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ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE IMPACT OF ETHNO-POLITICS IN IRAQ

THESIS

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İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ONAY FORMU

Enstitümüz Siyaset Bilimi Ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Siyaset Bilimi Ve Uluslararası İlişkiler İngilizce Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı Y1312.110052 numaralı öğrencisi **Shno Mohammed Khalnd KHALND'**ın "**Ethnic Politics in International Reletions And Its Impact On Iraq's Politics: Acase Study Of Kurdish Regional Government**" adlı tez çalışması Enstitümüz Yönetim Kurulunun 28.02.2019 tarih ve 2019/2 sayılı kararıyla oluşturulan jüri tarafından oybirliği/oy~~çokluğu~~ ile Tezli Yüksek Lisans tezi 15.02.2019 tarihinde kabul edilmiştir.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results, which are not original of this thesis. (/ /2019)

Shno Muhammed KHALND

With special honor and respect, I dedicate this project to the following; To my beloved parents: Mr. Mohammed Khalnd and Mrs Bayan Sharif, who have been so instrumental and supportive in my life and in this academic paper.

To my siblings: Ashna, Shiwan, Parisa, Shahen, Hemdad, Fryad, Farman, Hawler. On their dedication in assisting me until now.

I cannot also forget the many unforgettable mentors I have encountered in my life who have provided me no small support in many areas of my life. I cannot elaborate how much they mean to me and to my career paths.

An un-ended applause goes to my academic supervisor, Assist. Prof. Dr. Filiz KATMAN, who has been there always providing me with all the academic and social apparatus necessary to complete this work.

I equally wish to extend my gratitude to the staff of Istanbul Aydin University, International Students Union (ISU), ISSA, and International Students Office.

I wish that this thesis will be useful for researchers in further study on fields related to this topic. thesis will be useful for researchers in further study on fields related to this topic.

FOREWORD

This thesis is written in completion of Master's Program in Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Aydin University. The research is focused on "The Impact of Ethno-Politics in Iraq". It tries to analyze the consequences of ethnic mentality in Iraqi politics. It will equally try to dissect the state of Iraq through regionalism fronts and its effect on a national government. Prior to choosing this research study, it is in the opinion that many Iraqis may have come to terms with the reality of ethno-politics in Iraq and how its negative consequences influences political opinion of the country which practically is divided into regional construct

If I stumbled several times without falling, it was because I leaned on a handful of individuals and groups to whom I am deeply indebted. My profound appreciation goes to my supervisor Assist. Prof. Dr. Filiz KATMAN, whose ideas; criticisms, guidance, encouragement and devotion spurred me, and gave the shape and form of this study. Despite her very charged commitments, she created appropriate time to guide me, read carefully through my manuscript, made necessary corrections and observations, making sure I was on the right tract. I will rather say she was more of a mother and care taker than just a supervisor.

My sincere gratitude and appreciation goes to my beloved parents, for their relentless encouragement, moral and financial assistance throughout my time in Istanbul for studies.

Above all, greatest thanks go to ALLAH for protection and guidance throughout the entire course, and His marvelous deeds in my education and life.

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January, 2019 **Shno Muhammed KHALND**

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ABBREVIATIONS

CPA **:** Coalitional Provisional Authority
DOD **:** Department of Defense
GDP **:** Gross Domestic Product
GNP **:** Gross National Income
ID **:** Iraqi Dinars
IGC **:** Iraqi Governing Council
IR **:** International Relations
ISIS **:** Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KRG **:** Kurdish Regional Government
ORHA **:** Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
TAL **:** Transitional Administrative Law
UN **:** United Nations
USA **:** United States of America

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IRAK'TA ETNO-SİYASETİN ETKİSİ

ABSTRACT

Bu tez, etno-politiğin Irak'taki ana etkisine genel bir bakış açısına odaklanmış, siyasetin din ve etnik çizgiye göre yeniden inşa edildiğini ve siyasi ittifakların bu setler üzerinde yeniden şekillendirildiğini hatırlatmaktadır. Amerikan askerlerinin geri çekilmesi ve Iraklı partilerin iç farklılıkları, yalnızca mezhep ve etnik üslerle sınırlı olmayan siyasi dengeleri tetikledi. Arap Baharı'nın siyasi ve stratejik gayreti ve Iraklı siyasi gruplar arasındaki iç güç mücadelesi ile siyasette yeni bir döneme girildi. Uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininde etno-politik açıdan ilham alan çatışmaların yükselen zorlukları ne yeni, ne de beklenmediktir. Uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininde etno-politik çalışmalar araştırmacıları, özellikle de giderek artan bir ulusluluk bilincinin olduğu durumlarda, kendi kaderini tayin etme arayışının sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan etnik kaynaklı çatışmaları ele almak için farklı yaklaşımlar önermiştir. Bu yaklaşımların bir kısmı konfederasyon, federasyon ve politik özerkliktir. Bununla birlikte, bu teorilerin çoğu, hevesli etno-ulusun dahil ettiği yaklaşımların her birinin önerdiği kurumsal düzenlemelere uyum sağlayıp sağlamadığını açıklamamıştır. Bu tez beş bölüme ayrılmıştır. Birinci bölüm çalışmanın genel bir girişini sunmaktadır. İkinci bölüm teorik çerçeveye (etno-politik teori, federalizm ve konstrüktivizm) odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma, tarihsel inceleme olan üçüncü bölüm ile devam etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Irak'ın durumu; Saddam Hüseyin döneminde, öncesinde ve sonrasında Irak'ın siyaseti; geçiş süreci ve siyasi uzlaşma hakkında iyi bir bakış ile güvenlik zorluklarını ve yanıtlarını özetlemektedir. Dördüncü bölümde, Irak'taki etno-siyaset ve politik yapı, Saddam Hüseyin'den sonra ABD politikasının ortasında, Irak'ın etnik ve dini yapısına, politik yapıya ve Kürtlere daha fazla vurgu yapılmıştır. Son bölüm araştırmacının çalışmanın önerilerini ve çalışmanın özetini gösteren bir sonuçtur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Irak, Etnik-Siyaset, Federalizm, Demokrasi.*

THE IMPACT OF ETHNO-POLITICS IN IRAQ

ABSTRACT

This thesis is focused on an overview of the main impact of ethno-politics in Iraq, recalling the fact that politics was rebuilt with respect to religious and ethnic lines and political alliances were reshaped over these set lines. Withdrawal of American troops and internal differences of Iraqi parties triggered political balances, which are not limited into just sectarian and ethnic bases. The political and strategic effort of Arab Spring and internal power struggle among Iraqi political groups entered into a new phase in politics. The rising challenges of ethno-politically inspired conflicts in IR discipline are neither new nor unexpected. Different scholars of ethno-political studies in IR discipline have suggested different approaches to addressing ethnic inspired conflicts, which sometimes arises as a result of quest for self-determination especially when there is a growing consciousness of nationhood. These approaches include confederation, federation and political autonomy. However, most of these theories have failed to explain whether the aspiring ethno nation's involved feels accommodated with the institutional arrangements of each approach. This thesis is divided into five chapters. First chapter presents a general introduction of the study. Second chapter focuses on the theoretical framework (ethno-political theory, federalism and constructivism). The study continues with chapter three, which is the historical review. Within this context, more focus is on the state of Iraq; the politics of Iraq before, during and after Saddam Hussein; a look on the transition process and political reconciliation, and finally, it outlines the security challenges and responses. Chapter four elaborates the ethno-politics and political structure in Iraq with focus on the ethnic and religious structure of Iraq, political structure, and Kurds in the midst of US policy after Saddam Hussein. Finally, the last chapter is the conclusion, which points out the findings of the study.

Keywords: *Iraq, Ethno-Politics, Federalism, Democracy.*

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to analyze the impact of ethno-politics in Iraq; it examines the consequences of ethnic mentality in Iraqi politics. It equally tries to dissect the state of Iraq through regionalism fronts and its effect on a national government. Developing interest in researching about ethnic politics in international relations especially in ethnically polarized Iraq is a process in showing the degree of differences that exist between the various entities in political bargaining. It also tries to widen the scope of research done on several fronts of ethnic politics, which is considered to affect people and society. In addition to the aforementioned, it also dissects Iraq as a state, through the fronts of regionalism and its effect on a national government. Many Iraqis may have come to agree with the ethnic politics in Iraq, and the way its negative consequences influences the political opinion of the country, which practically is divided into regional construct. However, this thesis will be conducted using a qualitative research that is ethnographically grounded and politically grounded.

This study also provides insight into the conditions surrounding ethno-politics in international relations and how it shapes states' behavior especially in ethnically polarized Iraq and its lopsided political system. To successfully develop the framework for this research, qualitative method (case study) is used. The researcher critically looks at approaches, data sources and collection methods, research instrument, and data analysis. The strength of the researcher's argument is received from a vast availability of materials namely empirical analysis in text books, journals, newspapers, articles etc. and other important and official write-ups are used. Content analysis of both primary sources like original documents, speeches, multimedia products is also used.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter presents a general introduction of the study, the second chapters focuses on the theoretical framework (ethno-political theory, federalism and constructivism). The study continues with chapter three, which is the historical review. Within this context,

more stress is on the state of Iraq; the politics of Iraq before, during and after the era of Saddam Hussein; a look on the transition process and political reconciliation. Finally, this chapter outlines

the security challenges and responses. Chapter four elaborates the ethno-politics and political structure in Iraq with more focus on the ethnic and religious structure of Iraq, political structure, and Kurds in the midst of US policy after Saddam Hussein. Finally, the last chapter is the conclusion, which points out the findings of the study.

2. THE ORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ETHNO-POLITICAL THEORY, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

This chapter aims to examine the theoretical framework of ethno-political theories in International Relations (IR) discipline. The analysis is conducted in reference to ethno- political studies as a separate subfield in the International Relations discipline, and the views of other IR theories towards ethnicity and ethno-politics. It begins with assessing what ethno-politics is all about using historical analysis and contextual meaning. The chapter further examines different theories of ethno-politics in International Relations discipline, and finally will study the concept of federalism in relation with the context of this research. Historically, the idea of ethno-political concept was an unpopular phenomenon in International Relations until the emergence of decolonization movements in international political structure. Nation-state was regarded as the yardstick for measuring political organization in IR discipline. Scholars like Gellner (1983, p. 146) demonstrated that, the decolonization movement reviewed that the concept of nation-state was not "inscribed into the nature of things" and that ethnic politics plays a significant role in shaping international politics. Ethno-political studies gained momentum in International Relations during the post-decolonization movements between the 1960's and 1970's (Türkmen, 2012, p.6). While decolonization movements created opportunity for political independence, it left new states to vulnerable position in consolidating the notion of nation-state, which was regarded as the universal political phenomenon of the twentieth century (Riggs, 1994,p. 588). Gurr (1994, p. 2) argued that ethnic conflict that dominated the twentieth century was a clear indication that ethno-politics played a significant role in international politics other than accepting nation-state as a yardstick for measuring political condition of states.

Although irrespective of the attempt to create a significance reason for ethno-political studies in IR discipline within this period (1950-1960), it still lacks a coherent theory since it was only interested in explaining ethnic controversies and other shallow ideas in international politics. However, the dominance of

Cold War as well as its political landscape in International Relations discipline equally played a strong role inhindering ethno-political studies. Significantly, the study of ethno-politics started gaining momentum in International Relations discipline between the periods of 1970- 1980. According to Türkmen (2012, p. 8), this period marked the rise of ethno-political scholars like Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Walker Connor (1973) who specifically write on nationalism. It was still in this period that the first notable academic journals on ethno politics was published, namely Journal on racial studies and ethnic studies. Also, journal on ethnic migration studies and Nationalities was published. Even authors like Horowitz (1985, p. 4) acknowledged that ethnic studies is a recent phenomenon and must be given a due attention. Similarly, Smith (1981), as a nationalist scholar particularly addressed ethnicity in the title of his book. Another significant contributor to the development of ethno-politics as a sub-field of International Relations is traceable to the works of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a political scientist, and Nathan Glazer a sociologist both of whom published an important book in 1972 titled 'Ethnicity: Theory and Experience' (Türkmen, 2012, p. 8). Previously in 1963, both authors had already published a book titled "Beyond the Melting Pot", which mainly focused on the ethnic groupings in United States of America, New York to be precise. Though, there are a lot of inspirational insights for ethno political studies, which cut across all other cultures in the literature. However, it was basically a sociological analysis. Meanwhile, the later publication of "Ethnicity: Theory and Experience" had been widely considered as a precursor for the study of ethno-politics in International Relations discipline. They offered following arguments on the study of ethno-politics:

> "Little in this field has been resolved. We are all beginners here. We consider this volume very much an initial contribution in an enterprise to be continued. There is a phenomenon here that is, in ways not yet explicated, no mere survival but intimately and organically bound up with major trends of modern societies" (Glazer and Moynihan,1975, pp. 25-26).

Türkmen (2012, p. 8) also points out that Nathan and Moynihan, considered ethno politics beyond a minor concept of social stratification. They envisaged that ethno- politics has a prospect of being a rising phenomenon in world

politics, and as such become an influential factor in shaping foreign policies. In a similar position, Donald

L. Horowitz (1985, p.xi) a professor of Political Science and Law, and one of the front runners of ethno political studies from early 1970's published a milestone piece of literature in 1985 titled "Ethnic Groups in Conflict." His very first line captured the significance of ethno-politics in international politics, which was fully acknowledged in the 1990s, and it states as follows:

> "The importance of ethnic conflict, as a force shaping human affairs, as a phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled, can no longer be denied. Ethnicity is at the center of politics in country after country, a potent source of challenges to the cohesion of states and of international tension" (Horowitz, 1985, p. xi).

Horowitz recognized the significance of ethno-politics in international system, and how it is emerging as a potent force which is capable, if not controlled of altering the conventional structure of nation-state, through shaping political conditions on the basis of ethnical alignment. Horowitz's book was published at the pix of the dominance of Cold War in International Relations discipline, which saw the discipline divided between the ideology of communism and capitalism. Notably, the end of Cold War, which saw a decline in the bipolar structure in international politics, earmarked the full resurgence of ethno-politics as the new question in International Relations. This therefore resulted in the refocusing of International Relations anti-foundational scholars to the study of ethno-politics. Among scholars of 1990s with IR background, it started appreciating the significance of ethno-politics in contrast with previous history of the sub-field. In line with that, broad researches were carried into the ethno- politics in the field of IR, for instance Gurr (1993) with 'Minorities at Risk'.

Nevertheless, despite the relevance and significance of ethno-politics in International Relations, ethno-political studies have not been sufficiently appreciated within IR discipline. The role of ethno-politics has been widely neglected by IR mainstream theories and its importance for national and international security tends to be overlooked. The reasons behind this neglect are twofold; that is both on the part of the separate field of ethno-politics studies and on the broader discipline of IR.

2.1 Ethno-Political Theory

The theoretical background through, which ethno-political theories in International Relations discipline IR was built, was constructed from varieties of theoretical frameworks offered in other sister disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and as well as classical philosophical studies. Thus, ethno-political studies selected these frameworks in general terms and alongside two focal questions: What is the nature of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness? Are there any possibilities of multiethnic society? Hence, the analyses of multiethnic societies are distinguished in line with

incompatibility. Scholars in these sense of reasoning includes John Stuart Mill, Woodrow Wilson, and consociationalism, which is characterized by plural society theory proposed by J. S. Furnivall and Anthony Smith. In a similar perspective, both Mill (2009, p. 344) and (Ryan, 1990, pp. 4-5), argued that "there is no possibility for free institutions in a country that is made up of different ethnic nationalities. Within a society without a common fraternity, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist." Contrary to this argument, it is claimed that human beings in the multi ethnic society can peaceful coexist except in the market place, which he argues that it will be necessary to impose laws.

According to Türkmen (2012, p. 12), different scholars of International Relations discipline have all attempted to theorize ethno-political studies using different theories and method of analysis in explaining the conditions of ethno political studies. As Hale (2008, p. 15) argued that, the classical philosophical theory of ethno politics is divided between two major theories of "constructivism" and "primordialism". This research accepted Hale's view since all the literatures reviewed so far sided with one of the main theories arguments. In a general sense, both theories of constructivism and primordialism discuss ethnicity in different perspectives. While constructivist emphasis on the ethno-genesis and ethnic identity change, that means that ethnic identity changes over time. In contrast, the primordialists are being concerned more on the effect of ethnic identity on the political and economic activity of the state. They maintain that ethnic identity is fixed and is traceable to

time immemorial. Primordialist scholars like Chandra (2001), Horowitz (1985), Fearon and Laitin (2003) organized different surveys and opposed the idea of social construction of ethnic identity.

Primordialism has been widely criticized by different prominent scholars especially anthropologist writers. For instance, Barth (1969, p. 10) attacked primordialist theory on the basis that ethnicity is a "category of ascription and identification which have the characteristics of organizing the interaction between people." Barth's opposition of primordialism is based on his situationalism theory that perceives ethnicity as a social construct which is necessitated by certain social interaction and circumstances.

Similarly, proponents of instrumentalism like Covers and Merveulen conceive ethnicity as not a matter of identity and status but as an instrument, which is constructed for the pursuit of certain interest (Türkmen, 2012, p. 13). Hence, these two categories of instrumentalism and situationalism are within the constructivist approach with their social construct and identity change assumptions.

Furthermore, nationalist scholars equally have different perception about primordialist idea on ethnicity. Anderson (2006, p. 4) presented what they considered as nation-ness and nationalism as opposed to a "distillation of complex crossing of discrete historical forces." They are of the view that ethnicity is not fixated but a result of social parsimony and can only be overcome through nation-ness.

Nevertheless, irrespective of the attack launched on primordialist assumptions, Türkmen (2012, p. 14), argues that most prominent International Relations discipline scholars (like Horowitz, 1971; 1985; Moynihan, 1993; Ryan, 1990; Carment, 1993;

Joseph Rothschild, 1981; Chandra, 2001; 2005; 2008) crafted their argument on primordialist doctrine.

Notably, the breakthrough of the theories of ethno-politics started from the study of ethnic conflicts, which emerged between 1960's and then 1990's hence ascribing the study of ethno-politics to be dominated with ethnic conflicts. The dominance is associated with the conventional inference that ethnicity is by definition conflictual and studies of ethno-politics is the study of

conflicts, in which ethnic groups is involved. However ethnic conflicts are considered as the most evidently and relevant issue in the studies of ethno-politics, but it has turned out that the studies of ethno- politics are not limited only to conflicts, and even not necessarily conflictual by its nature. In the light of this, Hale (2008, p. 18) directly argues that "next to almost every ethnic hotspot lie multiple zones of ethnic peace". Put away the reductionist view of conceiving ethno-political studies through the lens of conflict, the studies of ethno politics has stood out as an enduring phenomenon of the post-Cold War international politics. Therefore, describing the studies of ethno-politics as the studies of ethnic conflict is completely uncalled for and does not necessarily define the phenomenon.

In view of this problem of description, the lack of interconnectedness seems to be endangering the studies of ethno-politics in IR. Meanwhile, resourceful literatures of some prominent scholars have attempted to aid this research in rebuilding the trust of Ethno political theories. For instance, Donald Horowitz (1971, p. 232) designed a framework for explaining the structural differentiations within ethnic groups. The framework explained as "vertical" and "horizontal" systems of ethnic stratification. Vertical systems, he claims, involve caste structures and they generally consist of conquests and captures. Thus, in vertical systems, relations among ethnic groups are hierarchical between subordinate and superordinate groups. He further stresses that horizontal systems occurs either through voluntary migration or annexation, which results in parallel ethnic structures. Nevertheless, Horowitz concluded that it does not imply that social cohesion is likely be more horizontal in structure, and that Vertical system might as well prove to be more likely to form social cohesion.

Similarly, Gurr (1994, p. 15) traded their theory on the same path with Horowitz on the nature and type of ethnic grouping, and how different ethnic groups have political interaction among themselves. They categorized what they perceived as politically active ethnic groups into four different categories such as indigenous peoples, ethno- nationalists, ethno-classes, and communal contenders. Though their categories are not related in comparison with that of Horowitz ethno-political framework, but both Horowitz and Gurr are considered among

the most prominent scholars of ethno- politics. Although, none of their categories and frameworks was acknowledged as a reference point or considered for improvement or replacement by other scholars.

Hale (2008), in his book, started his theory by problematizing the inadequacies found among the current theories of ethno-political studies and offered what he considered as an alternative rational for theoretical basis. He therefore argues that theories of ethno-political studies are divided in two broad categories, namely "ethnicity-as- conflictual theories" and "ethnicity-as-epiphenomenal theories". He further discredited both theories on the reason that ethno-political theories must have more solid and firmer basis Hale (2008, p. 31). Hale's new approach was based on his relational and micro foundational theory, which its emphasis is rooted in psychology of human behavior. Meanwhile, his view comprises of two main arguments; ethno- politics and the nature of ethnicity. On the foundational theories of ethno-politics, which are primordialism and constructivism, Hale argued that they are not relational, since ethnicity is best described as instrument, through which human beings simplify, categorize and understand the complex world. Thus, equating ethnicity as an instrument of uncertainty reduction, therefore in his view ethnicity is not natural but a human creation, which he uses to understand the uncertainty of reality. His argument is closely related with Barth's description of ethnicity, which he explains as:

> "Ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction betweenpeople. We attempt to relate other characteristics of ethnic groups to this primary feature" (Barth, 1969, p. 10).

Hale's second argument was based on the premise that what one considers as ethno- politics is mainly a way through which human beings in the society seek to realize their self-interest. Thus, his conceptualization of ethno-politics involves the process of realizing human intrinsic behavior or individuals' desire in pursuing various interests Hale (2008, p. 55). Human interest within this scope involves both material and emotional factors; therefore, it corresponds with the argument of Moynihan (1993, p.

56) that the importance of ethnicity is because it combines effective ties with interest. So far, Hale's argument stands out as a solid framework for ethno-

political theories; however, it still lacks a general conceptualization on how the theory should be analyzed.

In 1993, Carment (1993, p. 138) made an observation that the neglect of the theories of ethno-politics in International Relations discipline needs to be amended. The main argument in his observation was that ethno-political studies present verities of challenges for both foreign policy formulation and interstate cooperation (Carment, 1993, p. 137). Citing Anthony Birch, Carment summed up his argument in the following lines:

> "Interestingly, though many scholars recognize the protractedness of ethnic conflicts and their oft violent nature, few have argued that this intensity of violence poses a major threat to the viability of the contemporary state and international system" (Carment, 1993, p. 229).

Ryan (1990, p. xix) validated Carment's observation and concluded that "the discipline of International Relations has so far underestimated the significance of ethnic conflict". He listed certain reasons that have so far hindered the furtherance ethnic studies in International Relations discipline. He argued that the ideological dominance of liberalism and Marxism during the twentieth century is one of the primary reasons for such hindrance. Thus, Liberalism and Marxism refuse to recognize the essentials of ethnicity thereby hindering ethno politics and "tended to be dismissive of ethnic sentiment" (Ryan, 1990, p. xix). This view is quite shared by both nationalist and ethno-political scholars. For instance, Moynihan (1993) explained how ethno-politics was disregarded by both Marxist prediction and Liberal expectancy. The liberal notion of ethnicity was based on the enlightenment idea, which conceives ethnicity as a component of feudal and primitive societies that would be forgotten through progress. This description equates ethnicity as an act of history that have no relevant in feature.

On the other hand, the Marxist prediction claims that class division would be the dominating identity and that ethnicity will be replaced by the advent of proletarian nationalism (Moynihan, 1993, p. 27).

Ryan's second reason showed that the long tradition of ideological dominance in social science equally predicted the demise of ethnicity and hence believes in the prevailing power of assimilation and acculturation (Ryan, 1990, p. xx). On his third reason, Ryan (1990, p. xxi) emphasized that the long tradition attitude in social science influenced the IR discipline; therefore, the realist tradition was

committed to the strength of the sovereign state and attached no importance to ethnic particularism.

Realist theories of IR, particularly Structural Realism and Classical Realism analyzed states as unitary actors in the international political system, hence, the nature of politics are indifferent to the domestic environments and by definition to ethno politics (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 1). Ethno-politics is seen as a "change in unit level"; thereby, it would not matter for the international system (Waltz, 2000, p. 5). Consequently, it can be argued that the neglect of ethno-political studies in IR theory is primarily caused by the dominance of Realism, given that the Realist tradition has dominated IR theory and together with Liberal theories has constituted "mainstream IR".

In addition to the aforementioned, Neoclassical Realism acknowledges that there is a role of domestic politics as an intervening variable between the international system and state behavior (Schweller, 2004, p. 164). The domestic politics variables that Neoclassical Realism formulates are social cohesion, government and regime vulnerability, elite consensus, and elite cohesion. "Ethnic animosities", as a component of social cohesion, are taken into account as a potential source of conflict along with "divergent class interests, economic inequalities, competing political goals, and normative conflicts" (Schweller, 2004, p. 175). Therefore, ethno-politics is indirectly incorporated into the framework of Neoclassical Realism. However, it is seen as epiphenomenal and solely as a source of conflict and fragmentation, a view that reduces the study of ethno-politics exclusively to one dimension.

It is possible to argue that ethno-political theory does not constitute any serious threat to neither Realist theories, save Neoclassical Realism, nor to Neoliberalism. These theories can simply ignore ethno-political assumptions within their theoretical logical consistency without any threat to their theoretical framework. Nevertheless, for liberal theory of IR, ethno-political theory seems to pose an existential threat to under examined variables. Liberal Theory of International Relations "opens the black box of state" and views states as not unitary actors, but representatives of individuals, groups, and polities embedded within their domestic societies (Moravcsik, 2003, p. 5). Therefore, ethno-

political theory inevitably becomes relational within the context of liberal theorization, since ethnic groups may be influential domestic actors.

2.2 Federalism

Etymologically, the word federalism originated from a Latin term *foedus* (Britannica, 2018), which means compact. Historically, federalism represented a political compact or system between groups of people, who came together in a political association with a purpose of common governance. However, federalism today is viewed through the lens of devolution of power that is "one in which there is a division of powers between one general and several regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is coordinated with the others and each of which acts directly on the people through its administrative agencies" (Burgess, 2006, p. 33). Federalism is a combination of self- rule and share-rule.

Different political and social scholars have given various definitions of federalism. According to Elazar (1987), federalism is conceived to mean a covenant. When a polity is said to come together via a covenant, it is perceived as choice. This "emphasizes the deliberate coming together of humans as equals to establish bodies politic in such a way that all re-affirm their fundamental equality and retain their basic rights" (Elazar, 1987, p. 4). Federal system constitutes a body of political arrangement established through "partnership and regulated by an act of covenant, and its internal relationships reflect a special kind of power distribution that must prevail among the consented partners, which is based on a mutual recognition of the integrity of each of the partner with an attempt to foster a common unity among them" (Elazar, 1987, p. 5).

According to Burgess and Gagnon (1993, p. 15), they regards federalism "as a political device for establishing viable institutions and flexible relationships capable of facilitating inner-state relation and inter-community co-operation". They further stated that it is "an expression of practices which encourages autonomy within regions" (Burgess and Gagnon, 1993, p. 16). Unlike other political phenomenon, federalism has so far gained a consensus agreement among scholars by consenting federalism asa political system having about two levels of government. Responsibilities of the government, jurisdiction and powers

are drawn, ingrained and divided within the constitution. However, power depends on how it is distributed within the federated political system and what degree of autonomy should be granted to the regional/states. Lalande (1978) proposes four approaches to understanding federalism as a political system and they are as follows: (1) Constitutional or Institutional (2) Functional or Sociological (3) Federalism as a Process of Developmental (4) Federalism as a bargain or Political.

Institutional or constitutional approach: This method deals with government operating system of governance. It focuses on the institutional correspondence of a country; power devolution between regional/state level and Central Government. It is also focused on the constitutional provision that makes the two and three tiers of the state politically independent as recommended by the law.

Sociological or functional approach: this approach focuses on the social cohesion of a country and the level of ethnic diversities that inhabits it (Lalande, 1978). Federalism in this context is seen as an appropriate political system for handling ethnically polarized country with the freedom of self-expression and political autonomy of its constituent's parts. In same sense, Stein (1971) argued that, the concept of federation is not only focused on the formal division of power between sub-state (provinces, regions or cantons) and centers, but equally a social phenomenon as well. Federal society has a chance "where a society is constituted of territorially based communities which are clearly differentiated by language and ethnicity" (Stein, 1971, p. 34). Hence, there is a strong tendency for a federal society to be organized in respect to societal differences such as ethnicity, even if there are territorially inclined. Additionally, federalism can be organized in form of ethnic relations so as to maintain, preserve and promote viable and accommodated identities that can be coexisted in a peaceful and neighborly association.

Federalism as a developmental approach: According to Lalande (1978), this approach critically outlines the transactions and communication that exist between two/three tiers of government in other to solve issues. Here, the problems are well understood so long as there is tension produced by the diversity of the society. Therefore, federalism is considered to be "much more than a system of government. It is also a process of: ongoing negotiations, an art of resolving

conflicts, an approach based on compromise and cooperation" (Auclair, 2005, p. 5). Within the corridors of federal structured state, solutions to problems are negotiated among constituent's parts other than a direct imposition by the central authority.

Federalism as a bargain approach: Lalande (1978), argues that this method focuses mainly on legalistic and political approach, so as to have a clue on federalism. Unlike institutional approach, federalism concentrates on the division of power between two tiers of government. Each of the levels of government safeguards the autonomy within its jurisdiction. The end product of political bargain however takes place during the manifestation in the division of powers, which is often considered to be in written constitution.

Adding to the argument of Lalande on classification of approaches to federalism, there is a tendency to think of the purposes that federalism can fulfill within divided societies. Erk, (2008), thinks there is a party proliferation freedom which is conducive to intersegment compromise and coalition building. Also, it allows political leaders to be able to form intergroup ties within electorate level before they go in to contesting on issues at the higher level of the central government. Another thought is that federalism defuses conflicts within the central level so as to solve issues at sub-national levels. Finally, federalism also makes it hard for parties aspiring to get hegemonic control of the state.

2.3 Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism as its name implies is often viewed as a synonym for a limited government and it seeks to prevent any arbitrary government. Arbitrary in this sense consist the abilities of rulers who govern with their free will, so as to serve their own interest and not the interest of the ruled. In order to avoid the dangers of this type of governance, there are mechanisms designed by constitutionalism to determine the person who can rule, how he can rule and for what purposes he can rule. There are two traditions, which are often within majority of democracies and most likely to be in line with most constitutions. The very first tradition is focused more on the design and functioning of democratic processes, with electoral system selection and choices that operates between the parliamentary and presidential forms of government and of federal or unitary

arrangements. Looking at the case of Iraq, Shakir (2014, p. 163) argues that the Iraqi Constitution reflects the will of most Iraqis to build a government

that is fully based on the rule of democracy and law. Backer (2009, p. 676) denotes that there is no Iraq's history of constitutionalism that can serve as a means of evaluating substances, forms, and the legitimacy of the state's constitution. However, this implies that constitutions must be used to show the main principles and values that are of constitutionalism standards, which can be easy to assess the legitimacy of a government.

In Iraq, things that contribute in building a constitutional culture are the emphasis on the rule of law, power-sharing, the effective representation of the Iraq people within the government, and protection of freedom and human rights. Irrespective of the numerous number of instability within the country, new political rules have been established through the constitution so as to avoid any illegitimate activity. An example of this is the case of Sunni, where its position within the constitution and political process was shifted from the state of rejection and refusal of federal state legitimacy to a general acceptance and participation. Shakir (2014, p. 164), expresses that people have come to realization that the constitutional context and political process are mere games in town, used to obtain benefits and achieve goals. Another constitutionalism example is the campaign against the Iraqi Minister for Women's Affairs, which was initially initiated by December 2011, by some Iraqis as a result of the Minister's decision of issuing regulations which were not in liberal context of the constitution.

It is theoretically believed that Iraq is a Federal Democratic country. This believes is not true practically, because federalization and democratization are still in the process with the help to amend the constitution (Shakir, 2014, p. 164). In order to put an end to the state of instability and political crisis that happens in Iraq, there is a need to introduce more economic and political structures.

3. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK: IRAQ

3.1 The State of Iraq

In order to have a full understanding of the present day political dynamics in Iraq, it is significant for it to be contextualized historically. Iraq shares boundaries with countries like; Kuwait, Saudi Arabia to the South, Jordan to the West, Syria to the North-west, and Iran to the East and finally Turkey to the North. According to Kirmanj (2013, p. 4), Iraq has a total land surface of 34,924 kilometers square. It equally has a population of 37.2 million. Iraq was created by the British from the former Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Basra and Baghdad. The British went further to divide the three Ottoman provinces into fourteen. This was so for administrative purposes, and four additional provinces were created. When the US and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003, it was administratively divided into eighteen provinces: Al-Anbar (Rumadi), Najaf, Muthanna (Samawa), al-Qadisiya (Diwaniya), Basra, Erbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniya, Najaf, Kirkuk (al-Ta'mim), Karbala, Babil (Hilla), Diyala (Ba'quba), Baghdad, Dhiqar (Nasiriya), Salah al-Din (Tikrit), Ninawa (Mosul), and Wasit (Kut) as seen in Figure 3.1.



Figure 3.1: The Provinces of Iraq

Table 3.1: Administrative structure of Iraq

Governorates		Status	Area sq.km	Population 2009 estimate
1	Al Anbar	Gov	137,808	1,451,583
2	Al Basra	Gov	19,070	2,555,542
3	Al Qadisiya	Gov	8,153	1,121,782
4	Al Muthanna	Gov	51,740	719,824
5	Al Najaf	Gov	28,824	1,180,681
6	Al Sulaymaniyya	K-Reg	17,023	1,878,800
7	Babii	Gov	5,119	1,727,032
8	Baghdad	Gov	4,555	7,180,889
9	Dhi Qar	Gov	12,900	1,864,788
10	Diyala	Gov	17,685	1,370,537
11	Dohuk	K-	6,553	968,901
12	Erbii	K-	15,074	1,471,053
13	Karbala	Gov	5,034	1,003,516
14	Kirkuk	Gov	9,679	1,290,072
15	Maysan	Gov	16,072	1,009,565
16	Nineveh	Gov	37,323	3,237,918
17	Salah Aldin	Gov	24,363	1,551,974
18	Was it	Gov	17,153	1,158,003
		.....	435,052	33,330,600

The economy of Iraq was dominated by oil production, with an average of about 95% of foreign exchange earnings. The country's Gross National Income (GNP) was estimated to be 745.2 million Iraqi dinars (ID) in 1967; while the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was set to be 937.7 million ID. This amount increased in 1982, with a total GNP of 12,334.6 million and GDP of 5,374.5 million ID (Kirmanj, 2013, p.2). It is rather unfortunate that both economic development and oil production decline after the start of the Iraq-Iran War and also the First and Second Gulf Wars. As a result, the economy continues to face a lot of problems and huge foreign debt due to high military spending and heavy war expenditures. In this chapter, the political history of Iraq will be analyzed with special interest from Saddam Hussein era to the current political turmoil engulfing the country. Below is the recognized political map of Iraq, displaying its international boundaries with its neighbors.

Figure 3.2: The map of Iraq with international boundaries

3.2 Iraqi Politics Before Saddam Hussein

So far, there has not been a generally acceptable literature or documentary on the exact political history of Iraq before its formal definition as a modern state in 1920. However, the predominant political history of Iraq became more popular from the outbreak of the military coup that was led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim, on July 14 1958, which overthrow an unpopular monarchy with the aim of

institutionalizing a republic. General Abd al-Karim Qasim after the coup urgently marginalized his rivals

by forming an autocratic government. Irrespective of the fact that General Qasim's revolutionary led government acted as an arbiter of hope on behalf of Iraq's long- exploited poor population, yet nothing was done to advance a stable government or strong national institutions in a country that is long split within the boundaries of ethno-sectarian lines. Later on 1963 a group of army officers who identified themselves as members of Ba'ath Party comprising people who oppose Western ideology, and people who are rooted in Arab unity with the influence of socialism carried out a coup overthrowing General Abd al-Karim Qasim led government. Subsequently, the political atmosphere in Iraq was characterized by history of coup until July 17, 1968, when a Ba'ath party chieftain Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr consolidated a one party system in Iraq. Similarly, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr led government was later sacked by another coup organized by members of his party.

3.2.1 Iraqi politics during/after Saddam Hussein Era

Saddam Hussein has always been a key politician in Iraq's politics and was at the center of Iraq's politics for about a quarter century. He ruled as the country's head of state for over eleven years until 2003 when he was ousted. His rise to power was so remarkable and he made himself an undisputed leader. Karsh and Rautsi (1991), points out that his leadership was characterized by skillful manipulations, tenacious perseverance and merciless elimination of his rivals. Saddam's long term in office is considered to be as a result of his hard work, unprincipled manipulation of allies and his enemies alike, and the genuine support from his colleagues. Saddam Hussein was born on April 28, 1937, in al-Ouja (near the town of Tikrit). He had a fatherless childhood.

Saddam Hussein waged a ceaseless campaign to improve himself, even though there were a lot of difficulties and challenges along the line. This can be seen during his very first years of schooling, which were achieved with the family's objections. The distance from his home to school was another great barrier for his academic career. His decision to go settle in Baghdad in 1955, landed to being a great icon in Iraq. In 1968, after being imprisoned when the

Ba'ath Party lose control of Iraq, The Ba'ath regained its powers and made al-Bakr as new president. Al-Bakr was a relative to Saddam Hussein, and he entrusted Saddam Hussein by awarding him one of the highest post in the party, just to make sure the party was in control for a long time. By July 16, 1979, Saddam Hussein became president of the republic of Iraq after the retirement of president al-Bakr. When Saddam Hussein became president, he reshuffled the cabinet and merged several cabinet ministries, created a new post of First Deputy Premier and five other posts of deputy of Premiers, and replaced eight ministers. He filled his family into the cabinet, and this became a huge problem after his era.

According to Henderson (1991, p. 85), Saddam Hussein's oldest son, Udai, was responsible for the of Saddam's most trusted bodyguard. Another critical situation that affected Saddam's leadership was the mysterious death of the minister of defense, Adnan Khairallah, in a helicopter crash in 1991. Before this incident, Henderson argues that Khairallah had taken the side of his sister, Sajida, when new erupted that Saddam Hussein had beaten her in his furry over Udai. The Khairallah branch was significantly short and Saddam could not rely on them for any state activities. This however brought rivalries among them. This situation became inevitable after Hussein Kamel al-Majid, who was the head of the presidential bodyguard, got married to Saddam's oldest daughter, Raghad. The Ibrahim's didn't approve such actions thus it became their fall from grace. The political situation from this period was not so stable.

Henderson (1991, p. 86), also points out that continues increased in greediness part the way to the fall of Saddam Hussein's administration, especially that of Barzan. Despite the strict laws that prohibits bribery especially from officials; Saddam Hussein tolerated a large measure of corruption from his closest collaborators so as to maintain their loyalty. Saddam Hussein led government in Iraq was saddled with autocratic rule and undeniable abuse of power, which he centered on himself, and members of his family. However, irrespective of his abuse of power and hegemonic rule, Saddam Hussein was able to tight the grip of ethnic divide in Iraq and concentrated more powers at the center of the government in Bagdad.

3.2.2 Iraqi politics Saddam Hussein era

The fall of Saddam Hussein led-regime in Iraq was a beginning to a completely new political landscape in Iraq. There have so far been different views on such a new beginning however the most widely perceived view is that it was a beginning of political quagmire in Iraqi politics. Having previously agreed on this research that Iraqi politics is divided within different sectarian rivalry, the fall of Saddam Hussein regime further deepened the distrust and sectarian conflicts among the political players in the

ountry. Kenneth Katzman (2009, p. 9) in his book titled *"Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security",* identified four major factors that categorized post-Saddam Hussein political history in Iraq and they are as follows: Transition process, political reconciliation, economic reconstruction and American assistance, security challenges and responses.

3.2.2.1 Transition process

The transitional process is a period of gradual shift of political sovereignty to the indigenous constructed political elites in Iraq. Katzman (2009, p.9) argued that the transition period followed different political stages before its realization and he pointed out this period as Occupational period.

After the capture of Saddam Hussein, the United States of America (USA) led- coalition-force set up a government which they believe will restore a political order in Iraq since set up immediate sovereignty government could favor anti-Saddam Hussein group thereby trampling on democracy. "The Administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction with a staff of USA government personnel to administer Iraq's ministries; they deployed in April 2003. He headed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), under the Department of Defense (DOD), created by a January 20, 2003, Executive Order" (Katzman, 2009, p. 9). It was revealed that the administration largely ignored the initial plan of the state department on the future of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Instead, Garner and his collaborators started an arrangement to come up with a representative successor regime by arranging a meeting on April 15th, 2003 Nassiriyah consisting about 100 Iraqi citizens from different ethnic nationalities. Subsequently, a similar

meeting of same nature with even a greater number of about 250 Iraqis was held on April 26th, 2003 and generally agreed to hold another meeting a month later to announce a coalition interim government. However, on May 2003, George W. Bush, the then President of the United States announced the dissolution of Garner administration and announced Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as the new administrator leading the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in a bid to hold a stronger political role in Iraq. On assumption of duty, Ambassador Bremer quickly discontinued Garner transitional arrangement and appointed an Iraqi advisory body who was non-sovereign, consisting of 25 members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Consequently, by September 2003, the IGC appointed up to 25 cabinet members to assume ministerial responsibilities with much similarities as the factional and ethnic balance of the IGC, with a slight majority of the Shiite Muslims. Moreover, irrespective of the fact that there were some Sunni figures within the CPA-led administration, many Sunnis still resented the new power structure as overturning their prior dominance (Katzman, 2009, p. 9). However, there was a huge resentment among the Iraqi's on this appointment, which led to the Kurds and the Shiites to question the prospects of democracy in Iraq.

There was another period known as the transitional administrative Law. Before announcing occupational government, the American government had earlier on announced that the American occupational contingent can only end if there is a completion of a new Iraqi constitution, and holding of a general election for a new government. This task was set to be completed by 2005. Nonetheless, Katzman (2009,

p. 10), argues that Sistani agitated for quick Iraqi sovereignty by contributing to the November 2003, US announcement which stated that the sovereign state of Iraq would returned to Iraq by June 30, 2004. National elections were to follow suit prior to this, by the end of 2005. The decision was widely accepted and was included in the new constitution of the state. Katzman goes further to argue that the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was drafted by the main organs and equally signed on March 8. 2004. The TAL came up with a roadmap for the political transition, which includes: (1) need for elections by January 31, 2005 (for a 275 seat transitional national assembly); (2) drafting of permanent

constitution by 15, 2005. There could possibly be a veto of the constitution from any of the three provinces, by a two-third majority. This could however trigger a redrafting and the revote by October 15, 2006.

Interim Government

The transitional national constitution could not set up a broad framework for forming the national interim/sovereign government joined with the pressure from opposition led Ayatolla on American government. This made American government to select the National Assembly members through the means of national caucuses, thus forcing them to appoint a United Nations (UN) envoy by name Lakhdar Brahimi, to select an interim government. The interim government started work on the 1st of June, 2004, and the handover ceremony took place on the 28th June, 2004. The ruling faction mainly dominated the interim government with a Sunni leading as the president. President Ghazi al-Yawar and Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi headed a cabinet of 26 ministers, of which 6 of them were women. The forming of the new interim government lead to an end to occupational regime and resulted in establishing a new American embassy in since January 1991 with Ambassador Christopher Hill as the new ambassador with about 1,100 staffs.

2005 Election

After political sovereignty of Iraq was gained the main focus was on how to establish a credible political structure in Iraq that will promote a long lasting unity government. The objective of the 2005 election was to create a political structure in Iraq; an ambition which was achieved but only lasted until the removal of Prime Minister Nur al-Maliki in 2014 which plus other security challenges is yet to organize a fresh election in Iraq.

On January 30th 2005 election took place on a transitional national Assembly, on a four years' term by 18 provincial councils. According to Katzman, (2009, p. 11), the Sunni Arabs who are still resentful of the US invasion boycotted the elections. No major Sunni Slates were offered, thus enabling the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) to win as the majority (140 of the 275 seats). "Sunni slates" were offered, enabling the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) to win a slim majority (140 of the 275 seats).

After the election a constitution-drafted committee was appointed and their findings approved by October 2015. However, the Sunni opponents had a two-third 'no vote' within the two provinces, but not among the three required provinces to veto the constitution. The main grievances of the Sunnis were the weakness act of the federal character giving more autonomy to the provinces in the constitution. This autonomy granted regional governments on the right to own their internal security forces, and to have full control of the internal energy resources.

By December 15th, 2005 elections (for a full four-year term government), some Sunnis who were seeking for ways to strengthen their position so as to amend the constitution, fielded electoral slates. UIA alone was not enough to secure enough seats based on the fact that two-third majority was needed to unilaterally form a government. In April 22nd, 2006, the Sunnis, Sadr faction, secular grouping, and Kurds wanted Jafari to be replaced as Prime Minister and Nuri al-Maliki to take over his position as new Prime Minister. Maliki, however, won the approval of a cabinet on May 20, 2006 (Katzman, 2009, p. 11).

3.2.2.2 Political reconciliation

One of the major challenges of Iraq after a successful enthronement of national government was how to achieve a national unity owing to the deep resentment that has so far divided the Iraqi state. Although many political scholars believe that the withdrawal of American troops was an indication of reconciliation and a stable Iraqi national government. However, between the periods of 2008-2012 there was a great deal of legislative and political achievement especially the adoption of De- Ba'athification reform law. A clear stipulation of law was made on the power of provincial councils, amnesty law for detainees, passage of 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 national budget and peaceful conduction of January 2009 provincial election. The onset of al-Maliki government was a promise of unity government not until 2012 when he started his policy of political polarization built under the axis of corruption. Irrespective of the fact that the Iraqi constitution allowed the regional governments some elements of political autonomy however the decision made at the federal level still influences political actions in Iraq.

The provincial election of January 2009 boosted the political reconciliation of Sunnis and the Shiites and at the same time strains the relations between the Kurdish regional government and the national government. Based on 2008 constitution, the regional governments has the political rights of electing their regional governors and provincial regional administrators in their regions giving them more powerful political control over their state affairs. The election had been slated for October 2008 however due to dispute of integrating the Kirkuk and other territories into the Kurdish control areas thus caused the Talabani veto of the elections that took place in June 2008. Subsequently the major political blocks accepted to put the Kirkuk dispute aside and proceed for the election. The road to achieving a broad range of political reconciliation in Iraq in the current post Saddam era is still a far journey to attain. However the presence of al-Abadi is still guarantying hope yet the security turmoil is worsening the chances.

3.2.2.3 Security challenges and responses

As far back to the fall of Saddam Hussein led-regime, the security challenges in Iraq has so far became increasingly more threatening. No doubt why some scholars attributed the cause of Iraqi security turmoil to the invasion of United States Army and its coalition forces in 2003. However, it cannot be denied that the USA on its own part has so far employed different security techniques to curtail the situation. Nonetheless, it keeps growing in dimension from sectarian conflicts to what is widely perceived as terrorist challenges. Because the content of this research is limited to impact of ethno politics in Iraqi politics, the study will not go in detail in analyzing weather the security challenges in Iraq is born out of terrorism or not. Rather the research will attempt to look inward into the nature, role and influence of ethno-politics in the security challenges in Iraq. The truth of the matter is that no amount of foreign backed intervention can restore security in Iraq. In that case it requires Iraqi citizens themselves to come to terms with the situation and foster a comprehensive and a long lasting security approach that will keep Iraq safe.

Most empirical literatures on ethno political studies reviewed in this research so far suggested that multiethnic societies are more prone to conflict, thus, posing a high risk of security threat, see 1971; 1985; Moynihan 1993; Ryan 1990; Carment 1993; Joseph Rothschild 1981; Chandra 2001. In the case of Iraq, where such

premise seems to be true, however, it is not correct going back to trace the origin of the State of Iraq. Naturally, Iraq is a composition of different ethnic group from history, yet there was no record of high volume of security failure until 2003. Although, it cannot be denied that there where issues of security challenges emerging from ethnic resentment, however the volume of security problems since the fall of Saddam Hussein led government is outrageous. The problem of Iraqi security failure started when Sunni Arab led insurgency together with an Al-Qaeda affiliate started growing discontent over the trend of Iraqi leadership, which sees the Shiites, and Kurds grow to power. Some Sunni insurgents aimed at restoring the lost Sunni political dominance and hence shift power back to Ba'ath Party. According to record, the Ba'ath Party senior political elites refused political negotiation with the USA on returning power to central government.

Similarly, according to Katzman (2009, p. 23) he noted that, the common strategy of Al-Qaeda in Iraq was mainly to provoke the Sunni-Shiite civil war so that the USA led support in Iraq will be undermined. He argued that despite Al-Qaeda common objective being based on waging Jihad, yet it purpose in Iraq was politically motivated. First, it is commonly argued that its formation in Iraq was based on group of Arab- Sunni volunteers who came to fight the American forces, likewise the Shiite domination of Iraqi politics (Katzman, 2009, p. 23). This security trend dominated the central security concern in Iraq between 2004 and 2007, in disapproving the allegation a group of Sunni Fighters mainly in Ambar province on August 2006 sought American military assistance to enable them fight Al-Qaeda and other groups in the area. Interestingly, Iraqi security challenges is always associated or motivated by political events in the central government of Iraq. Between the periods of 2009 and 2013, security situation in Iraq was relatively calm owing to the fact of the existing government in Bagdad. But between 2013 till date, Iraq security conditions have seen its eclipse owing to the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, and the Syria-ISIS. The state of Iraq today has become a battleground where the West and its allies come to test their weapon of warfare in the name of combating terrorist groups. The security problems in Iraq are born out of political

polarization rooted in ethnic resentment and corruption by few political elites who are desperate of political positions.

4. ETHNO-POLITICS VERSUS POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN IRAQ: KURDISH FACTOR

4.1 Ethnic and Religious Structure of Iraq

Iraq is shaped by a number of ethnic, cultural and religious forces. Due to inaccuracies in census data coupled with official manipulations, it is difficult to provide a precise statistical breakdown of the population. According to Kirmanj (2013, p. 5), he argues that about 97% of Iraq's population adheres to Islam, while the remaining 3% are: Christians, Yazidis (ethnic Kurds), Mandaeans (gnostics), and a small group of Jews. The largest ethnic group is the Arabs, with a total of 77 percent of the total population. The Shiite Arabs has the majority population in Iraq, having communities within most areas of the country. Another set of population constitute the Sunni Muslims with about 25 percent of the Iraq Arab population and about 20 percent of the total Iraq's population. The Sunni Arabs are geographically concentrated in the northwest and Midwest of the country. Two Sunni-dominated provinces do exist and are: al-Anbar and Salah al-Din. Other provinces include; Baghdad, Ninawa (Ninevah), Kirkuk, and Diyala. Kirmanj also argues that the Sunni Arabs were the majority in Baghdad until the late 1950s. The Shiites is also made up of Turkmen and Faili-kurds. The second largest ethnic group is the Kurds, with over 20 percent of Iraq's population and mostly the Sunnis. The third-largest ethnic group is the Turkmen, who are dispersed throughout the country (city centers of Kirkuk, Erbil, and Tala'fa), as seen in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Iraq's major ethno-religious groups

Shiism, one of the important Islam sects, emerged during the beginning of Islam following Prophet Muhammad death in 632. His death brought controversy on who to succeed the prophet, thus, resulting in a great hard and disunity to the entire community. There was an advocate idea from the Sunnis that the successor of Muhammad should be elected by members of the Qurayish tribe (the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad). Kirmanj goes further with his argument that there was an atmosphere of antagonism climaxed when the Safavid dynasty was established in Iran, coupled with the adoption of Shiism as the official state religion. Looking at its historic root, southern Iraq has always been a strongly of Shiism, with major cities such as;

Karbala, Kufa, Basra, Najaf and al-Kadhimiya emerging as Shiite cultural and learning centers. Najaf and Karbala later became Shiite pilgrim's destination due to the fact that both cities hold major shrines of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein. The Sunni Arabs enjoyed supremacy during the Abbasid dynasties and

Umayyad, though this lasted until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and also after modern Iraq was formed.

Another ethnic group in Iraq is the Kurd, who speaks more of Kurdish. The land on which the Kurds now settle was invaded by Arab Muslims during the mid-seventh century. Kirmanj explains that in the year 1514, the Kurdish area that was so populated was officially divided between the Safavids and the Ottomans. The end of centralization policies of the Ottomans in 1834, ended Kurdish self-rule and several rebellions ensued. The British invaded the territory in 1926, and the province of Mosul was formally annexed to Iraq after the settlement of a border dispute between Iraq/Britain and Turkey.

4.2 Political Structure of Iraq

Iraq has undergone a lot of economic, political and cultural challenges for the past years and this has however affected its current system implementation of a federal system of government. The outcome of this has been the increasing interest to implement a three-state within the country. Three different models of government implementation are analyzed in this section, likewise the best possible solution in stabilizing Iraq's geopolitical borders. The three models include:

Having a strong central government governed by Iraq;
Establishing the development of a federal model composed of three key regions, with each defined with ethno linguistic and religious lines;
Iraq should be decentralized into multiple regional governments

Model 1: Strong central government

One of the proposals for the state of Iraq is building a strong central government. The Iraqi government has been highly centralized since the creation of the state after World War I, and the strong central government became so suppressive of the different ethnic populations which consisted of military-sponsored regimes, monarchies and authoritarian rulers. It is not uncommon to see strong central governments in the Middle East. A highlighted government structure of these states is seen in Table 4.1.

Out of the fourteen countries listed, six (6) are monarchies, six governments pretends to be federations or republics while two are parliamentary democracy. According to Saikal (2003, pp. 113-114), he quotes that "close scrutiny reveals that in most cases their claims to democracy credentials have been purely rhetorical and void of substance in meeting even minimal criteria of democratic credibility." So long as dictatorial, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes within the Middle East continue to exist, it can be easily labeled to the regimes' oil-base economies. For more than half a century, the United States has focused part of its foreign policy to protecting the oil that flows from the Middle East. USA, including other Western countries interest in the oil has resulted to numerous authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

Table 4.1: Middle East governments

Country	Government
Bahrain	Monarchy
Eovot	Republic
Iran	Theocratic Republic
lraa	Parliamentarv Democracv
Israel	Parliamentary Democracy
Jordan	Monarchy
Kuwait	Monarchy
Lebanon	Republic
Oman	Monarchy
Qatar	Monarchy
Saudi Arabia	Monarchv
Syria	Republic under Authoritarian Regime
United Arab Emirates	Federation
Yemen	Republic

Monshipouri (2002, p. 72) also argues that "Western world has gained more access to the region's oil resources by working with dictators rather than democratic regimes accountable to their people." There has been a facilitated democratic deficit in the Middle East regions as a result of Western dependence on oil, and this has greatly caused a great impact on the quality of life for a huge population. According to Henry (2003, p. 61), elite does have control of oil wealth, which enables them to sustain regimes that are authoritarian. The revenue gotten from oil rents is to set up military industrial enclaves which however permit the government to suppress any challengers forcefully and economically. Regarding the fact that the economy of Iraq is based

more on oil centric, it becomes a problem for the development of a strong central government regarding the state's population. The consolidation of power around the center opens a way for the government of Iraq to utilize its revenues from oil to fund a security could help suppress the masses even the same way as the regime of Saddam Hussein.

According to Fitzsimmons (2008, p. 8), it is not encouraging with the historical experience of have centralized power in democratizing multi-ethnic states. The case of Sudan is a god example, where the country witness decades of civil wars after the Arab Muslims tried centralizing power over the Christians and animist populations. In addition to this, O'leary (2010), points out that the re-centralization of power to the central government dominated by Arabs is dangerous, based on the fact that it could a huge sectarian conflict between the Shi'a and Sunni, and also to a war with the Kurds. Sullivan (2013, p. 6) argues that "Maliki began his security consolidation not long after taking office in the mid-2006." With the consolation of power, Maliki saw it necessary to institute measures to allow him have full powers over constitutional checks and balances, and also to be able to marginalize his political competition. USA is a good example of a federal system with a strong central government. The colonialists of USA were afraid of Iraq's establishment of a strong central government which had been under the rule of the British Monarchy. The problem faced in the creation of a strong central government in Iraq is due to the failure of its constitution to include the creation of others sectors.

Model 2: Three regions federal solution

The three region federal model is seen to be one of the best solutions for the continued existence of the Iraqi state. According to Merritt (2007, pp. 70-71), it is important for countries like Turkey, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to come together with all Iraqi political parties to address all the three ethnic outside influences. By doing so, these states hold the accountability for the successful solutions of the internal conflicts in Iraq. Also, allowing these international states' participation enables them to take ownership of the regional problems of Iraq likewise helps to come-up with a viable solution.

Secondly, the reestablishment of Iraq's international borders will be another solution. ISIS successfully captured the territory around western Iraq to about 25

miles of Iran borders. Having a stable internal security apparatus is a way of maintaining a unified state, and it helps to secure the borders of the state. Lockhart (2014, p. 93), argues that in order to accomplish the task of regaining the full territory of Iraq and reducing the threat of ISS to an insurgency and not an occupation, there is a need of a concerted efforts all the religious and ethno linguistic groups within the country, likewise the help of international communities.

The third difficulty that needs a quick solution is the amendment and refinement of Iraq's constitution. Avoiding the errors committed by the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA), and the opposition leaders after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime will help in maintaining the stability of Iraq. Amending the constitution of Iraq is a possible way of resolving the lack of clarity, resolving language difference, and giving a clear definition of power-sharing arrangement between the regions/governorates and the central government of Iraq. Lockhart (2014, p. 94), goes further with his argument that in October 2005, Iraq's constitution was drafted in the space of four months, and presented to the masses for a referendum. This process was so fast, thus resulted to what highlighted the sectarian divide and resulted to aspects that delayed the stability of Iraq. "There was no discussion of the provisions that would later become highly contentious, such as the broad federal system, the exploitation of oil and gas, and the weakness of the center of the country in dealing with the regions" (Jawad, 2013, p. 11).

According to Marr (2012, p. 295), section four of Iraq's constitution recognizes the powers of the federal government, which handles some key factors such as; formulating national security policy and foreign policy, securing the country's borders, controls the armed forces, formulate fiscal policy, plans policies, and draws the country's national budget. The central government are main to execute all the define powers, but the contradiction of language which is clearly seen in Article 115 and Article 121of the constitution enables the regional government to supersede all the responsibilities.

In the UNHCR 2005, Article 115 acknowledges the relations of power sharing between regions/governments and federal government. It states that powers which are not included in the federal government are under the control of the

authorities of regions and governorates. Also, powers that are shared between the regional and federal government will be handed to the law of the governorates and regions where there are disputes.

In line with Article 121 (UNHCR, 2005), it states clearly that in cases where there is a contradiction between national and regional legislation due to issues which is not within the framework of the federal government. The regional authority is bound to amend the national legislation application in that set region.

According to Lockhart (2014, p. 95), constitutionally, the regional government has the powers to create laws that can directly influence or contradict the powers of the central government. This however draws the attention that the constitution needs reformation so as to tackle issues created by the constitution makers. Iraq's faces huge internal problems today as a result of not clearly defining the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Governorates' powers, and not defining it as well in the states' constitution. When it concerns issues of foreign affairs; resource exploitation and armed forces, the KRG's uses the weaknesses in the constitution as an advantage. It has also become so difficult to amend the constitution due to Article 126, which stipulates that; there will be no constitutional amendment if the powers of all the regions that are not of the federal authorities' concern are taken away. It also claims that in order for such amendments to be made, there must be a legislative authority approval from the concern region, likewise the citizens' approval though a general referendum.



Figure 4.2: Map illustrating a three-region federal partition

This model is disadvantageous in the sense that the three regions are not really ethnically homogenous. A viable solution for Iraq, regarding this model is the devolution of powers to all the regions, likewise extending it to the tribal/provincial levels. This former method which was implemented in Iraq, gave way to the Ottoman Empire to maintain its central authorities, while letting cultural issues to be managed by the various religious population and ethno-linguistics.

Model 3: The multiple regional government solution

Iraq's decentralization into what is known as multiple regional governments is a debated point by the opponents to the three region model. The structure of this model is still under agreement. According to Fitzsimmons (2008, p.6), "the form of decentralization most feared by Iraqi is the one predicted on the creation of new regional governments," and he thinks that the best solution to developing the federal system of Iraq is through devolving powers to the provincial level. He thinks so because there is already the existence of a provincial political structure thus no need for the creation of new regions. The provincial government will need a significant improvement in political institutions and provincial infrastructure so as to be feasible. Scholars of regional federation model like; Anderson and Stansfield (2004), al-Rubaie (2008) and O'Leary (2010), procrastinate that the development of five-region

model is capable of bringing forth a solution far better than provincial model. In line to this, Al-Rubaie (2008, p. 1), states that Iraq's political geography outlines five federal units. This likely unites include Kurdish Regional Government; a Western province (with Mosul and upper Tigris and Euphrates valleys); Kufa province (constructed around the Middle Euphrates governorates); Basra province (with Lower Tigris and Euphrates valleys); and Baghdad province (constructed around greater Baghdad). Al-Rubaie's five regions model which is based on a federal system do provide a viable solution, whereas Iraq's devolving of powers directly to all the 18 governorates is unlikely to provide solutions.

4.3 Kurds in the Midst of USA Policy in the Post-Saddam Hussein Era

The USA has so far played a crucial role to determine the political future of the state of Iraq, and its regional provinces like Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. Kurds as a minority ethnic group has long been demanding to create their own federal structure, which will give them full rights constitutionally, an idea that the United States has always been very supportive of. For example, former American Administrator to Iraq 2003-2004, Ambassador Paul Bremer, visited Talabani at his official headquarter in Iraq on 25th, 2003 and declared that the USA is committed in creating a federal system in Iraq that would guarantee the political freedom of all the

Iraqi citizens. Talabani was very pleased that the United States is working in line with Kurdish objectives (Bremer and McConnel 2006, p. 28). Thus, such a political accord is meant at maintaining the view of Coalitional Provisional Authority agenda of keeping Iraq together as a state. Similarly, Ambassador Bremer (2006, p. 83) reviewed an assurance made to British Premier by the American Administrator in Iraq of maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq as one state. This shows American interest in keeping Iraq together but under a new political framework of a federal state. On the contrary, the Coalition Provisional Authority preferred the structure of a strong central government in Baghdad. They preferred a development that can be interpreted as opposing the Kurdish demand for a less central control. Within the records of Galbraith (2005), he emphasized that, on the 27 of January, 2004, Ambassador Bremer brought up a

framework for the region. This framework was to be recognized as federal unit, where the central government will have powers over the regions security, borders and natural resources. Subsequently, on the 6th of February 2004, Ambassador Bremer informed the leaders of Kurdish Regional government that the Kurds would not be probably mentioned within the newly drafting Transitional Administrative law (TAL). Also certain from Galbraith, (2006), that the Iraqi federal structure will be based more on eighteen governorates and not the existing formula of the Sunni Arabs, Kurdish and Shiite Arab territories. The simple logic behind the new federal structure introduced by Ambassador Bremer and his coalition counterpart was to build a similar federal structure of the USA in Iraq, which will be based on geographical definition and not ethnic inclination. This act relegates the aspiration of the Kurds in establishing an autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), in a bid to dilute a non-ethnic political formula in Iraq.

Looking at the process of drafting the Iraqi constitution in 2005, it demonstrated the American opposition to the agenda of the Kurds seeking for a maximum state autonomy. Arguably, American opposition of incorporating oil rich Kirkuk in Kurdish Region was a demonstration that such incorporation could inspire Kurdish quest for independence, a condition that the USA is reluctant to support.

Iraq has been on the struggle of becoming an emerging democracy within the Middle East region. According to Knapp (2010, p. 3), Iraq is a country plagued by insurgent violence that originated since the US-led invasion in 2003. Since then, the history of Iraq has been characterized with ethnic tensions, even under the rule of Saddam's. There are three dominant regions within the state, which are; Sunni Muslims, Kurdish people and Shiite Muslims. A lot of tensions between these different groups have been operational throughout the history of Iraq. Currently, the atmosphere of Iraq shows some sort of a Unified Iraqi state. However, since 2003, Iraqis have taken part in several elections, and the largely based ethno-sectarian line began between 2003 and 2005. This shows that Iraqis voters mostly voted for candidates within their ethnicity or religion. Knapp goes further arguing that Iraqi nationalism was not present when the first two elections were held. During the period of the 2008 and 2009 elections, things

took a different dimension when voters broke free voting along the line of their identity and rather voted according to the candidate's politics and visions.

Knapp (2010, p. 4), points out that "all people who live in a country's borders are part of the nation, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or religious origins". He went ahead to say that "the core of the ethno-nationalist idea is that nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry". This statement is from the way Iraqis identify themselves, which shows the rate of their exhibition on national pride.

Table 4.2: Cross tabulation analysis of Iraqi nationalism and willingness to fight for country

Be willing to fight war for your country			
	Yes	**No**	**Total**
How.....	V651	1131	1782
	Q132	177	309
	N15	24	39
	N9 1.1%	18	27
Total	807	1350	2157

Beauchamp, Fisher and Matthews (2014, p. 5), points out that Iraq stands out as the fifth largest oil reserves country. The four challenging countries include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela and Canada. A great increase was seen from the pumping of oil per day. For instance, in the year 2000, about 2 million barrels were pumped a day, while in 2014 the rate increase to 3.6 million barrels pumped daily. Comparing this 21st century average of barrels pumped daily with that of 20th century, a huge difference is seen. A good look of this is following the Gulf War of 1991, just about 305,000 barrels were pumped a day. Iraq recovered from its defeat and gradually picked up with it rate of pumping barrels daily. The main areas saturated with oil reserves are; the Shia South and Kurdish North, likewise the Sunni regions to the West which is notable of not having oil wealth.

Table 4.3: Iraqi oil reserves by provinces

Governorate	Enrno-Sectarıan MIX	Percent Of Esnmated Oıl Reserves
Basra	Shi'i Arab	59
Maysan	Shi'iArab	8
Dhi Qar	Shi'i .Arab	5
Muthanna	Shi'iArab	0
Qadisiyyah	Shi'i Arab	0
Najaf	Shi'iArab	0
Karbala	Shi'i Arab	0
Babii	Shi'i Arab/Sunni Arab	0
Wasit	Shi'i Arab/Sunni Arab	I
Anbar	Sunni Arab	0
Baghdad	Shi'i Arab/Sunni Arab	6
Salah ad-Din	Sm111i Arab	3
Diyala	Shi'i Arab/SunniI Arab/Kurd	(three gas fields)
Tamim Sulaimaniyyah	Kurd/Sun ni Arab Kurd	12 0 (two gas fields)
Erbii	Kurd	3
Dahuk	Kurd	0
.....	Sunni Arab/Kurd	3 .....

Table 4.3 above presents the Governorate, ethno-sectarian mix and percent of estimated oil reserves in Iraq. Basra tops the list as a governorate, with its ethno- sectarian mix being Shi'i Arabs and has a percentage of 59 of its estimated oil reserve. Prices of oil in Iraq vary enormously from city to city, neighborhood to neighborhood with houses ranging from $2,000 to $20,000 (Kamil, 2006, p. 14).

Table 4.4: Oil reserves and production from developed current fields according to provinces

Province	Number of Fields	Oil Reserves Million of Barrels (1)	Available Production One Thousand Barrels Per Day (2)	Additional Production One Thousand Barrels Per Day (3)	Remarks
Basra	10	61,360	1,a800	1,700	Includes the fields of Nahr Omar, Majnoun and West Qurna
Amara	3	2,650	40	100	Abu Ghrab, Buzurgan and Fakkah
Nasiriya	--	--	--	--	--
Samawa	--	--	--	--	--
Diwaniya	--	--	--	--	--
Hilla	--	--	--	--	--
Najaf	--	--	--	--	--
Karbala	--	--	--	--	--
Wasit	--	--	--	--	--
Anbar	--	--	--	--	--
Baghdad	1	6,500	20	80	East Baghdad field, excluding the joint part with Salaheddin
Salaheddin	1	500	25	20	Ajil field, which shares a border with Kirkuk
Diala	1	30	10	10	Naft khana field
Kirkuk	4	12,350	570	155	Kirkuk, (excluding Khurmala Dome), Jambour, Bai Hasan, Khabbaz
Sulaimaniya	--	--	--	--	2 gas fields
Erbil	1	2,200	30	70	Khurmala Dome
Dahook	--	--	--	--	--
Mosul	3	1,040	30	115	Kabbara, Ain Zala and Sufaya
Total	24	86,630	2,520	2,640	

Table 4.4 above outlines the details of oil reserves and production from the development current fields according to provinces in Iraq. The table shows: the various provinces; the number of fields; oil reserves calculated in millions of barrels; the available production of barrels per day which is mostly 100 barrels per day; additional production which is also one thousand barrels per day. It also gives remarks of each province. The general remarks shows that; oil reserves existed in the currently producing fields, production capacity available from the currently producing fields and production capacity which will be available after completing the development of the currently producing fields.

Table 4.5: Oil reserves and production from the undeveloped discovered fields according to provinces

Province	Number of Fields	Oil Reserves Million of Barrels (1)	Expected Production From New Fields One Thousand Barrels Per Day (2)	Remarks
Basra	5	4,450	855	Ratawi, Rachi, Nahr Omar, Jrayshan, Toba, Seeba
Amara	8	5,825	430	Halfaya, Huwayza, Refa'e, Nour, Kumait, Rafidayn, Dejaila
Nasiriya	3	5,070	490	Nasiriya, Ghraf, West Rafidayn
Samawa	1	20	5	Abu Khayma field
Diwaniya	--	--	--	--
Najaf	1	200	20	East Kefil field, which is a joint field with Karbala
Karbala	2	340	30	Marjan and West Kefil fields
Babel	--	--	--	--
Wasit	3	1,350	150	Ahdab, Dhafriya and Badra fields
Anbar	--	--	--	--
Baghdad	--	--	--	--
Salaheddin	4	2,225	125	North (east Baghdad) field and the fields of Balad, Tikrit and Pulkhana
Diala	7	620	115	Khasham al-Ahmar, Injana, Nawdoman, Chiasurkh, Qamar, Naft Khana and Jeria Peka + 3 gas fields
Kirkuk	2	1,125	85	Hemrin and Jedayda
Sulaimaniya	--	--	--	2 gas fields, which are Chemchemal and Kormor
Erbil	4	960	275	Qara Choq, Makhmour, Taq taq and Demirdagh
Dahouk	--	--	--	--
Mosul	7	2,470	190	Najma, Jawan, Qasab, Alan, Sarjoun, Ibrahim and Butma
Total Undeveloped Fields	47	24,680	2,770	
Grand Total	71	111,310	5,410	

From Table 4.5, it presents the oil reserves and production from the underdeveloped discovered fields according to provinces. Table 4.5 shows: the various provinces; the number of fields; oil reserves calculated in millions of barrels; the expected production from new fields which is mostly 100 barrels per day; and remarks of each province. The remarks points out key points like; oil reserve existing in the underdeveloped discovered fields that have not been developed until now, and expected production from these fields once they are developed.

Table 4.6: Total oil reserves currently known according to provinces

Province	Number of Fields	Total Oil Reserves Million of Barrels	Percentage of Total %	Remarks
Basra	15	65,810	59.1	
Amara	11	8,500	7.6	
Nasiriya	3	5,070	4.5	
Samawa	1	20	--	
Diwaniya	--	--	--	
Najaf	1	200	0.2	
Karbala	2	340	0.3	
Babel	--	--	--	
Wasit	3	1,350	1.2	
Anbar	--	--	--	
Baghdad	1	6,500	5.8	
Salaheddin	5	2,725	2.5	
Diala	8	650	0.6	Plus 3 gas fields, which are Tall Ghazal, Mansouriya, and Jaria Peka
Kirkuk	6	13,475	12.1	
Sulaimaniya	--	--	--	2 gas fields, which are Chemchemal and Kormor
Erbil	5	3,160	2.9	
Dahouk	--	--	--	--
Mosul	10	3,510	3.2	
Total	71	111,310	100.0	

Table 4.6 above shows the total oil reserves currently known according to provinces in Iraq. Table 4.4 and 4.5 above show the various provinces; the number of fields; oil reserves calculated in millions of barrels; the percentage of total %; and the remarks of each province.



Figure 4.3: Iraqi civilian deaths, 2003-2010

Figure 4.3 above shows the civilian deaths in Iraq, from 2003 to 2010. Those who suffered the most during the Iraq War are the civilians. The figure above shows that there were three main stages of the war. The first stage began from 1003 to 2005. This war was between the Iraqi forces and US-led invasion forces, with the inclusion of Islamist and nationalist insurgents, and government forces. During this period of war, civilians were bystanders. Iraq conflict became a civil war by the early 2006, and it was fought among three factions. That is: the Shia militias, with some of them being rogue members of the state security forces; the Sunni insurgents, with the inclusion of Islamist extremists and former Saddam loyalist, and US-led occupation force. This period lasted for about two years, and the main targets of the violence were civilians. A lot of bombings and death squads were the aim of the day, so as to ethnically cleanse Baghdad. By the year 2008, the conditions of the war improved significantly, thus causing a lot of fear that the crisis could reignite the militias of 2006 to 2007 and sectarian hatreds.



Figure 4.4: Iraqi civilians displaced by the crisis

The Iraqi crisis brought a lot of disaster thus contributing to the impact of ethno- politics in Iraq. Figure 4.5 above shows details of the manifestations as a cause of the crisis. According to Beachamp, Fisher and Matthews, the United Nations reports by mid-June 2014 showed that about 1 million civilians were displaced as a result of the fighting in Iraq, amounting to about 3 percent of the country's population. Statistically, about 200,000 Mosul IDPs entered Dohuk, about 25.000 inhabitants were displaced within Mosul, over 100.00 Mosul IDPs fled to Irbil, more than 30.000 Tall afar IDPs fled to Duhok, 84,000 inhabitants were displace from Tall Afar. Also, 54.000 Tall Afar inhabitants displaced to

Sanjar Sun-districts, and over 500.000 inhabitants entered Mosul. 6.000 people from Mosul and Slahudin IDPs fled to Kirkuk, 40.000 other

inhabitants ran from Tikrit and Samara, over 6.000 others were displaced from Diyala, and about 480.000 people displaced from Anbar.



Figure 4.5: The spike in Iraqi deaths since 2011

Figure 4.5 above shows spike in Iraqi deaths since 2011. There is a great fear in Iraq for the fear of the return of sectarian civil war. This is because, from the Iraqi deaths from 2003 to 2010 in Figure 4.4, there has been a rising civilian deaths in Iraq since 2011, thus, showing how bad things have gotten into at wartime levels. The figure also shows that this crisis did not just begin out of a sudden but rather there has been a rising sectarian violence for the past years,

with much of it caused by terrorism by Sunni extremists, whose aim is often geared towards the Shia civilians and the government.



Figure 4.6: Monthly violent events for Iraq, 2004-2009

Figure 4.6 above shows yearly statistics of violence between 2004 and 2009. The number of insurgent (enemy) events in 2004 was 1000 and less than 1000 in respect to coalition (friend) events. The worst scenario of insurgent events was between 2007 and 2008, where over 8000 events occurred. By 2009, the rate of both insurgent events and coalition events reduce drastically.

Table 4.7: Coalition-insurgent reciprocity models

		Wald F	AUC	True pos. (pct)	False pos. (pct)	Num. events	Non-zero (pct)	N
All Iraq	Coalition	713.8	0.95	46.0	0.7	72,618	1.3	3,113,792
	Insurgent	1079.5	0.96	54.3	1.0	228,756	2.5	3,113,792
Kurdish areas	Coalition	163.6	0.93	41.4	0.4	7,484	0.9	454,080
	Insurgent	80.2	0.93	45.6	1.2	34,146	2.1	454,080
Shi'a areas	Coalition	154.0	0.90	39.0	0.9	10,627	1.5	517,440
	Insurgent	204.6	0.93	52.2	1.3	35,136	3.2	517,440
Sunni areas	Coalition	272.7	0.93	50.7	2.4	39,868	3.4	643,456
	Insurgent	401.4	0.94	65.2	4.2	114,556	6.5	643,456
Sunni poor	Coalition	177.5	0.92	53.2	3.0	19,320	3.6	326,656
	Insurgent	402.8	0.92	65.1	5.2	50,673	6.5	326,656
Sunni not poor	Coalition	105.0	0.93	48.1	2.0	20,548	3.3	311,168
	Insurgent	74.3	0.95	66.0	3.5	63,883	6.7	311,168
Urban areas	Coalition	55.3	0.88	100.0	100.0	32,736	31.1	38,016
	Insurgent	58.3	0.90	100.0	100.0	110,038	48.0	38,016
Non-urban	Coalition	719.1	0.93	39.8	0.7	39,882	0.9	3,075,776
	Insurgent	916.1	0.95	50.2	0.9	118,718	2.0	3,075,776
All Baghdad	Coalition	87.4	0.76	15.8	2.0	12,230	2.9	376,640
	Insurgent	17.0	0.79	56.8	15.2	42,358	8.4	376,640
Shi'a Baghdad	Coalition	9.8	0.75	18.2	2.6	2,052	3.1	59,136
	Insurgent	2.6	0.79	52.8	13.0	6,212	7.5	59,136
Sunni Baghdad	Coalition	9.3	0.77	21.5	3.4	1,462	3.1	42,240
	Insurgent	5.4	0.79	58.8	16.5	4,933	8.7	42,240

Table 4.7 above gives more details of Figure 4.6. Its shows the coalition-insurgent reciprocity models of the whole Iraq, and also some key areas with Iraq, such as Kurdish areas, Shia areas and Sunni areas. It also gives details of Sunni poor areas and areas that are not poor, urban area and non-Urban areas. The coalition and insurgent details of all of Baghdad is given, likewise the Shia Baghdad and Sunni Baghdad.

Table 4.8: Comparing Iraq to similar countries

Variable	Value for Iraq	All countries in peer group (approximately the same value as Iraq)	Average democracy score for peer group
GDP per capita (PPP)	$2,500	Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Ukraine, Uzbekistan	5.4
Literacy	58%	Comoros, Laos, Malawi, Nigeria, Oman, Rwanda	3.4
Energy exporter	1	All net energy exporters (45 countries)	4.5
Ethnic fractionalization	0.37	Croatia, Equatorial Guinea, Mongolia, Singapore, Turkmenistan, Zimbabwe	3.8
Religious fractionalization	0.48	Albania, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Haiti, Liberia, North Korea, Sri Lanka	4.9
Linguistic fractionalization	0.37	Aruba, Mongolia, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Tonga	6.5
Gini index	44*	Angola, Congo (Kinshasa), Grenada, Liberia, St. Vincent & Gren, Venezuela	6.1
Percent Moslem	96%	Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates	2.6
Middle East	1	All countries in the Middle East (18 countries)	3.0
British colony	1	All former British colonies (65 countries)	6.9
Years democratic	0	All countries with zero years democratic in twentieth century (54 countries)	2.7
Population (M)	24	Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Venezuela	4.2
Island	0	All non-island nations (144 countries)	6.2
Recent international war	1	All countries with international war in 1980s (39 countries)	5.1

Table 4.8 above compares Iraq with other nations in terms of its GDP per capital (PPP), Literacy, Energy exporter, Ethnic fractionalization, Religious fractionalization, Linguistic fractionalization, Gini index, Percentage of Muslim, Middles east, British colony, Years of being democratic, Population (M), Island, and Recent international war. For instance, the value for Iraq in its GDP per capital (PPP) is $2,500, while the countries in peer group having approximately the same value as Iraq include; Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Solomon Island, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The average democracy score for this peer group is 5.4.

5. CONCLUSION

This thesis is more to dissect the state of Iraq through regionalism fronts and its effect on a national government. Developing interest in researching about ethno-politics in International Relations discipline, especially in ethnically polarized Iraq, shows the degree of various entities in political bargaining. Many Iraqis have probably come to agree on how truly ethno-politics in Iraq is, and the way its negative consequences influences political opinion of the country which practically is divided into regional construct. However, a qualitative research that is both politically and ethnographically grounded will be conducted.

Theoretically, the idea of ethno-political concept was an unpopular phenomenon in the discipline of International Relations until the emergence of decolonization movements in international political structure. Nation-state was regarded as the yardstick for measuring political organization in IR discipline. Decolonization movement reviewed that the concept of nation-state was not "inscribed into the nature of things" and that ethno-politics plays a significant role in shaping international politics. Ethno-political studies gained momentum in International Relations during the post decolonization movements between the 1960's and 1970's. A lot of ethnic groups with huge political roots are seen in Iraq dated from its historical periods. Many scholars point out that Iraq was created by the British during the former Ottoman Provinces of Mosul, Basra and Baghdad. The British went further to divide the three Ottoman provinces into fourteen. This was so for administrative purposes, and four additional provinces were created. However, Iraq is shaped by a good number of ethnic, cultural and religious forces. Due to inaccuracies in census data coupled with official manipulations, it is difficult to provide a precise statistical breakdown of the population.

This thesis begins to analyze the political history of Iraq, before Saddam Hussein, during Saddam Hussein era, and after Saddam Hussein political dynasty. At the cause of the analysis, it identified some key factors that were

responsible for the fall of Saddam Hussein, which resulted in the disunity among different ethnic groups in Iraq. In addition, the research used post-Saddam Hussein era to explain the role of the USA

and coalition forces in repositioning Iraqi political structure. It further explained Kurds in the midst of American foreign policy in the post-Saddam Hussein era, identifying the inconsistencies in American policy at their expense of federalism.

Federalism remains a viable political alternative in promoting socio-political cohesion in Iraq. For federalism to function properly in Iraq, certain conditions must be met, and these conditions are discussed as follows: First, cooperation; both the Arabs and the Kurds must agree to cooperate with each other especially on some vital and sensitive issues of political interest. Without a close cooperation among all the Iraqi's, adequate functioning of federalism is unrealizable. Secondly, consensus; there must be a high level of consensus among the Kurds and the Arabs for federalism to work in Iraq. The existence and survival of the state of Iraq should be seen and conceived as paramount by all Iraqi citizens, instead of seeking for individual or ethnic oriented interest. The political elites should be composed of people with the interest of the state at heart and not separationist leaders. Third, compromise; both the Arabs and the Kurds most learn to compromise on certain issues of common and national interest. Since without compromise, most of the outstanding issues between the Arabs and the Kurds cannot be resolved. Fourth, concession; a high degree of concession must be played in Iraqi politics. Since without concession, the interest of the Kurds and Arabs is difficult to be accommodated within the federal level. Significantly, there should an amendment in the constitutional framework on power devolution. Important political offices should divide to reflect among the ethnic structure of Iraq and finally, commitment, sustaining federalism in Iraq is only possible if Iraqi citizens are committed to making it work. Iraqi political elites should not depend on external or foreign powers to dictate how the state of Iraq should function. Federalism remains a favorable political structure in sustaining unity in a deeply ethnically polarized Iraq.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: The Evolution of the Iraq Constitution Process: The Evolution of the State

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Area	The TAL	2005 Constitution	May, 2009 amendments
1. Fundamental principles **Political system**	Article 4: the system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and the powers shall be shared between the federal government and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations. The federal system shall be based upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon origins, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.	Article 1: the Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic and this constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq.	Article 1: has not been changed
Islamic Rule	Article 7.A: Islam is the official religion of the state and is to be a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited in chapter two of this law may be enacted during the transitional period. This law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi	Article 2: **First,** Islam is the official religion of the state and is a foundation source of legislation and no law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam, no law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of	Articles 4, 5: has not been changed

	people and guarantees the full religious rights of all the individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice. .	democracy, and no law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this constitution. **Second,** this constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi population and guarantees the full religious rights to the freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yezidis and Mandean Sabaas.	
Pluralism	Article 7. B: Iraq is a country of many nationalities, and the Arab people in Iraq are inseparable part of the Arab nation. Article 9: the Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac, or Armenian in governmental education institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions, shall be guaranteed.	Article 3: Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religion and sects. Article 4. First: the Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkomen, Syriac, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in governmental education institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions. 4. Fourth: the Turkmen language and the Syriac language are two other official language in the administrative units in which they constitute density of population.	Have not been changed.
2. Rights, Liberties and Freedoms	Article 12: All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin and they are equal	Article 14: Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality,	Article 42: has not been changed

	before the law. Discrimination against an Iraqi citizen on the basis of his gender, nationality, religion, or origin is prohibited. Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his life or liberty, except in accordance with legal procedures. All are equal before the courts. In addition to articles 10-23.	origin, colour, religion, sect, belief, or opinion, or economic or social status. Also articles 15, 16 17, 18. Article 18.2: anyone who is born to an Iraqi father or to an Iraqi mother shall be considered an Iraqi. This shall be regulated by law. Article 43.First: the followers of the religions and sects are free to practice of religious rites, including the Husseini rituals.	
3. Separation of Powers	Article 24.A: The Iraqi transitional government, which is also referred to in this Law as the federal government, shall consist of the National Assembly, the Presidency Council; the Council of Ministers, and the judicial authority. 24.B: The three authorities, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be separated and independent of one another.	Article 47: The federal powers shall consist of the legislation, executive, and judicial powers, and they shall exercise their competencies and tasks on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. Article 19. First: the Judiciary is independent and no power is above the judiciary except the law.	Article 63: has not been changed
4. Powers of Federal government	Article 25: The federal government shall formulate the foreign policy, the fiscal policy, and national security; regulate weights and Iraqi citizenship, and telecommunications policy.	Article 109: The federal government shall preserve the unity, integrity independence and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal democratic system. Article 110: The federal government shall have exclusive authority in the formulation of foreign policy, national security policy, fiscal and customs policy, regulating standards, weights and measures, regulating issues of citizenship,	Article154: The federal government shall preserve the unity, integrity independence and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal democratic system and protect the constitution. Article 155, add few more authorities to the federal government such as regulating the immigration policy and visa policy, regulating federal

		planning polices relating to water sources from outside Iraq, regulating the policies of broadcast frequencies and mail, and general population and statistics and census.	election and formulating of environmental policy.
5. Powers of the Regional Governments	Article 54.A: the Kurdistan regional government shall continue to perform its current function throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government. The Kurdistan Regional government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security, and it has the right to impose taxes and fees within Kurdistan region. 54. B: the Kurdistan National assembly shall be permitted to amend the application of the federal laws within the Kurdistan region, but only to the extent that this relates to matters that are not within the provisions of 25 and 43 of this law. Article 57: all authorities not exclusively reserved to the Iraqi government may be exercised by the regional governments.	Article 115: All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region. With regard to other powers shared between the federal government and the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not organised in a region in the case of dispute. Article 121. 2: in case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power shall have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region	Still under discussion

6. Shared Powers	Article 25.E: the federal government shall manage the natural resources in consultation with the governments of the regions and the administrations of the governorates, and distributing the revenues resulting from their sale through the national budget in an equitable manner proportional to the distribution of population throughout the country, and with due regard for areas that were unjustly deprived of these revenues by the previous regime. For dealing with their situations in a positive way, for their needs, and for the degree of development of the different areas of the country.	Article 112.: **First**, the federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifically an allotment for a specific period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law. **Second**, the federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment. In addition to articles 113,114.	Still under discussion

7. Regions formation	Article 53.C: any group of no more than three governments outside Kurdistan region, with the exception of Kirkuk and Baghdad, shall have the right to form regions from amongst themselves.	Article 118: The council of representatives shall enact, in a period not to exceed six months from the date of its first session, a law that defines the executive procedures to form regions, by simple majority of the members present.	Article 163: has not been changed. In October 2006 the Parliament enacted the Law of Regions.
8. Oil and gas and the Ownership of Iraq's resources	Article 25.E: the natural resources of Iraq belong to all the people of all the regions and governorates of Iraq.	Article 111: oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.	Still under discussion
9. Disputed Territories (The Issue of Kirkuk)	Article 53.A: the Kurdistan Regional government is recognized as the official government of the territories that were administered by that government on 19 March 2003 in governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymanyya, Kirkuk, Dyala, and Neneveh. Article 58.B: the previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The presidency council of the transitional government shall make recommendations to the national Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a natural arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request	Article 140: first, the executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of article 58 of the TAL. Second, the responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in article 58 of the TAL shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with the constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalisation and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of the their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31 December 2007.	Article 189: still has not solved because Article 142 of the permanent constitution states that the TAL shall be annulled on the seating of the new government, except for the stipulations of Article 53.A and 58 of the TAL.

	the Secretary General of the UN to appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.		
10. The Amendment of the Constitution	Article 61.C: the general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if the majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if the two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject it.	Article 142.First: the Council of Representatives shall form at the beginning of its work a committee from its members representing the principal components of the Iraqi society with the mission of presenting to the Council of Representatives, within period not to exceed four months, a report that contains recommendations of the necessary amendment that could be made to the constitution. 142. Fourth: the referendum on the amended articles shall be successful if approved by the majority of the voters, and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governments.	Article 191: has not been changed.

Source: Shakir F. (2014), The Iraqi Federation: Origin, Operation and Significance, https://kar.kent.ac.uk/47838/1/The%20Iraqi%20Federation.pdf

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