

The Future of Islamisation in Turkey

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In Partial fulfilment for the Degree of masters in

Arts in

Sociology

Department of Sociology

University of Warwick

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Charles Turner at University of Warwick for supporting me by encouraging and motivating whenever I faced a problem through the research process.



ABSTRACT

The most prominent country is Turkey, which has the distinction of being a country with 99% Muslim, but officially secular. Also the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, not as a state, is Muslim. Although Turkey is declared a secular state, between 95% and 99% of the population are practicing Islam. Turkey would become the first and only Muslim country of the European Union. Measures such as replacing the Sultanate by a republic and the abandonment of the caliphate designed to equip the modern Turkish state and secular political institutions. Thus, courts and civil codes Muslims are replaced by more modern forms of European inspiration. Islamist revival experienced by the Muslim countries in the seventies and eighties was often considered and explained as political activism aimed at establishing an Islamic order based on religious law (Sharia).

DECLARATION

I, declare that the following project has been an individual, unaided attempt and has not been published or submitted earlier. Additionally, it shows my views and take on the issue and is does not describe the view of the University.



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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In Europe, there are several Islamic nations and peoples. The most prominent country is Turkey, which has the distinction of being a country with 99% Muslim, but officially secular. Also the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, not as a state, is Muslim. The other European countries are Muslims in the Balkan Peninsula. In Albania and Kosovo still not recognized as a state by the international community I live Muslims with Christians, who represent half of the population in the first and a minority in the second. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the symbol of religious diversity in Yugoslavia until its fragmentation, and today is divided into two opposing entities: one composed of Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croats and other almost exclusive by Orthodox Serbs. Today are still big unknown to the Western audience, which sometimes makes the mistake of calling them 'Islamist' (Sural, 2008). But neither is the same Islamic or Islamist: the first is the one who follows Islam, and the second is a supporter of the fundamentalist movements (Sural, 2008).

Turkey has been, since the time of the Byzantine empire, the definite east-west and vice versa. What is equally north to south, and from Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus the Mediterranean world. It is part of Europe, but it is also the territory of Asia West and is located in the Near East. As such it represents a Turkey intersection of cultures, religions and ethnicities that make this country a dilemma political from the Western point of view. This image of Turkey as a bridge between cultures and land of contradictions can be seen in the fact that the country is member of NATO and the OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation European as being fundamental to the defence of the southeast of the continent, but not the European Union for its political and human rights doctrine, which has more characteristics of country of Asia Minor to Europe. In this study, an analysis of the future of Islamisation in Turkey is attempted (Cizre, 2008).

1.2 Research aim and objectives

The aim of this research is analyse the future of Islamisation in Turkey by evaluating relation between politics and religion with reference to differences between Islam and Christianity. The objectives of this study are:

- To understand the general relationship between politics and religion

- To evaluate the relationship of politics with religion by focusing on differences between Islam and Christianity

- To analyse the history of kemalism and Islamism particularly focusing on Islamic business class in Turkey

- To analyse the role of Islamic education in Islamism by evaluating functions of Imam Hatip school

1.3 Research rationale

Turkey in the last year grew around 9% (well above the other candidates and current member states) and is within several prestigious groups such as emerging countries analysed the Next-11 (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, Bangladesh and Turkey), the Emerging-7 (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and Turkey) or CIVETS (China, India, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa). The future of the Ottoman country seems really promising, and then the big question is what the future of Islamisation in this country is (Sural, 2008).

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions will be used to achieve result of this study:

- What is the general relationship between politics and religion?
- How the relationship of politics with religion is influenced by the differences between Islam and Christianity?
- What is the history of kemalism and Islamism particularly focusing on Islamic business class in Turkey?
- What is the role of Islamic education in Islamism by evaluating functions of Imam Hatip School?

1.5 Research Structure

The structure of this study is based on the following five chapters:

Chapter one: this chapter attempts to provide background of the study along with research aim, objectives and rationale.

Chapter two: this chapter is providing theoretical base to the study by giving a detailed as well as critical analysis of research objectives.

Chapter three: this is the methods chapter in which the research strategy, design, and techniques are provided.

Chapter four: this chapter is based on discussion and analysis of both primary and secondary data in order to lead towards conclusion of the study.

Chapter five: this is the concluding chapter of the research in which a conclusion along with recommendations in given.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In 2005, the Conservative Van Rompuy, President of the European Council is clearly and openly opposes entry: "Turkey is not part of Europe and will never be. Universal values that predominate in Europe, based in Christianity, lose integrity with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey". Just to let you remember that the Ottoman Empire during its expansion into Africa and Europe wanted to spread their religion at all costs in detriment of Christianity. Currently the religion of Islam, which is at a time of increasing number of followers, is perceived by some Western countries with some trepidation due to the growth of Islamic radicalism in recent years. Although history often enough in cases like this, and perhaps not many Europeans would welcome this possible accession to a Muslim country. Assume that overcame the barrier of religion in Europe, Turkey's entry would cause a change in the perception of border states to assume today that part of Asia, and that's when we should rethink what the limits are or where Europe ends(Baran, 2008).

2.2 Relationship Between Religion and Politics

The issue of religious identity is the ground many amalgams, especially when it comes to integration policy. The isolationism lent a part of the Muslim community there is a barrier to the integration or the decline is he, on the contrary, a lack of integration policy? (Norris & Inglehart, 2011).

This amalgam and political misuse of religion is also a problem. While many young Muslims say their faith in a way that may cause difficulty, it may be because they had the possibility of a better family life and better social integration; they would be less likely to live as a religious affirmation opposed to others. Religious problems and social problems are two distinct realities and it is not good to associate. In short: a part of the political world shows a segment of the population to curb the integration isolationism; whereas this decline would itself a deficiency of integration policy (Asad, 2009). The decline in the religious is not necessarily intended to counter the Republican membership! Still does it make this possible, membership?

2.2.1 Defining the Religions and Politics

Religion can be defined quite broadly as a set of more or less formal rules that define the relations of men with the divine. This definition is far from being united that is only one way among others to address the issue of the relationship between religion and politics. People can locate the "religious" in the public sphere through the actors who represent the outset as "religious" and give the function of interpreting the doctrine in order to mediate between it and the s believers. And religious actors are they defined not only by the institutions and religious organizations, and their representatives, but also by the Ulama - recognized by the State or self-appointed - the mystical brotherhoods and their leaders, imams of mosques, etc. this means fulfilling a mediating role with the divine, or at least with religious doctrine, in particular through their interpretation of texts and rituals. Political groups who claim Islam also define the religious sphere. The monarch himself, as people have seen, has a religious function, which is not necessarily directly interpret the texts, but to be the guardian. All these bodies produce practices and religious representation, which circulate in the public space and may even define a game. However, religion is much more than that: it is also present in all individual and daily practices or innermost beliefs. The recent democratic opening in Morocco also allows the question of the relationship between religious belief of voters and their political choices. The specificity of the religious sphere in Islamic doctrine holds the absence of clergy, which gives it fluidity: there is not in the doctrine of Islam. Yet in many Muslim countries, and throughout the history of Islam, strong chains of authority, often related to power were formed. These chains of religious authority servant, even today, the United States wishing to defend themselves against any concurrence political religious basis but can also put pressure on its own states and, more rarely, to turn against the powers have created and / or controlled widths (Asad, 2009).

2.3 Islam and Politics

Muslim people and Islam have a history, as well as the others which has different interpretations to the relationships between the reason and the faith, the mutual transformations and adaptations of the society. But the reality of this story is denied not only by Eurocentric discourses but also by contemporary movements which claim Islam. In fact, both share the same cultural bias

through the specific and different way of people and religious with their allegedly trans-historical, intangible and immeasurable nature. A Eurocentric contemporary western political Islam opposes to Eurocentrism itself.

In fact, the emergence of movements is totally connected with the expression of violent revolt against the destructive effects of existing capitalism, the unsparing modernity and their misleading sides. (cf. the challenge of modernity) (Milton-Edwards, 2010). This can be a strongly legitimate expression of revolt against a system that offers only a little to the people (Zubaida, 2009).

Discourse of Islam which is proposed as an alternative to the capitalist modernity (which is deemed as an unqualified experiences of modernity in the history of socialism) is a political issue, not theological. On the other hand, the fundamentalist qualifiers do not have a resemblance to the speech which is filled with allusion except speeches of some scholars who want to turn these terms in more Western opinion than theirs.

For this case, the proposed Islam is the adversary of all liberal theology. The political Islam calls for submission, not an emancipation. The only attempt of reading Islam that goes in the direction of emancipation realised by Mahmoud Taha of Sudan who was sentenced to death and executed by the government in Khartoum and has been claimed by any party of the Islamic movement as "radical" or "moderate", yet he was not defended by any intellectuals who was not willing to speak about in their dialogues and did not claim the "Islamic Renaissance" (Shryock, 2010).

The heralds of "the Islamic renaissance" is not interested in theology and never referred to a major texts. Hence, what they mean by Islamic view is a conventional and social version of religious which is limited with the formal and ritual practice. Islam defines a "community" that belongs to someone by inheritance such as ethnicity, not an intimate and strong personal conviction. It is only a affirming "collective identity", but nothing more. This is why the expression of political Islam, in which all of these movements was come true in the Arab countries, is certainly more accurate.

The modern political Islam was invented by Orientalist in the service of British power in India before being taken by Pakistani Mawdudi. It was a prove that believers of Muslims are not allowed to live in the state that is not itself Islamic- anticipating the partition of India- because Islam ignore the possibility of separation of state and religion. Orientalist have failed to observe that the English of the thirteenth century world have not managed to survive outside the Christianity. (Milton-Edwards, 2001).

Therefore, Abul Ala Mahmudi takes up the theme that power emanating from God and him alone, rejecting the concept of citizens rights to legislate for the state has the burden of law enforcement defined once and for all ("the Shariah") Joseph de Maistre also wrote similar things accusing the revolution having invented the the crime of modern democracy and empowerment of the individual. (Shryock, 2010)

The common interpretation is focusing that new requirements bring and impose the real changes. But in principle the fact still remains that the right of separating the roots from the past will drag

the society into the deadlock modern struggles for social changes and democracy. Islamic parties -no matter they are radical or moderate, all have the same understanding which shows parallelism on anti- modernist approach for living under the special principles of Islam. Even Christian Democratic parties of modern Europe which is a part of modernity accepting the basic concept of creative democracy as a gist of secularism do not have a validity anymore. So the political Islam is on the side of rejecting the modernity strongly. (Mandaville, 2014).

The proposed Islam therefore certainly not deserve to be called "modern"; and supporting arguments advanced in this field by friends of "dialogue" are of extreme flatness, ranging from the use of cassettes by his propagandists to the observation that they are recruited in layers "educated" - engineers for example! The discourse of these movements also knows little Wahabi Islam that rejects everything that the interaction between Islam and the history of Greek philosophy had produced in his time, as he simply rehash the writings of most dishes reactionary theologians of the Middle Ages - IbnTaymiyyah. Although some of his heralds call this interpretation of "back to basics" (even the time of the Prophet of Islam), it is really just a return to the current approach there are two hundred years, those of society arrested in its development for several centuries (Zubaida, 2009).

The contemporary political Islam is not the product of a reaction to alleged abuses of secularism, as is unfortunately too often said. The semi modern Kemalist Turkey, Nasser's Egypt, Syria and Iraq Baathist state was content to domesticate men of religion (as had often happened before) to impose a speech solely aimed at legitimizing his political options. The beginnings of a secular idea existed only in certain intellectual circles criticism. She did not have much control over the state; and it carried away by his nationalist project sometimes retreated in this plan, as evidenced by the disturbing trend inaugurated the same time Nasser, operating a break with the policy that the Wafd had adopted since 1919. Explanation for this drift may be obvious refusing democracy regimes in question are substituted him "the homogeneity of the community," which we see the danger grow into democracy in regression of contemporary West itself (cf. Diversity inherited from past and diversity in the invention of the future) (Heper & Israeli, 2014).

Political Islam offers a complete evolution already well-established in the countries concerned, to restore a conservative theocratic order unvarnished associated with political power "Mameluke" category. The reference to the ruling military caste up there two centuries, placing themselves above the law (pretending not to know about this plan that the "Sharia"), capturing the benefits of economic life and accepting - the name of "realism" - to fit in a subordinate position in capitalist globalization era, immediately comes to mind of anyone who observes both post degraded nationalists in the region that the new plan called Islamic regimes, their twin brothers (Shryock, 2010).

We must consider how very different the weight of the religious factor in the political struggle depending on the phase of contemporary history which has three: the preparation, development and the victory of the bourgeois revolution; the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal real dangers of restorations; the current phase in which capitalism now dominant control of the whole world on one front against the workers' revolution (Gwennap, 2012).

In the feudal system, political power rested on closed classes and exclusivist institutions, nobility, clergy, officer corps, dynasty; his doctrine justified the monopoly of wealth and power by the principle of authority and the inauguration by the will and grace of God. Religious preaching and organizing churches provided an essential part in the defense of the dominant regime and constituted a fundamental obstacle to the assault that led the new forces against the power and privileges. In some countries, the state relied on the Church; in others, it was with a church whose organization was penetrated by it, according to its own conservation objectives. God and the priest were used on the same plane to justify and defend existing property relations and production and exploitation of the masses subservient (Eisenstein, 2008).

Market and industrial bourgeoisie, deprived of rights commensurate with those of other orders, could not make his way in fighting against the Church and against the official religion. Criticism of the principle of authority and divine right it developed, its precursors theorists led to criticism of the whole theological system and even the negation of religion (Gwennap, 2012).

The quarter-state embryonic proletarian class could not fight alongside the bourgeois third state; and even he shared his struggles, he accepted his doctrinal and philosophical criticism as a result historical evidence. Not only the first socialist movement was born atheist, but he considered that in the struggle of anti-bourgeois class later for other reports and other principles, religious question would be raised as liquidated; This situation continued throughout the period in which the forces of absolutist monarchies and feudal tried to undo the gains of the revolution and used in first line in coalitions against revolutionaries and the uprisings in the Vendée type the influence of religion and excommunication by the priests workers struggled with the bourgeois liberals and monarchists Jacobins against the nobles and priests (Hunter, 2010).

True or illusory, the danger that the capitalist revolution (which had in the meantime acquired the power and socially transformed the world into his bowels on a frenetic pace progressive) can be defeated and reversed begat the particular policy of the anti-clerical block Masonic ideology cultivated type and diffuse belief that capitalists and workers, although divided by economic and social struggle, have in common an anticlerical and antireligious position. In Italy, this situation lasted longer than in other countries because the temporal power of the Popes of Rome represented a material obstacle to national unity, the basic premise of the bourgeois regime.

As a reflection of this historical process, the doctrine of the proletariat, Marxism, also went through the same steps, in the sense that, at first, the critique of bourgeois social and political systems appealed to a point was thought to be a final conquest, namely the victory of the destructive criticism of religion. In the early works of Marx, in which sin often complacently biased interpreters of Marxism (from both the side and the libertarian Free Democratic side, they converge on the point of agreement that, from the common root the conquest of the ideological and political freedom, it remains only additional work for the next conquest of "economic freedom"), so in these works, it is clear that this basis, that the opponent concedes that it agrees with the religious problem is gained. We talk about the Democratic opponent in socialist and revolutionary Marx of the "Critique of the Philosophy of Right" and "Judenfrage" (Jewish Question) dating back to 1844.

2.6 Islam in the Ottoman Empire

Turkey today was built on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, one of the most enduring empires of history. One of the main characteristics that define the identity of this empire is undoubtedly belonging to the Muslim world. Indeed, his political organization was defined by the model of the Caliphate and Sultanate. Sultan, name given to the rulers of Muslim

states, also acted as a caliphate. The latter is considered as the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and it is attributed to the leader of the Muslim community. Primarily, its role is to maintain unity within the Islamic nation in addition to ensuring compliance with the law and the spread of Islam. Note that the caliphate of Istanbul was the only one not belonging to Arabs (Itzkowitz, 2008).

2.7 Secularization of the Turkish state

Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, significant changes to modernize the Turkish state emerging are undertaken. To achieve this, a provisional executive committee, headed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was created. This council promulgated a new Constitution in 1924. Through several articles, the new Constitution and the amendments which altered, Turkey aims to distinguish its Muslim Ottoman past. The objective of Kemalism political doctrine attributed to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that shaped the development of the new state aims to replace the cultural reference that represents Islam in favour of Turkish nationalism (Berkes, 2013).

Before the adoption of the new Constitution, several steps were necessary to ensure a break with the Muslim tradition. That is why people witnessed in turn the abolition of the Sultanate in 1923, and the caliphate in 1924. Measures such as replacing the Sultanate by a republic and the abandonment of the caliphate designed to equip the modern Turkish state and secular political institutions. Thus, courts and civil codes Muslims are replaced by more modern forms of European inspiration (Kuru, 2009).

In addition, other measures came consolidate the aim of modernizing state by reducing the weight and influence of Islam. For example, education is withdrawn from religious organizations, resulting in the closure of religious schools, both Islamic and Christian. The new program, heavily inspired by Western methods rather advocates a secular education that will enable Turkey to reach the level of economic and social development of European nations (Yavuz, 2009).

2.8 Islam in Secularism

The new republic is secular that does not mean the disappearance of religious movements provided. Indeed, in a country where economic development is to consolidate and where income disparity is still important social institution that represents Islam has not lost its popular radiation. Moreover, the fact that the new Turkish state has adopted ideologies such as liberalism and capitalism only accentuates the difference in living standards, especially between cities and villages. Thus, Islam is growing support in the poorest villages and slums that are looking for solutions and security fringes, both socially and economically. For example, due to the lack of movement left in Turkey, Islamic organizations fulfil their role within the population. To do this, they are able to mobilize crowds through speech against the established order, against exploitation, or by focusing on human rights (Hashemi, 2009).

Since the Second World War, Islamic organizations are confined to the social aspect of the organization and community identification. However, as they hold a wide popular support, they

can fit into active politics, interposed by political parties. These take advantage of the situation by getting more support in areas that were not conducive to them without the connivance of religious orders (Engineer, 2008).

By the early 1990s, and even a little before, there is what Samuel Huntington called the Islamic resurgence. This reappearance helps make Islam a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, power and hope, which was somewhat mitigated during the Cold War, due to the supremacy of secular ideas of the Constitution and the two blocks which prevailed at that time (Hashemi, 2008).

2.9 The Ruling AKP

At the head of the country since 2002, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) are presented as a conservative Democrat. Strongly influenced by various religious movements since coming to power, he questions so increasingly notable major Kemalist principles, including the involvement of religion in politics. Moreover, several appointments within the state apparatus evidenced (Abramowitz & Barkey, 2009).

The AKP leader and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not hesitate to challenge secularism, but tries to combine Turkish nationalism, from the Kemalist reforms, the identity source that represents the Muslim religion. This mediation attempt is motivated by the desire that the secular republic and Islam should not operate in an environment of antagonism. Moreover, the Muslim religion must serve social control necessary for political development of democratic life. In this sense, during a speech before the Turkish legislature, he informs elected its intention "to form a religious youth" in line with "the values and principles of the nation". Instead, in addition to rejecting the idea of sharia, Erdogan went even extol the principles of secularism in the Maghreb countries like Algeria or Tunisia (Dagi, 2008).

2.10 Islam in Turkey

Islamist revival experienced by the Muslim countries in the seventies and eighties was often considered and explained as political activism aimed at establishing an Islamic order based on religious law (Sharia). Certainly, it is the political strategy that is most visible in multiple trends in contemporary Islam, but in the observation of this phenomenon, we must not fail to raise the social impact that can have ownership an Islamic reference and the participation of new social group sit generates. The idea of an Islamic revolution conceived as are volt of the masses isso huge effect that this political logic of revolution can only hide a logic that is socio-cultural reality. Therefore, it is difficult to see in the Islamist phenomenon on that pathological social order in crisis response. As a social movement, this phenomenon actually participates in the attempts to resolve this crisis. Accordingly, Islamist actors cannot be qualified both "masses" and "militant activists" as Islamist movements generate socio-professional and cultural elite (one-against elite). Activists of Islamist movements are often recruited from universities, which shows that it is not a movement from a traditional population but rather an urban movement invested recently urbanized and educated social groups. The actors of the Turkish Islamism have actually benefited from the opportunities offered them political pluralism and especially the development of a market economy during the decade 1983-1993. It can be argued that Islamist movements

evolve towards logic of participation if there is a possibility of renewal of elites through the educational system, for upward social mobility and democratic participation. The Turkish case could be an illustration of this hypothesis. In contrast, in countries where the paths of social mobility and political participation are blocked, Islamist movements may move permanently to logic of exclusion and violence. In the period after 1983, in Turkey, we saw Islamist engineers access to the workings of political power or veiled appear on university campuses in major cities Muslim students. Flowering of publications, magazines, newspapers Islamist persuasion has also revealed that this phenomenon had an undeniable impact on intellectuals (Hawker & Alicavusoglu, 2009).

Engineers, veiled women, intellectuals, these new players will come out of Islam from the periphery of the system. Contemporary Islamist movements are now at the heart of modernity. This is true from a geographical point of view as they are in urban centres, but it is also true to a point of political and cultural views insofar as they participate in the production values and the orientation of change. Their mode of action is not part of a logical break with the system, but in a sense of participation. Islamic elite training currently being aspires to control modernity rather than its rejection. The three standard figures that we mentioned - engineers, intellectuals, and women - also reflect quite the terms of the debate on secularism through Islamism. Engineers are both tempted by rationality and faith, intellectuals are torn between critical thinking and Islamic morality, and women are attracted by individualistic aspirations and community sense. Insofar as rationality, critical thinking and individualism will be an independent reference point for these three categories of Islamic elites formed by remaining secular education can be considered a process of secularization is underway. The more these people form a professional identity as an engineer or an intellectual, more the domain of secular will separate the sacred domain. But this separation of domains, this secularization is not appropriate. They create tension and are the seeds of future conflict within the Islamist movement. Individualistic aspirations of women, critical intellectuals, and pragmatic engineers defy rationality actually an Islamist project based on the sanctity of belief and belonging to the community of believers. On the one hand, the Islamist ideology defends a way of life inseparable Islamic identity against the modernizing projects, on the other, the social practice of Islamist elites develops with reference to the problems of secularization and thus questions puts to the test, ideology Islamism. Islamisation public space or secularization practices (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008).?

Contemporary Islamism is forged in the potential conflict between the neo-authoritarian communitarianism and the imaginary "identity" community. Indeed, Islam more than a political ideology is an imaginary community, that is to say, a place where you dream of deep and horizontal relationships between people who do not know each other, a place in the field the sacred. However, if the individual asserts itself by its practice even by secularization, that is to say by the domain separation of sacred and profane, Islamism aspires to a total community that finds its *raison d'être* in the Islamic state. Analyses of Islamism have actually focus on the latter aspect, the unity of religion and state in Islam and in most cases they conclude that Sharia is the source of authoritarianism. The vision itself is very "political scientist". It puts the light and political Islam defines Sharia as the opposite of secularism understood as a principle of political doctrine. For our part, we have tried to show how secularism in Muslim countries often took a different form by defining a new social hierarchy, a new social organization, and a new relationship between the sexes. We also tried to locate both modernizing secularism and political Islam in relation to society and social behaviour. We understand why the woman question, the cornerstone of the organization is not in our analysis a secondary issue involving only the status of women, but a question of civilization. About sexuality, relationships between men and women and morals

in general, are not epiphenomena of Islamism (Cizre, 2008). We cannot understand the tensions between secularism and Islamism if we refuse to see that there are currently issues that affect the very definition of lifestyles. Thus, we must go beyond the boundaries of political analysis to look at the individual, the delineation of private and public spaces, ethical and aesthetic questions. Control of public space becomes one of the central issues of democracy and political pluralism. Indeed, the Islamist political regains individuals who were who were previously excluded from political life. This re-politicization today generates debates are features on sexuality (headscarf affair, mix in buses, sport girls at school), the art (statue Ankara regarded as obscene by the Mayor) 11 on satellite dishes (intrusion of Western culture in the home), alcohol (it must prohibit the consumption of alcohol on the terraces of cafes in Beyoğlu), 12 on the New Year (currently does he there or not practice a Christian?) or the Turkish historical and cultural heritage (Byzantine Istanbul walls or the pyramids of Egypt are they part?). All these examples actually pose the problem of the boundary between private and public, between religion and politics, between the past and the present, between identity and community (Gumuscu, 2010). More than the state Islam is here Islamization of public space is at stake control of public space, the rights of the majority, cultural protectionism are the main policy areas of neo-Islamist authoritarian communitarianism. In fact, the debate is organized around these issues to distinguish one side of the liberal policies of openness, and other authoritarian political closure. For Islamists whole question is whether these three pillars of Islam: faith, lifestyle, and state will unite to achieve or rather remain independent (Eligür, 2010). Can we expect to see develop an identity communitarianism accepting political pluralism and away the spectre of authoritarian communitarianism which would be provided by an Islamic State? Islamism and political liberalism can they coexist? New approaches to political philosophy concerning the definition of liberalism and secularism, such as Charles Taylor, try to open a space for communities and multiculturalism. They can provide us with new tracks and a new language for a relevant approach to Islamism. Ultimately, the future of democracy depends on much intellectual and political capacity to bind collective identity and an individual, communitarian identity and political liberalism, and to ensure the autonomy of public space vis-à-vis the contracting state that it is secular or Islamic (Jenkins, 2008).

2.11 Kemalism in Turkey

Kemalism was adopted in 1932 as the ideology of CHP, Republican People's Party, of Turkey (Düzel, 2009). 1 Derived from the name of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic in 1923 and the president of the party which ruled the country single-handedly for three decades, Kemalism has never remained a political ideology only. It was and has always been a phenomenon beyond party politics; it was a way of life, and even for some, a religion. Nevertheless, starting from 1980s the Turkish history has recorded a tremendous transformation in the political culture with a new discourse of nationwide awareness and social revival. While this awareness is perceived by the supporters of Kemalism as a threat to the regime, for those who are a part of this new trend it is a rediscovery of their true cultural identity which liberates them from the con - fines of an isolated nation and helps them engage with the global society. Turkish people did not want to remain isolated from the world, and their willingness for liberation could no longer tolerate a regime which by no means could respond to the needs of an individual or a society in the twenty-first century(White, 2011). Indeed, it is not that Kemalism is not compatible with the new advancements in modern technologies of the twenty-first century; I believe Kemalism was never what Turkish nation wanted even eighty years ago and they made what they really wanted very clear first in

1950 when they had the opportunity to vote in a multi-party system first time ever and then repeatedly in all elections, and especially in 2007 with a landslide victory of a party which did not represent the status quo, in other words Kemalism. The final episode of this debate was put on stage recently in the referendum on September 12, 2010, in which 58% voted in favour of the reform package that is expected to shake some of the foundational pillars of the Kemalist state, especially the judiciary stronghold monopolized by staunch followers of this ideology. What is this Kemalism about? Why is it not compatible with the Turkish society? Is it out of date in twenty-first century, or has it ever been up-to-date? Why are its representatives still in feverish support of it to - day? It is important to explore the history of secularist philosophy and its manifestations in the world as well as in Turkey with their exclusive nuances in order to contextualize the Kemalist ideology, for it is a political belief that was not only the political thought of the ruling elite, but it has also been influential in characterizing the dominant patterns of political behaviour for a certain portion of the Turkish society at the micro-politics level (Azak, 2010).

2.12 Challenges Faced By Kemalism in the Twenty-First Century

The major challenge to the Kemalist establishment came with the coming into power of the JDP in the 2002 general election. The significance of this turning point cannot be adequately appreciated, however, unless one analyzes it against the backdrop of the events preceding it. The JDP is an off-shoot of the Welfare party itself the last in a long line of political parties which professed to uphold the 'National View' (Milli Gorus) ideology. The word 'National' in 'National View' must not be confused with secular nationalism in the modern sense of the word but rather a reference harkening back to the Ottoman millet (nation) system in which society was ordered around religious communities. Erbakan had been the undisputed and legendary leader of the neo Ottomanist/Islamist Milli Gorus movement since its inception in 1969 (Guney, 2013). Supporters of the JDP both in Turkey and abroad have welcomed this development and claimed that Turkey had moved into new phase in its history and declared Erdogan's rhetoric of change to be authentic. A Kemalist minority never bought in to claims of a sudden conversion but found itself in the unfamiliar position of being on the receiving end of accusations of resisting progress and falling behind the march of history (Ahmed, 2010).

However, the myths surrounding what Kemalism is must be dispelled for the debate concerning it to be constructive. Kemalism is fundamentally a project of nation-building and defensive/radical modernization; it is a textbook example of state nationalism. Kemalism upholds the ideal of civic nationalism without, however, being oblivious to the power of primordial ethnic ties. It subscribes to a positivistic form of secularism without, however, attempting to eradicate religion from the body social. It is Organic-Statist rather than liberal or socialist. Kemalist foreign policy is defensive, prudent and realist to the point of being based almost exclusively on hardcore security concerns. In light of the above, Kemalist Turkey represents a unique experience in the Muslim world. The endpoint of this experience remains to be seen (Murinson, 2012).

In the final analysis, however, Turkey's identity crisis constitutes its central problem and this problem cannot be resolved by insisting on either a Western or Middle Eastern identity or by becoming a bridge between the two without ever fully belonging to either. The only way is to rediscover and reconstruct an authentic Turkic identity within modernity.

2.13 Europe wants Islamisation of Turkey

The same day of the referendum would result in a massive "yes" to the reform of the Constitution,

columnist for Latest NewsAlsace wrote the name of democratization of the country, "the Turkish government wants to reduce or bring to naught, the prerogatives of the guarantor of secularism" institutions. The article continued by giving the example of changing the method of selection of members of judicial bodies such as the Higher Judicial Council, which "so far have been able to oppose the Islamic-conservative AKP party in its attempts to end the secular legacy of Kemal Atatürk. And it goes into the details until headscarf that the government wants to allow in public areas and prohibit judges" (Oğuzlu, 2008). In addition to obvious confusion on the headscarf issue has never been banned in Turkey in public areas, article feeds ghost risk of Islamization of Turkey, which would be inevitable if the government limited the power of the army itself behind several hit states and dictatorships. This is the same leitmotiv references have done many articles published in the French media and willingly gave the floor to the opposition and his eternal refrain of this Islamization. Jérôme Bastion RFI the idea of "a secular undermined" by these constitutional amendments, frieze trial of intent." The journalist assumes that "the opposition has just perhaps no other" to justify the "deny democratic institutions." He goes on to write: "It is difficult, frankly, to understand how these reforms could jeopardize secularism. It has been assumed that if the influence of the military judges and the public and political life is reduced in the name of democracy, it is a threat to the secular principles of the Turkish Republic. "If the argument of the risk of Islamization by the grip on justice has often been repeated by the opposition, countries and institutions in Europe and the United States, who welcomed the democratization of Turkey, not seem to share these doubts; even if they say they are anxious to see the result of the reforms (Oğuzlu & Özpek, 2008).

2.14 The argument of Islamization Denounced by Sociologists

The argument does not convince Islamization sociologists, who are even exceeded by a population that cannot handle playing on fear. Ferhat Kentel, who teaches sociology at the Bilgi University, sees the referendum results as proof of the inconsistency of the "horror stories". He explained that the arguments playing on paranoia could not be convincing, adding: "the referendum results show that 58% of the population carries a lot more confident view of the future and is not afraid." It describes the concept of propaganda as fact "write stories intended to instill fear face new situations." He denounces the creation of figures of evil, like supernatural creatures pose a threat to society (Ahmed, 2013). "Today the camp fear tried to rewrite these stories but the population has shown that it could be affected by such arguments. Ali Murat Yel for, director of the Department of Sociology at the University of Fatih in Istanbul, lies the risk of Islamization has caused serious damage to the opposition that has lost much of respectability and risk of its voice decline further in the next parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2011 (Kirmanj, 2008).

2.15 The EU welcomes "a step in the Right Direction"

The European Commission has welcomed the approval of the constitutional revision "is a step in the right direction", warning that it would follow closely its implementation and its application in the field. The outcome of the referendum "demonstrates the continued commitment of Turkish citizens to reforms in order to increase their rights and freedoms," said the Commissioner for Enlargement of the European Union, Stefan Füle. It is a step in the right direction, "in Turkey's efforts to fulfil the criteria for membership" in the EU, Füle noted in a statement. "But its impact on the ground will depend on its implementation. A series of implementing legislation will be needed and we will follow their preparation very carefully," said Füle. Brussels sharing "the view of many in Turkey according to which today's vote needs to be followed by other

reforms needed to address the remaining priorities in the field of fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion, "he adds. He also said "agree with those who, through the political spectrum, believe that a new civilian Constitution would provide a solid foundation for the sustainable development of democracy in Turkey" (Cohen, 2010).

2.16 Imam Hatip Schools and Islamisation

Originally, Imam Hatip centres were formed where the magnets of the Republic, but evolved as primary schools and secondary schools to be partially abolished in the mid-90s, after the "post-modern" military coup that ended Erbakan's Islamist government. By then, there were more than 600 colleges Imam Hatip in the country. However, following the rise to power of the AKP, in 2002, have resurfaced these centres and today there are over 450 schools in Turkey Imam Hatip, educating more than 120,000 students. Two of his most notable alumni are Prime Minister Erdogan and the cleric Fethullah Gülen, plus one third of the members of the AKP studied in schools Imam Hatip. While not all-hatipman are related to the Gülen movement, not all centers are Imam Hatip Gülen, the fact is that these schools share model (Jesuit) and ambitions educate poor form while future elites (Alam, 2009).

Thus, programs are full of mathematics, natural sciences, humanities and languages and subjects as "Muslim values" and turbine (modal) occupy a similar to the Catholic religion in the Spanish private schools instead. Turkey is trying to export this model through political means and religious, although both pathways often go hand in hand. In recent months, the Turkish government has taken various initiatives to promote it, committing Angela Merkel to open in Germany, requesting permission to Sarkozy, negotiating with the Ambassador of Pakistan and inviting the Afghan education minister to visit the centres. Farooq Wardak, the Afghan minister said during his visit that the model Imam Hatips is a reference to follow in developing the educational program of the country, adding that "an education system not only has to do with education, but must also be a tool to combat extremism"(Shively, 2008).

On the way out the Gülen religious movement, with more than a thousand schools in over 100 countries, with its missions in Central Asia. "The Gülen movement has only a leader but after a lot of ramifications. We are in contact with them as they seek dialogue with other faiths. I think we should not exaggerate, but be cautious. In fact, Gülen has imitated our system with its educational programs and has schools worldwide. Like us searching for meaning in life. We invite you to cooperate, but they have a lot more people and financial resources than us. The lack of resources is a problem for us, "says Louis Pelâtre, Apostolic Nuncio in Istanbul.

Fethullah Gülen, 68, leads an ascetic life in exile in Pennsylvania, where he controls an international movement with media, schools, universities and financial groups, grandstands used to disseminate an Islamic ethics and the need to recover the presence religious society. Dark Leviathan for some and holy teacher (hodjaefendi) for others, the truth is that Gülen has over 6 million followers worldwide (according to former Turkish Minister of Interior 70% of the country are devoted polícias Gülen). Gülen, known for its audio guides and their poetic tears during sermons, is accused of having a hidden agenda for the Islamization of Turkey and Central Asia, and his advice to "work patiently and keep quiet" are seen by their opponents as mere use taqiya of a religious castling that allows Muslims to hide their true intentions if circumstances so require. Very present in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan, and persecuted in Russia and Uzbekistan, Africa and Latin America, and looking to take the leap to Spain to spread their message of Sufism and Islamic ethics (Türkmen, 2009).

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

3.1 Introduction

For achieving a brilliant success, any individual must have a chain of methods to follow. It is true that this organised methodical programming addresses to the implementation of a plan to solve a problem or care a dilemma. This is the main process which involves organisation, background knowledge, solving critical point, creating a hypotheses and organising data for coming to a conclusion. With the aid of using methods in a research all the problem which the researcher faces can easily be solved. Moreover it is a stimulus that being in a creative intellectual activity, improving a study by connecting with the reality, trying to form the best knowledge, feeding the curiosity and living the happiness of solving a problem make people feel satisfied and reluctant to experience it more.

3.2 Research Strategy

In the process of a research, the main problem is to determine which methods will be used. It should be known that both quantitative and qualitative methods provide valuable information for the researchers. In this regard, important difference is the content of the information and how you intend to use to find the reality of the object of study (Liamputtong, 2009). The method used in this research is qualitative, which is characterized by the use of primary and secondary data. Research strategies are methods that try to increase or deepen our knowledge, enrich the cultural heritage with new discoveries and explanations more accurate facts and phenomena of reality.

3.3 Research Design

The research design is an organized activity in advance to guide the research process plan. This plan is used to clarify (for the researcher himself and others) for avoiding deviations; It is a structured program aiming to answer the research questions and controlling the possible variation of activity plan. A planned activity can yield more than an improvisation; in a case of a construction, for example, if there was not a plan to follow, the workers would be lacking of a working model and would everyone doing their homework in terms of what they think or supposed to do, thereby losing coordination with each other make them unable to use the time efficiently. In this research the situation is similar (Marshall & Rossman, 2010). In the process, designing, programming, taking action and making decisions based on certain predetermined criteria. In general, these designs are made up of the following elements:

- a) Research topic (incorporated within the general area of research).
- b) Objectives of the study (having a clear object which the research based on).
- c) Research Questions (general questions on many aspects).
- d) Programming questions which are relevant to the content.
- e) Address information (newspaper archives, libraries, archives, audio-visual and emails).
- f) Directory of specialists in the field (interviews, forums, panels).
- g) Agenda (tentative stages to the development of the work).
- h) Funding (Marshall & Rossman, 2010).

3.4 Data Collection

Data collection refers to the use of a wide variety of techniques and tools that can be used by the analyst to develop information systems, which may be the interviews, survey, questionnaire, observation, the flowchart and the data dictionary. All these instruments are applied in a particular time, in order to find information that will be useful to an investigation in common(Liamputtong, 2009).In this research both primary and secondary data are collected for analysing the result.

2.4.1 Primary Data

Primary data is the information which is collected for the first time. In addition to the internal information the researcher will need such as test, specific studies, surveys etc. In this research primary data is collected through questionnaire (Liamputtong, 2009).

3.4.2 Secondary Data

It is called secondary data because it is collected through indirect sources(Liamputtong, 2009). The secondary sources of information are books, articles, news, internet, audio and video sources etc. The use of documentation allows the researcher to gain specific informations about the case which they are working on. Allowing you to set a state of affairs which has been written on the subject before and giving clues about what prospects exist in the study, what are the main positions, which have been the main findings so far, etc.

3.5 Data Collection Tool

In this study questionnaire was used as data collection tool. This sample of data collection tool is so common in academia. However, the standards or specifications can be varied according to the questionnaire disciplines and the needs of individual research. In some areas of study such as marketing, economics or anthropology questionnaire is frequently used as research method or analysis. In other words, their role in the field Academics is to collect useful information for the support of an inquiry Formal data requiring review or trends(Marshall & Rossman, 2010).

3.6 Sample

Sampling is essential for the researcher as it is impossible to interview all members of a population due to the issues of time, resources and effort. In this study, a sample of 10 employees i.e. teachers and 20 students of Imam Hatip school is taken.

3.7 Data Analysis

After completing the stages of collection and processing of data, it is the time of the another important phases of research: data analysis. Data analysis is the precedent for the interpretation activity. The interpretation is in terms of the results of the investigation. This activity is for making inferences about the relationships between the various conclusions and recommendations. In this way, the analysis of data is interpretation of the relationships between variables and data that support on the basis of some level of statistical significance. It also establishes a broader meaning of research, i.e., determining the degree of generalization of

research results. In this study, the analysis is the integrating elements of the research process while making methodological decisions. The analytical inference we are making will contribute to where they will redefine our research questions and therefore our study objectives; going to recast our sampling decisions; and defining the techniques of data collection more consistent with the needs of the research process. Adjustments and restatements that will suffer our research process were derived from the recommendations of the analysis process, but the outcome of the critical of what we're doing reflection (Marshall & Rossman, 2010).

3.8 Research Ethics

All definitions set by us and analysed to arrive at a agreement on the concept of research, involving a process to expand the body of knowledge that have, or resolve questions or gaps in such knowledge and that cannot be resolved with the knowledge we possess. But research in education, which is the present case, is not only an act technical; It is primarily the exercise of a responsible act, and from this perspective the research ethics has to be seen as a subset within the moral though generally applied to much more restricted than the general moral problems, since we would be talking an aspect of professional ethics. But ethics in a profession is required to have a correct behaviour. The multiple situations that need to be answered from each profession show that professional ethics is a part of each individual professional act that includes a conflict between the intended effect and the effect which is achieved. Thus, from the point of view of research, an ethical act is exercised responsibly, avoiding injury to people, which sometimes unconsciously performs, by being connected the damage to the methods the researcher uses to achieve its goals. In recent years, the use of different codes ethics and standards of practice for educational research. In most include: the protection of human beings, the investigator states its orientation and values that respects the conditions of privacy, etc. In most of the literature four ethical problems arise fundamental: a) Hide participants the nature of the research or make participate without their knowledge. b) Expose participants to acts that could harm them or decrease their own estimation. c) Invading the privacy of the participants. d) To deprive participants benefits. In all cases opposing the violations of the rights of individuals, based on the principles of respect, fairness and profit optimization; principles are the basis of ethical research in humans (Marshall & Rossman, 2010).

CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The nations are the result of history and it influences the lives of its people to over time. The past does not bind, not force us to be in a way determined, but its influence is obvious to any observer. The Muslim Turkey has a long and proud history. For centuries it was rich and powerful, generated a great empire and above all, was the centre of Islam, the Caliphate, the core from which ran on basic aspects of human life - religion, politics and the right to a community of millions of believers. The Ottoman caliphate fell apart after the First World War I was able to adapt with the times and that led to its destruction. From their ranks, their army indicated the reaction: a despot movement that aimed to reform political institutions and modernizing society. If the Caliphate had collapsed to give back to Western thought and science, the future of Turkey should be built on reason and secularism. It was not an anti-coup Islamic, but clearly aimed at trying to separate the civil and religious spheres that was consistent or not with the teachings of the Prophet cannot elucidate.

The pro-Western modernizer and rotation imposed by General Mustafa Kemal, and then known as "Ataturk" or father of the Turks brought important consequences for his people. The changes were bearing fruit slowly and today the country has achieved an outstanding level of education and welfare. Democracy is a reality because there are citizens able to enforce it. The economy has developed with vigour. The Turks have been open to the world and understand the complexities of international politics. Turkey entered NATO and during these years has played an important role. But his commitment to the West has its limitations. The EU accepted Turkey's application for membership then implies that full incorporation would not take effect i.e. unacceptable behaviour and irresponsible. It has offended a whole people unnecessarily. But leaving a European side ways, it is essential that Turkey has realized that its way to the West has come to an end. An impenetrable wall has risen to them as a result not only of the serious problems that passes European Union, but also to incorporate eighty million Muslims, with a lower level of average income, at a time which openly acknowledged the failure of the integration strategies of Muslim communities; and finally, the need to set limits geographical avoid all Mediterranean and Caucasus states to apply also your income. Has the "no" European irritating been as frustrating as the way it has statement. The champions of openness to the West have lost claim against Islamists. The rotation imposed by Ataturk never permeate the whole society, which remained faithful to the tradition further than politics

Regional and global aspirations of the country are changing the time it has opened a reflection on his past, his identity and pending democratic advances. Turkey is no longer the country that the West knew in his day. The Libyan crisis has again highlighted his support for NATO is limited. Ankara prefers negotiate with Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad before I stop it, and feels comfortable talking to Hamas, Hezbollah and Sudanese President Omar al-Bahir. His prior cordial relations with Israel in the past are in crisis after attack the "Freedom Flotilla" bound for Gaza in May 2010. Turkish are longer desperately knocking on the door of the European Union but follows a policy favourable to their commercial and security interests' multifactor. The ties with Russia are flourishing. Turkish businessmen are implanted in Africa and Latin America. In short, Turkey is now an economic actor important and perhaps exerts an aspiring regional hegemony. The paradox is that, in this way, Turkey has become more like us: globalized, with a liberal and democratic economy. To unravel the Turkish puzzle is necessary to understand how the country sees itself him and the world. During the Cold War and well into the decade of the nineties, the West thought he knew the answer. Turkey-or at least the part Turkey wanted mattered-western part of the club, shunned Islam and kept a safe distance from the Middle East; believed in notions nineteenth century of progress and believed in a strong state its rigid national ideology was a shortcut to modernity. Turkish-Sceptics cared less that the country image of himself. What they saw was an authoritarian, militaristic, too poor, too big, state and harbouring too many Muslims, as well as being too close to the doors of the Fortress Europe. These stereotypes have been wrong. Current Turkey is not a country depleted and introspective on the outskirts of the West, but the centre of their own world, covering the territories of the former Ottoman Empire and beyond, connecting by trade, cross-border investment, culture and relationships interpersonal. In the words of Ibrahim Kalin, foreign policy adviser of the first

Turkey has just started to read the story from a view no longer Eurocentric identify alternatives. But the idea of a change of axis, or the view that political Islam has appropriateness of the foreign policy are not sufficient to explain such a radical turn. A Professor of International Relations at the Imam Hatip argues, Turkey prominence stems from the redistribution of the order regional after the end of the Cold War, 11-S and the 2003 war in Iraq. It is also consequence of globalization, along with close links and integrating with the EU, has brought prosperity and has

helped to strengthen the democratic government. The change in Turkish foreign policy is inseparable from the inner change. From 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has questioned the Almighty before "Deep State" installed in the army and bureaucracy, and has brought the country to the European standards of democracy and human rights. Greater openness also has resulted in having to deal with a difficult past. At present, live a public debate on the experience of Ottoman disintegration, the first decades of the republic, the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980, and war in the Kurdish provinces. Another respondent said, "Compared with 2001, the 2011 Turkey is a country richer, more open, more free, more democratic, more just and more peaceful." In addition, he is considered an inspiration for Arab societies who reject the sclerotic authoritarian regimes.

The Turkish economy has recovered from the crisis with a GDP growth of nine per cent in 2010 and is projected to grow at a rate of four per cent or more over the next decade. Inflation is around historic lows; the Per capita GDP has increased to \$ 14,243 in 2010 from 6,000 a decade ago, and its exports are becoming more sophisticated. The Turkish economy is the 16th in the world and the sixth in Europe. The country is a proud member of the G.20 and full of ambition and dynamism. Old and new dilemmas However, Turkish society is facing painful and divisive dilemmas. The universe of Turkish political and social debate is infinite, as testimony to the progress democratic achieved since the late nineties. Today it is possible to identify three key aspects of this discussion, each of which depends on largely perceptions of what is happening inside the country, in Europe and in the world general. First, can the new Turkey confront its internal diversity, ease historical tensions and heal deep wounds? Journalist Mustafa Akyol talks "Many nations under God" conservative AKP supporters, lay that once felt in possession of the State but have now begun to

However, rethinking fundamental issues such as concept of nation, citizenship and the relationship between state and religion is slope. If the first challenge is met, the second is fairly new. It is a reflection the fact that, although Turkey has replaced the tutelage of the military system and bureaucratic for a more advanced democracy, the AKP has spent a decade in a leader: Turkey Moves to consolidate the achievements democratic or is threatened by populism or even the majority authoritarianism, this time with a socially conservative hue? If in the years ninety nightmare was a secular elites that would lead towards Islamization second Iran, today, some of the "modern concerned," which looked favourably to the AKP, are afraid of something happening like it happened with Vladimir Putin's Russia. With a glass of raki ahead lash against Erdogan appetite for power, lack of checks and balances and the stress to which they are subjected critics media and civil society. The authorities are concerned about the sustainability of democratic progress, not sparing Altinay criticism of the EU, whose reservations about accepting Turkey have increased AKP's authoritarian temptation. His other goals are the liberals for their "easy partnerships with all the stakeholders whose purpose is to push the military coming back." According to some respondents, globalization has nurtured a vision of "multiple modernises" that replaced "the notion Classical modernization, bounded by Europe "to allow and force Turkey to "Reinvent" drawing on his past and rejecting the old polarity between East and West. The result is a new policy commitments, Suat Kiniklioglu as a member of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs of the AKP, is a conversion of the neighbouring enemies into friends and partners. Now capitalism has triumphed over the minds siege that permeated the political culture of Turkey, although the battle it's not over yet. But this comes at a time when relations with the EU and almost flat, as respondents believe Atila Eralp Zerrin Torun and the current deadlock in negotiations on accession can become a permanent lock.

The Turks are losing faith that Turkey will ever enter the EU. This makes the question arise whether the policy of "integration in various regions" I could not alienate by definition, or even intentionally to Turkey Union. And yet, the ambition to stand on its own may not be reward. Experts warn that, paradoxically, the Turkish policy in the Middle East has led to greatly intensify the persistence of the status quo authoritative within the region. With the "Arab Spring", the negative of Muammar al Gaddafi to relinquish power peacefully in Libya and the inability to Ankara prevent the Syrian regime responds to the pro-democracy protests with bullets Turkey could be losing influence instead of giving way to a path of progress in the Middle East and North Africa. Making Europe again Maybe the EU is increasingly absent from public debates in Turkey but it has not entirely lost its importance. Like it or not, the EU and Turkey, as one respondent said, trapped in a Catholic marriage: despite all disappointments, bad blood and infidelity, are designed to stay together. The Bonding, in fact plays an important role in each of the three sides of the debate. In terms of identity politics, the EU has demonstrated its ability to overcome differences with Turkish society for the sake of a common purpose. Through 2006 and 2007, Brussels provided the political glue that held the unit in a multi-party coalition trying to push through a transition from under military and bureaucratic tutelage to a democracy that deserved the name.

The prospect of future of Islamisation and the Kemalists ("moderate") democratic, opposed to the "deep state" liberals, Kurds, entrepreneurs, ethnic and religious minorities and Muslim middle class newly invested with power by the AKP. It is true that the policy conditionality became a divisive force history as it unfolded. Then produced a backlash, led by radical Islamist army nationalist-minded judges, the CHP (Republican People's Party, then headed by Deniz Baykal) and xenophobes on the right and the left (which resisted the dismantling of the old regime under the banner of stars the EU). But the coalition in favour of the EU as a promise kept adherence was credible. Moreover, democratization within the country is anchored in the EU. Even those who claim that Turkey has developed enough internal momentum during the last decade, would not dare to say that the prospect of membership revitalized not affect the rate and quality of the democratization process. The Union also has the potential to allay the fears of the laity regarding the power of AKP is out of control; moderate political polarization while writes a new Constitution; defend the rights of minorities; contribute to the CHP transformation into a centre-left democratic and a force credible opposition; and make the policy more dependent Kurdish powers civilians. The EU and Turkey need each other also in foreign policy. Erdoğ and Torun are calling for a strategic partnership in parallel negotiations for accession. Respondent argues that Ankara and Brussels act together on a shared-no-neighbourhood played in an era of change transcendental.

To make the functions interdependence, the Islamisation needs to cooperate with the new Turkey. Fear, confusion and uncertainty The Second Republic died, but the Third Republic unborn. There are many fears, confusion and uncertainty, so that you cannot wait what Turkey thinks that today is the same within a month. But several things are evident. Above all, Turkey is confident and optimistic, it that makes no West at a time when the West is pessimistic. This Optimism is explained largely by economic growth and profile population. Recent successes of Turkish foreign policy are also crucial for trust. Given the current state of excitement, the country is aware of the structural vulnerability of the situation has to underestimate others, especially the Islamisation and risks overactive load. However, Turkey is vulnerable in three ways. First, it is trapped between high-tech economies of Europe and the low-wage economies of Asia. At the moment, only a massive influx of foreign investment can ensure continued growth. But since 2007, the AKP government has lost some of its reformist fervour. The stagnation of reforms

could cause an economic crisis that would have a profound effect on the way the Turks see the world and their place in it. Second, although since 2007 the Turkish foreign policy has been instrumental in shaping the new identity and confidence of the regime, in the context of changes in the Middle East and North Africa, there is much more at stake. Third, the increasing polarization of society could lead to a neutral or even political authoritarianism.

Turkey is polarized between "Modern worried" and most Erdogan. Today, the real political risk for Turkish democracy is not Islamization but putinización. No doubt that the AKP was the major democratizing force of Turkey, but it's social, political and institutional constraints, the AKP regime could become an uncompromising majoritarian democracy, similar to the Russian model. For now, the attempt by the AKP proved to be seen with control judiciary and the media in the country. The EU is not the factor that ensures the future of democracy in Third Republic. One of the many reasons is that, after the army lost its power to overthrow legitimate governments, the EU lost its political importance for the AKP. Meanwhile, the secular opposition still resented the Union and does not know how use in their attempts to prevent the AKP is done with absolute control. The double set of the EU has created a feeling of distrust. While polls continue to show a considerable degree of support Turkish membership, support for the EU is conditioned by affiliation partisan. If the AKP decided to change his position towards the EU, the figures current change radically. The logic of the electoral cycle indicates that Erdogan does not do anything to achieve integration until 2015. For him, a more uncompromising stance respect to the EU is the only way to conquer part of the MHP vote (Game Nationalist Turkish) and, thus, consolidating his regime. Currently, the EU is not the main strategic objective of government policy, but rather its political insurance. Thus, the status quo seems assured. However, the EU could have a second chance. The question is whether it will able to take it as presented. Specifically, there may be a new integration opportunity if Turkey is facing a crisis and recovers Union confidence. Polls show a strong positive correlation between support for the EU and the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey.

For now, the argument Official says EU distance has helped Turkey to recover quickly from the global economic crisis. Finally, Turkish foreign policy has broad support and is considered a success. But while Turkey may end up being the most benefit from the changes in the Middle East, and is, in a paradox, the most affected. The consequence of the Arab revolutions is that Turkey's policy of "zero problems with neighbours "cannot be maintained. The latitude of Turkey has reduced. At the same time, however, have real advantages: a good knowledge of the region; the popularity of its culture; trade relations active; and familiarity with all stakeholders. Turkey will seek to mediate transitions (especially in Egypt) while maintaining a discreet background. Try to continue being a non-Western power and reject large joint initiatives with the West. In summary, the perspective is that of a more independent, not less foreign policy.

This discussion analysed that Good have been saved the Turks by a margin of one vote over eleven; the Constitutional Court has decided not to ban the Justice and Development Party, currently in power with 47% of the vote. Injustice to justify such nonsense was allegedly Justice and Development is an Islamic fundamentalist organization that conspires to abolish secularism of the republic of Turkey. It is as if in Spain a constitutional court formed by a hypothetical most more or less favourable to the PP judges would discuss seriously put completely outside the law claiming that the PSOE does not guarantee the unity of the country or something. What meant the Turkish Constitutional Court? The Ottoman Turks are a non-Arab people forged the last of the great Islamic empires. By 1500 administration had a highly structured, highly developed secular law, a fully professional army and the most advanced technology of its time. However, by 1700 and suffered an undeniable decline. The sultanate survived two centuries, but it was missing an

almost all provinces until a wrong decision-ally with Germany during the First World War led to the final disaster. From the ashes of that defeat which remerged phoenix modern secular Republic of Turkey. The dominant Islam among the Turks had always been Hanafism, one of the four orthodox schools of Sunni Islam, which was characterized as the most secular and liberal of all. So, after two centuries of Westernizing reforms, the secular nature of the new government was not such a radical transformation as it may seem. Moreover, Turkey as well as frequent as lived a dangerous political paradox of modernity is invoked to justify a policy that is intended to serve the common good, but in practice is limited to providing the ideological alibi of a repressive and corrupt system that denies effective rights of the whole population while favouring a small elite. Nevertheless, the alleged Islamisation of Turkey is but a myth. The combination of native tradition and nationalism influence reaffirms the Hanafi, the exact opposite of fundamentalist currents arising between Arabs and Iranians, currently referred to as historical enemies of the Turkish people. Turkey is a developed and industrialized democracy. There are social and political spaces where I could grow an archaic ideology and fundamentalism. The fundamentalism of course the current government is not more than the typical social conservatism of certain middle classes who defend the usual values of hard work, seriousness, modesty, thrift, sobriety and stability. Are social groups that in recent decades have been marginalized by the military dictatorship and civilian friends, some of whom managed to get rich quickly through corruption and cronyism? Despite some controversial decisions, such as allowing female head scarves in universities, the real reason for judicial attacks present government is the desire to restore military control over the civil power, instituted after the 1980 coup. Soon little the civil power has succeeded in eliminating the veto power that the military were attributed to the civil authorities. The electoral victory of the Justice and Development is the culmination of this process. Hence has aroused this desperate manoeuvre to turn back the clock, failed by their hype.

Turkey, the cradle of early Christianity, where it was called Christians for the first time disciples (Antioch), land of Noah, Abraham, Paul, from Mount Ararat, Ephesus, Galatia and the seven churches of Revelation among others, a population of 72 million, of which less than 2% profess the Christian faith, is the expectation of tomorrow's elections Sunday, which will determine the future of the ruling party (AKP) and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After corruption scandals where light conversations between Prime Minister Erdogan and his cabinet members came, promoting corruption and pressure to the press, were, according to many, the main reason why access to the portal is blocked Twitter and was conducted "administrative measures" against the YouTube site. The metropolis of Istanbul with over 15 million inhabitants, where Erdogan began his political career as mayor of the same twenty years, will play a decisive role in elections this Sunday. If the AKP, Erdogan's political party, you lose this key city, would be a serious blow to the political power of the Prime Minister. Recent allegations of corruption have severely beaten the credibility of President Erdogan. Erdogan says that this conspiracy orchestrated by this "Gulen Movement" of Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen, who lives in U.S. Support long the AKP "Gulen Movement" but now with this fighting game. Erdogan has accused followers of Gulen raising rumours of corruption in his government and control thousands of police, judges and trial lawyers supporters of Gulen Movement. Erdogan's followers believe that the decision to block these web portals is necessary to protect the state while critics argue that Erdogan has launched a frontal attack on democracy and their actions are a sign of increased authoritarian mandate. Turkey where only 2% of the population are Christians, must be a country that should be in our prayers, the Nationalist government of Erdogan with a clear Islamist agenda, has taken measures to cut the little freedoms that exist in this country.

Something that makes many think of is that the support the "Gülen Movement" gave the AKP in the past supported the Islamic agenda of the Erdogan government. This powerful movement occurs outside of Turkey as a movement of "acceptance and ecumenical dialogue" count in the U.S. with numerous institutes that promote this dialogue and with about 140 free secondary schools where their principles are encouraged. The future for this country that was the cradle of Christianity is uncertain and even more for the Christian minority as the two greatest forces of influence in the country, the ruling AKP and the "Gülen Movement" seeking a Turkey that lives according to faith Islamic. Therefore contains some views from our modern perspective that have become out-dated. Such is the case of praise Erdogan and his otánica Turkey as a potential ally in the Eurasian-Islamic project. As we all know, not long after the Turkish prime minister would "remove the mask" and prove to be a faithful servant of international Zionism (hypocritically says fight) through its bellicose anti-Syrian bravado and logistical and weapons support explicit hordes terrorist and mercenary trying for almost two years, to sink into chaos Syrian national-popular, this itself (along with Iran and Hezbollah) last bastion of militant anti-Zionism and anti-heroic firm and imperialism throughout region.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Conclusion

It would be a huge mistake to exclude the Islamic countries of the prospect of a gradual and organic integration in the Eurasian Empire, if the objective is containment of western global influence. Concepts like "Festung Europa" Fortress Europe, they are doomed to fail as any concept of an opposite Europe to Russia. In both cases, only the Tel Aviv-London-Washington axis triumph with its policy of "divide and conquer" arrogant. It is irrefutable that similar concepts of European isolation on behalf of a romantic à la Reconquista 1492 and 1683 still linger in the minds of some members of the "new right" identity. The propagandists of the mutilation of prospects, driven by an irrational Islamophobia, are "crossed Uncle Sam" or "ideological Likud infantry." That said the possibility of a settlement with the Islamic world should be explored. Who can cooperate? With the corrupt regimes that are linked to Washington? Of course not! The alternative must be compatible in terms of both ideological and organizational structure to the model of Reich or Imperium, with its hierarchical structure, but autonomous, based on respect for tradition and openness to the future.

In fact, the Caliphate would be the exact counterpart of the Reich and we would suggest see the Eurasia-Islam project primarily as unit Imperium (Roman and Christian), Reich (German) Third Rome (Russian) and Caliphate (Arab and Muslim). Just as Reich has seen a vast difference in concepts and content, there are right now - and perhaps forever - a struggle between the correct interpretation and application of the Caliphate, mainly in and between so-called Islamist movements. Admittedly, who is friend and who is the enemy - from a traditional Islamic view, and also from a European point of view. The enemy is clearly the Wahhabi Islam has always been an ally of the Atlanticist and in conflict with tradition and the plurality of Islam. The question of the ally may not be as easy to solve as the differences between the branches of the Arabic, Persian and Turkish Islamic peoples. Any implementation of a strategy of imperialist division is counterproductive to long-term project for Eurasia. The Islamic view of the caliphate should be supranational, like that of the Imperium. So, for us, the heart of the idea is eurasiatista peaceful coexistence of European Empire Islamic caliphate on the basis of anti-imperialism and independence. Also links with China, India and Japan are welcome - and are in fact economically solidifying - but not as urgent as reconcile Europe with its neighbours. The important link

between Europe and Islamic Turkey living space is Turkey is also a country where interesting developments are taking shape. It seems that Turkey develop a stable equilibrium with its Arab neighbours and Iran - against the destructive policies of the U.S., Israel and, on their behalf, the Kurds. The European support for the new policy and its moderate Islamist Erdogan is an urgent necessity, any failure in this sense by the EU could prove disastrous for European interests. Relations between the two former rivals Turkey and Russia are improving, while on the other side you can speak of a Moscow-Tehran axis, which remains the goal of U.S. aggression and Israel under the guise of "nuclear threat." The rising tide of anti-Turkish agitation by parties like the CDU Atlanticist and FPÖ 4 with the support of the media in the hands of the Springer group, is the biggest obstacle to the possibility of replacing the old Washington-Ankara-axis Tel Aviv, which has long prevented Eurasian integration, a Paris-Berlin-Ankara-Tehran axis. Now, what are the prospects for the spread of Eurasian idea to a Weltanschauung level 5, and not just in economic terms and in central Europe? There is a big difference between the maturation of the situation itself and the consciousness of the situation for themselves, due to the large amount of money from the mentally inert German right Atlanticist circles already, and therefore, the prospects even influence discourse in this way are terrible. The self-declared "New Right" or "intellectual right" is not really much more than a small group for lobbyistico strip right Christian Democratic neo-liberals, or in the case of Austria German nationalists (who simply refuse the twentieth century and still live in the nineteenth), the Freedom Party, whose heroes Mölzer Andreas Martin Hohmann or emanate the discreet charm of the 50s, the "golden age" of this type of anti-conservatism with his pompous and crusades against the Islamic veil, unable to envision more hope. Therefore, the small core of the Eurasian forefront Central Eurasia must reach new shores, in order to find new ideas of eternal tradition, and thus become the first in the morning. Eurasia-Islam, the new balance, is what we should and can build!

5.2 Recommendation

It is true, of course that the United States is the world power as such, and good relations with it are most important to long term. On the other hand, however, the Turkish government will not be able to successfully negotiate reforms without at least a basic agreement with national Islamic voters, as well as with international partners Islamists, mainly Saudi Arabia. Continually neglects the main loyalty AKP is due to its orthodox version of Islam, its good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and an extremely important project linked the two: an independent Turkish-Islamic settlement in Germany and at least 10 million Turks willing to emigrate over the next decade. Apart from the so-called reforms, which have not been very convincing, and the financial situation of Turkey still difficult upcoming accession talks should be addressed carefully. The public of the EU in general and German in particular have quite sensitive with respect to the credibility of the Turkish officials.

In terms of its appearance in danger of Turkish secularism, one may wonder actually how far this country has been secularized together. Doubts are twofold: national ethnic Turks are first. There may be room for negotiation on Islamic issues, but there is in regard to the dominant ethnic Turkish position. The connection between state and religion has always been very close, even along the Kemalist period. Only recently, Erdogan - an Islamist - stressed that "persecute the Kurds to Argentina", to continue dreaming of their own state. In addition, the Turkish government is keeping specialty topics within a traditional oligarchy of political parties, corporations, real estate tycoons, powerful bureaucrats and representatives of Islam. To date, the dome of equal interest has simply changed Kemalists Islamists without compromising the oligarchic agreement. Currently, secularism and democratic institutions in the Western sense

certainly [continue] to be very weak. Recently, EU officials have begun to assess the situation beyond their horizon "benefits for all" usual, not to mention the current German government, which is carrying out a policy frankly, if not prominently, Islamist.

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