

THE EMERGENCE OF A MODERNISED TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY:

**Changing Domestic Structures and Values in Relations with the European
Community and Emergent Regional Organisations**

By

SELAHADDIN BAKAN

**B.A. Public Administration (Turkey); M.Phil. Business Administration
(Turkey); M.A. International Relations (Nottingham University)**

Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy, 1995

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The list of people and institutions who deserve to be mentioned is quite lengthy therefore not all could be named here, I would like to begin with those who should under any circumstances be remembered with gratitude.

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Christopher Farrands whose advice and guidance have enlightened my way throughout the study. Without his warmness, friendship and patience, this thesis would not come about.

I should thank to the Department of Politics for their help throughout my study. I should also thank to the İnönü University, Turkey, for their sponsorship.

I would also like to thank to my wife Mühübet who has been patient and helpful throughout my study.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

1.INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER TWO

2. CONTENDING THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE DOMESTIC BASES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICIES	20
2.1.Introduction	20
2.2. Elitism and Democracy	22
2.3. Gap Theory	29
2.4. Integration-Equilibrium Theory	33
2.5. Interest Groups or Pressure groups	35
2.6. Corporatism or Pluralism?	40
2.7. Clientelism	51
2.8. Conclusion	57

CHAPTER THREE

3. AN ANALYSES OF FOREIGN POLICY THEORIES	60
3.1. Introduction	60
3.2. Democracy and Foreign Policy	63
3.3. Realism and its Critics	70
3.4. Interdependence	76
3.5. Globalisation and the New World Order	89
3.6. Conclusion	97

CHAPTER FOUR

4. THE MODERNISATION PROCESS OF TURKEY'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE	100
4.1. Introduction	100

4.2. Mainstream Ideologies of Turkish Politics.	102
4.3. Turkish Politics During One party Period	108
4.4. Introduction of Democracy and Its Aftermath	113
4.5. Social and Economic Transformation	123
4.6. Political Participation	125
4.7. The Period of Economic Reformation	126
4.8. Institutional Structure and Decision Making Process	130
4.8.1. Turkish Grand National Assembly	133
4.8.2. The President of the Republic	134
4.8.3. The Council of Ministers	136
4.8.4. The National Security Council	141
4.9. Turkish Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.	143
4.10. Turkish Public Opinion and the European Community	145
4.11. Conclusion	156

CHAPTER FIVE

5. THE EMERGENCE OF A MODERNISED FOREIGN POLICY IN TURKEY: FROM PASSIVITY TO AN ACTIVE INTERDEPENDENCE	158
5.1. Introduction	158
5.2. Ideological Basis and Domestic Background	161
5.3. A Passive Foreign Policy: 1923-1980	171
5.4. Towards a More Active Foreign Policy	175
5.5. Towards a Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy	188
5.6. Conclusion	195

CHAPTER SIX

6. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	198
6.1. Introduction	198
6.2. The Evolution and the Objectives of the Community	202
6.3. Westernisation as the Ideological Background of Turkish-European	

Community Relations	206
6.4. Turkish-European Community Relations during the Cold War Era ...	211
6.4.1. Ankara Agreement	216
6.5. The Greek Factor on Turkey's Relations with the European Community	226
6.6. Economic Factors	236
6.7. Conclusion	250

CHAPTER SEVEN

7. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR: COOPERATION AGAINST ENEMIES OR COOPERATION AGAINST POVERTY?	254
7.1. Introduction	254
7.2. The European Community in the Post Cold War Era	255
7.2.1. The European Community After the Maastricht	256
7.3. Turkey's Relations with the European Community, in the Post Cold War Era.....	260
7.4. The Gulf Crisis and Turkey.....	282
7.5. Turkey's latest Involvement in Regional Organisations.....	296
7.5.1. Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR).....	296
7.5.2. From Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) to Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO).....	304
7.6. Conclusion.....	322

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION.....	325
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	332

NOTE ON THE PRONOUNCIATION OF SOME LETTERS IN TURKISH ALPHABET

a: French a, as in *avec*.

c: English j, as in *jet*.

ç: English ch, as in *church*.

g: English g, as in *get*.

ğ: Generally silent, lengthens preceding vowel.

ı: Short English, as in *banana*.

i: As in *bit*; also notice capital İ.

j: French j, as in *jour*, or English si as in *cohesion*.

ö: As in German, or French eu in *peur*.

ş: English sh, as in *shell*.

ü: as in German, or French u in *tu*.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the development of Turkish foreign policy from the establishment of the Turkish Republic until today in order to explain how domestic political and economic structures have affected Turkish foreign policy. While acknowledging the importance of external factors, the thesis avoids a determinist position in trying to show how the foreign policy of the later Cold War and post Cold War periods cannot be understood without careful reference to the specific historical, political and cultural patterns of the internal arrangements of the Republic. Structural economic changes in the 1980s have also reshaped Turkish foreign policy. The change from a state centric planned economy to a more decentralised and internationalised economic system has gradually changed Turkish foreign policy. It was inward looking and passive until the 1950s when multi-party politics began. During the multi-party era, parallel to the gradual improvement in democratic structure, Turkish foreign policy has also evolved to become an active foreign policy. The major structural changes in the economy, which took place after the 1980s, have created a framework for a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Since the 1980s, although the democratic structure remains elitist, the elite became more plural and the decision making process has become more complex.

The thesis does not rely on the conventional terms of realist theory of international relations. It does not focus on the concepts 'state', 'sovereignty',

'nationalism', 'power' and 'military might'. It is not a strategic study of Turkish foreign policy. Instead, it relies on the theories of foreign policy, and in particular theories of political and economic interdependence. The thesis argues that the growth of an internationalised export oriented economic system has made Turkey economically interdependent with other countries. This thesis thus pays a special attention to regional economic organisations. Turkey's relations with the European Community and the other emergent regional economic organisations have been explained in order to examine the evolution of a Turkish foreign policy at least partly modernised in its agenda, structure and processes, and becoming increasingly modernised in response to internal and external pressures. The thesis is thus a study of the evolving relationship between the very particular domestic frame works of foreign policy and the distinctive, changing character of Turkey's foreign policy.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the impact of change in the domestic forces which shape Turkish foreign policy. It argues that the domestic political structure of Turkey is shaped by external and internal factors, and this in turn largely affects her foreign policy. It is thus argued that a stable, more democratic and organised social and political structure will positively affect the implementation of foreign policy decisions¹. Turkey's domestic political structure up to the 1980s was largely a reflection of external factors. Since the 1980s, and especially in the post Cold War era, Turkey's domestic political structure has become increasingly more effective, rather more democratic, and distinctly more multi-dimensional. Since Turkey sided with the West during the Cold-War, a Westernist ideology, which already existed long before the Cold War, preoccupied the domestic political agenda. During that time the term 'Westernisation' was used with the same meaning as 'Modernisation', and it is still used in the same way today. This thesis also argues that Turkey's still vulnerable democratic structure was granted by the elite not won by the people. The democratic structure was thus built upon the ideology of the same elite. This kind of political structure had produced a passive foreign policy motivated by the ideology of the elite. Although Turkish foreign policy gradually became more active during

¹ Institutional structure and the decision making process have explained in chapter four.

the Cold War, it was an ideologically based and westward looking foreign policy. Turkey was (and still is) in political terms a Western oriented country. Until the beginning of the 1980s, Turkey's centrally planned and statist economic structure did not resemble that of West European countries. By contrast, it was closer to the economies of the Eastern Europe. Turkey thus endured the problem of economic adaptation to the West in general and the European Community in particular. The implementation of the 24th January 1980 Decisions has gradually pushed this adaptation problem forward, and allowed Turkey to strengthen her ties with the West by establishing bilateral and multilateral economic relations. Turkey is still pursuing a westward looking foreign policy and Turkish-West European relations remain a vital interest for Turkey. What happened is that the motivation of Turkish foreign policy has changed. Turkish foreign policy is becoming increasingly pragmatic and active due to the changes in the external and internal environment. Externally, the Cold War is ended. Therefore, Turkey's ideological support to the West to stop the spread of communism was redundant. Internally, the economic liberalisation programme, which began long before the end of the Cold War, required Turkey to strengthen her relations with the West, particularly with the European Community.

On the other hand, this thesis argues that the gradual changes in Turkish foreign policy have continued during the post Cold War period. Parallel to the changes in the international structure, Turkey's domestic political structures have changed, and one might say, improved. The improvement in the democratic structure was associated with the growth of a more pluralist society. Although, democratic principles and channels are only partially effective because of Turkey's clientelist

structure², a pluralisation process started among the elite. These changes in the domestic political structure, together with the changes in the international environment, have allowed Turkey to exercise a multi-dimensional foreign policy, playing the role of a regional power in that part of the world.

This thesis therefore argues that Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War period can only be understood in the context of a longer term study of the modernisation processes at work in Turkey. The evolving nature of the elite politics of Turkey provides one key to this understanding. The study takes a long term view of change, interpreting 'modernisation' as a practical process of adaptation to the modern world as well as to the gradual development of some, but only some, of the institutional and political attributes of the modern state. However what Christopher Hill has called the 'weight of the past' has been significant in Turkish foreign policy in a diversity of ways³. The thesis uses foreign policy theories and some ideas drawn from comparative politics. But it does not argue that Turkish foreign policy can be reduced to a formula drawn from these theories. The main form of understanding used in this study is historical, and the thesis relates ideas of history and foreign policy in order to discern what is varied, distinctive, diverse and particular about Turkey's experience. The thesis thus stands in a tradition of foreign policy study which draws on the writing of Christopher Hill, Christopher Thorne and Avi Schlaim

² The theory of clientelism is explained in chapter two and incorporated into the study in chapter four.

³ Hill, Christopher, "The Historical Background: Past and Present in British Foreign Policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation*, Unwin & Hyman Ltd., London, 1988, pp.24-49.

rather than in a more formally theoretical, quasi-scientific (or perhaps pseudo-scientific) tradition of foreign policy analysis⁴. The thesis will argue that Turkish foreign policy has become more effective and interdependent, with a greater range of opportunity to define its own scope and direction, as a result of changes in both domestic politics and in the international environment. It will suggest that Turkish foreign policy is at once more autonomous and more interdependent as a reflection of the growing complexity of managing Turkey's position in the world; there is a paradox here which the whole thesis explores, but there is only an apparent contradiction. In particular, economic structural changes paved the way for a more interdependent foreign policy and greater interaction with the European and global economy. An autonomous Turkish foreign policy is not contradictory to an interdependent foreign policy. Being autonomous does not mean 'independent' in more than a legal sense. Turkey, being geopolitically situated between East and West, pursues an interdependent foreign policy, which has been challenged by the end of the Cold War. The developed West European countries pursue interdependent economic relations in order to further their influence. The implementation of a Western type, export oriented and decentralised economic system has pushed countries towards a more interdependent foreign policy and a more involved relationship with international organisations. The existence of regional economic organisations, especially the European Community, has obliged neighbouring

⁴ Thorne, Christopher, *Border Crossings: Studies in International History*, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1988, pp.1-28. and Thorne, Christopher, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945*, Hamish Hamilton Ltd., London, 1978.

countries respond. Turkey's foreign policy has gradually become more interdependent but the particular forms and processes reflect her domestic social, political and economic ideas and institutions.

The changes in internal structure were well under way even before the ending of the Cold War. But the ending of the Cold War has created further challenges and opportunities in Turkish foreign policy. It is against that background that the specific processes of Turkish relations with the European Community can best be understood. It is in this context that other opportunities which are still to be opened out, especially those in Central Asia, can be explained⁵.

This thesis could be written from a number of different perspectives, and the choice of a pluralist interdependence approach requires justification. Realism and neorealism are discussed and rejected in chapter three, and the whole thesis forms a challenge to -and is written in dialogue with- the realist tradition. The thesis has also been written outside the structural/dependency model. This requires some justification here. It is partly an honest matter of the author's personal preference. Also, the structuralist literature tended to see dependent countries' foreign policies as determined, uninteresting and not worth studying⁶. Turkey could nonetheless

⁵ See *Chapter Seven*.

⁶ See for example, Clapham, C. (ed.), *Foreign Policy Making in the Developing Countries*, Saxon House, Farnborough, Hants, 1978; Migdal, Joel, "Internal Structure and External Behaviour: Explaining Foreign Policies of Third World States", *International Relations*, vol. 4, no. 5, 1974, pp.510-525; McLaurin, R. D., Mughisuddin, M. and Wagner, A. R., *Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East*, Praeger, New York, 1977; for exceptions see Biddle, W. J. and Stephens, J. D., "Dependent Development and Foreign Policy: the case of Jamaica", *International*

convincingly have been treated as a country in a dependent relationship with the EC. In using the idea of interdependence later in the study, it is never suggested that the interdependent aspects of Turkey's relations with the EC are anything but asymmetrically interdependent even today. In the 1970s, Turkey was arguably a paradigm case of a semi-peripheral country, in its internal economic and political structures, in its trading and financial relations, and in its cultural relationships with the West (see chapter six). But in the 1990s, these categories are all more difficult to use. A substantial literature has criticised both the 'modernisation and development' school and the 'dependency' school⁷. The 'Third World' has become a category so broad that it looks to some writers to be 'schizophrenic'⁸, and to others to be irrelevant⁹. Turkey is not in the same class as countries which would now be described as 'semi-peripheral', either in its relations with a cultural hegemony or in its level of economic dependence (the Turkish economy, as chapter six and seven shows, has grown rapidly and become far more diversified than the semi-peripheral states literature just cited): it is not semi-peripheral in the way Ivory Coast or Jamaica are said to be, but it is equally not in the same class as the richer East Asian 'tigers'¹⁰.

Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, 1989, pp.411-434 and Moon, B. E., "Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 2, 1993, pp.297-329.

⁷ For the summary of contribution to this literature, see Manor, James (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*, Longman, London, 1991.

⁸ Ayoob, M., "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 1, 1989, pp. 67-79.

⁹ Berger, M. T., "The end of the Third World", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 2, 1994, pp.257-273.

¹⁰ Biddle and Stephens, Op.cit.; Manor (1991), Op.cit.; Mingst, Karen A., The Ivory Coast and the Semi-periphery in the World Economy", *International Studies*

It is, to repeat, partly a matter of personal preference that a 1960s/1970s structuralist model has not been used throughout this thesis; but there are also good grounds for the choice in a reading of the current state of the development studies literature.

The emphasis on history as an explanation should not be confused with a belief in some general historical force or spirit. The issues in this study are specific conditions which have arisen. The thesis does not claim to be original in its methodology. It follows on some relatively well worn methodological paths, already indicated in this introduction.¹¹ Hollis and Smith underscore the importance of a historically grounded understanding of international relations and establish limits for the nature of what we can know and how we can use evidence in such an endeavour. The thesis will draw on the debate between Carr¹² and Elton¹³, as well as on Reynolds¹⁴ robust defence of the primacy of historical rather than scientific approaches in understanding the causal processes which shape the evolution of change. This thesis is very much concerned with the interaction between long term

Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 3, September 1988, pp.259-274.

¹¹ Hollis, Martin and Smith Steve, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp.45-67; Reynolds, Charles, *Theory and Explanation in International Relations*, Martin Robertson, London, 1973; Collingwood, R.G., *The Idea of History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961; Carr, E.H., *What is History?*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964; Gardiner, P., *The Nature of Historical Explanation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961; Elton, G.R., *The Practice of History*, Fontana, London, 1969.

¹² Carr, E.H., *What is History?*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1964.

¹³ Elton, G.R., *The Practice of History*, Fontana, London, 1969.

¹⁴ Reynolds, Charles, *Theory and Explanation in International Relations*, Martin Robertson, London, 1973.

and short term changes in the shaping of a modern foreign policy in Turkey, and the ideas these writers suggest for the use and limitations of evidence shape the working out of the argument in the thesis. In particular, the thesis struggles to find a path between a naive acceptance of what the evidence at first suggests and a dangerous scepticism which rules out any possibility of judgement¹⁵. The reader must decide whether it has succeeded.

The claim to originality in the thesis rests primarily on what is actually said and argued about Turkish foreign policy. This in turn rests in part on original research including interviews which are listed in the sources at the end of the thesis. The claim to originality can be summarised in the following propositions, which underpin the whole argument:

i) Although, the domestic changes began earlier in 1980, the implications of the changes on Turkish foreign policy appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Gradual domestic changes and the ending of the Cold War made it possible for Turkey to pursue a distinct foreign policy. We have, in other words, to exercise great care in assuming that the ending of the Cold War marks a diplomatic revolution in which all aspects of foreign policies have suddenly been transformed, although the changes in the international context are of great importance and great interest; there is no other study of current Turkish foreign policy in the post- Cold War world.

¹⁵ Elton, *Op.cit.*, p. 105.

ii) Turkey is an 'imperfectly modernised' society which has some of the attributes of a modern democracy, but which remains dominated by a specific political and military elite, despite some rapid change especially since 1980.

iii) Turkish foreign policy cannot therefore be understood as a consequence of processes which are characteristic of modernised European societies: models which have been widely used such as pluralist democratic or corporatist theories cannot explain Turkish foreign policy, although asking questions about how they might be relevant helps us to understand what makes its domestic roots distinctive; it will, however, be argued that clientelist and elite theories have more relevance.

iv) As chapter four argues, although Turkish politics are still dominated by elite processes, the elite itself has become more diverse in interests and heterogeneous in ideas and organisation over the past thirty years. Turkish foreign policy nowadays more reflects the changes in domestic structure such as; pluralisation of the elite, improvement of the democracy, liberalisation of the economy, which command our attention, and have been studied through a careful review of relevant press sources reinforced by a series of interviews¹⁶; these form a basis for the argument in chapters four, six and seven in particular.

v) As Turkish foreign policy has become more 'modern' it has become more active, interdependent and more effective by comparison with its historical

¹⁶ A list of interviews can be seen in the Bibliography.

experience; Turkey is not, in this perspective, simply a 'dependent' or 'semi-peripheral' state; the meaning of this is explored and discussed in chapters five, six and seven; it has a certain interdependence which is expressed especially through the articulation of its foreign policy in international or regional organisations, and the process of the dialogue with the European Community is itself an articulation of a modern foreign policy notwithstanding the increasing rather than decreasing difficulties in the path of full Turkish membership.

During the Cold War era, the global political scene was largely shaped by the balance of power. Turkey had little choice. She either had to side with Russia, which was impossible because of the historic ties with the West and also because of the antipathy of Turkish history and public opinion towards the communist system, or she had to ally herself with the West. In this Cold War structure, the European states were also dependent on the Euro-Atlantic ties. *"The establishment of NATO as an American-European mutual defence organisation symbolised the lack of independent European options"*¹⁷. Turkey thus found herself linked directly to the containment policy of the United States. She was economically helped under the Marshall Plan¹⁸. Turkey became an active participant in the Korean War. This was a clear demonstration that Turkey had committed herself to the Western alliance. Membership of NATO was the first significant organisational link with the West.

¹⁷ Balkır, Canan and Williams, Alan M, "Introduction: Turkey and Europe", in *Turkey and Europe*, Edited by, Canan Balkır and Alan M. Williams, Pinter Publishers Ltd., London and New York, 1993, p.6.

¹⁸ See Chapter Five, and McGhee, George, *The US-Turkey NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*, Ph.D. Thesis, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1990, p.22.

Soon after NATO membership, Turkey joined the Council of Europe. This membership meant a lot for the Turkish political elite which was the guiding force of foreign policy. Membership of NATO seemed to be concrete evidence that Turkey was a European country.

Turkey has had a long and ambiguous relationship with the European Community. *"These have not always been easy relationships, but they have been critical in shaping the evolutions of Europe and European states, as well as of Turkey itself"¹⁹*. The changes in the world in general and in Europe in particular made it necessary to reevaluate the relationship between Turkey and the European Community. The end of the Cold War structure and the political and economic globalisation in the world caused Turkey to reassess and rearrange its relationship with the European Community and the other regional organisations. The end of Cold War between East and West has also remarked the beginning of a new relationship between Turkey and the West. During the Cold War, Turkey sided with the West more for ideological and military reasons than for economic reasons in order to prevent the spread of communism to the West. Turkey played a crucial role in the containment policy of the West, indeed. After the Cold War, Turkey found the opportunity to improve her economic relations with the West as well as with her other neighbours. That is why this thesis emphasises that Turkish foreign policy is gradually becoming more of an outcome of economic interest. The point above should be taken into consideration in order to discern the multi-dimensional

¹⁹ Balkır, Canan and Williams, Alan M, *Op.cit.*, p.3.

economic relations of Turkey. It then makes it easy to understand Turkey's newly established economic relations with the Middle Asian states and the Black Sea countries. As will be seen in chapter seven, the establishment of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR) are not alternative organisations to the European Community. They are, however, necessary economic organisations for the region concerned. In other words, the regional economic organisations, no matter in which part of the world they are, are pieces of jigsaw.

The Turkish application on 15th April 1987 to become a full member of the EC caused heated debates among the Turkish media and public as well as in the EC. The Turkish application to become a full member is the logical consequence of some important developments that commenced shortly after the Treaty of Rome on 1st January 1958. It was in reality a continuation of the westernisation process which took effect from the 18th century onwards. The Turkish intelligentsia have long thought that European Community membership was the final journey for Turkey to reach its destination. But this view contains problems in turn. Public opinion was not regarded as it should have been in a democratic country. The information and advice have always come from the government and its administrative branches to the public not vice versa. And the elite has raised expectations about Community membership, not least amongst its own members, which would be very difficult to achieve even if and when Turkey joined. In one sense, non-membership has the advantage of avoiding the frustration that membership would achieve.

At the beginning of the Republic, Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, tried to increase the momentum of Westernisation. It was a somewhat artificial process led by a Turkish elite mostly educated in the West. There had been a natural but less obvious political, social and economic interaction taking place over two centuries. Implications of that interaction show themselves in almost every aspect of the people's lives. As a result of an 'artificial' westernisation movement and the weakness of the newly established Republic, a gap between public opinion and the government emerged. This gap caused further estrangement between the existing elite and the mass public. To eradicate any danger to the Republic and to secure the continuity of the Regime, most of the democratic channels had to be cut. The public thus could not play their part in the policy making process of the government. Atatürk justified himself in the following words "*I will lead my people by the hand until their feet are sure and they know the way. Then they can choose themselves. Then my work will be done*²⁰". The thirty years of İnönü's rule (Atatürk's successor), characterised by a law censoring the media "*Non Criticism of Decisions (Tahriri Sukun Kanunu)*" continued this approach.

Although Turkey gradually became more stable and competent to stand against any internal problem, comparing with the early years of the Republic, the public was still neglected. The organised network of information through the printed and broadcast media is still limited. Some existing pressure groups are ineffective

²⁰ Quoted in, E.W.F.Tomlin, *Life in Modern Turkey*, (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1946), in Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage And Democracy in Turkey*, Published in Leiden, Belgium, 1973, p.1.

because of limits on their organisation and finance, and most have not been taken into account in the decision making process: the existing clientelist structure is more powerful. This clientelist structure has formed an enduring informal structure which had negative effects on formal organisations and on the decision making process, as the thesis will show. Turkish democracy in the last forty years was also vulnerable to abrupt changes. Military coups, which occurred in almost every decade, are perhaps the clearest evidence of the exclusion of public involvement in governmental decision making. As the forthcoming chapters will fully explain, political and economic stability was the main objective of the governments throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s in order to protect the reestablished democracy. The transformation from a mixed economy to a liberal economy has been taking place in order to make Turkey more adaptable to the economies of West Europe.

After taking a series of tough economic decisions known as '24th January 1980 Decisions', the Turkish economic structure has completely changed. The decisions initiated a gradual but decisive transformation process from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy. Other changes would no doubt have occurred anyway, but the opening of a more liberal market economy has been principally a result of change from above. The new economic structure has helped the stabilisation of the political structure by privatising some of the state enterprises, creating a mosaic of a bourgeoisie, and by establishing more open interdependent economic relations with the other countries. After the beginning of transformation in Turkey, a relative simplicity is gradually being replaced by complexity. Pushing

at one button would not therefore change a lot. These ideas are developed in Chapter four.

Chapter two analyses some of the political theories which might be applicable to explaining the change in Turkey. The use of these theories will help us to determine explicitly the state of the Turkish Democracy and its likely effect on Turkish foreign policy. The theories of pluralism, corporatism, clientelism and elitism will thus be analysed, and rejected or incorporated into the analysis.

Chapter three deals with foreign policy theories of realism, neo-realism and interdependence. It will also be argued that the creation of a form of new world order and a global interdependent economic structure depends on regional cooperation among existing nation states. The creation of regional economic organisations is therefore a part of the creation of a global interdependent world. Turkish foreign policy faces increasing problems of coordinating its role and interests in this interdependent context as chapter seven will explore. This chapter will also discuss integration theories and the relationship of interdependence and integration as they might explain emerging processes in Turkish foreign relations.

Chapter four will provide an analytical base for the interaction between domestic and foreign policy. To understand the domestic political framework the political development of Turkey will be explained. Analysing the process of 'modernisation' of Turkish political structure will provide the necessary background

in order to discern the gradual evolution of Turkish foreign policy which will be analysed in the next chapter.

The thesis does not have a single 'literature review' chapter as some do. Instead, it has two theory chapters. The relevant literature surveys have been conducted in the thesis at points where they support the pressing forward of the main argument. Literature reviews will therefore be found introduced where they are appropriate, in particular in chapters two, three and four, but without diverting from the main flow of the argument.

Chapter five will deal with Turkish foreign policy strategies from the beginning of the Republic to the late 1980s. Turkey's relations with the West and more particularly with the European Community will be emphasised²¹. An answer will be sought to the question of how internal and external factors affected Turkish foreign policy. It will be argued that the easing tension of the Cold War and the relative improvement in the democratic structure allowed Turkey to transform her passive foreign policy towards a more active foreign policy. As the Cold War ended and the domestic political structure improved, Turkish foreign policy became multi-dimensional and Turkey gradually started to be a regional power.

²¹ Despite the recent changes in its title, for consistency as well as historical accuracy the expressions European Community or EC is used throughout this thesis. EEC is used to refer to the specific economic competencies under the Treaty of Rome only.

Chapter six will analyse Turkish foreign policy towards the European Community during the Cold War era. It will analyse the main factors which motivated Turkey to apply for an associate membership in 1959. It will also explore the question of whether the foreign policy of Turkey during the Cold War was an outcome of domestic political structure, or whether it was purely determined by external factors. And it will also ask whether internal politics have played a role in shaping Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War at all, or foreign policy was shaped by a few in the elite, or the public played any role. Analysing Turkey's relations with the European Community, four main factors will be taken into consideration: the ideological factor, the existence of the Cold War, the Greek factor and the economic factor.

Chapter seven will analyse Turkish foreign policy during the post-Cold War era. It will be argued that Turkish foreign policy gained great confidence due to the increased democratisation process and to the collapse of the confrontation between the East and the West. Turkey's relations with the European Community during the post-Cold War era are analysed. Turkey's latest involvement in the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region and the revival of an Economic Cooperation Organisation will also be explored. Turkey's active involvement in the Gulf crisis will be discussed in order to show Turkey's changing foreign policy. This chapter will mainly argue that Turkish foreign policy after the end of the Cold War became multi-dimensional and that the external pressure on Turkish foreign policy is to a certain extent decreased. Turkey's internal political and economic structures are increasingly affecting Turkish foreign policy. This chapter also emphasises that

the multi-dimensionalisation of foreign policy did not in any way reduce the importance of the West in Turkish foreign policy. What happened is that Turkish foreign policy has been increasingly motivated by economic interests rather than by the ideology of a small restricted elite. The interest based Turkish foreign policy is suited to the spirit of an economic interdependence in the region.

In the last section, having determined the degree of relation between domestic and foreign policy, some conclusions will be drawn for each chapter. At the end a general assessment of the democratisation process and its implications for foreign policy will be made. Change (or continuity) in Turkish foreign policy will be explicitly assessed by explaining the main reasons for change. In the concluding chapter, Turkey's role in the region and the globe will also be emphasised.

To further the aims of the thesis, a series of interviews were held with officials and politicians mainly in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and the State Planning Organisation (SPO). Our search for appointments for interviews with the foreign spokesmen of the political parties -Motherland Party and Welfare Party- was successful. An appointment for an interview with the Foreign Minister of the present government could not be arranged due to his busy schedule. However, some official materials and reports were handed to me through his secretary. Foreign policy consultants and experts in TGNA have been very helpful in explaining their views and also by supplying some research materials, which are used and quoted in the bibliography. Also, an extensive library search was conducted, including of the major daily newspapers, in order to acquire original statements of the officials

concerned. All the newspapers and the other materials, which are referred to, have been listed in the bibliography.

CHAPTER TWO

2. CONTENDING THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE DOMESTIC BASES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICIES

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse a range of theories which are potentially relevant to the explanation of the relationship between domestic politics and society and Turkish foreign policy. It will note that some must in fact be rejected as unsuitable. It will identify a cluster of theory which can be used fruitfully to help to explain these relations and the structures and processes which underpin them. In the process, the chapter will serve the purpose of offering a selective bibliographic review of the main bodies of ideas in which the thesis as a whole is rooted.

In addition, it will clarify some relevant and useful concepts which are going to be used in this dissertation. A definition of each concept will be given in the context of the present study. It is necessary to understand the domestic political life in Turkey in order to emphasise the vitality of consultation for a stable domestic politics and foreign policy. This is because foreign policy is not free from domestic changes in a society. The main aim of this chapter (and the next chapter also) is to provide an analytical and terminological base for the current study. The compatibility of democratic regimes with international politics will be particularly discussed later in this chapter.

Before studying the theoretical concepts, it would be worth emphasising that no one theory in social science, particularly in political science, is the only theory to be used as a tool to analyse domestic or foreign political structure of one country. Each country's domestic political structure and the framework in which foreign policy takes its shape are different. In that case theories, no doubt, are useful and even inevitable in explaining one country's political affairs but no single theory is (or should be) the ultimate theory for a political analyst. Nevertheless, theories are useful for making comparisons with the realities of Turkey.

Studying the politics of developing countries complicates the theoretical problem even greater. Political theories stem from political clashes and crises. Theories, therefore, are designed and directed to understand the problem from which they are derived. Although theories should not necessarily be used in such a restrictive way, one should bear in mind that importing theories from advanced developed and modernised countries and applying them to the developing countries' case is still a danger and a trap for the political analyst. Each one of the developing third world countries have their own unique problems as well as having common features¹. To eradicate the danger and to avoid getting into the trap, it is necessary to explain some theoretical approaches and to emphasise the way that they will be used in this dissertation.

¹ For conceptual framework of the 'Third world' and its features, see Barke, Michael, and O'Hare, Greg, *The Third World*, Longman House, Essex, 1991; Manor, James (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*, Longman, London, 1991; Manor, James (ed.), *The End of the Third World*, Routledge, London, 1993; Harris, Nigel, *The End of the Third World: Newly Industrialising Countries and the Decline of an Ideology*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1990.

2.2. Elitism and Democracy

Studying Turkish politics without taking elite theory into consideration would not be satisfactory. Elites are defined by Field and Higley as "*persons who occupy strategic positions in public and private bureaucratic organisations (e.g. governments, parties, militaries, productive enterprises, trade union and other occupational organisations, various organised protest groups, and so on)*"². It should be noted here that the Turkish elite were quite homogeneous during the one party period. During the multi-party period between 1950-1980, although the homogeneity of the elite somewhat modified, the ruling elite have, on the whole, not changed. After 1980, the elite became more competitive and there was a strengthening of the clientelist structure. This section will analyse the theory of elitism with examples from Turkey in order to prove our assumptions above.

Before explaining the theory of elitism and the importance of elites in Turkish like democracies, it is quite important to know the main features of Turkish democracy. Pevsner sums up some of the important aspects of Turkey's experience with democracy and development. According to Pevsner, Turkish democracy shows three main characteristics;

"1- Democracy was introduced to Turkey by the leaders of a tutelary dictatorship.

² Field, Lowell G. and Higley, John, *Elitism*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980, p.20.

2- Industrialisation was also state induced, with important consequences for the present shape of the economy and society.

3- Turkey's style of democracy has combined liberal political institutions with clientelist and corporatist relationships that connect a changing society to its past traditions³".

Elitist writers argue strongly that "*the engine of modern democracy is competition between elites, characteristically organised around the electoral system*"⁴. This electoral competition, as Schumpeter observed, defines the democratic method itself. He explain it as an "*institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote*"⁵". Elitists argue that a pluralist democracy is an organised competition between blocs of elites. People thus cannot play their role in the policy making directly but do so indirectly. The indirect role is played by choosing between competing groups of the elite⁶. It is believed that in democracies the gap between the reality and the ideal cannot be closed⁷ without

³ For more on that, see Pevsner, *Op.cit.*, pp.6-20.

⁴ Sniderman, Paul and others "The Fallacy of Democratic Elitism: Elite Competition and Comment to Civil Liberties", *British Journal of Political Science*, no. 21, p.349.

⁵ Schumpeter, Joseph, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1962, p.269.

⁶ See Sniderman and others, *Op.cit.*, 362-363.

⁷ Dahl, Robert, "*Power, Pluralism and Democracy: A Modest Proposal*", American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1964, p.14.

competitiveness of political elites⁸. *"Thus it is said that there is no alternative but to recast democracy, emphasising the stable, constitutional, and liberal nature of the system of elite pluralism. ... In this view elites become the core of democratic or, if one prefers, polyarchical theory"*⁹. Elitist writers are emphasised that a complete participation in governmental affairs is impossible.

An elitist democratic structure is common in the third world countries and also in Turkey. The usefulness of elite theory for third world countries cannot be rejected, since a pluralist system is not yet established. Pluralist theory also accepts the existence of influential groups in a society. It, however, emphasises the importance of mass population in a society and claims that influential groups are also multiple in number and these groups can achieve power without having to overcome some obstacles¹⁰.

As Şerif Mardin has noted, *"if there is a simple dichotomy between the elite and mass, or between the "great tradition" and the "little tradition" no social structure seems to reflect it better than that of the Ottoman Empire"*¹¹. Again, as

⁸ Bachrach, Peter, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique*, University of London Press, London, 1969, p.8.

⁹ *Ibid*, p.8.

¹⁰ Springborg, Robert, "Social Background Analysis of Political Elites" unpublished ms.1972., p.16 onwards, in. George Lenczowski, "Some Reflections on the Study of Elites", *Political Elites in the Middle East*, Edited by, George Lenczowski, Washington, 1975, p.12.

¹¹ Mardin, Şerif, "Opposition and Control in Turkey", *Government and Opposition*, 1966, vol. 1. no. 3. p.382.

Davison observes, "*there always has been an elite in one form or another (in Ottoman or Turkish Society). It has been the ruling element and the moving element throughout Turkish history... without the ruling group, Turkish history is inexplicable*"¹². The existing political structure in Turkey emerged from the political struggle between the competing groups of elite. Nationalist-westernist group of elite has prevailed over the islamist group and established the Republic. From the establishment of the Republic to the beginning of multi-party system, competition between elite was hardly felt due to the existing one party system (Republican Peoples Party (RPP)). After the introduction of democracy a real political competition started between different groups of the elite. Since Turkish democracy is a competition between the elite, a widespread consensus should have been created on general matters among the elite so that a stable political structure could have been created. For instance, military coups repeated each decade are the cause and the result of the lack of a political consensus among the elite. The military takeover in 1960 has deepened the ideological differences among the elite class and caused the political instability in the 1960s and the 1970s. Even there was not a unity among the military junta. After hard power struggle, fourteen members of the junta, including some generals and lower rank officials who later will be known as the *fourteen*, were alienated from the ruling institution of National Union Committee. They were accused by the other members of the junta of being racist and endangering the country's future in such a political situation¹³. The military takeover in September

¹² Davison, Roderic H., *Turkey*, Spectrum Books, N.J. Prentice Hall, 1968, pp.8-9.

¹³ One of the leading member of the *Fourteen*, Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş, established the Nationalist Movement Party, a profoundly nationalist party and who is still the

1980 was the result of political impasse. Democratic institutions was not working properly due to fierce power struggle between RPP and Justice Party. Because it was a hung parliament, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) was unable to elect the president. The acting president was not constitutionally allowed to demolish the parliament for new elections. That created a rising political tension among the people as well. People started to fight in the street for their political aims. It cost many lives. The only solution perhaps was the military intervention and to introduce the democracy under a new constitution that might prevent such deadlock in the system¹⁴.

The elite owes its existence to the existence of patrimonial structure. As Szyliowicz said "*in its classical period the Ottoman Empire was a patrimonial system par excellence*"¹⁵. As is more explained later in the section on clientelism, the patrimonial structure of Ottoman Empire and of the Republic of Turkey helped the creation of an elitist structure. Patron-Client relations turned to be elite-mass relations depending on the situation. If subject is about the whole government or bureaucracy or elections in general, the relationship between the two classes might be called elite-mass relations. On the other hand, if one is talking about a

leader of the party. Also see *Chapter Four*.

¹⁴ The Constitution of 1961 placed presidents symbolic state with no real constitutional power, whereas the Constitution of 1982 brought a semi-presidential system and presidents became a dominant figures in the decision making process. For more, see *Chapter Four*.

¹⁵ Szyliowicz, Joseph S., "Elites and Modernisation in Turkey" *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East* Frank Tachau (ed.), London, Schenkman Publishing Co., 1975, p.25.

constituency in elections or in any other political affair at micro level, then it might as well be called as patron-client relations. Beside inheritance, the elite structure is also fed and maintained by the cultural and religious beliefs of people. Uneducated people have always relied on their patrons (elite) in political matters and referred the elite as their masters.

Democratic elitism¹⁶ sees pressure group politics as a process which stresses the concept of equality among the various pressure groups. Bachrach emphasised that in an elitist political structure it is almost impossible to give equal opportunities to every citizen¹⁷. Bachrach says *"of course, key governmental decisions must be made by a few, but this is no reason why we should settle for a criterion for democracy which provides no guidelines to combat a rapid concentration of power outside this narrow sphere of decision making"*¹⁸. This view argues the importance of the expansion of political participation in creating long term political stability and adaptiveness¹⁹.

As can be seen later in this chapter, the elitist structure throughout the life of the Turkish Republic has been the main political structure to shape Turkish political, social, and economic life. Elitist critics say that *"increased (political) participation*

¹⁶ Bachrach, *Op.cit.*, pp.1-9.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp.83-92.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.92.

¹⁹ Bianchi, *Op.cit.*, p.19.

(will be created) ... with the rise of mass parties²⁰". They, however, fail to accept widespread anticipative role of pressure groups. Political parties can reduce demands²¹ of masses and, most of the time, fail to represent the interest of their members. Political parties thus by their nature are the most suitable organisations to help the continuing dominance of elite. Political parties are thus quantitatively capable of extending political participation but qualitatively are not. Developing countries' newly emerged multi-party systems has all endured the lack of qualitative political participation. Unsatisfied masses in those countries, due to their weakness to have their voice heard, may try harsher and illegal methods to be heard and this may result in political crisis. Elites are unavoidable actors of democracies. Since a full participation in governmental affairs are impossible, most of the governmental decisions are taken by the elite in representative democracies. In order to prevent the repetition of political crisis, the gap between mass and elite should be filled by organisations seeking to maximise the interest of their members. Political parties are the main bodies of Western style democracies. However, having political parties in multiple numbers would not secure the stability of democratic structure. Political parties are not (or should not be) the only institutions to increase political participation and sustain political stability. In a relatively good democratic system

²⁰ Rokkan, Stein. "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation," in *Political Sociology*, Lewis Coser (ed.), Harper and Row, New York, 1966, pp.101-131.

²¹ See Almond, Gabriel. "A Functionalist Approach to Comparative Politics" in *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960, pp.3-64.

there should also be some other institutions to represent certain social and professional groups.

2.3. Gap Theory

Samuel Huntington²² is the leading representative of Gap Theory. He argued that stability can be conceptualised as the ratio between political participation and political institutionalisation. If institutionalisation exceeds participation in a "*Civic Society*" then political development can be created. Conversely, if participation exceeds institutionalisation a "*Praetorian Society*" emerges. The emergence of a praetorian society dominated by a military elite causes to political unrest and instability that affects political development negatively. A praetorian society emerged in Turkey between 1965- 1980 when society was unorganised. In other words, political development, at that time, was shaped by the clientelistic behaviours of the members of unorganised or semi-organised associations. Political decay emerged as a result of that kind of society, and informal relations prevailed over formal constitutional relations. Modernisation in Turkey has evolved so quickly that the existing social, political and economic institutions could not meet people's demands in every aspects. For instance, the growing percentage of urbanisation in Turkey is not purely a result of the process of industrialisation. In fact, the industrialisation process had little effect on the growing process of urbanisation in

²² Huntington, Samuel, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, pp.1-92.

Turkey and some other similar developing countries. Industrialisation did only facilitate the problem of transportation but it did not create as many jobs as was expected. If it did create any, the existing unemployed manpower in cities was sufficient enough to fill the created vacancies. Growing industrialisation in cities could not absorb all incoming population from rural areas for two main reasons. Firstly, Turkey did not follow the same industrialisation process as Western industrialised states did. Secondly, the land was already so heavily populated it could not support more people. Industrialisation in Turkish like developing states is mainly based on the importation of package technologies (often the latest) and thus it did not create enough employment. In addition to that, that artificial process of industrialisation did prevent the establishment of healthy social, economic and political institutions. Due to the lack of modern economic, social and political institutions, people adjusted the existing patron-client structure to the new urban life. Some examples of urban clientelism and their effect on political development will be given in chapter four.

Clientelist behaviour may be (or would have been in this case) beneficial where they support a plural political structure, but they can only be harmful if they emerge to substitute for a political system. Clientelism will be further discussed later in this chapter.

As can be seen gap theory tries to explain the gap between mass and elite. In other words the gap between, on the one hand, the state and its representative agents, on the other hand, organised pressure groups and unorganised pressure groups.

Bianchi²³ likens Huntington's Gap Theory to Gabriel Almond's *"Functionalist Scheme"* in which Almond sees both interest groups and parties as *"demand reducing mechanisms"*. The general objectives of political parties may differ from the interest and objectives of individual members'. In other words, accumulated interests of members does not reflect the interest of an individual due to the fact that the nature and operating machinery of political parties are capable of changing the pattern and the weight of interest. However, as far as the organised pressure groups, outside political parties, are concerned, they are not demand reducing mechanisms. On the contrary, they are the only existing interest representing and demanding bodies, if those groups are properly established.

Huntington²⁵ makes a general argument that *"economic and political stability are two independent goals and progress toward one has no necessary connection with progress toward the other"*. Looking at the political developments since he made that generalisation, in some cases it is true but in some other cases it is not. If simultaneous economic and political development in Western Europe is not a contradiction to that argument it is not certainly supportive. However, if we look at India's underdeveloped economy and a relatively stable democracy (and even in India there have been political clashes and crisis), then we could say that Huntington's theoretical generalisation had some empirical grounds. It would be worth mentioning here that the gap theory is limited in explaining the realities of a complex political

²³ Bianchi, *Op.cit.*, p.10.

²⁴ Almond, *Op.cit.*, pp.3-64.

²⁵ Huntington, *Op.cit.*, p.6.

structure. Gap theory is useful in explaining and understanding the remaining gap between mass (clients) and elite (patrons). By emphasising the importance of the gap, it also explains how elitist democracies emerged in modern times.

If we are to rewrite Huntington's generalisation to suit the present case study of Turkish Politics, we could assert against his view, that "the controlled, uncorrupted and justified development of the economy and the emergence of political stability are two mutually dependent goals; progress toward one has a necessary connection with progress toward the other".

Huntington attributes the existence of one countries political stability to the existence of political institutions. He claims that "*in the total absence of social conflict political institutions are unnecessary*²⁶". Political institutions are the most necessary mechanisms of a statehood even if there is no social and political conflict. As a matter of fact, political institutions are capable of preventing social crisis. On the other hand, Huntington argues that "*in the total absence of social harmony political institutions are impossible*²⁷". The dilemma here is that if political institutions are not necessary in the total absence of social conflict, and if those institutions cannot emerge in the total absence of social harmony, then the question of how political institutions emerge still remains unanswered. His assumption may however be that there might always be some kind of social harmony and therefore a

²⁶ Huntington, *Ibid*, p.9.

²⁷ See Huntington, *Ibid*, pp.8-32.

degree of political institutionalisation is possible. The degree of political institutionalisation depends on the level of social harmony. This is relevant to a study of Turkish politics, but it is general. Its imprecision undermines its use as a tool to explain the particular distinctive shape of Turkish political and social development.

2.4. Integration- Equilibrium Theory

As we have seen above, gap theorists have emphasised the danger of rapid political modernisation. They have alleged that rapid political and social change will bring their own illnesses of disruption and destabilisation. According to gap theory, rapid social change is the main threat to public and political order. Integration-equilibrium theorists, however, have argued that political and economic modernisation contain the potential remedies for their own illnesses²⁸. Rapid political and economic changes are not seen as a danger to public order. Instead, integrationists see rapid social change as an invaluable contribution to greater social, economic, and political adaptiveness. During the adaptation process there will, of course, be some social, economic, and political instability. A society can not be kept non-modernised just for the reason that some degree of instability might otherwise arise. This does not mean that one should not think of some kind of control mechanisms to reduce the proportion of instability in a rapidly emerging society. Integration equilibrium theory is no less concerned about social and political stability than gap theorists. It suggested that we should not simply increase the capacity of the

²⁸ Bianchi, *Op.cit.*, p.14.

state, as has been done by military interruptions in Turkey, in order to close a supposed political and economic gap, as gap theorists suggest. Integrationists accept that in the era of rapid political, economic, and social change gaps between mass and elite, between organised associations and unorganised ones, and between political institutions and political participation emerge. The solution to eradicate such gaps is not to increase the capacity of the state, but *"by maintaining a number of delicate balances- between liberty and order, between social differentiation and subsequent reintegration, and between the various segments of society in relation to one another"*²⁹. As De Tocqueville says *"Freedom of association in political matters is not so dangerous to public tranquillity as is supposed, and it may strengthen the state in the end"*³⁰.

Gap theory reminds us of a possibility of the emergence of a political gap between mass and elite. It will in that case be useful in our present study. It may be, however, that the solution gap theorists suggest is not a proper solution to eradicate such a gap. It might actually eradicate the gap at the expense of compromise on political and economic development. On the other hand, integrationists do not even worry about such a gap and they believe that rapid political development will eventually create its own medicine to cure such a disease. The deficiencies of gap theory, however, are; first, it fails to consider the importance of the economy in the political development, second, it does not emphasise efficiently on the importance of

²⁹ Bianchi, *Ibid*, p.15.

³⁰ Tocqueville, Alexis De, *Democracy in America*, Vintage Books, 2 volumes, New York, 1954, vol. 2. p.126.

pressure groups in political development and adaptation. Although gap theory tries to emphasise the gap between mass and elite, it does not explain the emergence of an elite in different societies, and fails to consider the role of the "elite". Integration theory (here meaning a liberal account of how societies integrate within themselves rather than the international integration theory discussed in chapter three) is of little use in discussing Turkish politics and society. Its ideological assumptions and its roots in the analysis of specifically western societies renders it irrelevant. And it is far removed from the actual historical experience of Turkey by comparison with other approaches which are to be discussed in the remains of this chapter.

2.5. Interest Groups or Pressure Groups

Before seeking some answers to the questions asked at the beginning, it would be better to define terms and their evolution. The concept of "Interest Groups" has been subject to evolution in the past fifty years. Developments in liberal or pluralist theory, together with the developments in empirical research and a growing economic and political complexity and interdependency between individuals and nations have helped to develop new concepts. These concepts, thus, underwent an evolution process as *"interest groups"*, *"pressure groups"*, and *"policy communities"*.

The term *"interest groups"* used in the 1960s and the 1970s to refer to specially organised groups which are mainly aimed to demand the interests of their member. Organised groups here has been perceived as separate institutions aims and duties of which are clearly defined. It is thought that *"interest groups are more or*

less free agents. They join with the government, criticise it, influence it, or ignore it as such actions coincide with their own advantage or their conception of the common welfare³¹".

Eckstein says pressure groups shall be seen as groups pursuing collectively common political aims. He proposes that "interest groups" have objective characteristics. In interest groups there exists a high probability that political purposes will be pursued collectively, and normally this is the case in groups sharing objective characteristics³². The main difference between interest groups and pressure groups is that the former are more focused and class based while the latter are less. These groups are likely to collectively pursue political aims just because they have objective characteristics in common. *"Groups need not always be involved in politics; but when they become engaged in politics they are a species of a broader genus (namely) 'pressure groups' ³³".* Grant sees a pressure group as *"an organisation which seeks as one of its functions to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy, public policy representing a set of authoritative decisions taken by the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, and by local government and the European Community³⁴".* Almond defines interest groups as "a

³¹ Holtzman, Abraham, *Interest Groups and Lobbying*, Macmillan, New York, 1966, p.3.

³² Eckstein, Harry, *Pressure Group Politics: The Case of The British Medical Association*, Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, p.9.

³³ Easton, David, *The Political System*, Knopf, New York, 1953, p.285.

³⁴ Grant, Wyn, *Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain*, Published by Philip Allan, Hertfordshire, 1989, p.9.

group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds. The structure of the interest group may be organised to include continuing role performance by all members of the group, or it may reflect only occasional and intermittent awareness of the group interest on the part of individuals³⁵".

The involvement and the importance of pressure groups varies from one country to another. The type of party system, the structure of the government, the nature of the consensus created within a country, and the degree of the respect for general rules and tendencies of the political game are major elements required to exist in a political system³⁶. If those elements do effectively exist in a political system, the restriction on pressure groups will be so limited and the legitimate intervention of pressure groups will increase at all levels of decision making and that increase in participation will, in turn, certainly facilitate the implementation of decisions taken.

Political parties unarguably have a great influence on policy formation. In pure electoral systems, political parties play major role as interest intermediators. In democratic countries, interest groups and political parties (pressure groups or policy groups) are the major institutions through which individuals and sub-groups can maximise their influence on government. As Holtzman puts it, political parties "*are more intimately tied (than interest groups) to the individual, on the one hand, and to*

³⁵ Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, Bingham G. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Little & Brown, Boston, 1966, p.75.

³⁶ Holtzman, Abraham, *Op.cit.*, p.3.

the government, on the other"³⁷. Political parties can represent the interest of its members in a broad manner. This representation does not most of the time satisfy the each member of the party. Parties' manifestation includes political, social, economic, and cultural affairs. A member should accept the package even if he or she dislikes it.

With the inclusion of emotional, cultural and clientelistic behaviours of people in more traditional societies, parties have another dimension. Individuals thus preferred the interest of their parties and leaders rather than pursuing their own interests. The survival of an electoral system in developing countries therefore does not, as it is thought, entirely depend on the existence of political parties, but on a great number and range of associations. To increase the mobilisation and eradicate the vulnerability of democracy, so many organisations are indeed needed representing every aspect of life. A member of a certain organisation can thus simultaneously be a member of another organisation. If the interests of those two organisation clash on certain matters, individuals, who are the members of both groups, will seek a consensus in their own interests. For instance, either one will vote in favour of an increase in salary or one will try to get more dividend for the share he owns. The overlapping and conflicting interests will create a more interdependent deep rooted political system. As in our example, trade union then would not necessarily vote to go on a strike, neither share owners would be disappointed. This was a simple example of a secret balance exist in pure interest represented systems. To explain the

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.11.

idea, some more appropriate examples could be found. The point should be emphasised here is that the degree of the purity of an interest representing system does very much depend on the number, range and quality of interest representing associations. Beside political parties, military and the other decision making bodies³⁸, a much more stable democratic political structure also requires interest representing associations. In Turkey those kind of associations started to flourish after the transformation to a much more liberal economy. However, contrary to industrialised countries, the main reason for political and economic instability in developing countries (thus in Turkey as well) is that organised pressure groups could not yet cover all citizens in every aspects of live. That is why the democratic structure in Turkey has always been unstable and vulnerable. Three military takeovers (1960, 1971 and 1980) would not have happened, if Turkey had enough organised pressure groups with a well working institutional structure that provides complexity instead of simplicity. In a complex political structure, intervention in democracy by one group (the military in the Turkish case) becomes almost impossible. For example, military juntas cannot declare their sovereignty simply by overthrowing the government and holding the broadcasting station in the capital city, if there exist strong private broadcasting stations and interest groups and associations. Pressure group or interest group activity may undermine aspects of democracy, but without them the development of mature democracy and the stability it can bring is impossible. The exception of 'policy community' or 'epistemic community' has been evolved to explain sophisticated institutional patterns within and cross countries

³⁸ For the decision making process, see *Chapter Four*

which reflect a cohesion of interests and of ideas among policy influences³⁹. These ideas are irrelevant to Turkey's experience in the period to about 1980. But, as chapter seven will develop, they have some limited use in helping to explain the more developed character of multi-dimensional or pluralist influences on foreign policy over the last decade or so.

2.6. Corporatism or Pluralism?

In order to make a comparison between theory and the realities in Turkey, we should borrow Schmitter's definition of pluralism and corporatism. He states that *"Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specifically licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or other wise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories"*⁴⁰.

He then defines a corporatist system as *"a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular,*

³⁹ See Goldstein, J., and Keohane R. O. (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993.

⁴⁰ Schmitter, Philip, "Still the Century of Corporatism", *New Corporatism* Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch (eds.), n.d. p.96.

compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support⁴¹".

"The major tenet of pluralism" as Ball and Millard observed "is that political power is fragmented and dispersed. Decisions are seen as the outcome of a complex process of group interaction and bargaining⁴²". The political system allows and even encourages people to organise themselves so that they can easily seek their interests through their organisations. The idea of a pluralist system is mainly based on the diversity of the society. The emergence of a multiplicity of organised social, cultural, and economic pressure groups is thus the essential bases of a pluralist structure. A pluralist structure best suits countries where all policy groups are well organised and a general consensus created on certain matters. Otherwise, as can be seen in the Turkish case in chapter four, a pluralist structure will facilitate the unconscious fighting of unorganised groups. It will then result in violence, instability and crime. The lack of organisations will create instability, and instability will result in an unstable -and inflation ridden- economy. As a result, an anarchic vicious circle may emerge.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.93-94.

⁴² Ball, Alan R, and Millard, Frances, *Pressure Politics in Industrial Societies: A Comparative Introduction*, McMillan, London, 1986. p.2.

To Vatikiotis the very definition of pluralism and its connotations differ in the islamic world from that of the West. He say that *"in the west, pluralism connotes the various pressure groups involved, including various associations, political parties, and others, within given political boundaries. In the islamic world, pluralism deals less with the political and more with the cultural and religious"*⁴³. That definition does not fit Turkey very well as she was striving to become a part of Europe and the only secular country whose citizens are muslim. Hardman⁴⁴ uses Vatikiotis's definition of the pluralist structure in the islamic world to apply to Turkey. The crucial point that Hardman partly fails to take into full consideration in his respectful study of *"Kemalism: Evolution or revolution"* is that *"Turkey is the only islamic country with a secular democratic government"*⁴⁵. Unlike the other traditionalist and revolutionary muslim states in the Middle East Turkey is the only muslim country where political system has been designed to suit political and economic adaptation with the West. The idea of becoming a Western country was prevalent long before the establishment of the Republic. The Turkish application to become full member of the European Community is a clear indication of that. But this western ideology and western way of life have so far largely failed to penetrate the masses. This is because Turkish culture, religion and some other aspects of life are so diverse that

⁴³ Vatikiotis, P.J. "Non-muslims in Muslim Society: A preliminary Consideration of the Problem on the Basis of Recent Published Works by Muslim Authors" Milton J Esman and Itamar Robinovich (eds.) *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, Carnell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, p.69.

⁴⁴ Hardman, Willard M., *Kemalism: Evolution or Revolution?*, Ph.D. Thesis, Catholic University of America, 1990, p.145.

⁴⁵ Kuniholm, Bruce R. "Turkey and West" *Foreign Affairs*, Spring, 1991, vol, 70, no. 2, pp.34-48

clientelist-elitist-pluralist structure failed to impose Western ideas. Even the Turkish guest workers in Germany have hardly accepted a western style of life⁴⁶. Nevertheless, the Turkish people started to consume more and more after the liberalisation of the economic system. The term "*Westernisation*" will be examined in chapter four and six in relevant sections.

To come to the theory again, elitist pluralists criticise classic pluralists, arguing that classic pluralism is not capable of describing the system of liberal democracies⁴⁷. They do not accept the allegation put by classic pluralists that some individuals are under represented. They simply say that they are represented by government itself and the problem of representation is thus minimised. Secondly, elitist-pluralists' answer to the question of how hierarchically run groups would efficiently respond to their members is oversimplified. They believe that system will still remain pluralist, because competition will run between the elite groups which are representing the majority of people and the rest is represented by the government through the voting system⁴⁸. The lack of participation of the masses in the governmental affairs will be eradicated by the voting system. Almond argues that political elites, organisation leaders, members, political activists, and political

⁴⁶ For the guest workers and Turkey's bilateral relations with Germany, see *Chapter Six*.

⁴⁷ For the critics of classic pluralism, see Dahl, Robert, *Polyarchy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971.

⁴⁸ Marsh, David "Introduction: Interest Groups in Britain, Their Access and Power" in. David Marsh (ed.) *Pressure Politics: Interest Groups in Britain*, London, 1983, p.11-12. And also see Mills, Wright C., *The Power Elite*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963.

participants are mainly drawn from the higher socio-economic strata whatever their country or ideological system might be. He says *"this general proposition about the universality of the relationship of socioeconomic and political inequality is not inconsistent with the pluralist view that as Suzanne Berger argues⁴⁹ interest group organisation can enhance the political power of poorer groups and increase their share of income and opportunity⁵⁰".*

With regard to Corporatism, most scholars agree with Schmitter that corporatism is a variety of pluralism. Almond accepts Schmitter's proclamation that it is *"still the century of corporatism⁵¹".* He, however, suggests that *"some degree of pluralism was built into modern differentiated societies, whether authoritarian or democratic. Thus, corporatism is a variety of pluralism - to be distinguished from a more desegregated competitive variety of pluralism at one extreme, and a state controlled variety at the other⁵²".* As in pluralism, the central emphasis in corporatism is on pressure groups. Corporatism accounts and analyses capital and labour and the relations between the two. It tries to measure and balance the functional groups in a society and emphasises their importance in the decision making process. A corporatist approach stresses the integration of various pressure groups into the state, and puts more emphasis on the role and making of the state than

⁴⁹ See Berger, Suzanne, "introduction", *Organising Interest in Western Europe*, Suzanne Berger (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp.1-23.

⁵⁰ Almond, Gabriel, "Corporatism, Pluralism and Professional Memory", *World Politics*, vol, 35, no. 2, January, 1983, p.253.

⁵¹ See Schmitter, Philippe C.,(1974), *Op.cit.*, pp.85-131.

⁵² Almond, Gabriel A.,(1983), *Op.cit.*, p.251.

pluralist theories. Although a great many of scholars have been studying on corporatism, it is still a vague term due to the existence of differences on the definition of the term. The term is sometimes "*widely used in conjunction with the analysis of fascism, which emphasised the corporate state, in the mid-1970s corporatism emerged as a tool of analysis of the modern liberal state*"⁵³.

Gerhard Lehmbruch's definition of corporatism is somewhat different from Schmitter's definition. He argues that corporatism concerns not only the articulation or even the intermediation of interests, but also the authoritative allocation of values and implementation of policies⁵⁴. Cawson says that "*corporatism in its broadest meaning is a pattern of articulation between the state and functional interests in civil society which fuses representation and intervention in an interdependent relationship*"⁵⁵. Cawson classifies Corporatism in three categories. These are: macro corporatism, meso-corporatism and micro corporatism. He argues that macro corporatism "*involves intermediation with peak organisations representing the interest of social classes, whereas meso-corporatism concerns organisations which aggregate interest at a sectoral level*"⁵⁶. According to Cawson a corporate system does not harm the pluralistic and competitive nature of the society. He says "*in a corporate system power is dispersed, but not pluralistically and competitively as in*

⁵³ Allan and Millard, *Op.cit.*, p.29.

⁵⁴ Lehmbruch, Gerhard, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government" *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1, 1977, p.94.

⁵⁵ Cawson, Alan, *Corporatism and Welfare: Social Policy and Intervention in Britain*, Heinemann Educational, London, 1982, p.41.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.41.

*the market model, among groups whose contribution to the economic and social product is indispensable to society, or at least is recognised as such in bargaining*⁵⁷".

Schmitter confesses that he once "*tended to define corporatism exclusively in relation to authoritarian rule*", but now wants to "*rescue the concept..... from various usages of it which have crept into the literature and which seem.... to do more to dissipate than to enhance its utility*⁵⁸". He categorises the term into two sub-types as "*societal corporatism*" and "*state corporatism*". Categorisation generally has been made according to the regime in which a corporatist system took place. "*Societal Corporatism*" or Lehmbruch's⁵⁹ "*Liberal Corporatism*" associated with and tried to explain liberal democracies, "*State Corporatism*" or "*authoritarian Corporatism*⁶⁰" associated with other regimes⁶¹.

It can be argued that corporatist structure in the Turkish case is a variety of an overall pluralist structure. In other words it can be argued that an overall pluralist structure exists in Turkish political life, even though it is more of a "*debilitating pluralism*⁶²". It has been a debilitating pluralism not least because of the lack of

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.41.

⁵⁸ Schmitter, P, (1974) *Op.cit.*, p.86.

⁵⁹ See Lehmbruch, *Op.cit.*, pp.91-126.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p.95.

⁶¹ See Martin, Ross M, "Pluralism and the New Corporatism", *Political Studies*, no. 31, 1983, pp.86-88.

⁶² See Bianchi, *Op.cit.*

organised groups to increase political participation⁶³. But it is also debilitating because the conflicts engendered by pluralism are insufficiently managed by existing institutions, according to Bianchi, and because of the inability of the economy to meet the expectations carried by the plural bodies which have emerged.

Corporatism and pluralism have co-existed in Turkey. That can be explained by looking at the associational life in Turkey. Turkish associational life has been divided between two types of organisations, namely private associations and public associations, reflecting the dual structure of Turkish political system. Both associations coexisted and expanded until 1980 when a policy of complete market economy was decided. This was the turning point towards what might be called an economic "*glasnost*" in Turkish history. From 1983, with the economic implementation of a more liberal market economy by the ruling "*Motherland Party*", their political implications helped private associations to represent their interest through pluralist channels and the state induced corporatist structure started to lose its importance. As Weiker puts it "(in Turkey) there has developed a real pluralism. ...a horizontal pluralism in the sense that there are many groups among the elite which are competing for all rewards of the Turkish society⁶⁴". Throughout the 1980s pluralist development continued as a direct result of the changing economic structure. Non-elite groups also have gradually started to involve in political affairs furthering the political structure. Since then the Turkish elite were no more homogenous.

⁶³ See the section on political participation in *Chapter Four*.

⁶⁴ Weiker, Walter, "Discussion on Democracy and Deadlock", *Foreign Policy*, vol. 8, no. 3-4, 1980, p.46.

Before the 1980s, corporatist interest representing associations had a considerable weight in Turkey's political structure. It was a state corporatism as they are created by the state and to a considerable measure incorporated into its policy making and implementation as well as its thinking. They were in limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, and they held monopolies in their respective activities⁶⁵. Most of the public associations have fallen into that category. An important duty of corporatist institutions was to guide the people by initiating and implementing new policies. For instance, public associations have played a major role in the introduction and implementation of the Value Added Tax. Even the government was astonished by the general acceptance of the tax. *The government was certainly expecting more difficulties in its implementation.* Government officials also emphasised the severe problems faced when the Italian government introduced the tax. Unlike the other European countries, Italy and Turkey had much in common. Both have similar economic structure, similar an informal clientelist structure, and in both countries the economic structure is shaped by countless small enterprises. It is thought that the existence of so many small enterprises would make the introduction and the implementation of new economic policies so difficult. Thanks to the existence of semi-corporatist institutions, (professional associations established and controlled by the state) Turkey did not endure so much as Italy did when VAT was introduced.

⁶⁵ See Schmitter's definition of corporatism above.

The existence of corporatist channels have not helped pluralism to develop. Alienation or a sense of distance between the mass and the elite remained until the late 1980s. The lack of channels and of state intermediation between the two have made the cleavage more clear. As a result, a corporatist system of behaviours has so far had little effect on the emergence of a middle class entrepreneur bourgeoisie. State Economic Enterprises in Turkey, for instance, are expected to encourage entrepreneurs in the private sector. However, due to the non-existence of a liberal economic model until 1980, they failed to do so. Until the 1980s, the policy was motivated by income substitution and the economy was not export orientated. As Keyder also noted *"State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), although serving to provide low-cost inputs to the private sector, were a presence of a quite different order. They were inherited from the etatist period of bureaucratic domination and they had remained quantitatively important within the industrial sector, despite changes in the political system and despite the loss of status suffered by the bureaucracy. Potentially, they (SEEs) posed a threat to the bourgeoisie since the instrumental authority enjoyed by the bureaucracy... It is significant, therefore, that SEEs served to transfer value to industrial bourgeoisie, and in doing so exhibited another dimension of the pattern of domination"*⁶⁶. The corporatist system was mainly established for that aim by the one party system (RPP) in the very early age of the Republic. During the One Party Period (1923-1950) the RPP's main aim thus was to create a middle-class society. It could not create a powerful middle class. However, it is further strengthened the special economic and political relationship between the

⁶⁶ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, Vernon, London, 1987, p.168.

masses and the homogenous elite. RPP in those years, using corporatist channels, further strengthen the elite. As a result the cleavage between the elite and the mass further strengthened and deepened. Turkey's multi-party political life between 1950-1980 thus suffered from that cleavage. As can be seen in chapter four, the Turkish democracy during those years witnessed a fierce power struggle between the mass and the elite, (between the village (land owners) and the city or between lower class and upper class). Although during the multi party period the Turkish elite gradually became pluralised, due to the handicapped democratic system the struggle for power has sometimes been undemocratic. The ruling elite of one party period, having the emerging (if any) bourgeoisie on their side, did not want to give up their power. On the other hand, newly emerging opposition (new elite), having the mass (clients) on their side, were the winning side in all the elections. This struggle thus resulted in three military takeovers. This vicious circle continued until 1980 when a more radical economic and political structural change took place. As a result of changes, the elite gradually lost its homogeneity and became more pluralised. Although the elitist structure was not diminished, the power struggle took place among a more heterogeneous elite. A further discussion on this issue will take place in chapter four.

Studying Turkish political life without taking into consideration a clientelist structure which exists as an umbrella over the system (be it pluralist or corporatist), would not be a satisfactory study. Political activities in Turkey continue to operate inside a *clientelist structure*. For that reason the next section will deal with the concepts of clientelism drawing on some empirical evidence in Turkey. Some more empirical explanation of clientelist behaviour is examined in chapter four.

2.7. Clientelism

This study would not be complete and satisfactory unless it includes the theory of clientelism. A clientelist structure is the very basis of much of Turkish political life. This section thus examines the theory of political clientelism and its implications on Turkey.

If we begin with Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy, he argues that a major source of bureaucracy's power is its continuing good relationship with its clientele people whose individual goals are compatible with those of the bureaucracy. Weber theorises that the relationship between an organisation and its client group is one of mutual dependency each needs the other to survive and/or to flourish⁶⁷. Carl H. Lande defines the patron-client relationship as *"a broad but imprecise spectrum mutual obligations consistent with the belief that the patron should display an almost parental concern for and responsiveness to the needs of his client, and that the latter should display almost filial loyalties to his patron...."*⁶⁸. Clientelism is a reality of traditional phenomenon. It has, however, been capable of transforming and adapting itself in different patterns to the current process of modernisation in different countries. Springborg accepts that *"modern political and administrative organisations do in fact provide fertile breeding grounds for patron-client*

⁶⁷ Weber, Max, *Essay in Sociology*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, p.196. quoted by Nancy J Obermayer, *"Bureaucrats, Clients and Geography"*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1989, p.3.

⁶⁸ Lande, Carl H, "Networks and groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Theory of Politics", *American Political Science Review*, March, 1973, p.105.

*relationships*⁶⁹, if the institutional structure is weak and cannot meet clients' (voters') demands. The sudden migration of people to cities does not mean the urbanisation sociologically. The same analogy exist for the peaceful political and economic modernisation as it can carry feudal patron-client institution into modern political structures.

Lemarchand has categorised four different types of clientelism in his distinguished study of clientelism in Africa. These are; the patrimonial, the feudal, the mercantile, and the saintly type⁷⁰. There is no doubt that the last three exist in Turkey. As can be seen later in this section the main dominating type of political clientelism has moved from feudal type to mercantile type. This is because the patron's source of power shifted from land ownership to the modern institutional economy.

Gunther Roth is not so optimistic about the implications of an existing clientelistic structure on the political and social system. He points out that in a system where clientelistic behaviours are predominant, there exist "corruption" and some illegal connections between clients and bureaucrats. Roth continues saying that

⁶⁹ Springborg, Robert, "Social Background Analysis of Political Elites" 1972, pp.16ff. in George Lenczowski (ed.), *Political Elites in the Middle East*, Washington, p.12.

⁷⁰ For more explanation of the types of clientelism, see Lemerchand, R. "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation Building" Schmidt, S.W., Guasti,L., Lande,C.H and Scott, J.C.,(eds.) *Friends, Followers and Factions*, University of California Press ltd., London, 1977, p.101. And also, for more theoretical and empirical explanation of clientelism see above mentioned book.

"favouritism prevails [in such a society] and for the few there is abundant profit in real-estate dealings⁷¹".

Clientelist structures are a fact of life in traditional societies, no matter in which part of the world that society is. It is thus an existing fact of Turkish political life. Clientelist structure takes its powers from emotive, traditionalist and religious feelings of people⁷². As Özbudun⁷³ says in his study of political clientelism in Turkey, Turkey does really *"provide a fertile ground for the formation and maintenance of a wide variety of clientelistic relationships. In fact, she meets almost all the conditions necessary for the wide spread presence of such relationships⁷⁴".* There are four such conditions: transformation of societies from the traditional to the modern, a rapid socioeconomic change, an uneven income distribution in the society, and an incompetent government and electoral system where patrons depend on the votes of their clients. All these conditions exist in Turkey and need examination.

First of all Turkey is neither a traditionalist nor is a modern country. During such a transition period, informal ties between the patron and his clients are unavoidably gaining ground. This is because people could not give up their

⁷¹ Roth, Gunther, "Personnel Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire Building in the New States", *World Politics*, vol, 20, no.1, January, 1968, p.202.

⁷² See Mair, Lucy, *Primitive Government*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1970.

⁷³ See Özbudun, E. "Turkey: The Politics of Political Clientelism" *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development*, S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemerchand (eds.), *Contemporary Political Sociology*, Volume 3, London, 1981,

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.252.

traditionalist way of behaviour in political matters. On the other hand, government is trying to impose a non-traditionalist "modern" political structure. As a result, it is the clientelist structure that keeps the country politically and economically alive. But it is simultaneously a conservative force.

The second condition was that an undergoing rapid socio-economic change would be the major cause of a clientelist structure. In this transitional period people are reluctant to obey formal rules and also unwilling to obey traditionalist rules because of the economic, social and political changes that they are undergoing. To give an example to make the point more clear, in traditionalist times people would group together and build a new house for someone whose house has been subject to fire. In a transitional period and (also in modern times), however, people in their multi storey flats hardly know each other, let alone building a new house for the needy. On the other hand, there are not enough modern social security institutions to help people in such situations. Patron-client relations are thus, in such situations, becoming a necessary institutions of society. This parallels the growth of knowledge based networks in developed economies⁷⁵.

Another factor enabling the clientelist structure to be predominant is the uneven distribution of income. Since clientelist behaviour more easily develops between unequal parties, Turkey is perhaps the best country on that issue. Turkey,

⁷⁵ Haas, Peter M. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control", *International Organisation*, vol. 43, no. 3, Summer 1989, pp.377-404; and Haas, Peter M. (ed.), Special Issue of *International Organisation*, vol. 46, no. 1, Winter 1992 on Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination.

because, has one of the worst income distribution in the world. 78% of the GNP (Gross National Product) is shared among the richest 20% of the population, whereas the other 22% of the GNP shared among the 80% of people⁷⁶. In another words, while the former are having \$6.400 GNP per capita, latter is only having \$533 GNP per capita. It is an unbelievable fact that 25 percent of the latter group (lower class) are living on the poverty line, if not below the poverty line.

The third condition is that a clientelist structure stemmed from a necessity in a society. In transitional periods most countries undergo an unstable political life. In these circumstances, governments are generally weak due to the lack of all necessary political institutions for a stable political structure and a powerful government. Political patrons have therefore been subsidised for political institutions. When functions of government are comparatively limited ones, the government does not control rich or considerable resources, hence a more limited role for mediating between government and their clients⁷⁷. Contrarily, when such scope is broader and when, in particular, the government is involved in extensive development programs, the role of patron takes on new and more significant dimensions, since a much greater share of their clients' lives comes to be affected by governmental decisions⁷⁸. *In Turkey, the scope of government has always been*

⁷⁶ For more economic data on Turkey, see OECD (Organisation For Economic Cooperation and Development) *Report*, 1990.

⁷⁷ Weingrod, A., "Patrons, Patronage, and political Parties" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1968, vol, 10, no. 3, p.393.

⁷⁸ Scott, J.C., "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 63, no. 4, 1969, pp.1153-54.

*broader than in most countries in the same bracket of socioeconomic modernisation, probably because of the long and strong tradition of statehood under the Ottoman Empire. Such scope has been further broadened under the Republic. Some government activities provide sectoral or sub-sectoral inducements, such as agricultural price supports, minimum wages, labour legislation, etc., which cannot be manipulated by patrons' mediations*⁷⁹. In some of the other activities, patrons' mediations are still important. These activities might be the construction of mosques, roads, electricity lines, telephone posts, drinking water pipes, irrigation projects or could be entirely for individual benefits such as agricultural credits, employment, solving the bureaucratic difficulties, choices of a factory or road location etc..

Finally, the kind of democratic system has also an effect on patron-client relations. An elitist democratic structure is more easily created by a clientelist society. In turn, patron-client relations are generally well maintained in elitist democracies. This is because patrons have to use informal channels to gain the vote and the confidence of their clients. Also an elitist democracy involves a competition within the elite. Such a democratic system thus *"promote(s) the expansion of patron-client ties and the politicisation of existing bonds. Knowing that an electoral victory is important, a local patron with a modest following will probably try to obligate more clients to him in order to strengthen his electoral position"*⁸⁰.

⁷⁹ Özbudun, E., *Op.cit.*, p.253.

⁸⁰ Scott, J.C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 66, no. 1, 1972, pp.109-10.

2.8. Conclusion

This chapter provides a critical review of a range of theories dealing with domestic politics, their structure, processes and culture, and their usefulness in explaining political behaviour. It accepts the value of some and rejects others, either on general ground or because they do not help in the specific circumstances of the Turkish case. This provides a solid and critical starting point for the discussion of foreign policy in the later chapters.

Gap theory reminds us of a possibility of the emergence of a political gap between mass and elite. It will in that case be useful in our present study. The gap theorists accepts that a gap is inevitable in a fast developing society. The gap can only be eradicated at the expense of compromise on political and economic development. On the other hand, integrationists do not even worry about such a gap and they believe that rapid political development will eventually create its own medicine to cure such a disease. The deficiencies of gap theory, however, are; first, it fails to consider the importance of the economy in the political development, second, it does not emphasise efficiently on the importance of pressure groups in political development and adaptation. Although the gap theory tries to emphasise the gap between mass and elite, it does not explain the emergence of elite in different societies or even fails to define the term "elite".

It can be argued that corporatist structure in the Turkish case is a variety of an overall pluralist structure. In other words it can be argued that an overall pluralist

structure exists in Turkish political life. Corporatism could be considered inside this overall period of pluralist structure as a secondary system. In another words, corporatism is not an alternative system to the overall pluralist system. It is only thought as an auxiliary system during the transformation of politics. Turkish corporatism was temporarily established in some sectors, generally supported by the Turkish elite, to establish a socio-economic structure in order to eradicate the debilitation of a pluralist structure and establish a western style democracy.

The corporatist system was mainly established for that aim by the one party system (RPP) at the very early age of the Republic. During the One Party Period (1923-1950), the RPP's main aim thus was to create a middle-class society. To a limited extent it did so. However, it is further strengthened the special economic and political relationship between the newly emerged homogenous middle-class and the elite. As a result the cleavage between the elite and the mass further strengthened and deepened. Turkey's multi-party political life between 1950-1980 thus suffered from that cleavage. As can be seen in chapter four, the Turkish democracy during those years meant a fierce and relentless power struggle between the mass and the elite, (between the village (land owners) and the city or between lower class and upper class). This struggle resulted in three military takeovers. This vicious circle continued until 1980 when an economic and political structural change initiated. As a result of changes the elite gradually lost its homogeneity and more pluralised. Although the elitist structure was not diminished, the power struggle took place among a much more heterogeneous elite. Further discussion on that issue will take place in chapter four.

To sum up, if corporatism exists in Turkey, it exists as a restricted process within certain parts of the elite. It does not exist even as a 'meso level' as a link between masses in sectoral level or in the whole system. It is therefore a restricted, intra-elite process, although it may be becoming more significant aspect of the political structure over time.

Clientelist structures are a fact of life in traditional societies, no matter in which part of the world that society is. It is thus an existing fact of Turkish political life. Clientelist structure takes its power from emotive, traditionalist and religious feelings of people. As Özbudun⁸¹ says in his study of political clientelism in Turkey, Turkey does really *"provide a fertile ground for the formation and maintenance of a wide variety of clientelistic relationships. In fact, (as analysed in this chapter) she meets almost all the conditions necessary for the wide spread presence of such relationships"*⁸².

⁸¹ See Özbudun, E. "Turkey: The Politics of Political Clientelism" Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development. S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemerchand (eds.), *Contemporary Political Sociology*, vol. 3, London, 1981.

⁸² *Ibid*, p.252.

CHAPTER THREE

3. AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY THEORIES

3.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to explore the literature on foreign policy analysis which is relevant to an understanding of the evolution of Turkish foreign policy. It thus serves two main functions, providing a critical literature review and generating ideas and questions which will be developed in the succeeding chapters. Chapter two has looked at ideas drawn from political science. The barrier between 'political science' and 'international relations' literatures needs to be broken down if we are able to bring sense of critical awareness of how we can best explain foreign policies once we reject, as this chapter argues we should reject, both realist and determinist ideas of the origins of foreign policy. This chapter will explore ideas drawn from international relations and foreign policy analysis, and in its later stages explains why the material discussed in chapter two should be integrated into the international relations literature if we are to develop a more effective understanding of Turkish foreign policy. To emphasise the importance of linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy, not in itself an original point as Wallace shows¹, the next section begins by analysing democracy and foreign policy. Then a discussion of realist theory and its critics will follow. This thesis next argues that the theory of interdependence can help us to explain the evolution of Turkish foreign policy. Integration theory is also compared

¹ See Wallace, W., *Foreign Policy and Political Process*, Macmillan, London, 1971, chapter two.

briefly to interdependence theory. The chapter ends with a view of how, in a global interdependent world order, Turkey's new role can be understood.

Although it is often assumed that "politics stops at the water's edge," domestic politics and foreign policy are closely interrelated². This thesis will emphasise that *"Foreign policy is a social process. The members of a decision making elite receive their values, assumptions and expectations about the world from a wider society. They also owe some responsibility to that society, whether it is organised on explicitly democratic lines or not, for the way in which they handle power and authority"*³. This remains the case even if the decision making elite is a relatively new group.

In Turkey, the previous chapter observes, domestic political structure was built by a limited number of elites with a limited political competition between them. The Turkish elite had all the responsibility to handle foreign policy issues. It can be argued that Turkish foreign policy was the outcome of the ideology of that homogeneous elite. When a more plural political life started in 1950, competition between the elite has also started, and foreign policy decisions then

² Hagan, Joe D., "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy", *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau, Unwin Hyman Ltd. London, 1987, p.339.

³ Farrands, Christopher, "State, Society, Culture and British Foreign Policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation*, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1988, p.51.

became an outcome of competing ideologies of these elites. In the late 1980s, when liberalisation of the economy started to yield fruit, the elites started to be influenced by different interest groups. Economic interest rather than ideology became the main factor behind the decisions of the elite. Beside the internal changes in the economic structure, the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have also removed tension and have allowed ideology to play a lesser role in foreign policy decisions.

To sum up, the internal improvements in political life and the changes in the external environment have made it rather more difficult to distinguish the process of Turkish domestic politics from Turkish foreign policy. This made the policy makers' job more difficult since it has increased the complexity of foreign policy problems. As in almost all democratic countries in the world, the line between international and domestic politics have become "*a line in water*"⁴. If anything, ethnic and religious issues which cut across frontiers add to this predicament.

As explained in the previous chapter, in the theory of pluralist democracies, foreign policy is said to be an outcome of the majority of the people and of a complex pressure group process. In order to support that idea, this chapter begins analysing the relation between democracy and foreign policy.

⁴ Goldmann, Kjell, "The Line in Water: Internal and Domestic Politics", *Cooperation and Conflict*, December 1989, vol. 24, no. 3-4, pp.103-116.

3.2. Democracy and Foreign Policy

Since the world is allegedly becoming smaller and smaller, the foreign policy of a nation is more dependent on external variables. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War came to an end. The world now arguably has only one superpower. America, together with regional powers, is trying to establish a new world order so that it can keep peace among nations and sustain the interest of the United States. One of the main reason for the establishment of a new world order is that America is also having an economic decline, and as long as relative economic decline is in process, America will not be able to play the role it had fulfilled as a superpower. It is therefore thought that electoral systems should be supported and encouraged throughout the world. Democratic systems are said to be less violent than the authoritarian ones in solving an international problem. As Rudolph Rummel empirically demonstrates, democracies do not generally make war on each other⁵. *"They may go to war but, if they do, there is far less violence than when non-democratic states engage in warfare"*⁶. As Rummel writes, the world *"have not had a real war between democracies in over a century and a half from 1816 to 1980"*⁷. To support Rummel's idea, for instance, if it was not for Saddam Hussein's authoritarian rule in Iraq, the war between Iran and Iraq and the latest Gulf Crisis

⁵ Rummel, Rudolph J. "Libertarianism and International Violence", *The Journal of the Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27, March 1983, pp.27-71.

⁶ Wildawsky, A., "No War Without Dictatorship, No Peace Without Democracy: Foreign Policy as Domestic Politics", *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 1985, vol. 3, no. 1, p.186.

⁷ For more explanation and the diagrammatic data, see Rummel, Op.cit., pp.27-71.

would not have occurred. According to Rummel *"a necessary condition of violence between two states is that at least one of them be partially or completely non-libertarian. Or, to turn this around, violence does not occur between libertarian states. Moreover, whether states are considered individually or dydically, the less free-libertarian- a state, the more violence it engages in...Whether having common borders or not, the less freedom in states, the more violence between them"*⁸. For instance, Turkish intervention in Cyprus was due to the action of the military junta aiming to overthrow the elected President Makarios. Only 20% of population was Turkish on the island and Turkey did not want to intervene as long as Cyprus had an independent electoral system of its own. However, when the military junta intervened, Turkey did not feel secure as the island was only forty miles away from the main land. The military government in Greece did not expect that Turkey would intervene. This was an expensive misperception by the Greek Generals and it cost both sides a great deal. It also destabilised the region. If it was an elected government in power, there would presumably not be a need for intervention by both sides. The 1974 military conflict between Turkey and Greece over the island worsened the situation⁹. The example shows that the absence of an electoral system leaves foreign policy making in the hands of a small elite who might misperceive and misread events. In the absence of a stable electoral system, the elite may not feel any effective pressure from the public due to the lack of democratic channels, although other channels of communication remain.

⁸ Rummel, *Ibid*, pp.27-71.

⁹ See Calvocoressi, Peter, *World Politics Since 1945*, Longman Group U.K. Ltd., Essex, 1989, pp.200-207.

Morse stresses that the modernisation of a nation can alter the character of its foreign policy¹⁰. He explains the general characteristics of 'modernisation' as *"the growth of knowledge about and control over the physical environment; increased political centralisation (but economic decentralisation), accompanied by the growth of specialised bureaucratic organisations and by the politicisation of the masses; the production of economic surpluses and wealth generalised over an entire population; urbanisation; and the psychological adjustment to change and the fleeting, rather than acceptance of the static and the permanent"*¹¹. Looking at the general characteristics of a modernised society, one can say that Turkey has already gone through the process of modernisation at least in this general respects. This aspect of Turkey's changing foreign policy will be discussed further in chapters six and seven. Foreign policy is an outcome of the changes in the domestic political and economic structure as well as of external changes.

Modernisation has been seen to imply a relatively open system of government with a free market economy by liberals such as Morse¹², even though the experience of some countries, such as those of East Asia, puts this generalisation into question. The process of modernisation diminishes, though might not completely eradicate, the barrier between domestic politics and foreign policy. Modernisation, in this view, tends to replace the idea of nationalism with the idea of internationalism. Citizens

¹⁰ Morse, Edward L., "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernisation, Interdependence and Externalization", *World Politics*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1970, pp.371-392. (Parenthesis added)

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.374.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 371-372.

of a modernised country thus are not (in majority) racist or nationalist but more internationalist. In other words, the more civilised and modernised people became the broader their mind will be. Morse states that by modernisation *"First, the ideal and classical distinctions between foreign and domestic affairs have broken down, even though the myths associated with sovereignty and the state have not. Second, the distinction between 'high policies' (those associated with security and the continued existence of the state) and 'low policies' (those pertaining to the wealth and the welfare of the citizens) has become less important as low policies have assumed an increasingly large role in any society. Third, although there have been significant developments in the instrumentalities of political control, the actual ability to control events either internal or external to modernised societies -even those that are Great Powers- has decreased with the growth of interdependence, and is likely to decrease further¹³".* These are general conditions of change in foreign policy. The specific instances of foreign policy will be discussed later.

Wildawski offers two statements to describe the relationship between domestic politics and world order: (1) Without dictatorship there is no war, (2) Without democracy there is no peace¹⁴. Wildawski's statements support the main theme of this study that there is a growing relationship between democracy and foreign policy.

¹³ *Ibid*, p.372.

¹⁴ Wildawski, *Op.cit.*, p.191.

Those who do not believe that democracy is a compatible system in international politics argue that international politics is *sui generis*. Waltz argues that systemic features determine the foreign policy of individual states¹⁵. The incompatibility hypothesis is derived from the assumption that the international relations between nations are mainly based on the dominance of the structure of the system. It is claimed, in this view, that because of these systemic features all nations, whether democratic or not, tend to make foreign policy in a similar way. Foreign policy thus cannot be subject to fully democratic procedures¹⁶. The incompatibility hypothesis is based on the assumption that international affairs take place in an anarchic environment and the power and secrecy are the only determining factors rather than international law and openness¹⁷.

We still, in the present world, have a great number of states where democracy either has not been established or where the degree of democracy is too low. Since the universal norms of an electoral system took centuries to become a system in the domestic life of citizens, it will perhaps take some time to make empirical observations of the compatibility of democratic systems to international politics. The

¹⁵ See Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw Hill Inc., London, 1979, pp.38-59.

¹⁶ Goldmann, Kjell, "Democracy is Incompatible with International Politics: Reconsideration of a Hypothesis", Kjell Goldmann, Sten Berglund and Gunnar Sjostedt (eds.), in *Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of Sweden*, Gower publishing co. 1986, p.11.

¹⁷ See Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981., and Bull, H., "War and International Order", in A. James (ed), *The Bases of International Order*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1974.

incompatibility hypothesis perhaps demonstrates a lack of confidence in the long term prospects of democracy which, one may at least hope, is unjustified.

Another criticism which can be brought to bear against the incompatibility hypothesis is that the economy, particularly the international economy, has been disregarded¹⁸. Military confrontations may now be less likely amongst developed states. Instead, economic competition, which will arguably create prosperity rather than creating poverty, might replace military confrontation. One point should be underlined is that democratic states are based on nationalist structure. We should thus not mix democracy and nationalism with each other. It is really the nationalistic structure of states that makes compatibility difficult, not democracy itself. Nationalism has the power to maintain the domestic unity of a country, but, at the same time, nationalism has the power to stop rational thinking and assessment of social and political affairs. It is generally felt that the main underlying cause of the two world wars was nationalistic feelings amongst people. To secure the compatibility of democracy, citizens view should be broadened through a comprehensive education, and that an international feeling should also be given.

Turkey's situation is quite different from the established nation-states. For Turkey is more of a state-nation rather than a nation-state¹⁹. As Enloe and Rejai

¹⁸ Note: For more explanation on the incompatibility hypothesis, see Goldmann, *Op.cit.*, pp.1-43.

¹⁹ Enloe, Cynthia H. and Rejai Mostafa, "Nation-States and State-Nations", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp.140-158.

noted "*Europe produced nation-states, whereas Asia and Africa have produced state-nations*"²⁰. Although, Turkey is not built as a typical state-nation of Asia or Africa, it was equally not a typical nation-state of Europe as well. This is because the Turkish Republic was built on the remnants of an Empire where a mosaic of nations used to live. After the establishment of the Republic, a unique Turkish nationhood was imposed by Atatürk and his coterie (the Turkish elite). Therefore, any citizen living inside the Republic's border was supposed to feel himself as Turk, whereas Turks who remained outside the border of the Republic were not accounted as Turks. According to this supposition, Kurds living in the southern part of Turkey were accepted as mountainous Turks. That kind of imposition of nationhood to the citizens of the Republic did not create a unique nation. It rather suppressed the other nationalities. After the improvement of democracy and of more human rights, different nationalities (such as Kurds) raised their voice asking for the regime to abandon its attribution of Turkish nationhood and to accept the multi-nationality of the society. The imposed nationhood did not therefore create a unity among the citizens as the Turkish elite at the beginning wished for. Turkish nationalist structures were thus neither compatible with the international community nor created a stable domestic political and economic structure. This is because there was no national unity on certain political and economic matters and the regime was not willing to accept the mosaic of nations and act accordingly. This is perhaps one further reason why Turkey evolved a passive foreign policy.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p.140.

To sum up the argument, it can be said that democratic structures are positively compatible with a liberal international politics. The degree of quality of the electoral system will determine the success of the compatibility. As a matter of fact, the European Community countries have so far been increasingly successful in taking joint decisions on economic, social and political affairs. Those who criticise the argument that democracy is compatible with foreign policy also say that foreign policy needs expert diplomacy. This has been their view since Woodrow articulated his 'Fourteen Points'²¹. The answer to them would be that even in the internal affairs of a country, some political matters need specialised expertise. This is why politicians do not deal with bureaucratic routine but they do observe the implementation of their policies. The speciality of diplomacy does not necessarily mean that even in democratic countries foreign policy decisions are taken in the same way as in non-democratic countries.

3.3. Realism and its Critics

This section outlines a realist view of foreign policy which this thesis argues is inadequate and insufficient to give an account of Turkish foreign policy since the 1970s. Realists believe that international politics take place in an anarchic environment²². This is because each state selects its own means to overcome any

²¹ Duroselle, J. B., "Changes in Diplomacy since Versailles", in B. Porter (ed.), *International Politics 1919-69*, The Aberystwyth Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972, pp.105-128.

²² Gilpin, *Op.cit.*, p.7. And also see Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society*, Macmillan, London, 1977.

problem which arises in an international environment, because legitimacy, violence and authority are decentralised, because there is no world government, and above all because of the predominance of the principle of sovereignty. As previously explained, realists are therefore convinced that the type of regime (democratic or non-democratic) is not of importance in international relations. Each state generate its own means and its own arrangement which might not necessarily be compatible with those of the other states²³. That incompatibility may cause conflict and war²⁴.

The realist idea is based on four main assumptions. These assumptions constitute realist behaviour in international relations. First, realists are convinced that nation states are the sovereign and independent actors. Nation states are the dominant actors of the international community. The second assumption is that nation states act or react in terms of their power and their definition of national interest. A nation state is thus aware of and aims to realise her power. If it is not aware of power and makes wrong calculations then conflict and possible failure arise. This is a political norm for realists. Realists might have neglected the complexity of relations between the nations and in explaining the motives of nations. The third assumption is that force is a major means of influence for the maintenance of state interest. As explained later in this chapter, in the short term and in a crisis situation the use of force could be the only way to preserve interests. However, long term objectives cannot be based on the use of force as the world is becoming more complex and more

²³ Waltz, 1979, *Op.cit.*, pp.11-112.

²⁴ Waltz, Kenneth, *Man, the State and War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, pp.159-186.

interdependent. The fourth assumption of realism is that states interact around the issues of power, peace and security, and that international politics are fundamentally an unchanging game of conflict and interaction²⁵.

The central argument of realist thinking is that the nation state is the main actor in the system²⁶. Realists attach great importance to power, including military power, as a means of preserving national interests, and above all national security. Military power is essential to protect the national interest²⁷. Any attempt to establish an international organisation should thus take nation-states' attitudes into account. Analysing the nation-state, Stoessinger identified a set of elements which are created the nation-state. To him, sovereignty, nationalism, language, culture and religion are important in the creation of a nation-state. Beside that national character, morale, ideology and leadership are also elements of a nation state²⁸. Perhaps one of the main deficiencies of realist theory is that it does not take into account the influence of the changing environment on the nation-state, and that the international environment is

²⁵ Bercovitch, Jacob, "Super Powers and Client States: Analysing Relations and Patterns of Influence", in *Superpowers and Client State in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence*, Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch (eds.), Routledge, New York and London, 1991, p.10.

²⁶ See Stoessinger, John, *The Might of Nations*, Fourth Edition, Random House, New York, 1973, pp.7-27. and also see Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, second edition, 1954, pp.28-29; Booth, Ken, "War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace", in *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, Ken Booth (ed.), Harper Collins Academic, London, 1991, p.337.

²⁷ See Garnett, John, "The Role of Military Power", in *Perspectives on World Politics*, Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (eds.), Open University Press, Routledge, New York, 1981, pp.63-75.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p.7-27.

becoming more complex than ever with a tremendous influence directed on the internal structure and policy of a state.

Krasner and Waltz explains that the freedom of states in the international arena is absolute and it can only be limited by its international environment. The power of states determine the character of the international system, but the working of the system determines the policy and position of states²⁹. This argument calls into question the role of organisation. Here, one might make a distinction between world wide political organisations (such as the United Nations) and regional economic organisations (such as the European Community). In the former, the power of the member states usually prevails over international law. And the international organisation is seen as a chessboard whereon the member countries exercise their power³⁰. In the latter, because of the interrelated economic relations, the power of the regional economic organisation such as the European Community might overshadow the power of its members which might help the creation of more interdependent relations between them. Pentland argued that international organisations can be used by the nation-states as an instrument of foreign policy. International organisations can also modify the foreign policy of member states. Finally, an international organisation can become a self-styled policy actor and can dominate over its members

²⁹ Krasner, Stephen D., "State Power and the Structure of International Trade", *World Politics*, vol. 28, no.3, April 1976, pp.317-343, and Waltz, Kenneth (1979), *Op.cit.*, pp.38-59.

³⁰ For the insignificance of the international organisations, see Huntington, Samuel P., "Transnational Organisations in World Politics", *World Politics*, vol. 25, no. 2, April 1973, pp.333-368.

which are in fact created it³¹. In other words, the structure of an international organisation is an important and potentially independent factor in explaining the creation of an interdependent world.

The developed Western countries have realised that the idea of the nation state is not potentially helpful in the global age. One of the main causes of the two world wars was the state system of the Europe which was based on the national principle and on the conventional terms of realist ideas such as sovereignty, power and the use of force. The West thus went "beyond the nation state"³² by establishing international political and economic cooperations. The creation of a new world order would then become easier. Regional economic organisations such as the European Community (EC)³³, the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO)³⁴ and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR)³⁵ might help the creation of a new political and economic world order. Then such organisations might throw off the 'nations' pact but they will continue to act as states. These organisations may also reduce the danger of nationalism, at least in a liberal view. Regional cooperations will also make

³¹ See Pentland, Charles, "International Organisations and Their Roles", in *Perspectives on World Politics*, Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), Routledge, London, 1991, 242-249.

³² See Haas, Ernest, *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisation*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964., and Cox, Robert W., "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Journal of International Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1981, pp.126-155.

³³ See *Chapter Six*.

³⁴ See *Chapter Seven*.

³⁵ See *Chapter Seven*.

people aware that they are indeed citizens of a broader society. In other words, regional cooperation might, to a certain extent, weaken the dangerous side of nationalism by promoting the idea of internationalism.

Having realised that realist theory failed to account for complex reality of international relations, neorealists, still paying central attention to power and other conventional realist terms, accepted that the nation-states's power could be limited and balanced by 'influence'³⁶. A neorealist approach does not directly challenge the realist view of the state, but instead seeks to dilute its importance by taking into economic considerations and institutional changes that reflect the reality of international relations in the 1970s and the 1980s³⁷. Neorealist theory characterised by the detente between East and the West and also by the expansion of the world trade³⁸. Neorealist theory, however, fails to explain and find a solution to the economic North-South division. Neorealism, being a revision of realism, uses the same terminology to analyse the international politics. The changing shape of the international economic structure cannot be analysed by neorealist concepts³⁹.

³⁶ Kousoulas, D. G., *Power and Influence: An Introduction to International Relations*, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, California, 1985, pp.12-14.

³⁷ Gilpin, Robert G., "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, pp.301-321.

³⁸ Kousoulas, *Op.cit.*, p.11.

³⁹ See Ashley, Richard K., "The Poverty of Neorealism", in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, pp.255-300; Halliday, Fred, *Rethinking International Relations*, Macmillan, London, 1994, pp.31-37; and Booth, K., and Smith, S. (eds.), *International Theory Today*, Polity, Cambridge, 1994.

3.4. Interdependence

Having described the inadequacy of realist and neorealist theories in explaining the international relations. One turns next to describe the theory of interdependence, which, it will be argued, is more relevant in explaining the international area. Improvements in information technology and in some other areas have created a more complex international relations. The purpose of this section is to explain the theory of interdependence and to start to consider if it is useful to explain Turkish foreign policy.

The fundamental base of the idea of interdependence is that as the world is becoming smaller due to the development in telecommunication and transportation, nation states lose their independence. They are not purely dependent to the others in classical terms. As Keohane explains, countries *"may be interested in the welfare of others not only for instrumental reasons, but because improvements in others' welfare improve their own, and vice versa, whatever the other actor does. As the world economy has become more tightly knit together since the end of World War II, situational interdependence has increased. It is bad for the United States economy for Europe or Japan to undergo a severe recession, reducing demand for American goods. Brazil's prosperity is important to the United States, even apart from what might happen politically as a result of economic collapse, because a bankrupt Brazil could not pay its debt to American banks"*⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ Keohane, Robert O., *After Hegemony*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984. p.123.

Interdependence theory challenges the assumptions of political realism that nation-states are the only important actors in world politics⁴¹. Multi-national corporations and transnational banks are examples of other actors that "*are important not only because of their activities in pursuit of their own interests, but also because they act as transmission belts, making government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another*"⁴². Foreign policy issues in an interdependent world will thus become larger and more complex. Government policies because will become more ranged and the scope of the government will be larger. Even those policies which are considered to be domestic will impinge on one another⁴³.

Interdependence theory focuses on three arguments⁴⁴. First of all, the world is becoming militarily more and more interdependent, as the strategic nuclear weapons can cause mass destruction and indeed those weapons are not any more usable in an international conflict. This is because neither side will get benefit in the use of mass destructive weapons. Also in conventional weapons there is a growth of security interdependence. Secondly, the world is becoming more economically interdependent. Economic decisions taken anywhere in the world can effect anybody

⁴¹ Kroll, John A., "The Complexity of Interdependence", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 3 September 1993, pp.321-348.

⁴² Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. "Complex Interdependence, Transnational Relations, and Realism: Alternative Perspectives on World Politics", in Charles, W. Kegley, Jr and Eugene, R. Wittkopf (eds.) *The Global Agenda*, Random House, New York, 1984, p.245.

⁴³ See *Ibid*, pp.245-260.

⁴⁴ See for instance, Allot, Philip, *Eunomia*, Oxford University Press, London, 1990, p.xxiii.

anywhere else. Thirdly, since the world became smaller after the advance innovations in communication and transportation technology, the world has become a common environment for all citizens of all states⁴⁵. The creation of an interdependent world is not going to be easy and painless. Interdependence faced a challenge from nation states. Some economically and politically strong nation states believed that the growing interdependence will endanger their sovereignty and autonomy. They hence reacted by erecting barriers to limit international economic interaction and, with it, interdependence⁴⁶.

Waltz, criticising interdependence theory, defines interdependence in economic and political terms⁴⁷. Strange, for example, argued that in market terms interdependence increases sensitivity⁴⁸. But Waltz's anxiety is that as advanced economic relations increase economic sensitivity, states politically become more vulnerable and dependent on each other. He uses the expression 'Interdependence as mutual vulnerability' to define interdependence⁴⁹. He says "*Interdependence tends to decrease as the number of great powers diminishes; and two is the lowest possible*

⁴⁵ See The Brand Report, International Commission on Development and Interdependence, *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, Fontana, London, 1980.

⁴⁶ See Spero, Joan Edelman, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, fourth edition, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1990, pp.25-26.

⁴⁷ Waltz, *Op.cit.*, 1979, pp.139-146.

⁴⁸ See Strange, Susan, "The Politics of International Currencies", *World Politics*, vol. 22, no. 1, January 1971, p.223.

⁴⁹ Waltz, 1979, *Op.cit.*, p.143.

*number*⁵⁰". What makes Waltz and other realists pessimistic about an interdependent world is that they use their own conventional terminology of high politics to analyse the existence or necessity of interdependence. Interdependence between the developed states but dependence between developed and less developed. As long as realists disregard the importance of the economy in their assessment of the international politics, they will each time draw a different conclusion about the theory of interdependence.

The world is becoming so compressed and interdependent that war between nations in classic terms is not generally seen any more as a way of solving problems. Even the most powerful states are now refraining from using force. For instance, though permitted by the United Nations, the latest (1993) United States attack on Iraq has been subject to a world wide criticism and reaction. France, a coalition partner, criticised the United States for being too tough and exceeding the United Nations' mandate⁵¹. The use of force also in turn damages the economic stability of the countries involved in warfare. For instance, United States involvement in the Gulf Crisis caused a sharp decline in share prices and interest rates increased.

As Spero shows, after the 1960s the world was based economically on three main systems: first, the Western system of interdependence; second, the North-South system of dependence; and third, the East-West system of independence⁵². As

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.145.

⁵¹ *Financial Times*, 21 January 1993.

⁵² Spero, *Op.cit.*, pp. 11-12.

the East-West confrontation came to an end the system of independence, in Cold War terms, has been essentially damaged though it has not completely vanished. The western system of interdependence has created limited development due to the fact that it was not a global interdependence. The western countries have implemented some kind of protectionist policies. These policies have created an economic division with political implications for relations between the North and the South. The eradication of the South-North system of dependence might create new opportunities for both side and it might as well help the creation of a global interdependence. Although, the North had the capacity to produce, there was no customer in the South with a high purchasing power to sell to. For example in transport systems, on the one hand, poor countries of the South are struggling to improve by having more rolling stock and vehicles; on the other hand, the rich countries of the North are struggling to sustain (let alone increasing it) their production capacity in order to keep their economy going and tackle the problem of unemployment. The two are closely interdependent in such a way that the prosperity of each depends on growth and prosperity in the other.

Western European states have realised that putting economic barriers at their borders will, in the end, limit their own economic development and cause a painful economic recession in their economy. The ongoing world wide recession is perhaps partly the result of the protective policies of the Group of Seven. If one looks at economic growth, one realises that while the Group of Seven are undergoing a severe recession, some of the developing countries (countries in the Far East and Turkey) are in the process of economic development. For instance, development rate in 1993 will

be in Turkey 4.9%, in Singapore 11.6%, in Thailand 11.5%, in HongKong 10.2%, in Malaysia 9.9%, in China 8.3%, in South Korea 7.7% and in Taiwan 6.8%. Whereas, in Japan 3.4%, in Germany 2.8%, in France 2.0%, in Italy 2.3%, in Great Britain 1.5%, in the United States and Canada 2.1%⁵³. This shows us that the developing countries in general are in progress, but that they have not been able to use their economic potential to escape from their situation of structural dependence; they are still turning around in their existing economic circle. The only way to get the developed countries' economy going is to widen the circle. This is only possible by creating economic cooperation between developed and developing states⁵⁴.

Fred Halliday also believes that a world wide cooperation system is necessary to keep the world in peace and prosperity. He uses the term internationalism. Internationalism according to Halliday is the idea that " *we both are and should be part of a broader community than that of the nation or the state*⁵⁵." Internationalisation of citizenship and the state are necessary for the evolution of interdependent relations of states with each other. Internationalization creates an atmosphere of understanding others, widening new horizons for people and states.

⁵³ Predictions made by Turkish Young Employers Society, ((TÜSIAD) (Türkiye Genç İşadamları Derneği) on the OECD report and published in *Zaman*, Wednesday, 6 January 1993, p.4.

⁵⁴ The Brand Report, *Op.cit.*

⁵⁵ Halliday, Fred, "Three Concepts of Internationalism", *International Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 2, Spring 1988, p.187.

In the creation of an interdependent world, economics plays an important role. The term 'interdependence' cannot be separated as economic and political interdependence. The main ingredient of interdependence is the economy. It is the economic relations of the countries that make them interdependent with each other. It is not that pure political friendship or non-interference agreements make the countries interdependent to each other. Economics has become closely relevant to foreign policy issues. *"The increasing relevance of economics to the conduct of foreign policy with the advent of nuclear state and the emergence of third world demands for a greater share of the world's wealth, issues of economic productivity and distribution have been elevated from low on the global agenda to the realm of high politics, and this shift has required a corresponding expansion of the skills and concerns of foreign policy analysts"*⁵⁶. Political economy nowadays has a special place on the global agenda. The role of a nation state is on the process of change. *"The role of the state, its limits, scope, and autonomy has emerged as a prime consideration in the conduct of foreign affairs"*⁵⁷. The growing interdependence has continuously eroded the distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy. *"It is not clear, as Rosenau puts it, that this distinction could ever be drawn with much clarity (though many study in the past purported to do so) but surely the line dividing*

⁵⁶ Rosenau, James N., "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Unwin Hyman Ltd. London, 1987, p.3-4. and see also Rosenau, James N., *The Study of Global Interdependence*, Pinter, London, 1980.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.4.

*internal from external phenomena has been greatly obfuscated, possibly even eroded in some respects,.. by the invent of issues and dynamics that are global in scope*⁵⁸."

The internal structures of countries play a fundamental role in the creation of a global world. There is even a close relation between the standard electrical appliances and foreign policy: standardisation of products will help trade and so ease economic relations among countries. This will certainly help globalisation. For the same reason, democratisation process all over the world should be encouraged and supported. Democratic processes will help to create a stable political structure at the global as well as national level. To develop the process of interdependence, citizens in democratic countries should be made aware that they are a part of an international society. Once internationalist ideas prevail in a society, then a wise citizen would expect his government to follow the policy of cooperation and obey international rules as he does for his government⁵⁹.

As mentioned above, the political system of a country essentially affects its relations with other countries. *"Open political systems, for instance, are less able than others to cut themselves off from external influences, the potential exists for domestic groups to respond differently to external stimuli which may lead them to adopt and promote divergent policy prescriptions*⁶⁰". As Turkey is becoming a more

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p.4.

⁵⁹ Bull, H., "Society and Anarchy in International relations", in H. Butterfields and M. Wight (eds.) *Diplomatic Investigations*, Allen & Unwin, 1966, p.35.

⁶⁰ Papadakis, Maria and Starr, Harvey, "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: the Relationship between Environment and Foreign Policy", in *New Direction in the*

open society, one can clearly see that Turkish foreign policy has become more complex. Turkish foreign policy has gradually become multi-faceted and multi-dimensional⁶¹. Turkey, at the moment, is struggling to become a full member of the European Community. On the other hand, she has special foreign policy relations with her islamic neighbours and more importantly with the Central Asian States. Turkey's involvement in reviving the ECO and the BSECR⁶² might support the idea that the world is going towards the growing interdependence through regional cooperations. African states and Far Eastern states are also increasingly involving in the creation of regional organisations.

Turkey's involvement in regional cooperation is the result of the latest upheaval in the international order. Keohane emphasises that the latest upheaval in the international order has increased "demand for international regimes" based on mutual economic relations⁶³. He also argued in his book "After Hegemony"⁶⁴ that it is difficult to imagine the creation of a justified international system without justified international institutions and mutual economic interest between states. He criticises

Study of Foreign Policy, Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1987, p.436.

⁶¹ See Smith, Michael, "Beyond the stable state? Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe", in S. Smith and W. Carlsnaes (eds.), *European Foreign Policy*, Sage, London, 1994.

⁶² For both organisations, see *Chapter Eight*.

⁶³ See Keohane, Robert O., *International Institutions and State Power*, Westview Press, London, 1989, pp.101-131.

⁶⁴ See Keohane, Robert O., *After Hegemony*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984.

the classic realist view about the role of power and the effects of hegemony. His main argument relies on the institutionalist tradition. He argues that "*a deterministic version of hegemonic stability, relying only on the realist concepts of interest and power, is indeed incorrect*⁶⁵". His central arguments draw that "*cooperation can under some conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that institutions,...affect the pattern of cooperation that emerge*⁶⁶". Keohane concludes that world politics can no longer be sustained by hegemonic powers. Non-hegemonic cooperation, however, is possible but difficult. Although, world politics is not a continuing state of war as realists argue, a non hegemonic world politics cannot be easy since it takes place among independent states that "*are motivated more by their own conceptions of self-interest than by a devotion to the common good*⁶⁷". To erode selfishness of the states and to help the emergence of devotion for the common good, regional economic cooperations are indeed the necessary steps towards an interdependent global world. A functioning global interdependence might perhaps only be possible through regional economic organisations. Keohane's work in *After Hegemony* stands at an intersection between realism and liberal theory. Indeed it is theoretically painfully self-contradictory. But it also captures a practical ambiguity that many policy makers would recognise.

In this study, regional integration theory will be seen as an adjunct of liberal interdependence ideas. It shares key assumptions with that theory, including a belief

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*; also see Kroll, *Op.cit.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

in institutions, in orderly cooperation, in the importance of common, often economic interests and in a pluralism which does not emphasise the centrality of the state to the exclusion of people and society. Dinan has stressed the interaction of the processes of interdependence and integration in his study of recent development of the EC⁶⁸. Similarly, Helen Wallace's collection of analyses of EC-EFTA relations takes as a working assumption the parallel development of interdependence and integration processes, suggesting that this is not simply a general process: specific patterns of interdependence and particular forms of integration overlap and affect each other even though they do not strictly speaking 'cause' each other⁶⁹. What the contributions to her book demonstrate of the EFTA countries evolving relations with the EC is also the case with Turkey, as chapter six explores. Allen and Smith point to the growing interdependence of the context of policy⁷⁰. But their study also shows that a growing interdependence of context, while it tends towards producing growing interdependence of policy structures and processes is not necessarily going to have that effect.

⁶⁸ Dinan, D., *Ever Closer Union?*, Macmillan, London, 1994.

⁶⁹ Wallace, H. (ed.), *The Wider Western Europe: Reshaping the EC-EFTA Relationship*, Pinter for the RIIA, London, 1991.

⁷⁰ Allen, D. and Smith, M., "The European Community in the new Europe: Bearing the Burden of Change", *International Journal*, vol. 47, Winter 1991-92, pp.1-28.

Taylor explains the functionalist idea as a sort of economic determinism⁷¹. Political integration in regional cooperations will come through "*by tying economics to the process of integration in such a way that political integration was an automatic result of economic integration*"⁷². The neo-functionalists⁷³ agree that the process of political integration results from economic integration (or its functional equivalent) but they do not see the process as automatic⁷⁴. Political variables cannot completely be neglected as political actors (technocrats and bureaucrats) often manipulate the process and give it a political push⁷⁵. "*The neo-functionalists view European integration as an ad hoc step by step process characterised by gradual, continuous movement toward regional integration*"⁷⁶. Federalists, however, are more interested in the measurable objectives of a cooperation. They focus on the end product orientation of the process. Federalists "*generally stress political solutions, political institutions, and an acceptance of the nation-state as political given that*

⁷¹ Taylor, Philippe Arthur, *The External Relations of the European Community: Toward a Common Foreign Policy, A Common Development Policy and Economic Union*, Produced from microfilm-xerography in 1979 by University Microfilms International, London, 1979, p.44.

⁷² *Ibid*, p.44.

⁷³ For more about neo-functionalist theory, see Ernest, Haas, Op.cit. 1958., Schmitter, P.C., "Economics and Differential Patterns of political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America", in *International Political Communities: An Anthology*, Gordon City, Doubledg, 1966, pp.259-300; Nye, J.S, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation*, Little, Brown Co., Boston, 1971; and George, S., *Politics and Policy in the European Community*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, chapter 2.

⁷⁴ Taylor, Philippe Arthur, *Op.cit.*, p.44.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p.45.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*. p.46.

*needs to be accommodated rather than abolished or circumvented in any scheme to reorganise world politics*⁷⁷".

Integration theory is not a theory of foreign policy. Or, at least, it was not intended as one. But it does have implication for our understanding of foreign policy. It reinforces and runs parallel to interdependence theory. It not only explains the changing context of foreign policy among EC members, but it also suggests something about the context of global relations even though it would be tendentious to argue that integration is a global reality. But relations between the EC and its neighbours, including Turkey, have some of the pre-conditions of integration, especially in economic, inter-elite and institutional relations⁷⁸. Integration theories aims to understand the emergence and functioning of regional economic organisations. By doing that these theories develop thinking about international politics a major step forward towards the idea of interdependence⁷⁹.

⁷⁷ Elazar, D.J., "Federalism", *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, edited by D.Shils, London, 1972. See also Pentland, Charles, *International Theory and Economic Integration*, The Free Press, New York, 1973, pp.149-150., Friedrich, J.C.; *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1968; Riker, W.H., *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*, Little & Brown Co., Boston, 1964; Hay, Peter, *Federalism and Supranational Organisations: Patterns for New Legal Structures*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1966; Diebold, W., *The Schuman Plan*, For the Council on Foreign Relations, Praeger, New York, 1959, pp.12-16 and part 4.; Taylor, P., *The Limits of European Integration*, Croom Helm, Kent, 1983.

⁷⁸ Huelshoff, M.G., "Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 2, June 1994, pp.255-279; Kroll, *Op.cit.*

⁷⁹ For a critical comparative study of interdependence or integration, see Milward Alan S. and Sorensen Vibeke, "Interdependence or Integration? A National Choice", in *The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992*, Alan S. Milward (ed.), Routledge, London, 1993, pp.1-32.

While Milward and Sorensen argue that European integration theories are of diminished relevance after the Cold War⁸⁰, it can be forcefully argued that while on the one hand European experience did not even follow these theories as if they were maps, but generated them as a form of explanation, on the other hand, they can be understood not only as a reaction to the Cold War but as a reaction to the growth of regional interdependence. This interdependence may be at security and cultural levels as well as in economic, technological and financial terms. If integration theory is understood as an adjunct of interdependence theory, it remains relevant as economic and other forms of interdependence evolve. Milward and Sorensen, anti-Maastricht historians who want to reverse the tide of European integration, are mistaken both in their definition of policy choices and their view that interdependence and integration are exclusive and not complementary ideas⁸¹.

3.5. Globalisation and the New World Order

The main aim of the idea of interdependence is to explain and argue that complex mutual relations of nations might create an interdependent globe. The purpose of this section is to emphasise the globalisation of foreign policies and the necessity of a new world order. Theoretical explanations of globalisation might provide us with the necessary theoretical background to understand the importance of interdependence theories and also explain the evolution of Turkish foreign policy.

⁸⁰ See *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

'Globalisation' as an idea is an extension of interdependence or, perhaps, a reworking of the idea in the 1990s. It does, however, put a greater emphasise on cultural as well as economic interdependence⁸². Tomlison argues that economic cultural and technological processes of globalisation overlap, but that they are not the same, and tensions between them produce conflict within structures of interdependence⁸³. This idea is useful in talking about EC-Turkish relations (see chapter six) and Turkey's increasingly complex relations with her neighbours to the East (see chapter seven). Cox has suggested that the total context of global relations needs to be understood to understand the changing nature of interdependence, and thus the growth of a multilateral world system, in which a single country or a single conflict no longer determine international relations, shape a new possibility of interdependence, although cox himself does not map out what that might be⁸⁴. Dicken has shown the scope and intensity of global processes in a study which underlines the importance of interdependence as both structure and process in international relations⁸⁵. Smith maps out the implications of this for foreign policy in a study which influences the work done in the last three chapters of this thesis⁸⁶.

⁸² Tomlison provides a broad survey of the growth of the use of the term in sociology and cultural studies: Tomlison, J., *Cultural Globalisation and Cultural Imperialism*, unpublished conference paper, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 6 March 1995, presented to the "Cultural Imperialism or Global Modernisation" Conference.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp.3-5.

⁸⁴ Cox, R. W., "Multilateralism and World Order", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2, 1992, pp.161-180.

⁸⁵ Dicken, P., *Global Shift: the Internationalisation of Economic Activity*, Chapman, second edition, London, 1992.

⁸⁶ See Smith, M., "Modernisation, Globalisation and the Nation State", in McGrew, A and Lewis, P (eds.), *Global Politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.

The extraordinary development in communication together with the spread of democracy have helped the globalisation of the world. As Fukuyama points out *"the transformation that occurred in Southern Europe in less than a decade was remarkable. These countries had earlier been seen as the black sheep of Europe, condemned by their religious and authoritarian tradition to reside outside the mainstream of democratic Western European development. And yet by the 1980s each country had made a successful transition to functioning and stable democracy, so stable in fact that (with the possible exception of Turkey) the people living in them could hardly imagine the situation being otherwise. Similar democratic development took place in Latin America⁸⁷".* Although Fukuyama is sceptical about the democratic process and stability in Turkey, that country, though not perfect, has made an astonishing progress in the establishment of a stable electoral system. The foreign policy implications of stable and more democratic domestic politics have already been discussed⁸⁸.

A new international economic world order will be created, as already suggested, by the growing economic relations of the nations. The new world order therefore is a new international economic world order⁸⁹. As one can easily observe, in this century, the world witnessed a large number of organisations and agreements between the nations. Most of them failed due to the lack of economic cooperation.

⁸⁷ Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992, p.20.

⁸⁸ See *Chapter Four*.

⁸⁹ See Walters, Robert S. and Blake, David H., *The Politics of Global Economic Relations*, fourth edition, Prentice Hall inc., London, 1992, pp.1-12.

Any friendship agreement might become void unless it is backed by the power of the economy. Before the start of the Second World War, there had been friendship agreements between the nation states. All these agreements were null and void as soon as one party did not obey it, and economic nationalism undermined whatever apparent will to cooperate existed. Economic organisations can be initiated by diplomatic moves but the course of events will control and determine their future.

To Agnew, the new world order is an order which is being created by the hegemony of the United States⁹⁰. He however accepts that the United States is in an impasse on the creation of the new world order⁹¹. He says "*the United States is itself caught between the(se) two process of globalisation and fragmentation. The policy levers available in the past, such as military spending and national macro-economic and tariff measures, are no longer appropriate to the problems at hand. Military spending, for example, can help some local economies, but it penalizes the competitiveness of the national economy. A world largely made by american design can no longer be relied on to deliver growth to America as a whole. America is becoming just another country*"⁹². Ravenal also argued that "*the age of superpower is passing, and the shape of the entire system is moving beyond the determinative*

⁹⁰ Agnew, John, "The United States and American Hegemony", in *Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: a Global Analysis*, Peter J. Taylor (ed.), Belhaven Press, London, 1993, pp.228-233.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 233-235.

⁹² *Ibid*, p.233.

*reach of either the United States or the Soviet Union*⁹³". Paul Kennedy also argued that (in fact predicted) the Soviet Union will collapse because of high military spending. He suggests that United States will also face the same result because of high military spending and aid⁹⁴. A new world order led by the United States is therefore not secure and stable. One way of securing a stable new world order is to put an adequate emphasise on the importance of regional and international economic organisations. The establishment of the regional economic organisation (North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico supports the idea. The United States realised that she alone can no longer economically challenge and lead the world. Turkey's response to the establishment of NAFTA was positive and supportive. Turkish President Süleyman Demirel stated that the establishment of NAFTA was a good step towards a closer and global world and that Turkey would always support such initiatives⁹⁵.

The idea of a global international order might be criticised as being imaginary. The supporters of complex interdependence are correct in their claim that *"the international polity may become the focal point of governments, primarily but not exclusively in economic terms"*⁹⁶. It has *"more consciously directed attention to the*

⁹³ Ravenal, Earl C., "The Case for Adjustment", *Foreign Policy*, no. 81, Winter, 1990/91, p.4.

⁹⁴ See Kennedy, Paul, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988.

⁹⁵ *The Voice of Turkey*, 26 November 1993, 3pm, gmt.

⁹⁶ Clark, Ian, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.211.

*nature of international order and seek satisfaction in that quarter. The appeals for a new international economic order may illustrate this trend to the extent that they are based on a recognition of the fact that individual third world governments cannot deliver (economic) development without some adjustments of the world's economic system*⁹⁷. " In order to deliver world wide economic development, it is necessary "to adjust the international financial and trading regimes in such a way that the less developed states would be less disadvantaged and sought to do so by such devices as adjusting the terms of trade, stabilising commodity prices, regulating the behaviour of multinational corporations and by improving poor country access both to technology and to international financial markets"⁹⁸. Although less developed countries tend to trade overwhelmingly with developed states, the economic relationship between the two is unequal⁹⁹. Despite the unequal economic relations between developing and developed states, there is a growing interdependence between the two. One way of further improving the degree of interdependence is the existence of regional economic organisations covering all parts of the world. Regional economic organisations can improve a world wide interdependence on one precondition that they should be compatible to each other. In other words, there

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p.211.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, pp.38-39. On financial globalisation see also Cerny, P.G. (ed.), *Finance and World Politics*, Edward and Elgar, Aldershot, 1993.

⁹⁹ Barke, Michael, and O'Hare, Greg, *The Third World*, Longman House, Essex, 1991, p.302.

should not be inward looking protectionist integration inside the organisation. Instead, an outward looking policy of interdependence should be pursued¹⁰⁰.

One obstacle to the creation of a global international order is perhaps the behaviour of economically centralised nation states. Turkey's centralised economic system before the 1980s might fall into this category and also the centralised systems of the Eastern European states most of which are in process of change. As usually small amount of elite keeps the power, the centralised nation states usually tend to close themselves to the public and the outside world. The elite in those countries take decisions usually according to their ideals. The objectivity and the pragmatism are not taken into account. When foreign policy issues opened to the influence of public opinion, then the increased democratisation of domestic politics produces pragmatic foreign policies and important internal economic and social reforms¹⁰¹.

Turkish foreign policy, until the late 1980s, for instance, was an outcome of elite processes and it was not generally compatible with the creation of global world. There was no long run foreign policy strategy due to the existence of a non-competitive elite and a strong centralised system. After the late 1980s, as decentralisation in the economy and democratisation process began, Turkish foreign policy began to be more varied and multi-dimensional¹⁰². Turkish foreign policy

¹⁰⁰ Van Ham, P., "The European Community after Hegemony: the Future of European Integration in a Multipolar World", *International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 5, August 1993, pp.451-467.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, pp.147-148.

¹⁰² See *Chapter Five*.

towards the West and particularly the European Community remained unchanged¹⁰³. As explained in detail in chapter six, the unchanged foreign policy towards the West was not a well planned long run policy. Before the late 1980s, effected by the external environment, Turkey for security reasons became an ally of the West against the Soviet Union. The Soviet factor was one of the major influential external factor of Turkish foreign policy¹⁰⁴.

Regional organisations will play the major role in the establishment and maintenance of the new global world order. The European Community is perhaps the most remarkable international organisation among others. Although it has been established between the nation states which were hostile to each other, it made remarkable progress in forty years. The European Community's move towards an ever closer Europe and United Nations' involvement in the protection of world peace shows us that the world is becoming increasingly inter-linked. The European Community has launched the Single European Act to further dismantle commercial barriers between the member states. The Single European Act was an important step for furthering the interdependence in Europe¹⁰⁵. The European Community is proceeding a global challenge by, at least, opening another gate towards interdependence by the introduction of the Single European Act¹⁰⁶.

¹⁰³ See *Chapter Six*.

¹⁰⁴ See *Chapter Five*.

¹⁰⁵ For more see *Chapter Seven*.

¹⁰⁶ See Bressand, Albert, "Beyond Interdependence: 1992 as a Global Challenge", *International Affairs*, vol. 66, no. 1, 1990, pp.47-65; Van Ham, *Op.cit.* And for the brief information about Maastricht Treaty and its likely effect on the future shape of

3.6. Conclusion

It is argued in this chapter that a pluralist democratic structure is necessary in order to have a stable foreign relations, and that democracy is compatible with effective foreign policy. Turkey's own experience shows that the improvement in her democratic structure created a multi-dimensional foreign policy. The experience of other countries also shows that non-democratic countries' foreign policies are usually based on ideology, emotion and the misperception of the totalitarian regimes in power. Democratic countries' foreign policies are on the other hand based on mutual interest and understanding. The increasing number of international organisations will create a complex interdependence between the states and that might help the globalisation of the world and world peace. As explained above, global interdependence will be evolved through regional organisations. The structure of the regional economic organisations is thus of great importance. Any federalist structure of any kind of organisation will eventually estrange the other organisations and states. The federalist structure might thus be more dangerous to international security than the non-democratic nation states. The disintegration of a federalist structure will certainly disturb the international order and will also cause a civil war which the international community are witnessing in former Yugoslavia. Federalist structures thus neither help the creation of a complex interdependence nor help the economic development of the world. An ideal regional economic cooperation is one that does

the Community, see *Chapter Seven*.

not proceed towards a federalist outcome by closing the doors outside and by becoming more tightly knit internally in economic and political terms.

Another aim of this study was to prove that realist theory is not capable of explaining a complex interdependent world. Some political scientists suggest that theoretical study in international study is almost dead due to the fact that theories could not predict or even explain international events. This study has on the contrary showed that the importance of theoretical study has not decreased. However, the taboo subjects such as 'state', 'military power', which realist theories are built upon, have lost their importance in international relations. Realists believed that the state was the only actor in international arena. But supranational bodies and international institutions are becoming more and more important. The neorealist approach does not also directly challenge the realist view of state, but instead seeks to dilute its importance by economic considerations that reflect a reality in the international relations of the 1960s and the 1970s.

The chapter has thus argued that an explicitly pluralist framework drawing on theories of interdependence and institutional and economic cooperation are the most useful starting point for an analysis of complex, multi-layered foreign policies. This establishes a set of parameters for the argument that follows. It suggests useful questions to note. It suggests how evidence might be sifted and analysed. It argues that foreign policy can be understood as a process of continuing adjustment in which domestic ideas, political forces and institutional structures play as significant a role

as the international system and its structures and power processes without assuming a determining role for any one of these factors.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. THE MODERNISATION PROCESS OF TURKEY'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE

4.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the modernisation of the political structure in Turkey which will provide the necessary background in order to discern the gradual modernisation of Turkish foreign policy¹. It is worth mentioning that the term 'modernisation' is used almost with the same meaning as the word 'westernisation'². Throughout this chapter modernisation and westernisation are used more or less in the same sense. It should, however, be emphasised that the term 'modernisation' assumed wider meaning after the 1980s thanks to the structural changes in the economic system. As from the 1980s, modernisation meant not only political westernisation but also economic progress, so much so that modernisation has become more economical less ideological term in the parlance of Turkish politics. Thus throughout this thesis the wider meaning of modernisation is referred to.

¹ See *Chapter Five*.

² For the history of westernisation (modernisation) in Turkey, also see Ward, Robert E. and Rustow, Dankwart A.(eds), *Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964.

This chapter mainly deals with three periods of political modernisation in Turkey. After explaining the mainstream ideologies that politically shaped the Republic, the one-party period is briefly touched upon. It is argued that during the one-party period, the domestic political structure could only produce a passive foreign policy³. This was because of the fact that the Kemalist revolution was new and it needed time so that new Turkish citizens be imbued with revolutionary ideas. That kind of political structure, however, left Turkey under tremendous foreign pressure.

The second is the multi-party period. Between 1950-1980, Turkey's political structure gradually became democratised and modernised. The most notable feature of that period is that despite gradually improving the political structure, the economic structure almost remained untouched. Although, the political structure day by day was more resembling that of a modernised European country, the economic structure was akin to centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe. During that period, parallel to the improvements in the modernisation and democratisation process, Turkish foreign policy became an active one. Because of the lack of proper economic structure, Turkish foreign policy was also based on the ideology of the elite rather than the economic interest. An active westward looking foreign policy was the outcome of that period⁴.

³ See *Next Chapter*.

⁴ See *Next Chapter*.

The third period started when major economic decisions are taken on 24th January 1980⁵. As could be seen in the forthcoming pages, those decisions started to yield their fruits in the second half of the 1980s when Turkish economy gradually became internationalised and multi-dimensionalised. Foreign policy was motivated by economic interest rather than the ideology of the elite. Turkish foreign policy towards the West remained intact, however. This was because of the very fact that a western type of modernisation was in process, and Turkey's economic interests forced her to keep even closer to the West.

4.2. The Mainstream Ideologies of Turkish Politics

Turkish political life has been influenced by three mainstream views: Turkism, Westernism and Islamism. Although Islam was the main religion of the people living in the newly established Republic, Islamism was the idea of those who wanted to establish a theocratic religious state instead of a secular modern state. Islamism thus was not popular among the elite. Turkism and Westernism were two prevailing ideologies among elite. A harmonisation of nationalism and westernist ideas was prominent amongst the elite. This was firstly, because nationalism was a dominant ideology of the world. Secondly, followers of the "*Young Turks Movement*"⁶ were largely based and educated

⁵ See the end of this *Chapter*.

⁶ For more on "Young Turk Movement" and their relationship with Great Britain, see Feroz, Ahmad, "Great Britain's Relations with the Young Turks", *Middle Eastern Studies*, July, 1966, pp.302-329.

in the West European countries. The Young Turks Revolution of 1908 can be accepted as a turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire. It is worth mentioning that supporters of all the three ideologies were trying to find a way to save the old aged Empire which was called the "sick man of Europe"⁷. When the Empire joined the First World War on the German side and was defeated, ideologues had to change their objectives. At the end of the War they were interested in the establishment of a new state on the ruins of the Empire.

The relative decline of its political and economic power handicapped the Emperor's officials in controlling even its heartland. In 1919, after the end of the First World War, the victorious allies sought to dismember the Empire, and to aid Greece in recovering some areas of south west Asia Minor over which she had ambitions.

Among all the mainstream views which are mentioned above, Islamism has been eliminated. Islamist ideas were not represented in the government. The elite thought that it was the only islamic and traditional believes that brought the Empire's demise. However, the influence of the religion and tradition have always existed. Nationalist (Milliyetçi-Türkçü) and Westernist (Batıcı) ideas prevailed over the islamist idea. Because nationalism was in vogue in the West. Nationalist-Westernist idea was also modernist in a European context. The prevailing ideology for the establishment of a new state was therefore a blend of Nationalist-Westernist ideology. As Krejci puts it "*a short*

⁷ Anderson, M.S., *The Eastern Question*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1966, p.277.

*but an intense civil war, combined with a war against foreign powers attempting to extent their colonial Empires (France and Italy) or to enlarge their own state (Greece) into Anatolia, set in. During this (intense civil war) the Westernists joined the Turkists, and the Islamists were defeated*⁸". Islamist elite were alienated and the new Turkish Republic were created by the Nationalist-Westernist elite represented by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk the founder of the Republic. Nearly three decades of one-party period (1923-1950) in turn has strengthened the position of the Westernist-nationalist elite. A homogeneous unique elite were created and economically supported by newly emerging bourgeoisie.

This Westernist-Turkist ideological blend has shown itself throughout the Republic's life. In internal affairs, nationalist feeling of the people used to insure the unity of the country. In foreign relations, Turkey's relations with the west has always been on a high level that was incomparable to her limited relations with the East and Middle East. As will be argued in the next chapter, Turkey would do everything to reassure the West about her desire to become a part of the Western 'family'.

The dismemberment of the Empire gave impetus to a nationalist movement in Anatolia, led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the Turkish military hero. He led a successful war of independence, following which Turkish sovereignty was regained at the Lausanne

⁸ Krejci, Jaroslav, *Great Revolutions Compared: Search for a Theory*, Wheatsheaf, Sussex, 1983, p.145.

Conference of 1922-23⁹. In the same year a new nationalist Republic was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Ziya Gökalp, a principal ideologue of the Republic and a consultant and close friend of Atatürk, formed the basis of national identity that would allow the Turks to adapt the most advanced economic and technological aspects of European civilisation without losing their moral superiority¹⁰.

Although, Gökalp's ideas cannot be neatly categorised owing to his scattered and vague explanations in his book *"The Principles of Turkism"*. However, he uses the term *"solidarism"* (*Tesanütcülük*) to describe his political view¹¹. His overall view of Turkish politics cannot really be described by a small quotation. It would, nevertheless, suffice to say that Ziya Gökalp was in favour of a Corporatist-Nationalist state structure. He was mainly influenced by the fashion idea of nationalism in the West and his corporatist idea was perhaps again an outcome of a processing socialist trend in the West. In Gökalp's mind socialism was almost equal to communism which is something he did not like at all. He was always in favour of solidarism and his Corporatist-Nationalist view of politics is an outcome of that idea. These words should perhaps clarify his stance on the political area: *"Turks love freedom and independence, they cannot be communists. But*

⁹ For further information, see Weiker, F. Walter, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey*, Published in Leiden, Belgium, 1973, pp.1-4.

¹⁰ Bianchi, Robert, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984, p.92.

¹¹ For more on Turkism and Ziya Gökalp's views, see Gökalp, Ziya, *The Principles of Turkism*, translated by, Robert Devereux, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1968.

they love equality, they cannot be individualists. The system most suited to Turkish culture is "Solidarism".... Together with private ownership, there must also be social ownership... The new Turkey, which has to introduce the latest and the most developed techniques of Europe, cannot afford to wait for the spontaneous rise of the spirit of enterprise among individuals in order to industrialise... Turks are temperamentally "Etatist". They expect the state to take the initiative in everything new and progressive.... The state (hence) ... must become an economic state... The modern state... is like a business concern... that will at the same time perform a moral service because the rise of a new class of speculators will be prevented... If we accept the principle of state capitalism, we will be able to prevent the rise of insatiable predatory capitalists in our country.¹²

As a matter of fact what Ziya Gökalp was doing is to describe the framework of the idea of "*Kemalism*". Kemalist ideas consisted of a blend of Nationalist-Westernist ideas. The Kemalist idea at its infancy was vulnerable to sudden changes in the country; it was therefore very persistent not to sympathise extreme left and right and thus to islamists. A democratic structure with its true meaning is to take time to be developed. As mentioned later in this chapter, the Democrat Party governments between 1950-1960 were trying to liberalise the economic structure. Even though there was no application of an extreme idea during the Democrat Party rule (apart from easing the pressure on people to perform their religious duties), "*in May 1960, fearing that Atatürk's path might*

¹² *Ibid.*

be abandoned, the military took over the government by a coup d'etat, staged political trials (the Prime Minister of the time Adnan Menderes and his two other cabinet ministers were hanged) and they held the power until the autumn of 1961. In sympathetic circles this move was seen as a furthering the revolution"¹³ and protecting the Kemalist idea on which the Turkish Republic was based. They -the supporters of the Republican Peoples Party- have seen the military's intervention in political affairs as forging an old fashioned Ottoman alliance between the men of sword and the men of pen¹⁴. Some others (Especially the banned Democrat Party supporters) claimed that the 1960 military intervention has stopped the economic development and democratisation process.

As mentioned above, Islamists failed to determine the destiny of the new Republic. Islam, however, was still the religion of the majority of people. A Turkist-Westernist blend of ideas had to take islamic feelings into consideration. Islam during the 600 years of the Ottoman Empire was a city religion. As Havrani notes, *"by virtue of its social constraints as well as its spiritual demands islam is a city religion. The city is a military fortress but more importantly it is a pillar of the faith and a framework within which to live the good live¹⁵."* What Turkist-

¹³ Krejci, Jaroslav, *Op.cit.*, p.146.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.146. Also see Dodd, C.H., *Democracy and Development in Turkey*, The Eothen Press, University of Hull, 1979, p.59.

¹⁵ Havrani, A.H., "The Islamic City in the Light of Recent Research", *The Islamic City: A Colloquia*, A.H.Havrani and S. N. Sterneds (eds.), Philadelphia: University of

Westernist ideas have done was to remove the political power of islamists from the city. In provincial areas and villages islam was not perceived as a political ideology but as a spiritual religion between God and man. To secure non-intervention of the city religion (Political Islam) to the political life of the Republic, Atatürk decided to change the capital city of the Republic from Istanbul to Ankara. This was because Istanbul still represented the islamic city; and it might have had an influence on the government, had it been retained as the capital city.

To sum up, it could be said that the power struggle between the three main stream ideologies (islamism, westernism and nationalism) has ended with the victory of nationalism and westernism. Nationalist-westernist alliance took revolutionary decisions in order to establish a modernised state.

4.3. Turkish Politics During The One-Party Period (1923-1950)

Any study on Turkish Politics would not be complete without analysing the idea of Kemalism and its principles. Kemalism and its principles because shaped the political structure of existing Turkish Republic. It is however worth mentioning that Kemalist principles remained as rhetoric: their application varied from one politician to another. In this section the Kemalist principles will only be explained to the extent that is necessary in order to explain the present domestic political structure.

Pennsylvania, 1970, p.10.

Secularism is one of the most important principles of Kemalist idea; so important that even some scholars saw Kemalism as identical to secularism¹⁶. Nayır said that "*The new system of thought and the new path (of life) brought about by Atatürk's words and reforms constitute Atatürkism*"¹⁷. *If the great leader's words and deeds were studied as a whole, one would come to the conclusion that this system of thought was founded on secularism and on orientation toward the West*"¹⁸. The abolition of Sultanate (1922) and the abolition of the Caliphate (1924) in the early age of the Republic suggest that Kemalism was mainly erected upon secularist precepts. These revolutionary changes have also shown how determined Atatürk was to westernise the political system. One conviction of Atatürk was that the cause of the failure of the Ottoman Empire was the application of corrupted islamic ideas. He thus used secularism as a weapon against islamic institutions and anything reminding the past. For instance, he changed the alphabet from Arabic to Latin (1928) in order to create a nation-state in place of *ummah* system¹⁹. Atatürk's foreign policy was designed to protect the newly emerging secularist structure. He thus "*wished to cut her [Turkey] off from her oriental and islamic past that*

¹⁶ See Nayır, Yaşar Nabi, "Atatürkism (Kemalism) is Secularism", in, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, Kemal Karpaz (ed.), Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, pp.322-333.

¹⁷ Note: Kemalism and Atatürkism are the words derived from Kemal Atatürk's name and both describe the same ideology. In this thesis we use the word Kemalism derived from his first name as it is more common.

¹⁸ Nayır, Yaşar Nabi, *Op.cit.*, p.322.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.323-324.

*the several Islamic Congresses held between 1926 and 1931 had received no support from Turkey*²⁰.

Nationalism is also an idea imported from the West. The French Revolution of 1789 has made the nationalism an ideology of modern state. In Turkey nationalism became attractive when the religious 'ummah' system was on the brink of collapse. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the first World War, Atatürk, himself an Ottoman general, left Istanbul and went to Anatolia in the hope of establishing a compact nation state on the ruins of the Empire²¹. Due to the fact that a multi-national mosaic inherited from the Ottoman Empire, Kemalist ideology could not establish a nation-state. A state-nation rather than a nation-state was created²².

Statism, revolutionarism, populism and republicanism were the other principles of Atatürk. Statism meant a centrally planned economy designated by a small elite. Turkish economy resembled that of Eastern Europe. Statist economic structure during that period created a corporatist structure amongst the elite and newly emerging bourgeoisie. It also helped the expansion and strength of the elite. *"Although the elite*

²⁰ Lewis, Geoffrey, *Modern Turkey*, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1974, p.133.

²¹ See Pevsner, Lucille W., *Turkey's Political Crisis: Background, Perspectives, Prospects*, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington Papers, vol. 12, no. 110, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp.6-11.

²² See Enloe, Cynthia H. and Rejai Mostafa, "Nation-States and State-Nations", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.13, no.2, 1969, pp.140-158. Also for Kemalist interpretation of nationalism, see *Next Chapter*.

was expanded under the Single Party rule and the sovereignty of the people was recognised through the People's Party and the Grand National Assembly, Kemalist development meant reform from above, generally imposed with minimal repression because of a unified elite [homogeneous elite] and an apolitical mass²³". Atatürk thought that the Republican People's Party (RPP) would democratically represent people until Kemalist principles gain a solid ground among the mass. Since Kemalist ideology was not popular among the mass (including populism), Kemalist elite imposed all the principles from above. As can be seen below, the introduction of democracy was a grant of the elite who thought that Turkey was ready for it. "The principle of populism [therefore] as well as the various reforms of Atatürk in the legal, economic, and cultural fields showed his desire to base both the ideology and the regime on the people. It was a pro-mass, pro-nation ideology. But the solution to the problems of the masses had been solved from above. [It is thought that] the masses had not yet reached political consciousness and did not press for a change of the traditional order²⁴".

During the One-Party Period (1923-1950), Turkish foreign policy was inactive and it is largely affected by the course of events in international politics²⁵. Kemalist foreign policy was based on the principle of 'Peace at Home Peace Abroad' epitomising

²³ Pevsner, *Op.cit.*, p.9.

²⁴ Kili, Suna, *Kemalism*, School of Business Administration and Economics, Robert College, Published by Menteş Matbaası, Istanbul, Turkey, 1969, p.90.

²⁵ See *Next Chapter*.

the passive nature of the foreign policy²⁶. As Lord Kinross noted *"Atatürk had been saying 'let us recognise our own limits'. By keeping Turkey small he would make her great. The Turkish Republic desired only its territorial integrity and freedom. As long as the West would respect this, Turkey in return offered the West a zone of peace in an explosive corner of the East. The new sovereign Republic, geographically poised between East and West, was to be stabilising element"*²⁷. As can be seen from this account, Atatürk's foreign policy was based on the policy of indifference to the events outside the boundaries of the newly established Republic. The one-party period focused more on the domestic integration and modernisation of the country by imposing and implementing Kemalist ideology. Turkey during that period practised a foreign policy of 'wait and see' without having a long term foreign policy strategies.

To substantiate what was said above, it is useful to stress that the main dynamics of Turkish foreign policy are rooted in the internal form of the country. As Vali says *"What particular interest of foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal organisation of the state"*²⁸. Atatürk always emphasised that foreign policy should be in tandem with the internal organisation. The primary determinant of foreign policy thus

²⁶ Karaosmanoğlu, Ali, "Turkey and Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts", *Nato's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, Chipman, J. (ed.), Routledge, London, 1988, p.293.

²⁷ Kinross, Lord, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation*, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1964, p.458.

²⁸ Vali, Ferenc A., *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971, p.5.

was the internal organisation and ideological framework upon which the state was founded²⁹. However, because the Turkish Republic was being built and focused more on internal matters, during the first three decades of the Republic, the internal structure could not produce an active well structured foreign policy. Turkey declared all her land sacred and her foreign policy was only designed to defend it.

4.4. Introduction of Democracy and Its Aftermath

Seven years after the establishment of the Republic, Atatürk concluded that the time for democracy had arrived. A second '*loyal opposition* [the Free Party]³⁰' party, as Weiker notes, was established in 1930 by Atatürk, who, at the same time, was a member and President of the Republican Peoples Party. The first attempt to build a pluralist democratic structure doomed to fail. The Kemalist Revolution was in its seventh years and the revolutionary ideas had only penetrated the surface of the elite let alone the mass. Atatürk thus postponed the idea of democracy. Weiker put four main reasons for the failures of the first experiment of Turkish democracy and the Free Party; "*First, the modernisation of the Turkish elite was inadequate to support a multi-party system. Second, Modern ideas had almost completely failed to affect the peasants, who made up 80% of Turkey's population. Third, Atatürk and other key leaders seriously misjudged*

²⁹ Sowerwine, James Edward, *Dynamics of Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy 1961-1980.*, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, p.14.

³⁰ Weiker, (1973), *Op.cit.*, p.5.

the state of the nation. Fourth, the differences which developed between the two parties proved to be fundamental rather than concerned only with degree, speed and detail³¹".

Atatürk's close friend and the then Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, repeated Atatürk's initiative. In 1950, İnönü, after his party's defeat in the general election, said in an interview that *"we were trained to be democrats and then we found ourselves really having to accept it."*³² Democracy introduced in Turkey soon after the end of the second World War. Turkey, being an ally of the West and a member of NATO, had to establish a western type of democracy in order to adapt herself to the West and prevent any possible communist (Soviet) threat. In the 1950s, Turkey received support from the West for her democratic initiatives.

Allied countries, especially Great Britain, supported both the Greek and Turkish armies and also supported the democratic initiatives of İnönü in order to strengthen the frontier against Russia. As noted in the British Foreign Office records *"It is hard to believe that we would sit back and allow a Yugoslav or Bulgarian invasion of Greece. ...a collapse of our position in Greece would probably mean that the Turks would give in too. The reaction of this on our situation in the Middle East can well be imagined"*³³.

³¹ Weiker, Walter F., *The Free Party of 1930 in Turkey*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1962, p.221., in Kili, *Op.cit.*, p.120.

³² *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1950.

³³ *British Foreign Office*, Record no. 371/58701/R11542/G.

As can be seen from the secret records, Great Britain and the West, soon after the Second World War, supported the democracy introduced by İsmet İnönü then the President of the country. They, however, had one reservation that the Turkish Army should remain strong in order to stand against external attack of Russia and also to closely monitor the internal structure of the country so that to eliminate the danger of the spread of communism. As a matter of fact, the Turkish Army remained strong and the Army intervened in the internal affairs of the country (three times 1960, 1971 and 1980) when they thought the democracy was in danger.

In the 1950 elections, the newly emerged Democrat Party (DP) won an overwhelming victory. The country's government was in the hands of a newly established Democrat Party about which something will be mentioned later in this chapter. However, it would be worth saying here that the policies of the RPP and the Democrat Party were almost identical on vital matters of foreign policy and security. The Turkish governments' unchanging position toward the European Community has been the result of that unity. Although Turkey endured various political crises, its desire to become a European country has remained unchanged. Firstly, because the political regime was a Western type of democracy and neither RPP nor DP was challenging to change the regime. Secondly, westernism was an ideology of the RPP and DP. Both parties have been supported and governed by the existing homogenous elite whose ideology was westernist. The differentiation amongst the elite began soon after the introduction of multi party politics. As a matter of fact, the only cleavage among the elite

on how to manage the economy was the main distinction between the two parties. The RPP did not have a western type of liberal economic understanding. The RPP, during the one-party period, applied a centrally planned statist economy. The Democrat party, however, was trying to apply a more liberal economic policy. The Democrat party's liberal economic programme during the 1950s was complementary to westernist ideology of the RPP. The weight of the west on Turkey thus never decreased. The two parties only failed on one thing, the nature and the pace at which the country ought to be transformed. The RPP claimed a slower and steadier transformation so that bureaucratic-military groups should not suffer by suddenly finding themselves losing power. They would be given time and opportunity to be absorbed into a newly emerging capitalist society. The Democrats, on the other hand, thought that the country was not the bureaucrat-military groups' own estate. They did not even consider the implications of rapid transformation on such groups. They only wanted an economic growth as rapid and soon as possible whatever the price³⁴. The price, unfortunately, was two military takeovers.

As Maurice Duverger argues, Turkey is perhaps the only country where an "authentic" (arguable) democracy has been gradually established by a one-party system³⁵. The one-party system tried to create a new ruling class and an independent political elite,

³⁴ See Feroz, Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, C.Hurst & Company, Published for R.I.I.A, London, 1977, p.40ff.

³⁵ Duverger, Maurice, *Political Parties*, Wiley, New York, 1954, p.280.

which will be discussed later in this chapter. Turkey was one of the rare countries to undertake rapid political, economic and social modernisation in the early twentieth century. It also undertook, perhaps the most difficult transformation of all, the conversion of a traditional society into an industrial and democratic society³⁶. Weiker argued that there were many reasons to predict that democracy in Turkey firmly rooted in social, economic and political life of people and that makes the continuance of democracy very likely³⁷. However, there have been two major breakthroughs in the democratic process since Weiker wrote that. This clearly shows that Turkish democracy cannot yet stand on its feet and still there is a degree of tutelage in Turkish democracy. Pevsner evaluates Turkish democracy and development, concluding that "*the democracy was introduced by the leaders of a tutelary dictatorship*"³⁸. He goes on to say that industrialisation was also state-induced, with important consequences for the present shape of the economy and society, and that the Turkish style of democracy has combined liberal political institutions with clientelist and corporatist relationships that connect a changing society to its past traditions³⁹.

³⁶ Weiker, (1973), *Op.cit.*, pp.1-4.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Pevsner, *Op.cit.*, p.6.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.6.

A different approach has been taken more recently by Fukuyama in his influential but flamed polemic *The End of History*⁴⁰. He considers Turkey's democracy as unsuccessful and unstable. He sees islamic principles as contradictory to electoral system and secularism. When he says "*it is perhaps not surprising that the only liberal democracy in the contemporary muslim world is Turkey, which was the only country to have stuck with an explicit rejection of its islamic heritage in favour of a secular society early in the twentieth century*"⁴¹". However, islam has its own wide range of political varieties. In other words, there is certain degree of pluralism in islam. Furthermore, his account mistakes the sources of potential instability in Turkey, and takes a deeply pessimistic view of its prospects on the basis of a deterministic -or pre-determined- logic which fails to see the distinctiveness of Turkey in its generalisations about islam. The two main related reasons for an unstable and debilitating political structure in Turkey are: first, the complete rejection of the political history, and secondly the economic vulnerability of the country. These two reasons are closely related and one is an outcome of the other. Political structure needs to have roots so that it should not be unstable. This does not, of course, mean the complete acceptance of the old but political structure needs to be based on compromise rather than the complete rejection. Turkey's political structure thus now needs time to become a tradition itself. To give an example to emphasise the importance of the compromise of tradition and change in politics, the

⁴⁰ Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.217.

United Kingdom would perhaps be the best example. Throughout modern history the Church and the Royal family have responded to the demands of the people in a conciliatory way. The latest example of that conciliation is that the Queen has accepted to pay a certain amount of income tax on her revenues⁴². In Turkey, this capacity to compromise has emerged slowly and painfully: during the Ottoman Empire two-thirds of Sadrazams (the Prime Ministers of the day) did not leave their post in an ordinary way. They were either executed (most of them for very minor reasons) or simply dismissed. We have witnessed the example of the same behaviour during Republic's life as well. For instance, when the military took over in 1960, the Prime Minister and two of his cabinet ministers were executed. The day of the military takeover (27th of May) has been declared as the national sovereignty day and celebrated throughout the country. After 1980, though the regime and the political structure remained intact, national sovereignty day was abandoned and a big funeral and commemoration day was organised for the executed Prime Minister and his colleagues.

The first military coup happened in 1960. *"The Military junta has outlawed the Democrat Party and about 4.000 of its leaders imprisoned and tried. They were mainly accused of corruption and turpitude. Trials ended with death sentences for fifteen ... twelve death sentences were commuted, but the military hanged the popular Prime Minister [Adnan] Menderes and two of his ministers [Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Rüştü*

⁴² *Financial Times*, 25 November 1992.

Zorlu] in September 1961, just a month before the start of another parliamentary rule⁴³".

The execution of the Democrat Party leaders was for two main reasons. First, military officials feared that with the start of parliamentary rule in case of a political victory by Democrat Party supporters they might be questioned by the leaders. Secondly, the junta tried to convince the media and people, by the execution of the three, that there was corruption and that they had to act. The Committee of National Union (CNU), the executive committee of the coup, has even "*felt strong enough to act against the radical minority within its own ranks*"⁴⁴". And in November 1960, six months after the coup, the expulsion of Türkeş, a radical nationalist colonel, and thirteen other officers from the Junta and their exile to diplomatic posts marked the victory of those favouring the Kemalist tradition.

Turkish democracy was interrupted in 1971 by a military memorandum. This time, the military chose not to involve directly in the government but to influence it. A civilian independent government was established and ruled the country until the general elections of 1973. The military coup of September 1980 was mainly a result of anarchy and civil war. The country was undergoing a severe upheaval. Political and social violence, conducted by extremist (Marxists and Fascists) militants, claimed more than 5.000 lives and 10.000 wounded between 1977 and the 1980 coup. Inflation was

⁴³ Lewis, Geoffrey "Political Change in Turkey Since 1960", in Hale, William H.(ed.), *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, London, 1981, p.117.

⁴⁴ Landau, M. Jacob, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Leiden, 1974, pp.11-12, in Pevsner, *Op.cit.*, p.31.

uncontrolled, basic commodities were in short supply, and foreign exchange crisis provided further evidence of state incapacity. To Pevsner, although it has been the target of three military coups in twenty years, the Turkish democracy was an achievement⁴⁵. In 1983, three political parties have been established and allowed to join the new elections. Two of these parties were under the influence of generals. These two parties were the Nationalist Democratic Party of Turgut Sunalp who was deputy chief-of-staff in the 1970s, and the Populist Party of Necdet Calp who was a former provincial governor and private secretary to two former presidents. *"The establishment of further parties was nipped in the bud by the simple expedient of the supervisory authorities preventing them from enlisting the necessary number of "acceptable" founding members by the deadline on 24 August 1983"*⁴⁶. Only Turgut Özal's Motherland Party, apart from the other two tutelary parties, had enough political base. The Generals did not expect that Turgut Özal's Party would be successful. They therefore did not want to ban his party since so many people and parties were banned. It would further damage the generals stand. Generals were clearly supporting Nationalist Democratic Party. The chief of staff, Kenan Evren, in his speech on the eve of the 1983 elections advised people implicitly not to vote for Özal's party⁴⁷. This speech did not help for the two tutelary parties, it rather further damaged the stance of these parties. *"The Turkish electorate voted with a clear majority against the generals' concept on 6 November*

⁴⁵ Pevsner, *Op.cit.*, p.1.

⁴⁶ Steinbach, Udo, "Turkey's Third Republic", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 3, no. 88, p.241.

⁴⁷ *Milliyet*, 5 November 1983.

1983. 45.15 per cent voted for the Motherland Party, giving it 211 of the seat in the Assembly and dealing crushing defeat to the official parties⁴⁸".

Another problem with the Turkish political structure is that the class divisions in social structure remains strong. There are two major classes: the upper class, consisting of the ruling class and the rich, and the lower class, mainly consisting of peasants and small tradesman. There is a growing pattern of corporatist behaviour among the upper class⁴⁹. This corporation, however, could not help so much to create a prosperous economic and political structure. A very optimistic statistical data may tell us that the upper class (the ruling elite and the rich) consists of only 20% of the whole population. According to statistics issued by OECD in 1985 80% of the annual national income in the hands of top 20% of people and 80% of people only share 20% of the annual national income⁵⁰. By comparison, in industrial countries lower 40% of people receives 25% of annual national income. To give another example, 80% of the population are still not covered by any social security and social insurance. Those who have an official duty or work in big companies have benefited from the national insurance policy. Existing democratic channels operated horizontally among two different classes. And most of the population is not yet "bankable" in liberal economic terms. This can only be restored

⁴⁸ Steinbach, *Op.cit.*, p.241.

⁴⁹ See *Chapter Two*.

⁵⁰ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Report, *Turkey*, 1990.

by the re-adjustment of income distribution. Suffice it to say that it can only be possible to have a stable economy and political structure, if more and more people are brought into the economic machinery. According to a survey, almost 38% of the population lives below the poverty line. Their income was defined as too low to meet the basic needs, whereas 5% are extremely wealthy⁵¹.

4.5. Social and Economic Transformation

Turkey, in the life span of one generation, has seen a very rapid social and economic change. The upheaval was so fast that the lower class could not keep up with the upper class. This was perhaps the reason for the breakthrough in democratic process. The population increased from 17 million in 1923 to 57 million in 1990⁵². The main difficulty for the government, therefore, was to provide sufficient facilities. And the migration from rural to urban areas has doubled the difficulty. This may be seen as positive development for an industrialising country. However, in Turkey's case migration to urban areas was not the same as it happened in western industrialised countries. Although migration was visible similar to all Southern Europe, like Southern Italy and Southern Spain, the vital difference was that in Europe migration was mainly motivated by a big industrialisation process in urban areas. Whereas in Turkey, the

⁵¹ Pevsner, *Op.cit.*, p.13.

⁵² *Statistical Pocket Book of Turkey*, issued by State Statistic Institute of Turkey, Ankara, 1990, pp.13-14.

increasing population in rural areas and increased transport facilities were two main reasons for migration. People left their villages, risking their lives and livelihoods, for the hope of a better economic life. The main reason for migration was that villages were not economically viable. The land was too fragmented because of the increasing population in villages. Some of the members of a typical Turkish family living in villages had to find some other sources for their livelihood. The development in transportation (certainly not industrialisation) has facilitated the migration. The government could not provide education, employment and the other social benefits to all immigrants. As has already been stated in chapter two, the clientelist structure provided risk insurance to those who are unemployed or underemployed. *"The rural poverty is thus alleviated by family and clientelist organisation"*⁵³. The result was that the cities (especially the three big ones) were full of villagers (culturally) without having villages. As Şerif Mardin noted *"the migration of people to cities has 'ruralised' the cities. Contrary to Greek experience, in Turkey the peasantization of the city has proceeded faster than the urbanisation of the peasant"*⁵⁴. More than half of the big cities were full of squatters and were also one-third of the other cities⁵⁵. The gap between the elite and the masses therefore remained to be an important issue with negative consequences for political development.

⁵³ Pevsner, *Op.cit.*, p.14.

⁵⁴ Mardin, Şerif, "Youth and Violence in Turkey" *European Archives of Sociology*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1978, p.243.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p.243.

4.6. Political Participation

From the establishment of the Republic to the beginning of multi party system, peasants and small tradesmen did not involve themselves in the political life. The lower class saw the matter as completely different professional matter which was nothing to do with them. They saw the ruling class as their masters who know better what their interest are than they themselves. Until the mid-1950s the typical Turkish peasant still referred to government leaders as "our master" and found it threatening to be asked to give opinions on state policy. This was not because people were depoliticised by the state. They were insensitive and apolitic on the matters of national policy (domestic or foreign)⁵⁶. The reasons behind that can be analysed in two categories: firstly, traditionalist inheritance of being a citizen (Teb'a). Teb'a is an islamic concept. Its approximate or rough translation into English would be "Client"-though with some difference. This difference is that the term client used in the context that there is a clear visible interest relations between client and his patron (the Ruler). The term "*Teb'a*" however is not as clear as that. Although there are interest relations between the ruler and the *teb'a*, these relations are shaped by traditional and religious motives. As a matter of fact, the exact meaning of the term is "*submitter*". The feeling of being "*Teb'a*" (the submitter) has thus prevented people from questioning their rulers. This thus made people insensitive or apolitical to political matters. Secondly, it was because the lower

⁵⁶ See Heper, Metin "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 35, no. 3, 1981, pp.345-363

class could not keep up with the revolutionary changes. Technological developments and the changing pattern of professional life have added to that. People felt more illiterate in political matters.

Despite the beginning of multi party political life in 1950, Turkish voters were still very reluctant to abandon their "*obedience to ethnic, tribal and landed patrons*"⁵⁷ upon whom their livelihood and security depended. Turkish political participation has indeed preserved its conservative character. In particular, at the beginning of the multi-party system, the Democrat party was specially interested in retaining the patron-client network for political reasons. This patron-client network existed throughout the 1950-1980 period. After 1980, especially after 1983 when the Motherland Party came to power, the new liberal economic model began to reveal implications for the political structure. The negative effects of patron-client networks have weakened, though they have not destroyed, the emergence of a genuine and more open democratic politics.

4.7. The Period of Economic Reformation

The 24th January 1980 decisions have been the turning point in Turkey's economic and political history. The internationalisation of the economy has started a

⁵⁷ See *Ibid*, pp.345-363

process of openness and restructuralisation. This decisions included; among others, the realistic exchange-rate policies, realistic interest rates, tight control over the money supply and credit, the ending of most state sector price subsidies and of price control boards, a tax reform through which value-added tax was introduced and the encouragement of foreign investment⁵⁸. These reforms have created dramatic economic and political results. The Turkish economy during the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s rapidly grew. For instance, Gross Domestic Product per capita has increased on average 5.9% between 1983- 1989 well above the OECD average⁵⁹.

The changes have made Turkish domestic political structure so much more complex. It has become difficult to follow the course of events. *"Even during a global recession, Turkey's economy grew by 5.9 per cent in 1992, and underground economy - perhaps as large as 25 per cent of the official economy, according to some economists- continues to prosper⁶⁰".* Industrialisation thus became another preoccupation of Turkish policy-makers⁶¹. *"The maximisation of economic assistance and the removal of obstacles to trade, such as EC quota restrictions on Turkish textile exports, are typical themes⁶²".*

⁵⁸ Barchard, David, *Turkey and the West*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers no. 27, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985, p.35.

⁵⁹ *Financial Times, Survey*, "Turkey", 7 May 1993.

⁶⁰ Abramowitz, Morton I. "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Özal", *Foreign Policy*, no. 91, Summer, 1993, p.170.

⁶¹ For the economic changes after the 1980 decisions, see *chapter seven*.

⁶² Barchard, David, *Op.cit.*, p.44.

It should, however, be noted that Turkey is still to develop *"specialized commercial and economic services for exporters within its diplomatic services, although the importance of 'economic diplomacy'... has increased markedly since 1980*⁶³".

The political changes and restructuring the economy after 1980 did not change Turkey's relations towards Western Europe. Although, ideology have been replaced by economic interest after the mid-1980s, Turkey's link with the West and particularly with the European Community remained intact due to the fact that 46.51% of the Turkish exports went to the Community countries in 1990⁶⁴. Beside that, as will be analysed in chapter six and seven, Turkey has initiated new kind of economic relations in the Black Sea region, Balkans and Central Asia.

Dramatic changes occurred in the Media as a result of free market economy and improved democratic life. *"Probably the most notable recent change has been the blossoming freedom of expression. Private television and radio stations have proliferated despite a constitutional prohibition on unlicensed private broadcasting*⁶⁵". The Constitution was amended three years later to make the illegal television channels legal and also to produce a law demolishing the monopoly of the State on radio and

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.44.

⁶⁴ *Statistical Pocketbook of Turkey*, State Institute of Statistics, Prime Ministry, Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 1990, p.246.

⁶⁵ Abramowitz, *Op.cit.*, p.170.

television broadcasting. Some of the taboo subjects, such as the Kurdish problem and military's involvement (non-involvement) in political affairs, are now being subject to heated discussions in the Parliament and the media, albeit with some restrictions⁶⁶.

This section has demonstrated how the economic and the political changes have also positively affected the foreign policy of Turkey. Liberalisation of the media have brought public's attention on foreign policy issues. Public opinion were more pragmatic thanks to the changes in the economic and political structure. Interest, instead of ideology, became the main motive of the foreign policy. The elite from a variety of political spectrum have engaged pragmatically in foreign policy debates despite the deep ideological differences between them. The growing consensus over the foreign policy issues among the elite was mainly due to the internal systemic changes in the country and partly due to the changes in the international environment which will be more analysed in the next chapter.

⁶⁶ National Security Council (NSC), mainly consisted of commanders, has been the watchdog of the regime. Its advices have usually been taken into full consideration by the governments. NSC's role in the decision making process will be explained later in this chapter.

4.8. Institutional Structure and the Decision Making Process


The dominance of a centralised political structure has been a major obstacle for Turkey's ongoing modernisation process. As Danielson and Keleş also has emphasised through the centralisation *"influence is concentrated in the hands of actors at the centre -national political leaders, top bureaucrats, and major economic interests. This national elite drives enormous advantage from centralisation in the fierce competition for limited resources and has a powerful vested interest in the maintenance of the centre as Turkey's political hub"*⁶⁷. The process of the economic liberalisation programme of the 1980s has steadily decentralised the economy and created new economic interest centres. And that might be the cause for the characteristic emergence of the long time "missing bourgeoisie"⁶⁸. This newly emerged bourgeoisie started to put pressure on the decision makers from different directions through different associations. That kind of economic structure has paved the way for the pluralisation of national elite, at the same time increasing the control over the decision making machinery.

Section 4.8 discusses the institutional structure and the decision making process of Turkey. Before going further, it would be pertinent to say that the basic futures of the

⁶⁷ Danielson, Michael N. and Keleş, Ruşen, *"The Politics of Rapid Urbanisation: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey"*, Holmes & Meir, New York, London, 1985, p.99.

⁶⁸ See the section "Missing Bourgeoisie" in Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, Vernon, London, 1987.

Kemalist regime have not changed. The institutional bodies, as can be seen later in this section, have done their best to protect the regime against communism and also against islamic fundamentalism. The changes in the political structure after the late 1980s and early 1990s (that is after the Cold War in external context) have emerged without fundamental changes. The changes (or one can call them 'improvements') have been a direct result of the ongoing modernisation in process, both internally and externally. The institutional structure which is described in this chapter is summarised in the diagram in Table 1.

Table 1. Institutional Structure of Turkey¹

¹Gozubuyuk, Seref, *Yonetim Hukuku (Administrative Law)*, Genel Dagitim (Genel Publications), fourth edition, Ankara, September 1991, p.54

4.8.1. Turkish Grand National Assembly

The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) is composed of four hundred and fifty deputies elected by universal suffrage by the nation. The TGNA should have a direct impact on the formulation of policies. It has the power to promulgate laws, grant and withhold confidence from governments, ratify treaties concluded with foreign states and international organisations, approve the declaration of the state of war, approve dispatch of Turkish troops to foreign countries and allow foreign forces to be stationed on Turkish soil. It also controls the national budget. The TGNA may also empower the Council of Ministers to issue decrees having force of law⁷⁰.

Despite having all these constitutional powers, *"the TGNA looks very much like talking chamber in which its members speak a lot but in the end they endorse what the Cabinet or the chief executive propose"*⁷¹. Mr Çalış's observation is particularly right for foreign policy issues. Decisions are taken by almost block votes of the member of parliaments. Although members are constitutionally independent, they are also members of political parties and the Assembly's composition is determined by the political parties. As the majority party (or coalition) form the cabinet, it is almost impossible for the members to attempt to use their constitutional rights. Most of the time, majority of the

⁷⁰ See 1982 Constitution, Part Three, Chapter One.

⁷¹ Çalış, Şaban, "The Turkish State's Identity and Foreign Policy Decision Making Process", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 2, Spring 1995, p.138.

Assembly vote in favour of the cabinet. That is particularly so for foreign policy issues where individual members are more aware of the sensitivity of the issue. The decision, for example, on participation of Turkey in the Korean War of 1950 was made by the cabinet despite the fact that 1924 Constitution empowered the Assembly (also Constitutions of 1961 and 1982) to declare war⁷². We asked Mr. Neziroğlu about the role of the Assembly on foreign policy decisions. He said that the Assembly's weight in shaping the foreign policy decisions is limited because members usually vote in favour of the government. As the government in power holds the majority in the Assembly, it is the Cabinet who is more powerful⁷³.

4.8.2. The President of the Republic

Presidents of the Turkish Republic have been accepted as the head of state responsible for protecting the regime and sharing executive power with the Council of Ministers which is chaired by the Prime Minister. The constitution of 1924 and 1961 placed presidents in a symbolic position. Exercising power under those constitutions very much depended on the personality of the president and his relations with the Assembly and the Cabinet. Until 1989, when Turgut Özal became the first civil president, presidents were elected from the generals in the Army. Despite their symbolic

⁷² Erkin, Feridun Cemal, *Dış İşlerinde 34 Yıl : Vaşington Büyük Elçiliği (34 Years in Foreign Ministry: Ambassador to Washington)*, Ankara, 1986, p.152.

⁷³ Interview, Neziroğlu, İrfan, The Library and Documentation Centre of Turkish Grand National Assembly, Principle Expert to the TGNA on International Relations.

position, presidents have played an important role in maintaining the Kemalist regime and keeping good relations with the West. That was mainly because presidents had the political support in the government. The constitution of 1982 however established a much more powerful presidential system. Turkish presidential system was not as powerful as the America's. It was more resembling that of France. The main reason for the introduction of a more powerful presidential system is to prevent recurrence of the parliamentary paralysis of the 1970s. In 1970s, due to the existence of a hang parliament, Turkey endured political crisis, the Assembly were unable to elect a president and grant vote of confidence to governments. The 1982 constitution even empowers the president to abolish the Assembly in such political situations.

Presidents have throughout the Republic been a watchdog of the regime and country's unity and integrity. Some of the other main powers of the president are:

- to summon the TGNA to meet when necessary,
- to promulgate laws passed by the TGNA or to return them for reconsideration,
- to call new elections for TGNA,
- to appoint the Prime Minister and to accept his (her) resignation,
- to appoint Ministers or dismiss them on the proposal of the Prime Minister,
- to decide to use Turkish Armed Forces,
- to call the National Security Council to meet⁷⁴.

⁷⁴ For a complete constitutional power of the presidents, see *the Constitution of 1982*.

The 1982 Constitution creates a presidential system with a strong legislative power. Even though executive power of the President is shared with the Council of Ministers, Prime Ministers are de facto the head of executive. However, former president Turgut Özal used his constitutional executive power up to the limit due to his close political relations with the Motherland Party. Before he was elected as President, he was the head of the party and the Prime Minister. After being elected as President, he appointed Yıldırım Akbulut, an ardent supporter of Özal and his ideas, as the head of the Motherland Party and Prime Minister.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, Presidents have all attached great importance to foreign affairs, since they have regarded foreign and domestic policies as inseparable parts of the same goal which is the modernisation of Turkey⁷⁵. "*... modernisation has always been perceived as Westernisation, (and) all presidents have favoured western oriented foreign policies*"⁷⁶.

4.8.3. The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is perhaps the most powerful executive body amongst the other decision making institutions. The Council of Ministers consists of the Prime

⁷⁵ Tamkoç, Metin, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernisation of Turkey*, Salt Lake City, London, 1976, p.297.

⁷⁶ Çalış, *Op.cit.*, p.140.

Minister and Ministers. The Prime Minister is the head of government and chair the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister therefore occupied quite important places in the decision making process similar to those of their counterparts in the non-presidential regimes of Western countries. Prime Ministers select the members of the Council of Ministers and submit the list to the President for the approval. The Prime Minister ensures cooperation among the Ministers, and supervises the implementation of the governments general policy⁷⁷. The Prime Minister also ensures that the Ministers exercise their functions in accordance with the Constitution and the laws and takes corrective measures to this end⁷⁸.

The Prime Minister's role in making policies very much depends on their parliamentary support, personality and ability to judge and balance the competing powers of the decision making bodies. Prime Ministers of the military coups have been under the tutelage of the military and their ability in shaping policy strategies were limited. At other times, Prime Ministers role in policy formation depended upon their willingness to take initiative. For instance, Turgut Özal, as Prime Minister between 1983-89, involved in the decision making process to the extent that he was criticised by the opposition for infringing the constitution and governing the country alone. Turgut Özal

⁷⁷ See *Political Structure of Turkey*, published by Directorate General of Press and Information, Ankara, n.d., pp.60-63.

⁷⁸ 1982 *Constitution*, article 112.

showed also great interest in the making of foreign policy⁷⁹. Süleyman Demirel, who became Prime Minister seven times since 1965, has always followed the rules and relied on his ministers. He "*always left foreign affairs to his foreign ministers*⁸⁰". Süleyman Demirel was committed himself to the status quo⁸¹. Whereas, Menderes as a populist in the 1950s, Ecevit as a populist and social democrat in the 1970s, and Özal in the 1980s, were among those Prime Ministers who sought to play greater role in decision making process.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, Turkish Prime Ministers have been circumscribed and controlled by the National Security Council, which has been explained below, and the bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is thus a significant policy making body of Turkish politics. The MFA's main task is to execute Turkey's relations with the other countries and international organisations in accordance with the country's law and interests. Traditionally, MFA has always involved in foreign policy decision making process by preparing the proposals and ideas to be discussed in the Council of Ministers and National Security Council. As Turkey chose West and Westernist ideas as the main stream of her foreign policy since the beginning of the Republic, there has not been any major foreign policy differences between the MFA and the other decision making bodies despite having political crisis and

⁷⁹ Gönlübol, Mehmet, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy by Cases)*, Seventh Edition, Alkim Publishing House, Istanbul, 1990, p.625.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.626.

⁸¹ Çalış, Şaban, *Op.cit.*, pp.138-41.

interruptions in domestic structure. If any differences appeared between the politicians and the bureaucrats of the MFA, usually the Foreign Ministers, most of whom had prior diplomatic careers in the Ministry, tries to intermediate between the two. In the implementation stage of a decision, MFA's bureaucrats can slow the process down or even simply shelve the decision, if the Minister does not have a consent and insistence on.

The MFA's power has relatively been lessened by the State Planning Organisation (SPO) which has been established in 1960 by the National Unity Committee of military junta. It is established to develop economic plans every five years annual government programs. The SPO has played an important role on Turkey's international economic relations by preparing reports to the government. Since 1983, Turgut Özal, who was an ex-head of SPO, have started new tradition of using the SPO in foreign policy matters. Because of decentralisation program of Özal's government it is thought that the importance of central planning decreased and therefore SPO's importance also reduced to a low level. That was true for domestic matters. But as far as foreign policy is concerned, as the international structure became more of an international economic structure and regional economic organisations started to emerge, the SPO started to have a new role. Mr. Bulgurlu, who is the deputy president of the department of Turkish-European Community relations in the SPO, has stated that the weight of the SPO in

foreign economic relations has gradually increased in the last ten years⁸². There is little evidence to suggest that the SPO has prevailed over the MFA⁸³. It can however be argued that the importance of the SPO has undeniably increased by the externalisation of the Turkish economy after the 1980s⁸⁴.

Mr. İnan, who himself was a diplomat and ex-State Minister responsible for Turkish-European Community relations, and presently is the foreign Spokesman of the opposition Motherland Party, has criticised Prime Minister Tansu Çiller for being undemocratic by not bringing foreign issues to the parliament. He further said that foreign policy decisions have been taken in an undemocratic way that has ever been so⁸⁵. He has also been complaining that Turkey's entry to the Custom Union has not been discussed in the Cabinet let alone in the Assembly. However, he also stated towards the end of our interview that despite the present government, Turkish foreign policy is being pursued at its main course and the weight of the West in Turkish foreign policy is vitally important for the modernisation of the country's political and economic life. The changes in the international structure after the Cold War required Turkey to have new kind of relationships with different directions without harming her relations with the West. In

⁸² *Interview*, Bulgurlu, Hacı Mehmet, State Planning Organisation, Ankara, 16 March 1995.

⁸³ See Çalış, Şaban, *Op.cit.*, pp.146-54.

⁸⁴ See *Chapter Six and Seven* for the power struggle between the MFA and the SPO on Turkish-European Community relations.

⁸⁵ *Interview*, İnan, Kamran, on 16 March 1995 in TGNA, Ankara.

fact, Turkey's new multi directional relations might further strengthen her relations with the West as Turkey is likely to be an economic gate to Central Asia⁸⁶.

4.8.4. The National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) has been playing a significant role in Turkey's decision making process. The NSC was created after the military coup of 1960⁸⁷. The NSC became a constitutional body after the introduction of the 1961 Constitution. The Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution notes that the NSC shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Minister of National Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air Force and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic. The NSC is constitutionally an advisory body and directs its advises to the Council of Ministers. The 1982 Constitution obliges the Council of Ministers to *"give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ See *T.C. Devlet Teşkilatı Rehberi (Guide for the State Organisation of Turkish Republic)*, published by the Institute of Turkish-Middle East Public Administration (TODAIE), Ankara, 1988, vol. 1. pp.179-188.

*country, and the peace and the security of society*⁸⁸". The NSC was introduced into the Turkish political system by the military in order to establish an institution which would insure the Kemalist identity of the state and assure increased military participation in the process of decision making⁸⁹. Thus although it shares a name with a major United States' institution, it has very little else in common with that body. By the creation of the NSC the military has been able to put his hand in civil society⁹⁰. Unlike many Middle Eastern countries' leaders, Turkish Prime Ministers are circumscribed by powerful institutions. The NSC is one of them that controls the ideologic initiatives and political ambitions of Prime Ministers. Although the existence of the NSC can be criticised for its tutelary role over the democratic system, it plays great role in preserving the regime and also determining cautious foreign policy decisions. For instance, the NSC advised the government not to become involved in the Gulf crisis of 1991, whereas Prime Minister Turgut Özal's political ambition was to intervene⁹¹. Although the Chief of Staff and Foreign Minister resigned over differences with the Prime Minister on how to handle the Gulf crisis, Turgut Özal still felt the pressure of the military through the framework of the NSC and he could not do what he might have done. As it can be seen from the

⁸⁸ *Constitution 1982*, Paragraph four. Translation taken from Dodd, C.H., *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, The Eothen Press, second edition, Huntingdon, 1990, p.190.

⁸⁹ Sowerwine, James Edward, *Dynamics of Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: 1961-1980*, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987, pp.185-86.

⁹⁰ Çalış, *Op.cit.*, pp.143-46.

⁹¹ See *Chapter Seven*, the section on Gulf Crisis

discussion above, the NSC is theoretically an advisory body attached to the Council of Ministers on a purely consultative basis. In practice, however, the NSC's advice is not usually ignored by the Cabinet.

After analysing the institutional structure of Turkey, it is worth emphasising again that Turkey's regime and the institutions protecting it have not changed. The change which this thesis always mention about is the gradual change of Turkish political structure through the modernisation of social political and economic life. The West has always been a paradigm for Turkey's modernisation. The main decision making bodies have been very sensitive to keep Turkish modernisation process on its way. However, Turkey is still far away from the developed nations of the West concerning the social, economic and political life. Through the functioning process of modernisation Turkey could reach to her long desired aim.

4.9. Turkish Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

After the 1960 Revolution and the ratification of the 1961 Constitution, profound changes occurred in Turkish society which were bound to affect foreign policy changes in the political system⁹². For the first time in Turkish political history, the way foreign policy decisions were taken was criticised.

⁹² See Sowerwine, James Edward, *Op.cit.*, pp.185-86.

Turkey's passive foreign policy in fact was criticised from the early 1960s. The liberal constitution of 1961 allowed people to speak out about Turkish foreign policy. For instance, in 1962 the Journal 'Yön' an effective pro-leftist Journal noted, *"until today there were no discussions either in the parliament or in the press except for a few technicalities about foreign policy. All the governments would say when asked about foreign policy "Peace at Home and Peace abroad" and nothing else. Nobody asked the questions of how do we maintain this peace and what are the conditions of living in peace. Why cannot we talk about the different alternatives in our foreign policy"*⁹³.

A survey made by Mr Gönlübol which analysed public opinion and foreign policy showed that the general public was found to be divided in a three layered pyramid based on knowledge and interest in foreign affairs⁹⁴. According to these studies the lowest and, by far, the largest level was composed of the passive public which showed little if any interest in foreign affairs. The public at this level was more susceptible to emotional outbursts and variations in moods and usually expressed its opinion in a reactive manner. Once a particular problem in foreign affairs had passed people in this classification were likely to become passive again. The second level consisted of the active public which was more intellectual and has a greater knowledge about foreign policy matters. At the top of the pyramid was a group of public opinion creators. These were the elite in

⁹³ *Yön*, Turkish monthly journal, 17 January 1962, pp.6-7

⁹⁴ Gönlübol, Mehmet, *Dış Politika: İç Etkenler Açısından Bir Dış Politika İncelemesi* (Foreign Policy: A Foreign Policy Analysis from Domestic Angle), Ulusal Basimevi (Ulusal Publishers), Ankara, 1969, pp.113-118.

government, particularly bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trying to gain public support on certain foreign policy issues. Active people (leaders) in different organisations was also put in this group as they usually try to influence public on certain issues concerning their organisations. This survey showed that until the 1980s the vast majority of the people were indifferent to foreign affairs partly due to the low literacy rate but mainly due to the lack of modernised democratic political and economic structure.

After the 1980s, the economic development helped the gradual creation of the bourgeoisie⁹⁵. The middle class has then started to have an influence on the elite. Since then one can observe the shift in Turkish foreign policy which has been explained in the previous section.

4.10. Turkish Public Opinion and the European Community

It is one of the main arguments of this thesis that Turkish public opinion did not have enough chance to discuss Turkey's stand towards the European Community. Although a long term natural westernisation was in process, Turkish officials' sudden decision in July 1959 to join the Community was mostly due to the external changes. As can be seen in chapter six, Greece's application in 1959 to become a member of the community alarmed Turkish officials. Since the country committed itself to western ideals, Turkey, already a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO),

⁹⁵ See Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, Vernon, London, 1987, pp.71-90.

decided in 1959, just a fortnight after Greece's application, to apply to join the community⁹⁶. The Turkish elite thought that Turkish interest would be harmed if Turkey chose not to join. This is because Greece decided to join. Greece was a main adversary of Turkey in the region and Turkey was having problems with Greece over Cyprus and the share of Aegean sea. Turkey had to closely monitor and follow Greece. The other factor in Turkey's decision was the existence of the Cold War. Turkey was an ally of the West in military terms. She wanted to strengthen its alliance by joining the Community. Turkey felt that she was in a strategic position and being a member of the Community would guarantee the security of Turkey.

However, as David Barchard says, *"Turkey's long history of involvement in the politics of Europe, and thereby the West, does not offer clear guidance for the future. Primarily because of the religious divide between Christianity and Islam, the history of Turkish-European relations is largely one of confrontation, antagonism and mutual indifference, dislike or misunderstanding. The cultural divide remains strong even today"*⁹⁷. Cultural cleavage between Turkey and the West remains intact due to the existing nationalist structure of Turkey and as well as of the West European Countries.

⁹⁶ Güran, Nevzat, *Türkiye-Avrupa Topluluğu İlişkileri (Turkish-European Community Relations)*, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Avrupa Topluluğu ile İlişkiler Başkanlığı (State Planning Organisation, the Department of the European Community Relations), Publish no. DPT.2230-AETB.23, 1990, p.5.

⁹⁷ Barchard, David, *Op.cit.*, p.7.

However, all those does not mean that Turkey should seek alternatives to her deep rooted relations with the West. Just as the main argument of this thesis, it is the interdependence of nations (the degree of dependency might not always be on equal basis) that a nation has its unique and irreplaceable place among the others. A nation or a country's place can be deceptive or unnecessary only when the domestic structure of that country is undemocratic. In other words, if public opinion is neglected in domestic and foreign affairs, then the outcome of policies will be unrealistic indeed.

Contrary to some of the other policy areas, (for instance, Turkish-Greek relations have always caused high involvement of public), Turkish public opinion has been indifferent towards the European Community. When the Ankara Agreement was signed, the Turkish press passed the news to their readers with a great deal of exaggeration and raised expectations. For instance, newspapers put their headlines as *"the historic Treaty is signed in Ankara"*⁹⁸, and *"we are a Community member now"*, and some others said *"from now on we are a European country"*⁹⁹. That behaviour of the Turkish Press showed that even some of the Turkish elite did not know much about the Community. The only information ordinary people had came from the statements of politicians. Turkey's move at that time motivated only by external factors due to the existing Cold

⁹⁸ *Hürriyet*, 13 September 1963.

⁹⁹ See *"12 Eylül 1963 Ankara Anlaşmasının Türk Basınındaki Yankıları"* (*The echoes of the 12 September 1963 Ankara Agreement in the Turkish Press*), İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Dergisi, (The Journal of Economic Development Fund), September, 1988, no. 59, pp. 64-69.

War structure and Turkey's relative weakness in foreign affairs. The Turkish Foreign Minister at that time, Feridun Cemal Erkin, however, knew that a hard time was ahead of Turkey. He was thus more cautious in his speech in the signature ceremony. He said *"We are aware of the difficulty of the task which awaits us. We know that signing this agreement is not sufficient for the attainment of its objectives and we are conscious that the targeted goals can be reached at the cost of great sacrifices and hard work. However, we are determined to overcome all the difficulties and have the faith that we will reach our goals"*¹⁰⁰.

After the 1987 Application for full membership, the Turkish government publicised the issue and tried to gain public support on Turkey's application. As a result, 61% of the people, according to a survey made by Turkish Industrial Employers Association, supported Turkish membership of the Community¹⁰¹. Also in another survey made by Milliyet-DATA majority of people explained their opinion in favour of Turkey's full membership¹⁰². 61.1% of people were in favour, 19.8% had no idea about what is going on and only 19.1% have rejected the idea of Turkey's membership of the

¹⁰⁰ *Hürriyet*, 13 September 1963, the English translation taken from İlkin, Selim, "A History of Turkey's Association with the European Community", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (Editors), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske & Budrich GmbH, Opladen, Germany, 1990, p.35.

¹⁰¹ Dinçkök, Ömer, "Ankara Anlaşmasının 25. Yılında Türkiye AET İlişkileri (Turkish-European Community Relations on the 25th anniversary of Ankara Agreement)", *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (Journal of Economic Development Fund)*, September, 1988, p.28.

¹⁰² *Milliyet*, 16 April 1987.

Community. 54% of the people have thought that Turkey was ready for full membership, whereas 23% thought that Turkey was not ready for full membership¹⁰³. In another survey made in August 1990 by *Hürriyet-Kamar*, while 72.3% of people would favour the membership, only 10.7% were against it and 16.9% had no idea about it¹⁰⁴. The government's campaign has been effective in increasing support for the full membership. It also increased public's involvement in foreign affairs. The higher percentage of the acceptance of the membership in 1990 has shown that people were ready to discuss and involve in Turkey's foreign affairs. People saw Turkish-European Community relations as an economic matter and they have convinced that Turkey having the full membership would be economically better off. When the same survey asked whether Turkey is a European country or an Asian country, 67.5% responded that Turkey was a European country, only 19% responded that Turkey was an Asian country. In fact, people were declaring their wish to become as much as possible a European country, though they might know that Turkey geographically was an Asian country. When asked about Turkey's foreign relations with the islamic countries, 59.2% of the same sample responded that they wanted closer relations with the other muslim countries, only 27% responded otherwise, 13.75% did not answer the question¹⁰⁵. But this does not indicate a priority choice between 'Europe' and 'Islam'.

¹⁰³ Note: Survey made on 1346 people from seven different regions. See *Milliyet*, 16 April 1987.

¹⁰⁴ *Hürriyet*, 15 August 1990.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

All those could be interpreted that Turkish people wanted a close relationship with the European Community as well as maintaining Turkey's relations with the other countries, particularly with muslim states in the region. However, it should be noted that there has been no referendum on such an important matter. Whereas political and economic advantages and disadvantages of the membership should be discussed on a wide political spectrum and then a referendum should be held.

Since Turkey's initial application in 1958 for an associate membership, all political parties favoured Turkey's membership except the National Salvation Party (after 1983 reestablished as the Welfare Party) of Necmeddin Erbakan. Necmeddin Erbakan spoke out about the danger of being a member of a European club¹⁰⁶. Erbakan's main idea on the issue is that muslim Turkey cannot be a part of a christian club. To him Turkey's sovereignty would be in danger once Turkey becomes a member¹⁰⁷. Erbakan and his coterie have always been against Turkish-European relations. To him any organisational tie with Europe will make Turkey a colony¹⁰⁸. The Welfare Party remains to this day only major party to reject EC membership.

¹⁰⁶ See Erbakan, Necmeddin, *Milli Görüş (National View)*, Dergah Publishers, Istanbul, September, 1975, pp.235-264.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, pp.261-262.

¹⁰⁸ Erbakan, Necmeddin, *His open speech to his party group in the TGNA*, 15 March 1995.

Having explained Turkish public opinion about Turkish-European Community relations, it is worth mentioning that the main problem is not how Turks see Europeans but how Europeans see Turks. It is after all Europeans who will decide for the full membership of Turkey. Taking the European Community as an independent variable might mislead us and make this analysis static. To maintain the dynamism and avoid any misleading projections about the future of the Community, possible changes in Communities own structure should be taken into consideration. To that aim, a big section of the chapter seven is devoted to the present structure of the Community and its likely future¹⁰⁹.

David Barchard again says *"Western images of Turkey tend to be static and sometimes anachronistic. For cartoonists, Turks wear Fezes which has been outlawed since 1925. For press photographers, women in veils are used to symbolise country. Such images can observe the political and social realities of a country which is increasingly urban and industrial and in which power has rested for almost the entire period since World War One with an upper class whose life-style is both anti-traditionalist and virtually, indistinguishable from that of many Western Europeans"*¹¹⁰.

Again, Turkey's relations with the Middle East and the other muslim countries have been perceived as contradictory to a Turkish commitment to the West. For

¹⁰⁹See Chapter Seven.

¹¹⁰ Barchard, *Op.cit.*, p.7.

instance, James Brown¹¹¹ in his article on islamic fundamentalism and Turkey says *"Prime Minister Özal argues that the surest way to contain the spread of fundamentalism is not its suppression, but through Turkey's accession to the European Community"*. Then he says *" Prime Minister Özal stirred a hornets' nest by going on a hajj [Religious Pilgrimage] to Mecca. This pilgrimage took place while President Evren was on a state visit to Great Britain, assuring Prime Minister Thatcher that Turkey is a fully westernised nation, ready for full membership in the E.E.C. This action by Özal may be misinterpreted and reflects that Turkey is still essentially an islamic, rather than a European country"*¹¹². The most important thing to be emphasised here is that one should separate political islam from cultural and social islam. To put it more correctly, de facto situation of being a muslim country does not necessarily mean that it is politically an islamic country.

Another problem sometimes arises from the fact that the application of secularism unnecessarily includes some religious and traditional ingredients in Europe and as well as in Turkey. Turkey is a secular state. Its population, however, is 98% muslim. For instance, the wearing of headscarf is quite common in Turkey due to religious beliefs. After 1980, the wearing of a headscarf has been banned in universities and public places, although in no European country is there such a restriction on the individual's rights.

¹¹¹ For that see Brown, James, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Turkey", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1988, pp.242-243.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p.242.

Unfortunately, however, some writers (in Turkey and Europe) have accused people who were protesting the prohibition rather than accusing the government for issuing such an undemocratic law. Dalacoura, for instance, says "*Although, Turkey purports to be a secular state, the banning of the headscarf can still cause passionate protest*"¹¹³. It can clearly be seen from that statement that the understanding of her secularism does not really match the actual universal meaning of secularism. It would, however, be appropriate to note that the implementation of secularism in Turkey (as well as in Europe) needs delicate expertise. In fact, the term 'secularism' should be redefined so that its application do not vary from one country to another.

Birand emphasised that the Turkish application for Associate status in the EEC in 1958, which had been prepared within two weeks by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without any serious research, did not draw any special attention in the Turkish media. For the public, the application meant no more than requesting credit from the United States or the World Bank¹¹⁴. Birand stresses that Turkish public perceived Turkey's involvement in the European Community as a commercial matter. He says "*in fact at the time of the Additional Protocol and the Ankara Agreement, people tended to regard the issue as something like going on a shopping trip to Paris! Let's be truthful about it,*

¹¹³ Dalacoura, Katherina,. "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1980s", *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1990, p.207.

¹¹⁴ Birand, Mehmet Ali, *Türkiyenin Ortak Pazar Macerası 1959-1990, (Turkey's Common Market Adventure 1959-1990)*, Milliyet Publishers, Eight Edition, September 1990, Istanbul, p.64.

*until the very end of the 1980s that was the public perception*¹¹⁵." After the 1980s, however, the public's perception of the foreign affairs in general and of the European Community in particular has somewhat changed, partly due to the governments informative campaign and mainly due to the improvements in the democratic structure bringing more freedom of expression.

Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Malatya Deputy of the Welfare Party, commenting on the Foreign Ministry Budget in the parliament on behalf of his party said that Turkey's European Community membership should be taken to a referendum¹¹⁶. In fact the Welfare Party is an anti-western party. Its leader Necmeddin Erbakan and his coterie repeatedly pointed out their anti-westernist ideas in almost every opportunity. Oğuzhan Asiltürk, while delivering a speech on an issue about Bosnia before the Parliament, argued that some 53 muslim countries could establish their own Islamic Nations as an alternative to the United Nations. Turkey could then play a leading role in this issue through this institutional framework¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁵ Birand, Mehmet Ali, From a Speech Made on Turkey's Regional Policy, in eds. Mary Strang and Arlene Redmond, *Turkey and the European Community: A Forum Conference in Partnership with the Turkish Permanent Delegation to the European Communities*, Brussels, October 30-31, 1991, p.163.

¹¹⁶ *Newspot*, 10 October 1991, p.2.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.2.

Chapter two has emphasised the relevance of ideas, elites and clientelism in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. These ideas underpin the questions this chapter asks. they are part of the characteristic 'debilitated pluralism' of Turkish politics which manifests itself in a dual structure of power where formal democratic or constitutional structures are dominated, as in many Mediterranean countries, by informal ones. Interview evidence supports this view, although as chapter seven will show below, the balance has tilted somewhat more towards democratic influences in the 1990s. Mr İnan, for example, emphasised the importance informal networks and relations in all policy processes, including those EC-Turkish relations for which he was directly responsible¹¹⁸. He also gave the example of the latest agreement which, now he is in opposition, he saw from a different view point¹¹⁹. Mr. Neziroğlu, and Mr. Makas also emphasised the significance of relations of obligation and the way in which political power in the hands of leaders such as Mrs. Çiller used the bureaucracy and people from the private sector while avoiding formal channels and accountability¹²⁰.

¹¹⁸ *Interview*, İnan, Kamran, ex-State Minister and Foreign Spokesman and the Member of Parliament of Motherland Party, on 16th March 1995 in Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Interviews*, Neziroğlu, İrfan, The Library and Documentation Centre of Turkish Grand National Assembly, Principal Expert on International Relations, on 15th March 1995 and Makas, Abdullah Cengiz, International Affairs Consultant to Welfare Party's Foreign Spokesman, Turkish Grand National Assembly, Public Relations Department, Ankara, on 15th March 1995.

4.11. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, it could be said that Turkey's modernisation and democratisation of political structure took a slow and gradual process. The political structure established by a homogeneous Nationalist-Westernist elite and modernisation and democratisation process were at the beginning also controlled by them. In other words, the introduction of democracy and the modernisation of political structure were granted from above. The same elite, having the military on their side, intervened three times (1960, 1971 and 1980) to rearrange the democratic structure. One of the lessons that can be taken from Turkey's democracy experience is that a granted democracy does not work. After the 1980s, when democratic channels were established and the elite lost their homogeneity, democracy became more stable by the competition of a more heterogeneous elite. The acceleration of the political and economic modernisation has *"brought the great majority of the population into the social, economic and political mainstream of national life ... and [they] are now agents of continuing modernisation, not merely objects of it"*¹²¹. Most important of all, the economic reformation after the 1980s can be seen as the most important changes that protected democracy. The implementation of the free market economy has created a heterogeneous middle class bourgeoisie. As Turgut Özal said in 1983, then the Prime Minister, that *"we are going*

¹²¹ Weiker, Walter, F., *The Modernisation of Turkey: From Atatürk to the Present Day*, Holmes & Mayer, New York, 1981, p.xvi.

*to create an economically wealthy middle class*¹²²". He called that class '*Orta Direk*' (the Middle Pillar) of the political and economic structure. The creation of a domestic economic interdependent structure between the different power groups and pressure groups has seemed to secure the continuation of democracy. Parallel to the economic and political improvements, Turkish foreign policy also evolved. The introduction of democracy in 1950 has also signalled the change of Turkish foreign policy from a passive foreign policy to an active one. Thanks to the structural changes in the economy, Turkey became more and more interdependent in international relations in general and in her regional economic relations in particular. The next chapter will deal with the creation of a modernised interdependent foreign policy.

¹²² *Hürriyet*, 19 April 1984.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. THE EMERGENCE OF A MODERNISED FOREIGN POLICY IN TURKEY: FROM PASSIVITY TO AN ACTIVE INTERDEPENDENCE

5.1. Introduction.

The previous chapter has explained the process of modernisation and the effects of this process on the emergence of a more modernised political structure. Also in the previous chapter it is emphasised that Turkish foreign policy has become more and more an outcome of a complex institutional structure. This chapter briefly examines Turkish foreign policy from the beginning of the Republic to 1992; it covers major changes in the shape and understanding of foreign policy. The main aims are to explain the bases of the foreign policy of Turkey. By doing that we may establish the necessary background for the evaluation of Turkish foreign policy towards the European Community.

The main theme of this chapter is that Turkish foreign policy has changed and evolved throughout the life span of the Turkish Republic. It is argued that in the evolution of Turkish foreign policy the domestic political and economic structure has played a vital role. It is not a coincidence, for instance, that passive foreign policy began slowly to be more active after the introduction of democracy in 1950 when a new era started after the end of the Second World War. Neither is it a coincidence that Turkish foreign policy began to multi-dimensionalise after the introduction of the political and

economic restructuralisation programme in 1980 when a detente process was also on the way between the East and West which finally led to the ending of the Cold War.

Turkish foreign policy will thus be scrutinised under three main headings. First, are the years of "passive foreign policy" when the country was unable to wield significant power in the international community. Turkish foreign policy was indeed passive until the end of the Second World War and also the beginning of multi party political life, approximately over the years between 1923-1950. The second period is the years when Turkey gradually moved from passive to "active foreign policy" after the introduction of democracy between the 1950s and the late 1980s. The third period is the years of "multi-dimensional" foreign policy which followed the late 1980s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has played a particular role in the new Turkish foreign policy. The growing democratisation process in Turkey and in the world in general has also had an impact in shaping a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey's new more engaged foreign policy has emerged against the background of the rhetoric of the 'New World Order' and is compatible with some aspects of that idea¹. But in her more independent foreign policy the central problem has been to find a new, less dependent relationship with the United States while protecting security. This has involved a search for a detente, a structure of security, at the regional level. The growing democratisation process together with the liberal economic system in Turkey and as well as in Eastern European countries and the Middle Asian states have created another dimension in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey

¹ See *Chapter Three*.

has developed more varied independent bilateral relations with many countries. To give an example, the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey before the Soviet Union disintegrated. In 1988, before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, relations between the two countries were very poor, indeed almost on the brink of war². As soon as the Soviet Union collapsed relations between the two dramatically improved. The relations developed to a point where Bulgaria has become a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region³ which has been established on the initiative of Turkey. Turkey's new foreign policy is an outcome of two major changes: first, the changes in the internal structure of the country, and second, changes in the external environment surrounding Turkey. The former changes were more gradual and smooth than the latter.

The aim of analysing Turkish foreign policy under three divided headings is to show the reader that internal and external changes occurred roughly at the same time. The external and the internal changes have not suddenly changed the main course of Turkish foreign policy. Those three periods have been identified in order to draw an approximate line between different phases of Turkish foreign policy. Otherwise, it should also always be emphasised that changes happened gradually and it is therefore difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between different phases of foreign policies. The point should be made that the aim of this chapter is not to explain the Turkish foreign policy chronologically. One cannot easily tell when passive foreign policy ends and

² See Mc.Intyre, Robert.J., *Bulgaria, Politics, Economics and Society*, London, 1988.

³ See *Chapter Eight*.

active foreign policy starts or when active westward looking foreign policy has become a multi-dimensional foreign policy.

5.2. Ideological Basis and Domestic Background

As chapter four shows, Turkey's domestic political structure is a mixture of pluralist, elitist, and clientelist structures. The domestic structure that has been outlined in chapter four emphasised ideas which lend continuity across the three periods identified here. These ideas also shaped the passive foreign policy of the period up to 1950. Ideas embodied in institutions shape foreign policy⁴. We can speak here of an 'ideological basis' for Turkish foreign policy which reflects the strength and coherence of ideas held across time and through large parts of the Turkish elite. For as far as foreign policy is concerned, the Turkish elite played a crucial role in foreign policy decisions. As is the case of most other democratic countries, foreign policy decisions have been seen as a sensitive area where the involvement of the public would be regarded as harmful to the country's interests in the international arena. Consequently, some kind of secrecy has been inevitable, particularly, when diplomatic negotiations are in progress. Publicity could easily reduce the bargaining power. A certain degree of secrecy in the bargaining process should thus be acceptable in foreign policy matters. This reinforces an elitist tradition in Turkey. The secret bargaining process is not or should not contradict the

⁴ See Goldstein, J., and Keohane R O, (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993.

theories of interdependence and globalism which are discussed in chapter three. After all, foreign policy decisions are taken by human beings who are under the constraints of their environment. Foreign policy is not made in a vacuum and the channels of networks inside the political structure of any country as well as between countries are not as fluid as they are thought, in democratic theory, to be. If the elite feel themselves under the pressure of the mass (or electorate, or clients in Turkish case) then that means that a certain degree of effectiveness exists in the establishment of domestic structure. In the case of Turkey, however, the pressure of the masses could hardly be felt by the elite, partly, because of deep socio-economic cleavages⁵ between the masses and the elite, but in the period to 1950 mainly because of the lack of democratic channels to be used by pressure groups, the lack of an organised structure of public opinion, and the close nature of the state.

As has already been explained in chapter four, the elitist structure was inherited from Ottoman Empire. The elite in Ottoman times were ideologically fed by islamic thought. In the last century of the Ottoman Empire, when the decline and disintegration started, the elite⁶ was looking for a change in ideology. A westernisation⁷ process took place which was part of a search for means to reverse a disintegration. The terms '*nation*'

⁵ For uneven income distribution and its effect on the emergence of dual structure in Turkey, see *Chapter Four*.

⁶ For more about the elite during the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, see *Chapter Four*.

⁷ See *next Chapter*.

and 'nation-state' became the main characteristic of the Republic, instead of 'umma', which means a community of the same religious group in islam.⁸

Atatürk himself was an Ottoman general and he *"inherited (from Ottoman) military and bureaucratic institutions that had developed during the nineteenth century, institutions which represented the pillar of his rule and from which were recruited most members of the political elite. Most administrators had continued to serve the Istanbul Government while the Turkish Republic was being born but they changed loyalty easily and many important posts were filled by them. Unfortunately it is difficult to assess the degree of continuity that occurred, for little detailed information is available apart from the Foreign Ministry".*

As far as foreign policy is concerned, *"the traditional considerations of family background remained important in the Foreign Ministry"*¹⁰. A study made by Harris conclude that *"the Kemalist regime preserved a striking amount of continuity with the past... The transformation... was evolutionary and gradual, with a minimum disruption of the old... The foreign service remained through Atatürk's life time a closely knit elite*

⁸ See Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism In Turkey*, McGill University Press, Montreal, 1964, the chapter on 'The Struggle For Establishment of a Secular Nation-State 1919-39'.

⁹ Szyliowicz, Joseph S., "Elites and Modernisation in Turkey" *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East* Frank Tachau (ed.), Schenkman Publishing, London, 1975, p.30.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p.31.

corps....¹¹". A main characteristic of Turkish foreign policy has been continuity. Contrary to a pattern of frequent changes and instability in the domestic policies, there is a consensus on most foreign policy issues. Until the 1980s, during which a multi-dimensional foreign policy slowly emerged, there was an absolute consensus on the policy of Westernization as a way of modernisation.

Although, foreign policy ideology was Western-oriented, there were few strong concrete links with the West. As Sowerwine noted *"due to Turkey's strategic geopolitical position, her recent wartime experiences, and other past time attempts by foreign powers to interfere in her internal affairs, Turkey was vigilant in maintaining her complete independence. Though, the new Turkey was not an expansionist country she was not a self-satisfied one either¹²"*. However, due to Turkey's weakness in foreign affairs, Turkish foreign policy between the two world wars was based on the preservation of the Turkish sovereignty. Turkey during that time was trying to create a unique and compact nation state in order to preserve internal stability. Atatürk said *"We are a nation which was late and negligent in applying the idea of nationality. ... Especially our nation [Turks] has suffered because her nationality was ignored. Various nationalities within the Ottoman Empire saved themselves by embracing the nationalist faith and by*

¹¹ Harris, George S., *The Atatürk Revolution and the Foreign Office, 1919-1931: A Preliminary Study*. (Paper delivered at the Middle East Studies Association Meeting, Binghamton, New York, November 1972) in Szyliowicz. *Ibid*, p.31

¹² Sowerwine, James Edward, *Dynamics of Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy 1961-1980*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987, p.14.

*the force of their nationalist ideal*¹³". As can be seen from Atatürk's statement, in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish political structure was based on nationalism which was in vogue in Europe, especially after 1789 French Revolution. As Kili noted *"...Kemalist nationalism was not racist and it was not a persecuting nationalism. According to Kemalist ideology one's Turkishness was not necessarily determined by one's race or religion but by the degree a person associated himself with the ideas, ideals, and goals of the Turkish nation and by determination to protect all that had been won as a result of great hardships; and also by commitment to Turkish modernisation*¹⁴". *"Members of the Turkish nation were (therefore) to speak Turkish and consider themselves to be Turks, regardless of religion, race, creed, or place of birth*¹⁵".

Atatürk's foreign policy was formulated as *"peace at home peace abroad"*¹⁶". These words implied *"a policy of based on the maintenance of the status quo and on the survival of a relatively homogeneous national state with a clear Turkish identity"*¹⁷".

¹³ Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri 1906-1938*, (Atatürk's Speeches and Sayings 1906-1938), vol.2, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1959, p.142-143.

¹⁴ Kili, Suna, *Kemalism*, School of Business Administration and Economics, Menteş Matbaası (Mentes Publishers), Istanbul, 1969, p.82.

¹⁵ Sowerwine, James Edward, *Op.cit.*, p.16.

¹⁶ Karaosmanoğlu, Ali, "Turkey and Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts", *Nato's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, Chipman, J. (ed.), Routledge, London, 1988, p.293.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.294.

"Peace at Home, Peace Abroad" was however a modest policy. As Fukuyama also emphasises *"a decolonising Britain or a Kemalist Turkey are equally power maximiser, because they were forced to consolidate. By growing smaller they guaranteed their power in the long run"*¹⁸.

Since the aim of this study is based on the argument that the foreign and domestic policies of Turkey were *"closely linked with the idiosyncrasies, perceptions, images, and attitudes of the Warrior Diplomats"*¹⁹ (elite), which were conditioned by their values, convictions and previous experiences, the slogan *"Peace at Home and Peace in the World"* should (thus) be interpreted within the context of the fundamental values and convictions of the Turkish Warrior Diplomats (elite)²⁰. The conviction of the elite at the beginning of the Republic was that power politics were dominant in international society, the international system thus was anarchic, because it rested on an unequal distribution of power²¹. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923, provided the necessary bases in international law for Turkey to maintain her status quo and national identity.

¹⁸ Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992, p.257.

¹⁹ See Tamkoç, Metin, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernisation of Turkey*, Salt Lake City, 1976, London, p.300.

²⁰ For more about the Turkish elite and their biography, see Tamkoç, Metin, *Ibid*, pp.7-307.

²¹ *Ibid*, p.300

The Treaty was therefore an essential and significant document. It made Turkey a status quo power among other nations²².

The transformation of a multi-national islamic community to a nation state was not Atatürk's only desire. He also wanted Turkey to become a part of western civilisation and a member of the community of civilised nations. In the eyes of Atatürk and his followers, there was only one civilisation, the western one, and Turkey should join "*in spite of the West*"²³.

The internal organisation of the state as well as its external relations were ideologically shaped by Ziya Gökalp, who is known as an extreme Turkish nationalist although he came from the Kurdish city of Diyarbakır. By looking at his origin one can clearly understand the nature of Turkish nationalism at the beginning of the Republic. Turkish nationalism was not attributed to peoples' racial roots. As far as the ideology of the Republic is concerned, Turkish nationalism certainly did not mean the protection of the Turkish race all over the world. Atatürk's view quite clearly supports that idea. According to the Kemalist idea the aim of nationalism was to create and maintain a Turkish nation-state in place of the Ottoman past and then create a solidarity among the Turks residing within the limits of the state (Misak'ı Milli). Atatürk believed that those

²² Lenczowski, *Political Elites in the Middle East*, Washington, 1975, p.122.

²³ Vali, Ferenc A., *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971, p.56.

Turks living within the new borders must thus reject allegiance or close affiliations with any other country, in spite of the fact that they might share a common religious or ethnic heritage. The citizens of the new Turkish state were to consider themselves to be Turks, regardless of their religion, race, creed, or place of birth²⁴.

Nationalism became the chosen ideology of the Republic for several reasons. Firstly, nationalist movements were in action throughout the world and particularly in Western Europe. Secondly the majority of people living in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire were Turks. Since nationalist ideas was in fashion, it had to be Turkish nationalism. And thirdly, the Republic is founded on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the original founders of which were Turks.

However, clearly the term "Turkish" was meant to include the people who were living in Anatolia, mainly muslim even though converted ones, and with the same culture and social relations. Turkish nationalism thus did not include all the people of Turkish origin but the people who lived inside the Republic and shared the same destiny and culture. It could therefore be said that the Turkish Republic is not a nation-state; rather it reflects the features of a state-nation²⁵.

²⁴ See Kili, Suna, *Op.cit.*, pp.82-83.

²⁵ See Enloe, Cynthia H. and Rejai Mostafa, "Nation-States and State-Nations", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.13, no.2, 1969, pp.140-158.

To sum up, the phrase "Turkish nationalism" never represented or signified the Turks who came a thousand years before from the Chinese border, nor did it mean the Turks all over the world. Turkish nationalism was designed to be influential, on the geographical area where the Republic was established, in order to create a unique nation. It would perhaps have been better to use the word *Anatolian* (Anadolu)²⁶ or the *mainland* (Anavatan) to make the unity long lasting and more stable. A specific territoriality is thus central to Turkish identity as it was re-defined in the 1920s.

The ideology of the Turkish Republic is based on six principles known as "*the Principles of Atatürk*". These are; "*Nationalism*", "*Populism*", "*Secularism*", "*Republicanism*", "*Etatism or Statism*", "*Revolutionarism*"²⁷. The interpretation and the implementation of those principles has varied. Intellectuals and governments interpreted those principles according to their ideals, their need or their expectation. For instance, on the one hand, Ziya Gökalp, as explained above and in chapter four, drew a corporatist nationalist picture, on the other hand, the *Kadro*²⁸ group elaborated on

²⁶ In an interview on TRT (*Turkish Radio Television*) on 27 August 1992, Even President Turgut Özal has shared the same view on solving the Kurdish problem. In some circles, in the Government and military, his view has been perceived as dangerous for the unity of the country and encouraging Kurdish people towards disintegration.

²⁷ About the explanations of those principles, see Karpas, Kemal, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959, pp.251-348.

²⁸ Note that *Kadro* is an intellectual journal published in the 1930s. It has been influential on governments in interpreting the principles of Atatürk and determining the ideology of the 1930s. For more about the journal and its writers, see Karpas, Kemal, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, Princeton University Press,

Gökalp's earlier social and economic writings and portrayed the Kemalist revolution as leading an international liberation movement struggling against capitalism and imperialism²⁹. The Kadro movement argued that for an underdeveloped country such as Turkey the main question was not the reconciliation of economic interests, as seen in economically developed countries, but the creation of an advanced technology, and of a society without social contradictions³⁰.

From the establishment of the Republic until the end of the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy was a passive one, unable to affect the events outside her boundaries. It was however a westward-looking foreign policy. Turkish identity was forged out of weakness in the aftermath of defeat. But it was also a strong identity, widely shared by the elite and the people, based on language, territory, history and a view of westernisation or modernisation. As a modernising nationalism re-defined after defeat based on a central state, it has more in common with Gaullism than one might imagine. It legitimised and helped to stabilise during radical change. As quoted in the Washington Post *"No country has undergone such vast changes in its whole way of life as has Turkey in one generation. For all these changes Atatürk alone was responsible... A new revolution in Turkish politics...is now being attempted...it can only be understood in*

Princeton, 1959, pp.70-73.

²⁹ Bianchi, Robert, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984, p.103.

³⁰ Karpat, Kemal, *Op.cit.*, pp.70-73.

*terms of Kemal Atatürk's astonishing feat in wrenching Turkey out of Asia and into the Western world and, above all, in terms of the fear of the Soviet Union, the fear which colours and affects all Turkish life*³¹". The next section will, in more detail, analyse the years of passive Turkish foreign policy.

5.3. A Passive Foreign Policy: 1923-1950

Turkey's internal organisation is designed to achieve the Kemalist movement's basic foreign policy goal of the survival of the Turkish state. Turkish foreign and domestic policies were each designed to achieve this common goal through "*Westernisation*". Atatürk's policy of survival was tantamount to a passive foreign policy. To take Atatürk's own words, "*to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of our nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence*"³². "Existence" meant more than the physical existence of the Turkish nation. It also meant Turkey's territorial integrity and self-reliance within the framework of political, economic and military independence, with its culture and values intact. At the same time it meant the survival of the political system itself.

³¹ *Washington Post*, 16 February 1947.

³² Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk (The Speech)* Zeynep Korkmaz (ed.), Prime Ministry Publishing House, Ankara, 1984, pp.298-299.

During this period of one party rule, Atatürk's passive foreign policy meant the abandonment of the land lost during the First World War. Atatürk was trying to build a compact westernised nation-state and rejected any Turkish link with the Islamic world. As Tachau remarked *"Turkish intellectual and political leaders (during one-party period) boiled down to the extent to which their society and political system should adapt western values, concepts, and institutions and abandon those of the Muslim East. ...Atatürk's position on this issue was an extreme one: he advocated -indeed decreed- uncompromising and comprehensive westernisation, including not just political institutions, but cultural matters and even such highly personal item as the mode of dress as well. Atatürk also harboured a strong and unconcealed antipathy towards the institutions of islam, one of the major cultural and intellectual pillars of the Ottoman system³³". Atatürk's view on Islam and the Westernist ideology of the elite caused the effective cutting of relations with the Middle East.*

As Roderick Davison observed *"Turkey alone of the nations defeated in 1918 was able to reverse the decision within a few years and to negotiate as an equal with the allied powers for a new peace treaty... the Turkish struggle to establish a favourable international position was unique also among muslim peoples in successfully shaking off foreign controls³⁴".* The Lausanne Agreement, signed on 24 July 1923, gave Turkey an

³³ Tachau, Frank, "Turkish Foreign Policy Between East and West", *Middle East Review*, vol.17, no.3, 1985, p.22.

³⁴ Davison, Roderic H., *Turkey*, Spectrum Books, Englewood Cliffs, 1968, p.6.

international platform to exercise her passive foreign policy³⁵. Although Turkey was defeated in the First World War, she could manage to survive. After a hard diplomatic bargaining process in Lausanne, Turkey was able to keep enough land to build a nation state.

During the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy on the whole was not changed much. She was always reluctant to join the War on either side. She preferred to be neutral. To quote Mr. Deringil's phrase it was an "*active neutrality*"³⁶. The years of 1939-45 demonstrate the wisdom of not trying to be too engaged in external crisis if avoidable. Turkey during that time achieved a diplomatic victory by procuring arms from both sides in the conflict³⁷. She signed a friendship agreement with Britain and France in 1939 and signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1941. Turkey's fluctuations somewhat irritated the Allies. Turkey finally came down on the Allies side when the outcome of the war was clear. She cut her relations with the Axis in 1944, and in fact, just on the eve of the end of the War she declared war against Japan and Germany on 23 February 1945. The reason was to qualify for the membership of the United Nations. As Ambassador Peterson noted in his autobiography "*...Turkey's attitude during the War I had regarded as frankly disappointing...It was Turkey's last chance to enter*

³⁵ See Gönlübol, Mehmet, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, (Turkish Foreign Policy by Cases), Alkım Publishers, seventh edition, 1991, Ankara, pp.48-57.

³⁶ Deringil, Selim, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp.135-143.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p.135.

the new organisation of the United Nations on the footing of an Ally and I remember that I used the metaphor of a club which had a few unexpected vacancies for new members who would not be required to pay the fee of 'blood, sweat and tears'³⁸.

On 24 February 1945, Turkey embraced the United Nations Declaration: *"Turkey having already at the time of signing her alliance with Great Britain on 19 October 1939, embraced the cause of the allied Powers in their struggle against aggression, has since then broken off her diplomatic and economic relations first with Germany and with Japan, and having declared war on those powers on 23 February 1945, has decided to adhere to the United Nations Declaration"³⁹.*"

Afterwards, Turkish officials declared that Turkey was going to abandon the one-party system and liberalise its economy⁴⁰. However, it took 35 more years for Turkey to accomplish the legal requirements of a liberal economy.

³⁸ Peterson, Maurice, "Both sides of the Curtain", London, 1950, p.241, Quoted in Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p.74.

³⁹ *Department of State Bulletin*, xii, 4 March 1945, pp.373-374.

⁴⁰ *Aym Tarihi*, (The Date of the Month), Turkish Monthly Journal, May 1945, p.633.

5.4. Towards a More Active Foreign Policy

The introduction of democratic life after 1946 -though real democratic life started in 1950 when a fair general election was held- coincided with the end of Second World War. As soon as the War ended, democratic life was gradually established. Turkey once more committed itself to its western-oriented foreign policy. In the 1950 elections, the Democrat Party had a sweeping majority over the Republican Peoples Party⁴¹. The Democrat Party did not intend to veer towards any radical departure in Turkey's external relations. Indeed they were more enthusiastic to develop closer links with the West and to join NATO. The foreign policy of the new government set out by the Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, was as follows: *"Our foreign policy, which has been oriented towards the West since the Second World War, will take a more energetic and active form in this direction"*⁴² As Mr. Karpaz also noted *"The foreign policy of Turkey was not made an issue from 1946 on; all (political) parties agreed on a pro- western foreign policy except the Communist Party"*⁴³. Turkey has become an active player and partner of the Western countries in the implementation of foreign policies. She has accepted the United Nations Declaration at its commencement and was involved in the establishment of international organisations and became a member of NATO, the Council of Europe,

⁴¹ See *Chapter Four*.

⁴² Feroz, Ahmed, (emphasis added) *The Turkish Experiment In Democracy, 1950-1975*, C. Hurst & Company, London 1977, p. 390.

⁴³ Karpaz, Kemal H., *Op.cit.*, pp.336-337.

the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in 1959 (when the EEC was only one year old) applied for an associate membership⁴⁴ to the EEC.

As soon as the Second World War ended, Turkey faced an obvious Soviet threat. In March 1945, the Soviet Union declared that they would not renew the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression which was signed in 1925. The Soviet Union claimed a right, as the winner of the war, to control Turkey's North Eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan, and she attempted to control the Turkish straits⁴⁵. The straits were geopolitically important for Turkey as well as for Europe and America. The Soviet factor has thus been the major external influence on Turkish foreign policy. As Mr. Peterson wrote in July 1945 *"It is no exaggeration to say that in every sphere of Turkey's activities (internal and external and over the whole range commerce and industry) the dominating factor at the moment is the uneasy state of Russo-Turkish relations"*⁴⁶. He continued, saying that *"the attitude of Turkey...is...that nothing will induce her to concede to Russia military bases in the Straits... Turkey would fight rather than make these concessions which she would regard as tantamount to the surrender of her independence"*⁴⁷.

⁴⁴ See *Chapter Seven*.

⁴⁵ Karaosmanoğlu, Ali, "Turkey and Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts", *Nato's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, Chipman, J. (ed.), Routledge, London, 1988, p.295.

⁴⁶ *British Foreign Office*, Record no. 371/48774/R13467. A secret letter written on 28 July 1946, by British Ambassador to Turkey, Mr.Petersen, to Foreign Secretary Mr.Bevin.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

After the Second World War, Turkey unofficially became a United States satellite. In a bipolar world, Turkey had to choose one side as she could not stand on her own feet. As Alvarez⁴⁸ also says, between 1945 and 1947 there was a fundamental change in United States' policy towards Turkey. The United States felt a global responsibility for containing communism and protecting potential allies⁴⁹. Her historical ambitions to lean towards the West led Turkey to accept United States' support, and a common antipathy to communism made her embrace the West. There was thus a mutual interest between the United States and Turkey. Had communism prevailed in Turkey, it would have made the country a satellite state of the Soviet Union. Turkey had good relations with Russia at the beginning of the Republic because the Bolshevik revolution and Kemalist revolution were both struggling against imperialism. Despite that Turkey did not want to become a member of the Warsaw Pact because it was against the Westernist ideology of the state. Turkey and Russia also had a long history of military, political and ethnic conflict in the region. The United States also wanted to side with Turkey in order to strengthen another frontier against the Soviet Union, and to keep Soviet influence out of Mediterranean waters.

The historical hostility between Turkey and the USSR remained despite the Non-Aggression Agreement signed in 1924. For instance, Moscow was still claiming two

⁴⁸ Alvarez, David J., *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey 1943-1946*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1980, pp.75-110.

⁴⁹ See Ambrose, Stephen E., *The Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*, Penguin Books, sixth revised edition, New York, 1991.

Eastern provinces of Turkey (Kars and Ardahan). The seriousness of the Soviet Union's demands had been demonstrated by her actions. For instance, Soviet' troops massed along the frontier area of Thrace, and an aggressive propaganda campaign was launched against Turkey from Moscow and Sofia⁵⁰. Turkey and Russia had fought thirteen wars in history and Turkey was the looser in the last. If Turkey had joined the Warsaw Pact, it would have been perceived as the acceptance of defeat and it would have caused the disappearance of its newly formed independent foreign identity. The Soviet Union's demands, being supported with its military posture, made it clear that Moscow's ultimate aim was not only the revision of the Montreux Convention⁵¹ and territorial adjustment, but also the submission of Turkey to a satellite status⁵². During that time, Turkey felt clearly the Soviet threat and feared its expansionist policies⁵³. At Yalta, Joseph Stalin said that the Montreux Convention should be revised. In June 1945 Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslaw Molotov made Soviet intentions clearer when he said to Selim Serper, Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, that *"the Soviet Government acknowledged that Turkey had acted in World War Two with good will in defending the Straits; but also a great country like the Soviet Union could not rely wholly on its neighbours' intentions*

⁵⁰ Karaosmanoğlu, Ali, *Op.cit.*, p. 295

⁵¹ Note that The Montreux Convention is an international convention arranging the conditions of the use of the Straits.

⁵² Vali, A. Ferenc, *The Turkish Straits and NATO*, Hoover Institution Press, California, 1972, p.76.

⁵³ Bowder, G.M., "Turkey at the Crossroads", *The World Today*, May 1977, Vol. 33, no.5, p.164.

*in such a matter without also considering Turkey's military capabilities*⁵⁴". Therefore, Molotov added, *"the Soviet Union wanted to have bases on Turkish territories for defending the Straits"*⁵⁵. This was an obvious threat to Turkey's sovereignty. Like many other European countries, Turkey felt the effects of the new era very deeply. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a new superpower made her pressure more serious than ever. That pressure put Turkey into a dilemma, either to accept or reject the Soviet demands. Turkey for the reasons explained above had to reject Soviet demands. Being an ally with the United States, Turkey would feel more free and independent due to the geographical distance and the very nature of democracy and liberalism, and because of the security guarantees of the NATO agreement.

Bearing the hostility of the Soviet Union in mind, after 1945 Turkey tried to secure the support of Great Britain and the United States. Great Britain at that time herself was weak. The Soviet Union's efforts to enforce her will on Turkey and to bring her to a satellite position provoked an American response to take up the British burden to defend Turkish sovereignty⁵⁶. The Labour Government in Britain claimed that for economic reasons *"it could no longer maintain the Western interest in the Eastern*

⁵⁴ Hurewitz, J.C., "Russia and Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origin of the Problem", *World Politics*, July 1962, p.606.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Bryson, Thomas A., *American Diplomatic Relations With the Middle East 1784-1975*, Scarecrow Press, Metuchen 1976, p.140.

*Mediterranean*⁵⁷." "The administration (in the United States) reported (then) with alacrity; less than three weeks later the President (Truman) addressed a joint session of congress, outlining in stark terms how freedom in Greece and Turkey were menaced by outside totalitarian forces (the Soviet Union). His Truman Doctrine called for immediate assistance to the two nations and went on to claim that the time had arrived on free people everywhere to rally to the defence of democracy⁵⁸". In fact, Turkish efforts to obtain American support first yielded fruit when on 6 April 1946 President Truman warned that a Russian subjugation and coercion of the Middle Eastern states was intolerable. Also, the arrival of the American battleship Missouri at Istanbul on 5 April was a concrete signal that Turkey would be given American assistance.

On the other hand, the speech of President Truman on 12 March 1947 with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine indicated the beginning of a new era⁵⁹, with the full support of the United States for Turkey and Greece in protection against the Soviet threat. President Truman stated in that speech that; "...I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free world peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. I believe that we must assist

⁵⁷ Public Papers of President of the United States: Harry S. Truman, Washington, 1947, pp.178-180. Quoted in Petersen Nikolaj, "The Alliance Policies of the Smaller NATO Countries", in *NATO After Thirty Years*, Kaplan, Lawrence S. and Clawson, Robert W. (eds.), 1981, p.85.

⁵⁸ Nikolaj, Petersen, *Op. cit.*, p.84-86.

⁵⁹ Hartmann, Frederick H., *The Relations of Nations*, McMillan, New York, fifth edition, 1983, p.393.

*free people to work out their own destinies in their own way...I therefore ask to the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey*⁶⁰.

Turkey was not included in NATO when it was formed in April 1949, but joined in 1952. Turkey initially withheld support for the new pact, and concentrated her attention on obtaining the United Kingdom's and America's support for a separate pact for the Eastern Mediterranean region. At the same time, Turkey decided to become a member of NATO. The United States was reluctant to create a regional pact embracing the United Kingdom and the United States⁶¹. Turkey and Greece wanted the assurance of the United States against any Russian aggression⁶² and they also feared internal communist parties. It was argued that Turkey and Greece could contribute to NATO more than Luxembourg, Denmark or Holland. In addition to that, both Greece and Turkey were already being given military assistance by the United States⁶³. The NATO agreement was thus amended in 1951 by the London Protocol, signed 22 October 1951, whereby the original member countries agreed to invite Greece and Turkey to adhere to

⁶⁰ McGhee, George, *The US-Turkey NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*, Macmillan, Hampshire, 1990, p.22.

⁶¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950*, vol. 5, Washington US Government Printing office, 1978, p.1272.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p.1272.

⁶³ Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, "Eisenhower's Right Flank", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1951, p.651.

the pact and extend the area it covered correspondingly⁶⁴. On 18 February 1952, Turkey and Greece welcomed the invitation and accepted membership of NATO. In 1953, the Greek Army was 165.000 and the Turkish Army consisted of some 400.000 men, and so the net gain for NATO strength was considerable⁶⁵. Turkey had finally found the support that she had needed to resist and stand against the Soviet threat. On the other hand, the United States found a new ally that was eager to be a part of any pact which would resist Soviet expansionism⁶⁶.

The shift in American policy was completed with a new and more comprehensive plan for the whole of Europe: the Marshall Plan. The scope of the Truman Doctrine was not so wide, and only Greece and Turkey had been mentioned explicitly by the President. The Marshall Plan, launched in June 1947, proposed a reconstruction aid program for all countries in Europe that had suffered in the war. The Marshall Plan was rejected by the Soviet Union for herself and for the states over which she had influence. At that time it was only America that had emerged from the war with a stronger economy. Therefore, most of the countries which suffered in the war were urgently in need of American aid. The effects of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan have been pointed out by George McGhee: *"The U.S. aid program helped to defeat the Greek insurgents and assist*

⁶⁴ Royal Institution of International Affairs, *Atlantic Alliance*, London, 1952, pp.157-8.

⁶⁵ Hartmann, Frederick H., *Op.cit.*, p.334.

⁶⁶ Rustow, Dankward A., *Turkey America's Forgotten Ally*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York and London 1989, p.91.

*Turkey in rearming, restoring its economy, and regaining its confidence and stability without the loss of one of US soldier. The Truman Doctrine is rightly credited with leading directly to the promulgation of the Marshall Plan four months later, which cost the US \$14 billion ; to the Berlin airlift, which broke the Soviet Blockade of West Berlin; and to the success in July 1949 of the US initiative in the creation of NATO. Ultimately, the consequences of the Truman Doctrine engendered programmes of military and economic aid to most of the non-communist world*⁶⁷.

As mentioned above, American military and economic aid under the Marshall Plan profoundly affected Turkey's whole political life. In particular, it played a determining role in shaping the political parties' views on foreign affairs. In the early Cold War years, Turkish political parties and elites re-aligned themselves along Cold War lines. Most of the legitimate parties followed the case of the elite in adapting strongly pro-American views which have been deeply entrenched in the state apparatus ever since. Marshall Aid also played a major role in strengthening the elite's position in the political structure. The elite, after the Second World War, once more strengthened their westernised views and implemented a westward looking foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the United States was not sure whether to extend the peripheral area of NATO necessitated by the inclusion of Turkey and Greece. On the other hand, the inclusion of Turkey might involve fewer difficulties than the establishment of an entirely

⁶⁷ McGhee, George, *Op.cit.*, p.33.

new organization⁶⁸. Turkey, at that time, has become unenthusiastic about establishing a security organisation which might negatively affect her relations with the West. The Turkish government was eager to keep its distance from its Islamic neighbours and to emphasize the western, secular character of Ankara's policy.

Turkey played a relatively passive but an important role in the Cold War era. Turkey also supported the detente process between the West and East. The Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil made a speech in French in the Assembly of the Council of Ministers on the 27 April 1977, in which he emphasised that detente has started between East and West but that it was too slow despite leading towards reconciliation, and that the policy of detente should be implemented with more urgency⁶⁹. He then continued *"We are trying to create cooperation zones around us. We want to expand those zones to the continental level and then even to the world level. Turkey is a bridge between Europe and the Near and Middle East. Turkey's traditional policy requires the cooperation zones around her to be the rings of a broader cooperation chain"*⁷⁰. As can be seen from this speech, Turkish leaders had ambitions to play an active role to help the detente process and to create a stable world. As Batu, a senior

⁶⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, Op.cit.*, vol. 5, p. 1306

⁶⁹ Günver, Semih, *Kızgın Dam Üzerinde Diplomasi: Avrupalı Olabilmenin Bedeli (Diplomacy on the Hot Roof: The Price of Becoming a European)*, Milliyet Publishing, no. 90, Istanbul, 1989, pp.75-80.

⁷⁰ Çağlayangil, İhsan Sabri, "From the speech he made on the 27 April 1977 in the Consultation Committee of Council of Europe in Strasbourg" Quoted in, *Ibid.* p.76.

official in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, stated *"Turkey cannot be regarded as a Western country in the real sense of the term... Turkey was admitted into the European Community (as an Associate Member), because of its geopolitical and strategic situation. It is the only Muslim member of that Community. In the past, it was affiliated with another culture. (Therefore) its position in the European Community cannot be regarded as strong"*⁷¹.

It is, however, important to note that Turkish ambition was not itself sufficient to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Internal and external factors were not allowing Turkey to pursue such a policy in the 1960s and 1970s. As explained in the previous chapter, structural changes began in 1980 created a domestic structure for a multi-dimensional foreign policy. The end of the Cold War then prepared a new external structure for Turkey to pursue a new foreign policy based on economic interest. The economic interest thus required Turkey to strengthen her relations with the West and particularly with the European Community even further.

Beside the reason explained in chapter four (modernisation through westernisation), Turkish antipathy and opposition to communism also made Turkey side with the West. In fact, it was a two way process. Mainly for military reasons, Turkey

⁷¹ Batu, Hamit, "Turkish Foreign Policy", *Belleten*, March 1965, no. 6, pp.21-25. Translation taken from Mahmut Aykan Bali, *Ideology and Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Muslim World*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1988, pp.11-112.

needed the West and the West needed Turkey. *"Turkey received military and economic assistance from the United States, entered the Korean War (by sending many soldiers, second only to America in number), joined United States sponsored military alliances, most notably NATO, and (even) supported French Colonialism in Algeria...Turkey so completely moved in to the United States sphere of influence that United States' domination over Turkey was felt in economic, political and cultural affairs. Turkey thus became an unofficial United States' satellite, as well as, an official United States' ally and Client State⁷²."*

Turkey's relations with Greece also pressed her into a more active foreign policy. This is discussed in chapter six in the context of relations with the EU. But the drama of relations with Greece has, it should be noted here, introduced a continuing tension in relations with the major process. Rivalry in the Aegean and conflict over Cyprus both before and after 1974 invasion, have forced Turkish diplomacy into an increasingly active attempt to counter Greek influence and to get support both bilaterally and in international organisations.

Turkey's active foreign policy started as soon as she joined NATO and she became a part of its Southern Flank. When the NATO Treaty was signed in Washington the reason was that America feared that the expansionist behaviour of the Soviet Union

⁷² Ceyhun, Fikret "The Politics of Industrialisation in Turkey", *The Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 18, part. 3, 1988, p.334.

would have its effect on European countries⁷³. But participation in international organisations including NATO had a significant effect in itself in challenging Turkey to engage on other political issues which would not normally have been explored otherwise.

The change in Turkish foreign policy strategies yielded fruits throughout the 1980s. Turkey also became a formal and increasingly active member of the Islamic Conference of Nations. Turkey's neutral position on the Arab-Israeli conflict changed in favour of the Arabs, especially after the Six Day War of 1967. Despite all those efforts Turkey could not gain the sympathy of the Middle Eastern countries. As Tachau said *"The West simply did seem to care, while the Muslim Arabs would not forget Atatürk's antipathy towards islam"*⁷⁴. One of the main difficulties for Turkey in not being able to develop good relationships with the Middle Eastern states is the non-democratic structure of the Middle East states. As previously argued in the theory chapters, mutual political and economic relations grow best between democratic states. For long term stability in the Middle East democratic principles should be introduced. Graham E. Fuller noted that *"The United States faces a fundamental philosophical choice: to focus on short term stability or to support the growth of democratic values and*

⁷³ Robert, Hunter, *Security in Europe*, second edition, Paul Elek Ltd., London, 1972, p.22.

⁷⁴ Tachau, Frank, (1985), *Op.cit.*, p.25.

*practices in the Middle East*⁷⁵". Apparently the United States has chosen short term stability, and that is not going to help Turkish-Middle East relations.

5.5. Towards a Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy

Modern states, Michael Smith has argued, face problems in making foreign policy which are characterised above all by complexity⁷⁶. To say that Turkey has evolved a multi-dimensional foreign policy is not to argue that she is unique, but is a way of pointing to the impact of modernisation. Smith argues that European foreign policies have the texture of multi-layered, multi-dimensional processes. In arguing this he draws on Morse and other writers of the interdependence school⁷⁷. Among the characteristics of multi-dimensionality are problems of coordination within government, the multiplication of agencies and non-governmental groups involved, the increasing use of international organisations, and the redefinition of the states engagement in global affairs, including a changing polity of sovereign autonomy. Economics and economic security interests also became more prominent, but military or territorial security issues do not -

⁷⁵ Fuller, Graham E., "Respecting Regional Realities", *Foreign Policy*, Summer, 1991, no. 83, p.39.

⁷⁶ Smith, Michael, "Beyond the stable state? Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe", in S. Smith and W. Carlsnaes (eds.), *European Foreign Policy*, Sage, London, 1994, pp.21-44.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.24. and also see Morse, *Op.cit.*, and *Chapter Three*.

and certainly have not in the Turkish case- necessarily decline⁷⁸. This is a part of the resolution of the apparent contradiction mentioned in chapter one, that at least part of the time Turkey's foreign policy is at the same time more autonomous and more interdependent.

After the 1980s, Turkey's economic structure dramatically changed. The policy of openness, explained in chapter four, in the economic structure has clearly helped in shaping of a new foreign policy. Globalisation processes have also brought about a shift in foreign policy, extending the scope of relations with other countries, enlarging the complexity of processes involved and making policy coordination more difficult⁷⁹. The range of institutional contacts has also grown and became qualitatively more significant⁸⁰. For instance Turkey joined the World Free Zone Union (WFZU) and opened up free zones in several places in Turkey⁸¹ in order to have more economic relations with the outside world. By doing that, Turkey started to adapt her economy to the liberal economies of the West. For economic prosperity, Turkey needed multi-dimensional economic relations. Multi dimensional economic relations have required

⁷⁸ See also *Chapter Seven* on security issues.

⁷⁹ On globalisation see chapter three, and see also M. Smith in McGrew and Lewis, *Op.cit.*; also M. Smith in Carlsnaes and Smith, *Op.cit.*; Cox, *Op.cit.*; Allen and Smith, *Op.cit.*,

⁸⁰ Van Ham, P., "The European Community after Hegemony: the Future of European Integration in a Multipolar World", *International relations*, vol. 11, no. 5, August 1993, pp.451-467.

⁸¹ *Newspot*, "Turkish Free Zones Opened to the World", Turkish Digest, 30. May. 1991.

Turkey to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Political seeds of multi-dimensionalisation were planted when Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974. The United States Congress suspended Turkish military aid in protest. Although Turkey reacted by closing United States's bases, she realised that Turkey was seen in the US as an ally only in confrontation with the Soviet Union. Turkey thus felt that she would not be indispensable in matters where there was no shared interest with the United States. Tachau noted *"These painful experiences triggered a wide-ranging reevaluation of Turkish foreign policy. One outcome of this reexamination was a considerable scaling down of the US presence in Turkey, involving both civilian (primarily peace corps) and military personnel, and ultimately a basic renegotiation of the conditions underlying US-Turkish cooperation. Second, the Turks undertook a long-range attempt to mend fences with third world countries, especially in the Arab world"*⁸². The Turkish Government at the time of the 1974 Cyprus crisis was a coalition government between the Republican Peoples Party (in which anti-American feelings were at their highest level under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit) and the National Salvation Party, (profoundly an islamic party). Since then Turkish foreign policy makers have looked for a new kind of foreign policy. The multi-dimensionalisation of foreign policy has gained pace during the 1980s due to structural economic changes, as well as the uncertainties of Turkey's position in the world.

⁸² Tachau, Frank, (1985), *Op.cit.*, p.25.

The foreign policy of today's government is also shaped by an ambition towards the "*globalisation*" of Turkish foreign policy. Armaoğlu, a Turkish scholar in foreign affairs, calls it a "new foreign policy" because he says it contains expressions which are very different from those in former government programs⁸³. Armaoğlu explains the main aspects of the government's new foreign policy: first, domestic political changes (growing democratisation and human rights) will be the basic philosophy, which he calls "*the philosophy of the 21st century*"⁸⁴, and will govern foreign policy. This philosophy is to bear in mind the upheaval in the world, putting a special emphasise on the growing interdependence and globalisation of the world. Secondly, another important quality of the government, according to Armaoğlu, is that it seeks the support of public opinion and consults the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) when carrying out foreign policy. For instance, in TGNA nowadays, one can hear different voices on Turkish foreign policy debates much more clearly than in the past. The language but also the process policy has evolved.

As Kuniholm also noted "*Granting European Community membership (to Turkey) may not be in favour of the West also may not be in favour of Turkey, if it happened at the expense of the Arab world. In this sense, the decline of NATO and the rejection of European Community membership may well lead Turkey to pursue its own*

⁸³ Armaoğlu, Fahir, "New Foreign Policy", *Tercüman*, The Turkish Daily Newspaper, 27 November 1991.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

*course*⁸⁵". Turkey may realise that developing a new security structure and economic cooperation will be the only way of assuring its interests in the future. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR) and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO)⁸⁶ were the outcome of such thinking. Having said that it is worth also saying that Turkey's multi-dimensional foreign policy is not emerging at the expense of her relations with the West⁸⁷.

As the 'Economist' argued, *"Perhaps no nation views the momentous changes in Europe with greater unease than Turkey. For nearly four decades successive Turkish Governments have luxuriated..., as a front line country within NATO, Turkey was indispensable to the West. It was a splendid bargaining lever in Turkey's dealings with its western friends. Now as the Soviet threat recedes, the Turks ... (are) no longer as dispensable as they were"*⁸⁸. Turkey thus tried to fill the emerging vacuum in the region by establishing the BSECR.

As explained further in chapter eight, the Turkish Government felt that they are not so much an indispensable partner in NATO as they were before. The rejection of the Turkish application to become a full member of the Community has also pushed Turkey

⁸⁵ Kuniholm, Bruce R, "Turkey and The West", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring, 1991, p.47.

⁸⁶ See Chapter Seven.

⁸⁷ See Chapter Six.

⁸⁸ *The Economist*, "Turkey that dispensable feeling", 26 May 1990, pp.63-64.

to seek and establish some other regional security and economic organisations such as the BSECR and the ECO⁸⁹. Turkey's involvement in regional organisations might be an outcome of her understanding of the new foreign policy, the foreign policy of globalisation, and a response to the dilemmas of a more complicated security dilemma. But it is also a result of a perceived opportunity to extend her influence as regional power.

The multi-dimensional foreign policy required Turkey to initiate good relations with her neighbours. Such relations inevitably included her islamic neighbours. In some circles, Turkey's changing relations towards the Islamic world has been described as a synthesis of Kemalism and Islamism⁹⁰. This language attempts to disguise what has in fact been an important shift in a long standing tenet of policy. As Steinbach said *"it is in keeping with the Kemalist-Islamic synthesis of state leadership that it sees no contradiction whatsoever between the opening towards the islamic world and the strengthening of ties with the European Community"*⁹¹. It is true that Turkey's multi-dimensional foreign policy sees no contradiction in multi-faceted relations and there appears to be a growing consensus in Turkey on foreign policy matters. The new Turkish foreign policy is an outcome of necessity which has emerged from the changes in the

⁸⁹ See *Chapter Seven*.

⁹⁰ Steinbach, Udo, "Turkey's Third Republic", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 3, 1988, p.247.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.247.

region and in the growing process of globalism in the world. Ideological considerations therefore had little impact, if any, on Turkey's new foreign policy.

Turkey's new commitments to regional organisations are not contradictory to its commitments to NATO and its interest in the European Community. The BSECR has emerged out of a necessity to fill the political vacuum which was the result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. At least for the present, it is complementary to Turkey's relations with other regional bodies. The European Community could be successful with a slowly widening community which fully commits herself to economic cooperation. If the European Community becomes a loose and wider organisation, Turkey's involvement in some other regional organisations is certainly not going to be contradictory to her commitment to the European Community. Ambassador Tansug Bleda, the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign affairs, has explained that the reason to establish the BSECR is to fill a vacuum in the region which emerged after the momentous changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe⁹². As will be argued in chapter seven, the first step of creating a global interdependent framework for foreign policy is to establish loose regional economic organisations respecting the free market economy and free trade among the member nations.

⁹² *Newspot*, Turkish Digest, 9 May 1991, p.2.

The launching of the BSECR is perhaps the best evidence to show the multi-dimensionality of Turkish foreign policy. As Bleda suggests *"the unique geo-strategic position of Turkey offers vast opportunities in this regard. Turkey, a European, Mediterranean, Balkan, and Middle Eastern country all at once, is now in a multi-faceted process of cooperation"*⁹³.

5.6. Conclusion

It is important to note that the changing foreign policy in other directions has not damaged Turkish foreign policy towards the West. In other words, no foreign policy decisions in Turkey have been taken at the expense of the West. By creating new dimensions in her foreign policy, Turkey took a step to fill the vacuum which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkey considers that she has helped the peace and the prosperity of the region, and has become a strategic gate to the Middle Asia and the Middle East. Western political and economic ideals could now easily penetrate through Turkey to the more remote parts of Central Asia. It remains to be seen how far this new role might be realised.

As far as Turkey's relations with the Middle East are concerned, Turkey's relations with her Middle Eastern neighbours is the result of her new foreign policy. The genuine Turkish support and the implementation of the United Nation's sanctions against

⁹³ *Ibid.* p.2. (Emphasis added)

Iraq have been used to suggest that Turkish foreign policy is no longer based on short term interests but is based on the universally accepted norms and on respect for international law. But a series of short term interests, including territory, trade, influence and the control of a Kurdish diaspora all count here. But Turkey's influence in the Middle East has undoubtedly grown, whatever the motives.

The reasons which lay behind the creation of the new multi-dimensional foreign policy in Turkey could be summarised by saying first that the growing democratisation process together with a developing education system have created an atmosphere for public debates on foreign policy issues. As a result, the foreign policy of the country (to a considerable extent) is no longer in the hands of one group of the elite or the other. Turkish foreign policy thus is now increasingly being based on reality rather than being based on the fantasy of the elite. Secondly, the erosion of the danger of communism has made the United States in particular and the West in general somewhat indifferent towards Turkey. The eradication of a possible Soviet threat has also made Turkey less dependent on the United States and the West. This does not mean that Turkey's relations with the West have been reduced to negligible proportions. Turkey has and will continue to have very good relations with the United States and the Western European countries. Turkey's relations will particularly develop with the European Community countries due to her deep and historic relations⁹⁴. The Turkish foreign policy is increasingly becoming an interdependent foreign policy moulded by the new emerging new world order and also

⁹⁴ See *Chapter Seven*.

newly emerging modernised political structure. Turkey's involvement in regional collaborations might not be perceived as contradictory to her commitments towards the West. If the West needs a 'Fortress Europe', Turkey provides a buffer to the East⁹⁵. But at least arguably the European Community needs a more active engagement with both the states and the peoples -and the economies- of the new Central Asia as well as with the Middle East. These questions are taken further in chapter seven.

⁹⁵ Kofman, E. and Sales, R., "Towards Fortress Europe", *Womens Studies International Forum*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp.29-40.

CHAPTER SIX

6. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

6.1. Introduction

Turkish involvement in the European Community (EC) has been a long and ambiguous journey. Turkish officials did not fully understand most of the time what type of organisation they were hoping to join. It sometimes gave hope and at other times despair to both sides. Structural political and economic developments influenced the relationship of Turkey to the Community. On the other hand, the EC itself has been subject to change. In particular, the changing confrontation between East and West and the growing integration of the EC economy have been the major factors in shaping the structure of the Community from its inception. As the tension eased between East and West, the Community has found itself in a structural dilemma. The Community is either going to be a loose (but not weak) economic organisation or it is going to be a politically and economically integrated organisation moving towards a full federal structure. There are a number of possible intermediate positions, but they do not avoid this basic choice.

As far as Turkey's relations with the Community are concerned, Turkey has been motivated by four main factors; ideology, the Greek question, the Cold War and economic interest.

First, the ideological factor: to become a part of the civilised western-world was the main ideology of the elite in power. For the elite, the Turkish application for an association agreement meant a big step towards the completion of the Westernisation process. This has already been substantially discussed in chapter four, and to some extent will be discussed in this chapter where we discuss the ideology of Westernisation and its implications to Turkish-EC relations.

The second factor was the Greek question. Because of regional problems, as well as a long historical conflict, Greece has been a traditional enemy of the Turkish Republic, although both countries are members of NATO and some other European organisations. Turkey's routine foreign policy has thus always required her to follow closely every move that Greece was making ¹.

The third reason for Turkey's desire to become a member of the Community was the existence of the Cold War. Turkey, already a member of NATO, wanted to strengthen her ties with the West against a possible Soviet aggression. Beside military collaboration inside NATO, Turkey wanted to benefit economically from relations with the developed European states, and to seek a role more closely allied to the United States. It was therefore anxious to participate in the security alliance².

¹ See Birand, Mehmet Ali, *Türkiyenin Ortak Pazar Macerası 1959-1990*, (Turkey's Common Market Adventure 1959-1990), Milliyet Publishers, eight edition, Istanbul, 1990, pp.71-81.

² Note: Even before Turkish Application for Associate Membership was discussed in cabinet, the Turkish Foreign Ministry had consulted on the issue with the United States and United States' response was positive. See *Ibid.*, p.73.

But the EC is also a security arrangement. It stabilises the relations of its members, and provides a framework in European Political Cooperation, or in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which allows common diplomatic action without requiring an enforced unity. As bloc relations change, the EC all the more necessary as a security framework³. Any secular modernising government in Ankara would want to be as closely associated with the EC as possible for security reasons which go along way beyond those questions of military security which remains the business of NATO.

The fourth reason was economic. Turkey, being geographically adjacent to Europe, wanted to secure some kind of economic relationship with Europe. As will be argued throughout this chapter, although Turkey's application to the Community was mainly for political reasons, Turkish politicians and the elite used the economic factor as an argument to convince public opinion that Turkey would economically benefit from a membership. They knew very well that Turkey had a long way to go in order to integrate herself with the Community in economic terms. There was a potential economic cost for Turkey, had she fully joined the EC. The Turkish elite, however, preferred not to mention the less attractive side of the coin. Turkey could not afford to stay out of the Community. If Turkey remains outside, she will still be

³ Risse-Kappen, T., "The Long Term Future of European Security", in S. Smith and W. Carlsnaes (eds.), *European Foreign Policy*, Sage, London, 1994, pp.45-61; also Shea, Jamie P., "Security: the Future", in Lodge, J. (ed.), *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future*, Pinter, second edition, London, 1993, pp.360-376; Van Ham, P., *Op.cit.*; Rees, G. W., *International Politics in Europe: the New Agenda*, Routledge, London, 1993.

deeply affected by the EC, but without access to influence over the core decision making processes.

The Turkish application for associated status of the EC in 1959 was mainly ideological and also motivated by the Cold War situation. İsmet İnönü, the second President of Turkey, known as the second big man after Atatürk, and the leader of the opposition in 1969, said *"being a member of the western world and in the view of our regime, from the start we were enthusiastic about the European Community. We want to join the Community"*⁴. As can be seen in the next chapter, Turkish-EC relations in the Post-Cold War, however, mainly became motivated by economic reasons⁵. One can see that Turkish foreign policy gradually changed after the 1980s due to changes in the domestic political and economic structure⁶ and also due to the end of the Cold War. One main argument of this dissertation is that calculations of interest rather than the ideology have become the main stimulus of Turkish foreign policy.

In this chapter all four main factors -ideology, Greece, Cold War and the economy- will be analysed. All are clearly important, each interacts with the others while the balance of which is most important changes over time. The main question will be how the changes affected Turkish-EC relations. The changes in Turkey's

⁴ İlkin, Selim, "A History of Association with the European Community", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (Eds), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske & Budrich GmbH, Opladen, Germany, 1990, p.35.

⁵ See *Next Chapter*.

⁶ For more see *Chapter Four*.

domestic political structure have already been explained in chapter four. The effect of domestic changes on Turkish-Community relations will also be emphasised.

6.2. The Evolution and the Objectives of the Community

The main object of this section is to outline briefly the structure of the Community and to put in context the Turkish application for membership. After all, the Turkish accession to the Community depends partly on the possible future shape of the Community. The history of the EC will not be covered in detail, as this would be inappropriate for the present study.

In the twentieth century, Europe experienced two disastrous world wars. The nationalist structures of the European countries caused the two World Wars. The lack of cooperation between the sovereign countries of Europe prevented them from taking pragmatic foreign policy decisions. At the end of the second World War, the question in the minds of politicians and political leaders was 'How to secure peace in Europe and how to sustain peace in Europe'. Equally important was the question as to how to create a modern, secure and developed Europe. It was believed that economic cooperation and collaboration were necessary for economic development. The cooperation in economic terms would prevent one country becoming a dominant power through the exploitation of economic and natural resources. This was the main reason for the need to establish an economic organisation in Europe⁷.

⁷ For the history of Franco-German reconciliation, see Willis, F. Roy, *France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1963*, Stanford University Press, Stanford,

Beside that economic argument, the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and across Eastern Europe was a major threat towards Western Europe. *"Western defence (then) became a matter of urgency, it could not be effective without German participation but, France could not take the risk of another war with a reformed Germany. Some way had to be found of making such a war not merely impossible but unthinkable. One obvious way was to integrate the coal, iron, and steel industries of the two countries, because (one could not) make war without coal and iron⁸."* Having those feelings in minds, the Schuman Plan, named after Foreign Minister of France Robert Schuman, was launched on 9 May 1950⁹. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established by the six European States in 1951. The aim of the organisation was to *"regulate the production, pricing and marketing of coal and steel products of the member states¹⁰."*

The EEC emerged from two main ideas, one that it is thought that *"closer links among the peoples and nations of Europe would prevent any repetition of the two world wars¹¹."* The other idea was that *"of economic cooperation to accomplish*

California, 1965; see also Milward, A. S., *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*, Methuen, London, 1984.

⁸ Kerr, Antony, J.C. *The Common Market and How It Works*, Pergamon Press Ltd., Oxford, 1977, p.5.

⁹ Galtung, John, *The European Community: A Super Power in the Making*, International Peace Research Institute, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1973, p.19.

¹⁰ Roberts, Geoffrey K. and Lovecy, Jill, *West European Politics Today*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988, p.187.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.187.

*the pressing task of post-war reconstruction more swiftly and more effectively*¹². " To achieve this, the Community aimed to reduce inequalities between peoples and regions, to create employment and prosperity within a common market, to create a big economic power in order to help the globalisation of the world through economic help to the poorer countries of the South. Beside that, it aimed to create technological and industrial progress, a common agricultural policy, closer political and economic links, a better environment and lastly a richer life¹³.

The Community has been moving, if uncertainly, towards economic and political unity. Undoubtedly, the Community has also been successful in its external economic relations. In foreign policy matters, however, the Community has not been acting as a full foreign policy actor like a sovereign state¹⁴. For instance, the United Kingdom won support in the 1982 Falklands Crisis. In this crisis, the Community was very active, and, as Edwards says, it had rarely moved with such speed¹⁵. As soon as the news of the intervention of the Argentines was received, the Community deplored the use of force and called for the immediate withdrawal of Argentine troops¹⁶. The Community's relative success in the Falkland Crisis was because of the

¹² *Ibid*, p.187.

¹³ For more see Budd, Stanley, A. and Jones, Alun, *The European Community: A Guide to the Maze*, third edition, London, 1989, p.25.

¹⁴ See Allen, D., Rummel, R. and Wessels, W., *European Political Cooperation*, Butterworth, London, 1981; and Hine, R.C., *The Political Economy of European Trade*, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1985.

¹⁵ Edwards, Geoffrey, "The European Community and the Falkland Crisis of 1982", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 22, no. 4, June 1984, p.295.

¹⁶ *The Times*, 3 April 1982.

support of all member states. The other member states had no clashing interests over the issue and there were few controversial questions among the member states. Whereas in some other foreign policy issues, the Community has had no real success. For instance, in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973¹⁷ and the latest tragic crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Community has failed to act as one due to the differing views and interests of the member states.

Previously, political and military collaborations failed, partly because of "*the sensitivity of the issues*"¹⁸, but mainly also because of the lack of common interest between the member states. The EC is perhaps the most successful international organisation in the world thanks to the fact that it is based on close mutual economic relations, if it is to be defined as an 'international organisation' strictly speaking at all, rather than as a body quite uniquely in a class of its own. As will be seen in the next chapter, after the collapse of the Soviet Union some regional organisations were being established (ECO and BSECR) on the model of the EC. Since the establishment of the Community, the major question in peoples' mind was whether the Community is going to integrate 'deeper' in economic and political terms or to spread the idea of integration over the other interested states in the region and become a 'wider' Community. Turkey's future relations with the Community also depend on the possible shape that EC is going to take as well as on the state of the internal situation.

¹⁷ See Robinson, Jeffrey, *Yamani: The Inside Story*, Simon & Schuster, London, 1988, pp.97-100.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.187.

6.3. Westernisation as the Ideological Background of Turkish-European Community Relations

Chapter four shows a Westernist ideology is the prevailing ideology in the 'establishment' of the Republic of Turkey. Turkey's desire to become a member of the Community thus mainly derived from that ideological background. To understand the relations between Turkey and the EC, it is essential to explain the term "*Westernisation*". Westernisation is a unique term used to explain Turkey's commitment to the West in order to become a civilised nation. The term thus has not been used in Western European countries¹⁹.

Turkish state and its elite leadership accepted the West as countries inspiration and model in cultural and economic reforms, with some reservations. The term "*West*" geographically included all of the countries situated west of the Baltic-Adriatic line²⁰. The influence of individual western countries varied depending on the time and the kind of influence. German influence, before the First World War, on the army and industry was clearly visible. A French influence was also visible on the daily way of life, on the language and the education system. English influence "*appeared in the philosophy of the government*"²¹. The ideology of westernisation was one of the main motivation in Turkish foreign policy. As Kramer also noted "*It*

¹⁹ See *Chapter Four*.

²⁰ See Karpas, Kemal H., *Op.cit.*, pp.324-326., see also Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993.

²¹ Karpas, Kemal H., *Op.cit.*, p.324.

is a factor that has more to do with the collective psyche than with interest-oriented foreign policy, and it often makes it difficult for Western Europeans to fully understand the Turkish attitude toward relations with the EC²²".

Turkish view of this relationship are significant here. To Ziya Gökalp, culture is unique but civilisation is common among nations. Civilisation is a rational product therefore an artificial creation, but culture is not²³. Turkey's commitment to the West and the acceptance of Western civilisation were not thus threat to Turkish culture. In the late period of the Ottoman Empire, religion and tradition were corrupted. As Namık Kemal says *"the traditions reached such a point that a man cannot be in command of his own beard, let alone his family²⁴".* The corruption of religion and the tradition has led the elite to seek an alternative and that was the idea of Western civilisation harmonised with Turkish culture.

The distinguished scholar Oral Sander has tried to find an answer to the question of why Turkey amongst the other Middle East and Afro-Asian countries is the only country continuously to ally herself with the West. Sander in his attempt to clarify the continuity and the change in Turkish foreign policy has pointed out four major factors for Turkey's Westernisation process. These factors are namely; the

²² Kramer, Heinz, "Turkey and EC's Southern Enlargement", *Aussen Politik*, vol. 35, no. 1, 1984, p.102.

²³ Gökalp, Ziya, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation*, translated into English by Niyazi Berkes, Colombia University Press, New York, 1959, p.23.

²⁴ Karal, Enver Ziya. "The Principles of Kemalism" in. Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Ideology and National Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Muslim World*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1988, p.22.

Ottoman heritage, the legacy of Atatürk, geo-politics and continuing sense of insecurity deriving from the continuing Soviet threat, and finally economic considerations²⁵.

Among the driving forces for Turkey's endeavour to become a part of the West, the Soviet threat was a major factor amongst the others. What makes it so important is that the Soviet threat after World War Two was more immediate and more concrete. State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu said in a statement that *"we would be more than pleased to see basic changes in Russia's foreign policy. Unfortunately, however, I can see no signs of change... present policy of Russia has given no signs of changes in their old policy...there is only a change in their tactics. Russia, after establishing a dominance over her satellites, realised that she can only be more successful (in the spread of communism) by waging a war against the West and America. For this reason, the Soviet Union has changed its tactics towards this region (Turkey), which is a crucial frontier in a likely war, by trying to make it an impartial region"*²⁶. For that reason, Turkey did not like the idea of neutrality. Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu expressed his feelings, in the 1955 Bandung Conference²⁷, about the danger of being impartial. He gave the example of Czechoslovakia to illustrate the danger and artificiality of a policy of impartiality. He

²⁵ Sander, Oral, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and of Changes", in Ahmet Evin, *Continuity and the Change in Modern Turkey*, Leske, 1984, p.115.

²⁶ Gönlübol, Mehmet, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy by Cases)*, Seventh Edition, Alkım Publishers, Istanbul, 1992, p.312.

²⁷ About the Conference, see *Ibid*, pp.273-276.

stated in that Conference that Turkey would be a part of the West because Turkey's national interest requires her to do so²⁸.

For the Turkish elite integration into the Western alliance through EC membership represented the final stage in the struggle for Westernization. For the United States and its European NATO partners the consequences were, obviously, more limited. Turkey would be an important deterrent to any Soviet attack and as a threat to Soviet Union's southern flank²⁹.

The religious differences between Turkey and the EC countries have sometimes caused and still cause some problems. In Turkey and also in Europe, it is thought that Turkey's population is 98% Muslim and such a country cannot be accepted in a 'Christian Club'. This phrase is widely used amongst some of the muslim groups and profoundly islamic Welfare Party in Turkey³⁰. It should emphasised that the EC is not a Christian Club. All the European countries (including Turkey as an associate member) committed themselves to secularist ideas. And also Turks have always been, even in Ottoman times, reluctant to build their political system on religion. They did, however, use religion to unify the different identities of the population. As Bernard Lewis also puts it "*Unlike the Persians, the*

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp.274-275.

²⁹ Kuniholm, Bruce R., *Turkey and NATO: Present and Future*, ORBIS, vol. 27, Summer 1983, p.423.

³⁰ The phrase first used by Necmeddin Erbakan, the President of Welfare Party. See Erbakan, Necmeddin, *Milli Görüş (National View)*, Dergah Publishers, Istanbul, 1975, pp.235-270.

Greeks, and the ancient people of the Middle East, the Turks and Mongols were never conquered by Islam. On the contrary, they entered the Islamic world as conquerors, some of them freely converted in their homelands, some of them, arriving as pagan aliens and imposing a pagan domination over the Muslims³¹". This historical distinction continues to resonate in the Turkish sense of identity.

The religious differences should not theoretically create any problem as both parties are fully committed to secular ideas. In particular, when economic ties are more important than the political ties there should be no problem at all. *"It is true that the Turks are muslims, and this shapes the way they think and behave outside the mosque as well as inside. But unless the European Community is going to say that its membership is confined to Christians (nowadays mainly ex-Christians)...this does not automatically disqualify the Turks. On two other counts, one of the history and the other of present inclination, Turkey has a good claim to be considered as a candidate member of the Europe of ideas, if not the Europe of formal geography³²".*

To conclude this section, it could be said that despite prevailing secular ideas both in Turkey and the Community countries, religious and cultural differences seem to be a substantial problem for Turkey's relations vis a vis the Community. Especially if the Community insists on deeper integration and tries to create a core European identity, the religious and cultural difference of Turkey would be a growing

³¹ Lewis, Bernard, *The Political Language of Islam*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p.7.

³² *Economist*, 14 December 1991, in a Supplementary Survey on Turkey, p.9.

problem³³. However, if the Community pursues a policy of widening and concentrating on the economically interdependent relationship of member states, then the importance of the cultural and religious differences between Turkey and the Community might be lessened. This is, however, difficult to predict.

6.4. Turkish-European Community Relations During the Cold War Era

The ideological factor is an important factor in explaining the Turkish-EC relations. It cannot, however, sufficiently explain the relations between the two. When Turkey applied to the Community for an association agreement, the Cold war between the two blocs was at its hottest. The United States was helping European states to rebuild their economies in order to stop the spread of communism in Europe. The United States wanted Turkey to have more links with Western Europe. The United States' President Truman thought that the only way to stop the spread of communism and thereby the aggression of the Soviet Union was big military and economic help to Turkey and Greece³⁴. Turkey was militarily in the Western Club. America also wanted Turkey to engage economically with the West. The only way to tie Turkey to the West was to arrange some kind of relationship with the EC. American pressure for Turkish EC membership has not been an insignificant factor, but not enough to achieve that change.

³³ Kofman, E. and Sales, R., "Towards Fortress Europe", *Womens Studies International Forum*, vol. 15, no. 1.

³⁴ Kuniholm, Bruce R., *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980, pp.73-129.

Before Turkey applied for associate membership, she consulted the United States. At the beginning the United States' answer was positive and supportive³⁵. The United States for security reasons wanted Turkey to strengthen her ties with the West. However, the United States had some reservations on Turkey's full membership of the Community. The United States did not want the phrases of 'full membership' and 'custom union' included in the Association Agreement³⁶. Feridun Cemal Erkin, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, explains in his memories how he convinced John F. Kennedy, the President of the United States, that Turkish-United States relations would not be harmed³⁷. When Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin met President Kennedy, the President was saying that through the development of a Common Market in Europe, Europeans might harm the United States' foreign trade³⁸. During that time the United States was anxious to see the EC grow stronger. The United States wanted Turkey, a frontier of the West against the Soviet Union, to strengthen her arrangements with the West in order to increase Turkey's loyalty. Fears in the United States among some who did not want a strong Common Market in Europe as an economic rival did not become powerful until later. Turkey convinced the United States that the special relationship between Turkey and the United States would not be harmed by Turkey's Association Agreement with the EC. Turkey again convinced the United States that she could not stay out of the

³⁵ Birand (1990), *Op.cit.*, p.73.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.170.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.170-171.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.170.

Community when all the others (especially the Greeks) were joining³⁹. The hostile attitude of the Soviet Union also encouraged Turkey to venture into Europe⁴⁰. There was a growing fear among Turkish officials that the Soviets would attack Turkey at the first opportunity in order to open a frontier to the Mediterranean⁴¹.

The EC itself was new. The application of Greece and then Turkey boosted the morale of the Community. They initially accepted the applications with great enthusiasm⁴². The reason for the warm welcome by the Community was quite clear. At that time there was a fierce competition between the EC and EFTA (European Free Trade Association). EFTA was founded on the initiative of the United Kingdom in 1959 with some other European countries. The Greek and Turkish application to the Community meant a lot as proof of the new Community's power and authority. For the Community, the Turkish and Greek application were some kind of proof that it was a competent organisation. By those applications six member states of the Community found additional moral support.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.171-172.

⁴⁰ Kılınç, Uğur, *Türkiye Avrupa Topluluğu İlişkileri 1983-1988 (Turkish- European Community Relations)*, Türkiye Ticaret, Sanayi, Deniz Ticaret Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği (Published by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Marine Commerce and stock exchange), Ankara, 1990, p.29.

⁴¹ See *Chapter Five*.

⁴² See Turan, İlter, "Relations Between Turkey and the European Community", in *Turkey in the Year 2000*, Turkish Political Science Association, Ankara, 1989, pp.35-56.

Turkey applied to the Community for Associate status on 31th July 1959 just a year and half after its establishment⁴³. *"The European Community members had to accept the Turkish application in order not to upset evenhandedness toward Turkey and Greece"*⁴⁴ The military intervention of 1960 caused the freezing of the relations between the two parties. Greece on 9 July 1961 signed the Athens Agreement with the Community⁴⁵. As Tsoukalis puts it, it was *"the most encompassing and complex agreement ever signed by the Community"*⁴⁶. As soon as the pluralist democratic structure was restored in Turkey towards the end of 1961, negotiations were resumed in 1962. While preparing the draft of the agreement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State Planning Organisation (SPO) were opposed each other. *"They were opposing each other to such an extent that it seemed as if these two departments were the negotiating parties, not the Community and Turkey. Both departments accused each other of selling the country to the European powers"*⁴⁷. The SPO accused the Foreign Ministry Officials of damaging Turkey's vulnerable economic structure for their political ideals. On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry accused the SPO of religious fanaticism and stressed that Turkey would prosper economically and

⁴³ See Dursun, Hilmi, *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye-AET ilişkileri, (The European Community and Turkey EEC Relations)*, T.B.M.M. Basımevi (Turkish Grand National Assembly Publications), Ankara, 1984, pp.39-62.

⁴⁴ Müftüler, Meltem, *The Impact of External Factors on Internal Transformation: Turkish Structural Adjustment Process and the European Community*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, the Temple University, U.S.A., 1992, p.72.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.75.

⁴⁶ Tsoukalis, Loukas, *The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1981, p.30.

⁴⁷ Müftüler, Meltem, *Op.cit*, p.75.

politically. Turgut Özal, then the head of the SPO, had good contact with the Demirel government then in power. He was stressing that Turkey should be cautious and should analyse the issue economically before signing the Additional Protocol with the EC. The SPO view was that Turkey had no data on economic matters and no long term economic perspectives, and she did not even have a clear economic model for development. Turkey thus should not hasten the negotiations. Mr. Dereli said that the SPO's role in dealing with Turkish-EC relations was limited due to the existence of the Cold War and the ideological behaviour of the Turkish elite⁴⁸. The SPO's role was to deal with a centralised internal economy. As the internationalisation of the economy began after the 1980s, the SPO's involvement in external economic relations increased⁴⁹. Turkish Foreign Ministry accused the SPO for damaging Turkey's relations with the West⁵⁰. As can be seen in the next chapter, time would later prove that Turgut Özal, who made the full membership application in 1987 then the Prime Minister, was not against Turkey's relations with the EC. All he was asking, as the head of the SPO, was that Turkey should take economically rational decisions. One of the main reasons behind the governmental friction between the two bodies was that there was a question of authority. The Foreign Ministry felt that it was an external issue and they were responsible and they should also have the

⁴⁸ *Interview*, Dereli, Sökmen, State Planning Organisation, ex-President of the Department of European Union Relations (then the President), Prime Minister's Office, Ankara, on 23 May 1992.

⁴⁹ *Interview*, Nebioğlu, Hüsamettin, State Planning Organisation, President of the Department of European Union Relations, Prime Minister's Office, Ankara, on 17 March 1995. See *next Chapter*.

⁵⁰ For the governmental dispute between the Foreign Ministry and the SPO, see Birand, (1990), *Op.cit.*, pp.226-245.

authority to negotiate. The SPO, however, was saying that it was an economic issue and as they had the expertise on the issue they were responsible⁵¹. They were saying that since the responsibility is on their shoulders, the authority should also be theirs⁵². This inter-governmental friction did not strengthen the Turkish position during the negotiations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a report including some conditions and reservations that Turkey would negotiate upon. When the negotiation started, officials from the Community side showed a translated copy of the report which was supposed to be top secret. The Foreign Minister of the time accused the SPO of conspiracy. Despite a governmental enquiry on the matter no one was blamed. The Turkish government on the whole was the loser⁵³. Besides losing bargaining power, the Turkish governments' seriousness on the matter was also damaged⁵⁴.

6.4.1. The Ankara Agreement

Five years after the initial application, Turkey and the Community signed an agreement in Ankara on 12 September 1963. The Ankara Agreement clearly

⁵¹ *Interview*, Bulgurlu, Hacı Bayram, the State Planning Organisation, Deputy President of the Department of European Union Relations, The Office of the Prime Minister, Ankara, on 17 March 1995.

⁵² Birand (1990), *Op.cit.*, pp.226-233.

⁵³ *Interview*, Makas, Abdullah Cengiz, International Affairs Consultant to Welfare Party's Foreign Spokesman, Turkish Grand National Assembly, Public Relations Department, Ankara, 1995.

⁵⁴ For more see Birand (1990), *Op.cit.*, pp.246-282.

determined the conditions and the principles of an eventual full membership⁵⁵. The main aim of the Treaty was to develop mutual commercial and economic relations between the two parties considering the improvement of economic situation and standard of life in Turkey⁵⁶. The main principles of the treaty were;

- to create a custom union between the contracting parties,
- to establish closer links between the Turkish people and their European counterparts,
- to receive economic help from the Community in order to develop the Turkish economy,
- to facilitate Turkey's possible eventual membership,
- to secure peace and freedom of the region.

Beside the Cold War structure that motivated Turkey to sign the Association Agreement, the ideology of the Turkish ruling elite also played a crucial role⁵⁷. Deputy Prime Minister Turhan Feyzioğlu stated after signing the Agreement that *"taking part in the European Economic Community does bring more advantages than the short term ones. This agreement has been a victory of Turkey which has been willing to be a European state for a long time. ...with this Agreement, it is once more registered that the European border extend to the eastern and southern borders of*

⁵⁵ For the full text of the Treaty, see *Ankara Agreement, Türkiye ile Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Arasında Ortaklık Yaratın Anlaşma (The Treaty Creating Partnership Between Turkey and E.E.C.)*, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı AET Başkanlığı (Turkish Republic, Prime Ministry, State Planning Organisation, The Office of EEC), pp.1-18.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.6.

⁵⁷ See *Chapter Two and Four*.

*Turkey*⁵⁸". As can be seen from the statement above, the motivation behind the Association Agreement was ideological and, as explained above, external political factors also played a major role. The economic considerations lagged behind those factors. Whereas, the economy should have been the main motivation as Turkey was signing an agreement about regional economic cooperation⁵⁹. However, the Turkish Foreign Ministry, under the constant pressure of the Cold War security structure, saw the issue as more political than economic.

The Ankara Agreement set out a time table for a process at the end of which Turkey could become a member of the Community. Article Two of the Treaty puts forward three phases through which Turkey will pass before she finally becomes a member⁶⁰. These phases are a preparatory phase, a transitional phase, and a final phase.

Preparatory phase started as soon as the Ankara Agreement came into force on 1st December 1964. The minimum period of the preparatory phase was planned to be five years and the maximum eleven⁶¹. To help Turkey to be successful during this period two additional protocols were signed between the parties. One is the Provisional Protocol designed to arrange the export of Turkish tobacco, raisins, dried

⁵⁸ *Akşam*, 13 September 1963.

⁵⁹ Note: The European Economic Community during that time was at its infancy and the economic integration was the focal point. The EC focused more on the trade relations of the member states.

⁶⁰ See *the Ankara Agreement, Op.cit.*, p.6.

⁶¹ *Provisional Protocol*, article 3, clauses 1 and 2.

figs and hazelnuts to the Community countries. The Provisional Protocol granted Turkey *Preferential Tariff Quotas*⁶². The other protocol was the Financial Protocol designed to arrange financial help to Turkey in order to facilitate the implementation of the Ankara Agreement. To that aim the Community countries agreed to grant Turkey up to 175 million dollars⁶³. Turkey was given 175 million dollars under the close supervision of European Investment Bank. During this period Turkey enjoyed some economic aid from the Community to improve her economic situation.

During the preparatory phase the EC also made concessions for some other commodities like citrus fruits, hand-made carpets and some textile products. The most notable consequences of this period is that, despite all those concessions Turkey gained from the Community, her trade deficit vis a vis the Community continuously grew. As a result of this, the ratio between Turkey's export to and imports from the EC continuously declined. The ratio fell from 71% in 1966 to 54% in 1973⁶⁴. On the other hand, 60.5% of the European Investment Bank's loan was spent on the infrastructure and the rest of the 39.5% on industrial projects⁶⁵.

⁶² See the *Ankara Agreement*, *Op.cit.*, article 3 clause 1, and *Provisional Protocol*, article 2, Clauses, a,b,c,d.

⁶³ *Financial Protocol*, article 2.

⁶⁴ İlkin, Selim, "A Short History of Turkey's Association with the European Community", in *Turkey and the European Community*, editors, Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 1990, p.39.

⁶⁵ Saraçoğlu, Tevfik, *Türkiye ile Avrupa Topluluğu Arasında Bir Ortaklık Yaratan Anlaşma: 1959-1963 (An Agreement Creating A Partnership Between Turkey and the European Community: 1959-1963)*, Book II, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (The Foundation for Economic Development), 1981, pp.99-108.

During this period the number of Turkish workers in most of the European Countries (especially Germany and France) dramatically increased and worker's remittances increased from \$8.1 million in 1964 to \$740.2 million in 1972⁶⁶. The remittances further increased to \$2.021 million in 1987⁶⁷. Turkish guest workers in Germany have particularly affected the bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany. They were called as 'guest workers' and were thought (particularly by Germany) that they will return back to Turkey as soon as they earn enough money to invest in their own businesses in Turkey. It did not happen like that. Instead, most of the guest workers have settled down in Germany and by some called as 'German Turks'⁶⁸. One reason for Turkish guest workers for not returning back to Turkey is the experiences of those who returned. There are about 1.4 million people who returned back to Turkey⁶⁹. Most of them are not happy about their decision. They expressed that they faced hard economic conditions in Turkey⁷⁰. As they did not have the experience of investing their money in their own businesses, most of the returning workers put their money in Turkish banks and hoped to live on the interest of their money. High inflation rates have melted the money they put in the bank away, and

⁶⁶ Yüksel, Ali Sait, "*Ortak Pazarla İlişkilerimiz Ne Durumda, Nereye Gidiyor (What is the Situation of Our Relationship with the Common Market, Where is it Going)*", Eskişehir Sanayii Odası (Eskişehir Chamber of Industry), Ankara, 1971, p.23. in Selim İlkin, *Op.cit.*, p.39.

⁶⁷ *World Bank*, in Martin, Philip L., *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1991, p.34.

⁶⁸ See Şen, Faruk, *Almanyadaki Türkiye (Turkey in Germany)*, Evrim Publishers, İstanbul, 1991, pp.4-9.

⁶⁹ *Milliyet*, 12 September 1988.

⁷⁰ Şen, Faruk, (1991) *Op.cit.*, p.7.

after a while, the interest they were getting was too little to survive. They then sought the way back to Germany or wherever they had returned from⁷¹. Despite the economic recovery after the 1980s,⁷² Turkish workers remained reluctant to return home. The second and third generation, who grew in Germany, have grown accustomed to a new life style. Despite the return incentives of the German government⁷³, Turkish workers were still reluctant to return due to the high unemployment rate in Turkey due to population increase. Low wages were also another factor. If the real wage index for public plus private manufacturing is put 100 for 1977, it dropped to 66 in 1981 and 52 in 1988⁷⁴.

According to the Ankara Agreement, at the end of the transitional phase, the right should have been given to workers to move freely between Community countries⁷⁵. Çelik noted that at least this right should be given to Turkish citizens living in EC countries⁷⁶. He said that his confederation is trying to use every legal means in order to gain the rights of free movement of people. He further stated that the EC did not accept the free movement of Turkish workers, although it was agreed

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp.6-9.

⁷² For the economic changes after the 1980s, see *next Chapter*.

⁷³ The Federal Republic of Germany offered up to DM 10.500 plus DM 1.500 per returning child. See Martin, *Op.cit.*, p.39.

⁷⁴ Uygur, Ercan, *Policy, Productivity, Growth and Employment in Turkey 1960-89 and Prospects for the 1990s*, mimeographed, Ankara, 1990, p.34.

⁷⁵ *The Ankara Agreement*, Article 12.

⁷⁶ *Interview*, Çelik, Necati, President of the Confederation of Trade Unions (Hak-İŞ), Ankara.

in the Ankara Agreement, because it was against the economic interests of the member states⁷⁷. The Additional Protocol, which came into effect in 1973, placed some limits on the article 12 of the Ankara Agreement. Article 60 of the Additional Protocol bestowed to the two sides the authority to take certain measures in economic and financial regards. This article also stated that the countries are responsible for taking measures which will do least damage to the process of putting the Ankara Agreement into practice. The Federal Republic of Germany has rejected Turkey's request on several grounds. One of the reason for not accepting Turkey's request was that the social and economic conditions in Turkey have still not reached the level agreed in the Association Agreement⁷⁸. The Court of Justice also made the decision that *"Turkish workers will not have the right to claim free movement on the basis of the Association Agreement and stated that the Association Agreement was characterised by being a plan only, and as having no concrete regulations"*⁷⁹.

Ilkin noted *"it is difficult to find any comprehensive study or discussion on the problem (of Turkey's economic readiness for the next stage of the Ankara Agreement)... One can hardly say that Turkey had prepared itself for membership in the European Community. Therefore, the desire to enter the second phase was based, by the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, not on previous preparations but*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ For the response of the Republic of Federal Germany, see Şen, Faruk, "New Problems for the Turkish Minority in the Federal Republic of Germany", *Centre for Turkish Studies*, Paper presented by the Director of Centre for Turkish Studies, Prof. Dr. Faruk Şen, at the 6th international Bursa Symposium, Bursa, 7-8 April 1993, p.10.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.10.

on the future potential of the country⁸⁰". As Bahçeli also noted "*the decision to seek associate membership was not based on comprehensive studies of the implications for the Turkish economy and development strategy of the envisaged customs union. For Turkish policy-makers, the association initially had greater importance as a step towards the realisation of Turkey's long-range aspiration to become an integral part of Europe*⁸¹". As can be seen from the statements above and also later on in this chapter, Turkish-EC relations were motivated primarily by the existing Cold War structure⁸². Technical economic considerations were neglected. The governmental friction, explained above, between the Foreign Ministry and the SPO was a result of that negligence of economic considerations by the officials in the Foreign Ministry. Turkish Foreign Ministry officials influenced by the Cold War structure, thus focused on the matter from a political point of view. But the SPO officials were more interested in the economic side of the issue. In the end, the Foreign Ministry's view prevailed and Turkey asked the Community on 16th of May 1967 to start the second phase of the Ankara Agreement.

In the second period the parties agreed to create a custom union built on the principle of mutual and balanced responsibilities⁸³. Negotiation for the transitional

⁸⁰ İlkin, Selim, *Op.cit.*, p.39.

⁸¹ Bahçeli, Tosun, "Turkey and the European Economic Community: The Strains of Association", *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 3, no. 2, January, 1980, p.222.

⁸² Also see Bourguignon, Roswitha, "The History of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (eds.), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske & Budrich GmbH, Opladen, Germany, 1990, pp.51-63.

⁸³ *Ankara Agreement*, article 4.

phase started between the two parties before the preparatory phase was due to end. The preparatory phase ended when the parties signed an Additional Protocol on 23rd December 1970⁸⁴. According to article 5 of the Ankara Agreement, the transitional phase would be a minimum of seventeen and a maximum of twenty two years. After the transitional phase Turkey would reach the final phase.

The Additional Protocol, signed on 23rd November 1970, marked the beginning of transitional phase⁸⁵. The Additional Protocol was a modification of the Association Agreement⁸⁶. It laid down some conditions through which Turkey will pass before becoming a full member. Protocol was based on the mutual and equal obligations. *"The Community eliminated custom duties, made some provisions for the harmonisation of policy and legislation, and proposed a gradual achievement of free movement of labour between the contracting parties. Because of the difference in the level of Turkey's economic development, the Community agreed to establish the transitional period in such a way as not to hinder Turkey's economic development."*⁸⁷ Article 18 of the Additional Protocol proposed to demolish custom barriers on industrial products between Turkey and the Community by the year 1995.

⁸⁴ Sezer, Özlenen, *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler (The European Community and Relations with Turkey)*, Published by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, publication no.16, Istanbul, 1990, pp.50-51.

⁸⁵ Bourguignon, Roswitha, *Op.cit.*, p.54.

⁸⁶ Müftüler, Meltem, *Op.cit.* p.81.

⁸⁷ Bourguignon, Roswitha, *Op.cit.* p.54.

The Ankara Agreement did not specify a particular period for the final stage. The Turkish authorities thought that the time would come for Turkey to apply for full membership. On 14th April 1987, Turkey formally applied for full membership⁸⁸. Turkey's application for full membership of the Community on 14th April 1987 created a new dimension to Turkish-Community relations. The state minister Ali Bozer, responsible for the EC relations, emphasised that *"this (the application) is an important historical moment for Turkey. I would like to emphasise that my government's ambition and determination to make Turkey a full member of the Community is also Turkish people's desire to share the future of the Community"*⁸⁹.

Beside the Turkish application for full membership of the Community, Turkey applied for membership of the West European Union (WEU), an association of seven European NATO member countries for cooperation and defence, in April 1987. Turkish officials denied that this was linked with the application for the Community membership, although observers stated that each application would have a bearing upon the other⁹⁰. In fact, the Turkish application for WEU membership was not a coincidence. It was a tactical manoeuvre. Turkish officials wanted, once more, to show their military commitment and emphasise that Turkey wanted to become a part of Europe in all aspects.

⁸⁸ *Milliyet*, 15 April 1987.

⁸⁹ Gümrükcü, Harun, *Göçün 30. Yılında Türkiye - Ortak Pazar İlişkileri ve Unutulan Alternative: Serbest Dolaşım (Turkish-European Community Relations in the 30th Anniversary of (Labour) Immigration and the Forgotten Alternative: Free Movement of People)*, Merajans Publications, Istanbul, 1991, p.22.

⁹⁰ *Keessing's World Archives*, volume xxxiii, May 1987, p. 35137.

After the extraordinary flux in Eastern Europe, the Turkish commitment to the West and NATO, and its indispensability inside NATO, was brought into question. The answer of the majority of the Turkish officials was that *"Turkey remains loyal to NATO; that NATO must go on being NATO for ever (or for many years to come), and that because of its fidelity to the West over the years Turkey deserves to be the 13th member of the present European Club (rather than, say, the twentieth and remotest member of a much broader Community some time in the distant future)"*⁹¹. This raises issues of the post-Cold War relations between Turkey and EC which are raised in the next chapter.

6.5. The Greek Factor on Turkey's Relations with the European Community

Greece has been an important factor for Turkey's relations with the EC. Turkey has always thought that their national interest would be harmed if they did not join the Western Club which Greece was in. For instance, Turkey's application in 1959 was directly motivated by the Greek application. It was certainly not a coincidence that Turkey applied just fifteen days after Greece⁹². It is a main argument of this thesis that, Turkish foreign policy decisions until the mid-1980s were determined by events outside her boundary. The Greek government applied to the Community for an associate membership on 15 July 1959. It is significant that

⁹¹ *The Economist*, "Turkey: That Indispensable Feeling", 26 May 1990, pp.63-64.

⁹² See Birand, Mehmet Ali, (1990) *Op.cit.*, pp.71-81.

Foreign Office officials in Turkey did not know of this until the Foreign Minister received a letter from Brussels, for it shows the lack of consultation in relations even then. The Turkish Foreign Minister of the time, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was very angry with his officers and he ordered them to be prepared for the application in two weeks. The Foreign Minister's idea was that Turkey should not leave Greece alone and should take her place in the West⁹³. Two weeks after the Greek application, on 31 July 1959, Turkey applied to the Community for an agreement of association⁹⁴. As Vali noted *"had it not been for Greece's application, it would have taken Turkey much longer to decide what kind of relationship to establish with the Six"*⁹⁵. Birand also emphasised that *"the application was motivated by political considerations more than economic realities. It is clear that if Greece had not applied, Turkey would have taken much longer to decide what kind of relationship to establish with the Community. As it was, the Greek application provided a sufficient reason for immediate action. The traditions of Turkish foreign policy required that Greece be watched very closely so that it would not use the political and economic weight resulting from a new relationship with Europe against Turkey"*⁹⁶.

⁹³ *Ibid*, p.73.

⁹⁴ İstanbul Ticaret Odası (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce), *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler (The European Community and Relations with Turkey)*, Publication No. 16, 1990, p.47.

⁹⁵ Ferenc, A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971, pp.124-125.

⁹⁶ Birand, Mehmet Ali, "Turkey and the European Community", *The World Today*, Chatham House, London, vol. 34, no. 2, 1978, p.52.

The Turkish application was made in such a short time that there was not even time to consult the parliament. Even before bringing the matter to the cabinet, foreign minister summoned the ambassador of the United States and asked the United States' view on a possible Turkish application. Three days later, Washington said that in principle it would be happy to see Turkey's relations with the Western Europe improved⁹⁷. In the Cabinet meeting on 30 July, Foreign Minister Zorlu was trying to convince the cabinet that for political reasons Turkey should apply to the Community before it became too late. Everyone in the Cabinet was convinced. Samet Ağaoğlu, the state secretary at the time, dared to advise that Turkey should be cautious and careful because they did not know where the EC was going⁹⁸. The answer of the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, was short and severe: Turkey had no time to discuss the matter as Greece would proceed towards full membership⁹⁹. In fact, the Prime Minister was right as far as the foreign interests of the country were concerned. He knew that Greece would use her improved relationship with the Community as a weapon against Turkey. For instance, when the Greek Prime Minister was asked how Greece's membership of the Community would affect the country's major foreign policy problems of Cyprus and relations with Turkey. The answer was *"it is certain that our membership of the Community will not place (our country) in a more*

⁹⁷ Birand (1990), *Op.cit.*, p.73.

⁹⁸ Kalpaklıoğlu, Cavid, *Avrupa Topluluğu Gerçeği (The Reality of the European Community)*, Memleket Yayınları (Memleket Publishers), Ordu, Turkey, 1992, p.121.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p.121.

unfavourable position to face the problems which concerns us like Cyprus and our relations with Turkey¹⁰⁰".

Greece has always been a major factor in Turkey's relations vis a vis the Community. The Cold War structure and Turkey's role in it, and Turkey's historic problems with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean dispute, were two main external determining factors of Turkey's relations with the Community. As has already been emphasised in chapter four, beside the lack of democratic structure, the external realities explained above also obliged politicians to neglect the public opinion in their decisions about the Community.

The military coup in 1967 in Greece caused the freezing of her relations with the EC. Turkey suddenly found herself in a more favourable position. Turkey, however, could not use that opportunity because of the lack of immediate political will to join the Community and she was not also economically ready¹⁰¹. Turkey took the opportunity to further her relations with the Community by stepping up to the second stage (transition stage) of the Ankara Agreement.

¹⁰⁰ Tsakaloyannis, Panos, "Greece, Old Problems New Prospects", In *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation*, Christopher Hill (ed.), Published for Royal Institution of International Affairs, by Allen & Unwin, London, 1983, p.126.

¹⁰¹ Birand (1990), *Op.cit.*, pp.208-212.

The military coup in 1967 in Greece led to a further deterioration in the relationship between Turkey and Greece. The military junta have taken a hostile attitude towards the Turkish community in Cyprus. Turkey wanted to intervene but due to the lack of military equipment she gave up the idea of military intervention. The junta misperceived that Turkey's acceptance of an independent Cyprus, which was ruled by the majority of the Greek Cypriots (66%), reflected an indifference to the issue. The Greek Junta therefore took a hostile attitude towards Archbishop Makarios. The Junta have supported the EOKA B, the unionist movement, instead¹⁰². In the morning of 15 July 1974 there took place a coup d'état, engineered and staged by the military junta then ruling Greece. Its aim was to over throw Archbishop Makarios and set up a government that would unite the island with Greece¹⁰³. The Greek Coup against Makarios provided a pretext for Turkey and she intervened militarily on 20 July 1974, five days after the coup, invoking the Treaty of Guarantee signed between Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom¹⁰⁴. Following the coup in Cyprus the EC issued a declaration expressing their opposition to any intervention or interference which might put Cyprus's independence in question¹⁰⁵. This declaration by the EC worsened already vulnerable EC-Greece relations. *"During the period of Greek dictatorship (1967-1974), Greece continued performing its (economic) obligations although, for political reasons, the Community froze financial aid to*

¹⁰² Necatigil, Zaim M. *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, second edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p.88.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, pp.89-90.

¹⁰⁴ Pantelli, Stavios, *A New History of Cyprus*, East-West Publications, London, 1984, p.377.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.377.

Greece and halted negotiations on agricultural policy harmonisation¹⁰⁶". The state of Greek-EC relations did not, however, put Turkey into a more favourable position due to the Turkish military intervention. In fact, the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 facilitated the membership of Greece. Turkish intervention in Cyprus led to the resignation of the military junta in Greece and democracy was reintroduced. The EC could not reject the membership application of the Karamanlis government because "*The Application for membership coming from a European state which had been the first to be associated to the Community and had re-established democratic rule with strong support from European governments and public opinion*"¹⁰⁷". On the other hand, the acceptance of Greek applications could also be related to the security of Europe. When the direct military conflict started between Turkey and Greece, Greece was threatening to withdraw from the military wing of the NATO in 1974.

When Turkey intervened in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, the EC was very active, both in Ankara and Athens through the French ambassador in the two capitals, asking Turkey and Greece to show caution and prudence¹⁰⁸. Two days after the Turkish intervention on 22 July the nine members of the Community met in Brussels and made a statement insisting on a cease-fire and a peace conference¹⁰⁹. The EC's

¹⁰⁶ Stephanou, Constantine and Tsardanides Charalambos, "The European Community Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle", in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990's*, Dimitri Conostas (ed.), Macmillan publishers, London, 1991, p.208.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p.209.

¹⁰⁸ Sjustedt, Gunnar, *The External Role of the European Community*, Saxon House, Farnborough, Hants, 1977, p.99.

¹⁰⁹ *The Times*, 23 July 1974.

reaction to the Turkish-Greek dispute was more than rhetoric but it had no concrete impact on both sides. It was the Community's first experience in dealing with such a crisis. Turkey and Greece were both associated members. The French government were more on the Greek side, but the United Kingdom were supporting Turkey because of Britain's historic relations with Cyprus¹¹⁰. The impartiality and the neutrality of the Community were only possible by keeping a distance and by trying to tackle the issue in the framework of the United Nations. France, holding the EC Presidency, exerted tough and effective pressure in Ankara and Athens especially during the first week of the crisis. As emphasised earlier, it remained rhetoric as the EC had no military power of its own. The Community did not even have such mission. The crisis, therefore, was mainly dealt with within the United Nations.

Greece was always more keen to join the Community than Turkey. Although the Turkish elite were ready ideologically to join the Western club, Turkey was not ready economically and there was a fundamental question in Europe whether to enlarge the Community to include Turkey, 97% of whose territory is not even in Europe. Turkish membership has posed a continuing challenge to European senses of Europe's identity. Beside that its socio-cultural structure in the 1960s also reflected more of an Eastern culture. Turkey's economic system in the 1960s and the 1970s was closer to an Eastern European model, in which central governments had a fundamental role in the economy. Greece's situation vis a vis the Community were somewhat different. First of all, while there was no religious difference with the

¹¹⁰ Bahçeli, Tozun, *Op.cit.*, pp.230-231.

other members of the Community, it was far less significant. Secondly, she was relatively a small country. The EC's leaders thought that the Community would easily digest the problem of Greek membership. Thirdly, Greece is a European country geographically and socio-culturally. The Greek government, knowing they had all these advantages over Turkey, applied for full membership of the Community on 12 June 1975 and it was agreed in 1982. By becoming a member of the Community, Greece would feel herself more secure against Turkey, having perceived Turkey as a major enemy. Greece wanted Community membership, as it would put her in a more favourable situation against Turkey, confirm her status as a European democracy, and strengthen her weak and divided economy. As Barchard puts it *"the fundamental lesson of the 1974 crisis in Cyprus and its aftermath is that the strategic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean -for many years fairly even between Greece and Turkey- is shifting irrevocably in the latter's favour. In 1923 there was a population difference of two or three million between the two states, and Greece - poor by European standards- was socially and economically far more advanced than Turkey. In the late 1980s, Turkey has nearly five times the population of Greece and a gross national product approximately twice as large¹¹¹".* Turkey, it might be added, has a lower GNP per head than Greece, but a far more significant position geopolitically.

Tsakaloyannis saw Greek accession to the EC as a necessity to protect Greece's independence from the *"discredited Americans and an insurance against*

¹¹¹ Barchard, David, *Turkey and the West*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers no. 27, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985, p.49.

*Turkish bellicosity*¹¹²". Turkey also for the same reasons has done everything to draw the attention of the Community (and specially the EC Commission) to the dispute between Turkey and the Greece. Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel has said in a statement that, "*the European Community should be cautious and try not to upset delicate political balance in this part of Europe (by treating the Greece better)*"¹¹³". The Commission's opinion over the Greek application for membership published in 1976, referred to the Greek-Turkish dispute as the main obstacle in front of the Greek accession to the EC¹¹⁴ and the Commission was also suspicious about the future of democracy in Greece. As explained above, between 1967-1974 Greece was governed by a military junta. The Commission did not want to worsen Turkish-EC relations. To avoid such danger, the Commission explicitly emphasised the issue¹¹⁵. The Commission noted in its opinion on Greece's application on 29th January 1976 that "*Until now the balance in the Community's relations with Greece and Turkey has found its expression in their identical status as Associates, both of them with the possibility of full membership as the final objective, albeit with different timetables. Unavoidably the prospect of Greek membership of the Community introduces a new element in this balance. In the view of the Commission steps will need to be*

¹¹² Tsakaloyannis, Panos, "Greece, Old Problems New Prospects", In *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation*, Christopher Hill (ed.), Published for Royal Institution of International Affairs, Allen & Unwin, London, 1983, p.121-136.

¹¹³ *Milliyet*, 29 May 1976.

¹¹⁴ Tsakaloyannis, Panos, *Op.cit.*, p.125.

¹¹⁵ See Kohlhase, Norbert, "The Greco-Turkish Conflict From a European Community Perspective", *The World Today*, vol. 37, no. 4, April 1981, pp.128-129.

*taken...that the examination of the Greek application for membership will not affect relations between the Community and Turkey and that the rights guaranteed by the Association agreement with Turkey would not be affected thereby*¹¹⁶. It should be noted, however, that the European Parliament was more divided, with the right tending to be more pro-Turkish and the left more sympathetic, after 1974, to the socialist government in Athens. The Foreign Ministers and European Council also tended to lean towards a more rapid Greek accession after doubts between 1974 and 1976, and Greek accession was pushed through the Council of Ministers and through successive summit meetings (European Councils) despite some reservations in the Commission.

Turkey so far was unable to establish any kind of relationship with Greece. Often in the 1980s Greece refused to join the consensus of the other EC member states. She thus paralysed the action of EPC on important matters¹¹⁷. Turkey wanted to restart negotiations with the EC, which were frozen after the military takeover in 1980. The Greek government throughout 1986 put reservations on the reactivation of the Turkish-EC Association Treaty¹¹⁸. Greece was always determined to link the Turkish-Greek dispute over Cyprus to Turkey's EC membership negotiations. The Turkish authorities, however, said that the dispute over Cyprus is a regional dispute

¹¹⁶ Commission opinion on the Greek Application for membership, *EC Bulletin, supplement 2/76*, p.7.

¹¹⁷ Dinan, Desmond, "European Political Cooperation", in *The State of European Community: Policies, Institutions, and Debates in the Transition Years*, Leon Hurwitz and Christian Lequesne (eds.), Longman, Essex, 1991, pp.416-417.

¹¹⁸ *Keessing's World Archives*, volume xxxiii, May 1987, p. 35129.

and should be dealt with separately, but were unable to convince Brussels of this view. The Greek issue, and its association with the Cyprus problem, have continued to shape EC-Turkish relations.

6.6. Economic Factors

Turkey is a relatively big country with a population of about sixty million¹¹⁹. Although the Turkish economy is improving, it is still much smaller than her European counterparts. The GDP in 1980 was \$54 billion compared with \$280 billion for the United Kingdom and \$620 billion for Germany. The GDP per capita in 1980 was only \$1.200, compared with \$5.000 in the United Kingdom and \$9.580 for Germany¹²⁰. During the 1980s, however, the Turkish economy made a dramatic leap forward with an average annual growth rate of 5.9% between 1983-1989. Although Turkey does still have to improve in her economy in order to close the differences between her economy and her European counterparts, the radical economic measures taken on 24th January 1980 yielded some fruits. Turkey's GDP doubled from \$54 billion in 1980 to \$120.6 billion in 1992¹²¹. GDP per capita thus improved from \$1.200 to \$2.150.

¹¹⁹ *Statistical Pocketbook of Turkey*, the State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, 1990, p.14.

¹²⁰ Denton, Geoffrey, "Economic Implications for the Community of Turkish Membership", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (Editors), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske & Budrich GmbH, Opladen, Germany, 1990, p.195.

¹²¹ *Financial Times, Survey*, "Turkey", 7 May 1993.

According to another survey between 1963 and 1992 GDP per capita has increased twelve times. In 1962 GDP per capita was only \$220, whereas in 1992 it was \$2.622¹²². This figures are raw data. they do not reflect the changing real value of the dollar. But they also understate the elements of the moral, 'grey' and 'black' economies not measured by official figures. Most of the time many people consume their own production in their villages without it being accounted for. The other reason is that (as explained in chapter four) the Turkish economy is mainly dominated and run by small firms (ie with less than ten employees) and most of the time they are not registered and are uninsured. Abramowitz has also stressed that there is an underground economy, perhaps worth 25% of the official economy¹²³. Governmental control is weak and thus the real Turkish GDP is more difficult to estimate due to tax evasion.

¹²² *Zaman*, 17 June 1993, p.4.

¹²³ Abramowitz, Morton I. "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Özal", *Foreign Policy*, no. 91, Summer 1993, p.170.

Table 2.

Nominal Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (\$'s)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
TURKEY	1837	1556	1575	1387	1280	1234	1353	1487	1671	1748	2005	2667
Belgium	11057	11986	9773	8633	8182	7782	8093	11313	14075	15180	15294	19343
Denmark	12886	12941	11177	10889	10959	10677	11350	16086	19830	20926	20215	25467
W. Germany	12380	13216	11054	10683	10679	10085	10189	14565	18271	19581	19398	23698
Greece	4040	4164	3803	3937	3551	3410	3366	3928	4620	5244	5419	6578
Spain	5282	5674	4875	4692	4060	4074	4259	5899	7449	8722	9629	12621
France	10879	12335	10784	10127	9605	9084	9482	13169	15854	17002	16951	21015
Ireland	4811	5656	5310	5458	5240	5046	5277	7101	8386	9181	9284	12361
Italy	6625	8023	7224	7116	7339	7264	7451	10507	13185	14430	14974	18858
Luxembourg	11477	12489	10455	9495	9334	9157	9445	13256	163321	17592	17476	23097
Netherlands	11220	11970	9926	9651	9292	8648	8688	12005	4510	15461	15038	18607
Portugal	2209	2701	2606	2469	2187	2008	2144	3041	3765	4265	4609	5748
U.K.	7437	9522	9040	8608	8138	7616	8027	9798	11957	14413	14440	16893

Sources²

1. For Turkey, The State Institute of Statistics (based on the new series, and calculated by using OECD's PPP estimates).

2. For other European Community Countries, the OECD National Accounts, volume 1, 1988-1989.

3. The 1990 figures are taken from OECD, "Main Indicators", April 1991, pp.31-37 and 173-178.

² *Ibid.*, p.212.

Table 3.

The Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (\$'s)												
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
TURKEY	2719	3034	3465	3707	3802	4137	4608	5075	5402	5809	6270	6816
Belgium	7116	8094	8763	9468	9827	10397	10768	11212	11751	12623	13675	14429
Denmark	7732	8389	9107	9993	10602	11468	12279	13027	13309	13682	14373	15295
W. Germany	8015	8838	9673	10238	10781	11528	12105	12690	13298	14161	15261	16023
Greece	4111	4522	4907	5213	5379	5695	6010	6188	6347	6799	7296	7382
Spain	5199	5702	6166	6607	6914	7260	7597	8008	8665	9343	10171	11091
France	7868	8683	9563	10382	10759	11246	11720	12240	12791	13603	14627	15445
Ireland	4466	4977	5560	5990	6133	6586	6901	7049	7608	8146	8831	9971
Italy	7023	7973	8797	9373	9767	10303	10927	11467	12133	12985	13923	14785
Luxembourg	8201	9012	9783	10504	11183	12301	13003	13841	14534	15558	16683	18205
Netherlands	7896	8624	9316	9730	10159	10811	11339	11790	12183	13832	13840	14670
Portugal	3787	4277	4722	5096	5219	5262	5516	5847	6309	6750	7392	7574
U.K.	7370	7852	8475	9185	9826	10373	11020	11659	12533	13428	14268	14861

Sources¹

1. For Turkey, The State Institute of Statistics (based on the new series, and calculated by using OECD's PPP estimates).
2. For other European Community Countries, the OECD National Accounts, volume 1, 1988-1989.
3. The 1990 figures are preliminary.

¹ Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimates made by, Güvenen, Orhan, *Marching in Stride with the European Community: A Statistical Presentation of the Turkish Case*, Presented to Forum Europe, Brussels, October 30-31, 1991, in *Turkey and the European Community*, Editors, Mary Strang, Arlene Redmond, Brussels, 1991, p.212.

Table 4.

The Ratio of European Community Countries' Nominal GDP Per Capita to the Turkish Nominal GDP Per Capita												
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
TURKEY	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Belgium	6.0	7.7	6.2	6.2	6.4	6.3	6.0	7.6	8.4	8.7	7.6	7.3
Denmark	7.0	8.3	7.1	7.9	8.6	8.7	8.4	10.8	11.9	12.0	10.1	9.5
W. Germany	6.7	8.5	7.0	7.7	8.3	8.2	7.5	9.8	10.9	11.2	9.7	8.9
Greece	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.5
Spain	2.9	3.6	3.1	3.4	3.2	3.3	3.1	4.0	4.5	5.0	4.8	4.7
France	5.9	7.9	6.8	7.3	7.5	7.4	7.0	8.9	9.5	9.7	8.5	7.9
Ireland	2.6	3.6	3.4	3.9	4.1	4.1	3.9	4.8	5.0	5.3	4.6	4.6
Italy	3.6	5.2	4.6	5.1	5.7	5.9	5.5	7.1	7.9	8.3	7.5	7.1
Luxembourg	6.2	8.0	6.6	6.8	7.3	7.4	7.0	8.9	9.8	10.1	8.7	8.7
Netherlands	6.1	7.7	6.3	7.0	7.3	7.0	6.4	8.1	8.7	8.8	7.5	7.0
Portugal	1.2	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.2
U.K.	4.0	6.1	5.7	6.2	6.4	6.2	5.9	6.6	7.2	8.2	7.2	6.3

⁴ The ratio based on the data on table 2.

Table 5.

The Ratio European Community Countries' Real GDP Per Capita to the Turkish Real GDP Using PPP Estimates³.

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
TURKEY	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Belgium	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1
Denmark	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2
W. Germany	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4
Greece	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1
Spain	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Ireland	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3
France	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5
Italy	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Luxembourg	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7
Netherlands	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2
Portugal	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1
U.K.	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2

³ The ratio based on the data on table 3.

Turkish GDP is a fifth of that in the UK (1992 figures). This is a crude measure, but it is a starting point. Table 2 shows Turkish gross domestic product by comparison with EC member states in nominal terms. Over time this is not very clear, and Table 3 takes the figures and turns them into real terms at purchasing power parity (PPP). They show that the Turkish economy is considerably less developed than most countries in the Community. These figures may well understate the total level of economic activity, but they are significant. However, if we look at *relative* change in GDP, we can measure this most usefully by an index comparison of Turkey with other countries. Table 4 does this in nominal terms, but, again, the real constant value (PPP) figures in Table 5 provide the clearest comparison. According to table 5, while Turkey lags behind all EC member states, it has been catching up quite rapidly. The figures show that Turkish GDP per head is now virtually the same as that in Portugal and Greece, and has even reduced the gap with Spain, despite the boom in the EC in the late 1980s in which all economies, but especially that in Spain, grew rapidly.

Taking these figures at face value, They suggest that Turkey is on a par with other Mediterranean countries and could not on grounds of economic development be excluded from the EC. There are, of course, other issues. Regional differences in Turkey remain, and South-Eastern Turkey in particular is still a long way behind any other EC region in development. Structural change -the modernisation of the service sector and a move from primary production- has happened rapidly and been accompanied by a population shift to the cities, but arguably has some way to go. Turkey could still not hope to conform to the Maastricht criteria on levels of public

borrowing and debt, but then neither can a number of states. Perhaps most important, Turkey may compare to Portugal and Greece, but would the EC as a whole want another Portugal or Greece, especially if it is far greater in size. So the evidence is that Turkey has gone a long way to converge on EC performance, but has still some way to go to satisfy the existing perceived Community interest in Brussels, even if the decision were to rest on political criteria, which it clearly does not

Table 6.

The actual shares of exports in imports of the Community and the rest of the world¹²⁴.

		Country	
Base Years	$\frac{X-X^{\wedge}}{X}$		
Greece	EEC Trend 1955-1958	+69%	
	1954-1959	+123%	
	World Trend 1954-1961	-14.4%	
	1956/57	+5.6%	
	1960/61		
Turkey	EEC Trend 1957-1961	-4.3%	
	1956/57-		
	1960/61	+0.8%	
	World Trend 1957/58-	-6.3%	
	1962/63		
	1959-1963	22.4%	

¹²⁴ Shalim, Avi and Yannopoulos, George, *The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1976, p.103.

Table 7.
Commodity Concentration of exports before and after the Association
Agreements for Greece and Turkey¹²⁵.

Average two years before agreement		1971/72		
	World	EEC	World	EEC
Turkey	42.41%	43.91%	23.24%	24.74%
Greece	35.57%	40.29%	38.12%	41.43%

Despite having more or less the same privileges as Greece, Turkey could not improve her economic relations with the Community as Greece did. Economic interdependence as measured by trade flows increased only at the same rate as aggregate world trade for Turkey, while for Greece the increase was substantially greater (see Table 6). This is partly explained by geographical distance. It can also be explained by the emphasise by Turkish politicians on ideological statements rather than political economic reforms. And the hesitation of changing coalition governments throughout the 1970s on whether to become a member or not delayed the implementation of the economic reforms. Transformation from a mixed economic system to a free market economy was made only with the reforms of 1980.

"Even though the Association Agreement was a very important step that promoted Turkish integration into European order, it was not used very effectively by the Turkish government¹²⁶".

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, p.103.

¹²⁶ Müftüler, Meltem, *Op.cit.*, p.80.

The evaluation of the economic implications of Turkish membership of the EC is quite difficult, since the date of Turkey's possible membership is not known. Any assessment will thus be something like forecasting the weather for the years to come. Turkey's membership of the Community very much depends on the political shape of the Community in the future. As will be analysed in the next chapter, The Community itself is in the process of change. The Community is changing herself in order to meet the requirement of the post-Cold War era. It is thus difficult to make any prediction about the future of the Community. As Farrands puts it *"the greatest asset of any student of the European Community is a large bucket of scepticism"*¹²⁷.

To conclude this section, it can be said that economic factors were not an important motivation behind Turkey's desire to become a "European country". Economic factors in Turkey's relations vis a vis the Community was perhaps the third in rank after the existence of the Cold War and the Greek factor, both of which explained above. As Eralp also noted *"the prioritization of economic issues in relations with the European Community was not shared uniformly by all government agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had, throughout the sixties and much of the seventies, followed their initial assessment of the importance to Turkey of accession to the European Community and had argued for the primacy of political rather than economic considerations in shaping Turkey's policy. By contrast, the*

¹²⁷ Farrands, Christopher, "External Relations: External Politics and M.F.A.", in *Policy Making in the European Community*, Wallace, H., Wallace, W. and Webb, C. (eds.), Wiley, London, 1983, p.317.

State Planning Organisation, in line with industrialists' demands, emphasised the detrimental effects of a customs union on Turkey's industrialisation¹²⁸".

As chapter three observes, economic development can only be created through economic institutionalisation. As long as one country implements a free market economy and obeys the economic arrangements of the regional economic organisation, economic prosperity can then follow. In Turkey's case however, the relations with the Community have been more political than economic until the mid-1980s. Turkey did not even change its overall economic system and insisted on planned mixed economy.

As far as Turkey's economic structure is concerned, up to the 1970s, it was nowhere near a liberal capitalist economy. In fact, the Turkish economy more resembled that of Eastern European countries. State Economic Enterprises were crucial (and are still important) economic institutions in Turkey before 1980. At the beginning of the sixties, when Turkey applied for an association agreement, the state economic enterprises accounted for more than half of the investment in manufacturing. *"Although their relative rate of expansion varied somewhat depending on which government was in power and other factors, the State Economic Enterprises were and remain an important part of Turkish economic life¹²⁹".*

¹²⁸ Eralp, Atila, "Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War International System", in *Turkey and Europe*, Canan Balkır and Alan M. Williams (eds.), Pinter, London, 1993, p.29.

¹²⁹ Krueger, Anne O. and Aktan, Okan H., *Swimming Against the Tide: Turkish Trade Reform in the 1980's*, International Centre for Economic Growth, ICS Press, San

Although state intervention has not yet vanished, thanks to the economic measures taken on and since the 24th January 1980, the influence of private enterprises has relatively increased. This has facilitated the transformation towards a more pluralist political system¹³⁰.

The 24th January 1980 Decisions unrecognisably changed Turkey's economic structure. These decisions were the base for a new economic approach. The implementation of those decisions has shown their political implications as well as restructuring the economy. Economic relations between Turkey and the EC have dramatically improved during the 1980s thanks to the restructured and more compatible economic system in Turkey. The trade volume between Turkey and the EC has more than doubled between 1982 and 1992.

Francisco, 1992, p.20.

¹³⁰ The prospects of 24 January Economic Decisions and the state of the State Economic Enterprises have been further discussed in the next Chapter.

Table 8.**The European Community - Turkish Trade (million ECU)⁵**

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
EC imports	1.746	2.191	2.962	3.233	3.141	3.772	4.302
EC exports	2.624	3.162	4.292	5.400	4.729	5.561	5.179
Trade Balance	878	971	1.330	2.167	1.558	1.789	877
index 1982=100	100	125	169	185	180	216	246
imports	100	120	163	206	180	212	197
exports							
%change							

⁵ *Turkey Economy*, December 1989, no. 4. p.15.

As table 8 (above) shows, Turkish imports from the European countries have risen from 1.746 Ecu in 1982 to 4.302 Ecu in 1988. Turkish exports also have risen from 2.624 Ecu in 1982 to 5.179 Ecu in 1988¹³¹. However, the overall Turkish trade volume has also more than doubled between 1980-1989. In 1980, Turkish trade volume was only 10.8 billion dollar and with an enormous trade deficit of 5 billion dollars¹³², whereas in 1989 the trade volume increased to 27.3 billion dollar with a relatively much lower trade deficit of 3.9 billion dollars¹³³. As the statistics clearly show, the development in Turkey's economic relations vis a vis the EC has almost been parallel to Turkey's increasing economic relations towards the whole world.

More about the international political and economic implications of the reshaped domestic political and economic structure will be analysed in the next chapter. Also in the next chapter the effects and the role of the restructured Turkish domestic order in Turkey's relations with the EC and the other regional organisations will be analysed in detail.

¹³¹ For the trade between Turkey and the EC after the application for full membership (1987-1990), see next Chapter.

¹³² *Statistical Pocketbook of Turkey*, the State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, 1990, p.238.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p.238.

6.7. Conclusion

This chapter is of great importance in the thesis as a whole. It charts the development of Turkey's relations with the EC. In doing this it demonstrates the growth of relations which, after 1960, became increasingly characterised by four factors. Firstly, while the ideology of Westernisation always mattered, the general ideology was less and less a guide to policy. Policy was founded increasingly on economic interests and on the particular experience of relations with the Community. Secondly, interdependence has grown at many levels in scope and in depth. Economic interdependence has not always been concerned with trade relations, but also with investment, debt, and with the growth of company and banking contacts. This has re-shaped the definition of interests and mobilised new groups and organisations. A multi-level, multi-issue interdependence (chapter three) has grown especially since the economic reform and the re-orientation of the values of the Turkish elite after 1980. Furthermore, interdependence with the EU has not only been economic. It has included security issues, especially in the 1980s and 1990s (a theme taken up in the next chapter), and the broader question of the political stabilisation of the country and the region it occupies. The Greek question has tended to destabilise Turkey's relations with the EC; it has also kept Turkey on the EC agenda, but often for negative reasons. Interdependence on a broad and varied range of issues has locked Turkey and EC together. Thirdly, Turkey has become more autonomous -that is to say less dependent in a 'Third World' sense- as her economy has grown more diverse and more modernised and as her institutional relations with the EC, expressed both within the Association agreements and through other

Beside the domestic political factors pressing for Turkey's application for full membership, Turkish politicians were also receiving some optimistic signals from the Community officials. These signals have encouraged Turkish officials to apply for full membership. For instance, the General Secretary of the Commission Emile Noel made an optimistic speech in Turkey on 16th January 1987. In that speech Noel was stating that Turkey's link with Europe is a well established link. *"Despite the fact that both sides are having some difficulties in implementing the Ankara Agreement. Turkey and the Community will carry out their commitment taken under the Ankara Agreement"*¹⁶. Noel was not necessarily voicing a view different from that of the Commission, but he was not expressing a 'Community view' and both the Council and the Parliament did not accept this emphasis¹⁷.

The end of the Cold War also meant a change in ideological attitudes in international affairs. The economy, including scientific and technical issues, became increasingly more important than ideology. As emphasised in chapter six, ideology has not been a major element of Turkish foreign policy since the ending of Cold War. Interests rather than ideology prevailed as a principle in Turkish foreign policy decisions.

anniversary of (Labour) immigration and the Forgotten Alternative: Free Movement of People), Merajans Publications, Istanbul, 1991, p.22.

¹⁶ For the full speech see Noel, Emile, "Türkiye-AET Ortaklığının Durumu" (The State of the Turkish- European Community Partnership), *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Dergisi* (The Journal of the Economic Development Fund), January 1987, pp.3-6.

¹⁷ *The Independent*, 17 January 1987.

The Turkish initiative in the establishment of the two regional economic organisations reflected the idea that Turkish foreign policy is increasingly determined by the economic interest of the country. The increasing involvement of the State Planning Organisation in Turkish-EC relations demonstrates how far economic considerations have come to the fore. Thus Mr. Nebioğlu was asked whether the importance of the SPO has declined as the state's intervention in the economy is gradually reduced. His response was that the SPO's importance did not decrease but that the role of the SPO has been changing. The SPO became more important than ever with regard to Turkey's external economic relations particularly with the EC¹⁸. The SPO is not dictating policy but acting as a central coordinating body. It works between agencies and firms and government, now, since privatisation, much less concerned in domestic issues, and with few formal powers. But it has an important informal role in external relations, acting as an advisor, a facilitator and a stimulus rather than as a planner or regulator¹⁹.

Changes in Turkish foreign policy have been a result of changes in the Turkish elite's view of foreign policy. The Turkish elite are no longer producing ideological slogans in foreign policy matters. Above all, there is a growing consensus between the extreme left and the extreme right on foreign policy matters. Both agree that Turkey's

¹⁸ *Interview*, Nebioğlu, Hüsamettin, State Planning Organisation, President of the Department of European Union Relations, Prime Minister's Office, Ankara, 1995.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

economic and political interest should be maximised²⁰. Prof. Yalçıntaş also supports this view of the changing view of the Turkish elite. He emphasised that we should no longer use slogans such as 'we are a part of Europe', or 'we are in the Western Camp'²¹. He also emphasises that Turkey's relations with the EC should be analysed on sectoral and sub-sectoral levels. After thirty years of integration in Europe, there are still about 600 fields of internal economic protection measures. If Turkey wants to compete with the most developed countries of Europe, she should analyse the issue in detail²² and desegregate policy rather than generalising across sectors and agendas.

Having said that it is vitally important to emphasise that whatever the economic difficulties, the major problem for Turkey in joining the Community is not economic. There are, of course, big economic differences between Turkey and the rest of the Community member states. They are, however, not so deep as to prevent any possible membership²³. Mr. Şenemek, an economist working in Belgium, addressed the problem of economic differences and concluded that Turkey is economically not ready to join

²⁰ The changing pattern of the Turkish elite has already been explained in *Chapter Four*.

²¹ See Yalçıntaş, Nevzat, "Turkey's Alternative Preferences to the European Community", in *AT'm Cevabı ve Yeni Tercihler (The European Community's Response and New Alternatives)*, edited by, Ali Coşkun, Selçuk Özçelik, Nevzat Yalçıntaş and Sabahattin Zaim, Aydınlar Ocağı Publications, Open Public Conference Series, No, 9. Istanbul, 1990, pp.17-33.

²² *Ibid.*, pp.22-23.

²³ For the comparative economic data, see *Chapter Six*.

such an organisation²⁴. As an economist he looked at the issue from an economic point of view. It can, however, be argued that the real reason for not granting Turkey the Community membership is not purely economic. In fact, the economic problem can be ranked after the problem of geography (only 3% of the Turkish territory is in European soil), culture (because Turkey on the whole reflects a typical Eastern culture), religion and politics. On the other hand, the EC's own domestic political uncertainty is also one of the major problems for Turkey's full membership. As has already been emphasised in the previous chapter, Turkey cannot be a part of centralised federal Europe. Even Britain does not like the idea of a federal Europe as it might put Britain in the secondary position. Turkey also would not be accepted (or join) a federal Europe because of its privileged relations with the United States. It would also become impossible for Turkey to join the Community where Britain, which is a developed European country, is finding it difficult to digest the implications. Thus anti-federalist commentators, such as Hartley, argue that if the EC is to preserve the Euro-Atlantic link for the security and political stability of Europe²⁵, it should be politically looser, territorially wider, and economically stronger. The Bosnian dispute has also shown how divided Europe is on foreign policy issues. By not becoming militarily involved in the war in Bosnia, the United States,

²⁴ Şenemek, Nuri, "Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Tam Üyeliğin Geleceği (Turkey and the European Community: The Future of Full Membership)", *Nokta*, 21 June 1992, Turkish Weekly, Istanbul, p.49-52.

²⁵ For more on Euro-Atlantic link, see Hartley, Anthony, *The Irrelevance of the Maastricht*, Occasional Papers, No.53, Institute of European Defence and Strategic Studies, London, 1992, pp. 32-54.

perhaps, has tried to prove that she is still indispensable despite the end of the Cold War.

As far as the economic situation of Turkey is concerned, Turkey made a dramatic economic recovery thanks to the changed economic system and a stable domestic political structure. The Turkish economy has in the last two decades been growing much faster than that of the EC countries. Real GDP rose 5.5 times between 1950 and 1980²⁶. In the last decade between 1980 and 1990, Turkish GDP per capita increased 5.9% on average per year, which is far ahead of the Community average. During Turkey's associate membership years between 1962 and 1992, Turkish GDP per capita in cash terms increased twelve times from \$220 to \$2.622²⁷. After the political instability at the end of the 1970s, when the a government dominated the economy and promoted protectionist trade policies, Turkey in 1983, three years after the military intervention, elected a civilian government committed to free markets at home and abroad. As Martin said *"Turkey's economy boomed: OECD data indicate that Turkey grew faster than any other OECD country between 1983 and 1987"*²⁸. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the real GDP is difficult to define because of the systemic features of the country. Turkey even now does not so much resemble a free market European country as one of

²⁶ Denton, Geoffrey, "Economic Implications for the Community of Turkish Membership", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (Editors), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 1990, pp.198-199.

²⁷ *Zaman*, 17 June 1993, p.4.

²⁸ Martin, Philip L., *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1991, p.95.

the Eastern European countries. It is thus difficult to forecast the real purchasing power. On the other hand, because of the weaknesses in the tax system a certain amount of income is not accounted for due to tax evasion.

The economic improvement in Turkey was a direct result of the change in the economic system. The decisions taken on 24th January 1980 can be summarised as:

- abolition of quantitative controls on exports, such as licensing,
- abolition of price controls,
- reimbursements to exporters of indirect taxes incurred, through export tax rebates,
- various credit facilities with relatively lower interest rates for manufacturers of exportables,
- permission to retain foreign exchange earnings to use for importing the inputs used in export production,
- centralisation of the administration of export policies,
- minimisation of bureaucratic involvement in the export sector,
- adjustment of the exchange rate on a daily basis to stimulate exports²⁹.

²⁹ Nas, Tefik S., and Odekon, Mehmet, (eds.) *Liberalisation and the Turkish Economy*, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1988, pp.3-4. For the details of the 24 January 1980 Decisions, see Ulagay, O., *24 Ocak Deneyimi Üzerine (On 24 January Decisions)*, Hill Publishers, Istanbul, 1983; Çölaşan, Emin, *24 Ocak: Bir Dönemin Perde Arkası (24 January: Behind the Curtains of an Era)*, Milliyet Publishers, Istanbul, 1983; Sönmez, M., *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalım (Crisis of Turkish Economy)*, Belge Publishers, second edition, Istanbul, 1982.

One of the major problem of the Turkish economy has been the deficit of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). As a result of state-led rapid industrialisation, the SEEs accounted for 26% of industrial value added in 1973, 34 per cent in 1979, and 27% in 1985. The share of SEEs in total investment rose from 32% in 1981 to 40 per cent in 1985. Their value added increased from 11% of GDP in 1980 to 17 per cent in 1985³⁰. Before the partial privatisation (explained below) in 1986 there were about 40 state enterprises, and various agencies of the government held minority interests in approximately 300 public companies. As a result, an important part of the Turkish economy was in the hands of the government³¹. Despite privatisation attempts after the 1980 programme, there has not been a real success if not a complete failure. The SEEs still play an important part in the Turkish economy. Employment in SEEs was approximately 600,000 persons in 1991, only a decline of 4 per cent as compared with the early 1980s³². A variety of factors such as political patronage, government intervention in the operations of SEEs, overmanning, lack of skilled managers and administration, bureaucratic procedures and controls, the lack of the threat of bankruptcy, and inadequate planning and poor feasibility studies put the state sector in a loss-making

³⁰ Karataş, C., *Privatisation in Britain and Turkey*, The Istanbul Chamber of Industry, Istanbul, November 1990, p.20.

³¹ Israfıl, C., "The Privatisation Program in Turkey", *Turkish Review*, Ankara, Turkey, Autumn 1987.

³² OECD, *Economic Surveys, Turkey*, 1991/1992.

position in Turkey³³. The politically motivated employment policy, and the highly regulated pricing system often entailed a short-fall between income and expenditure. This, inevitably, put the great majority of public enterprises in a loss-making position which simultaneously led to relatively heavy claims on public finances, often generating inflationary pressures.

When Turgut Özal's Motherland Party came to power in 1983, a basic distinction was made between the profit-oriented SEEs, which were given the freedom of determining their own prices and accounts, and the public-service-oriented public economic agencies (PEAs), that is, utility companies, which produced monopoly goods³⁴ certain essential commodities and basic services³⁵. The ultimate aim of the governments after the 1980 programme has been to privatise the SEEs. Many now view privatisation as the solution to all the problems state enterprises encountered. It is believed that by privatisation, state enterprises will become less politicised, more efficient, and provide higher quality products and services. Administrative corruption will cease because its cost can no longer be hidden or subsidised, and better managers will emerge³⁶. In

³³ Doğan, Çetin, *Evaluation of Turkish Privatisation Policies*, Department of Industrial Technology, University of Bradford, Bradford, 1993. (in computer disk)

³⁴ Although officially only one state monopoly remained, namely TEKEL (alcohol and tobacco), apart from utilities a whole range of exclusive suppliers has survived, for example, in sugar, tea, petro-chemicals or hard coal.

³⁵ Hershlag, Z. Y., *The Contemporary Turkish Economy*, Routledge, London, 1988, p.52.

³⁶ Doğan, Çetin, *Interview*, in İnönü University, Malatya, Turkey, 22 September 1995.

response to these beliefs and as an expression of the growing credibility of free-market economics world-wide, the Turkish government, like other countries, such as Britain, Malaysia, Brazil and the Philippines, has engaged itself in a large privatisation programme. To that aim Özal's government in 1983 had the following key objectives:

- to increase efficiency through competition, deregulation or other means;
- to raise finance which can be used to fund other expenditure priorities, to reduce borrowing, to reduce taxation, or any combination of these;
- to encourage employees to own shares in the company in which they work;
- to boost the level of share ownership in the general economy;
- to strengthen the capital market³⁷.

Since the end of 1983, *"the emphasis has been on decentralisation of decision-making, reduction to a minimum of state involvement and intervention in management and financing, aimed at prompting self financing of the current costs, growth of the participation of the SEEs' own savings and capital in new investments, and compliance with the market mechanism instead of reliance on administrative government protection and subsidies"*³⁸. In order to increase the role of competition in the economy, again since 1980, some measures combined with deregulation and promotion of the private sector have been taken. The Meat and Fish Organisation (EBK), which is a meat processing corporation, was a state monopoly until 1980. In 1980, EBK lost access to subsidies and

³⁷ Doğan, Çetin, *Op.Cit.*,

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.52.

32 new private companies had applied for licences to construct processing facilities to compete with EBK³⁹. A further attempt was made unsuccessfully by Prime Minister Çiller's government to privatise the EBK in 1994. Hak-İŞ, a confederation of trade unions, claimed that their employees are ready to take over the EBK and that would be the best way of privatising because it would distribute the wealth evenly and the employees interest can be maximised⁴⁰. Because of the fierce public and media reaction to the government's attempt to sell the EBK to its employees, the privatisation process has been postponed. The implication of this for foreign economic policy are two fold, a slowdown in adaptation to external pressures and an avoidance of the popular resistance which rapid change might well provoke⁴¹.

Although privatisation has a failure on the whole, the SEEs monopolistic position has gradually been removed. For instance, on the production and distribution of electricity, the state monopoly was removed in 1987 by law 3096. Again, in the same year, the tobacco state monopoly of TEKEL was abolished by law 3291⁴². The American company Philip Morris has now constructed a plant in Turkey and is producing,

³⁹ See Berg, E., *Divestiture of State-Owned Enterprises in LDCs*, World Bank, Washington, November 1985.

⁴⁰ Çelik, Necati, *Interview*, President of the Confederation of Trade Unions (Hak-İŞ), 15 December 1992.

⁴¹ Van Ham, *Op.cit.*, Rosenau (1980), *Op.cit.*

⁴² See Çizmeçi, S., "Özelleştirme (Privatisation)", *Tekel Dergisi*, (*Tekel Journal*) no. 1, January 1993.

marketing and distributing its own products, in direct competition with TEKEL. The monopoly of the state-owned tea distributor, Çaykur, was abolished with law 3092. Private companies can now purchase tea directly from growers in Turkey, process, pack and distribute it. Another example of deregulation has been seen in the educational services with Law 3035 in 1984, which enabled and encouraged the private sector to establish and run schools⁴³. However, an OECD Report suggested that, *"unlike in many OECD countries, the government has failed to seek an efficiency-enhancing regulatory framework for public utilities"*⁴⁴. SEEs are still protected from competition with regard to oil transportation, railway and air transportation (domestic flights), postal services and telecommunications. The majority of the existing SEEs and all their numerous subsidiaries accounted for around 40% of Turkish industrial production in 1986. Three categories of SEEs were distinguished to be sold to the public in three subsequent steps. A first group of four enterprises (a fodder producer, a cement manufacturer, a hotel chain and an airport handling company) were to be privatised immediately which has been completed successfully. A second group of SEEs would require some reorganisation before they could be considered for sale. A third group of SEES could only be privatised in the long-run after substantial restructuring. Mr. Doğan, has said in our interview that *"the implementation of a broad privatisation programme in Turkey would not be feasible because of financial and economic obstacles such as: (a) current domestic savings levels are not sufficient to absorb a broad privatisation programme; (b) the capital market is*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ OECD, Economic Surveys, *Turkey*, 1991-92.

*not sufficiently well developed*⁴⁵". He further emphasised that the participation of foreign capital is necessary in implementing a broad programme of privatisation. Otherwise, privatisation should proceed at a slower pace. Apart from the first step mentioned above, it can be said that the privatisation of the SEEs has been a failure; the SEEs still remain a prominent part of Turkish economy. It can also be seen that there is a close relationship between domestic liberalisation policies and confidence abroad. But to achieve that confidence, government may have to slow the privatisation process to stabilise borrowing potential.

Another important sector to be briefly analysed is the state of the agriculture and its effect on the overall economy. Turkey has been primarily an agricultural economy. However, as Hershlag put it "*agriculture, despite intermittent attempts at reform, legislation and some practical measures, has remained in fact, though not in declared policies, a stepchild and a neglected sector of the economy*"⁴⁶". The main problem of the agricultural sector was that imported pesticides and fertiliser did not fully meet national needs, improvements were in short supply, high-value export crops were inadequate in quantity and quality, and marketing arrangements were, and to a certain extent remain, unsatisfactory⁴⁷. Until 1978, the agricultural sector claimed the lion's share of GNP output. This share, however, has fallen since, due to the emphasise on industrialisation,

⁴⁵ Doğan, Çetin, *interview, Op.cit.*

⁴⁶ Hershlag, Z. Y., *Op.cit.*, p.55.

⁴⁷ World Bank, *Turkey*, 1980, p.xviii.

from 21.5% in 1979 to 19.6% in 1983, to 18.0% in 1987 and 16.5% in 1992⁴⁸. Turkey's agricultural production grew from \$12.165 million in 1980 to only \$14.567 million an annual average increase of 2.8%⁴⁹, whereas the increase in the industrial production for the same period was 5.8% (manufacturing increased 6.7%)⁵⁰. This is a substantial shift in this time period. Turkey's agriculture contains many still untapped potentials in such areas as forestry, livestock, inland fishing and in the more effective utilisation of water resources for both irrigation and energy generation. To explore those potentials, Turkey started a big irrigation and energy project called the South East Anatolian Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi-GAP), covering 41.6% of the countries area and 25% of its population⁵¹. This project comprises 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers⁵². The project has brought tension over water rights in relations with Iraq, but since the Gulf War that has not mattered very much. When completed, it is planned to irrigate over 1.7 million hectares of land and produce 27 billion kilowatt/hours of electrical energy⁵³. The completion of that project, which has been partly completed and the first irrigation started in the spring of 1995, will boost

⁴⁸ *Turkey*, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate of General of Press and Information, Ankara, February 1993, p.96.

⁴⁹ *World Development Report*, Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p.169.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.165.

⁵¹ Hershlag, Z. Y., *Op.cit.*, p.57.

⁵² *Turkey*, Office of Prime Minister, *Op.cit.*, p.130.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Turkey's agricultural production. It might also create new jobs for the people in the region. One of the major problems for Turkey is going to be the external marketing of the agricultural surplus. It also affects Turkish-EC relations as Community members have to deal with their own agricultural surplus. Mr. Nebioğlu stated in our interview that the Community did not want the agricultural sector to be included in the Custom Union for reason explained above⁵⁴. He also emphasised that Turkey was not included either in the services sector because they (the EC Commission) thought that Turkey would not compete⁵⁵.

All the economic data show us that Turkey has been gradually becoming an industrialised country. For instance, machinery and transport equipment accounted 8% of the manufacturing products in 1970, the production of machinery and transport equipment accounted 18% of the total manufactured products in 1991, while food beverages and tobacco dropped from 26% in 1970 to 17% in 1991⁵⁶. Government consumption is another indicator of the change in Turkey towards a decentralised economy. For instance, average annual growth of general government consumption was 6.3% between 1970-80 period, whereas private consumption grew only 4.8%. Between 1980-92 period, the average annual growth rate of government consumption was 3.4%, which is much lower than the 1970-80 period, while private consumption in 1980-92

⁵⁴ Nebioğlu, Hüsamettin, *Interview*, Prime Minister's Office, Ankara, 17 March 1995.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ World Bank (1994), *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

period was 6.2%, which is well above the 1970-80 period⁵⁷. The externalisation of the economy throughout the 1980s and until the mid-1990s attracted foreign investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) enormously increased since then. As Table 9 shows the authorised FDI was \$ 97.00 million in 1980. It sharply increased to \$ 234.49 million in 1985, \$ 1.861.16 million in 1990 and \$ 1.484.66 million in 1994.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.177.

Table 9

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Turkey, 1980-1995

YEARS	AUTHORISED FDI (US \$ million)	NUMBER OF FIRMS (cumulative)	TOTAL CAPITAL OF FIRMS (million TL) (cumulative)	ACTUAL INFLOWS OF FDI (million TL)* (cumulative)
1980	97.00	78	28,390	35
1981	337.51	109	47,400	141
1982	167.00	147	100,196	103
1983	102.74	166	147,109	87
1984	271.36	235	254,775	162
1985	234.49	408	464,981	158
1986	364.00	619	707,164	170
1987	655.24	836	960,035	239
1988	820.52	1,172	1,597,103	488
1989	1,511.94	1,525	4,847,832	855
1990	1,861.16	1,856	7,943,775	1,005
1991	1,967.26	2,123	13,101,036	1,041
1992	1,819.96	2,330	23,441,214	1,242
1993	2,271.30	2,554	36,737,050	1,016
1994	1,484.66	2,830	62,449,964	830
1995 **	563.81	2,900	77,900,831	
Total	14,529.95			7,572

Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury, Foreign Investment Directorate, *Foreign Investment Report, March 1995*, Ankara.

(*) millions of Turkish Lira.

(**) As of 31 March 1995.

Rapid industrialisation after the 1980s in Turkey created two main problems: one for the economy and another one for the society. Firstly, the economic industrialisation was mainly financed by foreign debts. Foreign debts were \$19.123 million in 1980, and grew to \$54.772 million in 1992⁵⁸ and to \$70.000 million in April 1994, when the Turkish government took series of economic measures (such as the freezing of wages and stopping or slowing investment programs) in order to pay back \$7.000 million⁵⁹. Secondly, social security and the welfare of the people were neglected. There are still no social security institutions, for instance, to pay jobless people unemployment benefit. According to the World Bank data the money spent on housing, social security and welfare in 1980 was 6.1% of total government expenditures, whereas in 1992 that ratio dropped to 3.9%⁶⁰, despite the fact that government mortgages included in this figure. If one takes mortgages out, almost nothing was spent on social security. This had a debilitating effect on society and clientelist relations found a ground to exist. Informal relations continued to dominate the relations between mass and elites. Urban clientelist structures in some parts of the society turned, in fact, into mafia⁶¹, as popular institutions replaced legitimate ones in the search for everyday survival and security.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.201.

⁵⁹ *Milliyet*, 6 April 1994.

⁶⁰ World Bank (1994), *Op.cit.*, p.181.

⁶¹ See *Chapter Two and Four*.

The economic improvement continued after the Turkish application for full membership in 1987. The economic development in Turkey cannot be attributed primarily to the improved relations between Turkey and the EC countries. In fact, economic relations between Turkey and the EC countries have always been steady and unspectacular. Being the oldest Associate Member (as Greece became a full member after 1982), Turkey, apart from some small amount of financial help and special access to some agricultural products such as hazelnuts, dried fig, cotton etc., has not enjoyed a privileged economic treatment from the EC. As the table below shows, the percentage of Turkish imports from and exports to the EC countries have been steady and parallel to the world trend. Turkish export extraordinarily increased from 46.5% in 1989 to 53.2% in 1990 due to the export ban to Iraq, which was Turkey's biggest export market in the Middle East⁶².

⁶² Turkish export to Iraq in 1988 was \$986 million which is 8.46% of the total Turkish export. Source, *Statistical Pocket Book of Turkey*, State institute of Statistics, Ankara, 1990, p.246.

Table 10

Percentage of Total Turkish Exports to and Imports from the European Community⁶³

%to EC\years	1987	1988	1989	1990
Exports	47.8%	43.7%	46.5%	53.2%
Imports	40.0%	41.1%	38.3%	41.8%

Turkey's increasing population is another issue on the agenda of her relations with the EC. The increase in the Turkish population is far ahead of the Community average. Turkey's population has more than doubled since Turkey applied for associate membership. In 1960, Turkey's population was 27.755 million. In 1990 it was 56.969 million and it is projected that Turkey's population will increase to 73 million by the year 2000⁶⁴. It should be noted that Turkey geographically and economically is capable of feeding around 150 million people. Turkey is one of the rare countries in the world which is self sufficient in agricultural products. Turkey's increasing population will certainly not be a threat in terms of food security to the EC or other regional organisations. Contrarily, being a big market, it might increase the economic development of the Community. The Commission of the Community, however, in its

⁶³ *Statistical Pocket Book of Turkey*, State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, 1990, p.246. and Güvenen, Orhan, *Marching in Stride with the European Community: A Statistical Presentation of the Turkish Case*, Presented to Forum Europe, Brussels, October 30-31,1991, in *Turkey and the European Community*, Editors, Mary Strang, Arlene Redmond, Brussels, 1991, p.212.

⁶⁴ *Statistical Pocket Book of Turkey*, State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Ankara, January 1991, p.14.

report upon Turkish application has said that "*Turkey is a large country -it has a greater geographical area and will eventually have a bigger population than any Community member state*"⁶⁵. Although, the Commission is concerned about the increasing population of Turkey, Turkey's increasing population, in fact, is not a real problem for her relations with the EC. But absorbing large new members is structurally a problem for the EC both politically and in terms of the EC budget, and, potentially, is a challenge to decision making arrangements as well⁶⁶.

As argued above, the creation of a common market between Turkey and the EC will not bring forward a huge economic burden on the Community countries. On the other hand, the creation of a common market will not also bring forward an economic burden to Turkey, as has been argued by some economists⁶⁷. Although some sectors from both sides might be negatively affected, the overall economy of both will prosper due to the trade creation effect of a widened market. Having said that, it should also be emphasised that Turkey's membership would not be merger agreement of two companies. It would be a complete economic cooperation between her and the Community. It is almost certain that the inclusion of Turkey will create a multiplier effect, and will further

⁶⁵ *Commission of the European Communities*, "Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community", 18 December 1989, no, 2290, p.4.

⁶⁶ Van Ham, *Op.cit.*

⁶⁷ For the controversial argument that Turkey would negatively be affected from a possible membership, see Yilmaz, Tomris, *The Likely Effects of Turkey's Full Membership of the European Community*, School of Economics and Political Science, London, March 1990, pp.1-30.

increase the prosperity of the region. The economic development, however, might vary relatively from one member to another. The economic balance of advantage is not a question of how to justify whether Turkey should be a member of the EC or not, but there remains an issue of the distribution of economic development between regions and between social groups.

This section has argued that since the end of the Cold War Turkey's relations with the EC have changed. The changes in the domestic political structure of Turkey have also affected Turkish-Community relations. Economic interest prevailed over ideological considerations in Turkish foreign policy in general and in Turkish-Community relations in particular. The next section will analyse Turkey's involvement in the Gulf in order to further emphasise the change in Turkish foreign policy.

7.4. The Gulf Crisis and Turkey

Turkey's changing foreign policy can also be observed in Turkey's active involvement in the Gulf Crisis. Although Turkey did not participate directly in the war, she played a vital role by applying the sanctions to the limit, and by giving great military and logistical support to the United States. When the United States offensive started on 17th January 1991, a law was passed authorizing the Government to enable Turkish armed forces and foreign forces based in Turkey to participate in military action against

Iraq⁶⁸. Apart from the Turkish intervention in Cyprus and sending Turkish ground troops to Korea, that was the first decision of its kind since the Second World War. In fact, one could say that the authorization of the Turkish forces to participate in a military attack was the first decision of this kind in the Turkish Republic's history. Even during the Second World War Turkey actively remained neutral and only decided to side with the allies at the end of the war⁶⁹.

To show her seriousness and deter any Iraqi attack and for some other reasons explained below, Turkey deployed 200,000 troops on the Iraqi border⁷⁰. "*The international coalition could not have achieved the liberation of Kuwait without Turkey's pivotal contributions*"⁷¹. This may be an exaggeration, but it expresses a level of political commitment. All this indicated that Turkey was willing to implement the United Nation's resolutions, whereas Turkey previously chose to remain neutral and apparently indifferent to Middle Eastern affairs. Turkey's main policy towards the Middle East previously was summarised by Robins:

⁶⁸ *Hürriyet*, 18 January 1991.

⁶⁹ *Department of State Bulletin*, xii, 4 March 1945, pp.373-374. Also on Turkey's active neutrality in the Second World War, see Deringil, Selim, *Turkish Foreign Policy During The Second World War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp.135-143.

⁷⁰ Kuniholm, R. Bruce, "Turkey and the West", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, Spring 1991, p.38.

⁷¹ President George Bush's Speech at Ankara Esenboğa Airport on 20 July 1991, in *Turkish Review*, vol. 5, no. 25, Autumn 1991, p.104.

- to avoid interfering in the domestic affairs of the region, and disputes between states in the region;
- to develop good relations with all states in the region;
- not to allow use of NATO forces in the affairs of the Middle East;
- to develop trade and economic relationship;
- to take a balanced approach to the Arab - Israeli problem⁷².

This policy orientation was bypassed in the Gulf Crisis. The Turkish stand in the Gulf Crisis has been a concrete example that Turkey was pursuing an active foreign policy. Turkey has always been overcautious in involvement in regional affairs. During the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey wisely managed to keep herself out of the conflict. Turkey's regional policy, as mentioned above, had been based on the policy of 'active neutrality' as also during the Second World War. As Indyk noted, *"Turkey had previously been reluctant to bring its power to bear in the regional equation. President Turgut Özal's decision to side with the coalition was highly controversial among Turkey's political-military elite and yet was to be vindicated"*⁷³. Turkey's active involvement in the crisis (especially implementing the economic sanctions immediately and decisively) might perhaps have two main reasons. First of all, Iraq became a military

⁷² Robins, Philip, *Turkey and the Middle East*, The Royal Institution for International Affairs, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991, p.65-67.

⁷³ Indyk, Martin, "The Postwar Balance of Power in the Middle East", *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, Edited by, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith, The Aspen Institute, Madison Books, London, 1992, p.105.

power in the region after the end of Iran-Iraq war. Turkey thus wanted to use the issue to weaken Iraq's power in order to eradicate any danger against Turkey which might arise in the future. Secondly, Turkey, by the immediate implementation of the sanctions against Iraq, has tried to gain improved prestige in the international community. By doing that Turgut Özal might perhaps have wanted to prove that he has confidently taken such an important decision without American pressure. Although people liked Özal's brinkmanship and his policy of openness and reforms in domestic affairs, he, however, in the eyes of ordinary people was America's man. But Özal might have thought that delaying the implementation of sanctions against Iraq might damage his support in the public opinion.

As mentioned above, if Turkey has been unexpectedly active in that crisis, it was partly due to Turgut Özal's personality. His political style was based on change not on the status quo. Even the General Chief of Staff, Necip Torumtay, found Özal's policy on the Gulf Crisis risky and dangerous, and resigned⁷⁴. He said that *"I am resigning because I cannot continue to serve with my principles and my understanding of what the state is"*⁷⁵. The military's principles are based on a status quo taking its cue from Atatürk's words "peace at home, peace abroad". During Atatürk's time that philosophy was reasonable because of the conditions Turkey faced⁷⁶. In the 1990s however, Turkey,

⁷⁴ *The Independent*, 4 December 1990.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ See *Chapter Six*.

being a regional power, has come to play an active role in the region in order to create and sustain political and economic stability in the region. Turkey clearly took advantage of the Gulf Crisis to build her interests and her autonomy in the region. This division at the heart of the security apparatus of government also demonstrates as nothing else could the widening of the Turkish elite policy group and its (relatively) greater plural nature.

Turgut Özal admitted that there was a fundamental difference of opinion between him and some generals. He emphasised that Turkey should no longer preserve the status quo and that she should play an active role in her surrounding region⁷⁷. Özal used the issue to show her military allies in the West that Turkey's geopolitical importance remains intact despite the end of the Cold War. *"For decades Turkey had held a position of unmistakable strategic importance in NATO. It held the longest border with the Soviet Union of any member of the alliance. As the Soviet Union turned inward and the Warsaw Pact folded its tents, Özal worried that his country would slip once again from the appreciation and attention of the West and of the United States"*⁷⁸. President Özal has thought that by active involvement in the Gulf Turkey would gain the confidence of Western Europe. Western European leaders, as Talbott noted, *"struggled with the immense challenge posed by the collapse of communism in the East, they would be even less open to Turkish labourers seeking work permits, not to mention politicians in*

⁷⁷ *Milliyet*, 7 December 1990.

⁷⁸ Talbott, Strobe, "Status Quo Ante: The United States and its Allies", *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, Edited by, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith, The Aspen Institute, Madison Books, London, 1992, p.8.

*Ankara seeking membership in the European Community. Özal saw the Gulf Crisis as an opportunity to prove that Turkey still had an important role to play in the new era*⁷⁹.

The Turkish government supported Özal's ideas, unsurprisingly since Turgut Özal's own party, which elected him as President, was in power. The Prime Minister of the time, Yıldırım Akbulut, has said that *"our active foreign policy will continue. Geographic location makes Turkey responsible to play an important role by assuring peace and stability in the Middle East. The requirements of this responsibility keeps Turkey in an active position to increase mutual understanding in the Black Sea, Balkans, the Mediterranean as well as in the Middle East and to participate in efforts to ease the tension and expand economic cooperation"*⁸⁰. Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, Yıldırım Akbulut's successor, also stated that *"it is difficult to distinguish history from geography and geography from politics in this part of the world"*⁸¹. Mesut Yılmaz meant by this statement that he would follow suit and continue to evolve an active foreign policy in the region. He also implied that Turkey can no longer stay indifferent to the region where she belongs geographically and historically. Mr. Yılmaz, 18 months after the Gulf War, answering a question on the size of the cost of the war to Turkey, said that *"Turkey devised its policies regarding the Gulf Crisis taking into account neither a need to show*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.9.

⁸⁰ *Newspot*, 11 April 1991.

⁸¹ Yılmaz, Mesut, "Highlights From the New Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz on the Regional and International Affairs", *Middle East Business and Banking*, vol. 11, no. 7, July 1991, p.10.

solidarity with the United States nor considering gain-loss accounts, but with consideration of principles that it believes and defends. If we are obliged to cite a country with which we have displayed solidarity, it would be correct to cite Kuwait,, which was subjected to unjust Iraqi occupation. Turkey, together with the United States, has participated in the solidarity with Kuwait which was called for by the international community and prescribed in the resolutions of the United Nation's Security Council regarding the problem. Anyhow, as a responsible and serious state, no other attitude could be expected from Turkey⁸²". In fact, Prime Minister Yılmaz's diplomatic statements included a lot of rhetoric about Turkish independence. The most important interpretation of his statements could be that Turkey by being geographically adjacent to the Crisis should take advantage of the situation in the Gulf by being active. Mr. Yılmaz's statement indirectly indicated that Turkey was a self-sufficient sovereign state in her foreign relations and she did not actively involved in the Gulf Crisis for the sake of short term economic gains. He tried to satisfy Turkish public opinion that Turkey's active involvement in the Gulf was not because of American pressure but because Turkey wanted to intervene as a responsible world state and for Turkey's own benefit. Mr. Yılmaz's justification of Turkey's economic loss contradicts with Özal's view. Turgut Özal said at the beginning of the crisis that *"this (the Turkish involvement in the Gulf Crisis) is the most profitable business deal of my life. It is the first time that I am making such big profits with so little work⁸³".*

⁸² *Turkish Daily News*, 20 July 1991.

⁸³ *Sabah*, 16 January 1991.

After the crisis it was clearly understood that the aim of Turkey was not to take short-term economic advantage of the crisis but to stake a political claim to regional leadership. Turgut Özal perhaps knew that Turkey would lose economically in the crisis. He thought Turkey would benefit in the long run by securing a deep influence in the north of Iraq, and in her relations with both Europe and the United States. Özal, for instance, said in the İncirlik air base that *"We did not previously have a foreign policy. We just followed behind others. But we have fundamentally changed this"*⁸⁴. At the same time, by having a political influence in the Northern Iraq, the Kurdish problem might also be solved without damaging the sovereignty of Turkey. Turgut Özal said just after the crisis that Turkey should discuss the Kurdish problem including the option of a federation. Turgut Özal, as John Bullock said, *"saw the possibility of a Kurdish state emerging from the conflict long before it dawned to others. An independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would, in conventional Turkish terms, be a threat to Ankara, but Mr Özal saw it as a chance to expand Turkish influence, even to regain a part of the Ottoman domains lost 70 years ago. Perhaps an opportunity to resurrect the Mousul question from the dust of history books, giving Turkey control of some of the huge oil reserves of Northern Iraq by reestablishing Turkish sovereignty"*⁸⁵.

⁸⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 19 February 1991.

⁸⁵ Bulloch, John, "Friendless People in a Hostile World", *The Independent on Sunday*, 7 April 1991.

To increase the popularity of his policies regarding the Gulf Crisis, Turgut Özal convinced the public that Turkey would economically be better off. 88% of Turkish people because were opposing to any kind of Turkish involvement in the Crisis⁸⁶. *"One of the slogans of the Zonguldak (an industrial province of Turkey where the biggest coal mines are) miners on strike during this period was: 'We are going to war not in the Gulf but against Özal'⁸⁷".*

Turkish involvement in the Gulf has also been a test for Turkey to show its commitment to the international community in general, and to the EC in particular. Turkey tried to pass the message to the West that despite the end of the Cold War Turkey is a committed Western ally. Although, she initiated and revived some new regional organisations (ECO and BSECR), they were aimed to fill the power vacuum in the region and to develop the economic prosperity of the region. They were certainly not alternatives to Turkish-EC relations. Turgut Özal, complaining about the limited import quotas on Turkish textile and the non-payment of the previously agreed 600 million ECU aid package, said that *"Turkey has demonstrated once again during the Gulf Crisis its attachment to the common values shared with the Community⁸⁸".*

⁸⁶ Navaro, Dario, "Turkey and the Gulf War", in *The Gulf War and the New World Order*, eds. Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, Second Edition, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1991, p.80.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.80

⁸⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 5 March 1991.

The Gulf Crisis has undoubtedly been one of the most important crises in the Turkish Republic's history. Turkey's inexperience in crisis management and the sensitivity of the issue has caused the resignation of some ministers. Foreign Minister Ali Bozer resigned on 12th October 1990⁸⁹; and the Turkish Defence Minister Safa Giray resigned on 18th October 1990⁹⁰. The resignation of the ministers was merely due to the fact that they did not want to be responsible for such crucial decisions. They were afraid of public reaction and they thought that Turgut Özal, the President, was going too far and too fast. The resignation of the Chief of Staff, Necip Torumtay, was not due to the public reaction. The military thought that Turkey's involvement in the Gulf would disturb the balance in the region and it was also against Turkey's status quo policy⁹¹. Former Defence Minister, Ercan Vuralhan, has also confessed that the army had opposed any involvement in military operation against Iraq from Turkey⁹². One important thing to be mentioned here is that despite all the resignations and the difficult times for the policy makers, the Turkish democratic structure was capable of managing that crisis without significant domestic political instability. The Chief of Staff, a crucial post in Turkish political life, has resigned in a democratic way for the first time in Turkish Republic's history without causing a domestic political crisis.

⁸⁹ *The Times*, 19 October 1990.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *The Independent*, 4 December 1990.

⁹² Cevizoğlu, Hulki, *Körfez Savaşı ve Özal Diplomasisi-Belgesel- (The Gulf War and Özal's Diplomacy-Documentary-)*, Form Yayınları (Form Publishers), no. 13, İstanbul, 1991, p.248.

Turgut Özal was even willing to contribute directly by sending some troops to the Coalition forces. He could not, however, gain the necessary legal support from the Parliament⁹³. Also he could not gain the support of the public to go that far. This showed that Turkish foreign policy is not made exclusively by the President and a small elite surrounding him. Turkish foreign policy is made by a functioning democratic system under the constant control of the Cabinet, Parliament and public scrutiny. Public opinion on that matter was mainly against military involvement in the Gulf Crisis. The Turkish public felt that direct military involvement would mean the betrayal of Turkey's neighbour Iraq. It would therefore damage already vulnerable Turk-Arab relations. It should be taken into account that during the crisis almost all the people of the Arab world were against their governments' pro-Western policies. In many peoples minds, Turkey acted against the Arab people⁹⁴. While this is not evidence of direct democratic control, it is evidence of a growth of a new level of democratic accountability.

As far as the economic effects of the Gulf War on Turkey are concerned, it did negatively affect Turkey's economy. Gross National Product decreased by 1% in that year, whereas Turkey's previous year's development was 5.9%⁹⁵. Turkish financial losses

⁹³ *The Washington Post*, 3 March 1991.

⁹⁴ Azam, Maha, "The Gulf Crisis: Perception in the Muslim World", *International Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 3, July 1991, pp.473-486.

⁹⁵ *Zaman*, 17 June 1993, p.4.

have been assessed at \$15 billion to \$20 billion⁹⁶. The long term economic loss is going to be higher. As long as economic sanctions remain operational on Iraq, which was a main trading partner, Turkey's economic losses will continue to rise. As Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut said *"Turkey suffered important economic losses after imposing the United Nation Security Council's economic sanctions decision before its neighbours"*⁹⁷. Turkey was the first country to apply sanctions against Iraq. As soon as crisis began Turkey closed the oil pipelines through which Iraq was exporting 54% of its oil⁹⁸. Turkey thus lost \$350 million revenue in a year in transit fees from the closure of the pipelines and another \$50 million for port handling charges⁹⁹. Turkey's trade with Iraq totalled \$2.1 billion in 1989, of which Turkish imports amounted to \$1.7 billion¹⁰⁰. Beside that Iraq owed Turkey \$1 billion dollar. Turkey lost \$600 million in the second half of 1990 in trade to Iraq and Kuwait¹⁰¹. The loss in imports from the same countries amounted to \$753 million¹⁰². The loss in contracting services was \$450 million, the increase in its oil bill \$800 million and the loss in the tourism industry was around \$300

⁹⁶ *Newspot*, 8 August 1991, p.5.

⁹⁷ *Newspot*, 11 April 1991, p.2.

⁹⁸ Kuniholm, R. Bruce, "Turkey and The West", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, Spring 1991, p.36.

⁹⁹ *The Middle East*, "Turkey Firmly Embracing Sacrifice", October 1990, p.41.

¹⁰⁰ *Statistical Pocket book of Turkey*, State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Ankara, January 1991, pp.244-46.

¹⁰¹ *The Middle East*, *Op.cit.*, p.41.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

million. These figures might be small for a developed economy but meant a lot for the Turkish economy whose exports was only around \$11 billion in 1989¹⁰³. It is however interesting that Turkish officials signalled that Turkey will also benefit economically from the crisis once it was over. President Turgut Özal stated that *"this is the most profitable business deal of my life. It is the first time that I am making such big profits with so little work"*¹⁰⁴. Turgut Özal, perhaps, was trying to gain the backing of people on that matter. Otherwise, it was quite clear that Turkey was the only country to lose more than the others in that crisis, apart from Iraq.

Some people have thought that being allied herself with the West in Gulf Crisis might secure Turkey's place in Europe and gain a possible Community membership. For instance, Mr Şen stated in a conference that *"fortunately, induced by the Gulf Crisis and by the ostentatiously pro-Western attitude of Turkey, Europe is beginning to discuss the future status of Turkey anew. A conviction seems to be growing that the borders of Europe should not end with Greece in order to gain political stability in that area and for the protection of the European integration in general"*¹⁰⁵. Mr. Şen is quite right in saying that political stability can only be sustained in the region by close cooperation between Turkey and Europe. It would, however, be naive to say that Turkey could be

¹⁰³ *Statistical Pocket book of Turkey, Op.cit.*, p.246.

¹⁰⁴ *Sabah*, 16 January 1991.

¹⁰⁵ Şen, Faruk, *The Turkish Economy, the EC, and the Gulf Crisis*, Conference at the Bologna Centre of the Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, 7 March 1991, published by Turkish Research Centre, Bonn, Germany, 1991, p.4.

awarded Community membership by a deterioration of her relations with the Middle East countries. Turkey's reaction to the invasion of Kuwait was not to try directly to secure Community membership; Turkey, by reacting in a decisive and severe way, has tried to show that she is an active foreign policy player in the region and that she is fully committed herself to the international community and to international law. Turkey's EC membership at the expense of her Middle East relations would neither help Turkey nor the stability of the region. As a matter of fact, at the end of the Gulf War, Turkish politicians have once more realised that Turkey's Community membership cannot be gained by gestures but by creating mutual interest.

It is thus clear that Turkey's membership of the EC is not an alternative to Turkey's relations with the Middle East or Central Asian countries. Most of the Community countries have their own separate arrangements with the other countries in the world, as Great Britain, for instance, has historic deep relations with the Commonwealth. As has been stressed in the previous chapter and in this chapter earlier, the obstacles to Turkey's Community membership are; the economic structure and the economic level of the country, the domestic political structure of the country, and most important of all, the readiness of the EC to digest a demographically and geographically enormous and culturally different country. The last question does depend on the Community's future shape, on whether it is going to be a regional economic organisation, or is going to go towards a compact United States of Europe. The first option seems more likely. Turkey might then be a remote member of the Community after the

membership of newly freed Eastern European countries. If the Community becomes more compact and more strictly federal, Turkey will almost certainly be excluded.

7.5. Turkey's Latest Involvement in Regional Organisations

7.5.1. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR)

The idea of setting up the BSECR was put on the agenda by Turkish diplomat Şükrü Elekdağ, a former ambassador in Washington,¹⁰⁶. There were two main reasons behind the idea of setting up an organisation between the Black Sea countries; firstly, the Turkish application to the EC was rejected¹⁰⁷ and Turkey was trying to establish some kind collaboration with her neighbours; secondly and more importantly, the collapse of the Soviet Union has created a political vacuum in that region. The establishment of the BSECR has been thought to fill that vacuum and to prevent the spread of regional conflicts between the newly emerged states (such as the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan). It became a distinct Turkish contribution to regional organisation.

¹⁰⁶ The idea of establishing a regional economic organisation in the Black Sea Region is put forward by Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ in a panel in Washington on 'the changes in the World and Turkey' and his idea is supported by Albert Chernishev, the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey,.

¹⁰⁷ *Commission of the European Communities*, "Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community", no. 2290, 18 December 1989.

President Turgut Özal took up the idea at the end of 1990¹⁰⁸. *"After the former Eastern Block states Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Rumania expressed their interest in economic cooperation in the Black Sea region in the wake of economic transformation, the project began to materialise¹⁰⁹".* The BSECR Document was initialled in Ankara on 3rd February 1992 when the foreign ministers of the nine countries met¹¹⁰. Turgut Özal in the opening speech stressed the importance of a cooperation in the region. He emphasised that the organisation will help the economic development of the countries concerned¹¹¹. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the number of original participating states increased to nine. The USSR was replaced by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine¹¹². With the joining of Turkey, Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania the number of the member states has now increased to eleven.

Turkey's membership of the BSECR is at once an outcome and a defining element of her multi-dimensional foreign policy. The Turkish proposition of the BSECR has been pointed out as an important development and indicator of Turkish influence in the

¹⁰⁸ Şen, Faruk, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Supplement to the EC?", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 44, no. 3, 1993, p.281.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.281.

¹¹⁰ Turkish TV, Ankara 1800 gmt, 3 February 1992, in *Summary of World Broadcasting (SWB)*, 6 February 1992, ME/1297 A/12.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* (SWB) ME/1297 A/12.

¹¹² Şen, Faruk (1993), *Op.cit.*, p.281.

region¹¹³. Turkey saw the BSECR as a link in the chain of global framework. In the stage of its establishment Ambassador Bleda, Deputy Undersecretary for Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained the motivation behind Turkey's effort to establish the BSECR. He said *"There is no doubt that these cooperation projects, in their turn, will contribute to the enhancement of the general framework and will give new dimensions of cooperative security and commonly shared ideals in Europe. Thus, a useful and efficient interaction will be initiated. At the same time, global economic interdependence has become one of the most significant phenomena of today's world. Different economies have indeed become more closely linked through the globalisation of markets. this can be explained by a complex set of factors, such as the revolutionary development of technology in transportation and communication, enhanced capital, increased goods and services mobility and the diffusion of modern technology and managerial capacity¹¹⁴".*

The guiding considerations behind the idea of launching the BSECR were noted by the Turkish official journal Newspot as:

"-the wish to form an integral part of the future European architecture;

¹¹³ Arter, David, *The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century*, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., Hants, 1993, p.232.

¹¹⁴ *Newspot*, Turkish Digest, 9 May 1991, p.2.

-the importance of securing the further development and diversification of our economic relations by making efficient use of the advantages arising from geographical proximity and the complementary nature of our economies;

-the necessity to ensure a higher degree of integration of this region into the world economy;

-the conviction that the promotion of economic relations depends on the effective functioning of the market economy, which relies primarily on the freedom of individual initiative and free movement of persons, good, services and capital;

-the importance of concrete mechanisms, such as the Foreign Trade and Investment Bank for the promotion of commercial and service relations;

-the need to adopt a step by step approach and a cooperation scheme based on coordinated joint efforts towards enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation¹¹⁵.

Şükrü Elekdağ argued that cooperation in the region will create a bigger trade volume between the member states and that financial problems for investment will be solved through the Black Sea Cooperation Region Development Bank¹¹⁶. He also argued that the cooperation will encourage the investors and surplus capital from the United States, West European countries, the Arab states and Japan to flow to the region¹¹⁷. On

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.2.

¹¹⁶ Elekdağ, Şükrü, "Karadeniz Ekonomik İş Birliği (KEİB), (The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR))", *Dünya Gazetesi*, Turkish Daily Newspaper, Istanbul, 3 February 1992, p.12.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.12.

the other hand, Osman Z. Orhan pointed out that the BSECR will not only bring economic prosperity to the region, but that socio-cultural and socio-political integration will also be by-products of the cooperation project¹¹⁸.

When the parties met in Istanbul on 25th June 1992, they agreed to cooperate on 18 points including trade, industry, science, technology and the environment¹¹⁹. The multilateral cooperation related to the following fields of activity;

- transport and communication including its infrastructure,
- computer science,
- exchange of economic and commercial information including statistics,
- standardisation and certification of products,
- energy,
- mining of ores and processing of raw materials,
- tourism,
- farming and the agricultural industry,
- prophylaxis in the field of veterinary medicine,
- health system and pharmaceutical,

¹¹⁸ Orhan, Osman Z., "Bir Integrasyon Örneği Olarak KEİB (The BSECR as an Integration Example)", *Istanbul Trade Chamber Report*, February 1992, p.13.

¹¹⁹ Note: Parties published a joint declaration known as the Bosphorus Declaration. For the whole text of the Declaration, see "Bosphorus Declaration", *Dünya Gazetesi*, Turkish Daily Newspaper, 26 June 1992, p.12.

-science and technology¹²⁰.

The BSECR could be assessed from several points of view. The first point is that what kind of role it will play in the new global world order. Secondly, to what extent and to which direction it will change Turkish-EC relations. Thirdly, what kind of advantages this kind of organisation will bring¹²¹. Beside those, proper answers should be given to the question of how far the BSECR will bring economic advantages. And how far will it promote Turkish interests, the Turkish agenda and Turkish influence in the region? These main points and questions will be answered analytically in the course of this chapter.

The BSECR is a relatively new organisation. Thus one cannot assess the success of its cooperation. However, it is worth saying that the BSECR is made up of eleven countries most of which have deep economic problems and there are also deep multilateral and bilateral problems between the member states. For instance, Turkey and Greece are old enemies over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. Again Azerbaijan and Armenia have a bitter dispute over the autonomous region of Karabagh, where a bitter war is

¹²⁰ See Balkır, Canan, Güran, Nevzat and Soyyörük, H Haluk, *Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Bölgesi (KEİB) Çerçevesinde Petrokimya Sanayii (Petrochemical Industry in the BSECR frame work)*, Editors, Petkim Petrokimya Holding Co., Izmir, 1992. Also see Şen, Faruk (1993), *Op.cit.*, p.282.

¹²¹ Saraçoğlu, Metin, "Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme (An Assessment on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation)", TÜHİS (Turkish Industrial Union of Employers), November-December, 1993, p. 4.

continuing. The BSECR is intended to be a conflict management instrument, although it is not the purpose of the thesis to discuss these bilateral issues in detail. It is also intended to represent a structure through which Turkey's leadership, as well as its view of the world, can be articulated. Here, it is at least in large part successful.

Despite all the negative points however, if mutual economic interests of the member states are maintained, some degree of economic success can be expected from the BSECR. So far, economic relations between the BSECR members do not fulfil the expectations. That might be due to the fact that there are big economic, cultural and political differences between the member states. One should not therefore be over optimistic about the success of the BSECR since it is yet an infant organisation. The diverse socio-economical and socio-political structure of the region might also make the cooperation even more difficult.

Turkey's initiative to establish a regional organisation is mainly to fill the political vacuum in the region and to prevent the Balkans and the Black Sea from a wider spread of conflict. *"Turkey was somewhat obliged to take advantage of the new environment and contribute to the acceleration of the political and economic transformation taking place in its proximity. The intention was to take the steps that would lead to economic stability and lasting peace in the region through stronger economic ties"*¹²². Turkey's

¹²² Özüye, Oktay, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 3, no. 3, Summer 1992, p. 49.

membership of the BSECR thus cannot and should not be perceived as an alternative to the EC¹²³. "*Ankara emphasises that the Black Sea project is not an alternative but a supplement to the European Community*"¹²⁴. Turkey urged Greece to be a member of the BSECR because of the very fact that she did not want to be seen to be in different pacts. "*The application of Greece, a member of the EC, to become a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation project is clear evidence of the complementary nature of this model and its compatibility with other European groupings*"¹²⁵. The Turkish authorities thought that Turkey alone cannot be the economic motor of the BSECR. With the joining of Greece, both country's economic development in the 1980s could be a model for the former Soviet Union Republics. However, neither the Turkish nor the Greek economy is powerful enough to be the motor of development in the region. It is however worth saying that through the BSECR member states have found a mechanism to start bilateral and multilateral relationships. The cooperation in the region is an important piece of a jigsaw without which a new liberal world order cannot be completed. Therefore, as İbrahimoglu emphasised, Turkey's desire to develop a cooperation model in the Black Sea region is not an alternative to Turkish will to integrate with the West. On the contrary the BSECR is going to play a complementary role for the integration of

¹²³ See Şen, Faruk (1994), *Türkiyenin Ufukları (Horizons of Turkey)*, Turkish Research Centre, Onel & Verlag, Köln, March 1994, pp.52-71.

¹²⁴ Şen, Faruk (1993), *Op.cit.*, p.286.

¹²⁵ Özüye, Oktay, *Op.cit.*, p.52.

Europe¹²⁶. The BSECR is in this sense an outcome of a globalist movement in the world. The global world will be created through the relationship of regional organisations. The BSECR framework is thus a necessary organisation to fulfil its role in the age of globalism¹²⁷.

7.5.2. From Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) to the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO)

The ECO is an intergovernmental organisation which now has a privileged place in Turkish foreign policy. Before explaining the reason why Turkey and the other member countries of the ECO are eagerly trying to revive the Organisation, it would be better to explain its emergence. During the hottest days of the Cold War, Turkey, with the encouragement of the United States, was trying to establish some regional security arrangements against a possible Soviet threat. The Baghdad Pact was the beginning of Turkey's relations with her Eastern neighbours. The Pact was designed to counter the Soviet threat directed at the Caspian and Black Seas, and in Central Asia. Turkey together with Iran, Iraq and Pakistan was convinced that a Soviet danger was on the agenda. Memory of the speech of the Soviet Minister, during the secret negotiations on

¹²⁶ İbrahimioğlu, Rafet, "Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği (KEİB) (The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC))", *Gıda İşveren*, Year, 24, no. 248, February-March 1992, p.17.

¹²⁷ For more, see Çıkrıkçı, Mustafa, "Globalleşme ve Bir Çözüm: "Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması (Globalism and a Solution: the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Agreement)", *Banka ve Ekonomik Yorumlar (Bank and Economic Interpretations)*, March 1992, no. 3, pp.57-59.

establishing a Soviet-Italian-German and Japanese Treaty in November 1940, confirmed that idea. Molotov, the Soviet Minister, said "*the area south of Batum and Baku (now Azerbaijan's capital) in the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognised as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union*"¹²⁸. The Baghdad Pact became operational when Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement on 24 February 1955. Several weeks later on 5th April, Britain joined the pact. On 23rd September and 3rd November respectively, Pakistan and Iran also joined¹²⁹.

The Pact was solely based on security issues. The motivation to keep the Pact alive derived from the Soviet threat. As can be seen below, neither the Baghdad Pact nor the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) have been successful due to the fact that they both have been established solely on security issues and due to divisions amongst their members. Economic cooperation among the members was neglected. As Gasiorowski pointed out "*The Baghdad Pact was beset with problems from its inception. Incensed at Iraq's decision to join the pro-Western alliance, President Gamal Abdul Naser of Egypt began to foment unrest in Iraq and isolate the Iraqi government in the Arab world*"¹³⁰. The Baghdad Pact, only three years old, became unoperational when the Iraqi

¹²⁸ Central Treaty Organisation, R.5296/64, February 1964, Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London, p.2. Quoted in, Burke, S.M., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p.169.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.170.

¹³⁰ Gasiorowski, Mark, J. "Security Relations Between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978" in *Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States*, Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski, eds. Yale University Press, New haven and London,

monarchy was thrown out in July 1958 in a bloody coup. The new Iraqi government boycotted the subsequent meetings of the Pact and then withdrew from it altogether in March 1959¹³¹. After Iraq left the Pact the remaining members changed its name to the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and its headquarters were shifted from Baghdad to Ankara¹³².

After the Revolution in Iraq, Turkish-Iraqi relations sank to a very low level. Iraq was orientated more towards Russia, and accused Turkey of encouraging the Kurds in Iraq, which she was. Turkey however "*was not anxious to stimulate a similar movement within its own borders and therefore, refrained from any overt action*"¹³³. Turkey at that time felt that since she was the most vulnerable front against a possible Soviet attack, she did not want any major trouble with Iraq as she was moving towards a closer relationship with the Soviet Union in the region. Turkey's quest to establish another regional security organisation in place of the Baghdad Pact should perhaps be seen as underlying those strained circumstances that Turkey was in.

1990, pp.157-158.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p.158.

¹³² Burke, S.M., *Op.cit.*, p.170.

¹³³ See Shaw, Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel Kural, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Volume II, 1977, p.430.

Although the United States supported the Baghdad Pact, she did not sign it. The reasons were given by Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallmann, the United States observer of the Council meeting in November 1955. He gave two reasons: first, America's entry would further estrange Nasser's nationalist-socialist Egypt and her Arab allies; secondly, the signing of the Pact would mean an alliance with Iraq, a member of the Arab League. This would invoke an Israeli counter demand for a mutual defence treaty¹³⁴. An Israeli defence treaty was something the United States President would not want to be involved in for domestic political reasons. Any American alliance would also irritate the Arab peoples' and make them ever more receptive to the Soviet Union.

CENTO was established with the same goals as the Baghdad Pact. Turkey, however, did not attach great importance to CENTO. The main aim of the organisation was to protect member countries against a Soviet attack. Turkey guaranteed her security inside the NATO framework, there was thus no reason for Turkey to try to promote CENTO. Turkey did not want her relations with America to be on the same level as those with Iran and Pakistan. Turkey was also not convinced that, taking a lesson from the Baghdad Pact, CENTO was going to be successful. She thought that her security interest during the Cold War would best be met in a Western alliance. Turkey, therefore, thus showed little enthusiasm for the idea of Iran to establish a Central Military Command on the lines of NATO¹³⁵. At the beginning of the 1960s, Turkey's indifference

¹³⁴ *New York Times*, 27 November 1955, quoted in Burke, Op.cit. p.171.

¹³⁵ *The Times*, 29 April 1961, quoted in Burke, Op.cit. p.172.

towards CENTO and Pakistan, and Iran's lack of confidence in the West, made the CENTO unoperational. As Burke argues "*all three Muslim members of CENTO cooled towards the Western powers and moved to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Iran felt she had received insufficient military hardware from her Western allies...; Turkey complained of the Western attitude in her quarrel with Greece over Cyprus; and Pakistan had the painful experience of watching her closest Western allies, the USA and the UK, supply arms to India*¹³⁶". Although, CENTO evolved into a forum for economic cooperation, little real progress was made in the economic areas¹³⁷. Nevertheless, CENTO continued to function in a limited way until Iran and Pakistan withdrew in March 1979, when CENTO formally ceased to exist¹³⁸. CENTO's life span was longer than the Baghdad Pact. If it was not for the Iranian Revolution it might perhaps have lived until the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is because CENTO was mainly designed to protect the member states against any attack from the Soviet Union. This aim was something all the parties were interested in. As Graham also points out "*unlike its predecessor the Baghdad Pact, CENTO has managed to survive so long largely because it is so innocuous*¹³⁹".

¹³⁶ Burke, S.M., *Op.cit.*, p.172.

¹³⁷ Gasiorowski, *Op.cit.*, pp.158-159.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p.159.

¹³⁹ Graham, Robert, *The Illusion of Power*, Croom Helm Ltd, London, 1978, p.175.

Subsequently, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan took some steps *"to consolidate the remnant of economic and social ingredients of CENTO to form the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)"*¹⁴⁰ which was no more successful than CENTO.

Perhaps the only positive outcome of CENTO was that it created a forum in which the member countries could discuss their problems. CENTO brought about cultural, political and economic conciliation between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. For the reasons explained above, an idea of a meeting between the three countries outside the CENTO auspices had been discussed. They finally decided in April 1964 in the CENTO Council Meeting in Washington to form a new partnership. It was then confirmed in the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Ankara on 4 July 1964 that a new Regional Cooperation Organisation (RCD) was going to be established¹⁴¹. President Ayyub Khan of Pakistan, who was also in Ankara that day, said that he proposed a new *"united front between Turkey, Pakistan and Iran"*¹⁴². The three heads of state declared on 22 July 1964 the name of the new organisation the Regional Cooperation for Development¹⁴³. On 28th

¹⁴⁰ *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, "Regional Cooperations, Organisations and Problems", volume VI, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1983, p.315.

¹⁴¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 5 July 1964.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Cumhuriyet*, 23 July 1964.

October 1967, President Cevdet Sunay of Turkey said in a statement that "*Turko-Pakistani relations have reached a high level which is far above that of an alliance*"¹⁴⁴."

At the beginning of the 1970s, the RCD yielded some fruits. The three states established some joint enterprises¹⁴⁵. The RCD did not, however, help further economic development among the member states. In the mid-1970s, Turkey and the other member states had domestic political crises¹⁴⁶. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the military coup in Turkey in 1980 made the RCD unoperational. As mentioned above, the roots of the RCD lay in the fact that the member countries could not rely on the West on non-Cold War issues. In fact, it was crystal clear that America, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the Nixon Doctrine, did not want to carry more burdens than it already had. The proof of that might be seen in the Indo-Pakistani War. Although, Pakistan invoked the CENTO Treaty immediately after the invasion of West Pakistan, the response of the United States and the United Kingdom was that they were not responsible under the Pact. Iran and Turkey responded more favourably to Pakistan's appeal for help. Iran declared the Indian invasion as "*aggression*"¹⁴⁷ but chose not to act. Turkey's Prime Minister also stated that "*they were deeply concerned about the action of India against*

¹⁴⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1967.

¹⁴⁵ See Burke, *Op.cit.* p.306. and for the complete list of enterprises, *Pakistan Affairs*, 31 January 1970.

¹⁴⁶ See *Chapter Four*.

¹⁴⁷ *Pakistan Horizon*, 4th Quarter, 1965, Quoted in Burke, *Op.cit.*, p.354.

Pakistan" and stressed that Pakistan was an ally of Turkey in CENTO¹⁴⁸. But neither gave direct military assistance.

The RCD was an outcome of a growing disenchantment of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey with their ties with the Western countries. At that time, the logic of establishing a regional organisation was perhaps that since America also desire to improve her relations with the Soviet Union, why should Turkey not do the same with Iran and Pakistan with whom she had traditional, cultural and historical ties. In fact, the establishment of the RCD was *"not only out of their disenchantment with CENTO's inadequate activities, but also as a consequences of their dissatisfaction with its inherent unresponsiveness to any conflict other than one with the Soviet Union"*¹⁴⁹.

Iran after the revolution was eagerly trying to revive the RCD to feel more free from the pressures of the big powers¹⁵⁰. After the revolution she pursued an anti-Western and anti-US policy. It was in fact Iran that terminated the United States sponsored Central Treaty Organisation. Iran saw the RCD more as a security organisation than an economic organisation. Iran's conviction was that she was alone in the community of

¹⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 8 September 1965.

¹⁴⁹ Ramazani, Rouhollah K., *Iran's Foreign Policy: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernising Nations*, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1975, p.354.

¹⁵⁰ Ramazani, Rouhollah K. "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", in *The Iranian Revolution: The Global Impact*, ed. John L. Esposito, Florida International University Press, Miami, 1990, p.42.

nations and that a revived regional organisation could reassure her that she was not alone. Turkey, on the other hand, saw the RCD mainly as an economic organisation. When the RCD was established with the three regional members of CENTO, the Soviet Union tried to use the issue to estrange RCD members from the West. The Soviets viewed Turkey, together with Iran and Pakistan, as isolated from the West. They argued that these countries had failed to follow a non-capitalist path towards socialism, and thus they had tried to pursue a policy of non-alignment¹⁵¹. The Soviet Union saw the RCD not only as an expression of dissatisfaction of the regional members with the West, but also as an organisation that in effect was taken outside the framework of the pact (CENTO) and aimed against it¹⁵². This was, at least, the Soviet perception, and they were partially right in their views. Iran saw the RCD as a regional security organisation which had emerged out of a mistrust of the West¹⁵³. Turkey's ideas about the RCD were completely different. Turkey, as a NATO member, felt relatively secure against the Soviet Union. She thus did not need a regional security arrangement in the same way which might bruise her relations with NATO. All Turkey wanted at that time (1964) was to establish a regional organisation for regional economic development and thereby to activate her foreign policy in this part of the world where her relations was very poor. As can be seen from the statement made on the day of the RCD's establishment, Turkey, convincing the other

¹⁵¹ Ramazani (1975), *Op.cit.*, p.340.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p.341.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp.340-341.

members, has emphasised that the new arrangement was not against CENTO, and it would deal with the economic development of member countries¹⁵⁴.

In some circles, in Turkey as well in the other member countries, it is thought that the RCD had a philosophy of bringing muslim nations together. Especially, the Welfare Party believed that close relations are necessary for Turkey in order to create an alternative organisation to the EC¹⁵⁵. Apart from the Welfare Party, all the other parties accepted that Turkey should have economic relations with non-European countries but those relations should not damage Turkey's deep rooted relations with the EC¹⁵⁶. In other words, the Welfare Party believed that the RCD is based on the philosophy of "*umma*" (religious nation). However, as Dursun has emphasised, the aim of the RCD was purely economic, even though the member countries believed that being closer on economic matters will also create political stability in member states¹⁵⁷.

¹⁵⁴ See *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, "Regional Cooperation Group Formed by Pakistan, Persia and Turkey", vol. 20, 1963-64, pp.438-439.

¹⁵⁵ Şener, Abdullatif, *Interview*, Foreign Spokesman of the Welfare Party. Professor Şener stated that Turkey should improve her relations with her muslim neighbour countries and should have a limited mutual economic relations with the European Community.

¹⁵⁶ Inan, Kamran, *Interview*, ex-State Minister, Foreign Spokesman of the Motherland Party. Mr. Inan stated that Turkey's regional relations should not be seen as alternative to the European Community but regional 'economic' relations should be seen as complementary. He further said that Turkey's role in the region is indispensable by being a gate between the West and the Middle East and newly freed Middle Asia.

¹⁵⁷ Dursun, Davut, *İslam Dünyasında Dayanışma Hareketleri (Cooperation Movements in Islamic World)*, Agaç Yayıncılık Ltd. (Agaç Publishers Ltd.), Istanbul, 1992, p.68.

After the Iranian Revolution, the RCD, like CENTO, ceased to exist in effect due to Iran's withdrawal. In 1985, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan decided to revitalise the RCD under the name of the ECO. Turkey's aim was to open an economic gate in order to enhance her newly established free market economy. Iran, which was long isolated from the international community, wanted to establish such an organisation for economic reasons as well. A new resolution signed on 29 January 1985 declaring the new name of the organisation and the changes made to the RCD¹⁵⁸. According to the new arrangement, four Committees were established under the Planning Council. These committees are¹⁵⁹;

- The Committee of Cooperation on Economy and Infrastructure,
- The Committee of Cooperation on Industry and Technology,
- The Committee of Cooperation on Agriculture,
- The Committee of Cooperation on Education and Science¹⁶⁰.

The main subjects discussed in these committees are;

- a- A highway project to ease the transportation between the members,
- b- Common satellite project to ease the communication between the members,
- c- A privileged trade arrangement and a special system of payment,

¹⁵⁸ Soysal, İsmail, *Türkiyenin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağlıları 1945-1990*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi (publisher), Ankara, 1991, Volume II, p.496.

¹⁵⁹ For the full text of the agreement establishing the ECO, See Soysal, İsmail, *Op.cit.*, pp.521-531.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.498.

- d- The establishment of an institute of finance to provide interest free credit for business,
- e- Creation of agricultural projects to improve this sector in member states,
- f- The arrangement of seminars, scholarships and common projects to facilitate the transfer of know-how and technology in medical, industrial and scientific fields¹⁶¹.

Those projects have not been effectively implemented due to financial and organisational problems. Between years 1985-1992, the ECO has shown no real progress due to the political instability in the region and the war between Iran and Iraq and the Second Gulf War¹⁶². The year 1992 was the busiest and most active year for the organisation. The first summit meeting was held in Teheran in February 1992. With the joining of the Turkic Central Asian states of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the organisation was enlarged to eight states¹⁶³. Also in that meeting, the parties decided to reduce custom duties by 10% for about 100 commodities¹⁶⁴. On the 28th November 1992, in the extraordinary meeting of Council of Ministers, the members accepted the recent application of Kazakhstan and

¹⁶¹ Fendoğlu, Tahsin H., *Türkiye ve Ortadoğu (Turkey and The Middle East)*, Akabe Yayınları (Akabe Publishing Co.) no. 94, Istanbul, 1988, p.134.

¹⁶² Dursun, Davut, *Op.cit.*, p.70.

¹⁶³ *Keessing's World's Events*, vol. 38, February 1992, p.792.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.70.

Afghanistan to bring the total number of members to ten¹⁶⁵. A Turkish spokesman, on declaring Azerbaijan's and Turkmenistan's membership of the ECO, stated that "*We (Turkey) especially support the participation of the Central Republics in this organisation. The ECO aims to promote economic activities through joint investments, reducing trade tariffs and other initiatives*"¹⁶⁶.

After all these concrete improvements in the framework of organisation, some of the media in Turkey, and in Europe as well, have stressed that the ECO was an alternative to the EC. But it was not. Turkey's relations with Central Asian states, after the collapse of the Soviet union, created another dimension in her changing foreign policy. Turkey did not only confine her relations to the political sphere but sought to expand her influence using the economy as a means of influence. President Muttalibov of Azerbaijan, in his trip to Azerbaijan, requested the expansion of ties in the sphere of telecommunications and information, technical aid to Azerbaijan, reduction of tariffs in bilateral trade and the possibility of Turkish construction companies bidding for contracts in Azerbaijan. His requests are welcomed by Turkish authorities¹⁶⁷. Turkey provided Azerbaijan with one million tons of wheat, 150.000 of which were donated, 400.000 paid

¹⁶⁵ *Zaman*, 30 November 1992.

¹⁶⁶ Anatolia Broadcasting in English 0920 gmt, 23 January 1992, in *Summary of World Broadcasting (SWB)*, 25 January 1992, ME/1287 A/8.

¹⁶⁷ Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Murphy, Emma C., "The Non-Arab Middle East States and the Caucasian / Central Asian Republics: Turkey", *International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 6, December 1993, p.523.

by bank credits and 450.000 tons paid for in cash¹⁶⁸. Turkey's relations with Armenia, "despite the continuing problems over the autonomous enclaves, have been infused with pragmatism and reinforced by geographical proximity¹⁶⁹. President Ter-Petrosian said "*we live near Turkey, we have our differences but we must proceed from the real interests of the Republic, which consist of the establishment of close contacts with Turkey*". He added that "*this view would prevail once Turkish goods start appearing in Armenia*"¹⁷⁰".

As has already been emphasised in the previous chapter, the ECO is a purely economic organisation among sovereign nations. The West also supports Turkey as a model of development for the rest of the Turkic states¹⁷¹. It can be argued that Turkey's importance to the West increased as Turkey is usually regarded as a gate to the new republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia because of its potential for helping the West to establish relations with those areas¹⁷². This at the same time extends Turkey's regional influence.

¹⁶⁸ *Newspot*, 7 June 1993.

¹⁶⁹ Ehteshami, *Op.cit.*, p.525.

¹⁷⁰ Commonwealth of Independent States, vol. 17, no, 3, March 1992, in Ehteshami, *Op.cit.*, p.525.

¹⁷¹ *The Middle East*, July 1992, pp.5-6.

¹⁷² Henze, Paul B., *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century*, Rand, Santa Monica, 1992, p.v.

As mentioned in chapter three, regional economic organisations are the bricks of a world wide global economic system. Turkey's relations with the ECO does not therefore, contradict her deep rooted relations with the EC. Turkish State Minister Işın Çelebi emphasised before the Tehran Meeting in May 1992 that *"the ECO is not going to be an Islamic Common Market"*¹⁷³. As Hikmet Çetin, Foreign Minister of Turkey, also said in a statement in the Council Meeting in Islamabad *"the importance of the ECO is that it became a very big regional organisation embracing more than 300 million population with a vast land of the world. The relations of Turkey with the ECO, the BSECR, and the EC altogether will make Turkey a country connecting Europe to Asia. Turkey is determined to play her role to materialise those ideals"*¹⁷⁴. Again Hikmet Çetin in an interview stressed that the ECO is an economic organisation and the political stability and peace in the region will be a by-product of the organisation¹⁷⁵. He also heralded the idea of an ECO bank to finance entrepreneurs which became a reality at the Council Meeting in Islamabad¹⁷⁶. After the end of the meeting it was revealed that the parties are agreed on three big joint projects, an ECO satellite to facilitate communication in the region, the establishment of the Ecobank, and the establishment of an ECO Airline¹⁷⁷.

¹⁷³ *Zaman*, 4 December 1992.

¹⁷⁴ *Zaman*, 1 December 1992.

¹⁷⁵ *Zaman*, 2 December 1992.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Zaman*, 5 December 1992.

It should be noted that the ECO is still in its early stage and there are many differences between the member states. In particular, the Turkic Republics, (perhaps except Kazakhstan where the political structure is relatively stable) and Afghanistan are all in deep political crisis. For instance, Tajikistan could not participate in the latest Council Meeting, although all the parties in the country were willing to, due to the civil war there. This political unrest in those Republics could continue for some time and have an effect on the progress of the ECO. Furthermore, the ECO might have a role in developing the stability of the region through prosperity and cooperation. One cannot predict what the future of the ECO is going to be due to the fact that most of its members are undergoing political and economic upheaval.

Turkey's long run political objectives require her to establish economic and political ties with her Eastern and Northern neighbours without harming relations with the West. The ECO and the BSECR are thus important institutions to fulfil that objective. *"Turkey may look to Central Asia and its natural resources as fertile commercial ground. Turkey hopes to become Central Asia's principle outlet to Europe, as well as a conduit for and a middleman for investment. The potential bonanza offered by the region's natural gas and oil reserves is enticing-transit fees; investment in pipelines, terminals, and refineries; oil service industry benefits; and shipping and finance¹⁷⁸".*

¹⁷⁸ Abramowitz, Morton I. "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Özal", *Foreign Policy*, no. 91, Summer 1993, p.168.

Turkey's influential involvement in the political and economic affairs of the newly freed Central Asian countries is not a secret matter. Turkey has historical, cultural and religious similarities and shared interests with the Central Asian Turkic states. Turkey might use all those factors in order to maximise her political and economic interests in the region. Iran is the only rival in the region to compete with Turkey. The ECO framework will, one might hope, allow Turkey and Iran to compete economically and politically without hostility as the big powers of the Europe do inside the EC framework. This kind of competition might even be helpful and beneficial for the prosperity of the region. However, this also depends on the response of the partner countries. For example, in October 1993, when a pro-Turkish government in Azerbaijan was replaced by a government of former Soviet communist officials, it looked as if relations with Turkey would worsen. Subsequently, the new government fell out with Moscow, and has resumed strong trade and political links with Ankara. However, relations between Turkey and Iran over Azerbaijan have remained cordial notwithstanding a certain competition for business and for influence.

However, Turkish officials on every occasion stress that they will not become involved in the domestic politics of other countries involved. Turkey, on the one hand, sent wheat and some other food products to Armenia to establish good neighbourly relations, and on the other hand, trained Azeri officers and sent basic needs for Azeri troops. Despite its emotional importance to the Turkish public, Ankara kept herself out

of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan¹⁷⁹. *"It (Turkey) has kept out of the Caucasus war because the Turkish leadership understands that siding with Azerbaijan could jeopardize Turkey's carefully nurtured relationship with the United States and Europe¹⁸⁰"*. Prime Minister Demirel argued for restraint and explicitly acknowledged the danger of *"a conflict between Muslims and Christians that will last for years¹⁸¹"*. Turkey's impartiality in the affairs of the Central Asian Republics does not reflect a weakness. Indeed, by being impartial, Turkey is playing a kind of regional power role in the stabilisation of the region. It has committed up to \$ 3 billion worth of credits to support this role, a substantial sum for such an economy¹⁸². Turkey is perceived on the one hand as the big brother of the Central Asian Turkic states and simultaneously on the other hand as a relatively developed, rich neighbour to the non-Turkic states (Armenia, Georgia). Turkey thus has to perform both roles sensitively in order not to disturb the political balance. She gains more influence in this situation by not committing herself.

Turkish influential involvement in the region is the result of Turkey's new multi-dimensional foreign policy. The freeing of the Central Asian states has provided Turkey with an opportunity to exercise a new kind of foreign policy. A chance to develop "a

¹⁷⁹ Pipes, Daniel and Clawson, Patrick, "Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbours", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 1, 1992/1993, p.136.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.136.

¹⁸¹ TRT (*Turkish Radio Television*), 2 May 1992.

¹⁸² Ehteshami, *Op.cit.*, pp.530-531.

*new and critical role as the bridge state between East and West, one which would enhance its status vis-a-vis Europe and America, at the same time as consolidating its position in the Middle East as a state to be reckoned with*¹⁸³". Turkey has so far managed to exploit the West, particularly US, by convincing them that unless they cooperate with Turkey, *"the post-Soviet environment would lend itself either to crumbling regional security, or to a geographical spread of Iran-style islamic fundamentalism, or, in a worst-case scenario, to both*¹⁸⁴".

7.6. Conclusion

It can be said that Turkish foreign policy after the 1980s has continued to become more pragmatic. This parallels changes in domestic politics. In particular, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union together with the dramatic improvement of domestic political life, Turkey found herself an opening to manoeuvre more freely. This chapter has explained how Turkey has wrestled with a series of complex issues in the region and has attempted, at least sometimes with success, to turn her predicament into opportunity which she has been able to exploit. This has involved a development of policy content, but also a change in policy style as more people came to be involved in policy processes. It also involved a change in implementation, in both style and substance. Implementation of a policy of neutrality or a declared partnership with the West was, in the 1950s, not

¹⁸³ Ehteshami, *Op.cit.*, p.529.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.530.

so difficult to carry out. But the more complex and more difficult to manage active policies of the 1970s and 1980s became more awkward to hold together. In the 1990s, the greater ambition of foreign economic and security policies, which is both a product and a cause of more elaborate patterns of interdependence, required more skilled implementation. At one level, this rested on the principle national leader. At another, it produced shocks and change within the elite bureaucracy. It implied an opening of policy processes, if not to 'the people' at least to a much wider elite, but popular influence was also felt, as the reaction to the Second Cold War (1990-1991) shows. The structure, fabric, cultural base and organisation of Turkish foreign policy have changed rapidly in response to these events. The reliance on the new regional organisations shows this. Perhaps without intending it, Turkish foreign policy has modernised even as Turkish policy makers have moved away from the emphasis on the ideology of their past, which was, ironically, an ideology of modernisation.

Many of these changes have been due to an ability in Turkish diplomacy to respond to change. This owes much to Turgut Özal. Although it is not entirely usual in a thesis, it is important to note his contribution in a paragraph of personal evaluation of his work. He was a key politician in Turkey's changing domestic and foreign policy. His commitment to a pure free market economy paved the way towards an open society. If it was not for Özal's domestic brinkmanship, it would have taken longer for Turkey to reach the existing level of democracy and economic development, and their implication for a multi-dimensional foreign policy would not be as it was. As Abramowitz noted,

which is also shared by the author of this study, that *"the sudden death of Turgut Özal, Turkey's President and former Prime Minister, on 17 April 1993, will (might) transform the Turkish political process, adding a new element of uncertainty to the country's prospects for managing its swirling foreign and domestic currents. In life, Özal helped change his country like no one since Atatürk, the 'father' of modern Turkey. Even in death, therefore, Özal's impact will remain profound¹⁸⁵".*

¹⁸⁵ Abramowitz, Morton I., *Op.cit.*, p.164.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

This thesis explores the evolution of Turkish-EC relations and emergence of contemporary Turkey as a major regional power. It has argued that Turkish foreign policy cannot be understood without taking into account the very specific bases in history and in domestic politics and culture from which it springs. The international setting is of course important. But it does not in itself explain the evolution of policy from its more limited, tightly controlled and tightly constrained origins to becoming a relatively much more complex, effective and more wide ranging set of concerns influenced by a more diffuse and pluralist domestic polity. These conclusions summarised the overall thrust of the thesis, emphasising where the claims to originality lie. Much could also be drawn from the conclusions of individual chapters, but that repetitions avoided here. Each chapter builds a part of the overall argument of the thesis.

The gradual change in domestic political structure has also gradually replaced the simplicity by complexity. As a result, Turkish foreign policy became more and more interdependent. Turkey gradually evolved a much more active foreign policy after the introduction of democracy in 1950 compared to the one party period. Although Turkish foreign policy was increasingly active after the 1950's, it was constrained by the existence of the Cold War and by an incomplete modernisation process -particularly economic modernisation- of the domestic structure. As the Cold War ended and the domestic political structure improved -largely through the

implementation of the 24th January 1980 decisions- and constraints on Turkish foreign policy decreased. New opportunities, but also new threats and new risk emerged. Turkey therefore was not simply a 'dependent' or 'semi-peripheral' state. She did not become an independent state either as the East-West system of independence has disappeared¹. As suited the modernisation and Westernisation process, Turkey associated herself with the Western system of interdependence and increasingly pursued a multi-dimensional interdependent foreign policy². Chapters six and seven are critical parts of this argument. They explore the interaction of the forces and choices through which a more complex pattern of policy making and implementation evolved. As a result developments in the international structure and in Turkey's domestic situation, Turkey's relations with the West -particularly with the EC- gradually strengthened and became more complex. Turkish-EC relations were reinforced by the mutual economic interests of the parties. As chapters five, six and seven show, the relationship the Ec and Turkey is founded on security, knowledge and diplomatic patterns of both dependence and interdependence as well as on a rapidly growing mutual economic relationship. Turkey's long running ideological choice of becoming a European country and thus a modernised country has been strengthened by more pragmatic and interest based foreign policy. Turkey's involvement in other regional organisations is a part of a pattern of interdependent organisation based relations³. For Turkey, her relations with the other emergent regional economic organisations are not and cannot be alternatives to her relations

¹ Spero, *Op.cit.*, pp. 11-12.

² See *Chapter Three* for the theories of Realism and Interdependence.

³ Spero, *Op.cit.*, pp. 11-12., see *Chapter Three*.

with the EC, but they have become an important part of her foreign policy, a resource as well as commitment and an expression of a new-found policy autonomy.

It has been argued throughout this dissertation that the influence of economic measures on the political structure are of great importance. Unrealistic expectations and decisions can cause political and economic corruption. They might also hinder the establishment of democracy. It can be seen in Turkish experience that the granted democracy of the 1950's did not work (chapter four). Turkey did have a military intervention in every decade as a consequence of the fact that democracy was granted from above by the elite. It has also been interrupted by the elite when they felt that their ideology was under threat. Because of the lack of a free market economy, there was not a plural economic structure whereby the public could put pressure on the government. The Turkish experience of democracy between 1946-1980 was of a *debilitating democracy*⁴ due to the statist, centralised economic structure. Everything was under central control and that control was manipulated by a small elite. As the pluralisation began amongst the elite, it has lost its homogeneity, but not all of its power. As a result complexity prevailed over simplicity in shaping the domestic political structure, and in turn shapes foreign policy processes.

As well as exploring the nature of Turkish foreign policy, the thesis explores issues of foreign policy. It is distinctive, but not of course unique, in the way in which it seeks to combine foreign policy theory more narrowly defined with ideas

⁴ Bianchi, Op.cit., p.149-201

drawn from comparative politics and public policy in order to understand better the intersection of foreign and domestic policy structures and processes in Turkey and in her European and neighbouring interlocutors⁵.

The claim to originality in the thesis rests primarily on what is actually said and argued about Turkish foreign policy in chapter four six and seven. The ending of the Cold War marked a diplomatic revolution. A new international structure created new kinds of foreign policies, and Turkey is perhaps one of the first countries to adapt herself to the new situation. To understand the transformation of foreign policies from independent (or dependent) to interdependent patterns, one has to use interdependence theories and pay enough attention to the economic adaptability of the country (see chapter three). The theory of realism can no longer explain the complex environment of the foreign policies of the West. Nor can it explain Turkey's new multi dimensional foreign policy⁶. That is way in this thesis it is argued that Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period became more distinctive, but draws in many respects on its earlier roots.

Turkey is an 'imperfectly modernised' society which has some of the attributes of a modern democracy, but which remains dominated by a specific political and military elite, despite rapid change especially since 1980. The existence of the clientelist structure has negatively affected the establishment of an organised society.

⁵ Thorne, *Op.cit*; Hill, *Op.cit*; Rosenau, *Op.cit*; Farrands, *Op.cit*.

⁶ See Smith, M, in Carlsnaes and Smith, *Op.cit*; Hill, *Op.cit*.

Due to the existing patron- client relations, informality prevailed formality. That informal structure thus maintained and strengthened the existing elitist democracy with one difference that is the pluralisation of the elite. This has emerged in the discussion on foreign policy in each chapter, and especially in the interview evidence cited in chapter four six and seven.

Turkish foreign policy cannot therefore be understood as a consequence of processes which are characteristic of modernised European societies: models which have been widely used such as pluralist democratic or corporatist theories cannot explain Turkish foreign policy, although asking questions about how they might be relevant helps us to understand what makes its domestic roots distinctive; it is, however, argued that clientelist and elite theories have more relevance in explaining and understanding Turkish political structure. They explain both the policy context and the content and implementation -or difficulties of implementation- of policy.

The shape of Turkey's domestic political structure during the Cold War was largely determined by external factors. But the thesis has argued that Turkey's domestic political structure became increasingly complex and multi-dimensional. Since Turkey sided during the Cold War with the West, a Westernist ideology, which existed long before the Cold War, preoccupied the domestic political agenda. Turkey politically and militarily was a Western country, and the elite was obsessively 'westernist', but so far as the economic structure is concerned she simply was not Western. By contrast, her economic structure more resembled that of the economies

of Eastern Europe. Turkey gradually began to eradicate that problem by taking economic decisions in 1980 which yielded fruits by the late 1980's.

This thesis also argued that Turkey's democratic structure was granted by the elite. Democratic structure thus built upon the ideology of the same homogenous elite. This kind of political structure produced policies motivated by the ideology of the elite. Although Turkish foreign policy gradually became more active and westward looking during the Cold War, it was not an interdependent foreign policy due to the lack of an adaptable economic infrastructure. Most importantly, Turkish foreign policy, during that time, reflected the ideology of the elite and it was far from being motivated by a broader conception of the interests of a modernising, complex, plural society..

On the other hand, this thesis also argued that Turkish foreign policy changed in the post-Cold War period. These changes did not happen suddenly, of course. Parallel to changes in the international structure, Turkey's domestic political structure improved. The improvement in the democratic structure was associated with the growth of a more pluralist society and a stronger more diverse society. Although, democratic principles and channels could not yet reach the majority because of Turkey's clientelist structure, a pluralisation process started among the elite. These changes in the domestic political structure, together with the changes in the international environment, have allowed Turkey to take on a multi-dimensional foreign policy, playing a new role in her region of the world. Turkey, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, became an economic gate rather than being a military

ally of the West. The weight of Europe therefore has not decreased in Turkish foreign policy. It is against that background that the specific processes and instances of Turkish relations with the EC can best be understood. It is in this context that other opportunities which are still to be opened out, especially those in Central Asia, can be explained.

This thesis stresses also the continuity of change in policy, and the role of the 'weight of the past', in Hill's phrase⁷. It suggests that radical changes in policy have to some extent taken gradually and by stealth. The Turkish leadership have played an important role in facilitating this, and the management of change is still is part 'top down'. But the context, institutional framework, definition of interests and implementation systems are much more complex than before. The opportunities and risks are both more difficult to calculate. In all these senses, Turkey has, while remaining distinctively Turkish and Mediterranean in character, a genuinely modernised foreign policy.

⁷ Hill, *Op.cit.*,

SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

List of Interviews

Bulgurlu, Hacı Bayram, State Planning Organisation, Deputy President of the Department of European Union Relations, The Office of the Prime Minister, Ankara, *Interview* on 17th March 1995 between 3.30 -4.15 p.m.

Çelik, Necati, President of the Confederation of Trade Unions (Hak-İŞ), *Interview* in the Headquarters of the Confederation on 15th December 1992 between 2.30- 3.15 p.m. in Ankara.

Dereli, Sökmen, State Planning Organisation, ex-President of the Department of European Union Relations, Prime Minister's Office, Ankara, *Interview* on 23th May 1992 between 9.10 - 10.30 in Nottingham University.

Doğan, Çetin, Associate Professor and the Deputy President of the Department of Economics of İnönü University, Malatya, Turkey, *Interview* in the Department on 22th September 1995 between 3.00 - 4.00 p.m.

İnan, Kamran, ex-State Minister and Foreign Spokesman and the Member of Parliament of Motherland Party, *Interview* on 16th March 1995 between 11.10 and 11.45 a.m in Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara.

Makas, Abdullah Cengiz, International Affairs Consultant to Welfare Party's Foreign Spokesman, Turkish Grand National Assembly, Public Relations Department, Ankara, *Interview* on 15th March 1995 between 2.15 -2.50 p.m.

Nebioglu, Hüsamettin, State Planning Organisation, President of the Department of European Union Relations, Prime Minister's Office, Ankara, *Interview* on 17th March 1995 between 2.30- 3.30 p.m.

Neziroğlu, İrfan, The Library and Documentation Centre of Turkish Grand National Assembly, Principal Expert on International Relations, *Interview* on 15th March 1995 between 11.00 - 11.45 a.m.

Şener, Abdullatif, Member of Parliament of Welfare Party, Foreign Spokesman of the Party and Deputy President of the Welfare Party's Parliamentary Group, *Interview* on 16th March 1995 between 12.00 - 12.35 p.m. in Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara.

Varlı, Bahar, The Library and Documentation Center of Turkish Grand National Assembly, Expert in the Research Service on Turkish-European Union Relations, *Interview* on 15th March 1995 between 10.00 - 10.45 a.m.

Documents and Official Publications

British Foreign Office, Record no. 371/48774/R13467, Public Record Office.

British Foreign Office, Record no. 371/58701/R11542/G, Public Record Office.

Cevizoğlu, Hulki, *Körfez Savaşı ve Özal Diplomasisi-Belgesel- (The Gulf War and Özal's Diplomacy-Documentary-)*, Form Yayınları (Form Publishers), no.13, İstanbul, 1991.

Commission of the European Communities, "Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community", no. 2290, 18 December 1989, Brussels..

Department of State Bulletin, xii, 4 March 1945, Washington DC.

EC Bulletin, supplement, Commission of the European Communities, 2/76, Brussels, 1979, p.7.

Financial Protocol, Published by the State Planning Organisation, Ankara, article 2.

Foreign Investment Report, Undersecretariat of Treasury, Foreign Investment Directorate, Ankara, March 1995.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, vol.5, Washington US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1978.

Güran, Nevzat, *Türkiye-Avrupa Topluluğu İlişkileri (The Turkish-European Community Relations)*, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Avrupa Topluluğu ile İlişkiler Başkanlığı (State Planning Organisation, the Department of European Community Relations), Publish no. DPT.2230-AETB, 23 September 1990.

İstanbul Ticaret Odası (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce), *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler (The European Community and Relations with Turkey)*, Publication no. 16, 1990.

Keesing's World Archives, volume xxxiii, May, Keesings, London, 1987.

Keesing's World Archives, volume xxxviii, February, Keesings, London, 1992.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, "Regional Cooperation Group Formed by Pakistan, Persia and Turkey", volume xx, Keesings, London, 1963-64.

OECD Report, *Turkey*, OECD, Paris, 1990.

OECD, *Economic Surveys, Turkey*, OECD, Paris, 1991/1992.

Orhan, Osman Z., "Bir integrasyon Örneği Olarak KEİB (The BSECR as an Integration Example)", *Istanbul Trade Chamber Report*, February, 1992.

Political Structure of Turkey, published by Directorate General of Press and Information, Ankara, 1984.

Provisional Protocol, Published by the State Planning Organisation, Ankara, article 3, clauses 1 and 2.

Resmi Gazete (Official Newspaper), Ankara, 1 February 1980.

Resmi Gazete (Official Newspaper), Ankara, no. 3512, July, 1938.

Statistical Pocketbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 1990.

Strang, Mary and Redmond, Arlene, *Turkey and the European Community: A Forum Conference in Partnership with the Turkish Permanent Delegation to the European Communities*, Brussels, October 30-31, 1991.

Summary of World Broadcasting (SWB), 19 February 1992, SU/1308 B/6, BBC, London.

Summary of World Broadcasting (SWB), 25 January 1992, ME/1287 A/8, BBC, London.

Summary of World Broadcasting (SWB), 6 February 1992, ME/1297 A/12, BBC, London.

T.C. Devlet Teşkilatı Rehberi (Guide for the State Organisation of Turkish Republic), published by the Institute of Turkish - Middle East Public Administration (TODAIE), Ankara, 1988.

The Brand Report, International Commission on Development and Interdependence, *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, Fontana, London, 1980.

The Voice of Turkey, 26 November 1993, 3 pm. GMT. (Radio Broadcast)

Turkey, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate of General of Press and Information, Ankara, February, 1993.

Turkish Constitutions, 1924, 1961 and 1982, Office of the Public Relations, Office of Prime Minister, Ankara.

World Development Report, Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p.169.

Theses

Bali, Mahmut Aykan, *Ideology and Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Muslim World*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1988.

Doğan, Çetin, *Evaluation of Turkish Privatisation Policies*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Industrial Technology, University of Bradford, Bradford, 1993.

Hardman, Willard M., *Kemalism: Evolution or Revolution?*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Catholic University of America, 1990.

Müftüler, Meltem, *The Impact of External Factors on Internal Transformation: Turkish Structural adjustment Process and the European Community*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, the Temple University, U.S.A., 1992.

Sowerwine, James Edward, *Dynamics of Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy 1961-1980*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987.

Weiker, Walter F., *The Free Party of 1930 in Turkey*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1962.

Newspapers

Akşam, 13 September 1963.

Armaoğlu, Fahir, "New Foreign Policy", *Tercüman*, Turkish Daily Newspaper, 27 November 1991.

Bulloch, John, "Friendless People in a Hostile World", *The Independent on Sunday*, 7 April 1991.

Cumhuriyet, 29 October 1950.

Cumhuriyet, 5 July 1964.

Cumhuriyet, 23 July 1964.

Cumhuriyet, 8 September 1965.

Cumhuriyet, 29 October 1967.

Cumhuriyet, 19 February 1991.

Cumhuriyet, 5 March 1991.

Dünya Gazetesi, Turkish Daily Newspaper, 26 June 1992.

Elekdağ, Şükrü, "Karadeniz Ekonomik İş Birliği (KEİB), (The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR))", *Dünya Gazetesi*, Turkish Daily Newspaper, Istanbul, 3 February 1992.

Financial Times, 11 September 1992.

Financial Times, 16 September 1992.

Financial Times, 17 September 1992.

Financial Times, 1 October 1992.

Financial Times, 8 October 1992.

Financial Times, Weekend, 10-11 October 1992.

Financial Times, 25 November 1992.

Financial Times, 21 January 1993.

Financial Times, Survey, "Turkey", 7 May 1993.

Galbraith, J.K., "The Call of Arms and The Poor Man", *The Guardian*, 27 March 1991.

Hürriyet, 13 September 1963.

Hürriyet, 19 April 1984.

Hürriyet, 15 August 1990.

Hürriyet, 18 January 1991.

Hürriyet, 16 May 1993.

Milliyet, 29 May 1976.

Milliyet, 5 November 1983.

Milliyet, 16 January 1987.

Milliyet, 26 January 1987.

Milliyet, 15 April 1987.

Milliyet, 16 April 1987.

Milliyet, 12 September 1988.

Milliyet, 7 December 1990.

Milliyet, 8 April 1993.

Milliyet, 6 April 1994.

New York Times, 27 November 1955.

Newspot, 9 May 1991.

Newspot, 10 October 1991.

Newspot, 8 August 1991.

Newspot, 30 May 1991.

Newspot, 11 April 1991.

Newspot, 7 June 1993.

Sabah, 16 January 1991.

The Economist, "Turkey that Dispensable Feeling", 26 May 1990.

The Economist, 14 December 1991.

The Independent, 17 January 1987.

The Independent, 4 December 1990.

The Middle East, "Turkey Firmly Embracing Sacrifice", October 1990.

The Middle East, July 1992.

The Times, 29 April 1961.

The Times, 23 July 1974.

The Times, 3 April 1982.

The Times, 19 October 1990.

The Times, 8 October 1992.

The Washington Post, 3 March 1991.

TRT (Turkish Radio Television), 2 May 1992.

Turkey Economy, no. 4 December 1989.

Turkish Daily News, 20 July 1991.

Turkish Radio Television-TRT, Channel 1, *32nd Day*, presented by M. Ali Birand,
3 August 1989.

Turkish Review, vol. 5, no. 25, Autumn, 1991.

Washington Post, 16 February 1947.

Yön, Turkish monthly journal, 17 January 1962.

Zaman, 30 November 1992.

Zaman, 4 December 1992.

Zaman, 5 December 1992.

Zaman, 1 December 1992.

Zaman, 30 January 1992.

Zaman, 2 December 1992.

Zaman, 6 January 1993.

Zaman, 17 June 1993.

Zaman, 17 May 1993.

II. Secondary Sources

Books

Agnew, John, "The United States and American Hegemony", in *Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis*, Peter J. Taylor (ed.), Belhaven Press, London, 1993.

Allen, D., Rummel, R. and Wessels, W., *European Political Cooperation*, Butterworth, London, 1981.

Allot, Philip, *Eunomia*, Oxford University Press, London, 1990.

Almond, Gabriel. "A Functionalist Approach to Comparative Politics" in *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960.

Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, Bingham G., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Little & Brown, Boston, 1966.

Alvarez, David J., *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey 1943-1946*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1980.

Ambrose, Stephen E., *The Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*, Penguin Books, sixth revised edition, New York, 1991.

Anderson, M.S., *The Eastern Question*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1966.

Arter, David, *The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century*, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., Hants, 1993, p.232.

Ashley, Richard K., "The Poverty of Neorealism", in Keohane, Robert O., *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, pp.255-300.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri 1906-1938*, (Atatürk's Speeches and Sayings 1906-1938), vol.2, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1959.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk (The Speech)*, Zeynep Korkmaz (ed.), Prime Ministry Publishing House, Ankara, 1984.

Bachrach, Peter, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique*, University of London Press Ltd., London, 1969.

Balkır, Canan and Williams, Alan M, "Introduction: Turkey and Europe", in *Turkey and Europe*, Canan Balkır and Alan M. Williams (eds.), Pinter, London and New York, 1993.

Ball, Alan R, and Millard, Frances, *Pressure Politics in Industrial Societies: A Comparative Introduction*, Mcmillan, London, 1986.

Barchard, David, *Turkey and the West*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers no. 27, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985.

Barke, Michael, and O'Hare, Greg, *The Third World*, Longman House, Essex, 1991.

Bercovitch, Jacob, "Super Powers and Client States: Analysing Relations and Patterns of Influence", in *Superpowers and Client State in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence*, Moshe Efrat and Jacob Berkovitch (eds.), Routledge, New York and London, 1991.

Berger, Suzanne (ed.) *Organising Interest in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.

Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism In Turkey*, McGill University Press, Montreal, 1964.

Bianchi, Robert, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984.

Birand, Mehmet Ali, *Türkiyenin Ortak Pazar Macerası 1959-1990, (Turkey's Common Market Adventure 1959-1990)*, Milliyet Publishers, Eight Edition, Istanbul, 1990.

Booth, Ken, "War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace", in *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, Ken Booth (ed.), Harper Collins Academic, London, 1991.

Booth, K., and Smith, S. (eds.), *International Theory Today*, Polity, 1994.

Bourguignon, Roswitha, "The History of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (Eds.), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske & Budrich GmbH, Opladen, Germany, 1990.

Bryson, Thomas A., *American Diplomatic Relations With the Middle East 1784-1975*, Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, 1976.

Budd, Stanley, A. and Jones, Alun, *The European Community: A Guide to the Maze*, Third Edition, London, 1989.

Bull, H., "Society and Anarchy in International relations", in H. Butterfields and M. Wight (eds.) *Diplomatic Investigations*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966.

Bull, H., "War and International Order", in A. James (ed.), *The Bases of International Order*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1974.

Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society*, Macmillan, London, 1977.

Burke, S.M., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973.

Calvocoressi, Peter, *World Politics Since 1945*, Longman, Essex, 1989.

Carr, E.H., *What is History?*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1964.

Cawson, Alan, *Corporatism and Welfare: Social Policy and Intervention in Britain*, Heinemann Educational, London, 1982.

Cawson, Alan, *Corporatism and Political Theory*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.

Cerny, P.G. (ed.), *Finance and World Politics*, Edward and Elgar, Aldershot, 1993.

Clapham, C. (ed.), *Foreign Policy Making in the Developing Countries*, Saxon House, Farnborough, Hants, 1978.

Clark, Ian, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

Collingwood, R.G., *The Idea of History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961.

Coser, Lewis (ed.), *Political Sociology*, Harper and Row, New York, 1966.

Çölaşan, Emin, *24 Ocak: Bir Dönemin Perde Arkası (24 January: Behind the Curtains of an Era)*, Milliyet Publishers, Istanbul, 1983.

Dahl, Robert, *Polyarchy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971.

Dahl, Robert, *"Power, Pluralism and Democracy: A Modest Proposal"*, American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1964.

Danielson, Michael N. and Keleş, Ruşen, *"The Politics of Rapid Urbanisation: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey"*, Holmes & Meir, New York and London, 1985.

Davison, Roderic H., *Turkey*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice Hall, Spectrum Books, 1968.

Denton, Geoffrey, "Economic Implications for the Community of Turkish Membership", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (eds.), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske & Budrich GmbH, Opladen, Germany, 1990.

Deringil, Selim, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

Desmond, "European Political Cooperation", in *The State of European Community: Policies, Institutions, and Debates in the Transition Years*, Leon Hurwitz and Christian Lequesne (eds.), Longman, Essex, 1991.

Dicken, P., *Global Shift: the Internationalisation of Economic Activity*, Chapman, second edition, London, 1992.

Diebold, W., *The Schuman Plan*, For the Council on Foreign Relations, Praeger, New York, 1959.

Dinan, D, *Ever Closer Union?*, Macmillan, London, 1994.

Dodd, C.H., *Democracy and Development in Turkey*, The Eothen Press, University of Hull, 1979.

Duroselle, J. B., "Changes in Diplomacy since Versailles", in B. Porter (ed.) *International Politics 1919-69*, The Aberystwyth Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Dursun, Davut, *İslam Dünyasında Dayanışma Hareketleri (Cooperation Movements in Islamic World)*, Ağaç Yayıncılık Ltd. (Ağaç Publishers Ltd.), Istanbul, 1992.

Dursun, Hilmi, *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye-AET ilişkileri, (The European Community and Turkish-EEC Relations)*, T.B.M.M. Basımevi (Turkish Grand National Assembly Publications), Ankara, 1984.

Duverger, Maurice, *Political Parties*, Wiley, New York, 1954.

Duverger, Maurice, *Party Politics and Pressure Groups: A Comparative Introduction*, (Translated by, David Wagoner) New York, 1972.

Easton, David, *The Political System*, Knopf, New York, 1953.

Eckstein, Harry, *Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association*, Allen & Unwin Ltd., London.

Elazar, D.J., "Federalism", *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, David L. Sills (ed.), Macmillan & Free Press, London, 1972.

Elton, G.R., *The Practice of History*, Fontana, London, 1969.

Encyclopedia of Public International Law, "Regional Cooperations, Organisations and Problems", vol. 4, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1983.

Eralp, Atila, "Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War International System", in *Turkey and Europe*, Canan Balkır and Alan M. Williams (eds.), Pinter Publishers Ltd., London, 1993.

Erbakan, Necmeddin, *Milli Görüş (National View)*, Dergah Publishers, Istanbul, September, 1975.

Erkin, Feridun Cemal, *Dış İşlerinde 34 Yıl : Vaşington Büyük Elçiliği (34 Years in Foreign Ministry: Ambassador to Washington)*, Ankara, 1986.

Esman, Milton J. and Robinovich, Itamar (eds.), *Ethnicity, Pluralism and The State in The Middle East*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988.

Farrands, Christopher, "State, Society, Culture and British Foreign Policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation*, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1988.

Fendoğlu, Tahsin H., *Türkiye ve Ortadoğu (Turkey and The Middle East)*, Akabe Yayınları (Akabe Publishing Co.), serial no. 94, Istanbul, 1988.

Ferrench, A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971.

Feroz, Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, C.Hurst & Company, Published for R.I.I.A, London, 1977.

Field, Lowell G. and Higley, John, *Elitism*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980.

Friedrich, J.C., *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1968.

Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992.

Galtung, John, *The European Community: A Super Power in the Making*, International Peace Research Institute, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1973.

Gardiner, P., *The Nature of Historical Explanation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961.

Garnett, John, "The Role of Military Power", in *Perspectives on World Politics*, Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (eds.), Open University Press, Routledge, New York, 1981.

Gasiorowski, Mark, J., "Security Relations Between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978" in *Neither East Nor West: Iran, The Soviet Union and The United States*, Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), Yale University Press, New haven and London, 1990.

George, S., *Politics and Policy in the European Community*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, chapter 2.

Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.

Gilpin, Robert G., "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in *Neorealism and its Critics*, Keohane, Robert O. (ed.), Columbia University Press, New York, 1986.

Gökalp, Ziya, *The Principles of Turkism*, translated by Robert Devereux, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1968.

Gökalp, Ziya, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation*, translated by Niyazi Berkes, Colombia University Press, New York, 1959.

Goldmann, Kjell "Democracy is Incompatible with International Politics: Reconsideration of a Hypothesis", in *Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of Sweden*, Kjell Goldmann, Sten Berglund and Gunnar Sjostedt (eds), Gower, 1986.

Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Cornwell University Press, Ithaca, 1993.

Gönlübol, Mehmet, *Dış Politika: İç Etkenler Açısından Bir Dış Politika İncelemesi* (*Foreign Policy: A Foreign Policy Analysis From Domestic Angle*), Ulusal Basimevi (Ulusal Publishers), Ankara, 1969.

Gönlübol, Mehmet, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (*Turkish Foreign Policy by Cases*), Seventh Edition, Alkim Publishing House, Istanbul, 1990.

Gözübüyük, Şeref, *Yönetim Hukuku* (*Administrative Law*), Genel Dağıtım, (General Publications), Fourth Edition, Ankara, September 1991.

Graham, Robert, *The Illusion of Power*, Croom Helm Ltd, London, 1978.

Grant, Wyn, *Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain*, Philip Allan, Hertfordshire, 1989.

Greenwood, Justin, Grote, Jurgen R. and Ronit Karsten (eds.), *Organised Interests and the European Community*, Sage, London, 1992.

Gümrükcü, Harun, *Göçün 30. Yılında Türkiye-Ortak Pazar İlişkileri ve Unutulan Alternative: Serbest Dolaşım (The Turkish-European Community Relations in the 30th anniversary of (Labour) immigration and the Forgotten Alternative: Free Movement of People)*, Merajans Publications, Istanbul, 1991.

Günver, Semih, *Kızgın Dam Üzerinde Diplomasi: Avrupalı Olabilmenin Bedeli (Diplomacy on the Hot Roof: The Price of Becoming a European)*, Milliyet Publishing, no. 90, Istanbul, 1989.

Güvenen, Orhan, *Marching in Stride with the European Community: A Statistical Presentation of the Turkish Case*, Presented to Forum Europe, Brussels, October 30-31, 1991, in *Turkey and the European Community*, Mary Strang and Arlene Redmond (eds.), Forum Europe, Brussels, 1991.

Haas, Ernest B., *The Uniting of Europe: Political Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958.

Haas, Ernest, *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisation*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964.

Hagan, Joe D., "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy", in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1987.

Halliday, Fred, *Rethinking International Relations*, Macmillan, London, 1994.

Hallstein, Walter, *Europe in the Making*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1972.

Harris, George S., *The Atatürk Revolution and The Foreign Office, 1919-1931: A Preliminary Study*, Unpublished Paper delivered at the Middle East Studies Association Meeting, Binghamton, New York, November, 1972.

Harris, Nigel, *The End of the Third World: Newly Industrialising Countries and the Decline of an Ideology*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1990.

Hartley, Anthony, *The Irrelevance of Maastricht: Redefining the Atlantic Community*, Institute For European Defence And Strategic Studies, London, 1991.

Hartmann, Frederick H., *The Relations of Nations*, Mcmillan, U.S.A., Fifth Edition, 1983.

Havrani, A.H., "The Islamic City in the Light of Recent Research", *The islamic City: A Colloquia*, A.H.Havrani and S. N. Stern (eds), University of Pennsylvennia, Philadelphia, 1970.

Hay, Peter, *Federalism and Supranational Organisations: Patterns for New Legal Structures*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1966.

Henze, Paul B., *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century*, Rand, Santa Monica, 1992.

Heper, Metin and Landau, Jacob M (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, London, 1991.

Hershlag, Z. Y., *The Contemporary Turkish Economy*, Routledge, London, 1988.

Hill, Christopher, "The Historical Background: Past and Present in British Foreign Policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation*, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1988.

Hine, R.C., *The Political Economy of European Trade*, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1985.

Hollis, Martin and Smith Steve, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990.

Holtzman, Abraham, *Interest Groups and Lobbying*, Macmillan, New York, 1966.

Hunter, Robert, *Security In Europe*, Paul Eleck Limited, London, 1972.

Huntington, Samuel, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968.

İlkin, Selim, "A History of Turkey's Association with the European Community", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (eds.), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske & Budrich GmbH, Opladen, Germany, 1990.

Indyk, Martin, "The Postwar Balance of Power in the Middle East", *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith (eds.), The Aspen Institute, Madison Books, London, 1992.

Kalpakhioğlu, Cavid, *Avrupa Topluluğu Gerçeği (The Reality of The European Community)*, Memleket Yayınları (Memleket Publishers), Ordu-Turkey, 1992.

Karaosmanoğlu, Ali, "Turkey and Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts", *Nato's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, J. Chipman (ed.), Routledge, London, 1988.

Karataş, C., *Privatisation in Britain and Turkey*, The Istanbul Chamber of Industry, Istanbul, November 1990, p.20.

Karpat, Kemal, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition To A Multi-Party System*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959.

Kennedy, Paul, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988.

Keohane, Robert O., *International Institutions and State Power*, Westview Press, London, 1989.

Keohane, Robert O and Nye, Joseph S. "Complex Interdependence, Transnational Relations, and Realism: Alternative Perspectives on World Politics", in Charles, W. Kegley, Jr and Eugene, R. Wittkopf (eds.) *The Global Agenda*, Random House, New York, 1984.

Keohane, Robert O., *After Hegemony*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984.

Keohane, Robert O., *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986.

Kerr, Antony, J.C. *The Common Market and How It Works*, Pergamon Press Ltd., Oxford, 1977.

Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, Vernon, London, 1987.

Kili, Suna, *Kemalism*, School of Business Administration and Economics, Robert College, Published by Menteş Matbaası, Istanbul, Turkey, 1969.

Kılınç, Uğur, *Türkiye Avrupa Topluluğu İlişkileri 1983-1988 (The Turkish-European Community Relations)*, Türkiye Ticaret, Sanayi, Deniz Ticaret Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği (Published by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Marine Commerce and Stock Exchange), Ankara, 1990.

Kinross, Lord, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation*, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1964.

Kousoulas, D. G., *Power and Influence: An Introduction to International Relations*, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, California, 1985.

Krejci, Jaroslav, *Great Revolutions Compared: Search for a Theory*, Wheatsheaf, Sussex, 1983.

Krueger, Anne O. and Aktan, Okan H., *Swimming Against the Tide: Turkish Trade Reform in the 1980's*, International Centre for Economic Growth, ICS Press, San Francisco, 1992.

Kuniholm, Bruce R., *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980.

Landau, M. Jacob, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Leiden, 1974.

Lenczowski, George, "Some Reflections on the Study of Elites", in *Political Elites in the Middle East*, George Lenczowski (ed.), Washington, 1975.

Lewis, Bernard, *The Political Language of Islam*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988.

Lewis, Geoffrey, *Modern Turkey*, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1974.

Lewis, Geoffrey "Political Change in Turkey Since 1960", in Hale, William H (ed.), *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, London, 1981.

Louis, Roger, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.

Mair, Lucy, *Primitive Government*, Penguin, Revised Edition, Harmondsworth, 1964.

Manor, James (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*, Longman, London, 1991.

Manor, James (ed.), *The End of the Third World*, Routledge, London, 1993.

Marsh, David (ed.), *Pressure Politics: Interest Groups in Britain*, Junction Books, London, 1983.

Martin, Philip L., *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1991, p.34.

McIntyre, Robert.J., *Bulgaria, Politics, Economics and Society*, Pinter, London, 1988.

McGhee, George, *The US-Turkey NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*, Macmillan, Hampshire, 1990.

McLaurin, R. D., Mughisuddin, M. and Wagner, A. R., *Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East*, Praeger, New York, 1977.

Milward, A. S., *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*, Methuen, London, 1984.

Milward A. S., and Sorensen Vibeke, "Interdependence or Integration? A National Choice", in *The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992*, Alan S Milward (ed.), Routledge, London, 1993.

Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Knopf, Second Edition, New York, 1954.

Nardin, T., *Law, Morality and the Relations of State*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983.

Nas, Tevfik S., and Odekon, Mehmet, (eds.) *Liberalisation and the Turkish Economy*, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1988.

Navaro, Dario, "Turkey and the Gulf War", in *Gulf War and the New World Order*, Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.), Second Edition, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1991.

Nayır, Yaşar Nabi, "Atatürkism (Kemalism) is Secularism", in *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, Kemal Karpaz (ed.), Pall Mall Press, London, 1968.

Necatigil, Zaim M. *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.

Nye, J. S., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation*, Little, Brown Co., Boston, 1971.

Obermayer, Nancy J., *Bureaucrats, Clients and Geography*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1989.

Özbudun, Ergun, "Development and Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey", in *Turkey in the Year 2000*, Turkish Political Science Association, Ankara, 1989.

Pantelli, Stavros, *A New History of Cyprus*, East-West Publications, London, 1984.

Papadakis, Maria and Starr, Harvey, "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy", in *New Directions in*

the Study of Foreign Policy, Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1987.

Pentland, Charles, "International Organisations and Their Roles", in *Perspectives on World Politics*, Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), second edition, Routledge, London, 1991.

Pentland, Charles, *International Theory and Economic Integration*, The Free Press, New York, 1973.

Pevsner, Lucille W., *Turkey's Political Crisis: Background, Perspectives, Prospects*, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington Papers, vol. 12, no. 110, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 1984.

Ramazani, Rouhollah K., *Iran's Foreign Policy: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernising Nations*, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1975.

Ramazani, R.K. "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", in *The Iranian Revolution: The Global Impact*, John L. Esposito (ed.), Florida International University Press, Miami, 1990.

Rees, G. W., *International Politics in Europe: the New Agenda*, Routledge, London, 1993.

Reynolds, Charles, *Theory and Explanation in International Relations*, Martin Robertson, London, 1973.

Richardson, J. J. and Jordan, A. G. *Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post Parliamentary Democracy*, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979.

Riker, W.H., *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*, Little, Brown Co., Boston, 1964.

Risse-Kappen, T., "The Long Term Future of European Security", in S. Smith and W. Carlsnaes (eds.), *European Foreign Policy*, Sage, London, 1994.

Robert, Hunter, *Security in Europe*, second edition, Paul Elek Ltd., London, 1972.

Roberts, Geoffrey K. and Lovecy, Jill, *West European Politics Today*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988.

Robins, Philip, *Turkey and the Middle East*, The Royal Institution for International Affairs, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991.

Robinson, Jeffrey, *Yamani: The Inside Story*, Simon & Schuster Ltd., London, 1988.

Rosenau, James N., *The Study of Global Interdependence*, Pinter, London, 1980.

Rosenau, James N., "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1987.

Royal Institution of International Affairs, *Atlantic Alliance*, R. I. I. A., London, 1952.

Rustow, Dankward A., *Turkey America's Forgotten Ally*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York and London, 1989.

Sander, Oral, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and of Changes", in Ahmet Evin, *Continuity and Change in Modern Turkey*, Leske, 1984.

Saraçoğlu, Tevfik, *"Türkiye ile Avrupa Topluluğu Arasında Bir Ortaklık Yaratan Anlaşma: 1959-1963 (An Agreement Creating a Partnership Between Turkey and the European Community: 1959-1963"*, Book II, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (The Foundation for Economic Development), Istanbul, 1981.

Saraçoğlu, Metin, *"Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme (An Assessment on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation)"*, TÜHİS (Turkish Industrial Union of Employers), Istanbul, November-December, 1993.

Schmidt, S.W., Guasti, L., Lande, C.H and Scott, J.C., (eds.) *Friends, Followers and Factions*, University of California Press, London, 1977.

Schmitter, Philip, "Still the Century of Corporatism", *New Corporatism* Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch (eds.), Sage, London.

Schumpeter, Joseph, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1962.

Sezer, Özlenen, *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler (The European Community and Relations with Turkey)*, Published by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, no.16, Istanbul, 1990.

Shalim, Avi and Yannopoulos, George, *The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1976.

Shaw, Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel Kural, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Volume II, 1977.

Shea, Jamie P., "Security: the Future", in *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future*, Lodge, J. (ed.), Pinter, second edition, London, 1993.

Sjostedt, Gunnar, *The External Role of the European Community*, Saxon House, Farnborough, Hants, 1977.

Smith, M., "Modernisation, Globalisation and the Nation State", in McGrew, A and Lewis, P (eds.), *Global Politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.

Smith, M., "Beyond the stable state? Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe", in S. Smith and W. Carlsnaes (eds.), *European Foreign Policy*, Sage, London, 1994.

Soysal, İsmail, *Türkiyenin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağlıları 1945-1990*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi (publisher), Ankara, Volume II, 1991.

Sönmez, M., *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalım (Crisis of Turkish Economy)*, Belge Publishers, second edition, Istanbul, 1982.

Spero, Joan Edelman, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, Fourth Edition, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1990.

Stephanou, Constantine and Tsardanides Charalambos, "The European Community Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle", in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990's*, Dimitri Conostas (ed.), Macmillan, London, 1991.

Stoessinger, John, *The Might of Nations*, Fourth Edition, Random House, New York, 1973.

Szyliowicz, Joseph S., "Elites and Modernisation in Turkey" *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East* Frank Tachau (ed.), Schenkman Publishing Co., New York, 1975.

Şen, Faruk, *Almanyadaki Türkiye (Turkey in Germany)*, Evrim Publishers, Istanbul, 1991.

Şen, Faruk, *Türkiyenin Ufukları (Horizons of Turkey)*, Turkish Research Centre, Onel & Verlag, Köln, March 1994.

Tachau, Frank, *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East*, Schenkman Publishing Co., New York, 1975.

Tachau, Frank, *Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development*, Praeger, New York, 1984.

Talbott, Strobe, "Status Quo Ante: The United States and its Allies", *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith (eds.), The Aspen Institute, Madison Books, London, 1992.

Tamkoç, Metin, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernisation of Turkey*, Salt Lake City, London, 1976.

Taylor, Philippe Arthur, *The External Relations of the European Community: Toward a Common Foreign Policy, a Common Development Policy and Economic Union*, Produced from microfilm-xerography in 1979 by University Microfilms International, London, 1979.

Taylor, P., *The Limits of European Integration*, Croom Helm, Kent, 1983.

Thorne, Christopher, *Border Crossings: Studies in International History*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.

Thorne, Christopher, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978.

Tocqueville, Alexis De, *Democracy in America*, 2 volumes. Vintage Books, vol. 2., New York, 1954.

Tomlin, E.W.F., *Life in Modern Turkey*, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, London, 1946.

Trimberger, Ellen Kay, *Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1978.

Tsakaloyannis, Panos, "Greece, Old Problems New Prospects", in *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation*, Christopher Hill (ed.), Published for Royal Institution of International Affairs by Allen & Unwin, London, 1983.

Tsoukalis, Loukas, *The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1981.

Turan, İlder, "Relations Between Turkey and the European Community", in *Turkey in the Year 2000*, Turkish Political Science Association, Ankara, 1989.

Ulagay, O., *24 Ocak Deneyimi Üzerine (On 24 January Decisions)*, Hill Publishers, Istanbul, 1983.

Uygur, Ercan, *Policy, Productivity, Growth and Employment in Turkey 1960-89 and Prospects for the 1990s*, mimeographed, Ankara, 1990.

Vali, Ferenc A., *The Turkish Straits and NATO*, Hoover Institution Press, California, 1972.

Vali, Ferenc A., *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971.

Wallace, H., *The Wider Western Europe: Reshaping the EC-EFTA Relationship*, Pinter for the RIIA, London, 1991.

Wallace, W., *Foreign Policy and Political Process*, Macmillan, London, 1971.

Walters, Robert S. and Blake, David H., *The Politics of Global Economic Relations*, Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1992.

Waltz, Kenneth, *Man, the State and War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw Hill Inc., London, 1979.

Ward, Robert E. and Rustow, Dankwart A., (eds.) *Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964.

Weber, Max, *Essay in Sociology*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946.

Weiker, Walter F., *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey*, Leiden, Netherlands, 1973.

Weiker, Walter, F., *The Modernisation of Turkey: From Atatürk to the Present Day*, Holmes & Mayer, New York, 1981.

Williams, Geoffrey Lee, *The Logic of Diversity: Thoughts on the Structure of Defence*, Occasional Papers, Alliance Publishers for the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, no. 56, London, 1992.

Willis, F. Roy, *France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1963*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1965.

Yalçıntaş, Nevzat, "Turkey's Alternative Preferences to the European Community", in *AT'm Cevabı ve Yeni Tercihler (The European Community's Response and New Alternatives)*, Ali Coşkun, Selçuk Özçelik, Nevzat Yalçıntaş and Sabahattin Zaim (eds.), Aydınlar Ocağı Publications, Open Public Conference Series, No. 9. Istanbul, 1990.

Yılmaz, Tomris, *The Likely Effects of Turkey's Full Membership of the European Community*, London School of Economics and Political Science, Unpublished mimeograph paper, London, March, 1990.

Yücekök, Ahmet, *Türkiyede Dernek Gelişimleri (The Development of Associations in Turkey)*, Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, (Faculty of Political Science), Ankara, 1972.

Yüksel, Ali Sait, *"Ortak Pazarla İlişkilerimiz Ne Durumda, Nereye Gidiyor (What is the Situation of Our Relationship with the Common Market, Where is it Going)"*, Eskişehir Sanayii Odası (Eskişehir Chamber of Industry), Ankara, 1971.

Articles

"12 Eylül 1963 Ankara Anlaşmasının Türk Basınındaki yankıları" (The echoes of the 12 September 1963 Ankara Agreement in the Turkish Press), *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Dergisi, (The Journal of Economic Development Fund)*, September, 1988.

Abramowitz, Morton I., "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Özal", *Foreign Policy*, no. 91, Summer, 1993.

Allen, D and Smith, M, "The European Community in the new Europe: Bearing the Burden of Change", *International Journal*, vol. 47, Winter 1991-92, pp.1-28.

Almond, Gabriel, "Corporatism, Pluralism and Professional Memory", *World Politics*, vol. 35, no. 2, January, 1983.

Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, "Eisenhower's Right Flank", *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1951.

Aym Tarihi, (*The Date of the Month*), Turkish Monthly Journal, May, 1945.

Ayoob, M., "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 1, 1989.

Azam, Maha, "The Gulf Crisis: Perception in the Muslim World", *International Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 3, July, 1991.

Bahçeli, Tosun, "Turkey and the European Economic Community: The Strains of Association", *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 3, no. 2, January, 1980.

Batu, Hamit, "Turkish Foreign Policy", *Belleten*, no. 6, March 1965.

Berger, M. T., "The end of the Third World", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 2, 1994.

Biddle, W. J. and Stephens, J. D., "Dependent Development and Foreign Policy: the case of Jamaica", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, 1989.

Birand, Mehmet Ali, "Turkey and the European Community", *The World Today*, vol. 34, no. 2, February 1978.

Bowder, G.M., "Turkey At the Crossroads", *The World Today*, vol. 33, no. 5, May 1977.

Bressand, Albert, "Beyond Interdependence: 1992 as a Global Challenge", *International Affairs*, vol. 66, no.1, 1990.

Brown, James, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Turkey", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 16, no.2, 1988.

Ceyhun, Fikret "The Politics of Industrialisation in Turkey", *The Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 18, no. 3, 1988.

Çalış, Şaban, "The Turkish State's Identity and Foreign Policy Decision Making Process", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 2, Spring 1995.

Çıkrıkçı, Mustafa, "Globalleşme ve Bir Çözüm: "Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması (Globalism and a Solution: the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Agreement)", *Banka ve Ekonomik Yorumlar (Bank and Economic Interpretations)*, no. 3, March, 1992.

Cox, Robert W., "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Journal of International Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1981.

Cox, Robert W, "Multilateralism and World Order", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2, 1992.

Dalacoura, Katherina,. "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1980's", *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1990.

Dinçkök, Ömer, "Ankara Anlaşmasının 25. Yılında Türkiye AET İlişkileri (The Turkish-European Community Relations on the 25th anniversary of Ankara Agreement)", *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (Journal of Economic Development Fund)*, September, 1988.

Edwards, Geoffrey, "The European Community and the Falklands Crisis of 1982" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 22, no. 4, June, 1984.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Murphy, Emma C., "The Non-Arab Middle East States and the Caucaisan / Central Asian Republics: Turkey", *International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 6, December 1993,

Eisenstadt, S.N. and Lemerchand, Rene, *Contemporary Political Sociology*, vol. 3, London, 1981.

Enloe, Cynthia H. and Rejai Mostafa, "Nation-States and State-Nations", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 2, 1969.

Feroz, Ahmad, "Great Britain's Relations with the Young Turks", *Middle Eastern Studies*, July, 1966.

Fuller, Graham E., "Respecting Regional Realities", *Foreign Policy*, Summer, no. 83, 1991.

Goldmann, Kjell, "The Line in Water: Internal and Domestic Politics", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 24, no. 3-4, December, 1989.

Haas, Peter M. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control", *International Organisation*, vol. 43, no. 3, Summer 1989.

Haas, Peter M. (ed.), Special Issue of *International Organisation*, vol. 46, no. 1, Winter 1992 on Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination.

Halliday, Fred, "Three Concepts of Internationalism", *International Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 2, Spring, 1988.

Heper, Metin., "The State, Political Party and Society in Post-1983 Turkey", *Government and Opposition*, vol. 25, no.3, Summer, 1990.

Heper, Metin, "Country Report: Motherland Party Governments and Bureaucracy in Turkey, 1983-1988", *Governance*, part 2, 1989.

Heper, Metin "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 35, no. 3, 1981.

Huelshoff, M. G., "Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 2, June 1994, pp.255-279.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Transnational Organisations in World Politics, *World Politics*, vol. 25, no. 2, April, 1973.

Hurewitz, J.C., "Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origin of the Problem", *World Politics*, vol. 14, no. 7, July 1962.

İbrahimoglu, Rafet, "Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği (KEİB) (The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC))", *Gıda İşveren*, Year, 24, no. 248, February-March, 1992.

Kofman, E. and Sales, R., "Towards Fortress Europe", *Womens Studies International Forum*, vol. 15, no. 1.

Kohlhase, Norbert, "The Greco-Turkish Conflict From a European Community Perspective", *The World Today*, vol. 37, no. 4, April, 1981.

Kramer, Heinz, "Turkey and EC's Southern Enlargement", *Aussen Politik*, vol. 35, no. 1, 1984, p.102.

Krasner, Stephen D., "State Power and the Structure of International Trade", *World Politics*, vol. 28, no. 3, April, 1976.

Kroll, John A, "The Complexity of Interdependence", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 3, September 1993.

Kuniholm, Bruce R., "Turkey and The West", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, Spring, 1991.

Kuniholm, Bruce R., "Turkey and NATO: Present and Future", *ORBIS*, vol. 27, Summer, 1983.

Lande, Carl H, "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Theory of Politics", *American Political Science Review*, March, 1973.

Lehmbruch, Gerhard, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government" *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 10, no.1.

Mardin, Şerif "Opposition and Control in Turkey" *Government and Opposition*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1966.

Mardin, Şerif, "Youth and Violence in Turkey", *European Archives of Sociology*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1978.

Martin, Ross M, "Pluralism and the New Corporatism", *Political Studies*, no. 31, 1983.

Migdal, Joel, "Internal Structure and External Behaviour: Explaining Foreign Policies of Third World States", *International Relations*, vol. 4, no. 5, 1974.

Mingst, Karen A., "The Ivory Coast and the Semi-periphery in the World Economy", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 3, September 1988.

Moon, B. E., "Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 2, 1993.

Morse, Edward L., "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernisation, Interdependence and Externalization", *World Politics*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1970.

Müftüler, Meltem, "Turkey and European Community: An Uneasy Relationship", *Turkish Review*, vol. 6, 1993.

Noel, Emile, "Türkiye -AET Ortaklığının Durumu" (The State of the Turkish-European Community Partnership), *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Dergisi (The Journal of the Economic Development Fund)*, January, 1987.

Özbudun, E., "Turkey: The Politics of Political Clientelism" *Contemporary Political Sociology*, vol. 3, London, 1981.

Özüye, Oktay, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 3, no. 3, Summer, 1992.

Pipes, Daniel and Clawson, Patrick, "Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbours", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 1, 1992/1993.

Ravenal, Earl C., "The Case for Adjustment", *Foreign Policy*, no. 81, Winter, 1990/91.

Roth, Gunther, "Personnel Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire Building in the New States", *World Politics*, vol. 20, no. 1, January, 1968.

Rummel, Rudolph J. "Libertarianism and International Violence", *The Journal of the Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27, March, 1983.

Scott, J.C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 66, no.1, 1972.

Scott, J.C., "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 63, no. 4, 1969.

Şen, Faruk, *The Turkish Economy, the EC, and the Gulf Crisis*, Conference at the Bologna Centre of the Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, 7 March 1991, published by Turkish Research Centre, Bonn, Germany, 1991.

Şen, Faruk, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Supplement to the EC?", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 44, no. 3, 1993.

Şenemek, Nuri, "Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Tam Üyeliğin Geleceği (Turkey and the European Community: The Future of Full Membership)", *Nokta*, Turkish Weekly, Istanbul, 21 June 1992.

Snyder, Jed C. "Proliferation Threats to Security in NATO's Southern Region", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 1, Winter, 1993.

Soysal, Mümtaz, "Discussion on Democracy and Deadlock", *Foreign Policy*, vol. 8, no. 3-4, 1980.

Steinbach, Udo, "Turkey's Third Republic", *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 3, 1988.

Strange, Susan, "The Politics of International Currencies", *World Politics*, vol. 22, no. 1, January, 1971.

Şen, Faruk, "New Problems for the Turkish Minority in the Federal Republic of Germany", *Centre for Turkish Studies*, Unpublished paper presented by the Director of Centre for Turkish Studies, Prof. Dr. Faruk Şen, at the 6th International Bursa Symposium, Bursa, 7-8 April 1993.

Tachau, Frank, "Turkish Foreign Policy Between East and West", *Middle East Review*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1985.

Tomlison, J, *Cultural Globalisation and Cultural Imperialism*, unpublished conference paper, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 6 March 1995, presented to the "Cultural Imperialism or Global Modernisation" Conference.

Tuncer, Baran, "External Financing of the Turkish Economy and its Foreign Policy Implications", *The Journal of Political Science*, Department of Political Science, University of Ankara, 1974.

Van Ham, P., "The European Community after Hegemony: the Future of European Integration in a Multipolar World", *International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 5, August 1993.

Weiker, Walter F., "Discussion on Democracy and Deadlock", *Foreign Policy*, vol. 8, no. 3-4, 1980.

Weingrod, A., "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 10, no. 3, 1968.

Wildawsky, A., "No War Without Dictatorship, No Peace Without Democracy: Foreign Policy as Domestic Politics", *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1985.

Yılmaz, Mesut, "Highlights from the New Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz on the Regional and International Affairs", *Middle East Business and Banking*, vol. 11, no.7, July 1991.

Young, Oran R., "*International Regimes: Concept Formation*", *World Politics*, vol. 32, no. 3, April, 1980.

*at the required level of democracy. In Turkey there has been quite a good process on that way. I hope that process will bring Turkey to the required level in a short time*¹³⁶."

The next chapter will deal with Turkish-EC relations during the post-Cold War, and Turkey's involvement in the other regional economic organisations during the post-Cold War. The main question will be that how changing domestic political structures and the ending of the Cold War have affected Turkish foreign policy towards the EC, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR) and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO). Turkey's involvement in the latest Gulf crisis will also be assessed in the light of the changes in Turkish foreign policy.

¹³⁶ *Milliyet*, 16 January 1987.