

CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ORDER
DURING THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CONCERT OF EUROPE



KADİR ÜNAL

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BY

KADİR ÜNAL



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Prof. Dr. M. Fazıl GÜLER
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master.



Prof. Dr. Cengiz ERİŞEN
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts

Prof. Dr. Emin GÜRSES

Supervisor



Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Emin GÜRSES [Sakarya University]



Asst. Prof. Bilgen SÜTÇÜOĞLU [Yeditepe University]



Asst. Prof. Aylin Aydın ÇAKIR [Yeditepe University]



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07.03.2019

Kadir ÜNAL



ABSTRACT

Rather than participating in ongoing discussions about making discriminations in between the variations of polarity in international relations with regards to order and stability, I tried to draw attentions of scholars, who have been interested in sustainable political order in international system, on a point that stability of polarity in international relations considerably hinges upon the ability of international political arrangements. My research question is to seek an answer for whether structural stability in the international system is to be associated with the efficiency of the institutional strategic restraints on the returns to the arbitrary wield of power during the nineteenth century in the Continental Europe. Polarity (distribution of power) after war had been reinforced through a variety of the status quoist institutional restraining strategies developed in cooperation by sovereign states to limit the returns to arbitrary wield of power through the Concert of Europe of 1815.

The character of institutional order building has changed in accordance with the change in capacity and ability of states. Realists do not recognize the restraining strategy with the thought that states' main concern is to survive in a given distribution of power and, in an anarchic system, sovereign equals do not constrain themselves by any such higher authority as institution. However, sovereign states, in the Vienna system, attempted to develop consensual and benign institutional binding strategy for their long-term interests by reorganizing the given distribution of benefits after war.

Key words: System, order, institution, polarity, capacity, ability, strategy

ÖZET

Uluslararası ilişkilerdeki sistemsel varyasyonlar konusundaki tartışmalara katılmaktansa, tezimde, düzen ve sürdürülebilirlik konusunda konuya ilgisi olan akademik çevreleri, sistemsel düzenin kurumsal yapılanmaların kabiliyetiyle ilişkilendirilmesi gerektiği üzerine yoğunlaştırmaya çalıştım. Dolayısıyla, araştırma sorum; On dokuzuncu yüzyıl boyunca kıta Avrupası'nda oluşan sistemsel denge ve düzen, devlet odaklı olası keyfi güç kullanımının etkin kurumsal stratejiler dahilinde kontrol edilmesi ile ilişkilendirilebilir mi? Araştırma konuma paralel olarak da hipotezim; Savaş sonrası ortaya çıkan sistemsel güç dağılımını, bağımsız devletlerin uzlaşmayla bir araya gelmesi ve olası keyfi güç kullanımını engelleyici strateji oluşturdıkları kurumsallaşma desteklemiştir.

Kurumsal düzen devletlerin kapasitelerine ve kabiliyetine paralel olarak karakteristik özellik gösterir. Realistler bu tür etkin ve kısıtlayıcı stratejilerin anarşi-odaklı uluslararası sistemde devletler için bağlayıcı olamayacağını savunur. Halbuki, Viyana sistemiyle büyük güçler kısmen de olsa aralarında konsorsiyum oluşturarak, uzun vade menfaatleri, için kurumsal bağlayıcılığa razı olmuşlardır



dedicated to my father,

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1. INTRODUCTION

The main objective of my dissertation based upon the research question seeking rational answers for whether the structural stability in the international system during the nineteenth century is to be associated with the efficiency of the institutional strategic restraints of the Vienna system of 1815 on the returns to the arbitrary wield of power in the Continental Europe. For Mazower, the Concert of Europe of 1815 and the Vienna system were mentioned on many occasions as the first-ever great power consortium (Mazower, 2012: 243). Having completed my literature review about the Vienna system of 1815, I detected a missing brick in the discussions of the international relations theory that an institution has not been regarded as an alternative order so far by either Neo-realists or Neo-liberalists considering the order building during the Concert of Europe.¹

In accordance with this gap, I decided to test my hypothesis, which is that the polarity, or distribution of power after war, was reinforced through a variety of status quoist institutional restraining strategies developed in cooperation by a society of sovereign states to limit the returns to arbitrary wield of power during the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century. I used a society of sovereign states on purpose to draw a distinct line with that of the English School which claimed the international society consisting of sovereign equals with different domestic structures for stable order. Cronin also implies the oligarch nature of the Concert of Europe with secret protocols between four participants (Cronin, 1999: 60).² Democracy was not an ideology in international political relations of the nineteenth century, and it was not a determining factor to proceed institutional mechanisms within the Concert of Europe. Its principles under the pretext of free global trade and self-determination only became the means for the new preponderant power, that is the United States, to apply

collective security in global arena. Particularly, communist ideology became a strong adversary ideology soon after the Second World War in the West, and the precondition to become full member of the United Nations (UN) was to take initiative on the Western front at the expense of Communist Soviet Union. In effect, the most important discussion was actually held within the English School between solidarists and pluralists about if cultural differences matter to achieve an international society. It is too early to maintain that there is formal and legal binding institutions and rule of law within the context of European public Law crowned by the principles of democracy, but the Vienna Final Act and the following treaties, the First and the Second Paris Treaty, assured the participants that there would be periodic conferences in the peacetime and the articles in the treaties would last twenty years, no matter what character they do have in their domestic politics. Internalization of the values and norms in international arena and pacification of foreign policy of non-democratic countries have still been strong arguments among scholars of the international relations theory with regards to the period of the Concert of Europe. Furthermore, considering the functional, or non-functional, differentiations among the units, there is still an ongoing discussion and the puzzle upon whether there is a balancing or bandwagoning in a self-help system particularly since the Napoleonic Wars and the following period of time which is so called the Concert of Europe lasted till the outbreak of the First World War.

I accept that I am among those who are looking back to the past to seek for a true stable order in the infinite potential anarchic system. Furthermore, I share the common ground with Henry Kissinger that the Vienna system is historically the primitive and early stage for the contemporary constitutional order in international relations.³ Ikenberry's critical approach could seem to be similar to my contribution

into the related literature, but my discussion is somewhat distinctive. In the international political relations, during the post-Napoleonic era, the United Kingdom had the objective of setting up an institutional order to shape and constrain the unit-level action.⁴ In theory, Neo-neo synthesis can be considered as two distinct structuralists.⁵ The neo-liberalists, or liberal institutionalists like Ikenberry, assume institutions as the structural means to mitigate the conflict of interests among sovereign states in anarchic system while neo-realists admit that it is the anarchic system, but nothing else, that restrain and shape unit behavior (Ikenberry, 2001: 33). For Wendt, it is the anarchy which was made of by agents (Wendt, 1992: 393). Furthermore, with the underlying *ceteris paribus* of socialization and inter-subjective meanings, he claims that agents and structure are actually an effect of the other, and they are to be regarded as inseparable entities due to the fact that agents and structure are co-determined and mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1987: 337). I believe, within the context of constructivist paradigm, that through socialization, each entity shapes and constrains one another over time, but also do I admit that it will be misleading to disregard the restraining impact of the states-system, or structure of international system.⁶ However, according to Neo-realist generalization, due to the presence of anarchy in international relations, states function the same way against the threat, but this is an incomplete approach to figure out the international politics of the nineteenth century.⁷ According to Neo-realists, all sovereign units have the primary goal of survival and security in a self-help system (Waltz, 1988: 79). It is the system that urges any state, which potentially or actually attempts to initiate hegemonic war, to adjust itself to balance of power after war (Waltz, 1979: 143). War has always been regarded as an instrument in reward and punishment system (Powell, 1994: 342). Furthermore, even though neo-realists are not clear enough about the self-help system,

states are self-interest political entities (Mearsheimer, 1994: 11). Neo-realists, additionally, assume that preferences, in anarchic system, are exogenously given (Jervis, 1999: 54). The puzzling question in literature stems from the incomplete definition and misplacement of anarchic system in matter of systemic configuration of the system.⁸

Another distinctive puzzle, apart from whether there are functional differentiations among states against threat, is states' concern over relative power position of the other states (Oye, 1986: 19). For Neo-realists, this is the matter that urges states to develop short-term strategies to cope with the ineradicable uncertainty (Grieco, 1988: 497). For Neo-liberalists, by institutions, such uncertainty could be mitigated through consultation and moderation for the sake of the long-term interest and the general interest (Keohane, 1984: 24). However, what both misses is that, considering the preponderant power of the leading state in the nineteenth century, that is obviously Britain, when the states fail to make calculations about the measure of the balance between actual threat and potential threat, the systemic order became vulnerable to actual threat at any time.⁹ Actually, it was neither actual nor potential threat, but rather it was the miscalculations made by Britain whose misperception was stemming from historical obsessions about France and Russia. Britain failed to perceive that the potential danger of Germany after unification, and the cost of geopolitical decline of Austria as well, could turn out to be an actual and an external threat at any time (Millman, 1965: 181).¹⁰ French Revolution of 1789 and German unification of 1870 are the two important political developments in a sense that while the former eventually resulted in the end of Westphalian system in 1815 after very devastating hegemonic wars between Napoleon and the Coalition forces, the latter, particularly after the dismissal of Bismarck by Kaiser in 1890 and renouncement of

the Reinsurance treaty with Russia, and transformation of Bismarck's realpolitik into Weltpolitik by Kaiser as well, resulted in, four decades later, the collapse of the Concert of Europe system in 1914.¹¹ It will not be wrong that subsidizing the system with financial materials and compensating the cost of deteriorating Vienna system with credits and loans failed due to the constant increasing demand for raw resources in the continental Europe (Kennedy, 1987: 96). The capacity of the United Kingdom was no longer strong enough to meet such demands from the Continent for raw resources as such a failure was observed at the end of the so-called West African Congress of 1884-85 (Schroeder, 1972: 332).

Kissinger argues that in the first decade of the twentieth century, the puzzle was no longer about the historical dispute over Alsace-Lorraine between France and Germany (Kissinger, 1994: 87). What were managed to leave off the table at the Vienna Conference turned out to be the main reasons for the collapse of the Vienna system.¹² I accept that the relative impact of the industrial revolution on the continental Europe was an insoluble puzzle for all those in the Vienna system apart from leaving the eastern question off the table.¹³ It gradually became more and more an insurmountable puzzling problem to achieve balance between potential and actual threat since the distribution of benefit by the Vienna system shifted out of the continent in the last decade of the nineteenth century (Kennedy, 1980: 54). Potential threat against the overall balance of power could be contained by preserving the geopolitical value of Austria.¹⁴ Kissinger argues that the Crimean War, which led to the collapse of the legitimacy of the Vienna order, could be prevented (Kissinger, 2014: 96). At this point, however, another threat against the balance between potential threat and actual threat became impossible to resist, that is the impact of the industrial revolution which urged Germany and France to make the formulation of “strong

economy for strong military'' (Landes, 1969: 67; Kennedy, 1997: 241). The state system is potentially anarchic and the absolute gain assumption of liberal institutionalists was always subject to strong challenge considering particularly the second half of the nineteenth century (Adler, 1992: 114). Co-existence in this potential anarchic system is possible, but due to the impossibility to discard the role of power in international system, institutions could only to some degree reduce the use of power in the future (Arthur, 1989: 122). That is why, Waltz does not disregard the importance of institutions in international relations, but regards them only in economic matters, but not in power politics (Waltz, 1993: 71). The Neo-realism paradigm's emphasis on the potential threat is to legitimize defensive wars, such as preventive war and pre-emptive war, in the context of reward and punishment (Waltz, 1959: 23). Upon this assumption, considering the Crimean war that did not lead to any dramatic territorial change due to its being a defensive war, Neo-realists assume that the Vienna system is a continuity of the pre-1815 because of the presence of balance of power system.¹⁵ However, it is not a continuity for Neo-liberalists, and the objective of institutions through such mechanisms as periodic conferences at peacetimes was almost achieved to reduce the concern on the existing uncertainty stemming from relative power position of the strategic rival states in anarchic system (Lindley, 2004: 198).

My argument is that instability in the Vienna order was not stemming from the increasing worry about the delicate measure of potential threat at unit level, but rather it was the potential anarchic system that challenged the interests of the sovereign states in late nineteenth century due to the loss of harmony between power and legitimacy (Bairoch, 1982: 281). This does not mean that structure solely determines the unit behavior (Simmons and Haggard, 1987: 499). It does to the extent that the distribution of power is exogenously given among sovereign units after war within the

capacity of each sovereign agent. (Dressler, 1989: 453). No output of political conjuncture, like wars, permitted any state to be coercive hegemon (Cronin, 1999: 58). The distribution of power is exogenously given on status quoist foundation, but it requires reorganization, again in status quoist manner.¹⁶ Because no momentary material advantage lasts for good due to the existence of potential anarchic system (Kagan, 1998: 48). As long as the unit-level restraining strategy manages to achieve general interest, that is based on anti-revisionist principles, the capacity of relative power for each unit has relative chance to improve.¹⁷ Whenever this relative opportunity goes beyond the capacity of strategic rival states, the order becomes subject to challenge (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 39). Thus, restraining nature of the structure is to be regarded within the framework of status quo, and power capacity of units may improve via institutions to the extent where the status quoist structure is not disturbed (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 191). If improvement in power capacity begin to build up disturbing impact on unit-level institutional restraining strategy, it is the system which may begin self-correction for providing a new status quoist and defensive power distribution. As can be seen, I am neither pessimist as much as Neo-realists, or optimist as much as Neo-liberalists because of the existence of infinite potential anarchic system in international relations.¹⁸ The English School even tried to draw a mid-way between Hobbesian Realism and Kantian revolutionist liberalism, but they failed to achieve a consensus when the issue of the humanitarian intervention became a matter of discussion, and eventually divided in itself between solidarists and pluralists.¹⁹ What is obvious in the discussions among the international relation theorists that no executive theory is powerful enough to make elaborations on international politics (Cox and Sinclair, 1996: 85). The situation was made more complicated by Robert Cox when he argued that all the theories are formulated for

some purposes and also for someone (Ibid., 89). Smith goes further by his argument that all theories are to legitimize unit action of a hegemon in international realm (Smith, 1999: 47).

In chapter one, by choosing a group, read a society of states, or the participants of the Concert of Europe, as the unit of analysis in repeated-cross sectional methodology, I presented three types of order in order to prove that institutions must be regarded as an alternative order in the international relations of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, in Chapter two, in the context of single-case study, I made elaborations on the Concert of Europe for the purpose of providing the constraints and opportunities upon the Vienna system during the nineteenth century. In chapter three, by deductive methodology, I simply made theoretical analysis of the Vienna order via Possible Production Frontier Model in order to prove that internal balance may well disturb the external balance dramatically as soon as agents begin to move beyond their capacity. For testing my hypothesis by means of the PPF-Model, I used a state (read Germany) as the second unit of analysis for my single-case study within deductive methodology.

In this dissertation, the fundamental assumption is that the source of international stable order in the nineteenth century is exclusively neither the distribution of power nor institutions, but rather the ability of the participant sovereign states in their acknowledgement and accommodation in concert within their relative capacity, and within the institutional order.²⁰ The distribution of power after war is determining factor on states' behaviour (Walt, 1998: 11). The system itself has the feature of self-restraining, and within this distribution of power and capacity, leading states develop their restraining strategy enforcing this power distribution. All peace settlements, like the Vienna settlement, provided unique methodology to construct

defensive international policy in anarchic system for the purpose of preserving status quo in the system against any resurgence of revisionist aggressive state, or alliances (Mitzen, 2013: 36). Whenever defensive restraining strategy by the Great Powers, which provide conditions in compliance with the self-restraining feature of the system, fails to enforce the system due to the gradual decline in the capacity and ability of states in meeting the requirements of the restraining strategies, we observe a dramatic shift in the system, and a new distribution of power.²¹ Each newly emerged distribution of power stimulates preponderant states to develop a new methodology for the same purpose: defensive international political arrangements to preserve the status quo (Schroeder, 1986: 46). However, the new arrangements will be relatively more extensive in scope and reach. It is the period of ‘‘Back to the Future’’. It is the back due to returning to the war, or applying the use of force for a new capacity at unit level, and the future due to the seeking for the new capacity within institutional arrangements, but this time the new institutional order will be more extensive with regards to reach and scope in principles. Polarity (distribution of power by the system) after war was reinforced through the institutional restraining strategies developed in cooperation by sovereign states to limit the returns to power during the Concert of Europe in between 1815 and 1914.²²

Why, how and to what extent leading states formulated and employed institutional restraining strategies and what determined the constraints and opportunities on the variety of strategies for the establishment of institutionally binding order are the main puzzling questions on which I tried to make elaborations in my dissertation. My objective is to prove that history matters as we look back in historical developments, in which we observe that a leading state opted for restraining strategies that opened path for constitutional order.²³ Furthermore, during the order

building process, states recognize that setting up a new order would be costly and more demanding in relative to already existing order (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 41). In addition to increasing returns to institutions with the sunk-cost impact on choices for institutions, at unit-level, we observe consensual equilibrium necessary for institutional balance of power order in anarchic system in the Concert of Europe (Shepsle, 1986: 62).

For making elaborations on the constitutional order I drew a midway, or via media, between (neo) realism and (neo) liberalism. By harmonizing both, it is aimed to bring forward particularly what they did actually miss about order building. In my dissertation, I partly based my theoretical foundation on structural defensive realism by taking states as the only rational actor in anarchic system.²⁴ However, I defend that assumptions and uncertainties due to concern over relative power of the states could only be limited by restraining strategies of the leading states on the returns to any aggressive-oriented hegemonic power relations. Therefore, it is not solely the distribution of power, but the strategies compiled by states and particularly capacity and ability of leading states in enforcing status quo through unique mechanisms such as periodic conference, and intergovernmental multinational security cooperations, provide necessary conditions for stable order.²⁵ Status quo is exogenously given, that's preferences on outcome are to be regarded as given (Mearsheimer, 1990: 51). States' objective is to limit uncertainties over preferences on action, or substitutive agreement, through institutionally binding mechanisms (Duffield, 1992: 832). The preconditions for all those are first the extent of asymmetric power relations favoring preponderant states, and the character of states (Kupchan and Ikenberry, 1990: 289). Like neoliberals, I claim the order hinges initially on the ability of leading states to satisfy weaker states through restraining its power (Haas, 1992: 49). Nevertheless,

realists do not agree that preponderant states have any reason to share their power for a long term even though order, as suggested by offensive neo-realists, depends on a leading state.²⁶ Offensive realists particularly focus on maximizing power for survival, and hegemony fits well for stable order (Mearsheimer, 1993: 27). Under pessimism of realism, order is created by states and shifting in the polarity offers two kinds of order: Hegemony and Balance of Power.²⁷ In defensive neorealist approach, whether intentionally or unconsciously, unit level balance of power order is the output of a continuous process of balancing feature of anarchy, and adjusting any aggressive accumulation of threatening power through anti-hegemonic coalitions among states (Snidal, 1993: 732). A balancer state combines its power with the weaker ones against the aggressive one (Haas, 1953: 373). Hegemonic order, according to Realism, emerges as a preponderant power begins exploiting its material power capacity to dominate the others by coercion or consent.²⁸ The puzzle is that states' primary concern, since 1815, has been preserving the balance of power, which emerged after war by distribution of power, through institutional strategies to restrain the returns to hegemony by distribution of benefits in correspondance with already given-by-system capacity (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992: 75). However, without a hegemon, it is not possible to stimulate balance of power because the system has always been anarchic due to ineradicable concern over relative gain, particularly considering the very stage of institutional order building (Keohene, 1988: 381). States are all motivated by self-interest, and, especially for realists, sovereign equals are reluctant to share their sovereignty with any other political units like institutions²⁹. However, it is not absolutely the distribution of power after war by the system, but the distribution of benefit by the restraining strategy of initially leading states determines the sustainability of stable order.³⁰ Capacity and ability, thus, very crucial point to focus

on. And this capacity requires favoring asymmetric power, and it hinges on the character of states each of whom is party to the strategy (Zacher and Mathew, 1995: 139). Internal and external pressures are the two main restraints for both the implementation of the strategy and the establishment of defensive international order (Jervis, 1985: 71). In critical approach, Powell argues the functional differentiations as a matter at unit level by focusing on ‘‘the Guns and Butter Game’’ in order to make elaborations upon the point that states may develop different strategies to test their trade-off capability between the short-term interests and long-term ones with regards to consumption of military capacity, and strategic environment must be taken into account according to him as well (Powell, 1993: 119).

The inspiring question of my dissertation is that what states actually do soon after winning the war with their newly achieved and acquired power. In the context of historical developments, two options came before the winners; Attempting to maintain their position in the new distribution of power, or seeking original ways to proceed limitations on their power, and, making, in following, the others accept (Krasner, 1983: 81). By means of the postwar settlements, since 1815, leading states have used institutions for the purpose of setting up strategies to implement institutional restraints on their power so as to achieve acknowledgement of the secondary states for the sake of conserving its power for the long-term interest (S. Nye, 1992: 24). In literature the prevalent puzzling questions were centered on why preponderant powers, like the U.K. in 19th century, and even the U.S. in the 20th century, engaged in developing restraining strategy by which they, voluntarily to some degree, began limiting their power even though, in most of the period, they implemented foreign policy of isolationism.³¹ Additionally, for what rational account did the weaker states get engaged themselves in such institutionally binding mechanisms with a hegemonic

state? The success of strategic restraint hinges on the answers of these problematic questions in the context of capacity, capability and ability of the states which are party to the systemic institutional arrangements.

Another question is actually questioning the reason and the logic behind the durability of political order even without a balancer or a preponderant power; Why did intergovernmental multinational organizations manage to live on even after the bipolar system? Liberal institutionalist Robert Keohane actually emphasized on this point by claiming that even without a hegemon institutions could continue functioning.³²

However, the establishment of institutions among unequal states in anarchic system initially requires the existence of the preponderant power (Slantchev, 2005: 585). In oppose to realism, the answer to this question is very well answered by the liberal institutionalists. The concepts of democracy and advanced industry brought states together to share the common interest even though the coherence of anti-communist alliance collapsed.³³ Even though Robert Keohane stresses on the mutual adjustment rather than common interest, during the nineteenth century, participant states developed policies within interlocking incentives of the Concert of Europe by recognizing that withdrawal would be too costly (Abbott and Snidal, 1998: 28). At the outset, it is not wrong to voice that domestic character of states is very important point to pay attention while realists maintain that they are all similarly functioning for primary security concern in anarchic system, no matter what type of domestic structure do they have.³⁴ However, democratic peace theory of liberalists, that is based on the claim that “‘democratic states do not fight each other’” in general speaking, should not be disregarded to figure out the reasons for stable order (Brown, 1992: 61). Moreover, international political order after victory depends on the capacity and capability of both the leading states and weaker states in restraining their power and

engaging in binding themselves to the long-term interests rather than short-term interests (Moravcsik, 1997: 539).

Neorealist argument on hegemony, for instance, elaborates on a point that preponderance of the U.S. power will create a trigger effect on weaker and secondary states to organize a counterbalancing reactions and loosening of political ties (Lake, 1997: 24).³⁵ Some realists argue that it is the U.S. ability to wield its material capacity to reassure its allies, thus obstructing balancing and resistance against it (Layne, 1997: 113).³⁶ The same kind of material capacity was exploited by the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century, but not at the same parity. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the impact of industrial revolution, such material capacity fell short to meet the requirements of the European states (Ibid., 117). Other realists provide somewhat different approach for why the U.S. unipolarity was not challenged by a renewed balance of power in such a way that current U.S. power is much stronger than that of the other states, and counterbalance will not function (Layne, 1993: 19).³⁷ However, during the nineteenth century, there was still balance of power based on countervailing power relations, considering the absence of nuclear power that is so expensive and mass destructive. In parallel to the discussions that institutions could function without a hegemon, as Keohane maintained, even though the objective for the Cold War institutions evaporated, they have still been alive and more importantly expanded in scope and reach (Rosecrance, 1966: 63). Such developments could only be explained beyond neorealist assumptions.³⁸ Upon the basis of the anarchic nature of the international system, states are not only the sovereign entities, but also the rational and primary actors (Simmons and Haggard, 1987: 498).

In my dissertation, my hypothesis evolved out of the question that what explanation could be made for resorting to institutional strategies in building political order within a newly emerged asymmetric power relations (new distribution of power) after war. Deudney and Ikenberry claims that liberal theory is relevant but not complete in figuring out order building after war (Ikenberry and Deudney, 1999: 181). It is true that liberal institutionalism is less concerned with asymmetric power relations among states and the constraints on cooperations.³⁹ May be the reason for not producing an explanation about asymmetric power relations is because of liberals' claim that by means of institutions and cooperations, comparative advantage and complex interdependence will increase relative power of states in peace (Nye and Keohane, 1987: 712). Therefore, relative power concern is not as a significant concern as what neoliberalist thought and, by cooperation, absolute gain, or the joint gains, is possible for all participating states (Mastanduno, 1991: 91). Particularly neorealists argue that in economics to some degree institutions could function the way neoliberalist assumed, but only possible in economics (Glaser, 1994: 54). International relations are power game, and in this game, it is not possible to implement mutual cooperation and reach the joint gains considering self-interest driven sovereign states in anarchic system (Gaubatz, 1996: 114). What they all missed is that institutions are alternative to traditional balancing.⁴⁰ By my dissertation, I drew a midway between realists' order types in anarchy, which are hegemony and balance of power, and liberalists' institutionalism through formulizing constitutional order entailing autonomous, or self-enforcing, institutions. It is an order dating back to 1815 system, in accordance with the path dependence model by which it is emphasized that restraining strategies of the nineteenth century opened way for more sophisticated mechanisms binding even those who set it up (Elrod, 1976: 151). Thus, history

matters. Liberal theories regard institutions as getting international functions that provide cooperations, and change the ways where states identify their interests.⁴¹ As can be seen, liberal institutional approach actually applies constructivists' critical approach from the stand point of Alexander Wendt.⁴² Kissinger claims that the Concert began to decay when Austria submitted the ultimatum to Russia just before the Crimean War, thereby the most important component of common interest was lost; Legitimacy, read sharing common interest, and Power was no more in harmony, which was essential for the periodic conferences, as of the Crimean War of 1854.

What was aimed by the U.K. was to achieve peacetime cooperation among the then great powers by means of some norms and values. The U.K. supposed that with the passage of time, each sovereign would share more and more within the picture of general interest, and through such a close interaction, they will get used to living in consensus and harmony to deal with any divergent expectation-oriented dispute. The best fit theoretical explanation is systemic version of Wendt's constructivism, apart from unit-level and holistic constructivism; For Constructivism, it is not the material distribution, but the actors' identities and interests in the context of interaction define international politics, and structures do actually exist by such socialization between the agents and structure. And this socially constructed structures are defined as inter-subjective, because in the process of socialization, this socially constructed and constantly changing structures, due to ongoing practice of sharing knowledge, will shape states' identities and interests. Thus, for instance, anarchy is to be regarded as co-determined, and agents and structure do affect each other. Anarchy could have cooperative nature or conflictual feature in correspondance with the agents' identity and interests which will be shaped in return by the (inter-subjective) structures over time (Wendt, 1994: 289). States are not atomistic egoists, and states identities and

interests are shaped by socially constructed inter-subjective structures. Namely, institutions define and reproduce states' interests and actions of states through interactions over time.⁴³ We observe such socialization intensively from 1815 up to the mid-nineteenth century. Furthermore, sharing common interest in peacetime was achieved through periodic conferences for the first time in international relations. However, assuming the periodic conferences during the concert of Europe as the inter-subjective institutional structures was too early in terms of shaping the divergent interests of the participant states over time. States identity and interests were taken into account during the order building process of the Vienna system, but Austria became more and more conservative in response to consolidating liberal movements. Germany, after unification of 1870, and particularly after the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, was consolidating its power at the expense of overall balance of power. Bismarck's "Blood and Iron" ideology within the context of realpolitik did never disturb the balance in continental Europe, but Kaiser's Weltpolitik turned out to be expansionist. Russia was very careful about the Ottoman Empire by the uncertainty over who would get the lion share in case of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, it never forgave Bismarck's Germany due to the Berlin Conference and Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From another standpoint of view, to be frankly, there was a sharing common interest, but this sharing was not fully inclusive considering the second-rank status of the Ottoman Empire during the Paris Peace Conference and the London Conference while France was taken into the system without any strict punishment. Furthermore, even though states' interests are not shaped over time as of 1815 through such institutional mechanisms as periodic conferences under the roof of Quadruple Alliance, it will not be wrong to suppose that their traditional interests had already been socially constructed, which was constant

concern about cheating and relative gain and relative power position of the other states. That is why, anarchy is actually what states made and perceived. Gagliardo also maintains that states' interests and identities, particularly German interests due to the bloody historical experience of constant wars since the Thirty Years' War of 1618-1648, were constrained and shaped by their historical bellicose rhetoric (Gagliardo, 1976: 13). France and Russia were always historical obsession for Great Britain. I admit within constructivism that British interest was socially constructed dating back to previous periods. Constructivism actually provides an account for the opportunity and constraints about the Concert of Europe system. States' interests were divergent considering their different domestic character. Since their interests were socially constructed, through inclusiveness and unit of accommodation in decision making by mechanisms of the Concert, that is periodic conferences, it partly became possible to shape their incentives in matters of foreign policy within the context of pacification. Rather than short-term driven policies, they had the chance to increase their institutional bargaining power. That is why, the Vienna System to some extent managed to shape and restrain the foreign policy of participants over time through interaction and socialization by means of peacetime periodic conferences. However, their socially constructed interests were actually prisoned within the realist paradigm theoretically. Obsessions and assumptions about the relative power position of the others, and fear of cheating and constant observation were still the "matter of fact". Most importantly, the Concert of Europe was not in a form of complete inclusiveness. From a general framework, all the structural developments, including such political conjunctures as war and peace, are socially constructed effects, and they are what states made of, and in order to understand the structural change, we should look deeply socially constructed states' interests and identities. The last point is that, 1

admit that it is a great puzzle to decide whether agents and structure are separable. For Wendt, each is the effect of the other considering their socially constructed nature, so they are inseparable. The test of constructivism in practice in international politics is the ability of states to opt for either traditionally constructed identity & interest or acknowledging and accommodating new socially constructed and constantly changing intersubjective institutional structure. However, there was limited issues during the periodic conferences. All issues are to be related to hard-power oriented issues during the nineteenth century conferences. Whatever they do opt for is actually based on socially constructed interest and identities of states. The problem is the test of transformation, according to Ikenberry, or transcending, according to Schroeder. For Ruggie, institutions change or fix the power distribution in political order (Ruggie, 1993: 161). What's more, Ruggie focuses on complex causal interactions, unlike constructivists, between actors and institutions (Ibid., 1993: 171).

My assumption is that agency and structure problems occur whenever agency fails to sustain restraining strategy in distribution of benefit while enforcing self-restraining distribution of power given by the system. However, again, neo-neo discussions paid less attention on a point that institutions could be used as mechanisms to process restraining strategies to tie states all together as an alternative to traditional balance of power theory to decrease security dilemma, and overcome short term incentives and cope with divergent preferences on actions by focusing on preferences on outcome. Institutions do provide enforcement mechanism to enable states to get access to information through transparency in decision making and unit of accommodation in decision making process for realizing joint gains.⁴⁴ Institutions function as strategies to limit any opportunistic incentives.⁴⁵ Liberal theories claim that institutions can constrain state behaviour.⁴⁶ However, this is an incomplete approach

unless it is taken into account that leading states can use institutions to set limits on their power to mitigate the fears of the first two choices, domination and abandonment. What they missed is actually what's beyond realist assumptions. For realists, states cannot share their interest for long term with any above authority.

At political juncture of 1815, we observe that preponderant power acquired the opportunity of three major choices; Domination, abandonment, or transformation. The leading states may opt for domination after victory by exploiting their newly acquired material capacity by either coercion or consent to prevail their hegemonic ambitions.⁴⁷ Isolationist foreign policy is another strategic choice for the preponderant states by making themselves aloof from any kind of foreign policy related entanglements (Holsti, 1989: 37). The third choice is the main topic for the context of my dissertation in effect; providing favorable and durable postwar political order to obtain allegiance of the secondary or weaker states (Jervis, 1982: 192). In order to realize sustainable order, leading states was confronted with certain variety of restraints to deal with the fear of the weaker states, and also the defeated ones that the preponderant sovereign states will seek for the other two options-domination or abandonment.⁴⁸ It is not the raw power distributed in asymmetric way after war, but the capacity and ability of both the leading state and the secondary states, including the defeated sovereign, in giving response to strategic restraints on returns to the power. Namely, allegiance, acquiescence and reciprocity are the key words in the process of institutional strategic restraints to limit the return to the power.⁴⁹ For resorting to institutionally binding strategies to exercise limitations on any arbitrary use of power, leading states actually experience internal (domestic capacity and capability in developing strategy) and external pressures (capacity and capability of secondary states in mutually acknowledging the proposal of the preponderant states) in

application of such consensual mechanism, that is international restraining strategy in anarchic world system.

Before the 1815 postwar settlements, particularly as of the 1648-westphalia settlements, settlements were about territorial segmentation and distribution of state power and counterbalancing, not systematically, the power (Weingast, 1989: 829).⁵⁰ However, with the Concert of Europe of 1815, states began to focus on coping with uncertainties in distribution of power for the sake of long term interests by means of consensually binding institutional strategies.⁵¹ In general approach, we witness in historical context of international relations that since 1815, states have been attempting to lock themselves into some set of postwar relations, founding principles of restraining strategies mutually recognized in consent and limiting the fears of abandonment and hegemonic ambition involving domination. Again, achieving the maintenance of institutional strategy for limiting the emergence of any aggressive power within the countervailing power relations of the balance of power order in anarchic international system hinges on the capacity, capability and particularly the ability of states, after postwar peace settlements, which are parties of the settlements, rather than on the distribution of power after war.⁵² The capacity of the leading state in implementing institutional restraining strategy depends on the extent of the asymmetric power relations favoring the preponderant power and the character of the states each of which are party in the settlements. Particularly the more favoring the power disparity favoring the leading state, the more opportunity will it have in getting allegiance of the secondary states in reaching institutional trade-off between short term interests and long term interests (Deutsch and Singer, 1964: 402). Furthermore, in following pages, it will be in detail discussed that democratic states have more capacity in adjusting their foreign policy to binding factors of the international

institutions and sharing common interests for long term objectives (Elster and Slagstad, 1998: 87). Considering the political developments in international realm, we realize that history matters. Moreover, each political conjuncture since 1815 provided exclusive opportunities for states to opt for more sophisticated institutionalized settlements (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981: 514). It will not be wrong to make a claim that democratic nature of states in the 20th century has facilitated steady growth of intergovernmental institutions and become the main glue in between them to keep such institutions as NATO and UN living on up to now, even though there is no more any communist threat which had become the particular coherence for them to stand against the Soviet Union until its dissolution, and the collapse of bipolar system (Axelrod and Keohane, 1988: 247).

Unit of accommodation in decision making process through inclusiveness by establishing well-designed principles of permanent diplomacy firstly became the main concern for the parties of the Concert of Europe of 1815 by the implication of peace without victory (King, 2008: 167).⁵³ It is true that the peace without victory was firstly mentioned by the architect of the collective security, W.Wilson, during the Paris Peace conference of 1919 (Kim, 1990: 81). Just like defining the order of 1815 as the earliest manifestation of international institution in peace time, it will be a correct position to call the Vienna peace conference as the congress of the peace without victory since the states agreed on including defeated France into the system without imposing any punitive clauses (Lebow and Stein, 1990: 341). Castlereagh very well recognized that momentary advantages after war were vulnerable to get challenge sooner rather than later (Schroeder, 1984: 13). That is why, he wanted to transform such relative gain-driven short term interest to peace time alliances for achieving durable and stable political order in international relations even though it was not until

the settlements of 1919 that the constraints of the Vienna order went well beyond the continental Europe.⁵⁴ It is too early in 1815 to maintain that order building on the basis of balance of power saved itself from domination of coercive tools by a hegemonic state and constitutional institutions began to take autonomous life at that period.⁵⁵ In order to understand the discussions in literature, for instance, that the European Union paved the way for constitutional institution in which even those initiated policies for its contemporary form have been locked-in, we should look back up till Concert of Europe of 1815 since it is the earliest manifestation of the institutional order (Grieco, 1996: 277). By political conjunctures, I mean systemic changes as exactly termed by Robert Gilpin.⁵⁶ Systemic changes, or shifting in the distribution of power are the moments when hierarchically reorganized domestic order of the defeated states and international institutions are reorganized in favor of the preponderant powers. However, during the nineteenth century we do not see any radical intervention into the domestic structure of France, but just unconditional surrender of Napoleon (McNeill, 1982: 267). Even during the political developments in France in between the July Revolution of 1830 and the Liberal upheaval of 1848, which was described in a perfect historical framework by Collingham, we do not see any foreign intervention in domestic matters of France. Furthermore, Collingham mentions that the new constitutional monarch announced that the pre-French position in the Concert of Europe would be preserved (Collingham, 1988: 26).

Classical realists focus on equal sovereign status of the states, and the power is the end for each to survive due to concern on relative gain of the other states in the context of zero-sum game, and their power capacity is the only variable that makes each of them different in international realm, but all struggle for the same purpose no matter what characteristics they do have (Soutou, 2000: 37). The primary concern is

always security for each sovereign unit (Milner, 1991: 73). Structural realists, particularly defensive realist Waltz, insist on the point that unlike the classical realists, states are not inherently aggressive, but this system itself is the determining factor for state behaviour, and also he claims that power is not the end, but the means for each sovereign equals to maintain their positions in global politics (Randall and Priess, 1997: 28).⁵⁷ Particularly, it is the system itself which necessitates and makes it essential for sovereign states the balance of power (Schweller, 1997: 25). Because states are rational entities that it will be costly to break the balance of power (Lipson, 1984: 14). Since 1648, actually no state had power to be hegemon (Kraehe, 1992: 711). However, Cardinal Richelieu's *raison d'état* made the European system too decentralized and vulnerable and expose for any time to the emergence of a hegemon as exactly happened in the late 18th century soon after the French Revolution of 1789 (Webster, 1958: 81). The primary concern in 1815 was to undo Cardinal Richelieu's system by decreasing the number of states and consolidating the sovereign states' power status as can be seen in the domestic structure of the confederation of Germany.⁵⁸ The number of principalities were over three hundred, but as of 1815 the confederation was consisting of 39 principalities (Owen, 2010: 47). The system of 1815 was defensive alliance system (Haas, 2005: 149). Again, the overall balance of power of 1815 manifest itself in the domestic structure of the German confederation; too weak to be aggressor, but too strong to defend itself (Ibid., 179). It functioned like a buffer zone in a narrow scope between Prussia and Austria, each of which was rival over Germany, but in a large scope between France and Russia, or for continental balance of power (Katzenstein, 1997: 53).⁵⁹ For Waltz, maximizing power will result in coalitions against any state who has hegemonic ambitions (Waltz, 1964: 899). No matter if it is state-center or system centric, realism does not pay attention on domestic

factors since hierarchic domestic structure has nothing to do with anarchic international system in which there exists no central government and each state's emphasis upon sovereignty enforces the anarchic nature of the global politics (Randall, 1996: 63).⁶⁰ However, considering the Napolenonic era, Kaiser's Germany and Nazi Germany, the primary concern for the coalition forces were the unconditional surrender of the autocracy and reorganization of their domestic order for sustainable international order (Schroeder, 1992: 691). It will not be wrong to say that Waltz recognized war in Machiavellist way; war is an instrument, or the means like power, for punishing aggressive and readjusting it to the system by some kinds of reorganization of its domestic order and rewarding the preponderant powers to exploit its opportunity to maintain its position for long term interests (Schweller, 1996: 98). Pessimism of realism in general is due to impossibility of wiping out assumptions about the relative power, or the potential revisionist strategy of the other states, and realizing absence of war (Claude, 1989: 83). That is why, states' self-interests are restrained by the short term foreign policy and by preferences on action since preferences on outcome are given exogenously as indicated by Stephen Walt (Walt, 1997: 167). Walt also developed a theory within neorealist paradigm that it is not solely the balance of power, but within the context of the balance between external balance and internal balance, the balance of threat is a matter of fact in anarchic system (Walt, 1987: 40). Under such anarchic position, alliances are possible, but inevitably only ad hoc type alliances are possible (Buzan, 1996: 425; Snyder, 1987: 22). Therefore, mutual cooperation for absolute gain became beyond-recognition for realists (Stein, 1982: 298). Waltz to some extent soften non-interventionism of realism in the context of defensive structural realism in a distinctive way that differs from Mearsheimer's offensive realism.⁶¹ He not only criticizes, but also exploit the prisoner

dilemma model at the expense of liberal institutionalism, and also opposes the offensive realism (Lieber, 1999: 104). He claims that maximizing power could lead to security dilemma for the others, let aside emergence of anti-hegemon coalitions in the balance of power (Mearsheimer, 2001: 34). Defensive realists maintain that states are not inherently aggressive, and the system determines their action (Huth and Russett, 1990: 481). Furthermore, system urges states to maintain their position since bidding for hegemony will lead to balancing coalitions (Ibid., 499). However, for offensive realists there are no states in this anarchic system to be regarded as status quoist (Zakaria, 1998: 35). They are all opportunists (Ibid., 35). Moreover, they claim that stability requires for each sovereign to maximize their power, thereby hegemony would bring about stable order in this anarchic system (Olson and Groom, 1991: 61).

As can be seen, power is the means for both for different ends. For Napoleon case, and even Hitler case, defensive realists attribute aggressive attitudes to internal factors. System urges states to be defensive, and offensive policy will always result in security dilemma according to defensive neo-realists while offensive realists voice that the system itself constitute determinant factor for states' aggressive foreign policy (Snyder, 2002: 154). My argument based on what defensive realists are not clear. Specifically, the balance of power became a system as of the Westphalian Settlements by which states began to put more emphasize on the concept of sovereignty by driving clear line between religion and state affairs. After the Napoleonic War, and also even before and after the Vienna settlement, no power distribution after the wars produced any position for any state to be hegemon (Schroeder, 1990: 155). Because the system is infinite potential anarchic system which applies self-correction unless states achieve to manage the order in status quoist manner (Jervis, 1997: 11). There occurred minor changes between the distribution of power after the Napoleonic war, which

determined the capacity of all, and the distribution of benefits after the postwar settlements of the Vienna Conference of 1815 (Schroeder, 1976: 21). Such minor changes proved mutual flexibility between the system and the systemic order (Taylor, 1954: 64). Periodic conferences during the nineteenth century kept such flexibility constant for restraining and limiting the return to arbitrary exercise of power in the Continental Europe (Christensen and Snyder, 1990: 148). With the leadership of the preponderant power, that is Britain, states had the objective, within the Concert of Europe, to preclude and balance any would-be aggressive and hegemon state (Strange, 1987: 562). This primary objective was already reinforced by the system itself. No power could emerge as a hegemon after the war. However, the system required some kinds of reorganization at unit-level. To achieve this requirement, the United Kingdom wanted to shape and constrain the incentives, thereby states began to shape their preferences in international relations (Weiller, 1991: 244). I would like to name the preferences as rational limited aggression like defensive neo-realists. However, unit-level credible commitment depends on mutual restraining strategies for common good (Müller, 1993: 18). At the outset, it was not the power capacity but the ability of mechanisms to keep the Concert strong enough against any challenge. Snyder as a defensive realist points Mearsheimer's claim that for offensive neo-relists it is the structure itself that urges any state to bid for hegemony and pay high cost by giving the example of Prussia/Germany between 1862 and 1945 (Snyder, 1990: 171). My argument is that this example deserves to be analyzed at unit level. For instance, within the structure of balance of power just after the French defeat of 1870 against Prussia/German, Bismarck was strong enough to alter the Vienna system, or at least deeply disturb it (Bridge, 1991: 112). However, he took initiatives supporting the Vienna order by establishing very complex alliance system (Jofee, 1995: 98). Because

the cost of withdrawal from the Concert is beyond the capacity of either Bismarck's Germany or the rest with respect to financial cost and political burden (Ibid., 112). Moreover, for the balance of power, it is not the state-level cost and benefit calculations, but rather overall system comes prior for isolationist and pragmatist England. More specifically, the status of Low countries was so crucial for the balancer apart from the containment of France, domestic structure of German Confederation and blocking Russian ambitions (Holbraad, 1970: 53). Again, after the Napoleon War there emerged two leading powers. While England had no territorial interest in the Continental Europe, Russia, for the purpose of achieving key actor-role in Europe, always tried to get involved in European affairs without disturbing the overall balance of power (Hinsley, 1963; 29). What deterred Russia from taking aggressive action was not only the possible fear of the balancing power of the system against Russia in case of offensive diplomacy, but also the achievement of Castlereagh and Metternich to hold Russia back (Rendall, 2006: 529). Russia was actually satisfied with the balance of power of the Vienna Order by leaving the eastern question off the table since its diplomacy was based on sphere of influence rather than territorial conquest and all-out-victory against the Ottoman Empire (Schroeder, 1994: 113). The fear of uncertainty about the lion share out of the spoils of the in-any-case collapse of the Ottoman Empire extended the Ottoman Empire's lifespan (Osiander, 1994: 121). Thus, it is the concern about the relative power provided condition for Ottoman Empire and the Concert of Europe to live longer. There is still ongoing discussion whether keeping the eastern question out of the discussion just postponed the problems, but not perceptually provided solution. What to be paid attention that the first tests of 1820s Greek revolution and The October 1830 revolution of Belgium were successful since there did not occur any general war (Rendall, 2000: 55). The

most important successful test was the Crimean War since no dramatic territorial change came into existence after Paris Treaty of 1856 (Ingram, 2002: 151).

To sum up, political rearrangements by the preponderant states are all favoring the long term interest, and the discussion that, for external balance (balance of power), leading states cared about the internal character of the aggressor is a paradoxical theory for realists since rational and sovereign self-interest urges states function similarly in anarchic system (Legro and Moravscik: 22).⁶² Surviving is the primary and common concern for all sovereign political entities for realists (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittenberger, 1997; 148). In effect, as we get interested in historical developments, leading states attempted to adjust the defeated states to the international system by reorganizing the hierarchical order of the secondary states.⁶³ During wartime, this happened within the strategy of unconditional surrender, and by peace settlements such reorganization was achieved by containment as applied for France in 1815 for the purpose of holding it in the system, or through the peacetime reorganization by means of financial or political enforcement, as we witness, for instance, during the U.S. help to Germany in interwar period (Gulick, 1967: 51). The Dawes plan of 1924 and Young aid of 1929 are two examples. Meanwhile, the preponderant power, that is the United Kingdom, tried to achieve status quoist defensive alliance-oriented balance of power during the 19th century, and she used her material power (loans and credits) to achieve it.⁶⁴ However, the impact of industrial revolution began firstly in there became completely different from what she supposed. The unique formulation of industrial revolution for continental Europe was not *laissez faire* domestic order, but rather the formulation of the “‘strong economy is for strong military”’ (Schulz, 2007: 33). In addition, after the Castlereagh era, the domestic pressure upon foreign policy became more clear (Millman, 1965: 63). Steadily, Britain

became more decisive in turning back to its isolationist policy (Ibid., 65). No matter the collapse of system began soon after the Crimean war or any other time, but what's more important that the balance of power order was turning out to be a system beyond the continental Europe (Pouthas, 1960: 23). The impact of industrial revolution stimulated particularly France and Germany to look for new raw materials for sustainable military capacity (Herz, 1968: 17). All concession made even during the West African Conference went in vein, and the system lost its maneuvering capacity, and rigid block system unfortunately brought forward an unprecedented complex deadlock in the system by 1914 particularly for the United Kingdom (Schroeder, 1994: 31). Thus, the distribution of benefit became incompatible with the distribution of power in the system. The intersection between self-restraining nature of the system and institutionally designed restraining strategy to keep the status quo after war lost its flexibility in strength with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 (Blainey, 1973: 34). Unit level restraining strategy was no more enforcing the system level distribution of power given exogenously since capacity and capability became dysfunctional, and asymmetric power relations were no more favoring the long term interest of both the balancer and the other participants, which is the precondition for the 1815-Balance of power.⁶⁵ The long term interest lost its position to relative gain considerations of the sovereign states, thereby the U.K. began to experience the gradual decline of its benevolent hegemony (Russett, 1985: 211). Even though the United Kingdom was regarded as the best appropriate to play as a balancer since it did not have any hegemonic ambitions for the continental Europe, uncertainty and self-interest driven ambitions eventually and gradually prevailed among major powers of the continental Europe in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Wetzel, 1985: 71).

The unique character of international political orders which emerged at certain dramatic moments under the name of peace settlements have proved significant changes over the time (Martin, 1993: 69). The Westphalian system of 1648 was no more than a continental European conjuncture (Gross, 1948; 33). The Vienna settlement, even though it left off the table not only the Eastern question with Russian success, but also British colonial interests till late 19th century, could be regarded as a loose manifestation of the first attempt for institutional balance of power.⁶⁶ Namely it was to some significant degree consciously designed balance of power system through periodic conferences on the basis of moderation and consultation to bring forward principles of peace-time diplomacy within the context of cooperating legitimacy (sharing common interest) and power (Langhorne, 1981: 61).

The 1919 Versailles peace order which was institutionalized by the League of Nations to keep constant the collective security was regarded in most of the related literature as global (Deudney, 1995: 199). Additionally, the scope of the institutions has been expanded over time as compared with the new intergovernmental multinational organizations set up in early period of bipolar system. The strategy since 1815 was to bring together under binding institutions all rivals (Jervis, 1992: 723). Furthermore, Robert Jervis presents that it is a very crucial theoretical puzzle why and for what reasons we observe institutionally constraining balance of power order different from the pre-1815 balance of power and reemerged in more sophisticated form during and after inter-war period (Ibid., 724).⁶⁷ It is undeniable to claim that the U.S. made more extensive attempt during 20th century than that of the United Kingdom during 19th century due to relatively higher level of capacity (Lake, 1993: 467).

For realists, anarchic system made it essential the formation of order in two types: Balance of Power and hegemony.⁶⁸ Put differently, the system is anarchic and this system will bring about either hegemonic order or balance of power order. Before 1815, balance of power was reinforced predominantly by self-restraining anarchic system. In literature, this was defined in a way that balance of power before 1815 as an unintended outcome, so we observe constantly shifting ad hoc alliances till 1815 (Kupchan, 2010; 44). However, particularly since 1815, preponderant United Kingdom began to stimulate early manifestation of institutionally binding strategy and mechanisms through periodic conferences for the purpose of formulizing principles of balance and countervailing power relations.⁶⁹ I share the same point with Robert Gilpin that over time systemic changes occur at dramatic moments. Furthermore, shifting in the system, a new distribution of power, will eventually leads states for reorganization of order in order to reflect the new power distribution (Gilpin, 1981: 51). As can be seen, new distribution of power by the system has been reorganized through distribution of benefit within self-restraining of the anarchic system, and all political orders are status quoist and defensive to achieve enforcement of the system's distribution of power. This situation for instance demoralized France in the interwar period by insisting on that potentially powerful Germany should be contained by tangible assurances even though the U.K. and the U.S.A. blamed France for the inefficiency of the collective security. That's why the U.S.A. began to support Germany for stable internal balance. For Wilson, the threat was not German people, but autocracy of the German domestic structure. Neither the Concert of Europe nor the Versailles order of 1919 did pay attention on certain redistribution of power by leaving clauses uncertain and vague. The purpose was to lengthen life expectancy of the institutions and transferring short term interest to long term principles of

permanent diplomacy (Figes, 2011: 65). The precondition for the success of defensive alliance is to be inclusive.⁷⁰ Kissinger focuses on this point when comparing the order of 1815 with that of 1919 apart from the balance between Power and legitimacy (Kissinger, 1957: 196). While France was just contained without any punitive peace and retreated only to the border of 1790, Germany was completely destroyed by demilitarization and reparation even though these two clauses were not implemented fully due to absence of enforcement machine of the League of Nations (Ibid., 201). Considering political conjunctures of 1815, 1919 and 1945, postwar peace settlements applied variety of restraining institutional strategies to cope with the new asymmetric power relations for the purpose of mitigating fear of domination and abandonment.⁷¹ Since 1815, we observe that leading states have developed variety of strategies to deal with uncertainties and postwar power disparities and consequently established variety of postwar international political orders.

In general approach, after war, preponderant powers had the opportunity to choose among domination, abandonment, and transfer. Different strategies to choose in between them resulted in variations in order building. However, actual character of order building depends on not the distribution of power completely, but capacity and ability of the states which take part in the peace settlements. The Vienna settlement of 1815 dealt with the uncertainty by reorganizing balance of power order of pre-1815 through institutional restraining strategies.⁷² However, Wilson blamed traditional balance of power even by including the Concert of Europe system for instability in international politics by presenting collective security (Strauss, 1991: 44). However, the capacity of the U.K. in the 19th century was different from that of the U.S. in the 20th century (Friedberg, 1988: 135). That is why, it is not the distribution of power which is exogenously given, but the capacity and the ability of preponderant states

determines the actual character of the orders. At this point I share with Ikenberry that this capacity and ability depends on the extent of asymmetric power favoring preponderant power and the character of states for the acknowledgement and accommodation of all states who are party to the settlements and institutions. I determined that till the development of advanced democratic states, the asymmetric power relations even among secondary powers gradually made the order unstable as can be seen in the second half of 19th century and during interwar years (Snyder, 1991: 157). The point here is that mature democratic character of states that did never existed in the Concert of Europe became the main challenging point particularly in multipolar system between 1815 and 1945 (Hinsley, 1963: 116). System level self-restraining distribution of power after war has been reinforced by state level institutional restraining strategies to limit the returns to hegemonic power through efficient distribution of benefit by postwar peace settlements. If this enforcement gets weaken, system itself will apply self-correction and the new distribution of power will be inevitable. The internal structure and external balance must enforce each other to block the shift in power distribution of the system. Particularly as of 1919 settlements, this enforcement was strongly emphasized by Wilson by voicing that democracy is so crucial for stable order (Przeworski, 1988: 28). Waltz defended for instance himself against critics that he failed to perceive the collapse of the bipolar system even though he regarded bipolar as the best fit for stable order by claiming that bipolar system ended due to the collapse of internal structure of the Communist Soviet Union.⁷³ I agree with him in a way that bipolarity ended and there occurred shift in the system due to evaporation of the mutual enforcement between internal and external balance. Another discussion that was underlined by Waltz and Art that unipolarity would be challenged sooner or later (Art and Waltz, 1993: 32). Their argument was to justify

the ordering principle of anarchy surely, that is the balance of power. However, Waltz failed to make distinguishment between absolute decline and relative decline (Wohlforth, 1999; 34). Even Kennedy claims that the U.S.A will experience the same kind of challenge like that of the U.K. in the nineteenth century (Kennedy, 1997: 133). However, both Waltz and Kennedy miss the point that the world is not the same as what it used to be. Joseph Nye contributes that the contemporary world is more complex and passing through complex interdependence (Nye, 1992: 64). Hegemonic stability theory is also an incomplete account if we take such a distinguishment into account through regarding two kinds of decline (Snidal, 1985: 611). The scope and reach of institutions has been entailing more and more issues since 1815 (Ruggie, 1993: 22). Without a hegemon, institutions may function autonomously to shape divergent expectations of states, and with beyond-the border issues and nongovernmental institutions, stable order is not out of reach with the presence of extensive institutional arrangements. Joseph Nye discusses the role of institutions without hegemon, but also emphasize that it is too early to talk about it by mentioning the vital role of hegemon U.S.A in anarchic system for institutional order (Nye, 1992: 34). Considering the involvement of new issues, complex interdependence and the matter of relative decline, it is categorical mistake to classify the system into multipolar, bipolar, or multipolar because security and power are not the primary issues as what it used to be, particularly in the post-cold war period. It is true that in the nineteenth century, the top-issue was material distribution of benefit corresponding with the distribution of power, or capacity, after war (Rock, 1989: 22). There were no such terms as soft power and smart power, but hard power during the Concert of Europe (Randle, 1973: 89). Status quoist and mostly consensual hegemon, that is Britain, at the turn of the century was challenged by another hegemonic

challenge, that is Germany (Schroeder, 1972: 311). External balance was under pressure of both limited issues in the institutions of the nineteenth century and non-democratic character of participant states (Weitsman, 1997: 169). Not just Castlereagh till 1823, but also Wilson felt great constraining pressure internally, read domestically, on their ability to choose and implement externally restraining strategy. The extent of the capacity and ability in the process of strategy determined the true character of the orders. There emerges another puzzling question that I tried to response in this dissertation; The logic behind why preponderant states which enjoyed asymmetric power position favoring its position begin to implement strategic restraint on its power within institutional order hinges on the fact that system is at some variety of anarchy (March and Olsen, 1989: 61). Anarchy implies not just reluctance of sovereign states to share their interest and absence of world government but also no preponderant power in history could have managed to set up perceptual hegemony in international relations (Jones, 1991: 26). United Kingdom in 19th century recognized that stable order could be set up by undoing Richelieu's *raison d'état* by consolidating states power since too decentralized European system was resulting in short term interest, uncertainty and obsession of fears for cheating (Morrow, 1991: 927). In order to limit any attempt for hegemony, United Kingdom wanted to transfer wartime alliance into peace-time alliance by means of periodic conferences under the name of the Quadruple alliance of 1815.⁷⁴ Another recognition of the United Kingdom was that anarchic system does never permit full control at all, and, for sustainable long term interest moderation, consultation and reciprocity are very crucial. She used its material capacity to enforce political order through leaving some topics off the table like eastern question and colonial matters.⁷⁵ However, in the second half of the 19th centuries, the institutional balance of power, with the impact of industrial revolution

and liberal movements, failed to constrain the order within the continental matters (Bullen, 1979: 183). The conference of 1884-85 failed to give satisfying responses for the demands from European powers. Neither Classical realism approach, for which order tempts to change as there occur a change in distribution of power at state level, nor neorealism whose standpoint is that distribution of power is given at system level could account for the logic that preponderant states since 1815 formulized strategy to restrain their power to mitigate the fears of secondary power for domination and abandonment in the context of relative gain.⁷⁶ The other important point is that new power distributions emerge after all-out war. Thus, it is given by the system itself. It will be wrong to claim that the source of order is solely the structure of the distribution of power after war.⁷⁷ It is the choice, after war, of initially the preponderant power which defines the type of order. However, this choice hinges on the capacity and ability of again initially the leading state in developing institutional restraining strategy, which determines the actual character of the international political order in international relations in anarchic system in which states are the primary rational actor. Within the given distribution of power, system has self-restraining nature. Again, for human-nature classical realists, states are inherently aggressive and power is not the means but the end to justify their strength within reward and punishment system of the anarchic system (Morgenthau, 1948: 41; Wilson, 2009: 22). They all disregard the position of institutions in anarchic system due to the constant fear of relative power capacity of the enemy (Martin, 1999: 63). States since 1815 by status quoist and defensive strategy reinforce the system level distribution of power by reorganization through institutions in order to establish satisfying distribution of benefit. This formulation, let aside the extent of asymmetric power relations, depends on the balance between internal structure of states and external policy. Namely, the

domestic structure of states must be in compliance with the overall balance of power. Hierarchic nature of domestic politics must reinforce anarchic international relations. Wilson solved to some extent this puzzle by universalization of democratic principles but failed due to absence of enforcement machine of defensive alliance organization which was called the League of Nations (Rich, 1992: 118). In 1919 Wilson emphasized the collective security is the system favoring democracy against autocracy. This objective was reformulated as of 1945; NATO and UN are the institutions of the policy of containment against the adversary ideology called communism. In general approach since 1815 we to some extent see a new version of balance of power in which preponderant power began to stimulate strategy to tie together rival states in peace time alliance.⁷⁸ In 1919 the strategy became more sophisticated than that of 1815 order by intervening domestic structure of defeated states and reached beyond traditional balance of power strategy.⁷⁹ What differs major powers from each other in terms of restraining strategy is the relative capacity and ability of them. My main objective is to analyze the ability of states in the process of implementation of institutional restraining strategy to limit the return to power, which determines the character of political order, thereby I do have the purpose of making elaborations on the constraints on these strategies within the framework of the impact of institutional development in international relations.

2. THREE TYPES OF ORDER: BALANCE OF POWER ORDER, HEGEMONIC ORDER AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

2.1. Order in Anarchic System

International relations should be regarded in terms of anarchic system in which states are all in pursuit of opportunities to take advantage at the expense of each other (Mearsheimer, 1990: 44). I believe the same way as realists, liberal institutionalists and even the English school theorists that states are the principle rational actors in anarchic system. Furthermore, order-building is initiated by leading states which have adopted variety of restraining strategies to deal with uncertainties and postwar power disparities.⁸⁰ For realists, war is ineradicable and alliances are short lived due to fear of cheating, and realists hold this formulation as constant even though liberal institutionalists regards the system as a process. The system is a world of sovereign states in which none of sovereign equals is willing to comply with the rules above themselves (Jervis, 1997: 22). In a condition of absence of world government, cooperation to attain absolute gain is impossible if states just care about the relative power position of the other states. Preferences for realists are given exogenously. As neoliberalists criticized neorealists for missing the analysis of preferences by focusing on differentiations between preferences on action and preferences on outcome, neorealists responded by claiming that if preferences matter, preferences on outcome is given exogenously.⁸¹ The fundamental problem of international relations is the problem of order building- how it is advanced, how it collapse and how it is reorganized.⁸² The meaning of order even became core discussions in IR theory.⁸³ For Hedley Bull, international order is a set of activity that involves main goals of the society of states, named as the international society.⁸⁴

Ikenberry defines order as governing arrangements while Robert Gilpin identifies order as systemic order (Gilpin, 1988: 23). Systemic or governance change, for both, means change in the governance of the (international) system and alterations in the distribution of power. However, the distinguishment between system change and systemic change is incomplete. System has the feature of, besides self-restraining through distribution of power, self-correction, whereby power and preferences are given exogenously. Reorganization at state level is not a complete rupture from the system level distribution of power. Leading states enjoy the opportunity given at the end of the war, and with this preponderance, leading states developed restraining strategies to keep the already existing status quo after war. Defensive and institutional strategy is not only reinforcing asymmetric power position favoring leading state and status quo, but also enforcing the restraining nature of the system.

Again, the crucial balance is between the distribution of power and distribution of benefits. Distribution of benefit, which is essential to set up stable order, is that power distribution is reorganized in accordance with the capacity of the unequally positioned sovereigns in the system of the states after war with regards to material capacity for the purpose of enabling each of them to obtain sufficient capacity and ability to participate in institutional restraining strategy initially developed by preponderant state. That is why, the U.K. in the Vienna conference recognized that inclusiveness of defeated, France, should be involved into the system for sustainable countervailing power relations which is essential to create equilibrium of power in the Continent.

2.2. Balance of Power Order

Equilibrium of power is the source of balance of power order.⁸⁵ In anarchic system ordering principle is the balance of power, and restraints on concentration of power is sustainable counterbalancing coalitions. This ordering principle existing in anarchic system composed of sovereign units recognizing no overarching authority. Thus, all functions the same way.⁸⁶ Survival is the primary concern for each of them.⁸⁷ Due to the assumptions based on short term interest and concerns about the relative power of the others and also fear of cheating, states do not rely on assurances of the other states to guarantee their security, thereby all alliances can only be short-run and subject to shifting in accordance with the shift in the system. Thus, balance of power for realists is necessitated by the system itself and emerges spontaneously and requires no normative agreement. Additionally, such order could base on convergence of interests among the units as can be observed in the 1815 Vienna conference. Another option according to realists is that order may base upon hegemonic coercion. The ordering principle in hegemony is hierarchy, and there exists no restraining on its power, and source of stability hinges on preponderance of the hegemonic power. Up until 1815, balance of power based on distribution of power which was formulized in accordance with territorial arrangements. However, the U.K. with the impact of industrial revolution recognized that such universalization of Westphalian system is vulnerable to security holes. She presented more systematic balance of power by providing institutional mechanisms which could be explained beyond the distribution of power based on solely territorial arrangements. Periodic conferences were not about the territorial managements, but sharing common interest for long term interests. However, the 1815 system can be regarded as modified version of balance of power of pre-1815. The main difference of 1815 order was that balancing power with

institutions rather than through power even though the spirit of Westphalian balance of power was still partly alive. Use of force was still in options as we witness during the Crimean war.⁸⁸ Ikenberry claims that three types of order differ in terms of distribution of power, restraints and source of stability.⁸⁹ By elaboration he maintains that ordering principle of constitutional order is rule of law and the restraints on it is binding institutions. However, anarchic system and its determining factor on unit behaviour in the context of third image explanation of Waltz provide us puzzling question for whether the institutions are an effect or a cause in the absence of central government in the international relations (Gowa, 1986: 169). Furthermore, source of stability is limitations put by strategic restraining mechanisms on the returns to power. However, distribution of power is already distributed after war. It is the distribution of benefit to the extent of the capacity of states by the leading state to enable them to respond to proposal of preponderant power for the sake of long term interest and peace time alliance by principles of permanent diplomacy through periodic conferences. The underlying condition for the distribution of benefit is the distribution of power after war. That is the reason why the U.K. wanted to include France into the system. Namely, by such inclusiveness and periodic conferences to harmonize power and legitimacy, it is aimed to create balance of power in the distribution of benefit, by which roughly equal capacity will deter each from being aggressive. More specifically, this rearrangement of capacity would make them strong enough to defend themselves and weak to be aggressive. To understand this balance, we should analyze the local version of this overall balance of power by looking at the internal arrangements of the Confederation of Germany. The overall objective is to limit uncertainties among the sovereign equals and relaxing sensitivity over relative power position through periodic conferences. Waltz points out that as long as the secondary

states get sure that the coalition they joined became stronger enough to be deterrent enough against the aggressor, they will participate on the weaker front.⁹⁰ However, the puzzling question was that secondary states opted for joining on coalitions as another preponderant power took initiative. This was the United Kingdom. It will be oversimplification to claim that secondary states' calculations opted for the U.K. because it has no hegemonic ambitions on the continental Europe. Waltz discusses by contrasting balancing with bandwagoning by such a claim that bandwagoning is a matter of domestic politics.⁹¹ He explicitly claims that in hierarchy we see bandwagoning but in anarchy such an initiative could not exist. The reason is that this would leave the secondary states to the mercy of the preponderant state. This is a high risk. Therefore, balancing is the essential and necessity of the anarchic international system.⁹² However, this is a puzzle for me. There emerged quasi-bandwagoning in Europe in the Napoleonic era, and even on the eve of the two world wars. In Napoleonic era, the conditions urged the U.K. to take part in the coalitions. It is the France's ability to take the U.K. in the First World War, and the U.K.'s ability to take the U.S.A. into the war apart from the domestic calculations of each. Even on the eve of the second World War, it is the U.K. stimulated the conditions to urge USA to take part in on her side. There was a potential bandwagoning, and this underlying fact urged preponderant power to bring together all behind the U.S.A. Namely, bandwagoning was already ready before the participation of the USA on the eve of the second World War. Actual bandwagoning already emerged before the direct participation of the USA in 1917. The opportunity that emerged after war for preponderant power already existed before the war by the existence of preconditions for bandwagoning. These conditions were very well calculated by U.S.A. in the 20th century and the U.K. in the 19th century. The crucial point that realists do not even

argue that, after war, even though there legitimized the preponderance of power of the leading state, neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A. has the capacity to be hegemon. The most rational way for both was to enforce status quoist restraining strategy favoring initially their long-term interests. To achieve that, leading states had the objective of distributing benefit to the extent of their capacity.

The U.K. relatively did have more hegemonic power in terms of material capacity. In general approach, order is based on the balancing actions, or restraining strategies, of states.⁹³ My argument is that whenever the capacity of states turn out to create triggering effect on already given distribution of power after war, or as the distribution of capacity made by peace settlements becomes disturbing on the power distribution after war, there occurred shift in the system. This will inevitably result in a new distribution of power. This proves that system has the feature of self-correction. Rearrangements of the distribution of power were all status quoist, defensive and enforcing the distribution of power. Again, Ikenberry stresses that for realists as the distribution of power shifts, coalitions will shift as well. This is true but not the complete and clear enough. System itself has self-restraining and self-correction. Kissinger says that when the blocks emerged prior to the outbreak of World War I, the U.K. got deadlocked on which side was right. The deadlock is because of the incompatibility between the distribution of power after the war and the distribution of the benefits after the peace settlements arranged in accordance to their capacity. This capacity is designed roughly in parallel to the already given outcome of the system after the war. Namely, this capacity is enforcing the outcome given by the system itself after the war. War is the product of anarchy and determines the power disparity among the states (Bull, 1977: 42). My claim is that this capacity or asymmetric power relation, which must favor preponderant power of the leading state who has no

hegemonic or territorial ambitions, hinges on the ability of initially the leading state and at next stage the capability of the secondary states in taking part in the settlement or restraining strategy. The puzzling question is how secondary states get sure that this leading state in future will not have coercive hegemonic ambitions. Another puzzling question is that whether there is a need for a hegemon for stable functioning of institutions in sustainable stable order.⁹⁴ Waltz claims that as long as the state looks like winning the war, almost all join on the bandwagon rather than making up coalitions to prevent any form getting the prize.⁹⁵ In domestic politics particularly in democracy, even for the loser, losing does not have to do with insecurity or long term lost. However, in anarchic system Waltz claims that bandwagoning, in general, is not possible. To some degree this is true but particularly in the early stage of the U.N., the U.S. forced neutral states with a condition that only under the condition of taking part in the war on the west front they would be eligible for being a member of the UN. This meant that bandwagoning became an obligation for neutral and non-belligerent sovereign states. The only preponderant power in the U.N. has been the U.S. which organized also multinational security cooperation to implement the policy of containment up till the end of the bipolar world. In the final stage of the World War II the question was that whether there existed any other choice for instance for Turkey which waited till the last second to join the winning side. Actually, it is up to the political stance of one to decide if this is the sample of bandwagoning, or an example for participating in a coalition necessitated by anarchic nature of the system itself or relative power calculation of each functionally-the-same states whose main concern is security and survival. During the Napoleonic war, Metternich's diplomacy in contacting with Napoleon created pressure on the U.K. that it is likely for secondary states to bandwagon with France. Furthermore, economic type of bandwagon was

continental blockage that most of European states, even Russia, for a while joined in it. The U.K. used its material capacity (subsidy and loans) to form coalition forces to realize unconditional surrender of France, namely all-out defeat of Napoleon.⁹⁶ The primary goal was to end autocracy in France and set up peace settlement with no punitive clauses by just containing it.

To sum up, if we still discuss that there is a world hegemony, unipolarity, today, is it wrong to say that this is not only about balancing, but bandwagoning that is realized by means of institutions set up by the U.S. diplomatic initiatives? Balancing and bandwagoning were harmonized in the mid-20th century. In the 19th century or the 20th century, would institutional and systematic balancing be possible without a preponderant power? At the turn of the 19th century, the U.K. was not strong enough to be primary balancer, but in the 20th century the formulation of balancer role was deeply reformulated by the U.S. through collective security through putting a blame on traditional balance of power (Friedberg, 1988: 122). Ideological approach became determining. The communism was not a threat till 1945. Therefore, Wilson could be correct that his system is different from traditional balance of power. However, due to punitive-oriented miscalculations in the Versailles peace settlement and absence of enforcement machine in the League of nations, the return to balance of power, as communism became a threat and strong challenging by having nuclear weapon, became inevitable. Waltz does not agree that nuclear power is determining power of bipolar system by focusing on preferences are given exogenously. However, state level preference on action must be taken into account without disregarding self-restraining and self-correction feature of the system.

2.3. Hegemonic Order

Hegemonic order functions according to relations of power and authority conceptualized by governing principles of hierarchy. Political authority is clearly centralized and we see to some degree autonomous and interdependent and functionally different units.⁹⁷ For waltz, this type of order is witnessed only in domestic politics.⁹⁸ In international relations, hegemonic order is maintained, for a while, by the preponderance of power of the strongest state, and as the power collapse or passes to the other, this situation brings about a new challenging state who engage the leading state in a hegemonic war and eventually the order will break and new hegemonic power and order will eventually and inevitably come about.⁹⁹ Where hierarchical power authority is established by rule of law and agreed upon institutional strategies & policies, we can define such order as a weak version of constitutional order. If hierarchy is maintained by coercive means then we could witness hierarchy within hegemonic order (Ikenberry, 2001: 142). Ikenberry gives the empire as an historical sample to define coercive ordering principle of hierarchy in hegemonic order. For Doyle, imperial orders varied with regards to the degree of their domination (Doyle, 1997: 18).¹⁰⁰ Evera perfectly captured the logic of this type of order; The process of order in the system has come on earth by the rise of powerful units in succession and they governed the system and determined interaction among the units and set up the rules of the system (Evera, 1984: 91). Ikenberry share the same point by advancing that the shift in the distribution of power leads to hegemonic war and emergence of a new hegemon which establish a new order favoring its long-term interest (Fearon, 1998: 301). Furthermore, he says that rules are made up and reinforced by the power capacities of this newly emerged hegemonic state.

Compliance and participation in this order hinges on the extent of the hegemon's capacity of military power, financial power, technology and so on.¹⁰¹

The fact that no hegemon power, since 1815, had power to implement strategy for full hegemony arbitrarily could be regarded as the reason why preponderant powers applied restraining strategy on their powers initially to defend the status quo emerged after war. Coercion is an option for the enforcement of the order. The common point between hegemonic order and constitutional order is the existence of hierarchy. Ikenberry makes distinction between both according to coercion and consent (Ikenberry, 1998: 153). However, he emphasizes that there is no clear cut between coercion and consent. Hierarchy in domestic politics may well be based on consent while in international relations hierarchy in constitutional order may involve coercion even though the latter may well base on the so-called all agreed upon institutional mechanisms and strategies. Particularly defensive realists attempt to legitimize their theory by emphasizing on preventive and preemptive wars. These wars were regarded as short, local and instruments rather than the end in themselves, and also, at system level, essential and necessary instrument for the adjustment of the balance of power.¹⁰² However, the hegemonic orders can be benevolent.¹⁰³ Under such a condition, there emerges a weak version of constitutional order. Interesting point is made by Ikenberry in a way that the most coercive hegemonic order, or in a more benign hegemonic order, secondary states do not opt for either balancing or balance of power. Here is the first common point that is similarity between neorealists and neoliberalists; Let aside both accepts that the system is anarchic and state is the primary concept like the English school, existence of preponderant power for the institutional order is very crucial. Particularly offensive realist Mearsheimer is pointing out that survival is possible by power maximization and order will be stable

by the existence of hegemon (Mearsheimer, 1993: 47). Keohane discusses that institutions can function eventually without a hegemon, to a variety of extent (Keohane, 1988: 383). Thus, they all position, including Waltz who emphasizes that the U.S. should cooperate states more, their theories on a point that hegemon power is important for order building.

2.4. Constitutional Order

In general definition, it is an order made up by all agreed on formal political institutional mechanisms that operate to allocate limitations on the exercise of power. Power is less consequential. A constitutional, or institutional, order is not identified by constitutional charter even though it may in effect have written form. Namely, institutions involving acknowledgement of rights and rules and accommodation in decision making to reach commitment give certain variety of shape in wielding power among sovereign states within order.¹⁰⁴ However, in anarchic international system, institutionally organized order with regards to balance of distribution of power with that of benefit is not clear enough or certain. Stephen Krasner points that in international relations institutions are not, at satisfying level, constraining, and actually always subject to challenge (Krasner, 1976: 338). He stresses on that institutions have never been strong enough to confirm path dependency, or enforcement between structure and agent through socialization in anarchy in relatively the same weight within the domestic ones.¹⁰⁵ Krasner claims that constitutions are instruments of governments which put considerable restraints on the exercise of the power (Krasner, 1984: 29). He, rather than international realm, takes constitutional order within the context of domestic politics. However, I agree with him and to some degree share Ikenberry's supportive elaboration that the underlying reason is the anarchic nature of the international system. Ikenberry advances this point in a correct

way that conditions exist for some variety of constitutionalism.¹⁰⁶ Up to now the elaborations imply weak constitutional order in which power relations to some extent are restrained institutionally and acknowledgement and accommodation, due to anarchic international system, has been achieved in a limited way. By to- some- extent, it is implied that there is a puzzling question of why some orders are more constitutional than others. To answer this question I focus on the three-main character of constitutionalism;

2.5. Main Characteristics of Constitutional Order

2.5.1. Shared agreements

Participation and consent are two important requirements to realize shared agreements. Shared agreements bring forward mutual recognition of unit actions taken within institutions as legitimate. Sovereign equals which participate in institutions willingly embrace the rules as appropriate. However, sharing common interest through mutual recognition by consent is not exclusively enough to make the order legitimate. In International relations balance of power could be regarded as legitimate according to Ikenberry.¹⁰⁷ For me, this legitimacy lost its meaning as soon as power distribution shifts. Even hegemonic order could be legitimized by coercion for a certain period of time. Defining legitimacy in constitutional order will be incomplete by just focusing on sharing agreement as long as it may involve not consent for short term interest but also coercion as observed during the Saxony-Polish Crisis at the very stage of the Vienna Order (Chapman, 1998: 52).

2.5.2. Limitations on the implementation of power

All agreed upon rules and institutions put binding restraints on wielding of power. In constitutional order, institutions should have a binding impact even on those

who established them. In this order, constitutions involve principles that specify basic rules within institutions which employ constraints on wielding of power through mechanisms such as separation of power and check and balance system.¹⁰⁸ Again constitutions does not necessarily take the shape of written set of principles considering the anarchic system. Institutions are to be seen as instruments to reach constitutionalism. Therefore, institutions function as mechanisms to create shared agreements by achieving acknowledgement and internalization of restraining strategy through institutions and unit of accommodation in decision making process to limit the fears of secondary states for domination and abandonment.

To sum up, constraints on wielding of power are achieved through institutional devices such as periodic conference in 19th century. Furthermore, such institutional restraints must achieve willing participation of secondary states through binding impact on even those who set such mechanisms up. Ikenberry implies that institutions are alternative order to realists paradigm that in anarchic system hierarchy and balance of power are two types of order by pointing out that for constitutional order institutions play crucial instrumental role to reach constitutional order. Constitutions do not necessarily mean that the order is constitutional unless institutions exist and achieve shared agreement together with binding factor on all those who participate in institutional mechanisms.¹⁰⁹ Samuel Huntington also indicates the importance of institutions that they moderate and redirect the power of each participant sovereign states to limit the dominance of any one of them to the level of compatibility with the rest (Huntington, 1968: 44).¹¹⁰ Ikenberry clearly makes a statement that constitutional orders will get their true meanings with autonomous institutions without reflecting any specific forces of preponderant power (Ikenberry, 2001: 111).

2.5.3. Not easy to change

Constitutional struggle does not occur frequently, and if it happens, readjustment happens within the context of the order. Ikenberry explicitly points out the importance of path dependency here by pointing out reluctance of participants in discarding institutions due to cost effect of building a new one (Ikenberry, 2001: 65). He stresses on the normal lawmaking we generally observe within the limits of constitutional order (Ibid., 68). He claims that higher lawmaking requires vast mobilization for constitutional revisionism.¹¹¹ Keohane also discusses that it is relatively easier to maintain the institutions than that of founding a new one (Keohane, 1988: 391).

2.6. Peace Without Victory

Institutions to realize constitutional order building serve to limit the returns to power. Limiting arbitrary wielding of power disproportionately within the order requires the existence of autonomous institutions which are required to set up mechanisms to establish accommodation of all states in settlement. This opens the way for legitimacy based on willing recognition of the order. Shared agreement through consent must be achieved by autonomous institutions by means of proportionately organized unit of accommodation in decision making process, which decrease the fears of secondary states for domination or abandonment.¹¹² Not to be forgotten that no preponderant state emerged in history to set up perpetual hegemonic power in world politics, and particularly as of 1815 the strongest hegemonic state in terms of material capacity took the first initiative to set up systemic order to put restraints on their power to realize accommodation of the others. But constitutional order becomes alternative order so long as these institutions become autonomous

binding all participants to transfer the short-term interest to long term all agreed upon shared interests. The logic behind including France into the Concert of Europe, and even Germany during the interwar period, even though it is too late and the fact that League of Nations lost its legitimacy by such additional treaty of the Locarno treaty of 1925, was to realize principles of permanent diplomacy through proportionately organized unit of accommodation. Adam Przeworski stresses on mitigation of increasing returns to power via institutions.¹¹³ Namely institutional restraining mechanisms provide limitations on momentary advantages. The U.K. by including France into the system, and even the U.S. by taking Germany into the system in 1925, wanted to assure all participants that institutionalism is for ensuring that there aimed a balance, which is named under the title of peace without victory, between winning and losing with the thought that there is no permanent advantage, or losses for defeated will be temporary after war. For the latter, preponderant power implied that it is useless to engage in all-out war in institutional system to have coercive domination on defeated ones. Thus, through strong constitutional order achieved by institutions states realize that it is not possible to obtain gain at the expense of the others who are party to the settlement (Kegley and Raymond, 1999: 64). Therefore, they willingly stay in the system and engage in playing by the rule of law in international relations. It is not war but institutions became instruments or the means for adjustment to balance of power up till WWI. This is completely different from neorealist assumptions.¹¹⁴

However, the importance of preponderant power and the fact of relative gain concern is starting point and could seem to be puzzling; with recognition that losing war will yield no lost, but what to gain if it attempts to initiate a hegemonic ambition?¹¹⁵ No state makes calculation on the basis of loss, but in accordance with the realist pessimist assumption, self-interest states based their concern on short term gain in the

context of zero sum game in which war is ineradicable instrument for adjustment to balance of power and gain the best share. Namely, the goal in institutional order is to limit states' self-interest driven incentives even though states are pessimist about the relative gain and opportunist to take the share of outcome for short term interest at the expense of its enemies or rivals (Powell, 1991: 714). As of 1815 the main consideration is to make ensure all states that zero sum game will be unproductive after war during peace settlements. Therefore, the primary goal is to decrease opportunist incentives that is starting point of realists assumption in maintaining that war is inevitable. System is anarchic and war is inevitable, but could be limited to important degree in constitutional order and I believe that democracy is the important coherence in constitutional order to sustain comparative advantage and complex interdependence. Ikenberry thus implies that institutionalism is not only a matter of economic cooperation but also alternative order to balance of power and hegemony in international politics by accepting the importance of power game in anarchic system in which states are the primary units.¹¹⁶ Within institutions, states achieve the joint gains through reducing uncertain assumptions based on relative power of the other states, reducing the transaction cost, and functional & utilitarian solutions to problems among participants by providing unit of accommodation in decision making process (Sphepsle, 2009). Institutions in constitutional order prevent agent and structure problem through mitigating opportunistic incentives among states. The actual puzzling question is that institutionalism of anarchic system can be sustainable without a hegemon, or with a hierarchic system involving permanent membership in decision making process (UN), or hierarchic ordering principle of constitutional order with unanimous voting process (The EU). The rule of proportionality in decision making and allocation of resources to achieve unit of accommodation with the consent of all

party members in embracing institutional restraining mechanism, thereby realizing all agreed on binding institutional mechanisms, became primary goal to reach strong constitutional order. There exist commitment problems, or no credible guarantee as the power does not meet the demands of the other parties in restraining its power, or fail to implement autonomous institutions in which losers recognize that their loss is not permanent and have still voice in decision making.¹¹⁷ By strong constitutional order institutions will be the means to limit preemptive and preventive wars.

Constitutions manifest as a declaration of basic rights & principles and be regarded as a form of formal and legal constraints & limitations on power. Emphasizing on point that the European Union is becoming constitutional order, Weiller starts from constitution which compiles principles to serve to create a Europe administered by interstate governmental structure (the EU) defined by a constitutional charter and constitutional principles and norms.¹¹⁸ My maintenance is that diffusing and applying common values and shared agreements to create restrain on return to the power on the basis of unit of proportionality and acknowledgement of all to achieve all agreed on institutionally organized constitutional order requires stable functioning or utilitarian institutions. Thus, institutions are cause and constitution is effect in my dissertation. However, rather than making distinction, I based my theory on restraining strategy in general approach that restraining strategies in anarchic system of sovereign states will have binding impact on each party through institutions. By all agreed on binding institutions states come together to share common interests, thereby concern on uncertainties and fear of cheating or worries about abandonment and domination will be lowered to a significant degree.

To sum up, institutions will be the means to create constitution which specifies basic rights. On the basis of the extent of all-agreed-on binding formal institutions,

certain variations of constitutional orders will emerge in which institutions will function as mechanisms to administer or govern the power relations among the sovereign states in anarchic system. Constitutional order deeply depends on the utilitarian function of institutions to shape, constrain and linking mechanisms among states in international system.¹¹⁹ Thus it is not the constitution but the institutions themselves as the means to build constitutional order as long as they involve all agreed upon binding formal legal constraints on the basis of unit of proportionality and accommodation on consent.¹²⁰

True constitutional order entails (constitutional) institutions as an autonomous means to allocate and distribute benefits such as basic rights and principles involving restraining and limitations on exercise of power favoring particular state interest through proportionality in decision making in accordance with the distribution of capacities between anarchic system (structure) and sovereign entities (agents) in global politics. System is anarchic; therefore, institutions must be autonomous to be the means between agent and structure which is radically different from that of domestic politics where institutions are the means of governments. Even in domestic politics, governments in advanced democracies function in relative to others in more compliance with autonomous institutions in the context of separation of power and check and balances, but in international relations it is hard to achieve in anarchic system. Therefore, the constitutional order in international relations will only be stronger and stronger autonomous as long as the institutions becomes more and more consensual & all agreed and binding and formal. Institutions should not represent any specific interest or power but rather operate even independently of those who set it up or part of it. Under the condition of this, states who do not recognize above authority will willingly participate in it. However, the initial step must be taken by preponderant

power who should embrace restraining strategy on its power to ensure all the rest that she had no interest in domination and abandonment.

2.7. What Makes Constitutional Order Weak or Strong?

Strong constitutional order will come into existence by the combination of all agreed on rules, principles, norms, institutions and formal-legal authority (Arend, 1998: 119). The precondition for strong constitutional order hinges on the fact of more sophisticated autonomous institutionalization. It must achieve test of resistance against manipulations by an aggressive power.¹²¹ That's why from now on, I would like to combine two terms; constitutional institutions as the autonomous means between structure and agents in anarchic system. They grant the constitutional order legitimacy by mitigating the return to the power. Namely strong constitutional order will be set up only when those states who enjoy momentary advantage with victory or suppose victory after war will be permanent begin to leave their opportunistic incentives. This could be achieved when the institutions become autonomous. This institutional autonomy is achieved by the consent of all. Consent depends on the efficiency of restraining strategy. This restraining strategy hinges on the efficient process of unit of proportional allocation of resources and accommodation in decision making to reduce the fears of secondary states for domination and abandonment. More importantly constitutional institutions will ensure secondary states that realist assumption that there exist zero sum game and ineradicable concern on relative power of the others, thereby war is ineradicable and necessary instrument of the system is not a matter since loser will not lose too many things by including it into the system. The simple implication here is that gaining at the expense of the other will be worthless within institutional order. No need to war but joint gain in peace time is the most rational foreign policy in anarchic system through constitutional order. Constitutional

character of the constitutional order depends on the degree to which international institutions bind powerful and secondary states together within consent (all agreed upon) in their power relations.¹²²

2.7.1. Restraining Strategies on Power

2.7.1.1. Consolidating state autonomy

It is the technique & strategy in order to realize fragmenting political entities into sovereign states. Decentralizing power realized through employing sovereign autonomy to territorially defined states was put into force by the Westphalian settlements of 1648.¹²³ Cardinal Richelieu's *raison d'état* gave an end to religious universalism of the Habsburg Roman-German empire and as indicated in most of the related literature states became more autonomous sovereign political entities with regard to territorial distribution of power and freedom from the dominance of particular religion.¹²⁴ Furthermore, each territorially sovereign political entities were given status equal to emperors.¹²⁵ However, upon discussions about the Vienna settlement of 1815 on whether it is a continuity with the past or a clear rupture, Stephen Krasner treats the Westphalian settlements of 1648 as not a sharp rupture from the past, and claimed that they are built on the earlier practices¹²⁶.

2.7.1.2. Division of territories

Division of territories is simply defined as dispersing power aggrandizement of any power. The best example is self-determination practiced by the Versailles treaty of 1919. Austria-Hungarian empire and Ottoman empire experienced such restraining strategy in the second decade of the twentieth century.¹²⁷

2.7.1.3. The balance of power

It is simply to prevent the emergence of hegemony, or any alliance threaten overall balance.¹²⁸ The mechanisms in power balancing can vary and take different forms.¹²⁹ However, the general assumption in the theory of balance of power is to prevent aggressive power through temporary, or ad hoc type, countervailing alliances. The Vienna settlement could be seen as reorganizing order on the foundation of traditional balance of power and equilibrium.¹³⁰ However, there is some ongoing discussions in literature. The Vienna settlement is identified less with material distribution of power or territorial matters than with consensually organized periodic conferences to achieve legitimacy among major powers.

2.7.1.4. Institutional binding

It is to tie together even threatening states in alliance. Binding mechanisms such as treaties, organizations, principles increase the costs of exit but gives all states opportunity to voice their demands in decision making, thereby decrease the problems in dispute settlement cases.¹³¹ Institutional binding may vary with regards to extensiveness. The Vienna settlement of 1815 may well be considered as the early manifestation in term of creating binding factors on states each of whom was party to the Vienna settlement.¹³² There was no Post-Cold War type security organizations, but periodic conferences were assembled to reach beyond the wartime alliances and obtain long term interests through peacetime alliances within the principles of diplomacy (Weitsman, 1997: 161).¹³³ It is true that the Vienna settlement based on consciously designed overall balance of power even though peace time alliances created not strong enough binding institutions if we compare with that of bipolar multinational security institutions. The main reason was that the situation was far

beyond the territorial considerations of the sovereign states. There were now ideological concerns together with mass-destructive nuclear weapons and such a situation can only be deterred not through distribution of power based on balance of power but new version of collective security under the name of the policy of containment. In bipolar system neither the U.S.A. nor the Soviet Union has objective of conquest but creating sphere of influence.¹³⁴ Wilson naturally missed perceiving such future case. During interwar period between 1919 and 1945, he emphasized on democracy by declaring autocracy as the common enemy, but disregarded by miscalculation of still alive aggressive characteristic of domestic politics.¹³⁵ Such short term relative gain consideration with the impact of industrial revolution, particularly Kaiser's Germany began to practice Weltpolitik to conquer and implement expansionism. This expansionism is similar to universalism of Napoleon, but completely different from sphere of influence policy of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

2.7.1.5. Supranational integration through overarching institutions:

The logic is based on sharing of sovereignty and the earliest example for this strategy is the ECSC.¹³⁶ The west, actually initiated firstly by France to get access to German coals to obtain input for the production of its steel, decided to tie German material capacity (coal) to European institutional organization. This was, rather than balancing against Germany, or completely destroying its material capacity, but exploiting this capacity at the expense of Germany.¹³⁷ Considering the first implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1995 which step by step abolished border checks and introduced Euro as the official currency of the European Union, Ikenberry maintains that the European union is taking the form of supranational and constitutional order.¹³⁸ Such binding institutions as the N.A.T.O. and the W.T.O. are

set by multinational treaties. Treaties here are to be regarded as systems of checks and balances functioning to control the power of the organization (Mancini, 1991: 22).

The treaty of Rome which set up the European community was also to be considered as a traditional multinational treaty.¹³⁹ Therefore, the institutions which was set up by such traditional treaties are not to be seen as constitutional agreements.¹⁴⁰ In recent decades, however, some certain steps as indicated some of them previously were taken to make the treaty constitutional.¹⁴¹ There has been some steps to carry the EU towards the supranationalism or beyond traditional treaty-driven institutional binding.

Ikenberry advances the character of constitutional order well beyond autonomous constitutional institutions by diffusing domestic structure with formal federative character.¹⁴² Furthermore, Ikenberry advances his theory of constitutional order well beyond state-level. Actually, he made explicitly that state level restraining strategy depends on the character of domestic structure of states. At this point I do not share Ikenberry's approach, but English school's midway in a way that there may occur agency and structure problem if we focus on same type of domestic structures of the participant states within constitutional order. I admit that democratic states' credibility of commitment is relatively higher, but via institutions, within constructivist approach on socialization, state action and even their interests will be shaped and change over time (Kupchan and Ikenberry, 1990: 305). The international constitutional institutions must be built through sovereign states without disregarding political and cultural differences. I am in between Westphalian system in which realists assumption best fit to describe and Kantian revolutionism & universalism as classified by Whight & Bull.¹⁴³ States are still sovereigns, but it should not be transferred by any kind of ideological universalization during institutional order building. I agree with Ikenberry that constitutional order requires all agreed on formal & legal binding institutions

among states who are to be party. Autonomous institutions are the means to achieve coherence by such legitimacy based on consent and recognition, and autonomy is very crucial word if we accept that system is anarchic and states are the only sovereign political entities without recognizing no overarching authority. To pass beyond such unrecognition by states, institutions must obtain autonomous status by getting extensiveness and inclusiveness on the foundation of unity in diversity. Ikenberry focuses on path dependency by which he draws our attention on the evolution of power restraining mechanisms.¹⁴⁴

2.8. Discussions on the Stability

Stability is more problematic matter than it might seem at first sight.¹⁴⁵ Some IR theory scholars maintain that order is stable under the condition of absence of conflict, or war.¹⁴⁶ However for some, like Waltz, war is assumed as a necessary mechanism for adjustment to balance of power.¹⁴⁷ Robert Jervis points out that peace could have deep impact than that of war.¹⁴⁸ As defined, political order meant governing arrangements among states, entailing rules, principles and institutions. By taking into account that through all agreed on formal and legal autonomy of binding institutions, international institutions will bring about constitutionalism. Constitutional order in anarchic system will be stronger to the extent where institutions will become autonomous binding organizations in order building.¹⁴⁹

Achieving such organization hinges on the ability of states party to the institutions to acknowledge the restraining strategies. Autonomous institutions must provide self-restraining strategy binding even those who set them up.¹⁵⁰ Pre-1815, we don't see such political order and more importantly balancing power with power was predominant since 1648 Westphalia agreements. Namely, Balance of power was

unconsciously designed system.¹⁵¹ In the order of 1815, the U.K. recognized that *raison d'état* must be undone and balancing power with power must be replaced by periodic conferences to eliminate uncertainties, and ensure states that settlement of future disputes could be dealt through consultation in these periodic conferences by principles of peacetime diplomacy. Ikenberry like the other institutionalists elaborates on a point that order will change with the shift in power distribution, rise of a new challenging state, alterations in the objective of states. However, this is an incomplete elaboration; Shift of distribution of power does not occur by itself, or due to alterations in the objective of states. States in anarchic system are rational self-interest principal actors who can never make themselves aloof from the relative power of the others to survive in the power-driven anarchic system. Restraining strategy is to limit to some degree this relative power consideration. We cannot talk about alterations because system determines the states behavior.¹⁵² As the restraining strategy of order fails to distribute benefits after victory, and begin to lose its reinforcement of the system, system will begin to some degree to stimulate the self-correction. War is inevitable if the balance between distribution of power and distribution of benefit get lost. Put differently, restraining strategy or the ability of order becomes incapable in responding the system level distribution of power, potential concern over short term interest will turn out to be actual. Such conditions will inevitably produce demand from the system and system responds by implementing self-correction by holding constant that system determines the states' behavior, thereby states will seek for a new distribution of power by attempting to increase their previously organized capacity given in the context of previous restraining strategy. Looking for a new alliance is a revolution against the state-level order designed institutional strategy.

According to the ability of states in managing power at the expense of their enemies, system redistribute power among states after war. System does never permit perpetual power concentration in a single power. Again, all restraining strategies are status quoist and defensive. This means that they all behave within the self-restraining of system level distribution of power emerged after war. 1919 Versailles settlement presented punitive clauses for Germany and this disturbed Wilson because he recognized that such settlement will disturb the system level distribution of power. That is why, he wanted to increase the distribution of benefit for Germany to keep the balance with the distribution of power; The Dawes plan of 1925, by including Germany into the system, or 1919 Young plan. Jervis indicated another point that longevity of order must be measured by test of strength. Can we say that 100 years of long peace legitimize that it is more stable than that of Wilson's collective security?¹⁵³ Kissinger formulized the precondition for stability perfectly by emphasizing on the balance between legitimacy and Power.¹⁵⁴ Ikenberry draws conclusions about the stability in order in a way that balance of power demands states' ability to respond to shifting in distribution of power.¹⁵⁵ However, my argument is that this is possible to the extent the system permits. Out of this discussion, a new point came into existence with regards to number of states.¹⁵⁶ Discussion on the number of states to measure stability are not productive and conclusive because the actual matter is enforcement power of the state level restraining strategy with that of the system for the sake of protecting status quo after war by means of defensive settlements. No peace settlements aimed to concentrate power into a single hand, or no postwar order had the objective of challenging the preponderant power who had no interest at the expense of others. It is true that it is puzzling to assume that the others will trust preponderant power in drawing strategy. However, considering historical

developments since 1815 there always needed a leading state initially to assure others that there will be no domination or abandonment in order building process. The actual objective is to balance power with acknowledgement of all states without disregarding even the defeated with the thought of peace without victory. Surely, I do not want to disregard completely the ability of states with the thought that states have the only power to trigger the shift in the distribution of power at system level. I agree with Gilpin that an international system is stable as long as no state begin to think that the challenging the order outweigh the cost (Gilpin, 1986; 35).¹⁵⁷ In constitutional order, the longevity and duration of the system depend on the stability of constitutional political institutions which conceptualize the principles and rules. If this order privileges certain power, then it will lose its autonomous position, thereby acknowledgement by the others will be lost eventually.¹⁵⁸ At the global level relations, stability in constitutional order hinges on the efficient functioning of institutions to restraint the return to power. To the extent where institutions shape the exercise of power, constitutional orders vary from each other. The credibility of commitment to institutions depends on the capacity of them in making assurances to states that there are neither permanent winner nor eternal losers. The constitutional logic will be evaporated if unit of accommodation in decision making gets decline in conditions that institutions begin to grant privileges to certain power. That means as the constitutional logic of institutions gave way and autonomy get lost, the order will turn out to be traditional balance of power or hegemonic order. As can be seen constitutional order is an alternative order in relative to both order models. At the end of my dissertation the scholars who are interested in the evolution of stable order strategies in international relations will get some observations about what variations occurred in order building around institutionally organized restraining strategies since

1815. The starting date is 1815 because I agree with the general assumptions in related literature that the first appearance of institutional strategy began by the Concert of Europe with the diplomatic initiative of the United Kingdom.¹⁵⁹ The balance of power could spontaneously develop or self-consciously designed. The Vienna order of 1815 could be regarded as an attempt to provide a systematically designed institutional balance of power lasting beyond the wartime alliances. The hegemonic power may appear to be coercive as observed during Napoleonic era, Kaisers' Germany and Nazi Germany. However, it may be an order based on consensus and benevolent. Here we can link early manifestation of constitutional order, in which preponderant power's initiative is very crucial to ensure other states that institutional order is for the benefit of all to limit the uncertainty among them, with benevolent hegemonic order. The Vienna conference consisted of some certain number of sovereign equals (Fazal, 2007: 72). Furthermore, it was made up of four great powers before the participation of France. In this sense, the early stage of the Vienna order could be assumed as something like oligarch system (Church, 1983: 76). The final stage of such beginning roots in sharing common interest and advances to the extent that institutions become constitutional, thereby they gain their autonomous position in anarchic system. The acknowledgement of such institutions hinges on the extent of capacity and the ability of preponderant state, and in following ability of the all states in allocating the proportional distribution of resources and having voice in decision making process.¹⁶⁰

Constitutional order moves well beyond the realist assumptions about the order. Constitutional institutional order is about the distribution of benefit in peacetime based on the principles of diplomacy. When the order turns out to be autonomous, the asymmetric power relations will be muted. Rousseau's very prominent formulation, that the strongest can never be sufficiently strong to get master unless he transforms

his power into right and obedience, or into obligations & duty, stimulated me to focus on why leading state consults on restraining strategy. However, even though preponderant power enjoys the opportunity to make a choice between domination, abandonment and transfer, and more importantly has incentive to set up a new postwar order in favor of its long-term interest, this formulation ought to be elaborated due to the fact that new governing arrangement must be legitimate by the ability of acknowledgement of the secondary states. The key words here are coercion and consent.

Legitimacy could be secured by coercion but in literature it refers to willing allegiance to the order.¹⁶¹ The consent by the secondary states depends on the ability of preponderant power in dealing with the weaker states' fear of domination and abandonment. The extent of the asymmetric power and the internal pressure for each party are two important variables create impact on their ability for the allegiance to the order (Morrow, 1991: 908).

2.9. The logic for the Restraining Strategy from the Standpoint of Leading State

It recognizes that to conserve its preponderant power for the long-term interest, a durable, predictable, stable, and status quoist order must be set up¹⁶². For realizing such conclusion, it must explicitly offer something in return to secondary states. More specifically the logic behind reinforcing restraining strategy is to decrease the enforcement cost. Resolving conflicts with momentary advantages is short term calculation and it may well cause to increase in future defense spending.¹⁶³ Short term advantages may lead to more uncertainty and blocks states from developing long term strategies.¹⁶⁴ Institutionalized bargaining is very less risky for preponderant power than confronting challenges.¹⁶⁵ To sum up, bargaining, observing and enforcing will

be less costly within institutional order. It will not be wrong to make a claim that basic institutional order is somewhat a hegemonic investment for the leading state for the future. The leading state's recognition that hegemonic state may enjoy the momentary power after the war but it is vulnerable to any challenge, and hegemonic war eventually becomes inevitable unless it disregards the fact that institutional order could lock in favoring governance arrangements.¹⁶⁶ With the extensiveness in the range of institutions, even though the leading power's preponderance may get deteriorated, the order may continue to function in accordance with his long-term interest. Losses will not urge leading state to risk everything due to the presence of unit of proportionality in decision making. Gains will be still possible in the process of decline in terms of the material capacity of preponderant power. The same approach is also the account for why secondary states should participate in institutional arrangements. Therefore, institutional order could be regarded as an order providing assurances for the future possibilities by taking into account that hegemonic stability is always subject to challenge by other states. The U.K. managed to exploit its momentary advantage to create some favorable prospective returns for the future.¹⁶⁷ Again these future investment-led incentives together with consensually designed formally binding institutional order based on the assumption that the decline in the relative power of the defeated will not last forever. Such assumption stimulated the leading state to include and contain the defeated France to some degree. The other important assumption is similar to Keohene's assumption that institutions' utility after hegemony could last even after its decline in terms of material capacity.¹⁶⁸ For the leading state it is the fact that momentary advantage is always subject to challenge while for the secondary states it is the fact that institutions are the opportunity for voicing their divergent expectations, and maintaining order is less costly and less

demanding than establishing a new type of order. There are two types of agreements, and since 1815 the leading state wanted to create a balance between distribution of power and distribution of benefit. The first distribution is the first stage of allocation of resources, or even to some degree territorial distribution of power. Institutional agreement is the second stage by which the main objective is to settle disputes on outcome in the long term among states.¹⁶⁹ The short-term, relative-gain oriented, substantive gains and long-term institutional arrangements are to be in balance for all states, including the leading state. For the leading state, momentary advantage could provide opportunity, but may increase the enforcement cost in future to secure compliance onto its short-term driven and favoring material capacity. The institutional order could be seen as a future investment for the leading state. By decreasing uncertainty by means of cooperation, consultation and moderation, secondary states' assumption could be transferred to assumption that unsettled matters could be settled in future without conflict as long as they have a voice in decision making. Therefore, even the Versailles Conference, but particularly 14 point of Wilson principles, presented vague clauses for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of institution- the League of Nations. Namely, the purpose is to achieve that institutions could settle the disputes in the long run after to some degree substantive agreements settled some disputes. However, transferring institutions into autonomous constitutional institutions in which there is no need for a hegemon failed due to unexpectedly early withdrawal of the U.S. from the order building. The U.S. rejected the ratification of Versailles agreement and the League of Nations. Thus, substantive agreements left no room for institutions in intervening into the problem-solving process. Substantive agreements thus turned out to be punitive in 1919-1921 as can be seen when reparation was numbered. Waltz emphasizes on a point that conflict is for

adjustment process. However, the U.K. at Vienna conference focused on periodic conferences to expand the short-term interest to the long term (Bridge and Bullen, 2005: 22). The main objective was secured by transferring substantive agreements into periodic conference oriented (institutional) agreements by leaving some matters in substantive agreements unclear by means of granting participants voice in decision making.

Adam Przeworski perfectly describes the assumptions that drive particularly secondary states, but in general all parties into the institutions and peace settlements; Institutions will be attractive for all participant states to overcome any result harming their fundamental interests by locking in agreements.¹⁷⁰ Additionally, these institutional bargaining will become attractive in general approach to compensate the loss of autonomy, and limits on the arbitrary use of power. For weaker states, institutional agreements will rule out the situation in which the fear of domination and abandonment are predominant.¹⁷¹ The objective of institutions is not to be neutral but rather arranging rules and principles to allow each participant to defend and protect their divergent interests without conflict.¹⁷² Thus the presence of substantive divergent interests will bring forward a situation by which states themselves will make institutions attractive for long term interest by keeping in mind that conflict resolution will be costly without institutions. Again, the early stage of institutional order building initially requires diplomatic initiative by the preponderant power in designing restraining strategy on its material power. But in general approach institutional settlement hinges on the ability of mutual restraining strategy at state level in achieving institutional order. During 1815, the U.K credits and subsidies could be regarded as restraining strategy. Territorial concessions were out of the table till The African conference of 1884-85. Appeasement policy in interwar period by the U.K.

could also be considered as restraining strategy. The mechanism for such strategies in 19th century were simply periodic conferences.

Constitutional agreements, or institutional bargainings, specify the basic rules and principles. These rules and principles are parameters by which in the long run states compete to settle existing or prospective disputes to secure their long-term interests. Thus, institutional agreements shape and restrain the choices of short term self-interest and substitutive bargainings of states and place parameters on the distribution of benefits. Institutions become attractive for both leading and secondary units.¹⁷³

Uncertainty assumptions of pessimist realism here become opportunities in institutional order, and such order becomes consciously designed matter of fact for future specific distribution of gains, or substantive gains. Institutions serve to reduce the ongoing need to wield material power resources to secure and obtain compliance and favorable outcome by locking in agreements well into the future. Moreover, institutional agreements specify parameters on the distribution of benefits & gains according to which states shape their actions. Thus, indirectly institutions give shape to state actions and constrain the choices of states within these parameters.¹⁷⁴

However, institutions also allow rival states to come to agreement by providing ambiguity about specific and future distribution of power. Since relative power of the other side cannot be eliminated completely, institutions were recognized as an opportunity and attractive to settle disputes at some point in future on the basis of uncertainty. While weaker states regard institutions as an opportunity to defend their still alive divergent interest with the assumption that their demand will be settled by having a voice-thereby accommodation by secondary states will be achieved-in future, leading state knows that, even in case of losing material capacity in the future,

institutions will serve to their long-term interest by locking in and constraining secondary states into the future. Additionally, momentary advantage is always subject to challenge.

The precondition of course depends on the mutual ability of both leading and weaker states to achieve agreement on institutional arrangements. Again to some degree uncertainty and ambiguity, by facilitating institutional agreements, make institutions attractive for rival states' future assumptions, but too much ambiguity may diminish the attractiveness of constitutional agreements for the outcome of future distribution of gains. Institutional investment in future was stimulated by the ability of states in achieving restraining strategy. This restraining strategy becomes institutional as long as states get satisfied with overall state-level restraining strategy. Specifically, weaker states must have the capacity and capability in accommodating and acknowledging the extent to which the leading state provides restraining strategy on its preponderant power. Thus, constitutional agreement hinges on the degree of certainty, thereby institutions will mitigate and limit the states' return the power. All should recognize that there is no permanent advantage of momentary success after war.

Uncertainty about the outcome of distributive struggle in advance entails optimism in a way that restraining strategy will not allow any return to power and within institutional order war becomes in-vein attempt since momentary advantage will not be permanent. Additionally, while a leading state gets secure that institutional order will conserve its long-term interest even when there occurs decay in its material capacity in relative to rivals, secondary states will have less fear of domination or abandonment. Due to inclusive feature of autonomous institutions within the (constitutional) institutional order, material capacity of power will not have

determinant impact on substantive outcome, but rather the ability of states' restraining strategy in reinforcing the system-level restraining.¹⁷⁵ Inclusiveness, current certainty and assumptions on a point that parameters in institutional agreements will solve problems in future on consensus in accordance with both the accommodation (unit of proportionality in decision making and having a voice) and credible restraint of the leading state, and recognition that losses and momentary advantage will not be permanent are very crucial points. Uncertainty over the outcome of future distribution of gains must be in balance with the certainty about the actions of the rival states. Additionally, as the range and scope of institutions get expanded well beyond their very stage, the uncertainty increases, thereby institutions become more attractive and stronger alternative for both the subordinate states and the leading state.

3. THE CONCERT OF EUROPE 1815-1914

The Vienna settlement of 1815, or the postwar order of 1815, lasted till the outbreak of the first world war. In related literature, most commonly made assumption is that this period could be regarded as a long peace, or a hundred years of peace.¹⁷⁶ The Vienna settlement has a distinct position from the previous postwar agreements with regards to using institutions to shape relations among the participant states.¹⁷⁷ The leading state after post-Napoleonic War was the United Kingdom where the industrial revolution began to create impact on civil life in the first half of the 19th century. Laissez faire-oriented liberal democracy and the favoring power disparity together with superior Royal Navy power, in addition to decisive victory over France, provided the best opportunity for England to shape its long-term interest and capability to make trade-off between its short-term interests and long-term interests.

3.1. A Brief Historical Context

England derived a lesson from the Cardinal Richelieu's *raison d'état* that pre-1815 order, since the Westphalia system of 1648, did provide greater autonomy on sovereign status of major powers, but the Europe turned out to be too decentralized and such condition failed to eradicate uncertainty in state action.¹⁷⁸ Alliances were regarded as wartime and short-term mechanisms, and there occurred frequent shift of alliances in Europe according to changing conditions (Krasner, 1995: 62). Furthermore, calculations were made by sovereign political units for short-term gains. Discarding Richelieu's system, limiting and consolidating the state power and turning the relations among major powers into both principles of long-term diplomacy and peacetime alliances for the sake of preserving the status quo after war became primary concerns of the United Kingdom. These objectives were the first steps to be regarded

as beyond the traditional alliance system of Westphalia order.¹⁷⁹ It was more than redistribution of territorial arrangements (Holsti, 1991: 35). England knew very well that preponderance power position of any hegemon would be subject to challenge and in order to restrain the return to power balancing relations, it proposed early formulation of institutionalism through exploiting its material capacity (Subsidies and loans).¹⁸⁰ The Quadruple Alliance presented periodic conferences by which consultation, representation and moderation would be achieved within asymmetric power relations. On the basis of defensive alliance system, France was included into system in 1818 by no punitive clauses in agreements at Vienna Congress of 1815, and all others were well informed that there would be no permanent loser or winner within the system (Nicolson, 1946: 327).¹⁸¹ Most importantly, through consultation mechanisms by means of periodic conferences, secondary states was ensured that they will have chance to voice their divergent expectations and interests with recognizing the fact that disputes will not lead to war. Furthermore, with socialization through periodic conferences, they began to feel deeper and deeper faith in assuming the system as restraining pact on each other's foreign policy and more importantly they become sure that the United Kingdom will be in the system without applying arbitrary wield of power.¹⁸² Kissinger perfectly describes the overall system of 1815 order by analyzing the domestic structure of the Confederation of Germany.¹⁸³ It was more consolidated from the pre-1815 order and well-designed defensive confederation; it was weak enough to be aggressor and strong enough to employ defensive strategy. It will not be wrong to claim that there was still countervailing relations among major powers and this traditional balancing power with power did exist, but we observe early manifestation of institutional order in continental Europe. The Confederation of Germany was a buffer-zone between two rivals; Prussia and Austria. Also, it was

playing important role in countervailing relations between France, Austria and Russia. In addition, all powers began to think that unilateral withdrawal from the system would be too costly. That is why, Napoleon III followed dual-strategy; While supporting liberal revolutions behind the curtain, he wanted to urge status quoist Concert of Europe to convene conference for some degree of revisionism with the thought that France was too contained. However, it would be too late for him to see the fact that the presence of the confederation of Germany was actually the most rational guarantee for France to maintain its power position. Each diplomatic initiative resulted in the decline of Austria and more opportunity for Bismarck to realize the unification of Germany (Mosse, 1958: 87). What England missed was that Bismarck policy would lead to insoluble puzzle as of 1890. Bismarck did never attempt to disturb the overall balance of power by giving assurances to England and Russia.¹⁸⁴ Even though his overlapping, complex and secret diplomacy was very disturbing particularly for Russia, the incompatibility of interest between England and Austria, and very disturbing diplomacy by Napoleon III for England granted the best opportunity for Bismarck not just to unify Germany but also consolidate its power more than the others. 1890s were the turning point in European history, when Kaiser, within 24 years, began to apply Weltpolitik by discarding Bismarck's realpolitik. Isolationist England failed to make long-term calculation that the impact of industrial revolution in Europe would result in the birth of new formulation: Strong economy is for strong military. The external pressure upon England became hard-to-solve problem in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The Congo conference, also known as the Berlin Conference, of 1884-85 failed to satisfy the imperial ambitions of particularly France and Germany. Actually, the collapse of the concert of Europe began when Castlereagh failed to confront domestic pressure (Young, 1991: 256).

Internal pressure together with external ones brought about the outbreak of unexpected cost-involving the First World War. The war lasted longer than expected. Pitt's plan was reformulated as Russia proposed the Holy alliance.¹⁸⁵ It was entailing religious imperatives and unacceptable for England which was protestant and its domestic structure does not fit for the proposal of Russia. However, Castlereagh, rather than giving special assurances, attempted to organize institutional order by means of periodic conferences to achieve consultation in the context of harmonizing power with legitimacy (sharing common interest through mutual recognition).

Domestic pressure was centered around the critical approach upon Castlereagh that the system in Europe was turning out to be European Government. Isolationist England wanted balance of power under its control within asymmetric power relations.¹⁸⁶ This is not different from the Theodore Roosevelt's critical approach towards Wilson's collective security. As Castlereagh was driven out of history in 1822, the concert of Europe began to pass through early stage of collapse. At this period, we observe early signal of external pressure: liberal movements. The first one was Greek revolution. In general approach, Metternich till the mid-19th century managed to hold the concert of Europe constant. He managed to include France in the system, thereby he aimed at holding strong the conservative and status quoist Vienna order. He even reformulated the Holy alliance to keep the concert of Europe tight, thereby, Russia would be kept out of European matters and Prussia would be taken under control by such institutional countervailing system. Let aside steadily growing pressure of liberal movements, France's diplomacy as of 1850s and particularly the Crimean war of 1853-56 brought about a breaking point for the Concert of Europe (Rich, 1985: 114). The ultimatum by Austria brought the end of the Holy Alliance. This was a great blow to the legitimacy nature of the Vienna order of 1815. The wars

between 1859 and 1870 did not lead to territorial change and that is why we can assume the period between 1815-1914 as the long peace, but this period was the beginning of the end of the Vienna order.¹⁸⁷ The concessions during the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 was too late and isolationist England again acted too late even during the interwar period between 1919 and 1939 while proceeding appeasement policy for Nazi Germany. The Concert of Europe was gradually developed out of the continental Europe with the impact of industrial revolution in the second half of the 19th century. Kissinger claims that it is a great achievement to organize periodic conference and preventing punitive peace settlement through institutional mechanisms (periodic conferences) which was not achieved during the interwar period, but it was also great mistake to leave the eastern question out of the table. Peripheral issues resulted in a general war in Europe eventually, but the actual reason was the incompatibility between distribution of power and distribution of benefits. It will be a narrow-scope analysis to maintain that Alsace-Lorraine rivalry between Germany and France and Russian imperial ambitions in Mediterranean Sea brought the end of the Concert (Rotberg and Rabb, 1989: 98). However, it will not be wrong to make a statement that diversity of interest between England and Austria opened the path for Prussia to make maneuvering in a much free space. While England does not care about the Balkans but just Russian policy over Mediterranean (the threat over the axis of Egypt and India), for Austria, due to its multi-ethnic oriented domestic structure, became more and more concerned about the Russian Slavic-policy in the Balkans. As England became more and more isolationist, Austria became more and more rested and dependent on the parameters of the Holy alliance.¹⁸⁸ This meant that the more the system was becoming conservative. Anti-liberal suppression policy of Austria increased the gap between England and Austria. British silence during German

unification must stem from the British thought that overall status quoist system has nothing to do with conservative domestic politics. Austria in the second half the 19th century was becoming unsuitable countervailing power for England against Russia. Prussia was gaining great advantage due to such Austria's conservative policy and France's revisionist liberal foreign policy. With the German Customs Union (Zollverein) in the first half of the 19th century, which was initiated by Prussia, Austria was already losing its historical legitimacy among the principalities of German Confederation. At the turn of the 19th century, the rigid blocks emerged in Europe and England felt itself deadlocked in between both.¹⁸⁹ On the one side, there were Russia and France and on the other side Germany and Austria. By achieving consensus with England on the issue of the 1905-war between Russia and Japan, France managed to get England into its war-block.

3.2. Opportunities and Puzzles (Constraints)

During the 19th century the worry for the secondary states was not domination but abandonment by the leading state.¹⁹⁰ Great Britain had no territorial interest in Europe and had, in relative to others, strong material capacity and advantage with regards to financial and navy power. England wanted to keep its long-term interest in terms of its colonial gains (Langhorne, 1986: 294). Even during the Napoleonic wars, there existed pressures on England. Russia wanted to directly intervene in European matters by claiming direct march into the center of France while Metternich was trying to find ways to come to negotiation and conclude separate peace with Napoleon.¹⁹¹ His primary goal, during and after the Napoleonic War, is to hold France in the system as a precaution against Russia. However, for the U.K., particularly having experienced the cost of Napoleon's Continental Blockade, wanted unconditional surrender of Napoleon. England, considering its material capacity,

managed to obtain appropriate power disparity to set up peacetime restraining pact among the major powers to preserve the status quo- that is new asymmetric power position ¹⁹². England was also the best fit to be balancer not just due to having no territorial interest in Europe, but because of being subsidy and loan provider for major states. ¹⁹³ All England aimed at is to set up all agreed upon binding institutions by means of mechanisms (treaties, peacetime alliances, periodic conferences) to achieve consultation within harmony between legitimacy and power. ¹⁹⁴ England knew very well that momentary advantage would always be subject to challenge sooner or later. ¹⁹⁵ Of course it is too early to achieve legal and formal autonomous institutional order due to still alive anarchic system in which states are obsessed with relative power of the rival states. The key word here is the “rival”. It is too early in this period but among the participant states, each began to regard themselves as rivals rather than enemies. I may suffer from bias within the liberal institutionalism. Meanwhile, Metternich managed to convince Russia and Prussia that ideological danger did exist due to French-inspired liberal movements and created greater pressure on their strategic opportunities. In parallel with the U.K. foreign policy, Metternich managed to include France in the system only by letting its withdrawal and retreat to its 1790 borders. However, legitimacy, that was achieved not by Quadruple alliance but through the Holy Alliance, failed to compensate Austria’s geopolitical collapse due to the fact that its conservative domestic structure became incompatible with the national and liberal tendency. The Crimean War did not produce any territorial change but the coherence (legitimacy) for institutional binding began to evaporate.

The ability of secondary states was constrained between French ambitions which was to break the containment and Austria’s conservative-based domestic

oriented foreign policy. Isolationist and pragmatist British foreign policy resulted in gradual rigidification of asymmetric power relations at the turn of the 19th century. Flexibility in the system was gradually lost during the German unification process between 1859-1870.¹⁹⁶ In 1890, soon after dismissal of Bismarck, Kaiser rejected the renewal of reinsurance treaty with Russia by assuming that it is an obstacle to get in close relation with England.¹⁹⁷ However, England was historically isolationist and it is the complexity of Bismarck model on alliance that kept the system constant. Such a miscalculation became more and more costly for Wilhelm by thinking that Russia would not attack on Germany because of French interest in Alsace-Lorraine and France would not make alliance with Russia for the Russian ambitions in the Balkans. What he missed that each was thinking that the common obstacle for their short-term interest was Germany. It must be taken into account that, for England, waiting for actual power disturbance, or not opting for the threat of potential power to take action, before placing herself on the weaker side for the sake of balance of power, was to be assumed as the cost of isolationist foreign policy.

3.2.1. Strategic Rivalry vs Strategic Restraint for General Interest

All those historical developments will not account for who must be hold responsible for the World War I. This is out of my consideration for this dissertation because by such historical context i just wanted to present internal and external constraints on all the participant states during institutional order building. Even though England wanted to realize mutual restraints on state action through principles specified by institutional arrangements within institutional order in order to make the foreign policy of participants more predictable, domestic orientation of foreign policy of each state brought forward limited flexibility at system level.¹⁹⁸ Rigidification of foreign policy, rather than pacification, resulted in a situation in which state-level

restraining strategy became inefficient due to increase in short-term interest driven state policy and fail to reinforce the existing, or exogenously given, postwar power distribution of the system. Considering the institutional order building since 1815, the power disparity favoring the preponderant power status of the lead state, decisive victory, presence of balancer power, and democratic character of the leading state are the key important variables to achieve institutional bargaining in the process of institutional and status quoist (mutual) restraining strategy among the participant states.

To sum up, the source of stability has never been exclusively the raw power within institutional order particularly as of 1815, but the source of instability unfortunately became the power. However, power without legitimacy, that is the absence of long-term consensual agreements, will always be subject to challenge, and legitimacy without power, that is the absence of consensually built enforcement machine, would mean nothing for institutional order in anarchic system. This may seem to be realist approach, but my objective is to draw a midway between realism and liberal institutionalism. It is the choice rather than the raw power that shape the type of order. And this choice hinges on the capacity and ability of both leading and subordinate states in order to obtain accommodation and acknowledgement. This ability determines the character of the order in restraining the returns to the arbitrary exercise of power. However, the extent to which asymmetric power favoring the leading state and character of participant states, particularly the leading state, shape the ability of all states to reduce aggression within strategic rivalry and increase the bargaining within institutional order for the sake of general, or common, interest via institutional mechanisms.

The starting point for the institutional order at the very stage of institutional order of the Concert of Europe was to secure balance of power which meant mutually agreed upon distribution of territory. However, by the Treaty of Chaumont, England managed to convince the others to stay allied for the next twenty years. Furthermore, by the second treaty of Paris, within the Quadruple Alliance, participant states would be convened by periodic conferences for settling the distribution of benefits.¹⁹⁹ Britain managed to bring allies onto the point of common interest and using subsidies were very critical.²⁰⁰ After Castlereagh, the Concert of Europe was mentioned as the Metternich System in related literature.²⁰¹ Previously, as I mentioned, the settlement of 1815 dates back to Pitts Plan of 1815. However, due to Russian requirement after victory over Napoleon in 1812, Castlereagh put higher emphasize on general agreement rather than special guarantee by recognizing that Pitt plan would be inefficient as of Napoleon's unsuccessful invasion of Russia.

Up till the death of Castlereagh, England began to question the continental system by the critical approach that the system is turning out to be European government rather than balance of power system. Even though Castlereagh was successful at the very stage of the Concert of Europe to tie states together in wartime and peacetime within Concert, England was becoming more and more isolationist. As of early 1820s, Metternich became the new architect of the system until the mid-nineteenth century. His task was subject to challenge externally while Castlereagh was confronted with external and internal pressures. Liberal movements were very disturbing and in order to deal with it, he did his best to hold France in the system as a countervailing force against Prussia and particularly Russia. Holy alliance was reformulated by him as well in order to keep conservative values in the concert of Europe, thereby Russia and Prussia would be within the order.²⁰² The best example

for concession and moderation and consultation made by Britain was by forgoing domination on Netherlands. Supporting independence of Netherlands was simply a signal to secondary states for strategic restraint.²⁰³

3.3. Institutional Binding Mechanisms

As of 1815, with diplomatic initiative of the preponderant power status of the leading state, we observe three main mechanisms to secure status quoist, defensive, and all agreed upon institutional binding restraining strategy: Peacetime alliance, the congress system via periodic conferences for consultation and moderation, and formal and legal oriented legitimacy and power. I regard the 1815 order as an institutional balance of power, thereby we can say that in terms of sharing common points with the pre-1815 the Concert of Europe is a continuity of the traditional balance of power.²⁰⁴ However, considering the three main mechanisms, England wanted to tie states together beyond wartime alliances by using its material capacity. Restraining strategies was to make other states get sure that no self-aggrandizement would be acceptable and the system will not function for any special interest of state. I would like to focus on these mechanisms in detail.

3.3.1. Binding by means of alliances

Britain regarded alliance as a mechanism to lock in secondary states not just in wartime but for peacetime. It will be correct not to see the Vienna order of 1815 completely different from traditional balance of power. The early stage was to achieve a just equilibrium and balance among the states in continental Europe.²⁰⁵ Rather than balancing power, by alliance system Britain wanted to ensure the participant states that alliance would function as a restraining pact for the foreign policy of participants.²⁰⁶ Therefore, by mutual restraining strategy, alliance was regarded as a

mechanism not just against a threatening power, but for those who take part in the order and each of whom would get access to the policy orientation of another participant.²⁰⁷

3.3.2. Institutionalized restraining strategy and consultation

The institutionalized strategic restraint and consultation were achieved through regular meetings to realize concert among the great powers. The primary objective was to extend short-term and very divergent interests of the states to long-term concert among the strategic rivals in order to overcome conflict of interest.²⁰⁸ Since the ratification of the treaty of Chaumont (March 1814), until the second Paris treaty, it was made a formal obligation to conserve the agreements in peace time through periodic conferences.

The most important emphasis on periodic conferences, which gave opportunity to England to set up institutional pact through moderation and consultation, was made by the Article six of the second Paris peace treaty.²⁰⁹ Treaties, alliances and periodic conferences are all to be assumed as mechanisms for institutional restraining strategy, as of the Vienna settlement, to achieve consultation among great powers of the continental Europe. For a durable and stable institutional order, states must achieve mutually designed restraining strategy. The character of the institutional order hinges on the ability of strategic rivals to realize acknowledgement and accommodation, thereby each will have institutionalized voice opportunity in decision making and restrain the foreign policy of one another. The enforcement cost of achieving durable alliance will decline and with the principles provided and specified by the institutions, state action will become more predictable. The extent of asymmetric power and character of states play crucial determining factor upon the ability of participant states.

With the passage of time, sovereign units, none of whom has power to set up hegemonic order, recognized that it will be costly to withdraw from the order, and momentary advantages would be subject to challenge. In addition, all-out-victory will not provide permanent victory, and with the inclusion of defeated France, which just retreated to 1790 border, there will be no loser within anti-revisionist and defensive alliance system.

The most important test of strength for the Concert was the dispute over Saxony and Poland in late 1814.²¹⁰ Prussia's goal was to annex Saxony in return of accepting Russian autonomy on Poland. England and Austria blocked such calculation by including France into the conference as a countervailing power. The dispute settled in consultation, but of course Prussia was warned by war if Prussia did not give away her ambitions during the conference. War was still as-a-last-resort option (George, 1991: 159).

The turning point in Concert of 1815 was the revising the Pitt Plan as Russia proposed the Holy Alliance in September 1815. It is true that democratic states are more capable and enjoy high credible of commitment in institutional order. However, it will be misleading if we disregard the domestic pressure and responsibility of the ruling power for becoming accountable to the opposition party. Not just allocation of resources to support international commitment becomes conditional set by domestic pressure, but also capability of England was constrained by historical isolationist foreign policy. Castlereagh failed to give a general security guarantee to the members of the concert. That is why, he returned to the renewal of the treaty of Chaumont (the Quadruple Alliance) and it was reaffirmed and spelled again at the second Peace conference. Now, there was no general security guarantee but permanent process of moderation and consultation.²¹¹ I detected very significant discussion in related

literature about the reach and scope of the Concert of 1815. While Kissinger argued that leaving the Eastern question off the table, considering the causes of the collapsing process in the second half of the nineteenth century, Ikenberry and Schroeder supported the idea that such a situation enabled states to make agreement in Vienna limited and acceptable.²¹² Such an external constraining upon the restraining pact-arrangements during the Concert of Europe system is not as easy as what it seems, in effect. I agree with Kissinger that Crimean war could be prevented. However, considering French ambition to break the containment, Austria's higher and higher emphasis upon conservative values due to British isolationist policy and French-inspired liberal upheavals, and growing diversity of interest between Austria and England prepared the conditions which made the Crimean war inevitable. There was a very delicate balance of power in the Balkans. Britain did not permit any Russian influence but there was a potential danger in the Balkan peninsula. Only when Russia became actual aggressive on Ottoman domain in the Balkans, Britain took initiative. Bismarck's model of overlapping and secret diplomacy delayed the collapse of very fragile balance of power in the region.²¹³ However, German unification, decline of Austria's power after war with France, renouncing the reinsurance treaty with Russia soon after the dismissal of Bismarck by Wilhelm II, and Kaiser's Weltpolitik proved the fact that it is not the ultimatum given to Russia by Austria before the outbreak of the Crimean War, but such historical developments together with the different impact of industrial revolution on the European continent resulted in inevitable rigidification of system. Not just the domestic structure of German confederation but also geopolitical value of Austria was the most crucial issue for the stability of the Concert system during the nineteenth century.²¹⁴ The treaties signed by the sovereign states were not providing formal-legal binding guarantee and not to be considered as legal

mechanisms. However, all recognized that violation would result in unpredictable cost.²¹⁵



4. INSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINING STRATEGY

Beside the fact that leading power after the war enjoys its preponderance power with the choices, Peter Cowhey claims that secondary states will not commit into institutional order if they do have faith in that leading state has no sincere intention to stay in what it wanted to organize within institutional order (Cowhey, 1993: 313). Thus, their willingness to take part in institutional restraining strategy depends on the ability of the leading state to ensure them its reliability to forgo unilateral wield of power. Ikenberry puts his strong emphasis upon the points which are the openness, transparency and accountability of states who take part in institutional order for the sake of strong accommodation. Pacification of foreign policy must not to be linked to one single domestic structure.

More specifically different types of domestic structure will not be obstacle to achieve strong accommodation in constitutional order. More importantly I believe that through socialization institutions will shape the actions of the states in international relations. The crucial point is to reach unit of proportionality which explicitly makes it clear that there is no decision favoring specific class. Institutions are not neutral but rather allow states to keep their divergent interests. Predictability and transparency in constitutional order will be possible by inclusiveness. Namely, not just convincing the secondary states on consensus or the ability of leading states to obtain allegiance of weaker states in restraining strategy on return to power, the underlying condition of taking the foreign policy of states into account by means of proportional allocation of resources in terms of decision making makes institutions constitutional.²¹⁶ Kupchan's approach is another way for evaluating the pacification of foreign policy particularly of leading state. Institutions provide mechanisms to create impact on the foreign policy of the preponderant power (Kupchan, 2010: 31).²¹⁷ Thelen and Steinmo

focuses on the dynamic feature of binding institutions by stressing on that both mitigating anarchy leading to security dilemma and power balancing hinge on the mutual constraining among all states who are party of institution (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 37).²¹⁸ In traditional balance of power we observe *temporary restraining strategy* and mechanisms by wartime alliances against common and specific threat.²¹⁹ In collective security of 1919, all threats were regarded as identical. Schroeder makes a distinguishment here; Alliances were not made solely for the sake of creating pledges for mutual assistance for a common threat but rather serve as mechanisms for states to restrain their rivals through the alliances.²²⁰ Slantchev advances this thought by claiming that the Concert of Europe was simply self-enforcement as a deterrent against any threat (Slantchev, 2005: 601).

4.1. The Logic for the Mechanisms that Bind and Lock in States' Foreign Policy (Elements in Institutional Binding)

Institutional agreements provide all agreed upon formal legal parameters for states on how disputes to be settled, establishing channels of consultation through mechanisms like periodic conferences within institutional order. The primary concern is to make future behavior of states more predictable by leaving some specific substitutive bargaining vague to test the durability of the order.

Within the process of socialization, institutions take on autonomy, thereby states none of whom recognize no above sovereign authority in anarchic system will be willingly take part in due to the presence of unit of proportionality in decision making process. Institutional agreements determine the states' behavior through specifying how relations to be conducted in appropriate and also expected ways. The cost of breaking institutional agreement still exists but in different way from that of

domestic law. Glahn perfectly pays attention on binding by focusing on domestic ratification to measure the binding force of institutional agreement.²²¹ The more socialization within institutional order, the more institutional agreements will stimulate institutions to become autonomous.²²² The more socialization means more commitment and less surprising or unexpected withdrawal from institutional order. This socialization within constitutional order opens the path to have a voice in domestic structure of the other states.²²³ Additionally the more socialization will lead to more issues to be involved in institutions. This spillover process also makes the withdrawal harder and harder and increase the coherence in institutional order. Institutional agreements establish continuity with regard to longevity of institutional order and prompt alterations in both domestic policy and foreign policy of states.²²⁴

Additionally, through socialization we observe multidimensional dynamic activities between transnational groups and domestic structure. Institutional order facilitates the situation in which activities in domestic politics will be shaped in favor of institutional order.²²⁵ More specifically intergovernmental groupings (trans-governmental experts) may demand more specialized knowledge from states, thereby institutions will become more autonomous. Domestic structures may use these claims as leverage or domestic demands may be reinforced against protectionist policy of states by such groups' requirements as witnessed during the Zollverein of 1833 initiated by Prussia in the Confederation of Germany. At the very stage of institutional order the ability of the material capacity of the preponderant postwar leading state to restrain its power within the institutional order is the very important puzzling question. Upon the prominent formulation made by Rousseau, transferring power into right and obedience into duty is another puzzle in international relations. Namely, legitimizing the institutional order requires mutual recognition (all agreed upon formal

legal institutional agreements) and well-designed unit of proportionality in decision making, thereby institutionalizing voice opportunity. The incentive for the leading power is to turn momentary commanding power into long term and durable advantage by recognizing that momentary capacity of power is subject to challenge and it must be invested in institutions by locking in states well into the future.

The institutions will provide benefit even after the state's power position has declined. The very stage of institutional order requires asymmetric power favoring the leading state and democratic character of secondary states. Subordinate states must be ensured that they will have opportunity to have a voice in foreign policy of the other rivals (including the leading state). All hinges on the ability of leading state that it will stay in the system and restrain its power in the exercise of its power and the institutions won't serve as a privilege for the interest of any power. Institutions will reduce the need to use power resources to secure compliance and produce favorable output by specifying rules of the game (parameters and mechanisms) to make the state action more predictable and expected. Again, the leading state must overcome secondary states' fear of domination and abandonment to conserve its power position for long term. Thus, specifically the leading state will decrease the transaction cost while maintaining order within the system. In general, traditional balancing power relations were temporary and lasting very short in making rival states action predictable and restraining states' action. By institutional order this will be extended to the future by locking in agreements in peacetime. The constant use of power to secure specific, short-term, and substitutive interests and future distribution of gains and benefits are all costly.

The allegiance, and even acquiescence, of subordinate states hinges on the convincing ability of the leading state in restraining its power through

institutionalizing voice opportunity in the context of strong unit of proportionality. Such a system will constrain weaker states well into the future and make their action more predictable and to some degree clearly observable. Institutionalized bargaining is less costly, and the stronger does it get, the more will it be less costly, and less likely to be challenged by subordinate states. Institutional order may well be defined as a hegemonic investment in the future. The gains may well be the ones for the leading that would not be realized in an unconstitutional order. Restraining the return to power, or restraining short-term momentary advantage, may let the leading state to obtain favorable future returns. In Institutional order, it is not the pessimism on relative power of the other states but rather incentives and concerns over future power position becomes determining factor.²²⁶ In general, even the domestic structure matters to some important degree, the constitutional order depends on the ability of states on coming to an agreement within institutional order. This agreement is institutional agreement specifying parameters within which states conduct their relations. This reduces the uncertainty and pessimist assumption of realism.

The ability of states hinges on the recognition that material capacity or momentary advantage is not permanent. For leading state the primary concern is to realize institutional investment for the future or for the long-term interest with the thought that institution will be favoring its fundamental interest even in case of that its capacity power decay and not at sustainable level in future. For secondary states, commitment depends on the ability of the leading state in convincing them in the process of restraining its power. Upon this we can also claim that unit of accommodation in having a voice institutionally is very crucial. For the very beginning, it is true that asymmetric power relations must favor the leading state for all agreed upon legal-formal institutional binding order, but to realize autonomous

institutions, institutions must ensure all states that it is not the capacity that determine gains or benefit in the long term matters, but constitutional agreements which to some degree specify the parameters to make state action predictable and provide mutual recognition that all participants will stay in the institution by restraining their power on returns to the power, and also there will be no permanent winner or loser in the system.

More specifically, autonomous institutions will render asymmetric relations less exploitative. Since institutional agreements focus on long term gains through some measure of uncertainty, institutional agreements strengthen the longevity of institutional order. More importantly, autonomous institutions do not provide precondition for the character of the domestic structure of states with the assumptions that socialization through autonomous institutions will prompt alterations in their domestic structure. Socialization through inclusiveness will make it possible to involve more issues, thereby institutions will be more attractive and made it costly for states to withdraw from the system. Institutions ensuring socialization will alter and shape domestic structure of states in favoring trend. Meanwhile, inclusiveness urges states to think that war is an in-vein attempt in addition to recognition that short term gains are not permanent and there exists actually no loser in strong institutional order. It is true that the certainty about the actions of other states will stimulate each to invest in future and focus on long term interest together with to some degree uncertainty over future substantive distribution of benefit & gains.²²⁷ At the very stage, uncertainty about the future substantive distribution of benefit will be sufficiently made clear by states themselves through institutions and this incentive for cooperation in turn supports institutional (constitutional) order.²²⁸ Autonomy of institutions depends on all agreed upon formal and legal agreements. It can be realized by the ability of

initially the leading state, domestic character and asymmetric power favoring the leading state.²²⁹ However, the ability of leading state in restraining its power requires the ability of secondary states to take part in this process. Subordinate state must be ensured and convinced that the system will not favor any specific power or there will be no domination or abandonment and unit of accommodation will give voice opportunity for all.

The general assumption for all states in institutional order is that autonomous institutions will outweigh the loss of autonomy by willingly participating the process of restraining power and put some measure of limitations on the arbitrary exercise of power even if the underlying substantive short term interests remain widely divergent and antagonistic. Thus, institutions are not neutral in terms of self-interest. Institutions will be attractive therefore to defend their interest particularly for the long term. In the long term through institutional agreements states will adopt their policies into institutions in anarchic system in which no state recognize any above authority due to strong emphasize on their sovereign status. The logic for willing participation into institutions in such an anarchic system in which alliances were accepted short term hinges on its autonomous feature. In autonomous institutional order, states have institutionalized voice opportunity by which subordinate states will have access to the foreign policy of the preponderant state. The same constrain is actually applied on the weaker states. Mutual institutional restraining strategy on limiting the return to power will increase the durability and longevity of the order in the context of socialization with each passing time and with the involvement of all states and new issues.

The constitutional agreement or institutional agreement requires some degree of certainty that institutions will limit the ability of states to turn power disparities into permanent advantage. Namely, it specifies a range of acceptable state actions and

parameters in which states compete and settle their disputes. However, it does not determine in advance the future substantive specific distribution of gains. At the very stage of institutional order the leading state, but in general all states, focuses on balance between substantive agreement in which to some degree states actions are knowable on specific issues and institutional bargaining in which future substantive agreements are to some degree ambiguous and uncertain. I used on purpose “to some degree” because all states keep hope to come to consensus in the long term in their defense of underlying divergent interests. Unsettled specific conflicts were hoped to be settled by certainty of state action through mutually restraining strategies and uncertainty about the future outcome of substantive distribution of gains by recognizing the fact that there is no permanent winner or permanent winner now or in the future. Thus, the ability of states to agree on constitutional order depends on a measure of separation but not complete divorce between substantive agreements and institutional agreements.²³⁰ Through autonomous institutions it will be achieved that power capacities will not completely determine substantive outcomes. At the very stage of institutional order not just the asymmetric power relations favoring the preponderant power of the leading state but the extent to which the leading state permits others to have access and collect account of its foreign policy by means of restraining its power in convincing the subordinate powers that it will not dominate or abandon and not exercise power arbitrarily is very crucial. However, at the autonomous stage of institutions, a leading state must initiate strategic restraint through institutionalizing the order by providing mechanisms to enable all secondary states to have institutionalized voice in decision making. Thus, pacification of foreign policy will be possible by making state actions more predictable through all agreed upon formal legal institutional restraining strategies. Each constrain each other’s

foreign policy in peace time in the long run. Thus, asymmetric power will be less exploitative and return to power will be less likely. Thus, the problem anarchy (security dilemma) will be mitigated by the attraction of autonomous institutions, thereby state actions will be predictable (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 41). Power balancing will be replaced by institutional balance of power in which power capacity will be reduced to the level of less determining factor in international relations and in the end, we may well witness full supranational institutional order where asymmetric power relations will lose its meaning since territorial sovereignty will be melted in the pot of free-from-territorial arrangement institutions.

The 1815 order seems to be threat-oriented. Actually, it was designed not for actual but potential threat by containing and including France through setting up countervailing power relations among the then Great powers. To some degree it is to be assumed as a continuity since institutionalization was set up on the basis of traditional balance of power. However, this order can also be assumed as a continuity when comparing with interwar order of collective security since 1815 concert of Europe had the objective of restraining foreign policy of rival states for potential threat in peace time (Sheehan, 1996: 23). This continuity to some degree proves that history matters in determining the reasons for the institutional choices since 1815, or in understanding the path for institutional choices as of the 1815 concert of Europe.²³¹ With learning effect, institutional order can be modeled by path dependency in a formulation that rival or new institutions must involve greater gains and compensate the sunk costs of discarded previous institutions (Ruggie, 1985: 36).²³² The cost of institutional change make it hard to change institutions as institutions manifest increasing returns.²³³ This is true even if potential institutions becomes more desirable.²³⁴ With the increasing returns to institutions we should know that states

invested interest in the continuation of the institutions by recognizing that competing orders or alternative institutions involves the hard-to-compensate sunk cost of the institutional change. This cost of change increases over time. As historical junctures matter, cost logic changes since the war has eliminated the old order and the postwar institutions will not compete with entrenched rival institutions. For any potential institutional rivalry, the new postwar institutions will be more adaptable.²³⁵ What to be taken into account that, for the establishment of a new institution, there is a need for the all-out-collapse of the previous order. In general approach, as long as institutions provide locking in agreements well into the future, institutional choices will always be attractive and in the context of sunk cost the increasing returns to institutions will be the fact by which state will adapt their foreign policy in long term interests. Such an increasing return of the path-dependency model fit well on theoretical account for the long peace period of the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century.

4.2. Power Disparity (asymmetric power) and Possible Production Frontier

Model

The main objective of the leading state is to transfer its momentary advantage into long term gains by recognizing the fact that without making rival states action predictable it is always subject to challenge. In order to lower the enforcement cost, leading state begins to design restraining strategy to convince the secondary states by lock in institutional agreements. The ability of leading state hinges on its trade-off capability between its short-term interests and long term gains. The U.K, for instance, used its financial capacity by subsidizing and giving financial credits and loans to major powers during the institutional order building apart from restraining its power to

ensure the secondary states that it will stay in the system and had no intention for domination or abandonment by arranging periodic conferences in the context of moderation and consultation by paying attention on, during these conferences, unit of proportional accommodation for the purpose of achieving their accommodation and acknowledgement.

Interestingly, the number of major powers in the 19th century was hold limited and each became more consolidated to decrease the opportunity cost of offering by the leading state.²³⁶ There would be required more sacrifices in the U.K. budget to lock in sovereign secondary states in case of high number of states. Inefficiency is possible if any state, or states, begin to think that the restraining strategy in institutional order is functioning at the expense of its long-term interest. This case will urge the secondary states to allocate its resources for the substantive distribution of gains. The best example is the U.S. Aid in 1924 and 1929 for the Weimar republic. Unfortunately, these external material resources did not become efficient to make the domestic order in Germany sustainable. Most importantly, it is the curve of Possible Production Frontier on which all points are efficient in a given resources, or scarcity of resources, since sacrifices are in effect made in return for long term interest. However, after a time there may also emerge some cases in which states may require more resources unattainable at the moment as observed in the second half of the nineteenth century. The U.K. did its best to shift the curve to compensate the shortage of the distance with the contemporary unattainable resource-point during the West Africa Conference of 1884-85. This may urge the secondary states to search for new resources to catch the current unattainable gains. In economics, Possible Production Frontiers is generally discussed and here I tried to apply the model on international relations to make elaborations on how dynamic the curve of the PPF may become in anarchic system.

I would like to focus on the Possible Production Frontier Model in detail together with historical developments in the nineteenth century.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom enjoyed the output of industrial revolution, and began to exploit her material capacity to increase its bargaining power during the Napoleonic Wars, the Vienna Conference and the Concert of Europe. For instance, the turning point during the Napoleonic Wars was giving one million pound-subsidy to Austria for her participation to the sixth coalition war against France. The relative amount of financial credits and subsidies were given to Russia and Prussia as well. The United Kingdom was very disturbed by the possibility of bandwagoning considering Metternich's negotiations attempt with Napoleon during the early nineteenth century. Additionally, considering the unsuccessful previous coalition wars against Napoleon, Britain did not want the great powers to get exhausted while engaging in successive wars against Napoleon. The war must not last longer than what she expected. British expectation was unconditional surrender of Napoleon as soon as possible. Another unprecedented threat occurred soon after Napoleon's campaign failed against Russia. Napoleon made mistake by leaving Spanish local unrest behind himself when he declared war against Russia. When the tide turned, Alexander I began to threat to march into Paris. As can be seen, since the Napoleonic Wars until the outbreak of the First World War, there emerged external pressures on Britain, considering also domestic pressures on her about the approval of subsidies and credits conditionally. These conditions gave Castlereagh bargaining power to get the support from her allies, but also created pressure to move within a more flexible diplomacy. However, particularly as of the Kaiser's Weltpolitik, not just Germany, France also got engaged in a different type of rivalry in the Continental Europe. The geographical rivalry in between both developed out of

the continent in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and became more and more intense as of the dismissal of Bismarck. Kaiser began to repeat delivering official speeches that Bismarck model did no longer meet the contemporary European politics. Similar to interwar diplomacy of the United Kingdom during 1930s against Hitler under the name of Appeasement Policy, England commenced to implement the policy of concessions for compromise by convening the West African Congress of 1884-85. Napoleon's claim came true while selling Louisiana to the United States in 1803. He really left great political and economic burden upon the British long term interest by letting the United States accumulate and consolidate her territorial strength in the New World at the expense of particularly the United Kingdom, let aside the Continental system of 1800s by Napoleon, which resulted in great financial cost on Britain.




Chart.3.2. The Possible Production Frontier

Let me apply Possible Production Frontier model on international politics to prove that the shift of Curve outward is a test of strength of the flexibility in between the units (sovereign states) and the structure (balance of power system). In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the West African Congress was the restraining strategy of the British to limit the return to the power. However, it was a great fiasco

for her. Particularly Germany, and France, began to meet the requirements of the new formulation completely different from the United Kingdom; Strong economy for strong military. Within the context of the Possible Production Frontier, all points on the curve is efficient. Efficiency means that producing a weapon has an opportunity cost, or a state sacrifices some units of natural resources to produce more weapon. We must know that there is a scarcity of resources, and, while developing this model, there is the *ceteris paribus*. *Ceteris Paribus* means that other things are hold equal, or constant. Each sacrifice will result in diminishing returns. This means that, as we move from A to B, it is sacrificed 100 unit of natural resources to produce 125 units of weapon, and moving from B to C will result in another 100 units of natural resources, but weapon production will increase only by 100 units within scarcity of resources in relative to the 125 units of weapon-production between A and B. There will occur in each sacrifice more and more decrease in per-unit production of weapon simply due to scarcity of natural resources even though total sum of output in manufacturing weapon increases gradually. Meanwhile, all the points inside the curve is inefficient due to non-existence of opportunity cost. Namely, there is a sacrifice for nothing. The points outside the curve is unattainable, or impossible to catch by scarcity of resources. However, each increase in diminishing returns will create pressure upon the states. With the impact of technological developments, particularly Kaiser began to seek for new resources in Africa. Morocco crises of 1905 and 1911 seem to be tests of alliance between the United Kingdom, France and Russia to show the United Kingdom that Britain's actual need is to have alliance with Germany. Each unilaterally taken diplomatic initiative by Germany and Kaiser pushed the curve out and tempted test of strength between systemic order and the structure. Britain did her best to move the curve out only within her capacity. However, the points outside the curve, which was

demanding by Germany and France, was out of the capacity, capability and ability of the British long-term interest. Such a conclusion is true for Germany as well. To some extent, France and Germany managed to obtain the previously unattainable resources to improve the efficiency of resources crucial to meet the military-oriented domestic industrial requirements. However, the outward-shift of the curve began to disturb the balance between the balance of power order and infinite potential anarchic system in late nineteenth century.

Table.4.2.1. Total population of the Powers, 1890-1938

		1890	1900	1910	1913	1920	1928	1938	
1	Russia	116.8	135.6	159.3	175.1	126.6	150.4	180.6	1
2	United States	62.6	75.9	91.9	97.3	105.7	119.1	138.3	2
3	Germany	49.2	56.0	64.5	66.9	42.8	55.4	68.5	4
4	Austria-Hungary	42.6	46.7	50.8	52.1	—	—	—	
5	Japan	39.9	43.8	49.1	51.3	55.9	62.1	72.2	3
6	France	38.3	38.9	39.5	39.7	39.0	41.0	41.9	7
7	Britain	37.4	41.1	44.9	45.6	44.4	45.7	47.6	5
8	Italy	30.0	32.2	34.4	35.1	37.7	40.3	43.8	6

Note. The source for the Table is from Kennedy, P. (1987), The Rise and The Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House.

Table.4.2.2. Total Industrial Potential of the Powers in Relative Approach, 1880-1938 (U.K. in 1900 = 100)

	1880	1900	1913	1928	1938
Britain	73.3	[100]	127.2	135	181
United States	46.9	127.8	298.1	533	528
Germany	27.4	71.2	137.7	158	214
France	25.1	36.8	57.3	82	74
Russia	24.5	47.5	76.6	72	152
Austria-Hungary	14	25.6	40.7	—	—
Italy	8.1	13.6	22.5	37	46
Japan	7.6	13	25.1	45	88

Note. The source for the Table is from Kennedy, P. (1987), The Rise and The Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House.

Table 4.2.3. Iron/Stell Production of the Powers, 1890-**1938 (Millions of tons)**

	1890	1900	1910	1913	1920	1930	1938
United States	9.3	10.3	26.5	31.8	42.3	41.3	28.8
Britain	8.0	5.0	6.5	7.7	9.2	7.4	10.5
Germany	4.1	6.3	13.6	17.6	7.6	11.3	23.2
France	1.9	1.5	3.4	4.6	2.7	9.4	6.1
Austria-Hungary	0.97	1.1	2.1	2.6	—	—	—
Russia	0.95	2.2	3.5	4.8	0.16	5.7	18.0
Japan	0.02	—	0.16	0.25	0.84	2.3	7.0
Italy	0.01	0.11	0.73	0.93	0.73	1.7	2.3

Note. The source for the Table is from Kennedy, P. (1987), The Rise and The Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House.

Table 4.2.4. Energy Consumption of the Powers, 1890-1938 (in**millions of tons of coal equivalent)**

	1890	1900	1910	1913	1920	1930	1938
United States	147	248	483	541	694	762	697
Britain	145	171	185	195	212	184	196
Germany	71	112	158	187	159	177	228
France	36	47.9	55	62.5	65	97.5	84
Austria-Hungary	19.7	29	40	49.4	—	—	—
Russia	10.9	30	41	54	14.3	65	177
Japan	4.6	4.6	15.4	23	34	55.8	96.5
Italy	4.5	5	9.6	11	14.3	24	27.8

Note. The source for the Table is from Kennedy, P. (1987), The Rise and The Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House.

**Table.4.2.5. Shares of Manufacturing Worldwide Production,
1880-1938**

	<i>1880</i>	<i>1900</i>	<i>1913</i>	<i>1928</i>	<i>1938</i>
Britain	22.9	18.5	13.6	9.9	10.7
United States	14.7	23.6	32.0	39.3	31.4
Germany	8.5	13.2	14.8	11.6	12.7
France	7.8	6.8	6.1	6.0	4.4
Russia	7.6	8.8	8.2	5.3	9.0
Austria- Hungary	4.4	4.7	4.4	—	—
Italy	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.8

Note. The source for the Table is from Kennedy, P. (1987), The Rise and The Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House.

To test my model of the Possible Production Frontier (PPF), I used four charts involving some periodical survey statistics of states between 1880s and 1930s. Table 2 is taking the 1900 in the U.K. as the base year and country with an index of 100 to measure the index-value of the total industrial potential among other states, including total industrial potential of Germany in relative perspective. Between 1880s and 1900, the index increased by 159,85 %, at the index-value of 71,2 out of 100, in Germany while the German population jumped up by 13 %. However, in between 1900 and 1913, the index providing the value of the total industrial potential of Germany in relative perspective decreased almost by 16,6 % in comparison with the previous period of 1880s till 1900. Even though we observe an increase in total industrial potential of Germany, particularly due to increase in German population, there is a relative decline in Germany in the context of total industrial potential of Germany. Thus, with scarcity of resources, with the increase in population, we witness a decrease in production per person in Germany. However, it is too early to claim that

population increase did not match the increase in total industrial potential in terms of per person to justify the PPF model. As mentioned previously, my purpose is to justify my model with the theory that diminishing returns will create pressure on the curve of PPF to shift outward. Assume that all people in Germany was in labor force for Iron/Steel production, and divide the total population with the total output of Steel/Iron producing German factories. We will get the mathematical results of 12 ton, 8,8 ton, and 4,7 ton of Iron/Steel production per German in 1890, 1900 and 1910 respectively. Again, we see the diminishing returns, in a scarcity of resources, which stimulated Germany to look for contemporary unattainable sources to increase weapon-production. The increase in German population and the so-called foreign policy of Kaiser II, that is Weltpolitik, had already shifted the actual PPF curve inward, and the efficient points on the previous curve fell into inefficiency considering the production and relative share of manufacturing output per person in Germany. With regards to the total population, there was an increase in German manufacturing output. However, due to scarcity of resources, each increase in population decreased the efficiency per person. On the relative share of world manufacturing output in between 1880s and 1910s, considering the increase in German population between the same period of time, while the relative power, or shares, of World manufacturing output of Germany increased by 55 % between 1880 and 1900, and 12 % between 1900 and 1913, the German population increased by 14 % and 19 % respectively. Kissinger says that at the turn of the nineteenth century, Kaisers II's Weltpolitik was turning out to be expansionist policy. He was right because while the total amount of German population was increasing over 10, or approximately 20 %, its relative share of World manufacturing output decreased almost by 78 % between 1900 and 1913.

All those statistical analyses aimed at justifying how internal balance may function at the expense of external balance. The PPF curve represents the internal balance of Germany, and each shift of the curve outward was stemming from the pressure by the decrease in production per German. Kennedy was correct by claiming that in the last decades of the nineteenth century, particularly Germany was claiming strong economy only for military power. Thus, the underlying fact for the domestic demand hinges upon the requirements of the Kaiser's Weltpolitik. By both the Possible Production Frontier Model and statistical data between 1890s and 1910s, the manifestation of internal, or domestic, balance entailing domestic industrial resource requirement may well test the flexibility of the external balance over time. Surely, I need more variables to test my model in such single-case based study. With the Table 4, another variable to test my model is energy consumptions of Germany between 1890 and 1910, which was measured in millions of metric tons of coal equivalent. Even though total amount of energy consumption constantly increased, there occurred relative decline in Germany if we take the increase in German population by calculating per-person energy consumption. There was 71 % of increase between 1890 and 1900 in energy consumption of Germany in total, and during the following decade we see an increase only by 41 % between 1900 and 1910 in relative to previous decade. Here do we see that, not just the total amount of energy consumption, but also, considering the double-digit increase in total population of Germany in two decades between 1890 and 1910, we clearly detect observable downward trend in energy consumption per-German person.

Soon after German unification, the total population of Prussia-German dramatically increased, and began to pass through deficiency to meet the military-oriented domestic demands for new resources. Such lack of shortage was attempted to

be compensated through some concessions-involving proposals by the United Kingdom through conveying the conference of the West Africa for the purpose of compromise and particularly limiting any possibility of Kaiser's returning to the arbitrary exercise of power in near future in the Continental Europe. The traditional conflict between Germany and France over Alsace-Lorraine turned out to be peripheral political matter for both rivals, that is Germany and France. Actually, what resulted in the outbreak of the First World War was such peripheral dispute over the Alsace-Lorraine between France and Germany. The core issue was actually to reach new resources well beyond the borders of the continental Europe to catch up the efficiency in industrial manufacturing of weapon-output, and increase the relative power position, for Germany in particular, and the rest in the continental Europe. By 1815, the U.K. recognized the fact that there must be consensually realized binding order within the capacity of all participant states with the belief that the exogenously given distribution of power is always subject to challenge. Through some institutional arrangements, with its leadership and its preponderant power, the United Kingdom wanted to keep the status quo after war by distribution of benefits after peace through periodic conferences. Since no power emerged as the hegemon power to take the full control of the continent, I maintain that after the Napoleonic war, the balance of power system was already produced status quoist system. However, it requires unit-level organization in a simple manner. Furthermore, as can be seen during the nineteenth years of crisis, the infinite potential anarchic system involves flexibility to the extent where the order does not disturb the balance of power system. More specifically, from the Vienna Final Act of 1815 throughout the nineteenth century of periodic conferences, no dramatic territorial changes occurred among the five great powers. Thus, the objective of reinforcing the system at state-level was considerably achieved

in Europe. In general framework, all the state-level arrangements hinge on the capacity and ability of the participant states to accommodate and acknowledge the restraining strategies in mutual sense, and the separate treaties must be serving for the general interest of the Europe. We should also pay attention on the point that England managed to preserve the concert system through allocating its financial power by means of subsidies and credits & loans to achieve mutual consensus, and still keeping the use of force as a last resort.

Is power disparity favoring the leading state important to take secondary states into institutional order and making such an order stable? We can make such a generalization to some degree that power disparity is very important for the leading state to make a tradeoff between its long term and short term interests and such sacrifices is made to the extent its material capacity permits in addition to the extent of internal pressures. However, mutual constraining policy is necessary to achieve sustainable institutional order. To reduce the fear of domination and abandonment among the subordinate states, leading state must convince them by strategy limiting its power on returning to the arbitrary exercise of power, and more importantly institutionalization of voice opportunity for all states in institutional agreements within the order is prerequisite. The path dependency during the institutional order will bring forward increasing returns to institutions by urging states that there is always sunk cost of changing order, thereby they all become reluctant in supporting any potential and rival institutions. But as the historical junctures like wars occurred, the sunk cost calculations by states change. Here the point is not the path dependency during the institutional order but the one after the breaking point in history. Leading states again opt for institutions after war and such a choice proves that history matters but this time more extensively and more far-reaching. Ikenberry argues that the new order will be

path dependent more as the extensiveness of the breakdown of the order becomes more. I agree with him on a point that leading states become more concerned with relatively far-reaching postwar institutional bargaining as long as the breakdown of the previous order is deeper and greater.²³⁷ The decisive victory is also important to usher new institutional order for the leading state.²³⁸ Since 1815 unconditional surrender had been more generally an officially declared demand from the leading state, since the defeated one is directly associated with the old order, and order is regarded as inefficient with the emergence of anti-status quoist and revisionist aggressor.²³⁹ It is not an easy discussion to make such a conclusive statement that commitments of democratic states entail relatively more credibility and also there occurs less surprises in their commitment into institutional agreements.

I agree that reward & punishment process functions in institutional order completely different from that of realist assumptions. We are confronted with the puzzle that realism does not care about domestic structures due to its assumption that all sovereign equals function the same way together with primary goal of survival.²⁴⁰ However, democratic states will be more willingly getting engaged in international institutional arrangements due to their emphasis on the joint gains, or absolute gain, and predictability in the foreign policy of others.²⁴¹ How about the relations between the external commitment and domestic cost & calculations?²⁴² Furthermore, democratic character of the leading state may help the subordinate states to have a voice in the foreign policy of the preponderant state, thereby regardless of the character of the states, subordinate states may feel secure in their commitments into institutions with the expectations that the leading state will be in the system and no arbitrary wield of power in this anarchic system will there be.²⁴³ The leading state hopes that with increasing returns to institutions in the context of sunk cost and test of

time, the institutions will shape and constrain the foreign policy of the secondary states. The institutions will be attractive for the leading to transfer the character of its democratic domestic structure through institutional mechanisms into the non-democratic weaker states. To be frankly, such situation in a simple manner did never happen and this created constraint upon the Concert of Europe.

Autonomous institutions will strengthen the ability of weaker states with the institutionalized voice opportunities by means of unit of proportionality in decision making process in institutional (constitutional) order. Thus, institutions can shape the domestic structure of all states in some desired ways.²⁴⁴ Competitive electoral function of the institutional structure will provide the optimum reward and punishment system by which the policy orientation in decision making process will act in accordance with well-designed institutionalized voice opportunities. Can we say this was achieved in practice with the permanent membership structure of the United Nations?²⁴⁵

It will be oversimplification by maintaining that democratic domestic structure provides special capacities to set up binding institutional agreements if we compare the order of 1815 with that of 1919 in the context of domestic structure of the participant subordinate states. If we assume that institutions will eventually shape and constrain the domestic policy orientations of all states regardless of whether they are democratic or not, it is only when the very stage of binding institutional agreements may well require leading state to be democratic with regards to transparency and accessibility to its foreign policy while the rest may well defend their divergent interests that may be organized in nondemocratic structure.²⁴⁶ The critical point is the ability of leading state in designing restraining strategy on the road of establishing all agreed upon legal and formal institutional agreement by means of voice opportunities

for all hinges on its democratic nature. Thus, in general framework, institutional agreements could be regarded as *restraining pact* in peace time, by which all recognize in status quoist manner that there will be no permanent winner and no permanent loser. That means that institutional arrangements will not be exploitative of asymmetric power relations on the basis of formulation that no power capacity will be determinant in policy orientation.

All upon these circumstances, autonomous institutions (constitutional order) will enjoy attractiveness, thereby it will represent itself in anarchic system as the rational alternative order more stable and durable in relative to hegemonic order or balance of power order. The degree of power disparity favoring the leading state and decisive victory play very crucial role for preponderant power to the extent where it enjoys relative stronger incentive to set up binding institutions through restraining mechanisms to achieve almost simultaneously conserving its power in the long run and convincing the rest to constrain themselves by institutional agreements, but also this happens through the ability of the leading state in restraining itself in the system to decrease their fears of domination and abandonment on the basis of strong unit of proportionality.²⁴⁷ The most disparity of power favoring leading state occurred during the Cold War. Rather than discussing the stability of bipolar system by placing mass destructive nuclear-head weapons in the middle of discussion, I claim that it is to have nuclear weapons that stimulate strong incentives for particularly the weaker states to constrain themselves in US-organized institutional order that does not require ongoing power struggle.²⁴⁸

The presence of the industrial democracies is not the cause leading to the institutional order but additional stimulating and reinforcing factor for its arrangement. The claim that postwar institutional junctures varied to the extent where

participating subordinate sovereign units are democratic will be incomplete if we look back and compare 1815 order with 1919 order. *The possibility in reaching* institutional agreements hinges on, firstly, the ability of leading state initially to increase its commitment credibility and in following the weaker states to succeed in setting up all agreed upon formal legal binding agreement, or restraining pact of peace-time, within institutional order and, secondly, the extent of the power disparity favoring the leading state. Mutual restraining strategy on limiting the return to the power with the given outcome in distribution of gains must satisfy the restraining outcome of the anarchic system by means of transparency and accessibility in decision making process of institutional order in the context of unit of proportionality.

Since 1815, democratic character of the leading state has been important for institutional arrangements. The United Kingdom during the 19th century and the United States in interwar period between 1919 and 1939, let aside their domestic pressures on their external policies, did not only exploit their postwar material capacities and power disparity in their favor to conserve their power base, but also increased the credibility of commitment into binding agreements by, to some degree, passing their transparency and accessibility, with regards to foreign policy, to secondary states within institutions in order to achieve consultation and direct representation in international order.²⁴⁹

We should not forget that the U.K. and the U.S.A. have never given up their isolationist policies. The theory that democracies have stronger capacity with regards to credibility of commitment to set up binding bargainings & agreements will not provide satisfied account for strength and durability of Cold war multinational security institutionalism among European democratic states since the case of the Cold War should be analyzed in the context of two adversary ideologies never existed

before. Communism was the driving force for the West to commit themselves into democratic institutions with the fear of domination by the communist institutionalism that based on coercion rather than consensus oriented western-type democratic institutionalism.

Up till mid-20th century, democracy must be regarded out of ideological context and placed as significant advanced-liberal economics for both the very stage of institutional arrangements to increase the credibility of commitment and eventually, on the belief that institutions will constrain and shape the interest of all states regardless of domestic character of subordinate states, within institutionalized unit of accommodation. Until the Cold war, leading state attempted to convince the weaker states it has no ambition for domination but by the Cold war the fear among the western industrial democracies was the threat of domination by the coercion oriented communism. Another dimension of discussion about whether democracy is crucial coherence for stable institutional order that reduce unexpected and abrupt shift will present puzzling question by analyzing non-European Cold war institution called the O.P.E.C. It was set up by nondemocratic states in 1960 and became so far successful in restraining both each other's policy orientation and to some degree those out of the institutions by deciding the supply of oil for political objectives.

Considering political developments, the institutional order has been the alternative order for all states to reduce the need for power in the future. Whenever state-level restraining strategy on distribution of gains become incompatible with the self-restraining outcome of the distribution of power by the anarchic system, the status quoist institutional order turn out to be inefficient and become vulnerable to self-correction of the system. This will result in new distribution of power and eventually

new preponderant state will seek for more far reaching institutional order under the condition of decisive victory and complete breakdown of the old order.²⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

Within theoretical framework, institutions provide some certain kinds of mechanisms to process restraining strategies in order to tie states together as an alternative to traditional balance of power theory to decrease security dilemma, overcome short term incentives, and cope with divergent preferences on actions. Furthermore, institutions do provide enforcement mechanisms to enable states to get access to information through transparency in decision making and unit of accommodation in decision making process for the purpose of realizing joint gains. Additionally, institutions function as strategies to limit opportunistic incentives. Liberal institutionalists' assumption, which is simply that institutions can constrain state behavior, is incomplete approach because leading states can use institutions to set limits on their power to mitigate the fears of the first two choices, domination and abandonment. What they missed is what's beyond realist assumptions. For realists, states cannot share their interest for long term with any (above) authority.

We witness in the historical context of international relations that during the nineteenth century, states were attempting to lock themselves into some set of postwar relations, and initiated set of principles of restraining strategies mutually recognized in consent, thereby particularly the leading state to some degree achieved limiting the fears of abandonment and domination. Again, achieving the maintenance of institutional strategy for limiting the emergence of any aggressive power within the countervailing power relations of the balance of power order in infinite potential anarchic international system hinges on the capacity, capability and particularly the ability of states which are parties of the settlements, rather than on the distribution of

power after substitutive bargaining-oriented postwar peace settlements. The capacity of the leading state in implementing institutional restraining strategy depends on the extent of the asymmetric power relations favoring the preponderant power, and the character of the states each of which are party in the settlements. More specifically, the more favoring the power disparity for the leading state, the more opportunity will it have in getting allegiance of the secondary states in reaching institutional trade-off between the short-term interests and the long-term interests.

The United Kingdom knew very well that momentary advantages after war would be subject to challenge. Moreover, England was the best fit for having balancer role in the Concert of Europe since it did not have any territorial ambitions in the Continent. All it wanted was to preserve its colonial interests, and, by status quoist system, to prevent any challenge against its naval power. Unit of accommodation in decision making process through inclusiveness by establishing well-designed principles of permanent diplomacy firstly became the main concern for the parties of the Concert of Europe of 1815 by the implication of peace without victory. Again, since Castlereagh very well recognized that momentary advantages after war were vulnerable to challenge sooner rather than later, he wanted to extend wartime alliances, or short-term restraining pacts, into permanent principles of peacetime diplomacy in the context of European public law. That's why, he wanted to transform such relative gain driven short term interests to peacetime alliances for achieving durable and stable political order in international relations.

Considering the very stage of the Concert of Europe, Britain's primary objective was to consolidate state power within static territorial distribution. It derived the most rational lessons from the past that Richelieu's *raison d'état* system must be wiped out since too decentralized Europe was always subject to test of hegemonic

war. By minor territorial adjustments, its primary aim was to create sphere of influences on the basis of buffer zones. The crucial restructuring was made within the German Confederation to realize peacetime balance of power among Austria, Russia, Prussia and France. Thus, England managed to interlock the very divergent interests of the subordinate states within institutional order. By including the defeated France into the system, it was ensured to participants that there will be neither permanent loser nor permanent winner in case of any war. Furthermore, each state recognized that unilateral withdrawal from the system would be much costlier than expected. The crucial point to be paid attention was that England reinforced the system by exploiting its material capacity through subsidies and loans. What is out of discussion is the question of when the system collapsed, but it must be known that the liberal movements, the impact of industrial revolution on the Continental Europe, France's aimless aggressive foreign policy, declining geopolitical value of Austria, German unification, Kaiser's policy transforming *realpolitik* into *Weltpolitik* by renouncing Reinsurance treaty with Russia, leaving off the eastern question off the table, failure of British foreign policy to meet the industrial requirements of the European states due to beyond its capacity are the main political developments that produced insoluble and puzzling constraints upon the Concert of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century.²⁵¹

After the Napoleonic wars, the power distribution after war did not permit any power to set up hegemonic order.²⁵² The system itself already provided restraining power distribution even though it was England which enjoyed the opportunity stemming from favoring power disparity. However, such asymmetric power required from the preponderant power of the leading state, that is simply England, to reorganize the systemic order with the thought that no momentary advantage could

last forever. The institutional systemic order was also anti-revisionist. What was done simply is to make small changes territorially and these changes were extended into periodic conferences. Theoretically, status quoist Concert of Europe managed to reinforce the after-war power distribution to the extent of the capacity of all participants. Thus, it is not the distribution of power, but the status quoist distribution of benefit within their capacity enabled the system to live on for almost a century. However, what was unattainable with regards to capacity turned out to be short-term interest of the Continental states in the second half of the nineteenth century. There occurred incompatibility between the distribution of power and the distribution of benefit. States began not satisfied with the benefit disparity because of the thought that strong military requires strong economy. And to obtain financial power in order to increase military capacity, particularly Germany and France began to go beyond the borders of the Continent to reach new raw resources. Such political development was beyond British capacity. However, during the nineteenth century, polarity (distribution of power) after war had been reinforced through a variety of the status quoist institutional restraining strategies developed in cooperation by sovereign states to limit the returns to arbitrary wield of power as of the Concert of Europe of 1815. Whenever inefficiency came into existence due to unit-level's divergent expectations within the institutional order in restraining states' action to return to the self-interest-oriented power, the governing arrangement of the 19th century fell short to reinforce the after-war power distribution. Eventually, the system began to trend toward self-correction. In 1914, England was deadlocked which block was a real threat; On the one side, there was Austro-German block, on the other side there built in Franco-Russia. It was too late for Britain to decrease the tension, because the infinite potential anarchic

system turned out to be actual anarchy in which system began to apply self-correction by means of war.

NOTES

¹ Powell stresses on the same puzzle by maintaining that “we need more powerful theories that make more specific claims about the extent to which institutions shape future decisions and actions than neorealism or neoliberalism presently does.” Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,” *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring, 1994, p. 345. For discussions on the Concert of Europe see, John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994/1995, pp. 33–38; Korina Kagan, “The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-Institutionalist Debate and Great Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821–41,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1997; Matthew Rendall, “Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece 1821–29: A Test of Hypotheses About the Vienna System,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2000; and Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self Enforcing Equilibrium,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005. Jennifer Mitzen, “Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,” 2013, pp. 2–23. Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at the International System,” *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, pp. 160–163; Paul W. Schroeder, “The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure,” *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1986; Paul W. Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 97, No. 2, 1992.

² Cronin argues the legitimacy that “At its core, the Concert of Europe was an agreement among the elite statesmen of Europe’s great powers to adhere to and enforce a particular set of principles in their relations with one another on the European continent. Sometimes these principles seemed to exist as informal but powerful norms in the constructivist sense that their normative content was deeply internalized by the actors that shared them. Regardless of whether or not they codified into international law or represented deeply held values and identities shared by the leaders who advocated them, what mattered most was that these principles were both widely recognized (in rhetoric) and widely practiced (in behavior) by the great powers throughout the Concert era. The Concert of Europe was thus a collection of often informal but nonetheless influential rules agreed to by the great powers of Europe—Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and, later, France—after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Great Britain was the dominant power in terms of wealth and actualized resources, while Russia was destined to play a large role in the post- Napoleonic system as the polity with the most potential power.” Bruce Cronin, “Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation,” New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, Chapter 3. Cronin also argues that “The five Powers are firmly resolved never to depart, neither in their mutual relations, nor in those which bind them to other states, from principles of intimate union which hitherto presided over all their common relations and interests.” *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61. He advances his argument that “Although this seemingly high minded rhetoric might sound like public relations gibberish, it was actually part of a secret protocol, just for the great powers, and was not released to the public or other states.” *Ibid.*, 64.

³ See, Henry A. Kissinger, “A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822,” Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957, p. 5; also for further survey, see, Henry A. Kissinger, “Diplomacy,” New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994; Henry A. Kissinger, “World Order,” New York: Penguin, 2014; Mark Mazower, “Governing the World: The History of an Idea,” New York: The Penguin Press, 2012, pp. 123–125, 195–197.

⁴ See G. John Ikenberry, “After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars,” Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, Chapter 4.

⁵ Powell argues that “The three issues at the center of neorealist-neoliberal debate are the meaning and implications of anarchy, the problem of absolute and relative gains, and the tension between cooperation and distribution.” Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate, *International Organization*,” Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 332.

⁶ The argument is that the outcomes of international relations derive more from the structural constraints of the state systems than unit behavior. The system is structured by anarchy rather than hierarchy, considering the primacy of survival, security, and independence for each unit wishing to remain within the self-help system, and competition between units which produces a recurrent pattern of various balances of power. The central work is Kenneth N. Waltz, "Theory of International Politics," Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979. Also see Kenneth Waltz, "Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis," New York: Colombia University Press, 1959; "The Origins of War in Neo-Realist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg, and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., "The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars," Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 39-52.

⁷ Grieco defines anarchy as such "international anarchy is the principle force shaping the motives and actions of states. Furthermore, states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests. Finally, international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation only marginally." Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation; Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 50, Summer 1988, pp. 485-507. The point of departure for Keohane's analysis in *After Hegemony* was to use the prisoners' dilemma to show that anarchy did not imply a lack of cooperation. Grieco responded by arguing that "Keohane's model was misspecified because he neglected states' concerns for relative gains." *Ibid.*, 119. Duncan Snidal then tried to show that "anarchy does not imply a lack of cooperation even if states are concerned with relative gains." Duncan Snidal, "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, September 1993, pp. 726-43. Robert Art and Jervis together explain that "international politics takes place in an arena that has no central governing body. No agency exists above individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes. States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punishes deviations. This-the absence of a supreme power-is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics." Robert Art and Robert Jervis, "International Politics," 3d ed., Boston: Harper Collins, p. 13. Also see Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," in Kenneth Oye, ed., "Cooperation Under Anarchy," Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986, particularly pp. 1-4. Keohane challenges neorealism more explicitly and develops an institutional approach in more detail in his study, "After Hegemony". The central question is, "Under what conditions can independent countries cooperate in the world political economy?" Robert Keohane, "After Hegemony," Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.7. "Can, for example, states cooperate in the absence of a hegemon ?," *Ibid.*, p.5. Keohane begins his analysis by this puzzling question, and with Neo-liberalist insights about the role of power, Keohane's central arguments draw more on the Institutionalist tradition, arguing that "cooperation can under some conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests and that institutions, broadly defined, affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge." *Ibid.*, p.11. Waltz does not deny the possibility of cooperation with implication of short term duration, or in matters of economics, and argues that "no higher authority exists that can prevent them from using the means they have... the use of military force, in alliance, which is one of the means available to states in the international system." Waltz, "Theory of International Politics," Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 104-121. "The primary means are the wars for adjustment process to balance of power. However, wartime alliances are the other type of means in anarchic system" for Waltz. *Ibid.*, 114. Also see, Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," *International Organization*, Vol. 36, Spring, 1982, pp. 293-324. Slantchev defines the concept of anarchy that it is "the use of coercive power by states to obtain their objectives, and states' inability to commit credibly to particular agreements even after such agreements are reached by bargaining. To this end, states must be able to commit credibly to uphold the distribution of benefits generated by the configuration of the system." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, no. 4, October-December 2005, p. 569. Within this definition, he labels the Concert of 1815, "complete divorce from the traditional balance of power of pre-1815, as self-enforcing equilibrium, or credible equilibrium of endogenous enforcement threat to revisionists or satisfaction for status quoists." *Ibid.*, pp. 589-591. His formulation constitutes the theoretical account for the Concert of Europe; "satisfaction would have required that benefits correspond to the interests and capabilities of the state." *Ibid.*, p. 567. What differs my argument from him is his claim that "Since endogenous credible commitments depend on the territorial distribution, states must have had the means and opportunity to redesign the map of Europe appropriately. The aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars left central Europe an essentially blank slate with the victorious great powers able to redraw essential borders...an explanation of peace under anarchy during this period must crucially depend on how the territorial distribution was structured appropriately to either satisfy the powerful or deter the less fortunate." *Ibid.*, p.587. After the Vienna

settlement, France only withdrew as far as 1790 borders. No dramatic redesign was made on European map. The territories before the Napoleonic war did not differ from the Post-Napoleonic wars. Territorial distribution was no more primary concern for the Europe. Britain already enjoy power disparity and exploited it for setting up strategic restraint to enforce after-war existing status quoist distribution of power through reorganizing the distribution of benefit within their capacity. I used the term status quo because no power had sufficient power to be hegemon or having no hegemonic capacity to enjoy.

⁸ Upon the Waltzian generalization, Slantchev argues that “When players do not change themselves but do change their behavior, we must carefully examine the environment in which strategic interaction takes place, for variations in structure can explain different behavior when actors are very much the same. Peace and stability collapsed...it was not because yet another mysterious transformation of preferences took place, but because the Crimean War altered the system of incentives such that maintaining the European status quo was no longer optimal for potential revisionists. State preferences were essentially the same as during the eighteenth century.” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, no. 4, October–December 2005, p. 569. Also see, Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. By admitting puzzling conditions of anarchic structure of the system, Powell maintains that “institutions may serve as a means of achieving the joint gains of cooperation. But institutional history does not matter. Previous institution choices do not constrain or significantly affect the future institutional arrangements and the future distribution of benefits...however, we need a better understanding of the conditions under which institutional history matters and the extent to which the international system satisfies these conditions. We need more powerful theories that make more specific claims about the extent to which institutions shape future decisions and actions than neorealism or neoliberalism presently does.” Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,” *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring, 1994, p. 349. As can be seen, “preferences are output of anarchic system and wars are not to be regarded as a proof for the transformation of preferences.” *Ibid.*, p.348. I share the same point, but their account for anarchic system is incomplete. Anarchy has nothing to do with preferences, or the output for state incentives but rather potential incentives and preferences are the input for the anarchic system. At outset, I agree with Alexander Wendt that it is “what states make of, and within socialization and constant intersubjective meanings in between both, agents and structure are mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct entities. Each is in some sense an effect of the other; they are co-determined. Agents and structure were conceptually inseparable.” Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425. However, I do not agree with Wendt on the subject of the problem of agent and structure in theoretical sense. They are not inseparable. Namely, we must accept that during the nineteenth century, it is the primary objective to create a governing arrangement in order to set up sustainable re-configuration of the anarchic system through some certain mechanisms within institutional order.

⁹ Kissinger argues that “the level of urgency with which threats were perceived varied significantly. Britain, protected by its command of the seas, preferred waiting until a major threat from Europe took specific shape. The continental countries had a narrower margin of safety, assessing that their survival might be at stake...or far less dramatic than those causing Britain to take alarm.” Henry Kissinger, “World Order”, pp.89. What Kaiser miscalculated by assuming that it is the treaty with Russia that created obstacle for Germany not just to have more freedom of action to put his influence on the Alsace-Lorraine, but also to get British support for his Continental foreign policy against France was very well elaborated by Kissinger; “it is unusual for England to enter into engagements with references to cases which have not actually arisen, or which are not immediately in prospect.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, chapter six.

¹⁰ What is the manifestation of the fact that Austria’s geopolitical position turned out to be less valuable for England was confirmed by Albrecht. “With British withdrawal from continental affairs, Austria depended more than ever on Russian assistance, as the 1848 Hungarian revolt demonstrated.” Albrecht-Carrie, “Diplomatic History”, 70–76. Slantchev claims that “French ambitions were also checked mostly by the Anglo-Russian common front. With Russia absent, France could challenge the system openly, which it did in 1859 with a war on Austria in Italy. Prussian restraint was also conditional on the Russian presence—once the Eastern threat was gone, Prussia could concentrate either in the Rhineland against France, or in Germany against Austria (it did both).” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, no. 4, October–December 2005, p. 601. However, the most strategic restraint of the Concert hinges on the ability of Austria, and as Austria fell in conflict with British interest, what mentioned by

Slantchev lost its meaning with regards to dynamics of the balance of power in the Concert of Europe, particularly as of German unification in 1871. Also see, Paul W. Schroeder, "Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972, 403–409. The more conflict of interest occurred between England and Austria, the less France was contained, thereby the more Austria got depended on Russia and conservative values. Metternich to some extent managed to compensate the declining power of Austria stemming from French-inspired liberal revolutions until his resignation by keeping close ties with Russia to contain Prussia and France. However, after Metternich, Austria made strategic mistake by giving ultimatum to Russia during the conflict resulted in the Crimean War, rather than keeping its neutral position. For further reading see, Norman Rich, "Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale", Hanover: University Press of New England, 1985. Also see, Bridge, F. R., and Roger Bullen, "The Great Powers and the European States System 1814–1914", 2nd ed., Harlow, U.K.: Pearson Education Limited, 2005, pp. 83–87; Paul W. Schroeder, "Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert", Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 201–207. Such mistake resulted in Russian silence, and its withdrawal and abandonment from European affairs, during periodic wars between 1859 and 1870. France had more opportunity to proceed aggressive policy against Austria, and Prussia as well. From now on, after the Crimean war, Concert meant nothing for Russia and supported any diplomacy wrecking the concert. Supporting Napoleon III's policy and even keeping its neutrality in the conflict of Holstein and Schleswig implying that Russia was now supporting even cooperation between Austria and Prussia were some examples. Castlereagh, Metternich and Bismarck were the three who managed to hold the Concert stable to some important degree. However, we should figure out the constraints upon each of them respectively. By 1859, Austria was already in an isolated position due to its strong anti-liberal interventions, and ultimatum against Russia, which was guarantee for its geopolitical position against Prussia and France, and Russian ambitions in the Balkans as well. Furthermore, after German unification, Bismarck manage to compensate the evaporating flexibility by secret and complex alliance system between Germany, Russia and Austria. However, Kaiser discarded such freedom action by aloofing himself of Russia. It was too late in 1914 to recognize that it was the balance of power between the three that preserved the Concert and interlocked the interests. The cement of the Concert, thus, was the interlocking interests between Russia, Austria and Germany, and containment of France for Britain.

¹¹ Bridge and Bullen focus on main goals in the Concert of Europe: "In crafting a settlement following the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, these leaders sought to address and forestall two interrelated concerns for the future: (1) subsequent bids for continental hegemony that could be as destructive and nearly as successful as Napoleon's had been and (2) radical, revolutionary movements that might externalize aggression and trigger system-wide regime change, as France's had during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars." F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, "The Great Powers and the European States System, 1814–1914," 2nd ed., Harlow, U.K.: Pearson Education Limited, 2005, pp. 3–19. They also argue that "In the Second Treaty of Paris, for instance, the powers praised themselves for preserving France and Europe from the convulsions with which they were menaced by the late enterprise of Napoleon Bonaparte, and by the Revolutionary system reproduced in France, to promote its success. They also noted how the order of things had been happily re-established in France with the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy before going on to articulate a similar goal of restoring between France and her Neighbors those relations of reciprocal confidence and goodwill which the fatal effects of the Revolution and of the system of conquest had for so long a time disturbed." Ibid., 23–26. Slantchev argues that "The Vienna settlement was the creation of a contract that enabled participants to commit credibly to upholding the Concert. The agreement structured incentives such that they produced a credible deterrent to potential revisionists, facilitated cooperation in protecting the new boundaries, and ensured the satisfaction of the most powerful actors. In an anarchic environment, such an agreement could have succeeded only if it had been self-enforcing, which in turn implies that it must have been reached through a bargaining process in which each party's gain was consistent with its strengths." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium", p.589. This approach is incomplete in a sense that no power achieved sufficient power beyond its capacity. That means that no power had adequate capacity to set up hegemonic order at the end of the Napoleonic war. Britain recognized this fact and wanted to preserve such favoring status quo through peacetime mechanisms such as periodic conferences. Furthermore, it is not rational to talk about self-enforcing about the Concert of 1815 without any formal institutions similar to the League of Nations or the United Nations. Kissinger perfectly formulizes the shortage of the institutional order of the nineteenth century by including the interwar institutional attempts; "Legitimacy without power tempts empty posture and power without legitimacy tempts test of

strength.” Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, chapter four. Also see, James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” *International Organization* 52, no. 2, spring 1998, pp. 266–307.

¹² Slantchev claims that “In the eighteenth century, conflict over territory was the principal source of war. In the first half of the nineteenth century, territory ceased to be a significant source of friction, and war between the great powers did not occur. Since it is unlikely that the character of states had changed, this sharp change in their behavior had to reflect their strategic interaction in the new context, in which threats to enforce the settlement were perceived as credible. The Concert worked without an overarching principle, a formal organization to resolve disputes, or a system of collective security to enforce its rules...credibility of the endogenous enforcement threat... (essential feature of the concert) ... credible commitments to uphold it (concert) because it delineated spheres of influence such that any significant changes would impinge directly on the interests of enough powers to allow them to counter any such revisionism.” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium”, p. 566. Slantchev, thus, distinguish the Concert of 1815 from the traditional balance of power, and for him “equilibrium was sustained through endogenous enforcement threats and satisfaction with the status quo.” *Ibid.*, p. 569. Slantchev thus share the same point with Lipson who claim that “Concert succeeded without the need for elaborate new institutions and without transforming the self-interested behavior of states.” Charles Lipson, “Is the Future of Collective Security Like Its Past?” in *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, ed. George W. Downs, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 119. Because, for both, Concert system is “self-enforcing equilibrium, or concert of Europe achieved, without formal and legal binding institutions, credibility of endogenous enforcement threat to potential revisionists, or anti-revolutionist.” Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium” p.567.

¹³ For Kissinger, “leaving off the Eastern question was a mistake and Crimean war could be prevented within this assumption.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, chapter five and six. Slantchev advance further this approach that “because of its dependence on a fixed territorial distribution, it could not account for technological changes that would alter the value of some pieces of territory. Nobody could anticipate in 1815 that the useless lands assigned to Prussia would provide the basis of its industrialization fifty years later. Second, the Vienna settlement disposed of only European lands; it excluded similar arrangements outside the continent. In particular, it did not deal with territories in the east, where Britain and Russia could come into conflict with each other. It was not possible to handle these lands in 1815 because the Ottoman Empire had not been a participant in the Napoleonic Wars...this meant that events outside of Europe could impinge on the cooperative equilibrium there, especially if one of the potential revisionists hit upon the idea of antagonizing either one of the two dominant powers sufficiently to cause it to withdraw its support for the system in order to redirect it to the east. As we shall see, the Crimean War allowed France to do just that to Russia, essentially spelling the demise of the Concert. But even without this war, the Concert may not have been able to contain Prussia for much longer.” Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium” pp. 567-569. For further survey, see David S. Landes, “The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; and William H. McNeill, “The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000,” Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Gulick also mentions that “...in the former on the startling increase of coal output in the Ruhr. Prussia received territories in the west and was immensely increased on the Rhine when Russia forced the settlement in the east.” Edward Vose Gulick, “Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft”, New York: Norton, 1967, pp.257-262; Matthew Rendall observes that “the great powers often disagreed whether the norms of the concert should even be applied to the Near East”, Matthew Rendall, “Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821–29: A Test of Hypotheses about the Vienna System,” *Security Studies* 9, no. 4, summer 2000, pp. 52–90. Enno emphasizes that “the Anglo-Russian rivalry... there was real, keenly felt, and on Russia’s side at any rate vigorously pressed.” Enno E. Kraehe, “A Bipolar Balance of Power,” *American Historical Review* 97, no. 3, June 1992, pp.707–15. Webster argues that “Alexander I himself ominously protested in 1821 that the Ottoman dominions were not protected by the Vienna Treaty.” Charles K. Webster, “The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815–1822”, London: G. Bell, 1958, p.373. Also, Ingram claims that “the Vienna Settlement, which left out too much and put in too little, defined Europe too narrowly by leaving out the Ottoman Empire.” Edward Ingram, “Bellicism as Boomerang: The Eastern Question during the Vienna System,” in “The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848: Episode or Model in Modern History?”, ed. Peter Kruger and Paul W. Schroder, Munster: Lit Verlag, 2002, p. 206. I agree with his assessment that “the challenge from the

periphery that transformed the European subsystem in the mid-nineteenth century was implicit in the map drawn at the Congress of Vienna." Ibid., p.209. He seems to be elaborating the point, however, by insisting that "the European powers simply exported their bellicosity to the periphery, and hence that the European peace can be explained by warfare outside the system." Ibid. p. 211.

¹⁴ Owen claims that "An increasing divide between the powers over whether and how to respond to liberal revolutions across the continent became alarmingly clear once liberal revolutions broke out across multiple European polities in 1820 with Castlereagh's absence at the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach (Ljubljana). Differences became alarmingly clear, once liberal revolutions broke out, between the eastern and western Concert powers that would never be reconciled. The eastern powers immediately demanded a congress to organize a concerted response. Yet Great Britain (through Castlereagh) was arguing that unless revolutions clearly threatened international tranquility, they were outside of the Concert's scope of influence. Britain not only continued Castlereagh's tradition of opposing concerted anti-liberal interventions after 1820, but also began lending rhetorical and even material support to pro-liberal revolutionary causes abroad. These actions, often undertaken with the support of France, unsurprisingly provoked Metternich and the eastern powers to put higher and higher emphasis on their anti-revolutionary interventionist practices, eroding at least some of the powers' trust in the Concert system and each other." John M. Owen, "The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010," Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 147–148; Also see, Albrecht-Carrie, Rene, "The Concert of Europe", New York: Walker & Company, 1968, p. 48; On the development of these adversary ideological blocks within the concert of Europe, see Mark L. Haas, "The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics", 1789–1989, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005, Chapter 3.

¹⁵ Jervis points out that "Realists are the Concert skeptics, arguing either that the Concert never actually existed or that it consisted only of high-minded rhetoric that had little tangible effect on state behavior." Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983; Also see, Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1985; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1991; and Dan Lindley, "Avoiding Tragedy in Power Politics: The Concert of Europe, Transparency, and Crisis Management," *Security Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2003; G. John Ikenberry, "After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, Chapter 4. Moreover, Ikenberry claims that "the realist claim that the European Concert rested on a little more than traditional balance of-power thinking—a grand strategic maxim that had already dominated European diplomacy for at least 100 years prior to the Concert—is a position that is no longer regarded as tenable in the vast majority of Concert scholarship." Ibid. p. 44. As Jennifer Mitzen recently put it, "the realist perspective overlooks the fact that the leaders themselves intended to manage Europe together. They did not think that their redrawing of the map of Europe and redistribution of territory and political control . . . had the force to keep the peace. That is precisely why they chose to renew the alliance in November 1815 and insert an article in that treaty that called for consultation." Jennifer Mitzen, "Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance", Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, pp. 22–23. For all their ongoing deep disagreements over the Concert of Europe, scholars have generally agreed, according to Kupchan, that "its architects viewed what they were doing as, in many ways, a repudiation of balance-of-power diplomacy, not a reaffirmation of it. Scholars of the liberal international relations persuasion, by contrast, treat the Concert as a primitive but successful version of a conflict-mediating international organization. Specifically, liberals characterize the Concert as either (1) a multilateral forum that decreased the difficulties of negotiation among many parties (transaction costs) while increasing the reliable information each could learn about one another in these negotiations (transparency) or (2) a particularly institutionalized version of a military alliance that contained novel provisions for limiting the exercise of raw power by its most-dominant members, Great Britain and Russia." Charles A. Kupchan, "How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010, Chapter 5. On designing a shared transnational identity, see Bruce Cronin, "Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation", New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, Chapter 3; Also see, Mark L. Haas, "The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989", Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005, Chapter 3; and Paul W. Schroeder, "The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848", New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

¹⁶ Slantchev argues that "Britain and Russia could not be challenged militarily and consequently managed to achieve most of their goals, ensuring their relative satisfaction with the new status quo...

restraint arising from self-interested behavior largely resting on satisfaction with the status quo.” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium”, p. 590. The point that I want to draw your attention on is the “new status quo.” It is exogenously given and reinforced, as Slantchev defined similarly, by self-enforcing, or self-restraining, the Concert system of 1815. It is self-restraining because it was born out of divergent self-interests of states. This is theoretically neo-realist approach. However, I claim that Post-1815 balance of power is different from that of pre-1815 in a sense that states began to implement peacetime principles of diplomacy through periodic conferences. Moreover, not preferences but incentives were shaped and constrained to some extent by such mechanisms.

¹⁷ With regards to relative power and balance of power, Powell argues that “the guns-versus-butter game presumes a conventional military technology in which the probability of victory or defeat depends on the relative sizes of the opposing military forces. Given this stylized assumption about military technology, the states’ balance against each other in the way we would expect the units to do in an anarchic system.” Robert Powell, “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, March 1993, pp. 115-132. He further his critical approach to Waltzian structural theory that “a state must decide how much of its output to consume, how much to allocate to its military sector, and whether or not to attack the other state. Each state’s utility is the discounted sum of its consumption in each period. As long as neither state attacks, the game continues. The fact that a state’s probability of victory depends on its military allocation creates a trade-off between current and expected future consumption. The more a state consumes today, the smaller its military allocation, and the higher the probability of defeat. The guns-versus-butter game presumes that the probability of victory or defeat depends on the relative sizes of the opposing military forces.” *Ibid.* 133. As can be seen, by opposing to Waltzian generalization that “no higher authority exists that can prevent them from using the means they have due to lack of world government.” Powell, by accepting it as the puzzle, stresses on “unit level and military-oriented balance of power, or potential use of force to the lack of a central authority (anarchic system), but within the context of the guns-versus-butter game, as an alternative to anarchic system-driven behavioral outcome (countervailing power relation), or structural constraints with regard to balance of power.” *Ibid.*, pp. 321-333. Thus, Powell claims that “anarchy, while perhaps a necessary condition, is certainly not sufficient to explain any of the variation in international politics during the modern era. In particular, anarchy cannot account for whatever variation in the level of international cooperation and institutionalization there has been. Whether units balance or not depends as much on other features defining the strategic situation in which they interact as it does on the presence of anarchy.” *Ibid.*, p.332. However, this “political development of the guns-versus-butter game did begin to change approximately as the industrial revolution began to place its impact exclusively on the military capacity of each state in the Continental Europe.” James Morrow, “Social Choice and System Structure,” *World Politics* 41, October 1988, pp. 75-97. We should develop a more careful analysis of the strategic settings in which sovereign units interact if we are to explain the pattern of their interaction in global arena in order to figure out institutional balance of power within anarchy during the nineteenth century. Powell argues that “When we use the guns-versus-butter model to isolate the effects of anarchy, we find that conclusions claimed to follow from the assumption of anarchy depend at least as much on other unarticulated assumptions about the units’ strategic environment.” Robert Powell, “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy,” p. 333. Robert Jervis provides four main assumptions that constitute the balance of power: “all states must want to survive, they are able to form alliances with each other based on short-term interests, war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft, and several of the actors have relatively equal military capabilities.” Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” *World Politics* 38, no. 1, October 1985, pp. 58–79. Slantchev also make a critical approach toward Jervis’s elaboration on balance of power system that “In such a system, the growth in any one state’s power will eventually be checked by a countervailing coalition of others who become fearful of its expansion and the eventual threat it will pose to the system as it makes its bid for hegemony. From here there are two divergent traditions: one maintains that balancing is automatic, a side effect, a consequence of state behavior but not its goal, and the other sees states as actively pursuing strategies designed to maintain the balance... None of these features can be discerned during the Concert period.” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium”, p. 599. His critical approach was to define “the Concert as self-enforcing threat based on either satisfaction or deterrence, rather than traditional balance of power, and it is the credibility of endogenous enforcement threat to potential revisionists that extended the longevity of the Concert of Europe.” *Ibid.*, pp. 568-605. I agree with him that by such an assumption there is no need to discuss like Waltz that “the concert is autopilot version”, or for some, “it is consciously designed with regard to balance of power.” See, Kenneth N. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”, New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1979; Paul W. Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" *American Historical Review* 97, no. 3, June 1992, pp. 683–706. There were already two hegemonic powers, and asymmetric power relations, but none of them attempted to break the balance of power due to self-enforcing nature of the system. Such situation has nothing to do with the traditional balance of power in oppose to Jervis's definition.

¹⁸ Kupchan argues that "Against the liberals, characterizing the Concert as even a primitive international organization comparable to the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seems problematic. The Concert had no formal or permanent bureaucracy and—outside of the initial treaties and whatever notes, minutes, or declarations individual delegations decided to write down—codified virtually nothing about its procedures, processes, and principles. In fact, several scholars attribute the Concert's effectiveness not to robust collective security guarantees or institutionalized commitments but to a distinct lack of these features that allowed it to remain flexible and adaptive to changing circumstances." Charles A. Kupchan, "How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010, Chapter 5. Also See, Elrod, 1976; Slantchev, 2005, especially pp. 591, 606.

¹⁹ My dissertation is exclusively neither theoretical discussion nor historical description. However, without having theoretical background and historical knowledge, to my personal knowledge, it will be hard to make conclusive statements about the developments in international relations. Discussions on the purpose of theory in international relations, the role and contribution of IR theory in world politics and, more specifically, the position of IR theory are all to be assumed as beyond the discussions for my dissertation. My starting point is simply the same with those who assume that international relations and the history of modern state began with the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648. This period coincides with Cardinal Richelieu's *raison d'état*, and realism best fit to describe the Westphalian system. Accordingly, during the early stage of the political history of the international relations, states emerged as the sovereign political units, and each owned their sovereign equal status. By self-national interest, states' moral judgement has nothing to do with the foreign affairs. Hierarchy matters only in domestic matters. States do not recognize any above authority, thereby there emerges anarchy in which we observe sovereign equals. By disregarding the Neorealist approach that it is the system that determines state action and each perceives threat similarly, thereby there is no functional differentiations among them, Realism claims in general that states' primary concern is to survive, and it is impossible to eradicate both wars and concern on relative power position, and also fear of cheating. That's why, it is not rational, in this anarchic system, to assume long-term cooperation. Realism disregards differences in domestic structures of the sovereign states, but emphasize on power positions of each. What we need to know is that the United Kingdom of the nineteenth century had the objective of ending the Richelieu's *raison d'état*, or discarding the universalization of the Westphalian system. Because too much decentralized Europe was not permitting long-term alliance. The most important achievement in the Vienna system was reached by defensive domestic structure of the German Confederation and periodic conferences.

²⁰ In my dissertation I felt myself in dilemma on whether to include the United States as a constraint upon the Vienna System of the nineteenth century. The U.S, with the proclamation of Monroe Doctrine, wanted to keep Europe off its so-called internal affairs by claiming that any interference in Latin, central or North America would be considered as a threat for the U.S. national interest. Buying Louisiana from Napoleon in 1803, Monroe Doctrine of 1823, Civil War of 1861-65, emergence of the U.S. as the supreme manufacturing good producer soon after the Civil War, Open Door Policy in late nineteenth century, Theodore Roosevelt's approach to balance of power, and Wilson's foreign policy based on collective security are some of crucial landmarks for the U.S. participation in global politics of the Continental Europe. Kissinger maintains that "America's singular approach to international affairs did not develop all at once...throughout the nineteenth century, Great Britain was considered the greatest challenge to American interests, and the Royal Navy the most serious strategic threat." Henry A. Kissinger, "Diplomacy", New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p.456; Henry A. Kissinger, "World Order", New York: Penguin, 2014, p. 19. He points out the very stage of U.S. foreign policy in early 19th century that "American foreign policy was in fact a sophisticated reflection of the American national interest, which was, simply to fortify the new nation's independence. Since no European country was capable of posing an actual threat so long as it had to contend with rivals, the Founding Fathers...manipulate the despised balance of power when it suited their needs; indeed, they could be...skillful at maneuvering between France and Great Britain not only to preserve America's independence but to enlarge its frontiers. Because they really wanted neither side to win a decisive victory in the wars of the French Revolution, they declared neutrality. Jefferson defined the Napoleonic Wars as a contest between the tyrant on the land (France) and the tyrant of the ocean (England)." Ibid.,

p. 33. Thus, we can observe the constraint on Britain while political developments in Europe was urging Europe to go well beyond its capacity. Napoleon exploited more and more such British incapacity by selling Louisiana in 1803 to compensate French incapacity to challenge Royal Navy Power of the U.K. Deudney argues that "Until the turn of the twentieth century, American foreign policy was basically to fulfill the country's manifest destiny, and to remain free of entanglements overseas. America favored democratic governments wherever possible, but abjured action to vindicate its preferences." Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, Spring 1995, pp. 191-228. Upon all those assumptions, I decided to take the American case out of my discussion in my dissertation due to its important, but limited constraining impact on the general balance of power in the nineteenth century. However, such an approach contradicts my unit of analysis which is participant, sovereign state Continental Europe. To ease this contradiction, it may well be said that the American self-restraint created constraint on the leading British power particularly, but not the rest who mainly got engaged in countervailing relations within the Continent at least until the late 19th century. Kissinger describes the puzzle that Britain confronted in a way that "The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 arose from the attempt of the Holy Alliance to suppress the revolution in Spain in the 1820s. Opposed to intervention in domestic affairs in principle, Great Britain was equally unwilling to countenance the Holy Alliance in the Western Hemisphere." Henry A. Kissinger, "World Order", New York: Penguin, 2014, chapter two. "United States applied the Monroe Doctrine on many occasions to exclude European colonialism from the New World as a unilateral American decision." Ibid. p.56. The growth of the United States on the basis of Monroe Doctrine constituted relatively heavy constraint on the British long-term interest. Not just American isolationist policy within the context of the Monroe Doctrine, even though it became world's major industrial power in manufacturing output, its army was not strong enough, ranked fourteenth in the world. See Paul Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000", New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 143-275. It was not until the (Theodore) Roosevelt Administration and the Algeciras Conference of 1906, to settle the dispute over Morocco, The U.S. was gradually drawn into European affairs. Kissinger claims that "Roosevelt gradually came to see Germany as a threat to the European balance and began to identify America's national interest with those of Great Britain and France." Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy", New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p.24. However, the U.S. foreign policy together with Britain to support Japan against Russia and the Japanese victory on Russia would result in that Russia's turn back to its historical ambitions on the Balkan peninsula. But the cost of 19th century unproductive Russian policy in Europe and the defeat of 1905, high dependence on British subsidies and loans were all increasing the social unrest in Russian domestic politics, which would lead to October Revolution of 1917 in Russia. What was aimed by supporting Japan was to impose limited defeat on Russia to keep countervailing power position of Russia against Germany. But, this was not an achieved one as exposed by the outbreak of Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. This could be regarded as the very stage of the unprecedented conflict of two ideologies, which would be the foundation of bipolar Cold War era. Throughout the 19th century, on many occasions the U.S. was voicing that it is the beacon of liberty for the rest of mankind, but at the turn of the century, particularly, by the Roosevelt Administration, "the U.S. wanted no more than to improve the balance of power and to invest America's role in it with the importance commensurate with its growing strength. Wilson followed very different strategic restraint by collective security which disregarded domestic matters by focusing on moral values and emphasize on democratic principles for the international law of rule in which threat was regarded as identical for all and through general disarmament World peace was within reach." Ibid. p. 56. What's significant that at the turn of the century, requirements of the balance of power was going beyond the U.K.'s capacity and U.S. was becoming more and more entangled with the affairs of the Continental Europe. Even though Wilson put blame on traditional balance of power, his emphasize on peace without victory very identical with that of the U.K.'s foreign policy during the Vienna system of 1815 by its inclusiveness. Containment of France was achieved, while the containment of Germany after World War I was failed, by no punitive peace of Vienna settlement. British demand for unconditional surrender of Napoleon was completely different from the unconditional surrender of Germany particularly soon after the U.S. did not ratify the Versailles Treaty and withdrew from all what it initiated, including the League of Nations due to Article X. The Versailles Treaty turned out to be punishment for Germany in the case of never-applied fully reparation and demilitarization due to lack of enforcement machine and absence of long-term periodic conferences of the 19th century. For further survey, see Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 109-39; A.J.P. Taylor, "The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918", Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954, pp.

1–2; Paul M. Kennedy, "The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914", London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1980; Norman Rich, "Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914", New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992.

²¹ Ikenberry claims that "the willingness and ability of states to offer and enter into these self-binding bargaining hinge on the types of states involved and the character of postwar power disparities. Democracies are better able to do so, but are also often unwilling. The greater power disparities in power, the more opportunities the leading state must lock in a favorable order, and the more weaker and the secondary states will be attracted to institutional arrangements that lower the risks of domination or abandonment." G.J. Ikenberry, "After Victory; Institutions, Strategies, and the rebuilding of order after major wars", New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001, p.51. I think the underlying condition for institutional restraining strategy by the initial initiative taken by leading state is that no state can be hegemon. Therefore, the rational way is to keep status quo by saving relations from balancing power with power. This is the logic for institutional order building starting by the Vienna Conference of 1815.

²² Slantchev argues that "The fifty-odd years after the Napoleonic wars, usually referred to as the Concert of Europe, have been either lauded for their stable peace or denounced for their reactionary anti-liberalism. Several arguments have been advanced to explain their stability: balance of power, fear of provoking revolution and self-conscious management, assimilation, change in preferences, and general system legitimacy. These, of course, are not mutually exclusive." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium", p. 599. For excellent histories of the nineteenth century, see Charles K. Webster, "The Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815", London: Thames and Hudson, 1934; Harold Nicolson, "The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812–1822", London: Constable, 1946; and Tim Chapman, "The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes, and Results", London: Routledge, 1998; Paul W. Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics* 39, October 1986, pp. 1– 26.

²³ Ikenberry claims that "the third choice is for the leading state is to use its commanding power position to gain acquiescence and participation in a mutually acceptable postwar order. The goal would be to establish a set of rules and rearrangements that also serve the long-term interests of the leading state." G.J. Ikenberry, "After Victory; Institutions, Strategies, and the rebuilding of order after major wars", p.59.

²⁴ My starting point theoretically goes in parallel with the way Paul Schroeder holds argument that "States generally tried to balance against power or threat; states are not functionally differentiated in international politics; potential hegemonies are countered and defeated by the balancing efforts of other states; unipolar periods motivate other states to rise to great power status as part of the general tendency to balance and to emulate successful military and organizational development." Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994, p. 111. Again, my purpose is not to test whether neo-realism provides a paradigm for figuring out the general nature of international politics in terms of its broad outcomes and general patterns. Another point is that I do not attempt to monopolize historical case by a specific international relations theory, or revise and improve international relations theory in general, but rather designing a unique methodological thought and approach in International relations theory to understand how institutionalism firstly brought about in early nineteenth century with the establishment of the Concert of Europe in 1815 by Vienna settlement in the context of opportunities and constraints upon sovereign states in anarchic system of balance of power order. Moreover, for a detailed attempt to demonstrate how the realist paradigm does not explain a long and crucial period, see Paul W. Schroeder, "The Transformation of European Politics", 1763-1848, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

²⁵ Mitzen argues that "months long meeting of the major foreign policy representatives of Europe's polities produced only a small portion of the rules that came to define the Vienna System. But it fostered spirit that led to the remarkable instances of cooperation in the decades thereafter." Jennifer Mitzen, "Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance", Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, chapter three.

²⁶ Kupchan and Ikenberry made the point clear by claiming that "Why principled agreement is sought by leading postwar states and how it might be secured among unequal states are important questions that neorealist hegemonic theories cannot answer." G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization*, Vol.44, No.3, Summer 1990, pp. 283-315.

²⁷ Kissinger claims that "Europe was thrown into balance of power politics when its first choice, the medieval dream of universal empire, collapsed and a host of states of more or less equal strength arose from the ashes of that ancient aspiration. ...there are only two possible outcomes: either one state becomes so strong that it dominates all the others and creates an empire, or no state is ever quite

powerful enough to achieve that goal.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p.19.

²⁸ Few scholars did get almost satisfied with an understanding of hegemonic order built simply around the arbitrary exercise of material capacities. Robert Keohane, for example, notes that “theories of hegemony should seek not only to analyze dominant powers’ decisions to engage in rule-making and rule-enforcement, but also to explore why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemony”, and stresses that “these theories need to account for the legitimacy of hegemonic regimes and for the coexistence of cooperation.” Robert Keohane, “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the world Political Hegemony”, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.39. Likewise, Robert Gilpin argues that “the governance of the international system is in part maintained by the prestige and moral leadership of the hegemonic power. Although the authority of the hegemonic power is ultimately established by the military and economic supremacy, the position of the dominant power may be supported by ideological, religious or other values common to a set of states.” Robert Gilpin, “War and Changes in World Politics”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 34.

²⁹ Waltz’s statement of neorealism assigns little significance to the role of international institutions in international relations. For recent discussions of international institutions within the realist paradigm, see Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, “A Tale of Two Realism: Expanding the Institutions Debate,” *Merston International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, Supplement, May 1997, pp. 1-32; Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No: 1, Summer 1999, pp. 42-63.

³⁰ Robert Powell’s theoretical generalization perfectly fits the second half of the Concert of Europe: “The possibility that institutions may not adjust smoothly and that the existing institutional arrangements and distribution of benefits may not reflect the underlying distribution of power is a recurrent theme in international politics.” Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate”, pp. 341-342. Powell quoted from Gilpin that “Robert Gilpin, for example, sees this as the cause of hegemonic war. A hegemon establishes an international order and associated distribution of benefits that favors the hegemon. Over time, the hegemon’s relative power declines because of uneven economic growth, and the existing order and distribution of benefits no longer reflect the distribution of power. This sets the scene for another hegemonic conflict.” *Ibid.*, p. 342; Also see, Robert Gilpin, “War and Change in World Politics”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Krasner also argues that “When regimes are first created, they generally reflect the underlying distribution of power. But the pressure to change the regime builds over time as the distribution of power changes. This pressure does not lead to a smooth adjustment.” Stephen Krasner, “Regimes and the Limits of Realism,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 355-68. In the neorealist-neoliberal debate, Keohane generally emphasizes “market failures, transaction costs, uncertainty, information, and institutions as important means of cooperation.” Robert Keohane, “After Hegemony”, p. 33. But he also argues that international institutional history matters. “Once institutions or regimes are established, actors behave in ways that, whether deliberately or not, make it costly to change the regime or build a new one.” *Ibid.*, p. 10. Thus, “even if the original distribution of power underlying the regime shifts, the now more powerful states will not change the regime unless the distribution of power has shifted to such an extent that the benefits of a new regime, which would reflect the new distribution of power, outweigh the cost of changing the existing regime. The cost of changing or constructing new regimes thus gives existing regimes some resilience to shifts in the balance of power.” *Ibid.*, 104-105. “The high costs of regime-building help existing regimes persist.”, *Ibid.*, 109. The best example is the duration of the overall (institutional) balance of power of the Vienna system after Bismarck unified Germany. It was only after 1890, the regime failed to respond, and the total devastation of the Concert of Europe resulted in new regime. But this regime was also institutional order considering the collective security within the foundation of the League of Nations. History matter as there has been increasing returns to institutions since 1815. Powell argues the same point that “Previous institutional choices do not constrain or significantly affect the future institutional arrangements and the future distribution of benefit.” Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate”, pp. 342-343. History matters even in the pre-1815 period, but restraining pacts and strategies were all within the framework of relative gains and short term (substitutive) bargaining.

³¹ For comparisons of American and British hegemony, see Robert Gilpin, “US Power and Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign direct investment”, New York: Basic Books, 1975; David Lake, “British and American Hegemony Compared: Lesson or the current Era of Decline”; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Bound to Lead: The changing nature of American Power,” New York: Basic Books, 1992.

³² For discussion of how neoliberal institutional theory is helpful in accounting for strategic rivalry, distributive struggles, and (competitive) security relations between, unequal, sovereign states, see Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate", New York: Colombia University Press, 1993, pp. 269-300; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. *International Security*", Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, pp. 39-51.

³³ Balance of power theory of neorealists failed to account for the situation that "intergovernmental organizations like NATO and UN did not weaken and European powers did not return to strategic rivalry at the end of the cold war." John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, Summer, 1990, pp. 5-57; Also see, Mearsheimer, "why we will soon miss the Cold War," *Atlantic*, No. 266, August, 1990, pp. 35-50; Conor Cruise O'Brien, "The Future of the West," *National Interest*, No. 30 Winter 1992/93, pp. 3-10; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and American are Drifting Apart," *National Interest*, No. 54, Winter, 1998/99, pp. 3-11.

³⁴ Grieco perfectly frames institutional order in international relations that in critical approach that "The problem with institutional binding strategies is that they leave states potentially exposed to the opportunistic actions of other states. The leading state, in placing limits on its use of power, must be confident that it will not be exploited by secondary states, and secondary states must be confident that they are not opening themselves to domination or abandonment by the leading state. For self-regarding states to agree to pursue their interests within binding institutions, they must convey to each other a credible sense of commitment. They must be something certain that binding institutions actually do bind. They must reassure each other that they will not abandon their mutual restraint and exploit momentary advantages. Neorealists, of course, argue that such guarantees are never sufficient to go forward with far reaching institutionalized cooperation. Under conditions of anarchy neorealists assert, states will be reluctant to seek even mutually advantageous agreements if it leaves them vulnerable to cheating and or the relative gains of others. In a self-help system such as anarchy, states face huge obstacles to institutionalized cooperation because the interdependence and differentiation that comes with it are manifest within an anarchy as vulnerability." Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 485-507

³⁵ See, Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusions: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5-51; Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 86-124; and Josef Joffe, "Bismarck or Britain? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," *International security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 94-117.

³⁶ See Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4, Spring 1997, pp. 49-88; Robert F. Lieber, "Response to Walt, The Ties That Fray," *National Interest*, No. 55, Spring 1999, p. 114.

³⁷ William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 5-41.

³⁸ See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring, 1999, pp. 179-96.

³⁹ Zacher and Matthew claim that "Theories of the democratic peace, pluralistic society communities, complex interdependence, and international regimes all identify important features of international relations, and they are particularly useful in explaining aspects of relations among the Western industrial countries in the postwar period." Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Mathew, "Liberal International Relations Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands," in Charles W. Kegley, ed. "Contraversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge", New York: St. Martin's, 1995. For an important elaboration for liberal theory, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513-53.

⁴⁰ Ikenberry argues that "The explanation of how and for what reason the practice of using institutions to tie states together as a restraining pact emerged in 1815 as an alternative to balance of power order, and reappeared in even more sophisticated shape after the two world wars are all important historical and theoretical puzzles." John G. Ikenberry, "After Victory", *Ibid.* 8-9.

⁴¹ The liberal-regime literature on international relations literature is very extensive. For overviews, see Stephen Krasner, ed., "International Regimes", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981; Steph Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 491-517; Volker Rittberger, ed., "Regime Theory and International Relations",

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittnerberger, "Theories of International Regimes", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. For excellent survey of institutional and regime theory, see Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, ed., "Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics", pp. 89-117. Shepsle argues that "The neoliberal approach argues that institutions are essentially functional or utilitarian solutions to problems encountered by rational actors seeking to organize their environment in a way that advances their interests. Institutions are to be regarded as agreements about the structure of cooperation that reduces transaction costs, opportunism and other forms of slippage." Shepsle, "International Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., *Political Science. The Science of Politics*, New York: Agathon, 1986, p.74.

⁴² As Alexander Wendt argues that "Constructivists are interested in the construction of identity and interests and, as such, take a more sociological than economic approach to theory." Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 285-384. Adopting similar view, Peter J. Katzenstein argues that "institutional power can be seen to mold the identity of the states themselves and thus the interests they hold." Peter J. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an integrating Europe," in Katzenstein, ed., "Tamed Power: Germany in Europe", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 5.

⁴³ Ruggie argues that "The organization of postwar order reflects the prevailing thinking among those party to the settlements about what the proper principles and purposes of international order should be. This prevailing thinking, in turn, is rooted in the principles and purposes that shape the fundamental identities of the states themselves." John. G. Ruggie, "The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, ed., "Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institution", New York: Colombia University Press, 1993, pp. 46-47. John Ruggie takes further his argument that "multilateralism became the basic organizing principle that allowed the emerging interstate system to cope with the consequences of state sovereignty. Multilateralism furthermore provided an institutional form that defined and stabilized the international property rights of states and facilitated the resolution of coordination and collaboration problems." *Ibid.*, p. 33-34.

⁴⁴ The more general claim in the neoliberal approach do we observe in Keohane's pathbreaking study is that "states -in the rational pursuit of their self-interest-often find incentives and opportunities to establish institutions that reduce transaction costs and overcome other obstacles to cooperation." Keohane, "International Institutions: Two approaches," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, December 1988, pp. 379-96, and Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 39-51. See also Lisa Martin, "Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions", Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

⁴⁵ See Lisa Martin, "An Institutional View: International Institutions and State Strategies," in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, ed., "International Order and Future of World Politics", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

⁴⁶ Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 1991, p.282. See also Young, "International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and Environment", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.

⁴⁷ Ikenberry argues that "domination can be pursued in the settlement itself by imposing severe penalties and extracting oversized reparations from the defeated states. Domination can also be pursued well into the future, using superior power capabilities to bully other states over the entire range of economic and political relations." G. John Ikenberry, "After Victory", New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 50.

⁴⁸ Schroeder argues that "Apart from the strategy of supporting the weaker side and bandwagoning, neutrality is another strategy that contradicts Waltzian neo-realist assumption of self-help system of sovereign units in anarchic order. Self-help may not be possible without others' help in alliance type relations to deter the aggressor. However, mechanism of self-help will be meaningful if we define it as a means to preserve its position within its interest and there is no one to do that on behalf of it. This implies that short-term calculations are a matter of each sovereign states' policy to conserve and secure its power position. No one could help any state while making short term calculation, involving alliance, as threat comes into existence. Therefore, self-help does not mean states have enough power to preserve itself, but states are the ones who can make rational short term calculations to preserve its power position. There is no one else to do such policy on behalf of them in anarchic system. There is no 911 to call for help." Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", pp. 115-119. Schroeder

perfectly describes four main strategies employed by sovereign units in a way that “One commonly employed strategy was hiding from threats. This could take various forms: simply ignoring the threat or declaring neutrality in a general crisis, possibly approaching other states on one or both sides of a quarrel to get them to guarantee one’s safety; trying to withdraw into isolation; assuming a purely defensive position in the hope that the storm would blow over; or, usually as a last resort, seeking protection from some other power or powers in exchange for diplomatic services, friendship, or non-military support, without joining that power or powers as an ally or committing itself to any use of force on its part.” Ibid., p. 122. He also claims that “What it is called hiding may be related to buck-passing.” Ibid., p. 123. Also see, Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 137-168. Schroeder advances the concept of strategy that “A strategy less common, but far from unusual, was transcending, i.e., attempting to surmount international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of conflictual politics; to solve the problem and prevent its recurrence through some institutional arrangement involving an international consensus or formal agreement on norms, rules, and procedures for these purposes.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, p. 112. Also see Ikenberry for the same discussion, “After Victory”, pp. 97-98. Another strategy is shared by Schroeder: “it is bandwagoning, i.e., joining the stronger side for the sake of protection and payoffs, even if this meant insecurity vis-a-vis the protecting power and a certain sacrifice of independence.” Ibid., 126. Also see on the tendency for balancing over bandwagoning in international relations, Waltz, “The Origins of Alliances”, pp. 17-33, 263-66. I agree with Schroeder that alliance could also be regarded as bandwagoning rather than balancing; “Against the views of some, such as Waltz and Stephen M. Walt, I see bandwagoning as historically more common than balancing, particularly by smaller powers.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, p. 117.

⁴⁹ Ikenberry mentions in his book that “to get the willing participation and compliance of other states, the leading state must offer to limit its own autonomy and ability to exercise power arbitrarily.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p. 51.

⁵⁰ Krasner mentions that “the modern state system, conventionally dated from 1648, has always been anarchic in the sense that it lacked a common government.” Stephen D. Krasner, “Westphalia and All That,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., “Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change” Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 238. That is why Powell claims that “Thus, anarchy, while perhaps a necessary condition, is certainly not sufficient to explain any of the variation in international politics during the modern era. In particular, anarchy cannot account for whatever variation in the level of international cooperation and institutionalization.” Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate”, *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring, 1994, pp. 332.

⁵¹ Schroeder opposes any theory endorsing the existence of balance of power in the nineteenth century and maintain that “Why didn’t these two (the dual Anglo-Russian hegemony) simply impose their rules on the rest? Restraint and stability arose from mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law, and an overall balance among the various actors in terms of rights, security, status, claims, duties, and satisfactions rather than power.” Paul W. Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?”, *American Historical Review* 97, no. 3, June 1992, pp. 705–706. However, Slantchev argues that “Anglo-Russian restraint is even more puzzling in the light of how the two states had behaved barely thirty years earlier: how can a system based on hegemonies be peaceful when a similar one had promoted near constant warfare from 1792 on?” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, p.594.

⁵² During the pre-1815 period, we observe, in almost every major crisis, that different states perceiving the same threat or similar ones adopted different strategies. Britain by the Vienna settlement of 1815 attempted to set up international legitimacy within institutional order through consolidating state autonomy by giving them institutionalized voice opportunity in decision making in the context of consultation through periodic conferences. Gagliardo provides proofs for short-term interest; “The crisis of 1785 in the Holy Roman Empire, or Reich, caused by the Austrian Emperor Joseph II’s attempt to exchange the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) for Bavaria.” John C. Gagliardo, “Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763-1806”, Bloomington: de France, 1976, pp. 145-168. He elaborates on the same example that “Almost all German states and principalities saw this move as a threat to the German internal and external balance. The reason the proposed move would threaten the independence and security of the Reich and its members was not just that it would strengthen Austria, but also and mainly that it would damage the Reich, or the Reich constitution, as legal order guaranteeing the liberties of all its members.” Ibid. p. 157. Kissinger indicated the same point that “during the Vienna settlement of 1815, the domestic structure of German Confederation was

made more consolidated by reducing the number of principalities to make it stronger defense league, and England realized that the balance of power on German land is so delicate in a sense that either stronger or weaker Germany always resulted in instability and absence of order in continental Europe. Domestic structure of Germany, the confederation of Germany, is the crucial unit for the overall balance of power in the nineteenth century.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, chapter 4. Paul Schroeder exhibits the disorganized strategy of balance of power by giving the example of the 1785 crisis; “Many units hid from the threat, i.e., simply ignored the issue or remained neutral, even though they knew the outcome might affect them critically. Some balanced against it. Prussia and Hanover, old rivals, joined to exploit an idea of forming a Protestant League of Princes to check the Catholic Emperor, Joseph II. Some bandwagoned to the winning side Prussian side. But some also tried to transcend; that is, certain lesser princes attempted to form a union of smaller states not to stop Prussia or Austria by force or to balance with either great power or against both, but to revive and reform the institutions and constitution of the Empire so as to provide guarantees for everyone’s territorial rights and machinery for the arbitration of future disputes.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, p. 119. From the outset, states will function similarly will be oversimplification if we base our theory on (neo-) realist paradigm.

⁵³ Elrod argues that “In the post- Napoleonic settlements, and for the first time as a collectivity in history, the great-power victors of the wars officially granted themselves new status as a separate, more important class of states uniquely fit to dictate the fate of Europe. Only they would be responsible for maintaining peace on the continent and determining what that peace would look like.” Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at the International System,” *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, pp. 163–165; and also see, David King, “Vienna, 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna”, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008, p. 50; Edward Hertslet. “The Map of Europe by Treaty: Political and Territorial Changes Since the General Peace of 1814”, Vol. 1, London: Butterworths, 1875, p. 18; Andreas Osiander, “The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peace making and the Conditions of International Stability”, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 236. Elrod advances his approach that “what was to become the single most important principle at the core of the Concert was an acknowledgement by the great powers that only together would they establish, defend, and redefine as necessary the political and territorial status quo on the continent. Simply put, no unilateral territorial changes would be permissible without consent from (or at least consultation with) the great powers acting in concert. This principle was codified across several the important agreements and was historically novel in many ways. In the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1814), the four great powers pledged to only negotiate a final peace with France as a collective, single unit. They also committed to this collective for at least 20 years.” Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at the International System,” p. 167. Also see, Ikenberry, G. John, “After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars”, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 93-96; King, David, “Vienna, 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna”, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008, p. 247. Mitzen, Jennifer and Power argue that “The Congress of Vienna produced the Vienna Final Act (June 1815) and through the Final Act, European stability was made indivisible, and it was made the responsibility of all signatories.” Mitzen, Jennifer, Power, “Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, p. 95. Elrod maintains that “The great powers also recognized that acknowledging their responsibility to act in concert was only a first step, not the last, in ensuring perpetual stability on the continent. They therefore built into this system a loose mechanism for consultation and dispute resolution through periodic great-power meetings. If conflicts arose, the great powers would meet and then negotiate among themselves to reach some resolution, resorting to the use of force only as agreed to together and only when necessary to contain a larger disruption to the status quo.” Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at the International System,” p. 169. Also see, King, 2008, pp. 309–310; Elrod, 1976, pp. 163–168; Paul W. Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, 1992, pp. 686–703. Finnemore claims that “Having acknowledged the former revolutionary adversary, that is France, in the conference of Aix-La-Chapelle in 1818, the now-five great powers jointly indicated another principle that The Vienna system would seek the recognitions of sovereignty and the protections built into the Vienna System, and the great powers would henceforth look favorably only upon those with nonrevolutionary and conservative (non-liberal) domestic political institutions. This general principle represented an important break from past practice in that it sanctioned great-power interference in the domestic affairs of other European states.” Martha Finnemore, “The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force”, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 117–121. Also see, Andreas Osiander, “The States System of

Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability”, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 223; David King, “Vienna, 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna”, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008, p. 317; Kissinger argues that “Alexander’s initial idea for and articulation of the Holy Alliance were unintelligible; it was Metternich who later gave the pact tangible meaning by connecting it to liberal regimes and domestic disturbances.” Henry A. Kissinger, “A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822”, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957, p. 189; Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 83.

⁵⁴ Michael Mastanduno, “Do Relative Gains Matter?”, *International Security*, 16, Summer 1991, pp. 73-113; Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory”, *Review of International Studies* 17, January 1991, pp. 67-85; Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory”, *American Political Science Review*, 85, December 1991, pp. 1303-1320; Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation”, *American Political Science Review*, 85, September 1991, pp. 701-726; and Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration,” *International Organization*, 36, Spring 1982, pp. 294-324. Also, for further survey on cooperation under anarchy, see, Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy,” *World Politics* 38 (October 1988), pp. 226-54; Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation”; Stephen Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power”, *World Politics*, 43, April 1991, pp. 336-66; Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” *World Politics* 37, October 1984, pp. 1-23.

⁵⁵ Christopher Layne advances some important historical systemic constraints upon hegemonic ambitions in a way that “whenever a dominant or hegemonic power emerges at particular times, producing a unipolar system, tight systemic constraints lead weaker states to balance against that power and eligible states to become great powers in response...eligible state’s adjustment to the international system’s structural constraints...unipolar moments cause geopolitical backlashes that lead to multipolarity.” Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring, 1992, pp. 5-51. Additionally, short-term traditional and wartime alliance mechanism of the balance of power order during pre-1815 was transferred into restraining pacts in peacetime through periodic conferences within consensus and moderation through achieving accommodation and acknowledgement by unit of proportionality in decision-making. United Kingdom, by arranging new restraining strategy, had the objective of preserving the distribution of power after war by defensive peacetime alliance system. Within institutional order, it is not relative power position but the ability of participants to adjust their functional differentiation for the sake of general interest. However, “the Concert of Europe was oligarchic and took relative power position of the states as reference at the very stage of institutional order.” John G. Ikenberry, “After Victory”, chapter 4.

⁵⁶ Robert Gilpin, “War and Change in World politics”, New York; Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp.41-44.

⁵⁷ Waltz argues that “The central argument is that the broad outcomes of international politics derive more from the structural constraints of the state systems than unit behavior. The structural theory proceeds in a series of logical inferences from the fundamental postulate of a state system in which all units are autonomous, so that the system is structured by anarchy rather than hierarchy; to the primacy of survival, security, and independence for each unit wishing to remain part of the system; to the mandate of self-help this need imposes upon each unit; and to a resultant competition between units which produces a recurrent pattern of various balances of power.” Kenneth N. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 45. Other expositions by Waltz of his position are his “Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis”, New York: Colombia University Press, 1959; “The Origins of War in Neo-realist Theory,” in Robert I. Rotberg, and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., “The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 39-52; and “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3, 1964, pp. 881-909, Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., “The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics”, 4th ed., Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993. Other Versions and applications of realist theory may be found in Stephen M. Walt, “The Origins of Alliances”, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987; Robert Gilpin, “War and Change in World Politics”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; and John Mearsheimer, “Conventional Deterrence”, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993. For a good introduction to realism and its chief current rival, idealism, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History”, London: HarperCollins, 1993. The classic work of the classical realism, which is emphasizing the state’s inherent drive for power rather

than structural constraints as the chief and main source of power politics and conflict, belongs to Hans Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace", New York: Knopf, 1948.

⁵⁸ Slantchev argues that "The most glaring example of this practice is the fact that the Vienna settlement reconstituted only 38 of the more than 350 German states. Although the allies had to reward the princes who had fought on their side, they recognized that German disunity had greatly facilitated Napoleon's conquests." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, p. 598. Also see, Harold Nicolson, "The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822", London: Constable, 1946, p. 146; Edward V. Gulick, "Europe's Classical Balance of Power", New York: Random House, 1962, pp. 248-251. Kissinger advances the thought on early attempt for institutional order in the nineteenth century that "none of Europe's erstwhile practitioners of *raison d'état* are now strong enough to act as principals in the emerging international order. They are attempting to compensate for this relative weakness by creating a unified Europe, but no automatic guidelines for the conduct of a unified Europe on the global stage would be at hand, since such a political entity has never existed before." Henry A. Kissinger, "Diplomacy", New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994; Henry A. Kissinger, "World Order", New York: Penguin, 2014, pp. 24-28.

⁵⁹ Kissinger argues that "The best-known and most-important success story here was the creation of the German Confederation at the Congress of Vienna...the Congress of Vienna's ingenious solution to the German question: The German Confederation was too divided to take offensive action yet cohesive enough to resist foreign invasions into its territory. This arrangement provided an obstacle to the invasion of Central Europe without constituting a threat to the two major powers on its flanks, Russia to the east and France to the west." Henry Kissinger, "World Order", New York: Penguin, 2014, pp. 64-65. Soutou makes a very important addition about the buffer-zone that "Yet the powers achieved similar successes with neutral buffers in the form of the Swiss Confederation, Scandinavia, and the Kingdom of the United Netherlands." Georges-Henri Soutou, "Was There a European Order in the Twentieth Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War," *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000.

⁶⁰ Kenneth Waltz holds very strong discussions about strong division between domestic and international structure in his book "Theory of International Politics", 1979.

⁶¹ For current neo-realist arguments, see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5-55; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5-51; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 44-79. For divergent views, see Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 52-67; Jervis, "A Usable Past for the Future," in Michael J. Hogan, ed., "The end of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 257-268; and John Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some After thoughts on World War III," in Hogan, *The End of the Cold War*, pp. 39-52. See also Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, "Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era", London: HarperCollins, 1992; Mark Bowker and Robin Brown, eds., "From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; Geir Lundestad and Odd Arne Westad, eds., "Beyond the Cold War: Future Dimensions in International Relations", Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; and Stanley Hoffmann, Robert o. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., "After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991", Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. This dissertation will not, however, discuss how neorealist theory fits recent and current history, or test neo-realism with historical cases. Instead, it takes up a question seldom if ever discussed, whether neorealist theory, including Classical realist theory, and liberal institutionalism are adequate and useful as an explanatory framework for the history of international politics over the whole nineteenth century and early twentieth century- the period in which the validity of realist paradigm is widely accepted and commonly appreciated even by non-realists. It is strikingly interesting, for example, that a strong opponent of realism, Bruce Russett, seems to accept the validity of the realist theory for this period in his writing: "It may be possible in part to supersede the realist principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice to the exclusion of liberal or idealist ones since at least the seventeenth century." Bruce Russett, "Grasping the Democratic Peace", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 24. I formulated my claim close to structural theory in the context that system determines units' behavior with given outcome in anarchic system, but I put into this formulation that institutional restraining strategy at state-level was designed as of 1815 in the context of defensive and status quoist alliance system in peacetime through consultation during

periodic conferences. Thus, with flexibility of state action at predictable level, restraining nature of the system was reinforced by systemic order, or arrangements. As the flexibility got lost, states began to turn toward substitutive bargaining and short-term interest, thereby self-correction of the system was activated by rigidification of alliance system at system-level. As Kissinger pointed out that "in 1914, England got confused who was right when analyzing the blocks; on the one side, Germany and France conflict over Alsace-Lorraine; on the other side, Austria and Russia dispute over the Balkan peninsula." Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy", chapter eight. This dilemma proved that the reason for the historical conjuncture (war) will be get more complicated if analysis constrain themselves within sovereign state approach. Multidimensional flexibility and restraining determine both state action and system self-correction.

⁶²For further reading, see Helen Milner, "The assumption of Anarchy in International Theory: A Critique," *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17, January 1991, p.67-85; David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy and the variety of International Relations", *International Organizations*, Vol.50, 1997, pp.1-33; Barry Buzan and Richard Little "Reconceptualizing Anarchy", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.2, No.4, 1996, pp.403-39; G.John Ikenberry, "Constitutional Politics in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.4, No.2, June 1998, pp. 147-77. During the 19th century, the primary objective is to tie states together for common, or general, interest. Schroeder gives examples drawn from the first half of the nineteenth century that "Britain, for example, claimed during the nineteenth century to be the special holder of the European balance, protecting small countries, promoting constitutional liberty, encouraging commerce, and preserving peace. Russia claimed to be the guardian of the monarchical order in Europe, defender of all states against revolution, and protector especially of smaller states against threats or domination by other great powers. The United Netherlands after 1815 claimed special treatment, and after 1830 Belgium claimed guaranteed neutrality, like Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden, because the Low Countries served Britain and others as a barrier against French expansion, and served Austria, Prussia, and the lesser German states as a vital economic and political link connecting Britain to the Continent and Central Europe." Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", p. 117. "What it is called hiding may be related to buck-passing." *Ibid.*, 121. Also see, Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2, Spring 1990, p. 145.

⁶³For surveys of the major postwar settlements, see Robert Randle, "The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the structure of Peace Settlements", New York: Free Press, 1973; Charles F. Doran, "The Politics of Assimilation", Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971; Kalevi J. Holsti, "Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, "How Nations Make Peace", New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.

⁶⁴Slantchev argues that "in every treaty that resulted in territorial adjustment or foreign intervention, the signatories renounced any attempt at territorial aggrandizement and affirmed that the essential features of the system would remain unaltered." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, pp. 599-600. Such status quoist incentives of participant states were also mentioned by Schroeder and Kissinger. See, Schroeder, "Transformation", pp. 617-19; and Kissinger, "A World Restored", pp. 287-89.

⁶⁵Schroeder argues that "All the alleged attempts of states to hide, transcend, or differentiate themselves functionally reflect unit-level differences in behavior, but do not change the essential structure in which the great powers, their power positions, and the balance of power remain decisive." Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", p. 130. Decisive victory is essential to set up new institutions with different restraining strategy. Till the establishment of new institutional order after World War I, the Concert of Europe order was under internal and external constraints during the nineteenth century. There occurred no dramatic territorial change in Continental Europe. But the point that I want to focus on is stressed on by Schroeder that "the system level structure allows to some degree unit level functional differentiations and they have been shaped and constrained by the mechanisms of institutional order. The new distribution of power does never permit any state to be hegemon." *Ibid.*, p.132. If we look at the nineteenth century, no power had enough power to be hegemon, but shift in system level structure, or shift in the distribution of power, required to be reordered for the purpose of reinforcing the new polarity. Kissinger argues that "the attempt by the leader of the most powerful country to create a system of collective security failed because of domestic inhibitions and historic tradition." Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy", chapter 4. Kissinger finds common problem between collective security of 1919 and the institutional balance of power, the Concert of

Europe of 1815, during the nineteenth century. United Kingdom managed to set up institutional order through periodic conferences by letting secondary states to defend, consensually and by moderation, their divergent interests and functional differentiations. Functional differentiations are to be regarded as historic tradition and Britain managed to institutionalize such functional differentiations for the purpose of achieving General interest. Particularly, subordinate states began to regard institutional order as of the establishment of the Vienna system to defend their interests in status quoist manner, and peacefully apply their unique functions. Thus, unit level countervailing relations together with substitutive bargaining of the participant states served for durable common, or general, interest of the overall balance of power. When the ability of institutional order loses its flexibility in management of power, system begins not to allow and discard the functions of state, or states, due to their fail to serve to balance of power. To sum up, functional differentiations are historical tradition, and institutions had the ability to ensure the participants to adjust their functions to the system to some degree. However, as Kissinger occasionally argued, the voice opportunity collapsed because of the domestic inhibitions and historic tradition. Germany could not manage to decrease the impact of bellicose rhetoric due to the fact that all the wars passed on the German lands and bitter rivalry with France was never taken under control. British foreign policy was always pragmatist and isolationist as long as the system in Europe was supporting its long-term interest. Russia, particularly as of Japan defeat of 1915, began to turn to its historic ambitions in Balkan region. The only guarantee for the longevity and durability of institutional order hinged on the geopolitical value of Austria. However, the more England turned out to be isolationist, the more Austria began to stick to conservative values and norms. Such circumstances increased the conflict of interest between England which was sympathetic to liberal movements to some degree and primarily interested in Dardanelles for the Egypt-India axis, but not the Balkans, and Austria who was deeply concerned on the Slavic minority. As can be seen, domestic character and traditional functional differentiations of participants, once seen as an opportunity, turns out to be constraints on the ability of institutional order. Paul Schroder points out that "all examples of functional differentiations are instances of not balancing, but of transcending, often in a collective, consensual way." Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", p. 128. Functional differentiations, serving to general interest, were used by states to remove aggressive states from power politics by sanctioning particular functional differentiation of states that fall apart of the general interest of overall balance of power. Self-correction becomes reality as the leading state and subordinate states got prisoned in deadlock due to the loss of mutual flexibility between system level restraining, that is the distribution of power after war, and unit level restraining strategy that is defensive and status quoist. Kissinger provides us a historical reality about this deadlock that "When the diplomacy turned rigid, there emerged two blocks; Germany vs France over Alsace-Lorraine, and Russia vs. Austria over the Balkan peninsula. Britain did really get confused about who was the actual threat." Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy", chapter 6.

⁶⁶ The first test of leaving off the eastern question was the Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1820s. Rene provides us with a perfect historical description that "The great powers even refused to meet with the Greek representative in Verona in 1824 and declared the uprising a rash and criminal enterprise. However, when Alexander died in 1825, his successor, Nicholas I, decided to pursue a more proactive policy in the Balkans, Britain and France together with Russia had agreed, out of fear that Russia would act unilaterally, to cooperate in seeking autonomy for Greece. The Treaty of London, signed by Britain, France, and Russia in July 1827, provided for an autonomous vassal state in Greece and the imposition of an armistice should the two Balkan parties fail to agree to the terms. Refusal by Ottomans resulted in an unfortunate event- Navarino incident of 1827. Mahmud declared jihad against Russia, which responded by going to war with Turkey on April 26, 1828. Although the Russian victory was not immediate, the Sultan was forced to accept the Treaty of Adrianople in September of 1829. Article X of that treaty made clear that this constituted an adhesion to the articles of the Treaty concluded at London. Greece became independent. With Paragraph 8 of Protocol No. 1 of the London Conference, February 3, 1830, the three powers (France, England and Russia) also agreed to forgo unilateral intervention in newly established Greece." Albrecht-Carrie, René, "The Concert of Europe", New York: Walker & Company, 1968, p. 48. Rendal argues that "When it became clear that the Ottoman Empire was unable to restore stability in the region, which was a source of temptation for Russia, the great powers imposed a solution that preserved the features of the system. Russia exercised moderation not because it was afraid of some counter-coalition, but because it clearly recognized that even a victorious war against the Ottoman Empire would inevitably lead to the collapse of the prized European system, which it was satisfied." Matthew Rendall, "Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece 1821–29: A Test of Hypotheses About the Vienna System," Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2000, p. 84.

⁶⁷ This discussion advanced by Schroeder in a way that “the problem of divergent strategies is not unknown to theorists. Stephen Walt proposes to meet it with an argument that states balance against threats rather than simply against power. This does not, however, really help answer the question of which of the four strategies—hiding, transcending, bandwagoning, or self-help—or which combination of them, prevailed in each instance of international political cases. Walt’s thesis, designed to help neo-realist theory explain why states so often join overwhelmingly powerful coalitions, actually makes it virtually impossible to distinguish between balancing and bandwagoning. Besides, states seldom choose a strategy unconditionally or without mixed motives, and in particular they consider what strategy will yield the greatest side payment (territorial gains, future alliances, political concessions, prestige, etc.).” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, The MIT Press, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994, pp. 120. Symcox presents that “A good example is the conduct of Piedmont-Savoy under King Victor Amadeus II before and during the War of Spanish Succession (1702-14). He always bandwagoned with the stronger side, shifting alliances to do so; he always exacted the highest possible price for doing so; and he always claimed that he was balancing against the greatest threat to his state and Europe.” Geoffrey Symcox, “Victor Amadeus II”, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, chapters eight. Thus, self-help justifies that states’ primary concern is constrained within short-term relative gain and distinguishing bandwagoning from balancing in anarchic system is not as easy as what neo-realists assumed.

⁶⁸ Even though my purpose is not to discuss how (neo-)realist theory fits recent and current history, its structural analysis of international politics did get relative success in explaining the dynamics of the modern European state system with some modifications to accommodate current changes. Schroeder argues that “Investigating the long term fit between neo-realist theory and international history might also shed light on current questions and issues in international relations theory, such as the obsolescence or continued utility of nuclear weapons; the problems and uses of deterrence; the comparative incidence of balancing versus bandwagoning in international politics; hegemony in theory and practice; the development of an international society under conditions of anarchy; the necessity and possibility of developing rules and norms for greater international order and peace; the possible transformation of international politics through the effect of dependence and interdependence and the emergence of new transnational actors and institutions; and historical conditions and negotiating postures and techniques best suited for peaceful solutions of conflicts. Theorists of different schools might wish to see such an investigation done for their purposes and tailored to their interests and needs.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, The MIT Press, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994, pp. 147-148. Also for further reading on similar to Paul Schroeder’s elaborations, see Robert Jervis, “The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution”, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989; John Mueller, “Retreat from Doomsday”, New York: Basic Books, 1989; Paul Stern, et al., eds., “Perspectives on Deterrence”, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989; Paul K. Huth, “Extended Deterrence and Prevention of War”, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988; Richard N. Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Dependent Variable,” *World Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 3, April 1990, pp. 336-369; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference”, *World Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 4, July 1990, pp. 466-501; Robert Gilpin, “The Political Economy of International Relations”, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1986; Kenneth A. Oye, ed., “Cooperation under Anarchy”, Princeton University Press, 1986; Robert O. Keohane, “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy”, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984; Hedley Bull, “The Anarchical Society”, New York: Colombia University Press, 1977; Martin Weight, “Systems of States”, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977; Friedrich Kratochwill, “Rules, Norms, and Decisions”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Samuel S. Kim, “The Quest for a Just World Order”, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984; Lynn H. Miller, “Global Order”, 2nd ed., Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990; Dorothy V. Jones, “Code of Peace”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991; Charles R. Beitz, “Political Theory and International Relations”, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979; Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., “Progress in Postwar International Relations”, New York: Colombia University Press, 1991; Christ Brown, “International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches”, New York: Colombia University Press, 1992; James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., “Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Charles F. Doran, “Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century’s End”, Cambridge University Press, 1991; Stephen R. Rock, “Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective”, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989; Alexander George, “Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War”, Washington,

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991; William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, "The Practical Negotiator", New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

⁶⁹ Powell argues that "given the absence of a supranational authority, the states cannot bind themselves to any particular initial institutional arrangement and corresponding allocation of cooperative benefits. The institutional structure is always subject to renegotiation if a state believes it worthwhile." Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate", p. 340. Keohane regards institutions as a means to an end. More specifically, he claims that "institutions are the means to achieve the joint gains." Robert Keohane, "After Hegemony", p. 9.

⁷⁰ Elrod argues that "So long as the European Concert functioned, the five great powers had the assurance that both their legitimate rights and their self-esteem would be respected...[u]nder no circumstances did one invite, in any capacity, a state of the second or third rank which was an enemy of a great power." Elrod, Richard B., "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at the International System," *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, pp. 166-167. In addition, Kissinger argues that "a regular practice produced through frequent meetings was the rapid and peaceful reintegration of reconstituted polities into the European system of states. The leniency shown to France in both Paris peace settlements and again at the 1818 congress was remarkable. It indicates an understanding that only a relatively satisfied French state could help ensure tranquility on the continent—an unusual and far-sighted intuition for diplomats of the time." Henry A. Kissinger, "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822", Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957, pp. 177-178.

⁷¹ I am simply in pursuit of an explanation about variations in the extent to which leading states pursued institutional strategies of order building and the extent to which the resulting postwar order had been in institutional – or constitutional- characteristics during the nineteenth century. I am not seeking to explain the more general variations in the types of order- balance of power, hegemonic, and constitutional- across all major postwar settlements. If the objective were to explain the presence or absence of institutional strategies, or constitutional characteristics, the focus would be on the contrast between pre- and post-1815 settlements. But the focus here is on variations among wartime and peacetime settlements during the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century, which involve the use of various institutional strategies, and exhibit & explore traces of constitutional order. The dependent variable is the order-building strategy of the leading state during and after the wars of the Napoleonic era, and the characteristics of the institutional order that resulted out of it, and my objective is to focus on the relative weight of constraints and opportunities within the institutional order of the Concert of Europe to measure the strength of institutions in potentially anarchic international relations.

⁷² This is not to argue that the pre-1815 postwar settlements did not also involve the creation of norms, rules, and institutions. Indeed, they did. Hedley Bull, for example, depicts the rise of sovereignty and the balance of power among Continental European states, and later, gradually, the international order as a process of institution building within international society, or a society of states. See Hedley Bull, "The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics", London: Macmillan Press, 1997. However, Bull also claims that "But institutional strategies in the more restricted sense used here-binding intergovernmental institutions, such as security alliances, devised as mechanisms to establish commitment and restraint among the great powers- were not in evidence.", *Ibid.*, p.29.

⁷³ Waltz uses historical evidence, drawn mainly from the recent past, primarily to back up certain particular theses in neo-realist theory, e.g., that "a bipolar balance is superior to a multipolar one. Structure shapes outcome in international politics through relative power position of each unit drawn on material from domestic rather than international politics. States as rational actors prefer to join the weaker one or coalitions for it is the stronger side that threatens them." Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", pp. 126-127. I claim that institutions will pacify the domestically oriented foreign policy of sovereign states through unit of proportionality in decision making process, thereby each will restrain the foreign policy of the other strategic rivals. Mutual strategic restraint hinges on the ability of participants in effect. Waltz also required additional theory since his approach on domestic politics contradicts his structural theory even though he emphasize that "states are functionally the same in matters of security and structurally distributed (relative) power position determines state behavior." *Ibid.*, p.138. He argues that his "theory of international politics needs to be supplemented by a separate theory of foreign policy that can explain misguided state behavior." *Ibid.*, p.133. However, additional theory, which invariably emphasizes domestic political considerations, is not a structural theory. The system urges states to tend toward balancing in the context of the presence of functional non-differentiation. The puzzle is upon when it matters to measure the impact of relative power on state behavior, thereby each unit differs from one another. Was it Kaiser's policy, domestic calculations on relative power, resulted in structural change, or was it the decline in the structural flexibility led to power shift at system level and self-correction nature of system became a matter for the conduct of

international politics? I claim that it is the ability of international institutional order that determines the degree of shift in the system level asymmetric power relations among sovereign units. The main objective of institutional order is to reinforce the polarity within the restraint of the system in status quoist and defensive manner. Multidimensional flexibility and multidimensional restraint are two important determinants on the conduct of international relations.

⁷⁴ Ikenberry argues that "The rule of periodic consultation first codified in the Quadruple Alliance, the Concert system established an unprecedented amount of elite-level contact and consultation through great-power congresses and conferences." Ikenberry, G. John, "After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 81. He also maintains that "Regardless of the precise number of meetings one counts as part of the Concert, the fact remains that great-power consultation in the 19th century after 1815 was much more frequent than it had ever been before, and it often had an effect on state behavior." Ibid., p. 97. As Paul Schroeder, the prominent American scholar of the Concert of Europe era, has put it, "19th-century statesmen could, with a certain minimum of good will and effort, repeatedly reach viable, agreed-upon outcomes to hotly disputed critical problems. The 18th century simply does not record diplomatic achievements of this kind." Paul W. Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1986, p. 3. Also, for a well-designed view that identifies a considerable number of conferences, see Charles Webster, "The Art and Practice of Diplomacy", New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961; Hinsley, F. H., "Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

⁷⁵ I admit that Vienna system was tested by the Eastern Question. Slantchev claims that "The Egypt case of 1839-40 demonstrated that the Quadruple Alliance was a credible threat even after twenty-five years, and even when the allies were split on many other issues. France followed aggressive policy, but only achieved its isolation." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, pp. 597-598. Slantchev also presents that "On July, 15, 1840, the four powers revived the Quadruple Alliance and signed a convention against France and Egypt, imposing their solution—a hereditary pashalic in Egypt and Acre for his lifetime—on Mehemet Ali. Two days later, Palmerston informed the French ambassador of the London convention's ultimatum, insultingly expressing regret that France had not been invited to join it. The July note called the French bluff and thereby signified its expulsion from the Concert. Anglo-Austrian forces entered the Syrian rebellion in September, the pressure for war in France increased. In late October, the king forced his resignation as foreign minister and installed the anglophile Guizot. On November 27 Mehemet Ali, his forces defeated, accepted hereditary rule of Egypt and abandoned his claims to Syria. In July 1841, France signed the Straits Convention and was re-admitted to the Concert." Ibid., p. 599.

⁷⁶ However, I share some certain points indicated as well by structural theorists. Waltz does simplify his argument; "All states are guided by structural constraints through the relative or asymmetric power position of each sovereign political units and imperatives of anarchy, self-help, and balance of power, and must be if they hope to survive and prosper. States are not functionally differentiated within the structure of international politics. Their common, primary function, structurally determined, is to survive and remain independent through self-help. What differentiates states is instead their position within the system, i.e., their power relative to others. Domestic society, structured by hierarchy and heteronomy, enforces upon its units (citizens and domestic structure) the mandate of specialization in order to survive. International society, structured by autonomy and anarchy, imposes on its units (states) the mandate not to specialize but to concentrate their resources first and foremost on security. States ignoring this rule suffer serious consequences." Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", pp. 97-99. However, I oppose to neo-realism with the thought that international relations must not be regarded solely within power relations. But, considering the nineteenth century and twentieth century till the end of cold war, I agree with neo-realist claim that the system level structure restrained states within power balancing. There was the absence of functional differentiation among units and presence of anarchy in international system and also the only differentiation was by their power position given exogenously. Therefore, relative power given by the structure at system level after war, in guise of distribution of power, is the main determinant of state behavior. However, it will be oversimplification if we disregard the achievement of the United Kingdom in designing restraining strategy to limit the return to power within institutional order, which lasted a century.

⁷⁷ Waltz argues in "Theory of International Politics", p. 117, that "the principles of Realpolitik noted by Thucydides and expounded by Machiavelli have always governed international politics for structural reasons." Schroeder argues in critical approach to such Waltzian generalization that "the main fault lies with neo-realist theory because of its insistence on the sameness effect and on the unchanging,

structurally determined nature of international politics, which makes it unhistorical, perhaps anti-historical. Neo-realist theory not only prevents scholars from seeing and explaining the various strategies alternative to balancing, or the different functions and roles of the various actors within the system, but even blocks a genuine historical understanding of. The balance of power as a historical variable, changing over time, conditioned by historical circumstances, and freighted with ideological assumptions.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory”, p. 148. In my dissertation, my hypothesis built upon the assumption that system-level restraining does exist, and within this distribution of power, that is polarity, considering the period of Concert of Europe, states were tested in their participation into the Vienna system of 1815 with their divergent interests and different domestic structures. The main objective was to increase the credibility of commitment within institutional order in order to make the order capable in shaping and constraining the state action. Pre-1815 could be regarded as the Westphalian system in which sovereign states exhibited their functional differentiations stemming from historical tradition and suffered from short-term bargaining due to constant fear of cheating. Thus, each sovereign unit got engaged in wartime alliances to improve their relative power position in the anarchic system. England wanted to create a system in which it is not the relative power capacity of the states, but institutions with their consensually designed parameters will shape state action. What is provided by Neo-realist with regard to functional sameness among units and unchanging structural determining effect of the system is actually what the United Kingdom wanted to discard by undoing Richelieu’s *raison d’état* in 1815. System-level restraining allows to the extent where there emerges hegemonic attempt. The Vienna system was always subject to test of strength, and when it failed to adjust itself to the restraint of the structure, system applied its self-correction power. Systemic order did not go out of control until the states went beyond their capacity. System level restraint does not mean that the very stage of output after war has nothing to do with the improvement in the relative power capacity of the participants, but rather providing a new distribution of power not permitting any state to be hegemon. Not just after the Napoleonic War, but also after the World Wars, what system provided was reinforced by unit-level status quoist restraining strategies within institutional order. At this point, I share the common point with both Schroeder and Ikenberry that the Vienna System is the early manifestation of institutional order which proved that traditional balance of power could be changed and served for the long-term interest of states, thereby each subordinate states improved their power position as long as they did not threaten and disturbed the general interest of the Continental Europe. However, what none of the sovereign participants failed to figure out was perfectly formulized by Kissinger: “Legitimacy without power tempts empty posture, power without legitimacy tempts test of strength.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, chapter four. Meanwhile, it is the institutional order in the nineteenth century that provided the stable and peaceful arrangements by which each European state began to construct military power out of the industrial revolution, thereby, in the second half of the nineteenth century, their long-term interests turned out to be short-term within constitutional order. For perfect account for the constraints and pressure upon the Concert system, see Paul Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000”, New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 143-275.

⁷⁸ See Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p.95.

⁷⁹ See Robert Gilpin, “War and Changes in World Politics”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 42.

⁸⁰ Some critics, especially Robert O. Keohane, Richard K. Ashley, and John G. Ruggie, agree and contend to some point that neo-realism is too static theory, and fails to allow or account for change and development in international system, and it is less likely to achieve long-term mutually organized cooperation in anarchic system according to neo-realist paradigm. See Robert O. Keohane, ed., “Neo-Realism and Its Critics”, New York: Colombia University Press, 1986. However, Waltz claims that “Structure does not account for everything, nor does (neo-realist) theory explain or predict everything. Furthermore, the changes in international politics cited by critics occur at the unit level; only if hierarchy replaced anarchy would its structure be changed.” Waltz, “The Origins of Alliances,” pp. 17-33, 263-66. My approach upon this discussion is that as of 1815, leading states developed some variety of restraining pacts to institutionalize the balance of power which is different from balancing power. Additionally, institutions are to transfer anarchy, to some important degree, to hierarchy. The member states of the Concert of Europe may seem to be within the system of oligarchy in decision making through unit of proportionality. We don’t see such structure, and periodic conferences, during interwar years. However, Cold war institution (the United Nations) entails permanent membership in decision-making. The EU designed different version in decision making by giving veto power to each of members. Liberal institutionalists, like Ikenberry, tried to place institutions as an alternative mechanism

within constitutional order and emphasized that “with the autonomous nature, institutions will change the state action of participants with the passage of time. Institutions will function eventually by providing principles within which states will try to settle their disputes in the long-run.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p.121. I claim that the outcome is exogenously given and within this restraining nature of the system, states develop enforcing and status quoist strategy to design a political order for the sake of realizing distribution of benefit in the long run. Absolute gain will be possible with the involvement of new issues in the relations of states. The puzzling problem is not the uncertainty, that will be reduced within institutional order, the short-term, but the very fluid asymmetric power relations which may well function at the expense of those who may suffer from inefficiency in comparative advantage, and begin to feel concern on uncompetitiveness and dependency. However, I believe that with the thought that, even though (preventive or preemptive) war is ineradicable, by recognizing that there will be no loser and winner permanently, rivalry will not lead to war, bargaining power will be the primary objective of all sovereign states. Institutions will reduce the use of power with regard to military and shape and constrain the domestic structure of participants by favoring the principles of democracy and free trade. Thus, system level structure does not explain everything since international system is so dynamic. Not just external factors but the compatibility between internal and external factors determines the time for self-correction of the system. This is a constant process of recurrence sequence of multidimensional interaction in infinite potential anarchic system considering the nineteenth and early twentieth century. We observe explicitly or implicitly drawn definitions in every theory involving *ceteris paribus*. Dynamic nature of international relations always requires theorists to make additional theoretical approach. Upon this thought, I tried to develop a new methodology to figure out the historical developments in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the context of neo-liberal institutionalism, but recognize the fact that it is subject to face challenge. See Doran, “Systems in Crisis”, pp. 2-3, 258; See also the discussion in William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, “International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation”, London: HarperCollins, 1991, pp. 262-284.

⁸¹ Paul Schroeder advances historical generalization of neo-realist that “states, regardless of their ideology, domestic structure, individual aims, etc., have claimed exclusive sovereignty over their territory and the sole right to the legitimate use of force within it, have set a high value on their independence and security, have upheld their right to use force in self-defense, have tried to provide means for their defense, and have conducted foreign policy with an eye to maintaining their security and independence.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, p. 115. With respect to no importance of different domestic structure of sovereign units, it is possible to set up institutions with different domestic characters even though I admit that the democratic character of the leading state is important to increase the credible commitment and reduce the fear of subordinate states. Furthermore, I admit that structure determines state behavior with uncertainty of relative power position of rival states. However, uncertainty can be reduced within institutional order with the ability of the leading state in anarchic system. English school focuses on the possibility of international society with functionally the same, or different power position from the stand-point of pluralists. However, they failed to bring out a single voice together with solidarists when it comes to the extent of legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. See Heley Bull, “The Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics”, London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 14. My argument is that structural role of the potential and actual use of force in international politics will be institutionalized by the institutionalized voice opportunity within institutional order. Claiming that system urges states to balance power in international relations does not provide clear understanding about the self-help. It is the objective of institutional order to reduce the uncertainty stemming from the states’ concern on self-help nature of anarchic system. In this regard, Vienna settlement of 1815 was the first attempt to reduce the worries about cheating and constant observation on relative gain of the other states.

⁸² See Raymond Aron, “Peace and War”, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966, and Stanley Hoffmann, “World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era”, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, chapter eight.

⁸³ Order is obviously only one important feature of world politics. Critics of this focus argue that “to give order primacy is to give the study of international politics a static, statist, and western bias.” Steve Smith, “Is the Truth Out There? Eight questions about International Order,” in T.V. Paul and John A. Hall, ed., “International Order and the Future of World Politics”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. For a discussion of the different meanings of order, see Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, “Approaches to World Order”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁸⁴ Heley Bull, “The Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics”, London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 7.

⁸⁵ Kissinger claims that “the balance of power system did not avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and scope of conflicts. By definition, a balance of power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, pp.20. Also see Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self Enforcing Equilibrium,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005.

⁸⁶ See Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 127.

⁸⁷ Waltz perfectly describes power game in anarchic system from neo-realist paradigm; “Three assumptions lie behind the neorealist claim that the balance of power is the only real solution to the problem of order. First, all states seek security, but because other states can always become threats, that security is never absolute. Second, the intentions of other states are inherently uncertain. A state can never be absolutely sure that its current allies will remain ally in the future or turn into adversaries. This is because all states have the capacity to threaten, and their intentions are unknowable. Finally, relative capabilities are more important than absolute capabilities to ensure the secondary of states, because security is derived from the relative strength of a state in relation to competing states.”, *Ibid.*, p.39.

⁸⁸ Paul Schroeder argues that “No neutral state in Europe considered Russia a military threat with recognition that there was a clear superiority of allied coalition. Even Austria, which had a general fear of Russian domination of the Balkans, recognized that this danger was for the moment allayed, and tried hard to prevent the war.” Paul W. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory”, p. 122. Kissinger focuses on Napoleon III dual- aimless strategy by claiming that “Crimean war could be prevented.” Henry A. Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, p.121. This war was the output of Napoleon III policy which followed both calling for conservative and status quoist conference for any crisis and supporting liberal revolutions at the same time. There occurred no territorial change in accordance with the promises of the Vienna settlement of 1815 at the end of the Paris peace conference of 1856 that there would be no permanent loser or permanent winner. Moreover, the highest cost was the collapse of legitimacy with the ultimatum given by Austria. The continuity of Napoleon III’s miscalculation did not just unbalance the countervailing relations in the continent by the wars between 1859 and 1870, but also declined the geopolitical value of Austria. Russia would never forgive Austria due to the ultimatum. It was too late for Napoleon III to figure out that domestic structure of German confederation and relative power of Austria were the guarantee of France’s security. The dismissal of Bismarck and renouncing Reinsurance treaty with Russia and transformation of Realpolitik into Weltpolitik was narrowing the flexibility of the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century. See Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, chapter 5 and six. Paul Schroeder also argues that “Most German states, including Prussia, considered the Anglo-French coalition a greater military and political threat to their security and interests. Yet Sardinia-Piedmont joined the dominant coalition militarily, Austria did so politically, and even Prussia and the German Confederation, although sympathetic to Russia and wanting only to hide from the conflict, were dragged into helping force Russia to admit defeat and accept an imposed settlement. In short, some states bandwagoned; others tried to hide and then bandwagoned; still others, like Sweden, Denmark, and Low Countries, remained in hiding; none balanced against Anglo-French domination.” Paul Schroeder, “Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War”, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. Stopping the war by a negotiated settlement was intended by Austria to achieve permanent solution to the eastern question ended in failure. For further reading, Ann Pottinger Saab, “Origins of the Crimean Alliance”, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1977; and Norman Rich, “Why the Crimean War?”, Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1985.

⁸⁹ Ikenberry claims that “The choice to seek a legitimate and mutually acceptable postwar order is separate, at least at the outset, from the choice to employ binding institutions to achieve this mutually agreeable order.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p.112. Ikenberry made it more clear that “in general a leading state will want to bind weaker and secondary states to a set of rules and institutions of postwar order- locking in these states to predictable patterns of behaviour- but remain unbound itself, free of institutional constraints and obligations.” *Ibid.* p. 51.

⁹⁰ See Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 128.

⁹¹ On the tendency over bandwagoning in international relations, see Waltz, “The Origins of Alliances”, pp. 17-33, 263-66.

⁹² The need to preserve and maintain the balance of power to prevent the all-out victory of a dominant power is the core idea in realist theory from Thucydides to the contemporary period of time. A similar

statement of such thinking can be seen in a report of the British Foreign Office written just before the First World War; "History shows that the danger threatening the independence of this or that nation has generally arisen, at least in part, out of the monetary predominance of a neighboring State at once militarily powerful, economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its influence. The only check on the abuse of political predominance derived from such a position has always consisted in the opposition of an equally formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries forming leagues of defense. The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power, and it has become almost an historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single State or group at a given time." Quoted in "Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907," in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperly, ed., "British Document on the Origins of War, 1898-1914", London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1928, Vol. 3, Appendix A, p. 405.

⁹³ For more discussions on the balance of power politics, see Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in Butterfield and Wight, ed., "Diplomatic Investigations", Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 149-76; Edward V. Gulick, "Europe's Classical Balance of Power", New York: Random House, 1962, pp. 3-93; Inis L. Claude, "The Balance of Power Revisited," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 15 (April 1989), pp. 77-86; Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescriptions, Concept, Propaganda," *World Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1953, pp. 370-98; Stephen M. Walt, "The Origins of Alliances", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Politics", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987; and Michael W. Doyle, "Ways of War and Peace", New York: W. W. Norton, 1997, chapter five.

⁹⁴ We see the same, or similar puzzles, did European powers confront as France began to emerge as coercive hegemon by 1793. Schroeder describes the period that "The first coalition (1792-97) was formed against France by Spain, Piedmont, Naples, and various German states, soon joined in early 1793 by Great Britain. Once France's real revolutionary power became apparent from late 1793 on, states began hiding by leaving coalition (Prussia and some German states) or bandwagoning by joining France, as Spain did. The same thing happened to the Second Coalition (1798-1801): states hid or bandwagoned to the allied side so long as it was winning, to mid-1799, and then bandwagoned to France's side from late 1799 on. Even Russia, a main founder of the Second Coalition, did so." Paul Schroeder, "The Collapse of the Second Coalition," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 59, No. 2, June 1987, pp. 244-290. Schroeder advances his thought that "in every succeeding war from late 1799 to mid-1813, despite the fact that France under Napoleon had become by far both the most powerful Continental state and the most ambitious one, the French-led coalition was always larger and stronger than its counterpart; more states always bandwagoned than balance. Napoleon was able to organize most of war against a single isolated foe (Britain in 1803 and 1807, Prussia in 1806, Spain in 1808, Austria in 1809, Russia in 1812). In short, the main response to Napoleonic hegemony and imperialism by European states was not balancing but either hiding or bandwagoning as France's active ally, or Napoleon's satellites, for a considerable period. Wars continued to break out mainly not because European states tried to balance against France as a hegemonic, but because Napoleon's ambition and lawless conduct frustrated their repeated efforts to hide and bandwagon. This happened to, for instance, Spain from 1795 to 1808 and Russia in 1807-12. Only after the failure of Austria's attempt to transcend the crisis, by mediating a negotiated peace in the summer of 1813 with the leadership of Metternich, did Austria join the coalition (-but for the purpose of controlling and ending the war rather than winning the war due to potential Russian threat and need for French countervailing power for overall balance of power in continental Europe), and only after the decisive defeat of Napoleon's army at Leipzig in October 1813 did Napoleon's coalition break up, with smaller states bandwagoning to the winning allied side." *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247. For a brief survey of evidence, also see Paul Schroeder, "Napoleon's Foreign policy: A Criminal Enterprise," *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 54, No. 2, April 1990, pp. 147-162. The discussion here is not to make elaboration that Napoleon made strategic mistake by frustrating other states' option for hiding and bandwagoning and without settling dispute in Portugal and Spain, he made mistake by attacking Russia in winter time in the context of history, but rather to prove that all that history provided great lesson for England to prevent such short-term calculations of states and organize an institutional order to extend their interest into the future. Therefore, England aimed at thwarting Napoleonic rule and organizing domestic structure of France and also containing, but not devastating France, by including it into the system. Napoleon's aggressive strategy resulted in collapse of negotiation with Metternich and opened the way for England to exploit her material capacity (subsidy) in order to convince Austria. The inefficiency of Continental system, or lack of its

sustainability must also be taken into consideration. While Bismarck did his best to restore his position deteriorated by the Berlin conference by renewing the Three Emperors' League for the second time and signing Reinsurance Treaty with demoralized Tsar- even though tsar did never like Bismarck policy due to complexity and his position during the Berlin Conference, Napoleon failed to proceed flexibility in diplomacy as Russia began to lose the tide of the Continental system. Meanwhile, this system was costly not just for Russia who dependent on British subsidies for Britain whose laissez faire has nothing to do with Napoleonic embargo or protectionism against British manufactured goods.

⁹⁵ See Kenneth Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 126

⁹⁶ Charles Webster argues that "the task of reconciling the differences of the Allies, of binding them closer together, of creating machinery by which they could act in union against Napoleon, and of providing some plan by which Europe could be reorganized so as to obtain a period of stability after a generation of warfare, was largely the work of Great Britain." Charles Webster, "Foreign policy of Castlereagh", p.29. Ikenberry advances this approach that "the financial weapon was, indeed, what Castlereagh relied upon to secure his ends. Castlereagh made it clear that future subsidies were to depend on the Allies agreeing on his terms." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.94. Paul Schroeder argues that "Britain's costs in money, and lives, in waging the Napoleonic Wars were greater than those incurred during World War I." Paul W. Schroeder, "The Transformation of European Politics", pp. 485-86. Ikenberry argues that "parliamentary control of the British war subsidy had two effects of the peace process; it created added incentives for the allies to negotiate the postwar settlements early, even while the war was going on, and it gave Britain added bargaining power." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.94. By the second treaty of Paris, mechanism was presented for the future settlements through periodic conferences. By letting France retreat only to the 1790-borders, and calling for the first conference, all participant was urged to recognize that within this new order, there would be no permanent loser or permanent winner within defensive and status quoist institutional order. Britain did its best, even through using its financial capacity, to hold together allies during and after the Napoleonic wars. Austria and Russia were two great pressures for England since the former wanted to make separate peace with Napoleon while the latter was threatening to march into France.

⁹⁷ Upon the assumption that structure determines state behavior, and preferences are exogenously given, Waltz believes that "state behavior varies more with differences of power than with differences in ideology, in internal structure of property relations, or in governmental form." Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics", p. 329. Furthermore, Grieco also argues that "international institutions play a minimal role in shaping international politics and that the prospects for cooperation in anarchy are bleak." Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 118. Upon the belief that behavioral outcome hinges on the ability of institutions, Joseph Nye and Keohane argues that "the intensity of international interdependence or the degree of institutionalization of international rules do not vary from one state to another on the basis of their internal characteristics and are therefore not unit-level factor." Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization*, 41, Autumn 1987, pp. 725-53, and especially p. 746. More specifically, Keohane stands against Waltzian approach by emphasizing that "except for the distribution of power given by the structure, the rest must be regarded as unit level factors, and also all unit factors function the similar way with those of other states (security and survival)." Ibid. p.735. Within historical politics, all pre-1815 states, regardless of their domestic structure, mainly cared about the relative power position of the other states and territorial distribution of power. That is why we observe short-term alliances. Waltz theory in this sense is applicable. However, post-Napoleonic era experienced that, again regardless of domestic structure of participants, the U.K. had the objective of conveying strategic rival states within the peacetime alliance system of institutional order through periodic conferences. The goal was to set up an order in which it is the consensually determined parameters that states settle their disputes originally based on divergent expectations, and institutions will become attractive, thereby it will be the ability of institutions, but not the asymmetric power position of states, that shape and constrain unit behavior. Therefore, institutions are not unit level factors. However, what was not achieved was the extent where domestic structure of the participant states was not transformed into what the UK hoped and expected. We see limited socialization in the 19th century institutional order. See G. John Ikenberry, "After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, Chapter 4. For further survey about the possibility of cooperation in anarchy, see, Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images," *International Organization*, 40, 1986, pp. 167-186 and particularly pp. 172-179.

⁹⁸ See Kenneth Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 15.

⁹⁹ For more discussions on hegemonic power and hegemonic stability theory, see Charles Kindleberger, "The World in Depression, 1929-1939", Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973; Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, April 1976, pp. 317-47; Robert Gilpin, "US Power and Multinational cooperation: The Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment", New York: Basic Books, 1973; Robert Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Change in International Economic Regime, 1967-1977," in O. R. Holsti, R. M. Siverson, and Alexander George, eds., "Change in the International System", Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980, pp. 131-62; Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn 1987, pp. 551-74; and David P. Rapkin, ed., "World Leadership and Hegemony", Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990. For a review of the literature, see David A. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 459-89.

¹⁰⁰ See Michael Doyle, "Empires", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.

¹⁰¹ In another version of the theory, George Modelski argues that "the global political system goes through distinct historical cycles of domination by power states." George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20, No. 2, April 1978, pp. 214-35. According to Modelski, "four states have played dominant or hegemonic roles since A.D. 1500: Portugal until the end of the sixteenth century, the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, Great Britain in the early eighteenth century until the Napoleonic wars and again in 1815 to 1945, and the United States since 1945." *Ibid.*, p.231. Modelski argues, as does Gilpin, that "each cycle of hegemonic domination ends with war, ushering in a new hegemonic era." *Ibid.*, p.232; also see, George Modelski and William R. Thompson, "Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economic and Politics", Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996. For survey on the power relations in literature, see Torbjorn L. Knutsen, "The Rise and Fall of World Orders", Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.

¹⁰² Kissinger maintains that "the balance of power was thought an improvement over the exactions of religious wars. But how was the balance of power to be established? In theory, it was based on realities; hence every participant in it should see it alike. But each society's perceptions are affected by its domestic structure, culture, and history and the overriding reality that the elements of power are in constant flux. Balance of power produces the wars whose extent it also limits." Henry Kissinger, "World Order", New York: Penguin, 2014, p. 44. As can be seen, like Neo-realists, power is regarded by Kissinger as the means for the adjustment to the balance of power as long as it is to be limited.

¹⁰³ The clear distinction between benevolent and coercive hegemony is made by Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of the Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Autumn 1985, pp. 579-614; also see, Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or Is Mark Twain Dead?" *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 2, Spring 1985, pp. 207-31; and Joseph Lepgold, "The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European Defense, 1960-1990", New York: Praeger, 1990.

¹⁰⁴ Most of the countries of the world have variety of constitutions, but this in itself does not make them constitutional political orders. Elster argues that "As a recent study of Eastern European constitutional experience notes, although these countries under communism did have constitutional characters or texts, they were not meant to constrain and to obligate the power elites. They had little, if anything, to do with the idea of constitutionalism." John Elster, Clause Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, "Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 63.

¹⁰⁵ For Stephen Krasner "institutions, in the international system, are less constraining and more fluid, more subject to challenge and change than in more settled circumstances. The mechanisms for locking in particular institutional forms, such as socialization, positive reinforcement between structures and agents, or path-dependent processes, are weaker at the international level than well-established domestic politics." Stephen Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1995/96, p. 117.

¹⁰⁶ Ikenberry, by implying that democratic feature of states for satisfying level of credible commitment, claims that "institutions can be established that provide some measure of binding restraint on states, and where domestic politics allow for the locking in of international commitments, the conditions exist for an international political order to operate with some measure of constitutionalism." Ikenberry, "After victory", p. 30.

¹⁰⁷ Kissinger makes elaborations on the balance of power that “A state of nature occurs when the absence of authority produces a war of all against all. For Hobbes, to escape such insecurity, people deliver their rights to a sovereign power (Leviathan) within the state’s borders. The social contract in Hobbes’s analysis did not apply beyond the borders of states, for no supranational sovereign existed to impose order. The international arena remained in the state of nature and was anarchical because there was no world sovereign available to make it secure. The Peace of Westphalia in its early practice implemented a Hobbesian world. After the Peace of Westphalia, the balance of power made its appearance as a system in which primary actors are the sovereign equals and disturbing it would evoke a coalition on behalf of equilibrium.” Henry A. Kissinger, *World Order*, New York: Penguin, 2014, p.54. Kissinger also points out that “until the outbreak of World War I, England acted as the balancer of the equilibrium, backing the weaker side against the stronger, preventing any single country from achieving hegemony in Europe with shifting alliances-not in pursuit of specific, purely national goals, but by identifying the national interest with the preservation of the balance of power. While England acted as a guardian of general stability, for Central European balance essentially manipulated by France, the aim was to prevent the emergence of a unified Germany.” *Ibid.*, pp.78-94. However, by the Vienna system of 1815, the goal was to balance the system with institutional mechanisms, rather than power, within status quoist manner. The primary concern for England to prevent any challenge against its navy power and colonial matters. By shaping incentives, rather than preferences based on domestic structure and traditional historic ambitions, subordinate states left aside their substitutive bargaining considerations for the sake of long-term, or institutional bargainings. We observe the justification of flexibility by means of adjustment through consultations via periodic conferences rather than frequent shift of alliances as of 1815. Kissinger gives the example for the Westphalian adjustment process: “the Westphalian system met tests in the eighteenth century, first by thwarting the thrust for hegemony by France’s Louis XIV, then by adjusting the system to the insistence of Prussia’s Frederick the Great for equal status.” *Ibid.*, pp.55. The war after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England between 1688 and 1713 when the treaty of Utrecht was successfully signed, to some degree, contained French *raison d’état* of Louis XIV. Soon after Prussia annexed Silesia, Europe experienced the war of Austrian succession. While Great Britain was on the opposite side of Prussia during the war of Austrian Succession between 1740-48, during the Seven Years War between 1756-63, it was together with Prussia. Kissinger says that “the change of sides was the result of pure power calculations of immediate benefit, not of any overriding principle of international order. None of the key continental countries felt any obligations to the balance of power. Rather, every king thought that strengthening his own rule was the greatest possible contribution to the general peace.” *Ibid.*, 189. Mearsheimer’s offensive neo-realist approach best fit to account for such case for the pre-1815. He claims that “the best for sovereigns to survive is to maximize its power, and better is to be hegemon for stable order.” John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994/1995, pp. 34–37. Kissinger identifies British foreign policy in such words that “Great Britain’s foreign policy has always been practical, not philosophical; tactical, not strategic.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, p.121. Thus, British foreign policy, let aside interwar period, has always been pragmatist splendid isolationist. Also see, Aaron Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988; Charles A. Kupchan, “The Vulnerability of Empire”, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

¹⁰⁸ For a discussion about constitutional constraints that emphasizes both the negative features of constitutional binding and its positive purposes as a model of institutional design, see Stephen Holmes, “Precommitment and Paradox of Democracy,” in Holmes, “Passion and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 152-77.

¹⁰⁹ Ikenberry states that “Constitutional political orders are those in which the fundamental political institutions within the polity have gained sufficient autonomy to shape and limit the play of deeper social forces.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p. 31.

¹¹⁰ Samuel Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Societies”, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 9.

¹¹¹ Bruce Ackerman, “We the People: Foundations”, Cambridge: Belkap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 6

¹¹² Ikenberry states that “the leading state, in the case of abandonment, would neither attempt to exploit its favorable power position for postwar gains nor try to use that power to achieve agreement with other states over new postwar rules and arrangements. The other states are left to their own devices. This choice by the leading state may not lead to a specific type of postwar order. But left to themselves, weaker or secondary states, - faced with uncertain, unpredictable, and disengaged powerful state- are likely to pursue some sort of balancing response.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p. 50.

¹¹³ According to Adam Przeworski, “unless the increasing returns to power are institutionally mitigated, losers must fight the first time they lose, for waiting makes it less likely that they will ever succeed.” Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 36. See also Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. In this way, constitutions set some measures of limits upon what power holders could do with their momentary advantages. See Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p. 32.

¹¹⁴ Losers realize their losses are limited and temporary, and also losses will not give the winner a permanent advantage. See Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p. 32.

¹¹⁵ Powell argues that “The causes for both are the underlying features of the states’ strategic environment that jointly induce a concern for relative gains and thereby make cooperation difficult.” Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate”, p. 337. Also, Jervis states that “The conditions under which states seek to maximize their relative as opposed to their absolute gains need more exploration.” Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation”, p. 14. Powell argues that “A possible explanation of the concern for relative gains might at first seem to be anarchy: a lack of a central authority leads to balancing and a concern for relative gains. This answer, however, fails for at least two reasons. Anarchy has been a constant feature of the modern international system. It cannot therefore account for variation in the degree of a state’s concern for absolute gains. And, as we have seen above, anarchy does not imply balancing.” Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate”, p. 337.

¹¹⁶ Weingast argues that “A growing formal theoretical literature is exploring the ways in which constitutions function to establish credible limits on the exercise of state power. Competitive markets and stable democracy hinge on the ability of a polity to overcome the problem of credible commitment, that is, its ability to establish and maintain guarantees of economic and political rights by providing binding assurances that state rulers or a majority coalition will not exploit their power position to confiscate wealth or oppress minorities. In this formulation, the constitution operates as a self-enforcing agreement, solving coordination problems that allow citizens to police the state.” Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets,” *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 149, No. 1, 1993, pp. 287-311; also see, Douglass S. North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitments: The Evolution of the Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England”, *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 49, No. 4, December 1989, pp. 803-32. My question is in simplest way that whether democratic domestic character of leading or subordinate states is determining factor for more credible commitment in international relations. Adam Smith’s self-regulating market and invisible hand theories were the ones which were practiced in international politics of the nineteenth century by England. However, the impact of the industrial revolution was not the establishment of laissez faire institutions in Europe, but rather consolidation of state power militarily. Castlereagh wanted to set up a system in which the Concert would be self-functioning. However, we observe that it was too early to expect participants to leave aside their concern on survival and relative power calculations if we analyze state-level foreign policies of each sovereign units during the nineteenth century.

¹¹⁷ For further reading about the commitment problems within domestic orientation, see James D. Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998; Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Inter-Ethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4, December 1996, pp. 715-35.

¹¹⁸ Joseph Weiler argues that “European Union is becoming a constitutional order. European judicial principles and practices, which serve to create a Europe governed by a specific interstate governmental structure, are defined by a constitutional charter and constitutional principles.” Joseph Weiler, “Transformation of Europe,” *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 100, No. 8, June 1991, p. 240-247. However, for others, stable functioning of a constitution requires a relative consensus on basic principles and rules. Dahl explicitly makes certain kinds of elaborations on consensus by focusing on the principles of democracy. See Dahl, “A preface to Democratic Theory”, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956, p. 143; Also see Dahl, “On Democracy”, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, chapter ten.

¹¹⁹ Schroeder argues that “roles cannot be reduced to security matters and considered solely for their effects on security and the balance of power. Moreover, different functions among states and roles modified the behavior of states, including great powers, and significantly changed their purposes and methods in using power. For example, one reason Russia’s conduct toward the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century differed so strikingly from that in the previous periods (pre-1815) was the Russian Tsars’ new self-conception as guardians of the European order and peace. Britain’s continental policy was peacefully influenced by self-imposed role of advancing liberalism and

constitutionalism. States, seeing that certain problems if left unmanaged would lead to dangerous security issues and balance of power confrontations, used the device of functional differentiation to remove problem areas and states from power politics and balance of power competition by recognizing and sanctioning particular roles and functions for particular states. Every example of functional differentiation in the Vienna system illustrates this rule and they were all instances not of balancing but transcending, often in collective, consensual way.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, p. 128. Also see Barbara Jelavich, “Russia’s Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. As can be seen, particularly by the Vienna system, institutionalized functions and roles were given within the capacity of states. Divergent interests still exist, but within constitutional order, states’ actions reinforce the overall balance of power for general interest, thereby legitimacy was achieved by recognition of different functions of each unit in international relations. This approach is beyond the theory of neo-realism that is state action is functionally the same and what differs them from each other their relative position and in anarchic system this builds uncertainty and worry about cheating in alliances or relations. Within institutional order, functional differentiation becomes reality but within capacity through socialization they will be institutionalized in defensive and status quoist reinforcing strategy for the overall balance of power. Thus, it is not the power-oriented capacity, but institutions, by recognizing the capacity and ability of states, shape unit actions within defensive-oriented European institutional, or constitutional, order.

¹²⁰ Ikenberry concludes the discussions on constitutional order in such a way that “power is restrained through binding institutions that tie states down and together, and thereby reduce worries about domination and abandonment. In this sense, constitutionalism depends heavily on the role of international institutions as shaping, constraining, and connecting mechanisms between states.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p. 35

¹²¹ Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Societies”, p. 21.

¹²² Stinchcombe argues that “In practice, an international order with strong constitutional characteristics may, in relative terms, look more like a domestic political order with weak constitutional characteristics. But the point is that constitutionalism- whether in domestic or international political order- varies, and therefore variations can be explained and identified.” Arthur L. Stinchcombe, “Constructing Social Theories”, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, pp. 108-118.

¹²³ See John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Autumn 1993, pp. 139-174.

¹²⁴ Kissinger summarizes the 17th century political developments in such a way that “Raison d’etat puts a distinct line between the Habsburg’s initiative for spiritual unity and strategic advantage. In practical politics, Cardinal Richelieu recognized that France was encircled with Habsburg dynasties, and the way to break such threat is to exploit the opportunity provided by Protestant upheavals. The Thirty Years War, at its very stage, may well seem to be a religious conflict. However, with the participation of France on the Protestant side, the war turned out to be conflict of strategic interests. In political theory, Cardinal Richelieu claimed that Man is immortal and the state has no immortality. Moreover, its salvation is now or never. Simply, he claimed that state’s actions can only be judged by their success. This approach is similar to Machiavellist reward and punishment, or all ends justify the means.” Henry A. Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, pp.145-146. Kissinger claims that “when Richelieu conducted *raison d’etat*, Machiavelli’s treatises on statesmanship circulated. It is not known whether Richelieu was familiar with these texts on the politics of power. He surely practiced their essential principles.” Henry Kissinger, “World Order”, New York: Penguin, 2014, p. 32. Carrot and Stick approach, in the same context, was well spelled out by Theodore Roosevelt’s Big Stick Diplomacy: “Speak softly, and carry a big stick.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, Chapter 3. According to Kissinger “To Roosevelt, international life meant struggle, and Darwin’s theory of the survival of the fittest was a better guide to history than personal morality.” *Ibid.*, chapter three. While Theodore Roosevelt supported the conflict of interest and balance of power serving to the long-term U.S. interests, Wilson blamed traditional balance of power and endorsed collective security based on the principles of democratic moral values. Also see Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 42, No. 1, January 1948, pp. 20-41. Upon the assumption that Britain wanted to end conquest-oriented territorial distribution of power, what differs the Vienna order of 1815 from the Westphalian system perfectly described by Kissinger in such a formulation; “Newtonian clockwork of interlocking parts vs. the Darwinian world of the survival of the fittest”, Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p.46. Ikenberry provides the idea that “within constitutional order, early attempt of which was made by the periodic conferences during the nineteenth century, it was not the relative power position of the sovereign equal participants, but mechanisms determine unit actions for the long-term interests of each.” G. John Ikenberry, “After

Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, Chapter 4.

¹²⁵ See Kalevi J. Holsti, "Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.25.

¹²⁶ Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., "Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 235-64.

¹²⁷ See Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

¹²⁸ For a recent survey, see Michael Sheehan, "The Balance of Power: History and Theory", London: Routledge, 1996.

¹²⁹ Organski, for example, identifies six methods by which states might attempt to maintain the balance of power: "to arm, seize territory, establish buffer zones, form alliances, intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, or divide and conquer." A.F.K. Organski, "World Politics", 2nd ed., New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1968, p. 267.

¹³⁰ See Andrea Osiander, "The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and Conditions of International Stability", London: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 121.

¹³¹ These terms are from Albert Hirschman, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty", Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

¹³² See Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., "Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems", Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975, pp. 227-62.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 230.

¹³⁴ Ikenberry argues that "domination could take many forms. An extreme version of this strategy was the imposition of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe after World War II. As part of this strategy, the Soviets stripped its parts of occupied Germany of factories, vehicles, and industrial goods and sent them back to Russia." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 50. As Stalin told Tito and Djilas: "This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise." Milovan Djilas, "Conversations with Stalin", New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1962, p. 81.

¹³⁵ Ikenberry makes elaborations on institutionalism in such a way that "the willingness of the leading state to move toward an institutionalized order will also be influenced by its judgement about how effectively it can operate within such an order. To operate within an institutional order, it will need to bring organizational skills and capacities to bear in a political process that involves coalition building, bargaining, and compromise. Some leading states will better able to do this than others." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 61. Millward pointed out that "while U.S is better organized than Japan within multilateral institutions, Japan finds itself better able to operate within formal bilateral relations and these differences are due to different internal organizational characteristics." Alan S. Milward, "The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951", Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984. Ikenberry advances his claim that "As a result, they (democratic states) will respond to the basic constitutional incentives in slightly different ways. This is crucial variable, which has shaped the willingness of military dictatorships to move forward a constitutional democracy; those that have political parties that can represent their interests within the electoral system will be more clined to move toward democratic constitutionalism than those that do not have such operational capacities." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 61. For similar discussion, also see Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts." In literature, the common point shared by liberal institutionalist is that democracies are better suited to process and operate within institutionalized orders than nondemocracies, and such order serves to reduce the returns to unilateral wield of power, and also to be regarded as restraining pact for pacification of foreign policy, thereby the fears of subordinate states will be reduced and credible commitment will increase for cooperation.

¹³⁶ Gillingham argues that "French support for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was driven by practical and immediate commercial goals, such as gaining access to cheap German coal as an input to its steel production. The actual political and economic achievements of the ECSC are widely questioned." John Gillingham, "Coal, Steel, and Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from the Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

¹³⁷ See Alan S. Milward, "The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951", Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984; Milward, "The European Rescue of the Nation-State",

London: Routledge, 1993; and Andrew Moravcsik, "The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998, chapter two.

¹³⁸ Carl Friedrich argues that "the substitution of an international organization for an international balancer is, in a sense, merely a specific instance of the general feature of all constitutions; a constitution seeks to balance various governmental powers and organizes a balance of interests in the community." Carl Friedrich, "Constitutional Government and Democracy", p. 86. Grieco claims that "Even in the case of the European Union, the move toward greater integration and shared institutions is at least partly driven by the balancing logic, most recently as European countries have grappled with the rise of unified and economically dominant Germany." Joseph M. Grieco, "States Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 1996, pp. 261-306. However, Ikenberry claims that "nonetheless, when order is built around institutional binding practices and supranationalism, it is substituting interlocking institutional constraints for balance-of-power controls as the basic check on concentrated power. The logic of balance is to check power with power; the logic of institutional binding and supranationalism is to restrain power through the establishment of an institutionalized political process supervised by formal-legal authority." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.43. Interlocking interests were achieved through concessions and buffer-zones, as can be seen with the independence of Netherlands and Belgium (1830). Church points that "As the October revolution broke out in Belgium in 1830, the Russians seemed keen on implementing their threat, but they could not reach the territory without marching through Prussia. Prussia had a direct interest in preventing the independence of Belgium and could have used the occasion to begin a war for national unification. Prussia, however, not only did not seize the opportunity but prevented Russia from sending the troops already mobilized, and then acquiesced to the separation of Belgium. Prussia decided against expansionism because France had warned that it would resist an intervention, that threat was deemed credible, and Prussia was not willing to fight without the support of the other powers. Of these, only the Russians seemed eager, but even they got distracted soon by the Warsaw insurrection in late November. With the Russians busy putting down the coup of the nationalist Polish cadets, no political will was left for a military intervention in support of The Hague. Prussia preferred the status quo to a war with France and resolved that it would cooperate with the other great powers to solve the problem. This is a clear instance of interlocking interests providing for a credible threat that deterred potential revisionism by Prussia." Clive H. Church, "Europe in 1830: Revolution and Political Change", London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983; and H.A.C. Collingham, "The July Monarchy: A Political History of France, 1830-1848", London: Longman, 1988. Schroeder claims that "France also could have profited from expansion into Belgium but its government knew that any attempt to annex a major part of Belgium would mean war with all of Europe." Paul W. Schroeder, "The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848", Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 677. He gives some more details that "Even though Louis Phillipe recognized France's obligations after July Revolution, Metternich was not convinced and invaded Parma and Modena. Phillipe attempted to put his second son on Belgium throne. With potential revisionist attempts by France and Prussia deflected by credible threats to oppose them, the London conference was convened and gave ultimatum to France (1831 Jan.). France recognized Leopold as king in July. However, this time Netherlands brought forward problem in 1831 and 1832. Upon Netherlands's local declaration of war against decisions taken at London Treaty which obliged Netherlands to relinquish Antwerp and France dispatched its corps and intervened under the condition of withdrawal having achieved the mission." Ibid., p.681. Slantchev argues that "First, armed interventions demonstrated the credibility of enforcement. In Belgium, possible Prussian ambitions were checked by an Anglo-French threat, whereas French expansionism itself was checked by the unified opposition of the four other powers. Likewise, in Greece, Russia was willing to forgo some advantages in the Near East in order to preserve the system. The great powers imposed their solutions by force, and the weaker states had to submit to their judgment. Belgium's neutrality was as much a check on France as was the united Netherlands, and its position was cemented by the guarantee of all the great powers." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, p. 584.

¹³⁹ Ikenberry argues that "Binding legal and institutional commitments agreed to in intergovernmental treaties do not recognize the legal supremacy of a higher judicial authority." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.43.

¹⁴⁰ Ikenberry states that "the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community, was also secured through a traditional multilateral treaty. As such, the resulting institutions are not constitutional agreements. Treaties that establish international organizations do not enjoy the same higher-law status as domestic law." Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁴¹ See Frederico G. Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," in Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., "The New European Community", Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 177-194. Ikenberry argues that "in more recent decades, however, incremental steps have been taken to constitutionalize the (traditional) treaty by the expansion of the authority and reach of the European Court of Justice and the incipient establishment of European citizenship rights." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 43.

¹⁴² Ikenberry maintains that "As the EU moves further in this direction, supranationalism takes on a more formal-legal and federal character, and the resulting political order moves well beyond traditional treaty-based institutional binding." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 43.

¹⁴³ Kissinger clearly points out the problem between theory and practice: "Enlightenment philosophers on the continent generally opted for the rationalist rather than the organic view of political evolution. Montesquieu concluded that events never caused by an accident. There was an underlying cause that reason could discover and then shape to the common good. It is the Kantian thought that the devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their power arising from interstate clashes would in time oblige men to contemplate an alternative. In accordance with Kant, within a federation of republics, their citizens would cultivate peace because, when considering hostilities, they would be deliberating about calling down on themselves all the miseries of war. It was Nature's purpose that humanity eventually reason its way toward a system of united power, hence a cosmopolitan system of general political security and a perfect (perceptual) civil union of mankind." Henry Kissinger, "World Order", p. 33. He continues his discussion that "Considering political developments in international relations since the Thirty Years War, it is ongoing discussion whether governmental orders could be invented from scratch by intellectual thinkers. In the process of opting for the rationalist rather than organic view of political evolution, the enlightenment philosophers contributed-unintentionally, indeed contrary to their intention-to an upheaval that rent Europe for decades." Ibid., p. 34. That's why, Wilson in accordance with Classical realist E.H. Carr claimed that "Theories must come after practice." Peter Wilson, "E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis: Appearance and Reality in World Politics. Politik", Vol. 12, No. 4, 2009, pp. 21-25. I agree that, if theories come before practice, it may well be subject to idealism or utopianism. However, liberal institutionalism provides different angle by sharing Holsti's approach that "every theory provides unique privilege to understand political events in international relations." Ole B. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy", Diplomatic History, No.13, Vol. 1, Winter, 1989, pp. 15-43. Stephen Walt also claimed that "No theories are strong enough to account for a single event." Stephen M. Walt, "The Origins of Alliances", Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987. Kissinger focuses on Rousseau's general will that "The Revolution's intellectual godfather was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Let aside his condemnation all existing institutions as illusory, in pursuit his theory, in politics, Napoleon followed an ideology by which all monarchies were treated as enemies; because they would not give up power without resisting, the Revolution, to prevail, had to turn itself into a crusading international movement to achieve world peace by imposing its principles." Henry Kissinger, "World Order", p. 33. He advances his thought that "Rousseau's thought was transferred into politics, or abused by political ideology, in such a way that the impossibility of permanent coexistence between countries of different religious or political conceptions of truth, and the transformation of international affairs into a global contest of ideologies to be fought by any available means and by mobilizing all elements of society. The concept of an international order with prescribed limits of state action was overthrown in favor of permanent revolution that knew only total victory or defeat." Ibid., p.39. Kissinger also draws our attention on a point that domestic changes may well directly affect foreign policy by maintaining that "Napoleon treated as enemies anyone who refusing liberty and equality. Rousseau's definition of popular sovereignty, legitimacy, public possession and lawgiver in the context of General Will was expanded in ideological abuse to all across Europe by Napoleon, and we observe during his command in the Napoleonic Wars how internal changes within societies were able to shake the international equilibrium more profoundly than aggression from abroad." Ibid., p. 38. Rousseau's theoretical discussions about the problems occurred by transition from state of nature to civic society, his reasoning about the solution based on social contract within the context of General Will, and his model of General Will on reconstruction of corrupted civic society are all beyond the discussion of my dissertation. Additionally, it is out of discussion to focus on the Kissinger's point that "Civil society transforms men from isolated beings with limited wants into the warlike creatures found in a Hobbesian state of nature and for Rousseau, civil society is a state of war." Ibid., p.38. However, to figure out the French Revolution and make sense about Napoleon's expansionist ideology based on abuse of Rousseau's theoretical approach on domestic reconstruction of civil society, it is better to understand Rousseau's domestic reconstruction model and his call for discarding all existing institutions. Kissinger

repeats that “Rousseau had written that whoever refuses to obey the general must be forced to do so by the whole body. Anyone refuses the General Will will be forced to be free meaning that they will be restrained by the will of common good. The Revolution no longer made the leader; the leader defined the revolution as we observe gradually in French Revolution. In Rousseau’s General will-based theoretical framework of Napoleon’s ideology, unconditional surrender is not something to be accepted by Napoleon, and his fear was that any acceptance of limits would destroy his only claim to legitimacy. Such approach justifies the theory of Rousseau’s General Will.” Ibid., p.38. It may well be confusing about the General Will. It is not the reflection of individual will but rather it is the will applied by a lawgiver forcing people to figure out what is their actual interest. The general will is to be considered as an additional will. When a person fell into disagreement with the general will, he would actually be taking initiative contrary to his basic ambitions and desires, and that it would be appropriate to use force to get his consent with the general will. The general will reflects the real will of each member of society. By definition, the general will is always right. Kissinger underlines that “The general will is the overriding good to which each person is willing to sacrifice all other goods, including all particular private wills. Individuals must be constrained and the common good must overrule the selfish individual, which provides legitimate rule. Moreover, sovereign has no need for guarantor since it is formed of individuals. The social contract based on General Will is to dilute the justice in corrupted civil society. Thus, individuals deprive of some advantages enjoyed in state of nature because the General Will will prevail, thereby individual cannot follow their interests. Thus, individuals will be forced to understand what’s in their interests. Again, Rousseau’s argument that sovereignty is simply the exercise of the general will was abused in history to legitimize totalitarian regimes as observed during Napoleon era. Furthermore, popular sovereignty based on convention entailing the rule of the majority and enabling equality in collective sense. Also, his (Rousseau’s) argument about public possession paved the foundation toward Marxism and Communist ideologies.” Ibid., p.39. Even though it is unclear where the General will is actually directly coming from, it is clear that General Will is well over the individuals and it is not actually the will of all, but rather serving the interests of all individuals. Individuals are free only if they obey the laws and free of self-individual interest, and restrained, or constrained, only by the General Will. For further survey see, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract, in Basic Political Writings”, trans. Donald A. Cress, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987. Napoleon obtained and achieved Rousseau’s consent-based social contract to consolidate, and in following exploit, the General will that was achieved by his success in military and the conscription for military. Napoleon made unilaterally his proclamation as the First Consul for life, and later as the Emperor, and began to force the European states to his arbitrary-oriented will. He even refused to be legitimized by any power except for his own, took the imperial crown away from the Pope’s hands, and unilaterally crowned himself as the Emperor. England in the nineteenth century wanted to undo Rousseau’s theory and in practice contain France, and discard French *raison d’état* with the objective of setting institutional restraining strategies within anti-revolutionist, or status quoist, institutional order through periodic conferences for the purpose of achieving the balance between legitimacy (sharing common interest) and power by consultation and moderation. Kissinger claims that “Particularly England recognized that French revolution and the political developments afterwards named as the Napoleonic Wars transformed the rationality of Enlightenment by the passions of the Reign of Terror. The period between 1815 and the turn of the century was modern Europe’s most peaceful, and the decades following the Congress of Vienna were characterized by an extraordinary balance between legitimacy and power.” Ibid., pp. 65-69. In history, we observe that political theories of, for instance, enlightenment thinkers were eventually abused. That’s why, I agree with Robert Cox that “all theories are for someone and for some purposes.” R. W. Cox, “Approaches to World Order”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Alexander Wendt claimed that “anarchy is what states make of it.” Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It”, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1992, pp. 391-425. Out of this approach, I share the same idea, with E.H.Carr, that theories must come after political practice. However, my argument is not supporting realist claim in the first great debate since no theory is enough to define a single case in international relations. On the other hand, what I need to specify in oppose to the claim by liberal institutionalists is that it is not the preferences that can be shaped, but rather incentives could be restrained to some degree by consent-oriented institutions.

¹⁴⁴ My claim is to be based on path-dependency model, and within that history matters in the context of increasing returns to institutions is perfectly described by Ikenberry; “It is possible to see both an evolution in the types of power constraint mechanisms employed by the postwar states and a general increase in the degree to which formal intergovernmental institutions were central organizing elements of the postwar political orders. The Westphalia settlement primarily sought to establish the religious

and political independence of the European states, and its codification of the doctrine of state sovereignty served to fragment power. The Vienna settlement and the world war settlements of 1919 and 1945 are also notable for the new use of binding institutions to limit and restrain the exercise of power. The Vienna settlement relied primarily on mechanisms of consultation and great-power norms of restraint. The twentieth-century settlements involved the establishment of global and regional multilateral institutions and alliances, although the balance of power and other restraint mechanisms were manifest in these orders as well. Overall, the settlements reveal changes in the way in which power was regulated and restrained; the mechanisms have become increasingly more varied, sophisticated and institutionally binding." John. G. Ikenberry, "After Victory", pp. 54-57.

¹⁴⁵ See Robert Jervis, "Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life", Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 94-98.

¹⁴⁶ John Herz argues that "A system is (relatively) stable where changes are relatively slow, gradual, and peaceful; unstable where they tend to be sudden, far-reaching in impact, and frequently violent." John Herz, "The Impact of the Technological-Scientific Process on the International System," in Abdul Said, ed., "Theory of International Relations", Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 115.

¹⁴⁷ Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", chapter ten.

¹⁴⁸ Robert Jervis advances his claim that "Change can be peaceful without being slow and gradual, as the events in East Europe in 1989 reminds us, and peaceful changes can be far-reaching in impact." Robert Jervis, "System Effects", p. 95. Ikenberry supports this approach that "Slow and peaceful change can eventually result in a radical transformation of the order which is not a mark of stability." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 45.

¹⁴⁹ Within well-founded theoretical framework of structurationist theories in sociology, Alexander Wendt argues that "agents and structure are mutually constitutive, yet ontologically distinct entities. Each is in some sense an effect of the other; they are 'co-determined. Agents and structure were conceptually inseparable." Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, Summer 1987, pp. 335-70. Dessler argues that "structure is an environment in which action takes place for Neo-realists. Structure means the setting or context in which action unfolds. Structure is, in other words, a set of constraints. However, in a transformational theory, structure is a medium of activity that in principle can be altered through activity. Structure shapes action and is shaped by action. The goal, therefore, of a transformational theory is to explain how structure and agent interact." David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate", *International Organization*, Vol. 43, Summer 1989, pp. 426, 441-70. As can be seen, while he emphasizes that with socialization, there will not emerge any agent and structure problem, Wendt focuses on the most likely possibility of problem if two entities were hold separate by saying that they are ontologically identified political units and each is a product of the other within interaction, and both is mutually constitutive within the framework of intersubjective understandings and meanings. Powell claims that "we cannot decompose the international system into units and structure if we treat states as the units. For example, a change in the international system, like the rise of British hegemony, that reduces the risk and therefore increases the expected return to international trade will also tend to change states' preferences. States and structure are interdependent; each is in part an effect of the other." Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate", *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring, 1994, pp. 329-343. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, state preferences returned to pre-1815 system by allocating resources for military capacity through searching new raw materials off the shores of the Continent. See, Paul Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000", New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 143-275. Ikenberry more explicitly advances this thought by claiming that "autonomous institutions based on all agreed upon legal and formal binding parameters will bind even those who set up them and shape state action in the long run." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.45. Such an approach goes actually in parallel with Wendt's emphasize on socialization. But the discussions are made upon whether the agents and structure are separable. Ikenberry here draws our attention that "if so; whether such separation results in any problem; whether within this separation to what extent socialization is possible and to what extent unit action could be changed in the context of assumption that agents and structure are separable are puzzling problems in international relations theory." *Ibid.*, p.67. Waltz claims that "character does not change and the only possible thing is the change in state behavior by assuming that preferences and outcome (even intersubjective meanings) are given exogenously and they are determined by the constraints of structure for a short term due to constant fear of cheating and ineradicable concern on relative power position of the other state." Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", p.81. Ikenberry claims that "institutions will be attractive and become means to reduce such obsessions in the long term by such mechanism as

introduced by the United Kingdom in the Vienna system. Britain, through exploiting its material capacity, managed to set up peacetime restraining pacts through enforcing periodic conferences, thereby transparency increased and transaction cost and enforcement cost decreased by institutionalized voice opportunity by means of unit of proportionality in decision making. Thus, they are the ability of institutions, but not the capacity of participant subordinate states, constrain and shape unit action & behavior in international relations." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.66. For further survey, see Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders," in Keohane, "Neorealism and Its Critics", pp. 204-54; Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?"; John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in World Polity," in Keohane, "Neorealism and Its Critics"; John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," *International Organization*, Vol.47, Winter 1993, pp. 139-74; Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory"; and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It", *International Organization*, Vol.46, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425. The preferences of the autonomous institutions, or general interest of the constitutional order, will be reflective of the preferences of participant states as long as all states are in consistent with the general interest. This underlying condition is that preferences is not functioning at the expense of the other strategic rival states. At unit level, many situations, however, are much more complicated, and what to assume about preferences over outcomes is not obvious enough. It is not sufficiently clear, for example, what to assume about a state's preferences over some trade arrangements. See Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, Winter 1992, pp. 101-46; Barry Posen, "The Origins of Military Doctrine", Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984; Jack Snyder, "The Ideology of the Offensive", Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984; and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War", *International Security*, Vol. 9, Summer 1984, pp. 58-107; Peter Gourevitch, "Politics in Hard Times", Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986; Peter Katzenstein, ed., "Between Power and Plenty", Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978; David Lake, "Power, Protection, and Free Trade, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988; Helen Milner, "Resisting Protectionism", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988; and Ronald Rogowski, "Commerce and Coalitions", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. Robert Powell argues that "the neorealist-neoliberal debate largely focuses on the likelihood of cooperation in anarchy and on the role of institutions in facilitating cooperation. Neorealism maintains that cooperation will be difficult in an anarchic system composed of units that prefer survival over extinction. Neoliberalism questions this conclusion but not the assumption that units are minimally motivated to survive. Indeed, it would seem bizarre not to assume that units prefer survival over extinction. Thus, the criticism that these preferences are specified exogenously is unimportant to the debate about the likelihood of cooperation in anarchy. Because given its preferences over outcomes and its beliefs about what the other players are doing, a player can rank its potential actions from most to least preferred." Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate", *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring, 1994, pp. 320-321. Moreover, Powell makes a final claim that "Structural theories do not try to explain preferences of one type but do try to explain preferences of the other type. Structural theories take the units' preferences over possible outcomes as given and, consequently, lack a theory of preferences over outcomes. But structural theories try to make predictions about the units' preferred actions by combining assumptions about the units' preferences over outcomes with other assumptions about the structural constraints facing the units. In this sense, structural theories claim to be a theory of preferences over actions." *Ibid.*, 318; also see, Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", p. 91.

¹⁵⁰ Ikenberry claims that "the political order is threatened or broken apart when these arrangements are overturned, contested, or in disarray. An essential element of political order in this view is that participants within the order must have some acknowledgment or awareness of the order." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.45.

¹⁵¹ Ikenberry here implicitly defines pre-1815 order; "some historical periods and regions of world politics are without political order." *Ibid.*, p.45. There was order, but not political in a sense that none was systematically designed and the balance of power before 1815 based on no awareness and no institutional peace-time restraining pact. Kissinger also claims that "Over the course of the next nearly century and a half, the Westphalian system had managed to constrain challengers to the equilibrium through the more or less spontaneous alignment of countervailing coalitions." Henry Kissinger, "A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age", New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1994, pp. 317-18.

¹⁵² We must know that each of the three models of political order makes different claims about the source of stability. Waltz defines power politics in balance of power system that "Balance of Power order theorists claim that an order is stable when competing states faithfully engage in counterbalancing

and produce an equilibrium of power. Stability is achieved through the ongoing competitive adjustments of states operating within anarchy. The system tends toward equilibrium, and even war can be regarded as punishing states, eventually paving the way to a return to balance and system equilibrium." Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", chapter ten.

¹⁵³ True definition of stability is the ability of the political order to contain and overcome any disturbances and challenges to order. Ikenberry claims that "order will differ in their ability by different governing rules, principles and institutions to cope with such disturbances as shift in power distributions, the rise of new states, and changes in the goals and purposes of states. Additionally, the durability and longevity of order is not in itself a complete measure of its stability." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.45. Jervis argues that "An order may last a long time, but not be put to the test in terms of its ability to contain disturbances, whereas an order may be strong but it can be overturned because of extraordinary circumstances." Robert Jervis, "Systems Effects", p. 95. Therefore, both Ikenberry and Jervis focus on the relative test of strength and mechanisms in institutional order with regard to measurement of durability and longevity of order.

¹⁵⁴ Test of strength and mechanisms were perfectly formulized by Kissinger; "Legitimacy (all agreed upon legal formal binding institutions) without power (test of strength without absence of enforcement machine) tempts empty postures and power without legitimacy tempts test of strength." Kissinger, "Diplomacy", chapter 4.

¹⁵⁵ Stability therefore requires the ability of states to recognize and respond to shifting power distribution. Kissinger takes this view of the post-1815 order and emphasizes the importance of the cooperative and self-conscious management of a stable balance: "Their goal was stability, not perfection, and the balance of power is the classic expression of the lesson of history that no order is safe without physical safeguards against aggression. A new international order came to be created with a sufficient awareness of the connection between power and morality; between security and legitimacy." Henry Kissinger, "A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age", New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1994, pp. 317-18. He advances his approach that "The failure of states elites to appreciate power shifts and respond with counterbalancing action is a source of instability. War is the result of the failure of successful balancing activity. Moreover, specific type of underlying power distributions may be more likely to result in stable power balances than others." Ibid., p.321. Hans Morgenthau makes the same argument in more general terms: "Before the balance of power could impose its restraint upon the power aspirations of nations through the mechanical interplay of accepting the system of the balance of power as the common framework of their endeavors; where such a consensus no longer exists or has become weak and is no longer sure of itself, as in the period starting with the partitions of Poland and ending with the Napoleonic Wars, the balance of power is incapable of fulfilling its functions of international stability and national independence." Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace", New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, pp. 163-65.

¹⁵⁶ Ikenberry underlines that "A dispute continues as to whether bipolar or multipolar balances are more stable." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 46. In the classical formulation of the argument, Kenneth Waltz argues that "bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems." Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 1964, pp. 881-901. However, Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer argue that "multipolar systems are more stable. A multipolar order entails a much more complex set of variables and more relations, creating more uncertainty about how particular balancing policies will impact on the wider system. The disagreement is really over whether this uncertainty creates more opportunities for false steps and destabilizing foreign policy or whether it encourages prudence and caution." Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3, April 1964, pp. 390-406; and also see, Richard Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1966, pp. 314-27; Jack Levy, "The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis," in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., "Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict", Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985.

¹⁵⁷ Gilpin argues that "a stable system is one in which changes can take place unless they do not threaten the vital interests of the dominant states and thereby cause war between them. Furthermore, an international system is stable (in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it is profitable to attempt to change the system. Rising states will be accommodated within the existing hegemonic order until the benefits of challenging the existing leading state outweigh the costs." Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, eds., "The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 16. For further reading, Robert Gilpin, "War and Change"; Organski, "World Politics"; Organski and Jack Kugler, "The War Ledger", Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1980; and Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss, eds., "Hegemonic Rivalry from Thucydides to the Nuclear Age", Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991.

¹⁵⁸ Stability in constitutional order requires that institutions function relatively autonomously and operate to ensure that there will be no longer any permanent loser by establishing unit of accommodation proportionally in decision making, thereby states will even defend their divergent interests in status quoist manner within mutual restraining strategies. All those processes will pacify power oriented foreign policy and make the institutions as an alternative international order. Also for further reading, Samuel Huntington, "Political Order in Changing Societies", chapter one.

¹⁵⁹ Ikenberry depicts a very crucial point that "The British in 1815 advanced less extensive institutional binding proposals than the United States did after 1919 and 1945, but for the case of 1919 the USA did not ratify the Versailles settlement and the League of Nations due to article 10. The 1945 order entailed more extensive use of binding institutions than either 1815 and 1919." John G. Ikenberry, "After War", p.48.

¹⁶⁰ Schroeder maintains that "The balance-of-power order may be automatic and operate strictly in terms of material power-balancing requirements, or it can be a more managed order informed by self-conscious rules and norms. A hegemonic order may involve the direct and coercive domination of weaker and secondary states by the leading state, or it may be organized around more reciprocal, consensual, and institutionalized relations. The order is built upon asymmetric power, but the extreme consequences of those power asymmetries are muted. The constitutional order can vary in terms of the strength of the rules and institutions that bind the states together and limit the returns to power. Constitutional orders are identified in terms of the presence and functioning of an institutionalized political process. But institutions may more or less ensure a mutually agreeable distribution of gains. The weak versions of balance-of-power and hegemonic order involve the presence of rules and institutional processes that diminish the pure operation of balancing or hegemonic coercion. In both cases, institutions are intervening mechanisms that alter the underlying dynamics built around power distributions." Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994, p. 123.

¹⁶¹ John and Kupchan argue that "The distinction between legitimate and coercive orders is one of the most elemental ways of characterizing political systems. A leading state can secure its interests and the compliance of other states in two fundamental ways. One way is through coercion, where the leading state directly uses its material capabilities to induce other states to operate in a desired manner within the order. The other is through a process of rule making and institution building, where secondary states agree on their own to abide by the rules and expectations of the order." G. John and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power", *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 283-315. A similar distinction between types of acquiescence, or acceptance, is made by Michael Mann: "pragmatic acceptance, where the individual complies because he perceives no realistic alternative, and normative acceptance, where the individual internalizes the moral expectations of the ruling class and views his own inferior position as legitimate." Michael Mann, "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 35, June 1970, pp. 423-39.

¹⁶² Snyder claims that "This assumption about the power goals of the leading state is broadly realist. The state seeks to use its power as efficiently as possible. It wants to preserve and extend its power position into the future, and it is willing to give up some returns on its power in the short run in favor of a greater longer-term return on its power if such a possibility exists." Jack L. Snyder, "Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Also see, Fareed Zakaria, "From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Rule", Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?", *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 5, Spring 1996, pp. 90-121; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimistic: Cooperation as Self-Help", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994/95, pp. 50-90; and Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics", in Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., "New Thinking in International Relations Theory", Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 163-201.

¹⁶³ See Charles A. Kupchan and G. J. Ikenberry, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power. *International Organization*", Vol. 44, No. 3, 1990, pp. 283-315.

¹⁶⁴ As Lisa Martin argues "a hegemon can expect fewer challenges to an institution in which smaller states have a say in joint decisions than to some unilaterally imposed arrangements." Lisa Martin, "The Rational State Choices of Multilateralism," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., "Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form", New York: Colombia University Press, 1993, p. 110. Within the constitutional settlement, the leading state agrees to extend decision-making access to secondary, or subordinate, states in exchange for their acquiescence within the order's rules and

institutions. The legitimacy of the order gradually reduces any chance that secondary states will be in pursuit to overturn or attempt to challenge the overall order.

¹⁶⁵ Margaret Levi argues that “coercion is expensive, and its use often precipitates resentments that can fuel the flames of opposition.” Margaret Levi, “Of Rule and Revenue”, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988, p.32.

¹⁶⁶ Wolfer argues that “The leading state can make a choice between using its power capabilities to gain momentary advantages in particular distributional struggles and using those capabilities to invest in institutions that will persist into the future.” Arnold Wolfers, “The Goals of Foreign Policy”, *Discord and Collaboration: Essay on International Politics*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, pp. 73-74.

¹⁶⁷ Snidal claims that “Assumptions about the institutional conservation of state power are actually variables, and their presence or absence will have an impact on the possibility and appeal of a constitutional settlements. If a state does not conclude that its power will decline or be threatened, it will be less concerned with anchoring its position in a constitutional order. Conversely, when the leading state foresees declining power and rising conflict, the incentive for offering a constitutional agreement increases.” Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory”, *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn 1985, pp. 579-580.

¹⁶⁸ March and Olsen maintains that “Unless there is a substantial shift in a state power and interests, postwar institutions are likely to persist and continue to shape and constrain state action even after the power that created them has declined. Thus, institutions can have an independent ordering impact on their environment even after the disappearance or decline of the actors that created them.” James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “*Discovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*”, New York: Free Press, 1989.

¹⁶⁹ Przeworski focuses on types of agreements; “The first type of agreement is a substantive agreement with outcomes that determine the distribution of material benefits between states. The second type is an institutional agreement that specifies the principles, rules, and parameters within which particular negotiations over outcomes are conducted.” Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts”, in Jon Elster and Rune Stagstad, eds., “*Constitutionalism and Democracy*”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 64-70. The institutional agreements also lock in secondary and weaker states to a particular range of rules and norms. Ikenberry claims that “The institutions make it more difficult for both the leading and lesser states to make radical shifts in their policy orientations, and they provide rules and expectations about how power is exercised and disputes are settled.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, pp.67-68.

¹⁷⁰ Adam Przeworski makes a claim that “Agreements about institutions are possible, even if the political forces involved have conflicting interests and visions because institutions shape the opportunities of realizing specific interests and the groups involved understand that institutions have this effect.” Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts”, pp.70-71.

¹⁷¹ Elster and Stagstad claims that “The possibility of an institutional settlement stems from the ability to achieve agreement on institutional arrangements even if the underlying substantive interests remain widely divergent and antagonistic.” Jon Elster and Rune Stagstad, “*Constitutionalism and Democracy*”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

¹⁷² Kagan states that “Institutions are not neutral with respect to interests of states; they do not make all outcomes equally possible. Agreement to abide by the new institutional rules comes from an understanding that within this framework, the arrangements will allow them to defend and protect their interest. All competition within institutional order make them recognize that disputes will not lead to war. War is assumed to be inefficient with recognition that there will be no permanent loser or winner.” Kagan, K., “The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-Institutionalist Debate and Great Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821-41”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1998, pp. 56-57.

¹⁷³ It will be helpful to participate in discussions in related literature for a general understanding about the impact of international order. About the topic see, Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Cevallos, “Understanding the Current International Order”, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1598-OSD, 2016. In my argument, the very stage of institutional order in early 19th century is to be regarded as intentionally designed set of principles (order as input). However, it will be incomplete definition if we disregard the behavioral effect of the potential anarchic system (order as output). Legro and Moravcsik also claim that “it might be rational instructive to treat input and output not as alternative conceptions of order but instead as two important components of any single order.” Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. (1), 1998, pp. 5-7. Order as input during the pre-1815 period was short term and existed in wartime alliances. What makes the Vienna system differ from the system of Westphalia is

that the order as input became at least as equally important as order as output since the United Kingdom took diplomatic initiative to convene strategic rival states in order to achieve institutional order on the basis of consultation, representation and moderation through periodic conferences. The objective is to ensure subordinate states that defensive institutional order, that is the Vienna System, won't function according to relative power position of states and no state will have any special privilege at the expense of the other. Functional differentiations, which stems from divergent interests and expectations, of each participant will serve for the general interest of the systemic arrangement. Thus, the primary objective was to extend the wartime alliance to the peacetime defensive and status quoist alliances with the recognition that distribution of power after war always subject to challenge and need to be rearranged in anti-revisionist manner. New structure after war determines state behavior by not providing condition for the emergence of hegemonic power and requires from the preponderant power to reinforce this status quoist order. However, within this restraint of the structure, participant units may have chance to improve their capacity as long as none of them do not disturb the system level and unit level status quo. During the nineteenth century, periodic conferences as mechanisms granted opportunity to consolidate the ability of the institutional order to shape and constrain the unit behavior. From the outset, institutions could be regarded as the means not just among the units, but also between state system and systemic order, or system level and state level, considering the long peace in the nineteenth century. However, any claim that Concert's core principles had demonstrated effects on state behavior, that is behavioral outcome of institutional order, would be oversimplification since the nineteenth century order was far away from being self-reinforcing. Ikenberry adds that "The main reason was the existence of non-democratic states. Even though Great powers in the Concert privilege non-revolutionary conservative regimes as the most legitimate polities worthy of autonomy and protection, there emerged uncertainty and disagreement over the Concert's relationship with French-inspired revolution in the first half of the nineteenth century and regime type." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.122. The more British foreign policy became isolationist, the more Austria put emphasize on conservative values, and the more Austria based its policy on religious norms of the Holy alliance. See Matthias Schulz, "Did Norms Matter in Nineteenth-Century International Relations? Progress and Decline in the Culture of Peace Before World War I," in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson, eds., "An Improbable War: The Outbreak of World War I and European Culture before 1914", New York: Berghahn Books, 2007; Jack Levy, "War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975", Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1983, Chapter 4.

¹⁷⁴ Shepsle and Weingast discusses that "Institutions induce particular outcomes or solutions to particular bargains." Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice", *Public Choice*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1981, p.503. They advance their claim that "Problems in substantive agreements will not be seen in negotiations for institutional settlements which defines parameters among states. The problems in institutional settlement will be displaced onto the institutions. Thus, institutions will be more attractive. During institutional order building states also shape and constrain future substantive outcomes with the assumption that current uncertainty may outweigh the long-term benefit. If this is so, why would institutional agreement be more attractive than substantive agreements? This is partly because of the ambiguity about specific distributional gains by institutional agreements. Thus, uncertainty determines state behavior but this uncertainty is transferred into long term with the assumption that it will be favoring their long-term interest. The uncertainty by institutional agreement will stimulate leading and secondary states to come to agreement on institutional order building." *Ibid.*, p.507-508.

¹⁷⁵ Rosenau and Czempel argue that "The ability of states to agree on a constitutional bargain thus depends on a measure of separation-but not a complete divorce- between institutional and substantive agreements. If all distributive struggles hinged on the constitutional rules- and the complete substantive implications of the rules were knowable to all parties in advance- agreement might be impossible or at least much more difficult. But the implications of the institutions must be sufficiently clear. Furthermore, within institutional order power capacities will not completely determine substantive outcomes, but provide parameters within which state actions will be more predictable and disputes will be settled and institutions will be attractive for future or long term interests of all those who participate in institutions. All those processes provide the conditions by which relative power of other states will not become to some important degree the primary concern due to reduce the use of power for future and decline in the level of uncertainty." James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempel, "Governance without Government: Order and Changes in World Politics", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

¹⁷⁶ Ikenberry points out that "Scholars differs as to how long the concert system lasted. Some argue that it was in decline or ended in the early or mid-1820s. Support for this view comes in two forms, the first involving the rapid fall of Castlereagh himself. Overworked, unpopular at home, and possibly mentally

ill, the foreign minister committed suicide in the summer of 1822. His successor, George Canning, was a relative Concert skeptic." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.98. Also see, Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., "International Regimes", Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 180; Inis Claude Jr., "Swords into Plowshares", New York: Random House, 1956; F. H. Hinsley, "Power and the Pursuit of Peace", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963; and Harold Nicolson, "The Congress of Vienna: Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822", New York: Viking, 1961 edition. Some others argue that it lasted until the Crimean War (1854-1856), or until World War I. See Paul Schroeder, "Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972; Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, "Force and Statecraft" New York: Oxford University Press, 1983; and Kal J. Holsti, "Governance without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth Century European International Politics", in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Oto Czempiel, ed., "Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 30-57. Schulz advocates the view that "the Concert continued until 1914." Matthias Schulz, "Did Norms Matter in Nineteenth-Century International Relations? Progress and Decline in the Culture of Peace Before World War I," in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson, eds., "An Improbable War: The Outbreak of World War I and European Culture Before 1914", New York: Berghan Books, 2007, pp. 43-59. For further survey upon the discussions on longevity of the Concert of Europe, see Harold George Nicolson, "The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822", London: Constable & Co Ltd., 1946; and Carsten Holbraad, "The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory", New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970. While some scholars extend the longevity of the Concert up till 1914 due to periodic conferences, considerable numbers of scholars put significance upon the same foundation through critical approach. Kissinger, for instance, claims that "the eastern powers' invocation of the so-called Holy Alliance to suppress liberal revolutions created an irrevocable split that effectively ruined the Concert and after 1822, the most-important leaders almost entirely ceased meeting with one another directly (congresses), opting instead to let their intermediaries represent them (conferences)." Henry A. Kissinger, "Diplomacy", pp. 143-144.

¹⁷⁷ Schroeder argues that "The leading view of the Vienna settlement has been that it was fundamentally a reestablishment of the balance of power. Scholars have long debated the Vienna settlement's logic and significance, particularly the issue of whether the concert system constituted simply the modification and refinement of the balance of power or a much more fundamental departure from the balance." Paul W. Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement rest on a Balance of Power?", *American History Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, June 1992, pp. 683-684. As Edward Gulic argues that "When the time came to discuss preliminary plans for peace, the statesmen flew as straight as been toward the hive of balance of power. The state system was to be restored; Prussia was to be increased in order to stabilize north-central Europe; and France was to be reduced to a size compatible with the secure independence of other states." Edward Gulick, "Europe's Classical Balance of Power", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955, pp. 121. Kissinger makes an addition that "The balance of power system after 1815 might not have been as unvarnished as in the eighteenth century, but its fundamentals were the same. Others have been argued that the balance of power was refined and socialized in Vienna; the operation of balance was more self-conscious and rooted in a mutual recognition of the necessities and virtues of equilibrium among the European powers." Henry Kissinger, "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822", Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973. Others, like Kupchan, have gone still further and argued that "the Vienna settlement constituted a more fundamental break with older forms of European balance of power politics. Vienna represented the rejection of the classical balance of power in favor of a quasi-institutionalized concert system of great-power cooperation." Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe", *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, pp. 114-115; Also see, Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 173-94; Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation", *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1, October 1985, p. 58-79. The well-known historian Paul Schroeder has claimed that "Vienna system is a reconsideration of the sources of order in post-Napoleonic Europe that emphasizes the transformations in the institutions and practices of European security. The settlement did not rest only (or even fundamentally) on the balance of power but was built on a mix of power and institutional constraint arrangements." Paul W. Schroeder, "The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848", Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

¹⁷⁸ Kissinger describes the pre-1815 period that "The Holy Roman Empire had become a facade; no rival European claimant to universal authority has arisen. Almost all rulers asserted that they ruled by divine right- a claim not challenged by any major power- but they accepted that God had similarly

endowed many other monarchs. Wars were therefore fought for limited territorial objectives, not to overthrow existing governments and institutions, nor to impose a new system of relations between states. The exercise of that power was constrained by the recognition that the system would not tolerate hegemonic aspirations." Henry A. Kissinger, "World Order", New York: Penguin, 2014, pp. 30-31.

¹⁷⁹ Langhorne argues that "the greatest significance of the Vienna settlement lies in the fact that it saw the creation of the first deliberately contrived international system rather than in the precise nature of its territorial dispositions." Richard Langhorne, "Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 1986, p.314.

¹⁸⁰ Bairoch point out that "Between 1760 and 1820, Britain was responsible for about two-thirds of Europe's growth in industrial production." P. Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels From 1750 to 1980", *Journal of European Economic History*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 1982, p. 291.

¹⁸¹ For a perfect analysis about the containment of French pro-revisionist ambitions, see, Charles F. Doran, "The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath", Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, pt. 4. Slantchev mentions that "France was quickly assimilated into the new system and to prevent French revisionism, the allies settled (twice) on lenient terms. Even after Napoleon's second bid for power, France did not lose much territory (scaled back to its 1790 borders), and although it had to pay an indemnity of 700 million francs and support an occupational army, the army was withdrawn ahead of schedule. These terms were indeed remarkably generous considering the turmoil and general destruction that France had caused." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-enforcing Equilibrium," *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, p. 584. Osiander also argues that "if France was stripped of too much territory, peace would last only until it found a suitable opportunity of endeavoring to regain what she has lost." Andreas Osiander, "The States System of Europe, 1640–1990", Oxford: Clarendon, 1994, p. 202.

¹⁸² Kennedy argues that "Britain does not appear to have given up much in the way of short-term gains in exchange for the institutional cooperation of the other European states. The institutional bargain was more specifically an agreement by Britain and the other major states to restrain the arbitrary use of power in territorial disputes, made credible by alliance and consultation mechanisms." Paul Kennedy, "The Rise and The Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000", New York: Random House, 1987.

¹⁸³ From another stand point of view, Paul Schroeder focuses on German confederation, but in effect, to prove that states have always had functional differentiation; "The smaller German powers - principalities-play roles as independent states in forestalling struggles between Austria and Prussia for control of Germany, or attempts by France or Russia to dominate it from the flanks; as well as buffers and decompression zones between the absolutist East and the liberal-constitutionalist West. Many special international functions were assigned to the German Confederation from 1815 on: regulating and controlling conflicts between individual German states, between the Confederation and individual states, between Protestants and Catholics, and between the great powers Austria and Prussia, former bitter rivals for supremacy in Germany and now required to work together to manage the Confederation." Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Klaus Knorr, ed., "Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems", Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1976, p. 226.

¹⁸⁴ About British observation on political developments in Continental Europe without direct participation and intervention, and also the logic behind the British isolationist policy together with Bismarck's expectations during German unification were all well-described by Schroeder briefly; "It (Germany) did after 1870 become a true great power. But it did so militarily and politically by defeating first Austria and then France, annexing or subordinating all the lesser German states in the process and half persuading, half threatening Russia into accepting the outcome. Thus, the only major power against which Germany did not direct its expansion was Britain. Bismarck expected the British to accept the new Germany and grow to appreciate it. It would be peaceful, progressive, Protestant power, a useful commercial partner, and a good guarantor of peace in Europe against a restless France and dangerous Russia-everything the British wanted. The main pattern of Anglo-German relations until well after his fall in 1890 was cooperation more than rivalry. Much of Germany's later policy was an ill-advised attempt to pressure the British into friendship. Even challenge to Britain after 1900 of Admiral Tirpitz's battle fleet was intended by most German leaders only to help keep Britain neutral in any clash between Germany and its real opponents, France and Russia." Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory", p. 146. Germany exploited all the opportunities of *realpolitik* during Bismarck era. German unification was achieved by power politics rather than democratic principles, but, after unification, Bismarck, by recognizing that Germany was losing flexibility at unit level countervailing relations, developed a complex model privileged Germany enjoy to some degree

freedom of action and never directed disturbance to the so-called General Interest of the overall balance of power. Diplomatic initiative in setting up German Customs Union in 1833 by Prussia long before the German unification (1870) was a perfect experience to achieve the British sympathy. However, even though Bismarck compensated the cost of diversity and incompatibility of interest between England and Austria due to the Austria's policy during liberal economic-oriented Zollverein period, Austria's strong emphasis on conservative values within Balkan question, with the Three Emperors' League in 1873 and 1881, soon after his dismissal, Germany disregarded traditional isolationist policy of Britain by miscalculating that reinsurance treaty was a great obstacle to set up privileged institutional link with Britain. However, this treaty was compensating the cost of British isolationism over Austria and Russia's imperialist ambitions over the Balkan peninsula. All attempts by Germany after Bismarck was to convince Britain that, without Germany, Britain cannot pursue its long-term interest. But Germany's aggressive attitude, rather than gaining British sympathy on German foreign policy, humiliated Britain. Kruger Telegram and Morocco Crisis in 1905 and 1911, for instance, were regarded as embarrassing historical political development for German-British relations. Each attempt by Kaiser did not only irritate Britain, but to test the entente. However, each test brought Anglo-French-Russia relations forward into alliance type relations. Kissinger perfectly describes Kaiser's miscalculation that "Great Britain had refused to commit itself to an open-ended military alliance. It would make only two kinds of agreements: Limited military engagements to deal with definable threat or entente-type arrangements to cooperate diplomatically on those issues in which interests with other another country ran parallel. What Germany should have asked of Great Britain was not alliance, but benevolent neutrality in a continental war and entente-type arrangement would have been sufficient." Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy", chapter seven. However, Kaiser's Weltpolitik could not produce maneuvering space, and failed to extend the sustainability of the same measure of flexibility that was already presented by British benevolent neutrality policy during the period between 1859 and 1870 when Bismarck managed to unify Germany by Realpolitik even though Germany between 1890 and 1910 did not attempt to balance against Britain. For further reading on Anglo-German rivalry, see, Paul M. Kennedy, "The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914", London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1980; Norman Rich, "Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914", New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992.

¹⁸⁵ History repeats itself. Napoleon's Russian attack and its defeat, and tsar's ability to claim in 1812 that Russia was the key actor in defeating Napoleon created external constraints on England in addition to deeply autocratic Russian domestic structure. Osiander argues that "Russia simply wanted to become a key player, and not to be thrown to the periphery of the continental Europe. The same story was experienced after the defeat of Nazi Germany as Stalin began to set up sphere of influence in the Continent, but this was achieved in the context of ideology till the end of Cold War, or bipolar system. Russia was dependent on British loans and subsidies during the long peace of Vienna Order of 1815." Andreas Osiander, "The States System of Europe", pp. 178-179. Until the defeat by Japan, Russia felt itself free of any similar to Concert-driven moral obligations of balance of power for its Asian ambitions. This also created constraint on British institutional order building strategy. Russia managed to put eastern question off the Vienna-table. This granted opportunity for Russia to have free space and flexibility to apply its policy in the Balkans. Even Prussia during Bismarck era began to think the overall balance of power was not precondition for survival. Not just France, but also Prussia began to feel disturbed by becoming (junior) partner of Austria over the confederation of Germany. It is true that Bismarck never attempted to break, or disturb, the 1815 system, but rather he himself developed a very distinct alliance system after German unification. His delicate, or very fragile, balance of power was supporting the overall balance of Power, but Kaiser Wilhelm misused the capacity earned by Bismarck in Weltpolitik at the expense of Concert of Europe as of 1890.

¹⁸⁶ Schroeder claims that "The defeat of Napoleon was not the defeat of hegemony on the continent; it only altered which states would be the leading powers, and the conditions under which they would exercise their power. The Napoleonic period was dominated by British and Russian pursuit of hegemony although often under the guise of balance of power rhetoric." Paul Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?", p. 686. But, even though Russia's military capacity was stronger than Britain, it was heavily dependent on British loans and subsidies. The actual problem was actually the extent of the German capacity particularly in comparison with France. This capacity, in the context of Weltpolitik as of 1890, turned out to be expansionist-oriented policy to increase the current power position in the balance of power. Schroeder also argues that "It is not rational for Britain to compensate shortage of financial capacity in establishing institutional order by Russian military." Ibid., 689. Russia was always considered during the nineteenth century as a threat for British interest and most importantly England wanted to replace power balancing with permanent diplomacy, and legitimacy on the basis of consultation and representation within the frame of unit of proportionality in

decision making via periodic conferences with recognition that momentary advantage would be subject to challenge and hegemonic war.

¹⁸⁷ An unprecedented period of territorial stability in Europe could be regarded as the consequence of the Concert's principles. Simply put, between 1815 and 1853, Europe's political borders did not change too much. Each great power restrained itself from territorial opportunism in favor of preserving Concert in unity. Even though in the second half of the nineteenth century, the eastern question was becoming a puzzle for the participants of the Concert due to Russia's imperialist ambitions in the Balkans and Napoleon III's foreign policy was gradually leading to decrease in the geopolitical value of Austria, there did no dramatic territorial change in the system. Kupchan claims that "the reason for such situation was the existence of sphere of influence. The power in question did not have a free hand in these spheres, but other members tended to defer to its preferences. Britain oversaw the low countries, Iberian Peninsula, and North America, while Russia's sphere extended to parts of eastern Europe, Persia, and Ottoman territory. Austria held sway in northern Italy and jointly managed the German confederation with Prussia. France's reach was initially curtailed after its defeat, but it gradually came to enjoy special influence in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Such spheres helped manage and contain crises in the periphery by effectively apportioning regional responsibilities among Concert members." Kupchan, Charles A., "How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 192-193; Also see, Slantchev, Branislav L., "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, p. 585. Slantchev additionally stresses on the importance of the two most-powerful states, Great Britain and Russia; "They have been the most satisfied with their spheres in the wake of the settlements." Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment", p. 590. He makes addition that "During the order building period of Vienna system, some lands in Italy was given as concession to Austria and confirmed by Russia and Britain for different reasons up till 1820s when liberal movements and Austria's anti-revolution & liberal diplomacy became more disturbing for Britain. Not only was it the only territory available to compensate Austria for (in)voluntary losses, but Austria was the least troublesome state to take possession of it. Since France wanted Italy, Britain wanted to keep France out of there, and Russia, in turn, wanted to keep Britain out. Austria was the safe choice; both Russia and Britain treated it more gently in diplomatic affairs because of this. French influence in Italy was curbed and the territory was recognized as an Austrian preserve." *Ibid.*, p.604.

¹⁸⁸ Rene focuses on the point that "The Troppau-Laibach conferences established the general principle that great powers could intervene within their own spheres of influence to maintain order as they saw fit. This was a far cry from Alexander's designs with the Holy Alliance, which envisioned a system of collective security based on religious norms and values. Meanwhile, after Castlereagh, England became more and more anti-liberal interventions no matter if it is conditional on withdrawal after the restoration of domestic structure of the intervened state." Albrecht-Carrie, René, "The Concert of Europe", New York: Walker & Company, 1968, pp. 54-59.

¹⁸⁹ Schroeder more explicitly claims that "It is hard to find two decades in British history from 1688 to 1945 in which it exerted less influence in Europe or control over the international system than 1855 to 1875. Britain either failed to control or simply observed without important participation." Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory", p. 144. Schroeder also perfectly summarizes the constraints that produced insoluble puzzle and deadlock for the Concert of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile we should pay attention on the output of British isolationist and pragmatist foreign policy and the cost of declining geopolitical value of Austria for general interest of the Vienna system even though there did not happen any dramatic territorial change. The long peace in the Concert of Europe system was mentioned together with unchanging territories of sovereign units. Schroeder presents political landmarks of the nineteenth century to prove that matters were tempting beyond the continental Europe; "The Peace of Paris after the Crimean War; the liberation and beginnings of national unification of the Danubian Principalities (Rumania); the unification of Italy; the building of the Sues Canal by Egypt under French guidance; Russia's competition of its conquest of the Caucasus and steady penetration into Central Asia and toward India's Northwest Frontier; huge Russian gains in China (till 1905 defeat by Japan); French annexation of Nice and Savoy (1859), ruining the Anglo-French alliance; Austria-Prussian conquest of Britain's client Denmark (The war over Schleswig-Holstein, 1864); serious troubles with the United States over the American Civil War; an Austro-Prussian (1866) destroying the German Confederation, ousting Austria from Germany, redrawing the map of Central Europe, and drastically changing the balance of power; a Franco-German war in 1870 which Britain tried half-heartedly to prevent, and which further revolutionized the European system; Russia's repudiation of the Black Sea clause of the Peace of Paris; and the isolation of France in Europe, particularly more after the Napoleon III era, and the renewal of Austria-German-

Russia ties in the Three Emperors' League after 1871." Ibid., p. 145. As can be seen, the balance of power began in this period to move out of the continent. However, in order to understand the reason for such trend toward non-continental issues, we must focus on the impact of British-oriented industrial revolution on the Continent. Each state in the Continental Europe began to consolidate their economic power to strengthen their military capacity while the industrial revolution in Britain was to increase the power of laissez faire structure. See Paul Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000", New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 151-58, particularly chapter four, and five; W.E. Mosse, "The European Powers and the German Question 1848-1871", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958, pp. 98-123; Richard Millman, "British Foreign Policy and Coming of the Franco-Prussian War", Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 44-67.

¹⁹⁰ Ikenberry perfectly makes an analysis of British power position that "Britain had the most advanced economy and it was a global naval power, but it did not have territorial ambitions in Europe or military capabilities to dominate the continent. As the preeminent state after war, its threat to the other great powers was more one of abandonment than domination. These circumstances limited what Britain was willing to offer the other European states in exchange for institutional agreement. Equally important, the autocratic character of the states placed limits on institutional order building." Ikenberry, "After Victory", pp. 121-122.

¹⁹¹ Charles Webster, "The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815", reprint, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963, p. 45. First published by the British Foreign Office, 1919.

¹⁹² Charles Webster, "Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815", London: G. Bell and Sons, 1950, p. 3.

¹⁹³ Kennedy provides us with the fact that "The actual size of Britain's economy, measured in terms of gross domestic product, was roughly equal to those of France and Russia after 1815." Paul Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000", New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 151-158. Slantchev summarizes the reasons for why Britain had no territorial ambitions in the continent and why it wanted status quo not permitting any hegemon: "Castlereagh managed to exclude the crucially important maritime rights and colonial questions from consideration at the Congress altogether. Britain's most important territorial gains lay outside Europe. Britain retained its unchallenged sea power and could position itself to appear as the mediator in continental disputes. Britain did not desire territorial aggrandizement in Europe and had a single overriding objective: to prevent any one power from dominating Europe. In practice, this meant the containment of France and Russia. As part of the French containment scheme, Castlereagh envisioned the creation of a large United Kingdom of the Netherlands under British influence. To that end, the money from the British compensations to Holland was earmarked for construction of fortresses on the Belgian border to strengthen the cordon. When his initial plan of a united Austro-Prussian center fell through, he worked on the rapprochement between Austria and France as a counterweight to Russia and Prussia." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, pp. 577-578. However, particularly after Castlereagh, this policy turned out to be more and more isolationist and opposition to anti-liberal policy. We observe rapprochement between Russia and Austria due to Austria's more emphasize on conservative value. Such approachment collapsed as Wilhelm II abandoned the Bismarck realpolitik by renouncing the reinsurance treaty with Russia. For further understanding about such changing dynamics in the balance of power, see Ikenberry, "After Victory", chapter Four. The destabilizing impact of the evaporating buffer states between 1859 and 1871 is discussed in depth by Paul W. Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System", International History Review, Vol. 6, February 1984, pp. 1-27.

¹⁹⁴ I agree with Ikenberry that the major states were seeking to set up an oligarchic system as of 1815. See Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 83. He claims that "For England, the treaty of alliance, the treaty of Chaumont or the first and second treaty of Paris, was not to terminate with the (Napoleonic) War, but to contain defensive engagements, with mutual obligations in peacetime through periodic conferences. The coalition must go beyond the reach of dissolution of Napoleon's hegemonic-oriented diplomacy. Direct consultations among statesmen were seen as crucial for Castlereagh rather than traditional diplomacy implemented by diplomats." Ibid., pp. 104-105.

¹⁹⁵ Ikenberry argues that "A general and moderate peace was the supreme goal of British foreign policy, and the details were of less importance than agreement on an overall settlement." Ibid., p. 91. Actually, this primary goal is to be assumed as the simple formulation of institutional bargaining within constitutional order. Meanwhile, I use institution and constitution interchangeably.

¹⁹⁶ As Schroeder observes in detail, “[t]here has never been an era in European history before 1815–1848 or since that time when a small state could feel so confident that it would not be the target of conquest or annexation by some great power.” Paul W. Schroeder, “The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure”, *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1986, p. 25. Fazal provides us data with elaboration that “Indeed, data show that no European state suffered state death (violent or otherwise) between 1815 and 1859. The few European state deaths occurring in the second half of the century came only as components of the successful German and Italian unification campaigns.” Tanisha M. Fazal, “State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation”, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 21–23. Kennedy makes additional notes that “None of this peacefulness came about for lack of disagreement or the absence of serious crises in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. Instead, the accommodating and flexible structure of the Concert system itself afforded the great powers a forum through which to peacefully resolve their disputes. However, the increasing effect of liberal movements and the industrial revolution that urged European states to increase their economic capacity for strong military power resulted in loss of flexibility of Concert of Europe system in the second half of the nineteenth century.” Paul M. Kennedy, “The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914”, London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1980; Also see, Paul Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000”, New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 151-58, chapter four, and five.

¹⁹⁷ Paul Schroeder advances the matter of flexibility by a question that “what becomes of the structural constraints of anarchy if they are elastic enough to allow some of the state action, or behavior, involved in transcending?” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, p.124. He furthermore claims that “all attempts of states to hide (neutrality), transcend, or differentiate themselves functionally reflect unit-level differences in behavior, but do not change the essential structure in which the great powers, their power positions, and the balance of power remain decisive.” *Ibid.*, p. 139. However, he provides puzzling approach by such a claim that “it is far from obvious that in the long run bids for hegemony always fail and new balance emerge.” *Ibid.*, p. 124. Kissinger analyses the overlapping alliance system of Bismarck model, which was soon after the German Unification of 1870. Kissinger simplifies and explains the logic of the Bismarck model in a way that “Bismarck realized unification resulted in little space for flexibility, and in order to refresh the pre-unification flexibility to reinforce the flexibility of the overall balance of power, he began to conduct a new treaty with Russia, give assurances to England that he had no ambition to break the system, and conduct new consensual alliance with old rival Austria as a counterbalancing force against particularly Russia. For the practice of Realpolitik avoids armament races and war, only if the major players of an international system are free to adjust their relations in accordance with changing circumstances, or are restrained by a system of shared values, or both.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, chapter six. Such complexity of unit-level relations formulized the Bismarck model which, particularly after the unification, provided Bismarck privileged position of freedom of maneuvering for Prussian-founded Germany in conducting relations with Russia, England and Austria. Slantchev also argues that “the (Vienna) system was capable of absorbing changes in the territorial distribution as long as these changes did not alter the basic set of incentives. Peace and stability could arise only if the incentives to challenge them were sufficiently altered.” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-enforcing Equilibrium”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, p. 577. He also holds an argument about the concert of Europe within theoretical approach that “one cannot expect a completely static system, it should be able to accommodate changes that do not alter its fundamental features. We should expect to see relative freedom of action for the great powers in their own spheres of influence as long as such activities are not aimed at altering the territorial distribution.” *Ibid.*, pp. 599-603.

¹⁹⁸ Ikenberry perfectly describes British thinking about postwar order in early 19th century; “British leaders did seek to capitalize on their momentary power advantage to lock in a favorable and durable order; they recognized that a durable order would best be secured through mutually satisfactory rules and institutions; and they offered some modest assurances of strategic restraint in order to gain agreement on institutions and process that would bind the major states together and limit strategic rivalry. But there were sharply defined limits on how far Britain would be willing to go in binding itself to a European order through security guarantees- considering domestic pressures, and there were also severe limits on the ability of the other European states to make binding commitments as well, considering still existing short term interest-driven countervailing relations together with nondemocratic character of the subordinate states. Asymmetric power relation to extent provided opportunity for the England in setting up institutional order building that has the objective to reduce the possibility of exploiting exercise of power at the expense of secondary states. England did not want power balancing, but distribution of benefit through institutions and mechanisms.” Ikenberry, “After

Victory", pp. 90-91. Again, powers were still interested in specific short term gains rather than the general system of Europe, based on the principles of diplomacy. Sheehan argues that "The 1815-Vienna order was the first step for transformation of the Westphalia system based on shift of alliance according to short term calculations into reducing the power balancing based on distribution of power through conquest. Namely, England attempted design restraining strategy through developing mechanisms to increase the ability of institutional agreements. However, the Napoleonic war did not lead to the triumph of a single hegemonic order, but rather two leading states (England and Russia) at either end of the European continent emerged as the leading arbiters of the postwar settlements -even though Russia was deeply depended on financial assistance of British subsidies." Michael Sheehan, "The Balance of Power: History and Theory", London: Routleg, 1996, pp.124-124. Ikenberry comes to the main problem about the early stage of the Vienna settlements. Ikenberry claims that "The coalition partners had different interests, most dealing with territorial claims and ambitions. Certainly, little agreements existed on how the war would end, and the possibilities included the outright defeat of the French armies, the overthrow of Napoleon, or some sort of cease-fire." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 93.

¹⁹⁹ Taylor discusses in detail that "The treaty locked in the allies to pursue the war until settlement objectives were obtained, and it pledged the allies to defensive alliance after the war as insurance against a resurgent France. In the second world war, the U.S. strictly opposed to pre-settlements before the unconditional surrender achieved or while the war is going on. Even during the first World war, Bolshevik Russia revealed all secret agreements. Here, Castlereagh, used the treaty as a mechanism to achieve after war defensive peacetime alliance, and, by the second Paris treaty, he included France to block the others to act in exploiting the spoils over France. Thus, specific interests of the allies were blocked. The primary objective for England is to overthrow Napoleon and to tie participant states together by subsidies and credits through periodic conferences on the basis of consultations to settle future substantive agreements. The main objective is to set principles and rules in which states would settle their disputes, thereby state action will be predictable by leaving substantive demands to some degree vague. The Quadruple Alliance, which was signed on 20 November 1815, the same day as the Second Peace of Paris. Article III, which was a straightforward renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont, was the one solely directed against French aggression. Even when the Quintuple Alliance was signed with France in 1818 at the Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, the original Quadruple Alliance was renewed." A.J.P. Taylor, "The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918", Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954, pp. 1-2.

²⁰⁰ Up till the decisive defeat of Napoleon's army, Britain tried to cope with Russian and Austrian pressure through using its financial power, and by diplomatic initiative it tried to set up conditions and principles for sustainable wartime alliance, but to transfer these principles into peacetime alliance, Britain extended the principles beyond the short-term interests to block states from concluding separate peace. Chapman discusses that "Subsidies and credits loaned for the allies were a kind of mechanisms to tie subordinate states together for the transformation of wartime principles into the principles of peacetime diplomacy. The flexibility of the British position and Castlereagh's search for compromise among the allies were key to reaching agreement. Castlereagh was engaged in a delicate balancing act, and the character of the postwar peace hinged on his success. If Metternich's eagerness to end the war were to prevail and the war end too soon or in a series of separate peace agreements with France, Napoleon would remain in power within France's natural borders. This outcome would split the alliance. However, if the war last too long and beyond their capacity, not Russia would get in European matters, Britain may be urged to get entangled with too complicated problems, and the institutional balance of power would be hard to achieve as all participant will be confronted with the short-term distribution of power over spoils of defeated France." Tim Chapman, "The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes, and Results", London: Routleg, 1998, pp. 156-157. As Schroeder notes that "In reinsuring the allies that Britain would not cut off its subsidies or retire from the continent and retain its colonial conquests, Castlereagh reminded them of what Britain could do and how they could neither wage war or make peace without her." Paul W. Schroeder, "The transformation of European Politics", p.501. However, even though Metternich attempted to make agreement with Napoleon due to the fear of Russian threat, Napoleon was under the impact of hegemonic ambitions and this prevented him to make rational calculation for long term, and such ambition gave Britain opportunity to tie Austria into British policy based on unconditional surrender of Napoleon as soon as possible. This story is similar in a sense with Hitler who wanted to realize lebensraum and everything was a means for it. These hegemonic fascist ambitions reduced the opportunity to set up strong alliance system.

²⁰¹ However, we should not disregard the still existing weight of British foreign policy even though it became more isolationist. Palmerston stated that "it was impossible to change the territorial order in a manner inconsistent with the Treaty of Vienna without the concurrence of the other powers who were

party to that Treaty.” Cited in F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, “The Great Powers and the European States System, 1815–1914”, London: Longman, 1980, p. 4.

²⁰² Kissinger argues that “Metternich coped with another version of delicate balance. British support was secured through Quadruple Alliance to secure preservation of the territorial balance, and Russian support through the Holy Alliance is to quell domestic (liberal-oriented) upheavals. The Quadruple Alliance was for geographic security and the Holy Alliance was for domestic stability. As the time passed and the memory of Napoleon faded, the combination of purposes of two alliance formation became increasingly difficult to sustain. The more the alliances approached a system of collective security and European government, the more Great Britain felt compelled to dissociate itself from it. And the more Britain dissociated itself, the more dependent Austria became on Russia, hence the more rigidly it defended conservative values.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, chapter four. Such conditions increased the incompatibility between England, who got disturbed by Austrian oppression on minorities and whose interest was not Balkans, and Austria who had no interest in Dardanelles and Mediterranean. As Austria became more and more dependent on Russia, considering French-inspired liberal revolutions of 1848, Metternich’s most complicated and puzzling question became how far his dependence on the Tsar’s conservative values could restrain Russia far from exploiting its political opportunities in the Balkan peninsula. Kissinger makes two conclusive statement: “Concert of Europe was ultimately shattered on the avil of the eastern question, and Crimean war was precipitated by France and it could be prevented.” Ibid., chapter four. Legitimacy, that is sharing common interest, got lost by both Austrian ultimatum and Crimean War. France managed to break the containment, but with German Unification, European long peace began to experience collapsing process. Restraining strategy was constrained with different impact of industrial revolution. Germany and France and their historical rivalry urged them to seek for up-to-that-time unattainable resources. Because, general assumption in late 19th century was that establishing strong army depends on strong economy, and for strong economy, sovereign units must reach new resources beyond the continental Europe.

²⁰³ Elrod mentions that “The willingness to forego acquisition of Dutch colonies in order to establish a reputation for moderation among the continental European states also reflected strategic restraint. At Vienna, Castlereagh argued that he still felt doubts about the acquisition of Dutch colonies.” Richard B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at the International System”, *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, pp.149-150.

²⁰⁴ The common point, by which we can claim that there was a continuity between pre-1815 and post-1815, is detected by Kissinger; “The inherent equality of sovereign states, regardless of their power or domestic system, was instituted. Newly arrived powers, such as Sweden and the Dutch Republic, were granted protocol treatment equal to that of established great powers like France and Austria. The concept of state sovereignty was established. The right of each signatory to choose its own domestic structure and religious orientation free from intervention was affirmed. The Peace of Westphalia did not mandate a specific arrangement of alliance or a permanent European political structure. With the end of the universal Church as the ultimate source of legitimacy, and the weakening of the Holy Roman Emperor, the ordering concept for Europe became the balance of power which, by definition, involves ideological neutrality and adjustment to evolving circumstances.” Henry A. Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, chapter four. However, in 1815, the power of states was more consolidated within defensive policy as observed in the new domestic structure of the Confederation of Germany.

²⁰⁵ Ikenberry claims that “Terms such as balance and equilibrium were used, but they embodied more legal-institutional ideas about the character and operation of European order than the older notion of balance of power. It was Castlereagh’s project of Alliance that carried forward Pitt’s initial proposal for a continuation of the alliance after the war to ensure against French resurgence and to manage European political conflict. The defensive alliance would be the center-piece of the settlement and all negotiations would be conducted by common consent of the allied powers.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, pp. 100-101.

²⁰⁶ Osiander claims that “the alliance provided a mechanism for the great powers to cooperate, but it also provided a way for them watch on one another and, on occasion, influence and restrain one another. They did have cooperation precisely because they could not trust one another.” Andreas Osiander, “The states System of Europe”, p. 234.

²⁰⁷ Paul Schroeder argues that “security alliances are often attractive to states for their mutually restraining effects, restraining, or controlling the actions of the partners in the alliance themselves. The anticipation is that threats and security dilemmas will be dampened by locking the potential adversaries together in an institutionalized security pact.” Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of

Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., “Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems”, Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1976, p. 230.

²⁰⁸ Dunn claims that “International conferences before the Congress of Vienna occurred only at the termination of war, and solely arranging distribution of territories, and their purpose was primarily concerned with the establishment of peace. In the decades after the Vienna settlement, Europe saw the establishment of the practice of holding periodic conferences during peacetime for the consideration of matters of general interest to the governments of Europe. The specific agreements are of less interest than the general framework of deliberations.” Fredrick Sherwood Dunn, “International Legislation”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 4, December 1927, p. 578.

²⁰⁹ Richard Langhorne presents that “The treaty of Chaumont formally ratified the notion that the allied powers would continue after the war to enforce the settlement and protect the peace. The first Peace conference called for the convening of a general congress in Vienna to regulate the agreement that emerged from the peace treaty. The practice of great-power meetings was again spelled out in the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance, which was part of the second Peace of Paris, signed 20 November 1815. Article Six of the alliance document stated that the peace agreement would be maintained through periodic conferences of the allied sovereigns to ensure the execution of the treaty.” Richard Langhorne, “The Development of International Conferences, 1648-1830”, *Studies in History and Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1981, p. 77.

²¹⁰ Slantchev describes the early test of the Vienna system; “negotiations over Poland and Saxony exposed Austria’s weakness, and the need to rely on French support to counter Russo-Prussian scheming. Faced with Russian intransigence and Prussian belligerence, Austria and Britain signed a secret treaty with France on 3 January 1815 with the express purpose of checking Prussia’s designs on Saxony. Having carried the day on the Polish issue, Alexander abandoned Prussian chancellor Karl von Hardenberg, who had to back down. On 12 January, the Council of Five had its first meeting.” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium”, p.585. From the stand point of Britain, the test of British capacity hinges on its ability in making concessions as a balancer in the continent. Bullen argues that “With Alexander I prevailing on the Polish issue, Austria opposed Prussian annexation of Saxony, which meant Prussia had to be compensated in the Rhineland. Austria, which renounced possession of the Netherlands, had to be compensated in Italy. Britain, of course, insisted on Holland and Hanover as strategic checks on France in the north. The tough bargaining tactics of Alexander on Poland and the subsequent war scare over Saxony showed that Russia could obtain anything it wanted for itself, even though it may not have wanted to risk war on behalf of a weaker friend. Having achieved his territorial and constitutional goals in Poland, Alexander joined the other three powers in coercing Prussia into accepting less than half of its demands in Saxony.” Roger Bullen, “France and Europe, 1815–48: The Problems of Defeat and Recovery in Europe’s Balance of Power, 1815–1848”, ed. Alan Sked, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979, p. 123.

²¹¹ Ikenberry argues that “The failure of Pitt’s idea for a general guarantee moved Castlereagh back in the direction of institutionalized consultation as the mechanism to manage order. A process of permanent diplomacy by conference was to be the central mechanism for keeping order in Europe. The odd personal evolution of Tsar Alexander from radical constitutionalism to mystical pietism, together with the low credibility of the restored French government, made an arrangement for a general guarantee impossible.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, pp. 111-112.

²¹² Ikenberry argues that “the splitting of non-European issue spared the diplomats in Vienna considerations of wider international conflicts that could have doomed agreement.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, p.112. As Schroeder argues “The Vienna settlement in settling European questions, and ignoring extra-European ones, shielded Europe, fenced it off from extraneous quarrels. By separating and sheltering European politics from wider global developments, agreement among the allied powers was made more stable.” Paul W. Schroeder, “The Transformation of European Politics”, p. 575.

²¹³ Bismarck model’s primary concern was Russia. Slantchev claims that “The gravest defect of the Vienna system was that it needed Russia more than Russia needed it. Satisfaction with the existing distribution of benefits goes a long way toward explaining the Russian restraint during the period.” Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium”, p. 600. Walker advances that “Russia was stronger than any other continental state, and perhaps stronger than any two of them combined. If Russia was the aggressor in a war against the Porte, the present European system would move inevitably toward catastrophe.” Walker, “Metternich’s Europe”, pp.74–80. Slantchev makes a claim that “The general weakness of Austria and Prussia also meant that these two powers had to depend on Russian support if they were to curb French aspirations or, in the Austrian case, restless nationalists. This naturally gave the tsar much influence in German

territories." Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium", p. 601. My argument, in accordance with Kennedy, Russia's capacity was not to be corresponded with efficiency. The best proof is simply the result of the Crimean War. It always exploited its geopolitical and climate conditions, and implemented defensive tactics as can be seen during Napoleon's attack in 1812 to Russia. Russia was deeply depended on material subsidies from England. Furthermore, leaving off Napoleon 's the continental embargo was stemming from this dependence. See, Paul Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000", New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 143-275.

²¹⁴ United Kingdom failed to make correct calculation by assuming that Russia was the primary threat against Egypt-India axis, and feeding faith in Bismarck's assurances particularly after German unification, besides continuing containment of France, and failing to perceive the long-term cost of the decline in geopolitical value of Austria were the main external constraints on institutional order of the Vienna system. The other point was the different impact of industrial revolution on the Continent. All those elaborations were mentioned in detail by Schroeder: "The character of international politics generally, and the survival of the system, would depend very heavily on both whether Austria proved able and willing to carry out the task of preserving conservative values, and whether the prevailing systemic rules and principles of international conduct order allowed and encouraged this functional differentiation, or instead discouraged, punished, and ultimately destroyed it. Much of the nineteenth century European international history must be seen in these terms. Otherwise, one cannot really understand or explain either the remarkable peacefulness of the system in 1815-48, or the real Long Peace of international history, or the final degeneration and collapse by 1914. A (Neo-realist) theory that holds that states are differentiated within the system solely by their relative power position cannot deal successfully with the history, or its outcome." Paul W. Schroeder, "History Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory", p.129. Institutionally shaped and constrained self-national interest of sovereign units must have the capacity and ability. If the flexibility got lost in between institutions and units, the institutions will have test of strength due to their inability to reinforce the polarity. Status quoist and anti-revisionist institutional, or constitutional, order will fail to enforce the functional differentiation of the units since such differentiation in functions of states would no more serving the general interest. The German unification was a short-term output of the flexibility of the overall balance of power. The more the maneuvering space get shrink in institutional order due to the enlarging gap between general interest and common interest, the less could institutions able to reinforce the exogenously given power distribution. The more Britain become isolationist, the more system turned out to be rigid. For an elaboration of this thesis, also see Paul W Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remark", *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 44, No. 3, September 1972, pp. 319-344; for Austrian foreign policy, see F.R. Bridge, "The Habsburg Monarch among the Great Powers, 1815-1918", New York: Berg, 1991. About the major effects of discarding small states and their unique functions within the system, see Paul W. Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System" *International History Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, February 1984, pp. 1-27.

²¹⁵ Langhorne argues that "each power, in order to obtain from the Vienna Treaty, the protection and guarantee of its own special interests, had to agree to the rest, however it much it might object to any particular portion of it. Therefore, treaties were an implicit enforcing mechanism that operate to give stability and authority to the settlement." Langhorne, "The Development of International Conferences, 1648-1830," p.84. See also Paul W. Schroeder, "The Transformation of European Politics", p. 573.

²¹⁶ Formal and legal, and all-agreed-upon, binding institutions can create some certain variety of constraints on the way that power can be wielded in the system, thereby asymmetric power relations will become less exploitative, and commitment, and more specifically the credibility of commitment, becomes more certain, and relatively higher. The returns to arbitrary use of power are reduced. For assumptions about how formal-legal institutions provide means for powerful participant states to convey and transfer credible restraints to secondary states, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 1, February 1998, pp. 3-32.

²¹⁷ Grieco argues that "weak states might find institutionalized collaboration with stronger states attractive if the institution provides mechanisms to influence the policy of the stronger states. States are likely to assign great significance to the enjoyment of such effective voice opportunities in a cooperative arrangement. The institutionalization of relations between weak and stronger states, when it creates voice opportunities for the weaker states, can be a solution for these weaker states that want to work with but not be dominated by stronger states." Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union", *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 1996, p. 288. See also Grieco,

"Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberalism and Future of Realist Theory", in David A. Baldwin, ed., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate", New York: Colombia University Press, 1993, pp. 331-34; Albert Hirschman, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States", Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. Dunn argues that "treaties and international agreements often require supplemental implementing legislation that further extends and integrates the institutional agreement into the domestic political system." Fredrick Sherwood Dunn, "International Legislation", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 1927, p.585. For a general discussion about the resources for international legal authority, see Anthony Clarc Arend, "Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics", *Virginia Journal of International Law*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Winter 1998, pp. 105-154.

²¹⁸ Deundey argues that "in agreeing to be institutionally connected, states mutually constrain one another and thereby mitigate the problems of anarchy that lead to security dilemmas and power balancing. Binding practices are particularly available to and desired by democratic polities that want to resist the state-strengthening and centralizing consequences of balance-of-power orders. Binding restricts the range of freedom of states-weak or strong- and when states bind to each other, they reduce the role and consequences of power in their relationship." Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union", *International Organization*, Vol. 49, Spring 1995, pp. 191-228; and "Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems", in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., "State Sovereignty as Social Construct", Cambridge University Press, 1996, esp. pp. 213-16.

²¹⁹ Schroeder argues that "When alliance treaties are *pacta de contrahendo*, that is pacts of restraint, potential rivals tie themselves to each other- alleviating suspicions, reducing uncertainties, and creating institutional mechanisms for each to influence the policies of the other (participant) sovereign states." Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Klaus Knorr, ed., "Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems", Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975, pp. 227-62. Also see, George Liska, "Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence", Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968, pp. 24-35. For a good overview about the alliance theory, see Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances endure or Collapse", Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 156-79.

²²⁰ Schroeder maintains that "The desire to exercise such control over an ally's policy is the main reason that one power, or both, entered into the alliance." Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945", p.230. For further reading, Patricia A. Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances", *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Autumn 1997, pp. 156-192. For a perfect detailed analysis on the intra-alliance dynamics in inequality, see James Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetries: Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 4, November 1991, pp. 904-33.

²²¹ Glahn argues that "inasmuch as the rules recognized by the states of the world as binding obligations are enforced in the courts of those states, or have been approved officially and formally by the governments of those states, the rules must be considered rules of true law." Gerhard Von Glahn, "Law among Nations", 4th edition New York: Macmillan, 1981, p. 3.

²²² Keohane and Nye argue that "The international organization model assumes that a set of networks, norms, and institutions, once established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically to arrange. Even governments with superior capabilities will find it hard to work their will when it conflicts with established patterns of behavior within existing networks and institutions." Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Power and Independence", Boston: Little Brown, 1977, p. 55.

²²³ Grieco claims that "The political process created by institutional agreements also provides opportunities for states to gain access to the thinking of officials in other states and to influence their policy by active engagement. International institutions thus provide channels for states to be part of the policy-making process in other states. In creating an ongoing interstate political process, institutions provide voice opportunities for states, mechanisms to influence what other states think and do. The result is greater reassurance that opportunistic or threatening reversals in policy will not occur." Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories", pp. 267-268. Haas points out that "More generally, institutional agreements can facilitate the growth of trans-governmental groupings of bureaucratic and technical experts who support and reinforce particular policy commitments. The more these intergovernmental groupings can claim jurisdictional competence and specialized knowledge, the more authority and autonomy they will have within the wider domestic and international settings." Peter Haas, ed., "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination", special issue of *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992.

²²⁴ Axelrod and Keohane discuss that “Institutional agreements can have an impact on state policy-making structures, reinforcing or locking states into particular policy patterns. For example, the United States pursued the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico in part in an attempt to lock in liberal economic reform in Mexico. Mexico needed to make particular policy and institutional reforms before it met the terms of NAFTA partnership. After its signing, NAFTA also reinforced liberal economic policy by strengthening the reform coalition and creating new vested economic interests in favor of the continuation economic integration with the United States. Institutional agreements can both trigger and reinforce domestic institutions that in turn make more certain that particular policy orientations and commitments will last.” Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy”, *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1988, pp. 226-227.

²²⁵ Müller claims that “The institutional agreement provides an organizational and normative framework for the activation of domestic and transnational groups who monitor and lobby governments over compliance.” Hans Müller, “The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes”, in Volker Rittberger with the assistance of Peter Mayer, ed., “Regime Theory and International Relations”, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 361-88. Also see, John Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels”, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, Autumn 1992, pp. 819-55. Evans maintains that “Institutional agreements can also have an impact on the continuity of state policy, to the extent that agreements prompt changes in the character of the domestic institutions that make policy. Institutional agreements can indirectly lock in policy orientations and commitments of states by promoting changes in the domestic governmental institutions, which in turn shape and constrain policy in desired ways. Changes in domestic institutions- promoted by institutional agreements- might, for example, help to strengthen the pro-free-trade coalition at the expense of protectionist groups.” Peter Evans, et al., eds., “Bringing the State Back In”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Also see, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., “Between Power and Plenty”, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978; Peter Hall, “Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France”, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; Peter Gourevitch, “Politics in Hard Times”, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986; Peter Evans, “Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation”, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975; Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, in Steinmo, Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., “Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 1-32.

²²⁶ The great discussion was held between Schroeder and Waltz on whether there was the functional differentiation at state level. The critical approach by Schroeder is that “neo-realist generalizations about the repetitiveness of strategy and prevalence of balancing in international politics do not withstand with the fact that historical scrutiny, hiding, transcending, and bandwagoning are all just different forms and strategies of self-help and bids for hegemony are defeated, and new balances of power do emerge.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, p. 124. For him, “neo-realists are regardless of all the supposed variations in unit behavior considering variety of strategies. Neo-realism based on the assumption of the sameness of behavior due to the formulation that structure determines state behavior- that is survival and security are primary concern for each-. During every period of the Westphalian era, states of various sizes defined their place and role within the system, and recognition by other states, not simply according to their position of power, but also, and often mainly, on the basis of their specific functions within the system.” *Ibid.*, p.125. He goes in detail in his critical approach that “It is true that waltz’ neo-realist formulation generalizes that what each state does for itself is much like what all of others are doing. Uncertainty does not stem from the strategy of other states, but from the relative power position of the rival state according to Waltz due to the fact that states behavior is determined by structure and they function similarly; security concern and power position (outcome, or distribution of power) is exogenously given for all sovereign units. Thus, exogenousity drives each unit to function similarly. Waltz accepts functional differentiation assertion of institutionalists only if hierarchy matters either in international politics and domestic politics and economic issues. For him international politics is a power game and in anarchic system uncertainty over relative power position is not ineradicable. This is a constant matter of fact for Waltz.” *Ibid.*, pp.125-126. Also for further survey on Neo-realism, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 44-79. Robert Keohane at this point criticizes Waltz on a point that “Neo-realists oversimplify the issue of preferences and claim that preferences on action is a missed point in Waltzian formulation.” Robert O. Keohane, ed., “Neo-Realism and Its Critics”, New York: Colombia University Press, 1986. Also see, Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513-53. Despite disregarding the demand by Waltz for additional

theory, Schroeder makes a perfect critical design on the assumptions of Neo-realists that “questions of how functions and roles were assigned to individual actors within international system, and how well the actors were fulfilling them, became major issues in international politics, and formed the basis for many decisions and actions. Most important, they affect broad outcomes. The survival of states could depend on them. States that successfully specialized within international system could continue to exist and prosper long after they were unable or unwilling to defend themselves, while states that failed to specialize might be destroyed. Furthermore, the durability, stability, peaceful or bellicose character of the system of international politics in different area could and depend to a major degree upon whether this functional differentiation between states was allowed and promoted, or was discouraged and destroyed.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality and Neo-Realist Theory”, p.126. My claim is that parameters for specialization are specified by institutions in the context of consensus and moderation through unit of proportionality in decision making. Through socialization institutions shape and constrain state behavior or action. Only when institutions become autonomous, states will function for general interest in parallel with institutionally specified specializations in, e.g., economics, environment, humanitarian matters, and institutions will function as all agreed upon binding formal-legal mechanisms to realize sustainable distribution of benefit for long term within the capacity, power position, together with strategic rivals. All hinge on mutual and multidimensional ability of states and institutional order for peaceful international system. Through subsidies and principles of democracy, United Kingdom attempted to set up Concert of Europe at the very stage of institutional order. During the Napoleonic era and Peace settlements in Vienna, and till the end of the Concert of Europe by the outbreak of World War, United Kingdom exploited its material capacity in accordance with delicate trade-off between substitutive gains and institutional bargaining. Until the Concert of Europe there was no such an attempt to undo Westphalian system based on power balancing according to territorial distribution of power. England recognized that it is short term calculation that created uncertainty. States followed different methods of strategy but they all served to the short-term interest. Survival was the primary concern and relative power position always became determining factor on units’ behavior during pre-1815. Absence of flexibility and self-correction at system level become a matter of fact as unit -level strategy fall apart of general interest. Within institutional order, states may have divergent expectations and interests and may have potential to follow different functions. Only when they begin to regard institutions as attractive and alternative for their long-term interests, it will be no matter whether they have different power position or different functions. All will be ensured that institutions will privilege each that no unit will exploit the asymmetric power relations for its special interest with recognizing that even if this becomes the case, there will be no winner or loser permanently in the end. No one could have sufficient power to be hegemon after war. Exogenously given distribution of power implies that system has restraining character and this is reinforced at unit level by status quoist and defensive restraining strategies to limit the return to the power. United Kingdom derived lesson from history and recognized that the system does not permit momentary advantage last forever unless it is reorganized in defensive manner by consensus among states who have different power positions after war. England wanted the distribute responsibility of Concert within institutional order through periodic conferences by achieving consensus for general interest. Governance without government implies that no aggrandizement would be permitted at all and no longer.

²²⁷ Robert Powell argues that “where the threat of war is absent, states are more likely to calculate their interests in terms of absolute gains. Constitutional commitments are, in effect, joint commitments to conduct relations without the threat or resort to war.” Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International relations Theory”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 4, December 1991, pp. 1303-20.

²²⁸ Elster claims that “In this sense, institutional binding is like marriage: two individuals realize that their relationship will eventually generate conflict and discord, so they bind themselves in a legal framework, making it more difficult to dissolve the relationship when those inevitable moments arrive. By raising the costs of separation and imposing legal delays, marriage makes it less likely that the spouses will give to strong but temporary impulses to separate.” John Elster, “Introduction”, in Elster and Slagstad, eds., “Constitutionalism and Democracy”, p.8. He also argues that “Legal marriage agreements raise the expectation that the relationship will last, which changes the calculations of goals and increase the willingness to invest in the future. In turn, these steps strengthen the bonds between the spouses, which in turn reinforce the marriage. Likewise, institutional link will reinforce states for future investments in the system within constitutional order.” *Ibid.*, pp.9-10.

²²⁹ Wohlforth argues that “The shifting of power disparities is also important. The more that the leading state anticipates that its power advantages will decline- and the more rapidly it believes this will happen- the greater will be the appeal of a constitutional order over the pursuit of its interests through

simple domination. The ability of state leaders to discern the actual character of the postwar power disparities and make judgements about future power trends is inherently problematic. This makes predictions of state behavior based on gross power differentials difficult, and increases the importance of attention to how states in specific historical circumstances perceive and act upon changing power realities." William C. Wohlforth, "Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Also see, Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Weary Titan: Britain and Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905", Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988; Charles A. Kupchan, "The Vulnerability of Empire", Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. Blainey argues that "Over time, states have had better data at their disposal and can therefore more accurately assess their power trajectory. In the aftermath of wars, states are also in better position to assess power disparities. War clarifies power relations." Geoffrey Blainey, "The causes of War", New York: Free Press, 1973.

²³⁰ Assumptions and expectations by the secondary, or subordinate, states about future substantive (short-term) bargainings, which are particularly based on self-interests of each sovereign participant states, were restrained due to the considerable cost effect of breaking off the Concert even though Britain was becoming more and more isolationist, and stronger and stronger, opposing any anti-liberal (conservative) interventions within the increasing effect of liberal movements. However, Elrod argues that "Despite ideological divergences, the European powers still agreed upon the necessity of peace among themselves and accepted concert diplomacy as the means to manage crises that might jeopardize that peace." Elrod, Richard B., "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at the International System", *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, pp. 171-172. Also see, Charles Pouthas, "The Revolutions of 1848", in J. P. T. Bury, ed., "The New Cambridge Modern History", Vol. 10, "The Zenith of European Power 1830-70", New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960; E. J. Hobsbawm, "The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848", New York: The World Publishing Company, 1962; and Mike Rapport, "1848: Year of Revolution", New York: Basic Books, 2010. None of these political developments, including domestic character of strategic rival states together with their divergent interests, and even the rise of Napoleon III and resignation of Metternich, resulted in any general war or dramatic territorial change during the nineteenth century. Mitzen claims that "However, the revolutions mortally wounded the Concert in several ways. Moreover, the Crimean War was more a symptom of the Concert's decline than a cause in literature. However, it was a cause." Jennifer Mitzen, "Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance", Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, chapter six. Also see, Paul W. Schroeder, "Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert", Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972, p. 409; Charles A. Kupchan, "How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace", Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 239-240. Kissinger close to my argument claims that "the Paris Peace Conference of 1856 was an important bond, especially in restraining competition between Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the east, but recognize that Crimean war was a symptom of the collapse of the Vienna order with the loss of legitimacy." Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy", New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 94. For further survey on the Crimean war, I strongly recommend well-known theorist Norman Rich, "Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale", Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1985; David Wetzel, "The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History", New York: Columbia University Press, 1985; and Orlando Figes, "The Crimean War: A History", New York: Metropolitan Books, 2011.

²³¹ Arthur claims that "Both rational choice and sociological theories of institutions offer theories of institutional path dependency, and both emphasize the phenomenon of increasing returns." Brian Arthur, "Comparing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events", *Economic Journal*, Vol. 99, March 1989, pp. 116-117.

²³² On the subject of sunk costs, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Constructing Social Theories", New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, pp. 108-18. He argues that "The phenomenon of sunk costs means that the maintenance of an international institutions will be easier than building some new institutions, even when the hypothetical new institution may more closely accord with state interests." Ibid., p. 112. Lynn-Jones indicates that "high costs of regime building help existing regimes to persist." Sean Lynn-Jones, "The Incidents at Sea Agreement", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Dalling, and Alexander Dalling, eds., "U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievement, Failure, Lessons", Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 498-99.

²³³ For in-depth discussions about path dependency, see Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Conceptions and Historical Dynamics", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, January 1984; Paul Pierson, "When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change", *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 4, July 1993, pp. 595-628.

²³⁴ For a well-designed survey on path-dependency and increasing-returns, see Stephen K. Sanderson, "Social Evolutionism: A Critical History", London: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

²³⁵ Ikenberry takes sunk-cost of path dependency within increasing return by giving an example; "A particular set of postwar institutions might in fact be adaptable-capable of internal change and reforms-and this will increase the cost advantage of the existing institutions in the face of potential rival institutions. The post-1945 Bretton Woods institutions, for example, evolved considerably over the postwar period, responding to functional changes but also adapting to pressures from states to make them more congenial to their interests. Adaptations in the existing institutions make the attractions of replacement of these institutions less compelling, which in turn reinforces the stability and continuity of the prevailing postwar institutional order." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p. 65.

²³⁶ Ikenberry argues that "Institutional bargaining, that is power disparity favoring the leading state, hinges on the postwar power possessing to trade off short term interest in order to lock in subordinate states. The greater the power of the leading state, the more it has to offer lesser states in seeking their institutional cooperation and lower the opportunity costs of doing so. Similarly, the greater the postwar disparities, the weaker and secondary states will necessarily worry about domination and abandonment." Ikenberry, "After Victory", pp. 73-74. He advances his approach that "Thus mutual restraining pact will enable secondary states to have institutionalized voice opportunity through unit of proportionality in decision making, thereby all recognize competition will not lead to war and restraining pact will make state action of others more predictable with the hope of defending their divergent interests in the long term. They become sure that the leading state will be in the system by limiting its power for domination particularly." Ibid., pp.143-144.

²³⁷ Rock discusses path-dependency that "The greater the breakdown of order, the greater the opportunities to recast the rules and principles of order. Where the breakdown is extensive, the postwar juncture is more path-dependent, and this situation provides incentives for the leading state to seek far-reaching and principled agreements on postwar order. In effect, the extent to which the leading state can in fact lock in favorable postwar order is greater when the degree of breakdown in the old order is greater." Stephen R. Rock, "Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective", Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

²³⁸ Soutou makes a perfect comparative politics-argument that "After 1918, the United States had found itself in a less commanding position. The war ended in a less decisive armistice, and the United States played a less decisive role in ending the war. During the Napoleonic war, Britain was critical not only in ensuring victory but also in using its wartime resources-particularly financial subsidies-to hold the coalition together and gain agreement on alliance cooperation after war. These differences in postwar power disparities and positioning are crucial in explaining variations in the capacities and incentives for postwar states to move toward an institutionalized postwar settlement. However, domestic structures and characteristics and also pressure ought to be taken into account. Furthermore, Wilson was claiming unconditional surrender of German autocracy even through armistice, but not German people. When the 1919 Versailles agreement turned out to be punitive, the USA began to support Germany in oppose to France which was demoralized deeply due to seeing Germany potential threat. Also, absence of enforcement machine of League of Nations must be taken into account." Georges-Henri Soutou, "Was There a European Order in the Twentieth Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000, pp. 40-41.

²³⁹ Christensen and Snyder make an additional discussion similar to Soutou; "When the war ends with a decisive victory, the terms of the peace can be more extensive and ambitious; the defeat of the losing states is associated with the defeat of the old order, and the opportunities to usher in new rules and principles of order increase. When the war ends in armistice or a case of ceasefire, it is more difficult for the winning states to impose a comprehensive settlement. Bargaining over postwar order tends to begin even before the fighting stops, and if the lead state is a decisive presence in ensuring victory, it is in a stronger position to dominate the postwar proceedings. However, in the second world war, USA strongly opposed any pre-war settlements while the war is going on. However, in late stage of the First world war, USA as satisfied with making armistice with Germany and for USA the collapse of autocracy in Germany is preferable more by emphasizing that it is not Germans but the domestic structure to be given an end without compromise." Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain, Gangs, and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1990, pp. 137-138.

²⁴⁰ English school to some degree solved this problem by drawing midway, but they are locked between solidarists and pluralists as the discussions on the humanitarian intervention got intensified.

²⁴¹ For a survey of arguments in this area, see Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations", *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1, Winter 1996, pp.

109-39. Also see, Charles Lipson, "Reliable Partners: The Promising Advantage of Democracies as an Explanation of Peace", Unpublished Paper, University of Chicago, 1998.

²⁴² Fearon claims that "For the relationship between external commitments and internal political costs, the signals that leaders send to other actors are more credible when those signals bear domestic political costs." James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and Escalation of International Disputes", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, September 1994, pp. 577-578. He also argues that "Like Castlereagh, Wilson was confronted with domestic pressure & restraints in designing strategy for the establishment of institutional order. Political competition is a reward and punishment system that creates incentives for leaders to be open and accountable. This process in international relations provide opportunity for the others to have institutionalized voice in restraining the policy of the leading state. Other nations will be more willing to enter into an agreement that they know will be maintained." *Ibid.*, 598. Mastanduno argues the similar point that "transparency of the United States political system helps to increase the prospects for enduring international cooperation." Michael Mastanduno "The United States Political System and International Leadership: A Decidedly Inferior Form of Government", in G. John Ikenberry, "American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays", 2nd ed., New York: HarperCollins, 1996, p. 343. See also Peter Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States", *International Organization*, 47, No.2, Spring 1993, pp. 299-326. Taylor explicitly shows high credible of commitment in democratic states in his writing that "Thus due to the fact that transparency and openness of democratic states' foreign policy is more predictable than nondemocracies. This predictability urges subordinate states to reduce the fear of domination and abandonment. Additionally, democratic states' adjustment and credible commitments is easier than nondemocracies. Competitive electoral system, check and balance system, separation of power is those which make the foreign policy of democratic states feel pressure from domestic policy and such process creates non-arbitrary and stable foreign policy, thereby predictability in state action increases." Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations", *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1996, pp. 109-110.

²⁴³ Gaubatz elaborates on commitment in democratic states that "In this sense, information about intentions and commitments flow in both directions. Democracies expose themselves more fully to other states than do nondemocracies, and their accessible institutions also allow them to absorb more information on the policies and motivations of other states. The credibility of commitment to lobby on behalf of their interests rise among democratic participants." *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

²⁴⁴ Deudney and Ikenberry focus on the opportunities within institutional order that "Autonomous institutions provide elaborate consultative mechanisms privileging no special interest of any state within constitutional order. Democratic polities provide opportunities for access by other states, which can increase levels of information about policy intentions and commitments, and it can also provide opportunities for foreign governments to press their interests within the policy-making process." Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, April 1999, pp. 179-96. Smelser also argues that "Either democratic structure or through socialization once-nondemocratic structures or even still-nondemocratic states will find opportunity in participating institutional arrangements. There is a need to focus on the role of private representatives, agents and, in general framework, intergovernmental, or interorganizational, relationships." Neil J. Smelser, "Theory of Collective Behavior", New York: Free Press, 1962.

²⁴⁵ Ikenberry claims that "all the principles of democracy and democratic character of states will always make good on their commitment even though the general assumption among the liberal institutionalists maintain that they do reduce the uncertainty." Ikenberry, "After Victory", p.78. Kissinger questions institutions by such approach that "As we question the decision-making structure of international institutions, can we talk about the domestic structure of institutions? Are all those international organizations have been serving for the interest of some states?" Henry A. Kissinger, "Diplomacy", chapter 14. Grieco also participates the discussion that "If democracies have special capacities to establish binding institutional agreements, the postwar junctures have varied greatly in the degree to which the participant states were in fact democratic. However, considering a hundred years of the Vienna Order between 1815-1919, states were not democratic. Furthermore, democracy as an ideological force in international relations emerged only when communism became a challenging one. Then can we ask that it is not solely democracy but the oppressive nature of communism created coherence among the western industrial democracies if we discuss the stable and durable order? How about cold war institutions during post-cold War? Increasing returns to institutions and sunk cost theory to some degree may account for the longevity of institutions after cold war, even for the Vienna system of 1815." M. Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1998, pp. 485-486.

²⁴⁶ Jervis argues that “higher levels of communication and more frequent meetings among national leaders increased transparency, lowered the level of debilitating suspicions that plague many attempts at cooperation, and made it less likely that any statesman could think that he could successfully cheat on understandings with others.” Robert Jervis, “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert”, *American Historical Review*, No. 97, no. 3, June 1992, pp. 716–717. Also see, Korina Kagan, “The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-Institutionalist Debate and Great Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821–41”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, no. 2, winter 1998, pp. 1–57. Even Dan Lindley was endorsing the view that “the Concert did increase transparency in the relations between the great powers, and not share the normatively benign view. Transparency reduced the dangers of miscalculation, and thereby made realpolitik coercive diplomacy more successful and less prone to end in fighting.” Dan Lindley, “Avoiding Tragedy in Power Politics: The Concert of Europe, Transparency, and Crisis Management”, *Security Studies*, Vol.13, no. 2, winter 2004, pp. 195–229.

²⁴⁷ Keohane argues that “The constitutional model of order building is an ideal type for leading and secondary states. The ability of states and afterward the ability of institutions are simultaneously important to reach agreement on institutional bargaining. Democracy has the capacity but no matter to what extent it is strong in other states with recognition that through socialization institutions will function to shape and constrain state action in the context of institutionalized voice opportunities in decision making. At the very stage of institutional order building the democratic character of the leading state and the asymmetric power relations favoring the preponderant state are two key variables to reach credible commitment of the other states and to secure their accommodation and acknowledgement. Trade-off capability of leading state is very important to set up lock in agreements with the others.” Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, *International Studies Quarterly*, No. 32, Vol. 4, pp. 379–378.

²⁴⁸ Ikenberry claims that “Postwar power disparities and the presence or absence of democratic states played a role in the ultimate outcome, that is institutional order. Power disparity, particularly during the Nuclear Age, increased the worries of secondary states for domination by Communism, or the threat of revisionism, or abandonment by democracy and urged them to opt for institutional order that does not require a continues power struggle in general approach and reduce the use of power in the future.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, pp.156–157.

²⁴⁹ Even though Christopher Layne regards the period of the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century as a unipolar period, Schroeder argues that “Britain did not enjoy anything comparable to the current dominant position of the United States in the international system. For Four decades after 1815, Britain enjoyed a certain kind of leadership in Europe, along with its wider maritime, commercial, and colonial lead.” Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory”, p. 144. Also see Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”, p. 5–51; Robert Gilpin, “War and Changes in World Politics”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 31–33; Paul W. Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?”, *American Historical Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, June 1992, pp. 683–706, 733–735. Schroeder advances the discussion that “During that period of half-hegemony, however, no European power tried seriously to balance against Britain, not even its supposed rivals France and Russia; all bandwagoned, seeking Britain’s alliance and partnership, again a problem for neorealist.” Paul W. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist”, p. 144. Ikenberry claims that “there were two leading states; Russia and Britain. However, it was Britain whose proposal for settlement after war was to reduce the use of power in the future and giving opportunity for all to have voice to defend their divergent expectations. Furthermore, Britain had no territorial ambitions, and, comparing with Russia, Britain’s democratic character and material capacity are two important factors which provided opportunity for Britain and increased credibility of commitment for all to achieve institutional order as well. Moreover, even Russia itself was highly depended on British loans and subsidies for its sustainable domestic development. However, considering the non-democratic domestic character of subordinate states, this opportunity could also be considered as a constraint on constitutional order.” Ikenberry, “After Victory”, pp. 63–64. Russia always wanted to be a key player in the balance of power order of Continental Europe, but even his proposal for Holy Alliance was criticized as being non-sense and has nothing to do with the objective of the Concert of Europe due to involving religious and mystic imperatives. The Concert of Europe was inclusive by accepting defeated France and imperialist Russia, and defensive alliance to keep all off their historical hegemonic ambitions. As Kissinger claimed that “Russia, at least till its defeat by Japan in 1905, did never felt obliged to comply with the parameters provided by the Vienna settlement of 1815 and enjoyed more free space of maneuvering in Central Asia, but, like the others, Russia was depended on material subsidies from Britain and had no sufficient capacity to found hegemonic order in the continental

Europe.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, pp. 87-88. Let aside the democratic or non-democratic character of domestic structure of rival states in institutional order, power disparity United Kingdom enjoyed during the Concert of Europe era was relatively more at favoring position for the United States in 1919 settlement and the asymmetric power was much more favoring for the United States during the Cold War if we compare it with 1815 and 1919 period. For further discussion see, John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 41-51; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 19-38; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 13-29; Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?”, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 23-49. Schroeder more explicitly claims that “It is hard to find two decades in British history from 1688 to 1945 in which it exerted less influence in Europe or control over the international system than 1855 to 1875. Britain either failed to control or simply observed without important participation.” Paul W. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory”, p. 144.

²⁵⁰ Kissinger argues that “almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values. In the seventeenth century, France under Cardinal Richelieu introduced the modern approach to international relations, based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its ultimate purpose. In the eighteenth century, Great Britain elaborated the concept of the balance of power, which dominated European diplomacy for the next 200 years. In the nineteenth century, Metternich’s Austria reconstructed the Concert of Europe and Bismarck’s Germany dismantled it, reshaping European diplomacy into a cold-blooded game of power politics.” Henry Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p.17.

²⁵¹ On the question of the impact of German unification, Kissinger makes a claim that “Richelieu’s *raison d’etat* design would endure through vast upheavals. For two and a half centuries—from the emergence of Richelieu in 1624 to Bismarck’s proclamation of the German Empire in 1871—the aim of keeping Central Europe divided remained the guiding principle of French foreign policy. For as long as this concept served as the essence of the European order, France was preeminent on the Continent. When it collapsed, so did France’s dominant role.” Henry A. Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, pp.125. Overall, the German unification prepared the condition for the collapse of the Vienna system of 1815.

²⁵² Kissinger argues that “after the dislocation caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe restored the balance of power at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and softened the brutal reliance on power by seeking to moderate international conduct through moral and legal bonds. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, the European balance of power system returned to the principle of power politics in 1914. There is no longer single threat and each country perceives its perils from its own national perspective.” Henry A. Kissinger, “Diplomacy”, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 176.; Also see, Henry A. Kissinger, “World Order”, New York: Penguin, 2014, p. 23. It is not wrong to claim that at the turn of the century, the international system was turning out to be unprecedented fragmentation, and globalization as well, considering the underlying conditions of national-liberal movements and the impact of industrial revolution.

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