TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE SHAPED THE DOMESTIC REFORMS IN TURKEY?

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Summary

It is widely acknowledged that the EU has been the main trigger of the recent normative transformation in Turkey. The acceleration of the reform process following the 1999 Helsinki European Council's decision on Turkey's candidacy and its deceleration since 2005 with the stagnation of Turkey-EU relations supports this claim. However, this study argues that the Normative Power Europe, which refers to the EU as a changer of norms, has been a crucial but insufficient factor in analysing the domestic reforms in Turkey. It appears that the Normative Power Europe has been influential on Turkey's reformation process to the extent that the EU promises a clear membership prospect, and its norms are compatible with the interests of the ruling elite.

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List of Abbreviations

APD	Accession Partnership Document
CW	Cold War
EC	European Council
EU	European Union
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NP	Normative power
NPAA	National Programme of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis
NPE	Normative Power Europe
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD	National Security Policy Document
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan)
PM	Prime Minister
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
UN	United Nations
US/USA	United States of America

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Preface

This dissertation intends to analyse the impact of the European Union as a normative power on the recent domestic reforms in Turkey. A significant amount of academic studies attribute the lion's share of Turkey's normative transformation to the European Union. This study does not deny its role; on the contrary, it admits that the EU has been the main trigger of the reform process. Nevertheless, this study highlights the significance of the conditioning factors that influence the EU's normative power *vis-à-vis* Turkey by relying mainly on secondary literature, newspapers and EU documents including the ones which institutionalise Turkey-EU relations. Due to space limitations, this dissertation concentrates on only two conditioning factors, while analysing the impact of the Normative Power Europe on two specific policy issues in Turkey. Thus, the findings may not generalise to the whole reform process; however, they provide a different point of view for the evaluation of the normative change in Turkey.

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INTRODUCTION

Were Hedley Bull alive, he would probably admit that his hypothesis concerning the EU's actorness has been falsified because the EU[1] has become an international actor. Functioning in limited policy fields with limited jurisdiction during its first decades, the Union has incrementally extended its influence on the world stage. The EU is now an economic giant having its own currency and dealing with international trade negotiations. Its internal market has been enthralling for foreign investors. It is the biggest financial donor in many regions and the largest supplier to the UN budget (Cameron 2012: 1). Furthermore, it leads negotiations on environmental and human rights issues. It also conducts peace-keeping and crisis-management operations around the world. However, its varying performance in different policy areas and its novel political structure have made it difficult to define its international role.

Since the beginning of the 1970s, the EU, itself, has started to search for the ways to describe its role and in 1973 it decided to adopt a document on European identity which would enable its members 'to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs' (EC 1973: 2). In most EU documents, commitment to values and principles has been highlighted as an important dimension of its international role. To illustrate, the 1973 Copenhagen Summit defined 'representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights' as the fundamental elements of the "European identity" and underlined the members' determination to defend these principles in their conduct of foreign relations (EC 1973: 2). Also the 1993 Copenhagen EC declared the existence of 'the achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities' as a significant component of the membership criteria (EC 1993:13). Finally, the Treaty on the EU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, stated that 'democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law' will guide the Union's international acts (Treaty on the EU, Art. 21).

In addition to the EU's own efforts, many scholars have attempted to define the EU's role on the world scene. Civilian power, superpower, soft power, quiet superpower, normative

[1] Throughout this study, the EU and Union are used interchangeably in a way to include the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community and European Community.

power, post-modern superpower and ethical power are just a few labels proposed. Duchéne's civilian power represents the starting point of the ongoing debate, but Manners' NPE concept, which highlights the EU's ideational impact on the promotion of "universal" norms, has dominated the scholarship since 2002. Following its introduction, specific EU policies and actions have been tested in order to determine whether the EU is an NP. Additionally, the reasons behind the EU's commitment to "universal" norms and principles have been widely questioned. All in all, the NPE concept has become one of the most popular topics in European studies.

Similar to the increase in NPE discussion, the literature on Turkey-EU relations has also proliferated during the 2000s. Many scholars have focused on the Europeanisation of Turkey, referring to the momentous transformation of the country thanks to the conditionality principle. A bulk of the academic studies have attributed Turkey's normative change to the prospect of full EU membership and have advocated their claim by underlining the decrease in the tempo of the process since 2005 with the weakening of the membership possibility.

It is true that reforms in many fields have come to a halt, or even reversed, due to blurred membership prospective. For instance, reforms related to freedom of the press and expression has considerably regressed in the post-2005 era. In November 2006, there were no imprisoned individuals in Turkey due to expression of non-violent ideas (Human Rights Watch 2006 cited in Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 9), whereas the number of imprisoned journalists increased from 15 in 2009 to 95 in 2012 (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 9); making the country the world leader in terms of jailed journalists in 2013 (Freedom House 2014: 11). Moreover, a record tax-fine was imposed on the biggest national media group in Turkey, Doğan Media Holding, which led to EU criticisms in 2009 Progress Report, because this penalty had the potential to undermine the freedom of the press through triggering self-censorship (European Commission[2] 2009: 18). Additionally, many journalists were targeted by the government because of their support and wide coverage of the Gezi Park protests[3]; and their critical views about the government's Kurdish policy and the recent corruption scandal. Numerous columnists and journalists were expelled or forced to resign, which engendered critiques of limited freedom of expression and the press in the 2013 Progress Report (Commission 2013: 52). Finally, the bans on social media and specific web-sites, and the Law on the Internet were criticised for not being in line with the European standards and

[2] Henceforth, this study will use Commission in order to refer to the European Commission.
[3] The Gezi Park protests began in late May in 2013 to protest the logging in the park. Originally started in İstanbul Taksim Square, the protests spread out to other cities and turned into anti-government protests.

created concerns about Turkey's prospective membership. Given these developments, it is not surprising that the Freedom House declared the media freedom in Turkey as "not free" in its recent report (Freedom House 2014: 21). Therefore, the halt in freedom of the press and expression implies the significance of the EU as an external incentive for the improvement of fundamental rights and freedoms.

Nonetheless, the ambiguity in relations has not stopped the reform process in some policy fields such as civilian-military relations, rule of law, asylum, minority, and competition policy. This fact points to factors other than the EU that may have influenced the recent normative transformation of Turkey, which is raised in this study.

This dissertation intends to analyse the role of the EU as an NP in Turkey's reform process. The research mainly engages with secondary scholarship and EU documents, including the documents that institutionalise Turkey-EU relations. Additionally, the Europeanisation of Turkey literature has been substantially benefited because Europeanisation, being a versatile concept, is highly interlinked to the diffusion of European norms and values in third countries (Diez et al. 2005: 2).

This study consists of two chapters. The first chapter focuses on the NP debate. It begins with a brief review of the academic discussion on the EU's international role. Afterwards, it presents Manners' NPE concept and its most voiced critiques. The second chapter starts with an overview of Turkey-EU relations in order to lay a background for the further discussion. Then it introduces Tocci's analytical framework used in this study. Subsequently, the chapter brings in two case studies, each of which concentrates on domestic reforms regarding the civilian-military relations and the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Being the focus of EU criticisms, these specific issues constituted a significant component of the political criteria that Turkey had to meet in order to start negotiations. Additionally, they have been one of the most long-standing and embedded norms in Turkey. Therefore, these specific issues were chosen because they are believed to best represent the normative change in Turkey and provide valuable indicators in terms of the NPE. Consequently, this study suggests two findings: Firstly, the NPE, which has been significantly shaped by the existence of a credible membership prospect and interaction between the promoted EU norm and internal political dynamics of the targeted country, has been a crucial but insufficient factor in understanding the domestic reforms in Turkey. Secondly, the membership carrot is an important tool for the NPE to spread its norms; but the EU still has the capacity to influence third parties even

without its carrot provided that its norms are supportive for domestic political actors in the third country.

CHAPTER 1
THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EU AND NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE

1.1 From civilian power to normative power

The debate on the NP of the EU is a part of the discussion about the international role of the Union. Therefore, the NP literature may be traced back to 1970s when François Duchéne conceptualised the Union as a civilian power. Although Duchéne did not provide a clear definition, he labelled the Union as a civilian power since it is 'a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces' and 'a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards' (Duchéne 1973: 19-20 cited in Stavridis 2001: 44). For him, the strength of the EU as a civilian power derived from 'its ability to promote and encourage stability through economic and political means' (Duchéne 1972; Sjursen 2004 cited in Whitman 2011: 4).

No sooner had the civilian power debate started than Johan Galtung claimed that the EU was an emerging new superpower with the aim to recreate 'a Eurocentric world, a world with its center in Europe' and 'a unicentric Europe, a Europe with its center in the West' (Galtung 1973: 12). According to him, resource power, which refers to the relative power of the Union when compared to its members and other major powers (1973: 48), and structural power, which refers to the international structures that the Union was promoting and that would be the instruments of its resource power (1973: 55), constituted the essence of power of this newly emerging superpower. Having analysed the resource and structural powers, relations with the Third World and socialist countries, and military aspect of the EU, Galtung concluded that 'images of a *pax bruxellana*, a world order with its center in Brussels but also based on law and order according to well known European recipes, are already rapidly becoming part of Western European belief systems' (1973: 117-118).

Gunnar Sjöstedt contributed to the literature by developing a set of criteria which would enable the evaluation of the EU's international actor capability. For Sjöstedt, the existence of 'a community of interests; a decision-making system; a system for crisis management; a system for the management of independence; a system of implementation; external communication channels and external representation; community resources and mobilisation system' were prerequisites of international actor capability (Sjöstedt 1977 cited in Whitman 1998: 13).

In his article dated 1982, Hedley Bull criticised the "civilian power" concept and argued that the concept was a contradiction in terms because 'the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control' (Bull 1982: 151). For him, '"Europe" is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one' (1982: 151). He discussed that the developments in the 1960s and 1970s may have demonstrated the rising importance of economic power but the international context in the 1980s proved the ongoing significance of military power. According to him, divergence of the interests of Western Europe and the USA, the continuing Soviet threat to Western Europe and the need for revival of European integration required the Western allies to develop military capacity which would lessen their dependency on the USA and provide them with the necessary tools to ensure their own security (1982: 152-157).

With the end of the CW, the definition and source of power has shifted. Hanns W. Maull redefined "civilian power" as one accepting 'the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives', relying on 'non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument…' and demanding the development of 'supranational structures to address critical issues of international management' (1990: 92-93). He argued that Germany and Japan were the best examples of civilian powers. In the same year, another concept, "soft power", was introduced by Joseph Nye. He pointed to the diminishing importance of resources as a proof for power and argued that 'the ability to change the behaviours of states' would be the indicator of power in the post-CW era (Nye 1990: 155). He defined soft power as one which concentrated on 'cooptation, multilateral cooperation, institution-building, integration and the power of attraction' (Nye 2004: 5 cited in Tocci 2008: 2). Even though the term was developed within the US foreign policy perspective, Hill believed that the concept was more applicable to the EU's newly emerging foreign policy (Hill 1990 cited in Tocci 2008: 2).

Similarly, Richard G. Whitman underlined the changes in the international system after the end of the CW and argued that this new context necessitated new concepts to define the international role of the Union. Admitting its utility, he found the civilian power concept insufficient in understanding the role of the EU (Whitman 1998: 234). Additionally, he observed Galtung's description of the EU as a "superpower in the making" inappropriate and discussed instead that growing economic diplomacy and broader definition of security preconditions increased the EU's international importance (1998: 234). He attempted to

explain the international role of the Union by analysing the impacts of its external environment, decision making structure and policy instruments, and concluded that the EU was a 'new, distinctive and significant actor' (1998: 233).

The discussion on the international role of the EU has gained a new dimension with the Union's intention to develop military capacity. A significant amount of studies has focused on the sustainability of the civilian power image with the acquisition of military power. At the very beginning of the militarisation process, Jan Zielonka emphasised that 'military turn of the EU' would undermine its 'distinct profile' on the world stage (Zielonka 1998 cited in Björkdahl 2011: 107). Karen E. Smith was another scholar who criticised the EU for developing military capacity. She perceived the militarisation efforts as abandonment of the Union's civilian power image (Smith 2000: 12). Smith underlined that militarisation may lead to a "security dilemma" by creating suspicions of the EU's intentions and 'the Petersberg tasks could instead be seen as excuses for unilateral intervention by the EU to promote its own selfish interests' (2000: 24). Moreover, she warned that the acquisition of military power 'would represent the culmination of a "state-building" project' (2000: 27).

On the contrary, Stelios Stavridis deemed the militarisation process as the empowerment of the Union's civilian image (2001: 47). He discussed that the post-CW security threats were so complex that the assistance of a military force was indispensable. Having admitted the inappropriateness of military power to tackle some of them, he supported that militarisation of the Union would facilitate the achievement of its civilian goals and transform the EU from 'a civilian power "by default" to one of a civilian power "by design"' (2001: 49).

Richard G. Whitman (2002) and Jennifer Mitzen (2006) were other scholars who believed that the adoption of military power would not undermine the civilian nature of the Union. Mitzen discussed that identities were determined by habits rather than capabilities and that they 'are anchored in routines with significant others and actors –even corporate actors such as states- become attached to or invested in these routines' (2006: 271). Therefore, developing military capabilities would not deteriorate the civilian identity of the Union 'because its collective identity as a civilizing power is anchored in intra-European foreign policy routines that permit deliberation and reflection...' (Mitzen 2006: 275).

Richard Rosecrance brought another dimension to the debate about the international role of the EU by emphasising the EU's role as a norm-setter in world politics thanks to its economic power. He argued that the EU's economic power enabled it to shift the balance of power and

affect the world outside it (Rosecrance 1998: 16). The attractiveness of its market urged other actors, who wanted to join the Union or develop economic relations with it, to meet the EU standards. In other words, the EU influenced the behaviours of other international actors by setting the norms. Rosecrance concluded that 'the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms'; therefore, 'Europe's attainment is normative rather than empirical' (1998: 22).

Zielonka agreed with Rosecrance that the EU had a normative potential, which enabled it to pursue a distinct foreign policy as compared to other traditional powers (Zielonka 1998: 10). However, he underlined the Union's inability to transform its normative strength into practice. He stated that the EU was unsuccessful at determining common goals and the policies to achieve these goals, likening the Union to 'a giant in normative terms, but a dwarf in practice' (1998: 11).

Zaki Laïdi also emphasised the EU's capacity to set and export norms. Laïdi, by citing Selin and Vandeveer (2006), claimed that the EU has replaced the USA as a norm-setter (Laïdi 2008: 8). He stated that the EU has the biggest internal market in the world and has adopted the highest norms regarding environment, health and sustainable development. Therefore, any economic actor who wants to enter this market must respect these norms. Consequently, the EU has become a global norm-setter through forcing its members and economic partners to adapt to its norms (Laïdi 2008: 8).

The debate on the EU's international role has intensified with the introduction of the "NPE" concept by Ian Manners in 2002.

1.2 Manners' Normative Power Europe

Ian Manners introduced the concept of NPE in an article which was voted among the five most important academic works published over the previous ten years by the attendees of the 2007 European Union Studies Association meeting (Forsberg 2011: 1184). Tracing his idea back to Carr's and Galtung's studies, he proposed the NPE concept, shifting the focus of discussion on the international role of the EU from the EU's capabilities as a civilian and military power to its ideational nature based on principles and values. Manners does not dismiss the significance of civilian and military power of the Union; however, he suggests that the NP of the EU which refers to 'its ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations needs to be given much greater attention' (2002: 239).

Claiming that 'the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is' (2002: 252), Manners concentrates on the EU's three main features which constitute its normative basis (2002: 240-241). First of all, the Union was born on the ruins of the Second World War, during which extreme nationalism rocketed, and so the Europeans noticed the significance of cooperation for the re-establishment and preservation of peace in the post-war context. Secondly, the EU developed in a different way from other traditional powers by combining supranational and national forms of governance. Finally, the Union was established on a political-legal basis which was led by political elites and shaped by treaties. Manners claims that this normative basis distinguishes the EU from pre-existing political structures and 'predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics' (2002: 242).

Having examined a wide range of EU documents and policies on which its normative basis has been founded, Manners describes five core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights) and four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance) (2002: 242-243). He states that these norms are diffused through several ways, namely: contagion, informational, procedural, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter (2002: 244-245). To briefly explain, contagion refers to the EU's unintentional norm exportation just by 'living as an example', while informational diffusion occurs as a consequence of strategic communications. Procedural diffusion refers to norm spread through the formation of relations between the EU and the third party, whereas transference points to diffusion 'when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means' (2002: 245). Finally, overt diffusion refers to norm diffusion thanks to the EU's physical existence in third countries and international institutions while cultural filter determines the response of the targeted countries or organisations to norm diffusion.

After focusing on the EU's role in the international abolition of the death penalty, Manners concludes that the 'EU abolitionist policy is diffused through *procedural* membership conditions, *informational* common strategies, and the *overt* role of EU delegations' (2002: 252). Finally, he proposes that 'in addition to civilian or military conceptions, the EU should be considered a normative power' and 'the ability to define what passes for "normal" in world politics, is, ultimately, the greatest power of all' (2002: 253).

Manners develops and clarifies his normative thesis in the years following. He states that normative theorising, which places the power of ideas at the centre of analysis, has been

introduced to fill the normative gap in understanding the EU in the post-CW era (Manners 2006b: 177). Furthermore, he makes it clear that NP is different from civilian power in various ways. He emphasises that NP attempts to abolish the civilising duty of the EU which directly or indirectly existed in the neo-colonial understanding of civilian power Europe (2006b: 175). Moreover, he underlines that NP highlights the ability of the EU to use non-material instruments while promoting its norms; and it also highlights the cosmopolitan feature of the EU by emphasising its commitment to universal values and principles whereas civilian power stresses the communitarian characteristic of the Union by focusing on non-military or economic tools (2006b: 176). Additionally, Manners states that the civilian power concept developed within the CW framework fell behind understanding the EU in the post-CW context while the NPE promises a normative approach independent from a CW mentality (2006b: 177).

In addition to distinguishing NP from civilian power, Manners clarifies 3 differing meanings of NP which he compounded in his 2002 article. He explains the first meaning as 'how we judge and justify truth claims in social science' (2011: 228). For him, his argument that 'the EU *should* act to extend its norms into the international system' reflects this meaning of NP, and he calls for reflective and critical analysis of the EU's NP in world politics in order to observe what 'the EU is, does and should do' in the international system (Manners 2002: 252, 2011: 228).

The second meaning of NP is defined as 'a form of power that is ideational rather than material or physical' (2011: 230). According to Manners, his statement that 'the EU *acts* to change norms in the international system' refers to this meaning of the NP, and he discusses that this aspect of the concept focuses on the EU's reliance on normative justification rather than on material instruments (Manners 2002: 252, 2011: 230).

The last meaning refers to a specific type of actor and its international identity (2011: 231). For him, his characterisation of the EU 'as a changer of norms in the international system' reflects this meaning of the NP, and 'a more normative type of actor would be one on a normative heading towards an ideal type of a normative power' (Manners 2002: 252, 2011: 232).

As a response to growing criticisms about the absence of a methodology for assessing the NPE, Manners suggests a tripartite analytical framework which requires the analysis of the principles, actions and their impact (Manners 2008a, 2011, 2012). According to Manners, in

the first part, the founding principles of the EU should be analysed (2008a: 55, 2011: 233, 2012: 196). At this stage, the legitimacy of the promoted norms and the EU's coherence and consistency should be questioned (2011: 233). He argues that the EU's reliance on international treaties, conventions and agreements, such as the UN Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provided legitimacy while the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was believed to bring coherence and consistency to the promotion of EU norms (2011: 234).

For Manners, the second part of the analysis should concentrate on the EU actions to promote its norms and how these actions may affect the targeted country or policy (Manners 2008a: 57, 2011: 235, 2012: 197). He argues that a normative action requires engagement with third parties through establishing necessary mechanisms which will provide the means for persuasion, argumentation and attribution of prestige or shame (2008a: 58). Illustrating accession procedures, association agreements and European Neighbourhood Policy, he states that the EU has prioritised engagement and dialogue with the third parties in its acts to promote its principles (2011: 236).

Manners next discusses that the impacts of the EU actions on the targeted partners or policies in the third parties should be examined at the final stage (2008a: 58, 2011: 237, 2012: 197). He expresses that a normative impact may include socialisation, partnership and ownership, and this third stage of analysis should focus on how this impact may yield reconsideration of the promoted principles (2012: 197-198).

Hardly surprising, Manners' NPE thesis has prompted many criticisms which constitute the subject of the next section.

1.3 Criticisms of Normative Power Europe

The most voiced critiques of Manners' NPE approach may be categorised into four groups: criticisms regarding the concept and methodology, its suitability for an increasingly militarised Union, its appropriateness in understanding the motives of the EU's external relations, and its limitations.

To begin with the first group, some scholars target the analytical weakness of the concept. Pace defines 'the EU's normative power as a semantically "empty" notion' (2007: 1060) while Sjursen highlights the closeness between the NPE concept and the EU's own perception of its international role, which she perceives as a handicap for EU-sympathisers to

adopt a critical approach (Sjursen 2006a: 170). Hyde-Price also states that developing a critical perspective is not easy since the NPE concept is believed to represent basic values (2006: 218). However, the number of academic studies signals that this difficulty has not been an obstacle to raising critical perspectives.

Manners' emphasis on the distinctiveness of the EU and his failure to provide a methodology to analyse the NPE in his 2002 article has been widely criticised (Diez 2005; Sjursen 2006b; Aggestam 2008; Forsberg 2011). Stating that other global powers also have a normative agenda, Diez wonders how to analyse a NP as normative and powerful at the same time. He suggests that 'the extent to which the spread of universal norms plays a role as an aim as well as the means of the projection of power', and the degree of the military power's dominance over other forms of powers may be used to judge an NP (Diez 2005: 620).

Manners adds two more factors by proposing that analysing 'whether the exercise of normative power transcends or reinforces the status quo of iniquitous and historically determined power and justice in world politics' and 'whether the exercise of normative power transcends the source of that power' (2006b: 170-171) would also be beneficial to judge an NP. He states that these four factors would help to decide whether the EU was distinct from other traditional powers (2006b: 171).

Laïdi and Sjursen come up with two different suggestions to judge the EU's NP. Laïdi underlines the importance of the link between norms and social preferences. He warns that the affiliation of the EU norms with ideals put the EU in an 'idealistic trap' and creates confusion between normative and idealist power (Laïdi 2005, 2006 cited in Bickerton 2011: 87). Therefore, he suggests that the EU's NP may be judged on the basis of the EU's ability to link its norms with the social preferences or interests of European society. Sjursen emphasises the importance of the cosmopolitan legal system, which prioritises the protection of individual rights over states' rights, in the NP discussion. She proposes that the EU's ability to 'overcome power politics through a strengthening not only of international but cosmopolitan law' may be used to assess its NP and to differentiate it from other traditional great powers (Sjursen 2006b: 249).

Tocci also complains about the absence of objective criteria to define a normative foreign policy actor and develops an analytical framework whose details will be discussed in the second chapter. She, along with a group of scholars, examines major foreign policy actors as well as the EU by using this framework and concludes that 'the EU is not always a normative

international actor' (Tocci et al. 2008: 26). In sum, this first group of criticisms about the conceptualisation and the methodology of the NPE led Manners to clarify the meaning of the concept and develop a tripartite analysis which was discussed above and it seems that the critiques about the absence of methodology have been sidelined to a great extent.

The second group of criticisms is related to the compatibility of the NP image of the EU with its increasing military capacity. Sjursen underlines that militarisation efforts have been seen as disappearance of the EU's normative feature and have amplified doubts about the NPE (2006a: 171). Zielonka argues that the EU was fulfilling its role successfully as a civilian regional power and developing military capacity would be insane (2008: 64-65). He supports that if the Union continues to do what it does best it would become a 'model power' which 'would be in a good position to identify shared global norms and persuade other countries to respect them' (2008: 75).

Diez joins the debate by stating that 'normative and military power are not necessarily incompatible' (2005: 635) but increasing reliance of the former on the latter may make it less 'distinguishable from traditional forms of powers' (2005: 620-621). He illustrates with the USA, whose military power has taken over its NP following the Second World War. Manners adopts a similar position with Diez suggesting that 'militarisation of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU's normative power' (Manners 2006a: 182) provided that the EU does not prioritise the use of its military power over achievement of its normative goals.

Moreover, Björkdahl argues that the EU may benefit from military forces in the promotion of its norms. She believes that the absence of military capacity prevented the EU from acting effectively in the crisis situations and defending its norms during the Yugoslavian conflict (2011: 105). Similarly, Ciambra argues that a sheer normative EU was insufficient in Macedonia and claims that the EU needed military capacity in order 'to exert its full potential of influence' (2008: 20-21). Additionally, Juncos's study demonstrates that the militarisation of the EU has not been an obstacle for the deployment of the EU's NP in Bosnia (2011: 83). Moreover, according to Lucarelli and Menotti, the EU is in fact drawing a line between the actions which require military reaction and actions which do not through developing military capabilities; therefore, militarisation of the EU denotes its intention to restrain military policy (Lucarelli and Menotti 2006: 159 cited in Whitman 2011: 12). Last but not least, Cooper emphasises the need for military force in order to defend European values since there is a pre-modern world outside the EU (Cooper 2002 cited in Björkdahl 2011: 108).

Another group of critiques focuses on the appropriateness of the normative theory to understanding the EU's external relations. The NPE's emphasis on the EU as a norm promoter and the ignorance of state as the centre of concern lead to realist/rationalist criticisms. Hyde-Price, one of the proponents of the realist perspective, rejects the liberal-idealist characterisation of the EU as an NP and claims that the EU 'acts as a vehicle for the collective interests of its member states' (2006: 220) rather than as an NP on its own. He underlines the systemic changes in the power structure in the post-CW era and demonstrates the importance of the stability in the region for the member states' interests. He claims that the most dominant members instrumentalised the EU to shape the region in a way that their long-term strategic and economic interests would be secured. He concludes that the EU, which utilised soft and hard power tools to export its economic and political vision, is not an NP but a collective instrument to ensure its members' interests (2006: 226-227).

Related to this perspective, numerous empirical studies highlight that the EU's external relations have been driven by its interests rather than its norms. It has been discussed that the EU's commercial, economic, security and energy interests have prevailed over norm promotion in the Western Balkans (Merlingen 2007; Tocci et al. 2008; Noutcheva 2009; Juncos 2011), Middle East (Youngs 2004; Pace 2007; Tocci et al. 2008), Mediterranean (Bicchi 2006; Lazarou et al. 2013), South Caucus (Stewart 2011), North Africa (Smith 2001; Youngs 2004; Martinez 2008; Diez 2013) and in Russia and China (Smith 2001; Balme 2008; Tocci et al. 2008; Tilley 2012). Moreover, contradictions between the EU principles and its internal and external actions regarding some issues such as labour standards (Orbie 2011), minority policy (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006), human rights policy (Smith 2001), arms export (Diez 2005) and conflict resolution (Diez and Pace 2011; Metreveli 2014) have been demonstrated as the prioritisation of the EU's interests.

Notwithstanding these critical analyses, there are also academic studies which prove that the EU fulfils its role as an NP. In addition to the abolition of the death penalty (Manners 2002; Metreveli 2014), the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and institutionalisation of the International Criminal Court indicate that the NPE is a 'credible utopia' (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007). Similarly, Birchfield (2011) underlines the consistency of the EU's normative discourse and actions concerning its development policy. Last but not least, examining the EU efforts concerning solidarity, core labour standards and crisis management, Manners adjudicates that 'the EU is a committed yet troubled normative power in the globalised world' (Manners 2008b: 37).

These two different perspectives display the difficulty of differentiating the interests and norms as the main motives of the EU's external actions. Portraying the EU as a pure NP does not explain its relative inactivity regarding norm promotion in security-related issues whilst dismissal of its normative feature would lead to incomplete understanding of the EU's international role. Therefore, as Pollack proposes, considering the EU as an international actor whose actions are shaped by both normative principles and strategic interests is more convincing (Pollack 2012: 202).

Finally, the NPE has been challenged in terms of its limitations. The fact that similar EU policies to promote norms have rarely produced comparable results points to the factors which influence its NP. It has been widely argued that the NP of the EU cannot go beyond the countries which hope to join the Union. That is, the absence of the membership carrot is believed to limit the NP of the Union. Evaluating the neighbourhood policy, Haukkala concludes that enlargement 'is the key to the Union's normative power in Europe and any neighbourhood policy that fails to take this issue into account is doomed to be a sub-optimal one' (2011: 61-62). Similarly, Stewart, who focuses on the EU actions in the South Caucus, observes that normative impact of the EU in the region is limited due to the absence of membership prospect (2011: 81). Finally, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz's study reveals that the EU's impact on the promotion of democracy in neighbouring countries is crucially shaped by the promise of membership and 'EU incentives such as partnership and cooperation do not reliably promote democratic change' (2008: 187).

Another factor which is highlighted as a limitation of the NPE is related to the domestic factors in the targeted country/region. It has been argued that receptiveness and internal dynamics of the third party are crucial for the impact of the NPE. Juncos (2011) argues that the NP of the EU has been limited in Bosnia owing to the lack of local ownership of the norm diffusion process. Likewise, for Bicchi (2006), inconclusiveness of the EU's Mediterranean policy restrained the EU's NP *vis-à-vis* Mediterranean partners. Furthermore, Lenz (2013) demonstrates that local conditions, such as physical and institutional capacity of the region, have constrained the EU efforts to promote regionalism in Africa. Noutcheva's (2009) research shows that different perceptions of the EU's demands by the political actors in Western Balkan countries produced divergent responses to the NPE. Additionally, it is discussed that poor economic conditions and the willingness of the Central and East European countries to integrate with the West Europe has accelerated the diffusion of EU norms in those countries (Tocci et al. 2008: 31) while relatively better position and higher

living standards in Belarus has made the Belarusians less enthusiastic about EU membership, hence limiting the exportation of EU norms in the country (Tocci et al. 2008: 36).

This last group of criticisms concerning the link between the NPE, and its membership tool and the internal conditions in the targeted country lead to the second chapter which evaluates the NPE's impact on the recent normative transformation of Turkey.

CHAPTER 2
NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE VIS-À-VIS TURKEY

2.1 An Overview of Turkey-EU Relations

Turkey-EU relations have been like a roller-coaster, characterised by ups and downs. Turkey applied to the newly established institution for membership in 1959 and became an associate partner in 1963. The 1963 Ankara Agreement envisaged the accession of Turkey to the EU through the establishment of a customs union. The Additional Protocol which stated details of the establishment of the customs union was ratified in 1970. However, the relations between two parties remained unstable during the 1970s due to internal conflicts in the EU and Turkey. Following the 1980 military intervention in Turkey, the European Parliament declared the suspension of the Ankara Agreement. With the 1983 elections, Turkey returned to civilian rule and applied for full membership in 1987. The Commission approved the eligibility of Turkey for membership but called for further cooperation that would facilitate integration of both parties (Ministry for EU Affairs 2011). In 1995, the Customs Union Agreement, which ended the transition period to membership envisaged by the Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol, was signed. Turkey became the first country that entered the customs union before being a full member. However, the relations came to a halt following the 1997 Luxembourg EC because of the exclusion of Turkey from the enlargement process but revived in 1999 thanks to the Helsinki EC's decision on the recognition of Turkey's candidacy.

In 2001, Turkey received its first APD which specified short-term and medium-term goals that it has to achieve in order to start negotiations. In response, Turkey prepared its NPAA and entered an unprecedented reform process. The coalition government[4] launched the process by adopting crucial constitutional amendments in 2001, most of which were related to consolidation of democracy and improvement of human rights. Even though the 2002 Copenhagen EC appreciated the first steps taken by the Turkish government to meet the Copenhagen criteria, it postponed opening of negotiations by declaring that 'if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European

[4] This coalition government was comprised of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) –left and nationalist party-, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) –far-right nationalist party- and the Motherland Party (ANAP)-centre-right party- and was in office when Turkey was granted candidate status at the Helsinki European Council. This coalition articulated Turkey's National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis and adopted three reform packages to meet the accession criteria.

Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay' (EC 2002: 5). The declaration of a clear objective (opening accession negotiations) and a firm date (December 2004) accelerated the reform process, and between 2002 and 2004 nine reform packages were adopted. These packages introduced considerable legal and institutional amendments ranging from freedom of expression and association to abolition of death penalty, permission for broadcasting in other languages, civilianisation of the NSC and extension of cultural and religious rights (Secretariat General for EU Affairs[5] 2007). Consequently, the 2004 Brussels EC announced that Turkey had sufficiently met the Copenhagen political criteria and accession negotiations could launch in 2005 (EC 2004: 6).

The accession talks started on 3 October 2005 but the reform process had begun to decelerate since then for various reasons. To begin with, the division within the EU about Turkey's membership had surfaced with the start of the negotiations. This manifested itself in the discussion of privileged partnership for Turkey and the wording of the Negotiation Framework for Turkey adopted in 2005. The characterisation of the negotiations as an open-ended process, the introduction of the possibility of permanent safeguard clauses in some areas and the emphasis on the absorption capacity of the EU generated a feeling that Turkey has been treated differently from other candidates and created resentment to EU-induced reforms (Eralp 2009: 162; Kirişci 2011: 342; Öner 2014: 26).

Another reason behind the slowing down of the process is the EU's attitude regarding the Cyprus issue (Patton 2007; Eralp 2009; Kirişci 2011; Öner 2014). Entrance of the Greek Cypriot state to the EU despite its failure to adopt a solution regarding its borders, that is the refusal of the Annan Plan, and the 2006 Brussels EC's endorsement of the GAERC's decision to freeze the negotiations on eight chapters and not to close any chapter until Turkey ratified an additional protocol which extends the customs union to new members including the Greek Cypriot state (GAERC 2006: 9) undermined the EU's credibility in Turkey.

Additionally, the resurgence of the PKK[6] terror after the improvement of the Kurds' rights in order to meet the accession criteria and also rising opposition to Turkey's accession in Europe contributed to the increase in Turkish nationalism and decrease in support for membership. Moreover, Turkey has become an economically more powerful and more active foreign policy actor in its region, which made the EU a less attractive destination (Öner 2014:

[5] This institution was transformed into Ministry for EU Affairs in 2011.
[6] PKK is the Kurdish acronym for Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan). The organisation was officially established in 1977 by Abdullah Öcalan and started terrorist attacks against Turkey in 1984. It is on the terrorist organisations lists of several international organisations as well as the EU.

27). In short, unpredictability of the negotiation process, growing opposition within the EU to Turkey's membership, fading public support for the EU membership in Turkey and rising self-confidence of the governing elite have diminished the pace of reforms since 2005 (Patton 2007; Eralp 2009; Kirişci 2011; Öner 2014).

2.2 Analytical Framework of the Study

As mentioned in the first chapter, the NP theory has been criticised for not providing a methodology to assess the NP of a foreign policy actor and many scholars have made suggestions about the issue. This study opts for Nathalie Tocci's framework while analysing the impact of the NPE on Turkey's reform process.

According to Tocci, in order to assess a foreign policy actor, the goals, instruments and results of its foreign policy have to be considered. For her, 'the truly normative foreign policy actor should score consistently on all three counts and in many different contexts, which will condition the extent to which normative policies are chosen, viable and effective' (Tocci 2008: 1). Thus, a normative foreign policy actor should have normative goals, rely on normative means and produce normative impact.

Tocci continues by clarifying these three dimensions of a normative foreign policy actor. To begin with, she refers to Wolfers, who defined "milieu goals" as the ones pursued by nations in order to shape the external environment in which they operate (Wolfers 1962: 73 cited in Tocci 2008: 7) and describes normative foreign policy goals as 'those that aim to shape the milieu by regulating it through international regimes, organisations and law' (Tocci 2008: 7). With regard to normative means, Tocci discusses that concentrating on *how* policy instruments are used will be more appropriate than focusing on *which* instruments are used since some non-military instruments may be as detrimental as military tools (2008: 9). As a result, she defines normative means 'as instruments (regardless of their nature) that are deployed within the confines of the law' (2008: 10). Lastly, according to her, 'a normative impact is one where a traceable path can be drawn between an international player's direct or indirect actions and inactions (or series of actions) on the one hand and the effective building and entrenchment of an international rule-bound environment on the other' (2008: 11).

Based on these three dimensions, Tocci develops a model which represents different foreign policy types, namely, normative, status quo, imperial and *realpolitik* (2008: 12). She argues that a foreign policy actor adopts different foreign policy types in different regions, in different policy fields and at different times. She suggests that there are three basic

conditioning factors which influence the possibility of an actor to act normatively (2008: 16-17).

The first conditioning factor is the internal political context of the actor which shapes its foreign policy goals. Tocci discusses that internal components such as political parties, interest groups, business organisations, public opinion, and political and institutional forces influence the normative aspect of a foreign policy. She exemplifies that public and media reactions to human rights breaches in Myanmar were not extensive enough to encourage the EU to take action, and trade and energy interests of the Union vastly shaped its limited response to the human rights violations in Chechnya (2008: 17-18).

The second conditioning factor is related to the internal capability of the actor, i.e. the availability of foreign policy means, which determines the tools and the scope of its foreign policy. Additionally, she states that powerful actors which have strong military and economic means are more likely to realise their foreign policy goals in a non-normative way compared to impartial or backward countries (2008: 18). Moreover, she underlines that the level of dependence of a foreign policy actor on the third party is also crucial for its decision to use either normative or non-normative foreign policy tools. She illustrates with migration cases in which the EU has accomplished signing of the readmission agreements with its Eastern neighbours whereas it has resorted to informal arrangements with North African countries because of its 'weakened relational power' (2008: 19).

Including three levels, the last conditioning factor refers to the external environment in which the actor conducts its foreign policy. Firstly, Tocci states that the NP of an actor is highly affected by the interaction between its foreign policy and the internal dynamics of the targeted country. She exemplifies this with Turkey where the EU conditionality accelerated the reform process only after the inauguration of a strong government which was widely supported by civil society (2008: 20). Secondly, she discusses how other foreign policy actors' policies in the targeted country or in a specific policy influence the NP of a foreign policy actor. Tocci illustrates with how Russia's *realpolitik* attitude towards Ukraine was crucial in the mobilisation of reaction against EU-supported domestic reforms, hence affecting the NPE in this country (2008: 20). Finally, Tocci argues that the 'wider international context' of a foreign policy actor and its strategic relations with other foreign policy actors impact its NP through shaping its choices. She gives instance where the EU's choice to sustain close relations with the USA and Israel prevented it from recognising the Palestinian government and restarting financial aid (2008: 20).

Having briefly introduced Tocci's analytical framework, this study aims to analyse the influence of the EU as an NP on the recent reform process of Turkey by taking this perspective as a point of reference. First of all, it should be noted that this study adopts the second meaning of NP described by Manners, i.e. an ideational power acting to change norms, and takes the EU as an NP *vis-à-vis* Turkey for granted. Word limitations preclude a detailed discussion about this issue. However, applying roughly the three criteria offered by Tocci, the EU can be said to be an NP *vis-à-vis* Turkey: it pursues normative goals, such as consolidation of democracy and promotion of human rights; it relies on normative means, that is, positive conditionality; and it has left normative impact since there is a close relationship between the normative change in Turkey and the EU's actions regarding Turkey. In short, instead of questioning whether the EU acts as an NP in its relations with Turkey, this research focuses on the factors which affect its NP.

This study does not deny the importance of the 1st conditioning factor, i.e. the internal political context of the EU. There was a favourable climate within the EU for Turkey's full membership in the beginning of the 2000s. The visit of a President of the Commission to Turkey after 40 years and the Commission's decision to launch the negotiations signalled the appreciation of Turkey's efforts on the way to membership (Müftüler Baç 2005: 29). Furthermore, political leaders of the member states, including French and German leaders, were supportive of Turkey's accession. However, this favourable context has changed following the 2004 Brussels EC's decision about the opening of the negotiations (Patton 2007: 344; Eralp 2009: 160). Concerns about Turkey's entrance to the Union has increased and culminated in the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty which was presented as a referendum for Turkey's membership in some member states. Growing opposition to Turkey's accession combined with the inauguration of the new political leaders who were sceptical about Turkey's full membership has also influenced the EU's attitude to the country. Characterisation of the negotiations as an open-ended process, the emphasis on the EU's absorption capacity and possibility of safeguard clauses, the introduction of unanimity for the opening and closing of the chapters and the increasing discussion about privileged partnership for Turkey have all fuelled Euroscepticism in Turkey (Patton 2007; Eralp 2009; Kirişci 2011; Öner 2014) and undermined the credibility of the EU's NP in the country.

Nevertheless, the 2nd conditioning factor -availability of the foreign policy means of the EU enabling it to act normatively- and the 3rd conditioning factor -the interaction between the EU acts and its external environment- appear to have been more significant in terms of shaping

the NPE *vis-à-vis* Turkey. Therefore, this study excludes the 1st conditioning factor and concentrates on the 2nd and 3rd factors. Additionally, in order to be more specific, this study narrows the content of both factors. To clarify, throughout this work, the 2nd conditioning factor will be used to refer to the existence of a clear membership prospect, the availability of which is supposed to facilitate the exportation of the EU norms; and the 3rd factor will be used to refer to the interaction of the EU with domestic actors, more specifically, compatibility of the EU norms with the governing party's interests.

2.3 Case Studies

2.3.1 The Normative Change Regarding Civilian-Military Relations in Turkey

2.3.1.1 An Overview of Civilian-Military Relations

One of the basic features of Turkish politics has been the extensive influence of the Turkish army on civilian politics. This tradition may be traced back to the Ottoman Empire and was inherited by the Turkish Republic which was founded in 1923. The fact that two well-known founders and reformers of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, were the former generals and military school graduates may give an idea about the activism of the Turkish army.

Atatürk, on the one hand, tried to keep the military out of politics[7], on the other hand, he ensured that the military was loyal to the principles[8] of the Republic (Hale 1994 and Mango 2000 cited in Karaosmanoğlu 2013: 152) and was the guardian of the Republican reforms[9]. The TAF embraced this duty and has been extremely sensitive about the principles of the Republic, especially the indivisibility of the nation and territory, and the secular characteristic of the state. Consequently, when it deemed there was a threat to these principles, it did not hesitate to directly or indirectly intervene in politics in order to protect the Republic.

Beginning with the first military coup in 1960, the TAF has gradually increased its influence on politics. The NSC, which has been perceived as institutionalisation of this impact, was established by the 1961 Constitution. The institution was comprised of civilian and military

[7] Since Atatürk perceived the politicisation of the military as the main cause of the failure of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, he abolished the right to vote and become parliamentarian of the military personnel.

[8] Republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, etatism and revolutionism are known as the principles of Republic/Atatürkism. They were incorporated in the constitution in 1937and have significantly shaped the key Turkish political norms.

[9] Following the victory of the National Independence War, crucial reforms which shaped the political and social structure of the new state were adopted. These reforms are known as Republican or Atatürk reforms *(Cumhuriyet/Atatürk devrimleri).*

authorities and was entrusted with advising the government on security issues (Heper 2005: 35). Moreover, the TAF Internal Service Law adopted in 1961 provided the legal basis for military intervention through Articles 35 and 85/1 which assigned the military to protect and preserve the Republic (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 7). The subsequent military takeovers improved the role of the army through the empowerment of the NSC. After the 1971 intervention the "advisory" council turned into an institution which "recommended measures". Additionally, the State Security Courts, composed of civilian and military judges, were established for the cases concerning state security; and the Supreme Military Council, whose decisions were exempted from judicial review, was created to decide the career path of military personnel (Aydın and Keyman: 2004: 19). Finally, the 1980 coup enhanced the role of the NSC by obliging the government to give priority to the NSC's recommendations (Heper 2005: 36).

The decreased influence of the army on politics in the early 1990s began to reverse due to the rise in PKK's terrorist attacks and political Islam (Aydın and Keyman 2004: 19). The growing polarisation between Islamists and secularists as a result of the Welfare Party's[10] acts and discourse evoked the TAF to undertake its guardianship role in 1997. Erbakan, the PM of the Welfare Party-led government, was forced to resign when he rejected taking measures against Islamic reactionism which were stated at the NSC meeting on 28 February 1997. This symbolised the role of the military 'as a second pillar of the executive through the NSC' until the end of 1990s (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1997: 158 cited in Gürsoy 2011: 295).

Before turning to the reforms in civilian-military relations, it is noteworthy to mention the perception of the TAF and democracy. In Turkey, the TAF has been the most trusted institution, and ensuring order and stability has been valued over democracy. Moreover, military coups are not perceived as intervention in democracy. According to a survey, 44.8 % of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that democracy can sometimes be compromised to restore order and security. Moreover, 39 % of the people questioned stated that they would support military takeover in some cases (Kemahlıoğlu and Keyman 2011: 20-21). Therefore, 'military guardianship has been a characteristic of the Republic' (Karaosmanoğlu 2013: 156) and military interference in civilian politics is not perceived as detrimental to democracy.

[10] The Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan was reopened after the 1980 coup as the successor of the National Salvation Party. The party had strong Islamic references and supported revitalisation of the Islamic nature of the country. Thanks to its electoral achievement in 1995, it formed the government with the True Path Party and Erbakan became the prime minister of this coalition government.

2.3.1.2 The Reforms Regarding Civilian-Military Relations

The civilian-military relations in Turkey gained a new dimension with the EU membership bid at the 1999 Helsinki EC. On 8 March 2001 the EC adopted Turkey's first APD in which the alignment of the constitutional role of the NSC as an advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU Member States was stated as a medium-term political objective (EC 2001: L85/19). In response, Turkey adopted its NPAA and promised to make necessary amendments (Turkey 2001). Since then Turkey has realised significant constitutional and legal amendments to decrease the influence of the military in politics (Aydın and Keyman 2004; Gürsoy 2011).

To begin with, the NSC was defined as an advisory institution which gives its opinion upon request. The number of civilian members in the institution was increased and its representatives in civilian bodies such as the High Education Board and High Audio-Visual Board were removed. The secretariat general of the NSC was decided as to be appointed by the PM. The monthly meetings were decided to be held instead once every two months. Additionally, the military judges in the State Security Courts were removed and the courts were totally abolished in 2004. Finally, the defence expenditures were brought under supervision of the Court of Auditors (Aydın and Keyman 2004: 20).

The reforms came to a halt for a while after 2005 but then restarted. Firstly, civilian courts were allowed to try military officers in peacetime. Then, the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order, which permitted the conduct of military operations against internal security threats without the approval of the civilian administration, was abolished (CNNTürk 2010 cited in Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 6). Moreover, the constitutional amendments adopted by the referendum in 2010 allowed trial of the commanders of the 1980 coup and subjected the Supreme Military Council's decisions on the dismissal of military personnel to judicial review. Additionally, the authority of the military courts was limited, whereas the civilian courts were permitted to judge the military staff who were indicted on crimes related to state security (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 6). Furthermore, legal changes were introduced in the Law on Court of Auditors to increase the institution's supervision over the military budget. Finally, Article 35 of the TAF Internal Service Law, which was perceived to lay the legal base for the previous coups, was amended in 2013 (Hürriyet Daily News 2013).

2.3.1.3 The Analysis

Being one of the deeply embedded norms in Turkey, the dominance of the military over the civilian authority has witnessed a crucial transformation since the beginning of the new millennium. The role of the EU in the launch of the reform process in this field is undeniable (Sarıgil 2007: 41). The first years of the new century were hard for Turkey. The country was hit by a serious economic crisis while trying to recover after a devastating earthquake. Meanwhile Turkey was ruled by a coalition government comprised of three ideologically different parties. Under these conditions, transformation of civilian-military relations was unlikely to be on the agenda. However, the reform process started as early as 2001 with the adoption of constitutional amendments to meet the objectives which were stated in the first APD. Therefore, the goal of opening accession talks brought the issue to the table and pushed for change.

The EU not only facilitated the initiation of the process at an early date; but also influenced the content of the reforms. To illustrate, the NSC representatives in High Audio-Visual Board and High Education Board were removed in 2004 following the EU critique of the situation in the 2003 Progress Report (Commission 2003: 18-19). Moreover, the criticisms about the transparency of the defence budget in the 2002 and 2003 progress reports were influential in adopting the legal amendments about public control over the military budget in the subsequent years (Commission 2002: 25, 2003: 19). Last but not least, the jurisdiction of military courts was limited through the changes in the Military Criminal Code dated 2006 following the 2005 Progress Report which criticised Turkey for non-progress in this subject (Commission 2005: 14). Therefore, the EU's NP, strengthened with the existence of a clear membership prospect, i.e. the 2nd conditioning factor, played a key role in the initiation of the normative change in the country.

Nevertheless, a critical evaluation of the internal political developments in Turkey suggests that in addition to the membership carrot, the notable compatibility between the promoted EU norm and the ruling party's interests, that is the 3rd conditioning factor, has contributed to the NP of the EU until 2005.

The 2002 parliamentary elections represent a critical milestone in Turkish politics (Patton 2007: 339). The mainstream parties were dismissed and only two parties managed to get into the TGNA. One of them was the one-year-old JDP which achieved majority in the parliament. However, the electoral breakthrough of the JDP was not welcomed by the secular

establishment, i.e. the judiciary and military. Because the party's main figures were proponents of National View[11] ideology and active members of the Welfare Party and Virtue Party, which were ousted by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001 respectively, the JDP was suspected of being the successor of failed Islamist parties. Although the non-Islamist, pro-EU and conservative democratic character of the party was highlighted, it could not prevent doubts. Thus, the party was under close scrutiny of the secularists including the military. Therefore, the reforms to decrease the military control over the civilian authority would have strengthened the JDP and secured its political existence (Doğan 2005; Tocci 2005; Bardakçı 2010; Yılmaz 2014; Saatçioğlu 2014). This correlation between the EU norm and party interests also explains why the JDP's commitment to Turkey's EU membership was met with suspicion.

As mentioned at the beginning, Turkey-EU relations have slackened and the possibility of full membership has become blurred after 2005. Despite the general slowdown of the reform process, the reforms aiming to increase civilian control over the military have continued. The increasing tension between the military and the civilian authority since 2007 implies that the interests of the ruling party, rather than the goal of EU membership, have motivated the government to maintain the process after 2005.

First of all, the friction between the TAF and the JDP culminated in 2007 owing to the presidential elections. The TGNA would elect the 11th President of the Republic and it was expected that the nominee of the JDP would be the president since the party had the majority in the parliament[12]. Therefore, the nomination of Abdullah Gül, whose wife was wearing a headscarf, created concerns among the secular elite and boosted the already existing polarisation within the society. Prior to the first parliamentary session for the presidential election, the TAF declared an online announcement stating its anxiety about the situation and determination to display its attitude 'openly and clearly when necessary'[13] (Hürriyet 2007a), implying the possibility of a military intervention. This was perceived as unacceptable by the government and Gül did not step down. He was elected as president but his election was

[11] National View *(Milli Görüş)* is an ideology that entered Turkish political life with the establishment of the National Order Party which was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970. The ideology advocates rapid industrialisation and commitment to moral values. Being anti-Western, it supports that Turkey would develop through the revitalisation of Islamist values and the cooperation with Muslim countries. The party was closed in 1971 because of being against the secular principle of the Republic; but the ideology has been referenced by other subsequent lslamist parties.

[12] The President of the Republic was elected by the parliament until the constitutional referendum in 2007. The President is now directly elected by the public.

[13] Own translation.

decided as void by the Constitutional Court because of the lack of the necessary quorum in the parliament. Consequently, the JDP called for the parliamentary elections and elected Gül as the president thanks to its increased parliamentary majority (Gürsoy 2011: 296).

Another source of tension was the revelation of coup plans in some newspapers after the presidential crisis (Gürsoy 2011: 297). These plans were claimed to have been prepared by civilian and military officers in order to overthrow the JDP government in undemocratic ways and this led to the initiation of judicial investigations, known as Ergenekon and Balyoz in 2008 and 2010 respectively. Within the scope of these investigations, many retired or active military officers, including the former Chief of Staff, famous journalists, authors and academicians were arrested. Therefore, these developments paved the way for new legal changes in order to strengthen the civilian government *vis-à-vis* military authority from 2007 (Gürsoy 2011: 298).

In conclusion, the NPE, which has been significantly shaped by the 2nd and 3rd conditioning factors, has been influential on the discussed normative change. As *Table 1* suggests, the existence of a clear membership prospect and the remarkable compatibility of the promoted EU norm with the governing party's interests had strengthened the NPE and accelerated the process until 2005 while the fading membership possibility has undermined it since 2005. Therefore, the continuation of the reforms regarding civilian-military relations in the post-2005 era seems to be more attributable to this EU norm's reinforcement of the governing party's interests rather than to the NPE.

Table 1. *The NPE's impact on the reforms concerning civilian-military relations in Turkey*

NPE *vis-à-vis* Turkey	**Civilian-military relations**	
	Pre-2005	**Post-2005**
Clear membership prospect (2 nd factor)	Strong	Weak
Compatibility of the EU norm with the ruling party's interests (3 nd factor)	Strong	Strong

2.3.2 The Normative Change Regarding the Kurdish Issue in Turkey

2.3.2.1 An Overview of the Kurdish Issue

The Ottoman Empire was a multicultural empire consisting of many ethnically and religiously different groups one of which was the Kurds. Under the Ottoman rule, the Kurdish

tribes enjoyed some autonomy in return for their loyalty to the empire. Many of the Kurds were appointed to important posts within the bureaucracy and military. More importantly, most of them joined Turkey's National Independence War and struggled along with the Turkish troops even though the Sévres Treaty[14] promised the Kurds a homeland (Ergil 2000: 124).

Inheriting the multicultural basis of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic aspired to establish a central, modern and secular nation state. In order to realise this aim, state authority was centralised so that necessary reforms could be adopted in a short time. Centralisation of power undermined the privileges of the Kurdish tribes who enjoyed substantial autonomy in the Ottoman era. Moreover, the abolition of the Caliphate, which was a significant institution in terms of keeping Muslim inhabitants together (Yeğen 1996: 221), represented weakening of the ties between the Kurds and the state. Additionally, the emphasis on Turkishness as the basis of the new Republic and non-recognition of other ethnic nationalities bred Kurds' alienation and triggered rebellions.

Among the others, the Sheikh Said rebellion which erupted in 1925 was significant in the sense that it shaped the young Republic's perception and policy concerning the Kurds. The founders of the Republic believed that the rebellion was a separatist and reactionary movement guided by illiterate religious and tribal leaders, and backed by foreign enemies to dissolve the Turkish Republic (Yeğen 1996; Bayındır 2007). Thus, the uprising was seen as a security issue and military measures were taken. Martial law was declared in fourteen eastern provinces and military courts were established to try rebels (Bayındır 2007: 65). The riot was suppressed but followed by other rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s. After the Sheikh Said uprising, the Republican elite adopted an oppressive attitude towards the Kurds and took measures to integrate them into the Turkish nation. For instance, the Eastern Reform Programme was designed which envisaged removal of the Kurds from the eastern region, a Kurdish language ban and establishment of boarding schools to teach Turkish (Bayrak 1994 cited in Bayındır 2007: 67). Similarly, the report, which was prepared by the PM İsmet İnönü in 1935 and revealed in 2007, proposed resettlement of the Kurds in western provinces and improvement of investment and education facilities in the region, which were believed to make the Kurds more loyal to the Republic (Hürriyet 2007b).

[14] The Sévres Treaty was signed at the end of the First World War and partitioned the Ottoman Empire among the Allies. It also envisaged the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region.

The Kurdish issue had started to institutionalise via political organisations thanks to the 1961 Constitution which extended political rights. However, the 1971 military takeover, one of the declared reasons of which was 'the separatist question in the East' (McDowall 1996 cited in Bayındır 2007: 83), caused the radicalisation of these organisations. Stating openly their separatist agenda, the Kurdish organisations strengthened during the second half of the 1970s and became one of the targets of the 1980 military intervention.

The military authority which ruled until 1983 highlighted the Turkishness and indivisibility of the Republic. It forbade the Kurdish language by law, changed the Kurdish names of some of the villages and forced Turkish naming for new-born Kurds (Ergil 2000: 127). This repressive policy was believed to cause the marginalisation of the Kurdish problem and initiation of the PKK terror in the mid-1980s. In order to fight against terrorism, state of emergency was declared in some provinces and governors with excessive powers were appointed. During those years, many suspected people were arrested, imprisoned and exposed to torture. There were reports about the deaths of many prisoners in detention (Aydın and Keyman 2004: 34).

Paradoxically, the measures taken to struggle with the PKK raised its terrorist attacks and Turkey deeply suffered from terror in the first half of the 1990s. The violent attacks of the organisation targeted not only state officials (mainly military personnel and teachers) but also civilians including moderate Kurds. The PKK acts were listed 'as the foremost security threat to the state' in the 1992 NSPD[15] (Cizre 2003 cited in Akgül Açıkmeşe 2013: 310). In sum, the Kurdish issue was securitised due to PKK terrorism and this justified the restriction of the Kurds' rights (Satana 2012: 173).

The issue gained a new dimension in the second half of the 1990s. The leaders of the PKK, Şemdin Sakık and Abdullah Öcalan, were captured in 1998 and 1999 respectively and the PKK declared a five-year ceasefire. The capture of Öcalan who was responsible for more than 30,000 casualties was regarded as a great victory of Turkey against terror. The Kurdish problem, which was deemed identical with the PKK terror, was assumed to have ended. However, the state elite comprehended that the Kurdish question was more than the PKK terror very soon.

[15] National Security Policy Document specifies the internal and external threats and significantly influences the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey. It changes once or twice in a decade and was prepared by the military until 2010.

2.3.2.2 The Reforms Regarding the Kurdish Issue

As discussed, the state policy based on non-recognition of the Kurds as a separate nation was modelled in the early Republican era. However, this started to change in the late 1980s. In 1989, the then PM, Turgut Özal declared that the state failure regarding the issue in the first years of the Republic should be admitted (Briefing 1989: 4 cited in Gunter 1997: 61). Two years later, Süleyman Demirel, as the PM of the coalition government which came to office in 1991, stated in his visit to Diyarbakır that 'Turkey should recognise the Kurdish reality, recognition of this is not an obstacle for Turkey's unity'[16] (Demirel cited in Coşkun 2012).

This discourse change from non-recognition to recognition was reflected in practice. In April 1991, the Kurdish language was again allowed thanks to the repeal of the Law 2932, which was enacted in 1983. Furthermore, the coalition government decided to make some changes regarding the Southeast policy of Turkey. According to the agreement between the coalition partners, 'everyone will be able to say 'I'm Kurd' freely, publishing and music recording in Kurdish will be unrestricted but for the present there will be no Kurdish television or Radio' (Hürriyet 1991 cited in Bayındır 2007: 105). Additionally, the introduction of economic measures by the incumbent governments in this decade in order to improve the economic situation in the east and south-east regions of the country, which were mainly Kurdish-populated, indicates the perception of the Kurdish issue as a problem deriving from the economic backwardness of the region.

Nonetheless, the increase in the PKK terror and the oath incident[17] of the Kurdish parliamentarians in the TGNA prompted restrictions on the Kurds' rights. In 1991, an anti-terror law was adopted which had a broad "terror" definition and limited the freedom of expression to a great extent. According to the law, the quest for further Kurdish cultural rights would be regarded as a terrorist act (Gunter 1997: 73). Within the framework of this law, many people, including intellectuals and academics, were prosecuted.

The new millennium witnessed a substantial reform process. Beginning in 2001, many amendments were adopted that would improve the cultural rights of the Kurds (Aydın and Keyman 2004: 35). To begin with, expressing opinion and broadcasting in Kurdish was

[16] Own translation.

[17] Hatip Dicle and Leyla Zana were the two Kurdish parliamentarians who entered the TGNA after the 1991 elections. In the oath-taking ceremony, the former declared that he said some parts of the oath (the parts related to the Turkish nation and its indivisibility) under pressure while the latter ended her oath in Kurdish (Bayındır 2007: 108). This incident and their close contact with the PKK led to parliamentary investigation at the end of which their immunities were removed. They were tried and given 15-year sentences.

permitted. Opening of private courses to teach Kurdish was allowed. Parents were permitted to give Kurdish names to their children. The state of emergency, which gave the special regional governors excessive rights to combat terror, was gradually shifted. The State Security Courts which were infamous for their dealing with the cases regarding the Kurds' rights were removed (Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit 2012: 69). Capital punishment was limited and totally abolished in 2004. The Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law were amended to broaden the freedom of expression. The Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project was adopted and implemented to encourage returning to the villages which were vacated during the 1990s as a measure to struggle with the PKK terror. Other reforms adopted to improve human rights also contributed to the enhancement of Kurdish rights (Aydın and Keyman 2004: 35). For instance, the introduction of retrial for the cases which the European Court of Human Rights found contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights enabled many Kurds, including former parliamentarians Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle, to be re-tried and released in 2004.

This reform process halted and even reversed after 2005 though. Owing to the increase in PKK terrorist attacks, security measures which limited the impact of the reforms were taken. For example, the amendment in the Anti-Terror Law in 2006 restricted the freedom of speech of those who discussed augmentation of the Kurdish rights (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 13). Additionally, some provinces were declared as "temporary security zones" in 2007 – reminiscent of the state of emergency which was lifted in 2002- hence military operations could be freely realised (Kurban and Gülalp 2013 cited in Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 14).

The process re-gained momentum in 2009 with the introduction of a full-Kurdish channel, TRT Six, by the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television. Legal amendments, such as the legalisation of letters which do not exist in the Turkish alphabet but were widely used in the Kurdish language, were adopted to facilitate broadcasting in Kurdish (Kirişci 2011: 344). Some universities were allowed to open Kurdish programmes such as Kurdish Language and Literature, and public schools started to offer Kurdish as an optional course (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 13). The most crucial but short-lived step was the initiation of the "Kurdish opening", which aimed to solve the Kurdish question. As the first phase of the process, 34 PKK rebels entered Turkey. They were questioned and then freed. Their entrance turned out to be a show for Öcalan and the PKK, and was presented as a victory against

Turkey (Kirişci 2011: 345; Cengiz and Hoffman 2013: 424). This caused a massive public reaction and brought the end of the process.

Finally, in January 2013, with a legal amendment, the accused was allowed to use Kurdish at certain stages of judiciary proceedings. Moreover, the Kurdish opening was re-launched under the name of the "Solution process", and "democratisation package" announced by the former PM Erdoğan[18] on 30 September 2013, which promised to allow the Kurdish language to be used while conducting political activities and also as an education language in private schools. Last but not least, the package permitted the reinstatement of the Kurdish names of the villages whose names were changed after the 1980 military intervention (Financial Times 2013).

2.3.2.3 The Analysis

It is widely debated that the young Republic's oppressive policies to incorporate the Kurds in the Turkish nation have been the main reason for the Kurdish question (Ergil 2000; Bayındır 2007; Kirişci 2011). However, the state's approach started to change in the late 1980s. Despite the EU's and other international organisations' pressures on Turkey about the improvement of minority rights within the context of human rights, Turkey's ideological shift appears to be the result of the developments in North Iraq. The possibility of the foundation of a Kurdish state in the region which might feed the PKK terror and represent an example for Kurds in Turkey urged the state elite to think about the Kurdish reality (Gunter 1997: 98). However, it was still too early for Turkey to discuss the improvement of the Kurds' rights while the struggle with the PKK terror was continuing in the 1990s.

One may have expected that the capture of Öcalan, the PKK leader, would have paved the way for the promotion of the Kurds' rights since his capture was presented as the ending of the PKK terror which was shown as the biggest obstacle for the improvement of Kurdish rights. However, this was not the case. On the contrary, the state discourse which did not recognise the Kurdish reality was re-adopted. To illustrate, in June 1999, the PM Bülent Ecevit emphasised the non-existence of a Kurdish or minority problem but the existence of a struggle against terror in Turkey in his letter to Gerhard Schröder, the then Chancellor of Germany (Hürriyet 1999). Additionally, the adoption of a 'master action plan' in 2000 which

[18] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the leader of the JDP and the Prime Minister of Turkey from 2002. He became the 12th President of the Republic as a result of the first direct presidential elections held on 10 August 2014.

was prepared by the NSC and included measures to develop the economic situation in the region denoted that the Kurdish issue was still perceived from an economic point of view.

It was the EU which confronted the state elite with the political and cultural dimensions of the issue. The first APD listed short and medium-term objectives such as allowance of broadcasting and education in other languages, improvement of freedom of expression and thought, ensuring cultural diversity and full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all citizens (EC 2001). The achievement of these goals necessitated a crucial change in the Kurdish policy and precipitated a huge discussion.

The state elite were divided on the required reforms. On the one hand, one of the members of the NSC declared that broadcasting in Kurdish was unlikely to be allowed soon and the permission of Kurdish in education would be detrimental to the pluralistic structure of the society (Financial Times 2000). Similarly, Demirel, the then President, stated that those reforms would divide the country into parts (Turkish Daily News 2000 cited in Aydınlı 2002: 213). Additionally, two members of the Nationalist Action Party stated that those EU demands about Kurds' rights were more detrimental than the Sévres Treaty and their party was against the reforms 'all the way' (Hürriyet 2000 cited in Aydınlı 2002: 214). On the other hand, the heads of the National Intelligence Organisation, the Supreme Court and Foreign Ministry believed that adoption of these reforms would help to deal with the issue (Aydınlı 2002: 214). Moreover, the leader of the pro-EU partner of the coalition government, Mesut Yılmaz had already underlined the importance of the Kurdish rights in Turkey's accession process as early as 1999 by stating that 'the road to the EU goes through Diyarbakır'[19][20] (Milliyet 1999).

Given these divergent views about the issue, nothing except the membership prospect seems to be powerful enough to bring the actors together and launch the reform process. The adoption of the reform package, which allowed broadcasting in Kurdish, by the coalition government despite high adoption costs and strong veto players demonstrates the EU's NP. Put differently, the 2nd conditioning factor, i.e. the availability of a clear membership prospect, has strengthened the NPE *vis-à-vis* Turkey.

Besides the membership carrot, the perfect interaction between the ruling party's interests and the promotion of the Kurdish rights, that is the 3rd conditioning factor, seems to have

[19] Diyarbakır is a province in the south-east region of Turkey mainly inhabited by the Kurds; and it has been perceived as the capital city of the so-called "Kurdish state".
[20] Own translation.

contributed to the EU's NP until 2005. To exemplify this, the promotion of the freedom of expression, which would benefit those punished for expressing thoughts about the Kurdish issue, was also supposed to benefit the party whose leader was once given a prison sentence because of reciting a poem in one of the public meetings. Therefore, the support for the improvement of this freedom was reasonable for the party elite who would gain the opportunity to freely raise their own opinions. Moreover, the introduction of retrial also pleased the Islamic core of the party who suffered from the national court decisions regarding the headscarf issue. Additionally, Yavuz and Özcan argue that Erdoğan ignored the callings of Hilmi Özkök, the then Chief of Staff, about making amendments in the anti-terror law in order to fight against PKK activism since he doubted that the amendments may be used against Islamic groups (Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 110). The objection of both the party grassroots and the Kurds to the amendments denotes the connection between the interests of the two groups and the compatibility of the mentioned EU norm with the governing party's interests.

Notwithstanding the weakened possibility of membership, the reforms concerning the Kurdish issue have continued after 2005. The changing approach of the former party leader Erdoğan to the issue and timing of the reforms signal that the electoral calculations of the JDP, rather than the NPE, have enabled the continuation of the process (Yılmaz and Soyaltın 2014: 23).

Unlike previous political actors, Erdoğan openly recognised the existence of the Kurdish problem in his speech in 2005 and promised to solve the question through further democratisation (Efegil 2011: 28; Satana 2012: 174). However, in the following years he adopted a more nationalist tone (Kirişci 2011: 341; Cengiz and Hoffmann 2013: 425). He preferred to label the issue as 'a terror problem created by extremist Kurds'[21] (Habertürk 2011) instead of naming it as a 'Kurdish problem'. This tone change may be observed as a response to increasing Turkish nationalism. Given the approaching parliamentary elections, it was reasonable for the party leader to refrain from acts that would offend voters with strong nationalist sentiments.

Additionally, the timing of the "Kurdish opening" is also significant in understanding the dynamics of the reform process. The JDP launched the process just a few months after the 2009 local elections, in which it lost some of the mainly Kurdish-populated provinces. This

[21] Own translation.

initiative appears to be the result of the electoral calculations of the party which was aiming to regain Kurdish support in the 2011 parliamentary elections (Kirişci 2011: 344; Cengiz and Hoffmann 2013: 424). However, as discussed in the previous part, the process was locked due to rising public reaction. It seems that the risk of losing public support in the forthcoming elections motivated the JDP to shelve the project. What is more, Erdoğan's emphasis on religion (a strong common denominator of the Turks and Kurds) in the election rallies[22] as a more binding instrument than nationality within the society reflected the rational choice of the party which aimed to satisfy both the Turkish and Kurdish voters.

The project was re-launched in 2013 under the name "Solution Process". This time, the JDP was more cautious and attempted to generate public support[23] in order to eliminate resistance. Finally, in September 2013, Erdoğan announced the "democratisation package" which included promises for further Kurdish rights. Once again, the introduction of an initiative on the eve of the local and presidential elections underlines the relationship between cost-benefit calculations of the party and the continuation of the reforms.

To conclude, the NPE, which has been mainly shaped by the 2nd and 3rd conditioning factors, has significantly affected the normative transformation regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey. As *Table 2* suggests the existence of a clear membership prospect and the remarkable compatibility of the EU norm with the governing party's interests has accelerated the process until 2005. Nonetheless, the blurred possibility of the EU membership has diminished the EU's NP in post-2005 era. Therefore, rather than the NPE, political interests of the ruling party seem to have driven the reform process since 2005.

Table 2. *The NPE's impact on the reforms concerning the Kurdish issue in Turkey*

NPE *vis-à-vis* Turkey	**The Kurdish issue**	
	Pre-2005	**Post-2005**
Clear membership prospect (2 nd factor)	Strong	Weak
Compatibility of the EU norm with the ruling party's interests (3 nd factor)	Strong	Strong

[22] In Bingöl and Diyarbakır meetings, Erdoğan mainly used religious references when addressing the Kurds (Satana 2012: 178-179).

[23] A committee known as the "Wise People Committee" was established by the government in order to explain the solution process to the public and generate public support. The Committee was structured on the basis of geographical regions and consisted of prominent authors, artists, academicians and representatives of civil society organisations.

CONCLUSION

The European integration has proved to be a success story. Established by six West European countries in order to re-establish peace and prosperity in the continent, the Union has made war unthinkable between the European states and achieved great prosperity in less than 50 years. The Union is now an effective international actor having its own institutions which combine supranational and national actors. It has its own jurisdiction and takes binding decisions regarding many policies ranging from trade to environment. Furthermore, it has created its own legal order which highlights universal values and principles. In short, the Union has transformed itself from a small economic community into a capable international actor. Now, the question is how to define the role of this strange organisation which is neither a state nor a federation. Among the labels suggested to characterise the EU's international impact, the NPE has dominated the academic debate since its introduction in 2002.

The making of modern Turkey is another success story. As Feroz Ahmad states 'Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was "made" in the image of the Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime' (Ahmad 1993 cited in Aydın and Keyman 2004: 3). Western modernity has been taken as a model by the young Republic and ground-breaking reforms ranging from the political structure of the country to dressing style were adopted in a very short time in order to establish a modern and secular nation state similar to its Western counterparts. In less than 50 years, Turkey has become a significant partner of the West as one of the founding members or member of many Western institutions. Therefore, Turkey's application to the EU and its aspiration for full membership is usually perceived as a part of this historic Westernisation project.

A new phase started in Turkey's modernisation project with the recognition of its candidacy to the EU in 1999. The country has entered a momentous reform process during which its major norms have been transformed. The majority of the academic studies have attributed Turkey's normative change to the prospect of full EU membership. Admitting the role of the EU as an external incentive, this study mainly highlighted the other side of the coin by emphasising the significance of the domestic factors and their interplay with the EU norms.

Benefiting from a wide range of secondary resources and official documents, this study began with the presentation of the academic discussion about the international role of the EU. Afterwards, the NPE thesis and its criticisms were examined in the first chapter. The second

chapter provided an overview of Turkey-EU relations and laid the analytical framework of the study before evaluating the normative change concerning civilian-military relations and the Kurdish question in Turkey.

As discussed, both of the norms were shaped in the early years of the Republic and have incrementally diffused. The TAF was entrusted with protecting and preserving the basic principles of the Republic and it has gradually increased its influence on politics after each *coup d'état*. Furthermore, the guardianship role of the TAF was so permeated in people's minds that military takeovers have not been deemed as a peril for democracy. With regard to the other norm, since the early years of the Republic, the Kurdish issue was perceived as a threat to the indivisibility of the nation and gave way to suppressive policies in order to incorporate the Kurds into the Turkish nation. The PKK's terrorist attacks which began in the mid-1980s led to securitisation of the issue and justified restriction of Kurdish rights in the following decade.

Nevertheless, these two long-standing norms have considerably changed in the 2000s. The transformation of civilian-military relations was perceived as 'a quiet revolution' (Financial Times 2003). The TAF's privileged position among other civilian state institutions was finalised. The NSC meetings which were once broadly covered in the media have become inconspicuous. It seems that the military elite has adapted to its new role while the civilian government has increased its control over the army. For instance, despite criticisms, the TAF did not undermine the government's Cyprus policy regarding the Annan plan (Aydın and Keyman 2004: 22). Additionally, instead of pressuring the government which demanded retirement of the military officers who were jailed because of the Balyoz investigation, the chief of staff and the commanders of the army, navy and air forces preferred to resign before the 2011 Supreme Military Council meeting (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2013: 6). Moreover, unlike the previous tradition, the NSPD, which specifies the internal and external threats, was re-written by the government in 2010 and reflected its "zero-problem with neighbours" policy.

With regard to normative change on the Kurdish issue, the fact that Turkey which once abolished the Kurdish language is now offering a full Kurdish TV channel via a state-owned institution is a remarkable indicator. Furthermore, Turkey has transformed from a country where a prominent singer was almost lynched and forced to leave the country just because of declaring his aspiration to sing in Kurdish to a country where Kurdish singers and songs are embraced. Most strikingly, Turkey is no longer a country which sidelines the Kurdish parties,

but is a country which welcomes a Kurdish party leader's candidacy for the presidency, the highest position within the state structure.

The comprehensive analysis of the transformation process in both issues demonstrates that the impact of the NPE on discussed domestic reforms has varied before and after 2005. The EU incontestably played a major role in the initiation of the process. It not only brought the issue to the political agenda but also influenced the content of the reforms through progress reports and extensive political dialogue. The Union continuously highlighted the incompatibility of the Turkish norms with European standards and pushed for change in order to launch the negotiations. As Bozkır[24], the President of the TGNA Foreign Affairs Committee, stated, 'Turkey could not have realised the political reforms without the EU accession process'[25] (Zaman 2013). This is especially true of the adoption of the earthshaking constitutional amendments by a coalition government, which included one member of an extreme nationalist party, indicating the EU's NP, significantly strengthened by the membership tool.

In addition to the membership carrot, the compatibility of the promoted EU norms with the ruling party's interests contributed to the NPE. The elimination of the military influence on civilian politics and the expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms for all citizens were favourable for the new political actor, the JDP, which needed to guarantee its political survival and maintain political power. Whether the JDP abused the accession process to increase its power is open to debate; however, it is indubitable that the required reforms were very well served its interests, and this perfect compatibility of the EU norms with its interests strengthened the NPE until 2005.

As *Table 3* suggests, the NPE has been undermined in the post-2005 era due to the weakening of the membership possibility. Concerning the civilian-military relations, the increased tension between the ruling party and the TAF because of the presidential crisis in 2007 and the display of coup plans against the JDP seem to have contributed to the continuation of the reforms in this field. Similarly, the electoral calculations of the ruling party appear to have motivated the government to proceed with the reforms regarding the Kurdish question. Consequently, it would not be a far-fetched claim to propose that the

[24] At the time of writing, Volkan Bozkır has been named as Turkey's new minister for European Union Affairs in the 62th cabinet of Turkey but the cabinet has not received a vote of confidence yet.
[25] Own translation.

continuation of the domestic reforms regarding these issues since 2005 has been driven by the governing party's interests, rather than the NPE.

Table 3. *The NPE's impact on the reforms concerning civilian-military relations and the Kurdish issue in Turkey*

NPE *vis-à-vis* Turkey	**Pre-2005**		**Post-2005**	
	Civilian-military relations	**The Kurdish issue**	**Civilian-military relations**	**The Kurdish issue**
Clear membership prospect (2 nd factor)	Strong	Strong	Weak	Weak
Compatibility of the EU norm with the ruling party's interests (3 nd factor)	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong

This study also wants to highlight the dynamism between the reforms in these two issues. From the very beginning, the Turkish army had concerns about the improvement of Kurdish rights because it perceived the Kurds as a threat to the indivisibility of the nation and territory. The abolition of many Kurdish rights following the 1980 military junta is a notable indicator of the TAF's approach to the Kurds. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the PKK terror enabled the military to enhance its influence on the politicians owing to the securitisation of the issue. Even after the victory against terror with the capture of the PKK leaders, the TAF, through the NSC, continued to interfere in political decisions by advising the government on the necessary measures that should be taken concerning the issue. Therefore, the reforms to restructure the NSC and diminish the military influence on the civilian administration have facilitated the improvement of Kurdish rights since one of the crucial veto players was eliminated.

The continuity of the reform process may be read as the result of the political actors' path-dependency and thus implying an indirect influence of the NPE in the post-2005 era. The normative change in Turkey started and had been shaped during its first years of candidacy process, the period during which the NPE was the most influential. It may be reasonable to support that the political choices made in this process limited the future alternatives of the rulers and committed them to proceed with the process. However, based on the analyses of the two cases, this study proposes that the rational choice of the political actors, rather than their path-dependency, is more convincing in understanding the post-2005 reform process.

Finally, this dissertation draws two conclusions. Firstly, the NPE *vis-à-vis* Turkey has been considerably influenced by the availability of the membership tool and the interaction of its norms with the domestic actors. Therefore, the NPE, which has been strengthened by the existence of these two conditioning factors, has played a substantial role in the initiation of the domestic reforms whilst the internal dynamics seem to have been driving the process since 2005. Secondly, the membership carrot is definitely an important tool for the promotion of the EU norms in third states but the NPE may still influence those without promising accession as long as its norms serve the domestic ruling elite in the targeted countries.

To conclude, notwithstanding its limitations, this study hopes to shed light on future research. Further studies may develop this discussion by adding the 1st conditioning factor as well as by extending the 3rd conditioning factor in a way to include the EU's internal dynamics and its interaction with other foreign policy actors. Another way to improve this research may be the inclusion of the domestic reforms regarding other policy issues. Consequently, the NPE and Turkey-EU relations appear to continue to provide a fruitful avenue for research.

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