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ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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THESIS

Ezatullah AFZALI

Department of Political Science and International Relations

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results, which are not original of this thesis. (…/…/2018)

Ezatullah AFZALI

DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to the following;

- ❖ My beloved Parents
- ❖ To my siblings
- ❖ Unforgettable Mentors
- ❖ Wonderful Supervisor;
  - **Dr. Filiz KATMAN.**

I equally wish to extern my gratitude to the staff of **Istanbul Aydin University, ISU, ISSA, SKS, ERASMUS Office** and **International Students Office.**
I wish that this thesis will be useful for researchers in further study on fields related to this topic.

FOREWORD

This thesis is written in completion of Master's Program in Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Aydin University. The research is focused on "Impact of The Taliban Reappearance in Afghanistan's Foreign Policy toward Pakistan in Hamid Karzai Period". It tries to analyze the various elements shaping the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the foreign relations existing between both sides. Looking at the world today, one will notice that lots of foreign and western countries are struggling to create relations with both countries. An example is United States of America and European Union members. Afghanistan is not left out of the race in this 21st century. To this note, this thesis therefore tells us why and how Afghan relations with Pakistan evolve.

If I stumbled several times without falling, it was because I leaned on a handful of individuals and groups to whom I am deeply indebted. My profound appreciation goes to my supervisor **Dr. Filiz KATMAN** whose ideas, criticisms, guidance, encouragement and devotion spurred me, and gave the shape and form of this study. Despite her very charged commitments, she created appropriate time to guide me, read carefully through my manuscript, made necessary corrections and observations, making sure I was on the right tract. I will rather say she was more of a mother and care taker than just a supervisor. My sincere gratitude and appreciation goes to my beloved parents, all my family members, uncles, aunts especially my older brother and wonderful friends like; G K S, U H, M A etc. for their relentless encouragement, moral and financial assistance for this exercise. My profound gratitude also goes to the staff of Istanbul Aydin University; ISSA, ERASMUS Office, International Students Office staff, and above all ISU-International Students Union. Above all, greatest thanks go to ALLAH Almighty for protection and guidance throughout the entire course, and His marvelous deeds in my education and life. I wish that this thesis will be useful for researchers in further study on fields related to this topic.

JUNE 2018 **Ezatullah AFZALI**

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ABBREVIATIONS

APTTA : Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement
ATTA : Afghan-Transit Trade Agreement
CARs : Central Asia Republics
CSFS : Colorado State Forest Service
CRS : Congressional Research Service
EU : European Union
FP : Fundamentalist Project
GID : General Intelligence Department of Saudi
LeT : Lashkar-e-Taiba
CIA : Central Intelligence Agency
IMF : International Monetary Fund
ISAF : International Security Assistance Force
ISI : Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIS : The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISIL : The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.
NATO : The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS : National Directorate of Security
NGOs : Non-Governmental Organizations
MB : Muslim Brotherhood
OIC : Organization of Islamic Countries
QCG : Quadrilateral Cooperation Group
SAARC : South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
TPP : Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
USAID : United States Agency for International Development
USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UN : United Nations
US : United States
USA : United States of America
USAID : United States Agency for International Development
WWI : World War I
WWII : World War II

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TALİBAN'IN YENİDEN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞININ HAMİD KARZAİ DÖNEMİNDE AFGANİSTAN'IN PAKİSTAN DIŞ POLİTİKASI ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

ÖZET

Bu tez Afganistan'ın Pakistan'a yönelik dış politikasına, özellikle de Taliban'ın yeniden ortaya çıkışının Hamid Karzai dönemindeki Afganistan'ın Pakistan dış politikası üzerindeki etkisine odaklanmaktadır. Daha çok Pakistan ile tartışmalı ilişkilerin arkasındaki ana yönler, iki aşamada analiz edilir. Tez 'Afganistan'ın Pakistan'a yönelik dış politikasını hangi faktörlerin etkilediği' ve 'Pakistan'ın İslami köktenciliğinin, dış politikanın yumuşak bir aracı olarak Afganistan'a karşı nasıl kullanıldığı' sorularına cevap vermektedir. Bu araştırmada, 1947'den 2001'e kadar ve 2001'den 2014'e kadar olan dönemlerde, Afganistan'daki politik ve tarihsel gelişmelere dayanan niteliksel analiz kullanılmıştır. Bu tez beş ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm çalışmayla ilgili genel çerçeve hakkında bilgi vermektedir. İkinci bölüm kökten(din)cilik, yumuşak güç, Afganistan'ın tarihsel geçmişi ve Afganistan dış politikasının doktrinini anlatmaktadır. Üçüncü bölüm, Afganistan'ın Pakistan'a yönelik dış politikasının tarihsel arka planını, iki kutuplu dönemi, Soğuk Savaş ve 11 Eylül olayları gibi uluslararası gelişmeleri göz önünde bulundurarak Afganistan'daki tarihsel ve siyasal gelişmelerini gözeterek, iki ülke ilişkilerinin kısa bir özetini, sunmaktadır. Dahası, bu bölümde iki ulusun ilişkilerini etkilemiş olan ana faktörleri, her iki dönemde-Durand Sınır Hattı ve Peştunistan sorunlarını-açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Ancak, sonraki yıllarda, asıl sorun mevcudiyetini korurken yeni sorunlar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu yeni sorunlar arasında Taliban terör örgütü, Hindistan-Afganistan ilişkileri, Transit sorunu ve su paylaşımı sorunu yer almaktadır. Pakistan, kuruluşundan bu yana, Afganistan ile olan tartışmalı sorunların üstesinden gelmek için bir yaklaşım olarak Afganistan'ın içişlerine siyasi müdahalede bulunmuş ve böylece Kabil'deki merkezi hükümeti zayıflatmıştır. Pakistan, söz konusu sorunların çözümü ve kontrolünü sağlamak için, kendisine yakın bağları olan Mücahit grupları ve Taliban gibi fundamentalist grupları kullanmaktadır. Dördüncü bölümde, Taliban'ın yeniden ortaya çıkışının, Hamid Karzai dönemindeki Afganistan'ın, Pakistan'a yönelik dış politikası üzerindeki en etkili faktör olarak gösterilmesi, özellikle de Taliban köktendinci grubunun Pakistan'ın Afganistan'a yönelik dış politikasının yumuşak güç aracı olarak rolünü açıklanmaktadır. Ayrıca bu bölümde Afganistan'ın barış sürecine 'Pakistanlı çift oyun' olarak adlandırılan duruma etkisini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Sonuç bölümünde Taliban'ın yeniden ortaya çıkışının, iki komşu ulusun zaten zayıf olan ilişkilerini daha da kötüleştirmeye hizmet ettiği belirtilmiştir. Pakistan'ın 11 Eylül sonrasında dış politikasında köktenciliği yumuşak bir güç olarak kullanması, Afganistan'la olan zayıf ilişkileri daha da parçalamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Afganistan, Dış İlişkiler, Fundamentalizm, Pakistan, Taliban, Yumuşak Güç.*

IMPACT OF THE TALIBAN REAPPEARANCE ON AFGHANISTAN FOREIGN POLICY ON PAKISTAN DURING HAMID KARZAI PERIOD

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the foreign policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan, especially in terms of the impact of the Taliban's reappearance on the foreign policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan during Hamid Karzai's period. The main aspects behind the controversial relations with Pakistan, are further analyzed within the two phase. The thesis answers the questions of 'what impactful factors have determined Afghan foreign policy towards Pakistan' and 'how Islamic fundamentalism is used as a soft power instrument of Pakistan foreign policy towards Afghanistan'. Qualitative analysis is employed within this research on the basis of the political and historical developments in Afghanistan within the designated periods-from 1947 to 2001 and the latter being 2001 to 2014. This thesis consists of five main sections. First section gives a general framework on the study. Second chapter defines some key concepts like fundamentalism, soft power, Afghanistan's historical background and Afghanistan foreign policies doctrine. Third chapter presents historical background of Afghanistan's foreign policy toward Pakistan in consideration with the international developments such as bipolar era, Cold War and 9/11 events with a brief overview of the relations of the two countries in relation to Afghanistan's historical and political developments. Furthermore in this section it attempts to explain the main factors that have influenced the two nation's relations within both periods-the Durand Line and the Pashtunistan problem. However, in the following years, while maintaining the real problem, new problems emerged. Such new problems include the Taliban terrorist organization, India-Afghanistan relations, Transit issue problem and Water sharing problem. Fourth chapter presents the impact of Taliban reappearance as the most influential factors on Afghanistan's foreign policy on Pakistan in Hamid Karzai's period, especially in explaining the role of Taliban fundamentalist group as soft power in instrument of Pakistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan. Furthermore, it attempts to explain the impact of what is termed as 'Pakistani double game' on the Afghanistan's peace process. It focuses on interesting phenomena played by both Pakistan and the international players within the region. Since Pakistan's establishment, the nation has exercised political intervention in the Afghanistan internal affairs, and thus, weakening the central government in Kabul as an approach in overcoming the controversial problems between the two nations. In order to solve and exercise control within the mentioned problems, Pakistan has been using fundamentalist groups such as Mujahedeen groups which had close ties to her and later on the Taliban. In conclusion, analysis on how the post reappearance of the Taliban served to worsen the two neighboring nations' already weak relations are provided. Pakistan's use of fundamentalism as a soft power in its foreign policy following the 9/11 September has further fragmented the weak relations with Afghanistan.
Keywords: *Afghanistan, Foreign Policy, Fundamentalism, Pakistan, Soft Power, Taliban.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The subject of this dissertation deals with notions of “Afghanistan’s foreign policy”, “fundamentalism as a “soft power” on “the Pakistan foreign policy tools” and common threats, which caused many political crisis and conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan during the time of Hamid Karzai presidency. The content features how international diplomacy, regional policy with commonwealth and local realities act as a medium for Pakistan to emerge and dominate selected factors, thus, dominating the whole scene.

The objective of the thesis is to analyze the Afghan foreign policy formed after 9/11 in a relatively short period, followed by explanation and methodology of the Afghan foreign policy toward Pakistan during Hamid Karzai period presidency. It is also determined to shed light on the effective factors on the foreign policy of Afghanistan toward Pakistan during Hamid Karzai. The stated effective factors are considered as the causal factors for the reappearance of Taliban inside and outside Afghan national boundaries in relation to Pakistan. As such being a case, Afghan-Pakistan relations are thus experiencing unstable diplomacy and lack sustainable peaceful relations in the face of addressing the challenges and threats that are posed by Taliban insurgency and their support from Pakistan.

Further addressed in this thesis is the questions of what effective factors have been present within the Afghan-Pakistan relations during Hamid Karzai period. Another question is as to why Pakistan uses 'fundamentalism' as a foreign policy tool in Afghanistan affairs so as to gain an upper hand over the Peace process in Afghanistan. Another important analysis is on how the post reappearance of the Taliban damaged the two neighboring nations' already weak relations. Pakistan's use of fundamentalism as a soft power in her foreign policy following the 9/11 September may be said to have further fragmented the weak relations with Afghanistan.

In Introduction, a general framework on the study is provided. Chapter Two concentrates on the establishment of the conceptual and historical framework on fundamentalism and soft power in Afghan-Pakistan relations and Afghanistan. It

establishes a conceptual framework on fundamentalism with central themes and the motivation behind the phenomenon thus leading the audience to have a better understanding of Islamic fundamentalism. It's good to mention that in this research the concept of fundamentalism is used as an ideological concept and it doesn't include the hard power concept as it's used at the 'terrorism' section. There is a further thorough analysis of two important significant variables which are "soft power in the Pakistan foreign policy" toward Afghanistan and "the retrieve of historical ties between the Taliban and the Pakistan state". The analysis and process of these variables result in the notion of "soft power" as employed by Pakistani state in furthering her interest in the region. A thorough analysis of the term 'soft power' is further examined with much insight gained from the leading authorities of the subject of 'power' such as the notably Joseph Nye. Upon examining Pakistan's use of soft power, one will be able to understand the basis of the existential ties between Pakistan, Pakistan's ISI (Inter Service Intelligence) and Taliban and thus shedding light on what is termed as "Passive Alliance of Terrorism" between them. There is also a comprehensive explanation of Afghanistan's historical background. Here the founding of Afghanistan is further revisited from 19th to 21st century. This is further followed by the analysis of the Afghan foreign policy with the doctrine after the 9/11. This study has its content divided into two periods, before 2001 and after 2001. The first part focuses on the history backgrounds of Afghanistan and relations with Pakistan from 1947 until 2001.

In Chapter Three, it further examines the impact factors of Afghan foreign policy towards Pakistan during Hamid Karzai period. It attempts to trace the impact of the reappearance signs of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Afghan-Pakistan relations. Taliban reappearance is observed at an angle that allows one to understand the phenomenon's subsequent political developments in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. It examines the foreign policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan after 9/11. It attempts to show five main significant factors that have impact on the foreign policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan. The five factors include Durand Line, Taliban (appearance and fall), India, transit way and lastly the common waters issue. However, it is important to note that it is the Durand Line issue that dates earlier than all others. One will be able to understand how these five factors have shaped each nation's foreign

policy to act in a way that furthers national interests and integrity (particularly for Pakistan).

Chapter four dwells on the impact of Taliban reappearance in Afghanistan's foreign policy on Pakistan in Hamid Karzai's period. A thorough analysis is done concerning the means by which the Taliban group began to resurge within the newly established constitutional Afghanistan. The infamous relations between Pakistan and Taliban after the 9/11 incidences are examined while backed by the veracity arising from intelligence information from the leading authorities. With the shift of focus by the international community from Afghanistan into Iraq, there was laid a foundation for Pakistan and Taliban to further their corroboration that effectively led to the resurgence of insurgency within Afghanistan. The chapter continues to explain the impact of what is termed as 'Pakistani double game' on the Afghanistan's peace process. Impending conflicts of interests between the key regional players and other international players (which is discussed in the last part of chapter four) have laid a weak basis for Afghanistan to have the essential national and peace building process. However, Afghanistan's corrupt elements within the central government are not downplayed, this itself has laid a potential atmosphere for insurgency within the nation. The last part of chapter four focuses on interesting phenomena played by both Pakistan and the international players within the region. It attempts to show as to why the chaos in Afghanistan has much to do with the international players' interests within the region. This is exhibited by the US and Russia's rival games of influence on Afghanistan, Pakistan's strategic depth and the incoming significant players such as India, China and Iran.

In conclusion, study is pursued to inform the audience of two main points on 'how Islamic fundamentalism is used as a soft power instrument of Pakistan foreign policy towards Afghanistan' and 'what effective factors have determined Afghan foreign policy towards Pakistan in President Hamid Karzai's period'.

Within this thesis, the methodology employed is of qualitative nature. Through content analysis, both primary and secondary sources are examined. The primary sources include original documents, speeches and multimedia sources, whereas secondary sources are mainly books, journal articles and newspaper articles. Furthermore, there is an information that has been obtained from the direct discussions and interviews conducted with a number of experts and authoritative figures.

2. CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK: FUNDAMENTALISM, SOFT POWER, AFGHANISTAN

2.1 Fundamentalism

In literature, the appropriate definition of fundamentalism is provided while considering other alternatives. In regard to the scope and nature of the study, fundamentalism is defined as "a more or less coherent array of groups and organizations, which grounding its ideology on a selective re-interpretation of sacred texts, acts in the public sphere in order to make as suitable as possible to its world view lifestyles, laws and institutions, taking a dialectic stance towards modernity and opposing other segments of society, identified as unyielding rivals" (Ozzano, 2009, p.355).

It is worth to mention as a caveat that this work has two terms such as fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism interchanged. This is with regard to the nature of the term itself in that in most cases it carries aspect of religion (particularly in its development as a concept). Hence, the stated definition for the concept of fundamentalism holds strong socio-political significance in analyzing the movement or arrays of groups in question (Derichs and Fleschenberg, 2010, p.13). This definition serves well in observing the prevalent existential fact that Taliban groups have always held some religious aspects that have been manipulated to fight for political power and dominance. George M. Marsden (1980, pp.4-5) defines fundamentalism as the 'demand for strict adherence to certain theological doctrines, in reaction against Modernist theology.' But one may encounter inadequacy when this definition is met with Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Taliban or Al-Qaeda in that these groups have an ultimate political objective.

This is to say that, reasonable number of academic literature have been predisposed to define religious fundamentalism solely with particular set of teachings or doctrines while reducing the significance of the political motives of the groups, however there are studies showing a significant association of religious fundamentalism with political dynamics of a respective nation under discussion (Derichs and Fleschenberg, 2010,

p.16). The problem with such definition is that, they tend to diminish the threat of fundamentalism as a favorable means of extremist in furthering their political goals or political power. Religious fundamentalism has been historically a profound influence in political dynamics; so that there has been transcendence of these movements into parliaments, assemblies, military units and governments. For example, after the wake of Iranian revolution in 1979, there began to be a significant number of fundamentalist movements that rose to the highest levels of power in countries such as Iran herself under Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, in Sudan in 1993, in Turkey, in Afghanistan in 1996, and India in 1996, and in India again in 1998 and 1999. Other countries that have experienced similar phenomena include Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and the United States of America (USA).

Archbishop of Wales Dr. B. Morgan (2007) has defined fundamentalism as philosophies perceived as literal minded or carrying the pretend of being the sole source of objective truth, regardless of whether it is usually called a religion. The notable strength in this definition is that it included the 'atheistic fundamentalism', however one should notice the focus on fundamentalist objectivism, struggle against modernity, secularism and assertion of inerrancy of their positions. This is in fact prevalent if one observes the motives and activities of prominent religious fundamentalist groups such as Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In his study, Andrew Heywood (2007, p.236) affirms that fundamentalism should be viewed in a wider framework as religious-political movement, rather than a relatively narrow view of it based on assertion of the literal truth of sacred texts or creeds. Once again one may observe the in adequacy of the social aspects of this definition. In that, it may be observed that fundamentalist groups such as Taliban have a relatively complex social system that hinges upon, makes it necessary for one to define fundamentalism in relation to social theory.

Contrary to other definitions, the chosen definition of fundamentalism in this literature considers the famous FP (Fundamentalist Project) in that, the study identifies the fundamentalist groups with the characteristics that are in two forms (ideological and organizational). These characteristics include activities to marginalize the religion,

selectivity, moral Manichaeism [1], absolutism and inerrancy, millennialism and messianic belief, elect, chosen membership, sharp boundaries, authoritarian organization and behavioral requirements (Ozzano, 2009, pp.339-359). However, one may notice that there is a much focus into the political dimension of fundamentalism while little weight has been placed on the social factor. Thus, FP is integrated with Social Movement Theories so as to provide a more comprehensive definition that considers fundamentalism as core ideology within an array of social groups or movements in relation to their set up. Moreover, Social Movement Theory will render the ability to analyze the social dynamics of any particular movement or group by which there are potential characteristics of fundamentalism. Systematized by Sydney Tarrow (1994), Social Movement Theory proves to be valuable in this thesis in that it provides a basis into which one can analyze the political and historical context where a particular fundamental movement's mobilization occurs.

Once again, while there is a dichotomy that exists within fundamentalism (the existence of both religious and non-religious fundamentalism), it is important to acknowledge that within the course of history, religious fundamentalism has in many cases transcended its boundaries into political structures. It thus becomes necessary for a rigorous study and definition of religious fundamentalism and a careful revision of the origin of fundamentalism, this will avoid the common curse western foreign policies faced in dealing with fundamentalist movements and organizations as a consequence of assertion of fundamentalism to be identified solely to terror attacks.

In his quest to develop a theory that emphasizes the need to redirect policy for coping with fundamentalism, Stephen C. Pelletiere (1995, p.3) emphasizes a comprehensive definition of the fundamentalism that is directly related to a particular movement as being a critical landmark towards understanding and solving the challenges of fundamentalism. He places the understanding of a movement as a priority to containing fundamentalism. He further emphasizes the need for understanding the origin of the fundamentalist groups as the avenue towards correct measures of dealing with fundamentalist among the peace and security stakeholders.

[1] Moral manecheism in this literature refers to the tendency based on ancient religions where followers embraced religious dualist movement such as the clear separation of issues into evil and good or light and darkness. In the contemporary world the term may be applied to any polarizing, black/white belief.

2.1.1 The origin and development

Although in contemporary age, fundamentalism is widely associated with all major religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Sikhism, Hinduism as well as Islam; historically it was first understood as a concept during the debates within the American Protestantism in the first quarter of the twentieth century. A series of pamphlets entitled "The Fundamentals", were produced within this period by the Evangelical Protestants aimed at advocating the inerrancy and literal truth of the Bible in retaliation to the then modern interpretations of Christianity. In fact, the coinage of the term "Fundamentalism" which occurred in 1920's had much consideration and imprints from the Protestantism's understanding. However, within this era, Islamic fundamentalism is the most important and critical of all forms or types of fundamentalism. Indeed, the basis underlying Islamic fundamentalist group may be considered as both "reactionary" and "revolutionary" (Sadowski, 2006, p.215).

Fundamentalist movements within the major Islamic regions began to be significantly noticeable within the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century. As Sabah Mofidi (2014, p.3) stated after the 1940, there existed an Islamic movement known as *"Jamaat-e-Islam"*, established by Abu Ala Maududi. At latter stages, within the 1970's, fundamentalism transcended to the world level. Movements such as the Jewish Gush Emunim (The Block of the Faithful) in 1974 and Islamic Revolution in Iran during the 1979 emerged. The 1990's witnessed the emergence of Al-Qaeda (1990) and Taliban groups (1996).

The development and use of Islamic Fundamentalism was a policy that had been exercised by the Western allies in the fight against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for over six decades before the backlash thereof. In an aim to build an Islamic bloc that would include the Middle East, North Africa and Central and South Asia, the policy had aimed at manipulating the core characteristics of political Islam. Although it ended up in miscalculation the US came to the late realization of this mistake following the 9/11 events.

Within the Cold War era, the US in the struggle against the spread of the elements of socialism and nationalism propagated by the USSR around the world especially within the prospective Islamic arch and the post-Second World War Eastern Europe. For example, within Eastern Europe, Marshall Plan was considered as the policy plausible

in dealing with Unemployment, poverty and reconstruction of Europe in general without falling into the influence of the USSR sphere of influence. As for the Islamic arc, Islamic fundamentalism was adopted as a policy that would mobilize Islamic countries against the USSR's influence. In fact, Pakistan was one of the nations that had its foundation in this basis of Islamic fundamentalism ideology as oppose to the nationalistic movements that had escalated within India.

Furthermore, any regime or a leader that did not fall along the political lanes of American agenda was considered as a threat. Furthermore, being allied directly to the USSR was not the only requirement of this animosity, rather a mere adoption of elements of secularism, humanism, socialism and nationalism were considered a threat. Such ideas were in turn used by the United States (US) to stigmatize the respective leaders against the counterparts-Muslim fundamentalist therefore enabling the US to set a perfect ground for the clash of the two sides.

As Robert Dreyfuss (2006, p.2) explains, the core reason behind the chosen strategy by the US to use Islamic fundamentalism as the tool of furthering her agenda within the cold war, had its rationale on the need for the establishment of the 'arc of Islam' as a plausible means of undoing the USSR operations within the regions in her reach. This meant that the Muslims activists with the Soviet's Central Asian republics would internally weaken the USSR, hence initiatives were taken to implement such policies.

According to Robert Dreyfuss (2006, p.3), in the 1960's, there was a rapid spread of nationalism and socialism within the Arab world nations such as Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Iraq and Palestine. Alarmed by the phenomena, the US forged an alliance with Saudi Arabia so as to manipulate the Kingdom's foreign policy of Wahhabi fundamentalism as a means of containing the respective Arab nations that had fallen in the realms of elements of socialism and nationalism. This strategy was orchestrated altogether by the King Saud (and the then Prince Faisal) with the US. Arrangements and policies were made to establish the Islamic bloc (the arc of Islam) that would stretch from the North Africa into Pakistan and Afghanistan.

However it is important to note that, the US did not manipulate Islam rather it was Islamism that was manipulated. Manipulation of the religion by itself would prove to be impossible as it happens to be a system of established culture and beliefs that have existed for almost fourteen centuries. But with Islamism, a relatively new trait in the Islamic world, dating from late nineteenth century being characterized with political

creeds, militancy and other infamous tenets that have blatantly appeared heretical to majority of Muslims-both from the devoted lay to the modern scholars. Islamic fundamentalism as an infamous mutation of Islam propagated by the US, had gained the support of various groups such as those of Muslim Brotherhood, by Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran, Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism, Afghan Jihadis and by Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

It should be noted however, even after the Iranian revolution of 1979 the unprecedented cancellation of relations between Khomeini and the US did not serve to shed a lesson into the US concerning the double edged nature of Islamic fundamentalism. The US continued with the same strategy in the fight against the USSR influence in Afghanistan through the use of the Islamist Jihadist (who had their direct training from Pakistan and other allies) as a way to secure her hegemony within the region. The US supported Pakistan through her ties with Taliban in controlling the political affairs of the region. And through this 'devil's game' Pakistan later on mastered this strategy so that it became a pressure point to be used against the US and the international community as a means of influencing the regional conflicts such as that of Pakistan against Afghanistan, and Pakistan against India.

Following the fall of the USSR, Islamic fundamentalism usefulness as a foreign policy tool for the US remained questionable. This became more vivid with the escalation of the crises as a result of the Islamic fundamentalism within the Middle East nations. As the political crises were being witnessed by the US within nations such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Afghanistan, managing the situation became challenging. However within this period, Islamic fundamentalism remained as a plausible tool for Pakistan (an ally of the US's dealings within the region) while it was stumbling block for the US.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban with the help of Pakistan had won America's early support. Even into this point America had remained as an ally of most of the proponents' states and groups of Islamic fundamentalism-Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Arab Gulf. This phase of uncertain relations between the US and these Islamic fundamentalist entities later culminated into the 9/11. These allies ended up to become a double edged sword towards the US herself, so that with presence of prominent groups such as Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the table were turned not only against the US but also against all elements of democratic procedures. In this thesis there is an attempt to show how the Islamic

fundamentalism went out of control from the US into the hands of the Pakistan's foreign policy. Furthermore, much emphasis is given on how Pakistan has been using Islamic fundamentalism as a major tool in her foreign policy.

Aforementioned fundamentalist groups share significant religious and political apparent features, and thus, one may easily be led to categorize them on the basis of such superficial and apparent characteristics. But as mentioned earlier, one of the prominent mistakes that were done by the western powers in dealing with the "fundamentalist groups" was a formulation of policies and strategies that did not have a comprehensive and specific definition of what fundamentalism was, or what a fundamentalist movement was, social and historical context behind the movement or group and other hidden factors. Thus, due to the lack of a comprehensive definition reflecting the historicity and nature of fundamentalism in relation to Afghanistan's socio-political history, this has been a hindrance factor in dealing with the problem among peace and security stakeholders. For example, many scholars saw Saddam Hussein as an Islamic fundamentalist while in a closer analysis he was an Iraqi nationalist, in fact he was less fundamental in his beliefs than the countries that supported US in the fight against "fundamentalism" (Suter, 2015). Hence, there comes a need for a more comprehensive and accommodating definitions of a particular fundamentalist group, ideology or movement in question. For example, when one considers a group such as Taliban, of all the mentioned fundamentalist movements and organization, the Khawarij hold an extensive resemblance to Taliban.

The Kharijites (Khawarij) was one of the fundamentalist movements that took rise within the first century of Islamic history. Commonly associated with the "First Fitna" was the era within the Islamic world that was faced with intense struggle over political supremacy within the Muslim community following the death of Prophet Mohammed (pbuh).

2.1.2 The central themes of fundamentalism

Rejection of the distinction between religion and politics; as a result of secularism, which explicitly set clear boundaries between public and private spheres, further extension reaches a point where there is a clear distinction between religion and politics. However, there is a general consensus where religion encapsulates the private sphere while politics are left entirely on public sphere. Religious fundamentalists reject

the distinction between the two, as Khomeini in his words puts it; 'Politics is religion'. It is thus vivid that there is a struggle between the two ideologies, and to a higher degree liberalism (particularly secular liberalism) has restricted the impact of religion on politics. However, it is significant to consider that implication of religion tends to fence within the private arena thus leading to 'privatization of religion' allowing a clear distinction between politics and religion (Heywood, 2007, p.238).

Fundamentalists often use religion as a tool of "politics of identity". This can also be substantiated by the Social Movement Theory, where religion is regarded as one of the significant and effective tools that may be used by politicians, in an aim to further certain political objectives. However, as said earlier research shows that upon ascension unto power, religion takes hold in that the religious principles by nature in turn use politics as a tool; example in the case of Iran, there were a number of parties that were involved in the revolution, however after the success of the revolution many non-religious faction (secularists) were annihilated out of the political arena by the religious faction.

Anti-modernism, a prominent feature of religion is its reservation towards modernization. There is always a sense of nostalgia in regard to the past golden times. Although there is a common assertion that fundamentalists are often against modernization, it is however reasonable to emphasize their selectivity nature towards the elements of modernization in relation to the underlying principles of a given fundamentalist movements or organizations. For example, many movements tend to appreciate the technological development that leads to the perceived betterment of the respective societies, such technologies include, telecommunication technologies.

In an attempt to revise the dynamics of fundamentalist militancy, it is necessary to understand the mindsets of the actors. In most cases, actors embrace the tenet that religious core values and beliefs should objectively be regarded as taking precedence over all other values and maxims within a general society. Furthermore, religion tends to set a common, strong, divisive and absolute identities. This leads to setting one side against another where by one of the sides is always left demonized. The demonized side is seen as threatening, and thus, a need for strength and protection. It thus forms the basis of having a militia to serve the need for protection against the enemy.

2.1.3 Motivations of fundamentalism

Modernization and Secularization: A number of studies conducted on seeking relationship between fundamentalism and modernization and secularization have asserted modernization and secularization to be the causal factor of fundamentalism. Emerson and Hartman (2006, p.32) explain that a large number of scholars define fundamentalism in a manner that regards modernization as a causal factor of fundamentalism. As a response to secularism, Almond et al. (2003, p.32) defines fundamentalism as "a discernible pattern of religious militancy by which self-styled 'true believers' attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors".

However, research shows that, in principle, there is no basis of asserting that fundamentalist groups or movements are against modernization (Saba, 1994, pp.29-30). If one considers the trajectory of Muslim Brotherhood in its early years, one may recall that it was highly influential among the highly educated members of the middle class. In fact, they were not against the modernization, they were against the aspects of colonization such as the economic and political dominance from the imperialist nations. This was further aggravated by the profound economic effects of the 1970's oil shocks.

Globalism, secularism and modernism as an agent, modernism and secularism tend to be one of the prominent factors that trigger fundamentalism within Islamic communities. In most cases, it is the challenges that are posed unto the pre-existing social structures, traditions and cultures that trigger reactions in the form of movements or revival groups. There are aspects arising from liberal values prominent among the Western nations that have served to trigger animosity among the fundamentalists, for example the commercialization of women in the west, has set distrust among the fundamentalists from the values that emanate from the west.

However, resistance against modernism and secularism may not entirely be the only perpetuating factors for the births and development of a fundamentalist movement; as the case of Taliban suggests, in many cases, fundamentalist movements gain support of their local population as a consequence of the perceived incompetence's within the economic and socio-political dynamics in relation to the existing governments.

Most religious societies in the modern world are prone to fall as a victim of religious marginalization. This follows the apparent violent extremism such as that of 9/11 attacks. Religious marginalization following such discrimination of respective individuals from the associated religious background may range from verbal to nonverbal attacks and the receiving end is often the innocent people who have nothing to do with violence. One of the perceived agents of discrimination includes media and religious intolerant policies from both domestic and foreign organizations. The prevalent prejudices act as an aggravating factor of religious fundamentalism. Prejudice and negative stereotypes are being actively disseminated against religious communities in a range of contexts, including in some mosques and classrooms, as well as in certain media outlets.

In addition to the above factors, there are other regional factors in motivation of fundamentalism in case of Afghanistan such as presence of "non-Muslim foreign forces". The presence of foreign military forces that are known to encompass non-Muslims and westerners provide a basis and argument that fundamentalist movement organizations are predisposed to capitalize upon. This is done in the garb of religion, and thus, winning homage within the Islamic societies. Keith Suter (2011) points out that most of the imperialist nations tend to overlook the colonial past whereas, the formerly colonized countries have a deeper memory of being run by foreigners.

Presence of unstable political system: Depending upon the degree of instability within a government of a given nation, fundamentalism may take a particular shape accordingly. By considering the 'Social Movement Theory' (Tarrow, 1994, pp.86-89) by revisiting a number of cases of fundamentalist movement organization, he shows how both mobilization and developmental trajectories of different movements and movement organization vary or relate on the basis of the existing political structures. In most cases, regions with pre-matured and less stable governments tend to be more liable for the birth and development of fundamentalism.

Illiteracy and unemployment: Most of the population within the Islamic societies are faced with poor standards of education and lack of employment, all these factors provide a ground that is welcoming for the suggestive notions of fundamentalist groups as an agent of providing a change and revival against the perceived failures of the incumbent governments. Furthermore, lack of education among the masses, makes many to be liable for the delusions and prejudices in an attempt to deal with the existing

challenges within their societies. Unemployment tends to make many idle youths susceptible towards joining the fundamentalist movement organizations.

Though poverty may not necessary be a causal factor, studies show association between lack of education, unemployment, poverty and fundamentalism. Lack of the basic needs tend to influence many to join the fundamentalist movement organizations as a means to obtain means to provide for themselves and their families. In case of Afghanistan, more than three decades of war, has made the nation's economy totally paralyzed. Most of youth are inclined into joining the religious madrasas of the fundamentalist groups such as Haqqani network in Pakistani.

2.1.4 Islamic fundamentalism

In current era, Islamic fundamentalism is the most important and critical of all forms of fundamentalism. Yahya Sadowski (1993, p.19) explains the basis underlying Islamic fundamentalist groups as being both “reactionary” and “revolutionary”. As mentioned in the preceding section, there is a need for a more comprehensive definition of Islamic fundamentalism, one that relates directly to the group or movement in question.

The suggested definition of Islamic fundamentalism alarms that Islamic fundamentalism should not be regarded as a monolithic phenomenon, rather there should be a direct regard to a particular movement and organization (Ozzano, 2007, p.133). Thus, it suffices to note that the movements and organization having a fundamentalist imprint should be regarded as arrays within the first initiatives to analyze them. Failure to appropriately define the fundamentalists may result to mistaken identities of the fundamentalist groups, in which the fundamentalist may capitalize upon to harbor social sympathies of the respective regions in question.

Firstly, the political history of Islamic fundamentalism within the Middle East will be evaluated, while focusing on the ideological history of Islamic fundamentalism within Afghanistan in the following part. In light of the Social Movement Theory, it may be inferred that the reason behind the existence and nature of Islamic fundamentalist groups, considering the religious perspectives, are marked by the predominant religious conflicts that have existed since the spread of the religion within the region. Political conflicts have played an important role in the emergence of Islamic sects, and large section of the Muslim community have roots in political conflicts.

Islamic fundamentalism came to exist from Salafism. Salafism is the "a socio-political movement that emerged in Egypt in the 19th century within Sunni Islam, which opposed integration into mainstream Western European societies" (Orav, 2015, p.3). One of the significant outcomes of Salafism was the formation of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt. The supporters of MB were at once highly consisting of highly educated members, so that they determined a way of protecting their values and beliefs while embracing the new institutions and technology. Thus, Islamism was considered as a way in reaching their goals. One of the main goals within the movement was to ensure religion's involvement in the society and to curb the secularizing influence of the political elites. Before forming a political party in the 1940s, the movement's ideas began to spread in the Islamic world, and thus, similar groups were founded in other countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. However, the movements were perceived as a political threat by Jamal Abdul Nasser due to its profound influence among the country's newly educated and middle classes. Hence, Nasser imposed pressure upon them including abolition of MB. Following the suppression, the movement operated underground within 1950s, it is thus when the movement became radicalized. In this phase, the chief thinker being Sayyid Qutb, whose ideas transcended to the successive generation of violent extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda. Prominent themes of Qutb's ideas were the need for armed struggle in order to achieve social justice, since it was impossible to work with the incumbent political systems.

Furthermore, the suppression of Islamism in Egypt (particularly in political circles) led also MB to focus on social aspects of the society such as charity and education. By doing so, Muslim Brotherhood managed to obtain support of the local people within the areas that they supported social welfare. Most leaders of the Islamist movement readily noticed the existence of tribes and traditions within the region that had a closer association with religion. It is thus the exploitation of these political potentials that influenced the formation of Pakistan, Iranian Revolution and most importantly the re-emergence of Islamist militants in region such as Al-Qaeda and most importantly Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Al-Qaida was established in Afghanistan by the Afghan Arab mujahedeen following the withdrawal of the Soviets. In 1979, following the invasion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in Afghanistan, many fighters from the Arab world

volunteered to fight what was considered as atheist invasion into the Muslim territories. These “Arab Afghans” played a significant role as the predecessors of what was to form the core values and ideologies of the Al-Qaeda network. The prominent figure and the founder of the organization, Osama Bin Laden, came from a wealthy family background of Saudi Arabia. He was determined together with other mujahedeen fighters at endeavoring their struggle against the global forms of imperial atheism. The defeat and fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) had proved to the mujahedeen the ability to stand against the world's superpowers. Out of these victories, there was a new global vision developed which was Al-Qaeda. This was to expand the Arab Afghans' experience into all parts of the world (Mandaville, 2008, p.106).

Understanding the development of Taliban from the activities of the Islamic fundamentalist arrays of groups, it is thus inevitable to revisit the historical era of Mujahedeen wars in Afghanistan, during the invasion of the Soviets and after the defeat of the Soviets. In 1950’s, there was cultural relationship between Afghanistan and Egypt, as a part of this cooperation, Afghan government sent some students to Egyptian religious institutions such as Al-Azhar University. It was in these years; the Muslim Brotherhood's political philosophy was highly active within Egypt. Influenced with the political philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood, most Afghani students upon their return to Afghanistan, they formed Muslim Youth Society particularly in Kabul University in 1968, which significantly contained the imprints of the Muslim Brotherhood political philosophy. At the time, Muhammed Daoud Khan was the president of the first Republic of Afghanistan following the 1973 coup against King Zahir Shah. Influenced by the communist groups, Daoud Khan began arresting the Muslim Youth Society activists, where most managed to escape to Pakistan. The Pakistani government at the time, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was in a cold war with Daoud Khan because of the Durand issue and Pashtunistan. Therefore, the Pakistani Prime minister decided to offer support to these incoming activists, allowing them to use the territory of Pakistan against Daoud Khan's Republic; thus, the former Pakistani Interior Minister explained how Pakistan had founded the Afghan Mujahedeen in 1973 by supporting the anti-government activists of Daoud. He explains how Pakistan established a structural form of Mujahedeen, which proved useful for General Zia Ull Haq and United States in their fight following the Soviet Red Army invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 (Shirzad, 2014, p.26).

Furthermore, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Congress with coordination with the White House supported and financed the Afghan Mujahedeen. Saudi Arabia financed Mujahedeen in cooperation with Pakistan. General Hamid Gul received the arms and the finances from Pakistani government; having direct contacts with the mujahedeen, he made them available to mujahedeen. The financial support was used to establish madrassas (religious school) which were freely available to the Afghani refugees and Pakistani youth. The teachers within these schools were the fundamentalist local Mullahs; thus, propagating their dogmas through these institutions. United States through USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and University of Nebraska released publications which influenced Islamic insurgency thus encouraging aggression and violence among the attendants of the religious schools (Shirzad, 2014, p.27).

In 1989, the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan signified two different victories among the Mujahedeen and USA and the allies. For USA, it marked the victory against the communists' counterparts (all over the world) since USA broke the back bone of communism and made revenge in regard to Vietnam. However, this victory for Mujahedeen was a pattern of freedom for the Islamic world. With the focus shifted from Afghanistan into other issues (conflicts in Central Europe) for example, the dissolution of Yugoslavia followed with the subsequent Balkan wars led to the intervention of the US in the Balkan therefore leaving power vacuum in Afghanistan devoid of attention. Making the situation worse, no strategies were put in place for state building of Afghanistan after the decades of wars.

Due to the power vacuum left, there emerged power struggles among the factions of Mujahideen. The intervention of the neighboring countries imposed civil war in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in response to the ideological vacuum, there was an emergence of Taliban groups in 1996 which were trained by *'Jameeate Ulama Islamiy'*, Haqqania network and *Jammate Islamy of Pakistan*. These echoed the concepts of fundamentalism, intolerance and violence which changed the social and political dynamics.

Taliban particularly, expressed their own interpretation of Islam. They did not accept any other interpretations and the elements of Taliban's fundamentalism was significantly originating from the Deobandi Movement, Jemaah Islamiyah, Pakistan's

ISI and other values which were propagated in the Madrassas in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.

Taliban adopted a new fundamentalist model which was based on Islamic Revolution, considered as a threat to the neighboring nations. Taliban were opposite to modernity, and the group was against the acceptance of new ideas which had profound implications on economic development. Taliban was completely alien with the Islamic history and Afghanistan's history. They were also alien in terms of theology, interpretation of Quran and the approach toward scientific and political progress of Islamic world in the 21st century. This was contrary to most of the former Salafists such as Muslim Brotherhood who protected their Islamic values while embracing the institutions and technologies that proved to be fruitful for the societies. Hence, one is led to draw a clear distinction between Taliban and all other contemporary Islamic movements. Furthermore, the major characteristics observed from the structure and operation of Taliban tends to be alien to the predominant ones (of both Sunni and Shia) within the region. According to the author of "On the Genealogy of Talibanism", Taliban radical ideology and conducts have significant similarities to those of the Khawarij (Shirzad, 2014, p.30).

Bashir Ahmad Ansari (2013, p.14), the author of "On the Genealogy of Talibanism", provides a remarkable guideline that can help analyzing and substantiating the significant similarity and connection between Taliban and Khawarij. He identifies this connection on the basis of the group's war against Muslim leaders, the prevalent tribal mentality, war against Muslim leaders, fanaticism and their objectivity towards determining the 'good and bad' for the Muslim societies. Further through these benchmarks, Taliban draws a clear distinction from all contemporary Islamic fundamentalist groups within Salafism and Afghan Mujahedeen.

Tribal mentality among the main tribes of the Arab Peninsula played a great role in the consolidation of the Kharijites. Thus; hostility, prejudice and tribal attacks of Kharijites towards other tribes can be explained from their historical roots. Within the early centuries of the golden years of the Islamic expansion, Kharijites are known to have been prominent figures in tribal wars against other tribal groups from the Middle Eastern region spanning from Sistan to Andalusia, and thus, comparing Taliban and Kharijites, one may notice the fact that Taliban has proved failure in forming a unified community within Afghanistan. This includes the perpetual raising of Taliban leaders

from only one tribe and perhaps one of the significant evidences of the tribal motifs behind Taliban and Kharijites would be the changes of the capitals upon their rise to power (Ansari, 2013, p.21).

Among Sunnis and Shiites, war against the leader of an Islamic community is forbidden. This is so long as he does not denounce Islam or forbid people from prayer obligations. This principle is also backed by authoritative sources such as 'Hadith' as narrated by Bukhari. However, when it comes to both Khawarijis and Taliban, there has been no regard to such a principle. Khawarij went to the extremes of not only waging war against Islamic leaders who were perceived to stay away from the "Right Path", but also killing the respective civilians. In regard to Taliban, following Soviet withdrawal, the collapse of the communist government in Afghanistan under Dr. Najeebullah was followed by the newly established Islamic State. The newly established Islamic State consisted of Mujahedeen leaders. However, Taliban expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership in a pretext that the mujahedeen leadership was not following the Islamic laws. Furthermore, this attitude transcended unto neighboring states. Thus, Taliban waged war against the Islamic leaders (Ansari, 2013, p.27).

Fanaticism was and is prevalent among both Khawarij and Taliban. The superficial approach towards the interpretation of religious doctrines is neither consistent with the common view of prominent Islamic scholars nor Islamic books. Most of the doctrines upheld by Khawarij are in a sense vice versa to the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. Generally, in Islam, "halal" (lawful) is to be prominent and "haram" (unlawful) is to be allowed in rare occasions, but among Khawarij and Taliban the opposite is true. Furthermore, the main teachings of Islam have been misplaced by minor contentious issues. While the main issues of the religion emphasize the acknowledgement of people with regard to their differences (culturally, socially and politically), both Khawarij and Taliban regard such an approach as straying from religion. With powerful themes such as "The verdict is of Allah", the Khawarij managed to commit atrocities in the name of religion. The understanding of such a phrase within Khawarij is based on their own prejudices and understanding. Similarly, Taliban has used the motion of Islamic Sharia based on their own superficial understanding. Such understanding is highly influenced with tribal traditions and their political ambitions (Ansari, 2013, p.33).

Religion of vengeance is among the prominent characteristics within the operations of Khawarij and Taliban. Ali Ibn Talib was assassinated by a member of Khawarij. It is understood that the motive behind the assassination was vengeance. Islamic authoritative sources prohibit Islamic warriors to destroy sources of food and nature or killing those that surrender; however, the modus operandi observed in the Taliban militants in their conduct of warfare has disregarded such principles. This is due to the vengeance directed towards the societies in question, who they deem as infidels. Taliban's vengeance against moderate Mujahedeen was due to political positions and financial positions. For example, financial aids sent from Western countries to the moderate Mujahedeen, caused economic prosperity among the members. Most Taliban members developed a sense of resentment these moderate mujahedeen. Taliban aimed at waging war as revenge against such moderate Mujahedeen when they were to get into power (Ansari, 2013, p.47).

Khawarij were known to come from poverty stricken social background. Such a state significantly accounted for the resentment they had towards other members of the Islamic societies that were moderate and economically prosperous. Same situation is relatively similar to Taliban, due to the lack of a well-established social system that is suitable for economic welfare with regard to 21st century. In fact, the Khawarij were known to be financially motivated in their dispositions. Within the Islamic history, the Khawarij's mobilization was known to be associated with financial dynamics at play. Similarly, Taliban's emergence and mobilization within the region is significantly accounted by the financial funds from outward sources that have been interested in Afghanistan's political affairs (example, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan). Furthermore, as a result of poverty many Taliban headed to Pakistan where there was free education and accommodation. For example, Taliban's leader was an orphan who came from a poor community that had a negative mentality towards other communities which were relatively more prosperous. These further accounts for the radicalization of the Taliban members.

While the Islamic caliphate was centralized in Baghdad, the Khawarij mobilized themselves in Sistan region which included Southern Western parts of today's Afghanistan. In terms of the climatic conditions Sistan region was arid; characterized with persistent dry weather. Due to the significantly large distance of the region from the then center of the caliphate, the Khawarij had an opportunity to consolidate

themselves with less opposition of the caliphate. During that period, the Khawarij directed attacks towards the people of the caliphate. Similarly, the weather and geographical conditions of the Southern Afghanistan has provided conducive environment for Taliban to conduct its affairs. This includes the prominent arid conditions of most parts of Southern Afghanistan coupled with the relatively far distance from the central government. Furthermore, the historical relationship between Taliban and the tribes of the Northern Afghanistan portrays significant occasions where attacks have been directed towards the northern region. This includes, bombing mosques and sources of water, mass killing of civilians, cutting trees and destruction of private properties.

Ordering good and forbidding bad has been one of the means of obtaining the highest prestigious outlook of Taliban from the society and this has always required speeches and the reception of the people. It is important for one to note that in Islam Ordering of good and forbidding bad should not entail violence against the audience. According to the Sahih-Muslim, initiatives of ordering good and forbidding bad should be stopped if there will be potential for war and violence particularly from the initiator's side (Ansari, 2013, p. 69). However, both Khawarij and Taliban's way of ordering good and forbidding bad has not recognized legitimacy of the nation and Ummah (Islamic world), and thus, imposition of their legitimacy by force (Ansari, 2013, p.67).

2.2 Soft Power

There is a serious division among power scholarship when it comes to the nature of power, and thus, there is no unique definition of power. However, in this thesis, power is defined as 'the ability to get the results that one wants' (Nye, 2004a, p.1). Some scholars see power in the aspects of capability (Singer, 1963) while others see power as the outcome determinant factor (Nye, 2002, 2004, 2011). Nye (2011, p.11) explains power on the basis of behavior outcome in the framework that he puts as 'three faces of power', where soft power is the combination of the second and third faces of power. Joseph Nye (2004a, p.1) defines power as 'the ability to get the results that one wants' and it places Nye in the side of those that define power as an element that involves one in getting what he or she wants. There are significant strides in Nye's concept of soft power from his initial definition. Whereas the earlier definition was ' the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment' (Nye, 2004a, p.10), later on, there was an expansion into this definition such as "ability to affect others

through the co-optive means of setting the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes (Nye, 2011, pp.20-21). In general, much enhancements into this definition have been focused on the outcome of soft power.

On the other side, some other scholars define power on the basis of exercise or realization of the potential power. However, here the use of Nye's definition is employed as it is a core element in the conception of 'soft power'. In influencing others towards the desired outcome, the means to the results may be of coercive or co-optive nature. Understanding the preferences of the subject under the influence of power is paramount if one is to understand and measure power. It is also important to note that power depends on the context of relationship. For example, a significant number of Muslim populations within the south of Afghanistan chose to support Mullah Omar not because of the coercive force or payment rather because of the shared ideology or tribal mentality that seemed attractive or legitimate to them.

Such a case makes one keen in avoiding the intuitive way of defining power while equating it to the resources of power. Nye (2004a, p.3) explains that such a definition of power assumes that power as easily measured while the fact is historical and empirical observations show the opposite. For example, with such an intuitive definition of power there is no logic of America failing to avoid the 9/11 attacks.

Power is further classified into soft power and hard power. Whereas hard power encompasses the coercive resources such as those of economic and military nature to reach at the desired results, soft power includes those that are of non-coercive nature and works in a co-optive way. Nye (2004a) coins a valuable concept of 'smart power' which is the intelligent combination of both soft power and hard power to yield the most efficient results. However, here it is soft power in relation to Islamic fundamentalism and foreign policy that is the subject of interest.

One of the significant points to consider is the reason Nye revisits the importance of hard power in his subsequent works (at least in his conception of 'smart power'). It is argued in this work that it was due to the realization of the often transformational nature of soft power (domestically) into hard power (internationally). In the case of Pakistan, one may observe how religious soft power was used through the use of madrassas and Islamic fundamentalism as an ideology to nurture the Taliban within the boundaries of Pakistan, and later on these became the instruments of hard power

that was exercised in Afghanistan leading to the accession of the Taliban into power and it was thus by the use of potential Islamic values and Islamic groups in the region of Kashmir and Afghanistan, Pakistan managed to extend its primacy within the region.

Soft power may generally be referred to as the ability of country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion. Coined by Nye (1990), in his book 'Bound to Lead', the term became even famous after the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, his book 'Soft Power', the means to success in world politics' published in 2004 was meant to clear ambiguities on the so often trivialized conceptual term (soft power). The term has been trivialized within the sphere of international relations and hence it becomes necessary to revisit the origin and development of the term, so that we can develop a framework that can be used to explain the how the foreign policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan was affected by Taliban's reappearance. In other words, how the use of Islamic fundamentalism as the soft power in Pakistan's foreign policy shaped the relationship between the two governments.

It is argued that soft power within the twenty first century has occurred mainly in a form of religion. Meaning the form of soft power is highly structured by religious actors and ideologies. This is substantiated by the use of Islamic fundamentalism as a soft power mechanism for Pakistan to project its primacy within Afghanistan. Furthermore, in the last quarter of 20th century has witnessed the resurgence of religion within the sphere of global international relations. This is substantiated by the presence of an immense amount of publication on this topic. The related publications on the topic signifies the presence of the phenomena.

2.2.1 The origins and development

Haynes (2009, p.296) defines soft power as the ability of an entity (not necessarily a state) to make other nations act in a form that is consistent with the entity's preference. Nye (2004a, p.10) also defines soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment" which includes "culture, values and foreign policies" (Nye, 2004a, p.11). Although in his works Nye does not portray the fair share of religion in the world of international relations, in one of his books he points out on religion as the "double edged sword" in that it may as well turn against the state or entity propagating it. This indeed is to substantiate the fact that soft power especially

in relation to religion as a main source (religion and cultural value) tends to be relatively intractable compared to hard power which may entirely rest on the government's domain. Thus, one may appreciate the concept of smart power in establishing the proper measure of both soft power and hard power to reach the desired outcome. For example, Pakistan have witnessed severe backlash from the Pakistani Taliban who have claimed responsibility of a number of attacks in the nation.

As a conceptual framework, Joseph Nye (1990) is given credits of coining the term 'soft power' in his book. The book was highly aimed at giving a corrective perspective for the then America that was seen as losing its edge of its competitors who were then Soviet Russia and the allies. Nye argued that America would still be pre-eminent as a super power in the further years, however, there was going to be a shift in the nature and structure of power so that many nations would have difficulty in attaining their state goals. He went on to explain that America was to focus on soft power rather than being fixated on her military primacy (hard power). It was then that the term began to gain popularity within and out of international relations sphere. However, the term received significant amount of misconception and miss use that led to the publication of more focused 'soft power: the means to success in the world politics' in 2004.

Nye expresses the sources of soft power being the parts of culture, ideology and institutions that are attractive to other nations and have gained legitimacy. However, in this thesis we show that contextually it is the propagation of Islamic cultures, ideologies and institutions that have roots in the Islamic fundamentalist movements which are inherent within Pakistan and Taliban as the mode of operation.

One thing to note would be stating that there are a number of reasonable criticism on Nye's conception of the term, with a fair share of retaliation by Nye himself. In general, most of the critics of Nye have focused on the areas that have been left in the gray areas. For example, Alpaydin (2010) expresses the ambiguity expressed in Nye's work on the sources of soft power and how it could be molded by a nation to obtain its desired outcome.

In this thesis, focus will be on providing a customized definition that meets the requirement of the Afghanistan-Pakistan situation. Such a definition has called for a revision of the sources of soft power which in this case are almost entirely based on the elements of the culture and ideology of a typical Muslim society. Islamic fundamentalism in this case as a form of religious fundamentalism, tends to be

propagated by Pakistan in shaping its foreign policy and the nation's relations with Afghanistan. In fact, in regard to soft power and religion, religious soft power is considered as the result of the two phenomena.

2.2.2 Soft power and foreign policy

The two types of power (soft power and hard power) as mentioned earlier have been important tools of foreign policy (especially soft power within the 21st century). One of the most important aspects of foreign power studies have been to understand how and to what extent soft power resources of different nations have been utilized within their foreign policies. Having conceptualized religious fundamentalism within the framework of soft power as a tool of foreign policy, it will be explained that how religious fundamentalism has become another subject of interest on the role it plays in the dynamics international relations. For example, how religious fundamentalism affects the foreign policy makers and how religious fundamentalism is related to the concept of soft power will be discussed.

In defining the relationship between foreign policy and religious fundamentalism, first definition will be on foreign policy as a system of activities that is established by one state so as to influence other state's activities (Northedge, 1968, pp.6-7) defines foreign policy as "the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in manner desired by the states concerned; it is an interaction between forces originating outside the country's borders and those working within them". As explained before, foreign policy involves the activities aimed at influencing other nation's behavior, soft power tends to be an essential entity within the foreign policy of an entity or nation that tend to influence another nation's behavior by shaping its preferences without coercion or payment.

For soft power, there has to be an ability to convince by argument and the ability to attract. As Nye (2004c, p.10) mentions, soft power uses a different type of currency not force, not money to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction to shared values, the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values. Religious fundamentalist epistemic communities in Pakistan manages to do so by instrumentalization of the Islamic values.

Nye acknowledges the intractability of soft power, especially in obtaining the desired outcomes due to its diffused effect when propagated to the public. One of the

significant reasons underlying this intractability is explained by the ownership and control of the resources of soft power. It is not easy for the nation (democratic) to wield the culture and ideology within the public to exercise its soft power. However, with the role of religious actors (religious fundamentalist groups) coming into play there is less intractability compared to that which is faced by the central governments. Furthermore, it is understood, that it is only the shared values that gain legitimacy among the target public, and this may not apply for an entire culture. Example, not all the values of America, are welcomed within Muslim societies particularly, commercialization of women.

It is argued that soft power as a part of foreign policies within the twenty first century has occurred mainly inform of religion. Meaning the form of soft power is highly structured by religious actors and ideologies. The primacy of the Christian right in the US foreign policy making as a reaction to Islamic fundamentalism, the use of Islamic fundamentalism as a soft power mechanism for Pakistan to project its primacy within Afghanistan, are all substantial elements to solidify this argument. At a point Nye acknowledges the role of religious movements as having possessed soft power (Nye, 2004a, p.98), however there is inadequate emphasis of the role of religion as a soft power in his works. It may be understood that the conception of soft power since the 9/11 incidence has been associated with the 'war on terror'. Here religious values have been the center of attention. For example, most of the foreign policies that have been formed within the US have been apparently informed by the Christian Right against the fundamentalist Islamic groups (Shlapentokh et al., 2005). In the discourse of the impact of the Muslim transnational networks, there is a general consensus among the analysts that fundamentalist groups -particularly Taliban and Al-Qaeda- receive more foreign policy attention from the great powers as compared to other political entities in the international system (Casanova, 2005; Haynes, 2005; Voll, 2006; Appleby, 2006).

Today, some transnational religious networks are influential. For example, the numerous extant cross-border Islamic movements all have soft power that 'enhances [their] strength' (Voll, 2006, p.15). Example of such religious networks include *Jemaat ul Islamic* and Haqqani networks. Fundamentalist religious epistemic communities such as those behind the Pakistan religious parties may be a significant conduit unto furthering the fundamentalist elements from a given religious ideology

to be adopted within the foreign policy of a respective nation. This is due to the collective identity and cultures that are emphasized by these communities upon the general population, thus, possessing the attractiveness to the masses, hence immense soft power. For example, through these religious epistemic communities, the institutions that may be formed (for example, madrassas in the Pakistan that have nurtured Haqqani network and Talibans) end up setting an ecosystem where the policies formed weather domestic or foreign have to be religiously informed.

2.2.3 Foreign policy and Islamic fundamentalism

Here, it will be discussed that how religion and fundamentalism may play a significant role in shaping the foreign policy of a state towards other states. This will be done by observing the case of "9/11 events", how it affected and shifted the foreign policy of the countries. For example, deep change considered on Pakistani foreign policy after US declaration and in the subsequent sections upon explaining the conceptualization of "soft power", the case of the foreign policies of Afghanistan and Pakistan in relation to the resurgence of Taliban will be examined carefully. During Cold War and after the collapse of the USSR and fall of communist regime, Pakistan began to use the Islamic fundamentalism as an arm of soft power of his foreign policy, by this method it is witnessed that the political instrumentalization of Islamic fundamentalism on Pakistan foreign policies.

After the collapse of the communism, Western world especially US was faced with a new threat. The new threat came from the former instruments who were the Islamic fundamentalist groups used to fight the Soviets. Pakistan was the base from which fundamentalist groups had been mobilized for decades. However, on the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks there was an inevitable foreign policy shifts involving both the supporter (Pakistan) and victim (US and Afghanistan) of the terror resulting from Islamic fundamentalism.

The significant issue here is the discussion of how religion (in form of Islamic fundamentalism) shaped the foreign policy of the primary countries involved in the incidence and the global foreign policies. As mentioned earlier in criticism against Nye's inadequate treatment of religion into the concept of soft power, the 21st century has been characterized with an increased activity of religious actors and ideologies within the sphere of international relations. In most cases, foreign policies have had to

be informed with the religious beliefs or values of particular actors within the nations whether majority or minority in some cases such as fundamentalist epistemic communities (Pakistan), Hindu fundamentalism (India) and Jewish fundamentalism (Israel).

It is important to revisit the trend of Islamic fundamentalist activities within Pakistan in relation to its foreign policy. Since the establishment to date, Islamabad, in different levels, has been in contact and agreement with Islamic fundamentalist groups. Pakistan leaders in order to consolidate favorable public view and in order to avoid impending clashes between the public due to the prevalence of different ideological beliefs (Shiites and Sunnis), languages and tribes has used Islamic values to unify people and avoid division within the nation (Neser, 2007, p.29).

The second essential duty of the Pakistani army was ensuring the Pakistani territorial integrity and saving the security and strategic depth of the nation. For this reason, in the span of the coming years Pakistan supported the radical groups that fought in Afghanistan and India. The Pakistani Army has Islamic political parties, which are in contact with one or more Jihadi groups, reason for the support being for the political purposes and use them for the national interests of Pakistan (Hujatzade, 2010, p.180).

Pakistan for the first time used Islamic militants in her foreign policy in seizing Kashmir as a part of Pakistan. This action of Pakistan resulted to tense relations between Pakistan and India, resulting to three military campaigns in the region between the two nations. For a new established secular state of Pakistan, it resulted to Islamization within the political and military dimensions (Karaca, 2013, p.110). The tension between Pakistan and India has less significance on saving the religion and Muslims but rather it is within economic interests. With the aim of acquiring Indus water sources and hydroelectric power centers, Pakistan tried to support the terrorist attacks under the name of Jihad.

Thus, Pakistan followed the same policy against Afghanistan in the mid 1970's. The Islamist leaders which escaped from Afghanistan to Pakistan due to the pressure that was imposed by Dawood Khan, the Pakistani government used this opportunity to keep its interests by establishing relations and contacts with these refugee leaders, supported them, and thus, gave them permission to open offices and parties in the Pakistan soil and provide all the facilities necessary for military mobilization against Afghanistan government (Marsden, 2009, p.52). This process was accelerated by the

leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) who was highly under the influence of the *Jemaat ul Islami*, and thus, the new military regime followed the religious policy under the religious fundamentalist group. At the same time in Iran, there was revolution under Khomeini, the US lost her allies (the shah). This revolution intensified the relations between the US and Pakistan following the loss of the Iranian allies. On the other hand, this relationship led to intensified relations between the US and the Gulf nations following having a common enemy (Kepel, 2001, p.107).

After the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets, General Zia-ul-Haq asked for immediate support of the Arab nations particularly Saudi Arabia. This involved sending representatives that were such as General Akhtar Rahman who was sent to Saudi Arabia so as to receive the support for the Mujahedeen who was in war with the Soviets. General Akhtar managed to receive financial and humanitarian aid from General Intelligence Department of Saudi (GID) and just financial aid from Saudi Arabia. In return, Saudi Arabia requested for 20,000 soldiers from Pakistan who then stayed in the nation from 1982 to 1988, as a means of dealing with the then regional threat (Israel and Iran). Following the unification of ISI and GID, the US intelligence CIA strengthened the Islamic factors in the Pakistan's foreign policy for the defeat of the Soviet Union (Riedel, 2011, pp.71-72).

The political Islam movement which was initiated by the Arabs (Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Sudan, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood) coupled with the political Islam movement which had been started by Sayed Abul A'la Maududi, Hassan al Banna and Sayed Qutb and religious reformation movements which had been started by Shah Waliullah all these acted effectively to influence Pakistan's foreign policy and politically Pakistan's military intelligence used these groups for Pakistan's interests (Marsden, 2009, p.53). In 1980, in Islamabad, there was established an international Islamic university which comprised Wahhabis and Muslim Brotherhood members and other fundamentalist groups.

After the collapse of the Kabul communist regime, Mujahedeen entered Kabul on 25th April 1992 for the establishment of the Islamic state in Afghanistan. In the line of strategic interest of Pakistan Gulbuddin Hikmatyar had decided with the support of ISI to fight the Kabul government under the pretext that the government had been a communist government. Pakistan in 1994 established the Taliban in Kandahar as a reaction to object the then situation in Afghanistan. This Islamic group caused a

profound political relation between Pakistan, US and Saudi Arabia (Riedel, 2011, p.72).

The former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf states that Pakistan is the only country that had deep relations with the leaders of Taliban, 9/11 was a return from the past to a non-clear future (Musharraf, 2007, p.311). Following the 9/11 attacks, "Paul called me, and I answered his call, very basically and shortly he said "you should be with us or against us", that was an ultimatum and a threat for Pakistan. Due to the military and financial weakness, Pakistan avoided encounter with US. Siding with Taliban was not a matter of national interest." (Musharraf, 2007, p.316) explains that after the end of the war with the soviet, US forgot Afghanistan, and thus, Pakistan took part in the appearance of Taliban in Afghanistan. "We supported them because of the geo-strategic presence, by this manner of method we attempted to take north coalition and resistance forces from getting to power. But after 9/11 events one got under big pressure which after this point the north coalition and the resistance forces were not important and one found new worries which caused us to stay away from Taliban or cut our support from Taliban because they did not have the chance of staying in power" (Musharraf, 2007, p.317).

Pakistan was obliged to come together with US due to surmount of terrorism from inside and outside of the boarders. This was considered an important initiative towards the suppression of the fundamentalist groups. Secondly, it had significant economic opportunity in that it led US to remove the economic sanctions due to the nuclear developments. This was also foreseen to reduce strictness of US concerning Pakistan's debts. Thirdly, after being in isolation due to nuclear weapon possession, it was a second chance to become a regional player (Musharraf, 2007, p.317).

As stated in earlier paragraphs, 9/11 was marked by the shift of many nation's power structures and subsequent foreign policies and much of the factors behind the major shifts were based on religious aspects. Whereas Pakistan under Musharraf had resolved to change its foreign policy against Taliban due to the impending conflict that the nation would be facing against the US. Furthermore, the coalition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in their war against terrorism.

In the US, Bush administration was highly influenced by the Christian right wing, so that most of the foreign policies that were formed were informed by the beliefs or values of the Christian right. In the Middle East, Islamic values, for centuries, have

been used by political leaders in their political endeavors. The formation of Pakistan for example, is a good example how religion played a role in shaping its separation from India. The same phenomena is seen within Afghanistan after the Mujahedeen wars, where the Taliban managed to seize power and established an Islamic state. Even though there was no 'smart power' in that there was no suitable and intelligent combination of the two types of power, significant proportion of both coercive power and co-optive power was prominent. Most of the co-optive power was derived from the manipulation of Islam thus Islamic fundamentalism. One may say, Islamic fundamentalism has proven to be efficient and much more effective unlike other soft power resources which are understood to be less tangible.

Keeping in mind the fact that the resources of soft power being institutions, culture and ideology, Islamic fundamentalism encloses all of these as a package and hence gaining legitimacy when presented in many susceptible Muslim societies. 'Susceptible' in this respect means Muslim societies that are prone to accept fundamentalist elements due to lack of education, poverty or lack of strong central governing unit as in the case of Afghanistan tribal societies after the defeat of the soviets. In fact, considering the predominant intractability of soft power among many nations, Islamic fundamentalism tends to be the most effective in accomplishing the desired outcomes for any given entity. When one traces the time line of Taliban, one may realize from its evolvement as a social movement that was born and nurtured in Pakistan, Taliban through Islamic fundamentalism, has manage to propagate its ideology and culture largely among the southern tribes with direct results mirroring the group's desire.

Instrumentalization of religion would be a significant point to begin with in showing how both the Taliban and Pakistan managed to use Islamic fundamentalism as a tool to further their goals in Afghanistan. Nye (1990, p.4) mentions the fact that in the future some nations will find it difficult to reach their state goals". The difficulty may to a significant extent be explained by the difficulty that arises in shaping the soft power resources of a given entity. For instance, when it comes to Pakistan, although Islamic fundamentalism has been used as a potential instrument in furthering the nation's objectives, it is indeed a fact that on several occasions this instrument has led to backlashes against Pakistan. Such backlashes involve the terrorist attacks within Pakistan herself such as mosque bombings.

It is widely accepted by many scholars within the cycles of political science that soft power as a concept had 'touted' since 1990 following the cold war times while gaining more publicity after the 9/11 incidence as American foreign policy undergone significant shift in its structure to face the terror from Islamic fundamentalism. However, the ripple effects transcended towards other states following the famous saying "you are either with us or our enemies" by the then President George W. Bush. Pakistan had significantly cut her support for the Taliban following the shift of American foreign policy unto fighting against terror. However, it should be understood for Pakistan, soft power as a phenomena began in the days of its support for Taliban through the religious madrassas (institutions) that were used to propagate the ideologies and culture that were highly influential and attractive to the southern tribes. From the definition of foreign policy, it is thus inevitable to state that Pakistan was using Islamic fundamentalism as the soft power for its foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Indeed, such a systematic policy favored the Taliban who in later stage after the global 'shift of power structure' as expressed by Nye, Pakistan began facing the other edge of this form of soft power, as attacks have been directed towards herself.

2.3 Afghanistan: Historical Background

Afghanistan is a landlocked country situated in the most critical, sensitive and challenging area of the world. The country's borders are touched by Pakistan to the south and east, Iran to the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north. There is a short border with East Turkestan in China to the far northeast, but in extremely inaccessible way.

Its history in the past had a strategic rule for the conquerors and in its economic perspective it was relevant for being the center of Silk Road *(Râh-e Abrišham)*. The history witnessed massive attempts of conquerors for occupying the country from Alexander the Great to Genghis Khan and from the Great Britain the Soviet until today's superpower (United States of America). The region that Afghanistan is situated can be traced as far as the era of the Persian Empire. Being linked with the Indian Northern Plains as under the Kushan dynasty of the 2nd century AD, occasionally it had existed as an Empire particularly at the time of Mahmud of Ghazni. According to history, there were the great empires in the territory which was located between two rivers Amo and Sind: the territory of Afghanistan after the Achaemenid and the period

of Ghazna empire; has had been the land of empires like Salchoqy, Ghori and the Durrani (Saiqal, 2014, pp.56-57).

Ariana is the oldest name of Afghanistan which start from period of Evista (thousands of years BC) to the fifth century AD. The other name of Afghanistan between the 5th until 19th century was Khorasan that means east and/or the sunrise. Finally, the current name of Afghanistan named after the nineteenth century where some ethnic groups do not accept the current name "Afghanistan" (Ghobar, 2009, p.9).

Afghanistan is a land of different ethnicities (Tajiks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Hazaras etc.) with the Islamic religion, but with different cultural and languages. Afghanistan comprises of 20 major ethnic groups with more than 30 languages spoken within the region (Saiqal, 2014, pp.6-7). A large number of the population speak Persian Dari and/or Pashtun. This highly explained by the geographical location of Afghanistan as a cultural crossroads, coupled with the isolation of the major ethnic groups that have been separated by the mountainous topography common in Afghanistan.

2.3.1 Founding Afghanistan

Within the 18th century, Afghanistan territory was faced by challenges that were mainly of issues related to political and national identity. This was due to the lack of a central and powerful central government. In this period, all the important social affairs ranging from the community to tribal levels were under the supervision of the Safavid of Iran and Moghul of India. The Safavi had influence on the West while the East was under the influence of the Moghuls. However, following the decline of both sides (the Safavid and Moghul), the alliance of the tribal settlements established the social and political foundations of Afghanistan empire.



Figure 2.1: Political Map of Afghanistan

Source: Maps of World (2012). Political Map of Afghanistan. Retrieved on 29.03.2018, address: https://www.mapsofworld.com/free-maps/#Afghanistan

Modern Afghanistan did not evolve until 1747, as Ahmad Shah Durrani consolidated the principalities and fragmented provinces into one Kingdom. Dated from the 1747, the beginning modern Afghanistan may be traced as the Afghan army returned home after Nadir Shah's death. Ahmad Khan Abdali became the elected King of Afghanistan in a tribal assembly, thus, taking a title Durr-i-Durran (pearl among pearls) while the name of his tribe was changed to Durrani. Having learned the profession of conquest from Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah Durrani applied such skills while gaining great success for the next twenty-five years of his leadership. Ahmad Shah Durrani attacked seven times for the conquest of India. Thus, in his time, the extent of the empire spanned form the Amu Darya in the north of the Arabian Sea and from Herat to the Punjab. It is understood that Ahmad Shah had been entitled 'Baba' (father of the nation). Thus, the throne remaining within Ahmad Shah's tribe, although there was much dispute over the subject of his descendants unto their ousting from Kabul in 1818.

However, following his death, the sons failed to maintain the territory safe, and thus, until the nineteenth century the modern boundaries were as a result of the rivalry between imperial British and Tsarist Russia. Even after the establishment of these

boundaries that determine the modern Afghanistan, British made efforts to determine the leaders for Afghanistan who would act against Russia.

Figure 2.2: Durrani Empire

Source: Cemml (1772). Map of the Durrani Empire. Retreieved on 25.09.2017, address: https://www.cemml.colostate.edu/cultural/09476/afgh02-10enl.html

During the Durrani Empire, in the period of 1775-1776, multiple riots and protests have been taken place by Ghalzaee, Khorasani and Sistani and made Timor shah to transfer the capital from Kandahar to Kabul. Timor Shah's period from 1780 to 1793 after his death the power transferred to his son Shah Zaman and lasted in the period of 1793-1800, Shah Zaman until the end of his period in 1800 could keep up the empire (Saiqal, 2014, pp.63-64).

2.3.2 Afghanistan at a glance from 19th to 21st century

After the death of Shah Zaman, his brother and successor, Mahmoud Shah took the power from 1800-1803 and ruled the Durrani's empire. After the death of Shah Zaman, domestic war for the purpose of getting the powers between their sons started and at the same time there was competition between the Great Britain and Tsarist Russia over the control Afghanistan's geographical territory.

During Dost Mohammed tenure, Kabul was conquered in 1818 by an Afghan tribesman. Dost Mohammed was the twentieth son of the twenty-one sons of the tribal chieftain. Until 1826 there was civil war against the supporters of the Durrani. This led to the division of the nation between Dost Mohammed and some of his brothers. Upon the division of the nation, Dost Mohammed received the greatest part which had

stretched from Ghazni to Jalalabad which includes Kabul. Thus, from 1826-1839, he received the formal title of Amir, following being approved as the leader of the nation. In this role he was accepted by both foreigners and the Afghan tribes.

In the early days of Afghanistan as a nation, there was an advancement towards the nation from both sides by the two then major world powers. Russia's expansion of its influence in the east reached Afghanistan boarders by 1828. Whereas, England's expansion towards Afghanistan, can be explained by the conquest of India between 1757 and 1857. This led to a situation where Afghanistan was under pressure from the expansion of the two great powers from both sides. Following, Britain attempted several times to impose a political will on Afghanistan. For example, in the 1838, with the intention of restoring a ruler from the Durrani dynasty (Shah Shuja) who was understood to be more receptive of the British demands. However, all attempts to that time had proved unfruitful. Hence forth, based on the history, in shaping the modern Afghanistan, England's role will fast be expounded while ending up with the role of America in shaping the modern Afghanistan.

Opium was one of the lucrative products that England exported from the then new colony of India. While the boundaries between India and Afghanistan were ill defined until 1893, cultivation of opium spread unto Afghanistan. The monopoly that England had enjoyed on the production of opium was faced by the threat of Afghanistan which was under King Dost Muhammad who apparently was in good terms with Russia. Following this, British sent an expedition with 12000 soldiers into Afghanistan to dethrone and replace the then king with Shah Shoja. However, highly due to the Afghan population being against dethroning King Dost Mohammad, British ended up retreating back to the east in the winter of 1842. While retreating Kabul 17,000 British soldiers and staff were killed by the Afghan forces (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p.34).

Following this victory, Afghanistan had Dost Muhammad return to power. However, there was a challenge of protecting its borders as there were no enough resources to do so. Thus soon, England managed to take control of the Afghan territory between the Indus River and the Hindu Kush including Baluchistan in 1859. This included the subsequent denial of access to the sea by British to towards Afghanistan (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p.38).

In 1878, British invaded Afghanistan again, in that to curb the growing relationship between Afghanistan and Russians. This was followed by the overthrowing the then

king while forcing the new government to become a British protectorate. As determined by London as that which was called “Scientific Frontier” of its Indian empire, however, it was then settled to create a government in Afghanistan that could ensure the Britain to retain the power over the economy and the foreign policy (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p.45).

During the British invasion, Afghan people developed an intense animosity towards all forms of western-style reforms. For the purpose of maintaining its gain and national interest, Durand Line was established in 1893 by the British. Durand Line, an arbitrary 1500-mile border between “British” India and Afghanistan that made claim to the north western frontier provinces, which were long considered part of Afghanistan. The Durand Line was made 'permanent' in a 1907 Anglo-Russian convention, without consulting the Afghan government (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p.54).

This was followed by the division of the Pashtun people between the two separate nations. Pashtuns had been considered from time immemorial as part of the Afghan homeland. This created animosity among the Pashtuns, and it is this animosity that has survived for more than 120 years. Thus, neither Britain nor Pakistan have been able to gain full control of the northwestern provinces, and it is in these areas where the Islamic fundamentalism led to both Al-Qaeda and Taliban.

The period of 1849 to 1900 was years marked by more than 42 military operations between the Afghan tribes and Britain. This highly signified the intractability of the mountain tribes. Pushing for reunification after the 1919 war, Amanullah was faced by British response of intensive efforts of pacifying the northwestern territories. In fact, in 1920 a five-day battle took place leaving two thousand British and Indian troops. Afghan tribes faced immense casualty where four thousand were killed (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p.60).

Amanullah became an icon of liberalization in Afghanistan (he was deeply affected by Ataturk’s revolution and reformations). This is highly due to his drastic attempted reforms in army, slavery abolishment and forced labor. He further discouraged the use of veils and all forms of discrimination against women while encouraging educational opportunities for females. In the fear that such movement for liberalization would spread towards India, Britain began supporting the conservative and reactionary Islamists to undermine Amanullah's rule.

1924 witnessed the rebellions against the social reforms. It was the conservative Islamists against the reforms such as public education for girls and the greater freedom for women. Abdul Samad Ghaus states in his writing of 1988, “Britain was seen as the culprit in the affair, manipulating the tribes against Amanullah in an attempt to bring about his downfall” (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p.68). It was thus in 1929 that the larger rebellion of conservative tribes, led Amanullah to flee the country. Abul Ghaus comments that “Afghans in general remain convinced that the elimination of Amanullah was engineered by the British because he had become an obstacle to the furtherance of Britain’s interests” (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p.63).

The short period from 17 January to 13 October in 1929 was ruled by Habibullah Kalakani, whom occupied the power as a Tajik. An unprecedented event in the recent history of Afghanistan, but the political opposition with the support of British collapsed his government and destructed his legitimacy. King Habibullah Kalakani came into power with the support of religious conservative people, against social injustice, economic inequality, ethnicity, injustice and at the same time addressing serious moves against modernists and radical reforms which was brought by Amanullah Khan in Afghanistan (Saiqal, 2014, pp.214-217).

Nadir Shah was the new King who had to submit to the dictates of Britain and one of the significant mandate was the acceptance of the Durand Line. 1930 was followed by a military campaign that was aimed at gaining control of the Northwest Territories. At the verge of defeat in the quest for Peshawar region by the tribal fighters, an aerial bombardment of civilian Afghans was exercised so that the defeat was prevented.

America's influence in Afghanistan can significantly be traced after the end of the World War. Mainly, the influence was motivated with the aim of suppressing USSR influence in the region. For example, in 1950 the top-secret US policy document 'National Security Directive' was warning of that which was called the Soviet's “design for world domination”. It is important to note that in 1945 the US had begun to initiate aid projects in Afghanistan. This was also understood by the USSR as a means by which US was trying to expand its influence within Afghanistan. Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev states in his memoirs that 'it was clear to us that Americans were trying to penetrate Afghanistan with the obvious purpose of setting up a military base' (Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009, p.94). The statement may further be substantiated by the

international airport in Kandahar that was built by the US. This airport built in 1956 was widely seen as a refueling base for the US bombers.

However, by the early 1970's, the US resolved to counter 'design for world domination' by the use of the Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan. These were the Islamist that were in opposition to the progressive reforms of the Afghan government. It is these fundamentalist Islamists that were later came to be known as Mujahedeen or 'fighters of Islam'. According to the Rogger Morris, National Security Council staff member, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had begun offering support to these groups as early as 1973 (Lucas, 2010, p.2). It should be further understood that the US was willing to support the Mujahedeen in their opposition to the then regime despite the ramifications on the economic and social reforms in Afghanistan. This is further backed by the August 1979 classified State Department Report stating "the United States larger interests …would be served by the demise of the current Afghan regime, despite whatever setbacks this might mean for future social and economic reforms in Afghanistan" (Lucas, 2010, pp.2-3).

William Blum (2001) explains that Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, admitted after the Soviet-Afghan war that the CIA was providing covert aid to Afghan Mujahedeen fully six months before the Soviet invasion. He explains that the aim of the US was to draw the Russians into the "Afghan trap" so that "the day the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War". It should also be noted that the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979 on the basis that the US was destabilizing the Afghan government for its own purposes.

US was quick to provide weapons to the Mujahedeen following the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan. Milton Bearden (2001, p.5) explains at the report of the foreign affairs that by February 1980, Mujahedeen was receiving arms from the US government. According to Mohammad Yusuf who was the Pakistani general supervising the covert war from 1983-87, significant amounts of weapons were such as 10,000 tons of arms and ammunition in 1983 which rose to 65,000 tons annually by 1987. Milton Bearden (2001), CIA Station Chief in Pakistan from 1986-1989 who was responsible for arming the Mujahedeen, puts it as "the US was fighting the Soviets to the last Afghan".

It is estimated that $40 billion worth of weapons and money was spent in favor of the Mujahedeen as the source of war (Huang, 2001). This worth of money came mainly

from the US and Saudi Arabia. The money was injected through the Pakistan government, which used some of it to set up thousands of fundamentalist Islamic religious schools (madrassas) for the Afghan refugee children flooding into the country; these became the formative institutions for the Taliban (Huang, 2001).

Most of the students recruited for the madrassas and Taliban-to-be were traumatized Afghan war orphans. These were then raised in these institutions where there was much emphasis on a literal interpretation of Islam and the art of war. Thus, fifteen years later the US was at war with these same fighters. These were the fighters that US had created through its funding of the madrassas and the fundamentalists. These were the very radical Islamists who carried the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

Three weeks following the 9/11 attacks, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair used 'the war on drugs' as a pretext of establishing a case for war in Afghanistan. In his speech to the Labor Party he points out that "The arms the Taliban are buying today are paid for by the lives of young British people buying their drugs on British streets". However, the Taliban had already outlawed the cultivation of poppies in May of 2000, and by the time of the US/NATO attack and invasion of Afghanistan the drug trade in Afghanistan had almost completely disappeared (Williams, 2012).

As Taliban was overthrown, the growing of poppies and production of heroin and opium surged so that new highest levels of all time have been recorded every year, thus, making Afghanistan the primary supplier and producer of these drugs. Between 2001 and 2012, production of heroin by Afghan farmers rose significantly from 185 tons to 5,800 tons. About ninety per cent of the heroin sold on Britain today is made using opium from Afghanistan. Furthermore, after twelve years of US occupation, heroin and opium now account for about 20% of Afghanistan's GDP (Williams, 2012).

It is of importance to note that over one million Afghans were killed in the Soviet-Afghan war, leaving over four million injured. More than five million refugees fled the country during that war and two million were internally displaced. 400,000 more died in the civil war, and 40,000 have died during the US occupation (Scaruffi, 2009). 30 years of war combined with 250 years of manipulation by foreign powers have left Afghanistan one of the poorest and most ecologically damaged countries in the world (Vasalli, 2013).

Former President Najibullah delivered the power to Mujahedeen but they ruined everything and instead of governing the country they overlapped against each other which eventually resulted in rise of the Taliban. After the attack on the World Trade Center, Taliban regime was overthrown and Hamid Karzai came to power. Additionally, there are two unforgettable events in the dark history of Afghanistan after the independence, the first one is the formation of a country named (Pakistan) and the second one is the emergence of a violent and mysterious movement named (Taliban).

At the end of the day, the consequences of war resulted on an ongoing violence, human rights violation, prejudice, civil war, terrorism, drugs, poverty and the rise of Taliban. Hence, in the last few decades, it presented the country with its negative characteristics and image to the world. But the name which coiled with suicides and explosions until today is Taliban. An uncivilized, uncultured and wild movement with a traditional look having a particular interpretation in the course of religion, known today in most of the countries. But the formation of Taliban is not a quasi but rather the lapse of time and history of Afghanistan and the situation during and after the occupation of this country by the Soviet is the factors leading into formation of this brutal and tyranny group.

Based on the history of Afghanistan, its territory has been the center for many powerful empires for the past 2,000 years. However, during the last four decades the country has been in chaos due to major domestic and civil wars, from the Soviet invasion in 1979 to their withdrawal in 1989 and from imposed civil wars which were managing by neighboring countries and then creation of Taliban by support of Pakistan and then the removal of the Taliban in 2001 and the ensuing American and NATO presence. The long lasting domestic and civil wars damaged the economic, social and political system of Afghanistan, thus, Afghanistan is considered to be a poor country compared to many other developing countries of the world. The country is currently going through a nation-wide rebuilding process with the support of international communities and foreign aid. But such aid could not help Afghanistan due to insecurity and lack of social justice.

2.3.3 Afghanistan's foreign policy after 9/11

Foreign policy is in fact the behavior of an organized society (in the framework of a sovereign nation state) to the surrounding political environment. Thus, with regard to

this perspective, the historical background and circumstance of the Afghanistan's foreign policy after 9/11 at the ruling period of Hamid Karzai will be explained.

In 1648, the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was signed among European nations following the religious turmoil. The main theme of the conference was the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the states. This implied the emphasis on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the participating states, respect for territorial integrity. There was further foundation of the international law and later on the codification of contemporary states. Due to the wide acceptance of this political-jurisdiction principle as related to the modern states led to the consideration of the governments with sovereign rights to become main actors in the sphere of international relations. Thus, since then, nation states have defended their national interests through the use of foreign policies in the international relations arena.

It is important to note that starting from the twentieth century, there has been a change in the nature of the main actors of foreign policy and international politics. This includes the fact that there is a decreased role of the nation state. The freedom of action of the nation state is likewise decreased. However, nation state remains as key player in the sphere of foreign policy (Spanta, 2008, p.5).

There are some forms of neutrality that has been considered as Afghanistan's foreign and national security policy. Within the 19th century, the nation was a buffer state that kept the rival British and Russian empire separated in the region. During the First World War and since the declaration for independence in 1919, Afghanistan has been advocate of particular forms of neutrality as the nation's official policy statement. In most cases, neutrality in Afghanistan's foreign policy has been advocated as essential for security and balance of power in the region. At one point, following the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion, British led the initiatives to establish Afghanistan as a neutral point. These initiatives were further promoted by the US. These initiatives included the immediate military withdrawal. These initiatives were rejected by both the Soviets and the regime in Kabul as they were seen as aiming at establishing western influence in the region. Thus, the foreign policy was however changed after the invasion of the USSR, in fact it was not of neutrality rather it was a continuation of the Soviet foreign policy in the region.

Following the Soviet military withdrawal in 1988, there was an initiative that was conceived in USSR. The initiative was however proposed by the regime in Kabul. This

involved the call by President Najibullah to the Secretary General of the UN for the international conference. This conference was to discuss the confirmation and restatement of Afghanistan as a neutral state. Within Afghanistan, Afghanistan's Academy of Science in May 1989 began studying the feasibility of demilitarized permanent neutrality. In 1990, the constitution had been amended to reflect the regimes turn to neutralization and demilitarization. This involved a whole chapter in the constitution that was dedicated to the foreign policy. For the first time, Afghanistan had the term 'permanent neutrality' featured in its constitution (Jahesh 1990, pp.15-38). Regardless of these initiatives by Najibullah, the western block showed relatively less support. In fact, western nations were expecting the fall of the regime following the withdrawal of the Soviets (Andisha, 2015, p.5).

Considering the failure of both initiatives (the British and Najibullah) there is an important conclusion. As long as in a conflict one of the party expects more utility through war, taking neutrality as the remedy of the conflict is unfruitful. Thus, in attempt to establish neutrality as a foreign policy towards another country in question, it is necessary that that nation should be willing to undergo military stalemate followed by diplomatic measures.

Following the then apparent failures in the initiatives to neutralize Afghanistan, there were additional neutralization proposals. For example, Selig Harrison, an American scholar and South Asia expert advocated the 'Finland-Style arrangement'. This was regarded as a softer and more soviet friendly version of neutralization (Andisha, 2015, p.5). This proposal did not thrive and proved a failure as the Soviet had more leverage through the communist regime within Afghanistan.

At the height of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda's power in Afghanistan, there was an appeal by Peter Thomson (former US envoy for the Afghan resistance) whereby he urged the necessity of securing Afghanistan from the regional rivalries. However, from 1992 to 2001, there was no visible interest in Afghanistan within the US foreign policy. Hence, neither of the next two administration heeded this appeal (Tomsen, 2000, p.87).

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the only nation that has significantly emphasized the issue of Afghanistan's neutrality was Russia. It should be understood that regardless of the support of Russia of the international security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Russia look forward towards a neutral Afghanistan upon the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. This scenario reflects the old

pattern in the context of great power rivalry, where a weaker power prefers neutralization of the contested area as the way of maintaining territorial integrity.

The collapse of communist regime of Kabul in 1991 was followed by the Mujahedeen accession to power. Mujahedeen's accession to power, there was imposed war from the neighboring countries which involved conflicts between the factions of the Mujahedeen. This caused isolation of Afghan foreign policy from international community. From 1996 until 2001, Taliban regime managed to capture a large territory of Afghanistan. Thus, Afghanistan's foreign policy entered into a deep historical isolation period from the international community. The 9/11 incidence was a turning point in Afghanistan's foreign policy that led to a change from the historical isolation unto multilateral relations with other nations.

The emphasized importance of the need for a foreign policy that has a perspective and strategy Spanta (2008, p.3) explains that the foreign policy of a country in transition should contain and encompass the past achievements, structures, inherited values and beliefs and power relations. With regard to the realities, geopolitical position and other impactful factors on foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2008 endeavored to present an Afghanistan foreign policy framework which was significantly informed or showed the principles of the nation state. This involved also the consideration of the long-term interests and geo-political position of the nation (Spanta, 2008, p.15).

However, from the accession of Taliban unto the fall, following the intervention of international forces led by the US resulted in a subsequent formation of a relatively less experienced and focused central government. This government formed a foreign policy that was significantly in line with the then 'war on terror'. Furthermore, the administrative weaknesses of the Central Government of Afghanistan led to the formation of successive foreign policies that were highly fluctuating and lacked a formal perspective. This is to infer that there was no strategic foreign policy.

To a large extent, the relations of Afghanistan with other nations within the international community were based on the tragic events of September 9 and 11. These events were the martyrdom of Ahmad Shas Masood (Afghanistan's national hero) in the 9th of September and the terrorist attacks of the World Trade Center in the US in September 11, 2001. This was characterized by the joint military operations and

coordination of the Afghanistan National Resistance Forces with those of the international community against terrorism and religious extremism.

Afghanistan was supportive of the influx of the trans-regional forces into the region mainly because of the then impending threats of regional intervention particularly those arising from Pakistan's influence within the region. Following the September 11 incidence, based on the UN Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and the expansion of NATO in accordance with Article 5 of the Charter of the North Atlantic Treaty, many nations' foreign policies have been affected let alone Afghanistan's (Monadi, 2014).

Taking into account the UN Security Council resolutions coupled with the presence of America's influence within Afghanistan's geopolitical and geostrategic area, there was a turning point in the regional diplomacy. These factors acted as determinant factors of the Afghanistan's foreign policy. Following the establishment of the National Assembly in 2004, it became important for the (government) presidential fundamental foreign policy to be informed by the national interests and be approved by the National Assembly. This was in regards to the Article 64 of the constitution. Thus, the outline of the foreign policy according to the constitution include inseparability of freedom, independence, unity and territorial integrity, refraining interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, neighborliness with neighboring countries, peaceful and friendly relations with countries in the region and the world, respect for international treaties and agreements, participation in international affairs and support and protection of human rights (Danish, 2015).

However, the government of Afghanistan has not complied with the formation of strategic policy (doctrine) that is in line with Article 64. Thus, most of the action with regards to foreign policy have been done without the approval of the national assembly. Afghanistan's foreign policy summarized from the presidential statements is full of contradictions (Saiqal, 2012). Observing the trend in the foreign policy of Afghanistan, it may be inferred that to a significant extent, international community has had a significant influence in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Taking into account the past civil war condition, the inadequate capacity of the nation's institutions coupled with the influence of the international community, it is thus reasonable to associate these factors with a lack of a clear perspective of the nation's foreign policy (Monadi, 2014).

The foreign policy of Afghanistan takes into consideration the fact that the nation's location is at the cross roads of the region's cultures. The nation is also at a geographical point that has energy resources and facilities that provides a linking to the regional economies. This has further necessitated Afghanistan's foreign policy to emphasize the notion of independence and national integrity in the face of other regional powers.

The foreign policy of Afghanistan under Karzai until 2014 primarily consisted of three rings: Firstly, international community, regional countries and Islamic countries (Obaidi, 2015). Upon further revision of the Afghani foreign policy's general axis, one reaches the major principles administered regionally and internationally. The principles include the exercise of multi-lateral foreign policy or pluralistic foreign policy, strengthening of the regional cooperation, and lastly; nurturing of Afghanistan's connection to Islamic civilization as a foreign policy invariant.

As a regional strategy, Afghanistan foreign policy is based on principles that are to further regional cooperation. This is with regard to the changes in the actors within the sphere of international relations in the globalization process. Nation's regional cooperation in the foreign policy operates in two levels, namely regional cooperation as a supplier to the national interests of Afghanistan and creating a conducive political environment for being a part of the process of globalization.

During Karzai's period, there was a total of four successive foreign ministers. Observing these four figures and their contribution to the foreign policy of Afghanistan renders significant insights on the dynamics of the foreign policy of Afghanistan. Under Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the government focused on capacity building within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second foreign minister, Dr. Rengin Dadfar Spanta endeavored in creating a foreign policy framework that was more epistemic, academic and strategic. He further ventured in assuring the placement of civil servants and executives who had the credentials that met the demands of the ministry. The third foreign minister, Dr. Zulmai Rasul was marked by the long-term strategic cooperation agreements and conferences with other nations while focusing on the interests of Afghanistan. The second draft of the doctrine of foreign policy was presented under Minister Zarar Ahmad Moqbel Osmani. It was within this period that documentation was conducted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was at the end of Karzai's government.

3. FOREIGN POLICY OF AFGHANISTAN TOWARDS PAKISTAN

Here, the emphasis is to understand how the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were developed, how the problems came about, the factors that drive the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the key developments that took place before and during the tenure of Hamid Karzai, and how all these factors play role in the formation of Afghanistan policy.

The political destination of Afghanistan following the Second World War to date has had much influence more than any other factor by the presence of Pakistan's in political arena. Pakistan due to her economic, political and military interests in relation to Afghanistan and to major powers uses Islamic fundamentalism as a soft power tool of her foreign policy. For example, after Taliban and Al-Qaeda September 11 attacks, these two countries once again took the attention of the diplomatic world.

World War II was followed by decolonization of many nations around the world. Pakistan and India was among the nations that gained their independence following the end of the World War II. Under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan left India. After a long history of cultural and historical ties between India and Afghanistan, the newly established Pakistan lifted a border between the two nations (Ahmadi, 2012, p.90). The newly established Pakistan has had a significant role in the peace and stability of the region. As constituents of the frontiers of the Eastern and Western blocs in the bipolar period, both Pakistan and Afghanistan became the key countries in the post-Cold War era, with significant impact on the overall world in terms of stability.

Afghanistan-Pakistan relations became significant after the acceptance of the Pakistan's independence in 1947 by the United Kingdom. This seemingly positive event was however going to leave behind significant problems between the two former colonies of the British colonies. However, since the establishment of Pakistan to date the two nations have had controversial relationship towards each other despite the common roots in cultural and historical ties between the two nations. The problem between the two nations are indeed based on the issues of Durand Line and

Pashtunistan (Karaca, 2011, p.3), and thus, from addressing the historical background it is possible to understand the underlying secondary issues such as providing extensive assistance to the Islamic fundamentalist groups like Taliban and Haqqani network by ISI in the form of funding, training, supplies, safe haven and munitions. Consequently, these groups caused conflicts and instability within the region.

From observing the relations from 1947 to 2014, the main factors underpinning the behavior of each nation towards the other are Durand Boundary Line, Pashtunistan problem, the issue of Taliban, India and the issue of transit way and the waters. Currently, Taliban is considered to be the most critical and significant problem between the international affairs of the two nations.

Nearly 70 years after the establishment of Pakistan there has been a problem on the subject of Durand Line and Pashtunistan. Pakistan has played a role of inducing instability with Afghanistan so as to have a leverage hand on the approach towards the results that will favor her national integrity and security. Within this general framework, General Muhammad Ziya-ul Haq by his support of the Mujahedeen, consequently led to the support of the fight against Afghan communist government and the soviet occupation. Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan political arena further stretches unto the era of the Taliban at the time of General Perviz Musharraf.

During Karzai's era, the Taliban issue got added unto the former problem such as Durand Line and Pashtunistan. This issue became a significant one in that more tension was rising between the two nations. Regardless of the growing tensions, in the years 2001 and 2014 there was continued mutual visits among the political figure of the two nations.

Afghanistan shares its longest common border among its neighbors with Pakistan. This border, which is about 2,500 kilometers, covers Afghanistan "in the south and Pakistan in the north". Afghanistan and Pakistan are located in a region that is also referred as the 'heart of Asia', so that there has been a significant focus upon the region by global forces. For example, 'The Great Game' was the competition between Britain and Russia over the region throughout the 19th century. As a means towards regulation of the situation an agreement was established between the two nations to regard Afghanistan as the buffer zone between the two forces. However, the wars between Afghanistan and Britain continued until 1919 leaving Afghanistan independent. This left Pakistan lands as a British colonial part of significant importance. This domination

of Britain on Pakistan continued until 1947 when Pakistan gained her independence. The existence of ethnical Pashtun societies within the borders of the two nations led to a new challenge of Pashtunistan. The situation intensified further with the Pakistan's independence in 1947 following the agreement that was signed between Afghanistan and Britain earlier in 1893, concerning the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Thus, this boundary problem is revealed by the British diplomat, Henry Mortimer as the 'Durand Boundary Problem'.

Pakistan having been established in the beginning of Cold war and bipolar world order, the new nation resided on holding a foreign policy that had harmony with the western bloc. Meanwhile Afghanistan during 1933-1973 under King Mohammad Zahir followed a balanced policy between the two blocs namely; neutral policy. Afghanistan started to slip towards the East with the influence of the left opposition in the country together with the power of Mohammed Daoud Khan in 1973, Afghanistan became a full member of the Eastern Bloc by the 1979 Soviet occupation. Thus, bipolar world order in relation to the foreign policy responses of the two nations (Afghanistan and Pakistan) had affected the Cold War era development of the two nations.

Since her establishment, Pakistan has followed a course of establishing the supremacy within the political sphere of Afghanistan. The basis of such an influence and strategy lies on the interest of Pakistan in shaping the internal politics of Afghanistan in relation to Kabul. It is reasonable for one to ascertain, thus, Pakistan has played a major role in the 'political instability of Afghanistan'. This stretches from the time when Pakistan provided support to the Mujahedeen with the leadership of Mohammed Ziya ul Haq, unto the latter days when there was support for the Haqqani network and Taliban. Unto this day Taliban has become one of the determinant of the Afghanistan internal political stability. Taliban's threat has further extended from the local levels unto the regional level. Thus, it suffices to say that it is reasonable for a mutual establishment of comprehensive initiatives that will render answers to the question of the stability, development and security of both nations.

From her independence in 1947 unto the tenure of the Afghanistan's pro soviet regime in 1978, the Durand Boundary Line and Pashtunistan has constituted the main tension between the two nations. It was in this period where Afghanistan proposed to establish an independent Pashtun state in the northwestern region of 'present day Pakistan', or in other words retaking this territory which was once a part of Afghanistan. It is indeed

a fact that under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Abdali in 17th century, the present day region of Pashtunistan was a part of Afghanistan territory. But after the domination of the region by the British Empire, the Pashtunistan region was taken away from Afghanistan. Thus, Afghanistan claims the return of the territory or the establishment of the 'Pashtunistan state'.

The second phase between 1978 and 1989 was characterized by the surge of Afghan left wing regimes relation with Pakistan. The situation was intensified further with the invasion of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The left wing regime's foreign policy toward Pakistan had a basis on their interests on the matters of Pashtunistan, Durand Line and Mujahedeen. This period was also marked with the Mujahedeen's continual gain in strength in the political sphere of Afghanistan. In 1978 the left wing groups took power. The strength of these groups began since the transitional period to the republic regime of Mohammed Dauod Khan. Consequently, as a result of the leftist groups gaining of power, Mujahedeen groups through the support of Pakistan and West began gaining strength. It is worth to note that, Mujahedeen were used by Pakistan to further the nation's agenda. However, within a short span of time Pakistan lost control of the Mujahedeen groups. In 1979 Afghanistan left wing regime had set a conducive environment for the Soviet's invasion. This invasion was preceded with the Kabul's invitation of the Soviet Union. Thus, with the invasion there was an increased tension on relation of Afghanistan and Pakistan as a result of the presence of the Mujahedeen groups in Pakistan territory.

The third phase is marked by the period after the withdrawal of the soviet red army from Afghanistan. This was the period from 1989-1996 which played major role in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Thus, on the basis of the fight between the Mujahedeen groups there was a new framework of relations between the two nations. It was in this period that Pakistan's influence within the Mujahedeen groups that were in conflict led to Afghanistan's civil war.

Furthermore, the fourth period is marked by the Taliban period. And one may observe how the relations between the two nations further changed in relation to the conflict at play. In this period Durand and Pashtunistan subject became the second topic of the tension between the two nations. The new issue at the forefront was then the Mujahedeen and the immigrants' problem. During the Taliban tenure, there was a conflict between the Taliban and other former allied mujahedeen groups. Thus,

Pakistan shifted her support to the Taliban regime so that there was a break of relations between the Pakistan and the former allied mujahedeen groups. It should be understood that it was in 1996 when the Taliban in Afghanistan came to power making the two nations' (Pakistan and Afghanistan) association assume a golden period of relations.

The support for the Taliban by the west had declined following the outdate practices of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the reaction from the international community against the fundamentalism exhibited by Taliban sparked more tension particularly with United States. The events of the September 9/11, there was a military intervention that was carried out by the US and the international coalition forces. This intervention was a reaction against that which is understood to be the provision of safe haven for the Al-Qaeda Leader Osama Bin Laden.

The fifth phase is marked by the regional and international developments in years 2001 to 2014, where the USA had carried Operation 'Enduring Freedom' against Taliban. These operations were done in the name of the support of the reaction to the human rights abuses, international law negligence and the search for Osama Bin Laden. As the military intervention continued, on 27 November 2001 negotiations were held in Bonn Germany with regard to the future of the Afghan central government.

To a significant extent the tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan may be associated to the Pakistan's exploitation of the Taliban. In 2006 the two presidents from both nations sat together for talks at the white house in 2006 with US President George W. Bush to mediate the tension of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations (BBC, 2006). There was a continual effort upon this mediation process that was exhibited under the leadership of Turkey in 2007, 2008 and 2009 under the name of the Tipartite Summit of Turkey-Pakistan and Afghanistan. Following these initiatives, the tension between the two nations reduced as evidenced by attendance of President Karzai on the ceremony in which Asif Ali Zardari was sworn as the president of Pakistan. There have been some developments following the initiatives that have been shown by the mutual visits and the reciprocal visits between political figures of the two nations. But overall this has not led to satisfactory recovery of the two nations' relations. However, the initiatives that have been exercised by the Afghan government by the negotiations with the Taliban have proved to be inconclusive due the Pakistan's lack of support (Khan, 2006, p.248).

Pashtun tribes' separatist initiatives poses a serious threat and concern to Pakistan within the region. Three separate outcomes may be expected following these possible separatist structures. The outcomes may potentially be, the creation of the separate state of 'Pashtuns', or the acquisition of Pashtun's autonomous status in Pakistan, or the establishment of the great Afghanistan upon the Pashtuns integration unto Afghanistan (Andishmand, 2007, p.183).

Pakistan politicians argue that Afghanistan's 'empowerment' translates to the strengthening of the autonomous demands of the Pashtuns and Balochs populations within the borders of Pakistan. And with such argument, Pakistan's foreign policy has been made to be weak or unfruitful to the mutual understanding with the neighboring Afghanistan (Ersoy, 2013, p.23).

Another motif for Pakistan's political intervention towards Afghanistan internal affairs is the need to reduce India's activity within the Afghanistan soil. This follows the fact that the existence of the rival (India) within a neighboring nation might be regarded as a potential military threat to Pakistan. Thus, for Pakistan, Afghanistan may be a strategic proxy in the conflict with India, which has nuclear weapons as Pakistan herself, and thus, to save this strategic depth it has been inevitable for Pakistan to support the Taliban in a fight against the Mujahedeen who established good relations with India and Iran.

The role of open government in Afghanistan may be regarded as one of the most important references to the achievements of Pakistan's aims within the Afghan political sphere. Thus, with such an aim, Pakistan's foreign policy is poised in the direction of ensuring that on the occurrence of a closed administration of consensus in Afghanistan, Kabul will still have an upper hand in protecting Pakistan's internal security and national interest as a whole. Thus, for Kabul, the main objective is to support and strengthen Pakistan's position in all the major contested points in terms of the nation's interests. And such areas of contest include that of the rivalry with India. However, the question of terrorist groups and networks such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban along with the Durand issue remain as the major concerns for Pakistan within her border and internationally. Regardless of such potential concerns within Pakistan herself, Karzai administration has been accused of her support and strengthening of the Taliban. Such an argument goes in tandem with the US intelligence experts who estimate that the key figures of the Taliban have been deployed within the Kuetta city

of Pakistan's Baluchistan region. Furthermore, it is acknowledged by the Taliban themselves that many key figures of the Terrorist networks had been provided a safe haven in Pakistan, this includes Molla Omar who was hiding in Pakistan and died around April 2013 (Gundu and Schaffer, 2008, p.1).

3.1 Impact Factors

3.1.1 Durand Line

After the 9/11 incident, there was an emergence of unanticipated ties between Afghanistan and the international community. The ties were mainly of economic, political and of military nature. These ties were expected to lead to the stability of Afghanistan. However, the emergence of violence particularly under war crimes and terrorism have served to prove otherwise the futility of the diplomatic ties between the nation and the international community. partnership between the international community and the Afghan government have failed to render the expected stability within the nation, much of this is attributed to the failure of the international community in solving the long standing issues and conflicts that lie between the borders of the two neighboring nations; Afghanistan and Pakistan. Perhaps the irony is a significant part of this problem is attributed to the seemingly irreversible destruction that was done by British in the course of expanding its influence in the region. From the consideration of Afghanistan as a buffer zone by the then rivals (British and Russia), to the establishment of the disputed Durand Line, to the use of Mujahedeen during the cold war unto the rise of Taliban regime in Afghanistan; it is reasonable to acknowledge the fact that most of these problems are irreversible as the course that they were brought about with cannot be used to solve them (colonialism).

On the effective factors that guide the foreign policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan, it is necessary to begin by visiting the Durand Line issue and show how it poses as a determining factor of the Afghan-Pakistan relations. Most importantly, Durand Line is the boundary that was established in the Hindu Kush following the Durand Line agreement that was signed in 1893 between Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Emir Abdul Rahman. This line marks the boundary in today's Afghanistan and Pakistan. This line is indeed a region that crossed through the areas where Pashtun tribes were and are located. Durand Line was expected to solve the Hindu-Afghan frontier problem for the British influence within the region. Following the British conquest of

the Punjab and taking over the ill-defined Sikh region at the west of the Indus River. This left a belt of territory between British and the Afghans that was populated by the Pashtun tribes. British managed to establish a direct rule on its side of influence through indirect rule. The decision of British to reach its influence into the Durand Line was faced by the number of wars with the tribes. The side that fell on the Afghanistan was left uncontrolled. However, in the mid-20th century, the area became a subject of the movement of Pashtunistan and independence of the Pashtunistan state. Until 1980 there were approximately 7.5 million Pashtuns living in the area around the Durand Line.



Figure 3.1: Map of Afghanistan-Pakistan Border (Durand Line Area)
Source: Independent Indian (2009). Map of Afghanistan-Pakistan Border (Durand Line Area). Retrieved on 25.09.2017, address: https://independentindian.com/2009/10/20/map-of-afghanistan-pakistan-border-durand-line-area

Indeed, the essence of the problem is based on the question of legitimacy, nature of the agreement (as related to the argument of coercion and periodicity) and its implication on the Pashtun societies located at the belt and as such the question of the

Durand Line plays a key role in determining the foreign policies of the two nations towards each other. Consequently, any initiatives to bring about stability in the region calls for settling the issue of this disputed international border line.

On the question of the periodicity of the Durand Line agreement; Afghanistan has always approached the Durand Line agreement as a periodical agreement that is to last for 100 years. This implies that from its establishment on 1893 it was supposed to have lasted until 1993. The problem with Afghanistan's stance on this question is the fact that there has not been any document to substantiate this claim. This includes the fact that such a claim is absent within the Durand Line agreement and the subsequent documents between the British and Afghan Boundary Commissions which includes completed border demarcation until 1896 (Aitchison, 1933, documents XII-XVI, XIX).

There was a treaty that was signed following the renegotiations done after the death of Abdul Rahman. These renegotiations were done between the British and the then renewed Emir Habibullah in the late 1904. Although the Emir was reluctant but the Sir Louis Dane insisted that the past agreement was signed under the person of the late Emir Abdul Rahman, and thus, it was necessary for the renewed Emir to sign the treaty following the renegotiations. Thus, the treaty was signed following the revision of drafts produced by both sides. The draft that was produced by Emir Habibullah were to a large extent mere reflections of this father's understandings. Thus, part of the treaty reads as follows (Ewans, 2001, pp.81-82):

> His said Majesty [Habibullah] does hereby agree to this that, in the principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of the treaty regarding internal and external affairs and of the engagements which His Highness, my late father . . . concluded and acted upon with the Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting and will act upon the same [Durand Line] agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealings or in any promise (Aitchison, 1933, document XXI).

Thus, it may be understood that the first treaty that was signed between British and Emir Abdul Rahman was only valid until the death of the emir. However, upon the renewal of the document by the person of Emir Habibullah in 1905, and thus, the treaty remained in exercise until the third Anglo-Afghan war. Following the aftermath of the war, on 8 August 1919 the treaty of Rawalpindi was signed following Afghanistan's

peace delegation's visit to Rawalpindi and this was essentially the treaty between the British and the potential independent Afghanistan. (Aitchison 1933, document XXIII; Ewans 2001, p.90; Grasmuck and Adamec 1969, p.21) Although the treaty acknowledged Afghanistan's independence, it also held that Afghanistan was the aggressor, and thus, posing a number of sanctions on Afghanistan such as that which involved the cancellation of the British-Afghan agreements such as that which involved the free importation of the arms through the British Indian territory. Furthermore, the article five of the treaty reads as follows 'The Afghan Government accepts the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Emir [Habibullah]', and thus, for the first time the Duran Line agreement was made permanent.

The treaty may be understood as the peace agreement that was aimed at regulating the relations between the two nations that had been in hostility. This treaty had been followed with further talks that had led to negotiating a treaty that ended placing the relations between the two nations on the permanent basis (Fraser, 1953, p.198). This treaty was titled, 'Treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan establishing Friendly and Commercial Relations', was signed on 22 November 1921 in Kabul. Once again Durand Line was agreed as a permanent border by the Afghan government. It may thus be understood that the Durand Line was aimed to be a permanent border between the British and Afghanistan, and it was a critical element unto the attainment of the Afghanistan independence (Gregorian, 1969, pp.227-231).

'Treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan establishing Friendly and Commercial Relations', was signed on 22 November 1921 in Kabul. Once again Durand Line was agreed as a permanent border by the Afghan government. This agreement under article two stipulated how Afghanistan by signing the agreement would accept the Indo-Afghan frontier as related to the Article V of the Treaty concluded Rawalpindi on the 8th August 1919 (Aitchison, 1933, document XXIV). This agreement involved also expiry of three years after its signature and was subject to one-year grace period from the date of its refutation (Aitchison, 1933, document XXIV). However, this agreement was never denounced under King Amanullah. In fact, under King Mohammad Nadir's regime; the agreement was once again reaffirmed on 6th July 1930 following the exchange of diplomatic notes in London between the Shah Wali Khan who was an Afghan minister and Arthur Henderson, the British Foreign Secretary (Aitchison, 1933, document XXVI).

Among the arguments that have been used by some scholars to justify the interest and intervention of Afghanistan unto the other side of the Durand Line originates from the attachment to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921, that contains a letter from the British Representative which explicitly acknowledges the Afghanistan's interest on the Pashtun tribes on the other side of the Durand Line (Fraser, 1953, pp.262-264; Dupree, 1980, pp.561-565). However, such arguments tend to shutter upon the comparison of the attachment with the contemporary documents that were issued by Britain to Afghanistan government condemning the nation's interference on the other side of the border. Thus, it may well be said that the attachment did not entitle Afghanistan to have claims on those territories. One may rather translate the document's objective as one that conveys the British ruler's courtesy towards the existing bond between the Afghan rulers and the Pashtun tribes across the border (Aitchison, 1933, document XXIV). Therefore, the Durand Line was indeed an agreement that was established and recognized on the permanent basis between the Afghanistan government and the British India. And this was a means that Afghanistan had used to gain her Independence.

It has seen the historical background of Durand Line and we have further observed the legitimacy of the Durand Line by analyzing the contents of the treaties that were signed between Afghan government and the British. So far as long as the treaties that were signed are involved, it is reasonable to that indeed the Durand Line is legitimate. At this point it will be presented that how the Durand issue became a critical determinant of the Afghan-Pakistan relations. It is indeed the rejection of the legitimacy of the Durand Line that is the source of the conflict between the two nations. This can be explained historically from the time when the Afghan convoy to the United Nations Assembly of 1947 rejected the independence of Pakistan, ever since the Durand Line proves to be a line that has accounted for the nature of behavior of the two nations towards each other.

Hence, from the historical background of the formation of the Durand Line it is reasonable to draw a conclusion that the nature of the agreement and the presence of the tribal societies and the geography and the influence of the colonial powers have led the Durand Line to be an effective factor influencing the foreign policy of the two nations (Afghanistan and Pakistan) towards each other.

Afghan ruler such as Mohammed Daoud Khan and others (including Hamid Karzai) had policies that advocated the illegitimacy of the Durand Line agreement, all these factors resulted to Durand being the effective factor of the relationship between the two nations. However, it should be noted Pakistan government opted for the referendum of 1947 where the locals of the Durand Line in Pakistan were given a chance to choose as to whether they would stay with Pakistan or Afghanistan. The results of the referendum had the inhabitants of the Durand region choosing to stay with Pakistan.

All of the mentioned factors made the Durand issue become the one of the most effective factors that govern the relationship between the two countries. It is reasonable for one to establish that Durand Line is the source of all other problems that face the relationship between the two nations. In this literature I organize the issue as related mainly to two major factors the historical background and the debate on the legitimacy of the border.

The historical background and the matter of the legitimacy of the Durand played an effective role in shaping the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Due to the issue of the Durand Line, Pakistan used Islamic fundamentalism as a soft power instrument in controlling Afghanistan's operations. This was done as an objective to decrease the influence of India on Afghanistan. Same strategy has also been used as a way of managing water issue, economic and transit relations.

So as to have an upper hand in the Durand Line issue, it is understood that Pakistan tried to establish its sovereignty and influence in Afghanistan by paving a way for establishment of weak governments and providing support for the groups that operated in harmony with Pakistan foreign policy. Although this matter can be tracked down from 1947 upon the establishment of Pakistan, the strategy became more intense in 1979 upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that both countries are a challenge to Pakistan in that India challenges Pakistan on the issue of 'Kashmir' while Afghanistan challenges on the question of 'Durand Line'.

Most of the international peace stakeholders recognizes the Durand Line as legitimate, International community recognize the Durand Line as the border line between the two nations, in addition to the fact that the United States and other countries consider the Durand problem solved with the Pakistan interest, they know that it is impossible to return stability to Afghanistan without solving this problem and many Afghans are

eager to end this incident. Even Marc Grossman (the USA special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan) during an interview with the Afghan local magazine, he had expressed his recognition of the Durand Line, and that there is no question on the legitimacy of the line/agreement. As such it is reasonable to state that the formidable initiatives to bring about mutual understanding between the two nations with the help of the international community has a significant proportion to do with the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the line.

However, some other neighboring countries has used the case of the Durand Line to further their goals or objectives of their foreign policies into the region. For example, India in conflict with Pakistan. India support for Karzai and the nationalist Pashtun military; and thus, India is the supporter of the groups that claim that Durand is the part of Afghanistan. It is the part of the proxy war of India against Pakistan through the use of the Afghanistan.

Now on the internal politics, the politicians who try to receive Pashtun's support within Afghanistan, they try to influence them by claiming that Durand Line is for Afghanistan. For example, Karzai during 2001–2014; during these fourteen years in many conferences many politicians spoke about Durand Line, and most of these speeches were rhetorical, they were used in a rather emotional way rather than being backed with historical facts. And due to these internal politics, there is a consequential harm on the relation between the two states. And there are many criticisms on these politicians by the oppositions, and unfortunately most of the Afghan authorities follow the argument of Durand being the position of Afghanistan. The argument that Afghanistan is aiming at creating a strong Pashtuns society, and as such were the policies of the Karzai, for example the group that criticized Karzai; such opposition groups expressed these irrational arguments and the failure to recognize the Durand Line as the core of the instability in the region. This is due to the fact that Afghanistan is claiming a part of Pakistan's land, thus posing national security concern by Pakistan. As a way of addressing her national security concern, Pakistan has engaged on long-term interference and the implementation of her patriotic strategy in the Afghan soil. Therefore, the clarification of the border with Pakistan will stop the interference. Thus, these groups argue that the only way to solve the issue between the nations is to recognize the Durand Line as the border between the two nations. The oppositional

groups understand the only way to deal with Pakistan's strategic depth is to solve first the Durand Line issue.

Before Karzai and during Karzai presidency, the Afghan government did not recognize the Durand Line since it was the matter of the patriotism, and thus, causing Pakistan's long term deep strategic intervention in Afghanistan. It is clear that Afghanistan can solve this by solving the border line issue first. How can the problem be solved? The answer lies on the need for mediation. In fact, it goes into two ways; by either using the regional and international organizations (thus using mediation) or by the use of referendum. But it should note that Pakistan held the referendum since 1947 with the local population choosing to stay with Pakistan.

Why the Afghan authority escape from the recognition of the Durand? The answer lies in the fact that acceptance of the Durand Line will be faced with the accusation of treason by the Pashtun societies and the pro-Pashtunistan politicians. Acceptance of the border may also be considered as means to split the nation. In other words, the acceptance of the Durand Line is faced by questioning of one's patriotism. For that reason, Afghan political stakeholders lack the courage to follow the rational initiatives against the Durand Line issue.

Most of the political figures in Afghanistan know that the people of the other side will never join Afghanistan; and they know that Pakistan will never allow such a thing. Judging from a potential referendum among the tribes on the non-Afghan side, it is a plausible assertion that due to the presence of better economic welfare and the relatively more consideration for human rights within the borders of Pakistan as compared to Afghanistan, thus, they will decide to be stay with Pakistan. Even more, the apparent instability that results from the lack of a well centralized state and welfare in Afghanistan further repels the other Pashtun tribes on the other side to opt for Afghanistan. Besides all this it is important for one to understand the calling of the Pashtuns society living in the Pakistan territory; the objective is to form Pashtunistan rather than joining with Afghanistan. Formation of the Pashtunistan is not the same as joining Afghanistan.

The Pakistan state domination of the Durand territories and its national stability being better than Afghanistan; and the powerful army etc. for many years Pakistan has had intervention in Afghanistan, and thus, Pakistan has deep roots in Afghanistan for defending its sovereignty. But know Afghanistan is a weak nation and a destroyed one

in that it lacks even the ability of protecting its own territory and if the international community cuts ties with Afghanistan, then Afghanistan will be under the occupation of Pakistan. It is evident that the current government of Afghanistan has its roots from the intervention of the United States and the international communities; and as such on the withdrawal of this influence will result to the imposed war as that of the 1990 until 2001; it means that if Afghanistan goes under control of terrorism and occupation by Pakistan. Thus, this irrational argument that the other side of the Durand Line is the part of Afghanistan, is raw imagination and false.

3.1.2 Taliban (appearance and fall)

The root of the Taliban could be traced and explained from the days of the soviet collapse. The collapse of the soviets was followed by the Western nation's shift of focus from Afghanistan. This shift of focus had profound impact on the state building of Afghanistan had profound prolonged effect. And it led to the civil war and the emergence of the Taliban as a social movement against the then existed social and political situation.

Since the appearance of Taliban regime in 1996, to the fall of the regime following the 9/11 events into the end of Hamid Karzai's period in power unto present day Afghanistan government has experienced the threat and attacks of Taliban. Because the international community's absence of the care about Afghanistan, and on the other side, and the Pakistan's dishonest influence within the struggle against Taliban, and thus, with these two reasons, Taliban still remains as the potential threat for the two nations. Since fall of the communist regime of Kabul in 1991, Afghanistan's political situation can be explained by the lack of enough international community's focus on the nation, intervention of neighboring states (such as Pakistan) and the presence of the weak government in Kabul. Thus, with the mentioned factors, Taliban remains as the most effective factor on the relations of the two nations.

Taliban is an Afghan origin organization which is a fundamentalist armed group founded and supported by Pakistan and developed from Deoband Madrassas. The group was found by Pakistan as a soft power instrument of her foreign policy towards Afghanistan. The emergence of Taliban began in Kandahar and Baluchistan as a military organization in October 1994 aimed at removing the Afghan Mujahedeen from the power and to reach the energy resources in Central Asia. The Taliban carried

30 years of widespread violence, migration and ideological suggestions that existed in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakıstan. The Taliban was basically a network of Afghans and Pakistanis on the border. It was at the border region where a significant number of the Afghan immigrants in the camps received military training by Pakistan military and other Islamic fundamentalist groups. This was aided by the financial support of America and Saudi Arabia (Rubin, 2006).

Pakistan had an intention of establishing a government within Afghanistan which would be close to Pakistan. This was done by supporting the Islamic Afghan groups and parties such as that of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and later unto Taliban. This was also done with the aim of solving the border problem of Durand and to reach the Central Asian energy and economic resources. This was followed with more pressure from Pakistan on Afghanistan government so as to prevent India's influence over Kabul (Rubin, 2006).

Apart from other reasons of Pakistan behavior towards the neighboring nation, Pakistan's policy of seeking its own interests in Afghanistan by establishing the Taliban is very important. Following the ingrained desire within Afghanistan to acquire Pashtunistan, Pakistan has aimed at policies that have focused on either including Afghanistan as a whole or at least the Afghanistan's Pashtun's region into Pakistan's Pashtunistan. Thus, it is reasonable for one to assert the Taliban influence as Pakistan's invasion of Afghanistan (Sheharyar, 2012, pp.28-29).

Following the death of Nadir Shah Afshar's death, Afghans established their empire in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durani from Durani tribes who used to be the guard of Nadir Shah Afshar. Thus, until the coming to power of the communists in 1979 sovereignty of these tribes were existed for centuries. Thus, with the emergence of the communists unto power these tribes were removed from power. In fact, among the seven parties of Mujahedeen in Pakistan, the Durani tribe had no leaders (Coll, 2007, p.271).

As the Soviet Army departed from Afghanistan, the situation of Kandahar worsened and there were fights among the groups leaders with each other. Such fights included those among the Islamic party commanders which were headed by Hekmatyar and supported by ISI. There were understood to be smuggling drugs and weapons, cutting tribute and torturing merchants among their destructive actions. Thus, the two caused the Taliban to come out with external influence. Initially, Taliban was established as a

social movement against the then existed situation, and thus, in 1994 there was Madrasah started in Kandahar to control the situation (Marsden, 2009, p.73).

The communist revolution in Kabul in 1978 was followed by a significant increase in number of new generation of Afghan refugees unto the schools which had been established by Zia ul Haq, ISI, Saudi and Jamaate Islam. These were the immigrants who had migrated to the regions where Pashtuns had lived. With the new support of the Saudi Arabia, there was an introduction of literature materials (such as books) which had some teachings that had the Islamic ideology of Saudi Arabia. Such madrassas include that of Haqqani madrassas near Peshawar, which together with Deoband's thoughts, taught fundamentalist Islamic concepts (Coll, 2007, pp.175-274).

Initially, there was a belief among the Taliban that their leaders (through dreams) were being commanded by the Islamic Prophet Muhammad to carry out and implement Islamic faith in Afghanistan, however the aim behind was to revive the sovereignty of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. This aim of moving towards the sovereignty of Pashtuns was in harmony with Pakistan. It should be understood that it was the religious roots of the Taliban that brought closer to the Al-Qaeda. Although the Taliban did not emerge from the Al-Qaeda ranks, Only Mullah Muhammad Omar had communication with Jalaluddin Haqqani, the leader of the Taliban, who was ordered to participate in Jihad, which provided a good opportunity for Al-Qaeda (Coll, 2007, p.275).

A significant role was played by Taliban in the continuity of the civil war after the 1992 in which Pakistan had a hand. Thus, they shortly spread the Islamic-nationalist movements across the country unto Amu shores. This was followed by further capturing the important parts of the country with the use of apparently religious and Sharia slogans with the nationalist tendencies hidden at the background (Lefuvre, 2010, p.1).

It should be understood that Taliban may be explained as a social movement against the other factions of Mujahedeen. Following the emergence of the group in Kandahar, initially Taliban was supported by the Jamiat-e Islami Party. The reason Jamiat-e Islami Party supported Taliban was due to the fact that they all had a common enemy who was Hekmateyar's Party. The relationship between Taliban and the Jamiat-e Islami Party can be traced from the time when Mullah Rabbani (who was one of the top Taliban leaders) had visited the then president Burhaneddin Rabani. It was in this visit that Mullah Rabbani received a letter which was to be given to Mullah Naqib

(who was the representative of the Jamiat-e Islami Party in the Kandahar province). In this letter president Rabbani, wanted for his representative to stand and support Taliban's side. But when Taliban captured the Kandahar they disarmed the representatives of Jamiat-e Islami party. It was this disarmament of Mullah Naqib that brought about the skepticism that led to the opposition of the Jamiat-e Islami Party against the Taliban. The Taliban took control of the Herat province following the occupation of Helmand, in 1996 they had also taken over the city of Jalalabad (which was partly due to Central State). Before occupying Jalalabad, engineer Shah Mahmood replaced Abdul Qadir, who was the chief and provincial governor of Yunus Khalis Islamic Party. Engineer Shah Mahmood was killed on his way to visit Taliban in Pakistan for the negotiations. He was killed with other six people. Thus, from the assassination of Shah Mahmood and the six people, it was clear to other Jihadists that Taliban was indeed not a peaceful social movement. And it was then that Jamyate Islamic Party began to hold talks with the Hekmatyar. Despite the fact that Hekmatyar was a prime minister of Rabbani's Government, he could not defend Kabul from being occupied by the Taliban. Taliban managed to seize many large provinces through propaganda, and thus, managing to disarm the Jihadist groups. This was followed with the partial peace that was provided under Taliban sovereignty, thus, earning the nickname such as 'Angels of Peace'.

Tuesday of September 26, 1996 Kabul had fallen to the hands of Taliban without bloodshed. Taliban presence within Kabul was followed by the attack against the UN office where the Afghanistan former president Najeebullah had been a refuge. It was this time that Najeebullah had been executed. By entering Kabul, they managed to put Islamic laws into practice. Mullah Muhammad Omar obtained the title of Emir of the Muslims, and thus, changed the political system of Afghanistan to Islamic Emirate. Thus, governors were appointed for all the provinces under the sovereignty of the Taliban (Marsden, 2009, p.74). Mullah Omar had also assigned Mullah Rabbani with a group of six people to head the Kabul government (Pahlawan, 2000, p.218).

Furthermore, the occupation of the Kabul was followed by the establishment of a new branch under the police, which had a role of ordering good and forbidding badness (Amr Bil Maroof Nahi Anil Munkar). This branch was given a role of finding out if the citizen were following the Islamic rules or not. The regime had spread the notion that Afghanistan was to be saved from oppression of the opponents and create a society

that was in conformity with Islamic jurisdictions. Furthermore, some edicts had been issued that dictated that the apparels that men were expected to wear, keeping beards, shorten hair, wearing Afghan clothes, and praying five times a day. The formal education for women was banned as they were to be put in charge of training and raising of the future Muslims. Women were obliged to wear veils, and they were also banned from going out alone, listening to music, watching television and video tapes. Islamic restrictions began to be implemented (Marsden, 2009, p.74).

The base of the group was strictly consisting of the Pashtuns due to the fact that majority and important leaders were of Pashtun origin. The leaders had a vision of reviving the sovereignty of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan as it was in the days before of Rabbani-Masood period. Despite the emphasis that was made on the notion that this movement was welcoming for all ethnic groups and tribes, there was still public anxiety over the supremacy of the Pashtuns within the movement. Because, in practice, their nationalist and sectarian (Sunni) aspects were turn out to be open while other nationalities and sects (Shia-Ismailiyah) had no formal role to them. This attitude of the Taliban was appreciated as it was clearly stated in the article entitled "The Decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan" by a liberal Pashtun nationalist Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi and in the book (Duwahuma Saqawi) by another Liberal Nationalist "Ismail Yoon". Furthermore, Taliban attitude towards Pashtun leaders in Peshawar was a major factor that garnered support from the ex-president of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai and the president Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (Coll, 2007, p.274).

General Malik support towards Taliban led to the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif. Apart from the support of General Malik, Taliban also garnered the support of commanders of Takhar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pol provinces. This led to the widespread of Taliban's influence over most of Afghanistan. Pakistan was the first country to acknowledge Taliban's regime as a government. This was later on followed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as few countries that acknowledged Taliban's regime (Marsden, 2009, p.86). Furthermore, following the capturing of cities such as Mazar-e-Sharif there were actions that were conducted that were against human rights including that of the massacres of Hazaras. Thousands were slaughtered among Hazaras in 1998 within Balkh, and cities of Sar-e-Pol and Bamyan were faced with ethnic cleansing in the years of 1999 and 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

Following the election of Benazir Bhutto as the prime minister for the second time, one of her major objectives were to reach Central Asian markets so as to improve Pakistan's economy. Central Asia was the potential supplier of oil, natural gas and cotton. In collaboration with ISI senior officers, Mrs. Bhutto opened an investigation that was to study Afghan's situation. This further involved the formation of a commission that had close ties with her supporters in Afghanistan. Among the members that composed the commission include General Naseerullah Babur who was Pakistan's interior minister. Following the investigation and analysis, the senior leaders of the ISI had enough comprehension of the Afghan's situation, so that it was perceived that cutting off Hekmatyar cooperation would render negative ramification on Pakistan's interests. It was understood that Rabbani's power would be strengthened in Afghanistan so that with development of relations with India, there would be unrest in the border of regions where Pashtuns lived, if Hekmatyar would not be supported. Babur's suggestion was that, Pakistan goods could reach central Asia without the need of Kabul, from Kandahar, Farah and Herat. Accomplishment of this scheme would result from bribing the local commanders (Coll, 2007, pp.281-282).

The Taliban organization caused the discovery of petrol and natural gas in the central Asia. The world's major petrol companies' interest towards Kazakhstan were aroused following the Shufron Patrol Company with Kazakhstan in 1994. Ever since the world's renewed petrol companies have been after the petrol and natural gas that is within the region following the positive report results. The major oil companies are looking forward to bring the benefits of the energy resources found in the central Asia region to the world market, and thus, during the Rabbani government these companies found the government of Rabbani as an obstacle on the way to the goal of employing these resources. Thus, in ensuring that they reach their goals they supported Taliban to implicitly tackle the obstacles (Ansari, 2004, pp.64-65).

Major petrol and natural gas companies conducted the surveys that eventually revealed the major total petrol and natural gas reserves totaled 30 billion square meters (particularly in Turkmenistan). Unical (US), British Petroleum, Delta oil (Arabia), Car Seat Group Petroleum (Pakistan) are among the companies that ventured to build the pipeline that runs from Ashgabat and Gwadar (in Pakistan). Following the cost analysis that has been conducted for the project, the pipeline is intended to pass through Afghanistan as is the most cost effective route. This leads to the estimated

total cost of 8 million US dollars. One of the major concerns that remain with these companies remained as the lack of the central government within Afghanistan. With a total massive costs that were about to be incurred in the project, the companies were reluctant to lead through implementation following the presence of several military groups that were prominent in respective provinces. In other words, political anarchy that was prevalent in Afghanistan posed as a serious and major challenge to the implementation of the program. The most potential and reasonable way to solve the anarchy problem was to form a new faction of Mujahedeen that would be armed to replace the pre-existing mujahedeen factions that brought about the state of anarchy. This would pave way for the oil and gas project. Pakistan had been in harmony with the plan so that to a large extent Afghan future was given to Pakistan. And therefore, the resulting armed group was to create the situation where the oil and gas companies could reach their interests (Paykar, 2010, p.180). Bashir Ahmad Ansari explains that Taliban may be regarded as a creation of Britain that was financially supported by Saudi Arabia with the support of US and the Pakistan's intelligence (Ansari, 2004, p.56).

Mawlana Fazulurahman aided Pakistani intelligence service ISI in placing their networks in and around Kandahar (Paykar, 2010, p.163). The United Nations representative Mahmood Mestiri had not taken into account the approach of Taliban into doors of Kabul, and thus, ignored them. With the arrival of the Taliban on the gates of Kabul, and Mestiri founded Taliban as an effective case of solving the problems in Afghanistan. In January 1995, US Secretary of Defense William Perry visited Pakistan and declared it as the closest ally of the United States. And abolished the nickname “Terrorism” given to Pakistan because it supported radical groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and canceled the Pressler Agreement (Ansari, 2004, p.73).

One of the concrete reason for the support of the Saudi government in the creation of the Sunni Emirates can be explained as the move towards weakening Iran’s role within the region. At the same time, Pakistan had concerns over the presence of Iran within Afghanistan. According to Pakistan the 20 percent Shiite population within the nation could be influenced with Iran’s influence within Afghanistan (Lefuvre, 2010, p.2).

A significant role was played by ISI with the support of CIA in training Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar between 1980 and 1990. Even after 9/11 events there were a continual contact between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban and members of the Al-

Qaeda organization. These contacts were meant to use the groups as a soft power instrument of her foreign policy against Afghanistan and international community.

During the Jihad era, in 1988, Osama Bin Laden was provided a safe haven in Khost province near to Waziristan by Jalaluddin Haqqani, member of the Hizbi Islami of Yunus Khalis. Following the exit of Soviet from Afghanistan, Osama left Afghanistan and went to Saudi Arabia and later to Sudan. Osama returned to Afghanistan where he had other jihadist from different parts around the world with the aim of establishing the Islamic Caliphate (Lefuvre, 2010, p.2).

The international community was brought into direct confrontation with Taliban following the presence of Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. This was due to the accusations that was facing him following the attacks of United States embassy in Africa in 1998 and by plane attacks in New York on 11th September of 2001. Taliban support of Osama Bin Laden led the US to attack Afghanistan. The attack by US against Taliban and Al-Qaeda led to the fall of Taliban regime and the subsequent flee of both Al-Qaeda and Taliban to Pakistan.

In protecting Afghanistan against the internal disturbances and external intervention, the international forces such as the US, the UN and ISAF have had a great role in ensuring the political stability and security since the fall of Taliban. So far these international forces have managed to unify and build a new state in Afghanistan. Regardless of the challenges that have been prevalent in Afghanistan such as flow of weapon-smugglers, losses in human capital and trade, the uncontrollable entrance and exit of the flow of people across the open borders of the nation; there has been a significant milestone that Afghanistan has made in regional stability and as a bridge for South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf countries.

3.1.3 India

India shares a longstanding historical, cultural heritage with Afghanistan. There is great number of Afghans who were educated in India's institutions. For example, President Hamid Karzai, received a part of his education in India. Overall, India has a positive image within Afghanistan, this is in accordance with the various opinions and polls that have been conducted.

In this section the manner in which India engages with Afghanistan, will be examined. This examination runs from the economical, socially and political points of view.

India's own security has a lot to do with the stability of Afghanistan, regardless of the fact that since 9/11 India has not been given enough importance within the Western-led discussion regarding Afghanistan. It should be understood that India has a long history of cultural and political connection with Afghanistan.

Both India and Pakistan have played a role in shaping the political and social developments within Afghanistan in the aim of furthering their interests in the grounds of economic interests, defense and in ensuring that none of the two rivals gains advantage over the other. This section is organized in such a way to compare both India and Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan and the ways in which the two nations have operated to reach their interests. Furthermore, Kabul's navigation within the rivalry of the two rival neighbors so as to reach its own interests is also taken into consideration.

Moreover, it will be pointed out specifically the implications that the Indian-Afghan relations cast on the foreign policy and the efforts of ensuring the stability of the region, all these implications became an effective factor on Afghan-Pakistan relations.

India has an objective of preventing all acts of Anti-India terrorism among others. And this has been done further by undermining Pakistan and Taliban influence in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Delhi intends at increasing access to Central Asia energy and economical potentials. This is by the increasing influence within the Central Asia Republics (CARs). Furthermore, projection of power and demonstration of global interest are one of the key objectives guiding India's operation in Afghanistan and in the region overall.

As a part of India's strategies within Afghanistan, the nation seeks to establish a strong influence within the political arena of Afghanistan. This is also followed by the provision of development aid, and thus, seeking economic influence. India has also regionalized the means to solution as related to Afghan security and stability problems. India also been providing military assistance to Afghanistan. All these strategies are eventually supposed to allow projection of power by India within the region.

As Price (2013) argued, it was India that expressed the allegation of Taliban having links with ISI long before this became substantial within the major authorities in the West. India has been concerned with the link between Taliban and Pakistan following the hijacking of the plane in 1999 whereby the hijackers had diverted the plane to

Kandahar. Most Indians believe that Taliban facilitated this hijacking in such a way that it was very hard for India to rescue the Indian Airlines Flight 814. This hijacking was followed by the inevitable exchange between the three Islamist militants and the hostages.

The hostility that India has showed towards Taliban has casted aspersion on the idea that Taliban may be regarded as 'moderate'. This makes it difficult to separate the status quo of Taliban to that of groups like Al-Qaeda. Therefore, with the western approaches of reconciling with Taliban, India has been skeptical of the success of such approaches. However, there are some Indian political analysts that regard the decentralization of Afghanistan's system of government as the way towards the peaceful and successful reconciliation.

Regardless of India's dubious view on Pakistan and Taliban's role in leading towards peace and stability in Afghanistan, in recent years, India's foreign policy has been focusing on the approaches that genuinely will result to peace and stability in Afghanistan. This is exhibited by the lessening of India's anti-Pakistan elements within her foreign policy. The motive behind this shift in the foreign policy of India may as well be explained by the desire for India to avoid any possibility of the rise of an Islamist government in Afghanistan. For India a stable central government within Afghanistan is better than a weak and unstable government that operates within the mere mandates or interests of India.

There have been some notable changes within recent years in the foreign policy of India towards the neighboring countries. The approach that India has in the mid 1990's was in the nature of 'non-reciprocity'. This meant that India being the largest and powerful economy of the region has a role of supporting the neighboring nations without expecting reciprocal benefits. As the government of Bharatiya Janata Party prioritized India global interests over those of the regional level, the policy of non-reciprocity policy began to diminish starting from the late 1990's. But following the ascendancy unto power of the Congress Party in 2004, India has had a more progressively inclination towards its regional interests compared those of the global level. This renewed commitment in the regional affairs can be substantiated by the Afghan policy that India has held in the recent years. The framework of the India's role in Afghanistan consist of social and economic approaches that are crucial to the stability of the regional stability (Price, 2013).

Since an Indian consortium won the Hajigak mining rights, Afghanistan has been regarded as a means of furthering a more positive relation between the rivalry India and Pakistan. Potential positive relations between the long-standing rival nations may come about by creating the confidence between the two nations that springs from the mutual financial gains emanating from the regional economic activities. This follows the extension of the Afghan –Pakistan transit trade through Afghanistan into Central Asia, thus, creating a chance for the beginning of the trade between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.

There has been a significant increase in the political joint activities between India and Afghanistan, with a large number of high-level bilateral visits between the two nations in this decade. In 2011 the prime minister, minister of external affairs, foreign minister, national security advisor, minister for steel and minster of law and justice, amongst others, all visited Afghanistan. There was an increase in the total value of trade between the two countries from $80 million in 2001 to $280 million in 2010. During this period Afghanistan became a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (in 2007) in accordance with a proposal by the Indian government. India represents Afghanistan's fifth largest source of imports, and India accounts for 20 percent of total Afghan exports.

Following the Kabul 'Heart of Asia' conference in 2012 India offered two confidence-building measures that were intended to strengthen and support Afghanistan in its integration into the regional economy. India has it that Delhi has an inevitable leading in facilitating trade and commercial opportunities for Afghanistan and the region. Following the improvements in trade links with Pakistan, some economics and political analysts see the possibility of Afghanistan becoming the hub for trade, transportation and energy in the region (The Economic Times, 2012).

India's hosting of the Investment Summit on Afghanistan in Delhi in June 2012, made it possible for the nations within the region to highlight the opportunities for investing in Afghanistan. The sectors that were highlighted by India as potentially productive were such as 'mining, infrastructure, telecommunications, agro-based and small-scale industries, health, pharmaceuticals, education and information technology' (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012).

India recognizes the social and economic development in Afghanistan as a vital path towards the regional security and stability. Thus, President Karzai signed the Strategic

Partnership Agreement during his visit to India in 2011 that established a formal and effective framework to reach the stated goals. Within this framework there is cooperation in the following areas: 'political & security cooperation; trade & economic cooperation; capacity development and education; and social, cultural, civil society and people-to-people relations' (Sabha, 2013). Within this framework India has pledged just under $2 billion to Afghanistan, and spent around $1 billion, making it the fifth largest bilateral donor after the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany and the largest non-traditional donor. To a large extent Indian assistance fits into three broad categories: humanitarian assistance, infrastructure projects and capacity building.

There are wide range of small scale-development projects that India has undertaken. Such development projects may well be expanded. This follows the fact that these projects have been concentrated in Pashtun border areas, raising concerns for Pakistan, which has accused Indian consulates of being fronts for espionage. India also plans to increase its capacity building for the Afghan government, broadening its engagement to issues such as education and health.

In contrast to the Indian objectives and strategies, Pakistan objectives in Afghanistan include blocking any other state's influence in Afghanistan; most particular India's influence in the region. This further boils down to prevention of encirclement and maintenance of the strategic depth. Pakistan also has aimed at establishing a safe haven for trained fundamentalist within Pakistan. Among these objectives, Pakistan is also committed to undermine the Afghan claim on Durand Line, this includes halting any influence that will lead Afghanistan to have the upper hand on the matter of Durand Line and Pashtunistan.

Objectives of Pakistan within Afghanistan may be explained as oriented in the relationship between Pakistan and India, so that Pakistan works to ensure that the influence of India within Afghanistan is undermined. This is also in tandem with the promotion of Pakistan influence within Afghanistan by Pakistan. By shaping the influence of Pakistan on Kabul, thus, Pakistan aims at maintaining her 'strategic depth' against India. This has been done through the training and backing the fundamentalist military groups such as Taliban. Pakistan has other important objectives such as developing strong trade links within the CARs.

The strategies being employed by Pakistan in reaching her objectives include, that of training the Taliban and other fundamentalists that are to counter India's influence within Afghanistan. The nation is also operating in such a way that it will become essential to Afghan reconciliation talks. Pakistan has also oriented herself in such a way that to avoid all the efforts of Afghanistan's regional integration. Kabul is also committed to ensuring that there is a strong control in the Central Asian's trade and energy resources. Furthermore, as a strengthening factor to the operations of Pakistan within the region, the nation tends to pressure Washington to protect Pakistan's interests. Thus, Pakistan has insisted that US minimizing Indian's role in Afghanistan.

Blocking India's influence within the Afghan soil follows the outlook that Pakistan has towards India in that it poses a threat to the territorial integrity. For example, Pakistan blames India as the reason behind the detachment of Bangladesh out of East Pakistan in 1971. Furthermore, one may state this outlook of Pakistan towards India as that of a 'zero-sum view' in that any political advantage that India gains translates to the disadvantage of Pakistan. Frederic Grare (2010, p.21), former French diplomat phrases the situation as that of which Pakistan holds the view that "whatever India does in Afghanistan is a ploy against Pakistan, be it economic investment, infrastructure, or any related matter. As a result, Pakistan has ensured that Indian interests would be blocked whenever and wherever possible".

Following the zero-sum view explained in the earlier paragraph; following the fact that Islamabad views all the interests of India as being based upon the need to gain the influence in Afghanistan so that to encircle and trap Pakistan between the hostile fronts. Islamabad overriding objective in Afghanistan is therefore to avoid any pro-Delhi administration in Kabul (Arnoldy, 2011).

Even though Islamabad my view presence of the pro-Pakistan regime within Afghanistan may foster Pakistan's national interests, the army maintains that a weak and subservient government is a key factor to ensure presence of Pakistan's strategic depth (Strategic depth is a doctrinal concept of the Pakistani military and is based on the idea that, if Pakistan's forces were overpowered by an Indian invasion, they could fall back to Afghan territory and continue to fight from there) (Singh, 2008, p.12). The view is however disputed by a number of analyst due to the presence of nuclear era where Indian invasion is made unlikely following the dire consequences of the nuclear retaliation should there be a military offense by India (Sawhney, 2011, p.10).

As a means of perusing her primary objectives within Afghanistan, the nations has backed fundamentalist military groups as proxies to face India's interest in Afghanistan. This has been done through the training and support that Pakistan has been offering these fundamentalist groups. For example, the ISI is widely believed to have provided extensive assistance to the Taliban and Haqqani network in the form of training, funding, munitions, supplies, and safe haven (notably in Karachi and the tribal areas of Baluchistan). ISI is also believed to have retained a significant influence over the two movements following the initial support that has been provided in the establishment and operations of these movements (Hanauer and Chalk, 2012, p.46).

According to the assessment of the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Pakistan's support is a critical element in Pakistan's strategic plan to counter India's military, political and economic influence in Afghanistan (Blair, 2010, p.9). Both groups (which historically have been engaged in fighting against US led coalition forces) are understood to have conducted attacks aimed at India, which correlates with Pakistan interests and support (Mazzetti and Schmitt, 2008). Major examples that can be used to explain these assessments include: the July 7, 2008, suicide bombing of Delhi's embassy in Kabul, which killed 58 and wounded 141; the attack on the embassy on October 8, 2009, which left 17 people dead and 63 wounded; and the February 26, 2010, leveling of the Hamid Guesthouse, a hotel in the heart of the capital that was popular with Indian doctors and reconstruction workers, which resulted in 18 fatalities and an additional 36 casualties (Hanauer and Chalk, 2012 , p.46).

There is a large of political analysts that express the deliberate redirection of the activities of the Kashmiri extremist to focus on the Afghan soil. Of particular note on this case is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which has had long standing affiliations with ISI's as the most strategic assets in the struggle against India. Stephen Tankel, an expert of LeT, the group is known to be playing a great role in recruitment of the militants from Peshawar's mosques and madrassa. Most of the promising potential fighters have been promised with training and subsistence payments in fighting against Afghanistan. He further asserts that the group has redeployed its own cadres to the country and that it has emerged since 2006 as one of several prominent entities battling for control of the contested Korengal Valley in Kunar Province (Hanauer and Chalk, 2012, p.47).

Consequently, Indian educational, economic and political joint projects and aids are the basic infrastructures of developing the education, hydroelectric and constructive projects in Afghanistan: electricity is being transferred from Central Asia to Afghanistan and the Chahbahar port in Iran, which is used as a transit way between India–Afghanistan–Central Asia. Thus, India's objective and strategy in Afghanistan established a partnership in the Afghan-Indian relations and also strengthened Afghanistan's central government. In contrast to the Indian-Afghan foreign policy implications and Afghanistan's imbalanced foreign policy toward both rival countries, Pakistan works to ensure that the influence of India within Afghanistan is undermined and Pakistan is preventing the Afghanistan's regional integration. This is also in tandem with the promotion of Pakistan influence within Afghanistan by Pakistan. This has been done through the training and backing the İslamic fundamentalist military groups such as Taliban.

3.1.4 Transit Way

Afghanistan was historically known as a regional junction in spite of being a land locked country. This follows the fact that Afghanistan is located on the historic track of the Silk Road that served as the junction between the central Asia and south Asia. Although the nation is located within the Silk Road, there only remains the historical honor of the name, the economic benefit cannot be taken advantage of following the prevalent wars that have faced Afghanistan.

The prevalent wars within the region has led to destruction of the major infrastructures such as roads and bridges. The wars have also led to the lack of road-construction, therefore forming one of the notorious challenges facing the transportation within Afghanistan. Furthermore, lack of technical capacity and skilled staff for maintenance of the roads have worsen the situation within the transportation system.

Following the 9/11 events, Afghanistan government came up with the strategies to regain the nation's role in the region, taking steps to build major transportation infrastructures such as roads and rail ways. Furthermore, there has been significant changes in the regulations and laws within airfields. This follows the government's recognition of the Transportation system as a major factor accounting for the development of the nation. With a well-developed transportation system, it will be easier to form a better framework through joint management of borders and other

bilateral and multilateral trade and transit agreements to transport good even faster, and thus, furthering regional coexistence. As a progress that has been showed by the Afghan government, the nation currently has thousands of km of asphalted roads, which are indeed the largest in the nation's history. Much emphasis has been placed in constructing these roads as one of the strategies that are to link Central Asian economies to those of the South Asia.

Afghanistan being a landlocked country, the nation has always reached the boundary waters through her neighbors Pakistan and Iran. There have been great challenges on Afghanistan's maritime transport through her neighbors especially from Pakistan. This follows the preexisting political tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the Pakistan's establishment as a nation. Pakistan has always taken advantage of Afghanistan (economically and politically) in allowing her to access the free waters.

Historically there has been political tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan which have been due to several underlying factors such as the existence of the Taliban militant groups, border disputes, India's influence on Afghanistan, common water issues and finally transit issues which will be investigated in this section. All these factors have had impact in the general relationship of the two nations resulting to subsequent economical negative effects. Despite the tension between the two trade partners, there have been efforts to create a political and economic atmosphere for the common interests of the two countries. In fact, Afghanistan has Pakistan as the largest trading partner while Pakistan also has Afghanistan as the second-largest trading partner.

Following this significant trade partnership that is evidenced by the trade volume, in 2010 the two nations signed an agreement that was to further trade relations and furthering Afghanistan's transit trade through Pakistan's soil. The two nations have been reluctant in following and implementing the terms within the agreement. Furthermore, as a means to overcome these trade restrictions between the two nations, there has been a need for the improvement within the insurance mechanisms, streamlined payments settlement, the use of bonded carriers, visa issuance, trade financing, tax collection and documentation.

The prevalent unstable political situation followed by the non-standardized transit system has led to serious negative consequences on Afghanistan's trade and economy as a whole. Pakistan has often issued seemingly difficult transit requirements to

Afghanistan as a result of the poorly structured transit administration within Afghanistan.

Following frequent political strains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the trade between the two nations has been negatively affected. In most cases, Pakistan has banned the transit of Afghan merchants. For example, Pakistan has at some points not allowed some goods from other nations to pass through her towards Afghanistan and vice-versa.

Therefore, both sides signed the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) in 2011 for solving the transit and trade problems, replacing the trade agreement that was signed in 1965, the Afghan-Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) (Ministry of Finance, 2011). Under the terms of the APTTA, through the ports in Karachi, Qassim and Guadar, the merchant trucks from Afghanistan can export Afghanistan's products to Indian and Chinese markets and other parts of the world (Shafai, 2013).

As both sides follow through the modernization of their custom and duty procedures, exports are expected to increase. Less time lags between the borders are expected as the terms of agreement will be implemented. Pakistan is also to benefit from her contact with the Central Asian and Iranian markets through Afghanistan (Shafai, 2013).

Former Afghanistan's minister of transportation stated that "despite the political problems that exist between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan ports of Karachi and Gwadar are still the best water ports for Afghanistan. Iran's Bandar-i-Abbas is not economical, and the Chabahar port of Iran still does not have the necessary facilities" (Shafai, 2013).



Figure 3.2: Map of Strategic Chabahar Port

Source: Bharat Shakti (2017). Map of Strategic Chabahar Port. Retrieved on 25. 09. 2017, address: http://bharatshakti.in/chabahar-port-strategic-necessity-for-india/

There has been an increase in the trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan from $0.83 billion in FY06 to $2.1 billion in FY13. Total imports to Afghanistan from Pakistan cover 24.3 percent of Afghanistan's total imports (Husain and Elahi, 2015, p.3). Despite data showing the increase in the total trade between the two nations, since 2011 there has been decrease in the level of imports following a combination of several factors such as; fundamentalist groups, customs delays, suspensions of NATO supply shipments among other factors. The decrease in the transit trade has however increased between Iran and Afghanistan, this follows the finalization of the transit trade agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan. With regard to this agreement, land route will run from Chabahar port in Iran which is in the Gulf of Oman, therefore establishing a connection between Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. This agreement is expected to see a rise in the movement of goods from South Asia into Afghanistan and Central Asia.

As explaned by Husain and Elahi, (2015, p.3) on the matter of exports, Afghanistan has her total exports covering only 5 percent of the total imports, where by the total exports are 363.70 million dollars in FY13. Pakistan tends to account for 32.2 percent of the Afghan total exports, while India follows as the second position as a major destination of Afghan exports accounting 27 percent of the total exports. It should be noted however that India accounts 27 percent of the total Afghanistan exports even without considering the direct transit access.

There are a number of tension points have being hindering the implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) agreement, regardless of continuous efforts that have been showed by the stakeholders of both sides. It follows that there happens to be some spillover effects that Pakistan has been facing from the APTTA agreement. The concerns rise within Pakistan, in that most of the goods that are being imported to Afghanistan from India will affect the local market. This follows the fact that for years smuggling has been prominent within the trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan, this can be explained by the 2011 study by the Federal Tax ombudsman of Pakistan, where by there was a significant level of smuggling activities involving high-tariff goods (such as cigarettes, electronics and vehicles) that were smuggled from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Before APTTA, trucks from Afghanistan could carry goods and end up at Peshawar. But with the agreement, trucks are allowed to go to and from Pakistan's southern sea port and Wagah border that faces India. This was of course faced by the preventive measures to combat smuggling by imposing a requirement of deposits on the trader's goods to ensure that goods are sent to the stated destination (Husain and Elahi, 2015, p.4). It is estimated that APTTA accounts for the three quarter of all the goods that have been smuggled into Pakistan after being diverted from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan traders have had also complaints over the APTTA following the common tendency of the goods from Afghanistan to be sold back with higher prices from Pakistan. Furthermore, the low-cost imports from Pakistan have raised serious concern on Afghan side, following the negative effects that have faced the Afghan production particularly Agriculture.

As a way of combatting the missuses of the transit trade agreement, the trade controls have become one of the points that have been met with a great deal of complaints from traders from both sides of the border. Most traders find the requirements of obtaining certified customs clearance documents as cumbersome and time consuming. Furthermore, heavy security deposit and insurance costs tend to increase the costs of operation among the traders (Husain and Elahi, 2015, p.5). There is a need for both Afghanistan and Pakistan along with other members of the region to focus on establishing harmonious financial ecosystem. The need for the EXIMBANK for trade settlement cannot be overemphasized.

Even with the redesigning of the APTTA, chances are there are a number of challenges that are expected in that, Pakistan is customary know to use economic and political pressure as a means of furthering her economic and political goals. This is a shared impression even among her major partners such as the US. For example, there is a major concern even with the United States, that Pakistan's support of the terrorist groups to further her political and economic agendas within Afghanistan could make the agreement ineffective. The use of the intelligence services to support the Haqqani network and provision of the safe haven for the fundamentalist groups is one of the stigma that remains with Pakistan's international identity.

Pakistan has been closing her borders in the pretense that it is inevitable as a measure against the terrorist attacks within her soil. Analyst see this as a pretense in that militants do not have to use official crossings to cross the borders, militants have used numerous sanctuaries on either sides of the border with about 2400 kilometer frontier. Wahid Muzdah, a Kabul-based analyst on the Taliban explains the closing of the border as a means by which Pakistan imposes economic pressure on Afghanistan (Saifullah, 2017). Furthermore, as a means of discouraging the economic and political contacts between Kabul and India, Pakistan has made the transit even harder so as to further her own market. Therefore, continuation of these policy by Pakistan against Afghanistan is one of the effective factor on both countries relations.

It is estimated that the annual trade between the two nations is about four billion US dollars. A figure such as this depicts the significance of the trading activities between the two nations, and thus, failure to solve the factors that are stifling trade between the two neighbors has negative economic implications on both sides. The challenge that arises in resolving the issues between the two nations lies in what can be understood as the political motivated transit related problems. Azarakhsh Hafezi an economic analyst explains that provided that the political relations between the two nations will be positive then there will be fewer issues on the subject of trade and transit. Therefore, it can be said that the existence of negative relations between the two nations has been an aggravating the trade and transit problems. For example, the freeze in the implementation and progress on APTTA has its roots in political events such as that of the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani who was leading the Afghanistan's top peace envoy. Furthermore, the killing of the Pakistan soldiers at the borders by the NATO forces is attributed to the factors that led to the stifling of the trade progress

between the two nations (Azadiradio, 2012). It should also not be ignored that there is a presence of conflicts of interest existing within the trade and transit issue. The presence of Pakistani transit companies that are worried about the beginning of the operation of the Afghan transit companies upon the implementation of the trade agreement makes the progress of the APTTA challenging.

Nevertheless, there has been efforts to create incentives for both sides to favor the implementation of the APTTA. November 2014, presidential visit to Pakistan was one among the efforts to restore Afghan position as a regional junction. Among the major agendas of the visit was the goal of increasing Afghanistan-Pakistan bilateral trade to $5 billion by 2017. This was followed by Pakistan's opting to take measures that would to clear almost 95 percent of Afghan goods imported under transit trade within a day, lowering the level of tariffs and other charges such as port and storage (BBC, 2014).

Afghanistan as a corridor connecting South Asia to Central Asia, economic and political cooperation between herself and Pakistan is inevitable for mutual benefits. Both countries are to opt for comprehensive agreements that are informed of the prevalent challenges that nullified the effectiveness of the precedent ones. The mutual benefits resulting from Afghanistan's establishment as a regional junction will be shared by all nations in the region. There lies a significant boost of exports especially in the context of the comparative advantage in resources that exists among the countries that are to benefit from this trade as far as economics is concerned. This will further the increase in the level of employment within the domestic and regional labor markets, foreign exchange, thus, leading to higher satisfaction as more goods may also be imported at cheaper rates.

3.1.5 Water

Water stands as one of the most essential resources on earth. Given the increasing growth in population, there has been a corresponding increase in the demand for the fresh water supply. But, unfortunately, the increase in the demand for the fresh water supply has not been met with the sufficient water supply within many nations. Thus, within the international environment many nations have used pressure and penetration towards each other as a means to meet the demand of the fresh water among their populations. This has brought about a new impending issue of water diplomacy across nations, where by the objective is to ensure that water resources are well managed for

diplomatic use so as to achieve economic and political objectives that further the wellbeing of the international community.

Twentieth century saw the demand for water being six times more the past century. With no solution having been found in the twentieth century the result has been more intensified conflict over the subject of fresh waters. Some experts estimate that majority of the wars that will be engaged in the 21st century will be over the "water". Currently, water scarcity is preventing within 31 countries. By 2025, there is a likelihood of seventeen other countries to join the group due to population growth that positively correlates with the increased consumption (Faheem, 2016, p.9).

Middle East and the Central Asia are known to be the world's arid zones. However, the issue of drought is not prevalent in all the countries found within the region (for example Afghanistan and Turkey). Turkey may be a good illustration of the significance of this case when one observes how the nation has used the water resources as a means to exert political force against her political neighbors, and thus, influencing them. Afghanistan, however, has a number of rivers such as Amu River, the Kabul River, Harirod River, and Hilmand River; where by all these have not been used as a source of political influence and leverage against her neighbors. A notable example is the Kabul River that forms an essential amount of the water consumption in the neighboring Pakistan.

Relationships between two countries may be affected by the issue of the water resources as long as it crosscuts the national security and geopolitical issues. And this may lead to positive results such as cooperation between countries or lead to the negative results such as those that have been witnessed within the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent.

It is understood among the water analyst that water resources may be a subject of war or a tool of war. Given that there will be a good management of the water resources and the emanating issues that result between respective nations, water can be used as a link for building and strengthening relationships between the respective nations. The Danube River and the Black Sea legal system is a good example of the move towards establishing a legal and manageable environment to regulate the relationship and activities between the nations in relation to the water resources.

This leads one to a point that, water issues are now one of the most significant indicators and parameters relating to the international security. Furthermore, in observing the water issues one may get a good understanding of its association with population growth, globalization and interdependence. This further becomes a point of concern when those nations that are faced with dry climate are put under analysis.

Given that the geographical position of Afghanistan is at a dry zone, so that the surrounding nations on its borders are also listed by the United Nations as ones facing severe dehydration problems; it becomes necessary for Afghanistan to set all issues related to the water resources as forefront in all issues pertaining to the foreign policy and national security. This follows the fact that water resources are expected to be one of the major sources of conflict within the region due to the presence of rivers that cross cuts national boundaries. Provided that there will be no comprehensive and well established agreements between the nations benefiting from these water sources, then water will be a potential source of disagreement which would compromise the regions peace and security.

Annually, water collected in Afghanistan is estimated to be 75 billion cubic meters, where by 57 billion cubic meters of it is surface waters and the remaining 18 billion cubic meter is underground water. Considering the population of Afghanistan, the annual per capita share of water is estimated as 2,775 cubic meters, and thus, the call for serious and more defined consideration on establishing diplomatic tools between Afghanistan and her neighbors follow the fact that Afghanistan has 70 percent of water derived from the sources that are shared with the neighboring countries (Faheem, 2016, p.14).

There are three main watersheds in Afghanistan. These are due to the natural geography and the mountainous nature of Afghanistan's location. These aquatic areas include that of Pamir and northern hemisphere, the southern hemisphere and Safid Koh and the Hermand and Harirud watersheds. However, Afghanistan has an advantage over her neighbors in that, most of the rivers in the region originate within Afghanistan. Such rivers that has their origin in Afghanistan include; Amu, Morghab, Harirud, Helmand and Kabul. Managing of these water resources have been hampered by the consistent years of political and civil conflicts within the nation. So that less has been done to utilize them for the economic and social benefits of the Afghanistan. For example, of areas that have received the waters from Afghanistan without any

overseeing agreement include Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa state. These water resources are indeed potential leverage points of Afghanistan's influence on neighboring nations due to the fact that most of the waters that originates from Afghan soil form a very important basis of the neighboring countries water consumption. Provided that recent decades have had climate and environmental issues resulting to subsequent implications on the military and political relations between nations it follows that it is imperative for one to consider water resource affiliations as a means to provide a regulated political environment to further regional cooperation and security.

Afghanistan's economy has 80 percent of population dependent on agriculture, horticulture and livestock. Thus, water is the most significant and direct factor that is to lead to the development of these sub-sectors. This point may further be elucidated by following on the effect of the drought that has faced the nations in the past few years where enormous drawbacks within the economic sphere of the Afghanistan's population.

Being a landlocked and mountainous country, Afghanistan is bordered by six countries out of which Afghanistan share water with five of them. For example, Amu River's water is shared with Tajikistan which stretches unto Uzbekistan. As for Harirud, the water is shared with Turkmenistan, whereas for Morghab the waters are shared by Turkmenistan and Iran. As for the region of the Helmand River, the waters are shared with Iran, and for Kabul River's waters are shared with Pakistan.

There has been a lack of sufficient contracts between Afghanistan and her neighboring nations, so that there have been subsequent issues that have arisen in the relationship between the Afghanistan and the respective nations. This problem can also be hinted by the fact that unto date Afghanistan has managed to establish only one contract with her neighboring countries (Iran). Some political analysts have claimed that Pakistan at one point has initiated instability within Afghanistan so as to have an upper hand in controlling the Afghanistan water sources. Formation of dykes within the rivers originating in Afghanistan has likely been followed by tense diplomatic relations with neighbors or even demolition of such dykes. Thus, only by the use of comprehensive contracts and agreements between Afghanistan and her neighbors, thus, water resources will be utilized with corresponding increase in positive relationship and cooperation with these countries.

The following are the plausible examples on the point that the lack of sufficient and comprehensive agreements poses a significant question and concern on the stability of the region. It is important for one understand there are three major sources of rivers in Afghanistan and the corresponding sources include the southern slopes of the Hindukush, Baba and Safid Koh mountains which include Panjshir, Kabul, Logar, Alishang, Kunar and Kama, all these rivers originating from the Afghanistan pass through 460 kilometers of Afghan soil and converge into the Pakistan's Sindh River. There are indeed a number of projects that have been established on Afghanistan, this include Naghlu, Mah-i-par, Sorobi and Darunta which were built over Kabul's River, however the exploitation of such projects has been limited by the presence of excess water flows into the Sindh River in Pakistan.

Pakistan concern and interventionism within the water exploitation and management by Afghanistan has made the process harder. This follow the fact that Pakistan has an objective of preventing the maximum control and determination of Afghanistan's water resource by the government within the country. This include all the initiative by the governments to create water reserves. Furthermore, it is considered as a threat for Pakistan dominance in the diplomatic leverage given that Afghanistan will gain an upper hand in the water diplomacy in order to use it as a tool of political bargaining and as a source of income.

Pakistan has most of its water sources originating from the eastern and western neighbors. The agriculture sector is considered as one of the fundamental economic institutions. Given that this nation has had water supply as a long lasting challenge on both political and economic arena, it follows that if Pakistan will not settle the matter, the nation will be one among the list of countries facing famine in 2020. Pakistan water supply issue is further aggravated by the fast growing population. And this might as well have an impact on the nation's economic growth.

Pakistan has a per capita share of water of about 1,000 cubic meters. This places Pakistan as one among the nations facing severe water shortage. According to UN in one and half decades the world's water reserve are expected to decline by 40%, which will render significant negative impact on the industrial sectors and agricultural production activities within Pakistan (Faheem, 2016, p.28).

Pakistan's official sources were quoted by The Daily Times, on March 28, 2004, referring the 15% reduction in the waters of the Kabul, Kunar and Indus rivers

given that Afghanistan implemented her potential legitimate exploitation of the river (Faheem, 2016, p.29). According to the United Nations Water Program, Pakistan is already ranked as the seventh on the list of countries that are facing severe water insufficiency. Apart from the environmental the fast growing population, any more factors to worsen the situation has to be met with serious contingency plans and strategies by Pakistan. Kabul River covers almost 20% of annual water demand within Pakistan. Between the years 2009 and 2016, there was a decrease in the water per capita from 1500 to 1017 cubic meters. This led to the classification of Pakistan as one among the countries with severe water scarcity from the former watertight country. (Faheem, 2016, p.28). Furthermore, it is estimated that until 2025, Pakistan is likely to be a desert. According to IMF, Pakistan is the third largest country facing severe water shortage. This places the question of water scarcity as one of the major concerns of Pakistan in relation to her security threat.

Indeed, water shortage is a major area of concern among the challenges that the nation faces. Regardless of the existence of extreme rivalry with India concerning the Indus River's waters; Pakistan has made significant strands in the process of establishing an agreement with her rival 'stable' western neighbor (India). However, with the unstable Afghanistan, Pakistan has not resolved any issue on the subject of water. On March 28, 2004, The Daily Times wrote quoting the Pakistan Foreign Ministry on water issue with Afghanistan, "Since the joint deployment of waters in 1921 between Afghanistan and the colonial government of India does not cover the common waters of Afghanistan and Pakistan, so it cannot be the basis of mutual reciprocity" (Pedrood, 2007, p.12).

The report further explains that Pakistan was supposed to intensify her involvement in Afghan-Pakistan water utilization project. One of the major strategy to intensify these water relations were that of making sure the commission under the directives of the Ministry of Water and Energy of Pakistan was going to retrieve important information on Afghanistan's expected consumption and projects from the common waters. The amount of waters entering Pakistan's territory from the Kabul River, Kiether River, Tuchi River and Gomel River were to be assessed by the Border and Baluchistan Provincial Governments (Pedrood, 2007, p.12).

As an indicator of the significant attention that the transboundary waters are receiving, Nawaz Sharif led the establishment of the committee to study the significance of the

dependence of Pakistan dependence of the water originating from Afghan soil, so that to set a comprehensive environment where there could be ample negotiations. Pakistan is has furthered bilateral projects such as the Kabul-Indus basin so as to prepare an environment where there will be effective talks with positive outcomes.

As a means to push the Afghan government to accept the validity of the Durand Line, Pakistan has used inducement of political instability and disruption of Afghan national security. Similar means have been used to attain more advantage over the water resources such as that of the shared rivers such as, Kabul and those of the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. The extension of the pipelines of gas and oil from Turkmenistan to Pakistan has also played a role in Pakistan's intervention within Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Afghan government has to establish an ecosystem where there will be a comprehensive understanding of her neighbor's policies in relation to her policies. This can be achieved through an increased efficiency and management of the nation's water resources. It is the proper management of the water resources that will guarantee Afghanistan water diplomacy as a political tool to reach her interests in the region.

It is expected that the question of the need for agreements on the waters between the two nations will increase. Afghanistan is expected to have an advantage on the issue of Durand Line and the threat of terrorism and Taliban against Pakistan as she will be using the water diplomacy as a political tool throughout the negotiations. Thus, the water issue has to be considered with all details so that to have a good understanding of the conclusion that will be drawn in all the forthcoming agreements.

It is necessary for Pakistan to focus on the establishment of the joint projects as they tend to further mutual trust between the participating countries. Joint projects such as Kunar Power line, can lead to the consolidation of the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan as opposed to the negative relations that arise due to the unilateral measures such as the construction of the Daso dam (Faheem, 2016, p.36).

Watershed of Kabul has a potential of establishing and enhancing the cooperation between the two nations. This is especially by the emphasis on the hydroelectricity that can be used to further peace processes on the two sides of the Durand Line. Water being a key element of the environment if follows that the 25th article of the Rio declaration of the environment emphasizes the interdependency that lies between

peace, development and environment. Water plays a significant role on the process of the peace building and stability of the region.

The implications of Pakistan's objective of control and determination of Afghanistan's water resource and Afghanistan water diplomacy against Pakistan became an effective factor on both countries relation. In fact, Durand line is a political and technical obstacle in signing a comprehensive water contract between the two nations. Thus, solving the Durand Line issue or technically diversion of water between two countries and having a strategic plan that will guide and moderate both sides' use of the common waters for the benefit of the people within the region and furthering social welfare, peace and stability within the region is the only solution. Furthermore, there is a necessity of signing agreements that are well informed with the current international laws. These agreements should also reflect comprehensible and proved reconciliation models. In so doing the region will avoid making water issues in relation to political aspects as a source of serious conflicts within the region.

4. IMPACT OF THE TALIBAN REAPPEARANCE IN AFGHANISTAN FOREIGN POLICY ON PAKISTAN IN HAMID KARZAI PERIOD

4.1 The Reappearance of the Taliban

Taliban reappearance in Afghanistan may well be explained by the influence of Pakistan, western powers and Afghan government's corruption. This is explained by Pakistan's dual role-playing and mistakes of the West in their fight against fundamentalism. In this section, reappearance of Taliban will be reviewed, as it is the main problem that has challenged the Afghan-Pakistan relations in the past 14 years. Through the widespread violence that Taliban group has exhibited, there has been subsequent instability and lack of the government to exercise its authority effectively. However, the whole political scenario has been framed in a complex political and security context. It is accepted among experts that it was during Operation Enduring Freedom, that the Taliban and other foreign fighters were overwhelmed by the US military power. This led to the subsequent move towards foreign cities and among tribal protectors living between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And therefore, following the progressive recovery of the Taliban after a long intermission, they returned but with their apparent target being non-governmental organization workers and government officials and other cross border attacks. Today, they are understood to be terrorist group in that they have gained momentum by not only attacking the civilians but also US convoys and Afghan military personnel.

One might as well consider this scenario as consisting of two main factors; external and internal factors. The first external factor being the presence of Pakistan's use of Islamic fundamentalism as a soft power instrument of its foreign policy in dealing with Afghanistan. The second external factor is the Iraqi war, whereby USA and NATO strategy worked to shift the attention from Afghanistan to Iraq. Coupled with the continual lack of interest from the international community, focus shifted to other parts of the world such as Iraq, Libya, Ukraine and Syria. With two external factors, the Afghanistan's transition and state-nation building process was halted. Furthermore, as

the internal factor the inherent weakness within the Afghan government coupled with corruption played a significant role in bringing about the Taliban reappearance.

On September 9, 2001, an attack was made against the leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Masood. This attack was organized by Al Qaeda. This was subsequently followed by the incidences of September 11, 2001 where attacks were directed on the World Trade Center and US defense ministry Pentagon. This led to the death toll of about 3000. US President George W. Bush described Usama bin Laden as the real person responsible for the September 11 incident (BBC, 2001). In a press statement on September 20, 2001, US President Bush said "every country should make its own decision. Either you are with us or with the terrorists. Any country that asylum or support terrorists after this day will be recognized by the United States as the enemy regime (The Telegraph, 2001).

Following the 9/11 attacks, it was inevitable that the US would overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This was due to the fact that, not only was Afghanistan keeping Usama bin Laden and his comrades but also a haven for global fundamentalism. Prior to the war on Afghanistan, President Bush demanded only that Taliban oust its leader, Mullah Omar, and cut its ties to Al-Qaeda. This position was also supported by Pakistan's President Musharraf was in favor of and hence supported (Kinzer, 2007, p.276). The reason behind the support was lies in the fact that Pakistan had created and protected the Taliban regime, and at that point did not want its destruction. "The rushed negotiations between the U.S and Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 changed Pakistan's behavior but not its interest. Supporting the Taliban was so important to Pakistan that Musharraf even considered to war with the U.S rather than abandon his allies in Afghanistan" (Rubin, 2007). However, failure of Pakistan to convince the Taliban to turn Usama bin Laden over to the United States was the beginning of the end of the Taliban regime (Kinzer, 2007). It should also be understood that the public opinion of the western nations played a great role in leading a vast number of states besides NATO members to approve the US attack on Afghanistan. The refusal of Taliban to cut ties with Al-Qaeda on the 7th of October, led to the onset of the US operation in Afghanistan. This was apparent as the CIA and Special Activities Division entered Afghanistan. The US also provided the air support to the Northern Alliance forces leading to the defeat against the Taliban. The defeat of Taliban was witnessed by the subsequent flee of the group to Pakistan (Riedel, 2011, p.161). This readily led

to the onset of the war, and the subsequent termination of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The rapid war continued for three months and appeared to be highly successful.

The fall of the Taliban regime was followed by the Bonn Agreement Conference, led by the United Nations and held among the Afghan groups (Karaca, 2013, p.149). It will be remembered that the conference was considered as reconstruction conference for Afghanistan. The conference was also a stepping stone towards the nation building process of Afghanistan. Within the text of the agreement of the Bonn Conference; there was an indication for the move towards presidential elections, establishment of the Loya Jirga, the constitutional grand meeting and the provision of a strong and inclusive state. After the subsequent talks following the conference a provisional government was established. From 2004 to 2009 and 2009 to 2014 Hamid Karzai was an elected president. In December 2003, the eighth constitution of the nation was formed by the Grand Constitutional Assembly. According to the framework of the Bonn Agreement conference, the approval of the constitution was a critical point at ensuring the stability and democracy of the nation (Omide Vatan, 2001).

Following the fall of the Taliban regime, the evacuation of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda members from Afghanistan to Pakistan was imminent. This was further followed by the worsening of the Pakistan's economy. In Pakistan there was an intense development of the attacks against the Shia and Christian minorities. Due the preexistent radical ties between the Pakistan army and the fundamentalists, the fight against the very radicals became questionable (Rashid, 2002, p.154). Through these developments, Musharraf was still in favor of the continual of the Afghanistan's war. Musharraf derived much of his confidence in the assurance by the ISI in that the Taliban were to remain in power in Afghanistan. These mistaken analyses came to an end as the Taliban came to their fall.

It should be understood that initially, Hamid Karzai and United Nations opted for peaceful agreement with Mullah Omar and the Taliban. This diplomatic move was however met with resistance from the US due to the existed ties between Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. This had prompted the further rivalry from the Taliban leader (Mullah Omar) leading to the undercover and secret war against the US. This was further followed by the Taliban's move from Kandahar to Pakistan (Shirzad, 2014, p.119).

Mullah Omar had settled in the Quetta with his warriors, and Usama went to the place where he lived the first times in FATA "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" and

connected with Haqqan-i-family, and from there he began to associate with the Quetta, Faisal Abad, Abyat Abad, Lashkare Tayiba, Lashkare Gangawi and other fundamentalist organizations (Lefuvre, 2010, p.3).

Tribalism played a significant role in strengthening the Taliban in Afghanistan. Following the September 11 events, Afghanistan witnessed the division of power between the liberals from the west (Pashtuns) and the Northern Alliance. For example, except for the president, seven members were Pashtuns while the other 23 ministers were from Northern Alliance members. It should be understood that with the division of power, it was not an ideal and persuasive government for the Pashtuns who had close ties with Pakistan. If this was not so, then the dissolution of Taliban would have been witnessed in the early days (Lefuvre, 2010, p.4). As Pakistan's rivalry against India intensified, it was in Islamabad's favor to influence the increase in the number of the Pashtuns within the Afghan power structure as the Northern Alliance had close ties to India. Thus, Taliban was also taken by Pakistan to be an armed arm of Islamabad in dealing with Delhi within the grounds of Afghanistan.

Following the ban of the Islamic fundamentalist movements in Pakistan after the September 11 events, they began to be allowed to work under different names in 2002. Musharraf's speech of January 12, 2002, the government began dropping charges against those who were imprisoned in relation to fundamentalist groups. It was thus a disregard on the procedures that were needed for the disarmament of the armed religious organizations (Rashid, 2002, p.155). Following these events, around 1003 Taliban members returned to the East of Afghanistan. This was followed by Washington's warning against Musharraf not taking a tough stance against the Taliban (Racine, 2004, p.3).

The Taliban is known to be composed of mainly dispersed groups of cells between five to twenty-five men who tend to be mobile across the Afghan-Pakistan border in carrying their terrorist operations (Karzai, 2006, p.2). Until 2005 it is estimated that they operated as one hundred men, and thus, as in 2008 they were operating both as battle units and small units (Jones, 2008, p.51). With the strong opposition coming from the coalition forces, Taliban has in most cases resided in attacking the 'soft' targets that include humanitarian workers, government employees and civilians. In the course of time, Taliban has been recovering in strength as matched by their progressive increase in their military capacity, thus, allowing them claim the restoration of their

regime. As a strategy towards their goals, Taliban has also supported by Jamiat-e-Ulema, which is the Islamic political party closely linked to the Deobandi movement that has close ties to the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. In explaining the resurgence of Taliban, the appeal to the jihadist discourse by the Mullah Omar in February 2003 is crucial. This follows the fact that a fatwa was issued, in which Mullah Omar claimed that there was a unanimous agreement among 1600 prominent scholars in Afghanistan are in support of every Muslim Undertaking Jihad (Crews and Tarzi, 2008, p.297). Mullah Omar further added that the support went further for the jihadist support networks. Thus, with this, there was a foundation for the attacks against the Afghan and coalition forces.

America's support and subsequent removal of interest on Afghan army is understood to have played a significant role in the eventual resurgence of Taliban. It was the primary agenda to strengthen democracy and civilian institutions in Afghanistan as a way to curb fundamentalism in the nation. This support had also come in the form of equipping the Afghan army and police. Until 2006, the Afghan army was able to protect Afghan army had a capacity to protect its government and civilians alongside America's support. However, with the shift of focus to Iraq, Afghan army remained without enough support so that the rivals (Taliban) garnered the support of the Pakistan's ISI support. The support for Taliban fighters came in form of financial and military support. The support for Taliban made it possible for the success of Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Above all these, Musharraf denied the presence of any Taliban members in Quetta and other cities, so as to make the Afghan officials void of understanding of Taliban's strategies (Riedel, 2011, p.141).

America began to have closer ties with Pakistan after Musharraf rule in 2008. This can be evidenced by the three-billion-dollar five-year project to train the Pakistani army to suppress militant groups. Colorado State Forest Service (CSFS) budget, shows that 53 percent of the financial aid that the US has provided for Pakistan was directed towards the Pakistani army. However, it is a general consensus among many American political and military officials that most of the aid that is directed towards Pakistan serves to enable Pakistan develop arms systems against India as opposed to the destruction of the fundamentalist groups (Hujatzade, 2011, pp.159-160).

In a report issued by London School of Economics, it is explained that according to some of the explicit claims of the Taliban commanders in Afghanistan there is a flow

of money, education and refugee to the group. Furthermore, ISI is understood to have been participating in the Afghan Taliban leadership council meeting. This is all aimed at weakening the Kabul's central government and at the same time neutralizing the Indian influence in Afghanistan (BBC, 2010a).

With consideration to the evidences, Hamid Karzai had always stressed that it was the training camps and madrassas in Pakistan that were the sources of the Taliban insurgency (Ghufran, 2008, p.162). Thus, with this nature of Pakistan's dealing with Afghanistan had significant role in determining Karzai's foreign policy towards Pakistan.

It should be understood that the resurgence of Taliban had the inter-government conflict as a source as well as other external factors such as the Iraq war as it served to divert the western world's political and financial resources from Afghanistan to Iraq. As America invaded Iraq, the financial demands for Afghanistan's struggle against the fundamentalist groups failed to meet according to the economic strength of the fundamentalist. With the intensified bad situation in the Iraqi war the Taliban accordingly acquired favorable grounds to resurge their influence in Afghanistan.

Hussaini (2012) explains how the shift of focus of America laid a great foundation for the regrouping of Taliban as it was for Al-Qaeda within Pakistan, thus, allowing for a rapid strengthening of the fundamentalist group. Within the most vital moments of the national reconstruction, the necessary tools and resources were diverted to another miscalculated war by the US. The initial intelligent research and searching of the Taliban and other terrorist leaders came to a halt as all the intelligence support began to be directed towards Iraq.

The vital phase of national reconstruction with all the goals and projects clearly identified with President Bush's promise of "Marshall Plan" only served to witness less assistance than it was for the post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo. An average of $3.4 billion a year have been used by the US federal government in reconstructing Afghanistan. Such inadequate figure is backed by the excuse that troop level in Afghanistan could only be raised as the situation called for (Hussaini, 2012).

The Afghan national building process is conceded to have been taken reluctantly by the US. Robert P. Finn a former American Ambassador to Afghanistan, said "from the get-go that we didn't have enough money and we didn't have enough soldiers". While

Zalmay Khalilzad, who was the next ambassador stated in an interview that national building and state building was not taken with the required caliber. Even further, it is Ronald E. Neumann that explained the totality of the problem in saying that "the idea that we could just hunt terrorists and we did not have to do nation-building, and we could just leave it alone, that was a large mistake" (Hussaini, 2012).

Unto this point, the resurgence of Taliban has not been taken with enough measure, as evidenced by the US and NATO's unwillingness to consider the cultural heritage of the problem at hand. It has been a strategy of priority that an increase in the number of troops in US may curb the issue of Taliban. In a closer and considerate view, one may see that Taliban represents a soft power cultural challenge rather than a military one. This lack of a sophisticated understanding of dealing with Taliban resurgence can be seen in America's shift of the concentration of deployments from the Northern provinces to those that appeared to be more volatile. This further served to make Kunduz on of much targeted provinces of the Northern part. This was with the opening of the logistic route for NATO supplies from Russia and Central Asia over an American financed bridge that was opened in 2007. This is a route that has been a substitute for the dangerous alternative that passes through Pakistan, known to face attacks by the Taliban militants (Gall, 2009).

The period that the US attention on Afghanistan was shifted to Iraq, saw an intensive recollection of the Taliban members as the enthusiasm of returning to power was more promising. This is not to say that Afghan government failed to see the developing thereat, rather in all the crucial efforts made to invite attention back to its cause, there was a lack of coordination within the efforts. Nevertheless, both intergovernmental conflicts and the aid-dependency made grounds for Taliban reappearance.

The inadequacy and inefficiency of the Afghan institutions may strongly be attributed to Pakistan's intervention in Afghan internal affairs as well as the Western policy shift towards Iraqi war. This weak governance is defined by Rotberg (2007, p.2) as the inability of state institutions to deliver proper 'political and public goods' to the people. And therefore, the prevalent political insecurity and insurgency within Afghanistan has been brought about by the weak institutional capacity, bad governance and extensive corruption. A further observation renders the vivid powerful figures who are mostly outside the government body, actin in a direction that undermines the

government influence. For example, insurgents tend to use drug production and routes as a means of raising funds for their operations against governments.

Public resentment among the Afghan people has played a major role unto creating a plausible environment for the insurgents to garner support and strength. Much of this resentment lies in the fact that the government has showed what may be stated as negligence of the public needs. This occurs at the time when Karzai's outlook was that of a corrupt leader among many of the Afghans. Corruption became a more destabilizing factor of peace among a poor Afghanistan that fails to register the public needs, hence paving a way for Taliban's resurgence (Tully, 2006).

As Pakistan has been exhibiting Islamic fundamentalism as her soft power in her foreign policy, consequently a sense of xenophobia has been propagated in Afghanistan. Phillips of the Heritage Foundation explains how xenophobia has been a deep rooted issue in Afghanistan. This makes the US and allies' presence a catalyst for further exacerbation of xenophobia among the Afghan people (Tully, 2006). It is thus imperative that the western peace stake holders of Afghanistan employ a strategy that will further improve relations with the public rather than the mere exercise of military prowess.

Evidence suggest that Afghanistan has exercised significant efforts in posing political and military resistance against fundamentalist terrorist attacks. However, Afghan efforts have not been matched with an appropriate support from the external intervention (particularly from Pakistan's fundamentalists' schools and the Western's shift of focus on Iraqi war). It is noteworthy to mention, the existence of trade of drugs, poverty and corruption as other factors that contribute to the rebirth of the Taliban (Shirzad, 2014 p.119).

As a conclusion, it suffices to state explicitly that Taliban reappearance has been the main reason the Afghan-Pakistan relations have been jeopardized. In the recent years there are three reasons behind the reappearance of Taliban. One of the reason behind Taliban's resurgence, is the withdrawal of most of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Withdrawal of foreign forces led to the subsequent reduced raids and bombing of Taliban training camps in Afghanistan. To make the matter worse, the lack of interest from the international community and diversion of attention from Afghanistan to other nations such as Syria, Iraq and Ukraine.

Following the Pakistani military operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched in the North Waziristan tribal area in June 2014 dislodged thousands of mainly Uzbek, Arab and Pakistani fundamentalist militants, who ran to Afghanistan, and thus, most ended up joining the Taliban's ranks (Azami, 2016). Pakistan has however continued to fund Taliban and other fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan.

It has been reported that there is significant number of Taliban fighters from Pakistan moving towards Afghanistan. This has been an undermining factor in Afghan security forces' fight against the insurgent over the past years. This is due to the inadequate airpower and reconnaissance. Further political infighting within the Kabul's central government has been exploited by the Taliban in furthering their objectives.

It is necessary to emphasize the establishment of institutions that will monitor and analyze the potential threats facing Afghanistan. This follows the fact that new trends are emerging in the grounds of terrorist activities. This involves the new influences from the Iraq, new terrorist alliances, technology and tactics. Establishment of these institutions should be done in a fashion that they will be flexible enough in dealing with the changing nature of threats. Dealing with the fundamentalist groups will require long perspectives and strategic actions.

It is high time that the nation-state building of Afghanistan should be taken with enough attention and measures. There should be a forceful pressure against Pakistan, as has been the neighbor with direct influences within Afghanistan's political arena. Through the camps that have acted as safe haven for Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Haqqani network, Pakistan has deformed the efforts that were aimed at bringing peace and security within the region.

4.2 Relations between Pakistan and Taliban after 9/11

There has been a consistent effort by Pakistan in weakening the central government of Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan has come to be recognized by the Afghan government opponents as a safe haven or an appropriate ground for their objectives. Taliban is the primary notable opponent that has benefited from the Islamabad’s secret relations among other terrorist groups. This has led to Playing a major role in the grounds of peace and security in Afghanistan.

Following the 9/11 September, Pakistan has played dual roles in the campaigns against the terrorist activities. On one hand, Pakistan has played a role of being one of the

members of the global coalitions against terrorism led by the US. On the other hand, Pakistan has moved in a direction to further their goals in Afghanistan and the region in general. This has unfortunately done through the use of fundamentalist armed groups such as Taliban and Haqqani network.

Many authorities on the matter, have pointed at Pakistan's support for Taliban for more than a decade, through ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) supporting the Taliban group who are in war with the central government of Afghanistan. Pakistan's support for Taliban has served to worsen the political situation in relation to Afghanistan. As a result of Pakistan's dual playing game, Afghan foreign policy towards Pakistan (during Hamid Karzai's period) was highly unstable and unbalanced.

The efforts that have been exerted by Afghan government in defeating Taliban have been jeopardized by the US government policy of maintaining ties with Pakistan. Pakistan use of the militant fundamentalists as a means to promote her foreign policy can only be met with direct confrontations with the Western powers. It is this support for fundamentalist that has given Pakistan a leverage over NATO forces in the region, and Pakistan will not relinquish this asset.

Pakistan's framework of identifying the 'good and bad' Taliban has played a major role in halting down the Afghan government's effort in the fight against the group. The 'Bad' Taliban, were thus understood by Pakistan to be those that were committing terrorist acts in the land of Pakistan. Whereas the good Taliban are those that are being supported in the fight against the Afghan government, this include Taliban and Haqqani network. For example, through the Afghan National police's investigation following the suicide bombing in Kabul led by Serajuddin Haqqani (Haqqani Taliban leader), no military action was taken by Pakistan against this group (Hakimi, 2010).

There is a presence of thousands of religious schools that are not registered with the government. Such schools are known to have extensive contacts with the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is in these schools were many are trained to participate in terroristic activities in Afghanistan. Many Afghan officials are concerned with the increasing connections between Pakistan's religious schools and Afghan Taliban. Over 30,000 fundamentalist religious schools are known to exist in Pakistan. Most of these are officially active and promote fundamentalism in the region in partnership with the local government (Atlaspress, 2016).

In 2014 the government of the state of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was put into sever criticism following its allocation of three million USD to Jihad University (the school of Darul-ul-ulum Haqqaniyah). This was the very school that Mullah Omar received his fundamentalist training. As Intelligence investigations have proved further and increasing links between Taliban and such schools in Pakistan, it is thus an evident indication of these schools being the center of recruitment of fundamentalist to carry their purposes in Afghanistan (Atlaspress, 2016).

The charges on the link between Afghan Taliban and some authorities of Pakistan, have been further substantiated by Pakistan's foreign Ministry report which was presented to the country's National Assembly. In this report, there was acknowledgement of Pakistan secretly dialoguing with Taliban group. Nevertheless, this confession came with the prerogative of establishing secrecy of the conversations (Pars Today, 2015).

In further validating the long term concerns of the Afghan central government over Pakistan's involvement in the elements of insurgency within Afghanistan, General Athar Abbas, who is a director general of the Inter Services Public relations and official spokesman for the Pakistan military is quoted, telling the BBC that "to say that these militant groups were being supported by the state with the organized camps in these areas ... I think nothing could be further from the truth" (Croft, 2011).

Pakistan's security service has been known to provide to Taliban insurgents fighting against the NATO forces in Afghanistan. This has to a high extent created tension between the US and Pakistan as a number of middle ranking Taliban commanders have revealed the existing support from Pakistani government agencies. These Taliban commanders revealed these significant insights in the interviews that were conducted by BBC Two documentary series, "Secret Pakistan" (Croft, 2011).

Pakistan's activities in Afghanistan have to a large extent limited the efforts of the western intelligences (especially due to the position of ISI). In the New York Times report dated June 30, 2008, Pakistan was provided by the CIA with documents that substantiated the association of Pakistan's intelligence with a number of terrorist militants in Afghanistan. This had specifically pointed out the relations between the ISI and the Haqqani militants under Serajuddin Haqqani leadership. In this report Al-Qaeda is also listed as one of the groups that had association with ISI. Most of these relations have been established within the Pakistan's tribal areas, where most of the

militant leaders have found a safe haven. The same report also goes on to show that it is these groups that were involved in bombing India's embassy in Kabul (Hujatzade, 2011, pp.148-149).

The United States Congressional Research Service (CRS) report summarizes that many analysts believe that Pakistan's intelligence services know the whereabouts of … Afghan Taliban leadership elements and likely even maintain active contacts with them at some level as part of a hedge strategy in the region. Some reports indicate that elements of Pakistan's major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban (Kronstadt, 2009, p.12).

Ahmed Rashid (2010) has argued in the Washington Post of 27 April 2010 that 'Taliban leaders and their families live in Pakistan and are in close touch with the military and its ISI. Some Taliban allies, such as the network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, are even closer to the ISI. Although the military is finally hunting down the Pakistani Taliban in the Northwest tribal areas, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani fundamentalists in Punjab province are being left alone.'.

It should also be understood that the ties between ISI and the Taliban are based on mutual benefit. This follows the fact that in their insurgency, Taliban need external sanctuary, military and logistical support. On the other side, ISI needs to maintain Pakistan's influence in strength and strategic depth in the rivalry against India.

Pakistan's fundamental strategy in dealing with the regional affair seems to have remained the same since 1970 (Riedel, 2008, p.40). According to Steve Coll (2010), Pakistan's national interests in Afghanistan as seen from the briefing to the US explicitly reports 'one overriding concern: India.' Indeed, in February 2010, the US Director of National Intelligence confirmed that 'Islamabad's conviction that militant groups are an important part of its strategic arsenal to counter India's military and economic advantages' (Blair, 2010). In The New Yorker, 1 March 2010, Steve Coll explains further that; 'Pakistan's generals have retained a bedrock belief that, however unruly and distasteful Islamist militias such as the Taliban may be, they could yet be useful proxies to ward off a perceived existential threat from India. In the Army's view, at least, that threat has not receded.'.

Among the common accusations of Pakistan's support of fundamentalist groups is that of the US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in 2009. Pakistan's ISI was accused of

supporting Hizb-i Islami (Hekmetyar), Haqqani network and Mullah Nezir group in Afghanistan. Pakistan's interference within the tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan has also been a point of concern by international community. This accusation was reported to Washington by the US and NATO's former commander Mack Crystal in Afghanistan in 2009 (Hujatzade, 2011, pp.148-149).

According to the White House's report in October 2010, ISI has always provided incentives for Taliban not to surrender to NATO forces. Whenever Taliban groups have defied the requirements and orders of ISI, there has been subsequent arrest of such Taliban groups. It is further reported that Taliban where once commanded to kill everybody, including the police, military personnel, engineers, civil servants and teachers to create fear among the Afghans (Hujatzade, 2011, pp.148-150).

According to the report by London School of Economics, the relationship between ISI and Taliban is broader than what had been though before among the stakeholders of the international community. The author of the report (who is the Harvard Analyst, Matt Waldman) further points to the seriousness of the problem as to the extent that there are undeniable evidences that prove the connections as opposed to mere deductions. Matt Waldman explains further that the extent of support of ISI to Taliban groups is too extensive that it is an official policy of the agency. The support is both operational and strategic (BBC, 2010a).

In 2010 Mr. Waldman spoke with nine local Taliban commanders in Afghanistan. Most of the commanders claimed to have contacts with ISI agents who have occasionally attended the Quetta shura, which is the group's top leadership council (Taliban top leader council). It was also said by the commanders that the primary objective of Pakistan's ISI agents within the Quetta shura, is the neutralization of India's political influence in Afghanistan (BBC, 2010a).

ISI has also been accused by Admiral Mike Mullen, former top US military officer of backing the attacks that were directed to US targets such as the Embassy in Kabul. Mike Mullen further alleges that the September 13 embassy attacks were plotted by the Haqqani network with the support of Pakistan's ISI. However, these allegations have been met with strict denial from Pakistan's side (Croft, 2011).

Some of the Taliban commanders have also confessed of being trained with their fighters in a network of camps in Pakistan which serve as safe haven for the militants.

Mullah Azizullah one among the Taliban commanders that have shared such information, the experts that supervise the training are either direct member of ISI or some associates that have close links to ISI. It is understood that for any fighter, a hiding place and supplies are crucial, hence Mullah Qaseem in This Talk with BBC stated that, "Pakistan plays a significant role. First they support us by providing a place to hide which is really important. Secondly they provide us with weapons," he said, according to excerpts provided by the BBC (Croft, 2011).

More than a decade following the fall of the Taliban regime, there has been consistent efforts of Taliban militants to return to power. Regardless, of the international community and the western forces fight against Taliban, the resilience of the group has had roots in its ties to the Pakistani Intelligence ISI. A leaked NATO asserts to this fact as the authenticated documents points to the fact that Taliban has had close links with Pakistan's spy service. These leaked documents had been confirmed by the spokesmen for NATO-led forces in Kabul. However, it is important to consider the caveat that the report though is said to be based on 27,000 separate interrogations of captured insurgents; the independence corroboration is questioned by the military officers (Hussain, 2012).

The leaked NATO report also was obtained by BBC and The Times newspaper where both of which affirmed the fact that the report served to restate the U.S. allegations and concerns over Pakistan in her dual nature within the region's move towards stability and security. The Taliban's war has been supported while at the same time Pakistan has also fought against the Islamist insurgency within her own soil (Hussain, 2012).

Pakistan's support for Taliban militants goes further in that ISI also manipulates the very Taliban leadership. This is done in making sure that the ISI objectives are being met, this include the attacks that are directed towards the NATO forces. It should be understood that in this 'unleveled' battle field, Pakistan has an advantage in that it plays a 'double game' hence obtaining information from both NATO and the Taliban militants. It should be understood that the report also alleged that Pakistan had been 'intimately involved' with the effort to topple the President's Karzai's administration (Hussain, 2012).

There are some findings depicting the fact that the Taliban leaders are not independent players. This follows the fact that Taliban's Pakistani patrons, the army and the ISI

have always controlled the very lives of the Taliban team in Doha. Amrullah Saleh, former head of Afghan Intelligence points at the frequent flights of the Taliban members from Doha and Karachi in meeting their supervisors or their families **(**Riedel, 2013**)**.

Much of this relationship between the Pakistan's ISI and the Taliban can be further explained by the incidences of the statements that were offered by the authorities concerning the presence or absence of both Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. In 2006 the Afghan officials sent information to Musharraf stating that Bin Laden was in Mansehra, a town that is situated 12 miles from Abbottabad, a place where Bin Laden was killed by the US forces in 2011. The former head of Afghan intelligence told the BBC that this information was not acted upon by Pakistan (Croft, 2011).

Syed Akbar was a Pakistani that is believed to have been smuggling guns to the Taliban. He is reported by the head of the Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security (NDS) Amrullah Saleh, to have been escorting Bin Laden. Saleh further explains that although this intelligence information was very important and critical, upon mentioning it to President Musharraf was displeased, and thus, refused to take action let alone street-to-street check of the area (Ariosto, 2011).

All in all, the information regarding the death of Bin Laden and Mullah Omar were given by Pakistan to Afghanistan. It should be noted that Mullah Omar was always an operator as opposed to a strategist of Taliban. It was Pakistan's ISI that supervised the strategy of Taliban as they were trained within the camps and schools within Afghanistan. Mullah Omar was always under the protection of the Pakistan army for years (Kumar, 2015). This makes it harder for the Afghan intelligence to rely on the information that was offered by Pakistan's officials. The questionable veracity of the information coming from Pakistan Intelligence sources to Afghanistan is a tragedy suffered in the region, but as time transcends Pakistan's hand clearer in the Islamic fundamentalism is uncovered.

4.3 Impact of Pakistani double game on Afghanistan Peace Process

Although the war in Afghanistan has a significant root from within its historical and social structure of the nation, there is a great input from other external powers. Thus, when it comes to the peace process and building, four parties are of utter importance; these are the Afghan government, the Taliban, the US and Pakistan. It has already been

stated by many Afghan officials that it is Pakistan that is responsible for the support that has been offered to the Taliban militants. These allegations have rather been responded by Pakistan, in a way that Pakistan has accepted contacts with Taliban but not controlling influence on the militant group (Azami, 2016). Therefore, in order for the peace process to be successful there is a need for all the four parties to have a common policy towards the question of peace and stability within the region. Progress in the peace and national building in Afghanistan calls for a proper resolution between the two states in dispute, while the international community should also acquire the proper positioning in furthering the main objective.

It was in expectation of Hamid Karzai that following the 9/11th of September events, Pakistan would significant supporter in the fight against terror in the region particularly the one arising from the fundamentalist armed groups. Although Pakistan did not meet Hamid Karzai's expectations, there were still efforts that were made by Kabul in all the 14 years of Karzai's administration to draw Pakistan unto cooperating in the peace process. All these efforts were however met by the unwillingness of the ISI to curb or interrupt Taliban maneuvers. Several times, Karzai expressed the futility that would come as a result of Pakistan's positive role in the peace and stability of the region.

The dis interest that has been depicted by Pakistan in her foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the fourteen years led to worsening of the countries' diplomatic relations. Afghan foreign ministry has thus filed complaints to the UN Security Council about the status quo, that has been a culprit of the ever instability in the region.

It should be understood whatever the unfolding of today’s events, negotiations with insurgents seem to have needed a clear strategic rationale. There outcomes or at least the expectations had to be clearly stated, in that the key players that were going to be involved in these negotiation and how the goals were going to be reached. This served to only bring confusion among the parties that were to be involved. Thus, halting down the seriousness of the matter even within the Taliban ranks.

In solving the Taliban problem, there were mainly two options at the International community’s disposal. This ranged from one that would have aimed at fighting Taliban so as to bring them to subjection, and hence making them receptive of the new realities of Afghanistan, the constitution and the presidency of Hamid Karzai. However, this did not succeed. Another option would be the famous Charlie solution, where by Taliban would be considered as a legitimate power in Afghanistan (Hussain, 2013,

p.2). In a sense this was a quest in choosing Taliban's side versus Karzai's side. To date Charlies solution is witnessed as being carried out or unfolding in an indirect way.

However, the immediate aftermath of the Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 created a diplomatic atmosphere in which Taliban was locked out of the discussions concerning the fate of Afghanistan. Following the insurgence that escalated, there was a growing number of voices that called for the reintegration of individual Taliban members into the government. These ideas, were further led to the outcry for a national reconciliation process.

In the race to establish clarity upon the rationale behind the talks that were to be established with Taliban, the west faced increased difficulty on finding members who would be willing to break off from insurgency and go for reconciliation. This was the reason that figures such as Mullah Baradar and Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour were considered for this strategy of negotiations. As there was no progress in dealing with some of the figures who seemed plausible to break off from core insurgents, it was high time to consider the very core insurgents such as the very Mullah Omar. This sudden turn in the policy of negotiation, created a heterogeneous environment where there was a lack of adequate support from the US and the NATO coalition.

Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's first democratically elected president in 2004, made it possible for May to think that it would create a suitable environment for negotiation talks. However, it was in 2005 that this vision was marred following the increased insurgency. Furthermore, the problem worsened as the US troops began to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. This was as a result of the shift of focus by the US from Afghanistan to Iraq. Until 2005, Afghanistan saw the number of troops declining from 20,000 to 17,000 US troops. It was further reported by General John Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM and the US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that, a further withdrawal of about 4,000 was to take place (China.org.cn, 2006).

Following the anticipated security vacuum following the incapacity of the Afghan police and army, Independence Peace Commission was created by Karzai. Within this framework there was a pursuit for persuading Taliban members to forgo insurgency and acquire amnesty. These efforts indeed had a support from the US as they seemed to be a plausible alternative to the failing military conquest strategies in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the efforts to persuade Taliban members to opt for amnesty proved to be a failure (Parliament.uk, 2009).

The idea of 'peeling off' member of Taliban insurgency proved to be futile, as the caliber of Taliban insurgency increased. Thus, there was a need for more consideration on a strategy that would involve Taliban as a whole in the process of national reconciliation. This willingness of the Karzai's administration to reconcile with the Taliban as a whole, were not met with the same caliber of interest from the Taliban as it was anticipated. In the context of the security vacuum there was less incentives for the Taliban to succumb to the wants of the Afghanistan government that seemed to be at a dis advantage.

As an avenue towards resolving the issue of the military violence, in October 2008, Pashtun tribal leaders from both sides (Afghanistan and Pakistan) conducted some meetings in Islamabad. This was indeed instigated by President Hamid Karzai and the discussions were regarded as Mini-Jirga. However, the level of seriousness within these discussion, it is shocking to realize that there was no representative from the Taliban whatsoever (Gall, 2008). As Reuters (2008) reported, among the initiatives for the peace talks, was that where Karzai offered a safe passage for Mullah Omar (Taliban leader) towards negotiation and even promising that he would refuse handing the Taliban leader over to the International community particularly the US. However, such offers were met with a strong refusal from Taliban's side as Zabiullah Mujahid made it explicit it his statements that it there would be no peace talks given there were foreign military forces in Afghanistan.

The year 2009 witnessed a surge in the number of American troops, so that it was expected that it would enforce the 'talk-fight' strategy meant to aid the counter-insurgency efforts against Taliban. It was purposed that Taliban would be cornered strategically so that they would opt for acceptance of the International community's condition in return for political participation. As time passed however there was not any decisive shift in the military momentum of the campaign, thus, leading to what was once 'prerequisites' for a dialogue with Taliban to a mere hope-for outcomes.

This lowering of the bar by the Karzai's administration (as compared to the requirements that the US and allies wanted) was followed by the establishment of the seventy-person High Peace Council in September 2010. This council was under the chairmanship of Burhanuddin Rabbani who was known to be a Taliban foe and the Tajik head of Jamiat-e-Islami (BBC, 2010b). Thus, the extent of the support that was directed unto these efforts may be evidenced by the action of the US forces in

facilitating the passage of the senior Taliban leaders to Kabul for the peace talks with Afghan government (Barnes, 2010).

It should be noted that The Peace High Council had released Taliban leaders from NATO and Afghan prisons. Large sums of money were thus spent so as to facilitate the peace process with the Taliban leaders. Upon evaluation of the success of The Peace High Council, it is reasonable for state that there has not been concrete success so far as designated. The outlook of these efforts was also darkened as the chairman of the council Burhaneddin Rabbani, died in a suicide bombing with which Taliban was responsible (Goudsouzian, 2011).

Worthy of mention, is the event that unfolded on June 18, 2013 in which Taliban office had been opened in Qatar's capital Doha. This office was to launch the peace talks in harmony with the US. Within the talks, Afghanistan's flag at the era of Taliban regime (with the Emaret-i-Islamic chart) was hung on the office. There was subsequent dissatisfaction by the public in Afghanistan, thus, leading to the immediate removal of the flag (NK, 2013).

Indeed, careful observation of Afghanistan would depict a clear picture that there had not been any head or government that made the strides in trying to establish positive ties with Pakistan as it was done by President Karzai. President Karzai made 21 trips to Pakistan as one of his efforts in getting closer so as to establish mutual beneficial foreign policies between the two neighbors that would further the defeat of fundamentalist threats within the region. It may well be said that, when it comes to the Afghanistan's peace prospects it is US that has always come first then followed by Pakistan (Neda, 2014).

It is reported that whenever Taliban leaders wanted to surrender they were subsequently killed or imprisoned by the Pakistani intelligence. This is evidenced by the arrest of Taliban's military council assistant Mullah Ismail with 25 other members on April 3, 2012. Among the arrested insurgents included Taliban's Laghman governor, the head of the Taliban intelligence and Ahmadullah's brother. The critical essence of these arrests lies upon the fact that a member such as Mullah Ismail, was known to be the figure that collected financial aid for Taliban from Pakistan and other supporting Arab nations. It is thus inevitable to learn that some Taliban personnel with deep communication and connection with Pakistan was arrested by his own supporters (Pajhwok Reports, 2012).

The fact that Pakistan's ISI knew the whereabouts may as well be regarded as a maxim. Following the 2001, ISI provided support and funds to the Taliban but however later on there was a sudden shift from supporting the Taliban's offensive campaigns to the reconciliation talks in Kabul. Thus, for ISI there had been a necessity for the demonstration of Mr. Omar as alive and in command. In order for the talks to be successful it was necessary that Mullah Omar be used to persuade the whole Taliban to regard the talks and negotiations.

However, following the death of Mullah Omar in April 2013, there comes a questionable future of Taliban, its leadership, and thus, the fate of the ongoing peace talks in Afghanistan. Upon considering the question of Afghanistan's reconciliation prospects with Taliban (in relation to Omar's death) it is reasonable to consider the interview of Amrullah Saleh with Kumar (2015). In the interview Amrullah states explicitly his disdain over the Pakistan-led peace talks. He also points out that the plausible way would be to establish a round table for peace talks that are Afghanistan-led and Afghanistan-owned. In his view Pakistan does not have a record for being a peace broker in the region, instead Pakistan proactive in conflicts and war within the region.

The former director, of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Amrullah Saleh, spoke in "Sarhad Ke Us Paar," a television program co-hosted by Pakistan's Express News TV and Afghanistan's Tolo News TV. In the program, he accused Islamabad's exchange of Taliban prisoners with monetary gains. He further explained that at the moment Pakistan was not denying the harboring of Taliban, and that as a part of peace talks, Pakistan was willing to give up Taliban for the 'right price' (Bezhan, 2013).

Evidences show Pakistan manipulating the relations with Afghanistan by creating the impression that Kabul is arranging the negotiations with the Taliban. The motif behind can be explained as a need for Pakistan to create a positive image to both the International community and Afghanistan. This follows after the allegations that have run for decades of Pakistan's role as war broker in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Pakistan has another motif, which is to acquire Afghanistan's efforts in fighting Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TPP). TPP is responsive for most of the terrorist attacks Pakistan. Thus, for Pakistan to get the intelligence from Afghanistan concerning the TPP, it will be of critical import in fighting TPP within Afghanistan. It

is thus for this reason and motifs that many remain skeptical of Pakistan's role within the negotiation of Afghanistan government and the Taliban.

As a conclusion, Pakistan's efforts that have been apparent within the journey of Afghanistan and Taliban peace talks can be understood as somewhat of calculated and strategic nature. This involve a means by which Pakistan will be able to solicit Afghanistan's help (intelligence information) in combating Pakistan Taliban (TPP). It is worth of note, that in view of the apparent contradiction was witnessed in the actions and statements of Taliban, Karzai's administration suspended the negotiations to a higher extent. Afghanistan government has however an obligation to form and focus on an Afghani-led negations with the Taliban. Thus, it is such a framework that will form a stable lasting political solution. Thus, under the framework of an Afghani-led talks and peace process, there seems to be a less likelihood that Pakistan shall reinforce the cause of Afghanistan.

4.4 Pakistan and International Players

When one considers the role interplayed by the external power's interests and the prevalent weakness and the inefficiency of the Afghan government; it thus suffices to reason for the difficulty that Afghanistan has had towards national and peace building. Fundamentalist groups (such as Taliban group) in collusion with immediate neighbors such as Pakistan have used the inefficiency within the central government of Afghanistan to create an environment of chaos. Even worse is the fact that most terrorist and other non-state actors have acquired an ability to cross boarders, acquiring necessary facilities to further their ends through the use of the very powers that are considered the part of the international community. In other words, the fundamentalist groups have often been appearing as agents of regional or global powers in shaping their foreign policy.

A significant amount of Afghanistan's destabilization intensified following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, thus, leaving the power vacuum within the war torn nation. Following the incoming US and the widespread of ISAF and NATO and the presence of the conflict of interests among the foreign actors (both regional and international); violence and severe damage to the nation’s political and economic affairs became apparent. The lack of enough period for the national building process left the nation with susceptibility of being hunted by fundamentalism.

As for the regional actors, it is known already that there has been a conflict of interest between Pakistan and India. Whereas India has been a supporter of peace and reconciliation, much of Pakistan input and performance has served to incite fundamentalism and terrorism in the region. Furthermore, fundamentalism has had much support from the regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations that have been supporting Wahhabism and Salafism. Afghanistan under the rule of Hamid Karzai faced a challenge in reaching the peace and stability following the economic and military rivalry between the United States-NATO against Russia-China.

Notable of all the powers that have had direct impact on the peace building process in Afghanistan is; Pakistan and her use of soft power as an arm of her foreign policy. Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan has always been served by the fundamentalist Taliban who are the very result of the fundamentalism that has been bred in the boundaries of Pakistan. And concerning question of the negotiation between Taliban and the Central government of Afghanistan, many political analysts believe it is necessary that the international community to force Pakistan to bring the Taliban group to the talks. Initiatives were made by the US, where by around 35 billion USD since 2001 has been given to Pakistan to facilitate the reconciliation process by inhibiting fundamentalism in the region. However, such initiatives have failed considerably in that Pakistan has always exercise her dual role, in that on one facet Pakistan has disguised herself in an appropriate way towards the international community, while the other facet bearing her mark of the support towards the very fundamentalist groups that have plagued Afghanistan (Alizadah, 2017).

As a contrast to Pakistan, India's role in Afghanistan is to a high extent constructive. India's role in Afghanistan has raised concerns among Pakistani and Chinese countries. It should be noted that India's role in Afghanistan is to a large extent in co-ordination with the Western countries and the international community in general. A tripartite partnership between Afghanistan, India and Iran known as Chabahar Transit Agreement has been sought to be neutralized by the economic transit corridor between Pakistan and China (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor).

Meanwhile, India has strived to exercise her influence in Afghanistan, China has also been in contact with Afghan government and Taliban. This follows the China's need to curb the separatist movements by the Uyghurs in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. China's role in the region may also be likened to that of Russia in the approach

to manage the fundamentalist movements, thus, undermining Xinjiang Muslim regions.

The existing disputes over between Iran and Pakistan, Russia and USA, Iran and Saudi Arabia over the ISIS project in Middle East, have had tremendous negative impact of policies that have been directed to Afghanistan. This has further led to the continual of war in Afghanistan. Both Iran and Russia have had incentives to use the Taliban in the fight against the ISIS. For Russia and Iran, it is necessary to distract the US focus on the Iran and the Middle Asia and curbing the security threat of ISIS in the region.

Dimitri Kabloev, Russian President Vladimir Putin's special representative stated the existing contacts between Russia and the Taliban group. The basis behind the contacts is so as to fight the ISIL (Islamic State) in Afghanistan by the use of the Taliban group. Russian embassy officials have also reciprocated these statements in what they say as Russia will protect its citizens, help the Afghan peace process and prevent the spread the spread of ISIL in Afghanistan by the use of Taliban. Such initiatives have been faced by strict condemnation from the western block in that, Russia has tried to legitimize the Taliban (Zandieh, 2017).

General Joseph L. Votel, commander of U.S. Central Command, during a hearing at the House Armed Services Committee explain the continual efforts that have been exercised by Russia in influencing Afghanistan. Russia has been conducting a number of meetings involving a number of countries that are key players in the peace building process of Afghanistan (Khattak, 2017).

In April 2017 for example, Russia hosted a conference that was to discuss key issues concerning Afghanistan. The conference constituted of 12 countries (including Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, India, Iran and the Central Asian Republics). This meeting was however met with the absence of the USA delegates. This refusal of the US in participating in what may seem to be one of the most critical conference and initiatives concerning the Afghan peace prospect is still debated by many analysts.

In the State Department briefing, Spokesman Mark Toner in a addressing as to why the US did not attend the meeting said that the meeting “seemed to be a unilateral Russian attempt to assert influence in the region that we felt wasn’t constructive at this time” (Lofaso, 2017). It should be understood that within this conference the Taliban were also involved as key players in bringing about the reconciliation process in

Afghanistan. The lack of the US delegates within this invaluable meeting sheds two facts; one there is indeed a conflict of interest between the US and Russia, second; the peace building issue in Afghanistan might as well not be the primary goal of America's influence in Afghanistan.

There has recently developed a general consensus among Kabul-based analysts concerning the motif behind Russia's role in Afghanistan. Two factors are considered by a large number of Kabul analyst as moving Russia to intensify her efforts in Afghanistan, these are; ISIS in Afghanistan and the need to be a key player on how Afghanistan will be oriented following the peace process launched under China and US-backed Quadrilateral Cooperation Group (QCG). One must also note that, QCG attempt to set up a reconciliation meeting between Afghanistan central government have often not been taken with significant consideration by the Taliban (Lofaso, 2017). So, it is less likely that the US would appreciate any regional influencing success that may arise from Russia.

Another motif behind Russia's recent developments in the region, has to do with the fact that more than 90,000 people die from drug over dosage (especially heroin) every year. For decades Afghanistan has held the title of being the largest producer of heroin in the world. Afghanistan takes 20% of the market share of heroin production in the world (Lofaso, 2017). It may thus be understood that Russia involvement in Afghanistan may also be attributed as the need for Russia to solve drug issues within its population. Hence it will have a significant effect on the number of death that result from drug addiction and overdose.

The two decades of war in Afghanistan, has had the US expending more than 800 billion USD. While the monetary expenses are alarming, the number of deaths is also shocking, for more than 2200 US troops have been killed in Afghanistan let alone the thousands of allied forces (Westcott 2017). Afghanistan civilians have also faced the downside of the war in that tens of thousands of Afghanis (civilians and military personnel) have died or suffered casualties. This leaves the stakeholders of peace and security with a very important question, whether the war in Afghanistan will ever be a success.

The US anti-terrorism efforts are well appreciated by both Afghanistan and the international community. Much appreciation is directed towards the nation's important contributions in the fight towards establishing the regional and global peace and

security. The delay of the success following two decades of war have put many analysts in a positions to consider the seeming possibilities that America might as well be using the escalation of insecurity in the region as a means of justifying the long-term presence in Afghanistan. It is was high time that some amendments be reconstructed so as to determine the exact position of Taliban in the journey towards peace and stability of Afghanistan and the region in general. This is a point that many analysts are increasingly giving much attention.

5. CONCLUSION

Pakistan has played the most important role and at the same time is the most influential state in the last half century developments of Afghanistan. Because of the border dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistan has consistently been involved in Afghanistan's internal affairs, unfortunately the manner with which Pakistan has involved herself with Afghanistan has been that of supporting the insurgent groups fighting against the central government of Afghanistan. Pakistan has thus been in a constant and strategic struggle as an attempt to mobilize the political affairs of Afghanistan.

Since its birth, the state of Pakistan has used fundamentalism as an element of military-political mobilizations in India and Afghanistan. Pakistani army and intelligence was the security and strategic depth with which the country used to protect the territorial integrity of the country. For the next several years, in both India and Afghanistan, the warrior continued this role by supporting fundamentalist groups. Likewise, the Pakistani army has supported the political Islamist parties for their political purposes and used them for the national interest of Pakistan.

For these reasons, the Pakistan army has emphasized ideological values that have furthered the development of fundamentalism and radicalization, thus, ensuring the unity of citizens against India and Afghanistan. In the first chapter, much attention was focused on fundamentalism, especially following the Cold War, when the Pakistani army became close to fundamentalist groups and began to use fundamentalism as an outward-looking foreign policy instrument. At such a point Pakistani army emphasized ideological values that had a basis on elements of Islamic fundamentalism, to the then plausible audience (Mujahedeen). Practical steps to radicalize the society were also employed by Pakistan as the West was also backing the Afghan Mujahedeen to fight against USSR. In 2001, Pakistan had then established good relations with most fundamentalist groups such as Taliban. This gave Pakistan a vantage point to use the fundamentalist groups as soft power in instrument of her foreign policy towards Afghanistan.

In this thesis, the effective factors on Afghanistan's foreign policy towards Pakistan were examined in two different periods 1947-2001 and Hamid Karzai 2001-2014, wıth Afghanistan's perspective in light of Afghanistan's developments. The Durand Line and Pashtunistan problems have been source of problem that continues to date in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. The Durand Boundary issue is still not resolved between the two countries. The Karzai government, (which was formed following the events of September 11), although has received the US and the West support, on the Durand Border Problem, the West continues to pursue policies that are indeed on the Pakistan's interest. It is reasonable to assert the fact that the international community is favoring the acceptance of the Durand Border line as the official border between the two countries.

Afghanistan's stability has always been perceived by Pakistan as threatening particularly on the central government's stern attitude towards Pakistan on matters regarding the Durand Border Line and Pashtunistan problems. In this context, Pakistan has consistently endeavored to weaken Afghanistan's central governments. Pakistan has built its basic strategy for "Afghanistan" to support groups fighting against the central government of Kabul. After 2001, it seemed that Pakistan tried to weaken the central government in Afghanistan by cooperating with Taliban and other fundamentalist terrorist groups against Karzai administration with a different approach.

The international environment has also had profound impact on the Afghanistan - Pakistan relations at all times. Pakistan from the first day of its birth has also been keen in taking safe position in the eyes of the Western bloc. On the other hand, Afghanistan has often had her foreign policy shifting in and out between the two blocs. The Afghanistan's foreign policy shifts may directly be related to the predominant instability within the country. The tensest period of relations between the two neighboring countries is the Cold War period. In this period, Afghanistan conducted Pakistani policy through the Pashtunistan and Durand Boundary Line with the assistance of the USSR. Against this, Pakistan allied with the US and the West supported the Mujahedeen groups, which fought against the central government of Kabul. Thus, Pakistan weakened the central government in Kabul, and thus, gaining an upper hand on the matter of Durand issue. This was accompanied with the

synonymous strive by the US to establish a government in Afghanistan that had close ties to the Western bloc.

It is important to note that it was in the Cold War era, where Pakistan began to use fundamentalism as a means of saving her territorial integrity against Afghanistan. Pakistan continued her pursuit of strategic depth politics in Afghanistan after the USSR was withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989. Pakistan's strategic depth entails that in the case of a possible war with India, Pakistan will turn to Afghanistan soil as a back front region for the Pakistani army in order fight India while joining forces in Afghanistan soil. Thus, Pakistan has always tried to establish a close government to Islamabad in Afghanistan. However, following the Burhaneddin Rabbani rise to power in Afghanistan, it became clear that this policy would not take place. This made Pakistan to begin the support of the groups affiliated with Hekmetyar's Islamic party. This subsequently dragged Afghanistan into a civil war, thus, making Pakistan playing an effective role in the ongoing civil war.

After years of civil war in Afghanistan, Pakistan with the support of the US, UK and Saudi Arabia established the Taliban fundamentalist terror group and in 1996 Taliban as a social movement entered Afghanistan. But the application of Islamic laws by the Taliban, the prohibition of women's education and social activities, the violation of human rights, the violation of diplomatic rights and the attack on the office of the United Nations made America not to officially recognize the Taliban. Al-Qaeda, the most important partner of the Taliban, organized attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. This was a turning point as the US and the West started operations against Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. On October 7, 2001 US took action against the Taliban according to the Article 51 of the 1989 United Nations chat which recognized the right of self-defense to all states. Following the Taliban's defeat in Afghanistan, most leaders and members evacuated to Pakistan's FATA state.

Following the September 11 incidents, the Taliban regime was overtaken by the US and Coalition forces. For the first time, the United States and Western states resolved the Bonn conference in Afghanistan and decided on the future of Afghanistan wıthout Pakistan's influence. Pakistan, unhappy with these developments, helped the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban against the Karzai new government. In this period, the relations between the two countries did not improve despite the mutual visits. Pakistan embarked on her policy of hosting and supporting Taliban and other

terror groups in Afghanistan, where suicide attacks and bombardment attacks took place, and the insurgence against the Kabul government increased. With such a policy, Pakistan was serving the destabilization of Karzai's government, and thus, aiming to make the international community fail in Afghanistan.

As explained earlier, following the events of September 11, Pakistan began to use fundamentalism and radical groups as a soft power as a foreign policy towards the region. This basic notion was in line with the internal interests of the Pakistani army and ISI. Pakistan preferred to support the Taliban and other fundamentalist groups even after they suffered defeat in the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's double standards in struggle against fundamentalism and terrorism in the region played a major role in the Taliban's reappearance. Therefore, the main factors that influenced the foreign policy (during Hamid Karzai's tenure) toward Pakistan was that of resurgence of Taliban. Thus, the Afghanistan's foreign policy toward Pakistan during the Hamid Karzai period was unstable and destabilized.

At the same time, Afghanistan's political and economic relations with other countries in the region is one of the factors affecting Afghanistan's policy toward Pakistan. Pakistan is concerned on the Afghanistan's foreign policy with the regional neighbors. For example, relations between Afghanistan and India have been developing very fast. The fact that Afghanistan is in close contact with India (the main enemy of Pakistan) has always negatively impacted the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, a strong Afghanistan threatens the territorial integrity of Pakistan. This comes at the time when India poses a military threat to Pakistan. Afghanistan's situation plays a significant role in Pakistan's national security and integrity. Pakistan standing with nuclear arms has thus sought to maintain her national security and integrity at the destruction of Afghanistan.

Besides political and security issues, the issue of economical aspect is also a major determinant factor worth of attention. Afghanistan is a landlocked country without sea. Afghanistan depends on Pakistan to get connected to the world trade. In fact, there has been several cases filed against Pakistan's ports and transit ways as Pakistan has ventured to use them as a means to control Afghanistan. On the other hand, Afghanistan has the best market for Pakistani exports and Afghanistan has an important geography that lies between Central Asia and South Asia. Thus, Pakistan has also had a need for Afghanistan to deliver the energy resources of Central Asia to

the international market. This issue makes Pakistan to opt for a puppet regime within Afghanistan. This was indeed a factor that emerged as a new parameter in relation to Hamid Karzai, and thus, influencing the two nations' relations.

According to Pakistan's view, the problematic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are based on the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Afghan executive's nationalist thoughts at that time produced various problems for Pakistan's establishment. The Afghan state has opposed Pakistan as a means of securing the Pashtun demography beyond the border. It was thus for the sake of recognition of Pakistan that Afghanistan put the condition of the free border (Serhad-e-Azad) and had Waziristan and Baluchistan as a part of Afghan territory. The nationalist policy of the Afghan state has thus led to bad relations and distrust between the two states. This kind of nationalistic policy is stated as common among all the regimes (except that of Burhanuddin Rabbani). In recent times, the Problems of Original Borders have been solved in a number of countries. But Afghan President Hamid Karzai had always established a careful stance on not recognizing the Durand border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Furthermore, the border has been considered as a line rather than a border.

Looking at the whole picture, the reason for the political conflicts between the two countries and the factors which are challenging Afghanistan foreign policy toward Pakistan, seems to continue to confuse Afghanistan for Pakistan's own benefit. The Afghanistan government should endeavor to establish good relations with Pakistan by putting nationalism at one end and considering real national interests in while considering those of Pakistan as well.

Practical initiatives have to be made so that Pakistan may close down the madrassas and militant training camps. Afghan authority has to get the support of that of Pakistan in apprehending the Taliban commanders who have used Pakistan as the safe haven for rest, treatment, training and resupply. Let there be an atmosphere of mutual trust between the two nations with the support of the foreign policies of both nations so as to form a strong partnership in the pursuit for the peace and stability of the region.

A growing number of Afghans are ready to have thorough dialogue and negotiations and talks with Pakistan. There is a growing readiness among the public to employ all measures necessary to convince Pakistan that Afghanistan is not posing a threat to her national stability and integrity. Thus, this remains as one of the goals and dreams of

the new Afghan generation. Therefore, there is a reflection of hope among Afghans in creating a region of mutual understanding.

There is a huge potential to be exploited for economic progress and development given that Pakistan will stop a geopolitical game of undermining Afghanistan, intending to turn Afghanistan subordinate state of Pakistan's commands. For Afghans, positive mutual understanding can be furthered towards Pakistan; Afghan public and the central government can assume a role of being best neighbors yet it's not in the nature of the Afghanis to be Pakistan's subordinates.

To this date, the Taliban has become the greatest threat to both Afghanistan's and Pakistan's stability. Historical experience reveals that the two countries are sharing a common destiny for the future. Therefore, the relations of the two countries are of great importance for the security and stability of region. Although the relations between the two countries are the stage for tensions, dialogue gates have been kept open and mutual visits have been realized. The two sides sharing the same culture and common values, even though they agreed to form and develop good neighborly and friendly relations, but both sides were brought face to face with the continuous intervention of external forces. The only way to improve cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan is based on the consideration by both states on the benefits of normalization and stability in the two nation's relations.

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