ANGLO-OTTOMAN RELATIONS AND THE REFORM QUESTION IN THE EARLY TANZİMAT PERIOD 1839-1852: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO REFORMS CONCERNING OTTOMAN NON-MUSLIMS

by

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This study examines Anglo-Ottoman relations in the early Tanzimat period with reference to reforms concerned with non-Muslims subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

The thesis is divided into three parts, with an Introduction and a Conclusion.

The Introduction describes the questions at issue and the primary sources, both English and Ottoman, which have been studied.

The second chapter, which follows the development of Anglo-Ottoman relations up to the time of the Tanzimat (1839), places into context the main topics under discussion in the thesis.

Chapter Three discusses the motives of the British and Ottoman governments in wishing to introduce reforms into the Ottoman Empire, and examines the areas where they coincided and diverged.

The next three chapters cover the whole period between 1839 and 1852, forming together a detailed discussion of the proposed reform measures. Chapter Four considers Ottoman attempts to secure British support, and the preparation of the Tanzimat decree. Chapter Five discusses the reforms which were introduced between 1841 and 1847, and whether or not Reshid's absence from Istanbul affected the progress and priorities of the reform programme. Chapter Six considers the reforms implemented from 1848 to 1852, and discusses the extent to which Britain saw the reforms she desired successfully implemented.

The political implications of the reforms concerning non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire are examined in the next two chapters. Chapter Seven treats the

reform of the law of apostasy. The central case of an Armenian who apostatised from Islam is put in the context of the traditional law of apostasy, and is examined through four contemporary accounts. The British government's involvement in the affair is set against the Ottoman response to the demands of the European Powers led by Britain.

Chapter Eight concerns Britain's negotiations with the Porte first for permission to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem, and then for recognition of the Ottoman Empire's Protestant subjects as a separate millet. This is put in the context of the millet system and the advantages of recognition to both Britain and the Protestants.

The Conclusion discusses the development of Anglo-Ottoman relations during the period under study, and the effect on them of the reforms which had taken place since 1839.

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N O T E S O N
T R A N S L I T E R A T I O N
A N D S P E L L I N G

In this thesis, words commonly used in English have been given their English form, e.g. Pasha, Grand Vizier; the name Reshid has also been anglicised. Other names are given in their Turkish form.

Terms, document names, positions and ranks are given in their modern Turkish form, and are underlined, e.g. ferman, Serasker, millet.

Place-names commonly used in English are given in English, e.g. Berlin, Athens; while other places are given in Turkish or in their original language, e.g. Istanbul, Balta Limanı.

In the notes, dates of British documents are given according to the Christian calendar; the dates of Ottoman documents are given according to the Islamic calendar, with the Christian equivalent in brackets afterwards.

C O N T E N T S

ANGLO-OTTOMAN RELATIONS AND THE REFORM QUESTION IN THE EARLY TANZİMAT PERIOD 1839-1852: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO REFORMS CONCERNING OTTOMAN NON-MUSLIMS

This thesis is dedicated to

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Rector of the University of Marmara

who helped and encouraged his students and staff to achieve their potential. His sudden death in 1992 has brought great sadness to all those who knew him.

CHAPTER 1

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The nineteenth century was a period of reforms for the Ottoman Empire, when the culmination of earlier reform programmes took place. In fact, the reform movement in the Ottoman Empire may be divided into two stages. A consciousness of the growing need for reform is apparent in the Ottoman Empire from the seventeenth century onwards. The first to present his ideas in a systematic way was Koçi Bey in a treatise (*Koçi Bey Risalesi*)[1] he submitted to Sultan Murad IV (1623-1640) in 1630. The reform movement gained momentum during the reign of Selim III (1789-1808), influenced to a large degree by prolonged Ottoman military losses on the Russian front. During this period reforms were governed almost exclusively by Ottoman social, cultural and moral values. As the government considered the Empire to be in a strong position, it did not seek inspiration from sources outside the boundaries of the Empire. The second stage of reforms began in the 1830s and lasted until the final collapse of the Empire. During this period the outlook of the Porte began to change as it realised that the Empire's strength was waning, and it looked beyond the Empire's frontiers to western Europe. In addition to studying European institutions in the hope of finding a model upon which to base the reforms, the Porte also understood that it needed a western ally in order to save the Empire's integrity and independence. In contrast to earlier times, there was a realisation by the Porte that Europe could sometimes be useful, and was actually necessary for the survival of the Empire. Since the Treaty of Bucharest had been signed in 1812, the Porte clearly understood, from a secret document which Canning showed to the Foreign Minister, Galip Pasha, that her neighbours were discussing the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Tsar Nicholas stated

in 1833, 'I have no confidence in this old body preserving life ...'.[2] Between 1833 and 1853 the Tsar put forward three proposals for the partition of the Empire, visiting Britain in 1844 in an attempt to persuade the British government to adopt his plans.[3]

The Tanzimat period belonged to the second stage of the reform movement mentioned above, and began with the promulgation of the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu (Tanzimat Decree) on 3 November 1839. 'Tanzimat' literally means 'reorganisation' or 'putting in order'. The term is used for the decree itself, and for the period which it heralded. I understand the Tanzimat period to continue until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, although some historians, such as Cemil Bilsel, consider it to have ended in 1876 with the beginning of the 'Constitutional' period.[4] The Tanzimat reforms were seen as the remedy for the Empire's weakness and it was hoped that they would succeed where earlier reforms had failed. The aim was to correct the worst abuses of administration and restore the strength of the Empire before it disintegrated totally. These reforms brought about many changes in the political, social and cultural life of the Empire. Reform of the Ottoman Empire was a complex process, each solution creating new problems. As Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, the statesman and historian pointed out, 'it is more difficult thus entirely to change and renovate the laws of a state than to found a state anew.'[5]

Although the Tanzimat was a crucial period in Turkish history, it has not been studied sufficiently from an unbiased, academic viewpoint. Approaches to the study of the Tanzimat reforms have been influenced by political leanings, and this fact has led in Turkey to the development of two main understandings of the Tanzimat and its architect, Mustafa Reshid Pasha. Either the Tanzimat is seen as the principal reason for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, with Reshid as the puppet of Europe and the

destroyer of the Empire; or it is viewed as the beginning of civilisation in the Empire, with Reshid laying the foundations for modern Turkey. Because of this polarisation, sight has sometimes been lost of the role played by other ministers and the Sultan himself in the reform programme. In fact, neither of these extreme views is supported by the evidence. I believe modern Turkish historians must set aside their political biases and study the Tanzimat on its own terms, taking into account contemporary conditions, the state of the Ottoman Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century, and why the Tanzimat reforms were needed.

As a preliminary to our account it may be useful to discuss briefly the work already carried out by both western and Turkish historians. Until the hundredth anniversary of the Tanzimat, that is, 1939, there was very little work carried out on the Tanzimat reforms. In particular, there was no monograph dedicated to the subject. All our knowledge was based on the work of Engelhardt,[6] which will be discussed later in this chapter. At the conference which celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Tanzimat era, many scholars delivered papers and discussed different aspects of the Tanzimat reforms. The proceedings of the conference were published in 1940, under the short title of *Tanzimat I*, with the help of Hasan Ali Yücel, the then Education Minister. Although these papers cover over 1,000 pages, and fill some of the gaps in our knowledge, they do not go far enough towards a full understanding of the Tanzimat reforms. Some reflect the political agendas of their authors and therefore must be used with caution. However, taken together, these essays are a good starting point for a new detailed research of the subject. A further conference organised by the Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society) took place at the University of Istanbul in 1964 to celebrate the hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of the Tanzimat.

Among the historians attending the 1964 conference were Enver Ziya Karal, Halil İnalcık, Reşat Kaynar, M. Tayyib Gökbilgin and Roderick Davison. Unfortunately, not all the papers were published, but some may be found in *Belleten*.[7]

The Tanzimat again became a focal point for Turkish historians from the mid-1980s. In particular, 1989 saw the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Tanzimat decree, and many seminars and conferences were held to commemorate this. 1989 was also the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution and the hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the _ttihad ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress). It is impossible to mention here all the papers which were published as a result of these conferences; however, one important collection was edited by Hakk_ Dursun Yıldız and published by the Turkish Historical Society under the title of *150. Yılında Tanzimat*.[8]

This collective work consists of twenty-five articles totalling about 600 pages. The articles deal mainly with administrative, economic and education reforms. Here, I shall discuss just a few of those most worthy of mention. The collection starts with Kodaman and Alkan's joint article on the life and achievements of Reshid Pasha.[9] Although it does not add greatly to our knowledge, it serves as an excellent introduction, presenting as it does the man responsible for introducing many of the reforms discussed in the following articles. Stanford and Ezel Kurat Shaw are best known for their original studies of Ottoman local administration. In this collection, E.K. Shaw's article[10] is one of the most interesting; by comparing Tanzimat provincial reforms with European models, she helps us to understand to what extent the Ottoman reforms were borrowed from these models. At the end of the article Shaw also compares the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu with the relevant clause in the Declaration of

the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. Another noteworthy article in this collection is Kütükoğlu's study[11] of the economic activities of foreigners within Ottoman territory, with emphasis on competition in trade and its effect on the Ottoman economy, and the rights given to foreigners in 1867 to hold property in the Ottoman Empire. Kütükoğlu concluded that competition with foreign traders gave an impetus to the Ottoman economy, but rightly points out that Europeans reaped the advantages of greater capital resources and more advanced technology, and Ottoman trade eventually became weaker. Davison's article[12] is a bibliographical survey of western studies concerning the Tanzimat between 1839 and 1878 and includes some 220 titles. It can be seen as the completion of the rather inadequate article by Faik Unat and Selim Gerçek published in *Tanzimat I.*[13] Davison groups the titles under 19 headings, for easy reference: bibliographies; multi-author volumes; general history; history of the Ottoman Empire; history of the Tanzimat years 1836-1874; government administration; law; social history; non-Muslims; Turkish literature; journalism; intellectual history; education; military history; diplomatic history; Balkan provinces; Arab provinces; contemporary accounts by western travellers and residents. The article is an indispensable work of reference for students of the Tanzimat, as each title is accompanied by a brief description of its contents.

Although all the articles in Yıldız's book, *150. Yılında Tanzimat* make valuable contributions there are some, like that by Enver Koray, which can also be found in *Belleten*, with minor variations.[14]

When we talk about historians of the reforms of the Ottoman Empire, the first Turkish names which come to mind are those of Baysun,[15] Berkes,[16] İnalcık,[17] Karal[18] and Kaynar[19]. While Baysun concentrates on Reshid's role in the Tanzimat, his

diplomatic career, and his views on reform, Kaynar publishes public and private documents relevant to Reshid's career and the Tanzimat. This work is discussed in detail later in this chapter.

İnalcık is the most famous living Turkish historian. He has written on various aspects of Ottoman history, including the Tanzimat. Within this field, İnalcık has studied the response to the Tanzimat of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire in Bulgaria and why the people there rose up against the authorities. This work is based on original archival sources and is an excellent study of the effects of the Tanzimat reforms on society and the social life of the Ottoman Empire.

Berkes' work is a survey of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, with a focus on the relationship between religion and state. He appears to have opted for a simplistic explanation of the situation by asserting that religion was the main obstacle to improvement of the condition of the Empire. As a result of his secularist bias, Berkes' work fails to present a balanced account of events. Karal's work suffers from a similar attitude to religion as Berkes'. He discusses the western influences which Reshid brought to the Tanzimat decree.

Engelhardt, who was a French Consul in Belgrade, was the first European to write a history of the Tanzimat. His two-volume book was published in Paris between 1882 and 1884 and is based on documents and his own notes, although he does not always specify his sources. It is the account of a European diplomat rather than that of an independent historian. According to Engelhardt, the reforms introduced by Mahmud were not systematic, while the Tanzimat was based on important principles which would bring the Ottoman Empire out of the Middle Ages. The only obstacle, as Engelhardt saw it, was the opposition of the people.

The foremost western historians are Bailey,[20] Davison,[21] Findley,[22] Lewis[23] and Shaw.[24] Although Bailey's work ostensibly covered the long period 1826 to 1853, the emphasis was on the earlier part of this period, before 1842. The principal focus of Bailey's work is the impact of the reforms on the British economy. While his study has a limited perspective, it provides a detailed account of one aspect of the question. However, Bailey was not familiar with either Turkish primary or secondary sources.

The best work was done by Davison, who presented a balanced discussion of the subject of Tanzimat reforms; however, in his monograph he covered the period from 1856, which is later than the period covered by this thesis. Davison narrates and assesses the main reform developments and puts them in their historical context by considering the Ottoman Empire as a vast territory inhabited by peoples of differing cultures and religions. Worthy of particular mention among Davison's articles is 'Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century'.[25] Findley focused on the organisation of government, a topic which also lies outside the scope of the present work.

Both Lewis and Shaw discussed the Tanzimat in their general histories. Lewis' work is a very well written general account of Ottoman reforms. It gives an excellent account of political and cultural development in the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth century to the founding of the Republic of Turkey, with particular emphasis on the emergence of the new republic from the old Empire. Lewis examines the source and nature of Turkish civilisation and, while discussing the principal reforms, attempts to trace and define the main phases of change. A book which covers such a long period cannot be expected to go into a great deal of detail, but it is excellent for the general reader and as an introduction for students coming to the subject for the first time.

Shaw is among the most knowledgeable non-Turkish historians on the Ottoman archives. His best known achievement has been to bring together Western and Turkish sources, especially in his book written with E. Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Although this work is a general history, it covers the Tanzimat in great detail. Shaw has made a particular contribution to our knowledge of local administration and councils. Because he uses both Western and non-Western sources he comes to some reliable conclusions.

However, the above-cited works are not the only available material on the Tanzimat reforms. Work continues on the Tanzimat, especially in Turkey, with young historians focusing on the organisation of the Empire and how the Tanzimat contributed to the development of new institutions. These modern historians, such as Seyitdanlıoğlu,[26] Akyıldız,[27] Şener,[28] Gürün[29] and Eryılmaz[30] have selected single issues and discuss their every detail. Seyitdanlıoğlu's work is the most recent; it is a very detailed account, based on archival sources, of the preparation and establishment of one institution, the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye (the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances) between 1838 and 1840. My colleague, Akyıldız's work concentrates on the organisation of the Ottoman central government, more specifically how the ministerial system was reformed between 1836 and 1856. It may be seen as an updating of Findley's work. In fact, these works taken together bring our knowledge of Ottoman administrative organisations and institutions up to date. On the other hand, the works of Şener and Gürün deal with the financial system of the Ottoman Empire. While Şener concentrates on the tax system, Gürün explains the budget and Treasury in the Tanzimat period. Eryılmaz focuses on the reform of the administrative control of the non-Muslim population under the authority of the Porte by means of the millet

system. While his work provides a useful study, it is not based on original archival sources. Koray's recent work[31] sets the Tanzimat in the context of the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey.

While Turkish historians have concentrated their attention on the Tanzimat reforms and have shown little interest in the British contribution to the reform programme, British historians such as Temperley[32] and Lane-Poole[33] have studied the subject from the point of view of British policy, with scant reference to the policies of the Ottoman government. Lane-Poole's contemporary 'history', written at a time when the events themselves were still unfolding, has tended to attribute to Canning more influence and involvement than may have been the case in reality. Temperley follows this assessment of Canning's role.

Despite the many books and articles written on the Tanzimat, in both English and Turkish, to date there is no work specifically dealing with Anglo-Ottoman relations in the context of the reform programme during this period. This thesis approaches the question of the Tanzimat reforms from both sides, seeking to obtain a balanced view of how the reforms affected the relationship between Britain and the Porte, and how the relationship affected the reforms.

It is certain that much work remains to be done, especially on individual Ottoman statesmen who served in the government during the period under study in this thesis. It is wrong to portray Reshid as the only Ottoman reformist, while labelling all his opponents 'reactionaries' or even 'anti-reformist', when the only policy they shared was a common opposition to Reshid's preferred reform style and priorities. I have found surprisingly little work done on these important ministers, and it is regrettable that no Turkish historians have studied their views and aims. Unless we study these

properly, we cannot legitimately call them anti-reformist. Rıza Pasha and Hüsrev Pasha cannot be put in the same category as Şekib Pasha and Rıfat Pasha, for example. In this thesis I have used the general term 'traditionalist', although I recognise the need for a terminology which is both more precise and less judgemental.

The thesis is divided into three parts: Part I provides a background to the rest of the thesis and a discussion of the motives of the British and Ottoman governments in introducing reforms; Part II considers the reforms and the priorities of British and Ottoman policies; Part III presents two case studies of reforms concerning non-Muslim Ottoman subjects.

To put the main topics under discussion into context, the thesis begins with a background chapter which traces Anglo-Ottoman relations up to 1839. The first part of this chapter covers the period up to 1808, when Stratford Canning's diplomatic career in the Ottoman Empire began. The second part of the chapter deals with attempts by the two governments to solve the Egyptian Question, up to 1833. The final part of the chapter discusses the effect on Anglo-Ottoman relations of Russia's increasing influence over the Porte gained by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi.

The next chapter raises the question of the motives of the British and Ottoman governments in wishing to introduce reforms into the Ottoman Empire. An examination of Britain's determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the ailing Empire leads on to a consideration of British interests and whether they were fundamentally commercial, political or humanitarian. The Porte's reasons for choosing Britain as her main ally are set against Britain's choice of Reshid as her instrument in carrying out reforms. The realisation of equality between all subjects of the Ottoman Empire was a goal shared by both Britain and Reshid. However, each party defined

'equality' differently, and these differences are explored. Other ministers at the Porte, for example, Şekib Efendi, were influenced by other European Powers and held opposing views on the virtues of an egalitarian state. The matter of Canning's greater or lesser role in the introduction of reforms is examined. The chapter also discusses the relationship between Canning and Reshid, as the main figures in the negotiations for reforms, and how this relationship deteriorated when the expectations of each were thwarted, especially after Britain's refusal to enter into a formal alliance with the Porte.

Each of the three chapters which constitute Part II of the thesis covers a chronological period, and together they form a detailed discussion of the proposed reform measures and an examination of the similarities and differences between British and Ottoman reforming priorities. The first chapter of Part II considers Reshid's first attempts to secure British support for his reform programme, together with an discussion of his reasons for presenting his confidential memorandum to Palmerston. The chapter also discusses the preparation of the Tanzimat Decree and the reform measures which immediately followed it, until Reshid's dismissal in 1841. The second chapter discusses the reforms which were introduced between the years 1841 and 1847, during most of which Reshid was away from Istanbul. The question of whether or not the reform programme progressed during his absence is examined, as well as the effect of his absence on the reforming priorities of the Porte. The third chapter of Part II considers the reform measures which were implemented during the productive period between 1848 and 1852, when both Reshid and Canning were in Istanbul. Also under discussion is the extent to which Britain saw the reforms she desired successfully implemented. The chapter concludes with the dismissal of Reshid and Canning's return to England.

The political implications of the reforms concerning non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire are examined in Part III. Britain sought to prolong the life of the Ottoman Empire, motivated by a desire to ensure for itself a larger share of that Empire when partition came. The kernel of this policy was to help the Ottoman government to introduce those reforms which would increase British influence at the Porte. An important reform in this respect was the result of the Apostasy Question, after which Britain was seen by the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire as their supporter. In Chapter 7, this reform, which granted equality in conversion from Islam to Christianity and vice versa is put in the context of the traditional Islamic law of apostasy. The central case of the execution of an Armenian for apostasy from Islam, which prompted Britain to negotiate for this reform, is studied from different contemporary accounts. The chapter also discusses how Canning turned an ostensibly religious question into a political one so that, in victory, his position was sufficiently strong to enable him to achieve further reforms which he wanted to see implemented. An examination of Britain's involvement in the affair is counterbalanced by the Ottoman response to the demands of the European Powers led by Britain. The backing of the other Great Powers was important for Britain, as it demonstrated her strength to the Porte, and enabled her to introduce further reforms.

Another important reform is discussed in Chapter Eight. This was the recognition of the Protestant community as a separate millet, a status enjoyed by the Armenians, Orthodox, Catholics and Jews within the Empire. Britain saw this reform as a means of containing the influence of both Russia and France, who enjoyed rights of protection over the Orthodox and Catholic Churches respectively; thereby creating a balance of influence over the non-Muslim populations and giving Britain the same

rights of influence in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire which were already enjoyed by Russia and France. The beginnings of this reform are traced to the missionary activities in Jerusalem which began in the 1820s. These activities led to the first mass conversions to Protestantism in 1844. Britain's struggle to obtain permission to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem is followed through the diplomatic activities of the British consuls in Syria. The ground was now prepared for the recognition of the Protestant community as a separate millet, which Canning achieved in 1850.

THE PRIMARY SOURCES

i) The Başbakanlık Arşivi

The Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul is one of the largest and most important archives in the world for the study of the economic, cultural and political history of Ottoman Turkey and today's independent states of the Near and Middle East, the Balkans and North Africa. Unfortunately, not all of the documents in this archive concerning the above subjects are available, because they have not all been classified. Although this work has gathered pace since 1984, it seems that it will still take some time to complete.

The Hariciye Arşivi (the Porte's Foreign Office Archive) is the section of the Başbakanlık Arşivi which contains all the correspondence to and from the Foreign Office and documents relating to the Porte's foreign relations. Classification of these documents is still being carried out, and the section is not open to readers. This is unfortunate, as the documents contained in it are very important for the study of Ottoman Turkey's international relations.

I attempted to gain access to the Hariciye Arşivi in the summer of 1991, but was told that it was not open to readers yet. My aim was to use the archives of both the

British and Ottoman Foreign Offices in order to get a balanced view of events, but as this was not possible I have managed to fill some gaps by using documents from other sections of the Başbakanlık Arşivi. However, as I have had to concentrate on the British Foreign Office archive, and until the Ottoman Foreign Office archive is available, the conclusions reached in this thesis are based primarily on the British documents.

İrades: The Başbakanlık Arşivi contains a collection of irades. An irade is a decree or command which comes from the Sultan. Until 1832, this kind of document was called an Arz Tezkiresi or a Telhis. Whenever the Sultan's opinion was needed on a subject, the facts were written down by the Grand Vizier and the document was presented to the Sultan who, having read it, wrote his reply on the document. It was then returned to the Grand Vizier. After 1832, the document was addressed not directly to the Sultan, but to his Kâtib-i _ehriyari (Principal Private Secretary), who read the contents out to the Sultan. The Sultan's verbal reply (irade) was then written on the document at an oblique angle to the body of the text. The document was then returned to the Grand Vizier.

There are five divisions of irade in the Başbakanlık Arşivi, of which I have used two: İrades from the years 1255-1309/1839-91, and Mesail-i Mühimme İradeleri (Important Matters).

a) İrades from the years 1255-1309: for this study only documents from the Hariciye section have been used.

b) Mesail-i Mühimme İradeleri: the irades studied are in the following sections:

1. İngiltere Devlet-i Mesailine Dair (concerning England), file nos. 798-

840.

2. Düvel-i Mütehabbe Mesail-i Muhtelifesine Dair (concerning the Great European Powers), file nos. 955-966.

3. Protestan Milletine Dair (concerning Protestants), file nos. 967-968.

4. Mürted Meselesine Dair (concerning Apostasy), file nos. 1825-1832.

These documents pose several problems for the researcher. Firstly, documents are not numbered individually, so that reference can only be made to the file number, and there is no standardisation as to how many documents are contained in a file. Also, few documents are dated, and often the writer and addressee are not stated in the document.

Cevded Hariciye: This collection contains documents concerning the foreign affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The documents were catalogued by a team headed by Muallim Cevded between 1932 and 1937. They are not very informative for the period studied here, and I have used them sparingly.

ii) ***Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Tanzimat*** **by Reşat Kaynar, Ankara, 1954**

Working on the premise that if Reshid were asked about the achievements of his political life he would not speak about them but would simply present the relevant documents and say, 'Here you are: take and read', Kaynar presents the documents and allows them to speak for themselves. The result, then, must be treated as a collection of primary sources. It is important to understand this, as some historians, on reading the title of Kaynar's book, have erroneously assumed that it is a secondary work.

The documents which Kaynar presents come from:

a) the Başbakanlık Arşivi

b) the Topkap_ Saray_ Arşivi

c) Reshid's inheritors

d) Other deceased persons who were involved with Reshid and the Tanzimat.

Kaynar has ordered them chronologically so that they tell their own story, and has added nothing. He himself presents his book as a source book.

iii) Takvim-i Vekayi

I have used the Takvim-i Vekayi, official Newspaper, which was founded by Sultan Mahmud II in 1831, for information on Reshid Pasha and his reforms.

iv) Documents of the British Foreign Office

These are housed in the Public Record Office at Kew, London. Despatches between the Foreign Secretary and his Ambassador and consuls in the Ottoman Empire are to be found under F.O. 78. These have been my main source of information on official British policy towards the Ottoman government. However, in order to fill some gaps, I have also used despatches between the Foreign Secretary and his ambassadors and consuls in the European capitals. These are found under: F.O. 25 (France); F.O. 7 (Austria); F.O. 65 (Russia); and F.O. 64 (Prussia). As well as providing information on British policy, they also shed light on how the other European governments affected British policy, and their own attitudes to certain important issues.

Miscellaneous documents are found under F.O. 198. These include some in Ottoman Turkish received by the British Ambassador from the Sublime Porte (vols. 76-81), which are of little importance and are very poorly bound. F.O. 424 and F.O. 881 contain printed copies of documents relating to the Ottoman Empire, most of which can also be found in F.O. 78. For this reason I have not used F.O. 424 and 881 to a great extent in this thesis.

Canning's Papers: these consist of several bundles of miscellaneous notes found under F.O. 352/1-55. As they exist today they are not particularly valuable, except to sometimes supplement the official Foreign Office documents. However, Temperley states that he 'received definite evidence some years ago that a mass of Stratford's papers was destroyed',[34] but without giving details of this evidence. Temperley also conjectures that the lost documents were probably just drafts of official despatches, the final version of which would be found elsewhere.

Aberdeen's Papers: these are located in the Manuscripts Division of the British Library under Additional Manuscripts 43139. Most of the documents here are duplicates of F.O. 78, but some of the private papers are important and have been used in this thesis.

v) *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning*, by Stanley Lane-Poole, London, 1888

Although a biography of Stratford Canning, the *Life* is compiled of documents, with brief explanatory passages by Lane-Poole filling gaps in the narrative. It should therefore be considered as a collection of primary sources.

It was published in 1888, only eight years after Canning's death, while the Ottoman Empire still existed. As Lane-Poole states that he had to read many thousands of documents, the work must have started soon after 1880. It may be seen as Canning's official biography, as it was authorised by the Foreign Office.

The *Memoirs* are the most important source which Lane-Poole used for the biography, as the information contained in there cannot be found elsewhere. However they have proved to be a problematic source, mainly because their whereabouts are unknown. This has meant that historians have had recourse to Lane-Poole's *Life* as the

only place in which passages from them have been preserved. Temperley[35] states that he could find no record of them, while Bailey says they 'are not to be found.'[36] Cunningham claims that Lane-Poole lost this 'priceless document.'[37] Malcolm-Smith emphasises the importance of the *Life* because Lane-Poole 'had access to private documents which have since disappeared.'[38] The first three of these appear to have made some attempt to locate the *Memoirs*, however unsuccessfully, although Malcolm-Smith accepts their disappearance as a fact.

In an attempt to locate the *Memoirs* for myself, I telephoned the Foreign Office and spoke to the archivist, a Mr. O'Connor. After searching their records he stated that the manuscript was not kept at the Foreign Office, but he assured me that I would find it in the British Library. I then made a search in the British Library, but found no record of the manuscript there. Lane-Poole's use of his sources also sometimes creates problems. For example, a letter to his wife concerning his efforts to obtain the return of Reshid to Istanbul, is included in the chapter on excavations at the Mausoleum of Halicarnasus (Bodrum). Here, the letter is completely misplaced: it has nothing to do with the excavations, yet Lane-Poole does not make any comment on its real significance.[39]

vi) The Times

This newspaper has been used as a source of information on how issues affecting Anglo-Ottoman relations were reported to the British public.

In general, the British documents are more informative than the available Ottoman documents, which tend to be repetitive, with several documents giving much the same information.

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CHAPTER 2

ANGLO-OTTOMAN RELATIONS BEFORE THE TANZİMAT

The purpose of this chapter is to present background information on the state of Anglo-Ottoman relations before the Tanzimat period, that is, before 1839. Although some unpublished archival material has been used, the chapter does not claim to bring to the study any original analysis of the subject. The chapter is divided into three chronological parts. The first deals with the period up to 1808, when Stratford Canning was sent on his first diplomatic mission to the Ottoman Empire. The second part covers the period 1809 to 1833, during which time the solution of the Egyptian Question was the principal joint preoccupation of the two governments. The final part of the chapter deals with the effect on Anglo-Ottoman relations of the privileges granted to Russia by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833, until 1839, when the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu, or Tanzimat Decree, was promulgated, although analysis of the Egyptian Question is taken up to its conclusion.

Up to 1808

The first contact between the two nations occurred during the Seljuk period, when English forces, under King William I's son, Robert, joined the First Crusade and arrived in Anatolia in 1097. Englishmen next came face-to-face with Turks towards the end of the fourteenth century, when England sent an army under the command of John Holland, Earl of Huntingdon, to join the crusade led by the Hungarian king, Sigismund, to expel the Ottoman forces from the Balkans. The European army was annihilated by the Ottomans, led by Yıldırım Bayezid, at the battle of Nicopolis in 1396. In 1553 an English merchant named Anthony Jenkinson obtained permission

from Süleyman the Magnificent[40] for him and his agents to trade in Ottoman territories.

Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries during the reigns of the Ottoman Sultan Murad III (1574-95) and Queen Elizabeth I of England (1558-1603).[41] Elizabeth was seeking a strong ally to help her in her fight against King Philip of Spain, and when she learned that the Ottomans did not have good relations with Spain, she thought to make an alliance with them against her enemy. To achieve this, Elizabeth sent three English merchants, William Harborne,[42] Edward Osborne and Richard Staper, with a letter to Murad requesting permission for English merchants to trade in Ottoman ports. This permission was granted by the Sultan in March 1579.[43]

This official communication was the first step towards relations between England and the Ottoman Empire. In her letter of thanks dated 25 October 1579, Elizabeth requested that this permission be extended to include all English merchants. In return, the Queen gave permission for Ottoman merchants to trade in England and assured the Sultan that they would be assisted in any problems they may have. The Sultan gave a limited Capitulation on 30 June 1580[44] and later, on 22 September 1580, England received more extensive Capitulations from the Ottoman government,[45] granting full rights and privileges to English merchants trading in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. Immediately following this, the Levant Company[46] was formed and received a royal charter. This opened up trade with countries lying beyond the Ottoman Empire, as far as the Persian Gulf and India.[47] Following the granting of these Capitulations, Murad III sent a Turkish merchant to London to buy goods for his palace. As soon as the establishment of these friendly relations was known by France, who already had such rights, she became alarmed and made efforts to have the rights of the Capitulations withdrawn from England.[48]

So far, England had not had a permanent Ambassador in Istanbul. Elizabeth now saw the importance of this for political as well as economic reasons, and sent William Harborne to Istanbul as England's first permanent ambassador there in 1582. Harborne arrived in Istanbul in March 1583, and he presented to the Sultan valuable gifts and a letter from Elizabeth dated 15 December 1582.[49] In this letter Elizabeth pointed out that King Philip of Spain was an idolater and the necessity of declaring war against him. Murad, however, did not see any benefit to the Empire in waging war with Spain, and so declined to join England in this endeavour, giving as his excuse that the Ottoman Empire was already at war with Persia. Nevertheless, he granted further Capitulations to England on 18 May 1583.[50] In these Capitulations the Sultan agreed that if there were any English prisoners of war in the Empire they would be freed and returned to England, and Elizabeth was asked to do the same for any Ottoman prisoners of war.

In 1590 William Harborne was replaced as Ambassador by Edward Barton,[51] who did not spare any effort in trying to change the view of the Ottoman government with regard to an alliance against Spain, even proposing to form a naval force against the Spanish merchant fleets in the Indian Ocean, but he also failed.[52] Elizabeth wrote another letter to the Sultan, repeating that Philip was an idolater and that he was attacking her country and her fleets because she was Protestant. She showed good will towards Muslim prisoners captured by the Spanish, whom she bought and freed, and she begged the Sultan not to believe her enemies, particularly Philip. Murad replied with an encouraging letter, assuring Elizabeth that he wished to continue the good relations that his Empire had with England. He also stated that he intended to prepare a large fleet to set sail the following spring.[53]

Barton worked tirelessly to maintain these friendly relations, which continued and even improved after Murad III's death in 1595, when his son, Mehmed III (1595-1603) succeeded him. One of the most important privileges he managed to obtain was the right of English merchant ships to fly the English flag in Ottoman waters.[54] Until this time, France was the only country to have this right.[55] England continued to use every opportunity to obtain more privileges from the Sultan. In the time of the Köprülüler,[56] Ottoman relations with France became difficult, and England took this opportunity to forge closer links with the Ottoman Empire, obtaining more Capitulations in 1675.

During the short reign of Ahmed II (1691-4), relations between the two countries improved greatly, by the efforts of England's Ambassador, Lord Paget.[57] One of his major roles was as mediator between the Ottoman Empire and Austria and her allies in a war which lasted fifteen years and which ended with the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699.

In 1701 the war of the Spanish succession broke out between England and France, and the Ottoman government supplied the English fleet with all its needs. England again mediated for the Ottoman Empire in its war against Austria which ended with the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718. In the second half of the eighteenth century Britain[58] allied with Russia against France, and helped Russia to increase her influence with the Ottoman government, which turned again towards France.

During the reign of Selim III (1789-1808),[59] the Ottoman government decided to send permanent ambassadors to the European capitals, in order to establish direct contact with Europe.[60] This was particularly necessary after the French Revolution, when the peace of Europe was destroyed. In 1793, Yusuf Agâh Efendi was sent as the

first permanent Ottoman Ambassador to London.[61] He was followed by _smail Ferruh Efendi. The Ottomans feared French expansion under Napoleon, and although Selim had been sympathetic towards France, he now changed his policy and renewed good relations with Britain, and in 1798 the two countries signed an alliance against France.[62] Napoleon's occupation of Egypt alarmed the Sultan, who was concerned with internal reforms and whose Empire was economically weak. In August 1800 he wrote to King George III, applying for a loan;[63] this was granted at 6% interest. Relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire became closer, and in his letters to George III the Sultan changed from addressing him as Kral (king) to the term he already used with the rulers of Russia and France, Padişah (emperor).[64] In 1799 the Sultan had issued a decree which gave British merchants the right to carry out commerce on the Black Sea.[65]

After the French troops had left Egypt, there was speculation that their place would be filled by British forces. Selim wrote to the English king concerning this matter, and George assured him that Britain had no intention of occupying Egypt.[66] Britain and France held a peace conference in London, where both sides agreed on the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but it was Napoleon's secret intention to divide Britain and the Ottoman government. He signed an agreement privately with Seyyid Ali Efendi, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris.[67]

Selim both feared the strong French army and hoped to benefit from it in his own reforms of the Ottoman army. However, some of the Ottoman statesmen, led by the Grand Vizier, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, did not like the French Ambassador, Sebastiani's, interference in all the affairs of the government, and wanted to maintain good relations with Britain. When George III realised the situation, he replaced Lord Elgin[68] with a

more able diplomat, William Drummond,[69] as British Ambassador to Istanbul, in the hope of preventing the Sultan from establishing closer links with France. Drummond spent six months in Istanbul, working hard to achieve this objective. Before he left in January 1803 he wrote a long letter to Pisani,[70] the British Embassy's interpreter, pointing out the importance of good relations between Britain and France, and Napoleon's secret intentions concerning the Ottoman Empire. He said that he would continue to work in Britain to maintain good relations between his country and the Ottoman government, and asked Pisani to inform the Ottoman Foreign Minister of this. Britain did not want to lose the friendship of the Ottoman Empire, nor see it under France's control.

Despite Drummond's wish, diplomatic relations were broken when the two countries found themselves on opposing sides of a conflict between the Sublime Porte and Russia. In 1802 Russia and the Porte had signed a treaty concerning the election and permanence in office of the Hospodars of the two Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Towards the end of 1806, the French Ambassador at the Porte persuaded the Ottoman government to break this treaty and depose those Hospodars favourable to Russian interests, in order to replace them by others more amenable to French influence. Consequently, Russia invaded the Principalities. Britain became her ally, and in 1807 broke off diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte. When Russia abandoned the alliance and signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, Britain found herself at war with both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Both Britain and the Porte were anxious to negotiate a settlement:[71] the Sublime Porte let it be known through the Austrian government that it was willing to bring the war to a conclusion, and George Canning,[72] the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decided

to send Robert Adair as plenipotentiary to the Dardanelles with offers of peace.[73] Three months after his arrival, on 5 January 1809, the Treaty of the Dardanelles was signed. Canning accompanied Adair to Istanbul and when Adair left in 1809 Canning became British Ambassador for the first time.

1809 to 1833

During 1809, Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador and cousin to George, was involved in numerous disputes over French privateers capturing British merchantmen and their cargoes. Despite strong protests from Canning, the Porte was reluctant to act, fearing the French response. Failing to obtain satisfaction from the Ottoman authorities, he took the matter into his own hands by asking the commander of the British fleet in the Archipelago, Captain Hope, to enter the port of Nauplia, in order to demand restitution of the prize ships seized by a French privateer. Hope entered Nauplia on 3 November 1811, and the privateer ran his prizes ashore and burned them. The Reis Efendi (Ottoman Foreign Minister), Galip Pasha, was furious at the violation of an Ottoman port. He threatened to complain direct to the British government, but did not carry out his threat. For three weeks mutual recriminations passed between the Porte and the British Embassy, but Canning finally gained victory in the affair by stipulating settlement in his favour of all the outstanding cases of privateering, as a condition to his agreeing to mediate between the Ottomans and the Russians, who were then at war. The question was closed by a ferman in February 1812 which prohibited prizes being taken into Ottoman ports and the sale of goods from them.[74] Napoleon tried to stiffen the Porte's resistance to the Russian peace terms by opening a French alliance, but Canning showed the Reis Efendi a secret document proposing the partition

of the Ottoman Empire[75] between Russia, Austria and France, and the Porte rejected the proposed alliance with France. In this way Canning gained the Porte's confidence. Meanwhile, Robert Gordon was sent to Bucharest to facilitate communication between the British government and the Russian plenipotentiary, Italinski, and Canning used his new influence with the Reis Efendi to accelerate the peace negotiations. However, the Ottoman ministers were suspicious that Britain was forcing an unfavourable peace upon the Empire in order to form a coalition against France. When he obtained no satisfaction from the Porte, Canning went direct to the Sultan. Finally, the Tsar's fear of Napoleon on the one hand, and the threat of partition of the Ottoman Empire between Austria, France and Russia on the other, brought about the Treaty of Bucharest, which was signed on 28 May 1812.[76] In the same year Bessarabia was lost to Russia, who thereby advanced one step further in her march towards Istanbul.

George Canning regarded the Ottoman Empire as of secondary importance compared with South America, with whom British trade had increased greatly in recent years, and he refused to guarantee the independence of the Ottoman state against aggressors. During George Canning's term in the Foreign Office a tide of Philhellenism swept across Britain, and his policy was one of opportunism: the Ottoman Empire was only one of Britain's many interests abroad, and a minor one at that. George Canning's opinion of Turks was: 'Your Turk is a Mahommedan it seems, and therefore an ally not fit for a Christian ... but an alliance with a Mahommedan may be as good as a peace with an Atheist'.[77] Aberdeen[78] believed that the end of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, but was not sufficiently interested at this time to save it.[79] On the other hand, Palmerston and Stratford Canning realised the importance of the Ottoman Empire's integrity and independence for British interests. One of the most significant

regions of the Ottoman Empire as far as these were concerned was Egypt. Britain's interest there began when Napoleon invaded that province in 1798; Britain then realised its strategic importance and the necessity of preventing French control over it. However, after Charles X of France was overthrown in 1830, the attention of the British Foreign Office was distracted from events in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The most damaging loss to the Ottoman Empire was that of Greece,[80] which left the Morean peninsula south of the Arto-Volo line, Euboea, and the Cyclades independent of the Sultan's rule. It was a time of crisis in Anglo-Ottoman relations, the cause of the trouble being the revolt of Greece against the Ottoman Empire, which began in 1821. Sultan Mahmud II, fearful that the Greeks were winning, had sent for Mehmed Ali, the Governor of Egypt, to crush them. Early in 1825, the Governor sent the Egyptian fleet and later an army of 17,000 men, commanded by his son, İbrahim, who set about exterminating the Greek population of the Morea.[81] The Duke of Wellington for Britain, and Nesselrode and Lieven for Russia, signed a Protocol on 4 April 1826 in St. Petersburg whereby the two countries would work together for the pacification of Greece. The aim of the Protocol was to secure for the Greeks the exclusive right to manage their internal affairs, which was the first step towards Greek independence. The other Powers were asked to accede to the Wellington Protocol; Austria and Prussia refused, but France joined before the end of 1826. By the terms of the Treaty of London, signed in July 1827, the three Powers, Britain, France and Russia, agreed to offer to mediate between the Ottomans and the Greeks.[82] The terms of the Protocol were to be followed, and there would be further discussions on the borders of Greece. A secret article bound the Powers to enter immediately into commercial relations with the Greeks, and to stop any more fighting between the

Greeks and the Ottomans. However, faced with the continuing obstinacy of the Sultan, there seemed no way to effect the implementation of the Treaty of London. During this time, Stratford Canning had daily conferences with the French and Russian Ambassadors in Istanbul. Then, in the early autumn of 1827, the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets were to be found in Navarino bay, and it was agreed that a naval squadron from each of the three countries should cruise around the south coast of Greece, ready to intervene if hostilities were resumed or seemed likely to be resumed. While the three ambassadors were to press their offers of mediation on the Porte, it was clear to Canning that force was to be used as a last resort. On 26 October 1827 the Allied squadrons entered Navarino harbour and sank the whole Turco-Egyptian fleet. Ninety Ottoman ships were destroyed, and 16,000 Ottoman sailors killed.[83] Canning established that the Ottomans had fired the first shot, but it was not easy to explain why the three Allied squadrons were in the harbour at all. The action put an end to further negotiations at the Porte, while the new Reis Efendi, Pertev Pasha, tried to detach Britain from the other two Powers by offering her a close alliance, which Canning refused.

Moldavia and Wallachia, over which Russia had secured a protectorate in 1774, remained a bone of contention for almost a century. By the Treaty of Adrianople it was agreed that these two provinces should remain Ottoman, but subject to Russian supervision. Having lost Bassarabia and Greece outright, and retaining merely nominal control over Serbia, the Principalities and Crete, the Ottoman Empire in Europe in 1839 consisted of Ottoman Turkey, Bulgaria, Thrace, Thessaly, Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, Montenegro, and the islands of Chios, Samos, Lemnos and Lesbos.[84]

The same pattern of disintegration of the Empire was being repeated in Asiatic Ottoman Turkey. Here the first and most important loss was that of Egypt, which became *de facto* autonomous under Mehmed Ali Pasha in 1808, though it was considered a part of the Sultan's domain until Britain established her protectorate there in 1914.

Mahmud II obtained Mehmed Ali's assistance in the Greek war at a very high price: he had to promise him Syria, Crete and part of the Morean peninsula. However, the Sultan did not feel obliged to keep his promise after the Governor of Egypt had withdrawn his troops from Greece without permission, and Mehmed Ali moved to occupy Syria.[85] The Egyptian army left Cairo on 14 October 1831 under the command of the Governor's son, İbrahim Pasha. The Sultan's commissioner had an audience with Mehmed Ali in Alexandria on 28 December 1831, and Mehmed Ali agreed to suspend his operations against Damascus until he had received the Porte's answer to his proposals, which consisted of the offer of money in exchange for the Paşalık of Acre. The Porte rejected this offer, however, and declared that 'they must therefore adopt measures to bring Mehmed Ali to reason.'[86] During the next few months the Egyptian governor sent his troops into Jerusalem, Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli, and on 27 May 1832 İbrahim Pasha took Acre. Now Mehmed Ali's price for his submission was higher: he demanded a ferman constituting him Governor of Egypt, as well as the Paşalıks of Acre and Tripoli. These terms were unacceptable to the Sultan, who dismissed Mehmed Ali and İbrahim Pasha from their positions in March 1832. Ağa Hüseyin, the Governor of Edirne, was appointed to lead the campaign against them. It was at this point that Mahmud II sought help from Europe. Austria did not have sufficient naval power; France had supported Mehmed Ali since the beginning of the conflict; and, Russia

being considered an old enemy of the Porte, the Sultan did not wish to give the Tsar any opportunity to enter the Straits. It was therefore natural to turn to Britain for assistance. Stratford Canning, in Istanbul, hinted to the Porte that Britain might intervene, although he did not commit his government. His authority was contained in a private letter from Palmerston, who suggested that Mahmud II be informed of Britain's general wishes to maintain him as 'an ancient ally and old friend and as an important element in the balance of power of Europe.' However, a general assurance of British good will had also been given to Mehmed Ali.[87]

While refusing any definite commitment such as the employment of the British fleet, Canning wrote a letter to the Sultan via Pisani which encouraged Mahmud II to hope, although he made no official communication to the Porte on the subject.[88] As a result of Canning's encouragement, Mavrojeni, the Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, was sent on a special mission to London to solicit naval assistance from Britain in return for additional privileges to British subjects in matters of commerce. The Sultan asked Canning for advice, and the Ambassador's reply was a memorandum which requested more details on the amount and nature of the support which Mahmud II was seeking. Canning expressed his personal wishes for the Sultan's success over the Governor of Egypt, but explained that he had no specific instructions on the matter. The Reis Efendi, Akif Pasha, and the Serasker (Chief of the Army), Hüsrev Pasha, also had interviews with Canning before he left to return to England, and both stressed the Porte's desire for naval assistance from Britain.[89]

After Canning's departure from Istanbul, the Sultan, recognising the importance of such assistance, also sent Namık Pasha to London in December 1832 as a special envoy to add extra weight to Mavrojeny's appeals.[90] Mandeville, the British

representative in Istanbul until Canning's replacement arrived, was not consulted until after the order had been given, and he warned the Reis Efendi that the Porte's expectations might not be fulfilled. Meanwhile, İbrahim Pasha's forces had taken Damascus on 13 June, Hamah on 10 July and Aleppo on 15 July. When Antioch fell on 1 August, the whole of Syria was under Egyptian control. On 21 August Mehmed Ali communicated his proposals for negotiation to Kaptan (Admiral) Halil Pasha, who forwarded them on to the Porte. When, after a month, Mehmed Ali had received no reply to these proposals, he told the British Consul-General that there was nothing left for him but to march to Istanbul. Four days later (25 September 1832) the Admiral informed Mehmed Ali that the Grand Vizier was writing to him with the Sultan's acceptance of his proposals, and that a plenipotentiary was being sent to the fleet to carry out negotiations. Mehmed Ali declined to send a plenipotentiary, declaring that there was no-one available whom he could trust, but he offered himself to negotiate with the Porte's representative at Alexandria. Meanwhile, İbrahim Pasha was advancing rapidly and on 21 December he defeated the Sultan's army at Konya.

Namık Pasha's instructions were to present a letter from the Sultan to King William IV,[91] and to work to obtain the help of a British naval force. Failing this, he was to negotiate for the supply of some British naval officers for the Porte's own navy, and ascertain how many men Britain would give and at what cost. However, it was understood that if Britain still had an alliance with France she might not give this assistance openly, and if Namık failed in his mission he was to raise other issues with the British government so that this matter would be seen as one of several, and not the only one which interested the Porte. If he were asked whether or not Mehmed Ali would be forgiven for his actions, Namık Pasha was to reply that he would be forgiven

only if he promised not to rebel again, accepted that his authority was limited to his province, and obeyed the Sultan's orders which were issued to the other parts of the Empire. Namık was to refuse to enter into any discussion about the question of the hereditary governorship of Egypt.[92]

Namık Pasha did not remain long in England, for the Porte's request was refused. Despite Stratford Canning's urgent appeals, the Foreign Office, occupied with events in western Europe, did not attach much importance to happenings in the Near East. Some members of the Cabinet, such as Lord Holland, thought Mehmed Ali should be encouraged, as they believed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was 'nearly certain'.[93] However, Grey agreed with Palmerston that they should not act inconsistently with Britain's friendly relations to the Porte, and that France must not be allowed to control Egypt as well as Algiers. He also suggested that Austria be asked to persuade Mahmud II to be reconciled with his Governor. Others advocated negotiating with Mehmed Ali, as it was thought that he was more likely to stand up to Russia than the Sultan. Both the King and Palmerston were in favour of sending naval assistance, and thought it would be less likely to bring about a war if it were sent before Russian involvement in the affair rather than as a reaction to it.

In conveying the British government's decision to Mandeville, the British representative in Istanbul, Palmerston stressed that there was no lack of good will towards the Sultan. Colonel Campbell had been sent to Alexandria to lend Britain's influence towards the conclusion of the negotiations between Halil Pasha and Mehmed Ali, and it was even suggested that Britain might intervene by force. However, in August 1833 Palmerston stated that 'it would have been impossible to have sent to the Mediterranean such a squadron as would have served the purpose of the war ...'[94]

Nevertheless, in 1840, Palmerston regretted what had been done.[95] He regarded the decision of the Cabinet to refuse assistance to the Sultan as the greatest mistake in the history of British foreign policy. He stated that it had led to more danger to the peace of Europe, to the balance of power, and to British interests than any other single decision.

At the British refusal to send maritime assistance, the Sultan appealed for, and obtained, help from his former enemy, the Tsar of Russia, the Russian envoy in Istanbul offering armed resistance on 21 December 1832. In his first interview with the Reis Efendi, Akif Pasha, General Mauravieff stated that he was on his way to Alexandria, to tell Mehmed Ali that he must immediately submit to the Sultan or risk the vengeance of Russia. The same message was communicated to İbrahim Pasha. Fearing a trap because of the prompt Russian response, however, Mahmud II hesitated at first to accept the offer. On the other hand, news reached Istanbul that İbrahim Pasha had arrived at Kütahya, and on 2 February 1833 the Sultan took the risk, applying formally to the Russian envoy. A few weeks later 40,000 Russian troops were encamped on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus, and their presence so close to the capital forced the French and British Foreign Offices to co-operate and offer to mediate in the affair. When General Mauravieff returned from Alexandria on 6 February 1833 he reported that he had received Mehmed Ali's solemn assurance of his submission to the Sultan's will, and that orders had been despatched to İbrahim Pasha to stop his march.

The British and French Ambassadors at Istanbul learned that the Russian fleet was in preparation at Sivastopol (Sebastopol). They urged the Porte to stop the Russians, and on 14 February the Reis Efendi informed them that he had been ordered

to request the suspension of the Russian expedition but that it should be kept in readiness if the need arose. However, the Russian fleet had already entered the Bosphorus and had anchored at Büyük Dere. Its immediate departure from the Bosphorus was requested by the British and French Ambassadors. On 21 February 1833 the new French Ambassador, Baron Roussin, signed an agreement with the Porte, by which he guaranteed that Mehmed Ali would make peace with the Porte on the terms proposed to him by Halil Pasha. These were: the cession of Syria and Egypt, in return for the Porte's agreement not to use any foreign assistance whatsoever. Mehmed Ali was dissatisfied with the suggested settlement, however, and pressure was exerted on the Sultan by a British and French naval demonstration. On 3 May 1833 Mahmud II was forced to relinquish Adana and Syria, and peace was agreed between the two sides. Russia began to withdraw her forces, but two days before the evacuation was complete, on 8 July 1833, Mahmud II had signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi.[96] This treaty consisted of six articles which completely reversed the policies of the western Powers. It declared for perpetual peace and friendship between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and provided for mutual assistance in the event of the independence of either state being threatened. However, a secret article released the Ottomans from furnishing men or arms to Russia provided that they promised to close the Straits at Russia's command. This article was not officially communicated to the British Foreign Office until 16 January 1834, although they were aware of it several months before that.[97]

1834 to 1839

The signing of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi brought about a profound change

in British foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The British Foreign Office now became aware of the strength of Russian influence in Istanbul, and the threat which this posed to the British trade route to India. Palmerston therefore examined measures designed to win the Sultan's favour and to encourage the reform movement already in progress in the Ottoman Empire. Palmerston urged Ponsonby, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, to persuade the Sultan that Britain was a truer friend than Russia since she had no territorial ambitions, and to look to England for aid.[98] As Ponsonby worked to substitute British influence for Russian, he seems to have made a deep impression on Sultan Mahmud II, who conferred a decoration on him in December 1835.[99] Throughout 1835 and the first half of 1836, Ponsonby reported a satisfactory position in the Ottoman Council. For his part, Mahmud's main pre-occupation was the recovery of the lands he had been forced to yield to Mehmed Ali. He approached both Britain and Russia but, whereas they were willing to defend him and acknowledge his authority over the whole of the Ottoman Empire, neither was prepared to give him the assistance he required for an attack.[100] Each was afraid that the other might use her position to establish an ascendancy at the Porte.

Britain considered the time was right to press for the conclusion of a commercial treaty with the Porte, which had been one of her long-term goals. Although there had been talk of an Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty for many years, it was thought to require several years' negotiations. In the spring of 1838 Palmerston sent Bulwer to Istanbul as chief negotiator. Bulwer's objective was to work secretly so that the other Powers would not suspect that its conclusion was imminent. His task was made easier when some ministers opposed to Reshid's policies fell into disgrace, and Reshid became Foreign Minister. Bulwer knew that the Porte was unable to act

against Russia as an enemy while it still had Mehmed Ali to contend with and he used Sultan Mahmud's desire to defeat Mehmed Ali as a lever to obtain his agreement to the Commercial Convention.[101] Mehmed Ali had established many state monopolies and had fixed prices so as to secure huge profits for himself to the detriment of the Egyptian population, and Mahmud II was led to believe that by signing the proposed Commercial Convention Mehmed Ali would be weakened: the abolition of monopolies would 'cut up by the roots the power of Mehmed Ali in Egypt and Syria'.[102] He might even be provoked into some action which would turn British public opinion in favour of the Sultan and make the supply of British military aid more likely.[103] Mehmed Ali must also be forced, if necessary, to accept the terms of the Commercial Convention, and Britain gave to understand that she would interfere militarily in Syria, which she had recognised as still under the Sultan's jurisdiction, although occupied by Mehmed Ali. Palmerston wrote: 'It is for the interest of England that the Sultan should be strong, and it is evident that he would be stronger with Syria and Egypt than without them.'[104] This was a stiffening of the policy of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire which had been defined in 1833. Since then, Palmerston had come to realise the significance of the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire to British prosperity. It was now clear that Britain would incur fundamental economic losses if the Empire were partitioned, and the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire became a definite part of British foreign policy. At the same time, the Porte became fully aware of Britain's influence and her desire to see the Empire remain intact.

The Balkans were another special case. Austria conducted her commerce with Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, with whom she was geographically adjacent, on long-standing conditions, and considered these provinces outside the jurisdiction of the

British negotiators. It was well known by Bulwer that any extension of the terms of the Convention to the Balkans without Austria's assent was out of the question. The British negotiator would have liked to exclude these provinces from the terms of the general Convention.[105]

Ponsonby and Reshid, then Ottoman Foreign Minister, agreed to submit the negotiations to a mixed commission in the summer of 1838.[106] Bulwer and Cartwright, the British Consul-General, acted as British commissioners, and Nuri Pasha, the Ottoman Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Mustafa Kani Efendi, acted for the Porte. The draft Convention was submitted to the Sultan, who approved it, still hoping for British aid against Mehmed Ali. After he had signed the Convention with Reshid, Ponsonby wrote to Palmerston that it was 'as good as we have any right to desire and surpasses everything that was to be hoped for.'[107] He added that the Sultan's agreement was largely due to Reshid's willingness.

The Commercial Convention was signed in August 1838 at Balta Liman, Reshid Pasha's home, and came into effect on 1 March 1839.[108] By the terms of the Convention, new tariffs were set, but Britain was to enjoy tariffs established with other Powers if they were lower; all monopolies, the necessity for permits to trade within the Ottoman Empire, and all interior supplementary taxes were abolished.[109]

As Britain had predicted, Mehmed Ali reacted strongly to the signing of the Commercial Convention. Towards the end of 1838, he announced to the Consuls General at Alexandria that he intended to declare himself independent of the Sultan, despite the fact that his son, İbrahim Pasha, was strongly against it.[110] Mahmud II was greatly alarmed, because such a step would mean he was no longer sovereign of the Holy Cities, a position upon which, to some extent, his claim to rule the Ottoman

Empire rested. The Sultan felt strong enough to defeat his Egyptian Governor, and believed that Britain would support him. On 22 January and 4 February 1839 the question of war with Mehmed Ali was discussed in the Council,[111] and preparations were made for a levy of troops throughout the Empire. İbrahim Pasha was determined not to be the aggressor, but declared that if he were attacked he would march on Istanbul.[112] Moreover, Ponsonby was instructed to inform the Sultan that Britain would definitely assist him against an attack from Mehmed Ali, but it would be a different matter if the Sultan were to start the war.[113] The British Ambassador was also instructed to co-operate fully with his colleagues in order that the Sultan would not start hostilities against Mehmed Ali.[114] On 1 May 1839 war broke out between them when the Sultan's forces crossed the Euphrates at Bir.

Meanwhile, in London, Palmerston and Reshid, now serving as Ottoman Ambassador to London for the second time, discussed the principle of a treaty between the Porte and Mehmed Ali, but the terms were not acceptable to Nuri Pasha, the acting Ottoman Foreign Minister.[115] Although the British government had accepted that the hereditary governorship of Egypt should be given to Mehmed Ali, the Porte still resisted this solution.[116] Indeed, Nuri Pasha was against the Porte making any treaty, since only one whose object was the destruction of Mehmed Ali would be in the interest of the Porte.[117] Meanwhile, Soult, head of the French government, suggested an informal conference at Vienna;[118] Palmerston considered the Great Powers justified in interfering, 'even though it was a contest between a sovereign and his subject, because that contest threatened their interest and the peace of Europe, which required the maintenance of the Turkish Empire ...'[119] Britain and France co-operated to prevent Russian intervention in Istanbul. Russia was isolated, and feared taking definite action

in the face of Anglo-French opposition. While Ponsonby did not discourage Mahmud II, Roussin, the French Ambassador, tried to restrain the Sultan. If they had co-operated, the Sultan's defeat at the hands of Mehmed Ali at Nizip, on 24 June 1839, and the surrender of the Ottoman fleet at Alexandria, might not have taken place.

The British government proposed to the French government that their admirals should go to Alexandria and prevent the Egyptian fleet from going in or out of the port.[120] They should then notify Mehmed Ali that their governments were determined to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and that they had orders to demand the immediate restitution of the Ottoman fleet. If he refused, they were to use coercion, and if necessary take possession of the fleet, but 'forcible measures' were to be used only as last resort. Although the Grand Vizier, Rauf Pasha, had assured Ponsonby that the Porte would not make any concession to Mehmed Ali without consulting the Great Powers, and that it would not have recourse to Russia alone, Pisani, the British Embassy's interpreter, reported that the Ottoman government was willing to give the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehmed Ali, and the government of Syria to İbrahim Pasha during Mehmed Ali's lifetime, after which İbrahim Pasha would succeed to Egypt.[121] The British proposal concerning the admirals was still under discussion when news arrived that the representatives of the five governments at Istanbul had, on 27 July 1839, presented a note to the Porte stating that all five Powers were agreed on the matter, and that the Porte should not make any definitive decision without first obtaining their agreement. The new Grand Vizier, Hüsrev Pasha, agreed to this, and said that he would inform Mehmed Ali of the situation.[122] When Mehmed Ali was informed of the intention to send the British and French fleets to Alexandria, the Egyptian Governor replied that immediately they

appeared he would order İbrahim Pasha to advance his army.[123]

Meanwhile, Palmerston stated that only the restoration of Syria would guarantee peace in the Near East, something with which France, strongly on the side of Mehmed Ali, could not agree. By January 1840, Hüsrev Pasha informed Ponsonby that the Porte was beginning to grow impatient for a settlement of the matter, but that it believed the Great Powers would not abandon the interests of the Sultan.[124] Nuri Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador to London, was given full powers to negotiate towards a treaty in London.[125] Progress was slow, and on 18 May 1840, Nuri Pasha appealed for a quick decision. However, he was replaced by Şekib Pasha, who also informed the Powers that the situation in the Ottoman Empire was so critical that a speedy solution was an urgent necessity. The stumbling block was France, and finally the other four Powers went ahead without her, and signed the London Convention of 15 July 1840, which promised Mehmed Ali hereditary control of Egypt, and Acre for life, although Syria was to remain part of the Ottoman Empire.[126] The secret article of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was cancelled by the Straits Convention, which was signed on 13 July 1841. By the terms of this Convention, Russia lost her privileged position, and the Straits were to be closed to all the Powers except when the Sultan was at war. The young Sultan, Abdulmecid, who had acceded to the throne on the death of Mahmud II on 2 July 1839,[127] did not achieve his father's ambition of deposing the Governor of Egypt, but the danger of a Russian protectorate was avoided. The way was now clear for Britain and the Porte to forge closer ties, and for their respective representatives, Stratford Canning and Mustafa Reshid Pasha, to carry out the reforms of the Ottoman Empire.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

40. Kütükoğlu, M., Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri I, 1580-1838, Ankara, (hereafter, İktisadi) 1974, p. 19.
41. General works on Anglo-Ottoman relations are: Kurat, A.N., Türk-İngiliz Münasebetlerinin Başlangıcı ve Geli_mesi, Ankara, 1953 (hereafter, Başlangıcı); Kurat, A.N., Türk-İngiliz Münasebetlerine K_sa Bir Bak__ 1553-1952, Ankara, 1952; Alt_nay, A.R., Türkler ve Kraliçe Elizabet, Istanbul, 1932; Dereli, H., Kraliçe Elizabeth Devrinde Türkler ve İngilizler, Istanbul, 1951; Burçak, S.R., Türk-Rus-İngiliz Münasebetleri 1791-1941, Istanbul, 1946; Uzunçarşılı, _.H., 'On Dokuzuncu As_r Ba_lar_na Kadar Türk-İngiliz Münasebetlerine Dair Vesikalar', Belleten, vol. XIII, 1949, pp. 573-648 (hereafter 'Vesikalar'); Horniker, A.L., 'William Harborne and the Beginning of Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic and Commercial Relations', Journal of Modern History, vol. XIV, 1942, pp. 289-316 (hereafter 'Relations'); Hale, W., 'Anglo-Turkish Relations: A Historical Conspectus', Dis Politika, vol. I, (3), 1971, pp. 140-50; Bailey, F.E., British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853, Cambridge, 1942 (hereafter British Policy); Kütükoğlu, İktisadi.
42. For information on William Harborne, see Cooper, T., 'Harborne, William', Dictionary of National Biography (hereafter D.N.B.), vol. VIII, pp. 1200-1; and Horniker, 'Relations', pp. 289-316.
43. Kütükoğlu, İktisadi., pp. 11-12, and for the Sultan's original letter granting this permission, see Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', doc. I, p. 615.
44. Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', p. 574. However, Kütükoğlu, İktisadi., p. 13, dates the first Capitulation to Evâil-i Rebiülahir 988 (May 1580).
45. These Capitulations were not considered binding by the Sultans, as they were issued in the form of a ferman, and not a signed treaty. It was not until the eighteenth century that Capitulations were in the form of a signed treaty. Pakal_n, M.Z., Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlü_ü, 3 vols, vol. 2, Istanbul, 1983, pp. 177-81. For Murad III's letter to Elizabeth, see Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', doc. IV, pp. 617-19; for a Turkish version of the first Capitulation, see Kurat, Başlangıcı, pp. 182-186, and for the English version, see Dereli, op. cit., pp. 125-131.
46. By 1579, English merchants were recognised in Istanbul; two years later the Levant Company was established. It was re-incorporated and given a new charter by James I in 1605. It existed until 1826, and was dependent upon the British government for protection. Bailey, British Policy, pp. 80-1. For more information on the Levant Company, see Epstein, M., The Early History of the Levant Company, London, 1908; and Wood, A.C., A History of the Levant Company, London, 1964.
47. Black, J.B., The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603, Oxford, 1959, pp. 241-2.
48. Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', p. 575.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 576.
51. Lees, S., 'Barton, Edward', D.N.B., vol. I, pp. 1262-3. Barton was secretary to Harborne at Istanbul and succeeded him as Ambassador in 1590; he was popular with the Turks. He died in 1597 and is buried in Heybeliada in Istanbul.
52. Vella, P.A., An Elizabethan-Ottoman Conspiracy, Malta, 1972, suggests that England was asking for an Ottoman fleet to attack the territories of Philip II, to draw off the Spanish king's attention from the north. p. 67.
53. The Sultan does not indicate in his letter against whom this fleet would be launched, although it is understood that it would be against Spain. However, he did not carry out this promise. Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', pp. 573-648.
54. Kütükoğlu, op. cit., pp. 38-45.
55. France received her first Capitulations from Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent in 1535 and, until the Capitulations with England, was the official protector of all Europeans settled in the Ottoman Empire. Temperley, H., England and the Near East: The Crimea (hereafter The Crimea), London, 1936, pp. 463-4, note 425. For a discussion of the flag question see Kütükoğlu, op.cit., pp. 38-45.

56. Members of the Köprülü family served the Ottoman Empire in various posts between 1656 and 1710. The first was Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, who became Grand Vizier in 1656; the last was Numan Pasha, who died in 1710. For more details on the Köprülüler period see Gökbilgin, M.T., 'Köprülüler', _slam Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul, 1967, vol. 6, pp. 892-908.
57. Rigg, J.M., 'Paget, Sir Arthur', D.N.B., vol. XI, pp. 45-6.
58. The use of the term 'Britain' 'dates from 1603, when James I united the crowns of England and Scotland and called himself King of Great Britain, but the constitutional use of "Great Britain" as the title of the UK dates from the Act of Union, 1707, by which the English and Scottish Parliaments were united ...' Everyman's Encyclopaedia, vol. 5, London, 1978, p. 674.
59. For Selim and his reforms, see Shaw, S.J., Between Old and New: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807, USA, 1971. Heyd, U., 'The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II', Scripta Hierosolymitina, vol. IX, 1961, pp. 63-96; Karal, E.Z., Osmanlı Tarihi, Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri 1789-1856, Ankara, 1983; and Karal, E.Z., Selim III'in Hatt-ı_ Hümanyunlari Nizam-i Cedid 1789-1807, Ankara, 1988.
60. Kuran, E., Avrupa'da Osmanlı _kâmet Elçiliklerinin Kurulu_u ilk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri (hereafter Elçiliklerinin Kurulu_u), Ankara, 1968; Unat, F.R., Osmanli Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri, ed. Baykal, B.S., Ankara, 1987.
61. Yalç_nkaya, M.A., The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Embassy in Europe: The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London (1793-1797), University of Birmingham PhD Thesis, 1993.
62. Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', doc. II, pp. 629-31.
63. For Selim's letter to George III, see Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', pp. 594-6.
64. Ibid., p. 596.
65. These rights were confirmed in the Treaty of the Dardanelles on 5 January 1809. In addition, protection of British nationals was assured in all trading centres, and Britain was given the right to have consuls in some of the minor ports. British subjects were to have the same rights and privileges as traders of other nations. Bailey, British Policy, pp. 81-2.
66. For a Ottoman translation of the king's letter to Selim, see Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', doc. XIII, pp. 634-6.
67. Ibid., pp. 599-605.
68. Wroth, W., 'Bruce, Thomas, Seventh Earl of Elgin and Eleventh Earl of Kincardine', D.N.B., vol. III, pp. 130-1.
69. Sanders, L.S., 'Drummond William', D.N.B., vol. VI, pp. 50-1.
70. For a summary of Drummond's letter to Pisani, see Uzunçarşılı, 'Vesikalar', pp. 607-8.
71. İsmail, F., '1807'de Ruslar_n ve İngilizlerin Osmanlılarla Yeniden Münasebet Kurma Teşebbüsleri', Tarih Dergisi, vol. 30, 1976, pp. 23-38.
72. George Canning (1770-1827), Foreign Secretary 1822-7, Prime Minister briefly in 1827 until his death.
73. Malcolm-Smith, E.F., The Life of Stratford Canning, (Lord Stradford de Redcliffe), London, 1933, p. 33.
74. Warr, M., A Biography of Stratford Canning, Oxford, 1989, pp. 27-31.
75. Malcolm-Smith, op.cit., p. 42.
76. Ismail, F., 'The Making of the Treaty of Bucharest, 1811-1812', Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 15, 1979, pp. 163-92.
77. Quoted from Temperley, The Crimea, p. 46.
78. Foreign Minister, 1828-30.
79. Aberdeen to Gordon, 31 November 1828, F.O. 78/179. Quoted in Gordon, A.H., Earl of Aberdeen, London, 1893, pp. 85-6.
80. For details of the Greek struggle for independence, see Crawley, C.W., The Question of Greek Independence, a study of British Policy in the Near East 1821-1833, Cambridge, 1930; Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire and its Successor 1801-1927, London, 1966; and Anderson, M.S., The Eastern Question, New York, 1966.
81. Bailey, British Policy, p. 44.
82. Webster, C., The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841 (hereafter Palmerston), 2 vols,

London, 1951, p. 83.

83. Warr, M., op. cit., Oxford, 1989, p. 66.
84. Ibid., p. 5.
85. Bailey, British Policy, pp. 44-5, and Altunda_, S., 'Kavalali Mehmet Ali Pa_a _syani Esnasinda, Nam_k Pa_a'n_n Yard_m Talep Etmek Üzere 1832 Senesinde Memuriyet-i Mahsusa ile Londra'ya Gönderilmesi', Belleten, vol. VI, 1942, p. 230.
86. Mandeville to Palmerston, 26 January 1832, F.O. 78/202, No. 5.
87. Webster, Palmerston, p. 279.
88. Webster suggests that he did this on Stefanaki Vogorides' advice. Ibid., p. 280. Vogorides was a Phanariot Greek of Bulgarian origin who had been exiled during the Greek Revolution and had then returned to Istanbul. He had direct access to the Sultan and influence over many of the Ottoman ministers, although how he had obtained this position was never clarified. He had been in contact with the Russian Embassy while working as an interpreter to the Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg, and from now on would play an important role in British policy in Istanbul.
89. The Serasker, Hüsrev Pasha, said that the army was strong enough, while the fleet was not to be trusted. Webster, Palmerston, p. 280.
90. Altunda_, op. cit., p. 242.
91. Mahmud to William, 8 May 1832, F.O. 198/76, No. 1.
92. F.O. 198/76, No. 61. Altunda_, op. cit., pp. 244-5.
93. Webster, Palmerston, p. 282.
94. Ibid., p. 283.
95. Ibid.
96. F.O. 198/76, No. 22.
97. The secret article reads: 'In virtue of one of the clauses of Article I of the Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two High Contracting Parties, are bound to afford to each other, mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance, for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid, if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it. The Sublime Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need according to the principals of reciprocity of the Patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessel of war to enter therein, under any pretext whatsoever.' Hertslet, E., The Map of Europe by Treaty, 4 vols., London, 1875-1891, vol. II, no. 168, pp. 925.
98. Bailey, British Policy, p. 60.
99. The decoration was the highest in the Empire.
100. Shaw suggests that 'as early as May 22, 1834, an Ottoman army prepared to enter Syria, and only strong British and Russian pressure preserved the peace', Shaw, S.J., History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols., vol. II, 1977, p. 50.
101. Puryear, V.J., International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, California, 1935, pp. 78-9.
102. Ponsonby to Pisani, 17 April 1838, F.O. 78/330.
103. Webster, Palmerston, p. 553.
104. Palmerston to Bulwer, 22 September 1838, in Bulwer, H.L., The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston with Selections from His Diaries and Correspondence, 3 vols., vol. II, London, p. 286.
105. Puryear, Economics, p. 90, and Kütükoğlu, op. cit., pp. 116-7.
106. Kütükoğlu, op. cit., pp. 102-3, and Puryear, Economics, p. 123.
107. Quoted from Puryear, Economics, p. 124.
108. The Convention was signed by Ponsonby, on behalf of the British Government and by Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Nazır-_ Umur-u Hariciye-i Devlet-i Aliyye, Mehmed Nuri, Müste_ar-_ Hariciye-i Devlet- Aliyye, Mustafa Kâni, Muavin-i Vekâletpenahi, on behalf of the Porte. For the original

text of the Commercial Convention in Ottoman Turkish and an English version, see F.O. 198/2.

109. Bailey says that 'Palmerston urged his Ambassador to point out to the Sultan that the profits from the monopolies could not possibly compare with the enlarged revenues which a greater volume of trade would make for wealth and prosperity of a larger number of Turks instead of the few privileged monopoly holders', Bailey, British Policy, p. 121.
110. Webster, Palmerston, p. 608.
111. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 27 January 1839, F.O. 78/354, No. 18; Ponsonby to Palmerston, 6 February 1839, F.O. 78/354, No. 20. The Council decided to first elicit the intentions of the British Government and then arrange to meet the representatives of the other Powers before coming to a final decision: '... _ngiltere ilçisinin a_z_ anla__ld_kdan sonra yine devletlu Kapudan Pa_a Hazretleri ve sair intihab ve İrade-i Aliyye buyrulacak bendegân dahi mevcud olduklar_ halde bir gün tahsisiyle Düvel-i hamse süferas_yla mülâkat ve mükâleme olunmas_ ve cümlesinin a__zlar_ dahi anla__larak icab_na göre...'. I.H. No. 132.
112. Granville to Palmerston, 11 March 1839, F.O. 27/580, No. 107.
113. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 15 March 1839, F.O. 78/352, No. 38.
114. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 12 April 1839, F.O. 78/352, No. 43.
115. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 22 April 1839, F.O. 78/355, No. 99.
116. '... M_s_r Eyaletinin Mehmed Ali Uhdesine ibkas_ lüzumunda tevarus maddesinin savu_turulmas_ çaresine bak_lmas_na...'. C.H. No. 7569.
117. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 23 April 1839, F.O. 78/355, No. 103.
118. Granville to Palmerston, 17 June 1839, F.O. 27/583, No. 225 and Palmerston to Beauvale, 28 June 1839, F.O. 7/278, No. 55.
119. Palmerston to Beauvale, 28 June 1839, F.O. 7/278, No. 55.
120. Webster, Palmerston, p. 632.
121. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 10 July 1839, F.O. 78/357, No. 181 and Ponsonby to Palmerston, 22 July 1839, F.O. 78/357, No. 188.
122. Granville to Palmerston, 18 August 1839, F.O. 27/585, No. 317; Granville to Palmerston, 19 August 1839, F.O. 27/585, No. 319; Ponsonby to Palmerston 27 July 1839, F.O. 78/357, No. 191; and Ponsonby to Palmerston, 29 July 1839, F.O. 78/357, No. 193.
123. Campbell to Palmerston, 15 August 1839, enclosure in Palmerston to Ponsonby, 10 September 1839, F.O. 78/353, No. 139.
124. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 22 January 1840, F.O. 78/392, No. 22.
125. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 26 February 1840, F.O. 78/399, No. 37.
126. The Grand Vizier, Hüsrev Pasha, informed Mehmed Ali of the Sultan's decision to give him the hereditary governorship of Egypt. Hüsrev Pasha to Mehmed Ali, 21 Zilhicce 1256 (13 February 1841), F.O. 198/78, No. 192.
127. C.H., No. 7136.

CHAPTER 3

BRITISH AND OTTOMAN MOTIVES FOR REFORM IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE TANZIMAT

Britain's motive in her relations with the Ottoman Empire was to prolong the life of the Ottoman Empire. It was generally accepted that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable in the long term, but its continued integrity and independence was important for both the balance of power in Europe and British interests. In order to avoid a general war in Europe, Britain's policy was to support the Ottoman Empire until its final and agreed division between the Great Powers if ever agreement could be reached. For its part, the Porte had two main objectives: to solve the Egyptian Question and to restore the Sultan's authority throughout the Empire. It seemed to both parties that their aims could be achieved by co-operation, although the Porte was always the weaker partner. Britain demanded a high price for her friendship and support, always in the form of reforms which furthered her interests such as equality for the Christian subjects of the Porte with its Muslim subjects 'in regard to everything connected with rights, privileges and duties, civil and political'[128] rather than the well-being of the Ottoman Empire. Palmerston instructed Canning that all reform measures were to be designed with this ultimate aim in view.[129] Negotiations for a formal alliance with Britain (1848-50), requested by the Porte, came to nothing when the Ottoman government found itself unable to implement the reforms demanded by Britain in return.

This chapter will analyse the relations between the British and the Ottoman governments in the context of their motives and the reform programme. Although the underlying aims of each government remained the same throughout the period under

study, the emphasis shifted according to the changing governments and personalities in Britain and the Ottoman Empire. For example, Britain saw Reshid as the only man capable of successfully leading the reform programme; to keep him in positions of influence, Canning formed a good relationship with the Sultan. On the other hand, Canning's predecessor, Ponsonby, thought 'He [Reshid] is a fool'[130] and refused to support him. Back in England, although the prolongation of the existence of the Ottoman Empire remained the general policy, Aberdeen and Palmerston had very different ideas on how this might be achieved within the framework of reform.

By the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was suffering the fate of all centuries-old states. Aberdeen believed that the end of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, and wrote to Gordon on 30 November 1828 that 'independent of all foreign or hostile impulse this clumsy fabric of barbarous power' was about to 'crumble to pieces from its own inherent causes of decay'.[131] Metternich likened empires to the human body: they each have a period of youth, middle age and old age, and the ageing process cannot be halted; as the organs of the human body grow weak with age, so too the institutions of the state.[132] Such was the condition of the Ottoman Empire. A anonymous French reporter quoted in *The Times* was of the opinion that the Empire was suffering from an incurable illness, and would try various remedies in turn; '... but there is no remedy against death. Like an invalid, who changes his doctor because he is ill, and then changes again because he is not better, Turkey will go on selecting her viziers first from the reform party, and next from the old system party.'[133]

The Sultan was at the centre of government, and his character and personality were pivotal to the well-being of the Empire. Canning portrayed Mahmud II as a man whose sexual proclivities led him to advance unsuitable men to the most influential

positions in the palace.[134] He cited as an example that in 1832 the Sultan's S_rkâtip (Private Secretary) was a former waiter in a coffee house. Besides this weakness, Canning believed that Mahmud was unequal to the task of controlling his Empire: '... although the character of the reigning Sultan is in some respects worthy of praise and even of admiration, it may well be doubted whether he possesses knowledge and capacity equal to the crisis.'[135]

Canning came to the conclusion that Abdulmecid was very different in temperament from his father, of a 'kindly disposition with a sound understanding, a clear sense of duty, proper feelings of dignity without pride, and a degree of humanity seldom, if ever, exhibited by the best of his ancestors. The full development of his good qualities was checked by a want of vigour which dated from his birth, and which his early accession to the throne and consequent indulgence in youthful passions served to increase.'[136] Canning's first impression of him was favourable: 'the graciousness of his manner, and the intelligent, though gentle and even melancholy expression of his countenance, warrant a hope, perhaps a sanguine one, that with riper years and a more experienced judgement he may prove a real blessing and source of strength to his country.'[137] Not only this: Canning saw that he might be able to influence the young Sultan: 'The bent of his mind inclined him to reform conducted on mild and liberal principles. Although he had not sufficient energy to originate measures of the kind, he was glad to sanction and promote their operation.'[138] However, Canning acknowledged that 'the sovereign of a Great Empire must delegate his authority to others, and that the execution of his will would always in some degree depend upon their obedience and capacity.'[139] Despite Abdulmecid's inexperience, he had been groomed for the throne and had received the special education of Şehzades (princes). He had also grown up in

the period of reform started by his father. It is true that when it concerned something which the young Sultan believed to be to the benefit of his Empire, Canning's influence often tipped the balance. However, when emphasis was placed on reforms of the army instead of the administration, Canning found the Sultan hard to sway, and it took him four years to persuade Abdulmecid to reinstate Reshid in a position of power. Although Canning acknowledged that to a certain extent the Sultan was dependent upon others for the execution of his wishes, the British Ambassador failed to develop good relations with the ministers, except for Reshid, and this hampered his progress and achievements.

When Abdulmecid acceded to the Ottoman throne in 1839 at the tender age of eighteen years, he inherited two major problems from his father, Mahmud II. These were the Egyptian Question and the re-establishment of the Sultan's authority over the Empire, which had been weakened since the dissolution of the Janissaries (1826) and Greek independence (1830). The resolution of both problems required some reform measures and regulations, a number of which had already been started during Mahmud II's reign. Learning from the West had begun under Selim III and under Mahmud was continued and expanded to other fields such as medicine. As the Ottoman state gradually saw itself becoming weaker and losing territory, especially to Russia, military experts were brought in from the West to train the Ottoman army in up-to-date warfare techniques.

Early on in his reign, Abdulmecid was shocked at the defeat of his army at Nizip by that of Mehmed Ali's son; a few days later the Kaptan Pasha, Firari Ahmed, handed over control of the Ottoman fleet to Mehmed Ali Pasha. Thus the Ottoman Empire was left without either effective army or navy, and was economically weak: it

was defenceless in every way, and at any time might be threatened or controlled by its enemies.

The first step which Abdulmecid took to resolve the Empire's problems was to appoint experienced statesmen to the highest posts of government. Hence, Hüsrev Pasha became Grand Vizier; Halil Pasha, Serasker; Rauf Pasha, President of the Council; and Reshid Pasha was recalled from London to resume his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs. These men belonged to different political groups, but were brought together by the Sultan at this critical time in an attempt to save the Empire. Reshid had more experience of Europe than any other Ottoman statesman and, as he had been a member of the commission established to solve the first stage of the Egyptian Question, he knew the views of the European Powers on the matter. Even more importantly, Reshid had good relations with some of the European statesmen such as Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary. Reshid had been sent to Paris as Orta Elçi in July 1834, while at the same time retaining his post as Amedci (Under-Secretary). With this, his first ambassadorial appointment, Reshid had become directly involved in international diplomacy at the age of thirty-four. Reshid's first embassy lasted eleven months, after which time he left Ruhiddin Efendi in Paris as Chargé d'Affaires, and returned to Istanbul. There, he presented a layiha (memorandum)[140] to Sultan Mahmud II, the text of which is as yet unknown, but is understood to discuss European views of the Empire and its future. We can gain an idea of its contents from a Hatt-ı Hümayun (Imperial Decree) [141] which the Sultan issued soon afterwards. In this document, Mahmud states that he considers the contents of the layiha very important and requiring careful study, so that they could be implemented when the right time came. The Sultan describes the author of the layiha as intelligent, honest and

working for the good of their religion and their state. In view of this, the Sultan ordered him to be promoted so that he could continue this good work. Reshid was given the title Büyükelçi and sent back to Paris as Ottoman Ambassador there.

Although Abdulmecid acceded to the throne at a very young age, he managed to save his Empire from the immediate crisis of the Egyptian Question, which he had inherited from his father by, rather than favouring one party or another, bringing them together under his command in order to solve the Empire's main problem. This was probably the only wise choice. The Sultan wanted to benefit from the specialist knowledge of his experienced statesmen such as Reshid, whose understanding of international diplomacy and good personal relationships with European ministers could be used as a bridge to obtain the European support necessary to save his Empire. With this wise policy, Abdulmecid succeeded in withdrawing Russia's privileges on controlling the Straits without precipitating war by balancing Russia's power with that of the other European Powers.

The Porte believed that the only way to solve the Egyptian Question was to obtain an alliance with, or at least support from, a foreign power against Mehmed Ali. Of the possible allies, Austria was considered not strong enough, Russia not to be trusted, and France already supported Mehmed Ali. The only powerful country which could therefore possibly help the Empire was Britain. She had already declared that she was interested in the integrity and independence of the Empire and, because of her distant geographical position, she had no territorial ambitions.

The Sultan saw Reshid as the ideal person to approach Britain with the proposal for an alliance because of his good relations with Palmerston. Abdulmecid wrote an imperial letter to Queen Victoria[142] in which he declared that he wished to continue and

improve the friendly relations between the two countries which had been begun in his father's reign; Reshid was charged with presenting this letter to the Queen. At the end of the letter, Abdulmecid made a point of saying that as soon as Reshid had presented the letter, he would return to Istanbul to resume his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs. This was perhaps a move by the Sultan to gain extra support from Britain by promoting the man who had good ties with the British government.

For her part, Britain believed that Ottoman integrity and independence was important for the balance of power in Europe. The British government also had in mind the trade route to India, and the possible new markets for British goods in the Ottoman Empire. The eventual collapse of this decaying empire was inevitable: in 1833 and 1840 Russia presented her proposals for its partition[143] which the British government rejected, as she would have received only a small share of the spoils.[144] British policy was to delay the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire rather than assist in its regeneration, and to determine what should be done with the pieces when it finally collapsed. When Canning spoke of the British government's desire to see the tranquillity, integrity and prosperity of the Ottoman Empire to the Grand Vizier (İzzet Pasha), he stated that Britain 'had no idea of interfering with its internal affairs unless it were by observation and friendly counsel ...'[145] Moreover, he tried to convince the Grand Vizier that British interests in no way conflicted with those of the Porte, and that 'no serious cause of difference could arise between the two governments so long as our trade was protected and the existing Treaties duly carried into effect.'[146] The British government would give the Porte its advice when it was thought appropriate, but in general strong representations would be limited to cases where Britain had a right to make demands in accordance with the Treaty of the Dardanelles (1809) and the later

Commercial Convention of 1838 (discussed in Chapter 2). The former provided for freedom for British ships on the seas surrounding the Ottoman Empire; the right to enter any port for provisions and safety; protection for British nationals in all trading centres; the right to maintain consuls in some of the smaller ports; and all other privileges enjoyed by traders of other nationalities. In the Commercial Convention the Porte confirmed these rights; in addition, British subjects or their agents were permitted to purchase any goods anywhere within the Ottoman Empire. The Porte also undertook to abolish state monopolies and permits for transporting goods from one place to another.

Besides interference on the grounds of treaty rights, Britain was prepared to interfere in the internal affairs of the Porte in matters concerning the Christian subjects of the Empire:

> 'Her Majesty's government would, in one particular, even go beyond their Treaty Rights, for they would be prepared to demand in the most authoritative terms that the Religion which they profess shall be respected in Turkey, and that the Christian subjects of the Sultan shall be exempt from any persecution on account of their faith.'[147]

It is very interesting that at this juncture (1844) Aberdeen placed such emphasis on one particular issue, largely ignored by historians hitherto, namely the position of Christian subjects. This is because he realised that when the end of the Ottoman Empire finally arrived, influence over these communities would be of great importance. Since the successful conclusion of the Egyptian Question, and the signing of the Straits Convention in 1841, Russia had lost the advantageous position over the other European Powers which she had gained with the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (1833). To capitalise on Britain's improved position at the Porte, Canning was instructed to concentrate his efforts on improving the condition of the Empire's non-Muslim subjects. Although

Britain came to be seen as a sympathiser in the affairs of the non-Muslim subjects within the Ottoman Empire, she did not hold the formal position of protector which was enjoyed by the French and Russians. To achieve parity with these other European countries, the British government worked for and achieved the recognition of the Protestant subjects of the Porte as a separate community. What, then, was involved was not just religious rivalry or humanitarian desires, but a struggle for power and influence at the Porte. Competition between the Powers for influence over the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire indeed was to become one cause of the Crimean War.

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As well as political considerations, the development of her trading relations were also important to Britain at this time. The usual explanation for Britain's interest in prolonging the life of 'the sick man of Europe' concerns her desire to see the route to India free from Russian control. This certainly remained valid, as well as fears of general turmoil following on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as is shown in Canning's memorandum. He urged the Foreign Secretary to change British policy towards the Ottoman Empire and to help it survive:

> '... I think the time is near at hand, or perhaps already come, when it is necessary that a decided line of policy should be adopted and steadily pursued with respect to this Country. The Turkish Empire is evidently hastening to its dissolution; an approach to the civilization of Christendom affords the only chance of keeping it together for any length of time; that chance is a very precarious one, at best; and should it unfortunately not be realized, the dismemberment, which would ensue, could hardly fail of disturbing the peace of Europe through a long series of years.'[148]

But it was also the steady improvement in trade relations with the Ottoman Empire which gave impetus to this development. Exports to the most important Ottoman ports increased after 1825 and the significance of the Ottoman state to the British economy

came to be realised. The need for new outlets for the increased production from her factories was a driving force of British foreign policy.[149] A strong Ottoman state would ensure such an outlet as well as provide raw materials. Prior to 1825, Britain's interest in the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was limited to concern that a change in the situation in the Near East, particularly a Russian invasion in the interest of the Greeks, might lead to a realignment of powers in Europe and possibly to war. If the Straits were controlled by a powerful nation such as Russia, the route to India would be affected and income from that trade reduced. In addition, there was the threat of a large-scale European war in the case of a sudden collapse of the Empire. For the British, it was Canning who had first become aware of the situation, and he had warned George Canning in 1826 that the suppression of the Janissaries must be followed by other reforms, for which knowledge, money and time were lacking. Knowledge would come from Christendom; money from increased trade and production; and time was dependent upon the patience of the Empire's neighbours. In order to obtain this, the Porte would have to be willing to renounce fanaticism and take instruction from one or more of the Christian Powers.[150] These points were not taken up by the British government at the time, but Canning later discussed the matter in a detailed memorandum to Palmerston dated March 1832.[151] Later the same year, Canning warned Palmerston that British 'Trade and East Indian Possessions'[152] would be under threat if the Ottoman Empire were to collapse. Therefore, Canning argued, Britain had to help the Sultan solve the Egyptian Question and, with eventual benefits to British interests in mind, Canning considered how Britain might best contribute to its resolution. He believed that participation in the question would bring with it influence in the Porte, which might be used to promote reforms.[153] Moreover, it would 'secure

the confidence and gratitude of the Sultan' to such an extent that he would be 'ready to make any reasonable sacrifice' in return. However, as the Porte was bound by treaties with the other European Powers, any commercial privileges awarded to Britain could not be withheld from the others for long. Nevertheless, an alliance with the Sultan would undoubtedly promote British interests within the Ottoman Empire. Another consideration was the reaction of the other European Powers to British support for the Sultan. Canning believed that the agreement of France would be desirable; she had long regarded the Middle East with particular interest, and any counteraction in this affair would increase the already existing difficulties; Austria could be expected to welcome British involvement in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire; while Russia would take the opposite view. At all events, Canning insisted that Mehmed Ali be prevented from establishing an independent state, for such an occurrence would constitute an irretrievable step towards the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.[154] Canning predicted: 'That Empire may fall to pieces at all events; and he must be a bold man who would undertake to answer for its being saved by any effort of human policy. But His Majesty's Government may rest assured that to leave it to itself is to leave it to its Enemies.'[155]

* * *

Canning's initial impressions of the Ottoman Turks were not favourable, and were founded on very slight acquaintance with them. From the *Sea Horse*, off Tenedos, on 19 October 1808, he wrote to Richard Wellesley, the British Foreign Secretary: '... they are, almost to a man, proud, ignorant, sly, jealous, and cruel; each ... cringing to his superiors, quarrelling with his equals, preying upon his dependents [*sic*], and indiscriminately cheating them all. There are doubtless some exceptions, and I

shall do my best to find some of them out when we get to Constantinople.'[156]

After some time in Istanbul, Canning had modified his views, telling George Canning, 'I am myself a daily witness to the personal qualities of the inhabitants, qualities which if properly directed are capable of sustaining them against a world of enemies.'[157] Indeed, he often asserted that 'all turcs are more or less children.'[158] In other words, Canning believed that the Ottoman Turks could be taught and encouraged in the right direction. It was the government which was corrupt, and those who were aware of its defects had neither 'the wisdom nor the courage to reform it.'[159]

> 'When you wish to know what a Turkish official is likely to do, first consider what it would be to his interest to do - next what any other man would do in similar circumstances - thirdly what everyone expects him to do. When you have ascertained these you are so far advanced on your road that you may be perfectly certain that he will not adopt any of these courses.'[160]

This statement by a British ambassador whose identity Temperley has not revealed epitomises British diplomats' prejudiced view of Turkish officials. Although it is an exaggerated claim, it none the less coincides with Canning's opinion, as is demonstrated by his attitude towards, and relations with, members of the Porte. On one occasion, Canning commented, 'It is really vain to think of treating the Turks like other people. The best of them are mere children, and often naughty ones too.'[161] According to Canning, even the most enlightened of Turks still had 'some barbarism to shake off'.[162] He cited an incident of a fire in a barracks in Istanbul. Finding that the fire had started in an office occupied by two clerks, the Serasker 'ordered them to be thrown into the flames ... Several suspected soldiers were also strangled on the spot.'[163]

Not only were the Turks barbaric, according to Canning, but the ministers of the Porte were incompetent and corrupt. In his first report from Istanbul in 1842, Canning wrote:

> 'It would be a great mistake to suppose that the Porte is the best judge of her own interests. Her ministers, independent of their bias from prejudice and private interest have neither the capacity nor the knowledge to grapple with the difficulty of the times. They have not even the sagacity to recognize their friends. History and recent experience are lost upon them.'[164]

Canning found the exception he mentioned to Wellesley earlier in Reshid Pasha, whom he described as 'by birth and education a gentleman, by nature of a kind and liberal disposition'.[165] However, Canning suspected that Reshid was of Greek parentage, for he was brought up in the Morea.[166] Canning and Reshid first met in 1832, during Canning's third mission to Istanbul. At that time, Reshid was a mere amedci at the Porte, and Canning 'saw but little of him at that time.'[167] Their acquaintance was renewed when Reshid came to England as the Ottoman Ambassador to London in September 1836. Lane-Poole quotes a passage from Canning's *Memoirs* which is not supported by the other evidence:

> 'I remember that he opened himself to me on the subject of reforms in Turkey. It was evident that he looked to taking an active part in the new policy inaugurated by the overthrow of the Janissaries, and stimulated by the example of Mohammed Ali in Egypt. He asked me when and how the promoters of the system ought to begin. I replied, "At the beginning." "What do you mean by the beginning?" he said. "Security of life and property, of course," I rejoined. "Would not you add the protection of honour?" he asked. "No doubt," I said. But in truth I wondered what he meant by honour among Turks, until I recollected their practice of applying the bastinado without discrimination to persons of any class or rank whatever. He was right, I thought, and so I told him.'[168]

This passage has been accepted by historians,[169] although there is disagreement about its possible date. Bailey places it in 1832[170] and therefore in Istanbul; Todorova places it in 1833 in London.[171] However, as we have seen, the two men had a very slight acquaintance at that time, and, as an under-secretary, Reshid would not have been in a position to discuss such matters with Canning. We do not have Canning's own

Memoirs to refer to, for, as Cunningham informs us, Lane-Poole lost them after making use of them to write his biography of Canning which was authorised by the Foreign Office.[172] However, in Canning's report to Palmerston in March 1832,[173] giving detailed information about the state of the Ottoman Empire and the officials he met, there is, significantly, no mention of Reshid. If the conversation indeed took place, it must have been in London after September 1836.

* * *

Reshid's knowledge of international diplomacy earned him promotion to the post of Hariciye Nazır[174] (Minister for Foreign Affairs) when Ahmed Hulusi Pasha died in July 1837,[175] and he returned to Istanbul to take up his position. Before he left London, Reshid visited some centres of trade and industry in England and Ireland, in order to observe their production methods and how they might benefit his country. Britain saw Reshid's promotion as a consolidation of its influence. However, Butenev, the Russian Ambassador to Istanbul, doubted that Britain would gain anything from this promotion:

> '[Reshid Pasha] enjoys a certain reputation of being capable and refined but, deprived of any determination of the character and of any system except that of managing not to fall into disfavour, he in all probability would be merely a blind tool of Pertev, the soul of the Council and the true and extraordinary leader of the Ottoman Cabinet, after the removal of Akif ...'[176]

On his return to Istanbul, Reshid presented his second layiha[177] to Mahmud II

the case. The British Foreign Secretary assured Reshid that in the event of a Russian attack, the British fleet would be ready to protect the Porte. However, the Ottoman government should not neglect the defence of the Empire, and should take measures to improve the fortification of the Straits. Britain had already sent some experts familiar with the Straits, and some maps. It was the Porte's responsibility to study these and take appropriate measures. The British government had contemplated sending some ships to the Black Sea, but had decided that this might place the Porte in a difficult position and encourage the Russians to take extra measures there. Palmerston advised Reshid to establish good relations with Austria, to whom sea trade was particularly important, and to consider her views on preserving the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. The British Foreign Secretary also cautioned the Porte against exacerbating the Algerian problem with France. Although Britain did not approve of the French occupation of that country, she could not at that time take any action beyond instructing Granville, the British Ambassador to Paris, to protest against it.

Back in Istanbul, Reshid approached Ponsonby, the British Ambassador to Istanbul in an effort to gain British support. They had a four-hour meeting on 10 May 1838 at which the Egyptian Question and the Commercial Convention, among other issues, were discussed at length.[178] Ponsonby considered Reshid far superior to the other Ottoman ministers[179] not because of the effect he could have on the internal affairs of the Empire, but because, although he feared Russia he showed 'somewhat more belief in the will and ability of England to resist Russia than some of his colleagues.'[180] At that time there were two groups within the Sublime Porte. Pertev Pasha led the reformists, while Akif Pasha, the Interior Minister, was leader of the traditionalist group. Seeing that the Sultan supported the reforms, Akif Pasha

attempted several times during Reshid's first months as Minister for Foreign Affairs to have him removed from the capital, but without success.[181] However, hoping to obtain European support through Reshid and to silence the opposition, Mahmud appointed him Ottoman Ambassador to London, although he still retained his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Reshid was again recalled to Istanbul, but he stayed in London until Sultan Mahmud II died on 1 July 1839. He had an important reason to disobey the order. His opponents in Istanbul had influenced the Sultan against him, saying that he was unsuccessful in finding solutions to the problems of the Sublime Porte and that he was trying to ruin the Ottoman Empire by his pro-British policy. Although the Sultan appreciated Reshid's ideas on reform, he believed Reshid's opponents on this occasion, and decided to recall him to Istanbul and punish him with the death penalty.[182] Reshid learned of this plan and used his health as an excuse to disobey the order of the Sublime Porte, for he knew that the Sultan was very ill and was not expected to live very long.[183] When Abdulmecid became Sultan on the death of Mahmud II, he renewed the order for Reshid to return to Istanbul to resume his post as Foreign Minister.[184] This time, Reshid obeyed the order, believing that he would be pardoned by the new Sultan, and he left London in August, arriving in Istanbul on 4 September 1839.

Before he left London, Reshid sent a memorandum to Palmerston in which he set out his ideas on the reform of the Empire. Although the Egyptian crisis was an immediate cause for concern to the Sublime Porte, Reshid did not believe it to be the central issue. He believed that with the friendly offices of the European Powers, especially Britain, Mehmed Ali Pasha could be returned to his place in the Empire without weakening the structure. Berkes[185] suggests that Reshid presented his memorandum to Palmerston in order to obtain Britain's support on the Egyptian

Question. However, the Egyptian Question is not addressed in the memorandum which contains Reshid's personal views on the state of the Ottoman Empire and the measures necessary to maintain its integrity and independence. It is more likely that his principal motive was to persuade Britain to distance herself from the Russian plans for partition of the Ottoman Empire. Another of Reshid's objectives was to strengthen the Sultan's waning power so that the process of disintegration would not continue further. Reshid therefore sought a remedy which would not weaken in any way the power of the Sultan, because such a reform would meet with the immediate disapproval of the majority of people in the Ottoman Empire. Both Temperley[186] and Berkes[187] speculate that Reshid intended to establish a parliamentary type of government over which the Sultan would have reduced authority. However, there is no evidence that Reshid tried to introduce such a system. On the contrary, he seems to have envisaged the establishment of a fixed governmental system, where each office was clearly defined and each minister knew his duties and his responsibilities. Such a system would lead to good administration and would be the best means of ensuring permanent reform. Reshid also believed that government should be based on well-established principles rather than on the arbitrary will of the Sultan. The difficulty in effecting genuine reforms as long as each minister's tenure depended on the good will of the Sultan, was an experience with which he was thoroughly acquainted. Furthermore, a fixed system based on law would be the best guarantee of life and property, which he held sacred. The execution of opponents and the confiscation of their property was one of the most deplorable of the Sultan's prerogatives, argued Reshid. He also believed that unless these weaknesses were corrected, the Sultan could not expect his people to support the state in a crisis.

On 10 September 1839, Ponsonby visited Reshid to congratulate him on his return to Istanbul. During their lengthy conversation, Reshid expressed his complete confidence in the 'good will and friendship' of England and of Austria.[188] He later repeated these sentiments, adding that he confided 'particularly in Her Majesty's Government'.[189] In a dispatch marked 'Separate and Secret',[190] Ponsonby reported that Reshid had come to him for advice on how the reforms should be effected, and that he 'thought of applying to Austria to take the lead, as that power would not be suspected of aiming at revolution.' Wishing to keep the leading role for Britain, Ponsonby dissuaded Reshid from approaching the Austrian government on the matter. Their conversation was interrupted, and there is no record of its resumption.

Reshid succeeded in having his reforms accepted and, with the declaration of the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu before the highest officials of the state, as well as the ambassadors of Europe and the leaders of the millets, he reached the pinnacle of his diplomatic career. Although, with the hindsight of history, it has become evident that a new era in Turkish history was dawning, Reshid was criticised by his opponents, as it was not clear how to get immediate results from the newly implemented reforms. He was also accused of introducing anti-Islamic reforms from Europe, and thereby trying to ruin the Empire. The author of the French article, published in *The Times* on 30 September 1842, stated that there was nothing 'Turkish' or Islamic about the policy, laws or administrative measures of the reform party. According to this commentator, they were all borrowed from western Europe and had no affinity with the manners, opinions or religion of the Muslim subjects of the Empire, and were therefore rejected by the people.[191]

However, a study of the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu contradicts the assertion

that it contains nothing 'Turkish' or Islamic; on the contrary, all the laws and regulations following from it were designed to conform with Islamic principles. There were two types of law in the Ottoman Empire, Şeriat law and örfi law. Örfi law consisted of those laws promulgated by imperial ferman as an extension of Şeriat law, not in opposition to it, with the aim of benefiting the state and its people. The laws deriving from the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu were such laws. The decree was not a constitution or even a law, but a declaration of principles upon which future laws would be based. The two concepts which were innovative to the Empire were the relinquishing by the Sultan of part of his power to the law, and therefore to the people; and equality before the law for all subjects.

It is true that the principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu met widespread resistance from several classes of Ottoman subjects, but for very different reasons from those cited in *The Times'* article. Hüsrev Pasha, the Grand Vizier, anxious to retain his power and influence, spoke out against Reshid and his reform programme. This divided the government into two camps, reformists and traditionalists. The latter's anti-reform propaganda filtered down through the provincial pashas, who were equally suspicious of any measures which would reduce their power, to the ordinary Muslim people. The principal strategy used was to persuade the Muslim subjects that the reforms threatened their superior status over non-Muslims. Religious leaders, both Muslim and non-Muslim, also showed that they did not welcome the principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu.[192] This led to uprisings and social upheavals during the early years of the Tanzimat period.[193] Reshid failed to anticipate this wave of anti-reform feeling and also to counteract it with explanations of the benefits accruing from his reform programme.

This reluctance to accept the reform principles and the laws which derived from them weakened Reshid's position. At the same time, as Foreign Minister, he had to deal with the Egyptian Question, and in this he did not have the complete support of the British government that he had expected. While he had hoped to have Mehmed Ali removed completely, he now had to accept his application for the Egyptian governorship to become hereditary, but the main stumbling block was the governor's request for a reduction in the annual tax payable to the Porte for this privilege.[194] With Europe, and Austria and Britain in particular, ready to compromise in the face of the threat from Russia, the Sultan was under great pressure to have Reshid removed from office, but did not act immediately. Reshid's position became untenable, however, following an incident in the Council, when he attempted to present a commercial code for approval.

* * *

Bailey argues[195] that Palmerston was not much interested in the general administrative reform programme proposed by Reshid and it is certainly a correct judgement that Palmerston was above all interested in military reforms. He believed that the Ottoman Empire would benefit greatly from the introduction of European officers into the army with the aim of reorganising the troops,[196] and he advocated the establishment of a corps of English or German soldiers which would set an example and 'spread the spirit of improvement throughout the rest of the Turkish army.'[197] However, the records show that Palmerston expressed opinions and interests in other reform areas such as state finance, and that his interest was not exclusively military. He instructed Ponsonby to assure the Sublime Porte that the British government would 'afford them all such support and countenance as a foreign government can properly

give, towards the carrying out of the excellent principles which are set forth in this Hattischerif, and Her Majesty's Government most sincerely wish Reshid Pasha all the success which he so well deserves ...'[198] Palmerston continued to encourage Reshid and the measures he was taking. On 4 February 1840, he instructed Ponsonby to congratulate Reshid 'upon the perseverance he has shown in his systematic endeavours to reorganise his country, and to improve its institutions, and upon the success with which those endeavours have already been attended.'[199] However, from another letter of the same date we learn that Palmerston was anxious that Reshid should not travel too fast down the road to reform. To avoid opposition, Reshid was advised against establishing new institutions 'which would be repugnant to the habits and prejudices of the Turkish nation.'[200] It was preferable to improve and develop the existing institutions, thereby avoiding unnecessary distrust.

Palmerston also supported Reshid in his attempts to remove his opponents from office, and congratulated him on the dismissal of Hafız Pasha, the Minister of Finance, and Tahir Pasha, both of whom violently opposed the Commercial Convention.[201] Palmerston did not only support Reshid against opposition in his own country: when the French Ambassador delivered to Reshid his government's threat if the Porte were to ratify the Peace Treaty regarding the Egyptian Question, he instructed Ponsonby 'to give Reshid Pasha every support in your power in this affair'.[202]

From the British point of view, Ponsonby feared that Russia would re-establish her influence in the Porte, and suggested that Britain 'must be prepared for continual intrigues in the Seraglio. They will be directed by persons well practised in such things and possessing and using means of which we have not the disposal; but I do believe that we may make such intrigues unprofitable if we take decisive measures'.[203] The

nature of these decisive measures is not specified, but Palmerston continued to stress the importance of keeping Reshid Pasha in a position of influence. He instructed Ponsonby[204] that, if Reshid Pasha were to require his assistance, then he should 'strongly point out to the Sultan, and to the Divan, the dishonour which would attach to the Turkish Government, if ... Reshid Pasha [who] has, in a most critical time, rendered eminent and important services to his sovereign and his country, should, without any crime on his part, be exposed to persecution.'

Thus, Palmerston supported Reshid Pasha and sought by all possible means to maintain him in his post so that he could carry out his reforms, for the British government was convinced that he was the person best qualified to put into practice those administrative reforms set out in the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu and any other decrees issued by the Sultan. Britain was not the only European power to support Reshid and his reform programme. When the news came out that Reshid was in danger of losing his post as Foreign Minister, Palmerston instructed Ponsonby to co-operate with the Austrian Internuncio[205] in supporting Reshid against any intrigue which had as its purpose his removal from office. Furthermore, Ponsonby was to tell the Sultan in the strongest possible terms that 'all the efforts of Great Britain to be useful to the Sultan in His Highness's present contest with Mehmed Ali would be marred if Reshid Pasha were to be removed from his post ...'[206] However, it seems that Ponsonby was not inclined to obey his instructions. We do not know how much of the British government's views he conveyed to the Sultan, but it is understood from Palmerston's despatches that he repeatedly emphasised the importance of Reshid's position and told Ponsonby to support him. However, when Ponsonby saw that Reshid was more inclined to liaise with the French, he reported to Palmerston, 'It is not to be denied that

Reshid looks more towards others than towards us... I am therefore not inclined to lose the Sultan by attempts ... to support a man who is not our man.'[207] Reshid disliked Ponsonby's coarse methods[208] and relations between the two men deteriorated to such an extent that when Reshid was overthrown rumours circulated that it was due directly to Ponsonby.[209] Metternich and Beauvale, the British Ambassador to Vienna, limited themselves to accusing Ponsonby of failing to give Reshid the necessary support.[210] Perhaps the Sultan, ignorant of Palmerston's instructions, understood from Ponsonby's attitude that Britain no longer supported Reshid and he saw no reason to keep him in his position. Although Metternich was not in favour of all Reshid's reforms, he took the opportunity of the rumours of Ponsonby's role in Reshid's downfall to send a message to Palmerston saying that the Austrian government would regret the dismissal of Reshid Pasha and stressing the importance of unity among the European Powers in support for the existing order of things in Istanbul, and for the maintenance of Reshid Pasha in office.[211] For this reason he asked Palmerston to send instructions to the British Ambassador in Istanbul to co-operate with Count Sturmer, the Austrian Ambassador there, for the purpose of maintaining Reshid in his post.[212] By working to keep Reshid in power, Metternich thought, perhaps, to strengthen Austro-Ottoman relations.

Although Palmerston had already instructed Ponsonby to support Reshid, he considered the Austrian government's proposal useful, and in April 1841 sent further instructions for him to co-operate with Sturmer. In explaining the details of the British government's views on the matter, he stated that 'as far as Her Majesty's Government can form a judgement of matters connected with the internal affairs of a country so remote as Turkey, and so different from the other states of Europe', the British

government thought that the removal of Reshid Pasha from power at that time would be an event very much to be regretted. Palmerston stressed his fear that 'if Reshid Pasha be removed, it is to be presumed that he would be succeeded by some person connected with the bigotted Mussulman party; who would be adverse to all improvements borrowed from the example of Christian nations, and who might endeavour to revive or to keep alive the Mussulman prejudices among the Turks'.[213]

All this was of no avail, however, and when Reshid was dismissed from office following the fracas in the Council, his situation became very precarious. Nevertheless, the British Ambassador's attacks on Reshid continued, and when Reshid was dismissed on 31 March 1841 Ponsonby declared, 'I am now convinced that he is wholly unworthy to be trusted and I rejoice at his fall and I consider it as a *respite* for this Empire from the full establishment of French influence over its counsels.'[214] Following a despatch from Beauvale in Vienna, warning of the possible dangers to which Reshid Pasha might be exposed because of his dismissal, Palmerston repeated his instructions to Ponsonby to offer Reshid any assistance that 'the representative of a foreign power could properly render him, in order to maintain him in his post in the Councils of the Porte.' In addition, he urged Ponsonby to protect Reshid, 'when out of office, from any injury to his person or his property which his enemies might seek to inflict upon him.'[215] Notwithstanding these instructions, Ponsonby wrote to Palmerston: 'I am furious against Reshid Pasha who seems on all occasions to have selected the greatest scoundrels in the Empire for employment in the offices of trust and honour. He is a fool.'[216]

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New archival evidence of Ottoman attitudes to reform comes from a hitherto

unused memorandum written by Şekib Efendi (later Pasha), appointed Ottoman Ambassador to London in February 1840. Şekib Efendi, who belonged to the party which opposed Reshid's reforms, took the opportunity of Reshid's removal in March 1841 to write this memorandum on the administration of the Ottoman Empire.[217] In this document, Şekib Efendi acknowledged that the system of administration required change, but he cautions against introducing a foreign system without considering how beneficial it would be to the people, and whether or not they would accept it. Instead of acting precipitously, the systems of other countries should be studied carefully and then a decision made as to what would be beneficial to the Ottoman Empire. Şekib had travelled through Europe on the way to taking up his post in London, and had observed the administrations of the various countries through which he had passed. In particular, he found the French system unsuited to the Ottoman situation, and saw dangers in Reshid's adoption of that country's laws. He discussed this in some detail, as the Porte at that time was considering introducing the French system of administration into the Ottoman Empire. A system based on equality among the population worked in a country like France, Şekib maintained, because the people were an homogeneous group, whereas the Ottoman Empire was made up of several racial, linguistic and religious groups which kept themselves apart from each other.[218] Among these groups the superior position was occupied by Millet-i Mütegalibe (Muslims),[219] whose task it was to keep a balance between the other groups in order to maintain stability within the Empire. Şekib Efendi expressed fears that a system based on equality would cause the ruling class to lose control and would lead to disorder. He envisaged a situation in which the millets would fight amongst themselves until one group took control, the Empire were divided between them, or even occupied by a neighbouring country.[220]

Another danger which Şekib envisaged was the possibility that the non-Muslim millets, supported by the various foreign countries with which they had secret connections, according to Şekib, would unite against the ruling class, thereby destroying the state. Şekib Efendi therefore considered it impossible to rule the Ottoman Empire by a system of administration based on equality such as the French system. If it were necessary to choose a European system, then Şekib advocated the adoption of that used in Austria, where the Emperor ruled over an Empire whose population consisted of several ethnic and religious groups as was the case in the Ottoman Empire.[221]

It is not surprising that Şekib Efendi was inclined towards the Austrian system of administration, for the Austrians were active in discussions on the best reforms to be implemented in the Ottoman Empire, and Şekib would undoubtedly have met Metternich, the Austrian Prime Minister, during his journey to England. Temperley states: 'At the time almost all Europeans believed that Turkey could save herself from ruin only by adopting reform. The one exception was Metternich, but Metternich was a fossilised conservative.'[222] However, it is not true that Metternich did not recognise the need for reform in the Ottoman Empire. It was he who, alone among all the European ministers, understood that whatever reforms were introduced, they must be suitable to the Ottoman state, and if foreign systems were borrowed, they must be adapted appropriately. In his instructions to Sturmer, the Austrian Ambassador to Istanbul, shortly after the proclamation of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu,[223] Metternich emphasised the need for a state contemplating reforms to recognise exactly what kind of state it was, on which principles it was based, and to take these into consideration when implementing reforms. According to Metternich, Mahmud's mistake had been to ignore these factors and to change the outward appearance rather than the essence of

the administration. To be successful in strengthening the Empire, the Ottoman ministers should first acknowledge the Islamic principles on which the Ottoman Empire was founded. In this way, those principles could be protected when systems were introduced from outside. This would require a great deal of hard work on the part of the intellectuals of the Empire who, while studying European systems, should nevertheless remain true to their own culture. Metternich believed that if the Ottoman government understood this necessity, the Empire would remain strong. At the same time, the Porte should be tolerant towards the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire.[224] Metternich wished to see a strong, Muslim Ottoman Empire, and for this reason he cautioned against the wholesale adoption of any foreign system, be it British, French or Austrian.[225]

However, Austrian interests lay primarily in the adoption by the Porte of an administration similar to its own. Metternich told Reshid that the liberal systems of England and France were not lasting, and were liable to change at any time.[226] In addition, the implementation of such a system might lead the various national groups within the Austrian Empire to demand the same rights.[227] Russia, which was also an empire made up of different national groups, shared the Austrian view. Perhaps criticising Britain's active role in the reforms, which naturally meant diminished Russian influence over the Porte, Nesselrode 'feared that the internal reforms which may be necessary in the Government of Turkey would not make much progress through the interference of foreigners, and ... perhaps we shall do well to allow the Turks to adopt the measures which they themselves consider to be most expedient ...'.[228] Ever watchful for an opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, Russia saw this in the non-implementation of the principles of the Tanzimat.

* * *

Britain, on the other hand, did not wish to see Russian influence at the Porte increased to the detriment of her own interests. Russian expansion would also be detrimental to French interests and the privileges she enjoyed. The French therefore strove to maintain their influence at the Porte, and Ponsonby's attacks were mostly directed against Reshid's French advisers. He took no further interest in the reforms, and when Aberdeen recalled him to London, the Ambassador condemned the measures taken by Reshid, writing: '[They] have always appeared to me to be very foolish and jejune, and the offsprings of frippery, French philosophy, and ignorant vanity.'[229]

1841 was an eventful year in Anglo-Ottoman relations: the Egyptian Question was settled; the Five Powers concluded the Straits Convention; Reshid was removed from power; Ponsonby was recalled to London, with Canning appointed his successor; and, following a change of government, Aberdeen replaced Palmerston as British Foreign Secretary in the September. On taking up his post, Aberdeen expressed his foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire in the following terms:

> 'The policy of Great Britain in the Levant has long been distinguished by a sincere desire to support the Turkish Power, and to avert the dissolution of the Empire, either from the effects of internal convulsion or of Foreign aggression ... our hope now is, by promoting judicious and well considered reform to import some degree of consistency and stability to a Government which is threatened by so many causes of dissolution.'[230]

Towards the end of 1841 Canning's instructions from Aberdeen[231] were concerned with 'the security and stability of the Ottoman Empire', and with maintaining good Anglo-Ottoman relations. Canning was instructed to contribute to these aims by suggesting or supporting reforms in the internal administration and institutions, but he was to interfere only 'when it is manifestly and imperatively called for by justice and

prudence'. Canning was to co-operate closely with the ambassadors of the other Great Powers. In addition, he was to 'maintain a constant and unreserved correspondence with Her Majesty's ambassador at the court of Vienna ... The opinions of the Austrian cabinet ... together with the views of the representatives of the allied powers at the court will always be of the greatest value and weight.'[232]

The period 1842 to 1858, when Canning was several times the British Ambassador to Istanbul, was a very important one for the Ottoman Empire, for it was at this time that many reforms were carried out or started. Canning's reputation as a 'great diplomat' and the driving force behind the Ottoman reform movement is founded on his own memoirs[233] and their interpretation by such British historians as Stanley Lane-Poole[234] and Elizabeth Malcolm-Smith,[235] and on the work of Harold Temperley.[236] Turkish historians,[237] on the other hand, credited him with a much smaller role. Temperley attributed Canning with more power than he in fact enjoyed as is shown in this assessment in his book *The Crimea*: 'Stratford was not an easy man to beat and he was about to teach a lesson to everybody, to British public, to diplomats, to Turkey, and to Europe.'[238] It must not be forgotten that Canning was no more than a representative of his country and was expected to follow the instructions of the government. His strength came from the fact that the Ottoman ministers with whom he dealt were inexperienced, and Ottoman diplomacy was generally in its infancy. In addition, the Porte knew that it had little choice but to comply with the wishes of the British government, through its ambassador, if it hoped to have Britain's support against Russia, and Canning threatened the Porte with leaving the Empire to Russia's mercy if he did not get what he wanted. His diplomatic experience, gained particularly in the Ottoman Empire, caused him to be the leading figure in relations between Britain and

the Ottoman Empire throughout the period under study, despite changes in the British government. Also, his efforts on behalf of the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte led them to respect him and call him 'the Padishah of the Padishah'.[239]

When Canning arrived in Istanbul in January 1842 he found the traditionalist party in power, and this made it difficult for him to make any progress with his proposed reforms. In his dealings with traditionalists, Canning met with endless obstacles and his reports reflect the lack of progress he was making, and his frustration. In March 1842 he noted that as long as British interests coincided with those of the Ottoman Empire, things went well. On the other hand, as soon as they diverged, 'however sound and friendly our views may be, the case is entirely reversed. Our motives are then misconstrued, our counsels are disregarded, and we meet with continual difficulties in every transaction at the Porte.'[240] In such circumstances, 'in proportion as the Turkish ministers feel the justice of our demands, and apprehend the consequences of their blind policy, they naturally become more irritable and resentful.'[241] It was therefore important for Canning to establish a close relationship with the Sultan. He recalled: 'On reaching Constantinople I soon learnt that several of the Turks in power, and those the most influential, disliked my appointment, some on account of my former transactions with Greece, and some, perhaps from the apprehension of having their interested intrigues detected and shewn up.'[242]

Through the personal affinity which developed between sovereign and ambassador, Canning was able to ensure a continuance of the close ties between the Ottoman Empire and Britain. After an audience with the Sultan at his country palace of Çırağan, Canning was able to report:

'Nothing could be more gracious than the reception which I experienced

> from His Imperial Majesty, who was pleased to express himself in terms of the most friendly character, as well towards Her Majesty the Queen, as towards Her Majesty's empire, and those great interests with respect to which it is so desirable that the relations of the two countries should continue to be closely united.'[243]

Canning reported that England had an advantage over the other Christian states by being viewed as a 'real friend, troublesome at times from the pressure of its counsels, but believed nevertheless, to have the Sultan's best interests at heart.'[244] It was because of this privileged relationship, Canning believed, that the Sultan had promised to continue with the reform programme. At a private audience attended by only Rıza Pasha, the Ba_mabeyinci (Grand Marshal), and an interpreter, Abdulmecid confirmed that 'the great object of his policy was the happiness of his subjects; he intended and had ordered the execution of those humane laws which had been promulgated at Gülhane and consigned to the reformed code; he wished to maintain relations of peace with every European Power and those of confidence and intimacy with Great Britain.'[245]

The themes of prejudice, self-interest, corruption and cruelty reoccur frequently in Canning's reports at times when he could make no progress with the Ottoman government. In March 1842 he wrote to Aberdeen: 'The captain pasha is ... wedded to his Mahometan prejudices, and impatient of foreign interference.'[246] Earlier, Britain had sent some doctors for the regular army, but there had been a delay in their employment. Palmerston wrote in the strongest terms to the Grand Vizier (İzzet Mehmed Pasha), who then suggested to the Sultan that it was a sensitive time in Anglo-Ottoman relations and that they should do as Britain wished. İzzet Mehmed Pasha believed that Palmerston would insist upon the matter until the Porte complied, so they might as well accede to his wishes and avoid unpleasantness.[247] The prejudice did not

only apply to international relations, but within the Porte itself. 'The foreigners, who are not many, in the service of the Porte, maintain their posts with difficulty, and rarely succeed, except by individual favour, in obtaining the adoption of their policies.'[248] This policy was also responsible, according to Canning, for the postponement of the introduction of improvements in agriculture, mining and internal communication.[249] This prejudice extended to Ottoman Turks who had benefited from outside education: 'The ... Turkish ... bigot ... dislikes his fellow mussulman, who speaks a foreign language or possesses any knowledge derived from foreign education.'[250]

This mistrust of all things foreign, which usually meant Christian, was responsible for the government's reluctance to learn from Christian civilisation, which Canning obviously held to be superior to that of Islam. Equality for the Christian subjects of the Empire was at the heart of Canning's reform programme. Aberdeen, on the contrary, stated at the beginning of his term as Foreign Secretary that Britain did not wish to create a pro-British party among the Christians, and that, moreover, she had no grounds on which the British Ambassador could base 'his interference in favour of any particular class of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.'[251] Later, however, Canning justified British interference with reference to the persecution they suffered 'through the intrigues of rival sects, or from the corruption and fanaticism of their Mahometan rulers.'[252] The British Ambassador claimed that the motives for such interference were obvious: 'Besides the obligations of humanity and religious sympathy views of sound policy ... engage us to dissuade the porte from dealing unjustly with her Christian subjects. Circumstanced as those subjects are, they naturally look to foreign support; and harsh or neglectful treatment can only serve to confirm them in that disposition.'[253] During the Apostasy Question, Canning believed the Porte continued 'to be blinded by

religious prejudice, and that, while she is indifferent to the claims of her Christian subjects, she has nothing more at heart than to cherish the bigotry of the Mahometans at the expense of what is due to the rights or to the services of others.'[254] After the dismissal of Reshid Pasha in March 1841, Canning complained that 'examples ... of popular fermentation and fanaticism have ... occurred in some parts of Asia Minor. This spirit, in which these movements originated ... has reproduced a strong anti Christian tone in the feelings of the Mussulman population throughout this empire, and more especially in places where bigotry and ignorance draw their chief nourishment from local circumstances.'[255]

While Canning saw Reshid's downfall as a blow to the reform programme, Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, did not share this anxiety: 'On the contrary, we hope that, adhering to the principles which since long have maintained the strength of the Ottoman Government, and slowing down the reforms which have increased the unrest in the Empire, he [the new Vizier, İzzet Pasha] will be in a state to avoid extremes which could awaken the old fanaticism.'[256] Nesselrode instructed Titov, the Russian Ambassador to Istanbul, to support İzzet Pasha and 'create relations of greatest trust with the Grand Vizier.'[257] Canning, on the other hand, did all in his power to have İzzet Pasha removed from office. During an audience with the Sultan in June 1842 he complained that he had obtained little satisfaction in dealings with the Porte, and indicated that 'a change in the highest department of the ministry would tend more than anything to promote His Majesty's views, and to secure his government the confidence of Foreign powers.'[258]

Despite Canning's view that Reshid's dismissal was a setback to the reform programme, he was not indispensable. Reforms clearly progressed without his

influence, although priorities changed. Other reformers, opponents of Reshid, such as Rıfat Pasha and Şekib Pasha, steered the emphasis away from reforms of the administration and equality for all subjects of the Empire. Canning was anxious that during Reshid's absence his influence over the Porte, and his ability to interfere in the internal affairs of the Empire to the benefit of his own country's interests, would be diminished. This was, in fact, the case, and it allowed the other Powers, especially Russia, to increase their influence over the Ottoman ministers who disliked Canning and his behaviour.

It seems that Abdulmecid wished to keep Reshid in Istanbul immediately after his dismissal, although Reshid's opponents wanted to see him removed from the capital. They were finally successful, for on 16 July 1841 Reshid was sent to Paris on his fourth embassy there.[259] However, after six months his health had deteriorated, and he applied to the Porte for permission to return to Istanbul. At first his request was denied, but after he had produced evidence that his health required him to return, it was granted on 17 December 1842.[260] Reshid arrived in Istanbul in February 1843, but his future was uncertain. In a secret interview with Reshid, Canning found him:

> 'entertaining a very gloomy opinion of the state of the country, condemning the conduct of the ministers, ready, though not anxious for employment, and scarcely knowing what to think of his situation with respect to Rıza Pasha, whose not unfriendly reserve towards Him, and continued credit with the Sultan, appeared to form the only doubt in His mind as to the expediency of adopting some immediate measure for bringing matters to an issue ...'[261]

Rıza Pasha's influence was growing. He was, according to Canning, 'generalissimo of the Army, Mayor of the palace, and Dictator at the Porte. The Grand Vizier [Rauf Pasha] and Rifaat pasha are merely his mouth pieces. The minister of Finance, an able but corrupt and bigoted man, plays into His Hands ...'[262] Canning

went on to lament the fact that despite Rıza Pasha's initial promises regarding the implementation of reform measures, he looked primarily to his own interests, and used his power to keep the Sultan in ignorance.[263] Canning reported that, if assurances about reform made personally by the Sultan and often repeated by Rıza Pasha were not put into effect, he would be obliged to conclude 'either that the Sultan's inclinations have undergone some change, or that Riza pasha is ... too well satisfied with his position ...'[264] Canning's reports alarmed the British government. Aberdeen accepted Canning's analysis of the situation, but, he added, 'the question with which foreign powers have to deal, is, whether they possess any means of acting upon a state so critically circumstanced, which may find a justification in the circumstances of the moment, and which shall not involve the risk of hurrying on a catastrophe they may be anxious to avert.'[265] He saw nothing in the Porte's policy to necessitate the interference of the British government or that of any other foreign power, either in its relations with Greece and its subjects in Albania, or in its internal administration. As far as Rıza Pasha was concerned, Aberdeen asked whether, if he were removed from power, he was certain to be replaced by a more compliant minister.

Bearing in mind the improvements since Mahmud II's accession to the throne, Aberdeen declared: 'Her Majesty's Government would fain believe that there is less reason to despair of the maintenance of Turkey as a substantive power in Europe, than might be inferred from the tenour of your Excellency's observations.'[266] He was anxious not to press too hard, observing that:

> 'Improvement, to be of real and lasting benefit to Turkey, must be entered upon in a manner consistent with the feelings and prejudices, not only of those in authority, but of the people at large. Changes that would pass almost unheeded in a civilized country, would in Turkey convulse the whole frame of society... But by pressing upon Turkey

> systems ill-adapted to the wants and sentiments of Her people, the risk is incurred of creating an aversion even to the very name of improvement, and of engendering suspicions such as those which your excellency states to exist, that the counsels thus obtruded originate in self-interested views on the part of those who recommend them.'[267]

After several months without a government post, Reshid was appointed as Governor of Edirne (Adrianople) in May 1843. Canning wished to see Reshid settled in a governmental post which would make his task easier, and saw his appointment to Edirne as the end of any hope of fundamental reform in the Empire. He wrote to Aberdeen, 'I have exerted myself to obtain his employment here ... the result ... is very different from that which I had hoped.'[268] Reshid was also reluctant to accept the appointment after having heard rumours that his opponents were planning to have him executed in Edirne,[269] just as Pertev Pasha had been by Akif Pasha six years previously. He communicated his fears for his safety to Canning,[270] and asked him to intercede on his behalf with Rıza Pasha, his chief opponent at that time, to give him another post.[271] Canning believed that Reshid saw his situation as so perilous that he might leave the country secretly or refuse to go to Edirne, thereby risking disgrace and exile. This idea seems to be supported by Cunningham,[272] who stated that 'Reshid, in a letter of May 20, 1843, asked Canning for a letter which could be used in an emergency to get him taken on board any British ship; see Lane-Poole, Life, 2:109.'[273] However there is no confirmation of this in other sources. Although Canning did not think that Reshid's life was in danger, he nevertheless wished him to stay in Istanbul, and he interceded with Rıza Pasha on Reshid's behalf. Rıza Pasha complied with the request. A lieutenant governor was appointed to Edirne, thus allowing Reshid to remain in the capital for a while, although he would be expected to take up his post eventually. It was initially intended to appoint Reshid as Ambassador to London, but he was finally sent on his

fifth embassy to Paris, leaving Istanbul on 17 December 1843.[274] The relationship between Canning and Reshid was unusually close; the archives show how important it was to Canning to maintain Reshid's influence in the Ottoman Empire, while Reshid thanked Canning 'in warm terms for the exertions I made in his favour.'[275]

Reshid was in Paris between December 1843 and December 1845. During his absence from Istanbul, Canning never lost hope of bringing him back to the Ottoman capital. The British Ambassador found an opportunity to do this when he defeated the traditionalist ministers over the Apostasy Question, which occupied him for most of these two years. As a consequence of Canning's victory, the Sultan's confidence in his ministers was now shaken, and he began to take a more active interest in government, criticising his ministers for the lack of progress in the reform programme.[276] Canning set to work persuading the Sultan to recall Reshid to Istanbul.[277] In the summer of 1845 his struggle to see Reshid recalled from Paris to a position of influence in Istanbul was near to fruition: Rıza Pasha was dismissed from his post as Ba_mabeyinci (Grand Marshal) on 8 August;[278] two other ministers were dismissed less than a week later.[279] This was good news for Canning. On 17 August 1845 Canning wrote to his wife in Paris, 'the Sultan is coming out handsomely ...'[280] As the return of Reshid is mentioned later in the letter, this sentence may be taken as evidence that Canning was pleased with his efforts to influence Abdulmecid in favour of Reshid. In the same letter he wrote, 'If this finds you at Paris contrive to let Reshid Pasha know in confidence that, though silent, I have never lost sight of his interests, and that I trust the present change will soon make an opening for him. But he must be very quiet for the present, and prepare to be very prudent in future.'[281] The recall of Reshid Pasha as Minister for Foreign Affairs was a major triumph for Canning, who conjectured that 'its eventual

consequences may go far to decide the fate of this Empire.'[282] That it had been one of Canning's prime objectives is confirmed in another letter to his wife, dated 27 October 1845, in which he refers to nine points[283] which he hoped to see accomplished by the following April. 'I have already scratched out the one which seemed but a few days ago the most difficult of all. It stands thus on my memorandum: Recall of Reshid ...[284] I reckon on Reshid being here about Christmas, and before he arrives I must have a thorough understanding with him, the more easily as what you said to him and caused him to say will serve as an excellent preface.'[285]

Having secured Reshid's return to Istanbul, Canning had to ensure that Reshid had full support. He wrote to Aberdeen: '... it strikes me as most important that the credit and influence of Reshid pasha should receive every proper degree of support from the representatives of those Foreign powers, which have declared their respect for the independence of this Empire, and more particularly from Her Majesty's Ambassador ...'[286]

Before leaving Paris, Reshid wrote to Guizot, the French Foreign Minister, Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary,[287] and to Palmerston, the former British Foreign Secretary, informing them of his new appointment and asking for their support. Aberdeen replied by assuring Reshid that the British government would 'always be happy to co-operate with Your Excellency by any proper means in their power.'[288] He also instructed Canning to convey to the Sultan 'the real gratification which Her Majesty's Government have experienced in learning the wise and patriotic choice which His Highness has made of a minister who, by his high qualities, is so peculiarly fitted for presiding over the foreign relations of the Empire at the present moment.'[289] This correspondence reinforces the conclusion that Reshid regarded foreign pressure to be

crucial to his pushing through reforms at the Porte.

Reshid arrived in Istanbul on 11 December 1845, in a steam frigate placed at his disposal by the French government. Four days later, he received Stratford Canning informally at his home, and acknowledged that the British government more than any other had the interests of the Ottoman Empire at heart, and that both the Sultan and he had the fullest confidence in Canning's personal disposition. He added that he proposed to maintain the most friendly and confidential relations with the British Ambassador.[290]

Canning discussed the state of the Ottoman Empire, and the reforms he believed necessary, privately with Reshid, who then conveyed Canning's ideas to the Council and to the Sultan.[291] In addition to private meetings with Reshid, Canning received confidential information from the Ottoman minister.[292] When secrecy demanded, he employed Austen Layard as go-between. Layard writes:

> 'I was constantly passing backwards and forwards between the Embassy and Reshid's house in Stamboul [Istanbul], or his *konak* on the Bosphorus. I frequently passed the night under his roof, and sometimes in the middle of it had to go in a *caique* [kay_k] to Buyukdere, when Sir Stratford with his family was in the country, at the great risk of being arrested and carried off to a Turkish guard-house by the water-police.'[293]

Reshid sometimes acted as interpreter during Canning's private audiences with the Sultan, an unusual step, thus transforming them into three-way discussions.[294] After one such occasion Canning reported that he had spoken favourably of Reshid to the Sultan, and was pleased to see that this met with the Sultan's approval.[295]

Four months later, in April 1846, Canning was able to report that the task of 'promoting the internal improvement of this Empire' was 'far more easy than it was before the late change of administration which restored Reshid Pasha to his former

place in the counsels of his Sovereign.'[296] However, he acknowledged that there were still many difficulties to be faced, and that 'the credit and influence of Reshid Pasha should receive every proper degree of support from the representatives of those foreign powers which have declared their respect for the independence of this Empire, and more particularly from Her Majesty's Ambassador, who had so much reason to deplore the ascendancy of the late ministers.'[297]

On 6 July 1846 the Peel government resigned; John Russell formed a new government, in which Aberdeen was replaced as Foreign Secretary by Palmerston. When Canning returned to London on leave on 17 August 1846 it was thought to be permanently, as at that time British Ambassadors lost their position when their political party fell.[298] Canning continued to work in Reshid's favour even when he was in England. The unpublished Foreign Office records reveal the lengths to which Canning went to support Reshid. In 1846, fearing that Reshid's position might be in danger, he asked Palmerston to send a letter to the Sultan in support of Reshid,[299] along the same lines as Aberdeen's letter the previous year, when Reshid had been appointed Foreign Minister.[300] Palmerston complied immediately, also expressing his apprehension at any change in the constitution of the Ottoman administration which would weaken Reshid's influence.[301] Despite Canning's fears, Reshid's position must have been strong, for he was appointed Grand Vizier before Palmerston's letter arrived in Istanbul. Reshid probably owed his promotion to the Sultan's awareness that he enjoyed a good relationship with Palmerston and his belief that with Reshid occupying the highest position in the government he was more likely to secure British support. Responding to the news of Reshid's appointment, the British Foreign Secretary wrote to Wellesley[302] confirming that, 'Her Majesty's Government would rejoice in any event which was

calculated to increase the influence of Reshid Pasha, as highly beneficial to the Turkish Empire.'[303]

Although Canning did not belong to Palmerston's party, the British Foreign Secretary wished him to continue his ambassadorial work in Istanbul. The two men agreed to bury their differences for the sake of their shared aim to increase British influence. Canning accepted the appointment on one condition: that he received support from the government to continue his efforts to obtain equality between Christian and Muslim Ottoman subjects.[304] This condition was accepted, and in the autumn of 1847 Canning wrote a memorandum[305] to Palmerston asking for instructions on how he was to act when he returned to Istanbul. Canning wanted authorization to encourage and support Reshid 'in the same benevolent line of policy, as the one best calculated to improve the Sultan's resources, to unite the several classes of his subjects in attachment to the throne, and to draw closer the Bonds of alliance between the porte and Her Majesty's government.' Canning warned that when introducing reforms care should be taken not to shock the deeply held convictions of the Muslims in order to avoid endangering the peace of the Empire. It would be necessary to 'provide simultaneously for the interests of the Turk and the Christian. If the latter were to be gratified by the removal of the Haratch, or poll tax, by the admission of Christian evidence against Mahometans in criminal cases and by a more liberal reception into the administrative councils, it would be advisable that the former should enjoy a substantial relief from the onerous and corrupt collection of Revenue and from other oppressive afflictions of tyranny in the provinces.' Canning suggests that if the haraç were to be abolished, it should be replaced by another, less objectionable, tax on the Christian population of the Empire.[306]

In reply to Canning's memorandum, Palmerston informed the Ambassador that he would find the Sultan's authority increased since he was last in Istanbul, but observed that, however wise and benevolent the intentions of the Sultan, he was dependent upon his ministers for the execution of his wishes. It rested with them to plan the detailed arrangement of the reform measures, and to take the necessary steps for carrying those arrangements into effect.[307] Fortunately, continued Palmerston, the Sultan had Reshid and Ali Efendi as his instruments in this matter; but they were exposed to attack from both within and outside the Empire; Canning was instructed to lend them as much support as he could against such intrigues, 'whether springing from domestic or from foreign assailants and whether directed to thwart and impede the execution of the measures of the government, or to undermine the ministers in the favour and confidence of the Sultan.' When giving advice to Reshid, Canning was to lay particular emphasis on the equality of the Christian subjects of the Porte with the Muslim subjects, 'in regard to everything connected with rights, privileges and duties, civil and political.' All reform measures were to be designed with this ultimate aim in view. A first step towards this goal would be the acceptance of Christian evidence in courts of justice. The exclusion of such evidence was, according to Palmerston, 'an evil which the Christian nations of Europe whose subjects frequent Turkey for purposes of commerce or amusement, can no longer consent to endure.' Canning was instructed to press for the removal of 'this intolerable grievance' on the grounds that the matter had ceased to be a domestic one, and had become an international question between the Porte and the European Powers. Another measure which would lead to ultimate equality was the admission of Christians into military service, and Palmerston suggested to Canning that he consult the views of the British government as contained

in his recent instructions to Cowley, who had been in charge of the Istanbul Embassy during Canning's absence in England. A third measure would be the equalisation of all taxes levied within the Ottoman Empire, so that Christians and Muslims of the same class paid the same amount of tax. Having strengthened his authority with these measures, the Sultan would then be in a position to increase the resources of the Empire by lifting the restrictions on his Christian subjects which were obstacles to their enterprise.

Research has now revealed that equality for Christian subjects was a prime objective of the British reforms in the Ottoman Empire, a fact that has been largely ignored by previous historians. In order to achieve this aim Britain chose Reshid as her instrument, doing everything she could to keep him in power, instead of lending her support to the Sublime Porte in general. That Reshid occupied an influential position was more important to Britain than the reforms themselves, for the British government sought to control to its own advantage the reforms which were introduced. This objective was shared by both Canning and Palmerston, who fully supported the British Ambassador in his attempts to urge the Porte to introduce reforms which would lead to the desired British goal.

Palmerston foresaw the possibility that in exchange for the implementation of these reforms the Ottoman ministers might ask Britain to give up rights and privileges that British subjects enjoyed by treaty within the Ottoman Empire. Two arguments might be put forward in support of this: either that such a success for the Porte would prolong its hold on power, thereby enabling it to carry out its reform programme; or that, by rendering the internal reforms more acceptable to the Muslim subjects, it would assist in the development of the Empire's industry. Canning's reply to these requests

was to be that 'Her Majesty's government very much regret that it is not consistent with their public duty to consent to them [i.e. abandonment of British rights].' Palmerston maintained that if such rights and privileges were given up in order to keep the progressive administration in power, Britain's sacrifice would be permanent, while the benefit to the Ottoman Empire would be uncertain. Although the ministry might survive for a period of time, it might be overthrown later by some intrigue or other unexpected event. On the other hand, if such concessions were requested in order to assist the development of industry, the British reply would be that British subjects enjoyed only those privileges considered essential for their security in the pursuit of trade and commerce, and that the Ottoman government should not seek to impose further restrictions on British subjects in order to place them on an equal footing with Ottoman subjects; rather, the Porte should remove the heavy restrictions from Ottoman subjects in order to place them on an equal footing with British subjects within the Empire. Armed with Palmerston's instructions, Canning returned to Istanbul in June 1848, but he found that little progress had been made in the way of reform.

* * *

The final years of Canning's embassy to Istanbul (1848-1858) are characterised by the coalition of the Western Powers against Russia, particularly in the matters of the Danubian Principalities, the Hungarian refugees, and the Crimean War. During Canning's two-year absence (1846-1848), Reshid Pasha and his followers had been replaced by traditionalists; within a few days of his return in July 1848, Canning persuaded the Sultan to reinstate Reshid Pasha to the Council, and two months later (13 August 1848) Reshid was Grand Vizier again. Almost immediately the Danubian Principalities fell victim to the revolutionary wave that was sweeping across Europe.

Following a popular uprising in Bucharest, and the subsequent dispatch of an Ottoman army across the Danube, the Russians, who, under the Treaty of Adrianople, claimed the right to maintain order in the Danubian Principalities, also sent an occupying force to the region. This Russian occupation had the Porte's consent, but the attitudes of the two occupying powers were diametrically opposed. The Porte, under advice from Canning, favoured amendments to the constitution, amnesty to the rebels, whom the British Ambassador encouraged it to think of as reformers, and the removal of the Russian troops. The Tsar, on the other hand, wanted repression of what he considered a revolution, punishment for the rebels, and a prolonged Russo-Ottoman occupation. The Tsar resented Canning's interference in a matter he considered to be one between the Sultan and himself.[308] The British Ambassador, on the other hand, was attempting 'to keep a steady line of march between the Porte and Russia, to keep the peace and to respect the treaties on one side, and on the other to sustain the Porte's courage and to lay a foundation for real improvement in Wallachia.'[309] In a report to Palmerston of 4 November 1848, Canning wrote, 'My advice to the Porte is always the same:- "Do not risk a quarrel with Russia as long as you can avoid it without serious loss or dishonour. Be faithful to your treaties, maintain your moral position quietly and firmly, and even when co-occupying keep your troops separate and if possible at some distance from the Russian."'[310]

Peace was restored to Wallachia in January 1849, but relations between the Porte and Russia deteriorated when the Tsar sent troops against the Hungarian insurgents, in defiance of the Porte; they suffered a severe defeat at the hands of General Bem. 'The time has come,' Canning now urged Palmerston, 'for adopting a definite and decisive course of policy with respect to this country viewed as to its

relations with Russia ...'[311] War seemed imminent, and Canning hoped to enlist the French and British forces, in the form of the Mediterranean fleet, on the side of the Ottomans. However, Palmerston, although he supported Canning's policy, did not consider the time ripe for naval involvement. The Porte stood its ground on the question of Russian occupation, and Reshid even declared that he would resign rather than give way to Russia. In April 1849 the Tsar sent General Grabbe as special envoy to the Porte; finally, most of Russia's demands were met by the Agreement of Balta Liman (1 May 1849), and a Hatt-ı Şerif was issued. Russia promised to withdraw her troops once the insurrection had been suppressed. Canning had vigorously opposed the Agreement, but his influence was not greater than that of the Tsar. He could only see to it that the Porte did not relax its guard, and the Empire continued to prepare its fleet and armies for defence.

Russia began to use the principalities under occupation as a base for military operations against the Hungarians,[312] and soon both England and France found themselves in a serious quarrel with Russia. The dispute arose from the interpretation of Article XVIII of the Treaty of Belgrade, which stated that the Porte was obliged to punish insurgents who took refuge on Ottoman soil, and whether or not the Hungarians fell into this category.[313] Canning advised the Porte to adopt a humane policy by refusing to hand over the Hungarians to the Russians and certain death. When, on 14 August 1849, seventy-six fugitive Hungarians and Poles landed in Istanbul, Canning advised that they be allowed to remain there, whereupon the Austrian Internuncio and the Russian envoy demanded their extradition. A few days later, the Hungarians were forced to surrender, and there followed a general exodus, which included the leaders of the national movement.

With Ottoman European territories in turmoil, and the outcome uncertain, it was imperative for the Porte to be watchful and to seek a formal alliance with another power. With this aim in view, Mehmed Pasha was appointed as Ottoman Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to London.[314] An important Ottoman document presented to the Sultan on 22 Zilkade 1264 (20 October 1848), and one which has not been studied before, is that containing the Porte's instructions to Mehmed Pasha. The document begins by acknowledging that as Mehmed Pasha was a former Grand Vizier he was conversant with international affairs and the Porte's relations with foreign powers, and did not, therefore, require detailed instructions on these matters. The Porte saw Britain as its natural ally, and Mehmed Pasha's main duty in London was therefore to prepare the ground for such an alliance by pointing out to the Queen and high-ranking officials the friendship which Britain showed towards the Ottoman Empire and the Porte's necessity for an alliance. In particular, Mehmed Pasha was to arrange a meeting with Palmerston to explain the situation to him.

It was foreseen that Mehmed Pasha might be asked about the situation in the Danubian provinces and the measures taken by the Porte to resolve the problem there. As he knew the question very well, he did not need instructions on how to reply, but he would be given copies of the relevant documents and could ask advice of the Porte whenever he considered it necessary.[315] The Porte believed it possible that a congress of European states might be held to discuss the future of Europe. If so, Reshid was of the opinion that it would take place in London, as the centre of diplomatic activity, and Mehmed Pasha was to do all in his power to see the Ottoman Empire included in these talks. Two reasons were given for this: to protect the standing of the Ottoman Empire among the European states; and to ensure that no decisions were taken against the

interests of the Porte. Mehmed Pasha was to report frequently and in detail to the Porte, recording what passed between him and the people he met. He was to realise the importance of the opportunity given to him and use it to the benefit of the Ottoman Empire. This document is significant as it clearly shows the importance of Britain in the Porte's foreign policy and that Reshid had confidence in Palmerston's support whenever he required it. It also demonstrates a most important point: that Reshid was anxious to see the Porte occupy a seat at the negotiating table if a congress of European states were held.

Another approach was made to Canning by Reshid who, towards the end of 1849, was fearful of a Russian advance;[316] this time the possible inclusion of France was considered.[317] According to Reshid, Cowley had made some kind of proposal which had led him to understand that Britain was interested in negotiating a formal alliance with the Porte.[318] When Canning learned of this, he informed Reshid that he had no knowledge of any such proposal being authorised by the British government. Reshid's request for an alliance now generated a great deal of diplomatic activity and correspondence, with Canning and Reshid meeting several times over the next few days to discuss the implications of such an alliance. During one such meeting, Canning put forward the main objections as he saw them.[319] The first of these was the doubt that the Ottoman government would be able to carry out the reforms in national defence and administration which Britain would require in exchange. To this Reshid replied that he was willing to raise a loan in Britain to provide for the most urgent needs, including the building of roads and the recall of the old coinage. He suggested that the Egyptian tribute, which amounted to approximately £360,000 per annum, might be given as security for this loan. Reshid assured Canning that if the Sultan were willing, there

would be no objection to the implementation of the reforms which the British Ambassador considered most urgent. Canning replied that if Reshid's proposals were viewed favourably by the British government, British naval officers might be obtained to train the Ottoman navy.

In light of this development in Anglo-Ottoman relations, Canning advised Palmerston:

> '... we are now called upon to choose between a more determined and systematic support of this Empire with its attendant inconveniences, risks and sacrifices, or a tacit acquiescence in the porte's habitual submission to the superior fortunes and calculating energies of a neighbour, whose moral ascendance would prove more injurious in its consequence to Europe, than even its territorial aggrandizement at the expence [*sic*] of Turkey.'[320]

The Sultan acknowledged the necessity of such conditions as Canning had outlined for Britain's participation in a formal alliance.[321] However, he maintained that while some reforms could be introduced immediately, others must be gradual and others were not at all practicable. He authorised Reshid to put the most important questions to a council of ministers, including the Şeyhülislam (Sheikhulislam),[322] which was to inform Canning of what, in their opinion, could or could not be done. Reshid and Canning agreed that the most important reforms were the abolition of the haraç in connection with the liability of non-Muslims for military service; the admission of Christian evidence in criminal cases against Muslims; a more efficient participation of Christians in councils either in Istanbul or in the provinces; a method of tax collection less open to abuse and oppression; the abolition of the slave trade; and the extension of commerce by the removal of all remaining obstacles to the full participation in trade of British subjects within the Ottoman Empire, as proclaimed at Balta Liman in 1838.

While Reshid foresaw serious obstacles to the adoption of such reforms, Canning observed that the proposed alliance might be the means by which to overcome them. The Foreign Office archives show that the matter of connecting reform to the alliance was referred to a small committee comprising Reshid, Ali Pasha, Fethi Ahmed and Mehmed Ali, the last two being the Sultan's brothers-in-law.[323] All these men were in favour of an alliance with Britain. Canning expected to be informed of the result of the deliberations within a week or ten days.[324] When he had heard nothing for almost a month, he asked Reshid about the cause for the delay. Reshid assured him that nothing had changed, but that both the Şeyhülislam and Fethi Ahmed had been ill.[325] Meanwhile, the Russians had heard of the proposed alliance and Titow had asked for an interview with Reshid; the Grand Vizier asked Canning what he should say if Titow asked if the Porte intended to make such an alliance. Canning speculated that the Porte might be contemplating a withdrawal from the proposed alliance; in any case he suspected that 'the difficulties of making any effectual reforms on a large scale are found to be more formidable than Reshid had imagined.' Discussions on the proposed alliance continued until February 1850, after which there is no further mention of it in the documents.[326] By following Canning's advice on the Hungarian Question, the Porte had placed the Empire in a precarious position and needed a formal alliance with Britain against Russia. The failure to conclude such an alliance negatively affected Anglo-Ottoman relations, and British influence was weakened after this date.

After the Porte's failure to conclude an alliance with Britain, the Sultan turned his attention towards France. Although he had not recognised the French Republic immediately, he now bestowed his Order of the Ni_an (an Ottoman order of special merit) on the Republic's President[327] and, two months later, on General Aupick, the

French Ambassador to Istanbul.[328] Having found out about the latter decoration by accident, Canning asked Reshid how the French Ambassador had deserved it. The Grand Vizier disguised the true reason by replying that it had been thought appropriate in light of the decoration awarded to the President. The French President reciprocated, again two months later, by conferring the Grand Decoration of the Legion of Honour on Ali Pasha, the then Ottoman Foreign Minister.[329] In an effort to counteract this rapprochement, Canning advised the Sultan that he should not limit himself to merely acquiescing to the ideas of his advisers, but rather lend the full weight of his own authority to the measures required to put those ideas into effect.[330]

When the office of Hekim Ba__ (Chief Physician) was abolished,[331] Canning observed that it had 'long been a dead weight on the Sultan's treasury, conducive to no good purpose, and often used as a channel of intrigue.' He hoped that this was evidence of the Porte's intention to introduce economies into the administration. Canning later realised, however, that this had been a naive hope, and that the abolition of the office had been prompted by the Sultan's wish to lessen the opportunity for intrigue.[332]

The Sultan's general reluctance to sanction reforms was explained when Canning learned from a confidential source that he was afraid of doing anything which might make his brother, Prince Abdulaziz, popular with the traditionalist party.[333] Canning observed that the Sultan's advisers would quickly have to devise a means of dealing with the problem, for it was threatening to obstruct the progress of the reforms. One possible solution was to appoint Abdulaziz to a provincial pa_al_k, probably Tripoli, as that would have seemed the safest place for such an experiment. Canning suggested sending the prince to western Europe, to open up his mind to new ideas. Also, contact with foreigners and Christians would identify him with the reform party

and cause its enemies to mistrust him. On his return, the prince would cease to be considered a serious competitor for the throne, as well as a resource against the progress of reform. In May 1851 Canning heard from a confidential source that the Sultan was considering freeing Abdulaziz from the confinement of the harem and giving him future employment in the government of the provinces.[334] The Sultan apparently viewed Abdulaziz with mixed feelings; with affection for him as his brother and apprehension of him as a rival.

At the beginning of 1851 Canning received instructions from Palmerston in which the British Foreign Secretary cast doubt on the expediency of the Porte raising a loan.[335] Canning defended his giving this advice to the Sultan and Reshid on two grounds: the urgency of obtaining an extraordinary supply of funds; and the impracticality of obtaining it from other sources. He argued that he had made two indispensable conditions: its strict application to certain specific areas, which was not without difficulties, but these were not insuperable; and the necessity for a provision for the redemption of the borrowed capital within a fixed number of years, that is twenty to twenty-five years. Canning also noted that there had been no improvement in the state of the Porte's finances, in defence, in internal communication or in any other public department, since he had written his long memorandum to the Sultan the previous year. The deficit was increasing, but while Canning believed that neither Reshid nor his immediate followers had changed their minds, he was also convinced that the Sultan's objections would probably mean that the question of a loan would be put in abeyance until a stronger sense of urgency were felt.

Reshid gave Canning to understand that the Sultan showed no inclination to authorise the adoption of the measures Canning had suggested.[336] The Grand Vizier,

'weary of the difficulties which he encountered, and the intrigues to which he was constantly exposed,' had requested the Sultan's permission to resign, but this application had met with a cool reception. However, Reshid was soon back in the Sultan's favour, after a means had been found to neutralise Fethi Ahmed Pasha's influence over the Sultan.

In March 1851 Palmerston wrote to Canning saying that the British government shared his disappointment at the slowness of progress in the reform programme.[337] However, although progress had fallen far short of their wishes, 'yet if the state of Turkey now is compared with what it was twenty years ago, there will probably be found in the contrast greater grounds for satisfaction and hope than for discouragement or despair.' Palmerston advised Canning not to press the Sultan and the ministers too hard for major reforms for the time being, but to rather 'take up one or two specific measures of improvement, and to continue to urge the Porte to adopt them.' Canning agreed that much progress had been made over the past twenty-five years; but it was regrettable that the underlying causes of the Empire's weakness and decline were still operating, and that the Porte did not grasp opportunities for removing them.[338]

Canning had become disillusioned. In 1852, when taking his leave of Ozerov, who was in charge of the Russian Embassy in Titov's absence, Canning told him that 'he had buried many illusions in Turkey and the lesson he had drawn from his long stay and his knowledge of the country was that the Turks, despite the reforms, would always remain Turks and that he cautioned everybody against sowing and planting on this uncultivated and barren soil.'[339] Moreover, the Sultan had 'latterly expressed opinions favourable to a more absolute exercise of power... He had been heard to express doubts of the concessions made by government to the spirit of the age.'[340]

* * *

Having examined in some detail the reform motives of both the British and Ottoman governments, it is now possible to assess overall how these motives coincided and diverged over the period under study.

When Sultan Abdulmecid came to power in 1839, he was faced with two major problems: the Egyptian Question and the re-establishment of the Sultan's authority over the Empire. The solution to both these problems he saw in the continuation and development of the reforms which had been started during the reign of his father. Abdulmecid's own reign began inauspiciously with the defeat of the Ottoman army at Nizip, an event which shocked him deeply. When his navy was handed over to Mehmed Ali a few days later, he found himself ruler of an Empire which was economically weak and defenceless. The Sultan acted quickly and decisively by appointing to government experienced statesmen from different political groups in an attempt to save the Empire.

Early on in his reign, Abdulmecid was shocked at the defeat of his army at Nizip by that of Mehmed Ali's son; a few days later the Kaptan Pasha, Firari Ahmed, handed over control of the Ottoman fleet to Mehmed Ali Pasha. Thus the Ottoman Empire was left without either effective army or navy, and was already economically weak: it was defenceless in every way, and at any time might be threatened or controlled by its enemies. The first step which Abdulmecid took to resolve the Empire's problems was to appoint experienced statesmen from different political groups to the highest posts of government. Rather than favouring one party or another,

he brought these men together under his authority at this critical time in an attempt to save the Empire.

However, the Sultan was aware that this would not be enough. Until his Empire regained its strength, the Porte needed an alliance with one of the Great Powers. The obvious choice was Britain, as she claimed to be interested in the Empire's independence and integrity and, because of her distant geographical position, she was believed by the Porte to have no territorial ambitions. The Sultan saw Reshid as the ideal person to approach Britain with the proposal for an alliance, for he had more experience of Europe than any other Ottoman statesman. He had been a member of the commission set up to solve the first stage of the Egyptian Question and knew the views of the European Powers on the matter. Furthermore, Reshid had already established good relations with some of the European statesmen, particularly Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary. The Sultan hoped to benefit from Reshid's knowledge of international diplomacy, and his good personal relationships with European ministers could be used as a bridge to obtain the European support necessary to save the Empire. With this wise policy, Abdulmecid succeeded in withdrawing Russia's privileges on controlling the Straits, which she had gained by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (1833), without precipitating war, by balancing Russia's power with that of the other European Powers.

For her part, Britain believed that the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire was important for the balance of power in Europe and for her own interests. In 1833 and 1840 Russia presented her proposals for the partition of the Ottoman Empire[341] which, although she believed that the eventual collapse of this decaying empire was inevitable, the British government rejected, as she would have

received only a small share of the spoils.[342] British policy was to delay the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire rather than to assist its regeneration, and to determine what should be done with the pieces when it finally broke up. In addition, a sudden collapse of the Ottoman Empire was likely to bring about a large-scale European war. It became British policy to assist the Ottoman Empire against her enemies and to support the reforms already started. However, the Porte had to pay a high price for Britain's friendship, in the form of reforms which furthered British interests.

Equality for Christian Ottoman subjects was always the main British aim in the Ottoman Empire during the period under study. The first major achievement along this path was the abolition of the death penalty for apostasy from Islam, which Canning effectively obtained in 1844. However, it became an overt British objective after Palmerston was reappointed Foreign Secretary in 1846, for he realised that when the end of the Ottoman Empire finally came, influence over these communities would be of great importance. Britain did not hold the formal position of protector like France and Russia, and Palmerston worked for and achieved the recognition of Protestant subjects as a separate community. He stressed that when giving advice to Reshid, Canning was to lay particular emphasis on the equality of the Christian subjects - he does not say all non-Muslims - of the Porte with the Muslim subjects, in regard to everything connected with rights, privileges and duties, both civil and political. All reform measures were to be designed with this ultimate aim in view. He shared this objective with Canning, and fully supported the British Ambassador in his attempts to have the Porte introduce reforms which would fulfil this goal.

Instead of lending her support to the Sublime Porte in general, Britain chose one

man, Reshid Pasha, resting all her hopes in him, and doing everything she could to keep him in power. It seems that his influence at the Porte was more important to Britain than the reforms, for the British government sought to control the reforms which were introduced in order to further its own interests. Palmerston repeatedly instructed Ponsonby, when he was British Ambassador to Istanbul, to support Reshid and, although there is no evidence as to whether or not Ponsonby obeyed his instructions, we know that he did not like Reshid. He believed the Ottoman Foreign Minister to be 'wholly unworthy to be trusted' and 'a fool'.[343] Perhaps ignorance of Palmerston's instructions to Ponsonby led the Sultan to understand that Britain no longer supported Reshid, and there was no reason for him to stand against those opposed to Reshid and keep him in power; Reshid lost his post in March 1841.

When Canning replaced Ponsonby towards the end of 1841 he found the traditionalist party in power, so he set about establishing good relations with the Sultan and preparing the ground for Reshid's return. Despite Canning's belief that Reshid was indispensable to the reform programme, it clearly continued during his absence from the Porte. However, at these times Reshid's opponents steered the emphasis away from reforms of the administration and equality for all subjects of the Empire. After Reshid returned to Istanbul in 1845, the personal friendship between Canning and him developed and they started to work together on the reforms. Canning's and Reshid's aims were different: Canning wished to achieve full equality for the Christian subjects of the Empire with its Muslim subjects in all aspects of life, while Reshid was interested in equality before the law for all subjects. Canning hoped that he would be able to influence Reshid to implement the reforms he wanted, but he overlooked the fact that one man has limited power, even if he occupies the highest government

position. Canning also failed to encourage a new generation of Ottoman ministers who could have continued the work of reform after Reshid's retirement. This attitude sometimes led Reshid to ignore the warning of the other ministers.

Despite these difficulties, Canning was in a strong position in relation to the inexperienced Ottoman ministers with whom he dealt. His position was further strengthened by the fact that the Porte required Britain's continued support against Russia, and Canning left the ministers in no doubt that this support would be withdrawn if they did not do what he expected of them. His ability to maintain this dominant position made him the leading figure in Anglo-Ottoman relations throughout the period under study, in spite of changes in the British government.

Reshid's opponents, such as Şekib Efendi, disagreed with the systems upon which Reshid modelled his reforms, particularly in regard to the administration and the equality of all Ottoman subjects. Şekib believed that the administration was in need of reform, but did not want to see the introduction of a foreign system, and also stressed that any system based upon equality would cause the ruling class (the Muslims) to lose its control over society as a whole, which in turn would lead to social disorder. His solution was to study foreign systems and the needs of the Ottoman Empire, and only then to devise an appropriate system of administration especially to meet those needs.

With the Empire's European territories of the Empire in turmoil towards the end of the 1840s, it was necessary for the Porte to seek a formal alliance. Consequently, Reshid approached Britain in the belief that her ministers, and particularly Palmerston, would support him in everything. During the Hungarian Question, he followed the advice of the British government as given through her ambassador in Istanbul, and stood firm against her main enemy, Russia. Reshid was shocked by the British Foreign

Secretary's refusal to enter into an alliance. This failure negatively affected Anglo-Ottoman relations, and British influence was weakened after this date. Reshid's hopes were destroyed, and he finally understood that Britain thought only of her own interests. Also, his position in the Ottoman government was weakened, and his opponents sought another option: both the Sultan and the young reformists turned their attention towards France. At the same time, Reshid lost his confidence in Britain, and Canning lost his confidence in Reshid's ability to carry out his reform programme. Both became disillusioned.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

128. Palmerston to Canning, 30 October 1847, F.O. 78/691, No. 1.
129. Ibid.
130. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 12 June 1841, F.O. 78/431, 'Private'.
131. Aberdeen to Gordon, 30 November 1828, F.O. 78/179. Quoted in Gordon, A. H., Earl of Aberdeen, London, 1893, pp. 85-6.
132. Metternich to Sturmer, 3 December 1839, translated as 'Türkiyede Abdülmecid'in Islahat_ Hakk_nda' by Timur, H. in Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetiyle, M.E.B., Istanbul 1940, pp. 703-8.
133. 'Turkish Politics', from the Journal des Débats, published in The Times, 30 September 1842, p. 5, col. 3.
134. Canning to Palmerston, 7 March 1832, F.O. 78/209, No. 12, 'Confidential'; this is a very long and detailed document, but Canning does not give the sources from which he drew such information.
135. Canning to Palmerston, 7 March 1832, F.O. 78/209, No. 12, 'Confidential'.
136. Canning's Memoirs, quoted from Malcolm-Smith, E.F., The Life of Stratford Canning, London, 1933, p. 181.
137. Canning to Aberdeen, 28 January 1842, F.O. 78/475, No. 9.
138. Canning's Memoirs, quoted from Malcolm-Smith, op. cit., p. 181.
139. Canning to Aberdeen, 9 June 1842, F.O. 78/478, No. 125, 'Most Secret'.
140. Kaynar, R., Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Tanzimat, Ankara, 1954, pp. 77-8.
141. Baysun, C., 'Mustafa Reşid Paşa', Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetiyle, M.E.B., Istanbul 1940, (hereafter, Baysun, 'Mustafa Re_id') pp. 728-9. See also Kaynar, op. cit., p. 80-1.
142. Sultan Abdulmecid to Queen Victoria, 1255 (1839), Cevded Hariciye, (hereafter, C.H.) No. 7136. '...name-i mahsus-u _ahanemiz ... sefaret memuriyetiyle ikâmet üzere bulunan ... Reşid Paşa ... teslim ve ita olunmak üzere ba's ve tesyar olunmu_tur. ... mü_arunileyh zikr olunan name-i hümayunumuzu teslim-i memuriyetini ifa eyledikden sonra culus-u ahanemiz münasebetiyle mü_arunileyh sefaret memuriyeti uhdesinde olmak üzere muahharen Dersaadete avdete ...'. The British Government replied that it took a deep interest in the 'integrity and welfare of the Turkish Empire' and informed the Sultan and the Ottoman Government of 'Her Majesty's anxious desire to use every means in her power for the maintenance of those relations of friendship and good understanding which happily subsisted between the two countries during the reign of the late Sultan, [Mahmud] and which Her Majesty trusts will be still further strengthened and improved during that of his successor'. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 1 August 1839, F.O. 78/353, No. 106.
143. For the Russian proposals see Temperley, H., England and the Near East: The Crimea, London, 1936, (hereafter, Temperley, The Crimea), p. 461, note 410.
144. Disraeli said in one of his speeches, 'The Eastern Question is not the condition of a few million subjects of the Porte. [It is] the partition of the Empire of the Ottomans.' Pte. Dis. mss., notes for a speech (1877). Quoted from Temperley, The Crimea, p. 368.
145. Canning to Aberdeen, 20 June 1842, F.O. 78/478, No. 133.
146. Ibid.
147. Aberdeen to Canning, 20 January 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 9.
148. Canning to Palmerston, 7 March 1832, F. O. 78/209, No. 12, 'Confidential'.
149. For details of the economic factors affecting British Foreign Policy, see Bailey, F.E., 'The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-1850', The Journal of Modern History, 1940, vol., XII, 4, pp. 449-85.
150. Canning to George Canning, 30 September 1826, F.O. 78/145.
151. Canning to Palmerston, 7 March 1832, F. O. 78/209, No. 12, 'Confidential'.
152. 'Memorandum on the Turco-Egyptian Question', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 19 December 1832, F.O. 78/211.
153. Ibid. Palmerston made a marginal note to the effect that Britain thought it had already acquired such influence when bringing Egypt under the Sultan's control the first time, but without any

beneficial result. No reforms or improvement had taken place.

154. Palmerston later explained the European policy of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire to Mehmed Ali Pasha, Palmerston to Canning 1 August 1846, F.O. 78/635, No. 3 and Palmerston to Wellesley, 20 October 1846, F.O. 78/636, No. 36.
155. 'Memorandum on the Turco-Egyptian Question', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 19 December 1832, F.O. 78/211.
156. Canning to Wellesley, 19 October 1808, F.O. 78/61.
157. Canning to George Canning, 27 April 1809, F.O. 78/66.
158. Cunningham, A., 'Stratford Canning and the Tanzimat', in Beginnings of Modernisation in the Middle East, the Nineteenth Century, Polk, W.R. & Chambers, R.L. (eds.) Chicago, 1968, p. 250.
159. Canning to George Canning, 27 April 1809, F.O. 78/65.
160. Saying of an unnamed British Ambassador, quoted by Malcolm-Smith, op. cit., p. 183.
161. Canning to Aberdeen, 2 May 1844, Add. ms. 43139, 'Private'.
162. Canning to Palmerston, 7 March 1832, F.O. 78/209, No. 12, 'Confidential'.
163. Ibid.
164. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 March 1842, F.O. 78/476, part II, No. 67.
165. Canning's memoirs, quoted from Lane-Poole, S., The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning: Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, 2 vols., London, 1888, (hereafter, Lane-Poole, Life), vol. II, p. 104.
166. Ibid. Cunningham, op. cit., p. 250.
167. Lane-Poole, Life, vol. II, p. 105.
168. Ibid.
169. There is nothing of this meeting in Webster, although all the other sources mention it.
170. Bailey, F.A., British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853, Cambridge, 1942, (hereafter, Bailey, Reform), p. 186.
171. Todorova, M. 'British and Russian Policy towards the Reform-Movement in the Ottoman Empire (30-ies - 50-ies of the 19th C.)', Etudes Balkaniques, 1977, vol. 3, (hereafter 'British and Russian Policy'), p. 28. The first part of this article is based on secondary literature, i.e. Webster, Bailey and Temperley; the second part is more important, as it is based on Russian archival documents.
172. Cunningham, op. cit., pp. 245-64. For further discussion of Canning's Memoirs as a source, see Introduction to this thesis.
173. Canning to Palmerston, 7 March 1832, F.O. 78/209, No. 12, 'Confidential'.
174. The post ceased to be called the Reis Efendilik in 1836.
175. Webster suggests that Ponsonby was behind this appointment: 'Palmerston described this handling of a difficult situation as "perfect". He took pains to tell Reschid Pasha, who was still at London, that the dismissal of Halil which had led to his own appointment as Reis Effendi, was due to Ponsonby's action and he praised Ponsonby warmly to him.' Webster, C., The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, 2 vols, London 1951, (hereafter, Webster Palmerston), vol. II, p. 535.
176. Butenev to Nesselrode, 5 June 1837, quoted in Todorova, 'British and Russian Policy', p. 36.
177. For the text of his second layiha see Kaynar, op. cit., pp. 84-94.
178. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 10 May 1838, F.O. 78/331, No. 119, 'Confidential'.
179. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 158.
180. Webster, Palmerston, p. 536.
181. Kaynar, op. cit., p. 137.
182. Derin, Ç., (ed.), Ali Rıza ve Mehmed Galip, Onüçüncü Asr-_ Hicride Osmanlı Ricali, Geçen As_rda Devlet Adamlar_m_z, 2 vols., Istanbul, 1972, vol. I, pp. 18-19.
183. Reshid never told anyone the name of the close friend who had written to him reminding him of the dangers awaiting him and advising him to delay his return to Istanbul. Derin, op cit., p. 19.
184. Baysun, 'Mustafa Re_id', p. 729.
185. Berkes, N., Türkiye'de Ça_da_la_ma, Istanbul, 1978, p. 207.

186. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 159, 'Reshid seems to have cherished ideas of parliamentary government in Turkey'.
187. Berkes, op. cit., pp. 207-8.
188. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 10 September 1839, F.O. 78/358, No. 249.
189. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 17 December 1839, F.O. 78/360, No. 333, 'Confidential'.
190. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 30 September 1839, F.O. 78/359, 'Separate and Secret'.
191. 'Turkish Politics', from the Journal des Débats, published in The Times, 30 September 1842, p. 5, col. 3.
192. Karal reports that, after Reshid had read out the decree and put it away in a specially made satin bag, the leader of the Orthodox millet said, 'I hope it will not be brought out from that bag again.' Karal, E.Z., Osmanlı Tarihi, Ankara 1983, p. 187.
193. Uprisings occurred in places such as in Lebanon, Nish, Bosnia, Crete and Iraq. Eren, A.C., 'Tanzimat', _slam Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul, 1970, vol., II, (hereafter, Eren, 'Tanzimat'), p. 723.
194. 80,000 kise akçe.
195. Bailey, Reform, p. 190.
196. Palmerston recommended the Polish General, Chrysanowski, whom he described as 'a remarkably intelligent well informed little fellow ...' The General was to be attached unofficially to Reshid's headquarters and was to be paid from British sources. Webster, Palmerston, p. 545.
197. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 2 December 1839, F.O. 78/353, No. 182. It is understood from the Turkish documents that Ponsonby complied with his instructions, and gave some layihas to the Porte on the reform of the army, '... sefir-i mumaileyh [Ponsonby] nizamat-_ askeriyeye lay_kiyle bak_lmas_n_ ma'raz-_ ehemmiyetde beyan itmi_ ve bu defa dahi buna dair baz_ layihalar takdim iderek derdest-i mütala'a bulunmu_ olub ...', Mesail-i Mühimme İradeleri (hereafter, M.M.I), No. 802.
198. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 2 December 1839, F.O. 78/353, No. 181.
199. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 4 February 1840, F.O. 78/389, No. 17.
200. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 4 February 1840, F.O. 78/389, No. 18.
201. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 30 May 1840, F.O. 78/389, No. 79.
202. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 4 September 1840, F.O. 78/390, No. 160, and 21 September 1840, F.O. 78/390, No. 181.
203. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 24 September 1839, F.O. 78/359, No. 263, 'Secret'.
204. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 21 April 1841, F.O. 78/428, No. 91.
205. A title dating back to the Holy Roman Empire which was abolished in 1807, and meaning no more than Ambassador.
206. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 9 November 1840, F.O. 78/391, No. 228.
207. Ponsonby to Palmerston 14 and 26 February 1841, Palmerston's Private Papers, quoted by Webster, Palmerston, p. 766.
208. Todorova, 'British and Russian Policy', p. 24.
209. Pontois to Guizot, 7 April 41, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de France, quoted in Todorova, 'British and Russian Policy', p. 24.
210. Webster, Palmerston, p. 766.
211. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 1 April 1841, F.O. 78/427, No. 65.
212. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 1 April 1841, F.O. 78/427, No. 64.
213. Ibid.
214. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 7 April 1841, F.O. 78/433.
215. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 21 April 1841, F.O. 78/428, No. 91.
216. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 12 June 1841, F.O. 78/431, 'Private'.
217. Şekib Efendi to Sublime Porte, 1257 (1841), İrade Hariciye, (hereafter, I.H.) No. 589.
218. Ibid., '... Devlet-i Osmaniyenin teba'as_ birbirinden müteba'id-i milel-i ke ideden ibaret olub mesela Türkmen ve Kürd ve Arab ve Rum ve Dürzi ve Ermeni ve Yahudi taifeleri vesairi her nekadar bir toprakda ve bir yerde ittihaz- __ mesken ve me'va itmi_ler isede yine milletleri mütegayir ve birbirleriyle ihtilat itmeyup yekdigerle kar__mad_klar_ bahirdir...'
219. Ibid., '...Türk didikleri millet milel-i merkumenin mafevkinde olub, milel-i saire beyninde

muvazeneyi vikayet itmek ... zapt ve rapt_na say-_ ber-kemal eylemek üzere memur olan millet-i mütegalibe hükmündedir'.

220. Ibid., '... milel-i muhtelife yekdigeriyle cenk ve cidal ve ... biri tahsil edinceye kadar veyahud araziyi memleket beyinlerinde taksim ve_ ayet hemcivar olan devletler taraf_ndan zapt ve istila oluncaya kadar harb ve k_tale müdavemet idecekleri derkârd_r.'
221. Ibid., '... Fransan_n idare-i mülkiyesi hiç bir vechile Devlet-i Osmaniyeye elvermeyip belki Avusturya imparatorunun usul-u idaresini ittihaz-_ numune itmek evlâ ve ercaht_rki ...'
222. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 246.
223. Metternich to Sturmer, 3 December 1839, translated as 'Türkiyede Abdülmecid'in Islahat_ Hakk_nda' by Timur, H. in Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetiyle, M.E.B., Istanbul 1940, pp. 703-8.
224. Karal, E.Z., Osmanlı Tarihi, vol., V, pp. 189-91. Undated (post Tanzimat) memorandum from Metternich to Apony, the Austrian Ambassador to Istanbul.
225. Metternich to Sturmer, 3 December 1839, translated as 'Türkiyede Abdülmecid'in Islahat_ Hakk_nda' by Timur, H. in Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetiyle, M.E.B., Istanbul 1940, pp. 703-8.
226. Reshid's second layiha to Sultan Mahmud, Kaynar, op. cit., p. 86.
227. Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol., V, pp. 189-90.
228. Rothesay to Aberdeen, 22 November 1841, F.O. 65/273, No. 12.
229. Ponsonby to General Jochmus, 23 March 1842, quoted in Bailey, Reform, p. 208, note 2.
230. Aberdeen to Canning, 30 October 1841, F.O. 78/439, No. 2.
231. Ibid.
232. Ibid.
233. The problems encountered in using Canning's memoirs as a source are discussed in the Introduction.
234. Lane-Poole, Life.
235. Malcolm-Smith, op. cit.
236. Temperley, The Crimea.
237. Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, Istanbul, 1940.
238. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 224.
239. Lane-Poole, Life, vol. II, p. 55.
240. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 March 1842, F.O. 78/476, Part II, No. 67.
241. Canning to Aberdeen, 21 December 1844, F.O. 78/564, No. 289, 'Confidential'.
242. Canning's memoirs, 21 January 1842, quoted from Lane-Poole, Life, vol. II, p. 82.
243. Canning to Aberdeen, 30 August 1842, F.O. 78/479, No. 183.
244. Lane-Poole, Life, vol. II, p. 104.
245. Canning to Aberdeen, 7 June 1842, F.O. 78/478.
246. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 March 1842, F.O. 78/476, Part II, No. 67.
247. I.H., No. 589, 1257 (1841).
248. Ibid.
249. Canning to Aberdeen, 19 January 1846, F.O. 78/637, No. 8. Canning had expressed similar sentiments in 1842, 'Memorandum on the Present Policy of the Turkish Administration', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 27 March 1842, F.O. 78/476, Part II, No. 67.
250. Ibid.
251. Aberdeen to Canning, 22 January 1842, F.O. 78/473, No. 6.
252. Canning to Aberdeen, 31 October 1843, F.O. 78/522, No. 227.
253. Ibid.
254. Ibid.
255. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 May 1844, F.O. 78/557, No. 89.
256. Nesselrode to Titov, 27 January 1842, quoted in Todorova, 'British and Russian Policy', p. 39.
257. Ibid.
258. Canning to Palmerston, 9 June 1842, F.O. 78/478, No. 125, 'Most Secret'.
259. Kuran, 'Reşid Paşa', p. 702. Reshid Pasha was given an instruction concerning his Embassy to

Paris, before he left. According to this, one of his tasks was to try to prevent the activities of those in favour of freedom for Christian subjects of the Porte: '... bu esnada Hiristiyandan olan teba'a-i Devlet-i Aliyyenin serbestine dair ngiltere ve Fransa da meclisler tertib olunmu olup, Devlet-i Aliyyenin murad- sahih-i alisi her s n f teba'an n istihsal-i emniyyet ve rahatlar merkezinde oldu undan ... tesirat- vahimelerinin mümkün mertebe def'-i çaresine bak lmas laz m gelece i ...' I.H., No. 620.

260. Baysun, 'Mustafa Re_id', p. 736.
261. Canning to Aberdeen, 1 May 1843, F.O. 78/518, No. 92, 'Confidential'.
262. Canning to Aberdeen, 13 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 260.
263. Ibid.
264. Canning to Aberdeen, 1 April 1843, F.O. 78/518, No. 70, 'Secret'.
265. Aberdeen to Canning, 20 January 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 9.
266. Ibid.
267. Ibid.
268. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 May 1843, F.O. 78/518, No. 107.
269. Canning to Aberdeen, 1 June 1843, F.O. 78/519, No. 112.
270. Ibid.
271. Canning to Aberdeen, 16 June 1843, F.O. 78/519, No. 132.
272. Cunningham, op. cit., p. 257.
273. There is no mention of this on page 109; however, on page 107 we learn that: 'Reshid used to come to dine at the embassy and bring his children with him. When he scented a plot, on his appointment to the government of Adrianople, it was to the English ambassador that he applied for advice and protection'.
274. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 265. While Reshid was on his way to Paris he passed through Vienna and joined Metternich's soirée where he discussed the Lebanon Question with him and obtained Matternich's views on the affair. I.H., No. 966.
275. Canning to Aberdeen, 31 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 183.
276. 'Traduction du Hatti-Chérif lû à la Sublime Porte en présence de Sa Hautesse, le 4 de moharrem 1261, (12 janvier 1845), enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 2 February 1845, F.O. 78/594, Part I, No. 18.
277. It is interesting to note that Reshid was recalled to Istanbul only two months after the date of this letter, to take up the post of Foreign Secretary. Lane-Poole frustratingly omits the next part of the letter, and one can only speculate as to its significance. See my comment on Lane-Poole's use of this letter in the Introduction. The appointment was reported by Canning on 23 October 1845. Canning to Aberdeen, 23 October 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 246.
278. Canning to Aberdeen, 9 August 1845, F.O, 78/600, No. 187.
279. Canning to Aberdeen, 16 August 1845, F.O. 78/600, No. 192. Canning does not record the names of the ministers who were dismissed.
280. Canning to his wife, 17 August 1845, quoted from Lane-Poole, Life, vol. II, p. 141.
281. Ibid.
282. Canning to Aberdeen, 30 October 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 248.
283. Canning to his wife, 27 October 1845, quoted from Lane-Poole, Life, vol. II, p. 142. We can partly reconstruct his list from references he makes in his letter:
    1. Recall of Reshid.
    2. Establish border with Persia.
    3. Obtain marbles from the mausoleum at Bodrum.
284. The words 'Recall of Reshid' are crossed out in the manuscript.
285. Canning to his wife, 27 October 1845, quoted from Lane-Poole, Life, II, pp. 142-3. What Reshid had said to Lady Canning was that he believed Canning to be 'the most loyal conscientious and upright of men and the truest friend to his sovereign and the Turkish Empire.'
286. Canning to Aberdeen, 30 April 1846, F.O. 78/639, No. 73.
287. '...Taraf- E_ref-i Hazret-i _ahaneden Nezaret-i Celile-i Umur-u Hariciyeleri uhde-i halisaneme havale buyurulmu olma la yak nda Fransadan hareket ve Dersaadete azimet itmek üzere

bulundu_umdan Ha_metlü Kraliçe Cenablar_n_n Nezd-i Devlet-i Aliyyede bulunan sefiri Kanin [Canning] taraf_ndan me_hur olan niyyet ve efkâr-_ Devlet-i fahimelerinin Saltanat-_ Seniyye hakk_nda derkâr olan efkâr-_ hay_rhahanelerine delil oldu_u misüllü hizmet-i memuremin hüsn-ü ifas_na daima zat-_ asilanelerinden dahi muavenet görece_imi memul iderim. Asilaneleriyle herkim tahsil-i münasebet itmi_ ise mevsuf olduklar_ bir gün benim dahi bu vecihle nisfet ve kiyaset-i zatiyelerinden kemâl-_ itibar ile istifade idece_im derkâr...' Reshid to Aberdeen, 23 November 1845, I.H. No. 1476.

288. '... Devlet-i Aliyye ile münasebat-i dostane ve revab_t-_ kaviyye üzere bulunan Devletler hakk_nda dahi hay_rl_ harekât-_ merkume izhar_na muvaf_k olacaklar_ meczumumdur... _ngiltere Devleti fahimesiyle müttehidane ve halisane harekete sa'y ve himmet buyuracaklar_ azade kayd-i i_tibahd_r.' Aberdeen to Reshid, 1 December 1845, I.H., No. 1476.
289. Aberdeen to Canning, 5 December, 1845, F.O. 78/593, No. 120.
290. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 December 1845, F.O. 78/603, No. 286.
291. Ibid.
292. E.g. Canning to Aberdeen, 4 July 1846, F.O. 78/641, No. 120.
293. Layard, Sir A. Henry, Autobiography and Letters, 2 vols., London, 1903, vol. II, p. 82.
294. E.g. ibid., and Canning to Palmerston, 14 March 1849, F.O. 78/773, No. 84, 'Confidential'.
295. Canning to Palmerston, 14 March 1849, F.O. 78/773, No. 84, 'Confidential'.
296. Canning to Palmerston, 30 April 1846, F.O. 78/639, No. 73.
297. Ibid.
298. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 230.
299. Canning to Palmerston, 22 September 1846, F.O. 78/641, 'Private'.
300. Aberdeen to Canning, 5 December 1845, F.O. 78/593, No. 120.
301. Palmerston to Wellesley, 25 September 1846, F.O. 78/636, No. 23. It is tempting to surmise that Palmerston's letter influenced the Sultan in his promotion of Reshid to Grand Vizier on 28 September 1846, but it is unlikely that the British Foreign Secretary's message arrived in Istanbul in time for there to be any link between the two events.
302. The British representative in Istanbul during Canning's absence in London.
303. Palmerston to Wellesley, 20 October 1846, F.O. 78/636, No. 44.
304. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 231.
305. 'Memorandum by Sir Stratford Canning with respect to his Instructions on returning to Constantinople', F.O. 78/691 and F.O. 352/30B/8. This memorandum was written before 4 October 1847, for there is a note on it by Palmerston which reads: 'prepare Draft founded on this memo: P. 4/10-47.'
306. The haraç was effectively abolished with the issuing of the Sultan's Islahat Ferman_ in 1856. It was replaced by the Bedel-i Askeriye, a tax levied on non-Muslim Ottoman subjects in lieu of military service. Inalc_k, H., 'Tanzimat'_n Uygulanmas_ ve Sosyal Tepkileri', Osmanlı _mparatorlu_u, Toplum ve Ekonomi, Istanbul, 1993, p. 368-9.
307. Palmerston to Canning, 30 October 1847, F.O. 78/691, No. 1.
308. On the other hand his Ambassador to London, Baron Brunov, attempted to persuade Mehmed Pasha, the Porte's Ambassador to London, that Canning was trying to destroy their countries' relations '... Canning den te_ekkiye k_yam ile _u adam mukaddema Petersburga Elçi nasb olunub Rusya Devleti taraf_ndan kabul olunmad_ cihetle ol vakitden beru hakk_m_zda husumet ve adaveti gün be gün artmakta ve Saltanat-i Seniyyenin bulundu_u mevki-i haz_ras_ndan adavetini icra için istifade ederek devletlerimiz beyninde ika'-i burudet ve _ikaka ... halbuki mukaddema dahi vuku buldu_u gibi bunlar iki devleti birbirine tutu_turdukdan sonra geri çekilerek bir takim suubet tevlidine sebep olacaklarinda ...' I.H., No. 2433.
309. Canning to Palmerston, 4 September 1848, F.O. 78/735.
310. Canning to Palmerston, 4 November 1848, F.O. 78/736.
311. Lane-Poole, Life, p. 184.
312. Canning's Memorandum quoted from Lane-Poole, Life, vol. II, p. 186.
313. Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. V, p. 216.
314. Instructions to Mehmed Pasha, appointed as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to

London, M.M.I. No. 840, undated, but presented to the Sultan for authorization on 22 Zilkade 1264 (20 October 1848).

315. The relevant documents referred to are not specified.
316. Canning to Palmerston, 24 November 1849, F.O. 78/782, No. 350, 'Most Confidential'.
317. Canning to Palmerston, 24 November 1849, F.O. 78/782, No. 351, 'Secret'.
318. Canning to Palmerston, 11 September 1848, F.O. 78/735, No. 105.
319. Canning to Palmerston, 26 November 1849, F.O. 78/782, No. 363, 'Most Confidential'.
320. Ibid.
321. Canning to Palmerston, 30 November 1849, F.O. 78/782, No. 364, 'Most Confidential'.
322. Dignitary responsible for all matters connected with the canon law, religious schools, etc., and coming next to the Grand Vizier in precedence.
323. Canning to Palmerston, 30 November 1849, F.O. 78/782, 'Private'.
324. Canning to Palmerston, 30 November 1849, F.O. 78/782, No. 364, 'Most Confidential'.
325. Canning to Palmerston, 29 December 1849, F.O. 78/783, 'Private and Confidential'.
326. With reference to the following documents, Palmerston made a note on 27 December 1851: 'These papers may be put away. They relate to an overture from the Turkish Government, which it was not thought advisable to encourage.' And another: 'The matter was allowed to drop.'
    No. 363, 364 of 1849
    No. 43 of 1850
    Private 30.11.49
    Private 5.12.49
    Private 29.12.49.
327. Canning to Palmerston, 29 March 1850, F.O. 78/818, No. 108.
328. Canning to Palmerston, 5 May 1850, F.O. 78/820, No. 143.
329. Canning to Palmerston, 19 July 1850, F.O. 78/821, No. 231.
330. Canning to Palmerston, 5 June 1850, F.O. 78/820, No. 186, 'Confidential'.
331. Canning to Palmerston, 19 April 1850, F.O.78/819, No. 124.
332. Canning to Palmerston, 5 June 1850, F.O. 78/820, No. 181.
333. Canning to Palmerston, 5 April 1850, F.O. 78/819, No. 120, 'Secret'.
334. Canning to Palmerston, 8 May 1851, F.O. 78/855, No. 157.
335. Canning to Palmerston, 4 February 1851, F.O. 78/852, No. 41.
336. Canning to Palmerston, 19 February 1851, F.O. 78/853, No. 46.
337. Palmerston to Canning, 13 March 1851, F.O. 78/848, No. 69.
338. Canning to Palmerston, 21 April 1851, F.O. 78/854, No. 134.
339. Quoted in Todorova, 'British and Russian Policy', pp. 32-3.
340. Ibid.
341. For the Russian proposals see Temperley, The Crimea, p. 461, note 410.
342. Disraeli said in one of his speeches, 'The Eastern Question is not the condition of a few million subjects of the Porte. [It is] the partition of the Empire of the Ottomans.' Pte. Dis. mss., notes for a speech (1877). Quoted from Temperley, H., England and the Near East: The Crimea, London, 1936, (hereafter, Temperley, The Crimea), p. 368.
343. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 12 June 1841, F.O. 78/431, 'Private'.

PART II: CHANGING PRIORITIES OVER THE FIRST FOURTEEN YEARS OF THE TANZIMAT PERIOD

The Tanzimat signifies the beginning of a new era in Turkish history. Its aim was to give a new shape to the Ottoman Empire which was on the brink of collapse. The architect of this programme of reforms was Mustafa Reshid Pasha, who was instrumental in the preparation of the Tanzimat Decree (3 November 1839) and a change in Ottoman political, social, and cultural life. It was obvious to the Porte that reform was the only means of making the Ottoman Empire strong and prosperous again. With this in mind, Reshid Pasha tried to forge good friendly relations with Britain. During his embassies in London he directed all his efforts to persuade the British government that the Ottoman Empire needed the support of Europe, and particularly Britain, for the reforms which would modernise and strengthen the Empire. In return, Europe would be assured of peace and Britain would gain in increased trading possibilities.

The three chapters in this Part of the thesis are a discussion of Ottoman reform measures and the British response, together with the priorities of both sides. The proposed reforms and their implementation, or lack of it, are examined in detail. Each chapter covers a chronological period. Starting with Reshid Pasha's first post as Minister for Foreign Affairs and his efforts to obtain British support for his reforms, the first chapter also discusses the preparation of the Tanzimat Decree; and Reshid's first reform measures until his dismissal in March 1841. The second chapter covers the reforms introduced between 1841 and 1847, a period during most of which Reshid was away from Istanbul, and Canning struggled to achieve the reforms he wanted to see implemented. While Reshid was absent from the capital, reform priorities shifted to

the army, but when he returned to Istanbul they again focused on the Empire's administration, particularly of the financial system. The third chapter discusses the reform measures implemented while both Reshid and Canning held their respective posts in Istanbul, 1848 to 1852. Towards the end of this last period, Canning lost his confidence in Reshid's ability to bring about more reforms. In December 1851, Palmerston was replaced as Foreign Secretary, and Reshid was dismissed from his post. Under these circumstances, Canning doubted that more could be done in the way of reforming the Ottoman Empire, and in February 1852 he asked for permission to return to England.[344] Although both Canning and Reshid were later reappointed to their positions, their terms of office were shorter and, because of the Crimean War, they were not able to concentrate their efforts on reforms of the Empire.

CHAPTER 4

PRIORITIES UP TO 1841

Pre-Tanzimat Reforms

Reshid served his second embassy in Paris until the spring of 1836, when, with the approval of the Sublime Porte, he exchanged posts with Nuri Efendi, the Ottoman Ambassador to London, who was suffering ill health and was advised by his doctor to try a change of air. Thus for the first time Reshid became Ambassador to London, which he believed to be the centre of international diplomacy. Reshid's knowledge of diplomatic affairs earned him promotion to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs when Ahmed Hulusi Pasha died in July 1837. During his first term as Minister for Foreign Affairs Reshid's priority was the establishment of new institutions and the reform of existing ones, with the aim of improving the general administration of the Empire. He was facilitated in this by the Grand Vizier's mild nature and the fact that Rauf Pasha did not belong to any party. Rauf Pasha was the man for a crisis, as his career shows. He served twice as Grand Vizier during the reign of Mahmud II, and four times under Abdulmecid. In all, he held that office for fourteen years, ten months and nine days.[345] He was chosen whenever the Sultan was unable to decide between a reformist and a traditionalist, as he was experienced in dealing with opposing views and factions.

Reshid's first act of reform was to organise a committee under the chairmanship of Nuri Efendi, who was at that time Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Five specialists on agriculture, industry and commerce were chosen to sit on the committee and to work to improve these three areas of Ottoman administration. In 1838 Reshid presented their findings to the Sultan, who trusted him and always respected his views

on reform. For this reason, the Sultan appointed Mustafa Kâni Bey as his private secretary, to communicate with Reshid confidentially, in all matters of reform.[346] Reshid had already established four councils: the Meclis-i Umur-u Askeri, composed of the Serasker and ten army officers, was set up to manage military affairs; the Meclis-i Umur-u Maliye was concerned with finance and internal civil matters; the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye (Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances) was a committee of eight men who examined all proposals. All laws had to be passed by the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye, which corresponded to the old Privy Council, before being submitted to the Sultan.[347] The Meclis-i Umur-u Sıhhiye was established to improve public health and to create a quarantine centre.[348]

Now that Reshid held a high position, he realised that the Empire could not survive without the introduction of wider reforms and, believing that this could not be achieved without the help of Britain, he held a meeting with Ponsonby, the British Ambassador to Istanbul. This meeting took place on 10 May 1838;[349] the only other person present was Stefanike Vogorides, the Prince of Samos, whom Canning is known to have used as his agent in secret dealings with the Sultan.[350] During this meeting Reshid discussed with Ponsonby his plans for the reform of the administration of the Ottoman Empire with a view to obtaining British support for his ideas before implementing them. 'His views seem to me just,' reported the British Ambassador, 'and I hope many of his plans may prove to be feasible.' Ponsonby also approved of the newly established councils, as they took away from individual ministers the responsibility for government actions, as well as allowing opinions to be stated to the Sultan in a collective voice which no single minister would have dared to tell him.[351]

Also under discussion at this meeting was the prejudice against employing non-

Muslim subjects in the defence of the Empire. Reshid stated, 'you will see that there will soon be no objection of that sort left to the employment of skilful persons in the Sultan's service.' Indeed, a few months later, towards the end of his life, Sultan Mahmud declared his desire to ensure equal treatment for his subjects of whatever creed: 'I distinguish among my subjects Muslims in the mosque, Christians in the Church, Jews in the Synagogue, but I have the strongest love and equal regard for each and every one of my subjects whom I treat as if they were my very own children.'[352] However, the issue of non-Muslim subjects serving in the Ottoman army, which was of particular interest to Palmerston, took many years to resolve.

Two other important issues aired at this meeting were the abolition of state monopolies and a commercial convention. The abolition of state monopolies (yed-i vahid) was regarded as a reform of great importance to Palmerston. These monopolies were an obstacle to free trade for foreign merchants within Ottoman territories, as manufacturers had to sell their goods to approved individuals who set the price of the goods and therefore controlled all trade. Furthermore, manufacturers were not permitted to sell their goods to foreigners for sale either within the Empire or for export. It was forbidden to export, among other things, grain, olive oil, copper, opium, coffee and cotton fabric.[353] The abolition of these monopolies was to be encouraged for both commercial and political reasons. At Reshid's request for guidance on how it might be effected, Ponsonby suggested the conclusion of a commercial convention, which had been on the British agenda for many years, and for which negotiations had begun in the spring of 1838 (see Chapter 2). Ponsonby explained that, if a law were passed abolishing the monopolies the Sultan could depend upon the assistance of France, Austria and Britain in forcing Mehmed Ali to obey the law. If this became a

treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, the British government would be within its rights to insist upon its execution in Egypt as well as throughout the rest of the Ottoman Empire, thus helping the Sultan to subdue his rebellious governor. Reshid said that he would be prepared to look at the terms of a draft convention on the understanding that, if it contained anything disadvantageous to the Porte, the British government would either alter it or give sufficient reasons for the inclusion of such provisions.

This treaty, known as the Commercial Convention of Balta Limanı, was agreed with the British government on 16 August 1838, and was the most important innovation introduced by Reshid during his first ministerial post.[354] With the Convention the Sublime Porte accepted to relinquish all its monopolies. From the political point of view the Convention, for which Palmerston had been striving for some time, was a significant achievement for the British government. It strengthened economic relations between the two countries and was to prepare the way for closer political co-operation. However, some historians believe that it adversely affected the Ottoman economy. The British government and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects benefited, but not so the Ottoman government. For this reason Reshid Pasha has been criticised by some historians of Ottoman economic history for accepting the Convention.[355]

With the co-operation of Britain over the Balta Limanı Convention, and the Sultan's acceptance of equal treatment between his subjects, Reshid started to put in place his major reform programme, the Tanzimat. The official Ottoman Turkish newspaper, the *Takvim-i Vekayi*, reported[356] that the Sublime Porte had begun to think about future reforms and that statesmen had met from time to time to discuss them in

detail; they all agreed that these reforms should not contradict the provisions of Şeriat (Islamic) law. These men presented their conclusions to the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye, and as soon as this council had approved them it was decided to put them into operation.

With these first attempts at reform, Reshid's programme had four aims: to safeguard property against violation; to reform the tax system; to take measures against corruption; and to fix a salary scale for government officials. It was also decided that everyone should be treated equally before the law, including the Viziers and the Ayans (Notables). The two sancaks of Bursa and Gelibolu were chosen to operate these reforms for a trial period.[357] However, Reshid was not allowed to stay in Istanbul to see the results of his efforts, and as soon as he was sent to London as Ambassador on 7 August 1838, the programme was postponed. The officials who had been sent to Bursa and Gelibolu were recalled, and it was declared that for the time being the two sancaks would be ruled as before.[358]

The Ills Affecting the Ottoman Empire: Reshid's Memorandum to Palmerston, 11 August 1839

During his stay in London as Ottoman Ambassador (November 1838 to August 1839) and in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Reshid had succeeded in gaining Palmerston's support for his reform programme as shown in the previous chapter, using the British government's realisation that the unity and independence of the Ottoman Empire were vital for the sake of peace in Europe. Before he left London he sent a very important and confidential memorandum to Palmerston dated 11 August 1839[359] which discussed the state of the Ottoman Empire and his ideas for reform.

In his memorandum, Reshid referred to the geographical position of the Ottoman Empire, and remarked that it was favourable to commerce with the European Powers. He discussed the attitudes of the people, and suggested that a very short time after adopting the new system, they would obtain numerous and profitable results. He pointed out that the previously poor direction given to the internal affairs of the Sublime Porte had been a real disaster for its subjects, and that so-called reforms 'have only added new humiliations to the tyrannies of the past.'[360] He added that when the new institutions were led with wisdom and judgement, everyone would experience the real advantages of an established system; and as tyranny diminished, affection for the government would grow, and the people would be wholeheartedly won over to the beneficial innovations. The rapid progress of a genuine reform would arise from the impulse of the love of the people alone, and the inevitable regeneration of the forces of the Ottoman Empire would follow.

On the other hand, Reshid criticised Mahmud II, after the destruction of the Janissaries, for not wishing 'to listen to anything; he wished to take counsel only from himself.'[361] However, Reshid did not deny that Mahmud II displayed strength and energy on great occasions, but added that the Sultan had 'no knowledge of administration'.[362] According to Reshid, the Sultan lacked judgement, and flattery to his pride and vanity assured approval. Furthermore, if some 'brave friends of truth'[363] ventured to air an opinion contrary to his own, they were rewarded with death or confiscation of their property. Reshid added that when someone did not agree with their views, the men who surrounded the Sultan, and who knew how to manipulate him, set out to ruin the outsider by slandering him, thereby assuring his death by poison or by other conspicuous means. He accused the Sultan of knowing how to rid himself

of unwanted advice and at the same time make others hesitate to speak for fear of similar severity. Reshid believed that the death of Sultan Mahmud would lessen the ills of the government of the Sublime Porte, but feared that the jealousy of the Empire's men of importance would not be assuaged. He was concerned that the new Sultan would be more easily susceptible to plots from within the Empire and from outside, and that under his reign even greater ills might befall the Empire than under his father. Mustafa Reshid believed the Sublime Porte to be in an extreme state of crisis, and he urged Palmerston to interfere in the internal administration of the Sublime Porte, subject to certain limits. However, he foresaw objections to this proposal because of 'the Muslims' blind submission to the laws of the Ku'ran and their recognised fanaticism.'[364] These objections could be overcome, he claimed, because the proposal had as its aim only the good of the people. Moreover, since it concerned an alliance of all the Great Powers, and not one alone, it would not act as a precedent for any one of them to interfere in the internal affairs of the Sublime Porte. In this way, argued Reshid, the young Sultan could be guided in the right direction. The Ulema had lost much of their power over the people; and in any case, the proposed reforms in no way undermined the laws of the Ku'ran. The leaders of the country would see an opportunity to gain the favour of the European Powers.

Reshid went on to accuse Sultan Mahmud of using the Ku'ran as an excuse for resisting solutions to recent disputes, while at the same time ignoring the laws of Islam whenever it suited him to do so. He was confident that any reforms adopted by the Sublime Porte which gave real advantages to the people would meet with universal agreement. The resistance to reform shown by countries such as Bosnia, Albania and Kurdistan was born out of fear that the new institutions might become a further source

of persecution in the future.

Nor could the powers whose governments were absolute object to the proposed reforms, for they did not go beyond guaranteeing life and property. As 'to shed men's blood and despoil them of their goods, with no other motive than hatred or revenge is a crime which would not be tolerated by any of the laws of the absolute states of Europe,'[365] no nation could refuse to come to their aid. It was a question of humanity. Moreover, when Austria and Russia were seen to be willing to allow Walachia, Moldavia and Serbia to adopt their own constitutions, Reshid believed it impossible that any power should want to prevent the Muslim peoples from obtaining simple guarantees for their lives and property. Thus, the proposals made to the Porte by Europe would meet with no objections from outside the country. In addition, the Sublime Porte's Christian subjects would welcome the reforms and see in them 'the most powerful element in its regeneration.'[366] However, to ensure the Sublime Porte's independence and its territorial integrity, Reshid was aware that it would be necessary for the Porte to adopt the European law prohibiting the killing of citizens and the confiscation of their property unless justice demanded it. Indeed, Reshid argued, this is what the Kur'an dictates.

Reshid suggested that if the proposed reforms should meet with difficulties and setbacks in their implementation, then at least the ambassadors of the European Powers should advise the Council that lack of security for its subjects' lives and property was the cause of such ills as the backwardness of its people, despite their capabilities; the disobedience of the Pashas; the establishment of their own governments by Walachia, Moldavia and Serbia; and the independence of Greece. If the Sublime Porte persisted in its errors, it would rapidly become even weaker, and those powers who desired the

preservation of the Ottoman Empire would become discouraged, and withdraw their support. If, however, the Porte were to implement reforms and guarantee the safety of its people and their property under 'wise regulations and faithfully executed laws',[367] then the European Powers would not fail it.

Reshid concluded by saying that the European Powers knew about the executions carried out in secret by the Sublime Porte, and the blood shed by provincial pashas. These crimes were enough to alienate the peoples of Europe for ever. The Sublime Porte must be made to listen to the representations of the European Powers.[368] Perhaps Reshid lived to regret this last sentence, as it may have given Canning the power to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.[369]

It is interesting that Reshid sent this memorandum the day after he had an audience with Queen Victoria to announce the accession of Abdulmecid. It is understood from a letter from Salame,[370] the Ottoman Embassy's interpreter in London, that Reshid joined the audience without him or any other interpreter, which was most unusual.[371] The audience took place on 10 August 1839, although Bailey states that it occurred on 9 August, with Reshid having a separate meeting with Palmerston the next day.[372] There is no written record of the audience, and so one can only speculate as to what may have been discussed, but Reshid may have raised the subject of the memorandum. It is clear from the text of the document that it was completed some time after the death of Mahmud at the beginning of July, and obviously could not have been written in one day. Fearing for his life while Mahmud remained alive, Reshid may well have been reluctant to present his views until the new Sultan had come to power and his own position was stronger.

Reshid's memorandum is an important piece of evidence which has hitherto not

been fully considered by historians. It seems that Temperley was not so much interested in this document as in 'comic incidents inseparable from Turkish diplomacy. He [Reshid] left his copper kettles and tobacco behind him at Dover and had to ask Palmerston to recover them, and to help him to import six hundred bottles of French wine into England free of duty.'[373] Although Temperley saw the memorandum, he did not refer to it directly; in a note he referred to Rodkey's article,[374] stating that Rodkey 'adds Reshid's memo on reform ...'[375] Only Rodkey and Bailey[376] have published the text of this memorandum, without making much comment on it, except that Rodkey described its presentation to Palmerston as one of Reshid's 'last official acts' before returning to Istanbul. However, it is clear that the Ottoman Ambassador was not representing his government in this case, and that the memorandum contained his personal views. Surprisingly, Webster,[377] whose research of Palmerston's foreign policy is detailed and thorough, did not make any mention of the document; nor did Baysun,[378] Karal[379] or Eren.[380]

Reshid had an important reason to present this memorandum to Palmerston, for he believed that if Britain could be persuaded to distance herself from the Russian plan for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, then it had a much greater chance of survival. The first point which Reshid made in his memorandum, concerning the advantageous geographical position of the Ottoman Empire for European commerce, was one which Britain could not ignore. It was designed to underline the importance of the integrity and independence of the Empire to the European Powers, and especially to Britain because of the trade route to India, at a time when Russia's influence was on the increase, after the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi.

It is not difficult to see why Reshid criticised previous reforms, and even Sultan

Mahmud II himself. Ottoman subjects continued to suffer because of the misuse of power, and the people were not satisfied with the administration. Reshid explained that previous attempts at reform were unsuccessful because they were not founded on wise, basic principles which could be followed by all government officials. Instead, power was in the hands of opportunist ministers and pashas. In addition, Reshid complained that Sultan Mahmud was easily manipulated by those close to him, as he had a limited understanding of administration. However, this does not mean that Reshid was arguing for a diminution of the Sultan's authority; perhaps his comments reflect the fact that Mahmud had recently sentenced him to death. Reshid tried to convince Palmerston that his reform programme was different from previous ones and that, with such principles as he proposed, the Porte would be able to save the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan's authority, given sufficient support from Europe. Although Reshid was worried about the inexperience and youth of the new Sultan, Abdulmecid, he pointed out to Palmerston that this was a good opportunity for the Sultan to be guided in the right direction.

Fully aware that European interests lay with the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, Reshid assured Palmerston that his reform proposals would be welcomed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. He accepted that reform would not be easy, but he believed that, with British support, a system could be introduced which would give power to the law rather than the individual, and in this way the abuse of power would be eliminated. Reshid tried to allay Palmerston's fears by assuring him that the Porte was capable of saving the Ottoman Empire, given European support and the chance to prove itself.

The First Tanzimat Reforms (1839-1841)

Reshid returned to Istanbul in September 1839 to resume his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs. In order for him to hold a dominant position and to implement his reform programme without direct opposition, it was necessary to keep his opponents away from the capital, so he influenced the Sultan to remove them from Istanbul.[381] Reshid then spoke to Abdulmecid on the matter of the Sultan's confidence in him and his group, before starting their programme of reforms, and he obtained the Sultan's assurance of his confidence in his ministers.[382] As soon as he had received this assurance, Reshid prepared the ground for his reform programme with the Sultan. During his audiences with his sovereign, Reshid explained to him the political situation of the Ottoman Empire within Europe, and how the British and French governments advised that its institutions needed to be reformed if the Empire were to survive. In addition, because Reshid knew that without the approval of his colleagues he could not achieve his reforms, he also influenced Hüsrev Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and the Sultan's mother's Kâhya (steward), Ali Pasha, to issue a plan of reforms for ensuring that the Empire's subjects could not be condemned to death without trial, and for protecting property rights from arbitrary confiscation.[383]

All these steps had to be taken before the Tanzimat could be officially announced. Reshid's efforts were successful for two main reasons. First, he approached the problem in a methodical way. He ensured a strong position for himself by gaining the Sultan's confidence and persuading him to send his opponents out of Istanbul, and by winning over those who remained in power. Secondly, and more importantly, he had the advantage that every minister in the Porte wanted to act in order to save the Empire from the immediate crisis of the Egyptian Question, but they did not

know how to achieve this. They therefore accepted Reshid's proposals, although they did not agree with them totally, in the hope of securing support from Europe against Mehmed Ali.

On 3 November 1839 the Sultan issued a decree (known as the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu, or Tanzimat Ferman) based on Reshid's reform programme, whose text was read out by the Foreign Minister himself at a grand ceremony attended by the leading dignitaries of the Porte, the foreign ambassadors, and leaders of the millets.

The Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu began with a reminder that in its early years the Ottoman Empire increased in strength and greatness because the precepts of the Ku'ran and the laws of the Empire were always upheld. During the last one hundred and fifty years, however, there had been an increasing disregard for the law, and from strength and prosperity the Empire had fallen into weakness and poverty. Abdulmecid declared that ever since his accession to the throne he had been considering the well-being of the people and the improvement of the state of the provinces of the Empire. Given the geographical position of the Empire's lands, the fertility of the soil, and the aptitude and intelligence of the people, the Sultan believed that these objectives could be achieved within a few years. He was therefore seeking to give the Empire a good administration by means of new institutions. These institutions must aim to promote three things:

1. guarantees to the Sultan's subjects of perfect security for life, honour and fortune;
2. a regular system of assessing and levying taxes;
3. an equally regular system for the levy of troops and the duration of their service.

It is important to analyse the specific reforms of the Tanzimat in more detail than is to be found in the works of historians hitherto.

A regular and fixed assessment of taxes was necessary for the upkeep of the army and other services required for the defence of the Empire. Monopolies had been abolished with the Commercial Convention of August 1838, but tax-farming still existed and local administration was sometimes in the hands of men who looked only to their own advantage. Henceforth each subject would be taxed a fixed sum according to his means, and no more. Special laws would establish and limit the expenses of the army and navy. It had also become necessary to regulate the number of troops to be provided by each district, according to circumstances, and to limit the period of military service to four or five years. The present system was injurious to agriculture and to industry, and contributed to the depopulation of the nation.

Henceforth, every accused person would be publicly judged according to Şeriat law, and no one would be put to death unless proper judgement had been pronounced. In addition, no one would be permitted to attack the honour of another; and everyone would be free to dispose of his property freely. These imperial concessions were to extend to all the Sultan's subjects, of whatever religion.

The other points outlined above were to be settled by the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye, which was to be enlarged by new members and joined at certain times by ministers and the nobility in order to frame laws regulating the security of life and fortune, and the assessment of taxes. Laws regulating military service were to be discussed by the Bâb-ı Seraskerî Dâr-u Şûrası (Military Council).

As soon as a law was passed it was to be presented to the Sultan, who approved and signed it, in order for it to be valid. The Sultan engaged not to do anything contrary

to the aims of these institutions. After depositing the document in the hall containing the mantle of the Prophet, the Sultan took an oath and then made the Ulema and nobles of the Empire do likewise. Henceforward, anyone infringing the institutions would be punished according to his crime; a penal code was to be compiled for that purpose.

All public servants received a suitable salary, and the salaries of those who had not, so far, been sufficiently remunerated, were to be fixed. Favouritism was one of the principal causes of the Empire's decay, and a rigorous law was to be passed against it.

The rescript was to be published throughout the Empire and communicated to all the ambassadors of the Friendly Powers resident in Istanbul.

It is clear from the similarity in content of both Reshid's Memorandum and the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu that they were the products of the same mind. It is striking that in neither of these documents was there any blame attached to Islam or to the Ku'ran for the decline of the Ottoman Empire; rather it is the misuse of the Ku'ran by the Sultan and other high-ranking officials which was the cause. To eradicate these abuses, Reshid tried to establish regulations to define and limit the power of government officials, thus taking power away from individuals and giving it back to the law. This reshaping of the administration system was urgently needed to save the Empire from collapse. However, a discussion of one of the most important areas of reform, that of education, is entirely missing from both these documents.

Ponsonby's attitude towards the reforms contained in the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu seem to have been ambivalent. Before the declaration he seems not to have wished to become involved in any of the Tanzimat reforms; as far as he was concerned they had little to do with protecting British interests or fighting Russian influence. He wrote to Palmerston: 'I do not know how they intend to proceed to establish such a vast

good, nor to secure it. I think it prudent not to enquire much into the matter lest I should incur responsibility.'[384] However, immediately after the declaration, he called them 'excellent in conception and execution; it is in perfect unison with the religion and interests and feelings of the people ... It is a victorious answer to those who say that this Empire cannot be saved by its ancient government and that the spurious regeneration to be worked out by the Pasha of Egypt is its only preservative.'[385]

After the issuing of the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu, Reshid set to work to reorganise the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye which he had previously established. In his speech at the opening of this council at the beginning of 1840, the Sultan stressed the importance of the reform of the administration system.[386] The Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye was put in charge of all the Tanzimat laws and regulations; the number of its members was increased; and it was given more authority. Capital punishment could be meted out only by order of the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye, and confirmed by an imperial ferman.[387] The Sultan attended the opening ceremony of the Council's new building, which took place on 8 March 1840. On this occasion he emphasised that the Council should be completely independent. Later the Meclis-i Ali-i Tanzimat (Tanzimat Council) took over responsibility for drafting reform legislation.[388] It also investigated ministers and oversaw the administration of law and order.

Despite these initial innovations, there was no proper programme for putting into practice the principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu, and the Porte asked the Sultan to issue another ferman in order to clarify its benefits so that the provincial governors could explain them to the people. This ferman was issued in January 1840.[389] In it, the Sultan confirmed that the new measures were being taken with the

agreement of all the ministers, and that he would do nothing against its principles. The main principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu were then expounded, and it was emphasised that this was the only way to stop oppression. The governors were ordered to protect the Empire's subjects, particularly the poor, against oppression, as well as explaining the principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu to them. A copy of this ferman was sent to each sancak and kaza with an exhortation to the people to obey the law and their governor.

The main aims of the reform of the administration was to reduce the power of provincial governors, to eliminate the misuse of that power, and to allow the people to participate in the administration. To this end, a meclis was established in each province, with the governor as its president. The membership of this meclis was made up of four ayans; the kocabaşıs (the local heads of millets); the Müftü (official expounder of Islamic law); the Kad (judge); the local chief army officer; and the Mal Müdürü (the head of the district's finance office). Meclises were also established in each sancak and village. If any of these smaller meclises could not solve a problem, it was referred to the provincial meclis. The main task of this meclis was to ensure that the Tanzimat principles were correctly enforced and that officials did not misuse their power to the detriment of the ordinary people. Any official found to have abused his power was judged and punished according to Şeriat law. The provincial meclis had the authority to discuss all matters of civil service, finance and judiciary policy, and there was complete freedom of discussion.[390] This new administrative system was inspired by the French département system, but adapted to the needs of the Ottoman Empire. It was a demonstration of the principle of equality of all Ottoman subjects, both Muslim and non-Muslim, before the law, as promised in the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu.

However, in the last analysis it was not as successful as it might have been, and did not stop the misuse of power and bribery.

The Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye resolved that from the following March (1840), provincial governors would receive fixed salaries, and that those whose conduct merited it would be promoted. İltizam (tax farming) was abolished,[391] and the Christian bankers and moneylenders who either bought the farm of taxes themselves or advanced the funds to Ottoman officials which enabled their purchase, were called to Istanbul and told that their contracts were cancelled. The responsibility of the provincial governors was restricted to public security, and tax collection was given over to muhass_l-i emvâls (tax collectors), who were appointed directly by the Sultan. The introduction of this new system had as its aim to place both revenue and expenditure under the control of central government. Reshid believed that in this way the Empire would be strengthened for, without control of the revenue, provincial governors would not have the means to act independently. However, the new system failed to provide sufficient revenue.[392] This was primarily due to the muhassils' lack of training and to the lack of information provided by central government to the provincial meclis and the muhassils. A census was necessary in order to ascertain how much tax each individual was liable to pay, but this would have taken a great deal of time and was not carried out. A social crisis ensued, with an uprising in Nish, in the Balkans (1841).[393] This uprising grew from the wealthy non-Muslims' refusal to pay tax, as the new system demanded that they pay more than they had done previously. The vineyard owners, in particular, threatened to dismiss their workers if they were asked to pay tax on wine and rakı. Rich non-Muslims were not the only ones to suffer under the new regulations which levied tax according to wealth. Until the Tanzimat, all employees of religious

institutions, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, were exempt from paying taxes. Under the new regulations, they lost this privilege, and were naturally opposed to them. Two other tax reforms were also introduced. A new method of collecting the haraç[394] (capitation tax) was brought in by the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye; and the office of Cizyedar (Collector of the Capitation Tax) was abolished. The collection of this tax also came under the control of central government. The tax registers were sent to the muhassıl, who in turn charged the kocabaşıs with the collection of the tax. Not all these measures were successful, however. Within two years tax farming was reintroduced. The old system replaced that of the muhassilik when Reshid was dismissed from his post as Foreign Minister, and governors were again charged with the collection of taxes.

After the promulgation of the Tanzimat, Reshid's other main priority was the introduction of a Penal Code (Ceza Kanunu). He considered this essential to the success of the Tanzimat, for the only way to ensure public order and security, he believed, was to respect individual rights, for which a penal code was necessary. The Code was addressed primarily to statesmen and civil servants, to stop them from misusing their power and authority against innocent people. It was a great achievement to issue this only six months after the Tanzimat decree (3 May 1840/1 Rebiulevvel 1256), as it provided for the improvement of the administration of justice and reaffirmed the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law. The Penal Code[395] consists of an introduction, thirteen sections, each containing several clauses, and a conclusion. The document in print covers 11 pages. Before attempting to evaluate its significance, it would be useful to show first its salient features.

The first section covers treason against the Sultan, whom canon requires to be

obeyed, and incitement to rebellion against the Empire. Also, homicide of any subject, high or low. It states that everyone is equal before the law, and gives the court procedures to be followed both inside and outside Istanbul.

The document then goes on to describe two kinds of conspiracy, by word or deed. The punishment for incitement to sedition against the Empire and its laws was to be exile for one to five years. Incitement to armed rebellion against the Empire was to be punished by capital punishment, which might, however, be commuted by the Sultan to exile for life. The same court procedures as outlined in Clause 1 are given.

Attacks on personal security and honour are dealt with in the third section. The police are specifically mentioned, as is the procedure to be adopted when men of high rank are involved. This leads to the prohibition of threatening behaviour in order to acquire the property of another.

The fifth section forbids the taking of bribes by civil servants of whatever rank, while the sixth forbids employees of the Ministry of Finance and provincial tax collectors to receive any money except their salary, or gifts.

In the seventh section civil servants are prohibited from spending public money unnecessarily. They are also ordered to treat every member of the public equally, without exception.

The ninth section contains the fundamental principle that everyone is equal before the law, but also the warning that everyone must obey the law and its authorised officials. The people are ordered to pay their taxes on time. Anyone failing to report to the police when summoned, without good reason, would be sentenced to 10 to 40 days' imprisonment.

The punishment for anyone aiming a gun at another person is given in the tenth

section. They would be punished with one year's hard labour with exile (kürek cezası); if injury occured, the sentence would be two to three years' hard labour with exile.

The eleventh section deals with highway robbery, which was to be punished with up to seven years' hard labour with exile.

The twelfth section repeats the first part of the ninth section, and then goes on to state that no one will be sentenced without trial.

The final section warns that anyone obstructing civil servants in their duty or disobeying them would be punished.

The conclusion states that this Penal Code did not apply only to civil servants: everyone had an obligation to obey the law. It was therefore incumbent upon everyone to study the Code and point out any omissions or suggestions for improvements.

The first clause of this penal code clearly shows that Reshid had no intention of undermining the authority of the Sultan, as has been suggested by some historians such as Temperley.[396] His intention was to introduce equality for everyone before the law, and respect for individual rights and property, and to prevent government officials from abusing their power. However, the Code reminds everyone that in order for this new system to work they must obey the law. Some of the principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu now became law, and although Temperley suggested that this Code was based on the French Code Napoléon, it was adapted to suit the needs of the Ottoman Empire. It was by no means perfect, but was at least a basis upon which future improvements could be made.

It had long been the practice for non-Muslim Ottoman subjects to solve their commercial disputes amongst themselves, without interference from the Porte. However, the increased numbers of foreign merchants in the Ottoman Empire which

resulted from the signing of commercial agreements with Britain and other countries,[397] necessitated the establishment of commercial councils to judge cases between foreign and native merchants. These councils, which took over such responsibility from the Şeriat courts, were established in 1840. Collectively, they were called the Ticaret Meclisi (Commercial Board), and operated according to a regulation entitled Nizam-ı Muhakemat-ı Ticaret. A separate council, the Meclis-i Muhasebe (Accountancy Council), was established as part of the Ministry of Commerce to deal with cases among bankers.

Once the commercial councils had been established, Reshid attempted to introduce a code (Ticaret Kanunu) by which they would operate. Early in 1841 he presented this to the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye for approval, but was accused by Akif Pasha of irreverence towards the holy law of the Ku'ran when he maintained that it had nothing to do with such matters. Akif Pasha was supported by some of the Ulema, who 'declared they would never again enter the Council where like things were permitted.'[398] Much confusion ensued, and order was restored only with the intervention of Rıza Pasha. The Sultan was informed of the events, and ordered Reshid's immediate dismissal. Reshid was succeeded by Rıfat Pasha, and the code was suspended until 1850.

* * *

It was obvious to the Porte that reform was the only means to save the Ottoman Empire from decline and eventual disintegration. During his first term as Foreign Minister (1837-38) Reshid's priority was to establish new institutions and reform

existing ones with the aim of improving the general administration of the Empire. He established a council to improve industry, commerce and agriculture, which he believed to be the most important areas. Following this, Reshid established three specialist councils to deal with military, financial, and civil matters, and public health. The decisions of these councils were referred to a higher council which had to pass them before submitting them to the Sultan to become law. With the establishment of this system Reshid intended to take away from individual ministers the responsibility for government action, giving them a collective, and therefore more effective, voice before the Sultan.

Also during his first term as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Reshid was in a position to observe the Empire's problems at close hand, and he realised that it could not survive without the introduction of wider reforms. He knew that this would not be easy and would take some time. In order to effect its reform measures and to combat Russia's territorial ambitions, the Porte needed support from at least one of the European Powers and, from Reshid's point of view, Britain was the best choice. With such support in mind, he first approached Ponsonby, the British Ambassador to Istanbul, in 1838. Ponsonby was not much interested in Reshid's reform programme, however. He was concerned with the improvement of commercial rights for British subjects, which had been a long-term goal of the British government. The timing was now judged propitious for Britain to press for the extension of these rights. Thus, in exchange for its support against Mehmed Ali, the rebel Egyptian governor, the British government demanded the abolition of state monopolies (yed-i vahid) whereby manufacturers were obliged to sell their goods to licensed individuals who determined the value of the goods and thereby controlled trade. A direct result of the monopolies

was that the export of grain, olive oil, copper, opium, coffee and cotton fabric was forbidden. With the signing of the Commercial Convention of Balta Limanı both the abolition of monopolies and the extension of trade were obtained.

Reshid took the opportunity to put his reform programme directly to Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, when he was appointed Ottoman Ambassador to London. On 11 August 1839 he presented to Palmerston a confidential memorandum which discussed the state of the Ottoman Empire and his ideas for its reform, and asked Palmerston for his support. Reshid's most important reason for presenting this memorandum to Palmerston was to persuade Britain to distance herself from the Russian plan for partition of the Ottoman Empire, which would give it a much greater chance of survival. Fully aware of British interests, Reshid reminded Palmerston of the advantages of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire's integrity to British trade, a factor which Britain could not ignore. Moreover, bearing in mind that European interests lay with the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, Reshid assured Palmerston that his reform proposals would be welcomed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

When Reshid returned to Istanbul in September 1839 he obtained the agreement of the new Sultan, Abdulmecid, and of his colleagues on the necessity of reforming the Empire's institutions as already suggested by the British and French governments. He was therefore able to take up his reform programme where he had left off. The first stage of his plans was successfully completed when the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu was promulgated on 3 November 1839.

The aims of the Tanzimat were to establish a regular and fixed assessment of taxes, thereby providing the necessary revenue for the upkeep of the Empire's defences;

abolition of tax farming, thereby eliminating corruption; the limiting of military service to a fixed period; the abolition of the arbitrary death sentence; and a fixed salary scale for civil servants. These reforms were crucial for the survival of the Empire. It was now the Porte's task to introduce laws which would put these principles into practice. This required time, and educated and committed officials, but Reshid seems to have overlooked the need for a reformed education system.

Regulation of the Empire's finances was of primary importance to Reshid at this time, but it could not be achieved without first reforming the administration system. The aims of his administrative reforms were to reduce the power of provincial governors and to allow the people a greater say in local administration, which was in itself a demonstration of the Tanzimat principle of equality between all Ottoman subjects. The responsibility for tax collection was given to officials appointed directly by the Sultan. In this way, both revenue and expenditure were under central government control, and the unity of the Empire would be strengthened, as provincial governors would no longer have the means to act independently. Also at this time the system for collecting the haraç was reformed, and tax farming was abolished. Owing to a lack of trained civil servants, the system ultimately failed, however; tax farming was reintroduced, and the old system of haraç collection was reinstated.

On the other hand, Reshid achieved the introduction of a penal code, which was also considered essential to the success of his reform programme. This ensured public order and security as well as respect for individual rights. It also reaffirmed the equality of all subjects before the law. Although this code was by no means perfect, it formed the basis for future development of the principle and was twice improved upon before the end of 1858.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

344. Canning to Granville, 5 February 1852, F.O. 78/890, 'Separate'.
345. Karal, E.Z., Osmanlı Tarihi, Ankara, 1983, vol. 5, pp. 165, 252-3.
346. Takvim-i Vekayi, No. 167, 1253 (1838), Istanbul.
347. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 26 March 1838, F.O. 78/330, No. 79.
348. Kuran has this additional council, which Ponsonby does not mention: Kuran, E., 'Reşid Paşa', _slam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 9, p. 702 (hereafter, Kuran, 'Reşid Paşa'). Kaynar mentions only two councils, the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye in the palace and the Dâr-_ _ura-i Bâb-_ Ali in the Porte. Kaynar, R., Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Tanzimat, Ankara, 1954, p. 101.
349. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 10 May 1838, F.O. 78/331, No. 119, 'Confidential'.
350. Vogorides was a Phanariot Greek of Bulgarian origin who had been exiled during the Greek Revolution and had then returned to Istanbul. He had direct access to the Sultan and influence over many of the Ottoman ministers, although how he had obtained this position was never clarified. He had been in contact with the Russian Embassy while working as an interpreter to the Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg, and since 1832 had played an important role in British policy in Istanbul.
351. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 10 May 1838, F.O. 78/331, No. 119, 'Confidential'.
352. Engelhard, E., Türkiye ve Tanzimat, Devlet-i Osmaniyye'nin Tarih-i Islahat_ 1826-1882, (trans. Re_ad, A.), Istanbul, 1328 (1910), p. 37; Kaynar, op. cit., p. 100; The Turkish reads: 'Ben, teba'am_n müslüman_n_ Camide, hiristiyan_n_ Kilisede, musevisini de Havrada görürüm, cümlesi hakk_nda muhabbet ve adaletim kuvvetlidir ve hepsi hakiki evlâd_md_r'. Davison translates the passage as follows: 'I distinguish among my subjects, Muslims in the mosque, Christian in the church, Jews in the synagogue, but there is no difference among them in any other way'. Davison, R.H., Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, New York, 1973, p. 31.
353. Tengir_enk, Y.K., 'Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Devletinin Harici Ticaret Siyaseti', in Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetiyle, M.E.B., Istanbul, 1940, pp. 301-2.
354. Webster suggests that '... no doubt the convention could hardly have been secured without his [Reshid's] help, which Ponsonby secured by backing him against his enemies, and threatening to leave him to the mercies of Hüsrev [Pasha] if he refused ...' Webster, C., The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, 2 vols, London, 1951, (hereafter, Webster, Palmerson), vol. II, p. 554.
355. Kütükoğlu, M., Osmanlı - İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri I, 1580-1838, Ankara, 1974, p. 19; Tabako_lu, A., 'İktisadi ve Sosyal Yönden Tanzimat', 150. Yıl_nda Tanzimat, Ayd_nlar Oca__, Istanbul, 1990, pp. 41-5.
356. Takvim-i Vekayi, No. 169, 1253 (1838), Istanbul.
357. İnalcık, H., 'Tanzimat'_n Uygulanmas_ ve Sosyal Tepkileri', Osmanlı _mparatorlu_u, Toplum ve Ekonomi, Istanbul, 1993, (hereafter, İnalcık, 'Sosyal Tepkileri'), pp. 361-424. The same article may be found in Belleten, vol. XXVIII, 1964, pp. 623-649, and Takvim-i Vekayi, No. 174, 1253 (1838), Istanbul.
358. Takvim-i Vekayi, No. 177, 1253 (1838), Istanbul.
359. Reshid to Palmerston, Confidential Memorandum, 11 August, 1839, F.O. 78/383.
360. '... n'ont fait que venir ajouter de nouvelles vexations aux tyrannies du passé.'
361. '... rien entendre, il ne [voulut] plus prendre conseil que de lui-même.'
362. '... aucunement les connaissances à l'administration des affaires'.
363. 'courageux amis de la vérité'.
364. 'la soumission aveugle des musulmans aux lois du Coran, et leur fanatisme reconnu.'
365. 'verser le sang des hommes et les dépouiller de leur bien, sans autre motif que la haine ou la vengeance est un crime que ne saurait tolérer aucune loi des Etats absolus de l'Europe'.
366. 'l'élément le plus puissant de sa régénération.'
367. 'sages règlements et des lois fidèlement exécutées'.
368. 'Lui [la Sublime Porte] faire entendre ces représentations sévères et d'autres semblables serait un acte de la plus haute importance.'
369. There is no record of Palmerston's response to this memorandum, except a note dated 17 August 1839 sent to Reshid by the Foreign Office. The note reads as follows: 'Viscount Palmerston presents his compliments to Reshid pasha and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his

Note of the 11th of August inclosing a memorandum upon the state of Turkey, and he requests Reshid pasha to accept his thanks for the communication of that paper.' 17 August 1839, F.O. 78/383.

370. Salame to Palmerston, 10 August 1839, F.O. 78/387.
371. Salame expressed his disappointment at Palmerston's displeasure at his attending Reshid Pasha at the palace. He pointed out that he had always attended the Ottoman Ambassador, with Palmerston's approbation, when in the presence of the Queen, 'with the single exception of his last audience in June on his going to Paris, which was merely because he had not time to give me notice of it.' Salame to Palmerston, 10 August, 1839, F.O. 78/387.
372. Reshid requested an audience with the Queen on 9 August 1839 (F.O. 78/383). Palmerston's note on the reverse of his letter reads, 'To be at palace tomorrow at two'.
373. Templerley, H., England and the Near East: The Crimea, London, 1936, (hereafter, Temperley, The Crimea), p. 98.
374. Rodkey, S., 'Reshid Pasha's Memorandum of August 12, 1839', Journal of Modern History, 1930, pp. 251-7.
375. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 436, note 227.
376. Bailey, F.E., British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, London, 1942, pp. 271-6.
377. Webster, Palmerston.
378. Baysun, C., 'Mustafa Reşid Paşa', Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetiyle, M.E.B., Istanbul, 1940, pp. 723-46.
379. Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 5.
380. Eren, A.C., 'Tanzimat', _slam Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul, 1970, vol. 11, (hereafter, Eren, 'Tanzimat') pp. 709-65.
381. Akif Pasha, one of the chief opponents, was appointed Governor of _zmid in order to remove him from the capital, where he had been intriguing for power; Nam_k Efendi was sent on a diplomatic mission to Paris; Mustafa Kâni Bey was made Müsellim (administrative official under the Vali/Governor) at Bursa; Sar_m Efendi and Hafız Pasha, Minister of Finance, were dismissed from their posts. According to Ponsonby, these were the men of whom he had had so much cause to complain for many months. Also they were violently opposed to the putting into effect of the commercial convention, particularly Hafiz Pasha. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 22 September 1839, F.O. 195/160, No. 257.
382. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 24 September 1839, F.O. 78/359, No. 263, 'Secret'.
383. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 22 October 1839, F.O. 78/359, 'Separate and Confidential'.
384. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 22 October 1839, F.O. 78/359.
385. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 5 November, 1839, F.O. 78/360, Part I, No. 301.
386. İnalcık H., Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi, (Doktora Tezi'nin 50. Yıl_) Istanbul, 1992, (hereafter, İnalcık, Tanzimat), p. 6.
387. Eren, 'Tanzimat', p. 721.
388. The Meclis-i Ali-i Tanzimat was established in 1854 and later, in 1861, was reunited with the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye. Pakal_n, M.Z., Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlü_ü, 3 vols., Istanbul, 1983, vol. II, p. 429.
389. '... ancak din-u devlet ve mülk-ü milletin ihya ve ma'muriyetine bâ'is ve bâdi olacak asayi_-i hal-i ahali ve fukara maddesinin istihsali z mn nda laz m gelen haYılü ve menfaatlü usullere ba_lamak ...' For the text of the ferman see İnalcık, H., Osmanlı _mparatorlu_u, Toplum ve Ekonomi, Istanbul, 1993, pp. 394-405. The text may also be found in Kaynar, op. cit., pp. 226-234.
390. _nalcik, Tanzimat, p. 6.
391. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 31 December 1839, F.O. 78/360, Part II, No. 346. See also Ponsonby to Palmerston, 16 January 1840, F.O. 78/392, No. 15.
392. Davison, op. cit., p. 44.
393. İnalcık, H., 'Sosyal Tepkileri', p. 375.
394. The terms haraç and cizye were used interchangeably to mean a head tax paid by the non-Muslim peoples of the book, with the understanding that this was in lieu of military service.
395. For the original text, which I have summarised, see Kaynar, op. cit., pp. 303-13.

396. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 159.
397. On 16 August 1838 the Porte signed the Commercial Convention of Balta Limanı with Britain. She signed other such agreements with France on 25 November 1838; with Sardinia on 2 September 1839; with Sweden and Norway on 31 January 1840; with Spain on 2 March 1840; with Holland on 14 March 1840; with Prussia on 22 October 1840; and with Denmark on 1 May 1841. Tengir_enk, op. cit., p. 289.
398. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 7 April 1841, F.O. 78/433, No. 128.

CHAPTER 5

PRIORITIES 1841-1847

Between 31 March 1841 and 11 December 1845[399] Reshid was either in Istanbul without a government post, or out of the capital as Ottoman Ambassador to Paris. On the other hand, Canning was active in Istanbul for most of the period under discussion in this chapter, leaving Istanbul in 1846. While Reshid was out of power, the emphasis of his reform programme was altered, and priority was given to reform of the army over that of the administration, as the Porte believed this to be essential in order to maintain the independence of the Empire against aggressors.

The Janissaries had been disbanded by Sultan Mahmud in 1826 and had been replaced by the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye, which lacked training, discipline and good equipment. It was for this reason that both Mahmud II and Abdulmecid had been unable to quell a rebellion by the governor of Egypt without the aid of foreign forces. With the formation of the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye a new system of recruitment was also introduced, whereby every fit Muslim subject of the Empire between the ages of twenty and forty-five was required to serve for a period of twelve years. However, this system was unpopular and soon became a subject of complaint. Desertion was rife; and some poor were forcibly taken to serve in the new army, often for much longer than the regulation twelve years.[400] These problems made the Porte realise that reform of the army was necessary for the defence of the Empire; and such reform would obviate the necessity for repeated foreign involvement in crises like the Egyptian Question. It was for these reasons that reform of the military was one of the basic principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu; the relevant paragraph was as follows:

> 'Although, as we have said, the defence of the country is an important matter, and that it is the duty of all the inhabitants to furnish soldiers for that object, it has become necessary to establish laws to regulate the contingent to be furnished by each locality, according to the necessity of the time, and to reduce the term of military service to four or five years. For it is at the same time doing an injustice and giving a mortal blow to agriculture and to industry to take, without consideration to the respective population of the localities, in the one more, in the other less, men than they can furnish; it is also reducing the soldiers to despair, and contributing to the depopulation of the country, by keeping them all their lives in the service.'[401]

As far as British interests were concerned, although reform of the army was not one of Aberdeen's main priorities when he returned to the post of Foreign Secretary in September 1841 he believed that, if military reforms were to be introduced, they should be aimed at improving discipline and efficiency. In his instructions to Canning, Aberdeen reflected that in the past, the presence of troops had been 'marked by violence and extortion. They have harassed and oppressed the districts which they were sent to protect'. He hoped that improved discipline would 'render the Turkish troops more respectable in the field, and less terrible to the peaceable inhabitants of their country.'[402]

Stratford Canning replaced Ponsonby as British Ambassador in Istanbul in January 1842.[403] For the first three years of his embassy, he found it very difficult to make any progress with regard to reforms, as Reshid had been sent to Paris as Ambassador and the traditionalist party held power. When ministers whose reforming priorities differed from his own put obstacles in the way, Canning became frustrated with the lack of progress he was making, and his reports reflect this. One setback was that the new arrangements for the collection of the haraç, as set out in the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu, whereby non-Muslim subjects no longer had to prove payment by showing a certificate, had been abandoned. Instead of this tax being collected by

kocaba__s, the office of cizyedar had been revived. As a concession, each millet was permitted to send its own agents to accompany the tax collectors to the provinces, but Canning saw this as only a temporary concession. As he knew of no problem in the collection of the tax under the reformed system, he believed the return to the old system to be part of a wider scheme proposed by the traditionalist Ottoman government.[404] Soon afterwards, however, it became clear that the new system, which had been used between 1840 and 1842 (1256-1257) had been difficult to implement, and payments had fallen into arrears. The patriarchs 'declared their inability to pay into the mint the requisite sums at the proper time.'[405]

At this time Canning placed his hopes of reform on Rıza Pasha who, in 1841, had become Grand Marshal of the Palace, which was a position of great influence. However, Canning conjectured that Rıza Pasha looked 'chiefly to his own interests, and maintains his position by dexterously preserving an equilibrium between the opinions of the anti-reform party, and the personal inclinations of the Sultan.'[406] Despite the traditionalist make-up of the ministry, Canning was not completely pessimistic. 'Even if the present ministry were to remain in office,' he maintained, 'I should hope to derive some means of counteraction from my intercourse with Rıza pasha, sanctioned as it is by the express permission of the Sultan ...'[407] Instead of trying to find a compromise with the ministers of the Porte in order to contribute to the improvement of conditions within the Ottoman Empire, Canning remained antagonistic towards them. Furthermore, he tried to influence the Sultan to dismiss some of them, including Mehmed İzzet Pasha, the Grand Vizier. Canning saw Mehmed İzzet Pasha, who was known for the 'severity of his opinions, and the cruelty of his disposition',[408] as one of the chief obstacles to reform, and doubted his capacity for government.[409] Six months

after the start of his mission, in June 1842, Canning was suggesting to the Sultan that Mehmed İzzet Pasha be replaced. Canning believed that the Grand Vizier's retirement 'would give very general satisfaction to the public, as well as the Diplomatic Body,' and he did not expect any change in Ottoman policy while Mehmed İzzet Pasha remained at the head of the ministry. He claimed support against the Grand Vizier from at least one member of the Council and the Sultan's brother-in-law, who, Canning reported, spoke 'without restraint in condemnation of the vizier's policy and conduct'.[410]

The British Ambassador had thought that the removal of Mehmed İzzet Pasha would solve his problems, but the Grand Vizier's dismissal in 1843 changed very little. By May 1843, Canning felt he had exhausted all possibilities in an attempt to advance his reform programme: 'The promises of Rıza pasha, and the assurance, which the Sultan himself deigned to give me of their eventual accomplishment ... concurred to keep alive the hope, which I was unwilling to relinquish.'[411] Later that year, Canning made the following prediction: 'We may, therefore, expect to see the gradual abandonment of all that has been gained for humanity, and, unless some means of prevention be interposed, we shall also return to that system of policy and of administration, which during two centuries contributed so powerfully to the decline, and nearly completed the dissolution of this Empire.'[412] Canning painted a falsely grim picture of the fate of the Ottoman Empire. There is no evidence to suggest that, merely because Canning encountered obstacles in his own reform programme, the Porte was about to revoke the reforms which had been introduced in the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu. Once the Tanzimat decree had been promulgated there was no turning back for the Ottoman Empire.

In June 1843 Canning heard conflicting accounts of Rıza Pasha's plans, as

Nazır-ı Askeri (Superintendent of the Army),[413] to greatly increase the size of the army, and was fairly certain that such plans had been adopted by the Council. The speed at which the matter was progressing suggested to Canning that as well as more general objectives, it had an immediate aim, perhaps to keep Rıza Pasha and his associates in power by means of military force. However, Canning considered it very unlikely that the numbers discussed would be achieved, and reported that ministers denied anything more than the addition of a few regiments. Two weeks later Canning was in possession of facts rather than rumours.[414] He understood that the regular army was to be increased to between 90,000 and 100,000 men, thereby increasing the nominal numbers by about 15,000. This means that the nominal force at the time of Canning's report was between 75,000 and 85,000. This increase would apparently add more than 50,000 to the effective force, which would make the effective force at the time of Canning's report between 40,000 and 45,000.

In contrast to Canning's figures a report, compiled by Reshid and presented to Ponsonby in 1838,[415] gave the strength of the Ottoman army in Anatolia alone as 114,835.

ARMY

Cavalry	10 Regiments	6,245 men
Artillery		2,115 men
Infantry	14 Regiments	31,475 men
Militia	29 Regiments	75,000 men
	Total	114,835 men

In the light of this documental evidence, it is clear that the number of men in the whole of the Ottoman army must have been considerably more than the 75,000 to 85,000

reported by Canning in June 1843. It may be argued that the size of the Ottoman army had been greatly reduced by the heavy defeat of the Sultan's forces at Nizip in 1839, therefore accounting for the discrepancy with Reshid's 1838 figures. However, although there is no record of the losses suffered by the Sultan's army at Nizip, it seems unlikely that they would have been reduced to 85,000 men or fewer. Reshid's figure may be taken as accurate. I have found no record of Britain requesting this information, but at the time Reshid's report was compiled, the Porte was attempting to obtain the support of Britain against Mehmed Ali, and it is unlikely that under these circumstances he would have overestimated the strength of the Ottoman forces.

Canning reported that popular opinion held that possible military objectives of the enlarged army were war with Persia, the occupation of Serbia, designs upon Greece, and resistance to Russia. The immediate consequences of the increase in the size in the army, according to Canning, would be increased expenditure and decreased agricultural productivity, as recruits were forcibly taken from the land at harvest time.[416] While it is true that enlarging the size of the army would entail increased expenditure, it is difficult to believe that the Porte could have had the offensive military objectives which Canning mentioned. Bearing in mind the state of the Ottoman Empire, the Porte's overriding concern was the defence of its territories and the maintenance of its independence.

Canning reiterated his government's belief that the army was more in need of improvement than enlargement, and that such improvement would have to be applied to the whole administrative system of the army rather than to the selection and discipline of the soldiers alone. The Porte apparently had sufficient funds to pay for the initial expenses of the scheme, but Canning doubted that it could be sustained over a

long period of time.

By the middle of July 1843 the proposed measures had been put in to effect; Canning believed that if the changes were limited to these, and a better system of administration adopted, then 'a considerable step will, no doubt be made towards the recovery of the Empire.'[417] However, he understood that it was intended to increase the size of the army still further. Twenty-two million piasters per month were required to meet the expenses of the army in its present state; such a sum, on a permanent basis, would amount to almost half the public revenue. The Sultan had already advanced £900,000 from savings on the civil list.

As part of the reforms, the men levied from Asia were to be quartered in Europe, and those from Europe in Asia. The principal motive for this measure was apparently to introduce discipline among the Albanians. However, it had the opposite effect, and led to a revolt by between 15,000 and 30,000 Albanians, joined by 3,000 militia.[418] Reinforcements were hurriedly sent to the seat of the disturbance and concessions were made to the rebels. Canning felt that these would settle the present troubles, but would weaken the Porte's authority in the long term. There was also the problem of desertion. Canning reported that 'in drafting the militia into the line, a cruel deceit was practised on the men, that force was employed to coerce them, and that all the Subaltern officers were reduced to the Ranks... I hear on good authority that a guard of fifty men with their officers lately absconded in the night from one of the gates of Constantinople, and on being overtaken fought with their pursuers, and succeeded in escaping into the country.'[419]

At the beginning of September 1843 a law was passed[420] which limited military service for men between twenty and forty-five years of age to five years, instead of the twelve

years' service which had previously been required. After five years, soldiers joined the redif (reserve) for a further seven years, and during this period they reported every year for one month's training in their kaza. On 1 March every year one-fifth of the army became eligible for retirement into the redif and was replaced with new recruits. A revised system of army records showed new recruits; those in the redif; and retired soldiers, whose numbers included men unfit for service who had not completed the full twelve years. Army training staff were prohibited from taking civilian posts. In addition, the army was divided into five corps:

CORPS OF THE OTTOMAN ARMY

Corps	Name	Headquarters
1	Dersaadet Ordusu (Istanbul Corps)	Istanbul
2	Hassa Ordusu (Imperial Guards Corps)	Üsküdar
3	Avrupa Ordusu (Europe Corps)	Monastir
4	Anadolu Ordusu (Anatolia Corps)	Harput
5	Arabistan Ordusu (Arabia Corps)	Damascus

On 16 September 1843 Rıza Pasha was appointed Serasker[421] in Asia and Europe, in addition to his other offices of Grand Marshal of the Palace and Nazır-ı Askeri, as a reward for his success in implementing these further reforms to the army. Although Rıza Pasha was the force behind reforms with which Canning did not agree, and the British Ambassador had become disillusioned, he nevertheless wished to take advantage of this promotion to encourage Rıza Pasha to introduce further reforms. The following month, in October 1843, Canning wrote his first detailed memorandum to the Serasker on the subject.[422] He began by congratulating Rıza Pasha on his promotion and on his latest reforms and expressed the opinion that the 'reconstruction of the army

is no inconsiderable measure.' However, he warned that the 'hasty formation of a large army produces at first expense and discontent.' Population growth and agriculture, the main sources of national wealth, were affected. Canning was right to remind Rıza Pasha that the size of an army was not everything; it needed to be efficient, well trained and well commanded, and this necessitated heavy annual expenditure for regular and adequate supplies. Indeed, the Minister of Finance had promised Rıza Pasha a monthly sum of 45,000 purses, which Canning calculated to be nearly £2.5m per annum, and 'more than a moiety of the ordinary annual revenue of the Empire.'[423]

A year later, in September 1844, Canning complained that 'the real supporter of a system injurious alike to Foreign rights and to domestic interests is the present Minister of Finance [Musa Safveti Pasha]. He has made himself necessary to Rıza pasha by engaging to supply the expences [*sic*] of the Army, on which the Grand Marshal's [Rıza Pasha's] credit and influence mainly depend.'[424] In a private conversation which Canning had with Rıfat Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister confirmed that 'the funds appropriated to the army being wholly inadequate to its maintenance, Rıza pasha kept up an intimate connection with the Minister of Finance in order to secure the necessary additional supplies ...'[425] Moreover, Canning observed that the reform of the army was superficial and illusive. It was a great additional expense to the state, and was not 'disproportioned to the wants of the country, but to the means from which revenue is derivable.'[426] Nevertheless, Canning received information that Rıza Pasha was planning to increase the army to 150,000 men, and to pay the increased expenses from a tax levied on real estate.[427]

A report, drawn up by Lt. Dickson of the Royal Artillery in May 1845, on the size and effective strength of the Ottoman army, showed that Rıza Pasha had indeed

increased the size of the army to approximately 150,000 men, as he had intended.[428] There were 12,000 cavalry, 9,600 artillery and engineers, and 129,600 infantry. These numbers were made up as follows:

Cavalry	4 Regiments of Guards, 1,000 men each	4,000
	8 Regiments of Line, 1,000 men each	8,000
Artillery & Engineers	2 Regiments of Artillery of the Guard, 1,600 men each	3,200
	3 Regiments of the Line, 1,600 men each	4,800
	1 Regiment of Engineers	1,600
Infantry	16 Battalions of Guards, 1,200 men each	19,200
	92 Battalions of the Line, 1,200 men each	110,400
	Total	151,200

However, Dickson stated that the real strength of the army was no more than 90,000 because the regiments actually comprised little more than half their full complement. At the same time, the number of troops stationed in the capital had been reduced from 29,000 to 20,000, with perhaps 2,000 more in the marine corps. The taxes levied to pay for all this amounted to £2.5m per annum. As a consequence, Canning believed 'this military system to be as ruinous as it is unnecessary and inadequate in the present state of the empire.'[429] Nevertheless, the regiments stationed in and around Istanbul, under the immediate command of the Serasker, had made 'great improvement in equipment, discipline and general appearance within the last two years, and the interior arrangements for the maintenance and comfort of the soldiers in the barracks and hospitals are good.'[430] Things were very different in the provinces, however. The soldiers' discipline and general organisation were 'indifferent' and they were badly officered. The cavalry and artillery in both the capital and the provinces were

'wretchedly mounted', with few cavalry regiments possessing more than 250 horses. Half of the sixty-four guns attached to each regiment were field pieces, which were expected to be fully horsed and equipped. However, in reality, only twelve of these guns in each regiment were ready for immediate action. Dickson concluded that 'should the Turkish Army ever have to operate in its present state, against a very inferior force of well disciplined European troops, it must suffer a total defeat.' In order for it to be able to match European armies, a better system of educating and organising the officers was required. With the exception of those educated in Europe, the officers knew very little more than the soldiers under their command.[431]

This archival evidence shows us the real strength of the Ottoman army and the total number of soldiers in May 1845. If we compare this information with that given in Reshid's report, which we have already discussed, we can see that the increase in the size of the army was not very great. The information contained in Dickson's report shows that military reform was not based solely on increasing the number of soldiers; there was also improvement in discipline, equipment, maintenance, and the comfort of soldiers, particularly in and around Istanbul, although standards had not yet improved in the provinces. Despite the fact that all reforming efforts had hitherto been focused on the army, it is clear that the soldiers required still more education, discipline, organisation, and more good officers.

In his memorandum to Rıza Pasha in October 1843, mentioned earlier,[432] Canning also discussed the proposed reforms of the currency, which the Porte seemed to have given little consideration until the ministers realised that the poor financial state of the Empire affected military reforms. Although he admitted that the 'new monetary system may prove a source of advantage not only to Turkey but to Europe at large', he

warned that it too would be a drain upon the treasury. He cautioned against the proposal to issue it while several of the baser kinds of money remained in circulation. The consequence, as he saw it, would be that the new money would be collected by speculators and re-coined into the old, at a large profit. The new money would then soon disappear, an event which would necessitate a new issue, which would disappear in its turn. Canning saw three ways to avoid this:

1. The base money could be recalled; this would place too great a burden on the state.
2. The value of the base money could be assimilated to that of the new coinage; this would 'bear too hard upon the people'.
3. A paper currency could replace the base money; this option did not carry with it the objections of the first two and, 'with proper limitations and guards, might perhaps, be tried with success.'

While conceding that the Board of Agriculture contained 'the seed of much future good', Canning maintained that it was 'useless except as a machine for drawing out the resources of the land, and for this purpose it requires aid from the public funds.' With aids to industry paid from these funds, land which had fallen into neglect might again be made productive. In addition, the difficulties of transporting such agricultural produce needed to be alleviated: long distances were involved, and the Empire lacked the necessary roads. This is the first mention of this important aspect of reform by Canning. He suggested that the revenue for these improvements might be collected from the towns and districts which would benefit from them, with occasional assistance from the state.

In the same memorandum, Canning also proposed reform of the educational

system to allow mixed education. The college at Galatasaray was, he claimed, 'a model of useful institutions' and 'should be repeated in the Provinces.' Such an early date for the foundation of the Galatasaray lycée is interesting, and has hitherto been unknown to historians. It has so far been understood that the college was established by imperial ferman in 1868, and this earlier reference raises two possibilities: either the college mentioned by Canning is a hitherto unknown precursor, or the date of the document must be called into question.[433] In any case, as Canning's last embassy finished in 1858, he must be referring to a college founded before 1868. Canning argued that if similar colleges were established in some of the main provincial cities, a benefit which was already operating in the capital would be extended. Part of the expense for these colleges could be met by each province or its governor. Canning believed that by educating non-Muslim and Muslim boys together, as was the case at Galatasaray, the non-Muslims would experience a stronger sense of loyalty towards the Sultan and 'Europe would think more favourably of Turkish policy.' There is no indication from his despatches that Canning was interested in the reform of the education system in general.

Canning acknowledged that the new measures so far introduced were laudable, but the new institutions would decay if no provision were made for their continued existence and efficiency. This warning led Canning on to a discussion of the administration of justice within the Empire. Security of person and property, Canning explained, are not compatible with a system of 'venality, fraud and violence'. He spelled out the inevitable consequences when 'justice is bought and sold, when nothing is to be done without corruption'; when labour is taken away from the land; when revenues are farmed out to men in authority; and monopolies (although theoretically

abolished) were maintained for the benefit of the few. In such a situation, the general population declines, and houses, villages, even towns, fall into decay. Never losing sight of his underlying aim to bring about equality for the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte, Canning remarked that this tendency was all the more pronounced in the Ottoman Empire because of religious divisions. In this respect, the non-Muslims, who were not eligible to join the army, had the support of foreign states. Also, the classes which contributed most to the national economy 'are the most exposed to violence and extortion.'[434] 'To overlook these causes of ruin,' Canning observed, 'to leave such destructive evils without check is equivalent to saying that the army is re-organised, the coinage restored, and boards and colleges created merely to divert the Sultan and to employ the revenue.'[435]

Canning complained that he had stated all this eighteen months previously (on 8 June 1842) to Rıza Pasha and to the Sultan,[436] and had been told that the only obstacle in the way of following his advice was the lack of men to implement it. 'Give me, said, His Majesty, but ten Pashas, on whom I can rely, and all uncertainty shall be removed.' Canning admits that he had seen a few proofs of the Sultan's sincerity in, for example, the dismissal of Mehmed İzzet Pasha as Grand Vizier;[437] of Tahir Pasha as Kaptan Pasha; and of Arif Pasha as President of the Council. But, to his dismay, men he considered unworthy had been either retained in their offices or promoted, while men such as Reshid Pasha had been 'excluded from those departments, where they might best serve their sovereign and the State.'[438] Furthermore, Rıfat Pasha, the Foreign Minister, 'treated the proclamation of Gülhane as a matter of regret to the government.'[439]

Meanwhile, Canning again drew a grim picture of the state of the Ottoman

Empire, reporting that people in the provinces were crying out for 'protection against lawless neighbours and corrupt magistrates.'[440] The provincial governors were generally needy men who farmed the revenues and borrowed from their dependants. 'They employ extortion to regain what they have paid, they connive at venality in order not to pay what they have borrowed. Inadequate appointments and need of patronage compel them to be corrupt.'[441] The stationing of military posts in well chosen places, regular payment of public employees, the punishment of corruption and the sending of trustworthy inspectors, might gradually remove the grievances of the people, thus making them more productive and increasing the public revenue.

In December 1843 Canning complained that no other general reform measures had been implemented since his arrival, 'except the establishment of a corporation of Revenue Bankers, who pay dear for the honour of making advances to the Treasury, and the institution of a Board of Agriculture, whose existence would be a state secret if it depended upon its acts for publicity.'[442] On the positive side, Canning believed that there were distinct advantages over the period of Mahmud's reign:

> 'A certain progress has been made; the avenues to further improvement are more free; life and property are more secure; the number of educated Turks is increased; the popular prejudices are generally softened; and the porte's Christian subjects have rather to complain in common with the whole population, than on account of any flagrant grievance, to which they are exclusively exposed. The establishment of quarantine; the use of steam Navigation, the recognition of some milder principles of government, the introduction of European manufactures, and an increase of communication with the states of Christendom are so many steps in the road of civilization, so many advances towards a better form and constitution of society.'[443]

Despite the intransigence of the Porte and its ministers, Canning found an opportunity to strengthen his position in relation to theirs. He achieved one important reform during this period, which will be discussed in Chapter 7. In 1843 to 1844 he

worked towards the abolition of the punishment of execution for apostasy from Islam. This was a very sensitive subject, but Canning felt in a strong position to demand it as he would have the support of all the Christian Powers, and the Ottoman Empire would not be able to play one against the other. The Porte issued a statement agreeing to stop the practice of execution for apostasy on 20 March 1844, but Canning did not have complete trust in this, and asked for a declaration from the Sultan himself, which he obtained three days later.[444]

This was generally a peaceful time for the Ottoman Empire, one which 'proved favourable to trade; the army has made a certain degree of progress; the new coinage too proceeds, though slowly ...'[445] However, Canning thought these improvements lacked a solid foundation. The National Bank,[446] in Canning's view, had a 'very doubtful promise of success.' Indeed, the Ambassador later reported that the idea had not earned public confidence. The Armenian bankers, who were already giving large loans to the Ministry of Finance, were 'by no means disposed to risk any further advances in support of an institution, which they justly apprehend to be more likely to form an engine of extortion than a Depot of Capital.'[447] In addition, 'None of the base silver money of the country has yet been employed in making bullion for the improved circulation, and it would seem that the progressive withdrawal of the old coin is indispensable for the establishment of the new.'[448] Canning predicted difficulties in the Ministry of Finance when one of the two European merchants given the contract to carry out the improvement of the coinage and to prevent fluctuation in the rates of exchange refused to have further dealings with his associate. The statement he made in justification of this action suggested to Canning that 'the measures hitherto adopted by the porte have no solid foundation, that the pledges given by the Turkish Minister in

order to obtain permanent support have not been redeemed, and that the interests of the public are continually sacrificed to two or three powerful functionaries and their corrupt confidants.'[449]

It was within the context of the Porte's failure to effect any fundamental and deep-rooted reforms that the Sultan issued a Hatt-ı Şerif on 4 Muharrem 1261 (12 January 1845).[450] His aim was to chastise his ministers for their ineffectiveness and to urge them to introduce further reforms in an attempt to regain their credibility and the people's confidence, which had been lost in their defeat over the Apostasy Question. In this document, the Sultan expressed his dismay that, despite efforts to carry out the reforms, until then 'with the exception of military reforms, none of our various projects has had a favourable outcome; ...'[451] He said that words could not express the distress this fact caused him, for he had repeatedly explained his wishes to his ministers, and had tried to make them work together for the good of the country. He now ordered the Grand Vizier (Rauf Pasha) and the other ministers to discuss the measures necessary to bring about the prosperity of the Empire and the well-being of his subjects, using their combined effort and intelligence. Most important of all was the elimination of ignorance in both religious and temporal matters, and to this end he considered the establishment of schools the most urgent necessity. The ministers were therefore ordered to found schools in suitable places and organise public education. The Sultan declared that he also intended to establish, as a pious foundation, a large hospital for foreigners and the poor.[452] He ordered his ministers to consider very carefully the means to found these establishments as soon as possible, and to present reports to him for his approval.

This Hatt-ı Şerif was clearly meant as a warning to the ministers, in whom the

Sultan had lost confidence since Canning's victory over the Apostasy Question. It appears that he was beginning to consider alternatives for the improvement of conditions within his Empire. The ministers of the Porte, realising the threat to their positions, attempted to regain the Sultan's confidence by declaring that they would introduce administrative reforms. On 24 February 1845, the ministers' reply appeared in the official newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi*;[453] Canning was given an advance copy of it by Şekib Efendi. The document outlined the measures which the ministers planned to take in order to carry out the Sultan's wishes, as follows: Each district was to send two men to Istanbul to be consulted. They were to be called separately to the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye and questioned on the most appropriate measures to make their districts flourish, to extend commercial activities, and to make the interests of their citizens prosper; and on the measures which would have to be taken, according to the particular circumstances of each district, in the interests of the well-being of the inhabitants, so that the necessary arrangements could be made for the accomplishment of the Sultan's instructions. These people were then to be sent back to their own districts. To this end the Grand Vizier wrote to the pashas and governors instructing them to choose two men from among the notables and Primates of each sancak to be sent to Istanbul. These men were to be loyal and well informed on all aspects of their district, and able to indicate the most suitable means to assure the well-being and prosperity of both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. At the same time the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye deliberated on which administrative measures to take.

Canning was sceptical as to the sincerity of the sentiments expressed in this document. 'But,' he added, 'it would not be easy to obtain a stronger testimony to the soundness of that policy which has been so frequently recommended by this Embassy.'

The ministers had 'given to this policy, which they had not previously adopted, an impulse which it will require more strength than theirs to stop.'[454]

By playing upon the Sultan's loss of confidence in his ministers, Canning managed to obtain the dismissal of Rıza Pasha from the post of Serasker in August 1845; several other ministers were replaced at this time. In addition, Reshid was reinstated as Foreign Minister on 23 October of that year.[455] Canning saw Rıza as the cause of all the Porte's problems with regard to the reform programme but, as he found that he could not influence him, he turned against him openly.

> 'Had he [Rıza Pasha] limited the numbers while bettering the condition of the army; had he discouraged extortion and cruelty; had he relieved the industrious classes, promoted agriculture, restrained fanaticism, upheld the privileges of commerce according to Treaty, protected the Christians, and cultivated earnestly the good will and confidence of Foreign states, he might have retained the favour of his sovereign, and advanced by six years the improvement of his country.'[456]

Reshid's new ministry gave reforming priority to the administration of the Porte's finances over the military. All Canning's hopes of seeing the implementation of his preferred reforms now rested with Reshid. He observed that Reshid would have to overcome many obstacles, for:

> 'The habits of corruption are become more inveterate; with a few partial exceptions the impoverishment of the people has increased; appearances, which cover an abyss, are to be kept up in the army and in the mint; monopolies, and other infringements on the system of commercial reform, must be either abandoned at a loss or retained with inconsistency and discredit. The army alone consumes two thirds [£3m][457] of the Regular Revenue, to say nothing of it's [*sic*] disastrous pressure on agricultural industry ...'[458]

Nevertheless Canning was hopeful that 'the present administration will act up to the pretention of being an improvement on the last.'[459] He acknowledged that even if a more enlightened policy were to be adopted by the Ottoman government, it would meet

with difficulties 'in the selection and execution of the measures best calculated to give it effect. The members of the Council are by no means equally prepared for carrying out a scheme of practical reform; among the candidates for official employment in the provinces there are few untainted with the vices of the older system ...'[460] On the other hand, Canning was pleased to observe that the Sultan was 'solemnly pledged to a course of policy which cannot even in semblance be pursued without checking the progress of evil, and rendering a return to the old system of bigotry, misrule, and commercial restriction from day to day more difficult.'[461]

Canning saw Reshid's principal difficulties to be 'the deficient state of the revenue, and the arrears due to the Army.'[462] He felt that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be able to lay a solid foundation for future benefits if he could 'establish his influence with the Sultan, and at the same time maintain the present tranquillity, while he gradually checks the flood of corruption, relieves the people from illegal exactions, and diminishes the public expenditure ...'[463] Ali Efendi, the new President of the Council, acknowledged that 'the army was too large, the treasury too low, and the state of the country far from prosperous.'[464] From this, Canning inferred that Ali Efendi planned to make the army more economical. Safveti Pasha, the former Minister of Finance, had left the Treasury '180,000 purses, or about £820,000'[465] in debt, so that the new Minister of Finance declared that he could not assign to the army more than 30,000 purses per month (approximately £1,640,000 per annum).[466] Canning considered the army still to be larger than necessary, but that the Sultan's mind 'had been filled with military notions by Rıza pasha, and those who have succeeded to the late favorite's [*sic*] power are slow to incur the risk of attempting to remove impressions, which have not been weakened by his dismissal.'[467]

In January 1846 Hüsrev Pasha was appointed to the Council. He had formerly been Grand Vizier and Reshid's rival, but the two were now working together. The Sultan's consent to this appointment was 'obtained by Reshid pasha with the view of counteracting the adherents of the late favorite [*sic*], and bringing about that most desirable measure of reform, a reduction of the army.'[468] It is interesting to note that Canning did not oppose Hüsrev Pasha's appointment to the Council, although both he and Ponsonby had earlier criticised him for being corrupt and anti-reformist.[469] This was presumably because the British Ambassador, like the Sultan, wished to see the size of the army reduced. Two weeks after his appointment to the Council, Hüsrev Pasha was promoted to the post of Serasker, replacing Süleyman Pasha. While the new Minister of Finance asserted that he could keep the army at its present size for two-thirds of the costs incurred by Rıza Pasha, Canning observed that it would 'require all the credit and dexterity of the new Serasker to effect any considerable reduction of the army, or to expose the system of plunder which has taken place in the administration of its expences [*sic*].'[470] As a first step, Hüsrev Pasha intended to appoint Emin Pasha at the head of the Military Council. This young officer had finished his education 'with credit and some distinction' at Cambridge, and the Serasker stated that it was his intention to promote those who had studied in Europe and 'not treat them with the same neglect which they had experienced under the late ministry.'[471]

According to Canning, freedom and extension of trade were integral parts of Reshid's reform programme, and the British Ambassador reported that the Porte was ready to encourage an influx of foreign capital and the employment of foreigners in mining and road-building. In addition, the İhtisab tax was abolished on Turkish goods purchased for export by British subjects. Earlier, when the authorities had been

forbidden to levy the tax from the buyer, they had taken it from the vendor. Now, vizieral letters were prepared for the restitution of the money already levied from native vendors.[472] Furthermore, an imperial decree was issued which, among other measures, abolished the İmtiyaz privileges which distinguished between Muslim and Christian subjects of the Porte who engaged in navigation for commercial purposes, and were thus prejudicial to commerce.[473] Manifest and other charges were regulated, and port and customs officials were forbidden to demand any other payment. Captains of the Ottoman merchant navy were to be examined on their knowledge of marine matters and, according to their ability, were to be divided into three classes. All ships would henceforth carry the same mercantile flag.

In April 1846 the Sultan announced that he was to undertake a voyage to the provinces, and Canning took this opportunity to present a memorandum to him which expressed his opinions on the state of the Empire and those measures he considered necessary for its future security.[474] In this memorandum, he told the Sultan that it was imperative for immediate action to be taken, and reminded him that no fundamental improvement in the internal administration of the Empire had taken place; 'in more than one case the Sultan's benevolent intentions have been frustrated with impunity by the weakness, the corruption or the perversity of provincial functionaries.'[475] The most important things were 'the benevolence of Europe, the affectionate loyalty of the non-Muslim subjects, the progress of the people in the sciences and industry, and finally, the development of its [the Empire's] natural resources'.[476] Because, argued Canning, a political system founded on prejudice and dependent for success on violence, injustice and cruelty would not gain the Porte the affection of its own subjects or the friendship of the Christian Powers, it was imperative for justice to be administered for the benefit

of all the Sultan's subjects: the protection of life, wealth and honour must not be a privilege of race or birth. Canning acknowledged that the independence and sovereign rights of nations should be protected from attack, but warned that in times of crisis foreign countries respect them only in proportion to the interest they attach to their maintenance. In this context, monopolies and impediments to commerce were obstacles to the sympathy of Europe, and if the Ottoman Empire wanted to base its independence on the solid foundation of its own resources, the first step would be to create barriers against 'illegal exactions, ... corruption, and the abuse of arbitrary power.'[477] Canning, as 'a friend of the Empire', asked if there was any way, under the Muslim constitution, to stop corruption; to make taxes and military service seem less onerous to people of all classes; to rectify the administration of justice; to use the knowledge and capital of foreign entrepreneurs in the service of the Empire; and to remedy the abuses which hindered the execution of treaties and therefore of commerce.

The purpose of the Sultan's voyage to the provinces was to ascertain for himself their situation so that he could contribute to the well-being of his subjects. Reshid joined Abdulmecid on this voyage as Foreign Minister. In Edirne he gave a speech to the representatives of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire on behalf of the Sultan, saying that all Ottoman subjects should unite, for they were all born in the same country and held the same nationality.[478]

On his return to Istanbul in June 1846 the Sultan presented a Hatt-ı Şerif to the Grand Vizier (Rauf Pasha) in which he outlined his findings, the measures he had taken, and those he wished to see taken by his ministers.[479] The Sultan reported that in each place he had visited, the local officials had been brought into his presence and instructed that every subject should be able to benefit from the rights of an equal justice

for all. He now intended to keep himself informed of all measures taken to ensure this aim. As soon as he had arrived at Edirne he had ordered work to be carried out to clear the Maritza river and the port of Enos, a project which would benefit the whole of the European part of the Empire. He had also ordered the suppression of the customs duty for Edirne and other towns in the region, and its abolition in Bursa, Konya and Tokat.

The Sultan had recognised, before he had left on his journey, that the _htisab tax on food and animals was prejudicial against agriculture and commerce, and had ordered his ministers to solve this problem. What he had learned while he was away had confirmed him in his views, and he now ordered the abolition of the _htisab with effect from the following March (1847), the beginning of the new financial year.

The Sultan also stated in his Hatt-ı_ Şerif that he had been very satisfied with the improvement in the lives of the peasants and the progress in commerce in every district he had visited, but he considered further measures still to be necessary, and he would inform the Council of them. He hoped that his ministers would do everything they could to execute his will. The militia (zaptiye) responsible for policing the provinces were unable to maintain public security, and he wanted prompt measures taken to ensure the peace in each province. As a result of the Sultan's visit to the provinces, in the autumn of 1846 the administrative regions of the Empire were changed. The twenty-eight provinces of Mahmud II's time were increased to thirty-seven, with fifteen in Europe, nineteen in Anatolia, Syria, Iraq and Arabia, and three in Africa. Within these provinces there were 162 livas (or sancaks, sub-divisions of a province) and 1,267 kazas (districts).[480] Each province was ruled by a governor with the rank of Müşir (Field Marshal), while the livas and kazas were governed by Feriks (Divisional Generals) and Pashas respectively.[481]

According to the same Hatt-ı_ Şerif, the Sultan also greatly desired progress in education, in order to give prosperity to all his subjects and deliver them from ignorance in spiritual as well as worldly matters. He ordered the opening of schools in which the sciences and arts would be taught, and as a result the Meclis-i Muvvakkat (Temporary Council) was established, which derived from the Meclis-i Umur-u Nafia founded by Mahmud II in 1838. The aim of this Temporary Council was to prepare a plan for the improvement of the state education system. Later, the establishment of a permanent council, the Meclis-i Maarif-i Umumiye, was proposed to the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye and was created by imperial ferman on 20 June 1846 under the joint supervision of Reshid Pasha and Rıfat Pasha, President of the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye. It had seven members and was to be responsible for all matters of education.[482]

In fact, the subject of education was a glaring omission in Reshid's reform programme: there is no mention of it in either his 1839 memorandum to Palmerston, nor in the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu. Reform of the Ottoman education system was essential on two levels. On the one hand, educated and trained staff were required to implement the other reforms. These men had to understand the principles underlying the reforms and be able to put them into effect. On the other hand, the people must be educated to accept the new laws that were being passed. By the time he was returned to power, Reshid had come to understand that neglecting the reform of the education system would jeopardise the success of all the other reforms, and he now made it the focus of his attention.

While every village in the Empire had its own school, these were small and usually funded on a voluntary basis. The education reforms introduced minimum

salaries for teachers and an improved curriculum; better textbooks were also provided. At the same time, education was made compulsory, universal and free; in addition, it was attempted to introduce the teaching of Turkish history into Christian and Jewish schools. (1851 saw the beginning of secondary education, with the founding of six schools. However, these schools were suspended almost immediately and the system was not extended into the provinces.) Colleges were founded for the training of civil servants, and military, naval and veterinary officers. Both the Imperial School of Medicine,[483] founded by Mahmud II, and the Agricultural School, founded by Abdulmecid, had half Muslim and half Christian students, although there was no mixing between the two groups.[484] Another educational reform was the opening of an İdadi Mekteb (preparatory school) in the headquarters of each army corps with the aim of providing training for those joining the War Academy.[485]

The Meclis-i Muvvakkat also proposed the establishment of a university, the Darü'l-Fünun, which would teach all arts, social sciences and technical subjects, and would be open to Muslims and non-Muslims. While the building for the university was in progress, another council, the Encümen-i Daniş (Imperial Academy of Arts and Sciences), was established[486] to prepare all its educational requirements. Among the forty members of the Encümen-i Daniş was James Redhouse. All books and other materials used in state schools would be prepared by the Academy, which would also be responsible for the translation of essential books originally written in foreign languages. The Turkish language used in textbooks would be kept simple so that they could be easily understood by the people.[487] It is interesting to note that the British government did not introduce compulsory and universal education until twenty-four years later.[488]

On 28 September 1846 Reshid was promoted from Minister for Foreign Affairs and appointed to the highest position in the state, that of Grand Vizier, as a result of his reforming efforts and in order to give him an opportunity to improve still further the condition of the Empire. In the Hatt-ı Hümayun[489] issued on the occasion, the Sultan repeated that although he was in favour of the reforms declared on 3 November 1839, they had not been put into operation fully, and he now believed that Reshid was the only man capable of achieving this. At the same time, Reshid's closest friend, Ali Pasha, was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. In Britain, Aberdeen was replaced as Foreign Secretary by Palmerston, whose main priority was the reform of the military; but, while Aberdeen had advocated improvements in its administration and discipline, Palmerston's primary concern was to obtain the recruitment of Christians into the army.[490] Cowley, acting British Ambassador to Istanbul in Canning's absence, was instructed to tell Reshid that 'the employment of Christians in the services of the Sultan would, if it were properly arranged, be a great and important step towards that general amalgamation of all the subjects of the Sultan in one common mass, with equal rights and privileges, which would be the sure foundation for the future safety of the Turkish Empire and without which that Empire never can be secure.'[491] Palmerston was not in favour of giving command of a Christian regiment to an Ottoman colonel. 'It would seem on the contrary to be far better that each Christian Battalion should be officered entirely by Christians, but of course it would be under the command of some Turkish general of Brigade or Division' until there were Christians 'who by their attainments and military skill, and by their fidelity' had gained the rank of general in the Ottoman army.[492]

In addition, Palmerston was looking for a reform which had not been raised

before by Reshid, Canning or Cowley: that, from the moment a Christian entered the army he would cease to be treated like a non-Muslim subject of the Empire for the rest of his life, 'and should thenceforward be placed in all civil and political respects upon a footing of perfect equality with his Mussulman fellow subjects.'[493] Later, in a despatch to Canning dated 30 October 1847, Palmerston took this idea further, and instructed the British Ambassador that all reform measures should have as their aim equality between Christian and Muslim Ottoman subjects 'in regard to everything connected with rights, privileges and duties, civil and political'.[494] This seems an unrealistic demand, given that the focus of Ottoman reform had moved towards financial matters. There also seems to have been a communication failure between London and Istanbul, for Palmerston appears not to have prepared his representatives to work for such a reform, and his sincerity must be called into question.

Another area of concern connected with the army was the welfare of the soldiers. Even in those peaceful times, annual military casualties outnumbered population growth, and Palmerston saw the time coming when the Muslim population would be too small to provide the necessary number of annual recruits.[495] If casualties were higher than they should be, Palmerston suggested that it was because not enough care was taken of the food, clothing and lodgings of the Ottoman soldier. When he fell ill, there were not always proper arrangements to provide him with the extra comforts and attention he required, and good medical aid and medicines were not always available. From the purely economic point of view, it would be cheaper to look after the existing soldiers than to let them die or become disabled and have to replace them. However, Palmerston indicated the political consideration that in time of war the army's situation would be much worse and the sources of national defence would soon dry up.

The British Foreign Secretary also suggested that the scarcity of men from whom recruits could be obtained might seem greater than it was in reality because the 'violent and oppressive' means used in recruitment caused the younger men to flee and hide. The remedy for this would be to make the recruiting officers 'act with more strict justice; and with more discriminating forbearance and indulgence.'[496] There was the additional problem that proper care might not be taken of recruits up to the time they joined their regiments, so that the number of men taken from the population might be much greater than the actual number added to the army. Recruitment should be carried out by men 'not wedded by interest or prejudice to existing abuses, and who having a practical knowledge of the better system which is pursued in other countries',[497] might be able to indicate what was wrong and suggest changes that would remedy matters. Being aware of the power of the Ottoman army to exert pressure on its government, Palmerston saw that it would be difficult to achieve full equality for the Christian subjects of the Empire until this group was fully represented in the army. It is significant that Palmerston did not include all non-Muslim Ottoman subjects in his plans, but only Christians.

On 17 August 1846, Canning returned to London on leave. While he was there, Reshid's power was undermined by the propaganda of one of his opponents, the Serasker Damad Said Pasha, Abdulmecid's brother-in-law: he not only tried to destroy Reshid's public reputation by accusing him of being pro-British, but, at an audience with the Sultan, he also convinced Abdulmecid that the Grand Vizier would one day declare a republic, thereby making the Sultan fear for his position. On 28 April 1848 the Sultan ordered Reshid's seal of office to be taken from him, and İbrahim Sarım Pasha was appointed his successor in the highest office of the state.

* * *

The Porte's reforming priorities changed when Reshid was removed from power in 1841: reform of the army was now at the top of the agenda. Since the abolition of the Janissaries, the Ottoman Empire had not possessed a well trained and disciplined army, which the Porte now considered necessary for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Empire. It was for these reasons that reform of the military was one of the basic principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu. Such reform would obviate the necessity for repeated foreign involvement in crises like the Egyptian Question. However, while priority was given to increasing the numbers of soldiers, Britain would have preferred to see greater discipline and efficiency.

When Canning replaced Ponsonby in Istanbul, his aim was to see wider reforms introduced. His main interest lay in achieving equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. For the first three years of his embassy, he found it very difficult to make any progress with regard to reforms. He was dealing with ministers whose reforming priorities differed from his own, as Reshid had been sent to Paris as Ambassador and the traditionalist party held power. At first, Canning rested his hopes on the influential Rıza Pasha, although he believed him to be motivated primarily by self-interest. However, when he met with opposition to his reforming plans Canning, instead of attempting to work out a compromise with the ministers of the Porte, remained antagonistic towards them. To counteract this opposition, Canning established a good relationship with the Sultan, and used this to have the Grand Vizier, Mehmed İzzet Pasha, dismissed. This move did not, however, improve the situation in

Canning's favour.

More than once during this period Canning painted a grim picture of the political and social life of the Empire which was prompted by his failure to achieve his reforming goals. However, this description was a false one, and Canning was forced to admit that improvements had been made since the time of Mahmud II. Reform was a continuous process and its impact was clearly discernible.

In spite of Canning's opposition to an enlarged Ottoman army, Rıza Pasha increased its size to approximately 150,000 regulars. Archival evidence shows that this was not the large increase in numbers that Canning described. However, military reform was not based solely on increasing the number of soldiers; reforms of army administration were introduced, such as the age limits for recruitment and a reduction in the term of regular service from twelve to five years. In addition, there was some improvement in discipline, equipment, maintenance, and the comfort of soldiers, particularly in and around Istanbul, although standards had not yet improved in the provinces. It is clear that the soldiers required still more education, discipline, organisation, and more good officers.

Despite the difficulties which he encountered, in 1844 Canning did achieve the cessation of the use of capital punishment for apostasy from Islam. This strengthened his position and enabled him in the future to interfere in the internal affairs of the Porte. The Sultan lost confidence in the ability of his ministers to introduce further reforms, and began to take a more active interest in the reform programme. It was therefore easier for Canning to persuade the Sultan that the ministers he had defeated would not be able to contribute further to the improvement of the Empire, and Reshid was reinstated.

While the traditionalist ministers were in power they concentrated on military measures, and reform of the currency was neglected until it became clear that such reform was necessary to finance the implementation of other reforms. During this period Canning discussed the proposed reforms of the currency at great length, but little was achieved at this time. However, upon his return in 1845, Reshid gave priority to reform of the Empire's finances over military matters. He considered the best way to strengthen the Empire was to improve its institutions rather than to increase the size of its army. This coincided with Britain's wish for a smaller, more effective army. Freedom and expansion of trade were integral parts of Reshid's programme, and this period saw the abolition of two systems whose absence facilitated trade for foreigners in the Ottoman Empire: purchase tax on goods destined for export by British subjects, and privileges which distinguished between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects engaged in navigation for commercial purposes.

Reshid finally came to realise that his people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, needed to be educated in order for the other reforms to be effective. He reorganised the administration of the education system, and education was made compulsory, universal and free. Canning, on the other hand, was more interested in the establishment of mixed schools, and quoted the college at Galatasaray as a shining example. However, he contributed little to the reform of the general education system.

Generally speaking, Aberdeen was more interested in reforms which would truly benefit the Ottoman Empire than Palmerston and Canning, who were more concerned to press for reforms that would advance British interests. Palmerston's instruction to Canning that all reform measures were to be designed with the ultimate aim of equality between Christian and Muslim subjects 'in regard to everything

connected with rights, privileges and duties, civil and political'[498] encapsulates this. Palmerston was not interested in the size or effectiveness of the armed forces, but rather in the recruitment into the army of Christians who, from that time, would cease to be treated as non-Muslim subjects. This was a further stage in the overall plan to achieve equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

399. Reshid was appointed Foreign Minister on 24 October 1845, but did not arrive in Istanbul until 11 December 1845.
400. _lhan, S., 'Osmanlı _mparatorlu_u Askeri Yap_s_ içerisinde Tanzimatın Yeri', Belleten, vol. LV, August 1991, p. 572.
401. Bailey, F.A., British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853, Cambridge, 1942, (hereafter, Bailey, Reform), p. 278. The original Turkish reads as follows: 'Asker maddesi dahi ber minvâl-i muharrer mevadd-_ mühimmeden olarak e_erçi muhafaza-i vatan için asker vermek ahalinin fariza-i zimmeti ise de _imdiye kadar câri oldu_u veçhile bir memleketin aded-i nufus-_ mevcudesine bak_lm_yarak kiminden rütbe-i tahammülünden ziyade ve kiminden noksan asker istenilmek hem nizams_zl___ ve hem ziraat ve ticaret mevadd-_ nâfias_n_n ihlâlini mucip oldu_u misullû askerli_e gelenlerin ilânihâyet-il-ömür istihdamlar_ dahi füturu ve kat'-_ tahassülü müstelzim olmakta olmasiyle her memleketten lüzumu takdirinde talep olunacak neferat-_ askeriyye için bâz_ usûl-i hasene ve dört veyahud be_ sene müddeti istihdam z_mn_nda dahi bir tarik-i münavebe vaz' ve tesis olunmas_ îcab-_ haldendir.' Karal, E.Z., Osmanlı Tarihi, Ankara, 1983, vol. V, p. 256.
402. Aberdeen to Canning, 30 October 1841, F.O. 78/439, No. 2.
403. Canning was appointed to this post in October 1841, and arrived in Istanbul in January 1842.
404. Canning to Aberdeen, 11 February 1842, F.O. 78/475, No. 13; Memorandum enclosed in Canning to Aberdeen, 27 March 1842, F.O. 78/476 Part II, No. 67.
405. 'Substance of an article extracted from the Turkish Official Gazette of February 13th 1842', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 16 February 1842, F.O. 78/475, No. 21.
406. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 March 1842, F.O. 78/476 Part II, No. 67.
407. Canning to Aberdeen, 9 June 1842, F.O. 78/478, No. 125, 'Most Secret'.
408. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 March 1842, F.O. 78/476 Part II, No. 67.
409. 'Memorandum on the present policy of the Turkish Administration', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 27 March 1842, F.O. 78/476 Part II, No. 67.
410. Canning to Aberdeen, 9 June 1842, F.O. 78/478, No. 125, 'Most Secret'.
411. Canning to Aberdeen, 1 May 1843, F.O. 78/518, No. 92, 'Confidential'.
412. Canning to Aberdeen, 13 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 260.
413. In this capacity, Rıza Pasha received the military reports from all the provinces as well as from the capital's headquarters, and his office issued imperial orders for the direction and distribution of the whole army.
414. Canning to Aberdeen, 16 June 1843, F.O. 78/519, No. 124.
415. 'Etat des Forces Ottomanes dans l'Anatolie remis par S.E. Rechid Pacha à S. E. le Très Honorable Lord Ponsonby, le 19 juillet 1838', enclosure in Ponsonby to Palmerston, 23 July 1838, F.O. 195/150, No. 172. It appears that Tacan has underestimated the total strength of the Ottoman armed forces. He states a figure of 118,400 in 1839 for the whole of the Empire (Tacan, N., 'Tanzimat ve Ordu', Tanzimat I, p. 13), without giving a source. Karal also gives the same number as Tacan. Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. VI, p. 157.
416. See also Canning to Aberdeen, 29 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 35.
417. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 July 1843, F.O. 78/520, No. 155.
418. Canning to Aberdeen, 31 July 1843, F.O. 78/520, No. 159.
419. Canning to Aberdeen, 13 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 260.
420. On 6 September 1843; Karal, A.Z., Osmanlı Tarihi, Ankara, 1983, vol. V, pp. 178-9.
421. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 September 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 202.
422. 'Copy of Canning's Memorandum privately transmitted to Rıza Pasha, October 1843', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 51. The original document is not to be found in the 1843 files.
423. Canning to Aberdeen, 20 March 1845, F.O. 78/595, No. 71.
424. Canning to Aberdeen, 30 September 1844, F.O. 78/561, No. 212.
425. Canning to Aberdeen, 11 October 1844, F.O. 78/562, No. 223, 'Confidential'.
426. Ibid.

427. Canning to Aberdeen, 16 November 1844, F.O. 78/563, No. 256; Canning to Aberdeen, 22 November 1844, F.O. 78/563, No. 264.
428. 'Memorandum on the strength and general state of the Turkish Army for the Information of His Excellency Sir Stratford Canning', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 May 1845, F.O. 78/597, No. 108. Dickson compiled his report from information obtained by 'personal enquiry of Turkish Officers, and other individuals connected with the service.'
429. Canning to Aberdeen, 3 May 1845, F.O. 78/597, No. 108.
430. 'Memorandum on the strength and general state of the Turkish Army for the Information of His Excellency Sir Stratford Canning', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 May 1845, F.O. 78/597, No. 108.
431. 'Memorandum on the strength and general state of the Turkish Army for the Information of His Excellency Sir Stratford Canning', Enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 May 1845, F.O. 78/597, No. 108.
432. 'Copy of Canning's Memorandum privately transmitted to Rıza Pasha, October 1843', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 51.
433. The memorandum is, in fact, enclosed with a despatch from Canning to Palmerston dated 31 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 51, and Canning refers to it as follows: 'The important truths which I endeavoured to impress upon his [Rıza Pasha's] mind five years ago, are substantially contained in the paper inclosed herewith, and it was in consequence of his fruitless counteraction of measures to which they pointed as means of promoting His Sovereign's real interest, that I contributed so largely to his removal from power two years afterwards.' Rıza Pasha was, indeed, dismissed in 1845. This clearly refers to 1843; even if Canning's observations on the college date to 1848, they still predate the imperial ferman by twenty years. For the college at Galatasaray, see Sungu, _., 'Galatasaray Lisesinin Kurulu_u' Belleten, vol. VII, No. 28, Ankara, 1943, pp. 315-47.
434. 'Copy of Canning's Memorandum privately transmitted to Rıza Pasha, October 1843', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 51.
435. Ibid.
436. This was on 8 June 1842 at a private audience with the Sultan, attended only by Rıza Pasha and an interpreter. Canning to Aberdeen, 9 June 1842, F.O. 78/478, No. 125, 'Most Secret'.
437. Mehmed İzzet Pasha was replaced by Rauf Pasha, although Bailey states that his successor was Rıza Pasha. Bailey, Reform, p. 211. Rıza Pasha never, in fact, became Grand Vizier.
438. 'Copy of Canning's Memorandum privately transmitted to Rıza Pasha, October 1843', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 51.
439. Canning to Aberdeen, 1 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 250.
440. 'Copy of Canning's Memorandum privately transmitted to Rıza Pasha, October 1843', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 51.
441. Ibid.
442. Canning to Aberdeen, 13 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 260.
443. Ibid.
444. See Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of the Apostasy Question.
445. Canning to Aberdeen, 2 February 1845, F.O. 78/594, Part I, No. 18.
446. The Ottoman Bank was eventually established in 1856. Yapp, M.E., The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923, London, 1987, p. 118.
447. Canning to Aberdeen, 5 March 1845, F.O. 78/595, No. 47, 'Confidential'.
448. Canning to Aberdeen, 2 February 1845, F.O. 78/594, Part I, No. 18.
449. Canning to Aberdeen, 20 March 1845, F.O. 78/595, No. 71.
450. 'Traduction du Hatti-Chérif lû à la Sublime Porte en présence de Sa Hautesse, le 4 de moharrem, 1261, (12 janvier 1845)', Supplément au No. 203 du Moniteur Ottoman, enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 2 February 1845, F.O. 78/594, Part I, No. 18.
451. Ibid: 'à l'exception de la réforme militaire, aucun de nos différens projets n'a eu un bon résultat; ...'
452. The building of a hospital for the poor (Gurabâ) was begun in Yenibahçe in Istanbul the same

year.

453. 'Article que va paraitre dans la Gazette Officielle Turque 24th Février [sic] 1845', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 26 February 1845, F.O. 78/594, Part II, No. 37.
454. Canning to Aberdeen, 26 February 1845, F.O. 78/594, Part II, No. 37.
455. Canning to Aberdeen, 23 October 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 246.
456. Canning to Aberdeen, 30 October 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 248.
457. Canning to Aberdeen, 19 November 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 268. Here, Canning repeats the figure of two-thirds of the revenue, adding the amount in sterling: 'The expenses of the Army amounted under the late Ministry to little short of two thirds of the ordinary revenue, or about three millions sterling.' This means that the total revenue was approximately £4.5m.
458. Canning to Aberdeen, 30 October 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 248.
459. Canning to Aberdeen, 16 August 1845, F.O. 78/600, No. 192.
460. Canning to Aberdeen, 30 April 1846, F.O. 78/639, No. 73.
461. Canning to Palmerston, 11 July 1846, F.O. 78/641, No. 121.
462. Ibid.
463. Canning to Aberdeen, 19 January 1846, F.O. 78/637, No. 8.
464. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 August 1845, F.O. 78/600, No. 195.
465. Canning to Aberdeen, 19 November 1845, F.O. 78/602.
466. Canning to Aberdeen, 19 November 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 268. This gives an exchange rate of 1 purse = £4.55.
467. Ibid. Canning expressed the same opinion in Canning to Aberdeen, 19 January 1846, F.O. 78/637, No. 8.
468. Canning to Aberdeen, 3 January 1846, F. O. 78/637, No. 2.
469. See, for example, Canning to Palmerston, 7 March 1832, F.O. 78/209, No. 12, 'Confidential'; Ponsonby to Palmerston, 8 June 1840, F.O. 78/394, No. 116.
470. Canning to Aberdeen, 2 February 1846, F.O. 78/637, No. 16.
471. Ibid.
472. Canning to Aberdeen, 18 March 1846, F.O. 78/638, No. 44.
473. 'Supplement au Moniteur Ottoman, Traduction d'une Ordonnance impériale sur la Marine Marchande, en date du 19 de rebiul-akhir 1262 (16 avril 1846)', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 30 April 1846, F.O. 78/639, No. 70.
474. 'Memorandum to the Sultan', 30 April 1846, F.O. 78/639, No. 73.
475. Ibid: 'dans plus d'un cas les intentions bienveillantes du Sultan ont été impunément frustrées par la faiblesse, par la corruption, ou par la perversité des fontionnaires provinciaux.'
476. Ibid: 'la bienveillance de l'Europe, la loyaute [sic] affectueuse des Rayas, l'avancement du peuple dans les sciences et l'industrie, c'est enfin la développement de ses ressources territoriales'.
477. Ibid: 'les exactions illégales, ... la corruption, et l'abus de l'arbitraire.'
478. 'Hepimiz bir hükümetin teb'as_ ve bir memlekette do_up-büyümü_ vatanda_lar oldu_umuz için birbirimizi fena gözle görmemiz, asla münasip olmaz.' Eren, A.C., 'Tanzimat', _slam Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul, 1970, vol. 11, (hereafter, Eren, 'Tanzimat') p. 727. Karal states that Rıza Pasha gave a similar speech in his capacity as Grand Vizier, although Rıza Pasha never held that office. Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, p. 171. Karal does not include Rıza Pasha in his list of Grand Viziers (pp. 252-3).
479. 'Hatt-ı_ Şerif published at the porte on the 23rd June', Enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 25 June 1846, F.O. 78/640, No. 112.
480. Eren, 'Tanzimat', p. 729.
481. İnalcık H., Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi, (Doktora Tezi'nin 50. Yıl_) Istanbul, 1992, p. 186.
482. Gencer, A._., 'Encümen-i Dani_ ve Mustafa Reşid Paşa', Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri: Bildiriler, Istanbul, 1985, pp. 32-3.
483. For more information on the Imperial School of Medicine, see Tahsin, R., T_p Fakültesi Tarihçesi, Istanbul, 1991.
484. Templerley, H., England and the Near East: The Crimea, London, 1936, (hereafter, Temperley, The Crimea) pp. 234-5.

485. Ergin, O., Türkiye Maârif Tarihi, 5 vols., Istanbul, 1940, vol. II, p. 310.
486. On 15 April 1851.
487. Gencer, op. cit., p. 34.
488. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 235.
489. Takvim-i Vekayi, No. 305, 1262 (1846), Istanbul; also for abstract of the Hatt-ı_ Hümayun, see Baysun, 'Mustafa Re_id', p. 738.
490. Palmerston to Lord Cowley, 27 September 1847, F.O. 78/675, No. 253.
491. Ibid.
492. Ibid.
493. Ibid.
494. Palmerston to Canning, 30 October 1847, F.O. 78/691, No. 1.
495. Ibid. In 1844 the total population of the Ottoman Empire was approximately 35 million, of which 21 million were Muslim and 14 million non-Muslim. Eren, 'Tanzimat', p. 729.
496. Palmerston to Lord Cowley, 27 September 1847, F.O. 78/675, No. 253.
497. Ibid.
498. Palmerston to Canning, 30 October 1847, F.O. 78/691, No. 1.

CHAPTER 6

PRIORITIES 1848-1852

When Canning returned to Istanbul in June 1848 he immediately set to work to obtain Reshid's return to power by using his good relationship with Abdulmecid to influence the Sultan. He achieved this when Reshid was appointed to the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye and became Grand Vizier for the second time in August 1848.[499] In 1852, Canning recalled how he had accomplished this by 'inducing the Sultan to remove İbrahim Sarım Pasha from that office.'[500] Of the five times that Reshid held the position, this was the longest tenure, lasting three-and-a-half years. Rıza Pasha, acknowledging Canning's power to influence the appointment and dismissal of ministers, expressed his regret to Canning for the line which he had previously taken in opposition to Canning's advice, assuring him that 'his impressions were completely altered', and that in future he would find him 'a steady friend and supporter.'[501] The British Ambassador was not totally convinced of the minister's sincerity: 'How this will be in reality time will shew.'[502]

With both Reshid and Canning working on the reform programme together, this was a productive period as far as reforms were concerned. Priority was not given to any one area of reform, but wide-ranging issues were tackled: the army; financial administration; the status of non-Muslim subjects, including the admission of Christian evidence in criminal cases, the recruitment of Christians into the army and the haraç; taxation; infrastructure; commerce; and the administration of justice. Canning had been waiting for such a situation, when he believed that he would be able to achieve his reforms, but he was to be disappointed when some of the reform measures in which he was particularly interested failed to be implemented.

As we saw in the previous chapter, Palmerston was especially interested in the recruitment of non-Muslims into the Ottoman army. His fear concerning the dwindling number of men available for recruitment into the Ottoman army seemed to be confirmed when, in July 1848, Rıza Pasha declared '... that the Mussulman subjects of the Empire would not suffice to furnish the requisite number of recruits for the Turkish Army next year.'[503] Nevertheless, Rıza Pasha does not seem to have given up his demands for large sums of money for the army. In January 1849 Canning speculated on the reason for the dismissal of Nafiz Pasha, the Minister of Finance: 'The Commander in Chief of the Forces, Rıza pasha, had long complained of the late minister's reluctance to afford him the necessary supplies for his department.'[504] Three months later, Rıza Pasha was dismissed in his turn,[505] and replaced by Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Sultan's brother-in-law. For some time Rıza Pasha had been out of favour with the Sultan, who viewed his power as the head of the army as a cause for mistrust.

In March 1849, Mehmed Ali Pasha indicated that the strength of the army was 100,000 regulars and 60,000 reserve, though Canning reckoned the number of effective reserves to be 30,000 at most.[506] However, Col. Rose's memorandum, written in July 1850,[507] gives details which contradict Mehmed Ali Pasha's figures. According to Rose's memorandum the Porte had increased the number of corps in the army from five to six, the newly created corps being stationed at Baghdad. Rose gives the following information on each corps:

CORPS OF THE OTTOMAN ARMY

Corps	Name	Commander	Headquarters
1	Dersaadet Ordusu (Istanbul Corps)	The Serasker	Istanbul
2	Hassa Ordusu (Imperial Guards Corps)	Mahmud Pasha	Üsküdar
3	Avrupa Ordusu (Europe Corps)	Ömer Pasha	Monastir
4	Anadolu Ordusu (Anatolia Corps)	Re_id Pasha	Harput
5	Arabistan Ordusu (Arabia Corps)	Emin Pasha	Damascus
6	Irak Ordusu (Iraq Corps)	Namık Pasha	Baghdad

The nominal strength of each corps was as follows:

		Officers	Men	Total
Cavalry	4 Regiments	38	1,000	4,152
Artillery	1 Regiment	62	1,736	1,798
Infantry	6 Regiments	130	3,000	18,780
				24,730

The figure of 24,730 men in each corps is as near as the information in the document allows us to approach the given number of 25,000. In addition, there was one regiment of reserve artillery; two regiments of sappers and miners; and four regiments of 'Artillery of the Straits', making a nominal total for the whole of the Ottoman army of 155,914 men.

Col. Rose's report, which is preserved in the Foreign Office archives, clearly shows that in 1850 the Ottoman army was larger than Mehmed Ali Pasha indicated to Canning. Although Rose relied on Ottoman officials for his information, he was an

army officer with great experience in the Ottoman Empire, and his written report must be considered more reliable than the verbal figures indicated by Mehmed Ali Pasha to Canning. Furthermore, we do not know on what occasion the Serasker gave Canning these figures, and it is possible that he deliberately underestimated the size of the army because Canning was against a large increase. Also, as discussed in the previous chapter, the extra corps had been created in Iraq since the number of 151,200 was reported in 1845, so the total in 1850 was unlikely to be less than that figure. When we compare the 1845 and 1850 figures, we see that the difference in the size of the Ottoman army was negligible. However, the cavalry was more than doubled (from 12,000 in 1845 to 24,912 in 1850), while the infantry was reduced by about 14,000 (129,600 in 1845 to 112,680 in 1850).

Upon being appointed Serasker, Mehmed Ali Pasha acknowledged the necessity for considerable changes in the army. Perhaps encouraged by this, Canning began to press for the recruitment of Christians into the Ottoman army.[508] He argued that the fact that only Muslims were enlisted was endangering the very existence of the Empire. However, he insisted that if the distinction were to be eliminated completely, all classes of the population would have to be placed on an equal footing as regards civil rights. A half measure could be effected immediately: Canning suggested that the right of Muslims to pay for exemption from military service be extended to non-Muslims.[509] This tax should be collected by their respective millets. But this would not be possible if non-Muslims continued also to pay the haraç, which was not paid by Muslims. The haraç must therefore be abolished or suspended, thereby eliminating both a major cause of weakness to the Empire, the shortage of soldiers, and the 'humiliating distinction which, more than anything, engenders disunion among the

Sultan's subjects, and alienates the affections of a numerous population from His Majesty's Government.' In this, Canning demonstrated a somewhat different attitude to the condition of non-Muslim subjects from the one he held in 1843.[510] Now he was acting under Palmerston's instructions.

In accordance with these instructions, Canning also took up the matter of the admission of the evidence of Christian witnesses in criminal cases. There was a progression in the reforms which Canning brought before the Porte: first, general reform of the military, which led to the matter of the recruitment of Christians into the army; this in turn led to other reforms concerning the Christian subjects of the Empire. Canning thereby laid the foundation for further reforms which would lead to full equality for Christian Ottoman subjects, Britain's ultimate goal. In an official note which Canning addressed to Rıfat Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister,[511] he complained that on the eve of his departure from Istanbul over two years previously (in 1846) he had asked for immediate attention to be paid to the matter of Christian evidence being admissible in the criminal courts, but as yet no steps had been taken in this direction. The particular case in question was the murder of a young Englishman and his interpreter. The murderers had been arrested and brought to trial. According to Canning's report, the guilt of at least three of them had been 'clearly established on the evidence of a Christian eye-witness, and it might have been further corroborated by the testimony of a Mussulman eye-witness if practice of the court had not annulled the effect of the whole evidence by requiring that both witnesses should be Mahometans.'[512] Canning maintained that this requirement gave murder equal status to far lesser crimes and limited the penalty to a few years' imprisonment, 'thereby encouraging rather than repressing crime, and exposing society after a short interval to

fresh acts of violence from the same desperate characters.' He warned that the question should be settled without further delay if the Porte wished 'to obtain credit for a sincere law of justice, ... to remove humiliating distinctions, to deserve the support of its friends, and to surround the Sultan's throne with grateful subjects and the sympathies of Europe.'

On receipt of Canning's note, Rıfat Pasha indicated that 'he thought the moment selected for its presentation unfavourable.'[513] Archival sources show that this did not, however, deter the British Ambassador from pressing urgently for reforms concerning the status of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects; he sent a memorandum[514] privately to the Sultan on the matter, putting it in the wider context of the revolutionary wave which was engulfing Europe. This tide of revolution had spread eastwards and had 'caused a partial revolution even within the limits of the Ottoman Empire, which wore so lately the appearance of complete tranquillity.' Canning maintained that: 'Millions differing from the Mussulman population, in language, creed, and race, ... are still governed on principles humiliating to all, oppressive to many, and offensive to the whole of Christendom.' In order to counteract the propagation of revolutionary ideas, Canning advised the Sultan that it was becoming daily more urgent for measures to be adopted which might enable his Christian subjects 'to feel a cordial interest in the prosperity of the Empire, and prompt them not only to abstain from disturbing its peace, but even to hazard their lives and fortunes in its defence.' This issue had become one of prime importance in the light of Rıza Pasha's announcement concerning the lack of men available for recruitment into the army. Canning argued that Muslims as well as Christians would benefit by such reforms, but that if they were not carried out very soon the feeling of discontent would grow, and a large part of the Ottoman population

would fix its hopes on the sympathy of foreign powers. The time had now arrived, urged Canning, 'for counteracting so imminent a danger, for realizing long cherished hopes, and performing promises often repeated, ... but may soon pass away without the possibility of a return.'[515] The Sultan appeared to accept the importance of the contents of Canning's memorandum,[516] but over a month later Canning had heard nothing more on the subject and concluded that the return of tranquillity in Europe, and especially France, had persuaded the Sultan to postpone any action he may have been contemplating until some other cause for alarm occurred.[517] Perhaps Canning decided to bide his time and not pursue the matter for the time being for fear of harming his relationship with the Sultan, with whom he needed to be on good terms for more important and far-reaching reforms in the future.

Upon seeing the report of a meeting between Canning and Rıfat Pasha,[518] the Sultan ordered his Minister for Foreign Affairs to discuss with his colleagues the points which Canning had brought up at the meeting. These points included the continued application of monopolies; the status of the evidence of Christians in criminal courts; the use of torture in the provinces; and the corruption of provincial officials. During the meeting with Rıfat Pasha, Canning put the necessary reforms in the wider context of combatting revolutionary movements, and warned: 'It is through the continuance of abuses, the indefinite evasion of justice, the customary inattention to the complaints of the people, that the way is open to political innovations and to the success of the ambitions of the masses.'[519] He repeated that the application of the principles of Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu would benefit Muslims as well as non-Muslims, but advised that more than good will and good measures were necessary. What was required was the choice of capable individuals who were sincerely disposed towards

reform. Authority was all too often given to men who exercised corruption and cruelty. They were punished for a few months and then reappeared among those who enjoyed the government's confidence. The choice of these men was not necessary, Canning maintained: good men were not so rare as was claimed by those opposed to reform.

In December 1848 Canning noted in a despatch that a commission for reform, with particular responsibility for the question of judicial evidence, continued to sit at the Porte.[520] However, he was not hopeful of a satisfactory or definitive result in this regard until the completion of the new embassy building at Pera, for contact with the Ottoman ministers was not easy from the temporary embassy at Therapia. Furthermore, he conjectured that Reshid and his followers were meeting with greater difficulties in the Council than they had expected, and that the Sultan, 'however well-disposed at heart, ... [had been] induced by some less liberal influence to view with increased timidity any innovation opposed to long established usage and national prejudice.' Indeed, the Sultan was probably still worried by the alleged threat of a republic by which Said Pasha, his brother-in-law, had obtained Reshid's dismissal earlier that year. We have seen that Abdulmecid was in favour of reforms which would improve the general well-being of all his subjects, but he came under stronger pressure from traditionalist groups when it was a matter of granting increased status to his non-Muslim subjects. Although the admission of Christian evidence in criminal courts would not directly weaken the Sultan's power, the traditionalists no doubt impressed upon his mind that this reform would lead to others which would jeopardise his position. Hindsight shows that this was indeed a correct reading of the situation, for the non-Muslim subjects were seeking ways of gaining their independence, and these reforms opened the way for the Foreign Powers to increase their influence within the

Empire. Undoubtedly, the reforms concerning non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were just and proper, and if they had been implemented at a time when the Empire was strong, its independence would not have been threatened either then or in the period under study. As it was, they came at a time when the Ottoman Empire was fighting for its survival, and the influence of the Foreign Powers was on the increase. Abdulmecid was right to favour general reforms of the administration which would benefit and unite all his subjects, instead of those measures which tended to divide the people by enhancing the status of one group only. It would have been better if these reforms had been delayed until the Empire was again strong enough to defend its integrity and independence. The aim was admirable, but the timing inopportune.

In the same despatch, Canning recalled that several months previously he had made suggestions to Reshid and Ali Pasha on the deficiencies of provincial councils, and he found it satisfactory that appointments had recently been made in order to introduce experimental improvements at Bursa, Edirne and Beyrut. In each of those places, the council was to have a president sent from Istanbul, and accompanied by a Müftü as vice-president.

Canning was anxious to discuss the reforms with the Sultan before the report of the commission, 'of which I hear nothing satisfactory, should be definitively prepared.'[521] He managed to do this at a confidential meeting with the Sultan, at which Reshid acted as interpreter. Canning received Abdulmecid's assurance that he and his ministers were prepared to put into effect 'impartial justice and principles of equity applied to all', as a means of maintaining tranquillity within the Empire, and took Britain as 'proof of the advantages to be derived from a good system of Government'. Following this audience, Canning submitted a memorandum to Abdulmecid[522] in

which he urged on the Sultan the necessity for 'those long-expected acts of benevolence which may bind all classes to the Sultan and engage on his behalf the sympathy of foreign nations.' Canning realised that Abdulmecid was in all likelihood afraid of relinquishing his authority, and assured the Sultan that there was no question of him losing any of his power; on the contrary, he affirmed that these reforms would increase the Sultan's authority and the independence of the Empire. Canning insisted that the commission of reform be compelled to carry out its duties. These included the implementation of a just collection of the revenue; protection of subjects from cruelty and extortion; an equal distribution of justice; and the abolition of the haraç. These measures, according to Canning, would increase Treasury receipts; encourage industry; and open up new resources for the military, a subject which Canning realised particularly interested the Sultan. At another audience with the Abdulmecid, in August 1849,[523] Canning encouraged him to continue with the policies which he had been advocating. On this occasion he laid emphasis on a just and benevolent system of administration extending to all classes; a careful selection of civil servants; punishment for those who dared to disobey the Sultan's commands; attention to those reforms which would lead to general prosperity and national strength; and the encouragement of commerce.

The British Ambassador also approached Reshid,[524] reminding the Grand Vizier of the dangers to which nations were exposed at that time from the discontent of their people, and of 'the discredit eventually accruing to himself [Reshid] from a prolonged enjoyment of power unaccompanied with a fulfilment of his preceding promises.' In fact, Canning was becoming impatient with Reshid's failure to carry out those reforms which they had been planning for so many years. Reshid made the

excuse that he lacked the support of his colleagues, but promised Canning that he would receive the commission's report shortly, before the Council had made any final decisions upon its recommendations. Canning expected little from this except, perhaps, a foundation for the future.

In February 1850, Reshid informed Canning that he had made some progress with the Council concerning matters of reform and expected soon to be able to communicate some interesting development on the questions of Christian evidence and the haraç.[525] With respect to defence, the Council was disposed to follow Britain's advice, but the Sultan 'saw danger in some of the proposed measures, and looked, for instance, with little or no favour on the plan of raising a loan or admitting the Christian population to military service.' A development in the matter of the haraç came in May 1850 with a Buruldu (rescript) from the Porte to the Patriarchs of the three Christian millets (Orthodox, Catholic and Armenian) and the Chief Rabbi on 14 Receb 1266 (26 May 1850).[526] This set out new regulations for collecting the tax. The existing arrangement was for each individual to pay his own tax, but it was understood that this method of collection was open to abuse. Under the new system, which was that used at the beginning of the Tanzimat period, the tax was to be collected by the head of each millet, according to the situation and age of each individual. The three Patriarchs and the Chief Rabbi were then to consign the money to the Treasury. These men were to be sure to collect and deliver the tax at the appointed time in order to keep the state finances in order, and to avoid any harassment of those liable to pay the tax. They were to convene the appropriate councils, which were to deliberate on the question, and then present a report to the Porte, signed by all, indicating the elected method of collecting the tax and consigning the revenue to the Treasury. The Porte issued more detailed

instructions to the Patriarchs in December 1850,[527] which Reshid told Canning he considered a temporary measure which might be made more complete at a later date. The stated objectives in giving these new regulations were to collect the tax in a way convenient to both the contributors and the Treasury, and to eliminate abuse, which still existed. All the guilds of those belonging to the Greek millet were to pay collectively a sum stipulated each year by the Treasury. It was to be collected only by those persons responsible for the administration of finance in a particular province or sancak; they were to issue receipts and deposit the takings in the public cashbox on a daily basis. The archbishop was to name the people who were to accompany the collector. So that the Treasury would not suffer losses, and because the Primates knew better than anyone the means of each person, the heads of the millets would be responsible for the smooth-running of the system. They were also to be held responsible if the tax were not collected at the appointed time and if arrears were allowed to mount up. Each would pay according to his means and only in the place where he lived and was registered, not where he happened to be temporarily. In the future no haraç papers would be issued to an individual.

Canning reported[528] the state of the Treasury to be improved under Hüsni Efendi, the new Minister of Finance, and amounting to 800m piasters (approximately £7.3m) in the financial year ended 12 March 1849. He was also informed that 'the increase on the preceding year amounts to about fifty millions Turkish [piasters], that the revenue has given indications of improvement during the last five years, and that before that period the annual receipts of the Treasury did not greatly exceed six hundred millions.'[529] Unfortunately, expenditure was also increasing: 'It exceeded the public income last year by twenty five millions, and the deficit has been supplied by an

extraordinary issue of paper under the name of caimés [kayme], to the amount, as I am assured, of forty millions.'[530] At the end of the next financial year (1850), Canning reported that the state of the Treasury implied 'a considerable improvement either in the produce of the taxes or in the manner of collecting them', although the amount in question had fallen to 675m piasters, or £6.136m.[531] However, expenditure still outstripped revenue and the deficit in May 1850 amounted to £1.25m.[532] Canning blamed this on the 'irresolution or inactivity of the Turkish cabinet.' Despite the deficit, members of the Cabinet continued to receive very high salaries. In 1852 they ranged between 60,000 and 100,000 piasters (approximately £545-£909) per month, excluding expenses.[533] On the other hand, a minor civil servant received 80 piasters (approximately 70 pence) monthly. Officials therefore continued to take bribes in order to survive, and this is perhaps one of the reasons for the failure to eradicate corruption. The ordinary people blamed the reforms for their predicament.

There was some improvement in the revenue, but the expenses of the Empire had increased, so that there was not enough to implement the programme of reforms.[534] Canning felt that a foreign loan would be the most effective way of remedying this situation, and regretted the Sultan's opposition to the idea. The Sultan preferred to make economies in the budget than be under any obligation to a foreign power, even if this meant a slowing-down of progress in the reform programme. Lack of funds led to the continuance of certain monopolies and the farming of some taxes. In March 1850 an agreement was about to be concluded for farming the customs duties of Istanbul to some Armenian bankers for a three-year term.[535] In a confidential memorandum to Reshid,[536] Canning reminded the Grand Vizier of the need for sufficient revenue to deal with such matters as road improvement; the calling in of the old coinage; prompt

payment for goods ordered by government departments; the fixing of equitable rates of valuation on articles for export; and the maintenance of foreign exchange rates. It will be remembered that, in 1843, Canning had advised against calling in the old currency, as it would place too heavy a burden on the Treasury.

At the beginning of 1849, Canning took up a subject which he had first mentioned in 1843, without pursuing further: the importance of a good road network to the development and security of a nation.[537] This was a forward-looking plan to modernise the Ottoman Empire, although the Treasury was not large enough to support such a scheme at this time. In his memorandum to the Porte, Canning observed that sometimes less favoured nations, by hard work and ingenuity, acquire sufficient strength to subdue those more favoured. One important factor in this was internal communication, for 'an Empire without roads and canals is little more than a bare agglomeration of districts and villages.' As examples of states which have overcome natural deficiencies, Canning cited America, the Roman Empire, France, Russia, China, Britain and some countries of Central Europe, which he contrasted with Spain and Portugal, who were once great maritime nations but who had fallen in the league table of important nations because they had not overcome the limitations placed on internal communication by geographical features such as mountains and unnavigable rivers. The impact of the deficiencies of the Ottoman Empire's network of internal communication was delayed because of its long, deeply indented coastline, its internal seas, and its navigable rivers. However, large extents of the interior of the country were suffering from the consequences of these deficiencies. There were no canals, and the roads generally were no more than tracks fit only for beasts of burden, and certainly not suitable for the transportation of bulky merchandise over great distances. These factors

pushed up the price of commodities, which in turn resulted in decreased sales. But it was not only in connection with commerce that a well developed system of internal communication was necessary: national defence, general administration and the transmission of the Sultan's commands depended upon it.

The cost of developing such a system would be very high, and the Porte could not meet that cost without jeopardising other projects. The process would have to be gradual, with priority given to those places which would be likely to benefit most. Canning suggested that the provinces could contribute to the cost, and there was an abundance of materials for the purpose, such as wood and stone. He regretted that this project had not been considered earlier; if it had been started during the reign of Mahmud, it would have been completed by now. He maintained that the Ottoman Empire's neighbours were advancing while it stood still and allowed itself to be exposed to new elements of political change.

In April 1850 Canning received a memorandum whose author is not recorded, but who may have been James Redhouse.[538] It was certainly someone with detailed knowledge of the workings of the Porte. This lengthy memorandum addressed the problems of the administration of the Ministry of Finance and other departments; the administration of justice; the necessity for new road construction; and the recruitment of non-Muslims into the Ottoman army. The author began by discussing in detail the collection, equable distribution, and farming of taxes; improvements in the presentation and auditing of government accounts; and reform of the currency and exchange rates. When such improvements in the administration of the finance department had taken place, then a loan could be arranged with European capitalists for the building of roads and canals; the calling in of the debased currency; and the regulation of government

debts. The author also suggested a reduction in the number of provincial governors, Ulema and military pashas. Army officers' pay was too low, but to increase this would cost the Treasury nothing if the number of military pashas was reduced. The same also applied to navy pay. There were far too many clerks in the administrative offices of the Porte, and their pay was pitifully low. These numbers should also be reduced, with those clerks who remained receiving a higher salary. Registers of all salaried and unsalaried clerks, and of members of councils, should be kept, showing the number of years service and present pay. An annual review could then be carried out and the numbers increased or decreased according to requirements and the means of the Treasury. For the better administration of justice, separate days or hours of the day should be set aside for trials between Muslims alone, and for those between Muslims and non-Muslims. For the latter, half the council members should be non-Muslims, selected by the millet concerned. The Council of Public Utility should be instructed to obtain information and decide upon which roads from principal sea ports to interior agricultural provinces were most necessary, at what cost they could be constructed and kept in repair, and the best way to raise the capital. The memorandum recommended which roads should be constructed,[539] adding that, if they were begun at once, the effect on export trade would be felt in three or four years' time, with proper management, partial contributions from the provinces, assistance from the Treasury, and soldiers employed on the construction work receiving an allowance of 10, 15 or 20 piasters per month extra pay. Any military exercises and inspections could continue at a lower level. Priority should be given to those portions of existing roads which were impassable in winter and should be begun at the end nearest to the sea port. With greater exports, more wealth would be generated to extend the road network, build

canals, and even railways.

On the subject of the recruitment of non-Muslims into the army, the author of this memorandum cited the example of the British army in India, as well as the fact that Russia, France, Austria and Prussia employed Muslims and Jews in addition to Catholics and Protestants in their armies. Two Muslim companies in each battalion could be replaced with Christians, or here and there one Christian and one Jewish company. Christians of different denominations would be kept apart, and officered up to the rank of captain by men of the same creed. The soldiers would then be able to attend their religious services and keep their fasts without interfering or being interfered with by their Muslim counterparts. As there were eight companies in each battalion, a quarter of the army would thus be non-Muslim, which was small in proportion to the total non-Muslim population. The author of the memorandum did not foresee a danger of ambition driving privates and petty officers to convert to Islam, but occasionally men of higher rank might be tempted to take that route to promotion. This danger would be eliminated eventually when the higher ranks were opened up to non-Muslims. Any Christians or Jews aspiring to become officers or petty officers should be taught to read and write Turkish and elementary arithmetic. The author strongly advocated this point, so that when men returned to their homes after their period of service they would be much better fitted to serve the government in a larger and more effective police force. They could also spread civilisation to the remotest parts of the Empire. A complete revision of the civil education system was also required. The author of the memorandum offered his services in that respect: '... if I were selected as one of the superintendents of the departments, and as a truly and actively confidential adviser by Reshid Pasha, with powers to do good and support to ensure it, I could do good service

therein.' Great improvements to the infrastructure of Istanbul were necessary, and a special board should be established for this purpose. It should be composed of two or three engineers, the Mimar Ağası (Chief Architect) and one or two architects. These improvements should be started without delay, but nothing could be done without the necessary funds. The council in question would therefore be effectively a board of city finance, and if properly organised would be of equal importance to the Ministries of Police, War and Maritime Affairs. It would relieve the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye of some of its duties, and might even be charged with supervising the construction of roads. All private and corporate monopolies should be abolished throughout the Empire in order to facilitate commerce and increase revenue. The present holders of privileges should be compensated in some way, and all foreign merchants should contribute to the burdens of the state. The memorandum ended with the suggestion that private individuals and companies should be encouraged to work the mines and pay a share of the product to the government; and that a plan should be adopted for European agriculturalists to settle in the Empire as its subjects.

This hitherto unknown memorandum has been cited at length because it shows a detailed knowledge of the administration of the Porte and other Ottoman institutions. The author offers many constructive suggestions for the improvement of the general administration and the administration of justice, which are prompted by genuine concern for the improvement of Ottoman institutions. Provided with this information, Canning was then in a position to judge which, if any, of these suggestions it would be beneficial to pursue. We have already seen that Canning was interested in the construction of new roads, and it appears that he immediately took up this matter as proposed in the memorandum. In July 1850 he reported that the Porte had adopted a

definite resolution to construct new roads and improve existing ones, from Trabzon and Batum to the frontier with Iran,[540] one of the routes suggested in the memorandum.[541] The British Ambassador observed that unless this work was carried out quickly it would be too late to prevent the transfer of transit trade with Iran to Georgia.

The Muhtelit Ticaret Mahkemesi (Mixed Court of Commerce), had been established in Istanbul in 1847 as an extension of the existing Ticaret Meclisi, which dealt with commercial cases between Muslims and non-Muslims, both Ottoman subjects and foreigners. The tribunal consisted of thirty members, ten being Ottoman Muslim subjects, ten Ottoman non-Muslim subjects, and ten being foreigners elected by the foreign embassies. It did not follow any formal law, and its members were not judges; they arbitrated on the basis of established commercial precedent.[542] Similar courts had been established in İzmir, Cairo and Alexandria (the major ports of the Empire),[543] but this had been some time ago, and in June 1850 Canning requested Ali Pasha to extend the system into other parts of the Empire.[544] However, this did not occur until after 1860.[545]

Towards the end of the period under study, two reforms which had been started earlier saw further development. One was the introduction of the Kanûnnâme-i Ticaret (Commercial Code) which Reshid had attempted to introduce in 1841. This code, which was divided into four sections containing 315 clauses, was based on French commercial laws. It dealt with partnerships, bankruptcies, maritime trade and bills of exchange, while defining, protecting and facilitating the commercial transactions of those foreigners - British, French, Russian, Austrian and Dutch - resident in the Empire for commercial purposes.[546]

The second concerned the Penal Code of 1840 which, after ten years, required

updating, and a new Penal Code (Kanun-u Cedid) came into force in July 1851.[547] Consisting of an Introduction and three clauses, it confirmed the laws already contained in its predecessor and introduced new punishments in accordance with Şeriat law. The additional punishments were k_sas (*lex talionis*), ibka (retaining), diyet (blood money), imprisonment with hard labour, and corporal punishment. New crimes were specified in the revised Code: zab_taya kar__ gelmek (resisting the police); sark_nt_l_k (molestation); sarho_luk (drunkenness); kumarbazl_k (gambling); k_z kaç_rma (kidnapping or eloping with a girl); sahtekârl_k (forgery); and kalpazanl_k (counterfeiting). Despite the amendments it contained, this new Penal Code does not appear to have been successful in solving the Empire's social problems, as it was in force for only seven years. In August 1858 yet another Penal Code was introduced, which was used, with slight amendments, until July 1926, a total of sixty-eight years.

It will be remembered that _ltizam (tax farming) was abolished in 1840, only to be reintroduced two years later (see Chapter 4). In August 1850 Reshid informed Canning confidentially that it was the Porte's intention to again abolish tax farming.[548] Despite this, Canning was discouraged by the continued lack of general progress in the reform programme.[549] While he was convinced that Reshid had not undergone a change of heart, he complained that 'delays and evasions, unnecessary compromises, and weak compliance have but too often neutralized the advantage of his better principles and disappointed my hopes of a steady progress in real and lasting improvement.' Canning decided to confide his thoughts to Reshid and to give him all the support he could. To this end he had an audience with the Sultan at which both Reshid and Ali Pasha were present, and during which he presented a memorandum[550] stressing the urgency of introducing some of the reforms he had been advocating, and

the Sultan's responsibility to open new avenues to reform. In this memorandum, preserved in the Foreign Office archives, Canning emphasised the need for sufficient funds to carry out the reforms. This could be obtained by: economy in other areas; the disposal of state property; the transfer of other revenue to the general government; additional taxation; more efficient collection of existing taxes; or the employment of borrowed capital. 'Of these resources,' declared Canning, 'the last is the only one capable of yielding a prompt supply in sufficient quantity', thereby taking up the suggestion first made in the anonymous memorandum.[551] He envisaged a loan of £5-6 million paid over a period of three to four years at four per cent interest, repayable over twenty-five years. Canning then listed the possible Ottoman objections to the raising of a foreign loan, and discounted them one by one. The advantage, on the hand, would be the immediate implementation of a system of reform without burdening the ordinary revenue. The priorities should be the construction of roads; the protection of Istanbul and of the frontier line of the Danube, in order to retard any advance of a hostile army invading the Empire through Serbia or Bulgaria; and an effective navy. The recruitment of Christians into the army was also crucial to the defence of the Empire, but it was dependent upon certain other reforms: the extension of the criminal court procedures already introduced in Egypt; the abolition of the haraç; representation of each denomination in provincial councils; and just punishment for those who contravened the regulations. With these reforms in place, Canning maintained that Christians would serve loyally in the army. After all, he pointed out, the Porte had always manned its fleet with large numbers of Christian sailors. Other measures Canning wished to see introduced were the fair distribution of taxes; the elimination of corruption; and the abolition of tax farming.

The Sultan gave the memorandum for deliberation to a cabinet consisting of Reshid and four others.[552] Canning reported that the members of this cabinet seemed generally to be in favour of his suggestions, and that the Sultan also appeared to approve of the measures which Canning had submitted to him.[553] He observed that the outcome depended largely on Reshid's 'determination to confront the objections which he is nearly certain of encountering in the council of state ...' However, in a private and confidential letter to Palmerston of the same date, Canning admitted that the satisfaction he had felt at the Sultan's assurances had been somewhat tempered by the knowledge that they had been suggested by Reshid and that the Sultan 'had not manifested any intention to accept my suggestions, but, on the contrary, a sentiment of regret at having been led so far as he had already gone in the paths of reform.'[554]

In the course of private conversations between Canning and Reshid in November 1850, the Grand Vizier reported that the cabinet was willing to take Canning's suggestions into consideration, and that they had already begun on the course he recommended.[555] However, their opinions were divided as to the expediency of certain measures, with the principal objections being to a foreign loan and the recruitment of Christians into the army. Reshid maintained that the improvement of roads and fortifications was already under way; the collection of the haraç was reformed; commercial courts had been established in the principal cities; and equality in civil rights would soon be realised by the extension of the new procedures in criminal cases to the whole of the Empire. In fact, 'nothing further was practically wanting.' As far as reforms in internal administration were concerned, Reshid thought it unwise to proceed without prior investigation and local information. To effect this, two commissioners were being sent to the provinces, one to the Asiatic part of the

Empire, one to the European part. Their reports would form the basis of any reforms introduced when tax farming was abolished, a measure which had already been decreed by the Council and approved by the Sultan. Canning was not hopeful, and even doubted the Porte's stated intention to abolish tax farming, although a compromise to exclude civil servants from participating in the system and opening contracts up to public competition was being considered.[556] He reflected, 'I confess that if the present confidential communication were to be read as conclusive, I should resign myself to a feeling of despair, which it is at no time easy to repress in reflecting on the condition and prospects of this empire.'[557]

Nevertheless, a major reform in the status of Christian subjects was achieved with the recognition of the Protestants as a separate millet on 26 November 1850 (see chapter 8). This gave them the same political strength as the other Christian communities, with a leader who would represent them at the Porte. At the same time Britain increased its rights of influence in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, thereby balancing the influence wielded by France and Russia.[558]

In December 1850 the Sultan visited the Porte and instructed the cabinet to show 'a strict regard to economy as the only practicable means of balancing the receipts and expences [*sic*] of the empire.'[559] From this Canning inferred that the Sultan was still not in favour of raising a loan. Two weeks, later, however, he wrote that 'I have reason to believe that the Grand Vizier is awakening to the absolute necessity of resorting to a loan, and that he is at length prepared to urge that necessity with becoming earnestness on the Sultan's mind.'[560] He conjectured that if such a loan were to be taken out, it would not at first exceed £2m; on the basis of the results of this experiment, a larger loan might be raised at a later date.

Two months later, when still no action had been taken, Canning had an audience with the Sultan to again stress the urgency of setting the Porte's finances in order and of promptly carrying out more reforms.[561] The inactivity of the ministers led Canning to believe that it was the Sultan whom he had to convince of the compelling necessity of reform. '... the timidity of one Minister [Reshid] and the corruption of another [Fethi Ahmed Pasha] afforded but little prospect of real systematic advancement ... unless the Sultan were himself more thoroughly roused to a sense of the urgent wants and eventual dangers by which his throne is surrounded.'[562] Canning was convinced that the Sultan wished to adopt some measures of reform, as long as they did not involve any abrupt departure from the existing system. The Sultan agreed with Canning that capital was required in order to implement the measures needed to correct the state's finances, but did not see a loan as the answer. The British Ambassador was not encouraged by the Sultan's reaction: '... there was ... nothing that indicated a grasp of mind or force of character equal to the requirements of a vast and decaying empire.'[563] However, he believed that something might be achieved by piecemeal reform, and that increased financial embarrassment might prompt the Sultan to do more.[564] The Sultan, meanwhile, was receiving conflicting advice from Fethi Ahmed Pasha, his brother-in-law.

Canning felt vindicated in his advice on remedying deficiencies in the revenue and the army when the director of the Sultan's mines, who had travelled extensively throughout the Empire, told him that the decrease in the Muslim population was 'distinctly observable' everywhere and that the Porte would not be able to make any further general levies for the recruitment of the army.[565] Apparently, the ministers were aware of the situation, but would not face the problem. The principal director of the

Turkish Exchange Bank sent Canning a copy of an article entitled 'Considérations sur le maintien du change et le systême monétaire de la Turquie en janvier 1851'[566] which repeated the necessity of raising a loan. The same article had been sent to Reshid, and Canning hoped that its circulation among the ministers might prompt them to adopt a better system.

The only measures under consideration at this time for improving the Porte's finances were the appropriation of vak_f (pious foundation) property and an additional tax on tobacco. The first of these had been abandoned for the foreseeable future because of the Sultan's reluctance to risk offending religious prejudices; Canning believed there would be serious objections to the second if it were levied at the required level.[567] Three other measures had already been adopted to make economies in the budget. First, the rations previously assigned to all public servants of a certain rank were suppressed. Secondly, the number of boatmen retained in the service of pashas and other officers of rank was reduced. Except for the Grand Vizier, the principal ministers and their immediate subordinates now shared the cost of a steamer which took them between their country houses on the Bosphorus and their offices in Istanbul.[568] Finally, the custom of firing the cannon to celebrate a royal birth was stopped.

The establishment of a National Bank had been proposed in 1843, but the idea had not been pursued. It was now under consideration again as a means of obtaining a loan; Canning saw the main difficulty as convincing the ministers to establish it on principles which would gain the confidence of the money market and ensure its efficient administration. He hoped that if it were founded on native capital, open to foreign participation and subject to efficient control from both quarters, the prejudices

against it might be overcome, but he now believed that the loan would not exceed £1.5 million in the first instance.[569] If the plan were adopted, the Bank of Exchange would be absorbed into the National Bank.

With regard to wider reforms, Canning strongly recommended two measures in particular: the employment of more special commissioners to enforce and extend the reforms in the provinces; and the application of the improved system of criminal procedure, including the admission of Christian evidence, throughout the Empire. Canning was pleased to note that the Sultan had appointed a Commissioner for Bulgaria, 'with instructions similar to those which Sami Pasha is carrying so vigorously into effect at the other extremity of Roumelia.'[570] Preparations were under way for other appointments in the Asiatic provinces, and, as promised by Reshid in November 1850,[571] the improved system of criminal procedure was soon to be established in the principal cities of the Empire.

In August 1851 a crisis in the financial affairs of the Ottoman government was imminent.[572] Nafiz Pasha, the Minister of Finance, informed the members of the Cabinet that he could not even pay their salaries,[573] and the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye immediately set up a commission to look into the matter. The crisis manifested itself also in the fact that individuals in possession of government bonds received for goods supplied to civil servants were unable to obtain any of their money. Canning made formal applications on behalf of the British merchants involved, only to be informed that the Treasury was exhausted. In October, there were major changes in the government which, Canning reported, shook confidence in the government and aroused anxiety of greater changes involving measures as well as personnel.[574] The Sultan seemed to be more opposed than ever to the idea of a foreign loan. Canning

learned that he had taken his aversion to the proposal so far as to dismiss the Minister of Commerce for advocating it. On the other hand, the necessity for a loan was now widely accepted, and the strongest argument against it was that of the difficulty in ensuring that it would not be misapplied. Canning heard secretly that the Ottoman ministers might sound him out as to 'the practicality of interesting Her Majesty's government to assist the porte in raising a credit in England.' Perhaps they sought to obtain the Sultan's agreement by receiving funds in a less objectionable way. Canning submitted this idea to Palmerston in the hope that the British government would 'entertain with indulgence any reasonable plan of relief, to the success of which the countenance and credit of England might with propriety be led to contribute.' In fact, the Porte attempted to borrow from France in 1850, but the Sultan refused to sign the agreement, and the Porte paid France over 2m francs in compensation.[575]

In November 1851, the Porte adopted two further measures aimed at bringing financial relief to the Treasury: a tax of 20 piasters on all persons receiving a certain income; and a reduction of 10 per cent on all official salaries.[576] It was calculated that these measures would produce about 2m piasters (approximately £1.8 million),[577] but Canning thought that the actual revenue would fall short of this figure.

In March 1852, three additional measures were taken in an attempt to improve the finances of the Porte: a tax on all classes, expected to raise between £1.2 million and £1.5 million; a reduction of between 5 per cent and 20 per cent on all salaries; and a rigorous collection of tax arrears.[578] However, creditors of the Exchequer applied in vain for payment, and the army was irregularly paid. Strict economies were made throughout the administration, to the extent that some measures whose usefulness was acknowledged, and which did not involve great expense, were sacrificed. The tribute

from Egypt and the three Danubian Principalities was to be used to raise money from foreign capitalists, a step first proposed in 1849.[579] After the deduction of interest, this would be more than £850,000, and Canning commented that it virtually constituted a loan.[580] The Porte also made preparations to settle its accounts with the Exchange Bank and to adopt less costly arrangements for keeping the foreign exchange at 1.10 piasters/£.[581]

However, Canning complained that very little was being done to encourage agriculture and trade, while the Sultan was promoting an increase in the size of the navy and the construction of roads. The British Ambassador wondered how large enterprises such as these could be started while projects already begun were suspended for lack of finance.

Throughout these negotiations Canning received Palmerston's support.[582] Palmerston acknowledged that Canning's later despatches were not very encouraging, but that he still hoped that the 'prejudices of the Porte' would be overcome. 'The Porte ought to understand that rapidly progressive improvement in the whole system of Turkish government is the necessary condition upon the fulfilment of which must depend the continuance of that support which Turkey looks for and requires from the enlightened powers of Europe.'[583]

* * *

The years 1848 to 1852, when Canning and Reshid were working together in Istanbul, constituted a productive period as far as reforms of the Ottoman Empire were concerned. Priority was not given to one area of reform only, but wide-ranging issues

were tackled, including the army, financial administration, the admission of Christian evidence in criminal courts, the recruitment of Christians into the army, and the administration of justice.

When it became apparent that the decrease in population meant that there was a shortage of Muslim men for the army, Canning used this information to press for the abolition of the haraç, which he described as a 'humiliating distinction'. This was in marked contrast to the view he had expressed in 1843 that the Christian population was not subject to any hardship not also experienced by Muslim subjects. There was a logical progression is Canning's argument for the abolition of the tax: Christians should be recruited into the army to make up for the shortfall; and once in the army, they should be treated equally with their Muslim counterparts. This equality should be extended to the right to pay an exemption fee, but Christians could not be expected to pay this in addition to the haraç, so that tax should be abolished. Once this were achieved, further reforms concerning Christian Ottoman subjects might follow.

Another reform which Canning was anxious to see introduced was the admission of Christian evidence in criminal courts, but when he broached the subject with Rıfat Pasha he was told that the time was inopportune. This did not deter Canning, who sent a memorandum privately to the Sultan on the matter, putting it in the wider context of the tide of revolution which was engulfing Europe at the time. Although Abdulmecid appeared to accept the importance of Canning's argument, nothing came of it, and Canning did not press the issue, not wanting to damage his relationship with the Sultan. Abdulmecid was fearful of losing his power, and was influenced in this by his brother-in-law, Said Pasha, leader of the traditionalist party. His propaganda alleged that Reshid, by means of his reform programme, was seeking

to establish a republic. Canning assured the Sultan that the reforms which he proposed would not undermine his authority, but the Sultan was anxious that, although this reform would not jeopardise his position, it may lead to others which would. We have seen that the Sultan was in favour of reforms which he believed would unite and benefit his subjects; he was right to hesitate over a reform which would increase the status of his non-Muslim subjects only, at a time when the Empire was struggling to maintain its integrity and independence. This type of reform was ill-timed.

Delays in the implementation of reforms concerning Christian subjects caused Canning to become impatient with Reshid, whom he now considered too weak to fight for his beliefs in the face of mounting opposition. Reshid complained of lack of support from his colleagues, and his position became weaker after Britain refused to conclude a formal alliance with the Porte, although he still held the highest post in the government. However, despite the undermining of his authority, Reshid did manage to introduce a reform in the method of collecting the haraç.

In 1849 a scheme to modernise the road network was proposed. This project, if implemented, would benefit the whole population of the Empire, but unfortunately there were insufficient funds in the Treasury to finance it, and little improvement was made. Other reforms, whose benefits were acknowledged, were sacrificed for lack of funds. The fortunes of the Treasury fluctuated, but there was a general trend of improvement between 1850 and 1852 after certain economies, such as ceasing to fire the cannon on the occasion of a royal birth; the suppression of a daily allowance for higher civil servants; and the abolition of private boats for each of the ministers to take them between their country houses and the Porte, had been made. However, the Sultan persisted in his refusal to sanction a foreign loan and, despite the improvements,

expenditure continued to exceed revenue. If reform of the finances had been Britain's first priority, then perhaps the Porte would have been able to pay for subsequent reform measures without getting into financial difficulties. Nevertheless, two reforms, mixed commercial courts and the Penal Code, which had been started in an earlier period, were developed. However, the most important reform which Canning achieved during this period was the recognition of the Protestant community as a separate millet in November 1850.

* * *

When reviewing the reforms which were introduced between 1839 and 1852, it is possible to assess how the priorities of the Porte and the British government changed over this period of time. Both sides wished to see 'equality' within the Ottoman Empire, but by this Reshid meant equality for all Ottoman subjects before the law, while the British government interpreted it as including civil matters also. Common objectives were: the abolition of tax farming; the reform of the Empire's finances and general administration; and equitable taxation for all classes. Reforms which Britain alone sought were: the acceptance of Christian evidence in criminal courts; the abolition of the haraç; the improvement of the road system; the abolition of the death penalty for apostasy from Islam; and the recognition of a Protestant millet. Only the last two of these were realised by 1852, the end of the period under study. On the other hand, the Porte introduced both a penal and a commercial code in which Britain took little or no part.

Although Canning was always sure to emphasise to the Porte that Muslims as

well as non-Muslims would benefit from the reforms which concerned Christians, the result was somewhat different. Canning's aims matched those of Palmerston, and he worked for the abolition of tax farming and of the haraç; the acceptance of Christian evidence in criminal courts; the improvement of the Empire's infrastructure; the introduction of mixed commercial courts; and equal taxation on all classes. Britain looked for miracles from Reshid and, indeed, he did manage to effect most of the reforms Canning asked for, but it was difficult to satisfy the British Ambassador, who always seemed to want more. Reshid told him, 'nothing further was practically wanting',[584] but it was not enough for Canning. In fact, in 1852 few of the proposed measures remained to be implemented: the recruitment of Christians in the army; the raising of a foreign loan; and the admission of Christian evidence in criminal cases throughout the Empire.

One criticism which may be aimed at Canning's approach to the reform programme was that he pressed for more and more reforms, but did not study how these were to be funded. It was not until the Ottoman Treasury was in dire straits that the British Ambassador began to suggest ways to help it out of its predicament. Metternich, on the other hand, stressed as early as 1839 the importance of reform of the financial administration of the Empire.[585] He saw good financial administration as the strong foundation upon which other measures could be built. He also warned the Porte against borrowing from Europe until the Empire's finances had been put in order, to avoid falling into the hands of profiteers.

Reform in the Ottoman Empire was a continuing process during the period under study. The reform programme did not rely solely upon Reshid, but certainly the emphasis changed when he was absent from Istanbul and it gained momentum when he

was in the capital. By 1852 many improvements had been introduced into the administration of the Ottoman Empire but, from the British point of view, there was still a long way to go. Canning lost confidence in Reshid's ability to bring about more reforms and doubted that much more could be done. When Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary whose views on Ottoman reforms were closest to his own, lost his post in 1852, Canning returned to England.

During his terms as British Ambassador to Istanbul, Canning saw as many failures as triumphs: he did not succeed in obtaining the admission of Christian evidence in criminal courts, the abolition of the haraç, the recruitment of Christians into the army or the large-scale building of new roads. His most notable achievements, which are explored in detail in Chapters 7 and 8, were the end of the use of the death penalty for apostasy from Islam and the recognition of the Protestant community as a millet.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

499. Temperley mistakenly states that Reshid was Foreign Minister at this time. Templerley, H., England and the Near East: The Crimea, London, 1936, (hereafter, Temperley, The Crimea) pp. 258. For Reshid's career, see Salnâme-i Nazaret-i Hariciye (Year Books of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry), Istanbul, 1302 (1885), vol. I, pp. 270-3.
500. 'On my resumption of the Embassy in 1848, I procured his [Reshid's] reinstatement as Grand Vizier by inducing the Sultan to remove Sarim Pasha from that office.' Canning to Granville, 17 January 1852, F.O.78/890, No. 9, 'Confidential'.
501. Canning to Palmerston, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 51, 'Confidential'. See also Canning to Palmerston, 19 July 1850, F.O. 78/821, No. 229, where Canning recalls Rıza Pasha's assurances on the latter's resignation from the Pa_al_k of Salonica.
502. Ibid.
503. Canning to Palmerston, 18 July 1848, F.O. 78/733, No. 31, 'Confidential'.
504. Canning to Palmerston, 25 January 1949, F. O. 78/772, No. 18.
505. Canning to Palmerston, 16 March 1849, F.O. 78/774, No. 85.
506. Ibid.
507. 'Confidential Memorandum on the Turkish Military Force, Therapia, July 18th, 1850', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 7 September 1850, F.O. 78/822, No. 275.
508. 'Suggestions for the better organization of the Turkish Army and the abolition of the Haratch, or Capitation tax', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 20 March 1849, F.O. 78/774, No. 95.
509. The haraç was effectively abolished with the issuing of the Sultan's Islahat Ferman_ in 1856. It was replaced by the Bedel-i Askeriye, a tax levied on non-Muslim Ottoman subjects in lieu of military service. İnalcık, H., 'Tanzimat'_n Uygulanmas_ ve Sosyal Tepkileri', Osmanlı _mparatorlu_u, Toplum ve Ekonomi, Istanbul, 1993, (hereafter, İnalcık, 'Sosyal Tepkileri'), pp. 368-9.
510. Canning to Aberdeen, 13 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 260.
511. 'Official Note from Sir Stratford Canning to Rıfat Pasha, July 25, 1848', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/634, No. 50.
512. Ibid.
513. Canning to Palmerston, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 50.
514. 'Memorandum from Sir Stratford Canning, privately transmitted to the Sultan, July 31', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 51.
515. Ibid.
516. Pisani to Canning, enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 12 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 68.
517. Canning to Palmerston, 11 September 1848, F.O. 78/735, No. 105.
518. 'Memorandum of Conference held between Sir Stratford Canning and Rıfat Pasha on July 31, 1848', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 3 August 1848, F.O. 78/734, No. 50. This memorandum may also be found under reference F.O. 198/8.
519. Ibid: 'C'est par la permanence des abus, par l'évasion indéfinie de la justice, par une inattention habituelle aux plaintes du peuple que le chemin est ouvert aux innovations politiques et au succès des ambitions populaires.'
520. Canning to Palmerston, 19 December 1848, F.O. 78/737, No. 219.
521. Canning to Palmerston, 14 March 1849, F.O. 78/773, No. 84, 'Confidential'.
522. 'Memorandum presented to the Sultan March 10th 1849', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 14 March 1849, F.O. 78/773, No. 84, 'Confidential'.
523. Canning to Palmerston, 27 August 1849, F.O. 78/778, No. 262.
524. Canning to Palmerston, 16 April 1849, F.O. 78/774, No. 123.
525. Canning to Palmerston, 5 February 1850, F.O. 78/817, No. 43, 'Confidential'.
526. 'New ordinance respecting Haratch', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 5 July 1850, F.O. 78/821, No. 213. The Protestant community was not recognised until 26 November 1850.
527. 'Instructions adressées par la Porte aux Evêques et aux Primats', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 24 December 1850, F.O. 78/825, No. 385.
528. Canning to Palmerston, 18 June 1849, F.O. 78/776, No. 198.

529. Ibid.
530. Ibid.
531. Canning to Palmerston, 5 March 1850, F.O. 78/818, No. 75.
532. Canning to Palmerston, 5 May 1850, F.O. 78/820, No. 145.
533. Eren, A.C., 'Tanzimat', _slam Ansiklopedisi, Istanbul, 1970, vol. 11, (hereafter, Eren, 'Tanzimat'), p. 739.
534. Canning to Palmerston, 5 March 1850, F.O. 78/818, No. 75.
535. Ibid.; Canning to Palmerston, 20 March 1850, F.O. 78/818, No. 95.
536. Confidential Memorandum to the Grand Vizier [Reshid Pasha], enclosed in Canning to Palmerston, 6 March 1850, F.O. 78/818, No. 76.
537. 'Memorandum on Roads in Turkey', F.O. 352/32B/10, No. 44, 1849 (year only given).
538. Memorandum to Canning, 23 April 1850, F.O. 352/33B/9. James William Redhouse was born in London on 30 December 1811. In 1826 he went to Turkey and found employment there. His work brought him into contact with the authorities of military and naval colleges, engineers, the War Office, and eventually with the Foreign Office at the Porte. After visits to Russia and Malta, Redhouse returned to London, where his Turkish friend Namik Pasha was appointed Ottoman Ambassador. Namik Pasha offered him employment assisting young military and naval officers who came to London with the new ambassador, Nuri Efendi. When Reshid Pasha arrived in London as Ottoman Ambassador, Redhouse was a frequent guest, and he later tutored Sarim Efendi in French. In 1838 Redhouse returned to Istanbul, where he was given a post in the Porte's translation office, and he became a translator of the Imperial Divan. In 1839 he was chosen by Hüsrev Pasha, the Grand Vizier, as his 'confidential means of communication with Lord Ponsonby.' In 1843 he was appointed translator/interpreter at the Erzurum conference on the settlement of Ottoman-Persian border dispute. After four years of negotiation Redhouse drew up the text of the treaty in three languages (French, Turkish, Persian). Redhouse then resumed his post in Istanbul, where he was also in charge of the Porte's library, a position which gave him access to all correspondence to and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He became a member of the Encümen-i Dani_, which was created in 1850. Redhouse returned to England on the eve of the Crimean War, and in 1854 was elected to fill the vacant post of Oriental translator in the British Foreign Office, where he remained for many years. For more information on Redhouse, see Suba__, T., An Interpretation of a Letter of Kostaki Musurus Pasha the Turkish Ambassador to London, M.A. Dissertation, Birmingham University, 1989.
539. 'In Roumelia, I should recommend a road from Varna by Shumla to Tirnova; one from Rodosto or Silivri to Adrianople; one from Salonica to Seres and Petrovich, and another to Monastir; also one from Volo to Sarissa and Tricala. In Anatolia, first and foremost a road from Trebizond through Erzeroom to Bayazeed and the Persian frontier; and from Batoom to Kars; one from Samsoon to Sivas; one from Ghemlek or Ismid by Kutaheya to Konya; one from Adramitti; one from Smyrna meeting the Ghemlek and Konya road at Afiyon-Kara-Hissar; one from Scala-nova and one from Adalia, to Sparta; one from Tarsoos through the Kulek-Boghazi (Portæ Cilici) to Konya, with a branch to Kaysareyya; one from Alexandretta to Aleppo; one from Beyroot to Damascus; and another from Acre by Tabareyya to the district of Haowran.' Memorandum to Canning, 23 April 1850, F.O. 352/33B/9.
540. Canning to Palmerston, 5 July 1850, F.O. 78/821, No. 207.
541. Memorandum to Canning, 23 April 1850, F.O. 352/33B/9.
542. Berkes, N., Türkiyede Ça_da_la_ma, Istanbul 1978, p. 217.
543. 'Official Note from Sir Stratford Canning to Ali Pasha respecting Ticaret courts, Pera, June 10', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 18 June 1850, F.O. 78/820, No. 195.
544. Canning to Palmerston, 18 June 1850, F.O. 78/820, No. 195.
545. Berkes, op. cit., p. 217.
546. Temperley, The Crimea, p. 232.
547. Taner, T., 'Tanzimat Devrinde Ceza Hukuku', Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetiyle, M.E.B., Istanbul, 1940, pp. 220-32.
548. Canning to Palmerston, 19 August 1850, F. O. 78/821, No. 252.

549. Canning to Palmerston, 22 August 1850, F.O. 78/822, No. 261.
550. 'Memorandum presented to the Sultan by Sir Stratford Canning, August 22, 1850', enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 22 August 1850, F.O. 78/822, No. 261.
551. Memorandum to Canning, 23 April 1850, F.O. 352/33B/9.
552. Canning to Palmerston, 4 September 1850, F.O. 78/822, No. 268. The four other members of the cabinet are not named by Canning.
553. Canning to Palmerston, 18 September 1850, F.O. 78/822, No. 290.
554. Canning to Palmerston, 18 September 1850, F.O. 78/822, 'Private and Confidential'.
555. Canning to Palmerston, 16 November 1850, F.O. 78/824, No. 333, 'Confidential'.
556. Canning to Palmerston, 3 December 1850, F.O. 78/825, No. 355.
557. Canning to Palmerston, 16 November 1850, F. O. 78/824, No. 333, 'Confidential'.
558. This reform is the subject of Chapter 8.
559. Canning to Palmerston, 3 December 1850, F.O. 78/825, No. 355.
560. Canning to Palmerston, 18 December 1850, F.O. 78/825, No. 378.
561. Canning to Palmerston, 4 February 1851, F.O. 78/852, No. 40.
562. Ibid.
563. Ibid.
564. See also Canning to Palmerston, 6 March 1851, F.O. 78/853, No. 68, where the same opinion is expressed.
565. Canning to Palmerston, 19 February 1851, F.O. 78/853, No. 47.
566. Enclosure in ibid. Canning describes the director of the bank as 'a French gentleman of high respectability'; there is no clue as to the identity of the article's author.
567. Canning to Palmerston, 21 April 1851, F.O. 78/854, No. 134.
568. Ibid.
569. Canning to Palmerston, 5 May 1851, F.O. 78/855, No. 143, 'Confidential'.
570. Ibid.
571. Canning to Palmerston, 16 November 1850, F.O. 78/824, No. 333, 'Confidential'.
572. Canning to Palmerston, 30 August 1851, F.O. 78/857, No. 262.
573. Cevdet Pa_a, Tezakir, 4 vols., ed. Baysun, C., Ankara, 1986, vol. I, pp. 20-3.
574. Canning to Palmerston, 15 October 1851, F.O. 78/858, No. 302; Canning to Palmerston, 16 October 1851, F.O. 78/858, No. 307.
575. Suvla, R._., 'Tanzimat Devrinde _stikrazlar', Tazimat I, p. 269.
576. Canning to Palmerston, 25 October 1851, F.O. 78/859, No. 321.
577. Ibid.
578. Canning to Granville, 4 March 1852, F.O. 78/820, No. 49.
579. Canning to Palmerston, 26 November 1849, F.O. 78/782, No. 363, 'Most Confidential'.
580. Ibid.
581. Ibid. There is no reference in the documents used as to when this exchange rate was established.
582. Palmerston to Canning, 25 September 1850, F.O. 78/816, No. 256.
583. Palmerston to Canning, 16 December 1850, F.O. 78/816, No. 318.
584. Canning to Palmerston, 16 November 1850, F.O. 78/824, No. 333, 'Confidential'.
585. Metternich to Sturmer, 3 December 1839, translated as 'Türkiyede Abdülmecid'in Islahat_ Hakk_nda' by Timur, H. in Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetiyle, M.E.B., Istanbul, 1940, pp. 703-8.

CHAPTER 7

THE APOSTASY QUESTION 1843-1844

After the promulgation of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu, equality between Muslims and non-Muslims became a much discussed issue. However, this equality was not recognised in the law relating to apostasy, and the subject was long avoided by the Porte, which would have risked antagonising not only the Ulema but also the majority of the population if it officially renounced such a deeply embedded traditional practice. The reform leading to equality in conversion from Islam to Christianity and vice versa in the Ottoman Empire was a significant issue which enabled Canning, as the British government's representative, to strengthen his position in relationship to the Porte and thereby to introduce further reforms leading to full equality for Christian subjects.

The law concerning apostasy from Islam had a long history in the Ottoman Empire, although it did not become an issue until the nineteenth century. During the Classical Age of the Empire the law fell into disuse, as it was considered a privilege by non-Muslims to convert to Islam, and they did not attempt to convert back to their original religion. In the nineteenth century, however, conversion to Islam was not so advantageous; cases of apostasy began to reoccur, and the law of apostasy was applied once more.

Although the case of apostasy by the Armenian Avakim, which is the subject of this chapter, was initially a simple matter of religion, Canning took the opportunity to turn it into a political issue. It was an important case from Canning's viewpoint because it gained the sympathy of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire for Britain, which emerged in their eyes as the only country able to support them in their affairs at

the Porte. Canning was confident of support from the other European Powers in this matter, which meant that the Porte was unable to play one government against another. Russia and Austria faced a dilemma: if they failed to support Canning they would lose credibility among the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. They were aware of the increased influence which would accrue to Britain if Canning succeeded in having the law abolished, but the reform was something which they too wanted to see implemented. This explains their ambivalent approach to the matter even though, like Canning, they wished to see an end to the death penalty for apostasy from Islam.

Although Canning did not achieve the abolition of the law, he did obtain agreement that it would not be used in future. At the same time, the ministers of the Porte lost their credibility in the Sultan's eyes, and this paved the way for Reshid's return. Canning's success also won him the sympathy of the Christian subjects of the Empire.

In this chapter, the question of whether or not capital punishment for apostasy is dictated by Islamic law, a point which the Sublime Porte employed to support its execution of apostates from Islam, will be discussed; the emergence of the very sensitive question of executions for apostasy will be examined by discussing four accounts of the execution of the Armenian, Avakim; British and other European policy in the question, and the Porte's response to their demands, will also be examined. These topics have not previously received the attention of historians which their significance merits. They will be discussed for the first time using the evidence from the material available in both Turkish and British archives. Lane-Poole's short treatment relies mainly on Canning's *Memoirs*, with reference to the Blue Books.[586]

The Traditional Islamic Law of Apostasy

The word 'apostate' in Arabic is murtadd, 'one who turns his back on religion'. Two words are used for apostasy in Muslim Law: _rtidad and Ridda. It may be committed verbally by denying a principle of belief, or by an action, for example treating a copy of the Kur'an with disrespect.[587]

The Islamic Law has two primary sources: the Kur'an and the Sünnet, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammed. The agreement of the learned who represent the body of believers (_cma), and the derivation of legal principles by analogy (K_yas) are subsidiary sources, which are used either to settle arguments on the interpretation of the Kur'an and Sünnet, or to provide for situations not covered by the two primary sources.

The Kur'an deals with apostasy in several verses: for example, chapter 4, verse 90; chapter 5, verse 59; and chapter 16, verse 108. None of these verses expressly stipulates the penalty for apostasy in this life, but they all condemn the apostate in very harsh and unequivocal terms.[588] The punishment for apostasy in Islamic Law is based on the Sünnet, the traditions of the Prophet. For example, it is reported that the Prophet Muhammed said: 'The blood of a fellow Muslim should never be shed except in three cases: that of the adulterer, the murderer, and whoever forsakes the religion of Islam.' The commentary given on this tradition is as follows: 'The adulterer should be stoned; the murderer, when convicted of his crime, should be killed with the sword; but he who departs from Islam, becoming disobedient to God and His Apostle, let him be cut off or destroyed from the earth.'[589] In the first centuries of Islam, Islamic legal scholars elaborated a complex set of rules pertaining to the legal status of those Muslims who gave up their religion. These rules belong to the sphere of criminal as well as civil law. This doctrine remained valid until the nineteenth century.

An apostate, one who is held to have turned away from Islam, is a Muslim by birth or conversion who has renounced Islam, regardless of whether or not he has subsequently embraced another faith. He is held to have done so if he has expressed unbelief by word or deed, whether explicitly or by implication. The test commonly applied is whether he has repudiated what is known to be part of the Islamic religion, presumably as determined by the judge or court. But before the court can decide whether the accused is an apostate or not, at least two witnesses are required by law. The witnesses cannot simply declare that the accused is a apostate, but must testify that his words demonstrate apostasy.

When the accused is found guilty by a court, the punishment is the death penalty. The most important criteria in Islamic Law are that the apostate denies Allah's divinity and attributes partners to Allah, accepts Jesus as the son of Allah or conceives Allah as part of a Trinity; denies that Muhammed is the Prophet; and rejects the holy book, the Kur'an.

However, the death penalty is not applied to young men, and women of any age. If a boy is still not fully grown and of sound judgement, his life is saved by Islamic law, even if he has not acted under compulsion. Also, women are kept in confinement instead of receiving the death penalty; a woman's submissiveness to her husband is considered to exclude a fully independent judgement on her part and to render her not fully responsible. It is accepted that the Prophet Muhammed disapproved of the killing of females.

According to civil law, the apostate remains legally entitled to his property.[590] His rights to dispose of it, however, are in abeyance, pending his repentance. Upon returning to Islam, he is fully re-established in his rights. The legal effects of the

apostate's acts are also suspended. If he dies an apostate, on the other hand, his estate passes to the Public Treasury. An apostate is also deprived of the capacity to inherit from others. If he readopts the faith, then all his rights are restored. The female apostate remains legally capable and in full possession of her rights to dispose of her property. However, upon the apostasy of one or both partners the marriage contract immediately expires and without any need for judicial intervention. If the apostate repents, a new marriage can be contracted.[591]

There is no evidence that apostates are still being put to death in modern Islamic countries, although in some, such as Saudi Arabia, Islamic law is still officially in force. Today it is believed by many that the apostate cannot be put to death merely for apostasy. This should be done only if he is also a danger to the Islamic state. Modern scholars such as An-Na'im[592] claim that no verse in the Kur'an prescribes capital punishment for the apostate. They also argue that killing the apostate must be considered as compulsion in religion, which has been forbidden in the Kur'an (chapter 2, verse 256): 'There is no compulsion in religion.' In addition to these arguments, the requirement that the apostate should forever be asked to repent implies that he may not be killed. However, this does not mean that the apostate should be kept in prison until he repents.

Moreover, modern orthodox Muslims believe that there is no difference between an apostate and a born unbeliever. Muslims have an obligation to invite them to be converted; that is as far as they can go with regard to the apostate. For if the repentance of the apostate is caused by the fear of death or lifelong imprisonment, it is a form of compulsion, which is explicitly forbidden in the Kur'an.

One of the values adopted in the Islamic world is the principle of freedom of

religion. According to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this freedom contains three elements: freedom to practise one's religion; freedom to express one's religious feelings; and freedom to change one's religion. Modern Muslim authors emphasise the fact that religious liberty is already recognised in the Kur'an, and although there are some exceptions, the majority of Muslims today believe that Islam permits freedom of religion.[593]

The Case of the Armenian Avakim

In Ottoman Turkey the law of apostasy had been enforced by the courts for many centuries. The first case which drew Canning's attention was that of a twenty-year-old Armenian, Avakim, who was executed in Istanbul in August 1843. Four versions will be described in an attempt to ascertain the true course of events and the respective merits of each account will discussed.

The Alison Report: According to the report given by Alison,[594] the Oriental secretary of the British Embassy, Avakim, an Armenian youth, had had a drunken quarrel with some neighbours about a year and half earlier, and was sentenced by the Turkish Ministry of War to receive 500 bastinadoes. As soon as he heard this sentence he decided, out of 'fear and intoxication', to convert to Islam to escape from the sentence. He was immediately taken to the canonical court (Mahkeme) and given the name Mehmed. However, some days later Avakim repented of what he had done, left the country and went to Syra. He later returned to Istanbul and, in June 1843, while returning from his sister's house with a small bundle of clothes, he was recognised by Mustafa, the Kolağa (Lieutenant Commander) of the quarter, who denounced him at the Ministry of War as a renegade from Islam. He was then subjected to cruel

punishment to compel him once more to abandon his original beliefs. Avakim, however, was not intimidated by torture or the prospect of death, and proclaimed his firm belief in Christianity. He was executed on the Wednesday before Alison's report[595] by one of the armed police who escorted him. This man, Tavuk Pazarl_ Ali, took a large draught of spirits and made four drunken, unsuccessful attempts to cut off Avakim's head. Having failed to do this, he knelt over the accused and cut his throat. Avakim's head was then placed between his thighs, and his cap on his back (he was dressed in European costume). In a shop opposite, an official placard stated: 'The Armenian shoemaker, Avakim, son of Yagya, having last year, in the beginning of Moharrem, while at an age of discretion, accepted Islamism, and received the name of Mehemed, some time afterwards renegaded, and having now obstinately persisted in refusing the proffer made to him by the law to re-become a Muslim, sentence of death was awarded unto him, according to fetwa, and he has thereby suffered.'[596] Avakim's mother was seen rushing from the scene tearing at her grey hair. She later returned to sit by her son's body. The Armenians' petition for the body was rejected, and after being on display for three days it was thrown into the sea.

Gerard de Nerval's Account: Gerard de Nerval (1808-55) was a prolific French author of the nineteenth century. After spending some months in Egypt, he travelled to Istanbul via Cyprus, Rhodes, İzmir and the Greek islands. He was in Istanbul by 25 July 1843 and left on 28 October the same year,[597] arriving in Marseille about 20 December 1843. Nerval recounts[598] how he saw Avakim's body in the Balık Pazarı on the third day after his execution, and an Armenian shopkeeper told him the story. According to this Armenian, Avakim had been found three years previously with a Turkish woman, and as a non-Muslim he would be sentenced to death, whereas a

Muslim would be subjected to a beating only. He therefore became a Muslim, but later repented and went to the Greek isles, where he renounced his new religion.

Three years later, believing the affair to be forgotten, Avakim returned to Istanbul dressed in western clothing. He was denounced by some fanatics, and the authorities, although tolerant up to that time, were forced to apply the law, despite protests from Europe. Before his execution, Avakim was offered freedom if he renounced Christianity once more, but he refused. The authorities even offered him a means of escape, but he refused this also, saying that he wanted to live in Istanbul and would die of grief if he left it again, and of shame if he stayed there after apostatising again. Therefore he was executed. Many Armenians thought he was a saint and lit candles in his honour. The same evening three Jews, according to custom,[599] carried the body on their shoulders and threw it into the Bosphorus among the drowned dogs and horses thrown up against the coast by the sea.

The Account of the Armenian Patriarch at Kumkap_: In 1871, Avadis Berberyan, Armenian Patriarch at Kumkap_, published his *History of the Armenians*, which includes a further account of the case.[600] Berberyan gives few details of the events leading up to Avakim's execution, but concentrates on the diplomatic activities which followed. He says that Avakim had converted to Islam four years previously; he later became ashamed of this, confessed to his priest, and was living *incognito*. He was denounced, imprisoned and tortured. The elders of the Armenian Church did not intercede for him because that would have been an insult to Islam, but they advised Avakim's parents to petition the Russian Ambassador. When he had read their letter, the Russian Ambassador sent them to Canning. The British Ambassador sent Pisani to the Grand Vizier, Rauf Pasha, who said that the matter would be discussed and that

Avakim would be freed and sent to Canning. However, at the Council meeting, the 'Seyhulislam, Rıza Ali Pasha,[601] and the two other fanatical ministers', ordered the apostate to be executed.[602]

According to the Patriarch, this order was carried out after repeated exhortations for him to reconvert, and the promise of gifts. The executioner needed only one blow to decapitate him. The British and other European Ambassadors were furious and protested at the execution. Five months later they sent a note to the Porte requesting freedom of religion for all nationalities. After lengthy discussions the Porte issued a statement to the effect that it was in agreement with the request but that it could not let this be known to its fanatical subjects. The ministers asked for a period of seven years in which to introduce the idea gradually; otherwise there would be protests against the Christian countries.

Avakim's 'martyrdom' was the first step towards religious freedom. Before this, people used to be forced to apostatise; some were threatened with torture and others offered gifts to persuade them to convert to Islam. Then all this changed: permission was given to build new churches and restore others. The freedom to change religion was granted to all without insulting the religions of others.

The Account recorded in the Documents of the Sublime Porte: There are four available documents issued by the Porte which deal with the events leading up to Avakim's execution.[603] According to these documents, Avakim was a bootmaker who became a Muslim on 11 March 1842. The Seri'a Court established that he had reached the age of maturity, and was not being forced to convert; he pronounced the Kelimeteyn-i Şahadeteyn[604] and embraced Islam. He applied to change his name and was given the name Mehmed. His conversion decree was stamped and signed by the

Deputy of the Mahmud Pasha court, Esseyyid Hasan Refet Efendi. The witnesses were Elhac Yusuf bin Mehmed and Mehmed bin Hüseyin. He then decided to apostatise, and although an offer was made to answer his doubts about Islam, he refused, and insisted on returning to Christianity. As a result, the Istanbul Bâb-i Mahkemesi (Lower Court) pronounced the death sentence on him.[605] This sentence was read out in Cabinet, all the members of which agreed to give Avakim one more chance to change his mind. The Cabinet therefore referred the matter to the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-i Adliyye (High Court), to discuss it once more, and to inform Avakim that if he persisted, the Sultan would be asked for a ferman for the sentence to be carried out.

Avakim was a relative of one of the servants in the British Embassy,[606] and Canning, through Pisani, asked the Grand Vizier and the Foreign Minister for him to be forgiven.[607] The Porte's reply was that it was a religious, not a political matter, and that the decision could not be altered. However, if Avakim were to return to Islam he would be forgiven. For Canning's sake, it was decided to bring Avakim before the court once more and to give him a last opportunity to change his mind. If he refused, the sentence was to be carried out openly to show others that Islamic Law is fixed and cannot be altered.

It should first be noted that all four of these documents were produced by the Porte before Avakim's execution. As one of them is dated 20 August 1843, it supports Alison's dating of the execution to 23 August, and throws doubt on the date of Nerval's letter to his father. These documents furnish us with several facts unknown by the authors of the other reports studied. First of all, we have a precise date and place for Avakim's conversion to Islam, plus the names of the two witnesses required for conversion to take place. It is also confirmed that Avakim embraced Islam of his own

free will. Another interesting point is that Avakim was a relative of servants at the British Embassy, and this would explain why Canning was approached, and may be one reason why he took up the case so vigorously.

Alison does not give the source for his highly emotive account, which nevertheless leaves several questions unanswered. For instance, there is no explanation as to how his initial conversion to Islam saved Avakim from the sentence of 500 bastinadoes, and it is implied that a Muslim would not be punished for participating in a drunken brawl. Also, if Avakim were taken immediately to the canonical court, he would still be under the influence of alcohol, and in such a condition he would not be accepted into Islam. Two Muslim witnesses would be required, and the man's background would be enquired into. It is unlikely that all this could be accomplished on the same day. As to the reported attempts to induce Avakim to embrace Islam once more, any compulsion would make the conversion invalid. It was the duty of the court to try to ascertain the reasons for the apostasy, and to answer any doubts he might have had concerning Islam. It also seems unlikely that a man who, only eighteen months previously, had abandoned his religion in order to avoid the bastinado, was willing to die for that same religion.

Nerval's account raises several interesting points. First, if we take the date of Nerval's letter to his father[608] the day after he had seen the spectacle of Avakim's body (19 August), the execution must have taken place on 16 August, exactly one week before the date given by Alison. Secondly, we have a completely different reason for Avakim becoming a Muslim, which is supported by a fetva of the sixteenth-century scholar Şeyhülislam Ebusuud Efendi:

'*Question:* What is the procedure applicable if a non-Muslim has

intercourse with the Muslim wife of a Muslim man?

Answer: If he becomes a Muslim he is spared the death penalty. If the woman consented she should be stoned.'[609]

This account also states that Avakim chose to die rather than leave Istanbul. This seems rather improbable, and as Nerval was known to have borrowed and adapted stories from other travellers, he may well have done so in this instance. Whereas the letter to his father was written at the time, it was not until eight years later that the definitive version of *Voyage en Orient* appeared. Nerval had plenty of time, therefore, to embellish his account.

The Patriarch's account gives many interesting additional details, while being less precise than the other two in certain respects. For example, although Berberyan states that he was an eyewitness to the execution, he is undoubtedly writing some time after the events in question, as his dating is very vague. Also, he does not give any reason for Avakim's initial conversion to Islam. On the other hand, we learn why the Armenian Patriarch and others did not intercede on Avakim's behalf; although it implies a very weak position, we must assume that Berberyan knew the official Armenian line on the matter. Berberyan also informs us that Avakim's parents were advised to approach the Russian Ambassador for assistance. This was probably because Russia had the right of protection over the Orthodox subjects of the Porte, while seeing herself as the protector of all Christians within the Empire. Also, Russia was feared by the Porte, and her influence was therefore strong. It is difficult to know why the Russian Ambassador referred them to Canning.[610] He obviously did not wish to become involved in the affair and, indeed, the Russian government was the last of the European powers to express its attitude towards the Apostasy Question. The Grand

Vizier's promise to Canning of freedom for Avakim is not mentioned in either the British or Turkish documents currently available. Also, the reported statement of the Porte asking for seven years' delay is interesting, although not corroborated elsewhere.

The four accounts have been studied in order to gain a fuller picture of the affair than can be gleaned from Alison's report. As we have seen, only Alison's account and that of Nerval give a reason for Avakim's original conversion to Islam. Of the two, Nerval's account appears to be the more likely in this respect. Overall, the account contained in the Porte's documents must be accepted as accurate. At the time of Avakim's execution, there was nothing exceptional about the case as far as the Porte was concerned. The ministers therefore had no political reason to distort the facts, and there seems to have been nothing illegal in his treatment. On the contrary, the Porte went out of its way to give Avakim a second chance. This is corroborated by Nerval's account. The Armenian Patriarch alleges than Avakim was tortured in order to persuade him to return to Islam, an allegation which is also contained in Alison's report.

The other cases of execution for apostasy are not so well documented as that of Avakim. At the end of August 1843, a young Greek was hanged at Bilecik, near Bursa. According to Sandison, the British Consul at Bursa,[611] his initial conversion to Islam had been carried out properly and no coercion was used. According to Cordoba, the Spanish Minister at Istanbul, the Greek was twenty-two years old, and had converted to Islam in a moment of bad temper.[612] Having calmed down, he went to a priest and expressed a desire to return to his faith. The priest approved of his intention and told him that he must repair his error by a public retraction, which the young man did. As soon as the news reached the Ottoman authorities, he was caught and publicly hanged.[613] Canning had information which led him to believe that the ferman for this

second execution had been prepared some months previously, and had been despatched immediately after the European protests against the first, so that it seemed part of the same action without bringing fresh accusations against the Porte. There are no references to this and the other cases in the available Ottoman sources.

Further cases were reported in a despatch from Canning,[614] but there is no indication as to when they occurred. A Turk, Muhiddin, was condemned in Salonica[615] for blaspheming against Muhammed; at or near Bursa, an eight-year-old Greek girl was forced 'to embrace the Mahomedan faith, in spite of her own refusal and the clamours of her relations'.[616] On the other hand, a Turk who murdered a Christian 'without provocation' was allowed to escape without punishment. Canning states that he has no reason to doubt the truth of these accounts, or to suspect that they had been exaggerated. One reason for him taking up Avakim's case rather than any other may be that it was the first which came to his attention after his arrival as Ambassador at the beginning of 1842. Another may well be that Avakim belonged to the Armenian millet, which did not enjoy formal protection from any of the foreign Powers. By supporting the Armenians in this case, Britain came to be seen as their protector. This facilitated British objectives, as the matter of the recognition of Protestants as a separate millet was also on the British agenda at this time.

Britain's Policy in the Apostasy Question

Lord Aberdeen, who became Foreign Secretary on Palmerston's resignation in September 1841, sent additional instructions[617] to Canning, informing him of the government's policy towards the Sublime Porte. The Ambassador was requested to seek real protection and security for the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire.

Following these instructions, Canning concentrated on two aspects of the reform of the Ottoman Empire: the administrative system, and the situation of the Christian population. As he was also anxious to strengthen Britain's position in the Near East, he sympathised with reforms which would raise the prestige of his country, particularly against Russia. It was a matter in which he could rely on the support of the other European Powers, who buried their political differences in a united attack on the Porte's treatment of its Christian subjects.

Canning seems to have been waiting for an opportunity to urge the Sublime Porte to introduce reforms into the matter of apostasy. It came when the case of the Armenian, Avakim, emerged in August 1843, and Canning launched a campaign aimed at doing away with capital punishment for apostasy from Islam.

From the very beginning of the affair, Canning emphasised its political nature, and was anxious to point out that although in Avakim's case the apostate was an Armenian subject of the Ottoman Empire, the same law could equally be applied to a foreigner living within the Empire. This was intended to gain Aberdeen's support for his actions. He suggested to Aberdeen[618] that he bring Avakim's execution to the attention of Ali Efendi, the Ottoman Ambassador to London, to make him aware of 'its eventual bearing on the rights and interests of British subjects.' There seems little validity in this argument, however: the number of British subjects living within the Empire who were likely to convert to Islam and then converting back to Christianity, and thus apostatising, must have been negligible.

There were no references in Britain's Capitulations to cases of apostasy from Islam, although two articles dealt with the ownership of property found in the possession of any Briton who converted to Islam.[619] As Canning pointed out,[620]

Christian Europe had not formerly resisted the Porte's policy towards foreigners embracing Islam; but, he argued, the recent additional power acquired by Europe carried with it a moral responsibility:

> '... the pretension of the Sublime Porte with respect to foreigners adopting the Mohamedan religion, was not resisted in former times by the leading Powers of Christendom. But a mere conjectural inference will hardly suffice to decide the question at once against humanity and against the weighty political considerations which come in aid of that principle. The power of late acquired by Christian Europe may be said to carry with it a duty and moral responsibility ...'[621]

Where there were specific agreements, these had to be adhered to, but otherwise the 'indefinite tolerance of a known evil, which unites impolicy with injustice and cruelty' must be seen as irresponsible. Canning asked Aberdeen for detailed instructions to enable him 'either to resist its application with effect, or to avoid committing Her Majesty's Government by an unseasonable step.'[622] Aberdeen declared that 'whatever may have been tolerated in former times by the weakness or indifference of Christian Powers', those Powers would now require due consideration from the Ottoman government, and would not 'endure that the Porte should insult and trample on their faith by treating as criminal, any person who embraces it.'[623] It is clear from Canning's first despatch to the Foreign Office on this subject, dated 27 August 1843, that he had approached every member of the Ottoman government, but had received the same answer, expressing a willingness to meet his wishes, and regretting the inexorable necessity of the law. However, he did not believe that any such necessity existed. He believed that the leading Ottoman lawyers knew how to bend before the Sultan's will. He suggested that

> 'it is really time that some check should be given to this stupid and fatal tendency. In proportion as the old malignant spirit of Mahomedanism is revived, the Christian subject of the Porte will naturally look to the

> nearest foreign protection; harsh measures of repression will be adopted; more frequent acts of violence and cruelty will ensue; and a fanatical arrogance, making little distinction between the Rayah and the Foreigner, will trample upon our commercial privileges, and embroil the Porte with her best friends.'[624]

Expressing the views of the British government after Canning's first report of the execution of Avakim, Aberdeen regretted the reintroduction of 'so cruel a law', which, although it might still form part of Islamic law, had fallen into disuse. He felt it the duty of every Christian government to raise its voice against such acts, whether against its own subjects or the Christian community in general, and advised the Ottoman government to take immediate measures for 'effectually preventing the future commission of such atrocities.'[625] There was no indication of the possible consequences of a refusal. It should be noted here that at this stage Aberdeen was not calling for the abolition of the law, but only for it not to be used. Canning warned Rauf Pasha, the Grand Vizier, that if a case which involved a British subject were to arise, the Porte would have men more powerful than its non-Muslim subjects to deal with: 'A Power, to whose arms this empire has twice owed the recovery of a province, would not be slow to protect, or weak in vindicating the rights of its own subjects.'[626] Aberdeen gave a similar warning to Ali Efendi: while he admitted that so far the apostates in question had been subjects of the Porte and any interference by Britain would be for the sake of humanity only, if a similar case arose involving a British subject, the British government's reaction would be quite different.[627]

Meanwhile, Canning had been assured confidentially that it was neither the Müftü (an official expounder of Islamic Law) nor the Ulema, but Hafiz Pasha, the President of the Council, who was the chief obstacle to mercy. Hafiz Pasha insisted on enforcing the law. 'He is a bigot, and a bad man, his appointment to the presidency is a

signal and a disgraceful mark of the prevailing policy.'[628] Moreover, tension was very high. The general feeling of indignation aroused in England and Europe had made a very deep and serious impression.

Although Rıfat Pasha's verbal message to Canning regarding the measures which the Porte would take did not give a clear guarantee or promise to abolish the law, Canning was satisfied that it demonstrated that a step had been taken by the Sublime Porte towards abolishing capital punishment for apostasy from Islam. He indicated his satisfaction in his despatch to Aberdeen on 17 November 1843: 'I am happy to state, that a serious and salutary impression has been made upon the Turkish Government, by the communication of your Lordship's instruction.'[629] He was also happy with the removal of Hafiz Pasha[630] from the presidency of the Council and the appointment of the Sultan's brother in law, Fethi Ahmed Pasha in his place. He concluded that 'I am satisfied, that in order to secure the temporary advantage now obtained, nothing is wanted but a determination on the part of these Powers [Europe] in connection, if possible, with their allies, to repeat the present example as often as occasion may require.'[631]

However, the positive effect did not last long. After the execution at Bilecik, Canning met with his Austrian, French, Russian and Prussian colleagues and, finding that they were all equally alarmed about the incident,[632] he drew up instructions[633] for Pisani to give to Rıfat Pasha, and for the Foreign Minister to pass on to the Sultan. In these instructions Canning expressed his disappointment that the protests of the European Powers had not prevented the Porte from 'publicly outraging the principles of humanity', and he asked for the Porte's explanation, and an assurance that effective measures would be taken to avoid a repetition of 'such unwise and odious acts.' Similar

instructions were sent by the French and Prussian Ambassadors.[634]

An unusually vigorous despatch from Aberdeen supported Canning, and advised that the British government took the matter very seriously and would not compromise. The Foreign Minister added that

> 'Her Majesty's Government had hoped that the time had passed away when the perpetration of such acts of atrocity could have been tolerated; and that the law by which they are permitted or enjoined, although it might still disgrace the Mahomedan code, had fallen so completely into disuse, as to have become virtually null and of no effect.'[635]

Upon receipt of Canning's report of the execution at Bilecik, Aberdeen wrote to the Ambassador[636] to convey the British government's approval of his actions, and to react in the strongest terms to the second execution. Not content with assurance that the law would not be practised, the British government now required 'the Porte *to abandon, once for all, so revolting a principle*.'[637] Failure to comply would mean the withdrawal of Britain's friendship. This evidence underlines further the significance which Britain attached to the issue. Despite the reluctance of the other Powers to take so strong a line, Canning adhered to this instruction to the last.[638] If he did not receive satisfaction from the Porte, Canning was to seek an audience with the Sultan in order to explain the serious consequences ensuing from a disregard of the feelings of the British government.[639] Canning was to work closely with Bourqueney, the French Ambassador to Istanbul, and Aberdeen sent a copy of the instruction to Stuart de Rothsay, the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, although the latter was not to formally invite the Russian government to make a similar representation to the Porte.[640] Canning suggested a simultaneous appeal to the Porte by all the Great Powers, but Aberdeen rejected this idea, and was happy for Britain to act alone.[641]

Canning had a meeting with Rıfat Pasha during which he informed him of the

instructions he had received from Aberdeen.[642] In reply to Rıfat Pasha's initial negative response, Canning left the Ottoman Foreign Minister in no doubt that nothing but total compliance with Aberdeen's instructions would satisfy the British government. It was threatened that the British government would 'withdraw that support which it had hitherto uniformly lent to the principles of Ottoman independence.'[643] Meanwhile, Aberdeen, after learning of Metternich's disapproval of his demands through his brother's, Gordon's report, was beginning to regret them. He admitted that in his instruction to Canning he had asked for more than was necessary.[644] On receiving Canning's report[645] of his interview with Rıfat Pasha, Aberdeen was anxious for the Ambassador to avoid 'harsh or dictatorial terms' when dealing with the Porte.[646] He was to bear in mind that although the British government intended to abide by Aberdeen's instruction, it did not wish to cause 'unnecessary pain to the feelings of the Turkish Government.' Aberdeen was sure that the ministers of the Porte must be aware that without the support of Christendom the Ottoman Empire could not for long 'be preserved from the destruction with which, from numerous causes, it is continually menaced.'[647]

Rıfat Pasha offered to meet Canning and Bourqueney to discuss the matter amicably, and they were both ready to do this, but were agreed that they would refuse to meet any of the Ulema on that occasion. This, Canning believed, was a trap to make it seem that the two ambassadors approved of the religious nature which the Porte was trying to attribute to the question.[648] However, as his knowledge of Islamic law was negligible, it is unlikely that he would have emerged victorious from such an encounter.

According to Sturmer, everyone, Ottoman and European alike, began to study the Kur'an in order to find in it what each, according to his point of view, wished to

find.[649] This general search may have been instigated by Canning after Rıfat Pasha's suggestion.[650] Canning was sure that the Kur'an did not contain any passage which ordered the death penalty for apostasy,[651] but as he had been studying a French translation, he ascertained whether the passage was translated accurately from the original text. He sent Alison to Rıfat Pasha in order to draw the Pasha's attention to his findings, and an animated discussion took place between them. Rıfat Pasha sent for the Imam (prayer leader) of the district to continue the discussion, but, according to Canning, neither the Imam nor Rıfat Pasha could invalidate his argument.[652] Sturmer pointed out to Canning that the relevant law was to be found in the Sünnet, which for Muslims is no less obligatory than the Kur'an.

Canning reported his findings to Aberdeen.[653] He had discovered that those passages in the Kur'an which prescribed the death penalty for apostasy referred to specific incidents in the time of the Prophet and had as their aim the repression of renegades who actively opposed him under arms. He stated, moreover, that the other authorities (the Sünnet, the _cma and Kıyas) are invested with less sanctity, that they are inconsistent and fallible. However, Canning was less concerned with the validity of these authorities than with the effect of adherence to them on Christianity. They could not be received as authorities for executing apostates from Islam, he asserted, 'without opening a door to the revival of all that Christianity has ever suffered from the followers of Mahomet in the days of their strength and glory.' Always, his arguments return to the interests of British subjects: he did not see that Islam had the right to take the life of someone who wished to leave that faith by the same process by which he embraced it (i.e. voluntary declaration), 'especially since the law in question tells as fatally against a foreign Christian, it might be a British subject, as against a Rayah or a

Jew, the subject of the Porte.' Alison's report on the subject of the just penalty for apostasy as set out in the Kur'an concludes that it should be reserved for divine punishment.[654]

During the private interview between Rıfat Pasha, Canning and Bourqueney, the Pasha asked for advice from the two men: 'if we refuse, we lose the friendship of Europe; if we consent, we hazard the peace of the empire; you come as friends, and therefore we reckon upon your helping us to find some course by which we may satisfy you without injuring ourselves.'[655] He said that they had carried out their instructions as ambassadors, but now he was asking them for help as individuals. He appealed particularly to Canning, who had been Ambassador to Istanbul several times and who was well versed in European diplomacy. 'I ask you, if you were a minister of the Porte in charge of this question, what would you do in this position?'[656] He threatened to write directly to the relevant European Foreign Ministers if he did not receive any satisfactory advice from the ambassadors. Canning replied that it was necessary for the Porte to listen to Europe and know that Europe understood that the Porte was using the matter for political purposes. He rejected the Ulema's negative decision, saying that they had not been able to support it with evidence from the Kur'an.[657] Both ambassadors replied that their actions were prescribed by the instructions they had received from their governments, and Canning would not admit the possibility that his government had acted without a full consideration of the consequences. Although they were not instructed to demand a formal repeal of the religious law, the very least they required was 'an official declaration, that effectual measures would be taken to prevent the recurrence of executions for apostasy, and a disclaimer of every idea involving insult to Christianity, or the persecution of its followers, on account of their faith.'[658]

Canning suggested that if the Ottoman ministers were to explain the needs of the Empire to the Ulema in terms of Europe's friendship, then they would obtain the 'necessary' reply.[659] He rejected the argument that internal unrest would result from this, saying that other expedient interpretations of the law had not prompted such an outcome.

The British government supported Canning's refusal of the Porte's declaration of 14 March 1844, since it did not fulfil the requirements of Aberdeen's instruction of 16 January 1844.[660] However, it was now willing to accept 'an official declaration that effectual measures would be taken to prevent the recurrence of executions for apostasy', even without the additional clauses which Canning had demanded.

The Policies of the Other European Powers

During a meeting between Bourqueney and Rıfat Pasha the day after Avakim's execution, the French Ambassador said: 'It would have been better for you to have lost a province than to have assassinated the Armenian who died yesterday.'[661] He asked the French Foreign Minister to bring to the attention of Nafi Efendi, the Ottoman Ambassador to Paris, the gravity of the situation and the deep impression it had made,[662] which Guizot did. His reaction was not, however, as extreme as Aberdeen's: he suggested to Nafi Efendi that the Porte could have avoided the problem by allowing the apostate to escape the Empire.[663]

Bourqueney's instructions from Guizot were that the French government 'had no intention of requiring of the Ottoman Government that they should abrogate any law, but they expect a satisfactory assurance in writing should be given to the Allies, that the practice complained of should cease.'[664] The fact that the governments of the Northern

Powers (Russia, Prussia and Austria) were delaying issuing instructions to their ambassadors would not affect France's decision.[665] After two meetings with Guizot, in which the French Foreign Minister had used very strong language, Reshid noticed a softening in attitude on the part of the Frenchman, and asked an expert in diplomacy for the reason. It was explained to him confidentially that the demand for a written guarantee had been the idea of the French government, but had not gained support from Britain. On the other hand, Guizot had supported Aberdeen's demands[666] as expressed in his instruction to Canning dated 16 January 1844, hence the strong language used by the French Foreign Minister.[667] Metternich instructed the Austrian Ambassador to Paris to ask Guizot not to ask the Porte for a cancellation of the law, but apparently he did not comply at first. Later, Guizot had modified his language, and had sent instructions to Bourqueney in Istanbul to do the same. He informed Reshid of the new proposals which had been presented to the Porte.[668]

A few weeks after Avakim's execution, the French Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg was instructed to invite the Russian government to support the French moves against execution for apostasy, but received an unsatisfactory response from Count Nesselrode.[669] The Russian Vice-Chancellor apparently disagreed with the tone of the note in which Bourqueney was instructed to address the Porte on the subject.[670] Despite sharing the opinions of the British government, Nesselrode expressed the view that it might be more expedient to try other methods in order to attain the common goal, and that Christians would obtain greater security 'by the exercise of the individual influence of foreign agents, than by seeking an alteration in the fundamental laws of the Turkish Empire.'[671] Nevertheless, he instructed Titow to advise the Porte in friendly terms that Russia expected the practice of execution for apostasy to cease.[672]

Nesselrode also referred to Christian unrest within the Empire, and the Porte's necessity to be conciliatory towards its Christian subjects.

Aberdeen's instruction to Canning concerning the abolition of the law rather than the practice[673] went through Gordon, the British Ambassador in Vienna. Gordon read it to the Austrian Foreign Minister, Metternich, who objected to it. Gordon reported Metternich's opinions to Aberdeen, but he could not send the instructions back, and therefore forwarded them to Canning.[674] Metternich believed that if Europe's aim was the continued safety and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, then the language of the Powers should be moderated, and tolerance be shown towards Islam.[675]

> 'Everyone knows that in Turkey, the law of the Koran is inviolable; openly to stigmatize that law as barbarous, or to insist upon the abrogation of any part of it by the Caliph [the Sultan] himself is tantamount to issuing a decree for his downfall; and it is upon these grounds that Prince Metternich deprecates the forcible terms of your Lordship's despatch, and believes the course of proceedings recommended by it to Sir Stratford Canning to be fraught with danger.'

Titow told Sturmer[676] that he wholeheartedly agreed with the Austrian point of view, and that he would never adopt the opinions of Aberdeen. He shared Sturmer's view that a joint declaration of all the Powers would have accomplished their aim without embarrassing the Porte. The British and French Ambassadors had approved this idea but, according to Sturmer, their reports had determined the opinions of their respective governments before Metternich had had an opportunity to put forward his point of view.

Reshid told the Austrian Ambassador to Paris that he believed Metternich was behaving justly.[677] He also told Guizot that he expected Britain and France to behave similarly.[678] In order to convince Metternich that Britain did not harbour any hostile sentiments against the Ottoman Empire, and that she wanted no more than for the Porte

to show a proper respect for Christianity, Gordon showed the Austrian Foreign Minister a later instruction from Aberdeen to Canning which, while not dealing directly with the Apostasy Question, outlined Britain's 'enlightened policy' towards Ottoman affairs and which met with Metternich's approval. The Austrian Internuncio was instructed to work with Canning towards persuading the Porte with more conciliatory language, rather than insisting in menacing terms upon the abrogation of the law.

The Austrian Internuncio communicated privately with members of the Ottoman Cabinet, and informed Canning that he had not received instructions from Metternich.[679] Unofficially, he told Canning that he understood the Austrian government to be in broad agreement with Britain, and differed only in the best means of dealing with the Porte. Nevertheless, Canning believed Sturmer to be hostile. This is confirmed by Gordon,[680] who had learned that Austria and Russia, while wishing to uphold the cause of humanity, by no means wished 'to appear to triumph over the Mahomedans, or to attack openly any particle of their established law.'

Recognising that the ministers of the Porte could not propose the abolition of a religious law, Sturmer advised them to let the practice fall into disuse, which would be in effect the same as abolition.[681] Gordon warned Aberdeen that if Canning had indeed asked for the abrogation of the law, as the Internuncio presumed, or even if he had simply asked for a declaration from the Porte to the effect that the law would no longer be carried out, then Britain would not enjoy the support of Russia or of Austria.[682] The prospect of Russia supporting the Ottoman Empire against Britain was a danger to the peace of Europe, Gordon warned.[683] While Russia and Austria, like Britain, wished to stop executions for apostasy from Islam, they did not wish Britain to appear to be the only foreign power to support non-Muslims in this matter. However, in order to

counterbalance the increased influence which Canning was attempting to gain for Britain by making the matter a political one, Russia and Austria supported the Porte in its assertion that it was a question of religion. In fact, Russia's position was strong: she already had the official right of protection over non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, a right for which Britain was fighting. To solve the dilemma in which they found themselves, Russia and Austria did not support Canning in his insistence that the law of apostasy be completely abolished; they limited their demands to the abolition of the practice. This political rivalry did not prevent the ultimate objective being accomplished: all the powers achieved their aims in stopping executions for apostasy from Islam.

The Ottoman Response

The Sublime Porte sent instructions to its ambassadors in the European capitals to contact influential people in order to direct public opinion in favour of the Ottoman government.[684] Muhtar Bey (Vienna), Talat Efendi (Berlin), Ali Efendi (London) and Nafi Efendi (Paris), sent their reports to the Porte. Ali Efendi and Nafi Efendi reported that they had attempted to change public opinion in the countries to which they had been sent, but had not been successful.[685] Ali Efendi reported that the British newspapers were speculating that Avakim had been imprisoned and tortured in order to induce him to return to Islam.[686] They even claimed that a madman had been accepted as one of the witnesses at his conversion. The Ottoman Ambassador wrote to the newspapers explaining that torture is against Islamic law, and that the kind of conversion described would not be accepted. It was well known, he said, that Avakim had embraced Islam voluntarily and in front of two mature witnesses. The law of apostasy had been in existence since the beginning of Islam, and therefore the

execution of the Armenian could not be considered an insult to Christianity.[687] If the Ottomans had wanted to convert non-Muslims to Islam it could have done so long before, but there were many non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, and they were free to practise their religion.

At a meeting with Aberdeen, when the British Foreign Minister read out the part of Canning's despatch where he complained that execution for apostasy was insulting to Christianity, Ali Efendi replied that Avakim had not been executed because he was a Christian, but because he had turned from Islam.[688] The Ambassador reminded Aberdeen that in Europe many people had been executed for religious reasons, to which Aberdeen replied that this had happened several centuries ago, and that there was no such problem now. Ali Efendi implored Aberdeen not to send a note to the Porte, as it was a religious, not a political, matter, and did not concern the changing of a clause in an agreement between the two countries; there was no power in Istanbul which could change the law.[689] However, Rıfat Pasha later admitted that the question did have its political as well as its religious side.[690] He assured Canning that when the Council of Ulema met to discuss the matter, their deliberations would not be confined to the religious side of the question. Their findings would be referred again to the Council of Ministers, but he could not say when this would be.[691]

The insulting treatment of Avakim's body had made a particularly deep impression on the European public. Although this kind of behaviour did not form part of the law, and the Porte had considered punishing it, it did not believe that such action would change public opinion in Europe.[692]

While the Porte asserted that every nation had a right to protect its religion, it was also conscious of the need to maintain friendly relations with Europe. The Cabinet

decided that to avoid future problems over apostasy, such cases would no longer be tried by the ordinary courts, but all documentation relating to a case would be considered by the Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-i Adliyye, whose decision would be sent to the office of the Şeyhülislam for him to study the case. If he decided that the accused should be executed, he would issue a fetva. If a case arose in the provinces, it would be tried before the local Ulema, Müftü and high officials, and if there were any doubts about the decision of the court, it would be referred to Istanbul.[693]

At this stage the Porte did not see the European protests as concerning the abolition of the law of apostasy or its execution,[694] but rather the improvement of its procedures. However, after Rıfat Pasha had had separate meetings with Canning and Bourqueney, the Porte realised the extent of the demands of the European Powers. It was decided that 'suitable'[695] Ulema should discuss the matter confidentially, taking into account both the demands of the law and its relevance to the time. The Ulema's decision would be conveyed to the Cabinet, then to the Sultan, and finally the official reply would be sent to the European ambassadors.

Rauf Pasha, the Grand Vizier, explained to Pisani that 'neither the Ministers nor the Sultan could save the life of the Armenian.'[696] The letter of the law required the sentence to be carried out immediately, but the Porte, anxious to save Avakim's life if at all possible, allowed him several days in which to consider the matter carefully. However, as the Armenian resisted all attempts to have him return to Islam, they had to obey the law or otherwise face the protests of the Ulema. Asked what the Porte's position would be in the case of a British subject being involved in similar circumstances, the Grand Vizier said he did not know. Rıfat Pasha told Pisani[697] that the Porte was to take measures to ensure that an apostate was not taken to court and

tried. If a case arose in Istanbul, the offender was to be sent to the Porte; if outside Istanbul, then to the governor of the province. In this way, the matter could be dealt with without publicity and without recourse to the death penalty. If, on the other hand, an apostate were to escape to a non-Muslim state, the Porte would not attempt to obtain his return to the Empire.[698] It was not a matter of nationality, and would apply equally to an apostate who was a British subject.[699] The Porte could not, however, make any response in writing without compromising itself, either vis-à-vis the Christian Powers by saying that it was obliged to execute apostates, or vis-à-vis the law by declaring that it would not be carried out in cases similar to that of Avakim. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Foreign Minister believed that after the protests from Europe, the situation would not arise again; the measures which the Porte proposed aimed at avoiding a trial, and without a trial, a person could not be condemned to death.[700]

Until Aberdeen's despatch of 16 January 1844, the Sublime Porte had considered the problem as an ordinary matter and had not realised that the law pertaining to apostasy might be considered insulting to Christianity. Although the protest of public opinion in Europe had little initial impact in Istanbul, Aberdeen's despatch was received and examined very carefully in the Council. Rıfat Pasha sent a verbal message to Canning about the measures which the government would take to find a solution to this problem: 'The measures which the Government proposes to take aim to avoid a sentence, and without a sentence a person cannot be condemned to death.'[701] He also pointed out that he could not give an official written answer on this matter.

Canning had doubts about the long-term value of these assurances.[702] He suspected that they were no more than 'a temporary concession made to the necessities

of the moment.' The real gain, as far as Canning was concerned, was a precedent for interfering in similar cases in the future, and an opportunity to impress upon the Porte its dependence upon the good will of the European Powers. He told Aberdeen that he thought it possible for the Porte to issue a reply which would give the assurances required by the European Powers without going against Islam.[703] However, in a confidential response, Rıfat Pasha told Canning that if an official declaration were required, the Porte would be obliged to assert the supremacy of Islamic law.[704] To Bourqueney, Rıfat Pasha complained that while Europe claimed to be the friend of the Ottoman Empire and wanted to see the Empire maintain its integrity and independence on the one hand, on the other the European Powers were trying to divide the state from its people.[705] To Bourqueney's threat of the withdrawal of all the European ambassadors from Istanbul in the event of further executions for apostasy, the Ottoman Foreign Minister wondered why Europe would consider severing diplomatic relations 'for the sake of one or two useless men', similar cases to which would occur only once in twenty or thirty years.[706] This would seem to be a valid point: as we have seen, the law was used very rarely. In addition, the matter remained one of religion, despite Canning's attempts to politicise it, and matters of religion were not grounds for severing diplomatic relations.

When Canning read out Aberdeen's instruction of 16 January 1844 to Rıfat Pasha, the Ottoman minister rose silently from his seat and left the room for a few minutes.[707] On his return, he said that the matter was too important for him to reply without referring to the Council, but he imparted to Canning his initial observations:

> '... he then proceeded to draw a strong line of distinction between custom and divine law, intimating that a practice derived from the former source might be abandoned to meet the wishes of Europe, or

> even of Great Britain alone, but that a law, prescribed by God himself, was not to be set aside by any human power;[708] and that the Sultan in attempting it might be exposed to a heavy, perhaps even to a dangerous, responsibility.'[709]

Rıfat Pasha agreed that if the execution of apostates were merely a tradition and not a religious law, the Porte would have abolished it as it had already abolished other ancient civil laws. Canning would not be pressed into a discussion of the law, but merely insisted on an official guarantee from the Porte.

Rıfat Pasha also declared that no state, particularly Britain, who was a friend of the Ottoman Empire and supported its independence, had the right to insist on a change in a fundamental part of its religion. The Ottoman Foreign Minister wondered if Britain had an ulterior motive,[710] and if so he wanted to know it; Canning denied such intentions, and stressed that Britain had no other wish than to see the problem resolved as soon as possible. To this Rıfat Pasha replied that a meeting of Ulema and ministers had been unable to find a solution, even after studying all the fetva books, and that if Canning still did not believe the necessity of carrying out the law, he should ask anyone he knew who knew Turkish and Arabic to search the main books of Islam.[711]

The Austrian Internuncio's attempts at persuading Canning to soften his approach to the Porte were unsuccessful,[712] and Gordon reported to Aberdeen that Rıfat Pasha had been 'thrown into a state bordering upon desperation by the summons which he has received from the British and French Ambassadors on this question.'[713]

According to Sturmer,[714] the Porte saw in the demands of the British government an attack on its independence, and the less fanatical such as Ahmed Fethi Pasha felt wounded because of this. They were humiliated in the eyes of the non-Muslims who saw them locked in a struggle with Christianity which showed up their

weakness, and this led them to see, in the conduct of the British government, motives which did not really exist, and to think that a means of ruining them was being sought.

When Testa, the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires in Istanbul, managed to have a brief interview with Rıfat Pasha,[715] the Ottoman Foreign Minister was visibly agitated and told him that there was unanimous opposition to Canning's demand. The ministers found themselves in the situation where they had to choose between separating themselves from Europe or from their own people. He asked if the Christian Powers wanted the latter result, and if they could support the Ottoman government against its own people. Testa replied with a question of his own: What would the Porte do if Canning asked for an audience with the Sultan? Rıfat Pasha said that they had not yet reached that situation, and lamented instead his own personal position. Testa tried to comfort the Foreign Minister by saying that he was not alone, but Rıfat Pasha was afraid that the Porte's last hour had come, and he implored Testa to inform Metternich of their 'intolérable situation'.

Reshid, who had succeeded Nafi Efendi as Ottoman Ambassador to Paris, was instructed to find out the French government's view, and what its reaction would be if the Porte refused to give an official guarantee.[716] At a meeting in Paris between Reshid Pasha and Guizot, the Ottoman Ambassador insisted that the matter could not give any of the Powers the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Porte.[717] What Britain and France were demanding was both unjust and unsuitable for the Ottoman Empire. The Porte considered many things in Europe wrong, but it did not interfere in them.[718] Reshid also expressed in strong terms 'the concern of the Sultan at this interference of the Allied Sovereigns (of Great Britain and France in particular) in the internal concerns of his empire; that a compliance with these demands might be attended with

very serious consequences to himself and his Government; and that he (the Pasha) was instructed to express the fervent hope of his Master, that they would not be persisted in.'[719] Guizot would not be drawn on the French reaction to an unfavourable response from the Porte, saying that it was a matter for the future, and would be decided with Britain.[720] However, Reshid assured him, 'I may as well tell you, confidentially, that you will receive a favourable answer, in writing, from my Government.'[721]

The Müftü was ordered to deliberate with the Ulema and to submit to the Porte a report on the text of the law and its interpretation.[722] Present at this meeting were: the Şeyhülislam Efendi Daileri Meclis-i Valâlarina memur (representative of the Şeyhülislam), Abdulkadir Bey; the Darü'ş-Şurayi Askeriyeye memur (representative of the Council for the Armed Forces), Arif Hikmet Bey; the Sudur-i Rumeli (Chief Military Judge for Ottoman European territories), Esad Efendi; the Reis-i Etibba (President of the Medical Council), Abdulhak Efendi; the Maarif-i Adliye Mektebi Naziri (Minister for Judicial Education), Imamzade Esad Efendi; the Fetva Emini Efendi (Head of the Fetva office, under the Şeyhülislam), (unnamed); and the Rüus vekili (representative of the Ulema), Haci Ömer Efendi.[723] No solution could be found, so the meeting was adjourned and reconvened the next day with staff from the Porte also present. This meeting, too, failed to find a solution to the problem, and two more meetings were held, one at the office of the Şeyhülislam, and one in Dolmabahçe Palace. This last took four hours. It was agreed that the Empire could not allow European interference in its internal affairs. They did not want to change the law of Islam, but they had to find a way to prevent their enemies from destroying their nation.[724] For this reason, they were prepared to take measures to keep secret any examples of apostasy, but should they become public knowledge, the death sentence

would have to be carried out: 'Laws are divine; it is not given to man to change them.'[725] If it came to a choice between Europe and its own people, then the Ottoman government must avoid division among Muslims. It was the Sultan's duty, as Caliph, to preserve the pure religion of Islam. Mehmed Ali Pasha, Governor of Egypt, was reported as saying, 'If the Porte agrees to the proposals made by France and England ... such will be the public excitement that the throne of the Sultan will be in danger. If on the contrary the Porte resists their demands, the consequences may be still more grave; but there are moments in the life of a people as well as in that of an individual when death is preferable to submission.'[726]

Canning told Rıfat Pasha that there was no clear basis for the law of apostasy in the Kur'an, whereas many laws which were clearly indicated in the Kur'an had been interpreted according to the age and the circumstances. He gave as an example that of prisoners of war who were supposed to choose between paying either the Diyet (blood money) or the Cizye (poll tax), and execution. However, executions did not take place; instead, prisoners were detained until an exchange could be effected. Following this example, Canning maintained, the Porte could interpret the law of apostasy according to modern circumstances.[727] Rıfat Pasha replied that the Ulema had made their decision and the Porte had to adhere to it. Bourqueney said that they were not criticising the canonical law itself, but its misuse.

To Testa's argument that European countries such as Britain and Switzerland had 'dead' laws which had been allowed to fall into disuse, Rıfat Pasha replied that in Europe religion and government were two distinct powers which gave mutual support. In Islam, however, the Kur'an and the other religious texts were at the same time the religious and the governmental code.[728] To sacrifice a sacred law to the danger of

alienating Europe would be a cowardly and impious act. The view had been expressed that it was better to die obeying the holy law than to submit to foreign laws and be cursed by true believers.

Less than two weeks after the negative decision of the Ulema, Canning reported to Aberdeen that he had learned from a reliable confidential source that the 'Turkish Government has virtually decided on complying with your Lordship's requisition.'[729]

The Final Outcome

When Canning finally received the Porte's definitive answer,[730] it was 'so unsatisfactory, as to induce me to reject it without a moment's hesitation.'[731] It was rejected because the Turkish word katl (to kill, i.e. unofficially) was not thought to be comprehensive.[732] Canning insisted that the Turkish word idam (to execute, i.e. officially) should also be included, so that the Porte could not use another interpretation as a reason for killing apostates in the future.[733]

Canning was given to understood that the declaration had been prepared earlier but that the Porte had delayed its transmission to him in order that the Sultan's agreement might be obtained, thereby frustrating any possible appeal.[734] Canning immediately requested an audience with the Sultan, and asked for him to delay his decision until they had had an opportunity to discuss the matter. The British Ambassador was still optimistic: 'The Porte, I am satisfied, is prepared to give way in the end, though with much reluctance.'[735]

In the Cabinet meeting which took place on 20 March 1844, it was agreed to add the word idam, and the amended reply was issued the next day. On 23 March 1844 Canning reported to Aberdeen that the Apostasy Question was 'happily, and, to all

appearance, conclusively settled.'[736] He was writing before Aberdeen's instructions that the British government would accept a compromise declaration from the Porte. Canning, by dealing directly with the Sultan, had obtained a satisfactory reply in writing from the Porte. This read as follows:

> 'It is the special and constant intention of His Highness the Sultan, that his cordial relations with the High Powers be preserved, and that a perfect reciprocal friendship be maintained, and increased.
>
> The Sublime Porte engages to take effectual measures to prevent henceforward the execution and putting to death of the Christian who is an apostate.'[737]

In addition, Canning had received the Sultan's royal word that 'henceforward, neither should Christianity be insulted in his dominions, nor should Christians be in any way persecuted for their religion.'[738] The Sultan called upon Canning to convey his thanks to the Queen for the good treatment experienced by the millions of Muslim subjects living under British rule in India. He also expressed his anxious desire that the British government should appreciate the arrangements which he had made to protect the Christians established in his Empire from undue interference, and elicit fresh proofs of friendly interest on the part of Britain towards his dominions.

It can be seen that the Porte's written declaration fulfils the requirements set out by Aberdeen in his instruction which would not, however, be written until two weeks later. Taken together with the Sultan's promise, the requirements demanded by Canning and Bourqueney at their interview with Rıfat Pasha are met. However, they fall far short of Aberdeen's initial demand for the abolition of the law. The Porte's declaration was dated, but Pisani was unable to obtain Rıfat Pasha's signature to it. Pisani was assured by the Ottoman Foreign Minister that the date was 'sufficient proof of authenticity according to the usage of Ottoman diplomacy',[739] and this explanation

was accepted by Canning. However, the written reply was deliberately written as a short sentence on a large piece of paper, so that it would not be official.[740]

So as to leave no doubt as to the meaning of the Porte's declaration, Canning sent an acknowledgement which, however, reintroduced the matter of the abolition of the law. It stated that the British government would

> 'understand with satisfaction, that the Sublime Porte, in taking effectual measures to prevent henceforward the execution and putting to death of any Christian, an apostate from Islamism, *relinquishes for ever a principle*[741] inconsistent with its friendly professions; and the further assurances to be given at the Ambassador's audience of the Sultan ... will fully satisfy the British Government, that Christianity is not to be insulted in His Highness's empire, nor any one professing it to be treated as a criminal, or persecuted on that account.'[742]

Aberdeen complained that he had not received a despatch from Canning since his No. 45 of 14 March 1844. He had read of the solution to the Apostasy Question in the newspapers, and surmised that the Porte had changed its decision some time between 14 and 18 March,[743] under the influence of Titow, the Russian Envoy, who, Aberdeen assumed, had probably received his instructions from Nesselrode by then. Canning took the credit for the successful resolution to the problem,[744] and did not mention any role which may have been played by Titow, although *The Times* reported that a meeting between the two on 15 March 1844 would result in the resolution of the problem.[745] Aberdeen again drew attention to the lack of details concerning the events which took place between Canning's rejection of the Porte's first declaration and his acceptance of the last.[746] Nevertheless, Aberdeen felt that the concession made by the Porte was 'entirely consistent ... with the wishes and intentions of Her Majesty's Government, as expressed in my several instructions, Nos. 4, 38 and 56 ...' *The Times* called it 'The most remarkable diplomatic achievement in the annals of Turkey',[747] and noted that:

> 'The friends of humanity throughout the civilised world may congratulate themselves on the signal success which appears to have attended the efforts of our Ambassador to the Sublime Porte to put an end to those excesses of fanatical bigotry against professors of the Christian faith. ... If anything could add to the gratification we derive from the triumphant conclusion it would be that we find he was most ably seconded and assisted in his measures by the Minister of France at the Porte, the Baron Bourqueney. It is an ennobling spectable to see the representatives of two mighty Powers sinking all conflicting pretensions ... and thus making common cause in a vigorous and successful appeal on behalf of outraged humanity.'[748]

* * *

When the question of the apostasy law began to emerge it was in the wider context of the promise of equality before the law for all subjects within the Ottoman Empire which was made in the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu. However, Canning was quick to grasp the political implications of the execution of Avakim, and there is no doubt that the strong language he used when reporting the instances of execution for apostasy from Islam encouraged Aberdeen to demand the abolition of the law, while the rest of Europe was content to request a guarantee that such executions would not take place in the future. When Gordon, British Ambassador to Vienna, and Aberdeen's brother, relayed to the British Foreign Minister the objections which Metternich had made, Aberdeen began to regret his hasty instructions to Canning, and ordered the Ambassador to take a gentler line.

Canning's vast experience in European diplomacy allowed him to dominate the less experienced ministers of the Porte. Had they been more experienced, they would have used their ambassadors in London and Paris to better effect in dealing with the respective governments, as Sturmer stated he would have done in their place.[749] As it was, they turned for advice to the one man whose desire to see the law of apostasy abolished was unwavering. Even when Metternich became involved in the matter, and

the British government retreated from its extreme position, Canning continued to insist on the abrogation of the law, rather than its mere falling into disuse. He wrote to Aberdeen: 'I might have used the late crisis to shake and perhaps overset the Ministry; but I thought you would not like so bold an experiment just at the moment ...'[750] For this, the Ambassador must have had in mind much harsher measures than he actually employed, and he contented himself with frightening the Ottoman government: '... if Rıza Pasha [Marshal of the Palace] had not been well frightened, we should have failed.'[751] Despite his statement that he did not go as far as he might have done for fear of exceeding Aberdeen's political objectives, he did not hesitate to warn the Foreign Minister against undermining his position in Istanbul.[752] Aberdeen's remarks to Ali Efendi in London were quoted during an interview Canning had with Rıfat Pasha, 'to make me believe that you had receded from your first view ...'[753]

The outcome has always been seen by British commentators such a Lane-Poole as a great victory for Canning, who claimed to have succeeded in achieving all his objectives, that is the abolition of the law of apostasy. However, the Porte was satisfied that the documents which it issued in this respect were not officially binding, and they do not include a guarantee to abolish the law, but only to ensure that executions did not take place in the future. Despite Canning's claims, then, the result was a compromise. Nevertheless, Canning's position in relation to the ministers of the Porte was strengthened by his forceful conduct, and this enabled him to insist upon further reforms during his time as British Ambassador to Istanbul. The outcome was that Britain emerged victorious from this test of her power to interfere in the internal affairs of the Porte.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

586. Lane-Poole, S., The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning: Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (hereafter, Lane-Poole, Life), 2 vols., London, 1888.
587. Heffening, 'Murtadd', Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., 3,2, pp. 736-738., and Zwemer, S.M., 'The Law of Apostasy', Moslem World, 14 (1924), pp. 373-391.
588. Zwemer, S.M., The Law of Apostasy in Islam, London, 1924.
589. Peters, R. and De Vries, G.J.J., 'Apostasy in Islam', Die Welt Des Islams, 16-17, (1975-77) pp. 1-25.
590. Ibid.
591. Ibid.
592. An-Na'im, A.A., 'The Islamic Law of Apostasy and its Modern Applicability', Religion 16 (1986), pp. 197-224.
593. For more details on apostasy in Islam see: Rahman, A.S., Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, Lahor, 1972; Ruxton, F.H., 'The Convert status in Maliki Law', Moslem World, 3 (1913), pp. 37-40; An-Na'im, op. cit.; Zwemer, S.M., 'Law of Apostasy', and Law of Apostasy in Islam; Peters and De Vries, op. cit.
594. Enclosure 1 in Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 180.
595. i.e. 23 August 1843.
596. Alison's Report, Enclosure 1 in Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 180.
597. Nerval, G. de, Oeuvres Complètes, Editions Gallimard, 1984, II, pp. 1370-72.
598. In 'Les Nuits de Ramazan', part of his Voyage en Orient, ibid., pp. 605-608.
599. There is no such custom.
600. This account is taken from Ayfer Bakkalc_o_lu, 'A Case of Murtadd during the Reign of Abdulmecid based on the Accounts of Gerard de Nerval', Bo_aziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi, 3 (1975), pp. 19-25.
601. The Patriarch is mistaken: the Şeyhülislam at the time was Mekki-zade Mustafa As_m Efendi (1833-46), Dani_mend, _.H., _zzahl_ Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, 5, p. 153. He may be referring to Rıza Pasha, Marshal of the Palace, who was one of the leaders of the opposition.
602. Ministers did not have the authority to order executions.
603. M.M.I., No. 1825. Only one of the documents referred to here is dated precisely: 13 Receb 1259 (20 August 1843).
604. The statement of faith which is the first obligation of anyone converting to Islam, that there is no God but Allah, and Muhammed is his Prophet.
605. '_lâm-ı er'iyyede Masturu'l-isim Avakim veled-i a_yan' n ba'de'l-islam irtidad cihetiyle imhal olunub intikal etdi_i nasraniyetden teberri ile taib olur ise febima e_er irtidad_nda _srar ve islamdan iba ve imtina ider ise bilatevakkuf katl olunmak iktiza idece i.' M.M.I., No. 1825, undated.
606. The documents do not state the names of the servants or their relationship to Avakim. Canning, in his Memoirs, does not mention this; he states that he first knew of the affair when some of Avakim's relatives stopped his carriage one day by throwing themselves in front of the wheels and implored Canning to intercede on his behalf. Lane-Poole, Life, II, p. 90.
607. 'Ermeni taifesinden ve çizmeci esnaf_ndan Avakim nam-ı z_mmi sene-i sab_ka _ehr-i Muharreminde huzur-u _er'i Şerifde ak_l ve bali_ oldu_u halde cemi'-i edyan- bat_ladan teberri itmi ve eref-i islam ile mü_erref olarak ismi kendi talebiyle Mehmed tesmiye olunmu_ken bu defa merkum elyaizubillah-i ta'ala islamdan rucu birle mürted olub bildef'at _üphesi ke_f ve imhal olundukda adem-i kabul ile irtidad_nda _srar itmekle mürted-i mesfurun er'an katli laz_m geldi ini mutazamm_n verilen ilam-ı er'i fetva-i hanedana celb olunan fetva-i Şerif i_bu Cumartesi günü Meclis-i Umumiden sonraca akd olunan Meclis-i Hass-_ Vükelada tezekkür ve k_raat ve mersum _ngiltere Sefareti hademesinden birinin akrabas_ndan olmas_yla hakk_nda merhamet-i er'iyye-i _ehriyari buyurulmas_ Mösyö Canning canibinden savb-_aciziye ve Nezaret-i Hariciye Makam_na bi'l-def'at ba_ tercüman Pisani vas_tas_yla ifade ve iltimas olarak... kabul-u islam eyledi_i halde dahi tevbesi makbul olaca_na mumaileyh Canning bu suretle iltimas itmi_ idü_üne binaen an_n dahi diyecek kalmamak içün mersum bir kere dahi

Meclis-i Valâya irtidad_nda israr eyledi_i halde hükm-ü_er'i mucibince katl ve idam olunaca__ kendisine ifade olunarak yine_srar ider ise bermuceb-i ilâm-ı__er'i bilatehir katl ve idam_ z_mn_nda...' M.M.I., No. 1825, undated.'

608. Nerval, op. cit., I, pp. 1400-1403. In this letter Nerval briefly mentions the decapitated body, but says it is of a Greek, and that he had been executed for not converting to Islam after he had promised to do so in order to avoid the bastinado.
609. Düzda_, M.E., Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi Fetvalar_, Istanbul, 1972, p. 103, Fetva No. 449.
610. The Turkish documents state that Avakim was a relative of one of the servants in the British Embassy, see next account of the execution.
611. Sandison to Canning, 9 December 1843, Enclosure 1 in Canning to Aberdeen, 17 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 267.
612. Cordoba to Canning, 6 December 1843, Enclosure 2 in Canning to Aberdeen, 17 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 267.
613. Sandison to Canning, 9 December 1843, Enclosure 1 in Canning to Aberdeen, 17 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 267.
614. Canning to Aberdeen, 18 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 31.
615. This must have taken place at the end of January/beginning of February 1844; Reshid was instructed to defend the action of the Porte in this case to the French Foreign Minister, but as Guizot did not raise the subject, Reshid did not either. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 22 Muharrem 1260 (18 February 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 557.
616. This kind of conversion would never have been valid, as eight years is well below the accepted age of maturity.
617. Aberdeen to Canning, 30 October 1841, F.O. 78/439, No. 2.
618. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 181, 'Confidential'.
619. Article LXI -That if any Englishman should turn Turk, and it should be represented and proved, that besides his own goods, he has in his hands any property belonging to another person in England, such property shall be taken from him and delivered up to the Ambassador or Consul, that they may convey the same to the owner thereof.
Article LXXI -That should any Englishman coming with merchandize turn Turk, and the goods so imported by him be proved to belong to merchants of his own country, from whom he had taken them, the whole shall be detained, with the ready money, and delivered up to the Ambassador, in order to his transmitting the same to the right owners, without any of our judges or officers interposing any obstacle or hindrance thereto. Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, V, London 1827, pp. 366 and 368.
620. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 180.
621. Ibid.
622. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 180.
623. Aberdeen to Canning, 16 January 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 4.
624. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 180.
625. Aberdeen to Canning, 4 October 1843, F.O. 78/514, No. 123.
626. Canning to Pisani, 23 August 1843, Enclosure 2 in Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 181.
627. Ali Efendi to Rıfat Pasha, 24 Muharrem 1260 (14 February 1844), M.M.I., No. 1828.
628. Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 180.
629. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 November 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 237.
630. Reported in The Times, 26 December 1843, where his dismissal is (wrongly) attributed to his having signed Avakim's fetva, and the Porte's wish to dissociate itself from this act. On 25 January 1844 The Times' correspondent reported that it was now known that the Sultan had signed the fetva, and so Hafiz Pasha had been made a scapegoat. He concluded that this kind of behaviour showed the Porte to be untrustworthy, and was a 'contemptuous insult to the friendly allies of Turkey.'
631. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 November 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 237.
632. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 267.

633. Enclosure in Canning to Pisani, 16 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 267; and M.M.I., No. 1826.
634. M.M.I., No. 1826 states that Britain and France protested in writing, Russia and Prussia verbally.
635. Aberdeen to Canning, 4 October 1843, F.O. 78/514, No. 123.
636. Aberdeen to Canning, 16 January 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 4, received by Canning on 5 February 1844.
637. My italics. '... ngiltere Devleti _imdiden daimi olmak üzere taraf-_ Devlet-i Aliyyeden bu usul-u kerihenin terk olunmas_n_ taleb eder...', M.M.I., No. 1828, which contains a translation of the whole of Aberdeen's Instruction No. 4 to Canning.
638. Cf. 'There is in truth no lasting security against the recurrence of the barbarous practice except in a real surrender of the principle.' Canning to Aberdeen, 29 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 36.
639. '... Vükelâ-i Devlet-i Aliyye'ye i 'ar eyliyesinizki o cevab ngiltere Devletinin intizar kerdesi olan vechile olmad takdirde huzur-u _ahaneye ç_kma_a izin isteme_e zat-_ hümayunlar_na _ngiltere Devletinin te'sirat-_ derunelerini ve te'sirat-_ mezkureye istihkak-_ izhar olundu_u halde Saltanat- Seniyye hakk_nda ondan ne 'et idecek netayic-i mazarra-i elfaz- ekide ile arz ve i 'ar etme e me'mursunuz...', M.M.I. No. 1828.
640. Aberdeen to Canning, 16 January 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 5; Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothsay, 16 January 1844, F.O. 65/297, No. 8.
641. Aberdeen to Canning, 20 February, F.O. 78/552, No. 28.
642. M.M.I., Nos. 1827 and 1828; Canning to Aberdeen, 10 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 27. The meeting took place on 9 February 1844. The Times, 27 March 1844.
643. The Times, 27 March 1844.
644. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 8 Rebiülevvel 1260 (28 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 567.
645. Canning to Aberdeen, 10 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 27.
646. Aberdeen to Canning, 19 March 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 38.
647. Ibid.
648. Canning to Aberdeen, 29 February 1944, F.O. 78/554, No. 36.
649. Sturmer to Metternich, 21 February 1844, Enclosure 1 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
650. For the suggestion see under 'Ottoman Response' section.
651. Sturmer to Metternich, 21 February 1844, Enclosure 1 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
652. Canning's Memoirs, quoted in Lane-Poole, Life, II, p. 92.
653. Canning to Aberdeen, 18 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 31.
654. Enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 18 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No.31.
655. Canning to Aberdeen, 6 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 42; cf. M.M.I., No. 1828: '... imdiye kadar vaki olan tedkikata nazaran buna müsade-i mümkün-i _eri'ye bulunam_yaca__ ve o cihetle Devlet-i Aliyye bir mevki'-i mü_külde kalaca__ nümayan olma_la _unun bir ortas_ bulunarak Saltanat-_ Seniyyenin derkâr olan mecburiyet-i diniye ve mü_külât- er'iyesiyle devletlerin arzu ve iddialar_ tevfik olunmak üzere halisane müzakere olunmas_ ... Saltanat-_ Seniyyenin Avrupa ile olan münasebat-_ salimiyesi ve kendü milletiyle olan irtibat_n_n bekas_ derece-i nezaketde iki göze te_bih olunsa ki_i hiç birisini kendi eliyle ç_karam_yaca__ cihetle i_te Devlet-i Aliyye _u mevki-i mü_külde bulundu_undan ne Avrupay_ ve ne milletini feda etmiyece_inden bu iki sureti tevfik etmek üzere di_er bir suret-i tesviye bulunmas_ ...
656. M.M.I., No. 1828: '...Canning bir kaç defa sefaretle nezd-i Saltanat- Seniyyede bulundu_undan bizim halk_m_z_n ahvalini tahsil etdikleri vukuf ve Avrupaca olan tecarüb ve malumatlar_ hasebiyle fasl-_ dava kendi reyine havale k_l_narak _u mü_külâta göre memureyn-i Devlet-i Aliyye s_ras_nda tutulsa nas_l rey iderler ...' M.M.I., No. 1828. Reshid made a similar appeal to Guizot, see Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 27 Safer 1260 (18 March 1844) and 3 Rebiülevvel (23 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., pp. 562-3 and 564-5.
657. M.M.I., No. 1828.
658. Ibid.

659. Bourqueney also expressed this opinion: Rıfat Pasha's report of his interview with Bourqueney, M.M.I., No. 1828, undated.
660. Aberdeen to Canning, 6 April 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 56.
661. 'Il vaudrait mieux que vous ayez perdu une province que d'avoir assassiné l'Arménien qui a peri hier.' Bourqueney to Guizot, 27 August 1843, quoted in Nerval, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 1559.
662. Ibid.
663. M.M.I., No. 1826.
664. Cowley to Aberdeen, 25 March 1844, F.O. 27/694, No. 161.
665. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 27 Safer 1260 (18 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 563.
666. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 28 Muharrem 1260 (18 February 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 556.
667. The joint action of the two governments was seen by The Times' correspondent as Britain and France 'march[ing] together ... to defend the progress of civilization.' The Times, 16 March 1844.
668. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 8 Rebiülevvel 1260 (28 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., pp. 556-7.
669. Stuart de Rothsay to Aberdeen, 7 October 1843, F.O. 65/292, No. 130.
670. Stuart de Rothsay to Aberdeen, 14 October 1843, F.O. 65/292, No. 133.
671. Stuart de Rothsay to Aberdeen, 6 February 1844, F.O. 65/298, No. 22.
672. Nesselrode to Titow, 15/27 February 1844, F.O. 881/185, p. 30; M.M.I., No. 1829.
673. Aberdeen to Canning, 16 January 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 4.
674. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 8 Rebiülevvel 1260 (28 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 567.
675. Gordon to Aberdeen, 16 February 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 8.
676. Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
677. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 27 Safer 1260 (18 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 563.
678. Ibid.
679. Canning to Aberdeen, 22 February 1844, F.O. 78/ 554, No. 36. The Austrian Ambassador to Paris likewise told Reshid at a soirée given by the British Ambassador on 15 March 1844 that he had not received any instructions. See Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 18 March 1844, Kaynar, op. cit. pp. 562-3.
680. Gordon to Aberdeen, 15 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 21.
681. Sturmer to Metternich, 21 February 1844, Enclosure 1 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
682. Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
683. The author of The Times' article of 19 March 1844 also hoped that the affair would not push the Ottoman Empire into the outstretched arms of Russia, who alone would benefit. The Porte had accepted help once before against Mehmed Ali Pasha, and if she assisted in this matter Russia would not be content with the terms she got then.
684. M.M.I., No. 1826.
685. 'Ali Efendi ve Nafi Efendi do_rusu pek yolunda ifade-i madde itmi_ ve _ngiltere ve Fransa Umur-u Ecnebiye Nazırlar_n_n tadil-i lisan_na ve bu babda olan iddialar_n savu_durulmas_na hayli çal__m__olduklar_halde tesirat_mü_ahade olunam_yarak ...', M.M.I. No. 1826, undated.
686. The Times' correspondent used sensationalising language in his reports, e.g. he wrote that Avakim had been 'decapitated for alleged disrespect to the Mahommedan religion', thereby implying that the death penalty was used for minor offences against Islam (The Times, 26 December 1843); on another occasion, Avakim's execution was referred to as a 'fanatical murder' (ibid., 6 January 1844).
687. Ali Efendi used the same argument to Aberdeen, see Ali Efendi to Rıfat Pasha, Selh-i Saban 1259 (16 October 1843), M.M.I., No. 1826.
688. Ibid.; also Ali Efendi to Rıfat Pasha, 24 Muharrem 1260 (14 February 1844); and Rıfat Pasha's report of his interview with Canning, M.M.I., No. 1828.
689. See also M.M.I., No. 1828.
690. Rıfat Pasha to Pisani, 22 February 1844, Enclosure 2 in Canning to Aberdeen, 29 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 36.
691. Ibid.: 'Ainsi, non seulement je ne suis pas à même de répondre aujourd'hui, mais il m'est encore

impossible de vous dire avec précision quel jour je pourrais vous la donner.'

692. Ali Efendi to Rıfat Pasha, Selh-i _aban 1259 (16 October 1843), M.M.I., No. 1826. Also, another (undated) document in the same file, M.M.I., No. 1826: 'Her nas_l ise Avrupaca husus-u mezbure ili ilmi_ ve idam olunan habisin_ frenk elbise ve _apkas_yla idam_n_ bütün bütün tahkire hamil iderek ... vak_a merkumun bu makule elbise-i efrenci ile katlinde bügüne mecburiyet-i _er'iyye olmamas_ cihetiyle bunda sehv vuku bulmu_ ve bunun bügüne kasda makrun olmad_ n Avrupaca dahi ilan suretiyle siyaset memurlar_ndan baz_ kavas_n ... zahiri tedibi hat_ra gelerek fakat aras_ndan hayli geçmesi hasebiyle teskin ve tahvil-i efkâra pekde kafi görünmemi_.'

693. 'Bundan böyle mevadd-_ merkumeye dair bu güne istid'a ve ifade vukuuyla evrak_ Meclis-i Valâ-i Ahkâm-ı_ Adliyye'ye verildikde _öylece fetva haneye gönderilmeyerek tedkikat-_ kanuniye ve nizamiye icra ve zaruret-i haliyesi layik_yla mütala'a ve if'a olundukdan sonra o makule evrak Makam-ı_ Celil-i Me_ihat Penahiye havale olunmak üzere taraf-_ sadarete ifade olunmas_ ve Dersaadetde vuku bulacak mevad olvecihle huzurda rü'yet olunaca_ cihetle civar-_ asitane-i saadetde kain mahallerde zuhur idecek ayni maddenin dahi rüyet ve münafas_kezalik huzura mahsus ve münhas_r olmas_ Dersaadet'de ba'dice olan yerlerde dahi tedkikat-_ matlube husulune medar olmamak için böyle maddelar Mü_iran-_ Eyalet huzurunda büyük meclislerde Ulema ve Müfti ve Nukaba mevcud bulunduklar_ halde garazs_zca rü'yet ve icab-_ sihhat-_ vechile ba i'lam ve tahrirat enha ve i_aret k_l_nmas_ ve baz_ ta_ralarda icra-i mahkematında _üphe olunur _ey vuku bulur ise o makulenin dahi Dersaadet-i celile tedkikat-_laz mesine bak_lmas_ hususlar_ ...', M.M.I., No. 1826, undated.

694. '... _uras_n_ sual etme_e mecburumki _ngiltere Devleti fahimesi bu meseleye ne nazarla bak_yor, yani mürted katli maddesi Düvel-i islamiyenin bir usul ve adet-i kadime veyahud siyaset-i zulmiyesi adolunarak muharrer ispat_na muktedir oldu_u itikad_nda m_ bulunuyor. Yoksa bu hususun mevadd-_ esasiye-i diniyeden oldu_unu bilerek fakat tevil ve tahvili mümkün olam_yacak merkez-i mecburiyetde bulundu_una malumat-_ sahihe-i kâfiyesi olmayup mutlaka men'i sureti mi isteniyor?...', M.M.I., No. 1828, undated.

695. M.M.I., No. 1827, undated: '... keyfiyet evvelemirde baz_ münasib Ulema ile daire-i mahremiyyetde bir kere müzakere ve mecburiyyet-i _er'iyye ve nezaket-i asriye ile beraber icab-_ mütala'a olunmak üzere ...'

696. '... ni les Ministres, ni le Sultan, ne pouvaient absolument pas sauver la vie de l'Arménien.' Pisani to Canning, 24 August 1843, Enclosure 2 in Canning to Aberdeen, 27 August 1843, F.O. 78/521, No. 180.

697. Enclosure in Pisani to Canning, 3 November 1843, F.O. 78/523; Canning to Aberdeen, 1 December 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 249.

698. Ali Efendi to Rıfat Pasha, 14 February 1844, M.M.I., No. 1828; Rıfat Pasha's report of his interview with Bourqueney (11 February 1844), M.M.I., No. 1828, undated.

699. Rıfat Pasha's report of his interview with Canning (9 February 1844), undated, M.M.I., No. 1828.

700. Ali Efendi gave the same response to Aberdeen, Ali Efendi to Rıfat Pasha, 14 February 1844, M.M.I., No. 1828.

701. 'Les mesures que le Gouvernement se propose de prendre ont pour but d'éviter un jugement; et sans jugement on ne peut condamner personne à mort.' Pisani to Canning, 3 November 1843, enclosure in Canning to Addington, 3 November 1843, F.O. 78/523, 'Confidential'.

702. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 November 1843, F.O. 78/523, No. 237.

703. Ibid.

704. Canning to Aberdeen, 16 January 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 3.

705. Rıfat Pasha's report of his interview with Bourqueney (11 February 1844), M.M.I., No. 1828, undated.

706. Ibid.

707. Canning to Aberdeen, 10 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 27.

708. Ali Efendi used similar language to Aberdeen, see Ali Efendi to Rıfat Pasha, 14 February 1844, M.M.I., No. 1828.

709. Canning to Aberdeen, 10 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 27; also Rıfat Pasha's report of the interview, M.M.I., No. 1828, undated.
710. Presumably Rıfat Pasha is alluding to a belief held by the Porte that the European Powers were planning the partition of the Empire.
711. Rıfat Pasha's report of the interview, M.M.I., No. 1828, undated: '...bu keyfiyet Elçi Beg cenablar na inand r lam yor ve kendisi buna mesa - er'i var ise de ketm olunmuyor zuumunda bulunuyor. Halbuki kendi görü_tü_ü ve belki sefaretde istihdam eyledi_i zevat_n ekserisi elsine-i Türkî'ye ve Arabîye'ye a_ina olduklar_ndan bir kere onlardan dahi sual etsinler ve sair mahallerden dahi tahkik eylesinler...'
712. Sturmer to Metternich, 21 February 1844, Enclosure 1 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
713. Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
714. Sturmer to Metternich, 21 February 1844, Enclosure 1 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
715. Testa to Sturmer, 21 February 1844, Enclosure 2 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
716. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 28 Muharrem 1260 (18 February 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 556.
717. The author of The Times' article of 27 March 1844 supported the Porte's assertion that the only grounds on which the allies of the Ottoman Empire could legitimately interfere in its internal administration was regarding the fulfilment of the stipulations of the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu, and that they had not been infringed.
718. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 27 Safer 1260 (18 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 563.
719. Cowley to Aberdeen, 18 March 1844, F. O. 27/694, No. 150, 'Confidential'.
720. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 27 Safer 1260 (18 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 563.
721. Cowley to Aberdeen, 18 March 1844, F.O. 27/694, No. 150, 'Confidential'.
722. Sturmer to Metternich, 21 February 1844, Enclosure 1 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 8 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 15, 'Confidential'.
723. M.M.I., No. 1828.
724. M.M.I., No. 1828. See also Enclosure 3 in Pisani to Canning, 26 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 36; and Testa to Sturmer, 27 February 1844, Enclosure 3 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 15 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 21.
725. 'Les lois sont divines, il n'est pas donné à l'homme de les changer.' Ibid.
726. Lt.-Col. Barnett to Aberdeen, 20 March 1844, F.O. 881/185, 'Confidential'.
727. Rıfat Pasha's report of his interview with Canning and Bourqueney, M.M.I., No. 1828, undated.
728. Testa to Sturmer, 27 February 1844, Enclosure 3 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 15 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 21.
729. Canning to Aberdeen, 3 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 41.
730. 'Answer of Rıfat Pasha to M. Frederic Pisani', 14 March 1844, enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 14 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 45. Turkish text: 'Zat-_ _evket Semat Hazret-i _ahane Düvel-i fahime ile olan münasebat-_ halisenin hüsn-ü vikayesiyle müveddet-i kâmile-i mütekabilenin tezyid ve istikrar_ niyet-i mahsusa-i daimesindendir. Mürted olan hiristiyan_n katli maddesi fimaba'd vuku'a getürülmemesi hususuna dair esbab-_ müessirenin icras_na taraf-_ Devlet-i Aliyyeden te_ebbüse taahhüd olunur.' M.M.I., No. 1830.
731. Canning to Aberdeen, 14 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 45. Canning's refusal to accept the note was reported in The Times of 5 April 1844. On 8 April 1844 the same newspaper also noted that the British and French governments had instructed their ambassadors to leave Istanbul as soon as they received a refusal from the Porte. The correspondent had no doubt that this would result in the Porte's acquiescence in the demands of France and Britain.
732. Guizot warned Reshid during their meeting the same day as the declaration was issued that if the Porte's written guarantee proved to be ambiguous, another would be demanded. Reshid to Rıfat Pasha, 27 Safer 1260 (18 March 1844), Kaynar, op. cit., p. 263.
733. M.M.I., No. 1830, undated. The Times reported: 'Canning refused to receive the note until further amended in a verbal particular - namely, that where it had been declared that for the

future, no Christian or Mussulman should be "decapitated" on account of his abjuring his religion, a fuller specification should be added, to the effect that the punishment of death should not in any instance be inflicted.' The Times, 16 April 1844.

734. Canning to Aberdeen, 14 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 45.
735. Ibid.
736. Canning to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 49.
737. 21 March 1844, Enclosure 1 in Canning to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 48. Turkish text: 'Zat-_ _evket Semat Hazret-i _ahane Düvel-i fahime ile olan münasebat-_ halisenin hüsn-ü vikâyesiyle müveddet-i kâmile-i mütekabilenin tezyid ve istikrar_ niyet-i mahsusa-i daimesindendir. Mürted olan hiristiyan_n katli ve i'dam_ maddesi fimabad vuku'a getürülmemesi hususuna dair esbab-_ müessirenin icras_na taraf-_ Devlet-i Aliyyeden te_ebbüse taahhüd olunur...' M.M.I., No. 1830.
738. Canning to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 49.
739. Canning to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 52. '...resmi takrir ve müzakere suretinde olmamak üzere _öylece pusula gibi birer varakaya terkim-i birle mezkur sefaretlere verilmesi cümleten ve mütemadiyyen tensib ve i_bu mazbata-i bendeganemiz bilkabul tasdik ve temhir olunmak...' M.M.I., No. 1828, undated.
740. M.M.I., No. 1828, undated. The Ottoman documents suggest that this refers to the Porte's first reply, but it is difficult to be certain as the documents are not dated.
741. My italics.
742. 22 March 1844, Enclosure 2 in Canning to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/550, No. 19.
743. Aberdeen to Canning, 6 April 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 56.
744. Canning to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/555, No. 49.
745. The Times, 5 April 1844: 'It is affirmed in high quarters that this step will lead to an issue on the question.'
746. Aberdeen to Canning, 19 April 1844, F.O. 78/552, No. 57.
747. The Times, 8 April 1844.
748. The Times, 11 April 1844. Quoting from the Journal des Débats, the same newspaper observed that it was 'a remarkable victory gained by civilization over barbarism ... Turkey herself by making laudable efforts to reconcile herself with the Christian states has opened the door to civilization. She has entered into the European system, and has taken an engagement, which does her honour, to humanize her manners by borrowing our customs.' The Times, 15 April 1844.
749. Sturmer to Metternich, 28 February 1844, Enclosure 1 in Gordon to Aberdeen, 15 March 1844, F.O. 7/316, No. 21.
750. Canning to Aberdeen, 1 April 1844, British Library, Add. Ms. 43139.
751. Ibid.
752. '... every indulgent admission you make in conversation with the Turkish Ambassador is used to my disadvantage here.' Ibid.
753. Aberdeen, in response to Ali Efendi's insistence that the European demands could not be met, had said he would think the matter over and consult with the French government. Ali Efendi to Rıfat Pasha, M.M.I., No. 1828, undated.

CHAPTER 8

THE RECOGNITION OF PROTESTANTS AS A SEPARATE MILLET (COMMUNITY), 1841-1850

One of the most important issues in Anglo-Ottoman relations during the Tanzimat period was the question of the recognition of the Protestants as a separate millet under Ottoman rule. This chapter will discuss the negotiations which took place to procure this recognition, and the events which precipitated them, that is the mass conversions of Orthodox Greeks in Hasbeya, and Armenians, to Protestantism. The relevant British and Ottoman archival material will be used for the first time. The question will be considered in the context of the status of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and other examples in the nineteenth century of the granting of special status to the Armenian Catholics and the Latins.

The necessity of containing the influence of Russia, which desired a monopoly of the right of protection over the Orthodox Church, and France, which was planning to use the Catholic Christians for her own purposes, alarmed Britain enough to work for the Protestant community and its recognition by the Sultan as a separate millet so as to create a balance of influence over the non-Muslim populations within the Ottoman Empire. This was intended to give Britain the same rights of influence in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state which Russia and France already enjoyed.

In July 1841 the British government, supported by Prussia, considered ways of improving the condition of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire and obtaining recognition of the Protestant Church there. Palmerston advised Ponsonby[754] that Britain was in favour of encouraging European Protestants to settle and purchase land within the Ottoman Empire, and to secure for Protestants, whether native subjects

of the Porte or foreigners who had settled there, the same protection offered to Christians of other denominations. Ponsonby was instructed to liaise with the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in Istanbul in order to fulfil these objectives. This would require the putting into practice of the fundamental reappraisal of the status of non-Muslims which was implied in the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu. A similar step had been taken in the past without any problematic consequences, when the Porte had needed the support of the French government, so that the ministers did not foresee any reason not to do the same again for the British.

The Status of Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire

The vast expansion of the Ottoman Empire occurred between 1453 and 1683, when it ended with the siege of Vienna. During this time, the number of Ottoman non-Muslims increased and varied from region to region and nation to nation: for example, Orthodox Greeks in Greece, Anatolia and Istanbul; Armenians in Armenia and some parts of Anatolia; Copts in Egypt; Bulgarians, Bosnians, Croatians, Serbians and Montenegrans in the Balkans. When the Ottomans accepted Jews who were escaping from Spanish assaults in 1492, they settled in Istanbul, Salonica and other cities in Anatolia and the Balkans. Thus, non-Muslims were spread throughout the Ottoman Empire, but the most important of these were the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. Sultan Mehmed II, the Conqueror (1432-1481), gave these communities some privileges which made them more important than other non-Muslims, and they gained power over the other religious groups in the Empire. The Sultan also recognised the Orthodox Church and gave the right of autonomy to the Patriarch of Istanbul. Later, similar status was given to the Armenians and the Jews.

Throughout Ottoman history each millet[755] organised itself separately and had to receive formal recognition from the Sublime Porte. The head of each millet represented his community at the Ottoman court and administered its affairs on behalf of the Sultan. He was elected by the members of the millet, but his appointment required the confirmation of the Sultan, and he was seen as the Sultan's representative. Thus it became easy for the Sublime Porte to intervene in the elections of the more important millets. Each millet had a council which heard civil cases affecting only members of the millet and which had almost complete autonomy in such matters. Each millet had the legal right to use its own language, and to develop its own religious, cultural and educational institutions. The head of each community was considered its temporal as well as religious leader. He was responsible for the collection of taxes, which he rendered to the Sultan. The most important right given to these communities was the right to maintain independent courts to deal with internal civil and criminal cases. Judgements rendered by these courts were enforced by the Ottoman authorities, who considered them part of the Ottoman administrative machinery.

In time such communities or millets developed their own particular characteristics and traditions and became identified with the various nationalities. Hence the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire became identified with the Greek nationality, and other minority groups developed their own identity through their own 'national' Churches.

Until 1831, there were just three millets in the Ottoman Empire: the Greeks, Armenians and Jews. In that year the Armenian Catholics, who had been exiled from Istanbul when the western Powers broke off diplomatic relations with the Porte, were recalled by a ferman and were separated from the Eutychians, with their own Patriarch

who held his authority directly from the Pope. In 1844, the Latins in the Ottoman Empire were placed under the direct control of the Pasha of Tophane, who was to be responsible for collecting their taxes and issuing tezkeres (certificates) confirming their nationality. This placed the Armenian Protestants at a severe disadvantage, for they had no religious head authorised to fulfil the duties required of them by the Porte. Their position was weaker than that of the Latins, who, although not enjoying full millet status, did at least have a recognised agent at the Porte. In 1846, when Alison compiled his report on the Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire, there were 85,000 Greeks; 110,000 Armenians; 16,000 Armenian Catholics; 4,000 Latins; and fewer than 1,000 Armenian Protestants, of whom approximately 400 were in Istanbul.[756]

The process of obtaining recognition for Protestants in the Ottoman Empire may be divided into three stages: the securing of permission to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem; the conversion of some Greek Orthodox subjects in Syria to Protestantism; and finally, the conversion of some Armenian Orthodox to Protestantism.

The Building of a Protestant Church in Jerusalem

The London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews was founded in 1809.[757] In 1820, the Society established a mission in Jerusalem which tried 'to promote the spiritual and temporal welfare of God's ancient people in that holy city.'[758] In order to give greater stability and permanency to this mission, in 1837 the Society appointed at its head a clergyman who was specifically ordained for that office by the Bishop of London.

In 1841 Sir Thomas Baring, the President of the Society, asked Palmerston to instruct the British Resident at the Egyptian Court to obtain permission for the erection of a 'chapel and suitable buildings' for the missionaries in Jerusalem. Palmerston responded promptly by sending an instruction to Colonel Campbell, the Consul-General at Alexandria, to that effect; instructions were also sent to Ponsonby, the British Ambassador at Istanbul, to support the Society in case of difficulties arising at the Porte.[759] The British representatives failed to obtain this permission, but the Society, following a suggestion by Palmerston, nevertheless found a way to celebrate religious worship in Jerusalem 'without exposing themselves to the interference of the Turkish Authorities.'[760]

In 1840 the Archbishop of Canterbury consecrated the Reverend Michael Solomon Alexander a bishop of the United Church of England and Ireland, 'to reside at Jerusalem, with spiritual jurisdiction over the English clergy and others in union with the Church, together with German clergymen ordained by the bishop, throughout Palestine, Syria, Chaldea, Egypt, and Abyssinia, his chief missionary care being directed to the conversion of the Jews to Christianity.'[761] A college, under the authority of the bishop, was also to be built. On the same day that Rıfat Pasha took office as Foreign Minister, 1 March 1841, Ponsonby had an interview with him, during which he informed Rıfat Pasha of the appointment of a bishop and asked the Porte to provide him with a safe-conduct and behave towards him as it did towards the leaders of other religious communities.[762] The Porte found itself in a difficult position, for if it approved the bishop's appointment it would create problems for itself in the region because it had heard that the recognised millets were against the appointment. It was therefore decided to write to the Governor of Damascus to learn the feelings of the

local communities. He was also instructed not to give the bishop the same recognition as the head of a millet.

Rıfat's reply to Ponsonby was that the British government had sent the bishop without asking the Porte's permission, and therefore he could not be recognised as a British representative. As far as religious matters were concerned, all foreign subjects were free to practise their religion; other matters were taken care of by the consulates, so that there was no need for anyone else.[763] Ponsonby countered by pointing out that the other communities had their own bishops in that region; the Protestant bishop would see to the needs of the Protestant British subjects, and Britain had no intention of converting any subjects of the Porte to Protestantism or of causing trouble among the Porte's subjects.[764] He asked for the Porte's official permission within a few days and told Rıfat Pasha that such a reply would lead to many benefits for the two countries. As 1 March 1841 was the Ottoman Foreign Minister's first day in office, and the situation was a new one, he wanted to consult his government, and he responded that he would need more than a few days in which to reply. Nevertheless, he told Ponsonby that the bishop's position could not be compared with that of the bishops of the Porte's own subjects.

News of the bishop's appointment appeared in the newspapers before the Governor of Damascus received his instructions from the Grand Vizier,[765] and the heads of the millets sent representatives to the governor to protest against the appointment. They declared that they would never recognise him and that the Porte should not either.[766] When the bishop arrived in Damascus, Rose went to see the governor and asked for a buyruldu (safe-conduct) for the bishop to travel to Jerusalem. The governor replied that he had no knowledge of the appointment of a bishop to

Jerusalem, and that he had received no instructions in the matter. Meanwhile, he had written on the subject to Tayyar Pasha, the Kudüs Feriki (Divisional General of the army in Jerusalem), who replied that there was already a Protestant bishop in Jerusalem, where a church was also being built by the British.[767] Tayyar Pasha may have been taking for a bishop the Reverend J. Nicolayson, who had been officiating in Jerusalem under the sanction of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London since February 1841.

After the Sultan's authority had been re-established in Syria with the settlement of the Egyptian Question in 1840, and Jerusalem was once more part of the Ottoman Empire, Baring renewed his request for permission to build a church. He asked Palmerston to use the influence gained over the Porte by the successful negotiations which resulted in the Sultan's victory over Mehmed Ali, to acquire a ferman granting the erection of a 'monument of national gratitude' and permission to have the property registered in Nicolayson's name.[768] Palmerston instructed Ponsonby, when making his application to the Porte, to refer to a strong public feeling in Britain that, because of the debt which the Ottoman government owed the Christian Powers with regard to the settlement of the Egyptian Question, the Porte should permit 'Christian worship to be openly performed in the city of Jerusalem.'[769]

The Porte delayed its reply to Ponsonby's initial request,[770] knowing that he was soon to be replaced as Ambassador and thinking he would therefore not be able to pursue the matter.[771] However, Ponsonby insisted, and a second application, made through Pisani in July 1841, was refused by Rıfat Pasha,[772] who stated that the Porte could not comply with a request that was contrary to Ottoman law. Rıfat Pasha admitted that some churches had been built in the Ottoman Empire in the past, but that

was because the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire would not remain without them. It was for that reason that permission was given to repair those churches which were in real need of it, but it was out of the question to grant permission for the erection of a new church. Ponsonby suggested that the Reverend Nicolayson could start by having a chapel in a house belonging to a Christian that with time would come to be considered as a sacred building, and that could then be repaired. He could establish a church in this way, but he must use patience and avoid open violation of the law.

Despite this pessimistic view, Ponsonby was able, two months later, to report that 'I expect to succeed in obtaining a firman to authorize the erection of a Protestant Church at Jerusalem.'[773] He communicated with the Prussian envoy, Count Königsberg, on the subject, after which the latter had an interview with Rıfat Pasha. The Ottoman Foreign Minister told him that while it was contrary to the precepts of Islam to permit the building of new churches, the Porte had never interfered with foreigners residing within the Ottoman Empire, and would not do so in the future.[774] Protestant subjects of friendly powers would therefore be as free to practise their religion as Catholics and 'foreign Greeks', and their cemeteries, hospitals and other religious establishments would be equally respected. Protestants would be free to establish chapels either within or adjoining the ambassadors', consuls' or agents' residences both in Istanbul and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Rıfat added that there were at that time no Protestant subjects of the Ottoman Empire, but if any chose to immigrate and become the Sultan's subjects, as the Jews had done, he was sure that the Porte would receive them. They would then enjoy all the privileges of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu.[775] Königsberg told Ponsonby that he believed the chapels permitted within embassy or consular residences would suffice for the time being, as

there were very few Protestants within the Ottoman Empire.[776] However, England and Prussia would have only an unofficial right to protect Protestant churches established by Ottoman subjects.

From other sources, Ponsonby learned that the best that could be hoped for was an 'unavowed permission from the Ottoman Ministers for us to build an English Church' in Jerusalem, and a promise that the Porte would order the authorities, including the kadı in Jerusalem, not to oppose the building. It was to be a modest construction, not designed to attract attention. Ponsonby reported that he hoped to have this promise in writing, although he did not expect to obtain a ferman. He was optimistic, however, that before long it would be possible to establish Protestant churches wherever they wished.[777]

On 7 October 1841, Ponsonby had an inteview with Rıfat Pasha during which the Ottoman Foreign Minister again refused the British request to build a church in Jerusalem.[778] He said that the Ottoman ministers themselves were not opposed, but they were overruled in the Council by some of the Ulema, led by the Şeyhülislam. Ponsonby argued that the Porte risked offending the British government by refusing to grant it what had been given to others. In support of his argument he quoted Article XVIII of Britain's first Capitulation,[779] which gave Britain the same privileges as those already granted to France and other allies of the Sublime Porte.

In the middle of November 1841, Charles Bankhead, the British representative in Istanbul, reported to Aberdeen that, although there would be some delay while the matter was discussed, he was confident of eventual success.[780]

The British documents are silent on the matter for the next sixteen months, during which time Ponsonby had been replaced by Canning as British Ambassador to

Istanbul (January 1842). Meanwhile, construction of the Protestant church in Jerusalem was 'tacitly permitted by the Turkish authorities'[781] and continued until March 1843, when it was 'abruptly and somewhat arbitrarily stopped.'[782] Canning was instructed to ask the Ottoman Foreign Minister for permission to continue the construction. Aberdeen did not think it prudent to renew the request for a ferman; as long as construction of the church was allowed to continue, official documentation was of less importance. Canning was also instructed to communicate with the Prussian Minister on the matter, and to work with him to obtain a successful outcome. Canning called the building an episcopal church,[783] while Bunsen, the Prussian Ambassador to London, referred to 'the state of the Protestant Bishopric at Jerusalem'.[784] This suggests that the British and Prussian governments had plans for something of much greater significance than a modest chapel attached to the consulate, a fact that is borne out in later documents. However, there was little optimism in Canning's next report to Aberdeen: a ferman seemed out of the question, and even unofficial permission from the Porte seemed unlikely without a great deal of difficulty; the best that could be hoped for was 'a local connivance at the covering in of the walls, which might, by skilful and patient management, be eventually improved into a completion of the building.'[785]

Nevertheless, new plans were drawn up in adherence to the Ottoman stipulations concerning the appearance of the building.[786] Its maximum capacity was envisaged at three hundred people; Bunsen considered this moderate, however, 'considering that, even under the present unfavourable circumstances, the congregation has frequently amounted to fifty.'[787] Initially, the policy would have been to increase the number of Protestants by converting Jews, as this would have satisfied the

objectives of both the Society for the Conversion of the Jews, and the British government, as they did not have the protection of any foreign power. However, the Armenians were in the same situation, and it was from this group that the greater number of converts came. In addition, Britain found the Armenians eager to secure the protection of a European Power to strengthen their position at the Porte in relation to the Orthodox and Catholic millets which had the protection of Russia and France respectively. In addition to the church, there were to be schools, a hospice for visitors, and the bishop's residence. The architect had been sent to Jerusalem by the Society for the Conversion of the Jews, and it was envisaged by Bunsen that the British Consul's residence should be funded by that Society.[788] However, Aberdeen objected to the provision of an official residence for the British government's representative being delegated to a private association, and he would not even promise that the British government would hire part of the building as a consular residence. Indeed, he wrote to Bunsen that the British government did not wish to be identified in any way with the actions of the Society.[789]

However, by October 1843 Aberdeen seems to have accepted the plans in which the church would have 'the appearance of a consular chapel', and that the British consular residence would form part of the buildings.[790] Canning was instructed to assist the Reverend Nicolayson, who was travelling to Istanbul in a further attempt to obtain a ferman for the continuation of the construction of the buildings. He gained no encouragement from Rıfat Pasha, who was once again the Ottoman Foreign Minister, with whom he discussed the matter briefly on 1 December 1843, but he was convinced that the Porte would give way to the joint efforts of Le Coq, the Prussian Ambassador, and himself. In Canning's next interview with Rıfat Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign

Minister agreed to discuss the matter with the Grand Vizier and the other members of the Council, although he foresaw difficulties and a further postponement.[791] Canning was not ready to accept further delay, and on 31 January 1844 he sent Alison to Rıfat Pasha with a memorandum which explained the instructions he had received. As proof of the unostentatious character of the proposed church, he gave 'the absence of Protestant sectarians among the Rayas of the Porte, and the well-known principles of Great Britain, which prevent her from meddling with the religious beliefs of others ...'[792]

A further meeting of the Council decided not to reverse the unfavourable decision. It was rightly believed that once the British government had obtained permission for a small church within the consulate, they would understand it as permission to continue the building already started.[793] The protests from the heads of the Greek and Armenian millets against the building of a Protestant church were also discussed, and it was decided to make a full report to Ali Efendi, the Ottoman Ambassador to London. Rıfat Pasha informed Canning that if Esad Pasha, the Governor of Sidon, had no objections, then the building work could be resumed.[794] Consequently, Rose, the British Consul-General of Syria, was instructed to try to influence Esad Pasha not to raise any objections to the resumption of the building work.[795]

For the next nine months British diplomatic activity in the region centred upon the consequences of the conversion by American missionaries of a hundred Greek Orthodox to Protestantism, but the focus changed when, in March 1845, Aberdeen sent to Canning a copy of a petition from the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, which was signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and over 15,000

others.[796] The object of the petition was to have Canning renew his efforts to obtain a ferman for the building of the church at Jerusalem.[797] Aberdeen noted that the last communication he had received from Canning on the subject had been his despatch (No. 85) of 3 May 1844, and he wondered if the report from Esad Pasha had been received by the Porte and what had been decided.[798] If the Porte continued to procrastinate, then Canning was to bring the petition to the attention of the ministers and 'take such further measures as may appear to you best calculated for giving effect to the wishes expressed in it.'[799] Since the number of Protestants in Jerusalem had been swelled by converts, the church and its associated buildings had taken on greater significance.[800] In fact, Esad Pasha had reported that the building would be a standard church, and Canning was told that permission had not been granted for such a building.[801] The British Ambassador pointed out that Britain had amended its request to a small church within the consulate, and that the matter had been drawn out over four or five years, with still no decision from the Porte, while France enjoyed the right to have Catholic churches within the Ottoman Empire.[802] Britain was the Porte's closest ally, Canning declared, and it was time for the Porte to prove its friendship. Britain would not give up its struggle, and would use any means available to obtain the permission it sought. Therefore, said Canning, the Porte might as well give its permission immediately and show that it sincerely wanted good relations with Britain; otherwise the Porte should not expect any assistance or good relations with the British government. The Porte saw that it would not reap any benefit from further delay; on the contrary, it could lose British support, which it needed in order to maintain its integrity and independence.[803] The Porte had been in this position before, when France insisted on the right to build Catholic churches in the Ottoman Empire; it had granted

this permission because at that time it needed France's support. It was therefore decided that the time was right to grant the permission to Britain.

The ferman was issued on 10 September 1845.[804] The memorandum which preceded it referred to 'internal difficulties and obstacles' which had delayed the issue of the ferman, but which had been overcome 'in conformity with the constant desire of His Imperial Majesty to confirm the special relations of amity and good understanding between him and Her Majesty the Queen ...'[805] Canning saw the condition that the church was to be within the consular buildings as a possible advantage, if it had the effect of 'placing the whole establishment more immediately under the control of Her Majesty's Government.'[806] There was a setback when Ali Pasha, the Governor of Jerusalem, would not allow the building which had been started to be resumed on the grounds that it was not within the British consular residency, as stated in the ferman.[807] After lengthy discussions and a visit to the site, it was agreed that both sides should consult their superiors. For his part, the governor stated that because feeling in the city against the building of a Protestant church was so strong, no work should be carried out for the time being. Newbolt, the British Consul in Jerusalem, sent a special messenger to Beirut for Rose's decision, and then visited the bishop and asked him to suspend the work which was then being carried out on the Society's premises, until Rose's decision was received. When Canning was informed of the governor's objection, he sent Alison to have an interview with Ali Efendi[808] in order to express his (Canning's) 'unqualified surprise and disappointment' at his refusal to implement the Sultan's ferman.[809] Alison was to request orders to the Governor of Jerusalem to execute the ferman 'without further room for cavil, subterfuge, or delay of any kind.'[810] Ali Efendi was also to be informed that Canning considered the governor's conduct to merit some expression of

the Sultan's displeasure. Ali Pasha was duly removed from Jerusalem and sent to Damascus.[811] Although Ali Efendi tended to agree with one of the governor's objections, that is, that the church was not within the consular residence, he nevertheless arranged for letters to be written to the Governor of Jerusalem and the Müşir (Field Marshal) of Sidon ordering that no further obstacles should be put in the way of the continuation of the building work.[812] In his letter, Ali Efendi referred to the word 'inşa' in the ferman, which means to erect anew, whereas it was proposed to continue the building already started. In addition, he stated that 'while it was requisite that the aforesaid place of worship should be built on the consulate, they now intend to built it openly.'[813] Aberdeen wrote to Canning expressing the British government's pleasure at his success in obtaining the ferman.

The Converts of Hasbeya

While the negotiations detailed above were taking place, the work of the American missionaries was also bearing fruit, and about 150 Greeks in Hasbeya converted to the Church of England, an act initially provoked by the heavy burden of taxes they were expected to pay rather than by any strong religious beliefs.[814] In this way the converts hoped to gain British support. Richard Wood, the Consul in Damascus, reported to Aberdeen that, although no British subjects had been involved in the conversions, the Greeks had written to him twice to obtain his support in case they had difficulties with the Ottoman authorities.[815] His position in Damascus already weakened by the affair, and fearful of the jealousy of both the foreign local ecclesiastical authorities, Wood did not reply to these requests. The matter of the conversion of the first Greeks to Protestantism was discussed in Ali Pasha's, the

Governor of Damascus', council, where one member 'argued that it was singular, at the very moment the British Government were earnestly asking of the Porte religious toleration in behalf of the Rayahs, that British subjects should be found in these parts converting them to the British Church, and endeavoured to explain, on this assumption, the secret motives which had instigated Her Majesty's Government to it; ...'[816] Another member of the council wanted to have the Greeks compelled to return to their original faith, but Ali Pasha overruled this idea. Instead, he decided to ask Esad Pasha for an explanation of the connection between the two matters. In order to allay the suspicions of the Porte that the British government was in some way connected with the conversions, Wood wrote to Ali Pasha, the Governor of Damascus.[817] In a later interview he also tried to persuade the Ottoman minister that it did not matter to which Church the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte belonged, as long as they paid their taxes and remained faithful to the Porte.[818] His objective was to play down the importance of the affair and thereby protect the newly converted from interference from the Ottoman authorities at the instigation of the Greek prelates, and avoid exaggerated reports of it being sent by the local representatives of the European Powers to their ambassadors in Istanbul.

In fact, it had been American missionaries who had supplied the Greeks with religious books and '25 purses'.[819] Rose wrote to Aberdeen that he did not approve of the activities of the American missionaries. He asserted that they publicly denied their proselytising ambitions, while following policies which they hoped would lead to conversion.[820] Rose also reported that, although the missionaries claimed that they took no part in politics, he had heard to the contrary.[821] Nevertheless, he considered them 'generally men of education, and universally persons of good conduct.'[822]

According to Rose, the Greeks had first addressed themselves to the Anglican Bishop Alexander, who, however, refused to communicate with them when they expressed a wish to convert to Protestantism.[823] Some of them had then gone to the Consular Office and repeated their desire to become members of the Anglican Church, but their application had been rejected. Wood assured the Greek Patriarch, who was fearful of a division in his Church,[824] that it was a rule of the British government in Syria never to interfere in the religious affairs of the people, and that anything which was said to connect them with the conversions was 'a malicious misrepresentation'.[825] His efforts were to no avail, however. It was generally believed that the British were 'favourable to proselytism, inasmuch as it may facilitate hereafter the invasion of this country.'[826] Wood asserted that these ideas were circulated by those who were 'anxious to witness the subversion of British influence in Syria'.[827] He wrote to Ali Pasha, giving the British viewpoint and denying any British involvement in the missionary activities which had led to the conversion of the Greeks.[828] Ali Pasha later informed Wood that the Porte had asked him for an explanation of the conversions, and Wood took the opportunity of this friendly gesture to repeat in person what he had put in writing, and was confident that Ali Pasha's report to his government would be favourable.[829] Meanwhile, the French Consul had warned Ali Pasha of the 'danger of allowing the Greeks to become members of the Protestant Church'.[830] Wood countered this by reminding Ali Pasha that the Ottoman Empire was in less danger from 150 Protestants than from France's assumption of the right to protect all the Roman Catholics within the Empire, who numbered several hundred thousand.[831]

About a month later, a group of approximately 150 armed men led by a Druse, a Maronite and a Greek, attacked the homes of the newly converted and threatened to kill

them unless they returned to their original faith.[832] Anxious to avoid persecution of the people of Hasbeya by other non-Muslims, at the instigation, perhaps, of the Greek clergy, Wood instructed Michael Mushaka, a close friend of Saadeddin, the local emir, to write to him requesting his intervention, as the perpetrators of the attack had gone unpunished and Saadeddin seemed to support their action.[833] This Mushaka did.[834] Meanwhile, Wood also assured Count de Portalis, the Prussian Secretary of Legation in Istanbul, that although he did not consider himself authorised to grant British protection to a community of Protestant subjects of the Porte, he would nevertheless 'exert all the means in his power' to protect them from persecution and violence.'[835] According to Wood, after the armed attack against the new Protestants of Hasbeya, Ali Pasha gave secret instructions to Emir Saadeddin to appease the Greek Patriarch, and to do nothing to excite attention.[836] Saadeddin was to ensure that one group of non-Muslim subjects did not attack another, which was 'contrary to the Imperial will'.[837] However, Saadeddin showed in his reply to Wood's letter of complaint that he was anxious to please the British government and its representatives.[838] He had made known Ali Pasha's instruction and had ordered everyone to behave in a proper manner. He saw it as his duty to 'preserve equality among the people, and to protect them without making any distinction between them.'[839]

Despite these measures, the situation in Hasbeya deteriorated, and Wood had a private meeting with Ali Pasha who then sent orders to Saadeddin to prevent further violence.[840] Wood thought it prudent also to visit the Greek Patriarch, and he persuaded him to write to the Greeks and their clergy instructing them to refrain from 'molesting in any manner whatsoever, the converts, with whom they were to live in peace and harmony according to the spirit and precepts of their Church.'[841]

Wood's main concern now was the interference of other parties who would want to either encourage the Greeks to return to their original faith or offer them protection. The Russian Consul-General of Syria sent his interpreter to the Ottoman authorities in Damascus to persuade them to assist the Greek Patriarch in recovering the converts. He also wrote to the emir[842] assuring him that it would please the Porte to hear of their return to their Church, which he declared to be under the protection of the Russian Emperor. Wood advised Saadeddin to make a polite reply to the Consul-General which was calculated to ensure that he would not pursue the matter further. Meanwhile, the Prussian Consul-General also wrote to the emir complaining of the ill-treatment of the converts.[843]

Rose wrote to Wood asking him to make representations to Saadeddin to 'treat Syrians under his care and government with humanity and justice.'[844] He believed that the emir was either acting under secret instructions or had been bribed by the Greek Patriarch of Damascus. He held Saadeddin responsible for the persecution of the converts, and threatened to report him for disobedience to the Sultan's orders. Rose justified his intervention in the affair in the name of justice and humanity. 'Promise of protection, in the event of conversion,' he declared, 'is very different from defence of converts against persecution ... Our position, therefore, as regards the seceders of Hasbeya is perfectly good and defensible, - that is, entire non-interference in favour of conversion, and, secondly, defence of the seceders, on the same principle of justice and humanity which has been exercised in favour of all other Syrians, without regard to their creed or persuasion.'[845] Nevertheless, Rose was fully aware of the political implications of the conversions: 'They are chequered with good and evil; the former, I think, predominates, if discretion takes the place of over-zeal and enthusiasm.'[846]

Aberdeen wrote to Rose and Wood to confirm that the British government approved of their actions, but advised discretion with regard to both interfering too much with the Muslim faith and appearing to lend official support to the Protestant missionary efforts. Aberdeen also warned that 'the religious hostility or active interference of Russia in the East is not to be desired.'[847]

Indeed, the Russian Minister in Berlin, Baron Meyendorff, was instructed to inform the Prussian Cabinet of the Tsar's concern at the missionary activity which was setting Christian against Christian, and at the protection afforded to the converts by the representatives of the Prussian government; Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, believed they must be stepping outside the bounds of their instructions. The dangers of this 'untimely proselytism' would soon become clear to the other Powers who, Nesselrode believed, would join Russia in preventing the growth of religious conflict, for they could not long remain mere spectators. 'Unity and agreement' were of the utmost importance.[848]

Basily, the Russian Consul-General in Syria, reported to Nesselrode that after he had informed Rose that he wholeheartedly supported the Patriarch, Methodios, in the affair, the British representative wished to take no further part in it.[849] Rose, on the other hand, reported to Aberdeen that he had merely 'disclaimed, as I had done before to other parties, all connexion with the American Missionaries, or attempts at conversion.'[850] Basily's instructions were to do all he could for the Greek Church, but not to press the matter when it became serious. Rose wrote that in his conversation with Basily the Russian had 'reasoned in a manner which was extraordinary on the part of a servant of a legitimate Government ... he advocated insurrection, oppression, and anarchy, because, in this instance, they favoured the objects which he had in view, that

is, the intimidation and re-conversion of the dissidents.'[851] In reply to Basily's accusation that Rose and Wood had worded their dispatches in such a way that the British government could not fail to support their actions, Rose declared that they 'had not advocated the cause of the dissidents as Protestants, but oppressed Syrians.'[852]

Indeed, it had now become a matter of rebellion, for the Orthodox Hasbeyans had made five demands of Saadeddin, including the deposition of the Muslim kad_ and his replacement by one of their party, which the emir accepted. Finding their position intolerable, the Protestants fled the district.[853] Rose informed the fugitives, together with the American missionary, the Reverend Thomson, that any interest in their plight taken by Wood or himself 'was solely to be attributed to the oppression of which they had been the victims ... [and] that oppression having ceased, all advocacy of them would cease also.'[854]

Wood had an interview with the Greek Patriarch, during which he complained that the Greeks were abusing their improved civil condition which had been largely obtained through the influence of the British Consulate, and that if they still wished that influence to be exercised to their advantage, 'they must give it [the British Consulate] better proofs than hitherto of their being worthy of it.'[855] Wood threatened to 'bring the assassins to an exemplary and an ignominious punishment' should the Hasbeyans carry out their threat of killing the converts when they returned.[856]

In order to make the Ottoman authorities, which had been reluctant to interfere in the affair while it was confined to a religious dispute between Christians, take a closer interest, Wood thought it appropriate to turn the question into a civil rather than a religious one. Once the 'ultimate pernicious consequences' of events had been explained to them, they promised 'to intervene with firmness, and to adjust the affair in

a few days according to my [Wood's] wishes.'[857]

During an interview with Ali Pasha, Wood told him that either he did or did not have the means to protect equally all the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. If he did possess them, but would not use them on behalf of the Protestants, then Wood must consider him their persecutor, and would inform his government of that fact. If, on the other hand, the governor claimed that he was powerless to act, the British government must also be informed.[858] Ali Pasha found himself in a difficult position. Kaptan Halil had written to him saying that those who were trying to obtain the re-conversion of the Protestants deserved 'encouragement and mildness' rather than the imprisonment and punishment which the governor had ordered.[859] In addition, Ali Pasha had received a letter from the Russian Consul-General to the effect that the matter was a religious one and the governor should deal only with the Patriarch with regard to it.[860] He reminded Ali Pasha of the right to protect the Greek Church given to Russia in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and complained of the threatened imprisonment of the Greeks of Hasbeya who had not 'given themselves up to foreigners.'[861] Basily also wrote that he would protest against 'every proceeding which may lead to the humiliation of the Greek Christians of Hasbeya, and to the encouragement of those who pretend to be Protestants, especially as the Sublime Porte does not recognise among her subjects such a community.'[862] Ali Pasha asked what measures would be considered appropriate by the British government, to which Wood made two suggestions: firstly, that Saadeddin be replaced by his brother, Halil; and secondly, that Şeyh Muhammed Keiss, one of the feudal chiefs of the Hasbeya district, be sent with a letter[863] to the exiled converts to escort them back to their homes. Ali Pasha readily agreed to arrange these two things. Wood wrote in friendly terms to Saadeddin, with whom he had had amicable relations

for a long time, explaining that despite the emir's promises, the converts were still being persecuted.[864] Because he did not want to bring ruin to Saadeddin's family, Wood had opposed the appointment of one of his worst enemies, suggesting Halil instead.

Nesselrode instructed Brunov to communicate his displeasure at Wood's interference to Aberdeen; he felt sure that Aberdeen would agree with him that Wood had gone too far, and would admonish him severely. Titow, the Russian Ambassador, also complained of the conduct of the British representatives to Canning;[865] he was surprised that Wood, a Catholic, had supported the missionaries so strongly.[866] Titow also asked Canning if he considered it legitimate for some consuls to understand that after the Apostasy Question (see previous chapter) the Ottoman government had given its non-Muslim subjects the absolute freedom to change their religion. Canning agreed that the declaration was restricted to 'renegades' (presumably to be understood as apostates from Islam returning to their original faith) and did not include Christians converting from one Church to another.[867] The British Foreign Secretary repeated to Wood the instructions of non-interference he had given in his previous despatches:[868] 'To that course of non-interference in such matters you will strictly and invariably adhere; and you will not, under the plea of protecting Christians from Mahommedan persecution, indirectly extend protection to Protestant converts as such. Her Majesty's Government ... do not consider it any part of their duty to meddle in religious disputes, between one sect and another.'[869] Aberdeen also reminded Wood that a British Consul's duty was to protect British subjects and British interests, and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country or district to which he was sent.[870]

Wood reported a successful outcome to the affair 'which, if promulgated, cannot

fail to give Her Majesty's Government a permanent influence in Syria'.[871] However, he foresaw a problem with the Russian Consul-General who, he believed, would not 'leave undisturbed the arrangements made, be it by his opposition here or through the representations of the Russian Embassy to the Sublime Porte.'[872] Aberdeen wrote to Rose informing him of the British government's approval in general of his and Wood's actions.[873] Nevertheless, he regretted 'the conversions which have been unwisely encouraged in Hasbeya from the Greek faith; since such proceedings could scarcely fail to provoke the interference of Russia, and the virtual head of that faith; an interference on every account to be deprecated.'[874] He also advocated as little interference as possible by all the foreign consulates in Syria.[875]

After the converts had returned to their homes in Hasbeya, a Commission was set up to ascertain the wishes of both parties, but before it had made its report, Kaptan Halil renewed his protests and insisted on the dismissal of Emir Halil in a letter to Ali Pasha.[876] The Kaptan wanted a 'Turkish' officer to be appointed in the place of the native Syrian. Wood attributed this to the Porte's 'secret policy of establishing its direct rule by the substitution of its own for native Governors', and saw 'the facility with which the Russian Consul-General acquiesced in it' as proof that the Russian government was not averse to the system.[877] Although Wood believed that it did not benefit the Syrians, he acknowledged that the Russians found it easier to influence 'Turkish' officers than native ones. Wood suggested Emir Halil's nephew, Emir Ahmed, as his replacement, which Ali Pasha immediately accepted. Moreover, he saw an advantage in the Emir knowing that he owed his nomination to the British Consulate.

At Rose's request, Kaptan Halil wrote to Ali Pasha to ask him to take measures

to prevent further oppression of the converts of Hasbeya.[878] The views expressed in this letter are completely opposite to those he expressed in his earlier letter to Ali Pasha: 'it is not lawful to do them [the Protestants] harm nor insult them, but to protect and defend them, according to the high justice of the Sublime Porte.' Rose used this as vindication of his and Wood's interference, for Wood had 'clearly proved that the Capudan Pasha, under a certain influence and alarmed by studied misrepresentations, had shown much hostility in the matter of Hasbeya'.[879] In addition, Rose believed that because he had 'only interceded against oppression, and ... my Government had not the slightest idea or intention of seeking religious protection of any Turkish Protestants; that I did not intercede in any way whatever for the converts at Hasbeya, because they were Protestants', it had proved to the Ottoman authorities that they had 'nothing to fear politically from British religious sympathies for their Protestant subjects.'[880]

Here, reports concerning the converts of Hasbeya ceased until, in April 1847, Wellesley, the British representative in Istanbul during Canning's absence in London, sent Palmerston a summary of events.[881] The persecutions had continued, and the converts were once again forced to flee. After two months' exile, they saw no prospect of assistance, and compromised to the extent of occasionally attending Greek Orthodox services. They were not permitted to hold religious meetings except in secrecy, and their school was closed.[882] Their situation improved when the war between Christians and Druses broke up the group of young men who were mainly responsible for the persecution, and they could again meet openly. Later their school was reopened. Mass was celebrated, sometimes by native preachers, sometimes by American missionaries. After the appointment of Savfet Pasha as Governor of Damascus, in the summer of 1846, all these gains were reversed, however. Wellesley now asked for specific

instructions to be sent to the British Consul for him to arrange an 'effective order from the Sultan to the Pasha of Damascus to protect these Protestants from all persecution and disabilities in the enjoyment of their religious privileges.'[883] Wellesley feared that 'without this authority for energetic interference on his [the Consul's] part, there is very little reason to hope that an order, however strong, will be attended with any benefit.'[884]

The Grand Vizier did not believe all the accusations made by the converts.[885] Nevertheless, he instructed the Governor of Damascus to investigate the matter, and if he found that the alleged persecution really existed, he was to take measures to stop it. All this was to be done 'in a way calculated to avoid scandal and disorder.'[886] Palmerston instructed the British Ambassador in Istanbul to thank the Porte for issuing these orders.[887]

Recognition of Protestants as a Separate Millet

Because of Russian protests against the conversion of the Greeks of Hasbeya, the American missionaries had turned their attention to the Armenian subjects of the Porte, who had no foreign power as protector, and the number of converts to Protestantism was growing. In March 1846 the British Ambassador reported that large numbers of Armenians now considered it a duty to read the Gospels and to reject any belief which was not supported by reference to them. Only a few had professed Protestantism openly, but it was thought that hundreds secretly looked forward to a time when they could do so without prejudice to their temporal interests. Canning believed that this time would also see the recognition of the establishment of the Protestants in the Ottoman Empire under a separate spiritual head.[888]

In March 1846 Canning wrote to Aberdeen that he had recently rescued 'from prison and other modes of persecution, a number of Armenians who had incurred the

penalty of a formal excommunication, with all its barbarous consequences, by embracing and professing Evangelical opinions at variance with the discipline or dogmas of their Church.'[889] Canning emphasised that he had neither encouraged the missionaries nor given the Armenian religious authorities any cause for complaint.

Aberdeen conveyed the British government's approval of Canning's policy of non-intervention. No doubt with the affair of the converts of Hasbeya in mind, he wrote that 'Her Majesty's Government have no desire to see any such dissensions fostered or encouraged, or to cause any parties to expect that they may secure for themselves an interest with Great Britain, and the protection of British Agents, by separating from the communion of the Church in which they may have been born and educated.'[890] The only justification for interference would be to stop religious persecution, and as this seemed to be the situation, Canning was instructed to inform the Armenian Patriarch of the British government's regret at so many cases of persecution, and to consider the impression which this made on the Ottoman government and people. Canning was also to remind the Patriarch that he may in the future have need of the support of a powerful influence to save his people from Muslim oppression, and that he would not obtain that support from Britain if he himself persecuted separatists from the Armenian Church.

By carrying out these instructions, Canning was able to obtain for the Armenian Protestants 'the full restoration of their civil rights, and to elicit from the patriarch 'such declarations of the principles of Christian tolerance ... as may be fairly hoped to close the doors against any renewal of the late persecutions.'[891] The Patriarch denied that the persecution of excommunicated Armenians had been carried out by his instruction, and he wished to stop such cruelty, to which end he asked Canning to inform him of

any instances that he knew of.[892]

The Porte was aware that if it wanted to prevent the Armenian Protestants from seeking help from foreign powers, it had to protect them itself.[893] It also thought that the Armenian Patriarch should take measures to stop further conversions, as he was responsible for the whole of his millet. The Porte's solution was: to find a guarantor for the converts to Protestantism within the Empire, whether Christians of another millet or Muslims; to instruct its officials that as long as the Armenian Protestants had a guarantor they should not be prevented from carrying out their business; and to tell the Armenian Patriarch that the converts should not die because of their religious beliefs.[894] If the Armenian Protestants applied to the Porte for assistance, they were to be told that the Ottoman government had information that their conversion was not sincere, and that they had received money from the American missionaries. They were to be warned against encouraging others to follow them and whoever did so would be punished for destroying public security. The British and Prussian Ambassadors raised the question of the Armenian Protestants' disadvantageous position compared with other Christian groups because they lacked a head.[895] The Porte was wary about granting this privilege, however, as it was seen as the first step from which the two European countries would progress gradually in the furtherance of their aims.[896] Although the Porte was anxious to avoid protests from the traditional Armenians, it authorised the issue of a buyruldu which gave the Armenian Protestants the right to choose one of their number to act as their agent and conduct their business with the Porte.[897]

In July 1846 Canning reported that the recently persecuted Armenians 'of the independent Protestant persuasion have declared themselves to be a separate Church',

an action which he believed might have important consequences.[898] This development was transmitted to Canning by two American missionaries, Dwight and Schauffler,[899] together with two declarations by the Committee of the Evangelical Armenian Church,[900] and a Confession of Faith.[901] The missionaries denied that they had gone to Istanbul with the intention of establishing a sect; at the request of the Armenian Protestants, the missionaries 'assisted in organising them into a church, and ordaining over them a pastor.'[902] While they did not ask Canning to obtain from the Ottoman government the recognition of a Protestant sect, they nevertheless requested 'the humane interposition of the British Legation' should the Protestants again find themselves persecuted for their religious beliefs.[903] The Armenians themselves declared that they had not become a new nation, but asked Canning for his protection against temporal punishment and persecution.[904]

Two months later, Palmerston, now Foreign Secretary, sent to Wellesley[905] in Istanbul a copy of a memorandum he had received from the Committee of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland requesting the British government's interference to stop the continued persecution of Armenian Protestants throughout the Ottoman Empire.[906] The Committee did not wish the British government to interfere in the religious beliefs of any Church, but they felt that 'where there is gross civil oppression for peaceably avowing and maintaining the principles of the Protestant Faith, it is the duty of all who value that faith, to use their influence in every legitimate manner to rescue their Christian brethren from persecution.' Wellesley was instructed to carry out the wishes of the Committee as far as was 'proper and consistent with the respect due to the independence of a Foreign Government.'[907] In accordance with these instructions, Wellesley again brought the Armenian Protestants' plight to the attention

of Reshid, the Grand Vizier, and Ali Efendi, the Foreign Minister. He tried to convince them of the advantages to all parties of their recognition by the Porte,[908] but he was not confident that he had made any impression on them. All he had achieved was a promise that they would consider his arguments further.

Despite the efforts of Canning and the promises of the Armenian Patriarch, Wellesley reported continued and even increased persecution of the Armenian Protestants.[909] He spoke privately to Reshid on the subject, asking him to take measures to halt the abuses, as they were contrary to the Sultan's declaration that none of his subjects should suffer for his religious beliefs. The persecutions were easier to contain in Istanbul, but in the provinces they were carried out openly; and the American missionaries, having no consuls of their own to turn to, applied to the British consuls for protection. Wellesley complained that the Ottoman authorities did not offer the same protection to Protestants as they did to others; and that the British consuls were placed in an embarrassing situation when Protestants came to them with their complaints: '... unable to interfere officially, except in cases of actual cruelty or oppression, which in this country are always difficult of proof, and fearful of seeing the animosity which exists between the two parties increase in violence, [they] are much embarrassed as to the course they ought to pursue.'[910]

Wellesley posed two questions arising out of this situation: firstly, was there any remedy for it?; secondly, would the advantages gained warrant the British government using its influence to obtain the remedy? Wellesley believed the remedy to be the recognition by the Porte of the Armenian Protestants as an independent Church with its own spiritual head, and a representative at the Porte. He did not consider himself able to answer the second question, but he put forward the advantages and

difficulties of pursuing this solution as he saw them. The advantages would be that many more Armenians would convert to Protestantism once it had been recognised by the Porte; and as the Armenians were 'without doubt the most intelligent and industrious of the Porte's Christian subjects', and were scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire, their shared religion with Britain would encourage closer links with British merchants. This would lay the foundation for an expansion of trade between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, 'which it may be hoped would extend itself by degrees to Persia and the Asiatic dependencies of Russia.'[911]

Wellesley had already suggested to Reshid that the Protestant Church should be recognised and given representation at the Porte. Although Reshid said that personally he looked favourably on the Protestants, their recognition was impossible for the time being. Nevertheless, he promised to take measures to stop their persecution and ensure that they enjoyed all their civil rights. A marked improvement had taken place in this respect, but there was still a long way to go before all their civil rights were restored to them.[912] Wellesley believed the reasons for Reshid's refusal to recognise the Protestants as a community to be: fear of offending the French and Russians; unwillingness to offend the Armenian bankers on whom the Porte was heavily dependent, and none of whom had converted to Protestantism; and dislike of change. However, he was confident that the British government would eventually succeed in overcoming these difficulties, especially if backed by the representatives of the other Protestant states. The decision whether or not to pursue the matter was Palmerston's, but Wellesley advised that, if started, the attempt should be sustained until they were successful; for failure would jeopardise Britain's influence in the Ottoman Empire.

Palmerston responded to Wellesley's suggestions by explicitly instructing him

to 'urgently press the Turkish Government to acknowledge these parties [the Armenian dissidents] as a separate religious sect, with a spiritual chief or head, and with an agent at Constantinople to transact their business with the Porte.'[913] Wellesley was to point out to the Ottoman ministers the wretched condition of the Armenian Protestants, and inform them that recognition was the only effective solution. Moreover, not only would such an arrangement be consistent with the Sultan's wishes, it would also be 'highly agreeable to the British Government.'[914] Bearing in mind the importance of strengthening the ties between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, an arrangement of this sort would increase the British people's sense of the 'importance of maintaining his Highness's authority and power unimpaired.'

Before this last despatch from Palmerston was written, Wellesley reported that Ali Efendi's answer had been more satisfactory than he had expected.[915] The Ottoman Foreign Minister promised Wellesley that the Armenian Protestants would be 'removed completely from under the superintendence of the Armenian Patriarch, that all their business with the Porte shall be transacted through the Ihtissab [office of the superintendent of guilds and markets], and that they shall be allowed to choose one of their own number to represent them before the Ihtissab. In fact, they are to enjoy the same privileges as the Latins.'[916] As yet, this was a confidential communication between Ali Efendi and Wellesley, and the arrangement had not received the Sultan's formal approval; nevertheless, Wellesley declared that if it were implemented in full it was 'a virtual recognition by the Porte of the Protestants as a separate Christian community.'[917] Ali Efendi promised that the arrangement would take effect immediately after the Bayram (Religious Festival), but in the interval the Armenian Patriarch had protested and the Ottoman Foreign Minister had changed his mind.[918]

Palmerston's despatch No. 53, dated 11 November 1846, reached Wellesley about this time, and he used it in support of his case. The British representative managed to secure a position for the Armenian Protestants whereby the only thing for which the Patriarch had any authority over them was the issue of passports. Wellesley felt that with more insistence he might have freed the Protestants from this obligation also, but he feared that in doing so he might have lost the advantages already gained. He advocated patience, as in the following March (1847) the office of the _htisab[919] was to be abolished, and then might be an opportune time to make other arrangements with the Porte. Pisani drew up a memorandum, in Ali Efendi's presence, to avoid any further misunderstanding in the affair.[920] Palmerston instructed Wellesley to thank Ali Efendi for these arrangements; the British government was 'extremely gratified by his compliance with their wishes in this matter.'[921] Wellesley was further instructed to endeavour to improve the arrangements when the _htisab was abolished.

A copy of Pisani's memorandum was sent to Bunsen, the Prussian Minister in London,[922] who expressed his satisfaction at this new development,[923] but urged that the Armenian Protestant community be put on exactly the same footing as the other Christians. Palmerston sent Wellesley a copy of Bunsen's reply and instructed him to liaise with the Prussian Minister in Istanbul to effect the arrangement referred to by Bunsen.[924] By this he meant that not only the Armenian Protestants but all Protestant subjects of the Porte should be acknowledged as a separate community, with perhaps the Bishop of the United Church of England and Ireland in Jerusalem as their religious head. When Wellesley attempted to raise this question with Ali Efendi, the Ottoman Foreign Minister stopped him, saying that he had already heard about it from Palmerston through Prince Kalimaki, the Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires in London, and

that he had instructed Kalimaki to convey his reply to Palmerston.[925] In fact, the answer was negative: the Protestants were few in number and the concessions already made to them had caused trouble enough; to concede more would exacerbate the situation.[926] Ali Efendi stated that he was favourably inclined towards the Protestants, and promised that they would suffer no more persecution, but that the Porte must proceed cautiously and needed time 'to make further progress without compromising its own interests, and without weakening the affections of its subjects.'[927] Reshid expressed the Porte's fears in a letter to the Pasha of Damascus:

> 'if ... the Armenians are persecuted in order to make them change their religion, that persecution will make them all the more steadfast in it, and will bring about foreign intervention; and their complaints, increasing more and more, will end in their being recognized as a distinct people, in the same way as was done in the case of the Catholic Armenians.'[928]

Despite Ali Efendi's discouraging response, Wellesley urged him to free the Armenian Protestants from the authority of the Patriarch with regard to passports. Wellesley thought this was all that could be achieved for the time being, and the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires agreed with him. It was planned that the Protestants would buy a house to use as a place of worship which they would eventually pull down to replace with a proper church on the same site. Wellesley foresaw difficulties with Palmerston's suggestion of the Bishop of Jerusalem as the Protestants' religious head, stating that the Porte would allow only an Ottoman subject to exercise such power and authority. Moreover, none of the Armenian Protestants had adopted the ritual of the Anglican Church.

In 1847 Wellesley was able to report a marked improvement in the position of the Armenian Protestants.[929] While Palmerston was gratified to learn this, he remarked on the urgent need to carry out his previous instructions with regard to the Protestant

community as a whole: '... it is desirable to endeavour at once to obtain from the Porte a formal consent to acknowledge as a separate and independent community the Armenian Dissenters, and any other parties dissenting from the Greek, Latin, or other Churches, to whom the general term of "Protestant" community may be applied.'[930] When Wellesley raised the subject again with Ali Efendi, the latter claimed that it was already so. He 'considered the Protestants as completely independent of their former co-religionists; ... and ... the Government were disposed, whenever their number increased sufficiently, to recognize a spiritual head.'[931] In another despatch, the British Foreign Secretary asked Wellesley to furnish him with precise details of the religious beliefs of the Protestant Armenians, and in what respect they differed from those of the Catholic and Schismatic Armenians; also if all the Protestant Armenians shared the same beliefs and, if not, the different divisions and the number of members in each.[932] Palmerston also asked for a similar report on separatists from any of the other recognised Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire. After much research by Alison, Wellesley, now Lord Cowley, was able to provide Palmerston with a detailed report in answer to the questions the British Foreign Secretary had raised. This included the Confession of Faith of the Armenian Protestants; a list of differences between this and the beliefs of the Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic and Greek Churches; the differences in doctrine and ceremony between the Orthodox Armenian Church and the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches; and information on the other Christian communities and their respective representations at the Porte.[933] Cowley reported that there had been no divisions from the other recognised Christian communities since the beginning of the Ottoman Empire.[934]

In November 1847, there was still no official recognition of the Armenian

Protestants as a separate community.[935] However, Reshid then requested the Sultan's permission to issue orders which would 'establish their independence at once and completely,' and this permission was granted.[936] Cowley sent Palmerston a translation of Reshid's Vizierial letter to İzzet Pasha, the _htisab Nazır_ (superintendent of guilds and markets),[937] and with it a translation of the letter which recognised the Latins as a separate community,[938] so that Palmerston could see 'how much more full and explicit is that recognizing the Protestants.'[939] In addition, Cowley explained that although it may have seemed more desirable to have an Imperial ferman, a Vizierial letter written by the Sultan's order was just as, if not more, effective than a ferman.[940] Similar Vizierial letters were sent to the governors of all the provinces in which any Armenian Protestants were known to reside,[941] and Palmerston sent copies to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, and Bunsen.[942] Cowley sent copies to the British Consuls at Erzurum, Trabzon, Aleppo and Damascus,[943] which, anxious to prevent dissension between the various Christian sects, he accompanied with a warning 'to abstain from all interference which might tend to inspire the belief that Her Majesty's Government is animated by any other motive than that of using its powerful influence to put an end to persecution and fanaticism, by whomsoever practised, or wherever met with.'[944] Palmerston entirely approved of this instruction;[945] and Cowley received letters of thanks from the American missionaries[946] and from the Protestant Council of Constantinople.[947] In his reply to the Reverend W. Goodell of the American Mission, Cowley acknowledged how much the Protestants owed to the missionary and the Society for which he worked, and attributed much of the success 'that has crowned our joint endeavours' to the 'zeal, prudence, and patience' which had characterised all his actions.[948] However, he instructed the missionary on the necessity of preventing further

disturbances between the Armenian Protestants and members of the Church from which they had seceded.

Upon receipt of his copy of the Vizierial letter, Wood wrote from Damascus to congratulate Cowley.[949] He also reported that he had received complaints from the expatriated Protestants of Hasbeya which he had discussed at length with Safvet Pasha, Governor of Damascus. These discussions led to an order to the Emir Saadeddin, Governor of Hasbeya, to receive the Protestants and give them the same protection as other non-Muslim subjects.[950] The emir replied to this order with threats of execution towards the converts.[951] The Protestants complained once more; Wood then had recourse to the Vizierial letter and finally obtained new orders for Saadeddin[952] which, Wood hoped, would lead to an improvement in the condition of the Hasbeyan Protestants. These orders were not as strong as he would have hoped for, but he felt it prudent not to make a more formal demand for the time being.

In November 1850, Canning wrote to Palmerston that he had intended for some time to obtain a 'more formal and permanent recognition of the Sultan's Protestant subjects as a separate community',[953] and was supported in this by the Prussian and American missionaries. He now reported his success: a draft of the ferman[954] had been sent to the Sultan, and Canning was confident that it would be approved. His action had been prompted particularly by two petitions from the Armenian Protestants,[955] who complained that the Vizierial letter granting them recognition was effective only during the tenure of the governor who initially received it, and they had never had a signed copy of it.

Acknowledging receipt of the draft ferman, Palmerston wrote to Canning that 'this important result of your highly meritorious exertions in regard to this matter is

extremely satisfactory and gratifying to Her Majesty's Government.'[956] Canning reported the Sultan's approval of the ferman on 26 November 1850[957] and sent Palmerston a copy, as it differed slightly from the original version.[958] He hoped that the Protestant community would now expand and act as a counterbalance to the existing Russian and French influences in the Ottoman Empire.

On receiving the report of the ferman from the Prussian Minister in Istanbul, the Prussian Foreign Minister expressed the satisfaction of his king, who also wished to convey his gratitude to Canning, to whom this 'happy result' was principally due.[959]

* * *

The British government and its representatives in the Ottoman Empire did not overtly support the work of the American missionaries or encourage Ottoman subjects to convert to Protestantism. It always maintained to the Porte that it had no intention of seeking protection over any Protestants who were subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, when Britain first applied for permission to build a church in Jerusalem, there were no Ottoman Protestants. However, once there were Protestant subjects of the Empire, Britain was ready to take advantage of the situation and thereby increase her influence in the Porte's internal affairs. There were also commercial advantages to be had from the recognition of a separate Protestant community in closer links with Armenian merchants who were scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire.

The ground had been prepared by appointing a bishop for the Protestants who were foreign nationals living in Jerusalem, which was presented to the Porte as a fait accompli by the British government. This was followed by the granting of permission to build a chapel attached to the consular buildings in Jerusalem, although the resulting Protestant church, which had been started without permission, was not the unobtrusive

construction envisaged by the Porte.

The first Ottoman subjects to convert to Protestantism were the Greeks of Hasbeya. We have seen that any interest shown by Britain in their situation met with objections from the Russian government, who had rights of protection over the Greek Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire, and did not wish to see any diminution of its influence. When the opportunity presented itself to offer protection to the Armenian Protestants, the main opposition came from the Armenian Church which, as it did not have the protection of a foreign power, was less able to counter the British will. Canning warned the Patriarch that if he persecuted the separatists he could not expect to receive British aid for his Church against Muslim oppression.

Although the top echelons of the Ottoman government understood Britain's aims, they felt powerless to resist: since the conclusion of the Apostasy Question Canning had restored his authority in Istanbul and the Porte knew only too well how dependent it was on British aid. Reshid expressed himself to be favourably inclined towards the Protestants; it was the local officials in Syria who failed to protect them against their former co-religionists. It was important for the final successful outcome that Reshid held the post of Grand Vizier for most of the period when the matter of recognition for the Protestants was in dispute: without his positive attitude, and Canning's forcefulness, it could well have been delayed longer than its ten years. It was Canning's presence in Istanbul which obtained the ferman for both the permission to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem, and the recognition of the Protestants as a millet. While other British representatives had started the negotiations and partially attained the goal, it was Canning who set the seal to both questions.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

754. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 26 July 1841, F.O. 78/429, No. 187.
755. For a comprehensive and critical discussion of the millet system, see Braude, B. and Lewis, B., (eds), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society, 2 vols, New York and London, 1982, especially Braude, B., 'Foundation Myths of the Millet System', vol. 1, pp. 69-88; Eryılmaz, B., Osmanlı Devletinde Gayrimüslim Teba'an_n Yönetimi, Istanbul, 1990, pp.70-1; Eryılmaz, B., Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi, Istanbul, 1992; Ursinus, M.O.H., 'Millet', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., vol. VII, pp. 61-4; Abu-Jaber, K.S., 'The Millet System in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire', Muslim World, vol. 57, 1967, pp. 212-23; Davison, R.H., 'Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century', The American Historical Review, vol. 59/4, 1954, pp. 844-64; Richter, J., A History of Protestant Mission in the Near East, New York, 1910, pp. 58-65.
756. 'Memorandum on the Position of Armenian Protestants in Turkey', Enclosure 1 in Wellesley to Palmerston, 10 October 1846, No. 80.
757. 'Memorial respecting Protestant Church at Jerusalem', enclosure in Aberdeen to Canning, 20 March 1845, F.O. 78/592, No. 32.
758. Ibid.
759. Sir Thomas Baring to Palmerston, 1 February 1841, enclosure in Palmerston to Ponsonby, 8 February 1841, F.O. 78/427, No. 21.
760. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 8 February 1841, F.O. 78/427, No. 21.
761. Ibid.
762. M.M.I., No. 800, undated.
763. '... devlet-i mü_arulileyh taraf ndan Piskopos nasb ve teferruat- sairesi taraf- Devlet-i Aliyyeye bilamuracaten icra olunmu oldu una nazaran Devlet-i Aliyyenin bu hususu tan mas dahi icab etmiyece i derkârd r e er bundan murad protestan ayininde bulunan ngiltere tebaas n n himayet ve siyanet ve icra-i umur-u mezhebiyede serbest meyanlar ise taraf- Devlet-i Aliyyeden kaffe-i milel-i ecnebiye tebaas haklar nda hüsn-ü muamele-i mütesaviye himayet ve siyanet laz me-i icra buyrulmakda olmas na ...' M.M.I., No. 800.
764. '... milel-i sairenin bulunduklar herbir mahalde ayr ca papaz ve piskoposlar mevcud oldu u misilli ngiltere devleti tebaas ndan protestan bulunan mahallerde dahi umur-u mezhebiyede kendüye müracaat olunmak üzere bir piskopos bulunmas laz meden ve bu i e ha a reaya-i Devlet-i Aliyyeyi protestan etmek veyahud izhan- teba'a ve reayay ihlal eylemek niyyetine mebni olmad ...' ibid.
765. M.M.I., No. 801, 7 Cemadiyyelevvel 1257 (5 May 1841).
766. '... keyfiyet bilvas ta Beyrutda bulunan Rum despotu vesair ... caniblerine esma' itdirilmi ve i ar- alileri vechile asla denk verilmiyerek ve suret-i taleb gösterilmeyerek kendi istid'alar yla mersumlar n istima eyledikleri gibi keyfiyeti Kudüs-i Şerif taraf na ve cebel-i durze i 'ar ederek piskopos-u mersumun bu vechile memuriyet ve ikamet-i ayinlerince mazeret-i adideyi ve enva'-i uygunsuzlu u müstelzem olaca beyan yla mersumun adem-i kabulu istirham na dair mahzar tertib ve tanzimi içün mahsusen adamlar göndermi olduklar n taraf- çakeriye ifade eylemi ler idi.' M.M.I., No. 801.
767. '... zikr olunan gazetenin vürud keyfiyeti olvakit Kudüs Feriki saadetlü Tayyar Pa a bendelerine dahi yaz lub bu babda olan malumat istilam k l nmak oldu undan vurud iden cevabnamesinde idare-i M sr ye hengam ndan kalma Kuds-i Şerifde bir nefer Protestan Papaz olub icra-i ayin etmekde oldu u ve ngiltere devleti taraf ndan mukaddema in as na müba eret olunmu olan mekteb k l klu kebirce ebniye dahi elyevm yap lmakda bulundu u muharrer olmak ve bu husus taraf- aciziyeye ita buyrulan talimat- seniyyede dahi münderiç bulunmak hasebiyle ...' ibid.
768. Sir Thomas Baring to Palmerston, 1 February 1841, enclosure in Palmerston to Ponsonby, 8 February 1841, F.O. 78/427, No. 21.
769. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 8 February 1841, F.O. 78/427, No. 21.
770. M.M.I., No. 798.
771. M.M.I., No. 799, undated.

772. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 27 July 1841, F.O. 78/436, No. 246, and enclosure, Pisani to Ponsonby, 23 July 1841.
773. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 27 July 1841, F.O. 78/436, No. 246, and enclosure, Pisani to Ponsonby, 23 July 1841.
774. '... Prusya elçisinin bu makule protestan mezhebi hakk_nda olan ifadesine ve bunlar_n kabul-u riayet ile taraf- Devlet-i Aliyyeye gelmek isteyen olur ise ne vecihle muamele olunaca na dair vukubulan suale Devlet-i Aliyye icra-i ayin hususunda kadimden oldu undan ba ka er'i ve ahden hariç bir _ey yapam_yaca ve kabul-u riayet isteyen olsa bile henüz keyfiyetleri malum olmad ndan mevadd- mechule üzerine _imdiden cevab- kat'i verilemiyece_i cevablar_ ita olunmu ...' M.M.I., No. 799.
775. Königsmark to Ponsonby, 12 September 1841, enclosure in Ponsonby to Palmerston, 15 September 1841, F.O. 78/437, No. 288; M.M.I., No. 799, undated.
776. Königsberg to Ponsonby, 12 September 1841, enclosure in Ponsonby to Palmerston, 15 September 1841, F.O. 78/437, No. 288.
777. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 15 September 1841, F.O. 78/437, No. 288.
778. Ponsonby to Aberdeen, 7 October 1841, F.O. 78/437, No. 11.
779. 'Article XVIII that all the capitulations, privileges, and articles granted to the French, the Venetians, and other Princes who are in amity with the Sublime Porte, having been in like manner through favour granted to the English, by virtue of our special command, they shall be always observed, according to the form and tenor thereof, so that no one in future do presume to violate the same, and act in contravention thereof.' Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, V, London, 1827, p. 350.
780. Bankhead to Aberdeen, 17 November 1841, F.O. 78/438, No. 48.
781. Aberdeen to Canning, 20 March 1842, F.O. 78/513, No. 41.
782. Ibid. Bunsen states that this originated in Beirut and Jerusalem, and was the product of local intrigues, and the impression entertained by the Pasha that the British consul had denied all knowledge of the building. Bunsen to Aberdeen, 17 August 1843.
783. Canning to Aberdeen, 18 April 1843, F.O. 78/518, No. 82.
784. Bunsen to Aberdeen, 17 August 1843.
785. Canning to Aberdeen, 1 May 1843, F.O. 78/518, No. 93.
786. '... yap_lmas_ iltimas_nda olduklar_ mabedhanenin mevkiine nisbetle ne cesametde _ey olabilmesi muhtemeldir.' M.M.I., No. 958.
787. Ibid.
788. Ibid.
789. Aberdeen to Bunsen, 26 August 1843.
790. Aberdeen to Canning, 4 October 1843, F.O. 78/514, No. 125.
791. Canning to Aberdeen, 16 January 1844, F. O. 78/554, No. 2.
792. Enclosure 2 in Canning to Aberdeen, 1 February 1844, F.O. 78/554, No. 20.
793. M.M.I., No. 958, undated.
794. Canning to Aberdeen, 3 May 1844, F.O. 78/557, No. 85; M.M.I., No. 958, undated.
795. Ibid.
796. Enclosure in Aberdeen to Canning, 20 March 1845, F.O. 78/592, No. 32; see also M.M.I., No. 816, undated.
797. '... _ngiltere Devleti _u maddeyi dört be_ seneden beri meydana koyarak iltimas itmekde bulundu_u halde bu ana de_in oyaland_r_lm ve sonra ta'dil-i istida eyledi_i takdirdede dahi takrir olunmayarak sürüncemede kalm ...' Ibid.
798. Aberdeen to Canning, 20 March 1845, F.O. 78/592, No. 32.
799. Ibid.
800. Enclosure in ibid.
801. M.M.I., No. 816, undated.
802. 'Mü_arunileyha tebaas_ndan ondörtbin ve Prusya Devleti ahalisinden onbe_bin kadar Papaz vesair ruesa ve muteberan- millet mühür ve imzalar_yla bu esnada Parlementoya arz_hal takdimiyle Frans_zlar_n memalik-i mahrusa-i Devlet-i Aliyyede kiliseleri olupda İngilizlerin kaç

senedir istidas_na deri_ müsaade buyrulmamas_ tessufe _ayan-_ keyfiyetden bulundu_unu beyan ...' M.M.I., No. 816.

803. '... e_er Devlet-i Aliyye ... kendüye lüzumu olan bir devleti safvet-i hakikiyesinden temin itmek murad buyurur ise fiilen isbat ve tashih eylemek laz_m gelip o dahi bu makule iltimasat-_ mecburesinin isaf_yla olaca_ ve mademki devlet-i mü_arunileyha mecburiyet-i milliye ve mezhebiyesi haysiyetiyle bu maddeyi bir kere istidaya te_ebbüs itmi_dir andan sonra her ne vakid olsa iddia ve_srar ve aciz kal_ncaya kadar husul-u merama sarf-_iktidar idece_inden ve o halde gösterilecek müsaadenin kadr_ve k_ymeti kalm_yaca_ndan ve böyle olmakdan ise saltanat-_ seniyyenin müsaade-i marziyyesi vaktiyle erzan buyurulmas_ bütün devlet ve milletinin mevcud memnuniyyetleri olarak mür-i aliyesi olan husus ve mevalat dahi ancak bununla isbat ve tasdik olunabilece_i ... husus-u mezküre adem-i müsaade ve muvafakat halinde art_k bundan böyle devlet-i mü_arunileyhadan hicbir gün dostluk ümidinde bulunmamas_laz_m gelece_i...' ibid.

804. The text of the ferman is to be found in the enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 16 September 1845, F.O. 78/601, No. 216; and Hechler, W.H., The Jerusalem Bishopric, London, 1883, pp. 128-9.

805. Enclosure, 29 Saban 1261 (2 September 1845), in Canning to Aberdeen, 3 September 1845, F.O. 78/601, No. 205.

806. Ibid.

807. Newbolt to Rose, 19 October 1845, Enclosure 1 in Canning to Aberdeen, 18 November 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 264.

808. In charge of the Ottoman Foreign Office in the absence of _ekib Efendi.

809. Canning to Alison, 12 November 1845, Enclosure 2 in Canning to Aberdeen, 18 November 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 264.

810. Ibid.

811. Canning to Aberdeen, 18 November 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 264.

812. Alison to Canning, 12 November 1845, Enclosure 3 in Canning to Aberdeen, 18 November 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 264.

813. 'Vizierial letter to the Mushir of Sidon and the Governor of Jerusalem', Enclosure 4 in Canning to Aberdeen, 18 November 1845, F.O. 78/602, No. 264.

814. Wood to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9. On the justification of Protestant missions among the Eastern Churches, see Richter, op. cit., pp. 66-75. On the work of the American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, see Tibawi, A.L., American Interests in Syria 1800-1901, A Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Work, Oxford, 1966, (hereafter, Tibawi, American Interests, particularly Chapter IV for the Hasbeya movement.

815. 'Memorial of the Orthodox Greeks of Hasbeya', and 'Second Memorial of Orthodox Greeks of Hasbeya', Enclosures 2 and 3 in Wood to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9. 'We have become your slaves, and will offer our prayers for you: we expect our deliverance at your hands, as well as the prevention of any injury to us from the Government.'

816. Wood to Canning, 18 March 1844, Enclosure 1 in Wood to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9.

817. Enclosure 4 in Wood to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9.

818. Wood to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9.

819. Tibawi, American Interests, discusses whether or not the Americans gave 'temporal aid', Chapter IV.

820. Rose to Aberdeen, 28 October 1844, F.O. 78/578, No. 45.

821. Ibid.

822. Ibid.

823. Rose to Aberdeen, 28 October 1844, F.O. 78/578, No. 45.

824. Tibawi, American Interests, Chapter IV.

825. Wood to Canning, 18 March 1844, Enclosure 1 in Wood to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9.

826. Ibid.; 'Memorial of the Orthodox Greeks of Hasbeya', Enclosure 2 in Wood to Aberdeen, 23

March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9.

827. Wood to Canning, 18 March 1844, Enclosure 1 in Wood to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9.
828. Wood to Ali Pasha, Enclosure 4 in Wood to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 9.
829. Wood to Aberdeen, 29 May 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 17.
830. Ibid.
831. Ibid.
832. Wood to Aberdeen, 5 July 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 21; Tibawi, American Interests, Chapter IV.
833. Michael Mushaka to Saadeddin, 27 July 1844, Enclosure 2 in Wood to Aberdeen, 5 July 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 21.
834. Ibid.
835. Wood to Aberdeen, 5 July 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 21. Because of the Prussian king's keen interest in the matter of Protestants in the Ottoman Empire, de Portalis had decided to make a report to the Prussian Minister in Istanbul before returning to Berlin.
836. Wood to Aberdeen, 5 July 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 21.
837. Ali Pasha to Saadeddin, 17 July 1844, Enclosure 3 in Wood to Aberdeen, 3 August 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 23.
838. Saadeddin to Wood, 18 July 1844, Enclosure 5 in Wood to Aberdeen, 3 August 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 23.
839. Saadeddin to Wood, 19 July 1844, Enclosure 6 in Wood to Aberdeen, 3 August 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 23.
840. Ali Pasha to Saadeddin, 17 July 1844, Enclosure 3 in Wood to Aberdeen, 3 August 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 23. Because the attackers remained unpunished, the Rev. Smith, of the American Mission, believed that Ali Pasha had given the emir secret instructions not to act against them. Smith to Wood, 12 July 1844, Enclosure 1 in Wood to Aberdeen, 3 August 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 23.
841. Ibid.; 'Patriarch of Damascus to the Greeks of Hasbeya', 20 July 1844, Enclosure 7 in Wood to Aberdeen, 3 August 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 23: 'You are to treat them [the converts] with brothers' love ... not to give them any cause whatever for irritation.'
842. Basily to Saadedin, 24 July 1844, Enclosure 8 in Wood to Aberdeen, 3 August 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 23.
843. Wildenbruck to Saadedin, 14 July 1844, Enclosure 9 in Wood to Aberdeen, 3 August 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 23.
844. Rose to Canning, 25 July 1844, F.O. 78/577, No. 37.
845. Ibid.
846. Ibid.
847. Aberdeen to Rose, 19 September 1844, F.O. 78/575, No. 10; Aberdeen to Wood, 19 September 1844, F.O. 78/575, No. 3. A copy of this despatch was sent to Nesselrode via Buchanan in St. Petersberg, Buchanan to Aberdeen, 10 December 1844, F.O. 65/312, No. 16. The Russian Foreign Minister agreed to give the Russian representatives similar instructions, and this information was conveyed to Canning, Aberdeen to Canning, 7 January 1845, F.O. 78/592, No. 3. Nesselrode was very satisfied with Aberdeen's response, and hoped the matter was at a close, Nesselrode to Brunow, 16/18 December 1844, F.O. 881/207, pp. 59-60. This despatch was communicated by Brunow to Aberdeen on 20 January 1845, and Aberdeen sent a copy to Canning, Aberdeen to Canning, 20 January 1845, F.O. 78/592, No. 7.
848. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 10/22 August 1844, F.O. 881/207, p. 35. This despatch was communicated to Palmerston by Brunov, September 1844.
849. Basily to Nesselrode, 13/25 August 1844, enclosure in Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 10/22 August 1844, F.O. 881/207, p. 35.
850. Rose to Aberdeen, 7 October 1844, F.O. 78/578, No. 42.
851. Ibid.
852. Ibid.
853. Tibawi, American Interests, Chapter IV.

854. Rose to Aberdeen, 28 October 1844, F.O. 78/578, No. 45.
855. Wood to Aberdeen, 11 September 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 30.
856. Ibid.
857. Ibid.
858. Wood to Aberdeen, 9 October 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 31.
859. Halil Pasha to Ali Pasha, Enclosure 1 in Wood to Aberdeen, 9 October 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 31.
860. Basilios to Saadedin, 21 September 1844, Enclosure 2 in Wood to Aberdeen, 9 October 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 31.
861. Ibid.
862. Ibid.
863. 'Ali Pasha to the absent Professing Christian Protestants', 2 October 1844, Enclosure 3 in Wood to Aberdeen, 9 October 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 31.
864. Wood to Saadedin, 3 October 1844, Enclosure 2 in Wood to Aberdeen, 20 February 1845, F.O. 78/622.
865. Titow to Nesselrode, 24 October/5 November 1844, Enclosure 1 in Nesselrode to Brunow, 14/26 November 1844, F.O. 881/207, p. 56.
866. Ibid.
867. In fact, the ferman forbidding Christian subjects to change from one sect to another (1834, confirmed 1839) had been cancelled by another, some time after Tanzimat, but definitely before the Apostasy Question arose (probably 1841). Eryilmaz, B., op. cit., pp. 70-1.
868. I.e. Aberdeen to Wood, 19 September 1844, F.O. 78/575, No. 3 and Aberdeen to Rose, 16 November 1844, F.O. 78/575, No. 14.
869. Aberdeen to Rose, 16 November 1844, F.O. 78/575, No. 14.
870. Ibid. A copy of this despatch was sent to Canning at Istanbul, Aberdeen to Canning, 20 December 1844, F.O. 78/553, No. 193; and to Rose, Aberdeen to Rose, 1 January 1845, F.O. 78/617, No. 1.
871. Wood to Aberdeen, 9 October 1844, F.O. 78/579, No. 31.
872. Ibid.
873. Aberdeen to Rose, 16 November 1844, F.O. 78/575, No. 14.
874. Ibid.
875. Ibid.
876. Wood to Canning, 16 December 1844, enclosure in Wood to Aberdeen, 19 December 1844, F.O. 78/622, No. 40.
877. Ibid.
878. 'The Capudan Pasha to the Pasha of Damascus' (undated translation), enclosure in Rose to Aberdeen, 9 January 1845, F.O. 78/618, No. 3.
879. Rose to Aberdeen, 9 January 1845, F.O. 78/618, No. 3.
880. Ibid.
881. 'Memorandum respecting the persecuted Hasbeyan Protestants', February 1847, Enclosure 1 in Wellesley to Palmerston, 18 April 1847, F.O. 78/680, No. 138.
882. This was the situation in February 1845.
883. 'Memorandum respecting the persecuted Hasbeyan Protestants,' February 1847, Enclosure 1 in Wellesley to Palmerston, 18 April 1847, F.O. 78/680, No. 138.
884. Ibid.
885. 'The Grand Vizier to the Pasha of Damascus', 20 Rebiülahir 1263 (6 April 1847), Enclosure 3 in Wellesley to Palmerston, 18 April 1847, F.O. 78/680, No. 138.
886. Ibid.
887. Palmerston to Cowley, 7 May 1847, F.O. 78/674, No. 144.
888. Canning to Aberdeen, 18 March 1846, F.O. 78/638, No. 41. Canning sent a list of cases of persecutions of Armenians to Aberdeen: 'Cases of Armenians persecuted by the Patriarch', enclosure in Canning to Aberdeen, 18 March 1846, F.O. 78/638, No. 42.
889. Ibid.

890. Aberdeen to Canning, 6 April 1846, F.O.78/635, No. 20.
891. Canning to Aberdeen, 17 May 1846, F.O. 78/639, No. 85. The Patriarch wrote to the Vartabed of Trabzon to stop the physical punishment of dissidents, to counsel them with 'fatherly love' and to do no more than excommunicate the stubborn. 'The Armenian Patriarch to Garabed, Vartabed of Trebizond', 30 April 1846/12 May 1846, Enclosure 2 in ibid. The Patriarch sent for the Vartabed to come immediately to Istanbul so that they could discuss the matter in detail. 'The Armenian Patriarch to Garabed, Vartabed', 22 April 1846/ 4 May 1846, Enclosure 3 in Canning to Aberdeen, 17 May 1846, F.O. 78/639, No. 85.
892. 'Memorandum of an Interview with the Armenian Patriarch', Enclosure 5 in Canning to Aberdeen, 17 May 1846, F.O. 78/639, No. 85.
893. M.M.I., No. 967, 18 Ramazan 1262 (9 September 1845).
894. '... mersumlar her nekadar tebdil-i mezheb etmi_ler isede yine Devlet-i Aliyye tebaas_ndan olduklar_ndan ... bunlara kendi millet ve esnaflar_ndan kefil olan olmayubda ehl-i islamdan ve milel-i saireden muteber küfela bulabildikleri halde i_leriyle ve kesb-i tayi_leri ile i_tigallerine muhalefet olunmamas_ hususunda laz_m gelenlere bildirilmesi...' ibid.
895. M.M.I., No. 968, 17 Camadiyyelahir 1262 (15 May 1846).
896. '... öyle reis-i müstakile tahammülleri oldu_u yollu lak_rd_larla geçi_dirilmekde isede ... beyan-i hacet olmad___ vechile bunlar bir kere dermeyan eyledikleri _eyden kolayl_kla fari_ olmayub serri_te buldukca davalar_n_ derece derece tezyid idegeldiklerinden...' ibid.
897. As far as can be ascertained from the available Ottoman documents, this refers to the Vizierial letter which was issued in November 1847 (see below). 'Sefaretlerin dahi _imdiki halde takrir-i istidaya bir gün sebeb-i zahirleri kalmamak içün mersumlar_n mesalihine ve mürür tezkerelerine ve nüfus defterleri ve izdivaç maddelerine bakmak üzere nezaretlerin Latin reayas_n_n liman taraf_nda oldu_u misüllü babuyruldu _htisab Nazır_ saadetlü pa_aya havale olunmas_ ve beyinlerinde vas_ta olunmak z_mn_nda içlerinden birinin dahi Kapu O_lan_ tayin ittirilmesi...' M.M.I., No. 968.
898. Canning to Aberdeen, 20 July 1846, F.O. 78/641, No. 126.
899. Dwight and Schauffler to Canning, 9 July 1846, Enclosure 1 in ibid.
900. Enclosure 2 in Canning to Aberdeen, 20 July 1846, F.O. 78/641, No. 126.
901. Enclosure 4 in Canning to Aberdeen, 20 July 1846, F.O. 78/641, No. 126.
902. Ibid.; also Enclosure 2 in Wellesley to Palmerston, 19 October 1846, F.O. 78/644, No. 91.
903. Enclosure 1 in Wellesley to Palmerston, 19 October 1846, F.O. 78/644, No. 91.
904. Enclosure 2 in Wellesley to Palmerston, 19 October 1846, F.O. 78/644, No. 91.
905. Wellesley was left in charge of the Embassy in Istanbul when Canning returned to England in August 1846.
906. Palmerston to Wellesley, 21 September 1846, F.O. 78/636, No. 16 and enclosure.
907. Palmerston to Wellesley, 21 September 1846, F.O. 78/636, No. 16.
908. Wellesley to Palmerston, 19 October 1846, F.O. 78/644, No. 91.
909. Wellesley to Palmerston, 10 October 1846, F.O. 78/644, No. 80.
910. Ibid.
911. Ibid.
912. The Armenian Protestants presented a petition to the Sultan complaining of their situation and asking for their civil rights to be restored. Enclosure 2 in ibid.
913. Palmerston to Wellesley, 11 November 1846, F.O. 78/636, No. 53.
914. Ibid.
915. Wellesley to Palmerston, 2 November 1846, F.O. 78/645, No. 104.
916. Ibid.; also M.M.I., No. 968.
917. Wellesley to Palmerston, 2 November 1846, F.O. 78/645, No. 104.
918. Wellesley to Palmerston, 2 January 1847, F.O. 78/677, No. 5.
919. Office of the superintendent of guilds and markets.
920. Enclosure 2 in ibid.
921. Palmerston to Wellesley, 1 February 1847, F.O. 78/673, No. 33.
922. Palmerston to Bunsen, 9 February 1847, F.O. 881/207, p. 105.

923. Bunsen to Palmerston, 22 February 1847, F.O. 881/207, p. 106.
924. Palmerston to Wellesley, 22 March 1847, F.O. 78/673, No. 85.
925. Wellesley to Palmerston, 18 April 1847, F.O. 78/680, No. 138.
926. Ibid.; for Ali Efendi's letter to Kalimaki, see enclosure in Wellesley to Palmerston, 19 April 1847, F.O. 78/680, No. 142, where the Ottoman Foreign Minister claims that the converted Armenians did not embrace Protestantism out of conviction but because of a misunderstanding with their priests or for the money which the American missionaries gave them.
927. Wellesley to Palmerston, 18 April 1847, F.O. 78/680, No. 138.
928. 'The Grand Vizier to the Pasha of Damascus', 20 Rebiülahir 1263/6 April 1847, enclosure in Wellesley to Palmerston, 18 April 1847, F.O. 78/680, No. 138.
929. Wellesley to Palmerston, 15 March 1847, F.O. 78/679, No. 89.
930. Palmerston to Wellesley, 3 April 1847, F.O. 78/674, No. 93.
931. Wellesley to Palmerston, 3 May 1847, F.O. 78/681, No. 154. The insistence on larger numbers before recognition could take place may have been to prevent the many other small communities from seeking similar rights. Palmerston informed Wellesley, who had since become Lord Cowley, of the British government's approval of his further representations to Ali Efendi. Palmerston to Cowley, 27 May 1847, F.O. 78/674, No. 158. The Armenian Protestants wrote to thank Wellesley and his predecessor, Canning, for the efforts they had exerted on their behalf. 'The Protestant Armenians to the Hon. H.R. Wellesley', enclosure in Wellesley to Palmerston, 3 May 1847, F.O. 78/681, No. 154.
932. Palmerston to Wellesley, 3 April 1847, F.O. 78/674, No. 108.
933. Enclosure in Cowley to Palmerston, 30 June 1847, F.O. 78/682, No. 206.
934. Cowley to Palmerston, 30 June 1847, F.O. 78/682, No. 206.
935. Cowley to Palmerston, 19 November 1847, F.O. 78/688, No. 394.
936. Ibid.
937. Enclosure 1 in ibid. Palmerston instructed Cowley to let the Porte know that the British government was very happy to see the Porte's treatment of its Protestant subjects. M.M.I., No. 829.
938. Enclosure 2 in Cowley to Palmerston, 19 November 1847, F.O. 78/688, No. 394.
939. Ibid.
940. This proved not to be the case, however, as the Armenian Protestants complained in 1850 that the letter's influence lasted only as long as the tenure of the governor who received it, whereas a ferman was valid until rescinded by the Sultan.
941. Cowley to Palmerston, 1 December 1847, F.O. 78/689, No. 402 and Cowley to Palmerston, 8 December 1847, F.O. 78/690, No. 429 and Enclosure 1.
942. Palmerston to Cowley, 4 January 1848, F.O. 78/725, No. 4. Their acknowledgements are enclosed with this despatch: Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
943. Cowley to Palmerston, 8 December 1847, F.O. 78/690, No. 429 and Enclosure 2, 15 December 1847.
944. Ibid.
945. Palmerston to Cowley, 12 January 1848, F.O. 78/725, No. 10.
946. 'The American Missionaries to Lord Cowley', 21 December 1847, Enclosure 1 in Cowley to Palmerston, 29 December 1847, F.O. 78/690, No. 447.
947. Enclosure 4, 27 December 1847, in ibid.
948. Cowley to the Rev. W. Goodell, 28 December 1847, Enclosure 2 in Cowley to Palmerston, 29 December 1847, F.O. 78/690, No. 447. Cf. the views on the American missionaries expressed by Rose in Rose to Aberdeen, 28 October 1844, F.O. 78/578, No. 45, discussed in the previous section.
949. Wood to Cowley, 8 January 1848, Enclosure 1 in Wood to Palmerston, 8 January 1848, F.O. 78/761, No. 2. The replies of the Consuls at Erzurum and Bursa are found in Brant to Cowley, 8 January 1848, enclosure in Cowley to Palmerston, 16 February 1848, F.O. 78/727, No. 64 and Sandison to Cowley, 11 March 1848, enclosure in Alison to Palmerston, 2 April 1848, F.O. 78/729, No. 9.

950. Safvet Pasha to Saadedin, 16 December 1848, Enclosure 2 in Alison to Palmerston, 2 April 1848, F.O. 78/729, No. 9.
951. 'The Protestants of Hasbeya to the Rev. Mr. Thomson', undated translation, Enclosure 3 in Alison to Palmerston, 2 April 1848, F.O. 78/729, No. 9.
952. Safvet Pasha to Saadedin, 4 January 1848, Enclosure 4 in Alison to Palmerston, 2 April 1848, F.O. 78/729, No. 9.
953. Canning to Palmerston, 18 November 1850, F.O. 78/824, No. 340.
954. 'Firman in favour of the Protestant Rayahs', Enclosure 1, 24 October 1850, in ibid.
955. Enclosures 2 (23 March 1850) and 3 (2 August 1850) in Canning to Palmerston, 18 November 1850, F.O. 78/824, No. 340.
956. Palmerston to Canning, 11 December 1850, F.O. 78/816, No. 312.
957. Canning to Palmerston, 26 November 1850, F.O. 78/824, No. 350.
958. Enclosure 2 in ibid. There were two differences: 1) the Protestants' agent was not required to be 'a bona fide subject of my Empire by descent'; 2) the phrase 'in none of their temporal or spiritual affairs in short' was added in connection with the prohibition on interference in the Protestants' affairs.
959. Manteuffel to Portalès, 9 February 1851, enclosure in Canning to Palmerston, 18 March 1851, F.O. 78/853, No. 84.

CHAPTER 9

C O N C L U S I O N

Although a serious attempt at reforming the Ottoman Empire was made during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), the decline of the Empire gathered pace. The Janissaries were dissolved in 1826, and a new army had to be formed from scratch to replace them. Furthermore, the Ottomans lost their fleet at the Battle of Navarino in November 1827. The Empire's weakened position encouraged Russia to pursue a war against the Empire in 1828-1829 which ended with the Porte's humiliation. The treaty of Adrianople was signed in 1829 and Greek independence confirmed in 1830, bringing with it new problems. These included the Egyptian Question, which further threatened the integrity of the Empire when Mahmud reneged on his promise to give Syria to Mehmed Ali Pasha in return for his help in the matter of Greek independence, with the excuse that İbrahim Pasha had withdrawn his army without the Sultan's permission. With the unity of his Empire under threat, Mahmud applied unsuccessfully to Britain for assistance, and he died in June 1839, before the news of his army's complete defeat at Nizip had reached Istanbul.

This was the legacy which Abdulmecid inherited when he ascended the Ottoman throne. Furthermore, political disagreement amongst the ministers caused the admiral, Firari Ahmed Pasha, to hand over control of the Ottoman fleet to Mehmed Ali. The Empire had no effective army or navy, and was economically weak; it was ripe for invasion by its enemies. Reforms of the Empire were necessary in order to resolve the two major problems which posed a threat to the integrity of Ottoman Empire: the Egyptian Question and the re-establishment of the authority of the Sultan. The resolution of these problems required a unified government and we have shown in

Chapter 3 that, in order to create this, Abdulmecid deliberately adopted a multi-party approach, appointing experienced statesmen from different political groups to the highest government posts, rather than favouring one group over another. This move demonstrates political acumen on Abdulmecid's part and the fact that he took this step only weeks after his accession to the throne shows that despite his youth he must have been observing and assessing the state of the Empire during his father's reign. This contradicts Bailey's depiction of the young Sultan as lacking the authority to carry out independent decisions, which follows Lane-Poole.[960]

However, the Sultan was aware that this step alone was not enough to save the Empire, and that an alliance with one of the Great Powers was also required. Austria had territorial ambitions in the Balkans; Prussia, far away, had its own internal problems and was not strong enough to interest itself in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire; France could not be completely trusted after her support of Mehmed Ali in the Egyptian Question; Russia, with borders contiguous with Ottoman lands, threatened territorial expansion. This left Britain as the Porte's natural ally, as they did not have a mutual border and Britain possessed a strong navy, which the Ottoman Empire needed.

Just as Britain was the obvious choice as ally, the Sultan considered Reshid, with his first-hand experience of European diplomacy and his good relations with Palmerston, as the ideal man to approach Britain with the proposal to strengthen friendly ties. Reshid was more familiar with Europe than any other Ottoman statesman, having travelled a good deal during his embassies in Europe. He also knew the views held by the European Powers on the state of the Ottoman Empire. During his first term as Foreign Minister (1837-8) Reshid had been in a position to formulate an opinion on the best remedies for the Empire's problems, and he realised that it could not survive

without wider reforms than had hitherto been implemented. Ottoman reforms before the Tanzimat era were introduced within the framework of Ottoman traditions. However, as these had not succeeded in halting the gradual weakening of the Empire, Reshid came to believe that reforms on European lines were necessary in order to make it strong, prosperous and modern.

We have shown that the initiative came from the Ottoman side to adopt reform measures when Reshid discussed his reform proposals with Ponsonby in May 1838. In response to Russian proposals to partition the Ottoman Empire,[961] it became the Porte's policy to prevent Britain from joining Russia in her partition plans. Reshid realised that Palmerston was more anti-Russian than pro-Turkish: the British Foreign Secretary had already declared his interest concerning the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire and reform measures in the Empire. Therefore it now was important for Reshid to persuade Palmerston that the benefits to Britain of continuing her support for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire were greater than those of partition. Given sufficient time the Empire would have an opportunity to reform itself and survive. While he was serving as Ottoman Ambassador to London, Reshid took the opportunity to strengthen his relationship with Palmerston, and attempted, by means of his memorandum on the state of the Ottoman Empire written in August 1839, to persuade the British Foreign Secretary to reject any further Russian proposals for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. He also reminded Palmerston of the advantages to British trade of helping the Ottoman Empire to survive rather than participating in its downfall. This was a factor which Britain could not ignore, and Reshid's strategy was successful, for in 1840 and 1853 Britain rejected two further partition proposals put forward by Russia.

The importance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire for

British interests was recognised prior to 1833, but no action was taken. However, after the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was signed between the Empire and Russia in that year, Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, realised that Britain needed a firm policy towards the Ottoman Empire, and Ponsonby was sent as Ambassador to Istanbul to neutralise the Russian influence (1833-41). Many of the British documents consulted in the course of this study reveal the determination of Britain to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. In his instructions to Ponsonby in 24 March 1841, Palmerston stated that 'Her Majesty is deeply convinced that the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, is essential for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe; ...'[962] This continued to be British policy despite changes in government. When he came to power in September 1841 Aberdeen's instructions to Canning (30 October 1841) expressed similar views. He wrote that Britain entertained 'the hope and intention of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire.'[963] This remained British policy: in October 1847 Palmerston reiterated Britain's continued desire to uphold the independence of the Ottoman Empire.[964]

Britain was convinced for various reasons of the importance of abolishing the Ottoman monopoly system, whereby manufacturers had to sell their goods to approved individuals who set the price of the goods, thereby controlling trade. Furthermore, manufacturers were not permitted to sell certain goods to foreigners for sale either within the Empire or for export.[965] The abolition of these monopolies was to be encouraged for both commercial and political reasons, as increased production in Britain required expanded markets and, while the monopoly system remained, British goods could not easily be sold in the Ottoman Empire. It was for this reason that

Palmerston was enthusiastic about signing a commercial convention with the Porte, which was achieved in August 1838. This was a good opportunity for Britain to increase her influence in the Ottoman Empire. It was not difficult to persuade the Porte to agree to the abolition of the state monopoly system, as it would weaken the power of Mehmed Ali, the Governor of Egypt. Britain also maintained that it would improve the Ottoman economy, although this proved not to be the case.

Once Britain had gained the trust of the Porte by supporting the Sultan against Mehmed Ali, Britain's greater influence could be used to accomplish more difficult and far-reaching reforms, such as the recognition of total equality for the Christian subjects of the Empire. Such reforms would allow Britain to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire by supporting its Christian subjects. When the Empire finally disintegrated, influence over non-Muslim communities would play an important role in deciding the benefits Britain would receive from partition of the Empire's territories. We have seen that although Canning quoted 'the obligations of humanity and religious sympathy',[966] political motives were not absent in Britain's support of the Ottoman Empire's Christian subjects.

When the Tory party was returned to power in September 1841, Robert Peel, the Prime Minister, gave the office of Foreign Secretary to Aberdeen, who wanted to capitalise on Britain's improved position at the Porte. With this aim in view, towards the end of 1841 Aberdeen replaced Ponsonby with Canning, the British diplomat most experienced in Ottoman affairs, to represent her interests. Canning arrived in Istanbul in January 1842. Both Britain and the Porte understood that the only way to further their interests was by reform of the Ottoman Empire. However, the two sides differed in their reforming priorities. British policy was to help the Ottoman government to

introduce those reforms which would increase British influence at the Porte. This is demonstrated by the fact that Canning played no part in the introduction of reforms which benefited all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, but did not directly further British interests, such as the penal code and the general education system, which were fundamental to the Tanzimat principles. It was Reshid who first approached Britain with his ideas on reform of the Ottoman Empire and who drew up the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu; it was Reshid who spear-headed reforms which derived directly from the principles of the Tanzimat decree, as we have demonstrated in Chapter 3. Therefore, Canning cannot be considered the originator of the Tanzimat reforms, as Lane-Poole has depicted him.[967]

Reshid was known by successive Foreign Secretaries and by diplomats concerned with Ottoman affairs to be more liberal than other ministers at the Porte and to believe in the protection of the rights of individual subjects, irrespective of their religion, basic human rights which were already commonplace in Europe. British Ambassadors in Istanbul were repeatedly instructed by British Foreign Secretaries, Palmerston and Aberdeen, to fully support Reshid and to press for positions of power for him. Ponsonby considered Reshid an 'untrustworthy fool' and refused to do this, but Canning followed his instructions closely, and much of his time when Reshid was away from the capital was spent working for the minister's return to power. Canning pinned all his hopes of reform on Reshid. His close association with Reshid led him to support the latter to the virtual exclusion of all other Ottoman ministers, even those in favour of reform, such as Ali and Fuad Pashas. In fact, it is clear to any reader of the Ambassador's reports that they were heavily biased in favour of Reshid, and he used them to influence British policy making. When Reshid was not in power Canning's

despatches are filled with reports of complaints against the Porte. Canning recalled in a report to Palmerston in 1850: 'I naturally expected that the resistance offered to my exertions by the partizans of reaction and fanaticism, whom I found in power both on my arrival in 1842 and on my return in 1848, would cease altogether with the reinstatement of Reshid Pasha and his friends in the Sultan's favour.'[968] Canning's attitude caused Reshid to ignore the advice of other reformists who had different priorities. This in turn hampered the progress of the reforms which Canning was so anxious to see implemented, as the other ministers tended to oppose anything proposed by Canning.

Reshid's reforming priorities lay with the administration of the Empire, with the objective of reducing the power of provincial governors and of allowing the people greater participation in local administration. However, Reshid failed to prepare the ground for his reform programme at home and, although he had widespread support for the principle of reform, the people generally, and the other ministers in particular, did not welcome his methods and the European model. As is well known, laws do not change attitudes, and without a full understanding of the necessity for such equality, the reforms met with hostility from both Muslims and non-Muslims. Although the reformists believed that non-Muslims would benefit greatly, they met resistance, particularly from the millet leaders, who did not want to see the erosion of their privileges. The introduction of new laws required educated and committed civil servants, but at first Reshid seems to have overlooked the need for a reformed education system which would provide them. It was the lack of trained civil servants which led to the failure of the new method of collecting taxes and the reintroduction of tax farming. While Reshid was absent from Istanbul (1841-1845), although reform did

not rely solely upon his presence in the capital, throughout Part II of this thesis we have shown that the other ministers of the Porte had different priorities from Reshid as far as reforms were concerned. Şekib Efendi, for instance, agreed that the administration was in need of reform, but did not wish a foreign system to be introduced. Rıza Pasha, on the other hand, saw military reform as the priority, believing that the Empire could defend its integrity with a strong army. Canning complained about the enlargement of the army, but his complaints fell on deaf ears. Rıza Pasha succeeded in increasing the number of soldiers, but some improvements in the administration were also introduced.

One of Reshid's most important achievements in the field of human rights was the introduction of a penal code which ensured public order and safety, and formed the basis for future development of the principle of equality. Indeed, equality was one of the most crucial aspects of the reform programme. Equality before the law for all Ottoman subjects was one of the major principles contained in the Tanzimat decree. Britain, however, did not limit her ambitions to this definition of equality, but rather strove for equal civil and political rights for all Christian and Muslim subjects. Although Canning's and Reshid's aims differed in this respect, Canning considered Reshid to be indispensable to the reform programme, and he hoped to influence him to implement the reforms he wanted. However, reform measures clearly continued to be introduced when Reshid was absent from Istanbul.

Canning gained his victory in the Apostasy Question during Reshid's absence from the capital while Ambassador in Paris (1841-5). It was the first major step on the path to equality for the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. While the Porte saw the reform of the law of apostasy as a religious matter, Canning used its political implications to obtain the support of France, Austria and Russia. Although he strove

for the abolition of the death penalty for apostasy from Islam, he in fact only succeeded in obtaining a ferman to the effect that the practice would be discontinued. This was in part due to the fact that Russia and Austria, in an attempt to neutralise the increased influence which Canning was trying to obtain for Britain, maintained, like the Porte, that the matter was a religious one. They therefore limited their demands to the cessation of the practice of execution for apostasy from Islam. None the less, Britain came to be seen as a sympathiser in the affairs of the non-Muslim subjects within the Ottoman Empire, and Canning strengthened his position in relation to the ministers of the Porte. However, Britain still did not have the formal position of protector of a non-Muslim community which was enjoyed by the French and Russians. To achieve parity with these other countries, the British government worked for and finally achieved the recognition of the Protestant subjects of the Porte as a separate millet in 1850.

Recognition of the Protestant community was seen by Britain as a means of containing the influence of both Russia and France, who enjoyed rights of protection over the Orthodox and Catholic Churches respectively; thereby creating a balance of influence over the non-Muslim populations and giving Britain the same rights of influence in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire which were already enjoyed by Russia and France. To the Porte, Britain always maintained that it had no intention of seeking protection over any Protestants who were subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This seemed a plausible argument as, when Britain first applied for permission to build a church in Jerusalem in 1841, there were only a small number of Ottoman Protestants. However, once considerable numbers of subjects began to convert to Protestantism, from 1844 onwards, Britain was ready to take political advantage of the situation. Commercial advantages were also to be had from closer links with the Armenian

merchants of the Ottoman Empire.

However, it was not all one-way traffic as far as benefits were concerned. From the close relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the Porte learned how to be more effective in European diplomacy. The Ottoman ministers abandoned their traditional belief that the Empire was strong enough by itself and had no need of an ally. Indeed, they learned enough international diplomacy to outmanoeuvre Austria and Russia during the Hungarian refugee problem (1849-51). The Porte also learned how to gain support from abroad for its actions: its ambassadors in London and Paris persuaded public opinion that it was keeping the refugees for the sake of humanity. Through these embassies, the Porte made a declaration in Europe that its only intention was to give humanitarian aid to the refugees and protect them from Austria and Russia, despite the great risk to the Porte. Immediately after this declaration, demonstrations in favour of the Ottoman Empire took place in England and France. In London a group of young people stopped the carriage of Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador, removed the horses and pulled the carriage themselves as far as the Ottoman Embassy.

We have seen that Canning was instructed to give Reshid all his support. Their relationship developed into a particularly close one, and Reshid became a bridge for Anglo-Ottoman relations, opening up a new era in Turkish history. This meant that during the periods when both Canning and Reshid held influential posts in their respective governments Anglo-Ottoman relations achieved their zenith. On the other hand, Anglo-Ottoman relations were adversely affected when the relationship between Canning and Reshid became strained around 1850: Canning became frustrated at the slow rate of progress and Reshid was exasperated at Canning's demands for more reforms. In fact, as we have seen, few of the reforms proposed by the Porte remained to

be introduced. Canning was forced to admit that there had been improvements since Mahmud II's reign, and reforms continued to be implemented. One reason for this was that the Porte was all too aware that compliance with Britain's wishes was a prerequisite for guaranteed British support against Russia. Canning threatened to leave the Empire to Russia's mercy if he did not get what he wanted.

However, Canning failed to obtain the recruitment of Christians into the army, the abolition of the haraç, or the admission of Christian evidence in criminal courts throughout the Empire, three reforms concerning non-Muslim subjects of the Empire which were central to British reform objectives. One of the reasons for these failures was the Sultan's fear that such reforms would undermine his authority. After all, it was a desire to re-establish the Sultan's authority which motivated the initial approach to Britain. We have seen that Abdulmecid was in favour of reforms which would unite his subjects but, despite Canning's assurances that Muslims as well as non-Muslims would benefit from the reforms concerning Christians, he was rightly wary of any which favoured only one section of the population. Even if these specific reforms did not threaten the Sultan's authority, he feared that they might lead to others which would. Allegations of republicanism were made against Reshid who, as we have seen, sought only to increase the Sultan's power.

Another reason for Canning's failures was that Reshid's opponents thought that the reforms which Canning proposed were incompatible with Ottoman civilisation and culture. Indeed, Canning often confused Christianity with civilisation, believing that anything to do with Western, Christian culture was automatically superior to Islamic culture. This arrogance turned some of the Ottoman reformers against Canning, who dealt only with Reshid, when he was in power, and who neglected to encourage a new

generation of ministers who would be able to continue the work of reform after Reshid's death. Canning showed displeasure at anyone who stood up to him, like Ahmed Vefik Efendi (later Pasha) who was a minor, but rapidly advancing, officer of the Porte, and a reformist, although not a supporter of Reshid.

However, the most important reason for the deterioration in the relationship between Britain and the Porte was the British refusal to enter into a formal alliance with the Ottoman government towards the end of the 1840s, a time when the Empire's European territories were in turmoil. Reshid was shocked by this refusal, which was detrimental to both Anglo-Ottoman relations and British influence at the Porte. Reshid's position in the Ottoman government was also weakened after this date, and he finally realised that Britain thought only of her own interests.

Antagonised by Reshid's behaviour towards them, Ali and Fuad, Reshid's former followers, turned to the French for support because they were not always lecturing them about reforms and interfering in the internal affairs of the Empire. Temperley claims that the Ottoman government was impressed by the superiority of the French military forces.[969] This is unlikely, although Ali Pasha did hope to find in France an alternative ally to Britain. After Ali Pasha came to power Anglo-Ottoman relations deteriorated further, and the British Ambassador was less able to exert his influence.[970] Ali Pasha's letter to Kostaki Musurus Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador to London, clearly shows that he considered Canning's reforms ill-suited to the Ottoman Empire and based on ignorance.[971] He acknowledged that Canning was sincere in his efforts to maintain the independence and prosperity of the Empire, but resented his 'unjustifiable' interferences and principles founded on a complete ignorance of the country and its inhabitants.[972]

As little co-operation could be hoped for from Ali Pasha and the other pro-French Ottoman ministers, Britain attempted to restore its relationship with the Ottoman Empire by bestowing upon Sultan Abdulmecid the Order of the Garter, on 1 November 1856, with Canning acting as the Queen's representative. This was a most unusual occurrence, and the first time a British honour had been invested upon a Muslim leader.[973] However this positive trend in Anglo-Ottoman relations was short lived. In 1858, on hearing of Reshid's death (7 January 1858), Canning himself resigned. It is true that his position in Istanbul was becoming untenable, and that the Porte had asked for Canning to be recalled. He had lost much of his former influence over the ministers of the Porte, and must have felt that he could achieve little more. Bearing all this in mind, it seems likely that the official reason for his resignation[974] was merely a means of saving his reputation.

It cannot be said that the Tanzimat reforms were entirely successful in achieving their aims: while the integrity of the Empire was maintained, its complete independence was not. The Porte became dependent upon the European Powers in all external, and even in some internal, matters. The Tanzimat opened the way for the European Powers to interfere in most of the Porte's affairs. Perhaps one of the main reasons for this failure was the fact that the people were not educated as to the benefits which would result from the reforms, and were therefore reluctant to take advantage of their new rights. One of these was the right of any subject of the Empire to complain directly to the Porte if he felt that he had been treated unjustly. However, non-Muslims did not do this; instead they applied to the representatives of the European countries in Istanbul. These representatives ignored the fact that this action was contrary to the principles of the Tanzimat, and interceded on behalf of the non-Muslim subjects. Thus,

instead of helping the Porte to make the new system work and encouraging the non-Muslims to approach central government, the foreign Powers undermined the reforms and caused the gap between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities to widen. This behaviour encouraged the non-Muslim subjects to wish for greater independence and halted progress in the reform programme.

Although the Ottoman Empire enjoyed fourteen years of peace between the promulgation of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu and the outbreak of the Crimean War, the reforms which were introduced during that period did not bring the expected stability to the Empire. Ottoman statesmen were divided on the subject of reforms, and interference by the European Powers only served to exacerbate their differences. The political instability within the Empire is demonstrated by the fact that between 1850 and 1853, the period leading up to the Crimean War, the holder of the post of Grand Vizier changed six times.[975]

Despite such difficulties, the Tanzimat decree was not allowed to fall into obscurity like other reforming decrees before it; it permanently altered the traditional structure of the Ottoman Empire and brought about many changes in the political, social and cultural life of the Empire. In 1852 there was still far to go, but the reforms were progressing and things had started to improve; the 'sick man' had been given a blood transfusion. Whereas in 1830 the Porte was unable to defeat one of its own governors, by reforming itself and with the help of its new strong ally, in 1853 the Porte was able to declare war against Russia. Before 1834, Britain took little interest in the affairs of the Sublime Porte and did not respond to its plea for assistance in the matter of the Egyptian Question; by 1853, British involvement in Ottoman affairs was such that it entered the Crimean War on the side of the Empire. Although the British and

Ottoman governments had different reasons for wishing to save the Ottoman Empire, this was achieved, and reforms were a very important aspect of Anglo-Ottoman relations.

After the early 1850s the character of Anglo-Ottoman relations changed fundamentally, and the special relationship was weakened. At the beginning of the Tanzimat period, the Porte had no choice but to turn to Britain for assistance. After fourteen years of reform and gaining experience in international diplomacy, the Ottoman government looked elsewhere for an ally, and this time there was, in France, a viable alternative to Britain. As Canning became more demanding in the area of reforms, the Porte turned towards France, with whom it now had shared interests.

In 1856 the Ottoman Empire was acknowledged as a European state by the Treaty of Paris. The terms of this treaty were based on those of the Vienna Four Points, which Russia had rejected in August 1854, and to which Canning was vehemently opposed. Russia, Britain and France each put forward separate proposals for reforms concerning religious freedom and equality before the law to be included in a ferman (known as the Islahat Ferman), but the Porte argued that such rights had been in existence since the time of Mehmed the Conqueror. Finally, she accepted France's proposal as being the nearest to her own ideas. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire was accepted in return for acknowledgement of more rights for its non-Muslim subjects.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

960. Bailey, F.A., British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853, Cambridge, 1942, p. 179.

961. Tsar Nicholas said to Count de Ficquelmont, the Austrian Ambassador on 18 February 1833 '... I have no power to give life to the dead, and the Turkish empire is dead ... [even if the crisis is arrested] I have no confidence in this old body preserving life, it is in dissolution from all sides. It will fall a little earlier, or a little later.' Quoted from Temperley, H., England and the Near East: The Crimea, London, 1936, (hereafter, Temperley, The Crimea), p. 67. For Tsar's partition plans see also p. 461.

962. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 24 March 1841, F.O. 78/427, 'Separate and Secret'.

963. Aberdeen to Canning, 30 October 1841, F.O. 78/439, No. 2.

964. Palmerston to Canning, 30 October 1847, F.O. 78/691, No. 1.

965. It was forbidden to export, among other things, grain, olive oil, copper, opium, coffee and cotton fabric. Tengir_enk, Y.K., 'Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Devletinin Harici Ticaret Siyaseti', in Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetile, M.E.B., Istanbul, 1940, pp. 301-2.

966. Canning to Aberdeen, 13 October 1844, F.O. 78/522, No. 227.

967. Lane-Poole, S., The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning: Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, 2 vols., London, 1888, (hereafter, Lane-Poole, Life), II, p. 105. Lane-Poole recounts a conversation between Canning and Reshid during which Reshid asked where he should begin the reforms. Canning is said to have replied that the reforms should begin with 'security of life and property'. These are the fundamental principles of the Gülhane Hatt-ı_ Hümayunu, and the implication is therefore that they originated with Canning during this conversation.

968. Canning to Palmerston, 22 August 1850, F.O. 78/822, No. 261.

969. Temperley, H., 'The last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe, 1855-1858', English Historical Review (hereafter, 'The last Phase'), vol. 47/186, 1932, p. 219.

970. Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote to him: 'There seems to exist at Constantinople a dogged and disagreeable determination to resist your wishes and advice ... Several times the Turkish government have asked that you should be recalled. They did full justice to your eminent talents and goodwill towards Turkey, but declared that they could no longer get on with you, as you required that your influence should be so paramount and notorious that they were lowered in the eyes of the people, and that you would not allow the Sultan to co-regner with you'. The last phrase is attributed to Ali Pasha himself. Clarendon to Canning, 4 January 1856, F.O. 352/44. Clarendon had written to Cowley using similar words on 26 September 1855; F.O. 519/172, 'Private'.

971. For Ali Pasha's letter to Kostaki Musurus Pasha dated 29 September 1858, see Yücel, C., Lord Stratford Canning'in Türkiye Hat_ralar_, Ankara, 1959, pp. XXXIV-XXXVIII.

972. However, Fuad Pasha, who had been one of the pro-French reformers, said in his memoirs that Britain had proved to be a better friend to the Ottoman Empire than France and that he would prefer to lose some of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire than the friendship of Britain. Akarl_, D., 'Fuad Pa_a'n_n Siyasi Vasiyetnamesi', Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadr_azamlar_ndan Ali ve Fuad Pa_alar_n Siyasi Vasiyyetnameleri, Istanbul, 1978, p.3.

973. See Appendix for a letter from the H.M. Queen Elizabeth II's secretary on this matter.

974. I.e. an act of sympathy at the defeat of the Palmerston government.

975. 1. Reshid Pasha 1848-52, three years, seven months, 21 days (his second appointment to the position); 2. Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha, 1852, one month, eleven days (his sixth appointment to the post); 3. Reshid Pasha, 1852, five months, four days; 4. Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha, 1852, five months, twenty-seven days; 5. Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha, 1852-3, nine months, twenty-seven days; 6. Giridli Mustafa Naili Pasha, 1853-4, one year, twenty-six days. Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye, Istanbul, 1984.

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D.N.B.	Dictionary of National Bibliography
F.O.	Foreign Office
I.H.	İrade Hariciye
M.E.B.	Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı
M.M.I.	Mesail-i Mühimme İradeleri
P.R.O.	Public Record Office
T.T.K.	Türk Tarih Kurumu

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