GIRNE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Institute of Social Science

THE IMPACT OF THREAT PERCEPTIONS ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: 1945-1960

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Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Master Degree
In
Department of International Relations

Supervisor

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Enver GULSEVEN

Kyrenia
2015

To my Family...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank to Dr. Enver GULSEVEN for everthing he has done for me during my graduate studies at Girne American University. His support and vision encouraged me to not only reach my goals but also to believe in myself again.

I would also like to thank all of the members of the commitee for the experience they provided me in being a member of the academy. Thanks to you, I learned how to create, produce, analyze and even to “think”, to build a genuine work. I studied harder and more seriously keeping in mind that “True friends tell the painful truth unsparingly”.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their love.

ABSTRACT

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2014

Turkish foreign policy studies have seen various attempts at explaining the dependency and permanency of Turkey on the Western states and Western civilization. Different scholars have emphasized the effect of the perceptions on security and foreign policy decisions. Since the Peloponnesian war, threat assessment and the need to balance against or ally with a threatening power were leading subjects of history and policy. However these theories were actually at the core of alliances, the balanc of power and of war. (Jervis, R. 2006, 1)

In this study, I discuss and analyse the relations between the threat perceptions and foreign policy of Turkey, examining the significant evidence, begining with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century until today but especially, the period after World War II to 1960, when Turkish western-style modernization and instituionalism reached its climax, leading Turkey to a dead end, in terms of foreign and security policy. The unidimensional security policy is a very complex topic which cannot be explained by merely the terms "permanent Soviet threat" or "the interests of the elites", however, the foreign policy legacy of Ataturk's vision and principles (Western Model Nation-State Establishment, Peace at Home Peace in the World, Modern Civilization Level) and the distinctive features of the Turkish liberation war, geographical position and the political insecurity at an international level (the numbers of the boundries, the Straits, the treaty of Sevr syndrome and the Lausanne as a red line,) provided a political path and framework, bringing economic necessities that can be an explanatory formulation of the process Turkey have been in.

The subject of the thesis is the threat perceptions and the affects of the perceptions on the foreign policy of Turkey. I tried to constitute the following chapters by taking neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism to link the philosophical perspective and the subject. The advantages and disadvantages of these theories are given for explaining foreign policy and security perspectives of the states.

After the assembly of sufficient data for the study, I used cases to analyze the subject more easily and effectively, which are divided into two theoretical and empirical codes. I classified them according to their content and arranged them appropriately within the paper, therefore, the codification took time and effort; this however, forced me to study in order. I also used newspapers as much as possible to show the transition of Turkish threat perceptions and the attitudes towards the issues of both the decision makers (government, bureaucracy, political parties) and public opinion. In almost all of the chapters, parallel to the topic and the argument I transtlated the headlines and quoted from the newspapers giving the certain dates and details important for the thesis.

The characteristics of the subject are contemporary due to the effects of traditional diplomacy and the consequences, which are still on the table for Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy since it is a comparatively more experienced member state of NATO and a potential member of the EU.

The dissolution of the Soveit Union, the changing atmosphere of the international community in the new globalized world affected Turkey's foreign policies. To observe the Turkish threat perceptions and foreign policy in a complete process, Ozal's and AKP's period are also examined to find the current traces of Turkish unidimensional security perceptions.

Keywords: Foreign policy, Threat perceptionss, NATO, EU, Cyprus Issue, Cuban Crisis, Westernization, Modernization, Neoliberalism, Realism, Security, Constructvism, Unidimensional security policies, Europenization, Ozal, AKP

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ABBRIVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

BTO	Brussels Treaty of Organizations
DP	Democrat Party
PRP	People's Republican Party
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
WEU	Western European Union
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II
U.S.	The United States
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialists Republics

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

(A) METHODOLOGY

1.1. THE SUBJECT OF THE THESIS

The subject of the thesis is the threat perceptions and the effects of the perceptions on Turkish foreign policy. Beginning with the dissolution period of the Ottoman Emprire, decision makers showed a tendency towards the acknowledgement that the West was superior in almost every field. Having suffered so many bitter defeats and lessons learned on the battlefield, the leaders considered the importance of taking caution of a possible breakdown of the mighty empire. This situation led them to choose a Western-style path to modernization, followed by reformation, first in the military and then by establishing political and economical institutions. Acutally this choice was also mandated by the Western states to impose on the Ottomans the capitalist, free market basic grounds supported by the bilateral and multilateral agreements binding and shaping the traditional and Islamic domestic law. The transition of the social, political and economical institiutions of the Ottoman Empire starting from the 18th century are overviewed to give the reader the significant points of the (ongoing) Turkish modernization, westernization and foreign policy decision-making process.

I observed and found supporting evidence by reviewing the significant examples of Turkish foreign policy to support the thesis. The Ottoman Empire was perceived as the "Eastern Question" by the West, which caused many wars for survival and consequences for the Empire. The intense diplomatic and reformist approaches for survival of the Empire are reflected as pragmatic transitions of the threat perceptions leading to changing sides and developing relations with its rivals. In the historical background component explaining the process, significant historical evidence and issues were chosen intentionally to show the instinct for survival and the pragmatic diplomacy planted in the roots of Turkish diplomacy by the Ottoman Empire. There had been some chronic foreign policy and security issues of the Ottomans shaped by the interests of the great powers of the time, which made the Ottoman territory a permanent battlefield until its dissolution and the founding of the Turkish Republic.

Instead of a detailed domestic historical overview, I have discussed the principles of Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy perspective cultivated by the succeeding politicians and decision makers of the Republic. By the settlement of many chronic economical and polical issues, the treaty of Lausanne was considered as a fresh start and also a red line for all the

succeeding leaders, who also suffered from the liberation war and faced the days of struggle together. Although the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne settled many issues, I chose to analyze some of the unsettled issues of Lausanne to demonstrate Mustafa Kemal's profound perspective of foreign policy by the specific diplomatic principles and precautions he developed and the diplomatic efforts to secure the new Republic by the help of regional pacts.

The loss of Mustafa Kemal's impact on foreign policy is discussed by questioning the advantages and disadvantages of the neutral position developed by the successors and the strategic attitudes of Turkey throughout the war are debated to determine the certain period when Turkey, as a soverign state, commited her threat perceptions intitiative to a Western perspective. An overview of the crucial events and only crucial data that can support thesis are exmanied. The Transition of Turkey and its orientation to "two bloc international community" and the mentality are discussed to determine the background of the uni-dimensional foreign policy strengthened by the membership of NATO, The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid and the attempts of membership of EEC.

Most students of international relations are aware of the fact that Turkey has been part of the European and Western world, however, there is much evidence that Turkey was confronted during especillay Cold War, which led Turkey to question its security-based foreign policy and to also manufacture anti-american and anti-western public opinion. In this sense, the question arises of "Why Turkey couldn't change her perceptions in spite of the existence of these questions and suspicions about the West." Pursuit of the answer to that question by the examination of the empirical evidence in the history of Turkish foreign policy leads us to the argument's basic question. Can Turkey change its threat perceptions?

The questioning process characterized by the survival instincts of the legacy of Turkish diplomacy stemming from the Treaty of Sevr (See Sevr Syndrome-Siege mentality section) causing a syndrome identified as "Sevr Syndrome'' in the literature and the doctrine. The traces of the efforts to change the threat perceptions of Turkey are sought and effects of these attempts and how they were perceieved by the West questioned to arrive at the reasons for Turkey's "dead end alley" in terms of its diplomatic preferences. The Cuban missile crisis and the intervention of Turkey in Cyprus are examined primarily to show strategic and even tactical consequences of Turkey's threat perceptions and its costs. Perceiving the same threats with the West had cost such that the Soveit Union perceived Turkey as a threat, which made Turkish security plans vulnerable against any kind of incoherence in relations with the West, which was also used as a bargaining chip by the West during and after the World War II.

The characteristics of the subject are contemporary because traditional diplomacy's effect and its consequences are still on the table for Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy since it is a comparatively more experienced member of NATO and still a candidate for membership in the EU. The dissolution of the Soveit Union, the changing atmosphere of the international community in the new globalized world affected Turkey's foreign policies. In order to observe Turkish threat perceptions and foreign policy in a complete process, Ozal's and AKP's period are also examined to find the current traces of Turkish unidimensional security perceptions.

1.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THESIS

''We are our choices.''

Jean-Paul Sartre

Why is the subject of this thesis, the threat perceptions and the effects of the perceptions on the foreign policy of Turkey, important?

First, the thesis is not a foreign policy proposal for Turkey but making clear the unidimensional threat perspective of Turkey by explaining some of the significant events of recent history. There are many history and policy studies exmaning the subjects with traditional elements of the foreign policy, which are well known by most. In this paper, I tried to determine the consequences derived from the periodic international conditions that Turkey undertook. In order to systematize the framework, I overviewed the important foreign policy issues and showed preference to the exceptional ones that resulted from the comprehension of traditonal foreign policies' dead ends.

The strategic choices made by the decision makers of Turkey, characterized by the traditional diplomatic posture of Turkey and those of the Ottoman decision makers, bureaucratic traditions and determinations, founding and official ideology of the Turkish Republic establishing new institutions and static political elements are primarily discussed. These reasons establishing the traditional decision-making model and path-dependency for Turkey left no realistic and applicable policy for Turkey. Instead of questioning the reasons for not choosing other alternatives, I discuss the issues and the methods that Turkey developed to settle and conclude that Turkey can't change its threat perceptions because of these institutional reasons that were necessary to establish to survive and progress through its foreign policy history.

Although the states generally don't change their threat perceptionss spontaneously, in some cases the decision makers stop and question the existence of any other alternative that can settle the diplomatic issue they confront. Most of the time they realize that it is too late to change the path and orientate.

The importance of the thesis and its humble addition to the literature comes from the assessment that Turkey's decision makers and even the public perceptions can't change even when necessary. It is a fact that every state must alter its perceptions and policies especially in situations such as conflict or incoherence of the interests with an ally. This study shows the

importance of strategic security policies, threat perceptions and material institutions built on them, which develop a static posture for Turkey leaving no other alternatives when needed.

In this study the Western-generated and originated institutionalization and its outcomes [Western identity and dependency] show that states cannot change or alternate what these institutions impose even when they are disappointed or left with no other choice. For instance, the Cuban (Jupiter) missile crisis, which had made Turkey grow suspicious about the safety of the membership of NATO and alignment. Despite having had these suspicions, Turkey couldn't change its threat perceptions or take any alternative strategic step because of the institutions that shaped its security perspective in the first place and forced it to take a position, metaphorically, in a hierarchical international structure. Even the changing executive power of the state couldn't intiate another route but merely question the situation.

In short, the study discusses the decision-making models in foreign policy by taking Turkish foreign policy issues and approaches developed by the decision makers of Turkey. It might be also a starting point for the research into the interdependency of Turkey and the West, the identity issues and questioning of the Western-originated modernizatation model.

1.3. THE ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS

The argument of the thesis is that Turkey cannot change its threat perceptions directly or its foreign foreign policy axis because of the process/progress it has been part of over the centuries. The reformation movement beginning especially in the 18th century shows that Turkey has been a part of Europe, both as an affecting and an affected figure in every field.

As discussed in reasonable order of the chapters and titles, by means of the empirical evidences as they occurred in Turkish foreign policy history, it shows evidence of some typical methods and strategies according to the positions. This is true especially after its loss of influence over the states far from the capital and the revolts against central authority. The balance of power and application of integrating ideologies were seen as savior diplomatic methods. Considering the corruption in the traditional institutions, which weren't enough to protect such a vast territory, it was high time to establish and implement survival reforms.

Choice for an individual means to give up all the others one would have. It is, indeed a change in perceptions. Turkish decision makers' perceptions have had a very heavy cost for Turkey. Particularly after WWII, it is understandable that Turkey made its choice in international area. Except for several significant issues (the Cyprus issue, PKK and the Cuban missile crisis), Turkey has always been instinctively part of the West, from which there has been no way back. When we consider the multi-faceted international relations after the Cold War, we might easily think that Turkey has many choices by having so many different kinds of allies in economy, politics and the military. In this study I show that Turkey's choice, during the post-war period was already made. This situation still makes Turkey feel legally obligated to be on the West's side due to the EU process and NATO. The argument is that Turkey can't change her threat perceptions independently from the West. The study aims to find some of the reasons of "Why Turkey can't change her threat perceptions independently from the West".

1.4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study of the threat perceptions and its impact on Turkey's western-based foreign policy process led me to question that how I could explain the subject effectively. I wanted to clarify how methodology literature has been studied and tried to get an idea from general approaches for studying, especially the social sciences. Keeping the depth of the subject in mind, in this chapter I will discuss the types of research methods and designs to present how I decided to study the subject and the thesis derived from it.

The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is often framed in terms of using words (qualitative) rather than numbers (quantitative), or using closed-ended questions (quantitative hypotheses) rather than open-ended questions (qualitative interview questions) (Cresswell, 2003, 3). Due to the content of the subject chosen, which needs to be researched and examined through the foreign policy of Turkey by reviewing comparatively remarkable cases in Turkish foreign policy history, qualitative design seemed more appropriate for the thesis at first examination. Before making the final decision to select the design differences, they should be understood clearly.

According to Cresswell's definition (Cresswell, 2003, 5), a qualitative research method should focus on a social or humanitarian problem, leading to a research process involving questions and procedures on which the researcher has a significant role in refernce to the meaning of data. I match the design in my mind with this definition, begining with the subject:

1. Threat perceptions and the foreign policy are social problems

2. The data I will collect to shape the design will be interpreted by my worldview.

These variables, in turn, can be measured, typically on instruments, so that numbered data can be analyzed using statistical procedures (Cresswell, 2003, 5). Instead of coping with the variables and the relations and analyzing them by using statistical procedures, I will follow what qualitative research design requires.

After detecting the differences in terms of terminology and methods between quantitative and qualitative research, the question arises:

"How can the choosen subject be designed best to present?"

Creswell answers this question by putting two components in each definition. Those are the approach to research involving philosophical assumptions as well as distinct methods or procedures. In any research, linking research subject and philosophical traditions or schools

of thought helps to determine the researcher's theoretical framework. I tried to constitute this in the following chapter by taking in neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism. The advantages and disadvantages of these theories in explaining the foreign policy and the security perspectives of the states are explained. Since the subject is the foreign policy of Turkey based on security concerns, I discussed the advantages and the disadvantages of these theories for the decision makers of Turkey in the periods chosen for the argument.

The cost of the constricted time frame in writing a thesis without consideration of the importance of the design is a waste of time and effort, as in the example of an apartment without an architect's plan, which is unthinkable to most. For implementation of this idea in a social science study, the researcher needs a proposal showing the philosophical worldview proposed in the study, a definition of basic considerations of that worldview and how the worldview shaped their approach to research. (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2000, 98) There should also be four topics conveying these parameters in a proposal: the definitions, the delimitations, the limitations, and the significance of the study (Cresswell, 2003, 6). All of these factors are taken into consideration starting from the beginning of the draft writing phase of the proposal.

There are broader instructions for the elements of the design however, the criteria for selection of a research design are more important in this chapter. Since there is little research on the concept of foreign policy analyses and the impact of threat perceptions in the manner I chose to do, the study merits a qualitative approach. Qualitative research seemed more appropriate for the thesis to show the important variables to be examined (Cresswell, 2003, 18).

I preferred to give place to the definitions of the parameters of the study to limit the scope of the study, which has its own terminology. Threat, perceptions, detterrence and the models using these parameters are taken in consideration in the theoretical chapter of the thesis. I also tried to ensure that the study consisted particularlyof the definitions, title of the study (see "Subject of the Thesis") purpose statement, theory-base of the study (see "The Theoritical Background of Threat Perception" section) and methods section (In this section, I try to present the design of the thesis) to add precision to the study. Especially when other subjects are relatively explained under the chapters I defined the terms or the historic cases when they first appear, (see "The Arguement of the Thesis" section) so the reader might understand the subject by reading the background of the case briefly.

In qualitative studies, the theoretical lens or perspective is increasingly used to guide the study and raise the supportive questions relevant to the argument (Cresswell, 2003, 148).

In this study, I preferred to build the chapters on questions seeking proof to support the thesis. The questions derived from the most significant of the historic, political, economical and military dimensions of its foreign policy in the time between the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, are supported by the theoretical framework in the introduction. Thus, by the end of each chapter, I present more arguments supporting the fundamental argument by analyzing a period, reform process or diplomatic steps in terms of policy, economy or military aiming to show the perspective of the decision makers most strongly affecting the evidence. The perceptions surely dependently change from time to time, according to the structural elements of the state, thus every period is taken in hand by considering the conditions at the time.

In this study, I use a case study method as qualitative strategy of inquiry by reviewing the foreign policy of Turkish Republic, starting from the dissolution period (particularly the reformation period) of the Ottoman Empire to the current time, searching the clues for support of the thesis that Turkey cannot change its threat perceptions directly or its foreign policy axis because of the institutional structure based on Western-generated international law, balance diplomacy tradition which generally, essentially and easily distracted by the Western Bloc, economic dependency deriving from the international and bilateral treaties with the developed and comparatively more industrialized states, Western-based reforms and steps taken especially and purposefully during the 1950-1960 period when the Democrat Party was in power. The membership in NATO and the membership applications to the European Economic Community are two main empirical evidences used to support the thesis. The effect of these significant events during that period shed light on the security-based policies derived from threat perceptions. Political priorities shaped by the security concern-rooted structural dependence on the Western Bloc, starting from the end of the World War II and especially during this period when the two blocs were divided ideologically, representing the West and the East. Since Turkey gained her legitimacy by signing the treaty of Lausanne with the Allies under the Western-originated international law, it may be said that the new Turkish Republic owes its sovereignty and status quo to this treaty. The foundation and reform process of Turkey are good examples for the interdependent relations of sovereign states gaining legitimacy under the international law, which is also constituted by the actions of the states. The institutions and significant individuals who led the country before and after this period are also mentioned to examine their roles, such as some of the reformist Sultans, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar.

The role and the contribution of the study is a fullfilment of the abscence of studies on this period, which has so far not been observed with this perspective. Can Turkey change its threat perceptions? What are the costs, if any, of membership in NATO and the attempts to be a member of EEC? Not being able to change the perceptions is the first and most remarkable cost. The answers to the questions are surely relative, yet by reviewing the empirical evidences and the processes, different and perhaps more satisfactory and reasonable answers leading to new deeper questions can be found.

Since the study is based on a historic and diplomatic period, data collection on this period supporting the thesis is critically needed. The collection procedures in qualitative research involve four basic types of observations and interviews during the process of research the qualitative investigator may collect documents (Cresswell, 2003, 214). Books, articles, journals and newspapers were my main sources to collect data. Browsing and optically scanning the sources on the period, I came up with new questions, which led the study to new spheres. I searched for articles especially about this period presenting the evidences from different perspectives and sought key sentences to support the thesis. It is an ongoing process, involving continual reflection about the data and asking analytic questions. I therefore first shaped the paper's table of contents and sorted the articles and books according to chapters and subchapters derived from the questions during the research that involved asking general questions and developing an analysis from the information supplied and examined accurately. When I read these sources, I realized and began to perceive differently than before beginning this study, so I changed some of the chapters and found some of them unnecessary and added extra sections because of the emergence of these new questions. (Cresswell, 2003, 208) After sorting sufficient data for the production, I used codes to analyze the subject more easily and effectively, which are divided into two theoretical and empirical codes. I classified them according to their content and gave place the appropriately in the paper, therefore, the codification took time and effort. However, this forced me to study in order. I also used newspapers as much as I could to show the transition of Turkish threat perceptions and the attitudes towards the issues of both the decision makers (government, bureaucracy, political parties) and public opinion. In almost all of the chapters, along with the topic and argument, I translated the headlines and quoted from the newspapers giving the certain dates and details which matters for the thesis. In these figures, I used the relevant part of the newspaper showing the general views reflected by the media, which display the transition of the perspective of government, bureaucracy, political parties and the public. The statements by the political leaders are supported by the chapter's subject directory. I also used

external auditors (one of my friends in the class and my supervisor) to review the entire project.

In sum, after searching the types of designing a study, research methods and systemically detecting the steps, giving me a perspective to inqury the subject, I realized that this effort also made me use my time and effort more effectively. I knew where and how better to look at the process starting from data collection to analyzing the whole compilation in reasonable order to reach a genuine academic conclusion for the thesis.

1.4.1. WHY SHOULD WE REVIEW THIS PERIOD?

The attempts of the founders and succeeding decision makers to seek to make Turkey a member of the European nations should be taken into hand not merely in terms of security and territorial integrity concerns but also with the cautious policies of independency and sovereignty. Despite these cautious policies implemented by almost any new-founded state whose freedom was gained from stronger powers, Turkey felt the necessity of the establishment of economic and political relations with the West. In a short period, Turkey became not only a sympathizer but also an ally of the Western states. (Sander, 2000,71-72) Why has Turkey had permanent alignment relations with the West among all the Middle Eastern and Asian-African states? It is not easy to explain such a complex and deep question requiring a multi-discipline analysis on the permenancy and tendency of the foreign policy derived from the perceptionss of the decision makers. However, the foreign policy legacy of the Ataturk's vision and principles (Western Model Nation-State Establishment, Peace at Home Peace in the World and the Modern Civilization Level) and the distinctive features of the Turkish liberation war, geographical position and the political insecurity at the international level (numbers of the boundries, the Straits, the treaty of Sevr syndrome and the Lausanne as a red line) providing a political path dependency and framework bringing economic necessities can be an explanatory formulation of the process that Turkey has been part of.

The foundation of the Turkish Republic after national liberation period, which consists of national circulars, congresses and battle phases, provided a nationalist revolution replacing the Ottoman Empire's administrative, political, economic, judicial, educational, military and almost all of the upper social institutions with the Western model-originated institutions, which were consolidated by the establishment of the 1924 Turkish Republic's constitution. This process was percieved as a determined and strong attempt to establish a 19th century Eurpean model nation-state and a member of the European nations. (Sander, 2000, 74) The principle of Ataturk, "Peace at home, Peace in the World", was taken as a motto and implemented in almost every field of politics. Even after the loss of the founder of the republic, succeeding authorities determined to put the reforms or developments into effect following the vision and principles of Ataturk. Ataturk's understanding of nationalism provided for realist features and was like the European model based, on national agreement and citizenship. Ataturk understood the core and pragmatic role of nationalization to survive from a struggle with the European states out of the Europe. The national organization would

guarantee an awareness which had a great importance to evoke the capacity of the nation when independence and territorial integrity were endangered again.

‘’Erzurum congress ended yesterday:"

‘’The Struggle begins for the salvation of the motherland’’

‘’The manifest of the congress declaring the inability of the Istanbul government stated the fact that a temporary government can be institued should the occasion arise’’

August 8th 1919

Figure No: 1.1

The process of nationalization also had effects on the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic, having a multi-cultural and multi-national legacy of the Empire. The process went through democratic attempts and failures. There had been attempts to transition into a multi-party democracy, however according to pro-reformists, these attempts were doomed to failure because of the inability of the society to orient to a new way of life provided by the new institution. On the other hand, according to the anti-reformist or the opposing groups who gathered and identified themselves against the new Republic’s institutions, the failures were rooted in the disharmony of the Western-originated reforms and the lack of mental readiness of the people who were forced to transition into a new identity. Although it also takes the form of a summary of the Turkish Republic’s domestic political history, this paper focuses on the foreign policy derived from the threat perspective of Turkey.

By the end of the liberation war, which came at a great cost for the people of Anatolia, it was time to build a new society rising from the Western-originated institutions. Having had the experienceof the Ottoman diplomacy legacy, Turkish decision makers envisioned the realist principles of Mustafa Kemal. The foreign policy of Mustafa Kemal was characterized by the consolidation of the newly founded state, using all the international legitimization means materialized in his motto “Peace at Home, Peace in the World”. Except for the unsettled issues, the Turkish state isolated itself from the inheritence of the Ottoman Empire and the debts and other international obligations for the nationalization and development of

the state. “Reaching the Civilized and Developed States Level” has been another motto of domestic and foreign policy used by almost all the governments, which was percieved as Westernization.

The perspective inherited by the Mustafa Kemal era had to be implemented by succeeding governments through raproachment because of the conditions developed in the international arena. The question is:

What has been the cost of turning to the West? Unidimensional threat perceptions and strategic security politicies of Turkish governments routed succesors onto a permanent path. Especially, after the death of Mustafa Kemal, which happened at a very unfortunate time when the state was on the brink of World War II. The course of the war determined the foreign policy and the threat perceptions of Turkey in a two-bloc international community. Neutraliy diplomacy as a reflection of the balance diplomacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire’s traditional foreign policy strategy had a negative isolating effect on Turkey’s position. (It is discussed in the “Was it worth it to be Neutral” section). Staying out of the war was the back of the knife because the victorious party would have determined the world’s new status quo. Additionally, Turkey was not ready for a struggle among these highly developed and industrialized states because of its army and economy. After the involvement of the U.S. in the war after 1941 and the changing balance in the Eastern front particularly affected all of the states’ policies. In 1943 the course of the war had shown the inevitable fall of Nazi Germany and the Axis. At the beginning of these developments, Turkey’s foreign policy was dragged into the Western side because of the victorious surviving bloc leader, The U.S.S.R.

After the death of Mustafa Kemal, Inonu and Bayar varied the democracy culture in Turkey with their economical and political diversities, which led Turkish democracy into the two primary parties’ conflict. Surviving after World War II, with approximately 50 million casulties, Turkey was led by Ismet Inonu onto the side of democratic world. This position encouraged an opposing demand in the Reublicans against the domestic status quo of the state. Regardless of the varying ideology of the governments, Turkey was determined to establish a multi-party democracy even though there were deep structural and forcing economical issues to confront.

The foreign policy of Turkey during the Cold War period was characterized by the cooperation in almost every field with Western Europe and especillay the U.S. The combination of these territories is geographically defined as ‘’the West’’. During the Cold War, the U.S. emerged as the leader of the West due to the economical issues faced by Britain. As the leader of the Western bloc, the U.S shaped the internatianol system and

formulated the agenda of the international community, therefore, coherence of the relations and interests with the U.S had been a priority for Turkey. The elements of the close cooperation with the West were: (Sander, 2000, 156)

a) The Soviet threat against the territorial integrity of Turkey
b) The Economical aid for the industrialization and development process
c) The desire for the consolidation of the western style modernization derived from the founding ideology of the Republic

The close cooperation and rapproachment with the West would actualize and secure the modernization and integrity. These institutional cooperations with the West by means of economic, military and political support provided ‘’organic integrity’’ (Institutional hierarchy). (Sander, 2000, 56)

According to realists, when a state begins to increase her power, other states begin to question their power relatively and can perceive the other state as a threat against its capabilities. Turkey perceived the Soviet Union as the most hazardous state having a long boundary and comparatively more developed army. Considering these elements and taking more realist political steps, Turkey seemed to be a “volunteer” warrior (Sander, 2000, 57) state in a two-bloc international system. In acknowledgement of this role, national interests were redefined and identified with the interests of the West. (The U.S.)

The Democrat Party’s rise to power after the election in 1950 was one of the important factors strengthening the alignment of Turkey with the West. Having had a more liberal economic understanding of the People’s Republican Party (who had led the state since its foundation), the DP opened an unprecedented economic development era with the support of the landowners and trade-industry bourgeois, who prospered during the war. These kinds of economy-politics were naturally in need and depended more on foreign aid.

The relatively eager politics and moves of the DP compared to the CHP (PRP) for membership in NATO and its success was not only the consequence of security issues. According to Oral Sander (Sander, 2000, 57-58), it was an attempt to establish a liberal economic order and democracy under the framework of NATO. The number of agreements (approximately 100) signed under and out of the framework of NATO showed the instinct to defend and secure liberal democratic institutions at all costs. The founding role of Baghdad and the Balkan Pacts, along with the defensive attitude of the West in the Bandung conference were empirical evidences of the desire of the DP for more economic and military aid. The

attempt for membership in the EEC can be asssed in terms of political reasons rather than an economical move, which was critical for Turkey to establish and consolidate Western institutions.

Although Turkey felt secure about the choice of the status in the international arena, the insistence on unidimensional foreign policy without any consideration of the change in the system brought many significant and negative effects in the implementation of Turkey's national interests. First of all, Turkey couldn't actualize the economic development and came perilously close to bankruptcy because of the balance of payments, deficits and credit issues in the end of every decade. The security and defence policies left the initiative to one center, which showed its disadvantage and negative results in the Cyprus issue. (Sander, 2000, 157) There was an attempt to settle almost every foreign issue under the umbrella of NATO, which isolated Turkey and alienated the issues belonging to the other parts of the region and the world. Turkey failed to acclimate to the rapidly changing international system and the leaders couldn't alternate solutions when necessary. The unidimensional security policy and partisanship prevented almost any Turkish government from implementing realistic, effective and multi-dimensional politics. The late attempt to orient to the changing atmosphere of the international system compared to other states of the World delayed Turkish liberal transition and integration until the 1980s.

'' Our respond against the Russian note was given to Soviet Embassy yesterday''

''In our note, Russians conditions are declined, it was stated that we do not breach the articles of the agreement and explained that under these circumstances a conference can't be held'

''Words of President Truman: Bosphorus Issue has a vital role for the peace and security for all of the World''

August 23rd 1946

Figure No:1.2

B) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.5. FROM OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO TURKISH REPUBLIC (18TH CENTURY-1923)

It is very important to understand the diplomacy front of the foreign policy of Turkey after the liberation war led the to the founding of the Turkish Republic. Basic characteristics of the contention was that it was against Imperialism, which consolidated the legitimacy of the struggle in the eyes of the people exhausted by the exploitation and war on the remaining soil of the Ottoman Empire. I believe that it is crucial to discuss on the political process to give explanatory information and vision in order for the reader to comprehennd the political possibilities and selections causing transition in perceptions of threat and alliances.

During the early period of the Ottoman Empire, its foreign policy was motivated by its military-offensive characteristic. (Aydin, 20014, 6) By the 18th century, the sultans, bureaucracy and the aldermen of the Empire realized that Western-style reforms should be implemented immediately to compete with powerful Western states. After almost a century, during which several wars broke out on both the western and eastern fronts, causing great losses of territorial control in several regions and psychological trauma due to suffering defeats, (Herzog and Motika, 2000, 139) the Ottoman rulers understood that warfare was not the only sphere in need of superiority but also new necessary reforms were needed, new kinds of production, agriculture, military, policy and schools were necessary to parry the threats in the short term and to survive in the longer run. I believe that the breaking point for the Ottoman Empire in making the decision to head towards the superior West came in the second decade of the 18th century. Therefore, it is important to consider this period when Western-style institutions began to be found in economy, policy, education, miltary, and architecture.

During the Tulip Era (a period in Ottoman History, starting with the Treaty of Passarowitz (Pasarofça, 1718) and ending with the Celali Rebels in 1730), one can see the key points of underdevelopment and inferiority. (Berkes, 1964, 26) Almost three hundred years behind Europe in the utilization of print, or typography, (1450s in Europe - 1727 in the Ottomans) gives us a clear clue to the outcomes of wars and competition in all other areas of modernization. The state itself launched a set of initiatives by founding state print houses, and constructing a paper manufacturing factory in Yalova and big public libraries in several

providences of the capital. Temporal diplomatic missions were founded, an admittance of the superiority of the West, to follow up economical, political and scientific developments aiming at the implementation in the homeland. A fire brigade founded by the soldiers; first application of vaccine, construction of fabric and ceramic tile factories indicates the tendency for improvements. Baroque and Rococo architectural structures built under the affection of European architecture also led to development in civil architecture. (Shaw & E. Shaw, 1977, 239-241) All of these evidences show us that the daily life in Istanbul must have been undergoing a change, which created an unambiguous economic class rivalry with the people in Anatolia to such a point that a rebellion broke out against the extravagant life style of the people around the palace that brought the era to an end. The only war in this period was in the East with Iran, which strengthens the idea that the Ottomans felt necessary to settle differences with the West at least until they reached a considerable level to compete.

During the era of Mahmut I, modernization of the army became a priority; therefore foreign specialists were appointed to train and teach Western style military tactics. Engineering schools were founded to train Western-visioned officers to lead the army from the tactical to strategic level. Innovations in the artillery and ammunition branches of the army were tried to adapt to the conventional Ottoman army. (Lewis, 1966, 48)

Mustafa III improved the degenerated fiscal points by making "loan bonds" applicable in public places (market) which gave relief to the treasury. The artillery branch was considered acute and mobile artillery formations based the military tactics on the consultation of Baron de Tot, a Hungarian officer. (Lewis, 1966, 49)

Another important reformist sultan, Selim III, took reports from appointed bureaucrats concerning the army and fiscal issues. He didn't dissolve the conventional army (Yeniçeri Ocağı) but founded a new one called Nizam-I Cedid (Matran, 1989, 438) (which is also the name of the reforms in general in his period), supported by a new treasury. (İrad-I Cedid) Permanent diplomatic missions were sent to Europe for deepening the relations and new institutions. Dissidents allied with conventional army (Yeniçeri Ocağı) (whose actions were suppressed) overthrew the Sultan and the reforms remained unfinished.

In general, the 18th century Ottoman decision makers questioned the reasons for the underdevelopment by the evaluation of the correlation between reasons and results of the evidences occurred. The reforms were considered to be state policy but not as sultan-concentrated and temporary solutions, which provided a better wave than the ones during the 17th century. As we can see in the summarized list of developments of the era, military and fiscal issues were considered the primary paths to lead the transformation and modernization

of the society and the state at the hands of military and institutionally western-versioned bureaucracy. By the end of the century, western countries were building fronts among themselves to materialize their economical and political interests, whereas the Ottomans attempted to use their traditional "balance diplomacy". Although there was a great determination in application of the diplomacy by means of political and military tools and moves, the Empire became labeled "the Sick man of Europe" in the conferences held by the great powers of the period. The empire was nearing the brink. Was there any way out? The Dissolution Era came on the heels of the great Empire successor to the Romans, who once ruled States spread over three continents.

During the 19th century, Ottoman historians classify the evidences that caused dissolution in two chapters: the French Revolution and Industrial Revolution. Since our thesis is not concerned with these topics, the relation of the evidences will be included under the political process.

The Revolution in France, led by the bourgeois and pushed forward by commoners against the king, aristocracy and the church transformed and dragged monarchic France into an unstable period. During these times, Napoleon Bonaparte and his national army changed the equation in Europe and the Holy Pact (http://www.upa.pdx.edu/IMS/currentprojects/TAHv3/Content/PDFs/Holy_Alliance.pdf) was signed by monarch states against ideologically poisoned (nationalism) France, having held a privileged position in Ottoman foreign policy since 1535, attempted an invasion Egypt in 1798 to block Britain's colonies in the East, especially India. Asking for the support of Russia and Britain, the Ottoman Empire held Egypt (Ucuzsatar, 2002/2, 55-68) in Akka (by Nizam-I Cedit army) and defeated Napoleon for the first time. The French navy was destroyed by the British-Russian allied naval fleet and retreated from Egypt. Traditional French-Ottoman diplomatic relations changed for the first time until the Serbian Revolt in 1804. As an inevitably rising power, France, edged ahead in European policy, which influenced the Ottoman Empire to take precautions and begin following "the balance diplomacy". This Russian-British alliance cost France its influence over the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby losing ground in its attempt to block Britain's colony building. Russia crossed the Bosporus with its fleet for the first time, which meshes with its traditional policy and gained advantage against the Ottoman Empire, using the excuse of possible French invasion attempt.

Although the Ottomans were members of the Holy pact, defending monarchy against nationalism's attacks at the hand of France, the other states of the pact sympathized with any kind of national revolts. In 1804, the Serbs under the rule of Ottomans since 1441 (almost 400

years) attempted to revolt (Ucuzsatar, 2002/2, 55-68) against Ottoman authorities in their region, supported and affected by the Russian pan-slav and pan-orthodox policies, which afterwards led to six years of war with Russia itself. Russia didn't evacuate the Aegean islands, invaded temporarily for a possible French settlement and held the islands willingly with its Mediterranean policy. Russia also provoked the Serbs in the Peloponnesus peninsula, Russian policies. Due to the hypocrisy of Napoleon, the Ottomans were forced to call a truce and signed the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), giving privileges to the Serbian minority, which was a first – a new and hazardous compromise, encouraging similar provocations in other regions under Ottoman authority. Serbs were the first revolting group to gain privileges in 1812, autonomy with the Edirne Treaty in 1829 and declared their independence after the Ottoman-Russian War (1877-1878), which ended with the Berlin Treaty in 1878. (Harris, 1936 and Ucuzsatar, 2002/2, 57)

After the French Revolution, the Greeks followed the Serbs in a bid for independence, supported and affected by Russia's promising policies. As a mutely national state, the Ottoman Empire was very prone to the nationalist ideas and was becoming more vulnerable as the support of the great powers of the Europe urged the fire in the heart of the Ottomans. Though Greece's first revolt in Flak was quashed brutally by the local authority, it didn't stop them. Nationalism spirit had been planted in the minds of the Greek intelligentsia, who also organized the Greeks under the Ethnik-I Eterya (Filiki Eterya) organization acting on the Megola Idea (see more about the reflections of the idea in Cyprus Issue section). In 1821, the Greeks this time revolted in the Peloponnesus peninsula under more suitable circumstances provided by the European states. Weakened central authority demanded help from the governor of Egypt, promising the government of Peloponnosesus and Crete. With the help of Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha (Ucuzsatar, 2002/2, 56) the revolt was quashed but the Europeans who considered Greeks to be the representatives of Helenic civilization, on which Western philosophy took shape and identified with. The allied European navy fleet destroyed the Ottoman fleet in Navarino. The Ottomans claimed compensation for the damages but the Europeans insisted on the independence of Greeks quid pro quo. France invaded Peloponnosesus and Britain invaded Alexandria temporarily when the Ottomans didn't accept the conditions and then declared war against Russia. Reforms in the army debilitated traditional concept and brought a harsh defeat by the Russians. The Ottoman Empire had to sign the Edirne Treaty, accepting Greece's independence. Eflak and Bogdan's privileges layed the foundation of Romania, war compensation and the loss of critical Caucasian territories (Batumi accepted as boundary), which would create dozens of issues influencing

foreign policy. Binding conditions of the agreement laid the foundation for the invasion of Algeria (first loss in Africa) and caused the Egypt Issue.

Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha had formed a decisive administration based on a strong economy, army and navy. In return for quashing the revolt in Peloponnosesus, he accepteded what he was offered but upon the foundation of Greece in Peloponnosesus, he demanded Syrian provincial authority under his son instead. Mahmut II accepted giving up Crete but refused the demand of his son concerning Syria. There upon Mehmet Ali Paşa revolted, this time against central authority. Defeated by one of his governors in two campaigns (Adana and Konya), Mahmut II demanded Russia's help after he confronted the risk of losing Istanbul when Mehmet Ali Paşa advanced towards Kütahya. In 1833, the Kütahya and Hünkar İskelesi treaties were signed with the Pasha and Russia respectively. Giving compromises to its own governor showed that the Ottoman Empire was really the "Sick man of Europe". As a result of balance diplomacy, The Ottomans couldn't risk another rapprochement that would strand it against Britain and France, leaving Russia as the only choice. According to the treaty with Russia, if the Ottoman Empire had been attacked, Russia would have supported with its army and navy, funded by the Ottomans, if Russia had been attacked, the Ottomans would have closed off the Bosporus. Britain and France reacted to this diplomatic move, they exaggerated the issue and internationalized the issue as we can see by the birth of another new strategic issue that accelerated the dissolution of the state: The Bosporus Issue, which would be solved ultimately in 1936 by the Montreux Treaty.

Although the period of validity of the treaty signed with the Russians was about to end, The Ottomans were unsatisfied with the Bosporus and Egypt issue. As a matter of balance diplomacy, Britain was the only state that could support the Ottomans and get results in an undesirable situation in return for more privileges. With the relief that came after the Treaty of Balta Limanı signing that gave dozens of economic privileges to the British, the Ottomans felt comfortable enough to fight with Mehmet Ali Pasha. However, the Ottomans couldn't stand in the way of defeat by the navy and the army of the Pasha in the Nizip war (1839). Britain intervened in the situation before the Ottomans demanded help from Russia as per their Hünkar Iskelesi Treaty and called for a multi-national conference in London. According to the conditions of the conference, Egypt remained an Ottoman state dependent for external affairs yet independent domestically. Syria, Kyrete, Cidde and Adana were given back to the Ottaman Empire. The treaty also laid Egypt under an annual contribution.

It is very clear that conflicting interests of Western states cost much for the Ottoman Empire in terms of its security of its southern regions and sovereignty. Britain also brought

the Bosporus Issue to an international conference in London to re-organize the interest the instant the Hunkar Iskelesı treaty expired. According to the treaty signed in 1841, (Ucuzsatar, 2002/2, 56) control over the Bosporus was established under Ottoman sovereignty. While free passage for trade ships was provided, warships were forbidden to pass. Thus, the Ottoman Empire lost its absolute sovereignty over the Bosporus at the cost of securing its survival. Russia lost the rights it gained from the Hunkar Iskelesi treaty while Britain consolidated its strategic interest over the territory. Due to the importance of the Bosporus, Russia didn't give up the defense of its interest in this front and carried on attempts to suppress the Ottoman Empire for compromising on the issue by provoking Orthodox-Slav minorities living under Ottoman rule. The Ottomans recognized this aggressive diplomatic language and moved closer to Britain and France to pass the issue over and let warships of these states come to the capitol passing through Bosporus. The Russians retaliated by burning the Ottoman navy in the Black Sea and the "sick man's territory" became a war zone again.

Between the years of 1853-1856, The Crimean war broke out because of the conflicting interests on Bosporus and the issues of sanctuary and the Orthodox-Slav minorities. (Ucuzsatar, 2002/2, 57) Fighting on both fronts, the Ottaman Empire asked for the help of Britain and the states whose interests were in concurrence with it, such as Prussia, France, Austuria and Piemonte. According to the treaty signed in Paris, The Black Sea would be a neutral zone, which meant the Ottomans affected transactions, as they were defeated in the war. An interesting breaking point for the Ottoman Empire and its successor Turkey is that the Ottoman Empire was recognized as a European state under European Law, which provided protection against Russia. Yet this situation showed that the Ottomans had no real military power to protect their territorial integrity, which can be a base for our argument in that the necessity for security forced the Ottoman Empire to change its perceptions in time depending on the diplomatic situation it was in. Islahat Fermanı (Yilmaz, 2005, 90, Imperial Edictesection) was presented during the treaty meeting, which may still be counted as a constitutional step and yet grounded on protecting and rooting western interests.

The balance of power favored the states, especially Britain, France and others that had colonies long before states politically integrated like Germany and Italy (1871). As a political rival of those states, Russia tried to benefit from the situation and re-acquire the rights lost in previous agreements by re-arming the Black Sea region. Russia also provoked rebellions against the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia-Herzagovina, Serbia, Romania and Montenegro but was quashed by Ottoman governors by the use of brute force in the regions. These bi-lateral steps created a process, which brought two states on the brink of war again. Provocations,

especially in these regions fostered by Russia, laid the groundwork for the Balkan depression, which was costly and accelerated the dissolution of the Empire, causing instability in policy.

In 1876, the constitutional monarchy was temporarily founded and the Ottoman Empire had it first constitution due to the attempts of a group of activists called the Junior Turks. As the minorities under the rule of the OttomanEmpire had sought their independence, Turkish decision makers pursued ways such as pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism for the protection of integrity of the Empire. One of the fundamental reasons for the adoption of the 1876 Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) was to give the right to minorities and people to represent themselves, which had been a blind excuse for the European states to intervene internal affairs.

After one year of relatively liberal governing, war was at the gate again and parliament was abolished by Sultan Abdülhamit II. In 1877, the Russians moved forward drastically in two fronts which led the Ottomans to ask for peace. According to the Ayestefanos treaty, Serbia, Romania and Montenegro declared their independence. Batum, Kars, Ardahan and several other cities were left to the Russians, Greater Bulgaria was guaranteed by the treaty, Bosna-Herzegovina had autonomy, the Armenians gained privileges and the Ottomans paid compensation. However, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire clashed with the interests of Britain and Austria over the Bosporus and the Balkans, which was observed and managed by Abdülhamit II. The balance diplomacy was again put into use for the Empire and another relatively better agreement was put on the table, which was more compatible with the interests of Britain and so the Ayestefanos Treaty wasn't put into affect. According to the treaty of Berlin, the amount of the compensation increased, the administration of Bosnia was given to Austria but maintained as an Ottoman state, greater Bulgaria divided into three parts and the administration of Cyprus was given to Britain. It was the most severe agreement signed in the 19th century, which suppressed the intentions of Russia trying to disintegrate the Ottoman Emipre through the efforts of Britain and Austria, who left the table with the most profits yet revealing new issues for the Ottoman Empire, such as the Armenian Issue and indirectly the Cyprus Issue.

It was clearly understood by the Ottomans that balance diplomacy would no longer work between these great powers because after this milestone agreement Britain didn't insist on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire losing a base in Mediterranean and headed its axis to a rising power in Europe: Germany. Power balance was changing in Europe and new blocs were being built by new powers.

1.6. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SINGLE PARTY PERIOD (1923-1938)

In the previous section, an overview of the Ottoman political and diplomatic history shows the basic issues internationalized and inherited by the Turkish Republic. Instead of examining the issues in detail for our thesis, the reasons and evidence that caused rapprochement to the West starting from the 18th century were covered. The foreign policy legacy inherited by the leaders of the liberation war distinguished and showed itself especially after World War I when the Ottoman Empire was defeated and the national libaration triumph made the new-founded state negotiate with the powers.

In this chapter, the discussion focuses on the turning points in the history of Turkish foreign policy. Basically, while I explain the official history under the titles of important periods starting and ending with the occurrence of significant events for Turkey's identical evolution process, I will also try to find out decision makers' real intentions by questioning the pros and cons of these decisions for Turkey in the long run.

Leaders, political parties, new national institutions, new constitutions and new laws, pacts and organizations, military coups, military operations, polarized world are some of the highlighted topics which caused shifts in Turkey's foreign policy. These factors also caused political and identical cracks among society.

Turkey's top decision makers, regardless of party affiliations, have surely interacted with some other countries especially within the framework of the UN, NATO and the EU. These interactions influenced Turkey's economic, political and social institutions, while constructing new identities and threat perceptions and in this way changed the path of Turkish foreign policy. How did Turkish decision makers make these important decisions? Did they really have to take such decisions? Have the economic & military dependence on Western institutions constrained the choices of Turkish decision-makers? Can Turkey change the axis or orientation of its foreign policy?

There are several reasons that I searched the indirect but relevant causes by the answers of these questions:

First of all, "the decision makers" of Turkey had already chosen its axis before the foundation of the country which was formed actually as neither Western or Eastern but as a sui-generis society whose receptions are very different compared to Western or Eastern

countries. However, as it is very controversial, geographically, where West and East are, I will explain in commonly accepted way. (The North Atlantic territory accepted as the West)

Secondly, the threat perceptions are related to security issues in international relations. Thus, when Turkey's political and economical moves are stated by means of security perspective, today's perceptions could be assesed more rationally.

During this period, there were always two sides on the Turkish policy's stage:

The founding ideology and its rival ideologies

In this chapter, the focus is on the real basis of the founding ideology in Turkey by discussing important decisions taken by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and other political actors during the single-party period. The rivals' positions are also analyzed after the very foundation of the new state and especially the effects of this competition to foreign policy.

As the founding leader of the new state, Mustafa Kemal's security perspective is very important in revealing the ideological basis of the state and after state's party. The speech delivered by him in Parliament in 1927 was about the process of Turkish revolution and internal threats to the institutions newly founded by him. (Aydin, 2004) He realized that the axis shift in international system had been dominated by European states. As the leader of the newly founded nation state, he had a realists vision of foreign policy and no desire for territorial conquests of inherited lands from the Ottoman Empire which made him successful in responding the challanges of the new international system.

Ataturk's direction for the Turkish foreign policy was clear and significant. His foreign policy targets revealed themselves as a deviation from the expansionist ideology of the early Ottoman period. He was mainly concerned with independence and sovereignty, thus his motto: "Peace at Home, Peace in the World". While he was attempting to preserve the status quo, he also sought a deliberate break with the Ottoman legacy by means of cooperation and aspects of diplomatic life.

Reforms taken by the victorious parliament during the transition period were so strictly stated that any kind of dissident organization was taken so seriously as a threat to the new regime and its values. Secularization and nationalization were headstones and redlines of the state, which later were put forward as a vital condition by Ismet Inonu before the introduction of the multi-party system.

Were six arrows enough to summarize and could the founding ideology be based in the core of the new regime's threat perception? How did these principles lead to Turkey's choice, especially after WWII? Can we derive from these principles that Turkey had to choose the Western front and perceive the Western polar's threats as its own? The answer provides us

with a means to understand the fundamental intentions and reasons of significant initiatives launched by the governments. In this way we can shed light on the forming-process of the threat perception and its affect on Turkish foreign policy.

World War I brought a bitter end to the Ottoman Empire's resistance against dissolution after centuries, by the attempts at implementation of temporary reforms and cooperation with several great powers pragmatically in and out of balancing pacts. The Empire was divided by the Allies but Turkey's Liberation War was won after great sufferings of exhausted nation and Republic of Turkey was established. When the Turks fought for independence after World War I, they fought not only against the Entente invaders, but also against the resistance of Ottoman Dynasty collaborating with the Allies. Hence, it is not suprising to see that the leaders of the new Turkish state sought to break with the Ottoman past of which they identified as corrupted and dated. To establish a new state, they had to clear away the instutional remains in social and political life, the legacy was disowned and new history and language initiatives launched in order to nationalize the people of the Ottoman Empire living in Anatolia. (Ataturk, 1927, 59) Yet the diplomatic and political experience inherited was an advantage to lead and for the success of the Liberation war and also for the very idea of the struggle. Instead of dealing with the subject directly, the effects to the foreign policy are important for the thesis.

Between the two World Wars, Turkish foreign policy was characterized by Ataturk's ideas based non-revisionist and peaceful policies on realist terms considering contemporary circumstances. The progress of Turkish foreign policy was paralel to the success and peace in the international field of this period. The world economy was affected by the grcat recession bctween 1929 and 1930. (Gol, 8) The basic aims of the foreign policy were to be recognized as a sovereign nation-state and enjoy the full benefits of peace that came after the first World War had brought drastic damage for both sides. For meeting these goals, new institutions were required forming a state nation and modernization of it in terms of westernization of the upper institutions.

Atatürk's policies were mostly realistic dealing with national and international issues, giving priority to independence but considering inter-dependent relations with powerful states under international law, which was another basic principle of his. The tradition of allegiance to international law created by the Western states was seen as crucial to remain independent and maintain legitimacy. The Briand-Kellog pact (1928), membership of the League of Nations and settlement of Mosul issue and Mountreux Convention (1936) are evidence of holding this principle. The westward direction in the modernization of the institutions of the

state were another element clearly seemed in political, military and economic fields which prolonged of the reforms and policies that had been initiated since the 18th century. Ataturk was one of the officers educated in the military academy, where officers educated and organized with a very familiar vision about development and Westernization.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly, as the state defeated in World War I, yet the only state negotiating peace on its own terms and winning almost all of its demands from the Allies, ratified the Treaty of Lausanne. The treaty of Lausanne was the only negotiation dependent on mutual negotiation, which was also the sign of acknowledgement of the new secular state (Kurkcuoglu, 1984, 88), however, it would be very optimistic to claim that the treaty of Lausanne left no issues. The Mosul issue, the Bosporus issue and the Hatay issue were major ones to deal with having priority in Turkish foreign policy of the period. Indeterminate circumstances brought about by the war became clear after the ratification of the Lausanne treaty and Turkey itself along with the other states began to consider strategies as the new borders which made Turkey a neighboring state to the victorious states of World War I. The Treaty of Lausanne was the official sign of international recognition and the claims were stated in the Turkish National Pact. (Ataturk, 1927, Vol 3)

The main issues of the foreign policy were the ones left by the Lausanne Treaty and the establishment of regional security pacts including relatively smaller states for both purposes of consolidation for independence and having a leading role among those states. In order to analyze this period, giving more detail about the single party period's vision would be more effective.

The foreign policy legacy of Ataturk's vision and principles (Western-model Nation-State Establishment, Peace at Home Peace in the World, Modern Civilization Level) and the distinctive features of the Turkish liberation war, geographical position and the political insecurity on the international level (numbers of the boundries, the Straits, the treaty of Sevr syndrome and the Lausanne as a red line) provided a political path dependency and framework, bringing economic necessities can be an explanatory formulation of the process Turkey had been in. (Sander, 2000, 71-72)

Ataturk's efforts on behalf of the founding of a 19th century European model nation-state provided international recognition to implement the development process. Influenced by the positivist philosophers of the 19th century and political ideas such as freedom, constitutionalism and nationalism, Ataturk made military and political campaigns to establish the institutions required for a nation state, stressing often that the struggle was not against the West but Western imperialism. (Sander, 2000, 74) The reason for emphasising intentionally

the differentiation between the West and Western imperialism was in consideration of the situation after the war. He was aware of the fact that the development of the nation-state would have been actualized only with the recognition of the West and he also knew the consequences of the opposing movements that failed in the19th century in other parts of the world, such as the Indiain revolt (Heatcote, 1995, 103) and the Boxer Rebellion (Esherick, 1987, 8) The bitter experience of the rebellions of the Serbs, the Greeks and the other minorities under the rule of the Ottoman Empire had already shown the way of the achievement of foundation of a nation-state. The way of founding a Turkish nation-state must have been in the same way that provided coherence between Western and Eastern tradional ways of thinking and actualization. (Temperley, 1924, 24 and Sander, 2000, 75) This situation created a "Westernized nation" in a region, which was alienated from Western values, which, have kept Turkey from being considered as a member of Europe since the end of the liberation war. It was also a key role for the survival of a new founded nation state. The institutions established and materialized on this ideology needed realist and pragmatic policies under the Western-originated international law and framework. The realist feature of the type of nationalism of Ataturk was that it wasn't characterized by race or religion (Panislamism) or claims of being descendance of Asian Turkic tribes (Pantranism). (Abdulahat, 1964, 52) The organizational process is based on citizenship having equal rights takes root in the will of mutual future (Renan model of nationalization). The type of organizational structure giving national consciousness provided mental resistance and power to defend national values and territory against the interferences of imperial states. Equal and soverign state principles of international law were internalized thanks to the bitter experiences remaining in the Empire. By the success of the war independence, the Turkish nation state recognized and had the opportunity to acutualize its development courtesy of the Ataturk motto: "Peace at Home, Peace in the World".

Although peaceful foreign policy seemed a necessary choice, the benefits and positive contributions were foreseen and analyzed by the decision makers led by Ataturk. The success of the treaty of Lausanne was formulated by Oral Sander (Sander, 2000, 75-76) to read:

i) "The realist and just framework of the demands
ii) Claiming nothing on the Arabic regions
iii) Sacrifice from the territories in Trakia
iv) Patience for the critical unsettled issues"

The attitudes of the new Turkish nation-state, characterized by these principles provided a long-term peace and stability, which were essential for new independent states. The analysis of political atmosphere in Europe was ciritical for the implementation of the policies. Even war with the Greeks or the growing tension with Italy didn't change the peaceful policies of Turkey after the war of independence because of the experience of the decision makers inherited the legacy of the Empire and were satisfied with the status quo of the international arena. (Sander, 2000, 77) Turkey also participated in almost every organization to support regional and collective peace and security. The determination on following the policies strengthened the relations with the West.

One of the other distinctive policies of Ataturk was the realization and the point of view stating that the way of the modernization was possible by a relatively independent Westernization. According to him, turning back against the West would divert Turkey from the way of civizilation. (Sander, 2000, 77) The realization of the distinction between the European imprealism and the value system was important and its traces quite perceptible among the refoms of the Ataturk era.

The new Turkish Constitution, based on the principle of national sovereignty was adopted in April 1924; the "new order" now had its legal frame bringing new laws and way of life, which constructed a different identity. New civil and penal codes had a secular posture derived from the constitution. (Paper presented to the Semlnar on Nehru, 1981, 3-5)

As Abdullah Cevdet (Paper presented to the Semlnar on Nehru, 1981, 3) states, there was no second civilization and it must have been imported with its roses and thorns considering the social tension among society revealed itself in every oppising party that had influence on political life. (Lewis, 1965, 231)

The fact that the reforms of Ataturk changed the face of the Turkish society was not a coincidence but part of long-term planned and organized development process. Samuel P. Huntington also underlines that: (Huntington, 1968, 348)

"…. The sequence of change in Turkey, however, was consciously planned by Kemal, and this pattern of unity-authority-equality is the most effective modernization sequence…"

(Rather than making the analysis of the content and the apllication of the principles, I tried to explain the concrete affects of these principles on the threat perception and the foreign policy of Ataturk and single party administration.)

The "Six Arrows"represented founding ideology which also affected the foreign policy and showed the route of Turkish development. They were adopted in 1931 and became part of the Constitution by an amendment voted in February 1937.

As a final analysis for the section, Turkey could accomplishits foreign policy objectives during this period by considering these principles formulated by A. GÖL: (Gol, 15)

"(a) Acception as a part of the European state system,

(b) Good relationships with its neighbours and preserved the peace both in the Balkans and the Middle East,

(c) Non revisionist attitudes; to protect the statues quo.

(d) Faithful adherent of international law.''

Atatürk, who had been president for 15 years passed away on November 10, 1938. A soldier who had fought on three continents ended as a remarkable statesman, succeeding in radically modernizing his country

''Goodbye Great ATATURK''

''Istanbul lays his eternal leader to rest to Ankara with tears''

''November 10th 1938''

Figure no:1.3

CHAPTER II
THEORITICAL BACKGROUND

In early the 70s, Robert Jervis, in his work, introduced the subjects of international relations have mostly been war, deterrence, alliances and conflict settlement resolutions. He states that IR theories have been evolved basically on these subjects. (Jervis, 2006, 1) Since Thucydides' Eight Books of the Peloponnesian Wars, threat assessment and the need to balance against or ally with a threatening power were leading subjects of history and policy.

But actually these theories were at the core of alliances and balances of power and of war, which is an unexamined concept of threat perceptions. (Jervis, 2006, 1-2)

Models have been built that focused explicitly on explanations of the causes of war in terms of threat perceptions. (Walt, 1985, 43 and Stein, 2003, eds, 1) Rationalist models of deterrence and war put credibility at the core of analytic problems. (Schelling, 1960 and Stein, 2003, 1-2) Robert Jervis came out with a Political psychology model exploring threat perceptions and misperceptions, which was followed by Stein in the early 80's, paying attention to the variance between what leaders perceive as threatening and what the evidence of intentions and military capacities suggest. Since it's not our purpose to analyze the evolution of threat perceptions in this work, I will only give the background of threat perceptions theories and their relevance with international theories especially realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism.

Threat is an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage (Merriam-Webster dictionary), which can be verbal and physical. In international relations, a threat is defined as a situation in which one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or group (Davis, 2000, 10 and Rousseau, 2007, 2). International relations focus mainly but not exclusively on the threats against the collectives by using ways of economic, military and cultural capabilities.

Deterrent threats require the target to refrain from committing acts that the threatened does not like and compel threats require the target to engage in actions that they do not wish to do. (Davis, 2000, 10 and Rousseau, 2007, 2) In our study, the Cuban Missile Cirsis and the Cyprus issue are example cases for diplomatic signals to show the seriousness of the Turkish State and the government to respond the undesirable steps taken by the Allies. The consistency for the security of missiles in Turkey in case of an attack by the Soviets and independent preperations for the intervention were signs of Turkish political efforts to show their determination and seriousness.

Perceptions are the result of percieving that which needs a subject, having the process of apprehending by means of the senses and recognizing and interpreting what is processed. While the motivation for action, which is very important in international relations in the processes of individual perceptions are emotional states, at the collective level, which is more relevant to our topic, the processes of perceptions are more difficult to identify. (Davis, 2000, 10 and Rousseau, 2007, 2) Turkish perceptions are rooted in its diplomatic legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire. During the Cold War period, Turkey's efforts to be a member of the West and Democratic world led her to perceive the same threats along with the West.

Diplomatic and political process based on economic dependency and a struggle for national-level security made Turkey unable to choose her subject by herself. This situation also produced a hazardous situation in which Turkey was also perceieved as a threat by the same states that were perceived as a threat by Turkey. The Political atmosphere and the basis of the decision makers are discussed in the following chapters under the titles of the chosen cases.

The nature of an international system and its effects on patterns of international systems outcomes: War and Peace. Many of the daily subjects of international relations are characterized by the theories of foreign policy. Theories were explained as their dependent variable, not the pattern of outcomes of states' interactions but rather the behavior of individual states, according to Waltz, who, in his work explains the significance of the outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system. (Waltz, 1979, 71-72)

While realists claim that big changes in the means of transportation, communication, and military strength strongly affects how states and other agents interact. Constructivists underline the important role of interdependence of the states and international institutions. As Wendt defines the institution (Wendt, 1999, 83), Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works.

In this sense, threats are socially constructed just like identities within and among private and public conversations of experts, political leaders, and the public, which are also individuals and agents of the construction. (Meyer & Miskimmon, 2009, 625-628) Before explaining which theory is more dominant and inclusive as to their advantages and disadvantages in the decision making process in international relations and foreign policy issues, [I think] it is more crucial to look over the concepts of threat and perceptions and their role in international relations.

D. Fearon, in his study, puts definiteness and totality of information at the core of the account because he thinks that leaders perceive a move as threat and go to war because they don't have complete information. Uncertainty created by privately held information causes leaders to make wrong decisions and in this context, states at times have an incentive to misrepresent information about their capabilities and their intentions. (Fearon, 1995, 379-414) [Cuban missiles Crises settled by the good sense of the leaders, JFK and Kruchev]. (see their letters for the determination and the efforts of the leaders trying to moderate the crises and the protection of the deterence at the same time). This logic sees war as a result of inaccurate threat perceptions that flow from deliberate misrepresentation and signals, which are not credible. Its criticism is based on the same fact and the realization that decision-making is

much more complicated than just weighing external factors like domestic circumstances, the personality of decision makers, and organizational influences.

The rationalist model claims that the sender of the signals faces the dynamics of the perceiver in formulating credible commitments. Credible commitments are important because they are markers of the future, a signpost which leaders can use to assess intentions and threat not only in the present but in the future (Stein, 5 and Mercer, 1996). Leaders first determine the capabilities and intents, then the dangers of "worst-case analysis" and "wishful thinking". The arguments of "offensive realists" are at first glance not directly relevant because they by-pass the signaling and credibility of commitment and reasoning directly from a shifting balance of power. (Stein, 7)

Diplomatic language is rather an art of bluffing or deceiving, misinterpreting information to manipulate, therefore leaders have strong incentives to bluff or deceive, to exaggerate their capabilities to conceal their weakness, especially when they fear attack or sometimes for their deterrence. The difficulty of making decisions complicates signaling for the sender but it simultaneously complicates threat perceptions for the receiverbecause both sides base their decisions on their credible commitments. Signaling and threat perceptions also become more difficult when intentions are difficult to read because of the workings of the security dilemma.

The application of diplomatic language of Ismet Inonu is a good example of concealing the real intention of a state by implementing a neutrality policy. Having had the fear of an attack of Axis powers that invaded Greek in a very short time, he also tried to secure the state by carrying on chrome trade with Germany. At the same time, he agrees on principle, joining the war against Germany on the side of the Allies. The ability of negativity with both strong sides of the war provided by the exeggeration (Jervis, 1978, 167-214) of military power and jeopolitic position of Turkey brought on stage by Inonu during the war.

Organizational and bureaucratic politics can produce pathologies where leaders structure problems in ways that increase their importance and push hard for solutions that advance their institutional interests. These institutional interests can generate and benefit from either a heightened or reduced level of threat assessment. Those who seek to draw resources, for example, from those agencies that are responsible for preventing threat and managing the response tend to push for lower threat assessments. (Stein, 7 and Allison & Zelikow, 1999)

In the diplomatic history of Turkey, the application and the effects of each decision making model and theoric appraoches can be found. In the analysis of the foreign policy of Turkey derived from its threat perceptions shaped by traditional attitudes, politics, diplomacy

culture, membership of institutions [especially NATO and EEC], economic dependency in terms of industrial infrustracture and miltary, theoretical background should be reviewed. Making comparisons and reviewing positive and negative sides of each theory have an important role for an effective explanation of the thesis. Thus, under the following titles of the theoretical framework for the implementation of the foreign policy and security dynamics of Turkey considering the political atmosphere of each period are discussed.

If we take Turkey as a component of the Euro Atlantic institutional structure, the assesment of the Soviet threat can be regarded as heightened assesment. Since the output of the representitives of the ideological blocs were super power behaviours, Turkey felt a clear imminent threat of invasion of the U.S.S.R. However, Turkey could appeal its traditional diplomacy without membership of NATO. The membership caused Turkey to assess the threats not as a sigle sovreign state on its land but as a member of NATO. NATO pushed Turkey into a conflict resolution that it couldn't manage with its capacity. This process also made Turkey obligated to solve her problems under NATO's umbrealla withuot consideration of long term national interests.

2.2. HOW DO THE I.R THEORIES TAKE THREAT PERCEPTIONS?

Theories show the way of solutions by pratice, cumulation of knowledge and experience of former researchers. A useful parallel is that of sunglasses. (Rosamond, 2000, 4 and Kalligas, 2006). It is very important to have a theoretical framework when one tries to understand, explain, or even predict social and political phenomena. The theoretical framework is presented under the titles of Neorealism (Realism and its fractions' basic

assumptions on the international system and security policies are discussed for the analysis of Turkish foreign policy), neo-liberalism ("Institutionalism" and international cooperation for peace and security also took place in this part) and Constructivism (Norms, identity-perceptions and security preferences) . This chapter focuses on the constituion of theoretical base on which this thesis rests on. (Kalligas, 2006)

2.2.1 NEO-REALISM

Neo-realism is a theory against the explanations of the variables by structural realists, who attempt to explain the intentions and behaviors of the states [in system level] in terms of relative power, anarchy and power-balance, ignoring the roles of states and statesmen. (Wohlforth, 1993) Neo-realists see themselves as different from other structural theorists in terms of perceptions and misperceptions in international relations claiming that the effect of power is problematic.

According to their approach, the perceptions of the decision makers, through which pressures must be filtered. (Rose, 1998, 144-172) The behaviors and output of the states cannot be explained merely by the idea of the "secret hand of anarchy or distribution of the capability among states". (Folker, 2004, 1-2)

International relation theories use the explanaions for the situations of the actors in several analyze levels by grading the roles of the actors: Images (Folker, 2004, 2)

1) "The perceptions of the statesmen
2) The internal affairs of the state
3) Impacts of power balance and anarchy perception".

Although Waltz defines these theories under the family of realists, neo-realists deny this kind of determination, explaining the perceptions of the statesmen and impacts of internal affairs on decision-makers. I want to give place to the security assumptions of each realist faction. (do you mean faction?)

The three assumptions define the hard core of the Classical Realist research program: (Keohane, 1984, 201)

1) **"The state-centric assumption**

2) **The rationality assumption**

3) **The power assumption**"

In the analysis of Turkish foreign policy in terms of its security perceptions, the realist viewpoint of Mustafa Kemal as an Ottoman officer, for the survival and development of the new nation-state among the great powers was a fundamental factor that characterized the foreign policy. Between the two World Wars, despite the existance of peaceful political and diplomatic steps of the decision makers, the cautious attitudes were very obvious and perceptible. The importance given to the army and the necessity of economic intervention of the state to the markets [especially industry] were signs of seeking maximization of the capacity of the city to survive and develop.

During the post war [II] period, all the perceptions can be evaluated as they were based on realism. Turkey's efforts for the prevention of a possible Soviet invasion were seen as the most rational choice for Turkey because of the conditions of uncertainty and without necessarily having sufficient information about alternatives or to conduct a full review of possible courses of action. The certain rapprochement with the West bacause of the Soviet Union left no chance or opportunity to return in terms of diplomacy and security perceptions.

Fareed Zakaria (Zakaria, 1992, 197) emphisizes the fact that the research of a state to implement a foreign policy in international relations is measured, according to its relative power.

When the distribution of the power and capabilities are changed, states immediately perceive their position and power relatively so after every significant economic or political conflict, states attempt to reposition themselves against other states. After the chaotic situation created by the conflict, new great powers rise and a new system is established under the leadership or hegemony of the rising power. The two world wars are good examples, showing the re-distribution of power and rise of new great powers. For instance, during the post war period, a new system was established under the two bloc leaders, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. These rising powers perceived each other as threats, which gave a start to the Cold War. The chaotic situation created by these powers in the international arena was materialized by the demand of the Soviets for Turkey (Land and mutual control on the straits).

The structural transition of the international system [foundation of UN, NATO, Warsaw Pact] made Turkish leaders grasp as a compulsive motivation to choose a side. The recession of the agreement signed by Turkey and the Soviet Union created by a certain diplomatic instinct or reflex which led Turkey to head westward.

For a systematic explanation of the foreign policy of realists, officials have accurate apprehensions of the distribution of power and these apprehensions are translated directly into national policy. (Friedberg, 1988, 8) Another realist theorist, Robert O. Keohane has also impressed that the link between system structure and how actor behavior is forged by the rationality assumption which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond the incentives and constraints imposed by their environments. He takes rationality as a constant that permits one to attribute variations in state behavior to various characteristics of international system. (Friedberg, 1988, 8)

There are also some studies on practices of the other states, especially those having a considerable impact on the system such as Soviet Union in the Cold War era, researched by Wohlforth; the U.S. and China were studied by Christensen, expressing that the dynamics of foreign policy grows out of the change of the distribution in relative power in international system. In other words when a state begins to increase its power, other states begin to question their power relatively and can perceive the other state as a threat against its capabilities. By means of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall aids for the Security of southeastern flank of Europe containing Turkey and Greece, The U.S also tried to keep the power in the region balanced considering the capacities [population and other comparative sources were basic elements for the assesment] of two rival states.

Although the idea of the impact of the structural change on distribution of the relative power seems familiar to structural realists, there is one point where neo-realists differ from the structural realists. While structural realists categorize the change and effects more objectively, neoclassical realists reason their assessments with the perceptions of statesmen.

As understood from Keohane's definition, the "Outcomes" refer to two sets of patterns: (Keohane, 1984, 183)

1) "The results of conflicts, diplomatic or military, that take place between states
2) Changes in the rules and institutions that regulate relations among governments in world politics."

The distribution of power causing the "change" in the international system's actors and the perceptions of the actors have always been crucial for states to reconsider their

capacity, ability for the implementation of their politics and the conduct of the politics according to their new "relative" power. The unprofound change in the status quo of the international system after World War II was a milestone for Turkish foreign policy. The Soviet Union as a rising super power was the first and most important state percieved as a threat. After the war, Soviet perceptions changed and regulated according to the post war conditions, therefore the Boshoporus issue was a priority for the ideal traditional Russian policy and naturally came into question again despite the existance of the treaty signed with Turkey. The capacity and the ability of the Turkish Army, which hadn't fought since the war of liberation was relatively weak compared to the victors of World World II, The Red Army.

Turkey's pursuit of its army's modernization seemed only possible with the integration with the West and especially the leader of the West. The uncertainty of the American foreign policy route before the Truman Doctrine made the Turkish govenrment feel very insecure about their future territorial integrity and sovereignty. The neutrality and undemonstrative attitudes during the war were principles strictly followed by the government. However it was perceived by the Allies to be a sign of reluctancy. This perception led Turkey to endeavor to show its loyalty to the Western World and the symbols of the modernization. [Democracy, free market, economic aids, membership of Western international institutions] The struggle for the establishment of western institutions accelerated the dependency and absolute integration during this period and reached its climax during the Democrat Party period.

In threat perceptions theories, I think one of the most important questions is "what is the cost of threat perceptions for a state?". Because this question brings us to a point that states assessing the best possibility for the distribution of their capabilities, considering the relatively limited sources. Fareed Zakaria, for instance, asks:

> " Why, as states grow increasingly whealthy, do they build large armies, entangle themselves in politics beyond their borders and seek international influence?"

Zakaria argues that this behavior stems from the tendency of the states to use the tools at their disposal to gain control over their environment. One of the basic instincts of a creature takes shape in behaviors of states, which brings us to the importance of the perceptions of statesmen. (Zakaria, 1992, 185) Turkish decision makers who organized the war of struggle and reform period were pro-western modernists. Especially after the death of Mustafa Kemal, the single party system was able continue at the end of the World War II. By the end of the war, Inonu and his managerial staff felt the need for multi-party democracy due to the

domestic and international demand. Inonu had no other choice but to offer a chance to the dissident group in his party, the Founders of Democrat Party.

Wohlforth expresses his observations on the output of the Soviet policy, basing the policy on assessment of external constraints by the states conditioned by the changes in the structure of the international system. (Wohlforth, 1993)

Neoclassical realists express their security perceptions of the statesmen affected both by material assessments and the change in the distribution of relative power. Differing from the structural realists, they give more importance to the perceptions of the head of the authorities making decisions. Thus, foreign policies are derived from the clarification of the impact of the structural changes on the threat perceptions of the leaders in charge of making policies correspondingly to these perceptions. (Source, 1998, 169)

According to Keohane, realism developed from a long tradition, dating from Thucydides, continues to provide the basis for valuable research in international relations. He also admits that realism does not provide a satisfactory theory of world politics. Realism is particularly weak in accounting for change, especially where the sources of that change lie in the world political economy or in the domestic structures of states. Realism, viewed dogmatically as a set of asnwers, would be worse than useless. As a sophisticated framework of questions and initial hypothesis, however, it is extremely valuable. (Keohane, 1984, 159)

Both realists and neorealists try to explain the dynamics of the international system as they see it. (Baylis, 2008, 69-85) The criticisms focus on the way that realists perceive the international community. According to them, because of the anarchy in the international system, states have to increase their capacity for stabilization and their securtiy, however this kind of a perception brings about the arms race, star wars and nuclear armament. The perceptions of the states lead them to act more agressively as they feel insecure. The political and economical insecurity determine a confrontational atmosphere and cooparative or collective atmoshpere. The importance given to the capacity of the states leads states to increase their relative power and balance the power of the state perceived as a threat in the international system.

2.2.2. NEOLIBERALISM

The Cold War was a period of time when political and military tension between powers in theWestern Bloc, led by the United States, with NATO among its allies and powers in the Eastern Bloc, dominated by the Soviet Union, along with the Warsaw Pact, in

developing a globalized internatioal structure, security and threat were not the only facts chracterizing the foreign policy of the states but new subjects such as trade, migration, health and environmental issues came into it. In this scene of the international relations, neoliberalist theories try to deal with peace and cooperation by means, especially globalization, rather than war and security issues. (Terrif, 1998, 29)

Neoliberals argue that cooperation and peace can be provided not merely by power balancing by the states or evolving policies on threat perceptions derived from relative power but also by means of coherence of the other actors such as international organizations, transnational organizations, NGOs, MNCs and other non-state players. They claim that the transition of the international community is possible when states take place in these organizations. Considering the period between 1945 and 1960, the discrimination of Westernism and Western imperialism was in its primary stage. The European identity constructing process had its domestic consequences for Turkey due to its revolutionary characteristics. Therefore, the coherence was questionable in terms of identity. However, the two bloc international atmosphere causing security concerns for all of the Western states accelerated the institutional integration in politics, the economy and military. Integration also created mututal interests and caused a redefinition of national and international interests based primarily on security and survival needs during the Cold War.

Turkish definition of threats and content of threats shaped the foreign policy and also kind of goverrment in the long run. The mutual threat assessment led Turkey to follow a unidimensional security policy biringing shared norms and mutual gains. As an example of shared gain with the West was securing her nuclear shield as a partner of the Western leauge. However, the deterence of Soviet nuclear and conventional power caused military-heavy budgeting, preventing social and economic stability in the states. In terms of the argument of the thesis, the effect of the degree of integration with the West should have been questioned considering the diplomatic isolation of Turkey during the Cyprus negotiations and the intervention period as well as the passive role during the Cuban crises when Turkish national security was ignored by bringing the jupiter missiles on the table as a diplomatic bargaining tool regardless of Turkish national security concerns and political psychology.

According to neoliberals, states are not simply “black boxes” seeking to survive and prosper in an anarchic system. (Slaughter, 2011, 14) They also agree with the realists on having a military capacity for deterrence of war against the potential adversaries of anarchic international structure. (Kegley, 1995, 4) Especially in the early years of the Turkish Republic, the evidence of cooperation and efforts of integration can be observed. Biletaral and

multiletaral agreements for the the maintanance of peace and security, a pioneer role for the establishment of regional economic and security pacts, membership in The Leauge of Nations and the attempt to finish some of the unsettled issues of the treaty of Lausanne under this institution, signing the Briand-Kellog pact are signs of the endeavour of Turkey to become a part of the Western and international community.

According to neoliberal theorists (actually radical globalists), the nation-state, conduct of modernization, has lost its ground in globalization process which gave the highlight to global markets behaving more rational than the traditional politicians or bureaucratic based government. Having more effective power than the states, market mechanisms will provide the transition from nation state citizenship to the membership of world's society. (Çalis, 2002, 42-43) They also think that the military expenses growing out of security concerns of the nation-states should be cut down because of the developing interdependence between more cooperative states seeking economic and social welfare. (Munck, 2005, 69) As Keohane and Nye refer to this process as complex interdependence and argue that the exclusiveness of neorealism fails to capture the complexities of international behavior and in particular distorts reality by ignoring the institutions, processes, rules and norms that provide a measure of governance in a formally anarchic environment. (Nye & Keohane, 1977) The integration of entity in monetary markets in world's scale has already disabled most of the traditional economical control mechanisms of the states.

Neoliberals also claim that international system is anarchic but differ from neoclassical realists. They seek other ways for the protection of the interests and consolidation of security; (Waltz, 1979) mitigating strategies in a quasi-anarchic arena. (Nye & Keohane, 1977)

According to Jervis, the fundamental idea of the theory is the natiaonl features of the states and their position towards their traditional output in international relations. However, this idea contradicts with the realist and instituionalist approach about the goals and output especially in matters such as the pursuit of wealth and survival. (Jervis, 1999, 42-63) On one hand, neoclassical realists stress the reason of application of power by States, on the other hand, neoliberals study types of options and elements affecting these options of the states for making security policies. In these cases, defensive realists and neoliberals see similar ways to reduce confict. Both embrace the apparent paradox that actors can be well advised to reduce their own ability to take advantage of others now and in the future. (Jervis, 1999, 42-63)

I find it very useful quoting the arguments of Andrew Moravcsik; summarizing the neoliberals' argument and who has developed a more general liberal theory of international relations, based on three core assumptions: (Moravcsik, 1997, 513-553)

1) ''Individuals and private groups, not States
2) States represent some dominant subset of domestic society,
3) The configuration of these preferences across the international system determines State behaviour''

The unstable atmosphere of the relations in which the foreign policy of the state planned and executed, Turkey had to have the feature of a "two-front state" directly "two status quo state". It had also been an issue for the Ottoman Empire during the foundation period. The Empire had repeatedly been attacked by the Eastern powers before having had the advantages of the wars in the West. However, the Turkish State was not an expansionist state, having comperatively more unpresuming ideals than the Empire as a newly founded nation-state. The insecurity and siege mentality background of the decision makers contributed to the feel for the necessity of modernizing of the army, having strategic partners or allies and being a member of collective economic, political and military organizations in the East and the

The status quo in the East took shape over almost 300 years of not merely military and political characteristics but also cultural and religious ones. (Sander, 2000, 139-140) Except for the wars between the southern and eastern neighbours and the ethnic separatist movements against the State, the Eastern status quo had been maintained. Therefore, Turkey hadn't had to determine her "relative power" against the potential Eastern threats. After World War II, the distribution of power in the region had been under the control of the great powers, having a global affect to deternine the agenda of its world politics.

On the other hand, the status quo in the West had a 90 year history and is politically more sensitively shaped by the treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Mountreux Convention (1936), The Treaty of Paris, the end of WW II, the regulation of the Bosphorus and Aegean islands, the Cyprus issue, participation in NATO and the endeavour to gain membership in the EEC. (Sander, 2000, 140) These treaties, issues, pacts and organizations made the Western status quo prone to any type of change or devaluation. In order to maintain the status quo on both fronts, Turkey had to develop good relations and implement collective security policies to balance the power distribution and gain more "relative power" courtesy of regional pacts, global security organizations and political economic organizations.

These preferences across the international system determined Turkey's behaviour concerning the distribution of power especially in the region. Turkey also tried to have a pioneering role to stabilize the region, however, the foreign policy preferences of the Western institutions and organizations caused unidimensional threat perceptions derived from the collective interests of these organizations. As Menon states: (Anand, 2004, 221- 236)

> "…From its inception, European integration has been concerned with issues of foreign and defence policy"

The Treaty of Paris (1856) gave the Otoman Empire European-state status.The Otoman Empire and its sucessor, Turkey, have always been seen as a dominant and decisive factor, considering the balance of power in Europe due to her neo-political position, cultural legacy and historical ties with the Middle Eastern states and the Balkans. As a part of European foreign and defence policy, Turkey has also been a subject of European defence and security issues.

The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) in 1948, and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 were created primarily for security reasons. (Anand, 2004, 222) The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) became the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954.(Kalligas, 2006, 15) The Washington Treaty (1949) and the Korean War the following year (indicating that Germany should rearm itself) stimulated European leaders to find a "middle way", which would "establish the correct balance between Germany and Europe, and between Europe and the USA." (Howorth, 1997, 12 and Kalligas, 2006, 15)

As a part of various plans under the framework of European Defence and Security Plan, (Kalligas, 2006, 23) Turkey had the same role among the other states in Europe. Especially during the Cold War, when the leadership of the U.S was more crystallized with her economic hegomony, Turkey also became the part of the hierarchy established by the framework of European Security and Defense Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The attempts at ingtegration of the European states supported by the U.S. especially in the Cold War, had to include Turkey. The agencies and the other executive organs established under the framework of the European Security and Defense Plan aimed: (Kalligas, 2006, 28)

> "1) To work towards the capabilities needs of the ESDP,

2) To promote collaborations in defence capabilities which will reorganize the defence industry in Europe,

3) To promote collaborative Research & Technology (R & T) initiatives

4) To cooperate with theCommission in creating "an internationally competitive market for defence equipment in Europe"

Putting the separate national functions under the same umbrella *(http://www.eda.europa.eu/randt/randt.htm.)* also meant sacrifice from the national interest and having the same security concerns as all of the states under the European Security and Defense Plan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The erosion of the national interests did not seem to be a threat or a problem in ordinary times in foreign policy planing and implementation, however conflicting interests of two member states affects the stability and credibility of the organization. This was apparent during the period when violence continued in Cyprus. Turkey's airforce bombed Greek Cypriot villages and other civilian targets in the summer. Although the British and Americans had initially agreed not to prevent a Turkish invasion, they also feared that a war between Greece and Turkey would seriously damage NATO's southern flank, to the Soviet Union's advantage. (Mallison, 2011, 27) To alternate solutions for security, both sides began to neutralize the efforts of the other upon the relatively passive and pragmatic decisions of the Western Bloc. (The political motives and dynamics are observed and discussed in their own chapters in a more detailed way) The efforts of the U.S. to maintain the status quo in the region can be explain by the concept of "hegemonic stability" by Keohane, who asserts that the states hold a: (Keohane, 1967, 1977, 1980 and Jonsson & Tallberg, 2008, 11) preponderance of power resources and that these regimes decline when power becomes more equally distributed among their members.

As explained above, the neoliberal theorists state that the soverign nation-state as a conduct of modernization, has lost its ground in the globalization process, which highlighted the global markets behaving more rationally than the traditional politicians or bureaucratic based government. As a member of several security and political organizations, Turkey's ability to conduct its own relative policies based on its own threat perceptions is quite questionable in terms of the limitations bound by the provisions of the founding framework of the organizations.

Jonsson and Tallberg define sovereignty as "the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains". (Jonsson & Tallberg, 2008, 6) Krasner has

also stated the significance of (Krasner, 1988, 66- 94 and Jonsson & Tallberg, 2008, 8) vertical depth and horizontal linkage to define sovereignty in terms of institutionalization. According to the definitions of sovereignty in terms of institutionalization Vertical depth means the spectrum of which an institution defines individual actors. Horizontal linkage stands for the number of links of institutional practices have with other practices. There are implemantations in international relations regarding sovereignty: diplomacy and immigration control. Without the consideration of sovereignty, the efforts to the found the League of Nations after World War I, which was an endeavour to definine democracy in terms of self-determination and soveringn states. (Jonsson & Tallberg, 2008, 9)

Beginning with the foundation of the republic, Turkey's security definition had to be broader than the Empire. However, the decision makers didn't underestimate the importance of the geopolitical/military asessments considering the neighboring unstable regimes. Turkey attempted to guide her neighbours to secure the domestic institution establishment process by means of regional pacts and cooperation agreements. As a part of the Middle Eastern geography which had been an anarchic arena since the dissolution period of the Empire, Turkey sought relative regional power by means of these regional organizations and pacts.

As stated before, Turkey had to discriminate between the Westernism and western imperialism. Having been suspicious in terms of political dependence about the Western states, Turkey sought ways of increasing transparency by means of international organizations founded by western states. As its former enemies, western states also hesitated for cooperation and demanded identical and emprical tests for understanding the strength of Turkey's real intentions especially because of the unsettled issues remaining from the treaty of Lausanne. The Korean war was a good example, as was the Cyprus Issue, which kept Turkey's attempts within reasonable and legitimate limits in the diplomacy process.

In my point of view that Turkey's coordination, in terms of sovreignty, in the international system is determined by the mentioned frameworks. The vertical linkage with the Western organizations shaped the perceptions and policies of Turkey. The determination process left her with the unidimensional security perspective and absolute loyalty demands in terms of interest implementation of the Western states. However, the domestic psychological and national identical pressures forced Turkish foreign policy makers to disobey the rules or orders of the Western states. [the Cyprus Issue]

2.2.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM

The end of the Cold war and globalization dragged the efforts to study the concept of human security through different perspectives in international relations. After the profound changes in 1989, the definition and the extent of human security began to remarkably affect and changed the terminology of international relations studies. (global politics, institutions…) (Oberleitner, 2005, 185-203 and Yu-Tsai, 2009, 20) Theoretical work on strategic culture, domestic structures, and organizational culture advanced significantly in this period, intersecting ever more frequently with the rise of constructivism. It is quite important to explain constructivism's epistemological and ontological content before taking the relation of constructivism with security and threat perceptions issues.

Where can we locate constructivism among the other international theories? Is constructivism really a theory? The answer of the question gives us to way how to compare it with the other theories or approaches taking security, threat perceptions and other important issues in hand. Constructivism is not itself a theory of international relations but a theoretically informed approach to the study of international relations, which is based on the notion that international relations are "socially constructed". Taking a sociological constructivist position in IR allows us to be critical towards rationalism, which is "formal and informal application of rational choice approach to IR". (Fearon and Wendt, EDS, 2002, 54 and Karacasulu, 2006, 29)

According to another definitive explanation of Anne-Marie Slaughter, (Slaughter, 2011, 14) constructivism shouldn't be explained under the determinants of a theory but as an ontology which refers to an aproach consisting some specific assumptions on the topics of the world, the motivation behind human behavior. To this extent, constructivism is assosicated with rationalism rather than the other theories helping to explain international relations. Literally, almost all of the constructivist theorists interchangeably prefer to use scientific realism and positivism.

More tellingly yet, modernist constructivists claim that it is plausible to mix an anti-essentialist ontology with a positivist epistemology. This has been dubbed the view media or middle ground. (Adler, 1997, 319-363) More recently however, those who endorse a modernist constructivism feel increasingly uncomfortable with the "middle ground" orthodoxy, essentially because it strives to combine a social ontology with a rationalist epistemology. (Fierkien, Dunne & Kurki and Smith, 2006, 166-184)

As it is seen, constructivism is an approach, which locates itself against the classical theories of international relations, which were contributed by the other critical theories of the time, such as the "English School" and the "Copenhagen School" considerably.

Although there are a number of schools of constructivism, they all share some common characteristics and basic assumptions. However, in this thesis, I will discuss the relation of the approach with security and threat perception issues in its mutual basic and significant characteristics.

Yui-Tai Tsai gives five assumptions of constructivism in his article, "The emergence of Human Security: A constructvist view", taking in hand the security and constructivist approach together by giving different constructivist theorists' views together. I will try to enrich his arguments about constructivism by quoting and sharing other supportive views put forward in other articles on the subject. I will use his compilation of assumptions and try to give a perspective for understanding the epistemological and ontological repretoire of constructivism: (Yu-Tsai, 2009, 29)

1) **Constructivism points out that social facts are human creations**

The evidence of the impact of the constructive world-view in Turkish foreign policy is generally searched for after the Cold war period due to the time of generation of the claims of constructivists' theories. Sınce the argument of the thesis focuses on the period of 1945-1960, the traces can also be searched for this period too, considering the empirical evidences.

Founding ideology, which had been envisioned by Ataturk, guaranteed its place in both the constitution and upper social institutions and was literally questioned for the first time in the Democrat Party period. The statist economic evaluation of Turkey's position in international areana had been considered an obligatory element, however it was a social fact and conduct of humans for the leaders of the Democrat party. Liberal applications of the Democrat Party led by Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes can be accepted as a deviation from the founding ideology, which had created a stereotype-identity. Economic integration by means of trade and aids formed a sound basis for liberal construction of Turkish economy, which also determined a new political way receiving support by a large group of people questioning the official ideology and their identity.

2) **Constructivism believes that norms, customs, culture and learning can change the behaviors and interests of a country's citizenry** (Wendt, 1992, 391-425)

Re-evaluation of conservatism and secularism is a sign of the mentioned deviation and custom changing since the foundation of the Republic. This ideological justiification of the

Democrat Party targeting the strictly founded and protected Kemalist institutions showed itself in bitter political and social competition with RPP and the bureaucracy. The eagerness of international integration of the Democrat party also created social and political camps in Turkish political arena. This caused domestic unsteadiness derived from the ideological competition and conflict in the bureaucracy revealed its effects on Turkish political life in the following years till the Democrat Party tried to become the monoplistic power in the country in the late 1950s.

3) **Constructivism asserts that the process of international politics alters interests and identity in the international system, instead of the material structure.** (Jonathon, 1995, 229-252)

Definition of interest is characterized by the identical posture of a state based on Kemalist ideology or worldview, which was pointing towards the West for Turkey with the motto of "Reaching civilized states level". The process came from the reformation process of the Ottoman Empire, which for two hundred years more guided the state elite and bureacracy through the years. The state elite or bureaucracy implemented institutional progress and adjusted state structure, which helped to construct a nation state identity after the foundation of the republic. Turkish Sunni and secular identity were derived from the western type of nation state structure constructed by following a French affected revolutionary model.

Until World War II, Turkey was characterized by the policies and principles of single party, which guided Turkey to a road of neutrality but also to poverty and politically vulnerability in any kind of threat. The evolution of the international system forced Turkish domestic political life to vary. The march of the Democrat Party to power should be analyzed at the international level by considering the transforming Turkish identity which materialized after the declaration of war on Germany on the dawn of the two bloc international system.

4) **The actors of the international community and the structure of the international political system exist in an interactive relationship of interdependence, which determines the evolution of the international system**. (Johnson, 1983,261,285) (Slaughter, 2011, 4)

The change of actors in the international arena during and after World War II determined Turkey's foreign policy approach, which was strengthened by her pursuit of

security. Power transition and distribution were crystalized by the establishment of new international organizations having had economic, political and security objectives provided by a substantial change also for the political structure of Turkey, which revealed itself in the transition to multi-party democracy.

If the Democrat Party's and succeeding parties' opposing position on founding ideology is reviewed, it would be easily shown that applications of the decision makers were not welcomed by bureaucracy, which created a deep political displeasure and unstable condititons for the people. When it came to foreign policy and threat perception assesments, disharmony among social and political institutions caused political inconsistency and economic vulnerability, and also determined a dependent Turkey in terms of economic aids.

5) Constructivism emphasizes the sociological concepts of ideas, norms, identity and culture.

In Turkish foreign policy history, "social structure is manifested by not only the material structure, but also by the international community". The situation can be observed in many cases. In 1946, the attempt of multi party democracy transition in democratic life was not only about the domestic material structure but the pressure by the international community, especially the Western bloc's model democracy should also be considered as the biggest motivation. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also accelerated the integration of structured Turkish Interactions with the West after WW II materialized the rapprochment in security and political pacts. The Korean War was a sign of the efforts of having a Western identity at all cost for survival in the Cold War.

As constructivism emphasizes the sociological concepts of ideas, norms, identity and culture, Turkish foreign policy permanency and tendency towards Western policies was based on the policies that had been followed since the 18th century. The European identity was gained by the geographical and cultural advantages of the invasions and long-term interactions with European states. According to the analysis of some scholarsa, "Turkey fought to be a European". After WW II, these attempts deepened due to the threat perceptions of the West and Turkey and were structuralized by means of agreements, security pacts, economic aids and cooperation, which increased the inter-dependency level.

CHAPTER III
OVERVIEW OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

3.1. WAS IT WORTH TO BE NEUTRAL? (1938-1950)

In this section, the focus will be on how the political psychology, which was affected by WWII, the economic problems, growing tension with Stalin's Soviet Russia and other significant events during the period that influenced the orientation of Turkish foreign policy. I will question whether Turkey was forced to join the Western camp or had the Turkish government had deliberately chosen that path and attempted to convince the Turkish people to accept communism as a threat to legitimize that choice.

Question: How did the political developments occurring in the world at that time bring Turkey and the West closer to each other?

By the bitter loss of the founding president of the Turkish Republic, a new era had begun, however his leadership and the principles kept their influence on the political institutions. İsmet Inonu was elected as the second president who tried hard to maintain the continuity of the established principles and reforms, which were characterized by the Western and modern perspective. Seeing that Inonu was favored amongst the ruling Republican Party delegates, Prime Minister Bayar *(http://www.ucc.ie/chronicon/3/hakkfra.html)* opened the way for Inonu's presidency in the name of averting political chaos before a likely war in Europe (Bozdag, 1992, 22) There have been other important issues after Atatürk's period but World War II had been the most important effect on both internal and external affairs and directly on the perceptions.

Reforms were implemented decisively in terms of the framework of Ataturk's period, however the intense influence on the economic and political life of World War II was felt deeply in the economic and political life. Before and during the war, both sides tried hard to draw Turkey to their side but Turkey considered being "neutral" as a survival move. The general tendency and permanency of Turkish foreign policy was to protect the status quo [in the West] established by the Treaty of Lausanne and in this way Turkey contributed the efforts of the winners of World War I, who tried to stabalize the balance of power. The close relations with the Balkan and Middle Eastern states were shaped in the light of this idea, aiming to survive as an independent nation-state and develop as rapidly as possible. With the post-Lausanne policy, Turkey aimed to protect itself against a possible intervention by building and being a member of a collective and collaborative security system by establishing pacts and taking place in international organizations, which enabled her to settle the issues peacefully remaining after the treaty of Lausanne by means of international law. (Kocak, 1986, 229)

To accomplish this policy, a friendship treaty was signed with Italy in May of 1928 but couldn't be developed after the imperialist approach to Middle East revealed good relations starting from the liberation war developed by other methods. During the same, National Socialist party took the power in Germany and Hitler developed the collaboration with aggressive expansionist Italy having possibly bitter aggressive attitudes claiming Lebensraum (living space) (Baranowski, 2011, 141) which was an important component of Nazi ideology in Germany. Since Germany developed its collaboration with Italy and the negative attitudes increased tension between the rising bloc of Europe, therefore Turkey

determined to seek alternative options. (Yalcin, 2000, 234-235) The growing threats to the status quo and peaceful intentions were calmed by the new bloc in Europe and therefore, Turkey was forced to change its perceptions of Britain, especially after the late 1930s. The tense relations after the Mosul issue were replaceed by essential rapprochement, deriving from the interests of both states over the straits and the Mediterrenian. Having had the intention to keep acceptable distance to both sides the relations with Soviet Union were getting worse because of the changing attitudes of the Soviet Union over the straits and her raproachment with Nazi Germany led Turkey to Polish psychology and fear for being carved up by two great armed states.

This rapprochment to Britian and France bore fruit in the signing of a declaration with Britain in 1939 and after the settlement of the Hatay Issue with France. As a follow up policy, an agreement was signed on 19 October 1939 in Ankara as a result of abstention from the Nazi-Soviet raproacment. Despite the existances of these treaties, Turkey's motto during the war was "being neutral no matter what". The policies were coming from the hands of a small group who had real diplomacy experience accumulated starting from the dissolution period of the Ottomans, the war of struggle period and applications of Ataturk's period. These policies, led by Inonu, focused on the principles such as remaining prudent and not making mistakes, which was perceieved as being "opportunist", especially by the Allies who reacted against Turkish neutrality after the war.

Is it possible to question the cost of being neutral during the war by giving information about the policies followed by Turkey? The rapprochment with the West was the result of Soviet pressure and threat especially after the war, so, if Turkey had helped and been on the side of the Allies by distracting the military forces of the Axis powers, would the Soviets have caused fewer concerns? The answers to the question can be found by reviewing the post-war policies and the events but before that I want to take a look at the attempts of Turkey to stay out of the war.

The order after World War I led defeated [revisionist] states into economic and political instability, which eased the way for radical regimes to become established after demolishing all the opposing groups in their states. The rapprochment between these militarily powerful revisionist states that had developed themselves shifted the power balance of Europe and indirectly the World. Therefore, the reasons for the outbreak of World War II should be researched among the regularities and the order constituted by Versailles and the other treaties signed after World War I. Agressive expansionist policies followed by these states forced Turkey to seek security among the Allies. [non-revisionist states]

Beginning in 1939, Russia's agressive and offensive policies developed into the diplomatic and political tension manifested in her efforts to establish bases on small Baltic States. Moreover, for Turkey, the Soviet Union, who claimed the rights to the Straits, offering Turkey a collective defense in the Straits caused deep concerns. (Muzaffer, 1975, 119) The changes offered by the Soviet Union at the Mountreux Conference were responded to by the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, Şükrü Saraçoğlu as: (Burcak, 1983, 90)

"Turkey will never live the circumstances of the treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi":

''<u>According to times</u> : ''What are the demands of the Soviets from Turkey?''

1) Invasion of the strategic points
2) Accession of a ''friend government'' to the administration

January 8th 1945

Figure no:3.1

Italy's participation in the war against Britain and France in 1940 endangered the security of the Mediterraenean and changed the attitudes of Turkey. However Turkey still didn't want to take part in a war against the Soviets. (Toprak, 2011, 161-170) At the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the relations were transformed with Britain, due to tension growing with the Soviet Union. Against the German propaganda, Soviet Russia, who was preparing for the invasion of Iran with Britain gave a note with Britain in 1941 stating that:(Toprak, 2011, 168) the Soviet government guarantees the loyalty to the Mountreux and shows the good will on the territorial integrity of Turkey.

Despite the existence of the good will demonstration of the Soviet government, the Soviet Union also critisized the neutrality policy of Turkey and tried to convince Turkey and Britain to take part in war. (Tacibayev, 2002, 162 and Toprak, 2011, 168-169)

Particularly after the changing atmosphere of the war in favor of the Allies in 1943, the neutrality policies and posture of Turkey materialized objectively against the military tactics of the Allies, who planned to enter Europe over the Balkans. (Kocak, 1986, 165 and Ozcelik, 2010/2, 262) Turkish statesmen insisted on the modernization and absolute gurantee against a Soviet agression. (Weissband, 2000, 67 and Özcelik, 2010/2, 262)

There was still pressure on Turkey by the Allies at the Moscow Conference in 1943 for the Soviets to take part in the war until the end of 1943. Interestingly, the British surpressed Turkey in Cairo by playing the "Soviet Card". This allowed British airplanes to use the airports against the Germans, who had been refused by Foreign Affairs Minister,

Numan Menemencioglu, who cited the necessity due to the modernization of the army. (Ekinci, 2002, 656 and Özcelik, 2010/2, 262-263) The threat perceptions of Turkey were diverted by the British threats of leaving Turkey on its own after the war. This situation also accelerated the rapprochement and diplomatic moves after the war. In Tehran (Ozcelik, 2010/2, 263) the same demands and conditions were on the table but for the first time Turkey had to agree to take part in the war on condition of the modernization of the army and a security guarantee after the war against the Soviets.

Turkish foreign policy was executed pragmatically during the war. Turkey also considered and envisioned the political atmosphere after the war, evaluating the balance of power and new distribution of power. The defeat of the Germans would create Russian influence ideologically and politically on the European states. (Yilmaz, 1999, 23) Because of the competition and the interests of Britain, Turkey knew it must preserve the army's alerted situation in case of a Soviet invasion. Considering this motive, Turkey showed determination to remain neutral at all costs.

At the end of the war, The Soviet Union emerged as a great power and increased its criticism of Turkey, stating its complaints more decisively and powerfully in the conferences. In almost every field, the Russians played the "suffer and pain" card it had during the war and tried to take advantage, claiming the change in power distribution. The Soviet influence over Europe and other parts of the world caused a structural change, which was new to international relations characteristics. Ideology and doctrine affected politcs, the economy, military technology and tactics, lifestyle and administration.

Despite the fact that Turkish foreign policy wasn't considered ethical by the Allies, Turkish decision makers insisted on staying out of a war that didn't interest them directly. Using its goegraphical advantage, Turkey resisted the pressures from the great allied powers. Although agreeing to take part in the war, Turkey also bought some time and waited for the implementation of its heavy conditions, while observing the progress of the war as it developed along a different course. Frequent and bitter changes in the war damaged the neutral position of Turkey, which caused a vulnerable diplomatic and political orientation for the decision makers. (Özcelik, 2010/2, 267)

Turkey had independent threat perceptions including alternatives that may have been for the last time until 1944. The Soviet and German threat, The non-agression pact with Britain, diversion of the demands of the U.S. and Britain were evaluated in a rational and legitimate means of foreign policy considering and envisioning the political atmospehere after the war.

After the beginning of the German operation against the Soviets, Turkey (Özcelik, 2010/2, 267-268) found reprieve and was allowed to avoid the "Poland Syndrome" until the end of the war. However, the absolute defeat of Germany caused "Credibility Syndrome" of the Allies and was used to manipulate the policies of Turkey after the war in the rapprochement process.

The neutrality policy was primarily used against the Soviet threat, therefore after the war the U.S. awarded this policy with a security guarantee and its protector posture. This progress was also accelerated by the aggressive attitude of the Soviets in the invasion of Berlin, the retreat from Iran and the termination of non-agression treaty with Turkey signed in 1925.

'' Our respond against the Russian note was given to Soviet Embassy yesterday''

''In our note, Russians conditions were declined, it was stated that we do not breach the articles of the agreement and explained that under these circumstances a conference can't be held'

''Words of President Truman: Bosphorus Issue has a vital role for the peace and security for all of the World''

August 23rd 1946

Figure No:3.2

Consequently, survival was a great diplomatic success but it also brought the bitter reality: **Absolute raprocahment.** Turkey was a loyal proponent of the western symbols and values differring from other Middle Eastern or Balkan States. The unidimensional threat perceptions and the integreation of interest caused erosion in an alternative foreign policy decision-making process and national identical interest among the membership of collective security organizations, economic aids and political agreements, establishing a binding framework actualizing the Western interests. This process shows its negativity in cases such as the Cuban missille crisis, when Turkey's security became a bargaining element. In Johnson's letter stamping the national sensivity and the threat to be left alone against the Soviet threat or in the Cyprus issue's intervention phase, legal settlement and negotiation phases, Turkey's collective security efforts weren't considered at all and it was isolated within the international community. The permenancy of neutrality would have given Turkey alternative perceptions of the issues and threats independent from any pressure and the ability to follow her traditional balance diplomacy. However the rapprochment also ended the implementation oppotunity of traditional diplomacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire as a central and regional state transformed and compacted Turkey's vision to a periphery state's vision. (Sander, 2000, 184)

3.3.1. TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The neutrality polices of Turkey during the war caused resistance to the pressures of the Allies to take part in and open new fronts during the war. While buffering Turkey from the destruction of the war, neutrality also caused "Credibility Syndrome" (Kuniholm, 27-72 and Jones, 1955, 155 and Bostdroff, 2009, 10) especially after the war felt in the growing tension with the Soviets. The demands of border change, collective security of the Straits and regulations in the Montreux Convention were materialized in agressive diplomatic steps taken by the Soviet Union.

The diplomatc loneliness of Turkey became more visible in the negotiations between the Allies on Turkish sovereignty and territorial integrity in Potsdam Conference [1945]. Although, the Allies didn't agree on any specific status-quo changing solution, (Deluca, 1977, 512) Truman's attitudes showed that the U.S. couldn't comprehend Turkey's strategic importance at that time. The sign of alienation of the U.S. to Turkish foreign policy motives and primary matters should be evaluated by considering the lack of experience of the U.S. in Middle Eastern policies. Following a neutral policy, Turkey's credibility was seen questionable in terms of security and strategy. Turkey was not an official part of the European system during the war despite its reformation and identity building process. Turkey's strategic importance also became clear after the boundries of Europe and Middle East became definite, according to the new power distribution and balance that took shape after the war. Until the economic collapse of Britain, the U.S. didn't take part as efficiently as Britain.

The signs of expiration of British hegemony on the Middles East and the ways of her colonies revealed itself with the emerging need of deterrent hard power capacity after the demolishing war. Political control was needed for the potential of the U.S. to become the victorious super power of the war. The strategic and fundamental transformation was seen over the international arena and community, who witnessed a structural change by the participation of new political actors and states.

While the the fact that the U.S. was unaware of Turkey's significant role in the Middle East, Black Sea and Balkans is discussed, identical incompatibility should also be taken into account. Despite the existance of several international organizations that Turkey took a role in, Turkish identity was still open to question in terms of its culture, norms and concept of ideas. Considering the religious identity, which can be evaluated as they were on a main

stage, there was still time to cover the institutional distance and identity integration. The neutrality policies had disadvantages appearing as a matter of the western states' hesitation, whom Turkey needed notably after the war in terms of security. This hesitation caused convenience to of the western states while considering the strategic function of Turkey, which was very important for Turkey to actualize her foreign policy according to her threat perceptions.

According to Truman, the land demands of the Soviets should have been settled by means of two-state negotiations, the demands on the Straits and regulations of the Montreux Convention making the Strait an international seaway were different from the Soviet Union. (Deluca, 1977, 512) The compromises of the Allies on behalf of Turkey which could have weakened its sovereignty and strategic importance casued an insecurity impulse to prove the significance which would be materialized as political, economic and militray cooperation and eagerness toward the U.S.

A number of factors, between 1945 and 1947 convinced them that the only way to maintain peace and democracy was to establish a balance of power between the West and the East. (Bostdorff, 2009, 5)

The consensus of those U.S. and British on defending Turkey's national interests and primarily her sovereignty can be assessed as a sign of attempt to define the strategic role of Turkey for the region and international community. To maintain economic superiority, Middle Eastern oil meant a lot for the Allies. The threat over the region and the ways carrying oil to the Allies needed to be taken into account. Defending the ways and securing the energy flow made for a need for regional stability and power balance, which should have been structurally designed by the Allies. Turkey's role began to crystallize after the agressive attitudes of the Soviet Union over the region and energy roads. The Straits also had a strategic historical meaning for the Soviet Union, in addition to its role for energy flow. Its vital role was for sustainable energy, Turkey's strategic position also would have helped to prevent communist expansion over the region.

The policy of containment was created as a reponse to the actions and threat of the Soviet Union. According to Kennan, the Soviet Union's motivation was supported by the contradictory arguments of socialism and capitalism and the inevitable consequences of communism projected by both socailist theorists and activist leaders. While having such a determination about the motives of Soviet aggression and philosophy, he also rejected the perception of the Soviet threat as a military one but believed and emphasized the characteristics of the threat as ideological and economic which sould be responded to by the

support of the economic developmet and consolidation of ideological arguments. To accomplish such a long and thorough mission, Kennan advised a policy of "long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment". (Ambrose, 1984, 46 and Freeman, 2002, 4)

The implementation of such a project should be planned very efficiently by dividing the whole strategic mission to operative and tactical tasks considering and ordering them according to their significance in terms of the national security of the U.S. The plan was based on strengthening the states and institutions by economic development through strategically planned economic aids. However, without the existence of any strategic obligation, military aid should be limited regarding its cost and potential of creating conflict. (Gaddis, 1982, 30-31 and Freeman, 2002, 5)

Having had one of the longest boundaries with the Soviet Union, Turkey reconsidered the possibility of being commissioned and a loyal appropriate candidate for implementing the contamination policy. Turkish decision makers who felt the need of security against a possible Soviet invasion, observed the outputs of two bloc leader states carefully to secure its territorial integrity and institutional integration with the West. However the lack of infrastructure, due to World War II and interrupted development brought about a political belief that Turkey's own resources couldn't secure her economic survival. An external support seemed necessary to evoke the capacity utilisation to cope with the Soviet's communist and ideological threat. Hence, the U.S.'s containment policy was seen as a savior policy by the decision makers. The attempts of Turkey to present or create strategic motivation for the U.S. aid revealed themselves by the eager pro-western diplomacy.

The disarmament of the Straits territory would weaken Turkey's defense and could create several advantages in favor of the Soviet expansionist policies. The unwillingness of the Soviets in Iran and the other invaded states in Europe, in additon to her efforts of establishment of a Communist Alliance after the Yalta Conference created (Freeman, 2002, 5) a strategic motivation among the American decision makers.

Considering the regional power balance, the promised aid of Britain during the war was put into effect after the war. Afer the settlement of the Mousul issue, closer relations were needed with Britain, especially during the war, regarding the need of new fronts, sources and air bases. After the devastation brought by the war, Britain began to lose ground in the region. By default, through political and economic control over the region, a new guiding and leading state appeared: The U.S.

The Truman administration decided to implement the containment policy of Kennan in 1947, which can only be supported by Congress and the nation in a real or artificial threat. To manipulate or create of such a supportive atmosphere, the administration preferred to use the strategic significance of Greece and Turkey. After World War II, Britain had to cease economic aid to Greece because of economic complications. (Ambrose, 1984, 46 and Freeman, 2002, 5) The Birtish authorities informed the U.S. State Department about the critical situation which could worsen over a six week period. (Acheson, 1969, 127 and Freeman, 2002, 5)

The strategic proposal of Kennan was presented as the Truman doctrine and was intitiated by the implementation of military aid to Greece and Turkey. It was justified by the projection of threats to the economic situation that could result as a threat to the U.S. The focus was on economic construction of Europe to weaken the effective practices of the Communist parties. Turkey was also on the list of countries given aid for reconstruction. It was taken as a promising sign by Turkish decision makers, who had followed a neutral policy during the war. Since the focus was on the states that sacrificed during the war, it was possible for Turkey to be politically sidelined. Turkey's lack of infrustructure was taken into account in terms of ideological expansion. The Turkish economic situation was prone to any kind of unsteadiness, which would have made it easier for communism to expand to the region. Containment meant that Soviet influence and Communist ideology should be contained within the areas occupied by the forces of the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. *(http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/pons/s2_9143.pdf)*

Truman went before Congress on March 12 to ask for $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey. In order to gain public support, Truman "had to describe the Greek situation in universal terms, good versus evil, to get support for containment". (Ambrose, 1984, 131 and Freeman, 2002, 6 and Gaddis, 1982, 51)

The uncertainty and reluctance of the U.S. for supporting Turkey against the Soviet Union due to Turkey's neutrality policy in the war, changed by the comprehension of the Soviet intentions in the region. Actually, the main idea of the aid was to commercialize the need of the Greeks, however, Turkey was involved in the plan by the crystilization of the Soviet threat on Turkish sovereignty and terriotorial integrity beginning in World War II. (Satterwaite, 3)

''In order to help Turkey and Greece
M.Truman demanded 400 milion dollars''

President says:
''The importance of the survival of Turkey is great''

In Moscow Conference
''Molotov critisized the application of the Potsdam decision''

March 13th 1947

Figure no:3.3

It is an established fact that the turning point in Turkey's integration with the West is the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. (Çalis, 1997, 75-100) This is simply because it provided Turkey with the moral and psychological support it needed. (Çalis, 2000, 1) With this support, Turkey would become a staunch ally of the West and a militant advocate of bloc politics during the Cold War. Redefinition of the Soviet interests after World War II concerned Turkey directly in terms of the Straits and Eastern territories. The neutral position of Turkey couldn't serve its territorial integrity and sovereignty, considering the threats of the Soviet Union actualized by the aggressive notes after the war. Turkish foreign policy had no strong ground and needed the aid of the U.S. to put the Soviet threats out of action. The implementation of Soviet politics in the occupied areas was also perceived by the states neighbouring the Soviet Union. The undetermined foreign policy was also a threat to Turkish national interests in the long run. This situation needed to be brought to light, considering the change in the army, which also prevented Turkey from completing the unfinished development process. The deployment of such a large army caused hesitancy for decision makers to invest and was also a handicap for foreign investment delaying the institutional integratiotn with liberal economies. The Turkish government, encouraged by the American attitude, rejected the Soviet demands and showed admirable determination to resist if Russia should resort to open violence.(Satterwaite, 77)

The implementation of the aid program began with a preliminary survey of Turkey's military needs organized by the Pentagon. But before an aid mission could be sent to Turkey, it was necessary to negotiate an aid agreement under the terms of "Public law 75".

(Satterwaite, 78) (U.S. Congress, Senate, "A Decade Of American Foreign Policy'', 1949, 1225-1226)

The focus of the Truman Doctrine was military assistance program to modernize and train the Turkish army. Derived from the mobilization of five hundred thousand men, who had been mobilized since early 1940, the Turkish economy was very fragile and these economically destructive efforts were not yet enough to deal with the woeful Soviet forces. The aid, which could make it possible the restoration of the Turkish economy was strategically significant for the U.S. policies. (Satterwaite, 80)

Economic development by means of aid showed an interesting and material point of view of the U.S. diplomats, it reveals itself in Major Genral William H. Arnold's statement, in which he told the House of Comittee that in four years the Mission had delivered substantial amounts of military equipment and had trained twenty five thousand Turkish officer and men in the use of the equipment. Turkey was by far the greatest point of strength in the Middle East. (Satterwaite, 80) He adds:

> " For your dollar investment you are getting more for your dollar than in any other place. The Turks are fighters. For dollars you get ten Turks for one American for a comparative expense. (The monthly pay of a Turkish soldier at that time, it should be explained, was about twenty one cents)"

The material point of view of the U.S revealed itself, starting with the sacrifice of the Korean War as an approval for membership in NATO. Turkish threat perception acquired a material shape as a reflection of this perspective. Having had the moral and psychological support for the security, Turkish decision makers didn't delicately approach alternative security issues because of the binding framework of the agreements. As soon as the aid was received, there seemed no need to question sustainability, however since the aid determined economic growth it also created consistent demand. Sponsored by the U.S., Turkey was presented as a protector of stability of the region and the greatest power in the Middle East for the European Allies.

Parallel to this presentaion, Turkish decision makers also identified the role of the state according to this point of view. Economically weak and lacking infrastructure, Turkey had only her army to export to the Allies. Consolidated by its geopolitical significance, the army's status was assessed as endurable to actualize the national interests in a guaranteed atmosphere. To be a member of the newly formed and institutionally consolidated Euro-Atlantic circle, Turkish decision makers weighted the advantages of sacrifice against the disadvantages of being isolated and defenseless.

The Truman Doctrine laid the foundation of military integration of Turkey by means of military assistance. Military modernization changed the understanding and developed the vision of Turkish military personnel, who were still very effective in politics, security issues and the foreign policy of the state. The continuous economic aid accelerated the integration and dependency on military equipment and training. Military orientation to the Western Security policy generated by the U.S. became easier with the military assistance. The

participation in the Korean War and membership of NATO should be examined by considering the unprecedented establishment of the idea of necessity of foreign military assistance ignited by the Cold War policy-making psychology.

3.3.2. MARSHALL AID

Turkey's neutral position during the war raised the question about the solicitude of Turkey for becoming a member of the democratic World after the war. Despite the Soviet Union's aggressive presence over the occupied zones of Europe, Turkey's position meant and was regarded as a secondary object in considering the structural change in Europe. Moreover, Turkey didn't implement any worthy policies, with the exception of a few diplomatic gurantees. It was a priority for Turkish decision makers to present the vitality of carrying out any kind of task assigned by the undisputed leader of the western bloc, the U.S.

The U.S. strategy was characterized by the containment policy, which needed qualified allies capable of achieving ultimate goals of the western bloc. Left in ruins by the war, European countries, including Britain, didn't seem decently qualified for the purpose. To maintain sustainable protection, the economic infrustructure needed to be established for developing the production capabilities of Europe. Transformation of European countries could be provided by the determination of Europe's territorial limits. The European Recovery programme could cover only strategically important states who were eligible to implement the phases of the development programme in perfection.

There were several reasons that Turkey wasn't able to receive foreign capital to invest in its domain. First of all, Turkey was a country who survived a liberation war in which it directly fought the owners of the potential capital. During the Ottoman Empire period, merchants and tradesmen were not Turkish but non-muslim minorities who were believed to be the strongest basis for the suffering resulting from the liberation war. A primary

component of the Otoman community, Turks didn't have proven trade culture/capital formation and surplus to finance and be the basis of a new Turkish nation state. These circumstances led Turkish decision makers who preferred the exhange of populations (minorities) also moved out the capital accumulated by non-muslim minorities (and?) had to lean on the proprietary capital of the Anatolian Turkish people. In addition to these conditions, the lack of infrastructure, which required a large amount of investment at the hand of the newly born nation state obligated policy makers to follow certain statist economic policies. Until the begining of the war, growing tension between newly formed European blocs, rehearsal for World War II in Spain, intolerable threats of Italy on Turkish territorial integrity and soverignty determined cautious policies by giving priority to security issues. While carrying on a development programme regulated for each five years, unsettled issues of the Treaty of Lausanne forced Turkey to maintain a standing army with a notable number of personnel. Despite the clear distinction of westernism and western imperialism prensented by the Kemalist governments, the army also represented itself as an assurance of the development process within the boundaries of a sovereign, victorious and independent Turkish nation state. Western-directed development process meant also the consolidation of European and civilized Turkish identity at the same time as the acqusition of a different character from other succeeding states of the Otoman Empire.

The United States Congress advanced the direction and construction of the greatest global strategy project in history. Re-evaluation of the totalitarian face of communism materialized by the aggressive political moves of the Soveit Union heightened the degree of deterrence which needed to be responded decisively as the leader of the free world, the U.S. had to take action to maintain the freedom of people living in the countries volunteered to fight communism on the side of the U.S. It was also stated in the United Nations charter, that the protection of international peace and security was the chief object for the states that claimed to be the leader and precedent of the democratic nations. Maintaining the peace of the nations who were faced with the imminent risk of invasion or being governed by a totalitarian Soviet satellite government was the primary task. Economic and political stabilization of these states would directly affect the peace of the world. The Euro-centric World War had already shown that the peace and security consolidation must be begun on the European continent. For the American decision makers, it was also vital for the welfare of the American nation. The idea constituted the core of political justification of the Truman administration, while bidding for domestic political support and international legitimacy. The main strategy was planned "to preserve America's vital tactical interests" in Europe. The U.S. Congress

presented the plan as a step to "mobilize public and political support" from both parties, to take immediate precautions for the construction of Europe's sovereignty. The focus on the presentation was based on the relation of the destinies of Europe and American civizilation. (Payne and Thakkar, 136)

The Truman Doctrine introduced a dramatic change in U.S. foreign policy. With much of it in ruins, Europe's reconstruction required a massive economic support. The collapsed infrastructure left by the war had also manifested itself with the traces of social trauma, which paved the way for communist expansion at the hand of deliberate Soviet projection. These circumstances were also reported by the Secretary of Defense, G. Marshall, who stressed the urgency of the situation in the countries facing conditions prepearing for their possible surrender to Soviet totalitarism. After the assessment of the atrocious situation witnessed in Europe by a tour of Marshall's, a massive economic programme was formulated under his leadership. The aim of the program presented a move not a against any country but against poverty, depression and chaos according to a speech given by Marshall at Harvard in 1947. By the revival of a working economy, which could provide appropriate social and political conditions, free institutions could exist and integration would have been possible. Communist riots in Czechoslavakia against a freely elected goverentment galvanized the U.S. government to implement Marshall Aid. Machines, drugs technical equipment and industrial material were provided to build homes and businesses within the context of the Truman Doctrine. The aid consisted of a wide spectrum, from construction equipment to coal supplies to fuel the industries of Europe to increase the capacity, which also meant the recovery of Western Europe.

Parallel to the development in Europe, to bolster resistance of Turkey against the Soviet threat, "interim" American military and economic aid, authorized under the Truman Doctrine, arrived the following year. However, as George Harris has noted, (Machado, 86-87) the Marshall Plan was not designed to deal with Turkey's particular situation.

After all, no "recovery" or "reconstruction" of wartime damage was needed. Unlike Western Europe, Turkey struggled with neither a balance of payments problem nor a dollar gap. Ankara, however, strongly disagreed. Disciples of Kemal Ataturk also did not want to squander an opportunity for Westernization, which promised creation of a unified home market. (Machado, 86-87) Turkish officials' eagerness for the aid casued greater expectations from the aid supporting the modernization and developlement porcess in Turkey.

The neutrality policy of Turkey casued a "credibility syndrome" and directly after a "loyalty issue" was revealed in economic and military aid after the war. The measurement of

suffering and need for help were considered under the aid plans for recovery in Europe. On July 1, 1948, the architect of the "neutrality policy", President Ismet Inonu, told C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times that his country was "getting a very stingy allotment under the Marshall Plan." (Machado, 87) With the amount of ECA aid as well as its apportionment, the Turks were chronically disappointed.

The success of the programme also represented the first sign of the U.S.'s determination as the world's most dominant economic superpower. By beating back communism over the Europe and stabilizing the political atmosphere, the U.S. passed its first global examination as the leader of the western bloc.

For the Turkish institutionalization process, the Marshall Aid was a sign of integreation with the western perspective materialized in the membership of NATO. It also gave the right to the U.S. to determine the production and development strategy of Turkey in the short run. The collective security umbrella led Turkey to complete her development in agriculture, industry and banking. However, the Turkish foreign policy perspective was then at the hands of the U.S. as the leader of the Western bloc considering the security issues.

As GI. Marshall reports:

''The needs of Turkey are examined''

''The American government considers preparing new aid projects''

February 5th 1948

Figure no:3.5

3.4. DEMOCRAT PARTY PERIOD (1950-1960)

Under this title of the paper, I will generally discuss the period between 1950-1960. The period that has often been examined in several ways related to modern Turkish history. In this period, which is called the Democrat Party or the Menderes decade, Adnan Menderes formed the government five times as the Prime Minister, presuming that I will find as much evidence to support the thesis. For instance, the Korean War, the membership of NATO, and application to the European Economic Community, which are empirical evidences showing Turkey's realist strategic moves.

After World War II, Turkey was also close to a change, not unlike the international system. With the dissolution of the fascist regimes in Germany, Italy and Japan, the world started to seem to change politically and by the founder of the new order new universal ideals produced for the international community. The events affected the internal and external affairs of the states. Turkish foreign policy history has to be researched starting from this period when the new status quo was established by the bloc leader states, which led Turkey to become a satellite state and deepen her relations essentially with the Western bloc especially with the U.S. Under these radically changing conditions of the world, Republican party leader and second president Inonu had to allow the dissident groups to establish a party: The **Democrat Party** which leveraged the politics by dragging Turkey to the democratic side of the World blocs.

Turkish endeavour can be defined as a struggle to be neutral in World War II because of the distraction efforts of both sides. Turkey had to declare war on Germany in 1945 to be able to join United Nations. The declaration of the war seen as a formality yet the government of the period took it very seriously as it can be seen from a newspaper view: (Deringil, 2001, 16)

> "…defending the straits line prevented many nations to join the war…The reason that Turkey was invited to sign the United Nations ….her fight on the side of the democracies and the total of her services on behalf of this idea…"

It was seen as the fruit of the shift westward. Turkey was getting what she deserverd by being an ally of the British-France bloc and a friend of the Germany. (Deringil, 2001, 146) It was a back of the knife policy followed by Turkey, who paid the costs and demanded the rewards or benefits after the war of joining of the war but she never got to the point where

there was a common understanding that was seen as fair by the allies for not taking part in the war effectively because of the insufficient conditions.

The policy in the war was a sign of acknowledgement of loneliness and isolation. The most dangerous situation that Turkey faced after the War was the defeat of the Axis powers and dissolution of the parties and the aggressive regimes in Italy and Germany and the rise of the United States after the war as an absolute superpower, Turkey felt the necessity for having close relations with the western bloc led by the U.S. Turkey found the west bloc more beneficial and appropriate for its interests and showed loyalty by taking part in the San Francisco conference as a founding member and signer of the United Nations Treaty, which was a promise for implementing the democratic ideals. (Zucher, 1998, 302) By signing the treaty, Turkey also became a more democratic regime constitutionally.

‘’Our relations has finished with Germany since last midnight.’’

Prime Minister said:

‘’This is not a decision of war. Its dependency on war decision depends on the other party’’

August 3rd 1944

Figure no:3.5

‘’The congress of D.P. gathered yesterday’’

‘’Celal BAYAR, in his speech taking more than an hour, stated the performances, complaints and the demands of the party’’

January 8th 1947

Figure no:3.6

On 14th May 1950, (Yesilbursa) Menderes narrated the party program after he was declared a member of the cabinet in the parliament. In first chapter he criticized the

Republican Party's period and in the second part he gave clues about the route on which they were going to take Turkey:

> "…We do not need to repeat the sincere loyalty to the ideal of the United Nations. It is very clearly known by the whole world that our peaceful foreign policy's nature is depending on the traditional British-France alliance and the close friendship and collaboration with United States, always loyal to its friendship of the far of near, big or small states …."

He also emphasized that their basic goal for the foreign policy was to strengthen the relations with the allies and the United States, who were supporting the peaceful foreign policy of Turkey with the assistance of Truman Doctrine and Marshall aid. He stressed the vital role of the East Mediterranean security, which was crucial for the security of all Middle East and the world. (Ozturk, 1968, 363-364 and Ankara Üniversitesi İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk yolu dergisi, no: 41, May 2008, 35-61) Menderes thought that it would have been possible to protect the state against a possible attack by means of several security treaties in the free states bloc completing each others missing points until a collective security system was founded. He defined the United States as a "Great Friend" and also saw the importantance of having close economic and political relations with Britain and France. The Democrat Party period was comparatively more active in foreign affairs. In this chapter, I will discuss how it was necessary that the perceptions of the Turkish government have similarities with the Western bloc. The rising Soviet threat to the territorial integrity and the Straits forced Turkey to seek and submit to Western policy, as it is clearly shown by the NATO membership process and the assignment of one brigade's power for the Korean War.

It was extremely hard to distinguish the charateristics of the foreign policy of the RPP and DP until the 1950 elections. The focus on foreign policy maintained good relations with the Western bloc and the presentation and acknowlegdement of the Soviet threat was the most dangerous and profound that Turkey had ever confronted. Both parties were aware of the fact that anti-communist political behaviours also supported the presentation of national identity of Turkey's as Western, which they preferred to promote both within the borders of the state and in the eyes of the Western bloc. (Ozturk, 1968, 363-364)

Turkey's Western identity construction had been carried on for two hundred years however, as periodic political conjuncture, which had structured the process in the international arena and power balance, especially before and after the World War II, were curiously taken into account. Institutional orientation and structural adjustment of the state played a significant role for the construction of western identity and its presentation to the world.

In the early years of the Turkish Republic, Kemalist political vision had a noticable impact on Turkish identity transformation. Strictly following the reformation process led Turkish society to a conscious level of nation state, on the basis of nationality. Enjoyment of civil rights assumed by the laws acquired from the western states helped to accelerate the identity construction process until the start of World War II. Every phase of westernization was enforced by the international interpretion endeavour by means of membership in international and regional organizations, which also provided stabilization and regional status quo, requiring isolation from the other successors and their issues, which was ensured by the policy makers who recognized the importance of civilized and institutional westernized Turkish identity.

One of the distinctive pillars of the DP's foreign policy was that Kemalism wasn't perceived as the only ideology which represented itself as the first deviated foreign policy. This also meant a decisive and different effort for the identification of the DP from its rival. The difference was because of the difference in the ideological background of the DP. According to Laciner: **Kemalism (seemed necessary for the time)**, **Liberalism** (in economic issues) and **Conservatism** (more tolerant on religious matters). (Laciner, 2011, 111)

Despite the existence of several complex reasons for the statist economic approach of Turkish policy makers, few of them are readily explained in the previous sections. While the determination of this selection emphasized the transformative atmosphere of the international community, the circumstances preparing the rise of Democrat Party are also presented. The Democrat Party also crystallized the ideological gap between the post-war blocs and imposed a challanging determination to have Turkey integrate the Western bloc, in consideration of the serious threats by the Soviet Union. Having had comparatively better relations characterized by the policies under the effects of the western perspective of the East, Turkey and the Soviet Union changed their policies after World War II. Agressive demands of the Soviet Union over Turkish territory endangering Turkish sovereignty caused the detoriation of relations that had

formerly been peaceful. The totalitarian regime led by Stalin was critisized by Turkish policy makers as being a corrupt administration. In addition to the pursuit of identitiy consolidation efforts of Turkey, the political pressure of the Soviet Union caused Turkey to percieve a threat and canalized her ideologically to western side. The ideological background of the West depended on the varied composition of a liberal approach. Ideological integration could only be provided by structural adjustment of the state at the hand of a coherent government.

Turkey's economic infrastructure had taken on a statist-visioned shape, starting at the foundation. Nationalism and the identity construction process were supported by this ideological source determined by the international position of the newly founded Turkish State. As the quick ideological transformation and differentiation revealed itself, the opposing group in the RPP had a different ideological economic approach and gained strength, gaining adherence in the party. There had already been efforts of organizing an opposing party provided by Ataturk with his arbitrary status who also defined the limits of the opposition. Liberal tradition had a peculiar articulation through Turkish political history which also revealed itself vehemently in those experimental opposition movements. The liberal Republic or the free republican party is a good example, which was embraced by the conservatives who thought of the existence of an opposing party as an opportunity to reverse or slow down the reformation process initiated by Ataturk. One party state system played a conservative role for statist approach and structured its bureaucracy, gradually representing itself as the protector of the state regime accepting no deviation as legitimate.

The deviation in the methodology of foreign policy implementation of the Democrat Party should be researched through external atmospere. In particular the political and economic reasons of the Democrat Party's coming to power are explained. The transformation of Turkey in its international and regional role, from a partnership to an Ally takes root in the necessity of a territorially expanded status quo. The requirement was also internationally institutionalized by the war's victorious states. Because of the post-war psychology, which was of a completely different character than that in the period between the wars, a deviation in methodology from the basic principles of Kemalist foreign policy was needed.

With the help of several great election victories of the DP in the 1950s, the ideological and identical deviation, showed significant differences. (Gonlubol in Karpat, 1975, 16 and Danforth) As stated in the previous sections, the founding idealogy that sprang from Kemalism had constructed a well-established identity, characterized by a strong political segment and state bureacracy. Having acquired different characteristics in terms of ideology and social/political background, the Democrat party presented a new foreign policy opposing

and clashing with the basic principles of Kemalism, such as independence. Unquestioned rapprochment derived from the stated reasons, a new perspective of the Democrat Party alienated from the state's traditional ways of foreign policy making.

Criticisms of Kemalist policy makers on western methodology based on the traditional posture of Turkey, rooted in the motto "Peace at Home, Peace in the World". Dependent upon this motto, the foreign policy had been followed since the foundation of new state, Turkey could remain neutral even during World War II. In other words, according to the criticisms, the Kemalist approach followed cautious policies to secure its own national interests. However, power distribution and new technology had to be taken into consideration according to the Democrat Party leaders.

The second pillar of the Democratic approach, and perhaps the most important, was its American-style Westernism. Unlike the RPP's radical, Republican Westernism, based on the revolutionary French experiences, Democratic Westernism was based on the British-American model. It was evolutionary, not revolutionary, therefore, the Democrats sincerely believed in an American political and economic model and dreamed of transforming Turkey into a 'little United States'. (Laciner, 2011, 114) The ideological deviation causing the trasformation of foreign policy methodology also derived from the need of ideological integration with the western bloc. Considering the leading position of the U.S., for Turkey who had followed a westernist pattern for hundreds of years, it was seen as a historical determination to the international pressures by means of western institutionalism at that period. Turkey's development process was regarded as having lost its revolutionary characteristic because of the particular circumstances of the post-war period. Considering power distribution, two bloc international atmosphere and the need of American leadership the other economically ruined European states, the Democrat Party leaders, pragmatically never hesistated to show their willingness as the representatives of Turkish state for the integration based on economic and security institutionalism. In addition to international circumstances and a demand for integration, the Democrat party leaders who came to power by criticizing the negative affects of the Turkish social development's revolutionary characteristics on Turkish society dymnamics. The political back ground of the Democrat party had also put pressure on decsion makers, demanding remarkable changes in economy and politics in Turkey.

Turkey strongly needed the political and diplomatic support of the U.S. and Britain, which was also ciritisized in terms of showing the path that Turkey would have depended on

during the Cold War. As it was detailed above, the Truman Doctine was a new approach for the U.S. and the world order. Due to the devastation of the war, Europe was very vulnerable to possible actualization of class movementes and totalitarian governrments controlled by the Soviet Union and desperately needed external support to regain economic balance and be able to directly defend its self-contained capability. Turkey's tendency to have the privileges of the European states was more about security concerns.

After WWI, the change of the RPP's policies was because of tactical necessity followed by Inonu who felt the immidiate need for the help of the U.S. On the other hand, the DP's firm commitment to American policies was critisized by the Kemalists, who felt that the transformation of the foreign policies was making Turkey a bastion of the Western bloc. (Laciner, 2011, 114) The DP defended its policies with the argument that Turkey's conventional anti-communist outputs bolstered the Western identity and provided international aid, which the goverentment needed to maintain the economic growth and consolidated it into its scepticism-free Westernism which also gave a free and strong hand in domestic policies. (Laciner, 2011, 114) However the "Scepticism-free Westernism" caused a security dilemma for Turkey during the conducting of the Cyprus policies and Cuban missile crisis.

The realist-aggressive steps taken by almost every western state during and because of the war created a mutual scepticism of the West and for Turkey who struggled to stay out of the war. The existance of mutual scepticism for both sides in the atmosphere of the post war period presented a particular challenge for Turkey. (Robinson, 1963, 175)

Harris states the reason for the subsequent rise in the US commitment to Turkey as the breakdown of talks at the Foreign Ministers Conference of December 1945. (Harris, 14-18 and Abou-El Fadl, 2009) The heated exchange of Soviet, American, British and Turkish notes during 1946 gave a rise in the defusion of tension, but there was no substantial U.S. aid for Turkey. Only after Britain asked the U.S. to turn over its economic role to the states in the region, this was when the strength of Washington's policy become apparent. While Washington stuck with the military aid, international agencies seemed also to be an alternative for the Turkish economy. The strategic success over the Soveiet Union could only be possible with economic coordiation and close relations between these states in this very strategic region of Europe and the World. (Vanderlippe, 176- 178 and Abou-El Fadl, 2009)

The Soviet threat over the territorial integrity of Turkey had an impact on economic stagnation due to the need for maintaining a large army. Increased aggression of the Soviet Union in Europe forced Turkey to integrate with Europe ideologically as well, which meant a

re-definition of national interest and identity and directly threats. As post-war negotiations continued, Turkey, who had struggled for neutrality during the war, tried to pay attention to its strategic value for both sides in terms of strategic balance of power. The diplomatic strategy of Turkey focused on the presentation of geopolitical vitality as a string element, which could change the power balance of the region and the world. The emphasis on geopolitical vitality combined with the role of Turkey with her defense capability based on economic infrastructure in terms of economy. Turkey could be classified as an underdeveloped country because of the defense budget saved for the war and its uncompleted industrial development. The strategic role revealed itself in the diplomatic notes of the Soviet Union which had an agressive characteristic over the sovereingty of Turkey. Actually this move was perceived by the North-Atlantic front as normal, considering the policies of the Soviet Union in other parts of the Europe and other occupied zones.

The Democrat Party's foreign policy approach, contrary to the Kemalist understanding and based on a new type of relation chracterized by the "firm commitment" to the West, which was institutionalized by the economic aid and involvements. (Laciner, 2011, 109- 157)

This main idea laid the groundwork for the argument of the thesis should be researched under the title of "Firm Commitment" of the Democrat Party. Unlike the predecessor decision makers, the Democrat Party's decision makers showed a tendency towards rigorous institutionalization as if they were in a chain of command. As explained in Neoliberalism section, international institutionalsm centralized the assessment of threat perceptions by the strictly followed international institutionalism through the international law. Horizontal linkage provided with the number of institutional practices and ammendments under particular institutions. Structural adjusment of the state and bureaucracy by legal process mandated by the exceptional circumstances of the Cold War brought unprecedented changes for Turkish foreign policy. Institutions of the state were alligned with the international institutions which also ensure new legal regulations binded Turkey in international arena. In addition to the impact of these regulations over Turkish decision makers, international institutional integration also helped the construction of a new bureaucratic identity clashing with the Kemalist bureauacracy. Based on primarily security concerns, Turkish foreign policy making and threat assesment process were particularly influenced by the Western bloc especially the U.S. threat assesments which were centrally on communism throughout the Cold War. The impact of threat perceptions on Turkish foreign policy was basically characterized by the deviation in the institutionalization methodology based on firm commitment without any further detailed consideration of possible conflicts of

interest. The idea of integration acquired a simulated charateristic, determined an identical threat perspective, generated unidimensional depended foreign policy orientation process and also required economic support, which helped to increase dependency on the U.S. aid and credits of international agencies sponsored by the U.S.

Western identity construction by means of different methodolgy also depended on domestic ideological polarization between the Democrat Party and the state bureacuracy/RPP axis. As the level ofcriticism increased on both domestic and international policies of the Democrat Party, social and political tension growth revealed itself in student movements parallel to the World, which were organized and supported by the state bureacracy in coordination with the RPP. Shortage of the economic credit of the U.S. was deeply felt by the Democrat Party leaders who also had difficulties in legitimizing their policies,which showed a totalitarian tendency according to opposing political segments of the society. Acqusition of a different character derived by the political interferences of the two-sided Turkish foreign policy making process left in the hands of foreign political and ideological conflict was begun to be perceived as a threat to national stability and security of the regime by the army. The idea of protection of the state on behalf of nation was implemented by the 27th May coup d'etat.

Political and military partnership agreements led Turkey to a permanent policy making process, dependent on security concerns of the Cold War period. The Democrat Party's perspective lacked Western scepticism; for the DP Turkey was not alone, there were common threats shared by the democratic world and not only by Turkey. According to this understanding, international solidarity could save Turkish interests as well. As a result, Turkey under the DP rule championed international co-operation and organisations against the communist attacks.(Laciner, 2011, 115)

The discussion on deviation of foreign policy and threat perceptions focused on the institutionalization process, which primarily concerned security issues and was deeply felt after the outbreak of World War II. The impact of ideological polarization on threat perceptions and foreign policy revealed itself in a firm commitment through the institutional integration of the state. Radicalism of the ideologies constructing different identities determined a new approach in foreign policy devoted to the service of the Western institutionalization process. It is understandable if the Cyprus issue and Cuban missile crisis are examined carefully taking into consideration the bitter independence struggle of the Turkish State since its founding.

During the Cold War, promordial western approaches were ignored because with the Cold War psychology and identitical process, Turkish foreign policy was based on an assumption that Turkish national interests were identical with Western interests.

''It is understood that Democrat Party won the selection in numerous provinces of the state''

''Participation percentage is over 80%''

May 15th 1950

Figure no:3.7

''The covenant was signed last night and Our Army invaded the Straits before sunrise''

''The delegates cheered the victory of the Turkish policy and said : Thanks to you we laid the foundation of great statue of peace''

July 21st 1936

Figure no:3.6

The Democrat Party period is exmained under the sections of Korean war which opened the way for the membership of NATO guaranteed the security of the homeland from the Soviet Union. The Cyprus issue and the situation before the London and Zurich conferences deeply effectedeconomic dependency and development strategy was shaped with the the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall aid. As Kemal Karpat puts it, himself seeming largely is convinced of the connection: (KARPAT, 1975, 131 and DANFORTH)

''The liberalization which started in 1945 was a step aimed at achieving political Westernisation – democracy.''

The political integration phase with the West was the application for membership in the EEC. Turkey's progress towards its goal of 'contemporary civilisation' took its reference point from the idea of close co-ordination of 'liberal democracies of 'the West'. The role model was the United States, which strictly followed the inviolability of private property, and rejection of the notion of class struggle. (Erogul, 60 and Danforth) To accomplish this mission, subsequent instituionalization process was initiated, which is explained in detail in following sections.

''9th Turkish Grand Nation Assembly opened yesterday''

''Celal BAYAR elected as president''

May 23rd 1950

Figure no:3.8

3.4.1 KOREAN WAR

The main factors shaping the Turkish foreign policy were threats and security concerns derived from the attitudes of the Soviet Union. To secure the territorial integrity and stay out of a war with the Soviets, Turkey felt the necessity of being a member in almost all of the political, military and economic organizations. The determination for the integration with the Western security system based on economy, political and (most importantly at that time) military, showed itself in the speeches of the decision makers of the period. The Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan were signs of this determintation, rather than economic dependency. Military, agriculture and industrial modernization were financed by aid from the Marshall Plan also gave the right to the donors to determine the framework for the usage of the eoconomic tools.

''The government took a gloabally significant decision''

''We participate in Korean War with a military force of 4500 personnel''

July 26th 1950

Figure no:3.11

To develop the discussion on the different perspective of the U.S. and Britain about the Europeans of Turkey, a comparison over the historical relations that created different Turkish each country is needed.

The British hegeomonic perspective of the Middle East on the protection of roads to the colonies and energy sources in the region chracterized the understanding of British policy makers and strategists about the Middle East didn't change after World War II, however the cost of the war on British economy determined the detante of British hegomonic policies over the region. Deprived of hegemony-based decisive policies over the region also brought a change in the perspective about the states. Turkey as a non-Arabic national state was a part of the Middle East not Europe. Thus, in any kind of application in order to recover Europe, Turkey shouldn't have been the part of it. The sole objective of Turkey could only be arranged through the co-ordination of the other Middle Eastern states' objectives. Even being secular and comparatively more developed and identically consistent with the West, Turkey could at most only be a model for the other underdeveloped and uncivilized states.

On the other hand, the American perspective was different from the British in terms of the evolution of Turkish geostrategical position. The level of strategic alienation of Britain was parallel to its economic depression, the U.S. took Britain's strategic place within a process controlled by co-ordination comittees or mutual organizations representing a common understanding about the international conjunture. As one of the victorious superpowers, the U.S. had already proved to be the industrial, military and economic leader of the North-Atlantic Territory and had stepped in to the breach for peace and liberation in Europe. Europeans took on a new meaning especially after the war parallel to the containment policy

of the U.S. The determination of the Turkish strategic role and objectives were identical with Greece as the protectors of South Eastern Europe. The Truman Doctrine and the following Marshall aid were based on this definition, which was different from the British perspective of Turkey.

The decision to participate in the Korean War was a sign of a new foreign policy characterized by the perspective of the Democrat Party leaders. It was the first time the Republic went to fight in a country miles away from the homeland. This was quite radical and new for Turkey's foreign policy. (Bagci, 2007, 7 and Akkaya, 2012) This was a serious implementation, leading Turkey to develop different and global perceptions that showed also in the Cuban missile crisis and other global issues. The security of an ally now became important for Turkey, who had implemented realist neutralist policies during World War II.

Despite the internal reactions for the decision to deploy 4500 military personnel for the war in Korea, the Democrat Party leaders were determined to implement the decision. The general opinion of being a member of the "Western Democratic Front" gave the courage to the decison makers. The general agreement with the opposing party on being a member of the Western world gave the Democrat Party political space.

''Peace negotations start in Korea''

''The commander of the United Nations reported that the opposing proposals of the reds were accpeted''

July 4th 1951

Figure no:3.12

Former allies, the U.S and the Soviet Union had liberated Korea from Japan, who enforced Koreans to accept Japanese authority during the invasion in World World II, now applied the strategy of separation, dividing Korea into North and South. The 38th parallel division was perceieved as an obstacle for Kim II Sung who thought of

the separation as a temporary measure. As a national hero, Kim II Sung sought ways to unify the Korean people under communist rule. In 1949, Stalin didn't permit an invasion because of the crisis in Berlin and other parts of the Europe considering the power balance and to prevent a possible strategic breakdown. However late in 1949, new developments appeared that could transform the power distribution. First was the detonation of the first of Soviet atomic bomb, which escalated the tension throughout the Cold War. This new concept of the war had a different and irretrievable character due to its massive destructive quality. The second was even harder to accept for the Western bloc: The final success of the communist revolution in China led by Chairman Mao. The agreement between Stalin and Mao established a united and stronger communist frontier, the U.S sought volunteer allies in theinternational arena to balance the vulnerable strategic position.

Encouraged by these crucial developments, Stalin permitted North Korean communist leader, Kim II sung, to invade South Korea and establish a communist regime. North Korean communists who soughtthe unification of Korean people living on the Korean peninsula flooded into the south. Equipped with Russian weaponry and artillery, approximately ten combat divisions started an offensive in Asia which transformed the Cold war into a hot war for the first time.

The immediate action against an ally had a shocking affect on the U.S. policy makers who had no contingency plan for a possible invasion of South Korea. Settlement of the retalliation strategy by the Americans was based on the internationalization of the process. It was presented to world that this was not just a matter for the Americans but the world. It was also an opportunity to incorporate the states against aggressive communism, which had become evident with the Korean invasion, sponsored by the communist frontier. The U.S. held a security council meeting to legitimize military intervention in Korea andgarnered the support of 16 states to fight communism under the leadership of the U.S.

The Truman administration determined the threat assessment for the states volunteered to fight against communism. Even in a small country miles away from the U.S., happenings on behalf of communism concerned every American. This statement should have also been assessed the same way in Turkey, who had transformed her own national interests. If such action could happen anywhere in the world, the next country could have been any of those in support of the western democratic ideals and they directly felt the danger of communist expansion. With the aid of this motivation that triggered the national

determination for the fight against communism, the U.S. also legitimized the war against the communist frontier under the United Nations.

The U.S. also led the United Nations forces who stepped into war in Korea to capture the capital and end the war in a short while. However, the nearest forces to Korea were in Japan and were not equpped to fight. Reinforcement provided by the U.S. and the other nations opened the road to the Chinese mainland, which also dragged Chinese forces into the war and extended the time and space of the war becomingmore complicated afer the bitter combat and casulties on both sides. As expected, two hundred thousand Chinese Communist volunteers who believed the justice of their course diverted the course of the war.

The American policy makers claimed that they were fighting for their natural security and survival after the enterance of China into the war. This statement was not exclusively about the national security of the Americans but of the components of North Atlantic frontier. Turkey, as a part of this integrity, had to consent to these assessments to secure her mainland. Turkish decision makers realized that the national interests needed an identical definition with The U.S. who could only have the power to protect Turkey's territorial integterity.

As both sides began to lose sources, negotiation came on the political agendas as a priority in 1952. The number of communist soldiers balanced the American supremacy. In 1953 after the elections in the U.S. and the death of Stalin brought sides to negotiate based on acceptable terms. Chinese, North Korean and the representatives of the United Nations signed a treaty. After three thousand U.N. casulties, 54000 American losses and approximately two million Koreans killed, there were no victors of the war. According to the Allies, the line was held and communism contained in the North.

To gain the support of the West and the UN, Turkey proposed to participate in the war, which gained it remarkable credit from the decision makers of NATO. On June 25th 1950, the DP's proposal regulating the deployment of a Turkish force of 4,500 was accepted with one abstention in Turkish Parliement. The participation in the Korean War meant fighting with the U.S. troops as the third largest contingent afterthe U.S. and South Korean forces. (Kilic, 1959, 155 and Laciner, 2011, 124) The Korean adventure was a clear determination of Turkey's potential contribution to the Western bloc, which was seen in the performance praised in the war. The Korean War clearly showed the strategic importance and potential in containing the Soviet Union. The Birtish argument before the war, which determined Turkey as a regional balancing force was falsified. (Kurkcuoglu, Eds Bagis, 1984, 95 and Laciner, 2011, 125) Turkey showed its readiness and determination by its performance and provided its entry into the core of the West. This process was seen as a

reward by Turkish decision makers for its decisive support of the West. On 18 February 1952, Turkey became the only Muslim member of NATO and the only member which shared a border with the Soviet Union.

For Turkish Westernists, Turkey was now a full member of the Western family. In the words of Altemur Kilic,

> "…the NATO alliance filled Turkish hearts with pride and exaltation. They were no longer 'outsiders'. They were at last part of the West." (Kilic, 1959, 155 and Laciner, 2011, 159)

On 23 September 1951, Inonu clearly declared that NATO membership would contribute towards peace in Turkey and in the world: (Erdimer, 1956, 66)

> ''Turkey's participation to the Atlantic Pact could be a valuable factor for the world peace. Turkey's national security is also supported with participation of Turkey in a great international organization. We are grateful to the US and to all of the member states. Hereafter our tasks increase in terms of world peace.''

High probability of hot conflict between blocs led Turkey to be a member of the newly integrated Atlantic Pact after the war. As a member of the Atlantic Pact and who also suffered from the consequences of the ideologic war, Turkey justfied the structural adjustment of the state according to North Atlantic institutionalization process now that the communist threat was crystalized and needed to be taken into consideration following domestic politics.

The concept of "full membership of the Western family" had a core role triggering an open ended process for Turkey's foreign policy moves. Considering the Kemalist perspective and foreign policy objectives for the civilization, Europeanization and development process was materialized by legal framework and diplomatic traditions implemented by successor governments. Turkey's NATO membership as a reward for the costs of Korean War has been highlighted to show the strength of the Kemalist ideology in Turkish foreign policy. Yet, Turkey's membership also underlined the European unwillingness to accept the Turks. Similar to previous RPP governments, the DP perceived

the European civilisation as a secular civilisation, based on scientific, positivist values. Thus, the DP government did not lose any opportunity to confirm its Europeanness, (Laciner, 2011, 126) which was more deep-rooted and systematically legalized and materailized by concrete diplomatic steps.

3.4.2. NATO

In the Yalta Conference, state leaders disscussed the possibility of a new outlook on Europe. Transition to democracy through the free elections in Europe was provided, however the situation in Eastern European countries was less fortunate in terms of the elections conrolled by the Soviet Union, who manipulated its partisans to take control of the states. Tensions were mounting after several other crisis which led the U.S.-European states to formulate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance agency to provide mutual defense and cooperation. Based on Washington's treaty, which established an organization aiming to protect the existence of Western Europe. Parallel to the idea of protection of Western European ideals, communism was represented as in the Euro-Atlantic region as an evil and malignant way of life having had a strong tendecy to expand throughout the countries economically and politically unstable. The idea of communism as an epidemic brought the idea of containment, which was a kind of political quarantine. Construction of new symbols for the consolidation of western identity against the Soviet Union caused realist threat assessments by the U.S. and other countries integrated under NATO.

After WW II, Turkey followed a Westernist policy, which also caused the deviation from its neutral role in its foreign policy. International atmosphere was also very effective forcing Turkey to initiate a decisive democratisation process aiming at close co-operation with the West to take part in the reconstruction process of Europe and justified these efforts by the regime's sustainability and strategic development. Strict westenization of

economy and directly foreign policy radicalized by the leaders of the Democrat Pary: Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, and Refik Koraltan. The Democrat Party's views on domestic and foreign policy under PM Menderes is accepted as a serious deviation from the Kemalist foreign policy tradition implemented. (Laciner, 2011, 109- 157)

As explained in previous chapters, the Democrat Party represented itself as an ideological alternative for Turkish policy making. The deviation in policy making and threat assessment based on ideological preferences in liberal economic perspective required institutional integration and structural adjustment of the state, which had followed statist and planned economy policies since its foundation. Moreover, the Democrat Party identified itself as anticommunist and accused the government of being soft on communism, thus justifying its existence in Turkish political life and gaining American support. (Laciner, 2011, 111)

The cautious policies of Ataturk and his successors with every state in the region derived from the bitter experiences during the dissolution period of the Ottoman Empire. However the sympathy and economic support of the Soviet Union were needed to secure the liberation war. The mutual enemy had been identified as imperialism. Apart from detoriated relations after World War II, threat perceptions of both states had to change. A political party that followed statist policies now became concerned about communist expansion because of the diversion in the Soviet Union's attitudes after the war. The Democrat Party, more liberal and eager for integration through the instituionalization by the support of the U.S. marginalized communism and assessed an identical threat perception with the U.S.

The ideological division evolved and Democrat Party presented by making empahasis on Turkey's firmly committed ally of the West. The Democrat Party identified itself as a conservative party,protecting the moral and national values of the nation, which had already been in a dilemma about secularization and conservation of the lifestyle. In addition to foreign policy applications and also in thedomestic policies of the Democrat Party, communism had been one of the political and ideological targets. This approach also served for the legitimization of Turkish determination to fight the war on communism, which provided a consistent and sufficient economic and military aid. Turkey continued to develop while not considering military development budget expenses, forcing the Turkish economy to choose a way of securing its own integrity through the protection of the U.S. by means of the organizations and economic/military aid which determined a permanent and dependent political path.

Although Turkey and Greece were in the strategic planning of NATO's Mediterranean region, they expected to be assured by the U.S. Despite the dissappointment, Turkey had to perceive this situation as progress for that time. In Oran's words: (Oran, 85 and Abou-El Fadl, 2009)

> 'the Turkish leaders realized that, for Turkey, there was no alternative to NATO membership.'

Turkey still had to contend not only with American reluctance, but with the added complication of Britain's plans being at odds with both its own and those of the U.S. However, the Democrats were attuned to the ways in which the Allies' respective positions seemed to be changing. In the U.S., developments in the Korean war, as well as Yugoslavia's recent conflict with the Soviets, were significant. 'The idea of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia becoming the shield to protect western Europe against a Soviet offensive through south-eastern Europe was developing fast in the minds of the American military.' (Athanassopoulou, 196 and Abou-El Fadl, 2009)

It should also be stated that the actualization of idelogical conflict in Korea in terms of the strategic motivation that obligated the U.S. to formulate the establishment of a permanent defense organization consisting of the countries willing to fight communism all over the World. (developments in Korea are explained in detail in the Korean War section) Sino-Soviet agreement was a great challenge even for the U.S. despite its economic and military capacity. What was happening in Asia could have happened in Europe any time soon, therefore a systematic deterrent military co-operation agency was an inevitable needthat should have been legitimized under th United Nation Charter's seventh chapter. The United Nations and the security council were institutional signs of the post-war period and new status quo of the World, however, the ideological tension's reflections became more serious by the moves of two blocs searching for a parameter that could change the strategic balance. Europe, as the center of the world and the conflict, despite the transition of the Euro-centric world declaration of the Soviet Union about the atomic bomb was one of the other significant developments consolidated the need for an organization like NATO. What was Turkey's role and position among these developments? How did western powers percieve Turkey's strategic role?

Ambassador McGhee's emphatic messages to Washington on Turkey's centrality to Middle East defense had played a role, as well as his warnings that Turkey might resume its

earlier neutrality otherwise. (Abou-El Fadl, 2009) The Turkish government under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes followed a very active policy and kept pressing the major western powers for Turkey's adherence to NATO. After some consideration, key figures of the US political and military leadership (not least officers holding NATO posts) emerged in early 1951 as strong advocates of Greek and Turkish inclusion into NATO. Indeed, other alternatives, including the establishment of a Middle East or Mediterranean pact did not seem viable. Therefore, by May 1951, the Truman Administration was officially endorsing NATO'senlargement towards the south-east, and during the summer of 1951, Washington sponsored Turkey's and Greece's admission to NATO. (Chourchouls, 2010, 40)

Turkey and the U.S got closer in an atmosphere where the U.S. gave importance to the regional and global organizations to establish a world according to its interersts. (Çalis& Akgun and Kutlu, 2006, 175) The Americans knew that from a geopolitical perspective the Turks always had the option of neutralism, while Turkey and Greece were indispensable for Western security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Moreover, both the Americans and the British acknowledged that for political and geostrategic reasons, if Turkey was accepted into NATO, Greece would have to be accepted too. (Yesilbursa, 1999, 70-102) The transition from the "neutral Turkey" to the "fundamantal western and democtaric ally Turkey" wasn't a choice but a strategically essential political move motivated by the aim of securing its survival.

Turkey's insistance of western institutionalism and the attempts to officially join the Western defense system crystallized in 1952 as a "southern flank" state. Turkey's role to contain U.S.S.R was thought as effective about preventing any ideological or strategic intervention of the Soviet Union considering the good relations of the U.S. with the Shah's regime. Turkey's decision makers emphasized the importance of the strategic role at any chance they found to express the desire of being an efficient part of the Western bloc. As Menderes underlines at the MEC and NATO meeting: (Minutes, 1951, 6-7)

> ''As a member of NATO, we will work towards the establishment of a Middle East Command with great determination…'

Although Turkey took real steps for strategic integration through instituionalization, there were some disadvantages derived from the exceptions to the pro-Western and risk averse foreign policy. TheCyprus issue was one of the most important points on which the

interests of Turkey and the U.S. contradict arose during the crisis of 1963-1964 and 1973-1974 when the U.S. strictly vetoed an intervention or military occupation of the Turkish army. (Çelik, 1999) These exceptions were not able to divide Turkey and the West which can be clearly understood by Ankara's repeated realignment with Western foreign policy goals. Because Turkish identity construction, which substantially relied on Western values, Turkey has yet to satisfactorily resolve its Cyprus dilemma or any other exceptions demonstrating its regard for its alliances over its national passions. Turkey's identity construction progress created a Western perspective that any kind of issue could only be solved by the consent or with the good faith of the West. Without rejecting the advantage of military cooperation with the West, which bolstered Turkey to manage external relations and regional issues, Ankara sought further alliances to promote its domestic socio-economic development which was not fully efficient because of the tension of the Cold War.

The Americans considered linking the defense of Greece and Turkey to Western Europe (rather than the Middle East) and, when the time was right, perhaps bringing them in. By doing so, some kind of a cooperation link would be established between NATO and the Middle East (something that might also satisfy the British efforts for the establishment of a Middle East Command), while the U.S. commitment would remain limited. Furthermore, both the military and the State Department officials pointed out that they looked at Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey not as an area into which they should put forces, but as an area that we could find forces. (Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Washington DC: 1951, V, .31- 55.) This would remain a basic concept of the Southern Flank throughout the 1950s. (Chourchoulis, 2010, 53)

VARIABLES	***NO RESPONSE %***		***YES %***		***NO %***		***TOTAL %***
	Senior	***Junior***	***Senior***	***Junior***	***Senior***	***Junior***	
To Make use of NATO as a Platform to Solve Problems with Greece	*4,1*	*0,3*	*8,2*	*22,2*	*87,7*	*77,5*	*100,0*
To Provide Security Against Soviet Expansion	*4,1*	*0,3*	*87,7*	*74,2*	*8,2*	*25,5*	*100,0*
To Ensure the Continuation of US Aid within the NATO Context	*4,1*	*0,3*	*32,6*	*61,1*	*63,3*	*38,6*	*100,0*

To Integrate with the Western World	*4,1*	*0,3*	*67,3*	*73,5*	*28,6*	*26,1*	*100,0*
No Idea	*4,1*	*0,3*	*0,0*	*0,7*	*95,9*	*99,0*	*100,0*

Table 3.1 Reasons for Turkey's Accession to NATO

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

NATO wasn't considered a platfrom to seek solutions for the issues with Greece by foreign policy makers. On the contrary NATO's integrated strategic posistion was a negative element on Turkish interests, evolving from the nations's founding. Starting with the President Johnson letter and the Cuban missile crisis, Turkey's perception of the most trusted ally was replaced by a suspicious perspective parallel to the rising anti-American movements in all over the World. Having had good intentions and determination for the settlement of the issue in Cyprus under international law by the help of the Allies, Turkey felt political desperation about its strategic security and its never-questioned approach about the organization. The discussion on unidimensional security policy bolstered by the membership of NATO and western bloc is expanded in following chapters.

Increased by reciprocal political and military moves of two blocs with the U.S., the level of armament technology and comparatively undeveloped conditions of the economy, Turkey needed economic aid provided by international institutionalization process coming with the need for structural adjustment based on ideological integration, which consolidated the alignment - in other words, to a dead end in terms of security policies. As in most of the states, Turkey's primary objective was security, which highlightened the geostrategic position in consideration.

Parallel to the instituionalization to provide security against the Soviet expansion, the need for the U.S. economic and military aid acquired a permenant characteristic. Membership of NATO brought a binding context, especially about security issues, which strenghten the isolated position of Turkey. Establishment of relations with Third World countries, Middle Eastern and Turkic states under the rule of the Soviet Union was definitely unthinkable. The implementation of Marshall aid also created a continual demand for development. For the political and economic stabilization of the country, meeting this continual demand became very important for the decision makers. Ideological integration in addition to structural adjustment of the state also made a substantional contribution to Turkey's dependence on the

West. Turkey's pursuit of western identity was a long term national aim for the desicion makers who perceived institutionalism just the right political and strategic path to follow.

Legitimization of the Western insttituionalization did not require a substantional political effort because westernization and modernization had already been used interchangebly. The Turkish modernization project had been implemented for two hundred years, acquiring the superiority of the West, which also led Turkey to develop balance diplomacy for survival. Thus, the democratic world and its symbols constructed a western driven identity, which also caused the perception of enemies of the west as Turkey's enemies. Territorial and ideological expansion of the Soviet Union was one of the most influential elements for the justification of integration with the West under NATO's umbrella. The diplomatic approach, detection of strategic enemies, determination of strategies of NATO didn't require any questioning or raise serious doubts about the intentions of the U.S. Turkish legislation authorities played a secondary role considering the international protection needs of Turkey. The Decision-making process in Turkey was implemented as if it was a matter of form. In terms of domestic policy making performance of the Democrat Party, investments of the state depended on American aid had become comparatively more important because of the electoral victories against the RPP. The Turkish identity transformation was consolidated through the altered decision making process which also contributed to it having a similar perception of the international community and of its issues.

Turkey's foreign policy approach depended on a western perspective to determine western methodology taking international matters in hand as a permanent western state. Turkey's identity construction and transformation caused such a perspective derived from the nationalization process that led Turkey to political isolation, which also brought a politically allienated mental background in the long run,particularly concerning regional issues. Turkey experienced diplomatic diffuculties for the settlement of regional issues, which it had always perceived as a NATO member. Political movements in the East, Turco-Greek tensions and low intensity conflicts in Cyprus sponsored by two allies of NATO and even domestic political differentiation had been misinterpreted, thus suspending the development of permanent and dependable relations with both the states in the region and the other parts of the world.

Institutions and consultation mechanisms were stipulated by the United States as the leader of the Western Bloc. By means of these mechanisms Turkey's national passions and interests gradually eroded and caused unidimensional security and foreign policy. To

understand the motivation behind the very intention of the desicion makers of Turkey, we must take a look on the survey conducted by Prof. Dr. Atila Eralp, questioning the reasons for Turkey's accesion to NATO and NATO's performance from the perspectives of Member States' interests.

[This survey consisted of interviewing and/or giving questionnaires to a substantial numbers of opinion leaders in Turkey. The total number of senior opinion leaders is 49 (Academics, MPs, Journalists, Staff of the Ministery of Foreign Affairs, Military Circle) and junior opinion leaders is 306 (Departments of International Relations, Departments of Political Sciences, Prime-ministry Institute of Middle East and Public Administration, Academy Of Ministry Of Foreign Affairs)] (Eralp, 16-18) Observe Table.3.1 and 3.2.

It may be said that although the Soviet threat perceptions were important, the senior and junior opinion leaders saw Turkey's accession to NATO as part of Turkey's integration to the West and thecontinuation of her modernization process. Unlike the dominant view that Turkey joined NATO because Greece joined, according to the senior and junior opinion leaders, this issue was not an important factor for Turkey's accession to NATO. On the question of making use of NATO as a platform to solve the disputes between Turkey and Greece, only 8.2 % of the senior opinion leaders responded in the affirmative,while 22.2 % of junior opinion leaders considered that this was a factor in Turkey's accession to NATO.

VARIABLES	***NO RESPONSE %***	
	Senior	***Junior***
NATO Served for the Interests of the all Members	*24,5*	*9,2*
Served mostly for the Interests of US and West European States	*28,6*	*54,2*
Mainly Served for the US Interests	*12,2*	*34,3*
Mainly Served for the Interests of West	*22,4*	*2,0*
European States	*12,2*	*0,3*

Table 3.2 NATO's Performance from the Perspectives of Member States' Interests

Sample Size: Senior 49, Junior 306

Total	*100,0*	*100,0*

NATO provided a security shield for each of its members, however, the incomparable influence of its framework on the member states was quite obvious. In

In terms of security issues, the U.S. impact on organizational reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan determined political and economic dependence on the U.S. for each member. Nuclear missiles were mounted in almost every strategically critical state, the increase in the numbers of conventional weapons, adjustment of the structures of the armies standardized in terms of military training and tactics strongly influenced mutual doctrine against the generic Soviet Union army, coordination of intelligence offices of each country headed by the CIA to fight against communist organizations in every state were critical matters revealing the structural and ideological impact of the U.S. on every member state. However, the influence of the U.S. varied in countries according to their reconstruction, economic infrastructure, the qualified population, or philosohical depth, which created a comparatively eager political background for sovereignty. Turkey's conditions should be assessed considering the elements mentioned above to make a conclusion about the discussion on the impact of dependency on foreign policy making.

From the time of Turkey's admission into NATO until the beginning of the 1960's, there was practically no reaction in the country against this organization. On the contrary, NATO was praised and exalted in Turkish political circles to such an extent that it was not deemed necessary or even possible to think of a Turkish defense policy outside of this alliance. (Gonlubol, 1971, 4)

Permanency characteristics of foreign policy and the requirement of economic ties were deemed essential in order to stimulate the economy, which had entered a period of stabilization and stagnation as a result of the haphazard economic policies of the Democrat Party. It was under the influence of such internal and external circumstances that the foreign policy views put forth by the radical left found the opportunity to pass an important test. The Cyprus crisis prepared the ground, in fact necessitated a Turkish intervention on the Island in 1964 (do you mean 1974?)in order to defend the Turkish community. The Cyprus issue presented a paradox in itself. Although being outside the specific area of interest of the

alliance, it directly involved two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey. The Turkish government, acting on the assumption that the United States was NATO's leading and most powerful member and one of the two super powers which would be affected by any major incident anywhere in the world, informed the U.S. Government of its intention to intervene on the island. The letter sent by Johnson as answer to the Turkish P.M Inonu in June 1964 marked the begining of a change in Turkish foreign policy. This letter, draftedat first in utter astonishment and then caused violent reactions not only among leftist circles but also among the public in general. The letter was an indication of the fact that the image of Turkey among the governmet circles in the United States, was contrary to the assumptions genrally held until then by Turks. (Gonlubol, 1971, 5)

The Republican Party governments in power until 1950, and especially the Democrat Party reinterpreted Westernization to mean intimate cooperation with the "Western" countries at all costs and under all conditions. (Gonlubol, 1971, 6) Although there was a popular discontent derived by the Cyprus issue, which triggered suspicions about the West, Turkish foreign policy traditions instinctively found a conservative way for the reallignment. Thus, it is understood that "Westernization" in this sense became a general philosophy (Gonlubol, 1971, 6) of domestic politics and foreign policy. Despite the existence of tense relations and rising anti-American political atmosphere, the program submitted by the goverrnment of Prime Minister Nihat Erim to the Parliament on April 2nd 1971 reads: (Gonlubol, 1971, 6)

> ''We maintain our close ties of friendship and cooperation with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and understanding. The fact that we differ on certain matters must be regarded as the natural expression of mutual understanding and sincerity between our countries, and as an open indication of their strength and of the political philosophy of the Western world of which Turkey and the United States are members''

Unlike the previous period of full commitment to the West without any question at cost of the erosion of national interests and identity, it is understood that the existence of incohorence was obvious after the realization of several serious issues. Considering the time of the submission of the government program when the Cyprus issue was reaching its climax, the emphasis on the "difference on [certain] matters"makes obvious the cautious foreign policy making mental background. However, the energy of the Prime Minister to relax the statements in the program is quite clear and could be a consequence of a traditional fear of deprivation of the American aid and support securing the foreign policy posture.

''We officially applied for the accesion to the Atlantic Pact''

''Bevin will negotiate with Koprulu on this case''

''England, America and Italywill support our participation demand''

August 3rd 1950

Figure no:3.13

(Danforth)

''A memorandum of the Soviets to Turkey''

''Our respond will be prepeared in a week''
''The permission and oppotunities given by Turkey to the Westerners due to Turkey's involvement to the Atlantic Pact in NATO, to establish air and naval base in Turkish territory are excepted.''

November 5th 1951

Figure no:3.14

Evaluating the numbers of military personnel, economic capacity reserved for a large army in this region in need of development and the cost for military readiness for allied duties has been quite remarkable for Turkey.

The primary reasons for the accession were to make use of NATO as a platform to solve problems with Greece, provide security against Soviet expansion, ensure the continuation of the U.S. aid within the NATO context or to integrate with the Western World. These evolved during the Cold War but the integration with the Western World had a key role for diplomatic and political legitimacy for the succesor governments even after the Cold War. The institutions established by NATO and economic, military and political stipulations bound by the agreements led Turkey a strategic uni-dimensional security perspective.The early years of the DP foreign policy of Democrat Leaders, Athanassopoulou states that: (Athanassopoulou, 1999, 165 and Abou-El Fadl, 2009)

> ‘‘The new government was going to be more persistent and loud than its predecessor in promoting Turkey’s security interests and regional role.’’

This is certainly true, but more specifically, there was a change in self-image which accompanied the change in government. This would have implications for both foreign policy and security. (Harris, 1972, 39 and Abou-El Fadl, 2009) The inability to create its own perceptions made it necessary for Turkey’s foreign policy to commit to the Western perspective, even after the clear evindence showing that Turkey’s place in it continued after the Cold war and reached its climax, especially after 2007 in AKP’s *(The Economist, October 21 2010 and http://www.economist.com/node/17276420)*period.)

Despite the questioning claims and studies to show that Turkey’s view regarding its commitment to NATO [West] to be evolving, especially after 9/11 with the change of NATO’s doctrine, Turkey took her role back as the most prestigious institution binding it to the West. However, by the change came with the end of cold war and the re-balance of the power in the early 2000s, Turks have also begun to question whether NATO is still indispensable to Turkey’s foreign and security policies. The U.S. have generally tried to manage co-operation with the help of bilateral relations, outside of NATO platforms. During the Cold War, Turkey’s commitment to NATO was largely identity-driven by the effect of globalization and the increase of the number of strategic centers, Turkey felt the necessity of re-definition. According to our thesis, the effect of the identity-driven foreign policy

materialized by Western institutionalization, still, cannot be alternated considering the effect of institutionalization on domestic structures, policies, public opinion and identity. (Aybet, 1997, 40-92 and Oguzoglu, 2012, 153-164) The existence of the 1982 constitution is also a sign of a do-nothing policy derived from the domestic dynamics. Although the need for a change is still very clear, the efforts to find a balancing and preventing power derived from the structure of the state and domestic social institutions are based on the western process.

Sevreral foreign policy issues made Turkey grow suspicious about the West during the Cold War. [The Cyprus issue and Cuban Missile Crisis]. Considering the tense foreign policy conjecture of the Cold War and conflicts all over the world manipulated by the blocs, Turkey's concerns about its mid-term and long term security were legitimate. As stated before, Turkey has always found a way to stabilize relations and present its commitmet to traditional values, symbols and institutions of the West. According to Oguzoglu (Milliyet, March 24, 2007.in *http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/24/guncel/agun. html*) in his article,Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests, he states the importance of the Gulf War and the reluctance of Western states to recognize the PKK issue creates serious hesitations for theEU process and security of Turkey.

The number of the crises, issues and cases can be increased, however, the subject of the thesis is limited to between the years of 1945-1960 as a commencement period for full commitment. The analysis ofOguzoglu is given to show the tendency and dependency of the Turkish traditional diplomacy to accept the West as the mainstream of perspective.

Turkey's role in NATO will be clear by the effect of the position it will take towards the issues with Russia and the Middle Eastern States. (Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings, German Marshall Fund, 2008, 5) which is quite controversial considering the fact and historical pattern presented in this thesis. Turkey, at least, hasn't instructed a path institutionally out of its traditional diplomacy, which is a sign of dependency and inability to realize alternative strategies or foreign policy derived from its own national threat-perceptions.

''Prime Minister, miraculously, got through the accident :''

''The Plane carrying Menderes crushed''

February 18th 1959

Figure no:3.15

3.4.3. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

As previously pointed out, the international situation and the change in the distribution of power and formation of new status quo by the victorious states forced Turkish decision makers to prepare to make domestic adjustments in the political system. The international situation combined with the domestic demand for a major change in the system revealed itself in INONU's words, which hinted that the readiness ofan opposing body could meet the need of an opposition party. (Feroz, 2003)

The founding leaders of the Republic defined Turkish identity as a mission which could only be achieved with the recognition of the Western states, based on peaceful bilateral relations and that the reformation process would be based on the efforts to break with the Ottoman past. The aim of the process was to create a 'modern' European state. These attempts weren't accepted politically or socially by the public and were rejected as an aspiration to become a superficial western state at the hands of state bureacuracy. The modernization process revealed itself as a domestic political struggle between the Europe-oriented state elite and the conservative elements in Turkish society. In terms of the argument, when the conservative elements came to power they also radically alternated the modernization project because of the domestic suppression and ongoing westernization, perceived as a state project. As Muftuler expressed, the Europeanization Project stimulated domestic political change in Turkey which can clearly be seen by the DP, ANAP and the other liberal rightist conservative parties like the AKP. He underlines that Turkey's initial objective in associating itself with the EC/EU was to gain acceptance of its European status. (Mufutler BAC, 2005, 16-30) (very important for the thesis argument)

Accoding to Önis, the modernization or westernization accelerated with the foundation of the Republic, which provided a great number of achievements considering the conditions of the time. Two pillars of modernization were industrialization and construction of economic infrustructure. (Önis, 2004, 7- 11) Considering the aspects of the reforms which should be understood as a preparation for the economic development. Turkey has had to remain closely aligned with the West ever since. (Littoz-Monnet & Villnueva, 2005)

As explained in previous chapters, The Soviet Union's aggressive behaviour towards Turkey, especially after 1945, bolstered the rapprochement with the West in general and the United States in particular because of the Cold War conditions. The Truman Doctrine laid the groundwork for Turkey's membership in NATO. (1952) The West also understood the significance of a politically and economically stable Turkey because of the outbreak of the Cold War and civil war in neighbouring Greece. (Feroz, 2003)

The change of power took place in 1950 de facto and de jure, but neither the DP for power nor the RPP for opposition was psychologically or sociologically ready. (Aydemir, 1993, 221) Due to this main factor, the DP felt itself alienated from power and desired to reduce the RPP's influence in the bureaucracy and military. In the meantime, it also wanted to make rapid changes to regain its power. When Menderes came to power, the main purpose of foreign policy lagged behind what it should have been, and thus he believed that it needed top priority. (Yavuzalp, 1996, 74-75)

In his opening speech before the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Celal Bayar made clear his views on foreign policy: *(http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-menderes-period-1950-1960.html)*

> "Turkish foreign policy was generally based upon the collective security system. I am so thankful to the government that Turkey joined NATO through its great efforts...''

Burrows stated on 18 January 1960 that the preference of Turkey became more clear with its memberhship in NATO and CENTO established under democratic western values which showed, in relation to the past, that the position of Turkey was in the west. *(http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-menderes-period-1950-1960.html)*

The opposition also criticized theforeign policy of the DP. After World War II, the RPP, like the DP, pursued a similar policy towards the West, yet it accused the DP of being **"westernized more than the west"**. It meant that the foreign policy of Turkey became bound entirely to the west, particularly with the Middle East policies of America. (Uslu, 2000, 20 and *http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-menderes-period-1950-1960.html)* Policymakers of Turkish foreign affairs considered themselves the representatives of the west in shadow. (Sever, 1998, 73-90 and *http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-menderes-period-1950-1960.html)* The national interests were most important, however, because the opposition exaggerated this

issue enormously. (Yesilbursa, 2000 and*http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-menderes-period-1950-1960.html)*

Security concerns arose from the Cold War atmosphere in addition to NATO membership, Turkey signed bilateral agreements with America, too, however, many of these agreements were not approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly but by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relevant military authorities only. According to these agreements, America gained the right to establish military bases in Turkey. The opposition accused the government of making a concession about the national security and sovereignty of the country. (Gonlubol, 1991/1993, 235-236)

Britain welcomed the fact that Turkey had joined the Western Alliance. The British Foreign Minister, Antony Eden, dispatched his views about the subject to Prime Minister Churchill on May 21, 1952: (Eden to Churchill, 21 May 1952, FO-371-101856)

> "Turks are a strong alliance, so that Americans can show success in many areas for Turks more than us. That they form a close relationship is very important for us".

Although a long time had passed since then, the British views on Turkey were almost the same. Burrows, the British ambassador to Ankara, wrote to London: BURROWS to Fofreign Affairs, FO-371/144757)

> "The existence of a strong and substantial Turkey is an important strategic interest in general for the west and in particular for Britain.''

Because of the geographic and cultural position of Turkey, it was not an easy fit for neither Europe nor the Middle East. The foundation of the Republic in 1923 and the path taken by the Turkish state bureaucracy afterwards clearly was toward the West and the efforts of orientation of European norms and standards. After WWI, Turkey was granted a secure place for its role in containing the Soviet Union. It became clearly anchored in the Western system of states when it joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1952.

The first step in the relationship consisted of Turkey's application for associatimg membership in the EEC on 31 July 1959. Its application was accepted by the EEC Council of Ministers on 11 September in the same year. On 12 September 1963, theAnkara Agreement

was signed between Turkey and the EEC. The Ankara Agreement entered into force on 1 December 1964. The main aim of this agreement was, as stated in Article 2:

> "to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade andeconomic relations between the parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and living conditions of the Turkish people".

Its membership in these organizations, on the one hand, served as a deterrent factor against perceived Soviet expansionism and on the other hand, worked towards the **fulfilment of the state elite's century-old dream of being accepted as part of Europe**. In line with these two parallel foreign policy objectives, in 1959, Turkey applied for an Association with the newly founded EEC and became an Associate member of the EC in 1963. The 1963 Ankara Agreement committed both sides to the step-by-step establishment of a customs union.:*(http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e40113_en.htm*l)

Thus, even though there was no promise of membership, it was insinuated as a long term goal. However, Turkey's relations with the EC throughout the 1960s and 1970s were highly unstable. This was partly due to the internal divisions inside the EC, the crises that European integration passed through and the unstable international environment of the 1970s, and also partly due to Turkish doubts about the benefits of an association with the EC. The hurdles that Turkish democracy passed through in the 1970s, which culminated in the 1980 military coup, did not help matters at all in terms of advancing relations with the EC. The crisis of the 1970s led to the suspension of the Association Agreement when Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, unilaterally froze the Ankara Treaty in 1978, invoking its self protection clause. Following the 1980 Turkish military takeover, the European Parliament suspended the Association in 1982. (Muftuler BAC, 2005,16-30)

Despite their formal separation, a partnership based on an "imperfect concordance" was formed among the military and political elites in Turkey.Although military-civilian relations seemed to be normalising by the early 1990s, the resurgence of Kurdish nationalism and terrorist activities together with the rise of political Islam brought it back to the forefront in the mid-1990s. This served to demonstrate the two fundamental values of the Turkish military, namely the indivisible integrity and the secular character of the state. (Aydin & Keyman, 2004)

Since its establishment, the EU has increased its power in the international arena both economically and politically. Its willingness to enter into new policy areas and play more important diplomatic, economic, and military roles in the international arena has made the EU one of the major foreign policy players in the world. In this context, the EU's enlargements have played important roles in foreign policy formulation and its efforts to be an influential international actor.

Enlargement implies new member countries, new neighbors, new security issues, new markets, new political issues, and new opportunities to exercise political power over new and wider geographical arenas in the foreign policy of the EU. Turkey's EU membership would affect the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFPS) of the EU since it is directly concerned with all of the aforementioned issues.

The EEC membership process overviewed to show the starting point of the choice and the effects of the diplomatic decision making background derived from the security concerns of Turkey, which led her to be perceived as a permanent Western ally. The European countries became suspicious of Western symbols and political steps also became suspicious of Turkey, both in relations in the security pacts pioneered by the West or bileteral relations. The European Union process and the effects of institutional steps leading to a unidimensional foreign and security policy taken between 1945 and 1960 will be observed in following sections chronologically. The Cyprus issue and the Cuban missile crisis are chosen as two sample cases to show the disadvantages of unidimensional foreign policy as exceptionaldisappointing evidences during under Europeanization process of Turkey.(Fox, Ozkan, Journal of Public Affairs, Vol XIII, Abstract)

3.5. BETWEEN TWO MILITARY INTERFERENCE (1960-1980)

After the overthrown of Adnan Menderes-the elected prime minister- by a military coup, a new constitution was drafted which has been regarded as the most liberal constitution in Turkey ever. I will discuss this case as a turning point in terms of threat perceptions.

Thanks to the liberal atmosphere provided by the new constitution in the country, leftist and rightist groups found the opportunity to express themselves freely. This evolution for supporters on both sides deepened the political and ideological polarization in Turkish society as we can understand from various activist public protests and university demonstrations. It would be hard to imagine in the late 1950s, that the Turks would ever be disappointed with the west and would join in the worldwide antiAmerican sentiment. Yet, the TurkishAmerican friendship, which began with the Truman Doctrine and flourished in the 1950s, began to cool down during the 1960s and deteriorated in the 1970s. (Aydin, 2006, 104) In terms of the thesis, the reasons for the conflict of interests and sceptism-free foreign policy approach are important to show the unidimensional threat perception tendency.

These developments took the country very close to the brink of a civil war. The effect of the army over political life was deeply felt and at times the military didn't hesitate to take precautions against these 'threats'.

During this period, the Cyprus issue revealed the divergence of Turkish policy from Western front due to uncompromising attitudes of the U.S government sparked by president Johnson in 1963. In that period, there was a serious reevaluation along with the rise of anti-American sentiments in Turkey.

Although the 1963 Cyprus crisis is accepted as the breakng point of Turkish-American relations, in the minds of decision makers and some politicians, the determination process had already begun as a result of various change in domestic and internatonal areas; and although this crisis is accepted as an emprical case for the deviation of perceptions about the West in Turkish foreign policy during the inter-coup period, there were other factors, both domestic and international, triggered Turkey's policy shift. After the Cyprus crisis, Turkey's suspicions grew about its position in the Western Alliance. The political loneliness of Turkey didn't exactly mean its return to the neutrality policy since it had to stay on the West's side.

One of his speeches, Menderes stated that:

> "We shall continue our efforts to bring our heroic army to a position consonant with the needs of today and capable of meeting every kind of aggression. This will be accomplished by using all material and moral resources in proportion to the strength of our economic and financial potential [Applause]. In fact, one of the main goals of our economic measures and development is to maintain, with our own means, a large army as soon as possible."

Inside NATO, the character of Turkey's officer corps began to change. Younger officers, who were open to the technology and the strategy of modern warfare, acquired a sense of importance and confidence they had never enjoyed before. They visited other countries and discussed the world's problems with the officers who presented perspectives different from their own. Their own world began to seem small and provincial in comparison, and the urge to reform and change grew stronger. (Feroz, 2003, 12)

These changes were introduced in the early 1960s by means of a new and liberal constitution and a variety of other laws which permitted Turks to enjoy democratic politics for the first time. Trade unions were given the right to strike, and socialists (though not communists) were allowed to form a party and offer their critique of Turkish society. All this was very novel for a Turkey which had known only the 'Kemalist' consensus. (Feroz, 2003, 9)

However, The army had begun to get restless in the mid-1950s, years marked by growing inflation, political instability, and a general sense of discontent in urban areas. The soldiers shared the same grievances with the general public, especially the lower middle class whose position was being rapidly eroded. (Feroz, 2003, 9)

The arny intervened again with further coups in 1971 and 1980, and although each intervention only lasted a reasonably short period, the military gained important guarantees that enhanced its role in the subsequent civilian regime. This was accomplished through two main strategies:

> ''1) To incorporate into the constitution certain substantive values cherished by the military territorial and national integrity of the state and the modernising reforms of Kemal Atatürk.

2) To create formal institutions dominated by the military with the duty of preserving such values, namely the National Security Council. ‘’

‘’New cabinet held its first meeting’’

‘’America, Britain, France, Iran and Pakistan declared the recognition of our government’’

May 31st 1960

Figure no:3.19

Although it was no longer possible to define the Turkish political landscape purely on the basis of the secularist versus anti-secularist axis, especially because of the transition to the multi-party system (1945) and the rise of the 'new left' (in the 1960s). Yet these challenges did not lead to a significant transformation in the construction of state identity. Nor did they give rise to a radical rupture in the ability of Kemalist nationalism to give meaning to the making of modern Turkey. In fact, both liberal and new left political discourses functioned in relation to Kemalist nationalism and, to a significant extent, assumed its will to civilisation, thus employing its principal modus operandi, creating the general will 'in the name of the people'. (Aydin & Keyman, 2004, 3)

''Democrat Party was shut down''

September 30th 1960

Figure no: 3.21

''The results of the Constitution referandum ''

''6 million yes, 3 million no''

July 11th 1961

Figure no:3.22

was able to reproduce its hegemony by according primacy to the state over society and identity which had a very powerful impact on foreign policy.(Aydin & Keyman, 2004, 7)

3.3.1. CUBAN-JUPITER MISSILE CRISIS

''Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.''
John F. Kennedy

Understanding the nature of the political, economic and diplomatic relations with the leader of the Western bloc, particularly from the start of the Cold War, it is significant to note the Turkish threat perspective with its retreatments and approachments to the Western front. For the argument, the exceptional diplomatic and political instabilities are comparatively more important than the general traditional diplomatic pattern of Turkey. Before explaining

''Menderes executed too''

''After Zorlu and Polatkan, last execution

September 18th 1961

Figure no:3.23

2007, 20) I will discuss the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in terms of the bargaining situation created by the U.S. who withheld information fromTurkey, who considered the Jupiter missiles a reflection of a very strategic move both for the Western bloc's safety and herself. The Kennedy Administration angered Ankara with its perceived lack of transparency and

consultation when it agreed to dismantle nuclear-capable Jupiter missiles that were based in Turkey during the missile crisis. (Lesser, 2007, 20) The first discredibility probably derived from the disappointment of the unenlightened government and re-consideration of the relations seems vital for the thesis questioning the dependency and unidimensioned security and threat vision of Turkey which has rarely changed, however disappointed or desperate Turkey may have been.

American popular and foreign policy interests did focus on Turkey in the 19th century, through the support for independence movements in the Ottoman Empire, particularly for the Greeks. (Lesser, 2007, 19) At that time, as covered in the historical background of the thesis in the first chapter, the strategic dynamics of the Ottoman's diplomacy focused on security concerns [survival] starting from when it was perceived as an Eastern Question by the West. Traditional allies and balancing actors of her diplomacy were Britain, France, Russia and later Germany, who established her political and territorial unity in 1871. Although the impact of the U.S. was materialized as conduct of a latent military power capacity in the first World War, one can understand from the attempts at developing relations with the U.S. that it had started long before, perceived not as a diplomatic life saver but a potential strategic ally.

As explained in Truman Doctrine section, the definition of American security interests in Turkey begins in the last stages of World War II as the tensions grew with the Soviet Union. Before 1945, American policymakers shared the tactical and strategic perceptions witth the British. (Barry, 1989 and Lesser, 2007, 20) The change in the distribution of power and establishment of new world order, which bolstered the competition with the Soviet Union caused a transformation of American interest of the region and Turkey. The Cold War conditions determined a perspective in the eastern Mediterranean for the U.S., with security guarantees to Greece and Turkey as was was legally regulated under the Truman Doctrine. Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 was a crystalized and transformed the strategic vision of the U.S. concerning the region and the roles of its actors. (Lesser, 2007, 20 and Kuniholm, 1980)

With an eye to the thesis, The Cuban missile crises should be examined in terms of the bilateral security ties of the Cold War period legal and crucial commitments. Under the strategic vision of the U.S.for South Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Turkish territory was seen as a significant strategic land for a possible nuclear retalliation against Soviet territory. Turkish decision makers were risking retaliation against Istanbul or Ankara and depending on the NATO guarantees. It was understood that the United States might have been required to risk nuclear retaliation against its own territory in defense of

Turkey. The important part relevant to the thesis is the reaction of Turkey upon the strategic bargain of the U.S., which created suspicions about the U.S.-led Western bloc.

The attempts to balance the misilse (technological) gap with the Soviet Union, which was crucial to consolidate the credibility of the allies and show to the rest of the world superiority as the leader of the Western bloc. The U.S. decided to deploy Thor and Jupiter missiles in Britain, Italy and Turkey and were received favorably by these states. (Norris, 1999 and Norris, 2012)

In 1958, Thor IRBMs in the UK (Project Emily) and Jupiter IRBMs to Italy and Turkey in 1961 more than 100 U.S.-built missiles having the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads were deployed. The Jupiter missiles deployed in Izmir-Cigli had been a critically important factor before and during the Cuban misilse crisis. Deploying missiles in Cuba was to protect Cuba from a possible military invasion by the U.S, to increase the range of Soviet's deterrent nuclear influence (Washington, DC: USAF, Volume 3, Chapter 3, June 1976, pp. 111-122) and a retaliation for the Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey. However, considering the capacity of the Jupiter missles in terms of fire power and the other weaknesses compared to the Sputnik's threats, the decision for the deployment of the Jupiters was rather "political and psychological". (Pash, 1997, 33 and Sever inpp. 647-660) Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu were aware of the weaknesses of the Jupiter missiles, however they could find no other alternatives but more conventionlal armaments or nuclear missiles to secure the country. (Pash, 1997, 33)

The decision for deployment created a moment of diplomatic glory regarding the Soviet threat. This diplomatic perspective kept on after the military intervention and the successor coalition governments.Parallel to this perspective giving so much importance to having deployed the missiles in Turkey's territory became apparent when Turkey rejected the offer by the U.S. to dismantle the missiles, considering the strategic functions. Turkish foreign policy makers pointed out that the Turkish Parliement has just approved appropriations from the missiles and that it would be embarrassing for the Turkish Government to infrom Parliment that the Jupiters were now to be withdrawn. Upon returning to Washington briefed by Rusk, Kennedy accepted the idea of some delay in removing the Jupiters. (Recollection by the Dean Rusk of Negotiating Channel through Andrew Cordier and Details of Negotiations to Remove Jupiters Prior to crisis, 25.02.1987) As an argument from the point mentioned, the U.S. authorities were aware of the lack of functionality of the Jupiter missiles and attempted to withdraw the missiles before the Crisis.

It was also perceived as an unfortunate period because the government of the U.S. began to change the security approach in terms of its nuclear armament strategy. It was initiated by McNamara who formulated the DOD with an entirely new defense philosophy. Like his predecessors and fellow politicians, McNamara strongly believed that the U.S. should maintain its nuclear supremacy, but where he differed was in its practical application. This shift is known in DOD terminology as the transition from 'massive retaliation' to 'flexible response'. (Keller, 2010, 38) This in turn, was seen by the Turkish side as an attempt to escape from the nuclear responsibility. (SEVER in *http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/42/480/5596.pdf, pp. 647-660)*

Turkey's eagerness in declining the withdrawal offers of the U.S. was a sign of the unconditional security asssurance diplomacy against the Soviet threat. Turkey perceived the Soviet Union as a threat but as the Turkish security asssurance attempts raised the Soviet against Turkey. For instance when the Menderes government signed the agreement on the deployment of the Jupiter missiles, the Soviets immediately protested and after the missiles became operational, their role the Cuban missiles crisis became also Turkey's issue. Actually Turkey felt the shock of the situation created by Cuba, which was so far from its territory and consequently out of its strategic diplomacy and foreign policy perspective. This shock revealed the fact that Turkey, taking place in the Western bloc had to confront all possible problems of the Western bloc from low-intensity conflict to nuclear warfare, regardless of which side was the aggressor.

The generation of the crisis and the Russian involvement, however, occurred three months earlier in July when the Premier met with Fidel Castro's brother Raúl. It was during this week long visit that "the decision was [presumably] taken to send to Cuba medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads." (Medvedev, 1983, 187 and Kroeschley, 2001, 1) Khrushchev would later write in his memoir, (Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath) that the purpose of the placement of nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba was "to maintain the independence of the Cuban people". The decision of placement had been made after Kennedy endorsed the U.S. orchestration of an invasion of Cuba. [At the Bay of Pigs in 1961]. He also writes his concerns about the security of Cuba and the presence of the communist ideology in the letter sent to Kennedy stating that:

" I understand your concern for the security of the United States…You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security…."

The agreement between Kruschev and Castro meant retalliation. By doing so, they would react to the United States placementof Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles in April 1962 in Turkey. (Correl, 2010 and Hanane, 2010, 34) Deployment process were implemented gradually by taking very confidential precautions by the Soviets and the Cuban auhtorities.On October 7, Cuban president Osvaldo Dorticos spoke at the U.N. GeneralAssembly:

" If we are attacked, we will defend ourselves….we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish toemploy.''

The Cuban Missile Crisis began [on October 16, 1962] when President Kennedy and his advisors were informed about the U-2 reconnaissance photographs taken two days earlier of missile sites in Cuba. From October 16 to 22, Kennedy formed the Executive Committee (Ex Com) which met every day to decide how to deal with the problem.(Hanane, 2010, 39)

When Kennedy announced a blockade of Cuba on Monday, October 22, in order to prevent further Soviet ships from reaching the island, Khrushchev could have plowed ahead and sought confrontation, which would have escalated the crisis even further. Though he initially ordered the ships to continue en route to Cuba, while they were still in international waters, the Premier decided to order "all Soviet transport ships carrying military cargoes… to halt and turn around," but not other "freighters and tankers." (Khruschev, *American Heritage.com*, 26 February 2010 and KROESCHLEY, 2011, 2) Both Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy wanted to avoid full-scale war, which contributed to Kennedy's decision to allow several ships through the quarantine line in addition to Khrushchev's order for ships to "stop at the line of blockade and to await further instructions." (Medvedev, 1983, 189 and Kroeschley, 2011, 2)

The decision to deploy Jupiter missiles in Turkey was taken in Eisonhower's term and the operational process conducted during Kennedy's term. The committee came up with the cancellation decision concerning the strategic weaknesses of the deployment. Upon these developments, Mc Ghee presented a report about the deployment of the Jupiter missiles

to the National Defense Advisor to the president on June 22nd 1961, listing the legal grounds for the deployment: (Sever,*http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/42/480/5596.pdf, p.* 651)

> " The meeting held in (3-4 June) Vienna by the participation of the leaders where the growing tension between the parties especially about Berlin made it possible to cancel IRBMs. A possible cancellation decision can be considered a weakness and stepback of the U.S" (Bemstein, 1980, 99 and Sever, 651-652)

Considering the legal grounds stated in the report and Turkey's opposition to the cancellation offer by the committee, Kennedy accepted the operational step of the deployment. (Bemstein, 1980, 99 and Sever, 651-652) This decision was one of the most remarkable reasons for the decision of Cuban missiles deployment. In addition to being in at the start, the Jupiter missiles came to order the end of the crisis as a bargaining tool which had prviously been discussed by the A
could have used this decision against the U
U.S. didn't seem to use Jupiter missiles or
the cirisis the American diplomats in cha
making the missiles a bargain tool w
been intentionally demanded from the Sovi

''Two Turkish cargo ships carrying Russian wheat caused us trouble''

''By the news that the America will sever the economic aid to Turkey broke out as a trouble'''

October 15th 1962

(Hürriyet)

Figure No:3.24

On the Turkish front, the shock wa
entangled by the Western bloc but also th
unwillingness of the U.S. to partake in a c
made very clear in the letters from the
understood by the Turkish side as a necessity of a desperate dependency on their Western ally, which was established on the guarantee of security for the Turkish motherland in the case of a Soviet attack. In addition to the risky situation, the damage to the transparency between the allies gave Turkey a reason for concern about its own security issues and re-

evaluate the traditional security and threat perceptions. The symbolic significance of the missiles is also a sign of the credibility of the Turkish-U.S. relations.

3.3.2. THE CYPRUS ISSUE

As presented above, Turkey's foreign policy derived from her threat perceptions based on Western perspective couldn't remain an option for Turkey because of the conflicting interests over issues perceived as crucial by Turkey, which still have an impact on current foreign policy, including some that seemed to be a dead end for the Turkish axis of moving politically and preventing her interests diplomatically from integreating/eroding with the Europian Union. The Cyprus issue is one that in I will discuss in this chapter. This is the issue, in a limited perspective, where I will underline the points, in particular showing the loneliness of Turkey (Cyprus As A Source of Existential Threat to Turkey and The Fear of Encirclement) (Kaliber, 2003, 109) in the diplomacy arena during the Cold War. The dynamics letting Turkey make strategic decisions individually and the basic characteristics of the Cyprus issue, pointing out features of Turkey's foreign policy. To comprehend the issue in the limited perspective I will only overview the historical background of the issue by emphasizing the significant treaties and organizations taking crucial roles before and during the issues affecting Turkish decision makers, states and theparties shaping the situation.

As stated before, the intention is not to give a chronological account of the events but rather is to make the readers familiar with the historical context in which the Cyprus issue has been shaped and reshaped through various factors derived from the perceptions of the Turkish foreign policy decision makers. In spite of the consistency of the traditional foreign policy path of status quo and depending on theWestern axis, Turkey's Cold War foreign politics did not reveal itself as a unified body of policy making for the sake of some exceptional cases of the period. (Aydin, 2004, 67-82)

Since Turkey was a member of NATO and playing an outsentry role, it was not easy to give up the foreign policy based on the experience and tradition that had been in place for decades. Despite a probable conflict with Greece, a Western state, semi-ally of Turkey having nearly the same political history by means of Marshall Aid derived from the Truman Doctrine, Tukey struggled to balance domestic and foreign policy pressure.

Why has Cyprus seemed such a crucial and even as a "national grand purpose" for Turkey and Greece? On one hand, according to Turkish politicians and military staff, the geostrategic importance of Cyprus for Turkey is because of Turkish security and defense concerns in many ways. Cyprus, is only 65 km from Turkey, it has importance for Turkey geographically. (see more about the strategic value of Cyprus for Turkey, Greece and the other actors on HAK (Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı-Turkish Military Academy, 1995, 72-75 and YILMAZ, 2009, 1)

On the other hand, Cyprus has a strategic importance for Greece. In addition to historical ambitions connecting the island to the homeland through Enosis, Athens sees Greek influence on Cyprus as adding to Greece's geostrategic importance in pactice. (Diez, 2002, 41) This, in turn, is expected to make Greece even more important in the eyes of its EU and NATO (Yilmaz, 2009 and Sayin Journal of Qafqaz University, Number 24, p.55) partners, who consider Cyprus to be situated at a traditional cultural crossroads and therefore as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. (Yilmaz, 2009, 4) The more the threat grows the more the spending on weapons increases (An academic research on Turkey's defense expenses shows that Turkey's spending on weaponary systems and navy had incread approximately 25% in 1961 due to the military intervention. In the following years it averaged 10% until 1971, due to the developments in weapon technology and tense relations created by the international community. See more on*http://www.belgeler.com/blg/18ex/turkiye-de-savunma-harcamalarinin-analizi-ve-degerlendirilmesi-the-analysis-and-evaluation-of-turkish-defense-expenditures)* Moreover, the shifts between distribution of power between the global and regional powers has always been of great importance in determining the fate of Cyprus (Özveren, 2002/2003, 7 and Henn, 2007, 4)

Being sovereign on the lands inherited by the Ottomans were giving the notion and the vision that

Because of these reasons, the Cyprus issue has been part of the foreign policy and security agenda of the international community, beginning with the revolt of the Greeks against Ottoman rule in 1821,which remains unsettled today. With the retreat of the Ottomans, Great Britain, the Russian Empire, Greece, the Turkish Republic and the United Nations have taken a role in the issue (Coskun Eds Tamcelik, 2013, 3) and by the official membership of the Cyprus issue in 2004 European Union has begun to be the part of the issue. When the actors of the issue are observed, it would be easy to recognize that they who

'' The American Fleet is leaving in the morning''

''30 thousand people fought in Taksim : 2 deaths''

ry diplomatic actors of Turkish foreign policy

security policies affecting the diplomatic attitud

United Nations Peace Force and the Turkish

o be a security issue, (Tamcelik, 2013, 203)

the issue has rather been taken in hand politically

rity policy shifts and the re-evaluations of thre

uld be the main focus of the chapter becau

pprochment with the West's instutional basis,

''The people rallying against the 6th fleet beaten by pro-AP* (Adalet Partisi-Justice Party) supporters''

November 17th 1969

Figure no:3.26

derived from being part of the democratic world. However, Turkish leaders soon realized that under the circumstances of forcing it to make decisions independent from the West or any kind of conflicts on the diversities of interests and policies made it float on the surface of events. In this perspective I will try to find empirical clues by the re/over view of the historical and political context of the issues.

The Ottomans, who controlled Cyprus for three hundred and seven years, introduced two measures, which were to have a long-lasting effect, one positive and the other negative. First, they introduced the millet system to Cyprus (as elsewhere), which allowed the Church of Cyprus to run its own affairs, and which put an end to the constant pressure of the Roman Catholic Church on Christian Orthodoxy. The Ottomans "treated the Greek Orthodox community as a largely self-governing religious group or millet" (Clement, 1999, 1 and Kaliber, 2003, 142) ensured the strengthening of Orthodox clergy within the extensively heterogeneous ethnic structure of the island. Indeed, at the end of Ottoman rule, the Church of Cyprus was, in a way, in a stronger position than it had been for hundreds of years. However, as the Ottoman Empire declined, its rule in Cyprus became brutal and corrupt. (Mallison, 2011, 16)

The second measure was the settling of thousands of Ottoman Turks on the island. These included many janissaries (from yeni çeri = new soldier), the elite guards of the Sultan, many of whom were Greeks and Slavs, who had been taken as young children, proselytized to and given intense military training. Thus, the original Muslim population of Cyprus is not of purely Turkish stock. Forced conversions to Islam followed the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821. (Mallison, 2011, 16) The demographic manipulation was perceieved as an attempt to assimilate the Christian minorities by melting the traditional and cultural mores into the mainstream cultural societies.

The Ottoman period was seen as reasonably uneventful by the minorities, apart from occasional protests, usually about the high taxation imposed by the Ottomans. An uprising in 1804 was a less clear-cut affair that has been likened to a revolution. Franco-British-Russian interests were clashing in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Russians had dramatically increased their influence in the Ottoman Empire through the treaty of Küçük Kainardji in 1774, whereby Russia had become the protector of the Orthodox Christians. The whole confused affair was the result of the self-interested policy of the great powers at a time when the

Ottoman Empire was beginning its slow descent into oblivion. Certain parallels can be drawn today, at least in terms of the interests that some foreign powers maintain in Cyprus.

The year 1821, when the Greek uprising for independence against the Ottoman rule commenced, is generally coded in the texts, sympathetic to Turkish thesis, as the onset of serious frictions between the Turkish and Greek or the Muslim and Christian populations of the island. (Kaliber, 142)

In 1878, the Ottoman-Russian war broke out which gave Great Britain the opportunity to temporarily lease the island in support of the Ottomans, who had been defeated in the war and signed a treaty (Kizilyurek, 2002, 214 and Kaliber, 142) giving many compromises to the Russians. However, the real intention of Great Britain was to secure the roads to its colonies by the annexation of the island as was clearly expressed in the words of the renowned historian, A.J.P. Taylor: "Cyprus was obtained as a 'place d'armes', and to watch over an unstable Anatolia." (Mallison, 2011, 19) Britain sought for the consolidation of the status of the island and even more, for the possibility of the island's legal annexation to the Empire. Thus, in 1914, following the Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War on the side of Germany, Britain annexed Cyprus and stopped paying the rent (92000 (what units?)gold per year*), (http://akaum.atilim.edu.tr/pdfs/KibrisTarihiveKibrisSorunu_I.pdf)* and then offered it to Greece, provided that the latter (Mallison, 2011, 20) entered the war against Germany.

By the time Greece joined the war in 1917 (following the victory of the Venizelists over the government of the King), the offer had been withdrawn. After the withdrawl of Russia from World War I, the amendment of the treaty signed in July 1st 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain provisioned that the island be given back to the Ottoman Empire but this was not implemented by Great Britain (Cicioglu, 2001, 21-30 and Demir, 2005, 347-367) because of the Ottoman Empire's weak diplomatic position at that time. After the struggle/liberation war of the Turks in Anatolia, who were determined to nationalize and modernize Anatolia had to primarily leave the destiny of the island legally up to the Treaty of Lausanne. (Article 20)

Turkey's formal acceptance of the permanent cession of sovereignty of the island and the hand over to Britain is explained by Turkish authors either in terms of the necessity of the international balances of power of the time or as a result of the peaceful foreign policy adopted by the founders of the Turkish Republic. Accordingly, the Turkish state elite giving primacy to the conduct of modernizing reforms in domestic politics consented to relinquish the island to Britain in order to preclude emergence of new crises in foreign relations. (Uslu,

2001, 263 and Kaliber, 142) This approach was necessary because Turkey had already unsetteled issues remaining after the Lausanne with the Allies. During the nationalization movement Atatürk and the decision makers couldn't risk endangering the process.

Despite British rule in the Island, the Turkish people never gave in, rejecting the idea and attempts of annexation of the island to Greece, (Mallison, 2011, 21) which was seen by the Greek Cypriots as anatural course of events. According to Greek Cypriots, the idea of annexation was legitimate because of the overwhelming majority of those of Greek descent, combined with the power and pressure of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, a movement for liberation and union with Greece was as natural as it was inevitable, although the British Colonial Office tried to play down the question. Encouragement had even come from Winston Churchill, who had said in 1907, that: (Mallison, 2011, 21-22)

> ''It was only rational that the Cypriot people who were of Greek descent should regard their incorporation with what could be called their mother country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly and fervently cherished.''

On the other hand, Turkish cypriots have always been seen as the main political block to the implementation of Enosis and state that if there were to be an annexation or return, it should be to the legal owner of the island: Turkey.

The Enosis movement had been opposed by the successive and sovereign British Government, for whom control of all Cyprus was necessary for their strategic and political concerns in the broader Middle East. (Novo, 2009,2) Grivas, who was a retired Greek officer, the leader of EOKA movement triggered and transformed the issue into an armed conflict (Mallison, 2011, 21-22) to be independent and save the island, which was "a slient slave woman for years" according to the governers of the island.

The main objectives (Ioannides, 1991, 50 and Kaliber, 151) of EOKA, led by general Grivas were formulized as "to force the British to grant Cyprus the right to self-determination which was bound to lead to Enosis or union with Greece by using Greek Cypriots. Grivas in his memoir confessed recruiting men from Greece. (Novo, 2009, 4)

The internatioanalization of the issue and the violent nature was characterized by the right of "self-determination" which was claimed by the Greek Cypriots unilaterally ignoring the right of the Turkish Cypriots and the armed movement of EOKA. Since the right of self-determination was given only to groups defined as people under a domestic law or international law, it was not right to claim the right unilaterally. The EOKA movement was

presented to the world as a "freedom struggle for independence" to legitimize the violent actions towards the Turkish people and Brtish government in the eyes of the International community. Although it was presented as a freedom struggle against the colonial British government, the violence spread to the Turkish Cypriots living in the island along with the Greek Cypriots for many years. However, the Greek efforts to internationalize the matter by bringing it to the agenda of international forums was confronted with unfavorable and vehement reactions particularly on the part of the nationalist and pan-Turkist circles in Turkey.

In the meetings organized by the nationalist associations and student unions the Greek attempts were harshly condemned and the Menderes government was called upon to pursue a more active and involved Cyprus policy. The Turkish government who also based the diplomacy on Atatürk's motto, "Peace at Home, Peace in the World'' like the previous governments, realized that the ignorance of the issue would have costs for also the domestic policies. The intensive emphasis on Turkishness prepared the ground on which the Cyprus issue was declared a "national cause (milli dava)". Parallel to the condensation of a nationalistic atmosphere in the domestic politics, the reluctance of the Menderes government to pursue an aggressive and clearly defined Cyprus policy began to erode by the summer of 1954. (Kaliber, 149)

'The explosions in Cyprus continued in yesterday''

'Homes and the buses used by the British offiecers were bombed. Arrests done''

'Turkish Cpriots demanded harsh precautions against the terrorists for

''The Government didn't allow th

Britain's last decision created reaction in the U.S.:
''Today's morning :Heral Tribune criticizes that
''It is a mistake to see the situation optimistically''

March 27th 1957

''Dr.Fazıl Küçük told that there was a total agreement with Sir John Harding yesterday yet didn't explain on which issues.

** The U.S., the leader of the democratic bloc who supported Turkey and Greece by means of politcal,economical and military tools took the situation seriously bacuse any kind of destabilization or conflict in the bloc would create weakness against the Soviet Union.

''First bomb exploded in Cyprus''

'Happening after 7 months no loss of life''

''The explosion is because of the way of last actions of Grivas''

August 3rd 1959

Figure no:3.31

demanded from the Motherland''

party that dragged the Cyprus conflict out. On the other hand, for Turkey the conference meant the official recognition of its status as a concerned party by the other two. (Salem, 1992, 118 and Kaliber, 152)

In February of 1959 in Zurich, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement by which they set up the basic constitutional framework of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and guaranteed its independence. (Dimari &Varnava, 2) In 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was formed. Political leaders of Britain, Greece and Turkey met in Zurich and London, where they formed agreements and created a power-sharing constitution. They agreed on a draft plan for the independence of Cyprus under a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot president and vice-president respectively. On 19 February, in London, the Greek, Turkish and British governments met to finalize arrangements. These agreements ended British rule and included a constitution and three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment. (Mallison, 2011, 27-28)

One notable thing about the birth of the RoC was the absence of celebration on either side, due to the fact that neither the aim of partition for the Turkish-Cypriots nor Enosis for the Greek-Cypriots was achieved due to the unclear provisions and articles of the Constitution.

Even though both Enosis and partition were banned with the Constitution of the Cyprus Republic proclaimed on 16 August 1960, the ‘motherlands’ have become more and more involved in thesociopolitical and cultural life of the island. As Joseph S. Joseph pointed out “education, religion, culture, language, history and military ties” were operationalized in the constitution. (Joseph, 37 and KALİBER, 157)

While constitutional basis was being established in Cyprus, Turkey was confronting a very crucial internal political process by the overthrown Democrat party leaders in a military coup, which is still being questioned as to it having been supported by the people or not. (Burak, 2011. 149)

The 1960 constitution did not resolve the root causes of the conflict, as the ideas of Enosis and Taksim were still on Turkey's agenda. (Nicolaides, 2008, 35) Makarios attempted to put the Akritas plan (Solsten, 1991 and *http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/12.html)* into effect, being dissatisfied with the constitutional basis. The attempts (Nicolaides, 2008, 34) to amend the constitution through direct violence thus erupted again in 1963 between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as Cyprus teetered on the brink of civil war.

Upon the growing tension and dozens of conflicts on the island, Turkey declared its

''Turkish Armed Forces is on duty''

''Our Armed Forces took over the administration of the state ad hoc''

''The Cominique of the Turkish Armed Forces''

May 27th 1960

Fıgure No:3.33

US Ambassador to Ankara, Raymond Hare. (Ankara, 1974, 158-162) because of the ongoing

crisis that was profoundly shaking the basis of Turkish perceptions. It was a very important diplomatic moment to decide what to do about the intervention, how to do it or even if it was possible to do it in time without the help of the Western powers who had been allies for decades. Especially after having consolidated relations with the U.S., against communism, with a shock Turkey was forced to scrutinize its relations with the U.S.. The Turkish government was aware of the provisions binding the use of force but this was an exception because Turkish Cypriots were suffering from the ethnic conflict and Turkish interference was thought to be the only solution. President Johson, however, reiterated that the consent of the U.S. was crucial and needed prior to the actions of the Turkish government, even if it was a basic interest:

> "I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreeement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished."

The letter was understood by the Turkish side to be an allusive threat, indicating that neither NATO nor the U.S. would be responsible for its security, if actions taken against Cyprus caused a Soviet intervention in the case. After 1943 when the progress of the World War II was changed dramatically in favor of the Allies and the Soviets in almost all the fronts, Turkey began to perceive the Soviets as even more of a threat. Having foreseen the results of the war, the states forming the Allies started to shape the international structure of the world, planning to integrate the new international norms and laws into the international law framework and consolidating the status quo by means of new organizations. The Soviet Union then felt free to change the diplomatic balance in its favor by demanding land and a re-evaluation of the status quo of the Straits. As the outpost of the Western bloc, Turkey was already conducting her assignment most decisively starting from the end of the war when the formation of the blocs and the tension were brought to a climax.

The Johnson letter was an open "abandonment of Turkey by the United States in favor of Greece." (Uslu, 2003, 48 and Akgul, 2004, 85) İnönü would state to the cabinet: "our friends and our enemies have joined hands against us." (Aksam, September 21, 1967 and T. Akgul 2004, 85), "This was an exaggeration, but it is important to show the perceptions and disappointment in Turkey regarding U.S. policies over Cyprus. The threat of not supporting

Turkey in case of a Soviet attack against Turkey would "shake confidence in American commitments." (T. Akgul 2004, 86), Turkey discovered that while Turkey had stood firmly against the Soviets, the main NATO members had increased their relations with the Soviet Union. Turkey had also "completely neglected" the Third World. Thus, both the Soviet bloc, and the Third World countries had voted against Turkey in the U.N. And even some of the NATO members, as well as most of the Muslim states, joined the Greeks in their votes against Turkey.

The unreliability and disappointment of the Turkish government implied by Bülent Ecevit, who was the Secretary General of İnönü's Republican People Party (RPP) in 1964: (Bolukbasi, 1993, 506 and Akgul, 2004)

> "We realized that our one-dimensional national security approach did not cover all contingencies. We began to discuss whether Turkey's membership in NATO contributed to Turkish security or actually increased dangers. We also realized that [NATO's commitment to our security] would be useless if our friends changed their minds [and did not stand up to their commitments]… We also realized how isolated we were. Because of the [international] isolation, we faced enormous difficulties [in convincing other states] that our cause was just…"

As clearly understood from the statements, the decision makers began to question their perspective of security and tried to alter the security approach of Turkey considering the conditions of the international arena. (Bolukbasi, 1993, 506) The letter wounded the Turkish government and public opinion turned against the U.S. when the letter appeared in the press, which was also a turning point in the Turkish-American relations. (Urer, 2003, 269-278) The Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun C. Erkin also would say: "After this the relations between Turkey and the United States will never be the same." (Nicolet, 242 and Akgul, 2004, 86-87) I should note that this diplomatic imply has been used so many times for so many foreign affairs cases by the politicians in Turkey which has been considered by the public as a sign of imprudence. Due to vulnerable relations of internal and external policy and dreadfully conflicting interests, Inonu agreed to Johnson's request and called off the operation.

On 13 April, İnönü sent a letter to reply to Johnson's letter. (Nicolet, 243-246 and Akgul, 2004, 87) He started his letter by pointing out his disappointment to the tone of the letter: "your message, both in wording and content, had been disappointing for an ally like Turkey''. The strongest point made by İnönü in his response was regarding the NATO unity

and the Soviet threat. Also, it was known for a fact by all the parties concerned with the conflict that, on numerous occasions, Turkey had proposed a joint intervention with Greece. Thus, if Greece chose to wage a war against Turkey in case of a Turkish intervention to the island, it was in fact Greece who was starting a war against a NATO ally. Therefore, it was the Greeks who needed to be warned against attacking a NATO country, not Turkey. Turkey would mount a military operation using its right given by the treaties, which were signed by not Greece as well as Cyprus. Thus, İnönü stated that: "If Greece were to attack Turkey, we could in no way be held responsible of [for] the consequences of such an action."(Akgul, 2004, 87)

The arguments put forward by the Turkish side were very important to show the U.S. policy goal was to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey, The Johnson letter should have gone to Greece instead of Turkey. (Akgul, 2004, 87) The U.S. was acting on the assumption that Turkey was aiming to establish partition. This also shows the mistrust between U.S. and Turkey despite the two decades of alliance. Further more, the letter by Johnson had clearly threatened to remain on the sidelines in case of a Russian attack on Turkey as a response to Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus.

The process shows that Turkey's threat perceptions dependent on the Westerns bloc's security perspective came at a cost. Turkey was also perceieved as a threat by the states, which she was determined to perceive as threat especially by the USSR. Thus, any kind of drifts on these perceptions, which were taken for granted by the Turkish decision makers were pushed to a kind of resourcelessness by the trusted allies. (Feroz, 2003, 157) The Cyprus issue (Meyer, 2000, 13) offered a very important foreign policy formulation test.

According to a constructivist approach, dealing with the normative basis of interstate conflict and state use of violence, also examines the how norms shape the security behavior of the states. (Farrel, International Studies Review, 4(1), 49-72) As a member of NATO, Turkey considered herself an "internanationally socialized" state. On the other hand, according to neo-liberal theoriststs, cooperation and peace can be provided not only by states' balance of power or evolving policies on threat percetions derived from relative power but also by means of coherence of the other actors such as international organizations, transnational organizations, NGOs, MNCs and other non-state players. Therefore, Turkey had to cooperate closely with the U.S. throughout the crisis up until the March 1964 U.N. resolution. (Akgul, 2004, 87) The U.S. had become aware of the bilateral aspect of the problem as a Greek-Turkish struggle, rather than a dispute among the Cypriot communities, and was trying to keep a balanced position between two of its NATO allies - Greece and Turkey.

In an era (Cold War) where realist approaches and attiudes are comparatively more preferable by the decision makers of the states to determine foreign policies according to the state's capacities, Turkey found it necessary to react to this letter and the attitude of the U.S. (Fuller, 2008, 39 and Aktas, 2010, 13) During this period, Turkey qualified all international issues within a uni-dimensional foreign policy through the perspective of NATO alliance and the United States. Relations with the other actors were kept at the minimum level. (Mufti, 1998, 41 and Aktas, 2010, 14) *(http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000615268.pdf)*

With the conduct of such a unidimensional foreign policy based on a unidimensional security and threat perceptions without any kind of pursuit of alternatives, Turkey's irritation and dissappointment became unbearable. In a diplomatic answer among the chronicles of CIA showing the reactive course of conduct, Turkish reaction to the letter varied from shock and disbelief that such a letter coud have been sent by the president of the United States to that of complete dissappointment in the United States. Some went even so far as to say that in the light of this letter Turkey should not have postponed intervention. The general concensus was that this letter made it almost mandatory for Turkey to become more independent of the United States in international relations. (Aktas, 2010, 14) This was so especially after the U.N. resolution in March. Turkey started being increasingly isolated in its case about the eventual solution to the dispute. Metin Toker, the son-in-law of Inonu, summarized how the Turkish Government felt at the time: (Uslu, 42 and Toker, Akis, 4 April 1964, 7 and Aktul, 2004, 79)

> "…We determined our policy in cooperation with the Americans. As a loyal ally of the United States, we informed Washington about our every action and intention… We seriously listened to advice of the Americans. When the Anglo-American plan of a NATO peace- keeping force was submitted to us, we accepted it though it had some points contrary to our policy..."

On the other hand, the principal aim of the Greeks was to internationalize the dispute as much as possible, and resolve the problem in the U.N. They were confident that, if taken to the U.N., the dispute would be resolved in their favor. The Security Council, the Third World countries (mostly those who were members of the "non-aligned" movement), and the Soviet determination." (Akgul, 2004, 88) To Turkey's irritation, it decided on 4 March 1964, through Security Council Resolution 186, to use the UN Secretary General's mission of good offices to reach a settlement in accordance with the UN Charter; to place UN peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) on the island; to appoint a UN mediator and to reaffirm the sovereignty and continuing existence of the Republic of Cyprus. In the meantime, violence continued, and Turkey's airforce bombed Greek Cypriot villages and other civilian targets in the summer. Although the British and Americans had initially agreed not to prevent a Turkish invasion, they also feared that a war between Greece and Turkey would seriously damage NATO's southern flank, to the Soviet Union's advantage. (Mallison, 2011, 27) To find alternate solutions for security, both sides began to neutralize the efforts of the other one upon the relatively passive and pragmatic decisions of the Western Bloc. Turkish–Soviet rapprochement, which had already begun during the previous year, can be evaluated. Directly after the visit of Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou to the Soviet Union, in September 1964, Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Erkin traveled to Moscow signaling the beginning of a rapprochement, aiming also partly at "neutralizing" the results of Kyprianou' s visit. (Sammoutis, 2007, 63-66)

The change in government had implications for the situation in Cyprus (Sammoutis, 2007, 70 and Ulusoy, 2008, 308-329), which brought a nationalistic posture on the Cyprus issue that would help deepen the crisis. (Wenzke & Lindley James, 2008, 31) The nationalist elements in both mother countries, came to a head, with Grivas' return to Cyprus (he had agreed to leave in 1960, returned in 1964 to lead the National Guard, left in 1967 and returned secretly in 1970). (Mallison, 2011, 28) According to the UN, broke out in November, and the threat of war between Greece and Turkey again loomed, with Turkey threatening to "invade"/intervene in Cyprus. Following intense international pressure, Grivas and the Greek

division had to withdraw. (Mallison, 2011, 28) To be able to settle the Cyprus problem by conducting direct negotiations between Turkey and Greece, a diplomatic meeting was organized on September 9 and 10, 1967 at the border cities of Alexandroupoli and Kesan. The Greek delegation assumed that Turkey would agree to resume the negotiations of the previous year on the basis of union of Cyprus with Greece and territorial compensation for Turkey, either on the island or on the Aegean. (Sammoutis, 2007, 69)

The wide gap that existed regarding the interpretation of the 1960 Constitution and the status of the two communities in the RoC, had an inevitable impact on the negotiating positions each community had during the inter-communal talks initiated in 1968. In particular, there was a disagreement upon the very basis of the talks. According to Glafkos Clerides, the Greek-Cypriot negotiator, the divisive elements of the 1960 Constitution exacerbated the differences of the two communities, while the constitutional impasse of 1963 proved that it was not functional, thus a fresh start was needed. (Polivou, 1981, 91 and Dimari & Varnava *http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Events/20115th%20PhD%20Symposium/Dimari-Varnava.pdf)* On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, by emphasizing that the Zurich Agreements acknowledged and protected their community's rights, declared that the 1960 Constitution would continue to stand subject to such minor adjustments necessitated in the light of agreement on the package deal. (Denktash in Clerides, 60 and *http://www.glafkosclerides.com.cy/Cms/GeneralInfo%5CPdf%5Callilografia%20klerides-denktash%201968-1975.PDF)* Noteworthy is also the fact that the main objective in these negotiations for the Greek-Cypriots was the strengthening of the unitary character of the state. According to the Turkish-Cypriot negotiator, Rauf Denktash, his community would not give up the partnership and the co-founder status, which he insisted they had gained with the Zurich Agreements. (Necatigil, 1981, 41 and Dimari & Varnava) In November 1967 Cyprus experienced the biggest crisis since August 1964. An attack by the Turkish Cypriots (Greek Cypriot forces led by George Grivas) (Wenzke& Lindley James, 2008, 33) in the village of Kofinou against a Greek Cypriot police patrol, aiming to secure the control of the main Nicosia – Limassol road, led to the use of excess violence on behalf of the Greek Cypriot National Guard in order to control the village, causing the death of 24 Turkish Cypriots who put up armed resistance to the operation. Turkey again started immediate preparations to land on Cyprus. These horrific evident [descriptions], combined with illustrations create an account in which the Turkish-Cypriots become victims of the merciless barbarous Greeks and Greek-Cypriots. (Brouwer, 2009, 39) This time Turkey did not stop with the threat of an

invasion but its military/ units started embarking on warships, while planes started flying over Cyprus, and a war atmosphere prevailed. As the Greek junta was unprepared for a clash with Turkey it ended up accepting the latter's ultimatum demanding, among other things, that Athens withdraw the Greek contingent. (Peristianis, 2008, 197)

Turkey's attempts to show the determined stand against her strategic interests in Near East Mediterranean were twice seen as fumble by the international actors. The attitudes based on realists approach were more consequent for Turkish Foreign policy engaged in the Cyprus issue. The implementation of the Turkish expressions causing deterrence providing for most Greek Cypriots saw the withdrawal of the contingent (December 1967) as a severe blow to the dream of Enosis. Feelings of regret were mixed with anger at the "betrayal of the national centre"; (Anthropos, 1928 and Peristianis, 2008, 198) to add to it all, at the end of December 1967, the Turkish Cypriots took advantage of the weakened position of the Greek side, and declared the formation of the "Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration": The 'first partition' thus received its symbolic seal. (Peristianis, 2008, 198)

The other side of the politics, military force as a tool, worked in favor of Turkish side taking more realistic steps made Makarios to accept more realistic terms. Thus, on 12 January 1968, Makarios called a press conférence to declare a new approach to the Cyprus Problem. After referring to the dead-end in the Greco-Turkish dialogue of the previous few years and the décision of the Athens government to withdraw the Greek troops from the islands, both of which militated for a new realistic policy on the Cyprus problem, he stressed the need for peaceful co-existence with the "Turks of Cyprus" - who were recognized as "equal citizens" and could be given further "special privilèges" in the form of a "Charter of rights". (Peristianis, 2008, 199)

Throughout the 1960s the United States and the United Nations had to intervene several times to prevent a renewed outbreak of war on the island and between Greece and Turkey as stated in the previous paragraphs. Yet, a split started to become apparent between the Greek junta (1967-1974) and Makarios (Denktash, 1982, 122 and Wenzke & Linley James, 2008, 44), because the Cypriot president had become increasingly disheartened by the idea of Cypriot union with a country ruled by a military dictatorship. *(http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Studien_zu_ZS-3.pdf)*

‘’The Constitution, regulating the social functions established’’

‘’**Turks in Cyprus, declared the formation of the "Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration"**

December 30th 1967

Figure No:3.35

‘’Turkish Administration will be in force until the reutrn of the 1960’s Constitution.’’

Between the years 1963-1974, both mediation and unofficial efforts had been used, however strategies failed to produce a settlement of the conflict. (Richmond, 1998 and Khasman, 2008, 6) In 1974, the military junta in Athens replaced Makarios with a more hardline supporter of Enosis. After failing to secure British support for a joint intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee, Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish prime minister, decided to act unilaterally. (Ker-Lindsay, 2005, 12) The decision of Turkey's uniletaral intervention was a realist attitude, considering the strategic interests clashing with her allies, to protect Turkish Cypriots from ethnic cleansing, to invoke the rights of them given by the Treaty of Establishment and her own legal rights given by the Treaty of Guarantee. At this point, Turkey, which had already been on the verge of intervening in 1964 and 1967 in response to inter-communal violence, in July 1974, citing the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, deployed her military forces in two separate actions to the island. In the eyes of most international observers and even of many Greeks, this unilateral Turkish action was legal according to the Treaties of 1959 (Nicolet, 99) but even in the eyes of the American Congress, the second phase of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus was an aggressive action, and was therefore unacceptable, although the members of Congress found generally the first intervention, aimed at protecting the innocent lives of Turkish Cypriots, justifiable, and even endorsed it saying: (Watanabe, 100 and Karagoz, 2004/2005, 120)

> "To this point [after the first Turkish intervention] the Turks had achieved the goals intended by their military intervention: they stopped the illegal coup on Cyprus, restoring that island's legitimate government. The intervention also caused indirectly, the fall of the 7-year Athens dictatorship. Turkey had a right, under theLondon accords of 1959, to intervene in Cyprus if the other guarantor powers [Greece and Britain] failed to act jointly but only for the purpose of restoring the state of affairs under the treaty."

However, the intervention opened a new path to a developing skepticism of the US (West) and fresh perceptions towards, "other" geographies. (Oran, 2001, 689-690 and Balci, 2003, 8) Turkey was at the crossroads of the great choice between a European and a non-European orientation. (Westetn or Non-Western) Suddenly, Turkey was no longer arguing in defense of the status quo, but rather was seeking to overthrow it. Turkey's objective now

became the replacement of the governmental structure that had been in place since 1960 with a framework based upon the concept of taksim, the division of the island's Greek and Turkish communities. (Bahceli, Columbus and Carley, 12)

''Everything will be clear on Tuesday''

''We declined the nagotiation offer of the U.S''**

''Ecevit: We don't have patience to wait anymore'

''The comment of the political environment: The adhoc situation created by Sampson in Cyprsu can't continue anymore''

''Demirel: We don't have single piece of rock to give to Greek''

July 18th 1974

Figure No:3.37

without the consent of the West, the membership of NATO forced Turkey to sit at the peace table. As a conclusion, (Meyer, 19- 22) Turkey's Cyprus policy in 1974 prompted a profound shift, derived from factors that had developed for over a decade and from events that had arisen in the after the coup. [Turkey's first intervention on July 20] On July 20, Turkey had

had to respond in a defensive attitude to the events had occured on Cyprus that could have led to Greek annexation of the island, however, the interventions of July 20 and August 14 were launched for defending the long-suffering Turkish Cypriot community on the island. These circumstances, following the July 20 intervention, included the following points:

1) An advantageous military position in Cyprus generally over Greece.
2) Diplomatic support from the international community.
3) Increased international support for increased protections for Turkish Cypriots.
4) Overwhelming popular support in Turkey for Ankara's initial intervention.
5) Political turmoil among the Greek and Greek-Cypriot leadership.

The August 14 intervention was seen as agressive and opportunist by the international community, however, by the help of the decision of the interventions, Turkey abandoned its previous policy of supporting the Constitutional status quo in Cyprus, strategically regulated and formulated under the mutual interests approach of the West and Turkey. Since Johnson's 1964 letter to Inonu which was seen publicly, Turkish leaders blamed the United States for preventing Turkey from acting to protect the lives of Turkish Cypriots. Although the efforts of Turkish Foreign Ministry to diversify its foreign policy to decline the growing anti-Americanism, the coup in Cyprus by the supporters of Enosis gave a legitimate cause for Turkish government who was already willing to act in a more independent manner than its predecessors. American initiatives toward establishing relations with the Sampson regime prior to Turkey's intervention, moreover, must have confirmed the strategy in Ankara that the only method of safeguarding Turkish interests in Cyprus was to maintain Turkey's military presence on the island once the initial landing had been completed. Under the conditions of so many advantages combined with more developed changes generally in Turkey's overall foreign policy outlook, a military foothold in Cyprus had become too vital for Ankara to surrender. (Meyer, 19- 22)

3.3.2.SIEGEMENTALITY (SEVRES SYNDROME)

For the Ottoman Empire the end of World War I came with the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres. The regulation of the treaty was seen very harsh and angered the Ottoman Empire's decision makers and bureacuracy. Signed on August 10th 1920, the treaty provided many strategic advantages for Great Britain, Italy and France as the victors. An unsettled issue for over a hundred years, The Treaty of Sèvres territorially carved up the "Sick Man of Europe". *(http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/treaty_of_sevres.htm)*

The founding leaders of the republic, who had witnessed the rapid dissolution period of the Empire saw the 1917 Sykes-Picot Agreement as a nightmare, arranged in secret by the British and French decision makers, which would cause great territorial loss for the Ottoman Empire. *(http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/treaty_of_sevres.htm)*

The Treaty of Sèvres, which would have had immense implications for Turkish sovereignty had it been implemented, was seen by many Turks as essentially Wilsonian in inspiration, and part of a wider American tendency to encourage Balkan, Kurdish, and Armenian self-determination at Turkey's expense. (Candar, eds, Abromowitz, 2000, 124- 125 and Lesser, 2007, 19) The experience is still very much alive in the Turkish discourse today, and the "Sèvres syndrome" has been a factor in contemporary Turkish suspicions about American policies toward northern Iraq, and Turkey itself. With this historical background, it is hardly surprising that many Turks fear a neo-Wilsonian policy and American talk of transforming the Middle East.

The Sevres syndrome is not limited to just the realm of public debate and Turkish politics. The trauma of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the importance given to the protection of the new born Turkish Republic from enemies inside and outside of the country. The impact has remained a central feature of the Turkish education system and the socialization of members of the Turkish military as well as bureaucracy and the judiciary. Since a large number of people are affected by this syndrome, politicians, independent of whether they intellectually believe in it or not, frequently resort to stoking Turkish paranoia towards the external world and especially the West. It is against this continuing invocation of a historical threat that the Turkish enigma needs to be understood. (Lesser, 2007, 20)

According to Lesser, the Sevres syndrome is weakening as Turkey becomes more and more an open society with pluralist democracy. Treating and bringing the Sevres syndrome under some degree of control is primarily Turkey's problem. The best policy for the allies might be to engage Turkey positively and constructively and reassure people that reform in Turkey will indeed bring the stability and prosperity associated with EU membership and is not a threat to the integrity of the Turkish culture or state. It would also help reformers

relegate the Sevres syndrome and the accompanying paranoia about the west to its final resting place in Turkish history. (Önis, 2009/05, 35 and Transatlantic Academy Scholars Views on Turkish Public Opinion, October 1, 2009)

As stated in the sections above, Turkish poiticians' eagerness for Westernist modernization mission proceedings has always been obstructed by this mentality. According to the argument of the thesis, despite the eagerness for western identity by means of intergrating institutional and political steps of the decision makers starting from the dissolution period until today, the diplomatic mental back ground has always remained on alert about the matters shaped by the Sevres. Even having had this siege mentality, Turkish politicans have alway figured out a way back to full commitment and integration. Especially in the period 1945-1960 when Turkey acquired a Western identity took an institutional status by means of bileteral and multinational agreements and organizations mostly because of the security concerns

According to Ziya Önis, the question raises now whether the drift towards loose Europeanization-Westernization is likely to be reversed. He states the possibility of a major reversal at present is low. From a more strategic long term vision, two possibly mutual supporting developments may start an empowered impact to the deep Europeanization process.

It is also likely that the weakening of economic performance will reduce the scope for the assertive and multi-dimensional foreign policy strategy with no firm trans-Atlantic or EU axis observed during the second phase of the AKP government. This process is forcing Turkey to align its policies much more closely with the Western alliance in the process. (Önis, 2009/05, 36)

It is possible for the thesis to conclude the section by stating that Turkey's political, diplomatic, military and economic institutional roots will always be her issues to confront when she needs an alternative foreign policy. The instutional identity characterized by her international accounts needed to be transfered which seems quite impossible, considering the agreements and international organization building the identity for Turkey as an Euro-Atlantic club member. During the Cold War, the identity was characterized by security issues, in the post-war period it is characterized by more multi-dimensional regarding the dynamics of a global World.

''The Parliement and the government is dissolved
Martial law is proclaimed all over the country''

''The Armed Forces seized the control of the government''

September 12th 1980

3.4. 1980-2003

''Greek prepares to return NATO''

October 8th 1980

Figure no:3.40

"1) Affirmation of the essentialism of Kemalism and its practice of inclusion and exclusion.

2) New modernity and thus by no means constituted a challenge to the Kemalist will to civilisation.

3) Although etatism was now subjected to serious criticism, import-substituting industrialisation remained as the motor of industrialisation after the transition to the multi-party system."

Hence, Kemalist nationalism was not questioned with respect to its industrialisation policy. Thus, the 1945-80 period made it clear that Turkish modernisation should involve some elements of economic and political liberalism, but did not alter the dominant role of the state and its strong character vis-à-vis society. By then the effective instruments of formal democracy had been established with the transition to a multi-party and parliamentary democracy in Turkey. (Feroz, 2003, 10- 12) Despite their formal separation, a partnership based on an "imperfect concordance" was formed among the military and political elites in Turkey. (Narli, 2000, 107- 127)

The military coup in 1980 came with a drastic change for Turkish modernization affecting almost every social and political segment of the Turkish society. The industrialization model transformed from import-substituion to export-promotion - a political preference by the decision makers. The Turkish economic background witnessed a remarkable transition from landowners and merchants to industrialists. Import-substitiuton industrialists became exporters by the subvention of the state after 1980. State interference on the economy showed itself in privitisation and neo-liberal economic institutionalization parallel to the Western models. . Similar to the new right policies of Reaganism and Thatcherism, it was also directed at the managerial and technocratic reconstruction of political discourse to shape state-societal relations on the basis of technical instrumental rationality, which was to operate by prioritising efficiency over social welfare. (Aydin & Keyman, 2004, 8) The application of Islamic figures and motives and its notion of umma were considered by the military regime to be a temporary and short-term pragmatic strategy to restructure the political domain and to restore the power of the Kemalist republican state. (Aydin & Keyman, 2004, 9-10)

During the transition period, The military's foreign policy had significantly affected the Özalist foreign policy. After the unilateral Cyprus intervention, Turkey had been isolated from the EC, from the Third World and from the United States, who applied an arms

embargo. The military's perceptions of the politics and Turkey's NATO membership prevented the development of relations with the communist bloc (while internal problems (terror, economic collapse) caused many problems) The military coup also affected Turkish foreign policy, such as the oil crisis in terms of Turkey's isolation. The EC's reaction to the coup was very moderate in the first days because it stabilised the domestic situation. Yet when the military regime retarded the restoration of democracy, the EC toughened its policy towards Turkey. As a result, ironically the Kemalist generals saw the Muslim world as the only way to get away from this economic and political isolation. (Laciner, 2009, 157)

''EVREN: Old parties are dissolved to start democracy which will be established with the new parties''

October 17th 1981

Figure no:3.41

3.4.1 OVERVIEW OF OZAL'S PERIOD

In this section, the impact of the perceptions of Ozal and his decision makers is basically taken hand to show the reflections of the institutional development, political turbulances and coups affects on the state's foreign policy.

According to Sedat Laciner, the 1980 military coup provided a suitable political base for Özalist foreign, economic and domestic politics. The fact that Ozal cooperated the Kemalist bureaucracy, legitimized his political steps, in additon to Özal's cooperation with the Army, which also contributed to the Ozal administration in putting economic reforms into effect. According to Özal, the military coup provided stability and order, which were needed for economic success: (Laciner, 2009, 153- 205)

> "In the past 32 months the sacrifices and courage of our nation, and its supreme ability to understand what was best for it, together with the restoration of peace and order through the successful war waged against anarchy and violence by the September 12 operation, has turned the bleak picture of the economy into a promising one."

Nevertheless, the Army was a political rival for Özal as well and the military elements were gradually banished from politics by the Özal governments. Third, the lack of political rivals granted Turgut Özal a respite to concentrate on the country's problems. Thus, Özal became one of the most creative and productive political figures in Turkish politics. (Laciner, 2009, 158)

As discussed above, the liberal idea has basic elements which include the free market, open market, law and democracy. While Turkey was formed by Mustafa Kemal, Turkey was based on the values of Western Civizilation. Therefore, Turkey had rules which draw a border to Turkish Foregin Policy. Turgut Özal was a vice prime minister who declared a decision that was called Decisions of 24 January 1980. This decision has brought the free market to Turkey. When Turgut Özal was Prime Minister, economic developments influenced Turkish Foreign policy. (*ÇINAR, 2011 and http://www.akademikbakis.org)*

When Turkey embarked on a major economic liberalization program aiming at integration with the global economy. During those years, both the generals who had assumed power with the coup of September 12, 1980 and the civilian bureaucrats they were working with were aware that if Turkey was to participate in global economic processes, this could only be achieved through the empowerment of the business community. The words of the

then foreign minister İlter Turkmen, from a speech in 1982, clearly illustrate how Ankara viewed the issue:

> "It is without doubt that a country can be opened to the outside world only through the joint efforts of its diplomatic missions and business community. It is our duty to meet the expectations of business circles, to contribute to their efforts of opening up to the world, and to search markets for their products…"

The major proponent of greater business involvement in foreign affairs was Turgut Özal, who served in the interim government after the coup as the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs. He won the elections with his Party (ANAP) and became the prime minister of Turkey in 1983. In his efforts to integrate Turkey with the rest the world, Özal preferred to work with the business community rather than with the bureaucracy, which he considered to be a slow, obsolete and uncreative apparatus, an obstacle against rapid progress that had to be bypassed. (Atli, 2001, 3 and *www.policyleadershipinstitute.org)*

In addition to the incentives provided for the private sector, Özal started the practice of holding regular meetings with the representatives of the private sector and taking business delegations on official state visits abroad. It was the dawn of an era for businessmen to communicate their interests relating to Turkey's foreign affairs directly to the state and to take part in foreign policy events. While this participation was largely limited to economic issues, it has to be noted, that Özal's confidence in businessmen was so great that in several cases businessmen were involved in 'hard' issues as well. For instance, in 1987 when the Turkish-Greek rift was at its worst, Özal preferred to bypass the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and employ a businessman as a liaison with his Greek counterpart, Andreas Papandreou. This approach, while increasing the role of businessmen in foreign affairs, widened the chasm between Özal and the bureaucracy. (Atli, 2001, 3 an*d www.policyleadershipinstitute.org)*

Ozal's foreign policy also aimed to have influence on the grounds of 'Turkified Islam' (Allesandri, 2010, 4) on the Balkans. Despite the credit of the Turkish Republic since its foundation – i.e. the Westernization and the break with the Ottoman past – Turkey has to deal with its Ottoman heritage. The weight of the rancor and aversion toward the Turks, the affinity with the Muslims in the Balkans sought or imposed by the events or some political classes in Turkey, cannot be ignored by the government. (Gangloff, 2000/2001, 91- 102 and Laciner, 2009)

From Ozal's point of view, the main reasons for Turkish underdeveloped condition can be found in the lack of liberalism and scientific thinking. His "skipping an age" motto was a reflection of his pragmatic perspective for this situation. Despite the fact that Turkey had been in a modernization process, Turkey did not actually experience an enlightenment process like in the West. According to Ozal, the Turkish cultural depth and civilization background was suitable for the adoption of the fruits of the enlightenment. In other words, Özal's Western vocation, contrary to Atatürk's, was based on the assumption that the Europeans must accept the Turks as they were. Undoubtedly, the reason for this confidence was Özal's ideological back ground and dramatic economic performance. Laciner, 2009)

''The Constitution passed by an overwhelming majority''

''Voted in the affirmative over 90%''

November 8th 1982

Figure no:3.43

While Kemalist policies took hesitant steps towards the Western League because of historical scepticism, Ozal claimed that Turkey could only solve its security issues through the integration with the West which can be provided by institutional cooperation in economy and politics. Thus, If Turkey managed to enter the EC, it would be far away from any risk of war: (Ozal, 1991 and Laciner, 2009, 296- 297)

On this point his neo-liberal thoughts are characterized by economic integration by means of instituional cooperation and diversfying the foreign policy selections, though not without the Westernization process. His thoughts can only be regarded as an innovative way-out for Turkish unidimensional foreign policy, thanks to the atmopshere derived by the post Cold War ambiguity which was considered for almost all the states as a new begining or end of history, according to Fukuyama. (Fukuyama, 1989)

However, the effect of the military on politics was still felt because of the constituional institutions like National Security Council. The military's security concerns seemed to have been aggravated by the end of Cold war. The traditional security discourse of the military, according to Bilgin, has three main components: (Bilgin, European Journal of Political Research 44, 2005)

1) Fear of abandonment.
2) Fear of loss of territory.
3) Geographical determinism.

All these seemed to have been aggravated with a rise in PKK attacks (Charountaki, 2012, 185-208), the rise to power of the Islamic Refah Party (Çandar, 27 June 1997, "Postmodern Darbe"(postmodern coup). Daliy Turkish newspaper Sabahin Turkish), the very end of bipolarity which heightened the fear Turkey would lose its strategic importance to the Western community. The fact that NATO was reviewing its mission and that the EU was enlarging without Turkey did not help Turkey to deal with growing instability in the neighbourhood.

According to the Chief of General Staff, in 1993:

> "the army, in the face of recent international developments, hasto assume duties that are far more important than it used to carry out"

The fact that the civilian government was weak and fragmented during the 1990s, with a series of weak coalition governments, frequent change of Foreign Ministers – there were nine different ministers between July 1994 and June 1997 – also helped make the military more assertive. (Pandrin, 2005, 175- 201)

An additional source of concern was the EU's growth, absorbing Eastern European countries, which until recently were members of a rival organisation which Turkey helped keep at bay. Turkey, which signed the Ankara agreement in 1963, liberalized its economy in the 1980s and applied for full membership in 1987, was being by-passed by former enemies. (Pandrin, 2005, 176)

The end of the Cold War, a transition which Özal navigated as Turkey's new president, only reinforced the emerging consensus that Turkey could not remain 'prisoner of its national project' in a sort of self-imposed entrenchment. Turkey's inclusion in the Western camp during the bipolar era was not at all 'un-natural'. It was on the contrary consistent with Ataturk's project of 'modernization through Westernization'. Turkey was, however, 'sealed' for sixty years in the Western bloc. (Hale, 2000 and Robbins, Aydin, 2000, 103-139 and Allesandri, 5) Additionally, the image Ozal gained from confronting the power of the military and challenging secularist and nationalist views on some social issues often cast an ideological shadow over the interpretation of his foreign policy decisions.

According to Nicholas Danforth, there are two motives apparent in the way Turkey engaged the world under Ozal. (Danforth, 88)

1) "Ozal sought and exploited opportunities to advance Turkish interests directly by enhancing Turkey's regional influence and economic position.
2) Ozal sought to demonstrate Turkey's continued value to the U.S. and NATO, which he believed were still essential partners for Turkey even with a lesser or diminishing Soviet threat."

The readiness of Ozal for a possible military contribution to the defense of "new World order" should be taken into account by the "succesfull" participation of U.S. led "Unified Task Force" in 1992-1993 during the involvement in Somalia. In other cases, most notably his outreach to the new Turkic states of Central Asia, Ozal saw Turkey's direct and indirect interests as working in tandem. In the early 1990s, there was much talk of Turkey

serving as an emissary of the west in Turkic Eurasia. The Turks' cultural connections were presented as a possible foundation for the economic and political connections for the U.S. Turkey presented itself as a cultural envoy who alone could establish economonic relations the Turkic Eurasia to the West (Danforth, 89)

Turkish-American relations had been under severe strain since the 1964 Johnson Letter. The Poppy Growing Crisis the Turkish Cyprus Operation and Arms Sale Embargo worsened the relations. However with the 1982 military coup the tension in the relations abated markedly. (Hale, 2000, 163 and Laciner, 2009) Several developments and factors in the 1980s helped to mend relations. According to Laciner: (Sayari, Ismael & Aydin, and Laciner, 2009)

> "1)The United States was more understanding about the coup and its domestic 'anti-democratic' policies compared with the EC's intolerance.
> 2) The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and rise of radical Islamism in Iran with 1979 Revolution were also common concerns of the US and the military regime in Turkey.
> 3) The rise of Turgut Özal in Turkish politics impacted Turkish-American relations more positively (Spain, 1984, 30 and Laciner 2009)''

From the Laciner's clasuses and Alessandri's analysis, Turkish identity and traditional diplomacy based on the Western values and the endevour to show commitment to Western values after even a very anti-democratic traditional domestic military application over the politics can be drawn as a conclusion for Ozal's period. In his thesis, Laciner also concludes the Ozal period as: an alternative but Western-dependent foreign policy. (Laciner, 2009, Conclusion)

Although Ozal's combinations for Turkish policy dynamics and orthodox political orientations for Turkish foreign policy seemed an alternative, Ozal and his succesors showed strong determination for Europeanization and Westernization project under the shadow of military pressure over political routines of the state by means of constitutional institutions.

In conclusion, Turkish traditional foreign policy couldn't create an institutional and permanent alternative foreign policy because of the cumulative identity process. However, the success of Ozal's assessment of the characteristics of the people, his arguments for and guidance to a long term solution for Turkey's unsettled issues should be taken into account which encouraged civil authorities for being comparatively more independent.

''Ozal is brave and believes in nation''

Who will come if Ozal goes, SHP wouldn't be an alternative''

September 21st 1988

Figure no:3.46

''Tanks in Sincan''

''In Sincan where came to order with the demonstrations of pro-Sharia recently, 20 tanks and 15 carrier made a parade''

February 5th 1997

Figure no:3.48

3.7. 2003-2007

After the economic crisis of 2001, the AKP appeared on the political scene of Turkey. It was a beginning of a new era for all of the institutions of the state. Leaders of the party based their legitimacy on the ratio they got from the elections on November 3rd 2002. As it was well known by the people and the bereuacracy, most members of the party were successors of parties such as Refah, Anavatan, MHP and independent ex-liberal-leftists, which were arguably rivals of the official ideology. Even though the party leaders tried to give embracing announcements for deepening their credibility. There were suspicions about their commitment to secularism among many segments of the society, especially among the Kemalists. The growing tension between the AKP and the secularist establishment carried the traces of a big clash in any area, which means perceptions were about to change in the political upsurge. The policies begining to be implemented were actually carried out under a more determined and dominant civil authority. (Bauman, Beck, Kadioglu, 2012)

''100-year Dream''

''Turkey takes a historical step for the Westernization act started in 19th century and breaks the customs walls by implementing customs union application''

''Çiller: We made it''

March 6th 1995

''Epoch-making signiture''

''The European cumstos union agreement which will be the most important step providing for Turkey full-membership of EU signed in Brussels yesterday''

March 7th 1995

Figure no:3.52

''At latest in 98, We are full member of the European Union''

May 7th 1995

Figure no:3.53

To understand the process that brought the AKP to power, I find it quite helpful quoting the clauses used in Suat Aydin and Fuat Keyman's article to set down the important events: (Aydin & Keyman, 2004, 11)

"1) Changing Turkish-EU relations and the need for democratisation.
2) The February 2001 financial crisis and Turkish-IMF relations.
3) The November 2002 national election and the AKP government.
4) The war in Iraq and Turkish-American relations.
5) The role of civil society"

Turkish-EU relations, Turkish-IMF relations, the AKP single-majority government, Turkish-American relations and the increasing importance of civil society have together brought about the possibility of making Turkish foreign policy to find alternative intitiatives.

3.7.1. SEARCHING TRACES IN AKP'S PERIOD

Parallel to the change in the international atmosphere, the 1990s brought a significant change and new approach to Turkish modernization. Despite economic developments in the country, the economic potential was not at a level to support a sustainable welfare level and living standards comparable to Western European countries. The adaptation of a new economic perspective, which was more liberal showed itself in a dualistic pattern of economic growth, consisting of both rich regions and those suffering from poverty due to several cumulative reasons. The political atmosphere was still unstable because of the unsettled chronic issues of Turkish political life in place since its foundation. After the military coup, nationalism and secularism in which the Kemalist circles excluded significant political segments of Turkish society from active political life, who therefore could find no opportunity to express their beliefs and ideology by means of political representation. A rigid interpretation of the principles of secularism and national identity limited its capacity to incorporate the demands of groups that wished to extend the boundaries of the political arena

on the grounds of religious and ethnic identity. The siege mentality syndrome was also effective on the challenges that Turkish policy makers confronted. (Önis, 2004, 7- 11)

The roots of the AKP political team had the reputation of Islamic radicalism which seemed marginal in terms of the dynamics of Turkish political life. Therefore, the decision makers of the AKP centralized their political vision, emphasizing liberalization, democratization and EU membership which gained remarkable support. Despite the fears of state bureaucracy of a hidden agenda of Islamization, the AKP represented segments of society that had never been represented before. (Allesandri, 4) The clash presented itself by the politcal efforts of the AKP to reduce the effect of the military and the other state elite, which had to be decreased in politics and the AKP was quick to institutionalize and constitutionalize the agenda, having the political support that came with the elections.

When the AKP's came to power, the political actors' thought that these conservative Anatolians could have lasting impact on the political order was doubted by many. However, the AKP government, to its advantage, had inherited a pre-existing trend toward reducing the institutional influence of the military. In 1999, the coalition government removed military judges from state security courts. In 2001, Parliament amended the constitution to increase the civilian membership of the NSC and removed the requirement that the Council of Ministers give 'priority consideration' to the NSC's recommendations. Once the AKP was in power, the requirement that the Secretary General of the NSC be a serving member of the military was abolished, as was the Secretary General's unlimited access to any civilian agency and the authority to monitor the implementation of NSC recommendations. (Kinikoglu, 32) It was perceived as normalization and a sign of stable civil authority and inspired almost all of the citizens in the state promising a "change".

The change had started long before AKP actually as it is presented in Ozal's period. Allesandri also describes the period of change as:

> "Turkey had started to change not really in 2002, but some twenty years earlier, in the 1980s. It was with Turgut Özal that Turkey began steering the wheel towards more pluralism internally and greater openness towards the outside world. Özal's 'opening' had multiple long-term consequences. While Özal is accredited domestically with smoothing out the military's disengagement from politics after the 1980 coup, in foreign policy 'Özalism' entailed a rediscovery of Turkey's identity as a Muslim country and a revaluation of Turkey's past as empire. Such re-appreciation of critical elements of the Turkish heritage, which had been too hastily buried after the establishment of the secular Republic in 1924, was not aimed at

altering Turkey's Western orientation. On the contrary, the recognition of all pieces of Turkish history and all faces of Turkey's identity was seen as allowing a reaffirmation of Turkey's choice for the West on a more solid and honest basis."

In terms of the thesis, it is important to underline the approach both Ozal and Erdoagan who tried to redefine Turkish identity by reconnecting the historical ties also found Westernism as a cooperative element. The important point is that the Westernization is at most open to discuss in terms of reevaluation not as a rival or enemy. This consequence

presents the idea that Turkish foreign policy should be analyzed under the Westernism evaluations of policy makers.

The AKP gave full course to the processes which had started in the previous years, while emphasizing even more the need for Turkey to shift its foreign policy orientation from confrontation to engagement. The emerging vision of Turkey as a 'promoter of regional stability' received particular support from the 'corporate' element of the new elite. Traders and entrepreneurs who saw Turkey's vicinity as a vast and under-exploited market in which to make profits as opposed to a chessboard for the game of power politics. (Demiralp, 2009, 315- 335 and Allesandri, 6)

Turkish foreign policy has a new mission and visioned group of politicians and consultants, who claim that Turkey's potential on the region can be increased in a very short term if a stable and powerful government remains in power in Turkey. Turkish diplomacy terminology started to change. In the article (Aktas, 2010, 55-69) of Aktas, new concepts of foreign policy are examined to show the tendecy of politics to change.

- **"Vision-based strategy or a visionary approach**. (NTV Karşı Görüş, 21 December 2005)
- **Consistent and systematic framework**:".(AKTAŞ, 2010, 59)
- **Utilization of "soft power:"** (NYE, 1990)

The politics implemented under the concepts of the AKP with regional and global actors of the internationl community caused the West to grow suspicious of the detachment of Turkey from the Europeanization goals and Western-style development project implemented faithfully in all years. Since it is not possible to discuss on every political evidendence occured in the AKP's period,I found it sufficient to make a presentation on new visionary principles and basic affects on the politics trying to answer the question of: ''Do these changes mean a ''detachment'' from the Westernization/Europeanization project''.According to ALLESANDRI's conclusion, which I agree on: (ALLESANDRI, Conclusion)

> ''Turkey has been in search of a new place and a new identity in the mutated context of the post-Cold War era. This complex process of transformation does not undermine Turkey's Western orientation, but it tests it again, calling upon Turkish political actors to re-affirm their commitment to cooperation and integration. It is time that the debate on Turkey's drift be replaced by a more serious and fruitful one on the reasons why Turkey is still important for the EU and for the West and what Europe and the West mean for, and can offer to, contemporary Turkey. To possibly a larger extent than in the past, this debate should see the active participation of the Turkish people and elite. Turkey's recent achievements bring with them new influence as well new responsibilities and Turkey's greater say in world affairs should translate into a more constructive and equal dialogue with its partners. Whatever the framework and scope, moreover, this debate should be oriented towards the future. Specters of the past and short-term calculations should be traded off with the gains that a re-founded relationship can bring if based on a realistic assessment of shared interests and a common vision of Europe's identity and role in the 21st century.''

KİRİŞÇİ questions the consequences of Turkey's increased foreign policy activism and independence by regarding Turkey' economic and political potential to be a trans-

regional actor that promotes regional peace, prosperity, and stability or an inward-focused regional state, whose domestic turbulence exacerbates problems abroad. He also underlines the affects of the changes in neighbooring states.He explains the instability of democratic process despite the existance of EU-driven reforms, such as greater freedom of expression, have changed the political landscape within Turkey dramatically over the last decad. However, He concludes that a substantinial change can only possible for Turkey toward by the completion of liberal democratic values which are far from complete. Considering the breakdowns in this process Turkey's foreign policy course will also be shaped by the evolution of its relations with its long-time allies in the West: the EU and the U.S(A.EVİN, K.KİRİŞÇİ, R. LINDEN, 2010, 7) Turkey's new regional activism hIs it possible for Turkey to respond constructively to Turkey's pursuit of its own foreign policy goals and orientation by recognizing how those goals may align with transatlantic policy objectives, even if they come from a different perspective to this end. Considering the changing role in its immediate neighborhood, including the Black Sea region to Turkey's north and the Middle East to its south, in a variety of policy areas. These topics include energy policy, conflict resolution, the promotion of democracy, trade and migration. It discusses the underlying causes of Turkey's current foreign policy, including changes in its immediate neighborhood, as well as changes within Turkey itself.(A.EVİN, K.KİRİŞÇİ, R. LINDEN, 2010, 7- 8)

As previously mentioned, the adoption of a diversified foreign policy was already visible in the 1990s. (FOX OZKAN, Journal o Public Affairs, Vol XIII Abstract) Turkey is self-admitedly in the process of redefining its identity.(A.EVİN, K.KİRİŞÇİ, R. LINDEN, 2010, 7- 8)

It is more than plausible that re-definition will not change Turkey's attitude so deeply as to question well-rooted aspirations, such as that of being more fully integrated in Europe. New reasons have to be found and old ones, if still valid, have to be re-affirmed in the new context. The extent to which this process of reckoning is still in its early stages is revealed by the same language and rhetoric of the current government..(A.EVİN, K.KİRİŞÇİ, R. LINDEN, 2010, 13)

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

4.1. WHY CAN'T TURKEY CHANGE HER THREAT PERCEPTIONS?

The tendency and permanency of Turkish foreign policy based on Western institutions determined a Westernized threat perspective for Turkey. In this study, I discussed the dynamics of this process, which has been leading Turkey to unidimensional threat perceptions and some of their consequences by observing the period: 1945-1960.

As indicated in the "Why Should We Review this Period" section, Turkey became not only a sympathizer but a sui-generis ally of the Western states. [Different from the Balkan and Middle Eastern States.] It is hard to conclude the position of Turkey in one study, however, regarding the vital impact of Mustafa Kemal's vision and principles, which had a deep affect on foreign policy perspective.

- Western model nation-state establishment
- Peace at home, peace in the World
- Modern civilization level
- Distinctive features of the liberation war (numbers of the boundries, the Straits, the Treaties of Sevr and Lausanne)

These principles and aims provided a political path, dependency and an identity establishment process. The Turkish modernization process that identified with Westernization especially after the death of Mustafa Kemal can be apparantly evaluated with this perspective.

The thesis didn't focus on the succession of the Turkish Republic, however, national circulars, congresses and battle phases, which provided a nationalist revolution replacing the

Ottoman Empire's administrative, political, economic, judicial, educational, military and almost all of the upper social institutions with the model Western-originated institutions. While stressing the replacement of the Republic, diplomatic legacy and the perspective of the decision makers with the settlement of continued unsettled issues are explained to highlight the permanency of the Westernization project. The perspective inherited by Mustafa Kemal's era meant that successor governments had to implement the rapprochment because of the conditions that had developed in the international arena.

The main question was about the cost of routing westward looking Turkey to unidimensional threat perceptions and security policies. The reason for the questioning was to reach the motive behind this process/progress. Did this situation arise from permanent political recklessness of the decision makers or an institutional dependency derived from the anarchy created by WWII and the Cold War.

While neutraliy diplomacy as a reflection of the balance diplomacy inherited from Ottoman Empire's traditional foreign policy strategy had a negative isolating affect on Turkey's position, staying out of the war was strategically and politically frightening because the victorious party would have determined the world's new status quo. Turkey was not ready for a struggle among these highly developed and industrialized states because of its army and economy. These political alternatives didn't present an easy setting for Turkish foreign policy makers.

Since the course of war was unsteady, Turkish threats and policies were adjusted according to the winning side. The political atmosphere was more important than the progress of the war. As the results became more apparent, Turkish diplomacy, rationally, came up with the close cooperation with the West to secure:

- The Soviet threat against the territorial integrity of Turkey.
- Economical aid for the industrialization and development process.
- The desire for the consolidation of the Western style modernization derived by the founding ideology of the Republic.

As a result of this institutional cooperation with the West by means of economic, military and political support provided "organic integrity" (Institutional hierarchy). (Sander, 2000, 56) Acc ording to realists, when a state begins to increase its power, other states begin to question their relative power and can perceive the other state as a threat against its capabilities. Turkey perceived the Soveit Union as the most hazardous state having a long

shared border and a comparatively more developed army. Considering these elements and taking more realist political steps, Turkey seemed to be a "volunteer" warrior (Sander, 2000, 57) state in a two-bloc international system. The acknowledgement of this role forced politicians to esctablish a new national interest model who immidiately redefined identified with the interests of the West. (The U.S)

The Democrat Party's coming to the power after the election in 1950 was one of the important factors strengthening the alignment of Turkey with the West. Having had a more liberal economic understanding than the People's Republican Party who had led the state since its founding, the DP opened an unprecedented economic development era with the support of landowners and trade-industry bourgeois prospered during the war. (Erogul, 1990, 55- 62) This kind of economy-politics, naturally needed and depended more on foreign aid. (see more in Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid section)

The comparatively eager politics and moves of the DP, more than the CHP (PRP), the membership in NATO and its success were not only the consequence of security issues. According to Oral Sander, (Sander, 2000, 157) it was an attempt to establish liberal economic order and democracy under the framework of NATO. The number of agreements (approximately 100) signed under and out of the framework of NATO showed the instinct to defend and secure liberal democratic institutions at all costs. The founding role of the Baghdad and Balkan Pacts, the defensive attitude of the West in the Bandung conference were empirical evidences of the desire of the DP for more economic and military aid. The attempt for membership of the EEC can be assessed in terms of political reasons rather than economical move, which was critical for Turkey to establish and consolidate Western institutions.

First of all, Turkey couldn't actualize the economic development and came within an inch of bankruptcy because of the balance of payments deficits and credit issues at the end of every decade. The security and defense policies left the initiative of one center, which showed its disadvantage and negative results in the Cyprus issue. (Sander, 2000, 157) Turkey attempted to settle almost every foreign issue under the umbrella of NATO, which isolated Turkey and alienated the issues belonging to the other parts of her region and the World. Turkey couldn'tto adjust to the rapidly changing international system and the leaders couldn't alternate and apply solutions when needed. The unidimensional security policy and partisanship prevent Turkish government from implementing realist, effective and multi-dimensional politics. The late orientation to the changing atmosphere of the international

system compared to other states of the World delayed Turkish liberal transition and integration until the 1980s.

In overview of the Ottoman political and diplomatic history (18th century-1923) showed the basic issues internationalized and inherited by the Turkish Republic. Instead of examining the issues in detail, for our thesis the reasons and evidence causing rapprochment to the West, beginning in the 18th century, I explained the official history under the titles of important periods starting and ending by the occurrence of significant events for Turkey's identical evolution process, also tried to find out decision makers' real intentions by questioning the costs and benefits of these decisions for Turkey in the long run.

Turkey's decision makers, no matter what party they represented, have surely interacted with other countries, especially within the institutional contexts of the UN, NATO and the EU. These interactions influenced Turkey's economic, political and social institutions while constructing new identities and threat perceptions and in this way transformed the formulation of Turkish foreign policy. The question is asked to reveal the motivation of Turkish decision makers who caused Turkey's obvious economic & military dependence on Western institutions, which caused trouble when Turkey had to reevaluate its axis orientation in terms of its identity and strategic poisture.

Ataturk's direction for the Turkish foreign policy was clear and significant. The foreign policy objectives reflected a departure from the expansionist ideology of the early Ottoman period. He was mainly concerned with independence and sovereignty. Secularization and nationalization were headstones and red lines of the state, which later were put forward as a vital condition by Ismet Inonu before the introduction of the multi-party system. Ataturk's ideas of non-revisionist and peaceful policies were based on realist terms, considering contemporary circumstances.

The basic aims of the foreign policy were to be recognized as a sovereign nation-state and enjoy the full benefits of peace came after the first World War brought drastic damage to both sides. New institutions were required to meet these goals, forming a state nation and the modernization of it in terms of Westernization of the upper institutions. Although, peaceful foreign policy seemed to be a necessary choice, the benefits and positive contributions were foreseen and analyzed by the decision makers led by Ataturk. The success of the treaty of Lausanne was formulated by Oral Sander to be: (Sander, 2000, 76-77)

- The realist and just framework of the demands
- Claiming nothing on the Arabic regions

- Sacrifice from the territories in Trakia
- Patience for the critical unsttled issues

One of the other distinctive policies of Ataturk was the realization and the point of view that the way of modernization was possible by a relatively independent Westernization. According to him, turning back against the West would divert Turkey from the way of civizilation. In other words, Turkey had no other way out, but to integrate thoroughly into European civilization. The realization of the distinction between the European imprealism and the value system was important and its traces quite perceptible among the refoms of Ataturk's period. (Sander, 2000, 79)

In the "Theoretical Background" section, models have been presented that focused explicitly on explanations of the causes of war in terms of threat perceptions. (Walt, 1985, 3-43 and Stein, eds Huddy, Sears and Levy, 2013, 1) I gave the background only of threat perceptions theories and their relevance with international theories, especially realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism.

At the collective level, which is more relevant to our topic, processes of perceptions are more difficult to identify. In this section, Turkish perceptions taking root from its diplomatic legacy inherited by the Ottoman Empire are shown to relate the attitudes of Turkey during the Cold War period when Turkey's efforts to be the member of the West and Democratic world led her perceive the same threats as the West. The Turkish diplomatic and political process, based on the economic dependency and struggle for the national-level security, made Turkey unable to choose her subject alone. This situation also provided a hazardous situation that Turkey was also percieved as a threat by the states that it perceived as a threat. The political atmosphere and the basis of the decision makers were also discussed.

In the diplomatic history of Turkey, the application and the effects of each decision making model and theoric appraoch can be found. However, in this analysis, the level of the foreign policy of Turkey derived from its threat perceptions shaped by its traditional attitudes, politics, diplomacy culture, membership of institutions [especially NATO and the EEC], economic dependency in terms of industrial infrustracture and miltary, theoric background were reviewed to reveal the movtivation of the decision makers. Making comparisons and reviewing positive and negative sides of each theory had an important role for an effective explanation of the thesis.

In the analysis of Turkish foreign policy in terms of her security perceptions, the realist viewpoint of Mustafa Kemal, as an Ottoman officer, for the survival and development of the

foreign policy. Between the two World Wars, despite the existance of peaceful political and diplomatic steps of the decision makers, the cautious attitudes were obvious. The importance given to the army and the necessity of economic intervention of the state to the markets [especially industry] were signs of seeking maximization of the capacity of the state to survive and develop.

In the Post War [II] period, as well, all the perceptions were evaluated as they were based on realism. The reason for this evaluation was that Turkey's efforts to prevent a possible Soviet invasion were considered the most rational choice for Turkish decision makers because of the conditions of uncertainty and without necessarily having sufficient information about alternatives or the ability to conduct a full review of possible courses of action. It is understood that anarchy in the political atmosphere is regarded as certain raproachement with the West bacause of the Soviet Union left no alternative or opportunity to transform the diplomacy and securtiy perceptions.

In the "Realism" section, distribution of power and capabilities is overviewed, which makes states directly change their perception, their position and power relatively. Thus, after every significant economic or political conflict, states attempt to reposition themselves against the other states. After the chaos created by the conflict, new great powers arise and a new system is established with the leadership, or hegemony, of the rising power. Two world wars are taken into account as good examples showing the re-distribution of power and the rise of new great powers. For instance, at the end of the World War II, a new system established two bloc leaders, The U.S and The Soviet Union. These rising powers perceived each other as threats, which gave a start to the Cold War. The chaotic situation created by these powers in the international arena materialized by the demand of the Soviets for Turkey (both land and mutual control on the straits).

In addition to distribution of power, a change in the status quo of the international system after World War II was shown as a milestone for the Turkish foreign policy. The Soviet Union as a rising super power was the first and most important state percieved as a threat. After the war, Soviet perceptions changed and Russian decision makers regulated foreign policy objectives according to the post-war conditions. Therefore the Boshoporus issue was a priority for the ideal/traditional Russian policy. Russia brought up the question again, despite the existence of the treaty signed with Turkey. The capacity and the ability of the Turkish Army, which hadn't fought since the war of liberation, was relatively weak, compared to the victorious Red Army.

In this perspective, Turkey's pursuit of modernization her army seemed only possible with the integration with the West, particularly the leader of the West. The uncertainty of the American foreign policy route before the Truman Doctrine made the Turkish govenrment very insecure about their future territorial integrity and sovereignty. The neutrality and undemonstrative attitudes during the war were principles strictly followed by the government. However, this was percieved by the Allies as a sign of reluctancy. These perceptions led Turkey to endeavor to show loyalty to the Western World and the symbols of the modernization. [Democracy, free market, economic aids, membership of Western international institutions] The struggle for the establishment of Western institutions accelerated the dependency and absolute integration during this period and reached its climax during the Democrat Party period. Democrat Party can also be analyzed as a reuslt of this application of loyalty.

The question brings us to a point that states assesing the best possibility for the distribution of their capabilities considering their relatively limited sources. This is explained in the following sections by making comparisons between theories and outputs of Turkish foreign policy makers.

"What is the cost of threat perceptions for a state?"

In the "Neoliberalism" section, the fact that neoliberal theorists also agree with the realists on having a military capacity for deterrence of war against the potential adversaries of anarchic international structure is shown. (Kegley, 1995, 4) Considering the early years of the Turkish Republic, the traces of cooperation and efforts of integration can be obsevered. Bilataral and multiletaral agreements for maintaning peace and security, pioneer role for the establishment of regional economic and security pacts, membership of leauge of nations and the attempt to settle some of the unsettled issued of the treaty of Lausanne under this institution, signing the Briand-Kellog pact are signs of the endeavour of Turkey to become a part of Western and international community.

Turkish policy-making perspective was established in the unstable atmosphere of the relations in which the foreign policy of the state was planned and executed. Turkey had to maintain a "two-front state" and directly a "two status quo state". It had also been an issue for the Ottoman Empire during its founding. The Empire had always been attacked by the Eastern powers before the advantages of the wars in the West. However, the Turkish state was not an expansionist state, having comparatively more unpresuming ideals than the Empire as a new

founded nation-state. Because of their background of insecurity and siege mentality, the decision makers felt it necessary to modernize the army, having strategic partners or allies and being a member of collective economic, political and military organizations in the East and the West.

The status qou in the East took its shape over almost three hundred years, consisting of not only military and political characteristics but also cultural and religious ones. (Sander, 2000, 139-140) Except for the wars between the southern and eastern neighbours and the ethnic separatist movements against the state, the Eastern status quo maintened its position. Therefore, Turkey hadn't had to determine its "realtive power" against the potential Eastern threats. After World War II, the distrubution of power in the region was under control of the great powers and had a global effect to determine the agenda of world politics.

On the other hand, the status quo in the West had a 90 year history and was politically more sensitive, shaped by the treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Mountreux Convention (1936), The Treaty of Paris giving an end to WW II and regulating the Bosphorus and Aegean islands, The Cyprus issue, participation in NATO and attempting for membership of the EEC. (Sander, 2000, 140) These treaties, issues, pacts and organizations made the Western status quo prone to the any type of change or devaluation. In order to maintain the status quo on both fronts, Turkey had to develop good relations and implement collective security policies to balance the power distribution and gain more "relative power" by courtesy of the regional pacts, global security organizations, and political economic organizations.

At the 1856 Treaty of Paris, the Otoman Empire gained European-state status. Its legal sucessor, Turkey, had always been seen as a dominant and decisive factor considering the balance of power in Europe due to its geopolitical position, cultural legacy and historical ties with the states in the Middle East and the Balkans. As a part of European foreign and defense policy, it has been a subject of European defense and security issues. In this context:

- The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) in 1948.
- The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952.
- The Western European Union (WEU) in 1954.
- The Washington Treaty in 1949.
- The Korean War the following year.
- The European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970.
- The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986.

- Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992.

As explained above, the neoliberal theorists state that the soverign nation-state conduct of modernization has lost ground in the globalization process, which highlighted the global markets behaving more rationally than the traditional politicians or bureaucratic based government. As a member of several Euro-Atlantic security and political organizations, Turkey's ability to conduct its own relative policies based its own threat perceptions has been questionable in terms of the limitations bound by the provisions of the founding framework of the organizations.

The argument from the analogy of the "Neoliberalism" section, in terms of sovereignty and Turkey's coordination in the international system is determined by the frameworks mentioned. It was that the vertical linkage with the Western organizations shaped the perceptions and policies of Turkey. The determination process left the country with the unidimensional security perspective and absolute loyalty demands in terms of interest implementation of the Western states. However, the domestic psychological and national identical pressures forced Turkish foreign policy makers to disobey the rules or orders of the Western states. [Cyprus Issue]

In the "Constructivism" section, the linkage between identity, norms, customs, threat and security isses and the culture of Turkey and the international community and its structure is discussed with the help of Constructivist theorists' brief generalizations and comparisons with other international theories. It was stated that: (Yu-Taitsai, 2009)

In Turkish foreign policy history, "social structure is manifested by not only the many cases. In 1946, the attempt at multi party democracy transition in democratic life was not only about the domestic material structure but also the pressure by the international community, the Western bloc's model democracy being the biggest motivation. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also accelerated the integration of Turkey to the international markets after 1983 when Ozal was elected as prime minister and enrouted the Turkish economy.

The interactions with the West after WW II materialized the rapprochment in security and political pacts. The Korean War was a sign of the efforts of having a Western identity at all costs for the survival in the Cold War.

As Constructivism emphasizes the sociological concepts of ideas, norms, identity and culture, Turkish foreign policy's permanancy and tendency on Western policies based on the policies, followed since the 18th century, is rooted in the Turkish European identity process.

European identity was gained by the geographical and cultural advantages by the invasions and long-term interactions with the European states. According to some scholar's analysis, "Turkey fought to be a European". After WW II, these attempts deepened due to the threat perceptions of the West and Turkey and structuralized by means of agreements, security pacts, economic aids and cooperation, which increasead the inter-dependency level.

In Chapter III, the "Was it Worth to be Neutral?" section focus was on how the political psychology caused by WW II, the economic problems, the growing tension with Stalin's Soviet Russia and other significant events during this period influenced the orientation of Turkish foreign policy. The question was whether Turkey had been forced to join the Western camp or had the Turkish government deliberately chosen that path and attempted to convince the Turkish people to accept communism as a threat to legitimize that choice. Specific political developments occurring in the world at that time brought Turkey and the West closer to each other were also discussed in detail. Turkish diplomatic steps of this period should be assessed considering the arguments below:

- Reforms were implemented decisively in terms of the framework of Ataturk's period considering the intense influence of domestic economic and political competition
- "Neutral" identified as a "survival" move. The general tendency and permanency of Turkish foreign policy was to protect the status quo [in the West] established by the Treaty of Lausanne [Balance diplomacy]
- Polish psychology and fear for being carved up by two armed great states.
- Despite the existence of significant treaties with both sides, the motto of Turkey during the war was that "being neutral no matter what". [opportunism]
- The British diplomats supressed Turkey by playing the "Soviet Card"
- Turkish foreign policy was executed pragmatically during the war.
- The absolute defeat of Germany caused "Credibility Syndrome" of the Allies and used to manipulate the policies of Turkey after the war in the rapprochement process.
- The neutrality policy was primarily against the Soviet threat therefore after the war the U.S. awarded this policy by the security guarantee and with its protector posture.

The consequences of the discussion of "Neutrality" dispute enriched the argument of the thesis. The survival was a great diplomatic success but it also brought a bitter reality: **Absolute rapprochment.** Turkey was a loyal proponent of the Western symbols and values

unlike the Middle Eastern or Balkan states. The unidimensional threat perceptions and the integreation of the interest caused erosion in alternative foreign policy decision-making process and national identical interest among the membership of collective security organizations, economic aids and political agreements establishing a binding framework actualizing the Western interests. This process showed its negativity in cases such as the Cuban missille crisis when Turkey's security became a bargaining element, in the Johnson letter, eliciting national sensivity and threatened to be abandoned to the Soviet threat or in the Cyprus issue's intervention phase, in legal settlement and negotiation phases when Turkey's collective security efforts weren't considered at all and left alone in the international community. Permanent neutrality would give Turkey alternative perceptions of the issues and threats independent from any pressure and ability to follow its traditional balance diplomacy. However, the rapprochment also ended the implementation opportunity to use traditional diplomacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire as a central and regional state transformed and compacted Turkey's vision to a periphery state's vision.

The neutrality polices of Turkey during the war made it possible to resist the pressures of the Allies to take part and open new fronts during the war. Keeping Turkey away from the destruction of the war, neutrality also caused "Credibility Syndrome", (Kuniholm, 27-72, Jones, 1995, 155 and Bostdorff, 2009, 10) especially after the war felt in the growing tension with the Soviets. The demands of border change, collective security of the Straits and regulations at the Montreux Convention were materialized in agressive diplomatic steps taken by the Soviet Union.

The purpose of the section was to present the Truman Doctrine, which was an intitiative developed for military assistance to modernize and train the Turkish army. This section also argued that the Truman Doctrine laid the foundation of the military integration of Turkey by means of military assistance. Military modernization changed the understanding and developed the vision of Turkish military personnel who were still very effective on politics, security issues and foreign policy of the state. The continuous economic aid accelerated the integration and dependency on military equipment and training. Military orientation to the Western Security policy generated by the U.S. became easier with military assistance. The participation in the Korean War and membership in NATO should be examined by considering the unprecendented establishment of the idea of essentiality of foreign military assistance ignited by the Cold War policy-making psychology.

The Marshall Plan aid was also a relative sign of integreation with the Western perspective materialized in the membership in NATO. It also gave the right to the U.S. to

determine the production and development strategy of Turkey in the long run. The collective security umbrella led Turkey to complete her development in agriculture, industry and banking. However, the Turkish foreign policy perspective was then, at the hands of the U.S. as the leader of the Western bloc concerning security issues.

In the "Democrat Party" section, he post-war policies, the rise of Democrat party and its policies, which determined unidimensional foreign policy are discussed. After WWII, Turkey felt the necessity of having close relations with Western bloc led by the U.S. Turkey found the Western bloc more beneficial and appropriate for its interests and showed loyalty by taking part in the San Francisco conference as a founding member and signed the United Nations treaty which was a promise for implementation of the democratic ideals. (Zurcher, 1998, 302)

In this section, the discussion on how the perceptions of the Turkish government shared similarities with the threats to the Western bloc is the main focus. In general the Democrat Party period review is structured according to the political structure below. (NATO, Korean War, application of EEC sections and inquiries are discussed.)

- The rising Soviet threat on the territorial integrity- Korean War- NATO
- No essential difference between DP and RPP foreign policies before the 1950 elections. Both of them based their foreign policy on a friendship with the US and the Western bloc and believed that communism was the greatest menace that Turkey faced.
- Kemalist foreign policy heritage- **Kemalism**, **Liberalism** (in economic issues) and **Conservatism** (more tolerant to the religious matters). (Laciner, 2011, 111)
- A new outlook on foreign policy, which would in turn coheres with their novel approach to nation building in Turkey. American-style Wism. [evolutionary] (Karpat, 1975, 16 and Danforth)
- American political and economic system as the best model for Turkey
- Need for Western credit and aid for its economic development
- The political integration phase with the West. (EEC-NATO)

In the "NATO" and "EEC" sections, the following points supporting the thesis' argument are presented as concluding ideas:

- The decision of participation in the Korean War (A sign of a new foreign policy/radical/new)
- The idea of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia becoming the shield to protect Western Europe against a Soviet offensive through South-Eastern Europe (Southern Flank)
- Western security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
- The transition from the "neutral Turkey" to the "fundemantal Western and democtaric ally Turkey" wasn't a choice but a strategically essential political move.
- Considering the regulations in the countries that are members of an integrated military Alliance, the process of formulation of a defense budget was deeply influenced by additional factors, commitment to contribute to the collective defence effort and the deriving financial implications.
- Erosion of national interests and identity climbed its climax.
- Several foreign policy issues made Turkey grow suspicious of the West during the Cold War. [The Cyprus issue and Cuban Missile Crisis]
- It was perceived as a necessity to resolve the question of security in the foreign policy, which was not only a vital priority, but at the same time it needed urgent action. (Yavuzalp, 1996, 74- 75)
- The DP was criticized for being **"Westernized more than the West"**. It meant that the foreign policy of Turkey had become bound up entirely with the west, particularly with the Middle East policies of America. (Uslu, 2000, 20)
- Bilateral agreements with the U.S. without approval of TGNA
- Turkey has not been an easy fit, either in Europe or in the Middle East.
- **Fulfilment of the state elite's century-old dream of being accepted as part of Europe**.

The "Between Two Military Interference (1960-1980)" section takes place in the Table of Contents to show the political permanency and present the emprical traces of the argument after the period between 1945 and 1960. After the overthrow of Adnan Menderes, the elected prime minister by military coup, a new constitution was drafted which has been regarded as the most liberal constitution in Turkey ever. The atmosphere of freedom, which provided a safe haven for the rise of anti-Americanism/Westernism by the reevaluation of the left guaranteed by the constitution is disscussed as a turning point in terms of threat perceptions.

Thanks to the liberal atmosphere provided by the new constitution in the country, leftist and rightist groups found the opportunity for to freedom of expression. This evolution in both sides' supporters deepened the political and ideological polarization in Turkish society, as we can understand from various activist protests in the public places and university demonstrations.

After the Cyprus crisis, Turkey's suspicions about its position in the Western alliance grew. The political isolation of Turkey didn't exactly mean its return to a neutrality policy because it was forced to stay on the West's side.

In the "Cuban Jupiter Missile Crisis" section, the focus is on the comprehension of the nature of the political, economic and diplomatic relations with the leader of the Western bloc, particularly from the beginning of the cold war, is significant to state the Turkish threat perspective with its retreats and approaches to the Western front. For our argument, the exceptional diplomatic and political instabilities are comparatively more important than the general pattern of the traditional diplomatic pattern of Turkey. A summary of the relations of Turkey and especially the American perspective of Turkey, based on security interests and containment policies is presented.

Turkey's eagerness to decline the withdrawal offers of the U.S was a sign of the unconditional security ensurence diplomacy against the Soviet threat. Turkey perceived the Soviet Union as a threat but as the Turkish security ensurance attempts raised concerns about the Soviet Union higher, The Soviet Union also developed tactical and strategic moves against Turkey. For instance when the Menderes government signed the agreement on the deployment of the Jupiter missile, the government was immediately protested by the Soviets and after the missiles became operational, the Cuban missiles crisis became Turkey's issue as well. Turkey felt the shock of the situation created by the Cuban crisis, which was so far from its territory and consequently out of its strategic diplomacy and foreign policy perspective. This shock revealed the fact that Turkey, by taking its place in the Western bloc had to confront all the possible problems of the Western bloc, including low-intensity conflict or a nuclear warfare regardless of which side began it.

In terms of the argument of the thesis, in this section, the Turkish front's shock that Turkey was no longer only a side for the issues entangled by the Western bloc but also the target of the enemies of the blocs are discussed, giving diplomatic details of the issue. Regarding the unwillingness of the U.S. for a conflict that could develop out of the crisis is made very clear in the letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev on October 27, 1962. The unwillingness was understood by the Turkish side as a necessity of a desperate

dependency on Western ally, which was established on the basis of guaranteeing the security of the Turkish motherland in the case of Soviet attack. In addition to the risky situation, the damage to the transparency between the allies made Turkey concerned about the security issues and re-evaluate the traditional security and threat perceptions. The symbolic significance of the missiles is also a sign of the credibility of the Turkish-U.S relations.

The "Cyprus Issue" section has an exceptional role in the text because Turkey's foreign policy, derived from her threat perceptions based on Western perspective could no longer remain an option for Turkey. The conflicting interests over issues perceived as crucial by Turkey, which are still impacting current foreign policy, some to the extent of seeming like a dead end for the Turkish axis of movement politically and preventing her interests diplomatically from integreating/eroding with the Europian Union. The Cyprus issue has been one of the most important of them. Discussion of the issue in a limited perspective underlining the points with an emphasis on the isolation of Turkey (Cyprus As A Source of Existential Threat to Turkey and The Fear of Encirclement) (Kaliber, 2003, 189) in the diplomatic arena during the Cold War, dynamics allowing Turkey to make strategic decisions on its own, basic characteristics of the Cyprus issue pointing out features of Turkey's foreign policy. To comprehend the issue in the limited perspective I only overviewed the historical background of the issue by emphasizing the significant treaties and organizations taking crucial roles before and during the issues affecting Turkish decision makers, states and parties shaping the situation.

As indicated in previous sections, the intention was not to give a chronological account of the events but rather was to make the readers familiar with the historical context in which the Cyprus issue has been shaped and reshaped through various factors derived from the perceptions of Turkish foreign policy decision makers. Despite the continuation of the traditional foreign policy path of status quo and keeping the Western axis, Turkey's Cold War foreign politics did not exhibit a unified body of policy engagement, due to some exceptional cases of the period. (Aydin, 2004, 67-82 and Aktas, 2010, 12- 15)

Turkey's security policy shifts and re-evaluations of threat perceptions between 1963 and 1974 were the mainstream of the section because in joining NATO and the rapprochment with the Western instutional basis, Turkey felt the loyalty stemmed from from the idea of being part of the democratic world and afterwards realized that under the circumstance forcing Turkey to make independent decisions from the West or any kind of conflicts on the interests diversities of policies faded in. In this perspective, empirical clues seached by the re/over view of the historical and political context of the issues.

One of the reasons for Turkish unidimensional foreign policy, "Siege Mentality (Sevres Syndrome)" and its impact on foreign policy is discussed.The Sevres syndrome is not limited to just the realm of public debate and Turkish politics. The trauma of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the importance led to the protection of the new born Turkish Republic against enemies inside and outside of the country. The impact has remained a central feature of the the Turkish education system and the socialization of members of the Turkish military as well as bureaucracy and the judiciary. Since a large number of people are affected by this syndrome, politicians, regardless of whether they intellectually believe in it, frequently resort to stoking Turkish paranoia towards the external world and especially the west. It is against this continuing invocation of a historical threat that the Turkish enigma needs to be understood. (Lesser)

By the inconsistency derived from the military interferences and domestic policy dynamics, Turkish public opinion evolved and also needed re-evaluation of foreign policy issues. In the "1980-2003" section, the discussion is focused on the evolving dynamics of Turkish identity, showing a stable and traditional feature. In order to understand the Turkish changing approach following points served as a basis.

Although Ozal's combinations for Turkish policy dynamics and orthodox political orientations for Turkish foreign policy seemed an alternative, Ozal and his succesors showed strong determination for the Europeanization and Westernization project under the shadow of military pressure over political routines of the state by means of constitutional institutions.

As a conclusion to the section, the fact that the Turkish traditional foreign policy couldn't create an institutional and permanent alternative foreign policy the cumulative due to identity process being emphasized. However, the success of Ozal for his assessment of the characteristics of the people, arguments and his guidance for a long term solution for Turkish unsettled issues is applied.

Considering the instability of the politics derived from the economic devaluations in the 1990s, in the "2003-2007" section, traces of unidimensional threat perceptions and new identical identification efforts are analysed.

After the economic crisis in 2001, the AKP appeared on the political scene of Turkey. It was the beginning of a new era for all of the institutions of the state. Leaders of the party based their claims of legitimatacy by the ratio they got in the elections on November 3rd 2002. As was well known by the people and the bureuacracy, most members of the party were successors of parties like Refah, Anavatan, MHP and independent ex-liberal-leftists, which were arguably rivals of the official ideology. Even though the party leaders tried to give

embracing announcements for deepening their credibility, there were suspicions about their commitment to secularism among many segments of the society, especially among the Kemalists. The growing tension between the AKP and the secularist establishment carried the traces of a big clash in any area, showing perceptions were about to change by the political upsurge, which had actually begun twenty years earlier in the 1980s.

Turkish foreign policy has met with a new mission and an visioned group of politics and consultants claiming that Turkey's potential in the region can be increased in a very short term if a stable and powerful government remains in power in Turkey. Turkish diplomacy terminology began to change. In the article (Aktas, 2010, 55- 69) by Aktas, new concepts of foreign policy are examined to show the tendency of politics to change.

- **''Vision-based strategy or a visionary approach:**
- **Consistent and systematic framework:**
- **Utilization of "soft power"**

Because of the Europeanization goals and Western-style development Project, Turkey implemented faithfully in all years. Since it is not possible to discuss every political evidendence that occured in the AKP period, I found it sufficient to make a presentation on new visionary principles and basic effects on politics, trying to answer the question: "Do these changes mean a 'detachment' from the Westernization/Europeanization Project?". I also shared Allesandri's conclusion about the new place and identity to question a possible axis change of Turkey.

The thesis questions the possibilitiy of Turkey to respond the change in international relations with the consdiration of Turkey's Westerntization institutionalization process. The capacity of Turkey to pursue its own foreign policy goals and orientation by recognizing how those goals may align with transatlantic policy objectives are questioned by explaining the exceptional emprical evidences in Turkish foreign policy history. Even the contradictions materialized by sanctions of Turkish national security were postponed, the result was re-aligment with the West without any exception for change of any ideological goverment. Even when they came from a different perspective, the decision makers had follow their political and identical instict for international and domestic stability. Considering the changing role in its immediate neighborhood, including the Black Sea region to Turkey's north and the Middle East to its south, in a variety of policy areas. These topics include energy policy, conflict resolution, the promotion of democracy, trade and migration. (Fox Ozkan, Journal of Public

Affairs, Vol XIII, Abstract) The thesis also discusses the basis of Turkey's current foreign policy, including changes in its immediate neighborhood, as well as changes within Turkey itself. As previously mentioned, the adoption of a diversified foreign policy was already visible in the 1990s. Turkey is self-admittedly in the process of redefining its identity. (A.Evin, K.Kirisci, R. Linden, 2011, 7- 8) Especially after the cold war, the changes transfromed Turkish identity and foreign policy, however the power and capacity has not been enough to change the essence of the identity, threat perceptions and foreign policy.

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