



**T.C.
YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THEORY OF STRUCTURATION AND ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF MARCH 2006 UNTIL THE END OF 2ND LEBANON
WAR**

by

Nuri Berk OKER

**Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of
Political Science and International Relations**

ISTANBUL, 2009



**T.C.
YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THEORY OF STRUCTURATION AND ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF MARCH 2006 UNTIL THE END OF 2ND LEBANON
WAR**

by

Nuri Berk OKER

Supervisor

Asst Prof. Dr. M. Deniz TANSİ

**Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of
Political Science and International Relations**

ISTANBUL, 2009



**YEDİTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS
TEZ SAVUNMA TUTANAĞI**

8 Haziran 2009

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencilerinden Berk ÇOKER, 8 Haziran 2009 tarihinde yapılan Yüksek Lisans Tez Savunması sonucunda jüri tarafından oyçokluğu / oybirliği ile

- ☒ Başarılı bulunmuştur.
☐ Başarısız bulunmuştur.
☐ Düzeltmeler için adaya ek süre tanınmıştır.

Jüri Üyeleri

Tez Danışmanı

Unvanı, Adı, Soyadı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Deniz Tansi

İmzası :

Jüri Üyesi

Unvanı, Adı, Soyadı: Prof. Dr. Feroz Ahmad

İmzası :

Jüri Üyesi

Unvanı, Adı, Soyadı: Prof. Dr. Ahmet N. Yücekök

İmzası :

	Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	i-ii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
ABSTRACT.....	v
ÖZET	vi

CHAPTER I

1.	
INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THE PROBLEM AND THE NEED OF THEORY IN THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.....	6
2.1. The Relationship between theory and Foreign Politics.....	8
3. REALIST THEORY.....	11
3.1 How does Realist Theory evaluate international relations?	12
3.2 How does Realist Theory perceive foreign policy?	14
3.2.1 Power	16
3.2.2 Power Balance.....	17
3.2.3 National Interests.....	20
3.2.4 Security.....	21
4. FEATURES OF NEOREALISM.....	22
4.1 The Difference of Neorealist Theory from Realism in the Basis of Foreign Policy.....	25
4.2 New Expansions in Neorealist Theory.....	26
5. IDEALIST APPROACH	29
5.1 Idealism's perspective of International Relations.....	30
5.2 Theory of Liberalism in International Relations.....	32
5.3 The approach of peaceful foreign policy: Democratic Peace Theory.....	34
5.4 The Priority of Liberalism in Foreign Policy: International Collaboration.....	40
5.5 Pluralism.....	42

CHAPTER II

6. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH: STRUCTURATION THEORY IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS.....	45
6.1 Agent - Structure Phenomenon.....	48
6.2 Concepts of the Structuration Theory.....	50
6.2.1 Agency.....	50
6.2.2 Structure.....	50
6.2.3 Social Systems	51
6.3 Rules and Resources	52
6.4 Duality of Structure.....	53
6.5 Modalities of Structure.....	54
6.6 Structuration and Foreign Policy.....	55

CHAPTER III

7. MAPPING ISRAEL'S PLACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.....	62
7.1 Greater Middle East Project, Struggle of Nuclear Weapons, Hegemony and Structuration theory.....	62
7.2 Israel's Political Setting: Kadima and Israel Breaking the Ground.....	68
7.2.1 Place in the Political Spectrum.....	68
7.2.2 Party Program and the Elections.....	70
7.2.3 Olmert's Kadima and the Recent Developments.....	74

CHAPTER IV

8. A CASE STUDY: WHAT DOES THE LEBANON WAR TELL US ABOUT ISRAEL?.....	76
8.1 The 2 nd Lebanon War in 2006.....	76
8.2 The Political Structure of Lebanon.....	77
8.2.1 The Ta'if Accord.....	78
8.3 The Changes in the Balance of the Politics in the Middle East.....	83
8.3.1 Crisis and War.....	86
8.3.2 Consequences of the War.....	89

CONCLUSION.....	90
-----------------	----

APPENDIX A ISRAEL LEGISLATIVE ELECTION RESULTS (1992 to 2006).....	99
--	----

APPENDIX B MAPS	101
-----------------------	-----

REFERENCES.....	102
-----------------	-----

CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE AUTHOR.....	109
-------------------------------------	-----

YAZARIN ÖZGEÇMİŞİ.....	110
------------------------	-----

ABBREVIATIONS

EC	European Community
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
MK	Member of the Knesset
MNC	Multi National Cooperation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPA	Non-Proliferation Agreement
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
ST	Structuration Theory
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank my dear wife, Sigga, and my parents for their significant support.

Second, I would like to name Gizem Alioğlu, who has helped me whenever I needed.

Finally, special thanks to my Supervisor Asst. Prof. Dr. M. Deniz Tansi, who has made special contributions to the study.

ABSTRACT

Theories assist the author to reach systematical knowledge in international relations. On the other hand, systematical knowledge has always been the key to conceptualize how the international system functions and how states behave within this system. Primarily, the author refers to the former IR Theories to explain what these theories stand for and why it is not easy and eligible to implement these theories within the context of Middle East and Israeli foreign policy. Secondly, the author specifies that in the question of Israel, which is a preponderant power of the complicated Middle East chess table, one definitely feels the need of a new theory in the analysis of international relations which can deal with the explanatory implications of the structure and agency issue.

The author believes that Anthony Giddens's Theory of Structuration is a new but an embracing theory which can resolve the structure-agency problem. Structure and agency is still a debated question between scholars. After 9/11, so many agencies (minor actors such as small countries, multi-national cooperations and organizations) develop interaction amongst each other to sustain within the system that foreign policy analysis cannot be completely explained from a macro perspective. Besides Kadima's rise after the 2006 Israeli Legislative Elections, the ruling party of Israel between the years 2006-2008, and the war with Hezbollah in the 2nd Lebanon War, give the author an insight on which theory is most feasible in the analysis of Israeli foreign policy. In conclusion, Structuration Theory provides the author the opportunity to understand the situation as a whole.

ÖZET

Teori, yazarın sistematik bilgiye ulaşmasında önemli rol oynar. Öte yandan, uluslararası sistemin nasıl işlediği ve devletlerin bu sistem içindeki davranışlarını anlamada ve analizde anahtar görevi görür. Öncelikli olarak, yazar, günümüzde varolan uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin ne anlama geldikleri ve Orta Doğu-İsrail dış politikası bağlamında bu teorilerin zorluğu ve uygulanabilirliği üzerine okuyucuyu bilgilendirme amacı taşımaktadır. İkinci olarak, çetrefilli Ortadoğu satranç tahtasının önemli aktörlerinden biri olan İsrail gözönünde bulundurulduğunda, araştırmacının uluslararası ilişkiler analizinde ve yapı ile özne arasındaki sorunları açıklaması açısından yeni bir teoriye ihtiyacı vardır. Yazara göre, Anthony Giddens'ın "Yapılaşma Teori"si yeni olmasına rağmen yapı ile özne arasındaki probleme cevap verebilecek bir kuramdır. Çünkü yapı ile özne arasındaki sorunsal, günümüzde akademisyenler arasında hala tartışılan bir konudur.

11 Eylül'ün ardından, birçok özne (küçük devletler, uluslararası şirketler ve farklı ideoloji ve vizyona sahip kurumlar) sistem içinde varolabilmek için birbirleri ile etkileşimi geliştirmiş ve bu da dış politika analizinin makro bir çerçeveden bakılamayacağını beraberinde getirmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, 2006 İsrail yasama seçimlerini takiben Kadima'nın yükselişi (2006-2008 yılları arasında İsrail'in başındaki siyasi parti) ve Lübnan Hizbullah'ı ile yapılan savaş, İsrail dış politikasının analizinde hangi teorinin daha uygulanabilir olduğu hakkında önemli veriler sunmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, Yapılaşma Teorisi, yazara bölgede yaşananların kavranması açısından fırsat tanımaktadır.

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to evaluate the Israeli Foreign Policy theoretically, the author needs to conduct a literature review on how the foreign policy analysis is made. The subheading, “The problem and the need of a theory in the analysis of international relations”, deals with the issue on why the former theories of International Relations (Realism and Neorealism) are less beneficial to construe the region of the Middle East and the Israeli Foreign Policy as an entity and a new theory is requisite to conceptualize the dynamics of the structure. Apart from this, it is a necessity to analyze the evolution of former International Relations Theories which is also why a theory is needed to break down the factors and the conjuncture of the International Relations.

Theories help the researcher make substantive predictions between a specific passed event with today’s actual political process as well as future politics and events that will happen. The first chapter will be dedicated to the importance of a theory and the momentousness of a unit of analysis which will pave the way to looking at the behaviors of states, the manners of the international system, the decisions of the leaders, and to voting behavior which mirrors the structure of a society. The author also discusses whether former theories of International Relations propose reasonability within the context of Israeli Foreign Policy and how relevant it is to introduce a new theory with regard to the issue.

Realism, Neorealism and Idealism as theories and how they evaluate International Relations pose important questions that need to be answered. Realism has gained popularity after the fall of the optimistic idealistic approach “every conflict can be resolved through diplomacy”. Realism, especially after the 2nd World War has interpreted itself as the most objective, concrete and scholarly theory and pointed out that only realist theory can resolve the problems of a state. Besides, realist theory predicates the clash of national interests between countries on international relations and the structure. According to this theory, the more the country is rich in economics and strong in military, the more it is a welfare state. This chapter also comprises of subheadings, in which realist theory evaluate IR, the definition of the state within the context of IR, realist theory’s

perception of foreign policy and in which foreign policy dissociates the domestic policy.

After the disbandment of USSR, financial power and economic interests have become more vital than diplomatic and geographical power games. The international structure has transformed itself into a focal point of economical power relations. What really distill a realist from a neorealist can be explained by finance, in which neorealists utterly refer to the inclusion of economics and social issues alongside the military and political facts. One more acquisition that the neorealist theory has brought in is the interaction between states within the structure. In the case of Israeli foreign policy, particularly during the post-cold war era, there is an interaction between Israel and Palestine although politicians and intellectuals from both sides clearly disapprove of the idea that the world see in the case of non-recognition of the Israeli state. But there has been an invisible correspondence between the two states since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Before 1973, Arabs perceived the Jews as temporary settlers of the Arab homeland. But after the war, three prominent states of the Middle East (Iraq, Egypt, Syria) signaled the start of a rapprochement between themselves and the Jewish state as Arabic nations realized the fact that safeguarding their national interests and the survival of a Palestine state would only be possible by an interaction with Israel. Power is perceived as a means according to neorealists where it is an end for realists.

In order to debate the foreign policy of a state, the author is in need of a good knowledge about the international system and the impact of the international structure on state behaviour. Small countries within the structure survive as balance mechanisms instead of revolting against big nations, a phenomenon which can be denominated as “mutual dependency”. For instance, how could Iran threaten Israel without the existence of Shiite South Lebanon or how was it possible for Iran to conduct a proxy war against United States without Lebanon, might be good questions for understanding the importance of mutual dependency.

The post-Cold War era brought along a multi-polar structure where economy and stock market are on the agenda of both countries and people, where there is no need for a discussion of ideologies. Collaboration is affixed to interaction and states link relative benefits together with their national interests. For instance, Syria and Iran have a clash of national interests on Sunni-Shiite Lebanon, but on the other hand, they both have a relative benefit in the case of Israel.

According to neorealists, the only superpower prevailing after the Cold War is United States but the system is no more a unipolar but a multi-centered one. In the international system, peace is only possible by stabilizing the military powers of the world. Military interventions during the post-Cold War era are not so attractive due to their heavy financial burden, but US military interventions and Israeli military exercises are entirely different in this sense.

Why does a researcher need a new theory apart from the former IR theories? When Middle East and Israel are taken into consideration, there are five main reasons why a new approach is needed. First, Middle East and the countries which are located in that region are unstable and it is a zone of clashes of differing national interests. Middle East as a structure, but also as a restless region, is a geography which embraces the notion of the nation-state to an extent but also inhabits anarchic elements. Secondly, Realists distinguish foreign policy from domestic policy but neo-conservative political parties such as Kadima in Israel or Republicans in US can manipulate the national interests in order to promote their benefits. Thirdly, states are strong units but it is not possible to antagonize the interests of small actors. Realist approach which only prioritize nation states, cannot find an answer to the complex nature of the Middle East and Israel problem. Fourthly, hegemony is a concept which is regularly heard within the context of who controls the other states or who is more dominant in the Middle East. Gramsci's "hegemony concept" can describe the structure of the region and the foreign policy behavior of the nations which are situated in this part of the world. For instance, dominant states, such as US and Israel, with the consent of EU and other countries and by giving voice to 9/11 terror, conduct military interventions in Iraq and Palestine and at the same time help bringing democracy in Lebanon, all the while establishing dominance within the region. Hegemony, according to Gramsci, creates full support within the society, where the Israeli society unconditionally trusts and advocates its military and government in every step taken regarding war on terror. Finally, as there are so many large and small actors regarding Israel's foreign policy towards its neighbors, the author will elaborate on how vital the sociological demography and geography is within foreign policy.

Do the actors or the structure create the international system? Former IR theories cannot resolve the question of determination. On one hand, realists give weight to the structure, on the other

hand, idealists consider agency important. At the same time, pluralists point out every single agency as a contributor but the pro-democracy camp underline that a democratic structure should be constructed.

Theory of structuration, proposed by Anthony Giddens, which is an attempt to reconcile theoretical dichotomies of social systems such as agency/structure and micro/macro perspectives¹, can assist the author to comprehend the foreign policy behavior of states and in particular, the active foreign policy of Israel and the volatile structure of the Middle East. Giddens came up with suppositions that clearly ratify that the theory of structuration, is the optimal standpoint of understanding the structure of the system and what problems that a structure holds.²

There are four critical points where structuration theory can explain the structure of the international system by answering if the individual creates the societies or if the society creates the individuals. The basic assumptions of Anthony Giddens's theory of structuration explain the very nature of Middle East's actual situation and Israel's foreign policy.³

- Social life is not the sum of all *micro*-level activity, but social activity cannot be completely explained from a *macro* perspective.
- The repetition of the acts of individual agents reproduce the structure.
- Social structures are neither inviolable nor permanent.
- The social structures constrain the actions of individual agents.
- Thus structure and action constrain with each other in an evolving way.

In the question of Israel's national interests, the structure is more predominant in the foreign policy. But it will be a big error to look upon the big picture through such a narrow perspective, because according to the pro-agency camp, Hamas and Hezbollah's probable dovish long-run policies and an aware Jewish society's potential uprising against the Israeli state and IDF (Israel Defence Forces), which have together created a security paranoia within the population, might devastate the structure of the Jewish nation.

¹ Structuration Theory. Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuration_theory.

² "Anthony Giddens: The Theory of Structuration". Available on site <http://www.theory.org.uk/giddens2.htm>.

³ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press.

When the 2nd Lebanon War of July 2006 is taken into consideration, the neorealist approach might argue that Hezbollah has ended up suffering harm and defeated by IDF (Israel Defence Forces) due to statistical indications. The fact is that Israel has only lost 121 soldiers and 44 civilians where Hezbollah and the Lebanese society have suffered so many casualties and losses. But according to the theory of structuration, this war has also caused the rise of Hezbollah and assisted the organization to gain distinction in Lebanon and the Middle East. To claim that the 2nd Lebanon War has ended with the autarchy of Israel by referring to numbers of losses and the power of destruction (during the July war, the infrastructure of Lebanon was heavily damaged after the Israeli bombardment) might not be a wisely chosen point of view which at the same time doesn't reflect the true nature of the region. The author aims to dissolve the existing induction methods which generalize the Israeli foreign policy and the elements of the Middle East region as a structure. For instance, Lebanon has a sui-generis political structure based upon religious identities. On the other hand, Kadima, became the major party of the coalition after the Israeli legislative election of 2006 although Ariel Sharon was seriously ill.⁴ Failures of the Labour-Likud coalition government, demographical concerns and the hawkish perspective of the George W. Bush administration, made Kadima the ruling party. Kadima had no social agenda except the unilateral disengagement plan and the security paranoia mentioned above. Kadima's choice, Amir Peretz, as minister of defense was also a big balloon which has extinguished during the 2nd Lebanon War.

The author also foresees that the Greater Middle East Project after the 2nd Lebanon War and the security-paranoia-centered structure created by both neo-conservative parties in Israel and US has come to an end. The Israeli military strikes to Gaza Strip and Benjamin Netanyahu's sudden rise after the Israel-Gaza conflict (Israel-Hamas conflict of 2006) make it a fair argument that conservatism in the Israeli society increases. To understand the foreign policy of Israel within the context of theory of structuration, one has to elaborate on the national and regional-level conjuncture and how this conjuncture is being perceived by both parties.

⁴ Marcus J., 2006, "Can Kadima Survive without Sharon?". Available on site http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4585686.stm.

2. THE PROBLEM AND THE NEED OF THEORY IN THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International relations carry inherent contingencies and dilemmas. However, the international atmosphere has some continuous and coherent qualifications as well. First of all, international relations develop *de facto* between nation states. It is true that each component of the international environment has considerable effects over the direction of the international policies. But in the last era of history, state has become the main political actor of the current issues in the international political stage.

In the global arena, some non-state actors should be considered as secondary groups. Global Multi-National Cooperation (MNCs), multinational organizations, global banks, some big foundations and also terrorist groups can be counted as relatively autonomous actors in addition to nation-states. Nevertheless, with its complex bureaucratically structure, lobbies and leaders of states have the potential to affect foreign policies.

Both factors are categorical and concrete entities. However the states are not static variables of the international system. There are some differences between states. The imbalance of global power distribution between states leads to collaboration among states most dominantly in the time of conflict and wars. When Middle East is taken into consideration, this collaboration among states in times of conflict is considerably right. So it is hard to assume “all things equal, then” argument in the international arena.

Therefore socio-political scientific theories help us understand and analyze the complex structure of the international arena and international relations.⁵ Moreover, theories provide social scientists the perspective of the phenomena which enables them to achieve systematic knowledge.⁶

For Kenneth Waltz (2000), theories enable the understanding of processes, movements and events

⁵ Weber, C., 2001, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*, Routledge, p.17, London; New York.

⁶ Anderson, L., 1999, *Politics In the Middle East: opportunities and limits in the quest for theory* in area studies and social science : strategies for understanding Middle East politics ed. Mark Tessler, Bloomington : Indiana University Press.

in a retrospective manner.⁷ In other words, theories are the explanation of past experiences and processes. For Viotti and Kauppi (1993), theories help political scientists to have access to abstract and reasonable knowledge which explains the international systems and international relations in the world.⁸

Why do we need theories in international relations? Firstly, the task of the theory is to understand or make people conceptualize the experiences and processes more clearly. Secondly, numerous classified information, files and news make the researcher attain some generalizations to develop policies. Thirdly, theories create cause-effect relationships in the political atmosphere and therefore, they enable the theoretician to predict about future developments. In addition to these indications, predictions can be converted into hypotheses and these hypotheses can be tested by analyzing actual and past events and processes.⁹ Fourthly, a true theory should be explanatory and should have an inner consistency in its explanations. It should also be open to contemporary developments and be objective to understand the objective world.

For Rosenau (1993), theoretical attempts in international relations are not coincidental because international relations have a reasonable system and this system has a continuation in itself.¹⁰ Therefore, modern international relations can and should be the subject matter of the theoretical explanations.

For Sydnor (1984), international relations theories should not be a magical sphere for the politicians and states but should ask intelligent questions and invent useful concepts and perspectives to understand the nature of international relations.¹¹

⁷ Waltz, K.N., 2000, *Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory*, Andrew Linklater, Critical Concepts In Political Science, Vol: IV, New York: Routledge Press, p.1523.

⁸ Viotti, P.R. And Kauppi M.V., 1993, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, p.3.

⁹ Dougherty, J.E. And Pfaltzgraff, R. L., 1990, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Third Edition, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, p.18.

¹⁰ Rosenau, J.N., 1993, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly*, in Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, p.23-26.

¹¹ Snyder, J.L., 1984, "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy", *International Security* (Winter 1984/85), p.89-108.

2.1 The Relationship Between Theory and Foreign Politics

Like any other social sciences, political science needs theories in order to explain and systematize political dynamics. Theories can be helpful to analyze international relations' complicated structure. International relations is traditionally divided into two basic fields: international politics and foreign policy. The former focuses on the structure of the international system and its processes whereas the latter deals with the behavior of the states within the international system.¹²

Foreign policy can be defined as the set of planned and unplanned attributions, behaviors and applications of states towards other actors within the system. Actors in the system can be state-related such as ministers and the states themselves or non-state organizations such as international organizations and groups. Foreign politics is the sum of the actors' attributes and negotiations in solving international problems in a war or peace environment.¹³ In short, foreign policy includes pursued policy and concrete behavior of states organizations and their representatives within the international system.

The behavior and politics followed in the foreign policy is determined by a particular conceptual and theoretical conjuncture. Consequently, it is very important to detect factors that draw the borders of this conjuncture in the foreign policy behavior. Factors can be universal such as the importance of security in the Middle East politics or state-specific as Greater Middle East Project in which particular states are involved.

No matter the origin of the factors, each of them should be explained within a theoretical perspective, because theories are academic attempts to explain certain past and present political processes and thus have the capacity to make predictions for future policies and political processes in the international system. Hence, a factor can improve different interpretations and analyses. On the other hand, theories enable them to make critical truths.

¹² Arı, T., 2002, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, Alfa Yay., p.15, İstanbul.

¹³ Tayfur, M.F., 2005, *Dış Politika*, (Derl.) Atilla Eralp, Devlet ve Ötesi; Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar, İletişim Yay., p.73, İstanbul.

Theories are obligatory to cope with the problem of explaining politicians' behaviors within the limited perspective of ethics and psychological motivations under the politician's intentions. A concrete and coherent analysis and full comprehension of particular states' foreign policy depend on a comprehensive theory. For instance, Morgenthau establishes a theory based on the dynamics of power relationships and the power relations which become the central locus of his theoretical assumptions.¹⁴

Therefore each theory in foreign politics can be seen as an attempt to explain the reality underlying in the international relations. Theories can even be a guide for foreign policy behavior. It won't be wrong to say that US foreign policy was in harmony with Jacksonian detente theory* in the last period of the Cold War.

Different theories vary in international relations with their relationship to their methodology and particular unit of analysis. The analysis can take place in four dimensions. It can be in the system level analysis which examines state behavior by looking at the international system. At this level of analysis, the international system is the cause and state behavior is the effect. Characteristics of the international system cause states to behave the way they do. Change in the international system will cause change in state behavior. The key variable in the international system is the power of a state within the system. Some states are powerful; others are weak. For instance, the Cold War had two powerful states. Therefore, the central cause of all state behavior in the Cold War was due to the fact of United States and USSR being the two powerful states in a bipolar system. After the Cold War, U.S becomes the sole police of the world. This level of analysis might explain the US intervention in Iraq as a matter of the US, the one and only powerful state, flexing its muscles against states that threaten it. The US wants to preserve its dominance and for this reason it crushes all challengers.

State level analysis examines the foreign policy behavior of states in terms of state characteristics.

¹⁴ Mollow, M.B., 2002, *Power and Transcendences: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience*, Lexington Books Press, p.15.

* detente: It is a political term standing for relaxation and easiness between foreign politics of two or more states. The term was very popular during the Cold War days to refer to well-intentioned policies of the Cold War Forces after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

For example, some scholars say that all democracies behave in a certain way; they don't fight with other democracies. The weakness or strength of states can also be another way of using state level of analysis. Moreover, some scholars might say that the foreign policy behavior of every state is a cultural characteristic, defined by the historical legacy of the state, the religious and social traditions as well as the economic and geographic nature of the state itself.¹⁵ State level of analysis might explain Israel's invasion in Lebanon as a function of the missionary quality of Israel's foreign policy.

Organizational level analysis examines the way in which organizations within a state function to influence foreign policy behavior.¹⁶ States don't make decisions. Organizations bargain with each other to create a foreign policy that is a compromise between competing organizations. For this level of analysis for example, we could look at the war in Iraq and try to explain it by examining the interests of the US military, the department of defense, the state department, and the central intelligence agency. How these organizations create US foreign policy would be the key question at this level of analysis.

Individual level analysis focuses on people. Individuals make decisions within nation states and therefore people make foreign policy¹⁷ and scholars look at the roles of different leaders. This level of analysis might explain World War II by examining the role of Hitler or in the case of Kadima's success in Israel by looking at the role of Ariel Sharon. With these features, the basic international foreign theories are divided into two camps. On one hand there are realism and its reflections and on the other we have idealism and its derivations. Below the author will discuss them in detail and try to apply these theories in the context of Israel. Firstly, I will look at realist theory which can be considered as one of the earliest perspectives in international relations.

¹⁵ Newmann, B., (undated), "A Brief Introduction to Theories on International Relations and Foreign Policy". Available on site <http://www.people.vcu.edu/~wnewmann/468theory.htm>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

3. REALIST THEORY

The failure of international diplomacy followed by the First World War leaves its place to more optimistic and idealistic thought in the international relations after the war. However, international relations at the time were still keeping its ambiguity in itself and the problem of conflict between nation states was still a dangerous threat for the nation states. This chaotic situation in the international relations was seen as a result of an unrealistic perspective drawn by idealistic politicians and thinkers.¹⁸

In order to criticize idealistic liberal ideas which were predominant between the two world wars, E.H Carr (1962) claims that the regulations made after the First World War are the dissolution of idealist liberal ideas.¹⁹ The Second World War has raised the critiques towards liberal views. Realist approach to international relations was born as a reaction to unsuccessful idealistic thought and had great influence on international relations for a long time. Realist thought which reigned between 1930s and 1980s in the international relations arena has considered itself as theory and not just an approach.²⁰

Realism won a victory over idealistic approach after the Second World War by equating itself with scientific process. H.J Morgenthau's monumental book "International Relations" was published to announce the ascending validity of realistic theory.²¹

The Cold War was guided and led from the perspective of the realist thought. Hence realism sees international relations as an interest struggle among nation states. Therefore, those that will become powerful nation states can be the most prosperous ones according to this theory. This can be seen as a very simplistic explanation but within the Cold War perspective where many barriers were assumed with wars, collaborations, polarity and imperialism and other international phenomena, these explanations were fluid but very strong.²²

¹⁸ Arıboğan, D.Ü., 1998, *Kabileden Küreselleşmeye, Uluslararası İlişkiler Düşüncesi*, Mavi Ada Yay., İstanbul, p.156.

¹⁹ Carr, E.H., 1962, *The Twenty Years Crisis; 1919–1939*, St Martin's Press, London.

²⁰ Rosenberg, J., 1994, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, Verso, p.10, London.

²¹ Ibid, p.16.

²² Walt, S.M., Spring 1998, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", *Foreign Policy*, Vol: 1, p.15–16.

Therefore, one should move away from Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes to trace the formation of realistic perspective. When coming to the 20th century, Carr followed the heritage of Machiavellian concepts and Morgenthau was affected by the claims of Thomas Hobbes.²³

Carr and Morgenthau claim that the realistic perspective is compatible with the evidences of history. This enables the theory's continuity and validity. For them, the rise and decline of the power which is the determinant in state formation and the difference of the power capacities of the states are the primary reason of change in the international relations balance. History has proposed apparent proofs for this idea and this has made realistic theory a universal one. History also as a science has become the main engine of the realistic theory which pushes realistic thinkers to declare realism as the main paradigm of the science of international relations.²⁴

There are many different views on the essentials of realistic theory but most of them defend the following characteristics: The first one is the absolute importance of the state in the political stage. The sovereign equality among states since the Treaty of Westphalia has made realist thinkers claim that the international systems is structured chaotically since the states are not responsible to any authority above them.²⁵

3.1 How does Realist Theory Evaluate International Relations?

Realism evaluates international relations from a broad perspective. The primary point made by realism is that international relations are anarchic by nature. States in the international system are autonomous and sovereign. Since the states do not want to compensate any privileges from their independent and hegemonic position, they have a tendency of not accepting any authority above them. Even there are variations in the power balance in the international arena; no state has a right to claim sovereignty over another state. It is true that some states are more powerful than others

²³ Holsti, O.R., (1995), *Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers*, and Kegley Jr. C.W., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, New York: St Martin's Press, p.36–37.

²⁴ Rosenberg, J., 1994, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, Verso, p.10, London.

²⁵ Ibid, 136.

but there is no legal claim or agreement about a hierarchical relationship among the states. It should not be allowed that a state claims itself higher positioned than the other states. Therefore, Realism called this situation anarchy because there is a power system in the international arena but not a legal authority.

Realist theory also assumes that each state is governed by its own legislation and law system and has no obligatory dependency on the other states' law and legacy. Therefore anarchy is permanent and structural which is inherent in international relations. It is the definitive characteristic of the international environment. Since there is no authority over the states in the international arena, there is no institution to make common laws and execute them. Hence, anarchy solves the conflicts and provides the continuation of the international relations. The only way to maintain order then is to prevent conflicts and wars, in other words keeping the powers in balance. This can only be possible with a big structural apparatus, states in other words.²⁶

The second defining principle of realist theory is the distribution of capability among units, within the more capable ones, shaping the realm, posing the problems that the others have to deal with.²⁷ The analogy is between international politics on one hand and oligopolistic sectors of an economy on the other hand. However, this is not a purely competitive realm. It's one in which the major actors, those of greater capability, set the scene in which the others must act.

States are accepted as a rational element in the international relations according to realism. States are assumed in their unity because their territories are drawn by borders and any non-nation state actor is banned to interfere within these boundaries. Therefore, the realist state is defined as a single unified unit opposed to external factors.²⁸

A criticism can be made about the differences within the territories of the states but since our theme is focused on the international relations, as realism explains this situation as in the last instance; a state should establish a unity in its claims against the external world. This is the only way to speak in the international arena. To sum up, a realist state has and should have a single

²⁶ Viotti and Kauppi , p.48–50.

²⁷ Ibid, p.6–7.

²⁸ Ibid, p.33.

view about a particular issue discussed in the international world to keep itself as a “total and unified actor”.²⁹

The second component of the realist state is the rationality. For a state, being rational is up to the state itself. However, in order to reach goals and realize aims, it should calculate the cost and opportunity cost of its actions and behaviors. The Realist state is claimed to be a state which maximizes profit when reaching its goals and evaluating its alternatives.

Briefly, a realist state is defined as a free-enterprise in the market which can be considered as the international arena. In the market, the state definitely has a dominant role in contrast to non-state actors. Secondly, this entrepreneur should act according to the realization of its own goals and targets within the perspective of interest maximization and principles of rationality. This is the only way to survive in the jungle of the international arena which, as already mentioned is defined as chaotic because of the lack of absolute authority between the states.³⁰

3.2 How does Realist Theory Perceive Foreign Policy?

As stated above, states are the main and active agents of the international political system according to the Realist theory. In addition to this, states and governments are unitary beings with the purpose of achieving their own goals and fulfilling their needs just like individuals.³¹

Therefore, realist foreign policy stems upon the interests of nation states. Each state wants to defend and further its own interests and apply its politics due to the international system. Realists claim that in the politics, when ethics and interests of a state are conflicting, it is the interests which nation states tend to prioritize. Hence, the most ethical responsibility of a state is seen as realizing those interests. So, one can argue that realists evaluate universal ethical principles as non-applicable procedures as long as they conflict with the nation-states' interests.

In short, states have the right to protect its interests according to the realist theory.³²

²⁹ Ibid, p.34

³⁰ Holsti, p.56–57.

³¹ Rosenberg, p.36.

³² Ibid, p.16.

Morgenthau claims that foreign policy could not be identified with states' ethical choices or with principles governing the international relations. Yet, it is the concept 'Interest' within the context of power that protects a state from ethical radicalism and political mistakes. Therefore, foreign policy depends on three main factors according to Morgenthau. These are gaining power, keeping and maintaining the power in hand and using this power actively.

Then the question of what the relationship between national politics and foreign politics is? Do they differ from each other or do they have different political dynamics? Realist theory argues that national politics and foreign politics are totally different governing logics. It claims that one should not mix up national politics with foreign politics. According to realists, foreign politics is named as high politics and should be analyzed regardless to the national politics, because foreign politics are not able to interfere with national politics which embodies nation states and nations' essential values and interests.³³

Foreign policy has different political dynamics compared to national politics. For realist theory, all foreign politics have a political goal as the power struggle is justified and explained within the context of ethical and legal perspectives. Realist foreign policy is embraced by mostly statesmen and ambassadors who are actively engaged in foreign politics. They involve in realism because most states act in the context of national interest maximization. Moreover, foreign politics stand apart from national problems and national conflicts seems rational to the statesman. This rational basis enables them to win the heart of the public as well.³⁴

Realist theory suggests that the foreign policy of states is ruled by laws of rationality and the states are the perpetrators of this rational activity. This is because rational policy considers utility and interest maximization.

For this reason, the goals and targets should be rational according to the power capacity of a

³³ Ibid, p.17.

³⁴ Eralp. A., 1997, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplinin Oluşumu: İdealizm-Realizm Tartışması*, Atilla Eralp (Derl.), Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik; Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar, İstanbul: İletişim Yay, p.80.

state.³⁵

Realist hypothesis justifies its claims by operating useful concepts for the sake of the theory. These concepts are power, balance of powers and national interests. In order to understand realist theoretical formulations, the author will elaborate on and analyze these concepts in detail in the following chapters.

3.2.1 Power

The concept of power as the basis of realist theory is the struggle of states to gain it. International politics is a struggle to gain power as well. Many realist intellectuals propose ideas on the definition of power. A group of intellectuals, for example, defines power as the sum of all the superiorities of states in military, financial, technological and diplomatic aspects. Another group of intellectuals, on the other hand, does not see power as the total of absolute values for a state, but sees it as abilities of a country in relation and interaction with other states' abilities.³⁶ Moreover, a state has an influence on the other states and some values of quality and quantity accepted in the international arena. Geography, natural sources, industrial capacity, military capacity and population can be counted as values of quantity. National well-being and national character can be regarded as values of quality.³⁷ Some of these power resources even have both quality and quantity values. In this sense, powers of economical and technological capacity can be attributed to both values.

There are also some theories defying power as a capacity. According to this theory, comparing the population of two states does not contribute to assess power analytically; instead it should be defied through the capacity of influence on the other states. The capacity is defied through power sources. As the elements of power, geography, population, financial capacity, natural sources, military and technological facilities, political system, leadership, and national well-being are

³⁵ Williams, H., Wright, M. And Evans, T. (Derl.), 1996, *Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Siyaset Üzerine Bir Derleme*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, p.279–280.

³⁶ Milner, H., January 1991, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", *Review of International Studies*, Vol: 17, No: 1, p.67-85.

³⁷ Ibid, p.68.

generally taken into account.³⁸ According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (2001), they define power as “*the ability of an agent to make another agent do a specific action that this agent would not do under normal conditions*”.³⁹ In a general frame, the concept of power is the abilities of agents or states to solve the conflicts and overcome the difficulties by the means of influencing others' behavior for their own interests and taking the control over others' behavior and ideas.⁴⁰

In the very first ages of humanity, the concept of power was first used by Thucydides in his book called History of the Peloponnesian War. The main reason of war according to Thucydides, was the increasing power of Athens and the Spartans' fear of this power.⁴¹ It shows that the real reason of this war derived from the fear of change in the power balance itself. The power struggle in this era created concepts like ‘fear’ and ‘war’ that we have encountered countless times until our age.⁴²

Two of the realists from the modern era, E. H. Carr and R. Niebuhr also emphasized the importance of power. Morgenthau puts the concept of power in the center of international politics analysis by stressing the nature, the conductor and the borders of power. While emphasizing that power is the main reason of politics and the basic urge of any political action, Morgenthau also defines the concept of power as an instrument for realizing a relationship or an aim.⁴³

Consequently, the primary aim of each state is to reach power to survive in the international arena and to maintain their existence. If one evaluates the power in the field of foreign politics, it is the ability of main agents of international politics to influence other agents to apply politics that they would not do normally, so to say influence other states in accordance with their own interests.

3.2.2 Power Balance

In a power struggle, one state applies a counter power with the objective of preventing a powerful state from imposing its own rules on it and of creating a power balance and sustain it. There are

³⁸ Sönmezoğlu, F., 1995, Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi, İstanbul: Filiz Yay., p.140

³⁹ Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J. S., 2001, *Power and Interdependence*, Third Edition, Princeton Press.

⁴⁰ Knutsen, T.L., 2001, *A History of International Relations Theory*, Manchester University Press, p.253.

⁴¹ Arıboğan, D.Ü., 2001, *Globalleşme Senaryosunun Aktörleri Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güç Mücadelesi*, İstanbul: Der Pub., p.30.

⁴² Viotti & Kauppi, p. 35

⁴³ Arı, p.130.

two options of balance politics. The first is the creation of an alliance of smaller states against one powerful state by executing policies against the powerful state's superiority. The second is the politics of individual states to preserve their own interests while at the same time guarding their rivals' positions in order to avoid a change of status-quo to the favor of only one of the parties.⁴⁴

When a state or an international authority does not attempt to take over the hegemony of the world all the time, the defying aspect of the international system is anarchic. In the international system, states always compete to increase their power; however, none of them steps forward to be the political leaders and because of that, the international system remains as a system consisting of anarchic national states.⁴⁵ Together with this, it is possible that a separation between powers and abilities among the states in this anarchic environment could occur. Anarchy and the separation of powers always reflect the system itself. Despite this anarchic situation, there is an order in international relations. Not to a desired level, though. The concept creating this order is the power balance.⁴⁶

Realist theory suggests that there can be certain a order in the international system through war or power balance, since the war helps building a power balance that recreates the power separation by solving the conflicts in international relations.⁴⁷ There have been changes in power balance politics too as in the international system and in politics. According to realist theory, the power balance can be the theory of the international system. The proportion of power can be identified with the numbers of poles within the international system.⁴⁸

Realist theory suggests an analysis on a possible situation derived from a number of poles in international relations. It also asks questions about the relationship between the number of poles and the efficiency of power such as if the multi-polar system or the dipolar system is more effective? With this kind of questions, realists investigate the possibilities of war and peace. For this question, Kenneth Waltz thinks that the dipolar system is more effective, on the other hand

⁴⁴ Sheehan, M.J., 1996, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, Taylor & Francis.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p.9.

⁴⁶ Viotti & Kauppi, p.47.

⁴⁷ Sheehan, p.59.

⁴⁸ Viotti & Kauppi, p.51.

Morton Kaplan supports the idea of a multi-polar system.⁴⁹ Some theorists together with Waltz suggests that as the number of poles increase, it gets more difficult to decide as it requires more information, thus creating uncertainties in the system which makes them think that a dipolar system is more effective for the maintenance of a power balance.⁵⁰ According to John Mearsheimer, a multi-polar system has the possibility of war within itself more than the dipolar systems do. He argues that the multi-polar system that has some potential dominant states is the most dangerous of all systems.⁵¹

As the war is the last option to be chosen in problem solving, the power balance is accepted as an alternative security system to war. The fact that states want to preserve their interests and their power makes the importance of a power balance increase. In this framework, alliance politics and the army rivalry come to the scene as a way to maintain power balance without fighting. The failure of these politics, though, makes war inevitable.

The period after World War II can be given as an example of these ideas. While states got in the rivalry of armament, the foundations of NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955 contribute to the creation of the two blocks of powers. The conflict between these two blocks in military, political and financial fields continued until the 1990s.⁵²

Realists have discussed among themselves if the power balance is achieved automatically or through the will of state leaders. At the end of these discussions, some of the realists have reached a conclusion by pointing out that willingness is important for a power balance and that “power balance is one of the foreign politics of state politicians; it does not occur automatically”. State politicians and diplomats are the persons that create a power balance and preserve it. Other realists, on the other hand, have inferred the conclusion that power balance occur automatically as a consequence of basic elements of international politics. In our age, the power balance system is not commonly used in politics anymore. Security systems among states have taken its place instead. Moreover, in our time there is not an international environment based on power balance.

⁴⁹ Kaplan, M.A., 1969, *Balance of Power: Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems*.

⁵⁰ Viotti & Kauppi, p.55.

⁵¹ Mearsheimer, J., 2001, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton Company, p.21, New York.

⁵² Arıboğan, p.176.

With the developing world the role of international organization has gained more importance. In the power balance system, one cannot encounter with the idea of a common authority. In our times, there is an international organization in the center of the international system based on the representation of states providing collective security. This international organization is the United Nations, which is not a superior power, tough.

Consequently, one of the arguments of realist theory in foreign politics can be regarded as a political requirement that prove that states can survive and exist in the international system. It is believed that in the international system dominated by power struggle, a peaceful order can only be possible through power balance. Because of that, power balance has been an important part of politics that which states appreciate.

3.2.3 National Interests

National interests, one of realism's defying points of international politics, include all the political measures that are taken by states to preserve their own interests. National interests are one of the main stimuli of states for actions taken for the foreign politics; however it is hard to define this concept clearly.⁵³ Realist theory argues that the main reason of states foreign policy actions is to protect national interests. In this regard, Morgenthau also says that aims of foreign politics are based on national interests.

If one needs to define the concept of national interests analytically, one can come up with five titles under this concept: strategic interests, political interests, economical interests, constitutional interests, and ideological interests. To be more specific, Frankel investigates this concept in three parts: The level of ideals, functional level and polemical level. For the certain interests defying politics in a certain time period, he puts forward the functional national interests. National interests in the level of ideals are interests derived from political emotions and desires without taking a state's capacity into account. And lastly, interests defined through explanation, evaluation or

⁵³ Finnemore, M., 1996, *National Interests in International Society*, Cornell University Press, p.1.

critique of foreign politics is interests in the polemical level.⁵⁴

In the international system, states are the main actors of a state-centered system. A nation state uses the power in the name of the nation more than using it as a mere authority. This leads to the concept of national interests instead of the mentality of reason of state. Realists regard national interests as the source of motivation for foreign politics action and a defying point of certain decisions and priorities in the international system.

The ethical responsibility of a state is to protect its interests to the end. As a consequence of this action, ethical principles are out of the process in applying foreign politics. According to realism, the ethical behavior of a state is to protect its own national interests.⁵⁵ Consequently, realist theory defines the national interest concept as the rational application in foreign politics in the frame of certain interests derived from present capacity and aims of a state.

3.2.4 Security

The concept of security comes from realism's explanation of the international system as anarchic. Thus, realists often mention the anarchic structure of the international system which brings along the ideas of security. The states differ from each other in their ruling system, but because of the anarchic situation in the international system, their behavior in foreign politics resemble. In the field of the international system the biggest amount of evaluation concerning the security in the system comes from realist theoreticians.⁵⁶

Realist theory puts forward a conceptual framework of security concepts by systematizing it. The mission of security attributed by realists increases in regard with the realists explanation of international relations as inter-state relationships and with the evaluation of inner state politics in the frame of power politics. Realist theory gives the responsibility of providing national and state security to the state. According to this explanation providing national security means proving

⁵⁴ Frankel, J., *National Interest*, Pall Mail Press, 1970, p.32, London.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.33.

⁵⁶ Tanrısever, O.F., 2005, *Güvenlik*, (Derl.) Atilla Eralp, Devlet ve Ötesi; Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, p.109.

individual security.⁵⁷

Because of the realist theory's state-centered perspective, providing national security is the mission of the state. They think an existing national security brings individual security. Moreover they suggest that if the national and state security can be provided through military actions, the state will make necessary decisions and precaution within the frame of the power balance mechanism to apply military actions.

Security, in this framework, is explained as individuals providing their own physical security one by one. As a consequence, realist theory explains state security as individual security. Realist theory claims that actions to upgrade military capacity to diminish the threats to the common interests of foreign politics can be the most rational political behavior. So, one can say that realism has tried to put security applications to a more scientific level by systematizing its role in international politics. Especially in the Cold War period, realist theory focused on the concept of military power while evaluating the concept of security. In this framework, realist theory assesses a problem concerning military power at the level of security, so it infers that if a problem concerns military power it becomes a problem of security. Apart from that, problems not concerning military power are defined as political problems according to this theory. Realist theory has used the concept of security as a synonym of military security, and its evaluations and interpretations have been constructed according to this idea. The number and the intensity of explanations and interpretations concerning security have increased in realist theory after the Cold War period. These new explanations are evaluated under the title of the New Explanations in Realism.

4. FEATURES OF NEOREALISM

Changes have always been made along the way in the field of international relations. In the course of history and along with a changing world, realist theory has reviewed its own theories. Realism's regard on political benefits and power balance are the basis of the theory, and that it somehow has been neglecting the economical relation between countries has led realism to be criticized. In the

⁵⁷ Çelebi, Ö., 2006, *Güvenlik*, Haydar Çakmak (Derl.), Uluslararası İlişkiler, Giriş, Kavram ve Teoriler, Platin Yay., p. 71, Ankara.

international arena, economical blocks have started to prevail since the 1970s.

Moreover, the international system has changed from being focused on the USA and Soviet Russia struggle, to being a multi-polarized structure with the rise of Europe and Far East.⁵⁸ In this environment, new waves in the international relations theory have started to be discussed. Neorealism focuses on the topics that realism has not touched upon which are mainly about the financial part of the system. Neorealism, together with pluralism, was presented as an alternative to the school of mutual dependency and a revision mechanism for realism which neglected the economical power relations.⁵⁹

After realism framed its interests with political and military relations, the economical aspects of these relations had to be covered via liberal and globalist theories. Thanks to neorealism the lack of economic and social aspects has been filled with some new ideas especially by the efforts of theoreticians such as Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Krasner.

One of these important theoreticians, Kenneth Waltz is known as the founder of this theory. In his “Theory of International Politics”, he reveals the basic principles and ideas of neorealism.⁶⁰ He himself says that he wrote “Theory of International Politics” in a positivist tradition and in order to present an international theory that covers the points that realism misses.⁶¹ Neorealism's perspective of international relations started to be formed over the topics of the structure and the system.

Neorealists have claimed that the international system is not hierarchical but anarchic, and this system, by affecting other parts of the system, builds up interactions having the same functions.⁶² The International structure is formed through the interaction of countries and this structure prevents some countries from doing certain actions, while at the same time prompts others to do exactly these.⁶³

⁵⁸ Gilpin, R., 2008, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, p.115.

⁵⁹ Arıboğan, p.202.

⁶⁰ Waltz, K.N., 1979, *Theory of International Politics*, Random House, New York.

⁶¹ Griffiths, M., 1992, *Realism, Idealism, and International Politics: A Reinterpretation*, Routledge, p.77.

⁶² Arıboğan, p.202.

⁶³ Waltz, p.1528.

In the system, each unit's existence and success depends on its own power. Moreover, the system's foundation and continuity is based on the acceptance of the self-help principle as the major possibility by the agents. The self-help principle is the principle of continuing action in an anarchic environment.⁶⁴ According to this principle, in order to become an important part of the international anarchic structure, states use their power to preserve and protect themselves from others and they are always in a struggle for existence.

Thus, the international structure limits the cooperation between states.⁶⁵ Neorealist theory does not put forward a different understanding from realism's thesis of anarchic international relations. After neorealist theory has maintained itself, it coincides and conflicts with realism in certain points about international agents. However, in neorealism like in realism the basic unit is the state.

Neorealists focus on examining the state's behavior in the frame of the international system. They regard the state as an agent behaving rationally in any case.⁶⁶ The state is an intelligent agent which forms and moves the international system, while at the same time guarding its own interests. The state wants to be sure of reaching its aims in the most efficient ways. This opportunist approach reveals itself through power. Contrary to the realists, neorealists perceive power as an instrument, not as a target.⁶⁷ Power owned by a state is an instrument which is shared or used when necessary. In a more concrete sense, this power can be military, financial and technological.

According to Waltz, a state's power depends on its influence on other states. The more powerful a state gets, the more it influences other states while at the same time staying uninfluenced. Neorealists have developed the understanding of power a little further from what realists have, and they have taken it to the level of the international system. In this perspective, the use of power has become a basic signifier in both domestic and foreign policies of states.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Waltz, p.107.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.105.

⁶⁶ Arıboğan, p.203.

⁶⁷ Waltz, p.1531.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.104.

4.1 The Difference of Neorealist Theory from Realism in the Basis of Foreign Policy

Neorealists's great attribution to the international system derives from the fact that it is a point of origin for the foreign policy. According to neorealism, a state's foreign policy is determined not only through its own domestic sources, but also through aspects of the international system. In this sense, to be able to discuss a state's foreign policy, it is crucial to know the structure of the international system and the state's position in this system, - the level of power, so to say.

The difference between these two theories is that neorealism argues that the determining issue of foreign policy is the system itself. In contrast to realism, neorealist theory handles the system's effects on the state's behavior without taking the human nature into consideration. The system is anarchic, and each state has to stand alone. Waltz claims that this situation leads small states to choose to act like a balance mechanism rather than standing beside the more powerful states.

Within the system, neorealist theory defends that a dipolar system is more consistent than a multipolar one, contrary to what realism argues.⁶⁹ Neorealism prepares the conditions for the new theory of the system, assessing all the international policy system as a whole, and setting up an independent international policy apart from the structure and units. Neorealism expands the concept of system structure by pointing out that the system itself effects all the consequences of all the actions of even smaller units. The international structure derives from the interaction between the states and as mentioned before, it acts differently towards different states, by hindering or prompting some actions.⁷⁰

Although there have been some changes in the political structures of the states, their behavior within the international system resemble each other's. Thus, the resemblance makes their behavior in foreign policy closer. According to neorealist theory of the Cold War period, USA and Soviet Russia appear exactly different from each other; however, both their military policy and their interventions in other states' domestic policies were very similar. The resemblance between Russia's intervention in Hungary in the Cold War period and USA's intervention in Latin

⁶⁹ Griffiths, p.89.

⁷⁰ Waltz, p.1527.

American states can be regarded as an example of this similarity.⁷¹

One of the topics that the neorealists focus on is the role of financial issues in international relations. Economic relations and processes can have important outcomes on power and policy. It has been clearly emphasized in neorealist theory that the financial situation of the states plays a crucial role in their foreign policy. The realist theory's neglect of financial contradictions and conflicts prevents it from finding necessary solutions to problems.⁷² Realist theory fails taking both financial issues and social sciences into consideration which is a must in examining the foreign policies of states. Here lies one of the most important criticisms of neorealism concerning realism: Realism fails to use data of economics and social sciences.⁷³

Neorealist theory has emerged in the détente period of the Cold War. It has become a theoretical approach shaped after certain incidents such as financial issues taking over military power, the failure of analysis at the level of units, the international system's no longer explained through the classical power balance idea and new agents are entering the international scene, new agents other than states themselves.⁷⁴

4.2 New Expansions in Neorealist Theory

In the period of the post-Cold War, the structure of the international system has also changed. The end of the dipolar era has become the beginning of a monopole era. For the western culture, the threat of communism has gone just as any other threats that had prevailed in history. With this new era, the agenda of international relations has also been renewed. New discussions and theoretical approaches have taken the scene of the post-Cold War period.

This new era certainly has required new international relations theories for the necessary expansions, as the former theories only described the pessimistic atmosphere of the Cold War. International relations no longer need theories explaining ideas through the concept of a new

⁷¹ Ayman, G., 2001, "Neorealist Perspektiften Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunan Dış Politikası: Güç, Tehdit ve İttifaklar", Ankara: SAEMK Araştırma Projesi Yay., p.2.

⁷² Griffiths, p.85.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Arıboğan, p.207.

enemy. Thus, realism, the major theory of the Cold War period, needed to renew itself. Even some writers claim that realism died with the end of the Cold War. But the disappearance of realism is an exaggerated idea.⁷⁵ Realist theory still preserves its dominant position in international relations as it presents several stable, strong and realistic interpretations of the various incidents.

The Cold War is over, but the state-based system still exists. The state-based realist approach has not gone through any difficulties in reviewing itself and presenting new ideas and interpretations concerning the changing system. After the Cold War, realism has suggested ideas explaining the collaboration of the states. In this framework, neorealists claim that with the rise of importance of “relative” and “absolute” benefits, states try to collaborate with other states and other agents within the system in order to upgrade their capacities. The theory also tries to examine how much power and influence a state uses in the collaboration with others.⁷⁶

This aspect of the theory reveals an important difference between neorealism and neoliberalism. Neoliberalist theory argues that the states do not act according to the rules, but they tend to deceive and trick others just to preserve their own benefits making it impossible to create a real collaboration between the states.

In neorealism, it is claimed that deception and national benefits of the other parties are taken into consideration in a possible collaboration and that a state can give up collaboration if the other party does not apply to the present rules of the relations, and they can give up acting collaboratively, or finally turn to act alone.⁷⁷ Neorealist theory puts forward ideas about ethnicity-based conflicts and the problems of ethnic nationalism of the Cold War era. Barry Posen claims that multi-ethnic states will fall apart and that ethnic counterparts will become anarchic. He also underlines that an ethnic group can apply violence on the other in order to preserve its own position.

About the changes following the Cold War, neorealists claim that a multi-central system has

⁷⁵ Griffiths, M., 1992, *Realism, Idealism, and International Politics: A Reinterpretation*, Routledge, p.77.

⁷⁶ Waltz, K., 2000, “Structural Realism After The Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol: 25, p.23.

⁷⁷ Keohane, R.O., Spring 1998, “Uluslararası Kurumlar: Karşılıklı Bağımlılık Yürüyebilir mi?”, *Foreign Policy* (Turkish Edition), No:1, p.67.

started to be formed and especially states like Japan, India, Germany and China has come to scene as important power centers. Neorealists also argue that these foci of power will become more and more important in determining international politics; and the change of focus of power will move towards a multi-polar system.⁷⁸

According to neorealists, USA as being the only super power of post-Cold War era, along with newly emerging power of multi-central system rise the possibilities of conflicts. As a must for international peace these power motivations and agents should effectively balance each other, especially in terms of military power. The rise in the number of power focuses is a sign of rising ambiguity. With the rise of number, it gets more difficult for the agents and states to balance each other as easily in the former dipolar system.

Moreover, as it was experienced in previous multi-polar systems, this rise in the number of power focuses brings the danger of using weapons of mass destruction, like nuclear weapons, uncontrollably. A multi-polar system, in consequence, raises the possibility of a big war in a case of conflict.⁷⁹ Theoreticians working on post-Cold War security, give great importance to the new and more detailed ideas of neorealism.

These two new ideas, “aggressive” and “defensive” realism helps us understand the strategic preferences of states to exist in a nature of security prompted by the international system. Especially going for a distinction between aggressive and defensive interpretations is an interesting development within the theory. The theoreticians working on these new areas have preferred to be assessed differently from both realists and neorealists.⁸⁰

Defensive-realists like Waltz and Synder claim that states get only limited benefits from military occupations, defending that the budget of expansion is far bigger than the benefit itself. In accordance with this idea, Waltz thinks that the conflicts between big powers depend on their

⁷⁸ Mearsheimer, J., 2001, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton Company, p.270, New York.

⁷⁹ Waltz, p.30.

⁸⁰ Lamy, S.L., 2001, *Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, and Kegley Jr. C.W. (ed.) *Controversies in International Relations Theory*, p.187.

exaggeration of threat perception in smaller units and their overconfidence in their military power.⁸¹ Defensive-neorealists like Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder also claim that in big leaders' profit and loss account the loss part is always heavier. The military power used for expanding and occupations is in a complicated interrelatedness and in this age of globalism it is rejected by many leaders as a security strategy.

Aggressive-realists like John Mearsheimer and Fareed Zakaria put forward that anarchy prompts states to be of the greatest military power as it is never certain when a revisionist power comes to the scene of the international system. John Mearsheimer also claims that relative power is more important for the states than absolute power. Aggressive neorealists use several ideas of Waltz and of the positivist approach of traditional realism.⁸² Defensive neorealists are often confused with neoliberals.

Although neoliberals think that war can be avoided through decreasing the security dilemma and founding security organizations which are to set a secure area among the states, they do not regard international organizations as the most efficient means to prevent war.⁸³ Defensive neorealists share some pessimism with aggressive neorealist. Many of them claim that conflict is inevitable in many cases.

They explain this as a result of that the aggressive and expanding states are formed and challenge the system and this makes it impossible not to get in conflict with other states which try to protect their own interests in the same system. Consequently, defensive realists suggest existing in a secure state whereas aggressive realists suggest gaining this security through hegemony.

5. IDEALIST APPROACH

Idealism of international relations can be examined through different theories in history. The

⁸¹ Mearsheimer, J., 2001, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton Company, p.410, New York

⁸² Ibid, p.21.

⁸³ Moravcsik, A., Autumn 1997, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", *International Organization* Vol:51, No:4, p.513-53.

liberal universalism from the Enlightenment, idealism from in between two world wars' period and liberal institutionalism which started after World War I and developed until the 1970s. Pluralism of the 1970s can also be added to this list. The liberal universalism of the Enlightenment period was formed not by a certain theoretician but through the means of a general and dominant perspective. In this period that, lasted until World War I, the diversity of ideas reached from permanent peace to free trade and international harmony together with the rise of republican rules. The basis of these ideas derives from common concepts of the Enlightenment period such as individuality, rationality of mind, a search for rational morality, and the rise of parliament structure and positivist science.⁸⁴

Intellectuals of the Enlightenment such as Hugo Grotius, J.J. Rousseau and Immanuel Kant stepped forward with their idealist perspectives. Grotius mainly focused on the source of law in international relations. He researched natural laws and the rules of international relations which binding effect among states were accepted by the governments. J.J Rousseau suggested his ideas about a foundation of a confederation. He believed that among the states in a confederation conflicts would decrease and peace prevail, thus rules of law among the states would get the highest position in international relations.

The biggest contribution to idealism comes from Immanuel Kant. With his essay called "Perpetual Peace", he envisioned a peace federation shaped in an environment where rational individual and common values framed with republican rule would gain importance. After World War I, the idealist approach entered into a new process.⁸⁵

5.1 Idealism's Perspective of International Relations

World War I has been written as one of the biggest catastrophes in the history of humanity. Although the war lasted only four years, no other war in the history was as broad and geographically spread as World War I and no other war has been as destructive as this war, both materially and spiritually. The war also has an important role in terms of international relations.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Viotti and Kauppi, p.39.

After this war, for a long period of time, there could not be a permanent peace in the world. States and empires of those days' dominant power system had fallen down.

One of the most important consequences of World War I that still effects the international system is that the super power USA has given up isolationism with the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and has taken its position in international politics. Although USA preserved this isolationism strategy for some time between the First and Second World War, its politics and strategies prepared the way to becoming a super power of our time.⁸⁶

The most important intellectual that has influenced the idealist approach in international politics is undoubtedly Kant. He envisioned that a universal peace environment can prevail among the states and he saw change in the relations of the international scene. He suggested this idea realized not through a radical change in the states' system to forming a united world state, but on the basis of international laws and justice reinforced by an accepted democratic system.⁸⁷

Some parallelism can be found between the ideas of this European intellectual, Kant, and the USA president, Wilson. Wilson's idea of world politics structure derives from a radical separation from the old world's rules and traditions. He states that the structure of United States of America is basically and naturally peaceful and just like any self-determined peaceful state, they do not need to fight with and exert pressure on others.⁸⁸ Idealist approach to foreign policy claims that there are always social and political mechanisms behind conflicts and tensions between states. Idealists emphasize the need to find some institutions and organizations in order to prevent any future war and to preserve peace and democracy in the international scene.

Consequently, USA played a role with Europe's veteran powers in international politics for the first time in World War I where it presented solutions in the light of idealist approach and ideas for the existing problems. The triumphant European countries initiated the world system maintenance in fourteen countries. The League of Nations and the international law system supported this new

⁸⁶ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p. 353.

⁸⁷ Doyle, M.W., 1995, *Liberalism and World Politics Revisited*, Charles W. Kegley (Edited) Controversies in International Relations Theory, Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, St Martin's Press, p. 94, New York.

⁸⁸ Kissinger, H., 1994, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, p.206.

political arrangement. The Idealist atmosphere and Wilson's ideas strikingly marked this period of time between two world wars. However, the idealist approach failed in preventing war as the ideas originated from the New World still set new horizons for international politics.

5.2 Theory of Liberalism in International Relations

Liberalism is a theoretical movement which has some effects on the individual and the society through certain aims and ideals taking part in the history of modern western culture and literature. The basis of this theory consists of concepts like equality, rationality, liberty and property. Liberalism as an ideology has influenced Europe, England and USA in the 18th and 19th centuries in economical and political areas.⁸⁹

The dominant role of idealism in international relations during the two world wars period (1914-1945) has come to an end after the World War II. Realism's rise as a dominant ideology in international relations has declined after the 1970s with the rise of the regional unification movement. The rising influence of non-governmental institutions and multi-national companies has made liberal-focused politics gain more importance again.⁹⁰

As liberals are getting more and more influence in the international system, the major criticism to the system has also come from the broad spectrum of ideas in liberal theory. Liberal approach puts forward the idea that the economical dependency limits the use of violence states apply on each other as a counterpart to the idea that conflicts within the system prevent the welfare of the states.

Liberal theory's ideas of the nature and structure of the international system has its part in the theories of international relations. According to liberal theory, with trade and finance setting strong connections between the states and the expansion of democratic norms, it is possible to avoid the idea of an anarchic world which realism presumes.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Ari, p.308.

⁹⁰ Viotti and Kauppi, p.195.

⁹¹ Doyle, M.W., 1997, *Ways of War and Peace, Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*, W.W. Norton Company, p. 217–218, New York.

Doyle identifies the approach of international relations in liberal theory in the frame of four different elements. First of all, in liberal theory the agent sees the state as the legal representative of the society even if the agent itself accepts the actions of international institutions. The state should interfere in conflicts between individuals, not by taking part of either sides but as an arbiter. It should also preserve the conditions for the individuals to use their rights and fulfill their obligation to the highest extend possible.

According to the second approach, liberal theory deals with the international structure, and although it knows that the international scene is anarchic, it does not accept the idea that anarchy prevents the collaboration of states. It claims that states can eliminate conflicts between itself and the organizations and systems within these organizations. It also emphasizes that states can form up a beneficial alliance which is already between individuals and between the states.

According to the third approach, in liberal theory there happens to be local and global unifications between states in the course of time. The intense interaction among the states has increased and this certainly influences the relationships of agents in the international system. Finally, liberal theory suggests that within the frame of leading elements, the relationship between the states should continue not through common short term interests but through long term interests. Like neorealists, they also suggest that not the “relative benefit” but the “absolute final benefit” would gain importance among the states.⁹²

The importance of the state, according to liberal theory, is to clarify the position it occupies by setting parallelism between the state and the individual. For liberals, all individuals are equal and they have inborn rights such as freedom of living and freedom of getting education and so forth. Individuals maintain the state to protect these rights and the state gets its power from the individuals that it rules over. In this framework, also in the international system, all states are equal and they have the rights to exist, to be free and to protect their benefits.⁹³

⁹² Ibid, p.217.

⁹³ Ari, p.316.

5.3 The Approach of Peaceful Foreign Policy: Democratic Peace Theory

The major argument of liberal theory when it comes to foreign policy is peace and collaboration. Contrary to realism's concept of international conflict, liberal theory claims that this concept is derived from the very nature of international relations. Liberal theory expresses that with the changing world, politics based on security has also changed. It also claims that issues like welfare, modernization, external factors, and individual freedom influence states' approaches and behavior in foreign politics as much as security and power do.⁹⁴

In this framework, liberal theory supports the right of international politics traditional approach to take actions such as balance of power, collaboration and setting power areas. It is also an important right to challenge imperialist politics through the use of international law, international institutions and the right of a nation to self-determine its faith.

Moreover, liberal theory regards democratic ways of ruling a state as a requirement of a peaceful international system. Within democratically ruled states, it is possible to find institutions depending on collaboration of states. Thus, international organizations come to the scene of international politics as elements providing peace and security.⁹⁵ Many liberal intellectuals from John Locke and J.J Rousseau to Woodrow Wilson, Hobson and David Mitrany have expressed how important international organizations are for the preservation and maintenance of peace.⁹⁶

With the developing structure of the international system, the importance of non-governmental organizations has increased and these agents have influenced the setting and practices of international politics. Liberal theoreticians claim that it is no longer possible to explain and analyze foreign policy according to only one agent.⁹⁷

Liberal theory accepts that war is one of the main features of international relations and the anarchic situation of the international system, but at the same time it suggests that the international

⁹⁴ Ibid, p.320.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p.320.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p.321.

⁹⁷ Viotti and Kauppi, p.197.

system has an aspect of peace and harmony in itself.

Liberal theoreticians believe that in the international relations war and peace exist together, thus if war could be totally stopped, global peace would prevail. Liberals believe in the possibility of realizing the hope of having global peace would create a universal harmony.⁹⁸

Neoliberalism, institutionally and theoretically, shares many views with neorealism. However, neoliberals claim that neorealists focus extremely on conflict and competitiveness, and that they underestimate the chances of collaboration even within an anarchic international system. Neoliberal theoreticians regard institutions as instruments and mediators to set collaboration among the agents in the system.

Recently neoliberals have directed their research towards the issues such as universal ruling and setting while preserving necessary institutions related to the process of universalism. Neoliberals regard the system of government consisting of social institutions depending on accepted rules, decisions, norms, principles and decision making processes. These institutions rule the interactions of various governmental and non-governmental agents within fields like environment and human rights. They organize the state's interests and plan the rules and procedures.⁹⁹

After the Cold War, international institutions decide which principle should be accepted in order to decrease the number of conflicts and if the dispositions of certain states are legal or illegal. By doing so, they take active roles in agents shaping their expectations. Neoliberals regard international institutions as providers of international collaboration.

Systems of governments and institutions help a competitive and anarchic rule of the international system and their support of collaboration becomes an instrument to secure their states' interests and their requirement if necessary. Neoliberals believe that states should collaborate to reach final aims. The biggest obstacle for this collaboration is other states' reluctance and deceit.¹⁰⁰ After the

⁹⁸ Doyle, p.105.

⁹⁹ Scharpf, F.W., 1999, *Governing in Europe: effective and democratic?*, Oxford University Press, p.103.

¹⁰⁰ Russett, B. and Antholis, W., 1995, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War*, Worldprinceton University Press.

Cold War, the biggest development of the neoliberal theory was the concept of “democratic peace theory”.

In international relations, there are still discussions and criticisms concerning this theoretical concept.¹⁰¹ Democratic peace theory is the continuation of neoliberalist theory and suggests that democratic states are essentially more peaceful than autocratic states. Academicians like Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett bring different interpretations of this approach. They take Immanuel Kant's thesis of “democratic states do not fight with each other” as a starting point for their interpretations.

Kant's work “Perpetual Peace” which he wrote in 1795, helps us understand the international relations as it explains that collaboration, principles of mutual respect and understanding frames the peaceful relations of democratic states.¹⁰² This work has also influenced the discourse of the democratic peace of our time by mentioning the liberal peace federations consisting of republican rules. Kant has three different ideas required for international peace:

The first idea concerns ethics. According to Kant, each state's civil structure and constitution should be based upon republican values. By this he means that legal solutions should fulfill legitimate requirements such as participation of ethical freedom and individualization. The defining feature of democracies, the separation of powers, prevents law being formed for personal benefits, and by making up different and separated institutions possibility of rational decision making is increased. As these decisions are made by individuals, the harmony of the society directs itself towards peace in the international scene. The reflection of this to our time is the making of a cosmopolitan world system.¹⁰³

Kant's second idea is about the relationship between free trade and international peace. According to him, liberal republics ensured peace among themselves through trade agreements. Also through the right of free circulation, peaceful relations can be established with far away countries in the international system. Under these conditions, societies should get closer to each other step by step.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.23.

¹⁰² Doyle, p.94.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.95.

Today, this idea finds its place in the theory of liberal internationalists.¹⁰⁴

That democratic states don't make war is Kant's third idea. Kant expressed that the peace among individuals in a society can also be established among states in the international system. Kant identifies that a peace federation consists of republican democracies and he claims that with this federation it is possible for a state to keep its security and continuity in a peaceful environment while at the same time not losing its freedom.

This federation which is supposed to bring peace to common security area, will expand to the extent that it can include all nations and finally provide eternal peace. Moreover, the participant societies of this federation guarantee their security and it serves as a ground for the peaceful relations with other societies in mutual respect. The reflection of this theory to our time is the popular democratic peace theory.¹⁰⁵

In Kant's suggestion of setting a stable peace among states, these three ideas are highly important as they make up the basis of his theory. As a consequence of these ideas, liberal values together with republican governments become universalized and the concept of war is turned into that of peace. These liberal values can influence international relations. Liberalism intends to compose the international system identity of republican governments based upon highly liberal values.

Democratic peace theory is built on two basic propositions made by states of republican values. The first proposition is that democratic states will not make war but develop peaceful relations as they share the same values and the same kind of institutions. The other proposition is that the relationships between democratic and non-democratic states tend to be suspicious and conflicting. In this framework, it turns out that democratic states will not go to a battle among themselves, whereas the possibility of conflicting with a non-democratic state is high.¹⁰⁶

Statistical data proving these ideas reveal that only 12 out of 416 wars from the year 1816 till 1980

¹⁰⁴ Ibid p.95.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p.96–97.

¹⁰⁶ Pietrzyk, M.E., 2002, *International Order and Individual Liberty: Effects of War and Peace on the Development of Governments*, University Press of America, p.45.

were between democratic states.¹⁰⁷ A conflict between a democratic and a non-democratic state is directed and ended through non-democratic laws, because of the fact that non-democratic states can turn the advantages of democracy to their benefit by using force.

In the framework of these ideas, one can say that the starting point of democratic peace theory is democratic and liberal. These values shape the ways of interaction that societies develop among each other. In this sense, democratic and liberal values make it possible for states to direct their global political identities, and they help to bring about a common awareness and to be able to make common decisions.¹⁰⁸

Democratic peace theory brings two different explanations why democracies do not make war with each other. The first of these explanations evaluate democratic peace through a structuralist approach and claims that democratic peace is a consequence of institutions existing in democracies.

According to this structuralist approach of democratic peace, the complicated process of democracy makes leaders reluctant to claim a war, making the war the last option for them. Institutional and political structure makes the decision making process a multi-dimensional nature. In this framework, two democratic counterparts in a conflict can solve the conflict in a peaceful way because of the influence of the public. On the contrary, as the leaders of non-democratic states do not turn to the public for its opinion in a case of conflict, they try to solve similar problems through the use of force.

The second explanation is a normative approach. It explains the reasons of democratic peace through the ideas and rules accepted by democracies. Democracies develop relationships among themselves on the base of democratic values. By doing so, they can solve conflicts in a peaceful and rational without conflicting.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Doyle, p.99.

¹⁰⁸ Pietrzyk, p.45.

¹⁰⁹ Owen, J.M., 2000, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace", (Ed.) Andrew Linklater, Critical Concepts In Political Science, Vol:3, Routledge Press, New York, p.940–945.

Democratic peace theory argues that the negotiating norms of democracies prevent them from using force to the states that have the same norms. This peace theory also claims that the leaders of democratic states would not put the state in a condition of war even if they are supporters of war.

Common values are the biggest obstacles before a war between democratic states. Doyle expresses that states can fight for the values of historical heritage if necessary, and that democratic states will support democratic liberal states rather than non-democratic states violating these values. In this way, he shows the mission of democratic values to shape foreign policy by making up a common awareness among the states and societies of democratic and liberal values.¹¹⁰

Democratic peace theory is one of the main approaches directing the foreign policy of USA. After the Cold War period, the Clinton government can be regarded as a good example of the discourse that democracies do not make war, in order to legitimizing the aim to increase democratic states. When the internal security of USA depends on other states' internal policies, as we can see in the last Iraq occupation, USA follows a more interventionist strategy. With the democratic peace theory becoming the dominant approach of USA foreign policy, the ideas and criticism of the interpretation of the theory's foreign policy have increased.

Some intellectuals claim that the states tend more to make war in the middle of a democratization process. As a result of this tendency, one can see that the struggle for exporting democracy could make the situation worse. Other intellectuals claim more critically that war between democracies can be related to the differences of how distinct states identify democracy.

These intellectuals also claim that only a relatively small number of democracies exist, especially before 1945, but that it is important to consider that the history of democracy is somehow short and that effects the identification of democracies. Christopher Layne expresses that the fact that some democracies have given up the idea of going to war at the last moment is not related to common democratic values. Consequently, the increase of the number of liberal states that of democratic peace theory leads the expansion of democracy which in the end reinforces the

¹¹⁰ Sydnor, p.47.

possibility of global peace.¹¹¹

5.4 The Priority of Liberalism in Foreign Policy: International Collaboration

Liberal theory argues for policies which are peaceful, harmonious and collaborative between states concerning foreign policy. According to liberal theory, this collaboration does not mean that the states would compromise their liberty. A state's collaboration in the issues of international relations is not against that state's interests.¹¹² Moreover, international institutions and companies play important roles in developing international collaboration.¹¹³

For example, liberal theory regards institutions like the International Work Organization as having positive influence in developing collaboration and transnational organizations like the European Union. Such institutions can present opportunities for states to collaborate locally and regionally with other states in order to increase their national welfare.¹¹⁴ The biggest threat to international collaboration is undoubtedly war, especially according to liberal theory. The possibility, however, of war between democratic states is low, whereas the possibility of war between a liberal and non-liberal or between two non-liberal states is always higher.¹¹⁵

According to Doyle liberal states' approach to war and peace can be understood through three ideas. These three ideas are Schumpeter's "liberal pacifism", Machiavelli's "liberal imperialism" and Kant's "liberal internationalism".¹¹⁶ Schumpeter claims that as liberal institutions and principles have stable and consistent arguments about maintenance of peace, they prevent liberal states and institutions from making war. Contrary to some intellectuals stuck in a simple idea like that of trade as a maintainer of peace, Schumpeter sees the interaction between democracy and capitalism as the basis of pacifism.¹¹⁷

Thus Schumpeter emphasizes that the interaction between capitalism and democracy provides a

¹¹¹ Walt, p.24.

¹¹² Snyder, p.46.

¹¹³ Doyle, p.103.

¹¹⁴ Ari, p. 325.

¹¹⁵ Waltz, p.21.

¹¹⁶ Doyle, p. 83.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p.84.

strong and stable ground for the rise of pacifism. He claims that imperialism is an expression of limitless desire of expanding. He focuses on three reasons of modern imperialism. These are war machines, instinctive aggressiveness and export of monopoly. According to Schumpeter, war machines take control over states' foreign policies just after it has completed their own development. Guns created by the need of wars, just create wars again to keep their existence; and this circle will take over the states' foreign policies at the end.¹¹⁸

According to Schumpeter, capitalism and democracy together put pressure on a state in favor of peace. In fact, they represent the just opposite of imperialism. Moreover, the expansion of capitalism and democracy prepares the end of imperialism. Schumpeter claims that the possibilities of war decrease and people put their energy and time into more productive activities. He also argues that individuals in a working life have to calculate and prioritize life more and this leads to more individualization. Schumpeter defends that, as a consequence of these factors, a more rationally thinking individual votes for more democratic governments and finally through these steps, democratic capitalism reinforces peace.¹¹⁹

Machiavelli, defending the idea of liberal imperialism, claims that republics stand for the best system of government, not only because they are peaceful but also because they serve the best to the imperial expansion. He says that finding a republic suitable for imperial expansion is a guarantee of saving the state. Machiavelli's republic is a classical hybrid republic. This republic is not a democracy that can turn into tyranny, and it is a republic that envisions equality, freedom of public and political participations.

Machiavelli mentions this republic having a background that takes its power from representativeness and it consists of a council, a senate and a parliament of public. With the validation of separation of powers, the council, the senate and the parliament of public balance each other in order not to have the power in only one institution. Thus, this situation reinforces competitiveness and naturally freedom while at the same time providing negotiation. A democracy can only turn into tyranny if a very powerful minority group takes over the state; But the state

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p.85.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.86–87.

would still be able to provide the freedom of state using the freewill of the public.¹²⁰

There are many proofs of liberal imperialism. Both Machiavelli's Rome and Thucydides' Athens are examples of imperialistic republics of Machiavellian spirit. The documented policy of USA in the period after World War II supports Machiavelli's arguments. However weak it is, the liberal peace theory of our time brings some suspicion about some of Machiavelli's ideas.

Kant's idea of liberal internationalism is about creating peace, welfare and security in liberal states, and these states are generally open to collaboration. Even if there should occur conflicts between states of this structure and with states of other structure, they would end up with a final negotiation and they would still collaborate against non liberal states. Among liberal states, since the early 18th century, areas of peace, which are called "pacific unite" by Kant are being found. In the framework of Kant's ideas, it is defended that liberal states can develop peace and collaboration and by this perpetual peace can be established. This idea also defends that with the rise in the number of democratic states, a more peaceful international area can be created.¹²¹

Liberal theory, consequently, is an optimistic and constructive idea shaped around the belief of the possibility of international peace. Liberal theory's approach of foreign policy attracts attention to the importance of multinational companies and international organizations claiming that these institutions are the agents of the international system. Liberal theoreticians believe that with the rise of common values and collaboration, international peace can be achieved permanently.

5.5 Pluralism

During the 1970s, pluralism was launched in order to bring new ideas and perspectives in international relations against the ideas of state-based analysis and separation between internal and foreign policies of states, especially in a period when the system was in a process of change.¹²² In a period where the borders of a state got less important because of the mutual dependency and interaction with the urge of change, pluralism was brought out as a movement that claims

¹²⁰ Ibid, p.87.

¹²¹ Ibid, p.90–93.

¹²² Viotti and Kauppi, p.196.

international policy is under the influence of financial issues and the decision of international institutions. Thus it has evaluated the situation from the point of view of a mutual dependency.¹²³

Although pluralism is mostly handled in the framework of liberal theory, as it presents detailed explanations for the roles of multinational companies, extraordinary developments in communication technology making information easily accessible for individuals and international organizations, pluralism is regarded as a theoretical approach of its own.¹²⁴

Liberal theories on decision making, international governing system, multi-sidedness, mutual dependency and international integration are defined by pluralism. Pluralism claims to bring new ideas for the missing parts of liberalism and idealism, free from these theories¹²⁵. Being different from liberal theory, pluralist theory suggests that the most obvious element of behavior in international relations is uncertainty. Understanding that international relations is shaped by internal and external factors does not mean defining conditions in which one should be more dominant.¹²⁶

One of the leaders of pluralist approach, Rousseau, has expressed that the decrease in the influence of state will lead to an increase of the authority and influence on non-governmental elements. Consequently, there is little space left for the states to make changes in their foreign policies. Hence, international policy is not a sum of all the states' foreign policies anymore. In this new system, states are not the only makers of their own foreign policies, but they have to share this function with units outside of state.

To sum up the four major arguments of pluralist theory, one can start with the theory's acceptance of non-governmental agents as important elements in international politics. Pluralist theory supports the approach of multi-agent international relations rather than a state-based approach. Multinational companies and individuals of international organizations play a big role in defining international politics. Moreover, other than these institutions and agents, the influence of non-

¹²³ Ari, p. 295.

¹²⁴ Sönmezoğlu, p.107.

¹²⁵ Ari, p.296.

¹²⁶ Viotti and Kauppi, p.199.

governmental elements, like terrorist groups and gun merchants, cannot be denied. Just like multinational companies, the interaction and mutual dependency of non-governmental agents are that important that they cannot simply be categorized as of marginal importance. The major stimulator of mutual dependency is the increasing intensity of the communication network which holds the international system together.¹²⁷

Secondly, for pluralists the state is neither an element which is inseparable, nor is it a concrete being. A state consists of competing individuals, interest groups and bureaucracy. Rivalry, conflicts and negotiation among these groups are the basis of the coalition that forms the state. The state plays a role and influences in the forming of its foreign policy. For example, decisions related to Israel's foreign policy are not taken by the state, which is just an abstract existence, but by the combination of various institutions and agents that are part of foreign policy. Pluralist theory separates states into parts and regards these parts as the agents of foreign policy.¹²⁸

As a third argument, pluralists oppose to realism's idea of the state as a rational element. They think that this idea requires the rejection of conflicts, coalitions, bargains, and different ideas within the state, and claim that this idea should be regarded as a wrong approach to the understanding of the state. Pluralists think that different ideas can envision different rationalities and the state can become unable to negotiate over a common rational ground. Being unable to do so can be valid in much different process extending from the selection of methods applied to foreign policies.¹²⁹

Lastly, for pluralists the agenda of international relations is very broad and extended. As they give importance to issues of national security, they also mention various financial, social and environmental topics derived from the increasing mutual dependency of the 20th century. Some pluralists emphasize how issues about finance, energy and environment have gained great importance in the agenda of international relations. Other pluralists examine the international initiatives interested in topics like the world population problem, and hunger in the third world countries.

¹²⁷ Arıboğan, p.212.

¹²⁸ Viotti and Kauppi, p.192

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.193-94.

Contrary to realists who are interested in national security and define the agenda of international politics of a state-based on military, pluralists claim that financial and social issues are as important as the security of a state. According to pluralists, in the modern international system, there is a mutual dependency between states and societies in all these issues.¹³⁰

Pluralist theory, even though it seems as a theory supporting the arguments of idealism and liberalism, has different ideas. Pluralism presents its difference in many arguments like not degrading the state's interests to security and military base, accepting that the interests of individuals and the state are defined by the national and international system, presuming that the state forms its foreign policy decisions after the bargains or consensus of different elements.

The theory is also different in its ideas supporting that local and international conditions are dynamically subject to change, that international collaboration is something that can improve the freedom of individuals and states, and finally that international law, international organizations and international collaboration are important tools for a state's foreign policies.

CHAPTER 2

6. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH: STRUCTURATION THEORY IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

It is evident that traditional theories discussed above cannot work properly in the politics of Middle East. The author argues that there are five reasons behind this contention. Each of these reasons should lead us to find new alternatives to traditional theories. The first one comes from the fact that Middle East is a relatively unstable region. It has historically been the arena of famous battles, struggles of interests and conflicts. Moreover, Middle East has been exposed to a relatively new nation-state formation. Israel declared its independence in 1948 with the help of England and followed by three big wars with Arabic states to manifest its existence in the region. However, many territorial and political issues remain unsolved and are still posing problems in the region.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.193-194.

Nevertheless, these problems create its own *raison d'être* and new ways of keeping political power, as the author will discuss later, are created in this intense political atmosphere, therefore an idealist approach defending international peace environment seems very optimistic and rather utopic in the short run the international atmosphere cannot conceptualize nowadays.

Secondly, Middle East is a place where global and local interests are struggling with each other. The contemporary Middle East is subjugated constantly to many projects, investments, invasions and negotiations. The subjugators are varying from big hegemonic powers such as U.S to Iran's nuclear threat putting their interests on the chessboard of Middle East. Neo-conservative parties in Israel, as the author will refer later, manipulate these interests to reach their own local goals and aims.

Thirdly, these two facts cause many minor and major actors to be taken into consideration. States are still powerful, but without considering minor actors, an analysis on Middle East will inevitably fail. Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine are militant groups but they're having more and more public support of their politics after the operations of Israel.¹³¹ Therefore, a realist approach looking at only state relationship will inevitably misunderstand the complex nature of the Middle East. In addition to this, despite Israel's apparent power in the operations and conflicts, this can be supportive for the rivals in its local politics.

Nevertheless, Middle East's status of historically being a place of hegemony is the fourth reason why pluralist theories lose its reasonable ground. It is important to point out here that I use the word "hegemony" in the Gramscian sense. In other words, hegemony is conceived as being operative throughout the cultural and ideological practices of the civil society, in this case Middle Eastern communities.

According to Gramsci, consent is formed around the civil society and coercion or domination is revealed around the state. The civil society therefore organizes its hegemony and the terrain in which the dominant classes. Dominant classes in the dominant states, in other words.

¹³¹ Nahmias, R., 19 January 2007, "Nasrallah: Halutz's resignation filled me with joy", Ynet News. Available on site www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3354485,00.html

Thus, Gramsci states that the supremacy of a social group or class manifests itself in two different ways: coercion as well as intellectual and moral leadership. This latter type of supremacy forms hegemony. Social control, in other words, takes two basic forms: besides influencing behavior and choice externally through rewards and punishments, it also has an internal affect by molding personal convictions into a replica of prevailing norms. Such internal control is based on hegemony, which refers to an order of which a common social moral language is spoken, in which sole concept of reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behavior. It follows that hegemony is the predominance obtained by consent rather than force of one class or group over other classes. Whereas “domination” is realized through the coercive machinery of the state, “intellectual and moral leadership” is objectified in and mainly exercised by the civil society through the ensemble of educational, religious and associational institutions.

Hegemony is attained through the myriad of ways in which institutions of civil society operate to shape, directly or indirectly, the cognitive and affective structures whereby men perceive and evaluate problematic social reality. Moreover, this ideological superiority must have solid economic roots: If hegemony is ethic-political, it must also be economic; it must have its foundation in the decisive function that the leading group exercises within the decisive nucleus of economic activity.¹³²

Doesn't this show us the key features of the Greater Middle East Project? Therefore, the complex pluralist theories, where many actors are defined as contributors, skip the very governing aura of hegemony in their foreign policies.

Finally, it should be added that pluralists have got some strong points in the sense that the sociological demography and geography makes Middle East's foreign politics more complicated.

In short, all traditional theories sank into the mud by the determination problem. Whether it is agency or structure that determines the foreign policy of Middle East, particularly Israel in our concern, becomes the chicken-egg story of the Middle East.

¹³² Forgacs, D., (Ed.), 2000, *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-35*, New York University Press.

That's why a new approach is needed. This approach should be dynamic and interdisciplinary because of the problems discussed above. It must overcome the question of the determination of the agency and structure problem and provide insights for the implications of foreign politics of Israel. I argue that structuration theory can provide a useful framework to understand foreign politics in the Middle East, particularly Israel's.

Theory of structuration is a very new concept in foreign policy analysis, but the application of structuration to the foreign policy analysis has been discussed by scholars of foreign policy recently. It is claimed that this theory will add depth to the foreign policy analysis by the theoretical framework it provides. In order to understand the implications of the feasibility of this issue it is essential to go deeper into the agent-structure phenomenon which generates the backyard of the theory. For this purpose, this chapter will (1) explain the agent-structure phenomenon; (2) elaborate the structuration theory by describing its conceptualizations; (3) look how foreign policy instruments are articulated concerning the theory and finally, (4) indicate the feasibility by applying a case of foreign policy.

6.1 Agent - Structure Phenomenon

Criticism of the agent-structure phenomenon while defining social theories is discussed by many scholars. It is one of the central dichotomies around which sociological approaches are divided: the one between action and structure. The former regards the individual actor as the creator of the society.¹³³ According to this bottom-up view of society, actors possess consciousness and therefore have agency and capacity to plan and reflect upon their own conduct.¹³⁴ Therefore, structures are evaluated as products of action and interaction.¹³⁵ On the other hand, structural theories, take a top-down view; that is, they characterize the society in terms of patterns and forms which are independent of individual actors and their intentions.¹³⁶ With reference to this structure, this is not under the domination of human action. Rather, the structure is able to constrain the variations of

¹³³ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

action.

In this sense, the problem with agent-structure phenomenon is that it seems to be “Janus-faced, presenting an action side to some and a structure side to others.”¹³⁷ While individualists, rational choice theorists and subjectivists see the agent face of Janus, structuralists, functionalists and objectivists view the structure face of him. However, it is nothing more than a reduction of one component of the actor-structure linkage in the explanation of the terms of the other.¹³⁸ The dependent element is robbed its capacity to exploit or to influence the determining element, for it lack the autonomy or independence to do so.¹³⁹ As long as actions are explained with reference to structure, or vice versa, the independent variable in each case remains unavailable for problematization in its own right.¹⁴⁰

The problem with all of this is that both approaches isolate the mutual interaction between the two. The question of how agent and structure affect each other reciprocally is answered by ‘structuration theory’ which has been generated by the sociologist Anthony Giddens. According to structuration theory, the basic domain is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time.¹⁴¹ In this sense, structuration theory constitutes a bold attempt to amalgamate the division between action and order by substituting an overarching conception of duality for the various dualisms that have previously defined this division.¹⁴² Instead of a Janus-faced model, this theory proposes an “irreducibly single medallion consisting of an agency side and a structure side.”¹⁴³ Structuration theorists have created their own content by giving reference to the notions that have been re-conceptualized for their understanding of the agent-structure dichotomy (in this case duality). In order to understand the functioning of structuration theory, first, we should look at the conceptualizations generating the backbones of the theory itself.

¹³⁷ Carlsnaes, W., September 1992, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol: 36, No: 3, p.245-270, p.246.

¹³⁸ Ibid, p.249.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Carlsnaes, p.250.

¹⁴¹ Wallace, R. A. and Wolf, A., 1999, *Contemporary Sociological Theory*, Prentice Hall, p.180, New Jersey.

¹⁴² Carlsnaes, p.257.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

6.2 Concepts of Structuration Theory

6.2.1 Agency

Giddens accords great power to agents that they have the ability to make a difference in the social world.¹⁴⁴ Even more strongly, agents make no sense without power; that is, an actor ceases to be an agent if he or she loses the capacity to make a difference.¹⁴⁵ Giddens certainly recognizes that there are constraints on actors, but this does not mean that actors have no choices and make no difference.¹⁴⁶ Incorporation of power as integral to the constitution of social practices (232) is an important dimension of the theory.¹⁴⁷ Another significant element, which has been integrated to the understanding of human agency, is the concept of temporality.¹⁴⁸ In functionalism and structuralism, an attempt is made to exclude time from social theory. Therefore, sociological theory has tended to neglect the significance of temporality and spatiality in analyzing social life.¹⁴⁹ However, the existence of the time and space dimension helps us to comprehend that “at any point of time, the agent could have acted otherwise.”¹⁵⁰ Giddens refers to *historically located modes of activity*, meaning that the action is the production of the spot in which the action takes place.¹⁵¹ Unlike functionalists who underestimate human agency, Giddens recognizes the interpretive dimension of human action.¹⁵²

6.2.2 Structure

Giddens underlines the distinction between structure and system.¹⁵³ Structure is not the system but it refers to the “structuring properties (rules and resources) providing the binding of time and

¹⁴⁴ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press, p.394.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Giddens, A., 2002, *Agency, Structure in Contemporary Sociological Theory* eds. Craig Calhoun et al. Oxford Blackwell 232-243, p.232.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press, p.320.

¹⁵⁰ Giddens, A., 2002, *Agency, Structure in Contemporary Sociological Theory* eds. Craig Calhoun et al. Oxford Blackwell, p.233.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press, p.317.

¹⁵³ Giddens, A., 2002, *Agency, Structure in Contemporary Sociological Theory* eds. Craig Calhoun et al. Oxford Blackwell, p.236

space in social systems.”¹⁵⁴ Incorporation of time and space and existence of rules and resources are the elements making structure possible.¹⁵⁵ Rules and resources are structural precisely because they transcend the particular temporal and spatial location tied to any given location of their use.¹⁵⁶

Second, structure only exists in and through the activities of human agents.¹⁵⁷ Thus, Giddens offers a very unusual definition of structure that does not follow the Durkheimian pattern of viewing structures as external to and coercive of actors.¹⁵⁸ Structure is what gives form and shape to social life, but it is not itself that form and shape.¹⁵⁹ Structure to Giddens is not a framework like the “skeleton of a body.”¹⁶⁰ It is more like the nervous system of the body which is not rigid like the bone and which, at the same time, can lead the body or respond to its decisions. In case of danger; that is, when you bring your hand too close to the fire, prior to your decision, your nerves warn you to take your hand back. However, when you want to walk, the nervous system responds to the decisions of the agent human body for acting. The nervous system is always both “constraining and enabling”, just like structure.¹⁶¹

Third, structure recognizes the existence of 1) Knowledge –as memory traces- of ‘how things are to be done’ on the part of social actors. 2) Social practices organized through the recursive mobilization of that knowledge. 3) Capabilities that the production of those practices presupposes.¹⁶²

6.2.3 Social Systems

As for the case of distinction, systems are not structures in themselves but they have structures, or more accurately, have structural properties.¹⁶³ They are patterned in time as well as in space,

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press, p.394.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p.320.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p.394.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p.395.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Giddens, A., 2002, *Agency, Structure in Contemporary Sociological Theory* eds. Craig Calhoun et al. Oxford Blackwell, p.238.

¹⁶² Ibid, p.236.

¹⁶³ Ibid, p.237.

through continuities of social reproduction.¹⁶⁴ A social system is thus a ‘structured totality.’¹⁶⁵ Social systems involve regularized relations of interdependence between individuals or groups that typically can be best analyzed as recurrent social practices.¹⁶⁶ The most deeply layered practices constitutive of social systems are institutions.¹⁶⁷ They are the manifestation of the recursive social practices involved in the system.

6.3 Rules and Resources

Rules and resources manifest themselves at both the macro level of social systems and at the micro level of human consciousness.¹⁶⁸ They recursively implicate in the reproduction of social systems and in the human action.¹⁶⁹ Practices are situated within intersecting sets of rules and resources that ultimately express the features of the totality.¹⁷⁰ Rules can only be grasped in the context of historical development of social totalities, as recursively implicated in practices.¹⁷¹ There is no singular relation between an activity and a rule like ‘the rule governing the Queen’s move in chess’.¹⁷² It is a mutual interrelation in which the rule also shows itself as a creation of the agent. It is the human who creates the rule that the knight will always move in the shape of ‘L’ and it is the rule that make human act in terms of this action in order to play the game. “This has two consequences (a) Activities or practices are brought into being in the context of overlapping and connecting sets of rules, given them coherence by their involvement in the constitution of social systems in the movement of time. (b) rules cannot be exhaustively described or analyzed in terms of their own content because rules and practices only exist in conjunction with one another.”¹⁷³

Second, in emphasizing the importance of resources as structural properties of social systems,

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, p.236.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p.237.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p.236.

¹⁶⁸ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press, p.395.

¹⁶⁹ Giddens, A., 2002, *Agency, Structure in Contemporary Sociological Theory* eds. Craig Calhoun et al. Oxford Blackwell, p.241.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p.237.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

Giddens means to stress the centrality of the concept of power to social theory.¹⁷⁴ ‘Rule’ power is not a description of a state of affairs, but a capability.¹⁷⁵ He treats resources as the ‘basis’ or ‘vehicles’ of power, compromising structures of domination.¹⁷⁶ Power is generated by definite forms of domination in a parallel way to the involvement of rules with social practices.¹⁷⁷

6.4 Duality of Structure

The concept of structuration is based on the idea that the “constitution of the agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality.”¹⁷⁸ Neither can exist without the other.¹⁷⁹ The duality of structure relates to the fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency.¹⁸⁰ The structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems.¹⁸¹ The identification of structure with constraint is also rejected: structure is both enabling and constraining.¹⁸² Structure forms personality and society simultaneously -but in neither case exhaustively because of the significance of unintended consequences of action, and because of unacknowledged conditions of action.¹⁸³ Giddens takes great pain to separate agency from structures as he wants to make the point that actions often end up being different from what was intended; in other words, intentional acts often have unintended consequences.¹⁸⁴ Unanticipated consequences may become unrecognized conditions of action and feed back into it.¹⁸⁵ As Archer puts it: “it is the past in the present and the future in the present which matters.”¹⁸⁶ Today is the product of yesterday, and tomorrow will be the product of today. It is a cycling process which gives the system the capacity to regenerate again and again.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p.238.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press, p.395.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Giddens, A., 2002, *Agency, Structure in Contemporary Sociological Theory* eds. Craig Calhoun et al. Oxford Blackwell, p.238.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press, p.395.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Carlsnaes, p.257.

Structure, thus, is not to be conceptualized as a barrier to action, but as essentially involved in its production.¹⁸⁷ Human actors re-create through their actions the very social practices (and institutions) that in turn constrain those actions.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, determination of social action in general is impossible because the creative aspects of human action –the individual aspect of duality- makes this impossible.¹⁸⁹ As a result, to study the structuration of a social system is to study the ways in which that system, via the application of generative rules and resources, and in the context of unintended outcomes, is produced and reproduced in interaction.

6.5 Modalities of Structure

Modalities represent rules and resources considered as institutional features of systems of social interaction.¹⁹⁰ These are three general forms which structure can take and in which are produced and reproduced in action and interaction. These three forms are referred to as signification, domination and legitimation.¹⁹¹

By “signification”, Giddens means language and other symbolic orders, i.e. all those ways for human beings to express themselves and communicate with others. The organized forms of communication both make possible particular communicative acts and, at the same time, also reproduce the system of rules, the codes. Members of society share these codes, which makes it possible for them to understand one another.¹⁹²

By “domination”, he refers to all the organized ways in which humans are related to one another in structures of hierarchy and control. These structures make possible certain kinds of action and interaction between persons and also reinforce and reproduce the hierarchies which these actions presuppose.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁷ Giddens, A., 2002, *Agency, Structure in Contemporary Sociological Theory* eds. Craig Calhoun et al. Oxford Blackwell, p.239.

¹⁸⁸ Wallace, R.A and Wolf A., p.180.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, p.181.

¹⁹⁰ Giddens, p.241.

¹⁹¹ Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press, p.320.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

By “legitimation”, he means the normative aspect of social systems, the sets of moral beliefs which are shared by some or all of a society’s members. All actions are subject to normative appraisal, to judgement about whether they are proper, acceptable, desirable and so on. While such judgements are informed by socially shared assumptions, it may not be the case that all members of society accept the same moral standpoints. Such consensus is highly unlikely.¹⁹⁴

6.6 Structuration and Foreign Policy

The feasibility of structuration theory in foreign policy is the sequential part of our discussion. Many scholars examine the structuration theory for generating a methodology for their studies on state action which is important in terms of foreign policy. Some scholars of international relations find it useful to apply it in their cases because neorealism and world-system theory do use the properties of both states (powers, interests) and of system structures (polarization, relations of unequal exchange) to explain state behavior.¹⁹⁵ Looking into their conceptualizations will help us to articulate the state agency because they are very interested in the power and interest constituting the prominent elements of foreign policy analysis.

Wendt adopts some conceptualization of the ontological and explanatory relationship between social actors or agents (in this case, states) and societal structures (in this case, the international system).¹⁹⁶ He argues that this conceptualization force to rethink the fundamental properties of (state) agents and system structures. In turn, system is allowed to use agents and structures to explain some of the key properties of each as effects of the other, to see agents and structures as “codetermined” or “mutually constituted” entities.¹⁹⁷

“The elements of a social structure could be agents, practices, technologies, territories –whatever can be seen as occupying a position within a social organization. The fact that these elements are internally related means that they cannot be defined independently of their position in the structure. Thus, a structurationist approach to the state system would see states in relational terms

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p.321.

¹⁹⁵ Wendt, A. E., 1987, *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory*, Cambridge University Press.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p.339.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

as generated or constituted by internal relations of individuation (sovereignty), and, perhaps, penetration (spheres of influence). In other words, states are not even conceivable as states apart from their position in a global structure of individuated and penetrated political authorities.”¹⁹⁸ Secondly, Wendt suggests that “all agents possess three intrinsic capacities or powers in virtue of their internal organizational structure. 1) To have a theoretical understanding of its activities that it could supply reason for its behavior, 2) to reflexively monitor and potentially adapt its behavior and 3) to make decisions. To the extent that states are considered goal-directed units of action, they can be considered agents by definition.”¹⁹⁹

Social structures do not exist independently from the activities they govern.²⁰⁰ The deep structure of the state system exists only in virtue of the recognition of certain rules and the performance of certain practices by states.²⁰¹ Similarly, the states exist in respect to the structure of the international system. There is no place for empires, for which the territory is important, in the present time’s international system. Rather, economically advanced but territorially small countries, like the Netherlands, have more power than a country which is larger than Holland but being of smaller economic scale. Resources which give states power have changed since the medieval times. Territory is still important for the states in the Middle East, like Israel or Palestine, but it is not the ultimate goal of state action. Energy and finance are now the power resources of these states.

Structure is also important for determining the state interests. Individual and organizational decision-making may be crucial for determining how a state’s real interests translate into subjective interests and actual performance.²⁰² “The importance of their internal organizational structures notwithstanding other causal powers and the real interests of the agents are dependent upon, and thus explainable by, the external or social structural context in which they are embedded. For example, the causal powers of capitalists (for example, to invest and disinvest capital or to extract a surplus from labour) and their real interests (to maximize profits, and so forth) are a function of the organizing principles of the capitalist mode of production which define

¹⁹⁸ Wendt, p.357.

¹⁹⁹ Wendt, p.359.

²⁰⁰ Wendt, p.358.

²⁰¹ Wendt, p.359.

²⁰² Ibid.

their position and interests as a capitalist. Similarly, the causal powers of the state –to maintain control over resources and to act in an international environment free of legal compulsion- are given by the domestic and international social structures in virtue of it being a state in the first place. Thus, a balancer in a balance-of-power system, or a core state in the capitalist world economy, has certain powers, responsibilities, hegemonic power and interests which it possesses only in virtue of its structural position. Social structures constitute the conditions of existence of states and state action; indeed, without social structuring principles one could not talk meaningfully about fundamental building blocks of international relations: states, state powers, foreign policy and so forth. International and domestic structures generate the rules of the game within which states interact”.²⁰³

The “social construction of power and authority” is also analyzed by Mumme with respect to structuration theory.²⁰⁴ Mumme argues that structuration theory (ST) offers an alternate approach with promise for understanding the dynamics of international conflicts.²⁰⁵ “Power defined as a transformative capacity is seen as a fundamental element in the constitution of society. 1) all social action expresses power and all relations of domination and control offer some resources to subordinate for shaping the expression of power, namely dialectic of control.”²⁰⁶ 2) Institutions also store the instruments of administrative power (like governments).²⁰⁷ 3) *locale* is the setting of social interaction in space and time.²⁰⁸

In the light of these claims, ST’s relevance for understanding international disputes is evident: “(a) individual agents (states) are units of analysis; (b) Institutions are social constructs that are mutable, alterable, and fundamentally contested in a variety of ways by those actors affected by such institutions. In this sense, political jurisdictions are thus socially constructed artifacts that may be understood and acted upon in a variety of ways; (c) ST incorporates the study of *locales* as a key to an accounting of where, how, and why individuals behave as they do; 6) ST is sensitive to

²⁰³ Wendt, p.360.

²⁰⁴ Mumme, S.P. And Grundy-Warr, C., 1998, “Structuration Theory and the Analysis of International Territorial Disputes: Lesson from an application to the El Chamizal controversy”, *Political Research Quarterly* 51: 969-985, p. 972.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p.973.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

temporality as a mode of cognitive orientation actively linked to other contextual elements of human society.²⁰⁹ As a result, Mumme claims that ST explicitly requires the analyst to examine this interplay of elements at and across different social and institutional levels.²¹⁰

As we see above, Mumme and Wendt have a common opinion in seeing the state as an agent whose actions are generating the structure which will, in return, affect the decisions of the states by determining the rules of the game. If the properties of states and system structures are both thought to be causally relevant to events in the international system, and if those properties are somehow interrelated, then a theoretical understanding of both those units are necessary to explain state action.²¹¹ At this point, it will be useful to touch on the analysis of structuration theory of Carlsnaes who has predominantly tried to measure its feasibility on foreign policy.

He starts with the introduction of Gidden's ST and confirms that "Structural factors – such as institutions or rules - logically both predate and postdate any action affecting them; and that an action – such as a policy - logically both predates and postdates the structural factors conditioning it. Thus, it can be penetrated as a consequence of its essentially sequential thrust in social transformation."²¹²

The way in which leaders of states conceptualize their situations is strongly affected by the institutions of international relations: states not only form the international system: they are also shaped by its conventions, particularly by its practices."²¹³ Recognition of this discursive form of mutual constitution is thus both historically and analytically of crucial importance to the systematic study of foreign policy.²¹⁴ Its primary concepts cannot be treated as given, static or equally applicable to all foreign policy actors. Instead their meanings have to be solidly anchored to the mutually constitutive frameworks – the various domestic institutions or international regimes - which at all times underlie and underwrite state praxis within the international system

²⁰⁹ Mumme, p.973.

²¹⁰ Ibid, p.981.

²¹¹ Carlsnaes, p.258.

²¹² Ibid, p.260.

²¹³ Ibid, p.261.

²¹⁴ Ibid, p.261.

(Carlsnaes, 261).²¹⁵

The concept of the state as we know it today – what it means to act and to have empowerment as a sovereign international actor – has gained its present currency only as a consequence of this institutional revolution of the international system, it is a recognition par excellence of both the historically contingent and mutually constitutive nature of the agent-structure issue in state-to-state interactions.

According to Carlsnaes, the mutually constitutive dimension can be found in more recent and less momentous developments within international relations.²¹⁶ For example, the contemporary concept of a neutral state can be properly understood only with reference to the rules of meaning and membership which define neutrality as an institutionalized international structure (or regime).²¹⁷ Thus, just like the concept of a state, the concept of a neutral state has no real meaning prior to the existence of the international institutions coming to maturity in Europe in the early nineteenth century.²¹⁸ The outcomes of courses of action are in turn a function not only of conscious intention, unanticipated consequences or perceived opportunity costs, but also of how other actors understand and play the same game of institutional reconstitution.²¹⁹ As a result, the neutral states are generated because of the projected need for, and international empowerment of, neutral states *qua* “bridge builders” whose good offices was found to be beneficial by both blocs in the ongoing Cold War.²²⁰ He defines these policies in terms of “Feedforward” processes and hence innovative rather than adaptive policies.²²¹

He gives the example of Sweden-EU relations with respect to ST and claims that “the recent Swedish application for EC membership can be used to illustrate the rationale for combining this dynamic perspective with the modified explanatory framework.”²²² The things that should be examined are:

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid, p.262.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.


²¹⁹ Ibid, p.263.

²²⁰ Ibid, p.265.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

- 1) Current reasons for this application, choices and preferences underlying this decision;
- 2) Relevant values and perceptions informing the decision makers' intentional behavior such as a powerful desire to participate more fully in the economic reconstitution and dynamism of Western Europe;
- 3) Structural factors, objective conditions and institutional settings, constraining Swedish foreign policy, such as economic dependency on trade with members of the EC, realignment of strategic domestic groupings, fluidity of rules and practices characterizing the post-Cold War neutrality regime.²²³



224

Moreover:


- 4) This case could be compared to her earlier decision – in 1971- not to apply for membership or with the Irish policy of joining the EC in 1973 despite her neutral status, a condition that, in Sweden's view, had stood in the way of her own interests to do so. So, it can be said that ST creates explanations and predictions in terms of “comparable” policy input and output attributes of sovereign states across time and space.²²⁵
- 5) The decision in question was the empirical end result of a series of complex, reciprocal agent-structure interactions, involving changes in both domestic conditions and the discursive rules governing the neutrality regime, as a consequence of which the structured fields of action

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid, p.254.

²²⁵ Ibid. p.263.

available to Swedish decision-makers in this matter were perceived to have changed their character from one of more or less constraint to one of relative opportunity.²²⁶



227

²²⁶ Ibid. p.266.

²²⁷ Ibid, p.264.

CHAPTER 3

7. MAPPING ISRAEL'S PLACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

7.1 Greater Middle East Project, Struggle of Nuclear Weapons, Hegemony and Structuration theory

The recent discourse on the Middle East basically focuses on the existence of nuclear weapons and the evil use of these weapons as a threat for the whole world. The formal American political discourse dominantly emphasizes the problem of nuclear weapons in the Middle East during the invasion of Iraq. Even the Bush administration tried to solve this issue by developing a new project called the Greater Middle East Project.

When analyzed retrospectively, it is evident that this discourse is created to provide a legitimate basis for the invasion of Iraq. But the main intention is targeted at the potential that the Iran Nuclear energy program carries. Therefore, it is important to know the discourse of nuclear energy. The author argues that Iran's nuclear weapons provide a support for the security politics and predictive targeting and neo-conservative parties like Kadima in Israel benefit from this tension and, as the author will discuss later, the Lebanon War in 2006 is symptomatic of a clear crystallization of this.

Iran's nuclear energy program and US's struggle to stop Iran, have taken a prominent place in the world's agenda since 2005. Iran took some measures to prevent a US intervention. However, US have succeeded in bringing the issue to the international arena. US integrate not only strategic countries but also international organizations to the process in order to strengthen its pressure. Iran has responded to the sanctions that have come out of the recent decision of the UN by reversing its moderate attitude towards international suppression and by declaring that in case the UN, pioneered by US, continues to apply sanctions towards Iran's nuclear activities, Iran will cut its relations with IAEA and will continue its nuclear activities without any control. Moreover, Iranian authorities have proclaimed that Iran can retreat from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as

well.²²⁸ This case can be an example for the application of the structuration theory which has been discussed above.

As mentioned above, the theory permits us to see the states as agents whose actions depend on rationality and interest maximization.²²⁹ Therefore, US, Iran, China, Russia and Israel appear as nation states constituting the agent side of the medallion. The motivation behind state action serves as calculator for payoffs in a rational way. As Wendt puts it, states are goal oriented units of action which defines them as agents.

The nuclear activities of Iraq started in 1967 with the support of US in order to balance the power of USSR. In 1958 Iran became a participant of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in 1970 it signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Here we can see that the structure made US take such an action. A bipolarized world order made US perceive USSR as an enemy and Iran as a possible ally which could strengthen US's position in the region. Therefore, US decided to facilitate nuclear reactors which would be a deterrent for USSR. However, unacknowledged conditions of action carried issues of another dimension.

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, nuclear activities were halted because of its expenses and of the Iraq war between the years 1980-88. Both the war and the revolution deteriorated Iran's relations with western countries. The revolution's anti-US/West character changed the norms and values concerning the US relations which would later affect the decisions of Iran. In return, US no more conceived Iran as an ally but a possible threat and convinced IAEA to terminate the nuclear project of Iran. Western countries allying with US also cancelled their agreements on the nuclear activities to isolate Iran. However, change in this institutional framework let Iran to perceive non-western countries as cooperative units. In 1986, Iran found other collaborators in order to break its isolation. It signed agreements with China and Argentina and in 1989 with USSR and turned back to its nuclear activities in order to increase its defense and energy capacity which insufficiency was observed during the Iraq war. However, US' intentions had been totally different during the

²²⁸ Evrensel Gazetesi, 26 July 2007, "ABD yaptırımları İran'ı korkutmuyor."

Available on site http://www.evrensel.net/haber.php?haber_id=14269 (Accessed 1 September 2007).

²²⁹ Allison, T.G. and Zelikow, P., 1999, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York.

facilitations of the nuclear reactors in Iran. US were trying to decrease the cost of oil which was burned by Iran for providing energy and it tried to challenge to the power of USSR. Here, we observe how US' action had completely unintended consequences.

After the 90's, Iran's foreign policy has been determined in terms of its anti-US and anti-Israel discourse and it sees them as strategic enemies and threats to its own existence. Rather, Iran pursues Russia-centric foreign policy which narrows the influence of US in the region. This is due to an important structural change which occurred in the region. USSR has collapsed and the bipolarized world system has come to an end. Therefore, Iran's perception of Russia has changed and made Iran see Russia as a possible ally. Rules of the game changed as the bipolar system collapsed and multi-polarity has emerged to become the new world order.

Unintended consequences of the action of agents, thus, prepared the setting of the new institutional structure. Iran has strengthened its nuclear activities in a period when US has become aggressive in its foreign affairs because of its increasing concern regarding the resources in the Middle East. US has many interests in the region in terms of controlling and directing energy and petroleum resources and, Iran, with these energy resources, occupies an important geopolitical place in the region. These resources, the structural property of the region, create tension because of their relatedness to power as a capability. We could also argue that the concept of *locales*, offered by Mumme, creates the setting of social interaction. Iran and US could act otherwise in other geographical areas or at any other period of time. US strives to become the main decision-maker in order to control the energy and petroleum transition in the region by eliminating the capacity of interference of Iran. For this purpose, US's action was realized to invoke the world public opinion against Iran by claiming that Iran is going to produce, if it hasn't already, nuclear weapons which will change the dynamics in the region negatively. This is why international organizations are included in the process: UN and IAEA. US has involved UN in the problem in order to apply an institutional legal sanction to Iran. IAEA has become the key institution after this process because the UN decision will be based on the reports that IAEA prepares according to its observations. These institutional settings are able to constrain the actions of Iran, whereas they enable the demands of US. Iran's official discourse about the nuclear diplomacy is that they are not producing nuclear weapons but only nuclear energy. However, it has been proved that Iran has

been kept some information about its nuclear reactors since 1992²³⁰ which has brought a situation of distrust towards Iran's nuclear program. This distrust characterizes the perception of the agents and makes them take an opposite action. At the end, UN Security Council members have decided against Iran due to the pressures of US. The structural setting has entailed Russia and China to also decide against Iran nuclear activity, although Iran is their strategic and economic counterpart. However, Russia continues to support Iran indirectly as it has big shares in Iran's nuclear facilities, meaning that a stoppage of Iran nuclear activity would cause economic losses for Russia. China also has kept their deep economic relations with Iran. They have signed another cooperation agreement on energy despite China's official opposing attitude. On the surface, these countries seem to be on the side of US as international structures dominate the decisions of the member states by constraining their action. The norm behind this structure is to be democratic against totalitarian regimes. However, at the same time, they continue to pursue their national interests because the system which imposes that every agent should pursue their own interest to enable them to perceive Iran not as a threat but as a strategic ally for them. However, Russia does not want to appear to be on the side of Iran in the eye of US as it could affect its relations to the West.²³¹

In this issue, US's biggest supporter is Israel. Israel, contrary to US, has got a territorial proximity with Iran. Therefore, its feeling of being under threat is stronger than that of the US. Structural forces, more specifically *locales*, again prepare the basis for the perception of threat. In early June of 2008, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz expressed frustration with the perceived ineffectiveness of sanctions aimed at discouraging Iran from enriching uranium.²³² Israel has also rejected IAEA's November 2007 and February 2008 reports on Iran, and Israeli officials have called for the resignation of Director General Mohamed El Baradei, accusing him of being "pro-Iranian."²³³ These reactions are the outcome of the environment which imposes the idea of Iran as being ready for nuclear war.

²³⁰ Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, "İran'ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar". Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

²³¹ Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, "İran'ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar". Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

²³² Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, "İran'ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar". Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

²³³ Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, "İran'ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar". Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

Despite the UN resolution²³⁴ (s/res 1696 of 31 July 2006), Iran continues its uranium enrichment program. This decision cannot be understood apart from its historical setting. Iran has little confidence with the international community because of its indifferent attitude towards Iraq using chemical weapons against civilians during the war with Iran.²³⁵ Shahram Chubin, Director of Studies at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, asserts that in response to this, “Iran has learned from its war with Iraq that, for deterrence to operate, the threatening state must be confronted with the certainty of an equivalent response”.²³⁶ After the war and the isolation following the Revolution, Iran became a state of security. It started to perceive Israel and US as crucial enemies which could attack it any time because of the fact that Iran had experienced how potential threats could turn into actual threats in the Iraq war.²³⁷ Because of this distrust, it did not take any action in applying the decisions of US. Moreover, the issue has become a problem of national honor as much as national security due to the build-up of Ahmadinejad. He is a radical and non-concessive in foreign affairs issues as the government needs public support in order to cover the unsuccessful domestic policy-making. Structural failures lead the agent to adopt a more radical attitude in decision-making process. Ahmadinejad is admired by the public because of his hostile and aggressive attitude toward US and Israel. He uses populist factors very cleverly, both in religious and national terms, in order to win their support.

Internal dynamics consisting of conservatives and reformists deepens the structure. Reformists think that Iran has the right to have nuclear energy, but they do not want this issue to constitute a serious crisis between the international actors and Iran.²³⁸ However, the reformists are not the dominant part in the nuclear diplomacy. Decisions about nuclear activities are made by the conservatives who find US’ sanctioning unacceptable. In fact, the radical wing of the conservatives argues that Iran can retreat from the NPA if necessary. Therefore, US is not as insistent as before and seems to leave the issue to IAEA because of the fact that the radical wing

²³⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1696, 29 March 2006. Available on site <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SC1696.pdf>.

²³⁵ Parsi, T., 2007, *Treacherous Alliance: The secret dealings of Israel Iran and United States*, Yale University Press.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, “İran’ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar”. Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

²³⁸ Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, “İran’ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar”. Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

of the conservatives could become even more powerful if US continues its suppressive policies against Iran. These conservatives have the capacity to get public support by accelerating the transformation of the nuclear crisis into a national honor problem. One-sided and unconditioned stoppage of nuclear activities would make the Iranians feel as if they lost the struggle against US. It would be perceived as a submission. Iran is not willing to accept a situation in which its national honor would be perceived damaged internally and externally. Iran strives to be one of the great powers, so an unconditioned retreat would deteriorate its strong image in the eyes of the other states. Values addressing the nuclear policy issue are determinant in the preferences of the decision-makers as we see here.

In June 2007, IAEA director Mohamed El Baradei suggested that Iran should be allowed limited uranium enrichment under strict supervision of the IAEA.²³⁹ IAEA's decision could be evaluated as an enabling factor for Iran and on the other hand a constraining one for US. An institution created by the agents for making them more effective has come to an unintended decision once again. Mohamed El Baradei's remarks were formally criticized by Nicholas Burns, the US Under-Secretary of State, who said: "We are not going to agree to accept limited enrichment."²⁴⁰

However, in February 2008, Pierre Vimont, the French Ambassador to the United States, urged the United States to adopt a more flexible approach towards Iran by accepting its regional role and recognizing that the nuclear issue has broad popular support among Iranians.²⁴¹ The foreign policy action towards Iran is altering because of the structural changes in the region. European Union countries argue for an integration of Iran into the international arena rather than as isolation as the US wants. France is the most insistent because of it having one of the biggest shares in Iran nuclear facilities.

On top of this, the US public does not support the war anymore because of the foreign policy action of US towards Iraq. US did not apply the UN decision in the Iraq war and lost most of its

²³⁹ Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, "İran'ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar". Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

²⁴⁰ Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, "İran'ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar". Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

²⁴¹ Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, "İran'ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar". Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>.

legality on the war on terrorism. The ashes of that war are still hot, so the world public opinion would not perceive a potential war on Iran rightful. Therefore, decision-makers cannot get the support of the public which make them think twice before taking any aggressive action.

Israel, on the contrary, poses an exception in this case as it is quite incidental that Israel has a policy of military operations systematically. Therefore, one should look at the individual level, in other words the political setting in Israel to understand Israel's position.

7.2 Israel's Political Setting: Kadima and Israel breaking the Ground

Israel passed through a very harsh period during the elections in 2006. Prior to the elections, the Israeli political arena witnessed a new party coming to the establishment which dramatically changed the dynamics of the elections. In November 2005, Ariel Sharon held a press conference and declared his departure from the Likud party claiming the ineffectiveness of Likud “lead Israel toward its national goals.”²⁴² He stated that he was going to establish a new party for reaching his goals. The official name of the Sharon-led new movement was Kadima meaning ‘forward.’²⁴³

The triumph of the party, which was proved by it getting a big number of seats in the Knesset, is considered to be a great success for such a newly established party as Kadima was. It has led Israeli politics since 2006 by breaking new grounds in terms of the relations with the Palestinians and the Israeli public itself. An analysis of Kadima therefore is important with respect to the understanding of the recent developments in the Israeli political arena. In the following, the establishment and the political positioning of the party will be elaborated. Furthermore, Kadima’s priorities in the electoral campaign and the party program will be explained and the developments taking place after Kadima’s foundation will also be analyzed by looking into the dynamics in the foreign and their domestic policy. Moreover, Ehud Olmert, a very important political figure of the party, will be mentioned to better understand the internal dynamics of the party.

7.2.1 Place in the Political Spectrum

²⁴² Hazan, R. Y., 2007, “Kadima and the Centre: Convergence in the Israeli Party System”, *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 13, No: 2, p.266-288.

²⁴³ Ibid, p.266.

The political positioning of the party is important in the eyes of the voters. Some scholars argue that Kadima is a centrist party consisting of diverse groups, such as the religious, Sephardim and even Arab personalities are on the member list.²⁴⁴ Furthermore, the centre-right is claimed to be of another position because most of its elected members are former Likud party members, but it also has a number of notable ex-Labour MPs.²⁴⁵ However, Hazan argues that concept of a middle party, as opposed to that of a centre party, can help describe and analyze Israeli politics in general, and the 2006 election in particular.²⁴⁶ Therefore, Hazan clearly puts a conceptual framework which provides us with a better understanding for the positioning of the party in the eyes of the voters and the party itself. According to Hazan, the middle is the area between the opposing alternatives of the major cleavage in politics of a particular country.²⁴⁷ It can be said that attempts to occupy this area has not reached a great success until 2006.²⁴⁸

Middle parties must function in a bipolar (not necessarily a two-party) system, and are therefore more flexible concerning their policy positions.²⁴⁹ They are willing to form a coalition with parties to their right as well as to their left, and to sit in a coalition with the extremist parties whereas centre parties make coalitions only with the moderate parties on either side.²⁵⁰ That's why middle parties are parties of interest, not parties of principle.²⁵¹ Hazan puts Kadima into this framework by positioning it between the right wing Likud and the left wing Labour party as "the major opposing poles of party competition in 2006 were still the left/doves headed by Labour and the right/hawks headed by Likud."²⁵² According to him, Kadima has clearly positioned itself and campaigned in the middle.²⁵³

Sharon's departure from Likud to the establishment of Kadima was a risky attempt as the elections

²⁴⁴ Sandler, S. And Rynhold, J., 2007, "Introduction: From Centrism to Neo-Centrism", Israel Affairs, Vol:13, No:2, 229-250, p.229.

²⁴⁵ Kadima Political Party. Available on site <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>.

²⁴⁶ Hazan, p.267.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, p.268.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, p.273.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid, p.271.

²⁵³ Ibid, p. 272.

were so close and there was only a limited period of time (128 days) for the preparations of the electoral campaign. However, the idea of a new movement under the leadership of Sharon, an iconic and popular figure, attracted not only the Israeli voters but also MKs. Thirteen Likud MKs joined Sharon when the new parliamentary grouping was presented to the Knesset House Committee; and since there were 38 MKs elected from Likud in 2003, the 13 who joined Sharon sufficed to guarantee Kadima's Knesset status.²⁵⁴

Sharon initially gave Kadima media visibility and thus wide public recognition.²⁵⁵ But besides this, both Sharon and Olmert had always been regarded as the most capable of bringing peace and security in the opinion polls.²⁵⁶ Their popularity brought about a positive asset for the electoral campaign.

However, both the election campaign in general and Kadima's campaign in particular were dramatically disrupted because of Sharon's two strokes. Finally, on 4 January 2006, Sharon was sent to hospital again and would not appear in public for the rest of the election campaign.²⁵⁷

After Sharon's disappearance, "Kadima averted a possible leadership battle and circled the wagons around Ehud Olmert, perceived by many as Sharon's hand-picked successor."²⁵⁸ "Kadima converged around Olmert, knowing that in doing so, it would avoid a possible devastating leadership battle, and at the same time be perceived as continuing Sharon's legacy."²⁵⁹ The leader replacement was again a problematic development which has the capacity to ruin the success of the electoral campaign led by Sharon. However, the disappearance of Sharon did not affect the polls very much.²⁶⁰ After all, Olmert was also a popular figure.

7.2.2 Party Program and the Elections

The popularity of the leaders of Kadima is not the only fact that carried party to the top. The party

²⁵⁴ Hazan, p. 275.

²⁵⁵ Sandler and Rynhold, p.245.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Hazan, p.276.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

program was also very important in terms of capturing the voters' attention. Kadima's priorities in the sphere of party competition are appropriate to the most important concern of the voters: Security. Although socio-economic affairs received greater attention and had more impact than earlier, the issue of peace and security had become more important in determining the most significant aspects of the election results.²⁶¹ The result of this is explained by the fact that the Israeli voters' prime importance has changed due to incapability of the previous parties to cope with the security problems. As Hazan puts it:

“From independence in 1948 until the 1967 Six Day War, the socioeconomic cleavage represented the main sphere of party competition. Since 1967, this cleavage has been replaced by that of territories and defense. The result was a new dominant cleavage in Israeli politics, focused on the territories, where the left was identified with those willing to exchange territories for peace, and the right with those unwilling to part with them”.²⁶²

The Six Day War, thus, changed the very nature of the party competition, and, in its new constellation, the now-dominant security dimension survived as the main continuum in the 2006 election.²⁶³ For fulfilling this dimension, Olmert's plan, which has become known as the Convergence Plan and outlined on 8 February 2006, was the supporting of a significant withdrawal from the West Bank.²⁶⁴ This plan involved a civilian and military Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, including the dismantling of all of Gaza's 21 settlements and a further four settlements in the northern part of the West Bank.²⁶⁵ The premises taking place in the party program on security issue, first, accept that the Jewish people have a national and historic right to the Land of Israel in its entirety and address a sovereign Jewish and democratic state that is a secure national home in which solid Jewish majority lives within the State of Israel.²⁶⁶

These premises embrace the Zionist point of view for capturing the attention of the voters who have a tendency of supporting the right. However, in the third premise Kadima addresses voters

²⁶¹ Rynhold, J., 2007, “Peace and Security in the 2006 Election”, Israel Affairs, Vol:13, No:2, p.384-400.

²⁶² Hazan, p.270.

²⁶³ Ibid, p. 271.

²⁶⁴ Ibid, p.278.

²⁶⁵ Rynhold, p.387.

²⁶⁶ Ibid, p.277.

who have a tendency of supporting the left. Kadima suggests that the balance between allowing Jews to fulfill their historic right to live anywhere in the Land of Israel and maintaining the continued existence of Israel as the national Jewish home necessitates a choice that requires territorial compromise.²⁶⁷ Nonetheless, many people support a compromise, not because they believe in peace but because they think that a separation from the Palestinians will enhance their personal security and neutralize the impact of demographic trends, thereby ensuring that Israel remains a Jewish and democratic state with a large Jewish majority.²⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the Israeli public consistently ranks peace higher than retaining the territories - which comes in the last place after a Jewish majority, peace, democracy and only then a greater Israel.²⁶⁹ It can be said that voters of the right look at the long-term benefits of the premise, whereas voters of the left focus on the short-term benefits. According to Hazan, the compromise was the conciliation of the left-wing and right-wing problem under the umbrella of Kadima's convergence plan.

Secondly, "Kadima's socioeconomic Action Plan is a similar exercise in trying to occupy the middle", in other words, to reconcile the left and the right.²⁷⁰ "Kadima believes that there is no contradiction between a free market economy and a sensitive and a compassionate society. A strong economy depends on a strong society, on the ability to earn a dignified livelihood and on a strong governmental backbone of the highest social and health services."²⁷¹

This socio-economic action plan was laid out as follows: Modern, open and competitive markets are the key to getting the country back on track. However, this by no means implies that laws governing free markets are synonymous with the laws of the jungle, in which the strong devour the weak with impunity. A Kadima-led government will build the essential physical and human infrastructures together with the services necessary to overcome inevitable market failures and shortcomings.²⁷²

With this plan, Kadima aimed at addressing the voters who suffered from the neoliberal policies of

²⁶⁷ Hazan, p.277.

²⁶⁸ Rynhold, p.384-385.

²⁶⁹ Shamir, Y., 2006, **Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Two Level Game**, presented a communiqué at the conference on Public Opinion, Democracy and Peace Making, (May 2006). Jerusalem.

²⁷⁰ Hazan, p. 278.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid, p.278-279.

the previous government, especially the workers who were criticized by Netanyahu, the finance minister during the Likud government, for being “capable of paralyzing the Israeli economy” with its Labour unions.²⁷³ At this point, it is ironic that Kadima positioned itself opposite the neoliberal policies which are mostly implemented by MKs coming from Likud and now composing the most dominant part of the party.

Thirdly, religion is another significant dimension determining the voters’ behaviour. Kadima promised that each person will live with his or her own beliefs. Each person will be given freedom to worship and the right to combine religion with day to day life according to their desires and outlook, as long as it does not infringe upon human rights and on basic freedoms.²⁷⁴

Moreover, the Kadima platform also promised “a special law that will solve the problem of those who are unable to wed according to Halakha.”²⁷⁵ In accordance with this, the party also claimed that “this law has already been formulated and accepted by leading rabbis who agree that it does not contradict Jewish law.”²⁷⁶ As we can see, there was not any conflicting and radical premises produced on this issue. Rather, the party took a conciliatory position with the current state of affairs on religion while arranging new laws.

The campaign attempted to connect Kadima with the national, the official, the state.²⁷⁷ That’s how it captured voters who had been in the middle in terms of political concerns. There is an important reason for this. First, the Israeli public opinion since 1994, which shows that despite the surge in violence as of 2000, a firm and growing majority exists among the Israeli public that advocates negotiations with the Palestinians; this majority supports the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and is ready to dismantle settlements in order to implement a physical separation.²⁷⁸ In other words, the public of Israel had already converged on, the middle—at least on the main security dimension. The creation of Kadima did not create the middle, it simply established the political party that expressed the position and desire of what constituted already the

²⁷³ Likud Political Party. Available on site <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Likud>.

²⁷⁴ Hazan, p.279.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ibid, p.281.

largest part, if not a majority, of the Israeli society.²⁷⁹

After the elections, Kadima won 29 seats in the Knesset by declaring their victory a very significant achievement since no other newly formed party had ever won so many seats in any Knesset elections, nor had any other new party ever risen to become the strongest party.²⁸⁰ The result of the Kadima-based coalition was as following: the Kadima-based coalition government was sworn in on 4 May 2006. Besides Kadima it included three other parties: Labour, Shas and the Pensioners, of a total of 67 MKs. Kadima received 12 ministerial positions, including foreign affairs, finance and interior, but became short in achieving the majority in the 25-member government. Labour held seven positions, including defense and education. Shas was given four, and the Pensioners received two.²⁸¹

7.2.3 Olmert's Kadima and the Recent Developments

Olmert became the most important figure of the party after the elections. However, his reputation has been irreparably eroded by the recent lengthy courtroom testimony of Morris Talansky, a New York businessman, who is said to have made improper cash contributions to Olmert for a decade, before becoming prime minister.²⁸² Moreover, his rule has been ruined almost from the outset by his decision in July to go to war in Lebanon, where Israel in effect lost to Hezbollah.²⁸³

Olmert's era has witnessed many diplomatic developments. He decided to launch a massive retaliation for a cross-border kidnapping by Hezbollah of two Israeli soldiers, a decision in which

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p.281.

²⁸⁰ Sandler, S. And Rynhold, J., 2007, "Introduction: From Centrism to Neo-Centrism", Israel Affairs, Vol: 13, No: 2, 229-250, p.229.

²⁸¹ Hazan, p.284.

²⁸² The Economist Magazine, 31 July 2008 "Ehud Olmert says he'll go, at last."

Also available on site http://www.economist.com/world/Mideast_africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11848288.

²⁸³ The Economist Magazine, 31 July 2008 "Ehud Olmert says he'll go, at last."

Also available on site http://www.economist.com/world/Mideast_africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11848288.

he enjoyed wide support in parliament and among the public in general.²⁸⁴ The air force destroyed almost all Hezbollah's long-range missiles.²⁸⁵ Israel's chief of staff, a former air force commander, assured Olmert that Hezbollah's thousands of short-range missiles could be dealt with in the same way.²⁸⁶ A month later, however, these missiles were still raining down on the northern parts of Israel, and support for the war had turned to recrimination and despair.²⁸⁷ This resulted in Kadima's main policy to be damaged severely and support for negotiation has lost its effect. Olmert, on the same account, has lost his credibility and his personal standing has been devastated because of his failures in the foreign policy regarding the security of the state and the claims on corruption.

On 30 July 2008, Olmert announced that he would not contest the Kadima Party Leadership election the following September, and he would resign from office once his party had elected a new leader.²⁸⁸ In his resignation speech, he addressed the cases of corruption of which he was accused, saying he was "proud to be a citizen of a country in which a Prime Minister can be investigated like any other citizen."²⁸⁹ These events have been interpreted as signaling the end of Olmert's political career.²⁹⁰

As expected, Tzipi Livni won the leadership of Israel's ruling Kadima party in a primary election on September 17th.²⁹¹ Her initial target was to set a new coalition but she has failed to fulfill this end. Therefore, new parliamentary elections were set for 10 February 2009.²⁹² Some senior Likud officials criticized her for demonstrating a lack of leadership, inability and inexperience.²⁹³ Others

²⁸⁴ The Economist Magazine, 31 July 2008 "Ehud Olmert says he'll go, at last."

Also available on site http://www.economist.com/world/Mideast_africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11848288.

²⁸⁵ The Economist Magazine, 31 July 2008 "Ehud Olmert says he'll go, at last."

Also available on site http://www.economist.com/world/Mideast_africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11848288.

²⁸⁶ The Economist Magazine, 31 July 2008 "Ehud Olmert says he'll go, at last."

Also available on site http://www.economist.com/world/Mideast_africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11848288.

²⁸⁷ The Economist Magazine, 31 July 2008 "Ehud Olmert says he'll go, at last."

Also available on site http://www.economist.com/world/Mideast_africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11848288.

²⁸⁸ Ehud Olmert. Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Olmert.

²⁸⁹ Ehud Olmert. Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Olmert.

²⁹⁰ Ehud Olmert. Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Olmert.

²⁹¹ The Economist Magazine, 18 September 2008, "Tzipi Livni bids for the spot."

Available on site http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=122673627

²⁹² Kadima Political Party. Available on site <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>.

²⁹³ Israel gears up for elections: Kadima chairwoman Livni told President Shimon Peres that she had failed to form a government. **McClatchy Tribune Business News**.

asked the question how a person incapable of managing coalition negotiations would be able to negotiate with the Palestinians and Syrians.²⁹⁴ Recently, Tzipi Livni, the Labor Party chairman and the Minister of Defense, Ehud Barak, and Likud chairman MK Benjamin Netanyahu shared the podium for the closing session of the "Globes", an Israel Business Conference.²⁹⁵ Livni promised to make changes in the eligibility periods for National Insurance allotments.²⁹⁶ It can be evaluated as one of Kadima's final efforts to settle the accounts with the Likud and Labour parties.

Chapter 4:

8. A CASE STUDY: WHAT DOES THE LEBANON WAR TELL US ABOUT ISRAEL?

8.1 Lebanon War in 2006

The Lebanon war in 2006 brought Israel and its foreign policy back on the Middle East political stage. What does structuration theory tell us about the Lebanon War? First of all, it seems that there is a continuous conflict between the creator of the Greater Middle East Project, U.S., which is pursued by Israel after 9/11 and those who are against the project, both in the governmental and non-governmental level. Therefore, according to structuration theory, developments in the region can be explained through strategic interests in the region and international political (structural level) as well as the struggle of identities in the region and intra-national politics (individual level).

In this part, the author will try to explore the developments in Lebanon in the light of structuration theory. Getting closer to what this war means for the region is essential for an understanding of future events in the political sphere. Structuration theory is very helpful in investigating the developments in a region like Middle East where consistency, negotiation and stability is rare. The author argues that the Lebanon War in 2006 shows symptoms of a dead-born Greater Middle East Project and an Israeli Foreign Policy guided by conservative hegemonic Kadima leaders.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Major party heads speak at closing panel: Each candidate spoke on 'Government's role in an economic crisis', Israel Business Conference." **McClatchy Tribune Business News**.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

However, this analysis, at the same time, indicates the limits of structuration theory.

8.2 The Political Structure of Lebanon

Lebanon is a unique case or an exception from various kinds of points in the Middle East. It abolished French Hegemony after the First World War and established an independent government in 1943. One of its most distinct features is the dependence of its institutions and practices to religion and religious identity. For this reason, Lebanon recognizes 18 religious sects by looking at the population census of 1932, while it was still under the French Hegemony, the proportion of each sect according to the population calculated. The whole political structure of its system is formed according to this proportion. The political power is distributed proportionally according to the proportions of the population census of 1932. The state apparatuses and bureaucracy is reformulated according to the proportion principle. It can therefore be said that the political power is determined in a sectarian logic and ideology. This is inevitably affecting the social and cultural life to a significant extent. In other words, the unitary state principle was kept small and ineffectual in Lebanon, which was formed dominantly by Sunni and Maronite tradesman. These features have made Lebanon an exception in the Middle East in contrast to powerful and interventionist state formation applications that were very common in the Middle East in the beginning of the 20th Century. That's why we can say that Lebanon has a relatively more liberal economic and political understanding than its neighbors in the East.²⁹⁷

Lebanon occupies a very important strategic geopolitical position in the region. It is located in the Eastern Mediterranean region becoming a tampon region between Syria and Israel with the result that either the actors in the region or outside the region has a special interest in Lebanon. Its intersection position enables Lebanon to involve in many different local and national political movements. This is precisely the determinant fact of the civil war in Lebanon that started in 1975. The civil war caused by many inner and outer dynamics brought together. In the local politics, the political system could not respond to the demographic facts and develop new political dynamics. This system collapsed completely after the intervention of the Palestinian Revolution Army to the

²⁹⁷ Harris, W., 1997, *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions*, Princeton.

political stage of Lebanon.

The Palestinian Revolution army was compelled to retreat by force from the Jordan territory in 1970 and then came to play an important role in Lebanon politics. Although the civil war from 1975 to 1990 was between the supporters of the status quo in Lebanon and opponents of the status quo, many actors outside the country were involved actively in the war as well. These actors or states supported different sides of the civil war; and even changed sides sometimes resulting in strategic confrontations over Lebanon.

Contemporary Lebanon can therefore only be understood by carefully analyzing the power distribution and identity struggle in the national politics on the one side and regional power distribution and identity struggle distribution on the other. Since these two sides are juxtaposed with each other, structuration theory can make the picture clearer. A bi-polar Lebanon model fits perfectly with the structuration theory model discussed above and enables us to analyze the Lebanon crisis by looking at the interaction of the two spheres both in Israel and Lebanon.

8.2.1 The Ta'if Accord

In 1989, civil war in Lebanon ended with the Ta'if Treaty. This event signaled a new order for Lebanon. The primary characteristic of the new order was the influence of Syria over Lebanon politics. The new regime was supported and protected by the Syrian state. Lebanon also made some regulations in its inner structure of politics. For instance, half and half distribution of Christian and Muslim representatives, the increase in the power of the prime minister who has to come from the Sunni sect in contrast to state president, who has to be Maronite tradesman, and finally the incumbency of the president of the assembly was extended. These examples can be given to illustrate some of the regulations in the politics.²⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the Ta'if Accord is a Maronite-Sunni order in its essence. Shiites, those who are living in the South in poor conditions, are still excluded from the important parts of the government. The Ta'if Accord is therefore under

²⁹⁸ Norton, A.R., Summer 1991, "Lebanon After Taif: Is the Civil War Over?", Middle East Journal, Vol: 45, No: 3.

the guidance of Syria which has brought some peace and stability to a Lebanon that was demolished and confused because of the civil war. The previous structural problems, however, were not solved. Lebanon then continued to pursue its political structure based on the two main religious identities and excludes the Shiites with the result of big socio-economic inequalities in the society.

In order to understand contemporary problems arisen in Lebanon and to analyze the Israel-Lebanon war in this context, one should look at the inner and outer actors actively engaged in the region. Syria increases its effect over Lebanon after the Ta'if Treaty in accordance with its developing relationship with Gulf and western countries in the Gulf Crisis. The Ta'if Treaty recognizes the privileged relationship between Syria and Lebanon and recognizes Syria's influence over Lebanon. From this prospective, this is a great political success for the Syrian government. However, the problem is defining and practicing the quality of this privileged relationship. What were the basic privileges and how was it pronounced from the legal rational law? The problem was shortly solved after a decision taken by Lebanon government. The Lebanon parliament allowed the immense role of the Syrian army over Lebanon's security policy in September 1989. In practice, though, problems appeared concerning the fulfillments of the agreement that Hafez Al-Assad regime always disfavored General Michel Naim Aoun who was totally against the Ta'if Treaty. Syria had to solve this problem. The gulf Crisis helped Syria, and the military solution paved the way for the Syrian army. The primary supporter of General Aoun was Iraq, but Iraq was not able to enter the scene at that point. Moreover, US accepted Syrian hegemony over Lebanon due to Hafez Al-Assad's diplomatic and military assistance to US forces. The US convinced Israel not to interfere with the close Syria-Lebanon relationship.

These developments encouraged Syria to attack the Presidential Palace in 13 September 1990. The aim was to destroy the opponents who were against Syria. However, this attack, especially the Syrian air force attack, was unacceptable to the Red Line Treaty which had been signed between Israel and Lebanon. The military facilities of Syria were determined in this treaty, but this attack was a dubious one and Israel preferred to remain silent.²⁹⁹ Syria harvested the fruits of its

²⁹⁹ Nasrallah, F., 1994, *Syria after Ta'if: Lebanon and the Lebanese in Syrian Politics* in E. Kienle (ed.) *Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace*, London: British Academic Press, p. 135-6.

diplomacy pursued throughout the Gulf crisis. The Syrian government raised its influence over Lebanon with these attacks and this influence gained a formal status after an agreement signed in May 1991 between the two countries. The agreement named as the Friendship and Collaboration Agreement made Syria's position to Arab countries and Israel more powerful.

In short, Lebanon was governed primarily under the hegemony of Syria and religious sects which have been a positive aspect in Syrian politics in the region throughout the 90's. Therefore, it is true to say that Lebanon was structurally bounded to Syria and religious sects and groups were the actors in the political domain. Approximately 30.000 Syrian soldiers and complex intelligence power proved Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.³⁰⁰ Syria also guaranteed its existence on the Lebanon territory by manipulating parliamentary elections after the Ta'if Accord. Syria applied many techniques and ways to interfere with the active political environment in Lebanon by supporting and guaranteeing an absolute power to the actors and persons who had close relationships with Syria. Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that groups existing in Lebanon were happy with the Syrian existence and the Ta'if constitution, although Syria was in cooperation with many different groups and actors from different stratas of the Lebanese society. The Maronites, for instance, complain about their primary roles in Lebanon, whereas Shiites are divided into minor groups and remain excluded from the society, Shiites have fear about the increasing Sunni influence and Durzis are unhappy about losing their autonomous position.

In this conjuncture, the Shiites becomes very crucial for our structuration analysis. The primary actors for the Shiites community consist of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. After the Ta'if Accord, the representation crisis has led many Shiites to get involved in Hezbollah. However, with its positive approach to integration to Lebanon and reformatory ideas, the Amal Movement and its leader, Nabih Berri, become the most two important representatives among the Shiites. But Hezbollah and its Shiite supporters could not get their interests from the Ta'if Accord. Hezbollah was seen in the Lebanon political spectrum after Israel's military invasion in Lebanon in 1982 and won the hearts of the poor and lower class Shiites. However, they have been continuously excluded from the political stage after the Ta'if Accord. Moreover, it faced loss of legitimacy and

³⁰⁰ Gambill, G.C. And Aoun, E.A., August 2007, "Special Report: How Syria Orchestrates Lebanon's Elections", Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol:2, No:7. Available on site http://www.meib.org/article/0008_11.htm.

power after the Middle East Peace Process started in 1991. In this context, Hezbollah shifted its ideology and politics towards a more negotiating attitude. It entered the Lebanese elections in 1992 where it tried to improve the socio-economical conditions of poor Shiites who were gradually excluded from the political and economical sphere. Moreover, the organization worked for a possible peace with Israel. Therefore, it can be said that Hezbollah gave up establishing its Islamic State Project on the Lebanon territory. This means that Hezbollah was going to find itself a place in the political stage. Hezbollah got 8 seats in 128 seats big parliament in the first elections after the Ta'if treaty from 1992.

Hezbollah, however, did not give up its struggle using force and weapons. Syria found it likely to use Hezbollah's military power in the South against Israel if something would go wrong in the peace process. Israel got out from most of the Lebanese territories in 1985, but was still invading 9 km "Security Zone" on the South of Lebanon. This zone consisted of dominantly Shiites and this situation enabled and justified Hezbollah's military facilities on the South Lebanon. Therefore, Hezbollah became a "Resistance organization" (al-Muqâwmat) for not only Shiites but also other groups, although some were against a powerful Hezbollah. In addition to this, an informal and unwritten negotiation between Israel and Hezbollah after the operations realized in 1993 and 1996 kept the military struggle in control. With this negotiation, Israel recognizes Hezbollah's right to attack Israelite targets in the Security Zone and each side promised not to attack civil targets. In short, Hezbollah conserved its military power as well as gradually increased its political activity. However, it used its power only when it needed it for strengthening Syria against Israel in the peace negotiations and rising up its position and legitimacy to a respectful place in Lebanon's political life.

It was crucial for Syria to be in cooperation with Hezbollah as well. Syria applied equilibrium politics between the Lebanon regime and Hezbollah throughout the 1990's. These politics progressed, although there were crises at times. Iran took part of the Syria-Hezbollah relationship as well. Indeed, the warm relationships between Iran and Syria began in 1980's. The reasons of the close relationship was due to their common frustration towards the Iraq and Israelite regime and politics, fear from the Western hegemony in the region and their will to limit Turkey's influence in the Middle East. Iran wanted to escape from being alone in the region and targeted to be

influential in politics of the Arab world.

The Iranian regime, moreover, wanted to strengthen Syria against US and Israel in the region to protect Syrian interests on Lebanese territory. All these facts ended up with a close and collaborative relationship between Syria and Iran in the 1990's. I argue that Hezbollah became Hezbollah as a result of this relationship. Iran played a crucial role in the establishment and training of Hezbollah. In addition to this, there are historical and sectarian bonds between Iran and Shiites of Lebanon which gives both sides a mutual dependency making the increasing continuity of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah throughout the 1980's an evident proof of the bonding. It is also a fact that Hezbollah took both monetary and military support from Iran.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, provided influence and the right to speak up to the Iranian regime in the Arabian-Israeli conflict. Moreover, Iran could reach the Eastern Mediterranean region and support its claim to become a dominant power in the Arab region this way. On the other hand, Iran needed Syria to pass through Lebanon. Syria, hence, used Hezbollah against US and Israel, as well as its enemies inside Lebanon.

In short, there is a complex equation between the actors of the region. It is true that the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria axis was increasingly developing throughout the 1980's and beneficial to every actor to realize its own strategic goals. Therefore, rather than analyzing the relationships and politics within the context of hegemonic relationship, one should evaluate this axis as a complex web of relationship and a win-win politics as structuration theory suggests for analyzing social policies.

Lebanon is very important for Israel because many non-Lebanese actors were active in the region and used Lebanese territory as if it was a place to fight against Israel. Israel invaded Lebanon two times, in 1978 and then in 1982, to destroy the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)'s activity in the region. The 1982 invasion was much more violent than the one in 1978, the Israeli army marched into Beirut and the invasion continued till 1985. While the Israeli army returned back to Israel in 1985, it formed a 9 km. long Security Zone in the South of Lebanon. The South Lebanon Army were trained by Israeli soldiers but established by Lebanese people to control the Southern part of the country. This picture would continue until the 2000s where Israel gave up

staying in the region. Israel and Hezbollah's conflict concerning the region also continued until the 2000s, but as the author stated above, they tried to manage the conflict rather than being in active war due to their unwritten negotiation.

8.3 The Changes in the Balance of Politics in the Middle East

Lebanon and Middle East politics faced important changes during the 2000's. To begin with, Syria which is claimed to be the most important actor on Lebanon politics has lost its position in Lebanon. The appointment between Clinton and Hafez Al-Assad didn't go well and put an end to the Peace Process of the 1990's. New governments came into power in Israel and U.S had negative attitudes towards peace with the Syrian regime. As a result, the Syrian position in the region has evolved and resulted in the loss of its powerful position.

On top of this, the head of Syria, Hafez Al-Assad, died and his son, Bashar al-Assad, took hold of the power leading Syria to a transition. As Bashar al-Assad was an inexperienced man, he wasn't able to govern Syria's position very well. September 11 contributed to the power loss of Syria in the region and US announced their anxiety towards the Syrian regime. The George W. Bush government declared Syria as one of the axis of evil countries making Syria a target that should be controlled by US. These developments inevitably effected Lebanon as well.

Israel's withdrawal process, which began in May 2000, also led to a reaction against the Syrian withdrawal in Lebanon. A reactionary movement arose, mainly of Christians living in Lebanon but also other groups were supporting the movement. The movement wanted to put an end to Syria's hegemony over the region. This opposition grew increasingly after the Syrian-backed Lebanese Parliament extended President Lahoud's term in office for another three years. This was quite unusual for Lebanese politics, the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005. The assassination of Rafik Hariri brought Lebanese politics to another juncture. The general idea that Syria had an important role, to say the least, in the Hariri assassination had placed the Syrian presence to the center of the political debate in the country.

In addition to inner pressures, also external gazes were on Syria. On 11 May 2004, President Bush

approved the decision of the US Senate which called for imposing sanctions on Syria. The UN Security Council Resolution 1559 of September 2004 called for the “disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the extension of the control of the government of Lebanon over all its territory, the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon and fair and free presidential elections according to the Lebanese constitutional rules without foreign interference and influence” can be considered within this context as well, pointing the Hezbollah weapons and Syrian presence as the main obstacles to Lebanese sovereignty.³⁰¹

Syria could not stand against the pressures and started to withdraw its soldiers and intelligence officers by 27 April 2005. In May 2005, Lebanon had its first elections in 30 years without any Syrian existence. The Syrian-opposed coalition under the leadership of Rafik Hariri's son, Saad Hariri, won the elections.

The effects of these developments of Hezbollah needs complicated analysis. Israel's withdrawal beginning in 2000 increased its popularity in Lebanon. This withdrawal was interpreted as Hezbollah's success in Lebanon as well as in the Arab world. Hezbollah furthered this wind by raising its influence in Lebanese national politics. While doing this, it pursued a two-headed strategy. On the one hand, it rose up its effort for its integration to Lebanese political life which began after the Ta'if accord. In this context, Hezbollah participated in the government for the first time with two ministers.

This development is very important in terms of the politicization and transformation of Hezbollah as well as the representation of the marginalized Shiites in national politics. It also shows Hezbollah's power through the withdrawal of Syria from the region as well as the will of negotiation between groups in Lebanon by inviting Hezbollah to national politics and the government.³⁰² On the other hand, Hezbollah continued its military struggle in its efforts to become a political party and a politicized power. Its military power can be interpreted as

³⁰¹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1559 (2004), S/RES/1559, 2 September 2004. Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UN_Security_Council_Resolution_1559.

³⁰² Fayyad, A., 15 August 2006, “Hezbollah and the Lebanese State: Reconciling a National Strategy with a Regional Role”. Available on site <http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article274>.

emergency hammer itself.

United Nations accepted Israel's withdrawal as a total withdrawal by the decree no. 6878 on 18 June 2000. However, Hezbollah was still defending its military legitimacy by two basic theses. The first thesis is the withdrawal of Israel from Shebaa Farms, and the second is the liberation of Lebanese prisoners kept in Israelite prisons. These demands were kept continuously on Hezbollah's agenda and led to keep its military legitimacy against Israel. It's still a valid resistance position also contributing to the use of military power in national politics and refusal of critics against militant structure of its organization.

After the withdrawal of Syria in 2005, these parameters have kept its validity in internal politics even in a more discussant way. With the victory of Syrian-opposed groups in 2005 and with the National Dialogue Process which started in 2006, Hezbollah's military legitimacy and its demilitarization have been questioned.

Although the Syrian withdrawal and election results have weakened Hezbollah's movement, regional and national dynamics enable the organization to keep its influence in the region. Because of the fact that Israel is still keeping Shebaa Farms under its control, Hezbollah positions itself as being the most important resistance organization against an Israeli invasion and it has been accepted by other groups that Hezbollah is the only existing social network in the Lebanese society that can be categorized as a resistance organization. The rising Shia consciousness and its marginalized positions after the Ta'if Accord, the catalyzing effect of the Iranian regime as well as the rise of Islamic movements in general in the region are other components enabling Hezbollah to become one of the important actors in the region.

Hezbollah has proved its autonomous existence in the region and showed that it wasn't totally dependent on Syria. Its politicization also shows that it will become an active actor in the politics of Lebanon. Indeed, the Anti-Syrian Coalition, who won the general elections, was aware of many difficulties in the realization of the transformation of the country which was on its list of tasks to undertake. The National Dialogue Process which began in the beginning of 2006 was thus unsuccessful in terms of defining a new political order and forming institutions after the

abolishment of the Syrian hegemony in the region.

8.3.1 Crisis and War

The incidents that triggered the war in Lebanon took place between 12th of July and 14th of August in 2006, and were Hezbollah's bombardment of Israeli military zones and the villages close to borders with volleys and Katyusha rockets and a Hezbollah SWAT to kidnap two Israeli soldiers. During Israel's mission to save the two kidnapped soldiers, five Israeli soldiers were killed. Israel responded with a declaration of a total war and led an attack firing with volleys and besieged Lebanon from sea and air occupying the southern territory of the country. In what way was this incident that led to a war different from the other incidents in the same inconsistent territory which had only led to a few short term conflicts? In this framework, one can say that both two countries' internal and foreign development as well as local and international conjuncture, especially this conjuncture's perception of Israel and Hezbollah led to this war.

First of all, when we look at the internal developments of both countries, we see that the position of agents of war and these agents' perception of threat and opportunity are quite important. For Israel, the government headed by Ehud Olmert is one of the agents of the incident. As we know, during the March 2006 elections, the newly founded Kadima party made up the new government as the biggest party of the coalition for the first time in Israeli history, despite the non-existence of Kadima's founder, Ariel Sharon. Contributing to Kadima's success, was Likud's resistance to approach negotiations with the new party. This played an important role as well as the disappointment of a group from the Worker's Party's peace projects and Camp David's failure in negotiating with the Palestinians. This group had supported Sharon's unilateral disengagement process probably with the demographic concerns in mind while he was leading Likud.

Kadima, however, started to face problems in the very first days of its rule. The continuing negative environment after the Gaza withdrawal and the increasing attacks coming from Gaza to Israel activated people to oppose the one way withdrawal. An important debate about the Gaza withdrawal started to take place in Israel. This debate put Kadima in a very difficult position as it did not have any alternative to the "one way withdrawal" ideology. Moreover, especially because

the government had members without military background, like the minister of defense and the new president of the Worker's Party, people of Israel who believed the military competency and success are a must for leadership got insecure towards the government. In such a conjuncture, Hamas' and Hezbollah's kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers was perceived a challenge for testing this new government's determinism and power. Hezbollah kidnapped these soldiers through an operation within the borders of Israel for the first time after a long period. The government being under very strong pressure concerning its internal politics and being suspected of lack of authority, thus felt obliged to show its determinism and power. The internal politics of Israel in this case explains to a certain extent why the Olmert government responded to the soldier kidnapping operation in such a fierce manner.

In a similar way, incidents in Lebanon and the position of Hezbollah give us some clues about why Hezbollah attempted this operation against Israel. After Syria's withdrawal from the scene and knowing that there would be a new role sharing in Lebanon, Hezbollah started to struggle to keep its power against the 14th March camp that got stronger in the international conjuncture. This struggle with Israel had gotten crucial. Increasing the control in this context could be important in Hezbollah's desire for internal power. One can easily find clues regarding certain moves of Hezbollah to make connections with Israel before the war which only resulted in a dead end. An example of this is Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who came up with the issue of releasing Lebanese prisoners made Israel a main target and declaring 2006 as the year of prisoners could be returned for these moves. Again, Hezbollah's aims of internal politics cannot be explained totally by the reasons of such a destructive war. To fully understand the reason of this war, it is necessary to investigate the regional and international conjuncture as well as both countries' perception of this conjuncture.

The regional and international context of the war mainly consists of the Middle East politics of the USA, developed after September 11, which has led to the USA–Syria relations and the Iran nuclear crisis. This conjuncture was perceived as threatening by both sides of the war. For Israel, Hezbollah's attempt to move the conflict to a more aggressive level (bombardment of Israel, kidnapping soldiers by tres-passing the border) was perceived as a part of a bigger conflict in the Middle East. The main agents of this conflict are Syria and Iran. In this perspective, Hezbollah is

the puppet of both countries. Oppressed by USA and partially by EU politics, these countries wanted to show their power and authority towards Israel which they believe to be serving USA and EU politics. Israel, thus, was not able to neglect this challenge. Moreover, Israel believed that if Hezbollah could be weakened Hezbollah after using this excuse to attack Israel could gain this important power from Syria and Iran, an attack on Hezbollah would be a useful action to take. Israel's perception of Hezbollah's recent armament as getting threatening was another reason. Furthermore, it can be claimed that Israel's attack on Hezbollah served for both weakening Hezbollah and giving a message to Syria and Iran. That's why, in other words, also Syria and Iran was a target for Israel in this, maybe even to a bigger extent than Hezbollah.

For Hezbollah the perspective is the opposite. Hezbollah perceives the Greater Middle East Project to be designed by USA to take control of the whole region, and the rest of the Islamic world.³⁰³ For Hezbollah the incidents in Lebanon are just a small part of the hegemony that USA is pursuing. After Syria was forced to withdraw from Lebanon, groups supporting this withdrawal have gained control in Lebanon which is a benefit USA big project. Thus, Hezbollah's target in the war was also USA and the "new order" it wants to create in Middle East, maybe even more than Israel.

Shortly, both sides perceive each other's moves as being made on a bigger scale chessboard. Because of this, the incidents in 2006 gained speed and aggression, and at the end it turned into a regular war. In this context, it is impossible to know today to what extent the perception of both sides reflect the reality. Did Hezbollah really want to take Israel into the picture so that it could improve its own and its allies' power and authority in Lebanon and in the region? Did Iran and Syria support Hezbollah's attack to prevent the threats towards themselves? Did Israel start a more aggressive attack to diminish Hezbollah for being opposed to the new order to be created in the region with the support of USA? Was this war necessary for Lebanon to attach the block of Western supporters? More importantly, did Israel want to weaken Hezbollah as a power of Iran just to ground a future attack to Iran by Israel or USA? It is not possible to know the answers to of

³⁰³ Saad-Ghorayeb, A., August 2006, "Hizbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict", Part I ve Part II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Outlook.

Available on site http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/saad_ghorayeb_final.pdf and http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ghorayeb_part2_final.pdf.

these questions today. An analysis in this context will derive from political positions. It is possible, however, to claim that the direct and indirect agents of this war all had their own reasons to engage themselves in the war, but this does mean that these reasons are reason enough to start the war themselves.

8.3.2 The Consequences of the War

The final consequence of the war of who the winners and losers are remains a controversial issue. Both sides had their benefits and losses from this war. The military consequences cannot be satisfactory from Israel's perspective as it did not achieve any of its military aims. It can be claimed that Israel did succeed in weakening at least a part of Hezbollah's military structure. Nevertheless, Israel has not achieved its major goal. Although having a massive military power, and known for the myth of being unbeatable, Israel has not been able to defeat Hezbollah, which is the major military failure of Israel together with Hezbollah's capacity to fire at Israel a few times. The fact of being unable to save the kidnapped soldiers is another failure for Israel. Also politically it is possible to say that Israel achieved only some of its aims. The Hezbollah and Lebanon problem got internationalized because of this war, an expanded peace force in Lebanon and this peace force and Lebanon army's position in the south are all for Israel's benefits. On the other hand, the peace force in Lebanon also limited Israel's ability to interfere in Lebanon.

For the other major side of the war, Hezbollah, the consequences of the war are complicated. Hezbollah could claim itself as the winner of the war because of its resistance, of not being defeated by the powerful Israeli Army.

This situation has increased the popularity of Hezbollah, especially in the war period in both Lebanon and generally in the Arab Islamic world.³⁰⁴ Although its popularity increased for a certain period of time in Lebanon, especially among the Shiites, it is not possible to say the same thing for the other parts of Lebanon. In these other parts, because of the fact that Hezbollah brought

³⁰⁴ Telhami, S., January 2007, "Lebanese Identity and Israeli Security in the Shadows of the 2006 War", *Current History*, p.22. Available on site http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2007/01middleeast_telhami/20070123.pdf.

Lebanon into disastrous incidents once again, an atmosphere opposing against Hezbollah appeared only a short time after the war. Hezbollah's attempt to turn the benefits of war into political authority was responded by some resistance.

The side which totally lost in the war is Lebanon and the Lebanese people. The war led to the death of 1.191 people and thousands of injured, and made almost a million people homeless. Moreover, the infrastructure of the country was affected very badly. The financial losses in the Lebanese economy because of the war are almost 12 billion US Dollars.³⁰⁵

CONCLUSION

The U.S. intervention to Iraq after 9/11 induced many political, social and economical changes in the Middle East. United States drew a new picture for the Middle East region and either state-scale or out-of-state scale, those who are against the theme of the picture has become an enemy in the eyes of the U.S or in other words "rouge states".

The "new order" declared by U.S condemns Iran and Syria as main reasons of regional instability and sees Israel's position as one of the strategic points in peace-establishment for the Middle East. On the other hand, Iran, Syria and their extensions such as Hezbollah evaluates Middle East project as the map for hegemonic domination of the Middle East under the control of Israel and U.S. Regardless of different perspectives, Israel seems one of the key actors in the reshaping process of the Middle East. Therefore it is crucial to analyze Israel's foreign policy in the region.

Israel's position in the region becomes very important because its actions can be symptomatic for the future developments in the region. Therefore an analysis on the foreign policy of Israel can indicate us that whether it is true what U.S. thinks or not.

Is Israel really indoctrinating faith like a hypodermic needle to the so called peaceful atmosphere of Greater Middle East Project or is Israel going to be gradually neo-conservative like its partner

³⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, 1 November 2006, "Israel, Hizbullah, Lebanon: Avoiding Renewed Conflict", Middle East Report No:59. Available on site <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4480&l=1>.

US and furthering its pragmatically interests in the region? We can reformulate this question as whether there is a Greater Middle East Project at all.

However, foreign policy analysis implies many difficulties. Questions such as to what extent a nation state is autonomous in the international relations or to what extent international organizations and bodies are affectual over states are inevitable to the analyzer. This is due to the fact that because foreign policy decision-making is a matter of simultaneous internal and external policies of the nation states. Especially for the Middle East, where nation states are formed with certain political, economic and social inequalities and where many calculations are made on how the map of the region should be drawn, theoretical perspectives can be insufficient to analyze the developments in the region. Even some political theorists, such as James Rosenau, advice to avoid general theories when analyzing foreign policy:

“To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external forces is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other. Foreign policy lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations. Foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory. (Rosenau, 1966)³⁰⁶”

Rosenau’s claims should not be interpreted as if foreign policy analysis needs non-theoretical approaches. However, a political analysis necessarily needs a theory to put the issue in an context and order.

But traditional theories are too limitative and the actor-based new expansion in the traditional theories undermines the structural balance of the historical interests in the region, Therefore, I borrow a theoretical framework from the field of sociology and politics in order to analyze Israel’s foreign policy. By that, I predict that realist theories can be incompetent on certain non-state actors such as Hezbollah (before the 1990s) in Lebanon and Idealist theories can be far from the truth in the Middle East region where the equilibrium can change quickly.

³⁰⁶ Rosenau, J.N., 1966, *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy*, (a book chapter written in 1964, Farrell, 1966).

The author argues that complicated and dynamic regions need a new theory. Control of the Middle East is desired by many actors varying from petrol companies to non-state actors from big states to small Emirs in the Middle East. Therefore, a new theory should be close to the political and sociological structure of the Middle East.

Structuration theory can be helpful to understand Israel's foreign policy as well as the meaning of its decision-making. The author argues that this theory grasps politics and sociology in itself as well as actors and structure which is very problematic in previous international relationship theories. The Structuration theory has been formulated by Anthony Giddens in order to understand social life and therefore involves a duality of structure which relates to the fundamentally recursive character of social life and expresses the mutual dependency of structure and agency (Giddens, p.138). This theory implies relative impotence of social practice in context rather than individual experience or structural social theory. Social practices are the result of the dialectical relationship between structures and agency. In other words, the activities are both shaped by and shape actors, not in conscious manner, though, or by social construction of reality, but through the means of engagement in practice.

It can be claimed that Giddens is interested in the dialectical process in which practice, structure and consciousness are produced. For this reason he looked at processes such as the motivational which provide an overall plan for action, rational in which he seeks the most secure way and reflexivity to convey the action. Therefore, practical consciousness is his main concern rather than a discursive one.

Although agency carries primary component of the structuration theory, Giddens is aware of the constraints of structure's rules and resources over human action. However, he claims that the structure only exists in and through the activities of human agents. Even he has described unintended consequences which are caused by human agents that play an important role in the social systems.

Giddens claims that social systems do not have structures but structural properties. Therefore

social systems are a mere product of reproduced social practices. Even structures carry agency-based modalities such as the signification in which language helps members to diffuse the codes. It is a domination in which humans are related to each other within hierarchy and legitimation in which the moral aspects shared by all members of society. The structure is therefore a pure manifestation of itself in the social systems at the macro-level and human consciousness in the micro-level.

The concept of structuration refers to exactly this dual nature, that the constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena. There exists a dualism but it represents a duality that the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices or daily social life. Since social practices are not free floating abstract concepts, Giddens has a more diverse analysis of them bounded by time and space. This makes the structuration theory more sensitive to agency institutions and even to the sociologists.

Can we transform these concepts into language of politics? The author's answer to this question is yes. The agency in the theory can be thought as the political parties and the political leaders, opinion leaders and thinkers. The structure can be defined as the structure of the foreign policy in the world. To be specific about the author's thesis, the overall conjuncture and the balance of the region is the structure of the foreign policy in the Middle East and Israel's Kadima Party and its components which become the agency of it. The author believes that agency acts autonomously in the stage of politics, however, the structure of the policy making in the region is also effectual in the consciousness and political action and decision-making as well.

Therefore, in the first part of this thesis, the author explored the main theories in international relations and their validity with relation to the Middle East and Israel's foreign policy. The author argues that realist theory appears to be very reductionist in the Middle East where also minor actors are important and idealism is utopic where many interests are conflicting within region countries and to Israel's foreign policy.

In the second part, the author introduced the Theory of Structuration to the reader. Since there is only a very limited amount of work on this theory in the international politics, the analysis of it

will derive from an investigation. The author will explain why this theory is crucial for political scientists to understand the foreign policy of Israel.

In the third part, the author applied the basics of structuration theory into Israel's politics. This includes an analysis of the socio-political structure and actors of Israel and its foreign policy as the author also introduced some think-tanks and parties mainly focused on Kadima.

The structure and the ideology of the Kadima Party and reflections on the foreign policy create a need for a historical perspective and foreign political analysis. Thus, the author began with the formation of Kadima. Its existence on the political stage can be dated back to the year of 2005 where it was founded by the former Likud leader, Ariel Sharon. When he was the prime minister of the Israeli state, he formally resigned from the Likud party to form a new party, Kadima. A name which means “forward.”

However, when the new party was formed, it was “National Responsibility”. The title “Kadima” has a symbolic meaning for many Israelis because it is associated with the battle-charge of army officers, suggesting that Sharon might have been attempting to highlight his military accomplishments before the coming elections in March 2006. According to Sharon supporters, Kadima already had nearly 150 members, including several defectors from the Likud Party.

Kadima’s extraordinary success in the Knesset makes the author understand the importance of an agent-based and actor-specific theory in the analysis of foreign policy. A newspaper wrote these words after the victory of Kadima:

“The Movement for Quality Government in Israel has succeeded in convincing the police department to investigate allegations that many Israeli citizens were unwittingly registered as Kadima party members sees Israel as a democratic Jewish state with Jerusalem serving as the country's undivided capital.

The State of Israel serves as the Jewish national home, thus the need to maintain a Jewish

population majority is essential.³⁰⁷

The Structuration theory shows us that foreign policy is not independent from internal politics. Hence, Israel's political climate can be helpful to understand the position of Israel in the Greater Middle East Project. Ariel Sharon's plan for the unilateral disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank shook the stability of his government in 2004. When the disengagement plan was implemented in August 2005, it resulted in the disintegration of the governing party, Likud. In November 2005, Sharon announced his intention to defect from Likud to form a new party, Kadima (Forward), and hold early Knesset elections.

Kadima won an overwhelming success that has never been seen before in Israel's political history. This paved the way to the formation of a new government when Kadima took the majority of the votes despite its weakened political leader as Ariel Sharon was semi-paralyzed during the 2006 March elections. Likud's refusal of negotiating, the failure of the peace-movement of the Labour Party and the dissolution of the Camp David meetings made Kadima reach a bright victory.

However, Kadima had no proper policy other than the unilateral disengagement. Israel tried to control the political crisis arisen from this situation by having its military attacking Palestine and by its ideological propaganda for security paranoia. This policy was supported so that Israel could its might to its enemies: Iran and Syria.

Therefore, the second part of the first part included the analysis of Kadima's ideology. Kadima defines itself as the most embracing party in Israel. It says that it's the only party with an ideology. Even Kadima sees ideology revisable as it is like a chain in the mind of people and like the institutions which make them undemocratic which prevents the people to move forward. In her speech, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tzipi Livni, evaluated the Israeli-Arab relationship with these words:

"For Teheran, for Hezbollah and for the Hamas, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not political but

³⁰⁷ "Fraud Unit to Investigate Membership Rolls of Olmert Party." Available on site <http://www.middleeastupdate.net/archives/1222>.

religious, and the two state solution do not comply with the agenda of hatred. They are opposed to co-existence and to the two-state solutions not just as a matter of policy, but as a matter of ideology. The conflict is the consequence and not the cause for this ideology. Moderate leaders must provide answers to the new threats in the region, but there are also new opportunities; because we share the same goals and the same vision with all the moderates in the region. Talking about Israel, about moderates in the Palestinian Authority, about moderate Arab and Muslim leaders, the international community, and the free world - it is not a zero sum game. To support Israel is not to be anti-Palestinian and to support the moderates is to fight for the same goals that we all believe in."³⁰⁸

These words reminds us the famous thinker Francis Fukuyama in his end of history thesis and the end of ideologies. This thesis has become one of the main principles of the neo-conservatives. Neo-conservatism is the ideology that back in the 1970s was against the Stalinists from the 1930s, Vietnam War opposers in the 1970s and Communism in the Cold War in general. It has gradually become the ideology of the centrist rightist.

Kadima's party programme has many similarities with the ideas of Kadima's pioneers. They defend Israel's values everywhere. For them, the Road Map Peace Plan should be followed. The Kadima party is considered as a call for the establishment of a disarmed, terror-free Palestinian state alongside Israel and the preservation of Jerusalem and the large West Bank settlement blocs under Israeli control. Kadima's main principles can be counted as follows:

- 1) The Israeli nation has a national and historic right to the whole territory of Israel. However, in order to maintain a Jewish majority, part of Israel must be given up in order to maintain a Jewish and democratic state.
- 2) Israel shall remain a Jewish state and homeland of the Jews. The Jewish majority in Israel will be preserved by territorial concessions to the Palestenians.
- 3) Jerusalem and the large settlement blocks in the West Bank will be kept under Israeli control.
- 4) The Israeli national agenda should put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and and the creation of two states for two nations will be the road map. It will be carried out in the following stages: dismantling terror organizations, collecting firearms, implementing security reforms of the

³⁰⁸ Available on site <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2007>.

Palestinian authorities, and preventing incitement of violence. At the end of the process, a demilitarized Palestinian state devoid of terror will be established.

5) Israel's political system will be modified to ensure stability. One way to achieve this goal could be to hold primary, regional and personal elections to the Knesset and the Prime Minister's office.

6) Kadima wont rule out a future coalition partnership with any Israeli political party or person.

Therefore, it is worth to analyze whether Kadima is going to be a neo-conservative party in the region or not. It is crucial to interpret the meaning of the Greater Middle East project. The international arena and the foreign policy may provide a vast testing field to this question because the peaceful multinational milieu dreams of a Greater Middle East Project. The answer of the question provides the author with an insight about the existence of the Greater Middle East Project as well.

Lastly, the fourth chapter of the dissertation is based on the analysis of the Israeli foreign policy within the structural perspective and Kadima's political action in the region. The author has elaborated on the recent developments by looking at the relations between countries of the region, concrete events, meetings, interviews rather than intentions or pseudo-theories. The author also made a research concerning the Lebanon War as a case study for the analysis of Israel's political behavior within the perspective of structuration theory.

This thesis is therefore an attempt to analyze Israel's foreign policy in the Lebanon War and its consistency with the Greater Middle East Project. The author argues that Kadima's brightening success is not coincidental. The succes is very much related to the party's interests and accounts in the Middle East as well as its identity struggle in the region. To overcome Iran's close relationship with Shiites, US proposes and supports moderate Sunni powers and this has resulted in a more conflictory environment in the region.

Therefore, the author argues that both Kadima's foreign-policy making and the second Lebanon war in 2006 shows us that the Greater Middle East Project has been buried in the territory of

Beirut with bombs and bullets thrown by Israel.³⁰⁹ Developments in the region also indicate the emergence of neo-conservatism in the Israeli nation state where Kadima manipulates every political election by launching military operations to its weak neighbors.

³⁰⁹ Tansi, M. Deniz, 22 May 2008, "BOP Beyrut'a gömülüyor." Available on site <http://dtansikemalizm.blogspot.com/2008/05/bop-beyruta-gmlyor.html>.

APPENDIX A ISRAELI LEGISLATIVE ELECTION RESULTS

Knesset (1992)

Labour Party 44

Likud 32

Meretz (Mapam, Shinui and Ratz) 12

Tsomet 8

National Religious Party 6

Shas 6

Yahadut Hatorah 4

Hadash 3

Moledet 3

Democrat' Arab Party 2

Knesset (1996)

Labour Party 34

Likud-Gesher-Tsomet 32

Shas 10

National Religious Party 9

Meretz 9

Yisrael Ba`aliyah 7

Hadash 5

Yahadut Hatorah 4

Moledet 2

Knesset (1999)

Labour Party 26

Likud 19

Shas 17

Meretz 10

Yisrael Ba`aliyah 6

Shinui 6
National Religious Party 5
Torah Judaism 5
United Arabs List 5
HaIchud HaLeumi 4
Hadash 3


Knesset (2003)

Likud 38
Labour Party 19
Shinui-Mifleget Merkaz 15
Shas 11
Meretz 6
National Religious Party 6
Yahadut HaTorah 5
Hadash 3
Yisrael Ba`aliyah 2
United Arabs List 2

Knesset (2006)

Kadima 29
Labor-Party 19
Shas 12
Likud 11
Ichud Leumi - Mafdal 9
Gil 7
Meretz 5
United Arab List – Arab Renewal 4
Hadash 3
National Democratic Assembly 3

APPENDIX B MAPS



REFERENCES

BOOKS

- Allison, T.G. and Zelikow, P., 1999, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York.
- Arı, T., 2002, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, Alfa Yay., İstanbul.
- Arıboğan, D.Ü., 1998, *Kabileden Küreselleşmeye, Uluslararası İlişkiler Düşüncesi'*, Mavi Ada Yay., İstanbul.
- Arıboğan, D.Ü., 2001, *Globalleşme Senaryosunun Aktörleri (Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güç Mücadelesi)*, İstanbul: Der Yay.
- Carr, E.H., 1962, *The Twenty Years Crisis; 1919–1939*, St Martin's Press, London.
- Çelebi, Ö. 2006, *Güvenlik*, Haydar Çakmak (Derl.), Uluslararası İlişkiler, Giriş, Kavram ve Teoriler, Platin Yay., Ankara.
- Dougherty, J.E. And Pfatzgraff, R. L., 1990, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Third Edition, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990.
- Doyle, M.W., 1995, *Liberalism and World Politics Revisited*, Charles W. Kegley (Edited) *Controversies in International Relations Theory, Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, St Martin's Press, New York.
- Doyle, M.W., 1997, *Ways of War and Peace, Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*, W.W. Norton Company, New York.
- Eralp. A., 1997, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplinin Oluşumu: İdealizm-Realizm Tartışması*, Atilla Eralp (Derl.), Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik; Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar, İstanbul: İletişim Yay.
- Finnermore, M., 1996, *National Interests in International Society*, Cornell University Press.
- Forgacs, D., 2000, (Ed.) *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-35*, New York University Press.
- Frankel, J., 1970, *National Interest*, Pall Mail Press, London.
- Giddens, A., 1996, *Theory of Structuration: Constitution of Society*, University of California Press.
- Giddens, A., 2002, *Agency, Structure in Contemporary Sociological Theory* eds. Craig Calhoun et al. Oxford Blackwell.

- Gilpin, R., 2008, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press.
- Griffiths, M., 1992, *Realism, Idealism, and International Politics: A Reinterpretation*, Routledge.
- Harris, W., 1997, *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions*, Princeton.
- Holsti, O.R., 1995, *Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers*, and Kegley Jr. C.W., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, New York: St Martin's Press.
- Kaplan, M.A., 1969, *Balance of Power: Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems*.
- Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J. S., 2001, *Power and Interdependence*, Third Edition, Princeton Press.
- Kissinger, H., 1994, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster.
- Knutsen, T.L., 2001, *A History of International Relations Theory*, Manchester University Press.
- Lamy, S.L., 2001, *Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, and Kegley Jr. C.W. (ed.) *Controversies in International Relations Theory*.
- Mearsheimer, J., 2001, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton Company, New York.
- Mollow, M.B., 2002, *Power and Transcendences: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience*, Lexington Books Press.
- Nasrallah, F., 1994, *Syria after Ta'if: Lebanon and the Lebanese in Syrian Politics* (ed.) E. Kienle in *Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace*, London: British Academic Press.
- Owen, J.M., 2000, *How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace*, (ed.) Andrew Linklater, *Critical Concepts In Political Science*, Vol:3, Routledge Press, New York.
- Parsi, T., 2007, *Treacherous Alliance: The secret dealings of Israel Iran and United States*, Yale University Press.
- Pietrzyk, M.E., 2002, *International Order and Individual Liberty: Effects of War and Peace on the Development of Governments*, University Press of America.
- Rosenau, J.N., 1966, *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy*, a book chapter written in 1964, Farrell, 1966.
- Rosenau, J.N., 1993, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly*, in Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.

- Rosenberg, J., 1994, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, Verso, London.
- Russett, B. and Antholis, W., 1995, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War*, Worldprinceton University Press.
- Scharpf, F.W., 1999, *Governing in Europe: effective and democratic?*, Oxford University Press.
- Sheehan, M.J., 1996, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, Taylor & Francis.
- Sönmezoğlu, F., 1995, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*, İstanbul: Filiz Yay.
- Tanrısever, O.F., 2005, *Güvenlik*, (Derl.) Atilla Eralp, Devlet ve Ötesi; Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar, İletişim Yay., İstanbul.
- Tayfur, M.F., 2005, *Dış Politika*, (Derl.) Atilla Eralp, Devlet ve Ötesi; Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar, İletişim Yay., İstanbul.
- Wallace, R.A. and Wolf, A., 1999, *Contemporary Sociological Theory*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
- Waltz, K.N., 1979, *Theory of International Politics*, Random House, New York.
- Waltz, K.N., 2000, *Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory*, Andrew Linklater, Critical Concepts In Political Science, Vol: IV, New York: Routledge Press.
- Wendt, A. E., 1987, *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory*, Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, H., Wright, M. And Evans, T., 1996, (Derl.)*Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Siyaset Üzerine Bir Derleme*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi.
- Viotti, P.R. and Kauppi, M.V., 1993, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

- Ayman, G., 2001, “Neorealist Perspektiften Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunan Dış Politikası: Güç, Tehdit ve İttifaklar”, Ankara: SAEMK Araştırma Projesi Yay.
- Carlsnaes, W., September 1992, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol: 36, No: 3.
- Hazan, R.Y., 2007, “Kadima and the Centre: Convergence in the Israeli Party System”, *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 13, No: 2.

Kaufman, A., Autumn 2002, "Who owns the Shebaa Farms? Chronicle of a Territorial Dispute", Middle East Journal, Vol: 56, No: 4.

Keohane, R.O., Spring 1998, "Uluslararası Kurumlar: Karşılıklı Bağımlılık Yürüyebilir mi?", Foreign Policy (Turkish Edition), No: 1.

Milner, H., January 1991, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", Review of International Studies, Vol: 17, No: 1.

Moravcsik, A., Autumn 1997, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", International Organization 51, 4.

Mumme, S.P. And Grundy-Warr, C., 1998, "Structuration Theory and the Analysis of International Territorial Disputes: Lesson from an application to the El Chamizal controversy", Political Research Quarterly 51.

Rynhold, J., 2007, "Peace and Security in the 2006 Election", Israel Affairs, Vol: 13, No: 2.

Norton, A.R., Summer 1991, "Lebanon After Taif: Is the Civil War Over?", Middle East Journal, Vol: 45, No: 3.

Sandler, S., and Rynhold, J., 2007, "Introduction: From Centrism to Neo-Centrism", Israel Affairs, Vol: 13, No: 2.

Snyder, J.L., 1984, "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy", International Security (Winter 1984/85).

Walt, S.M., 1998, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", Foreign Policy (Turkish Edition) Vol: 1, (Spring 1998).

Waltz, K.N., 2000, "Structural Realism After The Cold War", International Security, Vol: 25.

ELECTRONIC JOURNALS and ARTICLES

Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab-Israeli_conflict.
(Accessed on 22/October/ 2008)

The Economist Magazine, 31 July 2008 "Ehud Olmert says he'll go, at last."

Available on site http://www.economist.com/world/Mideast/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11848288. (Accessed on 24/December/2008)

The Economist Magazine, 18 September 2008, "Tzipi Livni bids for the spot."

Available on site <http://www.economist.com/world/mideast->

africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=122673627 (Accessed on 25/September/2008)

Evrensel Gazetesi, 26 July 2007, “ABD yaptırımları İran’ı korkutmuyor.”

Available on site http://www.evrensel.net/haber.php?haber_id=14269 (Accessed on 31/September/2007)

Ehud Olmert.

Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Olmert. (Accessed on July 2006)

Fayyad, A., 15 August 2006, “Hezbollah and the Lebanese State: Reconciling a National Strategy with a Regional Role”.

Available on site <http://arab-reform.net/spip.php?article274>. (Accessed on September 2006)

Gambill, G. C. and Aoun, E.A., August 2000. “Special Report: How Syria Orchestrates Lebanon’s Elections”, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol: 2, No: 7.

Available on site http://www.meib.org/article/0008_11.htm. (Accessed on September 2006)

Hezbollah.

Available on site <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah>. (Accessed on September 2006)

International Crisis Group, 1 November 2006, “Israel, Hezbollah, Lebanon: Avoiding Renewed Conflict”, Middle East Report No.59.

Available on site <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4480&l=1>. (Accessed on December 2006)

Kadima Political Party.

Available on site <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>. (Accessed on September 2006)

Keskin, A., 25 January 2005, “İran’ın Nükleer Çabaları: Hedefler, Tartışmalar ve Sonuçlar”.

Available on site <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat1=2&yazi=77>. (Accessed on February 2006)

Lebanese General Election 2005.

Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_general_election_2005. (Accessed on September 2006)

Likud Political Party.

Available on site <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Likud>. (Accessed on January 2007)

Likud Platform

Available on site http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections/knesset15/elikud_m.htm. (Accessed on May 2009)

Marcus J., 2006, “Can Kadima Survive without Sharon?”. BBC News World Edition.

Available on site http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4585686.stm. (Accessed on February 2007)

Nahmias, R., 19 January 2007, "Nasrallah: Halutz's resignation filled me with joy", Ynet News. Available on site www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3354485,00.html. (Accessed on March 2007)

Newmann, B., (undated), "A Brief Introduction to Theories on International Relations and Foreign Policy". Available on site <http://www.people.vcu.edu/~wnewmann/468theory.htm> (Accessed on 2008)

Ratzlav-Katz, N., 15 July 2008, "Fraud Unit to Investigate Membership Rolls of Olmert Party." Available on site <http://www.middleeastupdate.net/archives/1222>. (Accessed on September 2008)

Saad-Ghorayeb, A., August 2006, "Hizbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict", Part I ve Part II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Outlook. Available on site http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/saad_ghorayeb_final.pdf and http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ghorayeb_part2_final.pdf. (Accessed on September 2006)

Tansi, M. Deniz, 22 May 2008, "BOP Beirut'a gömülüyor." Available on site <http://dtansikemalizm.blogspot.com/2008/05/bop-beyruta-gmlyor.html>. (Accessed on May 2008)

Telhami, S., January 2007, "Lebanese Identity and Israeli Security in the Shadows of the 2006 War", Current History, p.22. Available on site http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2007/01middleeast_telhami/20070123.pdf. (Accessed on September 2007)

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1559 (2004), S/RES/1559, 2 September 2004. Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UN_Security_Council_Resolution_1559. (Accessed on September 2006)

UN Security Council Resolution 1696, Iran, 29 march 2006. Available on site <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SC1696.pdf>. (Accessed on October 2007)

Westcott, K., 4 April 2002, "Who are Hezbollah?", BBC News World Edition. Available on site http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1908671.stm. (Accessed on September 2006)

NEWSPAPERS

Ghazal, R., Saudi King's talks with Hizbullah may indicate new bid to end crisis in Beirut. **The Daily Star Lebanon**. (5 January 2007).

Sensenig-Dabbous, E., Why is everyone ignoring the Butrous proposal? **The Daily Star Lebanon**. (4 January 2007).

Young, M., Next time around Lebanon will be in a civil war. **The Daily Star Lebanon**. (25 January 2007).

Israel gears up for elections: Kadima chairwoman Livni told President Shimon Peres that she had failed to form a government. **McClatchy Tribune Business News**. (26 October 2008).

Major party heads speak at closing panel: Each candidate spoke on 'Government's role in an economic crisis', Israel Business Conference." **McClatchy Tribune Business News** (16 December 2008).

COMMUNIQUE

Shamir, Y., 2006, **Public Opinion in the Israeli–Palestinian Two Level Game**, presented a communiqué at the conference on Public Opinion, Democracy and Peace Making, (May 2006). Jerusalem.

CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE AUTHOR

Nuri Berk Çoker

Personal Information

Date of Birth	25.10.1979
Place of Birth	İzmit
Marital Status	Married

Education

High School 1994-1997 ATA College

College 1997-2001 Istanbul Bilgi University Media and Communication Systems Department

Work Experience

2006- NGO Representative (ARI Movement)

2004- Mostly Net (Web Content Manager)

1996-2003 Basketball Player (Professional)

YAZARIN ÖZGEÇMİŞİ

Nuri Berk Çoker

Kişisel Bilgiler :

Doğum Tarihi	25.10.1979
Doğum Yeri	İzmit
Medeni Durumu	Evli

Eğitim :

Lise	1994-1997	ATA Koleji
Lisans	1997-2001	Bilgi Üniversitesi Medya ve İletişim Sistemleri Bölümü

Çalıştığı Kurumlar:

2006- STK Temsilcisi (ARI Hareketi)

2004- Mostly Net İnternet İçerik Yöneticisi

1996-2004 Profesyonel Basketbol Oyuncusu