory. For Avicenna, memory retains what the estimative faculty perceives of non-sensible intentions existing in individual sensible objects (*Najāt* III, ed. Fakhry, p. 201-2, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 31; *ShN* IV.1, p.169). Two names refer to this faculty, it is named *ḥāfiẓa* because of its preserving of what is in it; and it is *mutadhakkira* for its spread of preparing /capacity them to prove (*ShN* IV.1, p. 167 -8). (*ShN*, IV.3, p. 182ff.) Avicenna makes memory the storehouse of the meanings (*ma'ānī*) whilst it was more materially described by Aristotle as it deals with imprintings.

Now, with the faculty of memory, our quest for the intentionality-related terms ends. Now it is time to give a quick summary of the findings and list the main concepts that will be further used in the next chapter both with a relation to Mullā Ṣadrā and intentionality.

2.5 CONCLUSION

In this historiography chapter, I tried to trace back Brentano's intentionality thesis on the one hand and detect pieces for reconstruction of Mullā Ṣadrā's possible intentionality thesis. The chapter is divided into three main sections as three sections on the soul, sense perception, and imagination. The question of intentionality concerns how people relate to the extra-mental world. In terms of providing the pool of terms common among many ancient and medieval philosophers, Aristotle's *DA* is the centre of most of the discussions. His definition of the soul as the perfection/actualization and form of the body is affirmatively developed after him by some and criticised by some others with a more

immaterial understanding of the soul. Separability and immateriality of the soul is also related to the cognition processes and production of immaterial objects in the mind. One of the interpretations of Neoplatonic approaches to human soul and their cognitive theories in terms of intentionality discussions is as such: When human is regarded as micro cosmos and knowledge is seen as some kind of recollection, this creation is turned into a self-revelation of the cosmos within. Another important idea discussed by Neoplatonists is the substantial change of the soul.

In terms of the cognitive processes, I mainly focused on the sense and imaginative faculties. This is because of the way many scholars constructed their intentionality historiographies. According to these, the common candidates for intentionality are sense perception, imagination, estimation and self-knowledge. So accordingly this chapter scanned different philosophers' related theories starting from and based on Aristotle's *DA*. The question at this stage is what the findings from these philosophers' are. The immaterialist explanations of soul that claims it is different from material beings and that it is something beyond the body are common points between Neoplatonist and Aristotelian explanations of the soul. In that sense, Aristotle, Avicenna and Plotinus, and so on, share the title *dualist* with varying applications of the term. The decider at this point is soul's relation to the body, and how dependent the soul is to the body: Can the soul come to existence without the body; can the soul survive after that it is separated from the body with death? Influence of both traditions is observable in Avicenna's soul as the soul cannot come to existence without certain configuration of the matter is prepared for the specific soul on the one hand. On the other hand, substantiality of the soul as independent and immaterial self is emphasised and chosen over the substantiality of the compound of body and soul. *The flying man argument* is discussed accordingly.

The discussion on sensation brought the question of soul's relation to its activities into the picture. The concepts in *DA* created a literature on what the sensation is together with the notions of medium, proper object, change and the identity thesis. The questions of how active the soul is in the sensation process as well as whether the perception, perceiver and the perceiver are identical, similar or different are proved to be central to examine the nature of sense objects. Since sense objects are members of the set of intentional objects, these two questions will be also part of my reconstruction of Mullā Ṣadrā's intentionality. Another crucial concept for detecting identity of sense object to extra-mental object is the Active intellect which is a central cosmological and epistemological principle for Avicenna.

From the next chapter, I will start the reconstruction of Mullā Ṣadrā's intentionality. I started this chapter trying to create a cluster of intentionality related terms from psychological ancient and medieval texts. Rather than a large set of notions, I ended up with the idea that it is better to take this historiography as exploration of the essential questions for a medieval quest of intentionality. So the questions that are common among these discussions are proved to be primary over the answers and partially more important than the notions. Let me then summarize the essential questions to be extracted from this historiography.

The role of the soul is essential decider on the characterization of a theory of intentionality. What is the soul? What is soul's relation to the extra-mental world, to its own actions, and to the products of its experiences? For example, is the soul active, or is it passive? Centralizing the soul for intentionality might be one of the important consequences of this chapter. Second, how do human beings produce knowledge? Is it a relational process; is it a projection, or internalization? What is the role of extra-mental objects in the process? Are they necessary, or accidental for sensation? Are there any other third agents that play a role in the process of production of forms of perception? What is the relation among perception, perceived and the perceiver? Who or what is the real perceiver? What happens to the internalized object (assuming perception is a internalization of an extra-mental object)? What happens to the soul?

The first step for reconstruction of intentionality is Mullā Ṣadrā's idea of sense perception. The above-mentioned questions will shape the next chapter and my investigation of sensation theory. This will help picture how intentionality takes place on the one hand, and explore nature of intentionality with its relation to mind on the other hand.

3 CHAPTER III

PERCEPTION AND THE SOUL

In the previous chapter, together with Brentano's three claims on intentionality, I tried to follow Brentano's own historiography as a lineage from Aristotle to Brentano. This chapter will investigate Šadrā's notion of intentionality through the process of perception. This will reveal not only the production of intentional objects, but also the nature of the agents of this production, humans.

Intentionality is mainly traced in two large clusters of vocabularies that emerged around "immateriality" and the "mental". Both claims are related to the human being and its relation to the extra-mental world. Brentano's examples from his predecessors give the clue that intentionality can be traced through classical knowledge processes such as sense perception, inner perception and intellection. In its Neoplatonic reading, Aristotle's sense perception occurs as the process of abstracting the immaterial form from the extra-mental sense object through a *non-material* change (Brentano, 1874, 1924-5, 1.124-25).

In terms of the historiography of intentionality, the different interpretations of Aristotle's words seem to have influenced the way in which contemporary researchers wrote their histories of the term. Some started their search for intentionality with Aristotle's concept of *phantasia* (Caston, 1998, p. 254; Sorabji, 2001, p. 60).⁶⁰ Sorabji researched the earlier chapters of *DA* and examined the theory of sensation. He focused particularly on the commentators' more immaterialized reading of Aristotle's sense perception, which I believe is Brentano's reading as well (Sorabji, 1995, pp. 194-226). Some other scholars such as Hedwig, Hasse, and Gyekye focused on the translations of the word *intentio* backwards from Brentano in history. These analysed 'intention' either as it appears in the medieval Latin texts, or in the Arabic texts that gave rise to those Latin translations.⁶¹ This second one resulted in some scholars' emphasis on Avicenna's estimative power when they wanted to discuss the history of intentionality, or in some cases the scholars shifted the discussion to mental existence or issues in logic. The interest in estimation comes with different perspectives. Sorabji's focus on the history of intentionality is on

⁶⁰ See also Caston, Victor, (1998) "Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 249-298, p. 254; Perler, "What are intentional objects? A controversy among early scotists", in *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, pp. 203-226.

⁶¹ See Gutas (2012) on the translation of *ma'na* as intention "The Empiricism of Avicenna", *Oriens* 40, pp. 391-436, at p. 427.

the immateriality of the object, the organ, and the change. So he thinks that it is not Aristotle but the commentators who had a notion of intentionality in the sensation theory. He also mentioned the estimative faculty as a candidate for being a source of intentionality, because its object are the meanings (*maā' nī*) (1991, pp. 236-7). But his general stance is not straightforward; he mentions that he is convinced by Caston that Aristotle's *phantasia* can be seen as the source of some of the features of intentionality (Sorabji, 2001, p. 60). Black considers Hasse to be at the opposite end to the estimative theory as the candidate for intentionality. Hasse, in his detailed analysis of estimative faculty, agrees with Caston that Avicenna is not an essential part of the history of intentionality thesis that ends with Brentano (Hasse, 2000, p. 128). Black remains hesitant about accepting any of the two extremes, and instead seems to take a more comprehensive approach to the topic. In terms of his sensation theory, Avicenna does not have an intentionality theory (Black, 2011, pp. 159-174).

One can also find the reception of Brentano's thesis and define intentionality in accordance with Chisholm's famous criteria that I have mentioned in the introduction: 1- failure of existential commitment, 2- failure of truth functionality, and 3-failure of co-existive expressions (Kaukua, 2007, p. 36). We find these criteria used by Black, Caston and Kaukua. It is interesting to observe the usage of a linguistic criterion even after the linguistic turn has lost its influence on philosophical discussions. Kaukua is aware of the gap between propositions and mental phenomena, yet he is content with the usage of these criteria (Kaukua, 2007, p. 37). Accordingly, he finds that three of the criteria are applicable to Avicenna's estimation. He explores another interesting point about intentionality that self-awareness is an essential part of the discussion (Kaukua, 2007, p. 39). This point is rather surprising when we read Black claiming that consciousness is not an essential part of Avicenna's estimation. Black's claim is based on the fact that estimation is common between animals and humans (Black, 2010, p. 3).

Jacob presents the three principles from Brentano's intentionality. Black formularizes these into four issues: object-directedness; mental existence; consciousness; knowledge of non-existents. In this investigation, I tried to find a comprehensive approach and thus included all levels of cognition in the concept of intentionality. The umbrella term which is used in order to comprehend all intentionality related concepts is "mental existence". This problematization is affirmed by usages and discussions found in Avicennan texts such as: *ShMd* I.2 where Avicenna states that universals do not exist extra-mentally and in *ShI*.I.5 where he talks about impressions "in the soul" (*tartasim fī nafs irtisāman*) and

again in *ShI*. V.1.2 where he talks about different issues related to universals and quiddities.⁶² These usages might have also given rise to Latin usages such as *esse intentionale* and Brentano's *intentional inexistence* or *inner word*. In '*Ibāra*', he expresses the denotation to affections in the soul (*āthār fī-l-nafs*) which brings the ontological and linguistic aspects together (*ShIb*, p. 9). In addition to these points, the centrality of the soul became clear in the historiography chapter. The importance of soul will be duplicated when Ṣadrā is the focus of research.

In order to follow the continuous line of psychology-related discussions from ancient to medieval, the presentation of intentionality is shaped by the very frame of Aristotle's *DA*. The *DA* created an influential literature that affects Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy and framework of psychology in the Islamic world as well.

In this chapter, Ṣadrā's account of external senses will be discussed with two aims. One is to follow the frame provided by the *DA* literature, which is mainly presented by Aristotle and Avicenna. The second is to explore the nature of human beings' relations to the extra-mental world through the process of sense perception. As a result, the plan of the chapter is defined by *DA*'s flow of discussions. In most places in his *Asfār*, Ṣadrā presents the discussions in a similar framework. Aristotle discusses sense perception as a relation of the sense organ to an extra-mental object with a change in the medium and in the sense organ. Aristotle presents some of the first expressions on *the identity theory*. The sense is an actualisation and a change is *happening* on or to the sense organ. In order for this to take place, a special relation is required between the sense organ and the object. Accordingly the concept of *proper objects* emerges. The sense organ, the activity or passivity of the soul and the extra-mental object and the outcome of the perception are four main discussions that compose this chapter. The source of all four discussions is Aristotle's *DA*.

In this chapter, I will give a detailed presentation that summarizes Ṣadrā's own stance in *Asfār*. The production process of the mental objects will then be pursued with the discussions on the inner senses. By the comparative presentation of Ṣadrā's inner senses with that of Avicenna's, it will be clear that the differentiation between inner and external senses is not essential for Mullā Ṣadrā's theory. Even at the level of sensation, the

⁶² In this, I share the intuitions expressed by Deborah Black, (2010) "Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy", <http://individual.utoronto.ca/dlblack/articles/intentions.pdf> accessed: 28.01.2014; Later Medieval Perspectives on Intentionality, special issue of *Quaestio* 10, pp. 65-81.

imagination and the intellect are at work. On the other hand, despite his extreme internalism, Şadrā's progressive understanding of the soul requires that in order for the soul to perfect itself, experience through the external senses is necessary. Thus we find an immaterialized explanation of the senses together with a *unified* and *monist* understanding of the soul. In this account the notion of soul is freed from the duality of matter and form. In Şadrā's theory, in place of the multiplicity of senses, we rather find that the unity of the soul is the main issue.

3.1 EXTERNAL SENSES

The *DA* can be said to dominate psychology discussions in the Middle Ages, and sense perception is one important part of it. This is partly because Aristotle posits sense perception as the basis for knowledge. Another reason for the importance of sense theories is that the nature of explanation (being materialist or immaterialist) is dependent on one's philosophical proclivities to Aristotelian or Platonic approaches. For the present investigation, sense perception is important as it is a bridge between the mental and the extra-mental. Intentional objects can be formulated as a question about the objects of perception. In the previous chapter I discussed two central definitions of sensation: *abstraction* and *actualization*. In terms of the nature of a relation to the extra-mental world, peripatetic theory's material tendency is observed in the causal explanation of sensation by the soul's passivity and the triggering power of the extra-mental object. As well as the necessity of the extra-mental object, the change in the medium (in Aristotle's case) and in the sense organ (addition of relation to nerves and centrality of brain in Avicenna) proved this materialist tendency further. The main language is based on a hylomorphic cosmology and epistemology. In Avicenna's philosophy, cosmology and epistemology are connected through a developed notion of the active intellect and of a human being's ability to connect with it (rather than unite with it). The success of Avicenna's hylomorphic language is dependent on a second point other than the active intellect. It is that the quiddity is informative and is the basis of knowledge. For example, knowledge of an object is possible in this approach through the knowledge of the quiddity of that object without knowledge of the particular properties of it. Abstraction and knowledge are a simple transportation of forms from extra-mental object to the human mind. And both forms are in their essence identical to their form in the active intellect. The reason behind this identity is that they are given by the active intellect.

In contrast to Aristotle's causal account, sensation is not triggered by the extra-mental sense object for Şadrā. The sensation is an internal and immaterial process.

Someone should not say: The perceptive faculty though not existent in these organs but it has the instruments, so when the attention of the soul is driven to the eye, it sees, and to the ear it hears. For we say: When the soul is attentive to the tongue, then does the tongue perceive the taste? Or to the skin—when the skin is beaten—is it in pain or not? If it perceives then our objective has been obtained. But if it does not perceive then it entails that the perception is not particular to the tongue, rather [instead of] the tongue [the soul] becomes [attentive] to the hand in its being the tool for the taste [and then perceives the taste] (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 274-5; tr. Peerwani, p. 202).

Sense object, medium (more central in Aristotle than in Avicenna), and the sense organ are important in Peripatetic theory. The object of the perception for Ṣadrā, on the contrary, is internal and its presence is different from *imprinting*. He continues to use the same terminology. However, he changes the frame at times, or expresses them with more spiritual application of the terms. Here is an example to how he shifts the usage of proper objects to a more immaterial one by change of the frame:

The intelligent ones by the self-evident [knowledge] of their intellects perceive that the perception of the objects of sight is obtained in the sight and not in other than it, and the sensation of the sounds is obtained in the ear and not in other than it. Also, the self-evident [knowledge] judges that the tongue is not the organ of sight, and the eye is not the organ of taste. It also judges that the tongue is [the organ of] taste and the eye is [the organ of] sight (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 274; tr. Peerwani, p. 201).

[A]ccording to minute [or subtle] reflection the sensible in essence is the form which is present with the soul and not something extra-mental corresponding to it (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 238 ; tr. Peerwani, p. 174).

The notion of a medium continues to appear in the similar fashion and the notion is used with a more spiritual meaning of the word and now related to illuminative relation (*iḍāfa ishrāqiyya*):

It has been discussed earlier that the contact between the two [i.e., the seer and the object of sight] though not a necessity, nevertheless it is necessary that there be either the object of contact, or the existence of a corporeal intermediary between the two by which both the intermediary and the passive object are under the rule of one body, some receiving the effect because of the existence of aptitude in it, and some not

receiving [the effect] due to the non-existence of aptitude (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 235; tr. Peerwani, p. 173).

[T]he “illuminative relation” is appropriate [to be called] the relation between the agent of form and its essence. This relation, as we have established, is realized in the vision between the soul and the form emanating from it on itself [or its essence] (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 214; tr. Peerwani, p. 159).

Not only is the sensation an immaterial process, but also its agent is not the organ any longer. In this explanation the real actor is the soul:

Also, the intelligent ones by the self-evident [knowledge] of their intellects know that the seer is not the eye, nor the hearer the ear, nor the speaker the gullet, but it is the man who is the hearer, the seer and the speaker (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 275; tr. Peerwani, p. 202).

In this immaterialist account of sensation the sense organs are merely tools and faculties for the soul. Ṣadrā explains the soul’s need for these tools with a metaphor about glasses. The fact that one needs glasses to see better does not entail that the glasses are the seer (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 276; tr. Peerwani, p. 203). Unlike many philosophers of his time, Ṣadrā thinks that the soul can interact with the world herself and she can perceive particulars. As part of this approach, the soul plays an active role in the production of sensation. Following Aristotle’s idea of change, the change that is supposed to occur in the sense organ is carried by the soul. The contrasting peripatetic notion of passivity is best described by Aquinas:

A sense is a passive power, meant to be in action by a sense object external to it. This outside source of internal change is the per se object of sense perception and where it differs the nature of sense power differs (Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.78.3, v.11, p. 131).

If perception is thought to be a passive process, then the mind can be considered as some form of a container. In line with his denial of a passive process, Ṣadrā redefines the mind. The mind is the soul’s ability to acquire knowledge that has not yet been attained (Chittick, 2002, pp. 220, 221). One can think of the mind as a *tabula rasa* which is being filled and shaped by the perceptions and experiences: “the soul is the same as its perceptions and the things that are known (*al-naḥsu maḥallun li-mudrikāt wa-ma’lūmāt*) (MQ, p. 51)”. In terms of their ontological place, since the soul is the same as its

experiences, existence of the sensibles are dependent on the soul, and they occupy a realm of imagination.

Rather, [according to us] it is through the subsistence of its form by the perceiver (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 277; tr. Peerwani, p. 204).

[K]now that every sensible perception's subsistence is by the imaginative perception, and every imaginative perception's subsistence is by the intellection. Also, if a sense separates from the intellect it cannot exist, for its existence without the intelligence is not possible (*Asfār*, v.8, pp. 239-40; tr. Peerwani, p. 176).

What is sensed is an abstracted form. In this manner, Mullā Ṣadrā's sensible form and the Peripatetics' sensible form appear to have the same feature of *being abstracted*. According to the Peripatetic explanation of vision, for example, the sensible forms are abstracted by the human, while in Mullā Ṣadrā's vision the abstracted forms emanate from a purer realm than the extra-mental material world.

Perception in general does not take place – as the well-known doctrine of majority of the philosophers states-by the perceptual faculty's abstraction of the perceptible form itself from matter and encountering it along with its enveloping material attachments –since it has been established that forms imprinted in matter cannot move locally... *Perception occurs because the giver [...] bestows another psychic and luminous cognitive form, thanks to which perception or knowledge arises. This form is the actual sentient and the actual sensible at the same time. As for form-in-matter, it is neither sentient nor sensible, but is only a condition (or occasion) for the emanation of that (actually cognized) form* (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 212-13, tr. Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 224).

Imagination is dependent on the activity of intellect. Following that lineage, sensation is then dependent on the intellect. What is more, Ṣadrā claimed that the sensibles are intelligibles: “Now every sensible is an intelligible, in the sense the intellect perceives it in reality” (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 240, tr. Peerwani, p. 176). The correspondence is transformed into a mental relation. The forms are created by the imagination and for this reason no sensation becomes complete without the intervention of imagination. In this frame, the created forms are particular existents:

If the sense [of sight] perceives an external form, such as a square having two squares one on each side in a particular relation externally—that shape being existent externally only with the external detached

material accidents extraneous to the quiddity of the square as a creation and an existence, for it is existent in the matter receptive to division—then it is *for the imagination to make a form corresponding [to the external form]* which is either similar to it, or different from it. [This it does] by one simple making, and [the form produced] resembles the external [sensible] in dimensions and positions (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 282; tr. Peerwani, p. 209).

Like many aspects of his psychology, Ṣadrā's active understanding of the perceptive soul is reminiscent of some Neoplatonic approaches. Despite this similarity, Plotinus is separated from Ṣadrā's monism by a dualist approach to the cognitive processes. According to Plotinus, the purely immaterial soul is never subject to change (Steel, 1978, p. 157). Yet, in contrast to Plotinus, another Neoplatonist, Iamblichus challenges this idea, applying idea of change to the soul (Steel, 1978, p. 156,157).

The presentation in the above mentioned paragraph from *Asfār* can be treated with some suspicion. Firstly, on the one hand, Mullā Ṣadrā eliminated the imprinting theory and abstraction process, while on the other, the soul still ends up having an abstracted form. This abstracted form, however, is different from the extra-mental object present for perception. How can the soul then create a form correlating with the extra-mental object if the form does not come from it? Apart from this isolation from the extra-mental world, another problem occurs: how can the soul create a sensible form while it is itself immaterial? Mullā Ṣadrā claims that *the identity principle* is the key. The soul creates an immaterial form whilst it confronts the extra-mental object and becomes one with it (Hāshim Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī Ḥasan, 2009, pp. 133-6). This creation cannot be an act of the sense faculties alone: "[E]very sense perception's subsistence is by the imaginative perception, and every imaginative perception's subsistence is by the intellection (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 240, tr. Peerwani, p. 176)." Ṣadrā's sensation is never complete without the intervention of the imagination. Consequently, we need imagination for the creation of forms as well as for the reception of them. This intervention of the imagination is the reason why Ṣadrā's theory is built on an activity of the soul. If not for this, one would suspect that his sensation is even more passive than the peripatetic approach. However, with the act of the soul, every sensation is an active construction of the soul. This explanation is, however, not satisfactory.

According to Ṣadrā, the substantial change even at the lowest level of knowledge is made possible with a further principle: the principle of substantial motion. This is an original

idea because change in substance is radically anti-Aristotelian and anti-Avicennan. According to them, change can only occur in the four categories of quality, quantity, place and position (McGinnis, 2010, pp. 84-7, Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b32-4a5). Substantial change is an important principle to understand Mullā Ṣadrā's theory of the nature of the soul.⁶³ Thanks to this idea of substantial change, we find a unique explanation of a human's nature which goes beyond dualist or materialist explanations.

Simply by virtue of the fact that a human can be unified with its objects of perception, the knowledge process changes her and knowledge occurs as a substantial movement. The lowest levels of perception are not excluded from such change in the human and in their identity. The essential change that the soul undergoes even at the lowest levels of knowledge engenders a different approach to knowledge itself. Knowledge is the process in which the soul travels from a material being into an immaterial one. A further claim is also made: that knowledge is indeed a mode of existence. Both the knowledge is a level of existence and with the knowledge the soul changes and travels to a different level of existence. Thus, through knowledge the soul changes in its essence. And with the identity principle, the soul is nothing but the things that it perceives:

All of man's real perceptions and all of his knowledge, intelligible or sensible... are not separable from its existence and distinct from its existence. But its precept is essentially just its very existence (*Shawāhid*, p. 203, tr. Darebidy, 2002, p. 177).

Each level of knowledge is a level of existence according to Ṣadrā. This can be combined with his views on psychology, namely that the soul is the very things that it perceives. The result is that each experience is a level of the human soul. Accordingly, Ṣadrā says:

The investigation is, the soul has three modalities of being—intellective, imaginative and sensory. It has the unification with intellect, imagination and senses. So the soul at its perception of the sensibles becomes precisely the same as the senses (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 278; tr. Peerwani, p. 205).

This presentation is interesting for many reasons. One of the striking issues is Ṣadrā's immaterialization of the process. This is related to my claim that Ṣadrā is a hard-core internalist and monist. Moreover, this approach has implications that break the dichotomy of material-immaterial. Let us remember the centrality of sensation for animal soul. Even

⁶³ For an elaborate discussion of Ṣadrā's notion of *tashkīk* in relation to substantial change, see Rizvi, 2003, p. 233.

for Plotinus as well as for Avicenna, the faculties related to the animal are considered as material. When sensation is presented as an immaterial case, then the aforementioned state of the animal's soul as material becomes at risk. Either the animal faculties in human and animal are going to be considered as being different, and as a result, it will be material in one and immaterial in the other; or the animal soul will be considered as immaterial too. Şadrā chooses the second stance and devotes a section to show that the animal soul is immaterial (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 45ff, tr. Peerwani, p. 33ff).

Let me summarize the sensation theory presented so far. The abstracted form, the internalized essence of the extra-mental object, is not wholly informative. Şadrā rejects a definition of knowledge based on the quiddity. The definition is changed into *creation of forms in the soul*. What is more, Şadrā reports that the sensed forms are different from the forms of the extra-mental object. This is related to the process in which sensation takes place. Sense perception is no longer described as the abstraction or imprinting of forms (*MQ*, p. 54). Rather, it is a process of construction that takes place with the power given by Allah. The agent of the sense is not the sense organ, but the soul: “The soul is not simply the receiver of those forms. Rather it is the active [agent] (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 281, tr. Peerwani, p. 208).”

The form is defined differently from the peripatetic tradition because the form of the sense perception does not directly come from the sensed object. Thus, in Mullā Şadrā's epistemology, it is no longer the form of the extra-mental object that the human derives during the process. The object is both given to the human and created in the human. In the sense that the object is created in the human, the sensed and the sensing agent are the same (*MQ*, pp. 36-8; Kalin, 2010, p. 153). The identity is different from the Aristotelian approach. The object obtained during perception is different from the extra-mental object. Human beings appear to have both a creative and a passive status at this level. Moreover, the human soul undergoes some sort of change due to this creation. The idea is that the forms are effused (*şudūr*) from the soul. All these points require a different approach from that of peripatetic epistemology and psychology. Another point about this definition is about the description of sensation as construction, rather than “reception”.

Before going into details about each sense, a brief explanation on the relation of the senses would be helpful to understand Şadrā's unified understanding of the soul. The idea of a hierarchy among the senses together with a discussion on the type of relationship among the senses is part of the classical literature of sensation theory. In *Najāt*, Avicenna examines how some faculties rule others, and how each faculty serves as part of a system

(*Najāt* VI, p. 37; ed. Fakhry, pp. 206-7).⁶⁴ He follows Fārābī's approach and he starts the hierarchy with the higher intellects.⁶⁵ The highest in the hierarchy is the holy intellect (*al-ʿaql al-qudsī*) followed by the actual intellect (*al-ʿaql bi-l-fiʿl*), and later by habitual intellect (*al-ʿaql bi-l-malaka*) and lastly material intellect (*al-ʿaql al-hayūlānī*) follows. The intellect which is lower than the material intellect is the practical intellect (*al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī*). The inner and the external senses are connected with these higher intellects (*ittiṣāl*) rather than united with them (*ittiḥād*). The hierarchy among the human senses are listed in the order of estimation (*wahm*), cognitive imagination (*mutakhayyila*) and imagination (*khayāl*), and common sense (*phantasia*). All five external senses serve *phantasia*. The hidden assumption behind the notion of rank and hierarchy is that some faculties are more immaterial than others. Immateriality here can mean that the nature of the process is more immaterial or that the objects that the faculties interact with are more immaterial. Suhrawardī makes the hierarchy important among external senses as well and centralizes vision (*HI*, p. 133; Marcotte, 2000, p. 138). Marcotte argues that Suhrawardī had developed a vision theory with two levels: one level of vision is material and the other immaterial. The immaterial vision is a higher form of knowledge which is a form of direct knowledge as well. The higher and direct sense perceives beyond the limits of material forms.

Kāshānī, whose *Jāwidan-nāma* is translated into Arabic by Mullā Ṣadrā as *Iksīr*, connects the hierarchy of senses to the order of the world and combines cosmology with psychology. As a result, he adds a gnostic dimension to the relation of the senses. The human is viewed as a microcosm (*Iksīr*, p. 42). Each sense is a messenger without awareness or knowledge (*Iksīr*, p. 24). This point is different from Aristotle, who claims that the perception of perception either automatically comes together with the sense itself, or with the common sense. In the first case, the sense organ is identical to the perception (*DA* II.12, 424a24-5). Ṣadrā's perception occurs with the soul's command and awareness, thus it is hard to differentiate between awareness and perception. But in the sense that the attention of the soul is prior to the sensation as its trigger, perception and awareness of perception are separable in Ṣadrā's theory.

⁶⁴ All references are from Fazlurrahman's translation which corresponds to the sixth article of the second section of *Najāt* (pp. 196-232 in Majid Fakhry ed. (1982)). the roman numbers refer to chapter numbers in Fazlurrahman's translation. For example I. p. 24 would correspond to II.6.1, p. 196 in Fakhry's edition.

⁶⁵ Fārābī's systematic approach is also a cornerstone for this literature and it is important to show how parallel different disciplines for a systematic philosopher can be. Fārābī's hierarchy is representative of the totality of society and its parts, so this hierarchy, set in a theory of soul, is applicable to ontology and moreover to political philosophy. For a detailed discussion on Fārābī, see Davidson, 1992, pp. 49-52.

One important aspect of Kāshānī's gnostic attitude is that the multiplicity of senses is drawn together within the unity of the soul (*Iksīr*, p. 25). Šadrā's cosmology is filled with conscious beings, be they animal or plant. A hierarchy is assumed due to a being's intensity of existence. Elements at the lowest stage of the hierarchy are followed by plants and then animals.

Know that God created the substance of plant from the earthly substances. It is more perfect in existence than the elements, [and solids such as] stone and mud, and also more perfect than the mineral substances such as iron, copper, etc. That is because He created in it [i.e. in the substance of plant] the faculty which can attract food to the direction of its trunk and roots in the earth. He prepared for it the tools and faculties which are its servants (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 183, tr. Peerwani, p. 135).

The different elements and faculties in each being is also differentiated and regarded at a level according to the being they are in.

The nutritive faculty is existent in the plant, but is not prepared to receive the sensation and movement, we say: The nutritive faculty in plant is different in quiddity from the nutritive faculty in animal, just as animality in all animals is different in quiddity from the animality in man. Generally the cause of that is, the aspect of potency negates the aspect of actuality. If a form becomes powerful in its actuality and existence, the matter becomes perfect by it, and its essence becomes complete by that form, then its preparedness to receive another form becomes invalid due to the intensity of the existence of the form. But if the form is weak in being, is between sheer actuality and pure potency, then it does not prevent the matter to receive another form more [perfect] than it (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 178, tr. 132).

Unlike the tradition, a hierarchical approach to the senses does not appear to be essential for Šadrā. This is mainly because all faculties are considered to be tools of the soul and the soul is regarded as the real perceiver. And this is another reflection of monism in his philosophy. Senses help perfection of each other and perfection of the substantial being that they are part of (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 184-186). The lowest and most common sense among animals is touch. Šadrā connects intuitive acts such as looking for food with this sense rather than memory. Touch in its role for the search of food needs another sense for its perfection, i.e. smell. With this a couple of distant objects will be perceivable for the

animals. The search also requires a sense of direction which comes with another sense, sight. The relation of the senses continues in a similar fashion to what will be given below. Šadrā seems to be applying the Neoplatonic notion of simplicity to the senses as well. So we observe another application of Šadrā over the allegedly material parts of the psychology discussions and comfortably refer to these material entities as immaterial. Each sense becomes *perfected* and comprehends the others below it. Let me give the rest of Šadrā's text explaining the interaction of the senses further:

Hence the sense of sight has been created for it in order to perceive [the things] which are at a distance from it, to perceive its direction by its eyes and endeavour to reach that direction. But despite [having the sense of sight] the animal is *imperfect* because it cannot perceive what is behind the walls and behind the obstacles, so it can neither see the food which is veiled from it, nor an animal hidden from it. At times the obstacle may not be lifted except after the enemy has come near [to it], but then it is not possible for it to flee from it. So the sense of hearing has been created for it by which it can perceive the sounds from behind the walls when they are in movements (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 185, tr. Peerwani, p. 135-6).

We also observe that Šadrā uses functions of different senses interchangeably. Fear of the enemy is commonly related to estimative faculty. Here he relates it to hearing the sounds that are related to danger. Moreover, the search for food and the notions of *agreeable* and *disagreeable* are connected to the sense of taste eventually. Both notions are unconventional occurring in a discussion of external senses, as they are more close to *meanings* in peripatetic discussions, meanings that are exclusively objects of estimation.

Now all [those faculties] would not benefit us or animals if there were no faculty of taste. Without it, if the food reaches [the mouth] it is not perceived whether it is agreeable or disagreeable [to the health of the animal], for if it eats [something disagreeable] then it may be destroyed [by that food]. Like a tree in whose roots all kinds of liquid is poured. It has no [faculty of] taste, so it absorbs all of that [liquid] which at times becomes a cause of its drying up. Further, all those [senses] are not enough for it if another [organ of] perception called *sensus communis* were not created in the frontal lobe of the brain to which come the sense perceptions of five [senses], and are collected in it. If it were not there then every affair for the animal would take long, resulting in its destruction. Some insects like moth etc., due to the

absence of [this] internal sense fall again and again on the fire and are harmed by it. If it had [the faculties of] imagination and retention of what it had sensed the first time, it would not return to that by which it was harmed once. Despite having [the *sensus communis* an animal] is imperfect because it is not possible for it to be cautious of that which it does not perceive by the [external senses]. For as long as an animal is not harmed by a thing, it does not comprehend that it should be cautious of it (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 185, tr. Peerwani, p. 135).

If any hierarchical relation is to be found to be important for Ṣadrā, it is mainly about the locus of the faculties, as in the example of nutrition in plants being higher than that in humans. A second way to find hierarchy is found in a similar fashion to Suhrawardī's material and immaterial visions, Ṣadrā has the idea of lower and higher levels of senses. Yet this idea occurs in his theory more in relation to a human being's journey in perfection. The more perfected a human is the higher and more delicate her faculties become. This approach is quite Neoplatonic. I will give further details in the specific discussions on the senses. Let it suffice for now to say that the higher and lower senses are considered in a monist fashion. The journey of the soul connects all the experience of the soul, including that of sense perception. Since the soul starts the journey of life in corporeal form, the external senses are an essential part of it: indeed it is the very beginning. Now that I have explained the general sensation theory, I will discuss the details in which more about Ṣadrā's original sensation theory can be revealed.

3.2 MULLĀ ṢADRĀ AND THE EXTERNAL SENSES

In the previous section of this chapter, I talked about the main discussions in *DA* and Mullā Ṣadrā's basic principles related to the sensation theory. Let me now carry on with each particular external sense to see how Mullā Ṣadrā applies his basic principles and the general idea of sense to the particular senses. I will follow the order of presentation in *Asfār* and *Shifā*, which is the reverse order to Aristotle's *DA* and its translations.

Faculty of touch is the primary sense. This means that most of the other senses can be explained in relation to touch. Moreover, it is the most common among animals, thus no animal lacks the sense of touch (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 135; *Mabāḥith*, p. 279; *ShST*, tr. McGinnis, p. 67). According to him, this is mainly due to the need for this faculty, which is similar to the urge for things that are good for the body and the ability to avoid the danger. Still, the will to avoid the dangerous is stronger than the will to move towards food. This is because the latter becomes possible with the help of other senses. This shows that touch is the first of all the senses as well as the most common of all. He agrees with Avicenna and Aristotle on this idea of touch being the most common sense among animals (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 188; *DA*, II. 2.413b5; *ShST*, II.3, tr. McGinnis, p. 67).

In terms of the presentation of external senses and connecting them to each other, we find that the *Paraphrase of DA* and the Persian translation by Kashānī⁶⁶ include the faculty of vision mentioned in the discussion of all external senses. In these, some similarity to the faculty is mentioned for each of the other external senses. In Ṣadrā's presentation however, he links each sense mainly to the sense of touch. This latter is in a similar fashion to the Greek version of the *DA*, where he somehow explains their functions as a way of touching. With his illuminationist tendency this might be a surprise. However, I think there are two reasons for this in *Asfār*. First, Ṣadrā presents all the topics in *Asfār* in a parallel way to their original discussions in the texts of Aristotle or Avicenna. Even when Ṣadrā has a completely different stance, as in the case of categories, or inner senses, he first gives the peripatetic stance in great detail. Second, as the soul starts its journey as a material substance, the need for touch and the primacy of touch only in this sense might be an expected move from his philosophy. This does not mean that vision is ranked lower as a sense. The primacy of touch here is not in terms of its rank.

Following the discussion in the relevant chapter, Mullā Ṣadrā shares Avicenna's idea that touch is extended to the whole body whereas Aristotle thinks that the organ of touch is

⁶⁶ 39. Mullā Ṣadrā, Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirāzī (2003) *The Elixir of the Gnostics*, (tr.) W. C. Chittick (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University)

deep in the flesh and the skin is the medium for touch (Ḥasan, Hāshim Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī, 2009, p. 122; *DA*, II.11.423b23-30). In its Arabic paraphrase it is mentioned that the flesh is the organ of touch (*Paraphrase*, p. 281). Avicenna seems to combine the medium and the organ and says that the organ of touch is the skin and the flesh. Perception takes place through the nerves rooted in the flesh (*Najāt* II, pp. 26-27; *ShN*.II.3, pp.68-9). Mullā Ṣadrā claims that the faculty of touch is spread all over the body because the animal body is from the genus of a matter qualified with tangibility (*malmūṣah*). The genus of the perceiver is the same as the perception (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 188). This is a similar case to Aristotle where he defines senses according to their potentialities of being qualified with the quality of their sense object. So, because all the body has tangibility (the potentiality) then the whole body can receive forms of objects of touch. Mullā Ṣadrā defends this case for other senses too. In the case of vision, because objects of vision are light, the perceiver of this should be unified with the object in its essence (so the self should be related to light as the agent of vision). The organs of the body are, however, not lights (potentially or actually). Thus the light of sight cannot travel through the body as it is not transparent. Body and the other senses, such as hearing, tasting and even the internal senses, are like the case of vision. The whole body cannot be the organs of these senses due to the principle of identity of the perceiver and the perceived (*ittihād al-mudrik wa-l-mudrak*) (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 189). Here, then, together with Aristotle’s claim about proper sense objects, we see another application of the unity of knower and known on the senses. However, the real identity occurs in the soul and sensation is in essence an immaterial process.

This implies another feature of touch. All objects possess contact points, and due to having contact points they are all potentially objects of touch. However, not every object can be a proper object for hearing or taste (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 190). This recalls the idea of proper objects in Aristotle, where each sense starts acting only when their proper objects come on the scene and cause some kind of affection in the proper sense organ. The idea that, “the genus of the perceiver is of the same genus of the perception” allows Mullā Ṣadrā to claim that the organs for imagination, estimation and other inner senses cannot be the brain as well. This is important for demonstrating the stance of Mullā Ṣadrā regarding the immateriality of inner senses. Mullā Ṣadrā does not exclude external senses from immateriality. According to him, external senses, too, are activities of the soul. The above discussion he made about vision and other senses about identity is to show that the body or the organs are not enough to explain the process of the senses and that the soul is

the real perceiver. The role of external objects together with the role of sense organs is almost reduced to an accidental necessity:

Thus, for example, the heat which is felt in essence is not what is found –for example, fire- in the body which is adjacent to the organ in contact, nor even what is in the heated and so called touching limb. Rather, it is in another form, hidden from this world, occurring in that state of being proper to the soul, which perceives it through its power of touch (*Wisdom of the Throne*, 1981, pp. 133-4).

According to this, the line between external and internal senses seems to be very thin in that the difference seems to be that external senses have an accidental relation to their extra-mental objects. The assimilation theory of Aristotle is still present in this version of sense theory, but the forms of the extra-mental objects do not seem to be merely abstracted from the received objects and the received forms are no longer identical to their source (*Asfār*, v.8, pp. 212-13).

Going back to explaining the sense of touch, another issue related to touch is the multiplicity of touch. Mullā Ṣadrā gives space to the problem related to varieties of senses of touch, and whether there is one or more than one sense of touch. This problem is introduced in Aristotle's *DA*:

It is a problem whether touch is a single sense or a group of senses. It is also a problem, what is the organ of touch; is it or is it not the flesh (including what in certain animals is analogous to flesh)? On the second view, flesh is the medium of touch, the real organ being situated farther inward. Every sense seems to be concerned with a single pair of contraries, white and black for sight, sharp and flat for hearing, bitter and sweet for taste; but in the field of what is tangible we find several such pairs, hot cold, dry moist, hard soft, etc. (Aristotle, *DA* II.11.422b19-20, 23-7; *Paraphrase*, pp. 277, 281, 285; Badawi, *Aristū fī-l-naḥs*, pp. 59, 60).

The claim is that there are four different kinds of touch: one working on hot and cold; one on humid and dry, one on hard and soft, and one on smooth and coarse (*DA* II.11.422b17; Avicenna, *ShN* I.5, pp. 42-43). According to Mullā Ṣadrā, this situation proves only that the organ of touch on its own should be free from any one of these and their contraries so that any one of them and their contrary situations can be attributed on the organ (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 190).

There is an interesting section in which Mullā Ṣadrā argues for awareness of plants and minerals due to some of their movements. This is in reference to Aristotle's discussion on differentiating the animal and the vegetative soul through the notions of *mean* and *assimilation* (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 191; *DA* 424a30; *Paraphrase*, p. 287 (12) ff).⁶⁷ Ṣadrā's monist ontology requires homogeneity of consciousness as well as other features of *wujūd*. In terms of contemporary approaches, this makes him close to panpsychist theories according to which all things possess consciousness. The monist approach is the argument that everything is regarded under an extended notion of matter (Strawson, G., 2008, pp. 24, 36). Ṣadrā's approach in this section is important because his stance is different from the common approach of the Peripatetics and also rejected by the *mutakallimīn* like Rāzī (Rāzī, *Mabāḥith*, v.2, p. 279). He finds awareness in all existents, even in non-living things such as stones. This proves that his cosmology is different from Avicenna's in essence. It demonstrates the monist tendency in his ontology.

[A]nd you should say: we do not know that animals perceive the sensible and that they are aware apart from their moving towards the things they want and avoid those they do not want. So much so that the deficient animals like spongy ones and pearl oyster do move with closing and opening voluntarily. If we did not observe this movement from them, we would not know that they have faculty of touch. If the situation were like this, we definitely found similar things to this in elements and in plants as well. The earth moves away from high into the low in one direction. Fire moves away from low to high in one direction.

And when the flowing fire is put a hindrance on its direction of movement, it turns away from the hindrance to another direction. But it does not go lower and it carries on climbing from other directions which have no hindrance. Plants are likewise, when there is a hindrance before their growing or moving, they deviate from the hindrance and tend to another direction from the shadowy to the sunny side...

⁶⁷ "A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated. The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same. What perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude; what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude. This enables us to explain why excesses in objects of sense destroy the organs of sense; if the movement set up by an object is too strong for the organ, the form which is its sensory power is disturbed; it is precisely as concord and tone are destroyed by too violently twanging the strings of a lyre. This explains also why plants cannot perceive, in spite of their having a portion of soul in them and being affected by tangible objects themselves; for their temperature can be lowered or raised. The explanation is that they have no *mean*, and so no principle in them capable of taking on the forms of sensible objects but are affected together with their matter." *DA* II.12.424a24-424b19

All these are proof for their awareness of wanted and unwanted things
(*Asfār*, v.8, p. 191).

Accordingly, even the elements show signs of consciousness by the way they move. When they are forced into situations unwanted by them, they change direction. Šadrā's examples include fire, the simplest plants, and so on not only in terms of a denial of consciousness, but also in regards to voluntary action. The position of the Peripatetics is quite the opposite.

Aristotle, for example, denies that plants have perception simply because they are not changed in a certain way by the objects of sense; in other words, the imprinting of forms does not take place. See, for example, the discussion in *DA* II.12 onwards:

This explains also why plants cannot perceive, in spite of their having a portion of soul in them and being affected by tangible objects themselves; for their temperature can be lowered or raised. The explanation is that they have no *mean*, and so no principle in them capable of taking on the forms of sensible objects but are affected together with their matter

Šadrā accepts some level of awareness and consciousness and even perception for plants. However, he does not think that all of the plants can receive forms. During this discussion, Mullā Šadrā also shows that he does not totally reject the *mizāj* explanation of Avicenna. He, too, accepts that a being's capacity to receive awareness depends on their balance in their *mizāj*. He says that the reason plants have less awareness is the presence of contradictory elements in them such as fire and water (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 192). Even so, in his explanation, everything including minerals is in a constant and voluntary movement towards their perfection.

Taste is the second of the senses after touch, simply because it is the awareness of the body for the things from which it will benefit. Whenever the need for food increases, its perception reaches its highest level. It is also the most similar to touch (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 193; *Paraphrase*, p. 275; Avicenna, *ShN*, II.4, p. 75). Unlike other senses, air does not play the role of medium for taste (*Paraphrase*, p. 275).

Contact is one of the conditions for taste due to this similarity. However, contact or touch is not enough for taste to occur: the tongue, the organ of taste, is the second requirement for taste to take place, together with the medium of the moistness of saliva (*Asfār*, v.8, pp. 193-4). One issue about taste is that the organ of taste should be free and not be

qualified strongly with a taste, as this will weaken its sharpness in perception. However, moistness being qualified with taste is not enough:

For something external to the body cannot be a place of awareness of the soul. Because the natural connection is not obtainable to the soul except through the relation to the body and its faculties, and not through that which is outside the management of the soul and its control. The soul is united in some kind of unification with its faculties and their tools. That is why the existence of anything in them is identical to its existence for the soul. The perception consists of the existence of perceptible thing to the perceiver. So inevitably, the soul becomes aware of an existence by which the body and its faculties get qualified, and not of that which is outside of it. (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 194; tr. Peerwani, p. 143).

For Aristotle, the object of taste is *flavour*. The tongue is the medium whereby the assimilation takes place. For Mullā Ṣadrā, the object of the taste (*madhūq*) is not the quality of taste that occurs in the object of taste. It is neither the quality of taste in the moistness of saliva nor of that on the tongue. The taste object is, rather, the form that is related to taste (*ṣūrat al-dhawqiyya*) that occurs in the faculty of taste (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 195). Mullā Ṣadrā compares the relation of this faculty and the form to the relation of matter to form and the relation of potential intellect to active intellect. This similarity is not restricted to the faculty of taste, but also applicable to the other faculties: “The real object of sense is the particular form produced (*ḥāṣila*) for the soul by the faculty of sense” (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 195).

This point is quite important as we see now that *the real object of sensation is no longer the extra-mental object* that starts the sense perception; the form received is neither the form of the original extra-mental object nor the abstracted form of the Peripatetics. The form is produced for the soul and emanates from it. When it comes to quantity, taste has numerous objects. These, however, are not of different kinds as it had been the case for touch. Thus, with a more homogenous kind of numerous objects, taste – just like touch – is not a cluster of faculties, but a single faculty (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 195; *Paraphrase*, p. 277; Rāzī, p. 281).

Third after touch and taste is *the faculty of smell*. It is a more delicate sense than the first two senses. Mullā Ṣadrā regards the inner parts of the nostrils or nose as the organ of smell: “The objects of perception of this faculty are the odours reaching the nostrils by

the air qualitatively changed by meeting [the odours]” (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 197; *Paraphrase*, p. 273). Just like taste, contact is a requirement for smell to take place; this equally relates smell to the sense of touch. However, smell is more delicate than both taste and touch.

An interesting point about smell is brought up at the end of the chapter on smell. A human being has a better ability to perceive delicate odours than animals when they are closer to the smell. However, they cannot capture it in a detailed way, instead they can name the odours in general as good or bad ones (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 198; *Paraphrase*, p. 271; *DA* 421a22-23). There is a more important link between the human’s sense of smell and a human being’s experience of higher things. Mullā Ṣadrā accepts the Neoplatonic claim that celestial spheres have a special smell and a faculty of smell (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 198-199).

In contrast to the Peripatetics’ position that celestial spheres do not have air to maintain the condition of contact for smell, Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with mystics saying that that world is not conditioned by the physical world’s laws. Dreams, according to him, are another proof that a human can experience that sort of smell (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 199). Assigning a special ability of connection to the dreams is not unique to Ṣadrā. We have seen Ibn al-‘Arabī’s explanation of dreams in the previous chapter. According to Ibn al-‘Arabī, thanks to dreams and the faculty of imagination, the soul perceives objects which are not material (Chittick, 1989, p. 115).

Continuing with the senses, the next station is **the sense of hearing**. Hearing is the perception of sound. “The sensible is the sound subsisting by the air compressed between the two objects, one striking and the other being struck only (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 200)”. Mullā Ṣadrā quotes three clusters of issues discussed before him.

The first issue relates to how hearing occurs (*Asfār*, v.8, pp. 200-1). Some people claim that hearing does not occur unless air between two objects, one striking and the other one being struck, takes place. This compressed air transmits sound to the nerves which are all over the cavity of the ear hole. This process, according to them indicates some consequences about hearing; one of these is that the earhole is an essential part of the process and that any closure in the hole causes hearing to cease. Second, as air is the medium, any dense body between the object creating sound and the hearer causes hearing to take place with difficulty. Third, distance affects the loudness of the sound. Fourth, if the sound is transmitted in an isolated place, only those in the area can hear the sound due to the air. The example given for this point is that of a reed. So if a person puts his mouth on one end of a reed and another person stands on the other end putting her ear there, no other person around these two can hear the sound produced. The fifth issue is about when

as times of strong winds those far away can hear better than those closer. This may be caused due to the strength of the sound of the wind being able to cause damage to the essence of the other sound and make it harder to hear (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 201).

Mullā Ṣadrā presents some problems with these assumptions as well. For example, for the first indication, a dense entity is supposed to weaken the hearing at the point when the sound of a person reaches someone talking behind a wall. However, someone else can hear the speech from the other side. Their⁶⁸ reply to this objection is that hearing through a wall is only possible because some air passes through the wall although in small amounts.

The second objection is about hearing someone's speech. When someone speaks they create waves in the air and this is supposed to distort the totality of the air which should affect the sound heard. Their response to this difficulty is that the letters are compressed in the air in a particular way and each part of the letters creates waves one by one in the air. Each piece of air carrying pieces of speech arrives and raises awareness in the hearer. Mullā Ṣadrā mentions these, however he does not think they are really important.

As well as the notion of medium, the notion of an extra-mental object is accidental in his theory of hearing:

Not because one air [wave] carries that quality [i.e., the sound] and reaches with it to the ear-canal; and not because a number of air waves transmit all [of the sound] to the other part, [and that part to the other part of the air] until the air in the proximity of the ear-canal is qualified [by the sound] and transmits that to the ear-canal. This does not negate what has been mentioned by us earlier, that is, the soul does not connect to the perception [of sound] except through a form obtained in the substrata of its disposals by nature. Except, our discussion there was about the perceptible in essence for the soul. The perceptible in essence for it there is the perceptive form from the object of hearing obtained in the faculty of hearing. But here, our discussion is regarding the accidental sensible, and that is the external object of hearing. The source of this accidental connection is the particular position for the object of hearing in relation to the hearer together with the existence of the subtle body [i.e. the air] between the two [i.e., the object of sound and the hearer] (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 202-3, tr. Peerwani, pp. 148-9).

⁶⁸ These responses are by Rāzī in *Mabāhith*, p. 296 ff.

This accidental relation becomes the conditions for hearing. And when the organ of hearing, the connecting air, and the object possessing sound come together they become the soul's tool for perception.

The second cluster of problems concerns the object of sound (*Aṣfār*, v.8, p. 203; *Paraphrase*, p. 269). Is it the sound of the air striking the air canal or is it the air striking the ear canal together with the air outside the ear as well? According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the answer is the air between the two objects compressing the air. The proof for this is that our awareness of the direction and distance of sound come together with the awareness of sound. Direction is known to leave no traces in the waves as the air reaches the canal. From wherever the sound comes, the hearer cannot make the distinction about its direction or distance.

One could respond to this objection by linking the direction to the traces of air: the traces of the stroke will be stronger when the object of sound is near, and so on. Let's think about a case where the sound comes from left but the left ear is blocked and the sound thus reaches the ear from the right. Mullā Ṣadrā claims the direction of the sound will be noticed as coming from the right although the sound emerges from the left. Mullā Ṣadrā also replies with another example of two sounds coming from the same distance, one stronger than the other. According to the claim we are supposed to perceive one of the sounds as coming from a further distance. However, it is not the case. These cases occur because it has always been difficult to detect the real reason for our awareness of distance and direction of sound.

Mullā Ṣadrā focuses on and criticises Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdadī's idea that awareness of the direction is obtained by following from where the trace came, and what is left of it in the air, which is the distance which it crossed (*Aṣfār*, v.8, p. 205; *al-Mu'tabar*, 1373h, pp. 331-6). According to this position, right after the sound enters the ear canal (the opening of the ear), we perceive the distance *by contemplation*. We follow the tracks of the sound until it becomes weak. The degrees assumed in Abū al-Barakāt's theory concerns Mullā Ṣadrā because for him hearing is a set of things that come into existence all together: "There is the perception of one thing together with its direction, nearness and distance." That makes every sound unique. So each sound is existent in the particular direction and position (*Aṣfār*, v.8, p. 152). He finds it difficult that the previous idea implies that there are previous and past perceptions to each instance of hearing: perception of direction distinct from perception of sound. This is related to Mullā Ṣadrā's

understanding of material beings as being units of space and time: “The existence of something material is not separate from the position and direction” (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 205-7).

Just as the sensible is one thing, likewise the sensible perception connected to it is one perception. It is precisely the same as the perception of its existence, the perception that it is in such a direction, and the perception that it is in such a position (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 207, tr. Peerwani, p. 152).

The features of a thing and its existence are not separable because the existence is the same as the existent. The perception comes with a notion of identity and accordingly the perceived thing is not separated from the perception.

Šadrā discusses the senses in the most immaterial manner possible. As he debated in favour of celestial smells in the section on smell, celestial spheres can be heard as well. This is the ancient discussion which finds its source in Pythagoras and is debated further by the Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus, Simplicius, and Proclus (Steel, 1978, pp. 61 ff). So the main claim is about hearing the harmony of spheres. This topic is originally discussed by Aristotle as a problem discussed by the Pythagoreans. Aristotle rejects this idea. Firstly, the question is whether harmony has a sound. Aristotle indirectly rejects the claim that spheres can be heard by rejecting the fact that the spheres make any sound (Aristotle, *On Heavens*, 291a6). This is built on the assumption that sound is created through strike of two hard surfaces, and this further necessitates that sound is a material thing. As the spheres are different from the material earth, then we cannot attribute sound to it. Many Neoplatonists who accept heavenly music explain the possibility of hearing it as an exceptional case only for special humans, e.g. Pythagoras. Ordinary men cannot hear it because their ear is not compatible with the celestial sounds. Nicomachus of Gerasa thought an ordinary human’s weakness in nature is the reason for their inability of hearing heavenly sounds. In a similar way Iamblichus claimed that the reason Pythagoras could hear the heavenly music is that he was *similar to god*⁶⁹ and no longer in need of instruments such as music to prepare him for his own perfection. Music in this view is an instrument to create order in one’s self. In Simplicius’ case we have purified souls who can grasp heavenly music in a non-physical way. Hearing this music is not only turned

⁶⁹ Sedley talks about how becoming like god is related to a human being’s return to her former matterless form, to her original nature. With improvement of the intellectual self, the human achieves godlikeness (*homoiosis theoi*) (Sedley, 1999, p. 320). This tradition is continued until Šadrā and is an important part of his psychology. He strengthens the notion of becoming godlike with his unique idea of the human soul in constant substantial motion.

into an intellectual process but also an inner journey by turning away from the extra-mental world. Plotinus mentions this at the end of *Enneads* V.1.12:

None the less every being of the order of soul is in continuous activity as long as life holds, continuously executing to itself its characteristic act: knowledge of the act depends on transmission and perception. If there is to be perception of what is thus present, we must turn the perceptive faculty inward and hold it to attention there. Hoping to hear a desired voice, we let all others pass and are alert for the coming at last of that most welcome of sounds: so here, we must let the hearings of sense go by, save for sheer necessity, and keep the soul's perception bright and quick to the sounds from above (tr. Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page, p. 379).

Two more relationships can be thought of another familiar conclusion from these claims. Relating the idea of the human soul's fall from higher realms and the epistemological theory that knowledge is remembering, one can conclude: in reality, human beings are familiar with the heavenly smells, sounds, and so on. In order to remember their pre-body histories all they need do is eliminate the relationship to the body and discover what is within (O'Meara, 2007, pp. 149-158). Šadrā quotes the *Uthūlūjīyā* and Plotinus' introspective method and how isolation from the world helps elevation of the soul (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 333, 360; *Uthūlūjīyā*, pp. 22-3, 69). As long as the idea of turning away from the material world is still central for him, sensation is an important part of the soul's elevation. The perfection of the soul is started and maintained by the senses. Moreover, the senses themselves are made immaterial in his account as they too are connected to intellection.

Among Islamic philosophers, al-Kindī accepts that the celestial spheres produce their own music. The Ikhwān al-Šafā after al-Kindī followed the idea with two principles: First, that the celestial sphere has an efficient causal role over the earthly world of generation and corruption. Second, that there is affinity and similarity between the higher realm and the world below it. They think that the idea of the difference of celestial spheres from earthly beings does not require that celestial beings are totally different from natural bodies, some characteristics are shared between two realms (Shehadi, 1995, pp. 43-4). Shehadi lists a second argument based on the causal effects of celestial spheres that inhabitants of them would be supposed to be deaf and this is not suitable for their high existence. The third argument is the fact that humans have music requires that their teleological goal and source should have music too (Shehadi 1995, p. 45).

Şadrā has a similar stance to the Neoplatonists and the Ikhwān al-Şafā (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 208). However, the idea of the unity of soul is stronger for him and explains material and immaterial parts of the soul in a similar manner. In terms of the high senses, similarly, he connects them to the material senses. He manages this by a monist approach that takes even the lower levels of the soul's functions as immaterial. I explained this immaterialization of the extra-mental senses previously. This paragraph shows how the idea of unity of soul and the identity principle is brought into the picture eventually:

The psychic Man has the sensations of the things by his essence, and the judgment on them by his essence. He does not need the natural [bodily] tools for his perception and act. So his perception of the external things from the sensibles [or sensory impressions] is either by the form of something additional present with him, or obtained in him, except that his perception of it is its very form and not by another form, otherwise there will entail the chain of double perceptive forms. Thus his essence by itself is for perceiving the visible objects of sight, the audible objects of ear, and likewise every species of sensibles. Thus he in his essence, for his essence, is [the sense of] hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch. You have learned from what preceded about “the unification of sense with sensible”. So he is the sense of all senses (*Asfār*, v. 9, pp. 92-3; tr. Peerwani, pp. 403-4).

Thus in Şadrā's presentation the third cluster of issues is related to the existence of air between the hearer and the object of sound together with the requirement of no thick object between the two. In the case of celestial objects ancient philosophers thought that the contact is enough for maintaining the transmission of sound. Mullā Şadrā does not negate the existence of the faculty of hearing in celestial bodies, just as he did not negate smell. It indicates that these sensations – smell, sound and so on – are not purely material features for him. For him, celestial entities have simpler and more perfect faculties which are similar to that of our imagination (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 209).

This section is important because it shows that his understanding of celestial hearing is not limited to exceptional human beings and also that ordinary hearing is not a physical process either. For him, every extra-mental sense is performed by the soul and is non-physical. This in an interesting way of also making the celestial spheres closer to humans and in a way claiming the possibility of perception and perceptibility for them requires a frame outside the context of the material-immaterial dichotomy. He uses cases like

celestial hearing and dreams as proofs of the activity of the soul during “seemingly” physical senses.

Mullā Ṣadrā’s **vision** is a construction/creation (*inshā’*) that occurs in the human with the power of Allah. This is a construction of a similar form of the object of perception but the form in the human emanates from the angelic realm of the soul (*‘ālam al-malakūt al-naḥsī*). This form is abstracted from material features and external matter. And it is considered as an action of the soul itself more than an action of the extra-mental sense object (*qā’im bi-fā’ilihi*) (*Aṣfār*, v.8, p. 212). A human being is armed with a creative power given from Allah that enables them undergo a change and receive the emanation of special abstracted forms of the external objects. Here the idea of abstraction is combined with the idea of change in the soul. Ṣadrā devotes a number of chapters solely to vision and the first chapters criticize the previous theories of vision.

Lindberg lists three main approaches in Greek optical thought as a medical tradition (mainly Galenic), a physical or philosophical tradition (mainly featured in Aristotle), and a mathematical one (pioneered by Euclid) (Lindberg, 1976, p. 33). Although it is almost customary to categorise the theories of vision as extramission and intromission theories, when we delve into the details of these theories, one easily sees that this twofold categorization is oversimplified. Ṣadrā, in his take on the history of theories of vision states that there are three clusters of theories: theories of Naturalists, Mathematicians, and Suhrawardī’s. Throughout all these discussions, the main problems are about explaining vision when it occurs at a distance. However, vision happens only when an object is present. The other problem is due to the unbalanced sizes of the objects of vision and the organ, the eye. While some theories focused on explaining how vision occurred at a distance (by contrast to the nature of touch), the others focused on the duality between the object and the organ. In Ṣadrā’s presentation, the nature of the light and colour is not discussed as much in detail as in the previous philosophers. Apart from this single difference, Ṣadrā follows the same titles as had been customary in the vision-literature.

The first group he mentions are the naturalists, who argue for the imprinting theory of sensation. Aristotle’s theory might be one of the most influential theories; however, it was not that popular amongst ancient philosophers. Nevertheless, it can still be used as a frame for the main discussions of the topic. Remembering his definitions of sense, one of Aristotle’s definitions of soul was a relative scheme of actualities and potencies. When sight is defined in such a fashion, the first actuality becomes the capacity to be changed into the object of sight, which means to change into the colour. The second actuality in

sight is actually seeing, which is to be changed by colour and to be actually like it (Johansen, 1997, p. 36; *Paraphrase*, p. 264). In a similar context, sense is also described as a change. In this definition, a sense object is the agent and the organ of sense is the one acted upon.

Aristotle claims that vision requires the transparency of its medium (Johansen, 1997, p. 38; also *DA* 418b4-10; *Paraphrase*, p. 259). Colour is transparent, in other words, visible, because the medium makes it possible (Johansen, 1997, p. 38)

But what we call transparent is not something peculiar to air, or water, or any other of the bodies usually called transparent, but is a common nature and power, capable of no separate existence of its own, but residing in these, and subsisting likewise in all other bodies in a greater or less degree (*DSS* 439a21-5, cf. *DA* 418b4-8; *Paraphrase*, p. 257)⁷⁰

So, as Aristotle treats water and air as transparent, it means that they are see-through. But Democritus and defenders of reflection theories claim just the opposite, that these are surfaces for reflection. With the idea of transparency, Aristotle makes it possible that the object has more agency (Johansen, 1997, pp. 47-8).

While Aristotle's theory is defended by Avicenna, it appeared with some revisions. Light is understood as the state or affection of the medium. And the medium is transparent. Aristotle's colour is in a sense always actualized. The medium, on the other hand, is sometimes potentially transparent (thus actually dark), and at other times actually transparent. Light, in this account, is a state of medium being actually transparent. For Avicenna, the medium is always actually transparent while colour shifts from being potential to actual (McGinnis, 2010, pp. 104-6).

Don't suppose that white, red, and the like actually exist in the bodies in the way that they are seen but that the dark air prevents the vision of it, for the air itself is not dark. What is dark is only that which itself receives the radiant light, whereas the air itself (even if there is nothing luminous in it) does not hinder the perception of that which receives the radiant light nor does it conceal the colour when it exists in something (*ShN* III.1, p. 93, tr. McGinnis, 2010, p. 106).

This is built on Avicenna's differentiation of two kinds of light, natural and acquired light. In this revised theory air does not carry the images. Whilst in Aristotle's case the light is

⁷⁰ *Mushaffat* used in Arabic for *transparency*

what actualizes the medium and colour is what sets it into motion, Avicenna thinks what is needed for actualization of the medium is presence of a body which has acquired or natural light (Hasse, 2000, p. 111). On this issue, Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with the need for a transparent medium for vision to occur (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 233-5). However, this need for a medium is not necessary but accidental. Because sight, as well as other senses, is in its reality defined as an immaterial process.

Avicenna's intromission theory betrays the influence of Galenic ideas on notions such as crystalline humour and optic nerves (Hasse, 2000, p. 122). His detailed analysis and criticism of rival theories in *ShN* are summarized in *Mashriqiyyūn*:

We say that the image of the object is transmitted through the mediation of the translucent towards the receiving member of the body, which is smooth and luminous, without the substance of the translucent receiving it in any way in the sense that [the substance] is this form; rather it happens in no time, when [object and perceiver] face each other. [We say] that the image of the object at the moment it gets imprinted is imprinted in the crystalline humour and that the faculty of sight in fact is not situated in the humour, otherwise one thing would be seen as two [...] the whole of this image is conveyed in two hollow nerves towards their intersection in the form of a cross. Just as a thin cone extends –in *estimation*⁷¹-(*wahm*) from the external form until it lets its point fall behind the surface of crystalloid, likewise *the image in the crystalloid is conveyed through the mediation of conveying spirit*, which is the two nerves, towards their intersection in the way of a cone, so that the two cones meet and cross there and one image-like form is formed out of the two in the part of the spirit, which conveys the perceived [form],[...] *the common sense* then receives this form, being the perfection of vision (Hasse, 2010, p. 121).

As well as explaining the imprint through the Galenic idea of spirits and nerves, Avicenna also admits interference of inner sense for perfection of the sight. This reminds one of the ideas of Baghdādī and Ibn al-Haytham. Both talk about a two-staged notion of sensation in the second of which the sensation is formed through interference of the inner senses. In Ṣadrā's case, the external sense is never completed without this interference. In that sense, he admits the two staged account and moulds the stages into one. In a way, he also

⁷¹ Hasse translates "*wahm*" as imagination, which might suggest slips in Avicenna's usage between *wahm* and *khayāl*.

challenges a linear explanation formed of sense-inner sense-intellect, and turns it into a circular explanation in which all the stages are in relation to each other and intellect is active at all times.

The third theory that Ṣadrā discusses is Suhrawardī's. For Suhrawardī, vision of objects is not solely the result of the reflection of light on the object. This light is what gives the object its colour which is later transmitted by the air to the eye. On the contrary, light is not material and it cannot be reduced to colour (Marcotte, 2000, p. 143). He evaluates and rejects two previous theories of vision in his *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*. In the first one vision is accepted as occurring by the emission from the eye of a ray that encounters the objects seen. According to the second theory, vision is the imprinting of the things in the crystalline humour (*HI*, p. 70). *Partawnāma* is more in line with the peripatetic explanation of vision (Suhrawardī, *The Book of Radiance*, tr. Ziai, p. 30) since he rejects ray theory and accepts Aristotle's idea of imprint. However, he rejects Aristotelian sense theory in *Ḥikmat*. The difficulty with this theory is to describe how the eye, being different from the objects it perceives, manages to capture those objects. When the example of a mountain is taken, if seeing is imprinting, how does the eye manage to imprint a mountain which exceeds by its magnitude the limits of the eye?

According to Suhrawardī, vision is neither through a medium in the air nor is it by the eye; rather it is an unveiling where vision becomes possible between two things. He explains later the main conditions for vision to take place:

Since you know that vision is not by the imprinting of the form of its object in the eye nor by something emerging from the eye, it can only be by the illuminated object being opposite a sound eye—nothing more. [...] being opposite amounts to the absence of a veil between that which sees and that which is seen. Extreme nearness hinders vision only because illumination or luminosity is a condition of being seen. There must be two lights: the seeing light and the light seen (*HI*, tr. Wallbridge and Ziai, p. 96).

One can think that lights are constraints to the immaterial world simply because Suhrawardī sees light as a metaphysical element and reality. However, even in the physical realm, the subject and the object must be luminous. This occurs with differently when these lights in the physical realm are accidental (*HI*, p.77, Marcotte, 2000, p. 150). The light of the subject is important, as "when the act of vision occurs it is ultimately the seeing light of the soul", and the object is important in order vision to take place.

The object of vision is subject to two types of light: physical and ontological. The condition for the object of vision is to receive the light or be the light itself: “thus, the nearer the illuminated object or light, the more easily it is beheld, so long as it remains a light or illuminated” (*HI*, p. 96).

Vision occurs only when its conditions come together. There is the necessity of face-to-face encounter, absence of any sort of obstacle or veil between the subject and the object, and the presence of light (Marcotte, 2000, p. 149).

Suhrawardī thinks that in the process of vision, objects receive light and are constituted of light (Marcotte, 2000, p. 150). Thus, in his theory, he makes light the focus of his ontology and his theory of vision. He presents an active understanding of lights which refers to lights in the seer and in the seen. Finally, he sets conditions for vision to take place. As a result he gains his highly immaterialised theory of vision. Perfect vision only occurs at the metaphysical level when all obstacles between the soul and intelligible realities are eliminated (Marcotte, 2000, p. 149). At the metaphysical level, similar processes are listed only with a notion of unveiling (Marcotte, 2000, p. 153; *HI*, p. 140).

In his *Hikmat*, Suhrawardī states: "Though vision is conditioned both on being opposite and [on possessing] an eye, that which sees is in fact the commanding Light (*isfahbad light*)" (*HI*, p. 139) By making the commanding light the real agent of vision, Suhrawardī covers vision in the realm of a rational soul's actions, as the commanding light is the ruling rational soul.

Another important aspect of vision and the senses in general is that they are acts of the soul. This has been stated above. Moreover there is another implication of this idea. Suhrawardī claims that sensation is not reducible. This is because knowledge must be relying on some foundation that does not entail regress, and that all other knowledge is built upon. Sense data is one of these bases. And another important reason is that they are products of subjective experience. They cannot be defined objectively, and by anything other than themselves:

There is nothing more evident than sensations to which the definitions might be reduced, since all our knowledge is abstracted from sensations. Therefore the simple sensibles are known innately and have no definitions. [...] the simple sensations and experiences are all without parts and nothing is more evident than they. By them, their components are known (*HI*, tr. Wallbridge and Ziai, p. 74).

Şadrā differentiates himself from these three theories but also claims to perpetuate the theory that ‘Aristotle’ defended in *Uthūlūjīyā* (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 213). However, he does not explain what the theory in the *Uthūlūjīyā* is. This indeed is the theory of Plotinus. In terms of its basics, Emilsson thinks Galen and Plotinus follow the vision theory that is found in Plato’s *Timaeus*. Lindberg also connects Galen to the Stoic theory of vision (Lindberg, 1976, p. 10). Both find discomfort in the previous theories for the same reasons. In Galen’s approach the medium of air plays a role in perception as part of the body, it is extension of nerves (Emilsson, 1988, p. 59). Emilsson connects this to the *sympatheia* of Plotinus.

Galen’s theory is rejected by both Suhrawardī and Avicenna. Avicenna argued that if the rays going out from the eye can travel to the objects and then back to the eye, the first journey of the rays from the eye appears redundant as it is possible to have vision only by the rays travelling from the objects. Second, he rejects the role air plays in Galen’s vision. According to this, if the air changes and acts as part of the soul, in cases in which there is more than one seer, the vision of the viewers should be sharper as the amount of optical *pneuma* is larger (McGinnis, 2010, p. 107). Suhrawardī’s rejection of these comes from a totally different concern. It is that light is special for him and he rejects these theories on the bases that vision is not material. First, he claims that the rays cannot be accidental, and second that they cannot be bodies (Marcotte, 2000, p. 140). Şadrā mentions Galen’s rejection against imprinting theory and finds it unsuccessful (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 214).

Going back to Plotinus, as Şadrā’s possible predecessor; for Plotinus, we are part of the cosmos in a permanent state and the cosmos resembles an organism. In Galen’s case, the relation of the air as an extension of body is not part of the cosmos (Emilsson, 1988, p. 59). With this permanent connection between the human and the world, he explains vision of an object at a distance without the need for rays or medium. The emanated form, which is the abstracted sense object in Şadrā’s theory, resembles the special form invented by Plotinus, a non-physical omnipresent form which is dependent on the organic unity of the cosmos (Emilsson, 1988, p. 57). Thanks to the *sympatheia* theory, Plotinus assumes a unity in the cosmos that connects the sense organ and the sense object. This makes it possible for him to claim direct perception of a distant object (Emilsson, 1988, p. 59).

Şadrā gives these three approaches and claims that his theory is different from the three. Yet, he does not explain how he differs from them. From what he explains we can infer that he disagrees with the idea of imprinting in the peripatetic theory, the idea of rays in the naturalist theory due to both their material tendencies. It is difficult to see how he

differs from Suhrawardī's more immaterialist approach in which the light is incorporeal. It seems that Ṣadrā would like to disengage from any idea of extra-mental objects in his theory and that for Suhrawardī the object and confrontation is part of the theory. His position is summarized in *Asfār* as:

[T]he vision takes place when the illuminated object is face to face with the organ of sight in which there is vitreous humour. If these conditions are found together with no obstacle, then there occurs to the soul the knowledge of the illuminative presence of the object of sight; the soul perceives it as a clear manifest vision (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 212, tr. Peerwani, p. 156).

Despite his rejection in general, Ṣadrā continues Suhrawardī's notion of luminous relation. In terms of a tradition, Ṣadrā places himself in line with the author of the *Uthūlūjiyā*. Yet again he does not explain what the exact form of this theory is. I think one could deduce from this that the mechanics of vision are not really important for him. What really matters is that the sensation itself is not an extra-mental issue and that it is not a material process:

The vision takes place by the creation of form [by the soul] by the power of God. It resembles [the object of vision in the external world] but it is from the world of dominion of the soul which is disengaged from the external matter, is present with the perceptive soul; it subsists by it as the subsistence of act with the agent, and not as the subsistence of the object of reception by its receiver [...] the external form is the preparatory [or occasional cause] for the emanation of that form [from the soul] when the conditions [for the vision] are realized (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 212-213, tr. Peerwani, p. 156-7)

With the theory of vision, Ṣadrā's presentation of external senses ends. The chapters that follow after the senses in *Asfār* continue with discussions on inner senses. The flow of topics is almost word by word the same with Avicenna. In many places, he also uses the versions of Avicenna's texts paraphrased by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. When it comes to revision of the Avicennan inner senses or rejection of the multiplicity of faculties, he often uses Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī's proofs.

Ṣadrā's presentation of inner senses is not particularly distinctive. He explains the five inner senses faithfully after Avicenna using summaries of the relevant sections from *Mabāhith*. As mentioned previously, Avicenna's systematization of inner senses rest on differentiation between different cognitive objects, between receptive and retentive

powers, and between active and passive powers. This appears to be a stricter and more sophisticated application of Aristotle's idea of proper sensibles:

Each sense then is relative to its particular group of sensible qualities: it is found in a sense-organ as such and discriminates the differences which exist within that group; e.g. sight discriminates white and black, taste sweet and bitter, and so in all cases (*DA* III. 2, 426b8).

As mentioned before, many of the inner senses appear to emerge from the irregular cases that can be classified as neither sensation nor intellect. One solution to these cases where an analysis, composition, judgement etc. of data from different senses is regarded is that of a sixth sense, responsible for the common sensibles. As well as Aristotle, many philosophers after him, such as Avicenna, Aquinas and Ṣadrā, continued to reject the existence of a sixth sense (*ShN* IV.1, p. 163; *Summa theologiae* Ia78,3, p. 129; *Asfār*, v.8, p. 236). In the *Shifā'*, common sense occurs as a faculty where all external senses end up (*ShN* IV.1, p. 163). But this is not a faculty for *common sensibles*. It receives all the forms which are imprinted on the five senses and transmitted to it from them. It is located in the forepart of the front ventricle of the brain (*Najāt* III, p. 31). In relation to the discussion in the *DA* about common and accidental sensibles, Mullā Ṣadrā says this faculty is not what senses accidental or common sensibles. It is where the traces of sensibles are collected (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 237). The relation between a man and his being a father of a person is not a function of a faculty but a work of the intellect. Things such as movement, dimension, or magnitude have some kind of relation to the external senses. At this point, Ṣadrā separates his path from Avicenna. Dimension, magnitude, number and so on comes together with the perception of senses (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 238). They are not accidental or common sensibles, they are perceived together with the senses. Avicenna, as mentioned in chapter two, tries to prove their existence through two points. First is the issue of incidental perception and the ability to analyse trans-sensation data. The second is the differentiation of capacity of retention and reception.

Mullā Ṣadrā accepts that the existence of such a faculty is not essential and, moreover, it is not bodily, nor is it located in the brain: common sense is a faculty of the soul, thus it is not located in the brain because the soul is not identical to or existent within the body (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 243). I have discussed Ṣadrā's evaluation of proofs for common sense. However, it should be evident that he neither proves nor disproves differentiation of inner senses. As seen in the previous discussion, he tries to reply to Rāzī's criticisms of the Avicennan proofs according to his own stance in which imprinting theory is denied.

Mullā Ṣadrā largely discusses the previous theories; however, he does not reveal much about his original ideas about common sense. His approach to the other inner senses is the same. He follows the tradition of proving imagination and its separation from the other senses. His presentation on this topic, like the one about common sense, does not reveal a lot about his own understanding of imagination. He presents mainly the peripatetic approach, thus his presentation is not novel on its own. He generally states that the soul is enough to account for these cases. However, he does not object to the peripatetic inner senses nor does he present arguments against this. This is mainly because the active agent for all levels of perception is the soul and the soul is a unity.

In terms of the relation of *khayāl* and *sensus communis*, we can look at how the usage changed between Aristotle and Avicenna. After the discussion of external senses, Aristotle talked about a sixth sense other than the five external senses and rejected this. He also spoke about perception and judgement on data coming from different senses. As each sense is strictly bound to its own organ and objects, this kind of perception either requires a central perception system for the external senses or a sense that can combine the data coming from the senses and different from them. What Aristotle implied as common sense is later formulized as a faculty that is a storehouse for the sensible forms coming from the different senses. This is found with the name *ḥiss mushtarak* or *bintasiya/phantasia*. What follows is *khayāl*, which is important for explaining perception as absence of objects or dreams. Following the differentiation principle, Avicenna assigns common sense (*ḥiss mushtarak*) for reception and imagination (*khayāl*) for retention. Moreover, each faculty has a specific bodily organ just like the external senses. Inner senses are located in different parts of the brain.

After *khayāl*, we have *mutakhayyila* as the next faculty. This faculty acts under the control of the intellect in humans and of estimation in animals. For Ṣadrā, the differentiation of this faculty from intellect and estimation is so weak that one can claim they are one and the same as intellect.

Know that although estimation according to us is different from the faculties mentioned, its essence is not different from the intellect. Rather, it is related to essence of intellect for the particular individual; it is connected to it, and its management is for it. So the intellective faculty connected to imagination is estimation. Also, its perceptions are universal meanings but related to individual, imaginal forms. Estimation does not have another essence in existence other than the intellect, as the natural universal, as the quiddity *qua* it has no reality neither the external

existence nor the intellectual existence (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 255-6, tr. Peerwani, p. 188).⁷²

So, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, the estimative faculty is a separate faculty from the intellect. But its essence is the same as the intellect. This is also related to Ṣadrā's principle that the soul is all its faculties (*al-naḥs kull al-quwā*).

Mullā Ṣadrā establishes a unified perceptual system where external and inner senses are intertwined. Accordingly, no sense perception is merely the work of the sense organs and the object of the sense perception is not merely the extra-mental object before the sense organ, i.e. the eye. External senses and inner senses are all dependent on the soul and the soul is all its faculties: "That the soul is the single faculty which is the perceiver of all types of perceptions" (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 261).

One striking point Ṣadrā makes is that the soul is the perceiver of particulars and this gives him the opportunity to say that the soul is the real perceiver while sense perception occurs, e.g. when the eye sees. Sense perceptions and the inner senses in this schematization are but tools the soul uses and intellect is active during the processes. Ṣadrā and Avicenna's theories differentiate in the sense that one takes the brain as its central organ when the other has an immaterial understanding in which the soul is the centre. One proof Ṣadrā discusses as proof for the fact that the brain is the centre is the dysfunctions which occur when the relevant part of brain is damaged. Ṣadrā replies that the brain or the other physical organs function as tools for the soul. It is natural that problems with the tools affect perception; however, it falls short of showing that the brain is the centre for perception. To say that the brain or the organs are the centres of perception is like saying that the glasses are the seer rather than the eye. The central question is about accepting differentiation principles. And it can be formularized as: does the differentiation of senses entail multiplicity of souls? Another important question is related to the range of imagination over other processes of sensation. It is active when the object is absent. So when sensation is not active, imagination is performing. The defining question is whether imagination is active or passive at the time of sensation as well. In Ṣadrā's case, imagination is active at all processes of external senses. Let me discuss the first point about unity further. This is important because unity and monism is at the centre of all of Ṣadrā's accounts. His answer to the second question is also related to his monism.

⁷² Some changes have been made to the translation.

3.3 THE UNITY OF THE SOUL

“By this demonstration it is established that the substance of your soul by which you are you is the hearer, the seer, the subject which is pained, delighted, intellective, comprehending, striker and walker although for every kind of these acts there is a need for a particular, natural tool as long as we are in the natural world” (Asfār, v.8, p. 266; tr. Peerwani, p. 196)

When it comes to what is really important for Mullā Ṣadrā, we find that his stance is radically different from that of the peripatetics: “[...] that the perceiver-*mudrik* of all perceptions-*idrākāt* that belongs to human faculties are the rational soul” (Asfār, v. 8, p. 261). This implies a unity among all types of perception for a human being. An idea of unity for the soul can be found in Aristotle’s thought as well. As was mentioned before, some vague references to a unity were given in works such as *DSV*.

Now, since every sense has something special and also something common; special, as, e.g., seeing is to the sense of sight, hearing to the auditory sense, and so on with the other senses severally; while all are accompanied by a common power, in virtue whereof a person perceives that he sees or hears (for, assuredly, it is not by *sight* that one sees that he sees; and it is not by taste, or sight, or both together that one discerns, and that sweet things are different from white things, but by a part common to all the organs of sense; for there is one sensory function, and the controlling sensory organ is one, though differing as a faculty of perception in relation to each genus, e.g., sound or colour); and since this subsists in association chiefly with the faculty of touch (for this can exist apart from all the other organs of sense, but none of them can exist apart from it—a subject of which we have treated in our speculations concerning the soul); it is therefore evident that waking and sleeping are an affection of this. This explains why they belong to all animals; for touch alone belongs to all (*DSV* 455a13-455a26).

Ṣadrā’s understanding of knowledge is less related to extra-mental realities. As has been discussed in the previous section, for him an extra-mental object’s role is nothing more than preparing the soul for accepting abstracted forms. For Aristotle, on the other hand, the extra-mental objects are an extremely important part of the theory of knowledge. Aristotle claims that the intellect and senses are different in their nature and they require

totally different processes; one material, the other immaterial. However, with his principle that the soul perceives particulars, Şadrā claims it is the soul at all times that perceives at times of intellection as well as at times of sense perception.

To make it more understandable, Şadrā posits a number of proofs:

First proof: The soul-self (*nafs*) is all its faculties because it dominates among different inner and external perceptions, estimation (*wahm*), and also intellect. The exchange among these can be possible only if *nafs* is supposed to be the main cognizer (*mudrik*) of all these.

Şadrā uses an example we are familiar with from Avicenna's proofs of common sense: our judgements such as, "This sweet and white thing is sugar". These show our ability of conjunctive judgements among data from different senses. There must be a centre and a central perceiver which is the self (*nafs*). The ability to connect white and sweet with the sugar is not only about an exchange among senses; it is also about the ability - so to speak - to convert between universals and particulars in both directions. Thus, these cases of one combining different sense-data, to combining particular universal concepts and experiences proves that the human self is the centre of all perceptual and cognitive processes. For example, in the case of imagining a form, for example of Zayd and seeing Zayd himself, "There must be one faculty which is the perceiver of imaginative form and the sensible form so that it is possible for it to arbitrate that this form in imagination corresponds to this sensible. There must be a judge between the two to call to presence the two to judge upon them" (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 262; tr. Peerwani, p. 193). For the judgement to take place the governor of composition of meanings and forms or of differentiation must be one and the same as the perceiver of meanings and forms (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 262-3).

Although it appears that the imaginative form and the sensible form is in action in the previous example, Şadrā takes a step further and places *nafs* as the central cognizer which is active in the process of matching particulars and universals too:

When we sense Zayd or 'Amr, and judge that he is a man or a [rational] animal and not a stone, nor a tree, we judge that the particular sensible by the universal intelligible. When we perceive an individual horse, but we judge that it is an animal and not human, we judge that the former sensible is the particular of the latter intelligible idea, and not the particular of some other intelligible. So there is in us a single faculty which is the perceiver of universal intelligibles and particular sensibles. Therefore, it is established that the soul is that single faculty which is

the perceiver of all types of perceptions (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 262; tr. Peerwani, p. 193).

A certain familiarity strikes one when one reads the first proof as Šadrā uses the very same example other philosophers use to prove the existence of common sense (sweet and white) to prove a slightly contradictory idea of soul being the main perceiver. Moreover, remembering the notion of duality in Plotinus and Avicenna, the parts of the soul that interact with universals and particulars were differentiated in their essence. Šadrā requires a unity of the soul in order to recognize particular samples of universals and concepts. Thus he thinks it is one and the same that knows the particulars and the universals.

This first proof explains why it is not important for Šadrā to differentiate between different faculties and why it is not important to differentiate between inner senses. If we explain the source of the developed theory of inner senses as the irregular cases that do not classify as external senses and as intellect, for Šadrā the unity of the soul is itself explanatory enough for irregularities. These are not irregularities in the first place because the exclusive understanding of proper sensibles is not an essential part of his theory. He even claims a further dynamic: not only the transportation of information between inner and external senses, but also the transition of the activity of particular to universal is brought under the umbrella of unity.

The second proof talks about similar actions mentioned in the first proof. This time, the focus is on the psychological nature of this multiplicity. Put in more traditional phrasing, this proof is from the point of the knower. This proof can be labelled as the introspective proof. On the one hand we have multiplicity that is observed through different functions as perception of seeing/hearing etc. objects and cognizing universals. On the other hand, a person who is the active agent of these different functions does not suspect that s/he is numerically one. When these two unsuspected premises are combined, one would be sure that the self is the real centre of all these.

If the perceiver of intelligibles was other than the perceiver of sensibles, then the substance of your essence which is “you”, according to the investigation, would not perceive the two together. If you perceive the two, then you are one essence that is the perceiver of the two... If not then you will be two essences and not one essence. Similar is the argument regarding the concupiscent and irascible [faculties] (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 266; tr. Peerwani, p. 195).

This paragraph points to the continuity of experiences and shows the holist perspective of the subject. The assumption behind it is that the differentiation principle entails radical

separation of different parts of the soul. And that the differentiation principle is inconsistent with the continuity of experiences.

The third proof on the matter is from the point of knowledge. A basic principle that makes this proof possible is Šadrā's idea of the soul as perceiver of particulars as well as universals. This is connected to his definition of the soul as bodily at the beginning of soul's journey.

The soul is the perceiver of particulars. There is no doubt that the soul is an individual essence and is *connected to the body*, which is a connection with respect to managing [the body] and disposal in it [...] It is known that a particular soul would not be the manager of the universal body otherwise it would be an immaterial universal intellect. In which case it would not have the connection with a particular body but would be [an entity] having its connection with all the bodies. The consequent is invalid, so the antecedent is also invalid. Therefore the soul is the manager of a particular body. Now the managing of the individual qua individual is impossible except after having the knowledge of it from the aspect of its individual ipseity. That is only possible by the presence of its individual form before the soul. This necessitates the soul to be the perceiver of particulars and the perceiver of universals. *Thus in man there is one ipseity possessing numerable levels* (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 267; tr. Peerwani, pp. 196-7).

This proof is only a formularized version of the first one. There, Šadrā focused on the point that the different faculties are supposed to be considered as a unity and here he focuses on the nature of the thing known. He adopts the idea that knowledge requires knowledge of universals (this, though, should be indirect knowledge). Accordingly, particulars would not be known on their own. And it is mentioned in the first proof that the transition from one to the other requires continuity and unity of the soul.

It is possible to see some similarities between Aristotle and Avicenna's texts and the idea of unity of the soul. There are obvious paragraphs in *Najāt* where Avicenna talks about different perceptual processes being a unity which is the soul: "We say that the soul is a single substance and has many faculties" (*Najāt* XV, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 64). Still, for Avicenna the differentiation of each faculty is important. Thus the unity might be regarded as the soul being a centre of all these differentiated faculties.

Again, we say ‘when I perceived such and such a thing, I became angry’; it is a true statement, too. So it is one and the same thing which perceives and becomes angry.

Now this unitary thing is either man’s body or his soul. If it is the body, it is either the totality of his organs or only some of them. [...] Then what becomes angry is that very thing to which the sensory the perceptive faculty transmits the content of its perception. Its being in this status, even though it be body, is not due to its being body alone; it is then due to its being in possession of a faculty by which it is capable of combining both these things. This faculty not being a physical one must be soul itself. Thus the substratum in which both these qualities in here is not the whole of our body, nor yet a single organ in so far as it is a physical organ; so the conclusion is that the combining substratum is soul itself or body in as much as it possesses soul, the combining substratum even in the latter case really being the soul, which itself is the principle of all these faculties (*Najāt* XV, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 65).

Two points are clear in Avicenna’s texts: that every faculty is differentiated by their functions and objects, and that the intelligibles are given to the soul and never gained through other lower faculties of perception. Secondly, it is obvious that all perceptual levels are still related to each other and necessary for knowledge.

I mentioned before that for Avicenna souls have two aspects, that relating to bodily nature and that to higher principles.

It is as if our souls have two faces: one turned towards the body, and it must not be influenced by any requirements of the bodily nature; and the other turned towards the higher principles, and it must always be ready to receive from what is There in the Higher Plane and to be influenced by it (*Najāt* IV, p. 33).

However, this unity must not disguise the inevitable gap between the sensible and the intelligible. According to Avicenna, neither can particulars be perceived by the intellect nor can universals be perceived by or gained through senses (*ShN* V.2, pp. 209-210).

There are two essential points for understanding Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of the unity for the soul. The first is that all stages of perception must be completed either by the intellectual or the imaginative faculties. Accordingly, perception is considered with a sense of wholeness or completeness. This makes sense perception close to other stages of cognition in nature. The second point is that the soul can perceive particulars. This is an

implication of making the soul an active agent behind sense perception as well as intellection. The main reason why peripatetics separate sense and intellection is that one perceives particulars and the other one perceives universals. This shows why active intellect is such a cornerstone of their cosmology and epistemology.

As regards the activity of the imagination, we need to recall Ṣadrā's notion of sensation. In the previous chapter, I mention that every sense is completed by help of either intellect or imagination: "[E]very sense perception's subsistence is by the imaginative perception, and every imaginative perception's subsistence is by the intellection" (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 240; tr. Peerwani, p. 176). Accordingly, I claim that even the most material stages of knowledge are immaterialised by Mullā Ṣadrā (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 277; tr. Peerwani, p. 205). This results in an ambiguity between the inner and external senses. The examples used for proving the existence of inner senses are repeated in his *Asfār* without strong resistance. On the other hand, where he effectively uses these examples is to prove that the soul is the real active agent and not the objects in the extra-mental world. So the main example can be listed as the line seemingly caused by a raindrop, ghouls in the desert, and the experiences of epileptics and the images we see in dreams. Ṣadrā combines them as the peripatetics' third and strongest argument to prove common sense:

A man perceives forms which have no existence in the external world such as what occurs to the epileptics, and also what is perceived by a sleeping person in his dream. He witnesses big sensible forms, audible sounds which are distinguished from other [sounds]. Also, those who have eminent souls, such as the prophets and the friends [of God], peace be upon them, they witness with their sound senses the sensible beautiful forms and sounds about which they do not doubt [their occurrence], and they distinguish between them and the other [forms]. So do those weak in mind when scared and afraid at seeing the battles, earthquakes, etc., in the external world may see forms corresponding to the states of their mental distress. Now those forms have existence because the pure nonexistence would prevent from being distinguished from the others, [and since they are distinguished from each other, so they exist]. But their existence is not in the external world otherwise every one with sound sense [of sight] would see them. Now the perceiver of those existing things is neither the faculty of intellect, for the intellect prevents perceiving the bodies, dimensions, and shapes with measures. Nor is it the external sense because these forms are perceived when the senses are more or less quiet and non-active. They

are also perceived in the dream [state]. Besides, the object of vision may also be perceived in the waking state at the closing of the eyes (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 248; tr. Peerwani, p. 182).

These cases do not occur frequently in everyday life because they are generally caused by weakness in the sense perception, such as in sleep, or emotions clouding reasoning, such as in the case of fear causing one to see ghouls or physical conditions such as epilepsy. With the effect of the weakened sense the creative imagination becomes more active and less controlled by intellection. In these cases we see human beings' creating these non-existent forms and although the soul is still regarded as the agent, they are neither in the intellect nor in the sense:

According to us the imaginative forms which the epileptics witness are not in a substratum which may entail their substratum to be either a corporeal part from us or a soul. Nay, they are suspended forms which subsist by the soul and are preserved by it so long [the soul] witnesses them (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 221; tr. Peerwani, p. 163).

For perfected souls, there is the possibility to connect with the higher realm and to witness what is unseen for ordinary people. Thus, another explanation for perceiving non-present things in senses is that the soul interacts with the unseen (Bonmariage, 2002, p. 45). In this case, we cannot directly talk about creativity of the soul for these non-present forms, as they come from the realm of the unseen.

As for the second point that the soul perceives particulars, Şadrā lists a number of proofs and assigns a whole chapter to this topic in his *Asfār*. The first proof is that intelligible people perceive that the senses take place in the sense organs. If the soul were the perceiver, then we would not have particular awareness about particularity of the senses. The second proof comes from the factual cases of dysfunction. In these cases when the sense organs and parts of the brain are damaged, this damage affects the performance and success of the external and inner senses. This should demonstrate correlation between the senses and the sense organs. Accordingly, it is not the soul but rather the sense organs which are the perceiver. The third proof is built on the multi-layered understanding of the world (in a similar fashion to seeing the senses multi-layered as those for particulars and others for universals). If the soul is the perceiver, every being that can sense should have a soul. In this case we would end up with the absurdity that animals have immaterial souls since they too perceive.

In general, the basic assumption behind these proofs is a multi-layered idea of the world and the senses. In this, each layer is dramatically differentiated and distanced from the other, and none of these layers can interact with any of the other layers. However, Ṣadrā's epistemology and ontology is built on a monist approach. His main reply to the proofs about the multiplicity of the senses is based on this.

These cases are used to claim that correlation is superficially true. They are for him only proofs that the soul uses these organs as tools and that perception might require some physical conditions. However, these do not, according to him, necessitate that these tools are the actual perceivers.

This is possible because the active [or agent] faculty [that is, the soul] needs those tools [of perception] for those acts in regard to its activity for those acts but not in regard to its essence. For do you not see that people having weak eyes need the eye-glasses for vision?

From that it does not entail that this tool is the perceiver. So is the case with these natural [i.e., physical] tools (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 276; tr. Peerwani, p. 203).

The material features of the sensation as the object, organ, and so on are already discussed and it is explained that for Ṣadrā these are redefined as immaterial. The object and the perception and the perceiver are the same as the soul. And this is possible because, just as the extra-mental object is only preparation for the sensation, so is the sense organ.

After three considerations on the unity of the soul, Ṣadrā adds some particular proofs (*Asfār*, v.8, pp. 268-278). These proofs draw attention to different activities of the soul and connect it to the divisibility of the soul. The basic claim in these proofs is that these activities are related to the soul rather than the body.

First particular consideration: The locus (*maḥall*) of lust and irascibility is not the body, and it is not anything bodily. All bodies are divisible. If the body were the locus, then one part of the body could be angry and the other part in lust. As a result, we would observe one individual in both these states at once. This is absurd, so the locus of these should be immaterial. This proof also proves that not only lower levels of the soul such as animal faculties, but also emotions, are explained in an immaterial fashion.

Second consideration: The estimative faculty is non-bodily. If it were bodily, then we could think about proportions of things such as friendship as a quarter friendship, a half friendship, etc. Moreover, objects of estimation such as enmity and friendship would be

capable of sensible pointing (*al-ishāra al-ḥissīya*). In this way, we could think of enmity here, and there. But this is not the case. Thus, estimation should be non-bodily.

Third consideration: The faculty of imagination (*khayāl*) and memory (*ḥifẓ*) are not bodily. One of the proofs for immateriality is that the imagination is active at the dream-state and when people with mental health problems perceive non-existent things. Objects of dreams, illusions, and similar issues are not bodily and existent. Thus, the faculty that perceives them is not bodily due to the identity principle. Secondly, if things that are imagined and remembered were imprinted in the brain, then humans would not have enough space in our brain for all the experiences they cognized.

To sum up the arguments we discussed so far, Mullā Ṣadrā's proofs for the unity of the soul, his principle that soul is all its faculties, and that the soul perceives particulars are all intertwined. They are connected with the idea of identity. The soul is the same as those that it perceives and as well as the soul, its percepts are immaterial. Now let me give a summary of the chapter and Ṣadrā's theory of sensation.

3.4 CONCLUSION

As has been stated above, Mullā Ṣadrā posits monist ontology when his ideas on his approach to the human as a microcosm and the gradation of existence (*tashkīk*) are considered.

Mullā Ṣadrā still keeps the Active Intellect's role as a source of knowledge, but also applies two important principles; firstly, unification of the knower and the known; secondly, knowledge as a mode of existence. Knowledge and experiences of self, in this picture, play an important role in the human soul's substantial change and movement from its material departure to its higher immaterial destination. On the side of the object, material objects of perception present a unity that carries their space-time features into the perception process. On the side of the agent, the self undergoes a change with the process of perception which Mullā Ṣadrā names as identity of knower and known.

To sum up, the substantial difference of Mullā Ṣadrā's thesis from the Peripatetic attitude is the principle of 'unity of being'. The harmony between God, human, and other existents, *tashkīk*, and substantial motion (*ḥaraka jawharīya*) are closely related to and caused by this main principle that existence is one single reality that is the cause of multiplicity in the universe (*basīt al-ḥaqīqa kull al-ashyā*):

You have come to know that *wujūd* is a single, simple reality. Its individuations are not differentiated between themselves by things essential, such as genus, specific difference and the like. Rather, they are differentiated from each other by perfection or deficiency, self-sufficiency or poverty. Now, deficiency and poverty are not things which are postulated by the reality of *wujūd* itself. If this were so, there would be no Necessary Being. The consequent is false, as was established; the antecedent must therefore also be false.

It has become therefore evident that the reality of *wujūd* is, in itself, complete and perfect, infinite in power and intensity. Deficiency, shortcomings, contingency and the like only come from what is secondary and caused. Inevitably the caused is not equal to the cause and the emanated is not equal to the source of emanation. It is therefore evident that the Necessary Being is the plenary perfection of all things; it is the *wujūd* of all existences and the Light of all lights. (*Mashāʿir*, p. 49, tr. I. Kalin, etc)

It will then become clear that sense is not only about grasping what is present out there, but a construction. Perception becomes completed when imagination is involved.

In this new presentation of sensation, the object of sense is no more than a -mental object: “: [...] the sensible in essence is the form which is present with the soul and not something extra-mental corresponding to it” (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 238; tr. Peerwani, pp. 174-5).

Şadrā refuses to take the sense organ as the real perceiver. He takes support from a proof from regression:

You may say that the visual faculty which is in the eye is the eye is the organ which perceives the perceptible object, then it transmits what it has perceived through the connection which exists between it and yourself and thus you gain an awareness of the thing which (actually) the visual faculty has already perceived. (In that case) we will ask: after the transmission to you, do you (again) perceive the visible object as the organ had perceived, or not? If you say “yes” then in that case your perception is one thing and you’re your organ’s perception is another. But if you say that you do not perceive after the transmission, then you have not perceived or heard or felt your pleasure and pain...for the knowledge that the eye sees, the ear hears, the feet walk, and the hand seizes is not identical with seeing, hearing, walking and seizing, any more than our knowledge that someone else is hungry or feels pleasure

or pain is identical with our feeling hungry, pleasure, or pain (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 265-66, tr. Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 222).

In this case, it is fair to say that Mullā Ṣadrā's external senses are not externally centred or sourced; in contrast, it all comes from inside or above. This is why: "[E]very sense perception's subsistence is by the imaginative perception, and every imaginative perception's subsistence is by the intellection" (*Asfār*, v.8, p. 240, tr. Peerwani p. 176). The relation of the sense object and the sensation is an illuminative relation. This immaterial relation is made possible by the redefined internalized sense object. Thus, in terms of the intentionality question reflected to the relation of sensation and sense object, we have an internalized sense object, and an immaterial relation between the object and the sensation. To say it more exactly, the sensation, the sense object, and the soul are one and the same.

In Mullā Ṣadrā's theory, we find an upside-down relation of Aristotelian or Avicennan external-internal senses hierarchy. The extra-mental world is not the only and unique source for intellection as it was for Aristotle. Quite the opposite, even the external processes find their source in the human or from the higher worlds than the material extra-mental world.

I can now state some basic principles from what I have discussed among Sadrian texts.

First, sense perception is an active process for the soul, not the sense organ, whereby the soul undergoes a change and an abstracted form that correlates to the extra-mental sense object emanates from it.

Second, the form subsisting in the soul has an accidental relation to the extra-mental sense object. However, the extra-mental object still correlates to the internalized real sense object and is similar to the abstracted version of itself. The form of the material object plays a preparatory role for the soul to accept the emanated form.

Remembering the centrality of the active intellect in Avicenna's theory, the active intellect's role as the guarantor of knowledge is given by Ṣadrā to the notion of homology of human and the cosmos. What makes a datum true is the correspondence between human mind as human imagination and the world as the imagination on a larger scale (Khamanei, 2006, p.153).

In this chapter I aimed at explaining how the mental world is built and how it is related to the extra-mental world. I concluded that the inner world of the mind is actively built by the human, thus intentional objects are creations of human beings themselves. Their

relation to the extra-mental world is of a similarity and built on the homology of the soul to the world. In this sense, Mullā Ṣadrā's epistemology is at some points reminiscent that of Plato in which knowledge is remembrance. However, Ṣadrā does not say it explicitly and the characteristics of knowledge in his version seem to be more active than a theory of remembering. The next chapter will pursue linguistic and ontological aspects of intentionality. First part of the next chapter will deal with the idea of soul and her place in the world. After this introductory section, the first question will be how the mentalized objects are turned into symbols and used as entities of language. The language of existence is a by-product of this quest. The related question is what kind of language is required for an ontology that accepts mental and extra-mental entities. After these, I will give a detailed discussion of the ontological issues on intentionality.

4 CHAPTER IV

LANGUAGE AND LOGIC

Spoken words are the symbols of “mental experience” [or “of affections in the soul” (tr. Ackrill)] and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images (DI, 16a3-7).⁷³

The wujūd of a thing is either extra-mental or mental, or spoken, or written.

The first two are real and the latter two are conventional (Tanqīh, p. 254).⁷⁴

In the previous chapter, I focused on Ṣadrā's version of the theory of perception. Together with Ṣadrā's conception of the soul, I aimed to show the process of the production of objects of perception. This chapter discusses the way in which those objects are reflected in symbols in language and speech. In previous chapters, the basic claim for intentionality is that the quest is that the discussion on soul is an essential part of medieval discussions. In terms of intentional objects in the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā, it is discussed that the object of perception is internal and produced by the soul. This is not only a more immaterialized version of the Peripatetics' theory of sense perception but a fresher way of looking at the relationship of human beings to their environment. In Ṣadrā's case, we find a more active agent and a process that is less dependent on the extra-mental world. I also mentioned that the theoretical tools Ṣadrā used for this kind of perception theory is the idea of 'the creative capacity of the soul' and 'the human being as a microcosm' which plays a similar guarantor role for knowledge to the Peripatetics' active intellect (MQ, pp. 33-5). Ṣadrā is not accounting for the infinite and random creation of mental worlds that are subjective. Rather, his idea that the human is a microcosm is the guarantor of certainty and objectivity. With this relationship of similarity the relationship to the extra-mental world is assured. The creative power in the human is due to the human being's status that she is created in the image of God. Mullā Ṣadrā finds similarities between the forms in the human mind to the creations in God's knowledge. He thinks that, whether mental or extra-

⁷³ In the Arabic version the word *mental* (as narrated by Ḥunayn) is “affections are in the soul” (الاثار التي في النفس) (IbAR, v. 1, p. 59).

⁷⁴ “وجود الشيء إما عيني أو ذهني أو لفظي أو كتبي. والاولان حقيقيان والاخران وضعيان، لاختلافهما بحسب الاعصار والامم” (Tanqīh the Ibāra section, p. 254). Cf. a parallel text from Aristotle about conventionality of names: “I say ‘by convention’ because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name” (DI 16a26).

mental, the real active agent in existence is always God (*MQ*, p. 34). Thus, together with the idea of the human being's similarity to the cosmos and human creative nature, he points to the dual nature of the human (similarity to cosmos and God) and a human being's in-between status (*barzakh*). Since the creation process of mental beings are, as mentioned, covered in the previous chapters by the process of sensation, this chapter will focus on the way these beings are represented in language and writing; it aims to explore intentional inexistence further by looking at linguistic and logical entities.

The main claim is that language is a realm created by and dependent on the human mind and that language is basically this humanly world of the mental made *apparent/visible* and *symbolized*. The relation between object and the mental is turned into a relation of words and concepts. The mental status of these linguistic entities comes from the fact that they are products of judgements. Here I would like to draw attention to a differentiation between an image in the mind and a judgement (Findlay, 1963, p. 5). In Brentano's case, the image (*Vorstellung*) is passively received by the human. The judgement, on the other hand, is maintained by an active mental process. This is similar to the Peripatetic understanding of sensation as discussed in the previous chapter. Previously Ṣadrā's different active explanation was also presented. What this means in terms of the mental image and the judgement is that both the image and the judgement is actively maintained by the soul. Yet, when it comes to the symbols used for these mental images, Ṣadrā agrees with the idea that the symbols are derived from the images and thus, in a sense, more passive. It is commonly observed in the classical philosophies that the extra-mental world, the world of mental constructions, and linguistic entities are constructed in such a way as to be connected and distinct at the same time. In modern times, the relation of the extra-mental object and the mental content is identity when we read Brentano. This might be due to his direct realism (Findlay, 1963, p. 7). Meinong thinks that the words are a second level of signification and sentences are representatives of judgements (Meinong, 1983, pp. 24-28, 28-30). The medieval philosophers show a more complicated case of both similarity and distinctiveness between different realms of the extra-mental, mental, and symbolic world of writing and speaking. The argumentation about the similarity of the object and mental content for Peripatetics were discussed in the second chapter. Some nuance of distinction becomes observable when the locus of each consideration is considered. The locations are different even the content is regarded as being identical. The distinctiveness makes it easy for philosophers to explain how concepts, physical things, and words can have different attributes from each other. Avicenna, for example,

discusses different attributes of a quiddity when it is mental and extra-mental. We can say that part of Avicenna's theorization of mental existence is related to the second part about explaining differences between these realms. Similarly, Fārābī discusses how linguistic terms and concepts are different and, as a result, they are ruled by different norms (Abed, 1991, p. 127). Avicenna describes the process of language production in a similar way, but more dependent on the extra-mental world and on the sensation process. He creates a relative hierarchy between imprints (*āthār*) and meanings (*ma'ānī*). Words in essence signify (*tadullu*) things (*umūr*) which are extra-mental (*ShIb*, pp. 1-3). This is a representative theory in which linguistic entities are explained in relation to the imprints of the extra-mental objects. However, in terms of accountability, Avicenna opens up space for mental interrelations as he does not deny meaning for fictional things or accept truth values for propositions over these. To put it more clearly, the reference of a word is to the extra-mental object when the object is existent and to the mental correspondent when there is no extra-mental object that corresponds to the word.

The classification of different realms that are parallel platforms of being can be traced back to Aristotle as: *de re*, *mental*, *spoken* and *written*. Given that this type of classification is common and dominant between ancient and medieval thinkers, in this chapter I will assume that all other than *de re* being are mental existents. In terms of spoken and written entities, they are more of a reflection of what already is a mental being. They are symbols for the world of the mental (*DI* 16a 5–9; *IbAR*, p. 59).⁷⁵ In this sense the latter two realms are second order and similar to the term *derived intentionality*, a notion found in modern discussions. Objects that possess derived intentionality are content-bearing artificially in contrast to mental states that are intrinsically content-bearing. I will not discuss this connection further as the differentiation of intrinsic and derived intentionality is beyond the scope of this research.

Returning to the original discussion, the difference between the mental and the other two symbolic realms is that the latter are conventional and have more dependent modes of being than mental existence (*Tanqīh*, p. 254). This conventionality is also related to a human being's creative nature and active role in language and concept formation. It will be explained further in the section about *assent and conception* that the creative role is apparent in the judgement and the passivity of language is apparent in the assent. Āmulī evaluates Ṣadrā's words in a way that implies a stronger link between extra-mental world

⁷⁵ A section from *DA* can be added as a relevant text as well. In *DA*, soul and imagination is presented in relation to speech: "Voice is a certain kind of sound made by ensouled being" (*DA* 420b 5-7, 29–32, *Paraphrase*, p. 269).

and mental existence than that of extra-mental world and language. Thus mental beings are individuated (‘*aynī*’) as being the human construction of a similar world, but writings and linguistic entities are not (Āmulī, 1307, p. 30).

The first sections of this chapter will deal with Ṣadrā’s idea of the soul. The following section will be on the nature of proposition, predication, and the copula as mental entities (though they are shadowy in comparison to mental beings). This will show how they are bound to different rules than physical beings due to their representation of mental beings’ intentional inexistence. How such construction of a special world made up of linguistic and logical rules can be possible will be the topic of the last section of this chapter. This is connected to Ṣadrā’s idea of *tashkīk of wujūd*⁷⁶ and his unique approach to different meanings of being. Accordingly, this type of world is possible because existence is a single reality manifested at different levels, intensities and priorities/posteriorities.

⁷⁶ The word appears in the translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and re-emerged in Islamic philosophers’ writings later. Ṣadrā reinvents the term for his principle of primacy of *wujūd* (existence). During the text, I decided to leave *tashkīk* in its original form as I did in the usage of similar other terms such as *wujūd*. This is mainly because I want to keep the focus on its original usage in Ṣadrā’s philosophy. In relation to predication with *tashkīk*, Kalin translates the term as *predication by equivocality*, in relation to ontological usage he translates the term as gradation. Rizvi uses a more original term for *tashkīk*: “modulation”. In one of the earliest works on Ṣadrā, Fazlurrahman chooses “systematic ambiguity”. I chose to leave the Arabic term as it is because I think each of these translations only partially reflects its meaning. I believe the nuances that emerge during the different contexts will be more apparent as the text evolves. For a detailed analysis of *tashkīk* in philosophies before Ṣadrā, see Treiger, 2012, pp. 327-66.

4.1 MULLĀ ŞADRĀ'S IDEA OF THE SOUL

The previous chapter discussed how what is formed in the soul in the process of perception is through the action of the soul. The knower, the known, and knowledge are identical. The process is explained immaterially and internally. The soul is active at the process of sensation and the sense is always completed with the interference of either imagination or intellect. The result is that the objects of the sense are among the list of most obvious habitants of the mind: what is perceived in sensation becomes mental existent. In order to discuss how the mentalized objects are symbolized and carried further to the realms of language and logic, I will first need to discuss Şadrā's idea of the soul. This discussion will, moreover, add depth to the previous explanation of how the soul is active in the sensation process. With this, Şadrā's ideas briefly mentioned previously as the soul being active and having creative capacity together with the idea of the soul as a microcosm and the human as a god-like being (*theosis*) will be connected to his explanation of what the soul is. And this will be connected to the linguistic discussions of mental beings.

Aristotle's definition of the soul, which is different from the purely immaterialist Platonist approach and the materialist pre-Socratics, formed a new form of dualism which values the body as well as the immateriality of the soul. His exploration of this definition started with the idea of life. The living bodies were then regarded as having vegetative, animal, and rational souls. Each one of these had corresponding faculties and bodily structures. When summarising the previous definitions of the soul, Şadrā lists them as the form of the body, as the perfection of the body, as a compound of soul and body, and as the substance (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 7-9).

That the rational soul is immaterial and different from the body is a celebrated idea by the time of Mullā Şadrā. The flying man argument or similar introspected thought experiments implied this outcome in the hands of Porphyry, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Avicenna and Suhrawardī. Suhrawardī's proofs for an immaterial soul can be given as an example.⁷⁷ The knowledge of the self is not related to the knowledge of the body. This requires differentiation of soul from body. The ego/self is not the same as the body. Similarly, the consciousness of one's self is continuous. Awareness of the body, on the

⁷⁷ For a detailed analysis of Suhrawardī's soul see Halide Yenen (2007) *Sühreverdî Felsefesinde Epistemology (Epistemology in Suhrawardī's Philosophy)*, University of Marmara/Istanbul.

other hand, is not (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 46). Following these differences, the soul is neither body nor ‘in’ the body (*Partawnāma*, p. 23). Another proof is given through objects of knowledge. The knower should be of the same nature as the known in order to be able to conceive it. The universals do not occupy space and are not material. Yet, the human can apprehend them. The identity principle requires that the knower should be of the same nature as the known. As a consequence, the soul should be immaterial as it is the knower. The idea of illuminative relation and this proof is used by Šadrā. His employment of the proof is for immateriality of imagination as well as immateriality of the soul (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 214-5, *Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 278ff.). Another proof draws attention to the difference between body and soul. The body confronts growth, ageing, and other kinds of changes. However, the soul remains the same.⁷⁸ This proves the difference of the soul as well as her immateriality (*Hayākil*, p. 85, *Asfār*, v. 8, p. 45).

Sadra quotes Plotinus’ introspective anecdote to point to the immaterial nature of the human and her similarity to the cosmos.⁷⁹ The idea of the human as microcosm is not unique to Šadrā. What makes his attitude unique is the way he combines this idea with the substantial motion of the soul and the dynamic reality of existence. The similarity of the human to the cosmos can be traced in ancient philosophies as well as modern ones. Examples include Plato’s *mega zoon*, Aristotle’s *phusis* in *Physics* (252b26), the Stoic all living universe, the Neoplatonists’ idea of kinship between the human soul and the World Soul, as well as the biblical idea of the human being created in the image of God (Genesis 1.26) and the Renaissance idea of *proportion* (Bizri, 2006, pp. 4-6).

Mulla Šadrā brings about the idea of the identification of man and the cosmos in his *Iksīr al-‘ārifīn*. This book is mainly based on Kāshānī’s *Jāwīdan-nāma* where Kāshānī defends unification of the knower and the known.⁸⁰ This identification comes as one of the

⁷⁸“The parts of the [body of the] animal may increase at times and decrease at other times due to the [natural] dissolution [within]. There is hardly any animal body that is not overpowered by the innate heat and the heat of elements within it, the heat of the motion [of the sun] and the air around it especially when the summer [heat] increases at the high altitude of the sun, [when its body decreases in weight]. But that animal subsists by its individuality in all its states. So we learn that its ipseity is different from its sensible structure” (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 45, tr. p. 33).

⁷⁹ “At times I became solitary in myself and removed my body on a side and became as if I was a substance disengaged [from matter] without the body. I was inside my essence [or myself], outside of all things. I saw in myself beauty and loveliness, and I remained very much astonished at it” (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 360, tr. p. 267).

⁸⁰ For a comparison of the book of the cosmos with the book of human see *Iksīr al-‘ārifīn*, 2003, p.22; for how the coming into existence of different parts of the human is compared to the creation of the cosmos, see *Iksīr al-‘ārifīn*, 2003, p. 28.

expected consequences of the uniformity of existence. Moreover, Mulla Ṣadrā links this identification to the possibility of a human's knowledge:

[M]an has knowledge of everything, and his essence has the receptivity for every form, since there is nothing that is not similar to him (*nazīr*). Thus all existent things are parts of his existence and, and he is all things due to his oneness. Because his existence is a macrocosm, his body is a microcosm, and his ruling property flows in all things through subjection (*Iksīr*, tr. p. 19).

This similarity of the human and the universe and its facilitating role reminds one of Plotinus and his *sympatheia*. In Mulla Ṣadrā's theory, human beings create an emanated form which is the abstracted form corresponding to the sense object. This resembles the special form invented by Plotinus, a non-physical omnipresent form which is dependent on the organic unity of the cosmos (Emilsson, 1988, p. 57). Thanks to *sympatheia* theory, Plotinus assumes a unity in the cosmos that connects the sense organ and the sense object (Emilsson, 1988, p. 59). According to Emilsson, this (originally Stoic) term is used by Plotinus to account for direct perception by allowing action at a distance. *Sympatheia* depends on the unity of the soul in the world and the soul in the recipient (Emilsson, 2008, pp. 24, 27, 28).

The *Iksir al-ʿarīfīn* paragraph, similar to Plotinus' position, not only claims that the human being is a microcosm, but also that the human and the cosmos (other existents than human) share some sort of reality which makes such a microcosm-macrocosm relation and knowledge possible.⁸¹ This point can be used to prove that Mulla Ṣadrā is among those philosophers who think knowledge is possible among similar things. The small worlds and the great world are not only similar but also they are in harmony. This is the reason what makes human beings capable of contemplating on themselves and on the world. What is more, the human is also like a mirror for this world (*Maḥāṭih al-Ghayb*, v.1, p.56).

Existence is one reality shared by all existent things at different levels. By gradation of intensity, one reality remains as the source of many (Principle of Unity and Multiplicity). Beside his other writings, in *Shawāhid*, Mulla Ṣadrā explains how existent things are differentiated from each other with the seventh witness (*shāhid*) on existence (*Shawāhid*,

⁸¹ When the human being (created with this resemblance) perfects her being, she becomes Perfect Man (*al-insān al-kāmil*) where her resemblance to the universe results in her being able to command the world (Khamaneī, 2006, p. 151).

1382 [2003 or 2004], pp. 15-6): “particularity (*khuṣūṣ*) of every existence is through their being prior and being posterior, perfectness and deficiency, richness and poorness; or through their material accidents if these existents are material ...”. Every existent is unique and takes place at a level of existence.

Going back to the idea of life as the centre of the idea of the soul, life is material for Ṣadrā (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 23-24). He follows the established syllabus in previous texts for discussing the soul in relation to the body and bodily features, and to the material configuration (*mīzāj*). Ṣadrā also refuses to define the soul in relational terms. Ṣadrā’s refutation of identifying the soul as one of these material candidates or as an accidental reality in contrast to substantial constitutes partially his proofs of the immaterial soul. He discusses the ancient ideas of soul such as ratio and harmony and denies them when they are interpreted to prove the soul as material. However, he thinks most of these ancient theories are misunderstood (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 286ff.).

His notion of the immateriality of the soul is stronger than that of the Peripatetics. Moreover, the disconnectedness of matter and the immaterial is no more emphasized, so his stance is stronger than that of the Neoplatonists as well. This is due to his monist psychology in which matter is almost disregarded or matter is dissolved into the immaterial. One substance that is material changes into an immaterial substance through a continuous process of change. As a result, materiality and immateriality are assigned to this very same substance. “The human soul is corporeal in existence and disposal, and spiritual in subsistence and intellection” (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 402, tr. p. 298).⁸²

The change in the soul from the material into immaterial can be applied to the directedness of the soul’s knowledge. The directedness assumed for the flying man argument can also be seen as the source of the dichotomy of direct and infallible knowledge versus indirect discursive and fallible knowledge formulized by Suhrawardī as knowledge by presence (*‘ilm al-ḥuṣūlī* and *al-ḥuḍūrī*). The idea of direct knowledge is important and part of the proof of existence and immateriality of the soul for Mulla Ṣadrā (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 50).

⁸² Cf. *Asfār*, v. 8, p. 395, tr. p. 293: “The material souls [i.e., the souls at the potential level of intellect] are distinguished from each other by the attachments attained by them due to the matter. Since the souls are corporeal in creation so their ruling-property is the ruling-property of forms and the material natures subject to multiplication because of the corporeal agents of distinction. Due to these [attachments] there entails the determination of each one of them as their particular existence which is precisely the same as their self-awareness; and that continues firmly despite some kind of existential renewal. There is no doubt that there always remains the distinction among them because all of them obtain an existential difference according to their substantiation from the beginning of their generation till the end of their substantial perfection.”

However, indirect knowledge evolves into direct knowledge in a similar way. Here, Ṣadrā employs the traditional notion of self-knowledge:

When a man turns within himself and is in the presence of his ipseity he sometimes becomes unaware of all universal notions even the notion of being a substance, or an individual or the one governing the body. When I apprise myself I only sense the being which perceives itself in a particular way. Whatever is other than that particular ipseity to which I refer by “I” is outside of myself, even the notion of “I”, the concept of existence, the concept of the perceiver itself, the concept of the body’s manager or soul, and so forth, for all of them constitute universal knowledge, and each one is indicated by me by “it”, whereas I refer to myself as “I”. Thus, the unawareness of substantiality, or ignorance of it does not negate it being one of the essential predicates for the human quiddity, and also for the animal [quiddity] (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 50-1, tr. p. 38).

The real knowledge is this kind of knowledge. In regards to awareness of the self, he thinks even animal souls are aware of their souls and this awareness is continuous. “The animal’s knowledge of its ipseity is continuous, and not acquired by the senses. Whereas its knowledge of its internal and external parts [of its body] is not so. Therefore, its ipseity is different from its parts [of the body]” (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 46, tr. p. 34).

Ṣadrā’s idea that all forms of souls are immaterial breaks the boundaries of material and immaterial in an innovative way. As mentioned before, this is an extreme monism in favour of the immaterial.⁸³ See, for example, how comfortably Ṣadrā applies Avicenna’s *flying man* to prove immateriality, and directedness of the animal soul as well as self-awareness of animals of themselves:

Man cannot know the external parts [of his body] except through his senses; nor can he know the internal parts [of his body] except through

⁸³ Sadra gives a textual proof and spiritual reading for this. “The next world is a genus for many worlds. All those worlds, despite their levels of priority among them are greater and nobler than this world. Likewise, for man and his senses there are many modalities of existence other than this material modality subject to generation, corruption and dissolution. That is why the Exalted said: We will substitute your likenesses and recreate you in what you do not know [56:61]; and the Exalted said: The next world is greater in levels and greater in preferment [17:21]. After mentioning the creation of semen, a clot, a clot of tissue, all of which are the natural material levels, the Exalted said: Then We produced him as [yet] another creature. So blessed is God, the best of creators [23:14]. This is an indication to the nobility of the mode of spirit. The Exalted said: He has created you in stages [71:14]. Then there is the modality of being of the friendship [with God] for the one who triumphs in the next modality of being which is higher than the modality of being of the foundation of the spirit” (*Asfār* v. 9, p. 242, tr. p. 503).

the dissection [of the body]. Also, an animal cannot know its parts [of the body], and if it knows then it is through one of the two [afore-mentioned] ways. Another demonstration that animal is not just a sensible frame: We say, if it is postulated that an animal is created suddenly, and created as a perfect [entity], but its senses are veiled to see the external things; *that it is suspended in the void or in the absolute air; that nothing collides with it in [its] standing in the air*; that it does not sense anything from the qualities; its limbs have been severed so there is no mutual contact [between it and its limbs]. Now in this condition also it is able to perceive its self [or essence], and can become oblivious to all its external and internal parts [of its body]. Nay, it is able to affirm its self but is not able to affirm that it has extension, height, breadth, or any direction. Even if it imagines a position, or a direction, or an organ [of the body] in that state, it is not able to imagine that any of those is a part of its self. Thus it is evident that the one who is aware of itself is other than the one from which it is oblivious. Therefore, its ipseity is different from all the parts [of its body] (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 47, tr. p. 35).

Soul is a unity that starts its journey as a material substance. It is the same as her precepts and her experiences. This was previously mentioned as the principle of the soul being all its faculties.⁸⁴ The soul's journey towards her perfection is not reversible.

⁸⁴ "The soul is all faculties; that it is their unified combination, their beginning and their end. This is also the state of every higher faculty in relation to the faculties below it which serve it, even though their service is [in the order of] prior and posterior, for some of these faculties are prior to the others, and whatever is prior in time is posterior in rank and eminence. The soul that we have, or every animal has, is the unifier of the elements of its body, its combiner and composer in a way that is appropriate to become a body for it. It also nourishes it, feeds it and perfects it, as an individual by the nourishment and as a species through the reproduction; it preserves its health, repulses its sickness, and brings it back to its sound temperament when it corrupts, and by which lies its well-being. It keeps it continuing in the order which is necessary for it so the foreign external entities do not become dominant on it as long as the soul is existent in it. If the soul were not [there], then being the principle of the acts of perception and animality, and being the principle of the vegetal and natural acts in the bodily matter, it would not remain sound; rather it will corrupt at the dominance of the external states over it. When the imaginative or intellectual perceptions, whether joyful or painful, occur to the soul resulting in happiness or pain, they affect the body by either strengthening it or weakening it in the faculties of growth. This effect is not just from the belief qua belief of happiness or sorrow, rather these are also the states of soul and they affect the subtle matter flowing in the body, resulting in the change of states of the vaporous spirit and its temperament, and affecting the states of the coarse [physical] body and its temperament through the intermediary of the faculties. As for the rational joy, it adds to the strength of the faculties of the body, such as [the faculty of] growth, or that which is lower than it in degree, strongly and penetratingly. The rational sorrow adds to its becoming weak, to disability, and lassitude, so much so that its act corrupts it and impairs its temperament. This is one of the strongest indications that the activity of the soul and its management flow till the ultimate end of the matter and the distant coarse shell [of the body] from the core of its most subtle higher substance. Thus it is established that the animal soul, nay the human soul, is the combiner of these vegetal faculties of perception, and their near and distant subjects [or bodies]. It is

But once it becomes one of the species in actuality, its descending to the level of a pure potentiality another time is impossible, just as it is impossible for an animal to become sperm and blood-clot after it has reached the completion of [its] creation. That is because this is the [ascending] movement [of growth] in its essence and substance, so it is not possible for it to reverse, neither by compulsion, nor by nature, nor by will, nor by accident (*Asfār*, v. 9, p. 4, tr. p. 343).

Simplicity requires that each level contain the levels below. Yet the faculties at each level come with capacities required for their specific level. The faculties in the higher beings are more perfect than those in lower beings. The vegetable soul in a plant is different from the vegetable soul in an animal. So in this presentation the notion of simplicity is combined with the idea of perfected faculties at each high level. This can be read as a redefined version of the definition of the soul as perfection. Each previous level plays a preparatory role for the soul's journey to the next level, or its perfection:

[The souls] are different in degrees in eminence in the existential perfection. The one which is prior directs itself to the one posterior to it, which is the directing of a thing to its perfection, and connecting the activity to its end, for the end of a thing is the cause of its completion, and not the cause of its invalidation (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 38, tr. p. 27).⁸⁵

In terms of the idea of perfection, the same type of perfection happens in the human internally as human is a microcosm. The human travels from her vegetative being to human being and turns into even higher and more delicate beings.

The first of those [perfections] is the mineral form. It is the preserver of the composition [of the body], and is beneficial to the temperament.

The second one is the vegetal form, and after that is the animal form. In

also the perfection for the subject [i.e., the body] which cannot be constituted except through it. It is also the one which perfects the species and is its artisan. For the things differ from each other by the souls, which differ from each other in the reality of species and not just in individual accidents. So the souls for the bodies are like the forms joined to the species which are actualized after their completion. Also know that the vegetal faculties existing in the plant are different in quiddity and species from the vegetal faculties existing in the animal. They are in two subjects [i.e., bodies], and also they are not accidents, as is imagined. Rather, [the vegetal faculties] in the plant are the actual substance, whereas in the animal they are potential" (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 54-5, tr. p. 40-41).

⁸⁵ Cf. "[T]he substance of the soul gradually acquires the levels in perfection, and necessarily includes the faculties and [their] branches which are requisite to it and included in it, which were before together with the other additions in quantity and quality. Those faculties and [their] branches are continually renewed in number according to their renewal in intensity and perfection. There is a beautiful simile given by some philosophers for the state of the soul from the beginning of its generation till the end of its perfection" (*Asfār*, v. 8, pp. 172-3, tr. p. 128).

this way the gradual intensity occurs in the substantial form of existence until it disengages from the matter and rises above it in essence, then there is perception and management, and [the power of] acting upon and affecting [something] (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 172, tr, p. 128).

The more perfect it gets, the more perfect and highly sensitive its capacities become. As a result, the perfect human becomes capable of perceiving happenings in higher realms and, for example, is able to hear celestial music, smell, and so on.

Şadrā places the human in between the cosmos and the divine being as an isthmus (*barzakh*). As well as the similarity to the cosmos, another feature of the human being is her similarity to the divine (*theosis*, *ta'alluh*). The notion of similarity comes with two consequences. First, that humans are chosen among all creatures as the vicegerents on earth. Second, that humans possess the capacity to create. This is different from the ability to produce that can be observed among animals in cases such as building a nest, etc. Creation of inner forms and ability to have a unique inner world is possible for a human due to the imaginative power common among all human beings (*Asfār*, v. 1, pp. 266-8). Khamanei lists two types of creative command, one creation from nothing (*ibdā'*), and the second, creation from matter (*khalq*), both of which are applied to human beings as well. Similar to human perfection in the senses, the capacity to create can grow more perfect such that a human can affect the extra-mental world (*Asfār*, v. 1, pp. 266-8).

4.2 PROPOSITION

4.2.1 Proposition in relation to Conception and Assent

Şadrā's monist philosophy is reflected in his attitude to language and writing as a holistic approach. In this approach, linguistic forms are loyal reflections of mental beings. One of the drawbacks of a holistic approach is failing to differentiate between logical, ontological, and linguistic levels of inquiry. On the other hand, Şadrā allows us to develop a more monist and minimalist theory at all three levels as they manifest similar characteristics. I started with his holistic approach because his examination of propositions is, on the one hand a combination of sentences and statements, and on the other judgements, concepts, and assents. As a consequence of accepting four modes of parallel existence – *de re*, mental, spoken, and written – each level is a shadow of the one that comes before it. With a holistic approach of this sense, the inquiry of sentences, statements and propositions fall under the inquiry of conception and assent. Şadrā accepts conception and assent as divisions of acquired knowledge, so we find ourselves bound to

his epistemology as well as his theory of language. As a monist in the extreme, he thinks conception and assent are simple, and they are mental beings.

An impression, which is the form of a thing occurring to the mind (*hāṣila*) or in the mind, or the occurrence of the form of a thing in it or to it—since we take all of this to boil down to one and the same thing, given that occurrence is the same as existence, that mental existence is none other than the form which is in the mind, and that everything present in the sense organs of the soul is present in the soul itself because the soul is none other than its very sense organs as we have established in *Asfār* (RTT, p. 51, tr. p. 120).

Regardless of whether the impressions in the mind are accompanied by a judgement, it is a conception in Ṣadrā's presentation. The notion of conception and assent melt into one concept to become merely the notion of conception.

How do these points come together with the ideas before Ṣadrā and how do they allow us to explore more about the language of intentionality? Let me start with some structural background with Fārābī, Avicenna, and Bahmanyar. Propositions are the basis for assents and conceptions. And propositions are expressed by using sentences. Thus, structurally, the first unit to understand is *sentence*. Desire, belief, and wish can be expressed with sentences; moreover, they can be used in order to command, request, and ask questions. When sentences form the basis for assent or dissent, and when they are declarative, then they form propositions. Thus, for example, sentences that express greetings or questions are not propositions (Restall, 2006, pp. 9-11). Fārābī talks about sentences by terming them “complete phrase” (*qawl tāmm*). Ṣadrā describes complete phrases as those for which it is permissible to be silent at the end of it, and one side of it is a noun without any restrictions of time and the other side is either (he) or a word and this second part has a complete meaning which is also attached by time (*Tanqīḥ*, p. 248). Complete phrases are divided into five as statement or declarative (*jāzim*) (*DI* 17a1-17a7; *IbAR*, p. 63), imperative (*amr*), entreaty (*taḍarru*), request (*ṭalab*), and vocative (*nidā*) (Abed, p. 37; *Ib.FR*, pp. 139-40; tr. Zimmerman, p. 226). Avicenna follows Fārābī with a similar list. Apart from the first one, the other four have no truth value unless by accident (*Ib.FR*, pp. 139-40). The statements, on the other hand, must be either true or false (*Ib.FR*, p. 139; *DnM*, pp. 20-21). This is in line with Aristotle's statements in *DI*:

Every sentence is significant (not as a tool, but as we said, by convention), but not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but

only those in which there is truth and falsity. There is not truth and falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false (*DI* 17a1-6, *IbAR*, p. 63).

A number of terms which appear in Fārābī's writing are interchangeably used for declarative statements such as *qawl jāzim*, *qaḍiyya*, *hukm*, *haml*, *taṣḍiq*, *khavar* (Abed, 1991, pp. 37-8). When the sentences are about the future, it is difficult to find out whether the proposition is true or false (*DnM*, p. 21). Ṣadrā does not argue in terms of these terms and he does not give a long discussion on these classifications other than a brief section in his *Tanqīḥ*.

When it comes to assent and conception, he sides with Avicenna as well. He differentiates Avicenna's approach from the common understanding of his day and criticizes the view that assent is conception combined with judgement. According to him the problem is the misunderstanding and literal interpretation of Avicenna's basic definition by his commentators. According to Avicenna, a thing can be known from two viewpoints. The first one is that the thing is conceived alone, so that its name occurs in the mind simultaneously with its meaning. This viewpoint does not include the truth or falsity of the statement. In the second one the conception comes together with assent (*taṣḍīq*). This one requires a further examination, affirmation on the concept. In this presentation, all assents necessarily include conceptions but not vice versa (*ShMd*, pp. 16-17). Ṣadrā reports the statement that "the conception accompanied by assent" has been interpreted in three different ways: a) conception is a preparation for assent, thus it is a precondition, b) it is part of assent, and c) lastly that conception is identical to judgement (*RTT*, pp. 45-9). Ṣadrā rejects all three interpretations. In order to understand Ṣadrā's rejection, his division of knowledge should be examined.

One might be reminded here that for Ṣadrā there are two forms of knowledge, one direct (knowledge by presence/ *ilm al-ḥuḍūrī*) and the other indirect (acquired knowledge/ *ilm al-ḥuṣūlī* – i.e. Avicennan knowledge). The second one is through knowledge of quiddities. The division here into assent and conception is a division of acquired knowledge which is passive (*infī 'ālī*). One should not be misguided by the usage of "passive". Even at the level of passive knowledge (especially for sense perception which is an act of object on the sense organ and a change caused by it for the Peripatetics), Ṣadrā's perception of knowledge is more active. Bahmanyar gives the example of the difference in his *Tahsīl* when he differentiates intelligibles from objects of senses (inner and external). He explains that there is an affect and being affected taking place on the

organ by the object when perception takes place (*Tahṣīl*, pp. 489, 498; especially p. 493). However, Ṣadrā believes that even in the early stages of knowledge such as sense perception there is an active function of the soul. This can be a reason to suspect that the differentiation between “passive and active” is not accurate enough but “direct and indirect” is more faithful to Ṣadrā’s explanation. Ṭūsī gives a further example in which some objects such as intelligibles are explained in relation to their extra-mental existence (*Ishārāt*, v. 3, p. 14).

Lameer affirms the usage of the active and passive as he thinks Ṣadrā follows in the footsteps of Aristotle when it comes to the affection theory and is a Platonist when it comes to knowledge through universals (Lameer, 2006, p. 41ff.). There are two problems with this understanding of Ṣadrā. Firstly, as the discussions in previous chapters have shown, Ṣadrā is a monist in his epistemology and psychology as well as in his ontology. He thinks that the soul is active at all levels of knowledge. Thus, he does not leave sense perception out of this. His rejection of affection theory was also described before. The second point will be clarified through his rejection of previous positions on assent. However, to summarize that point: he thinks assent and conception are both simple and in essence identical. They are built on the judgement which is one of the activities of the soul. Ṣadrā’s rejection of the other Peripatetics would not make sense if he too simply accepted the divided epistemology of particular and universal knowledge and also of assent and conception. If we remember the original quotation at the opening of this chapter, language aims to symbolise what is in the mind. What is more, linguistic entities are mental (in a weaker sense). I think the ‘mental-extra-mental’ bi-partite classification is exhaustive, thus if one has to find an ontological home for linguistic entities, it should be the realm of the mental. However, their difference to other mental entities is that they are representations of what is in the mind. So, metaphorically speaking, if some actual thing is X, the *concept* (mental being) about X is like a shadow and the *words* (linguistic entity) used about X are like shadows of the shadows. The main mental structures in relation to language are conceptions, assent, and judgment. For Ṣadrā, as well as for Avicenna, conception and assent are divisions of knowledge (‘ilm) (*RTT*, p. 43; *ShMd*, p. 16). And the division is of a generic concept divided into two naturally unified terms (*RTT*, p. 46; tr. p. 109).⁸⁶ Neither concept nor assent is composite. They have their existence in the soul and they are simple qualities. What kind of mental beings are they

⁸⁶ Ṣadrā differentiates three different types of unity for classified things: generic specific and individual in accordance to the thing classified or natural, artificial or relative/from a certain perspective (*tabī‘ī, sinā‘ī, itibārī*) (*RTT*, p.46; tr. p. 109).

then? They are “two ways of mental being through which things are known. As concepts, they belong to the things known that are part of the secondary intelligibles that the logicians inquire about in their art.”(*RTT*, pp. 46-7, tr. p. 109).

As mental existents, they take their fair share from being: “they are two ways of being, and all being is simple and as such it is individualized by itself” (*RTT*, p. 47; tr. p. 111). But on the other hand “they are two species belonging to the concept of knowledge that come under it as two species under a generic concept, in the way in which blackness and white come under colour” (*RTT*, tr. p. 111).

One problematic section of Sadrian introduction is that assent is simple. This is problematic because the common understanding for Ṣadrā’s day – defended by names such as Rāzī and the Peripatetics – was that assent is composite. For him, mainly because assent and conception are of the genus ‘knowledge’ (*RTT*, pp. 45-50), and that they are the narrowest species that cannot be divided any further, then it is not sound to assume assent as composite. Assent is not the same as judgement (*ḥukm*) as well. The reason is that judgement is one of the acts of the soul, and assent on the contrary is passive. Knowledge that is being-affected (*‘ilm infī ‘alī*) [as mentioned, conception and assent are divisions of acquired knowledge in contrast to knowledge by presence which is direct and active] (*RTT*, p. 75; tr. p.144).

Another question is that of how assent is different from conception, as it would be difficult to differentiate them when both are considered simple. Conception and assent are identical in terms of instauration and in its being (*RTT*, p. 48; tr. p. 112). Indeed, Ṣadrā too seems to use the common language about conception and assent in terms of the analysis: one is conditioned with privation of judgement and the other is conditioned with presence of judgement. Lameer suggests that the conception-absolute is what he means by “identical”, and that divides into conception and assent (*RTT*, tr. p. 113). This point becomes clear in the *RTT* itself (*RTT*, p. 75; tr. p. 144).

The main problem Ṣadrā has with the existing ideas on conception and assent is that they present a non-dynamic analysis. In that kind of evaluation, assent, conception, and judgement first are considered as independent beings and later they are thought to come together to form assent (Lameer, 2006, p. 118). These two exist together in unity; their existence is one while the notion is two (*RTT*, p. 51, tr. p. 119). According to Ṣadrā, Avicenna’s original account is similar to his, but he is misconceived by confused latter-day thinkers like Rāzī (*RTT*, tr. p. 149). As a result, judgement appeared in their writing as the *assent* at times and a *condition for assent* at other times.

I say: the purport of his statements [Avicenna's] "a conception accompanied by [assent]⁸⁷" and "or the conception is accompanied by belief" as figuring the accounts of the *Ishārāt* and the *Shifā'* is the same sense of assent [...] and they are one thing, because the relation of conception absolute to assent is one of unity and not relative [...] However, in his statements the expression "assent" is sometimes applied in the sense of a judgement and at other times to one of the divisions of knowledge (*RTT*, tr. p. 151).

The confusion is between plain conception and conception with a relation to truth:

The mistake derives here from confusion between the essence of a thing and that of which it is true. Now in the definition of assent, conception is understood as being not conditioned by anything and not as the particular individual of which the conception is true. And the one that is opposite to assent is the notion of conception, restricted by the absence of a judgement. That is, disconnected [from it], not [conception] absolute, like in all divisions (*RTT* tr. p. 155).

The second part of the treatise (*RTT*) takes a turn we expect from this highly Peripatetic approach to propositions. The discussion so far is built on the division of direct and indirect knowledge. Indirect knowledge is then divided further into assent and conception. In terms of the process of indirect knowledge, as it is not the passage through certainty, and as it is the deficient form of knowledge, the representationalist theory in the Peripatetic theory appear without dramatic changes. The only twist from common approaches is that these two parts of knowledge are considered as identical and simple, and that they differed for the benefit of analysis. Further on in his *RTT*, Ṣadrā challenges the division of knowledge into assent and conception:

From the above it emerges that assent is a class of conception absolute and that a judgement is an action of the soul which forms no part of conceptual, affective knowledge, even though it is knowledge, [but] active. This is because the actions linked to the apprehension have a being that is coeval with manifestation and inner revelation (*RTT*, p. 56, tr. p. 131).

The identity of active and acquired knowledge is read as a mistake by Lameer. As a result,

⁸⁷ Lameer translates *tasdīq* as "belief". Despite using his carefully prepared translation in general, I excluded the translation of *tasdīq* and changed "belief" into "assent". Belief appears as a stronger term loaded with more implications than the term assent. Belief as a central term for modern discussions of epistemology is different from assent which is commonly accepted as a logical term.

he translates the word ‘*ayn* as *coeval* in place of *identical*. My reading of this passage is literal, and that ‘*ayn* means identity. Let me explain this point through Ṣadrā’s theory of sensation. Even at the level of sensation Ṣadrā thinks that the process is immaterial and the object of sensation and the perceiver are identical. The object of sensation is maintained by the active role of the soul. Even the external senses are active processes of knowledge. What differentiates between a lower level of perception, i.e. perceiving a stone, and a higher level of perception, i.e. perceiving heavenly sounds, depends on the soul’s own perfection.⁸⁸ As a result, it can be said that the differentiation of different types of knowledge is relatively defined. In reality, there is only direct knowledge. The success of the knower depends on her own success in perfecting her soul. This perfection is achieved through the soul’s actions, including sensation in this world.

Every soul emerges from potentiality to actuality in the period of its corporeal life; and according to the acts and deeds, good or evil, it has a kind of actuality and actualization in [its] existence, be that fortunate or unfortunate (*Asfār*, v. 9, p. 8, tr. 343).

‘What propositions are’ needs to be clarified further than this. This can be explored better when the relation of propositions to concepts and extra-mental world is clarified. The clarification eventually becomes a quest about truth values. In contemporary discussions, sentences, propositions, statements, beliefs and judgements are differentiated and made to compete as the best candidate to be a truth bearer (Connor, 1975, pp. 35-58). In our case, propositions are taken to be the carriers of truth and this enables the truth as an inner reality (Kuenne, 2003, p. 91). In this traditional analytical understanding, concepts and their linguistic parallels are tightly bound to each other. Thus, we can easily assume that the truth bearers are propositions. There are two options, to define propositions extensionally or intensionally. Especially in the mainstream Russellian position, it is the extra-mental reality that not only is the truth-maker of a proposition, but also makes the proposition possible (Glazenberg, 2013).⁸⁹ The rival idea is to define them intensionally and relate them to the human mind. A third option is to construct a realm of true propositions independent of both. In Ṣadrā’s case we are dealing with the second type of

⁸⁸ He whose heart is illuminated by the light of certainty [of the Reality], will witness the parts of the world, its concrete beings, its natures and its souls changing at every moment. So everything is transforming, and its concrete beings are passing away (*Asfār*, v. 9, p. 387, tr. p. 600).

⁸⁹ Not according to the sense or connotation, rather according to its reference or denotation. The Moorean-Russellian truth model can appear in the form of an identity version of a correspondence theory of truth in which case true propositions are identical to facts in the extra-mental world. Truth is a property for propositions in this approach. This is a critical stance against the idealist approach. This identification causes difficulty when it comes to explain false propositions. This latter evolved into a correspondence theory in which propositions resemble facts in the world.

definition. So when a sentence is stated, it does not refer to an extra-mental fact, but rather to a holist inner world. In propositions where something is affirmed or denied, the relations are mainly maintained mentally and with internal relations among already constructed concepts. Human beings, according to Ṣadrā, inherently have essential knowledge about the extra-mental world, and in a similar manner to how God has names and those names are prototypes of beings in His knowledge; human beings have names which are assigned by him/her on things. These names created by humans are never capable of grasping the reality of beings; however, they are perfect representations of the abstractions from extra-mental things (*Mashā'ir*, p. 12, tr. p. 13).⁹⁰ Thus, when we discuss the truth of a proposition, it is indeed an internal relation of correspondence to the data in the proposition with the data in mind (*Tafsīr*, v. 3, p. 404ff.). The verse in the Quran says that the knowledge given to Adam on names is interpreted as the ability to see the reality of things. The real names are identical to the Divine Names (*Tafsīr*, v. 3, p. 410-11), and they are also the archetypal perfect versions of things in the material world. The human is given the faculties to recognize these realities. However, the level of their apprehension is dependent on their level of perfection. The perfect human is not only able to witness the realities but also becomes a locus of manifestations of these realities gathered together (*Tafsīr*, v. 3, p. 411-12).

Propositions as assents are parts of indirect knowledge which indeed contain judgements that are actively and mentally constructed. Thus, in the case of language being the representation of the mental, we find out how they differ. Language is passive and mental as in judgement is active (*MQ*, p. 51). The truth of a proposition thus is indeed carried by the mental content which is represented in the proposition. When the judgement is about an extra-mental entity, then truth is sought in correspondence to the extra-mental thing about which it gives information. This still is not a direct investigation in which humans can inquire directly of the extra-mental object or fact. However, when the proposition is about a merely mentally constructed concept without any extra-mental reference, then its truth is sought internally through correspondence to the mental individuals of the concepts used in the proposition.

Thus, although the structure of truth theory in general still carries the idea of correspondence, the quest for truth starts with an already established holistic world of concepts. This feature together with the internalism of the theory makes Ṣadrā closer to idealist theories of truth rather than realist ones. Modern correspondence theories are

⁹⁰ The relevant paragraph will be quoted below.

constructed in terms of word-world relation. On the other hand, coherence theories are constructed internally around a holistic system of concepts and coherence among them. Tarski's controversial approach among modern theories might be seen as being close to that of Ṣadrā. Although Tarski himself admitted his tendency towards correspondence theories, the essentials of his theory are not necessarily incompetent with non-correspondence theory either: 'X is Y' is true if the referent of X satisfies P. The satisfaction criterion maintains the relation of word to world, but this is a lot more loosely necessitated by an extra-mental entity because the satisfaction can also be maintained by a mental relation as in the case of merely mental concepts (Glanzberg, 2013).

Beside the correspondence feature, the judgement system requires an internal mental construction process in both extra-mentally referred and mentally referred constituents. This is what enables one to create fictional concepts for even impossible things and formulate judgements on them, such as the ultimate non-existence:

Intellect ('*aql*) can imagine nonexistence of itself, nonexistence of nonexistence, ultimate nonexistence, mental nonexistence, and all impossibilities. It can consider ultimate unknown, literal concepts. Later, intellect builds judgements on them. For example that one cannot gain information about ultimate unknown. [...] This is not possible because that what is being judged on is itself ultimate unknown. [...] On the contrary, everything that the mind judges on is existent which is possible. [...] Intellect has tendency that these can only be invalid in essence and impossible in reality. And mind judges over them due to their representation of that concept (nonexistence and impossibility) (*Asfār*, v. 1, pp. 401-2).

A further question which is about the ontological status of propositions is not clearly answered in Ṣadrā's writing either. If propositions are accounted for with an idealist reading, does this entail a realm of propositions which are accepted to be mental constructions and simple entities from a realm of their own? In this case, there are hints of a realist reading as well as a nominalist one. In terms of realism, it requires the existence of the thing's independence from anyone's beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on (Miller, 2012).

The truth is then established by a third figure which is a transcendent truth maker which is other than the thinking agent and her belief system or linguistic universe. This understanding of realism is different from a realism that accepts that the world of ideas is prior reality to the reality of material the extra-mental world. Firstly, Ṣadrā affirms the

existence of the world of similitudes. This might entail that he is a semantic realist (assuming semantic realism requires an independent world other than the extra-mental physical world). The idea of an independent world of similitudes requires a different stance than the two-fold realism/non-realism debate. Miller explains this twofold understanding as in the realism about the extra-mental world, our understanding of at least some sentences concerning the external world consists in our grasp of their potentially recognition-transcendent truth-conditions. The central question is whether we should define a persons' understanding in terms of the understanding of potentially recognition-transcendent truth-conditions? (Miller, 2012). According to semantic realists, there are transcendent truth conditions other than the extra-mental world and the thinking agent. Thus, one could claim truth of a sentence, say, "There are dinosaurs in Berlin", independently from the speaker and time, Şadrā does not mention any transcendent conditions about the truth of propositions. One might think Şadrā's acceptance of the world of similitudes can be useful at this point. There are flaws with this acceptance though. Firstly, although Şadrā spends a chapter on the world of similitudes and tries to prove it in *Asfār*, it is almost contradictory for him to claim primacy of being together with a world of similitudes which is unchanging. He clearly says that everything other than God is in constant change. He does not exclude the heavenly bodies from this, and that implies the extremity of his idea for his time. One cautious step would be to not ignore the fact that Şadrā accepted the world of similitudes and not to claim that he is in obvious contradiction with himself; rather, to claim that *the world of similitudes is less important for him and is not an essential feature. In this case similitudes are a rhetorical device and cannot play the serious role of the verifier for truth value.*

If not the world of similitudes, then one can expect another concept in his philosophy to be useful at his point: *nafs al-amr*. So, there is still hope. Şadrā also seems to accept *nafs al-amr*: a condition which is neither mental nor extra-mental, a situation where a thing is itself without any further conditions. As long as *nafs al-amr* is interpreted as an ontological category, then it is plausible that propositions belong to such a world. When it comes to the point of *nafs al-amr*, I will discuss in the next chapter further that *nafs al-amr* is not part of an ontological classification and it is merely a consideration and, thus, it is another example of mental existence⁹¹. According to this, and in terms of ontological status of propositions, they can be considered as mental existents which are dependent on

⁹¹*Asfār* v. 1 p. 401: "The intellect can consider nonexistence ... even non-existence of itself." Here non-existence of one's own is considered as an operation of mind. A similar point is made by Razi in *MbR*, v. 1, p 42.

human beings.

What makes Şadrā different from idealists, realists, and nominalists is that the inner world and creation is eventually related to the world as human beings are microcosms. Also, the capacity to know is inherent in them. Thus, although a human being is unique with having language, and language is totally dependent and conventional, it is still not a perfect idealism. When he discusses the truth of sentences, he does not directly keep the relation of the extra-mental factuality and the fact expressed in the sentence. He investigates the truth of sentences through a correspondence to internal factuality. This makes Şadrā closer to coherence theorists than correspondence theorists. Also, this makes us suspect that the propositions have an extra-mental status in a world of *nafs al-amr* or of ideas. Even as entities, the propositions must be dependent on the human and their existence shall be similarly internal, in a world of mind/s.

One essential point about *nafs al-amr* emerges when it is considered in terms of “thing in itself,”⁹² a state in which something is considered isolated from its attributes. So the classical explanation is that the thing is conditioned neither with existence nor without; neither particular nor universal (where). In order for someone to consider *nafs al amr* as an ontological concept, distinguishing between quiddity and existence *in re* as well as in mind is necessitated. Peripatetic philosophers would not have an issue with this. According to them, only God is pure existence and all else is a composition of existence and quiddity. However, Şadrā rejects this idea of composition and makes it clear that the quiddity and existence are merely mental divisions. In this case he cannot tear something apart from that thing’s own existence *in re*. This can only happen as a thought experiment or as a consideration in the mind. It is contradictory to consider an ontological mode which is not conditioned with any form of existence and later claim that this mode actually is one of the forms of existence.

One last detail needs to be given at this point. It was mentioned that Şadrā’s focus in these evaluations is acquired knowledge. He follows the tradition that only universal propositions in contrast to singular ones are subject matters of investigation. I think it is also related to his understanding about the distorting nature of mental investigation. Naming things or classifying or making things subject matters of acquired knowledge changes the true nature of things:

⁹² For Mu‘tazila’s explanation of thing in itself, see Frank, 1978, p. 57

Know that to all *wujūdāt* there correspond external realities; however, their names are unknown. In order to supply these names, we say 'the existence of this', 'the existence of that'. Moreover, the totality of it necessitates in the mind a general concept. In contrast, the different things and quiddities have names and properties which are known. However, it is not possible to express the real *wujūd* of each thing among all the different things, or real *wujūd* of everything, through a name or a qualification because the formation of names and qualifications is in correspondence to concepts and universals used in logic, not in correspondence to individual ipseities of *wujūd* nor of concrete forms (*Mashā'ir*, p. 12, tr. p. 11).

This is why naming and language is conventional and necessarily different from the true reality of things. This paragraph is further evidence that language and mental constructions are not totally dependent on the extra-mental reality as in the case of correspondence theories. The interesting part of Ṣadrā's notion of assent is that he denies a composite understanding of propositions as we find it in Rāzī or a simple notion as it appears in the Peripatetics. Assent is identical to conception and they are conventional versions of mental content. As the production process of mental content is active and dynamic, the assent and conception consequently become distorted versions of the extra-mental reality. This is a second level derivation as the linguistic entities are derived from the mental and the mental is actively created in relation to the extra-mental. In a similar way to sense perception, the level of certainty and success of this derivation depends on the perfection level of the soul. The less perfect the soul is the less truth-bearing the language belonging would be. This is the reason why we find the dichotomy of real unknown names and names that do not represent reality.

Propositions can also be investigated in terms of its parts, such as subject, predicate, and copula. The next section will focus on these parts and their relation in terms of how they come to become a unity as proposition.

4.3 SUBJECT AND PREDICATION IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER

Categorical propositions are constructed with a relation between two or more components. One group is affirmed or denied over the other group or one or more things are denied or affirmed *of existence*. The proposition carries a judgment that is about the affirmed or denied parts of the sentence. This judgment at the same time requires a unity

between these parts. The sentence is considered to be simple when existence of the predicate is affirmed or denied: “X is existent” or “X is non-existent”. It is considered to be composite when the sentence is in the form “X is Y”. Şadrā thinks both forms require some judgemental relation; however, the copulative relation is only required in the second form (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 92ff, p. 161ff, p. 381ff.; *Dīnānī*, 1383, pp. 167-9).

Şadrā talks about two types of beings in relation to this: predicative existence (*al-wujūd maḥmulī*) and copulative existence (*al-wujūd al-rābiṭī*). This classification applies not only to the language, but also to the existents. This ontological reflection will be briefly discussed later. Predicative existence is independent and stands on its own. Copulative existence, on the other hand, is a dependent type of existence, and in the relevant context it depends on the subject and predicate. The simple and composite forms can be compared to different meanings of “is” and its alleged ambiguity as claimed by Frege and Russell. The copula or “is” can be used for different meanings and goals: as Hintikka lists them, predication, existence, and subsumption,⁹³ or as Williams lists them existential, copulative and identity (Williams, 1981, p. 12). I believe that these ambiguous usages other than the predication belong to the copulative existence and they are all different manifestations of the relationship between subject and predicate. So if the usages are connected under one roof:

- a. X is existent
- b. X is non-existent
- c. X is X
- d. X is Y (there exists some kind of relation between X and Y, subsumption etc.)

So, according to Şadrā, the first two are considered simple and the others are composite. Even when it is composite, the relation can entail some existence claim. Thus, two usages of “is” in the form of “X is Y” are also distinguished. Among ancient philosophers, the most discussed two usages are copula as establishing an existential claim which appears in contemporary writings as *simpliciter*, “*wujūd ‘ala’l-iṭlāq*”, and the copula one as

⁹³ “They distinguished between the following different meanings, each with a different formalization in the usual formalization of first-order logic (lower predicate-calculus):
 (i) the is of identity, as in “Jack is John Jr.” or $Jack = John Jr.$;
 (ii) the is of predication (the copula), as in “Jack is blond” or $Blond(Jack)$;
 (iii) the is of existence, as in “God is” or $(\exists x)(God = x)$;
 (iv) the is of class inclusion (generic is), as in “Man is an animal” or $(\forall x)(Man(x) \supset Animal(x))$. (Hintikka 2004, p.27)”. The ambiguity is in the usages of a single word or of its contexts is a matter of discussion (Hintikka, 2005, *Language, Meaning, Interpretation, Philosophical Problems Today*, vol. 2, pp 117-39).

“*wujūd bi-ḥālīn mā*”. In ancient philosophy, the usage as a relation other than existential import had been more common and later especially with Avicenna the dominance turned into existential usage even when a relation is expressed (Bäck, 1987, p. 360). In this section I will first start with the categorical propositions of general relations, where something is affirmed or denied over something else.

As a result of the dominance of existential usage even in sentences in the form of “X is Y”, “principle of presupposition” emerges. According to the principle of presupposition, the affirmation of something presupposes the existence of the attributed thing (*Tanqīḥ*, p. 256). This principle will be useful later when the proofs of mental existence are examined in the next chapter.

The different usages presented in the Frege-Russell claim are found distributed in different sections of discussions on predicate and proposition of medieval philosophy as well as in Aristotle’s writings. Moreover, the relation of subject and predicate is reflected in categories in Aristotle’s work. So here I need to discuss the relation of subject and predicate in related senses and the ambiguity of predication, especially copula in the proposition. The relations to be discussed hereafter will be of predication, identity, copula and existence.

a. Aristotelian Categories

The Aristotelian categories, mainly four and later multiplied into ten, are not a substantial part of Ṣadrā’s philosophy. He definitely discusses the categories and uses the terminology in his philosophy. However, in my opinion, in a fictional world if you found a book in which all his mentions of categories were omitted, the essentials of his philosophy would still be in one’s hand.

I will briefly mention the categories and how much it reveals about the relation of subject and predicate. One essential claim that comes in Aristotle’s writing is that *whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also* (Cat.AR 1b10-15; Kat.AR, v. 1, p. 5, Bahmanyar, *Tahṣīl*, p. 27). The categories, when dissolved to their bases, are mainly subject and accidents. Again, when dissolved into basics, the categories are built on two concepts: *said-of* and *present-in* (Studtmann, 2013).⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Studtmann, Paul, "Aristotle's Categories", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/aristotle-categories/>>.

Of things there are⁹⁵: (a) some are *said of* a subject but are not *in* any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. (b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject. (c) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar. (d) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, the individual man or the individual horse— for nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject. Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject—the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject (*Cat.AR* 1a20-1b9, *Kat.AR*, pp. 4-5).⁹⁶

The common interpretation is that the “said in” classification distinguishes between substances and accidents and the “said of” classification differentiates universals and particulars. Primary substances fall into the category of things that are neither said-of nor present-in anything. Accidents are always dependent on their substance. Thus, there is always a dependence relation between the accidents and the substances. Substances, on the other hand, are self-subsistent and need no other in order to be understood (*Sharh wa Ta’līq-i Ilahiyāt al-Shifā*, Tehran: 1382, p. 209). Accordingly substances are prior to accidents (*ShI*, II.1, pp. 57-60, tr. p. 45-48; *Asfār*, v. 1, p. 43). He later introduces his readers to the ten categories of “*things that are said*”. These are: substance, quantity, quality, relatives, somewhere, sometime, being in a position, having, acting, and being acted upon (1b25-2a4; Badawi pp. 5-6; *ShI* 1960, pp. 93-156, tr. pp. 71-123; Bahmanyar, *Tahṣīl*, pp. 29-35). If I connect this list to the four sentence-forms mentioned above, then it can be concluded that the relation between X and Y in “X is Y” can be essential or accidental. And when it is accidental, it can be either one of quantity, quality, place, time, and so on. Among medieval philosophers the essential and accidental predication had been two of the main types of predication. “*dhātī awwālī*” has been used for the primary

⁹⁵ *Mawjūdāt* in the Arabic text.

⁹⁶ The example used in Arabic translation is “writing/ *kitāba*”.

essential predication and “*shāyī ṣināī*” or “*muta‘ārif*” or “*‘araḍī*” is used for the accidental predication (Āmulī, 1307, pp. 33, 34).

This is the case when we consider categories to be merely part of a linguistic investigation.

However, what Aristotle meant to do when mapping categories had been a matter of debate especially in terms of reading the categories. Is it a classification of “things that are” or about concepts, or words? In terms of our interests in this research, it is fair to say that for medieval Islamic philosophers, the ontological interpretation and considering categories a classification of beings had been the dominant reading (Rizvi, 2009, p. 69; Bertolacci, 2010, p. 37). One important discussion emerged from the ontological readings is that what kind of an understanding of “existence” is needed to classify all else under being. I will come back to this question with Ṣadrā’s idea of *tashkīk*. But so far, it can be said that existence is considered outside the list of categories for Ṣadrā. The discussions on categories play a role in terms of defining *wujūd* negatively, that what it is not. In terms of the ontological reading of Aristotle’s categories (that each category is a different class of being), the real correspondence of the discussion in Ṣadrā’s ontology is the levels of existence.

For now, before discussing *tashkīk*, let me continue the relation of subject and predicate. The first one concerns the relation. In order to form a proposition, there needs to be a relation between subject and predicate. All things said for the predicate can be said of the subject (*Cat.AR* 1b10-15; *Kat.AR*, p. 5; Bahmanyār, *Tahṣīl*, p. 27). This premise requires the predicate being more comprehensive than its subject. For example, in the case that the subject is universal, the predicate necessarily is universal and it cannot be individual. The predicate is an attribute (*ṣifa*) with which we get to know the subject. One cannot learn about a universal through a universal. This is the reasoning Bahmanyār brings in order to show that the predicate needs to be universal (*Tahṣīl*, pp. 26-7). Another important implication is that the proposition needs to have at least one universal term (*Md.FR*, p. 119 as cit. Abed, 1991, p. 6).

The second one concerns modal relations between subjects and predicates. Categorical propositions can be possible, impossible or necessary according to their content (Chatti, 2012, p. 24; Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 242). This is determined according to the relation between subject and predicate, not according to their factuality in the extra-mental world. Thus, this can be seen as a modal aspect to subject and predicate relation. If the predicate is an essential attribute of the subject as in the case of “man is a body”, it is necessary. If

the predicate is an accidental attribute, for example “man is a writer”, then the proposition is *contingent*. As in the case of “man is an angel”, it is *impossible*. We can now look at each of these three propositions in terms of their truth-value. The impossible proposition such as “man is an angel” is necessarily false. Similarly, a negative version of this proposition is always true (*DnM*, p. 24). This is a result of the relation of subject and predicate in the impossible proposition: the predicate is never adequate for the subject. In the second one, a possible proposition is composed with a non-essential attribute of the subject: “man is a writer”. It is not necessarily true. Neither is a universal quantifier version of it true: “All men are writers”. In the third proposition, the necessary one is made with an essential attribute of the subject: “a bird has wings”, “a square table is square”. It is necessarily true when the proposition is affirmative.

The third point is on a slightly different aspect to the relation. Two types of predication were mentioned earlier, these also can be seen as types of relations between subjects and predicates, when a categorical proposition is formed, the predicate can be identical with the subject; in this case it is called essential first order predication (*dhāti awwālī*). The term “essential” refers to the identity of predicate and subject both in essence and designation (*dhāt wa ‘unwān*). When the predicate is an individual under the title of subject, then the predication is named as accidental. Difference between the predicate and subject is the intrinsic criteria for accidental predication. This difference can occur in the form of essential accidents, intrinsic or extrinsic concomitant to the subject (*Tanqīḥ*, p. 249).

Remembering Aristotle’s classification of being in a subject and of a subject, one relevant classification of predication is univocal (*mutawāṭi’*) and denominative (*ishtiḳāq*) (*Tanqīḥ*, p. 249). Univocal predication takes place when the predicate of something is the same as itself. The denominative predication occurs when in a subject and something of the subject is possessed in the predicate. The difference between univocal and denominative is important as it will be used for the discussions on predications of existence.

Before I discuss what kind of commonality being possesses, I will first discuss the copula. The different types of relations between subject and object will be opened further through the copula with ontological implications.

b. Copula

Avicenna says a third element in propositions other than predicate and subject is needed, that it is hidden (except presuppositions of time (*adawāt zamāniyya*)) in the Arabic language, and that it links (*nisba*) the other two, and that this is the “connection” (*rābiṭa*)

(*ShIb*, p. 39, *Tanqīh*, p. 255, *Asfār*, v.1, p. 92). Šadrā adds an ontological point and claims that the connection in the proposition requires a specific kind of existence. He names this as copulative existence (*wujūd rābiṭī*) (*Asfār*, v. 1, pp. 92, 161). Thanks to the copulative existence we have not only the connection but also the unity in a proposition. Copula is neither the subject nor the predicate. However, it maintains a specific relation to both subject and predicate (Dīnānī, 1383, p. 169). Its in-between⁹⁷ status enables the connector to maintain the unity (*ShIb*, p. 41). This is a dependent way of existing and when the two sides that the connector links disappear, the connector, too, cannot persist.⁹⁸

Šadrā links the copula to ontology in an innovative way and classifies three types of being: predicative being, copulative being (*rābiṭī*), and copula (*rābiṭ*) being. Before Šadrā, *wujūd rābiṭī* and *rābiṭ* had been used interchangeably; thus the main classification was into two types, copulative and predicative being. This twofold separation of predicative and copulative is a reflection of the twofold classification of *wujūd* into *wujūd fī nafsih* (*wujūd* by itself) and *wujūd fī ghayrihi* (*wujūd* for something else) into propositions (*qaḍāya*). Propositions, unlike extra-mental things, are composed of predicate, subject and connection. When the proposition is expressing existence, then it is structurally simple (*hilya basīṭa*). Examples to this are cases such as “X is existent” or “X is non-existent”. However, when the predicate is not existential, then there are more than two things necessary to have some mode of existence additional to the subject and connector: the existence of subject, of predicate, and of the connector. According to Šadrā, both propositions have a judgemental connection but the copulative connection is only found in composites. Accordingly, copulative being is found only in composite propositions which are not made of existential predicates (*Asfār*, v. 1, pp. 92-3).

To sum up, there are different dimensions of discussions dealing with predicative and copulative: meaning, letter-word, proposition, thing, and each of these realms’ dependency or independency. These categories seem to have metaphysical, linguistic and semantic applications. Predicative existent is found in existential or simple propositions, and in extra-mental reality it is a reflection of independency. Copulative existence is found in composite propositions where existence of subject, predicate and copula is needed. In extra-mental reality it is reflected on the existence of adjectives or accidents. This is a case of dependent existence: existence of something in something else, or with something else, or for something else (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 93). We see examples of accidents

⁹⁷ This in-between-ness also reminds one of Ibn Arabī’s idea of *barzakh*.

⁹⁸ For a detailed evaluation of *wujūd rābiṭī*, see Dīnānī, 1383, pp. 167-186.

like *white*, of relational words such as *father-son*, and of mere literal connective ‘*is*’ and of literal words such as ‘*till*’, ‘*as*’, ‘*in*’ under the classification of copula or copulative existence.

Şadrā talks about the debate over whether predicative existence is of the same genus with copulative one. He claims that their commonality is none other than literal, thus they are sharing merely the same words (*ishtirāk lafzī*) (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 95). Independent things (*wujūd fī nafsih li nafsih*) can be either by itself or by other. An example of the first is necessary existence (*wujūd al-wājib*); an example of the second is substance. Dependent things can have meaning on their own or not. The first case concerns accidents: we can understand white, line, or relations or mere connectors which are literal concepts (*ḥarfī*) (in *DnM*, p. 20 differentiation of expressions with and without complete meaning).

Şadrā, with this expanded explanation, allows a new mode of existence in the form of actual existential connector (Rizvi, 2009, p. 65) which makes copula more than a linguistic tool. This is a third usage beyond firstly of a mere linguistic connector of predicate and subject and secondly of existential ‘*is*’.

The application of connective *wujūd* on the extra-mental world might be related to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s influence on Şadrā in which all that there is other than God is an imagination and a realm of in-betweenness. Thus, in reality, all-that-there-is is dependent on God. Everything other than god is a dependent and copulative being which is in privation of independent existence.

So far, I have discussed different relations in declarative sentences except the cases where the predicate is “existence”. I have decided to discuss it last as it will hopefully reveal Şadrā’s ontology more than the other usages.

4.4 EXISTENCE AS PREDICATE

There is a curious case about statements in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*:

The things we seek are equal in number to those we understand. We seek four things: the fact, the reason why, if it is, what it is [in Arabic, *annahu yūjid, limāza, in kāna mawjūdān, wa mā huwa*]. For when we seek whether it is this or this, putting it into a number (e.g. whether the sun is eclipsed or not), we seek the fact. Evidence for this: on finding that it is eclipsed we stop; and if from the start we know that it is eclipsed, we do not seek whether it is. When we know the fact we seek the reason why (e.g. knowing that it is eclipsed and that the earth moves, we seek the reason why it is eclipsed or why it moves). Now while we seek these things in this way, we seek some things in another fashion—e.g. if a centaur or a god is or is not (I mean if one is or not *simpliciter* and not if one is white or not). And knowing that it is, we seek what it is (e.g. so what is a god? or what is a man?) (*PoAR* 89b23-36, *TAAR*, v. 2, p. 407).

Here Aristotle talks about four different ways in which a human can investigate things: the fact, the reason why, if it is, what it is. Some researchers see this differentiation between the knowledge that a thing exists from the knowledge of whatness of a thing as the source for Avicenna's ontological and central differentiation between quiddity and existence (Shahadi, 1982, p. 62). It must be added, however, that there are other parts in Aristotle's writing where he mentions the thing and its quiddity as identical. What is more, he also does not centralise or ontologise this differentiation (*Metaphysics* 1031b20-2 vs. 1032a).

One aspect of separating “what?” questions from “is it?” questions is that quiddity and existence are not conceptually the same. This is a logical differentiation. As occurred in medieval philosophies, it might or might not be distributed to ontology. Another aspect of the two different questions is about the propositions that are used in order to answer these questions. So for one we would reply with definition or essence of the thing and for the second we are expected a confirmation or a denial. Although it is not directly the same, the discussions on existence as a predicate, and defenders of both sides contain a similar nuance. The main question behind whether existence is a predicate is that of whether “existence” in the predicate position causes a tautology. Does it merely confirm

identity of the thing with itself or does it let us learn something in addition to the information that the thing exists. If we proceed one step further “is there anything more to a thing other than its quiddity?”

Although Fārābī rightly differentiates between natural and logical contexts, mostly the discussion has been a blend of logic, language, and ontology (Rescher, 1963, pp. 39-40). This is related to Avicenna’s *ontologization*⁹⁹ of the essence-existence distinction. According to Avicenna, existence is attached to quiddity and becomes existent.¹⁰⁰ Suhrawardī builds primacy of quiddity on this legacy. According to him, existence is merely an abstraction, a common term. When existence is the predicate, such as “the house exists”, it gives no new information about the house which we would not already know when we learn what a house is. Existence is dependent on its subject. As a defender of the *primacy of wujūd (aṣāla)*, Ṣadrā claims that existence as a predicate is not merely a confirmation of identity of the thing with itself and that an existence-proposition is not tautological. In order to claim that no new information is maintained when existence is predicated, one needs to identify quiddity with existence. Only then “X exists” will occur to be the same type as “X is X”. But for Ṣadrā, existence is identical with the existent (*Mashā‘ir*, p. 11, tr. pp. 11-12); quiddity however, is a mental construction. We gather what X’s quiddity is, secondly, simply because X exists. The X as an existent makes it possible for us to abstract a quiddity – Xness. The knowledge process works in the opposite direction from common understanding in which first quiddity is provided and then existence is predicated on it.

Ṣadrā’s rejection of Suhrawardī’s thesis is important. In my main reading, I claim that Ṣadrā divides the illuminationist claim and accepts one part of it. However, he keeps rejecting Suhrawardī’s essentialism. Accordingly, Ṣadrā introduces “existence as a concept” and regards it among secondary intelligibles (*Mashā‘ir*, pp. 7, 8, tr. p. 8). In that sense, existence as a concept is universal. Existence in the discussion of predicate, however, is rejected from being an ordinary universal. In that sense, “existence as a predicate” is different from other universals as well as the reality of existence. Suhrawardī’s claims about existence as a predicate are rejected totally (*Mashā‘ir*, pp. 25-27). Ṣadrā also adds that *wujūd* is not genus-like, or it is not predicated with synonymy (*tawāṭu‘*). He does not adopt pure homonymy as well. His claim is that existence is

⁹⁹ I am borrowing the term “ontologization” from Bertolacci (2010).

¹⁰⁰ Avicenna’s modal ontology in relation to quiddity/existence will be discussed in the fifth chapter in further detail. But for now, let it suffice that the attachment is understood to be mental by some interpreters and extra-mental by others.

predicated on the things with predication of gradation (*tashkīk*). Thus, I suppose I need to refine my original claim and add that existence as predicate is also different from existence as a concept. In *Asfār* (v. 1, p. 45), Ṣadrā explains that existence as a general reality is a mental construction. Existence as a predicate is mentally constructed, too, but the way it is predicated is different from other predicates. Accordingly, existence as a concept acts no differently from other universals; existence as a predicate acts, on the other hand, differently than other predicates.

In this context, Fārābī stands between Suhrawardī and Ṣadrā: according to him, being as a common predicate is not universal but a relation (Lameer, 2006, p. 31). According to Fārābī, there are two equally plausible interpretations for “X exists”: that of naturalists and that of logicians. According to the former, the actual reality and nature are essential, so existence cannot be a predicate.

Question: Does the proposition "Man exists" have a predicate, or not?

Answer: This is a problem on which both the ancients and the moderns disagree; some say that this sentence has no predicate, and some say that it has a predicate. To my mind, both of these judgments are in a way correct, each in its own way. This is so because when a natural scientist who investigates perishable things considers this sentence (and similar ones) it has no predicate, for the existence of a thing is nothing other than the thing itself, and [for the scientist] a predicate must furnish information about what exists and what is excluded from being. Regarded from this point of view, this proposition does not have a predicate. But when a logician investigates this proposition, he will treat it as composed of two expressions, each forming part of it, and it [i.e., the composite proposition] is liable to truth and falsehood.⁷ And so it does have a predicate from this point of view. Therefore the assertions are both together correct, but each of them only in a certain way (tr. Rescher, 1963, pp. 39-40, *Risāla fī jawāb masāil su'ila 'anhā*, Dieterici, 1890, Leiden, pp. 428-9).

It seems one part of the discussion is generally missing: what does it mean for existence to be a predicate?

From the evaluation given above, I can infer that one side of the criteria is then being informative.¹⁰¹ The question became famous for modern philosophers because of Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate during his discussion of ontological proof. The motive behind Kant's famous claim might similarly be this informative viewpoint. He says the predication of existence, in the example that "God exists" adds nothing new to the concept of God: "so setze ich kein neues Prädikat zum Begriffe von Gott" (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (KRV), A 599). So we see identification of the concept and existence in the example of Kant as well. Kant might still be closer to a milder approach (similar to Fārābī) than expected. Rescher points out that although he rejects existence as a real predicate, he too accepts it as a logical predicate:

Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat, d. i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was zu dem Begriffe eines Dinges hinzukommen könne!) Es ist bloß die Position eines Dinges, oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst. Imlogischen Gebrauche ist es lediglich die Copula eines Urteils (KRV, A 598).

Can we then say that the real predicate is not the logical predicate, but Fārābī's natural scientist's predicate? If we take "real predicate" as informative, then Ṣadrā does not accept Kant's claim. For Ṣadrā, "man exists" is not identical with "man is man".

Once it is established (*thabata*) that the *wujūd* of every contingent being (*mumkin*) is its very quiddity *in concreto*, then one of two alternatives follows: either there exists between quiddity and *wujūd* a difference in the significance and in concept, or such is not the case. The second hypothesis is false. Otherwise man and *wujūd*, for example, would be two synonymous terms and there would be no benefit in saying "man is existent." In the same way, to say that "man is existent" and to say that "man is man" would come to saying the same thing. Besides, it would be impossible for us to conceive one of them while neglecting the other, not to say anything of other absurd consequences mentioned in common books (*mutadāwilāt*). Furthermore, the absurdity of each of these consequences postulates the absurdity of the antecedent. Therefore there remains the alternative mentioned in the first place, that is, that quiddity and *wujūd* are different from each other in their concept when they are analyzed by the mind, while they form one single unity

¹⁰¹ In *Tanqīh*, Ṣadrā talks about a type of predication (*mufīd*) in which the predicate and subject are different and thus new information is gained. I could not find more information on this type of predication. Thus I have refrained from using this notion in place of informative above (*Tanqīh*, p. 249).

essentially and in their ipseity *in concreto* (*fi'l-'ayn*) (*Mashā'ir*, p. 29, tr. pp. 30-31).

The predication in the form of “X is X” is named as the primary essential predication. Two main types of predication are listed in the relevant discussion: essential primary and common artificial. In essential primary predication, the subject is the same as the predicate both in designation and in extra-mental reality (Rizvi, 2009, pp. 66-7). The unity of the subject and predicate in existence and quiddity as a consequence emerges as a tautological and analytical sentence.

If the subject is the same as predicate (as in the case of primary essential), analytical predications occur. If there is no reality to existence other than the quiddity, then when existence is used as predicate, the proposition is analytical. Then one other feature of being a real predicate is not being a primary predication.

It appears now that clarifying the claims about existence as a predicate is necessary. And in the case of medieval discussions it is indeed mainly a question about the informative nature of the predicate: whether or not existence is more than a logical predicate. So, part of the question is whether the predication is more than a primary essential predication. In those terms, it makes sense to carry on Kant's discussion on real predicate and then real predicate occurs as synonymous with synthetic predicate and common artificial predicate. To sum up, judgment is a mental process for Mullā Ṣadrā and as a result, it is active. Propositions and assents, on the other hand, are acted upon, and passive because they are derived from these first order mental states. One might need to ask about existence propositions in the same context. So Ṣadrā places existence-predicated propositions differently from other predicated propositions. And he also says the predication of existence operates with *tashkīk* and not with univocality (*mutawāṭi'*). As a result, at this point, I think we need to separate Ṣadrā's ideas on predicate-existence from his ideas on *wujūd* itself. For him, the thing is the same as its existence, and in that sense he needs to be regarded as being similar to naturalists among the two groups Fārābī mentions. This is because there are not different parts of a thing, one to be predicated over the other part. The existence is not separable from thingness. When we say “X exists” the predication is not *in re* but mentally constructed, just as the mental construction of “essence-existence distinction”. If a real predicate requires this kind of differentiation, then existence is not a real predicate for Ṣadrā.

So it is the concept of *wujūd* which is being predicated (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 41). *Wujūd* as a concept is, I think, still different from *wujūd* as a predicate. Ṣadrā talks about the concept

of existence as being an ordinary mental construction (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 45). On the other hand, *wujūd* as a predicate does not act the same as other predicates. Also, it is not predicated over things like an ordinary universal concept. Existence is predicated by *tashkīk* which I claim is a specific form of univocity. Accordingly, the following section will be on Ṣadrā's idea of *tashkīk*.

4.5 TASHKĪK: IS IT HOMONYMY?

What does it mean for each of the beings, when different things are said to be? The source of discussions found in the Aristotelian corpus is in his *Categories*. Aristotle talks about three types of relations among words (also related relation to meanings/definitions/essences and things, depending on the interpretation). The first group is *equivocal*: “Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each”.¹⁰²

Secondly comes *univocal* (*mutawāṭi*): “things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common”.

And thirdly *derivative* (*mushtaqqā*): “Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination”.

The terms used in *Greek* for these three classes is synonymy, homonymy and paronymy. A synonymous word picks up different things in extra-mental world. An example of this would be “*zoon*”, “animal” as applied to an actual person and a figure. Homonymous words share a definition and a name as in the case of man and animal sharing the meaning of animal.

The essential question related to being is when different things are said to be, whether they share only a name, or a name together with a definition. The second pair (man and animal) shares the essence of having a sensible soul; the first pair, however, does not. Commonality and differences among these usages are important. Fārābī gives an elaborate classification of terms as: metaphorical (*musta‘ār*), transferred (*manqūl*), homonymous (*mushtarak*), univocal (*tawāṭu*), synonymous (*mutarādif*), paronymous (*mushtaqq*), narrow or wider sense, and distinct (*mutabāyin*) (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 227).

In this classification, *mutarādif* and *tawāṭu* seem to be types of synonymous. Fārābī describes *mutarādif* as being a plurality of names to one and the same thing alone. They are words whose equivalent definitions are identical (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 230). *Mutarādif* according to Zimmerman is *polynymous* in Greek tradition and is *synonymous* in Arabic philology (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 230). We can think of *mutarādif* as one narrow type of synonymy. And a wider sense of synonymy is what Zimmerman translates as *univocal* (*tawāṭu*). Fārābī’s *tawāṭu* is a “single word which from the beginning

¹⁰² *Muttafiqa asmāuhā* as it is translated into Arabic (*Kat.AR*, v. 1, p. 3).

applied to several things but signifies a single general notion which comprises them” (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 228). I will keep the original Arabic terminology for four of the related terms *tawāṭuʿ*, *mutarādifa*, *mushtarak*, and *mushakkak*. These three are different types of words which mean some sort of commonness. I think that when one is considering a philosopher’s explanation about many meanings of being, one should first define what each of these terms mean. The discussion on many meanings of being depends on what is accepted as being common and what is accepted as being distinct about each use. So the question is, for example, is it commonality of the name alone? Is it the meaning alone? As long as philosophers define many meanings in these two choices, it is easy to define the many meanings as synonymous or homonymous. But most of the other choices seem to be on a more subjective line of definition between synonymy and homonymy. For this reason, as well as types of synonymy (*mutarādifa* and *tawāṭuʿ*), there are types of homonymy as well.

Fārābī lists homonymy by mere coincidence as when two words only share the word itself. An example is “‘*ayn*”, meaning, on the one hand, the organ of sight, but on the other a source of water. Homonymy can be in a similarity between two things in an accidental correspondence, as the word “animal” is used for *an actual person* on one side and *a statue of a horse* on the other. It can also be built on a relation to a single goal (war-man, war-horse, war-speech) or a single agent (medical record, medical instrument) (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 228-30).

In terms of many meanings of being, most Aristotelian commentators interpreted him as defending a special form of (*mushakkak/pros hen or focal*) of homonymy (*ishtirāk*) and rejecting univocity of being (Rizvi, 2009, p. 46).¹⁰³ Aristotle presents categories as different ways a thing can be said to “be”. In this presentation, substance and essence is the essential meaning and the rest depends on this.

There are several senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;’ for in one sense the ‘being’ meant is ‘what a thing is’ or a ‘this’, and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are. While ‘being’ has all these senses,

¹⁰³ According to Bahmanyar, Rizvi reports that *mushtarak* predication is about different senses of a name whose name and concepts are one but not equally so (Rizvi, 2009, p. 46). For other types of homonymy presented by Porphyry (as discrete homonymy, homonymy of similarity, homonymy of analogy, focal homonymy and homonymy for those oriented to the same goal, see Rizvi 2009, p. 47).

obviously that which ‘is’ primarily is the ‘what’, which indicates the substance of the thing (1028a10ff).

However his main theory is the idea that being is used as a special homonymy appears in *Metaphysics*, 1003a33:

There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art.

Shield talks about four usages of predication of being by combining predication with Aristotle’s categories. In this case, every category is one sense of being homonymously. Some things are said of and in other things, others are said-of but not in, others are in but not said-of, and still others are neither said-of nor in (*CatAR* 1a16–b9). Answering to these four types of predication conditions are four types of entities: non-substance universals, substantial universals, non-substance particulars, and individual substances, the primary substances (*CatAR* 10a16–b9; cf. 2a11–19; *Kat.AR*, p. 33-35; Shields, 1999, p. 21).

According to Ṣadrā, existence is predicated with gradation (*tashkīk*)¹⁰⁴ (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 41). In the relevant chapter of his *Asfār* (*Asfār*, v.1, p. 41ff), Ṣadrā connects the concept of existence, its predication, and the priority and posteriority of things themselves. Accordingly, the mind recognizes some similarity (*ishtirāk*) in different quiddities of things and creates the concept of existence. This concept, however, is not a predicate that is univocal which requires each usage to be distinct from the others; this is not a mere commonness in name as well. Otherwise, the mind would not be able to see any similarities. With *tashkīk*, he means gradation in priority and posteriority or intensity and weakness. In this explanation, language is a mirror of ontology. Things in the world have different levels of existence according to their intensity or priority, just as language does.

¹⁰⁴ Lameer reports that *tashkīk* as a word occurs in Arabic translations unrelated to discussions of being in the *Rhetoric*. Ibn Muqaffa‘, chooses the word “*tashkīk*” to translate homonymy. But the common usage in relation to the discussion here is found in Porphyry as one of four types of homonymy: homonymy from similarity (Lameer, 2006, p. 28).

One last matter is about comparison of focal homonymy for the Peripatetic school and Ṣadrā. As I have discussed it in the previous chapter on the senses, Avicenna's ontology rejects monistic approaches; it is dualist at its best even when it comes to psychology. It rejects substantial motion and gradation in intensity for the substance and other cases of ontology.¹⁰⁵ Even Avicenna respects some gradual predication on being; it would not be outside logic and language. So what does focal homonymy mean for Avicennan philosophers? Rizvi again gives an elaborate inquiry on the topic and lists the different types of priority as: by nature, by temporal progression, by rank, and by nobility (Rizvi, 2009, p. 51). We need to wait until Tūsi to reach philosophies that embrace the ontological implications of this special homonymy (Rizvi, 2009, p. 52). So, Ṣadrā accepts homonymy of being not only in logic but with its ontological commitments as well. The core meaning of being for him is an actual and all-existential being. As it is manifested in degrees of actuality, it is predicated gradually with this focal homonymy.

Although I have not elaborated it here, I think Ṣadrā's homonymy is closer to univocity than homonymy in some respects. For Aristotle, being is used for many with a core-meaning and each being has different features to them. Thus we can formulate it as

A. x-core meaning+ disjunctive meaning₁= existent 1

B. x-core meaning+ disjunctive meaning₂= existent 2

Disjunctive meaning 1 and 2 do not have anything necessarily in common.

Ṣadrā, on the other hand, explains that all existents are manifestations of the same reality at different intensities (*MQ*, pp. 38; 33-4). One can think core-dependence can be applied to this idea of stages of intensifications, such as different colours can be thought of as sharing a common meaning of colour. But the gradation (*tashkīk*) Ṣadrā claims is different from Aristotle's core-dependence. Ṣadrā's idea of *wujūd* requires a stronger commonness

¹⁰⁵ Gradational ontology and the identity principle are two distinctive problems that Ṣadrā needs to defend against Avicenna. In terms of substantial change and intensity of existence, he blames Avicenna for confusing existence and quiddity. "I say concerning it: Shaykh has confused existence with quiddity in every place when desiring to refute the transformation in substance. He considers the movement in being [i.e., trans-substantial movement] to be the emergence of the thing at every moment to another quiddity in actuality. But that is not the case. The intensity and weakness though different in kind but their difference in quiddity is there when the actual existence has been obtained by the two. Also, in the gradually intensifying movement each existence one individuality in time has one quiddity at every moment which is assumed to be its limit of existence in potency, and proximate to actuality, as its explanation was given. So the movement in the animal beings, for instance, only entails the emergence of the moving-being from an animal-being to another animal-being, and not the emergence of animal from its animality to other than it, such as for instance, to the being a sphere. Thus, for everything which is receptive to intensity and weakness there is the possibility of intensity and weakness in it. The category of substance according to us is like the category of quality in being receptive to both [weakness and intensity]. Hence it is possible for some of its kinds connected to the matters to have the transforming movements in [their] substance" (*Asfār*, v. 8, p. 304, tr. p. 225).

than core-dependence. If I follow the colour example, it must be the exact colour that we find in different intensities, not different colours. In Ṣadrā's case, although all existents manifest one single reality, they all take their actuality and existence from the One. All other than the One is a weak and dependent manifestation of the same reality.

C. x-core meaning+ disjunctive meaning¹ (with y level of intensity/priority/etc.)= existent 3

D. x-core meaning+ disjunctive meaning¹ (with z level of intensity/priority etc.)= existent 4

A related topic to existence being a single reality is whether existence can be used for God and other existents when it is considered as a univocal meaning. For Avicenna, existence in God is unique and pure, all else is a compound of existence and quiddity. As it will be discussed in the next chapter, existence is attached in a special way to the quiddity (there are different traditions that take this differentiation as mental and extra-mental). For Rāzī, existence is univocal and there is no commonness between God and the created things in terms of their existence (Wisnovsky, 2012, pp. 40-2). For the illuminationist tradition, the reality is carried by quiddities and the world is a hierarchy of different levels of quiddities where existence is merely a mental construction. In terms of God's existence, however, He is pure Light and Existence (*HI*, p. 132; *Mashā'ir*, p. 8, tr. p. 8). For Ṣadrā, the principle of *tashkīk* will suffice to solve the problem of differentiating God and other things, thus, he does not need to either claim that the existence has slightly different meanings in both (as with the Peripatetics' example of *pros hen* homonymy), nor invent two totally different meanings for existence (as Rāzī's example of equivocal existence).

One can solve this through three considerations: anteriority and posteriority (*taqaddum* and *ta'akhkhir*), perfection and deficiency (*tamām* and *naqs*), richness [in itself, and in need of nothing else] and need [independence and dependence] (*ghinā* and *hājah*). [...] But the meaning of "*wujūd being existent*" signifies that if it is actualized either by itself or by an agent, it has no need, in order to be realized, of another existence which would make it become realized, in contrast to non-*wujūd*, because of its need in becoming existent of the consideration of *wujūd* and that which is adjoined to it (*Mashā'ir*, p. 20; tr. pp. 21-22).

As the above paragraph suggests, the main principle in his linguistic considerations explanations is also an ontological principle: *tashkīk*. And the language about existence

is not considered different or distanced from the metaphysics about existence. In this sense, Ṣadrā continues Aristotle's steps on the parallelism between language and ontology. Now let me give a summary about this chapter which has focused on logic and language.

The linguistic part of my research comes to an end with the section on gradational ontology. The semantic approach is seen to be applied to ontology with Ṣadrā's idea of *tashkīk*.¹⁰⁶ This section showed that *tashkīk* is re-applied to language about existence by him. So the ontological claim that existents are of different intensities and degrees is applied by to language and linguistic entities are seen as a degree of being. Assent and conception are regarded as identical and representation of the judgement which is an activity of the soul. When existence is used as the predicate, we find that the sentences that involve existential predicates are informative. This is built on his ontology that concept is different from the reality and the existence. Moreover, as a reflection of his ontology, Ṣadrā claims that existence as a predicate applies in grades just as the reality of existence is in degrees of intensity. In the last section of the chapter I focused on the multiplicity of being. The result of this section was that because existence is a single reality that becomes manifested with different degrees at each existent, for Ṣadrā existence multiplicity of beings should be univocal.

The next chapter has two goals to complete the discussion on intentionality: first, to see how the ontology that appears as the source of above mentioned linguistic ideas functions, and second, to place intentional objects into the Sadrian scheme in the form of mental existence. As part of the second goal, different examples of mental existence will be analysed in more detail.

¹⁰⁶ This idea of application is claimed and analysed deeply by Rizvi, 2009.

5 CHAPTER V

ONTOLOGY

Hamlet: My father- methinks I see my father

Horatio: Where, my lord?

Hamlet: In my mind's eye Horatio.

Previously I discussed different examples of aboutness at different stages of knowledge such as objects of sense perception, logical entities, concepts, and linguistic entities together with the way mental constructions are represented in language. In Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy, psychology, epistemology, ontology, and language are tightly interwoven. As a result, despite being at different levels, the same rules and principles are applicable to all those parallel universes of beings, knowledge, and language. This chapter will take more of a more bird's-eye view of objects at different stages of knowledge and try to gather them under the umbrella of "mental existence". This aims to complete the circle which started with Brentano's definition of the mental when more about the nature of mental existence is explained. Intentionality, as Brentano described it, was meant to be a positive definition of mental states. In contrast to negative definitions, intentionality or aboutness would tell us what "mental" is. Built on this, he also made another negative definition that every mental phenomenon was to have an intentional inexistence: "Intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it" (Brentano, 1874, pp. 88-89).

In terms of a phenomenon different from other physical phenomena, one very close term to intentionality from medieval philosophy is 'mental existence'. Brentano as the inventor or resurrector of the concept "intentionality" traces inexistence back to Aristotle. Another inspiration for him is Aquinas, who claims that immateriality is the very reason why a thing is cognizant, and his explanation comprehends sensibles and intelligibles (Pasnau, 1997, p. 49). This and more examples from medieval philosophers provide us with reasons to think that intentionality is parallel and similar enough to mental existence. In the previous chapters, I examined objects of external and internal senses as other possible cases for intentionality. In terms of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy, it is made clear that his

internalism or realism is so strong that he does not greatly differentiate between objects of internal and external senses. External senses are related to the extra-mental objects only in terms of a preparation to create the sensible forms in the human; this process is led by the soul. At each stage of sense perception, the other two capacities of imagination and intellection have roles to play in order for perception to be completed. The case is even less material and independent of the extra-mental world when it comes to the internal senses. It is thus very hard to distinguish the internal senses from each other or from the intellect in Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy. Knowledge is a result of an activity of the soul, and the soul also changes during this process. An implication in relation to intentionality is that the objects of knowledge are not extra-mental and that they are creations of the soul. One important thing about these stages of knowledge is that for Mullā Ṣadrā each stage of knowledge is a mode of existence. More will be said on this in the following sections. As for mental existence, everything that does not have an effect extra-mentally is 'mental existence':

This existence that belongs to things and the quiddities upon which [all] specific effects (*āthār*) corresponding to it are not found when the soul conceives of them (*yataṣawwaru-hā*) and that are present (*ḥāḍira*) in the world of the soul, even when it stops to look at the external world, is called a mental (*dhihniyyan*), tenebrous (*ẓilliyyan*), and imaginative (*mithāliyyan*) existence (MQ 220.20-3 tr. Marcotte, 2011, p. 9).

Accordingly, objects of external senses must have mental existence as well as universals, quiddities/essences, and relational and relative connections (*'araḍīyāt and i'tibārīyāt*). Mullā Ṣadrā uses the term "relative connections" (*i'tibārī*) for mentally constructed situations. For example, things *in re* are not composite of quiddity and *wujūd*. The mind observes, analyses, and constructs these concepts. In other words, the distinction between existence and quiddity is conceptual.

In the previous chapters, different positions on Brentano's problem of intentionality and his historiography have been discussed with a related discussion of Mullā Ṣadrā's psychology, logic, and linguistics. With these investigations I aimed to dissect the problem of intentionality into matters related to human nature, logic, and language. In Brentano's presentation, intentionality has been presented close to psychology and the medieval term *inexistence* is introduced. One way of investigating the notion of intentionality is to ask how a human is able to possess intentionality. How a human ends up with this *inexistence* is not only related to theories of the soul but also to epistemology.

The common research method is to exclude the more material process of sense perception proposed by literal readings of Aristotle and the Peripatetics. However, I believe that Aristotle and Avicenna's objects of all perception processes can be named by this form of *inexistence*. Hence, even though the object of external senses and internal senses together with the organs and faculties of these are material, abstraction still starts even at the level of sense perception. Mullā Ṣadrā's claim is stronger though. For him, the object of even the most material perception process is internally created and different from extra-mental things. Thus, all objects of perception and intellection are different from extra-mental and material beings. They all have a unique way of existing in the human soul. Mullā Ṣadrā names this *mental existence* and introduces us to a unique world created by the human. The soul is, on the one hand, active, since it creates the objects of knowledge internally, while on the other the soul itself undergoes a substantial change with the knowledge.

In the following sections the mental constructions will be discussed together by focusing on their ontological status. As ontology is the main focus of the chapter, firstly the primacy of *wujūd* – which is at the centre of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system –, will be examined. The chapter will form sections on the primacy of *wujūd*, proofs of mental existence, and modern discussions of intentional objects. Up to this point I aim to present the general material we find in Mullā Ṣadrā's idea of *wujūd* first and the questions and debates in the modern discussions second. One can see these two stages as the raw material and the goal of production. The material we find in Ṣadrā's ontology will be viewed as products in the case of the section on proofs of mental existence and the examples of the mental existents. The section that showcases different examples of mental existents will provide an opportunity to see examples of mental existence as applications of intentional objects. In presenting the different cases of mental existence, I aim to conclude the general discussion on intentionality with an optimistic statement that Ṣadrā's ontology is a strong candidate for successfully accounting for intentionality in general and intentional objects in particular with a novel attitude through a gradational and monist understanding of existence.

5.1 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE

The notion of ontological priority can be found in Aristotle's priority by nature and substance. In the *Metaphysics* he explains priority by nature and substance:

Some things then are called prior and posterior in this sense, others (4) in respect of nature and substance, i.e. those which can be without other things, while the others cannot be without them,—a distinction which Plato used. If we consider the various senses of 'being', firstly the subject is prior (so that substance is prior); secondly, according as capacity or actuality is taken into account, different things are prior, for some things are prior in respect of capacity, others in respect of actuality, e.g. in capacity the half line is prior to the whole line and the part to the whole and the matter to the substance, but in actuality these are posterior; for it is only when the whole is dissolved that they will exist in actuality. In a sense, therefore, all things that are called prior and posterior are so called according to this fourth sense; for some things can exist without others in respect of generation, e.g. the whole without the parts, and others in respect of dissolution, e.g. the part without the whole (*Metaphysics* 1019a2-14).

He mentions three other types of priority in the same chapter of *Metaphysics Z*. The first set includes priority by "being in the beginning", "by reference to something", "by to place", "by being prior in time", "prior in movement", "in power", or "in arrangement". The second set includes *epistemological priority*. For example, things that are prior in formula are different from things prior in perception. Whilst universals are prior in the former, particulars come prior in the latter (*Metaphysics* 1018b9-1019a). His *Categories* has a more systematised list of different priorities: temporal priority; priority by being in a sequence that cannot be reversed (as in 'one' being prior to 'two'); priority in reference to something in an arrangement (as letters are prior to syllables); natural priority in terms of importance (as in the priority of honour and love), and natural priority in terms of an implication (as in a cause being prior to its effect) (*CatAR* 14a26-14b23). Avicenna makes the link between priority of rank (*martabī*) and nature. For example, the body is prior to the animal in comparison to substance and the position of substance as a principle (*ShI*. IV.1, tr. p. 125). He adds a dimension by showing the application of primacy to the notion of existence. One example is that one existent is dependent on the other as the case of multiplicity is posterior to one. This is not in terms of bestowing existence, but rather that the posterior existent is necessarily linked to the primary one (*ShI*. IV.1, tr. p. 125). Mullā

Ṣadrā makes primacy an important part of his philosophical system, and in a way he re-contextualizes the discussions on primacy. He talks about primacy of existence, and uses this principle with three meanings:

The first meaning is about extra-mental reality. As an extra-mental reality, there are no distinct entities called essence and existence. All that is real is existence. Secondly, primacy means having the capacity of affecting. Thus, existence is the source of causes. Its primacy means that existence is the main cause of all existents. Thirdly, it is similar to substantiality and independence: its primacy means that existence exists without needing or depending upon anything else.

The different types of priority as listed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics also show how things differ from each other in terms of their individual existents. Only by their existence do they have specific temporality, locus, etc., and these also differentiate them from each other. Bahmanyār, too, links different types of priorities to the ambiguous hierarchy in which all types are connected in an ambiguous ontological hierarchy (*Tahṣīl*, p. 467).

In short, primacy refers to being the *main source of independent reality* and *being the main principle other things rely on*. Thus, primacy of existence means that existence is this main principle. If existence is taken as the primary reality, then the language of quiddity-based philosophy must change. For example, there is no longer identity between the concepts *individual*, *reality*, and *quiddity* (*dhāt*, *ḥaqīqa*, and *māhīya*) (*ShI* I.5, p. 31, tr. p. 24). As for Mullā Ṣadrā, reality is identical with existence (*wujūd*), but quiddity (*māhīya*) is not the real existence. So the process of knowledge is therefore different from Avicenna's. It is no longer *certain knowledge*, according to him, when knowledge is gathered through the quiddity (*māhīya*) (Kalin, 2010, p. 104). This point will be discussed further later on.

Indeed, for Mullā Ṣadrā (as the first meaning of primacy suggests), there is only existence. There is no dichotomy of existence and quiddity in reality. All that quiddity has is a shadow of reality and a shadow of existence (*Shawāhid*, pp. 7-8) created by the minds, and dependent on the minds. As there is nothing outside existence, then existence cannot be defined. Definitions can be made through genus and differentia. There cannot be any differentia that existence is supposedly being differentiated from (*Shawāhid*, p. 6; *Mashā'ir*, pp. 6-8). Moreover, the first meaning implies that mental beings are real. The comprehensibility of existence means that even impossible things that can be thought of are some kind of existence (*Asfār*, v. 1; p. 268).

For Mullā Ṣadrā, *wujūd* is the principle for unity and multiplicity. The simplicity of *wujūd* makes it possible that each level of existence comprehends the features of the lower levels. In order to have his idea of *wujūd* in a comprehensive fashion, he talks about three degrees of existence. The first degree is *wujūd* which does not depend upon anything other than itself. This is the principle of all things and it is beyond the bounds of any limits. The second degree is *wujūd* that is dependent on something other than itself. Ṣadrā gives various examples such as intelligences and the souls of the heavens and the basic natures (heat, cold, dryness, and humidity), and celestial bodies, and material substances. The first two degrees remind one of Avicenna's classification of *wujūd* into necessary and contingent (*ShI*. I.6, p. 29ff). His classification is also built on the idea that all that exists should be dependent on one Necessary Existent and that regressive dependence is impossible. This is not only a theory of beings, but also Avicenna's take on the ontological proof for God ('proof of the veracious'/*burhān al-ṣiddīqīn*). Mullā Ṣadrā does not criticise Avicennian terminology, nor does he try to revise or change its language. Moreover, he places the Avicennan language of *wujūd* at the heart of his ontology. Yet he changes the context in which this language is used, and introduces a loose usage by interchangeably using the word *wujūd* with *mawjūd*. The third degree is *wujūd munbaṣiṭ* ('extended'). With this third level, Ṣadrā makes a similar shift in the Avicennan language. This level of existence is extension and comprehension of individual concrete things and quiddities. The relation of *wujūd* to the existents (*mawjūd*) is not in a manner which is like that of the abstract universals and abstract quiddities. Extension is explained with the gnostic approach to "Compassionate Breath" (*al-naḥas al-Rahmānī*).

This *wujūd* is in reality the first emanated among contingent beings (*al-ṣādir al-awwal*) from the First Cause (*al-ʿilla al-ūlā*), and called "the Truth by which creation is created (*al-ḥaqq al-makhlūq bihī*). And this *wujūd* is the source and principle of the existence of the universe, and its life and its light which penetrates into all that there is in the heavens and the earths. It exists in all things according to that thing in such a way that in the intellect it is intellect, in the soul it is soul, in nature it is nature, in the body it is body, in substance it is substance, and in accident it is accident (*Mashāʿir*, pp. 40-41, tr. pp. 44-45).

The explanation of *wujūd munbaṣiṭ* is a unique synthesis of Mullā Ṣadrā's principle of *tashkīk* and the *primacy of existence*. This combination enables Mullā Ṣadrā to talk about everything in terms of existence, irrespective of whether something is impossible or possible or non-existent. *Munbaṣiṭ wujūd* is almost as though God's face towards

existents. Mullā Ṣadrā also thinks *wujūd munbaṣiṭ* is one (*Asfār*, v. 2; p. 347), which explains that all existents carry the same homogenous existence. This one-reality takes the shape of the thing that exists, so “[i]t exists in all things according to that thing in such a way that in the intellect it is intellect, in the soul it is soul, in nature it is nature, in the body it is body, in substance it is substance, and in accident it is accident”. If this is interpreted further, one can also say that existence is the same as existents. This is also compatible with Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea that every existent is particular and individuated: “You have already come to know that *wujūd* is a concrete, simple reality and that it is not a natural universal” (*Mashā‘ir*, p. 33, tr. p. 35). This additionally explains why Mullā Ṣadrā rejects a concept of *wujūd*, as the reality of *wujūd* which collects under it all the different examples of existents. What we have in hand about *wujūd* is nothing except the particular existents. What collects them in reality is God. There is no other existence other than God. And in relation to God’s creation there is no other holistic entity that we can call as existence, there are existents which manifest the different levels of the reality of existence. The whole universe is built on a relation of this kind. A further explanation of how *wujūd* is the same as *mawjūd* is given in *Mashā‘ir*:

Wujūd is positive and real, which is the result of our previous demonstrations showing that *wujūd* is real and is that which is the principle of effects [on things] and the source of determinations and that by which quiddity becomes existent and that by which non-existence is repulsed from it. Such *wujūd* is a *wujūd* in concrete (*Mashā‘ir*, pp. 28-9, tr. p. 30).

It is thus made clear that *wujūd* is not an empty concept, it is also not an ontological content-less situation that happens to things as if *wujūd* is added on or attached to quiddity.

Not only is *wujūd* the most comprehensive reality, it is also a dynamic reality. This is the reason why it cannot be constrained by the static frames of quiddity. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, knowledge is itself a mode of existence (*Asfār*, v. 3, p. 306).

The primacy of *wujūd* implies a number of *characteristics* about *wujūd*. This is the reality all realities in the world depend on. Firstly, there is nothing outside *wujūd* (*Tahṣīl*, p. 280; *Asfār*, v. 1, p. 33). All that can be talked about, or referred to even as a negation of its existence, is listed under *wujūd* in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. *Wujūd* is not only the most comprehensive concept, there is also nothing in reality beyond existence as well. As the ultimate reality, it is God that really exists. Everything other than God has a dependent

and accidental existence which can also be expressed as relational-copulative and shadowy. In this scheme of the generality of *wujūd*, it is also important for Mullā Ṣadrā to prove mental existence. In agreement with the Peripatetic philosophers, Mullā Ṣadrā posits existence as the most common and evident primary reality (*Mashāʿir*, p. 6).

So, for Mullā Ṣadrā existence as the primary notion is also ontologically the best known: “The reality (*inniyyah*) of *wujūd* is the most manifest of things presentially and through direct discovery” (*Mashāʿir*, p. 6, tr. pp. 6-7).

Secondly, as there is nothing outside it, *wujūd* cannot be defined. This, again, is in agreement with the Peripatetics (*Dānishnāme*, tr. Morewedge, p. 15). Because it is the most common, *wujūu* has no genus, and it has no differentia to be differed from others that will fall under a genus with *wujūd*. A full definition (*ḥadd*), on the other hand, is composed of *genus* and *differentia*:

Consequently, whoever seeks to define it is mistaken, because it would need to be known by something more obscure than it. However, one can seek to awaken (*tanbīh*) the person [who wants to define being] and to provoke in him a remembrance. But in any case it only concerns a verbal definition (*Mashāʿir*, p. 6, tr. p. 7).

Thus, a full definition of existence cannot be given. Similarly, a description requires better known realities or concepts for the concept to be described. But *wujūu* is the most evident. Thus nothing can be known better than the *wujūu* itself. As a result, *wujūu* cannot be described. These two claims are the reasons why those philosophers who attempted to define *wujūu* ended up with tautological definitions (*Mashāʿir*, p. 6ff).

Another characteristic is that *wujūd* has no opposite. This, in terms of necessary being, was claimed by Peripatetics such as Fārābī and Avicenna (*al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, ed. S.H. Nasr, M. Aminrazavi, p. 120). For Mullā Ṣadrā, not only necessary being, but in general being has no opposite (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 398). Non-existence is not opposite of *wujūd*, non-existence is the absence of it. This is again related to the generality of *wujūd*. An idea of “opposite” requires two contraries that fall under one genus. However, it was mentioned that *wujūd* is the most general and there is nothing else that makes up a common genus with *wujūd*. Non-existence is not excluded from *wujūd*, as it has its share of existence as well (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 401). It is re-defined as an artificial concept created by assuming the privacy of existence. Related to the fact of *wujūd* having no genus and definition, another result is that *wujūd* is not substance or accident (*Asfār* v. 6, p. 57; *Asfār*, v. 1, pp. 62, 258). Quiddities, in contrast, accept division and have parts such as form and matter; genus and

differentia. This is due to quiddity being a secondary and mental reality in comparison to *wujūd*.

The idea that *wujūd* has parts is rejected as well. Parts can be mental or extra-mental. Mental parts require genus and differentia, and extra-mental ones require matter and form. *Wujūd* cannot be considered in relation to any of these.

One essential feature is that *wujūd* is simple (*amr basīṭ*) (*Mashāʿir*, p. 7). This is how *wujūd* is the reality and all other things take their reality from it:

The englobing of existing things by the reality of *wujūd* is not like the englobing of particulars by a universal concept, and its holding valid for them... the reality of *wujūd* is not a genus nor a species nor an accident since it is not a natural universal (*kullī tabiʿī*). Rather its englobing is of another kind of englobing which is not known except by the gnostics, those who are "firm in knowledge" (*al-rasikhūn fi'l-ʿilm*). It is interpreted sometimes as the "Breath of the Compassionate" (*nafas al-Raḥmān*), sometimes as the Compassion "which embraces all things," or as the "reality (*al-ḥaqq*) by which things are created (*al-khalq*)," according to a group of gnostics; and as the expansion (*baṣṭ*) of the light of *wujūd* upon the temples of contingent beings (*hayākil al-mumkināt*) and the receptivity of the quiddities and its (*light of wujūd*) descent (*nuzūl*) into the domiciles of ipseities (*manāzil al-huwiyyāt*) (*Mashāʿir*, p. 9, tr. p. 9).

Thus, one should combine the two features that *wujūd* is the reality and that it is simple. One of the implications of the simplicity is that neither existence nor existents are compounds of any kind, e.g. form and matter. Analysable parts of existents are products of the human mind and the result of mental analysis:

Therefore we say: each of the realities of these species has a mode of existence as a material body by which its members are differentiated, through which its individuals are multiplied, and in which they are found closely tied to one another in terms of space or time. In the same way, each of them has a specific intellectual existence, differentiating its species in meaning and concept. [...]

Existence by itself is inclusive of all these meanings with its simplicity and unity.”(RIAA, tr. Kalin, 2010, pp. 281-2).

This is the *principle of baṣiṭ al-haqīqa*. The source of this principle could be the Neoplatonic idea that only one comes out of one. Beside its Neoplatonic reminiscence, the similarity to Parmenidian monist existence should also be noted.

I think the next principle which combines the simplicity at the centre of all existents, - the principle that existence is the principle of one and many -, makes his idea of *wujūd* appear similar to Parmenidean existence. Ṣadrā accepts and writes about the Neoplatonic idea of cosmos which starts with one emanating from one. However, the idea that *wujūd* is the principle of one and many rests on the ontological gradation of *wujūd*. And the ontological gradation rests on the idea that it is one and the same reality that is manifested at different levels. In the previous chapter I claimed that Ṣadrā's *wujūd* is univocal. In his theory, the explanatory of role of emanation is kept, yet gradation is built on a stronger idea of oneness that is shared by all existents:

Verily the reality of everything is its *wujūd*, which is that from which its effects and [existential] conditions result. *Wujūd* is therefore the most appropriate of all things to possess reality because that which is other than it [*wujūd*] becomes the possessor of reality through it, and it [*wujūd*] is the reality of all that possesses reality, and it does not need, in its possessing reality, another reality. It is in itself in the objective world, and other than it by which I mean that the quiddities exist objectively through it and not through their own essence (*Masha'ir*, pp. 10-11, tr. p. 11).

Nothing is left outside of existence and, accordingly, one other innovative principle in Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy is that *knowledge is a mode of existence* (*Asfār*, v. 3, p. 411). This principle is implied by *Aṣālat al-wujūd*, as the primacy of existence excludes nothing from existence. Further reasons for this principle are claimed through the similarities between existence and knowledge.

Let me start with defining knowledge. In his *Risāla fī-l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq* (RTT, p. 43), Mullā Ṣadrā follows the classical definition of knowledge that it is the presence of a thing in the mind. This process is a change in the soul and a form becomes present at the end of it (RTT, p. 45). But he changes this representationalist theory when he is presenting his own theory. Mullā Ṣadrā rejects previous knowledge theories, since in those theories knowledge is acquired through quiddity or relation. Mullā Ṣadrā posits knowledge as the essential part of the human soul's substantial movement. Each process of knowledge changes something in the soul. As was discussed in the chapter about Mullā Ṣadrā's

psychology, Ṣadrā sees the soul as the agent at all levels of perception. Thus, even when the soul sees, it changes.

Here are some of the similar features of *wujūd* and knowledge: firstly, just as existence is the most general and it cannot be described or defined, every attempt to define knowledge results unsuccessfully and with tautology as well:

It seems that knowledge is among those realities whose ipseity (*inniyyah*) is identical with its essence (*māhiyyah*). Realities of this kind cannot be defined, for definition consists of genus and difference, both of which are universals whereas every being is a particular reality by itself. It cannot be made known through complete description either because there is nothing more known than knowledge as it is an existential state of consciousness (*ḥālah wijdaniyyah*) which the knower, being alive, finds in his essence from the very beginning without veil or obscurity. It is not [in the nature of knowledge] to allow itself to be known by something more apparent and clear because everything becomes clear to the intellect by the knowledge it has. How does then knowledge become clear by anything other than itself? (*Asfār*, v. 3, p. 306, tr. Kalin, 2004, p. 89).

Just as existence is in grades, knowledge has different levels and kinds:

By the same token, knowledge has various kinds, some of which are low in degree such as sense-perception [since] it is impossible to sense multiple sensibles through a single sensation. [But] some are higher in rank, such as intellection, in that a single intellect is sufficient to intellect an infinite number of intelligibles, as in the case of the simple intellect. In short, whatever has a higher status in being is more capable of [attaining] the knowables (*ma' lūmāt*) and more intense in containing quiddities. ... when we know something through its perfect definition, we know it with its full truth and reality even if we cannot know all of its parts [i.e., its sensible and intellectual properties] at once due to the impossibility of knowing the very truth and reality of anything at a given time (*Asfār*, v. 3, pp. 411, 412, tr. Kalin, 2004, p. 97).

In his *MQ*, knowledge is shown to manifest levels and shapes of difference, just like *wujūu* (*MQ*, p. 59). Accordingly, in the soul there are different abstractions which are subsumed within a unity: sometimes as low as the level of the earth and at other times as high as the heavens and intellects.

And finally, knowledge is a particular reality just as existence is. Kalin explains this in the following terms:

Even though the circular and non-definitional nature of knowledge represents common sense epistemology in Islamic thought and is shared by various schools, this is where Mullā Ṣadrā takes his departure from his predecessors by equating knowledge (*‘ilm*) with being (*wujūd*). For Mullā Ṣadrā, the ultimate object of knowledge is being particularized through a myriad of modes, states and instances. In fact, in many places, Mullā Ṣadrā defines knowledge simply as a mode of being (*nahw al-wujūd*): when we say that we know something, we affirm or deny the existence of something, and this cannot be other than being. In this generic sense, being is the standing condition of all knowledge and precedes the discursive considerations of the knowing subject” (Kalin, 2004, p. 89).

In *RTT*, Mullā Ṣadrā talks about knowledge as the genus of the conception and assent and the two being simple species (*naw’*) (*RTT*, p. 47). He states that that of which presence is gained (*ḥuṣūl*) in the soul is *wujūd* (*RTT*, p. 51). Rizvi points to the same claim from Sadrian texts as, “If one does not have cognition (*ma’rifa*) of oneself, his self has no being, because being is the same as light, presence and consciousness (*shu’ūr*)” (Rizvi, p. 84). *Thus not only is knowledge identical to wujūd, but so too is consciousness.*

O the intelligent and smart one! Look at the soul, its existential modes and states, and its being united with a group of existents from this mode of existence [15] in every existential mode. It is of a bodily nature with the body, a sense with the senses, an imaginal [reality] with imagination, and an intellect with the intellect. ‘And no soul knows where it shall die’ (Qur’an 31:34). When the soul is united with nature, it becomes the organs. When it is united with the senses in actuality, it becomes the very *sensibilia* that have come about for the senses in actuality. When it is with imagination in actuality, it becomes the imaginal forms that it has. This continues until it reaches the station of the actual intellect, and becomes the intellectual forms that have obtained for it in actuality. The wisdom behind this is that when God instated in existence an intellectual unity, which is the world of the intellect, and a physical multiplicity which is the world of the senses and imagination with degrees, the Divine Providence made it necessary to create a comprehensive being (*nash’ah jāmi’ah*), by which

everything in the two worlds is perceived. And it designated for it a subtle potency corresponding to this all-encompassing unity. It is through this correlation that the perception [of the two worlds] is possible (*RIAA*, tr. Kalin, p. 264).

The soul's journey from a material beginning to a high and immaterial entity is mainly thanks to the substantial change that takes place through knowledge:

When the soul becomes stronger, it becomes the locus of multiple meanings. Each of these meanings, when found by themselves as a weak existence, is a form for a deficient corporeal species such as the intelligible [reality of the] horse, the intelligible [reality of the] tree, and the intelligible [reality of the] earth. Each one of these has a form. When this form is found in the extra-mental world, it is the form of a material species with an essence different from any other material species. When it is found in the intellect, its intellectual form is existentially united with an intellectual substance because the intellectual existence is an exalted and noble being in which all of the *intelligibilia* can be found with one single existence in contrast to the unity of the *hylé* and forms of corporeal things in it (*RIAA*, tr. Kalin, p. 276).

Mullā Ṣadrā in reality does not totally reject other theories of knowledge, especially Peripatetic correspondence theory, but modifies them so that knowledge will be appropriate to the reality of *wuj r*. As the reality of *wujs* is dynamic and all existents are in constant movement, the stability of quiddities is far from giving the real picture of the world. Thus knowledge through quiddities and forms - the acquired knowledge - is not rejected, but rather is taught to be insufficient in his system. The reality of *wujūd* can only be experienced through direct knowledge, i.e. knowledge by presence.

5.2 PROOFS OF MENTAL EXISTENCE

5.2.1 1st Proof and Particularity of Mental Existents

The first proof that Mullā Ṣadrā presents in *Aṣfār* can be called the ‘conceivability argument’. The very conceivability of things that do not exist extra-mentally is the proof for their mental existence. We conceive extra-mentally non-existent things even when it is impossible that they could exist, such as the coincidence of two opposites (*ijtimā‘ al-naqīḍayn*), the particle that cannot be divided any further (*jawhar fard*), and a partner to the Creator (*sharīk al-bāri‘*). These non-existent things can be differentiated from one another. They also refer to mental individuals and they can bear judgements, and thus truth value can be associated with them as well. The things in the mind can be differentiated from each other. The differentiation of an absolute non-existent is necessarily impossible. If something is differentiated, it must have some sort of existence. These things are not extra-mental existents therefore; they must possess existence mentally (*Aṣfār*, v. 1, p. 319ff).

An important issue about this proof is Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on *tamayyuz* (differentiation). Since Mullā Ṣadrā clearly states that mental things are differentiated among themselves, this implies that they are individuated.

So all contingent beings, with their differentiations and grades in perfection and deficiency are, in their essences, in need of It [the Necessary Being] and derive their sufficiency in being from It. Considered in themselves, they are contingent beings made necessary by the First, the Necessary Being -- transcendent is He. Indeed, they are, in themselves, illusory and perishing, and they are not made real except by the Real, the One, the Unique: “All things are perishing save His face” (28:88). The relation between It and that which is other than It is analogous to the relation between the rays of the sun (*Mashā‘ir*, pp. 48-9, tr. p. 53).

Every existent is differentiated by its own existence, the locus and presence, and intensity it possesses, as well as its proximity to the Necessary Being. Ṣadrā states this in the next sentence of the above mentioned paragraph: “The same is true for the *wujūd* of contingent beings in which there is differentiation in their proximity and distance from the One, the Real; for the whole proceeds from God” (*Mashā‘ir*, pp. 48-49, tr. p. 53).

The main criticism for this proof relates to the definition of knowledge that knowledge cannot be obtained through non-existents. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s epistemology in which

knowledge is a mode of existence, how can non-existence be a source of knowledge? The criticisms Ṣadrā mentions are two: for those who regard knowledge as a relation there is nothing to be related to as they reject mental existence as a concept and the possibility that non-existents (*ma'dūm*) can have any kind of existence. Knowledge as a relation is contentless. It relies on the two sides of knowledge for this relation to be established. For those claiming that knowledge is a representation, the same problem occurs as it relies on references occurring both extra-mentally and mentally and their correspondent (*Asfār* v. 1, p. 320). So, in terms of knowledge through non-existents there will be no extra-mental objects to be abstracted or to refer to or to have images/similitudes of.

Mullā Ṣadrā says that the main goal of knowledge is not obtaining the similitudes or images of the extra-mental objects, but rather it is grasping a reality. In terms of mental existents, a shadowy form of reality occurs in the mind through knowledge. The only difference is that the forms obtained in this process are not established (*thubūt*) extra-mentally. The forms are created by the knower. Also, as was stated before, Ṣadrā does not follow Avicenna in identifying reality with quiddity. Knowledge is not produced through matching or discovering the quiddities.

For Mullā Ṣadrā's monist ontology, things which are non-existent in the extra-mental world share a specific mode of existence. In the case of non-existence, we extract existence as a concept and create "non-existence" in our minds. This non-existence has no reality other than being a concept for supposition of non-existence. Thus we can predicate and judge on its very abstraction. Likewise, the concept of fire can be given as an example of other mental concepts. The effects of burning or heat do not take place for the concept of fire. However, as their fair-share of existence requires, they share the feature of differentiation (*tamayyuz*). Connecting Ṣadrā's ontology to his epistemology, it can be said that all that can be known is that which has been differentiated (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 281).

Thus, with this proof we also gain insight into Mullā Ṣadrā's ontology and his conception of non-existents. Ṣadrā thinks that all that exists (extra-mentally or mentally) shares the same existence. They are all differentiated. In terms of his epistemology, although he rejects the relational attitudes claimed by theologians and the Peripatetics (the latter in the form of a representationalist theory and not content-free), his approach also requires a correspondence theory. The only difference is that he constructs this relation inside the mind for non-existents such as the mythical bird *anqā*. Thus, he continues by claiming that knowledge is some kind of occurrence of the presence of a form (Rizvi, p. 88). Thus,

both the form gained and the thing from which the form is gained are still necessary for him. In terms of the attitude of representationalist theories to nature, one that is carried from the extra-mental world to the mind as an abstracted form, Şadrā claims that things such as *anqā* can have their individuals without nature. Thus, he has a more nominalist stand in that sense.

I will talk about contemporary discussions later, and in comparison to that discussion, we can say that Mullā Şadrā's stance keeps both of the ontological and referential implications. Whilst the first proof is more related to the ontological assumption, the second proof is closer to the referential.

5.2.2 2nd Proof and Fictionals

The first proof was about non-existents (*ma 'dūmāt*) in terms of solely thinking about them (*taṣawwuru al-ma 'dum faqad*). The second proof is about judgements on mental things. We make affirmative true judgements (*ḥukm thubūtiyya ṣādiqa*) on non-existents; we judge non-existents and even make generalizations about them, such as that "*anqā* is flying" and that "the sum of the two sides of a triangle is equal to the third side" are known mentally. However, the triangle and *anqā* have no existence extra-mentally. We intuitively know the truth of these sentences. The truth of an affirmative judgement requires the existence of its subject/substratum. For the truth value of these, the existence of an extra-mental substratum is not sufficient, since no extra-mental substratum is the substratum of these propositions.

Then, given the truth of these judgements, their substratum must have a mode of existence which is different from extra-mental existence. Sabzawari lists this proof among proofs for mental existents, and adds that this proof requires the principle of presupposition (Sabzawari, 1977, p. 55; Rizvi, 2009, p. 62). When the dominant interpretation of existential usage of "is" was being discussed in the previous chapter, I mentioned that one of the results of this was the principle of presupposition (*qā 'ida far 'iyya*) which is as follows: affirming something of something presupposes the existence of the subject.

Mullā Şadrā does not seem content with the contents of this proof so far, so he adds three explanations which answer criticisms for this proof. The first criticism is made about the physicality of flying and the second one is about the nature which a name requires. Şadrā differentiates between name, nature, reality, and members of a reality. So in terms of *anqā*, in order to be able to use the word, one does not need a nature (which is physical and extra-mental). Thanks to differentiating between nature and members of a concept, it is

enough for it to have mental individual reference. Together with fictional beings, Şadrā includes judgements about the past in this proof.

5.2.3 3rd Proof and Generalizations as a Proof of the Mental

The third proof comes from generalizations and some sources name it the case of universals. As was discussed before, the universal as universal cannot be thought to exist extra-mentally. Thus, the product of mental abstraction such as whiteness must have a specific realm which is mental existence. Besides generalizations and abstractions, this proof is also related to the second proof. The possibility of predication and judgement is possible through universality. Otherwise, one would not be able to speak about common things of the same kind of things and say “Every X is Z”. Without universality, predication of this kind would not be possible.

Mullā Şadrā opens up this proof with a section he calls *istibşār*:

We can conceive of abstracted entities (*al-umūr al-‘intizāiyya*) and privative attributes (*al-ṣifa al-ma‘dūmiyya*) in extra-mental reality and we can predicate them of things. It follows that they have some affirmation, which is either in extra-mental reality but that is impossible because they are ‘beings of reason’, or they exist in the mind (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 327, tr. Rizvi, 2009, p. 83).

With this *istibşār*, his proofs for mental existence come to an end. Şadrā’s proofs on their own do not appear to be original. However, his giving an extended space to the debates on mental existence is important. The reason why his discussion on mental existence is unique, however, is not due to the proofs he mentions. It is the preliminary principles, such as the creative power of human beings and the principle of primacy of being. Mullā Şadrā’s proofs in *Asfār* are mainly repetition of what had already appeared in Ṭūsī and Fakhr al-din al-Rāzī. Rāzī’s presentation of the proofs is in contrast to others, not in order to affirm the notion of mental existence.

5.3 WHAT IS AN INTENTIONAL OBJECT?

As the long discussion of mental existence implies, I take Mullā Ṣadrā's objects of perception, concept of existence universals, and quiddity not only as examples of mental existence, but also as examples of intentional objects.

This section aims to link contemporary and medieval approaches to the ontology of intentional objects. The main question, "What kind of an existence do intentional objects have?", was at the very beginning rejected by some philosophers, as they either chose to eliminate them altogether or reduce them to other entities. This rejection of the legitimacy of the question arises mainly from the naturalistic intuitions of the philosophers. The other approach is acceptance of intentional objects and accounting for them with a new attitude to existence. This new attitude can either take place by expanding the notion of existence beyond extra-mental and physical things by introducing mental existence as part of existence or by introducing a concept larger than existence such as "thing". In this section I will first examine the expansive attitude with examples of Meinong and the Mu'tazila. In the second part, I will discuss eliminationist and reductionist approaches. And, lastly, I will discuss the examples of mental existence.

When Meinong and reductionist philosophers are discussed I will try to keep the presentation sufficiently broad to keep the contemporary frame. The problem of intentionality, as mentioned in the previous chapters is introduced by Brentano in the 19th century as a revised term from medieval intentional inexistence. Its initiation to analytical framework was made by Chisholm and from then on the story of intentionality took place in a totally different philosophical language. In the analytical tradition the problem is mainly discussed through propositional attitudes. In order to preserve the language difference, the presentation will be slightly long.

5.3.1 Meinong and Introduction of a Theory of Objects

"Even non-existents can be signified by a name"

(Posterior Analytics, 92b29-30).

One important issue about intentionality is its indifference to actual reality. It is not sensitive to truth-values or the extra-mental realities. This is the very feature that makes it troublesome for most theorists. Think about imaginations, beliefs, fears, etc ... Let's say I utter: "I do not like X" but thinking that X is dead, thus X no longer exists extra-mentally, is my utterance meaningless, or is the psychological experience of dislike unreal? What about the ability of imagining impossible objects like square circles, golden mountains,

and so on? Or how is the status of hallucinating things like ghosts, or similarly having irrational fears like that of witches?

Taking Aristotle's statement about naming, and adding intentional relations created between non-existent objects and mental states, new questions about the notion of existence occur: if non-existents can be referred to, or be signified by a name but do not exist actually (extra-mentally), how can we refer to them? Do we need to call them existents, just with an intuition that if we do not say so we would miss out on some of the meaning? Can they be called existents just because they appear suitable for reference? On the other hand, if they are existents, does that mean that they have another kind of existence other than the extra-mental existence? Does this imply that there are degrees of existence? Or if they are non-existents, how can we explain their situation? How is it possible that "an object may have a set of characteristics and yet no kind of being at all?" (Chisholm, 1972, p. 248). Or is it really possible to ask for criteria of being suitable to possess sets of characteristics or properties? How are objects that have no extra-mental reference to be accounted for?

Intentionality is presented as a positive definition of the mental, thus it is mainly a topic of the metaphysics of consciousness. Moreover, intentional objects became a highly debated topic in ontology as well because of the ontological problems that intentionality raises. In this section, I will take Meinong's presentation of intentional objects and objections raised against it, since it has been one of the most discussed models. This is mainly because Brentano did not discuss the ontological consequences of his idea of intentionality in detail. It is mainly Meinong who focused on this and established a theory of intentional objects. His main assumption was that existence and object-ness were separable.

But before this, I need to discuss his psychological starting point. I believe that one important step is taking intentional objects seriously: e.g. those about beliefs, hallucinations, dreams, desires, etc. The result is that he does not try to re-interpret relevant cases into other cases. So the first step is accepting *relata* (each side of the relation) of these as objects, towards which we have attitudes. While most other approaches try to interpret sentences containing intentional objects, and either ignore or reduce them to analysable propositions, Meinongians take the question as it appears (Priest and Read, 2004, p. 422).

To discover the outcomes of this first step, a schema will be presented taking help from Kriegel's argumentation (Kriegel, 2008, pp. 82-3). Afterwards, the contained-premises

will be discussed.

P1. If x is a cat-seeing, then there is a y, such that y is an intentional object of x.

P2. Both cat-seeing and cat-hallucinating are of the same intentional type.

P3. Intentional acts/states that belong to the same intentional kind have the same kind of intentional object.

C. If x is a cat-hallucinating, then there is a y, such that y is the intentional object of x.

I assume that this list of arguments is applicable to Meinong's theory as well. This argumentation at its end requires an account for these intentional objects. When accepting that there are objects of intentionality which do not exist extra-mentally, being the *relata* becomes one thing and existing becomes another. And this can be another way of expressing the possibility of "hav[ing] properties without existing" (Gibson, 1998, p. 67).

When the problem is defined in a very simplified way through intentional acts/states and a relation of them with intentional objects, then the first place to start a discussion becomes the third premise, and the problem of relation. There are three options in terms of relation. In the first group, there are those who accept that there is a relation. In the second group, there are those who claim that there is a contingent relation which does not construct. They also deny that relations need *relatas*, besides denying the relation itself. In the third group there are those who claim that there seems to be a relation but actually that proposition about relation can be paraphrased and the relation can be ignored.

When a philosopher takes the relation seriously she either brackets the *relata* with explaining them in a reductive way, or she takes the *relata* seriously as well. I take the second position to be similar to Meinong's; it accepts the third premise and, what is more, it reaches to deriving the fourth afterwards.

For Meinong, the realm of objects is wider than the realm of existents. Some of the objects exist and some do not. Some of those that do not exist may be said to be, to subsist, and some may not be said to be at all (Chisholm, 1972, p. 246). Even the unthinkable is an object; so the carrier of any property and whatever can be experienced in some way is an object. The unthinkable has the property of being unthinkable at least. The theory includes objects, properties or attributes, mathematical objects, and states of affairs (*Objektive*) (Chisholm, 1972, p. 246). In this case, objects that do not exist are occupied and, what is more, an ontological explanation about "carrying a property and not existing at the same time" is suggested.

Meinong's theory relies on two basic principles:

1. *Principle of Independence of So-being from Being (Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit des Soseins vom Sein)*: Suggesting a wider realm of objects requires independency of *being an object* and *existing*. A successor of Meinong, Mally, formulated this by the conceptualization of *so-sein*. According to this theory, "the so-being of an object is not affected by its non-being" (Marek, 2009).

2. *Principle of Indifference of the Pure Object to Being (Satz vom Außersein des reinen Gegenstandes)*: Separating being an object and existing implies that existence is not part of the nature of an object. So the second principle states that, "The object is by nature indifferent to being, although in any case one of the object's two objectives of being, its being or its non-being, subsists [is the case] (Marek, 2009)."

Meinong is quite careful about retaining two logical principles: the excluded middle and the non-contradiction. According to the law of the excluded middle, there cannot be a third realm other than being and non-being. Thus, this formulation does not imply a third realm other than existence and non-existence. Those objects like Golden Mountain and round squares have no kind of being at all, they are *homeless objects* (Chisholm 1972, p. 248). Meinong does not accept degrees of existence. He accepts the rule of the excluded middle, and thus everything is either existent or non-existent. So, what are these non-existent intentional objects? Although existence (*Sein*) is not in degrees, *so-being* (*So-sein*) of the objects is. And these objects are classified and explained with their *so-sein*.

Since there are horses, for example, there is also the being of horses, the being of the being of horses, the non-being of non-being of horses, and the being of the nonbeing of the nonbeing of horses.

And since there are no unicorns, there is also the non-being of unicorns, the being of the non-being of unicorns, and the nonbeing of the nonbeing of the unicorns (Chisholm, 1972, p. 246).

Some of the objects have being and some do not. Those that do not have being are defined according to their so-beings. If so-being of an object is non-contradictory, it is a *possible object*. If it violates the contradiction law it is an *impossible object*. If so-being of an object violates the law of contradiction, that object is an *incomplete object*. The most poorly endowed object, of which even Meinong is suspicious of calling it an object, is the *defective object* because it seems to have very little *so-being* (Chisholm, 1972, p. 248). A point may be clarified here: we talk about so-being of everything; so-beings have so-beings as well.

The idea of detachability between being and so-being helps Meinongians solve the *prima facie* contradiction which their basic motto contains. “*There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects*” can be taken as non-contradictory according to this Meinongian schema of objects. Russell paraphrases sentences that include non-existents in such a way that assumes an existential quantifier. This un-detachability drives him to accept the assumption that, “there are no true propositions about what does not have being” (Marek, 2009). But Meinong’s theory generates truth value for other sentences that include non-existents by detachability of “*there is*” and “*there exists*”. This separation lets the theory solve the problem of contradictory sentences about non-existents as well.

While “*The square is round*” is a contradictory statement, “*The round square is round*” and “*The mountain I am thinking of is golden*” are true statements. In Russell’s theory these are false statements. In Meinong’s theory, however, there are differences between statements about being and so-being. So,

a *Sein* statement (for example, “*John is angry*”) is an affirmative statement that can be existentially generalized upon (we may infer “*There exists an x such that x is angry*”) and a *So-sein* statement is an affirmative statement that cannot be existentially **generalized upon**; despite the truth of “*The mountain I am thinking of is golden*” we may not infer “*There exists an x such that I am thinking about x and x is golden*” (Chisholm, 1967, pp. 261-2).

The discussion of detachability can be connected to the principle of presupposition in medieval discussions or the existential import of Frege and Russell’s discussion on propositions. By the principle of detachability, Meinong and Mally avoid existential import or presupposition of existence. So it is fair to say that for them although the *relata* in two parts of a sentence are regarded as important, this importance comes without the burden of any implication on existence.

Detachability of *sein* and *so-sein* also implies that being is not of the nature of the objects. And this leads to the second principle.

5.3.2 Reductionist Answers to the Problem of Intentional Objects: Russell and Quine

Russell tried to solve the problem (though not directly the problem of intentional objects, but rather the problem about reference to non-existent things) by paraphrasing these sentences. He paraphrased these sentences and turned them into sentences which quantify and state the objects in an existential statement. For example, “*The golden mountain is*

golden” would be paraphrased as “*There exists an x such that x is both golden and a mountain*”. While the first statement was true according to Meinong, the second was false according to Russell. I am not sure the first one would be true according to Russell too. The first objection can be raised concerning the two sentences being the same. The question is whether such a paraphrase is successful or not. What is more, is it possible? Meinongian intuition would not accept this paraphrase because it eliminates one of the important features in sentences. “*There is*” and “*there exists*” is not the same, and thus the former cannot be equal to the sentence which is paraphrased through the second. Russellians, on the other hand, do not discuss the reason for the possibility of such a paraphrase.

Russell’s theory, although implying some ontological consequences, was originally about reference and descriptions. When it comes to Quine, he adopts Russell’s ontology (Quine, 1961, pp. 5-8). Although a very influential text in his “On what there is”, Quine does not develop a detailed argument against noneist theories. The basic assumptions behind his theory can be restricted to as the following two:

Ontological Assumption: Predication implies existence.

Referential Assumption: Every singular term refers to a kind of being (Bremer, p. 2).

Existence is mostly about extending in space and locating in time. Unlike Russell and Meinong (Priest defines him as a Platonist), Quine accepts some abstract entities but he tries to reduce their number. His basic claim in the paper is that “*to be is to be of a bound variable*”. To sum up, he tries to build a simple ontology that is compatible with Occam’s razor and solves the claim posed by Plato’s beard (Quine, 1953, pp. 2, 17).

Quine introduces us to two characters: McX and Wyman. Wyman believes that all terms denote and some of the objects that are denoted are existent and some are subsistent.

Quine objects to this theory because of its ambiguous use of “exists”. But he fails to arrive at a less ambiguous one.

On the other hand, he blames this theory for overpopulating the world. One problem is that neither of his objections apply to Meinongian or noneist theses, since in these subsisting is not posed as a third way between existence and non-existence. Things simply exist or they do not. According to Meinong, those denoted are objects but not existents. They are not subsistent either. Thus, the world is not overpopulated by additional existents, as Quine claims.

As an alternative, Quine adopts Russell's theory in two steps:

First, he takes names and translates them into descriptive phrases. And then he applies Russell's paraphrase.

Priest objects and finds Quine to have erred in both steps:

a. These names are not equivalent to their translated descriptive versions. Kripke's theory had shown that proper names and descriptions "hook on to reality in different ways" (Priest, 2005, p. 109). If they hook on to reality in the same way, descriptive statements would be analytical, but they are not.

b. Russell's paraphrase does not give us an equivalent of the original sentences. Therefore, the second step is controversial as well.

Russell's position seems to be a stronger criticism for Meinongianism. Quine, on the other hand firstly does not oppose the claims of the Meinongian thesis and this is the reason why some of his objections do not affect Meinongianism. Additionally, the rest of his argumentation depends on translation of proper names to descriptive statements and the contingent relation between the name and description causes this attempt to fail at its very beginning. Quine's own alternative about existence is not clear: what really does *being bound of a variable* mean? And what exactly allows mathematical objects to exist according to mathematical theories on the one hand, and all statements about fairies to be false on the other?

The contemporary discussions are mainly on propositional attributes. The main trend in the analytical tradition is to reduce the intentional into extra-mental realities. Although Meinongians take intentionality seriously, they still reject accepting different intensified levels of existence. Instead of explaining intentional objects among existents, they instead conceptualise '*objectness*' which accepts levels, which has a different truth value realm and which is indifferent to existence. Meinong's idea of indifference reminds one of Avicenna's idea of the three aspects of essence (*ShI*. V.1.). His attitude about thingness in general also appears very close to the quiddity of Avicenna. Details of Avicenna's quiddity will be discussed further together with Mullā Ṣadrā's ontology.

5.4 QUEST FOR A DIFFERENT FRAME TO THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY: MENTAL EXISTENCE

Tenants of the house

Thoughts of a dry brain in a dry season

In this research I aimed to discuss intentionality in pre-Brentano texts by describing the ideas on the soul and perception processes of different ancient and medieval philosophers. My quest in this research has been mainly to consider the largest possible context in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of intentionality. Thus, intentionality is related to all processes including sense perception and intellection in which human beings create a world unique which is for them, and objects in this world manifest different characteristics from the objects in the extra-mental world. Thus, they have *inexistence* as Brentano names it, or they have *mental existence* as Avicenna calls it.

Mullā Ṣadrā's attitude for mental existence is reported to be one of the most original ideas in his philosophy. This would disappoint many, as neither his question nor his proofs are as original as one would expect. Marcotte finds the close steps of mental existence in Avicenna's "*ma'na*" since *ma'na* has no extra-mental reality, and also in the representative nature of images for sensory objects in the mind (Marcotte, 2011, p. 157). In his presentation of the problem of mental existence, Rizvi adds an alternative suggestion that Avicenna's *modal classification* is part of the discussion of the mental (Rizvi, 2009, p. 79). He also traces the question back to the Platonic tradition. It is Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who have received more extensive discussions regarding the question of mental existence before Mullā Ṣadrā. The latter was one of the rare figures who wrote to reject the idea itself instead of to prove it. Ṣadrā largely mirrors the proofs for mental existence already presented objectively by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī in *Mabāḥith*.

5.4.1 Concept of Existence

Avicenna's thought that existence is added to quiddity is interpreted as an ontological evaluation about extra-mental reality as well as a logical one by philosophers like Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī and Averroes. However, as Ṭūsī's defense of Avicenna shows, for Avicenna, the distinction of quiddity and existence is not extra-mental (Izutsu, 1971, p. 3; Kalin, 2004, p. 87; *Ishārāt*, v. 3, p. 14).

Most of the discussions on the topic are the result of confusion about predication on existence. Consider talking about the existence of a tree. When this is carried to language, the statement occurs as "X exists" or "X is an existent". "X is existent" is in the same form as "X is white". The question is then whether the word "existence" carries same

characteristics as another word, say, “white”. As its form is similar to “X is white” in this formularization, existence appears to be an adjective (Izutsu, 1971, p. 4).

Existence’s appearance as an adjective implies that it is a concept that is dependent on something else, as in our case existence becomes dependent to the tree. This is strengthened by the idea that quiddities are possible situations and existence is attached to them. Eventually this requires the assumption that the quiddity of X exists before X’s existence. This is absurd. In order to avoid absurdity and regression, Avicenna claims that the accidentality of existence is a special one, different from other accidents. Mullā Ṣadrā discusses this point in terms of Avicenna’s own principle that substances are prior to accidents:

Shaykh al-Ra’is Ibn Sina has said in his *Ta’līqāt* (Glosses) as follows: “The *wujūd* of accidents in themselves is their *wujūd* for their respective substrata, except for this accident which one designates as “*wujūd*.” This latter differs from all other accidents as a result of the fact that they have need of their substratum in order to exist, whereas *wujūd* does not need *wujūd* in order to exist. It is therefore not correct to say that *wujūd* in its substratum is *wujūd* in itself if one means by that that *wujūd* has a *wujūd* (other than itself), as whiteness has a (difference from something that is white). Rather, one can say that it is so in the sense that its *wujūd* in its substratum is the very *wujūd* of the substratum, whereas in the case of all other accidents than *wujūd*, their *wujūd* in their respective substratum is simply the *wujūd* of their accidents” (*Mashā’ir*, p. 34, tr. p. 36).

Suhrawardī builds up ontology on a hierarchy of lights. His ontology is mainly built on the dual language of light and darkness. Shades of light, - thus different configurations of light and darkness - make up the world of existent things. He, however, denies attributing existence to the existents, and as a result he identifies reality with quiddity and light by differentiating them from existence. What Suhrawardī actually means is that there is no reality to existence other than that of a concept or a mental construction (*HI*, p. 45). Fārābī might be the first to focus on such a problem in terms of predication. He talks about two types of approaches to evaluate existential propositions, i.e. sentences like “X exists”. One is from the point of logic and the second is ontological. Although “existent” is “predicate” in the first, it is not according to the second. Extra-mental reality makes up the perspective of the second perspective. Logically, the sentence is made up of a subject and a predicate (Rizvi, 2009, p. 64ff.). Thus, the first perspective sees existence as a

predicate. However, there is only a unity in the extra-mental reality. Ṭūsī expresses this by saying that *wujūd* is an intellectual predication (Ashkivārī, 2008, p. 62). Fārābī's formula that, "Existence of something is nothing but itself", must have given inspiration to Ṣadrā's rejection of essentialist approaches to existence such as Suhrawardī's (Rizvi, p. 65). Ṣadrā's reply in this context had been differentiating between existence as a mentally-constructed concept and existence as actual reality.

According to Ṣadrā, the case Suhrawardī describes is true of existence as a concept:

It (*wujūd*) is in essence a reality which is simple (*baṣīṭ*), distinguished by its essence without having a genus or specific difference. And also it is not the genus for other things and it has no specific difference, no species, no general accident and no specific accident. But what is said concerning its being an accident for existents, from the point of view of abstract mental meaning that does not involve the reality of *wujūd*. Rather, it is the mental meaning of it which is derived from secondary intelligibles such as thingness, possibility, substantiality, accidentality, humanity, blackness, and other abstract words which are drawn from verbal nouns, upon which is based the manner in which an account is given of real or unreal things. Our discourse does not concern it [to explain secondary intelligibles] but what gives an account of them [i.e., reality of *wujūd*] and that it is a single, simple reality which does not at all need, in its realization or actualization, anything to be added to it, any condition of specific difference or accident whether it be of a class or an individual (*Mashā'ir*, p. 7, tr. p. 8).

For Ṣadrā, existence as a reality or - better put - as a dynamic reality, cannot be described, defined, or named. As soon as human beings try to make sense of reality, they freeze and distort it and create concepts and quiddities. In this way, the reality of existents is turned into concepts and their reality is distorted and conceptualized.

Know that to all *wujūdāt* there correspond external realities; however, their names are unknown. In order to supply these names, we say 'the existence of this', 'the existence of that'. Moreover, the totality of it necessitates in the mind a general concept. In contrast, the different things and quiddities have names and properties which are known. However, it is not possible to express the real *wujūd* of each thing among all the different things, or real *wujūd* of everything, through a name or a qualification because the formation of names and qualifications is in correspondence to concepts and universals used in

logic, not in correspondence to individual ipseities of *wujūd* nor of concrete forms (*Mashā'ir*, p. 12, tr. p. 13).

Thus, Ṣadrā does not reject most of the inquiry on how existence is an accident or an adjective or a concept. He places these characteristics under the characteristics of a concept of existence. This concept has the same characteristics as any other concept and it is a distorted picture of the reality of existence. The concept of existence is a mental construction. As a result, it cannot reflect the dynamic reality of existence. So, grasping the reality and freezing it without any distortion is only possible at rare moments of origination and resurrection¹⁰⁷. The reality of *wujūd* is not mental existence (*wujūd dhihnī*) that is common among many. Only as a concept is existence (*wujūd*) is a common meaning (*Mashā'ir*, pp. 7-8).

So *wujūd* is not mentally constructed (*i'tibārī*). It is not a universal reality (does not have mental existence), it is not particular or universal, nor general or specific. However, all these cases emerge from *wujūd* itself. One of the related issues is the expansion of *wujūd* on things, as it is not universal this expansion is not like that of a universal on particulars. Ṣadrā uses the term *sarayān* (expansion) for explaining this. Every existent is differentiated from another by itself, and not with any other differentiation (*Shawāhid*, pp. 6-7). One can tie this idea of *sarayān* with Mullā Ṣadrā's *wujūd munbaṣiṭ* (extended existence). So, at the level of ordinary things, *wujūd* is manifested as each thing that there is.

5.4.2 Non-existence

One of the classical classifications of things that are is to discriminate among the actual things, the things in the mind (*ShI*, I.5, p. 32, tr. p. 25), and the things from the linguistic realm either as they appear in spoken or in written form. Rizvi traces this back to Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* and the Late Antique commentaries (Rizvi, 2009, p. 58). Other than things *in re* (*fī'l-ʿayn*), all others are indeed uninstantiated in the extra-mental world and have a dependent existence: they are mainly the products of human minds. When reduced to a bi-partite classification of existence-non-existence, in terms of their uninstantiated status, all other than actual extra-mental things can be regarded as non-existents.

¹⁰⁷Ali Shirvani, "Epistemology and Transcendent Philosophy"
http://www.Mullasadra.org/new_site/english/Paper%20Bank/Transcendent%20Philosophy/13-78140%20@%20Shirvani.htm, accessed: 20th June 2013.

Another classification was Avicenna's tripartite classification of possible beings, impossible beings, and the necessary being. In the latter classification all things that exist extra-mentally are considered to be necessary (either necessary by itself or by something else). All else can be listed as non-existent. When possible things enter this, I must add that non-existent, in its most general usage, has two sides: one possible and close to actual existence and a second one closer to mere non-existence.

Although the Peripatetic approach works on a dual classification of actual existents and non-existents, some theologians claimed another category that is in-between. They named it subsistence instead of existence (Sabzawari, 1977, p. 75). Mu'tazila's subsistence, for example, is defined as being more general than existence. They call this a "state" (*ḥāl*) and instead of existence they apply "subsistence" to it. So a state is an attribute of an existent which is neither existent nor non-existent (Sabzawari, 1977, p. 76). Šadrā does not accept the idea of a state as an in-between status. Šadrā's main idea is that the things that can be said about *ma'dūmāt* including the negated attitudes (*ṣifa salbiya*) all eventually come back to being about *wujūd* (Asfār, v. 1, p. 400). Their separation from the extra-mental existence which is one of the levels of *wujūd* does not benefit their togetherness in existence *per se*. Its benefit for non-existence is not due to its being a concept. As a concept, it is not different from other concepts. It is the estimative power according to Šadrā that can abstract the subject for non-existent (*ma'dūm*) and judge that it is vain or invalid. Not according to the concept itself as the representative concept in mind. That is rather in ultimate nonexistence (*'adam muṭlak*) (Asfār, v. 1, p. 400).

Non-existence, too, is similar to ultimate non-existence (*'adam muṭlak*), but only from a different perspective. In terms of its concept it has a share of ultimate existence (*wujūd muṭlak*). It is evident that what non-existence and existents (*'adam wa mawjūdāt*) share in terms of *wujūd* is not the *wujūd* from which nonexistence (*'adam*) is said to be free (*muta'arri*) or *Mawjūdāt* are said to be opposite of. *Ma'dūm* is indeed a mental abstraction. Its *wujūd* is due to its conceptual existence in the mind (Asfār, v. 1, p. 401). Concept is an intellectual existence and it is one of the individuals of the ultimate existence (*wujūd muṭlaq*).

Šadrā lists the different cases of *ma'dūm* that the mind can imagine such as the non-existence *per se*, non-existence of non-existence, ultimate non-existence (*'adam muṭlaq*), ultimate non-existent (*ma'dūm muṭlaq*), non-existent in the mind, and all the impossibles, ultimate unknown (*majhūl mutlaq*), and so on. As soon as the mind can imagine or estimate these things, it can also make judgements on them. One cannot predicate through

common predication (*ḥaml shāyī*) as they are not about natures that are in the mind or in the external world, thus the predication is first order (*ḥaml awwālī*) (*Asfār*, v. 1, p. 402).

This evaluation of Mullā Ṣadrā on non-existents as having some share of existence makes one think that in reality, Ṣadrā rejects non-existence itself. Non-existence according to him is nothing but a concept produced by the mind. And as a concept it has its fair share of existence.

How about ultimate non-existence? Fārābī and Mu‘tazila say that non-existence is a thing. Avicenna says that the ultimate non-existence is not a thing. How about Mullā Ṣadrā? According to Ṣadrā, as his primacy of existence principle implies, the distinction between existence and quiddity is a mental construction. The reality is existence, and as existence is not content-less, as soon as the mind is directed to things their quiddity is constructed by the mind. In this approach quiddity is a secondary universal. All universals as well as quiddities are mental constructions which depend on the human for their existence. Non-existence is a mental construction and, in reality, other than this construction, there is nothing to be referred to as non-existence. Thus he rejects non-existence totally, and rejects that non-existence is a thing.

In the next two sub-chapters I will continue to present how Mullā Ṣadrā explains universals and quiddities as mental objects with other examples of mental existence.

5.4.3 Universals as Objects of Mental Existence

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, universals are creations of the human mind. According to his comprehensive concept of *wujūd*, universals are classified as existence, though a mind-dependent one.

In terms of defining universals, Mullā Ṣadrā follows the Peripatetics: the universal is that which is not prevented from being predicated on many (Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 17a38; *ShI tr*, p. 148; *Asfār*, v. 2, p. 12). This is mainly a logical approach to the universal (*ShI tr*, p. 149; *Tanqīḥ*, Ṣadrā, p. 248). Universal can be considered in different ways: universality in as much as it is universal is different from universality in as much as it is something to which the universality is attached. In the case that the universal is a horse, for example, the universality and horseness are two different meanings. Horseness on its own has a meaning that can be thought of without universality. In that sense, horseness is neither one nor many. It is neither extra-mental nor mental (*ShI tr*, pp. 149, 151).

When a universal is said to have extra-mental presence, what is meant is the universal's attachment to a particular extra-mental thing (*ShI tr*, p. 156-7; *Asfār*, v. 2, p. 8). This

attachment is never a physical one. So according to Avicenna, following Aristotle, universals do not subsist externally (McGinnis, 2007, pp. 170-1).

Mullā Ṣadrā follows the Peripatetic tradition in rejecting the extra-mental subsistence of universals. He also repeats Avicenna's explanation of how a universal can be said to be present externally only in terms of being an attachment of a particular thing. However, if Ṣadrā accepts that extra-mentals can be attached by universals, he needs to accept the essence-existence distinction too. On the other hand, his idea of the primacy of existence seems to contradict such a stance. According to Ṣadrā, all that there is, is nothing but different levels of a single reality: *wujūd*. The principle of unity and multiplicity is this reality too. So, according to Ṣadrā, what differentiates things from each other are not accidents, matter, form, nor configurations of things. Rather, different intensities of existence are the real cause of existence of different beings in the universe. As a result, Ṣadrā rejects the individuation theory of Suhrawardī as much as he rejects that of Avicenna: the principle behind differentiation is not Suhrawardī's quiddity too. So, on the one hand, Ṣadrā rejects any reality apart from existence, and moreover the very idea of compound of quiddity and existence. Mullā Ṣadrā's presentation is not black and white in terms of separating his individuation theory from that of the Peripatetics and Suhrawardī's. In the *Mashā'ir*, he chooses to promote his idea of intensification of existence as a principle of plurality, by accepting the compounds of existence and quiddity:

It will become apparent to you also in what way it is true to say that the reality of *wujūd*, while being individualized by itself, is differentiated realities according to the differentiation of contingent quiddities, each of which is united to one of the degrees among its degrees and one of the stages among its stages. Except the primal Reality of *wujūd* which has no quiddity because it is pure *Wujūd*, of which there is none more complete or more intense or more perfect. Neither generality nor particularity are mixed in it (*wujūd*), and no definition defines it nor any name or description renders it precise, and no knowledge comprehends it. "All faces will be humbled before the Ever-Living, the Self-Subsistent Fount of All Being. [*Qur'an*, 20:111] (*Mashā'ir*, p. 9, tr. p. 10).

An explanation that does not single out the primacy of existence is that Mullā Ṣadrā talks about these compounds in terms of their status intellectually. Thus, apart from the pure existence, all existents can be made objects of mentalization and can be turned into

compounds of existence and *wujūd*. “Know that in all existents *in concreto* except *wujūd* there is composition, even if it be only in an intelligible manner, in contrast to pure *wujūd*” (*Mashā‘ir*, p. 12, tr. p. 13).

This is made clearer when Mullā Ṣadrā talks about external realities being beyond the grasp of language and mind:

Know that to all *wujūdāt* there correspond external realities; however, their names are unknown. In order to supply these names, we say ‘the existence of this’, ‘the existence of that’. Moreover, the totality of it necessitates in the mind a general concept. In contrast, the different things and quiddities have names and properties which are known. However, it is not possible to express the real *wujūd* of each thing among all the different things, or real *wujūd* of everything, through a name or a qualification because the formation of names and qualifications is in correspondence to concepts and universals used in logic, not in correspondence to individual ipseities of *wujūd* nor of concrete forms (*Mashā‘ir*, p. 12, tr. p. 13).

Quiddity, for Mullā Ṣadrā, is a product of mind. On the appearance *wujūd* is attached to quiddities and this appearance is intellectual as well. So, for the sake of analysis it is acceptable to allow students of philosophy to mention qualification of *māhīya* with *wujūd*. Thus, Ṣadrā adds a pedagogical dimension to this usage. Yet, this does not mean that the implication of this usage - that existence is accidental - is also true for *de re*:

Verily, the qualification of quiddity by *wujūd* is an intelligible qualification, and accidentality based upon the analysis by the mind. In this kind of accidentality it is not possible that there be for the substratum which receives the accident any degree of existence and any ontological reality, either externally or in the mind, that which is named not being called by this imposition an accident. As for specific difference, if it is said, for example, that it is accidental upon a genus, that does not mean that the genus has in *concreto* reality whether it be external or mental without the specific difference. Rather, it means that the concept of specific difference is outside the concept of genus but related to it in meaning, even if being united with it existentially. And accidentality belongs to the quiddity from the point of view of (mental) analysis while being united with it [in *concreto*]. The same holds true for *māhīya* and *wujūd* when it is said that *wujūd* is one of the accidents of *māhīya* (*Mashā‘ir*, p. 16, tr. p. 17).

Māhīya and *wujūd* are not two entities, and quiddity does not have any reality other than its shadowy existence dependent on *wujūd*. So as a result, although some composition of *wujūd* and quiddity is mentioned in different parts of Sadrian texts, there is not a real distinction of quiddity and *wujūd* apart from a mental production.

More needs to be said about quiddities, especially about their status as mental beings. Accordingly that has been discussed in detail in the previous section.

In terms of the ontological status of universals, although he denies their extra-mental existence, universals have mental existence:

Universality is the harmony and the correspondence (*mutābaqa*) of an intellectual form to many. In comparison to other things, its existence is a shadowy one (*Asfār*, v. 2, p. 9).

As soon as universality emerges extra-mentally it loses its exemplary (*mithālī*) status, it possesses an individuated essence (*huwiyya*), thus in its new status universality becomes no longer applicable to many (*Asfār*, v. 2, p. 8).

5.4.4 Quiddity as Objects of Mental Existence

One would still wonder what the relationship of a common nature or universal and its particular examples is. Avicenna, in his *Madkhal*, talks affirmatively about a tradition of classification of universals as before multiplicity, in multiplicity, and after multiplicity. The first refers to *the intellectual universal*, the second to *the natural universal*, and the third to *the logical universal* (*ShMd*, p. 65ff). At the example of an actual horse that can be pointed to, the quiddity of horseness is found in multiplicity. The universal "horseness" in the mind, on the other hand, is in a certain respect logical and in another intellectual.

The case of the intellectual has different considerations according to human and according to God. For human, some forms are intellectual before multiplicity and they cause existence of extra-mental forms, and these are artificial. Thus, tableness, for example, takes place in the mind first and then the human produces a table and it becomes existent in multiplicity. In the second case, a universal is found in multiplicity and human abstracts it, and it becomes intellectual after multiplicity. Avicenna leaves aside what kind of existence they have, but describes some universals in the mind of God which are before multiplicity (*ShMd*, 1902 (1985), p. 67ff).

Another famous evaluation is Avicenna's idea of three aspects of quiddity (*ShI*. V.1). Quiddity can be regarded as a universal existing in the mind, as essence existing in a

concrete individual, and thirdly by itself, as quiddity *per se*. Quiddity in itself is neither universal nor particular. The curious point is whether quiddity with this special aspect is ontologically posited or not. It appears to me that it is difficult to consider this as an ontological realm. This is because things are present either in mind or external to mind. Remember this evaluation is about human mind: It is hard to think a third realm which is neither in or outside human mind. Some might claim this is a realm such as God's mind, but then this is still a presence the outside human mind. Mullā Ṣadrā talks about the separate intellects in a similar fashion: as being in God's knowledge. However, he makes it very clear that these do not have an independent existence (*Tafsīr*, v. 3, p. 410)

Some might claim that if this is only a way of consideration which is not ontological, then this aspect must be considered as a special kind of mental existence. That mind abstracts universal of its concomitants as well; this kind of a function can be thought of for human minds. Izutsu explains that the misunderstandings regarding Avicenna lie in misunderstanding the quiddity itself as an ontological mode. Hence, consideration denotes a mental analysis:

He calls these three different aspects of one and the same "quiddity" the three ways of viewing a quiddity (*i 'tibārāt thalāsah*). The word *i 'tibār* means a subjective manner of looking at a thing something produced or posited through the analytical work of the reason. It is an aspect of a thing which primarily appears in the subject and which, then, projected onto the thing itself as if it were an objective aspect of the thing (Izutsu, 1971, p. 98).

One can talk about a quiddity in terms of its universality or in terms of its attachment to an individual (*Asfār*, v. 2, pp. 8-9). So when one talks about the universal extra-mentally, what he means is the nature that is attached to the extra-mental entity.

The relationship of a universal and its particulars, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, is mentally constructed and mentally attached to things. Universals are merely common meanings which the mind constructs about things. Quiddities (a natural universal) for example, when they are present in different minds, or when they are attached to different entities extra-mentally; the relation of quiddity to many things it is attached to is not the relation of numerical one's presence in many. As a realized reality (let's call it A), every being has its own quiddity which is different from all other things. What occurs about A in the mind and what it has in common with others' quiddities is a natural meaning in mind. The commonness is then *commonness in meaning*. So each quiddity is different in terms of

their reality in individuals, but the same in terms of meaning (*Asfār*, v. 2, pp. 7-8). One would think Avicenna is different from Mullā Ṣadrā as he thinks it is the exact common nature that occurs to the mind and for Ṣadrā the nature that is created in the mind is different from the extra-mental object. The paragraph from Avicenna, however, shows that these two are closer than one would imagine:

And the soul itself also conceptualizes another universal which unites this form with another one in this soul or in another soul; but all of them, insofar as they are in the soul, have a single definition. And even if this form, in relation to the individuals, is a universal, in relation to the particular soul upon which it is impressed, it is an individual, for it is one of the forms which are in the intellect. And because individual souls are many in number, therefore it is possible for these universal forms to be many in number in the respect in which they are individual. And it may have another universal intelligible, whose relation to it is like its relation to an external. Avicenna adds further that once a nature has assumed mental existence in a particular soul, it can become an object of understanding as an individual in its own right: —And because it is in the power of the soul to understand and to understand that it understands, and to understand that it understands that it understands, and to compose relations of relations, and to construct many states belonging to one thing from among these relations, potentially to infinity, it is necessary that there be no end for these intelligible forms ordered to one another (*ShI*, V.2, p. 210.14–18, tr. Black, 1998, p. 55).

This is mainly because “universal” can be a relative term similar to genus. Just as genus can be thought of as a genus for some matter, it can be a matter for some other genus too. A similar relation is thinkable for universals and particulars:

Insofar as this form is a disposition in a particular soul, it is one of the individual sciences or concepts. For just as something may be a genus and a species from different perspectives, so too it may be a universal and a particular from different perspectives. Thus insofar as this form is some form among the forms in some soul, it is particular; but insofar as many share in it, ... it is a universal (*ShI*, V.2, p. 209, tr. Black, 1998, p. 54).

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, things that are common in meaning can be differentiated from the others in four ways: in the form they share accidentally, they differentiate by their quiddity; in the genus they share, they differentiate by the part that belongs to the essence

(*dhāt*); some also differentiate by their accidents which are not concomitant (*lāzim*); if they are common in their species, they differentiate by the wholeness of their nature or in terms of the level of deficiency of this wholeness (*Asfār*, v. 2, pp. 9-10). These cases of differentiation are called *tamayyuz* by Ṣadrā; separating them from what he calls *tashahhus* - individuation. Before him, individuation, is explained by some philosophers through sense and observation, by others through the identifier ipseity or he-ness (*huwiyyah* ‘*aynī*), or through the analytical parts which are gained through an intellectual analysis of the thing (*juzz al-tahlīlī*), or through the cause of the thing, or through the thing’s relation to the real existence (*Asfār*, v. 2, p. 15).

For Mullā Ṣadrā, individuation can only take place through existence. Although different causes seem to explain the emergence of things extra-mentally, he insists it is *wujūd* which is the real maker. It is also the real cause for individuation as well as for differentiation.

The process of one thing becoming itself (*ta’ayyun*) is either (1) the essence of the thing (*dhāt*) itself or (2) it is something attached to it (*Asfār*, v. 2, p. 15). If it is something attached to it, it shall be one of these three: (2a) it is due to existence (*wujūdī*); (2b) it is due to the absence of something (‘*adamī*); or (2c) it is a compound of the first two. An example of (2a) is the necessary existent, possible quiddities in the mind and the mental existents. An example of (2b) is differentiation of the “writer” from the “illiterate” by the ability “to write”.

An example of (2c) is “illiterate” differentiating from “writer” by the absence of the ability to write. Another group of examples about (2) is human: human being is differentiated from horse by itself.

The cases for the second possibility are due to *wujūd*, - although they seem to be through an attachment - because all those attachments are concomitants of *wujūd*. Accidents, attributes, or attachments of things can play a role in differentiation. Despite their active role, in order to avoid an unending regression, they need to be of an existent. Thus, even in these cases, it is “existence” that causes the differentiation (*Asfār*, v. 2, pp. 15-16).

While I was discussing the primacy of *wujūd*, I mentioned that one of the characteristics is that it is simple and it accepts no parts. Quiddity, in contrast, can be analysed into parts such as genus and differentia, and form and matter. The nature of the combination of genus and differentia on one side is vague and determinate; it is a relative and mental situation. In the case of matter and form, its nature is of unification (*Asfār*, v. 2, p. 18). As a result of the entrance of form into matter, one object emerges. Eventually, this too is

mental and relational. Neither matters nor forms independently exist. Form is always a form of something and matter is likewise. Thus, both duos are mental and relational. The essence of this examination is that when any of those four are taken as conditioned (*muqayyad*), they are matter and form; when they are taken as unconditioned (*muṭlaq*) they are genus and differentia (*Asfār*, v. 5, p. 477).

Mullā Ṣadrā introduces a double-sided understanding of quiddity, form and differentia as well. One side of the definitions refer to their nature revealing the reality of things. For example, quiddity tells us what makes a thing itself. In this sense, what makes a thing itself is only in a loose usage of the word the quiddity. As in his theory, what really makes a thing itself is nothing but the *wujūd* itself (*Asfār*, v. 2, pp. 3-5). Accordingly when quiddity is used to mean "what makes a thing itself", then it really means "*wujūd*". Thus the word quiddity has two usages: one is the universal, the quiddity, and the other is the existence.

These analyses are related to the considerations and analyses of quiddity as well. For example, we can talk about the unification of form and matter only when the quiddity is conditioned to be something, only something instantiated physical can be thought to be composed of matter and form.

After discussing universals and quiddity, I will finish the evaluation of different examples of mental existence with objects of sense perception. Similar to quiddity and other universals and mental constructions, sense objects too are mental and constructed by the active involvement of the soul.

5.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I tried to focus on intentionality in terms of the ontological status of intentional objects. On the one hand, I presented contemporary Meinongian and Russelian/Quineian discussions of intentional objects and on the other medieval Avicennan and Sadrian discussions on mental existence. Following Brentano's indication from Aristotle's inexistence and Aquinas' inner word (*verbum mentis*), intentionality in Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy is sought in his position on mental existence. The investigation showed how Ṣadrā's theory is internally built. Fortunately, in terms of intentionality we face a case which contains object-directedness (though internally), aboutness (mental things are not defined merely in relational terms and as being content-less) and immateriality. This helps us claim that Ṣadrā talks about intentionality.

In medieval philosophies, existence is not used only for extended corporeal things. The second part of the bipartite separation of mental and extra-mental thus includes intellects and God which are pure and immaterial. Existence in the mainstream usage still meant that which is differentiated and instantiated.

In modern discussions, the dominant understanding is a univocal existence which is basically actual, determined, instantiated, physical, and extended in space. Due to this more restricted definition of existence, intentional objects have been a problematic case due to its alleged non-physicality. A detailed investigation of these theories, some of which are functionalist, teleological, representational theories, is not given in this chapter or in the other chapters. Instead, I chose three representatives hoping to represent three different attitudes in the modern era. Quine with his variable dependent reductionist approach and Russell with his more linguistic reductionist approach are two cases of explaining intentionality totally in relation to extra-mental physical world. For both philosophers, as for a majority of analytical philosophers, intentionality is to be accounted for in compatible terms with the physical world and language of science. In this attitude, existence refers to physical things or things that are explicable through science. Meinong, on the other hand, takes intentionality seriously and accepts its ontological implications as well. He does not introduce a new definition of existence. However, he discriminates between a thing's existence and "*so-sein*". So he introduces a larger category than existence which is object. This discrimination reminds one of Avicenna's quiddity and existence. But different from Avicenna's quiddity, *so-sein* is a state that includes existent and non-existents. In this sense, the *so-sein* is reminiscent of the "*ḥāl*" of Mu'tazila more than it is of quiddity.

Medieval philosophers like Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā accepted a different mode of existence as well as the central-meaning which is the actual extra-mental existence: mental existence. According to Avicenna, universals and quiddity would be vague and common. According to Ṣadrā even universal and common meaning had to share features of existence and be differentiated (*mushakkhkhaṣ*).

Although for Avicenna it is performed by bodily organs at some levels, both philosophers talked about abstracted forms in the acquired knowledge process. In Avicenna's case, it seems the correspondence of extra-mental object and object of perception and possibility of knowledge is guaranteed by Active Intellect, which is an ontological agent as well as an epistemological one. And the soul was kept to one side of the correspondence. Knowledge, for Mullā Ṣadrā, is part of the soul, performed by the soul and both the

faculties and the extra-mental object which play preparatory roles. Soul creates similar forms of an extra-mental object and the created object is identical with the knower agent. Knowledge is part of the soul and its substantial change. A human being's ability to create forms similar to those in the world gives the human a world of her own: mental. This world is part of the central existence and shares features of it with different manifestations than the extra-mental things. Mullā Ṣadrā and Avicenna both expand the application of existence to non-actual things. Intentional objects, according to them, fall under the classification of mental existence.

As for mental existence, Avicenna does not discuss this in detail nor does he try to prove it. It is thanks to Fakhr al-din Rāzī and Ṭūsī that we see how mental existence starts to be part of philosophical discussions on existence. Mullā Ṣadrā, too, is one of the important figures in terms of his prioritizing the discussion of mental existence. It is important to prove mental existence, because without the differentiation of mental and extra-mental existence, proving primacy of existence would be a more difficult mission. Thus, part of his argumentation for the primacy of *wujūd* depends on mental existence. Thanks to the difference, the existence can be claimed to not be an abstracted concept. His proofs for mental existence are not original, and he mainly repeats the argumentations from affirmative true sentences, from generalizations and fictional and non-existent things. The originality of his approach lies instead in his understanding of the soul and existence. He thinks that human beings are capable of creating a unique world and that *wujūd* manifests itself at various intensifications and stages. In Mullā Ṣadrā's case, then, intentionality is re-creation of a world in the human mind by the creativity of the soul. This world has resemblance to the extra-mental world. However, its causality and effects as well as its nature are different. The existence of this world is totally dependent on the human being; however, it is still one of the manifestations of *wujūd*.

With this expanded approach to existence Mullā Ṣadrā pursues a different path from those who introduce "thingness" or those who try to eliminate or reduce intentional objects with a univocal understanding of existence which is only extra-mental and in many cases only physical. His comprehensive understanding is only possible because of the creative capacity of the soul and the principle of *tashkīk*.

CONCLUSION

*Words move, music moves,
 Only in time, but that which is only living
 Can only die. Words, after speech, reach
 Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern,
 Can words or music reach
 The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
 Moves perpetually in its stillness.
 Not the stillness of the violin, while the notes lasts,
 Not that only, but the coexistence,
 Or say that the end precedes the beginning
 And the end and the beginning were always there
 Before the beginning and after the end.
 ... the detail in the pattern is movement
 As in the figure of ten stairs
 T. S. Eliot, "Burnt Norton"*

THE QUESTION, THE ARGUMENT AND THE FINDINGS

What if the question of intentionality is discussed with a comprehensive concept of existence that includes intentional objects? This was the main question behind my research. In this investigation the aim was, on the one hand, to reconstruct the question of intentionality around a wider understanding of existence and, on the other, to reconstruct Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy around the question of intentionality. It has been shown in various chapters of this thesis that we can find a fresh understanding of intentionality when Ṣadrā's ontological, psychological, and epistemological principles are composed around "intentionality". The results of my reconstruction of intentionality are mainly based on Ṣadrā's *monist* ontology and psychology.

The result can be summarized as such: ontologically, there is only one reality and nothing is left outside it; this reality is "existence". Accordingly, the intentional objects are mental

beings that are a lower level of existence called “shadowy existence” (*wujūd zillī*). The principles behind the monist ontology are, first, the gradational ontology (*tashkīk*) that all things are determined beings (*mutamayyiz*) and they are manifestations of a single reality at different levels of intensity (*mutashakkik*), and, second, the simplicity principle (*basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa*) in which existence is a simple reality that comprehends all beings whilst being the principle of multiplicity at the same time. Epistemologically, whole knowledge processes including external senses are regarded as internal processes in which the causal effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being an accidental preparatory tool. Perception is always completed with the touch of imagination and the real object of perception is internally created. The soul is no longer the receiver of forms, but is the active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes substantial change as the objects are being produced. The soul is then no longer a container of forms. It is rather the case that the forms themselves construct the soul. The last touch of this extremely internalist psychology is the claim that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being (*knowledge*) indeed is the very existence of the human soul. This connects us to the psychological situation of Ṣadrā’s intentionality: the soul is neither material nor immaterial per se. It is a substance, which is in constant change. The soul starts her journey as a material substance and becomes more delicate and immaterial through her journey. The soul’s journey is made possible with the preparatory role of the perception processes.

Ṣadrā’s monism is observable at all three of these levels of investigation. In ontology, the main idea is that existence is one reality, and that it is differentiated at each and every one of the existents. When this notion is reflected at the derived level of language and logic, existence is predicated of its instances univocally. The reflection of monism in epistemology and psychology is observed in the claims that the soul is a unity that is active at all levels of knowledge, and that the soul is capable of creating a world of her own which reflects realities in an extra-mental world, and lastly that the soul is identical with this world which she creates, so she undergoes change through all of her experiences.

So what does this reconstructed theory of Ṣadrā say about intentionality? Thanks to intentionality, there is a world within the human being. And knowledge and experience are ultimately on an expedition of discovery and a process of finding this unique world. Whether human beings come to this world with an inner world embedded in them or without one as a *tabula rasa* is not so clear in Ṣadrā’s case. However, by the process of knowledge, this inner world is at one and the same time both internally built and explored.

One suspects that an internalist theory can claim to explain intentionality. With a radically internalist understanding of the cognition and knowledge process, one suspects Şadrā's philosophy can do so as well. However, one interesting result of this investigation has been that an internalist theory of intentionality is possible together with the assumption that there is coherence and correspondence between the mental objects. Moreover, these intentional objects reflect features of their source-objects in the extra-mental world. The more perfect a soul is the more perfect the replica created becomes. I would not like to connect this point to Plato's theory of anamnesis. The main reason is that Şadrā does not explicitly try to prove that knowledge is remembering. Moreover, the creative process in knowledge is an essential part of the Sadrian notion of knowledge. The discovery or remembering or its unveiling is an active process rather than a passive one due to this creativity.

To sum up, intentionality is the human soul's capacity to create a unique world of her own which is different from the extra-mental world. The objects that are internally produced populate this inner world. Moreover, this inner world is given an ontological status and regarded as a level of existence. These existents are dependent on the human soul in their continuity of existence. The more the soul experiences and perceives, the more she becomes ready for her own perfection and the forms she creates become more perfect replicas of the extra-mental objects. The soul undergoes change and becomes the objects that it perceives. Thus, the ontological status of the intentional objects is closely related with knowledge being a mode of existence and the soul being the very perceptions of her own self. In this picture, intentionality is what happens to the soul and intentional objects are what the soul is in her constant state of change.

Let me explore these points in some more detail and define the ontological and psychological questions in a larger context. In the 19th century Brentano introduced the concept of intentionality with the main intention of defining the "mental". Brentano's intentionality claim caused heated debates in the field of ontology. Kriegel, for example, expresses how Brentano's intentionality thesis created a nightmare for naturalist philosophers: "Ontology of merely intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities we should" (Kriegel, 2008, p. 79). Brentano opened the way to this "nightmare" by claiming that intentional objects are different from physical phenomena. However, he did not follow through his immanence claim to its full extent to make ontological claims. Şadrā's philosophy, on the other hand, is capable of a

fully extended ontological commitment. That is one of the reasons for choosing his theory in this thesis.

Şadrā's theory admits propositional implications as well. He accepts that propositions including intentional objects can have truth value. Similar to Avicenna, when the objects are not extra-mentally existent, Şadrā builds the correspondence aspect of the truth claims between inner relations of concepts. Accordingly, we can say not only that mental existents are created by the soul but also their coherence is "in the mind" as well. One may suspect that this extreme internalism could be vulnerable to solipsism. However, the similarity of the human to the cosmos saves Şadrā's theory from being some sort of solipsism. Indeed all truths about the universe are potentially already present in the human being. The more the human soul experiences these, the closer it gets to her perfection. Even after death, the journey to perfection does not end. Human beings are also created with the ability to create. This is the reason why they can visualize mental existents that are impossible or fictional things absent from the extra-mental world: the mental world and imagination is the never-ending realm of man's creativity (Khamenei, 2006, p. 151). Mental existents are dependent on the human soul, especially her faculty of imagination. Şadrā's explanations of knowledge of the extra-mental world, the nature of knowledge and ontology return back to human beings. The circle starts and ends with the human. The only way out of this circular explanation and to avoid solipsism is to relate the human to the world by the claim that the human being is a microcosm. A second approach relates the human soul and the world through a transcendental connection. All existence in reality starts and ends with God. And following Ibn al-ʿArabī's explanation, the whole universe is imagination and has an in-between (*barzakhī*) status. The world and the mental world are alike: mental beings are creations of and the inner world of the human. Similarly, the world itself and human beings in it are dependent on God and are merely imaginings of God. The main reason how Şadrā's philosophy avoids scepticism is the postulation that everything is based on the idea of God. Thus, only through God can one talk about existence and the reality of existence. But simply because one can talk about real existence, all that there is exists. The cosmos is open to accounts of different natures because there are different aspects to it. From the human perspective, it is a dynamic reality, and unless the human has direct connection to it, this reality is in constant change, it is unnameable and unspeakable.

Existence is a homogenous reality shared by all. Part of my reading focuses on Şadrā's idea that every existent is necessarily differentiated from other things that exist. As a

result, my interpretation of Şadrā's ontology had made him close to reist approaches and radically monist with a univocal understanding of the concept of existence. This is not to mean that Şadrā is following a concretist and materialist understanding of existence. But his approach goes beyond the dichotomy of material and dualist understanding.

Reism is based on the idea that only "things" exist. Brentano's later philosophy as well as some nominalist medieval philosophies defended this idea. All categories are reduced to one category: the thing. In many versions of reism, we find the rejection of abstract objects. In relation to intentional objects, it results in a direct realism that the only object is the extra-mental thing. The Reist approach has implications for semantics as well: "Only singular names, that is, names referring to concrete things, should be used, and abstract words avoided. Eventually, one can use sentences with abstract words provided that they have translations into statements with singular terms" (Woleński, Jan, (2012)). Due to its rejection of abstractness, one would imagine reism is also attractive for some materialist explanations. However, these aspects of reism and its strong relation to direct realism are not the reasons why I find it close to Şadrā's philosophy.

The main similarity is that Şadrā's explanations are similarly based on the idea of differentiated and determined existents; if not the thing, the world is filled with existents. The existent is not necessarily concrete nor three-dimensional. However, it is always determined and individuated, and this results in a different approach to universals. Universals as well are differentiated and they appear to manifest some sort of particularity, if not the same kind of particularity as singular things.

In Şadrā's approach, everything other than God is unstable and deficient. Still, each existent has a share of one reality at different levels of intensities and perfections. Every existent (this is to say every existent) is determined. Existents or existence is never vague. So my point of analogy between Şadrā and reist approaches is mainly about this rejection of vagueness about existence. I think my reading is a necessary step to be taken when Şadrā's primacy of existence claim is strictly applied to all areas of his thought. Part of this is that the primacy of existence entails the idea that existence is never a vague term but instantiated and differentiated at all levels and in all samples of its manifestation. Another implication of the primacy claim is that as all things share a homogenous reality, they also need an entity for their uniqueness: a differentiator. Şadrā claims that everything that exists does so with its own particular existence, and the particular existence of each existent is what causes the differentiation of one from another. What differentiates one thing from another then is its own strength and level or manifestation of existence. In

terms of thought, our concepts have a similar differentiation: each time we judge a mental object, we judge it as such and such. This kind of realism (the realism of *relata* which I mentioned in the Introduction for intentionality) can imply two different results: in Meinong's case, these differentiated things are necessary, because we apparently judge not only beings, so-beings, and subsistence, but also non-beings and impossible beings (*On Assumptions*, tr. James Heavenue, p. 243). In order to be able to judge non-existence of an impossible object such as a four-edged circle, we need a bearer of the judgment (Meinong, "Über Gegenstandstheorie", 1904, p. 9). Otherwise, we are left with open sentences which cannot bear a judgment, a falsity or truth. So Meinong's developed theory is mainly built on this realism and built on Mally's *Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit* and the result is that we need to assume that there are things that do not exist. This is an expanded world of objects. He does not try to expand the notion of existence in order to account for intentional objects. Mullā Ṣadrā gives the second reply and expands the notion of existence itself. What differentiates him from other medieval philosophers such as Avicenna, who also accepts the category of mental existence, is his principle of primacy and gradational ontology. There is only one reality that is existence, but it manifests itself in different intensities and gradation. The monist nature of his ontology allows him to account for all mental existents without overpopulating the cosmos with individual monads.

Bearing in mind Brentano's claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental, we can now pursue the psychological questions related to intentionality. Every mental phenomenon is accordingly characterized by reference to content, and direction to an object. "Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself". In this account, illusions or fictional beings are not excluded, but rather included, since they are mental phenomena. *Intentionality* can be thought of in three parts: the mental act (as the word "direction" would suggest), its content, and its object (most commonly the extra-mental object which is being referred to by the content). The presence of non-existent things in the list implies that the objects in intentionality are not necessarily extra-mentally existent. Brentano's explanation further claims: "No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it". Mental phenomena are different from physical phenomena. Thus, when one sees a cat, even when the cat is extra-mentally existent, Brentano claims that the intentional directedness towards it creates something different from any physical phenomena. In Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy, the trio of mental act, content, and object is reduced to the soul's action alone. This is due to Ṣadrā's principle of identification of the

knower and the known. However, for the sake of investigation we can still talk about the object of cognition and the cognizer. Intentional objects are directly translated – accordingly – as “mental objects”. Searle lists that the main questions to ask for identifying intentionality are: “What is X directed to?”, “What is X about?”, and “What is X of?” (Searle, 1983, pp. 1-37). Many analytical philosophers have described intentionality in relation to extra-mental reality and some with reference theory. So when someone sees a cat, according to these theorists, the agent sees the actual cat which is before them. This seems pretty straightforward. The problem for many of them occurs when there is no cat but somehow a content or about-ness is built. Kriegel talks about two types of intentional objects in a similar context. When the object is not extra-mentally existent he names it as a “merely intentional object” (Kriegel, 2008, p. 80). Brentano’s claim is stronger in its immanence. According to him, even when there is an actual cat I see before me, when I see it, I do not get an ‘experience’ of the vision of the cat. I ‘see’ the vision of the cat (Searle, 1983, p. 37).¹⁰⁸

The psychological question then is easily translated to *DA* literature of sensation after Aristotle. Since Aristotle, the processes of cognition starting with sense perception are explained dominantly as a process of abstraction. In its basic description, sense perception is extraction of forms from the extra-mental objects. The material world is thought to be consisting of compounds of matter and form. When we perceive with sense organs, the first level of extraction of the sensible form from the compound (of matter and form) takes place. Brentano refers to Aristotle’s explanation of sense as the production of matter-less form as a statement of *intentional inexistence*. However, whether there is immanence in Aristotle’s original theory is debatable. One way of testing this is through looking at how materialist Aristotle’s theory is. The literalist reading of Aristotle’s text would result in Aristotle defending a physical change and assimilation in the sense organ with the perception. Accordingly, the eye actually becomes red when it sees a red object. Even when we assume that Aristotle really means what his actual wording suggests, it seems that after him the understanding has been more and more immaterialised by his commentators. So much so that we read that the change is “spiritual”: “A natural body receives forms in accordance with natural and material existence ... but senses and

¹⁰⁸ Huemer links Brentano’s immanentism to his intentionality claims as follows: “The passage clearly suggests, however, that the intentional object towards which we are directed is part of the psychological act. It is something mental rather than physical. Brentano, thus, seems to advocate a form of immanentism, according to which the intentional object is “in the head,” as it were.” Huemer, Wolfgang, “Franz Brentano”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/brentano/>>.

intellect receive the forms of things spiritually and materially, according to a certain intentional existence” (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato* 449a15; tr. Pasnau, 1997, p. 37). It seems that the discussions on how much an account is immaterialist are built around different explanations at different levels of cognition.

The reason for identifying a particular philosopher who is classified under different approaches is how it reveals the differing focus of each scholar’s approach to that philosopher. Some focus on the *act* of cognition itself. Accordingly, when cognition can be thought to be operated by a physical body, then they consider it physical and material. For example, the inner senses in Avicenna are explained as functions of the brain and then, in accordance with this, his account of not only external senses but also inner senses is described as material. Some others focused on the *process* of the event. The literalist readings of Aristotle, for example, explained change as happening in the sense organs and claimed that the organ literally becomes like the object. As they focus on the event and as the change is material, for them immateriality does not occur at the level of the senses. Another group of scholars have focused on the *object* of cognition. So, for example, when the sense objects are considered, because the physical presence of the object is a necessary condition, sense perception is considered to be material at all times. For this kind of approach, Avicenna’s discrimination between form and meaning as two possible object types are important. So when meaning (such as in estimation) becomes the object, then it is a higher level of immateriality. What makes meanings special is that they can in no way be perceived by the external senses (McGinnis, 2010, p. 112). Eventually, even at the level of sense perception and even with the most materialist reading of the process, the outcome seems to be different from the physical. So going back to Aristotle’s wax example, the necessity of the ring does not necessitate that the imprint in the wax is iron and white, (and other particularities of it), and so on. The imprint in the wax, by contrast, is necessarily different from the ring that causes the imprint.

Mullā Ṣadrā explains sense perception in an extremely internalist fashion as the aspects discussed above. According to him, sense perception is neither the abstraction nor the imprinting of forms; instead, it is a process of construction of inner forms that takes place with the power given by Allah. The process is immaterial because even though sense perception is the agent is the soul, the bodily organs are the tools of the soul. The extra-mental object as well is not the object of the sense: “[...] the sensible in essence is the form which is present with the soul and not something extra-mental corresponding to it”

(*Asfār*, v. 8, 238; tr. Peerwani, 174-5).¹⁰⁹ In this explanation, when I see a cat, the object of my vision is the internally created form of the cat. Thus, I see the experience of the cat and not the extra-mental cat. The phenomenology is constitutive of the intentional content.

Ṣadrā's explanation of the world is dynamic. From the start, existence is a dynamic reality. As soon as it is frozen into quiddities or stable criteria, its reality becomes distorted. Accordingly, all natural things including earthly and celestial beings are in constant change. This change does not only occur in the accidental features, but in the very substance (*Hudūth*, pp. 59-83). Everything in the world is in constant flux and in reality there is only a flow of changing substances: one form changing into another (Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 97). This understanding of the constant change affects our conception of "thing", since no stable identity remains in this world. As Fazlurrahman expresses it: "Thing is a particular segment of continuous progress regarded as a particular event-system *for purposes of description* (Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 98)". The human eye or cognition in general cannot capture this reality in its constant flux.

As mentioned, cognition is – in a sense – "freezing" this flux. So, in cognition the changed parts of one segment look like one thing because the constantly changing forms are similar. As a result, we *imagine* the parade of similar substances to be the same or subsume it under a stable and static concept (*Asfār*, v. 3, pp. 74-76; Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 97). Imagination is then one essential part of perception. Not only sense perception, but also all the things in our minds and the world we think we live in are products in this fashion. There are no things to be captured in their reality of constant change. Another point that connects Ṣadrā's psychology to his ontology is that according to this explanation everything is in a movement towards its own *perfection*. As mentioned before, Ṣadrā sees this as a proof that even minerals have consciousness (*Asfār*, v. 1, pp. 190-1; v. 9, p. 67ff.). The movement is irreversible and it is only possible in the direction towards perfection.

The importance of the substantial change is not only that the objects of senses in the external world are never graspable, but also that the human soul undergoes change. So cognition is the way the human soul changes in its substance. Every form created in the soul causes change in the human soul for better. Ṣadrā says that the movement is toward God, but in its perfected and most observable fashion this change is found in human

¹⁰⁹ *Asfār*, v. 8, p. 238. "فالمحسوس بالذات هو الصورة الحاضرة عند النفس لا الامر الخارجى المطابق لها"

beings (*Aṣfār*, v. 9, pp. 67-9). The soul starts its journey as a corporeal being and with the substantial change caused by its experiences it moves into a more immaterial essence. Ṣadrā names this as the “principle of the soul’s corporeality in her origin and spirituality in her survival”.

This principle brings out the most important characteristic of his philosophy: monism. In terms of intentionality, this monist approach makes him unique for the ontological aspects as well as the psychological aspects of his thought. The first aspect of psychological monism is explained through the essence of the soul in her journey from corporeal to spiritual. A second psychological aspect is observable in the actions of the soul. The soul is the active agent in not only the incorporeal actions of the self, but also in physical events. The soul is the real perceiver of sensation, it is the real mover when the vegetative or animal soul moves, and it is responsible for higher cognition such as intellection and so on. To sum up, the soul is all its faculties. This can be interpreted to evolve into a bundle theory with the soul being an instable substance. Similar to the result of substantial movement constituting the soul in its movement, its experiences also shape the soul. This is a very dynamic understanding of the self. As I mentioned before about phenomenology being constitutive of intentional content, the soul is constitutive of its content and thus its own. The principle that the soul is all its faculties implies that the soul is nothing but what it experiences. The soul is not a receiver of data, or a factory that processes them, nor is it a container.

LIMITATIONS

Finally, a number of limitations need to be considered. The current investigation was limited by Brentano’s presentation of intentionality and further discussions are not included. Brentano and Mullā Ṣadrā agree with previous philosophers frequently in their argumentations. Accordingly, the research has a historical aspect, although this is limited to being mentioned briefly. In order to understand Mullā Ṣadrā’s synthesis various aspects of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s mysticism, Avicenna’s Aristotelianism and Suhrawardī’s illuminationism were necessary ingredients. This resulted in some of the complicated philosophical ideas being reduced to brief discussions. Limitations of time also might have caused a misreading of these philosophers. I believe one way of expanding this research is to place the problem of intentionality in a historical reading that follows the lineage of concepts and explore the clusters of discussions within their chronological and semantic contexts. However, that kind of a conceptual and historical investigation is of a

different nature and thus needs to be pursued with a methodology independent from that of the present work.

In places I deliberately focused on some interpretations over others. For example, in the case of peripatetic tradition, I did not focus on a tradition that finds the idea of ontological gradation (*tashkīk*) in Avicenna's writings. Neither did I mention more Neoplatonist interpretations of him. Instead, I focused more on a literal reading not only of Avicenna, but also of other philosophers as well. In a similar fashion, I did not delve into the large secondary literature on many sections of the *DA* and modern interpretations of Aristotle. Thus, this simplified approach to important philosophers such as Avicenna, Plotinus, and so on can be targeted by expert scholars on these particular philosophers. As I mentioned before, this was a deliberate strategy on my part to create a coherent frame to work on the related concepts in order to reconstruct the 'intentionality' question.

The strong monism together with internalism is an interesting synthesis that can be used to link phenomenological approaches to the monist analytical philosophies such as Russellian monism and even Galen Strawson's panpsychism. This research can serve as a base for that kind of further research.

More important than the already mentioned projects is that a frame that goes beyond immaterial-material, ideal-real dichotomies provides an important opportunity for ontological and psychological discussions. This research is an attempt to discover this framework with a focus on only intentionality.

CONTRIBUTIONS

I believe this research is a fresh approach to both intentionality discussions and modern Ṣadrā studies. On the side of intentionality, whilst this study does not develop a full-blown theory of intentionality, it provides a new approach different from many modern theories of intentionality. On the side of Mullā Ṣadrā scholarship, this research is important with its emphasis on the ideas of particularity and the monism of existence.

As the study makes no claim that Ṣadrā originally had a theory of intentionality, this study is also important in its reconstruction of his ideas around a modern question. One last and perhaps most apparent contribution this research makes is that it is among a small number of works on Ṣadrā in English. This study is important in providing a large-scale evaluation of Ṣadrā's theory of the senses. In terms of its focus on Sadrian psychology in general and its reconstruction of intentionality, this research adds to the growing body of literature of medieval studies of psychology.

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