T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
İNGİLİZCE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF JEWISH AND PALESTINIAN NATIONHOOD: THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE VIEWED THROUGH ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

MELİH ÇOBAN

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Günay Göksu Özdoğan

İstanbul, 2003

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

The question of Palestine has been a significant subject of international relations during the past century and yet, a permanent and constructive solution has not been achieved by the parties to the question.

Following its emergence as a territorial issue, the question of Palestine has been deepened as both the Jewish and Palestinian parties realized that the opponents they were facing were people of different ethnicities, cultures and religions. Jews and Palestinians based their strategies of survival in the region on these identity factors, whereby they sought to preserve their ethnic and religious identities of their own to ensure mobilization among their communities while confronting with the other side. In addition, during this search for survival, both sides developed various political identities, each approaching the issue from a different perspective. Thus, during the process, the question of Palestine has evolved in accordance with the perceptions of Jewish and Palestinian identities on ethnic, religious and political dimensions.

Jewish ethnic identity in Israel developed through their self-perception in terms of constituting an ethnic group different from that of the Palestinians, and while questioning their ethnic make-up, Israeli Jews, as of constituting mostly an immigrant community, have experienced an ethnic division among themselves as the *Ashkenazim* and the *Sephardim*. The term Ashkenazim denotes the Jews of Western European origin, whereas Sephardim denotes the Jews of Spain. However, today the term Sephardim is used to denote all Jews who are not Ashkenazim, mostly as a synonym for Oriental Jews coming from the Eastern regions of the world. The cultural differences between these two groups marked the main ethnic division of Israeli Jews based on their territorial history. The Ashkenazim, as of being more educated and sophisticated when compared to the Sephardim, became the founding generation of Israel and have enjoyed

a relatively higher social status. The Sephardim, ignored by the Ashkenazim, were preoccupied with proving their Jewishness and during this process, they generally developed a harsh attitude towards the Palestinians.

Jewish religious identity also evolved through this process, whereby the secular-Orthodox cleavage among the Israeli Jews have been extended from the national to the international arena. While Secular Jews displayed a relatively moderate and tolerant attitude towards the Arab world and the Palestinians, Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups pursued a hawkish policy towards them based on religious references.

Israeli national politics served as means to develop political identities for the Israeli Jews, whereby most of the Jews identified themselves with whether center left or center right political positions with a moderate and reconciliatory approach towards the Palestine issue; and a growing number of them have identified themselves through radical political attitudes, pursuing hawkish and fundamentalist policies against the Palestinians.

On the Palestinian side, the development of a core Palestinian ethnic identity could not become as integral as that of the Jews due to the territorial seperation of the Palestinian masses. The Palestinians living in the neighboring Arab countries mostly integrated into the socio-political lives of these countries and became somehow isolated from the issue; while the Palestinians living in West Bank and the Gaza Strip continued to perform as the real activists and representatives of the Palestine case. On the other hand, the Palestinians living in Israel, while enjoying Israeli citizenship and contributing to its social, political and economic affairs, have experienced a dilemma of identity facing the reality that they constituted a part of Palestinian nationality.

Palestinians also suffered from the religious disunity among themselves, with a Muslim majority and a Christian minority. The rise of Islamic identity among the

Muslim Palestinians has been viewed in suspicion by the secular-nationalist Palestinians and by Christian Palestinians as well. The considerable influence of the former in a future Palestinian state troubles the latter groups.

In terms of constituting political identities, Palestinians have been influenced by two main groups, the nationalists and the socialist-based groups. Recently, the political popularity and influence of the latter has been diminishing.

Apart from Jewish and Palestinian sides, there are other communities with different ethnic and religious identities playing an important role in the question of Palestine. These are the Circassian and Bedouin communities in Israel with distinct ethnic identities and the Druze community with a specific religious identity. These groups have been allied with the Israeli Jews since the establishment of the State of Israel and have served in the Israeli army against the Palestinians. They still preserve their allied position with the Israelis.

The question of Palestine, in addition to land sharing and political legitimacy, has also involved the process of conflict between Jewish and Palestinian identities. During this process, the development of different sub-identities within both communities has affected the question in terms of the parties perceiving and responding to it in different perspectives.

ÖZET

Filistin sorunu geçtiğimiz yüzyıl boyunca uluslararası ilişkilerin önemli bir konusu olmuş ve hala sorunun taraflarınca kalıcı ve yapıcı bir çözüm sağlanamamıştır.

Bir toprak meselesi olarak ortaya çıkışını takiben Filistin sorunu, Yahudi ve Filistin taraflarının yüzleştikleri karşıtlarının farklı etnik köken, kültür ve dinin mensubu olmalarını kavramasıyla derinleşmiştir. Birbirlerine karşı verdikleri mücadele içinde tutundukları etnik, dini ve siyasi kimlikler, Yahudilerin ve Filistinlilerin bölgede varolma stratejilerini derinden etkilemiştir. Buna ek olarak, bu varoluş mücadelesi süresince, her iki taraf soruna farklı perspektiflerden yaklaşan çeşitli siyasi kimlikler geliştirmiştir. Böylece, süreç boyunca, Filistin sorunu Yahudi ve Filistinlilerin etnik, dini ve siyasi kimliklerini kavrama ve sürdürme biçimiyle iç içe seyretmiştir.

Yahudi etnik kimliği Yahudilerin kendilerinin Filistinlilerden ayrı bir etnik grup teşkil etmelerini idrak etmeleriyle gelişmiş ve etnik kökenlerini sorgularken, çoğunluğu göçmen bir toplum olan İsrail Yahudilerinin kendi aralarında Aşkenazim ve Sefardim olarak iki ayrı etnik gruba bölünmelerine yol açmıştır. Aşkenazi terimi Avrupa kökenli Yahudileri tanımlarken, Sefardim terimi İspanya kökenli Yahudileri belirtir. Ancak günümüzde Sefardim terimi Aşkenazi olmayan tüm Yahudileri belirten ve çoğunlukla Doğu Yahudileriyle eş anlamlı kullanılan bir hale gelmiştir. Bu iki grup arasındaki kültürel farklılıklar Israil Yahudilerinin topraksal köken bazlı bir etnik bölünmeye gitmesine yol açmıştır. Sefardilere oranla daha kültürlü ve eğitimli olan Aşkenazlar İsrail' i kuran kuşak olmuş ve nispeten daha yüksek bir sosyal statü edinmişlerdir. Aşkenazlarca hor görülen Sefardiler Yahudiliklerini ispatlamakla uğraşmış ve bu süreçte Filistinlilere karşı genelde sert bir tutum izlemişlerdir.

Yahudi dini kimliği de bu süreç içinde, İsrail Yahudileri arasındaki ortodoks-laik çatışmasının ulusal alandan uluslararası alana taşınmasıyla gelişmiştir. Laik Yahudiler Arap dünyasına ve Filistinlilere karşı nispeten daha ılımlı ve hoşgörülü bir tutum sergilerken, ortodoks ve aşırı ortodoks Yahudi grupları dini söylemlere dayanan şahince bir politika izlemişlerdir.

İsrail ulusal siyaseti Israil Yahudileri için, çoğunluğunun kendilerini Filistin meselesine daha ılımlı ve uzlaşmacı bir yaklaşım gösteren merkez sağ veya merkez sol siyasi kimliklerle; giderek artan bir kesiminin de Filistinlilere karşı şahince ve tutucu politikalar izleyen radikal siyasi kimliklerle tanımladığı siyasi kimlikler sağlamak konusunda aracı olmuştur.

Filistin tarafında, Filistinli kitlelerin topraksal bölünmesine bağlı olarak bir Filistinli etnik kimliğinin geliştirilmesi Yahudilerinki kadar başarılı olamamıştır. Komşu Arap ülkelerde yaşayan Filistinliler çoğunlukla bu ülkelerin sosyo-politik hayatlarına dahil olmuş ve bir nevi Filistin meselesinden izole olmuşken; Batı Şeria ve Gazze Şeridi' nde yaşayan Filistinliler Filistin davasının asıl mücadelecileri ve temsilcileri olmaya devam etmişlerdir. İsrail' de yaşayan Filistinliler İsrail vatandaşlığından yaralanarak ve İsrail' in sosyal, siyasi ve ekonomik meselelerine katılırken, aynı zamanda Filistin milliyetinin bir parçasını teşkil ettiklerinin bilincinde olarak bir kimlik ikilemi yaşamışlardır.

Filistinliler aynı zamanda kendi aralarında Müslüman bir çoğunluk ve Hristiyan bir azınlık teşkil etmeleri itibariyle bir dini bölünmeden de olumsuz etkilenmişlerdir. Müslüman Filistinliler arasında İslam kimliğinin yükselişine laik-milliyetçi ve Hristiyan Filistinli gruplar tarafından şüpheyle bakılmıştır. Gelecekte kurulacak bir Filistin devletinde İslamcı grupların tasavvur edilebilir etkisi diğer grupları rahatsız etmektedir.

Siyasi kimlikler teşkil etmeleri açısından Filistinliler genel olarak milliyetçi ve sosyalist-bazlı olmak üzere iki ayrı gruptan etkilenmişlerdir. Günümüzde, sosyalist bazlı grupların siyasi popülerliği ve etkisi azalmaktadır.

Yahudi ve Filistinlilerden başka, Filistin sorununda önemli rol oynayan başka kimlik grupları da mevcuttur. Bunlar, İsrail' de yaşayan ve etnik kimlikler oluşturan Çerkez ve Bedevi, ve dini bir kimlik oluşturan Dürzi topluluklarıdır. Bu gruplar İsrail devletinin kuruluşundan beri İsrailli Yahudilerle ittifak kurmuş ve Filistinlere karşı İsrail ordusunda savaşmışlardır. İsraillilerle olan müttefik pozisyonlarını hala sürdürmektedirler.

Filistin sorunu toprak paylaşımı ve siyasi meşruiyet mücadelesinin yanı sıra Filistinli ve Yahudi kimliklerinin çatışma sürecini içermiştir. Bu süreç boyunca iki toplum içinde farklı alt kimliklerin gelişimi de sorunun farklı perspektiflerde kavraması ve tepki göstermesi şeklinde katkıda bulunmuştur.

FOREWORD

As a student of international relations, I have always been interested in the conflictual status of the world map whereby states or communities within a state, who pursue their own interests and seek survival, struggle with each other. Among these various conflicts, the Question of Palestine, regarding its historical background and still lasting status, has been significant for me. As I have been more involved in the case, I have learnt about the existence of different religious, ethnic and political entities within the Israeli and Palestinian societies and began to question their differing attitudes towards the Question of Palestine.

This master thesis is a study to describe these differing attitudes of these ethnic, religious and political entities, or namely identity groups, towards the Palestine issue. I would like to present my special thanks to my advisor Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Prof. Dr. of the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University for her special support and assistance during the preparation of this thesis. Also, I would like to present my gratitude to my family, my friends and the academic staff of the Department of Political Science and International Relations and the Department of Sociology, Marmara University, for their material and moral support.

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

ANM:	Arab Nationalist Movement
DFLP:	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
IDF:	Israeli Defense Forces
IR:	International Relations
PFLP:	Popular Front for the Liberation fo Palestine
PLC:	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO:	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNA:	Palestinian National Authority
PPP:	Palestine People' s Party
UNSCOP:	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

INTRODUCTION

The history of mankind witnessed many wars and conflicts and these tragic events were mostly based on ethnic, religious or political differences among the parties to these conflicts. The world map is still full of conflictual areas where states or groups within a state clash with each other due to these differences.

The question of Palestine is one of these problems which evolved throughout the 20th century history and is still of crucial importance. Since the initiation of the Zionist movement, Jews migrated to Palestine which they viewed as their homeland; and the Palestinian Arabs who found themselves inceasingly surrounded by a large number of Jews responded to this situation. Paramilitary actions of each side on the other led to further aggravation of conflict in the region, and after the establishment of the Israeli State, four wars between the Israelis and the Arabs took place, jeopardizing to the hopes of peace, and contributing to and deeping the problem which has existed till today. After the last war in 1973, kin partners of Palestinian Arabs withdrew from the stage, persuaded by the fact that Israelis could not be beaten by means of warfare and Palestinians, feeling themselves left alone, tended towards new strategies of struggle against the Israelis, like the Intifada movement. Today, still no viable solution and working consensus to achieve peace in the region have been reached by the parties, except the recent agreement of both parties on a roadmap to peace which is a complementary version of the previous Oslo Accords and the question of Palestine still remains as one reminder which reflects the historically conflictual situation of the Middle East.

When we consider the general public opinion concerning the question of Palestine, we mostly observe that the question of Paletsine is generally presented as a two-sided

problem, with Israelis on one and the Palestinians on the other side, thus making a classification of the parties as the invading Jews and suffering Arab victims whether intentionally or unintentionally. Or, they lead to a generalization of the parties to the conflict in religious terms as Muslims and Jews.

It is not a secret that the question of Palestine is mainly based on a territorial problem deepened with ethnic and religious differences of Jews and Palestinians. But, making such classifications as stated above do not reflect a sociopolitical background whereby the parties can be identified more clearly. The parties are Jews and Palestinians, but who are these Jews and Palestinians? Do these two parties respond to the problem as one united body among themselves or do they each constitute seperate religious and ethnic bodies? Who is an Israeli Jew and who is a Palestinian? Can we talk about single Israeli and Palestinian identities which respond to the problem in the same way? These questions have to be answered in order to draw a more comprehensive picture of the question.

The main context of this master thesis is to denote the influence of collective identity on the Israeli and Palestinian peoples' approach to the Question of Palestine. Identity is a construction through which an individual or a collective body explains himself and perceives the outer world. The identity of an individual plays an important role on his or her decisions in all areas of daily life, and people sharing the same characteristics and opinions create what we know as social, ethnical, religious, cultural or political groups, depending on which of these factors is of crucial importance on constituting that identity. The identity of an individual or a collective body may be explained in terms of ethnicity, religious belief, political affiliation, socioeconomic status or gender. For example, when we talk about the Christians in one country, we are talking about a religious form of identity to denote these people, but when we mention

the Armenians in a country, we use a definition of ethnic form of identity as well. When we mention communists, we are talking about a political form of identity, whereby the political choice of these people unite them under a political identity to denote themselves.

The hypothesis stated in this study is that different conceptions of Jewish and Palestinian identities have been influental in the shaping of Israeli and Palestinian nationhoods and the conflicts among these identities within both sides have deepened the question and even turned it into a very complex one. Different Jewish and Palestinian sub-identity groups, while struggling for particular political ends, sought legitimation by pursuing different conceptions of nationhood in the course of their national development, changing in the course of time. Thus, this study involves an analysis of these particular Jewish and Palestinian groups with an aim to highlight how different constructions of national identity work to reproduce " otherness " against each other fluctuating between inclusionary and exclusionary perspectives. This analysis is based on the assumption that the particular constructions of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian identities have a mutual relationship with the evolution of the Question of Palestine, while these identity perceptions have been shaped by the development of the question, they have also contributed to the deepening of the conflict.

In this study, the three main forms of identity as ethnic, religious and political among the Israeli Jews and Palestinians will be questioned. The area of research will include the Palestinian Arabs, Jews and minority groups such as the Druze, Circassians, and the Bedouin living in the state of Israel and in the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza Strip. The identity groups constituted by the Jews living in the diaspora will be held out of context, whereas in several cases, the Palestinian diaspora living within the frontiers of the neighboring Arab states will be referred to.

The study will evolve in a five level process, each level constituting a chapter within the master thesis. The theroretical backdrop of the concept of identity will be examined in the first chapter.

The second chapter will deal with the historical backgound of the question of Palestine. This background will cover a timeline dating from the Biblical times in Palestine until the beginning of the 21th century.

In the third chapter, different conceptions of Jewish identity in ethnic, religious and political terms and the approaches of these identity groups towards the question of Palestine will be examined.

The fourth chapter will deal with the Palestinian side, whereby different conceptions of Palestinian identity in ethnic, religious and political terms and different approaches by these identity groups towards the question of Palestine will be examined.

Finally, the fifth chapter will involve other identity groups living within the research area, constructing identities in ethnic and religious terms. These groups are the Druze, the Bedouin and the Circassians living in Israel. The characteristics shaping their identities and their participation in the question of Palestine will be examined.

1. THEORETICAL BACKDROP: THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY

The concept of identity has become an important topic of social sciences in the twentieth century. Especially after the end of the Cold War, with the world map full of conflicts based on identity issues, this concept has gained wide priority among other topics of international relations (IR), and this situation has even been regarded by some academics as the ' return of identity ' after a short exile during the Cold War, stating that " the sense of a deepening reorientation toward culture and identity thus gains massive support as we turn our attention to the critical margins of the IR discipline " [1].

There are various definitions of identity in social sciences. In a simplest sense, " identity consists of the answer to the question:" *Who am I (are we) and with what do I (we) identify?* " [2]. Another definition may be as identity refers to individuals' self-perception of what they feel best describes them. According to Satya Mohanty, " identities are theoretical constructions that enable us to read the world in specific ways. In them, and through them, we learn to define and reshape our values and our commitments we gave texture and form our collective futures " [3]. In socio-political terms, identity refers to individuals' habits of labelling themselves as a part of or representing a specific national, social, ethnic or gender oriented group. Thus, in the

---

[1] Yosef Lapid, " Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory ", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p: 4

[2] Anton du Plessis, Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics, available at: http://www.kas.org.za, p: 2

[3] Satya P. Mohanty, " The Epistemic Status of Cultural Identity: on Beloved and the Postcolonial Condition ", in *Reclaiming Identity*, eds. P. Moya, M. Hames-Garcias. Berkeley: UCLA, 2000, p: 43

scope of social sciences, the concept of identity is linked to other concepts such as state identity, national identity, ethnic identity, tribal identity, social identity, cultural identity, gender identity...etc.

The use of the term identity in social sciences has been developed first by the school of psychology whereby psychologists sought to define the attitudes, choices and self-perceptions of the individuals through this term. In the process of the development of the concept, psychologists started by evaluating the concept of self. " In psychology, the most general concept to define identity is the concept of self; self refers to an individual's identification of who he is as a sum of characteristics through which he regards and attributes himself a socio-affective value " [4]. The confusion of the term identity with that of self has been overcome by another psychologists E. M. Lipiansky who regards self as a bridge to the construction of identity. According to him, " self-consciousness includes all components of consciousness addressed or related to a person; these components are various at most and changing all the time. However, identity refers to the most stable, integrated and unchanging elements of self-consciousness in this active game " [5].

The individualistic approach towards identity by the psychologist school has been developed by the initiatives of the schools of social psychology and sociology, whereby individual identities have been extended to the concept of collective identities. In a simplest definition, " collective identity provides the link between one's identification as belonging to a group and one's political actions with and on behalf of a group " [6].

---

[4] Nuri Bilgin, *Sosyal Bilimlerin Kavşağında Kimlik Sorunu*. Izmir: Ege, 1994, p: 208

[5] ibid, p: 225

[6] Marilynn B. Brewer, " The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology ". *Political Psychology*, vol. 22, 2001, p: 119

Collective identity is a uniting body for individual identities who share the same or similar characteristics of identity through which they perceive and define themselves. Furthermore, " collective identity reflects a process rather than a situation. The identity of a community evolves in its relations with other communities and in time " [7]. Collective identity also owes much to the past in terms of deriving values from the past during its development, such as symbols, memories, traditions, beliefs, knowledge and customs...etc. [8]. Thus, collective identities emerge within social groups which are composed of individuals sharing the unifying characteristics and values of that group.

The development of collective identity has been a topic of debate between two theoretical schools namely as the social identity theory developed by Michael A. Hogg and symbolic interactionist sociology developed by B. Cronin. " Social identity theory has its roots in social psychology and focuses on identification with a social group. Accordingly, individuals are socially constructed in a group (collectivity) to which they belong and develop conceptual ties through the creation of social identities supported by group solidarity and collective action. This produces a distinction between different or unlike units (the "in-group and the out-group"), where the collective selves identify themselves with and in comparison are viewed by the others as being in different categories. Symbolic interactionist sociology focuses on interaction processes and the symbolic meaning individuals assign to particular situations. In these situations the Self is socially constructed and is always ' being ' (reproducing) and ' becoming ' (changing) " [9].

According to J. Berque, collective identity involves certain characteristics such that

[7] Nuri Bilgin, *Sosyal Bilimlerin Kavşağında Kimlik Sorunu,* p: 53

[8] ibid, p: 53

[9] Anton du Plessis, " Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics ", p: 3

it is both securising and mobilising; it involves continuity and transformation; and that various actors, categories and components of collective identity are interchangable [10]. Another academic, J. Michaud names the characteristics of collective identity as being perceived and lived by the group members subjectively; being based on consciousness of belonging to the group; and being defined in contrast to other collective identities [11]. B. Cronin defines collective identity as " an inter-subjective concept that is manifested in group consciousness, rather than a material entity that can be measured by quantitative standards " [12]. John Shotter stresses the notions of group activity and group consciousness as individuals' search for acquiring social status, whereby he defines the formation of collective identities as a " joint action " by the members of that identity who seek " social accountability " under the unifying body of collective identities [13].

The concept of the " other " is significant in the formation and development of collective identities in that both at the individual and collective dimensions, identities are shaped by self-perceptions in comparison to others. According to G. Simmel, while considering the evolution of social relations among human groups, three main stages can be observed, whereby in the first stage, the primitive men constituted small groups with strong internal cohesions and isolated from others even in terms of enmity; in the second stage groups slowly cease to isolate themselves and establish connections with the outer environment and regard the others as a link between the group and the outer

[10] Nuri Bilgin, *Sosyal Bilimlerin Kavşağında Kimlik Sorunu,* pp: 53- 54.

[11] ibid, p: 54

[12] Anton du Plessis, " Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics ", p: 3

[13] John Shotter, " Psychology and Citizenship: Identity and Belonging ", in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, ed. Bryan S. Turner. London: Sage, 1993, pp: 121- 125.

world; and finally in the third stage, groups spread around and get mixed with each other, but others are still viewed in a certain degree of enmity and suspicion [14].

The conflictual status of confrontation of the collective group with the other has been stressed by two theories, namely the realistic group conflict theory developed by M. Sherif and the minimal group paradigm theory developed by Henri Tajfel. Realistic group conflict theory holds that the competition for scarce resources between groups is necessary to create conflict among themselves. Minimal group paradigm theory suggests that only the formation of otherwise meaningless groups is sufficient to create conflict between group members and nonmembers [15] .

Thus, it is evident that social groups, while serving as bridges to formation of collective identities, perform two main roles. First, social groups serve as grounds for integration, whereby individual members are united under their organisations, and secondly they serve as grounds of alienation, whereby members of these groups feel themselves different and alienated from the members of other groups, thus their identities are strenghtened by this feeling of being different [16] .

The concept of identity has also been a topic of academic debate in terms of its nature and existence whereby two different schools of social sciences have been involved in the debate of whether identities are constructed or given entities. The first school regards identity as essential, fundamental, unitary and unchanging, whereby the second school, namely the constructivists, regards identities as constructed, emergent,

---

[14] Nuri Bilgin, *Sosyal Bilimlerin Kavşağında Kimlik Sorunu,* p: 43

[15] Leonie Huddy, " From Social to Political Identity: a Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory ". *Political Psychology*, vol. 22, 2001, p: 129

[16] Nuri Bilgin, *Sosyal Bilimlerin Kavşağında Kimlik Sorunu,* pp: 113- 149

contested, polymorphic and interactive entities [17] .

The first school regarding identities as given entities of natural existence mainly depend on primordialist and sociobiological theories. Primordialist approach, as developed by Clifford Geertz, considers the characteristics of primordial ties among individuals as given and natural, not constructed through time and interaction, but naturally existing in terms of congruities of blood, speech, beliefs, attitudes, customs [18]. " The strength and form of primordial attachments differ from individual to individual, from community to community, from one period of time to another. But, as Geertz puts it, within each person, each community and at every time, there are particular ties, inferred from the feeling of natural, almost spiritual affinity rather than from social interaction. They are non-rational foundations of the human personality "[19]. Thus, identities in ethnic, religious and tribal kind are what Geertz puts as primordial identities and he bases the concept on these assumptions: " primordial identities are natural or given; primordial identities are ineffable, that is, can not be explained or analysed by referring to social interaction, but coercive; and primordial identities deal essentially with sentiments or affections " [20] .

Another contribution to the primordialist school has been the work of Harold Isaacs, whereby he named the elements which contribute to the basic identity of a person as: " the physical body which includes skin colour, size, type of hair and facial traits, the person' s name, language one learns first to speak and with which discovers the world, the religion one is indoctrinated into, the history and origins of the group one

[17] Yosef Lapid, " Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory ", p: 8

[18] Viera Bacova, " The Construction of National Identity: on Primordialism and Instrumentalism ". *Human Affairs*, August 1998, p: 3

[19] Viera Bacova, pp: 3- 4

[20] Josep R. Llobera, *Recent Theories of Nationalism*. Barcelona: ICPS, 1999, p: 3

is born into, one's nationality or ethnic affiliation, the geography of the place of birth and the culture that one inherits " [21] .

Sociobiological theories are concerned with the explanation of human behavior on the bases of kinship and ethnicity. One of the leading figures of this theory is Pierre van den Berghe, who sought to explain the existence of identities on the bases of ethnic and racial ties, which, according to him, are the most fundamental sources of identity consciousness.

Among the constructivists, who regard identities as constructed entities, Alexander Wendt is of significance. " His basic view is that human beings are purposeful actors whose actions reproduce and transform society, and that society is made up of social relationships which structure the interaction between human beings " [22] . Thus, the explanation is that, it is not identities that exist naturally, but instead individuals who construct identities regarding their interactions and relationships among themselves.

Apart from the assumption that identities are constructed, the process of construction is also significant in this context. Constructivist school defines three categories of identity construction. The first category takes social and economic processes as agents of identity construction, whereby the influence of primordial ties is rejected and social and economic relations are considered as the main factors merging individuals under a collective identity. Secondly, discourse is taken as the main agent of identity construction, whereby individuals are seen as products of discourses that exist and move independently of the actions of any particular individual. And finally, in an inductionist sense, individuals are taken as agents of identity construction, whereby

---

[21] Josep R. Llobera, *Recent Theories of Nationalism*, p: 4

[22] Anton du Plessis, " Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics ", p: 3

they seek cooperation with other individuals sharing identical characteristics [23] .

From the scope of theory of international relations, two categories of theories compete over the role and existence of identities in international relations: mainstream and non-mainstream theories. Mainstream theories, such as realist, liberalist and globalist theories, focus states, international organizations and similar bodies as the principal actor in world politics and thus place identity in an inferior status concerning the area of international relations. Non-mainstream theories, or reflectivist theories, include feminist, post-modernist and critical theories which aim to constitute alternatives to the former, and seek to explain world politics by means of contribution of other actors, such as identity groups. " identity has become a focal concern of non-mainstream theories, critical of the fact that mainstream theories silence the voice, marginalise the discourse or suppress and subordinate the phenomenon of identity " [24].

The challenge of non-mainstream theories especially accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 90s. International relations discipline was up to then mostly based on state-behavior and ideological camps. The collapse of the Soviet Union, while bringing an end to the bipolar international system which had prevailed for half a century, brought forth the academic need for addressing new international conflicts incapable of being explained by the framework presented by former mainstream theories which had been based on the strategical balance of the Cold War. " The demise of the Soviet empire surprised statecentric theorists in part because their theories could not accommodate a revival of old identities. Such theories are equally useless when it comes to addressing mini-nationalisms, tribal violence in Africa

---

[23] James D. Fearon David D. Laitin, " Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity ". *International Organization*, 2000, vol.54, pp: 850- 853

[24] Anton du Plessis, " Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics " , p: 5

, the globalization of business and finance, or criminal cartels " [25]. Another reference to the Soviet Union, considering ethnic nationalism as a response to the former communist rule came from George Schopflin, whereby he stated that " communism destroyed civil society in the region, turning communities there into civic deserts characterized by mistrust and atomization. Consequently, ethnonational identities were the only ones in the public sphere that could become salient " [26].

The references to the ending of the Cold War as the return of the concept of identity from the academic exile is based on the fact that, identities, although continuing their existence and evolving during the process, were " simply suppressed, masked or incorporated by more topical concerns (e.g. ideology, power politics, nuclear deterrence...etc.) or by more salient forms of social, political or ideological identification (e.g. communism, nationalism, liberalism...etc.) " [27]. In addition, increasing influence of identity groups on state behavior and policy making forced the academic environment to review their perception of the world and to base this on new factors such as identity. The collapse of the Soviet Union thus symbolizes the return of identity as an important topic of international relations in two main points: first, the emergence of micro-nationalist groups, who base their identities on ethnic or religious grounds, from the ashes of the Soviet Union and a series of events such as the violence in the Balkans, the Middle East, Far East and Africa following this, have made it evident that identities were significant in influencing people' s actions and their political

---

[25] Stephen Shulman, " Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dischotomies in the Study of Nationalism ". *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 35, June 2002, p: 557

[26] cited in Yale H. Ferguson, Richard W. Mansbach, " The Past as a Prelude to the Future? Identities and Loyalties in Global Politics ", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p: 21

[27] Anton du Plessis," Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics ", p: 1

behaviors through collective action; and secondly, due to this situation, the concept of identity, while in an inferior position during the Cold war, was to be the new leading topic of international relations.

The increasing significance of identity on world politics has also been annoying the nation-state which was the victorious form of state in the twentieth century when compared to other forms as they ceased to exist on earth. " The conventional conception of nationhood, dating back to the emergence of first national states in Europe and the specific political dynamics of the succeeding ages of nationalism, is being globally challenged in a wide range of cases " [28]. These cases comprise of the emergence of identity groups questioning their belonging to the nationhoods they live within and claiming self-representation and even self-determination on the basis of their identities.

The conception of nationhood has been another debated issue of international relations, whereby a general reconciliation over the answer to the question of " what constitutes a nation " has not yet been achieved. The first part of this debate has been involved with the dichotomy between ethnic and civic models of nationhood. " This conceptualization originally emerges from a comparison of French and German notions of nationhood, which are based on two different historical paths of nation-state formation in Europe. The French conception, following centuries of state building during which national consciousness grew as a result of the centralizing policies of the territorial state, emphasized a political union. After the French revolution, nationhood was conceived more in political terms, and specifically as a voluntary union of citizens within the state territory. The genesis of the German conception of nationhood, emphasizing an organic, cultural community based on ethnicity, on the other hand, goes

[28] Günay Göksu Özdoğan, " Civic versus Ethnic Nation: Transcending the Dual Model? ", in *Redifining the Nation, State and Citizen,* eds. Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Gül Tokay. Istanbul: Eren, 2000

back to the romantic movement that had emerged almost a century before constitution of the German nation-state " [29].

The civic versus ethnic debate over the establishment of nationhood has been further discussed by Hans Kohn and Anthony Smith, namely the debate over Western and Eastern types of nationalism. " Kohn stipulated and conrasted that in the Western type of of nationalism (specifically in England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, and the British dominions) nationality was conceived in terms of citizenship while in the Eastern counterpart, that is Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, it was based on ethnic bondage " [30]. Smith, unlike Kohn, does not stress the notion of duality of these models of nationalism, but instead aims to reconcile these two models as " the nation is defined not in terms of rival models, but as a collectivity ' signifying a cultural and political bond uniting in a single political community all who share an historic culture and homeland ' " [31].

The revival of identities in the post-Cold War era also brought forth the question of security, whether citizens of a state will continue to maintain their ties to the state in terms of national identity and will pursue their own interests and survival through state security; or they will tend towards seeking societal security through their collective identities. This duality of state security and societal security develops in accordance with identity challenges against national identity whereas " while the former has sovereignity as its ultimate criterion, the latter is held together by concerns about

---

[29] Günay Göksu Özdoğan, " Civic versus Ethnic Nation: Transcending the Dual Model? ", p: 39

[30] ibid, p: 40

[31] ibid, p: 41

identity " [32].

While observing the conflicts arising from identity issues, it has become evident that , identity groups within states have generally tended towards fading away from the center and seeking solutions to their demands through their collective identity bodies. In this sense, ethnic, religious and political identity groups have become the leading actors of identity politics. Identity politics can be simply defined as the practice of basing one's politics on a sense of identity. Thus, political activity and participation of individuals within a state based on their national identity has been overcome by identity politics based on the sub-identities of these individuals, through which they perceive their place among that society and seek partnership with other individuals sharing the same identity characteristics. These sub-identities, while constituting the components of national identity, have become, for many individuals, dominant factors of self-perception when compared to the consciousness of national identity. According to Shulman, these components of national identity are categorised as civic, ethnic and cultural. Civic identity involves the notions of citizenship, territorial belonging and political ideology. Cultural identity involves religion, language and traditions and finally, ethnic identity involves ancestry and race as key components [33]. Thus, ethnic and cultural components, while contributing to the development of national identity, also form the bases of alternative identities through which political action and choice may be manipulated regardless of national identity.

---

[32] Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, " Revisiting the National: Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism ", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p: 118

[33] Stephen Shulman, " Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dischotomies in the Study of Nationalism ", p: 559

While discussing the concept of nationhood, apart from these sub-identities which contribute to the formation of nationalities, the concept of citizenship is also important to be noted whereas citizenship serves as a bridge for the integration of these various identities into the political system. The *de facto* use of identities in belonging to a certain community has been accomplished by the *de jure* use of citizenship to denote the participation of individual or collective bodies in a political system. Thus, citizenship may be regarded as the " legal expression of membership in that community "[34].

The modern conceptualisation of citizenship as an outcome of democracy has been studied by William Safran who sought to define five models of citizenship, with these models concerning states of France, United States, Germany, Great Britain and Israel. According to him, the French type of citizenship reflects the French model of civic nationality, whereby the nation consisted of all the inhabitants of a territory who obeyed the laws, paid taxes, and performed various other duties required of all citizens [35]. Thus, the French model regards citizens as residents of French territory who willingly and voluntarily contribute to its social, political, economic and cultural affairs.

The US model of citizenship is one based on a contract between the state and the citizens whereby both sides pursue their interests and survival in the course of this contractual relationship. Regardless of primordial elements and sub-identities, US citizenship requires a consciousness of belonging. Although very similar to the French model, the US model of citizenship differs from the former in that citizenship in a

[34] William Safran, " Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community ". *International Political Science Review*, vol. 18, 1997, p: 313

[35] William Safran, " Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community ". p: 315

federal unit is a component of citizenship in the central body [36] .

The German model of citizenship is closely related to the German model of nationhood based on ethnicity whereas German tradition has based citizenship on ethnic ties as of coming from German descent [37] . Although in the recent years, immigrants from different ethnic stocks have been granted German citizenship, ethnic-based tradition is still influental on German conception of citizenship.

The British model, considering the centuries-long historical traditions of the United Kingdom, regards citizens as subjects to the central authority in an imperial sense. According to the British Nationality Act of 1981, UK citizenship can even be extended to the residents of the British Commonwealth [38] .

Finally, the Israeli model of citizenship, which is an important component of this study, reflects a debate whereas civic and ethnic models of nationhood clash with each other. " Citizenship is accorded automatically to all who were born in Israel before 1952, to all Jews born in Israel; and to all non-Jews one of whose parents is an Israeli citizen " [39] . This civic situation has been challenged by the Law of Return, which grants all Jews outside Israel the right to settle and acquire Israeli citizenship. Conversely, Israeli State opposes the demands of the Palestinians, who were expelled after the 1948 war, to return to Israel. Thus, the Law of Return, as based on an ethno-religious essence, contradicts with the civic conceptions of Israeli citizenship.

Among these five models of citizenship, French, American and British models heavily depend on a civic dimension, whereas German and Israeli models reflect a duel

[36] William Safran, " Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community ", pp: 317- 318

[37] ibid, pp: 321- 323

[38] ibid, pp: 323- 325

[39] ibid, p: 326

between ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship.

The close relationship between identities, nationality and citizenship gives birth to both positive and negative outcomes. The positive outcome can be viewed whereas an individual identifies himself within a collective identity which constitutes a part of the dominant national elite within any state and thus, the concepts of identity, nationality and citizenship go along in harmony. The negative outcome may be viewed whereas an individual identifies himself within a collective identity which serves as an opponent or contradictory body to the dominant national elite within that state and that individual may go through a dilemma of whether pursuing his interests through his belonging to that collective identity or pursuing his interests through his legal membership in that state through citizenship despite the controversy between his collective identity and the dominant national character. For example, a British citizen of Irish origin living in Northern Ireland may fall into a controversy of whether taking part on the side of his seperatist Irish brethren with whom he shares an ethnic and religious identity; or to continue living as a British citizen, regardless of his primordial ties. Thus, the tripartite relationship between identities, nationality and citizenship is an important component of political participation and choice, whether influencing it in a negative or positive way.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

The question of Palestine as a territorial issue has a history dating from the end of the nineteenth century. However, considering the fact that the question is highly based on claims by both the Jewish and Palestinian sides based on historical issues relating to religion, culture and tradition and that it is a struggle shaped and influenced by Jewish and Palestinian identities makes it inevitable to date the first roots of the conflict to the times before Christ as the development of a Jewish identity dates back to these times. Jewish claims for a Holy Land and their historical traditions have been the motivating factor which provided their survival among other nations for centuries. Thus, in this study, the historical background of the Question of Palestine will be dated back to the Biblical times.

In accordance with the evolution of Jewish and Palestinian identities, this historcial background chapter will cover four periods. The first period will date from the Biblical times to the birth of Zionism at the end of the nineteenth century as to denote the influence of historical claims and primordial elements on the development of Jewish and Palestinian identities. The second period will cover the years between 1897 and 1948 whereby the first confrontation between the Jews and Palestinians in terms of an organized struggle for the control of land took place. The third period covers the years between 1948 and 1973 with reference to the four Arab-Israeli wars; a period when the fate of both the Israeli state and the Palestinian people was uncertain. Finally, the third period will date from the 1973 war until today whereby the role identities on policies concerning the question of Palestine have become more significant.

2.1 EARLIEST BEGINNINGS

The land of Palestine is one of the first human settlements of historical significance. The settlement of various tribes in the region date back to 2000 B.C. and since that time, it' s been a place of invasions and struggle for the control of the land. The information about the early history of the land and its peoples are mostly derived from the Old Testament.

According to the Old Testament, about 1700 B.C. Abraham took his family with him and migrated from Souheastern Anatolia to Hebron upon God' s orders [1] . The land was called as the Land of Canaan, deriving its name from the Semitic tribe of the Canaanites residing there. When a famine spread through Canaan, Jacob, Abraham' s grandson , his twelve sons and their families settled in Egypt, where their descendants were reduced to slavery and pressed into forced labor. They called themselves Israelis upon the memory of Jacob who was attributed this title by God [2].

After 400 years of bondage, the Israelites were led to freedom by Moses who, according to the biblical narrative, was chosen by God to take his people out of Egypt and back to the Land of Israel promised to Abraham. (3) This is called the Exodus from Egypt and during the next two centuries, the Israelites conquered most Canaan Land and since then, the land has been called by Jews *Eretz Israel* (land of Israel).

---

[1] " Now the LORD said to Abraham, "Go from your country and your kindred and your father's house to the land that I will show you " . Genesis, The Old Testament, Chapter 1, available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/RsvGene.html

[2] According to Genesis Chapter 32, Jacob wrestles with a man and the man says, "Your name shall no more be called Jacob, but Israel, for you have striven with God and with men, and have prevailed

[3] "To your descendants I will give this land." Genesis, chapter 12.

The Israelites lived in Canaan as ununified tribes for two centuries until the reign of King David who put an end to the struggles with the native tribes and founded the Hebrew Kingdom. However, after King Solomon' s death at 930 B.C., growing antagonism between the monarchy and the seperatist tribes led to the division of the kingdom into two as the Kingdom of Israel in the North and Kingdom of Judah in the South [4] . The Kingdom of Israel lasted more than 200 years until when it was crushed by the Assyrians and the ten Hebrew tribes who had founded the kingdom were exiled. These tribes are today known as the Lost Tribes in literature. The Judah Kingdom lasted for nearly four centuries and it was conquered by the Baylonians in 586 B.C and most of the Israelis were sent to exile. This exile marked the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora which still exists today with a huge of population of Jews dispersed around the world. When the Persians conquered Babylonia in 538 B.C., most of the exiled Jews returned to *Eretz Israel* under the permission of the Persian King Cyrus. In 332 B.C. the land was conquered by Alexander the Great and Hellenistic rule lasted until 142 B.C. when a revolt led by the Hasmonean family brought Jewish authonomy in the region for more than one century. In 63 B.C., Romans captured the land of Israel and the Seleucid family became a dynasty who ruled the province in the name of the Roman Emperors. The Jews revolted against the Roman rule and this uprising was finally crushed by the Romans in 73 A.D. The remaining Jews began to migrate to other districts and were soon dispersed around the world, leaving a small number behind in *Eretz Israel.* The land was from now on named in historical records as " the land of Philistines " [5] dedicated to the people who also resided in the land and were previously defeated by King David' s forces.

---

[4] Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab Israeli Dilemma.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985, p: 8.

[5] Süleyman Özmen, *Ortadoğu' da Etnik Dini Çatışmalar ve Israil.* İstanbul: IQ, 2001, p: 34

With the seperation of the Roman Empire into the Eastern and Western parts, *Eretz Israel* was ruled by the Byzantines whose reign lasted until 636 A.D. when Muslim-Arab armies invaded the land and took control in the region. In 1099, the first wave of Crusaders conquered the region and maintained Christian rule until 1291 when Saladin Eyyubi of the Mamluks took back the land in the name of the Mamluk Empire which had been founded in Egypt. When Egypt was conquered by the Ottomans in 1517 under Sultan Selim and the Mamluk Empire was crushed, the land of Palestine came under Ottoman rule which lasted until the end of the World War One.

2.2 THE BIRTH OF ZIONISM AND THE BRITISH MANDATE

Their expellation from the Holy Land had led to a cumulative psychological disappointment among the Jewish communities dispersed around the world for centuries. Falling into an inferior status among the majorities they lived and viewed by them in suspicion and religious enmity, most Jews did not feel themselves secure and with these distresses combined with their historical longing for the Holy Land, a political movement which fundamentally changed the fate of the Jews and Palestinians developed.

" The turning point in the modern history of Palestine was the birth of political Zionism, a movement launched in Europe by Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian-born Viennese playwright and journalist, whose ultimate objective was the establishment of a Jewish national home in the Holy Land. " [6]. Herzl published his plan in 1896 in a book titled *der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) and convened the First Zionist Congress in

[6] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict " in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians* eds. Elizabeth Warnock Fernea& Mary Evelyn Hocking. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992. p: 7

1897 in Basel, Switzerland.

The resolution as an outcome of the Zionist Congress involved the necessity of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine and in order to achieve this goal, to promote and support Jewish migration to Palestine who would form the population of the new Jewish state. This Zionist plan also required diplomatic efforts to mobilize the support of the major powers, but none of these powers, except Great Britain and USA to a certain extent, performed any willingness nor support for the Zionist Plan.

The movement led by Herzl was unique in that it was a well-organized movement with all social, political and economic aspects seriously considered and planned, and it served as the means of attaining a permanent and successful solution to the homelessness problem of world Jewry. Although two Zionist migration waves had taken place previously [7], they were small in number and, were lacking the intention to create a homeland for the Jews.

" Although Zionist groups such as *Hovevei Zion* and *Bilu* had existed before 1897, none were as powerful and effective as the organizations founded by Herzl. Subsequent meetings of the Zionist Congress, held almost every year, together with fund-raising to secure donations from wealthy European Jews such as the Rothschilds created the machinery to purchase land in Palestine, assist relocating immigrants, and support newly constructed settlements. " [8] .

---

[7] The first wave took place during the Reqonquista movement in Spain in 1492 which led to the expulsion of Muslim Arabs who had previously dominated Spain from the country and many of the Spanish Jews took refuge in the Ottoman land while some of them left for Jerusalem. The second wave of migration took place in the 19th century before Herzl under the leadership of an organisation named *Choveve Zion* (lovers of Zion) who pursued the aim of creating in Zion a spiritual center from which Jewish faith and culture would spread.

[8] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ", p: 9

Due to the Zionist propoganda and efforts by leading Jewish elites to organize this migration process such as the establishment of operational bodies like the World Zionist Organization, Jewish Colonization Association and Jewish National Fund, Jewish masses started to migrate to Palestine and they were settled on the land which they bought from native Arab landlords. At first, Arabs responded to the Jewish migration as a new opportunity for the development of economy and employment in the region with those Jews arriving in the land with large stocks of cash and European experience in many sectors. However, the picture began to change when the number of immigrants increased to such a number that the Arabs realized that this was neither an ordinary nor a temporary situation. " By 1914, the Jews in Palestine numbered about 85.000 of a population of 500.000 in Palestine " [9] .

Besides Jewish initiatives and efforts, foreign support was also achieved through diplomatic activity and bargaining. In 1914, First World War broke out and the British, aiming to achieve US support on behalf of the Allied Powers and to control the post-war situation likely to emerge in the Middle East, decided to assist the Jews in this migration process. On November 1917, Lord Arthur James Balfour, UK minister of foreign affairs sent a letter to Lord Rothschild, a leading figure in Zionist movement, stating that the British would support the Zionist efforts to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. This letter known as the Balfour Declaration, changed the fate of the Zionist movement towards an advantageous status, with France and Italy declaring that they also supported the Declaration. " Thus, the fate of Zionism was combined with the war affairs of the Allied Powers " [10] .

---

[9] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ", p: 9

[10] Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih*, vol. 2. Ankara: Imge, 1995. p : 279

British troops, with the assistance of Arab militia forces, entered Jerusalem in October 1917 and expelled the Ottomans. After this point, the British fell into a dilemma of political choice, as there were two conflicting groups in the region both of whom they had promised to support: Jews and Arabs. Jews were demanding the continuation of British assistance declared in the Balfour Declaration, whereas Arabs were demanding an Arabic state to be founded in Palestine after the Turks were expelled. Jews were still optimistic about the future of Zionist movement, however, from the side of the Arabs, suspicion about Jews and the British was emerging among the community, showing the signals of a forthcoming struggle and violence.

" The Arabs generally regarded the Balfour Declaration as an act of betrayal because it contradicted earlier pledges made by Britain to them.....The British gesture was evidently made to lure the Arabs into the Allied camp and to secure their assistance in the war against the Turks. The Arabs understood those promises to mean a commitment to include Palestine in a future independent Arab state. The establishment of a Jewish national home in that territory was viewed as a violation of that commitment. " [11] .

However, Arab reaction to land purchase by the Jews and their immigration to Palestine was at first based on economic reasons. The optimism at first sight about the flow of capital into the country and hopes of economic development (this motto of economic development was also promoted by Jewish representatives in Palestine to appease the Arabs and decrease any emerging or potential reaction) later left its place for the reality faced by middle and lower class Arabs who were disadvantaged by the labor surplus in the region created by Jewish mass migration.

---

[11] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ", p: 11

The pity for the Zionist movement was the fact that it developed in the same time period with the rise of Arab nationalism. Arabs were awakened with a new national consciousness which was promoted previously by the British, and they were asking them to stay loyal to their promises and were feeling insecure about the Jewish migration. Thus, what was inevitable came into being and what the Arabs suffered from the Jewish existence in economic terms, turned into a political struggle for them. Arabs launched various armed attacks against the Jewish settlers aiming to discourage them from migrating to their land by using armed deterrance. Jewish response to this situation came as early as 1921 when a Jewish militia organisation named *Haganah* was founded in order to protect the Jewish settlers from Arab attacks and to respond in kind. Following *Haganah*, other militia organisations like *Irgun* and *Lehi* were founded [12].

The British, using the rights granted by the League of Nations, formalized their mandate over Palestine in 1922. Faced with the growing tension between the Arabs and Jews, Great Britain took a series of measures to appease the Arabs, while not offending the Jews. One of these measures is the White Paper of 1922 which stated that " the number of Jewish immigrants should be limited to a figure determined on the basis of the Palestinian economy' s ability to absorb them. Additional White Papers were issued in 1931 and 1938, although Britain continued to claim that they did not constitute a reversal of her position in favor of a Jewish national home." [13] . However, Jewish migration continued illegally and every year thousands of Jews mainly from Europe flowed into Palestine.

" The flow of immigrants allowed expansion of both urban and rural communities.

[12] Fahir Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi ve Arap-İsrail Savaşları(1948-1988)*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1994, pp: 47- 48

[13] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ", p: 13

The city of Tel Aviv became the main Jewish urban center, while the kibbutzim (communal agricultural units) were the center of rural Jewish life. Elective bodies such as the *Va'ad Leumi* (National Committee), the Jewish Agency and various political executives, laid the groundwork for the democratic structure of the Jewish political entity. " [14] . The Zionist movement was organized and effective, while at the Palestinian side, they were struggling against growing Jewish dominance in the region as a disordered and non-unified population. Lacking the existence of unifying organisations like the Jewish Agency of the Jewish side, Arab leadership was pursued by heads of clans who at the same time shared a rivalry among themselves. Four major families competed over power in Jerusalem: Husseini, Khalidi, Nashashibi and Nussebia. Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Moslem Council, who emerged as the prominent leader of the Arabs was an extremist " [15] . At the Jewish side, Chaim Weizmann had become the successor to Herzl and taken the leadership of the Zionist movement. He was also the representative of Palestinian Jews at the international diplomatic arena.

The struggle for control of the land had a tripartite characteristic, constituted by three main elements: Arabs, Jews and British authorities. Arab and Jew militia powers , as well as fighting with each other, were performing attacks on British soldiers and the British officials were desperately seeking control over these two competing groups. Both Arabs and Jews, while opposing the British existene as a threat to their future plans about the control of land, also performed armed attacks on each other in order to provide superiority in terms of armed struggle experience and deterrance. This situation continued with growing violence until the end of the mandate.

---

[14] Avraham Zilkha, *History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* , p: 14

[15] ibid, p:15

During this process, British authorities were in search of a permanent solution which would appease both communities. In order to perform fact-finding studies in the region, a commission headed by Lord Robert Peel was sent to Palestine in November 1936. This commission, namely the Peel Commission issued a report in July 1937 which recommended the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arabic states, while Britain would still hold a mandate in the areas stretching from Jerusalem to Jaffa on the Mediterranean coast [16] . (see Appendix C Maps) .

Jewish reaction to the report expressed a deep feeling of frustration and dissatisfaction, with many Jews blaming the British of reducing the land available for the Jews and forcing them to live in a ghetto-like residence. However, most of the Jews were in favour of the principle of partition. Arabs strongly opposed the plan and demanded the withdrawal of the British from Palestine and the ending of Jewish migration [17] .

Faced by opposing reaction from two sides, the British authorised another committee headed by Sir John Woodhead in 1937 to find an alternative solution to the problem. Woodhead Commission offered the establishment of Jewish and Arabic states linked together, but each one deprived of economic sovereignity. This plan was also opposed by both sides and in addition, the British, refraining from angering the Arabs whose support she might need for the forthcoming World War, abandoned the idea of partition.

After the outbreak of World War II, escaping Nazi violence more Jews migrated to Palestine and were smuggled illegally into the country. Jewish militia forces in Palestine were pursuing a more violent policy against the Arabs and the British forces. During

[16] Süleyman Özmen, *Ortadoğu' da Etnik, Dini çatışmalar ve Israil*, p: 51

[17] ibid, pp: 51- 52

this period, Zionist leadership had passed from Weizmann to David Ben Gurion.

In 1945, an Anglo-American committee was formed and this committee issued a report recommending the repeal of the 1939 White Paper, admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine (upon the request of US President Harry Truman) and the establishment of UN trusteeship. The committee concluded that Palestine should be neither a Jewish state, nor an Arab state. This plan was again rejected by both Jewish and Arabic sides [18] .

In July 1946, Morrison Plan was issued, which proposed the division of Palestine into two autonomous regions which would be under British control in foreign affairs. As well as Jewish and Arab parties, the plan was rejected by Truman [19] .

The British, unable to bring a solution to the conflict and desperate about the future of the region, asked the United Nations to include Palestine in the agenda of the upcoming session of the General Assembly. United Nations authorised UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) to handle initiatives to seek for a solution. UNSCOP recognized the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee as the formal representatives of the two communities. Under the light of the findings and reports by UNSCOP, UN General Assembly approved the partition of Palestine into three parts as Jewish, Arabic and Jerusalem under UN supervision . Towards the last days of the mandate, violence between Jewish and Arabic militia groups had escalated to maximums. The fate of 1.2 million Arabs and 650.000 Jews in Palestine was uncertain . The withdrawal of the British and the lack of authority coming afterwards marked an important development. On May 14, 1948, a few hours after the last British

---

[18] Süleyman Özmen, *Ortadoğu' da Etnik, Dini Çatışmalar ve İsrail*, p: 55

[19] Fahir Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi ve Arap-İsrail Savaşları(1948-1988)*, pp: 79- 80

soldiers left the country, establishment of Israeli state was declared. A provisional government was immediately installed, with Ben-Gurion as the premier and Moshe Shertock as foreign minister. Shortly thereafter, the state of Israel was recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union.

2.3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

" The war in which Israel gained its independence evolved in two phases:the first phase lasted from the partition resolution of November 1947 to the British withdrawal in May 1948, and the second phase, from Israel' s declaration of independence to the signing of the armistice agreements in July 1949 " [20] . During the first phase, increasing guerilla warfare between Jewish and Arabic militia groups in Palestine took place. The second phase developed by the involvement of five Arabic states namely Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt who declared war to Israel after the declaration of the establishment of the Israeli state. In addition to these forces, the Army of Salvation led by a Syrian officer named Fawzi-al Qawuqji which was composed of 2000 skilled troops, was at the Arab side. All these powers united, the Arab military power was superior to the Israelis and the forthcoming war was likely to end in favour of the Arabs.

On May 15, Arab armies attacked the Israelis. Arabs were hopeful and had no doubt about their victory to be achieved in a massive attack with their military power compared to that of the Jews. " According to a plan that had been worked out in April 1948, the first four armies (Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian) were to cut off Jewish access to the sea by taking over the coastal area, including the vital port of Haifa

---

[20] Avraham Zilkha, *History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, p: 21

and the oil refineries. The Egyptian army was to pin down large Jewish forces protecting Tel Aviv. In the final stage of the plan, the armies would divide Palestine horizontally north of Tel Aviv " [21] .

However, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), consisting of skilled militia warriors of former underground organisations such as *Haganah* who had been experienced in warfare during the mandate period, were able to stop the Arab forces and even to counterattack. IDF also made a deal with the Soviet Union and received weapons from Czechoslovakia and the tide began to turn in favour of the Jews.

Efforts at the international level to stop the violence and bloodshed were held by the United Nations. UN authorised Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden to act as a mediator in the conflict [22] . On June 11, a four week cease-fire was declared, but with no progress for peace in sight. The attempts at diplomacy failed and fighting resumed with even greater intensity . Count Bernadotte continued his efforts and proposed a new partition plan, but he was assasinated in September 1948, probably by the members of the Jewish extremist *Stern* organisation, and warfare continued until peace initiatives by Ralph Bunche, the UN representative of the USA, came into being. In March 1949, all Arab countries except Iraq, who were parties to the war seperately signed permanent cease-fire aggreements with Israel in Rhodes. The outcome of the war was in favour of the Jews, whereas Israel had gained 20 percent more land than originally allocated in the partition plan (see Appendix C Maps) . In addition, Israel was admitted to the United Nations on 11 May 1949. From the Arab side, approximately one million Palestinians had left Palestine and taken refuge in neighboring Arab countries, homeless and unemployed and Arabs were feeling humiliated due to their defeat by the Jews

[21] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ", pp: 22- 23

[22] Süleyman Özmen, *Ortadoğu' da Etnik, Dini Çatışmalar ve Israil*, p: 68

whom they had ignored comparing their mutual military powers. Except Jordan, who annexed the West Bank and granted its residents Jordanian citizenship, and Egypt who gained control of Gaza, Arab states made no gains.

The war of 1948 left behind many problems which proved the fact that the armistice of 1949 would not serve as a permanent means to peace. With the Arabs feeling humiliated by their defeat and proving ineffective to protect their Palestinian brothers a majority of whom had become refugees, the conflict was likely to continue with growing tension. However, the war of 1956 had another underlying important motive which developed under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser: Pan-Arabism.

Nasser rose to power in Egypt in 1954 after a successful military coup and pursued an anti-imperialistic policy in foreign affairs. He ideologised his thoughts and plans under the main titles of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism and Pan-Arabism whereby he sought to establish a united Arab world deprived of Western dominance and superiority. In order to achieve these goals, his main target was Israel, who Nasser viewed as the puppet and agent of Western imperialism in the Middle East. Thus, the Middle East was once more moving toward war, with Egypt emerging as Israel' s main antagonist.

During the period between 1948 and 1956, the war at the Palestinian front was continuing at a low level with frequent attacks by the *Fedayeen*, a militia group backed up by Egypt, against Israelis at border districts. Nasser' s act of nationalizing the Suez Canal in July 1956 drew the attention of the British, French and the Israeli to Egypt, whom they viewed as the menace of the Arab world. Britain would lose all of her strategic and economic privileges by the nationalization of the Canal and Israel would feel insecure by the withdrawal of the British from the Sinai Peninsula which served as the passage between Egypt and Israel. France, in addition to sharing Britain' s strategic

interests in the Suez Canal, also was annoyed by Nasser' s support of the Algerian revolt against French rule. All these factors combined, the armies of Britain, France and Israel launched a military operation against Egypt.

According to their plan, Israel began to invade the Sinai Peninsula on 29 October and clashed with the Egyptian troops. France and Britain issued a joint ultimatom forcing Nasser to end the conflict, but due to Nasser' s negative response to the ultimatom as predicted, French and British air forces launched assaults on Egypt. By December 1956, Israeli troops had gained control of the Canal and British and French had destroyed many military bases and installations in Egypt and had landed parachute divisions to acquire control of strategic regions. Soviet and US governments, not in favour of this joint operation which had developed out of their control in the strategic Middle East region put strong pressure against the invading powers and forced the British and French to end the warfare and withdraw from invaded regions. Israel, stating that without the necessary guarentees for her security it would not stop the warfare, continued to clash with Egyptian forces. These guarentees were the stationing of a UN peace force to take control of the Gaza with Israel' s rights to act preserved in any case of insecurity and the right of free passage through the Acaba Gulf [23] . After the establishment of a UN Peace Force in Gaza, Israeli forces withdrew.

The 1956 war differs from other three Arab-Israeli wars in that this time Egypt was alone without the support of other Arab countries and the issue is not that of including the question of Palestine, but Nasser' s challenge to the imperialist powers.

However, Nasser, although being defeated, gained a world wide popularity as well as among the Arab world, and growing nationalist tendencies in the Arab world were

---

[23] Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih*, vol. 2, p : 272

combined with the emotional hatred against Israel due to the question of Palestine. Thus, it was likely that war in the Middle East had not ended and would break out once again when necessary conditions prevailed.

Nasser' s Pan-Arabist policies gave its first fruits by the establishment of the United Arab Republic on 1 February 1958 with the unification of Egypt and Syria. This action was interpreted by the Israeli side as a serious threat to security as these two states constituted a neighbourhood in the North and South of Israel, thus Israel might be sandwiched in any case of joint attack by these states. In addition, several events such as the 1958 crisis in Lebanon and the military coup in Iraq escalated the tension and political turmoil in the region.

In Apil 1967, a series of clashes on the Israeli-Syrian border took place mainly due to disputes over the use of Jordanian River' s water sources. This friction on the border triggered the enmities derived from previous wars. The Syrian shelling of Israeli farming settlements met an air attack reprisal by Israel. Syrians sought help from Egypt as the other founding party to the United Arab Republic, and Nasser' s reply came immediately. " On May 1967, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai. Although they had been stationed by UN action in 1957, the troops were promptly pulled out by Secretary General U Thant, who did not consult the Security Council " [24] . In addition, Nasser, despite the warnings by the Israeli side that closing the Straits of Tiran would be *casus belli*, declared the closure of the waterway to Israelis.

Diplomatic activity among the Arab leaders convinced the Israeli statesmen that instead of waiting for a forthcoming invasion by Arabs who were superior in terms of

---

[24] Avraham Zilkha, *History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, p: 30

warcraftand military equipment, it would be wise to launch a surprise attack on them for the sake of Israel. On June 5, Israeli air forces bombed the air bases in Egypt and destroyed almost the entire Egyptian air force, leaving Egypt disabled to launch any counter attack against them. Following that, Israeli troops defeated the Syrian and Jordanian soldiers and took control of the Golan Heights and West Bank. This war namely " the Six Day War " ended with a changing map in the region in favour of the Israelis. Israelis for the first time occupied all of Palestine including the Sinai, West Bank and the Golan Heights. Especially, the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem was the most important part of this victory for many Jews owing to the historical significance and holiness of the site. " The Israelis immediately expected that the humiliating defeat would convince the Arabs that Israel was invincible, and they would sit down and talk peace " [25]. But, Arabs refused to accept the permanency and superiority of Israel mentioned by them and pursued a policy of "no recognition " and " no negotiation for peace ". Thus, Arab-Israeli wars seemed likely to continue.

The great distress and humilitiation of the Six Day War led to the development of a mood for the Arab leaders to revise their strategies and put a final end to this Israeli issue which had been troubling the Arab world for decades. Thus, under the leadership of Anwar Sadat who had succeeded Nasser in Egypt after his death in 1970, Arab leaders sought to find a means to this end.

This situation led a more detailed reflection of the Cold War on Middle East affairs. While Egypt and Syria were being supplied Soviet military equipment, United States was backing up Israel in the same way [26] .

[25] Avraham Zilkha, *History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, p: 33

[26] Until the 73 war, both the US and the Soviets refrained from frankly supporting either of the two sides. The 1973 war marked the choice of the two great powers as US supporting Israel and Soviets the Arabs.

" After careful preparations and an effective political camouflage, Egypt and Syria launched an all-out war in the afternoon of October 6, 1973, catching the Israelis off-guard " [27] on the Jewish Holy day of *Yom Kippur*. Egyptian forces in the South entered the Sinai and Syrian troops in the North invaded the Golan Heights. Thus, what the Israelis had feared since the unification of Egypt and Syria in 1958 had come into being, with the armies of two countries attacking Israel from its northern and southern borders.

After getting rid of the confusion of this sudden attack, Israeli forces got mobilized and launched a counter attack which forced the Egyptian and Syrian troops to retreat. However, the war ended very costly for Israel, as the Arabs for the first time gave such massive damage by means of war and the myth that Israel was invincible was damaged with Arab states feeling more confident.

With UN initiatives to stop the war, Security Council called for a cease-fire and issued resolutions. After a short-term diplomatic deadlock, Egyptian leader Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin started negotiations to find a diplomatic solution. " An agreement was signed at Camp David which led to the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979 " [28] . According to this, Israeli forces would withdraw from the Sinai and Palestinians would be granted autonomy under Israeli rule for five years. However, due to a series of events in the Middle East such as the assasination of Sadat in 1980, the war in Lebanon and the refusal of land concessions by the right-wing government in Israel, such an autonomy could never be granted.

---

[27] Avraham Zilkha, *History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, p: 35

[28] ibid, p: 38

2.4 THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AFTER THE 1973 WAR

The war of 1973 forced the Palestinians to face the reality that their Arab allies were not capable of defeating the Israelis, thus leaving the destiny of the Palestinian people in their hands would be of no use anymore. In addition, Egypt and Jordan had come closer to the US, which meant their indirect reconciliation with Israel. Even before the 73 war, Palestinians had sought representation through political bodies such as *Al Fatah* and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). These bodies, together with armed attack against Israel, sought to perform as means to unite the Palestinian people under organisational spirit. Success of such efforts came with Yassir Arafat who became the chairman of the PLO in 1967 after the *Al Fatah* group gained dominance inside PLO. Under Arafat' s leadership, PLO attained international recognition and legitimacy as the representative of the Palestinian people and was granted observer status at the United Nations in 1974. However, terrorist activities by PLO such as the assasination of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, made the Israeli authorities view the PLO as a terrorist organisation.

PLO also had problems with neighboring Arab countries like Jordan and Lebanon where large numbers of Palestinians took refuge and PLO was operational. Jordanian authorities viewed PLO existence in the country as a challenge to their authority and PLO bases in Jordan were closed. " After the closure of their bases, Palestinian guerilla factions moved from Jordan to Lebanon. Using the Palestinian refugee camps as their power base, they established training camps and built a strong military infrastructure. Lebanon soon became the center of operations and headquarters for the PLO,

undermining the Lebanese government' s authority in the south " [29] . During the 70' s, PLO initiated military activities and even became a party to the Lebanese civil war.

The war in Lebanon broke out in 1975 with Christian, Muslim, Druze and Palestinian elements fighting with each other. Israel, supporting the Christian militia groups, invaded Southern Lebanon in 1978 and destroyed many Palestinian refugee camps. After the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force, Israeli forces withdrew, but entered Lebanon again in 1982 under the operation titled 'Operation Peace for Galilee', by which Israel aimed to bring an end to Palestinian terrorist activity in Lebanon. PLO headquarters moved to Tunusia, but clashes between Palestinian guerillas and joint Israeli-Christian troops continued.

The role of the Palestinians in the Lebanese war was of diaspora stock. The Palestinians in Israel and the occupied lands started a great resistance movement in 1987 named *intifadah*. This movement involved soft armed struggle such as throwing stones at Israeli soldiers and economic struggle in terms of boycotting Israeli goods and refusing to provide goods and services to Israelis. The massive participation of Palestinians to this movement perhaps gave more damage to Israel than that of the four wars previously mentioned. " Although the intifada has not achieved a change in Israeli policy toward withdrawal, it has attracted international attention and increased pressure on Israel " [30] .

On November 14 1988, Palestinian National Council declared the independent Palestinian state which was composed of the Gaza Strip and Westbank. However, Israel did not recognize this unilateral action and did not withdraw from the occupied

---

[29] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict " , p: 41

[30] ibid, p: 44

lands. Some of the Palestinians began to approach the newly founded Hamas, a Palestinian organisation based upon Islam oriented fundamentalism which pursued armed struggle against the Israelis.

The Madrid Conference held in 1991 started the negotiations between Arab and Israeli leaders. The Oslo Conference of 1993 ended with the signing of the " Declaration of Principles " which proposed the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian State in Gazza and Jericho within a period of five years. This agreement was accompanied by the Cairo Agreement in 1994 and second Oslo Agreement in 1995. Yassir Arafat was elected as president of the Autonomous Government in 1996.

The optimistic images drawn after these series of peace initiatives were overshadowed by various continuous violent acts and massacres by radical Jewish and Palestinian groups. In addition, Israeli governments did not obey the regulations about Jewish settlements in West Bank stated in the Oslo Accords and instead right-wing governments encouraged Jewish settlers.

On September 28 2000, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon visited *Haram-al Sharif*, a holy site for the Muslims, and this visit was interpreted by the Palestinians as a symbol of Jewish invasion and led to a massive hatred. A second *intifadah* with growing violence started. After a series of suicide bombing attacks on civilians in Israel, Israeli authorities blamed Yassir Arafat of not behaving responsible about this issue of terrorism and addressed him as the secret supporter of these terrorist groups. On January 21 2002, Israeli army invaded Tulkarim in West Bank and took Arafat' s office in Ramallah under siege. Under strong international opposition and pressure, Israel ended the siege.

On 29 April 2003, Palestinian National Assembly elected Mahmoud Abbas, publicly known as Abu Mazen, who was until then the second man in PLO standing

behind Arafat, prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. Following that, the US State Department issued the 'Roadmap to a Permanent Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', which proposed the steps for the two parties to follow in order to reach a permanent solution and a timeline continuing until 2005 when both parties are supposed to reach a final act.

3. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF JEWISH IDENTITY

The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 brought forth a new problem namely the 'Who is a Jew Controversy' . Israel, as an immigrant society of Jews coming from different parts of the world, has suffered from problems stemming from the uncertainty of the elements which constitute Jewishness, or in other words, from the conflict between various Jewish identities, each claiming to constitute the dominant elements of Jewishness. This ongoing situation has been influental on the evolution of the question of Palestine, whereby these different Jewish identity groups, while questioning their Jewishness in a conflictual status, have viewed Palestinian existence in an evolving and reactionary manner.

Jewish identities in Israel have different conceptions based on mainly ethnic, religious and political identities. While ethnic and religious identities struggle with and question the Jewishness of each other, display different attitudes towards the Palestinians and the question of Palestine as well. Political identities, on the other hand, serve as bridges for the representation of these ethnic and religious Jewish identities on the political arena, thus enabling the integration of various identity groups into Israeli policy making process involving domestic and foreign issues.

3.1 DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF JEWISH ETHNIC IDENTITY

The conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians which arised as a struggle for land control has been deepened by the fact that both communities constitute different ethnic bodies. Unlike any tribal war among the Arabs, the Palestinians consider the Jews as an alien element who invaded their land and ignored their right to survive. Conversely, the Jews viewed the Palestinians as Arabs who had been unable to constitute any state-like embodiment in the region for centuries and were occupying the land available for the establishment of a Jewish state. According to them, the Arabs already had various independent states in the Middle East whereas Jews had none, living in host states for centuries after being expelled for their Holy home land. Thus, in addition to recognizing each other as communities struggling for their land, they viewed the other side as different ethnic bodies and they clang tight to their own ethnic identities.

Apart from the ethnic difference between the Jews and Palestinians, the ethnic diversities within these communities and the existence of other ethnic groups in the region have contributed to the problem, with each group showing differing attitudes towards the question of Palestine. A brief desciption of these various ethnic groups and their attitudes towards the problem is very important in this sense.

3.1.1 Development of Jewish Ethnic Consciousness

The development of Jewish ethnicity in a modern political sense owes much to

the Zionist movement and the establishment of the Israeli State. Before the initiation of Zionism, Jews considered themselves as a rather cultural and religious group residing in various countries. Although their characteristic of constituting a different group was perceived by both themselves and the ethnic majority elites in the host states they were residing in, Jewish tradition was to accept the host country as homeland and to stay loyal to its values and contribute to its development. Herzl' s Zionism was based on a secular essence, regarding all Jews around the world constituting a single people and he strongly opposed the notion of Judaism as a religion. By means of the Zionist propoganda, Jews began to perceive that, in addition to religious, they constituted an ethnic group and this ethnic consciousness later on was transformed into a national-political consciousness with the establishment of Israel and the concept of Israeli citizenship which came afterwards with thousands of Jews migrating to the homeland and being granted this title.

However, with many Jewish immigrants coming from different countries to Israel and the confusion of whether they constitute a single national unit or rather a religious group brought forth the famous debate of " Who is a Jew Controversy? ". From the secular Zionist perspective as stated above, it is a rather cultural and ethnic concept. " Today, a man does not have to believe in God to be considered a Jew: he can be an atheist and a Jew. Judaism is much more than a religion " [1]. According to the *Halakhah* (see Appendix B Glossary), Judaist laws regulating all aspects of life respected mostly by the Orthodox Jews, it is a hereditary concept whereby a Jew is someone born of a Jewish mother. From a modern conservative sense developed by Rabbi Shaye J.D. Cohen, Jewishness is a mixture of inseperable elements of religion, ethnicity and

---

[1] Pamela Ferguson, *The Palestine Problem.* London: Martin Brian& O' Keeffe, 1973. p: 30

nationality through which Jewishness evolved throughout history [2]. An alternative approach comes from the Bundist school who define Jewishness as *peoplehood* [3].

In Israel, the notion of ethnicity is associated primarily with immigrant groups, regarding their background of migration. In this perspective, Israeli Jewish society is literally divided into two groups namely the *Ashkenazim* and *Sephardim.* These groups, carrying different cultural values, have been alienated from each other in general throughout the history of Israel and this situation have influenced their perception of Israeli affairs in social, political and cultural terms. Thus, the development of two distinct Jewish identities in Israel have led to a diversity in political choice and in their attitudes towards the Palestinians and the question of Palestine as well.

3.1.2 The Ashkenazim in Israel

The term Ashkenazim comes from the old Hebrew word for Germany and has been used to denote the Jews coming from the Americas, Northern and Eastern Europe, and Russia as well. Literally speaking, Ashkenazi means one who speaks Yiddish, a dialect of German used by German Jews. Under Herzl' s Zionist propoganda which developed in Europe and due to the rising anti-Semitism throughout this continent, the Ashkenazim were the first to immigrate to Palestine. When the state of Israel was first founded in 1948, the Ashkenazim accounted for % 77 of the Jewish population. They were the founding elite of the state of Israel and since then, the Ashkenazim played an important role in state affairs and governing. " A large majority of Israeli presidents and

---

[2] Hershel Shanks, " What' s a Jew? Defining Jewishness is not easy ". *Moment*, June 1999, p: 2

[3] ibid, p: 2

prime ministers and % 80 of the members of the Knesset are Ashkenazim " [4].

3.1.3 The Sephardim in Israel

The term Sephardim is derived from the word *Sefarad* which means Spain in Hebrew and originally referred to Jews of Spanish descent who spoke Ladino, a Castillian dialect of Spanish. However, this term gained a wider use throughout time, including the Jews from African and Middle Eastern territories. Or, in a broader sense, this term has been used to denote all Jews who are not Ashkenazim. They are referred to as *Edot Hamizrachim* (communities of the East) in Israeli literature, or shortly as Oriental Jews.

During the first decades of the Israeli state, Sephardic Jews constituted a minority when compared to the population of Ashkenazim. However, due to a massive migration of Jews from Middle Eastern territories since the 60' s and their their high birth rate considered, the Sephardim became the majority group among the Israeli Jewish community.

3.1.4 The Ashkenazim and Sephardim in Comparison

The Ashkenazim were the founding generation of the Israeli state as they constituted the major part of the first great wave of migration to Palestine. Coming from European countries with their cultural heritage based upon the democratic and civilized values, or in other words the socio-political and cultural norms of these countries, they aimed to shape the newly founded state through these norms. However,

[4] Süleyman Özmen, *Ortadoğu' da Etnik Dini Çatışmalar ve İsrail.* Istanbul: IQ, 2002, p: 113

the cultural heritage the Sephardim brought with themselves to Israel was something contradictory to this aim. " The arrival of these Oriental Jews was for the Europeans a belated reminder of a world passed by in the Jewish hinterland. That world was an ancient one, as it happened, and in many cases older than the Ashkenazic diaspora " [5].

The Ashkenazi elite, faced with this cultural diversity likely to deepen in Israeli society, adopted a policy of *mizug galuyot* (melting pot), through which they aimed to maintain national unity and solidarity. " Through such socializing agents as the political party, the army, and educational institutions, Orientals were encouraged to give up their own cultural traditions and adopt the model of the dominant Ashkenazi culture as their own " [6].

Ashkenazi worries about the status of the Orientals which might endanger the sake of the Israeli state primarily came from the fact that Orientals were resembling their Arab ex-hosts who were now the enemy of the newly founded state and its people. Orientals, apart from their culture, were even similar to the Arabs in physical appearence, most of them with dark hair and dark skin, when compared to the white, European-like Ashkenazim. Thus, Israeli elites felt themselves forced to get rid of this quasi-Arabness likely to emerge within the society. " Distinguishing the evil East (the Muslim Arab) from the good East (the Jewish Arab), Israel has taken upon itself to cleanse the Sephardim of their Arabness and redeem them from their primal sin of belonging to the Orient " [7].

---

[5] Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time*. New York: Alfreda Knopf, 1996, p: 396

[6] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", in *Israel Faces the Future*, ed. Bernard Reidh & Gershon R. Kieval. New York: Praeger, 1992, p: 81

[7] Ella Shohat, " Sephardim in Israel ", in *Dangerous Liaisons*, ed. Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, Ella Shohat. Minneapolis: Un. Of Minnesota Press, 1997, p: 44

However, the Oriental Jews were not in favor of such a cultural assimilation. They had survived for centuries among Muslim communities without losing their Jewish identity; and they were surprised to be treated by their Ashkenazi brethern as half-Jews who had to be trained to fulfill their identity of Jewishness. In addition, the socioeconomic gap between these groups in disadvantage of the Sephardim was annoying them. They had emigrated to Israel with the hope of starting a new life in the Holy Land and they were frustrated with the reality that they had fallen into an inferior status when compared to their Ashkenazi brethern who had " saved " them from the so-called harsh rule of their Arab captors.

Taking all these sentiments into consideration, it was inevitable for a strong reaction from the Sephardi side to emerge. The *Sephardi Revolt*, as often denoted in literature, emerged as a reaction to Ashkenazi dominance, namely the Wadi Salib riots of 1959, which took place after the police had shot a protestor in a slum area in Haifa called Wadi Salib. The riots involved widespread violent demonstrations requiring major intervention by the police. Following these riots an official commission of inquiry, was appointed.

Another important Sephardi reaction was the initiation of the Black Panther movement in 1970s which organized demonstrations against the Government, complaining of inadequate social rights and the alleged pain and suffering endured by poverty-stricken, predominantly Sephardi citizens. " They so named themselves after the Black Panthers in the US to show that they felt like victims of similar forms of racial discrimination " [8]. The Black Panthers were not a big group, with about 500 members [9], but they succeeded in drawing wide public attention to the sufferings of the Orientals.

---

[8] Pamela Ferguson, *The Palestine Problem*, p: 137

[9] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", p: 81

In addition to cultural clash, the close correlation between ethnicity and socioeconomic class in Israel remains the main axis along which the Ashkenazi-Oriental cleavage is drawn. Most of the Orientals are in a poor and underpriviliged status when compared to the Ashkenazim. " While a large proportion of the Ashkenazim seized the opportunities offered by the mass migration to move from the working to the middle class, the new immigrants, lacking marketable skills, advanced education and connections with the authorities, had to accept lower paying jobs, often in marginal neighborhoods and settlements which offered little economic promise " [10]. This socioeconomic inferiority experienced by the Orientals merged with ethnic consciosness and became a problem which troubles Israel still. However, there are also opportunities for upward mobility and not all Orientals remain poor and disadvantaged. In addition, those Sephardim who do rise to the middle class are unlikely to think of themselves as Orientals anymore. They identify more with Ashkenazi patterns. Upwardly mobile Orientals loosen their ties with their own ethnic groups and for them the term *Oriental* is reserved for the poor or underpriviliged [11] .

The socioeconomic gap between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim still remain an important domestic problem, but however this gap seems to be narrowing in that the number of Sephardi Jews employed in higher rank jobs and taking part in political affairs and bureaucracy has been increasing. The number of Knesset members of Oriental origin has been increasing since the 1980s. In the sixteenth Knesset which performs as the legislative in today' s Israel, of the 120 Knesset members, 20 are Ashkenazi Jews born in Europe, 17 are Orientals born in the Middle East and other

---

[10] Jonathan Kaplan, " Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Gap in Israel ", p: 2, available at: www.jajz-ed.org.il

[11] 1upinfo Web Encyclopedia, available at: http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guide-study/israel

Eastern territories, 75 are Israeli born and 8 are Israeli Arabs [12]. Of the 75 Israeli born second generation Knesset members, the Ashkenazi-Sephardim proportion seems to be at a balance when the available information about their surnames and cultural background is considered [13] .

3.1.5 Ashkenazim, Sephardim and the Question of Palestine

The Ashkenazi- Sephardim cleavage in Israel, as well as conflicts at the domestic level, leads to a general disparity over the question of Palestine. The attitudes of both groups towards the Palestinians has divided the academic environment into two main groups as one proposing general statements considered as applicable to them, and another condemning the statements of the first group as a bulk of prejudices and myth.

These statements interpreted as prejudices mainly stem from two facts: the cultural inferiority of the Sephardim in comparison to the Ashkenazim and Orientals' electoral rejection of Labor Party and the shift of Oriental votes towards the Likud Party, which pursues a hawkish policy toward the question of Palestine. " Due to their inadequate education and lack of experience with democracy, the Jews of Asia and Africa tend to be extremely conservative, even reactionary, and religiously fanatic, in contrast to the liberal, secular and educated European Jews. Antisocialist, they form the base of support for the right-wing parties. Given their cuel experience in Arab lands, furthermore they tend to be Arab-haters, and in this sense they have been an obstacle to peace, preventing the efforts of the peace camp to make a reasonable settlement with the

[12] Knesset Official Website, available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il

[13] Ashkenazim mostly have European type surnames and speak European languages, whereas Sephardim generally have Oriental-style surnames and speak mostly Arabic as second language.

Arabs " [14] .

The prejudices stemming from political choice as to vote for Likud have been denied by some scholars as " Even though the Oriental Jews voted for Likud, which advocates a hard-line policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, one can not assume that a) Oriental Jews hate the Arabs because of their treatment by the Arabs in their countries of origin b) that they refuse to negotiate with the Arabs or make any concessions to them or c) they are warlike and do not want to see Israel at peace with its Arab neighbors " [15].

The mass migration of Sephardi Jews to Israel after the 1950s was not welcomed by the Ashkenazi elite at first sight. They resembled the enemy (Arabs) in terms of culture, language and physical appearence as well. During the process of absorbtion of more immigrants to Israel and the evolution of the question of Palestine which developed parallely to each other, the ruling elites of Israel considered that the Oriental Jews, with their historical background and cultural ties related to their ex-host Arabic states, could serve as intermediary means to a peaceful confrontation with the Arabs. The Oriental response to events such as the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat' s visit to Jerusalem in 1978 set the grounds for this opinion. " Sadat' s peace mission was warmly applauded by Oriental Jews. ....There was a breakthrough in Oriental attitudes as a result of the visit. They no longer viewed all Arabs as enemies. To come from an Arab country was no longer a criterion for inferiority. With Sadat' s mission, many Oriental Jews admitted for the first time that they were Arab Jews " [16]. Some Oriental groups even admitted their loyalty to their ex-host countries as examplified in Morroccan

[14] Ella Shohat, " Sephardim in Israel ", p: 41

[15] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", p: 86

[16] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", p: 87

journalist Mohamed Maradji' s visit to Israel. " In his book *Salam* he notes that ' the question they asked over and over was how is our king? ' " [17] .

However, this policy of using the Oriental community as an intermediary tool to draw a peaceful image towards the Arabs did not work. The Oriental Jews generally turned towards a hawkish policy towards the Arabs and the Palestine issue. The reasons lying under this attitude has been proposed by two distinct schools whereby the first school explains this phenomenon through the political culture approach. According to this approach, the Oriental Jews, lacking democratic experience and liberal values, and aware of their previous treatment by the Arabs in their ex-host states, they shifted to a cruel and harsh policy towards the Arabs. This approach lacks the consideration of realities such as the socioeconomic gap which led the Orientals feel themselves inferior in Israeli society and face their Ashkenazi brethern as the *enemy* instead of the Arabs. However, the second approach developed by Ofra Seliktar namely the *marking-off perspective* which stems exactly from the same statement of social inferiority of the Orientals as stated above, but does not take the historical origins of coming from an Arab country into consideration. " She notes that the Ashkenazi Israeli elite frowned upon Arab influences on Oriental Jews. ....The Oriental Jews were often called Arabs. Since they wanted to be absorbed into Israeli society, one way for them to show their loyalty and identification with the Jewish state was by displaying intense hatred of the Arabs to mark themselves off from the enemy. In this way, their loyalty could not be questioned. " [18] . The Jewishness of the Orientals always questioned by the Ashkenazim thus serves as the main ground for the marking-off perspective. Israel' s first prime minister David Ben-Gurion had described the Sephardi immigrants as

[17] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", p: 87

[18] ibid, p: 86

lacking even " the most elementary knowledge " and " without a trace of Jewish or human education " [19]. To prove their Jewishness and their right to survive in the Israeli society, most of the Sephardim tend to show minimum tolerance to Arabs and pursue hawkish policies towards them.

The Orientals' electoral rejection of Labor Party is also an important milestone in this anti-Arabisation process. There are two important underlying reasons for that. The first is the cultural and socio-economic cleavage between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim which led most of the Sephardim Jews to refrain from voting for Labor which is the founding party of the state and which does not serve as a representative body in the name of the Orientals, but rather an Ashkenazi-dominated institution; and Orientals' search for new political bodies to represent them. This search resulted in an electoral shift to Likud, a party founded by Oriental Jews pursuing a conservative and hard-line policy towards the Palestinian issue. Another reason for this shift of political choice is the emergence of the Labor in a spacegoat image in most Oriental eyes after the 1973 War. " The Oriental Jews believe as do the Ashkenazim in a strong Israeli state. The fear of being overtaken by the Arabs or being seen as weak by their enemies is very strong. It is for this reason that the Yom Kippur War of 1973 is viewed as the beginning of Oriental Jewish defection from the Labor Party. Labor was perceived as having weakened the state by failing to ensure military readiness. Support for Begin (Likud leader) was forthcoming because he appeared strong in his dealings with the Arabs " [20] . Thus, in the 1973 elections, Labor lost thirteen seats in the Knesset and this political decline was accompanied by the victory of the Likud Bloc which took over the government after the 1977 elections.

---

[19] Ella Shohat, " Sephardim in Israel ", p: 42

[20] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", pp: 86- 87

This general situation of the Oriental attitude towards the Arabs has been breached by a few exceptions such as protests by Ethiopian Jews, the *Ma'Avak 85* movement and statements by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, but these so-called examples of an Oriental-Arab approachment in reality stems from Oriental reaction to Ashkenazi superiority and has nothing to do in favour of the Palestinians. " Ma'Avak 85 (Struggle 85) is a new group combining social protest with the struggle for peace. Led by former Black Panthers Sa'Adiya Martziano and Charly Biton, the group promises to work against unemployment and reductions in subsidies, while at the same time struggling against any further Israeli presence in Lebanon, and new settlements on the West Bank " [21] .

The case of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the spiritual leader of the Shas Party which has political support from *Haredi* (see Appendix B Glossary) Sephardim Jews, sometimes makes moderate and peaceful statements about Israeli-Palestinian affairs. However, voters and members of the party are mostly hardliners who pursue an ultranationalist and anti-Arab policy [22]. Yosef' s main concern is his enmity towards the Ashkenazim and under the so-called title of *culture war* [23] he makes radical statements about the Ashkenazim to such an extent that he even declared that it was not a coincidence that the Ashkenazim suffered from the Holocaust and that those killed in the killed in the Holocaust were atoning for sins from previous lives [24] .

---

[21] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", p: 89

[22] Moshe Zuckermann, " İsrail: Parçalanmış bir Toplumun Sıvası Olarak Etnik Hınçlar mı? ". *Birikim*, December 2000, vol. 140, p: 65

[23] Omar Kamil, " Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and his Culture War in Israel ". *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, December 2000, vol. 4, p: 22

[24] Omar Kamil, " Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and his Culture War in Israel ", p: 22

The case of Ethiopian Jews is a different one whereas the Jewishness of these black Jews have been suspected by other Jewish groups in Israel and they identify themselves with Afro-American motives such as hip-hop culture and its outcomes of physical appearence like *rasta* haircut [25] and colorful baggy clothes. They organize protest demonstrations and cultural activities to make masses hearken to their voice. " In May 2002, a hip-hop dance protest was held in downtown Tel Aviv bringing together some 1.000 youths calling for an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza " [26] .

However, the attitude of these exceptional Oriental Jews about Israeli withdrawal from West Bank and Gaza contradicts with the fact that most of the Oriental Jews support Likud' s policies to expand the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and most of the Jewish settlers who reside in the newly built settlements are Sephardi Jews. The real reason lying under this attitude is explained in economic terms by Amos Oz in his book *In the Land of Israel.* " Amos Oz talked with a group of Moroccan Jews from the development town of Bet Shemesh. Those interviewed gave an economic argument for not giving up the West Bank have fileld the lower status jobs in Israel, freeing up the Oriental Jews who once held these positions to take higher status jobs. If the West Bank were given to the Palestinians, they argue, the Orientals would have to return to their previous jobs " [27] .

The ethnic cleavage between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim presents a tideous character whereas " war unites the Israelis and their incompatible collection of

[25] Rasta is a socio-cultural concept which most of the Jamaican negros exercise as a wy of life, and the leading symbol of this style is specially braided curly hair.

[26] Hisham Aidi, " How Israel Treats its Ethiopian Jews ". *New African*: November 2002, p: 4

[27] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", p: 89

backgrounds: peace and quiet highlights the cleavages " [28] . Apart from that, the attitudes of Ashkenazim and Sephardim towards the Palestinians have evolved in such a way that both groups seem to have changed the roles. Ashkenazim, as the founding generation of Israel and the leading figures of the four Arab-Israeli wars tend to become moderate in Palestinian affairs, whereas the Sephardim, underpriviliged and Arab-like figures, tend to become less tolerant and more hawkish towards the question of Palestine. There is a close correlation between the social status of the Sephardim in Israel and their attitude towards the Palestinians described in terms of the *marking-off perspective.*

" The marking -off perspective seems to be abating. As Oriental Jews develop a clearer identity and feel more secure about their place in Israeli society, one can expect a softening of their position toward the Arabs " [29] . As Israel gets rid of its internal wars resulting from this ethnic cleavage, the grounds for peace in Israel' s external wars will be set.

---

[28] Pamela Ferguson, *The Palestine Problem*, p: 136

[29] Renee Taft, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", p: 91

3.2 JEWISH CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

Jews constitute a religious community and have survived throughout history by preserving their religious identity in the host-states they were residing. They were regarded by the majority elites of these states as a religious community and in this sense, were alienated from other groups within these states. Although Zionism came to be known as a secular movement regardless of the religious identity of the Jews, their isolation from the society in these host-states in terms of religion and the alien-kind attitudes towards them was a leading motive lying under their willingness to emigrate to the Holy Land. Suspicious attitudes of the *gentiles* (a term used to denote the non-Jews) towards the Jews which reached even violent levels of enmity such as anti-semitist sentiments and massacres of Jews led to a general opinion among the Jewish diaspora that the need for a Jewish homeland was inevitable. They clang tight to this ideal such that they would live in the Holy Land which was promised to them by God and they would no longer suffer from their alienation by the *gentiles.*

The land of Palestine is the place where the three monotheistic religions were born and the struggle for the control of this Holy Land among the three religious groups has continued throughout history. In the eyes of many Jews, Christians had taken their chance during the Crusades, and the Muslims had controlled the land for so long; and it was now time for the Jews who claimed the right to regain their promised Land.

The development of a Jewish religious identity is not only based on these factors of promised Land and their treatment by the gentiles. Their claim to be God' s favourite nation and their general belief that God would send no more prophets after the Old Testament era and the final salvation of the world would be achieved by the arrival of

the Messiah, not a prophet. Led the Jews generally regard Christian and Muslim prophets as false ones whose legitimacy were to be questioned.

The Christian and Muslim responses to these religious motives stressed by the Jews in the process of their development of a religious identity are also significant in shaping the major differences between the three religions. At the Holy Land level, in addition to the Jews, both Christians and Muslims regard the land of Palestine as a Holy Land and give it a unique place in terms of religious symbolism and worship. " What gives it its unique position is that members of the three religions, who do not dwell in the country, are yet for religious reasons concerned in its destiny. For Muslims, the issue is not Palestine as a Holy Land, but Jerusalem as a Holy City. For, according to Muslim belief, the temple of Solomon was miraculously built, and it was to and from Jerusalem that Mohammad was transported in order to make his ascent into heaven where his vacation was recognized by his prophetic predecessors. Jerusalem is therefore the third holiest shrine in Islam. For Christians, the land as a whole is the Holy Land, as the scene of earthly life of Jesus Christ. For Jews, the land is a Holy Land in the sense of being a promised land " [30].

The question of Palestine has been deepened by the degree of self-identification whereby both conflicting groups define themselves in terms of religious identity. Different conceptions of religious identity among the Israeli Jewish society, as well as internal frictions and conflicts among the Israeli society, lead to different attitudes by these identity groups towards the Palestinians and the question of Palestine. Thus, adding to the historical competition between the three religions, the case of how religious Jews define themselves is a key factor in analysing this conflict.

---

[30] James Parkes, *Whose Land? A History of the Peoples of Palestine*. UK: Penguin, 1970, p: 135

The State of Israel, as of being founded as a homeland for a certain religious group, approaches certain social and political affairs through religion. Even the Declaration of Israel' s Independence gives reference to religious concepts which imply the significance of religion in the framework of the new state. " The State of Israel.....will be based on the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew Prophets " [31]. This statement implies the Judaist tradition and heritage which have existed as the fundamentals of Israeli societal affairs.

Although Israel is a democratic republic, it lacks the characteristics of secularism which has been experienced in most modern liberal democracies. The lack of separation of religion and state is an important factor which directly influences social and political relations among the Israeli society. Israeli citizens are divided into four groups according to their religious belief and these religious communities are officially recognized. In Israeli judicial system, certain aspects of social life are regulated by the religious courts of these recognized religious communities, namely as the Jewish Rabbinical Courts, Muslim Religious Courts, Christian Religious Courts and Druze Courts. These courts have the authority to make decisions on and act out deeds such as marriage, divorce, burial...etc. The supreme religious authority of Judaism in the country is the Chief Rabbinate which encompasses both the Ashkenazi and Sephardi [32] Chief Rabbis and the Supreme Rabbinical Council. Chief Rabbinate is the ultimate

---

[31] Declaration of Israel' s Independence, 1948, taken from the Avalon Project website, available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm

[32] As well as in most countries where the Jewish diaspora reside, synagogues and their Rabbis in Israel are divided into two categories as of being under service for the Ashkenazi and Sephardim communities. For example in Turkey there are 19 Sephardi and 1 Ashkenazi synagogues. For further information see Yusuf Belalel, *Yahudi Tarihi*, Istanbul: Universal, 2000.

authority to make interpretations about Judaist teachings. There are also 195 religious councils which maintain religious services and supply for religious needs. These councils are under the administrative control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Even the existence of such a ministry is a key point in discussing the role of religion in Israeli affairs.

The way Israeli Jews define themselves in terms of religious loyalty and practice is a key issue in defining the development of different religious identities among them, which influence their view of life, politics and their attitudes towards each other. " Israelis religiously cathegorize themselves first as *dati*, that is religiously observant Jews, or *lo dati*, not religiously observant Jews " [33] . The first group consists of loyal followers of *halakhah*, that is the Jewish customary law derived from religious teachings which regulate all issues of daily life. The second group consists of rather less-religious, secular or atheist Jews who prefer to define themselves in terms of ethnic, political or cultural identities rather than a religious one.

Apart from this general categorization of Judaism in Israel, Israeli Jews can be divided into four main groups which directly constitute four distinct religious identities: " ultra-Orthodox (*haredim*), religious Zionists (*datiim*), traditional Jews (*masortiim*) and secular (*hilonim*) [34] . Another categorization gives us a world-wide grouping of Judaism which refers to the varieties of Judaism as the orthodox, conservative, reformist and reconstructionist Judaism [35] . The Orthodox Category consists of three main groups namely as the Hasidim, the Ultra-Orthodox (haredim) and the modern orthodox.

---

[33] Library of Congress Website, available at: http://www.loc.gov

[34] Daniel J. Elazar, " Religion in Israel: A Consensus for Jewish Tradition ". Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Website, available at: http://www.jcpa.org

[35] Wikipedia Website, available at: http://www.wikipedia.org

Israeli Jews, when asked their self-conceptions of religious identity, define themselves as religious (*dati*) which makes % 11 of the Israeli Jewish population, % 26.8 as traditional (*masorti*), %23.4 as secular but maintaining some traditions (*chiloni hamekayem masoret*), % 30.3 as secular (*chiloni*), % 3.9 as ultra-orthodox (*haredi*) and % 4.4 as anti-religious [36] . These various religious identities lead to an internal conflict among the Israeli Jews, influencing their viewing of each other and the non-Jews as well. Thus, examining these groups and their religious perceptions is a key to understanding the role of religion in Israeli affairs regarding the Question of Palestine.

3.2.1 Secular Jewish Identity

Secular Jews constitute an important part of the Israeli Jewish society. Among them are Reform Judaists, Reconstructionist Judaists, anti-religious and atheist Jews. They are the current representatives of the secular essence of Zionist ideology and they are loyal to the State of Israel and see their future in it, viewing it as a home for the Jews as a nation rather than a religious community. Secular Jews are annoyed by the situation whereby Orthodox branch of Judaism is the only recognized form of Judaism in the country. Orthodox Rabbis have considerable authority to regulate life in Israel through their control over marriages, burials, recognition of whether an individual is Jewish, issuance of *Kosher* [37] certificates to restaurants...etc. The undisputed dominance of

[36] Dahlia Moore, Baruch Kimmerling, " Individual Strategies of Adopting Collective Identities: The Israeli Case ". *International Sociology*, 1995, vol. 4, p: 387.

[37] The *Kosher* is the food in accord with the *Kashrut*, which is the Jewish dietary law derived from the instructions stated in the Old Testament. All restaurants in Israel must obtain a *Kosher* Certificate in order to prove that they are serving food not contradictory to the principles of Judaism.

Orthodoxy in social affairs is a serious problem for the secularists, who, while not denying their Judaist essence of identity, seek to live in an Israeli state deprived of religious principles which constitute a barrier against the existence of a modern democratic Israel. " For many citizens, laws emanating from halakhah are merely an annoyance, such as Sabbath regulations that prohibit public transportation or the opening of places of entertainment " [38] .

Among the secular Jews, the movement of Reform Judaism is significant in that although it does not attract a large population within Israel, it constitutes an important part of modernisation of Judaism facing its Orthodox counterpart. The basic principle of this movement is the belief that an individual's personal autonomy overrides traditional Jewish law and custom, thus it proposes an individualistic philosophy. Reform Judaism has been influenced by the Enlightenement movement in Europe and it was German Jews who developed this philosophy of Reform Judaism.

Reconstructionist Judaism, as another variant of secular Judaism, is a movement developed by Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan (1881-1983). Reconstructionist Judaism, just like reform Judaism, again stresses the notion that an individual' s personal autonomy overrides traditional Jewish law and custom, and in addition, they reject the belief that Jews are the chosen people of God. They have a positive attitude towards modern culture.

Secular Jews view the Israeli state as a nation-state in a modern sense and they define their Jewish identities in terms of nationhood and culture rather than religion. This self-perception in non-religious terms is also embodied in their perception of non-Jewish communities. Unlike their fundamentalist brothers, they do not view the

[38] *Israel, A Country Study; Area Handbook Series.* Washington: The American University, 1979, pp: 62-64

Palestinians as Muslim or Christian communities to be regarded as historical enemies in a Holy war of three religions; but as a nation who pose a serious threat to the sovereignity of the state of Israel. Secular Jews see their future bound to the existence of Israel, but despite their commitment to the state of Israel they are not in favour of a war-like situation to continue to exist between the Israelis and the Arabs. They define themselves as loyal supporters of the peace process and condemn further expansionist policies by the Israeli state and the violent acts by both Israeli and Palestinian sides [39]. Thus, secular Jews, while supporting the State of Israel and constituting a loyal part of its community, at the same time support the peace process and act as a catalyst between the Israeli and Palestinian parties towards the achievement of a permanent solution of the question of Palestine.

3.2.2 Conservative (Traditional) Jewish Religious Identity

Conservative Jews (*masorti* in Hebrew) are a religious group in moderate and traditional terms. They have a positive attitude towards modern culture and while preserving their loyalty to traditional modes of interpretation of Judaist teaching, they also support modern scholarly techniques of Judaist studies.

Conservative Jews, like the secular Jews, are committed to the survival of Israel and they see their future tied to its existence. Their perception of the Palestinians is not in terms of religious or civilizational enmity, but rather on a political dimension whereby they regard the Palestinian question as a land issue and like the secular Jews, they are in favour of a permanent peace with the Arab world which would lead to a more secure environment for the sake of Israel.

---

[39] International Federation of Secular Humanistic Jews website, available at: http://www.ifshj.org

3.2.3 Orthodox Jewish Religious Identity

Orthodox Judaism developed as a response to the secularist and reformist influences of European Enlightenement on Judaism. This segment of Judaism adopts a strict adherence to the traditional codes of Jewish law and follows a fundamentalist teaching and acceptance of Jewish principles of faith. However, through the process of its development, several varieties of Orthodox Judaism has emerged and as well as in Israel, it presents a large variety among the Jewish world (see Appendix D, chart 1).

In Israel, Orthodox Judaism has three main varieties: modern Orthodox, *Hasidim* and the ultra-Orthodox. These three groups, although sharing the basic essence of Orthodoxy, pursue different interpretations of social, religious and political life. Their perception of each other and the place they stand among the Israeli society play an important role in Israeli politics concerning both the internal conflicts among religious identity groups and the ongoing question of Palestine.

3.2.3.1 Modern Orthodox Jewish Identity

" The modern or neo-Orthodox are those who, while scrupulously adhering to halachah, have not cut themselves off from society at large. They are oriented to the same ideological goals as many of the secularists, and they share the basic commitment to Israel as a Zionist state. Furthermore, they participate fully in all the major institutions of the state, including the Israeli Defense Forces. This group is also referred to as Orthodox Zionists " [40].

[40] Library of Congress Website, available at: http://www.loc.gov

Modern Orthodox Jews have successfully adapted themselves to the social and political framework of the Israeli state and contrary to other Orthodox groups, they regard Zionism as an inevitable need for the survival of the Jewish world.

Modern Orthodox Jews played an important role in Israeli political history through the initiation of the *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful), an organisation formally founded in 1974 by Orthodox Jews who pursued a hawkish policy towards the Palestinian issue and sought to maintain the survival and security of the Israeli state through means of Jewish settlements in the occupied lands. The ideology of Gush Emunim was based upon the teachings and principles of Rabbi Abraham Kook (1864-1935) and his son, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook (1891-1982) as his successor. " The two rabbis taught that secular Zionists, through their conquests of *Eretz Israel*, had unwittingly brought about the beginning of the messianic age, which would end in the coming of the messiah and the recognition of Jewish superiority by all peoples. Gush Emunim supporters believe that the coming of the messiah can be hastened through Jewish settlement on land they believe God has alloted for Jews " [41] .

Although the number of its activists never exceeded 20,000, the significance of *Gush Emunim* comes from the fact that " ...the clearest and strongest expression of fundamentalist tendencies in Israeli society has been concentrated in Gush Emunim.....By any measure, it has been the most successful extraparliamentary movement to arise in Israel since the state' s establishment in 1948 " [42] .

The basic motive for Gush Emunim was the religious belief that Land of Israel was the promised Land of the Jewish people and through this Holy right they claimed, Gush

[41] http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gush_Emunim

[42] Ian Lustick, *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel: For the Land and the Lord.* New York: Council on Foreign Religions, 1988, p: 8

activists encouraged Jewish settlements in the occupied lands and publicly prompted the refusal of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai according to the Camp David accords. Instead of the official name of State of Israel, the organisation referred to Israel as *Eretz Israel*, a term which denoted the land promised by God through His testament with the chosen people, and through this conception they aimed to legitimize the expansion of Jewish settlements in a religious sense [43] .

Gush Emunim' s political success has been based on two major factors: first, it was a movement which was born through the frustrating and humiliating atmosphere caused by the 1973 War among the Israeli Jewish society due to IDF's relatively less successful performance when compared to the previous wars with the Arabs. The fundamentalists took advantage of this general frustration among the Jewish society to prompt their expansionist and religious propoganda. *Gush Emunim'* s slogan of " The Land of Israel, for the people of Israel, According to the *Torah* of Israel " [44] has gained wide popular support and secular Zionism, which served the founding principles of the state of Israel, was leaving the throne to religious Zionism prompted by religious fundamentalists. The ultimate effect of this return to religion among the Jewish society was the electoral victory of the right-wing Likud Party in 1977 elections which brought an end to the executive monopoly of the left-wing secular Labor Party which had existed since the establishment of Israel in 1948. Secondly, *Gush Emunim* has evolved as a powerful pressure group which served as a catalyst between the religious fundamentalists and the ruling elites. " The friendly ties that fundamentalist leaders enjoyed with the highest echelons of government, and the public sympathy and even admiration that Likud ministers and other officials displayed toward *Gush Emunim* settlers, greatly helped

[43] G. Kepel, *Tanrının İntikamı*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1992, p: 176

[44] Ian Lustick, *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel: For the Land and the Lord,* p: 8

to legitimize fundamentalist ideas in the national debate over the future of the territories and their Arab inhabitants " [45].

Gush Emunim has been significant in Israeli society, as of constituting a model of integration for other Orthodox groups as well. Its role as a mediator between the fundamentalists and the Israeli state and its existence as a pressure group which has the power to influence Israeli policies regarding the question of Palestine has been a prompting element for the Ultra-Orthodox who began to play an active role in Israeli affairs since the 80' s.

3.2.3.2 The Hasidic Religious Identity

Hasidic Judaism is a variety of Orthodox Judaism which was founded by Israel Ben Eliezer (1700-1760). Like most varieties of Judaism, it was developed in Europe and spread around the world. " Hasidism is a mystical movement within Judaism that stresses man' s awareness of his relationship to God, the communal brotherhood with other Hasidim, and the use of devotional aids such as ecstatic prayer and joyous singing " [46]. They preserve most values and customs of ancient Judaism through symbolic elements such as their clothing style. Hasidic Judaism is an anti-Zionist movement whereby Hasidic Jews believe that the current existence of the state of Israel is contradictory to Judaist thought, as it is the Messiah who will save the Jewish people and make them settle in the Holy Land. Thus, the State of Israel is an illegitimate body invented by the secular Zionists and its existence is not to be accepted until the Messianic Age is reached.

---

[45] Ian Lustick, *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel: For the Land and the Lord,* p: 9

[46] *Israel, A Country Study;* Area HandbookSeries. Washington: The American University, 1979, p: 76

The Hasidim in Israel are divided into several groups. One of the most prominent of these groups is the *Neturei Karta* (meaning guardians of the City in Aramaic) The members of this group reject the Israeli state, and avoid using the facilities of the Israeli government, including courts, identity cards, schools, currency and public utilities. They have isolated themselves from the society, living in enclaves where they shut out the secular modern world as much as possible. " Most of the Neturei Karta live in an Orthodox quarter of Jerusalem; they are all Ashkenazim. There are only a few thousand Neturei Karta-their numbers can only be estimated because they refuse to submit census data- but their influence on Orthodox movements in Israel is considerable, which is noteworthy since they adamantly refrain from participation in the political life of Israel " [47] .

Neturei Karta does not display an open enmity towards the Palestinians although being an Ultra-Orthodox Jewish denomination. Indeed, they display their anti-state opinions through collaborating with Palestinian groups in demonstrations against Israeli violence towards the Palestinians. In the eyes of Israelis who are loyal to the state " they have gone so far as to negotiate privately with hostile Arab states and leaders " [48] . Their discomfort with the secular Israeli state which was founded contradictory to Judaist principles before the coming of the Messiah leads them to establish relations with any element who oppose its existence and this range of collaboration may even be extended to the Palestininans in this sense.

The same attitude of viewing Palestinians as a parallel opponent to the existence of the Israeli state has been displayed by other Hasidic groups as well. While the Hasidim in Israel respond to the Israeli State by means of demonstrations, media

---

[47] *Israel, A Country Study*, p: 78

[48] http://www.acs.ucalgary.ca/~elsegal/363_Transp/Orthodoxy/Naturei.html

and public propoganda, the Hasidim in the Jewish diaspora collaborate with the Palestinians and other Arab groups to protest the State of Israel. A very recent example of this situation was the anti-Zionist Orthodox Demonstration in Manhattan on 1 June 2003, with the participation of hundreds of Orthodox Jews who protested the Zionist state of Israel and called for the stopping of Israeli violence against the Palestinians [49].

3.2.3.3 The Haredi Religious Identity

Haredi Judaism is a Jewish denomination of an ultra-Orthodox type and they are generally referred to as Ultra-Orthodox Jews. Like most Jewish denominations, it emerged under the influence of the European Enlightenment as a response to the reformist interpretations of Judaism and called for the return to a way of comprehending and practicing Judaism in accordance to the time of Moses. " Ultra-Orthodox Jews consider their belief system and religious practices to extend in an unbroken chain back to Moses and the giving of the *Torah* on Mount Sinai. As a result, they often have a complicated relationship with other Jewish denominations, which they consider to be unjustifiable deviations of Judaism " [50].

Haredi Jews, although they do not make up a huge population in Israel [51], constitute an influental pressure group on social, religious and political affairs. Since the

[49] Neturei Karta in the United States Website, available at: http://www.nkusa.org/index.cfm

[50] http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultra-Orthodox_Judaism

[51] According to Moore& Kimmerling, Haredi population in Israel is 3.9% of the total Jewish population, whereby Shahak& Mezvinsky give a percentage of 11%, probably associating other Orthodox groups with the Haredim.

Establishment of the State of Israel, like the Hasidim, they have opposed the existence of the state in the Holy Land due to the fact that it was founded before the arrival of the Messiah and they regarded the Israeli state as an illegitimate body, not contributing to its political affairs. Their main concern has been the influence of religion on social affairs, whereby they regard the degree of this influence to be at a very low level. " But although Haredi representatives may wield substantial bargaining power on issues of direct religious concern, they tend not to regard macropolitical issues, including territorial questions, as matters of great consequence. Because they are non-Zionist, or even anti-Zionist, the Haredim have, effectively, opted out of key political struggles over the course that Israeli society will take " [52] .

However, this situation of the Haredi Jews of isolating themselves from political affairs has changed through the historical course whereby they tended to become a pressure group backed by political representation. The first sign of this politicisation of the Haredim was their withdrawal from the Agudat Israel Party (see Appendix B Glossary) which served as the political representative of Orthodox Jewry and as a founder party of the State of Israel. The Sephardi Haredim withdrew from Agudat Israel and founded the Shas Party in 1984 whereby they sought to establish a political body to represent themselves, deprived of Ashkenazic dominance over politics they experienced under Agudat Israel. Agudat Israel ceased to exist as a unified body and its remaining Ashkenazi Haredi members founded Yahadut Ha'Torah party [53] . Yahadut Ha'Torah have displayed a negative approach to the question of Palestine whereby its members generally oppose territorial concessions to the Palestinians and the formation of a Palestinian state. However, the attitude of Sephardi Haredim under the political

[52] Ian Lustick, *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel: For the Land and the Lord, p: 7*

[53] Israel Shahak, Norton Mezvinsky, *İsrail' de Yahudi Fundamentalizmi.* İstanbul: Anka, 2002, p: 37

umbrella of the Shas party displays a more elastic nature concerning the question of Palestine. The party officially supports autonomy for the Palestinians, but are against the establishment of a Palestinian State. Shas officials display a flexibility over the issue of land concessions for peace, but the real reason lying under this approach is the Haredi belief that when the Messiah comes the Holy land of Israel will automatically return to its rightful owners, who, without doubt, are the Jews.

Shas school, which reflects the Sephardi Haredim views, does not display an open enmity towards the Palestinians and even seems to approach them in a moderate manner, but statements by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the spiritual leader of Shas and Sephardi Haredim, imply their real approach towards the Palestinian issue. Comparing the Israeli State founded as a secular initiation to that of a Messianic State of Israel which they hope to emerge in the future with the arrival of the Messiah, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef stated that Isral neither had enough power to destroy all Christian churches in the Holy Land, nor the power to gain control of the Holy Land as a whole. Thus, Rabbi Yosef is in favour of land concessions to Palestinians rather than experiencing a war to be resulted with the ending of all Jewish lives " [54] .

The feeling of insecurity deeply rooted in this statement by Rabbi Yosef has been a leading factor in the process of integration of the Haredim in Israeli political life. The leading motive in this sense is the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which was a surprising humiliation in the eyes of the Haredim as well as many Israelis, when compared to the previous victorious wars. The Yom Kippur War led to a serious change in the mind of the Haredim whereby they sought to revise their approach towards the non-Messianic secular Israeli state and their future existence within it. " The Six Day War superficially, at least, seemed to be a vindication of Zionism, of secular Israel and the

[54] Israel Shahak, Norton Mezvinsky, *İsrail' de Yahudi Fundamentalizmi*, p: 49

capacity of human design. The Yom Kippur War, on the other hand, seemed to reflect the tentative and insecure status of Israel, its isolation from the world and the folly of Israel' s leaders. It, more than any of Israel' s wars, might help narrow the sense of alienation that Haredim heretofore have felt. The tradegy and trauma of the war and the deep scars it left in Israeli society would serve to evoke in Haredi eyes the age-old experience of the Jewish people since the destruction of the temple " [55] . The counterattack through which Israeli Defense Forces prevented the Arab armies to invade Israel was seen by the Haredim as a miracle of God in favour of the Jews, thus their anti-Israeli sentiments for a secular Israel lacking Messianic legitimacy began to change. " Frequent allusions to the miracle through which God saved the Jews of Israel in general and the Israeli army in particular strengthen the Haredi sense of identity with society and the feeling that God cares for the Jewish state " [56] .

Haredi Jews have been generally integrated into social and political life of Israel, sharing a consciousness of common future and security with the non-Haredi Jews, thus being no more indifferent to the problems surrounding them. As their sense of being associated with Israeli identity develops, their hidden enmity towards the non-Jews may likely become more evident.

---

[55] Charles S. Liebman, " Paradigms Sometimes Fit: The Haredi Response to the Yom Kippur War ", in *The Shaping of Israeli Identity: Myth, Memory and Trauma*, eds. Robert Wistrich& David Ohana. London: Frank Cass, 1995, p: 171

[56] ibid, p: 172

3.3 JEWISH CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

Israel, although having a relatively small population when compared to most democracies in the world, has an especially high number of political parties. There are two main reasons for this situation whereby, first, political activity in Israel in terms of both domestic and foreign policy is at a very intensive level considering the multi-ethnic and multi- religious structure of its society surrounded by Arab countries whom served as enemies in the four Arab-Israeli wars; and, secondly, electoral threshold in Israel is at a very low level of 1.5 %, encouraging political leaders to establish parties and win seats in Knesset, the parliament of Israel. In the last elections of 2003, 27 parties or party coalitions entered the elections [57] and out of this number, only 19 could win at least one seat in the Knesset.

Israeli politics had displayed a tradition of two main center parties, namely Labor and Likud, competing at the political arena, together with a few smaller parties assisting them and performing as pressure groups by means of their assistance to the two big parties. However, since the seventies, this picture began to change in accordance with the huge increase in number of political parties as a result of people' s dissatisfaction with the parties they formerly supported and of developing identities within the Israeli society seeking to find bases of political representation and participation. The elections of 1977 has been interpreted by many historians as a turning point in Israeli politics since it brought an end to political monopoly of the Labor Party on governing issues which had continued since the establishment of the state in 1948. However, Likud' s electoral victory was accompanied by the rise of radical parties who questioned Likud' s

[57] Knesset Official Website, available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il

new position as the new representative of the masses in the center spectrum of politics " Israeli society faces a crisis of political legitimacy. The roots of this crisis began with the loss by Labor of the legitimacy that charactarized its rule at the peak of its popularity. The Likud failed to establish the extensive ideological authority that characterized Labor' s most successful early years of rule " [58] .

Thus, the two-sided competition over politics led by Labor and Likud was likely to dissolve, with new players claiming to be the representatives of the dissatisfied voters or developing identity groups seeking political representation. " The ideological domination enjoyed by the two largest Zionist blocs that founded the state of Israel has dissipated noticeably over the past few years. In its place, new parties are emerging that reflect specific styles of preferred political Cum social life- Shinui/ Meretz or Shas/ United Torah Judaism " [59] .

Political parties in Israel are mostly center parties either on the left or right spectrum of politics. There are also radical right parties on the rise since the eighties and Arab parties representing the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Most of these parties pursue ideological interests and draw supporters from within the Israeli society who vote for the party which, he thinks, best fits his political, cultural or ideological views. Thus, many of these parties maintain the characteristics of providing political identities for their supporters through group activity at the political level. Thus, when considering different conceptions of Jewish political identities, these political parties are divided into two main categories as center parties and radical parties.

---

[58] Myron J. Aronoff, " Significant Trends in Israeli Politics " , in *Israel Faces the Future*, eds. Bernard Reidh & Gershon R. Kieval. New York: Praeger, 1992, p: 29

[59] Kenneth W. Stein, " Israel: Reconciling Internal Disparities? ", in *The Middle East in 2015*, ed. Judith S. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2002, p: 86

3.3.1 Jewish Identities on the Center Spectrum of Politics

Center parties have been the dominant characters of politics in Israel since the establishment of the state. Two of these parties, namely Likud and Labor, are the most significant in that, while having provided mass support and ruled the country through coalitions with smaller parties, these two center parties developed political cultures and traditions of their own, thus influencing a serious base of their supporters in constituting a political identity, whereas identifying oneself as of supporting Labor or Likud has been a sort of social status enjoyed by those who identified themselves through their voting loyalty to either of these two.

The Labor Party (Avoda) , although founded in 1968 with the joining of three Labor parties namely *Mapai, Rafi and Ahdut Ha'avoda*, has been the founding party of the State of Israel, since it is the continuation of the Mapai Party of David Ben Gurion. It was the labor tradition which governed the state since its establishment until the electoral defeat of 1977 by Likud. Labor Party is a social-democratic party loyal to secular principles and it is the biggest party on the center left spectrum of Israeli politics. Labor entered the 2003 elections under a coalition with another smaller center party named *Meimad* and Labor-Meimad Bloc won 19 seats in the Knesset [60], acquiring the second biggest number among other political parties, but unable to meet the necessary conditions for an executive coalition, Labor could not come to power.

Labor party, due to the Ashkenazic dominance within its top level staff, has been electorally rejected by a majority of the Oriental Jews whose votes shifted to Likud and other right wing parties after the 1977 elections. The secular and Zionist principles to which Labor devoted itself to have been challenged by parties on the radical right. Thus,

[60] Knesset Official Website, available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il

the founding party of the state has been experiencing a high degree of political turmoil since the electoral defeat of 1977.

Labor Party is an important figure in the process of peace talks with the Palestinians, whereby their amenable approach towards the Palestinians forms an important bridge between the Israeli and Palestinian communities. Their political position over the question of Palestine is based on full support to the continuation of the peace negotiations and prevention of terrorist and fundamentalist initiatives from damaging this peace process. Labor aims to frame the peace negotiations within the principles of " A united Jerusalem, capital of Israel, and under Israeli jurisdiction; a separation of Israel and the Palestinian autonomous areas that would respond to the needs of security and national identity; refusal of right of return for the Palestinian refugees abroad, sovereignty over the River Jordan valley, the North-east of the Dead Sea, the Etzion block and those areas considered essential to the security of Israel; economic cooperation between Palestinians, Jordanians and Israelis; the maintenance of Israeli jurisdiction over the Jewish settlements and the ending of building new Jewish settlements [61] .

Labor Party, as the founding party of the state, has committed itself to advocate the survival of Israel in terms of security and is in favour of the creation of a Palestinian State only when the necessary conditions of security have been acquired. The political culture and views of the Labor tradition and their current position concerning the peace process displays a more amenable and moderate attitude towards the Palestinians when compared with Likud, as Labor' s counterpart on the center right.

Likud Party (consolidation in Hebrew) was founded in 1973 as a party coalition of right wing parties and since then, it has become the major center-right party of Israel.

[61] *Israeli Political System* - Special File, available at: http://www.ub.es

Likud' s policies concerning the question of Palestine generally contradict with those of Labor. Unlike Labor, Likud seeks to ignore the Oslo Process and refuses any concession of land to the Palestinian side. Indeed, they reject the establishment of an independent Palestinian State, showing consent to only an autonomous Palestinian rule in the Westbank and Gaza strip. In terms of Jewish settlements, Likud government declared that no more settlements would be built, but they approved the expansion of existing settlements [62].

Apart from these political contradictions with the Labor over the issue of Palestine, Likud and Labor share two main opinions in that both parties are in favour of a permanent solution to the issue only when the permanent security of Israel is guarenteed and maintained; and, both parties advocate the existence of Jerusalem as the unified capital city of Israel.

Labor and Likud, as the two biggest parties on the center spectrum of Israeli politics, seek to streghten their electoral positions among the Israeli society whereby their status of leading center parties have been challenged by other smaller parties claiming to be on either center left or center right. Some of these parties are noteworthy in terms of their capacity to serve political identities for their members. One of these parties is *Gesher* (bridge in Hebrew) established in 1996, a right-wing party whose voter profile is based on Oriental Jews of Morocco. *Gesher* aims to serve as a bridge between the Ashkenazi-Oriental conflict in Israel and defines its mission as " to promote a society in which being Jewish forms the bond that unites, not the wall that divides " [63].

---

[62] http://www.us-israel.org

[63] Gesher Official Website, available at: http://www.gesher.co.il

Another center party at the leftist spectrum of politics is *Meretz* (vitality in Hebrew), established in 1992. *Meretz* is a left-wing Zionist party advocating human rights and seperation of religion and state in Israel. Concerning the question of Palestine, they advocate the formation of a Palestinian state and the ending of settlement buildings in Palestinian autonomous areas [64] .

Yisrael B' Aliyah was established in 1995 by Jewish immigrants from the ex-Soviet territories. The party does not place itself in neither left nor right wing, but claims to represent and advocate the rights of immigrants (Aliyah means immigrant in Hebrew). The party gains most of its votes from ex-Soviet and Ethiopian Jews. The approach of *Yisrael B' Aliyah* towards the question of Palestine is sort of hawkish whereas it recognizes the Palestinian Authority, but rejects the creation of an independent Palestinian state; regards Jerusalem as the indivisible capital of Israel and accepts the establishment of new Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Their only political toleration towards the Palestinians is that *Yisrael B' Aliyah* is in favour of land concessions to the Palestinians, as regards Golan [65] .

The center parties discussed above are all in favour of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, however ways of framing the road to peace differ. These parties, with their political views and traditions, serve as grounds for development of political identities for their members and influence their approaches to the question of Palestine.

---

[64] http://www.awesomeseminars.com/elections99/party_meretz.htm

[65] http://www.ub.es/solidaritat/observatori/english/palestina/data/system.htm

3.3.2 Jewish Radical Political Identities

The rise of radical right parties in Israel since the eighties reflects the fact that identity groups, which had not found opportunities of representing themselves at the political arena until then, had embodied these demands through political initiation. Thus, it is not surprising to observe overlapping identities among the supporters of these parties.

One of the most significant of these parties is Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) founded in 1984 by the Oriental religious leaders who split from Agudat Israel. The voter profile of the party consists of Sephardic Haredi Jews, thus Shas involves three overlapping identities such as Sephardic ethnic identity, religious Haredi identity and political ultra-Orthodox identity. The elctoral success of Shas can be explained in terms of identity issues whereas " Shas is a repulsive political party because it merges ethnicity and ultra-Orthodoxy " [66] . Its election slogan in 1996 Knesset elections " Shas: it' s not a platform, it' s an identity " [67] diplays the identity feature of the party.

" Shas appeals primarily to the underclass and to underpriviliged Jews of Oriental or Sephardic origins. Shas provides an array of social services, including day-care centers, pre-school education, cheap summer camps for children, food and clothing for the needy, and a vast socio-educational network " [68] .

Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the spiritual leader of Shas is an important figure in the development of this interlinked identity of ultra-Orthodox Sephardic Haredim under

---

[66] Kenneth W. Stein, " Israel: Reconciling Internal Disparities ", p: 91

[67] Omar Kamil, " Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and his Culture War in Israel ". *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, December 2000, vol. 4, p: 1

[68] Kenneth W. Stein, " Israel: Reconciling Internal Disparities ", p: 90

the umbrella of Shas. Rabbi Yosef, while questioning the religious legitimacy of the state of Israel considering its establishment before the Messianic era and its secular functions, also makes hostile declarations redarding the Palestinians. " The spiritual leader of Israel's ultra-orthodox Shas party said yesterday that Arabs were reproducing like insects and in the old city of Jerusalem they're swarming like ants. In his Friday sermon which is broadcast on Israeli army radio Rabbi Ovadia Yosef went on to say 'they should go to hell -and the Messiah will speed them on their way" [69] .

Apart from Rabbi Yosef' s declarations of this kind, party members and officials refrain from hostile declarations of policy and opinion concerning the Palestinians and the question of Palestine. Shas advocates the indivisibility of Jerusalem and reject the establishment of a Palestinian state. Indeed, Shas is flexible about the issue of land concessions for peace, and they base this attitude on religious grounds such that when the Messiah comes the Land will be returned to its rightful owners, as they believe.

Another significant party on the radical side is the *Yahadut Hatorah* (United Torah Judaism) which is made up of two ultra-Orthodox groups: *Degel Hatorah* (the Flag of Torah) and *Agudat Israel* (Union of Israelis). Winning five seats in the Knesset after the 2003 elections [70] , Yahadut Hatorah has served as the Ashkenazic version of Shas in terms of politics. Its members are anti-Zionist and mostly Ashkenazic ultra-Orthodox Jews who oppose the peace negotiations with the Palestinians and the Oslo Accords. The political tradition of Agudat Israel is the dominant factor in shaping the policies of *Yahadut Hatorah*, whereby it rejects the creation of a Palestinian state, backs

---

[69] *Israeli Racism Threatens the Futures of Both Israelis and Palestinians*, News Archives, July 30 2001, available at: http://www.palestinemonitor.org

[70] Knesset Official Website, available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il

the continuation of settlements and regards Jerusalem as the capital of Israel [71] .

Shas and Yahadut Hatorah perform as new political players on the radical camp in Israel, whereas there is another radical party of historical significance and tradition: The National Religious Party (NRP, or *Mafdal* as Hebrew abbrevation). Established in 1956, the NRP has served as a political platform for religious Zionists who advocated the idea of a Greater Land of Israel. Since then, it has participated into electoral coalitions both with Labor and Likud and played an influental role on both domestic and foreign policy. In terms of domestic affairs, " Mafdal strongly emphasizes the fostering of Jewish education, forbids any violation of the Sabbath, demands strict enforcement of Orthodox dietary laws in public life, and insists on the preservation of legislation that gives the Orthodox rabbinate control over Jewish marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption and other family matters " [72] . However, Mafdal has been losing its popular support in the recent years and currently it has six seats in the Knesset [73] . " Among the many factors accounting for the decline of Mafdal were: the success of its educational system which produced a more observant and more nationalistic generation whose members shifted their support to the Likud, Tehiya, Matzad and Kach; the alienation of Eastern Jews who gave their support to Tami and Shas; and the extreme factional infighting among the top leaders " [74] .

On issues concerning the question of Palestine, Mafdal pursues a hawkish policy whereby it opposes the Oslo Peace Accords, advocates the need for the building of

---

[71] http://www.ub.es/solidaritat/observatori/english/palestina/data/system.htm

[72] Don Peretz , Gideon Doron, *The Government and Politics of Israel*. Oxford: Westview, 1997, pp: 113-114

[73] Knesset Official Website, available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il

[74] Myron J. Aronoff, " Significant Trends in Israeli Politics ", pp: 35- 36

more Jewish settlements in the West Bank [75] . They oppose the creation of a Palestinian State whereas " Mafdal determined its policy regarding the Westbank and Gaza Strip in the pre-state era and has pursued this policy in a stable way. According to this, there is no room for another state than Israel between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea " [76] . Similarly, it regards Jerusalem as the indivisible capital of Israel, rejecting all Palestinian claims over the city. Although Mafdal has lost much of its popular support during the recent years, it still preserves its significant and influental position in Israeli politics in terms of being a political pressure group and of developing a political identity which merged the notions of nationalism and religion, two vital concepts for the majority of Israeli Jewish society.

Radical parties in Israel retain an important position in politics since they have been influental on Israeli foreign policy since the early years of the state concerning her relations with the neigboring Arab countries and the Palestinians. Apart from the historically significant Mafdal, the new initiations of Shas and Yahadut Hatorah maintain a high potential for political pressure with their loyal ultra-Orthodox members who consider their membership to these parties as a new form of identity. Their confrontation with the secular system directly influences their perception of the Israeli state and its non-Orthodox society, and of the Palestinians and the question of Palestine as well.

---

[75] http://www.ub.es/solidaritat/observatori/english/palestina/data/system.htm

[76] Mehmet Yılmaz, *Mafdal: Radikal Sağın Israil Dış Politikasına Etkisi*. Istanbul: Zaman, 2003, p: 168

4. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

The development of a Palestinian nationality has been shaped by the question of Palestine whereby it served as an unifying element for the Palestinians who realized their own national existence seperate from other Arabs. Thus, at this point they clang tight to their Palestinian identity while confronting with the Israelis and in the course of time, different conceptions of Palestinian identities developed in accordance with the evolution of the Palestine issue. Palestinians, as a divided people, while questioning their ethnic and religious identity, have sought means of survival and based their liberation movement on various political organisations which served as bridges for the development of Palestinian political identities. Thus, as in the Jewish case analysed before, different conceptions of Palestinin identity is to be studied in terms of ethnic, religious and political identities.

4.1 DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIAN ETHNIC IDENTITY

The Palestinians are an ethnic group coming from a Semitic stock of race and they are a part of the Arab world in terms of ethnicity, culture and linguistics. Their confrontation with the Jews and the ongoing conflict has been deepened as Palestinians became more aware of the fact that they were dealing with a people of different ethnicity; and the development of a Palestinian identity in terms of ethnicity found its counterpart. However, the development of a Palestinian ethnic identity in terms of history and culture has been accomplished very lately when compared to that of the Jews, and this situation formed one of the bases of their failure to maintain their right to survive under equal conditions in the region. In other words, the efforts and initiatives of the Palestinians to prove that they constitute an ethnic entity and that they were the descendants of historical peoples who had survived in the region until now were lacking success to draw attention at first sight when compared to those efforts by Jews.

It is at this point, the disadvantage of the Palestinians to be considered as just Arabs by the British and the French who have redrawn the map of the Middle East after Ottoman withdrawal and divided the region into states considering all of the Arab residents the same. Left alone without a state and their land promised to the Jews, they lacked the ability of their Arab brothers to develop ethnic and national values under statehood, which are vital elements of survival.

The Zionist movement allowed Jews to emigrate to Palestine stressing that it was their right to settle in the Holy Land, as this was their promised land and that they were the first people to establish a state in the region [1]. Zionist literature denied the existence of Palestinians as an ethnic group or a nation and their right to live in the Holly Land. For them, the name Palestinian was an invention of anti-Zionists and Palestinians referred to the Aegean-origined historical people told in the Old Testament who had ceased to exist on earth [2] . These, in the eyes of the Jews, so-called Palestinians were opportunists who had settled in the Holy Land after the Jewish exile, creating no significant culture nor any unitary political entity for centuries. Indeed, they were Arabs, and Arabs had taken the lion' s share after the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the Middle East by establishing many states, and just one state for the Jews who had the historical right to achieve it should not be ignored.

The continuous change of ruling elites in Palestine indeed has been influential on the late development of a Palestinian ethnic identity. The residents of the region had been under the rules of different empires and dynasties who imposed religious assimilation on them. " Two thousand years ago a Maccabean king tried to make all the inhabitants into Jews; five hundred years later Justinian tried to make them all Christians; the mad caliph Al-Hakim wanted them all to be his brand of Muslims " [3] .

---

[1] The Jews, under King Saul and his successor, King David, had established a Kingdom in Palestine in the 11th century B.C. and later this kingdom was divided into two as Kingdom of Israel and Kingdom of Judah, of whom the former lasted for more than 200 years and the later lasted for more than 400 years.

[2] In most chapters of the Old Testament, the name Philistines is used to denote a people who had struggled with the Jews for the control of the land for many years. Their famous king Goliath was killed by King David and Jewish dominance in the region was achieved.

[3] James Parkes, *Whose Land? A History of the Peoples of Palestine*. UK: Penguin, 1970, p: 312

Owing much to texts in the Holy Books, Palestinians had always been aware of the fact that they were the descendants of the semitic tribes who had inhabited the region since Biblical times [4] and these semitic tribes intermixed and formed the ethnic group today known as Arabs, of whom Palestinians constitute a part of. In addition, according to their belief, Arabs were the descendants of Ismael, son of Abraham and the brother of Isaac, thus they were cousins with the Jews [5] .

Jews had maintained their ethnic identity and survived as a seperate group among the communities of their host-states for centuries. The Arabs, although never leaving their land and creating their own local and ethnic cultures, were to discover their Arabness as late as the end of the 19th century. After the glorious times of the Islam Empire, they were left to remain as a religious group rather than an ethnic one under Ottoman rule. Thus, it was no coincidence that the European powers were surprised to discover the Arab existence in the Middle East before World War 1, a very existence forgotten by the Europeans for centuries. A quotation from Albert Hourani about his friend Philip Hitti who had written a book about the Middle East best explains this situation: " He had just finished his *History of the Arabs*, and I asked him what period it covered. He told me that, apart from a short epilogue on the last century and a half, he had ended in the 15th century. I asked him why he had ignored the centuries in

---

[4] The Old Testament gives reference to inhabitant communities in Palestine such as Canaanites, Amorites, Perizzites and Jebusites whom are of Semitic stock and supposed to be the ancestors of Arabs.

[5] The genealogical tree stated in both Old and New Testaments refer to Isaac, son of Abraham as the ancestor of Jews. The Quran, accepting this genealogy, adds the fact that Abraham had another son named Ismael from his other wife and Ismail is accepted to be the ancestor of Arabs. Southern Arabs like the Yemenites, accept another historical character named Qahtan as their ancestor and call themselves " sons of Qahtan " after him.

between, and he said ' *There was no Arab history then* ' " [6] .

The end of the 19th century witnessed a revival of the Arab world in terms of identity consciousness and Palestinians took their part in this process as well. The development of Palestinian ethnic identity is closely related and tied to the rise of Arab nationalism, and rise of Zionism in terms of counter-effect.

4.1.1 The Rise of Arab Nationalism

The term Arabness is not new to political literature nor an invention of the British and the French in the beginning of the 20th century. It was a reality and consciousness experienced by the Arabs and their neighbors even during the *Cahiliyya* [7] period and during the expansion of the Arab-Islam Empire. " Certainly, the first seeds of a form of Arab nationalism were sown when the Moslem invaders spread the structure of a vast Arab empire from Arabia to other parts of the Middle East, and accross North Africa to Spain. But, modern Arab nationalism really dates back to the decades at the end of the Ottoman Empire, when radical Arabic-speaking groups began to search for a new identity " [8] .

The leading motive for the development of Arab nationalism was the Ottoman dominance in Arab lands which had lasted for five centuries and nationalist and patriotic sentiments were spreading among the Arab masses with British and French initiatives, as the two powers aimed to get rid of the Ottomans in the region by use of

[6] Albert Hourani, " How Should We Write the History of the Middle East? ". *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 23, 1991, p: 129

[7] Arabic literature refers to the times before their conversion to Islam as the Cahiliyya Period, which means a time of ignorance and disorder.

[8] Pamela Ferguson, *The Palestine Problem.* London: Martin Brian& O' Keeffe, 1973, p: 26

Arab uprising against them. The British sent spies like Thomas Edward Lawrence who stressed an anti-Ottoman propoganda among the Arabs and encouraged them to ally with the British in order to return to their glorious and self-ruling days. This propoganda awakened the consciousness of Arabness among the Arabs and they sought their national revival in the expellation of the Ottomans from their land. This British policy proved success with the defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War and their withdrawal from the Middle East.

However, the expelled so-called *tyrants* were replaced by imperialist powers of the West, who were, unlike the Ottomans, representatives of a different culture and a new way of exploitation. The British and French, who divided the Middle East region among themselves into mandates have marked the existence of Western imperialism which resembled the days of the Crusades to the Arabs. Thus, early Arab nationalism which had emerged as a reaction to Otoman dominance had been shaped by anti-imperialistic elements during its evolution.

Arab nationalism was a secular, regardless of religion, and anti-imperialistic movement demanding the right of self-determination for the Arabs. " One of the earliest Arab radical groups was formed at the Protestant American University of Beirut. It was founded by a group of young Christian Arabs, not Moslems, in 1873 " [9] .

Arab nationalism, emerging from reactions towards external dominance, evolved in accordance with the political developments in the Middle East. Twentieth century Arab nationalism was influenced by mainly three groups as the Ba'ath Socialist Party, the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and the Nasserists.

---

[9] Pamela Ferguson, *The Palestine Problem.* London: Martin Brian& O' Keeffe, 1973, p: 27

The Ba'athist movement established in the early 1940s was anti-imperialistic and nationalist with some socialist essence which might be explained as social equality for the Arabs. The Ba'ath Party had come to power in Syria and Iraq and established branches in Lebanon and Jordan. The party attracted many Palestinians and even one of their representatives in Jordanian parliament was Kamal Nasser, a young poet from West Bank, who was later to become the official spokesman of the PLO in Beirut [10]. However, Jordanian monarchy viewed the Ba'ath as a serious threat to their rule as it attracked a huge mass of Palestinian refugees in the country and the party was banned. " While the Ba'ath continued to attract Palestinians elsewhere in the Arab world, its banishment from Jordan diminished its ability, and that of its Palestinian members, to mobilise the refugees in the country where they were most concentrated " [11] .

" The Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) founded in the early 1950s had many famous names among the Arab intelligentsia as its founders like George Habash, Nayif Hawatmah, Ghassan Kanafani and Wadih Haddad. Like the Ba'ath, it espoused pan-Arab unity and anti-imperialism....however, unlike the Ba'ath, it espoused social reform rather than revolutionary socialism, and until its transformation into a Marxist party in the early 1960s, took a dim view of communism, preferring instead to emphasize the need for modernisation and nationalist unity. In addition, unlike Ba'ath, it was led by Palestinians for whom the struggle to regain Palestine was paramount " [12] .

The ANM did not last long and was divided into several groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Democratic Front for the

---

[10] Pamela Ann Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians 1876-1983*. London: Croom Helm, 1984, p: 181

[11] Pamela Ann Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians 1876-1983*, p: 182

[12] ibid, pp: 183- 184

Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). However, the latter Palestinian nationalist movements and organisations were based upon its principles and owed much to the ANM experience.

The Nasserist movement was developed by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose philosophy was composed of anti-imperialistic, pan-Arabist, Arab nationalist and Arab-socialist elements. Nasser' s main concern was the so-called Western superiority which led to the inferiority of Arabs, and other exploited and ignored nations of the world as well. He aimed to disprove this situation and widespread a consciosness of identity among these undermined nations. As early as 1953 Nasser reflected:

" Existence can not come out of nothing. We can not look stupidly at a map of the world not realizing our place therein and the role determined to us by that place. Neither can we ignore that there is an Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much a part of us as we are a part of it, that our history has been mixed with it and that its interests are linked with ours. These are actual facts and not mere words...Can we ignore that there is a continent of Africa in which fate has placed us and which is destined today to witness a terrible struggle in its future? This struggle will affect us whether we want or not...Can we ignore that there is a Muslim world with which we are tied by bonds which are not only forged by religious faith but also tightened by the facts of history ? " [13].

Nasser' s ideology and his challenge towards the Israeli, British and French in the 1956 War drew great attention from the Palestinians as well as all Third World

---

[13] Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, " Nasser and the Struggle for Independence ", in *Suez 1956; The Crisis and its Consequences*, ed. W. Roger Louis& Roger Owen. Oxford: Oxford Uni. Press, 1989, pp:31-32

countries. Nasser was a new hope in the process of constituting a Palestinian ethnic identity and of struggling against the Israelis. However, the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 War and Anwar Sadat' s succession of Nasser which implied a de-Nasserisation in Egyptian politics led to great disappointment among the Palestinians.

4.1.2 Zionism versus Palestinian Ethnic Identity

" Essentially, the duel over Palestine is between Arab nationalism and Jewish nationalism. Both movements arose at the end of the nineteenth century, both developed beyond Palestine' s borders. Both nationalisms were liberation movements; both sought new identities for their people through territorial independence " [14].

However, in addition to Arab nationalism, Zionism has a counter-effect on the development of a Palestinian ethnic identity and Palestinian nationalism. Facing their Zionist counterparts and left as the only Arab community without a state among the Arab world, Palestinians moved upwards from Arabness to Palestinianhood.

The first Jewish settlers in Palestine motivated by the Zionist propoganda were welcomed not as a different ethnic group, but as a new community in terms of socioeconomics. Many Palestinians realized that as Jews bought land from Arab landlords and settled in Palestine, they would have problems with unemployment and allocation of resources in the region. Palestinian peasants were expelled from the lands bought by Jews, finding themselves unemployed and the first optimistic hopes of the Palestinians towards the Jews in economic terms of flow of capital into the country were slowly fading away. " Arab opposition to Jewish immigrants appeared as early as 1886, when Arab residents attacked Petah Tivka, the first Jewish colony, in a dispute over

[14] Pamela Ferguson, *The Palestine Problem,* p: 26

grazing access " [15] . With more and more Jews arriving in the land, a huge mass of Palestinians found themselves in an economically impoverished and inferior status when compared to the Jews. Thus, the development of a Palestinian identity facing the Jews was carrying a socio-economic dimension in the beginning.

The Balfour Declaration of 1917 undoubtedly made the Palestinians aware of the fact that Jews were not immigrating to Palestine just to reside there, they were coming to establish a state of their own in Palestine. Jews were pursuing a world wide policy based upon their so-called historical rights to establish a state in the Holly Land and were claiming to constitute a nation which had maintained its ethnic, religious and cultural unity and purity since Biblical times. Palestinians, challenged by this well-studied background, felt themselves forced to present a similar background to the world in order to prove that they were the real owners of the land. Apart from constituting a part of the religious community which had been exercised under the m*illet* system [16] of the Ottomans, they should prove that they constituted a nation based upon ethnic ties.

This notion of relating Palestinian nationalism has been criticised by many scholars denying this counter-effect. Professor Rashid Khalidi' s analysis is one of the most suitable to reconcile these two contradictory statements: " Although the Zionist challenge definitely helped to shape the specific form Palestinian national identification

---

[15] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ", in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians,* ed. Elizabeth Warnock Fernea& Mary Evelyn Hocking. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992, p: 9

[16] The Ottoman Empire exercised a *Millet* System in civil law affairs whereby communities of the empire were cathegorised according to their religion as Muslim, Orthodox, Armenian and Jew, with each group having their own religious courts authorised to handle cases concerning civil law

took, it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism. " [17] . " This is because Palestinian nationalism developed alongside the nationalism of the Arab world, and in fact helped revitalize and refocus an Arab identity that had roots as far as the 18th century " [18] .

The Zionist challenge shaped the Palestinian national movement in that it paved the way for a Palestinian ethnic and national consciousness seperate from the notion of Arab unity. During the beginning of the 20th century, as Wasif Abboushi states that the Arabs of Palestine regarded themselves as Syrians [19]. The first Palestinian-Arab Congress convened in January 1919 had declared Palestine part of Syria [20] . Later on, after the 1948 War, Palestinians were a ssociated with Jordanians and " The Jordanian takeover of the West Bank was initiated in Jericho in 1948 where Palestinian leaders declared the unification of Palestine with Jordan and asked Abdullah to be the king of the united country....The Jordanian-Palestinian joint parliament formally annexed West Bank and granted its residents Jordanian citizenship " [21] . Thus, Palestinians were in search of a brethren to identify themselves with against the Israeli invasion.

The defeats of the Arab armies by the Israelis following one another and changing attitudes of neighboring Arab countries, like Jordan having problems with its Palestinian refugees, towards the Palestinian issue forced the Paletinians to realize that they were left alone against the Israelis. Their Arab brothers had failed to save them,

[17] quoted from Rashid Khalidi," Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness ", in *The Emergence of Palestinian Identity* by Dr. Hala Fattah, p: 1, available at http://www.jerusalemites.org

[18] Hala Fattah, " The Emergence of Palestinian Identity ", p: 1

[19] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ", p: 46

[20] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict " , p: 12

[21] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict " , p: 25

thus they would defend and protect their rights on their own, based upon their own identity of Palestinianhood. As Rashid Khalidi puts it " Palestinian identity was the last garb that the Arabs of Palestine tried on when all other possibilities were exhausted "[22] However, this situation was also something which they refrained from admitting to their Arab brothers., so they sought to explain Palestinian identity in different terms, as Zuheir Mohsein, member of the Supreme Council of the PLO puts it: " There are no differences between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. We are all part of one nation. It is only for political reasons that we carefully underline our Palestinian identity, because it is in the interest of Arabs to encourage a seperate Palestinian identity in contrast to Zionism. Yes, the existence of a seperate Palestinian identity is there only for tactical reasons. The establishment of a Palestinian state is a new expedient to continue the fight against Zionism and for Arab unity " [23] .

Mohsein, although giving reference to Arab unity, ironically criticises the Arab states of failing to defend the case of Palestine. More extreme criticisms have been made by many Palestinian authors such as: " The Arab regimes have tried to confuse the Palestinians, but recent events prove that they have not succeeded. Since they could not confuse the Palestinians, they took part in the struggle against them instead. No doubt the Arab governments have the right to sell anything, even their own dignity; but they may not sell what they do not own " [24] .

Whether Palestinians identified themselves with other Arabs or not, it was in

---

[22] quotation from Rashid Khalidi, " Palestinian Identity ", in *Establishing a Firm Divide*, by Boris Shusteff, available at: www.netreach.net

[23] Trouw Newspaper, March 31,1977, the Nederlands

[24] Samy Mansour, " Looking for a New Beginning ", in *Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict,* ed. Michael C. Hudson, Washington D.C. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984, pp: 75-76

favor of the Israelis in both ways: if Palestinians were to develop an identity of their own regardless of other Arabs, they would be alone and weak against them. Conversely, if they were to identify themselves with other Arabs, then it would prove that there was no seperate Palestinian identity in contrast to Jewish identity. Depending on that assumption, Israeli prime minister Golda Meir had said " There is no such thing as a Palestinian " [25] . The reaction towards the existence of a seperate Palestinian identity even came from Arab writers: " Palestine has never existed...as an autonomous entity. There is no language known as Palestinian. There is no distinct Palestinian culture. There has never been a land known as Palestine governed by Palestinians. Palestinians are Arabs, indistinguishable from Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis...etc " [26] .

It was now the turn for the Palestinians to exist on the stage with their own initiatives and their own ethnic identity

4.1.3 Diversities among the Palestinians

The development of a Palestinian ethnic identity together with the establishment of the PLO in 1964 caused great self-confidence among the Palestinians. They now had their own identity to claim and their own political body to act as a spokesman in the name of all. The first outcome of such a self-confidence was the the Battle of Al-Karameh in 1968 when thousands of Palestinian *fedaiyyin* (see Appendix B, Glossary) fought the Israeli troops and caused serious damage. " The battle of Al-Karameh had

---

[25] Don Peretz, " Israeli Approaches to a Solution ", in *Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict,* ed. Michael C. Hudson, Washington D.C. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984, p: 41

[26] Joseph Farah, " Myths of the Middle East ". *WorldNet Daily*, 11 October 2000

several meanings for both Palestinians and Arabs. In Arabic the noun *al-karameh* means dignity, and the battle was seen as the beginning of the restoration of Arab dignity after the humiliating defeat of the Six-Day War. Further, it was fought by Palestinians who had been distrusted and hounded previously by the defeated states who had promised to liberate Palestine for them " [27].

Following the Battle of Al-Karameh, Palestinian National Charter was declared by the Palestine National Council in July 1968. The Charter, stating the essentials for the solution of the question of Palestine, also gave the implications for a Palestinian identity. Article 4 of the Charter states as follows: " The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children.

The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership in the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them " [28] .

Article 5 of the Charter puts the final stage of the development of the concept *Palestinian ethnicity* as follows: " The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is also a Palestinian " [29] .

The Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the Charter imply the indivisibility of Arab unity and liberation of Palestine, stating that the survival of these two depend on each other (see Appendix E- Palestinian National Charter).

[27] Samih K. Farsoun, Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, p: 183

[28] Palestinian National Charter, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School Website, available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm

[29] Palestinian National Charter, article 5

The preconditions for the Palestinians to defend their case on their own were achieved, but the problem faced by them was that Palestinian population had been dispersed around the world, as Palestinians in Israel, Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian diaspora (highly concentrated in neighboring countries like Jordan and Lebanon). Few had emigrated to Arab countries in the Persian Gulf Region or the countries of North Africa, and a small minority had fled the region to live in Europe or the Americas [30] .

The Palestinians in neighboring countries as Jordan and Lebanon mostly lived in refugee camps, constituting a very huge population . Their very existence in Lebanon and Jordan has caused problems in these countries, whereby ruling elites viewed the masses of Palestinian refugees as a threat to the political balance of their countries as well as a threat to their rule. The Palestinians in Lebanon took part in the Lebanese War, fighting against the Christian Maronite militia and the Israeli troops. Today, clashes between the Palestinian and Maronite militia still continue.

The Palestinians in Jordan, constituting the biggest Palestinian population among all locations where they reside, have been viewed by the Jordanian ruling elite as a potential threat to their rule as well as to their relations with Israel and the US. When the number of Palestinians who were granted Jordanian citizenship after the 1948 war is added to that of the Palestinian refugees, they make a total population of 2.6 millions [31] of whom 1.708.507 are in refugee status [32] . Jordanian monarchy has always been

---

[30] Ewan M. Anderson, Khalil H. Rashidian, *Iraq and the Continuing Middle East Crisis*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, p: 19

[31] data obtained from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, available at: www.pcbs.org

[32] The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) available at: http://www.unrwa.org

restless about the development of a Palestinian identity inside Jordan, and pursued a propoganda of Arab unity aiming to supress the development of seperate Arab identities among the Jordanian society. The Department of Palestinian Affairs is the government organ which takes care of the thirteen refugee camps in Jordan.

Refugee camp experience is significant in societal affairs of the Palestinian diaspora in Arab countries. They maintain their Palestinian identity through collaborational mechanisms they develop. " Powerful features of the older Palestinian society persist even in the face of the refugee camp experience. The camps are organized along village and clan lines. Kinship groups that lived together in Palestine continue to live together, somewhat isolated from others in the camps " [33] .

The Palestinian refugees in Syria make up a population of 407.742 [34] and they have similar economic and social conditions as Syrians and enjoy a higher socio-economic status when compared to their brethren in Jordan and Lebanon, however they are not allowed to vote as they are not granted political citizenship.

The Palestinians in Gaza Strip and Westbank, or in other words, Palestinians in the occupied lands, make up the second largest Palestinian group counting to a population of 3.389.000 approximately [35] . More than one and a half million of this population is consisting of refugees mostly living in refugee camps [36], the remaining, being non-refugees who had been inhabiting these lands before the Arab-Israeli wars live in villages. The Palestinians of the occupied lands form the base population of a future Palestinian state, as they inhabit the lands under the control of the Palestinian authority.

[33] Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinian Society and Politics*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980, p:227

[34] data obtained from UNRWA

[35] CIA World Fact Book-Gaza Strip and West Bank, available at: www.cia.gov

[36] data obtained from UNRWA

However, continuous Israeli interventions in Gaza and West Bank affairs led this group of Palestinians remain as the most nationalist and anti-Israeli of all. There is a general trend among these Palestinians to see themselves as the real representatives of the Palestinian case, as their refugee brothers in neighboring countries stay far to and secure from the problems they suffer under the Israelis and their Palestinian brothers inside Israel are not of much and efficient use considering that they have become half-Israelis living inside the borders of the enemy state. The most extreme Palestinian groups organise and function in the occupied lands, and possibly they are the ones who have paid the biggest price of this conflict when compared to other Palestinian communities, feeling the shadow of the Israeli tanks and guns everyday.

The third biggest Palestinian community is the Palestinians of Israel, who have been granted Israeli citizenship, but suffer in many aspects of life from inequality. They constitute approximately %17 of Israel' s population. Viewed by Israel as *the enemy within,* they preserve their Palestinian identity, but relating to the fact that they have become a part of the Israeli state in terms of political, economic, social and cultural life, they have somehow been opted out of the Palestinian case when compared to their brethren in the occupied lands and in neighboring countries.

Israeli Palestinians generally suffer from a dilemma of identity, whereas they share a dual identity of Israeli-Arabhood. While constituting a part of the Palestinian nation, they are also a part of the Israeli society as citizens. According to Azmi Bishara, their way of defining themselves can be observed in several identity categories:" a) National identity: There are two versions of the national component: Arab, those who stress the Arab national component and give expression to the link to Pan-Arab nationalism in the Middle East. Palestinian, those who stress the Palestinian national component and give expression to the tie to Palestine that is the Land of Israel in the eyes of the Palestinians.

b) Identity as citizen: Those who stress the component of citizenship, define their identity as Israelis and thus emphasize their link to the State of Israel. C) Religious identity: Those who stress the religious component, their belonging to the Muslim or Christian religion " [37] .

In the course of this dilemma of identity, Palestinians in Israel developed various definitions of identity such as: Arab-Israeli, Arab-Palestinian, Palestinian, Palestinian-Israeli, Arab-Palestinian-Israeli. The priority of ranking these identities change throughout time. " When asked by Israeli sociologists in the summer of 1966 to state their core identities, those in a sample gave the following rank order: Israeli, Israeli-Arab, Arab, and Palestinian. " [38] .

The attitude of the Palestinian diaspora toeards the Israeli Arabs is also influental on the shaping of their identity. They are viewed by other Palestinians in suspicion, as of contributing to and becoming a part of the enemy state of Israel and of isolating themselves from the struggle of the Palestinians in a sense, and they are even condemned to be collaborators. " Between 1948 and the 1967 war, those who did not leave the Jewish state occupied a position as uncertain and ambigious within Israel as in the eyes of other Arabs " [39] . Israelis viewed their existence in suspicion considering them as a potential threat among the Israeli society, like the Trojan Horse of the Arab world, whereas their Arab brothers outside Israel viewed their existence inside the enemy state in favour of the Palestinian case at first sight. However, this view evolved

[37] *The Identity of the Arabs in a Jewish Democratic State.* Report from Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, available at: http://www.edume.org

[38] Baruch Kimmerling, Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians-The Making of a People.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, p: 170

[39] Baruch Kimmerling Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians-The Making of a People*, p: 159

through time as the integration of Israeli Arabs into the Israeli society developed. " While many began to think of themselves as Palestinians and to support the ideals of Palestinian nationalism, their experience as Israeli citizens psychologically and socially seperated them from that of dispersal and longing " [40] .

Through the process of their integration into Israeli society, Israeli Arabs pursued their interests in terms of Palestinian ethnic identity. A group of Arab intellectuals formed a group called *Al-Ard*, which means the Land, espousing the principle of social and political equality for the Arabs of Israel. The movement was banned.

The main areas where Israeli Arabs have stressed the notion of inequality were education, employment and political participation. Israeli authorities aimed to get rid of this general restlessness among the Israeli Arabs through pursuing educational and socio-economic policies to provide upward mobility and satisfaction for them in these terms. In addition, Arabs were allowed to establish political parties, so that they would be integrated into the political system of Israel through political participation and representation. In the sixteenth Knesset, there are eight Arab members [41] .

Palestinians in Israel are exempted from military service due to security issues. Except this situation, they seem to enjoy all rights stemming from Israeli citizendship. However, generally they are still at a lower rank in socio-economic terms when compared to Jewish citizens. " Although Israel' s Arabs are far wealthier and better educated than their brethren in the occupied territories, as well as in those countries such as Jordan and Egypt, it is to Israel' s Jewish citizens they compare themselves " [42].

---

[40] ibid, p: 159

[41] data obtained from Knesset official website, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il

[42] Andrew Album, " Israel' s Arabs: a Dilemma of Dual Identity ". *The Middle East*, July-August 1995, p: 3

The Palestinian *intifadah* led to an ambivalence among the Israeli Arabs whereby they began to feel that they were like sheep reserved for a sacrifice and their growing feeling of insecurity drew them closer to ther brethern. " Once the uprising against Israeli rule broke out in the occupied territories, the ambivalence of Israel' s Arabs became even more pronounced. To be sure, the Intifada unleashed strong feelings strenghtening a sense of Palestinian identity and support for political Islamic movements. A sense of sharing a common fate with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza became palpable " [43] .

A change of attitude towards the Israeli Arabs by their Palestinian brothers in the occupied lands took place after the 1990s whereas they were viewed as a bridge to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. " Recently, with the advent of the peace process, Israel' s Arabs have managed to gain wider recognition within the Arab world. As Dr. Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, a prominent leader of the Islamic movement in Jordan told one group of Israeli Arabs ' boycotting you was an historic error. You have preserved your culture and honour. You are Arabs in spite of being Israelis. In my view, you can serve as a bridge between the two peoples ' " [44] .

However, Palestinians in Israel were not eager to forget their exclusion from the Arab world because of living in Israel and their sentiments of Palestinianhood which was growing since the *Intifadah* turned towards a decline after the 1990s. As journalist Amira Hassan says: " I was never a bridge to peace. I was the bridge they walked over " [45] . Enjoying the benefits of Israeli citizenship and witnessing the diversities among the Arab world, they strongly see their future tied to Israel. The duel between

---

[43] Baruch Kimmerling, Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians-The Making of a People,* p: 181

[44] Andrew Album, " Israel' s Arabs: a Dilemma of Dual Identity ", p: 3

[45] ibid, p: 3

their national identity of Palestinianhood and their civil identity of Israelihood seems to be evolving in favour of the latter.

4.2 PALESTINIAN CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

The question of Palestine, apart from being just a territorial issue whereby both Jews and Palestinians struggle for their control over and survival in the region, involves a highly significant religious element due to historical importance and holiness of the land regarded by both groups and the development of religious identities by each side during the process of their conflictual confrontation.

In terms of the holiness of the land, both Muslim and Christian Palestinians regard it as a holy land whereby according to the Christian belief, Palestine is the place where Jesus lived and performed his ministry, and Jerusalem is the place where he died; and according to Muslim belief, Jerusalem is the third Holiest shrine, from where Muhammad, the Islamic prophet, is believed to have ascended to heaven.

The role of religion in the development of a Palestinian identity did not only become influental in terms of these historical and holy phenomena, but also in terms of a mutual conception by the Jews and Palestinians of each other in a religion-based sense, thus leading to a religious revival among these communities concerning the Palestinian conflict. This religious revival led to the rise of religious Zionism on the Jewish side, based on Biblical promises declaring the Jews as the righteous owners of the land of Palestine and condemning Palestinians who had betrayed God' s rule by following " false prophets " [46] and on the Palestinian side, it led to a rise of Islamic consciousness integrated into the Palestinian liberation movement.

---

[46] Judaist tradition does not regard the prophets after the Old Testament era as real ones, thus does not accept the religious legitimacy of Christianity and Islam. For detailed information see Orhan Hançerlioğlu, *Dünya İnançları Sözlüğü*. İstanbul: Remzi, 1993

The Palestinians are divided into two groups in terms of religious belief as Muslims and Christians. The majority of the Palestinians are Muslim, predominantly belonging to the Sunni sect, and Christian Palestinians make up a small minority whereas the % 0.7 of the Palestinian population in Gaza Strip, % 8 in Westbank and % 10 among the Palestinians in Israel are Christians [47] .

The religious identities of the Palestinians of either Islamic or Christian, influence their perception of each other, the Jews and the question of Palestine as well. The role of religious identity in this conflict which emerged in the homeland of all three monotheistic religions whose believers are parties to it, is significant to be examined in this sense.

4.2.1 Palestinian Islamic Identity

The fact that the majority of the Palestinian population is Muslim has been an important element of identifying Palestinians in terms of religious identity. During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, Palestinians were regarded as a Muslim community under the regulations of the Ottoman *Millet* system, which cathegorised the communities of the Empire according to religion. As a consequence of this dominance of Muslim element experienced among the Palestinian society for years, even during the British Mandate which had been established after the Ottoman withdrawal from Palestine, Palestinians were regarded as a Muslim community. The highest administrative authority among the Palestinians during the Mandate was the " Supreme Moslem

[47] CIA World Fact Book, available at: http://www.cia.gov

Council [48] , an organ representing all of the Palestinian population, but titled regardless of the Christian Palestinian population.

The first Palestinian responses to the Jewish migration to Palestine were mostly in religious nature. " During the earliest years of the Palestinian movement, the mandate period, its most prestigious and influental leader was Hajj Amin Husseini, who gave the movement somewhat of an Islamic coloration by emphasizing Qur'anic references and Islamic symbolism, suggesting that Palestine is a blessed land, and referring specifically to Islamic holy places such as the two mosques on Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount). Early uprisings, especially during the 1920s, were marked by religious tension " [49] .

The Qur'anic references that inspired the Palestinian movement in its early years were mainly about the evaluation of the Jews in terms of their religious obedience to God. " So because of their breach of their covenant, We cursed them, and made their hearts grow hard. They change the words from their (right) places and have abandoned a good part of the Message that was sent to them " [50] . This Qur'anic quotation accuses the Jews (and Christians as well) of changing the words of Allah sent through the prophets in their own favour. Following that, the Jewish notion of being God' s chosen people is criticised as " And (both) the Jews and the Christians say: "We are the children of Allâh and His loved ones." Say: "Why then does He punish you for your sins?" Nay, you are but human beings, of those He has created, He forgives whom He wills and He punishes whom He wills " [51] .

---

[48] Avraham Zilkha, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ". in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians* eds. Elizabeth Warnock Fernea& Mary Evelyn Hocking. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992. p: 14

[49] Timothy D. Sisk, *Islam and Democracy*. Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1992, p: 51

[50] Quran-al Qarim, Surat al Maidah, 14, available at: http://www.unn.ac.uk/societies/islamic/quran

[51] Quran-al Qarim, Surat al Maidah, 18

These Qur'anic statements ignited the developing enmity between the Palestinian and Jewish communities in terms of a Holy war of religions and the Islamic identity of Palestinians evolved due to their perception of the Jews as a distinct religious group who had invaded the land of the Palestinians, the rightful owners of it. This perception in the Islamic sense later on framed the ideological infrastructure of Palestinian Islamic groups. " Islamic political ideology sees all of Palestine as holy Muslim land that must be liberated, an Islamic society and state to be established there " [52] .

However, Islamist elements within the Palestinian movement lost power since the last years of the British mandate whereby Arab nationalism became the dominant character that framed the movement until the 1967 War. The Palestinian masses, seeing their victorious future in the hands of their Arab allies, clang to Arab nationalism considering it as the most likely way to salvation, and Islamist side of the Palestinian movement was to take a long rest until its resurrection.

" The 1967 War, however, was a turning point. While Islamists had previously played a subordinate role in the movement, those who became disillusioned after 1967 with western influences, secular Arab nationalism and socialism turned to Islam " [53] . The revival of Islamic consciosness in the minds of many Muslim Palestinians was a consequence of their search for new methods of mobilisation and eliminating the enemy. However, Islamic groups, although being at the backstage for more than two decades, had been active in their mobilisation. " Until 1967, organized Islamic groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were situated in socioreligious centers and mosques run by the *Waqf* establishment, as well as charity funds in Jerusalem and the West Bank. These groups drew most of their support from middle class traders who were beginning

---

[52] Samih K. Farsoun , Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Oxford: Westview, 1997, p: 197

[53] Timothy D. Sisk, *Islam and Democracy*, p: 52

to develop in urban areas of the West Bank " [54] .

One of the most prominent among these Islamic groups was the Muslim Brotherhood, a Palestinian branch of the original Egyptian one, which was active in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After Israel' s entry into West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the Brotherhood enjoyed more freedom than in the past [55], perhaps as a result of Israeli policies aiming to weaken the Palestinian national movement by an Islamic split from the movement. Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood heavily relied on drawing support through propoganda activities in mosques. Their methods of mobilisation were differing from that of secular nationalist groups in that " while secular groups established financial institutes and became heavily involved in professionals or workers unions, Islamic groups centered their activities in mosques which served as a communal factor no less than a religious one. Through the mosques, Islamic groups promoted awareness, religious education, preaching and ideological, political and social indoctrination, financial activity through charity funds, sports activities, and more " [56]. Muslim Brotherhood paved the way for the establishment of new Islamic groups, in case that the two radical Islamic organisations namely Hamas and Islamic Jihad were the offshoots of the Brotherhood, established by those who split from it in the mid-1980s.

The revival of Muslim religious identity through the Muslim Brotherhood led to a struggle between the nationalist and Islamic sides of the Palestinian liberation movement. Especially dating from the eighties, the degree of militancy within the

---

[54] Reuven Paz, " The Development of Palestinian Islamic Groups ", in *Revolutionaries and Reformers*, ed. Barry Rubin. New York: State University of New York Press, 2003, p: 23

[55] ibid, p: 24

[56] ibid, p: 28

successors of the Brotherhood increased to extreme terms. The Islamists displayed a hardliner attitude not only towards the Jews, but also secular Palestinians. " A new wave of tensions in the occupied territories, particularly in Gaza, broke out, with the new Islamists first targeting fellow Palestinians who did not adhere to strict Islamic behavior. Internal tensions between nationalists and Islamists flared, with clashes between factions commonplace on university campuses " [57].

However, it was only after the Intifada that Islamic groups gained a large popularity among the Palestinians and became powerful elements within the Palestinian movement. The Palestinian resistance movement carried the characteristics of a *Jihad*, Islamic holy war, and this image of the movement in a holy war sense led to serious changes in the minds of many Palestinians whereas they clang tightly to the idea of a Jihad, which would serve as the only means to achieve victory against the Zionists. The successful performance and Islamic propoganda of Islamic groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas during the Intifada also contributed to this change.

The Islamist essence within the Palestinian movement has served as a bridge for many Muslim Palestinians to reconsider and revise their religious identities. Although this Muslim identity has been extended to extreme and radical degrees by some of the Palestinians, its role as an alternative to the secular-nationalist approach of PLO and other Palestinian groups is significant regarding the question of Palestine.

---

[57] Timothy D. Sisk, *Islam and Democracy*, p: 53

4.2.2 Palestinian Christian Identity

Christian Palestinians, although constituting a minority within the overall Palestinian community, have played an active and important role within the Palestinian liberation movement. It was not only Palestinian Christians, but also Christian Arabs from other districts of the Middle East who contributed to the development of anti-imperialist and pan-Arabist ideologies among the Arab world, whereby a consciousness of Arabness regardless of religion spread among the Arab world. Even before the outbreak of the Palestinian issue, it was a group of Christian Arabs who had first founded an Arab nationalist organisation in Beirut in 1875 [58] . During the earliest decades of the Palestinian question, Chrisitan Palestinians, considering their relatively small population to their Muslim brothers, were significantly on the front stage whereby " Christians have provided a disproportionately higher percentage of the leadership core and intellectual raison d'etre " [59] .

Apart from the secular nationalist approach of Christian Palestinians in defining themselves as Arabs regardless of the Muslim Arab majority surrounding them, certain phenomena stemming from historical religious cleavages also influenced their attitude towards the Zionist invasion of Palestinian land. It was not simply a people settling in their land in huge numbers, leaving many Palestinians whether Muslim or Christian homeless or unemployed, but a people who had not obeyed the order of Jesus, not recognized Him as the true prophet of God and the Messiah, and even killed him, thus a

---

[58] Pamela Ferguson, *The Palestine Problem*. London: Martin Brian & O' Keeffe, 1973, p: 27

[59] Timothy D. Sisk, *Islam and Democracy*. Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1992, p: 51

cursed people whom God would sure punish [60] .

Christian Palestinians, considering their relatively small population, had perhaps been more troubled with the Zionist invasion and the establishment of the Israeli State in that their population has decreased to a very small percentage in the region and they were expelled from the former Christian towns they had been residing in. " Israel' s birth in 1948 forced waves of Palestinian refugees-some Christian but mostly Muslim- to seek haven in the West Bank, turning towns like Bethlehem and Ramallah into cities with Muslim majorities. After Israel' s occupation of the West Bank in 1967, came hardships that spurred Palestinian Christians, a prosperous and well-educated group, to emigrate at twice the rate of Muslims " [61] .

" Historian Sami Hadawi estimated that over 50 percent of Jerusalem' s Christians were expelled from their west Jerusalem homes, the largest numerical decline of Christians in Palestine in history " [62] . The most important factor leading to this high degree of Christian emigration is the Israeli confiscation of lands owned by Christian Palestinians. " approximately 34 percent of the lands seized by Israel were owned by Palestinian Christian churches, and they were simply taken by force with no compensation given to the previous owners " [63] .

Christian Palestinians, especially after Israel' s entry into the territories of West Bank and Gaza, emigrated to foreign countries in larger ratios of their population compared to the Muslim Palestinians. " When Muslims lose hope, they resort to

---

[60] According to Christian belief derived from the New Testament, it was the members of the Pharisee sect of Judaism who had denounced Jesus to the Roman officials who had crucified Him, thus killing Jesus indirectly.

[61] *Palestine' s Shrinking Christians*. Economist, December 18 1999, vol. 353, p: 1

[62] Don Wagner, " Palestinian Christians: Historic Community at Risk? " *Al-aqsa*, Spring 2002, vol.4, p: 1

[63] Don Wagner, " Palestinian Christians: Historic Community at Risk? " , p: 1

fundamentalism, thus emigrating psychologically. When Christians lose hope, they emigrate geographically, says Mitri Rahab, Bethlehem' s Lutheran pastor " [64] . A majority of the Christian Palestinians emigrated to foreign countries, especially in European and American continents, thus establishing a powerful and influental part of the Palestinian diaspora in terms of their intelligensia and relations with other Christian communities in these countries.

The Christians in Israel, when compared to their Christian brothers living in the occupied territories, constitute a relatively larger population and perform more influental in the Palestinian issue. Concerning their relations with other Christian communities in Israel like the Armenians, and their relations with Vatican and other power centers of Christianity worldwide, they perform successful in drawing worldwide attention and support to the Palestinian issue. The local religious leaders of the Christian churches in Israel periodically issue joint declarations demanding full Israeli contribution to the peace process by recognizing the rights of the Palestinians and by withdrawing from the occupied lands [65] .

Christian Palestinians, while seeking survival among the Jewish majority surrounding them, also suffer from a future nightmare of being a religious minority among their Muslim brothers in the Palestinian State to be established. " The Christian fear is that a future Palestinian state will be Islamist, particularly in its laws and education.....The national curriculum now being prepared for schools in the West Bank and Gaza equates the history of Palestine largely with the Islamic conquest of Palestine. The only Christian references concen the Crusades and Napoleon " [66] .

---

[64] *Palestine' s Shrinking Christians.* Economist, December 18 1999, vol. 353, p: 1

[65] World Council of Churches Website, available at: http://www.wcc-coe.org

[66] *Palestine' s Shrinking Christians.* Economist, December 18 1999, vol. 353, p: 1

The Christian Palestinian community in Israel and the occupied territories, although their number decreasing day by day, still preserve their significant position concerning the Palestinian movement. They also regard themselves as the defenders of the Christian Holy land against the Zionists and base their moral power on their historical existence in the land and their material power on their relations with other Christian groups through lobbying. Thus, the Christian identity among the Palestinians remains as a significant factor shaping the evolution of the question of Palestine.

4.3 PALESTINIAN CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

The struggle of the Palestinians against the Zionist invasion of their land has been carried on by means of armed struggle which has even been extended to a terrorist dimension by certain groups and political activity involving the establishment of political parties and groups, and lobbies within the Palestinian diaspora. The Palestinians living in West Bank, Gaza Strip and in the neighboring countries carried on their political activities through their participation in political parties and organisations, while the Palestinian Diaspora aimed to back the Palestinian liberation movement by means of political pressure, propoganda and lobbying activities in the countries they resided. On the other hand, the Palestinians living in Israel integrated into Israeli political system through political parties of their own initiation and by voting for Jewish parties through which they aimed to pursue their interests.

Some of these Palestinian political parties are officially recognised by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) whereby they have the right to be represented in the Palestinian Legislative Council, the decision-making organ of the Palestinian National Authority. These parties form their list of candidates to be elected from sixteen electoral districts in the Westbank and Gaza Strip- the territories which the jurisdiction of the PNA covers. Palestinian National Council consists of 89 seats, of which one seat is automatically reserved for the President, and the remaining 88 are distributed among the political parties according to the votes they gain. The first Palestinian legislative elections took place on 20 January 1996 and this council has been performing, with its members unchanged, as the legislative organ since then [67] .

---

[67] http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/plc.html

Some of these Palestinian political parties are noteworthy to the extent that they, by means of their ideological and traditional characteristics, have served as grounds for their activists to identify themselves through their membership and involvement, or in other words, to develop political identities for their members. Their differing methods of dealing with the question of Palestine and their ideological differences have been significant in the evolution of the Palestinian issue, and have been influental on the formation of a consciousness of political identity among the Palestinians.

4.3.1 Political Identity Groups in the Palestinian Autonomous Areas

During the evolution of the question of Palestine, many political parties and organisations pursuing Palestinian interets within the process have been established. However, many of these groups, mostly established by the initiations of the neighboring Arab governments, remained relatively small when compared to the few who provided great popular support among the Palestinians and performed in an active and influental way. " Apart from the small organizations that determined internal Palestinian political dynamics and policy remained Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP and the PPP " [68] . In terms of developing significant political identities, these political groups have played an the most important role.

Fatah (The Palestine National Liberation Movement) has been the most influental political group among the Palestinians, acquiring the greatest popular support and

[68] Samih K. Farsoun & Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Oxford: Westview, 1997, p: 196

constituting the dominant group within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Fatah was established in 1958 in Kuwait and the main principle on which Fatah based its establishment was the liberation of all Palestine deprived of a Jewish political entity. During the early years of its activity, it advocated armed struggle against the Israelis and displayed an attitude of suspicion and distrust towards the Arab governments, whom Fatah accused of preventing the victory in the 1948 war [69] . However, Arab governments favoured Fatah and supported it by financial, diplomatic and logistic means.

Fatah' s success in constituting a Palestinian political body as the most popular and significant one rely on several reasons. " Despite occasional internal splits, factors such as the extensive financial resources, its populist and traditional nationalist appeal, and perhaps its simple program and loose organization helped Fatah become and stay the most popular and important political organization in the diaspora communities and in the Westbank and Gaza Strip territories under occupation " [70] . Another important factor in this context is Fatah' s taking over of the PLO after the 1967 War, whereby " after Fatah' s leaders had decided to try to infiltrate the PLO to provide a political cover for the underground organisation and to make use of its diplomatic and military resources. Fatah was able to obtain almost half the seats on the Palestine National Council. In July, the Council amended the National Charter to include Fatah' s basic principle that armed struggle is the only way to obtain the liberation of Palestine " [71] .

Fatah' s basic principles of liberation for all of Palestine and armed struggle as the only way to achieve this goal evolved during the process in that since the beginning of

[69] http://middleeastreference.org.uk/indexbio.html

[70] Samih K. Farsoun & Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, p: 191

[71] Pamela Ann Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians 1876- 1983*. London: Croom Helm, 1984, p: 194

the eighties whereby Fatah adopted diplomacy as a method of conflict resolution and instead of liberation for all of Palestine, advocated the creation of a Palestinian state in the Westbank and Gaza Strip [72] .

Fatah serves as a political umbrella under which a large bulk of people from radical, conservative, liberal and secular camps are united. Fatah' s contribution to the development of a political identity for the Palestinians stem from its status as the most powerful political organization representing the Palestinians whereby this situation streghtens the self-confidence and group-consciousness among its participants. For many of its members, their membership and involvement within the Fatah is a privilige that increases their Palestinianhood. Fatah has 68 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council [73] , thus it is the biggest group within the legislative branch of the PNA.

A second political organisation to be mentioned in this context is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), founded in 1967. " Deriving from a strong pan-Arab nationalist background, the PFLP transfromed itself into a Marxist-Leninist party in the late 1960s: militant and revolutionary in its social and economic agendas " [74] . According to the ideology of PFLP, it was not only Palestine to be liberated, but also the Arab people living under the rule of conservative comprador Arab regimes who served as collaborators of the imperialist West. PFLP regarded Zionism as an extension of Western imperialism and thus, the struggle against it should be a revolutionary one with the prior aim of making the Palestinian masses consciouss of the imperialist characteristic of Zionist invasion.

---

[72] Samih K. Farsoun & Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, p: 191

[73] http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/plc.html

[74] Samih K. Farsoun & Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, p: 191

Thus, PFLP brought a definition of the question of Palestine in terms of class, deriving much from the Marxist school of politics. Indeed, according to them, " liberated Palestine was to be not only secular and democratic, but also a socialist country " [75] .

PFLP, as well as an active group struggling against Israel, also served as a strong opposition to the Fatah. The major differences between the two parties in terms of strategy, objectives, tactics and financial support paved the way for a Fatah-PFLP confrontation at the internal level of Palestinian politics. " In general, it was a difference over the nature of the Palestinian national liberation movement itself: was it a revolution or merely an independence movement? For the PFLP, it was the former; for Fatah it was the latter " [76] .

PFLP could not achieve a great popularity in comparison to Fatah and could not enjoy the benefits of financial and diplomatic support from the Arab governments as its political counterpart did. However, PFLP is unique in that it developed a political identity by deriving Marxist principles and adopting them to the Palestinian case. In the 1996 elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council, it acquired one seat [77] . Although not numerous in number, PFLP activists are respected by most Palestinians as honored freedom fighters and its founder George Habash has become a legendary figure in the Palestinian liberation movement.

A third significant figure in Palestinian political framework is the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which was established in 1969 due to the split of its founders from the PFLP. " It differed from the PFLP in that its ideology was

---

[75] Samih K. Farsoun & Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, p: 193

[76] ibid, p: 193

[77] http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/plc.html

more orthodox Marxist and much more attuned to Soviet policy during the cold war" [78]. DFLP, although very similar to the PFLP in terms of strategy, DFLP is unique in that " its singular contribution is a theoretical reconceptualization of the Palestine question and its formulation of a solution: Liberated Palestine, it says, can not be Arab, Muslim or Jewish but must be a nonsectarian, a secular democratic state where Muslims, Jews and Christians are equal citizens " [79] . This principle of the DFLP was later on adopted by the PLO as a basic principle of the liberation movement.

DFLP faced the same destiny with the PFLP whereby it too could not draw a large popularity and participation, but remained as a powerful figure of Palestinian politics despite its size and succeeded in developing a political identity for its activists.

A fourth political figure notewotrhy is the Palestine People' s Party, PPP, formerly the Palestine Communist Party, which was established by the Jews in 1919, but later on its leadership was taken over by the Arabs. " Its political platform was far more moderate than the hard-line PFLP, reflecting the traditional Soviet position on Palestine-Israel, and thus was closer to the transformed centrist Fatah, which sought a diplomatic resolution to the Palestine question " [80] . PPP supports the Oslo Accords and the peace talks with the Israelis, but " calls for the reconstruction of PLO and dialogue with anti-Oslo groups " [81] . The party, although having lost much of its former popularity and influence, has served as the communist ground for the Palestinians, thus constituting a distinct political identity.

---

[78] Samih K. Farsoun & Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, p: 194

[79] ibid, p: 194

[80] ibid, p: 195

[81] http://www.mideastweb.org/palestianparties

4.3.2 Political Identities among the Palestinians in Israel

The Palestinians in Israel, as of enjoying the benefits of Israeli citizenship, are integrated into Israeli political life through their participation to the elections and their activities through political parties. While a minority of the Israeli Palestinian population preserve their ties with Palestinian political organizations functioning abroad, such as the PFLP or DFLP, a majority of them support the Arab or Jewish parties in Israel. Arab citizens have served in the Knesset since its inception, whether elected from the lists of Arab parties or from the Arab Lists of center parties like the Labor Party. In the 16th Knesset formed after the 2003 elections, there are eight Arab members [82] .

The Arab political parties in Israel are significant in that they serve as the political representatives of an ethnic identity group within the Israeli society. One of these parties is *Hadash* (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) in 1977 with the merging of the former Communist Party of Israel and and the Black Panther movement of the Oriental Jews [83] . *Hadash* represents disadvantaged Israeli Arabs and Jews, and regards itself as a left-wing, non-Zionist and secular party. Since 1977, it has received the majority of Arab votes [84] . *Hadash*, although having Jewish activists in its ranks, is regarded as an Arab political party with the Arabic elements dominant in its framework. Concerning the question of Palestine, *Hadash* calls for complete Israeli withdrawal from the Westbank and Gaza Strip and supports the creation of an independent Palestinian state. *Hadash* received three seats in the Knesset after the 2003 elections.

---

[82] Knesset Official website, available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il

[83] Rebecca Weiner, " Hadash ", available at: http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Politics/Hadash.html

[84] http://www.ub.es/solidaritat/observatori/english/palestina/data/system.htm

Another Arab party is *Ra'am*, the Arab Democratic Party, founded in 1988. It regards itself as a left-wing party, supporting the Oslo accords and the creation of an independent Palestinian state as well [85] . It opposes the existence of Jewish settlements in the Westbank and Gaza Strip, and regards Eastern Jerusalem as the future capital of the Palestinian State. It also advocates a secular Israeli state that guarentees the cultural autonomy of its Arab citizens.

Thirdly, *Balad*, National Democratic Alliance, is another Arab political party in Israel headed by Azmi Bishara, a famous figure of Arab academic and political life in Israel. *Balad* advocates the continuation of the peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians regarding Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands and Israeli recognition of the right to return for the Palestinian refugeees. Apart from Israeli citizenship, *Balad* " regards Palestinian Arabs in Israel as part of the Palestinian Arab people " [86] . *Balad* won three seats in the Knesset after the 2003 elections [87] and serves as an influental bridge between the Israeli Palestinians and the Palestinians in the occupied lands.

---

[85] http://www.wujs.org.il/activist/israel/arab.shtml

[86] Balad Website, available at: http://www.azmibishara.info/nda.html

[87] Knesset Official Website, available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il

5. OTHER IDENTITY GROUPS REGARDING THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE

Apart from Jews and Palestinians, there are a number of other religious and ethnic groups living in Israel such as the Druze, Bedouin, Circassians, Bahai and Armenians. These groups, although constituting a small minority, are significant with regard to their contributions to the social, cultural, economic and political affairs of the Israeli State and among these, three are noteworthy in terms of their active roles in the question of Palestine. While the Bahai and Armenians remained as communities somehow isolated from the conflict, the Druze, Bedouin and Circassian communities of Israel have taken active part in the question of Palestine despite their small populations, they remain as influental actors concerning the issue.

4.1 THE DRUZE COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL

The Druze are a religious community living worldwide and concentrated mainly in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and in Europe and the Americas, together estimating a population of approximately one million. There are 104,000 Druze living in Israel under Israeli citizenship and an additional number of 18,000 living in the Golan Heights [1] .

Druze belief is a very special and original case, explained as " a chaotic mixture of Islam, Christianity and yet older elements " [2] . Druze religion has its roots in Ismailism,

---

[1] Naim Aridi, " The Druze ", available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il, p: 1

[2] *A Survey of Palestine* vol. 2. Washington: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, p: 925

a Shia [3] variation of Islam which emerged during the reign of the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt in the tenth century [4] . The name Druze has been derived from Ismail Darasi, the first missionary to the Druze [5] . " The Druze consider their faith to be a new interpretation of the three monotheistic religions " [6] . According to their belief system, all prophets of the three monotheistic religions were coming from the same source, as of symbolizng the essence of monotheism and God' s will, thus they do not accept religious loyalty to only one prophet like Moses, Jesus or Mohammad, but regard them all in equal degrees of importance. They also regard other historical characters as religiously influental and significant, such as Akhenaton the Egyptian [7], Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander the Great [8] . They believe that all rituals and religious ceremonies have caused Jews, Christians and Muslims to turn aside from pure faith, thus they perform no symbolic methods of worship, but tend to feel themselves with God all the time and prove their loyalty to God in all aspects of daily life.

The Druze community, although estimating a small population, had been

[3] Shia is the second biggest Islamic sect which evolved at the end of the seventh century.

[4] Naim Aridi, " The Druze ", available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il, p: 1

[5] *A Survey of Palestine* vol. 2. Washington: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, p: 925

[6] Naim Aridi, " The Druze ", p: 1

[7] Akhenaton, the Egyptian Pharaoh of the eighteenth Dynasty, developed a monotheistic belief system which regarded Aton as the only creator, but this Aton Cult did not attract Egyptian masses and ceased to exist after the death of Akhenaton. Some historians address Akhenaton as the inspirer of Moses to develop a monotheistic belief system which formed the bases of Judaism. For detailed information, see Orhan Hançerlioğlu, Dünya İnançları Sözlüğü. Istanbul: Remzi, 1993.

[8] Alexander the Great is regarded by some Middle Eastern communities as a religiously significant character whereby he has been regarded as a messenger of God' s will. Some Muslim communities in the Middle East name him *Zulkarnayn* , associating him with another religious character also named Alexander who is believed to have lived in the time of Abraham

considered by the Great Powers during the World War One as one of the loyal communities to be regarded in terms of mandate policies and the re-drawing of the Middle East map according to the interests of these powers. " In 1921, the French tried to set up a Druze state under the French mandate, but the attempt failed " [9] . Later on, during the Lebanese Civil War, they fought against the Christian Maronites with whom they shared a mutual historical enmity since the 19th century.

Apart from the French mandate plans and the Lebanese war, the Druze have played an important role in Middle Eastern politics with their contribution to the Israeli Defense Forces during the 1948 War. Although having refrained from taking part in the Arab-Jewish conflict during the British mandate, the Druze in Palestine joined the IDF and proved as a brave fighting ally of the Israelis. It is not surprising to see the Palestinian Druze fighting against the Arabs when we consider their historical confrontation with other Arabs and Muslims throughout history. The Druze have been viewed by other Islamic sects in suspicion and even been regarded as non-Muslims for centuries and this situation has led to their alienation and isolation from the Muslim majorities that surrounded them. Although ethnically coming from Arabic origin and speaking Arabic, they identify themselves as a distinct religious and ethnic group, thus constituting a minority group within the Arabic minority in Israel. Thus, instead of becoming a part of a minority group which have ignored themselves for centuries, they chose to be on the side of the majority group of the new state of Israel. " The Druze are a minority within a minority in the State of Israel, an Arab-speaking community loyal to the state that has suffered hundreds of casualties in its defense, and whose men serve today in high-ranking and sensitive positions within the Israeli military and security

---

[9] Naim Aridi, " The Druze ", p: 1

forces " [10] .

Druze loyalty to the Israeli state can also be explained in terms of Druze tradition of *taqiyya,* " a practice of seemingly assimilating into the major and governing culture, while hiding their unique identity " [11] . Thus, the Druze in Palestine have declared and proved loyalty to the State of Israel and since then have enjoyed the benefits of Israeli citizenship, as well as the benefits of constituting a loyal community.

The first seeds of the alliance between the Druze and the Jews were sown during the end of the 1920s by the initiatives of the officials of the Jewish Agency whereby they sought to establish close links with the marginal communities residing in Palestine. This diplomatic activity proved success with the Druze troops joined the Israeli Defense Forces in the 1948 War, despite a few exceptions whereby a very small minority within the Druze community declared their support for the Arab armies [12] .

The Druze troops fought bravely on the side of the IDF in Ramat Yohanan and Shafa'amr. Their third greatest contribution during the war was the Operation Hiram where the Druze within the IDF fought the Druze population of Junah and Jath villages. The events in Junah and Jath are very strange to observe in that Druze have fought with their brethern in the name of Israel' s victory.

The Druze in Israel were awarded in return for their contribution to the IDF during the 1948 war whereby even the Duze villages who had resisted the IDF and assisted the Arab armies were not evacuated while the Christian Palestinians residing in Druze

---

[10] Gabriel Ben-Dor, " The Druze Minority in Israel in the Mid 1990's ", available at: www.jcpa.org, p: 1

[11] Oren Yiftachel, D. Segal Michaly, " Jews and Druze in Israel: State Control and Ethnic Resistance ". *Ethnic & Racial Studies,* May 1998, vol. 21, p: 5

[12] Laila Parsons, " 1947-1949 Arap-Israil Savaşı' nda Filistinli Dürziler ", in *Ortadoğu' da Milliyetçilik, Azınlıklar ve Diasporalar,* ed. Kirsten E. Schulze, Martin Stokes, Colm Campbell. Istanbul: Sarmal, 1998, pp: 198- 199.

villages had been expelled [13] . The military supervision and restrictions on Druze villages have been lifted about four years before other Arab areas [14] . The Druze had their own religious courts to deal with social affairs such as marriages and were recognized as the fourth religious community of the Israeli state other than the Jews, Christians and Muslims. Indeed, their existence as a separate religious group has evolved toward official recognition paid to a distinct of ethnic identity such that " in 1962, Israeli authorities recognized Druze as a seperate nationality on internal identification cards- previously Druzes were differentiated only under *dat*, religion; their nationality was Arab " [15] . Thus, the Druze were awarded by the Jews as of being recognized as a nationality distinct from the Arabs who had ignored them for centuries under suspicion.

The Druze people today live in several villages in Israel (see Appendix C) where they preserve their concentrated population and their culture. Their voluntary contribution to the 1948 war was later turmed into compulsory military service in 1956 with a " *pact of blood* through which Druze leaders and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion institutionalized compulsory draft amongst the Druze " [16] . Both sides pursued serious interests by the establishment of this permanent alliance among the two communities whereby the Druze aimed to fully integrate into the State of Israel and enjoy the benefits stemming from close relations with the ruling elites. " Israel viewed the agreement with an indigenous Arab speaking community as a harbinger of future

---

[13] ibid, p: 205

[14] Library of Congress Website, available at: http://www.loc.gov

[15] Library of Congress Website, available at: http://www.loc.gov

[16] Hillel Frisch, " The Druze Minority in the Israeli Military: Traditionalizing an Ethnic Policing Rule ". *Armed Forces & Society*, Fall 1993, vol. 20, p: 1

cooperation, if not with the surrounding Muslim Arab region, then at least with other minorities in the area " [17] . Considering their continuing service within the IDF and the border police, the Druze community in Israel constitute a loyal ally of the Israelis and Israeli rulers can enjoy the advantages of having such allies with a reputation of good soldiery in any future conflict with the Palestinians or the Arab states.

4.2 THE BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL

The Bedouin are a Semitic people, hailing from Saudi Arabia from where they spread northwards in order to find new grazing grounds and natural resources. Although being Arabs, they are seperated from the Palestinian Arabs in Israel in social and cultural terms whereas they isolate themselves from other communities and maintain their nomadic characteristics and culture. They speak a dialect of Arabic named *Badawi*. This pastural community constitutes a population of 170.000 in Israel [18]. The Bedouin fall into two basic social classes as the shepherds, who preserve the true nomadic character of Bedouinhood, and the *fellahin* who are farmers with a more settled life. Almost all of Bedouin population is Sunni Muslim, whereas a very small minority of them (%0.01) are Christians [19] .

Israeli ruling elites have exhibited a positive approach towards the Bedouin since the establishment of the Israeli state. Their socio-cultural differences seperated them from the Palestinian Arabs in the eyes of the Israelis and since then they have been

[17] ibid, p: 1

[18] Yosef Ben-David, "The Bedouin in Israel", available at: www.mfa.gov.il, p: 1. However, the records of World Evangelization Center give the number of Bedouins in Israel as 64.000 as of 2000. The data from Ben-David' s article officially recognized by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been taken here.

[19] Bethany World Prayer Center Website, available at: www.bethany.com

treated as a seperate community regardless of their Arabness. In fact, the Bedouin exhibit a similar attitude towards the Israelis, whereby they took part in the 1948 war at the side of the Israelis and although military service is not compulsory for them, many Bedouin have been in a trend of performing voluntary military service. " Towards the end of the British mandate and during the struggle for the establishment of the State of Israel, many Bedouin joined the Jewish forces, believing that the Jewish state would be generous to them. This also explains the continued good relations after the establishment of the State, as manifested, first and foremost, in volunteering for the security forces and serving on the front lines; volunteering is considered by the Bedouin to be part of their blood-pact with the State of Israel. " [20] .

This attitude of the Bedouin in terms of not collaborating with their Palestinian Arab brothers and instead, supporting the Israelis in the Israeli-Arab conflict has been awarded by the Israeli governments. " One example of the good relations between the state and the Bedouin in the North is the tolerance displayed by the government regarding violations of building laws, non-expropriation of land and establishment of townships of Beit Zarzir and Ka'abiya " [21] . In addition, Israeli government has set up a Ministerial Committee for the Advancement of Bedouin Affairs to deal with the problems and demands of the Bedouin community.

The Bedouin population in Israel is concentrated in three main areas: Negev, central region and Northern Israel. There is a diversity of attitudes towards the Israeli state between these groups. " Whereas the Negev Bedouin are ambivalent in their attitude toward the state and their identification with it, the northern Bedouin identify

[20] Yosef Ben-David, " The Bedouin in Israel ", p: 5

[21] ibid, p: 6

with it almost fully. This is manifested, first and foremost, in the extent of volunteering for the security services. As a result, the Bedouin in the North are rewarded with a friendly attitude, both from the establishment and from Jewish society at large " [22].

Israeli ruling elites pursue a policy of Bedouin emigration to northern areas like Galilee [23] , whereby they aim to create a community of Bedouins loyal to the Israeli state in the region in contrast to the Palestinian population residing there. The current population of northern Bedouins are approximately 10.000 [24] and this number has been increasing due to Israel' s migration policies. Bedouin, although not being involved in the Palestinian question currently, remain as a potential Israeli ally with their past contributions to the Israeli defense forces and their current relations with the state.

4.3 THE CIRCASSIANS IN ISRAEL

The Circassians are a people of Caucasian origin who had arrived at Palestine in the late 19th century under the initiative of the Sultan Abdel Hamid of the Ottoman Empire. They constitute a population of 3000 approximately in Israel [25], with a number of 2000 in Kfar-Kama and 1000 in Rihania villages in Northern Israel (see Appendix

[22] ibid, p: 6

[23] Süleyman Özmen, *Ortadoğu' da Etnik Dini Çatışmalar ve Israil*, p: 155

[24] Bethany World Prayer Center Website, available at: www.bethany.com

[25] data obtained from Israel Yearbook and Almanac Website, available at: www.iyba.co.il. However this number varies according to different sources whereas Circassian Land website gives the number of Circassians in Israel as 4.500, and Süleyman Özmen gives an extreme number of approximately 100.000 without giving any referance

D- map 7). Although being Sunni Muslims, they share neither the Arab origin, nor the cultural background of the larger Islamic community. They preserve their own culture deriving from their Caucasian roots and they conduct themselves according to *Khabza*, which is the name given to the general Circassian customary law applied in all Circassian communities worldwide.The Circassians in Israel are divided into two tribal groups, namely as the *Shapsig* who live in Kfar-Kama and the *Abedzah* who live in Rihania [26] . They call themselves *Adyghe* in Circassian language. They have been granted full Israeli citizenship and been fully integrated into the socio-economic life of Israel. While enjoying the benefits of Israeli citizenship, they preserve their ethnic identity without assimilating either into Jewish or Muslim societies.

Circassians are similar to the Jews in that, they also constitute a worldwide diaspora which involves the core part of their population and their conformity with the host-states they live in is the same as the Jewish tradition, whereas both groups, while preserving their own identity and cultural values, fully integrate into the society and remain loyal to the unity of the host-state and identify their civil nationality with it. This situation for the Israeli Circassians can be observed in a quotation from Talia Carman, who visited the Circassian villages in Israel and had talks with Circassians: " During this talk I had one such 'shock' - I asked a question about "the Israelis". I was asked in return, "you mean the Jewish Israelis?' For perhaps the first time in my life the fact that not all Israelis are Jews was brought home to me. Obviously, I had known this, I had even written an essay about it,but I had never heard a non-Jew refer to himself as

---

[26] Circassians have been divided into twelve tribal groups based upon their location in the Caucasus, namely as Natukhai, Shapsig, Abedzah, Ubıh, Bjedugh, Temirgoi, Abhaz, Hatukhai, Mahoch, Beslenei, Brakiy, Karachai, and Kabhardey. (http://www.bianet.org/2002/09/30/13524.htm)

Israeli" [27].

The good relations established between the Circassian community and the Israeli elites date back to the 1948 war, whereas Circassian militia took part in the side of the Jews [28]. There may be two reasons lying under this attitude: first, the fact that they were sent to Palestine by the Ottoman Sultan in order to create a community loyal to his rule against the Arabs who had ceased to exist as a loyal community under the influence of the emerging nationalist sentiments among the Arab world, was met by a hostile reaction from the Arabs towards them; and secondly, like the Bedouin approach to the Jews, Circassians sought to establish a better status for themselves inside the newly formed Israeli state by supporting them against the Arabs. They continued to volunteer for the Israeli Defense Forces until 1956, when, at their request, army service was made compulsory for them. Today, they perform as IDF officials, policemen and other titles of security affairs.

Circassians still maintain close relations with the Israeli state and constitute a loyal community to be considered as a potential ally concerning Israeli-Palestinian relations and the question of Palestine.

---

[27] Talia Carman, " The Circassians of Rihania ", available at: http://www.partner.org.il/kavimut/news-0105-cir.html

[28] Israel Yearbook and Almanac Website, available at: http://www.iyba.co.il

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War era introduced the concept of identity as an important topic of international relations whereby policies of states both at the domestic and international levels have been influenced and shaped by the participation of various identity groups within the states in political affairs. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, ideologies ceased to dominate world politics and people from various districts of the world began to perceive the political environment through their identities, be they ethnic, religious or tribal, which challenged national identities and it has been evident that the role of identities on international politics has been increasingly significant.

The role of identities on the construction of nationhood is also an important topic of politics, whereby the duel between civic and ethnic models of nationhood seems to evolve giving priority to the latter considering the micronationalist and separatist movements worldwide which are based on primordialist perceptions of ethnicity and religion. Various communities within states claim differences from the national elites of these states and base their claims and organisations on their ethnic or religious ties.

These communities who seek their survival in terms of their identities do not always tend towards seperatist movements, but instead may pursue the dominance of their identity in the construction of nationhood within the state they reside in. Thus, various identities within that state may fall into a conflict among themselves, each identity group aiming to maximize its own influence on the conception of nationhood within that state. In this way, identity groups aim to pursue their own interests and become dominant over other identity groups in terms of political, economic and sociocultural control.

The question of Palestine is one of the issues of international politics significant in this context whereby different conceptions of Palestinian and Jewish identities have influenced the question at large. As a consequence of the struggle between these identity groups to become dominant on the construction of Jewish and Palestinian nationhoods, the question of Palestine, rather than a territorial issue, has tended towards a war of identities each trying to maximize its own influence on the question. Thus, the perception of the question by these groups differing from each other is a crucial subject to be studied.

Both Palestinian and Israeli nationhoods have been shaped by their own ethnic and religious identities. Israeli Jews, as an immigrant society, have developed Jewish ethnicity according to their territorial background, but at the same time, a consciousness of Israeli Jewishness in ethnic terms, regardless of the Jewish diaspora living worldwide, evolved in the course of time. In terms of religious identity, a common reconciliation about the influence of Judaism on Jewishness has not been reached and it has been the Jewish ethnicity which became the dominant component of Israeli nationhood. On the Palestinian side, the construction of Palestinian nationhood, while deriving much from primordial elements such as tribal, religious and ethnic ties, has been mostly shaped by the territorial dispersion of the Palestinian people, whereby they could not achieve a territorial unity covering the whole Palestinian population.

Israeli national identity, while displaying a civic essence, is based on Jewish ethnicity and religion as its dominant elements. Jewish ethnicity in Israel has been framed by two main ethnic identities based on territorial origin and historical background as the *Ashkenazim* and the *Sephardim.* Ashkenazim, due to their relatively more sophisticated situation and their past experiences among the democratic societies of the West have been the dominant elements of government and state affairs until the

eighties, while the Sephardim remained at an inferior status ignored by their Ashkenazic brothers. Apart from disparities at the domestic level, the Ashkenazi-Sephardi cleavage has been influental concerning the question of Palestine, whereby the Sephardi Jews, feeling a necessity to prove their Jewishness and their loyalty to the Israeli State, have generally developed hawkish and harsh tendencies towards the Palestinians. Facts like the shift of Sephardi votes to right-wing and Orthodox parties, the Sephardi dominance among the Jewish settlers in West Bank and Gaza, and the declarations of some Sephardi community leaders condemning the Palestinians constitute the bases of this general identification of the Sephardim in Israel. The Ashkenazim, on the other hand, generally display a relatively moderate and tolerant attitude towards the Palestinians and the peace process.

On the religious level, Jewish religious identities have been shaped by their religious observancy, whereas a majority of the Israeli Jews define themselves as secular at a low level of this observancy. However, since the last two decades, Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups have been influential on state policies concerning the question of Palestine as well. The main reason lying under this return to religion is the response of many Israeli Jews towards the underestimation of religion in Israeli sociopolitical life who seek survival not in terms of national or ethnic Jewish identities, but in terms of Jewish religious identities. These groups, while demanding a higher role of religion in social and political affairs and regulations, display a harsh attitude towards the Palestinians, condemning them as religious enemies who had challenged God' s chosen people. Only one exception among these Orthodox groups is the Hasidim, who reject the Israeli state due to its secular roots and display their enmity towards it even by collaborating with the Palestinians in the protest demonstrations.

At the political level, Jewish political identities have been shaped by their loyalty and participation to and in various political parties which serve as bridges to develop these political identities. In this sense, two main political identities have developed among the Israeli Jewish society, as the center political identities and the radical political identities. Center political identities involve loyal voters of parties either on the center right or left spectrum of politics like the Labor, Likud and Meretz. Among these, Labor as the biggest center left party in Israel pursues a tolerant policy towards the Palestinians and supports the continuation of the peace talks. Likud is the biggest center right party pursuing a relatively less tolerant policy towards the Palestinians, supporting the establishment of Jewish settlements in the occupied lands. The current agreements on the Roadmap to Peace has frustrated many Likud members who interpret this move as a back step in terms of of concession.

Radical political identities in Israel generally evolved out of three parties on the radical right spectrum of politics, namely the Shas, Yahadut Ha'Torah and the National Religious Party (Mafdal). Mafdal, although losing its popularity in the recent years, has been influental on Israeli policies towards the Palestinians and is significant in terms of merging ultra-nationalist and Orthodox values under its framework. Shas and Yahadut Ha' Torah are two parties of unique character, as they both represent overlapping identities: the former as the political body of the Sephardic Haredi Jews and the latter of the Ashkenazic Haredi Jews, thus both parties merging ethnic, religious and political identities within their organizations. Shas and Yahadut Ha'Torah are likely to become the most powerful voices of religious fundamentalism in Israel in the following years and their fundamentalist nature will probably contribute to the deepening of the question of Palestine.

Palestinian ethnic identity has been the main uniting factor when we consider the religious division of the Palestinian people. However, their territorial seperation has been influental on their ethnic self-perceptions, somehow similar to the Ashkenazi-Sephardi division on the Jewish side in territorial terms. The Palestinians living in the diaspora are mostly isolated from the issue as a consequence of their integration into the societies of their host-countries in social, cultural, economic and political terms. They are involved in the question only by means of lobbying and financial support. The Palestinians living in West Bank and the Gaza Strip have remained as the real victims of the question, and their suspicious attitude towards the Palestinians living in Israel, even sometimes condemned to be collaborators, is a serious issue whereby the contribution of Israeli Palestinians to a future Palestinian State might be questionable.

Palestinian religious identities have evolved during the question of Palestine, as on the Muslim side, a conflict between seculars and Islamists has been an important issue, and on the Christian side, Christian Palestinians as constituting a small minority of the entire Palestinian population, are suspicious about their future position in a Palestinian state and are troubled by the influence and dominace of Islamic identity on Palestinian affairs.

Palestinian political identities have been influental in their self-identification and their self-placement in the question of Palestine. The nationalist line of Fatah has been challenged by groups of radical left essence like the PFLP; the former perceiving the Palestinian movement merely as an independence movement, while the latter perceiving it as an anti-imperialist and revolutionary one. These socialist based groups, although losing their popularity in the recent years, have been significant in developing alternative political identities for the Palestinian people.

Apart from the Jewish and Palestinian sides, a third category of identity groups considering their involvement in the question of Palestine are noteworthy. These are the Druze, Bedouin and Circassian communities of Israel. The Druze constitute an unique religious identity and remain as a group loyal to the Israeli state and allies of the Jews since the establishment of the State of Israel. The Bedouin and Circassians, constituting distinct ethnic identities, have also been allies of the Israelis. The significance of these three groups concerning the question of Palestine comes from the fact that, despite their small number and their historical ties with the Palestinians in ethnic and religious terms, they have become active and successful allies of the Israeli Jews and have remained as potential powers to be used by the Israelis in any future conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world as well.

In terms of international relations theory concerning the concept of identity, the Israeli-Palestinian case displays a variety whereby three identity theories seem to reflect the situation in more clear terms. Firstly, considering the question of Palestine as a territorial issue, realistic group conflict theory developed by M. Sherif is significant in defining the question as a consequence of the competition between the parties for scarce resources; land as the main scarce resource as of marking the survival of both parties in the region and the main cause of the conflict between them. Secondly, the primordialist theory developed by Geertz signifies the development of ethnic and religious identities and the apparent influence of these identities on peoples' perceptions of the " other ". And, finally, constructivist theory, which takes identities as constructed bodies, helps us comprehend the development of various Jewish and Palestinian identities, whereby, in close relation to Geertz primordialist approach, it can be easily observed in this case that given ethnic and religious identities have been constructed or shaped according to

political affiliation, thus politicization of identities and their influence on the question of Palestine have become apparent.

Both Israeli and Palestinian nationhoods have been shaped by the ethnic, religious and political identities which have been dealt with so far in this study and the construction of these nationhoods is an ongoing process whereby the dominant identities shaping Israeli and Palestinian nationhoods change in the course of time. While questioning the dominant elements concerning their nationhoods, both Israelis and Palestinians have fallen into internal conflicts of defining themselves and external conflicts of responding to the each other. Thus, the general categorisation of the parties to the question of Palestine in academic literature as Jews on one side and Palestinians on the other has been misleading for those who study the issue. Different perceptions of identities among these two parties, and varying approaches to the problem by these identity groups should be seriously considered in terms of a comprehensive study of the question of Palestine.

APPENDIX A - CHRONOLOGY OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

1897: Theodor Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress in Basel, and declared the principles of the Jewish State to be founded in Palestine.

2 November 1917: The Balfour Declaration was issued.

29 September 1923: British Mandate was formally established in Palestine

29 November 1947: United Nations ratified the partition of Palestine.

14 May 1948: State of Israel was founded.

15 May 1948: Armies of Arab states attacked Israel, the 1948 war

16 November 1948: armistice between Israel and the Arab governments

11 May 1949: Israil was granted membership to the United Nations

24 April 1950: West Bank was annexed by Jordan and Egypt declared Gaza Strip under her control

2 November 1956: Israeli, French and British armies attacked Egypt

1 February 1958: Syria and Egypt established the United Arab Republic

7 October 1959: the establishment congress of Fatah was convened in Kuwait.

29 May 1964: Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded.

5 June 1967: The Six Day War began

21 March 1968: The battle of Al-Karamah between the Israeli army and Palestinian milita forces.

6 October 1973: The Yom Kippur War

26 November 1973: The Arab Union convened in Algeria and except Jordan, all participant countries recognized PLO as the " one and only legitimate representative of the Palestinian nation ".

26 October 1974: Jordan recognized PLO

8 April 1975: Civil war in Lebanon broke out

6 September 1976: PLO was granted full membership to the Arab Union.

17 May 1977: Likud Party won the elections in Israel and came to power.

14 March 1978: Israel invaded Southern Lebanon.

17 Sepember 1978: Camp David Agreement was signed between Egypt, Israel and the United States.

14 December 1981: Israel annexed the Golan Heights

25 April 1982: Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula was accomplished

6 June 1982: Israel began to invade Lebanon. PLO headquarters was moved to Tunusia

1 December 1987: Palestinians in the occupied lands initiated the Intifadah movement

12 December 1988: Palestinian National Council declared the Palestinian State

8 October 1990: The Mascid-al Aqsa massacres in Jerusalem

13 September 1993: Yasser Arafat and Yitzak Rabin signed the First Oslo Agreement and agreed upon the establishment of a Palestinian Autonomous Administration in Gaza and Jericho.

28 September 1995: Second Oslo Agreement was signed

20 January 1996: Yasser Arafat was elected president of the Palestinian Authority

28 September 2000: Ariel Sharon' s visit to the al-Aqsa Mosque was met with great anger among the Palestinians and the second Intifadah began.

21 January 2002: Israeli Army invaded Tulkarim and took Arafat' s office in Ramallah under siege.

30 September 2002: Israel ended the Ramallah Siege

29 April 2003: Palestinian Legislative Council elected Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the first prime minister of the Palestinian authority

30 April 2003: Roadmap to Peace has been released

APPENDIX B - GLOSSARY

(H for Hebrew, A for Arabic)

Agudat Israel: (H) a religious organization representing the Orthodox Jewry

Aliyah: (H) immigrants

Apiru: (ancient Egyptian) Egyptian term to denote the Jews during their existence in ancient Egypt

Ashkenazim: (H) Jews of Western territories, sin. Ashkenazi

Bene Israel: (H) Jews of India

Chiloni: (H) secular

Chiloni Hamekayem Masoret: (H) a term used to denote the Jews who are secular but do maintain some religious traditions.

Choveve Zion: (H) or Hovevei Zion , a religious Zionist group which was founded before the time of Theodor Herzl

Dati: (H) religiously observant Jews, pl. Datim

Dayan: (H) Jewish religious judge

Edot: (H) Community

Edot Hamizrach: (H) Communities of the East, aterm used to denote the oriental Jews

Eretz Israel: (H) Land of Israel,

Gush Emunim: (H) Bloc of the Faithful, fundamentalist and Orthodox Jewish organization

Haganah: (H) Jewish underground defense organization

Halakhah: (H) Jewish customary law derived from the Old Testament, which regulates all aspects of social lives of religiously observant Jews.

Haredi: (H) an ultra-Orthodox Jewish denomination, pl. Haredim

Hasidim: (H) An Orthodox denomination rejecting the legitimacy of the Israeli state.

Intifadah: (A) Palestinian uprising against the Israelis which broke out in 1987.

Irgun: (H) Jewish underground organization

Juhhal: (A) ignorant ones, denoting those Druze who lack intelligence

Kabbalah: (H) a mystical interpretation of Judaist tradition accessible to only religiously sophisticated Jews.

Karaite: (H) A Jewish community who broke away from mainstream Judaism in the 8th century. They follow the precepts of the Bible, but not the oral law or Talmud. They have a small population around 500 in contemporarty Israel.

Kashrut: (H) Judaist dietary laws

Knesset: (H) Israel' s unicameral parliament

Ladino: (H) A Castillian dialect spoken by Jews of Spain.

Lo Dati: (H) Jews who are not religiously observant, pl. Lo datim

Misnagdim: (H) areligious movement which emerged as a reaction to Hasidic tradition

Mitzvoth: (H) The 613 commandments derived from the Old Testament obedience to which is a must case in Judaist tradition

Masorti: (H) traditional Judaist, pl. Masortim

Neturei Karta: (H) Guardians of the City. An ultra-Orthodox denomination influental in Jerusalem.

Rabbi: (H) Judaist priest

Sephardim: (H) Jews of Spain. Today, this term is used to denote all Jews who are not Ashkenazim, sin. Sephardi

Stern: (German) Jewish paramilitary underground organization

Taqiyya: (A) Druze tradition of performing complete loyalty to the state they reside in and seemingly assimilating into the major and governing culture, while hiding their unique identity

Uqqal: (A) Knowers.

Waqf: (A) Muslim religious endowments

Yishuv: (H) the Jewish community of Palestine before the establishment of Israel

Yiddish: (H) A German dialect of Hebrew spoken by most Ashkenazim.

Zion: (H) an archaic term that originally referred to a section of Jerusalem, which, by Biblical definition, is the City of David.

APPENDIX C - MAPS

(Source for all maps: Texas University Website, available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/israel.html)

Map I: Map of Palestine According to Peel Commission Report, 1937



Map II: UN Partition Plan 1947

Map III: Israel after the 1949 Armistice

Map IV: Israel after the 1967 War



Map V: Israel Today



Map VI: West Bank



Map VII: Gaza Strip

APPENDIX D - CHARTS AND TABLES

Chart 1: Worldwide Varieties of Orthodox Judaism

(source: University of Calgary website, available at: www.ucalgary.ca)



Chart 2: Religious division of Israeli population

(source: www.mfa.gov.il)



APPENDIX E - OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Declaration of Israel's Independence 1948

(source: Avalon Project at Yale Law School Website, available at: www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm)

Issued at Tel Aviv on May 14, 1948

The land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and national identity was formed. Here they achieved independence and created a culture of national and universal significance. Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world.

Exiled from Palestine, the Jewish people remained faithful to it in all the countries of their dispersion, never ceasing to pray and hope for their return and the restoration of their national freedom.

Impelled by this historic association, Jews strove throughout the centuries to go back to the land of their fathers and regain their statehood. In recent decades they returned in masses. They reclaimed the wilderness, revived their language, built cities and villages and established a vigorous and ever-growing community with its own economic and cultural life. They sought peace yet were ever prepared to defend themselves. They brought the blessing of progress to all inhabitants of the country.

In the year 1897 the First Zionist Congress, inspired by Theodor Herzl's vision of the Jewish State, proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national revival in their own country.

This right was acknowledged by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, and re-affirmed by the Mandate of the League of Nations, which gave explicit international

recognition to the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their right to reconstitute their National Home.

The Nazi holocaust, which engulfed millions of Jews in Europe, proved anew the urgency of the re-establishment of the Jewish state, which would solve the problem of Jewish homelessness by opening the gates to all Jews and lifting the Jewish people to equality in in the family of nations.

The survivors of the European catastrophe, as well as Jews from other lands, proclaiming their right to a life of dignity, freedom and labor, and undeterred by hazards, hardships and obstacles, have tried unceasingly to enter Palestine.

In the Second World War the Jewish people in Palestine made a full contribution in the struggle of the freedom-loving nations against the Nazi evil. The sacrifices of their soldiers and the efforts of their workers gained them title to rank with the peoples who founded the United Nations.

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution for the establishment of an independent Jewish State in Palestine, and called upon the inhabitants of the country to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put the plan into effect.

This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their independent State may not be revoked. It is, moreover, the self-evident right of the Jewish people to be a nation, as all other nations, in its own sovereign State.

ACCORDINGLY, WE, the members of the National Council, representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the Zionist movement of the world, met together in solemn assembly today, the day of the termination of the British mandate for Palestine, by virtue of the natural and historic right of the Jewish and of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations,

HEREBY PROCLAIM the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called **ISRAEL.**

WE HEREBY DECLARE that as from the termination of the Mandate at midnight, this night of the 14th and 15th May, 1948, and until the setting up of the duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution, to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly not later than the first day of October, 1948, the present National Council shall act as the provisional administration, shall constitute the Provisional Government of the State of Israel.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open to the immigration of Jews from all countries of their dispersion; will promote the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew Prophets; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of race, creed or sex; will guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, education and culture; will safeguard the sanctity and inviolability of the shrines and Holy Places of all religions; and will dedicate itself to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be ready to cooperate with the organs and representatives of the United Nations in the implementation of the Resolution of the Assembly of November 29, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the Economic Union over the whole of Palestine.

We appeal to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building of its State and to admit Israel into the family of nations.

In the midst of wanton aggression, we yet call upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to return to the ways of peace and play their part in the development of

the State, with full and equal citizenship and due representation in its bodies and institutions - provisional or permanent.

We offer peace and unity to all the neighboring states and their peoples, and invite them to cooperate with the independent Jewish nation for the common good of all.

Our call goes out the the Jewish people all over the world to rally to our side in the task of immigration and development and to stand by us in the great struggle for the fulfillment of the dream of generations - the redemption of Israel.

With trust in Almighty God, we set our hand to this Declaration, at this Session of the Provisional State Council, in the city of Tel Aviv, on this Sabbath eve, the fifth of Iyar, 5708, the fourteenth day of May, 1948.

The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council July 1-17, 1968

(source: Avalon Project at Yale Law School Website, available at: www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm)

Article 1:

Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

Article 2:

Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3:

The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.

Article 4:

The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the

Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership in the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.

Article 5:

The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is also a Palestinian.

Article 6:

The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

Article 7:

That there is a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual, and historical connection with Palestine are indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner. All means of information and education must be adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his country in the most profound manner, both spiritual and material, that is possible. He must be prepared for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation.

Article 8:

The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of national (watani) struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among the Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, regardless of whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora (mahajir) constitute - both their organizations and the individuals - one national front working for the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

Article 9:

Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it . They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.

Article 10:

Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national (watani) struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses, so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation, and victory.

Article 11:

The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national (wataniyya) unity, national (qawmiyya) mobilization, and liberation.

Article 12:

The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share toward the attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

Article 13:

Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work toward the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work toward the realization of the other.

Article 14:

The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depend upon the destiny of the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in the realization of this sacred (qawmi) goal.

Article 15:

The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (qawmi) duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation - peoples and governments - with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly, the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human, moral, and spiritual capabilities to participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of Palestine. It must, particularly in the phase of the armed Palestinian revolution, offer and furnish the Palestinian people with all possible help, and material and human support, and make available to them the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to carry out their leading role in the armed revolution, until they liberate their homeland.

Article 16:

The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of race, color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17:

The liberation of Palestine, from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride, and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian Arab people look forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.

Article 18:

The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-defense. Accordingly the Palestinian people,

desirous as they are of the friendship of all people, look to freedom-loving, and peace-loving states for support in order to restore their legitimate rights in Palestine, to re-establish peace and security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19:

The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; particularly the right to self-determination.

Article 20:

The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

Article 21:

The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.

Article 22:

Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat vis-a-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland.

Article 23:

The demand of security and peace, as well as the demand of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.

Article 24:

The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity, and in the right of all peoples to exercise them.

Article 25:

For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.

Article 26:

The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle - to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination in it - in all military, political, and financial fields and also for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.

Article 27:

The Palestine Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its potentialities; and will adopt a neutral policy among them in the light of the requirements of the war of liberation; and on this basis it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Article 28:

The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness and independence of their national (wataniyya) revolution and reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship, and subordination.

Article 29:

The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude toward all states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt vis-a-vis to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the aims of the Palestinian people.

Article 30:

Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31:

The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance, and an anthem. All this shall be decided upon in accordance with a special regulation.

Article 32:

Regulations, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It will lay down the manner in which the Organization, and its organs and institutions, shall be constituted; the respective competence of each; and the requirements of its obligation under the Charter.

Article 33:

This Charter shall not be amended save by [vote of] a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization [taken] at a special session convened for that purpose.

A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

(source: www.mfa.gov.il)

Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
April 30, 2003

The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet [the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia]. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.

A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly,

progress within and through the phases may come sooner than indicated in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.

A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit - calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.

Phase I: Ending Terror And Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions -- Present to May 2003

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those

measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.

At the outset of Phase I:

- Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
- Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

Security

- Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.
- Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
- GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure

or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.

- Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
- Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.-Egypt-Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.
- All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
- Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.
- Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
- All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.
- As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

Palestinian Institution-Building

- Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian

constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. Constitutional committee proposes draft document for submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.

- Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making body.
- GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform efforts.
- Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.
- Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.
- Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.
- As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.
- GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.
- GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.

Humanitarian Response

- Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel.
- AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.
- GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.

Civil Society

- Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.

Settlements

- GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.
- Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

Phase II: Transition -- June 2003-December 2003

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on

tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state.

Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.

- **International Conference:** Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.

- Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble to this document.
- Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).
- Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues.

- New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.
- Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft constitution.
- Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
- Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.
- Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.

Phase III: Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict -- 2004 - 2005

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.

- **Second International Conference:** Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
- Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.
- Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy, in preparation for final status agreement.
- Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.
- Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Almog, Shmuel, *Zionism& History: The Rise of a New Jewish Consciousness*. New York: St. Martin' s Press, 1987

Anderson, Ewan M, Khalil H. Rashidian, *Iraq and the Continuing Middle East Crisis*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1991

Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Filistin Meselesi ve Arap-İsrail Savaşları(1948-1988)*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1994

Azarya, Victor, *The Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem*. California: UCLA Press, 1984

Bar-On, Mordechai, *In Pursuit of Peace*. Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1996

Besalel, Yusuf, *Yahudi Tarihi*. İstanbul: Üniversal, 2000

Bilgin, Nuri, *Sosyal Bilimlerin Kavşağında Kimlik Sorunu*. Izmir: Ege, 1994

Chomsky, Naom ed. *Terör Ne? Terörist Kim?*. Ankara: Ütopya, 1999

Dağı, İhsan D., *Ortadoğu' da İslam ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: Boyut, 1998

Dicks, Brian, *The Israelis*. Great Britain: David& Charles Ltd. 1975

Dumper, Michael, *Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State*. Washington: IPS, 1994

Farsoun, Samih K., Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1997

Ferguson, Pamela, *The Palestine Problem.* London: Martin Brian O' Keeffe LTD, 1973

Friedlander, Saul, Mahmoud Hussein, *Arabs & Israelis.* New York: Holmes& Meier, 1975

Garaudy, Roger, *Founding Myths of the Israeli Policy.* USA: IPP, 1997

Gerner, Deborah J., *One Land Two Peoples.* Colorado: Westview Press, 1991

Goldberg, David J., *To the Promised Land: A History of Zionist Thought.* London: Penguin, 1996

Gorny, Yosef, *The State of Israel in Jewish Public Thought.* London: MacMillan, 1994

Gresh, Alain, Dominique Vidal, *Ortadoğu.* İstanbul: Alan, 1991

Hançerlioğlu, Orhan, *Dünya İnançları Sözlüğü.* İstanbul: Remzi, 1993

Heilman, Samuel, *A Walker in Jerusalem.* New York: Summit Books, 1986

Hodgkins, Allison B., *The Judaization of Jerusalem.* Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996

Howe, Irving, Carl Gershman, *Israel, the Arabs and the Middle East.* New York: Quadrangle, 1972

Hudson, Michael C. ed, *Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict.* Georgetown: CCAS, 1984

Karsh, Efraim ed., *Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel.* Essex: Frank Cass Publications, 1994

Kepel, G, *Tanrının İntikamı.* Istanbul: Iletişim, 1992

Khouri, Fred J., *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985

Kimmerling, Baruch, Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994

Lapid, Yosef, Friedrich Kratochwil eds. *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996

Lewis, Bernard, *Ortadoğu' nun Çoklu Kimliği*. İstanbul: Sabah Yayınları, 1998

Llobera, Josep R., *Recent Theories of Nationalism*. Barcelona: ICPS, 1999

Lustick, Ian S., *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel: For the Land and the Lord.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988

Maoz, Moshe, *Palestinian Arab Politics*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Acadmic Press, 1975

McDowall, David, *Palestine and Israel*. London: IB Tauris Ltd, 1989

Migdal, Joel S., *Palestinian Society and Politics*. New Jresey: Princeton University Press, 1980

Moya, P., M. Hames-Garcias eds., *Reclaiming Identity*. Berkeley: UCLA, 2000

Öke, Mim Kemal, *Siyonizmden Uygarlıklar Çatışmasına Filistin Sorunu*. İstanbul: Ufuk, 2002

Özdoğan, Günay Göksu, Gül Tokay eds., *Redifining the Nation, State and Citizen.* Istanbul: Eren, 2000

Özmen, Süleyman, *Ortadoğu' da Etnik, Dini Çatışmalar ve İsrail*. İstanbul: IQ Yay. 2001

Parkes, James, *Whose Land? A History of the Peoples of Palestine*. Oxford: Penguin, 1970

Parlar, Suat, *Ortadoğu: Vaat Edilmiş Topraklar*. İstanbul: Bibliotek, 1997

Patai, Raphael, *The Jewish Mind*. New York: Charles Scribner' s Sons, 1977

Pearce, Mark Patrick, *Talk With Zionists*. Japan: IMS, 1988

Penniman, Howard R. Ed., *Israel at the Polls*. Washington: AEI, 1979

Peretz, Don, Gideon Doron, *The Government and Politics of Israel*. Oxford: Westview, 1997

Peters, F. E., *Jerusalem*. New Jersey: Princeton Press, 1985

Prior, Michael, *Zionism and the State of Israel*. London: Routledge, 1999

Reidh, Bernard, Gershon R. Kieval eds., *Israel Faces the Future*. New York: Praeger, 1992

Reiser, Stewart, *The Politics of Leverage: The National Religious Party of Israel and its Influence on Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Harward Middleeast Papers, no.2, 1984

Rokach, Livia, *The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine*. Worcester: Saqi Books, 1987

Roumani, Maurice M., *From Immigrant to Citizen*. The Hague: FSPS, 1979

Rubin, Barry ed., *Revolutionaries and Reformers*. New York: State University of New York Press, 2003

Sachar, Howard M., *A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*. New York: Alfreda A. Knopf, 1988

Sachar, Howard M., *Diaspora: An Inquiry into the Contemporary Jewish World*. New York: Harper& Row, 1985

Said, Edward, *Filistin' in Sorunu*. İstanbul: Pınar, 1985

Said, Edward ed., *Blaming the Victims*. London: Verso, 1988

Samuel, Rinna, *Israel: Promised Land to Modern State*. New York: Golden, 1969

Sayigh, Rosemary, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries*. London: Zed, 1979

Schulze, Kirsten E., *Ortadoğu' da Milliyetçilik, Azınlıklar ve Diaspora*. İstanbul: Sarmal, 1998

Shakak, Israel& Norton Mezvinsky, *İsrail' de Yahudi Fundamentalizmi*. İstanbul: Anka, 2002

Shimoni, Gideon, *The Zionist Ideology*. Hanover: Brandeis Un. Press, 1995

Shlaim, Avi, *War and Peace in the Middle East*. London: Penguin, 1994

Sisk, Timothy D, *Islam and Democracy*. Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1992

Smith, Pamela Ann, *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Worcester: Billing& Sons Ltd, 1984

Taylor, Alan R., *The Zionist Mind*. Lebanon: IPS, 1974

Turner, Bryan S. ed., *Citizenship and Social Theory*. London: Sage, 1993

Wistrich, Robert S. ed, *The Left Against Zion*. London: Vallentine& Mitchell, 1979

Wright, Martin ed, *Israel and the Palestinians*. Essex: Longman, 1989

Yılmaz, Mehmet, Mafdal: Radikal Sağın İsrail Dış Politikasına Etkisi. İstanbul: Zaman, 2003

Zander, Walter, *Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom*. London: W&N, 1971

ARTICLES IN BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

Abdo, Nahla, " Gender and Politics under the Palestinian Authority ". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Winter 1999

Aidi, Hisham, " How Israel Treats its Ethiopian Jews ". *New African*, November 2002

Album, Andrew, " Israel' s Arabs: A Dilemma of Dual Identity ". *The Middle East*, July 1995

Aronoff, Myron J, " Significant Trends in Israeli Politics ", in *Israel Faces the Future*, eds. Bernard Reidh, Gershon R. Kieval. New York: Praeger, 1992

Bacova, Viera, " The Construction of National Identity: on Primordialism and Instrumentalism ". *Human Affairs*, August 1998

Berman, Eli, " Sect, Subsidy and Sacrifice: An Economist' s View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews ". *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August 2000

Brewer, Marilynn B., " The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology ". *Political Psychology*, vol. 22, 2001

Christiansen, Drew, " Christians, Christmas and the Intifada ". *America*, February 12 2001, vol. 84

Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal, " Nasser and the Struggle for Independence ", in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*, eds. Roger Louis, Roger Owen. Owford: Oxford University Press, 1989

Ellis, Donald G., Ifat Maoz, " Cross-Cultural Arguement Between Israeli-Jews and Palestinians ". *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, August 2002

Ellis, Marc H, " On the Jewish Civil War and the new Prophetic ". *Tikkun*, July-August 2001

Farah, Joseph, " Myths of the Middle East ". *WorldNet Daily*, 11 October 2000

Fatah, Hala, " The Emergence of Palestinian Identity ", available at: http://www.jerusalemites.org

Fearon, James D., David D. Laitin, " Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity ". *International Organization*, 2000, vol.54

Ferguson, Yale H., Richard W. Mansbach, " The Past as a Prelude to the Future? Identities and Loyalties in Global Politics ", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996

Firro, Kais M., " Reshaping Druze Particularism in Israel ". *Journal of Palestine Studies,* Spring2001, Vol. 30,

Frerichs, Jonathan, " Whose Land is it? ". *Christian Century*, 7/17/2002, Vol. 119

Frisch, Hillel, " The Druze Minority in the Israeli Military: Traditionalizing an Ethnic Policing Rule ". *Armed Forces & Society*, Fall93, Vol. 20,

Gorenberg, Gershom, " Hot Shas ". *The New Republic*, Jan. 25 1999

Horowitz, Irving Louis, " Who Owns Judaism ". *Society*, May/Jun99, Vol. 36

Hourani, Albert, " How Should We Write the History of the Middle East? " *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 23, 1991

Huddy, Leonie, " From Social to Political Identity: a Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory ". *Political Psychology*, vol. 22, 2001

Israeli, Raphael, " State and Religion in the Emerging Palestinian Identity ". *Journal of Church and State*, Spring 2002

Kamil, Omar, " Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and His Culture War in Israel ". *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, December 2000, vol. 4

Katz, Sheila, " Arab National Communism in the Jewish State ". *The Middle East Journal*, 1999

Kelman, Herbert C, " The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National Identities: The Role of the other in Existential Conflicts ". *Journal of Social Issues*, Fall 1999

Kemp, Adriana, Rebeca Raijman, " Contesting the Limits of Political Participation: Latinos and Black African Migrant Workers in Israel ", *Ethnic & Racial Studies*, Jan2000, Vol. 23,

Khalifa, Osama Fouad, " Arab Political Mobilization and Israeli Responses ". *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2001

Knight, Gregory R., " The Pharisees and the Sadducees: Rethinking Their Respective Outlooks on Jewish Law ". *Brigham Young University Law Review*, Vol. 1993,

Kraus, Vered, Yuval Yonay, " The Power and Limits of Ethnonationalism: Palestinians and Eastern Jews in Israel, 1974-1991 ". *British Journal of Sociology*, Sep2000, Vol. 51,

Lapid, Yosef, " Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory ", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996

Lapid, Yosef, Friedrich Kratochwil, " Revisiting the National: Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism ", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996

Liebman, Charles S, " Modern Orthodoxy in Israel ". *Judaism*, Fall98, Vol. 47

Liebman, Charles S, " Paradigms Sometimes Fit: The Haredi Response to the Yom Kippur War ", in *The Shaping of Israeli Identity: Myth, Memory and Trauma*, eds. Robert Wistrich, David Ohana. London: Frank Cass, 1995

Lustick, Ian, " The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society and Military ". *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 2002

Mansour, Samy, " Looking for a New Beginning ", *in Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ed. Michael C. Hudson. Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984

Mazawi, Andr, Compare Elias, " Palestinian Arabs in Israel: Educational Expansion, Social Mobility and Political Control ". *Journal of Comparative Education*, Dec94,

Mikhail, Bill S., " Arab Employment in Israel: The Quest for Equal Opportunity ". *Middle East Policy*, June 2002

Milton-Edwards , " Political Islam in Palestine in an Environment of Peace? ". *Third World Quarterly*, Jun96, Vol. 17,

Mohanty, P. Satya, " The Epistemic Status of Cultural Identity: on Beloved and the Postcolonial Condition ", in *Reclaiming Identity*, eds. P. Moya, M. Hames-Garcias, 2000

Moore, Dahlia, Baruch Kimmerling, " Individual Strategies for Adopting Collective Identities: the Israeli Case ". *International Sociology*, 1995, vol. 4

Moran, Michal, Yahanan Eshel, " Jewish-Arab Violence: Perspectives of a Dominant Majority and a Subordinate Minority ". *The Journal of Social Psychology*. October 2002

Muslih, Muhammad, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict " *in The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, eds. Elizabeth Warnock Fernea& Mary Evelyn Hocking. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992

Özdoğan, Günay Göksu, " Civic versus Ethnic Nation: Transcending the Dual Model? ", in *Redifining the Nation, State and Citizen,* eds. Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Gül Tokay. Istanbul: Eren, 2000

Parsons, Laila, " 1947-1949 Arap-İsrail Savaşı' nda Filistinli Dürziler ", in *Ortadoğu' da Milliyetçilik, Azınlıklar, Diasporalar*, eds. Kirsten E. Schulze, Martin Stokes, Colm Campbell. Istanbul: Sarmal, 1998

Patterson, Margot, " Will Fundamentalist Christians and Jews Ignite Apocalypse?" *National Catholic Reporter*, October 11 2002

Paz, Reuven, " The Development of Palestinian Islamic Groups ", in *Revolutionaries and Reformers*, ed. Barry Rubin. New York: State University of New York Press, 2003

Peled, Yoav, " Towards a Redefinition of Jewish Nationalism in Israel? The Enigma of Shas " . *Ethnic & Racial Studies*, Jul98, Vol. 21,

Peretz, Don, " Israeli Approaches to a Solution ", *in Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ed. Michael C. Hudson. Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984

Safran, William, " Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community ". *International Political Science Review*, vol. 18, 1997

Said, Edward, " A New Current in Palestine ". *The Nation*, February 4, 2002

Sandler, Shmuel, " Israeli Arabs and the Jewish State ". *Middle Eastern Studies*, October 1995, vol 31

Shain, Yossi, " Jewish Kinship at Crossroads: Lessons for Homelands and Diasporas ". *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 2002.

Shamai, Shmuel, Ziniada Ilatov. " Assimilation and ethnic Boundaries: Israeli Students' Attitudes Toward Soviet Immigrants ". *Adolescence*, Winter 2001

Shanks, Hershel, " What' s a Jew? Defining Jewishness is not Easy ". *Moment*, June 1999

Shohat, Ella, " Sephardim in Israel ", in *Dangerous Liaisons*, eds. Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, Ella Shohat. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997

Shotter, John, " Psychology and Citizenship: Identity and Belonging ", in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, ed. Bryan S. Turner. London: Sage, 1993

Shulman, Stephen, " Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dischotomies in the Study of Nationalism ". *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 35, June 2002

Stein, Kenneth W, " Israel: Reconciling Internal Disparities? ", in *The Middle East in 2015*, ed. Judith S. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2002

Susser, Asher, " The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel 1948-2000 ". *Middle Eastern Studies*, January 2002

Tabory, Ephraim, " Jewish Identity, Israeli Nationalism, and Soviet Jewish Migration " . *Journal of Church & State*, Spring91, Vol. 33

Taft, Renee, " Ethnic Divisions in Israel ", in *Israel Faces the Future*, eds. Bernard Reidh, Gershon R. Kieval. New York: Praeger, 1992

Talhomi, Ghoda Hashem, " Palestinians in Jerusalem: the Denationalization of a Community ". *Middle East Policy*, September 1997

Wagner, Don, " Palestinian Christians: Historic Community at Risk? " *Al-aqsa*, Spring 2002, vol. 4

Wagner, Donald , " Evangelicals and Israel: Theological Roots of a Political Alliance ", *Christian Century*, 11/04/98, Vol. 115

Wertheimer, Jack, " The Orthodox Moment ". *Commentary*, Feb99, Vol. 107,

Yiftachel, Oren, Michaly D. Segal, " Jews and Druze in Israel: State Control and Ethnic Resistance ". *Ethnic & Racial Studies*, May 98, Vol. 21,

Zilkha, Avraham, " History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict " in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, eds. Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, Mary Evelyn Hocking. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992

Zuckermann, Moshe, " Israil: Parçalanmış Bir Toplumun Sıvası Olarak Etnik Hınçlar mı? ". *Birikim*, December 2000, vol. 140

ARTICLES IN ELECTRONIC SOURCES

Aridi, Naim, " The Druze ", available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il

Ben-David, Yosef, " The Bedouin in Israel ", available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il

Ben-Dor, Gabriel, " The Druze Minority in Israel in the Mid 1990s ", available at: http://www.jcpa.org

Carman, Talia, " The Circassians of Rihania ", available at: http://www.partner.org.il

Elazar, Daniel J, " Religion in Israel: A Consensus for Jewish Tradition ", available at: http://www.jcpa.org

Kaplan, Jonathan, " Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Gap in Israel ", available at: http://www.jajz-ed.org.il

Plessis, Anton du, " Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics ", available at: http://www.kas.org.za

Shusteff, Boris, " Establishing a Firm Divide ", available at: http://www.netreach.net

Weiner, Rebecca, " Hadash ", available at: http://www.us-israel.org

ENCYCLOPEDIAS

Israel, A Country Study. Area Handbook Series. Washington: The American University Press, 1979

INTERNET SOURCES

1Upinfo Web Encyclopedia, http://www.1upinfo.com

Avalon Project of Yale Law School, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm

Awesome Seminars Website, http://www.awesomeseminars.com

Balad Website, http://www.azmibishara.info

Bethany World Prayer Center, http://www.bethany.com

Bianet Website, http://www.bianet.org

Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace Website, http://www.edume.org

Central Intelligence Agency, USA, Website, http://www.cia.gov

Gesher Official Website, http://www.gesher.co.il

International Federation of Secular Humanistic Jews Website, http://www.ifshj.org

Israel Yearbook and Almanac Website, http://www.iyba.co.il

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, http://www.mfa.gov.il

Jewish Agency for Israel Website, http://www.jafi.org.il

Jewish Agency for Israel Partnership 2000 Website, http://www.partner.org.il

Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.us-israel.org

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA) Website, www.jcpa.org/index.htm

Knesset Official Website, http://www.knesset.gov.il

Library of Congress Website, http://www.loc.gov

Middle East Reference Website, http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk

Middle East Web, http://www.mideastweb.org

Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies Website, http://www.dayan.org

Netreach Website, http://www.netreach.net

Neturei Karta in the USA Website, http://www.nkusa.org

Quran-al Qarim Online, http://www.unn.ac.uk/societies/islamic/quran

Palestine Monitor Website, http://www.palestinemonitor.org

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Website, http://www.passia.org

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) Website, http://www.unrwa.org

University of Barcelona Website, http://www.ub.es

University of Calgary Website, http://www.acs.ucalgary.ca

University of Virginia Electronic Library, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu

Wikipedia Internet Encyclopedia, http://www.wikipedia.org

World Union of Jewish Students Website, http://www.wujs.org.il

JOURNALS AND NEWSPAPERS

Al Ahram (Egypt)
Economist International
Ha'aretz (Israel)
Jerusalem Post (Israel)
Newsweek International
Stratejik Analiz (Turkey)
Trouw Newspaper (Nederlands)