

**INFLUENCE OF GERMANY'S NATIONAL INTERESTS ON
TURKEY'S QUEST FOR EU MEMBERSHIP**

by

Özgür ÜNAL ERIS

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Government

University of Essex

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am truly indebted to my supervisor, Prof. Emil Joseph Kirchner at University of Essex, for his both intellectual and moral support for my research. I also would like to thank *der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst* (DAAD) for the logical support during my fieldwork.

DEDICATION

To Rauf, Mom and Dad, with much love. Thank you for everything.

PREFACE:

The aim of this study is to investigate the main factors influencing German foreign policy making, as can be best seen within the context of the enlargement process of the EU.

In particular, the German attitude towards the two categories of candidates for EU membership was analysed; the Visegrad countries and Turkey. Three different factors were analysed that may be important in national interest formulation at domestic level in Germany; economic, cultural and geo-political factors which also constitute the independent variables in the three hypotheses constructed for this thesis. These national interests are represented by the executives as foreign policy in the EU intergovernmental negotiations and final decisions are reached and expressed by the institutional choice of the EU. This kind of decision-making analysis was conducted with the aid of the liberal intergovernmentalist approach of Andrew Moravcsik.

In order to find out the most important factor in domestic politics and the national interest formulation of Germany that influences the dependent variable, namely foreign policy as seen within the broader framework of the enlargement policy of the EU, statements of the executives and MPs and official party position papers were analysed. In addition to this, in-depth-interviews were conducted with executives and MPs in Germany, during the period of February-June 2000. Political parties are seen as transmitters of national interests in Germany, which are articulated by interaction of several factors in domestic politics, while executives are seen as aggregating these interests and representing them in the form of German foreign policy in the EU.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:**CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS**

Introduction	1
Objectives of the research	2
German national interests	9
Interstate bargaining (The German position in the EU enlargement process)	10
Institutional choice	10
Methodology	11
1. Analysis of German national interests	11
Before unification (1945-1989)	12
After unification (1990-1999)	16
Cost-benefit calculations in the formulation of German national interests:	18
Relationship with the Visegrad countries	19
Economic factors	19
Geo-political factors	24
Cultural factors	26
Cost-benefit analysis	30
Relationship with Turkey	31
Economic factors	31
Geo-political factors	33
Cultural factors	38
Cost-benefit analysis	40
Summary	41
2. Interstate bargaining (The German position on EU enlargement policy)	45
3. Institutional choice	49
Summary	52
Methods	53
Plan of the remaining chapters	54
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	
Introduction	57
The Process of European Integration	58
Theories of European integration	63

Intergovernmentalism –2 nd stage of Moravcsik	63
Critique	75
The significance of national interests in European integration	81
1 st stage of Moravcsik	
Importance of economic factors in the construction of national interests	86
Summary	89
Research design	90
Operationalisation of Liberal Intergovernmentalism	96
The normalising Federal Republic of Germany	99
During the Cold War	101
After the Cold War	105
Summary	116
CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES, TURKEY AND GERMANY	
Introduction	120
Evolution of the EU enlargement process	121
Eastern enlargement as the institutional choice of the EU	121
Intergovernmental bargaining process	128
Arguments against eastern enlargement	141
Turkey and the EU	143
Potential Turkish membership as the institutional choice	143
During the Cold War	143
After the Cold War	147
Intergovernmental bargaining	153
During the Cold War	154
After the Cold War	157
Arguments against Turkey's EU membership	161
Summary	163
CHAPTER 4: THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY	
Introduction	165
Operationalisation of the LIG	166
EU Enlargement: Germany's Relations with the Visegrad Countries	168
German national interests in supporting eastern enlargement (economic factors)	170

The Kohl government	170
The Schröder government	180
Economic cost-benefit analysis in German national interests	196
Enlargement of the EU: Relations with Turkey	199
German national interests leading to reluctance towards	200
Turkish membership (economic factors)	
Potential economic benefits to German national interests of Turkish membership	205
Economic cost-benefit analysis in German national interests	207
Summary	208
CHAPTER 5: GEO-POLITICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS	
IN GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TURKISH MEMBERSHIP	
Introduction	212
German national interests in supporting eastern enlargement	213
(geo-political factors)	
Geo-political cost-benefit analysis in German national interests	227
German national interests in supporting Turkish membership	229
(geo-political factors)	
Geo-political cost-benefit analysis in German national interests	243
German national interests in supporting eastern enlargement (cultural factors)	244
Cultural cost-benefit analysis in German national interests	246
German national interests against Turkish membership (cultural factors)	246
Cost-benefit analysis	249
Summary	251
CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF THE THREE HYPOTHESES	
Introduction	257
Evaluation	259
The government of the SPD-Greens	266
The SPD	266
Alliance 90/Greens	273
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs	275
The CDU/CSU	278
The FDP	280
Major empirical research results	282

Summary	292
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS	
Introduction	299
Outline of the thesis	303
LIG approach	304
Main findings	308
German support for both categories of candidate	311
Importance of ‘stability’ and ‘new security threats’ in German foreign policy and national interest articulation	
The Visegrad countries	311
Turkey	316
Importance of ‘stability’ and ‘new security threats’ in institutional choice of the EU	318
Analysis of the 3 rd stage within the framework of the LIG approach	318
The application of the LIG approach for evaluating the hypothesis	319
Epilogue	327
Developments in 2000	327
Developments in 2001	329
Developments in 2002	332
Developments in 2003	333
Developments in 2004	335
Developments in Germany	337
Outlook for the future	341
Appendix 1	344
Appendix 2	346
Appendix 3	348
Appendix 4	349
Appendix 5	350
Bibliography	357

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Introduction:

Turkey became an associate member of the European Union ¹ in 1963, applied for membership in 1987, its membership was postponed by the European Commission in 1989 and it was granted candidate status in 1999. On the other hand, the other candidates for entry to the European Union (including Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia which are also known as the Visegrad countries) became independent at the beginning of 1990 and by 1999 had already started negotiations with the EU and succeeded in securing full membership by 2004. This discrepancy between the two categories of EU membership means that it is necessary to examine Turkey's EU membership bid extremely carefully. This research will look at the main reasons why Turkey's membership was postponed for several years, why it was left behind in the queue for EU membership in comparison with the Eastern European candidates for entry to the EU and for what reasons the prospect of Turkish EU membership became more viable after 1999. In the history of the relationship between Turkey and the EU, several studies have tried to find out the underlying reasons for the rejection of Turkey and the prevailing factors in the relationship between Turkey and the EU. The main point that differentiates this particular research different from the other studies carried out concerning the relationship between Turkey and the EU is that, a third party is involved; a country with an important stake in both the enlargement of the EU to the East and the possible inclusion of Turkey in the EU, Germany. Thus this research will specifically look at the *influence of German foreign policy on the quest for Turkey's EU membership* and to what extent it has become a determining factor in the speeding up of Turkey's prospects for EU membership. The

¹ It was called the European Community (EC) at that time; it was re-named as the European Union (EU) in 1991 and that will be used throughout the text.

period of investigation will be between 1990-1999. 1990 is important as this is the year when Germany was re-unified and the Visegrad countries gained their independence. 1999 is likewise important as this is the year when Turkey got one step nearer to its aim of EU membership by achieving the candidate status.

The main aim of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to the research in question. It will first explain the main objectives of the research and the core hypotheses. The elements most useful for testing the hypotheses raised will be divided into three sections: firstly, national interest articulation in Germany, secondly the aggregation of these interests by the executives in Germany and lastly their representation in the European Union during negotiations between the member states and the subsequent expression of the German national interests as an EU institutional choice. Each section will be carefully analysed; both for practical purposes, as well as in order to consider the influence of the unification period on the formulation of German national interests, they will be divided into two periods: those prior to and those following unification. Following this, the positive and negative factors influential in the formulation of German national interests and German foreign policy towards the two different categories of candidates, the Visegrad countries and Turkey, will be described for the periods, both prior to unification and afterwards. In the final section, the transformation of these foreign policy goals into the German position within the larger framework of the EU enlargement process will be shown. In each section of the analysis of the components of the hypothesis, correlations will be made with Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist approach. The methodology for the testing of the hypotheses will be explained, followed by a summary of the contents of the remaining chapters.

Objectives of the research:

With the end of the Cold War came the collapse of the communist system in the Soviet Union and its satellites that led to their eventual independence. As a result, the balance of power that western European governments had created within the strategic parameters of the East-West divide was also destroyed. With the independence of the ex-communist states and the creation of new borders, new patterns of co-operation and conflict emerged across the old East-West divide and transformed the economic, political and strategic shape of Europe. In contemporary Europe there is a new fault line that passes between the wealthy countries of Germany and Austria and the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe. The fault line is no longer military or ideological, but social and economic. This will have important implications for European restructuring in the twenty-first century.

Germany will clearly be an influential actor in the reshaping of Europe for a variety of reasons. Germany is now united, larger in population and in territory than the old Federal Republic. Freed from the constraints imposed by the outcome of the World War II, it is now a sovereign, *central* European state, located at the heart of the European continent, on the eastern border of the transatlantic security community. There are specific internal and external changes related with Germany. Firstly, the absorption of the eastern *Laender*² entailed financial difficulties. This was mainly because the western part of Germany started to channel eastwards an annual DM 150 billion³ in financial resources and subsidies, largely to support consumption in the new *Laender*. This has resulted in rising unemployment, increased taxes and sizeable cuts in West German incomes. Secondly, Germany's new location as the eastern

² Germany is a federal parliamentary democracy, made up of 16 federal states, which are called *Land* in English and *Laender* is the plural form. Many laws and decrees can only come into force after they have also been passed by the federal states. The federal states meet in the *Bundesrat*, the chamber of parliament which comprises elected members of each state government. The *Bundesrat* also sits in Berlin.

³ Though Germany uses euro now, in the period of investigation it was using *Deutschemark*.

border of the European Union and its proximity to the newly independent ex-communist states have made it vulnerable to the potentially destabilising factors in this region. Thirdly, Germany's liberation through the removal of post-war constraints and its re-emergence as a unified, central European state have attracted the attention of its western partners who have over the years successfully contained Germany within a certain western European structure. Germany's most valued Western partners, France and the UK in particular, were becoming concerned about the re-emergence of the 'German problem'. David Calleo (1978) refers to the German problem as having both international and domestic aspects:

"Internationally, a united Germany is often said to have been too big and dynamic for any stable European system. Inevitably, such a Germany threatened the political independence and economic well being of its neighbours. Germany's dynamic expansiveness, in return, is frequently said to have stemmed from the internal character of the German nation; the political institutions, culture, and economic and social systems that evolved during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For many people, these assumptions lead to a single practical conclusion: Whenever unified into one state, Germans become a menace at home and abroad. And this conclusion, shared by the post-war leaderships of all Germany's neighbours leads to an obvious prescription: To keep Europe safe and the German people safe from themselves, Germany must be firmly contained by alert and superior power" (Calleo, 1978: 1-2).

Specifically Germany's western partners were afraid of the re-emergence of this German power expressed in terms of likely German influence over the countries of Eastern Europe.

These changes have also modified its foreign policy priorities. All these factors combined have engendered considerations in German foreign policy with direct implications for the future of the European Union as well as of the Visegrad countries and Turkey which consider the prospect of EU membership to be their most significant foreign policy goal. Both the Visegrad countries and Turkey see Germany as an influential actor in their endeavour to become members of the European Union. From the *perspective of Moravcsik's approach*, German foreign policy is more favourable

towards the Visegrad countries and their potential EU membership because the inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the European Union will secure the concrete *economic* benefits German industry has been gaining and will gain from eastern markets and thus help relieve the financial problems it is experiencing. On the other hand, rising domestic financial strains in Germany will have detrimental effects on Turkish-German relations and on potential Turkish membership in the EU due to the likely problems caused by the impoverished Turkish economy. Problems concerning the Turkish community in Germany, the large population of Turkey and cultural differences are additional problems that may have reinforced German reluctance regarding Turkish membership of the EU.

The process of reshaping the future of Europe reached an important stage in December 1994, at the Essen European Council Summit under the German presidency, where the Union's eastern enlargement plans were first officially announced. It was at this summit that Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor at the time, called for the extension of European integration eastwards as a way to move towards European unity, and invited the new democracies of the Visegrad countries to the Summit.

From the Essen Summit onwards, the EU's eastern enlargement acquired an internal dynamic which culminated in the Luxembourg European Council Summit of December 1997. The Luxembourg Summit was seen as a watershed for the comprehensive enlargement process and confirmed the candidates for membership in the future construction of Europe. These were divided into two groups based on their levels of political and economic development, the first group consisting of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and the Federal Republic of Cyprus; the second group comprising Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia.

It is a striking fact that the country that has the longest Association Agreement with the EU (dating back to 1963), and that already had been integrated with the EU quite intensively through a Customs Union agreement, was excluded by this plan. This country was Turkey, an extremely reliable ally within NATO and an important bulwark against Soviet expansion during the Cold War. Given Turkey's long-standing status vis-à-vis the EU and NATO, the sharp discrepancy between the treatments accorded to the Visegrad countries and that accorded to Turkey in this plan merits investigation. In Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999, Turkey was declared a candidate for EU membership.

Thus, the aim of this research is to explore the main reasons that initially led to the overtaking of Turkey by the Visegrad countries in their common pursuit of membership of the European Union and the changes that led to the decision taken in the Helsinki Summit. The research covers the period between 1990-1999. What differentiates this research from other studies of the relationship between Turkey and the EU is the significance ascribed to the role of Germany as a third party. Several factors have contributed to Germany's significance regarding the relationship between Turkey, the EU and the EU enlargement process:

1. Since the foundation of the European Community, German foreign policy was always formulated in terms of strong support for European integration, including the EU enlargement process. Thus in the current enlargement process related with Visegrad countries' and Turkish memberships it was envisaged that it would automatically play an influential role.
2. Due to its geographical proximity to and historical links with the Visegrad countries, enlargement of the European Union to the East has a more direct and significant effect on Germany than on its western partners.

3. The relationship between Turkey and Germany is more intensive in comparison with those between Turkey and other member states of the European Union due to history, economic links and the presence of 2.4 million people of Turkish origin living in Germany.

This research will be conducted within the theoretical framework of Andrew Moravcsik based on his work on liberal intergovernmentalism (LIG) that was advanced mainly in his publications between the years 1993 and 1999.⁴ The research follows a 'state-centric, intergovernmental' approach as opposed to a 'collective, supranational' one. Moravcsik's assumption that states' formulation of foreign policy serves as an extension of their domestic politics will be the starting point for this research. He divides the decision-making process of states into three different stages. The first stage is the construction of national interests by the interplay of several factors in domestic politics that result in the foreign policy of the state. Moravcsik believes that the national interests of a state tend to be direct, issue-specific and influenced by domestic constraints usually formulated by *economic* incentives and sometimes external factors influenced by geo-political considerations. The second stage involves the bargaining of EU member states' executives in the relevant institutions to maximise their national interests that later become formulated as their foreign policies. The third stage is the delegation of certain powers by the state to institutions to act on their behalf or pooling of national sovereignties. Moravcsik stresses the importance of 'rationality' in each stage of decision-making.

⁴ The following account of Moravcsik's theory concerning the formulation of states' foreign policy is based on: 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31:4, 1993; 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', *International Organisation*, 51:4, Autumn 1997; *The Choice for Europe*, 1998; 'A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Co-operation', *International Organisation*, 53:2, 1999; 'Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37:1, 1999

The first and second stages are especially relevant for this research. The first stage is important, as the main focus of the research here is the national interests of Germany, specifically the elements in its domestic politics which make up these interests. The relevance of the second stage in Moravcsik's model for this research will be related to an analysis of Germany's foreign policy as viewed through its attitude towards EU enlargement. These foreign policy interests are formulated as an outcome of Germany's national interests and then brought to the negotiating table in the EU.

As applied to this research three hypotheses can be derived from Moravcsik's theory which help explain the factors behind the discrepancy in the German attitude towards different candidates for EU membership:

Hypothesis I: Economic factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German 'national interests' (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests.

Hypothesis II: Geo-political factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German national interests (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that favours Turkish membership in the EU.

Hypothesis III: Cultural factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German 'national interests' (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests.

All three hypotheses will be evaluated for the time period between 1990-1999; starting with German unification and ending with the Helsinki European Council Summit when Turkey was granted candidate status. German foreign policy will be

operationalised by the attitude of Germany in the EU enlargement process, which will be tested by analysing the outcomes of interviews concluded with the German executives and parliamentarians and statements regarding this issue published in newspapers, journals and articles.

The following elements will be dissected analytically in order to help formulate the link between Moravcsik's theoretical framework and the hypotheses:

1. German national interests

As could be seen in the construction of the hypotheses, several factors in German domestic politics add up to formulating German national interests. Moravcsik concentrates mainly on economic interests and motivations that 'stem from economic interdependence' and argues that it is these types of interests that constrain the governmental preferences in the negotiating process (Moravcsik, 1993: 485). However it would be too simplistic to relate Germany's foreign policy only to mean its domestic economic interests. In particular, with regard to its attitude towards Turkey's EU membership, there are other factors that are influential in the formulation of German national interests; such as the considerable impact of the Turkish community in Germany on domestic politics which could shift the focus towards cultural issues. Another example would be the security concerns of Germany which could lead to the importance of geo-political factors and the significance of Turkey on this issue. These national interests are articulated by societal actors such as political parties, interest groups and domestic voters and expressed through party position papers, manifestos, public opinion surveys or in the case of interest groups by direct pressure on the government.

While dealing with the formulation of German national interests, it is also important to consider the significance of the cost-benefit analysis that Moravcsik mentions in his work where he argues that:

“Costs and benefits to powerful domestic economic groups dominate the linkages between national interest formulation and foreign policy-making” (Moravcsik, 1993: 487).

2. *Interstate bargaining (The German position in the EU enlargement process)*

After the articulation of interests at the domestic level, executives aggregate them. Moravcsik argues that:

“Primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office which requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies whose views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation” (Moravcsik, 1998: 7).

It is these interests that emerge through these processes that states bring to international institutions in the form of ‘foreign policies’ and bargain with each other to formulate policies most favourable to their national interests.

3. *Institutional choice*

According to Moravcsik there are several reasons why states prefer to fulfil their national interests in the form of an institutional choice (pooling or delegating sovereignty to international institutions) rather than a unilateral initiative. One of them is the potential gain from co-operation. Where reciprocal policy adjustment can eliminate potential costs or create benefits more efficiently than unilateral responses especially in the current globalisation period affecting relations among states; governments have an incentive to *co-ordinate* their activities (Moravcsik, 1998: 25). Another reason is the comfort felt by the national executives to implement policies that might be greeted with domestic opposition in the form of EU collective policies which have to be followed. A third factor is the ability of the supranational institutions to help the efforts by governments to control and constrain one another, which Moravcsik calls

“the power of the institutions to enhance the credibility of commitments” (Moravcsik, 1998: 9).

Methodology:

In this section, each of the elements above will be looked at in detail and how they will be analysed in the body of the thesis will be described. In particular, the theoretical framework within which the analysis will be conducted will be introduced. This will bring to light how Moravcsik’s conceptual framework was used to deconstruct the making of German foreign policy with respect to the EU enlargement candidacies of Turkey and the Visegrad countries. As the hypotheses entail a view of the formulation of Germany’s national interests, the starting point of this analysis is the link between German national interests and the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism.

It should be mentioned that because of the fact that the core of this thesis is to explore the *national interests* of Germany formulated as a result of the interaction of certain factors in the domestic politics of Germany, throughout the text there may be some imbalance when analysing the three elements of Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach. The section analysing national interests may be more detailed and longer in comparison with the other two elements. This overemphasis of analysis of national interests constructs a significant limitation to the instrumentalisation of Moravcsik’s approach for this research. By concentrating too much on the national interest formulation leading to policy representation in the EU, Moravcsik in general overlooks the *dynamics* in the bargaining process of the EU. During the negotiations in the EU states may influence each other and specifically in the case of Franco-German relations, they may even *change* one another’s foreign policies and thus lead to a redefinition of national interests.

This leads to another limitation of Moravcsik's approach for this research. It may not be only economic, geo-political or cultural factors in domestic politics of states which lead to national interest formulation and consequently to foreign policy representation as summarised in the three hypotheses of the thesis. Other states' national interests and foreign policies may intervene to influence the outcome of interest formulation process. The best example to this would be the relationship between Germany and France. As constructing the motor of European integration process, France and Germany have often been the duo-leaders in the intergovernmental conferences leading to the major treaties of the EU, consulting each other before their final positions were determined, having regular meetings which were even formalised by the Elysee Treaty of 1963 and publishing joint initiatives. The details of this will be given in the following section.

1. Analysis of German national interests:

The above constructed hypotheses entail that there are economic, cultural and geo-political elements in the German domestic scene which help in the formulation of German foreign policy and in the construction of the German position vis a vis the enlargement process of the European Union, and in particular towards Turkish EU membership. Among these, with regard to the European integration process, Moravcsik identifies *economic issues* as the most fundamental interest for the integration of states within the European institutional structure and the construction of their bargaining position in the EU arena. According to Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmental theory of European integration, the national interests of a state are mainly determined by economic incentives, domestic constraints and opportunities that reflect issue-specific interests, and the cost-benefit analysis of powerful domestic economic groups influenced by global economic interdependence, which are then

taken into consideration by governments. The issue-specific economic interests usually consist of large exogenous increases in opportunities for profitable cross-border trade and capital movements. The external influences formed by geo-political considerations are of secondary importance in the formulation of national interests. These geo-political considerations usually consist of perceived threats to national sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Before going on any further, it may be useful to open a parenthesis here and give a more detailed analysis of Franco-German relations and explore how this relationship may in fact influence the national interest formulation process in Germany; a fact that was largely ignored by Moravcsik in his analysis of national interest formulation process.

Franco-German relationship:

Moravcsik's LIG approach shares some similarities with neo-realist theory specifically regarding the both theories' emphasis on power of some member states in influencing the outcome of the decisions of the EU intergovernmental conferences. Thomas Pedersen's neo-realist analyses in his book *Germany, France and the Integration of Europe: a Realist Interpretation* (1998) is a good example of the fact that the process of European integration has not transcended *Realpolitik*, only modified it in some respects, and the best example of this is the fact that *both* Germany and France have been leading the process of European integration (Pedersen, 1998: 2).

Pedersen explains the accommodating behaviour of Germany, the most powerful state in the EU, by identifying it as a 'co-operative hegemon'. A co-operative hegemon is 'a regional big power with limited military but superior economic capacity and extensive extra-territorial economic activities. It exercises a type of international leadership that is *institutionally* embedded' (Pedersen, 1998: 38). This is mainly

because of the fact that to the extent that it had made large direct investments in the region it would be interested in harmonising norms, standards and laws in the region so as to create an extended home market. Thus a *supranational* order would be able to ensure a higher degree of stability and predictability than would an intergovernmental regime'. Another feature of co-operative hegemon is that 'co-operative hegemony implies a willingness on the part of the hegemon to *share* power. One could say that power sharing is a way of winning legitimacy. (Pedersen, 1998: 57).

Within the EU this sharing of power of Germany could be seen in the *dual* leadership of Germany and France. It is true that Germany has exercised leadership in the European integration process, but the kind of leadership Germany has exercised in the EU has throughout been always exercised in close collaboration with France. Although for historical reasons and because of its internal federal structure the Federal Republic was generally more disposed to share power regionally than France, Germany and France *both* wanted to use the Community as a platform for exercising leadership.

Pedersen uses the same approach as Moravcsik and attempts to analyse the dynamics of the European integration process by exploring in detail major treaties of European integration, intergovernmental negotiations and the positions of the largest member states in this bargaining process. However unlike Moravcsik he makes a more detailed analysis of some special ideational features of big power strategy, behaviour and leadership in the European regional integration process and in this respect comes closer to explaining France's influence in Germany's national interest formulation process. His concrete analysis of the EU's intergovernmental conferences in 1985 and 1991 confirms the expectation that France and Germany provided directional leadership by generally managing to set the overall agenda of the IGCs, and tried to

shape the outcome by convincing other members (and each other) of the final outcome at an early stage in the negotiations... In both 1985 and 1991 the outcomes of the constitutive negotiations broadly reflected the joint negotiating positions of the two countries (Pedersen, 1998: 81).⁵

Even though there was some growing tension within Europe's dual core caused mainly by German unification⁶, Franco-German collaboration in the post-Cold War survived. The directional leadership role of France and Germany for example was again very clear in the process leading to the Maastricht Summit. With few accessions, France and Germany managed to set the agenda both in the EMU process and also the political union. Reaching agreement time and again proved painful, yet it was crucial to both leaders to be seen to be acting *together* and to be seen in *control* of European politics.

In this regard it would be even unthinkable to analyse Germany's position in intergovernmental bargaining regarding the enlargement of the EU without considering France. Enlargement was actually especially one area where there was certain tension between Germany and France initially after German unification. Germany was eager to stabilise the Visegrad countries and regarded including them in a tight integration structure as the best way of extending co-operative hegemony towards the East. On the other hand France was determined to prevent Germany from filling the power vacuum which had emerged in Central and Eastern Europe after the Soviet withdrawal. There were other factors, which led to the sceptic French position as well. Enlargement to the East would benefit the Germans disproportionately, and it was also obvious that

⁵ For example for the conclusion of the SEA, although European multinationals undoubtedly exercised a considerable amount of intellectual leadership, the political leaders in Germany and France, assisted by Jacques Delors, deserve the main credit for the initiative. The Franco-German duo played a key role in the chain of events leading to the adoption of the SEA

⁶ On November 28 1990 Kohl outlined his 10-point programme on the future of Germany without prior consultation with the French. This omission formed part of a wider pattern of growing Franco-German tension (Pedersen, 1998: 129).

Germany was deliberately trying to use enlargement to strengthen its position within the Union. For Germany, enlargement towards the East opened up prospects for exploiting geopolitical and cultural asymmetries institutionally.

From the French point of view there were basically two possible responses to the challenge of geopolitical asymmetry. They could try to stop it or they could reshape the institutional structure to improve France's chances of coping successfully with Eastern enlargement. Since the first option was hardly realistic, as long as France wanted to preserve its partnership with Germany, preparations had to be made for the second option (Pedersen, 1998: 190). Therefore in the current enlargement process of the EU France began to act together with Germany in the intergovernmental bargainings of the EU. The tendency over the last decade has been for the Franco-German collaboration to become more and more institutionalised both internally and vis-à-vis the Union. The Franco-German continued to function and there seemed as yet little prospect that it would change role from motor detonator.

French influence was not only obvious on the German position in intergovernmental bargainings but also on national interest formation process in Germany. However, as already stated, this fact was largely omitted in the LIG approach of Moravcsik. Since that this approach is used throughout the thesis to deconstruct German foreign policy, I will only focus upon the three factors mentioned in the hypothesis of the thesis. Thus, applying this theoretical framework to an explanation of the German position in the European Union enlargement process necessitates a careful analysis of the precise nature and relative weight of *geo-political*, *economic* and *cultural* considerations in the formulation of Germany's national interests. Due to the direct influence on the structure and policy-making of Germany of changes, which came as a result of the end of the Cold War, it is most practical to

divide the analysis of German national interests into two different time periods: before unification and after unification up to 1999 when the period of investigation of this research ends.

Before unification (1945-1989):

After World War II, the national interests of Germany could be structured within the framework of its 'semi-sovereign, federal, legalistic and militarily dependent characteristics'. Milward (1994) identifies the most important national interest of Germany in the 1950s as:

“...to bestow full sovereignty, to become re-unified and to be recognised as equal by the other Western European states” (Milward, 1994: 197).

This constituted the major motive of its foreign policy.

Recognition of Germany as a trustworthy partner by the other European states and the ultimate goal of re-unification with the East necessitated the establishment of a successful and stable democracy. In Germany, the bedrock of a stable democracy was established via a successful macroeconomic policy. Despite the huge devastation that resulted from World War II, the underlying elements of German economic power were still present. These, combined with the policy initially outlined by Ludwig Erhard ⁷, which consisted of free trade principles, currency reform, and export-based growth, led to the economic miracle of high growth.

The newly formed political and economic conditions of Germany and the fact that German economic power and political influence in world affairs were disproportionate became the source of competing assumptions by certain political scientists. For example Bulmer and Paterson (2000) stressed this by describing Germany after World War II as 'gentle giant but political dwarf'. By this they were referring to the influence of Germany's prior history, in particular how the atrocities

⁷ Ludwig Erhard was the Minister of Finance in the immediate after war period in Germany between 1949-1963.

caused by Hitler's policies during World War II, had limited Germany's freedom of movement in foreign policy, though economically, in the post-war period it had already grown powerful. Reich and Markovits (1997) agree with the relative weakness of Germany's foreign policy caused by its 'collective memory' of World War II, but give more emphasis to the influence of the underlying structural economic power of Germany. Sperling (2001) continues this argument by placing emphasis on the importance of German economic power, especially after World War II. He stresses the fact that the conditions of the Cold War had necessitated the instrumentalisation of economic power to secure peace and stability, which automatically gave Germany power among its western partners. However he does not agree with Bulmer and Paterson and Reich and Markovits that German foreign policy was self-contained, but states that Germany has acted more as an assertive power than a reluctant one. His assumption of the instrumentalisation of German economic power is in line with the multilateral approach advanced mainly by Anderson (1993), which assumes that Germany, as early as the 1950s, has been using the European Union as a multilateral cover for the pursuit of its narrow economic interests.

It is true that, even though it is a net contributor to the EU's social, regional and agricultural support funds, Germany has gained the most among all member states, with disproportionate shares of EU manufactured exports (both within the EU and externally), leading to impressively large trade surpluses. Its miracle of economic growth gave it an asymmetrical influence within the Union, especially in the areas of macroeconomics and exchange rates. Armed with this systemic advantage, Germany has been able to encourage other EU member states to adopt macroeconomic policy targets in line with its own. This influence was acceptable to the majority of other members of the European Union, as they saw the German economy as a locomotive for

their own growth, while believing that EU institutions would contain German development and power.

In a country that is second only to the United States as regards its volume of international trade, and that is able to instrumentalise this power in line with its objectives through this institutional framework, domestic economic policy naturally became the primary incentive in the formulation of foreign policy. The *Ostpolitik* of the Social Democratic-Liberal government between 1969-82, most enthusiastically articulated under the leadership of Willy Brandt (1969-74), can be cited as a significant example of this policy.⁸ Through its firm integration into the multilateral institutional framework of the West, *Ostpolitik* and the improvement of its relations with the East, not only was peace secured and international recognition for West Germany strengthened, but West Germany was also helped to establish its position as the largest export nation in Europe and to secure economic prosperity (Griffith, 1981: 280-282).

The German initiative, under the leadership of Helmut Schmidt (1974-82), to promote the development of the European Monetary System (EMS) was another important example where German economic incentives were influential in formulating its foreign policy within the European Union. Although it was introduced as a joint French-German initiative, the EMS was mainly a German vehicle which Schmidt had developed against the resistance of the German *Bundesbank* (German Central Bank),

⁸ *Ostpolitik* was an important element in West German foreign policy initiated by Willy Brandt. This policy initially came as a reaction to the foreign policy of the Christian Democratic Union, the governing party of West Germany since 1949, that was rigidly anti-Soviet, very reliant on American military power for German security and was hostile to East Germany. Alternatively, Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* aimed for the development of military parity between western Europe and the Soviet Union, the creation of a political climate that made military power of secondary importance or irrelevant and the linkage of the process of European integration with German unification. This policy change then necessitated improving relations with *East Germany*. As a result, the *Grundlagenvertrag* signed with East Germany led East Germany to open additional border crossing points, dismantle facilities disrupting West German TV broadcasts and permit limited and controlled emigration. Besides the strengthening of the image of Germany as 'keen to support the process of European integration by dissolving the division in its country first', German businessmen arrived in East Germany with trucks carrying food and other goodies to sell to their new clientele who were fascinated to watch the commercials on West German TV and grasp an image of the Golden West (www.germanculture.com).

and which mainly served as a response to the oil crisis of 1973/74 (Schmidt, 1990: 247-272).⁹ As another example of the importance of economic considerations and profitable economic partnerships in its foreign policy, Edinger (1998) cites the attitude of Germany towards Iran when the Americans imposed an embargo on trade. Instead of joining the American embargo, the Federal Republic sent more exports to that country than all other western European nations combined. German policy makers asserted that their efforts for a critical dialogue with Iran were a better way to encourage them than isolating that country¹⁰ (Edinger, 1998: 248).

In the section below the period *after* unification will be analysed with the aim of shedding light on the significance of economic factors in the national interest and foreign policy formulation of Germany. For a variety of reasons which will be explained in detail below, this period is more important for signifying the economic elements in German foreign policy making process.

After unification (1990-1999):

Germany was the only country in Western Europe that experienced a marked reorganisation of its domestic political system as a result of the end of the Cold War. This change was due principally to its re-unification with East Germany (Anderson-Goodman, 1993: 25). Though Germany got bigger, both in terms of size and in population, the unification process proved to be too costly and led to an economic recession in the country with the knock-on effects of increasing unemployment, economic burden brought by the eastern *Laender* and reduction in the rate of economic

⁹ Moravcsik argues that the reasoning behind the German government to propose the EMS was the fact that “the decline of Bretton Woods and rising capital mobility, both of which undermined domestic macroeconomic autonomy, triggered a search for regional arrangements to stabilise exchange rates” (Moravcsik, 1998: 239).

¹⁰ Things have become more positive especially after President Mohammad Khatami with his relatively reformist views came to power. The European industrial powers became more determined to cement their commercial and political ties with Iran in the wake of the reformist and democratic agenda pursued by Mr. Khatami’s administration. Today Germany is the leading European partner of Iran, followed by Italy and France. For example, between 1994-1996 Germany’s exports to Iran increased from \$1,600 million to \$1,864 million. (www.netiran.com, 1997)

growth. In addition, having immediate borders with the newly independent post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and being prone to the potential flood of persecuted, hungry or homeless people, it started to be regarded as being located in the most risky position on the European continent.

The combination of these internal and external factors also led to a modification in the realm of German national interests. An analysis of this transformation can be conducted with reference to the interaction of both geo-political and economic forces influential in the formation of national interests. Thus the national interests of Germany leading to its expression of foreign policy in the enlargement process of the European Union could be to focus on the means to secure the domestic prosperity and security achieved after World War II.

This concept of German national interests can be explored in two different areas:

1. From an economic point of view, it would not be wrong to state that the incorporation of formerly communist East Germany, which had different interests,¹¹ influenced the institutional landscape and the range of economic policy issues of the German domestic scene. The unexpected range of economic, social and political costs of German unification had led to insecurity over economic recession, the necessity for a re-structuring of the social net as well as the problem of right-wing violence. These problems necessitated an immediate solution and occupied an important place in the formulation of German national interests
2. From a geo-political point of view, the concerns over the fragile stability of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the violence in the former Yugoslavia and the costs that could accrue as a consequence of potential German involvement in this area

¹¹ East Germany was governed through regional socialism and a centrally planned economy and now it had to transform itself into a capitalist and a social market economy. This meant the adoption of West Germany's *acquis communautaire*; that is, it had to embark upon new policies of competition, environmental regulations, taxation and technical standards (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 31).

led to the significance of finding solutions to potential disruptions to German welfare, deriving from the instability in the adjacent regions. This fact inevitably led to a significant emphasis on the importance of geo-political factors in the formulation of German national interests.

Analysed within the framework of the above mentioned elements in national interests, the most important change in the German foreign policy after the unification period can be named as its 'normal' status. That is, as a unified, sovereign state, freed from the constraints imposed upon it by the World War II ¹², it can now act more freely in the international arena in accordance with its national interests. Ann Phillips (2000) refers to this normalisation process as:

“...growing intrusion of *domestic politics* into foreign policy as the clear parameters and priorities imposed by the international system faded” (Phillips, 2000: 35).

Germany no longer *has* to employ the institutional structure of the EU to fulfil its national interests. Related to this is the fact that now as a 'normal' state, it will be more obviously cost-conscious of its moves in the international arena and formulate its foreign policy as a result of cost-benefit calculations in the formulation of its national interests. This is consistent with Moravcsik's assumption of states' rationality which necessitates that:

“Calculation of costs and benefits of economic interdependence by important societal groups are the primary determinants of national preferences” (Moravcsik, 1993: 480).

Thus the German attitude towards the enlargement process may reflect the:

¹² Despite the economic power it had and as shown in the previous section despite its instrumentalisation of this power through the EU, its Nazi history, its divided status and its geopolitical position between East and Western parts of Europe made Germany very reliant on its Western allies. Thus 'autonomy' and 'sovereignty' were never strongly pronounced in and related to German foreign policy-making. In this regard Germany can be called as a singular case of 'semi-sovereignty' in the European continent during the Cold War before its unification (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996: 11).

“...cost-benefit analysis and their specification by domestic societal interests in particular areas and the ways in which these constrain governments’ bargaining position in the EU” (Moravcsik, 1993: 481).

Cost-benefit calculations in the formulation of German national interests:

There is a clear link between Germany’s new ‘normal’ stance, Moravcsik’s emphasis on cost-benefit calculations in the formulation of national interests and the three hypotheses formulated above. In the section below German relations with two different categories of candidate states, i.e. the Visegrad states admitted to the EU enlargement negotiations and Turkey as the excluded candidate will be explored within the framework of this relationship.

Relationship with the Visegrad countries:

Economic factors:

With regard to economic factors influencing national interest formulation and foreign policy attitude of Germany there are both advantages and disadvantages towards the membership of the Visegrad countries in the EU. In the section below, first the positive aspects will be analysed.

In line with the main national interest of *securing German economic prosperity*, the post-Cold War generation of foreign policy leaders have been keen on continuing the export-led growth of the economy and promoting German trade and investments within and beyond Europe. The domestic changes in Germany after the end of the Cold War also necessitated this policy. Bonn needed to come up with substantial outlays over the short to medium term to convert the East German regional economy from socialism to capitalism. In addition to the costs of economic modernisation, there loomed anticipated expenditures on environmental clean-up, infrastructure, housing, the transfer of the seat of government from Bonn to Berlin, and the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops. The bill for these huge tasks would in all

likelihood be paid with proceeds from the West German economy, thus reinforcing the value of the perennial cash flow for West German industry and of German free trade on international markets (Anderson-Goodman, 1993: 39).

This need for new markets and areas of investment brought into light the concept of integrating the newly-independent Visegrad countries as a solution. There were several factors why they were particularly seen as a 'formula' for easing Germany's economic problems:

1. They are the immediate neighbours of Germany. Moravcsik also stresses the significance of the geographical position in trade relations as a proxy variable for 'imperatives stated by interdependence' (Moravcsik, 1998: 49-50). All things being equal, it is reasonable to assume that international interdependence increases with geographical proximity, especially in economic terms. Geographical proximity creates opportunities for economic gains from trade and investment in many ways. One good example would be the reduced costs of transportation and communication. The relations between Germany and the Visegrad countries can be offered as evidence. Therefore, one can assume that as the country that is closest to, and most highly involved in the Visegrad countries, Germany's economic gain will be maximised by better relations with these countries.
2. In addition to its geographical proximity, Germany also benefits from its historical relationship with Visegrad countries. Culture and language are among the most significant factors in the increasing German significance in Eastern Europe. German culture and language, primarily a legacy of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern domination, had provided a common bond among the political class and cultural elite until at least 1945. After the end of the Cold War this cultural bond acquired a different perspective,

symbolising this region's wish to become 'Westernised or European'. This makes it easier for Germany to develop economic relations with the Visegrad countries.

3. The underdeveloped state of Visegrad countries' economies also works in favour of German interests. Germany has been seen as a role model for the Visegrad countries who want to modernise and develop their economies very swiftly, both because of its economic success and because of the bonds created through history as mentioned above. The Visegrad countries have been trying to adopt and apply the lessons of *Modell Deutschland* ¹³ in their transition to democracy and a market economy. Reich and Markovits (1997) link the aspirations to emulate Germany's impressive pattern of EU export growth in the 1970s and 80s in competition with its major European rivals and conclude that a similar export drive exists in the Visegrad countries. This would inevitably increase German influence and help the German export-led economy¹⁴. German dominance in Eastern Europe had already started with the *Osthandel* and *Ostpolitik* ¹⁵ during the Cold War and after its end, the impact of Germany increased rapidly. This change was manifested mostly at the micro level, in terms of company investments and joint ventures. ¹⁶

¹³ The post-war German economy was mostly shaped by Ludwig Erhard's economic policies that resulted in the development of a German economy run on free-trade principles. These policies especially emphasized currency reform and export-led growth and have been commonly associated with Germany's early post-war 'economic miracle' of high growth. The German combination of export-led growth and prudent fiscal conservatism was already seen by the Western Europeans as a suitable model for their own economic development. The image of *Modell Deutschland* was also supported in the minds of the Visegrad countries by their belief that they too could use the same economic strategies and achieve the same results in their attempts to reshape their economies after the collapse of communism.

¹⁴ Markovits and Reich attract attention to the common knowledge that the German economy thrives on exports. Its performance in EU export growth over twenty-five years is extremely impressive. The Germans were doing so at the start of the 1970s and they have significantly increased their advantage in every regard since. As countries joined the EU they found themselves importing predominantly German goods and Germany extended its regional export base. West Germany attained the title of 'world export champion' for the first time in 1988. A newly united Germany repeated the feat in 1990 and nearly replicated it every year since despite enormous difficulties with unification recessions and lagging European demand (Reich and Markovits, 1997: 155-157).

¹⁵ These two policies were the two pillars of Germany's post-World War II influence in Eastern Europe. *Osthandel* was related to economy and commerce and *Ostpolitik* was related to politics and ideology.

¹⁶ Markovits and Reich attempt to show the significance of the German factor especially by assessing the data on company investments and joint ventures. They argue that the data on company investments and joint ventures in Eastern Europe show that German firms are way ahead of the competition in

Against this argument that aims to explain the importance of the image of Germany as the *Modell Deutschland* for the Visegrad countries which also help Germany to develop better economic relations with them, Sperling (2001) suggests that this analysis exaggerates German power and economic influence over its eastern neighbours. He is more of a sceptic than are Reich and Markovits (1997) about the structural power of Germany, and about the significance of its potential *hegemonic* status in Eastern Europe. In order to support his counter argument regarding German power, Sperling analyses two things: the components of German structural power ¹⁷, and the presence of German foreign direct investment (FDI) in Visegrad countries and the other central and eastern European countries (CEECs). Looking at the trade preference structure of Germany in 1994, export concentration profiles of the CEECs, and the commodity composition of trade (which aim to show whether the *dominant* country manages trade to take advantage of the small countries), Sperling concludes that suggestions about the asymmetric position of Germany in Eastern Europe are actually false. ¹⁸ The German trade structure as seen in 1994 supports neither the

comparison with their nearest competitors Italy and France and, to a lesser extent, the US. The Germans moved rapidly to secure attractive investments in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall spurred by the East's desperate need for capital. German firms were offered East European assets at attractive rates. Of the 1231 joint ventures (JV) registered in Poland during the first quarter of 1990 over 40% involved German firms. A similar trend pertained in Czechoslovakia. Of 32 joint ventures begun by Czechoslovak and foreign firms in January 1990 11 belonged to Germany. By the middle of 1991 they had 873 joint ventures with firms in the Czech Republic compared to 133 by US firms. In addition Volkswagen purchased Skoda. This trend increased and in 1994 alone approximately 800 million USD was invested through single and joint ventures by German firms compared to about 600 million USD by the United States and \$ 300 million by France the next largest EU investor. Four German firms are among the largest twenty companies in the Czech Republic (not including Volkswagen's joint venture with Skoda) and one 1992 article claimed that German firms accounted for more than 80% of foreign investment in the Czech Republic. In addition, Germany has also been far and away the most important western partner of these countries concerning both imports and exports. Germany is these countries' leading partner in almost every category, ranging from cars, electronics and chemical products to textiles, agricultural goods and artwork (Reich and Markovits: 1997: 176-177). However, their arguments have been challenged by James Sperling whose line of reasoning is summarised in detail above.

¹⁷ 'Structural power' can best be defined as the "ability of a state in creating an economic order which services its interests disproportionately well" (Sperling, 2001: 17).

¹⁸ For example, if structural power were related to the placement of larger and smaller countries in an exploitable asymmetrical relationship, Germany's export preference index would be towards smaller countries. However, the 1994 export preference index for Germany indicates a German preference for

existence of an exploitable asymmetry in Germany's trade relations with its smaller Central and Eastern European neighbours, nor the successful German pursuit of such an asymmetrical relationship. In addition, by comparing the German FDI in CEECs with that of other countries, he argues that only in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria does German capital enjoy a clear margin of dominance in comparison with other EU member states and the USA.

There has been scepticism towards fears of Germanisation in the Visegrad countries as well. Markovits and Reich (1997) also accept that both Poland and the Czech Republic have tried to balance German investment with greater US investment. By 1993 for example American firms had already invested \$ one billion in Poland with the immediate promise of a further \$ 500 million as a result of an announced deal by PepsiCo (Markovits and Reich 1997: 233). One Polish official insisted at the time that:

“There is still too little US investment in this country. This is the case because we prefer it to German investment especially since in the west of Poland German investment raises certain negative historical connotations” (Perlez, Jane quoting Leszek Miller, deputy leader of the Democratic Left Alliance which had tremendous electoral success in 1993, *New York Times*, September 22, 1993: 30).

However, Patricia Davis and Peter Dombrowski (1997) have tried to show that this trend is changing. Quoting from the business journal *Business in Central Europe* they argue that the US has already become the number one country providing private investment to the region by 20.4% while Germany's share has fallen to 19.2% (Davis and Dombrowski, 1997: 9). The details of this analysis are provided in the table below:

Table 1: Direct Foreign Investment in Visegrad Countries by Country of Origin as of May 1995

Country	Per cent
United States	20.4
Germany	19.2

trade with larger countries. Comparatively, the United States and France have export preference indices that favour smaller countries (Sperling, 2001: 18).

Austria	11.1
France	10.4
The Netherlands	6.3
Supranationals	6.3
Belgium	5.5
Italy	4.3
United Kingdom	4.2
Switzerland	1.7
Others	9.1

Source: 'Investing by Numbers', *Business in Central Europe*, May 1995, p.33

In later chapters these contrasting views will be analysed in more detail when going into more depth of the significance of economic incentives in German foreign policy towards the Visegrad countries in particular.

Nevertheless, the fact that as a result of the three factors listed above Germany was in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the Visegrad countries especially regarding the economic benefits it can derive from a relationship with them merits investigation. Linking this with its position in the EU enlargement process one may say that its interests could be better secured by membership of these countries in the EU, the further opening of markets, and better protection of their economic assets in the region.

On the other hand, based on the fact that the underdeveloped economic conditions of the Visegrad countries will put the EU under an economic burden, and this will especially affect Germany as the net-payer to the EU budget, it will not be realistic to say that the Visegrad countries' EU membership will *totally* contribute to the improvement of the German economy. In addition to the perceived costs for Germany in the stage of accession, there was also the potential for German businesses experiencing difficulties in their ability to compete with the cheap labour and products coming from the Visegrad countries onto the German market. Adrian Hyde-Price (2000) also agrees with this argument as he states that:

“The continued viability of the social market model achieved by the Bonn Republic has already been questioned by intensifying global economic competition. The cheap products from the Visegrad countries, especially cheap agricultural products from Poland and the relatively low-cost skilled labour from all the Visegrad countries have contributed to this problem” (Hyde-Price, 2000: 23).

Geo-political factors:

The second potential benefit for supporting the Visegrad countries' membership in the EU is connected with external factors, namely the geo-political interests of Germany. Sperling (2001) stresses the influence that the collapse of the Weimar Republic has historically had on German foreign policy. In the first half of the twentieth century, this was mainly based on economic problems and resulted in political chaos, the rise of the National Socialist Party, and the disastrous collapse of Germany after the Second World War. This trauma, which is referred to as 'collective memory', continued to be influential in German policy making until recently, and even continues to exert some influence today. As a result, Germany is very sensitive to the risk of the failure of its economic system, and of instability as an outcome of such a failure. This is compounded by the fact that the country has already been struggling with the severe economic problems, that resulted from unification with eastern Germany. The fear of upsetting Germany's social peace and political stability has never been greater than in the 1990s.

In keeping with that, Germany is very cautious about developments in the countries surrounding it. The end of the Cold War brought with it the potential for *new security threats* emerging from Eastern Europe that could confront Germany. Citing a pilot study undertaken in 1999 to identify the 'new security threats', Kirchner (2002) states that:

“The notion of security has changed from that which overwhelmingly consisted of just military security during the Cold War. Security now includes a range of non-military factors, such as economic, political, environmental and societal factors. Concern with global developments (technological, communications, economic and

financial, environmental, human rights etc.) and the impact of these developments on countries and regions have become an important focus for security policy. Problems connected with terrorism, environmental degradation, or conflict due to scarcity of essential resources and ethnic tensions do not stop at the state and can be described as global threats. Threats to national security are becoming increasingly unconventional and difficult to defend against. Given their transboundary nature of the threat they pose, they require a co-ordinated and co-operative approach” (Kirchner, 2002: 12).

If this analysis is applied specifically to the fragile democracies in Eastern Europe, it would not be wrong to say that, if the efforts for transition to democracy and economic revival in Eastern Europe prove to be unsuccessful, this could result in instability, authoritarian solutions and mass migration. With the changed geo-political situation of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the war in Bosnia, Germany was well aware that large-scale instability in Eastern Europe was quite possible and that if this ever happened, Germany would be the first country to be negatively affected.¹⁹ Given the interdependent nature of international politics, these developments would have a direct influence on Germany. Its close proximity, economic potential, relative prosperity, and also wide influence of the German language, already exert attraction for a potential flood of persecuted, hungry or homeless people. Thus geo-political factors become to mean *security and stability* for Germany and these concepts will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis when mentioning the geo-political factors.

As a result, by the EU membership of the Visegrad countries and their consequent inner stability, Germany would be rescued from its frontline state status, the region surrounding it would be stabilised and potential risks to its domestic peace and welfare would be eliminated. Including countries which are still very fragile and

¹⁹ This argument was voiced several times by German politicians. One civil servant in the Foreign Ministry suggested: “In terms of our political geography, we are bound to be pioneers in *Ostpolitik*... We have no interest in building fences”. As the president of Germany Roman Herzog, stated in the mid 1980s: “If we don't stabilise the east it will destabilise us” (Edinger, 1998: 211). Volker Rühe, the former defence minister, contended: “Without stability in the East of our continent there will be no stability for the continent as a whole, and especially no stability for Germany” (3rd party protocol of the CDU, October 26-28 1992, Düsseldorf).

not totally stable was perceived by some as costly and taking a risk, but the supporters of the Visegrad countries' EU membership argued that excluding them would be costlier.

Cultural factors:

Regarding the cultural factors influencing national interest formulation and foreign policy attitude of Germany, there are both advantages and disadvantages against the Visegrad countries' bid for EU membership.

The Visegrad countries have been regarded as the 'core countries' of Europe throughout history and they have shared the experiences of the Enlightenment, Reformation and Renaissance periods with the Western Europeans. Thus after their break with communism, their re-integration with Western Europe was accepted by both the public and the elites as 'instinctive' and that they were regarded as 'returning back to Europe'. In addition to this cultural advantage, there is a *moral* perspective which created an advantage for the Visegrad countries' EU membership. The German public felt responsibility towards the Visegrad countries deriving from acts committed against the people of these nations during World War II.²⁰

Germany offers ample testimony for the powerful phenomenon of collective memory and its effect on shaping the interests that determine German and European policies in the 1990s. As a constituent part of German identity, collective memory influences the stereotypes and images in how a country perceives itself and the outer world. Memories of dismemberment and suffering under German occupation have left deep imprints on the collective memories of stance of Poland and the Czech Republic respectively and so affected the diplomatic stance both countries have taken vis a vis

²⁰ In an article published in the *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* in spring 2001, Vladimir Handl and Adrian Hyde Price, and in his book *Tamed Power* Peter Katzenstein (2000) also mention the importance of historical/collective memory in the formulation and execution of German policy towards the Visegrad countries.

Germany. The awareness of this fact and the guilt deriving from the misdeeds against the Visegrad countries, especially Poland and the Czech Republic, has caused the German government to be more favourable towards their bid for EU membership (Hyde-Price and Handl, 2001: 60).

On the other hand, from the moral perspective there is an issue which has negatively affected relations between Germany and some of the Visegrad countries, in particular the Czech Republic and Poland: the issue of minorities. This is especially the case with regards to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans by the Czech Government after World War II. The Czechoslovak side denied that an expulsion had ever taken place and claimed that the incident was merely an ordinary 'transfer' of the Sudeten population. On the other hand, the Sudeten German associations in Germany spoke of 'expulsion' and demanded a return of their property, which had been confiscated by Czechoslovakia. Thus there were prejudices towards each other in both sides; there were the injustices of German aggression during World War II, abetted and actively supported by a majority of the Sudeten Germans, German occupation, dismemberment of the Czech state, and the large-scale deportation and murder of the Czechoslovak population, and there were the injustices committed during the forcible resettlement of about three million Sudeten Germans at the end of the war.

After Czechoslovakia split on January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic inherited the problem and Czech-German relations seemed dominated by the Sudeten issue for some time. As tension intensified, the Czech-German Declaration was signed in 1997 in an attempt to improve the relationship. There were recent tensions in 2002 around the same issue, then relations between the two countries improved but still they remain somewhat strained. Because moral and political differences in interpretations weigh more heavily than legal ones; both Czech and German societies are still struggling

with painful historical memories (Aniol, Brzica, Byrnes, Gedeon, Jerabek, Katzenstein, Polackova, Samson and Zich, 2000: 268).

This fact was especially conspicuous in the interregional co-operation efforts between Germany and the Czech Republic. Despite the fact that there were Euro-regions established between the two countries since 1991 aimed to facilitate co-operation between regions, districts, cities and other territorial units, in particular in border areas, Kirchner (1998) stresses the challenges associated with this effort. Despite the initial good will, there were criticisms that these Euro-regions' activities were confined to a relatively narrow set of leaders or mainly took the form of improved personal relations. Kirchner lists various reasons that account for this. In addition to the disadvantage of having a heterogonous population without any strong relationship to the settled area of the borderland, Kirchner argues that the issues that dated from the wartime period of 1938 to 1945 (problems with the Sudeten Germans, especially their claim of the right to a homeland and barring of non-Czech citizens from property rights) were likely to be major obstacles to cross-border co-operation and improved German-Czech relations (Kirchner, 1998: 5).

A similar type of conflict also emerged between Germany and Poland, especially with regard to the German minorities in Poland and the Germans expelled from Poland after World War II. The democratic reforms in Poland and the signing of two treaties with Germany ²¹ improved relations between the two countries enormously, but nevertheless tensions still occur periodically.²² Kennard (1995) points

²¹ One of these treaties is the Treaty of November 14, 1990, confirming the Oder-Neisse border as definitive and the other is the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation of June 17, 1991 (Aniol, Brzica, Byrnes, Gedeon, Jerabek, Katzenstein, Polackova, Samson and Zich, 2000: 206).

²² A speech that Helmut Kohl made on November 28, 1989 especially alienated the Poles. In that speech where he presented his ten-point plan Kohl omitted any mention of the Oder-Neisse line as the final Eastern border of a unified German state. Kohl's attitude can be explained by domestic politics and electoral calculations. The post WWII German expellees, both from Poland and the Czech Republic, had become electorates of the CDU/CSU therefore Kohl was manoeuvring to make his policies more

out to the difficulties of inter-regional co-operation between Poland and Germany as well. The people living in the border regions of Germany and Poland have no shared history and the existence of prejudices and worries still influence bilateral relations and cross-border operations. There still exist a number of elderly people in the border regions that talk about horrible war memories. In the stage of co-operation, these psychological influences affect the decision of Polish officials; they become suspicious of German intentions (Kennard, 1995: 32).

Cost-benefit analysis:

In the section above, a list of potential benefits and costs of supporting the Visegrad countries' EU membership for the German domestic politics is given. As a result of balancing the quantity of the benefits and costs and reaching the outcome of benefits exceeding the costs, an obvious rationale for Germany to expand its commitments vis-à-vis the East is thus presented. For the security of its economic and political success, Germany sees self-interest in the successful transition of these states to the market economy and democracy. The belief is that, in the globalised world and already intensively integrated Europe, this transition can be best secured through the inclusion of these countries in the European Union. In this way, the enlargement of the EU to the East can be seen as an instrument to stabilise the Visegrad countries, to control the negative impact of political and economic reformation in the East, and to expand the borders of the EU zone of peace and prosperity; directly influencing

favourable towards the expellees. However, as German unification drew near, in order to secure Polish support for the unification Kohl backed down and in a speech he made on March 8, 1990, concluded that the Oder-Neisse Line was the border between German and Poland, which was contrary to the expellees' demands (Tewes, 2002: 59). Regarding the German minorities, even today on both sides of the border between Germany and Poland, extreme German nationalists continue to make Poles in Silesia suspicious that the recognition of a German minority may eventually open the way to the growth of a German fifth column in Poland. The situation is aggravated by some Silesians in Germany who still hope that Silesia will eventually become part of Germany and whose organisations are subsidised by the German authorities (Aniol, Brzica, Byrnes, Gedeon, Jerabek, Katzenstein, Polackova, Samson and Zich, 2000: 207).

stability of German domestic politics and securing its welfare and societal integrity. There are also potential benefits derived from direct economic interests of Germany in the Visegrad countries which may help to improve its worsening economic situation which started with the re-unification process. Against these huge benefits, the potential costs do not stand as important. In reality, despite the tensions between Germany and Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic, matters never went so far as to preclude German efforts for eastern enlargement. On the contrary, the German government provided huge financial assistance to Poland and the Czech Republic, directed aid to regional infrastructure improvements, and has been the most influential member state promoting their EU membership.

Relationship with Turkey:

As can be seen, Moravcsik's cost-benefit analysis in the formulation of national interests yields favourable conditions for the support of the Visegrad countries: both a gain of economic and geo-political benefits and cultural advantages with a small amount of potential costs that still do not exceed the benefits. In the similar analysis regarding the relationship between Turkey and Germany the factors influencing the German position towards Turkey can again be divided into two main kinds: positive and negative.

Economic factors:

There are as was the case for the Visegrad countries, both advantages and disadvantages regarding the economic factors leading to Germany's national interest formulation and foreign policy attitude. The most significant factor militating against Turkey's membership can be identified as its large size and 'sick' economy. As an example to support this view, Heinz Kramer (2003) cites the differences between the GDP per capita of Turkey and the EU. According to 1999 figures Turkey's GDP per

capita is only 25% of the average EU member states. Thus Turkey would automatically qualify for a large share of EU structural funds in aid (an estimate of € 20 billion), most of which would come from Germany (as it is the largest contributor to the fund). In addition, Turkey has a large and underdeveloped agricultural sector; 14.2% of the economy belongs to the agriculture sector whereas this figure accounts for only 1.7% in the EU. 35.4 % of the labour force works in the agricultural sector whereas this figure is only 4.2% in the EU. This would enable Turkey to obtain financial aid from EU's largest fund, Common Agricultural Policy, the greater contributor to which is, once more Germany (Kramer, 2003: 22). Faruk Sen from the Institute of Turkish Studies in Essen refers to another problem related to Turkey's bid for EU membership. He signifies the fact that the structural changes right after the re-unification and the implementation of monetary union caused a stagnation of the German economy. At the same time unemployment increased as numerous enterprises in the new and the old *Bundeslander* had to be closed down. The negative aspects of the re-unification on the whole economic situation in Germany also had consequences on the minorities living there. As a result of the overall negative economic situation, and as unemployment simultaneously increased foreigners were made scapegoats for both this unemployment and were perceived as an important reason for social turbulence. Regarding the fact that Turks are the most populous community among the other foreigners, the potential threat of more Turkish immigrants with Turkey's EU membership was seen as a huge problem (Sen, 1994).

On the other hand there are some positive aspects related with economic factors influencing Germany's national interest formulation towards Turkey's EU membership bid. Turkey and Germany enjoy very strong economic ties deriving from the fact that a huge number of Turkish workers contribute to the German economy through their

creation of a labour force and the generation of vacant positions through the entrepreneurships they have established in Germany. The positive contribution that Turkish workers in Germany make to the German economy has been demonstrated by the reports of the Centre for Turkish Studies in Essen. According to the 1999 report published in September there are more than 56,800 Turkish self-employed in Germany whose total investments exceed € 6.5 billion and whose revenues total exceed € 26 billion. In 1985 the number of Turkish self-employed was only 22,000. 77% buy from German suppliers thus create an impulse in the economy. It is no longer an isolated case to find a Turkish business for which Germans are employed. In particular in the marketing, consulting and management sectors well as in the administrative sectors of the economy, Turkish employers find it easier to hire Germans because of the lack of highly-skilled Turkish labour (www.ztf-online.de).

In addition, the fact that Germany has become the number one economic partner of Turkey in the European Union creates a great deal of export potential. Thus a possible Turkish EU membership would improve the Turkish economy and secure Germany's economic benefits. It would also offer great export potential for German businesses for entry into the Turkish market and further solidify the economic ties between the two countries.

Geo-political factors:

The second factor that harbours both advantages and disadvantages that help formulate the national interests and foreign policy of Germany vis a vis Turkish integration into the EU involves a totally different perspective. Schimmelfenning (2001), in his work on liberal intergovernmentalism, argues that liberal intergovernmentalism's emphasis on economic conditions goes a long way in giving a plausible account of states' behaviour, but in some important cases geo-political

interests seem to have been decisive on states' foreign policy attitudes (Schimmelfenning, 2001: 202). This is especially true regarding German national interests in relation to the Turkish EU membership.

Regarding the fact that geo-political factors will be used interchangeably with factors of security and stability in this thesis, Turkey was important for Germany based on reasons of security for two main factors:

1. During the Cold War and the Bosnia and Kosovo crises it could be seen that traditional distinctions between European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian regions on security matters were eroded. This growing inter-relationship between events in Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia involves the stability of Europe being linked to the situation in the Middle Eastern and Eurasian regions. In this context, it would be rather difficult for Europe and specifically for Germany to maintain a stable economic and political system if instability reigns in its adjacent areas. Turkey's role becomes crucial in the promotion of stability due to the fact that it is one of the few countries in its region with long-term ties to the West and a relatively stable political system in comparison with other countries in the region. If Turkey were excluded from the European system of security, this would have detrimental effects, both on the stability of Turkey and on that of its region as well, mainly because of the pivotal role Turkey plays there. Such instability therefore has the potential to affect Europe as well because of the increasing erosion of borders between Europe, the Middle East and the Eurasian regions. This attempt to prevent the spill-over of instability in the region Turkey is located in into Europe and Germany can be linked with the efforts of Germany to prevent both 'new security threats' and 'military security threats' to its own stability and integrity. In the previous section when dealing with the Visegrad countries' importance for Germany based on geo-political factors, the concept of new security

threats were already introduced. Carrying a political, social, environmental and economical nature and mainly consisting of issues such as ethnic factionalism, migratory pressures, environmental threats, macroeconomic destabilisation, terrorist attacks against state structure and transnational crime in the form of money laundering and narcotics trade, this type of security not only relates to the preservation of state boundaries and state territory but also to the protection of societies and individuals within states. Accordingly, security is the “ability of states and societies to maintain their *independent identity, functional integrity and stability*” (Buzan, 1998: 25). In this sense regarding the fact that the troubled region Turkey is located in carries all these types of security risks, it would not be wrong to argue that Europe was also prone to instability spilling-over from this problematic region. When states in this region such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Iran failed, their neighbours and often the global community would be faced with refugee flows, ethnic or civil conflict, and political disintegration. Kirchner (2002) argues that traditional military security threats comprise biological, chemical and nuclear warfare and conflicts with conventional weapons. These were still present especially in the Middle East region, e.g. conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and threat of chemical and nuclear war by Iraq.

In addition to the promotion of stability, Turkey also has crucial roles to play in the linkage of the trade, transport and energy routes of the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Transcaucasia to Europe (Eralp, 2000: 5). Turkey’s pivotal role in this region and its stability which could be guaranteed by EU membership, was also important for Germany as a trade nation it needed the stability of this region for the energy supplies it contained.

The cordial relationship between the Clinton administration and the Schröder government and the apparent support given to Turkey by the Americans based on geo-

political concerns helped to reinforce the ‘geo-political’ considerations of the Schröder government.

In sharp contrast to the perception that these geo-political factors served as advantages for Turkey’s EU membership bid, there were some who regarded the same factor as a disadvantage. This mainly derived from the characteristics of the conflict-laden region that Turkey is situated in and in particular its ‘problematic’ and undemocratic neighbours. Turkey’s EU membership had the potential to bring all the problems of the region it is located in into the very EU itself.

2. Regarding the prevention of ‘new security threats’ to Germany’s stability, Turkey’s EU membership carried another type of significance. Turkey is also a potential member state with serious socio-economic challenges, e.g. a heterogeneous character, potential instability due to existing unrest among the Kurdish population and Islamists, the high rate of population growth and uncontrolled and seemingly never-ending urbanisation. Especially the problems of the Kurdish population and Islamists have a direct negative impact on the domestic politics of Germany because of the large Turkish community present there, and the intensive relations these communities have with their motherland. In terms of possible membership, Germans fear the exacerbation of these problems on the domestic political stage and that this might lead to instability in German internal politics. Thus this is related to the concept of new security threats that may negatively influence Germany’s stability and welfare of its society; not because of proximity to Turkey like the case of the Visegrad countries but because of the linkage with Turkey’s domestic politics.

Nevertheless, with the change of the government from the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) to a Social Democratic (SPD)/Green coalition, this factor started to be an advantage that worked in favour of

support for Turkey's EU membership bid. Unlike Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder's Social Democratic background tended not to emphasise the 'cultural' problems related to Turkish EU membership but rather *political* problems, especially the situation regarding human rights. Schröder's government used this as a tool that could lead to the creation of an image of Turkey's potential EU membership as being of *benefit* for German domestic politics. The details for this argument are given below.

As already stated, the political problems occurring in Turkey had direct repercussions in Germany because of the huge community of Turkish workers in Germany and their close relationship with Turkey. For that reason, the improvement of the situation in Turkish domestic politics and solutions to political problems were also of crucial importance to the German policy makers. Especially in the time period following the Luxembourg European Council Summit of December 1997 no 'satisfactory' democratic reforms were embarked upon in Turkey. Turkey had reacted very strongly against its obvious exclusion at the Luxembourg Summit. All the Turkish reforms that both Germany and the other EU member states had expected Turkey to conduct were postponed, because Turkey had stopped paying attention to the demands of European institutions, and in particular the European Parliament which concentrates on the human rights situation in Turkey. The German policy makers started to develop the idea that the reluctance of Turkey to listen to the demands of the European Union for further democratisation efforts and economic reforms would lead to the exacerbation of problems in Turkey with direct negative consequences on the German domestic politics. As a consequence of their interpretation of the Turkish government's reactions towards the decisions made at the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 when Turkey was excluded from the EU enlargement process,

German policy makers had realised that the best way to motivate Turkey to carry out the necessary political reforms was a signal of possible EU membership.

This point was picked up by the SPD-Green coalition and the Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Two days after being appointed as the Chancellor, Schröder made a speech on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in which he stated that he was going to push for developing bilateral relations with Turkey and try to bring Turkey closer to the EU because of the need ‘to stabilise Turkish domestic politics’ (*Hürriyet*, October 29, 1998). To show their sincerity, the SPD-Green coalition was determined from the very beginning to issue a Dual-Citizenship Law and thus enable foreigners living in Germany to gain full citizenship rights. These moves encouraged the Turkish side to the extent that the then Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit sent a letter to Chancellor Schröder in May 1999 accepting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, promising to pay particular attention to the issues of human rights and the Kurdish problem. Therefore the presumption of the German government that a signal of EU membership would motivate Turkey to carry out the necessary reforms had proved to be correct. Through encouragement of reform, the German government hoped to ease the potential political problems in its own domestic politics, deriving from the spill-over from Turkish domestic politics which would also ease the integration process of the Turkish community in Germany into German society.²³

Cultural factors:

German politicians depend on their citizens' support, as do politicians in most democracies, and are therefore more inclined to take decisions that are favourable to the majority of the population. This leads to a disadvantage for supporters of Turkish

²³ Dietrich Von Kyaw, the former German representative to the European Union, also stated at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 that the European Union's formal recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership was on the basis of the groundwork laid by Mr. Schröder (von Kyaw, 1999: 33)

membership since negative public opinion and prejudice about Turkish culture and way of life has persisted since the first Turkish workers came to Germany. This situation has been to a certain degree the result of the Turkish workers' perceived incompatibility with German social and cultural life. Barbara John, the Berlin Senate's commissioner for foreign immigrants, attracts attention to the fact that even the youngest generation of Turks are often not very much integrated with the German society due to poor standards of education and training. A third of them have left school in 1998 without formal qualifications (*der Spiegel*, June 1999). In addition to this, Heinz Kramer (2003) stresses the fact that these prejudices are also a result of *historical* differences between the two societies. Turkey has never experienced the same breakthrough as experienced by Europeans as a result of the historical processes of Enlightenment, Renaissance and Reform and thus their level of political development was always perceived in a negative fashion by the Europeans and unfit for the European integration process.

The prejudices that stem from history, the interaction of the German society with the Turkish community living in Germany and the opinions derived from their face-to-face interaction with the Turks in their own society are also reinforced by the media and the former government and the attitude of the current opposition party, the CDU/CSU. Reports in the German media on fundamentalist tendencies and on conflicts in Islamic countries, very often written without contextualisation or provision of necessary background information, leads to a strengthening of already existing prejudices about the cultural and religious differences with the Turkish community. The policy of the former government, led by the CDU/CSU has also followed exclusive rather than inclusive targets aimed at reduction, expatriation and deportation rather than at naturalisation of ethnic minorities and have likewise served to weaken

and halt the immigration process. They have managed to attract the support of many citizens who have already formulated negative opinion about Turks living in ghettos and isolated from the host society (Şen, 1998).

On the other hand, the change of government from the Christian Democrats under Helmut Kohl to one led by the Social Democrats under Gerhard Schröder which led to a significant step towards the softening of the relations between Turkey-Germany-EU was also important in the way that in contrast to the position of the CDU/CSU it could use cultural factors in a way as to prove of benefit to Turkey's EU membership bid. The SPD-Green government emphasised the evolution of the EU enlargement project not described in cultural terms but rather as the spill-over of EU *values* such as democracy, the state of law, protection of human rights and protection of minorities to the candidate countries. They claimed that these values are universal and cannot be limited to specific cultures; not explicitly to Christian culture.

Cost-benefit analysis:

In this section, the factors in the domestic politics of Germany which lead to the formulation of German national interests in regards to Turkey's EU membership were dealt with. It was seen that from economic and cultural perspectives, Turkey's EU membership bid seem to have more disadvantages than advantages. Turkey's large and poor economy, threat of migration in the case of freedom of movement of workers, its big agricultural sector are seen as threats for Germany which is undergoing economic recession itself and certainly not willing to pay for the burden the Turkish economy might impose. From the cultural perspective, incompatibility of the Turkish community in Germany with the German society and the fact that Turks have always been seen as the 'other' against the Europeans throughout history seem to work against Turkey's potential EU membership. On the contrary to these negative factors, from a

geo-political point of view Turkey's EU membership may bring Germany and the EU benefits rather than costs. This may happen in two ways: 1. Securing the stability of Turkey would help securing the strategic location it is placed and thus avoid insecurity spilling over to the European continent; which may be very likely as security threats now have a transboundary nature in the globalised world. 2. As perspective of EU membership may motivate Turkey to embark upon political reforms that may solve the problems in its domestic politics, German domestic politics would be directly influenced and its stability would be guaranteed because of the fact that Turkish domestic political problems are directly transported to German domestic politics.

Summary:

The formulation of national interests of Germany for the both categories of EU membership candidates were made with the cost-benefit analysis adopted from Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist framework where the costs and benefits (can also be referred as advantages and disadvantages) of decisions concerning the two countries' accession for German domestic politics were weighed. In this process Moravcsik's cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool to determine which factors are important in the domestic politics of Germany which lead to its making of foreign policy.

At this point it is important to specify *how* these national interests are articulated and *by whom*. Moravcsik's model is a simple principal-agent model of domestic policy making. It divides domestic political actors into two categories: the executive (single agent) and societal groups (multiple principals). By executive he means the head of state or government (the chief executive), or the highest responsible political authority in a particular issue area that shares responsibility with ministries. The precise identity of the relevant societal groups varies across issues and

circumstances, encompassing interest groups, parties, parliamentarians, civil servants, individual citizens, other cabinet ministers or any other domestic constituency whose support may be critical for the promulgation and implementation of policy (Moravcsik, 1998: 490-495). In the formulation of national interests from the different factors in the domestic politics, Moravcsik (1998) believes in the interaction between these utility maximising domestic actors. This interaction then results in the formulation (articulation) of national interests. Each type of societal actor has different ways of expressing their interests. Political parties publish position papers, party manifestos to influence the executives. Interest groups, especially those that are most likely to be gaining most from potential co-operation²⁴, exert direct, instrumental pressure on politicians or may wield structural power, as when a desire to encourage business investment and growth requires the satisfaction of broad business demands (Moravcsik, 1998: 36). Domestic voters express their interests by answering questions in public opinion surveys conducted upon them or by simply voting for a certain party defending certain policies.

In Germany, it tends to be the case that the formulation of national interests in domestic politics is very interactive. In contrast to the strong state that can be seen in France and to a lesser extent in Britain, the German executives are more responsive to public pressure. The orientation of both civil servants and politicians in Germany is more favourable to seeking consensus and in seeking this consensus German policy makers are willing to engage in genuine dialogue with concerned citizens and groups. This communication means greater influence for organised interest groups and citizens' initiative groups (Wilson, 1999: 263). In this connection, in Germany strong interest groups have emerged that seek to exert influence on the government. Those

²⁴ These usually represent commercial interests of domestic producer groups. Peak organisations that are influential are the ones that represent three broad economic sectors: industry, agriculture, and services (Moravcsik, 1998: 36).

grouped together on the basis of their members' occupations have become important means of linking individuals into the processes that influence decisions by both influencing the recruitment of parliamentary candidates and getting access to ministerial bureaucracy. Major interest organisations are consulted in the drafting of laws affecting them as a matter of administrative procedure. Especially in a country in which stability is closely connected with economic prosperity, it is not surprising that business and industrial groups have considerable influence on decision-makers (Conradt, 2001: 132). The export orientation of Germany had already created a new and thoroughly commercialised group of economic elites, with very globalised and Europeanised sets of economic interests, who live off the country's sustained dependence on the willingness of other countries to buy its goods. In relation to this research and Moravcsik's LIG model, these elites would automatically favour eastern enlargement, which is then reflected in executives' incentives in policy making. There are those in the labour unions and the agricultural sector who would try to prevent or at least postpone enlargement, but the fact that the majority of the German people work in the business and industry sectors would lead policy-making towards positive support especially for eastern enlargement (Conradt, 2001: 133).

The importance of political parties at the decision making/national interest formulation stage are again explained by Sontheimer (1972) as:

“All political decisions in the Federal Republic are made by parties and their representatives. There are no political decisions of importance in the German democracy which have not been brought to the parties, prepared by them and finally taken by them” (Sontheimer, 1972: 95).

Related to the parties' significance for influencing the executives' bargaining in the European arena, especially after the Maastricht Treaty with the changes of the articles 23 and 45 of the Basic Law, a Committee for EU affairs was created in the

Bundestag (German Parliament). The primary aim for this was to enhance the *Bundestag*'s effectiveness in participating in the EU policy process.

The political party system in Germany also enables individual citizens to participate by offering them options at election time and opportunities for continuing participation in the parties' activities between elections. In such a way, the political activities of the political parties have developed into strong links between the public and the political process. This fact makes the opinions of the public important for the decisions of political parties (Wilson, 1999: 225). In relation to these arguments Frank Wilson (1999) makes the claim that:

“German people *are* interested in politics and seek appropriate means to express their views” (Wilson, 1999: 244).

This is why the link between the hypotheses and the theoretical framework in this research becomes relevant. In Germany just like the assumptions in Moravcsik's theoretical framework, the articulation of national interests is quite effective, a process where political parties, interests groups and citizens participate and influence the executives through party position papers and specific demands on the government.

Which factors are more influential in this national interest formulation process specifically regarding the enlargement of the EU? It is a fact that the German government *supported* the granting of the candidate status to Turkey in December 1999 at the Helsinki European Council Summit. The support was strong despite the economic, geo-political costs and cultural problems associated with Turkey's EU membership bid. Whether it was the realisation by Germany of Turkey's still existing geo-political importance, the implications of the Turkish reaction to the decisions of the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 for German domestic politics or the significance of the economic ties between the two countries which led to the German support for the Turkish candidacy-with prospect for-membership at the Helsinki

Summit will be analysed in the following chapters. There will also be comparisons made with the Visegrad countries which will help to ascertain the most significant factor in formulating Germany's national interests. However, unlike the support that Germany has given to the Visegrad countries, which supports a gradual but systematic process of eastern enlargement and involves a huge amount of bilateral and multilateral financial aid ²⁵, German support for Turkish membership seems to have more of a 'convenient' reference for the future. This discrepancy may derive from the fact that the benefits of the Visegrad countries' membership of the EU for German domestic politics are so huge that it is essential that they are included in the EU's enlargement process while on the other hand the costs related with Turkey's EU bid are too big to facilitate the *fast track* inclusion of Turkey in the EU.

In the section below, the German foreign policy formulated as a result of the German national interests will be analysed with regards to the German position in the European Union.

2. Interstate bargaining (The German position on EU enlargement policy)

Decision-making at European level is the result of interaction among various parties, in particular the 'institutional triangle' formed by the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. Still, arguably, the *Council* may be regarded as the most powerful of the EU institutions. ²⁶ The fact that the Council is composed of ministers of national governments makes national executives quite significant in the decision-making process. However, as already

²⁵ The Visegrad countries have benefited extensively from the funds provided by the EU. With regards to donors among the EU member states, Germany is by far the largest, for example supplying 14.6 billion of the 32.6 billion euros given by the EU in 1996. In terms of bilateral aid, out of the total of bilateral aid given by Germany to various countries, 78% went to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. In addition, when, after the end of the Cold War, some of the Eastern European countries applied to the Paris Club to defer their debts the greatest support came from Germany. For example, besides deferring Poland's debt of 5 billion DM, it gave Poland 4.5 billion DM in aid (Öymen, 2000: 210-213).

²⁶ For example, although it must work closely with the other institutions, the Council has the final say on what will and what will not become EU law (McCormick, 1999: 119).

argued in the prior section the decentralised German policy-making process is very much influenced by domestic socio-economic interests. The fact that, in Germany, foreign policy can be scrutinised very carefully and that elected officials are subject to public scrutiny and criticism at home about their movements abroad, necessitates attention to the consent of the majority of citizens.²⁷ Stephen Wood (1998) argues that especially in post-unification period, whoever wishes a share of political power in Germany must respond favourably to internal forces, actuated or supported in some critical instances also by intellectual and media opinion (Wood, 1998: 126).

Thus the German executives should aggregate the interests already articulated at the domestic level by political parties, interest groups and voters if they want to remain in power and receive the support of the coalition of these societal actors.

The national interests aggregated by the executives make up the foreign policy of Germany. Deriving from the post-war German tradition that emphasises foreign-policy making or exercising power only in multilateral, institutionally mediated systems, the implementation of German national interests (in the form of foreign policy) can best be observed in the EU arena through the negotiation and bargaining by the executives with the other member states of the European Union.

It is important to realise the continuity of Germany's multilateral approach to 'fulfilling its national interests', through the European Union specifically, rather than through bilateral relations. This is especially significant in a period when there is a great deal of talk about the 'normalisation of German politics' and the fact that

²⁷ For example, the fact that a considerable part of the electoral base of the CDU/CSU is in the agricultural sector has prevented them from including agricultural policy among the projected reforms for enlargement. Henning Tewes supports this argument by saying that "The interest groups in Germany limited the appreciation of the German civil power abroad, because they were scrutinising the manoeuvres of Helmut Kohl, who, though a Chancellor with a European vision, was also a party leader exhibiting considerable short-termism" (Tewes, 2002: 211).

Germany's foreign policy has now been more carefully constructed in accord with its national interests.

One of the leading advocates of the multilateral approach of German foreign policy, Anderson, in his edited book with Goodman (1993), accepts the growing influence of German national interests by stating that:

“In any study of policy choice in a democracy, the search for the sources of change *and* continuity should begin with domestic interest politics” (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 31).

Though Anderson and Goodman are aware of the fact that the combination of changes both on the international scene and inside Germany (deriving from unification), have led to a re-definition of German national interests within the framework of normality, he stresses the continuity in German foreign policy in relation to its multilateral approach in foreign policy making which necessitates bargaining with other member states of the European Union to get its national interests fulfilled (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 32-33).

There are several factors which have led to the continuation of Germany's multilateral approach rather than simply following a bilateral one. The first is economic: large amounts of technical and financial assistance would be needed to effect reasonably smooth transitions to a market economy, to make the Visegrad countries more export-capable so as to increase their earnings of hard currency and to secure minimum levels of prosperity, which in turn would dampen anti-democratic unrest, regional conflicts, and westward mass migration (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 390). The prevailing opinion in the German finance and economics ministries was that the financial limits of bilateral diplomacy had been reached. They predicted a concerted effort on the part of the Bonn government to arrange multilateral aid packages through the EU and the G-7 mechanism, since domestic budgetary

constraints experienced by re-unification had already begun to pinch by the middle of 1991 and had reached the emergency level with the *worsening* effects of the unification (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 390).²⁸

The second factor involves the risk of losing the trust of its Western partners, something gained over time by the enormous effort of Germany after World War II. As already explained, Reich and Markovits (1997) suggest that one of the most effective instruments of German influence in Eastern Europe is derived from the dominant investment position of German firms in Visegrad countries. This influence comes mainly from its structural power as a successful economic force and can be seen in the development manifested in the effort of Visegrad countries to adopt and apply the lessons of *Modell Deutschland* in the transition to democracy and market economy.²⁹ Edinger (1998) relates this reality with the continuation of Germany's multilateral policy. The fact that the other Western European partners are aware of the advantageous position that Germany enjoys in these countries, and think that this might lead to the spread of German power on the European continent, made it important for Germany to show to its Western partners that multilateralism in German foreign policy making was continuing. This would help ensure that it would not lose

²⁸ This argument is also supported by Henning Tewes (2002). He highlights the aspect of multilateralisation of national interests by suggesting that "The stabilisation of the emerging market democracies in East Central Europe was a task too large to be achieved by Germany alone, especially after unification" (Tewes, 2002: 81).

²⁹ Reich and Markovits argue that, "By the time the Cold War was over, it was hardly chance that the German model had become the most cherished option for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Economically, East Europeans wanted to emulate the West German *Wirtschaftswunder* as the best agent of transition to democratic order. In addition, in Eastern Europe, where German culture and language provided a common bond among the political class and cultural elite at least until 1945, the re-emergence of German culture and language in post-1989 East Central Europe would not be very surprising. In every Eastern European country, be it Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, German is still the predominant language" (Reich and Markovits, 1997: 16). "Thus, Germany's economy clearly dominated Eastern Europe as well. Germany makes the rules and is overwhelmingly beneficiary of all forms of economic engagement. In the East, this is evident in the policies of *Osthandel* and *Ostpolitik* that have laid the foundation for dynamic growth in trade and investment" (Reich and Markovits, 1997: 181).

the trust of the countries with which it had sought for so long to improve relations (Edinger, 1998: 245).

For that reason, Germany had to try and convince the other members of the EU of the inevitability of eastern enlargement, and of their own interests in supporting this. German politicians have been particularly careful not to give the image to the outside world that for post-Cold War Eastern Europe, Berlin is taking the place of Moscow as the centre of power in the region. Far from seeking German hegemony, political and economic elites have proceeded with utmost caution and in accordance with well-established multilateral principles, and stressed the inability of Germans to safeguard stability in Eastern Europe on their own (Edinger, 1998: 247).³⁰

Who are these 'executives' who bargain for fulfilment of their national interests in the form of foreign policies within the European Union? In Germany, the executives who bargain in the European arena are specified by the Article 65 of the Basic Law which stresses ministerial autonomy. The Chancellor has the competence to set the guidelines of policy but individual ministries conduct policy in their own spheres with relative autonomy. Till mid-1980s the traditional Euro-ministries were the Foreign Office, Economics and Agriculture. They have been joined by a number of others with intensive European policy interests and responsibilities since the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Finance (in regard to European Monetary Union (EMU) and in close relationship with the *Bundesbank* (German Central Bank), Interior and Justice (both with extensive concerns in the EU third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs Co-operation) and Environment. The role of

³⁰ Henning Tewes also agrees with this argument, and states that Germany, having decided that the enlargement process would definitely be a multilateral project, was prepared to use all the classical tools of diplomacy, such as pressure and persuasion, and to show the benefits and opportunities of enlargement to its Western partners (Tewes, 2002: 137).

the Cabinet is limited, confined to preparations of European Council meetings or resolving inter-ministerial disputes over the substance of European policy.

3. Institutional choice:

Moravcsik defines institutional choice as ‘pooling and delegating sovereignty’. Sovereignty is *pooled* when governments agree to decide future matters by voting procedures other than unanimity. Sovereignty is *delegated* when supranational actors are permitted to take certain autonomous decisions, without an intervening interstate or unilateral veto. Why would sovereign governments in an anarchic international system choose to delegate or pool decision making power rather than make decisions themselves? There are different strands of attempts explaining the concept of institutional choice. These stress respectively the belief in federalist ideology, the need for centralised technocratic co-ordination and planning, or the desire for more credible commitments. According to the ‘belief in federalist ideology’ the willingness of governments to pool or delegate control over policy stems from prevailing ideological beliefs about national sovereignty. Some national publics, elites and parties are more federalist; others are more nationalist. National positions concerning institutional form reflect these beliefs rather than the substantive consequences of transferring sovereignty. The second explanation for patterns in the delegation and pooling of sovereignty focuses on the need for centralised experts to manage complex, modern, transnational economies. In this view, modern economic planning is a highly complex activity requiring considerable technical and legal information. Such information is most efficiently provided by a single centralised authority. This explanation assumes that collective-action problem facing governments is one of co-ordinating the production of information. Centralised authorities are best placed to exploit informational economies of scale and overcome coordination problems or national

mistrust, thereby generating and disseminating sufficient information required for more efficient decision making. Around expert proposals-known as technocratic ‘focal points’-governments co-ordinate their activities (Moravcsik, 1998: 70-72).

It is actually the third explanation that is Moravcsik’s favourite. Moravcsik explains the decision of the governments to pool and/or delegate sovereignty to international institutions with three arguments: 1. Efforts by governments to constrain and control one another; in other words to enhance the credibility of commitments. Governments transfer sovereignty to international institutions where potential joint gains are large but efforts to secure compliance by foreign governments through decentralised or domestic means are likely to be ineffective (Moravcsik, 1998: 9). According to this view, pooling and delegation are ‘two-level’ strategies designed to precommit governments to a stream of future decisions removing them from the unilateral control of individual governments. Governments are likely to accept pooling or delegation as a means to assure that other governments will accept agreed legislation and enforcement and to signal their own credibility. If governments seek credible commitments, why do they pool and delegate sovereignty instead of promulgating precise rules in advance? The answer lies in *uncertainty* about the future. Pooling and delegation can be viewed as solutions to the problem of ‘incomplete contracting’ which arises when member governments share broad goals but find it too costly or technically impossible to specify all future contingencies involved in legislating or enforcing those goals. 2. Reinforcing the prior argument is that in today’s globalised world it is better for a ‘rational’ state to co-operate rather than try to implement certain policies unilaterally. 3. Employing ‘domestically unpopular policies’ as institutional choices national politicians reduce the political costs of these policies; especially in countries where the EU is a popular organisation it may easily

be employed as a ‘scapegoat’ by national politicians. Thus international institutions may lock in future decisions against domestic opposition (Moravcsik, 1998: 73-74).³¹

When applied to this research, it can be argued that since that decision concerning enlargement will be taken by a unanimity decision, and that the European Council, an intergovernmental institution, will have the last word in related matters, sovereignty is neither delegated nor pooled. But the fact that benefits deriving from improvement of the Visegrad countries’ economic conditions and their political stability are achieved by incorporating them in the European Union by a collective decision and there is need for co-operation among member states rather than a bilateral co-operation between the Visegrad countries and Germany makes this decision an ‘institutional choice’. In addition, though it is the member states of the EU which decide about the negotiation mandate of the European Commission for the enlargement process and which finally endorse the result of negotiations by means of national ratification or treaty of accession, it is the European Commission, a supranational institution in the EU, that negotiates for the EU with the candidates for the enlargement. Lastly, as already stated institutional choice is defined by Moravcsik as a:

“...strategy employed by governments who lock in future decisions against domestic opposition” (Moravcsik, 1998).

Regarding the fact that there are public concerns concerning eastern enlargement and Turkey’s potential EU membership in particular, it makes it easier for the German government to support its favourable position in intergovernmental bargainings of the EU by saying that the decision is an ‘institutional choice’.

Summary:

³¹ Especially in monetary policy, the centralisation of institutional control over monetary policy in an international institution may increase the credibility of domestic reform (Moravcsik, 1998: 73-74).

The rationalist assumption of Moravcsik concentrates on the egoistic calculations of member states in terms of the national welfare and security benefits, or national attitudes to integration, rather than on the formulation of a 'collective identity'. In line with this argument, certain factors were identified in this chapter which lead to the calculation and formulation of national interests at the domestic level and that were consequently aggregated by the executives to construct the foreign policy attitude of Germany. This foreign policy attitude, finding particular expression within the context of the enlargement of the European Union, lends supports to *both* the Visegrad countries and Turkey's inclusion in the EU. The relatively powerful German executives have been successful in convincing their western partners during the negotiations in the EU of the need to include the Visegrad countries in the EU and grant Turkey candidate status; thus turning their foreign policy objectives into the institutional choice of the EU. These assumptions are derived from the stages of Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist theory (LIG) that concentrate on the importance of national interests, their representation in the form of foreign policy in interstate bargains and negotiations in the European Union and formulating the institutional choice of the EU.

Below, the methods used to link the theoretical framework of Moravcsik and the research in question will be explained.

Methods:

According to Moravcsik (1998) the success of an empirical analysis comes from the fact that reliable evidence consistently confirms his three stages in the decision-making process: the pre-eminence of national interests, relative bargaining power and credible commitments in institutional choice. There are usually three types of resources used in this type of research: secondary sources, usually literature

reviews, offering divergent and often speculative conclusions on theoretically critical points of interpretation such as the underlying motivations of groups and leaders, strategic intent behind various moves and the power of some actors over others. 'Soft' primary sources are contemporary newspaper and magazine reports, and public statements given by government spokesmen and national leaders justifying their actions in memoirs or interviews. Finally, 'hard' primary sources are internal documents, interviews, memoirs and close examinations of policy. The last is the most credible source for the careful understanding of national interests. Neither text books nor traditional diplomatic histories investigate the range of information available to different governments, the considerations in the minds of national leaders who agreed to delegate authority to supranational institutions and the nature of societal support for specific policies. In this regard, an accurate assessment of the nature and intensity of state preferences should rest on 'hard' primary sources (Moravcsik, 1993: 500-516).

This being the case, the surest method to investigate the link between Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism and the hypotheses and to analyse the parameters of German foreign policy in the period between 1990-1999 was to conduct in-depth interviews with executives and members of parliament in Germany. Such interviews were conducted in Berlin between February-June 2000. Two categories of people were interviewed. As representatives of the executive, interviews were conducted with officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor's office. These interviews were complemented with those conducted with members of the Committees of European Union Affairs and Foreign Affairs in the German Parliament, civil servants and some members of the European Parliament. The statements of the members of the Parliament and civil servants were especially important for their role in

national interest articulation at the domestic level and transmitting it to the executives through party position papers and manifestos.

Plan of the remaining chapters:

Following this introduction to and overview of the thesis as a whole, the second chapter will introduce the main theories of European integration and try to explain why Moravcsik's approach may be the most suitable one to explain the hypotheses formulated and analyse this research. There will also be a section where a detailed analysis will be made of the national interests of Germany as formulated especially after the Cold War when enlargement became significant for the EU.

The third chapter will give the historical background of the relationships of the two categories of candidate, the Visegrad countries and Turkey, with the EU. This chapter will be of great importance in the sense that by showing the different paths followed by Germany and the EU towards the two categories of candidate, it will make it clearer how and in what ways was Turkey left behind in the queue for membership of the EU.

The fourth chapter will deal fundamentally with the first hypothesis that, in accordance with the main assumptions of Moravcsik, economic factors in the domestic politics of Germany serve as the main elements for construction of national interests and the foreign policy in the EU towards the Visegrad countries and Turkey.

The fifth chapter will deal with the remaining two hypotheses, one that sees the geo-political factors as the main elements in the construction of national interests of Germany and of its foreign policy and the other that stresses the significance of cultural factors in this process.

The sixth chapter will be an evaluating chapter where there will be discussions upon the saliency of Moravcsik's theoretical framework with the research in question.

There will also be an assessment of which hypothesis comes closer to explaining the reasons behind the postponement of Turkish EU membership during the Cold War era and in particular in the immediate period after the end of the Cold War and the growing support towards Turkey's EU membership bid with the Schröder government.

This chapter will be followed by the concluding chapter which will specify the conclusion of the hypotheses, describe current relations between Turkey and the EU after the Helsinki European Council Summit of December 1999, emphasise the continuities in the attitude of Germany and the EU towards Turkey following the Helsinki Summit, and indicate the outlook for possible future research derived from these findings. It will call attention to the fact that German national interests affected by the domestic economic conditions after the Cold War *were* influential in the formulation of a reluctant attitude towards Turkey as Turkish membership was seen to be further detrimental to its economy. The softening attitude of the Schröder government, which could best be seen in their support for Turkish *candidacy* in the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, is also mentioned as a proof of the importance of *geo-political* factors in German domestic politics with great emphasis on significance of new security threats and Turkey's strategic location. The events that took place in German-EU-Turkish relations after the Helsinki Summit till the present date confirm this view.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction:

This chapter aims to form the linkage between a specific theory used for explaining the European integration process, liberal intergovernmentalism (LIG) advanced by Andrew Moravcsik and the hypotheses introduced in the first chapter. It will first present a brief history of the European integration process. This will be followed by an introduction to Andrew Moravcsik's theory of liberal intergovernmentalism and his main assumptions and explanations about the process of European integration. During this introduction, comparisons and contrasts will be made with the other theories of integration, for the purpose of bringing attention to the fact that Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism theory should be regarded as the most appropriate in order to offer a satisfactory explanation of the reasons behind the European integration process. In the section that follows on from this, the research design will be presented, in which the attempt will be made to demonstrate that the liberal intergovernmentalist approach is indeed capable of explaining a specific policy of European integration, namely the EU enlargement process. This section will be linked with the spelling out the three hypotheses that aim to explore the underlying reasons for the *German attitude* towards both categories of candidate for EU membership. In the last section, the liberal intergovernmentalist approach will be applied to show that its main assumptions are relevant especially with view to the first hypothesis in this research. Examples of assumption that are of relevance to the hypothesis will be explored including the significance of national interests in formulation of German foreign policy, in other words, how German national interests became influenced by mainly the domestic *economic* changes after the Cold War and

after unification and how these changes in national interests and in foreign policy were reflected on its attitude towards the EU enlargement process.

The Process of European Integration:

As indicated in the first chapter, the direction of this research is in line with the dominant discourse that 'identifies Europe in instrumental and practical terms and presents it as essential to further the member states' interests' (Larsen, 1997: 221). Accordingly, this research will endeavour to illustrate how the European integration process is linked with 'state-centred', 'self-interested' and 'individualist' policies. The above-mentioned concepts are central to and will be analysed within the theoretical framework of liberal intergovernmentalism and its emphasis on the economic incentives underlying the formation of national interests.

The differences among contrasting theories of European integration emerge most noticeably around the conceptualisation of the state and its centrality to an understanding of international relations. This in turn, has led to contrasting interpretations of foreign policy making (Whitman, 1997: 64). In the literature on the European integration process, this is captured in the debate about 'supranational' and 'intergovernmental' decision-making. Intergovernmentalism stresses the continued importance of national sovereignty and the centrality of nation states and their governments in the decision-making of international institutions. Supranationalism is primarily defined as a process of integration from an intergovernmental to a more centralising process where states surrender formal exercise of their powers to a centralised body with full autonomy. The most well-known theory in connected with the supranationalist approach is so-called neo-functionalism. Mainly advanced by Ernst Haas in his book *The Uniting of Europe* first published in 1958, neo-functionalists advocated that the ultimate aim of the European integration process

would be to realise a *post-national* political community. Economic integration generates an increased level of transactions between actors within the integrating region and the high authority (supranational institution of the integration process) becomes the key sponsor of further integration thus limiting the authority of the individual nation states. Perhaps the most important concept in the neo-functionalist approach is the idea of ‘spill-over’, which was used to identify the mechanisms supposedly driving processes of regional integration. In Haas’ original formulation of this concept (Haas, 1958: 283-317), spill-over referred to the way in which the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that sector and ensure greater authoritative capacity at the European level (Rosamond, 2000: 60).

Andrew Moravcsik is an advocate of the intergovernmentalist school. Like the intergovernmentalists he too stresses the importance of states, in particular, national governments in the European integration process. He differs from intergovernmentalists in the way he attaches importance to the domestic processes within states and significance of economic interests and their influence on domestic politics. He sees the European Union as a:

“...pragmatic institution that best manages economic interdependence and serves the complex, increasingly interwoven interests of citizens (which can also be described as the national interests), in interdependent, advanced industrial democracies”. (Moravcsik, 2001: 117,121).

For Moravcsik, the initiative to take steps for further integration was mainly determined by the economic incentives resulting from this interdependence. By prioritising the link between national interests and economic incentives, and stressing their influence on states’ foreign policy, among various theories of European

integration Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism (LIG) ³² comes closest to helping to provide the link between the dependent and independent variables in the first hypothesis of this research that was constructed as 'Economic factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German 'national interests' (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests'.

It is helpful to take a brief look at the historical process of EU integration in order to understand better the strength of liberal intergovernmentalism as a theoretical device for explaining the European integration process and to contrast it with other European integration theories. The second purpose of this review is to illustrate the relevance of the liberal intergovernmentalist approach for this research. This is especially true for the first hypothesis that sees a direct link between national interests, domestic politics and foreign policy and the attitude of German policy makers in the enlargement process of the European Union and how in particular domestic economic interests play a vital role in the formulation of national interests.

The initial inspirations for European integration were seen as more idealised than pure economic incentives and based mainly on providing safety and security after the devastating consequences of World War II for the whole European continent. The first step towards this was to prevent the recurrence of the post-World War I situation where Germany had risen again to dominate the world and challenge the other European states. Under the leadership of two French statesmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1952

³² The theories of European integration that can be compared with Moravcsik's LIG are neo-realism, neo-institutionalism, historical institutionalism, intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance. None of them explored in great depth the link between national interests and foreign policy or the significance of economic factors in determining national interests.

through the signing of the Treaty of Paris. This treaty placed the Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common authority in order to reduce the risk of these states waging war against each other.

A new treaty, the Treaty of Rome (1957) established two institutional structures: the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and a European Economic Community (EEC). This treaty had a more economic motive. It was based on a common market, made up of a customs union and common economic policies, which was to be supervised by common institutions for the entire Community area.

Economic integration among the member states intensified step by step and the European Community increased in size with the addition of new members. By 1970 the six members of the EEC gave up national competence in trade negotiations, ceding this authority to the European Community (EC), as the organisation came to be called after 1967. In 1972 free trade was introduced among all EC and European Free Trade Area Countries (EFTA) countries. In 1977 all tariffs were removed among the nine members. In 1978 the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the French President Giscard d'Estaing, pushed through the European Monetary System (EMS) (Pond, 2000: 32). This move served as an example for Moravcsik to confirm the importance of national interests especially as determined by economic incentives, and the significance of intergovernmentalism in the process of European integration. Moravcsik argues that:

“Both Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing possessed adequate technical and political information, interacted through personal national representatives and small teams of national experts, negotiated in secret, formal EC channels and deliberately created the EMS through a 'resolution' of the *European Council* which is itself an intergovernmental institution in the EC. Though they tried to hide it, in private neither of them voiced much respect for EC officials or supranational ideology” (Moravcsik, 1999: 290).

The potential for German unification after the Cold War and the awareness on the part of member states of the necessity for further European integration to 'tame the more powerful Germany' led to the intensification of European integration in the beginning of the 1990s. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1991, came into force in 1993 and became a watershed for the European integration process. It could be regarded by many as courageous to give the EC the ambitious new name of the *European Union* in attempt to mark the intensive attempts for integration of the member states and the Union's intervention in the 'nationally sensitive' areas of currency, defence and foreign policy (Pond, 2000: 45). The policies that could not be resolved by the Maastricht Treaty were postponed and some were dealt with in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The last treaty to be signed was the Nice Treaty in 2000 that focused mainly on the implications of the current enlargement process for the functioning of the EU.

Moravcsik's work on European integration focuses on explaining this continuous history of the evolution of key policies that have been the essence of 40 years' intra-European co-operation. These key policies of the European integration process, specifically the main treaty creations, make up his third stage of decision making as already explained in the first chapter: *institutional choice* where individual member states delegate their sovereignties to supranational institutions of the EU or pool their sovereignties and thus decisions are taken on an institutional basis, legally binding upon the individual member states. His analysis of the steps in European integration, institutional choices, then focuses especially on three factors:

- intergovernmentalism (state-centred policy making as opposed to supranationalism). This constructs the second stage of decision making in Moravcsik's analysis where to reach the institutional choice, *executives of nation states* bargain and

negotiate with each other and to implement their own priorities in their foreign policies through an EU institutional arrangement.

-national interests and the importance of domestic politics (though national interests and intergovernmentalism are used together to analyse the structure of events in the European integration process). This is the first stage of decision making in Moravcsik's analysis. It is actually *the articulation of national interests at the domestic level and their aggregation by the executives*, which formulate the foreign policies of nation states and represented in the European arena.

-domestic *economic* incentives in the formulation of national interests and foreign policy.

Below the elements of liberal intergovernmentalism will be explained in greater detail, comparing it with other theories of European integration in order to show its relevance for the hypotheses of this research.

Theories of European integration:

Intergovernmentalism –2nd stage of Moravcsik

Moravcsik's emphasis on intergovernmentalism derives from the assumption that the main developments in the European integration process are outcomes of *interstate bargains* struck between the most powerful member states of the EU. He links two principles, lowest common denominator bargaining and strict limits on future transfers of sovereignty, with his intergovernmentalist approach. He describes intergovernmentalism both as a framework within which member governments will not willingly transfer their sovereignty to supranational institutions, and as one in which they gather to consider policy on the basis of unanimity, rather than on that of a majority vote. This leads to the principle of the lowest common denominator. The

view of a minority will be respected and the pace of integration can only proceed as fast as the most reluctant member state will permit (Moravcsik, 1991: 47).

With his emphasis on nation states as the most important actors in the European integration process, Moravcsik's arguments are similar to the central claims of neo-realism advocated mainly by Kenneth Waltz, Alan Milward and Joseph Grieco. Before exploring these linkages further, it will be useful to take a look at the main arguments of the neo-realists.

Kenneth Waltz was inspired by the main concepts of realism, but attempted to overcome its deficiency as a systematic theory of behaviour and outcomes in international affairs by systematising its main assumptions into a theory of rational behaviour in international affairs. He also modified it slightly by emphasising the importance of international economic issues. Waltz's main argument in *Theory of International Relations* (1979) was that the only significant actors in international affairs are actually the nation states themselves, discounting and discrediting all transnational organisations and linkages as arms of individual nation states. He views all forms of international co-operation as temporary, entirely dependent only on whether they serve the interests of the nation states involved. Although using a similar state-centric approach to that of liberal intergovernmentalism, Waltz was criticised for his divergence in explaining the European integration process. He had concentrated more on explaining the absence of strong autonomy of international institutions and stable forms in the *general* framework of international society. He thereby subsumed the formation of the EU into a wider structural context and concluded that international institutions are doomed to dissolve as soon as they lose their means of functioning (Waltz, 1979: 71).

In this sense, Alan Milward (1992) can be considered as an improvement in combining neo-realism's centrality of *nation states* with an explanation of dynamics of European integration. Departing from the main arguments of neo-functionalism as his main point of criticism, and citing the incident of de Gaulle's intervention in 1965³³ as disproving neo-functionalism, Milward argued that this theory "practically did away too soon with the nation state as the central unit of political organisation" (Milward, 1992: 4). Contrary to neo-functionalism, he sees European integration as something made in Europe and springing from the evolution of the European *nation state*. He argues that, as historians have also shown in regard to the evolution of the European Union, most of the power remains with the nation state and its bureaucracy, with only limited surrenders of national sovereignty being made to integrationist institutions and these only for narrowly defined purposes.

Neo-realism has undergone a great deal of criticism and modification. Much of that criticism stresses the simplicity of its assumptions about the primary role of nation states as *only* actors in international politics. Critics often argue that the world is a more complicated place than neo-realists assume, that definitions and foci of power are not as straightforward as neo-realists advocate, and that interests often transcend national boundaries and identities. Though he believed in the primacy of nation states in international politics, and their instrumental usage of institutions, Grieco was one of the first scholars to ascribe more importance to the role of institutions in international politics. By taking the structure of the Maastricht Treaty as an example to illustrate the importance of the EU, he reached the conclusion that the increasing powers of the EU reduce the importance of the rationalist assumptions of neo-realism in terms of states

³³ Alarmed by the Commission's wish for greater power, De Gaulle had taken the French officials out of the EU meetings to create a disfunctioning of the decision-making system and stop the increasing supranationalism of the European Community. These series of incidents are called the 'empty chair' crisis which led to a re-thinking of the progress of European integration.

using the institutions purely for instrumental means. These powers can be seen in the increasing supranational elements in the Community (Grieco, 1995: 35).

Such critiques led to a new approach, mainly termed intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalists also share common elements with liberal intergovernmentalism and can be seen as pioneers of the liberal intergovernmentalist approach. They have utilised the basic elements of neo-realism, such as the central role of nation states in the integration process, when trying to explain the European integration system, but have attempted to focus more on “how bargains between member states are made, and how those bargains produce new co-operative arrangements and institutions” (Hoffmann, 1966: 2). Their work is usually associated with Stanley Hoffman.

The intergovernmentalists were found to be more successful than neo-realists in interpreting models of the EU's policy-making process and in specifying the dynamics that allowed for the integrative outcomes. Hoffman for example produced a more detailed critique of the neo-functionalist approach. Taking into consideration the importance of national governments in European integration, Hoffmann argued that:

“Spill-over is a process that national governments tolerated only when it suited their interests and could bring to an abrupt halt when it did not” (Hoffman, 1966: 3).

In this way, he emphasised the importance of national interests, but, in contrast to standard assumptions of realism, his definition resembles that of Milward:

“State interests are made up of all the concepts within *domestic politics* such as ideas and ideals, precedents and past experiences” (Hoffmann, 1966:5).

His most significant divergence from Milward's assumption was that he does not see a smooth transformation of national politics into European integration as Milward does, but actually talks about the existence of a fundamental antagonism between European integration and the nation state.

The main tenets of LIG resemble those of neo-realists and Hoffmann, but Moravcsik presents a more *detailed* analysis of the decisions concerning European integration. He takes the treaties (examples for institutional choices) as his basis for showing the importance of intergovernmentalism and the weakness of supranationalism, and uses them to illustrate that supranational entrepreneurs had relatively little influence on interstate negotiations. He carefully analyses the factors important in reaching decisions in the Single European Act, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.

The Single European Act (SEA) is in fact seen by Moravcsik as the only major treaty-amending agreement in EU history where member governments have failed to advance and debate detailed proposals close to the final agreement. This led to an agenda like the White Paper and a goal like the Single Market emerging quickly with the strongest initiatives coming from the supranational institutions of the EU; the Parliament and the European Commission (Moravcsik, 1991: 512).

However, despite the fact that the supranational institutions had more initiative in the process of decision-making than before, the presence of the three elements of liberal intergovernmentalism, such as intergovernmentalism, the significance of national sovereignty and lowest common denominator, could lead one to the conclusion that *nation states* still had the central role in decision-making. In terms of *intergovernmentalism* it was significant that heads of government and their direct representatives made the decisions and that the Council, as a body of state representatives, enlarged the scope of its activities. This meant access to the EU for a growing number of national decision-makers who used their channels excessively (Hoffman and Keohane, 1991: 141). Thus the centrality of *national sovereignty* is preserved. As explained above, this time the members of the Commission acted as

important initiators and mobilisers, unlike the situation with earlier policies of European integration, but this was necessary only because the task of planning for a single market would have been difficult for any national administration due to the detailed and technical character of single market proposals (Moravcsik, 1999: 810). However, once national attention was focused, domestic co-ordination problems had receded and adequate information was supplied, governments immediately became influential again. Key bargains were made (unmediated) among national officials, ministers, chief executives and their personal representatives, and the distinctive power of supranational entrepreneurs also decreased (Moravcsik, 1999: 811).

In terms of the *lowest common denominator bargaining* aspect of liberal intergovernmentalism, one can cite the fact that the Germans and French generally reached agreement on the terms of the negotiation, but the British backed the German-Franco initiative only because they were faced with the threat of exclusion. As Paul Taylor has observed and Moravcsik has quoted:

“British diplomacy had to balance two objectives: that of satisfying specific interests, and that of staying in the game. A measure of compromise in the former became necessary to achieve the latter” (Moravcsik, 1999: 812).

The Treaty of Maastricht has been considered as one of the most integrationist treaties in the evolution of the European Union. Nevertheless, the protection of national sovereignty and significance of intergovernmentalism shine through the treaty. Moravcsik quoted Delors, the charismatic and influential president of the European Commission at that time and one of the initiators of the monetary union, during the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty:

“I refuse to identify myself with those who promote the disappearance of the nation state” (Moravcsik, 1998: 202).

The persistence of national power was the bitter lesson Delors drew from his difficult experience during the Maastricht negotiations.

Moravcsik argues that:

“The Maastricht negotiations witnessed a resurgence of the intergovernmental negotiating style that had dominated EU bargains before the SEA. Despite the fact that the Delors Report (the blueprint for EMU issued by the Delors Committee) is often seen as a personal victory and an initiative of the European Commission, the committee's product was actually manipulated before the Committee met. The bargaining process was conducted by governments and a handful of officials at the Council working with the Italian, Luxembourgish, and Dutch presidencies, along with the efforts of major governments, in particular the two national chief executives: Kohl and Mitterand, who placed a wide range of proposals on the table and mediated among them. All this confirms intergovernmental bargaining theory and rather decisively disconfirms supranational theory’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 386).

The leading role of the member states could also be seen in the increasing importance of the purely intergovernmental European Council and in the strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity³⁴ established in the SEA that makes nation states less able to commit themselves, even to the obligations in the treaties. Further evidence can be found in the intergovernmental character of the second and third pillars³⁵, and in the inclusion of the ‘opt-out’ clause that gave states the right to be excluded from certain articles in the treaty.

In line with Moravcsik’s interpretation, the process and outcomes of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 also reveal the main element of liberal intergovernmentalism: issue-specific national interest formation and the significance of executives in national governments in the negotiating process.

In terms of the importance of national executives, it can be seen that agreements were constrained by the positions of governments and that final approval lay in the hands of chief executives of the big member states on the basis of domestic political ratifiability and of institutional choice based on the need for credible

³⁴ Subsidiarity means: “Devolution of decision-making within the European Union from the centre to the lowest level possible. Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1991 which affirms that, wherever possible, decisions should be ‘taken as closely as possible to the citizens’, subsidiarity has been widely debated as a means of countering trends towards excessive centralisation and preserving national sovereignty (<http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0041312.html>).

³⁵ The second pillar is the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the third pillar is the Justice and Home Affairs.

commitments. This could, for example, be seen in the negotiations about the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV). While governments took rhetorical positions in favour of, or opposed to, the extension of QMV, in the fine print governments adopted finely differentiated policies in keeping with the advancement of their own substantive interests.

In addition to his emphasis on the centrality of nation states as seen in the analysis of the treaties of European integration, Moravcsik sees the EU's intergovernmental bodies, the European Council, the Council of Ministers and its team of national civil servants, in the driver's seat of European integration as opposed to the supranational bodies. He argues that the Union has a firm, intergovernmental backbone, strengthening the core argument of the state-centric approach of liberal intergovernmentalism. Despite the fact that, according to the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the legislative powers of the European Parliament were increased to the extent that now it is almost de-facto co-legislative with the Council in those policy areas where the procedure applies, the Council of Ministers is still seen as the ultimate guardian of the territorial dimension in EU decision-making. One of the reasons for this is the strong political leadership of the Council as reflected in the rotating Council Presidency, which is held in turn by member states for a period of six months. As the EU has enlarged, the Council presidency has become a more central player in EU politics. It plays the role of the manager, initiator and co-ordinator of EU affairs. In addition, the Council presidency provides each member state with the opportunity and responsibility to define the Union agenda and share in the progress of the EU. By giving such a central role to national capitals in EU decision-making, the

Council presidency shows the importance of national actors and inter-state bargains in EU decision-making (Kirchner, 1992: 87).³⁶

The introduction of the European Council in 1974 may be seen to confirm the significance of intergovernmentalism. Consisting of all the national heads of government, the French and Finnish Presidents (since they are elected) and the President of the European Commission, it is a purely intergovernmental institution and is totally 'national', directly accountable, not to the Commission, but 'to national parliaments and national electorates' (Pond, 1999: 29). It is the primary source of treaties and its 'presidency conclusions', agreed at the end of European summits, have become the main 'directories' that more than often drive EU decision-making. (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 34). Therefore, it is perceived as a forum where the member-states ultimately guard their vital national interests and in this way it symbolises the fact that the Heads of State and Government have taken upon themselves the pace and direction of the European integration process.

The other three institutions of the Union, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, are of a supranational character. The European Commission possesses the formal agenda-setting powers and no important legislative decision may be taken unless the Commissioners put forward a proposal. Despite its supranational character, in practice the Commission can also be regarded in some ways as the defender of national interests. Most Commissioners may be relied upon to defend the interests of the member states in the Commission because they are appointed by them and dependent on them if they seek reappointment. Once appointed, Commissioners cannot be removed, but national governments can abstain from

³⁶ As one Commission official argues: "It is precisely at this level where most of the 'national interest' is defined and decided and that most European legislation is made" (Spence and Edwards, 1994:50).

nominating a Commissioner for another term if he or she has not adequately taken into account the interests of their respective nation (Nugent, 1999: 105).³⁷

Moreover, the advisory committee network can undermine the Commission's independence from national controls. The expert committees that consist of national officials, experts and specialists of various sorts allow national interests to be promoted even in the 'deepest' recesses of the sub-systemic level. Hix (1999) sees the increasing number of committees in the EU, and their increasing significance, as aiming to have the widest possible accommodation of national interests in the pursuit of common EU goals (Hix, 1999: 202).

The European Parliament (EP) is the second supranational institution in the EU. Its modest role was significantly increased by the SEA, the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties. Following the Amsterdam Treaty, most EU legislation (apart from agricultural, justice and home affairs, trade, fiscal harmonisation and EMU issues) is subject to the co-decision procedure where the Parliament's powers are strongest, coming nearer to the Council's legislative capacity.³⁸ The Parliament's significance has now increased for two main reasons: 1. It is involved in the process of legislative bargaining with the Commission and the Council, especially within the framework of the co-decision procedure, both on an informal basis and in formal inter-institutional meetings. 2. The Commission and the Council accept a significant percentage of EP amendments.

Nevertheless, the EP has relatively important weaknesses that tip the balance of decision-making towards the Council. The first is that the EP does *not* have full

³⁷ A particular illustration of this point was seen in the way that a UK Commissioner, Lord Cockfield, was not reappointed by Mrs. Thatcher to the Commission which took up office in January 1989. She believed that he had been over-zealous in his support for aspects of the internal market programme for which he was responsible, and rather than looking to British interests had 'gone native' (Nugent, 1999: 105).

³⁸ Because of the fact that this research covers the period between 1990-1999, changes that were made by the Nice Treaty in 2000 are not analysed here.

legislative powers. Unlike national parliaments, it does not have the final say over what is and what is not to become law. On the one hand, it does not have the capacity to exercise a fully 'positive' legislative role by initiating, developing and passing into law its own proposals. On the other hand, its 'negative' legislative role is also considerably circumscribed. Though the co-decision and assent³⁹ procedures do give it a veto over most legislative proposals, under both consultation and co-operation procedures the Council has the power to overturn EP amendments that have or have not been accepted by the Commission and to ignore the EP's rejection of legislative proposals. (Nugent, 1999: 211).⁴⁰ The second weakness is that the EP is not consulted on *all* Council legislation. In practice, the Council, and more particularly the Commission (which conducts the actual trade negotiations), usually do discuss forthcoming and ongoing trade matters with the EP on an informal basis, but they are not obliged to do so and there is not much evidence of the Parliament bringing influence to bear on the EU's negotiating stance⁴¹ (Nugent, 1999: 211-212).

Regarding the role of the EP in the supervision of the executive, it is important to point out that the EP is less able to control and supervise the Council of Ministers than it is to control and supervise the Commission. Nugent's reasoning for this further shows the significance of nation states:

³⁹ The assent procedure is, whereby the Council must obtain Parliament's assent before certain important decisions can be taken.

⁴⁰ At any one time there are usually around 200-300 proposals upon which the Parliament has given an opinion that still await a Council decision. Proposals subject to the co-operation and co-decision procedures are not exempt from such Council inaction, since the restricted timetable that is attached to the procedures only comes into play once the Council has adopted its common position (Nugent, 1999: 211).

⁴¹ In only two sets of circumstances where EU law is being made with regard to external agreements is EP approval necessary, in both cases by the assent of an absolute majority of MEPs: for new accessions to the EU and for specific types of agreement, including association agreements, co-operation agreements, and agreements with important budgetary implications. The first of these circumstances is obviously only for occasional use. The second, however, has a more recurring application and has been used several times, especially in putting pressure on countries to improve their human rights records if they wished to receive financial assistance deriving from their association and co-operation agreements with the EU. In addition, the EP also has the right to be informed and consulted about various other forms of EU external relations (especially under the Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) pillar of the EU) but these do not involve legislation, and the EP's powers are purely advisory (Nugent, 1999:212).

“The role of the Council is a meeting place of the member states. To make it or any of its members, directly responsible to the EP would be to introduce a measure of supranationalism into the EU that has been, and is, unacceptable to most governments” (Nugent, 1999: 185).

In terms of its relations with the European Council, it has no power to control it.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is an important source of the EU's supranational power and an important strategic actor that is neither master nor servant of the Union's member states. The EU law is supreme and has direct effect over the national laws of the states. The national courts are no longer sovereign in areas within the competencies of the treaties (Garrett, 1993: 48-49). The *Cassis de Dijon* case in particular put the Court in an important place in the European integration process.⁴²

Because of these strong powers, the neo-functionalists have often cited the Court as an example of 'going the furthest in limiting national autonomy'. However, regarding the Court's limitations on national sovereignty, Moravcsik quotes from Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast that,

“The principles governing decisions of the European Court of Justice and hence governing those of domestic courts following its rulings are still consistent with the *interests of member states*, especially of France and Germany” (Garrett and Weingast, 1993: 51).

Garrett and Weingast's rational choice approach explains the growth in power of the ECJ by focusing, not on the Court, but on the preferences of member states. Their basic argument is that the member states have enabled and encouraged the ECJ to limit national autonomy in certain respects because doing so serves in general terms their collective interests. Only by delegating substantial power to the ECJ can member states be certain that compliance with EU regulations will be effectively monitored and

⁴² The *Cassis de Dijon* case has established the principle of mutual recognition. The principle of mutual recognition relates to the rule that a 'product lawfully produced and marketed in one member state must be accepted in another member state'. By establishing this rule, the Court has shown that its decisions overrule those of national laws and can take priority over the 'national interests' of member states (Nugent, 1999: 263).

that the ‘incomplete contracting problem’⁴³ will be overcome through the Court’s elaboration of vaguely defined rules (Garrett and Weingast, 1993: 53).

By carefully analysing the significance of national governments in the activities of the institutions, Moravcsik reaches the conclusion that, in EU negotiations, the interests and influence of national governments are the major determinants in the bargaining process. Governments themselves can and generally do supply the entrepreneurial leadership at relatively low cost. Therefore, the claims about informal supranational entrepreneurship in European integration are greatly exaggerated. It may be the case that the supranational officials in the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament have substantial formal powers in daily decision-making, but these powers have never led to the influence of such officials over the major ‘grand bargains that have driven the European integration process’⁴⁴. Especially the greater scale and importance of treaty-changing decisions, where national interests might be at stake encourage greater attention by governments. Thus governments of member states take into consideration the dynamics in their domestic politics which make up their national interests (Moravcsik, 1999:302).

Critiques:

For his ‘inadequate’ treatment of the power of supranational institutions in the important decisions of the European integration process, Moravcsik is heavily criticised, both by neo-functionalist and institutionalist approaches. They both emphasise the importance of institutions in states’ policy-making, though they differ in the way they attach importance to the nation state.

⁴³ Incomplete contracting problem as argued by Garrett and Weingast (1993) can be defined as “difficulty of predicting the circumstances under which future contingencies will occur”. It is also used by Moravcsik to explain why states delegate or pool their sovereignties to supranational bodies and decisions are taken as an institutional choice.

⁴⁴ This claim is totally contrary to neo-functionalist claims. The pioneers of neo-functionalism, Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, have consistently argued that the existence of effective informal supranational entrepreneurs is one of the major factors feeding the path-dependent process of unintended consequences - spillover- that powers regional integration (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963).

The importance of institutions in states' domestic politics and foreign policy was first significantly highlighted within the interdependence/institutionalist theories of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their book *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* published in 1977. Although institutionalists also stress the importance of domestic politics Keohane and Nye seem to put more emphasis on the role of international institutions. Keohane believes that the current general process of international relations is more than just bargaining among self-interested sovereign states. It is true that states pursue their interests through international institutions, interests that might otherwise be unattainable, but it is the *collective identity* which is formed as a result of being involved in institutions that in fact makes co-operation possible. While states use the institutions of the EU for exercising influence and aggregating interests, *the national interests of states are influenced and modified by the presence of institutional frameworks of which they are members*. Keohane believes that:

“The institutions influence the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate; the ability of governments to monitor others' compliance and to implement their own commitments - hence their ability to make credible commitments in the first place” (Keohane, 1989:2).

Wayne Sandholtz (1996) continues this argument and states that there is a danger in treating supranational institutions in particular as mere expressions of state preferences. He argues that Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism makes an “inadequate analysis of the historical specificity and character of co-operation among states and ignores the links that supranational institutions might develop with the domestic actors” (Sandholtz, 1996: 425).

He agrees with Moravcsik that Community decisions are bargains that reflect state interests, but argues also like Keohane and Nye that those interests are shaped in part by membership in the EU. The connections between the institutions and the

domestic actors open up a route for the EU to integrate itself in the domestic politics of the member-states by *bypassing* the gate-keeping of national governments. The links developed between the supranational institutions and the domestic actors might insert some non-state preferences into the EU's decision-making system. This inevitably leads to a situation “that brings about changes in domestic politics and institutions and the states are automatically changed as a result of their participation in European integration” (Sandholtz, 1996:426). In this way, Sandholtz succeeds in recovering some of the ground that neo-functionalism lost to realism.

Paul Pierson is another critic of Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism. His 'historical institutionalism' (HI) which incorporates key elements of neo-functionalism, sees the EU as no longer simply a multilateral instrument limited by the control of individual member states, but instead as an emergent multi-tiered system of governance with extensive bureaucratic competencies playing an important role in 'rational actor strategies'. This is mainly because of the strong dynamics of 'spill-over' effects in the process of European integration identified by neo-functionalists. The non-state actors of the EU put forward a certain form of 'path dependency' for the states to concentrate on certain policies and prevent radical policy change thereby greatly limiting the manoeuvring and negotiating capability of national states. Therefore policies can end up with unintended consequences rather different to those initially planned for by nation states. From the point of view of HI theorists, the 'unintended consequences' in the European integration process confirm the deepening and importance of supranational institutions (Pierson, 1996: 142).

Neo-functionalists have also focused on the significance of policy networks and Euro-groups as 'engines' of integration. So has the 'multi-level governance' approach to European integration advocated by Geoffrey Garrett, George Tsebelis and

Gary Marks who attempt to offer a framework for the use of policy network analysis.

⁴⁵ Reasserting the claim that institutions actually *do* have a big influence on member states, they link this with the institutional complexity and multiple governance system of the EU. Countering the state-centric approach, they claim that, while national governments may still be important in decision-making, the locus of political control has actually changed. Marks (1996) in particular argues that the evolution of structural policy in the EU does not necessarily run from nation state predominance to the emergence of a Euro-state. Instead, it appears to be a two-sided process, involving decentralisation of decision-making to subnational levels of government, as well as centralisation of new powers at the supranational level. This is the main reason why this approach is called ‘multi-level governance’ (Marks, 1996: 352).

Therefore, contrary to Moravcsik’s state-centric approach that sees state executives as the only important actors in the European arena, Marks argues that the developing ‘multi-level’ governing character of the EU has actually shifted authority away from state executives. He explains his argument in detail with three main points: 1. Decision-making competencies are *shared* by actors at different levels rather than monopolised by state executives. 2. Collective decision-making involves a significant *loss of control* for individual state executives. 3. Political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. States do not monopolise links between domestic and political actors but are only *among* a variety of actors contesting decisions that are made at a variety of levels. Because of this multiplicity of actors in the EU arena, complex interrelationships in domestic politics do not stop at the nation state, but rather extend to the European level. This multiple governance also provides multiple points of

⁴⁵ The following are especially important for presentations of their arguments: Garrett, G. and Tsebelis, G. (1996), ‘An Institutionalist Critique of Intergovernmentalism’, *International Organization*, 50:2; Marks, Gary, Nielsen, F., Ray, L. and Salk, J. (1996) *Governance in the European Union*, Sage Publishers, London

access for interest group activity. Therefore, unlike the state-centric approach, Marks' multiple-level governance approach is more actor-centred and involves specifying particular actors as participants in decision-making (Marks, 1996: 354).

Moreover, contrary to the LIG line of thought, Marks does not think that supranational institutions in the EU can simply be reduced to institutions that implement state executives' initiatives. It can be said that the Commission is demand driven, but this demand does not necessarily come from the intergovernmental leaders. A significant number of initiatives also derive from the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, regional governments, and various private and public-interest groups. Agenda-setting and policy-making have also become a shared and contested competence among the four institutions of the European Union, rather than monopolised by one actor (usually a state-oriented one), and the mobilisation of interest groups in the European arena has diverted the political focus away from nation states.

Marks' multi-level governance approach is important in the sense of pointing to the hybrid nature of the institutional context of the EU, with a combination of both intergovernmental and supranational characteristics. Wessels (1997) is also a theorist who combines intergovernmentalist and supranational methods of decision-making in his 'fusion theory'. Nevertheless, he diverges from Marks at some points and is inclined more towards an intergovernmentalist approach. He agrees with Marks that private actors and interest groups are influential but, since they are most powerful at the state level, this only reinforces the argument that the EU is actually a 'mobiliser of bias' in favour of nation states (Wessels, 1997: 118).

In comparison with his earlier work that was subject to so much criticism from other scholars working on European integration process Moravcsik, since 1997-98, has

started to acknowledge the significance of institutions in the European integration process by assigning an important role to institutions as *facilitators of positive sum bargaining*. However, as already stated in the previous sections even in his work of 1998 where he talks about the role of institutions in the European integration process, there is a tendency to limit the significance of supranational institutions. According to his argument (1998):

“Governments transfer sovereignty to international institutions *only* where potential joint gains are large but efforts to secure acceptance of all governments through decentralised or domestic means are likely to be ineffective” (Moravcsik, 1998:9).

If this condition does not exist, supranational entrepreneurial activities are likely to be unnecessary because states, as the main actors with interests, would have greater means and incentives to act as entrepreneurs anyway (Moravcsik, 1998: 305). In this way he actually criticises the historical institutionalists. He does not agree with historical institutionalists that major national policies in European integration were actually unintended and merely consequences of prior integration. The institutional constraints that HI theorists treat as unintended or unforeseen consequences of prior integration, were in fact constructed deliberately to enhance the credibility of commitments and increase the chances of achieving their aims through the EU. They were ‘unintended’ as it is natural for states not to always obtain their ideal when governments with varied preferences negotiate and construct institutions (Moravcsik, 1998: 491-492). Moravcsik claims that, because the national governments were already aware of these facts, the decisions were in fact *foreseen* and *desired* by them. Moreover, he also stresses that:

“The degree of transfer of functions from national to EU institutions is also settled within an intergovernmental bargaining process” (Moravcsik, 1998: 492).

In addition, if there do happen to be any constraints on governments' bargaining preferences in the European Union as argued by Pierson and Sandholtz ⁴⁶, these are largely derived from the *demand side* of European integration. Moravcsik explains the demand side of European integration as the *domestic politics* of the member states (total of social and national preferences, electoral, interest group and bureaucratic politics), and the relative power states bring to the negotiating table. Supranational entrepreneurs only *manipulate* ideas and information and their ability to use influence can only be derived from their “superior ability to overcome domestic and transactional *co-ordination* problems” (Moravcsik, 1999: 274). In this way, Moravcsik's approach can also be called ‘two-level’ bargaining theory, because he constructs the bargaining of states in international institutions as an outcome of state-society relations in *domestic politics* which actually comprise the national interests themselves that are aggregated by the executives and represented in the form of foreign policies in intergovernmental bargaining processes of the EU.

The significance of national interests in European integration-1st stage of Moravcsik:

Following the above analysis of both Moravcsik and his critics' understanding of the importance of intergovernmentalism in European integration, it will be necessary to go on to another assumption of the LIG line of thought which actually forms the first stage of decision-making in Moravcsik's theoretical framework: the significance of domestic politics and national interest articulation (Moravcsik, 1994: 475). Moravcsik argues that:

“An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of strategic interaction among states; that is symbolised by their foreign policy” (Moravcsik, 1993: 481).

⁴⁶ Their arguments can be seen especially in the following pieces: Pierson, P. (1996), ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 29:2’ and Sandholtz, W. and Zysman, J. (1989), ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’, *World Politics*, 42:1

In this sense, his arguments are similar to some of the neo-realists' arguments, especially Alan Milward's. They both emphasise *the importance of the nation state* and the priority of *national interests formulated by interaction of certain factors in domestic politics* within the integrationist framework of the EU (Milward, 1992: 221).

Coparaso's arguments also support this claim by stressing the relevance of *domestic political processes* in defining national interests and consequently formulating the set of substantive bargains of states in international institutions; their foreign policy (Coparaso and Keeler, 1995: 43). He also argues that:

"Policy making in international frameworks is actually the natural extension of domestic politics. Therefore domestic politics are internationalised and not vice versa" (Coparaso and Keeler, 1995: 44).

This is very similar to the main arguments of liberal intergovernmentalism for, while criticising neo-functionalism and neo-liberalism, Moravcsik also argues that membership of the EU, rather than domesticating the international system, actually *internationalises domestic politics* (Moravcsik, 1998: 2).

Moravcsik's main assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism are also similar to the claims of neo-realism in the way that he forms a link between the significance of national interests and the concept of rationality in the formulation of national interests. Rational state choices can be seen in three of the stages of his account of EU decision-making. In the first stage, when trying to aggregate interests already articulated at the domestic level, governments try to determine what best explains national interests. In the second stage, they try to obtain the best outcomes of interstate bargaining in the European Union arena based on these national interests. In the third stage, they try to obtain the best choice of decisions in an international institution based on a given set of substantive bargains (Moravcsik, 1998: 3).

However, there are important distinctions between the neo-realist approach and Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism:

1. Neo-realists stress the importance of *structure* in international relations. They argue that the structural properties of international politics provide particular sets of limitations upon possibilities for action and that the institutional framework and the position of a state in the international power distribution determine states' interests.⁴⁷ Moravcsik claims that on the contrary: It is actually *the member states* that are able to master and design institutions in accordance with their national interests and political decisions.
2. Moravcsik's theory is more carefully structured with the aim of finding what exactly determines states' *national interests* (Moravcsik, 1993: 480-482). In this regard he differs from neo-realists who argue that state behaviour is only influenced by *calculations of power*. His liberal intergovernmentalist approach concentrates on the significance of variation in *economic, strategic* and *cultural* sources of state preferences; hence the importance of domestic institutions, groups and public opinion.
3. Liberal intergovernmentalist theory also provides an explanation for the variation in the substantive content of foreign policy and historical change in the international system, something that is missing in neo-realist theory. This explanation is provided by the stress on national interests; national interests may change as the interests of domestic groups change due to certain internal events, external events and as a result of globalisation. This directly influences foreign-policy making and the evolution of the European integration process.

⁴⁷ These arguments are collected in the works of Waltz, K. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, Mc Graw Hill, New York; Grieco, Joseph (1988), 'Realist Theory and Problems of International Co-operation', *Journal of Political Science*; and Mearsheimer, J. (1990), 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15:1.

He also applies the importance of domestic politics and national interest formation to the major treaties of European integration. In his view, the decisions of the SEA were taken intentionally by nation states, *in accordance with their national interests*. The SEA was primarily concerned with ‘negative integration’, i.e. the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. The main reason for this was the presence of strong economic pressures in the world economy in the 1980s. As a consequence of the slow evolution of societal/national demands for international co-operation, the resultant liberalisation process was certain to take place (Moravcsik, 1997: 295).

During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the negotiations were tightly constrained by national governments, which in turn raised justified worries concerning *domestic ratification*. The bargaining outcomes of this treaty reflected *national interests* that were driven primarily by the enduring structural economic interests of countries under conditions of increased capital mobility and macro-economic convergence. The outcomes of distributive conflict tended to consistently reflect in particular the interests of Germany, the country with the tightest domestic win-set and which had the most to give up in the monetary negotiations. The interests were also influenced by calculations concerning the soon-to-occur electoral campaign (Moravcsik, 1999: 813).

The same was true for the negotiation process of the Amsterdam Treaty. The importance of domestic politics, in particular the significance of the predictable and structural changes in domestic politics and in the construction of national interests which led to foreign policy, and the accompanying effect on bargaining strategies, could all be seen in the policy changes of the three major countries as the negotiations went on. For example, Britain shifted its position immediately after the Labour

Government entered office. France shifted to support parliamentary co-decision after the election of a Socialist government. In Germany, Kohl's decision to support only modest institutional reforms, rather than the more radical proposals Germany had earlier backed, stemmed from his last minute concern about domestic political opposition, particularly with regard to EMU and EU enlargement (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1999: 82). Moreover, the fact in particular that the Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty just prior to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 made the concepts of domestic politics very important, and this was transferred to negotiations and the bargaining process within the EU. Therefore, in the negotiations which followed the Maastricht Treaty such as at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and the Treaty of Amsterdam, the member states experienced greater difficulty in reaching decisions now that they were faced with heightened public scrutiny.

Nevertheless, Moravcsik was not the first political scientist who studied the influence of domestic politics on international institutions, and the involvement of domestic political organisations, namely national political parties, interest groups and national parliaments on international politics. This was first advanced by Simon Bulmer. His contribution to European integration theories was a detailed analysis of national interest formation that can be brought to the European arena. He argued that, in order to understand the bargaining processes at the European level, one should first look at the dynamics of domestic politics. He believed that the domestic policy structures of individual member states influenced the negotiating behaviour and the attitude of states in the EU, and that their interaction was the key to understanding the dynamics of the European integration process (Bulmer, 1983: 221). However, the main problem with Bulmer's work was that he was too detached from the debate about the current European integration process, and that his work has not adequately explored

the linkages between the domestic and EU tiers. It is the latter point upon which Moravcsik has expanded.

Importance of economic factors in the construction of national interests:

In concentrating on the linkage between the domestic and the EU level, Moravcsik makes a further assumption about the importance of *economic incentives* for the formulation of national interests contrary to geo-political and cultural factors (Moravcsik, 1997: 485). For this assumption Moravcsik borrows from the liberal theories of economic interdependence. The assumption of the rational behaviour of states necessitates the calculation of the cost and benefits of economic interdependence, the interaction of the demand and supply of national interests based on this calculation, and strategic opportunities. These comprise according to Moravcsik's supposition, the economic incentives in the construction of national interests which lead to strategies in intergovernmental bargaining and co-operation. Therefore, co-operation is;

“...a means for governments to re-structure the pattern of unintended consequences of national economic activities on foreign countries-to their mutual benefit. The ultimate level is the institutional choice” (Moravcsik, 1997: 486).

This is the point where Moravcsik's principal arguments become similar to the main tenets of intergovernmentalism, especially the line of reasoning of Stanley Hoffmann as he also concentrates on the interdependent character of international politics. According to Hoffmann, the main reason why domestic politics has become important in European integration is because:

“The agenda of world politics is no longer filled by traditional strategic diplomatic issues but tends to be occupied by the very issues that are central to *domestic politics* such as economic growth, social welfare and foreign policy. Today, governments see their domestic and foreign policies intertwined. They look at the issues created by interdependence through the lenses shaped by their domestic experience; therefore, their foreign policy tends to be the extension of their domestic politics” (Hoffmann, 1987: 270).

Hoffmann's main difference with Moravcsik is that, unlike Moravcsik, Hoffmann thinks that economic interdependence might place restraints on states' power that do not exist in any comparable way in the strategic diplomatic realm. He sees the EU as an international regime designed to manage interdependence and thus that it can affect states' policy making. However, Moravcsik believes that national actors/executives and national states in the European integration process *can* manipulate the EU in accordance with their national interests.

Moravcsik argues that the transfer of national sovereignty to supranational institutions during the process of European integration was actually intended by nation states mainly for *economic* reasons. For him, the EU has been the deliberate creation of statesmen and citizens seeking to realise economic interests through traditional diplomatic means.

In this regard a brief look at the treaties of European integration from Moravcsik's perspective will be useful to show how *economic incentives* in the national interests of states facilitated the European integration.

It is true that the main aim behind the Treaty of Rome in 1957 was to prevent the eruption of another major war and contain Germany in a very strong institutional framework. However, according to Moravcsik, the national leaders who made the key promises during the negotiations for Treaty of Rome remembered that their competitors were also economic partners and therefore they tried to make themselves desirable as trading allies. Konrad Adenauer's Germany proved to be a suitable market for France's agricultural goods after World War II and the Treaty of Rome also provided financing for current and former French colonies. During the 1960s, the EU was held together by negotiations for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which organised large financial transfers from Germany to France, as well as to Italy and the

Netherlands. Critical decisions were taken, not at sessions mediated by the Commission, but at frank summit meetings between French President de Gaulle and successive German chancellors, which were mainly concerned with the economic welfare of their states (Moravcsik, 1999: 288).

Moravcsik (1999) also states that the movement towards monetary union which started in the 1970s was governed mainly by the German determination to avoid an inflationary rise in the *Deutschemark* and by the desire of other countries to control their economies against the perceived strength of German economy. The launching of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 was mainly a product of French-German combined interests. Confidential strategy documents drafted by the then German chancellor Helmut Schmidt leave little doubt that his use of the European credo in the EMS negotiations was deliberate ideological cover for the pursuit of German economic interests. In addition, French support for the idea of a monetary union, and the abrupt decision of Mitterand to adopt austerity and force the franc back into the EMS, was not only due to the fact that he wanted to play a geo-political role as a great European leader, but also because he wanted to reduce the trade deficit in France at that time and the outward flow of capital (Moravcsik, 1999: 290). However, the real effort to create a free trade area with no barriers was made with the creation of the single market in 1986. The German Federal Republic was eager to widen its markets. And since most of these exports went to its European partners, Bonn was especially keen during this time of recession to counter the new trend of protectionism and the erection of non-tariff barriers among the EU states (Pond, 2000: 34). This trend continued with the Maastricht Treaty that reached decisions on the most sensitive topics for the states: the harmonisation of currencies and the completion of the full monetary union. Moravcsik argues that national interests to go forward with the

Maastricht Treaty and especially with the European Monetary Union (EMU) project were driven primarily by;

“...enduring structural *economic interests* of strong and weak-currency countries under conditions of increased capital mobility and macroeconomic convergence” (Moravcsik, 1998: 381).

The negotiations leading to the Amsterdam Treaty were greatly affected by the sensitivities of the general European public. Public opinion regarding deeper integration has always been affected to some degree by economic circumstances, but the high unemployment levels and economic recession of that time further shook public confidence and thus influenced decision makers to be more sensitive about economic issues when bargaining in the EU (Rhodes and Mazey, 1995: 2).⁴⁸

Summary:

In this section, the main attempt was to show the link between the style of decision-making in the European Union and Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist approach in explaining the European integration process. Strong emphasis was placed on Moravcsik's core assumptions, such as the importance of nation states and specifically national executives as opposed to supranational institutions in the bargaining process in the EU, the significance of national interests articulated at the domestic level and aggregated by the executives to be represented in the EU arena, and the significance of economic considerations in the formulation of these national interests.

In the following section, the link between Moravcsik's assumptions and the hypotheses of this research will be constructed. It was argued by three different hypotheses constructed in the first chapter of the thesis that economic, geo-political

⁴⁸ These problems have also provided conditions for the rise of populist, extreme right wing parties such as the French *Front Nationale* and the German *Republikaner Party* which have sought to link European integration with increased immigration and high unemployment and a loss of national identity (Rhodes and Mazey, 1995: 2).

and cultural factors in German domestic politics make up the national interests of Germany which further lead to the formulation of the attitude of Germany towards the enlargement process of the EU; a symbol of German foreign policy in specific means. Moravcsik's LIG approach will serve as a tool to explore which factor may prove to be the most significant among the three factors cited in the three hypotheses that underlie the foreign policy attitude of Germany vis a vis the enlargement process of the EU.

Research design:

“EC politics is the continuation of domestic politics by other means”
(Moravcsik, 1991:25)

It would not be wrong to state that Moravcsik's approach to European integration does not explain completely the dynamics of the EU, as EU politics are more complex and less orderly than the events he describes, and the explanations he presents of underlying reasoning. Despite the arguments he puts forward in his work about the EU as evidence to the contrary, supranationality is important in the evolution of the EU and decision-making is really much more complex than he suggests.

However, this research concentrates specifically on the enlargement process of the European Union, which can be regarded as one of the most significant projects of current European integration efforts. For a variety of reasons, the LIG approach is more relevant than a supranationalist one for explaining the enlargement process. To explain this linkage, resorting to John Peterson's (1995) typology of decision-making in the European Union may be useful where he divides types of decisions in the European Union into three: history-making, policy-setting and policy-shaping. For mainly two reasons, enlargement of the European Union can be considered a 'history-making decision' as defined by Peterson:

- Enlargement of the European Union became a particularly important issue after the end of the Cold War that brought changes to the environment around the European Union and created a group of potential EU candidates in the areas just neighbouring the European Union. Peterson defines ‘history-making decisions’ as;

“...decisions taken as an institutional choice in the European Union that are all *responses* to broad changes in the international environment within which the EU operates” (Peterson, 1995: 82).⁴⁹

- Moreover, it is a fact that enlargement of the European Union will affect the negotiated order itself (i.e. both the institutional rules and the policy benefits which the member states reap from membership). This is another factor that makes enlargement of the European Union a history-making decision as Peterson argues that:

“History-making decisions alter the Union’s legislative procedures, rebalance the relative powers of EU institutions, or change the EU’s remit” (Peterson, 1995: 72).

If enlargement of the European Union is an institutional choice that can be regarded as a ‘history-making’ decision then it will be easier to formulate the links set out below with Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism in order to explain the incentives of enlargement as opposed to a neo-functionalist/supranational approach:

1. According to Peterson’s typology of levels of decision-making in the European Union, history-making decisions are taken at the ‘super-systemic’ level; that is these types of decisions are made by the European Council and national governments in the IGCs. Within the enlargement process of the European Union, decisions for accession of new member states are also taken by the member states in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. The role of the Commission in accession negotiations is principally to make proposals to the Council for ‘common

⁴⁹ The Single European Act (SEA) of 1980s and the Maastricht Treaty of 1990s were institutional responses/decisions to the changes in the European environment. The internal market was inspired by the need to halt declining European economic competitiveness in increasingly globalised markets. Arguably, the Maastricht Treaty was primarily a response to German unification (Peterson : 1995: 83).

positions'. The Council then decides about these common positions by *unanimity* and they are presented to the applicant country by the presidency of the Council. The accession negotiations take the form of an *intergovernmental conference* between the member states and the applicant country. The Commission's role is less prominent than is the case in a normal international negotiation, in which it is the spokesman on questions of 'Community competence'; in an accession negotiation, the spokesman is normally the presidency, and the Commission has a secondary role (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 32). The final decisions concerning accession negotiations are taken at the European Council summits, which provide important milestones in the history of enlargement process, e.g. the Copenhagen European Council Summit where the criteria for membership were accepted and the Amsterdam European Council Summit where Commission's Agenda 2000 was decided which gave the impetus for the eastern enlargement in the following decade. The Nice IGC 2000 which resulted in the Nice Treaty preparing the EU specifically for enlargement had also involved thirty sessions of the *personal representatives*, ten meetings of the foreign affairs *ministers* and three sessions of the *European Council*. Even so considerable changes in *national positions* in the final hours of the IGC have been reported. Thus it was clear that in the end only national governments were again the key players with a secondary role publicly given to the president of the Commission and to the frustrating 'waiting room' experiences of the representatives of the European Parliament at the summit which concluded the IGC.⁵⁰

The fact that decisions for enlargement are also taken by national governments and the European Council offers support to the argument that enlargement of the European Union can be considered as a history-making decision. This

⁵⁰ Wessels (2001) concludes that the traditional elite-driven method of intergovernmental bargaining was again conspicuous in the Nice IGC.

intergovernmental method of decision-making (the second stage of decision making in Moravcsik's analysis which favours the executives of nation states' bargaining for fulfilment of their foreign policies in the European arena) as opposed to supranationalism links the analysis of the enlargement process with Moravcsik's concept of liberal intergovernmentalism. Moreover, the fact that this requires unanimity in the Council will make the Commission monitor the preferences of the member states very closely. Therefore, in the formal agenda-setting phase, the Commission will not 'upgrade the common interest, but rather search for the *lowest common denominator*' which is another element of liberal intergovernmentalism (Friis, 1999: 5).

2. Peterson argues that:

"History-making decisions may reflect the rationality which stems from the need for member states to co-operate when solving collective problems" (Peterson, 1995: 81).

As enlargement of the European Union is a history-making decision, explaining the incentives for it to become an institutional choice shows a close correlation with Moravcsik's LIG's assumptions in where he states that:

"Based on the reality of economic interdependence⁵¹, the EU answers the need to *co-ordinate* policy responses to rising opportunities for profitable economic exchange (in particular the growing intra-industry trade and capital movements) more effectively than unilateral policies" (Moravcsik, 1994: 482).

Contrary to the LIG link between economic interdependence and the need to co-operate in international institutions, realists and neo-realists think differently. Especially among advocates of the realist school, there is a belief that the end of the bipolar system and of the stability that went with it, will raise real prospects of major crises in Europe. Mearsheimer (1990) argues that the biggest problem in world politics

⁵¹ The theory of economic interdependence assumes that 'states that are primarily motivated by the desire to achieve prosperity and that leaders who place the material welfare of their publics above all considerations, including security, value the *creation of liberal economic order* to achieve this'.

following the end of the Cold War is that the multipolar dimension of Europe including Germany, France and Britain (assuming major-power status) will definitely suffer the kinds of problems most typical of multipolar systems: namely vulnerability to instability. Therefore, the most important common interest of the states of Europe will be to attempt to eliminate factors that can cause such instability. According to Mearsheimer, counter to the standard assumptions of the theory of economic interdependence which are also advocated by Moravcsik, interdependence is likely to lead to *conflict* rather than co-operation. His main assumption in this direction is that states will struggle to escape the vulnerability that interdependence creates, in order to bolster their national security (Mearsheimer, 1990: 45).

3. Peterson's levels of typology of EU decision-making might be criticised for failing to account for the impact of *domestic* political outcomes in EU member states on the governance of the Union as 'two-level' games seek to do. However, a plausible assumption is that the impact of *domestic politics* is most powerful at the super-systemic (where 'history-making' decisions are made) and systemic levels, where political rationality usually prevails (Peterson: 1995: 86).

This assumption can be related with the first stage of decision-making in Moravcsik's LIG model where he argues that:

"The process of intergovernmental bargaining in the EU arena is influenced by the commercial interests of *domestic* producer groups, interests that reflected respective positions in the global market" (Moravcsik, 1998: 8).

Peterson argues that history-making decisions reflect distinctly political rationality: the desire for national governments to remain in power. Thus executives of member states in the EU are careful to represent the national interests articulated at the domestic level to secure their support. Moravcsik argues that:

"National governments always weigh the potential gains from *co-operation* against the domestic political risk" (Moravcsik: 1993: 517).

John Redmond, Lee Miles and Rene Schwok's (1995) arguments are also helpful in forming the linkages between the LIG approach and the enlargement of the EU especially in terms of the significance of domestic politics and national interests; the first stage of Moravcsik's decision-making process:

a) Enlargement is increasingly framed as an economic problem mainly because of the huge number of candidates and their poor economic conditions. Redmond, Miles and Schwok (1995) argue that in particular because of the further *economic* implications of enlargement and the risk of competition for scarce resources in a diverse EU, there has been a greater *prioritisation of domestic politics and national interests* rather than reinforcement of political loyalty at the supranational level (Redmond, Miles and Schwok, 1995: 190).

b) It is a fact that further enlargement will increase the diversity of national interests and ideological perspectives among individual member states and their respective elites. The successful spill-over of neo-functionalism requires prior pragmatic agreement among governments, which is more difficult to reach within a larger EU. Related to this, due to the problem of reconciling such a large array of interests is the fact that enlargement strengthens pragmatic tendencies within the EU, thus re-emphasising intergovernmental perspectives at the expense of those of neo-functionalist supranational elites (Redmond, Miles and Schwok, 1995: 190).

c) Expansion could also lead to institutional paralysis in the absence of radical institutional reform and more effective decision-making procedures. New members from Central and Eastern Europe have the potential to bring their ethno-national conflicts into the EU. In such a way, further enlargement could actually also incur 'negative spill-over' whereby the impact of new accessions makes existing EU policies inoperable and beyond reform, unhinging the Union's existing integrationist strategies

and moving it towards a more intergovernmentalist approach. (Redmond, Miles and Schwok, 1995: 191).

Based on the criteria stated at the beginning of this section, enlargement of the European Union can be considered as a ‘history-making’ decision. In this way, all three stages of Moravcsik’s decision-making analysis can be seen to take part in this process and make the LIG approach a useful tool for explaining the enlargement process of the EU.

Operationalisation of Liberal Intergovernmentalism:

“What is wrong with Germany is that there is too much of it” (A.J.P. Taylor, 1968:21).

The main aim of this section is to clarify the current foreign policy of Germany by operationalising the liberal intergovernmentalist approach and linking it with the hypotheses constructed in the first chapter. These hypotheses had stressed that the foreign policy of Germany (that the executives bring into the EU arena for interstate bargaining and negotiate before the institutional choice is established) is a result of the construction of national interests which reflect the dominant *economic, geo-political and cultural* factors in the domestic politics of Germany:

Hypothesis I: Economic factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German ‘national interests’ (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests. This hypothesis relates the most with Moravcsik’s LIG approach because of the fact that LIG model stresses the importance of economic interdependence in the national interests of nation states; specifically for Germany as it is well-known as an ‘export-dependent’ country. The economic difficulties that Germany has experienced since the

re-unification period which coincided with the independence of the Visegrad countries and the enlargement of the EU are reinforcing factors to analyse the influence of economic factors in German foreign policy. Thus in this research the economic relationship between Germany and the Visegrad countries and Turkey will be examined in detail.

Hypothesis II: Geo-political factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German national interests (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that favours Turkish membership in the EU. This hypothesis concentrates more on the external factors influencing national interest/foreign policy formulation in Germany with specific stress on the concepts of stability and security. Once more the influence of these factors in the relationship between Germany and the Visegrad countries and Turkey will be analysed in great detail.

Hypothesis III: Cultural factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German national interests (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests. This hypothesis is of particular importance in the case of Turkey with regard to the perceived cultural incompatibility of the Turkish community in Germany and the consequent prejudice formed in larger German society towards the Turkish community.

Through a thorough testing of these three hypotheses using empirical evidence this research aims to find the *most significant factor* that influences the formulation of national interests which are then represented by the executives in the form of foreign policy in the intergovernmental bargaining process in the EU. Examining mainly the period between 1990 and 1999 in this research the attitude of German executives will

be analysed with particular attention to the enlargement process of the EU as a specific example of their attitude towards foreign policy. Moravcsik's LIG model will be used as a theoretical guide to find the linkage between the dependent and independent variables in the hypotheses and help to examine the most significant factor underlying the German executives' attitudes towards the Visegrad countries' and Turkey's EU membership bid.

Moravcsik defines national interests⁵² as:

"...an ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes, often termed 'states of the world', that might result from international political interaction" (Moravcsik, 1998: 24).

He stresses the significance of the domestic economic factors in the formulation of national interests/foreign policy, therefore operationalisation will be made with specific emphasis on the economic incentives for the German attitude towards the enlargement process of the European Union.

For the analysis of German national interests, the main emphasis will be on the period after the Cold War as this was the time when enlargement became a very crucial issue. The focus of attention will be on the 'normalisation' concept of Germany because it constituted one of the central themes in German foreign policy for the period after the Cold War.

Hyde Price (2000) identifies several key elements influential in the construction of states' national interests which can shape both the goals and means of foreign policy of states. *Economic resources* is one of them. Hyde Price also states that, given its identity as a *Handelsstaat* (or trading nation) and its past fame for

⁵² He uses the word 'preferences' for interests.

cheque-book⁵³ diplomacy, this concept was especially significant for German national interests *and* German foreign policy (Hyde-Price, 2000: 10).

The normalising Federal Republic of Germany:

The contemporary German problem dates far back into history when Germany was first unified. The European balance of power created by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) was shaken by the rise of a unified Germany. The creation - through 'Blood and Iron' - of a Prussian-dominated *Kleindeutschland* produced a major challenge to the European balance of power. Thus was born the contemporary 'German problem' -in other words, the problem how to integrate, or at least contain, the economic strength and military potential of a unified German state situated at the very heart of the European continent. It was the failure to resolve this problem that led to the two world wars of the twentieth century. Calleo (1978) even goes so far as to say that;

“Had the lesson only been learned and applied earlier, the world would have been spared at least the second of this century’s general wars” (Calleo, 1978: 2).

Reich and Markowits (1997) relate the German problem to the shameful events of the Nazi period and stress their impact on German foreign policy; this impact is also called the ‘collective memory’. This collective memory is associated with acts of genocide and often symbolised as the *Auschwitz* phenomenon, named after the most dreadful concentration camp founded by Nazis to exterminate the Jews during World War II. It created a prism through which German foreign policy intentions, ambitions and capabilities can be interpreted and thus constrained. Sperling (2001) agrees with the importance ascribed to the Nazi period for the setting of limitations on German foreign policy, but sees the beginning of the German problem, and the restrictions on

⁵³ Germany was economically very powerful but because of the limitations of its constitution and also its reluctance caused by the ‘collective memory’ of World War II, instead of assuming responsibility during international crises (e.g. UN peacekeeping operations and NATO out-of-area operations) it used its economic power and made its contribution *financially*. This kind of policy making became to be known as ‘cheque-book diplomacy’.

German foreign policy, as the collapse of the Weimar Republic and its consequences (Sperling, 2001 39).

Awareness of this historical memory has been the most crucial determinant of German foreign policy after World War II and has led to the strict and widely accepted support for German involvement in the European integration process. However, changing conditions, both externally and internally following the end of the Cold War, inevitably gave way to a change to the parameters of German foreign policy. This is usually referred to as the 'normalisation' of German foreign policy, of which there have been different interpretations.

McKenzie (1996) argues that the concept of normalisation is a very imprecise term and the debate it generated brought forward problems at the same time because of the difficulties of how to define what was 'normal' (McKenzie, 1996:32). For some it simply meant acting in a more *self-confident manner* within multilateral structures, and taking *greater responsibility* for achieving policy objectives shared by the wider international community. Anderson (2000) argues that after the Cold War because of this manner of Germany at the level of interstate relations, the uniting of the two Germanys focused attention to deeply entrenched anxieties among its neighbours about German power and intentions. Perhaps more than ever, Germans were expected to walk, talk, and act softly. At the same time, however, the end of the Cold War and unification reshuffled the cards within Germany, thereby changing the domestic context in which European policy is made. New, hard material interests rendered it more difficult now for the German government to satisfy domestic constituencies with the exercise of power in Brussels (Anderson, 2000: 107). Thus the German government started to follow a policy which showed a more *rational, up-front insistence on German national interests* on a case by case basis in the European Union

while calculating costs and benefits of EU decisions at the same time. Because of the significance it attaches to the concept of national interests, the latter definition of normalisation is much more relevant with the LIG assumptions about what is important in determining states' foreign policy.

During the Cold War:

According to Kirchner, the normalising trend of Germany started long before the end of the Cold War due to a combination of factors. These factors include neglect of the EU because of growing German economic power and national confidence, and disillusionment and exhaustion due to the obligation placed on it to pay for the poorer regions (Kirchner, 1994: 5). Anderson and Goodman (1993) note that German political elites initially embraced the European Union as a means of re-establishing German national sovereignty. Subsequently, Germany used its sovereign power to project onto its European partners a markedly different, internationalised state identity. However, Germany has actually been liberally and skilfully using its economic instruments and incentives to achieve its foreign policy goals. Anderson calls this the 'soft power' of Germany (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 82). Bulmer (1994) agrees with Anderson and Goodman and says that, although Germany's prior history constrained it from projecting its national interests in a nakedly self-interested manner, its economic power had actually given it an indirect institutional power: more openly stated - the ability to shape the institutional development or mostly the economic policies of the EU in a biased way, or set the agenda more in line with its own economic concerns (Bulmer, 1994: 76). Bulmer cites the strong correspondence between the EU's constitutional order, norms, and patterns of governance and Germany's institutionalised identity and interests, as solid proof of his argument (Bulmer, 1994: 61).

There is important evidence in the history of European integration that serves to prove the truth in Bulmer's, Anderson's and Goodman's arguments. The most significant evidence in support of the above-mentioned arguments can be seen in the German role in the European monetary integration process. The European monetary integration process, recognised as one of the most important building blocks of European integration, reflects a German monetary policy and is based on German money and German norms. It was German economic interests, as determined by Helmut Schmidt, the German chancellor at the time, which governed the movement towards monetary union starting in the 1970s. Although it was vital for German national interests to continue with monetary union, Schmidt was actually concerned about the psychological and political unease that might arise from the first overt act of German political leadership in the history of European integration. In this regard, the EU as an international institution served as a means of domestic and international legitimisation, covering the claims of German hegemony and interests.⁵⁴ The first re-launching of the EMU in 1988 was also held under the German presidency. German assertiveness through multilateral channels in the economic realm also demonstrated itself in its position on the EMU prior to and during negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, which led to the treaty on the EMU and also on the project of political union conforming particularly to German preferences.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ In a confidential internal memo written the previous year, Schmidt outlined the tactic precisely, noting that the Federal Republic had become " ...in the eyes of the world de facto economically the second world power of the West. It is therefore necessary for us, so far as at all possible, to operate not nationally and independently but in the framework of the European Community. This attempt to cover our actions multilaterally will only partially succeed...we will (necessarily and against our own will) become a leadership factor " (Moravcsik, 1994: 42).

⁵⁵ Moravcsik argues that this decision of the government was backed by the public as well thus making the 'intergovernmental process compatible with the national interests formulated at the domestic level'. He states that "the German negotiating position at Maastricht, like that in negotiating the EMS, reflected a compromise between the *Bundesbank's* anti-inflation and the demands of German business interests and the Chancellery for a competitive exchange rate and macro-economic stimulation. Moreover, from 1987 through 1991, peak business groups in Germany consistently supported continued monetary integration, albeit subject to traditional economic concerns. The experience with the EMS had been largely positive as it had contributed to the undervaluation of the DM, which in the late 1980s created

To further strengthen these arguments, Bulmer (1994) differentiates among the institutions of the European Union and argues that this indirect institutional power of Germany is of particular significance in the European Council, where it plays a significant *agenda-setting role*. The European Council is an important institution within the EU as it is the principal institution shaping its constitutive politics; therefore the presence of the German initiative in European Council decisions demonstrates the importance of Germany's role in the Union. Bulmer has cited the former German chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl as leaders who played central roles in the European Council, noting especially the initiative of Schmidt who, along with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, established the European Council in the first place (Bulmer, 1994: 22). Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast (1993) argue that even the *Cassis de Dijon* decision of the European Court of Justice was a proof of the indirect power of Germany in the EU institutions. In this case, the German government put forward a position whereby it could credibly claim not only that it was prepared to fight for the protection of German industry but also that it was a 'good European' because it accepted that the legal system was the appropriate arbiter in trade disputes, even when this had deleterious consequences for Germany. Garrett and Weingast add that;

“One might even suggest that the European Court of Justice has tended to act as a de facto agent of the German government by vigorously persecuting the free trade cause but without extending its reach into other areas of more concern to Germany, such as financial delegation. The *Cassis* case is a specific example of a government pursuing a national interest apparently contrary to European agreements” (Garret and Weingast, 1993: 175).

large trade surpluses, while only limiting *Bundesbank* authority. Thus in October 1988, 60% of the German industrialists supported further monetary integration, though the lowest percentage in the EC, where support averaged 90%, it was still a significant majority” (Moravcsik, 1998: 392).

Katzenstein⁵⁶ and Hyde-Price argue the contrary; they stress the importance of institutions *on* the formulation of national interests – more specifically they are convinced by the difference in national interests made by membership in the EU. Hyde-Price rejects the rationalist assumption of liberal intergovernmentalists that national interests are fixed and argues that it is impossible to fully understand the construction of national interests without placing them in the institutional context. Regarding German national interests, Hyde-Price argues that the EU as an institution has played a constructive role in defining German interests and identity (Hyde-Price, 2000: 22). Katzenstein further stresses the importance of institutions in offering a normative context that provides a set of norms that influence the interests of actors, mainly states (Katzenstein, 2000: 33). He interprets the argument about indirect German power differently to how it is expressed above, claiming that German interests that were pursued through this indirect power were actually *shaped and defined* by the *institutional context* of Europe (Katzenstein, 2000: 16).

Following the approach of liberal intergovernmentalism and adoption of the second definition of normalisation as outlined in the beginning of this section, one is forced to look in the opposite direction to that indicated above by Katzenstein and Hyde-Price: i.e, domestic factors influence national interests, which then result in foreign policy formulation *and* are taken to institutions in the EU, especially the European Council, where the chief heads of state get together to exchange ideas and bargain to obtain maximum benefit. Therefore a true understanding of the German attitude in the EU towards enlargement necessitates a careful look at the changes in the *domestic* politics of Germany, especially the changes that had affected the economic conditions.

⁵⁶ These arguments are advanced in the following books: Katzenstein, P. (2000), *Germany: Tamed Power in Europe*, Cornell University Press and Hyde-Price, A. (2000), *Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York

After the Cold War:

With its successful economic policies after World War II, Germany became the supreme economic power in Europe, providing its citizens with a comprehensive welfare system and high living standards. The superior economic performance of Germany was exemplified in its economic growth, external balance, price stability and rate of employment. Germany's 'economic miracle' was especially apparent in average annual increases of real GDP of 8.2 percent between 1950 and 1960 and 4.4 percent between 1960 and 1973 (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996). Given such a context, it can be understood how the worsening of domestic economic conditions would influence the public's mood.

In 1989-90 when the West German federal government decided to unite with East Germany, they had severely underestimated the scale of the challenge presented by German re-unification and its long-term implications, despite warnings from the *Bundesbank*, from many economists and from within industry. The divergence between the two economies was enormous. The exchange rate selected for monetary union meant an effective revaluation of more than 300% for the area of the German Democratic Republic (GDR); economic union meant immediate access to cheaper, high quality western goods and measures supporting trade with the eastern bloc came to an end. As a consequence, Eastern Germany was plunged into deep economic crisis. The index of manufacturing production in the former GDR slumped by nearly 40% between 1990 and 1992; the number of those economically active dropped from nearly 10 million to under 6 million; and the unemployed, including those on government schemes, rose to 37% of the working population. These developments provided the background to net transfers of the East amounting to the equivalent of 5% of Western Germany's GDP and 40% of the value-added component of the East German economy

(*Bundesbank* monthly report, July 1995). The result was that the budget deficit rose from 1% of West German GDP to 6.2% in 1993, a temporary ‘solidarity’ surcharge on income tax of 7.5% was imposed (and then re-introduced); successive spending cuts were agreed and state and local authorities in the West were faced by the prospect of harsh funding cuts. In addition, with the absorption of new East German workers who were extremely uncompetitive in relation to their western counterparts, unemployment rose and inflation jumped from an annual rate of 2.7 percent in 1990 to 4.0 percent in 1992. The flow of new investment into the new *Laender* also met with legal obstacles, thereby destroying the potential for further improvement in the East. These problems; annual \$100 billion transfers to new eastern *Laender*, the economic crisis in the emerging markets for German exports, and interest rate convergence with the other countries in the monetary union, all combined to take Germany from being the strongest to becoming one of the least well performing economies in Europe.⁵⁷ In 1995 economic growth had reached zero, followed by unemployment rising a full percentage in the next quarter. These problems continued till 1997, further exacerbated by the unemployment rate reaching high levels, and in spite of a slow subsequent decline in the unemployment rate and a slight increase in the rate of economic growth, indicators still are worse than the pre-unification period.

In the tables below, these economic changes will be presented in more detail. Tables 1, 2 and 3 are more concentrated on the immediate period after unification whereas the figures shown in table 4 approach the year 2000 with the aim to show that economy has not improved as time has passed following re-unification.

⁵⁷ The two tables in Appendix 1 at the end of the thesis are useful for comparing the current situation of Germany with that of other members of the EU and showing how it became a weaker economy compared with the other economies due to its growing unemployment rate and shrinking growth rate.

Table 1: Public financial transfers to Eastern Germany (DM billions)

	1992	1993	1994
Transfers by territorial authorities	121.9	138.5	132.4
German Unity Fund	36.1	36.4	35.8
Net federal transfers	74.4	90.7	85.7
Financial transfers by social security funds	29.1	23.9	33.2
Public transfers total	151.0	162.4	165.6

Source: Five Economics institutes, Vesper, 1995

Eastern consumption levels are still dependent on public net financial transfers from west to east totalling about \$11.5 billion per year. In addition to social assistance payments, the government plans to extend funds to promote eastern economic development through 2019, which will not help to improve the budget deficit.⁵⁸

Table 2: Macroeconomic evolution in Western Germany, 1990-1994

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
GDP change (%)	4.5	4.9	1.2	-2.3	1.6
Unemployed (1000s)	1883	1689	1808	2270	2556
Unemployment rate	6.4	5.7	5.9	7.3	8.2
Consumer prices (% change)	2.7	3.5	4.0	4.2	3.0

Source: Flockton, 1996: 201-202

Table 3: Macroeconomic evolution in Eastern Germany, 1990-1994

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
GDP change (%)	-14	-28	10	7	9
Unemployed (1000s)	240	913	1170	1149	1142
Unemployment rate	-	10.4	14.6	15.1	15.2
Consumer prices (% change)	-	8.3	13.5	10.5	3.7

Source: Flockton, 1996: 201-202

⁵⁸ According to a government-commissioned report made up by 13 experts headed by former Hamburg Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi charged with examining the reconstruction of Germany's eastern states it was estimated \$1.54 trillion in aid has done little to help the economically depressed region. Perhaps even more worrying, the experts fear the € 90 billion spent by the government each year is slowly destroying the economy of western Germany, as growth stagnates and the eastern states fail to revive 14 years after German re-unification. (www.dw-world.de, April 5, 2004).

Table 4: Macroeconomic evolution in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 1990-1999

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
GDP change (%)	-	4.2	1.4	-1.9	2.4	0.9	0.9	2.1	2.7	2.5
Unemployment rate*	-	-	7.7	8.8	9.6	9.4	10.4	11.5	10.9	10.6
Consumer prices (% change)	-	-	5.6	4.0	2.4	2.2	1.0	0.6	1.0	1.3
Balance of payments on current account	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-4.0	6.4	8.0
		18.0	19.1	14.0	20.3	22.6	13.8			

*Though it can be seen that the jobless rate began dropping in mid-1998, the decline in the east was more modest and more dependent on job creation measures than the western part.

Source: Statistical appendix of *World Economic Outlook*, 1999

These factors soon started to influence public opinion about Germany's role in the integration process. In the period before unification, German interests were identified as 'European interests' and German executives were defending the position of Germany as the net contributor to the EU budget for a variety of reasons. Germany's net transfers to other EU states were 70% of the total budget; being four times greater than the UK and over six times greater than France, even when German per capita income was reduced in comparison to these states. Even by 1996 when Germany was experiencing the domestic economic difficulties, the EU was costing the average German twice as much as was the case for a Dutchman and four times as much as it cost the average Briton (*the Economist*, December 15, 1996: 46). Kirchner argues that:

"Especially the cost of German re-unification has made the German public more resentful about the country's high budgetary contributions to the EU" (Kirchner, 1996: 170).

It was already the case that by mid-1993 only 18% of West Germans and 12% in the East saw the Union as a net benefit. Prominent figures openly stated that the EU had 'for too long taken advantage of German multilateralism'. In the table below, Eurobarometer results would show the growing negative opinion in Germany about EU membership. The stress was made on the figures between 1994-1997 in order to

show the declining support of the public given to the Kohl government which contributed to his defeat in the next general election to the SPD candidate Schröder:

Table 5: Public opinion in Germany about the EU

Indicator	1990	1994	1995	1996	1997
A good thing	73%	61%	51%	39%	36%
Benefits my country	61%	50%	40%	38%	34%

Source: Eurobarometer 47/1997

80% of another poll in 1993 considered that Germany should be firmly in the EU but should ‘speak up more vigorously for its own interests’ (Schwarz, 1994:87). Hans-Peter Schwarz (1994) further asserts that changes in domestic factors and the international environment mean:

“Germany will have to stop imagining that its interests can be ‘European’; it will have no choice but to recognise that it has national interests and to define them as such” (Schwarz, 1994: 87).

Soon the government which desired to transpose initiatives and policies onto a European scale started to meet resistance and confrontation from internal perspectives. Specifically, the public discontent deriving from domestic economic problems increased when the level of German commitment to European integration (especially in terms of its disproportionate contribution to the structural funds) remained the same. Popular resistance to a tighter European Union reached its peak when Germans were faced with giving up their treasured *Deutschemark* for a ‘Euro’ of uncertain value within a monetary union with weaker countries. Already, a growing number of economists, historians, journalists, and politicians had rejected the need for the European Monetary Union outright or suggested a postponement. Overall, people were tired of Helmut Kohl still clinging to the European ideal and ignoring the demands of the public in this period of domestic economic recession. Even when the polls were showing that two-thirds of Germans opposed giving up their *Deutschemark*, Kohl was

still insisting on carrying out his plan. There was obviously a need for a new leader who could put the urgent *domestic economic problems* of the country ahead of European ideals. Hyde-Price (2000) refers to this as a *generational change* between Kohl and Schröder. As will be explained in detail in the section below, Kohl's *Europapolitik*, still bearing the marks of having grown up in the years after the defeat of Germany in World War II, and the identification of German interests with European interests, was giving way to Schröder's *Europapolitik* with a greater stress on enlightened German *self-interest* in European Union policies (Hyde-Price, 2000: 41).

This is one of the principal reasons for the victory of Gerhard Schröder in the elections of September 1998. It was the first time in the history of the Federal Republic that an existing government was directly voted out of office and that a substantial share of voters crossed over directly from one of the major parties, the CDU/CSU, to the other, the SPD, at any election. As already mentioned, the Christian-Liberal coalition government's social and economic policies were a major cause of the party's defeat in the election. The worsening economic situation in Germany had led to criticism of their economic management and of the political-economic characteristics of the German co-operative social market economy. Voters realised that some policies had to change in order to make Germany's economy more competitive. As a cross-sector party it was excessively difficult for the CDU/CSU politicians to advocate market-liberalising re-distributive economic reform programs. Therefore, its voters opted for the SPD with its firm commitment to the established welfare state and a third-way program which included a liberal market critique of German capitalism as too rigid and inflexible to generate the jobs and life chances many citizens desired (Conradt, Kleinfeld and Soe, 2000: 208).

More relevant for this research is another reason for Schröder's success in the 1998 elections: the *change of rhetoric* in German European-foreign policy. Even before it came to power, the SPD under the leadership of Schröder had realised the extent of public discontent about the inadequacy of the Kohl government to meet public demands regarding the economic problems, and had prepared reports about the role of Germany as European paymaster. Schröder then used these reports to criticise Kohl's management of the country's European policies, thereby introducing the paymaster issue into the German national electoral arena (Anderson, 1999: 50). As a leader who did not carry the burden of the past, Schröder's main distinction from Kohl was his open use of the term 'national interests' particularly in relation to the German role in European Union policies. Hyde-Price stresses the importance of this concept and says that:

"The notion of enlightened self-interest had emerged as a leitmotif of Schröder's *Europapolitik*" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 171).

This change of rhetoric and style led to doubts about whether Germany would maintain its multilateral style of foreign policy or change to a more unilateral style, acting purely in line with its own domestic concerns and in proportion to its economic power. The answer was soon given in Schröder's first declarations after coming to office:

"The first goal of German foreign policy will be to strengthen peace, security and stable environment upon which in the last instance our prosperity depends. This involves above all the strengthening and further development of the structures of European integration" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 172).

Multilateralism has been defined by Ruggie as;

"...a form of institutionalised co-operation that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct" (Ruggie, 1993: 11).

This also describes the traditional style of German foreign-policy making as mentioned above. Despite the changes since the end of the Cold War, there have been substantial reasons for Germany deciding to continue the rhetoric of relying on multilateral structures:

- Having won the trust of its partners by its carefully designed foreign policies following World War II, the new German government itself was aware of the need to be especially careful to dismiss the fears of its partners about its potential hegemony, especially after unification. Too much emphasis on national policy goals or a predilection for unilateral strategies would isolate Germany internationally once more, so it was for its own good to carry on with multilateral structures in foreign-policy making.
- Germany would also be better off economically. Germany's integration into the European Union had helped it economically by opening up a field of competition for German firms, Western European markets for German products and had helped to reduce the negative consequences of other countries' policies. Experiencing serious domestic economic problems, it would want to continue to obtain the benefits of European integration. In addition, embarking on unilateral economic policies in today's globalised world would not be profitable.

Therefore, having built a successful model of political economy through integration in Europe, and having achieved a stable relationship with their European partners and won their trust, German officials had every reason to sustain the foreign policy strategies of the pre-unification and Cold War period. With these reasons in mind, Anderson calls this decision of Germany to remain firmly integrated in the West after unification as an "internalised, intrinsic component of German identity and

political economy” since the benefits achieved had made this kind of policy-making a reflexive attitude of Germany (Anderson, 1999: 13).

If there are so many reasons for continuity in foreign policy, then where did the new government’s arguments about ‘normalisation’ and the ‘importance of national interest rhetoric’ come from? Paterson, Bulmer and Jeffery (2000) see this as a change from the pure integrationist, sacrificing short-term interests for long term goal policies of the Kohl era, to a more;

“...up-front insistence on German interests on a case by case basis in the EU, scrutinising them for their impact on German budgets, distributive outcomes, net pay-offs in the short term and competitiveness in European and world markets” (Paterson, Bulmer and Jeffery, 2000: 9).

In other words, though he clearly states his determination to stay integrated in the EU on every occasion, Schröder follows a more pragmatic approach in foreign-policy making. He appears firm about integrating German national interests more visibly into the European integration process and about placing his country on a more nearly equal footing with the other states. Given the fact that financial constraints, a deteriorating economy and public discontent were the factors that had brought him to power, this new strategy meant that there would be no more automatic ‘cheque-book’ diplomacy and that each individual step in the European integration process would be taken after considering specific budgetary concerns and German interests rather than the generalised benefits for Germany. A quote from Schröder on this subject would help understanding his logic:

“Within the next few years new big visions will not be on the agenda but the realisation of the old visions. What is required now are *pragmatic* politicians, these are the true visionaries of the near future” (Knodt and Staeck, 1999: 225).

The changing direction of Schröder’s policies was especially conspicuous in three areas. First, EU policy co-ordination responsibilities were transferred to the Finance Ministry which would more openly implement a rational calculation of costs

and benefits in EU policy-making. Second, as Schröder was the candidate from a workers' party, during his governance, agriculture would lose its primacy. This would then be relevant to a more careful strategy of policy-making in the implementation of the CAP where Germany seems to pay more than it receives. Third, as would be seen by Germany's role in Bosnia and particularly in Kosovo operations, the concept of *security* would start to play an influential role in the new government's foreign policy calculations.

The most important factor that needs to be mentioned here is the insistence of Germany on the completion of the 'widening' of the EU alongside its 'deepening', in other words, a thorough institutional reform. Gower and Redmond (2000) attempt to explain this by the stronger promotion of German national interests that takes domestic economic grievances into consideration. In this respect it is understandable that Germany advocates a radical reform of both the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural policies. In the absence of reforms, Germany would be most likely to lose out from the wave of enlargements which contain poor countries with some of them having large agricultural sectors, as it is the net contributor to the EU budget especially to the CAP and the structural funds (Gower and Redmond, 2000: 6).

This 'normalisation' of Germany could be seen during the first two months of its presidency in 1999. The German government started insisting on cuts in Germany's contributions to EU funds, and on a comprehensive reform of EU Common Agricultural Policy. A reduction in its contribution to the CAP could actually be used for its own domestic economic problems, especially for further aid to the eastern *Laender*.⁵⁹ In the end, not all German claims were accepted, and it was decided that Germany should maintain its contributions until 2002. This decision was reached by

⁵⁹ The previous Economics Minister Theo Waigel stated that Germany wants net payments to the EU budget to be reduced to about 0.4% of GDP from the current 0.6% (European Information Service, European Report Predicasts Newsletters, July 30 1997)

the German government as a sign of continued German commitment to the integration process, but was still important in that it showed the *changed rhetoric* of German multilateral foreign-policy making. In response to the French government's shock at the new German attitude, Schröder stated:

“We will voice German interests as forcefully as France voiced its interests. Franco-German relations will remain important, but this will be a relationship of two self-confident partners” (Grant, 1998: 75).

Even more shocking than this change of attitude was the fact that on March 24 1999 during the German presidency of the EU, four German ECR-Tornados took off from their base in Piacenza to participate in NATO's bombing of targets in the Yugoslav Federation. German participation in *Operation Deliberate Force* was a defining moment in the domestic politics of the new Germany as for the first time since 1945, German military forces took part in offensive combat missions against a sovereign state. Thus this act raised fundamental questions about Germany's self-perception as a ‘civilian power’ unwilling to take part in military operations, its underlying reasons to shift to a different attitude in military operations and about the future role of the Berlin Republic in the reshaping of post-Cold War European order.

In summary, it can be said that in the period after the Cold War (especially after 1997-1998) when enlargement of the European Union became a significant issue to be considered as an *institutional choice*, German executives (especially the Chancellor Schröder, in addition with the foreign and finance ministers) became more careful to act in accordance with their *national interests*, in *bargaining and negotiations* with other governments of the EU. An LIG approach with its stress on economic factors would link this attitude with the attention showed by the government to the public discontent about the costs of re-unification and the unchanging position of Germany as the net contributor to the EU budget; that is domestic economic

problems. However as can be understood from the role Germany adopted during the Kosovo operation (and as will be seen later in the following chapters from the change of attitude towards Turkey's EU membership bid), this may be a too-simplistic explanation. Thus with the testing of the three different hypotheses about the foreign policy attitude of Germany in the enlargement of the EU towards two different categories of candidate; the research will attempt to consider all the versions of the changing agenda and dimensions of German foreign policy and try to analyse the balance between its main *geo-political/security* and *economic* interests.

Summary:

This chapter has tried to highlight the main theories of European integration and their relevance to the research. Special emphasis was given to Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism because of its concentration on the importance of economic incentives and national interests in foreign policy making in the intergovernmental negotiations in the EU and reaching a decision about enlargement as the institutional choice of the EU. This appeared to be the most relevant approach to the chosen empirical assessment of Germany's position towards EU enlargement especially after the Cold War and for the period between 1990-1999 because of the increasing importance of usage of rhetoric of national interests in foreign policy making and the importance of economic incentives due to the increasing effect of domestic economic problems. Thus with its suitability for explanation of the attitude of the German executives as representatives of German foreign policy, it serves as a significant perspective to guide the research and the process of explanation of hypotheses which is backed by empirical evidence.

Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on the importance of intergovernmentalism in the EU integration process where nation states, as opposed to

supranational institutions, make the important decisions and put forward the initiative for further policies. Due to the fact that it is the *states* themselves that are the main actors in the European arena, it is their *national interests* articulated as a result of the interaction of domestic economic, geo-political, and cultural factors that are aggregated at the domestic level by the executives and are brought to the European arena in the various forms of their *foreign policy*. The national executives as representatives of states bargain with each other in order to get their national interests fulfilled. The decisions at the end of this negotiation process are reached in the form of an institutional choice; a decision made by the European Union itself. This is because in an increasingly globalised world the states delegate or pool sovereignty to institutions as it is seen to be in their best interests that they *co-operate* rather than act alone, it makes it easier to resist domestic opposition for certain policies and supranational institutions help the efforts by governments to control and constrain one another. It is especially the first two arguments that supports the enlargement policy of the EU to be taken as an institutional choice.

German foreign policy therefore found expression in the German attitude in the enlargement process of the European Union. Within the framework of Peterson's (1995) typology of decision making in the EU, enlargement of the European Union can be considered as a history-making decision. This is because of the way it can be considered a response to broader changes in the international community and also in the way it influences the carrying out of changes to legislative practices and institutional structures in the EU. Thus as a history-making decision, decisions about the enlargement of the EU leading to the *institutional choices* in the EU are taken in the *intergovernmental institutions on a unanimous basis* and this means that member states' *national interests* have to be taken into consideration.

When forging the link between the national interests and the foreign policy, Moravcsik especially stresses the importance of the *domestic economic interests*. Within the framework of Moravcsik's LIG model, in the last section of this chapter the national interests of Germany were analysed to better understand the logic of the transformation of national interests into Germany's foreign policy, as well as the significance of economic facts in the construction of Germany's national interests. The chapter focused in particular on the period after the Cold War because this was the period after unification when Germany became a 'normal' state that could articulate its national interests more boldly on the European stage. In addition, this was the period when Germany began to experience serious economic problems, which resulted in public support for the 'normalisation' of foreign policy and much more stress on the economic incentives for the construction of national interests.

However as the last section showed, the influence of economic problems on German foreign policy was not the only change that occurred after the Cold War. Rather, simultaneously, the German initiative in the Kosovo War showed *security* had become an important concept as well. This would bring us back to the theme raised in the first chapter where *three* independent variables were set out that influence the dependent variable; German foreign policy. This consists of in addition to domestic economic factors, geo-political and cultural factors. As already mentioned, the balance of these three factors influencing the national interests of Germany, the intervening variable and German foreign policy, the dependent variable will all be analysed in the following chapters.

In the following chapter the historical background of the relationship between both categories of candidate will be given. With its emphasis on the changes in German foreign policy attitude derived from changes in both its external environment

and internal politics, it will further help to identify the factors that helped Germany to formulate its national interests and thus construct a certain attitude towards the enlargement process of the EU. In this way, it will be an additional step towards choosing the *main factor* in national interest formulation process of Germany.

CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES, TURKEY AND GERMANY

Introduction:

In the prior chapters, the LIG approach to foreign policy formulation was introduced with its emphasis on linking decisions for institutional choice in the European Union to firstly, the intergovernmental bargaining process in the EU whereby nation states' executives represent their foreign policies, and secondly, to national interest articulation at the domestic level where executives aggregate these interests in order to formulate foreign policies.

In the framework of applying this model to this research, there was an introduction to the analysis of German national interests and three hypotheses were formulated which linked German foreign policy, as seen in the enlargement process of the EU, with the economic, geo-political and cultural factors present in the domestic politics of Germany. If analysed from Moravcsik's perspective, domestic economic factors ought to prove more significant in the formulation of national interests which lead to executives' foreign policy representation in intergovernmental bargaining. This argument formed one of the hypotheses constructed in the first chapter, as expressed in the following statement 'Economic factors in the German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German 'national interests' (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests'.

Therefore, in this chapter the evolution of the current enlargement of the EU will be analysed with an emphasis placed on Germany's position towards both categories of candidate. This analysis will be carried out by concentrating mainly on

the third and second stages of decision-making process in accordance with Moravcsik's approach, namely institutional choice and intergovernmental bargaining. The reason for the length of the section concerning intergovernmental bargaining-exceeding that of the section about institutional choice is due to the fact that it involves a more detailed analysis of the relations between Germany and the Visegrad countries and Turkey, including different factors in different time periods. The first stage, concerning articulation of German national interests, will form the content of the following two chapters.

Evolution of the EU enlargement process:

Eastern enlargement as the institutional choice of the EU:

Although the enlargement process of the EU, as already discussed, was decided primarily at the intergovernmental level by unanimous voting, it can also be regarded as an institutional choice since it involves the co-operation of member states, the delegation of a certain degree of sovereignty to the supranational Commission and regarding the somehow sceptic public opinion about enlargement of the EU it permits the member states to ignore the domestic opposition in their countries.

The EU was exceptionally quick to start preparing the Visegrad countries for membership soon after they had won their liberation from the communist international system. In July 1989, the EU took over the co-ordination of the G-24 aid programs for the Visegrad countries, and also those of various international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As early as 1990, the EU had concluded 'second generation treaties' ⁶⁰ with the Visegrad countries and the other CEECs as well as with the former Soviet Union. In January 1991 the EU granted Visegrad countries the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) status normally

⁶⁰ Second generation treaties were formulated to give these countries certain social and economic rights.

reserved for developing economies. In December 1991, the EU opened negotiations on associate membership with the Visegrad countries: the Europe Agreements. The Europe Agreements were useful for “establishing institutional frameworks for political dialogue and economic co-operation including aid and trade” (Nas, 1998: 4). Within the EU, the Europe Agreements were conceived as a framework within which the Visegrad countries could be prepared for accession. They were intended to create a “special type of relationship reflecting geographical proximity, shared values and increased interdependence” (Gower, 2000: 5). An institutional framework of Association Councils and Committees at ministerial, parliamentary and official levels was created to encourage political dialogue on a wide range of issues of mutual concern, including foreign policy, security, international crime and the environment (Gower, 2000: 6). In addition to the Europe Agreements, trade liberalisation measures known as *Interim Agreements* also came into force within a few months, complementing the political provisions of the Europe Agreements with their aim of facilitating the gradual economic integration of the Visegrad countries into the European economy.

The Copenhagen European Council in 1993, for the first time, mentioned the prospect of membership for the associated countries. In its declaration, the Council stated that:

“The associated countries in *Central and Eastern Europe* that so desire shall become *members* of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the *obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required*”.

In this respect the EU had formulated some conditions to be met by the would-be members. The list of conditions covers a wide range of political, legal and economic conditions such as the existence of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, respect for and protection of human rights and minorities,

existence of a functioning market economy, capacity to cope with market forces and competitive pressures within the Union, ability to take on the obligations of membership, including Economic and Monetary Union and to adopt the *acquis communautaire*⁶¹. In addition to listing the Copenhagen criteria, the EU member states decided to accelerate the liberalisation of trade barriers (Tewes, 1997: 123). In May 1994, the Visegrad countries also received an ‘associate partnership’ in the Western European Union (WEU) (Katzenstein, 1997: 27-28).

The Copenhagen criteria actually showed how the protection of the national interests of the member states, especially as affected by *economic* realities, had become important in their foreign policy. For the first time, specific conditions had been imposed on acceding countries that they would have to fulfil before becoming members so as not to disturb the proceedings of the EU or the welfare of current members. There had been some criteria as well in previous enlargements but these had affected only the conditions of *accession*, not the starting of *negotiations* and the very *chances* of joining (Inotai, 1999: 159). In addition, the previous Mediterranean enlargement criteria were characterised mainly by the political benefits and the candidate states’ democratic credibility. However, during the current eastern enlargement process the EU has not expressed any *short-term* political interests in favour of eastern enlargement. On the contrary, it actually tended to concentrate on the long-term political stability and economic performance of potential members. Moreover, in order to reduce the risk of general economic deterioration among its present members, the EU has embarked upon an intensive round of financial aid to help the development of the transition economies. One of these was the so-called PHARE measures. Under the original name of *Pologne Hongrie Assistance a la*

⁶¹ Rules and regulations of the European Union that are binding on member states.

Reconstruction Economique, the EU started to provide systematic financial and economic aid to these countries.

The Union's further enlargement plans were first announced at the Essen European Council in December 1994. At this summit, the question was no longer *if* the Visegrad countries would gain membership, but *when* and *how*. The EU, on a German initiative, developed a *pre-accession strategy*, which represented a significant commitment to enlargement. The pre-accession strategy's main purpose was to guide applicants towards fulfilling the main conditions for membership set out at the Copenhagen European Council. It incorporated earlier agreements and commitments and extended the Europe Agreements to the Baltic States and Slovenia, established the multilateral *Structured Dialogue*, and called at the same time for the preparation of a White Paper on the Single Market. The primary motivation for the establishment of the Structured Dialogue was to ensure the maximum integration of the Visegrad countries into EU policies as possible by including the ministers of associated countries in the Council of Ministers at EU meetings and facilitating access to EU textiles markets. These meetings with the candidate countries' ministers were useful for giving the candidates a sense of belonging to the EU family, but also provided them with a valuable insight into the workings of the EU machinery (Tewes, 1997: 1994).

From the Essen Summit onwards, the eastern enlargement of the EU acquired an internal dynamic. After the Essen Summit, the financial aid programmes were directly linked with the current enlargement process. Under PHARE it was planned that by the year 2000 all sectors of the applicant countries with the exception of agriculture, environment and transport would become compatible with the EU, with the help of financial aid from the EU. The financial aid directed to enable this would be a total of € 1.5 billion per year. Additionally, from 2000 onwards there would be a

budget of € 0.5 billion for reconstruction and € 1 billion for achieving compatibility in agriculture. Also, if a former socialist country could prove its firm commitment to political and economic transformation towards establishment of a plural democracy and market economy, it would become eligible for G-24 aid. The European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development provided additionally funds for various projects (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 9-20).

Moreover, in order to improve trade with the associated countries, the EU supported the Central European Free Trade Area initiative and its extension to all associated countries. It was assumed that, as trade barriers fell, foreign direct investment would follow, with further gains to productivity and competitiveness. The flow of FDI towards the Visegrad countries had been somewhat disappointing when compared to the far greater flows to Asia and other regions. Nevertheless, as can be seen in the table below, most of the FDI had been concentrated in *Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic*, the neighbours of Germany, which may serve as an indication of the German initiative on the enlargement process:

Table 1: Flow of FDI from the EU to the CEECs

Name of candidates	Percentage of FDI for all candidates
Hungary	25
Poland	19
Czech Republic	10
Slovenia	8
Romania	7
Slovakia	7
Latvia	7
Bulgaria	6
Estonia	6
Lithuania	5

Source: Estrin, Hughes and Todd, 1997: 12-13

In addition to benefiting from all sorts of financial aid and economic resources, the Visegrad countries were now also able to take part in certain programmes with the European Union in areas ranging from education, research, culture and environmental protection.

Further developments to speed up the eastern enlargement process followed. The Madrid European Council Summit in December 1995 reaffirmed the commitment to eastern enlargement, calling on the Commission to prepare a report on CEEC applications for membership, to be made ready shortly after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. In response to this, the *Agenda 2000* of July 1997, presented by the President of the European Commission at the time, Jacques Santer, announced proposals to expand the membership of the European Union in the near future. According to these proposals, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus were found by the European Commission to be eligible to be integrated into the EU framework in the next wave of enlargement. This was a supplement to the efforts of the Amsterdam Treaty signed in June 1997, that had proposed some formulations to ease the eastern enlargement process and put issues such as asylum, visa policies and co-operation of justice and customs offices under the control of the European Union.

The decision date for the Agenda 2000 proposals was planned for the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997. At the Summit, the text was accepted without major modifications. It was at this summit that the launching of ‘a new and comprehensive enlargement process’ was confirmed, and, depending on the level of preparedness for dialogues with view to membership; it was announced that six countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus were deemed as able to start accession negotiations almost immediately, that was at the end

of March 1998. There was a second group of countries, which would have to wait somewhat longer, but they would benefit from closer economic ties through *accession partnerships*. These included Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. These accession partnerships would bring together in a single framework all the various forms of EU financial assistance available to assist the applicant states to adopt the *acquis*, and would help the applicants to become more familiar with Union policies and procedures through the possibility of their participation in Community programmes. It was expected, therefore, that these accession partnerships would improve the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's pre-accession strategy, and the overall amount of aid was also to be substantially increased (Gower, 2000: 15).

On March 31, 1998, talks on future entry were initiated with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. The negotiations with these countries were carried out in the form of bilateral governmental conferences the subjects of which concerned conditions for joining the EU and for the revision of treaties that resulted from joining the EU. In the meantime, the analytic screening⁶² of EU legislation adaptation was initiated with Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania aimed at accelerating the process of preparing them for negotiation talks (www.czech.cz).

The first half of the year 1999 witnessed the German presidency of the EU with eastern enlargement constituting one of its most important priorities. By the time of the Helsinki European Council Summit of December 1999, it had been decided that negotiations for membership with Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania and

⁶² Screening refers to “the analysis and comparison of the candidate’s legislation with the Community *acquis*” (www.czech.cz).

Malta would also start from February 2000 in parallel with the first wave of candidates, with the hope that that they could soon catch up with the others.⁶³

As can be seen from the evolution of the eastern enlargement process, despite the fact that the Visegrad countries had only gained their independence at the beginning of the 1990s, it took them only 10 years to reach their aim of EU membership. The reasons for this are analysed below with a close attention to the German initiative.

Intergovernmental bargaining process:

According to Moravcsik, important decisions such as treaty amending negotiations (enlargement is an example as already explained in the second chapter within the framework of John Peterson's typology of EU decision making) are taken as a result of *bargaining over the precise terms of mutually beneficial co-operation*. This form of intergovernmental bargaining exemplifies a distinctly modern form of 'power politics' peacefully pursued by democratic states (for largely economic reasons) through the exploitation of asymmetrical interdependence and the manipulation of institutional commitments. Intergovernmental explanations often speak of Germany, France or Britain as 'powerful' or 'influential' in negotiations, but such claims are rarely demonstrated by offering specific evidence of what resources convey 'power' or which outcomes demonstrate that one country has been influential. Therefore Moravcsik attempts to specify interstate bargaining power more precisely by drawing

⁶³ Though they do not belong to the period of investigation of this research, it may be useful to give information about the developments that happened in the EU enlargement process after 1999. In June 2001 in Gothenburg, EU leaders agreed that enlargement negotiations could be completed in 2002, enabling enlargement in 2004 so that the newcomers could field candidates in the European elections to be held in that year. The final decision for the enlargement process was taken at the Copenhagen European Council Summit in December 2002 which put forward the proposition that Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, plus the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the Mediterranean islands of Malta and Cyprus should accede to the union by May 1 2004.

on the basic insight underlying formal theories of bargaining; namely that the pattern of preference intensity or ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ dictates the relative value of each state. He argues that:

“Bargaining leverage stems most fundamentally from asymmetries in the relative intensity of preferences, which reflect, the relative costs and benefits of agreements to remove negative externalities. The more intensely governments desire agreement, the more concessions and the greater effort they will expend to achieve it. The greater the potential gains for a government from co-operation, as compared to its best alternative policy, the less risk of non-agreement it is willing to assume and, therefore, the weaker its bargaining power over the specific terms of agreement” (Moravcsik, 1993: 499).

As already discussed, the eastern enlargement of the EU was *necessarily* important for Germany on the basis of its national interests. Given the definition of the terms of intergovernmental bargaining as advocated above by Moravcsik, one would come to a conclusion that Germany’s bargaining power in the negotiations leading to the decisions about the EU enlargement would be relatively weak. However, one should also remember the importance of ‘structural power’ of Germany in the EU, which was already discussed in the previous chapters. Germany’s ‘economic miracle’ and the fact that an extraordinary population boom had led to its growth in industrial production and productivity after World War II had *played a decisive* role in its regaining relative economic dominance in Western Europe. The European Economic Union, and later the European Union had helped West Germany’s economic growth, leading at the same time to a greater dependence of these institutions on West German economic resources. Thus Germany has been traditionally influential in the European Union and therefore in the intergovernmental negotiations.

During the decisions concerning the enlargement of the European Union, it would be very difficult to define *exactly* the position of Germany in the negotiating process because high-level discussions often occur over the phone, in informal settings and in the Council of Ministers where consultations are secret. Therefore all one can

do is to establish where German priorities lay. German involvement in the incorporation of the Visegrad countries within the EU structure was conspicuous from the statements of the German executives since those states' independence and in the European Council Summits when Germany was presiding.⁶⁴

So which 'executives' of Germany take part in the intergovernmental bargaining regarding the enlargement process of the EU? According to Article 65 of the Basic Law, the Chancellor has the authority to set down the guidelines of policy (*Richtlinienprinzip*). However, in the past, few Chancellors made use of their right to set the guidelines of EU affairs and very often delegated this matter to the Foreign Minister (who is at the same time Vice-Chancellor). In addition, there is the principle of ministerial autonomy (*Resortprinzip*) where the ministers at the federal level are independent actors responsible for their individual departments. The ministries who are mostly involved with the European Union activities have also extended competences by creating specific European departments or sections; such as the Economics Ministry, Ministry for Agriculture, Ministry for Employment and Social Activities and the Finance Ministry. Owing to the *Resortprinzip* and the fact that these ministries form a wide range of individual informal contacts with civil servants in Brussels and in the other European capitals, it is difficult to manufacture a coherent approach in EU policy-making. The Foreign Office has the primary function of ensuring overall co-ordination among the ministries and chairs the Committee of State Secretaries for European Affairs but has been relatively weakened by the independency of the ministries and competes in EU affairs with the Ministry of Economics. Because of this high level of sectorised policy-making within the larger framework of Germany's European policy making, it is said that in the end only the Chancellery can aggregate

⁶⁴ Especially the Essen European Council Summit in 1994 when German initiative to facilitate the incorporation of the Visegrad countries in the EU was conspicuous and in 1999 when Germany was the president of the Council, it had made enlargement one of the priorities of its presidency period.

interests adequately and represent them in intergovernmental negotiations (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000: 22-26).

The view of the fragmented style of European policy making in Germany is reinforced by policies concerning the eastern enlargement of the EU and German enlargement policy was not at all times dominated by the Chancellery or the Foreign Ministry. Some ministries saw the Visegrad countries primarily in terms of their *security/geo-political or economic significance* for the idea of European Union, i.e. in terms of stabilisation, markets and the growing together of the continent, which for example included the Ministry of Defence and the Economics Ministry.⁶⁵ On the other hand there were those ministries that had domestic clientele, in particular the Ministry for Agriculture, the Transport or Construction Ministries. Thus the enlargement policy of Germany was increasingly determined by functional interests which transcend the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic politics and was influenced by domestic political considerations which are supported by *different* ministries for *different* reasons. This fact also increased the extent to which societal actors take an interest in foreign policy.

The fact that the clientele ministries had such influence reinforces the argument that co-ordination is difficult to achieve in a policy-making process as fragmented as is the German case. However this should not lead inevitably to a negative conclusion about institutional pluralism gone wild. While the federal ministries involved and the *Laender* undoubtedly worked hard to defend their particular institutional 'possessions'

⁶⁵ However the Economics Ministry, pressured by specific domestic concerns, takes a different view of Germany's overall interest in the stabilisation of East Central Europe from the Foreign Ministry. This view is reinforced by the calls of then Finance Minister Waigel that the Eastern enlargement should not cost one more *pfenning* more to the German tax payer (*Le Monde*, July 25, 1995). Of course it is illusory to assume that the CAP or the Regional Development Fund could be extended to the new members without being more costly. Yet the need to demonstrate domestically that the German government was not wasting any money was crucial at a time when the country was in obvious financial crisis (Tewes, 1997: 24-25).

in the accession negotiations, none of them ever questioned the desirability of eastern enlargement in principle, and most of them have taken active steps to facilitate enlargement. There has developed a mass of activities led by German policy actors which-albeit highly sectorised and profoundly uncoordinated-were doing much to put the groundwork of an enlarged EU in place. Still though with the Schröder government the Finance Ministry gained importance in EU affairs, enlargement was in the main a concern of EU 'high politics'. This gave the triumvirate of lead EU policy departments-the Foreign Office, and periodically the Chancellor's Office-the leeway to make progress on the overarching German interest in stabilisation/security (Tewes, 1997: 11-12).

What were the priorities of the German executives in their European policies during the intergovernmental negotiations in the 1990s? Due to economic links, cultural affinity and a number of preferences in foreign and domestic policy, Germany had a good relationship with the Visegrad countries and had important interests in maintaining this good relationship. Hyde-Price and Handl (2001) argue that Germany came to see itself, and came to be seen, as the Visegrad countries' advocate vis-à-vis the European Union and the importance of these countries within Germany's foreign policy orientation gradually grew.

In the beginning, in the early 1990s, no serious strategy had been employed for the Visegrad countries' eventual accession to the EU. In March 1991, Chancellor Kohl said no more on the topic than;

"Of course the Visegrad countries would have to fulfill the necessary conditions. All of us hope that they will reach this aim soon; we have to make our contributions too" (Kohl's speech published in *Bulletin* no. 33, March 22, 1991, pp. 241-247).

Instead of the term enlargement, German politicians at that time pointed out that the Visegrad countries needed a '*European perspective*'. The most important

reason for that was that the German federal government was preoccupied with events in the German Democratic Republic. One of the other reasons for not promoting a rapid enlargement was that if the Kohl government had pressed for a rapid enlargement at this early stage, it would have risked a profound diplomatic rupture with its western partners, in particular with France. Because of its size and past Germany was much more distrusted and it could not act as explicitly as for example Britain did.⁶⁶

In September 1992 the Visegrad countries, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, issued a declaration in the context of their Visegrad summit expressing profound dissatisfaction with the progress on closer association. The message was clear, they wanted to accede to the EU, and they *expected* German support. In the bilateral treaties with Poland (signed in June 1991) and Hungary and Czechoslovakia (both signed in February 1992), Germany stated its intention to support the Visegrad countries' efforts for EU membership (Phillips, 2000: 92-96). Germany's pledge to support an eventual EU accession of its eastern neighbours was relatively discretionary but remained *non-committal*.

By the end of 1992 things started to change. The outcomes of the August 1991 Moscow coup led to the image of the Visegrad countries as a potentially unstable backyard, which, through immigration, organised crime and environmental risks could threaten the security and well-being of German society. Thus, although German business may have seen the Visegrad countries primarily in terms of export opportunities and cheap labor, German policymakers began to see it primarily in terms of its potential for instability. As Ludger Kühnhardt pointed out:

⁶⁶ At that time, rapid enlargement did have proponents, most notably the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In August 1990 Thatcher came out unequivocally in favour of widening the Community. In a speech cited in *The Times* on August 6, 1990, she stated that, "If we set off down the path of giving more power to highly centralised institutions, which are not democratically accountable, we will then make it harder for the East Europeans to join".

“For good reasons it is especially up to Germany to promote the *Westbindung* of its immediate eastern neighbours. Germany will only be redeemed of its old, often conjured upon *Mittellage*, if it has but western countries on its immediate eastern border” (Kühnhardt, 1994).

EU membership was a crucial element of this stabilisation strategy. Thus the German Chancellery and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to state the need for a coherent strategy for the economic and political inclusion of the Visegrad countries into the EU structure. In October 1992 Kohl said in a speech on the basic principles of his thinking on Europe:

“The fact that there are candidates for membership says something favourable about the European Community. I especially mean Poland, Hungary, the Czechs and Slovaks and the Baltic States. Even though not in this decade, I regard an *enlargement* towards these countries as possible at some point early in the next century” (Kohl’s speech on 3rd party protocol of the CDU, October 26-28, 1992, Düsseldorf).

In being so open in its views, by the end of 1992 Germany began to be regarded as the Visegrad countries’ natural advocate in the EU.

As early as spring 1993, Kohl had called for an invitation to the heads of government of the Visegrad countries to the European Council summits. Tewes (2002) argues that this is because of the realisation that not enough had been done for these countries and that a political overture might give a sign of encouragement. A symbolic sign would not be costly-an important point at a time when the state of public finances of EU member states in general and Germany in particular were becoming increasingly bad. The uncertainties of Russian politics in the last months of 1993, the return to power of post-communist parties in Hungary and Poland and the ongoing war in Bosnia all reinforced the desire for the integration process to expand (Tewes, 2002: 124). Also German politicians had the desire to ensure that the stabilisation of the Visegrad countries was seen as an obligation for the *whole* of Western Europe, not just for Germany, and attempted to engage the member states of the EU into a *more active policy* towards the East (Tewes, 2002: 101).

It is important to keep in mind that the EU decision about enlargement would be taken by unanimity, meaning that all members had to agree with enlargement. Within Moravcsik's model which takes the national interests of member states as crucial in EU bargaining process and negotiations, the need to reach unanimity on enlargement necessitates that the national interests of member states be compatible with those of Germany. Therefore in the bargaining processes of the EU, German executives have tried to converge the general economic, political and security interests of all 15 member states. While becoming the advocate of the Visegrad countries for their EU membership, it was of paramount importance for them to increase awareness in the West that potential eastern instability was *not* just a threat to Germany but instead would affect the *whole* continent. They made sure that enlargement had to be pushed through the EU institutional framework. This meant that other member states had to come on board. With regard to other member states, this involved the classical tools of diplomacy: pressure, persuasion and incentives, while ensuring that the German position was covered by a majority (Tewes, 2002: 38). The Chancellor said already in 1991:

“I hope this contribution (i.e. towards stability in the Visegrad region), which we pay out of our budget, will be recognised as a contribution in the interest of the whole of the West. By promoting reforms and especially the transition to a social market economy, we contribute to security and stability in the *whole of Europe*” (*Bulletin*, no.33, March 22, 1991, p.247).

This led to the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, in the *communiqué* of which an eventual *accession* of the Visegrad countries to the EU was mentioned for the first time (Tewes, 1997: 19). Again it is difficult to evaluate the precise German input in the Copenhagen negotiations. One can only study the priorities of the German government. Before the Copenhagen Summit, then foreign minister Genscher had asserted for almost a year that Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia should be EU

members by the end of the century. Kohl had assured Skubiszewski ⁶⁷ at a private dinner that he would be Chancellor of Germany until the Visegrad countries acceded to the EU. Publicly, German politicians began to assert that the Oder-Neisse line could not be allowed to remain the eastern border of the European Union.

This increasing outspokenness in favour of enlargement was matched by the assertion of the ministries with an interest in the long-term stabilisation of the Visegrad countries (the Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry and the Economics Ministry) over the ministries with a primary interest in the protection of domestic economic interests (chiefly the Ministry for Agriculture, the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry for Transport). This vindicated the previous assertion about the Chancellery's centrality in German European policy and that the role of *enlargement proponent* and the importance of *stability* within the enlargement process had become an official German position (Tewes, 2002: 100). ⁶⁸

Kohl reiterated in the spring of 1994 that relations with the associated countries would be one of the priorities of the German presidency. The proposals for a regular inter-ministerial dialogue, the *Structured Dialogue*, were endorsed first in a joint article in *Le Monde* by Kohl and Eduard Balladur, then French Minister, in May 1994. The German initiative received special momentum because the proper association agreements were now in place clearing the road for an application from the associated states for EU membership. Hungary and Poland applied in the spring of 1994, increasing the pressure on the EU to respond. The German announcement encouraged

⁶⁷ Krzysztof Skubiszewski had directed foreign policy in Poland in five governments beginning with Mazowiecki in August 1989. Skubiszewski guided Poland through a tumultuous period during which Warsaw reclaimed full sovereignty in foreign affairs for the first time since World War II and moved resolutely to 'rejoin Europe'.

⁶⁸ The Economics Ministry, pressured by specific domestic concerns, takes a different view of Germany's overall interest in the stabilisation of the Visegrad countries from the Foreign Ministry.

the Commission to come up with new proposals, like a new use for PHARE money and first proposals for the adoption of the Single Market legislation.

At that time it became fairly predictable that the German initiative would be adopted at the Essen Summit in December where Germany was presiding. At the end of the negotiations, the *Structured Dialogue* that gave the Visegrad countries a genuine prospect of membership, was a considerable *German* achievement, particularly in the form of its initiation at Essen, where the heads of state from the associated countries attended the European Summit at Kohl's invitation.

As a result by the end of 1994, the German politicians had become *increasingly* outspoken about their role as an advocate of the Visegrad countries' EU membership. The official German stance at that time was twofold: Enlargement had to be portrayed as a tremendous opportunity for the entire EU *and* costs and benefits had to be portrayed as unquantifiable for the time being. Therefore, with the *German* initiative in the Essen European Council the Commission was charged with the preparation of a White Paper on the steps the associated Visegrad countries would have to undertake in order to prepare for the Single Market. The publication of the White Paper showed that the costs of adjustment had to be carried by the *associated countries* and its adoption at the Cannes Summit in June 1995 constituted the point of no return for the *eastern* enlargement process (Tewes, 2002: 117).

At the same time two parliamentarians of the CDU/CSU caucus, its leader Wolfgang Schaeuble and its foreign policy spokesman Karl Lamers published a paper under the modest name 'Reflections on European Politics' in September 1994. The significance of this paper was twofold. Firstly, Schaeuble and Lamers emphasised that *deepening* western integration, reforming the institutions, going forward with the European monetary union, remained a vital German aim. Secondly, they asserted

clearly that EU enlargement was also an important German aim. The paper foresaw the accession of the Visegrad countries (plus Slovenia) for the year 2000 and even suggested that the Visegrad countries would not have to adopt the full *acquis communautaire* upon their accession into the EU. In addition they also warned that:

“If other EU member states chose not to support the stabilisation of Central and Eastern Europe, Germany might be called upon, or tempted by its own security concerns, to try to effect the stabilisation of Eastern Europe on its own and in the traditional way” (Schaeuble and Lamers, 1994).

Thus, they assisted in constructing security/stability as an important factor in German foreign policy and stressed strongly the German determinism for ensuring security/stability.⁶⁹

When we come forward to the year 1996 and look at the German bargaining position in the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that lead to the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, we see that enlargement of the EU had become a more important priority for the German policy makers than achieving a deepening. German policy makers were firmly intent on blocking all decisions on policy reform from the agenda of the IGC fearing an opposition to enlargement if such a debate were unleashed. They ignored the wild estimates of the EU’s budgetary expenditures in the case of its eastern enlargement, arguing that these relied on the assumption that current policies would not be reformed, and that in any case these estimates did not account for the benefits that EU member states would receive from enlargement.

The question of which countries to accept first also revealed a clear German priority for the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Visegrad

⁶⁹ This paper was not a government proposal, neither coming from the Chancellory nor from the Foreign Office but from two parliamentarians who were interested in foreign policy. Yet Schaeuble’s domestic status added substantial weight to the proposals of the paper. In addition it is commonly accepted wisdom that Kohl had read and accepted the paper in June but had asked the authors to postpone its publication for fear it would be mistaken as the government’s agenda for Germany’s EU presidency. It can therefore be assumed that the ideas expressed in the paper, although not official German policy, reflected on the thinking of the closest governmental circles. (Tewes, 1997: 21)

countries, to full membership. With the addition of Slovakia, these countries had of course been the first to be associated with the EU. They were also geographically closest to the EU-another way of saying that they were closest to Germany-and were perceived to be the most advanced in their transformation process. For Germany, especially an enlargement without Poland in particular was unimaginable and unacceptable. At that time a difference had also emerged between the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry. Whereas Kohl wanted to voice his support for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic publicly, the Foreign Ministry restrained by diplomatic behaviour and unwilling to face comments from those countries not mentioned by Kohl, urged caution. Not even the Foreign Ministry's restraint, however, could conceal that Germany's priority lay with its immediate eastern neighbours. Hyde-Price (2000) argues that the decision of the Luxembourg Summit to invite the five Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus to commence enlargement negotiations in the first half of 1998 was an exclusively *German* achievement.

The advocacy of the Visegrad countries' EU membership continued with the new Social Democrat-Green government as well. The Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has stated that:

“For the German state it is very important to establish the conditions for the enlargement of the EU. Germany takes it seriously that the EU should not stop at the German eastern border. Therefore Germany has been declaring especially in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and elsewhere that it would always be a trustworthy broker of enlargement” (Speech during the 14th Session of the German *Bundestag*, December 10, 1998).

The Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer would also characterise Germany as “being one of the EU member states who is mostly working for a fast and smooth enlargement” (Fischer's speech in the *Bundestag*, September 16 1999).

Thus though Germany has started to be increasingly outspoken about its advocacy of the Visegrad countries' EU membership, the fact that this is finding

support from the other EU member states and becoming an *institutional choice* of the European Union, leads to the view that the national interests of the member states *are* compatible with Germany's national interests:

The 'shared' reasons for supporting the German position on EU enlargement policies are detailed further below:

1. With eastern enlargement, the potential instability on Germany's eastern border would be eliminated, available resources could be dedicated to the economic modernisation of the transforming countries, and all EU members would benefit from the rapid development and high import demands of the Visegrad countries.

2. If eastern enlargement were postponed for any reason, there would be greater emphasis on German-Visegrad co-operation. As the closest neighbour to the Visegrad countries, Germany would be more careful to ease potential instability in the region and to divert more of its resources there. This would prove to be damaging for other EU member states which had been benefiting from the German contribution to the EU structural funds.

3. In the case of non-enlargement, Germany would make more extensive use of the production capabilities in the Visegrad countries and it would emerge as a more competitive economy within the EU. This would affect the intra-EU balance (Inotai, 1999: 174).

4. Though Germany continues to be the most dominant country in the region, the other countries have substantial interests in this region as well (Hughes and Grabbe, 1998: 28). This can be seen in the re-orientation of Visegrad countries' trade flows that has taken place since 1989 with the Union today accounting for 60 percent of these countries' trade. While Eastern European exports to the EU have grown significantly, these have been exceeded by imports from the EU, leading to the

development of an overall EU trade surplus with most of Eastern Europe, even in agriculture. The table below shows the increase in trade between the Visegrad countries and the EU between the years 1989 and 1996:

Table 2: Foreign Trade of the Visegrad countries (in percentage terms)

	Exports to 1989	Exports to 1996	Imports from 1989	Imports from 1996
EU 15	20	65	32	68
Russia	22	13	18	8

Source: EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 1997

Arguments against eastern enlargement:

On the other hand, assuming an expansion on the basis of predominantly unchanged EU rules the disadvantages of the eastern enlargement would arise in various areas:

1. Direct additional costs to the EU budget would result from the new member countries' access to structural funds and their membership of the Common Agricultural Policy. Given the fact that GDP per head in the new member-states is half that of the average in the current EU-15, in terms of purchasing power standards many people in the old EU expected that the poor newcomers would strain the EU's budget to the limit. For example the Dresdner Bank had calculated that enlargement to ten new member states would cost € 44 billion in 2005 alone if the new members received the same structural, cohesion and agricultural aid as the current members. Under this assumption, the EU would have to increase its budget by 50%, which would require raising its own resources ceiling of 1.27 percent of GDP to 1.4% of GDP. It also meant that Germany's net contribution to the EU would *double* to €21 billion (www.euractiv.com).

2. Adjustment costs for EU producers would occur in areas where the Visegrad countries push into the market. Modernisation of agriculture in the Visegrad countries

would put pressure on agricultural prices. Adapting the Visegrad countries' agricultural markets and their order to the Common Agricultural Policy would constitute a destructive development (Dauderstaedt and Lippert, 1996: 10).

3. Freedom of movement and of residency could lead to mass migration due to great differences in per capita income between the countries. There would be additional costs relating to unemployment benefits in those countries where migrating or commuting Visegrad citizens push EU citizens out of their jobs. This would also lead to considerable social and political problems (Dauderstaedt and Lippert, 1996: 10). .

4. The EU institutions which after the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) enlargement in 1995 have become rather unwieldy would need to be drastically reformed in order to avoid overburdening them. The Council, Commission and Parliament in the EU of the '15 plus' would need new rules as well as new composition and decision-making processes. A decrease in the efficiency of Community institutions in their ability to formulate decisions and policies would undermine their legitimacy in the medium term (Dauderstaedt and Lippert, 1996: 11).

Despite the presence of the above listed disadvantages against eastern enlargement, the decision of the EU to go forward with the eastern enlargement process shows that the interests of the 15 EU member states have converged in the form of general interests and Germany has been successful in persuading and convincing its partners of the inevitability of the eastern enlargement.

The section below will now recast the history of the relations between Turkey and the EU in order to show how the process for Turkey's EU membership worked in a reverse manner to the case of the Visegrad countries. This section will be in particular divided into two: during the Cold War and the end of the Cold War as

Turkey already had a EU membership perspective by its Association Agreement during the Cold War and the parameters surrounding the end of the Cold War have also affected the relations between Turkey and the EU to a great deal.

Turkey and the EU:

Potential Turkish membership as the institutional choice:

During the Cold War:

Shortly after the European Economic Community was founded by the Rome Treaty in 1957, Turkey applied for membership on July 31, 1959 under article 237 of the Rome Treaty. The European Union examined Turkey's application cautiously. Turkey's underdeveloped economy was a more important concern for the EU than its unstable democracy. They did not want Turkey's low level of economic development to stand in the way of European economic integration. However, certain factors turned the relationship between Turkey and the EU to the advantage of Turkey:

- The EU had signed an association treaty with Greece in July 1961, and European policy makers, aware of the need to strike a balance in their relations with the two countries, started to change their attitude towards Turkey.

- The Cold War also prompted members of the EU to consider the strategic positions of Turkey and Greece, as they were front-line states with economies that needed to be strengthened for the sake of political stability.

- The inclusion of more members would reinforce the advancement of this very new integration process.

These factors convinced European policy-makers to give up their economic objections to Turkey's accession, and the signing of the Ankara Agreement on September 12, 1963 followed which established Turkey's association with the EU.

The Ankara Agreement consisted of three stages. The final stage involved the establishment of a full customs union between Turkey and the EU, alignment of the Turkish tax structure with that of the EU, and integration of Turkey into the Common Agricultural Policy. The realisation of the final stage would lead to full membership as stipulated under article 28 of the Ankara Treaty.

However, things did not go as smoothly as planned. A military coup took place in Turkey in March 1971. Though not as violent as the first coup in 1961, it still led to a period of instability in Turkish domestic politics and the imposition of martial law. The EU began to be disturbed by these frequent military interventions in Turkish democracy. Furthermore, disagreements had started to form between EU members and Turkish policy-makers over some of the economic terms of the Ankara Treaty, which led to serious tensions between Turkey and the EU.

A number of external factors contributed to the deterioration of relations between Turkey and the EU. Economic difficulties brought on by the enlargement of the Community in 1972, the recession followed by the 1973 oil crisis, and disagreements over Cyprus in 1974 further raised doubts in the EU concerning Turkey's inclusion. Still, the Third Financial Protocol was signed on May 2 1977, "aiming in particular to provide Turkey with a better economic infrastructure, higher agricultural output, and modern more efficiently-run enterprises in the industrial and service sectors, whether they are publicly or privately managed" (Eralp, 1997: 28).

The initial tensions worsened as Europe embarked on a Global Mediterranean Policy and signed the Lome Convention to intensify its relations with certain Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. The concessions given to the Mediterranean countries led to a reduction in economic aid to Turkey, and strengthened distrust in Turkey about the EU's impact on the Turkish economy. The

tension among Turkish industrialists intensified and caused Prime Minister Ecevit to freeze the terms of the Association Agreement in October 1978.

At the same time, the EU had seriously begun to consider the inclusion of the newly democratised Mediterranean countries within its structure. The formation of new political attitudes in these countries shifted the emphasis from the economic criteria for membership to the promotion of democracy. This new attitude added to tensions between the EU and Turkey, due to the military interventions in its democracy.

Subsequently, as the military took power again in September 1980, relations between Turkey and the EU worsened. In a response to the military coup, the EU froze the Association Agreement and suspended Turkey's membership in the Council's Parliamentary Assembly. However, relations were not completely severed, as the Fourth Financial Protocol could still be ratified in June 1981.

The EU's attitude began to harden following the National Security Council's decree in October 1981 dissolving all political parties in Turkey and the consequent detention of many leading politicians. Reports prepared by some members of the EU about human rights problems in Turkey were additional factors in the formulation of the EU's negative attitude towards Turkey's possible membership. As a result, the Commission decided to delay the implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol, and the European Parliament passed a resolution on January 22, 1982 suspending the Joint Committee of the Turkish-European Parliament (Balkir and Williams, 1993: 31-32).

Further problems in the relations between the EU and Turkey began with the accession of Greece into the EU in 1981. As a full member of the EU, Greece brought its bilateral disputes with Turkey into the Union, and its frequent usage of its veto

power against Turkey made it more difficult for any favourable decision towards Turkey to be made in the EU:

The new Prime Minister of Turkey, Turgut Özal, who came to power after the 1983 general elections, facilitated improvement in relations with the Union, and Turkey's full membership became a central theme of his foreign policy. He embarked on a serious programme of economic liberalisation to open up the Turkish economy to European investment and prepare the Turkish economy for integration into the community. As a result, the EU decided to reactivate the Association Agreement, though it did not give up its demand for the enhancement of democracy in Turkey. Shortly after this reactivation, relations with the EU had more or less recovered and on April 14, 1987, Turkey submitted an official application for full membership. Both the members of the Union and also leading politicians and advisors to Özal thought for various reasons that the Turkish application for membership was untimely. The member states were still in the process of absorbing the new members, Spain, Greece and Portugal, into the structure of the EU. They had recently embarked upon a programme towards a single internal market and new decision-making procedures for its smooth operation. These developments affected the inner economy of the EU significantly and raised the economic standards needed for the integration of new applicants. This made Turkey's absorption into the EU, with its large and undeveloped economy, very unlikely (Mastny, 1996: 209).

The Commission delivered its opinion on Turkey's request for accession to the Union on December 18, 1989. Apart from considering Turkey's negative economic impact on the ongoing internal integration of the EU, the Commission concluded that there were a number of factors that made it impossible for Turkey to join the Union at this time, such as the need to expand political pluralism and to improve human rights,

the ongoing dispute with a member state (namely Greece), and the lack of any feasible solution to the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, the Commission confirmed that Turkey was *eligible* to be a member of the EU, suggested the reactivation of the Association Agreement, and proposed a set of measures for increasing interdependence between the Union and Turkey (Cayhan, 1997: 321). The Commission's position on Turkey was largely shared by member states, but proposals to strengthen relations with Turkey were mostly handicapped by the veto of Greece.

At the time, Turkey was disappointed but did not react strongly. The general interpretation of the Commission's opinion within Turkish academic circles was optimistic, since the opinion reaffirmed Turkey's fundamental eligibility to become a full member, and encouraged it to come closer to Europe. However, the declaration of the Commission's opinion coincided with the collapse of communism, the independence of the Visegrad countries and their moves to join the EU. This period marked a significant deterioration in the relationship between Turkey and the EU, as the problems already existing became more apparent and important with the perceived disappearance of Turkey's obvious geo-political role under Cold War conditions. Within the changing parameters of conditions surrounding the EU, the member states started to prioritise the inclusion of the Visegrad countries rather than Turkey.

After the Cold War:

The prioritisation of the Visegrad countries for EU membership in comparison to Turkey could be seen in the speed with which the Europeans responded to the independence of the Visegrad countries and also the length of time passed between their application for membership and acceptance by the EU which could be seen by the start of the negotiations for EU membership:

Table 3: Time of application for EU membership for all the candidates

Country	Time of Application	Time of Start of Negotiations
Turkey	April 1987 (association agreement dating back to 1963)	Negotiations not started
Cyprus	July 1990	March 1998
Malta	July 1990	February 2000
Hungary	March 1994	March 1998
Poland	April 1994	March 1998
Romania	June 1995	February 2000
Slovakia	June 1995	February 2000
Latvia	October 1995	February 2000
Estonia	November 1995	March 1998
Bulgaria	December 1995	February 2000
Lithuania	December 1995	February 2000
Czech Republic	January 1996	March 1998
Slovenia	June 1996	March 1998

Source: Redmond and Rosenthal, 1998: 57 and www.czech.cz

The difference in attitude of the EU towards the two categories of applicants for EU membership, the Visegrad countries and Turkey, became especially apparent at the Copenhagen and Essen European Council Summits. In Copenhagen in June 1993, and in Essen in December 1994, where serious attempts were made to achieve EU enlargement, Turkey was never mentioned as a candidate for enlargement, and concentration was focused on the incorporation of the Visegrad countries. The framework for the construction of the future of Europe and the expansion of the EU, supplemented by significant aid programs, had made references only to the Visegrad countries, and none of these programmes which aimed to prepare applicants for membership was applied to Turkey.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ At the Copenhagen European Council Summit in June 1993, it was stated that “The associated countries of *Central and Eastern Europe* that so desire shall become members of the Union” (European Council Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen June 1993). At the Essen European Council Summit in December 1994 this was further clarified by the statement that “The objective is to provide a route for

It was for this reason that when the EU made serious attempts to complete the Customs Union, most Turks viewed it with suspicion. The general perception in Turkey was that the EU wanted to sign this agreement with Turkey in order to convince Turkey that it was included in the enlargement process, while the EU's real aim was actually to *control* Turkey strategically and economically but delay its full membership *indefinitely*. Nevertheless, because the Customs Union continued to be regarded by the majority in Turkey as a necessary stage to be taken before full membership, Turkey signed the agreement establishing a customs union with the European Union on March 6, 1995. The Customs Union covered largely industrial and processed agricultural products. Starting from January 1, 1996, all tariff and quantitative barriers, and barriers having an equivalent effect on industrial products, were abolished in trade between the EU and Turkey. Harmonisation of Turkish legislation with the EU legislation in the specified area was also foreseen in the decision. Apart from these technical details and provisions related to the proper functioning of the Customs Union, the package also comprised an Association Resolution concerning the intensification of co-operation in areas not covered by the Customs Union.

Despite this concrete progress in relations between Turkey and the EU, in some respects the implementation of the Customs Union did not prove very advantageous for Turkey. Some academics and businessmen related this to the fact that “the Association on the basis of the Customs Union, when fully implemented, included a lot of administrative, economic and political *constraints* and the fact that Turkey did

the associated countries of *Central and Eastern Europe* as they prepare for accession” (European Council Presidency Conclusions, Essen December 1994).

not take part in the decision making process, except on a consultative basis, created problems for Turkey” (Kabalioglu, 1999: 33).⁷¹

The European Union Declaration Concerning Financial Co-operation was finalised during the Association Council meeting, where Decision 1/95 concerning the Customs Union was taken. A sum of nearly \$3 billion was to be given to Turkey in aid to complete the Customs Union with the EU. Taking into consideration the magnitude of the Customs Union, the amount allocated under financial co-operation was not anywhere near the support made available to member states themselves and the other candidate countries. Moreover, even that aid was blocked by Greece based on its concern about its disputes with Turkey.⁷²

Under Article 28 of the Ankara Association Agreement, Turkey had the legal right to seek full membership following a certain period after the completion of the Customs Union. However, the relationship between Turkey and the EU took the reverse direction, especially in comparison with the Visegrad countries. At none of the European Council Summits following the signing of the Customs Union, was Turkey mentioned in reference to the enlargement process. Agenda 2000 in particular was a big disappointment to Turkey. As an important document laying out the road map for the future of Europe, it invited only the Visegrad countries, the Baltic States, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia to membership, while not even mentioning Turkey. Further disappointment came at the Luxembourg European Council Summit of December 12-13, 1997, where it was decided to launch an *accession process* only for the ten CEEC applicants and Cyprus, confirming that all these states were destined to

⁷¹ From the European side this view was confirmed by Emil Noel, an Istanbul-born bureaucrat, who served as the first Secretary General of the Commission for almost three decades: “such a position can be acceptable for short time before full membership. It cannot be sustainable if membership is denied” (Kabalioglu, 1999: 42).

⁷² Appendix 2 at the end of the thesis presents a table that compares the amount of financial aid given to Turkey and to the CEECs which is further evidence of the serious attempts of the EU to help the CEECs fulfil the Copenhagen criteria while not doing the same for Turkey.

join the EU on the basis of the same criteria and participate in the accession process on the same footing, while excluding Turkey in a most obvious way.

In Turkey, the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council Summit were seen as a watershed in the EU's exclusion of Turkey from the enlargement process and as an obvious example of discrimination between the Visegrad countries and Turkey. It was at this Summit that it was decided that Turkey was not going to take part in this 'comprehensive, inclusive and ongoing process of enlargement', while 'Turkey's *eligibility* for accession to the European Union' was once again confirmed. The European Council took this decision based on its 'political and economic conditions' referring specifically to concerns about human rights violations, the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus, tense relations with Greece, the unfair treatment of minorities (namely the Kurds), and Turkey's poor economy. However, Turkey would be most welcome to what was called 'the European Conference' which was to be a 'multilateral forum for political consultation', intended to address 'questions of general concern to the participants' and deepen their co-operation in foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs and 'other areas of common concern'. Even attendance at this conference was subject to a number of conditions imposed by Greece, apparently at the last minute of the Summit. The Summit also required the Commission to draw up a strategy 'to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the EU in every field' (Kabalioglu, 1999: 43).

The Luxembourg Summit was a summit of deeds, not only words. Therefore even the relatively encouraging formulations which might have pleased Turkey immensely had they been issued by summits in the past were not adequate for Turkish goals (Makovsky, 1999: 196). The discrimination against an associate member for 34 years, a NATO ally for more than four decades, a country with a full customs union

which had thereby adopted all aspects of the Common Commercial Policy of the Union and most of its *acquis* (ranging from competition policy to industrial and intellectual property rights), combined with the inclusion of many post-communist countries in the enlargement process, many of which were still far behind Turkey, not only economically, but also in many aspects of socio-political structure, could not be taken lightly (Kabalioglu, 1999: 47).

The deep resentment of the Turkish governing elites towards the Luxembourg Summit decisions led to the distancing of the Turkish government from the EU. The Turkish government decided to follow a foreign policy that ruled out dialogue with the EU regarding political issues that were not of direct and mutual interest to both parties, and continued only on the economic terms obligated by the Customs Union.

The relations between Turkey and the EU and the prospects for Turkish candidacy began to recover during the Finnish presidency, in the period before the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, when many analysts began to believe that the EU might finally decide to formally accept Turkey as a candidate. Such a change was believed to be possible because of improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey following the earthquakes that hit both countries, and also the *change of government in Germany* that brought a different perspective to the Turkish-German-EU triangle. Though this argument seems to provide the most valid explanation of the change, another factor that has to be emphasised was the Finnish President's important role as the negotiator in the Kosovo conflict, and consequently a much greater awareness of Turkey's geo-political role.

The long-standing problem about Turkey's candidacy was 'solved' at the Helsinki European Council Summit of December 1999 with the declaration of Turkey's candidacy on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate

states. This meant in detail that, building on the existing European Strategy, Turkey would benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support reforms. This would include an enhanced political dialogue. Turkey would have the opportunity to participate in EU programmes, agencies and meetings between the candidate states and the Union in the context of the accession process. An accession partnership would be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions outlining priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of political and economic criteria, the obligations of a member state, and a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis*. With a view to harmonising Turkey's legislation and practice, a process of analytical examination of the *acquis*, similar to the screening exercise undertaken with the negotiating countries, would begin to increase Turkey's understanding of the *acquis*. In addition, an appropriate monitoring mechanism would be established (Helsinki European Council Summit Conclusions, December 10-11 1999).

Despite the 'great' step taken in relations between Turkey and the EU, the declaration of candidacy was not greeted with great joy in political circles in Turkey. It had come very late and after too many tense moments. In comparison with the speed with which the other candidates had already progressed towards full membership, it meant little for the Turkish decision makers.

Intergovernmental bargaining:

Germany and Turkey enjoy multi-faceted and close relations stretching back over many centuries. This close relationship is today characterised by three factors: politically, by Turkey's candidacy for European Union membership which has been openly supported by Germany, on the human level by the presence of approximately 2.4 million people of Turkish origin living in Germany, and by a lively economic exchange. However this relationship has not always been a healthy one. Therefore it is

important to look at this relationship historically to see how the attitude towards Turkey has changed from time to time especially after the German unification process and the end of the Cold War and to which factors is this due.

During the Cold War:

Relations between Turkey and Germany actually date back to 1761, with a developing friendship based on military aid from Prussia to the Ottoman Empire. This military relationship led to the ‘weapons brotherhood’ of the two countries during the World War I. During the Weimar Republic, a Treaty of Friendship was signed between the two countries. During the Third Reich, a large number of academics immigrated to Turkey, helping the Turks to establish modern universities and other educational institutions.

During the Cold War, and especially between the years 1949-1963, Germany and Turkey developed a special relationship as their strategic and economic interests and foreign policies coincided, especially in terms of containing Soviet expansionism and functioning as cornerstones of the American-led Western security system. The division of Germany, the occupation of the western part by the Alliance, and Soviet control of the eastern part, caused Germany to be particularly careful towards threats that could come from the Soviet Union. In this regard, Turkey, situated in a pivotal location on the Bosphorus, as well as bordering the Caucasus and the Middle East, served as a very important bulwark against the Soviet threat. The relationship between Germany and the US, and Turkey and the US, constituted another important element in this. During the sixties, the key to the solution of the German question was sought in its relationship with the US. At the same time, Turkey was seen as an important ally of the US due to its strategic location. This made ‘America's ally’ additionally important for Germany. The reports of German diplomacy at that time can be cited as evidence

for indicating how US policy gave direction to relations between Turkey and Germany (Gürbey, 1994: 40).

Soon this strategic partnership turned into an economic one, as Turkey became the largest source of cheap labour for Germany's growing economy with the Agreement of October 31, 1961 (Alkan, 1995: 3). In return, Turkey benefited from German exports and foreign exchange. As a result of this newly developing relationship Germany began to act as a more enthusiastic advocate of Turkey in almost all European institutions. It even supported the military coup of 1961, as can be seen in the letter sent by Konrad Adenauer to the then Turkish president Cemal Gürsel criticising the old Adnan Menderes regime and supporting the new regime. It supported Turkey's Cyprus policy with the German ambassador of the time commenting that Greek claims on the island were naturally unacceptable to Turkey and that Cyprus geographically belonged to Anatolia. Germany was also supportive towards Turkey's integration with Europe and in the signing of the Ankara Agreement of 1963. The German government at that time stated that it regarded this agreement as “a success that, combined with the membership in NATO will bring Turkey more closer to Europe” (Gürbey, 1994: 39). It was also former German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who tirelessly tried to get Turkey back into European institutions after the military coup of September 12, 1980 (Bagci, 1997: 91).

In return, Turks were among the most enthusiastic supporters of German entry into NATO. As can be seen in reports written at that time, they also showed great concern regarding Germany's divided status and supported German attempts to solve this problem.

Based on this history, Turks always thought that the Germans were their ‘best friends’ in Europe. However, some scholars, among them experts on Turkish domestic

and foreign policy such as Heinz Kramer, Udo Steinbach and Lothar Rühl ⁷³, have warned in their writings and in official discussions with their Turkish colleagues that Germans do not actually share this historical myth of German-Turkish friendship. Even before the end of the Cold War, there were events which signalled some tension in this relationship. The increasing population growth among Turks who had immigrated to Germany, and the declining need for further Turkish workers led the German government to announce a ban on the hiring Turkish workers. This led to sharp protests from Turkey, which at the time was faced with the onset of a serious economic crisis, triggered by the first international oil shock. The second crisis occurred when, in June 1980, the Bonn government decided to require visas from Turkish citizens. Turks interpreted this visa requirement as a case of Germany putting them in the category of second-class citizens.

Nevertheless, the real problems started during the first years of the Kohl government. Since 1982, when he became chancellor for the first time, Kohl had made the issue of immigrants one of the central points of his 'emergency problem'. As early as 1983, he led the Federal Government to push through new legislation to encourage the return of unemployed foreign residents to their homelands. It was especially the German interpretation of article 36 of the Supplementary Protocol to the Ankara Association Treaty, that led to serious tension during the initial years of the Kohl government. This article read: "The freedom of movement of workers between the member states of the Community and Turkey will be established under the principles of Article 12 of the Association Treaty between the end of the 12th and the end of the 22nd year following the coming into force of the said treaty". Since the Association

⁷³ These writers' main arguments can be found in the following publications: Kramer, Heinz (2000), *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*, Brookings Institution Press; Steinbach, Udo (2000), *Geschichte der Türkei*, C. H. Beck Verlag, München and Rühl, Lothar (2002), *Die Türkei zwischen Islam und Moderne, Zeitgeschichtliche Hintergründe aktueller Konflikte IX*, Zurich

Agreement came into force on December 1, 1964, the 22nd year ended on December 1, 1986, meaning that the ‘gradual’ implementation of freedom of movement should be completed by then. The German interpretation of this article came in an official document produced by the government at the beginning of July 1985. Pointing to the wording of Article 12 of the Ankara Treaty, the document stated that the parties to the treaty had agreed to be ‘guided’ by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the treaty establishing the Community. On this basis, the paper declined to grant freedom of movement to people from Turkey concluding that ‘being guided by’ provides open-ended scope only concerning the shaping of this freedom of movement and that Germany was not *required* to give this right to Turkey (Schlegel, 1986: 294).

The problems intensified as Turkey changed leaders. Aside from the personal dislike between Turgut Özal and Helmut Kohl, the pro-Islamist policies of Necmettin Erbakan clashed with the devout Christian Democrat policies of Helmut Kohl, especially in terms of the Christian Democratic Party's definition of the borders of Europe as including only the Christian countries. Hermann notes that:

“The former Chancellor Kohl had his own definition for Europe because he saw himself as the heir of Charlamagne. For Kohl, the Germany-France axis is the heart of Europe and this is a *Catholic* Europe. He therefore said that Turkey being a Muslim country could not be a part of this structure” (Hermann, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 2002).

Still, the strategic importance of Turkey remained influential in German-Turkish relations as long as the Cold War continued and the German reluctance to include Turkey in the European structure was *not* that obvious.

After the Cold War:

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the changing parameters of German foreign policy with the transformations after the end of the Cold War, and in particular the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the new freedom of the Visegrad countries, and

Germany's growing domestic economic problems, had changed the national interests of Germany especially in the immediate period following the re-unification. Turkey's strategic importance for Germany seemed to lose its importance and urgency. Germany's domestic economic problems reduced the potential for a favourable attitude towards Turkey which had the unfortunate characteristic of being too poor and too big. With these changes, problems that had remained invisible in German-Turkish relations became destructive and led to further problems.

The deteriorating relation between Germany and Turkey started to change considerably with the change of government in Germany from a Christian Democrat/Christian Social-Liberal to a Social Democrat-Green coalition. The new government reflected a more open and an inclusive attitude on the subject of Turkey's EU membership. Two days after being appointed as the Chancellor, Schröder made a statement on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic in which he stated that he was going to strive for the development of bilateral relations with Turkey and try to bring Turkey closer to the EU. This attitude strengthened when he received a letter from the Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit during the German presidency of the EU on May 26, 1999 stating that Turkey was ready to fulfil the Copenhagen membership criteria and pledged for better ties with Greece. Schröder responded by saying that he welcomed Ecevit's suggestions and promised to work for a 'positive outcome' to Turkey's ambitions for EU membership.

74

Notwithstanding, Germany was criticised because during its presidency of the EU no concrete results had actually materialised for Turkey. Alongside the stress on

⁷⁴ The Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping had openly declared that: "During its presidency, the German government has done its best to open the European perspective to Turkey and bolster its historical friendship with it" (Scharping, speech in the Turkish Parliament, December 20, 1999).

the need to proceed further with the enlargement process, the German government declared its position towards Turkey in the Cologne European Council Summit concluding its presidency in the following way:

“The German government will work towards a consistent application of the *European Strategy* for Turkey and will make further efforts to ensure that Turkey attends the *European Conference*” (Cologne European Council Summit conclusions, June 1999).

From the Turkish perspective, this statement did not mark a radical change in the German attitude towards Turkish membership. Aside from the fact that the word ‘candidacy’ was not used in the text, it was an earlier Kohl-Kinkel initiative that had reduced the role of the European Conference by making it merely a forum for discussing co-operation among European states on crucial issues but not the issue of *enlargement*. This outcome showed to the Turkish leaders that, though progress had been made following the exchange of letters between the leaders of the two countries in May 1999, the conclusions of the Cologne European Council Summit still did not grant Turkey’s wish as had been expressed in Ecevit’s letter:

“German support for Turkish membership by acknowledging Turkey's efforts to meet the political and economic criteria for membership, calling on the Commission and the Council to initiate a preparation path for Turkey and making the necessary moves to secure the declaration of Turkey's candidate status at equal level with the other candidates” (www.gov.tr) .

German officials answered objections from Turkey by claiming that such statements had actually *been* included in the presidency conclusions but, due to the veto of Greece backed by Italy and Sweden⁷⁵, had to be taken out. Gerhard Schröder stated that: “I wanted to give a sign that would bring Turkey closer to Europe, but this was not accepted by some other delegations”, adding that he would continue his efforts in Helsinki. His advocacy of Turkey’s EU membership was backed by France and Britain.

⁷⁵ This can be given as an example of the importance of convincing other states in the intergovernmental bargainings in the EU in the direction of national interests, in order to reach the institutional choice.

It is a fact that the Kosovo crisis had shunted the Turkish question down the list of priorities to become one of the final items on the agenda in Cologne. With little time left before the EU Summit was to end, Greece succeeded in getting a clause removed from the draft of the Summit's conclusions. The clause that Greece had removed was "The European Council, in association with the other decisions taken on enlargement, will endeavour to take the necessary decisions to bring Turkey into the *enlargement process as an accession candidate on equal footing*". The Greek delegation argued that the EU should not also commit itself to any decision in Helsinki and that the EU needed time to see whether Ecevit's new centre-left/nationalist coalition government would be able to implement its program of wide ranging reforms. Afterwards Schröder stated in a speech he gave in the *Bundestag* on June 8, 1999 that he would not give up his position in advocating equal criteria for Turkish membership (*Milliyet*, June 9 1999).

The months leading up to the Helsinki Summit were full of interesting developments. In August 1999, a major earthquake rumbled through cities in north-western Turkey, killing thousands and forcing thousands more from their homes. Among the first rescuers to arrive on the scene was a team from Greece. The Turks reciprocated when an earthquake struck Greece on September 7. They immediately delivered relief supplies and reconstruction materials. With this rapprochement that was born of the earthquakes that hit the two countries, Greece finally dropped objections to Turkey's closer integration into Europe and assisted Turkey with its application to join the European Union. In addition to this, the overreaching effects of the Kosovo war and the German involvement and the initiative in the Kosovo crisis had brought once again the geo-political importance of Turkey to the fore and led to the strengthening of the support of Germany for Turkey's candidacy.

The Greek withdrawal of its veto, the strengthened German resolve and the Finnish Prime Minister's increased optimism all culminated in the decision of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 which finally gave Turkey its long-desired candidate status.

The 'shared' reasons for supporting the German position on Turkey's EU membership are detailed further below:

1. Just like the Visegrad countries, inclusion of Turkey into the EU for security reasons would not only be to the advantage of Germany, but would be good for the whole European continent. There are also big Turkish communities in France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden as well; thus political reforms in Turkey with consequent stabilisation would help integration of these communities in host societies. As a result, this would prevent instability derived from spill-over of Turkish domestic political problems occurring in these countries.

2. Turkey's strategic location between Europe, Middle East and the Balkans and its role as preserving stability in this region was not only important for the security policies of Germany, but for the *whole* European continent.

Arguments against Turkey's EU membership:

The evaluation that was made in the previous section to show the compatibility of German national interests with those of EU members in regard to *support* for the Visegrad countries' membership also needs to be carried out concerning advantages and disadvantages of potential Turkish membership in the EU. However as can be seen from the arguments listed below, the disadvantages against Turkey's EU membership bid were in respect more numerous:

1. The poor condition of the Turkish economy was seen to be frightening for the members of the EU. The integration of the poor Mediterranean countries such as

Greece, Spain and Portugal had proved so costly that it was understandable that the EU would be reluctant to experience the same difficulties, especially for a 'problematic country with a very big area' (Balkir and Williams, 1993: 28).

2. Linked with this argument was the fear of some of the other EU member states of potential migration from Turkey in case of membership.⁷⁶

3. As the 'Öcalan affair'⁷⁷ in 1998 clearly demonstrated, the internal problems of Turkey could easily spill-over into Europe, not only Germany, but other states as well, disrupting their stability. This was due to the fact that Turkey's internal problems, especially the Kurdish issue and the more assertive presence of Islam in domestic politics, were exacerbated by the direct link that Turkish workers in Europe have with their motherland.

4. The risky geo-political region in which Turkey is located also raises the possibility that it could further bring security risks into Europe. Including Turkey in the European Union would automatically make Turkey's unstable neighbours such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, the immediate neighbours of EU member states. Linked with this is the potential problem for Europeans that could be created by Turkey's leadership and role as model for the newly established Islamic states of Central Asia. The incorporation of Turkey into the EU would then automatically bring in all the Central Asian and Islamic problems and uncertainties, and the volatility and instability of the region.

For these reasons a *pessimistic* perspective would argue that Turkish membership of the European Union would not minimise the security issues of Europe,

⁷⁶ As having the largest Turkish community, Germany is seen as the most important country whose public fears this. However, research conducted in this area shows that British, Dutch and French publics prove to be also very illiberal in their attitudes towards foreign workers in their societies. It was claimed that on a rejection scale of 200, while the western part of Germany ranked 135, France ranked 127 and Britain 114, well above the EU average of 103 (*Eurobarometer* 37 in *Documentation* 1993).

⁷⁷ When Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested and brought back to Turkey in November 1998, Kurds all over Europe demonstrated and made violent protests demanding his freedom.

but would affect the European security system in quite an adverse fashion, making the unstable neighbours of Turkey neighbours of the European Union, and injecting all the internal problems of Turkey into the domestic politics of the EU member states. In their search for a common foreign and security policy, Europeans would be reluctant to accept the political and security problems that Turkey would bring with its membership, and would not desire to become immediate neighbours of the problematic countries of the region.

5. Another concern linked with the above arguments is the potential instability deriving from the problems between Greece and Turkey that could easily be carried into the EU.

In spite of all of these disadvantages Turkey has become a candidate for EU membership with the perspective of becoming a full member. This has been realised as a result of the strong backing of the German SPD-Green government which also showed the radical change of attitude with the previous government of CDU/CSU-FDP. The reasons for this, which also makes up the testing of the three hypotheses formulated in the first chapter, will be analysed in the following chapters.

Summary:

In this chapter the history of both categories of EU membership candidates' wish to be involved in the enlargement of the EU specifically for the period between 1990-1999 (enlargement process of the EU is given as an example of institutional choice of the European Union) was given followed by the German position in the negotiations among the member state governments. It is noted that though German structural power is indisputable in the EU arena it is difficult to measure the exact influence of Germany in the intergovernmental bargaining process which results in the institutional choices of the EU. Moravcsik argues that:

“It is a foundational premise of conventional theories of power and bargaining that influence cannot be analysed without first knowing what *underlying objectives* actors seek to analyse. Therefore an understanding of *domestic politics* is a precondition for the analysis of strategic interaction among states” (Moravcsik, 1998: 21, 1991: 481). “Governments are assumed to act purposively in the international arena but on the basis of goals that are defined *domestically*. Following liberal theories of international relations, which focus on state-society relations, the foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions (Moravcsik, 1991: 481).

In line with the liberal intergovernmentalist approach there are two broad categories of motivation which might account for underlying national interests for and against European integration: these are geo-political and economic interests. Moravcsik’s concept of geo-political interests reflects perceived threats to national sovereignty or territorial integrity; economic interests reflect the imperatives induced by interdependence and in particular, the large exogenous increase in opportunities for profitable cross-border trade and capital movements in the postwar period. It was seen that though Germany was more enthusiastic and quicker to respond to the Visegrad countries’ EU membership bid, the German position reflecting German national interests in intergovernmental negotiations in the EU was supportive towards *both* the Visegrad countries’ and Turkey’s inclusion in the EU. The German government’s supportive attitude towards Turkey’s declaration as a EU membership candidate and its potential EU membership was particularly conspicuous as the previous government had proved itself to be extremely negative towards Turkey’s EU membership bid.

In the following chapters the underlying reasons for the German SPD-Green coalition government’s supportive attitude towards Turkish EU membership will be analysed which will also help to find the precise nature and relative weight of geo-political and economic motivations in the formation of German national interests concerning the enlargement process.

CHAPTER 4: THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction:

This chapter serves primarily as an extension of the section concerning ‘operationalisation of liberal intergovernmentalism’ contained in the second chapter. In line with Moravcsik’s approach to European integration process, the chapter will specifically look at the determinants of the German position in *intergovernmental bargaining* within the EU which has led to the enlargement policy of the European Union being decided as an *institutional choice*. In other words, the two stages of decision making already explored in Chapter 3 will be discussed in greater detail.

Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach purports that:

“It is *national interests* that determine states’ executives’ bargaining positions in international negotiations. These national interests emerge through the interaction of coalitions of *domestic* voters, parties and interests groups with *domestic* institutions and practices of political representation” (Moravcsik, 1993: 501).

In the first chapter the domestic factors that lead to formulation of national interests were characterised as economic, geo-political or cultural factors. This chapter will concentrate chiefly on the economic factors. This is due to the fact that according to the liberal intergovernmentalist approach economic factors are the primary motivations in the bargaining positions of state executives in the international arena.

Therefore in line with the LIG approach, in the first section of this chapter, the German attitude towards the Visegrad countries’ membership will be analysed by establishing the link between the *economic benefits* and *costs* for German national interests and the German attitude as a consequence to the eastern enlargement of the EU. In the second section, the same *economic cost-benefit* analysis of German national interests will be applied to Germany’s attitude towards Turkish membership in the EU.

Operationalisation of the LIG:

Before dealing with the exact details of this analysis, it will be necessary to once again pay attention to Moravcsik's model and the first hypothesis of this research as set out in the first chapter, namely 'Economic factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German 'national interests' (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests'.

As noted in the previous chapter, the concept of 'national interests' has been defined by David Clinton as;

"...a society's sense of its overall common good and interpretation of what makes the state better able to fulfil its obligation of protecting and promoting the good of society" (Clinton, 1991: 50).

Foreign policy is defined by Hyde-Price as;

"...the attempt of a state to influence its *international environment* in order to create *good conditions for realisation of its own national interests*" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 11).

These definitions are compatible with Moravcsik's model, which posits the *direct* extension of a state's national interests into its foreign policy. This is also compatible with the continuation of Germany's multilateral style of foreign-policy making as discussed in the previous chapter. Hyde-Price (2000) pays special attention to German executives' discussion of national interests, which are defined in terms of international cooperation and integration, and suggests that:

"European powers, Germany as an example, are inescapably caught in the web of interdependence and they cannot escape without heavily damaging their own interests" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 126).

It is this concept of *interdependence* which is also analysed by Moravcsik. His model of national interest formation was mainly derived from the liberal theory which

assumes that domestic societal ideas, interests and institutions influence state behaviour by shaping state preferences. These state preferences are constructed within the framework of contemporary theories of *economic interdependence*. The patterns of *international* economic interdependence, the core of so called ‘endogenous’ theories of tariff and exchange policy influence the formulation of national interests concerning international trade and monetary policy *and* as a consequence intergovernmental negotiations. Therefore, the economic interests of domestic groups within a state are influenced by factors that can also exist outside their state’s jurisdiction. In line with this theory of economic interdependence, Moravcsik argues that:

“When there are shifts in the domestic and international economic environment, these directly cause important changes in the priorities, policies and preferences of national governments” (Moravcsik, 1998: 472).

Moravcsik's model also borrows from realist theory. The significance of the rationality of states provides a general framework of analysis within which the *costs and benefits* of this economic interdependence also become influential for the construction of national interests.

Moravcsik’s model of liberal intergovernmentalism then combines these two assumptions and concludes that these are the two main determinants of foreign policy which states bring to the negotiating table in the EU. Governments that come to the negotiating table in the European Union are heavily influenced by the commercial interests of domestic producer groups, interests that reflect respective positions in the *global* market *and* that are made by a careful cost-benefit analysis. Within the intergovernmental bargaining process, all the national negotiating tactics of the executives then tend to be economic in nature. The European Union, Moravcsik argues, can be analysed as a “successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage *economic interdependence* through negotiated policy co-ordination” (Moravcsik, 1994:

574). In exceptional cases geo-political motivations appear to have played an important role. However, even here the concerns of domestic economic interest groups place tight constraints on national policy and repeatedly leaders of member states put most emphasis on economic goals (Moravcsik, 1998: 470-474).

The first component of the first hypothesis has already been analysed in the final section of the second chapter where the linkage between Germany's normalisation (in terms of it becoming more rational/aware of cost-benefit analysis and promoting its national interests more openly) and its domestic economic situation, in particular after the end of the Cold War, was discussed. The main aim of this chapter will be to illustrate how these two factors have transformed German foreign policy in regard to its position towards the EU enlargement, and how this *may* lead to different attitudes towards the Visegrad countries' EU membership on the one hand and Turkish membership on the other.

In order to explicate this transformation of German national interests and foreign policy, this chapter will try to analyse the following assumptions:

1. That the national interests of Germany formulated as a result of *domestic economic factors* lead to support for eastern enlargement.
2. That the national interests of Germany formulated as a result of *domestic economic factors* lead to an unfavourable attitude towards Turkish membership.

EU Enlargement: Germany's Relations with the Visegrad Countries:

"Thanks to Central Europe, Germany is no longer a political dwarf" (Burgess, 1997: 189).

It has been argued by Tewes (1997) that nowhere was Germany's willingness to pursue its national interests firmly in a multilateral structure more explicit than in its policies towards Central Europe. In the following section German *support* for the

Visegrad countries' EU membership will be analysed in detail, taking economic incentives as the primary consideration. This analysis of the German attitude towards the EU enlargement policy is important for a variety of reasons:

1. Though the first steps were taken under the Kohl government, the actual decisions that helped to formulate the German stance on eastern enlargement would be taken under the government of Schröder, who had already made clear his aim of pursuing German national interests more openly. This raises the question of whose decisions are more suitable for a 'normal' Germany.

2. The analysis of the German attitude towards the Visegrad countries and of the contrasting policies in regard to the two different categories of EU membership candidate (the Visegrad countries and Turkey) is important for identifying the factors significant in the construction of national interests, especially the new domestic pressures and economic incentives in Germany after unification.

3. Highlighting German support for the incorporation of the Visegrad countries into the EU structure, rather than adopting a more assertive unilateral approach, is important for showing both the continuity in German foreign policy in terms of multilateral policy-making, and its determination to share the *economic* costs of new engagements in European integration that would prove to be beneficial for the whole continent.⁷⁸

The last two points are especially important for dissecting the two variables of the hypothesis. It is important at this point of our analysis to list the arguments for the assumption that there is indeed a linkage between Germany's domestic economic considerations and national interests. We then must analyse what effect this linkage

⁷⁸ Multilateralism has been defined by Ruggie as "a form of institutionalised co-operation that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct". This also describes the traditional style of German foreign-policy making as mentioned above (Ruggie, 1993: 11). Unilateralism may be defined as "an orientation that maximises self-interest, a principle aimed at limiting commitment while maintaining autonomy of action" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 22).

brings to bear in terms of its attitude towards the bargaining process within the European Union and how this colours its attitude to enlargement of the EU. As the first step in our analysis, the differences in priorities for German domestic politics under the governments of Kohl and Schröder will be examined as the parameters of their policies changed with the changes in the international political environment.

German national interests in supporting eastern enlargement (economic factors):

The Kohl government:

1. The purported argument that there are direct links between national interests and foreign policy has as its best means of support the fact that Germany does use its powerful position in negotiations within the EU to offer direct economic incentives that entail support for eastern enlargement with the principal aim of aiding the construction of its own set of national interests. This example is in keeping with the LIG line of thought.

There are several German foreign policy analysts who support this view. Hyde-Price (2000) suggests that one of the key roles of German foreign policy stems from the fact that it is a trading nation and, that as such; it is expected to concentrate on cultivating *its economic, commercial and financial interests in order to boost the prosperity of its citizens* (Hyde-Price, 2000: 45).⁷⁹ The statements of many other German key policy-makers have also been made along the same lines.

Former German president Roman Herzog, in a speech he made in March 1995, listed the following as German interests: protection and maintenance of social welfare and free trade, expansion of democracy, and completion of European integration. A week later, Wolfgang Ischinger and Rudolf Adam, then director and staff member of

⁷⁹ In a world of intensive globalisation and economic interdependence, producers, exporters and those willing to embark upon foreign direct investment projects would be willing to join in transnational corporations, cross-national strategic alliances and transnational production processes (Hyde-Price, 2000: 45).

the Foreign Ministry's Planning Staff, published an elaborate outline of German foreign policy interests. The essay proposed a mix of continuity and change in German interests. Continuity was especially seen in Germany's continued commitment to *free trade* and to the EU and NATO. *International free trade* would remain a priority for Germany, given its constitutive role in domestic prosperity after World War II (Phillips, 2000: 33).

Therefore, particularly when one considers the information given in the previous chapters concerning the domestic economic conditions of Germany, it was no secret that, in order to finance its social-democratic system and maintain its sound economy, Germany had to strengthen its position in international trade and therefore needed more markets in which to sell its goods. The Visegrad countries, especially Poland and the Czech Republic (being the nearest to Germany geographically) are the most advanced countries in the post-communist world in terms of population, size, and per capita income, with markets enjoying the greatest potential to absorb German goods. Apart from the convenience gained from their physical proximity, these countries traditionally had had strong relations with Germany although these had disappeared with the Soviet domination of the region after World War II. Until the collapse of communism, German economic ties with the whole of Central and Eastern Europe were radically severed and previous German economic enterprises were taken over by the Soviet Union.⁸⁰ However, the history of their relationship and their complementary economic structure with Germany allowed Germany to easily fill the power vacuum that emerged with the disappearance of Soviet hegemony (Kreile, 1996: 147).

⁸⁰ For example, German ownership in countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania became a part of German war compensation to the Soviet Union and served as a basis of creating the so-called Soviet-Hungarian and Soviet-Romanian joint ventures, the economic strongholds of Soviet domination (Berend, 1993: 144).

The crisis and collapse of state socialism and of its isolationist regional trade agreement system (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) which included the Visegrad countries, dramatically changed the economic position of Germany in the region after 1989. Germany embarked on an impressive trade expansion to occupy former Soviet positions in the area and worked actively to promote a German advantage in the most promising sectors in the Visegrad countries' newly-opened markets. Although the Visegrad countries' volume of trade sharply declined and the region's role in world trade dropped by nearly one-third between 1988 and 1990, German imports from the Visegrad countries increased from 19 to 26 billion DM ⁸¹, i.e. by nearly 38 percent. Therefore Germany gained a leading position in the Visegrad countries' trade, accounting for roughly one quarter of the exports and imports of the countries of the region.

Germany assumed an equally determinant position in providing credits to and investment in the Visegrad countries. While most western countries were reluctant to assist, Germany took the initiative and exploited its geo-political advantage, knowledge and tradition regarding the markets of the region. German manufacturers and investors took advantage of the much cheaper, yet highly-skilled labour force (the cost of which ranges from one-sixth to one-tenth that in Germany) to be found just over the border by re-locating production there. In the first years of transition, Germany emerged as the most important single direct capital investor in the Visegrad countries. German companies financed around 40% of foreign capital investment in Poland, 30% in Czechoslovakia, and 20% in Hungary (Phillips, 2000: 40).

On the diplomatic front, German political leaders from the major parties regularly touted their role as the strongest advocates of Visegrad countries' interests in

⁸¹ For the period between 1990-1999, till the start of the usage of euro, the economic indicators will be given in DM. All the economic indicators measured after that time and the ones that were measured in ECU, will be quoted in euros.

western institutions; trying to secure their membership as an EU *institutional choice* (Phillips, 2000: 41). The domestic economic reasons for Germany taking this position in the bargaining process in the EU were thus three-fold:

1) There were considerable economic *benefits* to be gained from eastern enlargement. These can be listed as:

a) Enlargement of the EU to the East would both secure the stability of the Visegrad markets and make them secure for German trade. This would also expand the internal European market for German goods and further boost the German stake in the European market. With the Visegrad countries becoming a more and more profitable site for investment, with comparatively cheap and comparatively highly skilled labour, it would provide an excellent opportunity to intensify the division of labour in industrial production that would be required by economic globalisation (Freudenstein, 1998: 45).

b) Enlargement would add over 100 million consumers with rising incomes to the single market; more consumers with the potential to buy German products.

c) It could create many new jobs in the applicant states, the current EU member states, and Germany. The concept of ‘outsourcing’ should be mentioned here as this argument has become very popular and a new industry has boomed in the framework of outsourcing of the infrastructure of computer networks in particular. In Germany this new market has become highly competitive and even traditional medium-sized companies have overcome their hesitation and turned to outsourcing. The biggest advantage is that external consultants work with the company’s technology and personnel to manage many more projects in a much shorter time. This increased efficiency *can* reduce costs up to 30 percent.⁸²

⁸² Many German companies have started to see outsourcing as economically imperative. For example, the electronics giant Siemens was considering re-locating up to 10,000 jobs in order to cut labour costs.

d) The preparations that the candidate countries are making in order to adapt to EU norms are already making these countries economically strong and creating significant economic growth, especially around the principal cities of Warsaw, Budapest and Prague. Therefore, the inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the EU would lead to their improved performance in terms of economies of scale, higher growth and investment, more technological innovation, and making them stronger partners in trade between the EU and the applicant states. The fact that these countries are neighbours of Germany had the potential to benefit Germany in the longer term due to the dynamic effects of economic integration (Grabbe, 2000: 3).

e) The inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the EU would attract non-EU regions. The Visegrad countries' mix of low labour costs, skilled labour force, EU standards, and free access to the world's largest integrated market could help non-EU investors who desire to be present in the EU market but need low-cost production bases. This would also lead to capital inflows and further add to the strengthening of the Visegrad countries, closing the gap in incomes between Visegrad and EU countries and reducing the risk of migration (Tomann, 1996: 13). Moreover, the Visegrad countries have a history of important economic links with some countries, such as the former Soviet Union, where EU countries were not previously present. Re-establishing these links when demand picks up could become a source of growth and competitive advantage for the Union.

f) Economic integration with the Visegrad countries could also affect the competitiveness of Western European industries if the region proves to be an area of

And it is not only the IT sector which is estimated to have lost around 70,000 jobs last year as a consequence of the allure of lower costs abroad. The airline Lufthansa was to move large parts of its accounting department and its purchasing activities to Poland and car maker Volkswagen already has begun to build around 13% of its vehicles in the Visegrad countries. Furthermore the president of the DIHK federation of chambers of commerce, Ludwig Georg Braun, advised companies "not to wait for better policies, but to act and take advantage of the opportunities offered" by the eastward expansion of Europe (<http://fistfuleuros.net/archives/000492.php>).

dynamic growth and low production costs. This could bring about structural changes in western European industry if cheaper Visegrad countries' inputs and market opportunities for EU firms to expand in the Visegrad countries result in greater competitiveness in the parts of Western Europe most integrated with the Visegrad region.

g) On the other hand, if the EU did not enlarge to the East there were certain risks in terms of blocking the economic benefits (in other words high opportunity costs to delaying the accession of the Visegrad countries):

- Any delay to the entry of Eastern European candidates into the European Union could cause the intensified foreign direct investment inflows into the Visegrad countries to drop and the consequent decline in investment and trade would in turn slow down the process of industrial restructuring that is essential to improving the applicants' competitiveness. The benefits of dynamic economic integration with these countries would disappear in this respect.

- As the levelling effect of common rules under the Single Market would be left incomplete, it would be more difficult for economic agents to operate in the Visegrad countries' markets.

- If the prospect of EU membership disappears, the enormous incentive to reform economies and institutions quickly and radically would disappear also, and this would increase protectionism and threaten the continuity of reformist governments.

Therefore, the virtuous cycles of reform, FDI, restructuring and growth that are now evident in the Visegrad countries could be reversed (Grabbe, 2000: 5).⁸³

⁸³ This outcome can also be related to another aspect of Moravcsik's model where he suggests that the "Threat of exclusion from international co-operation might result in certain compromises for some nation states" (Moravcsik, 1993: 502). In such a case, the threat of the failure of the Visegrad countries' EU membership applications might even be adequate to help reduce any potential scepticism that German politicians may have towards Visegrad EU membership.

2) Though not directly based on domestic economic interests, another reason why Chancellor Kohl supported the Visegrad countries' inclusion in the EU was in order to allay the fears of his western partners about possible assertive behaviour towards Germany's eastern neighbours or, as Hyde-Price puts it, "a potential return to the concept of *Mittleuropa*" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 182).⁸⁴ The fact that this policy started during the time of Kohl's chancellorship is important due to the significance of 'collective memory' in his European policies. Because of the effects of World War II on his vision of foreign policy, he had always been determined to convince his partners of Germany's role as a team player and as merely one among equals, with a relatively low profile in the region in which Germany used to have hegemony prior to World War II. The initial bilateral aid from Germany to the Visegrad countries, and the amount of foreign direct investment Germany had sent to the region had already been seen as a potential increase of German hegemony in the region; and Kohl felt that he should alleviate these concerns.

3) The final argument is related to the necessity of *sharing* the costs of enlargement. In the beginning, Germany's technical aid initiatives towards its eastern neighbours to stabilise their democracies and political structures were mainly ad-hoc, without a strategic orientation or coherent concept. However, from 1994 onwards, the government decided to co-ordinate all technical assistance through the *Transform* programme, which was estimated to be spending around 300 million DM in the Visegrad region. This assistance depended on a number of criteria: in addition to the request from the recipient countries in relation to their needs, it also took into consideration Germany's foreign, economic and political interests, and the recipient country's political and economic significance for the region. The channelling of the aid

⁸⁴ The concept of *Mittleuropa* is defined by Naumann as "a zone of German economic and political domination stretching across much of Central and Eastern Europe" (Naumann, 1916).

to specific regions, primarily to the countries bordering Germany such as Poland and the Czech Republic, is significant in showing that this assistance was highly sensitive to Germany's defined national interests (Hanson and Spohn, 1994: 146).

However, soon this financial assistance proved to be very costly, as Germany itself was experiencing economic difficulties derived from the re-unification process. After a certain period, as the public (already dissatisfied with the growing economic difficulties caused by unification) began to demand more sharing of the burden of eastern enlargement with the other member states, the enormous task of stabilising these countries in a bilateral framework ceased to be seen as a foreign policy goal. It was at the 1994 Essen European Council during the German presidency that the German government first openly announced its intention to incorporate its eastern neighbours into the EU structure, and made the initial effort to convince its partners to share both the burdens *and* the benefits of the eastern enlargement for the whole European continent. This development also fits the cost-benefit analysis that Moravcsik employs when analysing incentives for the decisions of states delegating or pooling their sovereignty to international institutions. Moravcsik suggests that:


“Intergovernmentalist theory views the decision to adopt delegation to common institutions as the result of a cost-benefit analysis of the stream of future substantive decisions expected to follow from alternative institutional designs” (Moravcsik, 1993: 509).

To relate this suggestion to this research, within the framework of the cost-benefit analysis of its national interest formation, Germany would be better off trying to include the Visegrad countries into the EU structure than helping them unilaterally.

This is further proved by the results of the two questions consecutively asked in in-depth-interviews conducted in the time period between February-June 2000 in

Berlin to test the hypotheses of this research. This question was asked to a total of 86 people ⁸⁵:

Table 1: The form of the German attitude towards the Visegrad countries taken concerning their inclusion in the EU (N=86)




Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

Showing strong support for the *multilateral style* of German foreign policy-making, 79.40% of respondents indicated that bilateral aid to the Visegrad countries should be complemented by a multilateral approach. This again implies that, besides the bilateral aid Germany has been providing to the Visegrad countries, it should also advocate the incorporation of the Visegrad countries into the EU structure.

⁸⁵ Out of this number 20 people were Foreign Ministry officials, one person was from the Chancellor's office, two people were state secretaries, three people were bureaucrats, one person was the retired former German ambassador to Turkey, 19 people were SPD members of the parliament, 12 people were CDU members of the parliament, two people were CSU Members of parliament, five people were Green Party members of the parliament, two people were the FDP members of the parliament, two people were PDS members of the parliament, seven members were members of the European Parliament and nine people were civil servants and assistants to some of the people whom I could not speak to.

Table 2: The reasons for Germany preferring a multilateral approach towards the Visegrad countries (N=86)



Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

In this question because each person had more than one answer, the percentages relate to the *responses* not the *respondents*. The response to this question shows that the perception of the respondents is that, in fulfilling German national interests, in particular the endeavour to preserve its *stability* by preventing potential instability in its eastern neighbours' backyards, the best way is multilateralism, or in other words, through the EU. 35.3% of the responses show that this is the most significant reasoning that underpins the German government's continuing emphasis on multilateralism. Gerd Andres, Parliamentary State Secretary for Ministry of Employment and Social Order and Michael Klepsch, an official from the European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have stated that:

“Preserving the stability of Germany is the most significant national interest at the moment and the best way to do that would be through including the Visegrad countries, Germany's neighbours, in the EU”.

On the other hand, 21.80 of the responses show economic reasons as the most important reasoning for German multilateral approach to the eastern enlargement.

21.4% of the responses indicate the view that this is not only in the interests of Germany but also for the continent as a whole, from both economic and security/geo-political perspectives, thus helping the Visegrad countries *has to* be in multilateral form.

For both economic and geo-political/security/stability reasons, the respondents believed that Germany had to convince its partners concerning eastern enlargement. Rainer Eberle, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated the logic behind this as:

“Especially from the geo-political point of view, the inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the EU is a must for Germany. The dominant reasoning in Europe is that Germany will feel the bulk of the effects of enlargement so it is being very careful not to antagonise its partners and tries to convince them to take part in this process by stressing the inevitability of eastern enlargement”.

Martin Kremer, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attracted attention to the fact that:

“Germany *always* tries to achieve its national interests through the EU. Otherwise its goals would be unacceptable for its western partners because of its past deeds”.

Detlef Küster, another official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attracted attention to another necessity for eastern enlargement:

“In order to secure the Visegrad countries’ stability, their infrastructure has to be strengthened. Germany cannot do that alone; it has to be helped by its western partners”.

Below, attention will be paid to the attitudes of the Schröder government.

The Schröder government:

The emphasis placed on support for the Visegrad countries’ potential EU membership during the time of the Schröder government is important. This is primarily due to the fact that the real decisions leading to the formulation of a set of German attitude towards enlargement were taken during the time of Schröder’s


government. In addition, though the domestic economic benefits deriving from the Visegrad countries' EU membership would be more or less the same, it was under Schröder's government that due to his insistence on protection of German national interests in the EU, a stronger linkage between German national interests (under the influence of economic incentives) and German foreign policy (in terms of the German attitude towards enlargement in the EU bargaining process) may be observed, which fits the Moravcsik model introduced above.

This linkage is valid for two main reasons:

1. While arguing that Germany's European policy under the Schröder government placed more emphasis on economic incentives for supporting eastern enlargement, Paterson (2000) states that this was mainly because of the increasing importance of domestic economic concerns and their influence on German foreign-policy making within the EU framework. As mentioned in the previous chapters, this change was also apparent in the upgrading of the Finance Ministry in EU matters. The cost-benefit calculations of the Finance Ministry would inevitably make sure that the costs of enlargement would be shared by all the member states, and would not impose excessive costs on the German taxpayer who was already experiencing financial problems (Paterson, 2000: 32).

This is again further proved by the results of the question asked in in-depth-interviews to the executives during this researcher's fieldwork in the time period between February-June 2000:

Table 3: Can Germany be considered a more 'normal' state now- in what respects?
(N=86)



Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

In this question again percentages relate to *responses*. 64.15% of the responses show agreement with the definition of normalisation as a 'stronger definition of national interests'; in harmony with the definition already made in the previous chapters. The influence of the change of government was also mentioned in this respect. In regard to this concept, Peter Tsakkek, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued:

"Schröder and his colleagues, as children born after World War II, are trying not to make the guilt of Germany their reference point in foreign policy".

Franz Josef Kremp, another official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attracted attention to the fact that:

"Germany actually has always been paying attention to its national interests but now there is a change in style. With the return to its 'sovereign' status it has become easier for Germany to define and assert *national interests*".

Only 15.09% of responses indicated that there is no 'normalisation' in German foreign policy. 11.30% concentrated on the economic aspects related with

normalisation of Germany as Heidi Storch, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed it:

“With the unification, Germany is now economically more powerful and in proportion to its power it can more easily act like a normal state”.

Only 5.66% concentrated on the increasing responsibility in international affairs which, in the previous chapters, formed another aspect of Germany's normalisation. A mere 3.80% indicated their opinion that even if certain changes have occurred, Germany can never resemble another country and be ‘normal’.

2. In addition, the advantages of eastern enlargement were now more relevant due to the increasing economic problems of Germany and the fact that the German economy was now in greater need of additional markets offering investment opportunities in order to ease the problems of the economic recession. This became a priority for Schröder as his image as the saviour of Germany from its economic recession had assisted him a great deal in winning the 1998 elections.

However one should be cautious when stressing *domestic economic incentives* as the underlying reasons for the supportive position of Germany in the *intergovernmental bargaining process* within the European Union towards the Visegrad countries' EU membership and in accepting this at face value as an *institutional choice*. This caution is based on two main factors:

1. As discussed in detail in the first chapter, Markowits and Reich (1997) suggest that one of the effective instruments of German influence and proto-hegemony in Eastern Europe originates from the dominant investment position of German firms in Central and Eastern Europe, owing to the underdeveloped financial system in the Visegrad region and the image there of Germany as a role model for economic development. However, there are also arguments against this. James Sperling (2001) stresses the importance of the United States as a second source of foreign direct

investment in these states, and claims that it neutralises the power of Germany. This may be better understood by a careful analysis of Appendix 3 at the end of the thesis showing which countries are important in terms of Germany's external trade. The interesting point to note here is that the three largest importers from Germany are *Western European countries* and the *US*. Sperling particularly emphasises that until recently little attention was paid to this reality. By comparing the trade preference indices of Germany in 1938 and 1994, he figured that Germany in 1938 was a country with an import structure most highly biased towards small countries. When we look at the same figures in 1994 we see that Germany has become the *least* biased towards small countries after France. Therefore, the German trade preference structure in 1994 supports neither the existence of an exploitable asymmetry in Germany's trade relations with its smaller Visegrad neighbours, nor the successful pursuit of such an asymmetrical relationship (Sperling, 2001: 14).

Moreover, Sperling does not believe that Germany can have structural power⁸⁶ in the Visegrad countries deriving from trade and financial flows. These are very much influenced by autonomous decisions of *economic agents* interested only in their own profits, not motivated by the geo-political or economic calculations of their government. Therefore it is not certain that such agents would prefer to increase trade with the Visegrad countries, thereby giving Germany structural power as an outcome of dominance in that region (Sperling, 2001: 34). Regarding the export of German macro-economic strategies and practices to the Visegrad region, Sperling is less sceptical and accepts the influence of the *Modell Deutschland* in the Visegrad countries (Sperling, 2001: 23).

⁸⁶ Hyde- Price refers to the concept of structural power as "largely indirect and unintentional" and as the "ability to shape and influence the structures within which other political actors have to operate" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 112). Sperling opposes this view; in the previous chapters several examples were given showing how Germany used this power in the shaping of the monetary policies of the European Union.

Hans-Peter Schwarz, one of the strongest proponents of relating foreign policy attitudes of states with power politics and national interests thinks along similar lines to Sperling. Schwarz (1994) argues that German investment in the Visegrad region, which has attracted so much attention, is actually far surpassed by German investment in the *West and in the Far East*. Moreover, German investment in the Visegrad region was driven by a circumscribed interest in promoting *East German* exports until they became competitive. Otherwise, German interest in the Visegrad countries is primarily *political*; that is concerned with *stability*, rather than economic advantage (Schwarz, 1994: 100). This begs the crucial question of Visegrad countries' dependency on German capital and trade with Germany, however.

It is true that German credit and investment in the Visegrad countries had slowed down by 1992, since the economic consequences of the German unification and the need for investment in the former East Germany had already exhausted the potential of German capital exports. Until 1992, German investments had surpassed all others, for example in Hungary reaching \$ 800 billion, but they were overtaken by American investors in 1992. For example, out of 719 transactions totalling \$ 27.9 billion from September 1991 to September 1992, the United States assumed first place ahead of Italy and Great Britain, and Germany dropped to fourth place. In the spring of 1993, American private investment totalled \$ 1.8 billion in that country (Hanson and Spohn, 1994: 147).

2. Another fact that needs to be considered when attempting to elicit a direct link between domestic economic factors and the positive German attitude towards the Visegrad countries' EU membership is the sceptic public opinion about the benefits of eastern enlargement; in other words the *potential economic costs deriving from the Visegrad countries' potential EU membership*. As already stated in the previous

chapters, the executives in Germany were extremely careful to take into consideration the public demands transmitted to them in the form of public opinion surveys, interest group demands and political party position papers and manifestos in particular:

- The main concern for the German public was related to the free movement of labour and the fear that this would be destabilising for the domestic labour market. Germany, which is the world's highest cost production area, is near to the low cost areas of Hungary and the Czech Republic. This would inevitably place enormous strains on Germany's social partnership model, given the competitive pressures of low-cost labour and industrial re-structuring. In the short term, keeping industrial jobs in the Visegrad region could mean losing them in Germany, and Germany could be worse off in overall terms because of its simultaneous painful adjustment to re-unification. In particular, the practice of outsourcing by several companies started to be seen as economically unbeneficial by some citizens. In this regard, though it falls outside the period of investigation of this research it is useful to cite a study undertaken by *the Economist* in September 2002. There it is stated that in comparison with the USA (the balance for outsourcing done by American firms is \$ 1.13 positive for every dollar spent), because of the different outsourcing destinations (Eastern Europe instead of India) German companies actually save less. Moreover, the biggest difference emerges when workers who have been fired as a result of the off-shoring process look for new work. In Germany, the re-employment rate is only around 40%. This is a consequence, above all, of Germany's thicket of labour laws, which discourage firms from hiring workers who may prove a hard-to-shed liability (*the Economist*, September 2002).

Moreover, the huge income and GDP differentials would be an important determinant of migration, creating the risk of a flow of migrants to Germany. Cheaper imports from the Visegrad region could also undercut more expensive German

products. As suspected, the combination of these factors within the framework of globalising pressures, global economic competition, interdependence and physical proximity to the Visegrad countries soon exposed the exhaustion of the post-war *soziale Marktwirtschaft* (the social market economy) of Germany. The search for continued economic success in the face of global competition threatened to erode the commitment to social justice-itself one of the key pillars of the social market system (Hyde-Price 2000: 85).

- Another concern for the public is that they simply do not want to pay extra money for the eastern enlargement. Prior to the Agenda 2000 report, a number of scholars attempted to estimate the costs of accession of the Eastern European applicants, and their widely differing conclusions showed that this was no easy task. Estimates ranged from a low of around € 10 billion yearly to incorporate all of the Eastern European applicants to estimates as high as € 37 billion for Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics alone (O'Neill, 1998: 87). As stated already in the previous chapters, one of the most recent reports, a report prepared by the Dresdner Bank of Germany has calculated that enlargement to ten new Member States would cost € 44 billion in 2005 alone if the new members received the same structural, cohesion and agricultural aid as the current members (www.euractiv.com).

This was mainly due to the inadequate economic level of the applicants. With the exception of the Czech Republic, the Visegrad countries experienced two-digit rates of inflation and would prove incapable of meeting the Maastricht criterion of monetary stability. Most importantly, their level of GDP per capita was very low in comparison with the member states of the EU. This would mean huge transfers from the structural funds of the EU to help these countries. The German government was especially concerned about this. The increase of the structural funds in the EU budget

meant that, as the current biggest net contributor to the EU budget, Germany had to pay more (Landau and Whitman, 1997: 165).

The table below will show how there will be an increase in structural funds with the new eastern enlargement process:

Table 4: Changes in the population eligible for assistance under the Structural Funds (based on 1995 population figures)

	Eligible population (in thousands)	Eligible population as % (EU=100)
EU 12 1989	140,600	43.3
EU 15 1995	185,600	49.8
EU 26 2000+	291,400	60.9

Source: European Commission 1997

- Another problem is the fact that agriculture accounts for a significant share of the Visegrad countries' economies; in terms of the proportion of the land area it represents; approximately a 25% share of the GDP. In this sense, extension of the CAP in its present form to the acceding countries would create high budgetary costs. Taking into account the effects of the 1992 reform of the CAP and the further alignment of EU agricultural prices with world market prices announced in 1998, the increase in CAP costs due to enlargement were estimated at between € 8 to 12 billion. This increase could be an economic disadvantage for Germany due to its substantial contributions to the CAP (O'Neill, 1998: 87).

The table below shows the differences between the present member states of the EU and EU membership candidates in terms of their respective share of agriculture and the level of GDP. This would help to give some idea about the economic inadequacies of the candidates and their likelihood of damaging the common agricultural policy of the EU with their huge agriculture sector.

Table 5: Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and EU Member States
Basic Data for the year 2000

	Area (1000 sq. kilometres)	Pop. (millions)	GDP at current market prices (billion ECU)	GDP at current market prices (ECU per head)	GDP at purchasing power standards (billion ECU)	GDP at purchasing power standards (ECU per head at PPP rates)	Agriculture (% of total gross value added)	Agriculture (% of empl.)
Hungary	93	10.2	33. 4	3340	64.6	6310	6.2	8.0
Poland	313	38.6	90. 2	2360	203.3	5320	7.6	26.9
Romania	238	22. 7	27. 3	1200	94.3	4060	20.5	34.4
Slovak Republic	49	5. 4	13. 3	2470	38.0	7120	6.3	9.7
Latvia	65	2. 5	3. 4	1370	7.9	3160	9.9	18.5
Estonia	45	1. 5	2. 8	1850	5.9	3920	8.1	13.1
Lithuania	65	3. 7	3. 5	930	15.3	4130	9.3	23.8
Bulgaria	111	8. 4	9. 9	1180	35.4	4210	13.9	23.2
Czech Republic	79	10. 3	36. 1	490	97.2	9410	5.2	6.3
Slovenia	20	2. 0	14. 2	7240	20.1	10,110	5.0	7.1
CE 10	1078	105. 3	234	2220	582.0	5530	8.6	22.5
In % of EU 15	33	28	4	13	9	32	358	425
Belgium	31	10. 1	205. 9	20,310	196.0	112	1.7	2.7
Denmark	43	5. 2	132. 1	25,260	104.4	116	3.7	4.4
Germany	357	81. 5	1845. 2	22,600	1556.8	110	1.0	3.2
Greece	132	10. 4	87. 4	8360	118.4	66	14.7	20.4
Spain	506	39. 2	428. 1	10,920	518.8	77	3.7	9.3
France	544	58. 0	1174. 3	20,200	1076.5	107	2.5	4.9
Ireland	70	3. 6	49. 2	13,740	57.4	93	7.5	12.0
Italy	301	57. 3	831. 4	14,250	1036.8	103	2.9	7.5
Luxembourg	3	0. 4	13. 3	32,370	11.9	169	1.5	3.9
Netherlands	42	15. 4	302. 5	19,570	284.3	107	3.6	3.8
Austria	84	8. 0	178.4	22,180	155.5	112	2.4	7.3
Portugal	92	9. 9	77.1	7770	115.2	67	5.1	11.5
Finland	338	5. 1	95.6	18,720	84.5	96	5.2	7.8
Sweden	450	8. 8	176.3	19,970	153.5	101	2.1	3.3
UK	244	58. 5	844.8	14,410	971.7	96	1.6	2.1
EU 15	3326	371. 6	6441.5	17,260	6441.5	100	2.4	5.3

Source: CEECs: *Eurostat* based on data from the CEEC Statistical Institutes and Statistical Yearbooks
from the CEEC Statistical Institutes, 2000, EU Member States: *Eurostat*, 2000

- The positive economic impact of enlargement is likely to be smaller, given the small size of the Visegrad countries' economies. The estimates in general suggested an overall gain for the EU of about € 10 billion (Barber, 1997). Therefore,

adding these countries to the EU would mean an addition of 28% to its population but of only four percent to its gross domestic product on a purchasing power parity basis. The details of the impact of the complete enlargement process are seen below, with eastern enlargement being the least positively influential.

Table 6: Impact of the enlargement process on the EU (for the year 2000):

	Increase in area	Increase in population	Increase in total GDP (in purchasing power parities)	Change in per capita GDP	Average per capita GDP (EUR 6=100)
EU 9/EU 6	31%	32%	29%	-3%	97
EU 12/EU 9	48%	22%	15%	-6%	91
EU 15/EU 12	43%	11%	8%	-3%	89
*	34%	29%	9%	-16%	75
EU 26/EU 15					
**					

* including German reunification

** EU 26: EU 15+ Visegrad countries, Slovenia, Baltic States, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus

Source: European Commission 2000

Kirchner (1994) also argues that, after the unification process and the economic problems created as a result, the German public began to feel that Germany had more important domestic priorities than EU integration, especially when faced with the statistics displayed above that demonstrate that eastern enlargement could be expensive. The resentment about having simultaneously to bear the burden of absorbing eastern Germany, providing significant aid to the Visegrad countries, and accepting a huge number of refugees from the Visegrad countries was already reflected in public opinion polls which had started to affect consensus and cause uncertainty among policy makers (Kirchner, 1994: 215). Based on a commentary written in the German daily, *die Zeit*, Roland Freudenstein and Henning Tewes, argue that for three main reasons in particular the public was not very happy with the eastern enlargement:

1. They are afraid to lose their jobs to competition from cheap labour; a problem that has become much more significant after the experience with the unification process. 2. They are afraid that organised crime will increase 3. They see the eastern enlargement as an 'elite project' just like the launching of the euro; decided behind closed doors and against the common national interests of the German public (Tewes and Freudenstein: 2001: 4).

The third argument is very important. So far it has been noted that *executives* had a positive attitude towards a possible eastern enlargement. Contrary to the public's scepticism, the key politicians of the country saw the solution to the public's worries about the domestic economic problems as deeper EU integration and incorporation of the Visegrad countries within the EU, in order to reproduce at the European level the achievements of *Modell Deutschland* (Hyde-Price 2000: 85). Moreover, they thought, as Gunther Verheugen, then State Minister in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has warned, the economic alternative to eastern enlargement is 'a border with poverty running through the middle of Europe', which is in nobody's interest-least of all the Germans (*die Zeit*, December 9 1999).

It is difficult, in fact nearly impossible, to draw a clear line between elites and the non-elite, the public. Above the mass of German citizens is a group of a few thousand elites who manage the actual workings of the political system. Though the executives in Germany are said to consider the preferences of the public when taking decisions, public participation in politics is intermittent and limited in scope; elites are involved *full time* in making political decisions. The public has limited knowledge and sophistication about policy matters; elites generally are experts on the costs and benefits of various public policies. The public expresses its policy preferences, elites

make policy decisions. However, it can be asked: do the elites really reflect these preferences? (Dalton, 1989: 173).

In order to make a direct transition of public preferences to the decisions of elites, there are certain mechanisms at work in Germany. The 'formal' channels of communication among elites makes it inevitable that civil servants are officially encouraged to stay in close touch with relevant interest groups and monitor their preferences. Also the state ministries and governmental agencies are required to develop formal ties to interest groups. A prerequisite of this relationship is recognition of an interest group by the government which usually comes through legislation regulating the activities or internal structure of a group. Official recognition by the government often results in the granting of formal consultative status by government ministries. Federal administrative regulations require that relevant national associations be consulted and asked to provide testimony on proposals under consideration by a ministry; therefore encourage direct contact between representatives of the recognised interest groups and ministry officials when new legislation is being considered.

Dalton (1989) argues that this institutionalisation of the role of interest groups in the policy process makes the governments feel that *they are responding to public demands* when they consult with designated interest groups. Formal consultation and participation in government committees ensures group officials of access to the policy process. Moreover, this style of interest group politics encourages group members to depend on the organisation for the representation of their views, making interest groups the prime intermediaries between the public and government decision makers (Dalton, 1989: 174).

Nevertheless, Dalton argues that it is very difficult to make a simple assessment of whether elites or the political system faithfully represent the public's

policy preferences, because the congruence in policy preferences between elites and the public varies across issues, and probably across time. Moreover, it should be noted that the 'relevant' interest groups are indeed involved in the decision making process, but this assumes that all relevant interests are organised, and only organised interests are relevant. The views of latent groups, such as consumers, are seldom represented when business and labour combine within a neo-corporatist structure. Decisions affecting the entire populace are frequently made away from the public eye. At the same time, democratically elected representative institutions, *Laender* governments and the *Bundestag*, are sometimes sidestepped, as interest groups deal directly with government agencies.

However, on issues of long-standing controversy, such as economic problems, the evidence suggests that political decision makers enter the policy process with policy preferences that reflect the views of the *voter blocs* and *major interest groups* they represent. Kirchner (1994) also argues that, especially after the unification process and under the influence of economic problems, public opinion emerged as an indirect policy actor, whereas previously it had played merely a supportive role (Kirchner, 1994: 215). In Germany policy making has changed from being dominated by elites toward greater interdependence among the various participants in the policy process.

There are several occasions in the process of deciding certain EU *institutional choices* in which the influence of the public was exerted on the *bargaining positions* of the executives:

1. One of the most significant areas where the *economic concerns* of the public have influenced the executives' bargaining position was the signing of the Europe Agreements with the Visegrad countries:

The Europe Agreements which were originally signed with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were in principle economic accords that consisted of the removal of trade barriers. The idea was that this would be undertaken *asymmetrically*, with the EU removing its trade barriers more quickly and more comprehensively than the Visegrad countries would be expected to. This would increase the competitiveness of the Visegrad countries' products, help production, generate employment and would therefore assist the transformation processes in the associated countries. This idea failed. Though trade was liberalised quickly for an overwhelming majority of products, EU negotiators proved highly protective when it came to a set of specific 'sensitive' sectors such as agriculture, coal, steel and textiles, the sectors where the Visegrad countries were at their most competitive and where they had the best chance to export to the EU markets. While much of this protectionist impulse came from elsewhere in the EU, it resided in part in attempts by some *German ministries to protect their clients' markets*. Although the German government was explicitly supportive of the Visegrad countries' inclusion in the EU, it was extremely reluctant to lower trade barriers in those sectors where domestic German interests were threatened, especially in agriculture and steel. It is hardly surprising that the Ministry of Agriculture and a relatively uncompetitive farming sector figured strongly here; most of note was the protectionist stance of an Economics Ministry which had developed a notable free-trade pedigree throughout the post-war era.

This showed that in sensitive sectors, domestic economic interests were sufficiently assertive to influence the bargaining positions of the elites and thus the Commission's mandate and the outcome of decisions as an institutional choice (Tewes, 2002: 89-90).

2. The Europe Agreements also revealed a split between ministries committed to overarching goals - the Foreign Office and the Chancellor's Office - and others rooted more directly in domestic interests. This was a clash in interests which re-emerged six years later when enlargement again descended from the reaches of high politics to impinge on baser-and harder-economic interests. The catalyst was Agenda 2000, which made concrete the fact that eastern enlargement would require existing member states to sacrifice some current benefits and/or contribute more to the EU's costs; the CAP and the Structural Funds. A vital factor in the Agenda 2000 debate was the prominent role assumed by the German Finance Ministry on the question of EU budget reform, or what domestically became known as the *Nettozahlerdebatte*, the 'net contributor' debate. By the mid-1990s the fact that Germany's net contributions made up around 60 percent of the EU total budget looked very disturbing for the public against a domestic economic backdrop of post-unity fiscal rigour, reinforced by the dash to meet the criteria for EMU, and high unemployment. The authority and vigour with which the Finance Ministry sought concessions on the issue in the late 1990s reflected, and drew quite explicitly on, popular fears that the costs of the forthcoming enlargement, like all its predecessors, would be borne by a German taxpayer already 'suffering' for unification and EMU-Europe.⁸⁷

3. The increasing scepticism of the German public regarding eastern enlargement likewise showed itself *indirectly* during Schröder's visit to Poland in November 1998. Despite his policy of continuity in the German position in the EU towards the eastern enlargement process, the Schröder government had backed away from Kohl's support for *early* expansion of the EU eastward, a troubling development from the viewpoint of the Visegrad countries, most notably Poland. Although pleased

⁸⁷As already stated, this vigour was best shown by the calls of then Finance Minister Theo Waigel that "The eastern enlargement should not cost one more *pfenning* more to the German tax payer" (*Le Monde*, June 25 1995).

that Warsaw was among the first foreign visits of the new Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in November 1998, their Polish hosts were disappointed that Germany refused to set a target date for Polish EU membership:

“Compared with my predecessor,” Schröder said, “I lack the imagination to *name* a date” (*die Zeit*, November 22, 1998).⁸⁸

The new government argued that the delay was due to *domestic economic realities* and not the executives’ preferences.

Economic cost-benefit analysis in German national interests:

At this point, it is necessary to discuss the relevance of Moravcsik's economic cost-benefit analysis in the formation of national interests that lead to the bargaining position of the German executives and contribute to the decision of the institutional choice of the EU. Logically, Germany would be willing to support eastern enlargement, which can be seen in this research as an example of maintaining a particular foreign policy, as long as it was sure of the benefits exceeding the costs. In this way, it would be able to fulfil its national interests, which, especially during Schröder’s time, became very much economy-centred, calculating the outcomes of foreign-policy decisions on a step-by step basis with special attention to the costs and benefits to the German economy. A long list of economic benefits was given in this chapter which would show why the bargaining position of Germany in the EU based on the domestic economic incentives would be positive. Though German economic growth has been relatively slow after the unification period, the degree of internationalisation, expressed as exports and imports relative to German GDP, is rising slowly. In particular, as will be seen in the table below, German exports to the

⁸⁸ Back in 1995, Helmut Kohl had marked the year 2000 as an appropriate date for Poland’s entry, but later he revised that by setting the target back by *a few years*.

Visegrad countries have been rising regularly; which is an important motive to consider in German foreign policy as Germany has always been a country of export:⁸⁹

Table 7: German GDP and Export of Goods and services, 1993-2000, current prices, German Mark (DM), billions

	GDP	ExGS*	%GDP*	ExtoP*	ExtoCZ*	ExtoHu*	Sum*	%Ex*	%GDP
1993	3235.4	742.2	22.94	10.7	8.6	5.7	25	3.4	0.77
1994	3394.4	805.0	23.72	11.4	10.7	6.9	29	3.6	0.85
1995	3523.0	870.1	24.70	14.0	12.7	7.5	34.2	3.9	0.97
1996	3586.5	920.2	25.66	18.4	15.2	8.9	42.5	4.6	1.19
1997	3666.5	1038.2	28.31	23.0	17.9	12.4	53.3	5.1	1.45
1998	3784.4	1108.2	29.28	26.5	20.0	16.2	62.7	5.7	1.66
1999	3877.9	1160.0	29.91	26.6	21.0	17.6	65.2	5.6	1.68
2000	3989.5	1349.5	33.83	31.1	26.2	21.2	78.5	5.8	1.97
Change	23.31%	81.82%		190.65%	204.65%	271.93%	214 0%		

Source: *Deutsche Bundesbank, Zahlungsbilanzstatik*, different issues 1995-2001

Table 7 shows that though German GDP did not grow very much, export growth was remarkable. When expressed in current prices, German exports of goods and services expanded in percentage units nearly four times as much as German GDP. Even in monetary terms, German exports were growing highly.

However, as already mentioned in this chapter German economic interests were no longer so predominantly located in this region and although German export to these countries was of rising importance, this figure was only a small part of both German total export and even of German GDP.

⁸⁹ This strengthening economic relationship is based on geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic advantages Germany has over its western partners.

In addition, it has been mentioned that, at the beginning of 1990s in particular, a relatively large part of total German net foreign direct investment (FDI) was made in the Visegrad countries. The table below will show these data in detail:

Table 8: German Net FDI in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary
German Mark (DM), billions, current prices, 1993-2000

	DM (billions)	Poland	Czech Republic	Hungary	%Total
1993	28,431	0.439	0.774	0.916	7.48
1994	30,605	0.419	1,111	0.911	7.98
1995	55,962	0.800	1063	1772	6.50
1996	76,449	2113	1326	1370	6.29
1997	72,480	2502	1616	1108	7.21
1998	155,873	3534	1603	1539	4.28
1999	201,579	4313	0.849	0.755	2.94
2000	103,579	1622	1467	0.336	3.32

Source: *Deutsche Bundesbank, Zahlungsbilanzstatik*, different issues 1995-2001

As table 8 shows, in the beginning of the period, a relatively large part of total German net FDI was made in the three countries of the Visegrad region. However though in absolute terms, net FDI in the three countries was rising until 1999, after that year net FDI from Germany to the three countries began to fall. Compared to total German net FDI, the share, which was invested in the three countries, was also beginning to fall from 1998 onwards.

Thus it would not be wrong to say that in addition to the costs associated with the eastern enlargement of the EU, it would be very difficult for the German executives, who are increasingly dependent on public opinion, to formulate such a positive attitude towards eastern enlargement when the public makes it clear that it also fears the rising unemployment with the potential of shifting jobs to low-wage countries, within the concept of outsourcing.⁹⁰ Combined with the low figures of

⁹⁰ “In the mid-1990s there was a wave of moving manufacturing jobs out of the country, Dr. Stephan Wimmers from the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce told DW-world. “But now, Germany is

exports to the Visegrad countries and FDI in them, the linkage between Germany's bargaining position in the EU and direct domestic economic interests become undermined.

Therefore, despite the scepticism of German executives in some instances (especially the Schröder government surrounded by the intensified domestic economic problems)⁹¹ the fact that Germany has continued to be the main advocate of the Visegrad countries' inclusion in the EU may be linked with other factors. This brings us to the analysis of the other two hypotheses, which will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter.

In the section below, the same analysis will be conducted for the other candidate that is closely related to Germany, Turkey.

Enlargement of the EU: Relations with Turkey

“There are no eternal friends, no eternal enemies but there are always eternal interests” (Lord Palmerston, 1831)

The reasons why in this research Turkey is to be analysed in the same way as the Visegrad countries can be listed as:

1. Turkey is also a candidate for EU membership, although it has different characteristics to the Visegrad countries.
2. Just like the Visegrad countries, due to the strong relationship between Turkey and Germany, Turkey sees Germany as its natural advocate in the EU for membership.
3. Just like the Visegrad countries, the potential membership of Turkey would have serious effects on Germany.

also losing its advantage for better quality and capital-intensive jobs ”(www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1431_A_1273178,00.html).

⁹¹ For example, within the concept of outsourcing, the current government battling to bring down the chronically high level of unemployment in Germany, was very angry at the remarks of some companies regarding the *need* to outsourcing and Schröder even slammed their remarks as ‘unpatriotic’ (<http://fistfulofeuros.net/archives/000492.php>).

German national interests leading to reluctance towards Turkish membership (economic factors):

The influence of the German public opinion concerned with *economic* factors on the executives' bargaining positions in the EU was already discussed in the previous section. This would lead to negative factors brought to bear on the German government's attitude towards potential Turkish EU membership as the German public would think that Turkey's EU membership would bring Germany more economic costs than benefits. This way of thinking are similar to the reasons already spelled out in the previous section concerning the Visegrad countries' membership. However, in the Turkish case they are stronger:

1. The economic problems of Germany after unification have already been mentioned, with *unemployment* being one of the most important. The poor state of the Turkish economy entails the risk that Turkish membership of the EU would attract *additional* immigrants to Germany as a result of the freedom of movement principle offered by EU membership. If one considers the high birth rate among Turkish families in Germany, and the low birth rate among German families, this could have frightening results for the Germans, and would exacerbate the existing unemployment problem. The German public already saw the example of the incredible growth of the Turkish community in front of their eyes. When the first members of the Turkish community came to Germany, there were only 180,000 people for the 500,000 job vacancies. They came without their families, planning to stay only a few years and return home with newly gained skills and hard-earned savings. For most, this was to prove impossible. Despite the recession and resulting low wages, more Turks came; taking whatever jobs were offered in the automobile industry, coal mining, the foundries and textile factories. Even though their recruitment was banned in 1973 by

the government, the number of Turkish immigrants continued to rise as the legal *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) were joined by their families. Today, they number 2.4 million, constituting by far the largest foreign community in the country.

2. Linked with the previous assumption is the burden Turkey would most likely impose on the German economy in the event of membership. Experiencing a serious economic recession after unification, there was no way that the German public would want to pay huge amounts for the inclusion of another country in the EU, unless there was the potential to gain huge benefits. Aside from the economic problem Turkey could impose on Germany through the potential wave of additional workers, it was also obvious that Germany would have to pay huge amounts to incorporate Turkey within the EU. Turkey is a very large and underdeveloped country in comparison to existing EU member states and has a huge agricultural sector. It would automatically get a large share of the EU structural funds, especially from agricultural funds, to which Germany has to contribute significantly. The economic indicators of Turkey as can be seen in the table below give an idea about how the potential Turkish EU membership could lead to an increase on Germany's contribution to the structural funds. (The figures for the year 1999 are given as this research was conducted with *the end of* 1999 as its finishing date but more recent statistics will be given in the concluding chapter):

Table 9: Economic indicators for the year 1999

ECONOMIC INDICATORS	TURKEY
GDP purchasing power parity	\$ 409.4 billion
GDP real growth rate	-5% (1999 est)
GDP per capita	\$ 6200 (1999 est.)
GDP-composition by sector:	
Agriculture	18%
Industry	29%
Services	53%
Inflation rate	65%
Labour force	23.8 million (1.5 million Turks work abroad)
Unemployment rate	7.3% plus underemployment of 6.9%
Budget:	
Revenues	\$ 45.2 billion
Expenditures	\$ 66.7 billion
Industrial production growth rate	-5.2%
Exports	\$ 26 billion
Exports partners	Germany (21%), US (9%), UK (7%), Italy (6%), France (6%)
Imports	\$ 40 billion
Imports partners	Germany (14%), Italy (8%), US (8%), France (8%), Russia (6%), UK (5%)
Debt	External: \$ 104 billion
Economic aid-recipient	\$ 195 million
Population	65.5 million
Average annual population growth (1980-98, %)	2.0
GDP per head, dollars	3050
Trade balance with EU	-5489
Workforce in agriculture%	43.0

Source: *Economist Survey*, June 10-16, 2000

Within the framework of Moravcsik's LIG approach which signifies economic incentives in formulation of national interests and foreign policy, these problems can be considered significant enough reasons for a 'normalising' Germany, aware of its national interests as primarily determined by the need to calculate costs and benefits of policies. Bearing in mind the economic problems Germany has been experiencing, the public's perception of the costs of including Turkey in the EU could influence the

executives to formulate a *negative* attitude toward Turkey's inclusion in the EU bargaining process.

A major event experienced in German domestic politics in the year 1999 is proof of how sceptical public opinion can influence the executives' decisions.

In the direction of their policy of being softer to Turkey, the Social Democrat-Green government had proposed a new naturalisation law, very relevant and useful, especially for the Turkish community in Germany. This new naturalisation law aimed to give foreigners living in Germany the chance to obtain German citizenship *without* necessarily giving up their own citizenship, to grant citizenship automatically to the second generation born in Germany, and to shorten the residency requirement for obtaining German citizenship. However this proposal met with huge protests from the opposition CDU/CSU. As noted in the previous chapter, the fight against immigration to Germany was one of the most important priorities of the Christian Democrats. On the verge of losing power, the CDU/CSU did not miss this chance to win back the public's support whom it realised were unhappy with this new law giving enhanced rights to foreigners. Deploying arguments like "the proposed naturalisation law will further strengthen the resentment against foreigners already caused by *economic problems*, and thus will lead to racism, encourage crime, create disruption among the public, and endanger the identity of German society", the CDU/CSU pursued a committed *petition campaign* against this law immediately prior to the *Land* (state) elections in Hesse. The campaign addressed as many people as it could, collecting around five million signatures against the new law. The result was a set-back for the new government in the Hesse elections. The Social Democrats were largely unaffected as a result as their vote increased by more than 1.4% points compared with the last *Land* election. However, the Green Party, who was known to be the main initiators of

the naturalisation law, saw their vote reduced by 4% points. As a result of losing the Hesse election, the SPD-Green coalition lost its majority in the *Bundesrat*.

These events confirmed the reality of the negative public opinion towards Turkey and the Germans' reluctance to integrate Turks into their structure. Their attitude revealed the fact that *economic problems* may well be the overriding priority of the public and they were not very positive even on the subject of stronger integration of the Turkish community into the German society, never mind the prospect of Turkey's EU membership; fearing the threat of this resulting in further decline in their economic conditions. The result strongly influenced the new government, which naturally gave importance to the public's priorities.⁹² Thus, the government put the issue on hold and, having understood the need to build up a popular majority of support in the nation, decided to address the more immediate and concrete problems of the public, mainly ones of an *economic* nature, such as the creation of jobs and economic growth, and welfare reform. Regarding the citizenship law, it was consequently revised and the new draft significantly deviated from the original version. Many of the CDU demands had been incorporated and the possibility of dual citizenship was completely dropped (*BMI Pressemitteilung*, March 2, 1999). Schröder's explanation for this change was his government's loss of influence in the *Bundesrat* as a result of the loss of the respective SPD-Green majority after the Hesse elections. This automatically forced them to accept the demands advocated by the CDU. The outcome is that foreign policy was influenced by a public that was not very positive about Turkey and would be implemented by a government which had understood the significance of more concrete and urgent *economic* problems.

⁹² A survey by the German journal *der Spiegel* asked people whether "they are for or against the dual citizenship law", 53% of Germans asked stated that they were against it. The number of people who said they were in favour of the law was 39%, while the rest remained undecided (*der Spiegel*, February 1999: 23).

The changing parameters of German foreign policy, especially under the Schröder government, have already been mentioned in the previous chapters in terms of the new government being more careful about stressing German national interests with regards to decisions taken in the EU as an institutional choice. In line with Moravcsik's model these national interests were already listed as the need to protect German domestic *economic* interests, weigh the costs and benefits of foreign policy decisions accordingly and, in that sense, pursue a more 'normal' foreign policy in line with German national interests. This also necessitates that the government pays attention to wider public opinion. In that regard, the government's change of policy as a result of the Hesse elections relates well to the LIG analysis.

However, in spite of this event and the clear example of the ability of public opinion to have further potential to influence the executives in a negative fashion, the German government's positive attitude towards Turkey's EU membership bid in the intergovernmental bargaining in the EU, reached its peak in December 1999 as demonstrated by the support given for the official declaration of the Turkish EU membership candidacy in the Helsinki European Council Summit. This increase in support had as its starting point the letter sent by Schröder to the Turkish Prime Minister at that time in early May. Below, the economic benefits of potential Turkish membership will be discussed to explore whether *domestic economic incentives* have in reality been the underlying reason for the supportive German position in the intergovernmental bargainings within the EU vis a vis Turkey.

Potential economic benefits to German national interests of Turkish membership:

1. The first argument considers the contribution made by Turks in Germany, especially in economic terms. Research published by the Institute of Turkish

Studies in Essen in July 1999, demonstrated the important place Turkish workers occupy in the German economy:

Table 11: The contribution of Turks to the German economy

Number of Turkish businessmen	45,000
Turkish businessmen's production output	34.5 billion DM
Employees of Turkish businessmen	168,000 with 17% being Germans
Number of Turks in Germany who own property	51,000
Annual investment of Turks in Germany	8.5 billion DM
Annual earnings of Turks in Germany	35 billion DM
Net income of Turks in Germany	More than 20 billion DM
Percentage of Turkish businesses buying from German suppliers	77

Source: Turkish Studies Centre, Essen, 1999

These figures show that the Turkish community have actually economically integrated themselves successfully into the German society and are contributing positively to the development and likewise profiting from the German market. Considering their influence on German domestic politics and economy, the alienation of this group would not be a wise move and could be detrimental to domestic German politics.

2. Economic relations between the two countries are also very strong. The totality of the export capacity of the two countries is around \$13 billion. Germany is Turkey's largest European trade partner while Turkey ranks 16th among the foreign trade partners of Germany. 21.9% of Turkish imports come from Germany, while 15.9% of Turkish exports go to Germany. At the end of 1998, German investment in Turkey amounted to 852 million DM, and this number seems to be increasing as privatisation in Turkey opens up new channels for German capital. Regarding foreign firms operating in Turkey, Germany ranks 1st with 748 firms, while in terms of foreign direct investment it ranks 4th. From these figures it is not very difficult to see that

disruptions in this trade as a result of further alienation of Turks would have serious economic repercussions in Germany (www.uni-essen.de/zft).

Below there will be a cost-benefit analysis to understand if economic benefits have *indeed* influenced the positive German attitude towards the Turkish membership.

Economic cost-benefit analysis in German national interests:

Despite the above-mentioned potential economic benefits of Turkey's EU membership, the German public did not seem very convinced. In a telephone questionnaire conducted by the Centre for Turkish Studies in Essen at the beginning of 2000 it was found out that only 46% of the German citizens believe that Turkish membership will bring *economic benefits* (www.uni-essen.de/zft). The results of the Hesse elections in 1999 had also proved that the German public was sceptical about the proposed improved integration of the Turkish population (which was presented by the CDU/CSU petition as an initial step towards support for Turkey's EU membership) especially when the country was suffering from a serious economic recession. In the framework of the economic cost-benefit analysis of German national interests which relates to Moravcsik's LIG approach, in the 'normalised' Germany under Schröder's leadership, the government would go forward with policies in the European sphere that would bring concrete benefits, not impose costs on the German economy. However, despite the withdrawal of the naturalisation law, the Schröder government has continued to support Turkey's potential EU membership, an example itself of the EU 'institutional choice', in the bargaining processes within the EU.

This brings forward the question: 'If economic costs of Turkish membership are unbearable for the public and foreign policy is automatically influenced by domestic economic factors leading to the formulation of national interests, then what explains the supportive attitude of Germany towards Turkey's EU membership?' Thus

the incompatibility between the German executives' positive attitude, and the potential economic costs that Turkey's EU membership would impose on Germany and negative public opinion brings us to the significance of other factors in the formulation of German national interests and the German position in the bargaining process in the EU.

Summary:

As already seen in the previous chapter, current developments in the enlargement process and in the EU's institutional framework, seem to put the Visegrad countries at the front of the queue for EU membership in comparison with the Turkish case. Though Turkey has had associate status with the EU since the Ankara Agreement of 1963, relations between the two parties gradually deteriorated, reaching their lowest point with the final rejection of Turkey at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. It appears that there are different concepts used in the assessment of readiness for EU membership that had come out as institutional choices of the EU. This can be evidenced by examining the differences in aid supplied to the two categories of candidate despite the many claims of deficiencies in human rights and democratic procedures, and economic problems faced by the Visegrad countries as well as by Turkey. At the same time, many of Turkey's current problems, especially economic ones, also existed during the Cold War but this did not cause it to be excluded so visibly from the integration process.

In this chapter the reasons underlying these institutional choices of the EU were linked to the position of Germany in the intergovernmental bargaining process and in particular the domestic economic factors that led to the formulation of national interests influential in the German position in the EU. This was carried out within the framework of Moravcsik's projection of the significance of 'national interests' in EU

policies that would make Germany, influenced by economic incentives, go forward with eastern enlargement rather than adopt a more favourable attitude towards the 'economically more problematic' Turkey.

In short, the first hypothesis constructed in the first chapter as 'Economic factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German 'national interests' (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its own national interests' was analysed in detail. This analysis, in line with Moravcsik's LIG approach, concentrated on the fact that the main reason for Germany, in its formulation of a negative attitude and a visible reluctance to include Turkey in the EU, could be the change in the definition of its national interests after the Cold War. In particular the economic problems that emerged as a result of the unification process and the negative effects of globalisation pressures would present the Visegrad countries as means of providing future European economic development through their cheap sources of labour, improving and expanding markets, vulnerable economies in need of foreign leadership, and opportunities for direct investment based on the advantage of physical proximity. On the other hand, Turkey, a country of a huge size, big population and poor economy would prove a problem for Germany. This is consistent with Moravcsik's model: states are rational trying to maximise their benefits and reduce their costs, national interests are constructed within this rational framework and, under the influence of *economic interdependence*, they are transformed into foreign policy.

Moravcsik has always tried to show in his work that, in EU history, everything has been decided for the sake of economic and commercial interests in particular, and that the commercial interests of domestic producer groups, interests that reflect their

respective positions on the global market, influence governments' bargaining positions in the EU (Moravcsik, 1999: 474). These domestic groups comply with the transfer of sovereignty to international institutions (in other words institutional choices) when they calculate more or less that this would result in more benefits than costs. Moravcsik has suggested that:

“Where the consequences of international institutions' decisions are calculable and concrete for domestic economic interests, national bargaining positions will be instrumental, reflecting the expected influence of institutional choices on the realisation of substantive domestic economic interests” (Moravcsik, 1993: 494).

Relating this argument to the research, calculation of the economic costs and benefits of EU enlargement (as an example of 'the institutional choice' assumption of Moravcsik) for both categories of candidate would result in support for membership of the Visegrad countries but reluctance for Turkish membership on the part of the German government and politicians. This is rooted in the fact that the public, as reflecting the sensitivity of the economic costs of potential EU membership, particularly with regard to Turkey, would influence the German government in formulating a negative attitude towards Turkey within the bargaining processes of the EU.

It is important to note that fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria was regarded as an important step for admission of members to the EU. It has been noted in the previous chapter that the structure of the Copenhagen criteria placed the emphasis of membership criteria more on the *economic considerations* of the member states. The significance of economic factors was also confirmed in the Agenda 2000 concerning the negotiation process by the announcement that *economic considerations would remain the primary factor in negotiations over the potential member states' accession, and that the financial bottom line of an applicant country's wealth and level of economic development could either facilitate or frustrate its accession*. As shown in

sections above, Turkey's size and its economic problems were important disadvantages for it in even fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. In this respect Turkey's inability to fulfil the membership criteria was also a *legitimate* reason for the German government to oppose its membership.

Based on the above arguments taken together and in relation to Moravcsik's model, the question that still has to be tackled is why the decision to give Turkey candidate status with a clearer projection of membership was reached at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 with strong support from the German government. The sceptical public opinion concerning eastern enlargement based on the potential costs and declining German economic power in the Visegrad region discussed in this chapter has likewise not radically altered the supportive attitude of the German government towards the Visegrad countries' EU membership. Therefore, the next chapter will deal with non-economic factors in the formulation of national interests leading to the position assumed by Germany in the bargaining process. These will also serve as detailed analyses of the remaining two hypotheses of the thesis which were introduced in the first chapter. The chapter will attempt to evaluate whether cultural or geo-political (which are, as already stated, used interchangeably also as security/stability factors), rather than economic ones, are actually more influential in the formulation of Germany's national interests and Germany's consequent attitude towards enlargement in the bargaining process. With regard to the changes that have taken place in Europe, particularly after the break up of Yugoslavia, there will be a strong emphasis placed on the importance of security/geo-political factors.

CHAPTER 5: GEO-POLITICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS IN GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TURKISH MEMBERSHIP

Introduction:

In the previous chapter, in relation with Moravcsik's line of thought, the main emphasis was placed on economic incentives as the underlying reasons for the German attitude within the intergovernmental bargaining process in the EU and the resulting EU's institutional choice of supporting the Visegrad countries while formulating a negative attitude towards Turkey. However, as the Federal Statistical Office shows in its figures and in the other arguments already discussed in the previous chapter the Visegrad markets, despite their growing share in their trade with Germany, will *not* represent an alternative for the German economy to its western markets; Germany's East European foreign trade is only one-tenth its trade with Western Europe. The first five countries that are the destination of German exports according to the Federal Statistical Office 1999 figures is France (11%), United States (11%), United Kingdom (8%), Italy (7%) and Netherlands (6%) (www.statistik-bund.de). This obvious fact led to the belief that the German support in the intergovernmental bargaining for both categories of candidates may be due to other factors.

Therefore in this chapter the main emphasis will be given to the other two hypotheses introduced in the first chapter that links the German attitude in the enlargement process of the EU to factors other than economic ones. Hypothesis II was 'Geo-political factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German national interests (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that favours Turkish membership in the EU' and hypothesis III was 'Cultural factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German 'national interests' (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy

(*dependent variable*) that sees the Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests’.

In the first section of this chapter hypothesis II will be dealt with for both categories of candidates. As already stated in the first chapter the concept of geo-political factors will be used interchangeably as security/stability factors.

German national interests in supporting eastern enlargement (geo-political factors):

1. The first argument related to the German support for the Visegrad countries within the framework of geo-political ideology actually fits Moravcsik’s ‘policy interdependence’ concept, a concept he borrows from liberal theories of international politics. Moravcsik defines policy interdependence as:

“...the sets of costs and benefits created for foreign societies (meaning politically significant social groups outside their national jurisdiction) when dominant groups in a society seek to realise their preferences” (Moravcsik, 1997: 521).

Thus, the societal pressure on national governments reflects, not only the expected magnitude of gains and losses, but also the uncertainty and risk derived from relations with other countries (Moravcsik, 1993: 487). In relation to this research, it would not be wrong to state that the direction of foreign policy, domestic conditions of the Visegrad countries and the potential uprising of post-communist groups in opposition to democratic movements in these countries would actually affect Germany more directly due to its position as their neighbour. In this respect, especially under Kohl’s government, the most important reason for supporting Visegrad countries’ membership may be regarded as *stabilisation of the eastern border of Germany* and thus make the underlying reasons for the supportive German attitude towards the Visegrad countries’ inclusion in the EU as geo-political/security concerns.

At this point, it is important to tackle the exact meaning of ‘security’ as it has acquired new meanings due to the changes in world politics and new security *threats*

that have arisen since the end of the Cold War period. The Cold War was indisputably unjust and morally indefensible; but the bipolarity it engendered was at least predictable and stable. During the Cold War, security had a traditional, *military* meaning. A pilot study undertaken in 1999 by Emil Kirchner identified traditional military security threats as a deliberate biological and chemical warfare, a deliberate nuclear attack and conventional conflict between states with small numbers of light weapons.⁹³ Specifically, during the Cold War, West German security policy was dominated by one overriding concern: the perceived threat posed by the concentration of Soviet and Warsaw Pact armoured forces in eastern Europe which had led to West Germany's strong alliance commitments within NATO and the WEU and provided the rationale for the *Bundeswehr* (German Armed Forces)

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline and fall of state socialism transformed Germany's external security environment. Once directly threatened by the armoured divisions of the Warsaw Pact, and the short-range nuclear warheads of the Soviet Union, united Germany no longer faced any 'clear and present' danger. Some traditional security concerns remained; for example the management of the build-down of conventional and nuclear forces in the Visegrad region, the consolidation of the new regime of arms controls, confidence building measures and addressing the problem of nuclear proliferation. However, Europe's post-cold war security agenda has actually changed radically. The new security agenda is no longer dominated by one single, overriding security threat that derives from inter-state military conflicts. Rather now security is a very complex and multidimensional issue, composed of a series of 'non-

⁹³ This study was based on government documents, the academic literature, and survey data response of forty-two leading European and North American security experts to an extensive questionnaire. The results of this study were published in Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling (2002), 'The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 7:4, Winter issue

military risks' and 'challenges' (economic, social, political and environmental in character).

Kirchner (2002) argues that:

“There is at present no agreement among security experts as to a precise definition of security. Since the end of the Cold War the definition of security has been generally widened to include many non-military concepts, there is no clear consensus of precisely what these are, or how they fit together. In general the academic literature review covers these main themes: transnational crime, migratory pressures, environmental risks and ethnic instability and security” (Kirchner, 2002).

The most important characteristic of these non-military security threats is that they are not only directed at the state, but they have the possibility to disrupt the stability, integrity and welfare of *societies*.

It is especially the *threat of ethnic instability and security, transnational crime and migratory pressure* which are threats and risks emanating from the traumas and tensions associated with the transformations in the Visegrad region; with particular reference to the overhaul of the economy, political system and external policy, that will be concentrated upon in this chapter (Hyde-Price, 2000: 141).

One important problem has been the enormous economic and social hardships arising from the dismantling of command economies and the introduction of market capitalism. This has severely complicated the difficult process of state and nation-building, which is central to the political agenda in the post-communist East (Vogel, 1997: 23). Soon after 1989 it became apparent that transforming and modernising the economies which were the legacy of forty years of state socialism was going to be a much more difficult-and painful- undertaking than many had initially imagined. The turmoil and despair that all too often accompanied attempts at macro-economic stabilisation and the socio-economic costs of transforming authoritarian communist systems into democratic market-orientated societies threatened to undermine the young shots of political democratisation, fuelled long-suppressed historical animosities, and

created new patterns of ethnic, religious and national conflict thus providing fertile ground for instability (Hyde-Price, 1996: 180).

This potential for new forms of instability created a new major fault-line running through the continent. This fault line is no longer military or ideological, but *social* and *economic*. It runs through *Mitteleuropa*, dividing the relatively wealthy social market economies of Germany and Austria, from the new democracies of the Visegrad region. Despite the dismantling of the iron curtain and the Berlin Wall, huge socio-economic disparities and power asymmetries still mark the relationship between West and East.

This new security agenda and the risks deriving from the contemporary East-West division is shared by most European countries, but given Germany's central geographical location, it is particularly vulnerable to problems arising from the transformation process in the Visegrad region. This has inevitably necessitated the German government to formulate a new comprehensive security policy able to tackle the *non-military* dimension of security, especially the security implication of the resurgence of ethno-national conflict in much of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, migratory pressures deriving from these conflicts and transnational crime in the form of narcotics trade and money laundering. This has been voiced several times by the German policy makers (Hyde-Price, 2000: 142). Kurt Biedenkopf, the former Prime Minister of Saxony, noted in 1994 that:

“The threat to our values has not disappeared but has taken a very different form. The prime military threat from the East has been replaced by a global threat created by *disorder*. Our sovereignty and security are no longer threatened by atomic weapons, but by the dangerous proximity of chaos and disorder to our highly developed, albeit sensitive, societies” (Biedenkopf, 1994: 17).

Former Federal President Roman Herzog also observed in March 1995 that:

“Social, ecological and cultural destabilisation present additional security risks; such as problems concerning economic growth, frontiers and minority community problems” (Hyde-Price, 1996: 179).

Tewes argues that initially, Germany was more focused on the potential economic benefits from eastern enlargement. The conditions surrounding the Europe Agreements underlined this. This was mainly because of the fact that as long as the Soviet Union existed, Germany saw it as a guarantor of stability and security in the Visegrad countries. However the Moscow coup in August 1991 led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 created a fundamentally different security environment. This was reinforced by the outbreak of the war in Bosnia in the spring of 1992, which proved to be even more of a quagmire than the war between Serbia and Croatia had been in 1991. Both of these developments increased the fear in Germany that large-scale instability in Eastern Europe was quite possible. In particular the Yugoslav crises displayed some features which would prove to be typical of future conflicts in the Visegrad region, such as the ethnical basis of conflicts, a mixture of war and civil war, and unclear frontiers. If this crisis were to spill over to these countries (as they were considered to be very fragile democracies hardly immune to outside influence), Germany as the closest country to the region would be the most affected. The potential wave of refugees, the growth of a black economy and the influx of illegal workers would produce tensions within Germany and threaten the security and welfare of German society. This view was supported by an already exponential rise in asylum seekers in Germany, most of them from the former Soviet bloc; in 1988 approximately 100,000 people applied for asylum, and in 1992 the number had risen to almost 440,000.

As a result, the Visegrad countries came to be seen by Germany as a potentially unstable backyard. The policy planners directly linked successful transformation of

the new German states and maintenance of German economic prosperity with stability and economic growth in the Visegrad states, emphasising the *interdependence* of the transition processes (Phillips, 2000: 32). Thus, although German business may have still continued to see the Visegrad countries primarily in terms of export opportunities and cheap labour, awareness of these risks pushed German policy makers to take some action towards ensuring the stability of its eastern neighbours.

EU membership was seen as a crucial element of this stabilisation strategy. The role of the EU in facilitating the emergence of a security community in Western Europe had endowed it with the authority to exert a much broader influence on the European order more widely. It has managed to exert this influence in various ways:

It has created an institutional context within which member states are dependent on each other's decisions, thus prompting the development of an EU policy-making process. In addition it has already come to embody a distinct set of 'European' norms and values. These European norms and values are rooted in the experience of pluralist democracy, the rule of law, market economics and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Rightly or wrongly, the EU is widely seen as embodying these 'European' principles, and consequently exercises an important normative influence in Europe that extends way beyond existing members. The prospect of EU membership had already helped the diffusion of 'European' values and norms in wider Europe. This encouraged them to adopt liberal democracy, to consolidate democratic government (as it had done in southern Europe in the prior enlargements) to promote respect for human rights and the peaceful settlement of disputes, and stimulate further economic development and it was expected to lead to the same outcome for the Visegrad countries (Hyde-Price, 2000: 176). It is indeed true that because all of the new democracies in the Visegrad region either aspire to join the Union, or are keen to develop close economic relations

with it, the prospect of eventual membership of the EU has given the Union leverage in the post-communist East and the EU has been able to exert its soft power⁹⁴ in the Visegrad countries thus providing a central drive in the reform process. Germans have actually been the best examples of the Union in this respect. Currently, they are concerned, not with *Lebensraum* in the East or military glory as they have in the past, but with environmental protection and human rights, with 'quality of life' and gender issues, with participation and *Bürgerinitiativen*(citizenship initiatives)-all of which will be concerns of growing saliency in late modern Europe. With its social market economy, vibrant civil society, liberal-democratic political system and increasingly 'multi-cultural' culture, Germany has in many respects come to embody the 'European dream', particularly for those in the Visegrad region with the strongest links to Germany.⁹⁵

As a result, incorporating these countries into the EU mechanism would consolidate their democracies and be the best way to solve the non-military issues on the post-cold war security agenda, particularly those associated with economic transformation and the state-and nation-building process (Hyde-Price, 2000: 182). For example, an increase in effective co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs would help to fight crime and drug trafficking, the effects of which are felt throughout Europe. Another benefit would be ecological. There were decades of negligence under

⁹⁴ The concept of 'soft power' is defined by Kirchner (2003) as "the ability to attract rather than merely coerce others". Dyson (2003) concentrates in particular on the term related with Germany and argues that the German 'soft power' means the attractiveness of its institutional and policy models that others emulate because of their association with-and presumed causal relationship to-superior German policy performance (Dyson, 2003: 4).

⁹⁵ Indeed the example of Germany and conditionality of EU membership has encouraged the peaceful resolution of disputes, most notably the Hungarian-Slovak dispute over the Magyar minority in Slovakia and the Danubian dams (Hyde-Price: 1996: 93-9). The EU-sponsored 'Pact for Stability' (also known as the Balladur Plan) has further helped diffuse some of the minority and border disputes, which bedevil the post-communist east. "Enlargement to the East", as the then EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek noted, "is in the very first instance a political issue relating to *security and stability* on our continent" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 179).

socialist-communist regimes that caused large-scale ecological damage. Bringing higher environmental standards to Visegrad countries would benefit all of Europe by reducing cross-border and global pollution. In this regard, the inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the European structure was needed, as they lacked the know-how, and technological and financial means to design and implement a sound policy of ecological rehabilitation.

2. The second argument related with the German support for the Visegrad countries' inclusion in the EU based on geo-political factors is also directly linked with the pivotal role of Germany, its location between East and West and the fact that it does not want to lose the trust of its western partners. Kirchner (1996) argues that this role has been troublesome in the past, not only for Germany but for the rest of Europe too. Thus Germany now fears that the opening up of Europe may reawaken historical machinations in the Visegrad region, with Germany once more acting as the pivot of instability between East and West. During the Cold War Germany contributed to the European order by providing the eastern bulwark of the transatlantic community, thereby fulfilling a stabilising role along Europe's political-security dividing line (Kirchner, 1996). However, as the new Europe now demanded a new definition of the *Mittellage* Germany has a new 'stability-promoting role' not as a western bulwark along Europe's enduring dividing line but as a trans-European mediating power, which can *bridge* this divide (Hyde-Price 2000: 108).⁹⁶

Germany is therefore primarily interested in extending the zone of western security to its eastern neighbours, both through EU and NATO membership. This would help to avoid, according to the Germans, a security vacuum to the east of NATO

⁹⁶ Ludger Kühnhardt also points out that: "For good reasons it is especially up to Germany to promote the *Westbindung* of its immediate eastern neighbours. Germany will only be redeemed of its old, often conjured upon *Mittellage*, if it has but western countries on its immediate eastern border" (Kühnhardt, 1994)

territory, between Russia, which is still a great power, and the territory of the European Union (Kirchner, 1996: 169). It would also be wrong to underestimate the residual military arsenal of the former Soviet Union. Hyde-Price (1996) states that the Russian Federation remains a major military superpower with substantial conventional and military assets. Even though the operational effectiveness of the Russian army has been called into question by the conduct of its campaign in Chechnya, Russia's military strength continues to cast a long and dark geopolitical shadow over the European continent (Hyde-Price, 1996: 180).

3. In addition to these security concerns, Germany felt it *had* to calm fears about the risk of 'Germanisation' in the Visegrad region. These concerns derived mainly from the German role as the 'model economy' for the Visegrad countries and the growing German economic presence in the region, with major German exports to the region and FDI. The extensive development of transitional networks with the Visegrad region had given Germany an inevitable important advantage and some of the Visegrad countries came to understand that to a great extent Europeanisation means Germanisation at the same time.⁹⁷ Thus, in addition to showing its western partners its reluctance to establish hegemony within the countries to its east, Germany had to show its eastern partners the same as well too. The best way to do this was through genuine support for the Visegrad countries' wishes for membership. This would also help to prevent potential opposition towards Germany by the still existing communism advocates in the Visegrad countries which may threaten the welfare and stability of Germany in this way also.

⁹⁷ A good example of this fear of Germanisation can be seen in the Czech Republic. Germany is the leading foreign investor in the Czech Republic. Volkswagen's takeover of Skoda was the most important investment project and this has been followed by several other investments. This spontaneous expansion of German business has created fear among the Czech public. The proportion of Czechs who see Germany as a political and economic danger for the Czech economy jumped from 29% in 1992 to 39% in 1996 (Aniol, 1997: 235).

However as can be understood from the statements of the policy makers and the outcome of the interviews conducted for this research it is most notably the argument that is related with Moravcsik's 'policy interdependence' concept that has led to the positive supportive attitude of German elites towards the eastern enlargement in the intergovernmental bargainings of the European Union. Below there are some examples of the arguments voiced by the most important elites which support this view:

Roman Herzog, the former President of Germany, put this into words in the mid-1990s: "If we do not stabilise the East, it will *destabilise* us" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 35).

The current Chancellor *Gerhard Schröder* has declared:

"The first goal of German foreign policy is to strengthen *peace, security and create a stable* environment, upon which in the last instance our prosperity depends" (Schröder, 1999: 786).

His foreign minister *Joscha Fischer* stated on December 3 1999, in the *Bundestag*, shortly before the Helsinki Summit that;

"Eastern enlargement is the best preventive *security policy* Europe can come up with".


Gunther Verheugen, then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, also noted that;

"The war in the Balkans has taught us that only in those parts of Europe where the principle of integration has been carried out already, democracy, human rights and freedom will be guaranteed. A Europe of integration brings security, freedom and wealth. Thus in the EU enlargement process the *security* policy dimension is in the foreground" (Speech by Gunther Verheugen, the German Minister of State, Foreign Affairs, on April 23, 1999, *Bundestag*).

As already explained in the previous chapter in order to test the hypotheses of this research by empirical data, in-depth-interviews were conducted in Berlin with 86 people between February-June 2000. The responses in these interviews also show that the majority of the respondents think the reasons behind the German executives'

support for eastern enlargement during the intergovernmental bargainings in the EU were security:

Table 1: Germany's reasons for supporting the Visegrad countries' inclusion in the EU (N=86)



Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

Based on the fact that each respondent had more than one answer, the percentages again show *responses*. Confirming the arguments presented in previous chapters, the majority, 61.30 % of responses, indicate that the main reason for Germany's support of the Visegrad countries is *security and stability*. They have identified the notion of security as 'living in peace with neighbours so that it will bring *stability*'. In particular Martin Kremer, an official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated:

"The position of Germany as the central power in Europe makes the *stability* of its eastern neighbours necessary and the best way to do this is by incorporating them into the EU structure".

Phillip Deichmann, foreign policy advisor at the German Embassy in Ankara, has stated:

"If we do not stabilise these countries there will be people coming to knock on our doors, just because they are neighbouring countries to Germany".

These are similar arguments as already stated by the top executives in the German government. All these respondents agreed with the view that Germany is the country that would benefit most from eastern enlargement, and that therefore it is natural that Germany will be the strongest advocate for eastern enlargement. Only 16.50% of the responses show that economic factors are the main reason for German executives' support of the eastern enlargement process.

As can be seen by the statements of the key policy makers overall and the high figure of respondents who have stressed the significance of security, the fact that Visegrad countries' membership in the EU, which would rescue Germany from its frontline state status, stabilise the region and prevent any forms of non-military security threats deriving from instability of its neighbours to disturb its welfare, elicited widespread support (Phillips, 2000: 33). Agreement had emerged among the parties from left to right and among the government and foreign ministry officials that the issue of security especially in the framework of non-military security threats was a priority for formulating German national interests, leading to a supportive German attitude towards eastern enlargement during EU intergovernmental negotiations.

Solid proof for the fact that security had become an important aspect of German foreign policy could best be seen in the German attitude to the Kosovo war in 1999. The decision by the German government to participate in the NATO operation has shown the radical sea-change in German domestic politics. In 1991 German protesters had taken to the street in great number to protest against the Gulf War and Bonn had endeavoured to stay out of the conflict, writing a 10 billion dollar cheque to the US Treasury instead. By 1999, German pilots were firing HARM missiles into Yugoslav air defence sites, urged on by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and supported by clear majorities in opinion polls and the *Bundestag* (Denison, 2001: 154).

Hyde-Price argues that German motivations for participating in the bombing campaign were three-fold:

- A strong sense of responsibility towards its NATO allies. Not to have participated in the NATO action would have fatally undermined the international position of the new government, precipitating a major domestic political crisis.

- A strong sense of moral and political responsibility towards the humanitarian suffering in Kosovo. Such normative considerations are often overlooked in foreign policy analysis, but they can have a very real political force. This is certainly true in the case of Germany, given the legacy of Hitlerism and the Holocaust. Confronted by pictures of appalling human suffering, ethnic cleansing and Serbian atrocities, many Germans felt that ‘something must be done’. Hence the broad support for the use of military force to stop ethnic cleansing and prevent widespread human rights violations in Kosovo. Chancellor Schröder gave a speech, full of conviction and determination, in which he stressed Germany’s *Verantwortung* (responsibility), both to its NATO allies and towards the victims of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

- The third factor, less openly discussed but very important, was a concern about a new wave of *asylum seekers and refugees*. As already discussed, this was one of the ‘new security threats’, which formed the top priority in contemporary German foreign policy. Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo threatened to precipitate large-scale migration into Western Europe, which the German Government wished to prevent. As Rudolf Scharping, the Defence Minister of the German Federal Government, commented, the ghastly events in Kosovo pose a fundamental question:

“Do we deal with force, murder and expulsion by tackling these problems at their source? Or do we watch passively and wait until their consequences come home to us?” (Hyde-Price 2001, 18).

Not only did Germany actively participate in the Kosovo war but also given its presidency of the EU, it played a pivotal role in negotiations to find a lasting solution to the Kosovo war and to bring peace to the wider region. The German government's long-established preference for non-military conflict prevention and multilateral co-operation was illustrated by the *Stability Pact for Southeast Europe* launched by EU ministers on June 10, 1999 (Hombach 1999). Germany as president of the EU, took the initiative in developing this pact, which was designed to stabilise the region through economic investment and support. It helped develop a new pan-European security system under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) based on conflict prevention and the strengthening the process of democratisation in the region, assisted by the perspective of countries in the Balkan region developing closer relations with the EU, up to and including membership (Rueb, 1999: 22-3). In addition, historic decisions were reached at the Cologne European Council meeting (June 3-4 1999) concerning the building of a European Security and Defence Policy within the framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. This initiative was later followed up at the Helsinki EU Summit (December 10-11, 1999) which set a 'headline goal' whereby EU member states would, by 2003, generate military forces capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks⁹⁸, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (Hyde-Price, 2001: 29). These further demonstrate Germany's pronounced interest in stability in the region and the priority it places on security, which was not only limited

⁹⁸ Petersberg Tasks are types of military operations which are considered to be appropriate for EU intervention. They were defined by the WEU's 1992 Petersberg Declaration and incorporated into Article 17 of the Treaty of European Union by the EU's Amsterdam Summit. They are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

to the Visegrad region as well as its initiative in increasing the EU's involvement in this region.

Geo-political cost-benefit analysis in German national interests:

As the security agenda has widened, the range of problems and costs which enlargement can bring to the EU has grown in proportion. The likelihood of a new, long and populous eastern frontier with associated problems of crime and illegal immigration may be a significant security threat making the hard-won Schengen system come under the renewed pressure of both a technical and political nature once it has to be extended.

The accession process would also bring the environmental problems still produced by the old smokestack industries in Eastern Europe into the Union and create new responsibilities for protecting the peoples of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic from any future *Chernobyls* on their borders. Moreover on the energy front and the security of its supply, the eastern enlargement was likely to worsen the ratio of customers to producers within the EU. The Visegrad countries may have coal and lignite but they lack oil and gas. This does not matter in a period of stability and free trade, but things might look very different in the event of foreign policy crises with Russia or the Middle East. Even a rise in the price of energy for economic or ecological reasons might cause an enlarged EU problems of a more variegated and significant nature (Hill, 2000: 22).

Domesticating a large number of potentially intractable problems in the Visegrad region is hardly likely to make for a settled external frontier and geo-political stability. It increases the number of flashpoints, depending on where the line is drawn and leads to the protest from the public that eastern enlargement will lead to cross border crime, immigration and problems concerning labour markets. Thus it is

necessary to carry out a cost-benefit analysis here. For the reasons cited above it might be costly to expand the EU to the East. However, it will be costlier to *exclude* the Visegrad region from the European Union. The benefits of eastern enlargement seemed to be more than potential costs. In particular, a *delay* of prospect of membership would slow the reform process down leading to an increase in the influence of potential nationalist and traditionalist movements, which would both delay the emergence of civil society in the Visegrad countries, and increase instability in security policy, because the respective 'national' goals claimed by these groups often includes demands for a revision of borders and there is no guarantee that these claims would always be met by peaceful means (Kramer, 1993: 218). The opportunity costs of delaying the Visegrad countries' EU membership would have a direct impact on the stability and integrity of societies in neighbouring EU countries, especially on Germany.

As a result by projecting the benefits of institutionalised multilateral co-operation into the Visegrad region Germany's security environment along its eastern borders would be stabilised. Germany was also convinced that, based on its own experience of creating a stable, strong democracy through firm embodiment in a Western institution, stabilisation of the democracies of the Visegrad countries would be best served by anchoring them in the EU.

In this regard, the press statement published on December 15, 1998 just before the beginning of the German presidency of the European Union in 1999 shows the German government's reasoning for the support of the eastern enlargement process. The Federal government has declared that:

"Particularly by means of the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union has become an area of freedom, security and law. This signifies that the Union has to be a *security community* whose main tasks should be the protection of

its citizens in the fight against organised crime and illegal migration. This should be the high priority in the accession negotiations’.

Gunther Verheugen, Germany’s EU Commissioner for enlargement, has also made a cost-benefit analysis in a speech he has given in the *Bundestag*:

“People are protesting because they cannot see exactly what the true consequences of enlargement will be. It is true that we have problems. For example, we have enormous levels of cross border crime and illegal migration, which we didn’t have in the past. However, this situation will actually be *improved* by enlargement, because the new member states are being integrated into our common system for combating crime and securing borders, and they will have to meet our much higher standards. Thus the European Union will actually have fewer problems when some of these countries are subject to the socialising effects of European integration than if they are left outside to fester” (Verheugen, speech on December 19, 1999, *Bundestag*).

In the next section, the same analysis will be made for Turkey.

German national interests in supporting Turkish membership (geo-political factors):

1. The first argument that links the importance of geo-political/security factors with the German government’s positive attitude towards Turkey’s EU membership within the intergovernmental bargaining process of the EU is again related to Moravcsik’s assumption of ‘policy interdependence’ mentioned in the previous section; thus the connection between inner stability in another country and the preservation of the well-being of the German domestic economic and political system; in other words the prevention of new security threats of social, environmental and political nature which can disturb stability and well-being of the German society. The analysis that has worked in favour of the Visegrad countries also works in favour of Turkey’s future EU membership.

In order to understand the linkage between the stability of Turkish domestic politics and German domestic politics, it is necessary to examine the conditions of the Turkish community living in Germany. Since Turkey is not a neighbour of Germany like the Visegrad countries, the relation of interdependence between the two countries

derives from the huge size of the Turkish community in Germany and their lack of integration with the German society and the existing strong links with Turkey.

The problem of lack of integration of the Turkish community in Germany with wider German society can also be attributed to negligence on the part of the German government. Although in recent decades Germany has been experiencing high levels of immigration, the necessary strategies and infrastructure to deal with this have not been developed very efficiently. The citizenship issue in particular has not been dealt with in an adequate manner. Turks did have the opportunity to obtain German citizenship, but the fact that they would lose their Turkish citizenship if they did so prevented them from opting for it. The significance of this problem for the Turkish community in Germany, and therefore for German domestic politics, began to be appreciated among different strata of the German political parties, but although they slowly embarked on some reforms, the state never allowed for dual citizenship.⁹⁹

Even disregarding the citizenship issue, Germany's integration policy has always been seen to many as being to the detriment of the Turkish community. Over the years, integration came to mean that 'by living together, it is expected that foreigners will orientate themselves towards and integrate themselves in the German culture', rather than any attempt to understand their cultural background and to help to minimise German prejudices. This has caused the creation of ghettos, mainly concentrated in the Turkish community, in spite of the fact that many residents of Turkish origin have indeed acquired proficiency in the German language and German

⁹⁹ German nationality can only be given to foreigners (not ethnic Germans) through a 'naturalisation' process which necessitates a fifteen-year residency and a fee of 500 DM to be given to the German administration. In 1994 there were some improvements which allowed the children of eighteen years of age to choose between German and their parents' nationality. The new SPD-Green government proposed a radical change in the citizenship law making the granting of German citizenship to foreigners easier and allowing dual citizenship for the first time. After the elections in Hessen and the loss of the government's majority in the *Bundesrat*, this proposal had to be dropped and the new Act to Amend the Nationality Law came into force extending the principle of descent to children born of foreign parents in Germany and disallowing for the dual citizenship again.

citizenship. Even when some Turks have preferred to accept German nationality, they are still viewed by many native Germans as foreigners and feel that they are only in Germany on sufferance.

The failure to integrate Turkish workers into wider German society and the lack of any solution to the citizenship issue caused alienation among Turks and led to extremist tendencies in relation to particular ethnic and religious policies. These were exacerbated by the workers' unbreakable links with and dependence on domestic events in Turkey. Turkey's biggest problems, the Kurdish issue and the threat of fundamentalist Islam, were directly exported to Germany and became important problems on Germany's own domestic political agenda. Serious Turkish political cleavages such as the secularist-Islamist cleavage, Sunni-Alevi differences, and the tension between Turkish-Kurdish populations, were reproduced and intensified in Germany influencing, not only the Turkish population in Germany, but German society as well. Nevertheless Heinz Kramer (2000) argues that the exaggeration of Turkey's domestic problems among Germany's Turkish workers was mainly due to their social alienation and lack of integration into German society.

In terms of the reproduction of Turkey's Kurdish problem in Germany, the free operation of separatist organisations and groups in Germany, which normally would have been banned in Turkey, was a factor intensifying this problem. Despite its legal prohibition, the Kurdish terrorist group PKK with radical, separatist aims, was very influential in forming networks and influencing the Kurdish population, which had increased over the years due to Germany's rather lenient asylum policies. Before being dissolved, the PKK's secret network covered at least seven regions in Germany out of a total of 16. This network included cadres and would-be cadres, and officials who were regularly changed in order to thwart police attempts to locate them. This

prevented German police from penetrating the party organisation and allowed the PKK to continue killing Turkish people, blocking the highways, burning Turkish-based businesses and affecting the peace of German society in general. As the military conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army intensified at the beginning of the 1990s, German society was widely affected by this Turkish 'domestic' conflict.


The second most pressing domestic problem of Turkey, the potential of radical Islam, also surfaced in German domestic politics. The tension between secular and religious Turks was further exacerbated by German-based Islamist organisations. The largest, the *Milli Görüş*, was founded in 1985 in Cologne with the aim of destroying the secular system in Turkey and creating in its place another governmental and societal system based on the Koran and Sharia Law. This organisation was quite powerful, with about 26,500 members and around 500 meeting places in Germany, and therefore presented a great risk of creating and exacerbating tensions between Turkish representatives of secularism and those of fundamentalist Islam in Germany. The *Organisation of Islamist Societies of Cologne* founded in Cologne in 1984 by Cemalettin Kaplan was another radical Islamist organisation that advocated Islamisation of political affairs in Turkey and a radical change in the Turkish government system so that an Islamic system could be installed. Because Kaplan was planning to achieve this through revolutionary means, naming his main enemies as capitalism, democracy, secularism and the party system, he threatened to intensify religious cleavages in the Turkish community.

3. Though it is not related with the problems in Turkish domestic politics, increased immigration constituted an additional risk to German society's stability. The increase of Turkish workers in Germany could lead to a rise in racist tendencies, especially among former East Germans. They are the most affected by unemployment

and have had little experience of living with foreigners. Thus, the East Germans influenced in particular by the economic problems could resort to extremist tendencies, with young citizens seduced into joining neo-nazi and skinhead groups and the eastern population as a whole could begin to see Turkish immigrants as scapegoats for their alienation and unhappiness. This would create serious problems for the well-being and stability of German society. The burning of hostels housing Turkish families in Mölln and Solingen in 1992 were the most tragic cases indicating the potential for such extremism.

Regarding in particular the reality of Turkish domestic problems being reflected directly onto the German domestic political stage, the responses in interviews conducted in 2000 also shows that majority of the respondents think that the presence of the Turkish community in Germany has a *negative* effect on Germany's attitude towards Turkey's EU membership:

Table 2: The impact of the sizeable Turkish community in Germany on German policy towards Turkish membership (N= 86)



Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

In this question, because there was only one answer that the respondent could give, the percentages show the number of *respondents*. The results of this question show that only 12.18% of the respondents see the Turkish community's presence in Germany as having a positive effect on the German attitude towards potential Turkish membership mainly because of a conviction that it demonstrates that 'Germany is tolerant and that unique cultures can live together in Germany'. 4.88% of the respondents have said 'both positive and negative'. One of these respondents, Gerald Wolf, an official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that:

"The presence of the Turkish community has a negative effect on Germany's attitude because their very large numbers create a fear of immigration in the case of Turkey's EU membership. On the other hand, it also has a positive effect, it shows the world that Germany can experience the reality of two different cultures living together".

10.9% of the respondents see it as having no impact; they stated that "the domestic problems of Turkey only concern Turkey itself". However the largest number, 76.92%, see it as having a *negative* impact.

42.70% of respondents who thought that the impact is negative, see this as being linked with the strong relationship between the Turkish community in Germany and domestic politics in Turkey, and remain concerned about the influence of Turkish domestic problems on German public affairs. They have stressed the Kurdish issue and the potential threat of radical Islam in this context. This is directly related to the inadequate integration of the Turkish community into German society. Because they do not feel that they are part of German society, Turks are still influenced by what is happening in Turkey and carry Turkish domestic problems directly into Germany. The concept of 'parallel societies'¹⁰⁰ was widely mentioned among responses; Peter Kolb, an official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs related the concept of parallel

¹⁰⁰ Parallel societies in this regard mean the existence of two different societies living in the same country without having any contact with each other.

societies with the *Islamic* influences on the Turkish community in Germany. Martin Weiss, foreign policy advisor to the SPD group in the parliament and as someone who has been to Turkey on several occasions, pointed out that:

“As recently Turkish TV channels have become available by satellite and there are more frequent flights to Turkey, Turks find it unnecessary to try to become integrated into German society and so to break their strong links with Turkey”.

Harold Berwanger, another foreign policy advisor to the SPD group in the parliament considered the significance of Turkish voters in the success of the Social Democrats in the last elections as a result of the advice they were receiving from the government in Turkey and thus served as another example of the unbreakable link between the Turkish community in Germany and Turkey.

8.53% of the respondents who directly stressed the unsuccessful integration of the Turkish community into German society interpreted this as a sign of Turkey's incapability of achieving integration with the European Union. 25.6% said directly that Turkish culture is very 'different'. One of the respondents who is of this view, an official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Michael Klepsch argued that:

“This fact creates a negative reference for Turkey and gives the CDU/CSU politicians something to argue against Turkey's EU membership”.

Another official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Clemens Betzel, who is a specialist on Turkey, confirmed the view that:

“Because of the unsuccessful integration of the Turkish community in the German society, the image of Turkey in the heads of the German people is that they are not modern, not western oriented but actually backwards, violent and only *imitating* the western societies”.

However, as can be seen by the responses the most important problem that the Turkish community in Germany creates is their unsuccessful integration with the German society and thus the existing strong links with Turkey and the negative outcomes of this on the German society such as reflection of Turkish problems in

German domestic politics and potential instability. Therefore just like the Visegrad countries, democratic consolidation and solid structural reforms aiming to solve the political extremist tendencies in Turkish domestic politics were a major concern for Germany as well.

The prospect of EU membership was an important motivating factor for this purpose just like the case of the Visegrad countries. Issue of EU membership is intimately tied to that of the very identity of Turkey-secular modernity v. fundamentalist self-assertion-and by extension to internal political struggles of some ferocity. German politicians understood that Turks themselves take the question of EU membership very seriously and became aware of the serious effects on Turkish foreign policy that resulted from the Luxembourg European Council Summit in December 1997 when Turkey was openly left out of the enlargement process. Reacting sharply to the EU decisions and anger over the preferences being shown to other 'eastern' states, Turkey had frozen all political relations with the Union and was not keen to embark upon reforms that would improve the problems in its domestic politics. Thus as regards the fragile state of the Turkish political structure, further alienation could result in an increase of the tensions inherent in various cleavages, so inflicting severe damage on the standing of the pro-western domestic parties and leading as a consequence to further instability in domestic politics. If Turkey remained outside an EU that continues to undertake enlargement in eastern Europe, Germany could not afford to take Turkey's reactions for granted (Hill, 2000: 19).

Realising this, the Schröder government launched a policy of 'motivation' towards Turkey so that the prospect of EU membership would facilitate the reforms needed in its domestic politics with direct, positive consequences for domestic German politics. This eventually led to strong German support for Turkey's EU membership

candidacy in the period leading up to the Helsinki European Council Summit.¹⁰¹ The German government was supportive of Turkey's candidate status while stressing the need for the latter to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and at the same time to overcome its democratic deficiencies, human rights problems and economic problems.

An important point to add here is that the important domestic problems of Turkey are also priorities for the parties in the current government. The change to the Social Democratic-Green government had removed issues of culture and religion, which used to be of vital importance for the government of CDU/CSU, from the centre of attention, but the priorities which Social Democrats attached to *human rights* and importance given by the Green Party to *peace issues* focused attention on Turkey's Kurdish problem and the significant role of the army in Turkish politics.

2. In addition to the strong ties between the Turkish community in Germany and the problems of Turkish domestic politics spilling over to Germany and endangering the stability of German domestic politics, the 'security' factor underlying the German national interest and foreign policy formulation is very much related to the ongoing events in Kosovo and Germany's realisation of how important it is to secure the outer zone of Europe's fractured 'regional security complex', the Balkans *and* Eastern Mediterranean area; and that this is not just a matter for the Visegrad region. This security factor is related with both military *and* non-military/new security threats.

According to the definition of traditional, military security threats argued by Kirchner in his pilot study in 1999 which was mentioned earlier in this chapter, one can say that military threats still existed in the Balkans, eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Technological developments mean that the international system is increasingly subject to global security concerns, above all the spread of ballistic

¹⁰¹ The Minister of State in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Christian Zöpel, confirmed this by his statement in an SPD position paper published in February 2000 that: "the high number of Turks in Germany makes it necessary for Germany to support Turkey so that it will carry on its reforms".

missile technology coupled with the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Many of these international security concerns are focused on the emerging southern 'arc of crisis' which stretches from the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, through the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; the region that Turkey is located in. This was especially seen in the Gulf War in 1991 and is still seen in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Because of the interdependent nature of traditional military security threats and the fact that they can easily endanger the stability of the European continent as well in today's globalised world, the security of this region was very important for security of the European Union and Germany.

Turkey's geo-political importance is relevant within the concept of non-military/new security threats as well because threats of social, economic and political nature; i.e. transnational crime, ethnic factionalism, migratory pressures, environmental degradation are all present in the Balkans, eastern Mediterranean area and Middle East. They have the potential to spill-over very easily to Europe and thus threaten the stability and well-being of EU member states.

Situated at the crossroads of the Balkans, eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, the Black Sea region and Central Asia, it became obvious once more that Turkey's strategic importance had not at all diminished either for Europe or for Germany; it is potentially the most significant geo-political issue raised by enlargement as it is the country which holds the most critical strategic position of all the candidates for accession. As a long time (and valued) member of NATO on Russia's southern flank, its loss to the West would cause the most serious policy repercussions, even in today's geo-political environment, and its internal stability was found to be really necessary to counter the fragmentation taking place in the region both for military and non-military security reasons (Hyde-Price, 2000: 208). The best way to stabilise the country and

extend security to the region in which it is located would be through EU membership; by including it in the networks of institutionalised co-operation based on shared normative values of conflict resolution. By including Turkey in its structure, the EU would also help to demonstrate to the other unstable Muslim countries in the region that it is possible to combine liberal western values with a predominantly Muslim society, make Turkey an example for these countries thus attempting to help these countries' democratisation and stabilisation. In this way, Turkey could even act as a bridge between Middle East and Europe and help to prevent the *clash of civilisations*.

102

Gunther Verheugen has made a crucial remark about this issue:

“Because of the war in Kosovo, Europe has moved closer together and this has consequences for the dynamism of the enlargement process. In my opinion, the strongest impulse for a permanent stabilisation of south-eastern Europe, the Balkans and *Turkey* is the prospect of joining the EU” (Verheugen, May 26, 1999, Sofia).

In addition to the securing of the region Turkey is located in through maintaining Turkey's internal stability, with the inclusion of Turkey, Europe would also become a global player, exercising an increased level of influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

3. There are also security concerns for Germany arising from developments in the wider international system. Germany is a major trading nation and thus is concerned about potential threats to supplies of vital raw materials, markets and

¹⁰² According to an article written by Samuel Huntington for the *Foreign Affairs* in summer 1993, “The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington, 1993: 23)

maritime trade routes. Regarding the fact that Middle East and the Caspian region¹⁰³ may be the source for Germany's future energy supplies, this region became additionally important for Germany. The combination of Germany's future energy needs and the instability of this region made the strategic location of Turkey and the necessity to secure its internal stability additionally important for Germany (Hyde-Price, 1996: 180).

4. The German initiative along these lines was also linked to the triangular relationship between Turkey, Germany and the US. The strategic importance of Turkey made it an important ally of the US, who remained likewise an important partner for Germany. The US has also long been aware of the importance of Turkish membership in the EU and so pressurised the EU to adopt a more favourable attitude towards Turkey, believing that inclusion of Turkey in the European Union would be the best way of exporting stability to the Middle East and the Balkans. This pressure did not pay dividends during the years of the Kohl government, and the United States, desiring to keep Turkey within the western Camp, had pointed out Germany as a major obstacle to more favourable treatment of Turkey. However, the US pressure did reap benefits under Schröder's chancellorship. Schröder's call for a new centre, or a 'third way' invited comparisons with President Clinton's policies, and Clinton was known to be a supporter of Schröder. Thus, this alliance also worked in favour of German support for Turkey. Schröder even remarked that:

¹⁰³ The Caspian region is the Caucasus region; the mountainous region east of the Caspian Sea. Six independent states have emerged, in the Caspian Region, out of the breakup of the Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia on the west side of the Caspian Sea, and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the east side. While Armenia and Georgia do not border the Caspian Sea and they do not possess significant oil reserves, they are, nevertheless, positioned on the routes through which transporting pipelines are planned and /or already exist. And while Uzbekistan, sandwiched between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, also does not border the Caspian Sea, it possesses a significant amount of natural gas and is on the checkerboard of proposed pipelines running eastward toward China and southward toward Pakistan (el-Saghir, 1998:1)

“My position on Turkish-EU relations is closer to U.S. policy - which is aimed at tying Turkey into Europe's political and military alliances for *security* reasons - than it is to the position of Mr. Kohl” (Webber, 2001: 129).

Some statements of the key German decision makers below show that the underlying reason for the German executives' support for Turkey's EU membership in intergovernmental negotiations within the EU may be related to *geo-political/security* factors, especially as seen in the first two arguments stated above, within the framework of 'preserving stability' of Germany:

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's statements regarding the Turkish candidacy after the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 are important for showing the official state opinion about Turkish membership and the underlying reasons why they have supported the Turkish candidacy in the European Union in the Summit. In an interview he gave to the German daily, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Schröder stated:

“It was in the interests of the European Union to give a clear membership perspective to Turkey if it wants to see a *European* Turkey that has carried out necessary internal reforms for fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. Failing to recognise Turkey as a candidate at this summit would create a worse reaction in Turkey than that displayed following the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997 and would push Turkey away to the very outer boundaries of the European Union. This would be dangerous for the European Union especially when one considers the role Turkey continues to play in the stability of the region. Moreover this would empower the Islamist fundamentalists in Turkey who are against Turkey's EU membership and have negative influences on the domestic politics of Germany” (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 14 1999).

The Federal Government Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has also given statements along the same lines. Before the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, he argued that:

“To include Turkey is not a question of having a stronger military union; it is about leading Turkey towards democracy, a market economy, minority rights and respect for human rights. Also it is a question of which direction Turkey, the Middle East, the Caucasus region or Europe should be oriented, therefore it is important for us, as Germans who have a big Turkish community among us, to include Turkey as a natural part of the EU” (December 3, 1999, speech in the *Bundestag*).

Another important person at executive level to voice opinions is Dr. Christoph Zöpel, Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His views also complement the views of Schröder and Fischer and which taken together have been recognised as the official foreign policy view of Germany. Zöpel is important for the fact that as the foreign policy spokesman of the SPD Group in the *Bundestag* he represents the position of the SPD, that forms one of the partners of the current coalition, as concerns its attitude towards Turkey and is the leader of the German team responsible for dealings concerning the reforms inside the EU. Zöpel stressed the fact that the European Union is not a Christian Club but an institution based on a ‘*Werte Gemeinschaft*’ (community of values) that embodies principles such as respect for minorities, human rights, democracy and global co-operation. Therefore the ongoing reluctance of the EU so far to take Turkey into the European Union was due mainly to the internal problems of Turkey, in particular problems with minorities and incomplete democratisation as well as economic problems and the disproportionately high importance given to agriculture in the economic life. In the realm of its foreign policy, its problems with Greece and also the borders it has with troublesome countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria are of vital importance as its incorporation would cause the EU to assume direct borders with these countries.

However he gave more importance to the link between the place of the Turks in the domestic policy of Germany, Turkey’s strategic location and the support Germany has been giving to Turkey for its EU candidacy. This was mainly due to the fact that the high number of Turks in Germany have a large impact on the domestic politics of Germany and thus for the stability of German domestic politics full democratisation and radical reforms in Turkish domestic politics are necessary. In addition, within the framework of today’s interdependent relations among states, instability in the Balkans

and Middle Eastern region would directly spill-over to Germany, causing both military and non-military security threats to German welfare. To keep these regions stable and be an example for its unstable, Muslim neighbours Turkey's stability was necessary. This would be best achieved by EU membership. This is the main reason why Germany has developed a positive attitude in its foreign policy and has a favourable bargaining position as regards Turkey. With the integration of Turkey, maybe the EU would be economically and socially more heterogeneous than before but would *definitely* be a peace-zone (SPD Position Paper 494, July 28, 1999).

There are certainly a huge number of geo-political/security costs associated with Turkish membership in the EU. One should not foresee the fact that if the prospect of Turkish membership were to become real, then the EU would run straight into a set of foreign policy issues of even greater magnitude than those that the Visegrad countries would bring. Turkish entry would give the EU long, unmanageable frontiers with three of the world's most problematic states in Iran, Iraq and Syria (to say nothing of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), to add to those further north. Thus formulating a positive attitude towards Turkey's EU membership would necessitate a very careful cost-benefit analysis for Germany which has the strongest relations with Turkey among the EU member states.

Geo-political cost-benefit analysis in German national interests:

For the fact that has been mentioned above, it would not be very realistic to say that Turkey's inclusion in the EU would be without cost in security terms. It is true that being situated in one of the most risky locations in the world and having borders with some of the most unstable countries of the world, EU membership of Turkey would surely bring the EU certain risks. However, the statements of the executives show that the German government's view is that exclusion of Turkey would be more

costly. Turkey's EU membership would bring Germany stability/security for two principal reasons: 1. The big impact of the Turkish community in Germany on German domestic politics makes it necessary to push Turkey towards democratic consolidation and a drive for internal reforms which would have direct positive consequences on Germany's inner stability. 2. After the Kosovo war, Germany became aware of the importance of Turkey's location in the world and its role as an important ally for the well-being and security of the member states; in particular that of its most significant partner Germany. Thus it should not be alienated, as happened at the Luxembourg Summit 1997 and instead should be given real prospects for membership in order to tie it strongly to the Union.

In the section below, hypothesis III will be dealt with to explore whether cultural factors constituted the underlying reasons for the German attitude towards both categories of candidate in the intergovernmental process of the EU.

Hypothesis III was 'Cultural factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German 'national interests' (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees the Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests'.

German national interests in supporting eastern enlargement (cultural factors):

1. There were psychological factors. These countries felt that they had always been part of the same European culture despite their 45 years of communist rule and that now they wanted *to return to Europe*. Sharing historical experiences and cultural similarities with these countries, both German elites and the public alike felt that their inclusion was a *natural* step rather than a forced absorption. The re-unification of Europe would also help clarify the newly popular concept of 'borders of Europe'. The Germanic assumption of a future Europe in which "The West is identified with the

former western Christendom constructed by the historical experiences of the *Reformation, the Enlightenment and French Revolution*” (Wallace, 2000: 470), is also shared by most other EU member states as well. This is actually to say that the distinction between East and West carries little geographical reality, but is more of a socio-psychological judgment concerned with codifying who is ‘one of us’ and who is ‘not one of us’. This definition works in favour of the Visegrad countries’ inclusion in the EU, especially in cultural and religious terms, as they are already regarded as ‘part of’ and perceived as ‘returning to’ Europe. Although eastward enlargement could potentially endanger the strategy of achieving consensus through majority decisions, it was widely recognised that membership would in any case be acceptable wherever an evolved and sustainable awareness of the cultural, ethnic and historical *bonds* exists (Leopold, 1995: 128).

2. Though it cannot be considered as a real cultural factor but carries more of a moral nature, the influence of the concept of ‘collective memory’ in German foreign policy influenced the position of the German government for the Visegrad countries’ EU membership positively in EU intergovernmental negotiations. Because of the sense of guilt deriving from past crimes against humanity in general, and against the Visegrad countries in particular (and also due to their support for German unification despite these terrible experiences), Germany felt politically and morally obliged to support these countries’ wish to become part of the EU.¹⁰⁴

On the other hand, problems between Germany and the Czech Republic and Poland in particular regarding the Sudeten Germans expelled from the Czech Republic and the minorities in Poland still exist. Carrying a moral rather than a mere cultural dimension, these problems do sometimes form obstacles in the bilateral relations and

¹⁰⁴ It owed a special debt of gratitude to Hungary, as it was the country, which cut the first hole in the Iron Curtain in September 1989.

activate certain interest groups in both sides who are directly affected by these issues negatively. In Germany these groups oppose inclusion of the Czech Republic and Poland in the EU and in the Czech Republic and Poland these groups oppose improvement of relations with Germany.

Cultural cost-benefit analysis in German national interests:

As can be understood from the above section, the cultural benefits/advantages for supporting the Visegrad countries' EU membership do exceed the costs/disadvantages.

In the section below, the analysis regarding the importance of cultural factors in national interest formulation of Germany in its position towards Turkey's EU membership will be done.

German national interests against Turkish membership (cultural factors):

1. Moravcsik's assumption of the dependence of foreign policy on national interests also requires that politicians consider their public when taking decisions. Despite the positive changes mentioned in the previous section, it would not be wrong to say that a considerable section of the German public still harbours negative opinions about Turkey. The failure to integrate Turkish workers into German society had already spread the idea of cultural incompatibility between Turkish and German societies. The existence of 'parallel societies', or the phenomenon of 'two societies living in the same country at the same time but without any interaction or commonalties', made this cultural clash more obvious and intensified negative opinions held.

The role of the media is very important here because, far from trying to ease tensions between the two societies, it helped intensify negative German public opinion. Şeref Ateş (2002) claims that far from supporting the German government in its

attempts to draw up policies aimed at bringing the two societies together, the German media stressed the inability of Turks living in Germany to integrate into German society, and the tensions created within German society as a result of cleavages among the Turkish population. Nail Alkan (1994) stresses the creation of ‘national stereotypes’ as a result of primary sources or personal contacts between different societies, which influence the whole society and become very hard to eliminate over the years, especially if the media consciously works to reinforce them (Alkan, 1994: 6).¹⁰⁵

2. Despite the detachment of the Schröder government from such ideas, the German version of the debate about the future borders of Europe that includes factors of Europe’s ‘spiritual unity’ consisting of such elements as Roman law, a historic process of separation between Church and State, enlightenment and western Christianity, was still prominent within German society and emphasised the discrepancy between Muslim Turks and Christian Germans. Some members of the opposition party, the CDU/CSU also used these arguments to attract potential supporters. Former Christian Democratic leader and head of foreign policy, Wolfgang Schaeuble, has argued that:

“For Germany, the EU is a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* (a community of common destiny) united by a common identity, with roots reaching back to *Christian* medieval and to ancient times and therefore Turkey should not be included as a full member of the EU” (*Milliyet*, August 14, 2000).


Thus, combined with the already negative influence of the Turkish community in Germany that had helped to create notions of the ‘cultural’ incompatibility of Turkey with the EU member states, the strong statements of the opposition parties’

¹⁰⁵ Though it does not fall in the period under investigation in this research, the results of a survey published in the German weekly journal *die Stern* reinforce the arguments related with negative public opinion in Germany about Turkey’s EU membership: 45% of the German population does not want to give Turks membership until 2007; 19% of the German population does not want to give Turks membership at all; only 19% of the German population are in favour of Turkey getting membership (*die Stern*, February 14 2002).

politicians which stress Turkey's cultural incompatibility and the fact that it has not participated historically in the creation of the *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* of the EU had also made it more difficult for the German public to reflexively embrace Turks as they had the Visegrad countries.

Nevertheless, the responses in interviews conducted in Berlin between February-June 2000 show that the majority of the decision makers of Germany think different culture or what is seen as its best indicator, namely religion, is *not* greatly important in the formulation of a foreign policy attitude towards Turkey's EU membership:

Table 3: The different religion of Turkey being significant in the German attitude towards Turkish membership (N=86)



Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

Among the decision makers who were interviewed, 57.3% indicated that religion actually has no influence. 31.4% of the negative responses were from members of the current government of the SPD-Greens who often stressed that religion is not of importance. The main reasons listed for those people who answered 'no'

were: 1. Germany is trying to be a multi-cultural society and therefore there is tolerance and freedom of religion in Germany and 2. The EU is a union for common *values* and is not based on religion.

25.7% of the people who said that “religion is not significant” stated that religion is not a significant factor *unless* it is of a fundamentalist nature. This implies that these respondents are inclined to see religion only as a factor if they suspect that it is being practiced in an extreme manner. This was not the case for Christian Democrats. Out of the people who said yes, all the MPs belonged to the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Party and their main argument was that “the drawing of the borders of future Europe and the re-definition of being European necessitates the incorporation of religion, and this works in a negative direction for Turkey”.

As concerns cultural benefits, the example of Germany as incorporating two different cultures and being an example of a ‘multi-cultural’ society can be given. At the same time, Turkish membership in the EU would arguably undermine Huntington’s (1993) ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis because it would prove that there is no incompatibility between the Muslim and the Western world; a country may indeed make a synthesis of Islamic culture and western liberal values.

Cultural cost-benefit analysis in German national interests:

A careful balancing of the cultural costs/disadvantages and benefits/advantages in the formulation of a German attitude towards Turkey’s EU membership would show that cultural costs/disadvantages are of more importance than benefits/advantages. It is true that the majority of the respondents of the interviews used in this research have mainly stated the opposite, but these people all belong to the SPD-Green government which does not incorporate culture and religion in its policy-making framework. However, for several reasons that were stated above the majority of the German public

is sceptic about Turkey's EU membership based on concerns regarding Turkey's cultural incompatibility with the EU. The opposition parties' statements also reinforce this view. If the government executives were of the same view with the public and simple cultural reasons were to form the principal basis in the formulation of a German attitude towards Turkey's EU membership bid, then it would almost certainly lead to an unfavourable German position within the intergovernmental bargaining process when deciding about the EU's enlargement process.

Though not as crucial as the cultural factors written above, another disadvantage of supporting Turkey as regards German national interests can be seen as the large population of Turkey and its potential capacity for over representation in the EU. Appendix 4 at the end of this thesis shows the direct link between population and voting weight in the EU and compares Turkey in this respect with the other candidates; this is important in showing how Turkey's population may actually be a disadvantage for its membership application. The entry of Turkey into the EU would make it the second country after Germany in terms of its number of representatives in EU institutions, and therefore a very influential member. Including a country with such a different political culture and different cultural traditions as Turkey would be creating a 'dangerous' rival to Germany. The supportive 'returning to Europe' argument for the Visegrad countries that emphasises their compatibility with the EU and so worked in favour of the Visegrad membership applications, does not work for Turkey. There is serious concern within the EU that not only cultural incompatibility but the very different Turkish *political culture* could lead to an increase in the number of factions in the EP.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ The significant role of the army in Turkish politics, and the constraints on political competition as a result of the role of the army constitutes a legitimate concern for the EU. The nation states of the EU pool sovereignty and legislate jointly, therefore members need to be able to trust each other and be reasonably confident that these laws and regulations would actually be monitored and enforced across

Moravcsik also points to the problem of ‘potential inefficiency’ in EU decision-making in a union comprising between twenty and thirty members, and the problem of differences in political culture. He believes that “reapportionment of votes in the Council and Commission, already controversial, is a very tractable issue”, making it problematic to reach a compromise on the future of EU institutions in this case (Moravcsik, 1998: 41). In terms of the problem of differences in culture, he believes that some of the new EU membership candidates will be lacking the notion of a European identity; his supportive argument for this is “the absence of either a Christian Democratic heritage or connection between integration and peace”. He specifically refers to Turkey, and remarks that:

“Although Turkish accession is not rejected and is only being temporarily postponed, many observers believe that Turkey lies outside the border of any ideologically coherent conception of Europe” (Moravcsik, 1998: 41).

Thus EU members may not be ready to see Turkey, with its significant problems, different political culture and cultural traits occupy such an important position in their structure; especially when they are already looking for ways to adapt their institutions to the present round of enlargement. As Ulrike Guerot, head of EU research at the German Council on Foreign Relations, put it:

“You cannot have a situation in which the country with the biggest weight in the EU is also the poorest, is on the geographical periphery of Europe, is not a founding member of the European Union and has no history of European integration” (*the Economist*, May 5, 2000).

Summary:

As can be seen by the arguments made above, the overall emphasis for formulating German national interests and thus leading to its attitude in the intergovernmental bargaining towards the enlargement process of the EU was on German *geo-political* rather than on German *economic* interests. Rescuing itself from

the Union. The different political culture of Turkey could potentially endanger the efficient functioning of EU institutions (Dauerstadt and Lippert, 1999: 49)

its front-line status and co-determination in the stabilisation of its international environment is at the top of the German policy agenda rather than simply extending its economic markets. The emerging significance of new security threats was also influential in this attitude.

The end of the Cold War, besides several changes it brought forward, facilitated the globalisation of security issues. This globalisation of security problems did not replace or subordinate the traditional conditions of security emanating from geography, geophysics and demography. It rather complicated them by adding a whole new layer which permeates the existing security system (Rühl, 1998, 103). Thus in addition to traditional military threats, a cluster of new security problems arose after the Cold War, as a result of economic migration, swarms of refugees fleeing civil wars, international crime and the effects of environmental catastrophes which transcend national boundaries. Changes in the global economy also had a major effect on national economies and social stability. These and other factors combined to pose economic and social risks to security which work at the *global* and *transnational* level with direct political consequences on both state and society as a whole and hence on domestic stability.

These new developments were especially important for Germany because of its central location on the European continent and the fact that it operates in a thick web of interdependent relationships. Its status as the world's largest trading country and its partial subordination to the EU point to only the most obvious of these. Thus this new definition of security with its multi-dimensional and complex features in the era of globalisation and interdependence necessitated stability of those countries that are linked with it, such as the Visegrad countries and Turkey, though for different reasons. Therefore Germany became the main advocate for these countries' EU

membership bid as EU membership is the best way to secure their democratic consolidation and stability.

As early as 1994, German Defence White Book (*Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*) listed four central national interests determining German foreign and security policy. First, the protection of the freedom, security and welfare of German citizens and the inviolability of its territorial integrity. Second, integration with the European democracies in the EU. Third, a durable transatlantic alliance based on shared values and common interests with the US as a world power. Fourth, bringing in, on the basis of equality and partnership, its eastern neighbours into western structures and the shaping of a new comprehensive co-operative security system. (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*, 1994: 42). From there it could be understood how the German policy makers regarded the significance of the German society's integrity and preservation of welfare, which could be very well threatened by the new form of instability occurring in the eastern border with the freedom of and fragility in the Visegrad countries.

The best way to stabilise these countries on the eastern border of Germany and preserve the well-being of Germany would be including them in the EU, in the EU's common system of values and reference of solving security problems. Germany had seen itself in the past that economic prosperity plus a liberal and democratic development of state and society within the framework of western European integration continue to provide a necessary guard against a relapse into nationalistic attitudes. Thus integrating these states into the EU would create a buffer zone against renewed threats arising from instability in the Central Eastern Europe, in Yugoslavia and Russia. The break-up of Yugoslavia and the consequent chauvinism, religious hatred and nationalism that emerged have also proved once more that it was necessary

to include these countries in the EU and that the strongest bulwark to counter these trends is to be provided by further European integration.

The September 1998 election in Germany had resulted in a change of government and-more importantly-a change in the generation of political leaders. This new generation had a more pragmatic approach towards EU integration and a greater willingness to articulate Germany's national interests. Chancellor Schröder spoke of the "self-confidence of a grown-up nation that doesn't have to feel superior or inferior to anyone, that accepts its history and responsibility-but is looking forward" (Hyde-Price, 2000: 198).

The way that the Chancellor Schröder and his foreign minister Joschka Fischer approached eastern enlargement showed that the new generation of German policy makers were also keenly aware that the prosperity and security the Federal Republic enjoys within the Euro-Atlantic community would be threatened by instability and turmoil along its eastern borders. Moreover they continued to see that the most influential way to prevent this instability from spilling over to Germany would be the eastern enlargement. The significance they attached to national interests which underlined Germany's economic problems and changes in the German role as the paymaster in the EU did not change Germany's role as advocate of the eastern enlargement.

The other important difference that came along with the new government was the favourable attitude shown towards Turkey. Both Schröder and Fischer began to stress the importance of Turkey for the security and stability of the European continent because of the important role Turkey plays in the unstable region it is located, and how Turkey's stability is linked with the stability of wider German society via the link the Turkish community in Germany has with Turkey. They were aware of the importance

attached by the Turkish government to EU membership and the fact that EU membership perspective would be a push factor for Turkey to fulfil the Copenhagen membership criteria which would automatically lead to full democratisation of Turkey with direct positive effects on the stability of German domestic politics. As membership of the EU would be the best way to stabilise Turkey as it was for the other candidates, the German government argued in favour of a serious prospect for Turkey's EU membership.

Towards the end of 1999, the process of EU enlargement received some important new impulses. In part these represented a post-Kosovo awareness that enlargement was really vital as an instrument for stabilising the Visegrad countries as a whole, including Central and Eastern Europe and south-eastern Europe, which also increased Turkey's geo-strategic importance again. The Tampere EU informal summit in October 1999 proposed bringing a further six applicants into a flexible and multi-speed accession process rather than make them wait longer, alongside the six already engaged in negotiations. It also recognised Turkey as a candidate country. This principle was subsequently adopted at the Helsinki summit in December 1999 which formalised the speeding up of the eastern enlargement process and Turkey's candidacy, very much due to the support of the German government (Hyde-Price, 2000: 188).

This development does not show that neither economic factors nor cultural factors are unimportant. However, though in the case of the Visegrad countries one can easily argue in favour of their inclusion based on cultural and economic factors the same thing cannot be done in the case of Turkey because of all the economic and cultural disadvantages associated with its EU membership. Thus this chapter tried to show that the strong support of the German government for Turkey's EU membership

are far more connected with geo-political factors. The importance of geo-political factors, especially within the framework of prevention of new security threats was also important in the formulation of national interests and the adoption of a new foreign policy attitude towards the Visegrad countries' inclusion in the EU which reinforces the argument that they were the priority for the German government's position in the intergovernmental bargaining in the EU.

In the following chapter, this argument will be extended by a thorough elaboration of the three hypotheses mentioned in the thesis. In order to show the significance of the geo-political factors in national interest and foreign policy formulation of Germany for the Visegrad countries and Turkey, there will be a detailed analysis of the statements of the executives and the events which shed further valuable light on this issue.

CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF THE THREE HYPOTHESES

Introduction:

In the previous chapters, emphasis was placed on discussion of how the division of the international negotiation process that leads to history-making decisions can be regarded as a causal sequence of three stages; namely national interest formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. According to Moravcsik, in the first stage national interests are articulated at the domestic level of EU member states and transmitted to the executives through party and interest group position papers, party manifestos, citizen petitions etc. In return the executives aggregate these interests and formulate states' foreign policies from them. In the second stage they develop strategies and bargain with one another in order to reach substantive agreements that realise those national interests more efficiently than do unilateral actions. In the third stage, they choose whether to delegate or pool sovereignty in international institutions that secure the substantive agreements they have made (Moravcsik, 1998: 18). Thus this institutional choice of the EU is actually an outcome of the bargains struck between the executives of member states of the EU.

Moravcsik also constructs similarities between decisions that lead to the institutional choice(s) of the EU employing the main concepts of liberal economy; intersection of demand and supply. Supply is the institutional choice decided collectively by the EU as a result of the bargaining of member states' executives. Demand is national interest formulation at the domestic level by a coalition of voters, political parties, and interest groups. This also fits the assumption of Moravcsik that:

“States are not unitary in their international politics. National interests that states seek to realise through world politics are shaped through contention among domestic political groups. These are ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes, that might result from international political interaction. Interests reflect the objectives of those domestic groups which influence the state apparatus”.

The unitary actor assumption of Moravcsik only maintains that once particular objectives arise out of domestic competition, states strategise as unitary actors vis-à-vis other states in an effort to realise them (Moravcsik, 1998: 22-23).

Throughout the previous two chapters in this thesis, chapter 4 and chapter 5, the main aim was to determine what types of factors in the domestic politics of Germany influenced the formulation of national interests, the intervening variable, which in turn influenced the foreign policy attitude of Germany towards enlargement as an institutional choice of the EU. In chapter 4, the main emphasis was on the domestic economic factors that influence national interest formulation and foreign policy attitude, which is also prioritised by the liberal intergovernmentalist approach. In chapter 5, the main emphasis was on geo-political and cultural factors in German domestic politics influencing national interest formation and foreign policy attitude towards the enlargement process of the EU.

This chapter will mainly evaluate these three types of domestic factors that were summarised together in the three hypotheses in the first chapter of the thesis. It will attempt to understand which factor is prioritised by the government of the SPD-Green coalition, and what determines the foreign policy attitude of Germany towards the both categories of candidate; the Visegrad countries and Turkey. Therefore the main aim of this chapter will be to focus specifically on ‘national interest articulation’ at the domestic level, and try to evaluate which factors among the economic, geo-political and cultural, formed the most significant underlying objectives that actors in the intergovernmental bargaining process in the EU are seeking to realise. Specifically, this chapter will attempt to *choose* the main reason underlying the foreign policy attitude represented by German executives in negotiations in the EU towards the enlargement process regarding both the Visegrad countries and Turkey.

Evaluation:

A central concern of foreign policy analysis is to explore the '*national situation*' within which states as 'situated actors' find themselves. Hacke (1997) argues that:

“How a political community defines its ‘national interest’ depends on objective, material factors (such as geography, size and wealth) which are important in setting the broad parameters within which the state operates. However, the study of these material factors is not sufficient to indicate the course and objectives of a state’s ‘national interests’; a range of subjective, normative considerations is also very important. These include the identity of a community, its political culture, dominant moral and ethical values, the sense of justice and conception of the common good, and its belief in what makes it distinctive as a national community” (Hacke, 1997: 510-11).

Thus a formulation of ‘national interests’ consists of intersection of both *material* conditions and *normative* considerations.

Germany’s foreign policy roles also derive from its ‘national situation’ and the combination of objective and subjective factors shaping perceptions of its ‘national interest’. More specifically, Germany’s national role conceptions reflect its economic interests, geo-political location, size, national identity, multilateral commitments and democratic institutions (Hacke 1997, 521). As already stated, physical location does not determine a state’s foreign policy behaviour in the simplistic way suggested by cruder versions of geo-politics. Of far greater importance than physical geography are two other factors: the nature and structural dynamics of the regional security complex in question, and the defining political and societal characteristics of its *key actors*. Together, these constitute Germany’s national situation (Hyde-Price, 2000: 107). One can also refer to these as the intersection of *institutions and identities* (Hyde-Price, 2000: 30).

In particular, one of the most important areas of theoretical innovation in foreign policy analysis over recent years has been the growing awareness that identities matter in international relations. Identities shape the definition of state and

national interests, and thereby constitute an important influence on foreign policy behaviour. National identity helps shape the broad directions of foreign policy by providing cognitive lenses for policy makers, based on political judgments about the ‘national interest’; it thus provides the framework within which a nation’s foreign policy is formulated.

It would not be wrong to say that analyses of *official* discourses on national identity can only explain the *grand schemes of diplomacy*. They cannot provide detailed explanations of discrete foreign policy behaviour or the nuances of negotiating positions on specific policy issues. In the specific case under discussion in this research, they cannot for example shed significant light on Germany’s position in intergovernmental bargaining in the EU regarding the enlargement process. These are determined by a political process involving the relevant ministries, other political actors and private sector interests; thus the interaction of the factors in the domestic politics of Germany. *Conceptions* of the national interest only affect this political process indirectly, by establishing the broad cultural parameters within which competing policy options are considered.

For Moravcsik (1998), it is actually the executives who occupy the most significant position in his analysis of foreign policy, as they are the people who negotiate their country’s foreign policy in the European arena. Within this framework, the central argument of Moravcsik is that:

“European integration can best be explained as a series of rational choices made by national *executives*” (Moravcsik, 1998: 17).

In Germany, the executives who are responsible for bargaining for the ‘foreign policy’ are usually the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister. The classic other ministries, defence, finance, interior, and justice, are the other most important cabinet

posts.¹⁰⁷ The German cabinet, unlike the British, is not a 'working cabinet' in which government policy is openly discussed, debated and finally determined. Decisions are *approved* rather than made by the cabinet. Especially when it comes to *formulating* European policy, the process is highly fragmented. Paterson, Bulmer and Jeffery (2000) claim that Germany has more institutional actors involved in its European policy-making than most other states.

This institutional dynamic in German European policy is also reinforced by a constitutional one. As stated already in the previous chapters according to Article 65 of the Basic Law, the Chancellor has the prerogative of setting down the guidelines of policy (*Richtlinienprinzip*), whereas ministers are responsible for their *individual departments* (*Resortprinzip*). The most important governmental actors involved in policy-making towards Europe are the Federal Chancellor's office, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance. To a lesser extent the Economics Ministry, Ministry of Defence, those ministries that had domestic clientele, in particular the Ministry for Agriculture, the Transport or Construction Ministries all have their says. In addition both the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesbank* help shape German policy towards Europe, as do the political parties (Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W, 2000: 32).

The significance of societal actors and the importance of *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat* in shaping European policy of Germany are related with the importance of the national interest formulation process that has been mentioned throughout the thesis, which is then transmitted to the executives. Moravcsik supports this argument by saying:

¹⁰⁷ At the national level there are sixteen federal ministries. Ministries are divided into four levels: the executive, departments, sub-departments and sections. The key unit is the section or bureau and the key personnel are the section heads, *Referenten*. Each section is assigned responsibility for a particular policy area. The development, initiation, and supervision of ministerial policy are centred in these sections. (Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W, 2000: 31)

“The choices of executives respond to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful *domestic* constituents. Thus national interests or goals are formed as a result of interaction of domestic voters, political parties, interests groups and bureaucracies who transmit their views directly or indirectly to executives through domestic institutions and practices of political representation” (Moravcsik, 1993: 483).

“The relative power of each state in the international system and the role of international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments are *additional* factors affecting the decisions of the executives” (Moravcsik, 1998: 18).

This is why in this chapter party position papers, official political party publications and statements of members of the parliament who transmit their interests and aims to the executives (and thus participate in national interest formulation), besides the executives’ official statements will be analysed.

This last point needs some explanation as there are competing views within the school of European integration process about the influence of national parliaments and political parties. Several studies of European integration assume that national parliaments are normally uninterested, uninvolved and unable to exercise influence over the course of European integration. However, if we consider the entire process of European integration, that is implementation as well as negotiation, we gain a new perspective. Because parliaments retain significant authority at the implementation stage, failure to involve them at the negotiation stage can lead to serious obstacles to effective adjustment of policies that have already been decided. For Moravcsik for example members of the parliament are important to the extent that, as they are election-focused politicians, they accurately reflect national interests and therefore have a huge impact on the key decision-makers, the executives.

Germany’s political parties in particular have a much broader scope for engagement in European policy debates. On the whole, what post-war elites have succeeded in doing, is to all but erase the image many citizens had of parties as ineffective, unreliable and incapable of meeting key citizen demands. Political parties

in the Federal Republic became agencies which prepare important political decisions, make nominations, and fight elections with the aim of controlling the personnel and policies of the government (Conradt, 2001: 118). The European integration process has typically been conducted with a high degree of consensus about the purposes and goals of European integration since the latter part of the 1950s and the parties have also become involved in this process. Therefore, they are influential, both in shaping the political agenda in domestic politics and in projecting Germany's foreign policy goals in external arenas. Wood (1998) links this influential position of the parties with four factors:

1. German political parties play a very important role in their respective party federations. Especially at Intergovernmental Conferences, actors are keen to seek national input along ideological lines reflecting their pursuit of national interests in the negotiation process itself.
2. Because decisions have to be ratified by national parliaments, the political parties aim to be able to exert influence there.
3. Party channels may be used as an alternative route for test-flying bilateral European initiatives.
4. Political parties play a filter role. All have offices in other European capitals and they play the role of filter between the governing elites of these countries and German policy-makers and German politics (Wood, 1998: 134).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ The early recognition of Croatia stands out as an example which confirms the influence of political parties in German foreign policy-making. Despite Genscher's reluctance, political parties were able to reach a consensus and affect the decision to recognise Croatia. This shows that political parties can on occasion play a role in shaping the policy agenda and establishing a momentum for policy change which ministers may find difficult to resist. There are a variety of explanations for Germany's initial unilateral recognition of Croatia: the presence of a high proportion of Croats among the 700,000 Yugoslav population in Germany could be said to have the biggest impact, especially in moving the CDU-CSU towards recognition through their heavy involvement in the Catholic Church. In the absence of clear multilateral norms and institutions to guide action on this issue, the political parties moved swiftly to a policy of favouring recognition of Croatia, arguing that it was now too late to hold Yugoslavia together. The CDU called for diplomatic recognition of Croatia on June 27, 1991 and by July 1, when the foreign

With the combination of influential political parties and responsibility laid at the door on the individual ministries German enlargement policy was therefore influenced by a huge variety of *domestic political considerations* (Tewes, 1997: 24-25).

The fact that the clientele ministries had such influence reinforces the argument that co-ordination is difficult to achieve in a policy-making process as fragmented as the German one. However besides the ambition of most cabinet ministers to achieve a higher status in the government, the constitutional position of the Chancellor also gives the institution a relatively low profile. Thus, the cabinet is more a loose board of managers than a policy-making body and the Chancellery is further empowered as the only office which can aggregate these interests adequately and determine the direction of German foreign policy (Conradt, 2001: 199).¹⁰⁹

Smith (1992) argues that:

“The basis of the Chancellor's authority lies in the control over the government that he exercises. To an extent, he is inhibited by certain constraints, but in practice the test of his leadership lies in his ability to co-ordinate the work of government, to impart a clear direction to policy, and to operate harmoniously with the junior party in the coalition. The Chancellor has at his disposal, facilities and staff of about 500, headed by either a cabinet minister without portfolio or a high-ranking civil servant. The Chancellor's Office or *Kanzleramt*, which has effectively become a ministry in its own right, does not have administrative responsibilities but, rather, with its various actions, acts both as an instrument for *co-ordination* and as a *resource* for policy development. The office has above all a right to access to information, and its key officials, with daily access to the Chancellor, are among the most *influential* members of the government” (Smith, 1992: 49).¹¹⁰

affairs committee of the *Bundestag* was called together for an extraordinary session on the suggestion of the SPD, foreign minister Genscher found himself isolated. By July 9, Genscher's party, the FDP, had adopted a recognition policy. On December 11, 1991 the cabinet made public its decision to recognise Croatia (Paterson, 1996: 142).

¹⁰⁹ This reality also fits Moravcsik's assumption that when geopolitical/security reasons are the main underlying reasons for formulating national interests and foreign policy attitudes of executives, the chief executive will share primary responsibility for policy with the defense and foreign ministries, as well as elite and public opinion (Moravcsik, 1998: 35). On the other hand his primary political economic theory predicts that economic interest groups and economic officials, along with ruling parties and chief executives will take the lead in formulating policy (Moravcsik, 1998: 49)

¹¹⁰ The *Kanzleramt* has two additional functions: first, to ensure that the chancellor's policies are effectively disseminated to the wider public through the press office; second, to perform a similar task vis a vis his own party. The office is organised into departments, usually directed by senior civil

Thus in order to understand the underlying reasons for Germany's foreign policy attitude for enlargement of the European Union it is important to analyse the priorities of the Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, his party SPD and the Chancellor's office. Reflecting on the differences in attitudes between Schröder and the previous Chancellor Helmut Kohl, it would not be wrong to conclude that significant shifts in the political identity of Germany have taken place. These shifts occurred as a magnitude of the changes that have transformed Germany and its external environment since 1989 which led to amendments in the perception of decision makers as to what is 'good' for the society and thus the national identity of Germany.

The first change is associated with the end of cold war bipolarity, which has again revealed the importance of Germany's central geographical location, its *Mittellage*. The growing importance was reinforced by the unification and re-achievement of the sovereign status which moved the position of Germany towards the position of becoming a more 'normal' state; aware of its national interests and more courageous in its endeavours to fulfil them. Second, unification has posed Germany with the classic question of how to successfully achieve nation building, and shifted its centre of gravity towards the north-east; towards the Visegrad countries. This is symbolised by the move of the capital and seat of government from provincial, Rhineland Bonn to the cosmopolitan metropolis of Berlin. Finally, the generational change and the emphasis Schröder and Fischer attach to human rights and strategic security interests, which became especially more conspicuous and active after the events in Kosovo, should be mentioned. Thus one can link the prioritisation of geopolitical factors as opposed to economic factors to the changes in the international environment which have contributed to a subtle reformulation of aspects of German

servants that correspond to cabinet ministers and act as a liaison between the chancellor and the respective ministry (Smith, 1992: 49).

identity and formulation of national interests. Already in the previous chapter, more emphasis was given to the priority of geo-political/security factors in national interest formulation at the domestic level in comparison with economic factors; on the contrary to the liberal intergovernmentalist approach.

Below the emphasis placed on security factors as underlying reasons for the foreign policy attitude of the Chancellor, his party and the other parties, both in government and in opposition, towards the Visegrad countries and Turkey's EU membership bid will be analysed in more detail:

The government of the SPD-Green:

The SPD:

The Social Democratic Party's (SPD) rich historical legacy of leftist principles that retains labour and public sector workers as its core constituencies initially found it problematic to make adjustments to the new political realities created by a united Germany. However, in the 1998 elections, Schröder was able to present a winning formula to the electorate. The main reason that Schröder was able to win the elections, as mentioned in previous chapters, was his emphasis on rectifying the economic recession in Germany and his promises on tax reform, the key issue that was *not* given so much importance by Kohl. The 'new centre' of the SPD also moved towards a new 'middle course' on foreign policy, which emphasised the importance of continuity with the Kohl legacy, thereby giving European integration a central place in SPD foreign policy in the 1990s.

However there were some changes in SPD's European policies. As a result of September 1998 *Bundestag* elections, the generation with direct experience of the war and its immediate aftermath-the generation of Helmut Kohl and Helmut Schmidt-had finally left the political stage. It was replaced by the post-war generation of

‘sixtyeighters’ epitomised by Joscha Fischer, Gerhard Schröder and Otto Schilly. Schröder’s concept of ‘European identity’ was different from that of his predecessor, Helmut Kohl. Schröder had “grown up in and been politically socialised by a democratic Germany, which had always conceived itself as a natural part of Europe and thus was able to be less taciturn about pursuing its own interests than was the case in the past” (Hyde-Price, 2000: 41). Thus, a more relaxed view of national power and national interest was personified by Schröder. Schröder was aware that, in the *economic* recession, he had to act more bravely in defending his country’s national interests in the European arena if he wanted to stay in power (Conradt, 2001: 95-96).

Another important difference between the previous Kohl government and Schröder’s government that is of relevance to this research is the fact that *security* had become a very important issue by the time of Schröder’s government. One has to be careful here, as security can be understood both in terms of ‘traditional military’ security and also in the form of non-military ‘new security threats’. As already discussed in the previous chapter, military security threats are identified by Kirchner (2002) in his pilot study undertaken in 1999 as a biological and chemical warfare, a nuclear attack and conventional conflict with small numbers of light weapons between states. In the same study, it was found out that ethnic factionalism/irredentism and migratory pressure emerged as the types of menace that were perceived to be most likely to threaten security. On the other hand criminalisation of the economies and narcotics trade was second and environmental damage and degradation was third. The outcome of the study also indicated that there is a *linkage* between different types of security threats. In other words, the occurrence of a particular type of threat is often linked with the arrival of another or others (Kirchner, 2003: 8). As Hall and Fox (2001) illustrate, it is no longer possible to separate terrorism from money laundering

or organised crime from drug trafficking. Refugees and asylum seekers not only pose internal security concerns but may encourage xenophobia and conflict, as their 'flooding' to other states may cause higher unemployment in the host countries. Migration is also increased by environmental stability arising from climate change. (Hall and Fox, 2001: 8). Paradoxically all these concepts can be incorporated into the framework of political security. In a sense societal, economic, environmental security really mean political-societal security, political-economic security and so forth.

Barry Buzan (1998) also argues that in the post-Cold War period, the security agenda became wider and more complex. It covered not only the traditional military and political sectors but also the economic, environmental and societal ones. This 'wide' versus 'narrow' debate grew out of dissatisfaction with the intense narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War. This dissatisfaction was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s. 'Political security' is of particular importance here. Buzan (1998) defines political security as;

"Political security is organisational *stability* of social order(s) which also includes factors related with societal, economic, environmental security'. From this core, political security spreads out in two directions. First, they include the unequivocal non-military threats to political units other than states; threats to the social integrity of *societies*. Second and very much important for this research is political security in defence of international society or international law. Among the principles that can be securitised are *human rights* and other demands relating directly to the condition of individuals and *stability* of societies" (Buzan, 1998: 141).¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Especially for the European Parliament, human rights have become a very important issue. The parliamentarians even criticise the other institutions of the EU for not doing enough to defend human rights. Their main argument is that "security ultimately stems from the inside, that the only true basis for solid security is the state of law and respect for human rights. By conducting a human rights-based foreign policy, the EU not only defends the rights of concrete people around the world or a general universal principle; it also defends its own values and distinctiveness" Human rights are significant because as one MEP, Jannis Sakellariou, has told in the European Parliament in 1995 that despite national and political frontiers, we have succeeded in finding a '*common language*' (Buzan, 1998: 185). But there is a positional difference between the Parliament and those of the other institutions. Protection

For the generation of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer human rights concerns are central to their political beliefs, and have been used to give political coherence, direction and legitimacy to their foreign policy objectives (Hyde-Price, 2000). This was clearly conspicuous in the party manifesto of the SPD already written on December 20, 1989:

“The grounds of social democracy are freedom, justice and solidarity. We are the protectors of human rights. The formulation of both state and economic policy are carried out within the framework of protection of human rights’ (*Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*-quoted from the SPD party programme on December 20, 1989 in Berlin, changed on April 17, 1998 in Leipzig).

This change of rhetoric and the ‘generational’ change that occurred became specifically very conspicuous in the attitude of the SPD leadership exemplified by the discourse surrounding the Kosovo war. During the Kosovo conflict, with the initiative of the SPD-Green government, constitutional restrictions on non-article V *Bundeswehr* (German Armed Forces) operations were lifted. The *Bundeswehr* participation in Operation Deliberate Force was certainly a defining moment in the politics of the new Germany, as since 1945 German forces had never been engaged in offensive military operations against a sovereign state (Hyde-Price, 2000: 167).

The new government portrayed the campaign as the archetype of a ‘new moral crusade’, with humanitarian intervention as a new moral and political ‘categorical imperative’ leading to a Kantian order of peace. Germany’s reasoning for participation in the Kosovo campaign was already mentioned in the previous chapter. Germany was motivated by three primary considerations. In addition to the desire to demonstrate its reliability as a loyal NATO ally and partner to the USA there was a concern to prevent a wave of refugees heading for Germany (and the EU) and a normative impulse to

of human rights may be considered as an external issue where as the Union’s capacity to guarantee the citizens’ security by combating the drugs traffic and organised crime is an internal issue which is favoured by the Commission and the Council (Buzan, 1998: 186).

respond to ethnic cleansing and widespread violations of human rights.¹¹² Whatever the main reason was behind the government's attitude in the Kosovo war, the activism they showed was important for reflecting the generational change of German decision makers which seek to forge a new domestic and European *security* policy.

Ulrich Beck (1999) suggested that Kosovo represented a defining moment in European history: the end of the Westphalian system and the birth of 'post-national war' based on a 'militaristic humanism'. Rather than war as a continuation of politics by other means, war was now to be a continuation of *human rights* by other means. In particular, Operation Deliberate Force, the sustained aerial assault on Yugoslav military and special police units, along with the civic infrastructure that supported them-constituted a decisive watershed in post-cold war Europe (Beck, 1999: 984).

The Schröder government further continued its initiative with public manifestations of concern to prevent human suffering; the evident desire to avoid civilian casualties and the emphasis on using *Bundeswehr* resources to provide humanitarian assistance for refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania. In addition to the above, in particular during its presidency of the EU, Germany played a pivotal role in negotiations to find a solution to the Kosovo war, reach a settlement among the warring parties in the Balkans region and to bring peace to the wider region (Hyde-Price, 2000: 157-158). All these actions offer strong evidence that geopolitical/security factors, in particular new security threats, in the form of prioritising the concept of human rights, preventing ethnic violence and illegal migration/refugee flows thus protecting the integrity and welfare of its own society have become important in the formulation of Germany's foreign policy attitude.

¹¹² This third factor in particular reflects the continuing impact of Germany's self-perception as a *Zivilmacht*, motivated by moral and political concerns to act multilaterally in defence of victims of aggression and persecution; the concept of Germany's *Nie wieder Auschwitz*.

This can for example be seen in a position paper regarding the eastern enlargement of the EU prepared by the SPD members of the *Bundestag* on December 1, 1999 just before the Helsinki Summit. In this paper, the parliamentarians pointed to the necessity of integrating Eastern European countries into the structure of the EU:

“...for the sake of the people in these countries, for a courageous and intelligent future for the process of political integration and to reach the secure establishment of *protection of minorities, better asylum politics and environmental protection* “(www.spd-berlin.de).

Evidence of the trend discussed above is to be found in the *Europe Manifest* published on the official web site of the SPD where the SPD clearly advocates the enlargement process of the EU for the following reasons:

“The benefits of EU enlargement can be grouped under three headings: strengthening *security, growth and stability* in the whole Europe. In addition to the potential economic growth for the whole European continent as a result of the enlargement process, it is a great chance for Europe to secure its *inner and external security*” (www.spd.de, February 2003).

Related to this change in the foreign policy discourse of the Schröder government is the more favourable attitude shown towards Turkey. As already stated, Schröder had noted that his position on Turkey-EU relations is closer to a US policy which is aimed at tying Turkey into Europe’s political and military alliances for *security* reasons than was the position of Mr. Kohl (Webber, 2001: 129). In a speech he gave after the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999 he had argued:

“Our support for Turkey’s EU membership bid is not based on electoral purposes but based on our belief that Turkish membership will be beneficial to German interests. With the prospect of EU membership, Turkey now has the opportunity to prove that an Islamic society can be democratic at the same time as preserving its religious and cultural distinctions. Thus it may become an important bridge between continental Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. This will bring *stability* to that region and thus be a total gain for both Germany’s and Europe’s *security*’ (In a government statement given by Gerhard Schröder on December 19, 1999).

Schröder was also aware of the importance of the prospect of EU membership for facilitating the reform process in Turkey. He argued in an interview he gave to the Turkish daily *Hürriyet* in September 1999 that:

“Because of the fact that inadequate integration of the Turkish community and their strong linkage with Turkey causes direct reflection of Turkish domestic problems into Germany it is also important for Germany’s welfare that the reform process in Turkey continues and Turkey’s internal problems are solved”.

The SPD is supportive of Turkey’s inclusion in the European Union, mainly based on security as understood in the concept of ‘new security threats’, with particular reference to political security threats in the form of ethnic tensions, resulting human right violations, refugee and migration flows and criminalisation of economies. These security threats could derive from instability caused by the reflection of problems in Turkish domestic politics into Germany. In addition, in the form of criminalisation of economies, international terrorism, ethnic irredentism and migratory pressures they can also derive from spill-over of the instability that exists in the region that Turkey is located in. Due to the potential of nuclear, biological or chemical warfare in the Middle East and the military conflicts still existing between Israelis and the Palestines there is still the potential of military security threats, but non-military/new security issues are more likely to influence the European continent and Germany and cause a threat to the stability and integrity of its society.

This outlook is just the opposite of former Chancellor Kohl’s attitude. Chancellor Kohl had created an impression that Turkey, with a largely Muslim population is left outside of the EU because of ‘borders of faith’. On the other hand, Schröder and his party SPD highlight the *multicultural* character of Germany.

This tendency was conspicuous in the statements given by the SPD members of the parliament who were interviewed in Berlin in 2000. As Leyla Onur, an SPD

member of the Parliament and a member of the Committee of External Affairs in the *Bundestag* argued:

“The SPD values the fact that people in Germany who come from different cultural backgrounds can live together in harmony. Multiculturalism enriches us. We are aware of the cultural and social isolations of the foreigners in our society and the fact that they have become the victims of isolation and we will do everything to solve this problem” (Leyla Onur, interview held on April 5, 2000, Berlin).

Similar priorities, especially the importance of human rights and integration of foreigners in the German society, are incorporated in the party manifesto of the coalition partner of the SPD; the Greens. The Green Party is also important as it is the party of the Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, another influential character in the formulation of Germany's European policy and in the representation of Germany in the intergovernmental bargaining of the EU.

Alliance 90/Greens:

Known as one of the marginal parties in the *Bundestag*, the Greens divested themselves of this status by becoming a partner of the SPD in the current coalition. Particularly in the area of European integration, there has emerged a solid consensus among the Greens. In their 1994 party program, they had endorsed European integration as the best defence against nationalism and favoured working within the EU to make it more democratic, multicultural and ecological. The 1998 electoral program of the party supported both eastern expansion of the EU and the introduction of the European single currency. The current Foreign Minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer, is very influential in Germany's European policy and a popular figure among the public. Opinion polls have indicated that Fischer is known by 92 percent of the public, with a more positive image than several major politicians, including Kohl (Conradt, 2001: 34).

As could be seen in a party position paper published in December 1999 just after the Helsinki European Council Summit, the Green Party supports the eastern enlargement process of the EU because they think “an enlarged Europe will have more *understanding, tolerance and stability*”. They continue their argument by stating that:

“Through the enlargement of the EU, we will construct a *peaceful* Europe with open borders, democratic rules and a Europe that plays a responsible role in the world society. In economic terms also Germany will profit a great deal. However most importantly, there will be more *security* within the EU as there will be more co-operation with the Visegrad countries in the areas of justice and home affairs and in combating the fight against international terrorism. We will also have a greener environment as with membership the new countries’ environmental standards will improve” (The Green Party Position Paper, December 1999).

The Green Party’s policies are mostly focused on the issues of *ecology, anti-militarism and protection of human rights*. Though the standing of the party is in general very favourable towards the immigrants in Germany the fact that their attitude does not make any concession with respect to *human rights* issues causes them to be particularly careful about and interested in Turkey’s EU membership. They never argue that Turkey cannot be a part of the EU in terms of *culture* but they want Turkey to have the same *human rights standards* as the EU.

In this regard, the Green Party is aware of the importance of the *prospect of EU membership* for Turkey in realising a solution to the human rights problem. In the party position paper published in December 1999 they have stated:

“The Helsinki assent was an important and correct step in which the federal SPD-Green coalition government played an important role. We hope that this step will bring about political vitality and necessary reforms in Turkey; which will lead to expansion of freedom of opinion, assembly, association and religion and improvements for the Kurdish minority” (The Green Party Position Paper, December 1999).

In relation to this, it is also important to look at the official statements published by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, given the fact that the Foreign Minister is a member of the Green Party.

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

In December 1999 the reasons for the Ministry's support for the eastern enlargement of the EU were listed in the official web site of the German Foreign Ministry as:

1. The EU has for the last fifty years proved to secure *peace and stability* for its members. Therefore the current enlargement process of the EU is an opportunity for the Visegrad countries to follow the successful example of the European Union and incorporate the values of the EU such as democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights and minorities into their societies. In this way, *peace, freedom, security and political stability* for the whole European continent will be guaranteed. The inclusion of these countries in the justice and home affairs pillar of the EU will strengthen the inner security of the EU member states because of the intensive cross-border co-operations to fight against transnational crime which take the form of drug and human trafficking and money laundering. Environmental pollution is another important problem that will be more easily solved with the inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the EU. It is a transnational problem whose effects can be felt over borders which inevitably requires co-operation with other countries. Since it is a known fact that the Visegrad countries had serious environmental problems during Communist rule, with further co-operation and with the help of the reforms made during the enlargement process they will reach EU environmental standards as well.

2. Enlargement of the EU will also help the European continent economically through an increase in trade and investment. The economic potential of the new member states is huge and the perspective of EU membership has already caused the EU candidate countries to undergo enormous changes when they were trying to fulfill the economic Copenhagen criteria. Thus, with their inclusion the EU will have the

biggest single market in the world with new initiatives for the member states. With the EU membership the markets of the candidate countries will also offer more secure investment services for German enterprises and matching norms and rules will also make the calculation of investments economically more reasonable. Thus when they become members, Germany, as a neighbour to these countries will profit the most from this overall expansion of the trade between the Visegrad region and the EU. Obviously there will be costs incurred as a result of the enlargement process. People in Germany are especially very worried about these costs, as they have been paying for the unification of Germany since 1990. However a cost-benefit analysis will show that as a strongly export-led country, Germany will profit a lot from the inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the EU especially when they have economically and socially developed themselves during the preparations leading to the enlargement of the EU.

3. Enlargement of the EU is also important for cultural reasons. These countries have historically been the core countries of the European continent. Now they have the chance to re-unite with the other half of the European Union and to participate in the project of European integration (www.auswaertiges-amt.de, December 1999).

Out of these three arguments for the support of the eastern enlargement process of the EU, the concept of 'stability' which has also been underlined as the most significant factor for formulating German foreign policy throughout this research seems to be the most striking one. This can also be understood from the statements of the foreign minister Joschka Fischer in the preamble of the official web page of the Foreign Ministry where he argued that:

"The enlargement process has led to the real possibility of the continued existence of *peace and stability* in a free and unified Europe" (www.auswaertiges-amt.de, December 1999).

As can be understood from these statements, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has developed a *widened security concept*; political, economic, ecological and social security which incorporates stability as the key word for each sector. Included in this concept are principles such as the protection of human rights, social equality, state of law, participatory decision making, attention to natural resources, development opportunities for all the regions in the world and the employment of peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. Thus the concept of prevention of ‘new security threats’ is very conspicuous in the German Foreign Ministry’s underlying reasons for foreign policy formulation.

As already has been mentioned, related to the fact that the Foreign Minister is a member of the Green Party, *protection of human rights* is a central pillar of policy for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The foreign minister Joschka Fischer has even set up a special *committee on Human Rights* in 1998 (*Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Menschenrechtspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe*) that deals specifically with wide issues such as the fight against racism, intolerance of and discrimination against foreigners, development of children and women’s rights, the facilitation of freedom of opinion, press and religion, strengthening of economic, social and cultural human rights and protection of minorities.¹¹³

Regarding the fact that the concept of human rights occupies such an important place in the formulation of foreign policy, Turkey’s EU membership bid becomes inevitably important. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had constantly criticised the torture and mishandlings of the police forces and limitations on freedom of opinion

¹¹³ Throughout the research it could be seen that the concept of human rights is in general important within the framework of the EU’s external relations. The EU supports the international tendency for protection of human rights, democracy and state of law for leading to peace and security and integrates these concepts with development politics and trade policies. The significance of human rights for the EU can be understood from the precondition of protection of human rights within the framework of political Copenhagen membership criteria for the starting of negotiations for full membership.

and press. This also has a direct relationship with the solution of the Kurdish problem and the fact that problems in Turkish domestic politics, especially the Kurdish problem, are directly reflected in German domestic politics. The German Foreign Minister Fischer stated on this issue that:

“The internal stability of Turkey is important for the stability of European countries for two reasons: in particular in Germany there is a considerable Turkish community which closely follows domestic events in Turkey. Turkey’s internal stability will make them more at ease, help their integration into German society and consecutively preserve the internal stability of Germany. In addition, Turkey must be stable so that the region in which it is located can remain stable; this has inevitably direct consequences for the European continent. The only way to help the stability of Turkey would be to give them candidate status so that they would be motivated to implement the necessary reforms. For Turkey to reach this aim the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs *supports* Turkey’s EU membership” (*Hürriyet*, February 2000, two months after the declaration of the Turkish candidacy in the Helsinki European Council Summit).

It will be useful also to look at the main arguments of the opposition parties as well as they also contribute to foreign policy making in Germany:

The CDU/CSU:

Having ruled the Federal Republic for many years, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), are one of the best established political parties of the post-war era. The CDU has since the beginning of the European integration process under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer been a very strong advocate of the European integration process and continues to advocate an economically efficient and secure EU.

As could be understood from their statements in the position paper prepared in January 1999, the CDU’s concept of security was also a wide one similar to the government’s approach. The CDU’s party position was that

“The concept of security should not only be reduced to military threats, it also means prevention of poverty, hunger and underdevelopment, improvements in human rights and social reforms including protection of environment and natural resources. This wide security concept should be the core element of EU’s foreign policy where Germany will stand as an active, strong and responsible partner ready to participate in

international co-operation against security threats” (Position paper of the CDU/CSU Fraction, nr. 15/2438, June 27, 1999).

With great similarities to the position of the government, the CDU also formulated its enlargement policy with regard to the benefits for *security and stability*.

This was also evident in the same position paper:

“The eastern enlargement of the European Union presents one of the biggest opportunities for our continent in this century. With the enlargement of the EU to the East, the historical progress of the European continent would be completed and thus its stability and peace will be guaranteed” (Position paper of the CDU/CSU Fraction, nr. 15/2438, January 27, 1999).¹¹⁴

Though the CDU also recognised the influence of the possibility of EU membership on the consolidation of democracies and economic improvement in the Visegrad countries and related their EU membership to the maintenance of security and stability of the European continent, it criticised the initiative of the Schröder-Fischer government in supporting Turkey for the same reasons.

According to Willy Wimmer, the former State Secretary and currently a CDU member of the Parliament and a member of the Committee of External Affairs, the CDU/CSU opposed Turkey’s EU membership bid for political, economic and cultural reasons. Politically, the main problem with Turkey is the presence of *National Security Council* in political life. This fact, according to the party, is not compatible with the political structure of the EU. Economically, the huge difference between the income per capita of the average EU member states and Turkey, the burden it may impose on

¹¹⁴ The CDU also states its scepticism regarding the outcome of the eastern enlargement process: “Securing stability, peace and independence of the whole continent and protecting human rights is definitely an important role of Germany, but in addition to fulfilling this role Germany should also protect its economic interests. By the time these countries are integrated within the EU, their GDP per capita will be only 35% of the average of the EU. In the last ten years they have developed both economically and politically, but the differences with the EU countries are still very conspicuous. The EU’s institutions are also not developed well enough to secure themselves against the disadvantages of the enlargement process. Therefore not only the chances of enlargement will be influential on the German society but the risks as well. Thus it is the duty of the government to take into consideration the worries of the public seriously and make sure that questions about the eastern enlargement are publicly discussed and answers are sought” (Position paper of the CDU/CSU Fraction, nr. 15/2438, January 27, 1999)

the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural funds that will need to be allocated due to the poor state of its economy were the main concerns. But the most important factor that differentiates the general CDU/CSU position from that of the other German political parties is the importance they attach to Turkey's different *culture, religion* and *geographical* concerns. (Willy Wimmer, interview held on May 8 2000, Berlin). These concerns were also reflected by the Christian Democrat Prime Minister of Hessen, Roland Koch, who has stated that:

“There is a big difference of ‘culture’ and ‘mentality’ between Turkey and Europe and thus Turkey will not be fitting within the EU as easily as the other candidates. Moreover the uncomfortable truth is that the question of Turkey's accession to the EU has all the ingredients of fundamental debate over the future of Europe. It raises the question of the Union's future geography and character of borders. Will these borders have to be fortified ever more as they become longer and approach regions of weak states and instability?” (Koch, Roland, quoted from http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed_01.php, February 2000).

Below the analysis of the position of the other significant party in opposition, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) or the Liberals, will be made. Their views also contribute to national interest formulation in Germany.

The FDP:

Democratic elections are rarely won on foreign policy issues, and political parties are normally identified more with their domestic than their external policy agendas. The small FDP has always been different in this respect and has always displayed a distinctive foreign policy profile since the beginning of the Federal Republic, even while serving as a member of the first West German government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer after 1949. Twenty years later, the small party became closely identified with its role as Bonn's foreign minister party or *Aussenministerpartei*. It generally earned respect for promoting continuity, balance and moderation in foreign policy under a professionally competent leadership. Its attributes of competence, moderation and continuity seemed particularly well embodied by the

foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher during his unusually long tenure in office from 1974 to 1992.

Genscher showed a unique understanding of how to maximise political opportunities and take advantage of them, even as he benefited from some peculiarities of German domestic and international power linkages. With Genscher overseeing its foreign policy, the Bonn Republic gained more weight than its geo-political position would have suggested. In advancing West Germany's international position, Genscher stressed his country's integrative potential in NATO and the EU, as well as its special responsibilities in Central and Eastern Europe with particular attention paid to the Visegrad countries, making possible the policy of reconciliation with Eastern Europe and worked continuously towards European unification. His foreign policy style, eventually called *Genscherism*, also helped to legitimise the FDP as an important coalition ally of the SPD and CDU parties before and after 1982 respectively. After unification, there was some important continuity with the Genscher era. Both Kinkel¹¹⁵ and his party continued to play a corrective role and pursued a foreign policy that included a liberal emphasis on the protection of *human rights*, following the Genscherist approach of using multilateralism to channel international relations more predictably and safely, and preparing the sensitive political terrain for out-of-area deployment of German troops.

In matters of European integration, the FDP has maintained the same openness to participation by the Visegrad countries. They have supported the eastward extension of the EU in principle and full membership of individual countries as soon as possible (Hampton and Soe, 1999: 131). As can be understood from the responses given by Wolfgang Hirche, the former Minister of State and an MP from the FDP who is a

¹¹⁵ The German Minister of Foreign Affairs after the unification period, between 1992-98. He was also from the FDP.

member in the Committee of External Affairs, in the interview conducted on May 17, 2000 in Berlin, the FDP's reasoning for the support of the Visegrad countries' EU membership is similar to the other parties:

“By inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the EU, the EU's established principles of freedom, security and state of law will be extended to the eastern countries. Enlargement will also create a suitable environment for the fight against international terrorism and crime and environmental pollution” (Walter Hirche, interview held on May 17, 2000, Berlin).

Regarding Turkey's EU membership bid the former Vice-president of the *Bundestag* Dr. Burkhard Hirsch, who has also travelled to Turkey on several occasions, has underlined the reasons for the FDP's support for Turkish membership by:

“If the EU pushes Turkey away, the anti-democratic, anti-European and radical Islamic tendencies in Turkey will be strengthened. Germany, having a big Turkish community and huge links with Turkey, has no wish for a Turkey that has become the enemy of Europe. However, this does not mean that the German government should give false hopes to Turkey as to the chances of it being included in the EU in the immediate future. First, we should complete the eastern enlargement, see whether the prospect of EU membership has really encouraged Turkey's democratisation process and then we will see what happens” (Dr. Burkhard Hirsch, interview held on May 17 2000, Berlin).

As can be seen the FDP's reasoning for the support of Turkey's EU membership is also the same as that of the governing parties'.

Major empirical research results:


In the section above the analysis of executives' statements (especially the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister and their offices) as *representatives* of foreign policy and national interests in the intergovernmental bargainings in the EU and political parties' (both in the government and in opposition) statements and position papers as *transmitters* of national interest articulation at the domestic level were made. In addition to these, the responses given by some of the executives and MPs in the in-depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000 in Berlin were also analysed.

Moravcsik regards *face-to-face interviews* with such respondents as crucially important when trying to pinpoint the underlying reasons for executives' attitudes within the bargaining process in the EU. This is due to the fact that issues once handled by domestic parliaments and the public of each state are transferred to the European arena, bargaining is conducted in *secret* sessions of the European Council, employing domestic constitutional procedures designed to handle 'high political' issues of traditional foreign policy. This often allows national decision-makers to express one position in public and the opposite in private. Therefore, to understand the high politics of the European Union and the real considerations that underlie specific EU policies and transcend the indeterminacy and bias that can result from the secrecy of these discussions, it is important not to ascribe motivations or calculations on the basis of secondary sources, journalistic speculation or public government and political party statements, but to look for more reliable sources.

As already mentioned in the first chapter, it is very difficult to investigate the range of information that is available to different governments and is considered by national leaders who agree to delegate authority to supranational institutions. It is equally difficult to investigate the nature of societal support for specific policies. In this regard, an accurate assessment of the nature and intensity of state preferences/foreign policy and national interests should rest on 'hard primary sources' (Moravcsik, 1993, 500-516). Only with the support of 'hard primary sources' for case studies, does one have the possibility to react simultaneously to remarks made to generate divergent predictions from the same data; and draw the relevant conclusions. These all increase the potential decisiveness of the empirical test (Moravcsik, 1998: 78).

Thus in addition to the analysed party position papers and arguments published in the official web sites of the parties and ministries and in the daily newspapers; it is necessary to consider carefully the contribution of the outcome of the below questions to the research, that were asked by the researcher during the in-depth-interviews held between February-June 2000 in Berlin:

Table 1: The main obstacles to Turkish membership (N=86)



Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

There were a huge variety of answers to this question. The percentages again show the number of *responses*. Deficiencies in *democracy and human rights* were seen as the most important obstacles to Turkish membership in the EU, as cited by 31.8 % of responses. Anke Fuchs (SPD MP, Vice-president of the Parliament and former Minister of State), Uta Thietge (Foreign Policy Advisor to the SPD Group in the Parliament), Antonious Halbe (member of the Economics Committee of the CDU/CSU group in the Parliament) and Manfred Emmes (member of the Committee of EU External Relations in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs) all argued that:

“The most important problem is the myriad of domestic problems in Turkey and the solution to these problems will be through successful fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. Once the criteria are fulfilled, there will be no major problems and Turkey can then indeed become an EU member”.

C. Nunn, a bureaucrat from the Chancellor's Office also noted that:

“Specifically the problem of *human rights* in Turkey is the most significant issue that has to be solved first; which can be best achieved through fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria”.¹¹⁶

Hans Joachim Vergau, the former German Ambassador to Turkey also stressed the need to solve the domestic problems of Turkey through fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. Well acquainted with the internal dynamics of Turkish politics, he stressed that the best way for Turkey to make the necessary reforms and fulfill the Copenhagen criteria was that it should be offered a clear prospect of *EU membership*. In addition, most SPD MPs drew attention to the significance of the problems of lack of democracy and human rights in Turkey and contrasted this with the common *values* of the EU, stressing the fact that Turkey has to solve these problems if it wants to become a member of the ‘club’. These answers are similar to the statements of the executives and official party manifestos and position papers already analysed in the first section of this chapter.

5.17% of the responses pointed out the ‘problematic neighbours of Turkey’ as the most important obstacle against Turkey's EU membership. For example Gerd Andres, the SPD Parliamentary State Secretary for Ministry of Employment and Social Order, focused his attention on the *strategic* location of Turkey and argued that:

“The answer to this question is very relevant to the factors that should be taken into consideration when drawing the borders of future Europe; do we want to export the instability that is surrounding Turkey by including Turkey in the EU?”

¹¹⁶ On the other hand, most CDU/CSU MPs who were interviewed, Erich Fritz, Horst Gunther, Andreas Shockenhoff, Arnold Vatz and Michael Stübgen, to name just a few argued that “The perspective of EU membership given to Turkey through the Helsinki European Council was actually a wrong move. Bülent Ecevit had previously given the image of a statesman who does not recognise Copenhagen criteria and Turkey was very slow in reforming its democracy. The Helsinki European Council decision in a way suggested that Turkey's membership might be near and that Turkey would be wrongly encouraged when it still has so many things to do”. “In addition, argued Martina Krogmann, another CDU MP, “This status was only symbolic, not anywhere nearly as significant as actual membership. Therefore, Turkey might wrongly believe that being a candidate is very important”. Ralf Brauksiepe, another CDU MP and member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, said that, with candidate status, “The ball is now in Turkey's court and we can not be accused of being unfair anymore”.

On the other hand 12% of responses indicated that Turkey's *economic* problems are of the most concern. For example Klaus Lambsdorff, an official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that:

“The reason why economic factors are more important than political ones is because you can more easily deal with political problems. However, dealing with Turkey's serious economic problems may take years”.

Nevertheless, some of the respondents were optimistic concerning the long-term prospects for Turkish membership. For example, Martin Kremer, another official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that:

“Even if the freedom of movement, the biggest perceived threat among the economic problems of Turkey, may be a potential problem for Germany, this may be manageable through long transition periods”.

Moreover, several respondents brought attention to an important factor. Michael Reuss, official from the European Union Department in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Volkmar Schultz, SPD Member of the Committee of External Affairs in the Parliament and Burkhard Hirsch, FDP MP and former vice-president of the Parliament all argued that:

“It is a fact that Turkey has serious economic problems, but it will become a member of the EU only when it fulfills the Copenhagen criteria. When it fulfills the Copenhagen criteria, then it will be economically better off than it is now. This will reduce the potential problems that freedom of movement can bring and the risk of immigration to Germany because Turks will not want to leave their relatively ‘well-off’ country”.

It was a shared conviction among the latter group of respondents that Turkey's possible future EU membership obtained as a result of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria will actually reduce the risk of potential negative economic consequences to the German economy.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ The best example of this being the most likely outcome would be the Italian case where initially there was a fear about the poor Italian workers flooding into the EU but because of their increasing life standards as a result of EU membership that did not happen.

13.13% of the responses indicated that all three: deficiencies in democracy and human rights and economic problems are the biggest obstacles to Turkish membership.

8.62 % of the responses pointed Turkey's different *culture* as the real obstacle to Turkey's EU membership. These responses indicated that "It is not clear whether Turkey really belongs to Europe". All of those who offered this answer belong to the CDU/CSU and they criticised the government of not being honest. They argued that differences between Turkish and German societies are too large to think that Turkey will be integrated into the EU successfully and that the government at heart also thinks it is not in German interests to support Turkish membership of the EU because of this reality of cultural incompatibility, but it finds it 'politically more correct' to talk about the more obvious problems such as democracy and human rights. Erich Maas, a CDU MP and Deputy Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union in the German *Bundestag* argued that:

"The government, while supporting Turkey on the one hand, was opposed to selling Leopold tanks to Turkey on the other because they were afraid that Turks would use them in ways that violated *human rights*. If they do not trust Turkey, why did they support it?"

Reinhard Freiherr von Schorlemer, another CDU MP and member of the Committee on External Affairs also argued that:

"There are two German schools of thought regarding Turkish membership. One is the real school: they say that they do not want Turkey inside the EU. The other is the official school: they say that they should just give the prospect of EU membership and put the ball in Turkey's court, but in reality they also do not want Turkish membership; that is what the current government is doing now. They just want to keep Turkey at bay by making them trust the EU again, and they know that candidate status does not mean a lot and that before membership there are still a lot of things that need to be done".

All the responses which pointed to the role of the army in Turkish politics as a serious obstacle for Turkey's EU membership bid (6.89% of the responses) belonged to the members of the Green Party, who is traditionally opposed to military factors

within politics. 5.17% of the responses indicated ‘population’ as the most important problem mitigating against Turkey’s EU membership. For example Gerhard Schlaudraff, an official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that:

“The fact that Turkey has a huge population reinforces the thought that it may *economically* be a problem for Germany”.

Phillip Deichmann, foreign policy advisor at the German Embassy in Ankara brought attention to the reality that the Turkish population is young and dynamic while Germany is becoming old and this fact has the potential to *weaken* the German economy. On the contrary, Heidi Storch, an official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that:

“The size of the population should not be a very significant factor to take into consideration because by the time the EU is ready to open the negotiations with Turkey, it will probably be a different organisation; changed in shape and size”.

Gerd Andres, an SPD MP and Parliamentary State Secretary for Ministry of Employment and Social Order, argued that:

“The size of the population is not actually that important but the *structure* of the Turkish population may be problematic in the fact that it incorporates several cleavages”.¹¹⁸


Indeed, 6.03% of the responses showed that ‘structure’ of the Turkish population is very different; that it incorporates many cleavages in itself such as Islamists-seculars, Kurdish-Turkish nationalists and the army. This argument is actually linked with the importance of Turkey’s inner problems; thus if Turkey solves its inner problems and ease out the internal tensions and cleavages the size of the population will not be of such importance.

The other factors are familiar; they have been introduced in previous chapters and the distribution of the answers was more or less equal.

¹¹⁸ Besides the internal tensions in Turkey, he also listed the Turkish culture such as having big families and weak places of women in society as additional problems that make the social structure of the population problematic and not very easily compatible with the EU.

The question that followed on from this one was important in the sense that the answers could show the reasoning behind the current SPD-Green government's support for Turkey's EU membership. The question was phrased like this: *"If there were a variety of obstacles to Turkey's EU membership, then why was the German government the most enthusiastic supporter of Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999 and what explains the consequent presentation of a perspective of possible membership to Turkey?"*:

Table 2: The main reasons for the German government's support of Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999 and the consequent presentation of a perspective of possible membership to Turkey (N=86)



Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

The majority, 52% of responses, indicated that the German government supported the Turkish candidacy to reduce the risk of immigration, the influx of refugees and the potential tension that has arisen between PKK supporters and nationalists, as well as between radical Islamists and secularists which are seen as outcomes of the spill-over of the problems from Turkish domestic politics into the German domestic political arena and which threaten the *welfare, integrity and stability* of the German society to a large extent. These were in previous chapters defined as

‘new security threats’, having non-military characteristics and being more of economic, societal, environmental and political in structure.

The respondents who argued that prevention of new security threats and the resulting stability was the most important reason behind the government of the SPD-the Green Party’s support for Turkey’s EU membership also argued at the same time that the perspective of EU membership was the most influential way for pushing Turkey to make the necessary democratic reforms which would in return prevent potential spill-over of problems to Germany, would help to reduce threats of immigration and the influx of refugees, all of which have the potential to threaten German stability and well-being. Clemens Betzel, member of the Committee of External Affairs of the European Union in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a specialist on Turkey, argued that:

“It is in Germany’s interests to break the deadlock created by the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997”, hoping that once the doors to the EU are open, Turks will be *motivated* to implement the necessary reforms. This in turn will be beneficial for German domestic politics”.

Matthias Sonn, member of the Committee on Bilateral Relations between Germany and Turkey in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another specialist on Turkey specifically also stressed the importance of the perspective of EU membership for motivating Turkey to carry out the internal reforms which would in return reduce the risk of the migration of greater numbers to Germany. Being aware of the public’s skepticism regarding the support given by the German government to Turkey’s EU membership bid, Detlef Küster, member of the Committee of EU External Relations in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed the fact that:

“This is a very elitist decision and we still have to explain to the public that enlargement and inclusion of Turkey are for their own benefit in the longer term”.

On the other hand even the concept of incompatibility of the Turkish culture with the European culture can be related with the prevention of new security threats. The great cultural incompatibility between German and Turkish societies leading to the inadequate integration of the Turkish community into German society and problems deriving from this can likewise be linked to Buzan's definition of societal insecurity:


"Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community. This is mainly related with the potential threat of migrants to the collective identity of host societies, because of their cultural, religious and linguistic differences" (Buzan, 1998: 120).

37.20% of the responses pointed that the German government supports Turkey's EU membership bid for reasons connected with strategic location of Turkey between the Balkans, Middle East, Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. For example, Klaus Lamsdorff, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued:

"Turkey has to stand *within* the EU, not outside. By incorporating the liberal western principles required to be a member of the EU in its predominantly Muslim society, it will act as an example to the other countries in the region, help to keep the region it is located in stable and this will have direct consequences for the stability of the EU as well".

It is worth asking that if there is this much support on the side of the German government for Turkey's EU membership bid, in case of a definite preceding eastern enlargement, would that prove a disadvantage for continuation of Germany's support for Turkey? The results of the question asked by the researcher finds the answer for that:

Table 3: The relation between eastern enlargement and Turkish membership: does one prevent/preclude the other? (N=86)



Source: In depth-interviews conducted between February-June 2000, Berlin

The respondents had only one answer for this question, therefore the percentages show the number of *respondents*. The answers to this question show that the respondents were generally optimistic on this topic. 33.3% of respondents indicated that, once eastern enlargement is completed, the EU will have automatically accomplished serious internal reforms and that this will *ease* the incorporation of Turkey into the EU structure. Nevertheless, a not very insignificant number of respondents, 20%, indicated that eastern enlargement and the problems it will cause *may* make the public say that further EU enlargement is unnecessary and too difficult.

Summary:

Throughout his analysis of the European integration process, Moravcsik's focus has always been on motivations of executives to bargain in the international arena that stem from national interest formulation at the domestic level influenced by *economic interdependence*. He argues that:

“The dominant motivations of governments in EU history-making decisions reflect pressures from economically powerful interest groups, businessmen etc. to co-ordinate policy responses to rising opportunities for profitable economic exchange, in

particular the growing intra-industry trade and capital movements” (Moravcsik, 1998: 7).

He does not relegate geo-political ideology or security interests to insignificance yet argues that economic interests remain of primary importance. He further argues that:

“Only where economic interests were weak, diffuse etc. could national politicians indulge the temptation to consider geo-political goals” (Moravcsik, 1998: 8).

Throughout this chapter the statements of executives, official manifestos, reports of political parties and statements of members of the parliament in Germany were analysed to highlight the most significant factors that lead to national interest articulation at the domestic level by voter preferences and political parties, which is aggregated and represented as foreign policy attitude towards the enlargement process of the EU in the EU negotiations by the executives. It was seen that, contrary to the liberal intergovernmentalist approach of Moravcsik, economic interdependence was not the most important factor in the formulation of the foreign policy attitude of Germany towards the enlargement process regarding both the Visegrad countries and Turkey, but ‘stability’ was used as the key word as underlying reason for the support of the inclusion of both categories of candidate in the EU. The term stability which is directly related with geo-political/security factors was used in two senses:

1. *Prevention of military threats.* This usually comprises of a deliberate biological and chemical warfare, deliberate nuclear attack and conventional conflict with weapons between states. Though this threat was especially significant during the Cold War, in the post Cold War this took the form of managing the build-down of conventional and nuclear forces in the Visegrad region, consolidating the new regime of arms controls and confidence building measures and addressing the problem of nuclear proliferation. In addition, with technological advances in conventional weapons and the increasingly

common resort to the tactic of suicide bomb attacks against civilians, particularly by radical Islamist groups in the Middle East and in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians military threats still continued to be very relevant and dangerous for the European continent as well.

2. *Prevention of new security threats.* These occur in the form of non-military threats, e.g. economic, political, environmental and societal security threats. Mainly they relate to ethnic factionalism or irredentism, macro-economic destabilisation, general environmental degradation, migratory pressures, criminalisation of economies and narcotics trade.

An important reason for formulating a positive attitude towards the both categories of candidate is the prevention of new security threats and thus maintaining the stability of Germany. This is very much related with the previously mentioned arguments of Buzan that:

“With the end of the Cold War, the extension of the market economy into nearly all of the formerly Communist world, and the intensification of global finance, investment, and production, the case for a wider security agenda has become stronger. At least for the time being, greatly reduced military rivalries among the great powers diverts security concerns away from traditional military threats more towards the consequences of how the open international system operates” (Buzan, 1998: 211).

Prevention of new security threats and maintaining stability of Germany in particular facilitated the German support for the Visegrad countries’ inclusion in the EU because especially after the break up of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo war Germans saw how the effects of the war in neighbouring regions can rapidly affect their country. As Buzan also argues:

“Most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity. Most states fear their neighbours more than distant powers” (Buzan, 1998: 11).

Thus the widening of these security threats emerging in East and Central Europe and their interdependence further puts the stability of the European continent in

danger, and this is of particular concern to Germany with its central location and interdependent relations with neighbouring states. Therefore these concerns about instability and inequality make it necessary for Germany to secure the stability of its neighbours, the Visegrad countries so that there will not be a flow of refugees from these countries with the potential to disrupt German welfare, create unemployment and polarisation and co-operate with them against international crime in the form of illegal trade in drugs, money laundering etc. The best way to achieve this was to offer these countries EU membership. In addition with regard to the fact that environmental security was incorporated among the new security threats coming into being after the Cold War, the proximity of the Visegrad countries to Germany with the potential to negatively affect Germany's high environmental standards made it necessary for the Visegrad countries to reach the same environmental standards as EU member state countries, which could again be guaranteed through EU membership.

This stress on stability is also important for Germany's support of Turkey's EU membership, but for reasons other than those which facilitated the Visegrad countries' incorporation. Inadequate integration of the Turkish community in Germany causes direct transportation of the problems within Turkish domestic politics, such as the violation of human rights related to the Kurdish problem and fundamental Islam, onto the German political stage, making reforms and the consequent stability of Turkish domestic politics a necessity also for the welfare and stability of German domestic politics.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ The Kurdish problem in particular in Turkey may be regarded as a political security threat which has led to instability in Turkish domestic politics. Buzan states that "Depending upon what kind of weakness the state exhibits, it will be worried about different vulnerabilities and will therefore evaluate securities differently. The ethnic case is rather straightforward. When state and nation do not correspond there is potential for destabilisation". This reality also had destabilising consequences for German domestic politics (Buzan, 1998: 153).

The best way to prevent these security threats and ensure the stability of Turkey with positive outcomes for the stability of Germany was through the perspective of EU membership. By the perspective of eventual EU membership, Turkey would have to fulfil the membership criteria, especially political criteria, which would automatically lead to a reduction in the deficiencies in its democracy and decrease the tensions and instability deriving from the cleavages in its domestic politics. This was also realised by the German executives especially after the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 and in the time period leading up to the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, they had tried to convince their partners in the EU about the importance of Turkey's candidate status for motivating Turkey to carry out political reforms.

Linked with the fact that in today's globalised world security has become very transnational and borderless and instability can easily spill-over to adjacent regions of Europe, Turkey's internal stability was necessary for another reason. Germany realised after the Kosovo War that it was not enough just to secure the Visegrad region and the eastern Europe, but stability of the outer zone of the European continent such as the Balkans, eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East was also needed in order to guarantee the security and stability of Europe. Therefore Turkey's location between Europe, Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea region and eastern Mediterranean, its potential role as a bridge between Europe and the Muslim countries and its role as an example for synthesis of democracy and Muslim society made its stability important for Germany as it would help the stability of this region and prevent the spill-over of instability in the form of new security threats to the European continent. In addition, regarding the fact that military threats do exist in this region as states are still involved in military conflict with each other, prevention of traditional security threats was also

important. This fact was further substantiated by September 11 attacks by radical Islamists.¹²⁰

These arguments do not mean that the economy is an insignificant factor in national interest formulation at the domestic level in Germany and foreign policy representation at the EU level. Party position paper analyses and answers of the respondents in the researcher's interviews show that fear of more immigration, increasing unemployment, and in the case of Turkey, more financial burdens are also important factors that affect the national interest formulation process. Nevertheless, the government parties are keen in giving the message to the public that with the inclusion of the Visegrad countries, their improved economy will make the single market more profitable, create more labour opportunities, and in the case of Turkey, the improved status of the Turkish economy will not necessarily lead to a flow of migrants invading Germany as feared. However, it could be seen that the term *stability* was used constantly by the executives and political parties as influencing national interest articulation and foreign policy formulation, which as already been told, is linked with the prevention of traditional military but in particular new security threats. Therefore, it can be asserted that, security/geo-politics was a more significant factor in formulating German foreign policy attitude in the enlargement process of the EU towards both categories of candidate, in marked contrast to Moravcsik's stress on economic interdependence. This conclusion then signifies the relevance of the second hypothesis constructed in the thesis for determining the German foreign policy: 'Geo-political factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German national interests (*intervening variable*) which leads to an

¹²⁰ For example, against the statement of a conservative politician who stated that "September 11 attacks hurt Turkey's EU membership chances because the EU does not want to risk importing militant Islam, the Chancellor Schröder answered that "The opposite would be true; if Turkey, a secular Muslim democracy and NATO ally, were to gain entry into a club of western countries founded on liberal principles it would help to solve the problem of radical Islam" (*Hurriyet*, December 3, 2003).

outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that favours Turkish membership in the EU’.

If the first hypothesis ‘Economic factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German ‘national interests’ (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests’ and the third hypothesis ‘Cultural factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German ‘national interests’ (*intervening variable*) which leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests’ were more relevant than it would follow that the German government would *not* be supporting Turkey’s EU membership bid that strongly.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS

Introduction:

The European Union has never been an exclusive club. From its very start the possibility of more members was not only expected but actually anticipated. Article 237 of the treaty establishing the European Economic Community signed in Rome on March 25, 1957 by France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg states quite explicitly: ‘Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community’. Thus, the possibility was realised up for three enlargements of its membership to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The fourth enlargement took place on January 1, 1995, under the provisions of Article 238 of the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in February 1992. Accession by Austria, Finland, and Sweden took the EU to its position of having fifteen member states. The last enlargement involved ten states, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta and Cyprus, which took place on May 1, 2004 and increased the number of EU member states to 25.

With the end of the Cold War, considerations related to the future of the European Union have changed to a great extent. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialist-communist system in Central and Eastern Europe including that of the Soviet Union have completely redrawn the political map of the Eurasian continent. On the eastern side of the former ‘iron curtain’ new states have emerged and existing ones have had to fundamentally change their political and economic outlook. The old antagonism between East and West and the military threat from the East were swept aside together with the communist elites in power within a period of a few months at the end of 1989.

These events took the European Union and its member states totally by surprise, although this development had been one of their most important official foreign policy goals for decades. As the former socialist countries were occupied primarily with managing their respective domestic economic and political transformation processes, it was left to the Western European states to take the initiative in the establishment of the post Cold War 'new European order' and thus the rules and the motor of the new enlargement policy of the EU.

Within the context of the enlargement policy of the European Union, Germany has undoubtedly been the keenest and most influential supporter of EU eastern enlargement, especially with regard to the inclusion of the Visegrad countries, namely Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, into the EU. There were several reasons why Germany became such an important actor as far as eastern enlargement of the European Union was concerned. Firstly, since the foundation of the European Union German foreign policy was always formulated in terms of strong support for European integration and the enlargement policy of the European Union has become currently the most significant policy of the European integration process. Thus it was envisaged that in this policy it would automatically play an influential role. Secondly, Germany was now a 'normal' state. Throughout the research the term 'normal' was used in the sense that its emergence as a re-united state freed from the constraints imposed upon it after World War II, has allowed Germany to become 'normal' as far as it will henceforth formulate and implement its foreign policy in accordance with its own *national interests*. Therefore, it was not at all surprising that Germany became a keen supporter of the Visegrad countries' EU membership as a consequence of its geographical proximity and historical links with the Visegrad countries; it has national interests with regard to their inclusion in the EU and their subsequent stability.

The only country that was left out of the enlargement process of the EU in spite of the fact that it had been waiting in the queue for EU membership for quite a long period of time was Turkey. Turkey's interest in accession to the European Union can be traced back to 1959 when it applied for associate membership in what was then the European Economic Community. Turkey became an associate member following the Ankara Treaty on September 12, 1963 and applied for full membership during the office of the Prime Minister Turgut Özal in April 1987. In December 1989 the European Commission told the Turks that, while they were eligible for candidacy, their application could not be considered before 1993 at the earliest. Following this, during the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 when the EU announced the list of countries to be included in the EU in the near future, it left Turkey out of the enlargement process. The Turks in return showed a bitter reaction and suspended all political dialogue with the EU and decided to continue their relations only within the framework of the Customs Union.

In December 1999, two years after its rejection of Turkey's candidacy for accession, the EU agreed to accept Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. There were several factors that contributed to this reversal policy of the EU. One of them, which is the most important one with relation to this particular research, is the change of the German government from a CDU/CSU-Liberal coalition under the leadership of Helmut Kohl to the SPD-Green coalition under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder. Germany has always been seen as an influential country in Turkey's quest for EU membership as a result of the presence of 2.4 million people of Turkish origin living in Germany and the historical and intensive economic links between the two countries. However Kohl had always deliberately spoken about 'later membership' and had carefully avoided giving explicit support for Turkey's EU membership bid. The

change of government in Germany influencing the German position towards Turkey's EU membership bid in a positive fashion could also be inferred from the statements and behaviour of the key decision makers in Germany, and in particular those of the Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and the Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. As early as the parliamentary debate concerning the government program in November 1998, Foreign Minister Fischer had declared that the newly elected Red-Green coalition wanted to correct the mistake made by the prior government at the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997. In early March 1999 the Chancellor Schröder sent the Christian Democrat politician Walter Leisler-Kiep as his personal representative to Turkey's prime minister Bülent Ecevit in order to co-ordinate with Ankara Germany's plan to bring about a decision of the European Council to correct the Luxembourg decision at its meeting in Cologne in June under the German EU presidency. After thorough high-level preparations conducted by the foreign ministries Chancellor Schröder and Prime Minister Ecevit exchanged letters in late May 1999 in which the following points were clarified: Turkey acknowledged the necessity to fulfil the relevant Copenhagen criteria before the beginning of accession negotiations and Germany promised to support Turkey's EU membership and that Turkey would be treated as equal to all other candidate states. Moreover, an eventual decision by the European Council to grant Turkey candidate status would be given. In the following weeks the German government indeed intensified its efforts to convince other EU member governments of the necessity to change the decision made at the Summit. However it was not possible to overcome Greek, Italian, Swedish and Luxembourg resistance and consequently the European Council Summit in Cologne in June 1999 did not discuss the issue (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, July 21, 1999).

German diplomatic endeavours within EU meetings could, however, only become more successful after the Turkish-Greek policy of rapprochement gained momentum in the aftermath of the two earthquakes which shook the Marmara region and Athens respectively in August and September 1999. After many rounds of sometimes difficult discussions among the fifteen member states, the European Council in Helsinki on December 10-11, 1999 decided to grant Turkey candidate status and put it on equal footing with all other candidate states for EU membership. The German influence behind this decision proved very significant.

Outline of the thesis:

Based on the background information given above, the main aim of this research was to analyse the significance of German national interests within the enlargement policy of the European Union and the underlying societal factors that lead to the formulation of national interests with particular emphasis placed on the Visegrad countries' accession to the EU and Turkey's pursuit of EU membership. The analysis of the influence of German foreign policy on Turkey's quest for EU membership was chosen in particular because like the Visegrad countries, Germany has important national interests in the maintaining and upkeep of good relations with Turkey due to the effect of the strong economic ties between the countries and the presence of the huge Turkish community in Germany and their influence on German domestic politics. The research covered the period between 1990-1999, just after the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany and up until the European Council Summit which announced that Turkey had been designated a candidate as a result of the positive initiative of the German government. There was particular emphasis on the period when the SPD-Green government came into power. This was the time when German national interests were expressed more firmly and courageously within the EU due to

the generational change of the leaders which also had different priorities in foreign policy to those of the previous government. These priorities were influential in the way they affected their position towards the enlargement process of the EU; towards Turkey's EU membership bid in particular.

Because of the significance this research has attached to national interest formulation which has lead to German foreign policy making, the theory used to deconstruct German foreign policy and analyse the underlying reasons for the German attitude in the enlargement policy of the EU towards the both categories of candidates was that of liberal intergovernmentalism (LIG). This is mainly because of the fact that the main advocate of the LIG theory, Andrew Moravcsik, follows a 'state-centric, intergovernmental' approach which when explaining the important decisions in the history of European integration makes a detailed analysis of national interests and domestic politics of states and their influence in the foreign policies represented by the national executives in the EU.

LIG approach:

To understand the linkage between Moravcsik's LIG approach and the German position in the enlargement process of the EU, John Peterson's (1995) typology of decision making in the European Union was used. In relation to John Peterson's (1995) analysis, enlargement of the EU can be regarded as a *history making decision* as just like all other history making decisions:

"It is a response to broad changes in the international environment around the EU and it will totally affect the negotiated order itself; institutional rules and the policy benefits which the member states themselves reap from membership" (Peterson, 1995: 83).

Thus if enlargement is a history-making decision, then like all other history making decisions, all related decisions will be taken at the 'super-systemic' level; by the European Council and national governments in the IGCs who mainly represent

their *national interests* in the European arena. In addition, as a history-making decision, any decisions about enlargement will reflect the rationality “which stems from the need for member states to *co-operate* when solving collective problems” (Peterson, 1995: 84). This argument supports the preferred multilateral way of decision making in German foreign policy which means in particular ‘including countries (with whom Germany is interested in a stable and strong relationship) in the EU rather than helping them bilaterally’. John Redmond, Lee Miles and Rene Schwok (1995) have made the similar assumptions that by touching on the economic interests of the member states, enlargement will bring further prioritisation of domestic politics and national interests and by increasing diversity of national interests and ideological perspectives it will strengthen pragmatist tendencies and re-emphasise intergovernmental perspectives. All these assumptions relate well to the link between the liberal intergovernmentalist approach of Andrew Moravcsik and the EU’s enlargement policy. When this policy is contrasted with other theories attempting to explain European integration, Moravcsik’s approach becomes significant by the importance it attaches predominantly to careful analysis of a) national interests in the European integration process, b) intergovernmentalism as opposed to supranationalism, c) economic interdependence that makes it necessary for states to co-operate with each other and d) argues that the concept of rationality remains conspicuous in states’ behaviour.

Moravcsik’s theorisation, as a combination of liberalism and intergovernmentalism, focuses on the significance of three stages in the European integration process: the first stage is the national interest formation stage. Underlying societal factors and pressure from domestic societal actors, as represented in political institutions, make up the national interests, which are articulated at the domestic level

of nation states. These national interests are aggregated by the executives (in the case of Germany mainly by the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister who are the most significant figures responsible for Germany's *Europapolitik*) through messages transmitted by political institutions and in particular through political party manifestos and position papers (which also convey the general public opinion) and the reports of interest groups. These make up the preferences of the state, in other words, the foreign policy of the state.¹²¹ The second stage is the intergovernmental negotiation process in which nation states represented by their executives negotiate and bargain with other members of the EU to get their specific foreign policies carried out. The result is the third stage of EU decision-making. Whatever is decided finds expression as 'an institutional choice'; either as Moravcsik states, when the states delegate or pool their sovereignty to an EU institution and even when ruling by unanimity becomes the principle states prefer to arrive at a 'collective' decision rather than a 'unilateral' one. Governments are likely to accept pooling or delegation or collective decision making rather than a unilateral one as a means to assure that other governments will accept agreed legislation and its subsequent enforcement, to signal their own credibility, to lock in future decisions against domestic opposition or because it is more efficient to create benefits by co-operating with other states rather than acting unilaterally (Moravcsik, 1998: 73). In summary, according to Moravcsik:

"The broad lines of European integration since 1955 reflect *three* factors: patterns of commercial advantage, the relative bargaining power of prominent governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments and benefit from the co-operation all of which result in institutional choice" (Moravcsik, 1998:3).

Especially the importance Moravcsik attaches to the first stage in the European integration process (which signifies the interaction of several societal factors in

¹²¹ Regarding the importance of political parties and interest group politics in Germany, the messages they transmit to the executives is usually very strongly taken into consideration.

domestic politics that lead to national interest articulation at the domestic level and which is aggregated by executives to be represented as foreign policy in the intergovernmental bargainings of the EU) has made his LIG approach a suitable tool to analyse German foreign policy. Using the LIG approach to understand the reasoning underlying German foreign policy has led to the creation of three hypotheses in this thesis. Though the dependent variable as German foreign policy is the same in all three hypotheses, the independent variables have been seen to be different in each hypothesis. The dependent variable, German foreign policy, was assessed by its position within the enlargement policy of the EU; both towards the Visegrad countries and Turkey.

The hypotheses that were constructed were as follows:

Hypothesis I: Economic factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German ‘national interests’ (*intervening variable*) and this leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests.

Hypothesis II: Geo-political factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German national interests (*intervening variable*) and this leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that favours Turkish membership in the EU.

Hypothesis III: Cultural factors in German domestic politics (*independent variable*) influence the formulation of German ‘national interests’ (*intervening variable*) and this leads to an outlook in German foreign policy (*dependent variable*) that sees Turkish membership in the EU as detrimental to its national interests.

Given the important role Moravcsik attributes to *national executives* in foreign policy representation and national interest aggregation, an analysis of the attitudes of

executives is important to find out what societal factors are influential in national interest articulation at the domestic level. In this thesis, the method to analyse the attitudes of national executives was that of conducting in-depth-interviews with the executives in the Foreign Ministry, in the Chancellor's Office, members of the German Parliament who have seats on the Committees of Foreign Affairs and EU Affairs, and some German members of the European Parliament. These interviews were conducted in the period between February-June 2000 in Berlin, Germany. In addition to this, official statements of executives and published party position papers and manifestos which convey national interests to executives were also analysed.

Main findings:

The analysis of the official statements of the executives and the outcome of the in-depth-interviews showed that it is *geo-political factors* (used interchangeably as security/stability factors) as formulated in the second hypothesis, that were important in determining the German position in the enlargement process of the EU towards the both categories of candidates.

When dealing with the geo-political factors influential in national interest formulation in Germany's domestic politics, two aspects of geo-political ideology were discussed: 1. *The importance of new security threats such as those which emerged after the Cold War.* The 'new security threats' encompassed social, economic and environmental aspects ranging from macroeconomic instability, international terrorism, transnational crime, ethnic conflicts, migratory pressures to environmental refugees facilitated by the increasing trend of the involuntary regionalisation or globalisation. They can be articulated under the general notion of political security and what they had in common was the concern related to the ability of the state to protect the social and economic fabric of a society and act as an effective gatekeeper and to

maintain social *integrity* and *stability*. 2. *The importance of traditional military security threats that originated from the Cold War period*. These were spelt out in the thesis as deliberate biological and/chemical warfare, an intentional nuclear attack or conventional conflict with small numbers of light weapons between states. They still exist in some parts of the world. Both aspects of security within the framework of geo-political ideology are of importance for German domestic politics; however the end of the Cold War and the changes realised as a consequence of that development inevitably made the new security threats more significant.

The outcome of the in-depth-interviews in Germany showed the main following results:

-61.3% of the responses have indicated security/stability as the most important reason for Germany's support of the Visegrad countries' EU membership. Only 16.5% of the responses pointed economic reasons as the most important reason. Cultural reasons made up only 7.08% of the responses.

-31.80% of the responses indicated that the main obstacles to Turkey's EU membership were its problems related to democracy and human rights, and this represented the highest figure for that particular question. In addition, 42.70% of the respondents (again the highest figure for that particular question) stated that the impact of the sizeable Turkish community in Germany has a *negative* effect on German foreign policy towards Turkey's EU membership because of the fact that what happens in Turkey also affects German public welfare and stability. Only 12% of the responses pointed economic reasons as the most important obstacle against Turkey's EU membership bid and a mere 8.62% of the responses indicated cultural reasons as an obstacle.

-52% of the responses indicated that the main reasons for the German government's support of Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999 and the consequent presentation of the perspective of possible membership to Turkey was 'in order to reduce the risk of new security threats' while 37.2% of the responses pointed that 'strategic interests' were their most overriding concern. Linked strongly with the previous argument, reducing the risk of new security threats was related with helping the reform process in Turkey by eliminating the deficiencies in Turkish democracy and practice of human rights. In this way, because of the strong link between the Turkish society in Germany and Turkey (which has a negative impact on German society by causing the spill-over of the Turkish domestic political problems into Germany), threats to stability and integrity of the German society would also be eliminated. Strategic interests had to do with the important location of Turkey between the Middle East and Europe and involved both new security threats (in the form of preventing migration, environmental problems, refugee inflows caused by the problems in this region and thus disturbing stability of Germany and Europe) and traditional, military threats.

The analyses of statements of executives were along the same direction. To cite an example regarding the German position towards Turkey, the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Christoph Zöpel put forward the following view of the German government in an interview in the German daily *die Welt* on December 18, 1999 as:

"We have to include Turkey in the EU for our *security* interests. It is both in German and European interests that Turkey becomes a democratic state in which the rule of law is permanent. In this way it will be a more stable country and having a stable country in the eastern Mediterranean region is important for *our* stability"(www.welt.de).

An interview with the Chancellor Schröder on February 4, 2000 in the German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* the sentiments mentioned also above are expressed:

“The prospect of EU membership will motivate Turkey to carry out reforms to bring about complete democratisation and secure its western orientation. In this way, Turkey’s EU membership will stabilise the region it is located in, facilitate the integration of the Turkish society into German society and contribute to our stability”(www.faz.de).

Regarding the German position towards the Visegrad countries’ EU membership the German Foreign Minister Fischer stated:

“After the Cold War the EU must not be limited to Western Europe, instead at its core the idea of European integration is an all-European project. *Geopolitical* realities do not allow for a serious alternative in any way. There are certainly great costs and risks. But EU enlargement is likely to provide the best guarantee for continental *stability*” (*die Zeit*, January 21, 1999, p.3).

In the following section a detailed analysis of the above-mentioned arguments will be made for the both categories of candidate.

German support for both categories of candidate: Importance of ‘stability’ and ‘new security threats’ in German foreign policy and national interest articulation (Analysis of the 1st and 2nd stages within the framework of the LIG approach)

The Visegrad countries

The new security threats as defined in the section above appeared in particular at the eastern border of the EU as the Soviet Union collapsed and its satellite states won their independence. Although the termination of the East-West conflict freed the world from the acute tension between two sophisticatedly armed military blocs, it unfortunately did not produce lasting peace. The world has not become safer; indeed international politics have become even more unpredictable, obscure and complex and the risk of a large-scale war has been superseded by many different risks of regional conflict. In the aftermath of the Cold War, democracy was presented as a cure for

eastern ailments, but, given the painful nature of the reforms necessary, and the unhealed wounds re-opened by the spirit of freedom, democracy would potentially give rise to social unrest and national conflict. This scenario in particular applies to many situations ranging from ethnic conflicts (resulting in particular from the disintegration of multiracial states that had been artificially held together) to developments that arise as a result of hunger, oppression, underdevelopment, overpopulation, environmental destruction, drug trafficking, refugee flows or religious extremism; concepts that were defined as ‘new security threats’ in the thesis. The changes associated with the end of the Cold War also include other factors such as a more complex interdependence, the growth of globalisation, democracy and social market economies. At an international level these changes have led to a significant intensification of global interconnectedness between geographically dispersed societies so that events in one part of the world have effects on peoples and societies far away (Hyde-Price, 2000: 5). Thus, what happened in Central and Eastern Europe was of close concern to the Western Europeans.

The members of the EU had been trying for over half a century to ensure their security and stability within the European Union and had created mutual confidence and trust among themselves guaranteed by the institutional structure of European integration. However as the Yugoslavia example indicated, the growing complex interdependence after the Cold War had made it insufficient merely to maintain peace for the members of the Union (Krautscheid, 1997: 5). All the above-mentioned threats were pan-regional threats to national security and stability and consequently required a co-operative solution. The Visegrad countries were aware of this problem and pointed out to the discrepancy between western promises and actions. There would be a definite threat of instability on the European continent if the West failed to act.

These developments had a direct effect on Germany. When Europe's post-war power constellation collapsed, Germany's geostrategic position changed dramatically. Germany was no longer a front-line state but a country surrounded by friends and partners. However, the newly independent Visegrad states with the potential to fall into instability are on its eastern borders. Being a modern industrial state with global relations, Germany would be influenced by a great many political, socio-economic and military developments happening on its eastern border with direct negative consequences on its own domestic politics (Krautscheid, 1997: 4). Thus its eastern neighbours', the Visegrad countries' fragile democracies needed to be strengthened in order to avoid instability that could spill over into Germany. Bonn was aware of this and the Foreign Ministry declared that:

“The most immediate security problems of the region, were to do with ‘new’ security threats-the environment, migration, crime trafficking. Germany’s goal is promoting *stability* in the region” (Handl, Longhurst and Zabarowski, 2000: 13).

For several reasons, these objectives could be obtained most efficiently by these countries' inclusion in the European Union. Including them in the enlargement process would head off suspicion of Germany's western partners about its potential hegemony in Eastern Europe. Although German interests can be voiced more confidently at present, they have rarely been conceived of or promoted within a purely national context, they have rather been defined along European lines, compatible with multilateral structures, allies and neighbours (Handl, Longhurst and Zabarowski, 2000: 7). The continuation of this multilateral structure was important to comfort its Western partners. In addition, including these poor countries in the EU would help Germany share the financial cost of enlargement with the other states. However, most importantly, the prevention of new security threats, the stability and legitimacy of the European security order, would be best served by the expansion of the EU to the East.

Inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the European Union, which presupposes the meeting of membership criteria, would provide a seal of approval that would transfer economic credibility to those states. In addition, in Europe, international society has been transformed, not only by globalisation, but also by the consolidation of stable liberal-democracies based on comprehensive social welfare systems and social market economies. The effect of the transformation of statehood and the nature of international society in Western and Northern Europe is that a zone of 'stable peace' has emerged in Western Europe and the wider transatlantic area, with a 'security community' at its core.¹²²

The defining feature of this zone of stable peace is that the states that constitute it no longer regard war, or the threat of war, as an acceptable means of resolving conflicts within the security community (Hyde-Price, 2000: 6). By accepting the governing norms of democratisation and marketisation of the EU (and adherence to the *acquis communautaire*), the Visegrad countries would benefit from two other important externalities: they would be participating in the EU common frame of reference for identifying and resolving conflicts of interest; and in a community of interests and values which makes a collective security system possible (Sperling, 1999:7). Thus the successful integration of the new democracies of the Visegrad region into the Euro-Atlantic security community would be the best way to ensure their smooth transition to democracy and a market economy, preserving their stability and serve to enlarge the transatlantic zone of stable peace which would directly have a positive effect on their neighbour Germany's stability. (Handl, Zabarowski and Longhurst, 2000: 29).

¹²² This concept was first defined by Karl Deutsch on the project that formed the basis of *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. The guiding puzzle of this project was the 'study of possible ways in which men might some day abolish war'. The focus was on the operation of security communities-political communities within which the expectation of war was minimised. The definition of 'security community' was bound up with the conception of integration advanced by Deutsch and his colleagues. Security communities were groups of people that had become 'integrated' (Rosamond, 2000: 61).

Therefore these 'new' security threats led to Germany's early pledge of supporting EU enlargement to include the Visegrad countries, reinforced with considerable financial assistance to help alleviate the socio-economic problems of the region and thus the inevitable promotion of stability.

The other argument when analysing the importance of geo-political factors in the national interest formation of Germany was the importance the Kosovo War had on German foreign policy. All the ethical questions about the German troop presence in Europe were found to be lacking in this crisis. In addition to the importance of responsibility to its NATO allies and responsibility in the eyes of the whole world as regards the defence of human rights (the memories of Dachau and Auschwitz, set against the background of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the former Yugoslavia pulled Germany towards a desire to end the slaughter and the terror in the Balkans) there was also the wish to prevent *new security threats*. As Hans Maull (2000) comments, German policy in Kosovo may mostly be explained by Germany's concern about stability in south-eastern Europe and the possible damage to the credibility and effectiveness of European and international institutions and their members, if the war in Kosovo were allowed to continue unchecked. As it already has been explained, since the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy has been *obsessed* with dangers of European instability and it has therefore remained axiomatically multilateralist, and so depends more than others on functioning international institutions. Fears of instability in adjacent regions and worries about the corrosive effects of the Balkan wars on western institutions and its members, therefore defined both the way Germany evaluated its interests in the Kosovo crisis and its policy choices and provided an additional important explanation for German policies. The spill-over of the instability in the adjacent regions into Germany was very likely as Serbian ethnic cleansing in

Kosovo threatened to precipitate large-scale migration and a potential flow of refugees into Germany. Clearly, this was where most people from Kosovo would have wanted to go if they were unable to return. Many had relatives in Germany and many more saw Germany as their destination of choice. Already burdened with a large refugee population from Bosnia and substantial numbers of ethnic Albanians (who played a highly disproportionate role in the organised drug trade), German authorities were alarmed at the possibility of another large influx of refugees (Maull, 2000: 12).

Turkey:

The importance of 'stability' within the framework of geo-political ideology in the national interest formulation of Germany was also a decisive factor that led to a favourable position for Germany in intergovernmental negotiations within the EU towards Turkey's EU membership bid. The importance of interdependence manifested by the physical proximity of the Visegrad countries to Germany takes a different form in the case of Turkey. The big Turkish community in Germany has a strong link with their country of origin, Turkey. Because of this strong link between the Turkish community in Germany and Turkey, problems in the domestic politics of Turkey, such as the Kurdish issue and the potential of fundamental Islam, are directly transported into German domestic politics and actually reinforced and strengthened in Germany. The alienation of the Turkish community causes the exacerbation of these problems. As a consequence there remains threats to Germany's social and economic integrity and stability and inevitably this makes the stability of Turkish domestic politics and solution of the main political problems in Turkey an important issue in German domestic politics. The German government understood by the Turkish reaction to the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 (when Turkey was explicitly excluded from the enlargement process of the EU) that the best motivation to lead Turkey to carry out

the reforms necessary for its complete democratisation and stabilisation of its domestic politics was the prospect of EU membership. In addition, because membership criteria consisted of economic and political criteria which concentrated on the protection of minorities and human rights, a Turkey which wishes to become a member of the EU would inevitably reform its human rights policies which seemed to be the most significant destabilising factor in Turkish domestic politics.¹²³ The importance that the SPD/Green government placed on the concept of human rights, as could be seen from their position papers, was a reinforcing factor in this process and thus the German government was supportive towards Turkey's potential EU membership within the intergovernmental bargainings within the EU.

The Kosovo War was another factor which prompted a positive German attitude towards Turkey's EU membership bid. With the occurring need to preserve stability in the Balkans region, the German government once more realised Turkey's strategic and important location between the Balkans and the Middle East. This importance was due to both military and non-military/new security threats. It was important for preventing military threats spreading to the European continent because in this part of the world as could be seen in the Gulf Wars and Israeli-Palestine conflict, presence and usage of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons is still an issue where their usage could have negative effects for Europe as well.

On the other hand, in the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East all sorts of new security threats existed ranging from transnational crime, ethnic factionalism, environmental degradation, international terrorism, refugee inflows and migration as a result of abuse of human rights, which may easily spill-over to Europe and endanger the stability and integrity of the Western European states. Being a

¹²³ The problem of human rights in Turkey also led to a refugee flow to Germany. People of Kurdish origin who have families and friends in Germany asked for asylum, based on the fact that their rights were abused in Turkey for the fact that they are of Kurdish origin.

country whose inhabitants are predominantly Muslims who desire to incorporate western liberal values and aspire to become a member of the EU by adhering to and fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria Turkey would serve as a good example for the other Muslim countries in the region to help their processes of democratisation and stability, to help prevent a ‘clash of civilisations’¹²⁴ and form a bridge between the Muslim and the western world, secure the region for trade with the Western European states as well as assisting Europe in its ambitions to become an influential power in this region. For these reasons, Turkey’s stability was important. Just like the Visegrad countries, the best way to ensure Turkey’s stability would be to include it in the EU’s framework.

The conclusion of the ‘Stability Pact for South-East Europe’ in June 1999 as an outcome of the Kosovo War is important in showing this strategic importance of Turkey. It was the major political and institutional response to the Balkan crisis, initiated by the EU on the basis of a German proposal. Although it was mainly designed for the countries in South-East Europe, its effects were also related positively with the outcome of the Turkish application for EU membership. It had a clear and repeated commitment on the part of the EU that the countries in the region have a prospect of acceding, even if the time of accession cannot yet be determined and repeated; the fact is that the prospect of EU membership is a key incentive to reform and the only way to keep the countries in this region on the stabilisation track in the long term (Varwick, 2003: 6). It was another initiative which showed the SPD-Green government’s priority on security issues.

¹²⁴ The concept of clash of civilisations which was used by Samuel Huntington in his article in *Foreign Affairs* has meant that the fundamental source of conflict after the Cold War will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic but that the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. (*Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, 72: 3, p22(28))

*Importance of 'stability' and 'new security threats' in institutional choice of the EU
(Analysis of the 3rd stage within the framework of the LIG approach)*

Decisions for the enlargement of the EU are taken collectively by unanimity which requires the co-operation of all the member states. In this way, according to the Moravcsik approach it can be regarded as an 'institutional choice' which requires the convergence of foreign policies of the member states for a common decision.

By using the geo-political ideological framework Germany could convince its western partners of the need to remain attached to shared security by proposing a widened European security space from which no country would be permanently excluded and to which each would accede in accordance with predetermined criteria. After the events of 1989 there was no real alternative to eastward enlargement. The atrocities of the Yugoslav war has shown all the members of the EU the *inevitability* of eastern enlargement and has helped Germany, which has the largest stakes in the Visegrad countries' membership to convince its western partners in intergovernmental negotiations within the EU.

The relations with Turkey were far more problematic and far more difficult for the EU member states to accept because of all the economic and cultural disadvantages associated with its membership. However the fact that the German government was still insistent on supporting Turkey's membership shows that in contrast to Moravcsik's LIG approach which stresses the primacy of economic factors in national interest formulation and foreign policy making, geo-political concerns did indeed serve as the most important factor underlying the national interest formulation and bargaining position of Germany in the EU enlargement process. The details of this argument will be shown in the following section.

The application of the LIG approach for evaluating the hypotheses:

This research has tried to show how German national interests and foreign policy making have influenced the collective decision making of the EU and made the eastern enlargement and inclusion of Turkey in the EU into one of the most important policies in the current European integration process. The centre of attention for evaluating the outcome of the EU membership applications for both the Visegrad countries and Turkey was Germany because it has the greatest stake among all the EU member-states vis a vis the inclusion of both the Visegrad countries and Turkey in the EU. Another factor was also important in signifying the role of Germany in EU's enlargement policy. Since the fall of the iron curtain which brought about German reunification, a number of internal and external changes have altered the premises under which Germany develops its European policy. It was more than obvious that a larger and fully sovereign Germany would not only gain economic weight, but would also be braver to act in accordance with its *national interests* and become an increasingly important political player in Europe.

With its stress on the analysis of national interest formulation in the EU integration process, Moravcsik's LIG approach was useful to deconstruct German foreign policy-making and analyse in detail the interplay of factors at domestic level in Germany which lead to articulation of national interests. The instrumentalisation of the LIG approach was helpful because it led us through the thesis to stress the priorities of the national executives in bargainings at EU level when representing the foreign policies of their states and the factors influencing their decisions. It also helped to analyse in detail the arguments of political party members and their position papers which serve to transmit national interests to decision makers. Lastly, it helped to distinguish the different intensity and values of different factors in domestic politics leading to national interest formulation and foreign policy-making. [However as already](#)

stated in the introduction chapter of the thesis, concentrating too much on national interest formulation led to limited analysis of the other two stages of Moravcsik's LIG, intergovernmental bargaining and institutional choice.

Regarding the German position towards Turkey's EU membership bid there were some advantages that Turkey's EU membership were seen to be able to bring to the EU which were summarised in three hypothesis in this thesis. As far as cultural factors are concerned, with Turkish inclusion, the leaders' vision of a multi-cultural European Union would be enhanced by the membership of a secular Muslim state. When economic factors are taken into consideration, the vibrant, young dynamics of the Turkish economy would also be a great asset to the EU. But most importantly, as was explained in the section above, Turkey is still very important for Germany and the EU from a *security/geo-political* perspective.

In such a way, although Moravcsik's LIG approach may be proved to be a useful tool to understand German foreign policy by analysing statements of the executives and through an intensive analysis of national interest articulation at the domestic level, the findings of this research contradict his main argument that attaches great significance to the crucial role of *economic incentives* and cost-benefit analysis within the formulation of national interests. According to him, the most fundamental aspect of European integration is the significance of commercial/economic interests. He argues that:

“Most European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued *economic* interests that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global economy” (Moravcsik, 1998: 38).

Moravcsik does not agree with the arguments that support that ‘European integration emphasises geo-political interest or ideology’. He believes that geo-

political ideology is not insignificant, yet economic interests remain the primary factor in the European integration process as:

“Pressures from economic interest groups generally impose tighter constraints on policy than do security concerns and the ideological visions of politicians and public opinion. Only when economic interests were weak, diffuse, or indeterminate could national politicians indulge the temptation to consider geo-political goals” (Moravcsik, 1998: 6-7).

On the other hand, in the analysis of national interest articulation at the domestic level of Germany, Moravcsik’s observation of ‘domestic cleavages’ in foreign policy prove to be true for this research. Moravcsik argues that:

“When governments are making their foreign policy as a result of *economic* interests influential in national interest formulation, then the actors are sectoral interest groups and economic officials, perhaps elite opinion, ruling parties, and chief executives. On the other hand, when *geo-political* factors are the most influential in national interest formulation the principal actors in foreign policy are foreign ministry, perhaps elite opinion, ruling parties, and chief executives” (Moravcsik, 1998: 28).

This observation was true for this research, as it could be seen that especially during the SPD-Green government, the decisions in foreign policy based on geo-political factors emanated from the Foreign Ministry, the Chancellor (chief executive in Germany) and ruling parties.

Giving primacy to geo-political factors over economic ones does not mean that economic factors in national interest formulation leading to German foreign policy are unimportant. The emphasis on economic incentives in the formulation of German national interests was seen to be important especially due to the fact that, particularly as a result of unification with East Germany, in the period covered by this research Germany was dealing with economic recession, rising unemployment, a declining level of economic growth, and the economic burden brought by the inefficient East German economy which also acted as important reasons for the bringing about of the government change from a CDU/CSU-FDP to a SPD/Green led coalition. The problems were reflected in foreign policy making, and in particular in Germany’s

position regarding European integration policy, as Germany was now acting more in line with its 'national interests' and thus demanding reforms in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), cuts in its contribution to the EU budget. Furthermore, German foreign policy influenced by economic incentives would be supporting the eastern enlargement in particular, that would assist the improvement of its economy as the examples of how physical proximity to these countries led to flows of foreign direct investment and increases in the exports to these countries showed.

However the economic benefits the Visegrad countries were thought to bring to Germany in the form of foreign direct investment and an increase in exports mainly due to their advantage of physical proximity were *not* very concrete. Whereas less than 10% of German exports go to the Visegrad countries, more than 55% go to the *EU*. Hungary and Poland, the main target countries of German direct investments in the region had a share of less than only 3% of the total stock of German direct investments abroad at the beginning of 1999 (*die Zeit*, July 27, 2000, p.29). This was less than the share of Ireland alone. Between 1990-2003 Germany accumulated gross direct investment in the eight accession partners of some € 45 billion, and at its peak between 1999 and 2002 the outflow fluctuated between € 6-7 billion per year. This translates into a meagre 1.5 percent of the overall German cross capital investment, and it would be an exaggeration to conclude that the integration with the Visegrad countries has affected the German economy very much. It is fair only to admit that German direct investment created jobs in the East-even at the expense of Germany's own labour market and made the term 'outsourcing' also popular in German economy (Hishow, 2004: 8).

In addition even under a best-case scenario with faster euro zone reform, inclusion of the Visegrad countries in the EU was unlikely to have a high economic

impact on the old EU. Economic studies showed that the effect of enlargement on the EU-15 would be negligible, simply because the economies of the new members are so small: taken together, they amount to no more than five percent of the current EU (if measured at current exchange rates). In economic terms, therefore, eastward enlargement is the equivalent of adding an economy of the size of Netherlands to an economic area with 380 million people and a GDP of \$10 trillion. Although there would be some gains, most West Europeans would hardly notice this small and steady increase in their wallets. The benefits were long-term and amorphous; the economic costs of enlargement were immediate and concentrated on a geographical and sectoral basis (Barysch, 2004: 31).

All these factors make it difficult to support the eastern enlargement based on economic factors alone; economic costs are large and the economic integration with the Visegrad countries is not as significant and as favourable to Germany as imagined. However it is even *more* difficult to support Turkey's EU membership based on economic factors as Turkey is bigger and poorer as can be seen with the recent figures in the table below:

Table 1: Turkey-Macroeconomic Picture, 2002

Real GDP growth %	7.8
Unemployment (%)	10.68
Inflation (annual avg. %)	45.0
Inflation (year end %)	29.5
Budget balance (%GDP)	-14.16
Public debt (% of GDP)	88.90
Exports (% of GDP)	29.7
Current account balance (GDP)	-0.98
Foreign direct investment inflows (% GDP)	0.3

Sources: European Commission DG Enlargement website; Economist Intelligence Unit; World Bank Group

Turkey's possible membership of the EU would create a potential wave of migration and contribute negatively to the unemployment problem of Germany and would put Germany under financial strain due to its right to gain large amounts of financial support from structural funds. Moreover as can be seen in the table below, Turkey has a huge agricultural sector would give it the right to gain a great deal of financial support from the CAP:

Table 2: Agricultural employment and land use, 2002

Turkey	Total in agriculture ('000)	% of total Employment	Utilised agricultural land ('000 ha)	Share in GDP %
France	7,458	32.7	38,883	11.1
Poland	987	4.1	29,622	2.1
Romania	3,683	37.7	14,819	12.5
Ireland	121	6.9	4,372	2.0
EU 15	6,537	4.0	130,809	1.6

Source: the 2003 Agriculture Yearbook, European Commission; Eurostat

Thus it would be too difficult for the EU to embrace Turkey warmly when the potential economic costs it may bring the EU are too big to digest.

Regarding the cultural factors which may have been influential in national interest formulation and foreign policy making in Germany, the government's position towards Turkey's EU membership would also have had a negative effect as well. Influence of cultural factors was mainly a positive factor for the formulation of the attitude towards the Visegrad countries' inclusion in the EU. As well as the moral responsibility Germany felt towards these countries for the misdeeds it conducted in World War II, one of the most important defining feature of the Visegrad countries is their historic links with western Christendom, borne out by their participation in many of the defining cultural and intellectual movements of Europe (such as the Renaissance and the Reformation) and the influence of German language, culture and economics

which made it easier both for the elites and the public in Germany to accept them (Hyde-Price, 2000: 11). There were some tensions with the Czech Republic that stemmed from the problems created by Sudeten Germans after the Cold War and some tensions with Poland because of problems concerning minority and border issues, but they never constituted a serious obstacle for German support towards the Visegrad countries' potential EU membership.

On the other hand, in terms of cultural factors influencing the German position in the EU intergovernmental negotiations, there were several disadvantages related to Turkey's EU membership bid. The unsuccessful integration of the Turkish community in German society had created 'parallel societies', or the phenomenon of 'two societies living in the same country at the same time but without any interaction or commonalities'. This reality made it a significant fact that Turkey's culture, and its most significant feature being a difference in religion, would be incompatible with the culture and way of life of the citizens of EU member states. This argument was likewise reinforced by the media and assisted wider German opinion that Turks would be disrupting the cultural 'identity' of the European Union. Linked with this disadvantage is also the fact that the concept of the EU as being a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* (a community of common destiny) united by a common identity, with roots reaching back to *Christian* medieval and to ancient times, is extremely popular. Turkey has never been part of this cultural heritage, therefore it is very difficult to support Turkey's inclusion in the EU based on cultural grounds.

If economic incentives were the primary factors in the formulation of national interests in German domestic politics as Moravcsik argues or if cultural factors were important in national interest formulation in Germany, then it would be very difficult to explain the obvious growing support the German government showed in

intergovernmental negotiations within the EU towards Turkey's EU membership bid in particular. In this sense, the evaluation of the three hypotheses within the framework of the LIG approach and testing them with the help of the empirical data conducted in the research which signified *geo-political* factors in the national interest formation within German domestic politics and foreign policy throw up *contradictory* outcomes to the LIG theory.

Epilogue:

Since this research has attempted to analyse the relationship between Turkey and the EU up to the time of the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999, it is useful to take a brief look at developments from December 1999 to the present to see whether there have been changes in the German government's attitude towards Turkey and if so, in which respects.

Developments in 2000:

Not much was accomplished in the year 2000 regarding relations between Turkey and the EU. At the Association Council meeting on April 11, 2000, eight sub-committees were set up with the task of monitoring the process of analytical examination of the *acquis*. In December 2000, at the Nice European Council Summit, the Council of the EU decided on the draft framework regulation for assistance to Turkey within the framework of the pre-accession strategy. There were four main topics discussed at the Nice European Council Summit which were of particular concern to Turkey: 1. When the future plans for the enlargement of the European Union were announced, Turkey's name was not mentioned. Instead it was declared that the first ten candidates (the CEECs and Cyprus) would accede in 2004, and the remaining two (Bulgaria and Romania) in 2007. 2. Turkey was the only candidate that was not assigned votes in the Council and seats in the European Parliament in a future

enlarged Union 3. Turkey was excluded from the decision-making process for the EU Rapid Reaction Force despite its substantial offer of 5000 troops. 4. Cyprus was included in the short-term goals of the Framework Association Partnership, despite assurances that discussions between the EU and Turkey on this sensitive matter should, for the immediate future, be outside the public domain.

These developments do not mean that the German government stopped supporting Turkey's EU membership bid. In an interview he gave to the *Berliner Morgen Post* in December 2000, the Chancellor stated that:

“The fact that Turkey is not included in the concrete future plans for the EU does not mean that Turkey is *excluded* from the enlargement process of the EU. The main reason for the absence of Turkey's name in future plans were that the EU had not yet opened accession negotiations with Turkey”.

Another important incident which took place in 2000 with direct connotations on Turkey's EU membership bid and its geo-political importance was actually an outcome of the decision taken in the Helsinki European Council Summit: The EU decided to create a rapid reaction force that could (by 2003) send up to 60,000 troops abroad within 60 days and sustain them for a year. This force came into existence in November 2000. This decision was actually the consolidation of the EU declaration in the Helsinki Summit to ‘develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises’ which became known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The Helsinki declaration in 1999 can be attributed to a great degree to the conflict in Kosovo, which underscored Europe's military dependence on the US and its desire to have a force in readiness for humanitarian action, peacekeeping and peace maintenance operations (the full range of Petersburg tasks). The November 2000 decision by the EU to create the rapid reaction force constituted an important step in

addressing the problem raised by the conflict in Kosovo and showed once more the importance the EU placed on *security*. Turkey's importance in this new developing security initiative could not be set aside due to both its location and military strength. In a year subsequent to the announcement of the ESDP, Turkey's message to the EU was clear: it was prepared to take part in the ESDP and to provide 6000 troops for the rapid reaction force. However, Turkey likewise wanted to have a voice in decision-making and planning processes and be treated as a full-fledged partner on issues that affected its security in the region (Kuniholm, 2001: 21). Therefore, if it needed Turkey as a strategic partner in its newly developing security framework, the EU had to seriously consider its membership bid.

Developments in 2001:

As foreseen in the Helsinki European Council conclusions, the EU Commission adopted an *Accession Partnership for Turkey* which was approved by the Council on March 8, 2001. The framework regulation which was designed to furnish the legal basis for the Accession Partnership was also approved by the Council on February 26, 2001, with the aim of combining all EU financial assistance under a single program. With the adoption of these two documents, an important legal procedure concerning Turkey's accession strategy was finalised. After the approval of the Accession Partnership by the Council and the adoption of the Framework Regulation, the Turkish Government announced its own National Programme for the adoption of the EU *acquis* on March 19, 2001, and submitted it to the EU Commission on March 26, 2001. The National Programme has been produced with careful appreciation of the short and medium term priorities as spelled out in the Accession Partnership.

Progress towards accession continued along the path set out by the National Programme. The most pressing aim here was the opening of accession negotiations, which depended on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria. At the European Council in Göteborg in June 2001, European leaders made special mention of the political difficulties facing Turkey. As a response to this, in September 2001 Turkey took a major step towards reviewing its constitution. Thirty-four articles of the 1982 Turkish Constitution were amended, and 22 of these amendments actually coincided with the provisions of the National Programme. The package of constitutional amendments covered a wide range of issues such as improving human rights, strengthening the rule of law and restructuring democratic institutions. These represented only a part of the deep political reform processes that Turkey initiated as they were being followed by complementary legislative and administrative measures to ensure their implementation.

On the economic front, in line with the National Programme and in response to the serious economic crisis that Turkey has been experiencing, numerous reform measures have been adopted. Work on the harmonisation of Turkish legislation with the *acquis* also continued unabated.

The 2001 Progress Report for Turkey was announced on November 13, 2001. On the same day, the Commission also declared its *Strategy Paper* introducing proposals on methods to be applied in the future within the framework of the enlargement process. The steps taken in Turkey to implement improvements in the areas of economic, social and cultural rights areas, training carried out in the human rights field, and the modernisation of the prison system were found to be positive by the EU Commission. However, Turkey's weaknesses in fulfilling both the political and economic Copenhagen criteria were again emphasized.

The Laeken European Council meeting of December 14 and 15, 2001 had important implications for EU-Turkey relations. Foremost among these was the possibility of *opening* accession negotiations with Turkey, which for the first time had been explicitly mentioned at the highest levels. Recent concrete progress made by Turkey with regard to the European Security and Defence Policy, together with the recent developments in Cyprus, also have had a positive impact on Turkey's image in the eyes of the EU. Another important decision taken at Laeken was that Turkey would be taking part in the Convention on the future of Europe on an equal basis with the other candidates. This could be considered as a progressive step in the sense that the EU considers Turkey to be part of a common future.

One of the important events that happened in 2001 was the attack carried out by radical Islamists in New York and other targets in the US on September 11 which influenced Turkish-EU relations indirectly. With the September 11 attacks, 'international terrorism' started to constitute one of the most important of the 'new security threats' for the European continent. The threat posed by this new form of international terrorism had arisen to a great extent as a consequence of the fanaticism and fundamentalism that had been propagated by the Taliban and through the activities of Osama bin Laden and other reactionary regimes in the region. Against this background the constitutionally secular principles of the modern Turkish Republic with an overwhelmingly Muslim population served as an alternative model and example for stability. Thus the terrorist attacks of September 11 showed once more the sense of urgency to resolve outstanding regional disputes in the Middle East. In this region Turkey continued to be an important regional partner for the EU.

This world-changing event contributed to the wider realisation of the geostrategic value of Turkey for both the EU and for Germany. This was conspicuous

in many of the speeches of the German executives. In an interview Chancellor Schröder gave to the German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in March 2004 he clearly repeated his view that:

“Turkey’s EU membership is very important for common *strategic security interests*. In particular after the attacks of September 11th Turkey’s importance from both a strategic and security viewpoint has increased. Rejecting the entry of Turkey to the European Union would cause Europe to lose Turkey forever and will bring forward new strategic consequences of a negative nature’ (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 6, 2004).

Phillip Deichmann, an official in the German Foreign Ministry, has also stated:

“After the disaster of September 11, within the framework of formulating a dialogue between different religions and cultures; the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership has gained great importance. If Turkey becomes a member of the European Union, it will give the message to the world that a Muslim country can also be democratic. This will be an example for the other Muslim countries in the region and help improve prospects of stability in the region” (Interview with Deichmann held on August 10, 2004, Berlin).

Developments in 2002:

The year 2002 was also a crucial one for relations between Turkey and the EU. Turkish politicians had been lobbying the EU to get it to specify a specific date for the start of negotiations and were aware that they had first to accomplish certain reforms. Therefore, after intensive discussions among the coalition partners, the Turkish Parliament adopted the necessary changes in the Turkish Constitution with the aim of harmonising it with the EU *acquis* and fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. These changes included the abolition of the death penalty, strengthening the freedom of expression, changes in the laws concerning freedom of association, the right to protest, freedom to use languages other than Turkish in the Turkish media, and freedom to teach those languages in special language schools, as well as changes in the laws regulating the written media. These were passed by the Turkish Parliament on August 3, 2002.

The European Union watched these developments in Turkey with both surprise and pleasure. However, the main issues of concern that remained were that the European Union was still sceptical about the guarantee of these rights, in particular the existing application of Article 312 of the Turkish Constitution, the use of torture by the police force, and the persistent role of the Turkish military in politics.

The Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 was of particular importance for Turkey because this was where Turkey hoped to receive a date to start negotiations for membership. Following the general elections in Turkey held on November 3 when the AKP (Justice and Development Party) emerged as the victorious party, its leaders' first priority was to obtain the support of the EU member-states at the Copenhagen Summit. For this reason, they travelled to most EU member states where they tried to convince the EU leaders of Turkey's determination to become fully democratised and much better regulated economically so that it could pass to full membership of the EU. After about one month of lobbying, the EU leaders decided at the Copenhagen European Council that "it was still too early to give Turkey a date to start the negotiations. They would wait till December 2004 to see if Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and if results were positive, they would start negotiations immediately with Turkey" (Copenhagen European Council Summit Conclusions). This was not well received in Turkey as it had expected a date of December 2003 at the latest.

Developments in 2003:

2003 was a very productive year for the Turkish government in the sense of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. The AKP government passed five major political reform packages in 2003 introducing enormous changes to different areas of legislation. These were enacted in January 2003 (the fourth package), in February 2003

(the fifth), in July 2003 (the sixth), in August 2003 (the seventh), in December 2003 (the eighth) respectively.

The fourth and fifth reform packages included changes which aimed to clamp down on the practice of torture, broadening the scope of freedoms of association, demonstration and peaceful assembly, expanding the freedom to use the Kurdish language in broadcasting and election campaign periods. They removed some anti-democratic elements in the Turkish Penal Code, introduced measures to improve police conduct, gave prisoners/detainees immediate access to lawyers, lifted some restrictions on the press, and eased restrictions on the ownership rights of minority foundations. These amendments also paved the way for a retrial of imprisoned former deputies of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP).

The sixth and seventh reform packages touched on probably the most controversial issues. The sixth package abolished the Article 8 of Anti-Terrorism Law, and terminated its current proceedings, for which Turkey has been widely criticised by the EU. Most of the journalists and writers in prison had been sentenced under this provision. The package also revoked the authority of the Secretary General of the National Security Council (NSC) to appoint one member to the supervision board for cinema and music works. The sixth package also amended the related provision of the broadcasting law (named as RTUK) to guarantee the right to broadcast in languages other than Turkish. Despite the fact that the reform package of August 2002 had recognised that right, no significant action had been undertaken until then. Moreover, the package provided guarantees for parents that they would be allowed to give their children traditional Kurdish names. In the area of religious freedom, the new clauses in the package eased the rules and procedures for construction planning with regard to places of worship for other faiths than Islam. Turkey has frequently been a target for

EU criticism concerning the freedom of religion as Christian communities in Turkey have been facing some real obstacles in their attempts to establish churches of their own. These changes also eased the registration of the real estates of the foundations of religious communities by expanding the application period. Although the August 2002 reforms had abolished the ban on these foundations owning new real estate, these foundations still faced difficulties in registering their properties prior to the defined deadlines.

Only a few weeks later, the government passed a seventh package in August 2003. The package was crucial in terms of introducing changes to the structure of the NSC. Stressing the advisory status of the military-dominated NSC, new measures limited the number of times the NSC may meet, enabled appointment of a civilian head to its secretariat and allowed greater parliamentary scrutiny of military expenses. In addition, the Parliament approved a bill in December 2003, attempting to remove policies of secrecy governing the NSC's staff, by-laws and regulations, allowing decisions on these matters to be published in the government's Official Gazette.

Developments in 2004:

The May 2004 legislative package concluded most of the reform processes initiated and enhanced through previous packages dating back to October 2001. Turkey had realised a great deal in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria.

Despite a remarkable process in passing new legislation, the *implementation* deficiencies were still a major challenge for Turkey's democratisation. Recognising this fact, the EU has frequently admonished Turkish authorities about the need to pay more attention to the implementation of legislated reforms. The latest of such warnings came right after Turkish Parliament passed May 2004 reforms, in a mid-term report on May 18. While it applauded the amendments, the report criticised the fact that only

three schools teaching Kurdish are presently operating, while broadcasting in Kurdish has yet to commence. It criticised the verdict of the Ankara State Security Court on former DEP deputies. It also voiced concern that Parliament must exert full control of defence expenditures, and urged Turkish officials to effectively tackle torture and ill-treatment cases.

The Turkish government seemed determined “not to leave any excuse for the EU”. Within a few weeks of the mentioned report, the Turkish state radio and television (TRT) started broadcasting in Bosnian, Arabic, Circassian, and two common Kurdish dialects. Moreover, in its long awaited verdict, the Turkish Court of Appeal ordered the release of four former DEP deputies on June 9.

These new steps expanded on the institutional arrangements this government had made to improve human rights record and to implement reforms in the country. To cite just a few, the AKP government signed the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' Protocol, which stipulated the abolishment of the death penalty. It also created human rights committees for each province and district, as well as establishing a High Board of Human Rights. In September 2003, AKP leaders had launched the Reform Monitoring Group, comprised of Foreign, Justice and Interior Ministers. The monitoring group is designed to ensure the implementation of new laws and regulations concerning human rights and civil liberties. The Reform Monitoring Group, in addition to the newly established European Union Communications Group, regularly informs the embassies of the EU member countries of Turkey's progress in implementing key reforms.

The reform process undertaken by the last two governments is one of the most remarkable achievements in Turkish political history. The speed it has gained after the declaration of candidate status is enormous. Democratic changes of the last three years

portend a fundamental shift in the political life and institutional structures of the country. Thus, the EU membership perspective indeed proved to be a major motivation in completing Turkey's democratisation process. There are still serious deficiencies, as the EU has noted, in implementation of the reforms and big gaps in some areas between the real practice and what is written on paper. This applies specifically to the zero tolerance policy in the fight against torture and ill-treatment, and the strengthening and implementation of provisions relating to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women's rights, trade union rights and minority rights. Nevertheless, the progress Turkey has achieved in such a short period of time is very remarkable.

The most recent development in the relation between Turkey and the EU was the decision of the EU to start the negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005; as was declared in the conclusions of the European Council Summit on December 17, 2004. Despite certain reservations it created in Turkey related mainly to the sentences included in the Conclusions regarding the Cyprus issue, open-ended negotiation process and derogations in certain areas this decision symbolised Turkey's strong attachment to the goal of EU membership. The strong support of the German Chancellor Schröder was once more very conspicuous.

One should also open a parenthesis here to say that the Visegrad countries officially become members of the European Union on May 1, 2004. By their inclusion together with six other states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus Republic and Malta), the eastern enlargement process of the EU was completed.

Developments in Germany:

This research has linked the prospect of Turkish membership in the European Union with German foreign policy and Germany's attitude towards Turkey in the

European Union enlargement process. Thus it is also necessary to look at developments in Germany since the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999 in order to see what direction German foreign policy has since taken in the EU enlargement process.

It was noted several times in previous chapters that the big presence of the Turkish community in Germany has had a substantial influence on the domestic politics of Germany. As was seen with the change in the attitude of the German government as a consequence of the local elections in Hesse in February 1999 and the subsequent change in the proposed naturalisation law, Turkey remains an important issue in the domestic politics of Germany and influences the attitude of the government to a large degree.

The attitude of the main opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union, was made clear in the interviews conducted for this research in Berlin in 2000. The CDU members of Parliament mentioned in these interviews their *scepticism* and *opposition* to Turkey's membership of the European Union. This posture was hardened even further by the CDU's *Leitkultur* (prevailing culture) argument which cites as its central aim the need to increase the level of integration of Turks into German society by trying to help them accept the *priority of German culture* and which stresses the fact that Turks in Germany should attempt to embrace such an idea and integrate into wider German society, rather than living in isolation.

The issue surrounding the role of the Turkish community became more and more significant in German domestic politics as Germany entered the election period. Gerhard Schröder's conservative challenger, Edmund Stoiber, in particular, was

especially opposed to Turkey joining the Union and made this one of the significant elements in his election campaign.¹²⁵

The German government did not change its supportive attitude in spite of negative public opinion concerning Turkey's EU bid and the instrumentalisation of this issue by the opposition party though this clearly expressed support for Turkish membership could have lost it votes at the domestic level. Germany was especially influential in the time-period leading up to the Copenhagen Summit. Continuing the German-French initiative as the motor of European integration, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac met on December 5, 2002 to decide on what to do about the Turkish case at the upcoming Copenhagen Summit. They came to the decision 'to look at the developments in the Turkish political scene at the end of 2004 and, if they agree that there have been positive developments, then give a date for starting negotiations possibly on July 1, 2005'. It was known that the German Chancellor was more optimistic and, in an interview with the *Berliner Morgen Post*, a German daily, he stated:

"Turkey's place is in the European Union. We only have to get France's approval" (*Berliner Morgenpost*, December 4, 2002)¹²⁶.

The decision was finally taken at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 and the German-French initiative was accepted with minor changes.

¹²⁵ In a speech he gave in London in May 2002, the opposition of Stoiber towards Turkey's EU membership bid is very clear: "I believe that there must be geographical borders for the EU. We are of the opinion that Turkey is an important partner in NATO and should have particularly friendly relations with Germany. But that does not mean it can be a member of the EU". He criticised the Helsinki decision in December 1999 granting Turkey candidate status and added that "Europe cannot end on the Turkish-Iraqi border. If Turkey joined the EU, there will be calls for Morocco and Tunisia as well and whoever desires that endangers the cohesion of the European Union" (German Embassy in London, May 2002).

¹²⁶ It was also an important factor that it had been the influence of the Turkish votes that had greatly helped Schröder to win the general elections in September 2002, a fact that encouraged him to persuade the French prime minister. All these developments show how the Turkish case has become integrated into German domestic politics and how it has an important role in the formulation of German national interests.

Chancellor Schröder has continued to issue more statements hinting at the supportive attitude of the German government as regards Turkey's EU membership. In November 2003 in an interview in the German daily *die Zeit* he stated:

“Turkey's EU membership would provide a bridge to the Islamic world and greatly improve European *security*”.

Following this, on his visit to Ankara in February 2004 Schröder openly named the reasons in his speeches why Germany supports Turkey's wish to become a member of the European Union:

“Forty years ago the European Union concluded an association agreement with Turkey. The role Turkey played back then as a guarantor of stability and development in the region was regarded as a highly significant factor. The promise of full membership at some time in the future represented recognition to the importance of this role. In the globalised world of today, Turkey's stabilising role in the region has grown even more important. In particular after September 11 2001, Turkey as a Muslim country combining traditional Islamic characteristics with a western model of democracy has undertaken a very important mission in building bridges between the EU and the Islam world. Turkey's EU membership and the resulting growth in security that this will bring for Europe is something that should not be underestimated. Therefore if asked for opinion in the Council, the German government will give a positive opinion and recommendation” (*Hürriyet*, February 12, 2004).

The German Commissioner responsible for enlargement, Gunther Verheugen supported Schröder's comments and noted:

“Behind Schröder's attitude towards Turkey's EU membership lies *strategic* opinions shared by the other leaders of EU member states as well. For the future of Europe to be one based on political and economic security, it is very important to have a partner like Turkey” (Verheugen, *die Zeit*, March 20, 2004).¹²⁷

In this regard, Schröder has continued to be at loggerheads with the Christian Democrats on the issue of Turkey's EU membership. In November 2003, he strongly criticised a CDU politician who had suggested that bomb attacks in Istanbul the same month hurt Turkey's EU membership chances because the EU did not want to risk

¹²⁷ Currently, the US factor continues to affect the German attitude towards Turkey's EU membership in a positive manner. Schröder was re-elected in September 2002 after a controversial campaign that focused on opposition to US policy towards Iraq and left President Bush reportedly seething with indignation. Therefore the way to improve relations with the US, which is the foremost supporter of Turkey's EU candidacy, would be through the adoption of a positive stance as regards Turkey's EU membership bid based on strategic interests in particular (*the Guardian*, December 5, 2002).

importing militant Islam. Schröder insisted that the opposite would be true if Turkey, a secular Muslim democracy and also a NATO ally, were excluded from the EU (*Hürriyet*, November 28, 2004).

The German Foreign Minister's statements also contain expressions along the same positive lines. In a speech organised by the Bertelsmann Foundation in January 2004 the Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stated:

"If we don't keep our promise to Turkey regarding its EU membership on the ground that it has a traditional Islamic character we will consequently have to bear the negative consequences. There is no alternative to EU enlargement; therefore the Council should make its decision in light of the reforms accomplished by Turkey. The German government will continue its support for Turkey's EU bid, not because of political tactics but because of common strategic interests. If modern Turkey with Muslim population and culture develops democratically and economically and a democratic Turkey is incorporated into the European Union, for me this will be the greatest achievement in the struggle against international terrorism in the 21st century" (speech delivered for the Bertelsmann Foundation on January 8, 2004).¹²⁸

The statements of some members of the German parliament show that they share the same opinion as the executives. Lale Akgün, a MP from the SPD, has stated:

"The exclusion of Turkey from the European Union will directly affect the Turkish community in Germany in a negative fashion and so it follows, the stability and welfare of German domestic politics" (*der Spiegel*, February 23, 2004).

Despite the fact that the majority of the members of the CDU are opposed to Turkey's EU membership bid, Volker Rühe, the CDU chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee has openly supported the start of membership negotiations with Turkey. According to Rühe, Turkey's rejection would bring the country's reform process to an end with negative consequences for German domestic politics. He also does not give credence to the perceived threats of waves of immigrants coming to Germany unlike fellow members of his party. "When future EU

¹²⁸ Gunther Verheugen, the German Commissioner responsible from enlargement also gave a speech on the same day. He clearly stated that "Germany should help Turkey to meet the political, social and human rights preconditions for EU membership because Turkey's EU membership is necessary for Europe and Germany's *security*. For that matter, nobody should oppose Turkey's membership on the grounds of differences of culture, religious reasons, population and size of the country" (Speech delivered for the Bertelsmann's Foundation on January 8, 2004).

membership is given to Anatolia, the Anatolians will no longer go to Germany” he said (*der Spiegel*, February 3, 2004).

Thus it can be concluded by looking at the statements of the German executives mentioned above, from the end of 1999 till present the German government continues to support Turkey’s EU membership bid for the same reasons mentioned in this thesis.

Outlook for the future:

For several reasons the decision of the EU leaders will not be an easy one. Although Turkey has embarked on several improvements in law as required by the Copenhagen membership criteria, the EU is still sceptical about their implementation in every-day life and whether the Turks can make their country totally democratic and end the practice of torture in particular. In addition to these political factors, the serious economic problems Turkey has been experiencing and the recent problems of illegal migration into the EU from Syria, Iraq and Iran through Turkey serve as additional obstacles to be overcome.

The prospect of EU membership has indeed been a motivating factor for Turkey as seen in the period after 1999 in its attempts to reform deficiencies in its democracy and to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. This process has brought it closer to the start of the negotiations as was declared in the European Council Summit in December 2004. It has been widely understood that Turkey needs the European Union to fulfil its ultimate foreign policy goal of westernisation. On the other hand, Europe needs Turkey as well, from both an economic but principally from a strategic point of view. It is difficult to say at this point what direction the relationship between Turkey and the European Union will take. As this research has tried to show, a lot depends on the changing perceptions and interests of states. Therefore it may be better to leave things to take their course and see whether the Turkish reforms carried out will be

deemed adequate for admission into the European Union, and whether the support of the German government which is derived from a foreign policy based on the significance of geo-political factors in the formulation of national interests will serve to help Turkey achieve its final aim: entry into the EU.

Taking the point from here, with the eastern enlargement completed, there may be potential for further research on how Germany's foreign policy will serve to influence the Turkish bid for future EU membership in the coming years. This will directly show whether geo-political factors will continue to influence the foreign policy-making of Germany as well as whether Germany will be able to keep its promises to support Turkey's EU membership bid. Another issue that will remain to be a potential research question is whether Germany will retain an increasing and leading role in the world affairs, a process which started with the strong German initiative in the Kosovo War of 1999.

Appendix 1

Table 1: Unemployment Rates/EU

	1999	2000	2001
Austria	4.0	3.7	3.6
Belgium	8.6	6.9	6.6
Denmark	4.8	4.4	4.3
Finland	10.2	9.7	9.1
France	10.7	9.3	8.6
Germany	8.6	7.9	7.9
Ireland	5.6	4.2	3.8
Italy	11.2	10.5	9.4
Luxembourg	2.4	2.3	2.0
Netherlands	3.2	2.8	2.4
Portugal	4.5	4.1	4.1
Spain	12.8	11.3	10.7
Sweden	7.2	5.9	5.1
United Kingdom	5.8	5.3	5.0

Source: OECD, www.oecd.org

Table 2: GDP, Volume

Percentage changes from previous period as the average of the four quarters of a year

		2001
Austria	0.6	0
Belgium	0.7	-0.2
Denmark	0.6	0.1
Finland	1.3	-0.3
France	1.0	0.1
Germany	0.6	-0.03
Italy	0.7	0.2
Netherlands	0.7	0.1
Spain	0.9	0.06
Sweden	0.7	0.2
United Kingdom	0.6	0.4

Source: OECD, www.oecd.org

Appendix 2:

Table 1: Turkey-EU Financial Co-operation (euro/ECU million)

	Date	Period	Credits from the Budget	EIB	Donation	Total	Actual
1 st Financial Protocol	1963	1963-1969	175			175	175
2 nd Financial Protocol	1970	1971-1977	195	25		220	220
Supplementary Protocol	1973	1971-1977	47			47	47
3 rd Financial Protocol	1977	1979-1982	220	90		310	310
4 th Financial Protocol	1981	1982-1986	325	225	50	600	0
Special Co-operation Fund	1980	1980-1982			75	75	75
Total			962	340	125	1427	827

Source: www.mfa.gov.tr

Table 2: Turkey-EU Financial Co-operation within the Context of the Customs Union (euro/ECU million)

Budgetary Sources	1995	1996-2000			375	375	0
EIB	1995	1996-2000		750		759	0
Macro economic aid	1995				300	300	0
MEDA	1996	1995-1999			375	375	103
EIB	1997	1997-1999		300		300	95
Renewed MEDA	1992	1992-1996		340		340	340
Special Financial Co-operation		1996			2.9	2.9	2.3
Total				1390	1053	2443	540
Overall Sum			962	1730	1178	3870	1367

Source: www.mfa.gov.tr

Table 3: Indicative annual allocations per country for Phare, Ispa and Sapard from 2000: comparison with pre-accession flows 1995-99 (in euro million)

	PHARE	SPARD	ISPA	Total	Average allocation from Phare 1995-99
Bulgaria	100	52.1	Min: 83.2 Max: 124.8	Min: 235.3 Max: 276.9	83.0
Czech Republic	79	22.1	Min: 57.2 Max: 83.2	Min: 158.3 Max: 184.3	69.0
Estonia	24	12.1	Min: 20.8 Max: 36.4	Min: 56.9 Max: 72.5	24.0
Hungary	96	38.1	Min: 72.8 Max: 104	Min: 206.9 Max: 238.1	96.0
Latvia	30	21.8	Min: 36.4 Min: 57.2	Min: 88.2 Max: 109	30.0
Lithuania	42	29.8	Min: 41.6 Max: 62.4	Min: 113.4 Max: 134.2	42.0
Poland	398	168.7	Min: 312 Max: 384.8	Min: 878.7 Max: 951.5	203.0
Romania	242	150.6	Min: 208 Max: 270.4	Min: 600.6 Max: 663	110.0
Slovakia	49	18.3	Min: 36.4 Max: 57.2	Min: 103.7 Max: 124.5	48.0
Slovenia	25	6.3	Min: 10.4 Max: 20.8	Min: 41.7 Max: 52.1	25.0
Total	1085	520	1040	2645	730.0

Source: www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/paa.htm, 2000

Appendix 3:

External Trade of Germany

For the year 2001

Nr.	Imports	Mil.DM	Exports	Mil.DM
1	France	101,728.7	France	133,315.2
2	Netherlands	93,723.3	United States	119,752.3
3	United States	90,937.5	United Kingdom	97,075.4
4	United Kingdom	74,184.1	Italy	88,404.1
5	Italy	70,879.3	Netherlands	75,237.7
6	Japan	52,029.0	Austria	62,043.3
7	Belgium	51,113.0	Belgium	59,118.1
8	Austria	50,923.0	Spain	52,956.2
9	Switzerland	40,596.3	Switzerland	50,082.0
10	China	36,705.0	Poland	28,367.4
11	Spain	32,129.9	Sweden	26,585.7
12	Russia	28,462.6	Japan	25,805.5
13	Czech Republic	25,167.7	Czech Republic	25,028.3
14	Poland	23,303.2	Hungary	20,148.5
15	Ireland	21,610.6	China	18,390.2
16	Hungary	20,704.1	Denmark	18,137.7
17	Norway	20,656.4	Turkey	16,315.5
18	Sweden	20,151.5	Finland	13,541.0
19	Denmark	16,882.4	Russia	13,023.6
20	Taiwan	14,097.7	Portugal	12,378.1
21	Turkey	12,065.2	Brazil	9,838.9

Source: www.statistisches-amt.de, 2001

Appendix 4:

Weighting system for voting in the Council:

For the year 2000

Current members	Population(millions)	Weight of vote
Belgium	10.1	5
Denmark	5.2	3
Germany	81.5	10
Greece	10.4	5
Spain	39.2	8
France	58.0	10
Ireland	3.6	3
Italy	57.3	10
Luxembourg	0.4	2
Netherlands	15.4	5
Austria	8.0	4
Portugal	9.9	5
Finland	5.1	3
Sweden	8.8	4
UK	58.5	10
Prospective members		
Poland	38.3	8
Czech Republic	10.3	5
Slovakia	5.3	3
Hungary	10.3	5
Slovenia	2.0	3
Bulgaria	9.0	4
Romania	22.8	7
Lithuania	3.7	3
Latvia	2.6	2
Estonia	1.5	2
Malta	0.3	2
Cyprus	0.7	2
Turkey	55.6	10

Source: Redmond, John and Rosenthal, Glenda, 1998: 57

Appendix 5:

List of the interviewees:

Executives:

Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

J. Clemens Betzel: (Referat E22) Member of the Committee of External Affairs of the European Union. Specialist on Turkey, interviewed on May 24, 2000.

Dr. Johannes Bauer: (Arbeitsstab E) Referat Member of the Committee on EU Enlargement, interviewed on May 25, 2000.

Dr. Ernst Reichel: (Referat E10) Senior official in the European Department. Responsible for topics related to the principles and institutions of the European Union, interviewed on June 13, 2000.

Michael Reuss: (Referat E10) Official in the European Department, interviewed on May 25, 2000.

Matthias Sonn: Specialist on Turkey. Member of the Committee on Bilateral Relations between Germany-Turkey, interviewed on May 31, 2000.

Gerhard Schlaudraff: (Arbeitsstab E) Member of the Committee on EU Enlargement, interviewed on May 25, 2000.

Martin Kremer: interviewed on September 22, 2000.

Michael Klepsch (Referat E10-9), interviewed on September 26, 2000.

Gerald Wolf (Referat E22), Member of the Committee on EU External Relations, interviewed on September 26, 2000.

Klaus Lamsdorff, interviewed on September 27, 2000.

Bernhard Zobel (Referat E23), interviewed on September 27, 2000.

Detlef Küster (Referat E22), Member of the Committee of EU External Relations, interviewed on September 27, 2000.

Dr. Peter Kolb (Referat E20), interviewed on September 27, 2000.

Peter Ptassek (Arbeitsstab E), interviewed on September 28, 2000.

Heidi Storch (Arbeitsstab E), interviewed on September 28, 2000.

Rainer Eberle (Referat E12), interviewed on September 28, 2000.

Manfred Emmes (Referat E22), Member of the Committee of EU External Relations, interviewed on September 29, 2000.

Hans-Peter Schneider (Referat E23), interviewed on September 29, 2000.

Gudrun Sraga (Referat E23), interviewed on September 29, 2000.

Franz Josef Kremp (Referat E23), interviewed on September 28, 2000.

Chancellor's Office:

C. Nunn, interviewed on September 29, 2000.

State secretaries:

Gerd Andres: SPD, Parliamentary State Secretary for Ministry of Employment and Social Order. Has been to Turkey several times, interviewed on May 23, 2000.

Anke Fuchs: SPD, Former Minister of State, Vice-president of the Parliament. Has been to Turkey several times, interviewed on May 15, 2000.

Other officials:

Selver Weizenach (assistant to Barbara Young, the person responsible for foreigners), interviewed on September 27, 2000.

Emine Demirbüken: Official responsible from foreigners for the Tempelhof-Schöneberg region in Berlin, Germany, interviewed on September 29, 2000.

Dr. Philipp Deichmann: Foreign Policy Advisor at the German Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, interviewed on May 29, 2000.

Retired Officials:

Hans Joachim Vergau: Former German Ambassador to Turkey between 1995 and 2000, interviewed on June 14, 2000.

Members of the Parliament:

SPD

Wolfgang Behrendt: Representative of Germany in parliamentary gatherings of the European Council and the West European Union, interviewed on June 16, 2000.

Hans Werner Bertl: Member of the Committee for Affairs of the European Union. Specialist on Turkey, interviewed on May 11, 2000.

Petra Ernstberger: Member of the Committee on External Affairs., interviewed on May 17, 2000.

Monika Ganseforth: Member of the German-Turkish Parliamentary Group, interviewed on February 24, 2000.

Angelika Graf: Member of the Committee for Human Rights. Has been to Turkey several times for the cases of human rights problems, interviewed on June 5, 2000.

Dr. Uwe Jens: Spokesman for the Economics Policy of the SPD Faction. Has been to Turkey several times, interviewed on June 7, 2000.

Hans-Ulrich Klose: Chairman of the Committee of External Affairs. Has been to Turkey several times. Member of Chancellor's working group, interviewed on March 22, 2000.

Helga Kuhn-Mengel: Member of the Committee for Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 18, 2000.

Winfried Mante: Member of the Committee for Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 18, 2000.

Dietmar Nietan: Member of the Committee for Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on June 8, 2000.

Leyla Onur: MP of a Turkish origin. Member of the Committee on External Affairs. Has been to Turkey several times, interviewed on April 5, 2000.

Johannes Andreas Pflug: Member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on March 23, 2000.

Margot von Renesse: Has been to Turkey several times, interviewed on June 8, 2000.

Michael Roth: Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 17, 2000.

Gudrun Roos: Member of the Committee on European Affairs, interviewed on May 17, 2000.

Dieter Schlöten: Representative of Germany in Parliamentary Gatherings of the European Council and the West European Union. Member of the Committee on External Affairs and Deputy Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 12, 2000.

Ottmar Schreiner: Between 1991 and 1997 was spokesman of the SPD on the Committee on Employment and Social Order. Between 1997 and 1998 was deputy leader of the SPD Fraction. Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 10, 2000.

Volkmar Schultz: Member of the Committee of External Affairs, interviewed on April 11, 2000.

Gert Weisskirchen: In 1997 was the Social Democrat Member of the Parliamentary Gatherings of the OSCE and since 1998 has been the leader of the Committee on Human Rights and Democracy in the Parliamentary Gatherings of the OSCE. Since 1999 he has been the Foreign Policy Speaker of the SPD in the Parliament. Member of the Committee on External Affairs and deputy member of the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on April, 7 2000.

CDU

Hans-Dirk Bierling: Member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on May 16, 2000.

Dr. Ralf Brauksiepe: Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 11, 2000.

Erich G. Fritz: Deputy member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on April 6, 2000.

Horst Gunther: *Former Parliamentary State Secretary.* Between January 24, 1991 until October 26, 1998 was Parliamentary State Secretary for the Ministry of Employment and Social Order. Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 10, 2000.

Thomas Kossendey: *Former Government Director.* Deputy leader of the Turkish-German Parliamentary Group and deputy leader of the Defense Committee, interviewed on March 21, 2000.

Dr. Martina Krogmann: Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 11, 2000.

Erich Maas: Deputy Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on March 21, 2000.

Dr. Andreas Shockenhoff: Member of the Committee on External Affairs and Deputy Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 10, 2000.

Reinhard Freiherr von Schorlemer: Member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on March 23, 2000.

Michael Stubgen: Spokesman of CDU/CSU in the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 12, 2000.

Arnold Vaatz: Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 8, 2000.

Willy Swimmer: *Former State Secretary.* Between April 1985 and December 1988 he was the leader of the Working Group on Defense Policy of the CDU/CSU. Between December 19, 1998 and April 1, 1992 he was the Parliamentary State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. Since 1994 he has been the Vice President of the Parliamentary Gatherings of the OSCE. Member of the Committee on External Affairs. Has been to Turkey several times, interviewed on May 8, 2000.

CSU

Dr. Gerd Muller: Has also been member of the European Parliament between 1989 and 1994. Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 12, 2000.

Carl-Dieter Spranger: *Former Minister of State.* Between October 4, 1982 and January 18, 1991, he was the Parliamentary State Secretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, between January 18, 1991 and October 26, 1998 he was the Minister of State for economic co-operation and development. Member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on May 17, 2000.

Greens:

Rita Griesshaber: 4. Member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on March 20, 2000.

Ulrike Hoefken: Member of the Committee of Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 18, 2000.

Dr. Helmut Lippelt. Between 1988 and 1989 was one of the three spokesmen of the Greens faction. Member of the Committee on External Affairs and Deputy Member of the Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on May 19, 2000.

Cem Ozdemir: MP of a Turkish origin. Since 1998 has been the domestic policy spokesman of the Greens Faction. Leader of the Turkish-German Parliamentary Group. Deputy member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on April 10, 2000.

Christian Sterzing: Member of the Committee on External Affairs and Committee on Affairs of the European Union, interviewed on March 13, 2000.

FDP:

Ulrike Flach: Member of the Turkish-German Parliamentary Group, interviewed on May 8, 2000.

Walter Hirche: *Former Minister of State.* Between 1994 and 1998 was parliamentary state secretary in the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection. Currently a member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on May 17, 2000.

PDS:

Wolfgang Gehrcke: Deputy Leader of the PDS Faction of the Parliament. Foreign Policy Speaker of the PDS Faction in the Parliament. Member of the Committee on External Affairs, interviewed on April 10, 2000.

Heidi Lippman. Deputy Member of the Committee on External Affairs. Is member of Prison Watch International and Prisoners' Care International, has been to Turkey several times to investigate human rights problems, interviewed on March 16, 2000.

Retired Members of Parliament:

Dr. Burkhard Hirsch: Former Vice-president of Parliament. Has been to Turkey several times, interviewed on May 17, 2000.

Members of the European Parliament:

Ozan Ceyhun: MEP of a Turkish origin. Greens. Member of the Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee (Personally interviewed, March 4, 2000.

Ingo Friedrich: Christian Democrats. Vice-president of the European Parliament. Vice-chairman of Committee on Foreign Affairs (Replied to my questions by fax)

Dr. Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann: PDS (Personally interviewed), May 8, 2000.

Christoph Werner Konrad: Christian Democrats. Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. (Replied to my questions by fax)

Hans-Gert Poettering: Christian Democrats. Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (Replied to my questions by fax)

Feleknas Uca: FDP (Replied to my questions by fax)

Michael Gahler: CDU (Replied to my questions by fax)

Civil Servants:

Harald Berwanger: Foreign Policy Advisor to the SPD Group in the Parliament, interviewed on March 30, 2000.

Dr. Ole Diehl: Personal Assistant of Klaus Kinkel, FDP, the former Foreign Minister of Germany, interviewed on May 17, 2000.

Hans-Joachim Falenski: Head of the Office of Volker Ruhe, former Defence Minister of the Federal Government, specialist in the foreign policy and security issues, interviewed on March 6, 2000.

Dr. Gerhard Fisch: Advisor to the Economic Policy Group of SPD in Parliament, interviewed on March 12, 2000.

Antonious Halbe: Member of the Economics Committee of CDU/CSU Faction. Has been foreign policy advisor to Rudolf Seiters, interviewed on April 18, 2000.

Helmut Hugler: Foreign Policy Advisor to Angelika Beer, member of Parliament from the Green Party. Angelika Beer has been Defense Policy Spokeswoman for Green Party since 1994, interviewed on April 26, 2000.

Max J. Maldacker: Foreign Policy Advisor to the CSU Group in the Parliament, interviewed on March 28, 2000.

Uta Thietge: Foreign Policy Advisor to the SPD Group in Parliament, interviewed on April 3, 2000.

Martin Weiss: Foreign Policy Advisor to the SPD Group in the Parliament. Has been to Turkey several times and was in the group that went to Turkey after the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, interviewed on May 22, 2000.

In addition, the speeches listed below were read and analysed:

Dr. Johannes Rau, President of the German Federal Republic, April 6, 2000, Ankara Middle East Technical University.

Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic, All speeches reported in the newspapers between September-December 1999.

Joshka Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 21-22, 1999.

Dr. Christoph Zöpel, Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for enlargement of the EU.

Wolfgang Schulhoff (CDU MP), January 2000.

Christoph Moosbauer (SPD MP), March 1999.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Aggestam, Lisbeth (1997), 'The European Union at the Crossroads' in Alice Landau and Richard Whitman (eds.) *Rethinking the European Union, Institutions, Interests and Identities*, St. Martin's Press, New York

Alkan, Nail (1995), *Turkish Workers in Germany*, speech made in Middle East Technical University, Ankara

Anderson, Jeffrey and Goodman John B. (1993), 'Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe', in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Stanley Hoffman (eds.), *After the Cold War*, Harvard University Press, Harvard College

Anderson, Jeffrey (1995), 'The State of the European Union: From the Single Market to Maastricht, from Singular Events to General Theories', *World Politics*, No. 47, April 1995, 441-465

Anderson, Jeffrey (1999), *German Unification and the Union of Europe*, Cambridge University Press

Aniol, Wlodek, Brzica, et al. Danes, Byrnes, Timothy A., Gedeon, Peter, Jerabek, Hynek, Katzenstein, Peter, Polackova, Zuzana, Samson, Ivo, Zich, Frantisek (2000), 'Returning to Europe: Central Europe between Internationalisation and Institutionalisation' in Peter Katzenstein *Tamed Power in Europe*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, Berlin

Ash, Timothy Garton (1994), 'Germany's Choice' in Michael Mertes, Stephen Muller, Heinrich August Winkler *In Search of Germany*, Transaction Publishers, London

Ash, Timothy Garton (1995), 'Europa Denken-Thinking of Europe', *Internationale Politik*, volume 9

Ates, Seref (2002) *Integration und Medien*, Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, Bonn-Bad Godesberg

Avery, Graham and Cameron, Fraser (1998), *The Enlargement of the European Union*, Sheffield Academic Press

Bagci, Huseyin (1997), 'Alman Dis Politikasi ve Turk Alman Iliskileri', in Atilla Eralp (ed), *Turkiye ve Avrupa*, Imge Publishing, Ankara

Bagci, Huseyin (1999), 'Turkish-German Relations after the 1997 Luxembourg Decision of the EU', in Huseyin Bagci, Jackson Jones and Ludger Kuhnhard (eds.), *Parameters of Partnership: The US-Turkey-Europe*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft

Balkir, Canan and Williams, Alan (1993), *Turkey and Europe*, Pinter Publishing, London

Barber, Lionel, *Financial Times*, December 8, 1997

- Barchard, David (1998), *Turkey and the European Union*, Centre for European Reform, London
- Barchard, David (1999), *Turkey and the European Union*, Paper given in the conference in Leicester University on March 22, 1999
- Baring, Arnulf (1994), *Germany's New Position in Europe*, Berg Publishers, Oxford
- Barysch, Katinka (2004), 'EU enlargement: How to reap the benefits', *Economic Trends*, February 2004
- Beck, U. (1999) 'Über den Postnationalen Krieg', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, No.8, August
- Berend, Ivan (1994) 'German Economic Penetration in East Central Europe', in Stephen E. Hanson and Willfried Spohn, *Can Europe Work: Germany and the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London
- Bhabha, J. (1998), 'Get Back to Where You Once Belonged: Identity, Citizenship and Exclusion in Europe', *Human Rights Quarterly*, No. 20, 1998
- Biedonkopf, K. (1994), 'Facing the challenge of upheaval in Europe', *NATO Review*, 42:3, June 15-17
- Bulmer, S. (1983), 'Domestic Politics and EC Policy Making', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 21:4, 349-363
- Bulmer, S. (1994), 'The Governance of the European Union: A New Institutional Approach', *Journal of Public Policy*, 13: 4
- Bulmer, Simon, Paterson, William, Jeffery, Charlie (2000), *Germany's European Diplomacy*, Manchester University Press
- Bulmer, S. and Paterson W.E. (1996) 'Germany in the European Union: gentle giant or emergent leader?', *International Affairs*, 72:1, 9-32
- Burgess, Adam (1997), *Divided Europe*, Pluto Press, London
- Buzan, B., Waeber, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London
- Calleo, David (1978), *The German Problem Reconsidered*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Cayhan, Esra (1997), *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakışı-Relations between Turkey and the EU from the perspective of political parties*, Boyut Publishing, Istanbul

Christiansen, Thomas (1997) 'Reconstructing European Space: From Territorial Politics to Multilevel Governance' in Knud Erik Jorgensen (ed.) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London

Clemens, Clay and Paterson, W. (1998), *The Kohl Chancellorship*, Cass Publishers, London

Clinton, D. (1991) 'The National Interest: The Normative Foundations' in R. Little and M. Smith (eds.), *Perspectives on World Politics*, Routledge, London

Conradt, David, Kleinfeld, Gerald and Soe, Christian (2000), *Power Shift in Germany: the 1998 election and the end of the Kohl era*, Berghahn Books, New York

Conradt, David (2001), *The German Polity*, Longman Publishing, New York

Coparaso, James A. and Keeler, John T.S. (1995), 'The European Union and Regional Integration Theory' in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey (eds.) *State of the European Union Polity*, Lynne and Rienner Publishers, USA

Cottey, A. (1995), *East-Central Europe after the Cold War*, St. Martin's Press, New York

Croft, Stuart, Redmond, John and Rees, G. Wyn (1999), *The Enlargement of Europe*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, New York

Dalton, Russel J. (1989), *Politics in West Germany*, Scott and Fore Company

Dauderstaedt, Michael and Lippert, Barbara (1996), *No Integration without Differentiation*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Working Papers

Dauderstaedt, Michael and Lippert, Barbara (1999), *The German Presidency and Beyond, Twin Track Strategy for Deepening and Widening the EU*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Working Papers, London Office

Davis, Patricia and Dombroski, Peter (1997), 'Appetite of the Wolf: German Foreign Assistance for Central and Eastern Europe', *German Politics*, 6:1, 1-22

Davutoglu, Ahmet (1999), *Milliyet*, June 10-11, 1999

Denison, A. (2001), 'German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations since Unification', in Douglas Webber (ed.), *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*, Frank Cass, London, Portland

Deutsch, K. (1964), 'Communication Theory and Political Integration' in Jacob, P. and Toscano J. (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities*, J.P. Lippincott, Philadelphia

Donat, Yavuz, *Milliyet*, December 15, 1997

Duff A., Pinder J., Pryce R. (eds.) (1994) *Maastricht and Beyond: Building the New European Union*, Routledge, London

Dyson Kenneth (1996), 'The Economic Order-Still Modell Deutschland?' in Gordon Smith, William Paterson and Stephen Padgett (eds), *Developments in German Politics 2*, Macmillan Press, London

Dyson, Kenneth (2003), *The Shrinking Core and Declining 'Soft Power': Germany, Europe and the Future of Euro Economic Governance*, Renner Institute Working Papers, Vienna

Edinger, L.J. and Nacos, B.L. (1998), *From Bonn to Berlin*, Columbia University Press

El-Saghir, Khalil (1998), *Caspian Sea Region: The Checkerboard of Oil and Minefields*, draft working paper prepared for the conference in University of Michigan, August

Eralp, Atila (1997), 'Soguk Savas'tan Gunumuze Turkiye-Avrupa Birliği Iliskileri', in Atila Eralp (ed.), *Turkiye ve Avrupa Birliği*, Imge Yayinevi

Eralp, Atila (2000), 'Turkey in the Enlargement Process: From Luxembourg to Helsinki', *Journal of International Affairs*, 5:2, June-August

Evans, G. and Whitefield, S. (1998) 'The Structuring of Political Cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia', *Political Studies*, No. 66, 115-139

Flockton, C. (1996), 'Economic Management and the Challenge of Reunification', in Gordon Smith, William Paterson and Stephen Padgett (eds.), *Developments in German Politics 2*, Macmillan Press, London

Friis, Lykke (1999), 'The End of the Beginning' of Eastern Enlargement-Luxembourg Summit and Agenda Setting', *European Integration Online Papers (EioP)* 2:7

Foucher, Michael 'The Strategies of Enlargement' in Alice Landau and Richard Whitman (eds.) *Rethinking the European Union : institutions, interests, and identities*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke

Freudenstein, R. (1998) 'Poland, Germany and the EU', *International Affairs*, 74:1, 41-54

Freudenstein, R. and Tewes, H. (2001), *Die EU-Osterweiterung und der Deutsche Arbeitsmarkt*, Working Paper, Konrad Adenauer Foundation

Garton Ash (1994), *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, Vintage Publishing, London

Garton Ash, T. (1996), 'Germany's Choice', in M. Mertes, S. Mueller and H. Winkler (eds.) *In Search of Germany*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey

Garrett, G. and Weingast, B. (1993), 'Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market' in Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. (eds) *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, Cornell University Press, London

Garrett, Geoffrey (1994), 'The Politics of Maastricht' in Eichengreen and Frieden (eds.), *The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification*, Westview Press, Boulder

Glees, A. (1999), 'Building a New Europe: Britain, Germany and the Problem of Russia', *German Politics*, 8:1, 150-180

Griffith. W.E. (1981), *Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Ernst Klett, Stuttgart

Gower, Jackie and Redmond, John (2000), *Enlarging the European Union: the way forward*, Ashgate Publishing, London

Grabbe, Heather (2000), *Profiting from EU Enlargement*, Centre for European Reform, London

Grant, Charles (1998), *Can Britain Lead in Europe*, Centre for European Reform, London

Grieco, Joseph (1988), 'Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: A realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', *International Organization*, 42:3

Griffiths, Richard T. (1997) 'Reconstructing European Space: From Territorial Politics to Multilevel Governance' in Knud Erik Jorgensen (ed.) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London

Gordon, P. (1994), 'Berlin's difficulties: The Normalisation of German Foreign Policy', *Orbis*, 38:2

Gürbey, Gulistan (1994) 'Alman Diplomasinin 1949-1963 Dönemi Türk-Alman Siyasi ilişkilerini Değerlendirmesi', *Dış Politika*, 5:3

Haas, E. (1958), *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford University Press, Stanford

Hacke, C. (1997b), *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht wider Willen*, Ullstein Verlag, Berlin

Hacke, Christian (1998), 'The National Interests of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Threshold of the 21st Century', *Aussenpolitik*, 2:98

Haftendorn, Helga (1996), 'Gulliver in the Centre of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action' in Bertel Heurlin (ed.) *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, Macmillan Press, London

Haftendorn, Helga (1997), 'Gulliver in der Mitte Europas-Gulliver in Central Europe', *Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik Band 1: Grundlagen*, Oldenburg Publishing, Munich

Hall, R. and Fox, C. (2001), 'Rethinking Security', *NATO Review*, 49:8

Handl, Vladimir (1997), 'Czech-German Declaration on Reconciliation', *German Politics*, 6:2, 150-167

Handl, Vladimir, Longhurst, Kerry and Zaborowski, Martin (2000), *Germany's Security Policy Towards East Central Europe*, ESCR-IGS Discussion Paper 12

Hanson, Stephen and Spohn, Willfried (1994), *Can Europe Work: Germany and the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London

Herzog, Roman (1995), Speech by the Federal President on the occasion of the Award of the 1995 Peace Prize of the German Book Trade Association, *German Comments*, No. 95, 22-24

Heurlin, B. (1996), 'The International Position and the National Interest of Germany in the Nineties' in Bertel Heurlin (ed.) *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, Macmillan Press, London

Hill, Christopher (2000), *The Geo-political implications of Enlargement*, EUI Working Papers, No.30

Hishow, Ognian (2004), *EU Extension to the East and Exporting Jobs*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs Papers, May 2004

Hix, S. (1999), *The Political System of the European Union*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke

Hombach, B. (1999), 'The Stability Pact: Breaking New Ground', *NATO Review*, 47: 4 20-3

Hoffmann, S. (1966), 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus*, No. 95, 892-908

Hofmann, A.J., (1998) 'Die Ara des Vaclav Klaus, Bilanz und Perspektiven der Transformation in der Tschechischen Republik nach den Parlamentswahlen im Juni 1998', *Osteuropa*, 11:2

Hoffmann, S. (1987), *Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics*, Westview Press, Boulder and London

Hughes, Kirsty, Estrin, Saul and Todd, Sarah (1997), *The Nature and Scope of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe*, Working Paper Number 3, RIIA, London

Hughes, Kirsty and Grabbe, Heather (1998), *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*, London,

- Huntington, Samuel (1993) 'Clash of Civilisations', *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3
- Hyde-Price, Adrian (1996), 'Of Dragons and Snakes: Contemporary German Security Policy' in Gordon Smith, William Paterson and Stephen Padgett (eds.), *Developments in German Politics*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke
- Hyde-Price, Adrian (1997), 'The New Pattern of International Relations in Europe' in Alice Landau and Richard Whitman (eds.) *Rethinking the European Union, Institutions, Interests and Identities*, St. Martin's Press, New York
- Hyde-Price, Adrian (2000), *Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York
- Hyde-Price, Adrian (2000), *European Security in the Twenty-First Century: Towards a Stable Peace Order?*, IGC Discussion Paper 15
- Hyde-Price, Adrian and Handl, Vladimir (2001), 'Germany and the Visegrad Countries', *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, Spring
- Inotai, Andras (1999) 'The economy of enlarged Europe: an Eastern and Central European states' view point in Landau, Alice, Whitman, Richard and Curzon, Victoria Price (eds.), *The Enlargement of the European Union: issues and strategies*, Routledge Publishers, London
- Jicinsky, Z. (1997), 'Die Ablehnung der Erklärung wurde Tschechien in Isolation führen', *Ost Europa*, No. 47, 10-11
- Kabalioglu, Haluk (1999), 'The Relations between Turkey and the EU-A Turkish Perspective', in Huseyin Bagci, Jackson Jones and Ludger Kuhnhard (eds.), *Parameters of Partnership: The US-Turkey-Europe*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Berlin
- Katzenstein, Peter (1997), *Mitteleuropa: between Europe and Germany*, Berghahn books, Providence, RI
- Katzenstein, Peter (2000), *Germany: Tamed Power in Europe*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, Berlin
- Kennard, Ann (1995), 'The German-Polish Border as a Model for East-West European Regional Integration: Transborder Co-operation on the Oder-Neisse Line', *German Politics*, 4:1, 141-150
- Keohane, R. and Nye, J. (1977), *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Little Brown, Boston
- Keohane, Robert O. (1986), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York
- Keohane, R.O., (1989), 'Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics' in R.O. Keohane (ed.), *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, Westview Press, Colorado

Keohane R. and Hoffman S. (1991), 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s' in R. Keohane and S. Hoffman (eds.) *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*, Westview Press, Colorado

Keohane R. and Hoffmann, S. (1991), *The New European Community: Decision Making and Institutional Change*, Westview Press, Boulder

Keohane R., Nye, J., Hoffman S. (1993), *After the Cold War*, Harvard University Press, Boston

Keohane, Robert O. (1993), 'Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War', in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism, The Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, New York

Kirchner, E. (1992), *Decision making in the European Community*, Manchester University Press, UK

Kirchner, E. (1994), 'The Impact of German Unification on the New European Order' in Hugh Miall (ed.) *Redefining Europe*, Printer Publishers, London and New York

Kirchner, E. (1996), 'Germany and the European Union: From Junior to Senior Role' in Gordon Smith, William Paterson and Stephen Padgett (eds.), *Developments in German Politics*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke

Kirchner, E. (1998), *The Federal Republic of Germany in the European Community*, Essex Papers in Politics and Government, No. 54

Kirchner, Emil J. (1998), *Transnational Border Co-operation Between Germany and the Czech Republic: Implications for Decentralisation and European Integration*, EUI Working Paper RSC No. 98-50, Florence

Kirchner, E. (2002), 'The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 7:4

Kirchner, Emil (2003), *European Security Trends*, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, 3:6, University of Miami

Kleinfeld, Gerald, Conradt, David and Soe, Christian (2000), *Power Shift in Germany: the 1998 election and the end of the Kohl era*, Berghen Books, New York

Kuniholm, Bruce (2001), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and American Attitudes, and the Challenges for Turkey*, Working Papers Series, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy University of Duke, January

Klusmeyer, Douglas B. (1993), 'Aliens, Immigrants and Citizens: The Politics of Inclusion in the Federal Republic of Germany', *Daedalus*, 122:3

Knodt, Michele and Staack, Nicola (1998), *Die Europapolitik der SPD vor der deutschen Ratspraesidentschaft*, WIP Occasional Paper No. 3, Schwerpunkttheft: Policymaking im Parteienstaat

Knodt, Michele and Staeck, Nicola, (1999) 'Shifting Paradigms: Reflecting Germany's European Policy', *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 3

Kohler-Koch, Beate (1997), 'Organised Interests in European Integration: The Evolution of a New Type of Governance?' in Helen Wallace and Alasdair R. Young (eds.) *Participation and Policy Making in the European Union*, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Kramer, Heinz (1993), 'The European Community's Response to the New Eastern Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31:2

Kramer, R. (1997), *Grenzen der Europäischen Union*, Brandenburgische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Potsdam

Kramer, Heinz (2000), *A Changing Turkey, the Challenge to Europe and the United States*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington

Kramer, H. (2003), *EU-kompetibel oder nicht? Zur Debatte um die Mitgliedschaft der Türkei in der Europäischen Union*, SWP Studies 34, Berlin

Krautscheid, Andreas (1997), *Contemporary German Security Policy: A View from Bonn*, IGS Discussion Papers Series Number 97/8

Kreile, M. (1996), 'Will Germany Assume a Leadership Role in the European Union?' in Bertel Heurlin (ed.) *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, Macmillan Press, London

Kucia, Marek (1999), 'Public Opinion in Central Europe on EU Accession: the Czech Republic and Poland', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37:1, 143-152

Kuniholm, Bruce (2001), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and American Attitudes, and the Challenges for Turkey*, Working Papers Series SAN 01-24, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, University of Duke

Kühnhardt, Ludger (1994) 'Der Osten des Westens und die Russische Frage', *Europa Archiv* no.9

Kühnhardt, Ludger (1994), *Jeder für sich und alle gegen alle. Zustand und Zukunft des Gemeinnsinns*, ZEI Publications, Freiburg

Kühnhardt, Ludger (1997) 'On Germany, Turkey and the United States' in Dennis L. Bark (ed.), *Reflections on Europe*, Hoover Inst. Press, USA

Kühnhardt, Ludger (1997), 'Wertgrundlagen der Deutschen Aussenpolitik', in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (eds.), *Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik*, Oldenburg Verlag, Munich

Kyav, von Dietrich (1999), *Prioritaeten der deutschen EU-Praesidentschaft unter Berucksichtigung des Europaeischen Rates in Wien*, Centre for European Integration Studies, Discussion Paper 33

Lamers, Karl (1994), *A German Agenda for the European Union*, Federal Trust for Education and Research

Lamers, Karl and Schaeuble, Wolfgang (1994), *Reflections on European Politics*, CDU Working Paper, September 1, 1994

Lamers, Karl and Schaeuble, Wolfgang (1999), *Reflections on European Policy 2-the Future Course of European Integration*, CDU Working Paper

Landau, Alice and Whitman, Richard (1997), *Rethinking the European Union: institutions, interests, and identities*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke

Lankowsky, Carl F. (1993), *Germany and the European Community, Beyond Hegemony and Containment*, St. Martin's Press, New York

Larsen, H. (1997) 'British Discourses on Europe: Sovereignty of Parliament, Instrumentality and the Non-Mythical Europe' in Knud Erik Jorgensen (ed.) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London

Leopold, Helmut (1995), 'The Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: Opportunities and Obstacles', *Aussenpolitik*, No. 2

Liebich, A. (1998), *Ethnic Minorities and Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement*, EUI Working Paper, RSC No. 98/4, European University Institute, Florence

Link, Peter and Samson, Ivo (1998), *The Geopolitical Position of Central Europe, Development Tendencies in the 21st Century*, Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association Centre for Strategic Studies, The Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava

Lindberg, Leon (1963), *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Stanford University Press, Stanford

Link, Werner (1996), 'Integration and Balance, the Prospects for German foreign and European Policy', *German Comments*, January

Loewendahl, Ebru (1997), *Promises to Keep: The Reality of Turkey-EU Relations*, Action Centre for Europe Ltd., London

Loewendahl, Henry (2000), *Turkey's Performance in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: Implications of EU Enlargement*, <http://www.enepri.org/Publications/WP008.pdf>

Ludlow P. (1991), 'The European Commission' in R. Keohane and S. Hoffman (eds.) *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*, Westview Press, Colorado

Makovsky, Alan (1998), *Turkish Daily News*, July 14, 1998

Makovsky, Alan (1999), 'Post-Luxembourg Blues-An American Perspective', in Huseyin Bagci, Jackson Jones and Ludger Kuhnhard (eds.), *Parameters of Partnership: The US-Turkey-Europe*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Berlin

Manisali, Erol (1998), *Turkiye Avrupa Iliskileri*, Cagdas Yayinlari, İstanbul

Marada, R. (1998), 'The 1998 Czech Elections', *East European Constitutional Review*, Fall, 51-58

Markowits, A. and Reich, S. (1991), 'Should Europe Fear the Germans', *German Politics and Society*, Issue 23, 17-20

Markowits, A. and Reich, S. (1997), *The German Predicament, Memory and Power in the New Europe*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London

Marks, G., Nielsen, F., Ray, L. and Salk, J. (1996), *Governance in the European Union*, Sage Publications, London

Mastny, Vojtech and Nation, Craig (1996), *Turkey Between East and West*, Westview Publishing, Colorado

Matlary, Janne Haaland (1997), 'New Bottles for New Wine' in Knud Erik Jorgensen (ed.) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London

Maull, Hanns W. (2000), 'German Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a 'Civilian Power?'' *German Politics*, 9: 2

McCormick, John (1999), *The European Union: Politics and Policies*, Westview Press, Colorado

McKenzie, Mary M. (1996), 'Competing Conceptions of Normality in the Post-Cold War Era: Germany, Europe, and Foreign Policy Change', *German Politics and Society*, 14:2, 1-15

McNamara, Kathleen R. and Jones, Erik (1996), 'The Clash of Institutions: Germany in European Monetary Affairs', *German Politics and Society*, 14:3

Mearsheimer, J. (1990), 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15:1

Milward, A. (1992), *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, Routledge, London

Milward, Alan and Sorensen, Vibeke (1994), 'Interdependence or integration? A national choice' in Alan Milward, F. Romero, R. Rantieri and F. Lynch (eds.) *Frontier of National Sovereignty*, Routledge, London

Mitrany, D. (1943, 1966), *A Working Peace System*, Quadrangle Publishing, Chicago

Moorhouse, Jacqui (1996), 'Central and Eastern Europe: Accession to the European Union', *Aussenpolitik*, No.6

- Moravcsik A. (1991), 'Negotiating the Single European Act' in R. Keohane and S. Hoffman (eds.) *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*, Westview Press, Colorado
- Moravcsik A. (1993), 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31:4, 473-524
- Moravcsik, A. (1994), 'Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Co-operation', paper presented to the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, April
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1997), 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', *International Organization*, 51:4, 513-554
- Moravcsik, A. (1998), *The Choice for Europe*, UCL Press, London
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1998), *Centralisation or Fragmentation: Europe facing the challenges of deepening, diversity, and democracy*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York
- Moravcsik, A. (1999), 'A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Co-operation', *International Organization*, 53:2
- Moravcsik, A. and Nicolaidis, K. (1999), 'Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37:1
- Moravcsik, A. (2001), 'Bringing Constructivist Theories of the EU out of the Clouds: Have they landed yet?', *European Union Politics*, June
- Morgenthau, H. (1948, 1954, 1960, 1967), *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Knopf Publishing, New York
- Muftuler, Meltem (1997), *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*, Manchester University Press, Manchester
- Muftuler, Meltem (1998), 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', *Eastwest Journal*, March
- Mughisuddun Akgenc, Oya, (1997), 'Genisleyen Almanya ve Gelisen Turkiye', *Dış Politika*, No. 5
- Nagengast, E. (1996) 'Coming to Terms with a European Identity: the Sudden Germans between Bonn and Prague', *German Politics*, 5:1, 81-100
- Nas, Cigdem (1998), 'The Enlargement Policy of the European Union: contextual approach to the human rights problem', *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 5:1-2
- Nas, Cigdem (2001) 'Turkish Identity and the Perception of Europe', *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 9:1

- Naumann, F. (1916), *Mittleuropa*, Georg Reimer Publishing Co., Berlin
- Nugent, N. (1999), *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, Palgrave Publishers, New York
- O'Neil, Patrick (1998), 'Politics, Finance and European Union enlargement eastward', in James Sperling (ed.), *Two Tiers or Two Speeds*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York
- Orenstein, M. (1994), *The Political Success of Neo-Liberalism in the Czech Republic*, CERGE Working Papers, Prague, June
- Öymen, Onur (2000), *Turkish Challenge: Turkey, Europe and the World Towards the 21st Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Panayi, Panikos (1998), 'Racial Exclusion in the New Germany' in Klaus Larres (ed.) *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, Macmillan Press, London
- Paterson, William (1996), 'Beyond Bipolarity' in Gordon Smith, William Paterson and Stephen Padgett (eds.) *Developments in German Politics*, Macmillan Press, London
- Paterson, W.E. (1998), 'Helmut Kohl, The Vision Thing and Escaping the Semi-Sovereignty Trap', *German Politics*, 7:1
- Paterson, William, Jeffery, Charlie and Bulmer, Simon (2000), *Germany's European Diplomacy*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York
- Pedersen, Thomas (1998), *Germany, France and the Integration of Europe: a Realist Interpretation*, Pinter Publishing, London and New York
- Peterson, John (1995), 'Decision Making in the European Union: towards a framework for analysis', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2:1
- Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (1999), *Decisionmaking in the European Union*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke
- Pettifer, James (1998), *The Turkish Labyrinth: Atatürk and the new Islam*, Penguin Publishing, London
- Phillips, Ann L. (2000), *Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East-Central Europe*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., New York
- Pierson, P. (1996), 'The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies*, 29:2, 123-163
- Pond, Elisabeth (1999), *The Rebirth of Europe*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC

Pond, Elisabeth (2000), 'Come Together: Europe's Unexpected New Architecture', *Foreign Affairs*, March/April

Puchala, Donald J. (1999), 'Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A Review Article', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37:2, 317-31

Putnam, R.D. (1988), 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics', *International Organization* 42, 427-461

Purtas, Firat (1996), 'Turk-Alman Iliskileri', *Yeni Forum*, No. 17

Redmond, John (1993), *The Next Mediterranean Enlargement*, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, UK

Redmond, J., Miles, Lee and Schwok Rene (1995), 'Integration Theory and the Enlargement of the European Union' in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey (eds.) *State of the European Union Polity*, Lynne and Rienner Publishers, USA

Redmond, John and Rosenthal Glenda (1998), *The expanding European Union: past, present, future*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo

Rhodes, Carolyn and Mazey, Sonia (1995), 'Introduction: Integration in Theoretical Perspective' in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey (eds.) *State of the European Union Polity*, Lynne and Rienner Publishers, USA

Rosamond, Ben (2000), *Theories of European Integration*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke

Rueb, M. (1999), 'Reconstructing Kosovo: On the Right Track, But Where Does it Lead?', *NATO Review*, 47:3

Ruggie, John Gerard (1993) 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution' in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.) *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, Columbia University Press, New York

Rühl, Lothar (1998), 'Security Policy: National Structures and Multilateral Integration' in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein (ed.), *Germany's New Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Publishing, Munich

Sandholtz, W. and Zysman, J. (1989), '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', *World Politics*, 42:1, 95-128

Sandholtz, W. (1996) 'Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34:3, 404-427

Schimmelfenning, Frank (2001), 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union', *International Organization*, 55:1

Schlegel, Dietrich (1986), 'Turkish-European Pragmatism', *German Foreign Affairs Review*, 37:3

Schmidt, H. (1990), *Deutschland und seine Nachbarn, Menschen und Mächte Teil 2*, Siedler Publishing Co., Berlin

Schneider, E., 'Ende der politischen Stabilität?', *Osteuropa*, 47:1-3

Schnopper, K-P (1993), *Ausländerfeindlichkeit in Deutschland*, EMNID Report 7/8

Schröder, G. (1999), 'Die Grundkoordinaten deutscher Aussenpolitik sind unverändert: Frieden und Sicherheit und Stabiles Umfeld für Wohlstand festigen', *Bulletin*, Bonn, Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, no. 83/S, December 6, 1999

Schröder, G. (2003), *Internationale Politik*, September, No. 9

Schwarz, Hans Peter (1994), *Die Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne*, Siedler Publishing Co., Berlin

Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1994), 'Germany's National and European Interests', *Daedalus*, 123:2

Sen Faruk (1994), *Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Zentrum für Türkeistudien, Opladen

Sen, Faruk (1998), 'Draussen vor der Tür? Die Türkei, Deutschland and Europa', *Internationale Politik*, 1:98

Sen, F. (1998), *Avrupa Almanyada`ki Turk Ekonomik Varligi ve Turkiye-AB Iliskileri*, Turkish Studies in Essen, February

Seyhan, Azade (1999), 'Cultural Legacy, Legitimacy, and Identity in the Turkish Community in Germany' in Huseyin Bagci, Jackson Jones and Ludger Kuhnhard (eds.), *Parameters of Partnership: The US-Turkey-Europe*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Berlin

Smith, G. (1992), 'The New Party System', in G. Smith, W. Paterson, P. Merkl and S. Padgett (eds.) *Developments in German Politics*, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke

Soe, Christian and Hampton, Mary (1999), *Between Bonn and Berlin: German Politics adrift?* Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, London

Sontheimer, K. (1972), *The government and politics of West Germany*, Hutchinson, London

Spence, David and Edwards, Geoffrey (1994), *The European Commission*, Cartermill. London

Sperling, James (1999), *Two Tiers or Two Speeds*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York

Sperling, James, (2001) 'Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War Europe', *British Journal of Political Science*, 31:2

Stoss, Richard (1989), *Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik-The radical Right in Federal Germany*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen

Taylor, A.J.P. (1967), 'The Functionalist Approach to the Problem of International Order: a Defence', *Political Studies* 16

Tewes, H. (1997), 'The Emergence of a Civilian Power: Germany and Central Europe', *German Politics*, 6:2, 95-116

Tewes, Henning (2002), *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe*, Palgrave Publishing, Hampshire and New York

Tomann, Horst (1996), *Economic Reform, Institutional Change, and Integration: Are Central European Countries Prepared for EU Membership?*, IGC Discussion Paper Series, Number 96/11

Tuttle, Dale (1994), 'The Assimilation of East Germany and the rise of Identity-Based Violence Against Foreigners in the Unified German State', *German Politics and Society*, Issue 31, Spring

Varwick, Johannes (2003) 'The Kosovo Crisis and the European Union: The Stability Pact and its Consequences for EU enlargement', *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, January 2003

Vesper, D. (1995), 'Milliardengrab Ost?', *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 6, 572-578

Vodickova, K. (1997), 'Tschechisch-deutsche Beziehungen und die Versöhnungserklärung', *Osteuropa*, 47:10-11

Vogel, H. (1997), 'Opening NATO: A Co-operative Solution for an ill-defined Problem', *Aussenpolitik*, 48:1, 22-30

von Kyaw, Dietrich (1999), *Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft unter Berücksichtigung des Europäischen Rates in Wien*, ZEI Discussion Papers, C 33

Wallace, William (2000), 'From the Atlantis to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the European Union', *International Affairs*, 76:3

Walsh, James L. (2001), 'National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary Integration', *International Studies Quarterly*, 45

Waltz, K. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, Mc Graw Hill, New York

Webber, Douglas (2001), *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*, Frank Cass, London, Portland

Wessels, W. (1997), 'An Ever Closer Fusion: A Dynamic Political View on Integration Processes', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 35:2

Wessels, W. (2001), 'Nice Results: The Millenium IGC in the EU's Evolution', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39: 2

Whitman, R. (1997), 'The International Identity of the European Union: Instruments as Identity' in Alice Landau and Richard Whitman (eds.) *Rethinking the European Union, Institutions, Interests and Identities*, St. Martin's Press, New York

Wilson, Frank (1999), *European Politics Today: The Democratic Experience*, Prentice Hall Inc., New Jersey, USA

Wind, Marlene (1997), 'Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational Institutionalism' in Knud Erik Jorgensen (ed.) *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London

Wood, Stephen (1998), *Germany, Europe and the Persistence of Nations: transformation, interests and identity, 1989-1996*, Ashgate Press, UK

Zielonka, Jan and Paszkoska, Ania-Krok (2000), *The EU's Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates' Perceptions*, EUI Working Papers, European University Institute

Journals

Bulletin no. 33, March 22, 1991

BMI Pressemitteilung, March 2, 1999

Business in Central Europe, May 1995

East European Constitutional Review, Summer 1998

the Economist, December 15, 1996

the Economist, July 4, 1998

the Economist, May 5, 2000

Economist Survey, June 10-16 2000

the Economist, May 5, 2001

the Economist, September 2002

Emerging Turkey 1999, The Annual Business, Economic and Political Review, Oxford Business Group, London, 1998

European Report Predicasts Newsletters, European Information Service, July 30, 1997

German Comments, Unofficial Translation of the German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations and their Future Development, April 1997

der Spiegel, June 1999

der Spiegel, February 1999

der Spiegel, February 3, 2004

der Spiegel, February 23 2004

die Stern, February 25, 2000

die Stern, February 14, 2002

Newspapers:

Berliner Morgenpost, December 2000

Berliner Morgenpost, December 4, 2002

Financial Times, December 8

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 4, 2000

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 6, 2004

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 2002

the Guardian, December 5, 2002

Hurriyet, December 3, 2003

Hürriyet, December 10, 1999

Hürriyet, October 29, 1998

Hürriyet, February 2000

Hürriyet, February 12, 2004

Hürriyet, November 28, 2004

Le Monde, May 1994

Le Monde, June 25, 1995

Milliyet, June 9, 1999

Milliyet, August 14, 2000

New York Times, September 22, 1993

Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 4, 1999

Tagesspiegel Online, September 2, 1999

the Times, August 6, 1990

die Welt, December 18, 1999

die Zeit, November 22, 1998

die Zeit, December 9, 1999

die Zeit, January 21, 1999

die Zeit, July 27, 2000

die Zeit, March 20, 2004

Web Sites

[http:// www.auswaertiges-amt.de](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de)

<http://www.cdu.de>

[http:// www.czech.cz](http://www.czech.cz)

<http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed 01.php>

<http://www.dw-world.de> ,06.04.2004

[http:// www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1431_A_1273178,00.html](http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1431_A_1273178,00.html)

[http:// www.errc.org](http://www.errc.org)

[http:// www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)

<http://www.eu-presidency.de>

<http://fistfuleuros.net/archives/000492.php>

<http://www.germanculture.com>

<http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/speeches/060904.html>

<http://www.gov.tr>

<http://www.gruene.de>

[http:// www.netiran.com](http://www.netiran.com)

[http:// www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)

[http:// www.spd.de](http://www.spd.de)

[http:// www.statistik-bund.de](http://www.statistik-bund.de)

<http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0041312.html>

[http:// www.turkishdailynews.com](http://www.turkishdailynews.com), December 12, 1999

[http:// www.uni-essen.de/zft](http://www.uni-essen.de/zft)

[http:// www.ztf-online.de](http://www.ztf-online.de)

Official reports:

Bundesbank monthly report, July 1995

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, No. 42, 1994

Copenhagen European Council conclusions, December 2002

Eurobarometer 37 in Documentation 1993

Eurobarometer 47, 1997

Eurobarometer, October 2001

Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, April 17, 1998, Leipzig

Laeken European Council conclusions, December 2001

World Economic Outlook, 1999

Speeches:

Joshka Fischer, September 16, 1999, *Bundestag*

Joshka Fischer, December 3, 1999, *Bundestag*

Joshka Fischer, January 8, 2004, Bertelsmann Foundation, Berlin

Gerhard Schröder, December 10, 1998, *Bundestag*

Gunther Verheugen, May 26, 1999, Sofia

Gunther Verheugen, January 8, 2004, Bertelsmann's Foundation

Ludger Volmer, April 13, 2000, Organisation of Development and Peace, Potsdam

Helmut Kohl, October 26-28, 1992, 3rd party protocol of the CDU, Düsseldorf

Rudolf Scharping, December 20, 1999, Turkish Parliament

Volker Rühe, October 26-28 1992, 3rd party protocol of the CDU, Düsseldorf.

