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**A POSTHUMAN VISION IN C. S. LEWIS'S *THE*
*CHRONICLES OF NARNIA***

MASTER OF ARTS THESIS

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
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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Aslan, my beautiful divine cat, always in my heart. Dear Aslan, your celestial voice is always in my memory. Thank you for your great gift of existence. I will love you for eternity.



ABSTRACT

A POSTHUMAN VISION IN C. S. LEWIS'S *THE CHRONICLES OF NARNIA*

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In Posthumanism, “post” indicates an ontological break with long-standing humanist understandings of the human being as self-contained, exclusive, and limited. Rather than privileging human subjectivity posthumanists seek to disrupt biological and social hierarchies. This thesis examines C.S. Lewis's three fantastic stories from *The Chronicles of Narnia: The Magician's Nephew* (1955), *The Witch Lion and Wardrobe* (1950), *The Last Battle* (1956) concept of alienation, animality, and literary geography and topography with the theory of Posthumanism. The first chapter analyzes the alienation of species and significant identity problems by Posthumanist philosophies. In this respect, by discussing the impact of Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophy of immanence and rhizome on the Posthuman reveals theoretical and creative connections between Posthumanism and the philosophies of immanence and rhizome. It shows how Lewis reveals the interconnectedness of all species in the Posthuman era by breaking down the hierarchies imposed by humanism. The second chapter analyzes the relationship of all species in the light of animal theory. The third chapter examines the relationship of literature and place and time, cartography and Bakhtin's chronotope ideas, it reveals that Lewis constructs a Post-nature world by using geographical entities and mapping, contributing on the formation of the geography's Posthuman subjectivity. Bearing in mind all of these, this thesis trace the Posthuman situation in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, which removes all distinctions between species, and in doing so, thesis discusses the permeability between all human and non-human species revealed with Posthuman subjectivity.

Keywords: Posthumanism, Posthuman, C.S. Lewis, *Narnia Chronicles*, Animal Studies, Map.

ÖZET

C. S. LEWIS'İN *NARNİA GÜNLÜKLERİ*: POSTHÜMANİST BİR BAKIŞ

TURANLI, Duygu Şerife

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Posthümanizmde, "post", insanın kendi kendine yeten, dışlayıcı ve sınırlı olduğu yönündeki uzun süredir devam eden hümanist anlayışlarla ontolojik bir kopuşu ifade eder. Posthümanistler, insan öznelliğini ayrıcalıklı kılmak yerine biyolojik ve sosyal hiyerarşileri bozmaya çalışırlar. Bu tez, C.S. Lewis'in *Narnia Günlükleri*'ndeki üç fantastik öyküsünü: *Büyücünün Yeğeni* (1955), *Cadı Aslan ve Dolap* (1950), *Son Savaş* (1956), yabancılaşma, hayvanlık, edebi coğrafya ve topografya kavramlarını Posthümanizm teorisi ile inceler. Birinci bölüm Posthümanist bakış açısıyla türlerin yabancılaşması ve önemli kimlik sorunlarını analiz eder. Bu bağlamda, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin içkinlik ve köksap felsefelerinin Posthüman üzerindeki etkisini tartışarak, Posthümanizm ile içkinlik ve köksap felsefeleri arasındaki teorik ve yaratıcı bağlantıları ortaya koyar. Lewis'in, hümanizmin dayattığı hiyerarşileri yıkarak, posthüman çağda tüm türlerin birbiriyle bağlantılılığını nasıl ortaya koyduğunu gösterir. İkinci bölüm, tüm türlerin hayvanlık teorisi ışığında ilişkisini analiz eder. Üçüncü bölüm, edebiyat ile yer ve zaman, kartografya ve Bakhtin'in kronotop fikirleri arasındaki ilişkiyi inceler, Lewis'in coğrafi varlıkları ve haritalandırmayı kullanarak doğa sonrası bir dünya kurduğunu, coğrafyanın insan sonrası özneliliğin oluşumuna katkısını ortaya koyar. Tüm bunları göz önünde bulundurarak bu çalışma türler arasındaki bütün ayrımları kaldırarak *Narnia Günlükleri*'nde insan sonrası durumun izini sürer ve bunu yaparken insan ve insan olmayan bütün türler arasındaki geçişlilik durumu ortaya koyularak tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Posthümanizm, Posthüman, C. S. Lewis, *Narnia Günlükleri*, Hayvan Çalışmaları, Harita.

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INTRODUCTION

The Chronicles of Narnia, a seven-book fantasy series, is not just a relic of the past but a work that resonates with contemporary sociopolitical concerns. Produced during the Golden Era of English Fantasy literature in the 1950s and 1960s, it is steeped in Christian ideology. However, its exploration of the need to redefine humanity in the context of relationships among different societies and people, and between humanity and non-human species, nature, and God, is a theme that remains relevant today. In this light, reimagining the production of *The Chronicles of Narnia* in the present, the Christian humanist philosophical thought and vision of Lewis's work could be interpreted based on current Critical Posthumanist thought that is concerned with these relationships.¹ Christian humanism is an inclusive intellectual territory where many different theological and philosophical voices are heard; their common denominator is their rejection of the concept of anthropocentrism and their acknowledgment of the oneness of the universe, regardless of the interpretation each Christian humanist endows these concepts with.

¹ Different intellectual and independent Posthumanist movements, including Feminist Posthumanism, Critical Posthumanism, and Speculative Posthumanism, conceptually foster Posthumanism. Feminist Posthumanism may refer to a non-traditional study on the fringes or outside of traditional scholarly comfort zones (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 478). Critical Posthumanism and Speculative Posthumanism are the most prevalent. Both criticize anthropocentric (human-centered) thinking. However, Critical Posthumanism questions the anthropocentrism of contemporary intellectual life, focusing on the Posthuman as a cultural and political state. In contrast, Speculative Posthumanism is interested in the potential of certain technologically developed items and opposes anthropocentric thinking about the long-term effects of contemporary technology (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 1066). This thesis applies Critical Posthumanism to the discussion of Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia*.

The intensity of Posthumanism's rivalry with Christian humanism is relative and depends on which Christian humanist voice one hears; thus, evaluating the rivalry between Christian humanism and Posthumanism may be complicated. This thesis exposes readers to the (Post)humanist universe of C. S. Lewis as expressed in *The Chronicles of Narnia* using Critical Posthumanist discourse to deliver Lewis's Christian humanist ideas regarding the interaction of a human with other humans and non-human species toward one's self-awareness. This thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of *The Chronicles of Narnia*'s Posthumanist universe by examining the Posthumanist concepts of alienation, animality, and literary geography, illustrated in *The Magician's Nephew*, *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, and *The Last Battle*. Applying these Posthumanist concepts, this thesis concludes that *The Chronicles of Narnia* may be identified as literature of liberation, a primary trait of Posthumanist literature. The writer of this thesis does not intend to compare C. S. Lewis's Christian humanism and Posthumanism as reflected in *The Chronicles of Narnia*. The question raised and answered positively in this thesis is, "If Lewis had produced *The Chronicles of Narnia* nowadays, could this work be considered Posthumanist?"

When C. S. Lewis published *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* (1950), *The Magician's Nephew* (1955), and *The Last Battle* (1956), English society carried post-traumatic wounds from World War I and World War II. English society was also experiencing the Cold War and the threat of nuclear weapons through its participation in a new global order after World War II. In C. S. Lewis's contemporary England, there were specific social changes. New "welfare State" rules adopted by the new government dismantled the existing class system and granted new equal rights to all social classes. All classes began to benefit from privileges such as health and housing. The situation of the working class was improved, with equal rights to education and easier access to higher education through which youth of the lower classes could possess occupations traditionally occupied by the upper class. Moreover, a decision was made to nationalize many collapsed or damaged industrial enterprises, such as coal mines, railways, the iron and steel industry, and the Bank of England. However, these new privileges and rights could have been more effective in addressing issues like urbanization, unemployment, and poverty brought on by the increasing industrial mechanization of workers' lives. Also, this new world order- the class system disappeared, the value of money increased, and consumerism popularized the

dynamic, volatile, and future-oriented nature of the society caused individuals' alienation, especially among the youth, who became increasingly hopeless and helpless, losing their roots and adapting to the new order (Aydoğan, 2017, p. 110-112, 115, 119-120).

The Chronicles of Narnia can be linked to man's desire to fight the evils of civilization after both World Wars. The negative impacts of industrialization, urbanization, poverty, pollution, and alienation² have not damaged Lewis's land of Narnia, composed of rolling meadows, moorish mountains, musky caverns, slushy dells, and deep woods. Still, Lewis' *The Chronicles of Narnia* also includes urban settings associated with the primary world against nature, expressing diametrically socioeconomic and political ideologies from Narnia's world (Dolaykaya, 2020, p. 97). The city cannot guarantee a life in a secure environment despite its traditional connections with civilization, order, and security. Thus, nature serves as a means of escaping from the city's many obligations, establishments, and perils. The siblings' encounter with nature begins when they enter Narnia through the wardrobe. Similarly, in *The Magician's Nephew*, Polly and Digory live an urban life without physical security or emotional and intellectual growth. In the city, children are exposed to an unsatisfying and stale understanding of reality; adults' behavior- exemplified by Uncle Andrew, who represents those who, according to the dominant social standards, are the most educated and thus civilized- can be non-virtuous, providing, therefore, to the children an unsafe physical and intellectual environment. Still, like in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, this liminal pastoral setting is not the ideal natural environment for Digory and Polly because it is characterized by inactivity. Digory and Polly mature emotionally and intellectually in the Narnia world and find their true selves through interacting with different species.

Written in the 1950s, C.S. Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* is neither entirely modern nor entirely postmodern fiction. Lewis disapproved of much

² Under the pressure of the fulfillment of fake needs and desires, alienation in an urban setting creates impediments to individuals finding their true selves and constructively communicating with their fellowmen, whereas alienation in a rural setting away from the corrupt environment of the city, especially Lewis's Narnia that enriches the natural world with fantastic elements, is constructive for the individuals because they are exposed to the limitless unfamiliar where the individuals can freely wander and find their true needs and life purpose.

modernist writing in part because it tended to embrace flaws and exacerbate rather than lessen the bewilderment and hopelessness that pervaded a time when totalitarianism was a significant threat. Lewis attempted to challenge this passive attitude toward hardship with a message of hope in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, partly because he was a Christian. Furthermore, Lewis tried to avoid characteristics of high modernism, such as the elitist citation of works from earlier traditions in the works of Joyce, Pound, and Eliot. At the same time, he disliked the technical experimentation that occasionally rendered the modernists' prose and poetry unintelligible to the ordinary reader. Modern literature's excessive formal experimentation and focus on the negative aspects of modernity prevent it from regaining a new understanding of reality (Simonson and Gilete, 2008, p. 6). In the works of fiction written by authors like Lewis and Tolkien, the prospect of a new connection and engagement with the traditional Christian message is presented together with a renewed respect for the essential things of the natural world (Simonson and Gilete, 2008, p. 17).

The Chronicles of Narnia is also not Postmodern fiction. Postmodernism defies Modernism's fundamental classification and is more abstract than Modernism (Hochhalter, 2000, p. 43). The Postmodern worldview's critique of scientism is arguably its most compelling feature. Postmodernity recognizes the authority of story and experience instead of science's self-evident authority (Hochhalter, 2000, p. 56). *The Narnia Chronicles* was written while Postmodernism was only beginning, yet this is what makes Lewis such an intriguing paradigm for the Modern-to-Postmodern transitional period. Lewis used reason to explain Christian dogmas as a superb storytelling of vivid imagination. Given how Lewis used narrative to deliver the Christian message, it seems less probable that he consciously chose to accept postmodernism than simply transcending it. *The Chronicles of Narnia* shows Lewis' appreciation for storytelling to convey information. In a postmodern context, power is legitimized through story. Although Modernists may provide scientific evidence to prove the falsity of dragons, Postmodernists believe that such evidence does not always equate to total knowledge. In Postmodernism, power is transmitted through stories rather than logical arguments from the giver to the recipient. The narrative is sent to the addressee by the sender, who then grants the recipient the power and capability to deliver the story themselves.

The idea that Postmodernism opposes objective truth is one common misperception. This is only partially accurate since it disagrees with the Modernist interpretation of truth, which limits the truth to what can be demonstrated. For philosophy to speak to us as embodied, engaged, dynamic, and ever-changing living beings, narrative is the sole means of capturing this facet of the human experience (Hochhalter, 2000, p. 86). In *The Abolition of Man*, Lewis's anti-scientism is shown: "We reduce things to mere Nature so that we may 'conquer' them. [...] The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them; the soul does not become Nature till we can psycho-analyse her. [...] the entire process is stifled, for this time the being who would have benefitted and the being who has become a victim are one in the same" (Lewis, 1944, p. 79).

I. Contemporary Fantasy Literature: Fantasy And Speculative Fiction

"Fantasy" was first used to refer to a fictional genre in English around the 1940s. The 1950s and 1960s are considered the Golden Era of English-language fantasy. Clive Staples Lewis stands among prominent figures of fantasy literature, including J. R. R. Tolkien, Lucy M. Boston, Mary Norton, Philippa Pearce, and Alan Garner (Nikolajeva, 2003, p. 139). In *Fairy Tale and Fantasy: From Archaic to Postmodern*, Maria Nikolajeva highlights that fantasy literature is a diverse genre that incorporates elements from myth, romance, the novel of chivalry, the picaresque, the gothic novel, mysteries, science fiction, and others into its stories, often combining seemingly unrelated themes (Nikolajeva, 2003, p. 139). Specifically, contemporary fantasy fiction addresses modern times, unlike folktales, fairy tales, and myths (Nikolajeva, 2003, p. 138). Moreover, contemporary fantasy fiction serves the author's chosen aims in several ways, "instructive, parodic, satirical, religious, philosophical, social, or entertaining" (Nikolajeva, 2003, p. 139).

According to Mikhail Bakhtin, how space and time are constructed in literature is a feature he refers to as a "chronotope" (an interdependent unity of space and time), and every genre has a different "chronotope" (forms of time). Using this structural method, fairy tales and fantasy may be categorized based on how time and space are set up. The existence of magic or any other manifestation of the supernatural in a recognized, realistic world is one aspect that readily identifies the fantasy chronotope. This presence may take the shape of magical entities, things, or

occurrences, expanding into a whole cosmos or condensing to a single magical particle (Nikolajeva, 2003, p. 141).

In time-shift fantasy, there is unquestionably a more significant fascination with time itself, including its philosophical implications and metaphysical nature. Exploring time patterns, fantasy authors philosophize about predestination, free will, possible parallel times, causality, as well as time displacement and temporal paradoxes (e.g., time moving at a different rate or even in opposite directions in distinct universes) (James and Mendlesohn, 2012, p. 53). Time distortion, the primary ingredient of secondary-world fantasy, also includes the subcategory of time-based fantasies like *The Chronicles of Narnia*. The journey between worlds, which is seen to be the primary motif of secondary-world fantasy, is also most apparent in temporal fantasy. The passage is frequently linked to symbols like the door, the magical item, and the magic messenger, all appearing in secondary-world fiction. Postmodern fantasy advances all the spatiotemporal circumstances. A fascinating example is “heterotopia.” “Heterotopia” often known as a multiplicity of discordant worlds, is a literary term for ambiguous and unstable spatial and temporal situations. The word “heterotopia” highlights the dissimilarity, discord, and ambiguity of the world by using the prefix “hetero” (Nikolajeva, 2003, p. 143).

Furthermore, in *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion*, Jackson highlights that fantasy literature is a subversive literary form that can have a countercultural impact. The obstinate defiance of existing concepts of the “real” or “possible,” sometimes leading to violent antagonism, has been a quality most commonly linked with literary fantasy (Rosemary, 1981, p. 8). Numerous novels have a hidden subversive potential that aids future generations in changing the world. These novels are seen as a threat in many situations and nations by authorities, governments, conservatives of all stripes, parents, and educators who aren't prepared to take their kids on an adventure (Bukhina, 2019, p. 171). When the texts are introduced to a new culture, they could acquire additional subversive force. *The Chronicles of Narnia* was barely considered controversial in England in the 1970s, but afterward, it was published in Samizdat in Russia after being translated into Russian in the 1980s; it was considered revolutionary. Stories from Narnia discussed religious views that the Soviet government would not support, and any reference to Christianity would be removed from the children's book. The cause of the inventiveness and fun of children's books

may be explained psychologically, which enables us to understand the subversive force of children's literature (Bukhina, 2019, p. 184).

Fantasy scholars wanted a new umbrella term for all fantastic genres due to the rise in the popularity of fantasy in recent years, and many now prefer using “speculative fiction” for that reason, viewing science fiction as a subgenre or genre within that category. Speculative fiction includes genres that focus on concepts and pose questions such as “What if?” whereas fantasy tends to assume fantastical aspects and concentrate on character behavior (Weiss, 2021, p. 13). Therefore, “speculative fiction” is appropriate for genres that emphasize philosophical, scientific, technical, and political ideas (Weiss, 2021, p. 12). Speculative fiction creates a different universe where potential futures of existence are investigated rather than attempting to mimic real life. It achieves this by describing a world other than our own. It is a general word that covers fantasy and science fiction, among other genres. Lewis’s Narnia is a speculative fiction place. In summary, the fantastic may be divided into two main categories, fantasy and speculative fiction, while works like *The Chronicles of Narnia* cross the line between them.

C. S. Lewis’s *The Chronicles of Narnia* is fantasy and speculative fiction. It exemplifies the two significant features in the Fantasy genre: time displacement and secondary worlds. Narnia is an inclusive society of creatures of fairy tale/fantasy, myth, and folklore like witches, Father Christmas, talking animals, centaurs, unicorns, hairy beings, dwarfs, dryads-spirits of trees, naiads-spirits of water, fauns, centaurs, and giants. The variety of themes, motifs, and narrative events comprising the plot and the inclusive hypostasis of the Narnian world make *The Chronicles of Narnia* an example of contemporary Fantasy fiction. Furthermore, according to Lewis, *The Chronicles of Narnia* is a supposition of what the life of Christ would entail in another reality; thus, it can also be read as speculative fiction. Though it has unmistakable religious undertones, the book delves further than a straightforward narration of the narrative of Christ, touching on topics like the link between humans and the environment and the nature of reality (materiality, visibility, and appearances) Lewis was heavily inspired by Christian culture and was even dubbed the unofficial ambassador of Christianity (Sharma and Dev, 2021, p. 3409). Still, Lewis's extensive use of symbolism and archetypal representations becomes a means in his exploration

of philosophical ideas to create a different world vision rather than to promote a particular worldview limited by certain dogmas.

II. Western Humanism: Secular And Christian Humanism

Philosophical humanism, a transformative human-centered movement in society and culture, has been not only an educational program but also a beacon of inspiration for individuals to live their lives by morally acceptable norms, values, dignity, and rights, thereby emphasizing humanity's capacity (Dacey and Vaughn, 2003, p. 8). Secular humanism argues that the real source of knowledge is not dogmas but the rational human mind alone (Dacey and Vaughn, 2003, p. 17). Although there were few views held by all of the most famous Enlightenment thinkers, reason was not only the key to knowledge but also an instrument for affecting people's lives, values, and society; instead of figuring out God's will, humanity's primary objective in life was to use reason to shape the good life. Major figures of secular humanism discussed in this thesis towards an understanding of the connection between humanism and Posthumanism are Spinoza, whose monistic universe has also influenced Posthumanist discourse on reality, and Karl Marx, whose alienation theory has influenced the shaping of Posthumanist alienation.³

Christian humanism may be an oxymoron because humanism frequently alludes to its nonreligious version. Christian humanism was a varied movement. It comprised people such as Cornelius Agrippa, who examined occult practice and Kabbala; Pico della Mirandola, who became acquainted with Savonarola and had some of his religious ideas criticized as infidelity; Juan de Valdes, who was the core of an evangelical Catholic group in Italy; and John Fisher, who merged humanist perspectives discovering with famous piety, died a Cardinal and was ultimately became a saint. Furthermore, it included the Cambridge Platonists, such as Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, Benjamin Whichcote, Peter Sterry, John Smith, Nathaniel Culverwell, and John Worthington, who attempted to combine mainly Plato's and Plotinus's epistemology and metaphysics as well as Aristotelian philosophy and stoicism—with the philosophy and science of their times, as expressed by Descartes,

³ For the theories of Spinoza and Marx, see under III) Critical Posthumanism.

Hobbes, and Spinoza, as well as Bacon, Boyle, and the Royal Society (Zalta and Nadelman, 2023, p. 1).

Christian humanism is also known as Civic or Classical humanism. During the 1500s and 1600s, humanists turned to the church fathers and antiquity for guidance and inspiration to help create a virtuous society; they “focused on ancient society to help the present society” (MacCulloch, 2004, p. 77). Thus, Christian humanism wasn't a religious movement in the same sense as the English or German Reformations. The Christian humanist movement was instead motivated by ideas. The humanist movement sought to change how individuals believe, speak, and live rather than the Church. Therefore, the fact that they had no ambitions to change the church was not a sign of their weakness; that was not their goal. They aimed to create virtuous individuals using words and oratory to transform people's hearts and thoughts.

Therefore, since the Renaissance, Christian humanism has advocated freedom from religious authority, the pursuit of reason, and the right to follow one's conscience. Christian humanism is the source of many modern ideas, including personhood, human emancipation, progress, universal ethics/reason, and secularity (Zimmerman, 2016, p. 6). In the process of an individual's deification, one's life within the boundaries of physical life must be centered on self-knowledge resulting from a strong sense of brotherhood, that is, to participate in the totality (the oneness) through an essential connection to the variegated other. Thus, understanding oneself is contemplating one's relationships with others. Christ's command, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” describes how the philosophical principles are implemented (Shipton et al., 2020, p. 4). Christian ethics increase self-understanding as well as mutual understanding.

Moreover, the dignity of nature and the oneness defining nature as the other and humanity was also explored by Christian humanism. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the garden was the place of land reform most strongly associated with Christian teaching in Europe throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hence, a good garden was the paradigm for spiritually sanctioned land use. Creating a more ordered “second nature,” such as an estate garden or its bigger counterparts, a whole estate itself or a political region, became a gauge of responsible caretaking and excellent leadership, indicating both men's talents and essential qualities of Creation. This age saw an increase in the extent and importance of human activity in nature that

was purifying rather than polluting (Mukerji, 2002, p. 4). The importance of restoration in this gardening tradition was articulated even more firmly and passionately in the writings of the late sixteenth-century Protestant, naturalist, and garden writer Bernard Palissy. Palissy was a prominent Christian humanist who wrote on gardening because he recognized holy worth in “works” both of God and of man (Mukerji, 2002, p. 16).

In *The Problem of Pain*, *Mere Christianity*, and *Miracles: A Preliminary Investigation*, Lewis delved into the depths of his Christian faith, reconciling two opposite tendencies within Christianity—the rationalization of the Christian faith and the conventional, historic Christianity profoundly dedicated to ongoing supernaturalism. His Christian convictions, rooted in the Trinity, the Incarnation, Christ's Godhead, Christ's physical resurrection, heaven, hell, and the second coming, were not just beliefs but a profound understanding of the Christian teachings (Reppert, 2007, p. 3). In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, Lewis does not use direct or explicit scripture references but allusions, subliminal indications of accurate biblical phraseology, and ideas of biblical themes or settings (Wilson, 2008, p. 174). Aslan the Lion, one of the primary characters, is a Christian emblem that symbolizes Jesus Christ or the Lion of Judah (Waugh, 2016, p. 11). Also, *The Chronicles of Narnia* provide us with Narnian versions of Christian mythology: the Creation (in *The Magician's Nephew*), the death and resurrection of a god (*The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*), and the end of the world (*The Last Battle*) (James, 2012, p. 71). *The Magician's Nephew* explains Narnia's Creation (Genesis), the origin of evil, and how the latter invaded Narnia. The sacrificial death and resurrection of Christ (the Gospels) are explained in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, and the Antichrist's coming (the ape), the end of the world, and the Last Judgment (Revelation) are explained in *The Last Battle* (James, 2012, p. 71). Biblical references in *The Chronicles of Narnia* cannot be ignored. Still, Lewis insisted that *The Chronicles of Narnia* is not a Christian allegory but an excellent example of defamiliarization. In *Letters to Children*, Lewis confesses, “I’m not exactly ‘representing’ the real (Christian) story in symbols. I’m more saying, ‘Suppose there was a world like Narnia and it needed rescuing, and the Son of God (or the ‘Great Emperor oversea’) went to redeem it, as he came to redeem ours, what might it, in that

world, all have been like?”⁴ (Waugh, 2016, p. 38). Lewis’s Christian humanism is why he used Christian literature as a source of inspiration for creating *The Chronicles of Narnia*.

III. Critical Posthumanism

Beginning as a political movement in the 1960s, the disintegration of the "Human" evolved into an intellectual endeavor in the 1970s, then into a theoretical strategy in the 1990s, where Posthumanism started. In recorded history, various groups of individuals whose existence had previously been symbolically concealed by one particular type of embodiment (men, white, Western, heterosexual, physically able, etc.) developed their narratives as subjects, leading to a multiplicity of discourses. The realization that diversity, categorized by gender, racial, ethnic, social, and personal experiences, is innate to the species of humans is the historical foundation of the Posthuman movement's comprehensive inclusiveness of viewpoints, from animals to undiscovered forms of life. No species or particular kind of person can metaphorically symbolize humankind- the decentralized and devoid of representation democratized strategies and Posthumanism (Ferrando, 2012, p. 12).

From the official emergence of Postmodernism in 1979 until the 1990s, numerous “post” movements were witnessed: Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, Ecofeminism, and New Historicism are some of them. At this point, Posthumanism, just like Postmodernism, is the result of Humanism evolving from within. The realization that the human/nature distinction created in people's minds with an everyday discourse over the centuries has never really existed has been a critical turning point in transforming modern thought into Postmodern thought. Posthumanist pre-theoretical historical and cultural stages that developed after the 1980s can be considered anti-humanist. As the name suggests, the most distinctive feature of Posthumanism is its “rejection of traditional Western humanism” (Bolter, 2016, p. 1).

Critical Posthumanism, the theoretical stage of Posthumanism, developed after the 1980s with the significant contribution of influential writers, including Donna Haraway, Katherine Hayles, Rosi Braidotti, Bruno Latour, and Cary Wolfe. These

⁴ *Letters to Children*, p. 92.

authors discussed the discourses produced by famous French theorists, such as Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, and Jean-François Lyotard have benefited from Michel Foucault's inference on the first structuralism movement, questioning the existence and "value" of the human being (Lucci, 2017, p. 442)⁵.

Considering the transformation process of Humanism into Posthumanism, people have never been independent of their environment. *When Species Meet*, Haraway says, Haraway believes everyone is an interconnected body with ontic and ancient connections (Haraway, 2008, p. 165). Posthumanism, which sprang from postmodernism, appears to reject the idea of "method," and it indeed does. The postmodern criticism of objective knowledge and unchanging truth provides the rhizomatic contours of a Posthumanist "methodology," for want of a better term. To address existing difficulties and remain open to opportunities, one must be aware of the condition of things, which is not definite but dynamic, mutant, and changeable (Ferrando, 2012, p. 11). Therefore, Posthumanist philosophy argues that humans interact directly or indirectly with everything that has happened and is happening around them. The Anthropocene (Human Age) perspective has harmed the whole world, including humankind. Moreover, Posthumanist philosophy claims that there is no distinction between authentic dying and living and artificial. Everyone constantly interacts with each other (Ferrando, 2016, p. 159-160).

In *A Cyborg Manifesto*, Donna J. Haraway argues that humans and others are part of the Earth. She challenges anthropocentrism by emphasizing the relationship between humans and non-humans. She emphasizes the interdependence of earthly beings (of all kinds). Humans, whether or not there are (all kinds of) creatures, coexist with each other, form and dissolve each other in entanglement across all scales, periods, and things (Haraway, 2016, p. 97). Similarly, in *How We Became Posthuman*, Hayles asserts that "we have always been Posthuman" (Hayles, 1999, p. 279).

⁵ For Posthumanism, Foucault's view of power as a constraining (potestas) and generative (potentia) force is also essential. Power structures are reflected in theoretical and cultural representation systems, political and normative narratives, and social forms of identification, in addition to their function at the material level. These lack coherence and reason, and their improvised nature contributes to their hegemonic power (Braidotti, 2013, *Posthuman*, p. 26).

Moreover, Braidotti explains the interaction between posthumans and humans using Deleuze's and Guattari's conceptualizations of continuous becoming. Human and Posthuman are nomadic subjects inherent in the vitality of self-regulating matter in constant becoming. The concept of the “inhuman circulating,” which refers to the significance and sentient abilities of non-human actors and agents, has at least three distinct origins: Latour's Actor-Network Theory, Niklas Luhmann's system theory, and Deleuze's and Guattari's rhizome theory. This thesis will apply Deleuze's and Guattari's rhizome theory.

The Humanities may draw much inspiration from Deleuze's and Guattari's notion that thinking is the process of producing new conceptions since it is based on the similarities between philosophy, science, and the arts. Philosophy, science, and arts represent different forms of intelligence, and Deleuze and Guattari carefully emphasize these distinctions. Additionally, they contend that they continue to be indexed on a similar level of intense, self-transforming life force. The ontology of being, which serves as the conceptual foundation for Posthuman nomadic philosophy, is maintained by this continuity. The becoming or diversification procedures that comprise Deleuze's monistic ontology are not as widely received in science, as science must reconcile with the actualized and defined world's physical processes. Philosophy has an edge over other disciplines because it is a more nuanced instrument for the inquiring mind. It is more sensitive to the nonhuman, ever-changing “chaosmo-sis,” or generative power of a generative cosmos, and the virtual plane of immanence (Braidotti, 2013a, p. 170). Species already exist in liberated (post-feminist), multiethnic communities with significant levels of technology intervention, where they live in constant stages of hybridization, movement, and transition. These are multi-layered, internally conflicting phenomena rather than simple, linear occurrences (Braidotti, 2013a, p. 184). The Posthuman nomadic subject is depicted as a materialistic philosophy, vitalist, and deeply grounded; the radical immanence of the “politics of location” firmly situates it in any location. It is a complex and interrelated topic seen from the perspectives of feminist and post-colonial theories and Spinoza, Deleuze, and Guattari within the framework of a monistic ontology (Braidotti, 2013, p. 188).

Posthumanism eliminates the boundaries between the living and the inanimate in a quantum view of the mechanics of being, challenging biocentrism and

the concept of living (Kalpokas, 2021, p. 2). A “monistic universe” corresponds to Baruch Spinoza's fundamental idea that matter, the world, and humans are not dualistic entities defined on internal or external oppositional principles. Unlike Rene Descartes, who separated mind from body, Spinoza claims that Substance is one; it is ontologically autonomous and driven by the need for expression of oneself. In other words, in *Ethics*, Spinoza's monism beliefs about causation and the effort to persist in existence are defined by each thing's emotive capacity (Kalpokas, 2021, p. 2). Spinoza is a significant figure in Braidotti's Posthumanism. Braidotti contends that Spinoza's heritage makes a post-anthropocentric comprehension of consciousness and innovative Posthuman values possible (Abrams, 2017, p. 2). The elimination of humans by post-humanism exposes humans as mere elements of hybrid formations bound together by emotional variations. According to Spinozist theory, agency, and existence are believed to be contained inside these emotional fluxes (Kalpokas, 2021, p. 1-2). Additionally, referencing Spinoza helps one understand rather than being an indication of conceptual overstretch or weakness; Spinoza's insights help us comprehend how the hybrid form of current agglomerative world material is merely a demonstration of pervasiveness and strength. Having many traits indicates strength, and Spinozist Deus sive Natura has the quality of having each characteristic contained within it (Kalpokas, 2021, p. 2).

Spinoza's God is expressive; the attributes simultaneously involve God or Nature in infinite and constrained forms and explain God or Nature's nature (Deleuze, 1990, p. 337). At the same time, Spinoza's monist attitude makes him seem to be a pantheist and an atheist. In his famous thesis, Spinoza says, “God or Nature” (Deus sive Natura). Spinoza is attempting to customize theology and the physical realm with this concept fundamentally. The overlapping of reality and perception is the correlation between the worlds of thought and the correlations in the original reality. Therefore, it comes to the potential of hybrid agglomerations' non-human components to control the circumstances that influence human behavior, emotions, and sociability. As a result, old divisions and hierarchies have dissolved into a single monistic plain, a new perspective that is best understood through affective fluxes. The human being is more de-privileged in this setting because their datafied depiction gains importance, effect, and emotive power (Kalpokas, 2021, p. 2).

It would be incorrect to presume that there is no hierarchy, even in a monist ontology. Entities' realities shift and vary in connection to one another within a reality equated with emotional capacity. However, emotional unevenness must not be seen as predetermined qualities (like being a human or another agglomerative entity) but dependent on specific interactions where causality is always multiple and ever-present (Kalpokas, 2021, p. 3). Moreover, understanding Spinozist monism reveals that the Posthuman hybrid agglomerations- which are thought to be manifestations of only one material possessing cognitive and extensional properties- are not aberrations but rather signs of inherent human integration in the greater context of existence, as well as the broader mutually beneficial interactions that exist between the various components of hybrid communities (Kalpokas, 2021, p. 3). Knowledge, presence, and agency are found where these agglomerations cross and are interconnected among their many components. Affect becomes essential in this in-betweenness since it is a constant movement and interchange trait. Within hybrid agglomerations, precisely this conception of the circulation of emotion unites and ties the various parts.

Below, there is a concise examination of the concepts of alienation, animality, literary geography and topography, and literature of liberation around which the discussion of Lewis's (Post)humanist universe in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, particularly *The Magician's Nephew*, *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, and *The Last Battle* will revolve in Chapters One, Two, Three respectively. In this study, Chapter One: Alienation in *The Chronicles of Narnia* focuses on *The Chronicles of Narnia's* approach to alienation, the process of alienating or alienating from something. Humans can be estranged from their homes (exile), the other world (an alien society), and themselves. The cognitive process of considering inanimate objects or abstract concepts to have life qualities is called animalistic thinking or animus. Compared to anthropomorphic thinking (anthropomorphism), which gives inanimate objects or animals only human-like characteristics, it is a more expansive idea. Anthropomorphism and animism are different but closely related concepts. Generally speaking, animism is more common when people connect with nonliving items, such as brands or goods; anthropomorphism frequently entails animistic thinking, while animistic thinking does not always necessitate anthropomorphism (Krakowiak and Eisend, 2021, p. 104). It is believed that humanness fundamentally denotes a particular kind of existence. But becoming does not always mean that an entity is a human;

scientists argue that although animals and plants are living entities, they frequently lack anthropomorphic characteristics like features and thumbs that are opposing, as well as functionalities like communication. Therefore, it is rare for anthropomorphism to be regarded as a component of animism. In the case of animism, one must first acknowledge that an item has been given lifelike traits before considering it to be alive. The animistic mode of thought involves applying our prior knowledge of a living agent to a target before perceiving the object as endowed with life (Karpinska and Eisend, 2021, p. 106).

Alienation is typically a negative phrase, meaning a forced loss of appropriate possession and estrangement from the species that are or should be. The idea of alienation has philosophical roots that may be found in Plato's ideas. Since Plato considers the natural environment to be an insufficient reflection of the realm of ideals, it may be said that being in the natural world is a kind of alienation from the realm of ideas. Hegel was the first to apply the concept in detail. According to Hegel, nature is an estranged manifestation of the Absolute Mind/Reason or the commonly recognized God. As a result, the Absolute is made up of a Self that represents the fluidity between alienation and non-alienation rather than static or fixed objects (Hegel, 1977, p. 297-298). A human may be free only through self-awareness and, hence, a deeper understanding of the ultimate (Hegel, 1977, p. 561). When the person is sufficiently aware of themselves, alienation can be eliminated (Petrovic, 2006, p. 121).

Feuerbach restates the metaphysical illusion from a naturalist viewpoint to provide light on the problem of human estrangement. He says those who come from faiths believe in God only in fiction. Man is separated from his nature by this deception. By attributing his essence to an external being, humanity alienates his self and nature in these distinctions. Human consciousness is identified with God's self-consciousness according to Hegelian speculative doctrine. Man thinks of himself or feels self-conscious when he thinks of God. Feuerbach, however, begins from the premise that self-consciousness is the product of reflective thinking in the conscious being and contends that both the subject and the object of self-consciousness are human. The only genuine thing is the awareness of existence and reality. Rather than revealing God's actuality, man's knowledge of God will plainly show the truth of a man who possesses consciousness of God (Feuerbach, 1881, p. 230). Man's self-realization is the only way to address the issue of how religion's conception of God

alienates the human being. Man needs to give up on comforting, fictitious creatures and help create abstract political and cultural structures that will allow him to reconnect with his true nature. Feuerbach, therefore, offered an atheistic humanist identity to his modern philosophical thought, which maintained the ontological aspect of the existence and predictability of man rather than God (Kinağ, 2022, p. 430). Feuerbach uses the phenomenon of religion as an example. Human beings need to engage in an inner discussion with both the self and the other to distinguish between the lineage to which they belong and those who are not human species—believing that the specific awareness is a part of the universal. Man is a thinking being, which indicates that he is also a being with desires, aspirations, and emotions in addition to being a thinking being (Kinağ, 2022, p. 425). Feuerbach's focus on the link between the individual and the species in understanding human nature and its action indicates the transition from theology to anthropology, that is, the gradual shift from understanding God as an absolute outside force to understanding man. He sees man as the culmination of natural dynamism or circularity because man's essence is global. Feuerbach asserts that the oneness or integrity of the self and the other is the only thing man is looking for toward the ultimate, which he imagines and believes to be factual (Kinağ, 2022, p. 426).

Similarly, becoming posthuman by developing relationships with plants, animals, communities, materials, and machines would also imply alienation. Braidotti refers to Karl Marx's view on alienation (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 293). Karl Marx identifies two sources of man's estrangement from himself and reality: one is religious, and the other is social, economic, and political. Although Marx acknowledges Feuerbach's views, he claims that religion has the power to distance humanity from itself and that this estrangement simulates man's essence to an entity beyond himself. Man alienates himself throughout the alienation process not only from God as another entity but also from tangible, material commodities that he produces himself and from abstract goods that he makes himself.⁶

Moreover, for Marx, alienation is a separation from powers, from our collective capacities to modify our social surroundings via collaborative activity

⁶ Petrovic, Gajo. "Alienation". *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. ed. Donald M. Borchert. 1/120-127. USA: Macmillan Reference, 2006

(Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 292). People have access to only a minority of what they produce, and what is produced is more of a commodity than a societal purpose; workers are estranged from themselves. According to Marx, man's alienation from himself and nature is caused by capitalist production relations, the balance of class power (the power relationship between capitalists and workers), the permission to directly seize the producer's labor through the protection of private property, and man's appropriation of nature that have destroyed the metabolic relationship Marx used the concept of “metabolism” within the context of the society-nature relationship, pointing to structural processes such as biological growth, decay, and extinction; “metabolism” refers to the “material exchange” between humans and nature through labor between humans and nature.

Marx argues that when workers sell their labor to a capitalist, they become separated from the result of their labor, which is the capitalist's property and not their own. But under a capitalist system, this is required; the worker needs to sell their labor in order “to exist, first, as a worker; and, second, as a physical subject” since they can only get the money they need from work to buy the means of sustenance on the open market (Marx, 2007, p. 71). When people resist the forces and assemblages that make us up as posthuman processes of transition, people become racialized and alienated. People are trained to believe that humans are static because they have a specific fixation when estrangement is understood in terms of being and property (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 294). Marx’s perspective of alienation vindicates the posthuman as an alienating concept and process.

Therefore, alienation is a crucial idea for Posthuman philosophy in three ways. First, it permits a critique of the many processes of alienation imposed upon us by erroneous notions about the qualities and nature of humans. Secondly, it lets us monitor the beneficial forms of alienation that come with transitioning into a Posthuman state, wherein new coalitions and alliances provide us with greater abilities. Thirdly, it enables us to recognize how people can still experience a destructive negative sense of alienation when a process of becoming is pursued too quickly or too far, causing a line of transformation to vanish or lose its strength and alienating us from the creative powers of the collective (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 295-296). Humans are not self-contained entities characterized by essence, awareness, or physicality collection of interrelated processes in many forms and locations. When

these procedures are disregarded, a human being becomes a literal distortion of an animal alliance, a reliance on technology, or a multi-agent coalition (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 153). Defining alienation in terms of being and property, people are tempted to believe that the human is permanent, possessing a specific fixed state or fixed belongings and traits. This concept is alienating in and of itself because people are continually moving beyond situations, attributes, and predicates. Being Posthuman means being alien in a variety of ways at the same time (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 243).

Recognizing non-human bodies and decentralization of the human, Posthumanism challenges the epistemic boundaries of humanism. It presents a fundamental onto-epistemological change that decenters toward a more ecological viewpoint yet also places humans in a “more-than-human world as an ecological community” (Malone, 2017, p. 162). This approach focuses on the “reciprocal impacts of nature and culture, rejecting nature-culture dualisms, in which the notion of human difference determines the natural” (Biersack, 2006, p. 4). Thinking ecologically is already thinking in terms of community, the inescapability of “being-with” others, and coexistence that, while it varies for each individual being and each species, is always a world from which the only way people can artificially exclude themselves with an illusion of sovereignty (human or otherwise), which has terrible ecological, ethical, and political repercussions (Smith, 2013, p. 30).

Braidotti highlights that everyone is one species and does not divide from each other. The separation of self and other has frequently been used to marginalize diverse human and non-human outsiders. Braidotti relies on a non-hierarchical approach unconcerned with nature-culture divisions in advance, allowing for the critical detachment from both humanism and anthropocentrism necessitated by the Anthropocene (Vivaldi, 2021, p. 332). However, according to Vivaldi, Braidotti misses the necessity of fostering and advancing the alienation of the xenos, the other being housed and the other in which one is being hosted. The foundation of a xenological subjectivity is that, while there is undoubtedly much more diversity than the more rigid forms of the majority of dualisms and taxonomies suggest, this does not negate our capacity for differentiation associated with a need for alienation that detotalizes the present reality to remind us that what may be is unavoidably foreign, if not completely different, from what is (Vivaldi, 2021, p. 332).

A xenological approach to the self and its relationships to the other and the outside world emphasizes the urgency of conceiving the contemporary subject as both host and guest, inventing and designing transversal and multidimensional pacts of hospitality that allow us to live well together, and assuming the significant role that non-human entities play in our sociopolitical sphere. Hybrids(ism/ity) is a concept that appears in various ontologies and philosophies, particularly postmodern, multicultural, and postcolonial ones. In Posthumanist critique, “hybridism” frequently refers to the human's interwoven, relational, and symbiotic relationships with non-humans without giving humans any onto-epistemological precedence in the connection (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 125).

Because “hybridism” suggests a broader recognition of life beyond the borders of essentialist humanism by incorporating and granting significance to non-human as well as human components into a unified metamorphosed entity, Posthumanist criticism recognizes “hybridism” as an important variation of “Posthuman subjectivity” with definitional difficulties (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 125). In the humanities, the phrase is typically restricted to human states of consciousness, with the implicit notion that subjective states of mind are limited to rational people exclusively, implying that the human alone is distinct from non-human or inhuman others. Western philosophy has long held that humans exclusively possess reason and agency (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 125). However, Posthuman subjectivity frequently appears in 'beyond (hu)man' states because it may fluidly 'become' or embody many views or identities as opposed to being bound and defined by certain identifications like those of race, species, and biology; moreover, “Posthuman subjectivity” also refers to any self, not just those that are human but also those that are not, as well as hybrids of all these. Finally, “Posthuman subjectivity” not only incorporates and embodies various modes of being across species, technological, and virtual lines but also experiences the world from various heterogeneous perspectives, aiding in the disclosure of a wealth of knowledge about multiple realities and their intersections (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 126).

Paradoxically, from a Posthumanist perspective, alienation may become the means of an individual's reaching self-awareness. Similarly, from a Christian perspective, familiar to C. S. Lewis, alienation is considered a “Felix culpa.” Humanity has fallen because it has been alienated/detached from the totality (the Divine realm)

and can restore its prelapsarian state by realizing the oneness of nature. This is one common component of Christian humanist and Posthumanist ethics.

Chapter Two: Animality in *The Chronicles of Narnia* focuses on animal theory and the conditions of animal and nonhuman agencies in the Narnia world. It examines the relationship between humans and other species, including witches, dwarfs, and animals, in the Narnia universe. Chapter Two centers on animality, an instrumental idea to understand what is on the other side of the line that humans draw, internally in psychoanalysis, philosophy, and literature and externally in the world of ethics, politics, and animal rights. Within a Posthuman context, these inquiries often focus on notions of perceived human universals, such as the capacity for giving, dying, burying the dead, dressing oneself, working, inventing a method, and discursive animality.

C. S. Lewis was very concerned about how humans should treat animals. This concern resulted from the broad magnanimity that permeated most of his life. His compassion for the animals was unwavering, and there is no doubt that he had the best of intentions while trying to comprehend their suffering and turn it into an effective defense of Christianity (Root, 2010, p. 8). Lewis knew that human and non-human agencies struggle in life (Root, 2010, p. 2). Yet, according to Lewis, classic Christian defenses of human sorrow and suffering do not entirely apply to animal suffering. Because of his intense affection for animals, he was interested in finding a plausible explanation for animal misery, and he tried to reflect hope by considering the reasons leading to building a sustainable world in his novels (Root, 2010, p. 9). The mystery surrounding animals, the issue of coexisting with them in this world, the issue of animal suffering, and the human responsibility toward animals are all issues that merit serious consideration in Lewis's opinion. It was the subject of some of his earlier Christian apologetics writings and the subject of some of his final letters (Root, 2010, p. 30).

Animals are often distinguished from humans, angels, robots, plants, mushrooms, and microbes. These scientific categories are quite traditional. In etymology, which reveals that the word “animal” stems from anima, a Latin term for the soul and the animating source of life, every living creature has some aspect of an animal. Humans are also animals because they are born, breathe, move, consume other living things, breed, and finally pass away. Even though angels never die, they can

also be considered animals because they have wings, claws, talons, and tails. Therefore, anything with a tail must be regarded as an animal, including airplanes, comets, and rockets, even though humans typically distinguish celestial bodies and machines with tails from other beasts. People's first gods were animals when humankind was yet in its infancy (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 35).

From Aristotle through Descartes, and particularly from Descartes, Rousseau, and on, this line of philosophical investigation into the animal state has permeated Western thinking, especially in the works of Heidegger, Levinas, Lacan, Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida, and later, in the works of Tom Regan, Peter Singer, and Giorgio Agamben. The concept of a superior position for humans above animals has a long history. Aristotle establishes a hierarchy from matter to God, placing humans above plants and animals. The status of humans is determined by their presence of reason, a quality that Aristotle believed to be unique to and so defining of humankind. This means that for humans, *eudaimonia*, or living well, includes developing and using their unique reasoning ability. Additionally, he contends in *The Nichomachean Ethics* that all social and political groups have the same understanding of what it is to be “human” regarding reason (Labatut, 2016, p. 319).

Posthumanism is not just a framework that accepts the ontological rights of other living and non-living things. It is also a trend that focuses on heterogeneous entity combinations and crosslinks operating at various levels, explores them, and attempts to establish new ones in practice. The ecological crisis and many other situations highlight that humans owe their very existence to these bonds with other beings, their founding ties to other beings that populate the cosmos. The basic idea of Posthumanism is that humans exist in their cross-linkages with other living things and non-living things (including technology). The practical equivalent of replacing the ties that already cause ecological destruction with reparative and supportive relations is building partnerships to increase and support the diversity of life on earth. Posthumanism's purpose is to create a sustainable future.

By the Middle Ages, there were different human- animal relations in the various aspects of daily life (agriculture, hunting, clothing entertainment, transportation, war, etc.) in Europe, and as described in the chronicles, natural disasters, such as floods, plague, and hunger, affected the lives of humans and animals. Also, in the early Middle Ages, there were events in which humans were held

responsible for the actions of their animals, whereas in the late Middle Ages, animals were trialed for their actions (Gacar, 2020, p. 39). Based on the Medieval legal system, animals could be subjected to execution or death and excommunicated (Bayıltmış, 2017, p. 279). In other words, animals were considered conscious of what they did, admitted to being innocent, and were charged accountable for every "crime" they conducted and every damage they caused. Formally, they had almost the same legal status as humans (Gacar, 2020, p. 40). Still, in the Middle Ages, humans asserted their superiority over animals because of the authority of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy,⁷ and the influence of Christian preachers appraising the human mind and the idea of the Great Chain of Being, a vertical hierarchy of existence of different types of beings in the universe in which humans possess a middle position, but a higher position than animals. In contrast to animals that are earth-bound because of their physical needs and desires, humans can ascend to higher realms thanks to the human mind, which is capable of controlling animal instincts (Bayıltmış, 2017, p. 280).

Aristotle's philosophical approaches in the context of human-animal relationships, seeing animals as inferior to humans, were the dominant views in the West during the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment. The most influential proposition about animals in modern Europe to date is in Rene Descartes's *Discourse on Method* (1637), in which Descartes distinguishes between mind and body, hence, himself from animals exclaiming, "I think, therefore I am" (Ryan, 2015, p. 19-20). The human being is the only being who has access to the "I"- which expresses the "completely separate mind" (Descartes, 2006, p. 32). In other words, according to Descartes' famous statement, the act of existing is only associated with thought, and thus, it can be said solely that it exists. It has established the belief that only those who can express themselves exist. In other words, since humans are the only ones who can express what they think through language, humans are the only rational beings on earth, and thus, they have been given the right to rule over all other beings (Akıllı and Balcı, 2017, p. 125-126). In contrast, the animal body has become a machine and an automaton (Descartes, 2006, p. 46-47).

⁷ Paradoxically, Aristotle regarded humans as animals taxonomically.

Like Aristotle's view on animals, in Descartes's thought, animal and human bodies are the same species resembling machines; in his view on the human-animal relationship, Descartes emphasizes the non-rational animal and the rational man with access to language and knowledge. Hence, animals are lower than "even the most dull-witted of men" (Descartes, 2006, p. 46). Descartes is often considered to have rejected the idea that nonhuman animals were sentient and subjectively aware and instead believed that they were "automatons, or moving machines" created by God and no more than inanimate things (Kalof, 2017, p. 3).

Descartes encountered objections from Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz. While Descartes offers a static dualism, Spinoza and Leibniz offer a creative monism. They suggested that human and non-human species participate in an oppositional and non-hierarchical inherent arrangement of life. According to Spinoza, Descartes' machine animals- man and animal- are not different entities but different expressions and styles of the same entity (Nature) (Gacar, 2020, p. 44). A plant and a stone are just different in extent. Nature is vastly different. The only substance that exists through actualizations is the single individual. Thus, Spinoza questioned the boundary between humans and animals, and the hierarchy between species has been obscured (Kalaycı, 2017, p. 90; Uslu, 2015, p. 98). According to Leibniz, an animal, like a human, is the permanent mirror of the universe. All matter and souls are intertwined within the universe of beings. Animals are not exalted to join man in the transcendental sphere; instead, humans are removed from transcendence and treated as natural automatons like animals (Leibniz, 2011, p. 24-26).

Spinoza's and Leibniz's examination of the relationship between humans and animals solely within the physical sphere is also embraced by Martin Heidegger, whose study on Duns Scotus has influenced Posthumanist ontology and animal theory. Heidegger claims that the fundamental ontological differentiation between humans and animals is that despite the fact that humans have a world while simultaneously being in the world, animals are just linked to their environments. Animals will never be able to interact with other entities in their area as entities because an animal is incapable of understanding the ontological distinction; that is, it has a connection to other beings but not to the beings themselves (Calarco, 2004, p. 17).

Writing about Duns Scotus, Heidegger raises the question: "What distinguishes Being from beings? Or, more precisely: how is Being distributed among

beings?” (Smith, 2001, p. 168). Heidegger observes that in the Middle Ages, ontology transformed into onto-theology: the concept of God as the highest (ontic) being tended to take precedence over the question of the being of beings. The Platonic “Good” and the Neoplatonic “One”- which were “above” or “beyond” being- were the ancestors of the Christian understanding of God. Christian theology was therefore guided by two requirements: being transcendent, which is the more powerful necessity that God be kept as the one beyond existence, and immanence, which is the ontological need that the originating principle be a being (Smith, 2001, p. 170). On the other hand, the “divine names” tradition was interested in the conventional divine qualities (such as kindness, love, knowledge, power, etc.) (Smith, 2001, p. 169). The notion of univocity transcendence would suggest the words' equivocity; their univocity is their pure immanence. Between these two extremes, orthodoxy created a media-based solution primarily based on comparison, prominence, and denial tactics. Though these five approaches, equivocity, negation, prominence, analogy, and univocity, entered into historically varied combinations in Christian thinking, two broad approaches, a method of denial and a way of affirmation, acquired the stature of orthodoxy. Between these two extremes, orthodoxy created a thorough media strategy for solving the issue heavily reliant on denial, prominence, and analogy tactics (Smith, 2001, p. 171).

In *Difference and Repetition*, Gilles Deleuze articulates and addresses Martin Heidegger's ontological quandary in his way. According to Deleuze, a univocal ontology is the only pure and fully realized ontology capable of conceiving difference or giving difference with its idea (Smith, 2001, p.169). Univocity is the existence of everything that exists in the same sense. This unconventional application of the Christian theological tradition is best seen in Deleuze's appropriation of the medieval notion of univocity. Following Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus created the ontological idea of the “univocity of Being” in the thirteenth century in his magnum opus, *Opus Oxoniense*, which Deleuze refers to as “the greatest book of pure ontology” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 39). Duns Scotus said that equivocity, univocity, and analogy were the names Scholastics used to describe the different approaches to solving the problem. The idea of univocity, which holds that existence is ambiguous, states that entities are defined as “beings” in various senses without any standard measure. For example, “God is” and “man is” do not have the same meanings since God and man are different beings (Smith, 2001, p. 169). In contrast, Duns Scotus asserted that being univocal refers to

the idea that existence has just one sense and applies to all entities, including God, humans, animals, and plants (Smith, 2001, p. 169). Another option was devised between these two extremes since both viewpoints appeared to bring unexpected findings: univocity suggested pantheism, while equivocity rejected order in the Cosmos. Being is neither equivocal nor univocal but analogical. According to Thomas Aquinas, this became the tenet of Christian orthodoxy while Every type of existence has an accepted standard that is analogous and not (Smith, 2001, p. 169). Deleuze's adoption of the medieval idea of univocity is the most prominent and significant instance of this unconventional application of Christian theological tradition.

Individual beings, whether human or stone, have no ontological superiority or transcendence over others; everything exists in the cosmos in the same sense. Univocity affirms and grounds their singular existential differences rather than melting all beings into a single set of beings, as the expression seems to imply. That is, to exist in the same sense means that individual beings are defined by a fundamental difference, a process of differentiation that intensifies as they are themselves affected and produce effects (Smith, 2001, p. 174). Deleuze and Guattari argue a transversal, Posthuman view of the subject as a self-organizing and relational entity using the term "chaosmosis" in Deleuze's monistic ontology. Philosophy offers a more sophisticated instrument for investigating the mind and connecting with the creative power of a constantly changing cosmos, known as "chaosmosis." Thinking is the ability to influence and be impacted in a manner akin to how art works, leading to qualitative changes and creative conflicts. Critical theory is important (Braidotti, 2013b, p. 170).

The idea of life is made more nuanced by concepts like "chaos-mosis," "radical immanence," and "becoming-Zoe," which sit in between more traditional divisions like "organic matter" and "inorganic matter." Consequently, Posthuman theory enables a more comprehensive and, thus, appropriate theoretical and practical comprehension of the topology and ethology of the forces involved in the evolution of life (Braidotti, 2013b, p. 188). The transversality of relations is the fundamental idea for a postanthropocentric and Posthuman subject that connects material, symbolic, tangible, and discursive lines of interaction or forces. Zoe-centered egalitarianism is actualized by transversality as ethics and as a means of accounting for various alternatives, such as Posthuman subjectivity. Transversity actualizes ethics that prioritize non-human or personal life and is founded on the idea that relationships and

interdependence come first (Braidotti, 2013b, p. 95). The Posthuman approach focuses on severely de-familiarizing our mental patterns with connections that disrupt the monotonous procedures. It equates to greater degrees of disciplinary hybridization (Braidotti, 2013b, p. 169).

Giorgio Agamben highlights the historical development of humans in *The Open: Man and Animal*, which is essential to the Posthuman perspective. He describes the history of philosophy and science as components of the “anthropological machine,” which he terms a process by which the human is developed alongside and in opposition to the animal. According to his explanation, early iterations of this “machine” humanized animals, leading to certain “men,” such as slaves and barbarians, being considered animals in human form (Oliver, 2009, p. 810). By the animalization of man, the inhuman is produced, where the inside [the machine of old times] is achieved by humanizing a variety of animals- such as the man-ape, infant savage, or Homo ferus- as well as human-shaped slaves, barbarians, and outsiders—creates an incorporation of the non-human (Oliver, 2009, p. 811). The divide between humans and other animals opens the door for politics. Human society's “humanity” policy, which gave rise to the “polis” in the first place, determines who is accepted and who is not. In this way, the anthropological machine is essentially fatal to some (human) kinds of life (Oliver, 2009, p. 810).

Agamben is more concerned with rescuing humanity from the anthropological machine than with expanding man's understanding of animals or even his potential contact with them (Oliver, 2009, p. 812). According to Agamben, the distinction between man and animals is a split within the category of people. Slavery and genocide are acceptable because of the division of humanity into more and less human kinds in both the ancient and modern versions (Oliver, 2009, p. 814). The way the term “human” is created and perpetuated in opposition to the animal, which serves as both an external and internal constituent, makes certain “men” are either non-humans or subhumans (Oliver, 2009, p. 815). Although Agamben is delving into a subject of paramount importance to the Posthuman, his proposal has several limitations from the critical perspective of a Posthumanist. Using the “anthropological machine,” an optical device made of mirrors, through which man, facing himself, can see his image continuously transformed into the features of an ape, Agamben claims that

humans have been deliberately created by being separated from animals (Agamben, 2003, p.16, 36).

Agamben's work is of profound significance in understanding and describing the processes by which human life is humanized. Throughout the book, Agamben examines the history of human animalization and the dehumanization, animalization, and reduction of humans to "bare life." Agamben is aware of recent discoveries in animal cognition when he affirms that animals communicate entirely through language and are linguistic creatures. To overcome the presuppositional framework of metaphysics, which links concepts (bios and zoe, language and voice, human and animal, real and potential, etc.) by presenting one as the negative, buried foundation of the other, this logic must be deposited (Agamben, 2003, p. 36).

The animal also shouldn't be viewed in isolation instead as an elaborate pyramidal component, suggesting that specific individuals have been more closely likened to nonhuman animals than humans (Ferrando, 2019, p. 73). A critical examination of the human-animal division and the "anthropological machine" is essential to illuminate the political implications of animal and animal kinship. Agamben is primarily concerned with the moral and political implications of drawing a line between humans and animals theories. According to him, the subhuman- a human who is treated like an animal to defend their slavery and slaughter- is an outcome of the anthropological machine (Oliver, 2009, p. 61). A reunion of animality and humanity will take place at the end of history as a result of the so-called end of man, according to Agamben. As though mirroring the continuity that existed before the fall in Eden, humans and animals will have a new kind of relationship where people are at peace with their animal nature (Agamben, 2003, p. 3).

Chapter Three: Literary Geography and Topography in *The Chronicles of Narnia* examines Narnian geography as Posthuman ecology on nature, environment, and fauna. It attempts to locate the multidisciplinary roots of literary mapping in a more general conception of "literary geography," with a growing understanding of the nature of the relationship implicated. Chapter Three discusses a connection between the two fields of literature and cartography that directly applies common theoretical concepts that guide cultural geography and critical cartography back into literature (Bushell, 2020, p. 16). The concept of "literary geography" is very authorial and national in scope and influenced by an interpretive paradigm centered on authorial

purpose that eventually positions canonical literary texts in similarly canonical settings (Bushell, 2020, p. 18). In light of these considerations, a one-to-one relationship between a writer and a topographical area, or between literature and geography, exists simultaneously. A wholly multidisciplinary organism integrates art and cultural and social studies in two different approaches, “the study of space in literature” and “literature in space,” and draws maps to reveal how geography impacts the narrative structure of literature pieces. Geographical literature uses maps inside texts to investigate the innately spatial (Bushell, 2020, p. 20).

The interdisciplinary style of space-prioritized analysis, locations, and geographical activities in literary criticism is called geocriticism. It is a new way of reading and writing about literature. The spatial studies of narratives are centered on textual and actual places by De Certeau. Beginning in the 1960s, an environmental movement was a component of the analytical practice known as ecocriticism. Ecocriticism, viewed critically, has one foot planted firmly in literature and the other on solid ground; Lawrence Buell and Greg Garrard are two further influential ecocritical thinkers; both geocriticism and ecocriticism are literary analysis techniques that focus on space (Peraldo, 2016, p. 2).

Converging on literary studies and human geography lies the multidisciplinary field of literary geography research. This particular convergence of ideas from otherwise disparate fields gives it a lot of vigor and energy (Alexander, 2015, p. 3). Human geography has many divisions that relate to particular focus areas, like urban environments: economic, cultural, social, political, and historical. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, geographers examine ideas such as space, place, scale, landscape, mobility, and nature. The spatial and temporal aspects of our existence are ultimately highlighted by human geography, which illuminates the dynamic relationships between human societies and their environments (Alexander, 2015, p. 4). Literary geography is also known as creative geography, literary cartography, geocriticism, geopoetics, and geo humanities. Literary geography, according to some critics, is about creating maps using quantitative data to correlate discipline with geography or describe the boundaries of a narrative. Others are concerned with the characteristics of the relationship between physical and metaphoric locations (Alexander, 2015, p. 5).

Because of the georeferenced time setting or the imagery created by the characters, the literary space is depicted on a map or described as a territory. As a sort of narrative space, story space is defined by the thoughts and actions of the characters and is comparable to that concept. This definition also serves to rationalize the concept of story space (Ryan, 2012, p. 11). Russian philosopher and philologist named Mikhail Bakhtin coined the term "chronotope" in the 1920s to describe the space-time matrix from which literary space is constructed (Dentith, 2001, p. 187). It is a topographic structure pertaining to the region, a type of map composed of all the elements found in the entire text (Zoran, 1984, p. 316).

Time and geography have always been inextricably related to literary works of fiction because they establish what is referred to as "the setting" of a narrative. One of the first things a reader asks before reading a book is, "When and where does it take place?" In *The Dialogic Imagination*, Mikhail Bakhtin refers to the "time-space" combination as the chronotope, which combines the terms *chronos* and *topos* (1981) (Peraldo, 2016, p. 1). As Muriel Rosemberg argues when she asserts that "literature is the artistic form of an experimental geography," literature is a perfect area for geography. In 1989, Edward Soja used the term spatial turn for the first time in *Postmodern Geographies* to explain how academics in the social sciences began to become more concerned with space in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in light of the contributions of Henri Lefebvre (1974), Deleuze and Guattari (1980), and Michel Foucault (1984) (Peraldo, 2016, p. 1).

Literary mapping, or literary geography, functions precisely because of the project's uniquely literary nature. Writing is a spatialization that depends on the reader's acceptance of different standards (Pasquale, 2016, p. 39). Because of the interaction between necessity and chance, the author can construct the story around the two concepts of the polytope, which is the arrangement of diverse spatialities, and polychrony, which combines various temporalities. On the other hand, transgression enforces heterogeneity, polytope (the arrangement of various spatialities), and polychromy (the blending of several temporalities). The understanding of space in its plurality is called polytopy. However, the intimacy zone of an individual is shielded from unnecessary intrusions by the polytopic view of space. Here, concealed from the public eye and the code's directive, the person deploys an additional personal reality in a hyperbaton space (Pasquale, 2016, p. 42).

Tally (2013) defines “geocriticism” as a supplement to Bakhtin's concept of the literary chronotope, which addresses its historical limitations. This further extends chronotope theory, allowing it to analyze novel space-time relationships in literature and art. The French literary critic Bertrand Westphal first used the word “geocriticism” in his precisely entitled book to refer to an multi-disciplinary method for studying spatiotemporal representations (Westphal, 2011, p. 30-31). This method creates a reciprocal relationship between literature and geography and other spatial sciences like urban studies and architecture. Considering that all literature, regardless of its claims about thematic development, is in space (Westphal, 2011, p. 33), spatial and geographical domains should be included in literary studies as well, particularly in the postmodern age when spatiality considerations are crucial to any critical investigation (Westphal, 2011, p. 34-36). Bakhtin's idea of the chronotope, which emphasizes the axis of time, is complemented by Westphal's geocentric method, which emphasizes and observes the plurality and complexity of space. This method embodies literary and cultural studies' spatial turn. As a result, various rhizome-root assemblages trace maps and have different deterritorialization coefficients. Deleuze and Guattari state that:

There exist tree or root structures in rhizomes, conversely, a tree branch or root division may begin to burgeon into a rhizome. The coordinates are determined not by theoretical analyses implying universals but by pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities. A new rhizome may form in the heart of a tree, the hollow of a root, or the crook of a branch (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 80).

The Chronicles of Narnia, one of C.S. Lewis's grand narratives of adventure, concludes with the modest return of a courageous hero despite having a vast range of historical and geopolitical references, a prodigious number of characters, and toponyms. Lewis indicated the locations using the map. Thus, Adventure stories take the form of literary maps representing their world system. In many ways, creating a map and telling a story are similar. An adventure story is a map of the universe that what happens explores as it a group of characters as they travel through time and space. Meanwhile as he projects an instantly understandable world, Lewis shapes and describes the places it depicts. This gives the text a fantastical universe structure. Hence, in Narnia, the map serves as both a plot device and a means of understanding the story. Additionally, the map projects a spatial diagram in addition to telling a story; likewise, the characters' adventures reveal a geography and give context to the locations they show. The quest that gives rise to the literary cartography is thus made visible by the discovery of Narnia. Nevertheless, that hand-drawn map is a part of the

utterly literary mapping that C.S. Lewis did for *The Chronicles of Narnia*. The descriptive geography and the narrative trajectory are two related, though occasionally antagonistic, registers that are productively tense in literary cartography.

In the Conclusion part, this thesis concludes that the study of *The Chronicles of Narnia* within the Posthumanist context of alienation, animality, and literary geography and topography leads to the identification of Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* as literature of liberation. In *Animal Liberation* (1975), Peter Singer opposes "speciesism," a practice that discriminates against non-human animals by murdering them, abusing them, treating them like inanimate things, and dismissing their ability to experience pain or pleasure- and calls attention to the pain that non-human animals keep hidden (Braidotti and Hlavajová, 2018, p. 1250). Several philosophers, including Val Plumwood, have condemned "hyperseparation" practices of "logic of othering," which oppress sentient humans, animals, and anything that is not a hegemonic subject. (Plumwood, 2002, p. 117). According to Plumwood, liberation is a liberation from social and ecological interactions governed by ontological and moral systems of dominance (Plumwood, 2002, p. 118). In Plumwood's view, both enslaved humans and natures are confined by a system of "moral and cultural blindness" that minimizes or denies the other's independence (Plumwood, 2002, p. 118).

C. S. Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* stands among literature, as Italo Calvino said, "necessary to politics above all when it gives a voice to whatever is without a voice" (Calvino, 1986, p. 98). Narnians, including humans represented by the Pevensie children as well as other innocent characters like Polly, Digory, Queen and King Frank, and Queen Helen, fight with bravery against figures like Uncle Andrew, Shift, and the White Witch and her followers, who are advocates of limited and, thus, false perceptions of reality promoted by the political, social, intellectual, and religious authorities to manipulate humankind and exploit other species. All species in Narnia, whether they are humans, aethereal beings, or other beings from different spaces and times, unite as a whole in Narnia. This union is only possible when Narnia's collective consciousness reaches a certain level of consciousness after a series of wars. This level has been reached by destroying the old and creating a new, sustainable Narnia, which delivers Posthumanism's aim to achieve a sustainable world.

CHAPTER I

ALIENATION IN THE CHRONICLES OF NARNIA

Lewis's characters experience alienation that portrays the Posthumanist ethic of the empowerment of the Otherness idea. The vulnerable condition of some Narnia characters experiencing alienation will be analysed in the light of alienation studies reflecting the correlation between alienation and the relationship of different species. In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, due to human's violation of the principles of biology, the human characters are alienated as the counterpart of human beings, the other. The alienation of humans is revealed in the process of being dehumanized (questioning their existence and their relationship with the nonhuman agency) and evaluated. The dominant theme of this chapter is that humans and non-humans interact in Narnia, facing existential challenges that contribute to the creative evolution of the characters in their simultaneous process of being and becoming.

In humanist terminology, subjectivity is the perception of selfhood tied to the fundamental being or the perceived reality of distinct personal experiences and knowledge. This definition, however, is often confined to human states of consciousness in the humanities, with the belief that only rational creatures possess subjective states of mind. This perspective draws a clear line between humans and other non-human or inhuman species, which can inadvertently foster new forms of prejudice from their supposedly pure human counterparts. This humanist perspective, therefore, paves the way for the exploration of Posthuman subjectivity. This concept challenges these established notions and broadens the concept of subjectivity to include non-human, inhuman, and hybrid entities.

Posthuman subjectivity refers to any self, which is not limited to the human but can be non-human, inhuman, or hybrids of all categories. It often exists in states that are beyond human by being someone or something who can fluidly become or embody different perspectives or identities instead of being defined and limited by singular identifications like race, species, and biology. Posthuman subjectivity often

incorporates itself and embodies multiple modes of being across species. It experiences the world from multiple, heterogeneous perspectives that reveal a wealth of information about multiple realities and their intersections (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 126). Therefore, it challenges the Western humanist tradition because the Posthuman subjects are fundamentally alienated and othered, Posthuman subjectivity examines the constraints that characters living outside the privileged categories of the fictional societies portrayed in each text face when they are other, alien, hybrid, or Posthuman. An emerging subjectivity that critics have sought to label Posthuman is best understood via the inclusive study of these marginalized outsiders and the intersections of their many, sometimes diverse identities. Posthuman subjectivity explores the concepts of hybridism and alienation.

Hybridism, a concept of cross-fertilization or breeding of two or more species, blending two or more diverse cultures or traditions, and the heterogeneous composition of dissimilar parts, plays a critical role in posthuman subjectivity. It is an omnipresent concept in various ontologies and ideologies, particularly postmodern, multicultural, and postcolonial ones. In the context of Posthumanist critique, hybridism refers to the interwoven relational and symbiotic relationships between humans and non-humans. It incorporates and accords significance to non-human and human components into a unified metamorphosed entity, suggesting a broader recognition of life beyond the limits of essentialist humanism. Posthumanist criticism, therefore, recognizes hybridism as an essential variation of Posthuman subjectivity, underscoring its significance in our understanding of the Posthuman condition.

Metahumanism is another Posthuman condition that more clearly exemplifies the alienating effects of hybridization and mutation on humankind (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 126). Being labeled as alien frequently denotes a loss of privilege or a denial of an identity. The process of becoming alien (alienation) has a somewhat negative connotation and often suggests a forced loss of proper possession and estrangement from who species are or who species should be (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 127). The multidimensional cross-boundary, liminal, and hybrid posthuman subject is foreign in human society due to several factors, including this loss of identity or, more precisely, humanity's incapacity to integrate the posthuman within its recognized privileged categories. The perception of the posthuman subject as implying

a move away from the human leads to alienation, which increases negative judgment and treatment. To become posthuman, in alliances with plants, animals, societies, materials, and machines, would also be to become alienated (Williams, 2018, p. 28).

The alien archetype is represented not as definitively other but as an in-between creature not entirely strange or human in many modern literary and film portrayals. The Posthuman is established by this liminality of being in literary works and the imagination. The alien, like the majority of posthuman identities, represents a step away from anthropocentric humanity and is typically characterized by deeper relationships with nonhuman or human beings, as opposed to human essentialism's emphasizing humanity's perceived separation from the non-human other by justifying its superior status through a closed-off hierarchy (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 127). Humans and the vast majority of other species that live on earth are indeed part of what Haraway refers to as an eco-culture compost in which various species and cultural symbols coexist in continually changing arrangements (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 132). The human body may today be regarded as a microbiotic multi-species ecology in and of itself, supporting the multi-species hybrid mode hypothesis of the human body. The fragile nature of human essentialism is highly susceptible and dependent on inter and intra-species cooperation for our basic existence. These partnerships already permanently alter people and bridge gaps to create hybridized identities that are becoming more diversified (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 132).

In *The Magician's Nephew*, Polly and Digory go to Narnia with the help of Uncle Andrew's rings, but Uncle Andrew does not know the rings' working principle. Andrew is alienated from the ring system. The narrator states, "This proved, by the way, another thing about the rings which Uncle Andrew hadn't told Digory because he didn't know it himself" (Lewis, 1955, p. 136). Similar to Uncle Andrew's case is Puzzle's disguise as the Lion in *The Last Battle*. In *The Last Battle*, with the monkey's idea, the donkey disguises itself as a lion: "You look wonderful, wonderful, said the Ape. If anyone saw you now, they'd think you were Aslan, the Great Lion, himself. That would be dreadful, said Puzzle" (Lewis, 1956, p. 35). The monkey's goal is to deceive and control the people of Narnia. Even though the donkey pretends to be a

lion, the donkey becomes alien to itself since its essence does not differ from its essence as a donkey.

According to Deleuze, rhizomes can grow on roots. Uncle Andrew's failure to understand the rings' function means his impediment to perceiving his existence as a process that also includes his interaction with esoteric knowledge about the rings. Uncle Andrew's existence is fixed, not in continuous change; thus, he is alienated from his true nature. Similarly, Puzzle, as his name manifests, is confused about his true self because although he acknowledges that he can change, he forgets the root/the foundation of himself. All matter has a beginning point. A rhizome is a network because, in a network, there will always be at least one path from one location to a different one, or between a single refer to any additional location, sometimes to several indications, and ultimately to all points (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 91). Therefore, Andrew and Puzzle are alienated from their true selves, either refusing change or certain fixed elements of their existence, which are equally important in one's becoming.

Within Posthumanist discourse, the observation of Uncle Andrew and Puzzle and, in general, all the characters (human and non-human) in Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* as beings may lie on Deleuze's and Guattari's theory of rhizomes through the image of a tree. Although rhizomes can grow on roots, they are not roots themselves but underground stems or underground sprouts, such as bulbs or tubers, with many-branched roots and branches that split off and spread out in all angles; occasionally, these branches and roots come together to create a rhizome, or they may grow into something different with wind, animals, and people (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 18). Lewis, like Deleuze and Guattari, sees beings' development as a rhizome, a network in which every node has the potential to be conceptually connected to every other node.

At this point, one important thing related to the focus of Lewis's Posthumanist understanding of rhizome and Deleuze's and Guattari's Posthumanist one must be noted. Besides the image of the tree, Deleuze and Guattari also provide the image of the colonies of ants; ants create an animal rhizome that can regenerate even after the majority of it has been killed; thus, someone can never completely eradicate them (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 16). In this case, rhizomatic offshoots confuse the

genetic trees by establishing transversal communication with many lines of descent. The rhizome removes all references to a potential substance, substantive synthesis, and dialectical analysis pointing towards the One. Deleuze and Guattari praise the vibrancy of life and emphasize the multiplication of the multitude by juxtaposing the picture of the ant colony with that of the tree (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 13). The rhizome in the image from the realm of plants may break and fragment at a particular place, but it will regenerate on one of its previous or current lines; nevertheless, the tree model restricts heterogeneity to one. Lewis seems to embrace the image of the tree without rejecting the image of the colonies of ants, focusing equally on multiplicity and the One.

In *The Magician's Nephew*, an excellent example of an uninterrupted process of existence is the seed of the Narnia apple tree planted in Digory's backyard in London. Although originally from another dimension where things may not function according to the physics of our dimension, the tree planted in the garden of Digory's house from the seed of the apple that the Lion gives to Digory to heal his mother illness, and its motion stirs Digory's memory of the original tree in Narnia. The reason is that these trees are wholly interconnected and are one; they are rhizomatically related to each other. The tree in Digory's garden expresses both the multiplicity and the tight connection of something with its principal source in its process of being (see Appendix A, no. 1).

Comparing a being's existence to rhizomes, Deleuze and Guattari investigate and experiment with what the human body is capable of, the strange excitations that affect it, and how it connects with the non-human toward the expansion of our awareness of the subhuman and superhuman (durations that are either less than or greater than our own), and the transcendence of the human condition. In *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Deleuze and Guattari note that one's becoming may be seen as a type of "creative evolution," bringing disparate populations into a symbiosis and forming "counter-natural alliances" between various species (Vandenberghe, 2004, p. 80). This process enables a rhizomatic to become the most creative and destructive in which humans may engage, moving away from the genealogical or evolutionary background symbolized by the pattern of the tree or root and resulting in monster combinations of gods, people, animals, plants, artifacts, tools, equipment (see

Appendix A, no. 2 and no. 3). There is an interconnectedness between humans and nonhumans. The ring is an object, a non-human agency. When someone touches the ring directly, they can travel between worlds. Humans and non-humans are interrelated; thus, Digory and Polly establish an interconnected relationship with Uncle Andrew's ring, whose transferring capacity relates to the rhizome. "A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains. [...] There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 49-54). Moreover, when Polly asks Digory to leave her, Digory responds he is not touching her; both children notice that the White Witch has come to the Wood between the worlds with them, holding onto Polly's hair. Because of the rhizome's characteristics of multiplicity and assemblage, Polly and the White Witch, touching the ring directly and indirectly, can be transferred to the other World. "Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 48).

Alienation is not experienced the same way by all the interconnected entities. According to Deleuze and Guattari, "the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 84). In *the Magician Nephew*, when Uncle Andrew sends Polly and Digory to Narnia, both children are alienated from their environment. Digory asks Uncle Andrew about Polly, shouting, What have you done to her? Sent her to well to another place". Their dialogue continues: What do you mean? asked Digory. Uncle Andrew sat down and said, Well, I'll tell you all about it. Have you ever heard of old Mrs. Lefay?" (Lewis, 1955, p. 41) (see also Appendix A, no. 4). Uncle Andrew talks about one's alienation when passing into another dimension in our world in the ongoing events. The interplay between the inner and outer senses plays a catalytic role in one's perception of place. Different characters see the same place but comment differently about it based on their mental state; as Uncle Andrew confesses, reality may be strictly physical and magical, that is, unperceivable through the use of the outer senses, elusive, mysterious. Similarly, in *The Last Battle*, Lucy, the High King, Eustace,

Tirian, Jill, and Edmund have different perceptions of the place. Lucy asks Peter, “Peter, where is this, do you suppose?” (Lewis, 1956, p. 300) (see also Appendix A, no. 5)

The Narnia universe exposes all creatures in a constant state of self-exploration. In *The Last Battle*, Lord Digory observes, “More like the real thing, said the Lord Digory softly. Suddenly Farsight the Eagle spread his wings, soared thirty or forty feet up into the air, circled round and then alighted on the ground” (Lewis, 1956, p. 412). Farsight the Eagle says, “Kings and Queens, we have all been blind. We are only beginning to see where we are. From up there I have seen it all Ettinsmuir, Beaversdam, the Great River, and Cair Paravel still shining on the edge of the Eastern Sea. Narnia is not dead. This is Narnia” (Lewis, 1956, p. 413). The narrator explains,

“The difference between the old Narnia and the new Narnia was like that. The new one was a deeper country: every rock and flower and blade of grass looked as if it meant more. I can’t describe it any better than that: if you ever get there you will know what I mean” (Lewis, 1956, p. 306). All Narnian society, transforming into Aslan’s New Narnia, reflects collective consciousness. Posthumanism represents a paradigm shift in how species perceive themselves and their relationship with the Narnia universe. Humans’ effort to comment on place challenges the traditional human-centric view and recognizes the potential for humanity to transcend its biological limitations through philosophical contemplation. By doing so, Posthumanism offers a lifeline to the universe’s quest for self-understanding, breaking down the limitations of space and time. Through different points of view on space exploration and the potential for new Narnia existence, beings can explore the universe in ways previously deemed impossible.

The humans in *The Chronicles of Narnia* live in Narnia in many ways, unlike other biological and cultural species living on the same planet. When humans encounter this unknown environment and alien species, they experience alienation. Both humans and other species see each other as aliens. Humans have been suffering from leaving their maternal world, London, which threatens them with physical and psychological disjointedness. In *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, when the Pevensie children enter Narnia, the first character experiencing bodily and mental alienation in the alien Narnian environment is Edmund who meets a dangerous alien,

the White Witch. Particularly, the alienated Edmund cannot control his behaviour because he does not know how to handle his encounter with the White Witch; he pretends he is contented with his situation to please the White Witch, without knowing her intentions. Edmund is alienated from his exposure to a new, unfamiliar environment and from himself and his siblings in dealing with the White Witch. The interaction between Edmund and the White Witch is that between two others⁸ and hybrids.⁹ Edmund's confused attitude toward himself and toward the White Witch is justified by the boy's ambiguous perception of the White Witch as both the other and a hybrid that inspires fear from one side and attractiveness from the other side, both signs of admiration that are both destructive and constructive at the same time.

Edmund, as a representative of a potentially sociopolitically powerful white man and, thus, the best definition of what a human is, represents biological purity and superiority over hybrids and other species upheld by unpolluted human populations who see any sort of hybridization that results in bizarre new forms of life as a monster. Thus, the White Witch provokes the fear of difference in Edmund's anthropocentric perception of a reasoning living being. Edmund's fear is justified by his upbringing in a human society that strictly forbids contact with hybrids, considered tainted and corrupt entities. The White Witch's physical presence also justifies Edmund's fear; her excessive physical strength and Western external beauty (tall and lean body, white skin, and blondish facial characteristics) question Edmund's physical superiority based on the standards of his own society. Furthermore, the White Witch identifies herself as a queen, adding sociopolitical authority to her presence, making Edmund, the young Western man who reigns in a patriarchal society, feel little. Finally, Edmund's insecurity manifested as fear is justified by the White Witch's identification as a witch,

⁸ Others are classified and treated as aliens because of some distinguishing characteristics that set them apart from typical anthropocentric traits like race, skin color, species, culture, physical abilities, and disabilities, as well as various socioeconomic factors (Furman and Epss, 2016, p. 2).

⁹ People who share characteristics with species already beyond the norm for humans are seen as hybrids and are consequently tainted since they have unacceptably close relationships with (Borkfeit, 2011, p. 137). They are compelled to participate in the same alienating and discriminating experiences already encountered by other non-human aliens after becoming othered themselves, losing their prior privileged status (Muhammed and Yusuf, 2022, p. 124).

a being possessing esoteric knowledge that makes her uncontrollable; thus, Edmund, the offspring of a civilized patriarchal society, is forced to experience the unfamiliar role of the weak in his relationship with the White Witch.

On the other hand, Edmund feels an erotic attraction to the White Witch, which endows him with the ambiguous position of the inexperienced young lover being simultaneously both a victim and a predator. Edmund is at a sensitive age between late childhood and puberty when children experience biological changes and become more aware of their sexuality. Thus, Edmund's masculinity is awakened and must be tested by encountering a non-human female that defeats Edmund's familiar cultural portrait of the female within an unfamiliar territory. The narrator describes her admirable seductive beauty mirrored in the contrast of her face's whiteness and her lips' redness (see Appendix A, no. 6).

Although the behaviour of the bad Queen of Narnia (the White Witch) toward Edmund is harsh, offensive, and cold at the beginning, she deliberately changes her mean behaviour into seductiveness by offering Edmund a Turkish delight, an exotic/oriental sweet food stimulating desire and pleasure (see Appendix A, no. 7).

In the above excerpt, the narrator comments that Edmund starts feeling comfortable in response to the seductiveness of the White Witch, implying that Edmund gives in to the White Witch's luring. The abrupt change in the White Witch's attitude toward young Edmund causes his confusion/frustration, a main trait of alienation, and being inexperienced in flirting increases his emotional and intellectual vulnerability.

Edmund's alienation from his siblings is temporary¹⁰. Because of his actions, Edmund Pevensie is despised by his brother, which contributes to his increasing self-awareness. Edmund's pride is a result of both internal and external circumstances. To the queen's demands was his desire for dominance over his siblings. Edmund even

¹⁰ Temporal alienation is also discussed in Chapter Two: Animality in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, where it is presented as a disrupted rhizome that, according to Deleuze and Guattari, eventually restores its rhizomatic condition.

wants revenge when his elder brother Peter calls him a “poisonous little beast” (Lewis, 1950, p. 107). He thinks he should not be called a beast, but ironically, he is a beast because he is dangerous and maliciously intended to hurt. The narrator explains that Edmund wants his brother and sisters to be turned into stones (Lewis, 1950, p. 163). Another example of Edmund's arrogant self-centeredness is his drive to dominate and govern Narnia. Edmund complains bitterly: “When I’m King of Narnia the first thing I shall do will be to make some decent roads” (Lewis, 1950, p. 165), causing Susan to rebuke him to stop grumbling (Lewis, 1950, p. 21). Edmund's ill-tempered behavior alienates him further from his siblings. Edmund's humility results from his desire to atone for his hubris. Edmund's early volatile nature, his gluttony, betrayal of his siblings, and his lust for power and fortune are contrasted with his later actions of bravery and compassion, which came about as a direct result of his growing awareness of the difficulties and temptations he faces as he grows from boyhood into maturity. Edmund's self-awareness enables him to recognize the White Witch's terrible actions, motivating him to actively participate in eliminating her.

In *The Magician's Nephew*, Digory, who is the same age as Edmund in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, experiences a similar alienation when encountering the White Witch. Jadis (the White Witch) is the last Queen of Charn, a devastated city on a dying earth. Her height, charm, and beauty are astounding, and she possesses superhuman power that allows her to cast spells and create havoc. She exudes an air of power and lust. The narrator shares Digory's first reaction to the White Witch's presence with the readers: “Digory said he had never in all his life known a woman so beautiful” (Lewis, 1955, p. 88). After consuming the apple of youth herself, Jadis tries to convince Digory to taste the apple that would endow him with immortality, assuring him that they would be able to rule Narnia together “I know I shall never grow old or die. Eat it, Boy, eat it; and you and I will both live forever and be king and queen of this whole world or of your world, if we decide to go back there” (Lewis, 1955, p. 275). Digory resists the White Witch's temptations because of his virtue. The narrator comments “But I think Digory would not have taken an apple for himself in any case. Things like do not steal were, I think, hammered into boys' heads a good deal harder in those days than they are now” (Lewis, 1955, p. 273).

Through Digory's alienation condition, Lewis, as a Posthumanist, highlights the deceiving nature of dominant portraits of self-connected to earthly desires and needs, including physical immortality, power, and wealth, which decapacitate one to realize one's true self-identity. Indeed, Lewis's valuing virtue is Posthumanist because, from a Christian humanist perspective, it is associated with the true essence of the immortal soul, and from a Posthumanist perspective, it is related to one's being master of one's own self through expanded consciousness. Moreover, Digory's alienation from Polly when they meet the White Witch for the first time in the devastated and magical land of Charn is similar to Edmund's temporal alienation from his siblings. Their altercation concerning an enigmatic puzzle that offers advice on whether or not to ring a bell ends with Digory arguing with Polly because he wants to ring the bell (see Appendix A, no. 8).

Edmund's and Digory's cases illustrate Jean-Paul Sartre's argument that the Other should be acknowledged as the necessary prerequisite of the existence of the Self. Sartre claims that if someone makes an "awkward" or "vulgar gesture" (Sartre, 1978, p. 221), he will not feel humiliated till he is observed by someone else and becomes aware that he must appear in front of this other person (see Appendix A, no. 9). Sartre believes that the presence of another person in one's awareness conflicts with a reflective attitude, leading to feelings of shame. Sartre employs the term shame to show the progression of the sensation of shame. According to Sartre, shame is not an awareness attained via individual reflection but rather through exposure to and engagement with the other, who reinforces who he is (Sartre, 1978, p. 272).

In addition, according to Sartre, this new kind of being "was not in me potentially before the appearance of the Other, for it could not have found any place in the For-itself" (Sartre, 1978, p. 222). Sartre also defends the object dimension of "I" by giving the Other a position of power. As a result, for "I" to acquire a position as a subject, "I" must first render itself as an object. According to Sartre, someone exists as Self only through the Other's recognition (see Appendix A, no. 10).

Sartre can raise the bigger ontological query where do we locate being? Using "I am as the Other sees me" (Sartre, 1978, p. 222), or "I am as I appear to the Other," Sartre explains that the connection between "me" and the other's vision is an "inter-monad" relationship (Sartre, 1977, p. 222), one that allows the other to exercise its

power by being acknowledged as the one who can “thus the other has not only revealed to me what I was; he has established me in a new type of being which can support new qualifications” (Sartre, 1978, p. 222). Sartre argues that embodied consciousness's relationship with the world requires negation and non-being. The “inter-monad” dynamic involves how one's self-awareness is shaped by the gaze of the Other. When the Other looks at us, our existence gains an objective dimension through their perception. Sartre's exploration of self-awareness, the gaze of the Other, and the Look sheds light on human existence and subjectivity. The Look plays a crucial role in his philosophy, making us aware of ourselves as objects of others' perception. This dynamic interaction is similar to the “inter-monad” relationship between two individuals. In Lewis's fantasy, Digory's choice sets the adventure in motion, leading to encounters with Aslan and the creation of Narnia. Both Sartre's philosophy and Lewis's fantasy explore themes of choice, perception, and the interplay between self-awareness and the gaze of others.

In *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, another interesting example of an alienated character is Lucy, the youngest among the Pevensie children. When Lucy and the Faun, Mr Tumnus, meet for the first time, they see each other as equally alien (see Appendix A, no. 11). Tumnus's language conveys his kindness and interest in Lucy. Tumnus acts with benevolence, behaving like a civilized being. Despite being distinct species, they are fundamentally similar because they have the same desire to get to know one another and they share the quality of tenderness. Still, the fact that Tumnus questions Lucy's species impacts her. The Faun's repetitive questions about Lucy's identity as a human, the fact that he has a name himself, and his civilized behavior blur the lines between human and non-human external appearance and behavior as leading factors to the differentiation of humanity from other species. Moreover, Mr. Tumnus's strange appearance, a creature with a human upper body and a goat-like lower body, plays a pivotal role in Lucy's understanding, acceptance, and normalization of other species of equal status with humans and, consequently, the expansion of her being through her interaction with them in Narnia.

Edmund, Digory, and Lucy are Deleuzian characters, paradoxically, they can only maintain their essential identity by changing into someone or something other than what they are. Deleuze investigates how the biological organism differs from

itself inside and its inherent ability for change and endless diversity. This particular person is distinguished by how it creates its circumstances of existence, not by what it lacks. Deleuze states no separation exists among the elements constituting nature, including humans and non-humans, animate and inanimate forms (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 89).

Similarly, In *The Last Battle*, the Unicorn says, “I have come home at last! This is my real country! I belong here. This is the land I have been looking for all my life, though I never knew it till now. The reason why we loved the old Narnia is that it sometimes looked a little like this. Bree-hee-hee! Come further up, come further in!” (Lewis, 1956, p. 418). Narnia has no boundaries or bounds. It transcends the boundaries between the ontological regions. It lowers all that exists to a single ontological plane, the so-called “plane of immanence” or “plane of nature” without regard to time or space (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 164-175). The pure plane of immanence is a foundational concept where everything exists and is composed. Unformed elements and materials interact based on their speed, forming different assemblages. This fixed plane of life governs the movement and connections of all things, creating a single abstract animal for all assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 665-666).

Everything is loosely linked together to form a heterogeneous assembly, and everything is immediately brought out, balanced, and downshifted. However, everything is offered on an uninterrupted interior realm, where the sole characteristics that separate shapes and substances from one another are their rate of change and role in the organization. These are individually according to their connections and motion in a constant plane of time on which everything moves, slows down, or speeds up (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 312). Nevertheless, speed and slowness relate to the qualitatively distinct kinds of movement that things exhibit in space rather than the measurable measure of mobility. There are two distinct methods for creating space: topological and geometric methods. The topographical approach realises the space by following the unseen channel of material that moves in the form of a root and drags it in each direction, generating connections, while the geometric approach separates and arranges the space using barriers, supports, and closures., “taking up or filling a smooth

space in like a whirlwind, with the ability to emerge at any moment” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 473).

Next to the application of Deleuze’s theory of immanence towards a Posthumanist understanding of the alienation of Lewis’s characters in *The Chronicles of Narnia* that locates reevaluating the place of the other in our conception of who we are is also necessary, with selfhood being understood not as the static, isolated self but rather as the malleable intermediate area bridging the self and the other. The emphasis places less on our sense of self, identity, and independence, and the distinction between unconditional object and subjectivity disappears in favor of a relationship of dialectic in which the self and the other work together to form the social bond that gives the absolute, immanent, and private self a tangible existence that is alive and constantly shifting (Lin, 1998, p. 3).

According to Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction theory, what lies the goal of deconstructing is not to destroy language, the self, belonging, truth, or humanity; rather, it is to pave the way for the emergence of a new language, self, personality, and humanity by constant communication, interaction, and interaction between the self and the other (Lin, 1998, p. 8). In light of this, Posthumanism indicates that the cultural factors driving this form of division between the self and the other are none other than those fostered by Western humanism. Concerned with alienation in modern Western culture, along with Sartre, whose ideas about realizing one’s existence through the other have already been discussed, Mikhail Bakhtin and Karl Marx radically altered humanism and laid the stage for the development of Posthumanism. They base their theory of subjectivity on historical materialism. They see alienation as an epistemological problem or a problem of knowing rather than an economic one. They argue that alienation persists because we have misunderstood the other’s epistemic position and how it relates to the self (Lin, 1998, p. 35).

By demonstrating that the inner person is unable to evoke the other, Bakhtin asserts that another is conceptually essential “sensational-volitional reaction from the other, exists only in ontological emptiness and solitariness” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 30-31). Additionally, Bakhtin demonstrates that only the Other assists the one to “encompass and consummate” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 35) the entirety of one’s “outward appearance” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 27). In *Art and Answerability*, Bakhtin demonstrates that the

author's aesthetic activity is “creation” and that the author's role is that of an active “creator” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 7). In this case, “creation” refers to the process of creating the hero's persona as a “whole” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 6) and as an “integral countenance” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 6). To understand how this sort of artistic production takes place and how the “wholeness” of the hero's vision is built, Bakhtin argues that the author's production is impacted by the way he perceives his connection with the hero and how he responds to the hero as an object of creation. The author is described as existing “outside” of the hero in this circumstance and is considered a third party. This position “enables [him] to collect and concentrate on [the whole] of the hero, who, within himself, is diffused and dispersed in the story” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 14) by “supplying all those moments that are unavailable to the hero yet are “transgredient” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 27) to him, such as a whole external image, an exterior, and a background behind his back (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 14). In contrast, the hero is portrayed as an insider who can only access what is “inside” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 15). In this sense, the hero's “wholeness” or “consummation” is determined by his internal awareness of himself and the writer's outside perception of the hero. This separation between within and outside indicates that the hero's subconscious within and the author's production or reply are fundamental; without this connection, neither the hero nor the author would exist. In the novel author/hero connection, the hero is not perceived as a cognitive reflection or a representation of the author's thought; rather, an individual who lives on a new level of experience, i.e., a plane of being in which the hero himself is prohibited of being through his power. (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 14). Bakhtin's author-hero aesthetic connection theory might be seen as a model for the interaction between the self and the other.

Within a Posthumanist context, we may expand Bakhtin's author-hero aesthetic connection, viewing the self as the being in process and the author as the former's response to interacting with other beings in the process. In *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, readers access Lucy's mind through the omniscient narrator's description of her impressions of the Faun, Mr Tumnus, when they first meet. That is, the omniscient narrator can be seen not only as Lewis's mouthpiece (the author of all characters) but also as a reliable voice of Lucy's mind. In this case, people

understand Lucy (the hero/Self) through the narrator (the author/ Other), (see Appendix A, no. 12).

Viewing the narrator's description of the Faun as the Other to understand Lucy as a Self may also be strengthened by Sartre's claim that the other is an ontological component of the self as a phenomenon beyond phenomenology attempt to reinterpret the underlying significance of existence. According to Donna Haraway, Lucy and the Faun call the notion of "Oddkin," which Haraway defines as a "colloquial term for other-than-conventional biogenetic relatives"; it is another effort to explain the creature that results from the hybridization of several modalities (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 129). While not always beneficial or desirable, hybridizing developments that compel people to experience interspecies and various ways of life call into question the viability of previously accepted human ways of being human, together with all of its difficulties and paradoxes (Yusuf and Muhammad, 2022, p. 130). By maintaining that existence is more significant than essence, Sartre opposes Christian essentialism. After releasing man from his role as the object of God's creation, Sartre develops his theory of being, which is being for the Other. In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, Lewis does not repudiate Christian essentialism, but incorporates in Christian essentialism Sartre's understanding of the existence of self through the existence of the Other, which, simultaneously, is both God because everything is in God-and more importantly for a (Post)humanist reading of *The Chronicles of Narnia* the other beings (e.g. Lucy exists as a Self through the narrator and the Faun). According to Karl Marx:

We are to such an extent estranged from man's essential nature that the direct language of this essential nature seems to us a violation of human dignity, whereas the estranged language of material values seems to be the well-justified assertion of human dignity that is self-confident and conscious of itself (Elster, 2012, p. 33).

Marx's criticism of work is the foundation for his critique of alienation. Marx argues that in a negative sense, the political economy system creates the individual as labor power that is exchanged and sold, as well as the idea that labor power is the basic human potential the individual is identified and, more importantly, equated with his labor by selling his labor power in the market. Consequently, man becomes the "slave" of the "work" and its "object" (Marx, 1972, p. 72), both metaphysically reduced to a performing worker and quantitatively described as a producing force. Marx proposes

a three-stage theory to explain how alienation happens. In the first stage, a person's value and purpose as a human are subordinated to those of a worker; in other words, his worth as a person is determined by the quantity and caliber of labor he produces. Eventually, man goes through a subsequent phase of estrangement when the worth and purpose of his work are subordinated to the worth of the goods he creates. Ultimately, a man enters a third phase of estrangement where the amount and importance of his products are moved to money as the quantity and quality of the products are determined by money (Marx, 1972, p. 72).

The notion of alienation provide a crucial function in understanding the deeper meaning of the reclusive person rejecting alienation by discovering an everlasting return to the real self, a return that can only be attained by a course of non-activity, refusing action, consumption, and creation (Lin, 1998, p. 100). As a result, the self and the other are connected on a theoretical and ethical level. The other is no longer seen as unimportant and outside of the self, but rather as occupying a space within the self (Lin, 1988, p. 144). Marx bases his criticism of work on the premise that universal human nature is described as man's demand for the “essential bond connecting him with other men” (Marx, 1972, p. 117). Marx examines the alienated state of the laborers as seen in (1) their relationship to the output of their activity, (2) the process of labor itself, (3) the relationship of the laborer to “nature,” (4) the relationship between men, and (5) their relationship to the potential for freedom and creation within the human race (Marx, 1972, p. 67).

In *The Magician's Nephew*, the dialogue between Uncle Andrew and the White Witch during their first meeting, Uncle Andrew's private thoughts after their encounter, and the narrator's view on the White Witch and Uncle Andrew exemplify Marx's understanding of alienation. The White Witch and Uncle Andrew are beings alienated from themselves due to their tendency to use others by focusing on their “external existence” associated with wealth, power, and slavery. In front of the White Witch, Uncle Andrew utters, “Ah-ah-Madam,” gasped Uncle Andrew, I am most honoured highly gratified a most unexpected pleasure if only I had had the opportunity of making any preparations I- I” (Lewis, *The Magician's Nephew*, 1955, p. 124) the White Witch replies, “Where is the Magician, Fool? I see, she said scornfully, ‘you are a Magician-of a sort. Stand up, dog, and don't sprawl there as if you were speaking to

your equals” (Lewis, *The Magician’s Nephew*, 1955, p. 125). Later, Uncle Andrew confesses, “He kept on saying to himself, ‘A dem fine woman, sir, a dem fine woman. A superb creature. Andrew, my boy,’ he said to himself as he looked in the glass, you are a devilish well-preserved fellow for your age. A distinguished-looking man, sir” (Lewis, 1955, p. 135).

Furthermore, the narrator notes that at the Charn, the White Witch ignored Polly (see Appendix A, no. 13) and comments on Uncle Andrew: “You see, the foolish old man was actually beginning to imagine the Witch would fall in love with him. The two drinks probably had something to do with it, and so had his best clothes. But he was, in any case, as vain as a peacock; that was why he had become a Magician” (Lewis, 1955, p. 135). Uncle Andrew and the White Witch may be viewed both as victim/slave and predator/master. The power relationship characterizing the interaction of these two characters impedes their healthy interaction and, thus, their sense of Self.

Both characters, in their own way, assert their supposed superiority. An interesting examination of power, manipulation, and existential issues may be found in the relationship between Uncle Andrew and the White Witch based on Karl Marx’s commodification of being, a concept associated with self-alienation. Although Uncle Andrew and the White Witch are different beings from different worlds, they are characterized by a similar mode of existence, functioning further as another example of Lewis’s (Post)humanist approach to defining human and non-human. Both Uncle Andrew and the White Witch view each other as tools helping them fulfill their material goals. Thus, they experience self-alienation as action seekers who, fully immersed in their ruthless quest for power, wealth, and knowledge cannot feel empathy and exist at the expense of other people’s well-being. Both Uncle Andrew and the White Witch exemplify existential absurdity.

Shift’s speech and the Beasts’ response illustrate the three-stage theory of Marx on alienation (see Appendix A, no. 14). Like Uncle Andrew and the White Witch, Shift is an embracer of hierarchy and power relationships since he collaborates with the economic authority, the Calormenes. Also, like Uncle Andrew and the White Witch, Shift is the action seeker demonstrating wide material appetite as he consumes “a fresh nut into its [his] cheek.” He attempts to convince the Beasts that their sense of

self depends on their labor's productivity; they exist solely as performing workers and productive forces. Shift equates workers' salary with freedom and rejects the view of continuous hard labour as slavery; according to Marx, however, the Beasts' salary signals the third stage of alienation when one's value and productivity are translated into money. The Beasts respond, "But we don't want all those things, said an old Bear. We want to be free. And we want to hear Aslan speak himself" (Lewis, 1956, p. 85). The Beasts' disbelief towards Shift's deceiving rhetoric reflects the Marxist perspective on self-realization that is associated with refusing action and consumption. Moreover, their Marxist understanding of creation is echoed in their reference to Aslan (the arch-creator of all Narnia beings) who as a creator with dignity creates beings out of his love for life/existence and not motivated by power and wealth; thus, Aslan would never (ab)use them by selling them to the King of Calormen. What the Beasts imply here is their understanding that self-realization associated with true freedom comes through one's love bond with others, like in the case between Aslan and his creations, the Beasts.

Shift's speech to the Beasts may also symbolize Marx's advocacy of the unity of man and nature. Despite not using the phrase "human nature" directly, Marx draws from his claim that "Man is a species being and free conscious activity constitutes the species character of man" (Marx, 1974, p. 327-328). Marx's concept of human alienation in the 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* is closely tied to the idea of human species-being. Despite its absence in his later writings, this concept remains central in Marx's critique of capitalist society. The notion of human species-being plays a significant role in Marx's writing, particularly in his analysis of capitalist society. While it may not be as explicitly emphasized in his later works, its influence is still evident in his critique of the societal structure.

Marx challenges the conventional wisdom that views human nature as an impersonal quality ingrained in every person. Instead, he contends that the whole of social interactions shapes human character. It is a dynamic by-product of historical and social situations rather than a static, universal notion. Marx's philosophy strongly emphasizes the necessity of bringing man and nature together to achieve complete and unrestricted human growth. Marx's analysis shows that the capitalist production method upset the equilibrium between nature and man. When Shift, the Ape, attempts

to establish a capitalist society, the social order is destroyed, and ecological crises result from capitalism's exploitative relationship with nature. Through this way, Lewis highlights the need for structural reform that can bring humans and their environment together.

In *The Last Battle*, Lewis's employment of time is another symbolic representation of alienation. The Pevensie children and Digory and Polly return to Narnia as young adults, not children. The concept of aging is even complicated within the scene where the old Kings and Queens of Narnia return. Tirian observes that Jill "looked older, but then didn't, and he could never make up his mind on that point" (Lewis, 1956, p. 329). Digory and Polly are also transformed into youthful versions of themselves rather than the older figures that they were in the realistic world of *The Chronicles of Narnia*. The concept of age is meditated on in the same scene in which the Kings and Queens return. Tirian observes that Susan is not among the Pevensies, to which Peter replies, "My sister Susan, answered Peter shortly and gravely, is no longer a friend of Narnia" (Lewis, 1956, p. 332). "Oh Susan! said Jill. 'She's interested in nothing nowadays except nylons and lipstick and invitations. She always was a jolly sight too keen on being grown-up'" (Lewis, 1956, p. 333). Jill comments on Susan's absence, characterizing Susan's decisions irresponsible as a result of her need to grow older up. The use of the adjective except nylons and lipstick connotes the illusional nature of Susan's willful estrangement from Narnia, moreover, everything illusional is also temporary; thus, Lewis, indirectly, endows *The Chronicles of Narnia* with the spirit of hope regarding Susan's return without the latter being a part of the official narration. As Deleuze and Guattari observe, "There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 54), a main characteristic of the rhizome discussed extensively in Chapter Two: Animality in *The Chronicles of Narnia*.

The decision Susan decided to leave Narnia behind her and thus lose her capacity to preserve her youth represents not only one's detachment from religion and the prelapsarian state of man or the ideal/real self that is an expanded consciousness participating in God based on Lewis as a Christian humanist but also delivers Lewis's (Post)humanist understanding of the indefiniteness (infinite and eternal) within the

context of time connoting aging and mortality of a rhizome (Narnia) as an ongoing process of becoming. Susan's becoming old represents the corruption/vulnerability of the rhizome experiencing a rupture. What is noticeable in Susan's case of estrangement is the uninterrupted interrelation between her and others despite her voluntary detachment. Queen Susan Pevensie, the second of the Pevensie children, was a significant person in the magical land of Narnia. Queen Susan the Gentle was a practical, down-to-earth person who might occasionally be stubborn. When she governed Cair Paravel, the capital of the Narnians, she was also known as Queen Susan of the Horn. However, her fate took an interesting turn. Others' memory of her presence in Narnia preserves its vitality in the hearts of all who know her; memory keeps intact the oneness of the rhizome.

Characters in the Narnia universe go through estrangement, change, and development phases. Every individual in Narnia has a different path, and their alienation experiences enrich the wonderful world created by C. S. Lewis. The distinctions between self and other are eroded by Posthumanism, which questions what it means to be human. Accepting Posthumanism may enable us to rethink our identities and reassess our interactions with other humans, non-human species, and nature. Alienation draws attention to the gaps in our knowledge of the self and the other, and Posthumanism reinforces us to consider the meaning of human existence. Both ideas inspire us to go beyond conventional bounds and interact with the complexity of life.

CHAPTER II

ANIMALITY IN THE CHRONICLES OF NARNIA

Animal theory may be applied in *The Chronicles of Narnia* based on the Poststructuralist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben, the feminist philosophy of Donna Haraway, and Rosi Braidotti, Katherine Hayles, and Cary Wolfe's Posthumanism. Interacting with these theorists, who write with completely distinct preferences, raises various questions on the creative, ontological, and moral relationships between humans and animals. It is possible to grasp, deeper conceive, and better account for the entwinement of human and nonhuman life by centering serious investigation around animals and animality. Thus, the phrase “animal theory” refers to two complimentary goals: investigating philosophical advancements in the conceptualization of animals and animality and debating the role of animals in contemporary philosophical discussions. Animal theory is at the heart of critical animal studies (CAS). Scholars associated with CAS struggle for justice and compassion toward the animal world by advocating altering our largely violent relationship with animals and realizing how interconnected the goals of animal liberation and human emancipation are. According to Posthumanist animal studies, terms like human and animal are interchangeable ontologically. Therefore, Posthumanist animal studies contribute to developing a positive strategy devoid of hierarchies between people and animals, the mind and body, and nature and civilization.

One of the top topics for Posthumanism, which has several sub-philosophies and mentalities, is non-human creatures. In a posthuman expression, animals, or non-human animals, have historically been the entities that people connect with, communicate with, and involve in their communication processes (Gigliotti, 2014, p. 2). One of the most noticeable subjects of human-animal investigations, or posthuman discussion, is the ontological destabilization that arises from dissolving human and animal bonds. Animal studies, which problematize the animal category, bring into question the ontological anthropocentrism in the history of Western thought by questioning the Cartesian binary oppositions such as human/animal, nature/culture, and body/mind. Critical animal studies are discussed with a non-anthropocentric approach, such as adequately positioning the differences or similarities between humans and animals.

In the past, Aristotle's philosophical view of the human-animal relationship continued as one of the dominant views in the West after the Middle Ages. In *Politics*, Aristotle makes the often-quoted claim that humans are distinct from other animals because “man is by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, 1995, p. 59). Therefore, according to Aristotle, there is a natural conflict between humans and animals, in which speech is valued above nonspeech: “His gift of speech also evidently proves that man is a more social animal than the bees, or any of the herding cattle: for nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who enjoys it” (Aristotle, 1995, p. 50). He makes a clear allusion to animals when he says that domesticated animals are superior to wild ones in terms of nature. All such animals would profit from human oversight as they would be better preserved: “It is evident then that we may conclude of those things that are, that plants are created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men; the tame for our use and provision; the wild, at least the greater part, for our provision also, or some other advantageous purpose, as furnishing us with clothes, and the like” (Aristotle, 1995, p. 75). It would appear that in the beginning, one had to be a man or exist for the advantage of one. Although the Renaissance caused many changes in the mentality of humans, the old way of thinking, in which animals were opposite and hierarchically below humans, was preserved. In the 16th century, the Copernican revolution declared that the earth and the human species could not exist anymore seen as the center of the universe. The existence of

other planets and the possibility of life on some revealed that man is nothing but an ant in the face of the infinite. During the Enlightenment, Descartes' *Discourse on the Method*, which distinguished between thinking people and automatons, was published in 1637 and is credited as the most significant statement regarding animals in modern Europe. Moreover, Descartes's view of human reason as proof of existence- "I think, therefore I am" (Descartes, 2006, p. 29)-argues for the divisive Aristotelian approach to the relationship between humans and animals (see Appendix B, no. 15).

For Descartes, unlike humans, animals do not have a mind or soul and are deprived of the ability to think and feel; therefore, they do not exist. Descartes's thoughts were developed into Cartesian dualism, based on dichotomies such as mind-body, mind-emotion, and human-animal, endowing animals with an inferior status. This inferiority involved two ideas: cognitive inferiority, which held that animals lacked self-awareness, symbolic communication, rationality, abstract thought, and the ability to think for themselves, and spiritual inferiority, which held that nonhuman animals were not made in God's image, like humans and were not endowed with souls and were instead created for human use. In the 17th century, rationalist intellectuals, such as Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, who advocated creative monism, criticized Descartes's worldview of static dualism. By anchoring human and nonhuman entities in an impermanent system rather than a transcendent structure of existence, they created a framework for thinking about humans and animals in a non-oppressive, non-hierarchical way. In addition to not denying that animals have feelings, Spinoza does not constantly use his work to draw distinctions between humans and animals. He hardly ever talks about animals directly in *The Ethics*, and when he does, he writes, "many things are observed in the lower animals which far surpass human ingenuity" (Spinoza, 1994, p. 143). Spinoza contends that humans and animals are only various manifestations and modes of what, in essence, is the same reality (nature). The differences between mind, animal, plant, and stone are minimal. Nature exists in an unlimited number of actualizations. Thus, Spinoza's ideas distorted the the difference between animals and humans and the order of species (Kalaycı, 2017, p. 90; Uslu, 2015, p. 98). Leibniz believed that all substance, and hence all spirits, are interrelated in a vast world of animals; that both human and non-human species can state the basic element of life in an interconnection or adaptability; and that an animal, like a person,

is a continual sentient mirror of the universe. Humans have been de-transcendentalized and are now considered naturally automated, just like animals (Leibniz, 1991, p. 24-26).

By the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century, philosophical syncretism, a blend of Descartes's, Spinoza's, and Leibniz's ideas, seems to characterize the Enlightenment thought on animality; the most primitive form of humanity is animality, and to be fully human, one must transcend animality. Enlightenment thinkers thought about humans and animals from an oppositional and non-hierarchical perspective by anchoring them in an immanent order of existence. Furthermore, Kant says that people's ethical consideration for animals is mostly focused on avoiding weakening "morality in one's relations with other men" (Kant, 1996, p. 192-3). In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, the White Witch and Uncle Andrew in *The Magician's Nephew* and the Ape, Shift, in *The Last Battle* exemplify Enlightenment thinking on animality.

The White Witch expresses Cartesian dualism by creating a dichotomy and a hierarchy between herself and others. She states that Digory and Polly are just common children: "Who has awaked me? Who has broken the spell? she asked. I think it must have been me, said Digory. You! said the Queen, You? But you are only a child, a common child. Anyone can see at a glance that you have no drop of royal or noble blood in your veins" (Lewis, 1955, p. 98), (see Appendix B, no. 16).

"I see, she said scornfully, you are a Magician of a sort. Stand up, dog, and don't sprawl there as if you were speaking to your equals. How do you come to know Magic? You are not of royal blood, I'll swear" (Lewis, 1955, p. 126). The White Witch's Cartesian dualism is further strengthened by the Medieval Christian teaching that God had established the hierarchical framework known as the Great Chain of Being. It starts with God and moves through the spheres of angels, people, animals, plants, and minerals. Specifically, God is all spirit and unchanging. Angels: Angels are wholly spiritual entities, much like God. Humans are beings of both spirit and substance and are fundamentally transient. Animals are at the base of the hierarchy; animals are less endowed than humans. Plants have even fewer characteristics below, and minerals are made entirely of matter at the bottom (Harper, 1936, p. 59). Thus, the White Witch views herself superior to ordinary others based on the criterion of

authority within the context of sociopolitics and eugenics (a queen of royal blood), religion and esotericism (a witch), and biological age (an adult).

Another character who exemplifies Cartesian dualism and the idea of the Great Chain of Being in *The Magician's Nephew* is Uncle Andrew. "Digory suddenly remembered that Uncle Andrew had used exactly the same words" (Lewis, 1955, p. 111). "Men like me, who possess hidden wisdom, are freed from common rules just as we are cut off from common pleasures. Ours, my boy, is a high and lonely destiny" (Lewis, 1955, p. 40). The idea of a high and lonely destiny without restrictions but without pleasures alludes to the potential loneliness of leaders. Like the White witch, Andrew claims superiority by aspiring to authority and mastery over powers that transcend the natural universe. Digory's memory of Uncle Andrew's use of language reveals the trauma individuals like Andrew can cause to those with whom they interact.

In *The Last Battle*, Shift, the Ape, is another character echoing the Cartesian hierarchy among species (see Appendix B, no. 17). Based on the Cartesian dualistic belief that humankind is superior to animals because of possessing logos, the ability to speak and think, Shift attempts to deceive the people of Narnia through the use of a pseudo syllogism connecting wisdom with old age with apelike external traits and old age with wisdom and concluding that his apelike appearance reflects human wisdom. Moreover, he preserves the hierarchy among species by acknowledging the natural superiority of Aslan as a being of authority because of its refined external characteristics and logos.

From a Posthumanist point of view, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari questioned the fundamental animal ontology that various types of creatures have substantial essences or existential structures that are the suitable subjects of such inquiry, indicating that there are or are animal beings. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari use three methods of animal identification. The first group includes domesticated animals, pets who adapt to the human environment and are treated, as well as behave, like "little people"; the second group is identified as the classification or state animals, mythological creatures functioning as archetypes and symbols; the third group consists of nomadic packs existing collectively, that is, the one is involved in an on-going process of becoming interacting with others (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 628-629, 893-894). The first two groups are anthropocentric because they

become means of humanity's remembering their transcendental purpose, whereas, in the third group, humans and non-humans are of the same essence. They engage themselves in a continuous becoming, which is incorporating as opposed to developing, with "alliance" and "transverse communications" rather than "descent and filiation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 622, p. 893-894).

In their neo-evolutionism, Deleuze and Guattari reject constant and homogeneous majoritarian habits of cognition and observe the process of becoming animal as one of minoritarian potential and innovation. By concentrating on Franz Kafka's literary animals, Deleuze and Guattari go deeper into the concept of being an animal in Kafka: *Toward a Minor Literature* (see Appendix B, no. 18). Being an animal is not about identifying with it, mimicking its appearance or behaviors, or acting like it. Being an animal is being open and receptive to encountering animals (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 621). Deleuze's and Guattari's 'Rhizome' idea stresses horizontal development instead of 'arborescent' mechanism's hierarchical vertical structure. "What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of becomings" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 86).

In *The Magician's Nephew*, Aslan's creating Narnians exemplifies animal becoming's intensification/perfection through the traits of multiplicity and variation of species (see Appendix B, no. 19). The whole (Narnia), standing for the process of becoming, consists of a wide range of beings who inhabit the air, the water, and the land and whose outer and inner resemblance to humans vary in degrees. They all coexist and interact, having a common purpose in front of Aslan, becoming one another a distinct self, and the existence of the continuously in motion one, Narnia.

Another example of an animal becoming in *The Magician's Nephew* is the White Witch's entrance into Narnia. Aslan the Lion says, "There is an evil witch abroad in my new land of Narnia. Tell these good beasts how she came here," and Digory responds, "I brought her, Aslan, answering in a low voice" (Lewis, 1955, p. 231). Digory's low tone of voice shows his feeling of intimidation and humbleness, justified by his Deleuzian perception of the White Witch as an entity that affects and is affected by the interaction between her and all Narnians, including Digory. The

White Witch is a nonhuman that can neither be controlled as a category one animal nor be an archetype or symbol as a category two animal, according to Deleuze's and Guattari's animal grouping. The White Witch, a nonhuman, acts deliberately; she freely chooses to come, devour, and depart. Digory's low voice demonstrates intensification through his understanding of the severe degree to which all Narnians will be affected by the White Witch's entrance to the Narnia kingdom with his contribution as is revealed in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, in which the White Witch freezes all living things with the snow and does not allow them to show their essence.

The snow created by the White Witch freezing the country of Narnia is challenging for all Narnia species. Moreover, Digory's low voice speaks of his self-realization within the process of becoming perfect; that is, he and the White Witch become interconnected in becoming an animal. This process is liberating because it frees oneself from determinations known by heart and reinforces one's motion toward the universe of uncertainty, multiplicity, and infinity (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 263). What is valuable in the interaction of Digory and the White Witch, regardless of having positive or negative consequences, is that both beings become close to and indistinguishable from animality, making them receptive to and receptive to the "becomings animal traversing human beings and sweeping them away, affecting the animal no less than the human" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 880).

The role of speech in Narnia may impede the readers' perception of Narnia as a rhizomatic process of animal becoming. Speech is the essence of hierarchy among animals in Narnia, in which those animals who speak are superior to those who don't. Aslan the Lion, and every, and the deepest, wildest voice they had ever heard was saying, "Narnia, Narnia, Narnia, awake. Love. Think. Speak. Be walking trees. Be talking beasts. Be divine waters" (Lewis, 1955, p. 200). The children had long felt sure that he could speak (see Appendix B, no. 20).

The existence of a hierarchy based on speech in Narnia may directly be connected to Cartesian thinking if readers view C.S. Lewis as a humanist. Still, a discussion of Narnian hierarchy within a Posthumanist context is possible. Deleuze and Guattari confirm the existence of hierarchal rhizomes but explain that "if it is a question of showing that rhizomes also have their own, even more rigid, despotism

and hierarchy, then fine and good: for there is no dualism, no ontological dualism between here and there, no axiological dualism between good and bad” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 114). Deleuze and Guattari suppose mutually beneficial experience of being different, of getting involved in the deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction of ontological barriers by exploring areas of unpredictability between humans and animals because each animal may be addressed in each approach.

Deleuze and Guattari offer a strictly non-anthropocentric framework for thinking about both the animality of humans and animals. As a result, animals are not part of distinct groups: “There is always the possibility that a given animal, a louse, a cheetah or an elephant, will be treated as a pet, my little beast. And at the other extreme, it is also possible for any animal to be treated in the mode of the pack or swarm. Even the cat, even the dog” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 629). Deleuze and Guattari carefully avoid linking specific animals, wild or domesticated, large or small, irrevocably to specific categories. Animal uses that are anthropomorphic or anthropocentric are criticized by their animal ontology (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 262). For the formation of conventional humanist hierarchies, entities must be categorized vertically; however, in Narnia, vertical categories cease to exist because speech is possessed randomly by totally different creatures, such as Aslan, the children, satyrs, fauns, dwarfs, trees, rivers, beasts, and birds and, at the same time, fellow creatures may not be able to speak. In other words, speech in Narnia, although it manifests dualism, does not disrupt the interconnectedness among different entities but instead exists to highlight the intensity/effectiveness of the interaction.

The rhizomatic animal-becoming in *The Chronicles of Narnia* also manifests in Aslan’s assignment to Digory to fetch a special apple from a faraway place in Narnia. The results from the consumption of the same fruit by the White Witch and Digory’s mother differ; the difference lies not in the quality of the fruit but in the quality of the interaction created by the consumption of the fruit by the White Witch and Digory’s mother. Aslan informs Digory that “Things always work according to their nature. She has won her heart's desire; she has unwearying strength and endless days like a goddess. But the length of days with an evil heart is only the length of misery and already she begins to know it. All get what they want; they do not always like it” (Lewis, 1955, p. 297-298).

Furthermore, the fruit is still connected to Narnia, even if it has been uprooted and replanted in the backyard of Digory's house in London (see Appendix B, no. 21).

The motion of the apple tree in London without the presence of winds synchronizes with the apple tree in Narnia moving by winds. The oneness of the two trees in different realms illustrates Deleuze's and Guattari's idea of a meaningful fracture in opposition to overly significant fractures that split apart or cross one another. Rhizomes can break or fracture at a specific location, but they will regenerate on either their old or new lines. Ants create an animal rhizome that can constantly regenerate after the majority of it has been destroyed or killed. Thus, you can never completely eradicate them (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 54). Moreover, the two apple trees' connectedness and oneness occur through Digory's apple tree's sensually undetected interaction with the Narnian winds; that is, the apple tree in London and the Narnia winds form a rhizome expanding to the rhizome between the two apple trees in two different realms. In both cases, the non-vertical rhizomatic connectedness and oneness created are characterized by what Deleuze and Guattari identify as "deterritorialization" and "reterritorialization" (see Appendix B, no. 22).

The innate intelligence of plants: despite having roots, they also have an area beyond where they may develop a rhizome with another living creature, such as an animal, a person, or the wind. Additionally, there is an area where animals and people may establish rhizomes together (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 59). A similar example to the example mentioned earlier of the apple trees is the Dryad's response to the cutting of a far distant tree in *The Last Battle*: "A-a-a-h,' gasped the Dryad shuddering as if in pain-shuddering time after time as if under repeated blows. Then all at once, she fell sideways as suddenly as if both her feet had been cut from under her. For a second they saw her lying dead on the grass and then she vanished. They knew what had happened. Her tree, miles away, had been cut down" (Lewis, 1956, p. 53). Also, in *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, Father Christmas's offering to Lucy the medicine that cures Edward reminds readers of the apple of immortality coming as a seed from Narnia and growing in London given to Digory's mother. Father Christmas says to Lucy (see Appendix B, no. 23).

Still, in the process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, rhizomes never deteriorate but return to their former state (see Appendix B, no. 24). Rhizomes

that are forcibly disrupted can restore their rhizomatic condition. The White Witch's transformation of the disobedient subjects into statues is an attempt to manipulate or disrupt these beings' animal becoming. This is evidenced by the fact that when the White Witch's magic is weak, these statues return to their former state: "Everywhere the statues were coming to life" (Lewis, 1950, p. 297). For Deleuze and Guattari, the opposite of "deterritorialization" is mere mimesis (see Appendix B, no. 25). In *The Last Battle*, forced by Shift, the donkey, Puzzle, disguises himself as Aslan by wearing a lion-skin coat. Puzzle performs mimicry because he has neither lost from nor added anything to its essence. Its essence does not deteriorate; the roots do not deteriorate (see Appendix B, no. 26).

Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of a rhizome consisting of plateaus that condition the rhizome to lack a beginning and an end, and thus, to preserve its becoming, finds expression in the transformation of Narnia into New Narnia in *The Last Battle* (see Appendix B, no. 27) and "Kings and Queens, he cried, we have all been blind. We are only beginning to see where we are. From up there I have seen it all-Ettinsmuir, Beaversdam, the Great River, and Cair Paravel still shining on the edge of the Eastern Sea. Narnia is not dead. This is Narnia" (Lewis, 1956, p. 413) (see also Appendix B, no. 28 and no. 29). Lewis's Christian eschatological vision of universal oneness in the Divine alludes to New Jerusalem through the new Narnia. It also celebrates Deleuze's and Guattari's vision of reality as an abundance of rhizomes always in the process of being as one through the creation of the new Narnia. The new Narnia is a variegated rhizome extending from other rhizomes with their plateaus, such as Ettinsmuir, Beaversdam, the Great River, and Cair Paravel, including various humans, non-humans, plants, and rock; it is an unending rhizome "Narnia is not dead. This is Narnia, and it is the one reality of all the beings as the unicorn, on behalf of all Narnians, confesses: "This is my real country! I belong here. The reason why we loved the old Narnia is that it sometimes looked a little like this" (Lewis, 1956, p. 418).

The Posthumanist relationship between humans and non-humans in Lewis's Narnia may also be examined within the context of Jacques Derrida's lecture, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, Derrida suggests that being human is to follow animality; the human is what is generated by separating the animal within by taming it, by following it. Derrida plays with the various meanings of the word follow. It means to

be after because humans entered the world after animals, as well as ‘to hunt’ because humanity is created when a person captures an internal animal and is then able to say, “I am (following), I pursue, I track, overcome, and tame the animal” (Derrida, 2008, p. 410). Derrida suggests that there isn't a single indivisible boundary separating any animal from man in the general singular: “We need to consider the possibility of living creatures whose diversity cannot be condensed into a single image of an animality that is only hostile to humankind” (Derrida, 2008, p. 47).

Uncle Andrew exemplifies the conventional understanding between animals and humans in *The Magician's Nephew*. He foregrounds his perfect humanity, which manifests in his high status of being identified as a socially successful middle-class man and a spiritually advanced man possessing secret/esoteric knowledge. Uncle Andrew views Digory as an animal (see Appendix B, no. 30). Similarly, the White Witch, a superhuman being, considers herself superior to common men whom she views as animals because she can manipulate nature through her magic. Addressing Digory, she says, “You are no magician. The Mark of it is not on you. You must be only the servant of a magician. It is on another’s Magic that you have traveled here” (Lewis, 1955, p. 99-100). Like Derrida, in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, Lewis blurs the boundaries between humanity and animality. Uncle Andrew cannot communicate with the Narnians because he lacks their form of language (love). The White Witch loses her power to manipulate others through magic when she enters the world of London: “It must have been a terrible moment for the Witch when she suddenly realized that her power of turning people into dust, which had been quite real in her own world, was not going to work in ours” (Lewis, 1955, p. 142-143).

Lewis's description of the creation of Narnians in *The Magician's Nephew* echoes Derridean animality. As Digory, Polly, and the others watch, Aslan awakens the higher creatures in his newly created realm (see Appendix B, no. 31). For Christian Lewis, Love is a form of speech, and thinking and speaking result from it. At the moment of creating Narnians, Aslan shares his own essence of divine love with his creations, signaling that all are one. We may also notice that Narnians are responsible for caring for the non-communicative beings, which reminds readers of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s temporal disruption and final restoration of the rhizome. Another example of Derridean animality in *The Chronicles of Narnia* is found in *The Last Battle*, where

Puzzle remembers the interconnectedness among all beings and feels obliged out of pure love (logos) to bury a killed non-talking lion (see Appendix B, no. 32). In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, noticeable is the essential lack of distinction between humans and non-humans. Although humans can be differentiated from other species based on their external traits, the essence of all entities is defined by logos, which should not be viewed as a concrete component. Lewis enriches the meaning of language by associating cognitive capacities with one's ideals and values, the world of Ideas, an unmeasurable world. In Narnia, humans' and non-humans' ability to talk and be understood by others reveals their (Christian) virtue, endowing them with superiority over the non-talking humans and non-humans. Lewis's understanding of Christian virtue coincides with an expanded consciousness, an extended rhizome within a Posthumanist context. Moreover, Lewis highlights that the condition of a talking beast is fluid, not fixed; that is, a human, or a nonhuman, may relapse into a mere beast, a decapacitated rhizome (see Appendix B, no. 33). When the new Narnia is in the process of formation, talking Beasts who lack virtue also lose their capacity to speak (see Appendix B, no. 34).

Still, decapacitated rhizomes recover at some point under certain conditions; thus, as illustrated by the non-talking mice chewing away Aslan's bonds, the mice's reward is logos/reason/expanded consciousness. Logos refers to a universal divine reason, immanent in nature, yet transcending all oppositions "Reepicheep the Mouse who had fought at the great Battle of Beruna" (Lewis, 1956, p. 432). The magnificent lion Aslan frequently bestows gifts on creatures in *The Chronicles of Narnia* in recognition of their bravery, devotion, and sacrifice. Despite having a little part in the series, mice are excellent examples of these qualities. For example, the brave mouse, Reepicheep, is rewarded extra for his undying loyalty to Aslan and Narnia. His courage and integrity set him up for an extraordinary fate, proving that even the tiniest beings can have a big influence. Thus, experiencing a lack of logos is temporal. Due to logos's elusive nature, Lewis recognizes and considers the possibility of many forms of cognition that animals, especially humans, exhibit. As a result, it is not as obvious as one might think where non-talking and talking creatures in Narnia separate.

Giorgio Agamben has also discussed the relationship between humans and animals and humanity and animality, focusing on the animality of man in *The Open*:

Man and Animal. Agamben claims that the differentiation between humans and animals is not natural but historical, pointing out that the root of the problem may be found in culture and how the latter shapes one's self-image. Thus, the solution can be traced to one's realization that differences between humans and animals are culturally constructed, and thus, they must be rejected (see Appendix B, no. 35).

In *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, the Pevensie children, together with the inhabitants of Narnia, have defeated the White Witch; all Narnians- humans and non-humans unite to celebrate their victory (see Appendix B, no. 36). The transformation of human alienation into oneness literalizes human-animal hybridity, through their common celebrations. Lewis eradicates dualism between humans and non-humans, highlighting their established friendship through the Pevensie children's crowning as queens and kings in front of their friends, a social relationship reflecting brotherhood, solidarity, sincerity, and equality, as well as through Aslan's reminding on behalf of all Narnians to the newly made kings and queens their moral obligations towards their Narnian friends after the latter's endowing the Pevensie children with honorary titles.

The excerpt from *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* (see Appendix B, no. 36) also exemplifies Donna Haraway's idea of "companion species," referring to non-hierarchical intimate relationships that connect humans and non-humans "contact zones" (Haraway, 2008, p. 4). In *When Species Meet*, Haraway argues that companion species are created in a "dance of relating" (Haraway, 2008, p. 25). In which humans are not the only beings having faces. The reciprocal mixings produce the partners. Accepting that species co-shape each other involves acknowledging that dogs and other animals are "actors and not merely recipients of action". Companion species relates to the historical co-constitutive relationship between people and dogs, in which canines have performed roles rather than merely being objects of desire. The term "companion species" also refers to the kinds of interactions that are made possible at the intersections of various human societies of process, for whom "love of the breed" or "love of dogs" is an ethical and moral obligatory in a historically specific context that is constantly influenced by science, technology, and medicine. Companion species also design intricate bio-social-technical webs that include people, animals, objects,

and institutions, where certain ways of being arise and are maintained (Haraway, 2008, p. 134).

Moreover, the same example from *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* echoes Haraway's support for a transformational strategy for a multispecies body politic that must be firmly anchored in the uniqueness and interconnections of human and nonhuman life, in which it is necessary to acknowledge and honor the tangible intervention of other animals, Aslan solemnly crowned them and led them to the four thrones amid deafening shouts of, 'Long Live King Peter! Long Live Queen Susan! Long Live King Edmund! Long Live Queen Lucy!' 'Once a king or queen in Narnia, always a king or queen. Bear it well, Sons of Adam! Bear it well, Daughters of Eve!' said Aslan (Lewis, 1956, p. 319). Respect is more than just looking past the lens of speciesism; it also entails adding a social and political dimension to the epistemic level. Respect is the foundation of oneness because it requires listening and interacting with others with dignity, no matter what species they are. The category of companion organisms is inherently ill-defined and constantly evolving. The emphasis is on behaviors that vary from those of lone people in settings to those of intricate organisms (Haraway, 2008, p. 250).

Therefore, there is no difference between the world of man and the world of other living things. It is not possible to be superior for some reason. This permeability between humans and animals destroys the anthropocentric perspective on the animal problem. Human formation is lowered from its higher level and rises to a flat ontology with animals and other species. Kinship is both genealogical and historical, emphasizing lineage and connections between individuals. Haraway challenges the emphasis on purebred lineage, advocating against birth bias. Kinship goes beyond consanguinity, encompassing the interconnectedness of all individuals in the universe. It is a partnership highlighting the shared relationships among earthlings. Haraway's concept of kinship rejects the traditional focus on reproducing through childbirth, instead emphasizing the shared kinship relationships among human individuals. This perspective underscores all earthlings' interconnectedness and mutual relationships, transcending biological ties. Kinship is about the broader extent of human individuals and their connections with everything else in the universe (Çelik, 2018, p. 34).

Discussing entanglement, Haraway says, “The shape of my kin networks looks more like a trellis or an esplanade than a tree. You can't tell up from down, and everything seems to go sideways” (Haraway, 2003, p. 26-27). Becoming with is an everyday enacting of multidirectional gene flow, of multidirectional flows of bodies and values that is and has always been the name of the game of life on earth” (Haraway, 2003, p. 26-27). In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, Lewis depicts a very fluid universe in which there are no boundaries between people and the inanimate or between both of them, animals, or plants nonhumanized. In *The Magician's Nephew*, animals of earth, water, and air join their voices as one (see Appendix B, no. 37). All species' anchored energy held by the Aslan holds a platform for them. There is a sacred form held within the Aslan that supports their transition to their home space. All of them align with each other, enabling a smooth entry into their home space, Narnia. There is a collective synergy between all the covenant, the column of Light, Aslan.

In *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, entanglement occurs when different species fight against the White Witch and her army, which also consists of various species (Lewis, 1950, p. 307). Aslan continues to play an essential role in our transition. Aslan's reflective rays carry the mirrored fluidity of species brilliance. With this birthing of liquid light flowing into species in Narnia, they can merge more easily into the expanded dimensional fluidity. This Aslan's power, like sunlight fluidity, is a natural component that moves through all dimensional layers within Narnia. They are invited to move beyond their disbelief and open into the New Dawning light that is being imparted to Narnia fighters through the light rays of the Sun (see Appendix B, no. 38).

Also, in *The Last Battle*, the falling stars during Aslan's destruction of old Narnia show the interception of everything and every kind with each other (see Appendix B, no. 39). Within the home space, there exists a powerful energy of release. Embracing this energy allows old limitations to dissolve, opening the way for sacred reception. They can align freely into their entitlement, fully receiving them selves and moving effortlessly into this next phase of the transition. In the same story, Lucy and the Faun Tumnus see all of Narnia stretch out and comment: “I see, she said at last, thoughtfully. I see now. This garden is like the stable. It is far bigger inside than it was outside. Of course, Daughter of Eve, said the Faun. The further up and the further in

you go, the bigger everything gets. The inside is larger than the outside” (Lewis, 1956, p. 438-439).

Haraway’s understanding of company species as actors is also echoed in Cary Wolfe’s *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory*. Wolfe argues that a posthumanist approach to animals addresses “the unexamined framework of speciesism” (Wolfe, 2003, p. 1). Animal studies discussing the human-animal relationship are wide in scope. It is intertwined with other approaches, such as feminism and ecocriticism, which question all kinds of speciesist and othering approaches that ignore the “subjectivity of all non-human beings” by keeping their subjectivity above everything else (Wolfe, 2003, p. 1). Wolfe claims that posthumanist animal theory has the ability to significantly reevaluate suppositions in all of the other subjects of condemnation (Wolfe, 2003, p. xiii).

Still, as Katherine Hayles notes in *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics*, “the posthuman does not mean the end of humanity. It signals the end of a certain conception of the human” (Hayles, 1999, p. 1056-1057), (see Appendix B, no. 40). Narnia is a place beyond the human world, which humans aren't aware of. Lewis’s Narnia contains different species that are interconnected without losing their subjectivity. In *The Magician’s Nephew*, Lewis eloquently states through the “strong, happy voice of Aslan” the non-humans’ subjectivity advocated by Haraway, Wolfe, Hayles, and Braidotti: “Creatures, I give you yourselves” (Lewis, 1955, p. 203), and in *The Last Battle*, the dwarfs exclaim, “We’re on our own now. No more Aslan, no more Kings, no more silly stories about other worlds. The Dwarfs are for the Dwarfs” (Lewis, 1956, p. 184). Moreover, in Narnia, humans are neither superior to nor examiners of other species. In *The Magician’s Nephew*, a large bulldog scrutinizing Uncle Andrew says, “Look! isn’t there another of these queer creatures over there, beside the river, under the trees?” (Lewis, 1955, p. 214), and in *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, Tumnus, the Faun asks Lucy, “But you are forgive me you are what they call a girl? [...] You are in fact Human? To be sure, to be sure And may ask, O Lucy Daughter of Eve [...] how you have come into Narnia?” (Lewis, 1950, p. 31) and the White Witch interrogates Edmund: “BUT WHAT ARE YOU? Are you a great overgrown dwarf that has cut off its beard? A boy! Do you mean you are a Son of Adam? I see you are an idiot, whatever else you may be [...] Answer me,

once and for all, or I shall lose my patience. Are you human? [...] And how, pray, did you come to enter my dominions?" (Lewis, 1950, p. 65).

In Narnia, the tables are turned since humans are observed by non-humans. Thus, any prevalent human assumption about human and non-human essence is questioned. In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, Lewis not only deconstructs but also reconstructs humans and animals in a (post)humanist way, providing a richer, expanded, inclusive definition of the human and the animal by acknowledging that species co-shape each other.



CHAPTER III

LITERARY GEOGRAPHY AND TOPOGRAPHY IN *THE CHRONICLES OF NARNIA*

Geocriticism, a fascinating multidisciplinary collaboration between cartography and literature, finds its intriguing application in *The Chronicles of Narnia*. This unique link to reality presents the beauty of its settings as the genuine beauty of our world. The narrative space in *The Chronicles of Narnia* is not a static entity but a dynamic system of tensions, an aporia. A geocritical approach, rooted in the diversity of inscriptions in space-time and the multiplication of rhythms that flow from them, views each Narnia story as a map, each map as a narrative, and each narrative as a region. In this perspective, storytelling is essentially a cartography activity. The role of spatiotemporality in Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* is not just important; it's crucial for a Posthumanist understanding of the work, with the chronotope, a central geocritical concept proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin in his essay "*Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel*" in 1937, serving as a guiding light.

Bakhtin's concept of the literary chronotope, a revelation in children's literature introduced by Maria Nikolajeva, adds profound depth to our understanding of text analysis. A chronotope, the fusion of time and space in a text, is not a mere formal category but a powerful analytical tool. By delving into the development of time-space relationships in children's literature, it is discovered that story structures are not straightforward but increasingly intricate (Nikolajeva, 1996, p. 151). Bakhtin's "chronotope" is a fusion of the concepts "chronos" (time) and "topos" (place) (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 84). Within the realm of literary analysis, it is "the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 84).

Bakhtin's idea of a literary artistic chronotope is a potent tool to examine the intricate tripartite interaction between time, location, and character imagery (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 83). Bakhtin proposes and exemplifies a chronotopic reading of literary texts that takes into account the spatiotemporality of the surrounding environment in which protagonists are situated, how the environment enthusiastically influences situations and circulates, and how individuals expand their comprehension and interact with the context through conversations and decisions. Bakhtin's idea of the literary creative chronotope originated with Immanuel Kant's epistemological theory, which held that time and space are the primary “forms of any cognition” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 85), and the human image is inherently chronotopic (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 84-85). Thus, a chronotope is a particular mode of existence or a unique manner for a person, object, or event in the text to self-represent in space and time. Bakhtin's analysis of time and space in the text reveals that spatiotemporality does not align with reality, which is often mistakenly understood as an obvious representation of the physical world; time and space function as an indivisible category of the narrative explained by providing in-depth historical, social, and cultural analysis; in Bakhtin's words, “the mind of culture is inscribed in the narrative” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 115). Thus, memory and “heteroglossia” (the variety of speech patterns seen in a single language) are central traits of the artistic chronotope (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 67).

About Bakhtin's literary artistic chronotope, *The Chronicles of Narnia* also represents and realizes Bakhtin's epic chronotope as analyzed in his *Epic and Novel: Towards a Methodology for the Study of the Novel* (1941). Characters engage with the many chronotopic qualities that overlap and clash in the literary realms by engaging in spatiotemporal actions. Like literary creative chronotope, epic chronotope demonstrates a reciprocating and piercing interaction between theoretical interpretations of space and time in geocriticism and imaginative spatiotemporal fantasies. Literary environments are not shaped by geography but by human effort. A continuum from nonlinear time (kairos) in classical or mythological writings to linearity (chronos) in modern popular literature serves as proof for this. However, the spatiotemporal structure is repurposed and utilized as a foundational element for creating worlds, especially in young adult and children's heroic fantasy literature, which frequently alludes to elements of old myths and stories.

The epic chronotope, according to Bakhtin, is directed toward the distant/absolute past and is “walled off from all subsequent times by an impenetrable boundary” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 16). It is whole and absolute, maintaining an impenetrable distance from the everyday reality of the writer and the reader; it is “not localized in an actual historical sequence,” the word “absolute suggests that this past is not in the sense of the chronological or historical past but contains within itself the entire fullness of time” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 19). The epic chronotope is always valorized to a “sacred and sacrosanct” stance, insisting on being judged with a devout demeanor (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 16). It may be noted that Bakhtin believes that the epic chronotope is not to be desirable in modern literary creation. Bakhtin characterizes the epic chronotope as a “finished, congealed and half-moribund” structure (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 14). The humanistic chronotope, which emphasizes individual responsibility and participation while anchoring in an environment of immediate interaction with ambiguous current events, is a mode of literary world-building that he believes to be superior to the epic chronotope.

However, in modern fantasy literature, examples like *The Chronicles of Narnia* apply Bakhtin’s epic chronotope in variation. Lewis applies a non-static epic chronotope, in which the “absolute” means everything that happens is predestined and definitive. Still, divine omniscience does not limit the characters’s free exploration and understanding of reality. Bakhtin’s focus on developing the spatiotemporal paradigm in literary genres and Lewis’s intense curiosity in experimenting with English literary history, particularly his use and obsession with the epic, correspond very noticeably. The Narnia of Lewis’s imagination portrays a secluded mythical world apart from the young protagonists’ everyday reality. In terms of space, even though protagonists are granted access to the land of Narnia when summoned, there is still a clear distinction between Narnia and the main world (see Appendix C, no. 41).

Throughout most *Chronicles*, the secondary world remains physically separated from the primary world, which takes place in the 1940s-1950s England. In other words, the youthful heroes have minimal influence on the timing and method of their transfer into the Narnia world. Stated differently, the youthful heroes are not entirely in control of their transfer process or timing into the Narnia world. The Pevensie children in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* may only enter Narnia

through a wardrobe made of wood from a Narnian apple tree. When they must fulfill a prophecy that would save Narnia from experiencing an endless winter, there aren't any permanent portals between the two worlds. As demonstrated by Jadis, Uncle Andrew, and Digory, who must complete a task that doubles as a test of his faith in and dedication to Aslan as compensation for bringing Jadis, the evil White Witch, into the most recently founded Narnia, even though he seems to have no other choice, any attempt to transcend the border between realms in *The Magician's Nephew* is also punished. "Son of Adam," said Aslan. "Are you ready to undo the wrong that you have done to my sweet country of Narnia on the very day of its birth?" (Lewis, 1955, p. 242), (see Appendix C, no. 42).

Even more specifically, "the epic is based on a national epic past, or the 'absolute past' as Goethe and Schiller put it" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 13) is a stylistic element prevalent but redefined in Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia*. Narnia's enchanting realm is situated in the distant past of the Middle Ages, both in terms of space and time; humans, fantastical beasts, and speaking animals occupy the same space, a remote medieval and legendary setting. Thanks to C. S. Lewis, children's literature has benefited from a medievalist movement that has deepened our understanding of how children's universes are being reconfigured. C. S. Lewis profoundly appreciates medievalism and views his secondary world as a heavenly paradise. It has an internal order and coherence that can be readily assessed compared to the Middle Ages' philosophical systems, and it is beautiful because of various aesthetic principles established during that era (see Appendix C, no. 43).

Lewis turns to the Middle Ages to establish the necessary distance between the disenchanted reality of World War II and the magical world of Narnia that he imagines. While both worlds are temporarily ruled by evil, unlike the chaotic London of 1945, Narnia maintains an internal order and structural rule that ensures its redemption. The medieval spell Lewis casts over his world both defies and follows the general pattern of children's stories from his day using the armory of medieval romance elements, castles, knights, damsels, and witches, restoring traditional beauty standards. The aesthetics of Narnia incorporate both the metaphysical and the physical aspects of beauty. One of the significant ideas of medieval aesthetics is that proportion was destroyed by Jadis, the White Witch, and has to be restored in the world that Aslan

rules. Proportion was initially taken from Greek philosophy. Any legal infraction results in disarray, imbalance, and disproportion. This turns into the White Witch's icy domain of betrayers, liars, and wrongdoers in Narnia. The evil that Jadis assumes to rule the entire kingdom that she takes from Aslan, the rightful king, is represented by pride, selfishness, cruelty, treason, gluttony, and greed, as demonstrated by Edmund's treason of his brother and sisters and by Mr. Tumnus's betrayal of Lucy at the beginning of the story. Kindness is associated with self-actualization and emancipation, as the reawakening of a desire for virtue, fairness, innocence, courage, generosity, endurance, and patience. Lewis masterfully manipulates the beauty of Narnia under the White Witch's rule, making all the devoted residents want the return of the magical land. This takes over and further enhances love and the desire for kindness. Aslan, the rightful Savior, is the single source of justice and kindness that radiates beauty across the entire realm.

In *The Last Battle*, when Aslan decides whether the approaching species is permitted to enter the “real” Narnia or disappear into the darkness while standing by the Door, which resembles a massive separating machine and border sign (See Appendix C, no. 44). This depiction of Narnia's relationship to the main world and the giant lion Aslan's guardianship of the barrier between them suggests that Narnia is primarily geographically isolated from the textual quotidian world. Brief moments of connection between these two worlds occur when Aslan or the Narnian princes call upon the child protagonists to embark on heroic quests. These endeavors include protecting Narnia from the threat of invasion or overthrow and successfully navigating a daring expedition to the end of the world. The timing and method of the young heroes' transference into the Narnia realm are largely beyond their control. The “once upon a time” formula is the most prominent example of this kind of chronotope, which is also reflected in Golden Age motifs, allusions to the age of heroes, and the ancient truth also related to the “national tradition” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 13). At first glance, this feature is seen in Lewis's work. The children's journey is not purely a personal experience defined by a private cause and purpose but a collective experience of a broader cause and purpose since it is for saving Narnia. Finally, they become a part of the legends and local folklore of Narnia, redeeming themselves from conventional bodily boundaries and becoming part of a process.

Also, within the context of the national aesthetics and absolute past incorporated in Bakhtin's epic chronotope, it may be noted that in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, there is no clear historical link between the glorious past and anything that contemporary Englishmen may feel about their country's recent history (i.e., World War II) and thus can view the epic past as the "absolute past" history, contained within itself, and told from "the reverent point of view of a descendent" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 13). Bakhtin highlights that "an absolute epic distance separates the epic world from contemporary reality, that is, from the time in which the singer the author and his audience lives" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 13). In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, the world of Narnia is depicted as a secondary realm, existing in a distant, mythical past. This temporal and spatial separation from the contemporary setting of London serves to immerse readers in an epic chronotope, where the "absolute past" becomes a backdrop for timeless tales of adventure and moral lessons.

Narnia's medieval setting and isolated location invite readers to enter a world governed by ancient prophecies and destinies. The narrative of *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* is mainly driven by a central prophecy that foretells the end of the White Witch's tyrannical reign and the return of Aslan, the rightful ruler of Narnia. This multifaceted prophecy predicts the end of the eternal winter and the rise of four human monarchs who will usher in a new era of peace and prosperity. These predictions are more than just forecasts of future events; they symbolize the eternal battle between good and evil and the hope for redemption and renewal. The Pevensie children- Lucy, Edmund, Susan, and Peter- are destined to play a crucial role in fulfilling this prophecy. Their journey from innocence to royalty is a tale of personal growth, bravery, and accepting their destined roles. Each child faces challenges and moral dilemmas, reflecting the universal struggle between good and evil.

Aslan's return to Narnia is a pivotal moment that literally and metaphorically signifies the end of the dark winter and the beginning of spring. It represents a spiritual awakening and a new beginning, marking the end of the evil time and the start of a new era. The coronation of the Pevensie siblings at Cair Paravel is the climax of the prophecy's fulfillment, marking the beginning of Narnia's Golden Age. This period is characterized by peace, prosperity, and justice as the new rulers establish a harmonious and benevolent reign. The Golden Age is an idealized state where goodness prevails,

and the land flourishes under wise and virtuous leadership. Through fulfilling the prophecy, Lewis weaves a narrative that is both an exciting adventure and a profound allegory. It addresses timeless themes of destiny, sacrifice, and the eternal conflict between light and darkness.

Moreover, the prophecy that predicted the results of future events and the destinies of individuals depicts the ultimate past's completeness and binding nature in the temporal framework of the Narnia universe. For instance, the old rhymes that predict the arrival of Narnia's Golden Age are used to convey the ancient prophecy in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*: "Wrong will be right, when Aslan comes in sight, At the sound of his roar, sorrows will be no more When he bares his teeth, winter meets its death, And when he shakes his mane, we shall have spring again" (Lewis, 1950, p. 147). "When Adam's flesh and Adam's bone Sit at Cair Paravel on the throne, The evil time will be over and done" (Lewis, 1950, p. 149).

As mentioned before, in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, divine omniscience does not limit the characters' free experience and understanding of reality. For example, the prophecy predicting the arrival of the unstoppable Aslan and the crowning of the Pevensie children inspires the talking creatures of Narnian mythology and the young heroes' confidence, hope, and bravery to overcome the harsh totalitarian reign of the White witch. Additionally, it subtly reassures viewers on the outside that there will ultimately be a joyous turn despite whatever ups and downs the heroes may have on their quest to actualize the prophecy. Providing the story's primary narrative and joyful conclusion, the epic prophecy lessens the tension; it inspires bravery and a feeling of duty in the hero and heroine and strengthens their comfort, hope, and faith. In this regard, Bakhtin views the ultimate epic past as complete, "as closed as a circle" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 15) that imposes a definite and "finalizing" frame on the course of events as well as the fates of individuals (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 237). In *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, the Narnian world's present and future are now just as inevitable and unchangeable as its history.

Still, analyzing *The Chronicles of Narnia* from a Posthumanist perspective, people must focus not on the epic prophesy itself but the process in which the characters are involved, a complex interplay between the need for obedience and one's independence, which, although externally they may seem opposites, are paradoxically

essentially the same. Interpreting in Posthumanist way Lewis's Christian understanding of one's freedom, readers may observe that true individual freedom is experienced only in the infinite and eternal territory of divine providence, which never loses its mysteriousness by prophecies, the latter having an assisting function in the individuals' process of realizing themselves and their environment. Obedience to Aslan's directives in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* leads to inner freedom for Susan, Lucy, Edmund, and Peter (Lewis, 1950, p. 327) based on the definition of freedom given by the ape Shift who deceptively and arbitrarily imitates Aslan when addressing the donkey Puzzle "What do you know about freedom? You think freedom means doing what you like. Well, you're wrong. That isn't true freedom. True freedom means doing what I tell you" (Lewis, 1956, p. 86).

For Lewis, true freedom springs from the divine providence illustrated in *The Chronicles of Narnia* as Aslan. For Christian Lewis, Aslan/divine providence is beyond being, absolute, and one; at the same time, its manifestations are infinitely and eternally variegated, consisting of the selfless actions and thoughts of individuals; if the formation of self within physical reality is a forced social product upon the individual, then an individual's obedience to Aslan in his territory of the imaginary Narnia is the individual's assertion of their freedom from a limited understanding of their existence. Although a traditional Bakhtinian reading of *The Chronicles of Narnia* views the dominance of the epic chronotope to minimize human initiative because the young characters frequently have to renounce their judgment and obey Aslan, a Posthumanist Christian interpretation of Bakhtin's epic chronotope may view Aslan's spatiotemporal environment as a territory that encourages the mental growth of the young characters beyond the boundaries of the physical self. The depiction of the children's adventures in the vast epic world of Narnia takes up the majority of discourse time, which is also the story's main plot, making, thus, more obvious Lewis's understanding of the characters not only as individual, restrained physical entities but as processes. Also, in many children's and young adult fantasy literature, the primary physical world is the textual "real," whereas the fantasy world embodies another imaginative "reality"

Yet, Lewis endows Narnia with an unconventional spatiotemporal arrangement; as the kids venture farther and deeper into the actual Narnia, Digory the

Professor explains to them how worlds are related, drawing of Plato's concepts (see Appendix C, no. 45). The imagined 'real Narnia' a paradisiacal other world where Aslan finally guides his followers, is raised to the ultimate and everlasting reality. The main realm of everyday interactions, which the young characters belong to and are better acquainted with, is compared to it as an instantiate and insubstantial shadow, a dream. The true Narnia is preferable to the original shadowland: "It was only a shadow or a copy of the real Narnia which has always been here and always will be here: just as our own world, England and all, is only a shadow or copy of something in Aslan's real world" (Lewis, 1956, p. 415). The highly condemned ending to Susan, which places the true Narnia above the principal "shadowland" of the present world, serves to emphasize this aspect (see Appendix C, no. 46).

The Last Battle's conclusion provides much more evidence of the ultimate reality. Aslan informs Lucy that the Pevensie family has lost their physical life in a railway accident and that their physical death signals the end of their conventional physical reality and an opportunity to exercise "the right of permanent residence" in Narnia: "There was a real railway accident," said Aslan softly. Your father and mother and all of you are as you use mother and all of you are as you used to call it in the Shadowlands dead. The term is over: the holidays have begun. The dream is ended: this is the morning" (Lewis, 1956, p. 446-447). New Narnia is a sacred realm where love, peace, and higher consciousness prevail. The unique narrative structure communicates that the narrator of *The Chronicles of Narnia* places great importance on the values and ideology upheld by the genuine Narnia, which is the pinnacle of the valorized epic chronotope. These values are more important than the initiative and the subjective assessments of the characters, as was previously said. Additionally, they are worth more than the existence of the characters in their ordinary interactions. Hence, once more, the children as physical bodies become only parts of their participation in the unending process not only of their infinite intellectual existence in Humanist discourse but also their interaction with the rhizome/alliance (Aslan and his unrestrained and variegated territory) in Posthumanist discourse.

Furthermore, the world of Narnia has its own time, which moves far quicker than the time in the literary everyday world. In *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, the narrator comments that Narnian time differs significantly from Earth's time. In the

Narnian universe, conventional physical laws are not applied (see Appendix C, no. 47). In the same story, Lucy experiences a different flow of time in Narnia. She enters Narnia through a wardrobe and spends hours there. However, when she returns to her world, she finds that no time has passed at all (see Appendix C, no. 48). Two other examples can be found in *The Magician's Nephew*; the first example relates to Digory, who notices that the Witch's visitation in London provoking have could not be chronically conventionally perceived by the Londoners (see Appendix C, no. 49). The second example is about Jadis, the White Witch, who- when she enters the conventional physical reality of London- loses her magical power as it is manifested in her incapacitated logos that cannot be perceived by beings- represented by Aunt Letty- in her new environment but retains her extraordinary physical strength functioning with the boundaries of earthly physics (see Appendix C, no. 50).

There is a recurring theme in *The Chronicles of Narnia*; characters spend various lengths of time in Narnia, but upon their return to their own world, they find that time has stood still or moved at a significantly different pace. Because of this enormous time difference, the exploits of the young heroes in Narnia can only be noticed in their "real" time in London. In addition, the world of Narnia has a history that is distinct from the principal world's current "reality," beginning when Aslan creates it out of nothing: "Narnia, Narnia, Narnia, awake. Love. Think. Speak. Be walking trees. Be talking beasts. Be divine waters" (Lewis, 1955, p. 200) and ending when Aslan destroys it into blackness and nothingness: "At any rate, there were no stars there: just blackness" (Lewis, 1956, p. 368) (see also Appendix C, no. 51). Through the use of epic chronotope centered on a redefined epic absolute past incorporating the present reality of the characters towards the formation of a non-static reality, Lewis combines the internal, subjective motion of feelings of the characters with the external movement of the achieving order (a predestined but non-static reality), exposing the main paradoxical stylistic feature of the narrative. With the deep synchronization of the internal and the external subject (the children) and object (the definite complex and unrestrained reality), the children are experiencing the dramatic complexity of the spatiotemporal dynamics of Narnia.

Trees, one of the elements of the world of Narnia, are among the most important Posthumanist elements in *The Chronicles of Narnia* since they can listen,

watch, and generally interact with and respond to agents and events happening in their immediate and non-immediate environments. Therefore, there is plenty of fluidity between nature and humans, via which humans embark on a new learning curve of navigating themselves differently in this new world, acclimating to a new fluid state of being as part of their natural essence.

In *The Last Battle*, nature is destroyed when trees are cut: “Woe, woe, woe! called the voice. Woe for my brothers and sisters! Woe for the holy trees! The woods are laid waste. The axe is loosed against us. We are being felled. Great trees are falling, falling, falling” (Lewis, 1956, p. 50-51), and the King responds, “Murdering the talking trees? cried the King, leaping to his feet and drawing his sword. How dare they? And who dares it? Now by the Mane of Aslan!” (Lewis, 1956, p. 52). Similarly, in *The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe*, the Beaver says, “There are the trees’ said the Beaver. They’re always listening. Most of them are on our side, but some trees would betray us to her; you know who I mean, and it nodded its head several times” (Lewis, 1950, p. 47). Also, in *The Magician’s Nephew*, Aslan’s task for Digory is to fetch the tree’s seed: “In the center of that garden is a tree. Pluck an apple from that tree and bring it back to me” (Lewis, 1955, p. 209). When Digory plants this seed in London, the tree that grows up shows devotion to Narnia: “Sometimes it would move mysteriously when there was no wind blowing: I think that when this happened there were high winds in Narnia and the English tree quivered because, at that moment, the Narnia tree was rocking and swaying in a strong southwestern gale” (Lewis, 1955, p. 305). The behaviour of the Narnian tree planted in Digory’s garden illustrates that “Things always work according to their nature” (Lewis, 1955, p. 254), reminding us of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s observation: “A rhizome may be broken, or shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or new lines” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 62) and “The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 94).

Deleuze’s and Guattari’s philosophy of becoming concerns involving rather than evolving, with ‘alliance’ and ‘transverse communications’ rather than descent and filiation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 622) (see Appendix C, no. 52). The root of the tree in Digory’s garden goes back to Narnia. Deleuze’s rhizome and assemblages indicate the concept of fracture, which prevents overly significant cracks that split

apart or cross a single structure. According to Deleuze, “Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 48) (see Appendix C, no. 53). By making this tree into a wardrobe, the tree becomes a portal. Trees’ frequencies within the cells come from the higher realm of consciousness. They are held within a sacred, timeless space. Each time the children enter the wardrobe, they are exposed to a new level of frequencies associated with a more expanded awareness of self. Thus, the wooden wardrobe catalyzes humans’ transformation and union with the Narnian core. The wardrobe is a portal because it carries the root of a tree connected to Narnia, which shows the rheostatic theory that everything is connected. Lucy finds the wardrobe as a portal, Her fingers don't feel the hard, smooth floor of the wardrobe; rather, they feel something soft and powdery that is extremely cold: “This is very queer, she said and went on a step or two further. The next moment she found what was” (Lewis, 1950, p. 25).

Rhizome means that everything is connected; even if its parts are broken, it does not lose anything of its essence. This is exactly the point where Posthumanists say that we are all one. Deleuze's rhizome is the building foundation of Posthumanism. The geography, nature, trees, mountains, and waterfalls are all together as one and rhizomically connected. Lewis describes this connection as given when the trees were cut down. This sense of unity is the same in Christian Humanism and Posthumanism. From the Posthumanist point of view, an essential characteristic of Lewis’s *The Chronicles of Narnia* is that everything is connected.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued that there is a close relationship between C. S. Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* and Posthumanist philosophy within the context of alienation, animality, and literary geography. It has been said that *The Chronicles of Narnia* adheres to Posthumanist principles of eliminating binary logic characteristics, species distinction, and human primacy. In particular, a Posthumanist interpretation of human and non-human action on a horizontal ontology is the emphasis of *The Magician's Nephew*, *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, and *The Last Battle*; in Narnia, human/non-human connection is noted.

The current research investigated an inclination to destroy the distinction between animal and non-animal species by destabilizing human/non-human boundaries in a wandering flow of time and emphasizing human and non-human proactive connection as seen in Fantastic/Speculative fiction. Lewis reveals the ineradicable relationship between humans and non-humans in the selected stories by de-familiarizing humans and transforming them into a transuniverse species. All three stories are concerned with a new acknowledgment of Posthumanist conceptions in Narnia's sustainability, exposing a non-hierarchical relational ontology consistent with generic hybridity and undermining the idea of human exceptionalism based on the rhizome theory.

Specifically, in Chapter One, the writer has examined the theme of alienation in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, focusing on the characters' interaction in their alienation experiences and how Posthumanist ethics influences these experiences. The writer has discussed the effects of alienation on human relationships with other species and how it contributes to the development of the characters in the three stories from *The Chronicles of Narnia*.

Additionally, the writer has examined concepts within the framework of Posthumanist criticism and discussed the characters' existential experiences based on the theories of Deleuze and Guattari. Using the theoretical frameworks of Sartre, Bakhtin, and Marx, the writer has attempted to understand the characters' experiences of alienation. The concept of human species-being and its role in Marx's critique of capitalist society have been examined through characters such as Uncle Andrew, the White Witch, and Shift, whose attempt to establish a capitalist society results in ecological crises. This work has also delved into Marx's three-stage theory of alienation and how it is reflected in the characters' experiences in the Narnia universe. Through this way, the writer of the thesis has attempted to discuss the characters' self-realization, rejection of action and consumption, and the erosion of distinctions between self and other in a Posthumanist context. The writer has illustrated that alienation/otherness causes most of the characters (such as Digory, Edmund, and Lucy) to be liberated from a binary reality and a particular identity by realizing that they are one/a rhizome- as Deleuze and Guattari describe- with other universal elements, including fantastical beings, fauna, and flora- called Narnians in Lewis's *Chronicles*. Characters who have not succeeded in realizing their true selves in the formal narration- like Uncle Andrew, Susan, Shift, and the White Witch—may be treated as ruptures in the rhizome, which, according to Deleuze and Guattari, explode into a line of flight, but are still part of the rhizome.

In Chapter Two, the thesis has discussed the ontological, ethical, and imaginal relationships between humans and animals, focusing on Animal Theory. It references various philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben, Donna Haraway, Cary Wolfe, Katherine Hayles, and Rosi Braidotti. The writer has explored the concept of becoming animal and the fluidity of the condition of talking beasts (both humans and non-humans). The role of speech/communication in Narnia is deconstructed and reconstructed; speaking animals love the other instead of merely uttering conventional human language. Particularly, the writer has addressed the historical dominance of Aristotle's philosophical view of the human-animal relationship, the Christian Great Chain of Being idea, and Cartesian dualism, all of which are philosophical views advocating human supremacy based on the ability of humans to speak and think; the writer has refuted the application of anthropocentric

philosophies to the reading of Lewis's *Chronicles* by embracing a Posthumanist interpretation—influenced by Poststructuralism and Feminist philosophy—according to which human and animal are interchangeable ontological terms. This thesis has emphasized the critical animal studies' struggle for justice and compassion towards animals, the interconnectedness of animal liberation and human emancipation, and has discussed the deconstruction and reconstruction of humans and animals in a (Post)humanist way, providing a richer, expanded, inclusive definition of the human and the animal. The thesis has highlighted celebrating the victory of humans and non-humans united in *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, and the risks associated with using authority without discernment or empathy in *The Magician's Nephew* and *The Last Battle*. Additionally, it has touched on Lewis's Christian eschatological vision of universal oneness and the celebration of reality as an abundance of rhizomes always in the process of being as one through the creation of the new Narnia in *The Last Battle*.

In Chapter Three, the writer of the thesis has discussed the concept of geocriticism and its application to *The Chronicles of Narnia*, focusing on the role of spatiotemporality in the stories. The writer has delved into Bakhtin's notion of the literary chronotope and its application to *The Chronicles of Narnia*. The epic chronotope and its relationship to the distant past and the interplay between time, space, and character imagery in the Narnia universe have been explored. The narrative structure of *The Chronicles of Narnia* has been analyzed, emphasizing the significance of prophecy, destiny, and the battle between good and evil. The writer has also discussed the unique spatiotemporal arrangement of Narnia, its connection to the primary world, and the distinct history and time flow within the Narnian universe. Additionally, the writer has adopted a Posthumanist interpretation of the characters' experiences and the interconnectedness of all beings- humans and non-humans- in Narnia; within the same context, the significance of trees in Narnia and their connection to the rhizomatic theory, emphasizing the interconnectedness of all elements in the Narnian universe has been highlighted.

The discussion of C. S. Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* in the three chapters of this thesis within a Posthumanist context leads to the conclusion that *The Chronicles of Narnia* is a literature of liberation encompassing all sentient beings. In *Animal Liberation* (1975), Peter Singer, who stands among the first philosophers with a

Posthumanist attitude toward the world, vehemently opposed speciesism, a practice of discrimination against nonhuman animals that includes killing, abusing, treating them as mere objects, and deliberately ignoring their feelings, whether pleasure or suffering. Singer called on non-human animals to be recognized as partners in the moral world by drawing attention to their repressed pain (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2013, p. 879). Moreover, *The Chronicles of Narnia*, as literature of liberation, expresses and illustrates Val Plumwood's liberation from social and ecological interactions governed by ontological and moral systems of dominance (Plumwood, p.2002, 118). In Plumwood's view, both enslaved humans and natures are confined by a system of "moral and cultural blindness" that minimizes or denies the other's independence (Plumwood, 2002, p. 118). Through radicalized "hyperseparation," dominating subjects appear disembedded, which prevents them from surviving. Therefore, in literature of liberation, giving oppressed people and creatures a voice is the only way to liberate them and provide them independence (Plumwood, 2002, p. 118).

Plumwood's understanding of liberation is also shared and enriched by Braidotti who claims that literary imagination can be a means of transcending subjective restrictions and emancipating narrative from the perspective of the individual ego (Braidotti and Hlavajová, 2018, p. 643-644). In general, literature can give voice to "storied matter"- including those who are voiceless, alienated, or powerless, those incapable of verbally expressing their pleasure or pain, and in general, natural beings, elements, phenomena, and processes as Cohen points out- aiming to develop non-anthropocentric ontologies in which non-humans are what Latour names "full-fledged actors;" therefore, the literature that fosters the development of a posthuman imagination, or a perspective on our relationship with others, is literature of emancipation (Braidotti and Hlavajová, 2018, p. 647- 881). People cannot pretend that their being is distinct from theirs if they want to live authentically. The importance of literature lies in understanding that there is no difference between "ours" and "theirs;" all living creatures, as well as all things non-living, share the same existence with humans. They interact with their and other living creatures' lives (Braidotti and Hlavajová, 2018, p. 648).

Italo Calvino, who believes that literature that gives voice to the voiceless plays a crucial political role, captures the concept of literature of liberation in the closing words of *Six Memos for the Next Millennium*:

Imagine what it would be like to possess a piece of art that was created from a place outside of the self, a piece that would enable us to transcend the finite perspective of the individual ego, enter into selves similar to our own, as well as give voice to things that lack language, like the bird perched on the edge of the gutter, the tree in the spring and the tree in the fall, as well as stone, cement, and plastic. (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 881).

C. S. Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* echoes the idea that the path to liberation is finding our actual identity beyond ego or the idea of "I" as a distinct person. All dualities are resolved into cosmic unity, and tranquility is bestowed upon us by that delightful realization of how variegated our essence is. The aim and culmination of human progress, personally and collectively, is freedom and enlightenment. Whether a literary work can pass the test of time is primarily determined by how much it allows readers to transcend themselves. *The Chronicles of Narnia* is a literary work that affects us and pulls us from our little, self-centered worldview and exposes us to a broader, more compassionate relationship with life and the realization of our capacity for enlightenment. This thesis has attempted to foreground the importance of C. S. Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia* as a critical Fantasy/Speculative fiction, not just a passive experience for the reader but an active engagement that exposes them to higher realms of being and ever more exquisitely conveys the ground of Being.

C. S. Lewis understands universal oneness based on Christ's command, "Love one another; as I have loved you" (John 13:34). In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, Aslan's addressing all talking Narnians upon their creation strikingly resembles Christ's addressing his disciples. The reader may also not miss that each Narnian is a rhizome consisting of multiple plateaus (Others), as the whole Narnia comprises multiple plateaus of the rhizome Aslan; this imagery resembles ecclesiastical iconographer's imagination capturing Jesus, the historical figure, as the true vine and his disciples, the branches. Thus, Lewis's spiritual and political rhizome is not essentially different from the Posthumanist rhizome since both advocate unity based on the realization of the interconnection of species.

Emancipation lies in love, which is Lewis's understanding of logos and the true essence of all universal elements. In this thesis, it has been demonstrated that *The Chronicles of Narnia* as literature of liberation means that giving oppressed people and creatures a voice and allowing people to hear their experiences is the only way to liberate them and provide them independence (Plumwood, 2002, p. 117-118). The trans-corporeal exchanges of substances and the translocality of environmental processes embodied in *The Chronicles of Narnia* exemplify Posthumanist philosophers' position that the impersonal agency of a wide variety of "others" is essential to our existence. Fundamentally, the nonhuman makes us human, materially and discursively (Braidotti and Hlavajova, 2018, p. 884).

In Narnia, humans are reinforced to explore, discover, and make praxis limitless possibilities of relationships based on which all beings genuinely exist. Above all interactions in Narnia, all characters' interaction with the lion reigns supreme, whether the lion is seen as a non-human being/animal and Narnia's creator, a non-being/abstract idea producing that satisfied consideration of divinity at the center of all the Narnian characters due to its death and resurrection, or both. Indeed, the Lion resembles Lewis's Christian God/Christ, who is fully man and fully God, bringing cosmic harmony to all contradictions and granting tranquility to people by liberating them through the discovery of their true identity beyond ego or the sense of "I" as a separate self. In Narnia, humans are liberated from the dungeon of adulthood, which is associated with the master narratives permeating human society and the inevitable death that the same master narratives lead human and non-human species to. Through *The Chronicles of Narnia*, Lewis advocates liberation, the ultimate purpose of human advancement and expansion, both individually and collectively.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A. CHAPTER I QUOTATIONS

1.

Far out of the sound of Aslan's voice and far from the young air of Narnia, it did not bear apples that would revive a dying woman as Digory's Mother had been revived, though it did bear apples more beautiful than any others in England, and they were extremely good for you, though not fully magical. But inside itself, in the very sap of it, the tree (so to speak) never forgot that other tree in Narnia to which it belonged. Sometimes it would move mysteriously when there was no wind blowing: I think that when this happened there were high winds in Narnia and the English tree quivered because, at that moment, the Narnia tree was rocking and swaying in a strong southwestern gale. However that might be, it was proved later that there was still magic in its wood (Lewis, 1955, p. 313-314).

2.

In all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentary, strata and territories, but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization, and destratification. Comparative rates of flow on these lines produce rates of relative slowness and viscosity or on the contrary, of acceleration and rupture. All this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes an assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 39).

3.

In *The Magician's Nephew*, Uncle Andrew says to Digory;

To jump from world to world by using one of those rings you don't need to be wearing or touching it yourself; it is enough if you are touching someone who is touching it. In that way they work like a magnet; and everyone knows that if you pick up a pin with a magnet, any other pin which is touching the first pin will come too (Lewis, 1955, p. 119).

4.

Later in the story, Uncle Andrew explains:

'Only dust ,' said Uncle Andrew. 'Fine, dry dust. Nothing much to look at. Not much to show for a lifetime of toil, you might say. Ah, but when I looked at that dust (I took jolly good care not to touch it) and thought that every grain had once been in another world—I don't mean another planet, you know; they're part of our world and you could get to them if you went far enough—but an Other World—another Nature—another universe—somewhere you would never reach even if you traveled through the space of this universe forever and ever—a world that could be reached only by Magic well!' (Lewis, 1955, p. 44).

5.

The High King, Eustace, Tirian, Jill, and Edmund comment

'I don't know,' said the High King. 'It reminds me of somewhere but I can't give it a name. Could it be somewhere we once stayed for a holiday when we were very, very small?' 'It would have to have been a jolly good holiday,' said Eustace, 'I bet there isn't a country like this anywhere in our world. Look at the colors! You couldn't get a blue like the blue on those mountains in our world.' 'Is it not Aslan's country?' said Tirian. 'Not like Aslan's country on top of that mountain beyond the Eastern end of the world,' said Jill. 'I've been there.' 'If you ask me,' said Edmund, 'it's like somewhere in the Narnian world. Look at those mountains ahead and the big ice-mountains beyond them. Surely they're rather like the mountains we used to see from Narnia' (Lewis, 1956, p. 409-410).

6.

But behind him, on a much higher seat in the middle of the sledge sat a very different person—a great lady, taller than any woman that Edmund had ever seen. She also was covered in white fur up to her throat and held a long straight golden wand in her right hand and wore a golden crown on her head. Her face was white—not merely pale, but white like snow or paper or icing-sugar, except for her very red mouth. It was a beautiful face in other respects, but proud and cold and stern (Lewis, 1950, p. 64).

7.

It is dull, Son of Adam, to drink without eating, said the Queen presently. 'What would you like best to eat?' 'Turkish Delight, please, your Majesty,' said Edmund. The Queen let another drop fall from her bottle onto the snow, and instantly there appeared a round box, tied with green silk ribbon, which, when opened, turned out to contain several pounds of the best Turkish Delight. Each piece was sweet and light to the very center and Edmund had never tasted anything more delicious. He was quite warm now, and very comfortable (Lewis, 1950, p. 73).

8.

'Oh but don't you see it's no good!' said Digory. 'We can't get out of it now. We shall always be wondering what else would have happened if we had struck the bell. I'm not going home to be driven mad by always thinking of that. No fear!' 'Don't be so silly, said Polly. As if anyone would! What does it matter what would have happened?' 'I expect anyone who's come as far as this is bound to go on wondering till it sends him dotty. That's the Magic of it, you see. I can feel it beginning to work on me already.' 'Well I don't, said Polly crossly. And I don't believe you do either. You're just putting it on.' 'That's all you know,' said Digory. 'It's because you're a girl. Girls never want to know anything but gossip and rot about people getting engaged.' 'You looked exactly like your Uncle when you said that,' said Polly. 'Why can't you keep to the point?' said Digory. 'What we're talking about is' 'How exactly like a man!' said Polly in a very grown-up voice; but she added hastily, in her real voice, 'And don't say I'm just like a woman, or you'll be a beastly copy-cat.' 'I should never dream of calling a kid like you a woman,' said Digory loftily. 'Oh, I'm a kid, am I?' said Polly who was now in a real rage. 'Well you needn't be bothered by having a kid with you any longer then. I'm off. I've had enough of this place. And I've had enough of you too—you beastly, stuck-up, obstinate pig!' (Lewis, 1955, p. 91-92).

9.

It is certain that my shame is not reflective, for the presence of another in my consciousness, even as a catalyst, is incompatible with the reflective attitude; in the field of my reflection I can never meet with anything but the consciousness which is mine. But the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other (Sartre, 1978, p. 221-222)

10.

The Other's look makes me be beyond my being in this world and puts me in the midst of the world which is at once this world and beyond this world. What sort of relations can I enter into

with this being which I am and which shame reveals to me? In the first place there is a relation of being. I am this being. I do not for an instant think of denying it; my shame is a confession. I shall be able later to use bad faith so as to hide it from myself, but bad faith is also a confession since it is an effort to flee the being which I am. But I am this being, neither in the mode of 'having to be' nor in that of 'was;' I do not found it in its being; I can not produce it directly. But neither is it the indirect, strict effect of my acts as when my shadow on the ground or my reflection in the mirror is moved in correlation with the gestures which I make (Sartre, 1978, p. 261).

11.

'Good evening, good evening ,' said the Faun. 'Excuse me I don't want to be inquisitive but should I be right in thinking that you are a Daughter of Eve?' 'My name's Lucy' said she, not quite understanding him. 'But you are—forgive me—you are what they call a girl?' asked the Faun. 'Of course, I'm a girl,' said Lucy. 'You are in fact Human' 'Of course I'm human,' said Lucy, still a little puzzled. 'To be sure, to be sure,' said the Faun. 'How stupid of me! But I've never seen a son of Adam or a Daughter of Eve before. I am delighted. That is to say' and then it stopped as if it had been going to say something it had not intended but had remembered in time. 'Delighted, delighted,' it went on. 'Allow me to introduce myself. My name is Tumnus' 'I am very pleased to meet you, Mr. Tumnus,' said Lucy. 'And may I ask, O Lucy Daughter of Eve,' said Mr. Tumnus, 'how you have come into Narnia?' 'Narnia? What's that?' said Lucy. (Lewis, 1950, p. 34)

12.

He was only a little taller than Lucy herself, and he carried over his head an umbrella, white with snow. From the waist upwards he was like a man, but his legs were shaped like a goat's (the hair on them was glossy black) and instead of feet he had goat's hoofs. He also had a tail, but Lucy did not notice this at first because it was neatly caught up over the arm that held the umbrella so as to keep it from trailing in the snow. He had a red woollen muffler around his neck, and his skin was rather reddish too. He had a strange, but pleasant little face, with a short pointed beard and curly hair, and out of the hair there stuck two horns, one on each side of his forehead. One of his hands, as I have said, held the umbrella; in the other arm he carried several brown-paper parcels. What with the parcels and the snow it looked just as if he had been doing his Christmas shopping. He was a Faun. And when he saw Lucy he gave such a start of surprise that he dropped all his parcels. 'Goodness gracious me!' exclaimed the Faun (Lewis, 1950, p. 29-30).

13.

Now that she was left alone with the children, she took no notice of either of them. And that was like her too. In Charn she had taken no notice of Polly (till the very end) because Digory was the one she wanted to make use of. Now that she had Uncle Andrew, she took no notice of Digory. I expect most witches are like that. They are not interested in things or people unless they can use them; they are terribly practical (Lewis, 1955, p. 130).

14.

In *The Last Battle*, Shift, the Ape; addressing the Beasts, Shift says:

'And now here's another thing,' the Ape went on, fitting a fresh nut into its cheek, 'I hear some of the horses are saying, let's hurry up and get this job of carting timber over as quickly as we can, and then we'll be free again. Well, you can get that idea out of your heads at once. And not only the Horses either. Everybody who can work is going to be made to work in the future. Aslan has it all settled with the King of Calormen The Tisroc, as our dark-faced friends the Calormenes call him. All you Horses and Bulls and Donkeys are to be sent down into Calormen to work for your living' [...] 'None of that! Hold your noise!' said the Ape with a snarl. 'Who said anything about slavery? You won't be slaves. You'll be paid very good wages too. That is to say, your pay will be paid into Aslan's treasury and he will use it all for everybody's good.' Then he glanced, and almost winked, at the chief Calormene. The Calormene bowed and replied, in the pompous Calormene way. (Lewis, 1956, p. 82-83-84)

APPENDIX B: CHAPTER II QUOTATIONS

15.

I existed, even if everything else I had ever imagined had been true. I thereby concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature resides only in thinking, and which, in order to exist, has no need of place and is not dependent on any material thing. Accordingly this 'I', that is to say, the Soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even easier to know than the body; and would not stop being everything it is, even if the body were not to exist (Descartes, 2006, p. 29).

16.

Later, she states, "[...] 'all the ordinary people,' said Polly, 'who'd never done you any harm.' 'Don't you understand?'" said the Queen (still speaking to Digory). 'I was the Queen. They were all my people. "What else were they there for but to do my will?" 'It was rather hard luck on them, all the same,' said he. 'I had forgotten that you are only a common boy. You must learn, child, that what would be wrong for you or any of the common people is not wrong in a great Queen such as I. We must be freed from all rules. Ours is a high and lonely destiny' (Lewis, 1955, p. 111-112).

17.

'And now there's another thing you got to learn,' said the Ape. 'I hear some of you are saying I'm an Ape. Well, I'm not. I'm a Man. If I look like an Ape, that's because I'm so very old: hundreds and hundreds of years old. And it's because I'm so old that I'm so wise. And it's because I'm so wise that I'm the only one Aslan is ever going to speak to. He can't be bothered talking to a lot of stupid animals. He'll tell me what you've got to do, and I'll tell the rest of you. And take my advice, and see you do it in double quick time, for he doesn't mean to stand any nonsense' (Lewis, 1956, p. 81-82).

18.

There is no longer man or animal, since each deterritorializes the other, in a conjunction of flux, in a continuum of reversible intensities. Instead, it is now a question of becoming that includes the maximum of difference as a difference of intensity, the crossing of a barrier, a rising or a falling, a bending or an erecting . . . there is a circuit of states that forms a mutual becoming, in the heart of necessarily multiple or collective assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 22).

19.

Enormous animals were crawling and sliding down into Narnia: great dragons and giant lizards and featherless birds with wings like bats' wings. They disappeared into the woods and for a few minutes, there was silence. Then there came—at first from very far off—sounds of wailing and then, from every direction, a rustling and a pattering and a sound of wings. It came nearer and nearer. Soon one could distinguish the scamper of little feet from the padding big paws, and the clack-clack of light little hoofs from the thunder of great ones. And then one could see thousands of pairs of eyes gleaming. And at last, out of the shadow of the trees, racing up the hill for dear life, by thousands and by millions, came all kinds of creatures—Talking Beasts, Dwarfs, Satyrs, Fauns, Giants, Calormenes, men from Archenland, Monopods, and strange unearthly things from the remote islands or the unknown Western lands. And all these ran up to the doorway where Aslan stood (Lewis, 1956, p. 372-373).

20.

[...] Yet it was a lovely and terrible shock when he did. Out of the trees, wild people stepped forth, gods and goddesses of the wood; with them came Fauns and Satyrs and Dwarfs. Out of the river rose the river god with his Naiad daughters. And all these and all the beasts and birds in their different voices, low or high or thick or clear, replied 'Hail, Aslan. We hear and obey. We are awake. We love. We think. We speak. We know' (Lewis, 1955, p. 202).

21.

Growing in the soil of our world, far out of the sound of Aslan's voice and far from the young air of Narnia, it did not bear apples that would revive a dying woman as Digory's Mother had been revived, though it did bear apples more beautiful than any others in England, and they were extremely good for you, though not fully magical. But inside itself, in the very sap of it, the tree (so to speak) never forgot that other tree in Narnia to which it belonged. Sometimes it would move mysteriously when there was no wind blowing: I think that when this happened there were high winds in Narnia and the English tree quivered because, at that moment, the Narnia tree was rocking and swaying in a strong southwestern gale. However that might be, it was proved later that there was still magic in its wood (Lewis, 1955, p. 313-314).

22.

Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. It could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strata—a parallelism between two strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the same time, something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of code, surplus value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid, and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever further. There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 55-56).

23.

'Lucy, Eve's Daughter,' and Lucy came forward. He gave her a little bottle of what looked like glass (but people said afterward that it was made of diamond) and a small dagger. 'In this bottle,' he said, 'there is a cordial made of the juice of one of the fire-flowers that grow in the mountains of the sun. If you or any of your friends is hurt, a few drops of this will restore them. And the dagger is to defend yourself at great need. For you also are not to be in the battle ' (Lewis, 1950, p. 196).

24.

There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another [...] A plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end. A rhizome is made of plateaus [...] Rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 54, 86, 94).

25.

Mimicry is a very bad concept since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely different nature. The crocodile does not reproduce a tree trunk, any more than the chameleon reproduces the colors of its surroundings. The Pink Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces nothing, it paints the world its color, pink on pink; this is its becoming-world, carried out in such a way that it becomes imperceptible itself, signifying, makes its rupture, its line of flight, follows its parallel evolution through to the end (Deleuze, 1980, p. 58-59).

26.

'My dear Shift,' said Puzzle getting up at once, 'I am so sorry. I've been horrid. Of course I'd love to try it on. And it looks simply splendid. Do try it on me at once. Please do.' 'Well, stand still then,' said the Ape. The skin was very heavy for him to lift, but in the end, with a lot of pulling and pushing and puffing and blowing, he got it onto the donkey. He tied it underneath Puzzle's body and he tied the legs to Puzzle's legs and the tail to Puzzle's tail. A good deal of Puzzle's gray nose and face could be seen through the open mouth of the lion's head. No one who had ever seen a real lion would have been taken in for a moment. But if someone who had never seen a lion looked at Puzzle in his lion-skin he just might mistake him for a lion, if he didn't come too close, and if the light was not too good, and if Puzzle didn't let out a bray and didn't make any noise with his hoofs. 'You look wonderful, wonderful,' said the Ape. 'If anyone

saw you now, they'd think you were Aslan, the Great Lion, himself.' 'That would be dreadful,' said Puzzle (Lewis, 1956, p. 33-34-35).

27.

The Dragons and Giant Lizards now had Narnia to themselves. They went to and fro tearing up the trees by the roots and crunching them up as if they were sticks of rhubarb. Minute by minute the forests disappeared. The whole country became bare and you could see all sorts of things about its shape all the little humps and hollows which you had never noticed before. The grass died. Soon Tirian found that he was looking at a world of bare rock and earth (Lewis, 1956, p. 379).

28.

It was the Unicorn who summed up what everyone was feeling. He stamped his right fore-hoof on the ground and neighed, and then cried: 'I have come home at last! This is my real country! I belong here. This is the land I have been looking for all my life, though I never knew it till now. The reason why we loved the old Narnia is that it sometimes looked a little like this. Bree-hee-he' [...] (Lewis, 1956, p.418).

29.

[...] Till in the end they hardly noticed the light of the stars who stood behind them. At last, the sun came up. When it did, Lord Digory and Lady Polly looked at one another and gave a little nod: those two, in a different world, had once seen a dying sun, and so they knew at once that this sun also was dying. It was three times—twenty times—as big as it ought to be, and very dark red. As its rays fell upon the great Time-giant, he turned red too: and in the reflection of that sun the whole waste of shoreless waters looked like blood (Lewis, 1956, p. 382-383).

30.

'Silence, sir!' said Uncle Andrew, bringing his hand down on the table. 'I will not be talked to like that by a little, dirty, schoolboy. You don't understand. I am the great scholar, the magician, the adept, who is doing the experiment. Of course I need subjects to do it on. Bless my soul, you'll be telling me next that I ought to have asked the guinea-pigs' permission before I used them! No great wisdom can be reached without sacrifice. But the idea of my going myself is ridiculous. It's like asking a general to fight as a common soldier. Supposing I got killed, what would become of my life's work?' (Lewis, 1955, p. 47).

31.

Narnia, Narnia, Narnia, awake. Love. Think. Speak. Be walking trees. Be talking beasts. Be divine waters. (Lewis, p. 200) Creatures, I give you yourselves, said the strong, happy voice of Aslan. I give to you forever this land of Narnia. I give you the woods, the fruits, the rivers. I give you the stars and I give you myself. The Dumb Beasts whom I have not chosen are yours also'' (Lewis, 1955, p. 203).

32.

'I wonder who killed the poor lion,' said Puzzle presently. 'It ought to be buried. We must have a funeral.' 'Oh, it wasn't a Talking Lion,' said Shift. 'You needn't bother about that. There are no Talking Beasts up beyond the Falls, up in the Western Wild. This skin must have belonged to a dumb, wild lion.' (...) 'All the same, Shift,' said Puzzle, 'even if the skin only belonged to a dumb, wild lion, oughtn't we to give it a decent burial? I mean, aren't all lions rather—well, rather solemn? Because of you know Who. Don't you see?' (Lewis, 1956, p. 25 -26).

33.

'Creatures, I give you yourselves,' said the strong, happy voice of Aslan. 'I give to you forever this land of Narnia. I give you the woods, the fruits, the rivers. I give you the stars and I give you myself. The Dumb Beasts whom I have not chosen are yours also. Treat them gently and cherish them but do not go back to their ways lest you cease to be Talking Beasts. For out of them you were taken and into them, you can return. Do not so' (Lewis, 1955, p. 203).

34.

‘Look, look!’ said the voice of the Bear. ‘It can’t talk. It has forgotten how to talk! It has gone back to being a dumb beast. Look at its face. ‘Everyone saw that it was true. And then the greatest terror of all fell upon those Narnians. For every one of them had been taught when only a chick or a puppy or a cub how Aslan at the beginning of the world had turned the beasts of Narnia into Talking Beasts and warned them that if they weren’t good they might one day be turned back again and be like the poor witless animals one meets in other countries. ‘And now it is coming upon us ‘ they moaned (Lewis, 1956, p. 271-272).

35.

The distinction between vegetal and relational, organic and animal, animal and human, passes first as a moving boundary inside living man. Without this intimate caesura, it is likely impossible to decide what is and is not human. The only reason it is feasible to arrange the intricate, and occasionally uninspiring, economics of interactions between humans and animals while opposing man to other living things is because anything like an animal existence has been divided inside solely because the closest and most personal location has been used to assess and identify the man's proximity and distance from the animal. But if this is true, if the caesura between the human and the animal passes first of all within man, then it is the very question of man and of ‘humanism’ that must be posed in a new way. In our culture, man has always been thought of as the articulation and conjunction of a body and a soul, of a living thing and a logos, of a natural (or animal) element and a supernatural or social or divine element [...] What distinguishes man from animal is language, but this is no a natural given already inherent in the psychophysical structure of man; it is, rather, a historical production which, as such, can be properly assigned neither to man nor to animal. If this element is taken away, the difference between man and animal vanishes, unless we imagine a nonspeaking man—Homo alalus, precisely who would function as a bridge that passes from the animal to the human (Agamben, 2003, p. 16, 36).

36.

But next day was more solemn. For then, in the Great Hall of Cair Paravel—that wonderful hall with the ivory roof and the west wall hung with peacock’s feathers and the eastern door which looks towards the sea, in the presence of all their friends and to the sound of trumpets, Aslan solemnly crowned them and led them to the four thrones amid deafening shouts of, ‘Long Live King Peter! Long Live Queen Susan! Long Live King Edmund! Long Live Queen Lucy!’ ‘Once a king or queen in Narnia, always a king or queen. Bear it well, Sons of Adam! Bear it well, Daughters of Eve!’ said Aslan. And through the eastern door, which was wide open, came the voices of the mermen and the mermaids swimming close to the shore and singing in honor of their new Kings and Queens (Lewis, 1950, p. 319).

37.

The frogs, who all came up near the river, went straight into it with a plop-plop and a loud croaking. The panthers, leopards, and things of that sort, sat down at once to wash the loose earth off their hindquarters and then stood up against the trees to sharpen their front claws. Showers of birds came out of the trees. Butterflies fluttered. Bees got to work on the flowers as if they hadn't a second to lose a small earthquake and out came the sloping back, the large, wise head, and the four baggy-trousered legs of an elephant. And now you could hardly hear the song of the Lion; there was so much cawing, cooing, crowing, braying, neighing, baying, barking, lowing, bleating, and trumpeting (Lewis, 1955, p. 195).

38.

‘Of course,’ said Aslan. ‘And now! Those who can’t keep up—that is, children, dwarfs, and small animals must ride on the backs of those who can that is, lions, centaurs, unicorns, horses, giants and eagles. Those who are good with their noses must come in the front with us lions to smell out where the battle is. Look lively and sort yourselves’ (Lewis, 1950, p. 306).

39.

Immediately the sky became full of shooting stars. Even one shooting star is a fine thing to see; but these were dozens, and then scores, and then hundreds, till it was like silver rain: and it went on and on. And when it had gone on for some while, one or two of them began to think that there was another dark shape against the sky as well as the giants (Lewis, 1956, p. 367-368).

40.

Similarly, Rosi Braidotti says:

Ethical relations create possible worlds by mobilizing resources that have been left untapped in the present, including our desires and imagination. They activate the virtual in a web or rhizome of interconnection with others. We have to learn to think differently about ourselves. This is highly relevant for the posthuman subject, which cannot afford to restrict the ethical instance within the limits of human otherness, but has to open it up to inter-relations with non-human, post human and in-human forces (Braidotti, 2019, p. 478).

APPENDIX C: CHAPTER III QUOTATIONS

41.

‘Only dust,’ said Uncle Andrew. ‘Fine, dry dust. Nothing much to look at. Not much to show for a lifetime of toil, you might say. Ah, but when I looked at that dust (I took jolly good care not to touch it) and thought that every grain had once been in another world—I don’t mean another planet, you know; they’re part of our world and you could get to them if you went far enough—but a really Other World—another Nature—another universe—somewhere you would never reach even if you traveled through the space of this universe forever and ever—a world that could be reached only by Magic -well!’ (Lewis, 1955, p. 44).

42.

‘My son, my son,’ said Aslan. ‘I know. Grief is great. Only you and I in this land know that yet. Let us be good to one another. But I have to think of hundreds of years in the life of Narnia. The Witch whom you have brought into this world will come back to Narnia again. But it need not be yet. It is my wish to plant in Narnia a tree that she will not dare to approach, and that tree will protect Narnia from her for many years. So this land shall have a long, bright morning before any clouds come over the sun. You must get me the seed from which that tree is to grow’ (Lewis, 1955, p. 243-244).

43.

Do you think I am trying to weave a spell? Perhaps I am; but remember your fairy tales. Spells are used for breaking enchantments as well as for inducing them. And you and I have need of the strongest spell that can be found to wake us from the evil enchantment of worldliness which has been laid upon us for nearly a hundred years (Lewis, 1945, p. 31).

44.

When some looked, the expression of their faces changed terribly—it was fear and hatred: except that, on the faces of Talking Beasts, the fear and hatred lasted only for a fraction of a second. You could see that they suddenly ceased to be Talking Beasts. They were just ordinary animals. And all the creatures who looked at Aslan in that way swerved to their right, his left, and disappeared into his huge black shadow, which (as you have heard) streamed away to the left of the doorway. The children never saw them again. I don’t know what became of them. But the others looked in the face of Aslan and loved him, though some of them were very frightened at the same time. And all these came in at the Door, in on Aslan’s right. There were some queer specimens among them (Lewis, 1956, p. 375).

45.

‘Listen, Peter. When Aslan said you could never go back to Narnia, he meant the Narnia you were thinking of. But that was not the real Narnia. That had a beginning and an end. It was only a shadow or a copy of the real Narnia, which has always been here and always will be here: just

as our world, England and all is only a shadow or copy of something in Aslan's real world You need not mourn over Narnia, Lucy. All of the old Narnia that mattered, all the dear creatures, have been drawn into the real Narnia through the Door. And of course, it is different; as different as a real thing is from a shadow or waking life is from a dream' (Lewis, 1956, p. 414-415).

46.

Peter shortly and gravely, 'is no longer a friend of Narnia'. 'Yes', said Eustace, 'and whenever you've tried to get her to come and talk about Narnia or do anything about Narnia, she says, 'What wonderful memories you have! Fancy your still thinking about all those funny games we used to play when we were children' 'Oh Susan!' said Jill. 'She's interested in nothing nowadays except nylons and lipstick and invitations. She always was a jolly sight too keen on being grown-up' (Lewis, 1956, p. 275-276).

47.

'If there really is a door in this house that leads to some other world (and I should warn you that this is a very strange house, and even I know very little about it)—if, I say, she had got into another world, I should not be at all surprised to find that the other world had a separate time of its own; so that however long you stayed there it would never take up any of our time. On the other hand, I don't think many girls of her age would invent that idea for themselves. If she had been pretending, she would have hidden for a reasonable time before coming out and telling her story' (Lewis, 1950, p. 95).

48.

'You've been hiding, have you?' said Peter. "Poor old Lu, hiding and nobody noticed! You'll have to hide longer than that if you want people to start looking for you.' 'But I've been away for hours and hours,' said Lucy. The others all stared at one another. 'Batty!' said Edmund, tapping his head. 'Quite batty.' 'What do you mean, Lu?' asked Peter. 'What I said,' answered Lucy. "It was just after breakfast when I went into the wardrobe, and I've been away for hours and hours, and had tea, and all sorts of things have happened.' 'Don't be silly, Lucy,' said Susan. 'We've only just come out of that room a moment ago, and you were there then' (Lewis, 1950, p. 53-54).

49.

[...]...except that the Witch, the Horse, and the Cabby were gone, everything was exactly as they had left it. There was the lamp-post, with one arm missing; there was the wreck of the hansom cab; and there was the crowd. Everyone was still talking and people were kneeling beside the damaged policeman, saying things like, 'He's coming round' or 'How do you feel now, old chap?' or 'The Ambulance will be here in a jiffy.' 'Great Scott!' thought Digory, I believe the whole adventure's taken no time at all.' Most people were wildly looking round for Jadis and the horse. No one took any notice of the children for no one had seen them go. (Lewis, 1955, p. 305)

50.

In a battle with the Metropolitan Police

Instantly, as it seemed to Uncle Andrew, the Queen towered up to an even greater height. Fire flashed from her eyes: she flung out her arm with the same gesture and the same horrible-sounding words that had lately turned the palace-gates of Charn to dust. But nothing happened except that Aunt Letty, thinking that those horrible words were meant to be ordinary English, said I thought as much. The woman is drunk. Drunk! She can't even speak clearly. It must have been a terrible moment (Lewis, 1955, p. 142).

51.

Then Aslan said, 'Now make an end.' The giant threw his horn into the sea. Then he stretched out one arm—very black it looked, and thousands of miles long—across the sky till his hand reached the Sun. He took the Sun and squeezed it in his hand as you would squeeze an orange. And instantly there was total darkness (Lewis, 1956, p. 384).

52.

The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing. Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways; in this sense, the burrow is an animal rhizome, and sometimes maintains a clear distinction (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 62-63.)

53.

In *The Magician's Nephew*, the narrator explains:

However that might be, it was proved later that there was still magic in its wood. For when Digory was quite middle-aged (and he was a famous learned man, a Professor, and a great traveler by that time) and the Ketterleys' old house belonged to him, there was a great storm all over the south of England which blew the tree down. He couldn't bear to have it simply chopped up for firewood, so he had part of the timber made into a wardrobe, which he put in his big house in the country. And though he did not discover the magic properties of that wardrobe, someone else did. That was the beginning of all the comings and goings between Narnia and our world, which you can read of in other books. (Lewis, 1955, p. 314-315).