King's College London
School of Arts & Humanities
Coversheet for submission of coursework
(Undergraduate & Taught Postgraduate)

- Complete all sections of this form and ensure it is the first page of the document you submit. [Note: either copy and paste this page into the front of your work, or write your work on subsequent pages of this form]
- DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ON YOUR WORK.
- Pages should be clearly numbered.
- Failure to attach the coversheet as required may result in your work not being accepted for assessment.

Candidate no.	T	1	4	1	2	5

Module Title:	MA in Mediterranean Studies Dissertation
Module Code: (e.g. 5AABC123)	7AAJM004

Essay no: (e.g. 1 or 2)	1
Essay Title: (may be abbreviated)	**Turkish Asylum Policy Before and During the Syrian Crisis The Impact of the European Union and Other Factors**
Assignment tutor/group:	Dr. Charis Boutieri
Deadline:	30 September 2014
Date Submitted:	30 September 2014
Word Count:	14733

The word count, which should preferably be calculated electronically, must be stated accurately above.

For details of how to calculate the word count, please consult the School handbook. No penalty is exacted for work up to 5% above the word limit. Thereafter two marks will normally be deducted for every 5% above the word limit, until 50% is reached. After 50%, three marks will normally be deducted for each additional 5% above the word limit. These regulations are laid down by the Boards of Examiners in the School of Arts & Humanities.

DECLARATION BY STUDENT

This assignment is entirely my own work. Quotations from secondary literature are indicated by the use of inverted commas around ALL such quotations AND by reference in the text or notes to the author concerned. ALL primary and secondary literature used in this piece of work is indicated in the bibliography placed at the end, and dependence upon ANY source used is indicated at the appropriate point in the text. I confirm that no sources have been used other than those stated.

I understand what is meant by plagiarism and have signed at enrolment the declaration concerning the avoidance of plagiarism.

I understand that plagiarism is a serious examinations offence that may result in disciplinary action being taken.

Turkish Asylum Policy Before and During the Syrian Crisis

The Impact of the European Union and Other Factors

Abstract

.

This paper attempts to examine the determinants of Turkish asylum policy, and in particular the impact of the European Union on that asylum policy, with a case study on the current Syrian refugee crisis. I will argue that whilst the EU is clearly a relevant actor in shaping Turkish asylum policy, Turkey's decision-making process on this issue is mainly driven by its previous experiences with mass influx of refugees (including 350,000 Bulgarian refugees in 1989 and more than a half million Iraqi Kurdish refugees in 1991). These experiences have been reinforced by the current Syrian crisis which demonstrated, once again, the vulnerability of the Turkish state to mass inflows of refugees from neighbouring unstable and refugee-producing regions. Thus, even though the "Law on Foreigners and International Protection" which was ratified by the Parliament in 2014 established a comprehensive asylum regime for Turkey and complied with most of the requirements of the EU's asylum regime, it fell short of removing the "geographical limitation" clause from Turkey's conception of refugees. Turkey only recognizes those who seek asylum due to "events occurring in Europe" and therefore remains as one of very few countries who preserve this geographical limitation clause from the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The removal of this clause is an essential requirement of the EU for the accession process, and Turkish insistence on retaining this restriction demonstrates the EU's limitation on exerting pressure on Turkey to liberalize its asylum policy. This paper will attempt to show that the weak possibility of Turkish membership to the EU, its unwillingness to share the burden of Turkey in these humanitarian crisis and the EU's own securitised approach towards the incoming refugees significantly deteriorates the EU's capability to transform Turkish asylum policy. The recent Syrian crisis only endorsed the Turkish belief that the EU will not be willing to assist Turkey financially or by hosting some of the refugee population.

Introduction

On 29 April 2011, 252 Syrians crossed the porous Turkish-Syrian border at Yayladağı, in Turkey's Hatay province, becoming the first Syrian "guests" under the protection of the Turkish regime. This incident was, perhaps, the first time that Turkish officials asked themselves whether they were likely to receive significant numbers of refugees from Syria as a result of clashes between the Syrian government and protesters, or whether the Syrian uprising would soon be settled as it had in most other countries influenced by the Arab Spring. This paper seeks to identify the main determinants of Turkish asylum policy, and in particular to investigate the extent of European Union influence in this area. I use the recent Syrian Crisis as a principal case study in this examination, but contextualise it by examining in detail the broader history of Turkish refugee policy and comparing the refugee influx produced by the Syrian War Civil with major past refugee flows to Turkey.

In some superficial ways, the Syrian crisis might appear to have brought Turkey and the EU closer together both diplomatically and in policy terms. The adoption of the "Law on Foreigners and International Protection" by the Turkish Parliament on April 4, 2013 was a significant step in establishing a comprehensive Turkish law on asylum and immigration, an essential requirement for the EU accession process. This law practically complies with most requirements of the EU and attempts to harmonize Turkey with the EU *acquis* on the asylum and migration areas.

But this impression of meaningful EU-Turkish convergence does not survive much scrutiny, crucially because the Law on Foreigners and International Protection falls short of removing the "geographical limitation" clause from Turkish legislation, a change considered an "absolute must" for the European Union membership process. The Geneva Convention

relating to the Status of Refugees signed in 1951 limited the status of refugees both geographically and temporally: refugees had to be seeking asylum due to events occurring in *Europe* that occurred *before 1951*. However these limitations were lifted in international law by the convention's Additional Protocol of 1967 to create a universal refugee regime.[1] Whilst Turkey agreed to remove the time limitation component of the original convention it decided to retain the "geographical limitation", continuing to treat only Europeans as legal refugees.[2] And despite being an EU candidate state since 1999 and a negotiating country since 2004, Turkey remains one of the very few countries in the world who ratified the 1951 Convention, yet insisted on preserving the "geographical limitation" clause in its refugee policy. Turkey has been continuously criticized for this by the EU,[3] and by many human-rights organizations,[4] over the years. Considering that fulfilling with European requirements on the areas of asylum and adoption of the EU *acquis communautaire* on this issue are essential steps for EU membership, Turkey's continuing refusal to remove the "geographical limitation" clause substantially calls into question the degree of EU influence over Turkish policy.

Therefore, this paper engages in a more searching examination of Turkish policy on refugees, asylum and migration. I will argue that the EU has exerted a degree of influence in shaping Turkish policy in this area – the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and Turkey's

[1] *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, Geneva, 28 July 1951, p.2 available from http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[2] Kemal Kirişçi, "The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European-Turkish Relations", *Turkish Studies* vol.4 no.1 (2003):p.83
[3] For example, see the report of the European Parliament on Turkish Asylum Policy in 2005, the report urges Turkey to remove the geographical limitation clause: Parliamentary Assembly. "*Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants in Turkey*", European Union Parliamentary Resolution 1429, 2005. http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/ERES1429.htm (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[4] For example, the Amnesty International attacked the Turkish regime for still preserving the geographical limitation clause and therefore denying legal rights to the asylum-seekers coming outside of Europe in its 2009 report . Amnesty International, *Stranded: Refugees in Turkey Denied Protection*, (London: Amnesty International, 2009). http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/001/2009/en/0f217291-cae8-4093-bda9-485588e245d8/eur440012009en.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

ratification of its EU Readmission Agreement in December 2013 do indicate some "policy-transfer" processes are in effect.[5] But EU influence over Turkey is significantly constrained by three factors. First, the appearance that Turkish membership to the EU is unlikely for the foreseeable future considerably weakens the incentives for Turkish policy alignment with the EU. Second, there is a visible mismatch between the EU's own refugee, asylum and migration policies and its demands on other states. Its securitised approach and clear priority of securing its own borders to prevent refugee flows into the "Fortress of Europe" significantly undermines, in other words, any normative capital it might have as a role model for Turkey. Third, the unwillingness of the EU to share a meaningful proportion of the high refugee burden created by Turkey's proximity to refugee producing countries has made Turkey's experience of refugee flows expensive, and imposed what Turkish elites see as prohibitively high costs on any abandonment of the geographical limitation clause.

This paper will argue that instead of aiming to converge with the EU, Turkish asylum policy is primarily driven by Turkey's challenging past experiences with the mass influxes of refugees, such as the Iraqi refugee flows in 1988 and 1991, or the Bulgarian refugee flows between 1989 and 1990. Turkey's continued geographical proximity to unstable regions exacerbates this problem, deterring Turkish policy makers from lifting the geographical limitation clause out of fears that this could make Turkey vulnerable to mass waves of immigration from the Middle East and North Africa. Critically, Turkish foreign policy makers have deployed an identity-sensitive interpretative framework in assessing such risks: with responses driven by the anticipated impact of incoming refugees on the ethnic or religious balance of affected regions. All such fears were only reinforced when more than a million Syrian refugees arrived in Turkey between 2011 and 2014. Turkey's multiple experiences with the mass influx of refugees combined with the EU's reluctance to offer

[5] Sandra Lavenex, "EU Enlargement and the Challenge of Policy Transfer: The case of Refugee Policy", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* vol.28, no.4 (2010):p.702

assistance in these crises has caused Turkey to follow a "Europeanized" but "individual" asylum policy.

This paper will be organized in the following way. First, I will briefly summarize the methodology, concepts and resources utilized in this paper. Second, I will provide an overview of the history of Turkish-EU affairs, illustrating the awkwardness in their relations and the way this undermines contemporary Turkish faith that membership of the EU is actually likely. Third, I will engage in my specific examination of Turkish asylum policy and its determinants: investigate how the process of policy-transfer to candidate countries works in the EU case, how the previous refugee experiences of Turkey limits EU influence, and how the behaviour of Turkey as a host states differs for different refugee groups according to a perception of them as security threats based on their identity. In my fourth section I then bring in the current Syrian refugee crisis, assessing the extent to which it represents continuity or discontinuity with the past dynamics of Turkish refugee policy, explaining the significance of the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkish history, analysing the EU's role in this refugee crisis and scrutinizing why the EU's influence has remained limited on this particular issue.

1. Concepts, Sources and Methodology

I will adopt the definition of the term "refugee" provided by the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol which removed the temporal and geographical limitation clauses from the Convention. Article 1(A)2 of the Convention defines refugees as anyone who

> "...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."[6]

Reflecting the context in which it was written – early Cold War Europe after the conclusion of World War II – this rather strict and specific definition of refugees focuses exclusively on a person who is being persecuted or at the risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or a membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Simply fleeing war, let alone civil war, is not, explicitly, sufficient to make one a refugee. Yet those fleeing civil war clearly can have a well-founded fear of persecution should they return to their homeland – civil wars being chaotic multi-party affairs whose outcome is uncertain and with frequent abuses of civilian populations that remain in the country. And counting those fleeing civil war as refugees is consistent, for example, with the interpretation of refugee law advocated by Amnesty International.[7]

Turkey, of course, does not legally consider the incoming Syrians as "refugees", rather these people have generally been labelled as "our guests" and "our brothers and sisters" by Turkish officials since the very first refugee inflow after clashes between the Asad regime and Syrian rebels. Rather than grant legal refugee status, the Turkish government established the "temporary protection regime" in October 2011 in order to legally cover the Syrians in

[6] "About Refugees", UNHCR Regional Office, http://unhcr.org.au/unhcr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=179&Itemid=54 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014

[7] Amnesty International. *The Human Cost of the Fortress of Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe's Borders*. London: Amnesty International, 2014. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EUR%20050012014_%20Fortress%20Europe_complete_web.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Turkey.[8] Yet despite this, it is notable that even the Turkish Prime Ministry's Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) could not find a word to replace the term "refugees" in its 2013 report on the Syrian camps, and clarified that it used the term to correspond to those Syrians under temporary protection regime.[9] I thus feel it acceptable to likewise use the term "Syrian refugees" to refer to Syrians in Turkey under "temporary protection" status. The recent violence and atrocities in Iraq perpetrated by ISIS/Islamic State have now led to further flows of Iraqi citizens into Turkey. These do no feature in the bulk of this paper, but I shall mention them briefly in my conclusion – again, I assume that they can uncontroversially be seen as refugees under the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol.

Since the Syrian refugee crisis in the Middle East is a rather recent phenomenon, secondary sources on this subject remain limited. In order to conduct my research on Syrian refugees in Turkey, I had to draw on data from various different resources including reports from Turkish and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), reports from think tanks or intergovernmental organizations such as the Office of the United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as articles from Turkish and international newspapers. In addition to this, I have significantly benefited from the original documents of international treaties, the European Union's progress reports and legislative documents, and domestic legislation and regulations published by the Turkish government.

I supplemented these textual documents by conducting fifteen semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in the decision-making processes of the Turkish government and civil society – such as the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Trade Ministry, the Turkish

[8] "2014 UNHCR Country Profile: Turkey" , The UN Refugee Agency, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[9]AFAD. Syrian Refugees in Turkey, 2013. (Ankara: Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergence Management Presidency, 2013)

Red Crescent, AFAD, and the IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation). Most of the interviewees demanded anonymity in exchange for sharing information regarding the Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, and therefore I will be referring them in this paper with only their general institutional affiliations so as to protect their identity. One of my observations whilst conducting this field research is that the participants and in particular government employees were highly reluctant to share any information regarding the Syrian refugees, since they have become a controversial issue among the Turkish public (see section 4). An ancillary finding of my research was that the estimates by interviewees of the numbers of the Syrian refugees residing in Turkey were significantly higher than official figures, with estimates for July 2014 ranging from around 1.5 million to 2 million.[10] Field work conducted for this study is limited to Ankara, Hatay (including several provinces such as Reyhanlı, Antakya and Samandağı), Gaziantep and Kilis.

2. Turkish-European Union Relations Revisited

The Turkish journey in pursuit of European Union membership is a long, troubled and unfinished one. This journey commenced on September 11, 1963 when the European Economic Community (EEC) accepted Turkey's and Greece's applications for associate membership.[11] Following these discussions, Turkey and the EEC finalized an association agreement (the Ankara Agreement) on 12 September 1963. The Ankara Agreement envisaged incorporation of Turkey into the Community in three phases: a preparatory stage of 5 years to enhance the Turkish economy with European aid, a transition stage which would not last more than 12 years and would align the economic policies of two parties as well as

[10] The high figure of 2 million was, for example, used by a high-ranked official in the IHH, whereas a junior official from AFAD estimated around 1.4 million. Almost all of the participants agreed that the actual number of the Syrian refugees in Turkey were higher than the official estimates.
[11] Özgül Erdemli, "Chronology: Turkey's Relations with the EU", *Turkish Studies* vol.4, no.1(2010):p.4

establishing a Customs Union, and a final stage which would complete and entrench this Customs Union.[12] An additional protocol to this agreement was signed on 23 November 1970 between the parties (and it came into force in 1973),[13] which aimed at founding a detailed roadmap for the establishment of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EEC.[14] But despite these positive developments between the EEC and Turkey, the relations between these two political actors remained erratic due to the political instability of the Turkish regime, with the Cypriot intervention of 1974 and continuous military interventions in Turkish democracy particularly disruptive.[15] For example, Bulent Ecevit, the Prime Minister of the era, "unilaterally froze the Ankara Treaty in 1978, invoking its self-protection clause" because Turkey was afraid of the possible negative effects of the tariff reduction and it wanted to bring its economy to the level of the EC countries..[16] This was followed by the EEC's decision to suspend of all negotiations and agreements with Turkey in 1982 due to the military coup of 1980.[17]

The restoration of democracy, institution of reforms to liberalize the Turkish economy, and the election of a civilian government in the second half of the 1980s led Turkey to try its chances with Europe once again, and Turkey officially applied for EEC membership under the leadership of Prime Minister Turgut Özal in 1987.[18] However, as William Park argues "… it was not difficult for Brussels to find reasons – relating both to Turkish conditions and

[12] "The Association Agreement, 12 September 1963", *Official Journal of the European Communities* vol.16, no. C113, 24 December 1973. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf>. (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[13] "Turkish-EU Relations", The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[14] Ibid.
[15] Meltem Muftuler Bac, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union", *South European Society and Politics* vol. 10, no.1 (2005):p.19
[16] Ibid.
[17] Özgül Erdemli, "Chronology: Turkey's Relations with the EU", pp.4-5
[18] Carl Dahlman, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: The Geopolitics of Enlargement", *Eurasian Geography and Economics* vol.45, no.8(2004):p. 555

those of Community itself – for declining to open membership negotiations with Ankara in 1989."[19] The instability of the Turkish civilian governance, the human rights violations against its ethnic and religious minorities and in particular Turkey's Kurdish population, and the large and relatively poor Muslim population of Turkey, contributed to the negative decision of the Community.[20] Despite these setbacks in Turkish-EU relations, both of the parties agreed that development of the Customs Union would be mutually beneficial, and therefore concerted efforts to do so intensified after 1989.[21] Consequently, Turkey and the European Community finalized the Customs Union agreement and it came into effect on 1 January 1996, in a step considered highly significant for membership by the Turkish officials. In fact one of the Turkish architectures of the agreement stated that:

> "The Customs Union is the most advanced form of relationship that the European Union has formed with a non-member country so far. If Turkey is to optimise this infrastructure, the Customs Union could pave the way for full membership. But perhaps more importantly it could give Turkey the 'option' of being a full-member"[22]

As this attitude implies, the Turkish side continued to consider the European Community (EC) as an essentially economic union throughout this period, and underestimated the political integration that occurred between the EEC's member countries between the 1970s and the 1990s. Later, Ziya Öniş labelled this attitude as "Ankara Agreement Syndrome", arguing that Turkish decision makers "single-mindedly" believed economic integration and economic liberalization would pave the way for EC membership, and failed to fathom that

[19] William Park, "Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki- to Ankara?", Mediterranean Politics vol. 5, no.2 (2007):p.33
[20] Carl Dahlman, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union" p. 556
[21] Sedef Eylemer and İlkay Taş, "Pro-EU and Eurosceptic Circles in Turkey", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* vol.23, no.4(2007):p.562
[22] Chris Rumford, "Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform", *Mediterranean Politics* vol.51, no.68 (2002):p.53

the EC's/EU's commitment to democracy and human rights made Turkish domestic politics a significant barrier to membership.[23]

Turkish policy-makers were awoken to the reality of a need for deeper political reforms to ensure freedoms and rights when the EC announced that Turkey was still eligible for candidacy status, but that candidacy would not be granted at the EC's Luxembourg Summit of 1997. The EC emphasized the urgent need to address the problem of continuing economic instability, the need for reforms to enshrine minority rights and an urgent need to deal with the Cyprus question, if Turkey was to be granted candidate status.[24] This caused considerable resentment and disaffection on the Turkish side. What the Turkish side found especially problematic about the outcome of Luxembourg Summit of 1997 was that the EC did grant candidate status to 11 countries, 10 of which were former communist states with weak democratic systems. Moreover, the Community also accepted the divided island of Cyprus – only represented by the Greek side – as an eligible candidate country for EC membership.[25] Turkish political leaders responded to this decision furiously and stated that they would not participate in the European conferences. In fact, the Turkish Prime Minister of the time, Mesut Yilmaz, claimed that Turkey would accelerate the process for unifying Turkey with occupied Northern Cyprus.[26] Many also believed that the EC's decision reflected a cultural distinction of Turkey from the rest of the European countries and that Turkey would never be admitted to this "Christian club".[27] In line with this thinking, Prime Minister Yılmaz argued

[23] Ziya Onis, "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations", *Government and Opposition*, vol.35, no.4 (2000):p.465
[24] "Helsinki Summit Presidency Conclusions 2008", The Council of European Union,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[25] William Park, "Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki- to Ankara?", Mediterranean Politics vol. 5, no.2 (2007):p.35
[26] "Çıkarken Kapıyı Kapadık" (We Closed the Door When We Left), *Milliyet*, 15 December 1997, p.21
[27] Gamze Avcı, "Turkey's Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euroscepticism?", *Turkish Studies* vol. 4, no.1 (2010):p.150

that "Turkey was not evaluated with the same objective standards and good faith as the other candidate states".[28] All in all, the outcome of Luxembourg Summit was a serious blow to Turkish-EU relations.

Between the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and Helsinki Summit of 1999, a number of things changed in the Turkish domestic and international scene. First, Turkey managed to capture the leader of *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* (Kurdistan Workers Party, hereafter PKK) Abdullah Ocalan, creating greater willingness in Ankara to "redress its Kurdish problem in ways more palatable to the EU and Turkish self-interest".[29] Second, after devastating earthquakes in 1999, and assistance to Turkey from Greece, the relations between Turkey and Greece – which had been a vocal opponent of Turkish accession to the EU – was alleviated and the rapprochement between these two states began.[30] The Greek decision to no longer block Turkey's accession was also affected by the EC's promise to Greece about the Cypriot candidacy and Greek conviction that the membership of Turkey could be beneficial for the security concerns.[31] Additionally, the shift of political power in the German government to Social Democrat/Green hands, from Chancellor Helmut Kohl – one of the most vocal opponents of Turkish accession – to Gerhard Schröder, also contributed to the positive outcome for the Turkish candidacy in the Helsinki Summit of 1999.[32] Fourth, the United States, who wanted secular Turkey as an ally in the Middle East, also assisted the Turkish cause by lobbying for its candidacy with the European states.[33] With these positive developments on the political scene and the lack of staunch opposition to Turkish accession

[28] "Çıkarken Kapıyı Kapadık" (We Closed the Door When We Left), *Milliyet*, 15 December 1997, p.21
[29] Carl Dahlman, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union", p.556
[30] Ibid.
[31] Apostolos Agnantopoulos, "The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Explaining Greek Support for Turkey's EU Accession", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies vol.13 no.1 (2007):p.75
[32] Ibid.
[33]Fatos Taifa and Benjamin Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let Turkey In?", Mediterranean Quarterly, vol.18, no.1(2007):p.55

to the EU, Turkey was granted candidate status by the Helsinki Summit. However, the Commission argued that Turkey was yet to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria arguing that there were "serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities. Torture is not systematic but still widespread and freedom of expression is regularly restricted by the authorities".[34] Still, whilst demanding a substantive change in the political arena, the outcome of the Helsinki Summit repaired the damage caused at Luxembourg.[35]

Despite the Commission's clear emphasis that the accession negotiations would not be started without major political reforms that fulfil the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey did not start its political reformation process until 2001 for various reasons. First of all, in the end of 2000, Turkey experienced a devastating economic crisis which led to devaluation of the currency and a severe balance of payments crisis, and the entire economic system was re-organized and reformed with help from the IMF.[36] Turkey endured the biggest collapse in its economic history, with GDP shrinking by 7.4 per cent, and this "implied that the end of the road had arrived for many banks accustomed to the rentier mode of capital accumulation strategies of the 1990s, and they were forced to stop extending 'bad loans to good friends'."[37] With this collapse of the economy, Turkish political elites became aware of the unsustainability of recent economic policies, and Kemal Derviş, who had a "distinguished" career at the World Bank, was appointed as a minister responsible for the Treasury to reform the Turkish economic system.[38] Moreover, the corrupt political leadership of Turkey including former prime ministers Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz

[34] Chris Rumford, "Failing the EU Test?", p.54
[35] Sedef Eylemer and İlkay Taş, "Pro-EU and Eurosceptic Circles in Turkey", p.563
[36] Demet Yalcin Mousseau, "Is Turkey Democratizing with EU Reforms?:An Assessment of Human Rights, Corruption and Socio-Economic Conditions", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol.12, no.1 (2012):p.68
[37] O.B Dincer and Mustafa Kutlay, "The Arab Spring: A Game Changer in Turkey-EU Relations?", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* vol.14, no.4 (2013):p.420
[38] Ziya Onis and Caner Bakir, "Turkey's Political Economy in the Age of Financial Globalization: The Significance of the EU Anchor", *South European Society and Politics*, vol.12, no.2 (2007):p.154

stepped down.[39] In order to start accession negotiations, candidate countries are expected to institute a series of reforms in their legal and political systems in order to harmonize with European laws and standards – a major concern for European institutions for Turkish accession. In addition to the urgent economic reformation process, Turkey therefore also began to establish some reforms in the political arena and human rights including the abolition of the death penalty, the suspension of torture, and improvements in freedom of expression.[40] These reforms were followed by amendments to the constitution to align Turkish legislation with European norms and standards.[41] One of the most significant reforms of the era was the granting of the right to publish in alternative dialects and the opening up of a government-sponsored Kurdish TV channel.[42] This reformation process in political and economic arenas and the continuous US support for the Turkish bid for EU membership resulted in the European Council's declaration that Turkey had complied with the Copenhagen criteria and the European Council decided to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.[43]

But initial optimism in Turkish-EU relations after these commenced rapidly faded away. Since the beginning of the negotiations, only 14 out of 35 chapters have been opened for negotiation, and among these only the "Science and Research" chapter has been closed since 2005.[44] In addition, the EU has argued that Turkey failed to comply with the requirements of the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement by not extending this agreement to Cyprus,

[39] Demet Yalcin Mousseau, "Is Turkey Democratizing with EU Reforms?:", p.68
[40] Ibid, p.70
[41] Ibid, p.70
[42] O.B Dincer and Mustafa Kutlay, "The Arab Spring", p.421
[43] Fatos Taifa and Benjamin Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe", p.55
[44] Gamze Avcı, "The Justice and Development Party and the EU: Political Pragmatism in a Changing Environment", *South European Society and Politics*, vol.16, no.3(2011):p.412

and by closing its ports and airports to the member states of the EU.[45] The EU therefore froze 8 chapters from negotiation in 2006, and stated that no chapter will provisionally be closed (concluded) unless Turkey resolves this matter. Likewise, several more chapters were blocked by individual member states including Cyprus, Germany, France and Greece. Cyprus's individual veto over opening up the EU *acquis* chapter 24 entitled "Freedom, Justice and Security", which deals with the harmonization of asylum and migration policies, remains a significant obstacle to the EU exerting influence over Turkey's asylum regime.

Recent developments in Turkish politics, such as the brutal crackdown of anti-government protests in Gezi Park, the reversal of many reforms after 2007, persistent limitations on freedoms and human rights, and the imprisonment of journalists, led the EU to be increasingly critical of Turkey. Between 2010 and 2011, the number of cases brought against the Turkish government in the European Court of Human Rights reached a record 8072 individual complaints.[46] Moreover, having desired to open another chapter with Turkey to revive accession negotiations in June 2013, the EU decided to postpone this step for at least four months in light of the suppression of anti-government protests across Turkey with excessive use of force.[47] Austrian Foreign Minister Michael Spindelegger stated that the EU would grant Turkey "a probationary period for how it handles basic rights for citizens, how it handles the right to demonstrate and the right to free speech",[48] and he added that "…we cannot have a double standard in the European Union. We have a community of European values and this assumes that citizens' basic rights will be respected."[49] Another issue that the EU has found quite problematic is the growing power and authoritarianism of the Justice and

[45] "EU-Turkey Relations", The EU Commission: Enlargement.,http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm (Last accessed: September 15,2014)
[46] Senem Aydın-Düzgit and E. Fuat Keyman, "EU-Turkey Relations and the Stagnation of Turkish Democracy", *Global Turkey in Europe Working Paper* 02 (2011): p.6
[47] Adryan Croft and Justyna Pawlak, "EU Rebukes Turkey on Crackdown by Delaying Entry Talks", *Reuters*, June 25, 2013. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/25/uk-turkey-protests-eu-idUKBRE95O0BC20130625 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.

Development Party in Turkey. Hours after the announcement of the AKP's 46 percent victory in local elections in 2014, the EU Commission issued a statement that: "Following the overall worrying developments which have taken place over the past three months, Turkey ... now urgently needs to re-engage fully in reforms in line with European standards."[50] The EU expressed the same level of cautiousness and discontent when Prime Minister Erdoğan was running for the position of President in elections in August 2014, although Erdoğan stated his commitment to the EU process in order to defuse tensions.[51] Further, whilst in November 2005 there had been no prisoners in Turkey under arrest for expressing non-violent opinions, 95 journalists alone were imprisoned on such grounds by the end of June 2012, and 65 of these journalists were arrested because of they wrote on the Kurdish issue.[52] All in all, with the weakening of EU membership prospects after 2006 when the EU decided to freeze 8 chapters due to the Cyprus issue, the Turkish government has grown more authoritarian and intolerant towards critical voices, and begun to move away from the EU. This has not been politically costly for the AKP, since most of the Turkish population was convinced that Turkey would never be accepted to the EU because of its cultural background anyway.

Despite these setbacks and stalemates in Turkish-EU relations, the EU remains a relevant and influential actor for Turkey, since the EU is Turkey's biggest trading partner, and Turkey is the EU's sixth biggest trading partner.[53] The European Commission's Progress Report on Turkey indicates that Turkey has continued to align its policies with the *acquis* by achieving

[50] Luke Baker, "Erdogan's Victory Puts Icy Turkey-EU Relations to Deep Freeze", *Reuters*, March 31,2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/us-eu-turkey-idUSBREA2U13F20140331 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[51]"President-Elect Erdogan Heralds 'New Turkey' in Last Party Speech", *Reuters*, August 27 ,2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/27/us-turkey-government-idUSKBN0GR0L920140827 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[52] Senem Aydın-Düzgit and E. Fuat Keyman, "EU-Turkey Relations", p.7
[53] The European Commission, *Turkey: 2012 Progress Report*, (Brussels: The European Commission 2012): p.5 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/tr_rapport_2012_en.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2012)

progress on the free movement of goods, financial services, science, research and education.[54] However, the EU remains determined not to open the eight frozen chapters for negotiation because of Turkey's refusal to open its ports and airports to Cyprus as a requirement of the Customs Union agreement.[55] Similarly, Turkey did not recognize the Presidency of the Council of the EU during the second half of 2012 and froze its relations with the European Union, since the position of Presidency was occupied by Cyprus, a country Turkey does not recognize.[56] Nevertheless, Turkey has announced a new strategy for its EU membership, and stated that this strategy will be based on three processes: a "political reform process", a "socio-economic transformation in the accession process", and an "EU communication strategy".[57]

The prediction of whether and when Turkey will accede to the European Union is a difficult one. Because of its geographical position, its cultural background and the political instability of the Turkish state, Turkish candidacy has attracted more scrutiny and evaluation compared with other candidate countries.[58] Turkish membership to the EU is a significantly heated debate among the member countries and there are several significant arguments against membership that have been repeated by EU states since the first application of Turkey for the membership. One of these arguments challenges the "European-ness" of Turkey in terms of its geographic position, and argues that only "a small fraction" (the Thrace region) is inside of Europe.[59] However, this argument was significantly weakened when Malta and Cyprus were accepted as member states, since they were also not "technically" in the borders of the European continent. This calls into question whether the term "European" means physically

[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid, p.4
[57] "EU Minister Says Turkey's New EU Strategy to Overcome Challenges", *Today's Zaman*, 18 September 2014 http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_eu-minister-says-turkeys-new-eu-strategy-to-overcome-challenges_359112.html, (Last accessed: September 19, 2014)
[58] Carl Dahlman, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union", p.554
[59] Fatos Taifa and Benjamin Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe?", p.57

belonging to the continent of Europe, or that "European-ness" is considered as something else by the EU. This question opens the second debate that revolves around the question of the cultural similarity of Turkey to other EU countries. Catherine Macmillan argues that Turkish accession to the EU has been securitised by the French and German political leaders, who continuously emphasise the "Otherness" of Turkey compared to EU states.[60] Thus, even though cultural similarity is not a prerequisite for membership of the European Union as outlined in Copenhagen criteria, and has not been applied to candidate states other than Turkey, Turkey has often received critical statements from European leaders due to its Muslim background.[61] For example in 2000, the French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing argued that:

> "We have a problem of integration of Muslims that raises the issue of Islam in Europe. To say it is not a problem is to hide from reality. If you let one hundred million Turkish Muslims come in, what will come out of it?"[62]

D'Estaing's statement clearly clashes with the Helsinki Council's decision that "Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of same criteria applied to the other candidate states",[63] since no other candidate state is opposed due to their cultural "difference" from the EU. Dahlman argues that the fear of allowing "a large, poor Muslim nation" into the Union reflects fears of large immigrant flows from Turkey, overpopulation, the decrease in economic standards, and the danger of extremist Islamist policies.[64]

[60] Catherine Macmillan,"Privileged Partnership, Open-Ended Accession Negotiations and the Securitisation of Turkey's EU Accession Process*", Journal of Contemporary European Studies* vol.18, no.4 (2010):p.447
[61] Ibid, pp.455-457.
[62] Ibid, p.458
[63] Carl Dahlman, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union", p.554
[64] Ibid.

Indeed, one of the most significant concerns about the membership of Turkey is the EU's prediction of huge migration flows from Turkey into Western European countries. This fear is probably reinforced by the existence of significant Turkish migrant communities in some Western EU countries such as Germany and France, who also constitute the most vocal opponents of the Turkish entry into the EU. Turkey is a significantly populous country with an estimated 81,619,312 people.[65] Therefore, the EU's fear of high migration is not groundless. Dahlman argues that labour and asylum immigration from Turkey in significant numbers – though Turkish labour has been the "muscle" of the European economy in times of need – has particularly contributed to European fears of large immigration from Turkey in case of accession.[66]

In conclusion, the overall Turkish experience with the EU has repeatedly resulted in the Turkish perception that the possibility of Turkish membership is weak. Large parts of the political elite in Turkey believe that it has been treated unfairly by the European Union, and were especially offended when some of the EU states including Germany and France championed the idea of offering a "Privileged Partnership" for Turkey, rather than full membership. Not only was this scheme not offered to any other candidate states, but this offer came after Turkey had escalated its reforms to harmonize its legislations with EU standards and norms. Given that the prospects for the advantages of membership are the principle source of EU influence, the relative importance of the EU in shaping Turkish

[65] "CIA Factbook: Turkey". The Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html(Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[66] Carl Dahlman, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union", p.545

security or asylum policy is likely to be low unless the EU makes some attempts to demonstrate that the possibility of Turkish membership is still credible and alive.[67]

3. The Turkish Asylum Policy and the Influence of EU

Turkey is one of the major transit routes from refugee-producing regions to Europe, and approximately 72,000 refugees cross the Turkish borders each year to reach the European Union.[68] However, considering Turkey merely as a transit country is mistaken, since more than 1.6 million people migrated to Turkey between 1923 and 1997.[69] Especially with the significant growth of the Turkish economy in the recent decade, Turkey has become a destination country for a large amount of asylum-seekers. For example, between 1995 and January 2008, Turkey received more than 50,000 asylum applications, rejecting 9,000 of them.[70] Turkey also experienced significant refugee flows from neighbouring countries, welcoming more than 300,000 Pomaks and Turks escaping from the violent persecution of the Bulgarian regime in 1989, and more than half a million Iraqi Kurdish refugees fearing retribution from Saddam Hussein's regime fled to Turkey in 1991.[71] This section examines Turkish asylum policies and their causes, emphasise the role of previous refugee inflows to Turkey, analyses the impact of the EU, and demonstrates why Turkey is still reluctant to comply with some of the EU standards. As a candidate state, Turkey is "expected to lift the

[67] Frank Shimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no.4 (2004):pp:679-670.
[68] Alexander Bürgin, "European Commission's Agency Meets Ankara's Agenda: Why Turkey is Ready For Admission Agreement", *Journal of European Public Policy* vol.19, no.4 (2012):p.888
[69] Kemal Kirişçi, "Reconciling Refugee Protection with Efforts to Combat Irregular Migration: The Case of Turkey and European Union", *Global Migration Perspectives* no.11(2004):p.2
[70] Ibrahim Kaya, "Reform in Turkish Asylum Law: Adopting the EU *Acquis*?" *CARIM Research Reports* 16(2009):p.2
[71] Kemal Kirişçi. *Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Beyond the Limits of Hospitality*. (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2014): p. 7 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/05/12%20turkey%20syrian%20refugees%20kirisci/syrian%20refugees%20and%20turkeys%20challenges%20may%2014%202014 (Last accessed: September 15 2014)

geographical limitation, to set up reception centres for the asylum-seekers, to develop a country of origin information system, to introduce national asylum legislation and to set up a specialized unit to deal with asylum and status determination."[72] Some of these requirements were fulfilled by Turkey with the establishment of the "Law on Foreigners and International Protection" in 2013, which envisaged the establishment of a Migration Unit under the Interior Ministry to deal with asylum applications.[73] However, the Turkish government insists on preserving the "geographical limitations" clause, emphasising the limits to EU influence over Turkish asylum policy.

Instead, Turkey's previous experiences with mass influxes of refugees have been crucial factors determining Turkish asylum policy. In addition to this, the EU's continuing reluctance to share the burden on Turkey from the Syrian refugees, even having granted Turkey candidate status, and the EU's clear priority of securing its borders to prevent the refugee flow into the "Fortress of Europe" has further decreased the EU's ability to shape Turkish policy on issues relating to the asylum and migration. Considering that Turkey has hosted considerably more refugees than European states because of its geographical proximity to unstable refugee-producing countries in the Middle East, the removal of the "geographical limitation clause" has been seen as an especially burdensome move by the Turkish policy-makers.

The literature on "policy-transfer" from the EU to candidate countries predicts that reforms in the candidate countries will slow down, unsurprisingly, if the prospects of membership are

[72] Umut Aydin and Kemal Kirişçi, "With or Without the EU: Europeanization of Asylum and Competition Policies in Turkey", *South European Society and Politics* vol.18, no.3(2013):p.382
[73]"Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu (Law on Foreigners and International Protection)" *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette) no.28615 (2013). http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130411-2.htm (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

weakened.[74] However, much of this literature on the question of policy transfer focuses on the Central and Eastern European countries, which are difficult to analogise to the Turkish case since the ultimate credibility of European Union membership was not in question for these states.[75] We can argue that Turkey probably constitutes a middle-ground between such candidate countries, which will clearly join the EU at some point, and those states under the European Neighbourhood policy, with no realistic prospects for membership in the foreseeable future. Sandra Lavenex defines the policy transfer phenomenon as:

> "…a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting [in this case the EU] is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in other political setting [in this case candidate states]."[76]

Throughout the "policy transfer" period, the candidate states are expected to harmonize their legislation with the primary and secondary EU laws as pre-accession requirements.[77] Lavenex argues that because the EU's asylum policy is not complete and unified, the candidate countries are expected to keep up with a moving target; therefore asylum policy "has been primarily promoted through bilateral activities of individual member states towards their own neighbours, and following their own priorities."[78]

Turkey is one of the original drafters of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and a party of the 1967 Protocol, however, as already noted, Turkey still reserves the clause of "geographical limitation". Therefore only the asylum-seekers from

[74] Umut Aydin and Kemal Kirişçi, "With or Without the EU", p.376
[75] Ibid.
[76] Sandra Lavenex, "EU Enlargement and the Challenge of Policy Transfer: The case of Refugee Policy", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* vol.28, no.4 (2010):p.702
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid, p.704

Europe are considered as the refugees by the Turkish state, and it adopts a vague terminology of "temporary asylum-seekers" or "guests" when defining asylum-seekers from outside of Europe.[79] Turkey is not the only EU candidate state which has attempted to preserve this "geographical limitation" clause in order to protect itself from political and legal commitments in cases of large refugee inflows. Hungary also preserved the geographical limitation clause until 1998 to limit its obligations, but it had to lift this clause because of the pressures coming from the EU states, who argued that the preservation of this particular clause was not in accordance with the EU *acquis*.[80] Yet, unlike Turkey, the prospect of Hungarian membership to the EU was not in question, and lifting the "geographical limitation" clause in exchange for the eventual reward of EU membership was consequently less costly and risky for Hungary than for Turkey.

The Turkish legislation regulating asylum policy remains fragmented, and derives from two primary sources: the Geneva Convention of 1951, and various pieces of domestic legislation produced since the "1934 Law on Settlement". That law envisaged that only those of "Turkish descent and culture" (*Türk soyu ve kültürü*) would be granted refugee status, settlement and eventual citizenship in some cases.[81] On this basis, Turkish-speaking immigrants from the Balkans, and Muslim communities from the region including Albanians, Circassians, Bosnians and Pomaks were allowed to settle in Turkey within the framework of this legislation.[82] The aforementioned Pomak and Turkish refugees from Bulgaria in 1989 were also able to benefit from the Law on Settlement, and most of them were granted Turkish

[79] "Iranian and Iraqi Refugees in Turkey", European Resettlement Network,http://www.resettlement.eu/page/iranian-iraqi-refugees-turkey (Last accessed: September1 15, 2014)
[80] Sandra Lavenex, "EU Enlargement and the Challenge of Policy Transfer", p.710
[81] Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Önder, "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit? The Case of Iraqi and Syrian Refugee Flows", *Perceptions* vol.18, no.3 (2013):p.192
[82] Ibid, p.193

citizenship since they were considered as of "Turkish descent and culture".[83] The second key piece of domestic legislation determining the asylum policy of Turkey was officially titled "The Regulation on the Procedures and Principles related to Population Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum either From Turkey or Requesting Residence Permission in order to Seek Asylum from another Country" and came into force in 1994.[84] This was clearly formulated as a response to significant refugee flows between 1988 and 1991. As Kirişçi states:

> "The Regulation defined the need to respond to mass influxes of refugees before the refugees could cross the border into Turkey unless the government was to take a decision to the contrary. In the event that refugees did actually enter Turkey, the Regulation called on authorities to keep them in camps as close to the borders as possible."[85]

Prior to the introduction of this regulation, Turkey had an arrangement with the UNHCR, by which it allowed asylum seekers to stay temporarily in Turkey whilst their application was evaluated by the UNHCR. The "implicit" understanding between Turkey and UNHCR was that these asylum-seekers would be settled in a third country if their application was successful; if it was not successful Turkey had the right to deport these individuals.[86] However, Kirişçi argues that the individuals whose applications were unsuccessful often disappeared, or attempted to make their way to Europe, which convinced Turkey that its arrangement with the UNHCR was being abused by these individuals and that a more comprehensive solution for its asylum policy was needed.[87] Some of the elements of the 1994

[83] Kemal Kirişçi, "Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges" p.7
[84] Ibrahim Kaya, "Reform in Turkish Asylum Law" p.5 (Ibrahim Kaya's research on Turkish asylum policies also provides a detailed information on the Turkish legislations and regulations determining the asylum policy, as well as providing the European Union's response to these policies).
[85] Kemal Kirişçi, "Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges", p.8
[86] Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", *Middle Eastern Studies* vol.36, no.3(2000):p.12
[87] Ibid.

Regulation were amended in 2006, however, this amendment did not significantly transform Turkish asylum policy, and it still stated that only those who were of "Turkish culture and descent" could be resettled in Turkey.[88]

Perhaps more important than the influx of refugees from the Balkans, however, were the high refugee inflows into Turkey from the Middle East, especially in the Iraqi refugee influxes between 1988 and 1991. Before discussing this, however, it is important to clarify how host states perceive the incoming refugees, and under which conditions they are "securitised", i.e. considered as a potential security threat and analysed under a security framework. The literature on refugees has a general tendency to focus on the security risks refugees may pose for host countries. One of the most commonly identified issues is that refugees provide a fertile ground for recruitment by extremist groups. Those refugees who join extremist armed groups in this way are often referred to as "refugee warriors" in the literature.[89] Second, refugee camps can become beneficial for insurgent groups who go back and forth into their country of origin to fight, but whenever their resources are exhausted can hide in refugee camps and use them as a location to regroup.[90]

In 1988, Saddam Hussein's forces engaged in the infamous al-Anfal campaign against the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq, massacring more than 100,000 people, and prompting more than 60,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees to flee their country and seek refuge in Turkey. Similar to the other mass refugee groups, they became "guests" of Turkey in the Southeast region.[91] This was followed by another wave of Iraqi Kurdish refugees in 1991 who fled their

[88] Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Önder, "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit?" p.193
[89] Aristide R. Zolberg, et al., *Escape From Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989):p.275
[90] Daniel Krcmaric, "Refugee Flows, Ethnic Power Relations, and the Spread of Conflict", *Security Studies* vol.23 no.1(2014):p.183
[91] Kemal Kirişçi, "Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges" , p.7

country under fear of persecution and retaliation from Iraqi military forces after the withdrawal of the US-led coalition following the first Gulf War. The number of Iraqi Kurdish refugees was unprecedented in Turkish history at that time, and Turkey was reluctant to admit 500,000 Kurds into its territory. Krcmaric argues that states are more likely to consider refugees as security threats when the incoming refugees alter the ethnic balance of power in the state as a whole or in particular regions of the state.[92] And indeed, Turkey was having problems with its Kurdish minority in the Southeast region in the early 1990s, with clashes between the government and the Kurdish PKK insurgent group reaching its peak point between in the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, admission of a large Kurdish refugee population into Turkish territory was seen as an important security problem that could lead to the escalation of the Kurdish insurgency in the Southeast region of Turkey. Moreover, Turkey did not have sufficient financial resources to cope with such an enormous refugee population, and feared that international aid would not adequately cover the additional costs on Turkey that would be created by admission of the Kurdish refugees.[93] As a response to the mounting number of refugees along the Turkish-Iraqi border, Turkey closed its borders and stationed the Turkish military in Iraqi territory along the border to prevent Iraqi Kurds from entering Turkish territory.[94]

Not surprisingly, this provoked criticism from the international community, which especially emphasized the striking difference between the Turkish attitude towards the Iraqi Kurdish refugees and the Bulgarian refugees of 1989.[95] Kurdish refugees were even not allowed into Turkish territory, with more than 1,500 dying on the border due to inhumane conditions and

[92] Daniel Krcmaric, "Refugee Flows", 183
[93] Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Önder, "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit?",p.197
[94] Ibid.
[95] "Turkey Closing Borders to Refugees from Bulgaria" *New York Times*, 22 August 1989 http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/22/world/turkey-closing-borders-to-refugees-from-bulgaria.html, Last accessed: September 15,2014

cold.[96] As an alternative, Turkey supported the establishment of no-fly-zones inside Iraq as a response to the Iraqi crisis, and was able to gain the support of the international community on this matter. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, no-fly-zones and humanitarian corridors were established in Northern Iraq in order to avert the further violence by Iraqi forces against the Iraqi Kurdish population, and consequently preventing the inflow of Kurdish refugees to Turkey.[97] After the establishment of no-fly-zones in Iraq, most of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Turkey returned Northern Iraq.

As the international community had pointed out, the Turkish reaction to the refugees from Bulgaria differed substantially from its attitude towards the Kurdish refugees fleeing the brutality of Saddam Hussein's forces. Between 1985 and 1989, the Muslim community in Bulgaria, most of whom were Turkish, had been subjected to heavy persecution and assimilation policy. They were forced to change their names, they were banned from speaking Turkish in Bulgaria, and were prohibited from engaging in religious activities or rituals.[98] (Ironically some of these policies overlapped with Turkish policies against the Kurdish minority at the end of the 1980s, since the distinct Kurdish identity was not recognized and they were not allowed to speak Kurdish). In 1989, the persecution against the Muslim community escalated, and most of the Muslim Bulgarians were forced to leave their homes, and Turkey began to receive large numbers of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims as refugees.[99] After lifting visa requirements in June 1989 to allow the Bulgarian Turks to escape persecution, Turkey received more than 310,000 Bulgarian refugees within two

[96] Katy Long, *No Entry! Review of UNHCR's Response to Border Closures in Situations of Mass Refugee Influx*, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2010. http://www.unhcr.org/4c207bd59.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[97] Daniel Krcmaric, "Refugee Flows", p.183
[98] Edward Lawson and Mary L. Bertucci. *Encyclopedia of human rights*. (Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, 1996):p.164
[99] Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, Balkans: A Post-Communist History, (Routledge: Oxford, 2007):p.92

months. The Bulgarian refugees were welcomed and, as Europeans, they were granted the status of "refugees" and were considered of "Turkish descent and culture" by the government. However, due to the tremendous numbers of the incoming refugees and the difficulty for the Turkish economy in providing jobs and housing, Turkey eventually re-enacted visa requirements and effectively prevented further refugee flow from Bulgaria. However, the Bulgarian refugees who had arrived in Turkey were also granted interest-free loans, access to education and the right to work.[100] A third of these refugees returned to Bulgaria after the relaxation of the oppression of the Muslim minority, but almost 240,000 Bulgarians gained Turkish citizenship.[101]

The differences between the Bulgarian and Iraqi cases for Turkish policy constitute additional empirical evidence for Krcmaric's argument. Turkey considered the Iraqi Kurdish refugees as a threat to the fragile balance of ethnic groups in the Southeast region (a predominantly Kurdish region of Turkey) and settlement of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Southeast Turkey appeared to run the risk of significantly aggravating the Kurdish rebellion in the region, since refugee camps would offer fertile grounds for recruitment by armed insurgent groups.[102] The Bulgarian refugees, on the other hand, were not threatening the ethnic balance of Turkey. On the contrary, they were easily assimilated into Turkish culture and increased the number of people that belonged to the Turkish majority. Gil Loescher and James Miller argue that similarly, during the Cold War, Western countries were welcoming towards refugees from Communist countries and established substantial resettlement schemes for them, since these refugees were considered as a positive part of the struggle between the Warsaw Pact and

[100] *Human Rights Watch. What Happened to the Iraqi Kurds?*, (London: Human Rights Watch, 1991) http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/IRAQ913.htm#8 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).
[101] Ibid.
[102] Gil Loescher and James Milner, "Security Implications of Protracted Refugee Situations", *The Adelphi Papers* vol.45, no.375 (2005):p.30

NATO countries.[103] These refugees were not considered under a security framework, and were ideologically and materially supported by the Western states, who believed that the refugees from Communist regimes were "voting with their feet".[104] Such a stance was eased by the fact that those refugees who escaped the USSR-led bloc were often skilled, intelligent and well-educated intellectuals and brought valuable information about the technological development and social conditions inside the Warsaw Pact.[105] The Turkish response to the Bulgarian refugees, aside from the expressed public sympathy due to shared culture and language, was also very much in line with such Cold War thinking.[106]

However, with the end of the Cold War and eruption of the wars in the Balkans and African Great Lakes region, the refugee regimes of states, and in particular Western Europe, became highly securitised.[107] It was in this atmosphere that the European states coined the term "temporary protection status" in order to cope with the large influx of refugees from the former Yugoslavian countries. European states began to perceive such refugee influxes as a burden and potential risk for the stability of the host state, and as demonstrating the need to establish *special regimes* for the mass influx of people to EU states.[108] The European Council on Refugees and Exiles justified the establishment of "temporary protection" on practical grounds and argued that it is a necessary emergency mechanism to cope with such mass

[103] Ibid, p.24
[104] Ibid, p.24
[105] Monica Duffy Toft, "The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and Repatriation Policy", *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24 (2007):p.143
[106] Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Önder, "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit?", p.196
[107] Gil Loescher and James Milner, "Security Implications of Protracted Refugee Situations", p.25
[108] "Temporary Protection", The EU Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/temporary-protection/index_en.htm (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

influxes of people, when it is rather difficult to deal with individual asylum applications to determine who should be granted refugee status.[109]

Similarly, the increasing numbers of Syrians residing in Turkey accompanied by the international pressure on Turkey to regulate its asylum policy led Turkey to pass its most comprehensive legislation on asylum in April 2013.[110] Article 1 of the Law no.6458 (officially the "Law on Foreigners and International Protection) states:

> "The purpose of this Law is to regulate the principles and procedures with regard to foreigners' entry into, stay in and exit from Turkey, and the scope and implementation of the protection to be provided for foreigners who seek protection from Turkey, and the establishment, duties, mandate and responsibilities of the Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior."[111]

The legislation complies with most of the requirements of EU's asylum policy, in establishing a civilian unit to register asylum-seekers, but the legislation still preserves the "geographical limitation" clause and therefore effectively prevents anyone outside of Europe from being granted refugee status.[112] However, as mentioned earlier, the removal of the geographical limitation clause is an essential requirement for an EU candidate state. Thus, even though the EU provided technical assistance for the legislation of this law[113] (the UNHCR also said it supported the drafting process), it was not able to exert sufficient pressure on Turkey to see the clause removed. The law envisaged the establishment of Directorate General of Migration Management (hereafter DGMM), which will be responsible

---

[109] "Temporary Protection", The Official Website of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/81-temporary-protection.html (Last accessed:15 September 2014)

[110] Jonathan Burch, "Turkey Has New Law on Asylum But Sets Limits for non-Europeans", *Reuters*, 12 April 2013 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/12/us-turkey-refugees-idUSBRE93B0XO20130412 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

[111] "Law no.6458 Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu", *Resmi Gazete*, no. 28615, 11 April 2013. The English version of the this legislation could be found on the website of the Migration Unit which was established under Ministry of Interior Affairs. For more information: <http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng_minikanun_5_son.pdf>

[112] Jonathan Burch, "Turkey Has New Law on Asylum"

[113] The author's own interview with a high-ranking official in DGMM, Ankara, 17 July 2014.

for the registration of the asylum-seekers.[114] The legislation also authorizes the DGMM to specifically coordinate with the UNHCR and International Organization of Migration (IOM). At the moment, Syrian refugees are registered by AFAD, but this task will be soon taken over by the DGMM.

Despite the failure of the EU to shift Turkish policy regarding the geographical limitation clause, it did successfully encourage Turkey to sign, on 16 December 2013, a readmission agreement in a period when the credentials of Turkish-EU membership were low. This agreement affirmed that Turkey would take back the illegal immigrants which crossed to Europe via Turkey, in exchange the EU liberalizing its visa regime towards Turkish citizens.[115] The timing of this agreement was not coincidental, since the EU border agency Frontex had stated earlier that year that since September 2012, the "detections [of illegal immigrants on boats] in the Aegan Sea, between Turkey and Greece, [had] increased by 912%".[116] Such increasing numbers of Syrian refugees attempting to reach Europe led the EU to compromise on visa-free travel issue in exchange for the readmission of illegal immigrants back to Turkey. This equates to the EU sending tens of thousands of irregular immigrants to Turkey each year – a considerable burden, especially for the near future with perhaps two million Syrian and Iraqi refugees already in Turkey's Southeast. With France and Germany still expressing opposition to visa liberalization for Turkey,[117] the agreement seems rather

[114] The asylum seekers are currently registered by the Turkish police. In fact in my own interview with a high-ranking official at DGMM in Ankara at, I have observed that the police officers who used to register the foreigners were temporarily appointed to work at DGMM, until DGMM was able to train its newly hired "Migration Experts" on this particular issue.
[115] "Turkey, EU Sign Deals on Illegal Immigrants, Visa Free Travel", *Today's Zaman*, December 16,2013 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-334101-turkey-eu-sign-deals-on-illegal-immigrants-visa-free-travel.html (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[116] Frontex. *Annual Risk Analysis 2013*. (Warsaw: Frontex Risk Analysis Unit, 2013):p.23 http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[117] Alexander Bürgin, "European Commission's Agency Meets Ankara's Agenda: Why Turkey is Ready For Admission Agreement", *Journal of European Public Policy* vol.19, no.4 (2012):p.893

burdensome on Turkey in pursuit of uncertain gains. So, given the apparently weak prospects of Turkish membership of the EU, the signing of the agreement runs counter the general argument of most work on policy transfer – that EU influence over candidate states should be low if chances for admission are low. Negotiations between Turkey and the EU on the readmission agreement have been going on since 2002,[118] so what made it desirable for Turkey to accept such a burdensome agreement, especially since Chapter 24 of the EU *acquis* – which is directly related to the readmission agreement – remains blocked by Cyprus? Is this counter-evidence to the general argument I have been proposing, that EU influence over Turkish migration policy is relatively weak?

Domestic developments in Turkey suggest there may be another explanation here: that due to upcoming elections (the local elections and presidential elections of 2014), Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party considered that the prospect of a visa-free travel agreement could be electorally advantageous. Prime Minister Erdoğan publically stressed the significance of the potential visa-free travel agreement between Turkey and the EU for Turkish citizens after signing the readmission agreement, arguing that visa requirements should have been lifted a long time ago, and that the visa regime against Turkey only harmed the EU.[119] In addition to this, a statement by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the signing of the readmission agreement makes no mention about the legal obligations that Turkey agreed to, but underlines the importance of the potential visa-free travel agreement between the EU and Turkey.[120] Alexander Bürgin argues that Turkey needed to reform its

[118] Meng-Hsuan Chou, "The European Security Agenda and the External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Cooperation", *Perspective on European Politics and Society* vol.10, no.4(2009):p.548
[119] "EU and Turkey Agreement on Deporting Migrants and Visas", *BBC*, 16 December 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25398872 (Last accessed: 15 September 2013)
[120] "Türkiye ile AB Arasında Vize Serbestisi Diyaloğu Mutabakat Metni ve Geri Kabul Anlaşması İmzalandı" (Agreement Visa-Free Travel Dialogue and Readmission Agreement was Signed Between Turkey and EU), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ile-ab-

border management and migration policy due to increasing number of illegal immigrants in Turkey anyway, and therefore harmonization with EU asylum policy may provide the Turkish government with the necessary legitimation of such a reformation process.[121] Bürgin highlights questions over the credibility of the visa-free travel agreement between Turkey and the EU, given German and French opposition, but argues that nevertheless the agreement of visa-free travel could be a vote-winner for the Justice and Development Party.[122] The readmission agreement carries some other benefits too. According to the statement of the former Turkish Minister of European Affairs Egemen Bağış (who was still minister at the time of signing the readmission agreement), the EU will also financially assist in projects that would ensure reinforcements in Turkish border security as well as sharing the financial burden for the establishment of shelters and facilities for those immigrants who will be sent back from the EU states.[123] With Turkish borders vulnerable due to the Syrian civil war and conflict in Iraq, the financial assistance provided by the EU in order to enhance the Turkish border security is clearly significant for Turkey. In addition to this, Bağış also stressed that Turkey has been able to more than halve irregular immigration between 2011 and 2012 with the implementation of more rigid border controls.[124]

The readmission agreement is thus perhaps not quite as burdensome on Turkey overall as has been suggested in the literature, and can be explained somewhat through Turkish and AKP electoral self-interest, rather than by the power of EU influence – though such influence is

---

arasinda-vize-serbestisi-diyalogu-mutabakat-metni-ve-geri-kabul-anlasmasi-imzalandi.tr.mfa (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

[121] Alexander Bürgin, "European Commission's Agency Meets Ankara's Agenda", p.884

[122] Ibid, p.893

[123] "Turkey to Boost Border Security for Visa Deal with EU", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 16 December 2013 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-boost-border-security-for-visa-deal-with-eu.aspx?pageID=238&nID=59614&NewsCatID=338 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

[124] Ibid

clearly not zero.[125] The contrast between Turkish willingness to sign the readmission agreement and Turkey's enduring intransigence on the geographical limitation clause looks unsurprising. Though the projected burden of the readmission agreement on Turkey in terms of the return of perhaps 30,000-70,000 refugees from Europe each year is high, this number is significantly lower than the mass influx of refugees Turkey has itself received from Middle Eastern countries since 1988. Public sensitivity on this issue in Turkey is high. In an article on the readmission agreement Hurriyet Daily News immediately evidenced a concern that the agreement might bear upon the geographical limitation clause, stating that "this limitation saves Turkey from huge legal and political commitments in practice". Hurriyet managed, though, to secure a statement from a Turkish government official that the readmission agreement will not "oblige Turkey to remove its geographical reservations on the Refugee Convention, although this is something that the EU long pressed for" and which affirmed that "there will be no change in our refugee policy".[126] So the Turkish government was able to legitimate and exploit the readmission agreement precisely by emphasising its minimal implications for broader Turkish asylum policy, and its lack of impact on the geographical limitation clause.

Even Turkey's official assertions – made in the "National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis*" in 2001 – that it will ultimately lift the geographical limitation clause make clear that this will only be possible with considerably greater support from the EU as part of moves towards membership. The national programme stated that any removal of the clause would be "conditional to the introduction of 'legislative and infrastructural measures' and 'the attitudes

[125] Alexander Bürgin, "European Commission's Agency Meets Ankara's Agenda", p.884
[126] "Turkey to Boost Border Security for Visa Deal with EU", Hurriyet Daily News.

of the EU member states on the issue of *burden-sharing*'".[127] The third National Programme in 2005 reiterated this burden-sharing conditionality and argued that:

> "Turkey, which has always been subject to intense population movements, which may be equal to the sum of all movements towards of [sic] EU, should not be expected to handle issues of asylum and irregular immigration by its own. In the case of a mass population flow towards Turkey due to its geographical location other states, in particular EU member states, individually or as partners through UNHCR or other international institutions shall take necessary measures to enable an equal sharing of the burden of Turkey… Sharing should both include the financial burden and refugees/asylum seekers…The validity of Turkey's concerns of burden sharing becomes obvious when it is considered that countries making up the European Union have in recent period been working towards establishing stricter practices and policies in the field of asylum…"[128]

This statement not only shows Turkey's concerns about the insincerity of the EU for burden-sharing if Turkey is exposed to a mass influx of refugees, but also underlines the mismatch between the EU's demands from the candidate countries and its own behaviour. Interestingly, this 2005 programme also predicts the possibility of more than half a million refugees arriving in Turkey from the neighbouring Middle East or Caucasus in the near future and underlines that the EU's willingness to share the burden on this with Turkey in such case would be vital for Turkey to determine whether or not to lift the geographical limitation clause.[129] The programme also again illustrates how Turkish asylum policy is highly driven by its past experiences with mass refugee inflows. Therefore, the EU's effectiveness in asserting influence over Turkish asylum policy is significantly determined by its willingness to assist Turkey in managing humanitarian crises and mass refugee flows from the Middle East and Caucasus.

---

[127] Kemal Kirişçi, "Immigration in Asylum Issues in Turkish-EU Relations" in *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration* edited by Sandra Lavenex and Emek M. Uçarer, (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002):p.131

[128] "Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration". The European Union Ministry, http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE2TUR003_EN.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

[129] Ibid.

As the recent Syrian crisis illustrates (see next section), the EU has demonstrated very little such willingness, being instead focussed overwhelmingly on preventing the flow of illegal immigration to European borders. The EU has offered to make financial contributions in large-scale humanitarian crises, as an alternative to actually hosting the refugee population itself, but these sorts of burden are not completely substitutable, and in any case the financial support offered by the EU is minimal related to the costs of refugees on Turkey. Under these conditions, the cost of removing the geographical limitation policy remains much higher to Turkey that the costs involved in the readmission agreement. In addition, EU attitudes on immigration have undermined its symbolic authority as a normative role-model for Turkey. The Turkish government has questioned why it should liberalize its asylum policy when the EU, which repeatedly emphasises the importance of human rights in admissions negotiations with Turkey, portrays immigrants as security threats and seeks to protect itself from the liabilities of incoming refugees by transferring them to its neighbours or reinforcing border control units.

Overall, the readmission agreement does show that the EU is still a relevant actor in Turkish asylum policies. But the main drivers of Turkish asylum policy are not EU accession processes, but Turkey's previous experiences with mass influxes of refugees, its concerns about the burdens these create, and its identity-based securitised assessments of their impact. The combination of these explain how Turkey's response towards incoming refugees has changed in accordance with the religion, culture or ethnicity of the refugees, why Turkey has agreed to the EU readmission agreement, and why it continues to retain the geographical limitation clause on its legal definition of refugees.

4. Syrian Conflict, Refugee Inflow and Turkish Response

The balance between the different determinants of Turkish asylum policy has largely persisted during the massive refugee flows prompted by the current conflict in Syria. When civilian protests were violently suppressed by the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria on 25 March 2011, the Turkish government was put in a difficult position. Considering the troubled history of Turkish-Syrian affairs, with Syria once the most hostile country against Turkey in the region, the Turkish government did not wish to jeopardize its hard-won friendship with Syria. Consequently, the Turkish government initially urged Assad to comply with the demands of the Syrian population, and to allow peaceful protests to continue in the country.[130] Prime Minister Erdoğan, who had a personal friendship with the Assad family, made several calls for Assad to democratize the Syrian regime. The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the brutal suppression of demonstrations by the Syrian government that underlined that Turkey was concerned with the recent developments in its "brother" and "friend" Syria, and expressed hopes that the violence in Syria would cease soon with the reformation process promised by President Assad.[131] Turkey could not, however, associate itself for long with a regime that continuously used force again its unarmed civilian population.[132] One senior official in the Turkish Foreign Ministry comment that: "While we were speaking to the man [Bashar al-Assad] about the reformation process, he attacked Homs with all his might. Then, we had left nothing to speak about anymore… Our discussions were

[130] Semra Sevi, "Turkey's Twists and Turns on Syria", *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 18, no.1(2014):p.2
[131] "No:82 ,25 Mart 2011, Suriye'deki Olaylar Hakkında", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-82_-25-mart-2011_-suriye_deki-olaylar-hk_.tr.mfa (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).
[132] The author's own interview with a Senior official (I) from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2014, Ankara.
[132] Özlem Demirtas-Bagdonas, "Reading Turkey's Foreign Policy on Syria: The AKP's Construction of a Great Power Identity and the Politics of Grandeur", *Turkish Studies* vol.15 no.1(2014):p.143

not reflected in the resolution."[133] In the end, Turkey took a dramatic shift in its Syrian policy and became one of the most vocal opponents of the Syrian regime from August 2011 onwards.[134] In addition, Turkey opened its doors to Syrian refugees and allowed the Syrian National Coalition to open its headquarters in Gaziantep, in Turkey's southeast.

The open hostility of the Turkish government against the Assad regime resulted in several incidents between Turkey and Syria. First, a Turkish F-4 jet was downed by Assad's forces without any warning on June 22, 2012.[135] Whilst Turkey argued that the F-4 jet was in international airspace, the Syrian regime claimed that the aircraft was violating Syrian airspace. Second, in October 2012, a Syrian artillery strike killed 5 Turkish citizens at the Turkish border town of Akçakale, with Turkey retaliating by bombing certain targets in Syria.[136] Reports that Assad was supporting the PYD (the equivalent of the Turkish PKK in Syria) and that the PYD were in cooperation with the PKK in attacks on Turkey, contributed to the securitisation of the Syrian conflict for Turkey.[137] Turkey shot down a Syrian helicopter in September 2013 and Syrian military jet in March 2014, in both incidents with the claim by Turkish authorities that the Syrian aircraft had violated Turkish airspace despite continuous warnings from the Turkish side.[138]

Contrary to Turkish expectations, the Syrian war has continued since March 2011, producing strong spill-over effects in neighbouring countries, including Turkey.[139] Jordan and Lebanon

[133] The authors own interview with a Senior official (I) from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2014 Ankara
[134] Özlem Demirtas-Bagdonas, "Reading Turkey's Foreign Policy on Syria", p.142
[135] "Turkish F-4 Plane Shot Down Near Syrian Border", *BBC*, 22 June 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18554246 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[136] "5 Killed as Syrian Shell Hits Turkish Town", *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 3, 2012. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/five-killed-as-syrian-shell-strikes-turkish-town.aspx?pageID=238&nID=31590&NewsCatID=341 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[137] Özlem Demirtas-Bagdonas, "Reading Turkey's Foreign Policy on Syria", p.148
[138] "Turkey Downs Syria Military Jet in Airspace Violation*", BBC News*, 23 March 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26706417 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[139] ORSAM, *The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighbouring Countries Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations*, (Ankara: Orsam Report no.189 , 2014):p.11

have both attracted more scholarly and financial attention for the incoming Syrian refugees, given their small size and the possibly destabilizing effects of the Syrian civil war. But Turkey has also experienced considerable financial and technical difficulties in coping with the growing numbers of Syrian refugees since 2011. Turkey responded to incoming Syrians with an "open door" policy from the beginning of the crisis, and established 22 refugee camps in 10 cities over 3 years.[140] The mountainous Turkish-Syrian border is 911 kilometres long and Turkey had a visa-free travel agreement with Syria at the beginning of the crisis.[141] Even had Turkey wanted to close the borders to begin with, it would have proved very difficult to prevent Syrians from entering Turkish territory. However, despite Turkish pride in maintaining the open door-policy since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has – as in Iraq in the early 1990s – favoured the creation of no-fly-zones and humanitarian corridors inside Syrian territory in order to keep Syrians fleeing their hometown within Syrian borders.[142] Furthermore, an International Crisis Group (hereafter ICG) report indicates that even though the "open-door policy" is officially continuing, Turkey has begun to implement strict measures on incoming Syrians to restrict the number of refugees entering the Turkish territories.[143] Whilst Syrians with passport may enter Turkey without any restrictions, those without any documents are generally only allowed to enter Turkey in cases of humanitarian or medical emergencies.[144] This was confirmed by my own interview with a senior official in the Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade, who stated that several border check points had been closed including Akçakale, Akarkamış, Şenyurt and Mürşitpınar, and that only in the emergency situations was passage allowed for incoming Syrians.[145] Field research conducted

[140] " AFAD Suriye Raporu: Giriş", AFAD,https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetay1.aspx?ID=16&IcerikID=747 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[141] Mehmet Göçer et al. *Sınırlar Arasında Yaşam Savaşı: Suriyeli Mülteciler Alan Araştırması*, (Ankara: USAK Rapor, 2013): p.1
[142] Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Önder, "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit", p.192
[143] International Crisis Group. *The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire*. (Brussels: International Crisis Group Europe Report no.230, 2014): p.2
[144] Ibid.
[145] Author's own interview with a senior official in Ministry of Customs and Trade, 14 July 2014, Ankara.

by Özden also confirms these findings: many Syrians who attempted to enter Turkey from the Kilis border check-point were denied entry because they did not have the necessary travel documents.[146] Turkey has allowed huge numbers of Syrians to cross its borders, but by contrast with the Bulgarian ethnic Turks in 1989 and 1990, there has been no suggestion of permanently welcoming the refugees into Turkish society.

According to estimates by AFAD the number of Syrians residing in Turkey reached 1.1 million people in July 2014. The UNHCR's Daily Situation Report on 15th of September 2014 estimated that the total number of Syrian refugees had reached more than 1.35 million.[147] The UNHCR expects this number to reach 1.4 million by the end of December 2014 – numbers may increase further in light of recent ISIS violence. Estimates indicate that 75 percent of the refugee population consists of women and children.[148] The numbers of Syrian refugees in Turkey is far more than any refugee inflow Turkey has hosted before, and likely future growth in the number of the Syrian refugees in the region makes the sustainability of this situation in the long-run questionable.

The Syrian refugees in Turkey are notably referred as "guests" or "our brothers and sisters" by the Turkish government, which has announced that they are officially under "temporary protection" status, "a term vaguely emanating from the European Council's 2001 directive dealing with the aftermath of the mass influx into EU member states from the former Yugoslavia".[149] Temporary protection status for the Syrian refugees in Turkey meant the

[146] Şenay Özden. *Syrian Refugees in Turkey.* San Domenico di Fisole: Migration Policy Centre, 2013. http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC-RR-2013-05.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[147] "UNHCR Turkey Syrian Refugee Daily Strep", UN Refugee Agency, 26 September 2014 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).
[148] UNCHR, "2014 Syria Regional Response Plan: Turkey", 2013 ,p.3
[149] International Crisis Group, "The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire", p.3

continuation of an open-door policy, the principle of "non-refoulement" (no forcible returns), registration with the Turkish authorities, and Turkish government support for health and shelter for the Syrian refugees.[150] This legal status of the Syrian "immigrants", another term often used by the Turkish authorities, were determined according to two key documents. First, Turkey placed the incoming Syrians under "temporary protection" status based on Article 10 of the 1994 Ordinance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Second, the Turkish government issued no.62 "Directive on Receiving and Sheltering the Syrian Arab Republic Citizens and Stateless Persons Living in the Syrian Arab Republic, Who Entered Turkey for the Purpose of Mass Sanctuary" on 30 March 2012.[151] However, as Kirişçi indicates, the content of this regulation remains secret and not accessible to the public.[152] In an interview with Al Jazeera, the UNHCR spokesperson in Turkey, Carol Batchelor stated that:

> "Turkey has declared "temporary protection status" for these asylum seekers. This is an internationally recognized legal status. This means the following: a great number of people have arrived and these people are in need of protection. Turkey was the first country to declare this status. Turkey has stated that it will accept Syrians, protect them and will not force anyone to return and it has been acting in coherence with its remarks for the last 3 years."[153]

The UNHCR's praise for the Turkish government for adopting temporary protection status is not a unified position. Şenay Özden argues that persistence in Turkish officials' utilization of the word "guests" for Syrian refugees in Turkey, and refusal to grant them "refugee" status, increases the vulnerability of Syrians inside Turkey since they do not comprehend their legal status, and they fear that the government could deport them anytime.[154] Similarly national NGOs in Turkey have expressed their discontent with the vagueness of the "temporary

[150] "The Temporary Protection Status", The Official Website of Directorate of Migration, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-korumanin-unsurlari_409_558_1095 (Last accessed : September 15, 2014)
[151] ORSAM, "The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighbouring Countries, p.11
[152] Kemal Kirişçi, "Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges" , p.14
[153] "UNHCR Turkey Representative Ms. Carol Batchelor's Interview With Al Jazeera" UN Refugee Agency, 20 June 2014 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/flash_read.php?ID=186 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[154] Şenay Özden, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey", p.5

protection status" regime, and asked the Turkish government to provide a clear legal definition of the rights of the Syrian refugees, arguing that the current situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey stirs tensions with the Turkish population.[155]

Despite these legal debates concerning the status of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, the established refugee camps in the Southeast region of Turkey have received admiration from the international community. Indeed, an article in the New York Times praises the Turkish container refugee camp in Öncüpınar, Kilis, with the author of the article Mac McClelland reporting:

> "It's the nicest refugee camp in the world!" a Polish diplomat staying at my hotel crowed when I mentioned the place to him the next day. Standing with him was an Italian official; he nodded vehemently in agreement. No one I spoke to — not the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, not academics, not even the refugees — denies that the standard of living here is exceptionally high."[156]

The International Crisis Group also confirms the high standards of the refugee camps established by the Turkish government, and quotes an international official who stated that "I can clearly say the camps in Turkey are magnificent [in] the level of resources, infrastructure, services, space and security provided."[157] However, Özden provides a more cautious assessment, indicating that she was only allowed into two refugee camps throughout her field research, and on both occasions she was accompanied by a Turkish official and was not allowed to talk to any Syrian refugees within the camp.[158] Amnesty International's 2013 Report on the Syrian refugees likewise makes clear that it was not granted entry to the refugee camps, and that most national and international NGOs have been similarly

[155] "NGOs Urge Legal Definition of Temporary Resident Status for Syrians", *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 21, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ngos-urge-legal-definition-of-temporary-resident-status-for-syrian-refugees.aspx?pageID=238&nID=70737&NewsCatID=339 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[156] Mac McClelland, "How to Build Perfect Refugee Camp", *New York Times*, February 13, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/magazine/how-to-build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[157] International Crisis Group , *The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire*, p.4
[158] Şenay Özden, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey", p.12

restricted.[159] In one of my interviews, a senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that there are some limitations on the entry of researchers and NGO workers into the refugee camps because the government experienced problems with a journalist disguised as an NGO employee infiltrating one of the camps, and leaked photos that caused considerable difficulty for the families of Syrian rebels.[160]

The overwhelming attention on those Syrian refugees residing in the refugee camps obscures the fact that most Syrian refugees in Turkey live outside of the camps. The Syrian refugees have a tendency to live in Turkey's border cities due to cultural and linguistic similarities, or family ties, but they are estimated to be dispersed in 81 cities across Turkey.[161] The number of urban refugees is estimated to exceed 900,000 people according to statistics provided by AFAD.[162] However, Beşir Atalay, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, speculated that the numbers of the non-camp refugees are even higher, around 1.1 million, and that 40 percent of these refugees remain unregistered.[163] Unlike the Syrian refugees in the camps, the "urban" refugees struggle with the difficulty of fulfilling their basic needs such as shelter and food, and most do not have access to education or health facilities. In addition to this, because of financial constraints, urban refugees generally live in small apartments with 2-3 families, and according to the government estimates, one in every four lives in inadequate conditions or in

[159] Amnesty International, *Turkey: National Authorities and International Community Must Act in Partnership in order to Meet the Needs of Syrian Refugees*, (London: Amnesty International Briefing 2013): p.9. http://www.du.edu/korbel/middleeast/media/documents/AITURKEY-NATIONALAUTHORITIESANDTHEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNITMUSTACTINPARTNERSHIPTOMEETTHENEEDSOFSYRIANREFUGEES4-25-13.pdf (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[160] Author's own interview with a senior official (II) from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2014, Ankara.
[161] The author's own interview with the General Director of the Turkish Red Crescent Dr. Mehmet Güllüoğlu, 14 July 2014, Ankara.
[162] "Turkey Demands More Help on Hosting Syrian Refugees", *Agence France Presse*, August 15, 2014,
[163] "Turkish Deputy PM Concerned Over Growing Refugee Population", *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 1, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-deputy-pm-concerned-over-growing-syrian-refugee-population.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69872&NewsCatID=341 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

open spaces, and approximately 62 percent live with more than seven people.[164] They generally have to work in construction jobs or beg on the streets to earn their daily living. Since the Turkish government has not issued working-permits for all registered Syrian refugees so far, Syrian refugees have also often taken up black market jobs, work in construction jobs, or bed on the street to earn their daily living. Where they do take up jobs, they are likely to be exploited in the absence of government regulation (those Syrian refugees who entered Turkey with an official passport may obtain a work-permit after receiving their residence-permit).[165] Many urban refugees believe that they will be sent to the refugee camps if they are registered with the Turkish government.[166] Yet most of the Syrian refugees prefer to stay outside of the camps since the camps have several regulations (such as when you can leave the camp) that limits the lives of the refugees.

The Turkish government has attempted to fulfil the basic needs of the urban Syrian refugees by providing access to healthcare and education. In my interviews with government officials, they have continuously emphasized that the Syrian refugees were granted the right to use the state hospitals and register their children for education. However, one of the difficulties that Syrian refugees experience in Turkey, different from the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq or Egypt, is a linguistic barrier. Even if Syrian refugees are able to use Turkish state hospitals, they are unlikely to be able to communicate with doctors. Similarly, even if the Syrian children may go to Turkish state schools, they do not understand the medium of education.[167]

[164] UNHCR, "Turkey: Regional Response Plan 2014", p.4
[165] Turkey Eases Syrian Refugees Entry into Formal Economy", *Middle East Eye*, July 26, 2014. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-eases-syrian-refugees-entry-formal-economy-1079368480 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[166] The author's own interview with a high-ranking official in DGMM, 17 July 2014
[167] Since the teaching the Syrian children in Arabic would invoke the question on the right to be educated in the mother tongue, and this could stir significant protests among the Kurdish minority, who have been demanding the right to be educated in Kurdish language since the second half of the 1980s.

Whilst the Turkish population initially expressed sympathy towards the incoming Syrian refugees at the beginning of the refugee crisis, growing comprehension that Syrian refugees will be staying for much longer than initially expected has started to trigger hostility towards them. Syrian refugees are visible in almost every major town in Turkey, but their presence is especially visible in the border regions and the big cities. It has been a common sight even in Istanbul to see a Syrian child begging, or a Syrian family living in the parks.[168] However, since such scenes have triggered discontent among the locals of Istanbul, the municipality, in one shop-keeper's words, "swept them away" from the streets in August 2014.[169] Anti-Syrian protests still occurred in Istanbul due to the rising numbers of Syrians in summer 2014.[170] The discontent among the local populations of the Southeast, in which most of the Syrian population is concentrated, is even bigger. Reports that many Syrian women have begun to marry Turkish men as first or second wives in exchange for material support for the bride's family suggests particular problems.[171] Since polygamy is not officially permitted in Turkey, these women often marry Turkish men in religious ceremonies, which do not provide any legal rights and expose Syrian brides to exploitation.[172] A survey conducted by the Economy and Foreign Policy Research Centre (EDAM) in 2014 demonstrates rising discontent among the Turkish population about the growing numbers of Syrian refugees.[173] Almost a third (31 percent) of the participants argued that Turkey should determine a threshold for the incoming

[168] Ceylansu Yeginsu, "Ancient Haven for Refugees Sees Signs of Strain", New York Times July 31, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/01/world/europe/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-ancient-haven-sees-signs-of-strain-government-relocates-displaced-to-camps-in-south.html?_r=2 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)
[169] Ibid.
[170] "Turkey Protest in Istanbul over Syrian Refugees", *BBC News*, August 25, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28926956 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014).
[171] Constanze Letsch, "Syria's Refugees: Fears of Abuse Grow as Turkish Men Snap Up Wives", The Guardian, September 8, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/08/syrian-refugee-brides-turkish-husbands-marriage (Last accessed: September 15, 2014
[172] Ibid.
[173] Türk Kamuoyunun Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Bakış Açısı [The Turkish Public Opinion Towards the Syrian Refugees], January 2014 http://edam.org.tr/Media/IcerikFiles/12/EdamAnket2014.1.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Syrians, and close its borders once this threshold is exceeded.[174] In addition to this, 25 percent of the participants expressed their preference for Turkey to stop allowing Syrians in immediately, and 29 percent argued that Turkey should immediately stop its open-door policy *and* start sending the existing refugees back to Syria.[175] Only 11 percent of the participants expressed sympathy for the open-door policy and argued that Turkey should continue to accept Syrian refugees regardless of their number.[176] As anticipated by Turkish fears about high refugee flows discussed in sections 2 and 3, the open-door policy for Syrian refugees is thus proving costly for the AKP government: of the AKP voters who participated in the EDAM survey, only 20 percent supported the existing open-door policy.[177]

Turkish policy towards the Syrian refugees, then, is consistent with the major determinants of asylum policy identified in the previous two sections. At least initially, the refugees have not threatened to substantially disturb the ethnic or religious balance in Turkey – so the government has been willing to accept them in far greater numbers that it did Kurds in 1988 and 1991. But they have not been integrated in the way Bulgarian refugees were in 1989 and 1990.

On the EU side, the pattern of weak EU burden-sharing discussed in section 3 has likewise continued, with Turkey receiving limited assistance from the EU financially or technically in order to cope with the enormous amounts of Syrian refugees. As already noted, Turkey received the least help from the EU compared to other neighbouring countries of Syria who are dealing with significant numbers of refugees, despite Turkey being an EU candidate state. Turkey consequently expressed its discontent when the European Commission brought a

[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid.

complaint about the illegal crossing of Syrian refugees into Greece in October 2012.[178] Ahmet Davutoğlu, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed his bafflement that the EU would make an issue about 300 Syrian refugees at a time Turkey was already hosting more than 100,000 refugees.[179] The UK newspaper *The Guardian* summarizes the EU's response to the overall Syrian crisis with the words: "never was so little done by so many for so few".[180] EU policy suggests that it continues to perceive Syrian refugees, just like past refugee flows, as a security threat for the "Fortress of Europe", rather than placing political or normative emphasis on the humanitarian crisis and the need to alleviate refugee suffering. In contrast to the numbers of Syrian refugees neighbouring countries are hosting, the total amount of Syrian refugees in the EU stands at 124,000 people, or about 4% of total Syrian asylum seekers.[181] Even this number is not equally distributed among the EU states, with approximately 56 percent residing just in Germany and Sweden.[182] EU normative influence and credibility with Turkey on this issue area is unsurprisingly now extremely low.

Consistent with its past policy of preferring to bear (a portion of) the financial burden created by humanitarian crises, the EU has attempted to provide large amounts of funding whilst keeping its own refugee intake low. By December 2012 it had spent €313 million on humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees in the Middle East,[183] and by mid-2014 committed over

---

[178] "5 Killed as Syrian Shell Hits Turkish Town", *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 3, 2012. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/five-killed-as-syrian-shell-strikes-turkish-town.aspx?pageID=238&nID=31590&NewsCatID=341 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

[179] Ibid.

[180] Antonio Gutteres, "Europe Must Give Syrian Refugees a Home", *The Gurdian*, July 22, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/europe-syrian-asylum-seekers-refugees-illegal-trafficking (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

[181] By contrast Lebanon – a country of 4 million – is hosting more than 1.1 million people, whilst the number of the Syrian refugees in Jordan – a country of 8 million – reached 618,000 according to the UN estimates. The total population of Europe is over 670 million. Refugee numbers are likely to increase rapidly due to growing the threat of ISIL in the region. For more information please see the article written by the UN High Commissioner of Refugees Antonio Gutteres's piece titled: "Europe Must Give Syrian Refugees a Home", The Guardian, 22 July 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/europe-syrian-asylum-seekers-refugees-illegal-trafficking (Last accessed: September 15, 2014

[182] "UNHCR Urges Europe to Do More to Help Syrians", The UN Refugee Agency 11 July 2014 http://www.unhcr.org/53bfcd969.html (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

[183] Franck Düvell, "Turkey, the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Changing Dynamics of Transit Migration", *Strategic Sectors / Culture and Society* (2013):p.279

€2.8bn since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, including financial aid to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.[184] Yet EU contributions are low measured relative to its economic clout – in the same period of time Turkey alone has spent more than €2.6 billion on the Syrian refugees, with financial support from the international community covering only a tiny portion of these costs.[185] Indeed, of the €313 million spent by the EU in 2011 and 2012, only €25 million went to Turkey, despite it being the only EU candidate state in the region.[186] One reason for this is that Turkey initially believed that it could handle this crisis without outside assistance, since the numbers of the Syrian refugees remained "highly reasonable" from the beginning of the crisis until August 2012.[187] Turkey's decision not to allow the UNHCR to build and operate the refugee camps, but instead give this task to AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent, may have raised its own costs.[188] And even though the UNHCR generally registers incoming refugees in host countries, the UNHCR was not involved in the registration of Syrians in Turkey because of the "clash of terminology" between it and the Turkish government.[189]

Again, though, EU financial commitments appear to largely reflect its securitisation of asylum policy and the desire to prevent Turkey or other Middle Eastern countries allowing more refugees to flow into Europe. The fact that, for example, the EU spent more than €2 billion to protect its legal borders between 2007 and 2013, whereas it spent only €700 million to improve the conditions of the refugees within the EU in the same period, calls into

[184] These two figures come room different sources and may not reflect identical compilation methods.Nigel Wilson, "EU Boosts Economic Aid to Syria by €50 Million Amid "'World's Largest Humanitarian Crisis" , International Business Times, July 30, 2014 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/eu-boosts-economic-aid-syria-by-50m-amid-worlds-largest-humanitarian-crisis-1459039. (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[185] "Turkey Demands More Help on Hosting Syrian Refugees", Agence France Presse, August 15, 2014
[186] Franck Düvell, "Turkey, the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Changing Dynamics of Transit Migration", p.279
[187] The author's own interview with a junior AFAD official, 17 July 2014, Ankara
[188] Franck Düvell, "Turkey, the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Changing Dynamics of Transit Migration", p.279
[189] The author's own interview with a junior AFAD official, 17 July 2014, Ankara

question any thought that humanitarian or burden-sharing motives predominate over self-interest in this area of EU policy.[190]

EU officials have expressed appreciation of the difficulties faced by neighbouring states and have underlined the EU's commitment to be involved in humanitarian assistance. For example, Štefan Füle – the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Policy of Neighbourhood – stated that:

> "Capacities in neighbouring countries are stretched to their limits: I would like to reiterate the European citizens' solidarity with all of those affected by the Syrian crisis and the EU's commitment to support the governments and host communities of Syria's neighbours so they can deal effectively with the increasing flow of refugees."[191]

Individual EU states have also used various excuses to protect their reputation after coming under criticism from human rights organizations for their attitudes towards incoming Syrian refugees. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emma Bonino, underlined the necessity of harsh restrictions to prevent incoming refugees on the grounds that terrorists can hide amongst the refugees.[192] The British government argued that refugees will be better off staying in countries neighbouring Syria, and emphasized the significant amount of money it had allocated to the Syrian crisis.[193]

Yet the record of EU actions suggests that more self-interested motives are in play, for which the EU has received considerable criticism from sources beyond Syria's neighbouring states. UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming told newspapers that the EU has only welcomed a "miniscule" amount of Syrian refugees, whereas the neighbouring countries of Syria had

---

[190] Banu Şen. "Amnesty International Blames EU for Turkey's Refugee Burden", *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 11, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/amnesty-international-blames-eu-for-turkeys-refugee-burden.aspx?PageID=238&NID=68967&NewsCatID=359 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).
[191] "EU Increases Syria Aid by 215 M", *Noninvite*, September 24, 2014. http://www.novinite.com/articles/163566/EU+Increases+Syria+Aid+by+EUR+215+M (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)
[192] Daniel Trilling, "The Road to Nowhere", *New Statesmen* 17-23 January 2014, p.36
[193] Ibid

reached their "saturation point".[194] Moreover, Fleming argued that some of the EU countries have imposed terrible conditions on incoming Syrian refugees, detaining them or, in the case of Bulgaria, Greece and Spain, rejecting the Syrians and attempting to send them back in inhumane conditions.[195] Amnesty International, in its report *Human Cost of Fortress of Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe's Borders,* argues that even though the human rights of migrants and asylum-seekers are notional priorities of the EU's external migration policy, most arrangements with third countries again focus on the prevention of irregular immigration and promotion of readmission agreements to send illegal migrants back to the country of transit or origin.[196] Human Rights Watch's most recent report indicates that at least 43 Syrian refugees were forced backed to Turkey from Bulgaria, and there are several reports of ill-treatment against Syrian refugees including beatings or stripping them of from their belongings.[197] This report demonstrates that Bulgaria, an EU member state, violated one of the most essential principles of the Geneva Convention ("the non-refoulement" principle), and violated the requirements of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights.[198]

Again, then, the contributions and behaviour of EU states have hardly been sufficient to generate substantial new political capital in influencing Turkish policy. They have reinforced the EU's past tendency to shirk a substantial share of the refugee burden with Turkey – the

[194] Tom Miles. "UN Asks Europe to Take Syrian Refugees as Region Saturated" , Reuters, July 11, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/us-syria-crisis-refugees-idUSKBN0FG1ZZ20140711 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).
[195] For instance, some Syrian refugees died on their journey back from Greece after the Greek government shipped them away to their transit country. The UNHCR stated that these sort of treatments are unacceptable. For more information see: Tom Miles. "UN Asks Europe to Take Syrian Refugees as Region Saturated" , Reuters, July 11, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/us-syria-crisis-refugees-idUSKBN0FG1ZZ20140711 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).
[196] Amnesty International. *The Human Cost of the Fortress of Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe's Borders*. London: Amnesty International, 2014. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EUR%20050012014_%20Fortress%20Europe_complete_web.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).
[197] [197] "Bulgaria: New Evidence Syrians Forced Back to Turkey", Human Rights Watch, September 18, 2014 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/18/bulgaria-new-evidence-syrians-forced-back-turkey (Last accessed: September 19, 2014)
[198] Ibid.

main block, in the Turkish government's eyes, on it removing its geographical limitation clause in asylum policy. This, in combination with the weak prospects of EU membership for Turkey in the short to medium term, make the weakness of EU influence on Turkish refugee policy unsurprising, and likely to continue into the foreseeable future.

5. Concluding Remarks

Whilst writing this paper, the number of the Syrian refugees in Turkey has escalated significantly due to ISIS/"Islamic State" violence in Syria and Iraq over the latter half of 2014, with Turkey receiving more than 160,000 refugees over the last week (from the date of this paper's submission).[199] The Kurdish population in Syria, who have generally preferred to take refuge in Iraq's northern Kurdish provinces, began to escape to Turkey after the recent attacks by ISIS against Kobani. The UNHCR has warned that because of the advancements of ISIS into the Kurdish territories in Syria, the number of the Kurdish refugees might increase to 400,000 in a short period of time.[200]

These recent developments further complicate the effects of Syrian civil war in Turkey, increasing the proportion of refugees who are Kurdish. In light of the attention that, as I have emphasised, Turkish policy makers have paid in the past to the impact of refugees on local ethnic or religious balances, this may soon provoke unwillingness from the Turkish government to continue to take more refugees.[201] The Kurdish population of Turkey remains disaffected with authoritarian Turkish policies directed against them, and has protested

[199] Jonny Hog, "Turkey Refugee Crisis Deepens as Islamic State Besieges Syrian Border Town", *Reuters*, September 28, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/28/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-refugees-idUSKCN0HN0KE20140928 (Last accessed: September 29, 2014). Also look at: "No Syrian Refugee to Be Left Behind". Daily Sabah, September 27, 2014. http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/09/27/no-syrian-refugee-to-be-left-behind (Last accessed: September 29, 2014).
[200] Jonny Hog, "Turkey Refugee Crisis", *Reuters.*
[201] Kurds Enter Turkey from Syria to Flee Islamic State", BBC News, September 20, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29295921 (Last accessed: September 24, 2014

against the government's attitude towards the Syrian civil war, indeed, the Kurds have even accused Turkey of assisting the Islamic State in their attacks against the Syrian Kurdish population.[202] Syrian Kurds have a close relationship with the Turkish PKK (some of them even joined the ranks of the PKK in its struggle against Turkey), and support independence for the Kurds. In parallel, the Syrian Observatory has stated that more than 300 Kurdish fighters have left Turkey to join forces against ISIS in Kobane.[203] This suggests that it will not be difficult for Turkish policy makers to securitise enlarged refugee flows of Kurds into Turkey.[204] Indeed, whilst Turkish officials state that they are the only true friends of the Syrian refugees, Turkey has already demanded the creation of buffer zone inside the Syrian territory to prevent further refugee flows.[205] In addition to this, Turkey recently closed some of its border crossings with Kobane to prevent PKK forces from joining Syrian Kurds and become victors in the Syrian civil war. President Erdoğan recently announced that the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has now reached approximately 1.5 million, and that Turkey has spent more than $4.5 billion to accommodate these refugees.[206] The President also claimed that the international financial assistance to Turkey for Syrian refugees, including the assistance from the UNHCR, stands at around $150 million.[207] Certainly financial assistance from the EU to Turkey has remained small compared to the amount of money Turkey has spent on the Syrian refugees. Turkey's increasingly visible reluctance to take further refugees is thus consistent with the basic drivers of asylum policy I have identified.

---

[202] Guney Yildiz, "Turkey's PKK Peace at Risk From Syria Crisis", *BBC News*, September 28, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29403550 (Last accessed: September 29, 2014).
[203] "Syria Crisis: 66,000 Flee Islamic State into Turkey", *BBC News*, September 20, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29294656 (Last accessed: September 24, 2014
[204] Guney Yildiz,, "Turkey's PKK Peace at Risk"
[205] "Deputy PM: Turkey Only True Supporter of ISIS-Hit Kurds", *Daily Sabah*, September 26, 2014.http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/09/26/deputy-pm-turkey-only-true-supporter-of-isishit-syrian-kurds (Last accessed: September 26, 2014)
[206] Erdoğan: Ey Dünya PKK'ya Niye Sesin Çıkmıyor?", *Hurriyet*, September 28, 2014. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27291625.asp (Last accessed: September 29, 2014).
[207] Ibid.

This paper has argued that the EU's influence over the Turkish asylum policy is limited by three main factors: a) the apparently weak possibility of Turkish membership to the EU, b) the mismatch between the EU's demands from candidate countries and its own behaviour in asylum and migration policy, and c) its unwillingness to share an equal portion of the burden faced by Turkey when it is exposed to large migration flows from its unstable neighbours. These three factors are, of course linked: on the EU side, it has been emphasised that Turkey must remove its geographic limitation clause on refugees if it is to become a member, and Turkey has emphasised that it cannot do this unless the EU agrees to more equal burden-sharing in the face of refugee influxes. I have suggested that in lieu of heavy EU influence, Turkish asylum policies instead reflect its past experiences with mass refugee flows, and its varying attitude towards incoming refugees reflecting ethnic, religious and cultural sensitivities and preferences. Whilst Turkey has expressed solidarity with Sunni Syrians, who buttress Turkey's existing religious majority and lack particular connotations of ethnic animosity, it was highly unwilling to admit Kurdish refugees in 1991, deeming them a threat to the "balance" of ethnic communities in its fragile Southeast region. Even the Syrian refugees, who have begun to be a source of some tension and resentment amongst the Turkish population, have not been treated as warmly as the Bulgarian refugees of 1989, who received the warmest welcome from the Turkish population and state because they were deemed of "Turkish descent and culture."

Recent developments indicate that the Syrian civil war is not likely to be settled soon and therefore the numbers of Syrian (and Iraqi) refugees is likely to grow even more. If a humanitarian crisis is to be avoided, and if the EU wishes to remain a significant actor in shaping the policies of Middle Eastern states, it will need to significantly increase assistance to Syria's neighbouring countries, including Turkey. This should be both in terms of financial support and actually accepting more refugees into Europe. The EU is likely to remain only a

secondary actor in determining Turkish asylum policy as long as its refusal to share the burdens created by refugee flows continues. Turkey, for its part, ought to exercise restraint in its impulse to securitise some refugees, and refuse to allow ethnic and religious biases to colour refugee policy in ways that may end up imposing intense misery and insecurity on those fleeing violence in Syria and Iraq. Such an approach from the EU and Turkey would alleviate refugee suffering, and may somewhat improve EU-Turkey relations. But they will not undermine the deep obstacles to EU influence over Turkish asylum policy rooted in the stalled prospects for Turkish EU membership. Either way, therefore, this paper predicts that Turkey will preserve the geographic limitation clause for the near future after the Syrian refugee crisis.

References

Books:

Bideleux, Robert and Ian Jeffries. *Balkans: A Post-Communist History*. Routledge: Oxford, 2007.

Kemal Kirişçi, "Immigration in Asylum Issues in Turkish-EU Relations" in *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration* edited by Sandra Lavenex and Emek M. Uçarer, p.131

Lawson, Edward and Mary L. Bertucci. *Encyclopedia of Human Rights*. Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, 1996.

Zolberg, Aristide R. et al. *Escape From Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Articles:

Agnantopoulos, Apostolos. "The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Explaining Greek Support for Turkey's EU Accession". *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 13, no.1 (2007):pp.67-87

Avcı, Gamze. "The Justice and Development Party and the EU: Political Pragmatism in a Changing Environment". *South European Society and Politics* 16, no.3(2011):pp.409-421

Avcı, Gamze. "Turkey's Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euroscepticism?". *Turkish Studies* 4, no.1 (2010):p.149-170

Aydin, Umut and Kemal Kirişçi. “With or Without the EU: Europeanization of Asylum and Competition Policies in Turkey”. *South European Society and Politics* 18, no.3(2013):pp.375-395

Bürgin, Alexander. “European Commission’s Agency Meets Ankara’s Agenda: Why Turkey is Ready For Admission Agreement”. *Journal of European Public Policy* 19, no.4 (2012):pp.883-899

Chou, Meng-Hsuan. “The European Security Agenda and the External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Cooperation”. *Perspective on European Politics and Society* 10, no.4(2009):pp.541-559.

Dahlman, Carl. “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Geopolitics of Enlargement”. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 45, no.8(2004): 553-574

Demirtas-Bagdonas, Özlem. “Reading Turkey’s Foreign Policy on Syria: The AKP’s Construction of a Great Power Identity and the Politics of Grandeur”. *Turkish Studies* 15 no.1(2014):pp.139-155.

Dincer, O.B and Mustafa Kutlay. “The Arab Spring: A Game Changer in Turkey-EU Relations?”. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 14, no.4 (2013):pp.418-430

Duffy Toft, Monica. “The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and Repatriation Policy”. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24 (2007):pp.139-157.

Düvell, Franck. “Turkey, the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Changing Dynamics of Transit Migration”. *Strategic Sectors / Culture and Society* (2013):p.278-281

Erdemli, Özgül. "Chronology: Turkey's Relations with the EU". *Turkish Studies* 4, no.1(2010):pp.4-8

Eylemer, Sedef and İlkay Taş. "Pro-EU and Eurosceptic Circles in Turkey", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 23, no.4(2007):pp.561-577

Ihlamur-Önder, Suna Gülfer. "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit? The Case of Iraqi and Syrian Refugee Flows". *Perceptions* 18, no.3 (2013):pp.191-228

Kirişçi, Kemal. "The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European-Turkish Relations". *Turkish Studies* 4 no.1 (2003):pp.79-106.

Kirişçi, Kemal. "Reconciling Refugee Protection with Efforts to Combat Irregular Migration: The Case of Turkey and European Union". *Global Migration Perspectives* no.11 (2004):pp.1-14

Krcmaric, Daniel. "Refugee Flows, Ethnic Power Relations, and the Spread of Conflict". *Security Studies* 23 no.1(2014):pp.182-216

Lavenex, Sandra. "EU Enlargement and the Challenge of Policy Transfer: The case of Refugee Policy". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28, no.4 (2010):pp.701-721

Loescher ,Gil and James Milner. "Security Implications of Protracted Refugee Situations". *The Adelphi Papers* 45, no.375 (2005):pp.23-34

Macmillan, Catherine. "Privileged Partnership, Open-Ended Accession Negotiations and the Securitisation of Turkey's EU Accession Process*". Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 18, no.4 (2010):pp.447-462

Muftuler Bac, Meltem. "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of European Union". *South European Society and Politics* 10, no.1 (2005):pp.17-31

Onis, Ziya and Caner Bakir. "Turkey's Political Economy in the Age of Financial Globalization: The Significance of the EU Anchor". *South European Society and Politics* 12, no.2(2007):pp.147-164

Onis, Ziya. "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations". *Government and Opposition* 35, no.4 (2000):pp.463-483

Park, William. "Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki- to Ankara?". Mediterranean Politics 5, no.2 (2007):pp.31-53

Rumford, Chris. "Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform". *Mediterranean Politics* 51, no.68 (2002):pp.51-68

Sevi, Semra. "Turkey's Twists and Turns on Syria", *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 18, no.1(2014):pp.

Shimmelfenning Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe". *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no.4 (2004):pp.669-687

Taifa, Fatos and Benjamin Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let Turkey In?". *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18, no.1(2007):pp.52-74

Yalcin Mousseau, Demet. "Is Turkey Democratizing with EU Reforms?:An Assessment of Human Rights, Corruption and Socio-Economic Conditions*". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*.12, no.1 (2012):pp.63-80.

Official Documents and Statements:

Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, United Nations Treaty Series, available from http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Frontex. *Annual Risk Analysis 2013*. Warsaw: Frontex Risk Analysis Unit, 2013. http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Parliamentary Assembly. "*Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants in Turkey*", European Union Parliamentary Resolution 1429, 2005. http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/ERES1429.htm (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

The European Commission, *Turkey: 2012 Progress Report*. Brussels: The European Commission, 2012 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/tr_rapport_2012_en.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2012)

The European Commission. *Turkey: 2013 Progress Report*. Brussels: The European Commission, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/turkey_2013.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"About Refugees", UNHCR Regional Office, http://unhcr.org.au/unhcr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=179&Itemid=54 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"Turkey: 2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile", The UN Refugee Agency. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"The Association Agreement, 12 September 1963", *Official Journal of the European Communities* vol.16, no. C113, 24 December 1973. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"Turkish-EU Relations", The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa (Last accessed: September 15,2014

"Helsinki Summit Presidency Conclusions 2008", The Council of European Union. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"EU-Turkey Relations", The EU Commission: Enlargement.,http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm Last accessed: September 15,2014

"Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu (Law on Foreigners and International Protection)" *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette) no.28615 (2013). http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130411-2.htm (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"Temporary Protection", The European Commission Home Affairs, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/temporary-protection/index_en.htm (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"Temporary Protection", The European Council on Refugees and Exiles, http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/81-temporary-protection.html (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"Türkiye ile AB Arasında Vize Serbestisi Diyaloğu Mutabakat Metni ve Geri Kabul Anlaşması İmzalandı" (Agreement Visa-Free Travel Dialogue and Readmission Agreement was Signed Between Turkey and EU), Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ile-ab-arasinda-vize-serbestisi-diyalogu-mutabakat-metni-ve-geri-kabul-anlasmasi-imzalandi.tr.mfa (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration". The European Union Ministry, http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE2TUR003_EN.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"No:82 ,25 Mart 2011:Suriye'deki Olaylar Hakkında", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-82_-25-mart-2011_-suriye_deki-olaylar-hk_.tr.mfa (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"Syria Regional Refugee Response: Turkey", The UN Refugee Agency http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (Last accessed: September 29, 2014)

"The Temporary Protection Status", The Official Website of Directorate of Migration, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-korumanin-unsurlari_409_558_1095 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"UN Urges Europe to Do More to Help Syrian Refugees", The UN Refugees Agency, July 11, 2014 http://www.unhcr.org/53bfcd969.html (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Newspaper Articles:

"Çıkarken Kapıyı Kapadık" (We Closed the Door When We Left). *Milliyet*, December 15, 1997, p.21.

Croft, Adryan and Justyna Pawlak, "EU Rebukes Turkey on Crackdown by Delaying Entry Talks". *Reuters*, June 25, 2013. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/25/uk-turkey-protests-eu-idUKBRE95O0BC20130625 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014).

"EU Minister Says Turkey's New EU Strategy to Overcome Challenges". *Today's Zaman*, September 18, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_eu-minister-says-turkeys-new-eu-strategy-to-overcome-challenges_359112.html (Last accessed: 18 September 2014).

Baker, Luke. "Erdogan's Victory Puts Icy Turkey-EU Relations to Deep Freeze", *Reuters*, March 31, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/us-eu-turkey-idUSBREA2U13F20140331 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"President-Elect Erdogan Heralds 'New Turkey' in Last Party Speech". *Reuters*, August 27 ,2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/27/us-turkey-government-idUSKBN0GR0L920140827 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"Turkey, EU Sign Deals on Illegal Immigrants, Visa Free Travel". *Today's Zaman*, December 16,2013. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-334101-turkey-eu-sign-deals-on-illegal-immigrants-visa-free-travel.html (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"EU and Turkey Agreement on Deporting Migrants and Visas". *BBC*, December 16, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25398872 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"Turkey to Boost Border Security for Visa Deal with EU",.*Hurriyet Daily News*, December 16, 2013. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-boost-border-security-for-

visa-deal-with-eu.aspx?pageID=238&nID=59614&NewsCatID=338 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"Turkish F-4 Plane Shot Down Near Syrian Border". *BBC*, June 22, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18554246 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"5 Killed as Syrian Shell Hits Turkish Town". *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 3, 2012. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/five-killed-as-syrian-shell-strikes-turkish-town.aspx?pageID=238&nID=31590&NewsCatID=341 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"Turkey Downs Syria Military Jet in Airspace Violation", *BBC* News, March 23, 2014http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26706417 . (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"NGOs Urge Legal Definition of Temporary Resident Status for Syrians". *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 21, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ngos-urge-legal-definition-of-temporary-resident-status-for-syrian-refugees.aspx?pageID=238&nID=70737&NewsCatID=339 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014).

McClelland, Mac "How to Build Perfect Refugee Camp", *New York Times*, 13 February 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/magazine/how-to-build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html (Last accessed: 15 September 2014.)

"Turkey Demands More Help on Hosting Syrian Refugees", *Agence France Presse*, August 15, 2014.

"Turkish Deputy PM Concerned Over Growing Refugee Population". *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 1, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-deputy-pm-concerned-over-growing-syrian-refugee-population.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69872&NewsCatID=341 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014).

"Turkey Eases Syrian Refugees Entry into Formal Economy", *Middle East Eye*, July 26, 2014. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-eases-syrian-refugees-entry-formal-economy-1079368480 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014).

Yeginsu, Ceylansu. "Ancient Haven for Refugees Sees Signs of Strain". New York Times July 31, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/01/world/europe/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-ancient-haven-sees-signs-of-strain-government-relocates-displaced-to-camps-in-south.html?_r=2 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014)

"Turkey Protest in Istanbul over Syrian Refugees". *BBC News*, August 25, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28926956 (Last accessed: 15 September 2014).

Letsch, Constanze. "Syria's Refugees: Fears of Abuse Grow as Turkish Men Snap Up Wives", *The Guardian*, September 8, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/08/syrian-refugee-brides-turkish-husbands-marriage (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

Gutteres, Antonio. "Europe Must Give Syrian Refugees a Home". *The Gurdian*, July 22, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/europe-syrian-asylum-seekers-refugees-illegal-trafficking (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

Şen, Banu. "Amnesty International Blames EU for Turkey's Refugee Burden". *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 11, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/amnesty-international-blames-eu-for-turkeys-refugee-burden.aspx?PageID=238&NID=68967&NewsCatID=359 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

Miles, Tom. "UN Asks Europe to Take Syrian Refugees as Region Saturated" , Reuters, July 11, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/us-syria-crisis-refugees-idUSKBN0FG1ZZ20140711 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

"EU Increases Syria Aid by 215 M", *Noninvite*, September 24, 2014. http://www.novinite.com/articles/163566/EU+Increases+Syria+Aid+by+EUR+215+M (Last accessed: September 25, 2014).

Jonny Hog. "Turkey Refugee Crisis Deepens as Islamic State Besieges Syrian Border Town". *Reuters*, September 28, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/28/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-refugees-idUSKCN0HN0KE20140928 (Last accessed: September 29, 2014).

"No Syrian Refugee to Be Left Behind". Daily Sabah, September 27, 2014. http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/09/27/no-syrian-refugee-to-be-left-behind (Last accessed: September 29, 2014).

"Kurds Enter Turkey from Syria to Flee Islamic State". BBC News, September 20, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29295921 (Last accessed: September 24, 2014).

Yildiz, Guney. "Turkey's PKK Peace at Risk From Syria Crisis". *BBC News*, September 28, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29403550 (Last accessed: September 29, 2014).

"Syria Crisis: 66,000 Flee Islamic State into Turkey". *BBC News*, September 20, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29294656 (Last accessed: September 24, 2014).

"Deputy PM: Turkey Only True Supporter of ISIS-Hit Kurds", *Daily Sabah*, September 26, 2014.http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/09/26/deputy-pm-turkey-only-true-supporter-of-isishit-syrian-kurds (Last accessed: September 26, 2014).

"Erdoğan: Ey Dünya PKK'ya Niye Sesin Çıkmıyor?", *Hurriyet*, September 28, 2014. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27291625.asp (Last accessed: September 29, 2014).

"Yabancılar ve Uluslarası Koruma Kanunu (Kanun no.6458)", Resmi Gazete,

Reports from Non-Governmental Organizations and Think-Tanks and United Nations:

Amnesty International. *Stranded: Refugees in Turkey Denied Protection*. London: Amnesty International, 2009. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/001/2009/en/0f217291-cae8-4093-bda9-485588e245d8/eur440012009en.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

Kirişçi, Kemal. *Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Beyond the Limits of Hospitality*. Washington: Brookings Institute, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/05/12%20turkey%20syrian%20refugees%20kirisci/syrian%20refugees%20and%20turkeys%20challenges%20may%2014%202014 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

Kaya, Ibrahim. *Reform in Turkish Asylum Law: Adopting the EU Acquis?* CARIM Research Reports, 2009. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11849/CARIM_RR_2009_16.pdf?sequence=2 (Last accessed: September 15,2014)

Long, Katy. *No Entry! Review of UNHCR's Response to Border Closures in Situations of Mass Refugee Influx*. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2010. http://www.unhcr.org/4c207bd59.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

Human Rights Watch. What Happened to the Iraqi Kurds? London: Human Rights Watch, 1991. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/IRAQ913.htm#8 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014).

ORSAM. *The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighbouring Countries Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations* (*Report no.189)*, Ankara: ORSAM, 2014.

Gocer Mehmet et al. *Sınırlar Arasında Yaşam Savaşı: Suriyeli Mülteciler Alan Araştırması*. Ankara: USAK Rapor, no.13-04, May 2013.

International Crisis Group. *The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire* Brussels: International Crisis Group Europe Report no.230, 2014. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/230-the-rising-costs-of-turkey-s-syrian-quagmire (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Özden, Şenay. *Syrian Refugees in Turkey.* San Domenico di Fisole: Migration Policy Centre, 2013. http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC-RR-2013-05.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Amnesty International. *Turkey: National Authorities and International Community Must Act in Partnership in order to Meet the Needs of Syrian Refugees.* London: Amnesty International, 2013. http://www.du.edu/korbel/middleeast/media/documents/AITURKEY-NATIONALAUTHORITIESANDTHEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNITMUSTACTINPARTNERSHIPTOMEETTHENEEDSOFSYRIANREFUGEES4-25-13.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Amnesty International. *The Human Cost of the Fortress of Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe's Borders*. London: Amnesty International, 2014. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EUR%20050012014_%20Fortress%20Europe_complete_web.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Aydın-Düzgit, Senem and E. Fuat Keyman, "EU-Turkey Relations and the Stagnation of Turkish Democracy", *Global Turkey in Europe Working Paper* 02 (2011): pp.1-24 http://www.iai.it/pdf/gte/gte_wp_02.pdf (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

Websites:

"CIA Factbook: Turkey", Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)

"Iranian and Iraqi Refugees in Turkey", European Resettlement Network,http://www.resettlement.eu/page/iranian-iraqi-refugees-turkey (Last accessed: September1 15, 2014)

"UNHCR Turkey Representative Ms. Carol Batchelor's Interview With Al Jazeera" UN Refugee Agency, 20 June 2014 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/flash_read.php?ID=186 (Last accessed: September 15, 2014)