

T.C.
ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GRADUATE PROGRAM

**THE US AND ETHNIC CONFLICT BETWEEN ARABS AND KURDS IN
IRAQ SINCE 2003**

Master Thesis

Shirwan Hamid Muhammed

ANKARA-2015

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
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
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
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ÖZET

Muhammed Shirwan H. 2003 den beri Süregelen Etnik Kökenli Arap ve Kürt çatışmaları ve Birleşik Amerika, Ankara, 2015.

Arap ve Kürtler arasındaki etnik temelli çatışma Saddam Hüseyin rejimi sonrasında yaygınlaşarak arttı. Bu tezin temel amaçları arasında Birleşik Amerikanın bölgedeki etkin politikalarını anlamak ve analiz etmek bulunmaktadır. Irak'ın karmakarışık etnik yapısında BAAS rejiminin baskın bir yapıya sahip olması, Irak merkezi etnik çatışma ortamını arttırarak, Birleşik Amerika politikacılarının etnik çatışma bakışlı ve merkezi yönetsel iç şiddet çatışmaları önleyici bakış açıları yansıtılacaktır. Ayrıca , uluslararası ilişkiler, uluslararası sistem ve Irak'ta etnik çatışmalar arasındaki çok çeşitli bağlantılar da incelenecektir. Uluslararası ilişkiler ve sistemine göre etnik çatışmaların nedeni, bölgedeki cehalet seviyesinin yüksekliğidir. Bu tez çalışmasında, buna benzer bazı konulara açıklık getireceğiz. Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki, tek kutuplu dünya düzeninde, politik değişimleri ele alarak Ortadoğu'daki etnik problemleri göstermeye yardımcı olacaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Etnik çatışma, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Arap ve Kürt çatışması, yeni Irak, Amerikan Dış Politikası

ABSTRACT**The US AND ETHNIC CONFLICT BETWEEN ARABS AND
KURDS IN IRAQ SINCE 2003**

Muhammed, Shirwan H.

M.A, International Relations Department

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr.Cenk Aygöl

2015

Ethnically based conflict between Arabs and Kurds widely increased in Iraq's post-Saddam Hussein regime. Therefore, this thesis's primary objective is to analyze the responses of the US policy toward this conflict. Navigating the U.S. policymakers' reactions and their outlook on internal ethnic violence in Iraq, evaluating the evolution of ethnic strife since the rule of Baath Party, and domestic security dilemma in Iraq's complicated society are thoroughly presented. Furthermore, it has wide array linkages with international relations, international system, and causes of ethnic conflict in Iraq. It begins by covering the ignorance of ethnic conflicts by theories of international relations or even by great powers. In order to verify the validity of this, we explained several examples. The thesis then goes on to show the nature of ethnic dispute at the time of the Cold War, in a unipolar world, during political transition, and ethnic problems motive in the Middle East.

Keywords: Ethnic conflict, IR, Kurds-Arabs conflict, New Iraq,

American Policy

To the memory of my mother

Zainab Ali

1957-2005

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Last, but not least, I am deeply indebted and grateful to my wife, Dia Ali, and my son Ranw, who have always stood by me. Thanks for their endurance over the many hours that I spent alone working on this thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

This MA thesis aims at examining the United States reaction to the question of ethnic conflict in Iraq's lacked political stability and after Saddam Hussein's regime had ceased to exist. The argument, which is putted forward in the thesis, is highlighted into two ways. First, in the last decade there has been a strong desire among various groups (as principal actors) in the new Iraq to use political transition, the weakness of central government, and ethnically based conflicts to advance their political interests. Second, the U.S. shifts policy in dealing with ethnic strife in the post-Saddam era in comparison with treating such issue in other countries, such as in the Balkans or Africa. Washington paid particular attention to Iraq's domestic troubles since it is one of the richest oil producers, and has an important geographic portability in the region. The explanatory framework of the thesis presents a realist explanation for ethnic conflicts. It gives a comprehensive account of intrastate conflicts in world politics. The analyses not only cover the nature of intranation disputes during the bipolar world, but also discuss domestic conflicts that have influenced the ensuing years after the end of the Cold War.

Background

The level of ethnic conflict is different from one country to another one. For this reason, researchers have dissimilar definitions about this issue. Some of academics described intra-nation ethnic conflict as a disagreement among variety ethnic communities over unquestionable significant political, economic, cultural, territorial, and social matters.¹ From the standpoint of other researcher's the concept of ethnic conflict mentioned like an extensive universal phenomenon through determining the objective conditions of its emergence. It depicted as all kind of massive violence, clash, struggle, and strife between and among heterogonous rivalry

¹ Michael E. Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. (New Jersey, USA : Princeton University Press, 1993), 5.

ethnic groups.² When two or more different ethnic groups notice that their group's interests are contradictory, they aggressively try to achieve their goals that, finally, lead to brutal violence.

Ethnic conflict, like a form of group dispute, is extensively challenged multiethnic states after World War II. Specialist in this field argued that the basic premise of ethnic conflicts theory are related to the fact that organized ethnic groups widely used violence for earning strategic goals.³ Academically, one of the biggest challenges that confronted the appropriate definition of ethnic conflict is the considerable confusion between nationality and ethnicity, those two overwhelmingly used as the alternative of each other.⁴ After the fall of Nazi Germany, precisely in the 1950s and for several years' great efforts has been predominantly devoted to the study of nationalism, and at the same time a range of studies particularly focused on the cases of minority. However, during that time, very few studies can be found in the subject that addresses the phenomena of intrastate antagonism. Indeed, a watershed moment in ethnic conflict studies dates back to the late of 1970s. Since then, interesting and systematized approach, conducting deep analysis, and indicating western researchers have developed prim concepts of the ethnic conflict theory.⁵

In the post-World War II, once Western colonial powers began to disappear in Third World countries, ethnic conflicts continually produced the enormous majority of wars ever. Similarly, because of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia's break up in 1991 and 1992, several ethnic conflicts erupted, and local tensions between diverse ethnic groups continued to grow.⁶ Some data, which were acquired by professional researchers in ethnic conflict studies, provided strong evidence that between 1945 and 2001, around 50 ethnically based conflicts occurred globally.⁷ Communal rivalries together with ethnically based conflicts consisted five of the twenty-three

² Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (California: University of California Press; Second Revised Edition, 2001), 95.

³ Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Responses* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 5.

⁴ Mukhtar Senggirbay, "Main Approaches to the Difintion of Ethnic Conflict." *International Journal of Academic Research* 3:1 (2011): 890.

⁵ Cordell and Wolff, "Ethnic Conflict," 25.

⁶ Yahya Sadowski, "Ethnic Conflict." *Foreign Policy* 111(1998): 12.

⁷ Stefan Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective*(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5.

wars that just took place in 1994 and on account of such internal disputes about 27 million civilians have been displaced.⁸

Statement of the Problem

Even though in much of previous academic literature portrayed that the U.S. policymakers on the basis of geographical importance, protecting its national interest; and humanitarian reasons have become reflected upon multiethnic states' internal ethnic conflicts after structural political changes (Shultz and Schmauder, 1994; Lugar, 1994; Davis and Moore, 1997; Yoon, 1997; Farkas, 2003; Kurth, 2004; Ercan Yilmaz, 2007). However, with regard to Iraq's ethnic groups' conflict, the U.S. not only increasingly concerned, but also it seemed totally disconcertingly.

This thesis is guided by the following question: how has the United States responded to the Kurds-Arabs ethnic conflict in the light of Iraq's political transition since 2003? Moreover, this thesis provides a greater understanding in terms of identifying indicators behind American policy towards domestic disputes in the post-Saddam era, and accordingly, we can overreach the framework of ethnicity complex matter and transform our understanding about how great powers shape their foreign policy towards local ethnic conflicts. Finally, together with generating accurate insights about the magnitude of Iraq's ethnic groups conflict phenomena in the U.S. policy, this thesis adds straightforward political dimensions concerning the roots of ethnic conflict in a liberated Iraq.

Methodology

In essence, this MA thesis depends on qualitative method in nature and its prime objective is analytical. For examining the U.S. policy toward intergroup ethnic conflict in Iraq, in-depth descriptive investigate more often has being proposed. First chapter of the thesis discusses the explanatory framework. Here the status of ethnic conflict in international relations being outlined, and close attention has been paid to

⁸ Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." *International Studies Quarterly* 38:3 (1994):350.

ethnic conflict's argument under the theoretical idea of security dilemma approach, and realisms' explanations of such conflict. In this chapter, the focus of attention is also on the nature of ethnic conflict during a bipolar world and political transformation after the termination of the Cold War. As well, I considered the consequences of third parties intervention in local ethnic conflicts, and the prospects of the Middle East's ethnically based conflicts.

The second chapters pivotal concern is to delineate those factors which widely elevated the ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds during and after the collapse of Saddam regime, and it describes how this phenomenon being used by various ethnic and terrorist groups to achieve their political aims. The goal here is to demonstrate how the politicization of ethnicity, the Kurdish question, and Arabization policy at the time of Baathist regime deepened ethnic problems. Further analysis on the dimensions of ethnic conflict in the post-Saddam era have been conducted by looking at de-Baathification policy, the new political system, territorial disputes, and targeting religious and ethnic minorities by terrorist groups as a new version of ethnic wars.

The remainders of the thesis is devoted to present, estimate, and evaluate the reflection of the US handling policy with relation to domestic ethnic disputes in Iraq. I started with investigating Washington's response and involvement in connection with ethnic antagonism following the end of the Cold War, and in particular in the Balkans and The Horn of Africa. Previous U.S. actions are been analyzed in order to illustrate motivated factors that generated the United States reactions or interventions in the indicated areas of ethnic conflicts. In this chapter, particular attention is paid to the United States response on the recent increase of ethnic strife in Iraq, and it focuses on three reactions: stability over change, avoiding partition project, and peace crafting between conflicting ethnic groups to decrease the dangerous of ethnic conflicts.

CHAPTER I

1. THE EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

This chapter will examine the phenomena of ethnic conflict from the standpoint of international politics. Foremost the focus will be on the nature of ethnic conflict in the international relations subject area. In the beginning, I start to investigate the security dilemma's notion along with the effect of the realist school of thought of international relations upon ethnic conflict. The next topic will devote to demonstrate ethnic conflict in the age of bipolarity system in which the central question will be on superpowers' treatment of this matter. The linkage between political transition process in deeply heterogeneous societies and the rise of ethnic conflict comes next. Ensuing that, furthermore, the influence of external state interventions in ethnic issues, and how the state exploits ethnic conflicts for its interests are analyzed. Finally, I explain the Middle East's origins of sectarian and ethnic disputes and its impact on the region's proliferation of events.

1.1 Ethnic Conflict In International Relations

Over the years, enormous international relation experts were disdained the power of nationalism in terms of shaping the modern state system, and the conflicts between its constituent units. In the field of comparative politics, furthermore, many important strands were overlooking this basic question: how the struggle over political power fuels the flames of ethnic and civil wars.⁹ In a similar fashion, during the Cold War's ideological battle, various international relations theorists ignored the domestic political environment that characterized most divided societies owing to the fact that they treated the state as a unitary actor that pursue national interests and international relation as the interaction of sovereign states.¹⁰ Consequently, solely limited guidance to understand the phenomenon of ethnic conflict was provided by

⁹Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 199.

¹⁰Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, "Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*, ed. Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1.

international relations theories. In other words, international relations arena not only failed in the direction of adequately addressing with the ethnicity and racial conflict's consequences in its theories, but also largely ignored the existence of ethnicity. It pretended that ethnicity would disappear as societies modernized and the nation-state became more established.¹¹ In short, it is possible to conclude that theories of international relations have not succeeded to determine the phenomenon of ethnicity as a significant power. Doubtlessly, within an anarchic and unpeaceful international system, these theories mostly focused on two things: first, the importance of investigating material conditions like individual or group's power capacity as a way to determinant their behavior among a state, and then concentrating on state's and economic powers vital role.¹²

The emergence of ethnic nationalism in non-modern, disintegrated, and deeply divided societies which generated massive human suffering was associated with the fundamental change in international system. Around the world, both political system and the growth of economy substantially and simultaneously are overwhelmed by the brutality of intergroup conflict nature.

As a challenging problem, ethnic antagonism instigated neighboring countries to amplify their intervention in internal affairs of the ethnically divided societies. On top of that, it is intimidate regional and global security and constituted problems for their stability. To be sure, since the end of international crisis and wars (World War I and II), and ideological conflicts (capitalism and socialism), ethnic disputes came to the scene as a preoccupation for decision makers and accounted for like a vital issue for a state.¹³ It should be pointed out that since the decline of the Soviet state; ethnic conflict pervaded the fields of politics and international relations, and whereby, as groundbreaking element elevated to their center of disciplines, and as a case in point, it's appearance as seemingly the primary source of political instability both

¹¹Robert C. Oberst, "The Impact of International Diffusion on the Escalation of the Sri Lankan Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*, ed. Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004),165.

¹²David Carment, "The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics: Theory, Policy and Early Warning." *Third World Quarterly* 15:4 (1994), 557.

¹³David Carment, Patrick James, Zeynep Taydas, "The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: State, Society, and Synthesis." *International Studies Review* 11:1 (2009): 64.

domestically and internationally.¹⁴ From that point onwards, the concern of the future of cooperation between states, human rights, the threat of discrimination in international politics, and attempts to preserve global peace influenced scholars in international relations to construct remedy for ethnic conflicts. Some of these scholars, contrary to popular belief, hold the view that there are clear-cut ways to attribute, for instance like modernization mechanism, in the minority racial group's assimilation among dominant cultures. Thereby, bringing a collective identity into existence not only unify heterogeneous ethnic countries citizens, but also espouse to set aside the roots of racial antipathy.¹⁵

There are multiple factors in terms of the expansion of concern among the methods of international relations around ethnic dispute's dilemma. First, throughout liberalism and socialism's competing ideologies struggle from 1945 to 1991, little attention by these belief systems was paid to the rights of a minority. On the one hand, the liberals deemed that minority rights idea not relevant with individual equity, and on the other hand, the Marxists elaborated the idea of adhering nationalism and labor class's fight together. Second, social scientists in the west were explained their analyses based on the hypothesis that when a nation becoming modernized and its minority groups strongly integrated, ethnic strives in a short time will come to naught. At the same time, very much the attention was paid to the process of nation-building and assimilation for the purpose of eschewing inter-communal violence.¹⁶

It is necessary to recognize that while integration between states gained much more attention by international relations discipline; however, the realist tradition of international relations has paid considerable concentration to the sovereignty question of a state inasmuch as state like a figure of political institution is still a primary and powerful actor in world affairs. In contrast, much attention has not been devoted to the particularity of ethnic conflict as a main reason for the degradation of

¹⁴ Adrian Guelke, *Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2004), 2.

¹⁵ Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict* (USA: Pearson, Fourth Edition, 2010), 25.

¹⁶ S. Ryan, "Explaining Ethnic Conflict: The Neglected International Dimension." *Review of International Studies* 14:3 (1988):162.

a state from the within.¹⁷ The next subsection will find out the influence of both realists and domestic security dilemma upon the phenomena of ethnic conflict in greater details.

1.1.1 Ethnic conflict under the security dilemma

Because of the Cold War's antagonist nature: the military race among superpowers and the existence of theoretical hegemony which was dominated by realist and neo-realist schools, the security dilemma in international politics have played unprecedented role. At a broader theoretical point of analysis, the integral part of the security dilemma ascertains that the intent of one state's power maximization, leads to increased security threat perceived by a second state. Consequently, either reinforces security and amasses power by one state, or the backlash of the other, apparently, proved as political misgivings by each parts.¹⁸ While in the bipolarity's time system, security dilemma's approach played a fundamental role in terms of explaining the emergence and increasing international conflicts,¹⁹ however, with the finish of the Cold War, it is important to indicate that, inter-group's hostility outbreak paved the way for manifesting ethnic security dilemma oneself. In the light of these realities, local and regional anarchy was a byproduct of the collapse of multiethnic states, by which all members of the community realized that the seeds of insecurity within their society were prolific. In like manner, missing central authority undoubtedly will lead to pursue security vacuums by ethnic and racial groups and eventually social conflicts being investable. Moreover, solidarity among small ethnic groups will begin to rise and individuals try to provide safe havens by adhering more tightly to their ethnic groups.²⁰

The concept of security dilemma is essentially fundamental starting point to analyze the outbreak of racial clash between rivalry ethnic groups. According to the core of security dilemma's approach, the constant concern upon the future of states

¹⁷ Ryan, "Explaining Ethnic Conflict," 163.

¹⁸ Paul Roe, "Misperception and Ethnic Conflict: Transylvania's Societal Security Dilemma." *Review of International Studies* 28:1 (2002):58.

¹⁹ Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma* (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2005) 25.

²⁰ Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "Intra-State Conflicts in the Post Cold War Era." *International Journal on World Peace* xxiv:4 (2007): 20.

security and guaranteeing its survival is a result of the absence of overreaching sovereign body. With the existence of such self-reliant, abhorrence, and anarchy ascendancy, it is governments function to provide safety either for their own, or for its citizens.²¹ In this sense, the ethnic security dilemmas explanation holds the premise that, under the situation of states failure or states breakdown, all ethnic groups would fear for their life and property.²² Moreover, under those circumstances, the consensus view seems to be that each rival ethnic group consistency will reckon that their interests outflanked by rigorous pitfalls. Referring to this claim, it is important to realize that, security dilemma delineates a situation in which various impetus have precipitate to push multiethnic groups not only to recourse to hard power, but also to involve in squabble.²³ More to the point, the collective fear of the future by ethnic groups have being motivated by local anarchy. The key point is that when ethnic groups' fears for their security begin, there and then, a pugnacious feeling start to grow, irresolvable and prodigious opaque quandary by which accumulate, and foreseeable aggression that might happen. In keeping with this, at the outset of domestic security dilemma, the emergence of a moribund state will appear, ethnic groups fearful become more aggrandize, and disputes cannot be extinguish.²⁴

In fact, within international relation disciplines the emergence of ethnic security dilemma closely is linked to the collapse of multiethnic states. According to the realist theory, as a long-standing school of international relations, anarchy's resultant make states predominant solicitude being the issue of security.²⁵ However, when the breakup of a state occurs, as a result of political crisis, one or several groups immediately could realize the fact that they are responsible for granting their own security.

²¹David Carment, Patrick James, and Zeynep Taydas, "The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: State, Society, and Synthesis." *International Studies Review* 11:1 (2009): 66.

²²Anthony Oberschall, *Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 3.

²³David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." *International Security* 21:2 (1996):52.

²⁴ Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear," 41.

²⁵Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 35:1(1993): 28.

Under this circumstance, when an ethnic group is inclined to boost its security, in contrast, this action leads to diminish the effectiveness of another ethnic group's safety. Hence, the more ethnic groups perceived of being intimidated, the more likely to huddling and developing its security.²⁶ From realists' point of view, after an existing state splits apart, ethnic groups relationships begin to look like those among states in international system. In other words, the variance between defensive and offensive ethnic mobilization disappears, and neighbors kill neighbors in order to make sure that they will possibly not being killed in the future.²⁷ In a nutshell, for the realist tradition, ethnic groups' reliance upon providing their security is essentially interpreted as a product of the absence of an effective government within the state, and, immensely, in the world politics it delineated as a condition of self-reliant.²⁸ Of course, the foregoing discussion implies that the realist explanation of ethnic conflict have two specific traits. On the one hand, they view the increase of ethnic tension as a by-product of anarchy. On the other hand, because of their lack of a theory of nationalism, they cast ethnicity only in broad casual terms of as a spur to violent ethnic conflict.²⁹ Accordingly, regardless of ethnic security dilemma approach, realists and neo-realists has been criticized over their failure to explain how other factors, such as; domestic policy, ethnic group behavior, political entrepreneur and ancient hatreds can exacerbate ethnic conflicts. While having powerful government to terminate ethnic conflict backed by some of the neo-realists, however, they miss that ethnic violence can occur even in stronger states.³⁰

Overall, the concept of security dilemma in international relations discipline is central. This paradigm, under the condition of state collapse, has explained the root causes of ethnic strife. The previous analyses have shown that when it comes to the attached fear of ethnic group's security in the future, the security dilemma will arise. As claimed by realists, in such state of affairs, safeguarding the security of ethnic,

²⁶William Rose, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses." *Security Studies* 9:4 (2007): 2.

²⁷Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," in *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 276.

²⁸Roe, "Mispercption and Ethnic Conflict," 64.

²⁹Kenneth D. Bush and Fuat Keyman, "Identity-Based Conflict: Rethinking Security in a Post-Cold War World." *Global Governance* 3:3 (1997): 314.

³⁰Rose, "The Security Dilemma," 9.

national and religious groups, are requiring by themselves. For the sake of preventing the outbreak of ethnic violence in such situations, realists advocate a strong government.

1.1.2 Explaining ethnic conflicts in a bipolar world

The post-World War II era witnessed ethnic conflict's presence in multiethnic societies that lacked political stability. The fundamental truth of this time is that, ethnic violence, specifically, in the Third World and in the underdeveloped countries smoothly diffused. Although in the international system's structure (which divided into two camps), Proliferating Mass Destruction Weapons (such as nuclear weapons), did not allow direct quarrel among great powers, but this was not true for patron countries.³¹ As an essential starting point, when the bloody ideological wars within client states (for instance, like Mozambique, Guatemala and Peru) immensely occurred, most of the conflicts overwhelmingly had an implicit ethnic base.³² And more significantly, the reaction of the U.S. and former Soviet Union as two principal actors in world politics most likely were shaped by the pursuit of national interest and ideological preferences toward these states. Along similar lines, one explanation that advanced by scholars is that, during the Cold War neither ethnic conflict, nor nationalism vanished completely. Arguably, in the one hand, because of the encompass enmity between the western and eastern both of nationalism and ethnic strives were suppressed, and on the other hand, they were enhanced by the association of great powers and their nuclear policy of deterrence.³³ An important implication of these findings, nevertheless, is that thirty-two ethnic conflicts between different ethnic groups from dissimilar civilizations were took place during the polarization of East and West, including fault line wars in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and South-Central Asia.³⁴ To point out, an important implication for these findings is that crises might engulf superpowers when intensified intergroup

³¹Carment, "Ethnic Dimension," 564.

³²Frances Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 5.

³³ Tanja Ellingsen, "Colourful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:2 (2000): 244.

³⁴Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster Publisher, 1996), 254.

conflicts escalate. To a very large degree, when local and regional crises transfer into major wars, the international system structure will affect the involvement of superpowers in these crises.³⁵

Throughout the Cold War, superpowers' intervention upon intrastate ethnic clashes greatly accentuated the political instabilities in the Third World. In most cases, in the form of proxy wars, they were largely exported their sustained bipolar intense rivalry to the region. In other words, together with providing substantial and significant sources, such as, financial, political, and military aid to governments and insurgents in breakable polities in volatile regional environments. The rivalry of superpowers was extremely exacerbated ethnic tensions within the Third World.³⁶ On logical grounds, there is compelling reason to argue that both the US and the preceding Soviet Union were afraid of clients (governments or insurgent groups) vacuum in strategic areas. In coping with the issue of stability, by and large, they were attempted to prevent the collapse of multiethnic aligned states and being involved to redrawn political boundaries. They were afraid of the fact that the outcome of such unintended situation that might have an effect on their security preference, and eventually play a crucial role to damage Moscow/ Washington interests, or stimulus each of them to intervene in uncontrollable turbulent events in a way that is possible for them to pull out.³⁷ More to the point, superpowers assertiveness in terms of looking after stability is rooted in the importance of the geo-strategic value of some particular regions to themselves. For instance, the United States as a superpower, increasingly, had an obvious interest in international political stability, particularly in the Cold War international system that was defined by nuclear deterrence and prevailing assured annihilation. In general, the superpowers were afraid that the breakdown of multiethnic communist governments perhaps accelerates unforeseeable atomic warfare between Soviet-American. Further, in the

³⁵Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, "The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era." *International Studies Quarterly* 41:1 (1997): 65.

³⁶Mohammed Ayoob, "State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure," in *Leashing The Dogs of War: Conflict Management in Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hamson and Pamela Aall. (Washington D.C. United States Institute of Peace Press, Second Edition, 2008), 100.

³⁷Mohammed Ayoob, "The New-Old Disorder in the Third World." *Global Governance* 1:1(1995): 67.

case of breaking down of multiethnic pro-western countries, the outbreak of an immense military rivalry intensified between the US and the Soviet Union (as occurred after Portuguese empire's collapse).³⁸

Ultimately, among the superpowers' client states, ethnic conflicts had become more widespread inasmuch as of the nature of the bipolarity of the Cold War. Not surprisingly, those conflicts all were based in states that are ethnically divided societies. The escalation of proxy conflicts generated feelings of standoff between superpowers as parties were increasingly relied on outside support. In most instances, those situations were greatly aggravated insecurities in the Third World.

1.1.3 Transitions to ethnic conflict after political changes

The post-Cold War period witnessed substantial political change within non-western multiethnic societies. An important ramification of these progresses is that ethnic conflicts began to be aroused by political transitions of power. In many countries, the emergence of separate ethnopolitical groups, movements and ethnic militias were a sign of aggravated ethnic and nationalist violence, and as ethnic sentiment evolved national cohesion and political integration being threatened.³⁹ Following the fall of communism, for instance, political changes in Yugoslavia notably paved the way for intensifying ethnic violence, and its consequence contributed significantly to the disintegration of this country. Actually, the common argument for the decline of multinational states sees that a frightened ethnic minority groups might been convinced by the fact that proclaiming self-government guaranteeing more than necessary security for them in comparison to persist with remaining in a country which are dominated by antagonistic racial ethnic groups.⁴⁰

Of central concern, therefore, many experts in the field of ethnic conflicts study generally tended to assume that a variety of factors, such as, the alteration of politics,

³⁸ James Kurth, "Partitions Versus Union: Competing Traditions in American Foreign Policy." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15:4 (2004), 817.

³⁹ Eghosa E. Osaghae, "Political Transitions and Ethnic Conflict in Africa." *Journal of Third World Studies* 21:1 (2004): 221-22.

⁴⁰ Rose, "The Security Dilemma," 23.

bringing together heterogeneous ethnic groups, and the role of groups' own multidirectional political leaders, significantly, have key roles in transforming long-standing grievances into open and strife conflicts.⁴¹ For whom, the movement of multiethnic societies from authoritarian into democratic political systems might stimulate the probability of brutal local conflicts. More directly, democratization process strengthens ethnopolitical conflict. Yet, in multiethnic countries, the introduction of democratic proceedings has a tendency to cause political championship to exist on the lines of ethnicity. Consequently, violent ethnopolitical disputes are more predictable in lately democratized governments in comparison to well-established democratic countries.⁴² On these grounds, we can argue that the shift to democracy by multiethnic states could possibly smooth the way to ethnic and communal conflict. Hence, the growing numbers of ethnopolitical competitors could exploit the opportunities that are supplied by democratic process to justify ethnic rebellion and protect their groups' collective rights in the political framework.⁴³ Moreover, the consensus view seems to be that multiethnic states' transition to democracy is inevitably accompanied by the quick increase of ethnonationalistic movements. The evolution of ethnic groups during structural changes as political subjects to take care of groups interests constitute one of the major factors of democratization in multiethnic societies.⁴⁴

In short, the level of ethnic conflict among diverse ethnic groups after the Cold War largely increased as a result of political changes. Ethnic violence together with ethnonational group's transmission, in most cases, is a byproduct of shifting totalitarian into democratic political system. By and large, unstable democratic orders increased the likelihood of exacerbated conflict between different ethnic groups.

⁴¹Felice D. Gaer, "Ethnic Conflict and Preventive Diplomacy: New Challenge for International Organizations, Nation-States and Nongovernmental Organizations." *American Society of International Law* 88 (1994): 147.

⁴²Demet Yalcin Mousseau, "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 38:5 (2001): 552.

⁴³Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." *International Studies Quarterly* 38:3 (1994): 361.

⁴⁴Algis Prazuaskas, "Ethnic Conflict in the Context of Democratizing Political Systems: Theses." *Theory and Society* 20:5 (1991):596.

1.1.4 External intervention in ethnic conflict

According to western competent in ethnic conflict studies, international relation theories have failed to produce or develop a more desirable conceptual and theoretical framework for the purpose of explaining the interaction of those factors that either originate from the inside of a county, or reaching beyond national boundaries and causing the intervention of the third party.⁴⁵ Notwithstanding such criticism, the realist theory of international relations highlights the probability of great powers intervention in intrastate ethnic conflict when they feel that there are massive interests for their interventions. In contrast, the outlook of the liberals are grounded on the assumption that the global order after the Cold War, together with worldwide trouble's manifestation, such as ethnic conflicts, demands major powers to associate in safeguarding under-developing countries stability. Neo-realists, on the other hand, generally argued that in the Third World arena of conflict there are few areas to be considered important to justify great power interventions.⁴⁶

In practice, soon afterward the Cold War, local intergroup collision's question of intervention essentially raised the sources of regional and international political instability. While the eruption of ethnic conflict as a remarkable worldwide phenomenon of global politics has challenged the global peace and stability, but at the same time, these internal ethnic tensions notably paved the way and provided opportunities for third party intervention.⁴⁷ At a broader level, yet, there are three main arguments with regard to third party intervention in intrastate conflicts. Firstly, in most cases, the reasons that derive third party (especially highly homogeneous states) to intervene in ethnic conflicts is increasingly associated with the issue of security and stability escalation. These intervention efforts to push back potential threats and to bring an end to ethnopolitical fights motivated by the assumption that those ethnically based conflicts may play a crucial role on states security and national interest. For this reason, it assumed that reaching, or sweeping intergroup conflict

⁴⁵Mary-Alice C. Clancy, "Democracy and Security Special Issue: Foreign Intervention in Ethnic and Ethnonational Conflicts." *Democracy and Security* 7:2 (2011):86.

⁴⁶Deepa Khosla, "Third World States as Intervenor in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security." *Third World Quarterly* 20:6 (1999):1147.

⁴⁷David Carment and Dane Rowlands, "Three's Company: Evaluating Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42:5 (1998):572.

into national frontier not in any states' interest.⁴⁸ Secondly, in a similar vein, from the perspective of intervener, another straightforward goal behind the intervention policy, to a large extent, is primarily depending upon securing political stability in a particular area of the world. To achieve this goal, moreover, one preferred strategy that would be more likely is to facilitate contain overt military aggression through cease- firing encouragement, or by resisting group's erasing.⁴⁹ Thirdly, when a state fails to resolve its internal ethnic conflicts problem, the probability of regional security dilemma would increase since it paves the way for the third government to interference. As a point of view, policy decision makers in the third side may be decide to carry out intervention in domestic conflicts by exploiting internal weakness opportunities and ethnic cleavages within other states boundaries.⁵⁰

Leaving aside the theoretical orientation, it is important to realize that internal ethnopolitical disputes and tensions have had a fundamental impact on insecurity in the time and thereafter the Cold War. The competitions among these intra-nations not only have had an effect on the countries in which they occur, but also gradually extend its influence over neighbors and even the entire regions. Herein, the motivations behind the intervention by the international community, international organizations, or major powers were resulting from ending the sources of instability.⁵¹ Before considering the rate of intervention attempts by international characters, it is indispensable to note that the type of international system, the levels of competition, and the balance of power politics between great powers can affect the decision of intervention. In other words, the characters of the international system in terms of whether it is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, and the level of democracy of both countries (a state who wants to interfere and a one which is being targeted) have

⁴⁸ Ada Huibregtse, "External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict." *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations* 36:3 (2010): 273.

⁴⁹Patrick M. Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:2 (1996): 341.

⁵⁰David Carment and Patrick James, "Two-Level Games and Third-Party Intervention: Evidence from Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans and South Asia." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 29:3 (1996): 522.

⁵¹Colin Irwin, "Using Public Opinion Polls to Support Peace Processes: Practical Lessons from Northern Ireland, Macedonia, Cyprus, Israel and Palestine," in *Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies*, ed. Adrian Guelke.(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 164.

implications on intervention.⁵² As an illustration, Cold War's last decade witnessed (76 cases) of intervention were implemented by the great powers, however, (10 cases) of which were carried out under the auspice of UN. More to the point, compared to other great powers, the US participated in the most intervenes (in 35 cases). The Soviet Union comes with the second class by intervening in 16 situations. European states, like France and the UK, having 10 and nine embroilment in those local disputes.⁵³ Moreover, besides these data and arguments as has been noted, in numerous intervention efforts mix strategies in conjunction with economic punishments and military forces being used. Nevertheless, when the superpower rivalry ended, the process of intervention in is not restricted to great powers, many international organizations like the UN, NATO, and EU played essential roles to contain domestic conflicts.⁵⁴

On the whole, the foregoing analysis implies that the emergence of ethnically based conflicts has challenged regional security dilemma. As a result, to safeguard and uphold stability, third parties intervention in disputes being facilitated by these internal conflicts.

1.2 Underlying The Middle East's Ethnic Conflict

For decades, Middle East's never-ending disputes consistency yielded academic's much more attentiveness. Political competition as a dominant type of dispute between intrastate and interstate nationalistic groups in such a conflict-ridden region is seen like the greatest threat to state stability. Since ethnic groups are at odds with each other over political issues and rivalry for power and resources, sectarian tensions have hampered the process of democratic state-building. It goes without saying that, however, during the twentieth century, the nature of domestic conflicts in the region was changed dramatically. First of all, Middle East's geopolitical transition factor played a major role in terms of forming ethnic identities in different

⁵²Jonathan Fox, Patric James, and Yitan Li, "Religious Affinities and International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts in the Middle East and Beyond." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 42:1(2009):164.

⁵³Regan, "Successful Third-Party Intervention," 345.

⁵⁴Ibid., 340.

sorts. As a turning point, the Ottoman Empire's decay meant that the (Umma)'s basic concept – Muslim's unlimited socio-religious community – no longer being consistent with any political structure existence.⁵⁵ Secondly, whereas understanding conflict in the past generally concentrated on the notion of nationalism and internal conflicts, such as ethnic conflict, but in the time after the Cold War, proliferated spotlight continued towards religion as a source of conflict.⁵⁶

Indeed, studies of ethnic conflict have demonstrated that, in such a region, religion played a pivotal role regarding the outbreak of ethnic conflicts. For instance, in the afterward of the Cold War, depending on the religion legitimacy, Islamic groups were associated with 109 ethnic disputes. More specifically, like smaller groups, these groups participated in 38 conflicts, as a dominant group in 33 cases, and in 38 situations when the both sides of the conflict were Islamic.⁵⁷ Moreover, during the same time, of the 104 civilizational ethnic conflicts, Islamic groups being involved by the considerable amount of 80.8%. However, Islamic groups in the time of the Cold War involved with ethnic strife by 83.1%.⁵⁸

Finally, under the unitary political ideologies in the Middle East, for instance like Arab nationalism, ethnically based demands for political and other rights have been subdued. Subsequently, after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the ill-founded nature of state establishment and autocratic states strive to enhance their power and authority among highly synthetic borders has enforced the question of ethnic identity underground without getting rid of them.⁵⁹

Regardless of the strong level of integration between the Islamic religion and culture, over the decades and since Middle East countries gained their political independence, the most prolonged conflicts between ethnic groups and nationalism

⁵⁵Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires Central Europ, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923*(New York: Routledge, 2001),189.

⁵⁶ Jonathan Fox, "Religious Armed Conflict and Discrimination in the Middle East and North Africa: An Introduction." *Civil Wars* 15:4 (2013):407.

⁵⁷Jonathan Fox, "Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West." *Journal of Peace Research* 38:4 (2001): 463.

⁵⁸Ibid., 464.

⁵⁹Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East Since 1945*(New York: Routledge, Third Edition 2008),74.

of the predominant population created serious problems.⁶⁰ As a matter of fact, multiethnic states tried to use different ways to solve these irritating troubles. For example, Iran's religious and cleric regime during Khomeini's period (December 1979-June 1989) has based its policies toward minority ethnic groups – like Kurds, Arabs, Azeris, Turcomans, and Baluchis – upon the mandatory of Islamic unity. At the time of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit (1974, 1977, 1978-1979), Turkish left-of-center government continued to endorse Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's secularist doctrines against the challenge of Islamic rights and ethnic separatist groups (Kurds, Alevis, and Lazes).⁶¹ In Iraq and Syria, furthermore, through the ideology of Baathism, pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, the Arab Socialist Baath party calls for Arab unity. Under the banner of these ideologies, ethnic Kurds, Turcomans, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Kaka'is faced systematic forced integration. Indeed, on the basis of these evidences, it seems fair to argue that forced integration policy, seeking for unification primarily inspired by the spirit of nationalism. On the basis of this principle, a myriad of collision between dominant groups and other subordinate ethnic groups were deeply rooted in these societies.⁶²

As a result of internal tensions, the unity and territorial integration of the Middle East's country has been earnestly threatened. In Arab countries, regardless of the apparent ideology of pan-Arabism, remarkable intranation ethnic conflicts in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania are existing and active. Nearly 35 percent of these countries inhabitants are being different from the Arab majority in terms of language, religion, sect, and ethnicity). So, unsurprisingly, the nature of conflicts within these states in recent years had been flared up into severe armed tensions.⁶³ While Arabs in the region existing with less than 10 percent of the world's population, but since 1945, some data revealed that

⁶⁰Iliya F.Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3:3 (1972):303.

⁶¹R.Hrair Dekmejian, "The Anaomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives." *Middle East Journal* 34:1 (1980):11-12.

⁶²Harik, "Ethnic Revolution," 311.

⁶³Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in the Arab World." *International Social Science Journal* 50:156 (1998): 230.

the region have seen a one fourth of the entire our planets' ethnically based internal conflicts.⁶⁴

Owing to the fact that domestic tensions in the Near East tended to be permanent over a lengthy period, the proportion of such conflicts in the region is dramatically different compared to the other regions. According to a data that yielded by ethnic conflict researchers, from 1960 to 2003, the median of intergroup tensions in the Middle East is much higher than the Americas, Europe, and the Caucasus, but lower than sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.⁶⁵ The significant point here is that many factors, such as, the structure of authority, geography, religion, and language participated to deepen the segregation of different ethnic groups in the Near Eastern. The problem is that neither predominant racial categories, nor minorities had a common language, homeland, religious denomination, history, and the unity of ethnic mosaic.⁶⁶ And above all, since states came into view, the people of the Middle East thought of themselves not as an individual within these new born countries, but like members of their clans, tribes, families, villages, Arabs, and last but not least Muslims.⁶⁷ In the light of latter facts, when Israel was established in 1948, the nature of conflicts shifted on the road to ethnoreligious crisis. For instance, after the start of the Palestinian Intifada in 1987, religious armed conflict overshadowed Arab-Jewish tensions. Elsewhere in the region, ethnic minorities such as the Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, they use religion from time to time for their opposition movements.⁶⁸

In sum, after gaining political independence, the problem of ethnicity, and internal based ethnic conflicts seemed on the ascendant in the Middle East's multiethnic countries. Despite deepened rifts within societies, the unresolved ethnic minority uprising in particular has a direct impact on the region's stability. Because of the policy of forced integration, patriotism and nationalism in which dominant

⁶⁴ Ibrahim, "Ethnic Conflict," 229.

⁶⁵ Mirjam E. Sørli, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Håvard Strand, "Why Is There so Much Conflict in the Middle East?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:1 (2005):144.

⁶⁶ Harik, "Ethnic Revolution," 306.

⁶⁷ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 269.

⁶⁸ Fox, "Religious Armed Conflict," 408.

minority groups produced, they did nothing to reduce vulnerability. Thus, since these political ideologies are a serious blow to ethnic groups, local ethnic groups primarily depend on religious in terms of settling their calamities.

CHAPTER II

2. REASONS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN IRAQ

In the classification that adopted in this chapter, the attempt was made to lay out the reason behind ethnic conflict in Iraq. In fact, there is no reason to doubt that the fragile harmony of Iraqi society had produced vast heterogeneous groups most of which are characterized by purely ethnic ties. This scattered state and incompatible population are not strictly monophyletic. Iraq's disintegrated and incoherent society together with using segregation policy by its ruling system (specifically, after Baath's coup in 1968 and onwards) virtually took part in the nation's conflict deepening. Thus, noticeable factors that greatly enhanced the prestige of ethnic conflict essentially estimated.

2.1 Ethnic Conflict Nature In Baath Reign

From 1968 to 2003, the political elites of Baath Party played the ethnic card to secure and strengthen their power. Although, Baath was a nationalistic, unitary and secularist party and their internal curriculum emphasized the necessity of fighting sectarianism, ethnic orientation had taken an extreme form. Baathist leaders in Iraq, in order to achieve their pan-Arabist intentions, mainly relied on three basic agenda. Firstly, by preferring Sunni group and tending to incite them against Shiite and Kurds. Secondly, rising ethnic wars against Kurdish people by using genocide campaign and Chemical weapons and finally, implementing the process of demographic change and the policies of Arabization through forced displacement of vast majority of original inhabitants.

2.1.1 The politicization of ethnicity

The earliest developments of the politicization of ethnicity in Iraq took place as British colonialism's strategy of domination, which consisted almost entirely of installing Sunnis religious prominent character, like Hashemite Faisal, as Iraq's King. In fact, after the independence of Iraq, Faisal I and his ex-Sharifian officers'

nearly controlled the first ten years of its political life. In the two phases of the political history of the country, Mandatory Iraq from 1921 into 1932, and Iraqi Monarchy 1932 to 1958, most of the powerful Sunni characters excessively fixed. As well as, the rest of them have either ancient Ottoman family's roots, or Baghdad's Sunni outstanding ancestry.⁶⁹

It is a plausible argument that elites of Sunni Arab felt that growing sense of national solidarity among other ethnic groups remained free of any feelings and the rules of kinship largely determined status within Iraqi society. Under those circumstances, and when Iraqi state founded, it gradually nationalized access to positions of power and excluded all those not considered as members of the Sunni Arab nation.⁷⁰ This elaboration of the politicization of ethnicity was contemporaneous with a gradual compulsory assimilation of non-Arab Sunni minorities, which was practiced by the new regime leaders, and in contrast to the diversity of Iraqi society, they declared Arabism and Sunni Islam as centerpieces of the nation's cultural heritage.⁷¹ By insisting on the superiority of Sunni over other ethnic groups and owing to the existence of a strong pan-Arabist thought, the newly installed Arab Sunni elites did their share to create a deep rift in Iraq, which has constantly been the scene of prolonged and sanguinary struggles. As a matter of fact, from the early starting point, there has been an argument and disagreement over amplifying pan-Arabism as a potent nationwide ideology, along with imposing the policy of Arabisation of governmental, military, and administrative institutions. Prohibiting non-Sunnis civilians from exercising authority based on ethnoreligious reasons pushed up Kurdish nationalism movement into high level, and distinctly marked Shiism in political matters.⁷² The ideological basis of pan-Arabism has been underestimated Iraq's mosaic structure. In fact, the country's new rulers imposed the belief that such diversity had to be overcome. In their idea, making an Arab nation,

⁶⁹ Andreas Wimmer, "Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq." *Survival* 45:4 (2003-2004): 114.

⁷⁰ Andreas Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 156-57

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁷² Wimmer, "Ethno-religious Conflict," 116.

together with implementing nation-building process was senseless in a fragmented society.

Politicization of ethnicity under the authoritarian rule of Baath Party has broadened enormously. Above all, A sparsely of Iraq's Sunni minority politician elites from north and west of Baghdad city, which is known as (the triangle of Sunnis), were hegemonized Baath party,⁷³ and support for the present regime rests with the Tikrit clans and longstanding individual associate of Saddam Hussein.⁷⁴ Indeed, demands tending towards the Sunnification of Baath Party had been advanced, and to strengthen its position, among Baath Party program there were strong nationalist agitation that chiefly directed against other ethno groups. The consequences of this policy became precisely evident in government and military structure which have non-Sunni agents, for example, when Saddam Hussein's Baath Party become more and more the party of Sunni Arab nationalists, Kurdish and Shiite army officers and bureaucrats were increasingly excluded from the circles of power.⁷⁵ This deprivation worsened the relations between ethnic groups in Iraq and increasingly aggravated hostile perceptions, instability and inequality. While Baath leaders exploited this situation in their own interest, at the same time, they failed to balance the rest of non-Sunni groups. From a vantage point, a serial acute and critical event extremely embarked harsh lake of stability and constant suspicions. Inefficiency to bring interethnic various groups relationship to under the control of the central government, explicitly, made a preparation way for political contractor in order to use racial disputes for their own political goals.⁷⁶

During its 35 years of power, Baath regime favored the Sunnis and used the politicization of ethnicity to their advantage. Further to strengthen their position and authority in political life, the Baathists has tended to provoke conflict in order to

⁷³Stephen Day, "Barriers to Federal Democracy in Iraq: Lessons From Yemen." *Middle East Policy* 13:3 (2006): 132-33.

⁷⁴Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett. "The Historiography of Modern Iraq." *The American Historical Review* 96:5(1991): 1414.

⁷⁵Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 29

⁷⁶ Bojana Blagojevic, "Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework." *Journal of Global Change and Governance* 3:1 (2009): 9.

bolster their power, and, it coincides with the fact that in an ethnically divided society, domination of any powerful institution by a single ethnic group constitutes a danger that that institution will be used for ethnic purpose.⁷⁷

2.1.2 Kurdish question

The policy of oppression of the non-Sunni groups at the hands of Baath regime and the dominant Sunnis gave birth, from 1968 onwards, to a constant Kurdish rebellion, which continues until the Process of Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Indeed, in spite of the political change and the Iraqi monarchy being destroyed and replaced by republic system on 14 July 1958, the Baghdad authorities (especially in the time of Baath reign) consistently adopted a hard line stance toward Kurdish demands for fear of losing the oil that was located in the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the country being run through the interim constitutions and the state of emergency, both of which exacerbated authoritarianism and the absence of the rule of law. Under these circumstances, failing to implement the Kurdish demand paved the way for an internal war that lasted for many years.

Albeit, in the first Baath coup in 8 February 1963, when Abdul Kareem al-Qasim was ousted, the Kurdish question has not been resolved, but further complicated by resorting to a military solution, military campaign and bombarding civilian people.⁷⁹ In July 1968, the second Baath government gradually extended its authority so as to consolidate its rule over various political groups. With this intention, in accordance with fruitless violent clashes and perilous confrontations against Kurdish rebellion movements, which lasted for nearly two years, in spring 1970, Baath party leaderships ordered new relevant policies to solve Kurdish questions.⁸⁰ After a long series of insurrections, by mutual agreement between Mustafa Barzani, founder and the president of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP),

⁷⁷ Horowitz, "Ethnic Groups", 457.

⁷⁸ Adeed Dawisha, *Iraq: A political History From Independence to Occupation* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 26.

⁷⁹ Dr. Abdulhussain Shaaban, "Dhawun alaa al qadhia al kurdia," www.arabrenewal.info. September 20, 2006. <http://www.arabrenewal.info> (accessed September 9, 2014).

⁸⁰ Nader Entessar, "The Kurds in Post Revolutionary Iran and Iraq." *Third World Quarterly* 6:4 (2004): 918.

and Iraqi government in March 1970, Saddam Hussein had finally agreed to grant autonomy to the Kurds. In addition to the creation of autonomous region in northern Iraq, this treaty secured Kurdish representation in the body of central government. Nevertheless, the March Agreement remained as words without actions and in the aftermath paved the way for new tensions.

Saddam Hussein faced rugged and severe criticism at the hand of Mustafa Barzani because of his prior planned malefaction effort to settle Arab Sunni families and render the demographic reality of the disputed area. Without surprising, three years after Barzani- Saddam agreement and in 1973, the first sign of a new round of Kurdish-Arab conflicts began one more time.⁸¹ When both sides reached to the point of no return, the level of Baath brutality escalated steadily. To point out, in 1975, Baath succeeded to put out Kurdish revolution, and from 1980 onwards, Baathist military machinery committed a genocidal campaign against the Kurdish population, which morphed into an ethnic war. For instance, killing five thousand innocent civilians in the city of Halabja - by banned chemical weapons internationally - during the Anfal campaign, has participated to build a myriad of rampant anger feelings of hatred between Kurds and Arabs that takes so many years to remove their negative effects.⁸² It deserves to be here noting that Saddam pushed offensive action more systematically and vigorously. As an illustration, unlike all military law charters and international agreements concerning the employ of weapons, Iraqi government targeted both Kurdish citizens and militants groups through chemical bombs. The consequences of Anfal's campaign scourge deteriorated rural life areas. Three thousand villages have erased from the ground. Approximately, half of Iraq's total Kurds uprooted from their area. According to unofficial statics, almost nearly 180,000 civilians have been massacred on account of the Anfal's offensive.⁸³

Kurds ruthless suppression with decades of armed conflict at the hands of strongly Baath government confirmed that facing ethnic conflict is unavoidable. As has been noted, the Kurdish-Arabs dispute referred that there were disagreement over

⁸¹Kerim Yildiz, *The Kurds in Iraq: Past, Present and Future*(London: Pluto Press, 2007), 19.

⁸² Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, "Avoiding Ethnic Conflict in Iraq: Some Lessons from the Aland Islands." *Ethnopolitics*9:.2(2010): 221.

⁸³Yildiz, "The Kurds in Iraq," 25.

several interrelated elements. Firstly, although Mustafa Barzani ratified an agreement with Saddam to terminate Kurdish-Arab conflict, Kurds reached to the conclusion that figuring out a solution for their plights will be a painstaking process beyond a new form of government in a way must be accountable to all ethnic groups including both majority and minority ones.⁸⁴ Secondly, while Baath signed peace agreement with Kurds and decided to give autonomy to them, but among the overwhelming majority of the Sunnis were favored a strong central regime.⁸⁵ And yet, both factors, especially the second one, doubtlessly had intensified Kurds-Arabs direct ethnic rancor.

2.1.3 Arabization: refugees in their own country

Theoretically, in ethnic and sectarian conflicts, territory is often closely linked to group identity; enormous symbolic importance is attached to the locations where the group's history transpired, where its holy sites may be located, and where the group at one point exercised power and dominated the culture.⁸⁶ That is to say, in plural societies, broader intergroup political quarrel with ethno- territorial dispute will facilitate to amplify ethnic tensions.

In Iraq, the Baathist record of depriving the Kurds of their privileges and rights has combined with the policy of Arabization and demographic change. Actually, the Arabization policy, chiefly in Kirkuk city, is date back to the last century, and exactly to the 1935. Central government's plea for immigrating massive Arab groups of people was far-reaching agricultural projects in the southwest of the city. Further, under the pretext of military and civil duty a myriad of Arabs settled down, alike.⁸⁷ In heterogonous areas where conflicts erupted and encouraged sectarian tensions, the Arabization became Iraq's demonstrable policy from 1963 onwards; it was carried

⁸⁴ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in the Arab World." *International Social Science Journal* 50 (1998): 240.

⁸⁵ Anderson and Stansfield, "Avoiding Ethnic Conflict," 222.

⁸⁶ Larry Hanauer and Laurel E. Miller, *Resolving Kirkuk: Lessons Learned from Settlements of Earlier Ethno-Territorial Conflicts*. Monography, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2012.

⁸⁷ Nouri Talabani, "Who Owns Kirkuk? The Kurdish Case." *Middle East Quarterly* 14:1 (2007): 76.

out by forcibly removing Kurds from the city of Kirkuk and settling Arab families in their place who were brought from central and southern Iraq.⁸⁸

After defeating the Kurdish revolt in 1975, Baathist desire to expel non-Arab groups, particularly regarding the city of Kirkuk intensified. At the same time, it changed the administrative boundaries of this area, which did not reflect the ethnic makeup of the populations. As a result, for the sake of increasing Arabs number in the Kirkuk city, Baathist regime has sent displaced Kurds/Turcoman agriculturists into far from big cities overwhelmed government-made camps. Additionally, Baghdad intentionally attached manifold areas to the city where the majority of their inhabitants were Arabs.⁸⁹ Baath Party made various attempting to persuade Arab Sunnis to come and settle in newly vacated lands. It is enough then here to observe that even eight years of war with Iran did not stop Baathist regime from ongoing policies of Arabization. The most important event after this protracted war is that Arabization's unfailingly process was utterly close to accomplish. First, in 1990s, Saddam's never-ending determination to uproot non-Arabs (Kurds, Turcoman, and Assyrians) indigenous residents, then, divest them from their national character and rights, and next, changing Kirkuk province name into (Al-Tamim) province are a range of reasons.⁹⁰ Under those circumstances, the large displacement of the original inhabitants, which is the natural corollary of the mass expulsion of non-Arabs, set the record. According to unofficial statistics, from 1991 Gulf War until 2003, the former Iraqi government systematically expelled an estimated 120,000 Kurds, Turcoman, and Assyrians from Kirkuk. Most have settled in the Kurdish-controlled Northern provinces.⁹¹

Following the failed 1991 uprisings, Baath Party has legitimized Arabization program by adopting appropriate steps that taken to mislead public opinion. At a broader level, the central authority for the benefit of Arabs has changed each official

⁸⁸Yildiz, "The Kurds in Iraq," 206.

⁸⁹ Shak Hanish, "The Kirkuk Problem and Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution." *Digest of Middle East Studies* 19 (2010): 17.

⁹⁰Brendan O'leary, "Kirkuk in the Balance," *University of Pennsylvania*. May 5, 2009. <http://www.upenn.edu/gazette/0704/0704gaz11.html> (accessed July 5, 2014).

⁹¹Hanish, "Kirkuk Problem," 17.

census for using it against Kurds, Turcoman, and Christians,⁹² despite this; the government of Iraq pushed non-Arabs to change their ethnic identity and registered them as Arabs. For the same reason, Saddam Hussein forced all non-Arab groups in Kirkuk to sign ethnic identity correction cards, register officially as Arabs, and join the Ba'ath army. Non-Arabs not only bypassed from governmental departments and their places took by arrival Arabs, but their real properties also have taken over.⁹³

2.2 The Dimensions Of Ethnic Conflict In Post Saddam Era

Baathist regime's break down in 2003, the most critical periods in Iraq were the transition from dictatorship to democracy. During these periods, political power moved from Sunnis to Shiite, and those who were favored under the old Iraqi regime now find their prospects threatened by the new regime. In the event that high-ranking members of dissolved Baath Party were joined Sunni tribes. Most of these clan leaders, which have political sympathy and tendency towards Baath ideology, are from Sunni provinces. Besides, foreign terrorist groups who infiltrated into Iraqi soil declared their coalition with Sunnis against Iraq's new government and the Shiites, alike. According to their principles, killing Shiites and Kurds is a religious duty since the first of them is apostates and the second separatists.⁹⁴ Shiites and Kurds, who formerly were subordinate groups, benefited from the new system, and their increased power threatened Sunnis who were dominant prior to 2003. When Shiite dominance redirected power away from formerly dominant Sunnis, in Iraq's initial time, the Sunni Arabs forced to confront the loss of power as a community.⁹⁵ Overall, neglecting Sunnis in the new Iraqi government has accompanied by an outburst of implementing de-Baathification program, de-centralizing Iraq and territorial disputes, which exacerbated domestic tensions and ethno-sectarian conflicts.

⁹²Yildiz, "The Kurds in Iraq," 65.

⁹³ Denise Natali, *The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq*(New York: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 24.

⁹⁴Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set." *American Sociological Review*74:2 (2009): 320.

⁹⁵ Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 135.

2.2.1 De-baathification and sunnis insurgency

The de-Baathification project was George W. Bush administration's brainchild and Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)'s first order in Iraq in May of 2003. This process extended to include top Sunni Baathist leaders and active members, and all of them were prohibited from practicing profession. Generally speaking, the US administration's objective to instigate and made up of the (CPA) in 2003, where for getting rid of from the atrocity and the level of Baath Party influence on the Iraqi people. Moreover, for pushing aside those members having significant influence on the Iraqi political life,⁹⁶ and subsequently culminated Arab Sunni fury. The U.S. completely miscalculated the potential yield of depriving Arab Sunnis from power. Alienating Arab Sunnis from power and economic centers along with an excluding top Baathist members from political life encouraged them to enroll in the ethnic tensions and converted many of whom into supporters of insurgency.

This new political reality increased Sunni anxiety since they considered de-Baathification equivalent to de-Sunnization and marginalization. As a result, a well-funded, well-armed violent opposition quickly started to attack. These troublemaking acts initially led and largely manned by those individuals, or elements that had been in power under the old Baathist regime. The violent opposition rapidly took on a distinctively sectarian Sunni character.⁹⁷ In reality, the underlying argument in favor of these claims is that, de-Baathification process backed up ethnic conflict in Iraq. It is significant to keep in mind that since a solid majority of Saddam's regime elements removed from power, Sunnis have begun to contemplate striking other ethnic category targets and symbols. In that light, these political reactions in the new Iraq against Kurds and Shiites were anger, riot, and pushed the country to the brink. Along similar lines, most of them twisted from ex-Baathist member to the new rebellion ethnic leader and joined the insurgency.⁹⁸ Feeling disenfranchised they started using ethnic card to reach their political aims and Arab Sunnis devoted

⁹⁶ Andrew A. Terrill, *Lessons of the Iraqi De-Baathification program for Iraq's Future and The Arab Revolution*. Analytical Report, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012.

⁹⁷ Walter Slocombe, e-mail interview with author. September 27, 2013.

⁹⁸ Kenneth M. Pollack, *After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq*. Analytical Report, New York: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 2004.

serious efforts to organize in the new vast insurgency groups, which fed into the hands of ethnic or sectarian conflicts.

The atmosphere, which produced a conducive ground for ethnic conflict, is extremely detrimental for civilians' safety. For instance, on the basis of a plebiscite in which directed to the wide range of Iraqis, Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies (ICRSS) have shown that 60 percent of the participant responded that their life entirely in danger.⁹⁹ Because of this, Iraq's political scenery naturally divided into two categories. In one side, Shiites and Kurds were utterly delighted with exclusion considerable figures of Baath Party; they regarded Saddam's ouster as enabling a decisive shift of power and authority away from the Sunni minority. However, on the other side, bigoted Arab Sunnis who fostered ethnic antagonism were concerned with the dissolution of Baath Party. For this reason, by exploiting broken institutions, general insecurity, sectarian tensions and Sunni sensation, the ex-Baathists used several channels (including ethnic conflict) to restore their broken hegemony.

2.2.2 The paradox of federalism

The obvious ethnic confrontation in the post-war era in Iraq exclusively characterized by political wrestling between Kurds (who favored decentralization) and Arab nationalists since both of whom tried to redefine the nature of political system. Broadly speaking, both of Iraq's post Saddam interim and permanent constitution provided a federal structure. There seems to be compelling reason to argue that those ethnic groups (such as Kurds) who tended federalism based on ethnic lines were against the existence of a strong central authority and they like a decentralized government. In contrast, nationalists and Sunni Arabs were favored a constitution that support only one central regime.¹⁰⁰ It is remarkable that this controversy made a split between Iraq's ethnic groups. From the standpoint of Arabs, shifting from centralized government to decentralized political system could lead to many problems. For example, because of the dream of restoring power any

⁹⁹ Pollack, "After Saddam,".

¹⁰⁰ Anderson and Stansfield. "Avoiding Ethnic Conflict," 219.

federalization or power-sharing goal opposed by former prominent members and high-ranking officials within dissolved Baath Party,¹⁰¹ at the same time, the majority of Arab ethnic groups were afraid from the fact that the project of federalism accelerate and paves the way for establishing a Kurdish state.¹⁰² From a contrary point of view, decentralized systems of government either regarded as a prerequisite for reducing the level of ethnic conflict, or secure a unitary country. Although this may be true, a federal framework outlined by both Sunni and Shiite hues as being anathema to Arabs own interests and tantamount to empowering regionalist tendencies among the Kurds.¹⁰³

The existence of such a strong opposition to federalism has received opposing evaluation by non-Arab groups. Kurds have come to the view that a federal form of government is better than any other types of political system to run a multiethnic state like Iraq. Indeed, the reasons for this suppose came from the assumptions that persuading Kurds' ethnic group demands will achieve by federalism. Experts believed that lacking federalism equivalent to the division of Iraq into several mini-states.¹⁰⁴ For Kurds, having federalism is so important to prevent Iraq from being represented by a central form of government, to make no further war, implementing ethnic persecution and forced displacement. There is no doubt the primary influence which has guided the evolution of such belief were came through the fact that reaching to multiethnic group's affinity, without showing respect to each other, distributing governmental positions equally, and holding elections in a democratic atmosphere, will be impossible. Above all, Kurds have convinced that the existence of a decentralized government leads to protect minority ethnic groups from injustice, authoritarianism, and antagonism.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹Wimmer, "Waves of War," 149.

¹⁰²Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Continuing Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan." *Middle East Policy*12:1 (2005): 124.

¹⁰³Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson, "Kurds in Iraq: The Struggle Between Baghdad and Erbil." *Middle East Policy* 3:1 (2009): 142.

¹⁰⁴ Michael M. Gunter, "Permanent and New Realities Facing the Kurdistan Regional Government." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*28:2 (2008): 239.

¹⁰⁵David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." *International Security*21:2 (1996): 42.

To point out, the causes of Kurdish-Arab disagreement over federalism explained somewhat as has been noted above, but it would be of immense advantage to consider if supplying the theoretical elucidation of the decentralization of power. In estimating the influence of federalism upon decreasing ethnic conflicts, it is important to realize that, whatever the factors (such as, political, economical, religion, or culture), which have a hand in dividing ethnically based societies, but experts in this field, and leaders in these societies have agreed to find an outlet to push back ethnic conflict within these societies. All theoretical explanation on federalism confirmed that this type of political system supply geographical integrity, and grant autonomy for dissatisfied minority ethnic groups.¹⁰⁶ We may add that federalism is a convenient mechanism to diminish the probability of ethnic conflict inasmuch as it does not restrict political mobilization in the state-level centre. In other words, federalism conveys political actions into the provincial centers, and offers self-rules to divers' racial and ethnic groups,¹⁰⁷ and coupled with abandoning a centralized form of government, it will grant some sort of peace.

2.2.3 Territorial disputes in kurdo – arab conflict

Since 2003, when a plethora of abandoned non-Arabs returned to their Arabized regions, territorial disputes formed a controversial topic. It has deepened conflicts between Kurds and Arabs. Sporadically produced tensions with micro-minorities, (Turcoman, Christians and Yazidis), who have been historically concentrated in mixed belts between historic Kurdistan and Arab-dominated Iraq. Principally, the developments of territorial controversies not only accompanied by rising Iraq's hottest new political scene, but also by national consensus's absence to identify and define those areas. However, in 2004, under a severe mismatch of visions and attitudes between Iraqi elite leaders and ethnic groups, the state's interim constitution- the so-called Transitional Administration Law (TAL) - have been endorsed by the invading forces. Under this constitution, article 58 explained necessary procedures in terms of returning displaced immigrants to their homes.

¹⁰⁶Kristin M. Bakke and Erik Wibbels, "Disparity, and Civil Conflict in Federal States." *World Politics* 59:1(2006): 4.

¹⁰⁷Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective." *Political Science Quarterly* 107:4 (1992-1993):601.

Acting for reimburse all of them, and resolving all territorial disputed areas inclusively Kirkuk city.¹⁰⁸ Obviously, Sunni Arabs, by all means, were against the implementation of all (TAL)'s articles. For this reason, until the formation of the new Iraqi government in 2006, article 58 remained in effect. In the permanent Iraqi constitution, which civilians voted for, this article has turned into another one (article 140). In short, both articles paid too much emphasis on righting past wrongs, but they do not have enough speedy steps to resolute the status of disputed lands. When it comes to article 140, normalization, census, and referendum formed resolution's roadmap. According to the first step- normalization-, those civilians who forced to take leave their places in Kirkuk, from 1968 to 2003, must return to their homes. Moreover, to restore the demographic balance, those arrival Arabs who gathered in territorial disputed lands to be depart into their places in southern of Iraq.¹⁰⁹ Albeit, constitutionally, reversing Arabization was a legitimate and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has handled the matter, but for Arabs Sunnis, especially those who bribed to settle in the disputed territories, do not like the reversal of Arabization for obvious reasons. Other Arabs dislike the prospect of Kirkuk joining the KRG because they fear that the KRG will then seek independence.

In general, the tendency to put de-Arabization program into practice leads to establish a commission by the government to normalize territorial disputed zones in particular in the Kirkuk province. Yet, there is growing support for the claim that, due to ethnic group's divergence, article 140 has laid the ground for dilemma not only for the area in the Kirkuk vicinity, but also for the entire negotiation process among relevance ethnic groups about the rest of disputed areas. Reasons for the centrality of this issue should take into account since article 140; first, spurs Arabs to return to their previous areas. Second, it supports forcefully displaced indigenous peoples to come back to the city of Kirkuk. Third, it upholds changing Kirkuk administrative unites and restoring it to the pre-1976 condition. Finally, according to this article peoples in territorial disputed areas through a referendum must decide whether they want to be ruled by a central government or by Kurdistan Regional

¹⁰⁸ Hanish, "The Kirkuk Problem," 16-18.

¹⁰⁹ Peter Bartu, "Wrestling With the Integrity of a Nation: The Disputed Internal Boundaries in Iraq." *International Affairs* 86:6 (2010): 1330.

Government.¹¹⁰ In spite of all this, another key point is that the federal government in Baghdad having shown their unwillingness to make any progress concerning the case of Kirkuk. In the one hand, officials in the central government constantly worried about the loss of oil fields in the city. On the other hand, fear of Iraq's division and the announcement of a Kurdish state in the north have united the central government's effort to be against any normalization in disputed areas.¹¹¹ Common sense dictates that the central government is not willing to let go these areas as they have or might have valuable natural resources. Moreover, lacking serious compromise efforts over disputed territorial land reveals the depth of conflict among various ethnic groups, and Iraq's inability to solve them.¹¹² For these reasons, Baghdad is not going to be quick about abandoning Arabs settled in the disputed territories during Saddam's Arabization campaign, and any settlement that might be seen as strengthening KRG's hand is feared as something that could contribute to greater Kurdish autonomy, and perhaps, even, eventual movement towards Kurdish independence.

Consequently, while implementing constitution's article constitute a sort of mandatory upon Iraqi government, but neglecting, marginalization and obstructing the implementation of the above mentioned articles made its political causes clear, for example, "the Maliki government sought to prevent the plain implications of Article 140 because they wanted to prevent a larger KRG, which they feared would seek independence. They feared that the Kurds would take Kirkuk's oilfields - when in fact Kurds agreed that the field already exploited in Kirkuk would be jointly managed by the federal government and the region/governorate." ¹¹³

2.2.4 Yazidies eradication: ethnic conflict in the time of isis

Iraq is characterized as a multicultural and various spectra; despite Kurds and Arabs nationalism as well as there are minorities or authentic ingredients like

¹¹⁰ Denise Natali, "The Kirkuk Conundrum." *Ethnopolitics* 7:4 (2008): 436.

¹¹¹ David Romano, "The Future of Kirkuk." *Ethnopolitics* 6:2 (2007): 278.

¹¹² Marc Lynch, "Politics First: Why Only U.S. Withdrawal Can Spur Iraqi Cooperation." *Foreign Affairs* 87:6 (November/December 2008): 154.

¹¹³ Brendan O'Leary, e-mail interview with author. October 26, 2014.

Chaldeans, Syriacs, Assyrians, Armenians, Yazidis, Mandaean, Shabak, Turcoman, Faili Kurds, Al Kakaiyaa, Baha'i and Zoroastrianism. Although the constitution of Iraq guaranteed minority rights as Iraqi citizens, but terrorist groups have targeted them continuously. On the beginning of August 2014, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a radical Sunni Islamist group, took control of Sinjar (Shingal) city in Ninewa province in which mainly inhabited by Yazidis community. The Yazidis, by ethnic origin, they consider themselves as Kurds since they use Kurdish language and most of 500,000 to 700,000 of whom reside in the north of Iraq.¹¹⁴ When ISIS seizes Sinjar, besides of the mass exodus of tens of thousands, the Yazidis subjected to persecution, massacres, and mass killing. There are overwhelming evidences corroborating the notion that ISIS's discrimination of the Yazidis is both sectarian - driven by religious beliefs- and ethnic conflict since the Yazidis are Kurdish by ethnic origin and by sacred language. Therefore, it is not hard to figure out: may be ISIS's foreign fighters would say that they are performing their religious duties. Broadly speaking, ISIS' extremist terrorist group, in their publications, they described the Yazidis as a group who has no religion, an unbeliever group which are against Islam. ISIS stated that Yazidis's beliefs do not have any reality and built on the basis of Satanism,¹¹⁵ for this reason, when Sinjar being occupied, ISIS has distributed leaflets threatening local population in order to convert to Islam.¹¹⁶ The available evidence points out that those Yazidis who refused to convert to Islam faced ethnic cleansing campaign by the Sunni militants. Iraqi officials confirmed that, during their offensive in Sinjar. Unlike any humanitarian values 500 civilian peoples who belonged to the Yazidi's massacred at the hands of ISIS terrorist groups, and most of them, specifically children and women, buried alive. Further,

¹¹⁴U.S. State Department report on "International Religious Freedom." Washnigton, D.C, 2013. Retrired 10 November, 2014, from <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2012/nea/208390.htm>

¹¹⁵ Allen McDuffee, "ISIS Is Now Bragging About Enslaving Women and Children" *The Atlantic*. October 13, 2014. Web. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/isis-confirms-and-justifies-enslaving-yazidis-in-new-magazine-article/381394/> (accessed November 18, 2014).

¹¹⁶"ISIS threatens to forcibly Islamize Yazidi Kurds in Iraq's Sinjar". *www.ekurd.net*. July 25, 2014. Web. <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/7/kurdsiniraq238.htm> (accessed November 19, 2014).

300 women had abducted and being treated as sex slaves.¹¹⁷ Because of ISIS raids, for the same reason, tens of thousands of Shia Turcoman forced to flee their resident place in Tal Afar near Mosul city. As stated by Human Rights Watch Organization between June 13 and July 10, ISIS rounded up at least 83 men from villages on the eastern outskirts of Mosul, and seven of them were later found dead and the rest remain missing. Moreover, between June 25 and July 2, ISIS destroyed nine Shia Turcoman mosques and shrines in Tal Afar. In a word, since ISIS took over the city, more than 90 percent of the local Shia Turcoman – at least 125,000 people – have fled.¹¹⁸

With the inflation of systematic destruction, practicing comprehensive threats, and crimes against humanity at the hands of ISIS, superpowers, like America, and international organizations, like U.N., agreed that killing minorities in Iraq by radical Sunni militant's atonement fatwa has paved the way for genocide. Despite Obama, U.N. officials warned that ISIS militants trying to wipe out minority Yazidis, and they considered actions taken against Yazidis amount to attempt of genocide since they are defined by their religion and the only option they have is either to convert or to be killed.¹¹⁹

From the outcome of our analysis, it is possible to conclude that advancing on Yazidis, Shia Turcoman in Sinjar and Tal Afar by ISIS, and massacred them can be considered as a newest wave of ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq. Yet, innocent people were persecuted, uprooted and tormented just because they have a diverse religion, language and nationality.

¹¹⁷ Ahmed Rasheed, "Exclusive: Iraq says Islamic State killed 500 Yazidis, buried some victims alive". *Reuters*. August 10, 2014. Web. www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/10/us-iraq-security-yazidis-killings-idUSKBN0GA0FF20140810 (accessed November 18, 2014).

¹¹⁸ Human Rights Watch, "Iraq: Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities. Armed Group Targeting Christians Nuns, Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis." Report about War Crims, New York, 2014.

¹¹⁹ Margaret Besheer, "UN Official Warns of Possible Genocide against Iraqi Yazidis" *Voice of America*. October 21, 2014. Web. <http://www.voanews.com/content/un-official-warns-of-possible-genocide-against-iraq-yazidis/2491764.html> (accessed November 19, 2014).

CHAPTER III

3. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE TOWARD ETHNIC CONFLICT IN IRAQ

This chapter is organized into two sections: Section I is devoted to the issue of conflict in ethnically divided societies from the point of view of the US policy. Here, particular attention is paid to the quick historic perspective of the US's ethnic conflict policy before and after the Cold War. Back then, Washington's policy gave a clue that multiethnic disputes were seen as part of comprehensive security matter. Thus, emphasis is placed on the United States' insistence on guaranteeing security in order to maintain its interests.

The second section is dedicated exclusively to explore the motivations behind the American foreign policy reflections upon ethnic conflicts between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq. The general notion here is that the estimations, which derived from the U.S. decision makers, confirmed that in the case of intergroup ethnic conflict the unity of Iraq could be not achieve. To be able to prevent this tendency, the United States foreign policy has focused hard on the superiority of stability over change, avoiding the crushing sense of partition, exercising the right to build peace through nation-building and promoting democracy. Here, US officials predominantly attempted to reconcile between various Iraqi ethnic groups.

3.1 American Outlook On Ethnic Conflict

On the edge of the Cold War, when international affairs' fundamental changes took place, conflict's character began to change. Therefore, global peace has not only threatened by great powers challenging, but also it has jeopardized by considered different factor: intrastate ethnic groups' rigorous dispute.¹²⁰ In the international arena, major powers were differently reacted to local conflict and ethnic violence within multiethnic states. For instance, in the United States more than one trend emerged within officials in terms of the influence of intrastate conflicts upon

¹²⁰Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "Interactive Problem Solving in Intercommunal Conflicts." *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Science* 17(2005): 448.

America's interests. Firstly, a handful of foreign policymakers have embarked on the notion that all conflicts had immense effect on the U.S. national security and foreign policy. To advance that belief, they espoused the idea of exploiting overseas conflict - including ethnic conflict- for the US purposes when deemed useful to do so. For example, the US exploited ethnic divisions in Vietnam and Lao when it was fighting Communist forces during the Vietnam War. The US also exploited ethnic differences in Angola when it supported UNITA movement in its struggle against the Soviet-backed government.¹²¹

Secondly, in contrast, a solid majority of the United States foreign policymakers was at odds about the impact of ethnic conflict on foreign policy. They overwhelmingly considered that ethnic conflict was outside the attention of United States' policy and they concentrated on other components that often reflected their predilections. For instance, since many of them were economic determinists, they regarded economics as the engine of history.¹²² As a result, they were standing on this policy until the end of Cold War.

Notwithstanding these vantage points, from Berlin Wall's decline and new states emerge, ethnic conflict has leapt onto American foreign policy center stage due to the structural changes brought about in the international system.¹²³ On logical grounds, Soviet Unions' demise is the quintessential example of accumulating regional uncertainty in vanished global structure. By overshadowing intergroup conflicts in Balkans, Africa, and Central Asia, national security policies concern of the United States dramatically changed in all around. This policy alteration was initiated in 1990, when the president of the US, George H. W. Bush, in his doctrine declared a "new regionally oriented national defense strategy".¹²⁴

At the broader level, the result of political transition in multi ethnic countries carried diversified burdens for the Washington due to the rise of ethnic nationalism.

¹²¹ Michael Klare, e-mail interview with author. July 8, 2014.

¹²² Alexander Deconde, *Ethnicity Race and American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 2.

¹²³ Chester Crocker, "How to Think about Ethnic Conflict." *Orbis* 43:4(1999): 614.

¹²⁴ R.H. Shultz and J.M. Schmauder, "Emerging Regional Conflicts and U.S. Interests: Challenges and Response in the 1990s." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17(1994): 2.

The US policy experts believed that Cold War's consequences made this country being different from using its entire outside national frontier activities for preserving national safety,¹²⁵ but unforeseeably a growing fear of instability, declining economic activities, the failure of living in peace and harmony in deeply divided societies haunted their foreign policy.

Accordingly, when the US fails to track and accurately predict the trajectory of nascent ethnic conflicts in Europe, Central Asia and Asian subcontinent, Washington finds itself facing crises in which, consequently, threatened its vital interests.¹²⁶ The United States had grown frustrated by ethnic annihilation in places that have a strategic depth for conducting its policies. Not surprisingly, from the US geopolitical interest overview states in the western parts of Eurasian continent have outstanding value than other parts. As a matter of fact, involving in the former Yugoslavia's ethnic disputes more anticipated in comparison to the former Soviet Union's less important southern parts.¹²⁷

We can see herein that due to the possibility of amplifying security pitfall, principally in those areas that have extensive fertile grounds for growing instability, the US vigorously abandoned the policy of paying scant attention to specific interests in those places. On the basis of the evidence that available, it seems fair to point out in recent years the United States heavily focused on the ethnically based conflicts as a great source of security apprehensive.¹²⁸

Thus, to decrease security concern in the most ethnically heterogeneous states, in particular in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, and in the rest of the earth, the US intervened in multitude racial struggles. Furthermore, when the bloodshed progressed in these areas, some of the U.S. activities relied on the policy of negotiations.

¹²⁵James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger, and Steven C. Poe, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War." *The Journal of Politics* 70:1(1998): 64.

¹²⁶Anthony Lake and David Ochmanek. *The Real and the Ideal: Essays on International Relations in Honor of Rihvared H. Ullman*(New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001),137.

¹²⁷Shale Horowitz, "Political Source of Military Defeat in Post-Communist Ethnic Conflict." *European Security* 12:1(2003):21.

¹²⁸David R. Davis and Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 171.

Nevertheless, besides of what has been noted above, in some ethnic conflict cases, the US enhanced peace process to lessen negative outputs.¹²⁹

In fact, solid evidence for supporting American concern over security strongly has been emerged in the Balkan crisis. Deriving on the viciousness of Balkan's situation, government officials in the US forecasted that upcoming human catastrophes would be even more dangerous. As early warning, while some American policy makers during the division of Yugoslavia into three statelets believed that resolving Balkan's ethnic war is their governments' moralistic responsibility,¹³⁰ but the White House saw that containing security anxiety was as important as defending moral obligation and preserving individual rights.

Despite these double-dealings with the nature of Balkan crisis, on the cutting edge of instability in Kosovo in 1998, Washington began to show signs of overseas interventions. This point sustained by President Clinton in what became known as the Clinton Doctrine that pledged that the U.S. would intervene in ethnopolitical conflicts when it was within its power to stop them.¹³¹

From the perspective of the government officials, ethnic conflict reveals the degrees to which instability matters for the United States' interests. More to the point, top policymakers believed that ethnic conflict has direct threats to the U.S. targets. In retrospect, when two world wars because of ethnic nationalism widely began in the last century, ethnic violence quickly caused unprecedented casualties, a wide range insecurity within multiethnic states and its environs. As well as forced millions of civilians to emigrated, severely affected business recession, and spread to neighboring areas.

In a word, ethnic conflicts disproportionately hampered these states projects that build to strengthen democracy, national power and civilian societies faced

¹²⁹Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "Intra-State Conflicts in the Post Cold War Era." *International Journal on World Peace* xiv:4 (2007): 30.

¹³⁰Robert M. Kokta, "Sharing Risks, Burdens and Benefits: American Foreign Policy in the Balkans in the 1990s." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3:2 (2003): 186.

¹³¹Eugene R. Wittkopf, Christopher M. Jones and Charles W. Kegley, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*. (California: Wadsworth, Seventh Edition, 2008), 8.

immeasurable challenge.¹³² Along similar lines and from the American point of view, ethnic conflicts also have a wide-range of threats and one of them is that might pave the way for emerging radical organizations. That is to say, ethnic militant groups will exploit security vacuums in order to kill members of other ethnic groups. These groups benefited from the scourge of racial disputes and they used as an excuse for their business.¹³³ In a nutshell, since ethnic violence challenged the United States strategic goals in the post-Cold War world, policymakers had come to acknowledge that their country has no particular interest in ethnic conflict per se.

To deal with zones of ethnic strife and reduce security concerns, most of the U.S. foreign policy senior officials heavily tried to use more than an option. In countries, which have vital strategic locations, the U.S. could favor constitutional reforms to soothe/solve ethnic conflicts. They could also enhance financial support or link its aid to constitutional reforms. Nevertheless, we should also consider in the case of Yugoslavia quagmire, the United States privileged decentralization of power to the republics, but it was unable to avoid ethnic conflicts in the end.

To point out, a closer look at these arguments as noted above indicates that the U.S. foreign policy response toward ethnic conflicts is based on three major factors. Firstly, the position of U.S. allies nations or the regional power in a given case. Secondly, the fear of conflict spillover to the neighboring states in the absence of US policy, and finally, a perception that a negative international precedent would be established.¹³⁴

The most noteworthy mechanism within the U.S. foreign policy about stopping ethnic conflicts centered on the topic of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Second World War, with regard to this issue, a controversial aspect within policymakers' innermost circles became apparent. Some of them asserted

¹³² Samantha Power, "Reforming Peacekeeping in a Time of Conflict" (remarks presented at American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., November, 7, 2014), retrieved from <http://www.aei.org/publication/remarks-ambassador-samantha-power-reforming-peacekeeping-time-conflict/>

¹³³ Power, "Reforming Peacekeeping."

¹³⁴ Evelyn Farkas, *Fractured States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia, and Bosnia in the 1990s*. (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 3.

upon the inevitability of American interference in intergroup conflicts for different reasons. In the first place, as a moral responsibility, they are with intervention to address the issue of protecting civilians from flames of antagonism. Then, another key point is that; to stop the proliferation of military ethnic clashes among rivalry ethnic groups. Banning civilian mass killings through strengthening international laws is another significant plea factor.

By the same token, consolidating international organization, enhancing democracy spill over, and finally the US duty to keep world order safe, are comes as other basic factors for encouraging American intervention in ethnic conflicts.¹³⁵ Notwithstanding these closely -knit and duty-bound reasons as has been noted, however, there have been theoretical basis behind the enthusiasm of using American involvement in ethnic wars for achieving American strategic interests. For the most parts, this vision had manifested itself after the Cold War. In the first place, realists, who took control of the United States foreign affairs in the post-World War Second, prioritized national security when they were defining the U.S. postwar strategic interests. Their desire to intervene in conflicts explicitly stemmed from the following hypothesis: It is not for the US interest to intervene in these states, which have less strategic importance.¹³⁶

In the light of this premise, when radical changes occurred in the post-Cold War, in the 1990s, the US decided to intervene in the bloody ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia because of the strategic importance of this country for its interests.

Along similar lines, sooner after the Cold War, those who interested in the field of international relations argued the necessity of adding a new approach to this realm. They called for humanitarian intervention throughout joint military operation in order to reduce the severity of ethnically based conflicts,¹³⁷ however, the USA,

¹³⁵ Fred Wehling, "U.S. Intervention in Ethnic Conflict"(panel discussion, The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California in San Diego, California, January 5, 1995).

¹³⁶ Mi Yung Yoon, "U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:4 (1997): 581-82.

¹³⁷ Charles William Maynes, "Containing Ethnic Conflict." *Foreign Policy* 90 (1993): 14.

individually, made 35 interventions in intrastate conflicts.¹³⁸ In fact, under the justification of global responsibility, there seems to be compelling reasons to argue that the pretext of humanitarian concern was being used by America for securing the unification of failed states. In other words, the interventions implemented for purely humanitarian reasons have prioritized in order to guaranteeing the borders of countries under challenge.¹³⁹

There is overwhelming evidence corroborating the notion that one of the barriers for the US intervention in these ethnic conflicts has relation with the use of huge material cost. After the Vietnam disaster, Pentagon's officials strictly refused their country's military intervention in all conflicts or wars without any exceptions.¹⁴⁰

Although this may be true, but on logical ground, immediately after the Cold War, American leaders have adopted the policy of intervention in ethnic wars for security and humanitarian reasons. First, they believed that internal ethnic conflicts have a negative impact on the safety of international security in our time. Second, since we live in a unipolar world and the US has a major role, like a strong military power, or as a significant character in the UN; it will be called continuously for corroborating.¹⁴¹

Not surprisingly, these contradictory perspectives reveal that there are dissimilar priorities within American officials. In general, for humanitarian interventionist adherents, apart from the humanitarian reasons, which tended to advance for any U.S. involvement in ethnic conflicts, their discussion centered on the fact that by humanitarian intervention also internal ethnic antipathy will be avoided, it maintains international frontier from external aggression, and it keeps insecurity

¹³⁸Patrick M. Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:2 (1996): 345.

¹³⁹Michael Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene." *Foreign Policy* 95 (1994): 4.

¹⁴⁰Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. (New York: Basic Books Publisher, Second Edition, 2013) 283.

¹⁴¹ Michael Klare, remarks about "U.S. Intervention in Ethnic Conflict" (panel discussion, The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California in San Diego, California, January 5, 1995).

from happening. Overall, they consider humanitarian intervention is providing a secure environment for international order.¹⁴²

Ethnic conflicts that proliferated were considered threatening to the US interests. American political leadership has made extraordinary efforts to prevent the spillover of unsatisfied insecurity in deeply multiethnic societies. With attention to the tragedy of ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia, representatives in the Clinton administration substantially feared of spreading these racial strives into allied states and finally contribute to threaten the US interests in these areas.

While decision makers use ethnic conflict as an excuse for intervention in some cases, and argue that America's interest requires leading and making efforts to build a world order that are shaped by U.S. political values,¹⁴³ in others they act differently. In some ethnic conflict cases, like Rwanda, because of lacking a clear foreign policy aim in advance and non-existence a road map, the US attempts to deal with intergroup rivalry and ethnic cleansing in this state gained slightly consideration.¹⁴⁴

Overall, although each of these arguments provides an important contribution to our understanding of the U.S. policies central task toward intervention in ethnic conflicts, this interpretation has not been without its detractors, however. On the one hand, it can be seen from above analysis that, America does have a vital interest in strategic stability in preventing ethnic and religious conflicts from spilling over and igniting major wars of aggression.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴²Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "American Hegemony ... Without an Enemy." *Foreign Policy* 92 (1993): 5.

¹⁴³ Layne and Schwarz, "American Hegemony," 6.

¹⁴⁴Yael Aronoff, "An apology is not enough", *Washington Post*, 9 April 1998, p A25, From Stephen Wertheim. *A Solution from Hell: The United States and the Rise of Humanitarian Interventionism, 1991–2003* *Journal of Genocide Research* 12 :(3–4), (2010): 153.

¹⁴⁵Richard G. Lugar, "American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24:1(1994):27.

Nevertheless, on the other hand, a contrary explanation points out that since the motive of great powers – including America – intervention is for exploiting ethnic conflicts, as a result, such interventions may lead to conflict escalation.¹⁴⁶

Based on the results, it can be concluded that, the roots of United States perception upon ethnic conflict is return to the end of the second global war. Since ethnic conflicts in deeply divided societies turn out to be the most seriously damaging troubles for the United States, by all accounts, officials in this country had their reasons to end these concerns by direct intervention. However, the available evidence seems to prove the reality that Washington's mastermind foreign policy might have divergence goals especially when it comes to identifying the priorities of an intervention. Thus, the United States responses in terms of dealing with ethnic conflicts shift in line with its interests.

3.2 Ethnic Conflict After The Liberation Of Iraq: The U.S. Responses

Before Iraq invaded in 2003, Washington was aware of the level of ethnic and sectarian variances intensity in Iraq. United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a memo to the George W. Bush, concerning the problems that could result from such conflict in Iraq, estimated that Iraqi various ethnic nationalities would resort to violent means in order to settle their former issues.¹⁴⁷ This in fact, is a clear sign of the centerpiece of ethnic conflict concern in the Bush's administration before the onset of Iraq war.

Based on this, when intergroup conflict was being sparked, the United States foreign policy toward Iraq was focused on two important aims. The first was preventing the breakdown of Iraq and an ensuing instability of a country that the US has tried to stabilize for many years. The second was thwarting the progress of regional instability and the fear that other countries will interfere with Kurdo-Arab conflict. To achieve these goals, when the insurgency broke out, the US helped finance the Sunni Awakening movement as a way of isolating Sunni extremists. The

¹⁴⁶Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict*. (USA: Pearson, Fourth Edition 2010), 102.

¹⁴⁷Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004),150.

US has also sought to promote a multi-ethnic government in Baghdad, on the one side, again, to weaken the appeal of Sunni extremism and on the other side, to prevent the Kurds from seeking independence.¹⁴⁸

Each of these insights, as has been noted, helped us to understand plausibly the intentions of the US foreign policy reaction upon intergroup conflict and instability in Iraq. With these thoughts in mind, the central concern in the subsequent analysis is devoted for the U.S. policy in terms of dealing with ethnic conflict in Iraq.

3.2.1 Stability over change

Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the basic objectives, which guided US foreign policy toward Kurdo-Arab conflict in Iraq, was not only framed to prevent the spread of regional instability but also to ensure a stable supply of oil for the West. Albeit, taking the preserve of regional stability into account went back to the eve of Cold War. After plunging British hegemony and effectiveness in the region, the US started to arrange its priorities in the Middle East. It tried to stimulate political stability enormously,¹⁴⁹ and forge an alliance with the region's main oil producers in order to eliminate potential rival powers, like Russia, that could exert influence in this region.

It is necessary to understand that these strategic objectives reflect realists' overriding concern in terms of keeping stability. According to prominent modern realist intellectuals, and a group of leading-edge neo-realists, providing stability thorough the balance of power is much more important than the types of governments.¹⁵⁰

In the post Saddam era, Iraq has been destabilizing owing to the rapidity of ethnic and sectarian conflicts. The wide political cleavages between Kurds-Arabs and Shiites-Sunnis threatened the region's security. Iraq's feeble national identity paved

¹⁴⁸ Michael Klare, E-mail interview with author. July 8, 2014.

¹⁴⁹ William E. Odo, "Rush to the Exit ." *Foreign Affairs* 87:4 (2008): 155.

¹⁵⁰ Steven R. David, "American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East: A necessary Change." *Israil Affairs* 12:4 (2006): 615.

the way for a total disintegration. In general, in the new Iraq, ethno-sectarianism flatly institutionalized, partly when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led the political life and the management of public affairs, and partly when miscellaneous Iraqi governments established on a basis of sectarian provision.¹⁵¹

Putting in a nutshell, under those circumstances, seeking a stable Iraq and bypassing policies that might cause a collapse of this state have shaped the foreign policy of the US. The U.S. top long-term policy toward ethno-political conflict in Iraq has been drawn from the fear of fomenting instability beyond this country's border. In other words, extension Iraqi Kurds problem and provoked instability into the allied nation's boarder in the region, such as Turkey, threatened America. Moreover, Washington tried to consolidate Iraqi security situation since it feared from the ascendancy of Shiites in Iraq and the influence of Iran in the Middle East.¹⁵² Undoubtedly, policymakers in Washington paid thorough attention to the risks emanate from Iran. Their consensus view seems to be that, Iraq's ill-prepared integration has smoothed the path for Iran to be the regional dominant power.

Broadly speaking, to prevent regional instability and try to terminate intergroup dispute, markedly essential policy strategies has designed by the US. These strategies formed either by bias in favor of non-democratic regimes against ethnic groups, or by endorsing democratic regime change. First, there seems to be compelling reasons to argue that, from 1945 until 2000, the US chose silence policy towards authoritarian regimes in the Middle East only to maintain stability in this region. For this reason, America does not have any restraint regarding the nature of political system of these states.¹⁵³ Furthermore, previous experiments revealed that, regardless of backing democracy and human values, but to protect stability, the US for a long time has dealt with oppressive regimes in Europe, Asia, South America, and elsewhere. Without doubt, some of these governments have not any political benefits

¹⁵¹Adeed Dawisha, "The Unraveling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian Preferences and State Performance in Historical Perspective." *Middle East Journal* 62:2 (2008): 222.

¹⁵²Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War*. (California: Rand Publisher, 2000). 31.

¹⁵³Steven A Cook, "Disentangling Alliances." *The American Interest* 4:1 (2008): 80.

for the US interests.¹⁵⁴ Along with these policies, however, the U.S. relies on different strategies to solidify political stability. More than any intent, for instance, the humanitarian spirit as one of the chief pillars of American foreign policy during Clinton administration has played a formative role in terms of seeking stability and stamping out ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Horn of Africa. In Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as three zones of ethnic conflict where U.S. interests were not at stake, American government engaged in humanitarian intervention on behalf of Muslims and in each case the United States sought stability.¹⁵⁵

Second, after 11 September 2001, when many of the neoconservative movement adherents rose to power during George W. Bush's administration, they heavily overestimated the level of regional instability threat for the range of goals, including removing rogue states from power, framing the greater Middle East and constructing nation-building.

There are overwhelming evidences corroborating the notion that Bush's strategy to promote stability through democratic regime change not only backfired, but also destabilized the entire region. Roughly, Bush's administration attempts to spread democracy in non-democratic countries that do not have any preceding democratic experiment, authentic secular political parties, and solid competitive elections helped the Islamic militant parties to win elections in these states. The underlying argument in favor of addressing this issue is that because of Bush's ideal contemplate radical Islamic groups, such as al-Sadr in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, has wins the elections.¹⁵⁶

Up to the present time, ethnic group conflicts have played a vital role in destabilizing Iraq. Bush's democratic regime change doctrine was widely seen as an element to increase the likelihood of collapsing the whole Middle East's political structure and spilling over Iraq's instability into other countries. With regards to

¹⁵⁴Pierre M. Atlas, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests." *Digest of Middle East Studies* 21:2 (2012): 360.

¹⁵⁵Barry Rubin, *The Tragedy of the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 24.

¹⁵⁶Martin S. Indyk and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Back to Balancing." *The American Interest* 3:2(2007):45.

Iraq's quagmire, Barack Obama apparently admitted that changing regimes by hard power is demanding huge amount of money and have a great difficulties.¹⁵⁷ Paradoxically, Unlike the US perceptions, because of Iraqi change regime not only security vacuum have expanded, but also this state fall into opaque abyss. While the post-Saddam period has witnessed a number of harsh conflict incidences among ethnic groups in Iraq, the U.S. policy reaction was limited to mitigate these inhospitable multiethnic disputes through arbitration.

To alleviate Kurdo-Arab conflict, Washington made crucial efforts to consolidate a multi-ethnic, bilingual democracy in Iraq, and it has consistently backed the "principle of administrative decentralization" since 2003. This is a founding principle of the new post-Saddam Iraq, the idea that power and resources should be devolved to more local leaders if possible and safe. Certain exclusive federal authorities remain – defense, foreign affairs, monetary issues, ownership of oil – but everything else was to be decentralized. Within this concept, the U.S. government thinks Baghdad and Kurdistan Regional Government have all the tools they need to resolve their problems peacefully, including the constitution, the law on the formation of regions, the law on provincial powers.¹⁵⁸

3.2.2 Avoiding partition project

Since the hotspots of regional insecurity have constituted considerable hazards for the United States interests, Washington seeks to safeguard multiethnic society status by bypassing any partition endeavors. Washington believes that dissolution would increase national violence in general, by helping spark sectarian wars and would make alterations to the balance of power within its spheres of influence. For these reasons, it is not surprising that, in the first decade after the Cold War, Yugoslavia's partition project, at first, disregarded by the US policy.

¹⁵⁷ Barack Obama, "Moment of Opportunity: American Diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa" (remarks presented in the U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., May 19, 2011). Retrieved October 25, 2014, from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa>.

¹⁵⁸ Michael Knights, e-mail interview with author. November 25, 2014.

In the early responses, the US administration by keeping up Yugoslav's government tried to maintain this state's heterogeneous formation and status quo.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, the U.S. viewpoint stems from futuristic concerns. Washington predicts that the ontological formation of religionism, modern tribalism, ethnicities and traditionalism within old-fashioned societies will increase the possibility of the breakdown of multiethnic weak states. From there policymakers were consistently being on their well-trodden path to augment the imaginary fear of dissolution. They strongly contended that when systematic violence fuels through the bureaucracy of multiethnic weak states, a harmful consequence is that ethnic nationalism will facilitate new waves of hostility.

In a word, according to the American political perspectives, in the one hand, the partition of any state will lead to the emergence of nationalistic and separatist ethnic movements in other places, and on the other hand, it is not easy to find a solution for nationalistic battles that resulted from the division of multiethnic states.¹⁶⁰

Prior to 2009, when the current Vice President of America Joe Biden was a senator, he strongly supported the idea of Iraqi dissolution. However, the policy that recently expressed by the Obama administration officials was a unified Iraq.¹⁶¹ The U.S. deems that its national interests required preserving the unification of Iraq for multiple reasons. Firstly, even though Iraqi Kurdistan Region president, Masoud Barzani, said that, the weakness of Iraqi state and the lack of stability have prompted forward the notion of declaring an independent Kurdistan,¹⁶² but for American foreign policy decision makers the establishment of Kurdish state is enough to account for regional instability.

¹⁵⁹James Kurth, "Partitions Versus Union: Competing Traditions in American Foreign Policy." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15:4 (2004):810.

¹⁶⁰James D. Fearon, "Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order." *Security Studies* 13:4 (2004): 397.

¹⁶¹"Instability in Iraq Fuels Kurdish Independence Move," Voice of America, accessed October 28, 2014, <http://www.voanews.com/content/instability-in-iraq-fuels-kurdish-independence-move/1950480.html>.

¹⁶²"Instability in Iraq."

From 1991 onwards, the centrality of this American assessment manifested itself in the U.S. foreign policy.¹⁶³ Moreover, since then, the United States' preeminent goal has been focused on how to amass the fragile Iraq together, but the probable Kurdish independence has always been confirmed as the central hazard to achieve this goal. To lessen Kurdish prospects for sovereignty, Washington has exercised pressure over Kurdish leaders. Hence, to keep social peace and to prevent splitting Iraq into three parts, American decision makers showed their fixed policy with regard to opposing an independent Kurdish state.

Thus, to be able to understand, the case of Iraqi Kurds for the U.S. is perhaps unique because of the major Kurdish populations in Iran, Turkey and Syria. For Washington organizing a Kurdish state is unlike the Balkan situation in an important way: recognizing the European-leaning Slovenians in their own state or supporting the Muslim Yugoslavs in Bosnia was unlikely to begin the collapse of the borders of multiple countries in the region.

In the Middle East, there has traditionally been the fear that multiple states could collapse if a part of Kurdistan became independent. In fact, this fear is becoming less important as a motivating factor to hold Iraq together. Even Turkey sees that a near-autonomous KRG is probably not going to be the cause of a Kurdish uprising: maybe the opposite, with the Barzanis helping to reduce tensions. In addition, Kurds are rising up in Syria, in many cases independently of anything the KRG is doing. U.S. resistance to the formal, legal break-up of Iraq is more related to Washington's continuing belief that it is easier to deal with one country, not many small states. America believed that "If KRG in northern Iraq became formally independent, why not Basra too? Then how viable is an Iraq as a state? Washington ultimately wants to maximize stability and unity in Iraq, in large part because Iraq is a Saudi Arabia-scale oil producer".¹⁶⁴

Secondly, the U.S. policy has been committed to Iraq's territorial integrity. The federal framework (championed by many post-2003 Iraqi political actors particularly

¹⁶³Farkas, "*Fractured States*," 33.

¹⁶⁴ Michael Knights, e-mail interview with author. November 25, 2014.

the Kurdish parties) was seen as the best guarantor of a united Iraq and as a way of avoiding secessionist struggles. A key point here is that the Kurdish leaderships have consistently portrayed themselves as a part of Iraq albeit a part that is on the road to eventual independence at some distant unspecified point in the future. Within the post-2003 political order, Kurdish-Arab conflict seems to be more a competition or a contest. In 2014, Baghdad-Erbil relations hit the lowest point, rising outstanding issues and expanding political mistrust has been increased the possibility of armed confrontation. However, due to increase security and economic troubles, Baghdad and the (KRG) reached a formal agreement especially to terminate outstanding problems such as yearlong oil export and budget disputes that shook the foundations of unitary Iraq.¹⁶⁵

The future of this relationship is difficult to predict but in the meantime, it seems the Kurdish region needs the Iraqi framework for economic reasons if for nothing else. So that the US cannot champion partition due to the potential costs and due to the fact that the Kurds (at least the leaders) do not agree among themselves in a rush to achieving full formal independence. As for the associated costs, they clash with the U.S. interests regarding Iraq: namely, stability of oil flows and oil markets, reintegrating Iraq into regional politics, security concerns relating to non-state actors and to Iran and so forth. Though the necessary pre-conditions (both in Iraq and in the Kurdish region and also regionally) for Kurdish independence are not firmly in place and as long as Kurdish independence does not seem imminent, it makes little sense for the U.S. to champion Kurdish independence in the immediate term.¹⁶⁶

Thirdly, the United States concern over a shattered Iraq resulted from the fear of the emboldened attempt of radical forces to control such areas where the majority of inhabitants are the Sunnis. The assumption that ushered the American action policy has assumed that in the event of establishing the Sunni state, it would be a safe haven for radical groups to launch their terrorist attacks.

¹⁶⁵“ Baghdad – Erbil Agreement: New Hope To Be Treated Sensitivity,” *Turkish Daily News Newspaper*, accessed January 22, 2015. <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/177635/baghdad-erbil-agreement-new-hope-to-be-treated-sensitively.html>.

¹⁶⁶Fanar Hadad, e-mail interview with author. October 18, 2014

Similarly, furthermore, the U.S. suspected that in the case of raising a Shiite state with all the oil, Iran might have been seeking to control this newborn country. More broadly, the consensus view within American government seems to be that, when Iraq is divided, the Shiites, as a majority ethnic group, will try to build their religion state and they not only use it to fight the US interests in the region, but they declare a Shiite crescent with Iran. Along similar lines, Iraqi break down will facilitate for rising Iran as a regional dominant power, and as barrier in terms of the regions oil flow to the West.¹⁶⁷

For these reasons, from an analytical viewpoint, Washington reached the conclusion that while a partitioned Iraq would not bring an end to conflict; it leaves the space for emerging other powers to enlarge their influences at the expense of a partitioned Iraq.

Fourth, another motivation, which drove the U.S. foreign policy against partition, was to avoid future border problems amongst the fragile states. On the one hand, government officials in Washington sought to protect the position of states allied with America in the region and Persian Gulf and on the other hand, they were concentrating on putting off ethnicities matter. More to the point, fear of the fragmentation of multiethnic state borders, for example like Iraq, had lead America to anticipate hard challenges.

For instance, Washington considered that drawing new homogeneous countries border on the ashes of predecessor inharmonious states something unworkable since it creates a bevy of dilemma on the internal and external levels.¹⁶⁸Fifth, quite recently, Obama administration strictly focused on Iraq's partition consequence in a time of terror and instability crisis. After seizing massive areas in the north and north east of Iraq by radical terrorist group, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Obama administration reconfirmed their opposition to any partition of the country,

¹⁶⁷William Wunderle and Andre Briere, "Uncertain Future: A Strategic Review of the Middle East and Implications for the United States." *Comparative Strategy* 26:3 (2007):209.

¹⁶⁸Jaroslav Tir, "Letting Secessionists Have Thier Way: Can Partitions Help End and Prevent Ethnic Conflicts?" *International Interactive* 28:3 (2002):266.

due to the fact that, it would give a big chance to ISIS to create their Islamic caliphate across Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria.

Despite these American concerns, as has been noted above, in the final analysis, another key point is that since ISIS radical Sunni militant group gained ground, together with the dissolution of Iraq, losing oil-producing territories became urgent for the U.S. policy concerns. Since Iraq is one of the world's largest oil resources, the U.S. imports about 300,000 barrels of Iraq oil a day or about four percent of total imports.¹⁶⁹

American macroeconomic analysis examined the possibilities that in the case of the breakup of Iraq and taking over half of its oil fields by ISIS even for unprolonged time would lead to a disaster for the United States economy.¹⁷⁰

Summing up the results, it can be concluded that, since Kurdish-Arab conflict is a dominant form in the post Saddam era, the United States is trying to keep the geographical unity of Iraq. Apart from this, there are several key factors, which caused the U.S. to refuse the division of Iraq. The perceived concerns that stimulate Washington's foreign policy reaction toward ethnic conflicts in Iraq not only outcomes of forming three new diverse ethno-nationalist small states, but also is a consequences of the unpredictability of insurmountable headaches. Precisely, the overriding focus of the U.S. officials is on the remaining Kurdistan region as a part of Iraq and they demurred clearly the Kurds' dream of independence. When it comes to the long-simmering concern over Iran, Washington has seen that the breakdown of Iraq would provide a bigger chance for Iran in order to boost its position as a regional hegemonic power. On logical ground, since the emergence of ISIS, the possibility of splitting Iraq explicitly increased, the United States feared that a partitioned Iraq might be a breeding ground for terrorism.

¹⁶⁹“Oil Spike Fears Rise as Stability in Iraq Unravels,” *CNBC Network*, accessed November 20, 2014, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/101751907#>

¹⁷⁰“Iraq Instability and Oil Prices,” *Forbes*, accessed November 21, 2014, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/billgreiner/2014/06/30/iraq-instability-and-oil-prices/>

3.2.3 Crafting peace

In bringing Kurdish-Arab ethno-political conflict into an end, constructing peace through promoting democracy and nation-building process has been centered as another American foreign policy response to the conflict-ridden situation in the new Iraq. Principally, since 2003, the United States common peace building approach concentrated on forming a pluralist democratic coalition government between Kurds and Arabs.

Washington estimated that with the existence of a democratic government, politically, members of diverse ethnic group communities freely could elect their representatives, and economically, they have a chance to develop their projects and maintain their status positions.¹⁷¹ To shift these views into reality on the ground, meanwhile, to obstruct the evolution of interethnic conflicts in Iraq's war-torn society, nation building was seen by American officials as an essential cornerstone policy to facilitate peace building.

A brief look at Iraq's post Saddam era gives us an idea about the fact that the democratic environment have been preferred by the Shiites to control over power and politics. The Sunnis favored a power-sharing arrangement. In addition, the Kurds tried to have more autonomy in order to manage their affairs. With these different political goals, accordingly, a myriad of obstacles came into view.

Decision makers in the US acknowledged that in such an atmosphere, developing political institutions, political culture, and tolerance are crucial factors to build a new Iraq.¹⁷² As a result, after these painful realities became a breeding ground for ethnic feuds in Iraq and other shaky countries, the Bush administrations central issue in terms of nation-building efforts particularly focused on constitution

¹⁷¹Daniel Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities." *International Security* 28:1 (2003): 51.

¹⁷²Mohamed A. El-khaws, "Nation Building in a War Zone: The US Record in Iraq, 2003 – 2007." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 19:1 (2008):49.

writing and securing Iraqi politician, ethnic, religion and clan leader's advocacy to construct viable government.¹⁷³

Crafting peace in the aftermath of ethnic violence in Iraq was not trouble-free for the United States. The nature of Iraq's plural culture has had a profound effect on undermining its ethnic group identities. On these grounds, we can argue that even though the entire Iraqi governmental institutions after 2003 have been created by occupied powers, but another important key point is that Iraq's democracy suffered from the nonexistence of democratic values. Various ethnic groups accused each other's and they used hostility to express their political feelings.¹⁷⁴

A more essential concern over building peace, moreover, is the deteriorating security situation. For the U.S. political instability of nationalistic wars is fundamentally contrasting with the norms of peaceful resolution of intergroup ethnic conflict. In other words, policymakers in Washington believed that a peaceful Iraq could not be guaranteed without ethnic conflict resolution.

Reasonably, the United States decision makers expected that the protracted, bloody sectarian violence that dominated the political environment in Iraq not only exacerbated all of the risk factors that work against the survival of a fledgling democracy, but also increased the risk of renewed sectarian ethnic conflicts and, possibly, the failure of Iraq's democratic experiment.¹⁷⁵ For these reasons, as has been noted, American officials have contemplated to prevent and manage ethno political violence between Iraqi antagonistic groups either by militaristic strategy or by peaceful solutions.

For example, because the US is highly engaged with the ethnic and sectarian conflicts after the occupation of Iraq, militarily, its officials in the Pentagon, throughout intensive military operations, entirely focused on safeguarding stability. Politically, moreover, civilian service offices opened under the weight of the State

¹⁷³ Taras and Ganguly, "Understanding Ethnic Conflict," 244.

¹⁷⁴ Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald, "Democracy and Peace-building: Rethinking the Conventional Wisdom." *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 97:394(2008):139.

¹⁷⁵ David Mason, "Ending the War in Iraq: The Third Option." *Civil Wars* 14:2 (2012):213.

Department of the US administration in order to arrange the affairs of civilian populations and recovering Iraq's shrunken economy. President Bush directly began the process of political integration to ensure the future security of the country.¹⁷⁶

From the outcome of our analysis, it is possible to conclude that while American peace making missions depended on nation building and democracy promotion processes to deal with Iraq's intergroup ethnic disputes, it was not devoid of obstacles. The breakdown of Iraq's security foiled the United States nation-building project in this country. The policy of democracy promotion was being demoted on account of the arc of instability. In a nutshell, crafting peace as American policy response faced the most complicated challenges.

¹⁷⁶James Dobbins, "Preparing for Nation-Building." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 48:3 (2006):29.

CONCLUSIONS

From the research, which has been carried out, it is possible to conclude that around the world, the violent nature of ethnic conflict has generated devastating influence on political system and economic development. The phenomenon of ethnic conflict not only affected neighboring states, but also posed considerable hazard to both regional security and global stability, and came into view as a pivotal solicitude for decision makers.

Apart from the extent to which intergroup strife brought insecurity to the globe, however, theoretically, this thesis reveals that international relations discipline has been utterly unsuccessful to appropriately deal with the seeds of ethnicity and disputes within heterogeneous racial groups. It goes without saying that prior to the end of the Cold War, local political environment that characterized most divided societies being disregarded by numerous international relation theorists owing to the fact that they treated the state like a unitary performer that run after its national interests.

It is evident that this thesis has shown the paradigm of security dilemma, as a central discipline in international relations, has demonstrated the original sources of domestic conflict under the status of state break down. Undoubtedly, the availability of ethnic groups' extraordinary fear of their future safety has been increased internal security dilemma. This is in part, due to the fact that, national, ethnic, religious diverse groups are overwhelmingly compelled to provide their safety.

Indeed, owing to the nature of the prolonged Cold War, ethnic conflict becomes more prevalent within great powers' dependent states. To a very large degree, a wide range of internal disputes was raised in ethnically based divided societies. The more client states depend on outside support, the more feelings of confrontation among superpowers are generated. The exacerbation of proxy conflicts, moreover, markedly provoked instabilities in the Third World.

This study shows that in the Third World' post-Cold War, political transposition enhanced the level of intra-nations ethnic conflict within dissimilar ethnic groups. Shifting from totalitarianism into democratization paved the way for spreading ethnic struggle, violence, and ethnonational groups. Meanwhile, the mounting unstable democratic system of the region has given rise to the probability of aggravated disputes within diverse ethnic groups. The appearance of ethnically based conflicts, as a result, played a crucial role to challenge regional security dilemma. In some degree, this internal ethnic strife has smoothed the way for third parties intervention in order to protect and uphold stability.

During the waves of political independent, the question of ethnicity and inter groups ethnic war, at the broadest level, explicitly dominated the Middle East's multiethnic societies and countries. Coupled with growing division, unresolved ethnic issues directly challenged the region's stability. Even the policy of forced integration, patriotism, and nationalism in which dominant minority groups produced unlikely did not lead towards more decrease ethnic sensitivity. In contrast, since these political ideologies are a serious blow to local ethnic groups, these groups, primarily, they reckon on religious for the purpose of mitigating their catastrophe.

As we have seen, in the case of Iraq, the Baath regime (during its 35 years of power) has large sense in terms of advocating Sunni ethnic groups, and its leaders engaged to use the policy of politicization of ethnicity to Sunnis interest. Apart from reinforce its authority through ethnic cards, the Baathists sees provoking disputes within Iraq's heterogenous society as the core strategy to sustain in power. In fact, one of persuasive factor which is possibly gives an explanation is that the Baath party, as a single dominant power in Iraq's ethnically divided society, directly used all Iraq's institutions for ethnic purpose. Ironically, while Baath defined as a nationalistic, unitary and secularist party, and its internal curriculum emphasized the necessity for struggle against sectarianism and ethnic orientation, but practically throughout 35 years played the ethnic card. In contrast to the dissimilarity of Iraqi society, systematic obligatory assimilation of non-Sunni minorities originally led by Baathist leaders, supported by security forces, and Arabism and Sunni Islam declared such as pivotal of the nation's cultural heritage.

On logical grounds, the policy of ethnicity, raising the ideology of pan-Arabism, the Arabisation of Iraqi army, and exclusion non-Sunni ethnic groups from power significantly have played role in shaping nationalism and a politicized Shiism.

This thesis confirms that in Iraq's Saddam Hussein, depriving Kurds from the circles of power, and failing to ensure their rights worsened the relationship between the Kurds and Sunni Arabs, and irritated antagonistic perceptions, insecurity, and inequality. In addition, apart from these policies as has been concluded earlier, the policy of Arabization and demographic change participated to the emergence of the new patterns of Arab-Kurd ethnic conflict and violence. In deeply heterogeneous places this policy erupted bloody conflicts, and emboldened ethnic tensions and wars by brought Sunni Arab families from central and southern Iraq and settling them in the Kurds lands and cities.

The results imply that after Saddam's considerable figures of Baath Party being ousted from power in 2003, ethnic conflict had reached to the point that bigoted leading Arab Sunnis political figures began to foster ethnic antagonism. During these years ex-Baathists exploited several channels like weak institutions, security vacuum, sectarian tensions, and most importantly intergroup ethnic conflicts in order to restore their broken hegemony. The year 2014, for instance, recorded the crucial turning point in terms of ethnic wars in Iraq. The emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a brutal Sunni terrorist group deepened ethnic conflicts between Kurds and Arabs since they emphasized the national and religious differences.

Advancing on Yazidis and Shia Turcoman in Sinjar and Tal Afar city by ISIS and massacred of them can be considered as a newest wave of ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq inasmuch as innocent civilians were persecuted, uprooted and tormented just because they have a diverse religion, language and nationality.

This thesis provides genuinely insight concerning the rise of ethnic conflict in Iraq after the decline of Baathist regime. It puts forward the US most important barriers as an invading power. The U.S. decision makers, in the aftermath of the World War Second, responded to the phenomenon of ethnic disputes, within the

most deeply divided societies, as a seriously damaging trouble for its interests. In most instances, the available evidence seems to prove the reality that Washington's mastermind foreign policy makers might have different goals particularly with regard to labeling intervention's priorities in ethnic conflicts. Even the United States responses in terms of dealing with ethnic conflict phenomena shift in line with its interests.

In the case of Iraq, one possible reason was that the United States tended to take the edge off Arabs-Kurds ethnic conflict first by developing multiethnic and democratic peace society, and then through supporting the principle of administrative decentralization. It is obvious that a central element of this idea in the new post-Saddam Iraq paid a particular attention to devolve power and resource among local ethnic leader groups.

These results emphasize that the US has not been deeply conscious over the depth of ethnic and sectarian differences in Iraq, believing all Iraqis would rally behind a US-backed leader. However, when the insurgency broke out in Iraq after 2003, the US helped finance the Sunni Awakening movement as a way of isolating Sunni extremists. The US has also sought to promote a multi-ethnic government in Baghdad, again to weaken the appeal of Sunni extremists and to prevent the Kurds from seeking independence.

By and large, while Washington is not particularly well equipped to deal with ethnic conflict, but since local ethnic violence dominated the post-Saddam era, at least it tried to keep the geographical unity of Iraq.

These findings imply that to preempt the growth of dividing Iraq on the basis of three new diverse ethno-nationalist small states, the U.S. policy reaction is on the remaining Kurdistan Region as a part of the country, and even objected to Kurds dream of independence. Each of these insights, as has been noted, provided confirmatory knowledge to fathom the reasons of the US policy reaction upon intergroup ethnic conflict and instability in Iraq.

These results shed some light on how the US has tended to side with central regime in Baghdad against any effort by Iraqi heterogeneous ethnic groups to challenge the status quo; the policy has been to side with stability over change where ethnic conflict is concerned. In short, the United States has inclined to support stable regime in Iraq against rebellious ethnic groups; however, when it serves U.S. interests to destabilize an unfriendly regime, the U.S. will actively promote ethnic conflict. Basically, the U.S. supports and opposes ethnic conflict at different times depending on its prevailing interest, and its reaction based on this equation.

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